UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_160802

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 321.021 / F85H Accession No. 9847

Author Freeman, E. A.

Title History of Federal Governm

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

# HISTORY

OF

# FEDERAL GOVERNMENT



# HISTORY

OF

# FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

## IN GREECE AND ITALY

BY

EDWARD A. FREEMAN

EDITED BY

J. B. BURY, M.A.
FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN

SECOND EDITION

London
MACMILLAN AND CO.
AND NEW YORK
1893

"Could the interior structure and regular operation of the Achaian League be ascertained, it is probable that more light might be thrown by it on the science of Federal Government, than by any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted."

THE FEDERALIST, No. xviii.

*First Edition, published 1863, entitled "History of Federal Government, from the foundation of the Achaian League to the disruption of the United States. Vol. I. General Introduction—History of the Greek Federations."*

# PREFACE BY THE EDITOR

THE first and only volume of Mr. Freeman's *History of Federal Government* appeared in 1863. Soon after its appearance he left the subject for that of the Norman Conquest, and never resumed it. It is much to be regretted that he did not carry out his design, at least so far as to tell the story of the Confederation of the Swiss Cantons, and fully discuss Swiss Federal institutions, even if he had stopped short of the United States. The most recent Swiss historian of Switzerland, Dierauer, in his *Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft* (i. p. 265), has expressed this regret. "Man kann es nur lebhaft bedauern dass der englische Historiker nicht dazu gekommen ist in einer Fortsetzung seines Werkes *die Geschichte der schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, den 'angesehensten oder lehrreichsten' Teil seiner Aufgabe, zu bearbeiten."

But while the *History of Federal Government* as a whole was never completed, the first volume has all the value of a complete work. In a letter written in 1861, in connexion with arrangements for the publication of his book, Mr. Freeman observed that even if the work were never finished "this one volume—an essay on Federalism and a history of its Greek form—would be a substantial work in itself." It was therefore after his death decided to reprint it as a History of Federal Government in Greece. The manuscript of an additional chapter, which was to have been the first in Volume II, and was written before the author deserted his subject, was discovered among his papers. It contains a full account of the defective forms of

Federalism which have appeared in Italy, comprising the Leagues of early Italian history, and the Lombard Confederation of a later age. This discovery has enabled us to adopt the more comprehensive title, *A History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*. A fragment on the German Confederacy (which was to have been the beginning of Chapter XI) has been added.

The present work, then, is merely a reprint of the older volume, with the addition of a new chapter on Italy, and a new fragment on Germany. The original text has not been altered, except in a few cases where positive mistakes—afterwards recognized as such by the author—had crept in. The references to authorities have been revised. No additions have been made to the footnotes by the editor, except such as were indicated by Mr. Freeman himself in an interleaved copy of his work. The editor has reserved for an Appendix all observations and corrections which seemed required to bring the history of Greek Federalism up to date. Inscriptions have been published since the appearance of Mr. Freeman's work, which throw considerable light on some points in the Achaian and Ætolian Constitutions. A work of much value, though hardly marked by the lucidity of exposition which we are accustomed to expect in French writers, has been devoted to these Leagues by M. Marcel Dubois, and has been found very useful. It may be observed that M. Dubois, while his views differ in many respects from those of Mr. Freeman, fully recognizes his "érudition irréprochable."

The only matter of importance in which Mr. Freeman's account of the Achaian and Ætolian Federal systems needs modification is the Constitution of the Senates. We have now direct evidence that the Ætolian Senate was a body of Representatives chosen by the States.[1] We have no such direct evidence for the Achaian Senate, but we have some distinct indications pointing in that direction, as M. Dubois has shown; and the analogy of the Ætolian League confirms these indications. On the other hand, there is not an atom of evidence

[1] See Appendix II p. 651, note to p. 262.

for Mr. Freeman's guess that the Achaian Boulê was chosen by the Federal Assembly.[1]

This being so, certainly for the Ætolian, and probably for the Achaian Senate, a parallel and contrast may be drawn between the Federal Assemblies of these old Leagues and the Federal Assembly of modern Switzerland. The object of both the ancient and the modern Federations was to provide that both each State as a whole, and each citizen individually, should have a voice in the Federal Assembly. They necessarily set about accomplishing this object in very different ways, because Primary Assemblies were the rule in the age of the Greek Leagues, and Representative Assemblies are the rule in modern times. The Federal Assembly, which met at Thermon or Aigion, consisted of two parts: the Bouleutai or Senators, elected by the States, and all the Ætolian or Achaian citizens who chose to attend. So, too, the Federal Assembly which meets at Bern consists of the "Council of States," composed of Representatives elected by the States, and the "National Council," composed of Representatives who are elected directly by the people in the electoral districts, into which each Canton is divided. Thus the Council of States, corresponding to the Boulê, represents the States, while the National Council is the element which in an age of Representative Assemblies responds to the mass of citizens (πλῆθος) in an age of Primary Assemblies. Of course, the differences between the two systems are endless. The Greek system had, in particular, the advantage that unrepresented minorities—even minorities of one—could attend the Federal Assembly and speak for themselves. And it is also evident that, as the Greek Bouleutai were almost certainly elected in the Assembly of each State, a Representative of Patrai might be assumed to represent the majority of his fellow-citizens in a measure in which the member of the Council of States elected by the State Government of Bern could not be assumed to represent the opinions of the majority of the Bernese. Consequently, the citizens of the Greek Leagues often con-

[1] See Appendix II p. 643, note to p. 239.

sidered it unnecessary to attend the Assemblies themselves, knowing that their interests were represented by the Bouleutai; and hence the second part of the Assembly was of a very fluctuating kind. Sometimes the Assembly seems to have consisted altogether of the Boulê. Both the Greek method and the Swiss method resulted in dividing the Assembly into two constituent parts; but while the nature of Representative institutions secures that both parts of the Swiss Assembly are permanent Chambers, under the Greek system, one part—the Representative—was permanent, while the other part fluctuated and sometimes vanished altogether.

No references to contemporary events have been altered, and the reader must bear in mind that he is reading words which referred to the situation of Europe and America in 1862 and 1863. He must remember that the war between the North and the South had not yet been decided, and that two Federal Governments then existed together in America, the Confederate States and the United States. He must remember that France was in the hands of the "Emperor" Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, and the absurd proposal of a Confederation of Italian princes with the Pope at its head—put forth "only to become the laughing-stock of Europe" (p. 75)—was then an event of a couple of years ago. Elsass and Lothringen were then French (p. 273); the Ionian islands were under English "protection" (p. 270). If Mr. Freeman had himself issued a new edition of his work, he would doubtless have brought the book up to date in this respect, and substituted new comments on the historical developements in Europe which have taken place since he wrote. He ventured to foretell (p. 91) that "the United States and the Confederate States will have exchanged ambassadors before the year 1941, or even before the year 1869." He would have had something to say on the actual issue of the war which falsified that prophecy. He speculated on the theoretical possibility of a Federal State of monarchical constitution; he would have had some observations to make on the great mon-

archical Bundesstaat which was established in 1870, and which seems likely to last "longer than through a single generation" (p. 75). He would have pointed out that, though Federal in form, it is not "a real Federation." The position of Elsass and Lothringen, incorporated in the "Empire" as Prussian dependencies, but not members of the Federation, is another instance of subject districts in a Federal State, and one wonders whether they will be ultimately elevated, like Ticino, to the position of equal states. Mr. Freeman did not refer, in his Federal analogies, to the compulsory Referendum of the Swiss Constitution of 1848; but he would now, doubtless, have had some remarks to make on the optional Referendum introduced in 1874—that curious and ingenious attempt to find a substitute for the advantages of the Greek Ekklêsia, in circumstances in which such an Ekklêsia is not possible. The Referendum may be said to constitute a fourth exception (see p. 53) to the Representative system in modern Europe and America.

Touching South-Eastern Europe, the remarks with which Mr. Freeman closed his first volume are as applicable to-day as they were in 1863. Bulgaria is now only nominally a vassal state; the Bulgarians have won their freedom, and have shown that they are, perhaps, more worthy to possess it than any other state in the Illyric peninsula. But the "tinkering" policy of the Treaty of Berlin has not made it less true, and further tinkering by any such treaties in the future will not make it less true, that the only safeguard against Austrian and Russian aggression is a South Slavonic Federation, just as the only safeguard of Greece against absorption in the Macedonian monarchy was found in the Federal tie. In the present circumstances of the European world, the Illyric peninsula seems naturally marked out as a field for a most interesting experiment in Federal politics. One may hope that the only question is whether the Margos or Washington of the Southern Slaves will delay his appearance until the peninsula has been entirely delivered from Turkish bondage, or whether a Federation will prove the instrument of that deliverance.

Another question of the day which Mr. Freeman would, doubtless, have touched upon in a new edition of his work is that of an "Imperial Federation," as it is called, of the British Empire. The self-contradictory character of this idea, which he clearly showed, would have furnished him with a new illustration, by contrast, of the true meaning of Federalism. No one who masters his lucid exposition of the nature of Federal Government in Chapter II is likely either to be misled by such a phrase or to fall into the opposite error of the vulgar politician, who never loses an opportunity of confounding a bond of dependency with a tie of federation. To suppose that this error is due to a reminiscence of the fact that the states and kingdoms which the Romans termed "federate" were in every sense dependencies on Rome and not her equal allies, would be to credit those who commit it with more historical knowledge than they are at all likely to possess.

The Index has been prepared by Mrs. A. J. Evans.

TO

# SPYRIDON TRIKOUPES,

LATE GREEK MINISTER AT THE COURT OF LONDON

My dear Mr. Trikoupes,

There is no man to whom I can inscribe so fittingly as to yourself a volume which deals mainly with the restoration of Grecian freedom after a period of foreign oppression. As the native historian of regenerate Greece, you fill a position strikingly analogous to that of the illustrious writer who forms my chief guide throughout the present portion of my work. Like Polybios, your youth was spent among men and exploits worthy of the countrymen of Aratos and Philopoimên; like Polybios, too, your later years have been spent in recording, in the still living tongue in which he wrote, the great events of which you were an eye-witness and a partaker. You have helped to win for your own immediate country an honourable name among the divisions of the Greek race; you have helped to place Ætolia on the same level as Achaia, and to raise the name of Mesolongi to a reputation no less glorious than that of Megalopolis. And in one

respect you are more happy than your great predecessor. Polybios lived to see a time when the freedom of his country was wholly extinguished, and when all that he could do for her was to procure for her some small alleviation of her bondage. You have lived to see your country answer the calumnies of her enemies by conduct which they cannot gainsay; you have seen Greece once more draw on her the eyes of admiring Europe by one of the justest and purest Revolutions in all recorded history. While all that he could do was to obtain some contemptuous concessions from an overbearing conqueror, you are called on to take your share in the deliberations of an Assembly where every honest heart in Europe trusts that twice-liberated Hellas will be at last allowed to fix her own destinies. Whatever may be the result of those deliberations, whether a King is again to sit on the throne of Theseus or a President again to bear the seal of Lydiadas, that they may lead to the full establishment of law and freedom in the land where law and freedom first arose is the earnest wish of

Your sincere and obliged friend,

EDWARD A. FREEMAN.

SOMERLEAZE, WELLS,

*January 3rd*, 1863.

# PREFACE

I TRUST that no one will think that the present work owes its origin to the excitement of the War of Secession in America. It is the first instalment of a scheme formed long ago, and it represents the thought and reading of more than ten years. All that late events in America have done has been to increase my interest in a subject which had already long occupied my thoughts, and, in some degree, to determine me to write at once what otherwise might have been postponed for some time longer.

The present volume is mainly devoted to the working of the Federal system in Ancient Greece. The Federal period of Grecian history is one which has been generally neglected by English scholars, and I trust that I may have done something to bring into more notice a period than which none is richer in political lessons. But it must be remembered that I am not writing a history of Greece or a history of Achaia, but a history of Grecian Federalism. From this difference of object it follows that I have treated my subject in a somewhat different manner from that which I should have thought appropriate to a regular history of Greece or of any other country. First, As a historian of Federalism, I look to everything mainly as illustrating, or not illustrating, the progress of Federal ideas. I dwell upon events, or I hurry over them, not according to their intrinsic importance, but according to their importance for my particular purpose. I have disposed in a line or two of battles which were of high moment in the history of the world, and I have dwelt at length on obscure debates and embassies, when their details

happened to throw light on the Achaian Constitution or on the mode of proceeding in the Achaian Assembly. It so happens that much of the information most valuable for my purpose comes in the form of details of this kind, which a general historian would, naturally and properly, cut very short. I mention this merely that I may not be thought to have either depreciated or overvalued subjects which, writing with a special object, I have looked at mainly from the point of view dictated by that object.

Secondly, In writing the history, not of a particular country, but of a form of government which has existed in several countries, I have constantly endeavoured to illustrate the events and institutions of which I write by parallel or contrasted events and institutions in other times and places. I have striven to make the politics of Federal Greece more intelligible and more interesting, by showing their points of likeness and unlikeness to the politics of modern England and America. I should have done this, in some degree, in a history of any sort, but I have done it far more fully in a history of a form of Government than I should have done in an ordinary history of Greece or of any other country. And I trust that I have not compared ancient and modern politics in the mere interest of any modern party. I have certainly not written in the interest of either the North or the South in the American quarrel. I see too much to be said for and against both sides to be capable of any strong partizanship for either. Possibly this may not be a bad frame of mind in which to approach the history of the quarrel, when the course of my subject brings me to it. At present, what I have had to do has mainly been to argue against the false inferences on the subject of Federalism in general which some have drawn from recent American history. And, if I do not write in the interest of either side in the American dispute, neither am I conscious of writing in the interest of any English political party. I am conscious of holding strong opinions on many points both of home and foreign politics; for historical study does more than

anything else to lead the mind to a definite political creed; but, at the same time, it does at least as much to hinder the growth of any narrow political partizanship. A historical student soon learns that a man is not morally the worse for being Whig or Tory, Catholic or Protestant, Royalist or Republican, Aristocrat or Democrat, Unionist or Confederate. He soon learns to sympathize with individuals among all parties, but to decline to throw in his lot unreservedly with any party. But he will not carry his political toleration so far as to confound political differences and moral crimes. Indignation at successful wickedness is a feeling of which no honest man will ever wish to rid himself; no honest man, above all no honest student of history, will ever bring himself to look on the Tyrant whose very being implies the overthrow of right with the same eyes with which he looks on the mere political adversary whose motives may be as honourable as his own.

In writing the present volume, I have endeavoured to combine a text which may be instructive and interesting to any thoughtful reader, whether specially learned or not, with notes which may satisfy the requirements of the most exacting scholar. In the text therefore I have, as far as possible, avoided technicalities, and I have thrown the discussion of many points of detail into the notes. I have throughout been lavish in the citation of authorities, as I hold that an author should not require his readers to take anything on his bare word, but should give them the means of refuting him out of his own pages, if they think good. If I have overdone it in the matter of references, I am sure that every real student will allow that it is a fault on the right side. I have felt such deep gratitude to those authors who really act as guides and not as rivals to the original writers, and I have felt so aggrieved at those who follow another course, that I was determined to do all I could to avoid blame on this most important score.

The nature of the authorities for this period of Grecian

history has been explained in several passages of the volume itself, and the chief among them, Polybios and Plutarch, ought to be familiar to every scholar. But besides the evidence of historians, there are few parts of history on which more light is thrown by the evidence of coins. In this branch of my subject, I am bound, at every step, to acknowledge the benefits which I have derived from the numismatic knowledge of my friend the Hon. John Leicester Warren. A careful comparison of his numismatic and my historical evidence has enabled us together to fix several points which probably neither of us could have fixed separately. I should have drawn more largely on Mr. Warren's resources, which have been always open to me, were scholars not likely to have the benefit of his researches into Greek Federal Coinage in a separate form.

At the risk of offending some eyes by unaccustomed forms, I have spelled Greek names, as closely as I could, according to the Greek orthography. This practice is now very general in Germany, and it is gradually making its way in England. Mr. Grote first ventured to restore the Greek *K*; Professor Max Müller, in the Oxford Essays, went several degrees further. For the Latin spelling, nothing can be pleaded but custom—a custom, which is merely a part of that unhappy way of looking at everything Greek through a Latin medium, which has so long made havoc of our philology and mythology. In exactly the same way, serious mischief—I believe I may say serious political mischief—has been done by our habit of looking at nearly everything in modern Europe through a French medium, and of speaking of German, Italian, and Flemish places by French corruptions of their names. Strange to say, while we clothe Italian names in a French dress, we usually clothe Modern Greek names in an Italian dress. Inexplicable confusion is the necessary result; names which have not altered since the days of Homer are written in endless ways to adapt them to a Western pronunciation which is hardly ever that of Englishmen. The island of *Mêlos* has never changed its name, and its name is

sounded in the same way by a Greek and by an Englishman. It seems eminently absurd to talk about *Mêlos* in the history of the Peloponnêsian War, but, if the island happens to be mentioned in a modern book or newspaper, to change its name into that of *Milo* the slayer of Clodius. The only way to preserve consistency is to write every Greek name, old or new, according to the native spelling, and to leave each reader to pronounce according to accent or quantity as he pleases. This I have done throughout, with two exceptions. When a name has a really English, as distinguished from a Latin or French, form, such as Philip, Ptolemy, Athens, Corinth, I should never think of making any change; indeed I rather regret that we have not more forms of the kind. Again, a few very familiar names, like Thermopylæ, Bœotia, etc., though the form is not thoroughly English, I have left as they are usually spelled. The change which has the most unusual look is the substitution of the Greek *ai* for *æ* in the ending of plural feminine names. In many cases, however, there is also a singular form in use, which I have preferred wherever I could.

I trust that the second volume, containing the history of the Swiss and other German Leagues, will follow the present with all reasonable speed. But it involves a minute examination of some very obscure portions of history, and I cannot fix any certain time for its appearance.

SOMERLEAZE, WELLS,
*January 2nd*, 1863.

# CONTENTS

## CHAPTER I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION


PAGE

Object of the work . . . . . 1
Federalism a compromise; therefore hard to define . . . . . 1
General definition for historical purposes . . . . . 2
Definition of a perfect Federal Government . . . . . 2
Internal Sovereignty of the several members, combined with the Sovereignty of the Union in all external matters . . . . 2—3
Wider range of the history . . . . . 3
Four great examples of Federal Government . . . . . 4
1. The Achaian League, B.C. 281—146 . . . . . 4
2. The Swiss Cantons, A.D. 1291—1862 . . . . . 4
3. The United Provinces, A.D. 1579—1795 . . . . . 4
4. The United States, A.D. 1778—1862 . . . . . 4
Characteristics of the Four Great Confederations . . . . . 4
The German Confederation . . . . . 5
Other ancient examples; in Greece; in Italy; in Lykia . . . . 5
Other German Leagues; the Hanse Towns . . . . . 6
Other American Confederations . . . . . 6


## CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS COMPARED WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS


Illustrations of the relations of the members in a perfect Federal Commonwealth . . . . . 7
Two conditions of a true Federal Government . . . . . 8
Two classes of Federal Commonwealths; First, the "*System of Confederated States*," where the Central Power deals with the State Governments only . . . . . 8

PAGE

Second, the "*Composite State*," where the Central Power acts directly on all citizens . . . . . 9
The distinction one rather of means than of ends, and not always to be drawn in history . . . . . 10—11
Different classifications of governments; 1st, into Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy; 2nd, into Absolute and Constitutional Governments . . . . . 12
Need of a cross division . . . . . 12
Federalism a compromise between Great and Small States . . . . 13
Division into Great and Small States irrespective of their several forms of government . . . . . 13
Definition of Large and Small States . . . . . 14
Characteristics of the Independent City . . . . . 15
Patriotism confined to the City . . . . . 15
Full developement of city-independence in Greece . . . . . 16
Early and comparatively unimportant approaches to Constitutional Monarchy and to Federal Republicanism . . . . . 16
Municipal character of the Greek Commonwealths, aristocratic and democratic alike . . . . . 16—17
Civic Tyrannies . . . . . 17
Condition of Dependent Cities in Greece . . . . . 18
Difference between a dependent City and a member of a Federation . 18
Comparison of dependent cities with English Colonies . . . . . 20
No means of general Incorporation supplied by the system of Independent Cities . . . . . 21
Incorporation carried as far as possible by Athens in the case of the old Attic Cities . . . . . 22
Its impossibility in the case of the later Athenian Empire . . . . 22
Dependencies of mediæval and modern Italian cities, and of Swiss Cantons . . . . . 23
Effects of incorporation at Rome . . . . . 23
Town-autonomy in mediæval Europe; the independence of the cities modified by the claims of the Emperors . . . . . 24—25
General view of the system of Independent Cities . . . . . 26
Varieties in internal Constitutions and in external relations . . 26—27
Different relations between the City and its Territory . . . . . 28
Comparative gain and loss of the system . . . . . 29
Advantages of small Commonwealths . . . . . 29
Political Education of the individual Citizen . . . . . 29
Comparison with the English House of Commons . . . . . 31
Contrast with the Florentine Parliament . . . . . 31
Connexion of Athenian history with the subject of Federalism . . 32
Greater responsibility of the Athenian citizen than of the English member . . . . . 33
Position of the English Ministry . . . . . 33

PAGE

Received duties of the private member; different duties of the Athenian Citizen . . . . . 34
The Assembly a Government as well as a Parliament . . . . . 35
Functions of the Senate and of the Generals . . . . . 35
Nothing analogous to "Office" and "Opposition" . . . . . 35
Direct Diplomatic action of the Assembly . . . . . 36
Effect of these powers on individual citizens . . . . . 36
Athens the highest type of the system . . . . . 37
Opportunity for the developement of genius . . . . . 38
Intensity of patriotism in small States . . . . . 38
Identification of all citizens with the City . . . . . 39
Bad side of the system of city-commonwealths . . . . . 39
Their greatness less permanent than that of greater States . . . 40
Common fallacy as to the weakness of small States . . . . . 40
Different positions of small States where they are merely exceptions, and where they are the general rule . . . . . 41—42
Position of Free Cities in the Middle Ages . . . . . 42
Constant warfare among Free Cities . . . . . 42
Force of antipathy between neighbouring towns; examples in Greece and Italy . . . . . 42—43
Comparison between citizen-soldiers and professional soldiers . . 44
Severity of the Laws of War . . . . . 45
Increased bitterness of faction in small States . . . . . 46
Local disputes commonly more bitter than general ones . . . 48
General balance of gain and loss in small States . . . . . 48
Definition of large States, irrespective of their forms of government . 50
Two immediate results; smaller importance of the Capital; representative character of National Assemblies . . . . . 50
Position of the Capital in a large State; its influence either indirect or violent . . . . . 50—51
Necessity of representative institutions in a Free State of large size . 52
Representative Government not necessarily Cabinet Government . . 52
Exceptions to the representative system in modern Europe and America 53
Election of Polish Kings . . . . . 54
Napoleonic Universal Suffrage; its delusive nature . . . . . 55
English and American ways of attaining the same object . . . 56
Election of the American President practically another exception . 56
Its difference from Napoleonic Universal Suffrage . . . . . 57
General view of the system of large States . . . . . 57
Extent of local diversity in large States . . . . . 58
Opposite systems of Centralization and of Local Freedom independent of the form of the Central Government . . . . . 59
Difference between Municipal and Federal rights . . . . . 59
General characteristics of large States; balance of gain and loss . 60—61
Advantages of great States . . . . . 61

PAGE

Peace secured to a large country . . . . . 61
Lessening of local prejudices . . . . . 61
Lessening of the evils of War . . . . . 62
Lessening of party strife . . . . . 64
Disadvantages of large States . . . . . 64
Inferior political education . . . . . 64
Ignorance and corruption of many electors . . . . . 64
Different forms of bribery at Athens and in England . . . . 65
These vices inherent in the system . . . . . 66
Balance of advantage in favour of large States . . . . . 67
Federal Government a system intermediate between Great and Small States 69
It combines, though in an inferior degree, the special advantages of both systems . . . . . 69
Federalism a compromise; therefore suited only to certain positions 69—70
Popular prejudices on the subject . . . . . 70
No general deductions to be made from recent American events . . 71
Instance of similar disruptions in Monarchies . . . . . 72
No case against Federalism in general, nor against the original American Union . . . . . 72
Testimony of the Southern States to the Federal Principle . . . 72
A large State may be a Republic without being a Federation . . 73
No argument to be drawn from failures in England and France . . 73
A Federation may consist of Monarchies . . . . . 74
Imperfect approaches to kingly Federalism in the Feudal system . 74
A strictly Federal Monarchy unlikely to last . . . . . 75
Other approaches to Federal Monarchy . . . . . 75
Instance of two or more Kingdoms under one King . . . . 76
Members of a Federation may be either Cities or States of considerable size . . . . . 77
Difference of scale in Europe and America to be considered . . . 78
General view of Federalism as an intermediate system . . . . 79
Intermediate position as regards government of the whole territory . 79
Intermediate position as regards Political Education . . . . 80
Comparison of a State with a Kingdom, and with a consolidated Republic . . . . . 81
Circumstances under which a Federal Union is desirable . . . 83
General result of Modern Federalism . . . . . 85
Results of the American Union . . . . . 85
Its comparative permanency as compared with France . . . . 86
Evils which the Federal Union has hindered . . . . . 86
Alleged weakness of the Federal tie; true in a sense, but not necessarily injurious . . . . . 87
Circumstances under which a Federal Union may be lasting . . 88
Circumstances under which it may be useful as a transitional state . 88
Cases for consolidation, and for separation . . . . . 88

PAGE
Easiness of separation when needed; its good side . . . . . 89
Probability that a Federation will be less anxious than a kingdom to recover revolted members . . . . . 91
Inconsistency of striving to retain unwilling members . . . . 91
Witness of Switzerland in favour of the Federal system . . . 92
Recapitulation . . . . . 94

## CHAPTER III

### OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL

The Amphiktyonic Council not a true Federal Government . . . 95
Origin of the Error; opinions of modern writers . . . . . 96
The Council a Religious, not a Political, body . . . . . 97
The Delphic Amphiktyony only one of several . . . . . 98
Its incidental political action . . . . . 98
Amphiktyonic Crusades . . . . . 99
The Council becomes the tool of particular States . . . . . 100
No inherent force in its Decrees . . . . . 100
Indirect importance of the Council in the History of Federalism . . 101
Its close approach to a Federal system, without ever growing into one . . . . . 101
Its constitution unsuited to historical Greece . . . . . 103
The Amphiktyony an Union of Tribes, not of Cities . . . . . 103
Unfair distribution of the Votes; analogy of the unreformed Parliament . . . . . 103—104
These incongruities less palpable in a religious body . . . . . 104
Amphiktyonic championship of Philip . . . . . 105
Reforms under Augustus; new arrangement of the votes . . 105—106
Approach to Representative forms in the Council . . . . . 108
The Amphiktyonic body Representative, because not really a Government . . . . . 109
Political nullity of the Council during the greater part of Grecian History . . . . . 109

## CHAPTER IV

### OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE

#### § 1. *Of the Northern Leagues*

An approach to Federal Government not uncommon among the ruder portions of the Greek nation . . . . . 112
The Phôkian League as described by Pausanias . . . . . 113
Probably a revival of an earlier League . . . . . 113
The Akarnanian League . . . . . 114

PAGE
Various Notices, B.C. 431—167 . . . . . 114—115
Constitution of the League . . . . . 116
The Epeirot League . . . . . 116
Early Republican developement in Chaonia and Thesprôtis . . . 117
Constitutional Monarchy in Molossis . . . . . 117
Foundation of the Federal Republic of Epeiros, B.C. 239—229 . . 117
No real Federalism in Thessaly . . . . . 118
Position and Power of the Thessalian Tagos . . . . . 118
Monarchy of Jasôn, B.C. 372 . . . . . 119
Undisguised Tyranny of his successors, B.C. 370–359 . . . . 119
Thessaly a dependency of Macedonia . . . . . 119
Legislation of T. Quinctius Flamininus, B.C. 197 . . . . . 120

§ 2. *Of the Bœotian League*

History of the Bœotian League; its warnings . . . . . 120
Dangers of an overwhelming Capital in a Federal State . . . 120
Legal and practical position of Thebes in the Bœotian League . . 122
The circumstances of Bœotia suited to a *Synoikismos*, not to a Federal system . . . . . 123
Effects on general Grecian History . . . . . 123
Three Periods of Bœotian History . . . . . 124
First Period, B.C. 776—387 . . . . . 124
Bœotia both an Amphiktyony and a Political League . . . . 124
Use of the words "Bœotian" and "Theban" by Thucydidês and Xenophôn . . . . . 125
Constitution of the League . . . . . 125
Subject Districts or Subordinate Leagues . . . . . 126
Office of the Bœotarchs and of the Four Senates . . . . 126—127
Federal and Local Archons . . . . . 128
Theban Archon a mere Pageant; real power vested in the Polemarchs 129
Power of Thebes shown in the History of Plataia . . . . . 129
Secession of Plataia from the League . . . . . 129
Ill-feeling between Thebes and other Towns . . . . . 130
Theban claims at the Peace of Antalkidas . . . . . 131
Dissolution of the Bœotian League, B.C. 387 . . . . . 132
Second Period, B.C. 387—334 . . . . . 132
The Peace carried out in the interest of Sparta . . . . . 132
Spartan garrisons in the Cities; Restoration of Plataia . . . 133
Oligarchic and Democratic Parties . . . . . 133
Weakness of the Democratic element in Bœotia . . . . . 133
Thebes, hitherto the centre of Oligarchy, becomes, by her Revolution [B.C. 379], the centre of Democracy . . . . . 133—134
Career of Pelopidas and Epameinôndas . . . . . 134
Bad results of Theban supremacy . . . . . 134
Nominal revival of the League . . . . . 134

PAGE
Real subjection of the Lesser Cities to Thebes . . . . . 135
Destruction of Bœotian Towns . . . . . 136
General dislike towards Thebes throughout Greece . . . . 137
Gradual growth of the Theban claims . . . . . 138
Parallel between Thebes in Bœotia and Sparta in Lakônia . . . 139
The claims of Thebes exclude all true Federalism in Bœotia . . . 140
Restoration of the destroyed Towns . . . . . 140
Destruction of Thebes by Alexander [B.C. 335]. Zealous co-operation of the Bœotian Towns . . . . . 141
Third Period, B.C. 335—172 . . . . . 141
Restoration of Thebes by Kassander, B.C. 316 . . . . . 141
Restoration of the League with a modified Headship in Thebes . . 142
Insignificance of Bœotia in later Greece . . . . . 142
Constitution of the League . . . . . 143
Dissolution of the League by Quintus Marcius, B.C. 171 . . . 144

§ 3. *Of Various Attempts at Federal Systems—Ionia, Olynthos, Arkadia, etc.*

Unsuccessful attempts at Federal Union . . . . . 145
Advice of Thalês to the Ionians . . . . . 145
Degree of connexion among the Ionian Cities; no true Federal Union 145—146
Their relation essentially Amphiktyonic; its differences from the elder Amphiktyonies . . . . . 145—146
Thalês probably intended a true Federal Union . . . . . 147
His advice not taken; its rejection a striking illustration of Greek political ideas . . . . . 147
Attempted League of Olynthos dissolved by Sparta, B.C. 382 . . 149
Fatal results to Greece from its dissolution . . . . . 149
Views of Mr. Grote too favourable to the designs of Olynthos . . 150
Proceedings of Olynthos as described by Kleigenês . . . . . 150
The terms offered acceptable to the Macedonian Towns, but rejected by the Greeks of Chalkidikê . . . . . 151
Their real nature not Federal Union, but absorption into Olynthos . 152
Federal Union of Arkadia, B.C. 370 . . . . . 154
Little previous importance of Arkadia . . . . . 154
History of Mantineia; her destruction and restoration . . . 154—155
Arkadian Union hitherto merely Amphiktyonic . . . . . 155
Lykomêdês designs a true Federal Union . . . . . 155
Temporary success of the Federal scheme . . . . . 156
Foundation of Megalopolis . . . . . 156
General adhesion of Arkadia to the League . . . . . 157
Constitution of the League; the Assembly of Ten Thousand . 157—158
Probable existence of a Senate . . . . . 158
Institution of a sole General . . . . . 159
Foundation of Megalopolis; its advantageous position . . . 159—160

PAGE

Decline of the Arkadian League; history of Megalopolis . . 160—161
Pretended scheme of Federal Union in Euboia, B.C. 351 . . . 162
Evidence of the growth of Federal ideas in Greece . . . . 162

§ 4. *Of the Lykian League*

The Lykian League; its excellent Constitution . . . . . 162
Strabo's description and testimony to its practical working . . 163—164
Merits of the Lykian Constitution; no Capital . . . . . 164
The Assembly Primary, not Representative . . . . . 164
Apportionment of votes to numbers . . . . . 165
Approach to Representative Government . . . . . 166
A Senate not mentioned, but to be inferred from analogy . . . 166
Federal Magistrates . . . . . 166
Date and Origin of Federal Government in Lykia . . . . 167
Relation of the Lykians to the Greeks . . . . . 167
Traces of Federalism before the subjection of Rhodes . . . . 167
Lykia subject to Rhodes, B.C. 188 . . . . . 167
Lykia independent, B.C. 168 . . . . . 168
Origin of the Constitution described by Strabo . . . . . 168
Destruction of the League by Claudius, A.D. *c.* 50 . . . 169

## CHAPTER V

### ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE

§ 1. *General Character of the History of Federal Greece*

Common neglect in England of the History of Federal Greece . . 171
Earlier Grecian History mainly the History of Athens; nullity of Athens in the Federal Period . . . . . 172
Comparison between the earlier and later History of Greece . . . 174
Wide spread of Hellenic culture . . . . . 174
Importance of this age in Universal History and in the History of the Greek race . . . . . 175
Effects of Alexander's Conquests . . . . . 175
Character of the age of Polybios . . . . . 175
Comparison between Thucydidês and Polybios . . . . . 176
Beginnings of the Federal Revival, B.C. 281 . . . . . 177
Gaulish Invasion . . . . . 178
Reconstruction of Macedonia under the Antigonids . . . . 178
Revival of the Achaian League . . . . . 179
Opposite aims of Macedonia and Achaia; position of the Antigonid Kings 179
Condition of Greece under Philip and Alexander, and under the Successors . . . . . 179—180
Position of revived Macedonia and Greece . . . . . 180

PAGE
Comparison of Macedonia in Greece with Austria in Italy . . . 181
Generous aims of the Achaian League . . . . . 183
An earlier establishment of Federalism in Greece not desirable . . 183
Effects of the League . . . . . 184

§ 2. *Origin and Early Growth of the League*

Growth of Federal ideas in Greece in the Fourth Century B.C. . . 185
Further Federal reaction against Macedonian influences . . . 185
Early History of Achaia; early Union of the Achaian Towns . . 186
Probable greater laxity of the bond during the Old League . . . 187
Achaia during the Peloponnêsian War . . . . . 187
History of Pellênê; Tyranny of Chairôn, B.C. 368—335 . . 187—188
Achaia under the Successors and under Antigonos Gonatas, B.C. 314—288 . . . . . 189
Final dissolution of the Old League . . . . . 190
The Twelve original Cities; loss of Helikê and of Olenos . . . 190
Traces of Federal action under the Old League . . . . . 191
Beginnings of the revived League; Union of Patrai and Dymê [B.C. 280], of Tritaia and Pharai . . . . . 191
Union of Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia, B.C. 275 . . . . . 192
Extension of the League over all Achaia . . . . . 192
Loss sustained by Patrai in the Gaulish War . . . . . 192
Quiet and peaceful growth of the League . . . . . 193
Markos of Keryneia probably the true Founder of the League . . 193
Iseas of Keryneia abdicates the Tyranny . . . . . 194
Nature of the Greek Tyrannies; difference between their earlier and later forms . . . . . 194

§ 3. *Of the Achaian Federal Constitution*

Probable formal enactment of the Federal Constitution, B.C. *c.* 274 . 198
Sources of information. . . . . 198
The Constitution formed for the Achaian Towns only . . . . 198
Democratic Constitution of the League. . . . . 198
Differences between Achaian and Athenian Democracy. . . . . 199
Independence of the several Cities . . . . . 199
Subject Districts or Dependent Towns . . . . . 200
Tendencies to assimilation among the members of the League, both in Achaia and in America . . . . . 200
The League really a National Government . . . . . 202
No independent Diplomatic Action in the several Cities . . . 202
Comparison with America; the restriction less strict in Achaia . 202—203
Particular Embassies by licence of the Federal body . . . . 204
Later exceptions under Roman influence . . . . . 204
The Federal Assembly; its Democratic Constitution . . . . 205

PAGE
Aristocratic elements in Achaia . . . . . 206
Contrast with Athens; the Achaian Constitution a nearer approach to modern systems . . . . . 206
Causes of the difference, arising mainly from the greater extent of territory in Achaia . . . . . 207
The Assembly practically Aristocratic . . . . . 207
Its nature not understood by Continental scholars . . . . . 208
Analogies in England . . . . . 209
Practical Democratical elements . . . . . 210
Votes taken by Cities, not by heads . . . . . 211
Advantages and disadvantages of this system of voting . . 211—212
General merits of the Achaian Constitution . . . . . 214
Short and unfrequent Meetings of the Assembly; consequent restrictions on its powers . . . . . 214—215
The Initiative practically in the Government . . . . . 215
Place of Meeting; first Aigion, afterwards other Cities; advantages of Aigion . . . . . 215—216
Greater power of Magistrates in Achaia than at Athens . . . 216
The Achaian Magistrates form a "Government" . . . . . 217
Comparison with America and England . . . . . 217
Various Federal Offices . . . . . 219
The Ten Ministers; probably chosen from all the Cities indiscriminately . . . . . 220
Relations of the Ministers to the General . . . . . 221
An Achaian "Caucus" . . . . . 222
The President or General . . . . . 223
Powers and number of the Generals in other Greek States . . . 223
Two Generals of the Achaian League reduced to One . . . . . 223
Extensive powers of the Office; comparison with a modern First Minister . . . . . 224
Comparison of Aratos and Periklês . . . . . 225
Greater importance of Office in Achaia than at Athens . . . . 226
Comparison of the Achaian General, the American President, and the English First Minister . . . . . 227
Closer approach to the English system in Achaia, owing to the General being himself a Member of the Assembly . . . . . 227
Greater power in the General necessary in a Federal than in a City Democracy . . . . . 228
Chief Federal Offices unpaid, but without a property qualification 229—230
Power of summoning Assemblies vested in the General in Council . 231
The Ministers act as Speakers of the Assembly . . . . . 231
Joint action of the General and Ministers in diplomatic matters . . 232
Unrestrained power of the General in War . . . . . 233
Union of military and political powers contrary to modern usage . . 233
The General's title military, but his badge of office civil . . . 234

PAGE
Athenian experience on the union of civil and military powers; their gradual separation . . . . . 234—235
The Achaian system a reaction; its disadvantages . . . . 235
The Presidential interregnum aggravated by the union of powers. 235—236
Question of re-election of the President; the Achaian General incapable of *immediate* re-election . . . . . 236—237
The Senate . . . . . 239
Financial and Military policy of the League . . . . . 241
Military Contingents ordered by the Assembly . . . . . 242
Mercenaries; Federal garrisons . . . . . 242
General comparison between the Achaian League and the United States; their close general resemblance . . . . . 243
Differences between a Confederation of Cities and a Confederation of States . . . . . 243—244
Analogies and diversities in the position of the President . . . 244
No exact parallel in Achaia to the American Senate . . . . 246
Closer analogy of the Norwegian Lagthing . . . . . 247
Higher position of the Achaian Ministers . . . . . 248
Achaia the more democratic in theory, and America in practice . . 248
The American Constitution not a conscious imitation of the Achaian . 249
Remarkable treatment of the Achaian History in the "Federalist" . 249
An unconscious likeness to the ancient parallel, more valuable than a conscious one . . . . . 251

## CHAPTER VI

### ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ÆTOLIAN LEAGUE

General resemblances and differences between the Leagues of Achaia and Ætolia; their practical teaching . . . . . 252
Early History of Ætolia; probable early approach to Federal Union 254—255
Ætolian acquisition of Naupaktos. B.C. 338 . . . . . 255
The League in the reign of Alexander. B.C. 336—323 . . . . 256
Share of the Ætolians in the Lamian War. B.C. 323—322 . . . 256
Ætolia during the Wars of the Successors . . . . . 257
Glimpses of Ætolian Constitution at this time . . . . . 257
Share of the Ætolians in the Gaulish War. B.C. 280 . . . . 257
Annexation of Hêrakleia . . . . . 258
Earlier developement of Ætolia in some points; closer union of the Cantons . . . . . 258
Ætolia a League of Districts rather than of Cities . . . . . 259
Democratic character of the League tempered with Aristocratic elements . . . . . 260—261
Powers of the Assembly . . . . . 261
The Senate or Apoklêtoi . . . . . 262

PAGE
Federal Magistrates . . . . . 263
Powers of the General . . . . . 263
Foreign Policy of the League; contrast with Achaia . . . . 265
Variety of relations in the Ætolian League . . . . . 268
Differences of position among the conquered states . . . . 269
Comparisons with the different relations of British Dependencies . . 270
Comparison between Ætolia and Switzerland . . . . . 271

## CHAPTER VII

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE TO THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA.—B.C. 281—222

### § 1. *From the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Deliverance of Corinth*

B.C. 281—243

B.C.
284—272 Revolutions of Greece and Macedonia during the first years of the League . . . . . 276
State of Peloponnêsos; favourable position of the Achaian League . . . . . 276—277
261—251 Ten years blank in Grecian history . . . . . 277
255 Institution of the sole Generalship . . . . . 277
Biographical character of the Achaian history . . . 278
680—580 History of Sikyôn; its early Tyrants . . . . . 279
365 Euphrôn founds Democracy . . . . . 279
308—301 Sikyôn under the Successors . . . . . 279
301—251 Second period of Tyrants . . . . . 280
Administration of Timokleidas and Kleinias . . . . 280
264 Tyranny of Abantidas; escape of Aratos to Argos . . 280
252—251 Tyranny of Paseas and of Nikoklês . . . . . 281
251 Deliverance and internal pacification of Sikyôn by Aratos 282—284
251 Annexation of Sikyôn to the Achaian League . . . 285
Importance and novelty of the step . . . . . 285
Sikyôn admitted on equal terms . . . . . 286
251—245 Position of Aratos; his relations to Antigonos and Ptolemy . . . . . 287—288
245 Aratos elected General of the League . . . . . 288
His permanent position and character . . . . 288—289
Effect of the union of civil and military powers . . . 292
245—244 First Generalship of Aratos . . . . . 292
War with Ætolia; defeat of the Bœotians at Chairôneia 292—293
243—242 Second Generalship of Aratos . . . . . 293—294
Deliverance of Corinth, and its accession to the League . 294
Accession of Megara, Troizên, and Epidauros . . 294—295

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| | Position of Athens and Argos | 295 |
| | Achaian invasion of Attica | 295 |
| | Vain attempt to attach Athens to the League | 296 |
| | Condition of Argos: succession of the Argeian Tyrants | 296 |
| | Tyranny of Aristomachos the First | 297 |
| | Aratos encourages conspiracies against him | 297 |
| | Greek view of Tyrants and Tyrant-slayers | 297 |
| | Death of Aristomachos the First: succession of Aristippos the Second | 301 |
| 243—242 | Vain attempt of Aratos on Argos | 301 |
| | Suit at Mantineia between Aristippos and the League | 302 |
| | Ptolemy Philadelphos becomes the ally of the League | 302 |
| | Aratos' pension from Ptolemy | 303 |
| | Illustration of the Achaian Constitution supplied by the first two Generalships of Aratos | 303—304 |


§ 2. *From the Deliverance of Corinth to the Annexation of Argos*

B.C. 243—228


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 241—240 | Third Generalship of Aratos | 305 |
| | Relations of the League with Sparta | 305 |
| | Contrast between Agis and Aratos | 306 |
| | Difference in their plans for the campaign; Agis retires | 306—307 |
| | Capture and recovery of Pellênê | 307 |
| | Truce with Antigonos; alliance with Ætolia | 308 |
| 239 | Death of Antigonos Gonatas | 308 |
| | The Dêmêtrian War | 308 |
| 239 | Unsuccessful attempt of Aratos on Peiraieus | 309 |
| | Illustrations of the position of Aratos | 309 |
| 239—229 | Various attempts on Athens; feeling towards Aratos there | 310 |
| 243—229 | Attempts of Aratos on Argos | 311 |
| | Kleônai joins the League | 312 |
| | Death of Aristippos the Second: tyranny of Aristomachos the Second | 312 |
| | Rival celebrations of the Nemean Games | 313 |
| | Extension of the two Leagues in Arkadia | 314 |
| | Revolutions of Mantineia | 315 |
| | Union of Megalopolis with the Achaian League; its effects | 315 |
| | Character of Lydiadas | 315 |
| 233 | Lydiadas chosen General | 317 |
| | Rivalry of Aratos and Lydiadas | 318 |
| 231 | Second Generalship of Lydiadas | 319 |

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| 239—229 | Affairs of Northern Greece ; Revolution in Epeiros | 320 |
| | First political intercourse with Rome | 321 |
| | Hostility of the Ætolians towards Akarnania | 321 |
| 239—229 | Akarnanian Embassy to Rome | 321 |
| 231 | Siege and relief of Medeôn ; Ætolian Assembly in the camp | 322 |
| 230 | Ravages of the Illyrians in Peloponnêsos and Epeiros | 324 |
| | Alliance of Epeiros and Akarnania with the Illyrians | 324 |
| 229 | Joint expedition of the two Leagues to relieve Korkyra | 325 |
| | Death of Markos | 325 |
| | Dêmêtrios of Pharos | 326 |
| | Interference of Rome | 326 |
| 229 | Korkyra, Apollônia, and Epidamnos become Roman allies | 326 |
| | Humiliation of Illyria | 326 |
| 228 | Roman Embassies to the two Leagues, and honorary Embassies to Corinth and Athens | 327 |
| | Eventual results of Roman interference | 328 |
| 229 | Inaction of Macedonia ; death of Dêmêtrios | 328 |
| 229—221 | Protectorate and reign of Antigonos Dôsôn | 329 |
| | Advance of the League after the death of Dêmêtrios | 329 |
| 229 | Application of the Athenians to Aratos when out of office | 330 |
| | Aratos buys the Macedonians out of Attica | 330 |
| | Progress of the League ; union of Aigina and Hermionê | 331 |
| | Unauthorized negociations of Aratos with Aristomachos of Argos | 331 |
| | Lydiadas interferes as General | 332 |
| 229—228 | His proposal for the union of Argos rejected at the instance of Aratos, but carried on the motion of Aratos as General | 332—333 |
| | Aristomachos General | 333 |
| | Union of Phlious with the League | 334 |
| | Estimate of the conduct of Aratos | 334 |
| 228 | Commanding position of the Achaian League | 334 |


§ 3. *From the beginning of the war with Kleomenês to the opening of negociations with Macedonia*

B.C. 227—224


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 371—227 | Internal condition of Sparta | 335 |
| 241 | Reform and fate of Agis | 337 |
| 236—222 | Reign of Kleomenês | 337 |
| 226—225 | Revolution of Kleomenês | 337 |
| | Relations between Sparta and the League | 338 |
| | Different position of Sparta from the cities delivered by Aratos | 339 |
| | War acceptable on both sides | 340 |

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| | Position of the Ætolians; their inaction throughout the Kleomenic War | 341 |
| | Their acquisitions in Thessaly | 341 |
| 228 | Spartan acquisition of the Ætolian towns in Arkadia | 342 |
| | Achaian interests involved in this annexation | 342 |
| | Deliberations of the Achaian Government | 343 |
| | Attempt of Aratos on Tegea and Orchomenos | 343 |
| 227 | Kleomenês fortifies Athênaion | 344 |
| | Achaian declaration of war; annexation of Kaphyai to the League | 344 |
| 227—226 | Generalship of Aristomachos; battle hindered by the interference of Aratos | 344—346 |
| 226 | Indignation against Aratos; Lydiadas stands against him for the Generalship | 346—347 |
| 226—225 | Twelfth (?) Generalship of Aratos | 347 |
| | Aratos' campaign in Elis; his defeat at Mount Lykaion | 347 |
| | Mantineia surprised by Aratos and re-admitted to the League | 347—348 |
| | Results of the recovery of Mantineia; temporary depression at Sparta | 349 |
| 226 | Battle of Ladokeia; death of Lydiadas | 350—351 |
| | Utter defeat of the Achaians; indignation against Aratos | 351 |
| | Assembly at Aigion; strange vote of censure on Aratos | 352 |
| | Aratos contemplates resignation, but recovers his influence | 353 |
| 225—224 | Generalship of Hyperbatas | 353 |
| | Kleomenês' Revolution at Sparta | 353 |
| | His successes in Arkadia; he recovers Mantineia | 354 |
| 224 | Third victory of Kleomenês at Hekatombaion | 354 |
| | Position of Aratos and of Kleomenês | 355—356 |
| | Probable nature of the supremacy claimed by Kleomenês | 357 |
| | Aratos begins to look to Macedonia | 359 |
| | Difference between his view and that of Plutarch or of modern writers | 359—360 |


§ 4. *From the Opening of Negociations with Macedonia to the end of the War with Kleomenês*

B.C. 224—221


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 224 | Twofold negociations with Sparta and Macedonia | 361 |
| | Beginning of negociations with Kleomenês | 361 |
| 224—223 | Aratos declines the Generalship; Timoxenos elected | 362 |
| | Beginning of negociations with Antigonos | 362 |
| | Dealings of Aratos with Megalopolis; commission from Megalopolis to the Federal Assembly | 363 |
| | Megalopolitan envoys allowed to go to Macedonia | 364 |

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| | Their favourable reception by Antigonos; letter from Antigonos read in the Federal Assembly; speech of Aratos thereon | 364—366 |
| | Negociations with Kleomenês; strong feeling in his favour | 367 |
| | Negociations interrupted by Kleomenês' illness | 367 |
| | Mission of young Aratos to Antigonos; Antigonos demands Akrokorinthos | 367—368 |
| | Kleomenês breaks off the negociations | 369 |
| | Universal indignation at the thought of surrendering Corinth | 370 |
| | Appearance of extreme factions in the Achaian cities; they lean to Kleomenês | 370—371 |
| | His schemes appeal to Town-Autonomy against the Federal principle | 371 |
| 223 | Kleomenês wins the Arkadian and Argolic Cities | 372 |
| | Violent proceedings of Aratos at Sikyôn | 373 |
| | Corinth calls in Kleomenês; Megara joins the Bœotian League | 373—374 |
| | No real argument against Federal Government to be drawn from these events | 374 |
| 223 | Effects of the loss of Corinth | 376 |
| | Aratos invested with absolute power, and defended by a guard | 377 |
| 223 | He refuses the offers of Kleomenês, and asks for help of Ætolia and Athens | 378 |
| 223 | Final vote of the League to invite Antigonos and cede Akrokorinthos | 379 |
| | Estimate of the conduct of Aratos | 379 |
| | Lowered position of the League from this time | 379 |
| | Comparison between Cavour and Aratos | 380 |
| 223—222 | Change in the character of the War; Kleomenês now the champion of Greece | 382 |
| | Degradation of the League; monstrous flattery of Antigonos | 383 |
| 223—222 | Recovery of the revolted cities | 384 |
| | Argos returns to the League; execution of Aristomachos | 384 |
| 223 | Antigonos put in possession of Akrokorinthos | 385 |
| 222 | Fate of Mantineia | 385 |
| | Tegea united to the League | 386 |
| | Antigonos keeps Orchomenos | 386 |
| 222 | Kleomenês takes Megalopolis; first mention of Philopoimên | 386 |
| 221 | Battle of Sellasia; defeat and exile of Kleomenês | 387 |
| | Antigonos' treatment of Sparta | 387 |
| 221 | Death and character of Antigonos | 387 |
| | New position of the League | 388 |

## CHAPTER VIII

HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA TO THE PEACE OF EPEIROS

B.C. 221—205


| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| | State of Greece after the fall of Kleomenês | 389 |
| | Grand alliance under Macedonian headship | 389 |
| | Internal and external condition of the Achaian League | 390 |
| | Undiminished influence of Aratos; his relation to the Macedonian Kings | 391—392 |
| | Character of Philopoimên; comparison between him and Aratos | 392—393 |
| | Withdrawal of Philopoimên from Peloponnêsos; probable explanation of his conduct | 393—394 |
| 221 | Accession of Philip | 394 |
| | Causes of the Social War | 394 |


### § 1. *The Social War*

B.C. 221—217


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 221—220 | Third Generalship of Timoxenos | 395 |
| | Phigaleia held by the Ætolians | 395 |
| 221 | Dorimachos plunders Messênê; extensive incursions of the Ætolians | 395—396 |
| 220 | Invasion during a Presidential Election | 396—397 |
| 220—219 | Aratos General; he enters on office before the legal time | 397—398 |
| 220 | Military Assembly at Megalopolis | 398 |
| | Disgraceful campaign of Aratos; his defeat at Kaphyai | 398 |
| | Accusation and defence of Aratos in the Assembly | 399 |
| | Votes of the Achaian and Ætolian Assemblies | 399 |
| | Relations between Ætolia and Messênê | 400 |
| | Achaian Embassies to Macedonia and Epeiros | 401 |
| | Ætolian incursions in Peloponnêsos | 402 |
| | Insincerity of the Ætolian Government | 402 |
| | Affairs of Kynaitha; return of the exiles | 402—403 |
| | Horrible sack of Kynaitha by the Ætolians | 403 |
| | Unsuccessful attempt on Kleitôr | 403 |
| | Philip at Corinth | 404 |
| 222—220 | Affairs of Sparta | 404 |
| | Philip sits in judgement on the Spartan parties at Tegea | 405 |
| | Declaration of Philip in favour of Sparta | 406 |
| | Aratos' liberal views of International right | 406 |
| 220 | Congress at Corinth; war agreed upon | 406—407 |
| | Opening of the Social War; decree of the Congress of Corinth | 407 |

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| | Philip's Letter to the Ætolians; shifts of the Ætolian Government | 407 |
| 220—219 | Skopas Ætolian General | 408 |
| 220 | The Achaian Assembly ratifies the decree | 408 |
| | Behaviour of Akarnania, Epeiros, Messênê, and Sparta | 408—409 |
| | Comparative strength of Coalitions and Single Powers | 409 |
| | Warnings against general inferences as to forms of government | 410 |
| 220—219 | Ætolian Embassies in Peloponnêsos; Machatas wins over Elis | 411 |
| | State of Sparta; parties of Old and Young | 411 |
| | Intrigues of the Kleomenists with Ætolia | 412 |
| | First and unsuccessful mission of Machatas | 412 |
| 220—219 | Revolution at Sparta; Agêsipolis and Lykourgos chosen Kings | 413 |
| | Second mission of Machatas; Sparta joins the Ætolian Alliance, and begins war with Achaia | 414 |
| 219 | Beginning of the Social War; its character | 414 |
| | Paramount importance of Philip; his virtues and military skill | 414—415 |
| 219—218 | Generalship of the younger Aratos | 415 |
| | Successes of Philip | 416 |
| | Ætolian ravages in the Cantons of Dymê, Pharai, and Tritaia | 416 |
| | "Sonderbund" of the three Western Cities | 417 |
| | Loss and recovery of Aigeira | 418 |
| 219—218 | Dorimachos Ætolian General: sacrilege of the Ætolians at Dion and Dôdôna | 419 |
| | Psôphis annexed to the Achaian League | 419 |
| | Philip's conquests of Phigaleia and Triphylia | 419 |
| | Relations between Philip and the League | 420 |
| | Personal relations between Philip and Aratos | 420 |
| | Plots of Apellês against Aratos and the Achaians | 421 |
| 218 | Philip's interferences with the Achaian election | 422—423 |
| 218—217 | Generalship of Epêratos; connexion of this election with the events of the preceding year | 423—424 |
| | Philip recovers Teichos | 424 |
| | Further schemes of Apellês; Aratos restored to Philip's favour | 424—426 |
| 218 | Influence retained by Aratos in the Achaian Assembly | 426 |
| | Treason of Apellês against Philip; Philip crushes the plot | 427 |
| 218—217 | Weak administration of Epêratos | 428 |
| 217—216 | Aratos general; decrees of the Achaian Assembly | 428—429 |
| 217 | Aratos' mediation at Megalopolis; combination of full Federal sovereignty with strict regard to State rights | 429 |

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| | Philip's success in Northern Greece | 430 |
| 218—217 | Mediation of Chios and Rhodes; failure of the proposed Conference | 430—431 |
| | Second mission from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantion, and Egypt | 431 |
| | Philip turns his mind towards Italy | 432 |
| | Opening of a new period; close connexion of the history of Eastern and Western Europe from this date | 432 |
| | Influence of Dêmêtrios of Pharos; he counsels interference in Italy | 433 |
| 217 | Opening of the Congress of Naupaktos | 434 |
| | Speech of Agelaos; his policy compared with that of Isokratês | 435—437 |
| | Peace of Naupaktos | 438 |
| 217—216 | Agelaos Ætolian General | 438 |


§ 2. *From the End of the Social War to the End of the First War with Rome*

B.C. 217—205


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Analogy between the Peace of Agelaos and the Peace of Nikias | 439 |
| | Connexion of the Macedonian and Punic Wars | 439 |
| | Beginning of Roman influence in Greece | 439 |
| | Impolitic conduct of Philip | 440 |
| 216 | Philip's treaty with Hannibal; its various forms and probable explanation | 441 |
| | Hellenic position assumed by Philip in the Treaty | 442 |
| | Philip's relations with Peloponnêsos | 444 |
| 215 | Affairs of Messênê; interference of Philip and Aratos | 444—445 |
| | Last influence of Aratos over Philip | 445 |
| 214 | Philip's second attempt on Messênê | 445 |
| 213 | Death of Aratos; comparison between him and Philopoimên | 446—447 |
| 214 | Beginning of the Roman War; Roman policy of alliances | 447 |
| 211 | Position of Rome; her alliance with Ætolia | 448—449 |
| | Plots for the "reunion" of Akarnania | 449 |
| | Roman conquests | 449 |
| | Invasion of Akarnania; heroic defence of the Akarnanians and retreat of the Ætolians | 449—450 |
| 218 | Condition of Sparta; sedition of Cheilôn | 450 |
| 218—217 | Banishment and return of Lykourgos | 451 |
| | Reign of Machanidas | 451 |
| 210 | Ætolian and Akarnanian embassies at Sparta; speech of Lykiskos | 451 |
| | Sparta in alliance with Ætolia | 453 |

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| 210 | Naval warfare of Sulpicius; desolation of Aigina | 453 |
| 209 | The League asks help of Philip | 453 |
| | Philopoimên General of Cavalry; he reforms abuses | 453—454 |
| 209 | King Attalos chosen General of Ætolia | 455 |
| | Attempts at mediation on the part of Rhodes, etc. | 455 |
| | Philip at Argos | 456 |
| 209 | Conference at Aigion; demands of the Ætolians | 456—457 |
| | Negociations broken off by Philip | 457 |
| | Philip repulses the Romans | 458 |
| | His alternate debauchery and activity | 458 |
| | Exploits of Philip and Philopoimên | 458 |
| 208—205 | Character of the last years of the War | 459 |
| 207 | Philip's attempt on Hêrakleia | 459 |
| 208 | Philip's cessions to the Achaian League | 460 |
| 208—207 | Philopoimên General of the League; his reforms | 461—462 |
| | The Three Battles of Mantineia | 464 |
| 207 | Third Battle of Mantineia; complete victory of the Achaians | 464—465 |
| | Philopoimên ravages Lakônia | 465 |
| | Nabis Tyrant of Sparta | 465 |
| | Peace between Ætolia and Macedonia | 466 |
| 205 | Conference at Phoinikê; general peace | 466 |
| | Note on the Generalships of Aratos | 468 |


## CHAPTER IX

### HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE FROM THE PEACE OF EPEIROS TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE


Character of the Period . . . . . 471


### § 1. *From the Peace of Epeiros to the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus*

B.C. 205—194


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 202—200 | Aggressive proceedings of Philip; his dealings with the Achaian League | 472 |
| 200 | His devastation of Attica | 473 |
| | Justice of the war on the Roman side | 473 |
| 200—197 | Second Macedonian War | 473 |
| | Real good-will of Flamininus towards Greece | 474 |
| | Union of Greek States under Rome | 475 |
| | Relation of the Federal States to Rome | 475 |
| | Condition of Ætolia; Generalship of Damokritos | 476 |
| 200 | Indecisive Meeting at Naupaktos; Ætolians join the Romans | 476 |

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| | Position of Achaia ; influence of Philopoimên | 477 |
| 205—204 | Reunion of Megara with the League | 477 |
| 202—201 | War with Nabis ; deliverance of Messênê | 477 |
| 201—200 | Generalship of Kykliadas | 477 |
| | Philopoimên goes again to Crete | 477 |
| | Philip at Argos ; his vain attempt to gain the League | 478 |
| 199 | His pretended cession of Triphylia and Orchomenos | 478 |
| 198 | The League joins the Roman Alliance ; terms of the treaty | 479 |
| | Constitutional details supplied by the account of the debate | 479 |
| | Share of the League in the war | 480 |
| | Unsuccessful siege of Corinth by Lucius Quinctius | 480 |
| 198—197 | Argos betrayed to Philip and ceded by him to Nabis | 481 |
| 197 | Exploits of the Achaian troops at Kleônai and in Asia | 482 |
| 198 | State of Epeiros ; attempts at peace ; Charops acts for Rome | 482 |
| 197 | Bœotia constrained to join the Romans | 483 |
| | Firm adherence of the Akarnanians to Philip | 483 |
| 197 | Submission of Akarnania | 484 |
| 196 | Proclamation of Grecian Freedom | 484 |
| | New Federations in Thessaly and Euboia | 484 |
| 195 | Recovery of Argos | 485 |
| | Relations of the Eleutherolakônic towns to Achaia | 485 |
| | Nabis retains Sparta ; discontent of the Ætolians | 485—486 |
| 194 | Withdrawal of the Roman garrisons | 486 |


§ 2. *From the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus to the death of Philopoimên*

B.C. 194—183


| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Affairs of the Achaian League | 486 |
| | Eminence of Megalopolis ; parallel of Virginia | 486 |
| | Megalopolitan Presidents | 486 |
| | Absence of Geographical Parties | 487 |
| | Influence of Philopoimên ; his internal and external policy | 487 |
| | Other Federal statesmen : Lykortas, Diophanês, Aristainos | 488 |
| | The Macedonian party extinct | 488 |
| 194 | Discontent against Philopoimên at Megalopolis ; he raises the smaller towns into independent States | 488—489 |
| 193—192 | Philopoimên's fourth Generalship | 490 |
| | War with Nabis ; independent action of the League | 490 |
| 192 | Antiochos invited by the Ætolians | 490 |
| | Treacherous resolution of the Ætolian Senate | 491 |
| | Murder of Nabis by the Ætolians | 491 |

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| 192 | Philopoimên unites Sparta to the Achaian League | 492 |
| | The union not forcible, yet contrary to Spartan feeling | 492 |
| 192 | Antiochos elected Ætolian General; his relations with Achaia, Bœotia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Elis | 493—494 |
| 191 | Defeat of Antiochos at Thermopylæ | 494 |
| 191—189 | Ætolian War; submission of Ætolia to the Roman "Faith" | 494 |
| | Working of the Ætolian Constitution | 495 |
| 189 | Ætolia becomes the Dependent Ally of Rome | 495 |
| 191 | Union of Elis and Messênê with the Achaian League | 496 |
| | Dealings of Flamininus with Messênê | 497 |
| | Annexation of Zakynthos prevented by Flamininus | 497 |
| | The League extended over all Peloponnêsos | 498 |
| | Relations between Achaia and Rome | 498 |
| | Roman intrigues with the newly-annexed cities | 499 |
| 191 | First disturbances of Sparta composed by Philopoimên | 500 |
| 189 | Spartan attack on Las | 500 |
| | Secession of Sparta | 501 |
| 189—188 | Embassy to Rome | 501 |
| 190—188 | Philopoimên's two successive Generalships | 501 |
| 188 | Execution of Spartans at Kompasion; changes in the Spartan laws | 502 |
| | Impolicy of Philopoimên's treatment of Sparta | 502 |
| | Continued disputes at Sparta; policy of the moderate party there | 503—504 |
| | Roman intrigues for the dissolution of the League | 504 |
| 182 | Formal reunion of Sparta | 504 |
| | Quiet incorporation of Elis | 505 |
| 183 | State of parties in Messênê; revolt under Deinokratês | 505 |
| | Capture and execution of Philopoimên at Messênê | 505 |
| 182 | Re-admission of Messênê to the League | 506 |
| | Three Messênian towns admitted as independent States | 507 |
| 180? | Schemes of Chairôn at Sparta | 507 |
| 191—183 | Constitutional notices | 507 |
| 189 | Yearly meetings removed from Aigion | 508 |
| | Constitution of the Senate | 508 |
| 185 | Rejection of Eumenês' offer to pay its members | 508 |
| | Legal resistance to Roman encroachments | 509 |
| 185—183 | Assemblies refused to Q. Cæcilius and to Flamininus | 510—511 |

§ 3. *From the Death of Philopoimên to the Battle of Pydna*

B.C. 183—168

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Condition of the League at the death of Philopoimên | 512 |
| | Parties in the League; the elder Roman party not wilfully unpatriotic | 512 |
| | Growth of the extreme Roman party under Kallikratês | 512 |

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| 180—179 | Presidency of Hyperbatos | 513 |
| | Slavish doctrines of Hyperbatos and Kallikratês; opposition of Lykortas | 513 |
| 180 | Embassy of Kallikratês to Rome; rescript of the Roman Senate | 513—514 |
| 179—178 | Kallikratês elected General | 514 |
| 172—168 | Effects of the war with Perseus on the Federal states | 514 |
| | Greek patriotic feeling now on the Macedonian side | 515 |
| | Character of Perseus | 515 |
| | Character of L. Æmilius Paullus | 516 |
| 173 | Dependent condition of Ætolia; civil dissensions | 516 |
| 171 | Roman and Macedonian parties; Lykiskos General | 517 |
| 169 | Perseus in Ætolia; part of the country joins him | 517—518 |
| 167 | Massacre by A. Bæbius | 518 |
| | Dissolution of the Ætolian League | 518 |
| 157 | Death of Lykiskos | 518 |
| 171 | Affairs of Akarnania; debate in the Akarnanian Assembly | 518—519 |
| 167 | Leukas separated from Akarnania | 519 |
| | State of Epeiros; parties of Kephalos and Charops | 519 |
| 169 | Geographical parties in Epeiros | 520 |
| 167—157 | Conquest and desolation of Epeiros; tyranny of Charops | 520 |
| 173 | Condition of Bœotia; alliance with Perseus | 521 |
| 171 | Intrigues of Q. Marcius; dissolution of the Bœotian League | 521—522 |
| | Achaia during the war with Perseus | 522 |
| | Decree of non-intercourse between Achaia and Macedonia | 522 |
| 174 | Debate on its proposed repeal | 522 |
| 173—171 | Missions of Marcellus and the Lentuli | 523 |
| | Roman dealings with individual cities | 523 |
| 171 | Demands of Atilius and Marcius | 524 |
| 170 | Mission of Popillius and Octavius | 524 |
| | Further inroads on Federal rights | 525 |
| 170 | Convention of the Moderate Party | 525 |
| 170—169 | Archôn General | 526 |
| | Embassy from Attalos; debate on the restoration of Eumenês' honours | 526 |
| 169 | Negociations with Quintus Marcius | 526 |
| | Polybios opposes Appius Claudius | 528 |
| 169—168 | Embassy from the Ptolemies; debate at Sikyôn on the Egyptian question | 528—529 |

§ 4. *From the Battle of Pydna to the Dissolution of the Achaian League*

B.C. 167—146

Effects of the Conquest of Macedonia on the relations between Rome and Achaia . . . . . 530

| B.C. | | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| 167 | Embassy of Domitius and Claudius; demands of the Romans | 531 |
| | Challenge of Xenôn; deportation of the Thousand Achaians | 531—532 |
| 164—151 | Embassies on behalf of the exiles; insidious reply of the Senate | 532 |
| | Position of Polybios at Rome | 533 |
| 151 | Release of the Exiles | 533 |
| | Character of Roman dealings with foreign nations | 534 |
| | Dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis | 534 |
| 166—159 | Mission of C. Sulpicius Gallus; separation of Pleurôn from the League | 535 |
| 152 | Debate on the Cretan Alliance | 535 |
| 151 | Return of Stratios and Polybios | 536 |
| | Causes of the final war with Rome | 536 |
| 156—150 | Disputes between Athens and Orôpos | 536 |
| | Menalkidas of Sparta General of the League | 537 |
| 150 | Achaian interference at Orôpos | 537 |
| 150—149 | Generalship of Diaios | 538 |
| 149 | Disputes with Sparta; Diaios before Sparta | 538—539 |
| | Death of Kallikratês | 539 |
| | Damokritos elected General | 539 |
| 149—148 | Fourth Macedonian War; mediation of Q. Cæcilius Metellus | 539—540 |
| 148 | Victory and banishment of Damokritos | 540 |
| 148—147 | Second Generalship of Diaios; suicide of Menalkidas | 540—541 |
| 147 | Embassy of L. Aurelius Orestes; tumult at Corinth | 541—542 |
| | Embassy of Sextus Julius Cæsar | 543 |
| | Kritolaos elected General; sham Conference at Tegea | 543 |
| 147—146 | Unconstitutional proceedings of Kritolaos | 544 |
| | Efforts of Metellus to preserve peace | 545 |
| 146 | Tumultuous meeting at Corinth; violence of Kritolaos | 544—545 |
| | Beginning of war with Rome; further efforts of Metellus | 546 |
| | Secession and siege of Hêrakleia | 547 |
| | Battle of Skarpheia; defeat and death of Kritolaos | 547 |
| | Diaios succeeds to the Generalship | 547 |
| | Negociations between Sôsikratês and Metellus | 548 |
| | Cruelty and corruption of Diaios; death of Sôsikratês | 549 |
| | Mummius at the Isthmus; battle of Leukopetra and sack of Corinth | 549 |
| | Achaia not yet formally reduced to a Province | 550 |
| 146—145 | Dissolution of the League, and abolition of Democracy in the cities | 551 |
| 145 | Polybios legislates for the Achaian cities | 551 |
| | Nominal revival of the League | 552 |

PAGE
Devotion of the Peloponnêsian people; later parallels . . 552
Errors of the League, mainly the result of Roman intrigue . 553
General results of the Achaian League . . . . . 554
Roman opposition a witness to its value . . . . . 554
The Achaian League a natural model for liberated Greece . 554
Future of South-Eastern Europe; Monarchic Federalism probably the true solvent . . . . . 555

## CHAPTER X

### OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY

Recapitulation . . . . . 557
Indirect influence of Greece; direct influence of Rome . . . . 557
Connexion of Italian history with the subject of Federalism . . 558
Italian history a transition between the Greek and the mediæval Federalism . . . . . 558

### § 1. *Of the Federations of Ancient Italy*

Prevalence of Federalism in Ancient Italy . . . . . 559
Its causes . . . . . 559
These causes of general application . . . . . 559
Instances of Confederations beyond Greece and Italy . . . . 559
Greater importance of the Italian Leagues . . . . . 560
Uncertainty of the ethnology of Ancient Italy . . . . . 560
Early existence of Federations in Italy—Nature of the evidence . . 561
Late preservation of old Italian Constitutions . . . . . 561
League of ETRURIA . . . . . 562
The Twelve Cities . . . . . 562
Constitution of the States . . . . . 563
Amphiktyonic origin of the League . . . . . 563
Constitution of the Federal Assembly . . . . . 563
Traces of Federal Kingship . . . . . 564
Laxity of the Federal tie . . . . . 564
Power of war and peace in the League, and also in the States . 564—565
The accounts of our authorities how far trustworthy . . . . 565
Probable scheme of the League . . . . . 565
League of SAMNIUM . . . . . 566
Absence of details . . . . . 566
The Samnite Cantons . . . . . 566
Effect of the separation of Capua . . . . . 567
Analogy with Ætolia and Switzerland . . . . . 567

PAGE
Samnite struggle against Rome . . . . . 567
Lessons of Samnite history . . . . . 568
League of LATIUM . . . . . 568
Abundance of untrustworthy details . . . . . 568
Treaty between Rome and Carthage, B.C. 508 . . . . . 569
Nature of the League . . . . . 569
The Thirty Cities . . . . . 570
Relations of Rome to the League . . . . . 570
Probable origin of Rome . . . . . 571
Latin proposals of union with Rome, B.C. 337 . . . . . 571
Close union of the Latin towns illustrated by the proposal . . . 571
Dissolution of the League, B.C. 334 . . . . . 572

§ 2. *The Roman Commonwealth and the Italian Allies*

Rome not a Federal State; but containing *quasi*-Federal elements . 572
Gradual incorporation of other States with Rome . . . . . 572
Three great classes in Italy: Romans, Latins, and Italians . . . 573
The nature of the struggle between Patrician and Plebeian . . . 574
*Quasi*-Federal nature of the Roman Tribes . . . . . 575
Near approach of the Roman system to Federalism and to Representation . . . . . 575
The greatness of Rome mainly due to her *quasi*-Federal elements . 576
The SOCIAL WAR, B.C. 90—89 . . . . . 576
Its historical importance . . . . . 576
Probable results on the Italian side . . . . . 577
Nature of the Authorities for the period . . . . . 577
Character of the Roman dominion . . . . . 578
Condition of the Italian Allies . . . . . 578
Claim of Roman citizenship for the Allies . . . . . 579
Advantages and disadvantages of such admission . . . . . 579
Difference of feeling among the Italians; among the States near Rome; among the Samnites and Lucanians; among the Etruscans and Umbrians . . . . . 580
Federal or Representative institutions the true remedy. . . . . 581
The claim of the Allies opposed by the worst, and supported by the best men of both parties at Rome . . . . . 581—582
Tribuneship of Marcus Livius Drusus, B.C. 91. . . . . 582
Beginning of the SOCIAL WAR B.C. 90. . . . . 583
Analogy between the Italian Allies and the American Colonies . . 584
Federal Constitution of the seceding States . . . . . 585
Italicum the capital of the League . . . . . 585
Constitution of the Federal Government borrowed from that of Rome . 585
Rome the great obstacle to a permanent Italian Federation . . . 586
The Social War, B.C. 90—89 . . . . . 586

PAGE
Successes of the Allies . . . . . 587
Movements in Etruria and Umbria . . . . . 587
The Senate yields the demands of the Allies . . . . . 587
The other States accept citizenship, but Samnium and Lucania still hold out . . . . . 588
Legislation of P. Sulpicius, B.C. 88 . . . . . 589
Illusory nature of the franchise granted to the Allies . . . . 589
Their discontent . . . . . 589
Their cause embraced by Marius and Sulpicius . . . . . 590
The Civil War, B.C. 88—82 . . . . . 590
The Samnite War still continues . . . . . 590
Last stage of the war; the Samnites before Rome, B.C. 82 . . . 591
Battle at the Colline Gate . . . . . 591
Permanent devastation of Samnium by Sulla . . . . . 592

§ 3. *Of the Lombard League*

Gradual incorporation of the Provinces with Rome . . . . . 592
Rome forsaken by the Emperors . . . . . 593
The Imperial succession always maintained . . . . . 593
The Kingdom of Italy, A.D. 568—1250 . . . . . 593
Union of the Crown of Italy and Germany, A.D. 961 . . . . . 594
Weakness of the royal authority, 1039—1056 . . . . . 594
The Normans in Apulia and Sicily, 1021—1194; condition of Rome; Northern Italy in the twelfth century; predominance of the Cities; their practical independence . . . . . 594
Reigns of Lothar II. and Conrad III. (1125—1152) . . . . . 595
Imperialist reaction; election of Frederick (1152) . . . . . 595
Character of Frederick . . . . . 597
His position not to be confounded with that of modern Austria . . 597
The War not strictly a national struggle, but a struggle between royalty and municipal freedom . . . . . 598
Frederick enters Italy, A.D. 1154 . . . . . 599
Collision of claims between the Emperor and the Cities . . . . 599
Early successes of Frederick . . . . . 599
Destruction of Milan, A.D. 1162 . . . . . 600
Oppression of Frederick's agents . . . . . 600
Four opportunities for the Union of Italy: (1) in the Social War; (2) under the Lombard League; (3) under Manfred; (4) under Victor Emmanuel . . . . . 600
Distinction of northern and southern Italy . . . . . 601
The Campanian Republics, A.D. 839—1138 . . . . . 601
The Cities supported by the Pope, Eastern Emperor, and King of Sicily, A.D. 1166 . . . . . 601
Parallel with the revolt of the Netherlands . . . . . 602

PAGE
First movements in the Veronese March, A.D. 1155 . . . . . 602
Beginning of the LOMBARD LEAGUE . . . . . 602
Relations of Venice and the Lombard Cities . . . . . 602
Action of the Emperor Manuel . . . . . 602
Condition of the Eastern Empire . . . . . 603
Manuel aspires to reunite the Empires . . . . . 603
Growth of the League, A.D. 1164—1168 . . . . . 604
Accession of Lodi . . . . . 604
Foundation of Alexandria . . . . . 604
Indirect importance of the Lombard League in Federal History; analogy with America and the Netherlands . . . . . 605
Congress of the League . . . . . 606
The League not a true Federation; and why it did not become such . 606
Personal character of Frederick; he yields in time . . . . . 607
Second Lombard League . . . . . 607
No definite moment of separation in Italy . . . . . 607
No such tendency to union in Italy as in the Netherlands and America 607
The Lombard cities really sovereign; the Dutch and American provinces not so . . . . . 607—608
Vigour and constancy of the Confederates . . . . . 608
Peculiar policy of Venice; siege of Ancona, A.D. 1174 . . . . . 609
Course of the war; siege of Alexandria, A.D. 1174—1175 . . . . 609
Negociations between the Emperor and the cities broken off by the Papal Legates . . . . . 609
Battle of LEGNANO, A.D. 1176 . . . . . 610
Change in Frederick's policy; negociations for peace . . . . . 610
Frederick reconciled with Venice and the Church . . . . . 610
Rights of the Empire as understood by the Lombards . . . . . 610
Truce for six years between the Emperor and the League, A.D. 1177 . 611
Various cities join Frederick: Cremona, Tortona, and Alexandria . 611
Peace of Constanz, A.D. 1183; the treaty is in form a pardon, but amounts to surrender of direct sovereignty . . . . . 612—613
The Second Lombard League . . . . . 614
The First League primarily political; the Second League primarily ecclesiastical . . . . . 614—615
Union of Italy under Frederick or Manfred hindered by the Pope; good and evil which it would have prevented . . . . . 615
Italian nationality a purely modern idea . . . . . 615
Question of Italian Confederation or Consolidation . . . . . 616
Italian Federation discredited by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte . . 616
Arguments on behalf of, and against, Federalism in Italy . . . . 616
The question decided by the Italians . . . . . 617
Federalism no longer appropriate in Italy; local independence the true policy . . . . . 617
Future restoration of the Empire . . . . . 617

## FRAGMENT

### OF THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY

PAGE
Influence of the Empire on Germany . . . . . 618
The three Imperial Kingdoms: Germany, Italy, and Burgundy . 618—619
Closest connexion between Germany and Burgundy . . . . 619
Connexion between Germany and the Empire growing into identity . 620
The German Confederation, a lax *Staatenbund*; its theory and practice 621
Its peculiarities: (1) Most of its members principalities; (2) it arose from the splitting up of a more united State . . . . . 621
Process of disunion in Germany . . . . . 622
Germany really a Federation since Peace of Westphalia, A.D. 1648-1806 622
The Kingdom of Germany . . . . . 623
Comparison with England and France . . . . . 623
Origin of the German Kingdom . . . . . 623
Different history of England, 800—1087; France, 888—1202; and Germany, 936—973, 1039—1056 . . . . . 624
Circumstances which strengthened the Royal authority in Germany . 624
Retention of National Assemblies in Germany and England, but not in France . . . . . 625
The Royal Domain; the Free Cities; the Ecclesiastical Princes . . 625
Contrast between German and French Kings . . . . . 625
Contrast between the later history of the Kingdoms . . . . 626
Causes of disunion in Germany:
(1) The Crown elective; chiefly owing to its connexion with the Empire . . . . . 627
The Empire essentially elective . . . . . 628
Ways in which the Imperial and elective character of the German Crown diminished the royal authority . . . 628
(2) The German Confederation mainly composed of Principalities . 629
Connexion between this cause and the weakening of the monarchy . . . . . 629
Origin of the German Principalities; royal officers become sovereigns . . . . . 629
The Diet a Federal Congress rather than a National Parliament . . 629
Governments, not peoples, represented in the Diet . . . . . 630
The Diet sinks into a diplomatic Congress . . . . . 630
Other peculiarities of the German Confederation . . . . . 630
Loss of the ancient divisions . . . . . 630
Comparison with England and France . . . . . 630—631
Splitting up of the ancient Duchies . . . . . 631
Constant partitions and annexations . . . . . 631
Different position of the *arrière* vassals in France and in Germany . 632
Vast number, and singular disproportion in size of the German States . 633
Position of Austria and Prussia. Parallel with Bœotia . . . . 633

APPENDIX I. PAGE

1. Note on the Cities of the Achaian League . . . . . 635
2. Note on the Cities of the Lykian League . . . . . 637
3. The Federal Coinage of Akarnania . . . . . 638
4. The Federal Coinage of Ætolia . . . . . 638

APPENDIX II.

Additional Notes by the Editor . . . . . 639

INDEX . . . . . 659

from any higher power, but as a matter of absolute right, by virtue of its inherent powers as an independent commonwealth. But in all matters which concern the general body, the sovereignty of the several members will cease. Each member is perfectly independent within its own sphere; but there is another sphere in which its independence, or rather its separate existence, vanishes. It is invested with every right of sovereignty on one class of subjects, but there is another class of subjects on which it is as incapable of separate political action as any province or city of a monarchy or of an indivisible republic. The making of peace and war, the sending and receiving of ambassadors, generally all that comes within the department of International Law, will be reserved wholly to the central power. Indeed, the very existence of the several members of the Union will be diplomatically unknown to foreign nations, which will never be called upon to deal with any power except the Central Government. A Federal Union, in short, will form one State in relation to other powers, but many States as regards its internal administration. This complete division of sovereignty we may look upon as essential to the absolute perfection of the Federal ideal. But that ideal is one so very refined and artificial, that it seems not to have been attained more than four or five times in the history of the world. But a History of Federal Government must embrace a much wider range of subjects than merely the history of those states which have actually realized the Federal idea. We must look at the idea in its germ as well as in its perfection. We shall learn better to understand what perfect Federalism is by comparing it with Federalism in a less fully-developed shape. In order thus to trace the Federal principle from its birth, we shall have to go back to very early times, and, in some cases, to very rude states of society. But of course it will not be needful to dwell at much length on those commonwealths of whose constitution and history it would be impossible to give any detailed account. For some commonwealths, which may fairly claim the name of Federal Governments in the wider sense, a mere glance will be enough. Our more detailed examination must be reserved for a few more illustrious examples of Federal Union. There are a few famous commonwealths which, either from having perfectly, or nearly perfectly, realized the Federal idea, or else from their importance and celebrity in the general history of the world, stand out conspicuously at the very

Sovereignty of the Union in all external matters.

Wider range of the historical view.

Choice of examples for special illustration.

first glimpse of the subject, and whose constitution and history will deserve and repay our most attentive study.

Four great examples of Federal Government.

Four Federal Commonwealths, then, stand out, in four different ages of the world, as commanding, above all others, the attention of students of political history. Of these four, one belongs to what is usually known as "ancient," another, to what is commonly called "mediæval" history; a third arose in the period of transition between mediæval and modern history; the creation of the fourth may have been witnessed by some few of those who are still counted among living men. Of these four, again, one has been a thing of the past for many centuries; another has so changed its form that it can no longer claim a place among Federal Governments; but the other two, one of them among the least, the other among the greatest, of independent powers, still remain, exhibiting Federalism in a perfect, or nearly perfect, form, standing, in the Old World and in the New, as living examples of the strength and the weakness of the most elaborate of political combinations.

These four famous Commonwealths are,

The ACHAIAN LEAGUE, B.C. 281–146.

First, the ACHAIAN LEAGUE in the later days of Ancient Greece, whose most flourishing period comes within the third century before our own era.

The SWISS CANTONS, A.D. 1291–1862.

Second, the Confederation of the SWISS CANTONS, which, with many changes in its extent and constitution, has lasted from the thirteenth century to our own day.

The UNITED PROVINCES, A.D. 1579–1795.

Third, the SEVEN UNITED PROVINCES of the NETHERLANDS, whose Union arose in the War of Independence against Spain, and lasted, in a republican form, till the War of the French Revolution.

The UNITED STATES, A.D. 1778–1862.

Fourth, the UNITED STATES of NORTH AMERICA, which formed a Federal Union after their revolt from the British Crown under George the Third, and whose destiny forms one of the most important, and certainly the most interesting, of the political problems of our own time.

Characteristics of

Of these Four, three come sufficiently near to the full realization of the Federal idea to be entitled to rank among perfect

Federal Governments. The Achaian League, and the United States since the adoption of the present Constitution, are indeed the most perfect developments of the Federal principle which the world has ever seen. The Swiss Confederation, in its origin a Union of the loosest kind, has gradually drawn the Federal bond tighter and tighter, till, within our own times, it has assumed a form which fairly entitles it to rank beside Achaia and America. The claim of the United Provinces is more doubtful;[1] their union was at no period of their republican being so close as that of Achaia, America, and modern Switzerland. But the important place which the United Provinces once filled in European history, and the curious and instructive nature of their political institutions, fully entitle them to a place in the first rank for the purposes of the present History. All these four then I purpose to treat of at some considerable length. Over less perfect or less illustrious examples of the Federal system I shall glance more lightly, or use them chiefly by way of contrast to point out more clearly the distinguishing characteristics of these four great examples. Thus, for instance, the modern German Confederation is, in point of territorial extent and of the power of many of the states which compose it, of far greater importance than any of the European instances among the Four. But its constitution is so widely removed from the perfection of the Federal idea that, for our present purpose, this Union, which includes two of the Great Powers of Europe, is chiefly valuable as illustrating by contrast the more perfect constitutions of Achaia and Switzerland. On the other hand there can be little doubt that there were in the ancient world several other Confederations, whose constitutions must have realized the Federal idea almost as perfectly as the more famous League of Achaia. But some of these possessed so little influence in the world, that they can hardly be said to have a history. In the case of others we know absolutely nothing of the details of their constitutions. Northern Greece, especially, in the later days of Grecian freedom, abounded in small Federal States, but we have no such minute knowledge of their history and constitution as we have of those of Achaia. Even the great and important League of Ætolia, so long the rival of Achaia, is far better known to us in its external history than in its internal constitution. Again it is clear that the Thirty Cities of Latium, and probably some other similar

the Four Great Confederations.

The German Confederation.

Other ancient examples;

in Greece;

in Italy;

[1] See Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic, iii. 514.

Leagues among the old Italian commonwealths, must have been united by a Federal bond of a very close kind. But we know hardly anything about them except what may be picked up from the half-mythical narratives of their wars and alliances with Rome. Lykia too, beyond all doubt, had a Federal constitution which was in some respects more perfect than that of Achaia itself. But then Lykia has nothing which can be called a history, and its Federal constitution arose at so late a period that its independence was provincial rather than strictly national. So, in later times, the Swiss Confederation was really only one of several unions of German cities, which happened to obtain greater importance and permanence than the rest. One of these unions, the famous League of the Hanse Towns, still exists, though with diminished splendour, in our own day. So, in days later still, the precedent of Federal union given by the English settlements in North America, has been followed, though as yet with but little success or credit, by several of the Republics which have arisen among the ruins of Spanish dominion in the same continent. All these instances, Greek, Italian, German, and American, will demand some notice in the course of our present inquiry. But they will not need that full and minute attention which must be reserved for Achaia, Switzerland, the United Provinces, and the United States.

in Lykia.

Other German leagues;

the Hanse Towns.

Other American Confederations.

Before, however, we go on to describe in detail the constitution and history of any particular Federal state, it will be desirable to make some further remarks on Federal Government in general, and to draw out at some length the points of contrast between that and other political systems.

## CHAPTER II

### CHARACTERISTICS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WITH OTHER POLITICAL SYSTEMS

I HAVE already given something like a defini Government in its perfect form, premising th form is not to be looked for in all the examples w under our present survey. We have seen that it found in all even of the four illustrious Confeder have selected for special examination. Compared stitutions of Achaia and America, the Federal co Swiss Cantons before the French Revolution, and even the Seven Provinces, will appear to be only remote a the Federal idea. But in the present Chapter, whe to contrast Federalism with other political systems, my picture of a Federal Government wholly fro perfect examples. Much, therefore, that I shall s quite inapplicable to the United Provinces or to the League, much more so to the so-called German Confe our own day.

A Federal Commonwealth, then, in its perfect which forms a single state in its relations to other which consists of many states with regard to its int ment. Thus the City of Megalopolis in old times New York or the Canton of Zürich now, has absol rate existence in the face of other powers: it can or peace, or maintain ambassadors or consul[a]. Federal Government of Achaia, America, or Sw only body with which foreign nations can have[ds] But the internal laws, the law of real property, even the electoral law, may be utterly different and at Sikyôn, at New York and in Illinois, a Geneva. Nor is there any power in the Ass

/ashington, or the Federal Council at Bern, rsities into harmony. In one point of view gle commonwealth, as truly a national whole n; in another point of view, there is a col- ign commonwealths as independent of one and Spain can be. We may then recognize fect Federal Commonwealth any collection of is equally unlawful for the Central Power to he purely internal legislation of the several the several members to enter into any diplo- with other powers. Where the first condition the several members are not sovereign; their owever extensive in practice, is a merely muni- nce. Where the second condition is not obtained, wever ancient and intimate, is that of a mere her than that of a real *Confederation*. But another ll here arise. Even among those commonwealths secure to every member full internal independence, every member any separate external action, there diversities as to the way in which the Central ses its peculiar functions. It is here that we reach of Federal Governments into two classes which has wn by most of the writers on the subject.[2] In the e Federal Power represents only the Governments al members of the Union; its immediate action is hose Governments; its powers consist simply in issuing to the State Governments, which, when within the s of the Federal authority, it is the duty of those

e exceptional case, to be discussed in the course of the history, tate holding diplomatic intercouse with foreign powers by express deral power. See an instance in Polybios, ii. 48. This is most ase in which the exception proves the rule.

hli, Geschichte des schweizerischen Bundesrechtes, i. 554. erschied zwischen Staatenbund und Bundesstaat ist in dem anismus beider zu erkennen. Auch in dem Staatenbunde aten zu einem Staatsganzen verbunden, aber dieses ist r wieder als ein besonderer, von den Einzelstaaten ver- taat organisirt, sondern die Bundesgewalt ist entweder übertragen oder aus den staatlichen Spitzen der Einzel- esetzt. In dem Bundesstaate dagegen gibt es nicht bloss aten, sondern auch einen vollständig organisirten Zentral- achäische Bund zur Zeit von Philopoemen nicht mehr ein ein Bundesstaat; so sind die nord-americanischen Frei- die Schweiz seit 1848 als Bundesstaat organisirt."]

Governments to carry out. If men or money be
Federal purposes, the Federal Power will demand the
several State Governments, which will raise them in suc
as each may think best. In the other class, the Federal
will be, in the strictest sense, a *Government*, which, in the o
class, it can hardly be called. It will act not only on t
Governments of the several States, but directly on every citizen
of those States. It will be, in short, a Government co-ordinate
with the State Governments, sovereign in its own sphere, as they
are sovereign in their sphere. It will be a Government with
the usual branches, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial; with
the direct power of taxation, and the other usual powers of a
Government; with its army, its navy, its civil service, and all
the usual apparatus of a Government, all bearing directly upon
every citizen of the Union without any reference to the Govern-
ments of the several States. The State administration, within
its own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no
such thing as an Union; the Federal administration, within its
own range, will be carried on as freely as if there were no such
thing as a separate State. This last class is what writers on
International Law call a *Composite State*, or *Supreme Federal
Government*.[1] The former class they commonly remand to the
head of mere Confederacies, or, at most, *Systems of Confederate
States*.[2] Yet it is quite possible to conceive the existence of a
Federal Commonwealth, in which the Federal Power shall act
solely upon the several State Governments, which yet shall fully
answer the two conditions of external unity and internal plur-
ality. The American Union under the Confederation forbade
diplomatic action to the several States;[3] it therefore formed a
single commonwealth in the eyes of other nations. Yet the
Federal Power acted only on the several State Governments, and

Ce
Pow
direct.
all citiz

[1] This is what, in the Federalist, No. 9 (p. 47, ed. 1818) is called a *Consolidation of the States*. But Hamilton is here only using the language of objectors, and the name *consolidated* would seem better to apply to *non-Federal* commonwealths, as distinguished from Federal. It is so used by M. de Tocqueville, Démocratie en Amérique, i. 271.

[2] See Wheaton's International Law, i. 68; Austin's Province of Jurisprudence, p. 217; Calhoun's Works, i. 163; Federalist, Nos. 9, 21, 39 et passim. The distinction between the two classes is most fully and clearly drawn by Mr. J. S. Mill (Representative Government, p. 301), by Professor Bernard (Lectures on American War, Oxford, 1861, pp. 68-72), and by Tocqueville (Démocratie en Amérique, i. 250, 265 et seqq.).

[3] Articles of Confederation, Art. vi. § 1.

directly on individual citizens. The Swiss Confedera- 1815 even allowed diplomatic action to the several s within certain prescribed limits.[1] Yet, on the whole, the Swiss Confederation, and much more the American ederation of 1778, had far more in common with perfect deral, or "Composite" States, than with lax Confederacies ike the German *Bund*. The real difference between the two classes seems to be that the one is a good, the other a bad, way of compassing the same objects.[2] Both America and Switzerland found by experience that, without the direct action of the Federal Power upon individuals, the objects of the Federal Union could not be carried out. The several State Governments are indeed, under the other system, constitutionally bound to carry out all requisitions which do not transcend the limits of the Federal authority. But we may be sure that the State Governments will always lie under a strong temptation to disobey such requisitions, not only when they really transcend the limits of the Federal authority, but also when they are simply displeasing to local interests or wishes.[3] Such a compact, in short, may constitutionally be a Federal Union, but practically it will amount to little more than a precarious alliance.[4] Still a Confederation of this sort aims, however ineffectually, at being a true Federal Union. The American Confederation of 1778 professed, while the German Confederation does not profess,[5] to form one power, one nation,[6] or whatever may be the proper word, in the face of other powers and nations. The articles of Confederation wholly failed to carry out their own purpose; and

Inadequacy of the system of requisitions.

[1] See Wheaton, i. 90.

[2] "The attributes of Congress under the Confederation and under the Constitution were (with some not very important exceptions) the same. What was done was to make them real and effective in the only possible way, by making them operate directly on the people of the States, instead of on the States themselves."—Bernard, p. 69.

[3] See Mill, p. 301.

[4] Mill; Cf. Bernard, p. 68. See also Marshall's Life of Washington, iv. 256-62.

[5] On the German Confederation, see Mill, p. 300.

[6] I do not feel called upon, at all events at this stage of my work, to enter into the great American dispute between *National* and *Federal* (see Federalist, Nos. 39, 40; Tocqueville, i. 268; Calhoun, i. 112-161; Bernard, p. 72). I confess that it seems to me to be rather a question of words. A power which acts in all its relations with other powers, as a single indivisible unity, is surely a nation, whether its internal constitution be Federal or otherwise. So to call it in no way takes away from the independent rights of the several members. In the language of Polybios, the word ἔθνος is constantly applied to the Achaian and other Federal commonwealths; indeed he seems to use it as the special formal

the closer union of 1787, under the existing constitu
the result. Still, for my immediate purpose, it does n
needful to attend very closely to the distinction between
two classes of Federations. In many of the ancient Lea
with which we shall have to deal, it is evident that, on the
hand, the League formed a single state in the face of all oth
states, and that, on the other hand, the independence of the
several members was strictly preserved. But it is not always
easy to say how far the Federal Assembly and the Federal
Magistrates exercised a direct power over the individual citizens
of each city, and how far it was exercised through the Assemblies
and Magistrates of the several cities. We know, for instance,
that in the Achaian League there were Federal taxes;[1] we do
not know whether they were directly gathered by Federal
collectors, or whether they were merely requisitions to the
several cities, which their Assemblies and Magistrates apportioned
by their own authority. The latter arrangement is just as likely
as the former; but, if it could be shown to be the plan actually
in use, it would hardly have the effect of degrading the Achaian
League from the rank of a Composite State to that of a mere
Confederacy.[2] It is enough to enable a commonwealth to rank,
for our present purpose, as a true Federation, that the Union is
one which preserves to the several members their full internal
independence, while it denies to them all separate action in
relation to foreign powers. The sovereignty is, in fact, divided;

Th
tinct
not al
to be m
in history

title of such bodies. See, for instance, xx. 3, where ἔθνος, the Federal State, is opposed to πόλις, the single city-commonwealth.

According to Tocqueville (i. 268) the American constitution is neither National nor Federal, but some third thing, for which no name exists. He calls it "un gouvernement national incomplet."

The truest difference between a Federation and a perfectly consolidated Government is that already given. In a Federal state the several members retain their sovereignty within their own range; that is, the Federal power cannot alter their internal institutions. In an ordinary monarchy or republic, the supreme central power, in whomever it is vested, can alter the institutions of any province or city. See Bernard, p. 71.

[1] Pol. iv. 60 αἱ κοιναὶ εἰσφοραί.

[2] The system of requisitions is indeed in no way confined to Federal commonwealths; it is quite compatible with monarchy, and indeed it has always been exceedingly common under barbaric despotisms. The Sultan requires a certain contribution from a district, which the authorities of the district levy as best suits them. The royal administration is thus eased of a certain amount of trouble, and the district at once acquires a certain amount of municipal freedom. But that freedom, great or small, exists merely by concession or sufferance, not of right, as in a Federal State.

ament of the Federation and the Government of the ave a co-ordinate authority, each equally claiming ice within its own range. It is this system of divided eignty which I propose to contrast at some length with other principal forms of government which have prevailed different times among the most civilized nations of the world.

Forms of government may be classified according to so many principles that it is needful to state at the onset what principle of division seems most suited for the comparison which I have taken in hand. The old stereotyped division into monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, is sufficient for many purposes. A more philosophical division perhaps is that which does not look so much to the nature of the hands in which supreme power is vested, as to the question whether there is any one body or individual which can fairly be called supreme. This is the division of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, respectively, into *absolute* and *constitutional* examples of their several classes.[1] Thus the old Athenian commonwealth, where all power was directly exercised by the People, was an Absolute Democracy. An American State, on the other hand, where the People is recognized as the ultimate sovereign, where all power is held to flow from the people, but where a delegated authority is divided in different proportions between a Governor, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, is said to be an example of Constitutional Democracy. In this way of looking at them, an Absolute Government of any of the three kinds has quite as many points in common with an Absolute Government of one of the other kinds, as it has in common with a Constitutional Government of its own class. But neither of these divisions seems suited to our present purpose.[2] A Federal commonwealth may be either aristocratic or democratic; or some of its members may be aristocratic and others democratic; those Aristocracies and Democracies again may exhibit either the Absolute or the Con-

Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy.

Absolute and Constitutional Governments.

A cross division needed.

[1] See Calhoun's Works, i. 28, 34 et seqq.

[2] [Cf., on the classification of constitutions, Pütter, Historische Entwickelung der heutigen Staatsverfassung des teutschen Reichs (3rd ed.) ii. 159. He observes that, in discussing the constitution of the "German Empire," "man dachte nicht daran, dass zum Massstabe der verschiedenen Regierungsformen sich noch eine höhere Abtheilung einfacher und zusammengesetzter Staaten denken liess, und nur auf erstere jene dreyfache Eintheilung (namely, monarchic, aristocratic, democratic) passte." He failed to recognize the theoretic possibility of a Federal Monarchy.]

stitutional type of their own classes; indeed, though Federal States have commonly been republican, there is nothing theoretically absurd in the idea of a Federal Monarchy. The classification of governments, which we must make in order to work out the required contrast between Federalism and other forms, will be in fact a cross division to the common classification into Monarchies, Aristocracies, and Democracies. Federalism, as I have already said, is essentially a compromise; it is something intermediate between two extremes. A Federal Government is most likely to be formed when the question arises whether several small states shall remain perfectly independent, or shall be consolidated into a single great state. A Federal tie harmonizes the two contending principles by reconciling a certain amount of union with a certain amount of independence. A Federal Government then is a mean between the system of large states and the system of small states. But both the large states, the small states, and the intermediate Federal system, may assume a democratic, an aristocratic, or even a monarchic form of government, just as may happen.

Federalism a compromise between Great and Small States.

The two extremes then, with which the Federal system has to be compared, are the system of small states and the system of large states. Speaking roughly, the one is the ordinary political system of what is called classical antiquity, the other is the ordinary political system of modern Europe. The system of small states finds its most perfect developement in the independent city-commonwealths of Old Greece; the system of large states finds its most perfect developement in the large monarchies of Europe in our own day. It is not too much to say that the large and the small state alike may be either monarchic, aristocratic, or democratic. As a general rule, small states have flourished most as republics, and large states have flourished most as monarchies, and the natural tendency of the two classes of states seems to lie in those two directions respectively. But there is no sort of contradiction in the idea of a small state being monarchic or of a large state being republican. Many small principalities have enjoyed a fair amount of prosperity and good government, and the experiment of governing a large country as a single republic has been so seldom tried that we are hardly in position to decide whether it is necessarily a failure or not.[1]

The Division irrespective of their several Forms of Government.

[1] See Tocqueville, i. 270, 271; ii. 250.

But, this question apart, it is clear that a small republic may be either aristocratic or democratic, that a large kingdom may be either despotic or constitutional. And it is also clear that, while free states, great and small, have certain points of resemblance, large states and small states respectively have also some points of resemblance, irrespective of their several forms of government. It is in these points, where large states, whatever their constitution, form one class, and small states, whatever their constitution, form another, that Federalism takes its position, as a mean between the two, sharing some of the characteristics of both. I may add, that while Federalism, as a compromise, is liable to some of the inherent disadvantages of a compromise, it manifestly, in those positions for which it is suited at all, goes a good way to unite the opposite advantages of the two opposite systems between which it stands as a mean term.

I shall therefore now proceed, first to contrast at some length the two great systems of large and of small states, and then to show the way in which a Federal Government occupies a position intermediate between the two.[1]

Definition of Large and Small States.

Speaking roughly, I understand by a small state one in which it is possible that all the citizens may, if their constitution allows or requires it, habitually assemble for political purposes in one place. By a large state I understand one in which such personal assemblage is impossible; one, therefore, where, if the state be constitutional, the constitution must be of the representative kind. The large state, however, to have all the characteristics and advantages of a large state, must commonly be much larger than is absolutely necessary to answer the terms of this definition. But I by no means intend to confine the name to what are commonly understood by the name of Great Powers. All the Kingdoms of Europe, and even some principalities which are not Kingdoms, will count as large states for the purposes of this inquiry. All alike share the characteristics which distinguish them from the system of small states. The most perfect form of this last is found when every City, with its immediately surrounding territory, forms a commonwealth absolutely independent and enjoying all the rights of a sovereign power.

[1] It may be objected that a Federation may consist either of small or of large states as they are here defined. I shall recur to this point presently.

This was the political system usual in the commonwealths of ancient Greece and Italy, and it has been fully elucidated by the various great modern writers on Greek and Roman history, but most fully and elaborately by Mr. Grote. The ruling idea of the politicians of those ages was what Mr. Grote calls the "autonomous city-community." A man's "country,"[1] in those days, was not a region, but a city;[2] his patriotism did not extend over a wide surface of territory, but was shut up within the walls of a single town. His countrymen were not a whole nation of the same blood and language as himself, but merely those who shared with him in the local burghership of his native place. A man, in short, was not a Greek or an Italian, but an Athenian or a Roman. Undoubtedly he had a feeling, which may, in a certain sense, be called a patriotic feeling, for Greece or Italy as wholes, as opposed to Persia or Carthage. But this feeling was rather analogous to that which modern Europeans entertain for the great brotherhood of European and Christian nations, than to the national patriotism which an Englishman or a Frenchman entertains for England or France. The tie between Greek and Greek was indeed closer than the tie between European and European, but it was essentially a tie of the same kind. Real patriotism, the feeling which we extend to regions far larger than the whole of Greece, did not reach beyond the limits of a single Grecian city. This state of things is by no means peculiar to ancient Greece and Italy; traces of it are still to be seen in modern Europe; and it existed in its full force in some European states down to very recent times. But it was in the brilliant times of ancient Greece and Italy that this system found its fullest developement, and that it made its nearest approach to being universal over the civilized world. In modern Europe independent cities have existed and flourished; a few indeed even now retain a nominal existence. But such independent cities have been, for the most part, merely exceptional cases, surrounded by larger states whose form of government was monarchical. In ancient Greece and Italy the independent city was the ruling political conception, and in ancient Greece, in the days of her greatest glory, it was the form of political life almost universally received.

Characteristics of the Independent City.

Patriotism confined to the City.

[1] Πατρίς. The same use of the word is common in modern Greek.

[2] Aristotle excludes from his definition of πόλις anything at all approaching to the size of a nation. Babylon is hardly a city—ἔχει περιγραφὴν ἔθνους μᾶλλον ἢ πόλεως.—Polit. iii. 3, 5. Cf. Polyb. ii. 37.

Full development of city-independence in Greece.

Indeed the greater and more civilized the state, the more completely do we find the idea of municipal republicanism carried out. Neither of the other alternative forms of freedom, the constitutional monarchy and the Federal republic, was at any time absolutely unknown in the Grecian world. The polity of the Homeric age, the King or chief of each town, with a King of Kings at Mykênê as suzerain over at least all Peloponnêsos, might conceivably have grown into a monarchy, first of the feudal, and then of the modern constitutional type. And, in the half-Greek states of Epeiros and Macedonia, we actually find that the heroic royalty did develope into something which may be fairly called a rude and early form of constitutional monarchy. The Epeirot Kings swore obedience to the laws; the Macedonian, though a subject of a king, looked on himself as a freeman, and there were Macedonian assemblies which, however great may have been the royal influence, did impose at least some formal restraint upon the royal will.[1] On the other hand, the robbers of Ætolia, the respectable but obscure townships of the Achaian shore, and some other of the less advanced and less important members of the Hellenic body, possessed, as far back as we can trace their history, some germs of a polity which may fairly entitle them to rank among Federal commonwealths. But both the monarchic and the Federal states lagged for a long time far behind the purely municipal ones. In the Greece of Herodotos and Thucydidês, they play no distinguished part. In the Greece of Xenophôn and Isokratês, they still remain far from prominent; for the greatness of Thebes is really a municipal and not a Federal greatness. In short, constitutional monarchy never attained any full developement in the ancient world, and Federalism became important only when the most brilliant days of Greece were past. Both in Greece and Italy, the most important states so early threw aside regal government altogether that the idea of the King ruling according to Law, though certainly not unknown to Greek political thinkers, had no opportunity to assume any fully-developed form. And though a day came when nearly all Greece was mapped out into Federal Republics, that day did not come till the system of perfectly

Early approaches to Constitutional Monarchy,

and to Federal Republicanism.

Their comparative unimportance before the Macedonian period.

Municipal character of the Greek Commonwealths,

[1] On the Macedonians and their Kings, see Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. (April, 1857), 317-20, and the note and references in p. 327. See also Polybios, v. 27, 29; cf. Drumann, Geschichte des Verfalls, p. 23. Of the Molossian kingdom I shall have occasion to speak in my fourth Chapter.

independent separate cities had run its short and glorious career. Throughout the most brilliant days of Greece, all the greatest Greek states were strictly sovereign municipalities. The political franchise of the state was co-extensive with the municipal franchise of the city. And this was equally true whether the form of government of that city was aristocratic or democratic. The difference between a Greek aristocracy and a Greek democracy was simply whether legislative power and eligibility to high office were extended to the whole, or confined to a part, of the class of hereditary burghers. In no case did they extend beyond that class; in no case could the freedman, the foreigner, or even the dependent ally, obtain citizenship by residence or even by birth in the land. He who was not the descendant of citizen ancestors could be enfranchised only by special decree of the sovereign Assembly. In the democracy and the oligarchy alike the City was the only political existence, the one centre of patriotism. To live at a distance so great that it was impossible to appear habitually at Assemblies held within its walls was felt to be equivalent to sentence of exile.[1] The essentially civic character of a Greek state was not even affected by the occurrence of that irregular form of Monarchy to which the Greeks gave the name of *Tyranny*.[2] Even the Tyrant is still the Tyrant of the City; however oppressive his internal rule may be, he identifies himself with the military glory and outward prosperity of that particular city, and does not think of merging its separate being in any larger kingdom. He may conquer other cities by force of arms, but those cities are not incorporated like the annexations of modern potentates. Their inhabitants do not become the fellow-subjects of the inhabitants of the Tyrant's own city; the conquered city remains a dependency of the conquering capital. It was not till Greece had, in the

aristocratic and democratic alike.

Civic Tyrannies.

[1] "The natural limit of a democracy, is that distance from the central point, which will but just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand."—Federalist, No. xiv. p. 71. This is equally true of all Greek commonwealths, aristocratic and democratic alike.

[2] I shall, in my fifth Chapter, have occasion to speak more at length of the Greek Tyrannies. I will here only remark that I use the word throughout in its Greek sense. The Greek τύραννος is one who holds kingly power in a state whose laws do not recognize a King. He differs from the King (βασιλεύς) in the origin of his power, rather than in the mode of its exercise. The King may rule ill; the Tyrant may (though he seldom does) rule well; still the authority of the King is lawful, that of the Tyrant is unlawful. In short, the word *Emperor*, in its modern sense, exactly translates τύραννος; but one cannot talk of an Emperor of Megalopolis.

days of Macedonian influence, become familiarized with extensive monarchies, that the old Tyranny of Dionysios gradually grew up, in the hands of Agathoklês and Hierôn, into something like a Kingdom of Sicily. Everywhere, whatever might be the internal form of government in the particular city, the autonomous town-community, owning no sovereign, no feudal or Federal superior, beyond its own walls, was the ruling political idea of Greece in her best days, and the more advanced and civilized was the state, the more closely did it cling to that one favourite ideal of a commonwealth.

Condition of Dependent Cities in Greece.

As in many other cases, we shall be better able to take in the force and prevalence of the rule by looking at cases which formed exceptions to it.[1] The sovereign and independent city was indeed the political ideal of Greece, but there were many Grecian cities which were far from being sovereign and independent. But this was simply because the force of some stronger city stood in the way of their sovereignty and independence. There were many towns which were not independent; but every town looked on independence as its right; every town which was not independent deemed its loss of independence to be an injury, and was constantly looking out for opportunities to recover the right of which it felt itself deprived. The call to make all Greeks autonomous was the popular cry set up by Sparta against imperial Athens.[2] But the condition of a city thus shorn of its sovereignty sets more clearly before us what the nature of the city-sovereignty was. Such a dependent city, as Mr. Grote has shown in the case of the allies of Athens, was by no means necessarily subjected to anything which we should call foreign oppression. It might, and in many cases did, retain its own laws, its own local administration, its own political constitution, oligarchic or democratic according to the strength of parties within its own walls. It might, or it might not, be subject to a tribute to the superior State; it might even, in some favoured cases, retain fleets and armies of its own, raised by its own government and commanded by its own officers. It is clear that a city in such a condition retains a degree of local independence far greater than is allowed to any merely municipal body in the least centralized of European kingdoms. Its condition at first sight seems rather to approach to the

Difference between a dependent City and a member of a Federation.

[1] On the relation of Dependent Alliance, see Arnold, Later Roman Commonwealth, i. 165.

[2] Thucydidês, i. 139 et al.

purely internal sovereignty of a Swiss Canton or an American State. What it lacks of full sovereignty is exactly what they lack; it lacks a separate being among the nations of the earth; it cannot make war or conclude foreign alliances; its public quarrels are decided for it by a tribunal external to itself. Where then lies the difference? It is this. The municipality in a Constitutional Monarchy, the State in a Federal Republic, has indeed no direct corporate voice in the general administration, but that general administration is carried on by persons or bodies in whose appointment the citizens of the municipality or of the State have a direct or indirect voice. But a dependent city in Greece had its foreign relations marked out for it by a power over which it had no control whatever. An English town, as such, has nothing to do with peace or war, or with general taxation and legislation. But then laws are made and taxes are imposed by an Assembly to which that town sends representatives; peace and war are virtually made by Ministers who are virtually appointed by that Assembly. An American State, sovereign as it is within its own sphere, has no more corporate voice than a mere municipality in those high national concerns which are entrusted to the Federal Government.[1] But then the Government to which those concerns are entrusted consists of a President and Congress in the choice of whom the citizens of that State have a voice no less than in the choice of their own local Governor and Legislature. Thus, in both cases, if national questions are not submitted to the smaller body in its corporate capacity, it is simply because, in relation to such questions, the citizens of the smaller body act directly as citizens of the larger. But in relation to this same class of questions, the citizens of a dependent Greek city had no means of acting at all. The most favoured ally of Athens, Chios, for instance, or Mitylênê, quite as independent internally as an American State, had absolutely no voice, in any shape, in the general concerns of the Confederacy. So far were Chios and Mitylênê from themselves declaring war and peace that they had no sort of control over those who did declare war and peace. Their fleets and armies were at the absolute bidding, not of a

[1] The Federal Senators in the United States are indeed elected by the State Legislatures, and are held specially to represent the State Sovereignties. But the State Legislatures themselves are not consulted, and the Senators, when elected, vote as individuals, just like the Representatives.

President in whose election their citizens had a voice, not of a King governed by Ministers whom their citizens indirectly chose, but at the bidding of the Assembly of the City of Athens, an Assembly in which no Chian or Mitylenæan had a seat. A public dispute between Methymna and Mitylênê was not judged, like a dispute between New York and Ohio,[1] by a Supreme Court nominated by a President of their own choice, but by the local tribunals of a distant city, over whose nomination they had not the slightest influence of any kind. In many respects the condition of a dependent Greek city resembled that of an English Colony. The two agree in most of those points which effectually distinguish both from the member of a Federation. Both, unlike the Confederate City or Canton, are strictly dependencies of a greater power. The Colony, like the Athenian ally, is independent internally, but its relations towards other nations are determined for it by a power over which neither the Colony nor its citizens have any sort of control.[2] But there is one all-important difference between the British Colony and the Athenian Ally. The disqualifications of the colonist are purely local; he is a British subject equally with the inhabitants of Britain; he can come and live in England, and may become, no less than the native Englishman, elector, representative, or even Minister. The disqualifications of the Athenian ally were personal; the Chian or Mitylenæan was not an Athenian, but a foreigner; if he transferred his residence to Athens, he lost his influence in his own city, while he acquired none in the city in which he dwelled. Partly because he personally remains an Englishman, partly because the instinct of perfect independence is not now so keenly felt as it was in old Greece, the colonist commonly acquiesces in the dependent position of his Colony. It is felt that dependence is more than counterbalanced by perfect internal freedom combined with the gratuitous protection of the mother-country. As long as the mother-country abstains from practical oppression, as long as the Colony does not become so strong as to make dependence palpably incongruous, an English Colony has really no temptation to separate. But, in a dependent Greek city, the citizens were personally in an inferior position to the citizens of the ruling state, while the city itself was deprived of a

Comparison with English Colonies.

[1] See Tocqueville, Démocratie en Amérique, i. 254.

[2] See Lewis, Government of Dependencies, p. 155 et seqq.

power to which the political instinct of the Greek mind held that it had an inherent right. The sway of Athens did not necessarily involve either actual oppression[1] or any loss of purely local freedom ; it was the loss of all share in Sovereignty in the highest sense which the Greek city deplored when it was reduced to a condition of dependent alliance.

It follows therefore that a system like the Athenian Alliance or Empire always remained a system of detached units. A Greek city either remained independent, retaining its full sovereign rights, or else it became more or less dependent upon some stronger city. There was no means by which it was possible to fuse any large number of cities, like the members of the Athenian Alliance, into a single body with equal rights common to all. A Federal Union easily effects this end, but it effects it only by depriving each city of the most precious attributes of separate sovereignty. A Constitutional Monarchy, by means of the representative system, also easily effects it, though of course at a still greater sacrifice of local independence. Even under a despotism, there is not the slightest need for placing the inhabitants of a conquered, ceded, or inherited province in any worse position than the inhabitants of the original kingdom. But a Greek city had no choice but either absolute independence or a position of decided inferiority to some other city. It is clear that a city-commonwealth can incorporate only within very narrow limits. In such a commonwealth the city itself is everything in a way into which the inhabitants of large kingdoms can hardly enter. And the representative system, by which all the inhabitants of a large country are enabled to have a share in the government, is not likely to occur to men's minds in such a state of things. Every citizen in a Democracy, every citizen of the ruling order in an Aristocracy, deems it his inalienable right to discharge his political functions in his own person. Consequently incorporation cannot be carried out over an extent of

No means of Incorporation under the system of Independent Cities.

[1] That there were isolated cases of oppression on the part of individual Athenian commanders, like Pachês, there is no doubt. But there was certainly no habitual oppression on the part of the Athenian government. This has been forcibly brought out by Mr. Grote (vi. 47, and elsewhere). See also North British Review, May 1856, p. 169. Cf. Lewis, Government of Dependencies, p. 102.

I have drawn my picture of a Greek dependent city from the most favoured of the Athenian allies. But the condition of different allies of Athens differed much ; and the position of a dependency of Sparta or Thebes in the next generation was far inferior to that of the least favoured subject of Athens.

Incorporation carried as far as possible by Athens,

territory so large as to prevent the whole ruling body from habitually assembling in the city. Athens indeed, in a remote and unchronicled age, actually carried incorporation as far as a city-commonwealth could carry it. There is no record of the causes and circumstances of the change, but there is no reasonable doubt that the smaller towns of Attica, Eleusis, Marathôn, and the rest, were once independent states,[1] which were afterwards incorporated with Athens, not as subjects of the ruling commonwealth, but as municipal towns whose inhabitants possessed the common Athenian franchise equally with the inhabitants of the capital.[2] But then Attica was not so large a territory as to hinder all its free inhabitants from frequently meeting together in a capital whose position was admirably central. All Attica therefore was really incorporated with Athens. Athens became the only City, in the highest sense, in all Attica, and all the free inhabitants of Attica became her citizens. But this incorporation, which geographical position rendered possible in the case of old Attic towns, could never have been extended to all the members of the later Athenian Empire. If the jealousy of the Sovereign People could have stooped to communicate its franchise to subjects, or even to allies, it was utterly impossible that the rights of Athenian citizens could have been exercised by the inhabitants of Rhodes or of Byzantium. Even a Federal Union, except one which admitted the representative principle, could hardly have bound together such distant members; to unite them into a single commonwealth of the ancient type was physically impossible.

in the case of the old Attic Cities.

Impossible in the case of the later Athenian Empire.

[1] See North British Review, May 1856, p. 150.

[2] There can be no doubt that this incorporation was the main cause of the great power and importance of Athens. As such, it is one of the great events in the history of the world. No other Greek city possessed so large an immediate territory, or so great a number of free and equal citizens. The territory of Sparta was much larger; but then Sparta held the Lakonian towns as subjects; their inhabitants had no voice in general politics; whatever freedom they had was merely that of municipalities under a despotism. Thebes called herself the head of a Bœotian League, but the smaller Bœotian towns, as we shall see when we reach that part of her history, looked on her as a Tyrant rather than a President. A Bœotian town was practically a subject dependency of Thebes, but throughout Attica, a territory hardly smaller than Bœotia, the smaller towns were free municipalities, and their inhabitants were citizens of Athens. This was a wonderful advantage, precluding all fear of internal treason or discontent.

There is a dialogue in Xenophôn, comparing Bœotia and Athens at length, in which the Athenians are always set against the Bœotians as a whole, not against the Thebans only. *οὐκοῦν οἶσθα, ἔφη, ὅτι πλήθει μὲν οὐδὲν μείους εἰσὶν Ἀθηναῖοι Βοιωτῶν; οἶδα γὰρ, ἔφη.*—Xen. Mem. iii. 5, 2.

So in later times, wherever the system of city-commonwealths existed, we find subject cities and districts following naturally in the wake of other cities, which bear rule over them. We find the system of the Athenian Empire followed, even in cases where no geographical obstacle prevented the imitation of the earlier Athenian system of incorporation. Venice, Genoa, Florence, held sway over other cities and districts, sometimes near neighbours, sometimes dependencies beyond the sea. In both cases the subject countries often retained large municipal privileges, but in neither case did the Sovereign City ever dream of conferring on their inhabitants any share in its own more exalted rights. So in the old state of things in Switzerland, both the League as a whole and many of the several Cantons, democratic Uri no less than oligarchic Bern, assumed the character of despotic sovereigns over subject districts, which they too often governed yet more purely in the interest of the sovereign state than had been done by Athens or Venice. In short among city-commonwealths, where the Federal principle is not admitted, absolute political independence or absolute political subjection are the only alternatives. Once only in the history of the world has incorporation on a large scale been tried in the case of a city-commonwealth. And in that one case the experiment undoubtedly failed. The geographical position of Rome allowed an extension of the Roman franchise far wider than was possible with the franchise of Athens or of any other Greek city. From the narrow limits of the old *Ager Romanus* the freedom of the Roman city was gradually spread over the whole of Italy, and, when it had long ceased to confer any real political rights, its name was further extended to the inhabitants of the whole civilized world. Within certain bounds, this liberal extension of the franchise made Rome the greatest and mightiest of all cities. But the same system, carried beyond those bounds, led directly to the destruction of Roman freedom. Federation was not tried; it would have been inconsistent with the dignity of the Sovereign City. Representation was unheard of; so the hundreds and thousands of citizens of the allied states were gradually admitted to a personal vote in the Roman Assembly. The result naturally was that the Assembly became at last a frantic and ungovernable mob, utterly incapable of peaceful deliberation. When called on to discharge any political functions, to pass a law or to elect a magistrate, it commonly

Dependencies of mediæval and modern Italian cities,

and of Swiss Cantons.

Effects of incorporation at Rome.

appealed at once to violence, murder, perhaps to open civil war. From such a state of things even the despotism of the Cæsars was felt to be a relief. The Athenian, Venetian, or Bernese system was much as if the local Livery of London were invested with the supreme power over the whole United Kingdom, leaving to the other towns and counties full municipal, but only municipal, independence. The Roman system was as if the Livery of London were invested with the supreme power, every elector in the United Kingdom being at the same time invested with the freedom of the City.[1]

Greece then was the true home of the system of independent city-commonwealths, the land where the system reached its fullest and its most brilliant developement, the land where its good and its evil results may be most fairly balanced against each other. In ancient Italy the system hardly attained to full perfection; it was modified by a far stronger tendency than in Greece to unite many cities by a Federal tie, and also by the steady and increasing power of the one City of Rome. In modern, and even in mediæval, Europe Town-autonomy has always had but a comparatively feeble life. Many commonwealths of Italy, Germany, and the old Burgundian Kingdom,[2] have attained to fame, wealth, and power; but, even in the most brilliant days of mediæval Italy, town-autonomy was the exception and not the rule. Most European states, great and small, have always been monarchies. Such city-commonwealths as have existed have always had a far greater tendency than in Greece, sometimes to join themselves into Confederacies, sometimes to degenerate from great Cities into petty Principalities.[3] And, in truth, the perfect city-autonomy of old Greece could not exist in mediæval Europe. The still abiding life of the Roman

Town-autonomy in mediæval Europe.

[1] See National Review, April 1859, p. 337.

[2] I must remark, once for all, that mediæval history cannot be properly understood unless it be fully understood that the Kingdom of Burgundy, the region between the Saone, the Alps, and the Mediterranean, is historically no part of France. It has been gradually acquired by the Kings and "Emperors" of Paris, by a series of stealthy robberies (réunions), reaching from the thirteenth century to the nineteenth. Part of the country still retains its freedom as the Western Cantons of Switzerland. Lyons, Besançon, Marseilles, were anciently Free Cities of the Empire; they have been swallowed up, while Geneva and Bern have as yet escaped; that is the only difference.

[3] Most of the points touched on in this paragraph I have worked out more at large in the Oxford Essays for 1857, Ancient Greece and Mediæval Italy, p. 156 et seqq.

Empire forbade it. The parts of Europe where the cities attained to the greatest splendour lay within the bounds of one or other of the monarchies which retained the style and imperial pretensions of old Rome. Cherson[1] and the Campanian Republics were dependencies of the Byzantine Emperor; so was Venice, in name at least, long after she had attained to practical independence. The other cities which possessed republican constitutions, in Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Provence, and the Netherlands,[2] all lay within the limits of the Empire of the West. However carefully the Imperial power might be limited in practice, no commonwealth absolutely denied its existence in theory. The city then was not absolutely independent; it had an earthly superior, entitled always to honorary respect, often to some measure of practical obedience. A Greek city owned no king but Zeus; a German or Italian city had at least a nominal king in Cæsar.[3] The title of "Free Imperial City," borne as a badge of honour by many a proud mediæval commonwealth, would have sounded like a contradiction in terms in the ears of an Athenian. Venice alone, through her peculiar position and her peculiar policy, obtained complete independence in name as well as fact. The island city retained her nominal allegiance to the Emperor of the East till she became strong enough to dispense with all recognition of the successor either of Constantine or of Charles. But even Florence and Genoa in the days of their might would hardly have denied that some vague and shadowy superiority over them belonged of right to the chosen King of Germany and Italy, the crowned and anointed Emperor of the Romans. From all these causes, the independence of city-commonwealths, even in mediæval, and still more in modern, Europe, must be looked on as merely a secondary element, existing only in an imperfect shape. It is to old Greece that we must ever look for its one great and splendid manifestation.

Independence of cities modified by the claims of the Emperors.

[1] For the deeply-interesting history of Cherson, literally the Last of the Greek Republics, see Finlay, Byzantine Empire, i. 415 [History of Greece, ii. 350] et seqq.

[2] Strictly speaking, the cities in the County of Flanders should be excepted, as Flanders, or its greatest portion, was a fief of the Crown of France. But the history of Flanders can hardly be separated from that of the neighbouring and kindred provinces which were all fiefs of the Empire. Provence, of course, was not French till late in the fifteenth century.

[3] The Emperor of course was supreme, in theory at least, everywhere. But the independence of a town was often much more practically modified by the neighbourhood of some local Duke, Count, or Bishop.

General view of the system of Independent Cities.

Let us now strive to picture to ourselves the condition of a country whose great political doctrine is that of the perfect independence of each separate city. Such a land is crowded with towns, each of them acknowledging no superior upon earth and exercising all the rights of sovereignty as fully as the mightiest empires. Within limits, it may be, less than those of an English county, among a people one in blood, language, manners, and religion, you may pass, in a short day's journey, through several independent states, each of which makes war and peace at its pleasure, and whose relations to its neighbours are regulated only by the public Law of Nations. From any lofty peak you may look down on several capitals at a glance, and see the territory of several sovereign commonwealths lying before you as in a map. Within this narrow compass there may be perfect examples of every varying shade of political constitution.[1] In one city pure Democracy may reign; magistrates may be chosen, laws may be enacted, treaties may be ratified, by an Assembly in which every free citizen has an equal voice.

Varieties in internal Constitutions.

In another, an hour or two from its gates, all power may be in the hands of a narrow Oligarchy, who bind themselves by oath to be evil-minded to the People.[2] In a third, at no greater distance, we may even find that name of fear, the Tyrant—the ruler whose power rests on no hereditary right, on no popular choice, but who dwells entrenched in his citadel, lording it over unwilling subjects by the spears of foreign mercenaries. Thus, within this narrow compass, we may see every form of government in its extremest shape, and we may see them too in all those intermediate forms by which each shades off imperceptibly into the others. We may see Democracies in which an acknowledged sovereignty of the People is found not to be inconsistent

[1] [This is well brought out by Pütter in regard to the Germany of his day, Hist. Entw. der heutigen Staatsverf. des teutschen Reichs, ii. 162. "Kurz was irgend einem, der mehrere unabhängige Staaten in Europa bereiset, deren Verschiedenheit in Verfassung, Gesetzen und anderen Einrichtungen begreiflich machen kann, das wird einen Reisenden in Teutschland bald eben so deutlich, und oft noch viel auffallender belehren, dass es ganz verschiedene Staaten sind, wo er oft nicht halbe Tagereisen braucht, um bald republicanische, bald monarchische, bald eingeschränkte, bald beynahe despotische, bald erbliche, bald auf Wahlfreyheit beruhende Regierungsformen wahrzunehmen, um mit jedem neuen Gebiete wieder ganz andere Gesetze, ganz andere Münzen, andere Posten, andere Soldaten zu finden."]

[2] Arist. Pol. v. [viii.] 9, 11. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐνίαις [ὀλιγαρχίαις] ὀμνύουσι "καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακόνους ἔσομαι, καὶ βουλεύσω ὅ τι ἂν ἔχω κακόν."

with the practical ascendancy of a high-born and wealthy class, the leaders of the People but not their masters. We may see Aristocracies, where the ruling order is not a band of sworn oppressors, but a race of hereditary chiefs, submitted to, if not with cordial love, at least with traditional respect. We may even see Tyrannies, where the Tyrant would scarcely, in modern language, deserve the name, where he is sometimes hardly to be distinguished from a popular chief, sometimes hardly to be distinguished from a hereditary King.[1] And besides every variety of internal government, we may also see, within this same narrow compass, every possible variety of political relation between city and city. For, though every city claims independent sovereignty as its right, it may well be that every city is not strong enough practically to maintain that right. One city may stand absolutely alone, neither ruling over others, nor ruled by others, nor yet entering into habitual alliance with any other power.[2] Others, though not connected by anything which can be called a Federal tie, may yet be attached to each other by ancient affection; they may be accustomed to have friends and enemies in common, and they may, without resigning any portion of their independent sovereignty, habitually follow the political lead of some mightier and more venerable city.[3] Others may have sunk from independent into dependent alliance; their internal laws and government may be their own, but their fleets and armies may be at the absolute control of another state.[4]

Varieties in externa Relations.

[1] In the Islands and in the colonies Tyranny seems to have been less carefully distinguished from lawful Kingship than in continental Greece. Pindar freely applies the name βασιλεύς to the Sicilian Tyrants, but it may be doubted whether Herodotos, when speaking in his own person, ever distinctly applies the name to any Tyrant. This has been pointed out by a writer in the National Review 1862, p. 300.

The Tyrannies, both in continental Greece and in the colonies, must be carefully distinguished from the few cases of lawful Kingship which lingered on in a few outlying places, Salamis in Cyprus for instance, long after its general abolition.

[2] See the policy of Korkyra as set forth in Thucydidês, i. 32, 37.

[3] This was the condition of the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta during the great Peloponnesian War. Lacedæmôn took the habitual lead, but matters of common interest were debated by the voices of the whole Confederacy, and each city was free to act, or not to act, as it thought good. See Thuc. i. 125; v. 30; Grote, vi. 105. It is instructive to see how, after the temporary conclusions following the Peace of Nikias (B.C. 421), the different states gradually fell back into their old places and relations. Cf. Xen. Hell. vii. 4, 8.

[4] This was the condition of Chios, Mitylênê, and the other allies of Athens which never exchanged contributions of men for contributions of money. See Grote, vi. 2.

Or they may even be without any fleet or army of their own; they may pay tribute to some imperial city, which engages in return to defend them against all aggressors.[1] Or some unhappy cities may have fallen lower still; dependent alliance may have sunk into absolute subjection. Law and life and property may all be at the absolute command of a foreign governor, for whom even the domestic Tyrant would be a good exchange. And his yoke may be embittered rather than alleviated, when his power is supported by the intrigues of degenerate citizens who find their private advantage in the degradation of their native city.[2] Again, as there may be every conceivable variety of relation between city and city, so we may also find, within the same narrow compass, every conceivable variety of relation between the city itself and its surrounding territory. In one district, as we have seen in the case of Attica, every free inhabitant, that is every man who is neither a slave nor a foreigner,[3] enjoys the full franchise of the City, votes in its Assemblies, and is eligible to its honours. In another, the rural inhabitants may be personally free, protected by the laws in all their private rights, but shut out from the political franchise, subjects in short, rather than citizens, of the sovereign commonwealth.[4] In the third, the City, the abode of free warrior-nobles, may be surrounded by lands tilled for them by serfs, Lakonian Helots or Thessalian Penests, whose highest privilege is to be the slaves of the Commonwealth, and not the slaves of any individual master. But, in all these cases alike, the City is the only recognized political existence. Each city is either sovereign or deems itself wronged by being shorn of sovereignty. At a few miles from the gates of one independent city we may find another, speaking the same tongue, worshipping the same gods, sharing in the same national festivals, but living under different municipal laws, different political constitutions, with a different coinage, different

Different relation between the City and its Territory.

[1] This was the condition of the great mass of the Athenian allies.

[2] This was the condition of the extra-Peloponnesian allies of Sparta after the great victory of Aigospotamos (B.C. 405). On the harmosts and dekarchies, see Grote, ix. 271 et seqq.; Isok. Panath. 58.

[3] It must be of course borne in mind that the children of a foreigner, though born in the land, still remained foreigners. This seems strange to us as applied to the question of nationality, but it is simply the rule of burghership as it was carried out in many an old English borough.

[4] This is essentially the condition of the Lakonian *περίοικοι*. They had towns, but all notion of their separate political being was so utterly lost, that their inhabitants had more in common with a rural population.

weights and measures, different names, it may be, for the very months of the year, levying duties at its frontiers, making war, making peace, sending forth its Ambassadors under the protection of the Law of Nations, and investing the bands which wage its border warfare with all the rights of the armies and the commanders of belligerent empires.

Now what is the comparative gain and loss of such a political system as this? There are great and obvious advantages, balanced by great and obvious drawbacks. Let us first look at the bright side of a system to which the nation on which the world must ever look as its first teacher owed the most brilliant pages of that history which still remains the text-book of all political knowledge.

Comparative gain and loss of the system.

First of all, it is clear that, in a system of city-commonwealths, the individual citizen is educated, worked up, improved, to the highest possible pitch. Every citizen in the Democracy, every citizen of the ruling order in the Aristocracy, is himself statesman, judge, and warrior. English readers are apt to blame such a government as the Athenian Democracy for placing power in hands unfit to use it. The truer way of putting the case would be to say that the Athenian Democracy made a greater number of citizens fit to use power than could be made fit by any other system. No mistake can be greater than to suppose that the popular Assembly at Athens was a mob such as gathers at some English elections, or such as the Assembly of the Roman Tribes undoubtedly became in its later days. It was not an indiscriminate gathering together of every male human being to be found in the streets of Athens. Citizenship was something definite; if it was a right, it was also a privilege. The citizen of Athens was in truth placed in something of an aristocratic position; he looked down upon the vulgar herd of slaves, freedmen, and unqualified residents, much as his own plebeian fathers had been looked down upon by the old Eupatrids in the days before Kleisthenês and Solôn.[1] The Athenian Assembly was an assembly of citizens, of ordinary citizens

Advantages of small commonwealths.

Political Education of the individual Citizen.

[1] This quasi-aristocratic position of the citizen necessarily follows from the nature of a civic franchise. The freedom of the city could be acquired only by inheritance or by special grant. But in a great commercial and imperial city like Athens a large unqualified population naturally arose, among whom the citizens held a sort of aristocratic rank. Such an unqualified population may exist either in an Oligarchy or in a Democracy, and their position is legally the

without sifting or selection; but it was an assembly of citizens among whom the political average stood higher than it ever did in any other state. Our own House of Commons, though

same in either case. The difference between Oligarchy and Democracy is a difference *within* the citizen class. In a Democracy civil and political rights are coextensive; in an Oligarchy political rights are confined to a portion only of those who enjoy civil rights.

The really weak point of Greek Democracy is one which I have not mentioned in the text, because I wish to make my remarks as far as possible applicable to city-commonwealths in general, whether aristocratic or democratic. Each gives the same political education to those who exercise political rights; the difference is that in the Democracy this education is extended to all the citizens, in the Aristocracy it is confined to a part of them. The real special weakness of pure Democracy is that it almost seems to require slavery as a necessary condition of its existence. It is hard to conceive that a large body of men, like the qualified citizens of Athens, can ever give so large a portion of their time as the Athenians did to the business of ruling and judging (ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν), without the existence of an inferior class to relieve them from at least the lowest and most menial duties of their several callings. Slavery therefore is commonly taken for granted by Greek political thinkers. In Aristotle's ideal city (Pol. vii. 10, 13) the earth is to be tilled either by slaves or by barbarian περίοικοι. In an Aristocracy no such constant demands are made on the time of the great mass of the citizens; in an Aristocracy therefore slavery is not theoretically necessary. It might therefore be argued that Democracy, as requiring part of the population to be in absolute bondage, was really less favourable to freedom than to Aristocracy. In the Aristocracy, it might be said, though the political rights of the ordinary citizen were narrower, it was still possible that every human being might be personally free. But the experience of Grecian history does not bear out such an inference. Slavery was no special sin of Democracy; it was an institution common to the whole ancient world, quite irrespective of particular forms of government. And in fact, the tone of feeling, the general sentiment of freedom and equality, engendered by a democratic constitution, actually benefited those who were without the pale of citizenship or even of personal freedom. It must doubtless have been deeply galling to a wealthy μέτοικος, whose ancestors had perhaps lived at Athens for several generations, to see the meanest hereditary burgher preferred to him on all occasions. It must have been more galling than it was in a city like Corinth, where strangers and citizens were alike subject to the ruling order. But Democracy really benefited both the slave and the stranger. The slave was far better off in democratic Athens than in aristocratic Sparta or Chios. (On the Chian slaves, see Thuc. viii. 40.) The author of the strange libel on the Athenian Commonwealth attributed to Xenophôn makes it a sign of the bad government of Athens that an Athenian could not venture to beat a stranger (μέτοικος) or another man's slave! (Xen. de Rep. Ath. i. 10.) This accusation speaks volumes as to the condition of slaves and strangers in aristocratic cities. [With the μέτοικοι at Athens, cf. the Natifs at Geneva; Müller, Hist. de la Confédération Suisse (Continuation), xv. 275 sqq.]

In modern times the experiment of a perfectly pure Democracy, one, that is, in which every citizen has a direct vote on all questions, has been confined to a few rural Cantons, where the demands on the citizen's time are immeasurably smaller than they must be in a great city. The question of slavery therefore has not arisen. American slavery is, of course, a wholly different matter.

On the general subject of ancient citizenship, see Arnold, Thuc. vol. iii. p. xv. (Preface.)

a select body, does not necessarily consist of the 658 ~~wisest~~ men among the British people. Many of its members will always be mere average citizens, neither better nor worse than many among their constituents. A town sends a wealthy and popular trader, an average specimen of his class. A county sends a wealthy and popular country gentleman, an average specimen of his class. Very likely several of those who vote for them are much deeper political thinkers than themselves. But the average member so elected, if he really be up to the average and not below it, will derive unspeakable benefit from his political education in the House itself. He cannot fail to learn much from the mere habit of exercising power in an assembly at once free and orderly, and from the opportunity of hearing the speeches and following the guidance of those who are really fitted to be the leaders of men. This sort of advantage, this good political education, which the English constitution gives to some hundreds of average Englishmen, the Athenian constitution gave to some thousands of average Athenians. Doubtless an assembly of thousands was less orderly than an assembly of hundreds; but it must never be thought that the Athenian Ekklêsia was a mere unruly crowd, ignorant of all order and impatient of all restraint. The mode of proceeding was regulated by fixed rules just as much as the proceedings of our Parliaments. As far as we know the history of Athenian debates, breaches of order were rare, and scenes of actual violence—common enough in the Roman Forum—were absolutely unknown. It was surely no slight gain to bring so many human beings into a position habitually to hear—and that not as mere spectators, but as men with an interest and a voice in the matter—the arguments for and against a proposal brought forward by Themistoklês and Aristeidês, by Periklês and Thucydidês, by Kleôn and Nikias, by Dêmosthenês and Phôkiôn.[1] It is the habitual practice of so doing which is the true gain. Popular assemblies which are brought together only at rare intervals are incapable of wise political action, almost incapable of free and regular debate. The Parliament of Florence, for instance, was a mere tumultuous mob, which

Comparison with the English House of Commons.

Contrast with the Florentine Parliament.

[1] Tocqueville, Dém. en Am. ii. 241. "C'est en participant à la législation que l'Américain apprend à connaître les lois; c'est en gouvernant qu'il s'instruit des formes du gouvernement." How much more truly could this be said of the Athenian.

seldom did anything except vote away its own liberties. Such a political franchise could give no political education whatever. But the Athenian citizen, by constantly hearing questions of foreign policy and domestic administration freely argued by the greatest orators that the world ever saw, received a political education which nothing else in the history of mankind has ever been found to equal.[1]

Comparison of the Athenian citizen and the English member.

The ordinary Athenian citizen then must really be compared, not with the English ten-pound householder, but with the English Member of Parliament in the rank-and-file of his party. In some respects indeed the political education of the Athenian was higher than any which a private member in our Parliament can derive from his parliamentary position. The comparison is instructive in itself, and it is more closely connected with my immediate subject than might at first sight appear. When I come to the political history of the Achaian League, I shall have to compare the working of popular government, as applied to a large Confederation of cities, with its working as applied, on the one hand, to a single city like Athens, and, on the other, to a large country, whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy.

Connexion of Athenian history with the subject of Federalism.

I shall then show how the principles of the Achaian constitution, no less democratic in theory than the Athenian constitution, were modified in practice by the requirements of the wholly different state of things to which they were applied. Athens, in short, is the typical City and the typical Democracy. A clear view of the Athenian constitution is absolutely necessary in order to understand, as we go on, the modifications which later Greek Federalism introduced into the old ideal of the democratic city. I therefore do not scruple, with this ulterior purpose, to enlarge somewhat more fully on Athenian political life than would be of

[1] One of the few faults in M. de Tocqueville's Democracy in America is his failure to appreciate the Greek republics. Such words as the following sound strange indeed to one who knows what Athens really was. "Quand je compare les républiques grecque et romaine à ces républiques d'Amérique ; les bibliothèques manuscrites des premières et leur populace grossière aux mille journaux qui sillonnent les secondes et au peuple éclairé qui les habite," etc. (ii. 237). Fancy the people who heard and appreciated Æschylus, Periklês, and Aristophanês, called a "populace grossière," because they had no newspapers to enlighten them! And this by a writer who, in his own walk, ranks deservedly among the profoundest of political philosophers.

It is some comfort that Lord Macaulay, at all events, could have set him right. See the well-known and most brilliant passage on the working of the Athenian System in his Essay on Boswell's Life of Johnson.

itself necessary in a comparison between the system of separate city-commonwealths and the system of larger states. The Athenian citizen, the Achaian citizen, the English Member of Parliament, resemble each other in being members of popular bodies each invested with the most important powers in their respective countries. But the functions of the three are not exactly the same, nor is the political education received by the three exactly of the same kind. The Athenian had the highest political education of all, because he had the highest responsibility of all. The comparison between Athens and Achaia I will put off to another Chapter; I will now rather try to show what the Athenian political education really was by comparing the powers and responsibilities of the ordinary Athenian citizen with those of an ordinary Member of our own House of Commons.

There can be no doubt that an Athenian citizen who habitually and conscientiously discharged his political duties was called on for a more independent exercise of judgement, for a more careful weighing of opposing arguments, than is practically required of the English private member. The functions of the Athenian Assembly were in a few respects more limited,[1] but, on the whole, they were much more extensive than those of the English House of Commons. The Assembly was more directly a governing body. Dêmos was, in truth, King, Minister, and Parliament, all in one. In our own system the written Law entrusts the choice of Ministers, the declaration of war, the negociation of peace, in general the government of the country as distinguished from its legislation, to the hereditary Sovereign. But the conventional Constitution adds that all these powers shall be exercised by the advice of Ministers who, as chosen by the Sovereign out of the party which has the majority in the House, may be said to be indirectly chosen by the House itself. These Ministers, a body unknown to the written Law, but the most important element in the unwritten Constitution, exercise royal power during the pleasure of the House.[2] As long as they

Greater responsibility of the Athenian citizen than of the English Member.

Position of the English Ministry.

[1] Matters of Legislation, which we think so pre-eminently the business of a popular Assembly, were at Athens by no means wholly in the hands of the Ekklêsia. Its powers were a good deal narrowed by the institution of the Nomothetes (see Grote, v. 500). On the other hand, the Assembly exercised exactly those functions of electing to offices, and declaring war and peace, any direct share in which we carefully refuse to the House of Commons.

[2] With us a body which has no existence in the eye of the Law exercises the chief power in the name of the Sovereign and during the pleasure of the House

retain the confidence of the House, they take the management of things into their own hands.[1] The House asks questions; it calls for papers; it approves or censures after the fact; but its vote is not directly taken beforehand on questions of peace, war, alliance, or other matters of administration. It leaves such matters to the Ministers as long as it trusts them; if it ceases to trust them, it takes measures which practically amount to their deposition. No Minister remains in office after a direct vote of censure, or even after the rejection of a Government motion which he deems of any importance. He may indeed dissolve Parliament; that is, he appeals to the country. But if the new Parliament confirm the hostile vote of the old one, he has then no escape; he is hopelessly driven to resignation. No Minister receives instructions from the House as to the policy which he is to carry out; least of all, when he rises in his place in Parliament to advocate one policy, is he bidden by the House to go to his office and take the requisite administrative steps for carrying out another policy. Hence, under our present parliamentary system, the average member is in truth seldom called on to exercise a perfectly independent judgement on particular questions of importance. He exercises his judgement once for all, when he decides whether he will support or oppose the Ministry; by that decision his subsequent votes are for the most part determined. Whether this is a high state of political morality may well be doubted; it is enough for our present purpose that it is the political morality commonly received. Matters were widely different in the Athenian Assembly. Every citizen who sat there exercised much higher functions than those of an English private member. He sat there as a member of a body which was directly, and not indirectly, sovereign. His own share of that corporate sovereignty it was his duty to discharge according to his own personal

Received duties of the private Member.

Different duties of the Athenian Citizen.

of Commons. We shall presently have to contrast this with the Achaian and American system by which a magistrate, chosen for a fixed time, exercises nearly the same powers in his own person. Athens differs from all these by what may be called vesting the royal authority in the House of Commons itself.

[1] The gradual change of political language and political habits is curious. The Sovereign no longer presides at a Cabinet Council, because the practical function of the Ministers is no longer to advise the Sovereign, but to act for themselves, subject to responsibility to Parliament. Therefore it has of late become usual to apply the name of "Government" to the body which used to be content with the humbler title of "Ministry" or "Administration." Its members are felt, subject to their parliamentary responsibility, to be the real rulers.

convictions. Athens had no King, no President, no Premier; she had curtailed the once kingly powers of her Archons till they were of no more political importance than Aldermen or Police Magistrates. She had no Cabinet, no Council of Ministers, no Council of State.[1] The Assembly was, in modern political language, not only a Parliament but a Government. There was indeed a Senate, but that Senate was not a distinct or external body: it was a Committee of the Assembly, appointed to put matters in regular order for the Assembly to discuss. There were Magistrates, high in dignity and authority — the ten Generals, on whom, far more than on the pageant Archons, rested the real honours and burthens of office. But those Magistrates were chosen by the Assembly itself for a definite time; it was from the Assembly itself that they received those instructions which, in all modern states, whether despotic, constitutional, or republican, would issue from the "Government." There was nothing at Athens at all analogous to what we call "Office" and "Opposition." Periklês, Nikias, Phôkiôn, appeared in the Assembly, as Generals of the Republic, to propose what measures they thought fit for the good of the state. Their proposals, as coming at once from official men and from eloquent and honourable citizens, were doubtless always listened to with respect. But the acceptance of these proposals was by no means a matter of course; their rejection did not involve immediate resignation, nor did it even imply the rejection of their proposers at the next yearly choice of Magistrates. The Assembled People was sovereign; as sovereign, it listened to its various counsellors and reserved the decision to itself. Periklês, Nikias, and Phôkiôn, were listened to; but Thucydidês,[2] Kleôn, and Dêmosthenês were listened to also, and their amendments, or their substantive proposals, had as fair a chance of being carried as those of the Generals of the commonwealth. A preference given to the proposal of another citizen involved no sort of censure on the official

The Assembly a Government as well as a Parliament.

Function of the Senate;

of the Generals.

Nothing analogous to "Office" and "Opposition."

[1] I cannot but think that Mr. Grote, to whom, more than to any other man, we are indebted for true views of the Athenian Democracy, has been sometimes led astray by his own English parliamentary experience. He clearly looks on Nikias and other official men as coming nearer to the English idea of a "Government," and Kleôn and other demagogues as coming nearer to the English idea of a "Leader of Opposition," than the forms of the Athenian commonwealth allowed. I have tried to set this forth at some length in an article in the North British Review, May, 1856, p. 157.

[2] I mean of course Thucydidês son of Melêsias, the rival of Periklês; quite a different person from Thucydidês the historian.

man who was thus placed in a minority; it in no way affected his political position, or implied any diminished confidence on
B.C. 415. the part of the People. The Sovereign Assembly listened patiently to the arguments of Nikias against the Sicilian expedition, and then sent him, with unusual marks of confidence, to
Direct Diplomatic action of the Assembly. command the expedition against which he had argued. It was the Assembly which, by its direct vote, decided questions of peace and war; it was the Assembly which gave its instructions to the Ambassadors of Athens; and it was the Assembly which listened, in broad daylight and under the canopy of heaven, to the proposals which were made by the Ambassadors of other powers. In modern times, even a republican state has some President, Secretary, or other official person, to whom diplomatic communications are immediately addressed. The consent of a Senate may be needed for every important act, but there is some officer or other who is the immediate and responsible actor.[1] We shall see a very close approach to this system when we come to look at Greek Democracy as modified in the Federal constitution of Achaia. But in the pure Democracy of Athens
B.C. 343. there is no approach to anything of the kind. When King Philip has to communicate with the hostile republic, he does not commission a Minister to address a Minister; he writes in his own name to the Senate and People of Athens.[2] The royal letter is read, first in the Senate before hundreds, and then in the Assembly before thousands, of hearers, each of whom may, if he can gain the ear of the House, take a part in the debate on its contents. So, when the reading and the debate are over, it is by the sovereign vote of those thousands of hearers that the policy of the commonwealth is finally and directly decided. It
Effect of these powers on individual citizens. is evident that the member of an Assembly invested with such powers as these had the very highest form of political education opened to him. If he did his daily duty, he formed an opinion

[1] By the American Constitution the assent of the Senate is needed for the treaties entered into by the President, and the power of declaring war is vested in Congress. But all diplomatic business up to these points is carried on after the forms usual with the Governments of other states. Despatches are not addressed to Congress, nor even to the President, but to a Secretary of State, whose office is not mentioned in the Constitution. According to Athenian practice, the letters of Earl Russell on the affair of the Trent would have been addressed, not to Mr. Seward, but to the House of Congress, and the liberation of the Southern Commissioners would have needed a vote of those bodies.

[2] See the Speech of Dêmosthenês (or rather of Hêgêsippos) about Halonnêsos (Oratores Attici, vol. iv. p. 82).

of his own upon every question of the day, and that not blindly or rashly, but after hearing all that could be said on either side by the greatest of orators and statesmen. Of course he might blindly follow in the wake of some favourite leader—so might a Venetian Senator, so might an English Peer—but so to do was a clear forsaking of duty. The average Athenian citizen could not shelter himself under those constitutional theories by which, in the case of the average English member, blind party voting is looked upon as a piece of political duty, and an independent judgement is almost considered as a crime.

The great advantage then of the system of small city-commonwealths, the system of which the Athenian Democracy was the greatest and most illustrious example, was that it gave the members of the ruling body (whether the whole people or only a part of the people) such a political education as no other political system can give. Nowhere will the average of political knowledge, and indeed of general intelligence[1] of every kind, be so high as in a commonwealth of this sort. Doubtless to take Athens as the type is to look at the system in its most favourable aspect. The Athenian people seem to have had natural gifts beyond all other people, and the circumstances of their republic brought each citizen into daily contact with greater political affairs than could have been the case with the citizens of an average Greek commonwealth. At Rome, again, the vast numbers of the Assembly and the comparatively narrow range of its functions must have effectually hindered the Comitia from ever becoming such a school of politics as the Athenian Pnyx. The Roman Tribes elected Magistrates, passed Laws, and declared war; but they did not exercise that constant supervision over affairs which belonged to the Athenian Dêmos. The ordinary powers, in short, of a Government, as distinguished from a Parliament, were exercised by the Senate and not by the Tribes. It was not every city-commonwealth which could give its citizens such opportunities of improvement

Athens the highest type of the system.

[1] General *intelligence*, not of course general *knowledge*, which must always depend upon the particular age and country in which the commonwealth is placed. The average Englishman knows far more than the average Athenian knew, because the aggregate of knowledge in the world is incomparably greater than what it was then. But the average Athenian probably knew far more in proportion to the aggregate of knowledge in his own day; most certainly he had a general quickness, a power of appreciation and judgement, for which we should look in vain in the average Englishman.

as were enjoyed by the citizens of Athens. But, in estimating the tendencies of any political system, they must be estimated by their most perfect manifestations both for good and for evil. And undoubtedly even commonwealths which gave their citizens far less political education than was to be had at Athens must have given them far more than is to be had in any modern kingdom or republic. We idolize what is called the press,[1] as the great organ of modern cultivation; but, after all, for a man to read his newspaper is by no means so elevating a process as it is to listen with his own ears to a great statesman and to give his independent vote for or against his motion. And great statesmen moreover grow far thicker on the ground in commonwealths of this kind than they do in great kingdoms. Many a man who has a high natural capacity for statesmanship is, in a large state, necessarily confined to the narrow range of private or local affairs. Such a man may, under a system of small commonwealths, take his place in the Sovereign Assembly of his own city and at once stand forth among the leaders of men. In a word, it can hardly be doubted that the system of small commonwealths raises the individual citizen to a pitch utterly unknown elsewhere. The average citizen is placed on a far higher level, and the citizen who is above the average has far more favourable opportunities for the display of his special powers.

Opportunity for the developement of genius.

This elevation of the character of the individual citizen is the main advantage of the system of small states. It is their one great gain, and it is an unmixed gain. It does not indeed decide the question in favour of small Commonwealths as against Federations or great Monarchies. These last have their advantages which may well be held to outweigh even this advantage; but it clearly is unmixed gain as far as it goes. Less absolutely unmixed is another result of the system, which is closely connected with both its good and its bad features. A system of small commonwealths raises in each citizen a fervour and intensity of patriotism to which the natives of larger states are quite unaccustomed.[2] It is impossible, even in a fairly homogeneous country, to feel the same warmth of affection for a large region

Intensity of patriotism in Small States.

[1] It is worth notice that the "press" in common language always means newspapers and not books.

[2] On the intensity of patriotism in small commonwealths, see Macaulay, Hist. Eng. i. 350 et seqq.

as for a single city or for a small district. An Englishman is patriotic; a Dane, as a countryman of a smaller state, is more patriotic still; but neither England nor Denmark can awaken the same glow of patriotic zeal as the great name of Athens.[1] A man loves his birthplace, he loves his dwelling-place, he has a loyal respect for the seat of his country's government. But with the great mass of the subjects of a large kingdom these three feelings will severally attach to three different places. With an Athenian or a Florentine they all attached to the city of Athens or of Florence. In a smaller state, like Megara or Imola, the local patriotism might be yet more intense still, for the Athenian citizen might really be a native and resident, not of Athens, but of Marathôn or Eleusis. But the inhabitant of the rustic Dêmos was still an Athenian; if his birthplace and dwelling-place were not within the city walls, they could hardly be far out of sight of the spear-head of Athênê on the Akropolis. In any case the City was far more to him than the capital of a modern state can ever be to the great bulk of its inhabitants. To adorn a capital at the expense of a large kingdom is one of the most unjust freaks of modern centralization; but in adorning the city of Athens every Athenian was simply adorning his own hearth and home. Walls, temples, theatres, all were his own; there was no spot where he was a stranger, none which he viewed or trod by the sufferance of another. The single city will ever kindle a far more fervid feeling of patriotism than can be felt towards a vast region, large parts of which must always be practically strange. And this intensity of local patriotism is closely connected with all that is noblest and all that is basest in the history of city-commonwealths. Where the single city is all in all, no self-devotion is too great which her welfare demands, no deed of wrong is too black which is likely to promote her interests. The unselfish heroism of Leônidas and Decius sprang from the very same source as the massacre of Mêlos and the destruction of Carthage.

Identification of all citizens with the City.

For that there is a weak and a bad side to this system of separate city-commonwealths is as obvious as that there is a great and noble one. First of all, the greatness of such commonwealths is seldom so enduring as that of larger states. A democratic city, above all, if it would preserve at once freedom at home and a high position abroad, has need of a certain high-strung fervour

Bad side of the system of city-commonwealths.

[1] Thuc. vii. 64 τὸ μέγα ὄνομα τῶν Ἀθηνῶν.

of patriotism which is not likely to endure through many genera tions. This Mr. Grote has remarked in the case of Athens when he compares the feeble resistance offered by the contempor aries of Dêmosthenês to the growing power of Macedonia wit the vigour displayed by their fathers in the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.[1] A state again whose political franchise depend wholly on the hereditary burghership of a single city cannot s easily strengthen itself by fresh blood from other quarters, a can be done by a great nation. A conquest destroys a city; i not uncommonly regenerates a nation. Of all city-commonwealth none ever had so long a day of greatness as Rome. One mai cause doubtless was because the Roman People was less of purely civic body than any other city-commonwealth, and becaus no other city-commonwealth was ever so liberal of its franchis Rome thus grew from a city into an empire; other cities, aristo cratic and democratic alike, have often seen their day of greatnes succeeded by a long and dishonoured old age. Nothing coul well be more miserable than the latter days of democratic Athen and of oligarchic Venice. During the period of Grecian histor with which we shall chiefly have to deal, the once prou Democracy of Athens sinks into the most contemptible state i Greece. And surely the dregs of a close body like the Venetia patriciate afford the very lowest spectacle which political histor can produce.

Greatness of small states less permanent than that of greater ones.

Here then lies the real cause of the inherent weakness o these small commonwealths. Nothing can be so glorious as th life of one of them while it does live. The one century o Athenian greatness, from the expulsion of the Tyrants to th defeat of Aigospotamos, is worth millenniums of the life of Egyp or Assyria. But it is a greatness almost too glorious to last; i carries with it the seeds of its own destruction. This kind o weakness, at all events this want of permanency, is inherent i the system itself. But another kind of weakness, with whic the ancient commonwealths are often reproached by superficia observers, is not inherent, or rather it has no existence at all Men who look only at the surface are tempted to despise Athen and Achaia, because of the supposed insignificance of what ar called "petty states" in modern Europe. There are men who when they look at the colossal size of despotic France or Russia are led to despise the free Confederation of Switzerland and th

B.C. 508–405.

Common fallacy as to the weakness of small states.

[1] Grote, iv. 240.

free Monarchy of Norway. How utterly contemptible then must commonwealths have been, beside which even Switzerland and Norway would seem empires of vast extent. Such a view as this involves the fallacy of being wholly physical and forgetting all the higher parts of man's nature. France and Muscovy have indeed incomparably greater physical strength than Switzerland or Norway, but the Swiss or the Norwegian is a being of a higher political order than the Frenchman or the Muscovite. And this view also involves another fallacy. It goes on a mistaken analogy between small states, when they are surrounded by greater ones of equal material civilization, and small states, when small states constituted the whole of the civilized world. There is a certain sense in which the interests of Switzerland are smaller than the interests of France, but there was no possible sense in which the interests of Athens were smaller than the interests of Persia. The small states of modern Europe exist by the sufferance, by the mutual jealousy, possibly to some extent by the right feeling, of their greater neighbours.[1] But the small commonwealths of old Greece were actually stronger than the contemporary empires; they were less than those empires only in the sense in which Great Britain is less than China. The few free cities now left in Europe are mere exceptions and anomalies; they could not resist a determined attack on the part of one even of the smaller monarchies. Cracow could have been wiped out of the map of Europe at a less expenditure of force than the combined energies of three of the Great Powers. If Germany and Europe chose to look on, Denmark could doubtless annex Hamburg, and Bavaria annex Frankfort. So it must ever be when Free Cities are merely exceptions among surrounding Kingdoms, when every Kingdom maintains a standing army, when a city can be laid in ashes in a day, and when the reduction of the strongest fortress has become simply a question of time. But when we discuss the merits of a system of Free Cities, we do not suppose those Free Cities to be mere exceptions to a

Different position of small states where they are merely exceptions, A.D. 1846,

[1] Just at this moment Federal Government in general has acquired a certain amount of popular discredit from some of the acts of the power to which a momentary caprice has specially attached the name. It therefore cannot be out of place to point out the admirable union of dignity and modesty, the unswerving assertion of right combined with the absence of all unseemly bravado, which has distinguished all the acts of the Swiss Federal Government during the recent aggressions of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, both in the annexation of Savoy and in the more recent violation of Swiss territory in the Dappenthal. (February, 1862.)

general state of things, mere relics of a political system which has passed away; we suppose a state of things like that of old Greece, in which the independence of every city is the universal, or at least the predominant, rule of the civilized world. And even in much later times, in those centuries of the middle ages when Free Cities, though not predominant, were still numerous, a city surrounded by strong walls and defended by valiant citizens might successfully resist the resources of a great empire. Feudal levies could not be kept to constant service, and, before the invention of gunpowder, the art of attacking fortified places lagged far behind the art of defending them. A single city nowadays is weak as compared with a small kingdom, just as a small kingdom is weak as compared with a great kingdom. The fact that no state can resist a power which is physically stronger than itself proves nothing as to the merits of particular forms of government. Aristocratic Rhodes, democratic Athens, federal Achaia, and kingly Macedonia were all alike, as their several turns came round, swallowed up by the universal power of Rome.

and where they are the general rule.

Free cities in the Middle Ages.

But there is a far greater evil inherent in a system of separate Free Cities, an evil which becomes only more intense as they attain a higher degree of greatness and glory. This is the constant state of war which is almost sure to be the result. When each town is perfectly independent and sovereign, acknowledging no superior upon earth, multitudes of disputes which, in a great monarchy or a Federal republic, may be decided by peaceful tribunals, can be settled by nothing but an appeal to the sword. The thousand causes which involve large neighbouring states in warfare all exist, and all are endowed with tenfold force, in the case of independent city-commonwealths. Border disputes, commercial jealousies, wrongs done to individual citizens, the mere vague dislike which turns a neighbour into a natural enemy, all exist, and that in a form condensed and intensified by the very minuteness of the scene on which they have to act. A rival nation is, to all but the inhabitants of a narrow strip of frontier, a mere matter of hearsay; but a rival whose dwelling-place is within sight of the city gates quickly grows into an enemy who can be seen and felt. The highest point which human hatred can reach has commonly been found in the local antipathies between neighbouring cities. The German historian of Frederick Barbarossa speaks with horror of the hate which raged between the several Italian

Constant warfare among Free Cities.

Force of antipathy between neighbouring towns.

towns, far surpassing any feeling of national dislike between Italians and Germans.[1] In old Greece the amount of hatred between city and city seems to depend almost mathematically upon their distance from one another. Athens and Sparta are commonly rivals, often enemies. But their enmity is not inconsistent with something of international respect and courtesy. When Athens was at last overcome, Sparta at once rejected the proposal to raze to the earth a city which, even when conquered, she still acknowledged as her yoke-fellow.[2] That proposal came from Thebes, between whom and Athens there reigned an enmity which took the form of settled deadly hostility.[3] The greatest work that orator or diplomatist ever achieved[4] was when Dêmosthenês induced the two cities to lay aside their differences, and to join in one common struggle for the defence of Greece against the Macedonian invader. But even Athenian hatred towards Thebes was gentle compared with the torrents of wrath which were poured forth upon unhappy Megara.[5] So too in Bœotia itself; just as Frederick entrusted the destruction of Milan, not to his own Germans, but to Milan's enemies of Lodi and Cremona,[6] so Alexander left the fate of Thebes to the decision of his own Greek allies, and the vengeance, not of Macedonia, but of Plataia and Orchomenos, soon swept away the tyrant city from the earth.[7] A system of Free Cities therefore involves a state of warfare, and that of warfare carried on with all the bitterness of almost personal hostility. The more fervid the patriotism, the more intense the national life and vigour, the more constant and the more unrelenting will be the conflicts in which a city-commonwealth is sure to find itself engaged with its neighbours.

B.C. 404.

B.C. 339.

Examples in Greece and Italy.

A.D. 1162.

B.C. 335.

The same causes tend also to produce a greater degree of cruelty in warfare, and a greater severity in the recognized law of war, than is found in struggles between great nations

[1] See Radevic of Freising, iii. 39. Cf. National Review, No. XXIII. (January, 1861, p. 52.)

[2] Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 19, 20.

[3] Circumstances led Athens and Thebes to receive help from one another in the very crisis of their several revolutions (B.C. 403 and 382); but when these exceptional causes had passed by, the old enmity returned. It never was stronger than during the later campaigns of Epameinôndas and during the Sacred War.

[4] See Arnold's Rome, vol. ii. p. 331.

[5] This comes out strongly in those scenes in the Acharnians of Aristophanês, in which the Bœotian and the Megarian are severally introduced.

[6] Otto Morena, ap. Muratori, vi. 1103. Sire Raul, ib. 1187.

[7] Arrian, i. 8. 8; 9. 9.

Comparison between citizen soldiers and professional soldiers.

in civilized ages. An army of citizen soldiers is a very different thing from an army of professional soldiers. Undoubtedly the citizen soldier never sinks to the lowest level of the professional soldier. He never attains that pitch of fiendishness which is reached when the professional soldier degenerates into the mercenary, and when the mercenary degenerates into the brigand. Old Greece was full of wars, of cruel and bloody wars, but she never knew the horrors with which France, Germany, and Belgium were familiar from the wars of Charles of Burgundy to those of
A.D. 1631. Wallenstein and Tilly. Such scenes as the sack of Magdeburg
A.D. 1576. and the Spanish Fury at Antwerp are all but without parallel in Grecian history, they are altogether without a parallel among the deeds of Athenian or Lacedæmonian citizens.[1] But if the citizen soldier does not degenerate into the wanton brutality of the mere mercenary, yet the very feelings which elevate the spirit of his warfare serve, on the other hand, to render it far more cruel than warfare waged by a civilized army in modern times. The modern professional soldier does as he is bid; he does what is required by professional honour and professional duty; he is patriotic, no doubt, but his patriotism
B.C. 424. would seem vague and cold to an Athenian marching to Dêlion,
A.D. 1176. or to a Milanese going forth to Legnano. In any case the war is none of his own making; he is probably utterly indifferent to its abstract justice, and utterly ignorant of its actual origin. The enemy are nothing to him but something which professional duty requires him to overcome; they never did him any personal wrong; they never drove away his oxen,[2] or carried off his wife.

[1] Two events alone in Grecian history at all approach what was almost the normal condition of European warfare in the sixteenth century. One occurs in the Greece of Thucydidês, the other in the Greece of Polybios. But in the earlier instance the guilty parties were not Greeks at all, in the later they were the lowest of Greeks, the professional robbers of Ætolia. In B.C. 413 the little Bœotian town of Mykalêssos was fallen upon, and the inhabitants massacred, by Thracian mercenaries in the service of Athens (Thuc. vii. 29, 30). Even in the midst of the terrible Peloponnesian war, this deed of blood raised a cry of horror throughout all Greece. The other case is the seizure of Kynaitha by the Ætolians in B.C. 220 (Pol. iv. 18). They were admitted by treachery; once admitted, they massacred friend and foe alike, and even put men to the torture to discover their hidden treasures. This last extremity of cruelty is unparalleled in Grecian warfare, and any Greek but an Ætolian would have shrunk from it, but it was a matter of every-day business with the Spanish soldiers of the sixteenth century.

[2] Il. A. 154. *οὐ γὰρ πώποτ' ἐμὰς βοῦς ἤλασαν, οὐδὲ μὲν ἵππους,*
*οὐδέ ποτ' ἐν Φθίῃ ἐριβώλακι, βωτιανείρῃ,*
*καρπὸν ἐδηλήσαντ'.*

It is another matter when two armies of citizens meet together. The war is their own war; the general is probably the statesman who proposed the expedition; his army is composed of the citizens who gave their votes in favour of his proposal. The hostile general and the hostile army are not mere machines in the hands of some unseen and distant potentate; they are the very men who have done the wrong, and on whom the wrong has to be avenged. Defeat will at once involve the bitterest of evils, ravaged lands, plundered houses, friends and kinsfolk led away into hopeless slavery. Men in such a case fight for their own hands; they fight, in very truth and not by a metaphor, for all that is dear to their hearts,

> παῖδας, γυναῖκας, θεῶν τε πατρῴων ἕδη,
> θήκας τε προγόνων.[1]

War of this sort is habitually carried on with much cruelty. A modern kingdom seeks in its warfare the mere humiliation, or at most the political subjugation, of the enemy. The Greek or Italian warrior, as we have seen, not uncommonly sought his destruction. A nation may be subdued, but it cannot well be utterly wiped out; a single city, Milan or Thebes, can be swept away from the face of the earth. The laws of war, under these circumstances, are cruel beyond modern imagination. The life of the prisoner is not sacred unless the conqueror binds himself by special capitulation to preserve it.[2] To kill the men and sell the women and children of a conquered—at all events of a revolted—town was a strong, perhaps unusual, act of severity, but it was a severity which did not sin against the letter of the Greek Law of Nations, and which it was held that particular circumstances might justify. Even when the supposed rights of war were not pushed to such fearful extremes, the selling of prisoners as slaves was a matter of daily occurrence.[3] In such

Severity of the Laws of War.

[1] Æsch. Pers. 396.

[2] See Thuc. i. 30 et passim.

[3] The familiarity of this practice comes out strongly in an incidental notice in Polybios (v. 95). Certain Ætolians were taken prisoners by the Achaians; among them was one Kleonikos who had formerly been the *πρόξενος* or public friend of the Achaian State. On account of this personal claim on the regard of his captors he was not sold (*διὰ τὸ πρόξενος ὑπάρχειν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν παραυτὰ μὲν οὐκ ἐπράθη*), but after a while released without ransom. The sale of the prisoners who had no such claims is assumed as a matter of course. The same author elsewhere (ii. 58) distinctly asserts that the sale of the inhabitants of a conquered city, even when no special provocation had been given, was according to the laws of war, *ἀλλὰ τοῦτέ γε [μετὰ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν πραθῆναι] καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν ἀσεβὲς ἐπιτελεσαμένοις κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ πολέμου ὑπόκειται παθεῖν.*

a state of things we can even understand the most fearful spectacle of all, the cold-blooded slaughter of the captive leaders at a Roman triumph. One shudders at the thought that Caius
B.C. 291. Pontius was[1]—that Hannibal might have been—led in chains, scourged, and beheaded in a Roman prison. But we should remember that Hannibal had been to every Roman a deadly personal foe such as no hostile general has ever been to us. In our wars, the hostile sovereign, Philip or Lewis or Napoleon, has at most threatened at a distance what Hannibal had himself inflicted on the Roman at his own hearth and home. The received war-law then was one of terrible cruelty; but the soldier was still a citizen soldier; arms were only occasionally in his hands; warfare was not his trade; his heart was not hardened nor his conscience seared by a constant life of butchery and plunder. Hence, if one sort of cruelty was more rife, we find much less of another and a viler kind. We may believe that Charles the Fifth, or even his son, would have shrunk from pronouncing in cold blood such a judicial sentence as the Athenian Dêmos pronounced upon the people of Mitylênê, Mêlos, and Skiônê.[2] But then no Athenian army would ever have been guilty of the long horrors of plunder, outrage, torture, and wanton mockery which were the daily occupation of the soldiers of Bourbon and of Alva. The citizen soldier is a man, stern, revengeful, it may be even needlessly cruel, but he never utterly casts off humanity, like the mercenary soldier in his worst form.

Increased bitterness of faction in small states.

Again, as the system of small commonwealths tends at once to make wars more frequent and to aggravate the severity of the laws of war, so it has a similar result in aggravating the bitterness of internal faction. In saying this, I do not refer to any extreme or monstrous cases. The bloody seditions of Korkyra[3]

[1] See Arnold's Rome, ii. 365.

[2] I know of no modern parallel to these judicial massacres of a whole people. The massacre at Limoges by the Black Prince in 1371 (see Froissart, i. cap. 289, vol. i. p. 401, ed. Lyons, 1559) was the result of a vow, and was carried out by the Prince personally; still, as being done in a stormed town, the case is not exactly the same. In much earlier times a nearer parallel is found in the execution of 4000 Saxon prisoners or rebels by Charles the Great in 782. Eginhard, who does not scruple to blame his hero on occasion (Vit. c. 20; cf. Ann. 792), records it without remark (Ann. 782) just as Thucydidês (v. 116) does the massacre of Mêlos.

[3] Κόρκυρα and not Κέρκυρα is the correct local form used on the coins of the island. It is always so written in Latin, as well as by Pausanias and Strabo.

no more represent the normal state of things in a Greek republic than the horrors of the great French Revolution represent the normal state of things in an European monarchy. Such scenes of blood as either point to some circumstances of position or national character, independent of particular forms of government. Civil conflicts have been, in all ages, far more bloody in France than in England.[1] So all Greek democracies were not like the democracy of Korkyra; all Greek aristocracies were not like those selfish oligarchs who took the fearful oath to be evil-minded to the people. But on the other hand all Greek democracies were not like the democracy of Athens; all Greek aristocracies were not like the wise senates which bore rule at Rhodes and Chios. Athens, in its general obedience to law, in its strict observance of public faith[2], in its civil contests carried on, with sharpness and bitterness indeed, but still within the known limits of a defined parliamentary law, stands doubtless at the very head of all Greek commonwealths. The brutal mob of Korkyra doubtless stands no less pre-eminently at the bottom of the scale. Some unusually bad elements in the national character, some monstrous provocation on the part of their former rulers, can alone account for the equally monstrous excesses of the reaction. The normal state of an independent city-commonwealth doubtless lies somewhere between the peaceful debates of Athens and the bloody warfare of Korkyra. It is a state of things in which

Athens and Korkyra extreme cases for good and for evil.

Normal state of a city-commonwealth something intermediate.

[1] The French Revolution at the close of the last century, as being the most recent and the most permanent in its results, is naturally the best known event of the kind; but it is only one among several similar events in the history of France. The civil broils of France in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries read exactly like similar scenes in the eighteenth. In all cases we have refined and elaborate constitutional theories which in practice take the form of indiscriminate massacre. Our civil wars, again, in the seventeenth, the fifteenth, or even the thirteenth century, seem child's play beside the brutal strife of Burgundians and Armagnacs, and the long catalogue of internal warfare which may be almost said to form the civil history of France from Lewis the Eleventh to Lewis the Fourteenth. Philip of Comines, who had seen both lands with his own eyes, bears witness (Mémoires, liv. iii. c. 5) to the comparative mildness of English civil warfare. Englishmen killed nobody except in fair fighting; even in battle, as far as might be, they smote the leaders and spared the Commons. So the deeds of 1572, of 1792, of 1851, have no parallel in the worst times of English history; Strafford and Cromwell alike, one might rather say any Englishman of any sort since the days of Stephen, would have shrunk from the crimes of Guise, or Robespierre, or Louis Napoleon Buonaparte.

[2] Τοῖς ὅρκοις ἐμμένει ὁ δῆμος (Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 43) is the witness of an enemy to the good faith of the Athenian Democracy under the most trying circumstances. Thuc. viii. 97; Grote, viii. 122.

political enmity, though not reaching the fearful extremes of Korkyraian atrocity, will yet be far bitterer than it is in any modern constitutional kingdom. It will perhaps occasionally break out into deeds of open violence; it will still more frequently lead to unjust judicial sentences, and to no less unjust legislative enactments. Actual massacres will perhaps be unknown, and single judicial murders will not be very common; but the general expulsion of the leaders of a defeated faction will be, if not so common as the resignation of a defeated ministry is with us, yet certainly more common than the extremer measure of impeachment has become in modern times. Doubtless the comparison is hard to make, because we have to compare city-commonwealths of one age with kingdoms and federations of another, the Athens and Florence of a past time with the England and America of our own day. But, on the whole, the experience of ancient Greece, of mediæval Italy, of states like Geneva down to our own time, certainly seems to show that the bitterness of political enmity is greatly heightened in these small commonwealths. In such a commonwealth men of all sorts, men of whom but few are kept in restraint by the checks of personal character and position, are brought together face to face, with the most precious interests of both sides directly depending on the result. A great addition to the fierceness of the civil struggle can hardly fail to follow. We see that it is so among ourselves. Far greater bitterness, at any rate far greater outward expression of bitterness, accompanies an election or a local controversy of any kind than is ever to be seen among political leaders within the walls of Parliament. For the same reasons which make political differences in city-commonwealths more bitter, they are also more apt to become hereditary, to be made a point of family honour, at last to sink into mere watchwords of dislike without any rational political meaning. Even among ourselves it is not always easy to distinguish the Conservative from the Liberal or the Liberal from the Conservative; but who can point out the real political difference between a Guelf and a Ghibelin at the end of the fifteenth century?

Local disputes more bitter than general ones.

Enmities more permanent in small commonwealths.

We may then thus sum up the balance of gain and loss in a small city-commonwealth, as compared with a greater state. A small republic developes all the faculties of individual citizens to the highest pitch; the average citizen of such a state is a superior being to the average subject of a large kingdom; he ranks, not

General balance of gain and loss in small states.

with its average subjects, but, at the very least, with its average legislators. It kindles the highest and most ennobling feelings of patriotism; it calls forth every power and every emotion of man's nature; it gives the fullest scope to human genius of every kind; it produces an Æschylus and a Dêmosthenês, a Dante and a Macchiavelli. But, on the other hand, the glory of such a state is seldom lasting; it is tempted to constant warfare, and to warfare in some respects of a cruel kind; it is tempted to ambition and acquisition of territory at least as constantly as a larger state; and annexation by a city-commonwealth commonly brings with it more evils than annexation by a kingdom. Again, civil strife is intensified, and party hatred becomes at once more bitter and more enduring. And we may add that city-commonwealths cannot really flourish save when they either have the whole field to themselves or else have a marked advantage in civilization over the surrounding monarchies. The former was the case in old Greece, the latter in mediæval Italy. In mediæval Germany and Flanders the superiority of the cities was less marked; their freedom therefore was less complete, and their career was less glorious. As the surrounding monarchies advance in power, as they become more settled and civilized—above all, when they take to the employment of standing armies—the city-commonwealths gradually vanish, or exist only by the contemptuous toleration of the neighbouring potentates. Be the powers which surround them despotisms, constitutional kingdoms, or even consolidated republics, the tendencies of an age of large states are equally opposed to the retention of any practical independence by single unconfederated cities.

I have dwelt the longer on the nature of these independent city-commonwealths, because the subject, as one remote from our own political experience, is especially liable to be misunderstood, and because a clear and full grasp of it is absolutely necessary to understand the characteristics of that old Greek Federalism which was a modification of the system of independent cities. On the system of large states with which we are all familiar I need not dwell at the same length. I will only point out one or two of its direct political consequences, and then compare this system with that of independent cities and balance their comparative loss and gain. And I would again remark that among large states I reckon not only great kingdoms, but all states

System of large states.

Definition of large states, irrespective of their forms of government.

which are too large to allow all their citizens habitually to meet in one place. And I include alike republics, constitutional monarchies, and despotisms of the modern European kind. In a modern European despotism, though the sovereign may be the sole legislator, yet there is such a thing as Law, and, in matters which do not touch the sovereign's interest, the administration may be as good as in a free state. But I exclude mere Eastern despotisms, in which Law and Government, in the true sense of those words, can hardly be said to exist at all.

Two immediate results; smaller importance of the Capital; representative character of National Assemblies.

Two consequences immediately follow from the difference between a city-commonwealth and a large state as above defined. First, whatever be the form of government of a large state, there will be no such preponderating influence in any single city as exists under the other system. Secondly, if the state be free, whether as a republic or as a constitutional monarchy, its national assembly must assume the representative form. These two differences are direct, one might say physical, results from the increased size of the state.

Position of the Capital in a large State.

First then, as to the position of the capital. I assume that in the large state there will be an equal freedom or an equal bondage spread over the whole land. States like Rome, Carthage, Venice, or Bern, where a single city bears rule over a large territory, do not come within our present consideration. They are not legitimate large states, but a corrupted form of the city-commonwealth. In the large modern state there is no such overwhelming preponderance in the Capital. Indeed, the very use of the word Capital shows it. The Capital—the *Hauptstadt*—implies the existence of other cities, with which it may be compared, and among which it has the pre-eminence. In a pure city-government there is strictly no Capital, because there is but one City, and that City is co-extensive with the State. In a state like Carthage or Venice, the ruling City is something more than a mere Capital; it is absolute mistress over other cities. But the smallest European monarchy contains several cities, none of which is subject to any other, but of which one will be the Capital, the seat of Government, the official dwelling-place of the Sovereign. Still, that Capital is only the first among many equal cities; the national life is not inseparably bound up with it; it is the seat of government, simply because the seat of government must be somewhere, because the requirements of modern politics do not allow the Sovereign and his Councillors

to wander at large over the whole realm, like an old Teutonic King. The Capital will be the centre of politics, society, and literature; its inhabitants will perhaps affect to look down upon the rest of their fellow-countrymen; they may, especially when the Government is of a centralized kind, obtain an undue and dangerous political weight, but they will have no direct legal privileges above the rest of their fellow-subjects. The influence of a Capital in a large state is almost sure to be for evil, because it must be either indirect or violent. Even in the best regulated states, an undue attention will often be given to the local interests of the Capital, and advances from the national treasury will be more freely made in its behalf, than in behalf of other parts of the kingdom. But this is simply because they are more prominent and better understood, because they force themselves upon the notice of the Sovereign and the Legislature in a way in which the interests of other towns and districts cannot do. In a despotic state, where the Sovereign does what he pleases, where he is in no way controlled by the representatives of other parts of the country, money will be still more recklessly and unjustly squandered in adorning one town at the expense of a whole kingdom. The other form of the influence of a Capital is that by which we have so often seen a Parisian riot accepted as a French Revolution. A government is violently upset and another installed—it may be by the mere mob of the town, it may be by a perfidious magistrate who has a military force at his command; in either case the people of the whole land, who have never been consulted about the matter, submit without resistance to the King, Republic, or ten-years' President thus provided for them. In the one case the influence of the Capital is indirect, in the other it is violent; in either case it is illegitimate. The only legal weight of London or Paris consists in the representatives which those towns, in common with other towns, send to the common Legislature of the whole country. In a modern European kingdom, the Capital and the rest of the country are legally placed on perfectly equal terms. In a free state they are equally free; in a despotism the yoke will not, avowedly at least, press more heavily upon one town or district than upon another. This state of things, where political rights and political wrongs are evenly spread over the whole extent of a large country, differs equally from the state of things in which the Capital bears rule over the whole land, and from that in

Indirect and violent influence of Capitals in large states.

which the franchise of the Capital is extended over the whole land. An inhabitant of Eleusis was a citizen of Athens; an inhabitant of Lausanne was a subject of Bern; but an inhabitant of any English town or county is neither a citizen of London nor a subject of London; he is a member of a great commonwealth of which the capital and his own dwelling-place are alike integral and equal portions.

Necessity of representative institution in a free state of large size.

The second direct result from the increased largeness of territory is that, if the state be constitutional, its constitution must necessarily take the representative form. The people, or that portion of the people which is invested with political rights, will not exercise those rights in their own persons, but through chosen persons commissioned to act in their behalf. The private citizen will have no direct voice in government or legislation; his functions will be confined to giving his vote in the election of those who have. This is the great distinction between free states of the modern type, whether kingly or republican, and the city-commonwealths of old Greece. It is the great political invention of Teutonic Europe, the one form of political life to which neither Thucydidês, Aristotle, nor Polybios ever saw more than the faintest approach. In Greece it was hardly needed, but in Italy a representative system would have delivered Rome from the fearful choice which she had to make between anarchy and despotism. By Representative or Parliamentary Government I would not be understood as speaking only of that peculiar form of it which has grown up by the force of circumstances in our own country. A Cabinet Government, where the real power is vested in Ministers indirectly chosen by the House of Commons —that is, chosen by the King out of the party which has the majority in the House of Commons—is only one out of many forms of Representative Government. It suits us, because it is, like our other institutions, the growth of our own soil; it by no means follows that it can be successfully transplanted whole into other countries, or even into our own colonies.[1] By a Representative constitution I mean any constitution in which the people, or the enfranchised portion of them, exercise their political rights, whatever be the extent of those rights, not directly, but through chosen deputies. Such a Representative

Representative Government not necessarily Cabinet Government.

[1] On this subject the eighth chapter of Earl Grey's Essay on Parliamentary Government (London, 1858) is well worth reading; but of course there is another side, or rather several other sides, to the question.

constitution is consistent with the full personal action of the Sovereign within the legal limits of his powers; it is consistent with any extent, or any limitation, of the elective franchise. I include the constitutions of mediæval England and Spain, of modern Sweden and Norway, the constitutions of the United States and of the several States, even the old theoretical constitution of France in the days of the States-General. All these are strictly representative constitutions, though some of them differ widely enough from what a modern Englishman generally understands by the words Constitutional Government. A Representative constitution may be monarchic or republican, it may be aristocratic or democratic. The Representative system would be as needful in the case of a franchise vested in a large noble class scattered over the whole country, as it is in the case of a franchise vested in every adult male. But if political rights were confined to a hereditary body so small that its members could habitually meet together, say if our House of Lords possessed the whole powers of the state, the government would probably assume another form. The ruling aristocracy would almost unavoidably be led to take up their chief residence in the capital. The constitution would, in fact, become a city-aristocracy, like that of Bern or Venice, bearing rule over a subject district.

The necessity of the Representative system in a large state is so universally accepted as the result of all European and American experience, that I need not stop to argue the point at any length. But it may be necessary to speak a few words on two or three real or apparent exceptions, in which political power is, or has been, directly exercised by the people, or the qualified part of them, in large modern states. The exceptions which occur to me are: First, the way of electing the Kings of Poland under the old monarchy; Secondly, the new-fangled Napoleonic fashion of electing "Emperors," approving constitutions, annexing provinces, by what is called "Universal Suffrage;"[1] Thirdly, the practical

Exceptions to the Representative system in modern Europe and America.

[1] The Florentine Parliaments and the Venetian Great Council are not real exceptions, as being found in the constitutions of single cities. The latter was a part of the ordinary system of government in an aristocratic state. But the Florentine Parliament, which I have already once mentioned (p. 31), may be well referred to again, as it is so strikingly analogous to the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage. The whole Florentine people, perhaps once in a generation, met together in the square and presently entrusted absolute power to some Commission, sometimes to some Tyrant.

(not the constitutional) aspect of the election of the President of the United States. In all these cases the people, or the qualified portion of them, takes a more direct share than usual in political action. But even in these cases the representative system, as the means of ordinary legislation and government, is not disturbed.

lection
the
olish
ings.

The old Kingdom of Poland called itself at once a Kingdom and a Republic. In fact its constitution ingeniously united the evils of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, without the redeeming features of any of the three. The political franchise was vested in a nobility so numerous, and many so poor, that, while they formed a close aristocracy as regarded the rest of the people, they formed a wild democracy among themselves. Such a nobility, it need not be said, has absolutely nothing in common with the British Peerage. The Polish nobles were not so much

ature of
ıe Polish
obility.

a nobility in any common sense of the word, as a people, like the Spartans or the Ottomans, bearing rule over a subject race.[1] Such a very numerous nobility differs from the electoral body of a constitutional state as a Greek aristocracy differed from a Greek timocracy. In the one case the political franchise can be obtained only by hereditary succession, and, when once obtained, it cannot be lost. In the other case, it is attached to the possession of a certain amount of property, and may be gained and lost many times by the same person, if his property, at different times of his life, rises above, or sinks below, the necessary qualification. The difference is analogous to that between the hereditary burghership of a town and a municipal franchise attached to ownership or occupation. According to all ordinary political notions, the Polish nobility was a body which could not possibly meet together; it was as much under the necessity of delegating its powers to representatives as the electoral bodies of England or America. And for most purposes it did so delegate them. The common functions of a legislature were entrusted to an elective Diet, a body which had some strange peculiarities of its own,[2] which do not bear on our present subject. But, once in each reign, the whole body met to elect a King; they met

[1] I do not mean to imply that the Polish nobility was historically an aristocracy of conquest. Aristocracies which have grown up gradually, like that of Venice, often become narrower than those which really owe their origin to conquest.

[2] The best known is the requirement of unanimity, which gave every member of the Diet a veto upon all its acts. See Calhoun, i. 71. He really does not seem wholly to disapprove of the practice.

armed; and, in theory at least, the assent of every elector present was required to make a valid election. It is not wonderful if election by such a body, like election by the Roman People in their worst days, often took the form of a pitched battle. That this mode of electing a King, or of discharging national business of any kind, was an absurd and mischievous anomaly few probably will dispute. It was in fact merely an innovation of the latest and worst days of the Polish Republic.[1] And it was felt to be an evil by all wise and patriotic Poles. The constitution of 1791, by which Poland, in her last moments, tried to assimilate herself to other European nations, abolished election altogether, and instituted a hereditary monarchy.

Napoleonic Universal Suffrage; its delusive nature.

The Napoleonic Universal Suffrage, which has destroyed freedom in France and has reduced Savoy and Nizza to the same level of bondage, is simply a palpable cheat, which, had its results been less grave, would have been the mere laughing-stock of Europe. It is a mere device to entrap a whole people into giving an assent to proposals which would not be assented to by their lawful representatives. Hitherto it has been in every case a mere sham. There has been no free choice, no fair alternative between two or more proposals or between two or more candidates. The people have only been asked to say Yea or Nay to something which has been already established by military force. The election of a Polish King was a real election, a real choice between candidates; the pretended election of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte to the pseudo-Imperial Crown of France was no election at all. But supposing a vote of this kind ever offered a fair alternative, the system would be no less pernicious. A people cannot be fit to exercise direct political power, unless they are habitually trained to exercise it. In a great kingdom they cannot be so habitually trained. They may be perfectly fit to choose legislators;[2] they cannot be fit to le[illegible]te themselves. Least

[1] Till the extinction of the House of [illegible]772, Poland followed the common law of early European Kin[illegible] royal family, out of which alone Kings were chosen, but necessarily pass to the next in succession. The peculiari[illegible] that, in an age when other kingdoms had become purel[illegible]le their Crown purely elective. The practice of choos[illegible]o descent and by the voice of the whole nobility da[illegible]f Henry of Anjou in 1573.

[2] It must be remembered t[illegible]'uffrage" has nothing in common with the use of [illegible] English political controversy. Nobody has [illegible]d vote in the

of all can they be fit to legislate now and then on the most important of all questions, the choice of a dynasty or a constitution. Such an occasional and, so to speak, spasmodic exercise of power must be utterly worthless. Undoubtedly a great exceptional power of this kind may well be entrusted, not to the ordinary Legislature, but to a body specially chosen for the purpose. In the United States the meeting of such extraordinary Conventions under certain circumstances is specially provided for both in the Federal Constitution and in the Constitutions of the several States. In our own country it would doubtless be thought right by all parties that the introduction of any great constitutional change should be preceded by a Dissolution of Parliament. The election of the new Parliament in such a case would practically come to the same thing as the choice of a Convention in America. The whole body of electors would have, rightly and fairly, a special opportunity given them for considering the subject; but the final voice of the nation would speak through its lawful representatives, and not through the mockery of "Universal Suffrage." The English and the American practice both give full scope to the popular will in a way consonant with the received principles of all modern constitutional states. The Imperial invention is simply a blind; it is the device of a despot to deceive people by promising them something freer than freedom.

English and American ways of attaining the same object.

The election of the American President is, not indeed formally, but practically, another exception to the rule by which, in all modern free states, the political powers of the people are exercised solely by their representatives. Formally, it is not such an exception. The President is not chosen by the people at large, but by special electors chosen for the purpose.[1] But as those electors exercise no real choice, as it is known before the election

Election of the American President practically another exception.

making of laws, but only in th
is a separate question, quite
An impartial thinker will p
fit to use votes, ought t
should be fit to use th
it would be hard to fi
See Tocqueville, Dém.

hoosing of lawgivers. Whether this is desirable
cted by the results of the Napoleonic device.
y that those, whether many or few, who are
that it is desirable that the whole people
possibly in the New England States,
e whole people are fit to use them.

[1] How those electe
ii. § 1, 2) to be settle
the States, the Legisl
South Carolina, this
There are some goo
187 et seqq.

by the Federal Constitution (Art.
h State. Originally, in most of
: but, in all the States, except
sferred to the people at large.
haffner's War in America, p.

The Conf

the old provisions.

how every candidate will vote if elected, this election of electors practically comes to much the same as a direct popular election of the President. There can be no doubt that this is one of the weak points in the American system; it is the point in which the calculations of the illustrious men who framed the American Constitution have most signally failed.[1] Still, the popular election of the President has several points of advantage over the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage. First, the mere form of electing electors pays a certain outward homage to the representative system, while it is openly trampled under foot by the Napoleonic device. Secondly, the indirect mode of election, even as it is, has at least this result, that the President who is elected need not have a numerical majority of the people in his favour. This alone is no inconsiderable check on the tyranny of mere numbers. Thirdly, regarding the election of the President as really placed in the hands of the people, still it is a very different matter from electing "Emperors" and voting the annexation of provinces. The election of a President is not an irregular, occasional business like saying "Oui" or "Non" to the perpetrator of a successful conspiracy; it comes regularly at stated intervals, about as often as our Parliamentary elections. There is therefore no reason why the American people may not be as well trained to elect Presidents as the English people are trained to elect Members of Parliament. Still, the election of the President, as it is now practically conducted, though by no means such an evil as the Napoleonic Universal Suffrage or the election of the Polish Kings by the whole body of the nobles, is certainly a deviation from the representative principle, and is so far an anomaly in the practice of modern free states.

Its difference from Napoleonic Universal Suffrage.

We will then assume these two immediate results of the increased size of territory, the legal equality of all parts of the country, and the necessity for representative institutions, if the state be constitutional. Let us then pass, in imagination or in reality, through such a large state, through any kingdom, in short, of modern Europe. Its mere divisions, its Counties or

General view of the system of large States.

[1] See Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 68. He remarks that "the mode of appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States, is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents."

Even when Tocqueville wrote, this particular evil had hardly manifested itself. Cf. Calhoun, i. 369, 385.

Departments, may well be equal in size to the territories of several independent cities of old Greece or of mediæval Italy. A glance at the map of modern Italy or modern Greece at once sets forth this difference. We look on the Kingdom of Greece as one of the pettiest states in Europe; its weight in European politics is hardly so great as that of one of its smallest cities might have been in the days of Athens and Sparta. But a province of the Greek Kingdom is made up of what was once the domain of several Greek commonwealths. Corinth, Sikyôn, Pellênê, Phlious, are all found in a single department; Orchomenos, Mantineia, Tegea, and Megalopolis are all subordinate to the modern local capital of Tripolitza. So too the portion of Lombardy which free Italy has lately wrung from the Austrian Tyrant contains some ten or twelve cities, which once appeared as free republics, fighting for or against the Swabian Emperor. So again not a few cities, which once were free commonwealths under the suzerainty of the Empire, have been swallowed up during the six hundred years' aggression of the Kings and Tyrants of Paris against the old realms of Germany and Burgundy. We find then, in traversing a modern kingdom, that an extent of territory which, on the other system, would be cut up into countless independent commonwealths, is governed by a single Sovereign and is, in most cases, administered according to a single code of laws. If the state be despotic, the despot is equally master of the whole kingdom; if the state be constitutional, the highest power in the land will be an assembly in which the whole kingdom is represented.[1] But within these limits the amount of local freedom and of local diversity may vary infinitely. In one kingdom everything may be squared out according to the most approved modern cut-and-dried system. No man may be allowed to move hand or foot without licence from some officer of the Crown; local liberties, local bye-laws, magistrates or public officers of any sort locally elected, may be something unknown and proscribed. In another kingdom all this may be reversed; local and historical rights may be carefully respected; the assemblies of towns and districts may retain extensive powers

One such State answers to many City-Commonwealths.

A.D. 1859.

Extent of local diversity in large States.

[1] The whole kingdom, not necessarily all the dominions of the sovereign. Every integral part of the United Kingdom is represented in the British Parliament—the disfranchisement of a County would not be thought of for a moment—but the Colonies and dependencies are not represented, not being parts of the kingdom.

of local legislation; magistrates and public officers may be elected by the districts which they are to govern, or, if they are appointed by the Crown, they may be appointed according to a principle which gives them nothing of the character of Government functionaries.[1] These two opposing systems, of Centralization and of Local Freedom, do not at all necessarily depend upon the constitution of the central Government. Local freedom is quite possible under an absolute monarchy; local bondage is quite possible under a representative Democracy. A wise despot will humour his people by allowing them local liberties which will not affect his real power, and which, by acting as a safety-valve, may really stave off revolution for many years. On the other hand many states nominally free have had no idea of freedom beyond giving each citizen that degree of influence in the general Government which is implied in the possession of an electoral vote. That general Government may be one which he helps to choose, and yet he may be left, in regard to all those things which most directly concern him, as helpless a machine in the hands of an official hierarchy as if that hierarchy derived its commission from a despot. But, in any case, whether the local Government be centralized or municipal, its character is wholly dependent on the general Law of the Land. Wherever there are rights which are beyond the powers of King and Parliament, we have passed the bounds of strict municipality and are approaching the borderland of Federalism.[2] We might easily conceive the municipal principle carried much farther than it is in England;

Opposite Systems of Centralization and of Local Freedom independent of the form of the central Government.

Difference between Municipal and Federal rights;

Municipal rights dependent on the General Legislature;

[1] An English County is an aristocratic republic; the magistrates, though formally appointed by Royal Commission, are practically co-extensive with the local aristocracy. An English borough, as regards its administration, is a representative democracy, tempered in some degree by the indirect election of the Mayor and Aldermen. The borough magistrates, appointed by the Crown from among the chief inhabitants, introduce a slight aristocratic element into the judicial department. But neither Town-Councillors, nor Aldermen, nor County and Borough Magistrates, have the least analogy with the administrative hierarchies of foreign states.

[2] England and Wales, though local bodies retain much local freedom, form a perfectly consolidated Kingdom. But the relations between England and Scotland, where certain points are reserved under the terms of a Treaty between two independent kingdoms, make a slight approach to the Federal idea. The relations between the United Kingdom and the Colonies approach more closely to a Federal connexion, but they differ essentially from it. The Colony, as we have seen above (see p. 20), may have the same internal independence as the Canton, but it differs in having no voice in the general concerns of the Empire. The relation therefore of the Colony to the mother-country is not a Federal but a dependent relation. See Lewis, Government of Dependencies, caps. ii. iv.

one might conceive towns and counties at home, no less than Colonies abroad, possessing nearly the same internal powers as a Swiss Canton or an American State. But such towns and counties would still possess their powers, not of inherent right, but merely by positive law. Their rights, however extensive, would be delegated and not independent; they would still remain mere municipalities, and would not become Sovereign States. That portion of sovereignty which is vested in the State or the Canton cannot, without an unconstitutional usurpation, be in any way touched by the Federal power. But the most extensive rights of a mere municipality are the mere creation of Common or Statute Law; they may be legally altered or abolished without the consent of the municipality itself being asked. A vote of the national Legislature in a free country, a Royal Decree in a despotic country, can legally found, modify, or destroy all merely municipal institutions, just as it seems best to the sovereign power. A single Act of Parliament might at once cut down all English local rights to the level of French or Russian centralization. An Imperial Ukase might at once invest Russian towns and counties with all the rights enjoyed by those of England, or with rights more extensive still. The one measure would in no way deprive the English elector of that portion of influence over public affairs which he at present enjoys. The other measure would in no way infringe upon the sole legislative authority of the Autocrat. In any consolidated kingdom or republic, whatever be the extent of local freedom, the variety of local law and custom, it exists purely on sufferance; it emanates from, and may be altered by, a central power external to itself. The local body is, in most cases, strictly confined to local affairs; it has no voice, even by representation,[1] in the general legislation of the kingdom; if a local body takes any part in national affairs, its voice is purely consultative; in most countries indeed it has not even a consultative voice, it can make its wants known to the Sovereign or the Legislature only in the form of a Humble Petition, a process equally open to every human being in the nation.

Federal rights independent of it.

The great state then, whether it be a despotism, a constitutional kingdom, or a consolidated republic, confines local action

General characteristic of large States.

[1] The body holding local authority, the Town Council or the Quarter Sessions, is not represented, as such, in Parliament. The county or borough members represent the inhabitants of the county or borough, not the municipal government.

to purely local matters, and vests all general power in the national sovereign or the national legislature. That sovereign and that legislature may indeed derive their powers from the popular will, but in the exercise of those powers neither individuals nor local bodies can have more than an indirect influence. Rights are equal throughout the whole land; the capital has no legal privilege beyond any other city; the constitution, where there is a constitution, is of the representative kind. From these characteristics of large states at once follows a chain of gains and losses which are the exact opposites of the gains and losses which attend on the system of city-commonwealths.

Balance of Gain and Loss.

First and foremost, the blessing of internal peace is at once secured to a large country. This alone is an advantage so great that it must be a very bad central government indeed, under which this one gain does not outweigh every loss. A large modern kingdom will contain perhaps hundreds of cities, whose districts, under the old Greek system, might continually be the scene of a desolating border-warfare. All of these will, under the modern European system, repose safely under the protection of one common authority, which has power peaceably to decide any differences which may arise among them. And the same cause which hinders local quarrels, when they do arise, from growing into local wars, will also go very far to prevent local quarrels from arising at all. Towns and districts may indeed often retain irrational local prejudices, and the clashing of commercial interests may often arouse local jealousies which are not irrational. But when, as in the best regulated modern kingdoms, the inhabitants of every town and county are all citizens of a common country, when the inhabitants of one district may, without losing any civil or political rights, transfer their abode to any other, there can never be any very serious local differences between fellow-subjects of the same race and language. Even when such differences of race and language exist as may be found within the limits of France or of Great Britain, provincial diversities may now and then afford a subject for pseudo-patriotic talk, but it is in talk that they are sure to evaporate.[1] Indeed, it

Advantages of great States.

Peace secured to a large country.

Lessening of local prejudices.

[1] It has been gravely declared at a Welsh Eisteddfod that Her Majesty is properly Queen of Wales with the province of England annexed. However this be, the province and the kingdom have shown no tendencies towards separation for several centuries.

often happens that the country which fancies itself to be subject and degraded is, in very truth, a favoured district. Such a country often has its full share of the advantages of the common government, while it keeps its own local advantages to itself.[1] When differences of race and speech assume a really serious character, it shows that they are real national diversities, and that the two countries ought to be under separate governments. But mere local jealousies between town and town, between county and county, become of no political importance whatever. Towns which, in old Greece or in mediæval Italy, would have sent armies against one another, towns which would either have lived in constant warfare, or the stronger of which would have reduced the weaker to dependence, have, in a large modern kingdom, hardly any disputes which require the interference of the Legislature or the Law Courts. Under a good central government, which gives perfectly equal rights to all its subjects, peace and good brotherhood will reign throughout the whole realm. And a really good central government will not attempt to push union too far. It will not seek to extinguish that moderate amount of local distinction, local feeling, and local independence, which is both a moral and a political gain. The utter wiping out of local distinctions goes far to reduce the whole realm to that state of subjection to a single dominant city which, whether under a monarchy or a republic, is the worst political condition of all.

Lessening of the evils of War.

The same system, again, which tends to take away all causes of dispute between different portions of the same nation, tends equally to diminish the horrors of external war between different nations. We have already seen that the recognized war-law between contending kingdoms is much less severe than it is between contending cities. The severity of its actual exercise between the disciplined armies of two civilized states is lessened in an almost greater proportion. But take war between great states in its worst form, take such a war as might be waged between Alva on one side, and Suwarrow on the other. Even such a war as this will inflict, in proportion to its scale, a far

In Gaul matters seem to be different; the existence of the Breton Archæological Society, which one would have thought was a harmless body enough, has been found inconsistent with the safety of the "Imperial" throne of Paris.

[1] Scotchmen are eligible to the highest offices in England, and they constantly fill them without any Englishman feeling the least jealousy. Englishmen are, I suppose, equally eligible to offices in Scotland, but they hardly ever fill them.

less amount of human misery than a really milder conflict between two rival cities. It will not recur so often; wars indeed, when begun, may last longer, but the intervals of peace will be proportionally longer still. And when war does come, it will be, so to speak, localized. A happily situated, especially an insular, nation may wage war after war, and spend nothing except its treasures and the blood of the soldiers actually engaged. To an Englishman war has long meant only increased taxation and the occasional death, what he deems the happy and glorious death, of some friend or kinsman. It is quite another sort of thing to endure all this, and at the same time to have your lands ravaged by Archidamos or your city sacked by Charles the Bold. But there is one very important difference between the warfare of Archidamos and the warfare even of Charles the Bold. Archidamos could ravage every corner of Attica, Charles the Bold could ravage only a very small part of France. While Charles lay before Beauvais, the 1472.
inhabitants of Bourdeaux might sleep, as far as Charles was concerned, in perfect safety and tranquillity. Even of an invaded territory it is only a very small portion which directly feels the horrors of invasion. Besides, the Great Powers have not uncommonly agreed upon the ingenious plan of sparing each other's territories altogether, and fighting out their quarrels on neutral ground. Thus, for a century or two, whenever there was a war between France and Austria, it was generally carried on by common consent on the convenient battle-ground of Flanders or Lombardy. The worst war of modern Europe, the War of the The Thirty Years' War, 1618–48.
Thirty Years, derives its peculiar horror from its having less than usual the character of a war between two great nations. France, Sweden, and other powers, took a share in it, but it was primarily a civil war of religion. As such, it combined, in a great degree, the horrors of a war waged between small states with the scale of a war waged between great ones. The wars which we can ourselves remember, the Russian War of 1854-6 and the Lombard campaign of 1859, have been mere child's play compared with the great internal wars either of Greece or of Germany. The scale of the powers engaged of course caused a tremendous loss of life among actual combatants, but the general amount of misery inflicted on the world was trifling in proportion to what was caused either by the Peloponnesian War or by the War of Thirty Years. Cases of special cruelty

or perfidy in modern warfare have been almost wholly confined to local and civil conflicts, and those most commonly among the less civilized nations of Europe. On the whole, the substitution of large kingdoms for city-commonwealths has immeasurably softened the horrors of war.[1]

Lessening of party strife.

And as the system of large states abolishes local warfare and diminishes the severity of national warfare, so we have seen by implication that it very seriously diminishes the bitterness of political strife. These advantages form a great, indeed an overwhelming, balance of gain on the side of the large state. But it must not be forgotten that there is a reverse to this picture also.

Disadvantage of large states.

Inferior political education.

We have seen that the great advantage of the city-commonwealth is the political education which it gives, the high standard which it tends to keep up among individual citizens. This is the natural result of a franchise, like that of the city-commonwealth, which makes it at once the right and the duty of every man to exercise direct deliberation and judgement on public affairs. This education a city-democracy gives to all the citizens; even an aristocracy or timocracy[2] at all liberally constituted gives it to a large portion of them. But in a large state the only way in which the mass of the citizens can have any share in the government is by choosing their representatives in the Parliament or other National Assembly. It is plain that such a franchise as this, indirect in itself and rarely exercised, cannot supply the same sort of political teaching as a seat in the Athenian Assembly. A large number of the electors will always remain ignorant and careless of public affairs to a degree that we cannot believe that any citizen of Athens ever was. Under any conceivable electoral system, many votes will be given blindly, recklessly, and corruptly. Men who are careless about political differences, if well to do in the world and not devoid of a conscience, will not vote at all; if they are at once poor and unprincipled, they will sell their votes. Many again who are not corrupted will be deceived; a hustings speech has become almost a proverb for insincerity. This ignorance, carelessness,

Ignorance and corruption of many electors.

[1] See however, on the other side, an eloquent description in Sismondi, Répub. Ital. ii. 448.

[2] In Greek political language a *Timocracy* (τιμοκρατία) is a government where the franchise depends on a property qualification, distinguished from the Democracy, which is common to all citizens, and from the Aristocracy, which is in the hands of a hereditary class.

and corruption among the electors appears to be the inherent vice of representative government on a large scale. There is probably no form of government under which bribery can be wholly prevented. It is a vice which occurs everywhere in some shape or other, but which varies its shapes infinitely. If bribery appears in a despotism or in a city-commonwealth, it commonly takes the form of bribery of the rulers; in a representative government, it takes the form, the really worse form, of bribery of the electors. The ministers of despotic Kings, the chief citizens of aristocratic republics, have been open to bribes in all ages. The chief citizens of democracies lie equally under the same slur. At Athens we hear constant complaints of bribery; but it is always bribery of that particular kind which is unknown among ourselves. We hear of demagogues and generals being bribed to follow this or that line of policy. The charge was probably in many cases unfounded, for charges of corruption are easy to bring and hard to disprove. But the fact that it was so often brought and so readily believed shows at least that it was felt not to be improbable. It is certain that any citizen who was known to be above corruption obtained, on that account, a degree of public confidence which sometimes, as in the cases of Nikias and Phôkiôn, was above his general desert. But of bribery in the popular courts of justice we hear very little, and of bribery in the Assembly itself we hear absolutely nothing. That Assembly doubtless passed many foolish, hasty, and passionate votes, but we may be quite sure that it never passed a corrupt vote. But we may believe that Kleôn or Hyperbolos often had his reward for the motion which he made to the People, and to which the People assented in good faith. Among ourselves the vice manifests itself in an exactly opposite shape. Kleôn was accused of receiving bribes himself, but never of bribing others. No recent English statesman has ever been suspected of receiving bribes, but few perhaps are altogether innocent of giving them. It is long indeed since any great English Minister has made a fortune by corruption of any kind. But in the last century Members of Parliament were bought with hard cash; in the present century the representatives are no longer bribed themselves, but they do not scruple to bribe the electors. The example of Rome might possibly be quoted on the other side. Rome was a city-commonwealth, and yet, in the later and corrupt days of the republic, bribery at elections

Different forms of bribery at Athens and in England.

was as common at Rome as it is among ourselves. But this was evidently for the same reason which makes it common among ourselves. The Tribes were open to bribery, because they had, in those days, become little more than an electoral body; their legislative power had long been hardly more than a shadow. There are then two forms of corruption, each the natural growth of a particular state of things, and each of which has its peculiar evils. The corruption of a single great Minister may do greater immediate harm to the state than the wholesale corruption of half the boroughs in England. But when electors generally come to look on a vote as a commodity to be sold instead of a duty to be discharged, when they look on a seat in Parliament as a favour to be paid for instead of a trust to be conferred, more damage is done to the political and moral instincts of the people than if a corrupt Minister took hostile gold to betray an army to defeat or to conduct a negociation to dishonour.

These vices inherent in the system.

These vices of ignorance and corruption in the electoral body seem to be the inherent evil of modern representative government. There is no panacea, whether of conservative or of democratic reform, which can wholly remove them. Vote by Ballot would probably do a good deal to lessen intimidation and something to lessen corruption; but there is no reason to think that it would entirely wipe out the stain. Nor can corruption be got rid of by limiting the franchise to some considerable property-qualification. Actual bribery may be got rid of, but not corruption in all its forms. Those whose social position sets them above being bribed with hard cash will easily find out ways of repaying themselves for their votes by appointments in the public service or by jobs at the public expense.[1] And the vices of ignorance and prejudice are beyond the reach of Reform Bills. Ignorance and prejudice are the monopoly of no particular social class and of no particular political party. Really wise men and good citizens are to be found scattered up and down among all classes and all parties. No system has yet been found which will make them, and none but them, the sole possessors of political power. No class has any real right to despise any other class, whether above or below it in the social scale. In

[1] Tocqueville (Dém. en Am. ii. 88) says that in the reign of Louis Philip the bribery of an elector was almost unknown in France. This was doubtless because the high qualification at which the franchise was fixed engendered forms of corruption different from those which are rife in our own boroughs.

times of any widespread political delusion, a Papal Aggression, for instance, or a Russian War, the madness seizes upon all ranks and all parties indiscriminately. The few who still hearken to the voice of reason are a small minority made up out of all classes and all parties. Very little then is gained by mere legislative restrictions of the franchise. The vices of electoral ignorance and corruption are inherent in the system. They are the weak side of European Parliamentary Government, just as Athenian Democracy and American Federalism have also their weak sides of other kinds. But though the evil can never be overcome, much may be done to alleviate it. If well informed men will make it their business to diffuse sound political knowledge among the people; if they will deal with the people as men to be reasoned with, not as brutes to be chained or as fools to be cajoled; if as large a portion of the people as possible has some direct share in local matters however trifling; much may be done to raise the character of the electoral body. But it is in vain to hope that the average standard of the electoral body of a large state will ever stand so high as the average standard of the popular Assembly of a small one. We must not dream of ever seeing the every-day Englishman attain the same political and intellectual position as was held by the every-day Athenian.

They may be alleviated but not wholly removed.

On the whole comparison, there can be little doubt that the balance of advantage lies in favour of the modern system of large states. The small republic indeed developes its individual citizens to a pitch which in the large kingdom is utterly impossible. But it so developes them at the cost of bitter political strife within, and almost constant warfare without. It may even be doubted whether the highest form of the city-commonwealth does not require slavery as the condition of its most perfect developement. The days of glory of such a commonwealth are indeed glorious beyond comparison; but it is a glory which is too brilliant to last, and in proportion to the short splendour of its prime is too often the unutterable wretchedness of its long old age. The republics of Greece seem to have been shown to the world for a moment, like some model of glorified humanity, from which all may draw the highest of lessons, but which none can hope to reproduce in its perfection. As the literature of Greece is the ground-

Balance of advantage in favour of large states.

work of all later literature, as the art of Greece is the groundwork of all later art, so in the great Democracy of Athens we recognize the parent state of law and justice and freedom, the wonder and the example of every later age. But it is an example which we can no more reproduce than we can call back again the inspiration of the Homeric singer, the more than human skill of Pheidias, or the untaught and inborn wisdom of Thucydidês. We can never be like them, if only because they have gone before. They all belong to that glorious vision of the world's youth which has passed away for ever. The subject of a great modern state leads a life less exciting and less brilliant, but a life no less useful, and more orderly and peaceful, than the citizen of an ancient commonwealth. But never could we have been as we are, if those ancient commonwealths had not gone before us. While human nature remains what it has been for two thousand years, so long will the eternal lessons of the great Possession for all Time,[1] the lessons which Periklês has written with his life and Thucydidês with his pen, the lessons expanded by the more enlarged experience of Aristotle and Polybios, the lessons which breathe a higher note of warning still as Dêmosthenês lives the champion of freedom and dies its martyr—so long will lessons such as these never cease to speak with the same truth and the same freshness even to countless generations. The continent which gave birth to Kleisthenês and Caius Licinius and Simon of Montfort may indeed be doomed to be trampled under foot by an Empire based on Universal Suffrage; but no pseudo-democratic despot, no Cæsar or Dionysios ruling by the national will of half-a-million of bayonets, will ever quite bring back Europe to the state of a land of Pharaohs and Nabuchodonosors, until the History of Thucydidês, the Politics of Aristotle, and the Orations of Dêmosthenês, are wholly forgotten among men.

We have thus compared together the two systems of government which form, as it were, the poles of our inquiry. We have contrasted the city-commonwealth, which sacrifices everything else to the full developement of the individual citizen, and the great modern kingdom, which sacrifices everything else to the peace, order, and general well-being of an extensive territory. Each, if it be a really good example of its own class,

[1] Κτῆμα ἐς ἀεί. Thuc. i. 22.

attains its own object perfectly; but each leaves much that is highly desirable unattained. May there not be a third system, intermediate between the two, borrowing something from each of them, and possessing many both of the merits and of the faults inherent in a compromise? May there not be a system which aims at both the objects which are aimed at singly by the other two systems, a system which will probably attain neither object in the perfection in which it is attained by the system which aims at it singly, but which may at least claim the merit of uniting the two in a very considerable degree? Such a third system, such a compromise, is to be found in that form of government which is the special object of our present inquiry, that namely of the Federal Republic. A Federal Government does not secure peace and equal rights to its whole territory so perfectly as a modern Constitutional Kingdom. It does not develope the political life of every single citizen so perfectly as an ancient city-commonwealth. But it secures a far higher amount of general peace than the system of independent cities; it gives its average citizens a higher political education than is within the reach of the average subjects of extensive monarchies. This form of government is a more delicate and artificial structure than either of the others; its perfect form is a late growth of a very high state of political culture; it is, even more than other forms of government, essentially the creation of circumstances, and it will even less than other forms bear thoughtlessly transplanting to soils where circumstances have not prepared the ground for it. For all these reasons there is no political system which affords a more curious political study at any time. And, at this present moment, the strength and the weakness which it is displaying before our eyes make its origin and its probable destiny the most interesting of all political problems.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT a system intermediate between Great and Small States.

It combines, though in an inferior degree, the special advantage of both systems.

I have said that Federalism is essentially a compromise,[1] an artificial product of an advanced state of political culture. Near approaches to it may be found in very early stages of society, and yet it is clearly not a system which would present itself at the very beginnings of political life. It is probable that both the great kingdom and the independent city existed before the system of Federations was thought of. It is quite certain that both great kingdoms and independent cities had

Federal Government a Compromise,

[1] See Bernard's Lectures, p. 73.

reached a high degree of splendour and of political importance before Federal Governments played any remarkable part in the history of the world. Federalism is a form of government which is likely to arise only under certain peculiar circumstances,[1] and its warmest admirers could hardly wish to propagate it, irrespective of circumstances, throughout the world in general. No one could wish that Athens, in the days of her glory, should have stooped to a Federal union with other Grecian cities. No one could wish to cut up our United Kingdom into a Federation, to invest English Counties with the rights of American States, or even to restore Scotland and Ireland to the quasi-Federal position which they held before their respective Unions. A Federal Union, to be of any value, must arise by the establishment of a closer tie between elements which were before distinct, not by the division of members which have been hitherto more closely united. All that I here claim for Federal Government —though, to be sure, no more can be claimed for any other sort of government—is that it may be looked upon as one possible form of government among others, having its own advantages and its own disadvantages, suited for some times and places and not suited for others, and which, like all other forms of government, may be good or bad, strong or weak, wise or foolish, just as may happen. At this moment there is unreasonable prejudice abroad against Federal Government in general. This is partly because we hold ourselves, and that quite justly, to have lately suffered a wrong at the hands of one particular Federal Government,[2] partly because it is thought by many that the disruption of the greatest Federal Government that the world ever saw proves that no Federal Government can possibly hold together. A moment's thought will show the fallacy of any such inferences. They are exactly the sort of hasty conclusions which a knowledge of general history dispels.

only suited to certain positions.

Popular prejudice on the subject.

[1] The circumstances under which a Federation is possible and desirable are discussed by M. de Tocqueville (Dém. en Am. i. 269 et seqq) and by Mr. Mill (Rep. Gov. p. 298). It is curious to see the different aspects in which the matter is looked at by two such able writers. There is no contradiction between them, but each supplies something which is wanting in the other.

[2] January, 1862. These errors are fostered by the strange habit which the newspapers have of calling the Government at Washington, "*the* Federal Government," as if it were the only one in the world, or as if the Government of the Confederate States were not equally a Federal Government. It would be about as reasonable to call any kingdom with which we had a dispute "*the* Royal Government," and to make inferences unfavourable to monarchy.

All that these facts prove is the indisputable truth that a Federal constitution is not necessarily a perfect constitution, that the Federal form of Government enjoys no immunity from the various weaknesses and dangers which beset all forms of government. They undoubtedly prove the existence of mismanagement in the conduct of the American Republic; they probably prove that circumstances have rendered it undesirable that the whole Union should remain united by a single Federal bond. But they prove no more against Federalism in the abstract than the misgovernment of particular Kings and the occasional disruption of their kingdoms prove against Monarchy in the abstract. At this stage of my work I desire to keep myself as clear as possible from the tangled maze of recent American politics. I postpone to a later stage any definite judgement on questions which have as yet hardly become matters of history. I am not now concerned to judge between North and South, to act as the accuser or the champion either of President Lincoln or of President Davis. I have to deal only with such mistaken inferences from recent events as affect the general question of Federal Government. I am not concerned to defend either Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Davis; but I am concerned to answer any inferences which reflect on the wisdom either of Markos and Aratos or of Washington and Hamilton. The South has seceded from the North, whether rightly or wrongly I do not here pronounce. There can be no doubt that, to say the least, a plausible case can be made out on behalf of Secession on the ground of expediency.[1] It is quite possible that there may not have been that degree of mutual sympathy[2] between the States without which a Federal Government cannot be successfully carried on. It is quite possible that the Union, as it stood, was too large to be properly governed as one Federal commonwealth, perhaps as one commonwealth of any kind. All these admissions would prove nothing, either against Federal Government in the abstract, or against the wisdom of

No general deductions to be made from recent American events.

[1] Mr. Spence's arguments (American Union, p. 198) to show the *constitutional right* of Secession carry no conviction to my mind, but his arguments on the ground of expediency deserve, to say the least, the most careful answer that the North can give them.

Professor Bernard's Lectures on the constitutional question seem to me to maintain a very just mean between the extreme views of Mr. Spence on the one side and Mr. Motley on the other.

[2] See Mill, Representative Government, p. 298.

the founders of the particular Federal Government of the United States. Let it be granted that the continuance of the American Union was undesirable, that it was expedient and just for the Southern States to separate. This proves no more than is proved by similar disruptions in the case of monarchies. In different ages of European history, Sicily has seceded from Naples, Portugal has seceded from Spain, Greece has seceded from Turkey, Belgium has seceded from Holland, Hungary, we all trust, is about to secede from Austria. These examples are not generally looked upon as proving the inherent weakness and absurdity of Monarchy. The secession of South Carolina and her sisters goes exactly as far and no further to prove the inherent weakness and absurdity of Federalism. What all these instances prove is merely this, that, both under Monarchies and under Federations, States are sometimes joined together which had better be separated. So far from the disruption proving anything against Federalism in the abstract, it does not even prove anything against the American Union as it came forth from the hands of its founders. Those founders, when they legislated for thirteen States on the Atlantic border, could not foresee the enormous extension of the Republic from Ocean to Ocean. Nor could they foresee those vast diversities of interest and feeling which have, since their time, arisen between the different sections of the original Union. The opposition between slaveholding and non-slaveholding States, between agricultural and manufacturing States, is an opposition which has arisen since the establishment of the Federal Constitution. Could they have foreseen all that has happened since their day, Washington and his colleagues would have been, not merely the wise but fallible men which they undoubtedly were, but unerring prophets, a character to which they laid no claim. And, after all, the Southern States have, in their very secession, paid the highest tribute that could be paid to the general principle of Federalism. They have seceded from one Federal Government only to set up another. Their first act has been to re-enact the old Federal Constitution, with only such changes in detail as the experience of seventy years had shown to be needful.[1] That Belgium, in separating from the Dutch Monarchy, still remained a kingdom, proves far more in favour of Monarchy than its separation proves

Similar disruptions in the case of Monarchies.

No case against Federalism in general, nor against the original American Union.

Testimony of the Southern States to the Federal Principle. 1861.

Parallel of Belgium and Holland.

[1] See the Confederate Constitution in Ellison's Slavery and Secession (London, 1861), p. 312.

against it. So the fact that the Southern States, in separating from the old Federal Union, forthwith set up a new Federal Union of their own, proves far more in favour of Federalism in the abstract than their separation proves against it. I abstain at present not only from entering on the details of the recent Secession, but even from entering on the details of the Federal Constitution itself. I refer to them here only to answer popular objections, to show that recent events in America prove absolutely nothing against Federalism in the abstract, and that we ought to be able to discuss the comparative merits and defects of Federalism and other forms of government as dispassionately in 1862 as we could have done in 1860.

I have several times, when speaking of Federal Governments, assumed incidentally that their constitution will be republican, just as I have also sometimes assumed incidentally that the constitution of a large consolidated state will be monarchical. I have done so simply because, up to this time, experience has shown that they commonly are so. There is indeed no absurdity in supposing that the government of a large country might permanently assume the form of an Indivisible or Consolidated Republic. There is no reason in the nature of things why a large state, with an Assembly representing the whole nation, might not intrust executive functions, not to a hereditary King directed by Ministers approved by the Assembly, but to an avowedly elective Council of State or to a President chosen for a term of years. The attempts hitherto made to establish such a government have been so few that their failure by no means proves that some future attempt may not be successful. They have commonly been made under much less favourable circumstances, and under much less worthy leaders, than the Federal Constitution of the United States. Some Cromwell or Buonaparte has commonly soon appeared to convert the Republic into a Tyranny. No one can mourn over the extinction of the Rump in England. The republican constitution was in no sense the work of the nation; the mockery of a representative body which ordained it was in truth an oligarchy in no whit better than the royal despotism which it succeeded or the Tyranny by which it was followed. The last French Republic fell because of the twofold madness of placing a born conspirator at the head of a free state and of entrusting a republican President with the

A large state may be a Republic without being a Federation.

No argument to be drawn from failures in England and France.

command of an enormous army. Instances like these certainly do not show that the Consolidated Republic is at all an impossible form of government for a large country. But since, as a matter of fact, all the greatest states of the world are, and commonly have been, monarchically governed, I have, for convenience, in my comparison of the great state with the small commonwealth, assumed that the great state would be a monarchy. So, on the other hand, there is no abstract absurdity in supposing that a league of monarchies, especially constitutional monarchies, might assume the true Federal form. But, as a matter of fact, all the greatest and most perfect Federations, past and present, have always been Republics. I have therefore, in like manner often assumed, in contrasting Federal states with others, that the Federal state would be a Republic.[1]

A Federation may consist of monarchies.

The question of the possibility of a Federal Monarchy is one which it may be worth while to follow out a little further. The relation of lord and vassal between sovereign princes, if strictly carried out, would produce something very like a kingly Federation.[2] The vassal prince is sovereign in his internal administration, but his foreign policy must be directed by that of his suzerain. He must never wage war against him, and he must follow his standard against other enemies. But in truth this is an ideal which has never been fully carried out, and, if it were carried out, it would not produce a perfect Federal Government. It has never been carried out, because the harmonious relation of lord and vassal which it supposes has never permanently existed. Sometimes a too powerful suzerain has reduced his vassals from the estate of vassals to that of subjects. Sometimes too powerful vassals have thrown off vassalage altogether, and have grown into independent sovereigns. The one process took place in France and the other in Germany. By annexing the dominions of their vassal princes, the Kings of Paris extended their territories to the sea, the Rhone, and the Pyrenees.[3] In Germany the vassal princes and commonwealths gradually grew into practical independence of their nominal King the Emperor. The very name of the German Kingdom died out in popular

Approach to kingly Federalism in the Feudal system.

The theory never fully carried out,

[1] See Archdeacon Denison's Prize Essay on Federal Government (Oxford, 1829), p. 33.

[2] See the Federalist, No. 17, p. 90.

[3] The Rhone and the Pyrenees, not the Rhine and the Alps, which have been reached by another process. See above, p. 24, note 2.

thought and popular language.[1] The old Germanic body is often spoken of as a Confederation, and it may fairly claim to rank among Confederations of the looser kind. But it was a Confederation only so far as it had ceased to be a monarchy. Its modern successor, the so-called German Confederation, has but little of the true Federal character about it, and, so far as it is Federal, it is not monarchic. Some of its members are even now Republics, and it has not, like the old Empire, any acknowledged monarchic head. And, even if the feudal theory had ever been harmoniously carried out, the relation of vassal principalities to an Imperial head would not of itself amount to the true Federal relation. It would rather resemble the relation of dependent alliance in which Chios and Mitylênê stood to Athens. To produce anything like true Federalism, all national affairs should be ordered in a National Assembly, an Institution which in feudal France was never attempted, and to which the Imperial Diet of Germany presented only a very feeble approach. It is indeed possible in theory that the powers of the American President, as they stand, might be vested in a hereditary or elective King, and that the functions of the Governors of the States, as they stand, might be vested in hereditary or elective Dukes. Such an Union would be a true Monarchic Federation. The connexion would be strictly Federal, and Kings and Dukes would be invested with really higher powers than were held by a King of Poland or a Duke of Venice. But such a constitution has never existed; it would be a political machine even more delicate and hard to work than a Federation of Republics. We may safely say that it could not last through a single generation.

and, if carried out, would not produce a true Federation.

Scheme of a true Federal Monarchy;

unlikely to last.

But kingly states have sometimes made a nearer approach to true Federalism than anything that could practically grow out of the relation of lord and vassal. We may pass by instances in remote ages and barbarous countries, of whose details we have no record. Such may, or may not, have been the Twelve Kings of Egypt[2] and the Five Lords of the Philistines.[3] We may pass by the abortive scheme of a Confederation of Italian Princes with the Pope at their head, which was put forth by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte only to become the laughing-stock of Europe. A far

Other approaches to Federal Monarchy.

A.D. 1859.

[1] The name however remained down to the last. The formal titles, even of Francis the Second, were "Erwählter Römischer Kaiser, König in Germanien und Jerusalem." These he laid aside, and, dissatisfied with his hereditary rank of Archduke, assumed the portentous title of "Emperor of Austria."

[2] Herod. ii. c. 147. [3] 1 Sam. vi. 4.

Two or more Kingdoms under one King.

nearer approach may be found in the case of the union of two or more kingdoms under one King.[1] The kingdoms so joined may form one state in all their relations with other powers, while they may retain the most perfect independence in all internal matters; they may keep their own laws, their own constitutions, and a distinct administration of the ordinary government.

A.D. 1603-1707.

Such were England and Scotland during the century between the Union of the Crowns and the Union of the Kingdoms; such were

A.D. 1782-1800.

Great Britain and Ireland during the last eighteen years of the last century; such have been Sweden and Norway for nearly

A.D. 1814-1862.

fifty years past. But such unions have been few in number, and they have commonly been the result of accident. A Kingdom has been conquered or inherited by the King of another Kingdom; it has received the stranger as its sovereign, but it has retained its own constitution and laws. When many states have been so united, as by the Dukes of Burgundy, the Kings of Castile, and the so-called "Emperors" of Austria, had they been governed with any regard to right and justice, something like a Federal

Spain;

Monarchy might have been the result. But in Spain, the rights of independent kingdoms first sank into mere provincial liberties, and then were absorbed by the general despotism of the common Sovereign. Spain has risen again, not indeed as a Confederation, but as a constitutional kingdom, which lacks nothing except

The "Austrian Empire;"

rulers worthy of the nation. In the case of the "Austrian Empire," long years of tyranny and faithlessness have produced a hatred of the central power which separation alone can satisfy. But, were this otherwise, it may be doubted whether a union of such utterly incongruous nations, even on the mildest and justest terms, could ever satisfy the conditions necessary for a Federation of any kind. Where only two crowns have been thus united, a tendency to more perfect union has commonly arisen. This, in its best form, has taken the form of an equal fusion of the two kingdoms; in its worst form it has degenerated into an absorption of the weaker kingdom by the stronger. In our own

Great Britain and Ireland;

country, Scotland has first been united with England, and then Ireland has been united with Great Britain. Of cases where such more perfect union has not followed, the most permanent and

Sweden and Norway.

beneficial has been the union of Sweden and Norway. That is to say, the terms of union preserved to Norway liberties which otherwise she might have lost. The union was a desirable mean

[1] Mill, Representative Government, p. 303.

between mere absorption by Sweden, and an attempt at perfect independence which would probably have been fruitless. The union has worked well, through the indomitable love of freedom which reigns in the noble Norwegian nation. But it is hardly a system which a patriotic Norwegian would have hit upon as desirable for its own sake. On the whole the general tendency of history is to show that, though a Monarchic Federation is by no means theoretically impossible, yet a Republican Federation is far more likely to exist as a permanent and flourishing system. We may therefore, in the general course of our comparison, practically assume that a Federal state will be also a Republican state.

When I speak of the Federal system as one intermediate between the systems of large and of small states, it may be objected that the states which compose a Federation may be either large or small states, according to the definitions of large and small states which I have already given. It is undoubtedly true that the members of a Confederation may be either single cities or states of a considerable size. The Achaian League was a League of Cities, the United States are a League of countries, many of which exceed in size the smaller kingdoms of Europe. It therefore naturally follows, that in Achaia the internal governments of the several cities resembled those of any other Greek democracy, while the internal governments of the several American States follow the common type of modern European constitutions. That is to say, the Achaian cities had primary, the American States have representative Assemblies. It is clear that a great commonwealth, like the State of New York, is as much obliged to adopt representative institutions as England or Italy.[1] But though the component parts of a Federation may be as large on the map as some European kingdoms, they are not likely to be states which really occupy the same position. This great size of

Members of a Federation may be either Cities or States of considerable size.

[1] Switzerland exhibits an intermediate state of things. Some Cantons have primary, others have representative Assemblies. It is only in one or two of the largest Cantons that representation can have been absolutely necessary on geographical grounds. It must have been introduced elsewhere by the influence of the common type of European freedom. A Canton like Geneva, consisting of a large town with a very small surrounding territory, would have seemed the place of all others to revive a Democracy of the Athenian kind. But the constitution of Geneva, though democratic, is representative; Dêmos, in his purity, is to be found only in some of the small rural Cantons which contain no important town.

Difference of scale in Europe and America to be considered.

the States is peculiar to the American Union, and we must take into account the difference of scale between America and Europe. In a newly-settled continent, a country which covers as much ground as France or Spain may, in population, in everything in short except mere extent, be only on a level with a small Swiss Canton or German Duchy. The difference may be seen not only between Europe and America, but between the older and newer parts of the American Union itself. The area of Texas is between three and four times as great as the area of all the New England States; the population of Texas, bond and free, is less than half the population of the one State of Massachusetts.[1] Though several of the States are of the size of kingdoms, it is only one or two in which it would not be perfect madness to set up as wholly independent powers. A Federal connexion with other states is just as necessary to most of them as it was to the Achaian cities, or as it now is to the Swiss Cantons. Still it undoubtedly makes a great difference in the character of a Federation, whether its members are single cities or states of such a size as to require Representative Assemblies. That is to say, while Federations, as a class, occupy a position intermediate between the two other systems, some particular Federations will approach nearer to one extreme, and others to the other. A League of the Achaian sort will share many of the merits and the defects of a system of independent city-commonwealths. A League of the American sort will share many of the merits and the defects of a system of large monarchies or republics. And yet the position of Federations as a class still remains distinct and intermediate. The position of Megalopolis and that of New York, both being sovereign in their internal affairs, and mere municipalities as regards foreign powers, have really more of resemblance to one another, notwithstanding the difference of scale, than the position of Megalopolis has to the position of Athens and the position of New York to that of England. Though one Federation will incline more to one extreme and one to the other, it is still true that Federal Governments, as a class, occupy a middle position between the two extremes. Along with some of the defects inherent in a compromise, they have the

[1] Area of Texas, 237,504 square miles, of all New England, 65,038, of Massachusetts, 7800. Population of Texas, 601,039, of all New England, 3,318,681, of Massachusetts, 1,231,065. I take my figures from Ellison's Slavery and Secession, p. 362.

advantage of a middle position in uniting, to a considerable extent, the merits of both the opposite systems.[1]

General view of Federalism as an intermediate system.

A Federal Government then secures peace, order, and unity to a large territory, not so perfectly as a large kingdom does, but far more perfectly than can be done by a system of small independent states. It affords to its citizens a political education less perfect than is afforded to the citizens of a city-commonwealth, but far more perfect than is afforded to the subjects of a large kingdom. In theory indeed the Federal Government secures peace, order, and national unity just as well as the kingdom does. The Federal power supplies legal means for settling disputes between State and State, just as readily available as those which a large kingdom supplies for settling disputes between district and district. The Federation is as truly sovereign in its own department as the State is in its own department. Resistance to the lawful commands of its Government is as much rebellion as resistance to the lawful commands of a monarch. An injury done by one State to another State or to a citizen of another State is not a matter of international wrong; it is a mere breach of the peace, to be rectified by the Federal Courts or, if need be, to be chastised by the Federal army. The theory is exactly the same; but the Government of a Federation will have more difficulty in carrying the theory into practice than the Government of a consolidated state. For Federal purposes the several States are merely municipalities or individuals, but they possess infinitely greater powers than can ever belong to municipalities or to individuals.[2] If they wish to resist, the means of resistance are far easier. In the looser kind of Federation, that which works only by requisitions, disobedience to an unpleasant requisition will be a matter of course. Even where the Union is closest, the coercion, however just, of a recalcitrant State is sure to be a difficult and invidious business. The mere threat of nullification or secession by several States may weaken the action of the Federal power in a way which their constitutional opposition in the Federal Assembly could not

Intermediate position as regards government of the whole territory.

[1] See Tocqueville, i. 278. ' L'Union est libre et heureuse comme une petite nation, glorieuse et forte comme une grande. Again, ii. 208. La forme fédérale que les Americains ont adoptée, et qui permet à l'Union de jouir de la puissance d'une grande république et de la sécurité d'une petite.

[2] On these subjects there are many striking passages in Tocqueville. See especially, i. 241, 251, 252, 254, 256. Some of these passages have been strangely misunderstood by his English translator

do. There is therefore no doubt that a Federal Government is practically less efficient to maintain peace, order, and national unity than a consolidated Government. That it is more efficient to maintain them than a system of small independent states, which in truth does not seek to maintain them at all, needs no demonstration.

Intermediate position as regards Political Education.

In like manner it is easy to show that a Federal State will afford its average citizens a degree of political education, greater than they can obtain in a large kingdom, less than they can obtain in a city-commonwealth. Doubtless the amount of developement and education which a Federal State gives to the individual citizen will mainly depend upon the size and the internal constitution of its several members. In a Confederation of Cities the several cities will approach to the character of independent city-commonwealths; in a Confederation of large States the several States will approach to the character of large kingdoms or republics. Yet certain general tendencies will run through both classes. It is impossible that any member of a Federation of either kind can give to the mass of its citizens such a degree of political education as may be given by a perfectly independent democratic city. The Achaian Cities possessed, some of the Swiss Cantons still possess, Democracy in its purest form, where every adult male citizen has a direct voice in the popular Assembly. But no such City or Canton can possibly give its citizens the same political education as was given to the citizens of democratic Athens.[1] The very condition of the case forbids it. The mere existence of the Federal tie at once prevents the citizen of Pellênê or of Schwytz from being called on to deliberate and decide on such important and instructive questions as were laid before the citizen of Athens. It was the discussion of those high questions of imperial policy on which Periklês and Dêmosthenês harangued, which gave their hearers the very highest of all political teaching. But these questions, so far as any parallel to them can exist at all, are, by the Achaian and Swiss system, transferred from the Assemblies of each particular City or Canton to the Federal Assembly at Aigion or at Bern. The chief means of improvement is therefore at once placed out of the reach of the ordinary citizen of the

[1] That pure Democracy is now confined to some of the most backward among the Cantons is purely accidental. The argument would apply equally if it existed at Geneva or Basel.

Federation.[1] Still, the powers of the City or Canton are far more than municipal; it is really sovereign in all purely internal matters. A share therefore in its government must afford a political education, if inferior to that of the Athenian, yet at least superior to any that can be obtained in the purely municipal Assemblies of an extensive kingdom. Again, in a city or small district, the constitution may legally be representative; the legal function of the private citizen may be, not to make laws, but only to choose law-makers. Still, in such a commonwealth, the people at large will always have a far greater insight into public affairs, and will always exercise a far greater influence over their course, than can possibly happen in a large kingdom. In a Confederation of larger States, where some members may be as large in geographical extent as some European kingdoms, the direct share of the people in the government cannot well be greater in kind than it is in a constitutional monarchy. It may be greater in amount, because more offices may depend upon popular election; but in the State of New York, no less than in the Kingdom of Britain or of Italy, the direct influence of the people cannot go beyond the election of legislators and magistrates. But their indirect influence will be far greater in the State than it can be in the Kingdom. Republican habits and feelings will cause appeals to the people to be far more common and far more direct than is usual in a monarchic state. Political meetings and regularly organized Conventions will be far more common and far more influential. There will not be the same wide difference as to regularity of proceeding and as to moral weight between such self-appointed bodies and the constitutional Assemblies of the country. And this indirect influence of the people will not only be greater than it can be in the constitutional Kingdom; it will be greater than it can be in the consolidated Republic. It will doubtless be greater in the consolidated Republic than it can be in the Kingdom; but it may be doubted whether in a consolidated Republic it will be at all more enlightened or useful than it can be in a Kingdom. In a large Republic, say France in its short republican day, the danger is that the people will gain increased influence without increased means of improvement. The institutions of a smaller common

Comparison of a State and a Kingdom.

Comparison of a State with a consolidated Republic.

[1] The Achaian Assembly was in theory a Primary Assembly, but it had practically much more of the character of a Representative one. This will be discussed at length in Chapter V.

wealth, while they give the people the increased influence, give them the increased means of improvement along with it. No means of improvement, save the unattainable standard of the Athenian Assembly, is equal to that afforded by a good system of local Self-Government.[1] Now of all systems the Federal Republic is the most favourable to local Self-Government; the Consolidated Republic would seem to be less favourable to it than the Constitutional Monarchy. In such a Republic, the one Sovereign Assembly, the true and sole representative of the nation, will, in its natural love of power, be far from favourably inclined towards any authority which does not directly proceed from itself, towards assemblies or magistrates over which it has only an indirect control. The Parliament of a Monarchy, whose sphere is limited by its very nature, is not likely to have the same jealousy of local rights as the omnipotent National Assembly of a Republic. And both a Federal Congress and a State Legislature may be expected to have less jealousy still. Both Assemblies are accustomed to limitations of various kinds; the Federal Congress indeed is limited in a way which prevents it from touching local rights at all. And the State Legislature, which might touch them, is itself accustomed to limitations of one kind at the hands of the Federal body, and will therefore be more inclined to tolerate limitations of another kind at the hands of local bodies. The very model of the Federal Government, the perfect liberty retained by each State within its own walk, will naturally suggest the retention of a large amount of municipal liberty by the smaller divisions of which the State itself is composed. (In the New England States, where the true Federal model is best carried out, local Self-Government seems to have reached its fullest developement.[2] The Township, the County, the State, the Union, are wheels within wheels, governments within governments, each lower office preparing and educating for the office above it, from the Select-Man of the Township to the President of the United States.) It is clear that no system, short of the Athenian Democracy, can give the mass of the people a political education at all comparable to this. It may indeed be that even the general diffusion of political intelligence is not

Self-Government in Federal States.

[1] Tocqueville, ii. 208. Les institutions communales qui, modérant le despotisme de la majorité, donnent en même temps au peuple le goût de la liberté et l'art d'être libre.

[2] See Tocqueville, i. p. 103 et seqq.

an unmixed good; it is possible that where everybody is a statesman, nobody will be a great statesman; it is possible that the constant occupation of the mind on political subjects may tend to diminish some qualities, even some political qualities, which may be no less practically useful than political intelligence itself. The English people are certainly not remarkable for a high average of political intelligence; but they often display an amount of political good sense, of rational confidence in well-chosen leaders, which we might look for in vain among the busier spirits of America. But I believe that the faults, which, among many virtues, have disfigured the political working of the United States are owing to the peculiar circumstances of that Republic, and are not inherent results either of Democratic Government or of Federal Government. For the discussion of these points I trust to find a more fitting place in a later stage of my history. It is enough now to refer to the counter-examples of Athens, Achaia, Holland, and Switzerland. My present position simply is that, as the tendency of a Federal State is to give each individual citizen[1] greater political powers and greater political responsibility, so it also gives him the opportunity of submitting himself to a more thoroughly educating and improving process than lies within the reach of the ordinary subject of a great monarchy. But all that Achaia or Switzerland or America can give is utterly inferior to that political training, which the constant habit of ruling and judging, of hearing the greatest affairs discussed by the greatest men, offered to one and all of the twenty thousand citizens of Athens.

Circumstances under which a Federal Union is desirable.

Such then are the advantages and disadvantages which seem naturally to belong to Federal Governments as such. But it must be remembered that, of all political systems in the world, the Federal Republic is the last which it would be prudent in its admirers to preach up as the one political system to be adopted in all times and places. It is a system eminently suited for some circumstances, eminently unsuited for others. Federalism is in its place whenever it appears in the form of closer Union. Europeans, accustomed to a system of large consolidated states, are apt to look upon a Federal system as a system of disunion, and therefore a system of weakness. To a Greek of the third century B.C., to an American in 1787, it presented itself as a

[1] In an aristocratic Federation this must of course be understood of those citizens only who are invested with the highest franchise.

system of union and therefore of strength. The alternative was not closer union, but wider separation. A Kingdom of Peloponnêsos or of America was an absurdity too great to be thought of. A single Consolidated Republic was almost equally out of the question. The real question was, Shall these Cities, these States, remain utterly isolated, perhaps hostile to one another, at most united by an inefficient and precarious alliance?—or shall they, while retaining full internal independence, be fused into one nation as regards all dealings with other powers? Looked at in this light, the Federal system is emphatically a system of union, and of that strength which follows upon union. The Federal connexion is in its place wherever the several members to be united are fitted for that species of union and for no other. It requires a sufficient degree of community in origin or feeling or interest to allow the several members to work together up to a certain point. It requires that there should not be that perfect degree of community, or rather identity, which allows the several members to be fused together for all purposes. Where there is no community at all, Federalism is inappropriate; the Cities or States had better remain wholly independent, and take their chance of the advantages and disadvantages of the system of small commonwealths. Where community rises into identity, Federalism is equally inappropriate; the Cities or States had better sink into mere Counties of a Kingdom or Consolidated Republic, and take their chance of the advantages and disadvantages of the system of large states. But in the intermediate set of circumstances, the circumstances of Peloponnêsos struggling against Macedonia, of Switzerland struggling against Austria, of the Netherlands struggling against Spain, of the American colonies struggling against England, Federalism is the true solvent. It gives as much of union as the members need and not more than they need. At the present moment, by the confession of both sides, the Federal tie is the appropriate one to bind together New York and Massachusetts, South Carolina and Georgia. The only question is whether the requisite degree of community of interests, feelings, and habits exists between New York and Massachusetts on the one hand and South Carolina and Georgia on the other. If it does not, the interests of the world will be better promoted by the existence of two Federations instead of one. Even should a third Federation arise in the remoter West, the principle of Federalism will remain untouched, as long as the

Federal tie, and nothing tighter or looser, is applied to those States whose degree of fraternity with one another makes the Federal relation the appropriate degree of connexion. Wherever either closer union or more entire separation is desirable, Federalism is out of place. It is out of place if it attempts either to break asunder what is already more closely united,[1] or to unite what is wholly incapable of union. Its mission is to unite to a certain extent what is capable of a certain amount of union and no more. It is an intermediate point between two extremes, capable either of being despised as a compromise or of being extolled as the golden mean.

General results of Modern Federalism.

My object, at this particular stage of my argument, is, more than anything else, to answer certain popular fallacies with regard to my subject. I will therefore slightly forestall some things which are more appropriate to a later stage, and will ask what Federalism, applied in its proper place, has really done, and is still doing, before our eyes. What have been its real results in America? I do not ask what have been the results of American institutions generally; that is an inquiry which I postpone altogether. I do not ask what has been the result either of a democratic state of society or of a democratic form of government. I ask, What has been the result of the Federal system, as such, in the United States? I ask again, What has been its result in a land nearer to us though less closely connected? What has a Federal Union done, or failed to do, for Switzerland, and, through Switzerland, for Europe?

Results of the American Union.

No one who really understands the position of the United States at the time when their Federal Constitution was formed will doubt that the establishment of a Federal system was absolutely the only course open to the founders of the Republic. Thirteen independent, and possibly hostile, commonwealths hardly formed a desirable alternative. A consolidated State of thirteen counties was a notion utterly chimerical. The reasons which may now make two or three Confederations more desirable than one had not then shown themselves. Washington and his

[1] I mean of course countries really united like England and France. Where the tie is merely artificial or violent, as in the lands unequally yoked together under Austrian or Turkish tyranny, Federalism may (or may not) be the proper relation for the different states on acquiring freedom. The decaying Ottoman Empire certainly affords a most tempting field for the experiment of some form or other of monarchic Federation.

coadjutors did what wise men would do in the circumstances in which they found themselves. Like Solôn, they established, not the best of all possible constitutions, but the constitution which was the best possible in that particular time and place. And what has been the result of their work? Their constitution has at least outlived countless constitutions both in Europe and in America. When the American constitution was drawn up, France was still under the absolute and undisputed sway of a Most Christian King. The American Union has been contemporary with a Constitutional King of the French, a Convention, a Directory, a Consulate for a term, a Consulate for life, an Emperor of a Republic, an Emperor of an Empire,[1] a Constitutional King of France, an Emperor again, a Constitutional King of France again, a King of the French, a Provisional Government, a Dictator, a President for four years, a despotic President for ten years, an Emperor for what period no one can foretell. The constitution-making of Philadelphia has been at least more permanent than the constitution-making of Paris. At all events, the American Union has actually secured, for what is really a long period of time, a greater amount of combined peace and freedom than was ever before enjoyed by so large a portion of the earth's surface. There have been, and still are, vaster despotic Empires, but never before has so large an inhabited territory remained for more than seventy years in the enjoyment at once of internal freedom and of exemption from the scourge of internal war. Now this is the direct result of the Federal System. Either entire independence or closer union would have brought with it evils which the Federal relation has prevented. Had the thirteen States remained wholly independent commonwealths, had new States, equally independent, grown up to the West of them, we cannot doubt that the American continent would, before this time, have become the theatre of constant wars between so many independent and rival powers. Had the States formed a single Monarchy or Consolidated Republic, some attempt would long ago have been made to force upon the whole country one uniform law, either allowing or forbidding Slavery. Who can doubt that a Civil War, even more fearful than the present one, would have been the immediate consequence? The

Its comparative permanency as compared with France.

Evils which the Federal Union has hindered.

[1] The early Imperial coins of the first Buonaparte bear on the reverse the legend "République Française," which in the later ones is exchanged for "Empire Français."

Federal Union has at least staved off either evil for no inconsiderable term of years. It has staved it off for a period as long as the greatest glory of Athens, for a period not far short of half the duration of the truest glory of Rome.[1] There have been bitter dissensions and bitter hatreds, violent words and violent actions, there have been nullifications and threats of secession and attempts at local insurrection, but, till this present outbreak, there has been nothing really deserving the name of Civil War. The Federal system has at least saved that vast continent for nearly three generations from the mutual slaughter of men of the same race and speech, from the sight of ravaged provinces and of cities taken by storm. During all these years, the amount of union between the several States, the amount of independence retained by each State, has been found to be exactly that amount which answered the required purpose. If the system has broken down at last, we may be sure that any other system would have broken down much sooner. And, after all, it has only broken down very partially. One Federation has been divided into two, just as one Kingdom has often been divided into two; but neither of the powers thus formed has thought of setting up anything but a Federal system as the form of its own internal constitution.

Alleged weakness of the Federal Tie.

It is often said that the Disruption of the United States at once puts Federalism out of court by proving the inherent weakness of the Federal tie. To make a general political inference from a single example in history is not a very philosophical way of reasoning. The alleged weakness of the Federal tie is moreover, in a certain sense, a truism. The Federal tie is in its own nature weaker than the tie which unites the geographical divisions of a perfectly consolidated state. But what Federalism ought really to be compared with is not perfect union, but the complete separation which has commonly been its only alternative. I freely admit, in a certain sense, the weakness of the Federal tie. But the real question is not whether the tie is weak or strong, but whether there are not certain circumstances in which a weak tie is better either than a strong tie or than no tie at all. The Federal tie is weak because it is artificial. It is hardly possible

True in a sense, but not necessarily injurious.

[1] From the Declaration of Independence in 1776 to the Secession of 1861 is 85 years. From the battle of Marathôn (B.C. 490) to the conquest of Athens by Lysander (B.C. 404) is 86. The period of Roman History between the settlement of the quarrels of the Orders (B.C. c. 337) and the beginning of the later struggles under the Gracchi (B.C. 133) is about 200 years.

that a man can feel the same love for an ingenious political creation as he may feel either for a single great nation or for a single city-commonwealth. The Achaian League or the American Union can hardly call forth either that feeling of hereditary loyalty which attaches to Kings descended from Alfred or Saint Lewis, or that burning patriotism which the Athenian or the Florentine felt for the City in which his whole political and personal being found its home. A Federal Union, in short, must depend for its permanence, not on the sentiment but on the reason of its citizens. If circumstances remain as they were at the time of its formation, if the particular degree of union which it secures is found to be practically better than either closer union or more complete independence, a Federal Government may well be as permanent as any other. If circumstances change, if it be found that either consolidation or separation is desirable, then the Federal Union, essentially a compromise, may be found to have worked well as a system of transition. Let us suppose that the members of a Federal Union, by long connexion and familiarity, by the habit of united action for many important purposes, have at last formed the desire for a still more complete union. To turn a Federation into a Consolidated state will be found at least as easy as to unite a group of isolated atoms into a Federation. The several States have already delegated a large portion of their rights to a common Government of their own choosing; all that is needed is to go a step further, and to invest that common Government with rights more extensive still. Let us take the other alternative. Let us suppose that the union of a number of weak states has given to each a power and prosperity which it never could have obtained alone; that, under the wing of the central power, its childhood has grown up into maturity, and its weakness has developed into strength. The several States may feel that they are able to go alone, that the Union, which once strengthened, now only restrains them. In such a case the impulse towards complete independence would probably be irresistible. Such a separation would in a certain sense prove the weakness of the Federal tie; in another sense it would prove that there was strength in its very weakness. Or let us take the case which has actually happened. Let us not suppose a general disruption, a dissolution of the whole Union into independent atoms; let us suppose that, through circumstances unforeseen when the League was founded,

Circumstances under which a Federal Union may be lasting.

Circumstances under which it may be useful as a Transitional state.

Cases for Consolidation.

Cases for Separation.

certain parts of the Union have ceased to have that community of feeling and interest with certain other parts which it is essential that the members of a Federal body should have with each other. Here too the weakness of the Federal tie may be said to come in. In either of these cases, the idea of secession will present itself more readily, and the idea can be more easily carried out, than can happen when one portion of a consolidated state feels itself aggrieved by the common Government. Whenever the tendency in a Federation runs towards separation, the tendency will be almost irresistible. The amount of political independence retained by the several States is so great that it may both lead them to aspire to, and actually make them capable of, an independence still more complete. Each citizen will always entertain a warmer and more immediate patriotic feeling for his own State than he entertains for the whole Union. If he think that his own State is wronged by the Union, the idea of its perfect independence is one which may easily occur. And if the idea does occur, it will be found far more easy to carry out into practice than similar schemes of secession could be under any other form of Government. The secession of an English county or of a French department is something too ludicrous to think of. To say nothing of the inherent absurdity of the wish, to say nothing of the certainty of the rebellion being at once crushed, the new commonwealth would be utterly helpless. It has no political traditions apart from the whole country, it has no form of local government which it can at once convert into a sovereign power. But the American State has already a Governor and a Legislature on exactly the same model as the President and Congress of the whole Union. The Governor and Legislature already possess very large political powers; in the older States they are actually institutions of more ancient date than the Federal Government itself. It needs no great stretch of imagination to invest with greater powers a Government which possesses such large powers already, and for the State to enter alone upon the general stage of the world, to commission Ambassadors and to levy armies on its own account. So to do is, always in legal theory, sometimes in sober historic truth, only to fall back on the state of things when as yet the Sovereign State had ceded no portion of its powers to the Federal Union. This facility of Secession is what is meant when the weakness of the Federal tie is spoken of. But in truth it may be doubted whether this very

Easiness of separation when needed.

Easiness of separation has a good side.

weakness may not bring with it some incidental advantages. At any rate a plausible case may be made out in favour of this facility of Secession. Rebellion is sometimes necessary, and Secession is certainly the mildest form that Rebellion can take. For, beyond all doubt, Secession is, legally and formally, Rebellion. The Federal Union is essentially a perpetual union; a Federal Constitution cannot, any more than any other constitution, contain provisions for its own dissolution. The Federal power is entitled to full obedience within its own sphere, and the refusal of that obedience, whether by States or by individuals, is essentially an act of Rebellion. It does not at all follow that such rebellion is necessarily either wrong or inexpedient; but it does follow that Secession is not an every-day right to be exercised at pleasure. A seceding State may be fully justified in seceding; but to justify its secession it ought to be provided with at least as good a case as the original States had for their secession from the Crown of Great Britain. Granting therefore that separation between members of a Federation will be sometimes expedient, surely a system which supplies the means of a peaceable divorce is not without its good side. It is, on every ground, far easier to secede from a Federation than from a Consolidated State. Some reasons I have already given. In the case of a Kingdom, a feeling will often come in which, unreasonable as it is, is none the less powerful for being unreasonable. In many men's minds loyalty is simply a blind attachment to a person or to a family, not a rational conviction of the duty of obedience to all lawful authority. To such minds the most reasonable rebellion against a King will seem a far more heinous crime than the most unreasonable rebellion against a Republic. Again, Kings, whether despotic or constitutional, and Consolidated Republics too, can seldom indeed be got to give up a single inch of their territories, except by force. The supposed honour and the supposed interest of the Monarch require that, if he does not extend, he at least should not diminish, the boundaries of the realm which he has inherited. And nations have such a way of identifying themselves with their Kings that popular feeling will, in such cases, run for a long time in the same current with royal feeling. Every wise English statesman disliked the American War; but to George the Third on the one hand, and to the mass of Englishmen on the other, the honour of England seemed to require the recovery of the revolted

Why it is easier to secede from a Federation than from a Consolidated State.

colonies. The experience of Federal States on this point is not very extensive. But the reason of the case would lead us to expect that the members of a League from which one or more members have seceded would be less anxious to retain them, at all events less ready to make great sacrifices to retain them by force, than either a monarch or his subjects will be to recover a revolted province. Every Englishman thought his personal honour involved in the reconquest of Delhi; it does not seem so directly to concern a citizen of New York whether South Carolina is, or is not, a member of the same Federal body as his own State.[1] The War in the United States has not yet lasted a year and a half[2]; it has hitherto been chequered by victories and defeats on both sides, and, after all, the real difficulty on the part of the North is not to win battles or to capture towns, but to occupy, that is, to conquer in any practical sense, the whole of so vast a territory.[3] It still remains to be seen whether the people of the Northern States will be ready to endure so prolonged a struggle for the forcible reduction of their revolted brethren, as Spain or even as England endured for the forcible reduction of their revolted dependencies. It is dangerous to try to prophesy, but one cannot help thinking that the United States and the Confederate States will have exchanged Ambassadors before the year 1941 or even before the year 1869.[4] Besides the physical difficulties of conquering a large country, besides the difficulty of seeing what interest the conquerors have in the conquest, there is the absurdity of the process of conquest itself. A Federation, though legally perpetual, is something which is in its own nature essentially voluntary: there is a sort of inconsistency in retaining members against their will. What is to be done with them when they are conquered? They can hardly be made subjects of the other States; are they then to

Probability that a Federation will be less anxious than a kingdom to recover revolted members.

Inconsistency of striving to retain unwilling members.

[1] Of course the question of geographical possibility is here of great importance. If Kentucky or Tennessee had seceded all by itself, without the support of any other State, the thing would have been as ridiculous as a secession of Northamptonshire, and the nuisance would have been abated by the combined forces of the whole Union. But the secession of Maine or of Florida would not have so clearly touched the interests of other parts of the Federation.

[2] July, 1862.

[3] This is forcibly put in Mr. Spence's Seventh Chapter.

[4] The Dutch War of Independence began in 1568; the Thirteen Years' Truce was concluded in 1609, but the independence of the United Provinces was not formally recognized by Spain till 1648. Our own American War lasted eight years, 1775-83.

be compelled at the point of the bayonet to recognize their conquerors as brethren, and to send, under the penalties of treason, unwilling Senators and Representatives to Washington? Either alternative is utterly repugnant to the first principles of a Federal Union. Surely the remedy is worse than the disease. The revolted State, as a foreign power, may become a friendly neighbour; as an unwilling Confederate, it will simply be a source of internal dissension and confusion. A State will hardly think of Secession as long as it is its manifest interest to remain in the Union. When it ceases to be its manifest interest to remain, there may at least be grave doubts as to either the justice or the expediency of retaining it by force. The Achaian League was weakened, indeed we may say that it finally perished, by nothing so much as by the attempt to retain members in the Confederation against their will.

The truth is that the disruption of the United States has been mainly owing to their unparalleled prosperity. In that boundless continent, with no neighbour at once able and willing to contend with them on equal terms, Secession has been possible. No despot stands at either end of the Union ready to swallow up each seceding State as soon as it loses the protection of its neighbours. Federalism cannot be said to have been found wanting, where it has not been really tried. What a Federal union really can do when it is tried is best seen by another example. From America let us turn our eyes to Switzerland. The territory of the Swiss Confederation is, both in a military and a political point of view, one of the most important in Europe. Lying between the two great despotisms of France and Austria, it is above all things needful that it should be held by a free and an united people. But disunion seems stamped upon the soil by the very hand of nature, no less than on the soil of Hellas itself. Every valley seems to ask for its own separate commonwealth. The land, small as it is, is inhabited by men of different races, different languages, different religions, different stages of society. Four languages are spoken within the narrow compass of the League. Religious and political dissensions have been so strong as more than once to have led to civil war. How are such a people to be kept united among themselves, so as to guard their mountains and valleys against all invaders? I need hardly stop to show that the citadel of

Example of Switzerland.

Europe could not be safely entrusted to twenty-two wholly independent Republics or to twenty-two wholly independent princes. But would consolidation answer the purpose? Shall we give them the stereotyped blessing of a hereditary King, a responsible Ministry, an elected and a nominated House of Parliament? Or shall we, by way of variety, give them some neatly planned scheme of a Republic one and indivisible? Such a Kingdom, such a Republic, would but present, on a smaller scale, much such a spectacle as the Empires of Austria and Turkey. The Burgundian and the Italian provinces would rebel against a dominant German government, and would fly for support to their neighbours of kindred speech beyond the limits of the Kingdom. France would soon become to Vaud what Piedmont has been to the Italian provinces of Austria, what Russia has been to the Slavonic provinces of Turkey. The Federal relation has solved the problem. Under the Federal system, the Catholic and the Protestant, the aristocrat and the democrat, the citizen of Bern and the mountaineer of Uri,—the Swabian of Zürich, the Lombard of Ticino, the Burgundian of Geneva, the speakers of the unknown tongues of the Rhætian valleys—all can meet side by side as free and equal Confederates. They can retain their local independence, their local diversities, nay, if they will, their local jealousies and hatreds, and yet they can stand forth, in all external matters, as one united nation, all of whose members are at once ready to man their mountain rampart the moment that the slightest foreign aggression is committed on any one of their brethren. The Federal system, in short, has here, out of the most discordant ethnological, political, and religious elements, raised up an artificial nation, full of as true and heroic national feeling as ever animated any people of the most unmixed blood. An American State can secede, if it pleases: no Swiss Canton will ever desert the protection of its brethren, because it knows that Secession, instead of meaning increased independence, would mean only immediate annexation by the nearest despot. If any one is tempted to draw shallow inferences against Federalism in general from mistaken views of one single example, he may at once correct his error by looking at that nearer Federation which has weathered so many internal and external storms. No part of my task will be more delightful or more instructive than to trace the history of that glorious League, from the day when the Austrian

Perfect separation and perfect Consolidation alike impossible.

The problem solved by a Federal Constitution.

A.D. 1315.

invader first felt the might of freedom at Morgarten to the day when a baser and more treacherous despotism still, in defiance of plighted faith and of the public Law of Europe, A.D. 1860. planted the vultures of Paris upon the neutral shores of the Lake of Geneva.

Recapitulation. I have thus gone through the comparison which I designed between the two opposite poles of political being, and that ingenious and nicely-balanced system which is intermediate between the two. I have compared the small City-Commonwealth, the great Monarchy or Consolidated Republic, and the Federal Union, whether of single Cities or of considerable States. I have pointed out the inherent advantages and disadvantages of the three systems, and the circumstances under which each is preferable to the others. I now draw near to my main subject, to show the practical working of the Federal principle as it is exemplified in the history of the Federal Governments of the Ancient, the Mediæval, and the Modern world.

# CHAPTER III

## OF THE AMPHIKTYONIC COUNCIL

BEFORE entering on that great developement of the Federal principle which marks the last age of independent Greece, it will be well to speak somewhat more briefly of certain less perfect approaches to a Federal system, which may be seen in the earlier days of Grecian history, and of which the noble work of Aratos was doubtless in a great measure a conscious improvement. And, first of all, it will be needful to say a few words as to an error which is now pretty well exploded, but which was of early date and which once had a wide currency. Many philosophical speculators on government have been led into great mistakes by the idea that Greece itself, as a whole, and not merely particular Grecian states, ought to be ranked as an instance of Federal union.

The Amphiktyonic Council not a true Federal Government.

The body which has been often mistaken for a Federal Council of Greece is the famous Council of the Amphiktyons at Delphi. Probably no one capable of writing upon the subject can have been so wholly ignorant of the whole bearing of Grecian history as to take the Amphiktyonic League for a perfect Federal union after the Achaian or American pattern. But it is easy to understand how such a body as the Amphiktyons may have been mistaken for a Federal Diet of the looser kind. It is certain that Dionysios,[1] pretty clear that Strabo,[2] not unlikely that Cicero,[3] supposed the Amphiktyonic Council to

[1] iv. 25. He goes on, in his usual style, to say how Servius Tullius founded the Latin League in imitation of the Amphiktyons. Now the Latin League, though probably not a perfect Federal Government, has a fair right to be classed among close approaches to the Federal idea.

[2] ix. 3, 7. Strabo speaks of the League as consisting of πόλεις, Pausanias, (x. 8. 2) more accurately of γένη. Strabo's expressions, περὶ τῶν κοινῶν βουλευσόμενον and δίκας ὅσαι πόλεσι πρὸς πόλεις εἰσί, go far beyond the facts of the case.

[3] The often quoted expression of Cicero, "Amphictyones, id est, commune

have been invested with far more extensive powers than it ever possessed, at all events during the best days of Greece. The error on their part was natural: the later history of independent Greece was conspicuously a history of Federalism; and it was easy to carry back the political ideas of the times with which they were most familiar into days in which those ideas were most certainly unknown. And indeed there seems some reason to believe that the Amphiktyonic body had, in the age of Strabo, really put on something more like the outward shape of a true Federal body than it had ever worn in the age of Dêmosthenês. From the later Greek and Latin writers the error naturally spread to modern scholars. In days when all "the classics" were held to be of equal value and authority, and when it was hardly yet discerned that all "the classics" were not contemporary with each other, men did not see how little the descriptions of Strabo and Pausanias, even though backed by an incidental allusion of Cicero, were really worth, when weighed against the emphatic silence of Thucydidês, Aristotle, and Polybios. And in truth modern scholars, writing under the influence of political and historical theories, have often pressed the words of Strabo, Pausanias, and Cicero, far beyond anything that Strabo, Pausanias, or Cicero ever meant. The writers of the last century seem to have looked upon the Amphiktyonic League as a real political union of the Greek nation, and they sometimes highly extol the political wisdom of the authors of so wise a system.[1] In a like spirit, the accidental and fluctuating supremacy of a single Bretwalda over the several Old-English kingdoms was, by writers of the same age, often supposed to be the deliberate result of calculations no less far-searching than those which are attributed to Amphiktyôn the son of Deukaliôn.[2] The true nature of the Amphiktyonic League was, as far as I know, first clearly set forth by

Origin of the Error.

Opinions of Modern Writers.

Græciæ Concilium"—an expression, by the way, which in a certain sense, is quite defensible—is a mere *obiter dictum* (De Inv. Rhet. ii. 23), and may or may not express Cicero's deliberate judgement. From Cicero's words, Raleigh doubtless got his phrase, "the Council of the Amphyctiones, or the General Estates of Greece." Hist. of the World, Part I. Book 4, Cap. i. § 4.

[1] Compare the first two Chapters of Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, Book ix. He mentions the Amphiktyons but once, but he clearly has them in his mind throughout. On the other hand see the strictures on the supposed constitution of the League in the "Federalist," No. xviii. p. 91.

[2] Rapin (Hist. d'Ang. i. 139) gravely discusses the Bretwaldadom at some length, and compares the Bretwalda to the Dutch Stadtholder.

Sainte Croix, in his, for the time, really valuable work on old Greek Federalism.[1] The work of Tittmann on the Amphiktyonic League[2] is somewhat retrograde after that of Sainte Croix. It is needless to say that in the works of our own great countrymen, in the histories of Thirlwall and of Grote, no traces of the error can be discerned. The old notions as to the nature of the Amphiktyonic Council and the relations of the Greek states to one another may now be set down as an exploded mistake,[3] a mistake arising partly from ignorance of the true nature of Federal Government, partly from inability to distinguish between the different degrees of authority to be allowed to different Greek and Latin writers.

The Council a Religious, not a Political Body.

The Amphiktyonic Council then, there can be no doubt, was in no wise an instance of Federal Government, even in the very laxest sense of the word. It was not a political, but a religious body. If it had any claim to the title of a General Council[4] of Greece, it was wholly in the sense in which we speak of General

[1] Des Anciens Gouvernemens Fédératifs. Paris, an vii.

[2] Ueber den Bund der Amphiktyonen. Berlin, 1812.

[3] No scholar of recent times has attempted to revive it, except Colonel Mure, in a pamphlet (National Criticism in 1858, p. 22) which that distinguished scholar probably regretted before he died. It is no disrespect to Colonel Mure, whose studies, most valuable in their own line, did not lie in a strictly historical direction, to say that he clearly had no idea what a Federal Government really is. Some of the particular arguments are very weak, and the Colonel does not seem to have seen how far the silence of Thucydidês outweighs the speech of a thousand Plutarchs or Dionysii. He refers us to the description of the Amphiktyons by Tacitus (Ann. iv. 14) as "quîs præcipuum fuit rerum omnium judicium, qua tempestate Græci, conditis per Asiam urbibus, ore maris potiebantur." Undoubtedly Tacitus, as Colonel Mure says, is "an author not accustomed to speak at random," but his *obiter dictum* is really not decisive as to the mythical ages of Greece. Colonel Mure goes on to say that the Amphiktyons erased the boastful inscription of Pausanias. This is on the authority of an oration attributed to Dêmosthenês, but generally looked on as spurious (c. Neær. § 128), while Thucydidês (i. 132) makes the erasure the act of the Lacedæmonians themselves. That Themistoklês (Plut. Them. 20) opposed the proposal to deprive the medizing Greeks of their Amphiktyonic franchise, is very probable, but it does not go the least way towards showing that the Amphiktyons were, in any sense, a Federal Government.

[4] Æschinês (Ktes. § 58) has the expressions *κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων* and afterwards *Ἑλληνικοῦ συνεδρίου*. The latter phrase, as it stands in the context, referring to Philip's admission to the Amphiktyonic body, certainly proves nothing. Nor does the former, which is quoted by Tittmann (p. 62), prove very much. Tittmann also quotes the Amphiktyonic decree in Dêmosthenês (De Cor. § 198) where the Amphiktyons call themselves *τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον*. Of these expressions one comes from Æschinês, who is well disposed to magnify Amphiktyonic rights, and whose language is never imitated by

Councils in Modern Europe. The Amphiktyonic Council represented Greece as an Ecclesiastical Synod represented Western Christendom, not as a Swiss Diet or an American Congress represents the Federation of which it is the common legislature.

The Delphic Amphiktyony only one of several.

Its primary business was to regulate the concerns of the temple of Apollo at Delphi. And the Amphiktyonic Council which met at Delphi and at Thermopylæ was in truth only the most famous of several bodies of the same kind. An Amphiktyonic, or, more correctly, an Amphiktionic,[1] body was an Assembly of the tribes who *dwelt around* any famous temple gathered together to manage the affairs of that temple. There were other Amphiktyonic Assemblies in Greece, amongst which that of the isle of Kalaureia,[2] off the coast of Argolis, was a body of some celebrity. The Amphiktyons of Delphi obtained greater importance than any other Amphiktyons only because of the greater importance of the Delphic sanctuary, and because it incidentally happened that the greater part of the Greek nation had some kind of representation among them. But that body could not be looked upon as a perfect representation of the Greek nation which, to postpone other objections to its constitution, found no place for so large a fraction of the Hellenic body as the Arkadians. Still the Amphiktyons of Delphi undoubtedly came nearer than any other existing body to the character of a general representation of all Greece. It is therefore easy to understand how the religious functions of such a body might incidentally assume a political character. Thus the old Amphiktyonic oath[3] forbade certain extreme measures of hostility against any city sharing in the common Amphiktyonic worship. Here we get on that mixed ground between spiritual and

Incidental Political Functions of the Council.

Dêmosthenês, who so profanely talks of ἡ ἐν Δελφοῖς σκιά. The other comes from the Amphiktyons themselves, who certainly never had more occasion to magnify their office, than in the decree by which they invited Philip into Greece. Yet even they directly afterwards qualify the strong expression by the words οἱ Ἕλληνες οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων. All those expressions, like those of Herodotos to be presently quoted, hardly amount to more than the name Ἑλληνοτάμιαι, as applied to certain officers, not of a Hellenic Federation, but of the Athenian Confederacy.

[1] The derivation from ἀμφικτίονες, quoted by Pausanias (x. 8) from Androtiôn, is now generally received. Indeed the spelling ΑΜΦΙΚΤΙΟΝΕΣ occurs on the Amphiktyonic coinage at Delphi.

[2] Strabo, lib. viii. c. 6, 14. Ἦν δὲ καὶ Ἀμφικτυονία τις περὶ τὸ ἱερὸν τοῦτο, ἑπτὰ πόλεων, αἱ μετεῖχον τῆς θυσίας, κ.τ.λ. This gives the original idea of an Amphiktyony.

[3] Æsch. Fals. Leg. § 115.

temporal things on which Ecclesiastical Councils have often appeared with more honour to themselves than in matters more strictly within their own competence. The Amphiktyonic Council forbade any Amphiktyonic city to be razed or its water to be cut off, with as good an intention, and with about as much effect, as Christian Synods instituted the Truce of God, and forbade tournaments[1] and the use of the cross-bow. But, more than this, the Amphiktyonic Council was the only deliberative body in which members from most parts of Greece habitually met together. On the few occasions when it was needed that Greece should speak with a common voice, the Amphiktyonic Council was the natural, indeed the only possible, mouth-piece of the nation. Once or twice then, in the course of Grecian history, we do find the Amphiktyonic body acting with real dignity in the name of United Greece. We naturally find this more distinctly the case immediately after the repulse of the Persians, when a common Greek national feeling existed for the moment in greater strength than either before or afterwards. Then it was that the Amphiktyonic Council, evidently acting in the name of all Greece, set a price upon the head of the Greek who had betrayed the defenders of Thermopylæ to the Barbarians.[2] But, in setting a price on the head of Ephialtês, the Amphiktyonic Council, as head of Greece, hardly did more than was done by the Athenian Assembly, if not as the head of Greece, yet as its worthiest representative, when it proscribed Arthmios of Zeleia for bringing barbaric bribes into Hellas.[3] Sometimes again we find, naturally enough, this great religious Synod, like religious Synods in later times, preaching Crusades against ungodly and sacrilegious cities, against violators of the holy ground or of the peaceful worshippers of Apollo. And, whatever we may think of the pious zeal of Æschinês against the Lokrians of Amphissa,[4] we may at least fairly believe that the first sacred war under Solôn[5] was a real Crusade, carried

Instances of Amphiktyonic action.

B.C. 479.

Amphiktyonic Crusades.

B.C. 340.

B.C. 595.

[1] As at the Second Lateran Council. See Roger of Wendover, ii. 400, Eng. Hist. Ed.

[2] Herod. vii. 214 (so 213). Οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων Πυλαγόροι ἐπεκήρυξαν . . . ἀργύριον. Professor Rawlinson, in his Translation of Herodotos, strangely strengthens the words of the historian into the "deputies of the Greeks, the Pylagoræ."

[3] Æsch. Ktes. § 258. It is a favourite common-place with the orators.

[4] Æsch. Ktes. § 118 et seqq. Thirlwall, vi. 80.

[5] Plut. Sol. 11. Æsch. Ktes. § 108. In later times (B.C. 281) we find a Crusade against Ætolia led by the Spartan King Areus (Justin, xxiv. 1) on the same ground as this of Solôn, namely the sacrilegious cultivation of the plain of

The Council becomes the tool of particular States.

No inherent force in its Decrees.

on with as distinct a sense of religious duty as ever sent forth Godfrey or Saint Lewis or our own glorious Edward. At other times the Amphiktyonic Council, just like other religious Councils, does not escape the danger of being perverted to purely temporal purposes. Nothing is easier than to see that the Amphiktyonic Council, in the days of Philip, had sunk into a mere political tool in the hands first of Thebes, then of Macedonia.[1] And in all cases, whether the sentences of the Council were just or unjust, whether they were dictated by religious faith or by political subserviency, the Amphiktyonic body had no constitutional means at its command for carrying them into execution. The spiritual tribunal had no temporal power; culprits had to be delivered to the secular arm, and the secular arm had to be looked for wherever it might be found. If no pious city like Thebes, no pious prince like Philip, undertook to act as the minister and champion of the Council, an Amphiktyonic judgement had no more inherent force than the judgement of a modern Ecclesiastical Synod. Sparta, the most devout worshipper of Apollo, took no heed to the Amphiktyonic fine which B.C. 371. Theban influence procured as the punishment of the treacherous B.C. 382. seizure of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas.[2] So did Philomêlos and his successors in Phôkis resist both anathemas and armies, till

Kirrha. But I do not see the evidence for asserting, as is done by Droysen (Hellenismus, i. 645) and by Mr. P. Smith (Dict. Biog. art. Areus) that this was in consequence of a formal Amphiktyonic decree. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 53. There is an intermediate Sacred War (B.C. 449. See Thuc. i. 112) in which the Amphiktyons are not spoken of at all.

[1] There seems however no ground for believing that the Amphiktyons took upon themselves to elect Alexander as chief of Greece against Persia. The statement of Diodôros to that effect (xvii. 4) is, I suspect, a confusion, most characteristic of Diodôros, with Philip's appointment as chief of the Amphiktyonic Crusades. Both Philip and Alexander were chosen, so far as they were chosen at all, by the Congress of the Confederate Greeks at Corinth (Arrian, i. 1. Diod. u.s.). Diodôros is however followed by Mr. Whiston in the Dictionary of Antiquities, p. 81, and even by Mr. Grote (xii. 15). But Droysen seems to me to see the state of the case much more clearly. "Aber so dürftig war diess einzige Analogon einer verfassungsmässigen Nationaleinigung [the Delphic Amphiktyony] dass Philipp selbst die neue Form eines Bundes in Korinth versucht hatte, die Nation oder die nächsten Kreise derselben zu einigen." Hellenismus, ii. 503. Droysen's strong Macedonian bias must however be guarded against, just like the strong anti-Macedonian bias of Mr. Grote.

[2] On this see the remarks of Mr. Grote, x. 275 et seqq. It marks the progress of vagueness and misconception that Diodôros, in recording the Theban accusation of Sparta (xvi. 23, 29), merely uses the words *ἐς Ἀμφικτύονας ἐν Ἀμφικτυόσι*, which in Justin (viii. 1) have grown into "commune Græciæ concilium"—the phrase of Cicero without his explanation.

the clear eye and strong hand of Philip saw and grasped his opportunity at once to avenge Apollo and to make his kingdom Greek and himself the leader of Greece. Otherwise a bull from Delphi or Thermopylæ could have done as little to stay the march of Onomarchos as bulls from the Vatican, unsupported by the arm of the French invader, could do in our own day to stay the march of the first chosen King of Italy. B.C. 357–346.

But though the Amphiktyonic Council was in no sense a Federal Government, its importance in a History of Federal Government is of a high order. The negative bearings of the existence of such a body can hardly be overrated. Nothing proves so completely how dear to the Greek mind was the system of distinct and independent cities; nothing shows more clearly how little the minds of early Greek statesmen turned towards a Federal Union of the whole or of any large portion of Greece; nothing therefore shows more clearly how great was the work which was accomplished by the Greek statesmen of a later age. If the thought of a Federal Union of Greece had ever occurred, if the need of such an Union had ever been felt, the Amphiktyonic Council afforded materials out of which it might readily have been developed. As we find the ancient commonwealths coming to the very edge of a representative system, and yet never really establishing one, so we here find Greece coming to the very edge of a Federal system, and yet never crossing the limit. A body of Greeks, including members from nearly all parts of Greece, habitually met to debate on matters interesting to the whole Greek nation, and to put forth decrees which, within their proper sphere, the whole Greek nation respected. The wonder is that, with such a body existing, the idea of a Federal Union never presented itself; that no one ever thought of investing the Amphiktyonic body with much more extensive powers to be exercised for the common good of Greece. No more speaking witness can be found to the love of town-autonomy inherent in the Greek mind than the fact that no such developement of the Amphiktyonic body was, as far as we know, ever thought of. Perhaps, besides the love of town-autonomy, the constitution of the Council, so eminently unfair as a representation of historical Greece, may have had something to do with the fact that its proper functions were always kept within such narrow limits. But one difficulty which modern parallels may perhaps suggest

Indirect importance of the Council in the History of Federalism.

Close approach of the Council to a Federal System.

Why it never grew into a real Federal Union.

would not have occurred in this hypothetical transformation of the Delphic Amphiktyony into a real Federal Diet of Greece. The Amphiktyonic Council undoubtedly answers in its functions to the Ecclesiastical Synods of modern times; but to have made the Amphiktyonic Council the sovereign Assembly of Greece would have been quite a different process from investing the Convocation of Canterbury with the immediate sovereignty of England or an Œcumenical Council of the Church with the Federal sovereignty of Europe. We must always remember that in the ancient world the distinction of Clergy and Laity did not exist. There were spiritual offices and there were temporal offices, but there was no distinct spiritual order of men. The Amphiktyons were a religious body, but they were not a clerical body. The Council, after the manner of Greek Councils, had a larger Assembly attached to it, and this Assembly was of the most popular, not to say the most tumultuous, kind, consisting indiscriminately of all Greeks who might happen to be at Delphi to sacrifice or to consult the Oracle.[1] But even the members of the Council itself, the Hieromnêmones and the Pylagoroi, possessed no permanent spiritual character. They appeared at Delphi and at Pylæ as the servants of Apollo; elsewhere they appeared as statesmen, soldiers, or private citizens. They were therefore just as competent or incompetent as any other body of Greeks to undertake the management of the general affairs of Greece. Their immediate functions as Amphiktyons were not secular but religious; but those occasional functions in no way implied that their holders were personally or permanently isolated from common temporal affairs.

The Council an Ecclesiastical, but not a Clerical body.

But besides the general indisposition of the Greek mind to permanent union of any kind, there were some special causes why the Amphiktyonic Council was never developed into a Federal Union. It is true that deputies from most parts of Greece were in the habit of meeting together and of discussing questions, often perhaps trifling in themselves, but still questions in which the whole of Greece was interested. Here was indeed the raw material for constructing a Federal Union, had any Greek felt the want of one. But the constitution of the Council was such that, before it could have been safely invested with the smallest political power, the most sweeping of Reform Bills

Special Objections to the developement of a Federal System out of the Council.

[1] Æsch. Ktes. § 124.

would have been needed for its reconstruction. Its composition was of a kind which made it a most unfair representation of historical Greece. Historical Greece was, above all things, a system of Cities. The Amphiktyonic Union was an Union not of Cities but of Tribes. This alone, as Mr. Grote remarks,[1] shows the immense antiquity of the institution. Any League which had arisen, we might almost say from the time of Homer onwards, could hardly fail to have been a League of Cities. Any institution which had arisen since the time of the Dorian Migration could hardly fail in some way to represent the results of that great event. But though the list of members of the Council is given with some slight variations[2] by different authors, all agree in making the constituent members of the Union Tribes and not Cities. The representatives of the Ionic and Doric races sat and voted as single members, side by side with the representatives of petty peoples like the Magnêsians and Phthiôtic Achaians. When the Council was first founded, Dorians and Ionians were doubtless mere tribes of Northern Greece, of no more account than their fellows, and the prodigious developement of the Doric and Ionic races in after times made no difference in its constitution. How the vote of each race was determined is an obscure point of Greek archæology[3] which hardly bears on our immediate subject. What is important for our present point of view is that Sparta and Athens, as such, were not members of the Amphiktyonic body. They were simply portions respectively of the Doric and Ionic aggregates, and they had legally no more weight than the smallest Doric or Ionic city.[4] The wish of the whole Doric race, the wish of the whole Ionic race, nay, the common wish, if we can conceive such a thing, of Sparta and Athens and their respective followings of Allies, might be at any moment set aside by the votes of three or four petty tribes, some of which

Its constitution unsuited to historical Greece.

A Union of Tribes not of Cities.

Unfair distribution of the Votes.

[1] Hist. of Greece, vol. ii. p. 325, 7.

[2] The several lists are discussed at some length by Tittmann (p. 35), whose conclusions are followed by Mr. Grote (ii. 325). They differ chiefly in the enumeration of the insignificant tribes of Northern Greece. The omission by Pausanias of the Bœotians, a people so specially mentioned by Æschinês (Fals. Leg. § 122), must be an error.

[3] Cf. Grote, u.s. Strabo (ix. 3. 7) says that Akrisios settled the vote of each city, *ψῆφον ἑκάστῃ δοῦναι, τῇ μὲν καθ' αὑτήν, τῇ δὲ μεθ' ἑτέρας, ἢ μετὰ πλειόνων*. We shall presently come to reasons for thinking that this system of *Contributory Boroughs* belonged only to the latest form of the institution.

[4] Æsch. Fals. Leg. § 122.

were not even independent political communities. Perrhaibians, Magnêsians, Phthiôtic Achaians, had ceased to be independent states before the beginning of the historical days of Greece. They had sunk into mere subjects of the Thessalians, and their deputies in the Council must have voted as their Thessalian masters bade them. Viewed as a political representation of historic Greece, the Amphiktyonic Council was something even more anomalous than was the British Parliament in its unreformed state, when viewed as a representation of the British people. The presence of Gatton and Old Sarum, the absence of Manchester and Birmingham, the two votes of Liverpool and the four votes of East and West Looe, all had their perfect precedents in the constitution of the venerable body which met at Delphi and Thermopylæ. Or rather the defects of the Amphiktyonic system must have been practically by far the greater of the two. English rotten boroughs have at least often been the means of introducing into Parliament some of its most distinguished members, but it could only have been the deputies of these little insignificant tribes who gained for the whole body the contemptuous description given of it by Dêmosthenês.[1] But in a purely religious Assembly these incongruities were probably not found so intolerable as they assuredly would have been found in an Assembly exercising real political power. The very anomalies were consecrated by the traditional reverence of centuries. The very points in the constitution of the Council which made it so unfit for political action, made it only more venerable when looked at as a holy representative of past ages. What if certain tribes had sunk from independence to bondage? Statesmen might indeed, in their earthly policy, regard such merely political changes, but misfortune, without guilt, could not degrade any faithful worshipper of Apollo in the presence of his patron God. The zeal and piety of Athens and Sparta were not more fervent, doubtless they were far less fervent, than the zeal and piety of the little communities around the Temple, whose whole

Analogy of the Unreformed Parliament.

Incongruities less felt in a Religious body.

[1] Dem. Cor. § 190. *Ἀνθρώπους ἀπείρους λόγων καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προορωμένους, τοὺς ἱερομνήμονας.* Or are we to infer that the Hieromnêmones were an inferior body to the Pylagoroi? As Æschinês was one of the latter, we may infer that the greater members of the Amphiktyony sent deputies, in that capacity at least, who would not deserve the description. But in any case, the majority of both orders would come from the petty tribes, and would doubtless be what Dêmosthenês describes.

importance was derived from their share in its management. The God of Delphi was no respecter of persons; he looked with equal favour on the devotion of the weakest and of the most powerful worshipper. A change in the constitution of the Council would probably have been looked upon by the mass of Greeks as a heinous sacrilege. But, while such a constitution existed, the Council was unfit for political power, and, whenever it did meddle with political matters, its interference was invariably mischievous. Any power which could command the votes of the little tribes about Mount Oita could procure whatever decisions it chose in the Amphiktyonic body. Philip, the common foe of Greece, was welcomed by the Amphiktyons as a deliverer, a true servant of Apollo, a pious Crusader against the usurping and sacrilegious Phôkian. It is not improbable that[1] many of the smaller Greek cities may really have shared, from shortsighted political motives, in this ill-timed goodwill to the Macedonian. But this only shows the more clearly the utter unfitness of the Council to act in any way as a political mouth-piece of Greece. When Dêmosthenês had united Thebes and Athens in one common cause, the union of those two great cities did not command a single integral vote in the Amphiktyonic Council.

B.C. 352. Amphiktyonic Championship of Philip.

It is certainly very remarkable that, long after the Council had ceased to be of any importance whatever, many of the defects in its constitution should have been reformed. Pausanias[2] describes the Council as it stood in his time, when, under the Roman dominion, the debates of the Amphiktyons must have been of considerably less moment than the debates of an English Convocation. Some at least of the changes which he mentions he attributes to the legislative mind of Augustus Cæsar. The Council, in this its later form, became at last, in a great degree, a representation of Cities, when Greece had no more independent Cities to represent. An attempt too was made, after the happy precedent set by the wise confederation of Lykia,[3] to do what in modern political language is called apportioning members to population. In the old state of things the Dolopians, Magnêsians, Ainians, and Phthiôtic Achaians had formed a large proportion

Reforms under Augustus. B.C. 31–A.D. 14.

[1] Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. p. 319 (April, 1857).
[2] x. 8, 5.
[3] The Lykian League will be described in the next chapter.

of the Council. Now they lost their separate Amphiktyonic being; the Dolopians indeed had ceased to exist altogether;[1] the other tribes were made what we may call *Contributory Boroughs* to Thessaly. The votes thus saved were divided among several
B.C. 346. new and several restored members. The Phôkians had, at the end of the Sacred War, lost their Amphiktyonic votes, which were transferred to Macedonia, as the due reward of Philip's Crusade in the cause of Apollo. In the new constitution Augustus found room both for Phôkians and Macedonians, as well as for the inhabitants of his own new city of Nikopolis.

New arrangement of votes in the Council.

Delphi, Athens, Euboia, now appear as substantive members. The two Lokrian votes were divided between the two divisions of the Lokrian nation. The Dorian votes, in like sort, were divided between the original Dorians of the North and the Dorians of Peloponnêsos, that is to say those of Corinth, Sikyôn, Argos, and Megara; for Sparta, which shared in the exclusion of Phôkis, does not seem to have shared in its restoration. The whole number of votes was raised to thirty, and, instead of each constituency, as before, possessing two votes, the votes were now distributed among the members of the League in various proportions ranging from one to six.[2] Three of the members, Nikopolis, Athens, and Delphi, were single cities, and these, it is expressly said,[3] sent representatives to every meeting. The other constituencies were still not cities but races; their Amphiktyonic

[1] Paus. u. s. *Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἦν Δολόπων γένος.*

[2] The whole scheme is as follows:—

| | |
|---|---|
| Nikopolis | 6 votes. |
| Macedonia | 6 ,, |
| Thessaly (with Malians, Ainians, Magnêsians, and Phthiôtic Achaians) | 6 ,, |
| Bœotia | 2 ,, |
| Phôkis | 2 ,, |
| Delphi | 2 ,, |
| Northern Dôris | 1 ,, |
| Ozolian Lokrians | 1 ,, |
| Epiknêmidian Lokrians | 1 ,, |
| Euboia | 1 ,, |
| Argos, Sikyôn, Corinth, and Megara | 1 ,, |
| Athens | 1 ,, |
| | 30 |

[3] Paus. u. s. *Αἱ μὲν δὴ πόλεις Ἀθῆναι καὶ Δελφοὶ καὶ ἡ Νικόπολις, αὗται μὲν ἀποστέλλουσι συνεδρεύσοντας ἐς ἀμφικτυονίαν πᾶσαν· ἀπὸ δὲ ἐθνῶν τῶν κατειλεγμένων ἑκάστῃ πόλει ἀνὰ μέρος ἐς Ἀμφικτύονας καὶ ἐν χρόνου περιόδῳ συντελεῖν ἔστιν.*

representatives were to be chosen by the several cities of the race in turn. Thus the vote of the Peloponnesian Dorians would be given in successive years by a Corinthian, a Sikyônian, a Megarian, and an Argive,[1] while every meeting contained one member for Athens, two for Delphi, and six for Nikopolis. Most of the cities in short were in the same position as the counties of Nairn and Cromarty[2] before the Reform Bill, when they sent a member between them who was elected in alternate Parliaments by Nairn and by Cromarty. This account of Pausanias is well worth studying, as setting before us a very curious piece of amateur constitution-making. Had the Amphiktyonic body in the days of Augustus still retained any practical functions to discharge, its constitution, as settled by the Imperial reformer, would seem to be by no means unhappily put together. The Council was not indeed a representation of the whole of Greece, but neither had it ever been so in earlier times. It still gave an undue advantage to the North over the South; but something might be said for this in the case of a confederacy founded to manage the concerns of a Northern temple. We must also remember how completely Athens and Sparta had fallen from the position which they held in the days with which most of us are almost exclusively familiar. The weakest points of the Augustan charter are the enormous number of votes given to the new city of Nikopolis and the very scanty amount of representatives allowed to the Dorians of Peloponnêsos. Still, after all allowances, the new constitution of the Council was certainly a great improvement upon the old one. But possibly it was only because of the utter nullity of the Amphiktyonic body that any such constitution was bestowed upon it. The founder of the Empire could well allow so harmless a safety-valve to carry off the last feeble ebullitions of Hellenic freedom. While the firm

[1] It would seem that disputes sometimes arose among the contributory cities about their Amphiktyonic rights. At least in an inscription in Boeckh's Collection, No. 1121 (vol. i. p. 578), a certain Archenoos of Argos is praised for having, among his other good deeds, recovered the Amphiktyonic rights of his native city—*μετὰ τὸ ἀνασῶσαι αὐτὸν τὸ δίκαιον τῆς Ἀμφικτυονείας τῇ πατρίδι.* Another inscription (1124) commemorates an Argeian Amphiktyon named Titus Statilius Timokratês, the son of Lamprios—a curious illustration of "Greece under the Romans;" Titus being doubtless an Argeian who had obtained Roman citizenship. Another hybrid of the same sort, Caius Curtius Proklos, is commemorated, in another inscription (No. 1058, vol. i. p. 559) as a Megarian Amphiktyon.

[2] Besides these, the counties Bute and Caithness (a strangely chosen pair), and Clackmannan and Kinross also elected alternately.

grasp of Roman Governors was pressed tight upon the provinces of Macedonia and Achaia, their inhabitants might safely be permitted to play either at Town-Autonomy or at Federal Government beneath the sacred shadow of the Delphian Temple.

Approach to Representative forms in the Council.

It can hardly fail to have been observed that the Amphiktyonic Council, both in its earlier and its later forms, makes a far nearer approach to the forms of Representative Government than anything which we find elsewhere in ancient Greece, whether in the constitutions of Federations or in those of single cities. In every Greek Government, as we cannot too constantly bear in mind, every qualified citizen was entitled to take his personal share and did not delegate his rights to another. No Greek city, no Greek Federation, presents an example of a real Representative Assembly. But the Amphiktyonic Council is strictly a Representative body; in discussing its nature, it is impossible to avoid introducing the language which we familiarly employ in speaking of modern Representative bodies. It may indeed be said that, after all, the Amphiktyonic Council was merely a Senate, and that, in conformity with universal Greek precedent, there was an Amphiktyonic Popular Assembly, in which every worshipper of Apollo had a right to appear. But it is clear that the Amphiktyonic Council filled a much more exalted position in relation to the Amphiktyonic Assembly than the Athenian Senate, for instance, did in relation to the Athenian Assembly. In the Amphiktyonic Constitution it is the Council which is really the important body, and the Council is certainly representative. But a really representative Senate would be just as great an anomaly in an ordinary Greek constitution as a representative Assembly. The real reason why we find representative forms in the Amphiktyonic body, while we do not find them in ordinary Greek Governments, is that the Amphiktyonic body was in no sense a Government at all. The Amphiktyonic Council was not exactly a Diplomatic Congress, but it was much more like a Diplomatic Congress than it was like the governing Assembly of any commonwealth, kingdom, or Federation. The Pylagoroi and Hieromnêmones were not exactly Ambassadors, but they were much more like Ambassadors than they were like Members of a British Parliament or even an American Congress. The business of the Council was not to govern or to legislate, either for a single state or for a League of states; its duty was

The Council not a Government, but a mere Union for a particular purpose.

simply to manage a single class of affairs, in which a number of independent commonwealths were alike interested, but which did not come within the individual competence of any one of their number. It is manifest that this could only be done by deputies from the several states interested, that is by representatives. The nearest approach to the Amphiktyonic Council in modern times would be if the College of Cardinals were to consist of members chosen by the several Roman Catholic nations of Europe and America. Such a body would be entrusted with business in which every Roman Catholic country is interested, but it would not form a Federal or even necessarily a local Government. The Amphiktyons were the guardians of the Delphic Temple, but they no more formed a local Government for the city of Delphi than they formed a Federal Government for the whole of Greece. The Council was representative, just because it was not a Government, though again we may, if we please, wonder that the employment of representative forms in the Council did not suggest the employment of representative forms in the Federal, if not in the City, Governments of Greece. In like manner it would be a very interesting subject of inquiry whether, from a similar set of causes, representative forms, or a close approach to them, did not exist in Ecclesiastical Synods much earlier than they did in Secular Parliaments, and whether the founders of the representative system in modern Europe may not, consciously or unconsciously, have had ideas suggested to them by the constitution of the Assemblies of the Church.

The Amphiktyonic body was representative, because it was not a Government.

It belongs rather to a historian of Greece than to a historian of Federal Government to run through the whole evidence which so conspicuously shows the political nullity of the Amphiktyonic body during the best days of Greece. This has been amply done, to say nothing of the earlier work of Sainte Croix, both by Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote. The Amphiktyonic Council is of no moment in the world of Thucydidês, it is of no moment in the world of Xenophôn, it is of no moment in the world of Polybios. Its short and mischievous importance belongs wholly to the days of Dêmosthenês and Philip. Thucydidês never once mentions it, though he has often occasion to mention the Delphian Temple, to record stipulations for its management, and at least one war for its possession.[1] It is clear that, in his time, the

Political Nullity of the Council during the greater part of Grecian History.

[1] The Sacred War in B.C. 449. Thuc. i. 112. See above, p. 99.

Council so far from holding any Federal authority over the general affairs of Greece, was not even independent in its own proper sphere of religious duty. And if we find it playing an important part in the days of Dêmosthenês and Philip, the difference is simply because Sparta and Athens, in the previous century, had not thought it worthy of any notice at all, while now first Thebes and then Philip found that even the Shadow at Delphi was capable of being made useful as a political tool. The Politics of Aristotle contain no mention of it. Polybios speaks of it twice,[1] neither time in a way implying any sort of Federal power. The mistake of looking at the Amphiktyonic body as a Federal union of Greece arose only in times when freedom in all its forms, Federal or otherwise, had utterly passed away from the soil of Greece. Yet the Amphiktyonic Council is an institution of no small importance in a general history of Federal Government. What it was and what it was not, shows more speakingly than anything else how utterly alien to the Greek mind, in the days before Macedonian domination, was anything like a Federal Union of the whole nation or even the most remote approach to it.[2]

[1] The first time (iv. 25) the Amphiktyons are simply mentioned in their proper character as guardians of the Delphic Temple. In this duty they had been interfered with by the Ætolians, and Macedonia, Achaia, and the other allied powers, agree to effect their restoration. The second passage (xl. 6) is very curious indeed; it seems to set the Amphiktyons before us, not as a political, but as a literary body, a view which certainly did not occur to Dêmosthenês. Aulus Postumius wrote a book in Greek, and asked to be excused if, being a foreigner, he made mistakes in language. Cato tells him that if the Amphiktyonic Council had set him to write in Greek (*εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ τὸ τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων συνέδριον συνέτατε γράφειν ἱστορίαν*), his excuse would have been a good one; but as nobody obliged him to write in Greek or to write at all, he had no excuse if he wrote badly. This story is also told by Plutarch, Cato Maj. 12. It reminds one of Jeffrey's criticism on Byron: "If any suit could be brought against Lord Byron, for the purpose of compelling him to put into court a certain quantity of poetry," etc. Edin. Rev. Jan. 1808.

[2] On this subject of the Amphiktyonic Council, the eighteenth number of the "Federalist" should by all means be read. It is clear that the authors, Madison and Hamilton, had not the least notion of the true nature of the institution, but it is most curious to see the strong political sagacity of the authors struggling with their utter ignorance of facts. They were politicians enough to see the utter political nullity of the Council in Grecian history; they were not scholars enough to see that it never really pretended to any character from which anything but political nullity could be expected. Some of the particular comments and illustrations are most ingenious. I shall have again to refer to this curious paper when I come to speak of the remarks of the same writers on the Federal constitution of Achaia.

M. de Tocqueville also seems to have misunderstood the nature of the Am-

phiktyonic Council. He compares (i. 266) the position of Philip as executor of the Amphiktyonic decrees with the preponderance of the Province of Holland in the Dutch Confederation. Philip's position was really a great deal more like that of his French namesake when he undertook, by commission from Pope Innocent, to wrest the Kingdom of England from the sacrilegious John. Tocqueville's English translator does not point out the error.

Still more recently an example of the same sort of union of political shrewdness with utter lack of historical knowledge is to be found in Mr. Spence's work on the American Union, a book not indeed to be compared with the writings of Hamilton or Tocqueville, but abounding in keen observation of facts and in sound inferences from those facts. But Mr. Spence's remarks on the Amphiktyonic Council and the Achaian League (pp. 7, 8) are merely Hamilton served up again. Of Ætolia, Lykia, and even Switzerland, he seems never to have heard. Mr. Spence too is without Hamilton's excuse; if he could not read Polybios, he might at least have read Thirlwall.

# CHAPTER IV

## OF THE MINOR CONFEDERATIONS OF ANCIENT GREECE

### § 1. *Of the Northern Leagues. Phôkis, Akarnania, Epeiros, Thessaly*

An approach to Federal Government not uncommon among the ruder portions of the Greek nation.

I HAVE already remarked that the greatest and most civilized states of Greece were precisely those which clave most strenuously to the principle of distinct town-autonomy. The approaches to Federal Government which we find in the earlier history of Greece appear only among the more backward portions of the nation; and, as we know but little of the details of their several constitutions, we can derive from them comparatively little knowledge bearing on our general subject. In fact some sort of approach to a Federal Union must have been rather common than otherwise in those parts of Greece in which the city-system was never fully developed.[1] In a considerable portion of Greece the cities seem to have been of comparatively little consequence; particular cities and their citizens are seldom mentioned; we far more commonly hear of the district and its inhabitants as a collective whole. Such seems to have been the case with the Lokrians, the Northern Dorians, and, so far as they can be said to have had any political existence at all, with those other little tribes of which we scarcely hear except as returning so disproportionate a share of members to the Amphiktyonic Council. The whole tribe is spoken of as if it had some sort of political unity; yet they certainly were not monarchies, and we do not hear of the domination of any single city. There must have been a common power of some kind, and yet it would be hardest of all to believe that whole tribes formed indivisible republics, and that the

[1] "The system of federation existed everywhere in the early state of society, and Achaia was ripe for its renewal at a later period, because no one town had so outgrown the others as to aspire to become the capital of the whole country." Arnold's Life, i. 273.

villages or small towns whose inhabitants made up the tribe had no separate political existence at all. Some rude form of Federalism can hardly fail to have existed among them. Among other tribes, as the Phôkians and Akarnanians, we have distinct evidence that some sort of Federal Union really did exist. But of the details of their constitutions we know nothing; we have at best only a few scraps belonging to later times, when the examples of Achaia and Ætolia had given such an impulse to the Federal principle everywhere. Of the Phôkian League nearly all our knowledge[1] comes from an incidental mention of Pausanias, who describes the building, the Phôkikon, where the Federal body used to assemble.[2] But the traveller is much more anxious to describe the pillars and statues which adorned the place of meeting than to give us any information as to the constitution of the League itself. We gather however from his account that the Phôkikon did not stand in any town; possibly the Phôkians may have taken warning by the example of their Bœotian neighbours. We also gather that these meetings at the Phôkikon, like so many other old Greek institutions, preserved their nominal existence down even to the days of Pausanias. As to the date of the Phôkian Union, when we remember the utter destruction of the Phôkian towns after the Sacred War, it is clear that the League spoken of by Pausanias must have been an institution of a later age than the time of Philip. Indeed as all Phôkis was, for a short time, incorporated with Ætolia, and as all Greek Leagues were for a while dissolved by the Romans,[3] the mimic League of Pausanias' times must have been actually established since the days of Mummius. But it would probably reproduce the forms of the constitution as they stood in the great Federal period of Greece. And this League again, like the Achaian League itself, was probably only a revival of an older union, so that what Pausanias saw may well have been the shadow of

The Phokian League.

B.C. 346.

B.C. 196.

B.C. 146.

Probably a revival of an earlier League.

[1] In this chapter I am chiefly concerned with the constitution and the earlier history of the several Minor Leagues. Their history during the great Federal period of Greece I reserve, like that of the Achaian League itself, for my more strictly historical chapters.

[2] Paus. x. 5, 1. Ἐς δὲ τὴν ἐπὶ Δελφῶν εὐθεῖαν ἀναστρέψαντι ἐκ Δαυλίδος, καὶ ἰόντι ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσω, ἔστιν οἰκοδόμημα ἐν ἀριστερᾷ τῆς ὁδοῦ καλούμενον Φωκικόν, ἐς ὃ ἀπὸ ἑκάστης πόλεως συνιᾶσιν οἱ Φωκεῖς. Cf. Drumann, Geschichte des Verfalls der griechischen Staaten, p. 436.

There is a pleasing simplicity in the notion of suddenly coming upon the seat of a Federal Government by the roadside.

[3] See below, at the end of the next section.

the state of things which existed before the ascendency of Philomêlos. The Phôkians are always spoken of as a substantive whole;[1] we hear of embassies[2] being sent, and business in general being transacted, in the name of the whole Phôkian body. Philomêlos and his successors were chiefs, tyrants, or whatever we choose to call them, not of this or that city, but of the whole Phôkian people.[3] Yet the Phôkians had numerous cities, as more than twenty were destroyed after the Sacred War. It seems necessarily to follow that some sort of Federal Union had always existed in Phôkis, and, as we hear of no dominant or presiding city, the Phôkian League was probably a better devised political machine than the far more famous League of Bœotia.

B.C. 359–346.

The Akarnanian League.

Of the Akarnanian League, formed by one of the least important, but at the same time one of the most estimable[4] peoples in Greece, we know a little more than of that of Phôkis, but still our knowledge is only fragmentary. The boundaries of Akarnania fluctuated, but we always find the people spoken of as a political whole. We pick up a few details from Thucydidês, Xenophôn, Polybios, and Livy, and we know that Aristotle treated of the Akarnanian constitution in that great political collection, the loss of which is one of the greatest of all the losses which the historical student has to mourn. The single fragment however which has been preserved[5] unhappily contains no political information. We gather from the incidental notices in Thucydidês that, in his time, Akarnania, or at least the great mass of the Akarnanian towns, already formed a Federal body of some kind. The Akarnanians are constantly spoken of as acting with one will, and forming one political whole. Yet their union, just as we shall find in the earlier days of the Achaian Union,

Earlier Notices.

[1] Dem. Fals. Leg. 92. Ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Φωκέων.

[2] Xen. Hell. vi. 1, 1. Οἱ Φωκεῖς ἐπρέσβευον εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα.

[3] Diod. xvi. 23. Ὁ Φιλόμηλος, μέγιστον ἔχων ἐν τοῖς Φωκεῦσιν ἀξίωμα, διελέχθη τοῖς ὁμοεθνέσι. Ib. 24. τῶν δὲ Φωκέων ἑλομένων αὐτὸν [Φιλόμηλον] στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα. Cf. Thirlwall, v. 333. Tittmann, Staatsverfassungen, p. 709.

[4] Pol. iv. 30. Ἀλλά μοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ γνήσιοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ κοινῇ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν οὐδέποτε περὶ πλείονος οὐδὲν ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ καθήκοντος· ὅπερ Ἀκαρνᾶνες ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις καιροῖς οὐδενὸς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἧττον εὑρίσκονται διατετηρηκότες, κ.τ.λ. The Akarnanians must have improved since the days of Thucydides, who describes the Akarnanians, along with the Ætolians and Ozolian Lokrians, as retaining the old barbarous habits of robbery and going always armed. Thuc. i. 5.

[5] Arist. Pol. p. 297, ed. Oxon, 1837.

did not always exclude revolutions and changes of policy in particular towns. Thus, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the city of Astakos was governed by a Tyrant whom the Athenians expelled and the Corinthians restored;[1] and the city of Oiniadai was hostile to Athens, while the rest of Akarnania was firm in the Athenian alliance.[2] But these instances were clearly interruptions of an established Federal order of things. Thucydidês speaks, by implication at least, of the Akarnanian League as an institution of old standing in his time. The Akarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai as a place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation.[3] Thus the Supreme Court of the Akarnanian Union held its sittings, not in a town, but in a mountain fortress. But in Thucydidês' own time Stratos had attained its position as the greatest city of Akarnania,[4] and probably the Federal Assemblies were already held there.[5] In the days of Agêsilaos[6] we find Stratos still more distinctly marked as the place of Federal meeting. But in after times Akarnania was exposed to the inroads of the aggressive Ætolians, who so far betrayed the cause of Greek freedom as to join with Alexander the son of Pyrrhos in an attempt to dismember the Akarnanian Confederacy.[7] Stratos at length became a permanent Ætolian possession, and, in the later days of Akarnanian freedom, Leukas appears to have taken its place as the ordinary seat of the Federal Government,[8] till Leukas too was lost after the Third Macedonian War. At the same time, meetings were at least occasionally held at other places, as Polybios[9] records one held in the city of Thourion or Thyrion before the separation of Leukas from the League.

B.C. 431–429. B.C. 391. B.C. 272–239. Later Notices. B.C. 197. B.C. 167. B.C. 169.

Of the constitution of the League we know but little. Ambassadors were sent by the Federal body,[10] and probably, just

[1] Thuc. ii. 30, 33.

[2] Ib. 102.

[3] Thuc. iii. 105. Ὄλπας, τεῖχος ἐπὶ λόφου ἰσχυρὸν πρὸς τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὅ ποτε Ἀκαρνᾶνες τειχισάμενοι κοινῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἐχρῶντο. See Tittmann, p. 729.

[4] Thuc. ii. 80. Ἀφικνοῦνταί τε ἐπὶ Στρατὸν, πόλιν μεγίστην τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας, νομίζοντες, εἰ ταύτην λάβοιεν, ῥᾳδίως ἂν σφίσι τὰ ἄλλα προσχωρήσειν.

[5] See Dict. Anc. Geog. art. Acarnania.

[6] Xen. Hell. iv. 6, 4. Πέμψας εἰς Στρατὸν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων.

[7] Pol. ii. 45.

[8] Liv. xxxiii. 17. Leucade hæc sunt decreta. Id caput Acarnaniæ erat, eoque in concilium omnes populi conveniebant. So xxxvi. 11.

[9] Pol. xxxviii. 5.

[10] Pol. ix. 32. Παραγενόμεθα μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων ἀπεσταλμένοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.

Constitution of the League.

as in the Achaian League, it would have been held to be a breach of the Federal tie if any single city had entered on diplomatic intercourse with other powers. As in Achaia too, there stood at the head of the League a General with high authority.[1] We know not whether this was an ancient Akarnanian institution, or whether it were introduced in later times in imitation of the Achaian or Ætolian system. What little more we know of the constitution of the League is derived from an inscription found at Aktion,[2] the subject of which is the honours conferred by the Akarnanian body on two Romans named Publius and Lucius Acilius. This inscription incidentally tells us of the existence of a Senate and Assembly,[3] according to the common Greek model, of a Priest of the Aktian Apollo, who seems to have been regarded as a Federal magistrate, of a Secretary of State,[4] and of three other magistrates[5] whose functions are not explained. The General is not mentioned. Possibly the office may have been abolished under the Roman dominion, or it may have been usual to date the years, not by the Generals, but by the Priests of Apollo. So, at Athens, years were reckoned not by the effective magistracy of the Ten Generals, but by the almost honorary magistracy of the Archon. The existence of coins bearing the name of the whole Akarnanian nation shows that there was unity enough to admit of a Federal coinage, though coins of particular cities also occur.

There seems every reason to believe that these Phôkian and Akarnanian constitutions were fairly entitled to the name of Federal Governments in the stricter sense. The difficulty is to decide how far the strict Federal form really dated from an early period, and how far it was introduced in after-times in imitation of the great Achaian model. We may be also pretty certain that something similar was the constitution of Epeiros in those later times when the old half-barbarian Molossian Kingdom had taken its place as a Greek Republic. As early as the Peloponnesian War the Chaonians and Thesprôtians had adopted republican forms.[6]

The Epeirot League.

B.C. 429.

[1] Pol. v. 6. Ἦκεν ἔχων Ἀριστόφαντος ὁ στρατηγὸς πανδημεὶ τοὺς Ἀκαρνᾶνας. Liv. xxxvi. 11. Clytum prætorem, penes quem tum summa potestas erat.

[2] Rose, Inscriptt. Græcc. p. 282.

[3] ἔδοξε τᾷ βούλᾳ καὶ τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Ἀκαρνάνων.

[4] ἐπὶ γραμμάτεος τᾷ βούλᾳ Ἱροίτου. [5] A προμνάμων and two συμπρομνάμονες.

[6] Aristotle (Pol. 307) found the constitution of Epeiros, or at any rate of Thesprôtis, worthy of a place in his great collection, no small honour for a half barbarian state. [Cf. Blakesley on Herodotos, v. 92, η′.]

Early Republican development in Chaonia and Thesprôtis.

The Chaonians were in a state of political developement of which both Greece and Italy afford examples in the course of the transition from monarchy to democracy. Two annual magistrates, whose title is unknown, were chosen out of a single ruling family.[1] So at Athens the Archons were for a long time chosen exclusively out of the old royal house. So, if we believe the conjectures of Niebuhr, the Tarquinii[2] at one time and the Fabii[3] at another had a right, legal or prescriptive, to have one of the Roman Consuls chosen from among them.

Constitutional Monarchy in Molossis.

The Molossians, on the other hand, were governed by Kings, but they were Kings of heroic Greek blood, and constitutional monarchy must have made some advances among them. The hereditary principle was so firmly established that a Regent could be trusted to act for a minor King.[4] On the other hand, the Molossian King met his people in their National Assembly at Passarôn, where the King swore to govern according to the Law, and the People swore to preserve his Kingdom to him according to the Law.[5] The temporary greatness of the Molossian Kingdom under Alexander and Pyrrhos is matter of general history. Our immediate business is with the republican government which succeeded on the bloody extinction of royalty and the royal line. Epeiros now became a Republic; of the details of its constitution we know nothing, but its form can hardly fail to have been Federal.[6]

B.C. 429.

B.C. 350–272.

B.C. 239–229.

Federal Republic in Epeiros

The Epeirots formed one political body; Polybios always speaks of them, like the Achaians and Akarnanians, as one people acting with one will.[7] Decrees are passed, Ambassadors are sent and received, in the name of the whole Epeirot people, and Epeiros had, like Akarnania, a federal coinage bearing the common name of the whole nation. Epeiros was, undoubtedly in all its dealings with other nations, one Republic. But it is hard to see how a

[1] Thuc. ii. 80. Βάρβαροι δὲ Χάονες χίλιοι ἀβασίλευτοι, ὧν ἡγοῦντο ἐπ' ἐτησίῳ προστασίᾳ ἐκ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους Φώτυος καὶ Νικάνωρ· ἐστρατεύοντο δὲ μετὰ Χαόνων καὶ Θεσπρωτοὶ ἀβασίλευτοι. The name Phôtyos in these regions reminds one of the Souliot hero Phôtos Tzabellas.

[2] Niebuhr, Hist. Rom. i. 509, Eng. Tr.

[3] Ib. ii. 179 et seqq.

[4] Thuc. ii. 80. Μολοσσοὺς δὲ ἦγε καὶ Ἀτιντᾶνας Σαβύλινθος ἐπίτροπος ὢν Θαρύπου τοῦ βασιλέως ἔτι παιδὸς ὄντος.

[5] Plut. Pyrrh. 5. Εἰώθεισαν οἱ βασιλεῖς ἐν Πασσαρῶνι, χωρίῳ τῆς Μολοττίδος, Ἀρείῳ Διὶ θύσαντες ὀρκωμοτεῖν τοὺς Ἠπειρώτας καὶ ὀρκίζειν, αὐτοὶ μὲν ἄρξειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, ἐκείνους δὲ τὴν βασιλείαν διαφυλάξειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους.

[6] Colonel Leake (Northern Greece, iv. 181) calls it a "loose federacy of republics." I see nothing to lead us to suppose that the Federal tie was looser in Epeiros than in other contemporary Leagues.

[7] [Cf. Pausanias, iv. 35, 3.]

Republic, unless it assumed the Federal form, could have embraced so large a country, one which included many cities,[1] and several tribes which in earlier days had been quite distinct. The Federal form too was then in its full prevalence among the Grecian states, and was that which a newly-founded Republic would most naturally adopt.[2] Of the Epeirot magistrates we find no distinct mention in Polybios; one passage in Livy[3] im-
B.C. 204. plies the existence of three Generals, and it has been ingeniously suggested[4] that they represented the three tribes of Molossians,
B.C. 198. Chaonians, and Thesprôtians. But another passage in the same author[5] seems to imply a single General, and a subordinate Commander of Cavalry. Possibly between the two transactions referred to, a constitutional change may have taken place in Epeiros, similar to one which we shall have hereafter to consider in the Achaian League, and one chief magistrate may have been substituted for three.

Phôkis, Akarnania, and Epeiros may thus be set down as having enjoyed real Federal Governments. Thessaly, on the other hand, though a loose connexion sometimes existed among its several cities, cannot be looked upon as having at any time attained to the true Federal system. There may have been some feeble approaches to it in earlier times,[6] and after the battle of Kynoskephalai, an imitation of the Achaian constitution seems to have been set up under Roman auspices.[7] But, throughout the time of Greek independence, Thessaly was but seldom united as one political whole, and whenever it was so united, it was always merely through common subjection to a single man. The Tagos of Thessaly was not a King, because his office was not hereditary or even permanent; neither was he exactly a Tyrant, because his office had some sort of legal

No real Federalism in THESSALY.

Position and Power of the Thessalian Tagos.

[1] Seventy were destroyed by L. Æmilius Paullus, B.C. 168. Liv. xlv. 34.

[2] See Schorn, Geschichte Griechenlands, p. 87, and, more at large, Droysen's Hellenismus, ii. 432, 433. Cf. Tittmann, 730 et seqq.

[3] Liv. xxix. 12. Phœnice urbs est Epiri; ibi prius collocutus Rex [Philippus] cum Aeropo et Darda et Philippo Epirotarum Prætoribus, postea cum P. Sempronio congreditur. Affuit colloquio Amynander Athamanum Rex et Magistratus alii Epirotarum et Acarnanum.

These magistrates conclude a peace, so they probably were Plenipotentiaries from the Assembly.

[4] See Droysen and Schorn, u.s.

[5] Liv. xxxii. 10. Pausanias Prætor et Alexander Magister Equitum

[6] Niebuhr, Kleine Schriften, i. 248. Tittmann, 713 et seqq.

[7] Ib. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 361.

sanction.[1] But it came much nearer to the character either of a King or of a Tyrant than to that of a Federal President like the General of the Achaians. The Tagos, a citizen of one Thessalian city, exercised over all Thessaly a supremacy hardly to be distinguished from kingship,[2] a supremacy to which other cities submitted with reluctance,[3] and to which they were sometimes constrained to yield by force of arms.[4] Nor do we hear of anything like a Federal Council or of any other check upon the power of the Tagos, when he was once appointed. Jasôn of Pherai acts throughout like a King, and his will seems at least as uncontrolled as that of his brother sovereign beyond the Kambounian hills.[5] Even Jasôn seems to have been looked upon as a Tyrant;[6] possibly, like the Athenian Dêmos, he himself did not refuse the name.[7] Certain it is that, after Jasôn's death, the office of Tagos became, under his successors Polyphrôn and Alexander, a Tyranny of the worst kind.[8] In the next century, whatever may have been the nominal form of the constitution, Thessaly was practically a dependency of Macedonia.[9] The country indeed retained nominal independence enough to enter into treaty-engagements, and to be enumerated in lists of allies alongside of Achaia and of Macedonia itself.[10] But it is clear that the will of the Macedonian Kings was practically undis-

Monarchy of Jasôn. B.C. 372–0.

Undisguised Tyranny of his Successors. B.C. 370–359.

Thessaly a dependency of Macedonia. B.C. 346–198.

[1] Xen. Hell. vi. 1. 18. Ταχὺ δὲ ὁ Ἰάσων ὁμολογουμένως ταγὸς τῶν Θετταλῶν καθειστήκει. Ib. vi. 4, 28. Μέγας μὲν ἦν καὶ διὰ τὸ τῷ νόμῳ Θετταλῶν ταγὸς καθεστάναι.

[2] Niebuhr, Kl. Sch. u.s. Die Würde des Tagus, welche Jason übertragen ward, war eine königliche. Cf. Herod. v. 63, where we find a *βασιλεύς* of Thessaly, meaning doubtless the Tagos.

[3] See the whole speech of Polydamas, Xen. Hell. vi. 1. 4 sqq.

[4] Ib. vi. 1, 5.

[5] Ib. vi. 1, 18; 4. 29, 30.

[6] When Jasôn was murdered, the assassins were received with honour in various Greek cities, on which Xenophôn (vi. 4, 32) adds ᾧ καὶ δῆλον ἐγένετο ὅτι ἰσχυρῶς ἔδεισαν οἱ Ἕλληνες αὐτὸν μὴ τύραννος γένοιτο.

[7] Arist. Pol. iii. 4. Ἰάσων ἔφη πεινῆν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννοῖ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι.

[8] Xen. Hell. vi. 4, 34. Ὁ δ' αὖ Πολύφρων . . . κατεσκευάσατο τὴν ταγείαν τυραννίδι ὁμοίαν. Ib. 35. Ἐπεὶ δ' αὐτὸς [Ἀλέξανδρος] παρέλαβε τὴν ἀρχὴν, χαλεπὸς μὲν Θετταλοῖς ταγὸς ἐγένετο, κ.τ.λ. On the tyranny of Alexander, see Plut. Pel. 26 et seqq.

[9] Pol. ix. 28. Φίλιππος . . . οὐ μόνον τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης πόλεων ἐγένετο κύριος, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θετταλοὺς ὑφ' αὑτὸν ἐποιήσατο διὰ τὸν φόβον. This seems accurately to distinguish between the cities of Chalkidikê, directly incorporated with Macedonia, and those of Thessaly, merely brought under an overwhelming Macedonian influence.

[10] Pol. iv. 9. Ἡ γεγενημένη συμμαχία . . . Ἀχαιοῖς, Ἠπειρώταις, Φωκεῦσι, Μακεδόσι, Βοιωτοῖς, Ἀκαρνᾶσι, Θετταλοῖς.

puted, and also that in Thessaly, as elsewhere, their influence was maintained by the worst of means, by fostering disunion and disorder of every kind.[1] We know that elsewhere an efficient Federal system was the thing which they most sedulously discouraged, and no system of the kind is likely to have existed during the time of their supremacy. Flamininus was a lawgiver of a better sort; he doubtless sincerely desired to give both Thessaly and all parts of Greece as much liberty as was consistent with the dominant interests of Rome. His constitution at least set free the smaller Thessalian towns from their previous bondage to the great cities,[2] but the internal constitutions of the towns were, with the natural instinct of a Roman, fixed by him on an oligarchic basis.[3] But even a freer and better system, if dictated by a foreign deliverer, could be of little value then and of little interest now. There is no sign of anything like real native Federalism in Thessaly, and therefore any minute examination of Thessalian political antiquities would be alien to our subject.

Legislation of T. Quinctius Flamininus, B.C. 197.

## § 2. *Of the Bœotian League*

The political history of Bœotia is of far more importance than that of Thessaly; it is, indeed, in an indirect way, one of the most important portions of the political history of Greece. The Bœotian League was undoubtedly a very ill-arranged political contrivance; but its history gives us, if only by way of warning, some of the lessons which are most needful in a general survey of Federal Government. The fate of the Bœotian Confederacy is a constant commentary on the dangers which may arise to a Federal State from the influence of an overwhelming capital. A great capital, even in a consolidated state, has a strong tendency to be a great evil; but the existence of such a capital among a League of republics is more perilous still. A single great city, standing out prominently above all the others, is always likely to destroy the true Federal equality, and, instead of remaining a single equal member, to become first the President, and then the Tyrant, of the League. Of course, a Federation neither can nor ought, any more than other form of government, to check the growth and prosperity of any of its

History of the BŒOTIAN LEAGUE; its Warnings;

Dangers of an overwhelming Capital in a Federal State.

[1] Liv. xxxiv. 51.
[2] Niebuhr, Kl. Sch. i. 248, 9.
[3] See Thirlwall, viii. 361.

cities; but it is highly desirable to take such measures as may secure the League against a disproportionate influence on the part of any single member. A Federal State will do well to fix its Seat of Government anywhere rather than in its greatest city. If a Federal State has a capital, the same dangers at once arise which even in a consolidated state arise from the influence of one preponderating city. But in a Federal State they are likely to assume a yet worse form. In a monarchy the capital has, after all, no different legal position from that of another town; it is invested with no portion of sovereignty, nor is it commonly in the habit of legal political action. But in a Federal body, the capital is already a sovereign commonwealth, capable of, and accustomed to, distinct political action within its own sphere; it is therefore far more likely to encroach upon the rights of weaker members than can be done in a monarchy or an indivisible republic. Most of the wisest Confederations have avoided this danger, by having no capital at all, none at least in the same sense in which Paris or even London is a capital. We have seen Akarnanian Federal Meetings held on an entrenched hill-top, and Phôkian Federal Meetings in a temple by the wayside. The Achaian Congress, in the best days of the League, met in the insignificant town of Aigion, and afterwards in the several cities in turn. In the Dutch Republic the enormous influence of Amsterdam was somewhat counterbalanced by the arrangement by which both the Provincial States of Holland and the States-General of the United Provinces were held, not at Amsterdam, but at the Hague. So either a wise providence or a most happy accident has fixed the Seat of Government of the American Union in a city which is simply the Seat of Government, and nothing else. One cannot avoid a vague feeling of possible danger, if the gigantic city of New York were the permanent dwelling-place of the Federal President and Congress. Happily New York, like Amsterdam, is not only not the capital of the United States, it is not even the capital of the State to which it gives its name. So in Switzerland, the Federal Government till lately held its sittings in three towns, Bern, Zürich, and Luzern, in turn. It is a grave question whether it was a wise arrangement which has fixed the Seat of Government permanently at Bern. Bern indeed is not the greatest city of Switzerland, but it is the only one which combines an amount of population and a geographical position which could allow it to aspire to the

Most Confederations have avoided a predominant Capital.

rank of a capital. After these real Confederations, it seems almost ludicrous to speak of the body which calls itself a Confederation in Germany, but even that takes care to hold its Federal Meetings at Frankfort and not at Berlin or Vienna. Now in the Bœotian League we see the evils of a preponderating capital carried to their extreme point. The great city of Thebes became the mistress, and in the end the tyrant, of the whole League.[1] She at last came to rule with greater severity over kindred cities, members of the same Federal body, than Athens ruled over protected or conquered States. She at last became the object of a relentless hatred on the part of the smaller towns, which surpassed even the ordinary bitterness of hatred between hostile Hellenic cities. In short, the whole internal history of Bœotia is one long record of feuds between Thebes and the other cities, Plataia, Thespia, and Orchomenos. And the lesson is the more striking, because, as far as we can make out from our scanty notices of the Bœotian Constitution, the mere formal position of Thebes does not seem to have been at all extravagant or anomalous. To the great executive college of the Bœotarchs, while the other cities contributed one member each, Thebes contributed two. That is, in the chief magistracy of the Federation, the great city of Thebes legally commanded only two votes out of eleven or thirteen. Yet we find the Bœotian League, throughout two-thirds of its history, existing only as an instrument to advance Theban interests, constantly to the disadvantage, sometimes to the utter destruction, of the smaller towns of the Confederation. At last the weaker cities sink into the state of mere subjects; they are spoken of by Isokratês under the very same name which the subject Lakonian towns bear in reference to Sparta.[2]

Position of Thebes in the Bœotian League.

Difference between its Legal and Practical Position.

It is probable that, in the actual position of Bœotia, a really well-ordered Federal Government was impossible.[3] The vast superiority of Thebes over every other Bœotian city was the standing difficulty of the League. In Phôkis, Akarnania, and

[1] Boeckh, C. I. vol. i. p. 727. Aut plurima ex Thebanorum, quasi dominorum, gerebantur potentia aut ceteri Bœoti a Thebanis segregati alienas sequi partes solebant.

[2] Isok. de Pac. § 141. Τὰ μὲν Θηβαίων πράγματα πονηρῶς ἔχειν νομίζετε, ὅτι τοὺς περιοίκους ἀδικοῦσιν.

[3] Drumann (p. 440) says, "Ein Städteverein in Böotien hätte nach der Beschaffenheit des Landes mehr vermögen mussen, als viele andere." A συνοικισμός, had local prejudices once given way, might easily have been formed, and might have obtained much power, but hardly a "Städteverein" of the Achaian sort.

Epeiros, there was no city which had any such clear superiority over its neighbours; among them, therefore, no obstacle existed to the formation of an equitable Federal system. The wisdom of Bœotia would probably have been to follow the bold precedent of Attica.[1] The smaller Attic towns gave up all sovereign rights, all distinct political being, but their citizens received in exchange the full political franchise of the great city of Athens. Had the smaller Bœotian towns been willing, in the like sort, to merge themselves in the great city of Thebes,—had every Bœotian, like every Attican,[2] received the full Theban franchise,—each town, as a town, would have lost its rank as an autonomous city, but each of its citizens would have gained far higher and more enduring rights as a citizen of a great and free Theban commonwealth. But the Bœotian towns, even in forming a political union with Thebes, still clave to their separate political being, a political being which could not be practically maintained side by side with so mighty a neighbour. Hence, while the smaller towns of Attica were filled with attached citizens of Athens, the smaller towns of Bœotia were filled only with discontented subjects of Thebes. The result of this peculiar position of Thebes was that it was not till a very late time, and then only for a very few years, that Thebes ever took that position in general Grecian politics to which so great and so ancient a city was otherwise fairly entitled. Athens, with her whole territory filled with loyal citizens, Sparta, with her whole territory filled with unresisting subjects,[3] each enjoyed peace at home, and each might aspire to the general supremacy of Greece. Thebes was always too busy in maintaining her local supremacy to aim at any such ambitious schemes, till the two men arose who were to give her for a moment both a local and a general supremacy such as she had never held before.[4]

The circumstances of Bœotia suited to a "Synoikismos," not to a Federal System.

Effects on general Grecian History.

[1] See above, p. 22.

[2] How completely Attica became merged in Athens is shown by the fact that one has to form some such unusual word as "Attican," to express an inhabitant of Attica other than an Athenian. The difference between Ἀθηναῖοι and Ἀττικοί was perceptible so late as B.C. 300. See Grote, ii. 307.

[3] The Helots several times revolted, the Perioikoi never, and the Perioikoi had as much interest in suppressing a Helot revolt as the Spartans themselves.

[4] Drumann, p. 428. Daher konnten Sparta und Athen das Principat über alle Griechen zu erringen streben, während Theben noch dahin bemuht sein musste, die Herrschaft in Böotien zu erlangen.

Compare, at this moment, the three great despotisms of Europe. Russia has force enough to keep down all internal enemies; France (whatever its ruler may

Three Periods of Bœotian history. B.C. 776–387. B.C. 387–334. B.C. 334–171.

The history of the Bœotian League naturally falls into three periods. The first extends from our earliest historical notices of the country to the first dissolution of the League at the peace of Antalkidas. The second includes the short but brilliant period of Theban greatness, down to the conquest of the city by Philip and its destruction by Alexander. The third includes the history of Bœotia from the destruction of Thebes by Alexander and its restoration by Kassander down to the final dissolution of the League by Quintus Marcius Philippus.

First Period, B.C. 776–387. Bœotia both an Amphiktyony and a Political League.

During the first period we find, as early as we can get at any certain information, the Bœotian cities united by both a religious and a political bond. They formed an Amphiktyony, and they also formed a Federal Government. Of these two, one cannot doubt that the religious association existed before the political League and served as its groundwork. The Bœotian Amphiktyony held its solemn festival at the temple of the Itônian Athênê near Korôneia;[1] its title was the Pamboiôtia,[2] a name formed after the same analogy of so many other religious gatherings of the same kind. How soon this Amphiktyonic connexion grew into a political union it is hard to say, but it is clear that the Bœotian League was looked on as an institution of old standing during the Peloponnesian War. It must both have existed and have been perverted from its original purpose, before the oppressed Plataians sought for Athenian help. We may fairly believe that the Federal union of Bœotia was as old as Federal institutions in any part of Greece.

B.C. 519 (Clinton), c. 510 (Grote iv. 222).

The old Bœotian League, as far as its outward forms went, seems to have been fairly entitled to the name of a Federal Government, but in its whole history we trace little more than the gradual advance of Thebes to a practical supremacy over the other cities. This difference between the theory and

have) has no internal enemies to keep down; Austria is, like Thebes, helpless from internal dissensions.

[1] Paus. ix. 34, 1. Τῆς Ἰτωνίας Ἀθηνᾶς ἐστὶ τὸ ἱερόν· καλεῖται δὲ ἀπὸ Ἰτώνου τοῦ Ἀμφικτύονος. This smaller Amphiktyony is ascribed to a son of Amphiktyôn, as the great one at Delphi to Amphiktyôn himself.

[2] Strabo, ix. 2, 29. Cf. Pol. iv. 3; ix. 34, for the πανήγυρις of the Pamboiôtians. [The Boiôtian Amphictyony used also to meet at Onchêstos. Strabo, ix. 2, 33. Ὀγχηστὸς . . . . ὅπου τὸ Ἀμφικτυονικὸν συνήγετο.]

the practice of the Bœotian constitution is curiously illustrated by the ordinary language both of Thucydidês and of Xenophôn. Whenever there is anything like a formal mention of the whole people, in the description for instance of a battle or a negociation, the word used is "Bœotian;" but when the historians narrate or comment in their own persons on the policy of the League, the word "Theban" is commonly used instead. Thus the whole argument about the fate of Plataia is put by Thucydidês into the mouths of "Theban," not of "Bœotian," orators,[1] just as the first treacherous assault on the town is attributed wholly to Theban heads and to Theban hands.[2] But when he comes to describe the battle of Dêlion,[3] and the negociations after the Peace of Nikias,[4] he gives to the armies, ambassadors, and senators their formal title of "Bœotians." So Xenophôn attributes to "Theban" politicians the proposal[5] to destroy Athens and the receipt of bribes from the Great King,[6] but in describing the battles in the Corinthian war,[7] he too falls back upon the technical name "Bœotian." This usage of ordinary language exactly expresses the truth of the case. The League was a Bœotian body animated by a Theban soul; the devices of Theban statesmen were habitually carried out by the hands of Bœotian soldiers.[8]

Use of the words "Bœotian" and "Theban" by Thucydidês and Xenophôn.

It is perfectly evident that the Bœotian League had the form of a real Federal Government. It is equally evident that it altogether wanted the true Federal spirit. The common government was carried on in the name of the whole Bœotian nation. Its most important magistrates bore the title of Bœotarchs; their exact number, whether eleven or thirteen,[9] is a disputed point of Greek archæology, or rather of Bœotian geography. For our

Constitution of the League.

[1] Thuc. iii. 60. Οἱ Θηβαῖοι δείσαντες . . . . ἔλεγον.

[2] Thuc. ii. 2. Προϊδόντες γὰρ οἱ Θηβαῖοι, κ.τ.λ.

[3] Ib. iv. 91. Οἱ δὲ Βοιωτοὶ . . . ξυνελέγοντο, κ.τ.λ.

[4] v. 36 et seqq. throughout.

[5] Xen. Hell. ii. 2. 19. Ἀντέλεγον Κορίνθιοι μὲν καὶ Θηβαῖοι . . . . μὴ σπένδεσθαι Ἀθηναίοις ἀλλ' ἐξαιρεῖν.

[6] Ib. iii. 5, 3. Οἱ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις προεστῶτες . . . . πείθουσι Λοκρούς.

[7] Ib. iv. 2, 17 et seqq.

[8] Tittmann (p. 696) seems to me to under-rate throughout the practical supremacy of Thebes during our first period.

[9] Thuc. iv. 91. Τῶν ἄλλων βοιωταρχῶν, οἵ εἰσιν ἕνδεκα, οὐ ξυνεπαινούντων μάχεσθαι . . . . Ἡγώνδας ὁ Ἀιολάδου, βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν μετ' Ἀριανθίδου τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδου, καὶ ἡγεμονίας οὔσης αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ. where see Dr. Arnold's note, and compare Boeckh, vol. i. p. 727, and Mr. Whiston in Dict. of Antt. art.

purpose the number is indifferent; the important point for us is that Thebes chose two Bœotarchs,[1] and each of the other cities one.[2] The same narrative from which we learn this fact shows also that, besides the cities which were, in name at least, sovereign states, Bœotia, like Switzerland in the old time, contained districts which did not enjoy direct Federal rights, but which were connected, in some subordinate way, with some one or other of the sovereign cities.[3] It may however be doubted whether these dependencies were, strictly speaking, subject districts, like the Italian possessions of Uri, or whether Bœotia was not, like the Grisons, a League made up of smaller Leagues. However this may be, the Bœotarchs, as representatives of the several Bœotian cities, were the supreme military commanders of the League,[4] and, as it would appear, the general adminis-

Subject Districts or Subordinate Leagues.

Office of the Bœotarchs.

Bœotarches. [The Bœotarchs are mentioned in Herodotos ix. 15. Οἱ γὰρ βοιωτάρχαι μετεπέμψαντο τοὺς προσχώρους τῶν Ἀσωπίων.]

[1] Boeckh (u.s.) explains the second Theban Bœotarch to have been the representative of some town formerly a member of the League, but afterwards merged in Thebes. This is a highly probable explanation of the origin of the custom; practically the double Theban Bœotarchy, like the four members for the City of London, represented the superiority of Thebes to the other cities.

[2] Mr. Grote (vi. 523) speaks of the Bœotarchs as consisting of "two chosen from Thebes, the rest in unknown proportions by the other cities." Certainly Thucydidês does not directly say that there was one Bœotarch from each city, but almost every scholar seems to have taken it for granted (see Hermann, Pol. Ant. § 179, Eng. Tr.), and it is hard to imagine any arrangement by which any sovereign city would be left without its Bœotarch. This narrative of Thucydidês, and another which will presently be referred to, are, as far as I know, our only authorities for the number and power of the Bœotarchs during this first period of the League. With the Bœotarchs of the days of Epameinôndas we have as yet no concern. [With the position of Thebes in the Bœotian League, compare that of Davos in the Ten Jurisdictions. See Histoire de la Confédération Suisse (translated from the History of J. von Müller and continued), vol. xii. p. 612. Cf. also the privileged position of Chur in the Gotteshausbund, ib. xiii. 356; and the preponderance of the City of Zug in the canton of Zug, ib. xiv. 226, and Bluntschli, Gesch. des schweiz. Bundesrechtes, i. 422.]

[3] Thuc. iv. 76. Χαιρώνειαν δὲ, ἣ ἐς Ὀρχόμενον . . . . ξυντελεῖ, where see Arnold's note. I cannot help thinking that the word ξυντελεῖν implies a greater degree of freedom in these dependent places than Dr. Arnold allows. See also Boeckh, i. 728.

[4] It may be doubted whether the words ἡγεμονίας οὔσης αὐτοῦ, in the passage of Thucydidês (iv. 91) quoted above, imply that the supreme command was always vested in a Theban Bœotarch, or whether it was merely the turn of Pagôndas to command that particular day. It is worth notice that the Bœotian army at that time was not drawn up in any uniform order, but the troops of each city followed their own customs. The Thebans were twenty-five deep, the others in different proportions. Thuc. iv. 93.

trators of Federal affairs. This is the ordinary position of the military commanders in a Greek state, as we see by the authority possessed by the Ten Generals at Athens, and by the Federal General of the Achaian League. The Bœotarchs of course command at Dêlion, but they also act as administrative magistrates of the League by hindering Agêsilaos from sacrificing at Aulis.[1] We see something more of their functions in a narrative of Thucydidês which gives us almost our only glimpse of the internal working of the Bœotian Federal constitution. During nearly the whole of our first period, the Bœotian government was oligarchic. Just as in Achaia each city had its local democratic Assembly and the League had its Federal democratic Assembly, so in Bœotia the Federal Government was oligarchic, and we cannot doubt that the government of each particular city was oligarchic also.[2] The supreme power of the League was vested in the Four Senates of the Bœotians.[3] Of the constitution of these Senates we know absolutely nothing; but it is most probable that the division was a local one, and that the Four Senates represented four districts. If so, it shows that the Federal bond in Bœotia must have been much laxer than it was in Achaia, and the necessity of consulting several Assemblies suggests resemblances between the constitution of Bœotia and the constitution of the United Provinces. Still less do we know how four co-ordinate Senates were kept in harmony together; but the only glimpse which we get of

B.C. 424.

B.C. 397.

The Four Senates.

B.C. 421.

[1] Xen. Hell. iii. 4. 4. Οἱ βοιώταρχοι . . . . πέμψαντες ἱππέας, κ.τ.λ. This has a military sound, but it was doubtless in strictness a measure of police.

[2] Mr. Whiston (Dict. of Antt.) is doubtless justified by analogy in supposing that each Bœotian city had its own βουλή or Senate, and δῆμος or Popular Assembly (see Boeckh, i. 729), but the passage which he quotes from Xenophôn hardly proves it (Hell. v. 2. 29). It merely speaks of a Theban βουλή and that during the time (B.C. 382) when the Confederation was in abeyance. I am not clear about the existence of Popular Assemblies in the Bœotian cities during our first period. There is, as might be expected, abundant evidence for their existence in later times, but I doubt whether any of the many inscriptions in Boeckh, which mention a δῆμος, belong to the days of the old oligarchic League.

[3] Thuc. v. 38. Ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν . . . . αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσιν. Tittmann (p. 695) assumes their representative, and denies their aristocratic, character. The latter at least is clear enough. A Federal δῆμος, like that of the Achaians, is mentioned in later inscriptions (see Boeckh, i. 728); but one can hardly fancy its having even a nominal existence earlier than the revolution of Pelopidas.

them sets them before us as submissive and tractable bodies, which commonly did little more than register the edicts of the Bœotarchs.[1] Their constitutional powers seem to have been something like those of the American Senate; the Bœotarchs propose to them a scheme of a treaty, which it rests with them to accept or to reject. We may even believe that the Senates were, on such matters at least, only authorized to consider proposals made to them by the Bœotarchs, and that they had no initiative voice of their own.[2] It is clear that the actual negociation was carried on wholly by the Bœotarchs, just as it would be by an American President and his Ministry. In this particular case the Bœotarchs fully expected that the Senates would have ratified their proposals without examination or explanation, and they were much surprised at finding the proposed treaty rejected.[3] The whole story gives us a very poor impression of the management of the Bœotian Foreign Office.

Diplomatic Action of the Senates and the Bœotarchs.

Though the Bœotarchs were, like the Athenian Generals, practically the most important officers of the state, yet, like the Athenian Generals, they did not stand formally at its head. The nominal chief of the League was a magistrate called the Archon of the Bœotians,[4] whose name seems to have been used as a date even in purely local proceedings in the several cities.[5] We also find local Archons in the several cities.[6] Though many of the inscriptions which record the names of these Archons are doubtless later than the Peace of Antalkidas, or even than Kassander's restoration of Thebes, still the analogy of other states would lead us to believe that the Archons, both of the League and of its several cities, were magistrates of the highest antiquity. Probably

Federal and Local Archons.

[1] Cf. Grote, vii. 34. They must, as Boeckh (i. 728) remarks, have been assembled in one place.

[2] See Arnold's note on Thuc. v. 38.

[3] Thuc. ib. Οἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κἂν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν.

[4] See the inscription in Boeckh, No. 1594 (vol. i. p. 776). Mr. Whiston infers from this inscription that the Federal Archon "was probably always a Theban." As the inscription specially mentions that the particular Archon commemorated was a Theban, I should have inferred the contrary. This inscription is of a later date than the restoration by Kassander.

[5] See the inscription in Leake's Northern Greece, ii. 132. Χαροπίνω ἄρχοντος Βοιωτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.

[6] See Rose, Inscriptt. Græcc. 264 et seqq.

the Bœotian, like the Athenian, Archon had once been the real ruler of the state, and had been gradually cut down to a routine of small duties, sweetened by the honour of giving his name to the year. Of the particular Archon of Thebes, Plutarch[1] records an usage, which, though his mention of it belongs to a time later than our present date, must surely have been handed down from very early times. The Theban Archon, at least in the interval between the occupation of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas and the delivery of Thebes by Pelopidas, was chosen by lot,[2] and kept a sacred spear of office always by him.[3] These customs are not likely to have been of recent introduction; they savour of high antiquity, and point to the Archon as a venerable pageant rather than as a magistrate possessing real authority. He is spoken of, not as a ruler but as a sacred person, and it is clear, from the whole narrative of Xenophôn and Plutarch, that the main powers of the state were then in the hands of Polemarchs.[4]

Theban Archon a mere Pageant.

B.C. 382–379.

Real power of the Polemarchs.

Yet, with all this show of good Federal Government, the true Federal spirit could have had no place in a League where everything was carried on in the selfish interest of a single city. What the position of Thebes in the Bœotian League really was is shown by the whole history of the brave and unfortunate city of Plataia. The Plataians set the first recorded example of Secession from a Federal Union. But it was most certainly not Secession without a cause. The Plataians broke through their Federal obligations, they forsook the ancestral laws of all

Power of Thebes shown in the History of Plataia.

Plataian Secession from the League, B.C. 519?

[1] De Genio Socratis, 30.

[2] Ib. ὁ κυάμιστος ἄρχων.

[3] The sacred spear can hardly fail to have been an institution of the remotest antiquity, and it points to a time when the Theban Archon, like the Athenian Polemarch, had really been a military commander. But his appointment by lot is not likely to have been introduced at Thebes, any more than at Athens, until the office had become a mere pageant. When an office is disposed of by lot, it is, as Mr. Grote shows, a sign that the office is no longer thought to require special qualifications, but is held to be within the compass of an average citizen. The lot is not necessarily democratic; as the great equalizer, it is just as likely to be introduced into an oligarchic body where the feeling of equality among the members of the ruling order is commonly very strong.

Rotation, as practically adopted in the appointment of the Lord Mayor of London and of the Vice-Chancellors of the Universities, goes on the same principle as the lot. It implies that the office requires no special qualifications, but that one member of the class from whom its occupants are taken is as able to fill it as another.

[4] See especially Xen. Hell. v. 2. 30. Τοῦ νόμου κελεύοντος ἐξεῖναι πολεμάρχῳ λαβεῖν, εἴ τις δοκεῖ ἄξια θανάτου ποιεῖν.

Bœotia,[1] but it was because those obligations and those laws had been perverted into mere instruments of Theban domination. They found the Theban yoke too hard to bear, and they sought for aid against the oppressor, first at Sparta and then at Athens.[2] Even thus early, Secession from the Bœotian League was looked on by impartial spectators as a right to be secured against the overwhelming ascendency of Thebes. The Corinthians, when called in as mediators, determine that Thebes has no right to control any city which does not wish to belong to the Bœotian Confederation.[3] It is clear that language like this would never be used of any really equal Confederation in any age. If a mediator were to be called in to settle American differences, the form of his decree would not be that New York should leave the Confederate States undisturbed. That the example of Plataian secession was not followed by other cities may be partly owing to geographical causes. No other Bœotian city, except Tanagra, lay so temptingly near to a powerful protector. And the events of the Peloponnesian War at once tended to beget a bitter feeling between Athens and the Bœotians generally and to show how little real help Athens was able to give to a dependency beyond Mount Kithairôn.[4] But towards the end of the war, we hear in general terms of strong disaffection towards Thebes on the part of the smaller cities,[5] and in one case, even before the Peace of Nikias, in the very year after the common Bœotian victory at Dêlion, the Thebans destroyed the walls of Thespia, on the ground of the "Atticism" of the inhabitants.[6] The language of Thucydidês would almost imply that this was a mere act of high-handed Theban violence, without even the form of

Ill-feeling between Thebes and other Towns.

B.C. 407.

B.C. 423.

Thespia.

[1] Thuc. iii. 66 et al. Τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια. I cannot believe in any rivalry between Thebes and Plataia, such as Drumann (437) seems to imply, as if Plataia disputed the first place in the League with Thebes. Drumann also strangely omits all mention of the connexion between Plataia and Athens.

[2] Herod. vi. 108. πιεζεύμενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων. Thuc. iii. 55. ὅτε Θηβαῖοι ἡμᾶς ἐβιάσαντο.

[3] Herod. (u.s.) Ἐὰν Θηβαίους Βοιωτῶν τοὺς μὴ βουλομένους ἐς Βοιωτοὺς τελέειν.

[4] See Grote, iv. 222.

[5] Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 2. Βοιωτῶν μὲν γὰρ πολλοί, πλεονεκτούμενοι ὑπὸ Θηβαίων, δυσμενῶς αὐτοῖς ἔχουσιν· Ἀθήνησι δὲ οὐδὲν ὁρῶ τοιοῦτον. The date of this dialogue, which I have already had occasion to quote (see above, p. 22), between Sôkratês and the younger Periklês, is fixed to the year 407 by Periklês being spoken of as a newly-elected General. He was one of the unfortunate commanders at Arginousai.

[6] Thuc. iv. 133. Θηβαῖοι Θεσπιέων τεῖχος περιεῖλον, κ.τ.λ.

legitimate Federal action. He adds that the Thebans had long wished to destroy Thespia, and now found their opportunity. The city could not resist, because the flower of its warriors had fallen in the war with Athens. Such examples as this and that of Plataia might well cause a sullen acquiescence in Theban domination. Against Thebes backed by Sparta, resistance was hopeless. It was not till long after, when Thebes and Sparta were enemies, that, at last, on a favourable opportunity during the Corinthian war, Orchomenos openly seceded.[1] The event is recorded by Xenophôn in the form commonly used to express the revolt of a subject or dependent state. But, long before this, in the famous pleadings as to the fate of Plataia, though the Thebans put prominently forward the general principles of Bœotian Federalism, still the whole is practically treated as a dispute between Plataia and Thebes. The Plataians ask that they may not be given up to the vengeance of the Thebans; they pray that Plataia may not be destroyed, and its territory not be annexed to that of Thebes.[2] They prayed in vain; the captives were massacred, their city was destroyed, and their territory was confiscated, not to the profit of the Bœotian Union, but to that of the Theban State.[3]

Orchomenos, B.C. 395.

Plataia. B.C. 427.

Thus the power of Thebes went on increasing,[4] and no doubt the discontent of the smaller cities went on increasing also, down to the time of the Peace of Antalkidas. Then we first find the Theban claims formally put forth in all their fulness, but only, as it proved, to bring utter dissolution upon the whole Confederacy. In the Plataian conference all that the Thebans had ventured formally to claim was a primacy, expressed by a word[5] familiar to Greek diplomatic language, and not formally inconsistent with the independence of the smaller towns. Afterwards we have seen the Bœotarchs, themselves Federal magistrates, going through at least the form of consulting the Federal Councils. But now the Thebans openly put themselves forward as the representatives, or rather as the sovereigns, of all Bœotia.

Theban claims at the Peace of Antalkidas, B.C. 387.

[1] Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 6. Ὁ μὲν Λύσανδρος . . . . Ὀρχομενίους ἀπέστησε Θηβαίων.

[2] Thuc. iii. 58. Ὑμεῖς δὲ εἰ κτενεῖτε ἡμᾶς καὶ χώραν τὴν Πλαταιίδα Θηβαΐδα ποιήσετε.

[3] Ib. 68 (the whole chapter).

[4] Manso, Sparta, iii. 150. Theben begnügte sich nicht die erste, es verlangte die Hauptstadt im böotischen Lande und es in der Art zu seyn, wie in Lakonien Sparta.

[5] Thuc. iii. 61. Οὐκ ἠξίουν οὗτοι, ὥσπερ ἐτάχθη τὸ πρῶτον, ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑφ' ἡμῶν.

Antalkidas comes down with his rescript from the Great King, ordering that all Greek cities should be independent.[1] It suited the policy of Sparta[2] to construe this independence in the strictest sense everywhere except in Lakonia. When the Peace was to be sworn to, according to the usual Greek custom, by the representatives of every power concerned, Ambassadors from Thebes, not Bœotarchs or Ambassadors from the Four Councils, demanded to take the oaths on behalf of all Bœotia.[3] The Spartan King Agêsilaos refused to receive their oaths, or to admit them to the benefits of the Peace, unless they formally recognized the independence of every Greek city, great and small. The Ambassadors had no such instructions from their Government,[4] and it required a Lacedæmonian declaration of war to bring Thebes to consent to such terms. They were evidently understood as a formal renunciation of all Theban superiority in Bœotia, and apparently as a formal dissolution of the Bœotian League in any shape. As the Thebans consented to the required recognition of independence,[5] we may conclude that every Bœotian city entered into the terms of the treaty as a sovereign commonwealth, and we may thus look upon the old Bœotian Federation as formally dissolved.

Dissolution of the Bœotian League, B.C. 387.

Second Period, B.C. 387–334.

The second portion of Bœotian history includes the splendid day of Theban greatness under Pelopidas and Epameinôndas. As I am not writing a History of Greece, but a History of Federal Government, all that I have to do is to pick out from the general narrative such points as bear directly upon the Federal relations between Thebes and the other Bœotian towns. By the Peace of Antalkidas all Greek cities, great and small, became independent under the guaranty of Sparta. But Sparta seems, throughout Greece, to have interpreted independence after the same strange fashion as she had interpreted it after the end of the Peloponnesian War. Either at once or, as is more likely, gradually after some interval,[6] the several cities

The Peace carried out in the interest of Sparta, B.C. 387–2.

[1] Xen. Hell. v. 1. 31. Τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι.

[2] Ib. v. 2. 16. Εἰκὸς ὑμᾶς [Λακεδαιμονίους] τῆς μὲν Βοιωτίας ἐπιμεληθῆναι ὅπως μὴ καθ' ἓν εἴη.

[3] Ib. v. 1. 32. Οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι ἠξίουν ὑπὲρ πάντων Βοιωτῶν ὀμνύναι.

[4] Ib. Οἱ δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων πρέσβεις ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἐπεσταλμένα σφίσι ταῦτ' εἴη.

[5] Ib. v. 1. 33. Θηβαῖοι δ' εἰς τὰς σπονδὰς εἰσελθεῖν ἠναγκάσθησαν, αὐτονόμους ἀφέντες τὰς Βοιωτίας πόλεις.

[6] On this point see Mr. Grote's note, x. 46.

were occupied, like Athens under the Thirty, by narrow local oligarchies, supported by a Spartan harmost and garrison.[1] In the case of Thebes we know how this state of things was brought about, namely through the treacherous seizure of the Kadmeia by Phoibidas.[2] Plataia was restored,[3] restored as an equal and independent city; its restoration implied not only a loss of Theban supremacy, but the actual loss of that portion of the existing Theban territory which had formerly formed the Plataian district. But the independence of Plataia, like that of the other towns, was not thought inconsistent with the presence of a Lacedæmonian harmost. Several entirely new elements were thus introduced into the world of Bœotian politics. Hitherto Bœotia had been less affected than most parts of Greece by the struggles of oligarchic and democratic parties. The Bœotian cities had been, from time immemorial, oligarchically governed. Oligarchic government was doubtless, in Theban eyes, one of the ancestral principles of the Bœotian constitution,[4] hardly less important than the other great principle of Theban supremacy. Not that a democratic party was altogether wanting in Bœotia, but it was weak, and could do nothing without foreign help. Democracy was introduced by the Athenian victory at Oinophyta, but democracy did not flourish on the uncongenial Bœotian soil,[5] and oligarchy reappeared when Bœotia was again detached from the Athenian alliance by the first battle of Korôneia. The invasion which led to the battle of Dêlion was planned by Athens in concert with a democratic party in Bœotia,[6] but the utter failure of the scheme doubtless gave a deep and lasting blow to the democratic interest. The histories of Plataia and Thespia, as already recorded, leave hardly any doubt that this democratic or Athenian party was the party of the independence of the smaller cities against Thebes. But the dissolution of the League, and the Spartan occupation, for such it was, which followed, must have put matters on quite another footing. Oligarchy no longer meant, either in Thebes or elsewhere, the ascendency of the ancient

Spartan garrisons in the cities, B.C. 382.

Restoration of Plataia, B.C. c. 386.

Oligarchic and Democratic Parties.

Weakness of the Democratic element in Bœotia.

B.C. 457.

B.C. 449.

B.C. 424.

Thebes, hitherto the centre of Oligarchy,

[1] See Isok. Plat. 20, 21. Cf. Pol. iv. 27.

[2] Xen. Hell. v. 2. 25 et seqq.

[3] On this restoration see Grote, x. 43.

[4] Τὰ πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια. See above, p. 130.

[5] Arist. Pol. viii. 3. Ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην κακῶς πολιτευομένοις ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

[6] Thuc. iv. 76.

nobles of the land, whose rule, in a country where it had been so little interrupted, may well have involved no practical oppression.[1] Oligarchy now meant the domination[2] of a small number of citizens, whose power rested entirely on the presence of a foreign force. A powerful democratic spirit was naturally called forth, and, above all, at Thebes, hitherto the centre of oligarchy. A democratic revolution delivered Thebes at once from her traitorous citizens and from her foreign garrison, and the new Theban Democracy entered, under Pelopidas and Epameinôndas, upon its short and glorious career. There is no portion of Grecian history which more thoroughly awakens our sympathies than all that personally concerns those two most illustrious citizens. We hardly know which more to admire, Pelopidas the slayer of the Tyrants, or Epameinôndas who refuses to stain his hands even with Tyrants' blood. The fight of Leuktra, the invasion of Lakonia, the restoration of Messênê, the foundation of Megalopolis, the deaths of Pelopidas in Thessaly and of Epameinôndas at Mantineia, are all among the most spirit-stirring scenes even in the eventful history of Greece. But it is easy to see that Pelopidas and Epameinôndas were the chiefs of a people utterly unworthy of them; that the momentary greatness of Thebes did but leave Greece yet more disunited,[3] more ready to become the prey of the Macedonian aggressor; and that, looking at the matter with the eyes of a historian of Federalism, this second period of Bœotian history is yet more disastrous than the first period before the Peace of Antalkidas. The League was nominally revived; constitutional Federal language was employed in formal documents,[4] and

becomes, by her Revolution, [B.C. 379,] the centre of Democracy.

Career of Pelopidas [B.C. 379–364] and Epameinôndas [B.C. 379–362].

Bad results of Theban supremacy.

Nominal revival of the League. New Bœotarchs.

[1] The Platonic Sôkratês (Kritôn, c. 15) calls (B.C. 399) Thebes and Megara well governed cities—*εὐνομουμένας πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιωτάτους—εὐνομοῦνται γάρ, κ.τ.λ.* He does not call them *εὐνομουμένας* simply as being oligarchic, as he goes on to blame the ill government of oligarchic Thessaly—*ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστη ἀταξία καὶ ἀκολασία.*

[2] Xenophôn himself uses the strong word *δυναστεία*, only less strong than *τυραννίς*, meaning in fact a Tyranny in the hands of several persons instead of one only. *Ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν ὥσπερ ἐν Θήβαις.* Hell. v. 4. 46.

[3] Xen. Hell. vii. 5. 27. *Ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ ταραχὴ ἔτι πλείων μετὰ τὴν [ἐν Μαντινείᾳ] μάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι.* Four years afterwards Philip took Amphipolis.

[4] The *κοινὴ σύνοδος τῶν Βοιωτῶν* (Diod. xv. 80) received complaints from Thessaly against Alexander of Pherai (B.C. 364); and, just before Chairôneia (B.C. 338), Philip sent an embassy *ἐπὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Βοιωτῶν* (Diod. xvi. 85). Cf. above, p. 126, note 4.

Bœotarchs, and not mere local Polemarchs, again appear as the commanders of the Bœotian armies.[1] It is also clear that, immediately after the Theban Revolution, the Theban cause B.C. 378. was popular in the Bœotian cities.[2] No doubt the Theban Democracy, like the Athenian Democracy, put itself forward, and that for a while sincerely, as the champion of independence and democratic government everywhere, in opposition alike to native oligarchies and to Lacedæmonian garrisons. But the result soon showed how impossible it was that an overweening city like Thebes should ever enter into the true Federal relation with weaker states. Thebes showed more quickly than Athens, or even than Sparta, how easily Presidency may be developed into Empire. It does not indeed prove much that the recovery of the Bœotian cities is spoken of by Xenophôn in terms which are applicable only to a reconquest by force of arms.[3] To a Lakonian partisan like that renegade Athenian, the expulsion by Theban hands of a Spartan harmost and the oligarchy which he maintained, doubtless seemed to be the high-handed extinction of a legal government by the hands of a foreign invader. But though the Bœotian cities willingly entered into a revived Bœotian League, they soon found that a Bœotian League was now only another name for bondage to Thebes. A nominally democratic Bœotian Assembly, instead of four oligarchic Senates,

Liberal profession of Thebes.

Real subjection of the lesser cities to Thebes.

[1] The number now was seven (Paus. ix. 13. 6, 7). I do not know of any distinct evidence whether any of these Bœotarchs were really chosen by the smaller towns or not.

[2] See Grote, x. 215, 263. Xenophôn (Hell. v. 4. 46) seems to imply a sort of secession of the Dêmos from the smaller cities, *ὁ μέντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν [τῶν πολέων] εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἀπεχώρει.*

[3] Xen. Hell. v. 4. 63. *Θράσεως δὴ ἐστρατεύοντο οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἐπὶ τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις* [mark the word *περιοικίδας*] *καὶ πάλιν αὐτὰς ἀνελάμβανον.* vi. 1. 1. *Οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι, ἐπεὶ κατεστρέψαντο τὰς ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις, ἐστράτευον καὶ εἰς τὴν Φωκίδα.* This clearly implies actual warfare, but what follows the first of the two passages as clearly implies that it was a warfare in which the Dêmos in the cities attacked took the Theban side. Still I cannot understand Mr. Grote's meaning when he says (x. 183, 184) "that the Thebans . . . revived the Bœotian confederacy, is clearly stated by Xenophôn"—in the two passages just quoted. It is clearly stated that "the Thebans again became presidents of all Bœotia" (p. 183), but surely not that they revived a confederacy. Xenophôn speaks not of reviving a confederacy, but of Thebes warring against and conquering certain cities. Considering Xenophôn's prejudices, his language is in no way inconsistent with the fact, otherwise sufficiently established, that the restoration of the Federal system was at least professed. But surely his words do not clearly state it. And considering what happened to Plataia and other cities so soon after, I certainly think that the practical aspect of the case is better set forth in the words "subjugation" and "submitted" used by Bishop Thirlwall (v. 71).

might now sit to register Theban edicts in the name of the League, but the practical nature of the relation between Thebes and the other cities admits of no doubt. It is enough that the language of historians and orators always implies that Thebes had become practically sovereign. The smaller cities are spoken of in language which implies subjection;[1] we hear now, not of a Bœotian Confederation, but of a Theban State, into which other cities are compelled to merge themselves against their will.[2] Finally we hear, during this period, of the utter destruction by Theban hands of no less than four Bœotian towns. Plataia now paid for the crime of having so long been, first an Athenian and then a Spartan outpost.[3] Orchomenos, once rescued by the personal interference of Epameinôndas,[4] at last, during that hero's absence, became the victim[5] alike of its ancient mythical rivalry,[6] and of its more recent political opposition. Thespia, disaffected even before the fight of Leuktra,[7] was destroyed soon after, and Korôneia shared the fate of Orchomenos.[8] These events, the destruction of so many Hellenic cities, above all of the ancient and renowned Orchomenos, to which Thebes herself had once been tributary, raised a feeling of profound indignation throughout Greece.[9] When the genius of Epameinôndas no longer guided her counsels, and

Destruction of Bœotian towns: of Plataia, B.C. 373 or 372; of Orchomenos, B.C. 368 or 363; of Thespia, B.C. 373 or 371; and of Korôneia, B.C. 363?

[1] Περίοικοι, περιοικίδες πόλεις. I have already mentioned this use of the word.

[2] See the expressions used in the Plataic Oration of Isokratês 8-10, μὴ πεισθεῖσαν τὴν Πλαταιέων πόλιν ἀλλὰ βιασθεῖσαν Θηβαίοις [not Βοιωτοῖς] συντελεῖν—τῆς σφετέρας αὐτῶν πολιτείας οὐδὲν δεομένους κοινωνεῖν ἀναγκάζουσι—συντελεῖν ἐς τὰς Θήβας—προστάττειν ἡμῖν—οὐ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῖς ἀρκτέον, κ.τ.λ. Something is doubtless to be allowed for angry Plataian (or Isokratic) oratory, something doubtless to the old special hatred between Thebes and Plataia; still the most vehement orator in South Carolina would not use such language with regard to any single Northern State, though he might apply it to the Northern Union in general.

[3] The details of the destruction of Plataia are given by Pausanias, ix. 1. 4 et seqq.

[4] Diod. xv. 57. Paus. ix. 15. 3. Thirlwall, v. 158, 9. Grote, x. 264.

[5] Diod. xv. 79. The Plataians were only expelled; the men of Orchomenos were killed and the women and children sold, like the Mêlians and Skiônaians by Athens. According to Pausanias (ix. 15, 14) the Thebans slew or branded such Bœotian exiles as they met with in their Peloponnesian campaign.

[6] Isok. Plat. 11. Οὐ τῶν ἄλλων αὐτοῖς [Θηβαίοις] ἀρκτέον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον Ὀρχομενίοις φόρον οἰστέον· οὕτω γὰρ εἶχε τὸ παλαιόν.

[7] Paus. ix. 13. 8, 14. 1-4. The date of the destruction of Thespia is doubtful, see Thirlwall, v. 85. Grote, x. 219.

[8] On the date of the destruction of Korôneia, see Grote, x. 427.

[9] See Grote, x. 427, xi. 285.

even during his lifetime whenever he was not at hand to restrain her passions, Thebes stood forth as a city of coarse and brutal upstarts, who had suddenly risen to a place in the Hellenic world for which they were utterly unfit.[1] No Grecian city seems ever to have been more thoroughly hated than Thebes was between the battle of Mantineia and the battle of Chairônceia. Athens felt for her a repugnance which she never showed towards either her Spartan rival or her Macedonian conqueror. To overcome this loathing, and to range the warriors of Thebes and Athens side by side against Philip, was the most glorious exploit of the glorious life of Dêmosthenês.[2]

General dislike of Thebes throughout Greece, B.C. 362–338.

The dates of these acts of Theban violence towards the smaller Bœotian cities are in some cases matters of dispute. Most of them occurred after the battle of Leuktra, but that of Plataia took place before. Certain it is that, just before that battle, the Theban claims had risen to their full height. In the negociations which preceded it we seem to read over again the negociations which preceded the Peace of Antalkidas.[3] The Thebans swore to the Peace, or were willing to swear to it, in the name of all Bœotia.[4] Agêsilaos, as before, demands a recognition of the independence of the other Bœotian cities, and the admission of

Theban Claims before the battle of Leuktra, B.C. 371

[1] Ephoros, quoted by Strabo, ix. 2. 2. Τελευτήσαντος γὰρ ἐκείνου [Ἐπαμεινώνδου] τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀποβαλεῖν εὐθὺς τοὺς Θηβαίους συνέβη, γευσαμένους αὐτῆς μόνον· αἴτιον δὲ εἶναι, τὸ λόγων καὶ ὁμιλίας τῆς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ὀλιγωρῆσαι, μόνης δ' ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῆς κατὰ πολεμὸν ἀρετῆς.

[2] See a noble passage in Arnold's Rome, ii. 331.

[3] Pausanias (ix. 13. 2) evidently confounded the two occasions, as he introduces Epameinôndas as the Theban orator before the Peace of Antalkidas.

[4] It is certainly hard at first sight to reconcile the accounts of this event given by Xenophôn (Hell. vi. 3. 19) and by Plutarch (Ages. 28) and Pausanias (see last note). But they do not seem to me quite so contradictory as Mr. Grote thinks them (x. 231, note). In Xenophôn's story, the Theban Ambassadors first allow Thebes to be set down as having sworn, and on the next day demand (ἐκέλευον) to have the name "Thebans" struck out, and "Bœotians" substituted. Mr. Grote asks "why should such a man as Epameinôndas (who doubtless was the envoy), consent at first to waive the presidential claims of Thebes, and to swear for her alone? If he did consent, why should he retract the next day?" Now it strikes me that the proceeding is capable of another explanation, and that there is no "waiving of presidential claims," and no "retracting the next day." It is evident from the language of all the historians and orators, that the supremacy of Thebes was now far more openly avowed than it had been under the old League, and that the word "Theban" was now constantly used where "Bœotian" would have been used in the preceding century. The Thebans might well swear as "Thebans," meaning to carry with them the whole of their confederates; to say "Theban" rather than "Bœotian" might be meant not as any "waiving of presidential claims," but rather as the strongest way of asserting them. But Agêsilaos might very well choose to take it in a contrary sense; he would call on

each to swear in its own name[1] as a sovereign commonwealth. The Thebans again refuse; they are again excluded from the treaty, but this time with very different results. Their former refusal and exclusion had been followed by their submission, by the dissolution of the Bœotian League, at last by the occupation of the Theban Kadmeia by a Lacedæmonian garrison. The
B.C. 371. present refusal and exclusion was indeed followed by a Lacedæmonian invasion of Bœotia, but that invasion was crushed at the
B.C. 369. fight of Leuktra, and soon after repaid by the presence of the Theban invaders in Sparta itself.

In this negociation, as in the former one, Thebes formally claims to be regarded as the head of Bœotia, the representative of the whole Bœotian body towards other powers. She demands to be looked upon as capable of contracting, by her single act, international obligations binding on all the Bœotian cities. In this negociation, as in the former one, the Spartan King refuses to recognize Thebes in any such character. He knows Thebes, only as he knows Orchomenos, as one Bœotian city out of several, capable of contracting for herself alone, and whose obligations are binding on no other Bœotian commonwealth. Here is indeed a change on both sides since the Lacedæmonian judges sat to decide between the conflicting arguments of Theban and Plataian orators. Then all that Thebes formally claimed, whatever she practically exercised, was a mere supremacy implying no absolute subjection, and even that she grounded on old Bœotian custom, and on her own rights as the supposed metropolis[2] of the other Bœotian towns. Then, whatever Thebes claimed, Sparta, as her interest then dictated, was ready to allow. Now Thebes employs, even in her formal claims, the language, no longer of a metropolis or of a Federal president, but of a sovereign, or rather of a tyrant, city. Now Sparta, in pursuance of what has now become her interest, denies not only the claims lately advanced by Thebes, but the general principle of any kind of Bœotian

Gradual growth of the Theban claims.

the other Bœotian cities to swear separately; the Thebans would then demand to have the doubtful word "Thebans" changed into "Bœotians;" that is, to have their oath taken as the oath of all Bœotia. Then would follow the lively dialogue between Epameinôndas and Agêsilaos recorded by Plutarch and Pausanias, preceded probably by some such reasoning on the Theban side as Mr. Grote supposes. [Cf. Vischer, Kleine Schriften, i. 559, and see Appendix iii.]

[1] This is more clearly brought out by Pausanias (ix. 13. 2) than by any one else.

[2] Thuc. iii. 61. Ἡμῶν κτισάντων Πλάταιαν ὕστερον τῆς ἄλλης Βοιωτίας, κ.τ.λ.

unity, a principle certainly as old as any other immemorial fact of Grecian politics. But if the claims of Thebes had grown between the siege of Plataia and the Peace of Antalkidas, they had again grown between the Peace of Antalkidas and the negociations at Sparta.[1] Here, on her own ground, Spartan pride received such a home-thrust from the audacious Theban as Spartan pride had never before dreamed of. Epameinôndas ventured on a parallel such as assuredly the most daring imagination had never ventured on before. Thebes will recognize the independence of the Bœotian towns when Sparta recognizes the independence of the Lakonian towns. Thebes will allow Orchomenos to swear as a separate commonwealth, when Sparta allows Amyklai to swear as a separate commonwealth. Here the claims of Thebes stand plainly before us in the naked form of unalloyed tyranny. We have already more than once seen the Bœotian cities described, in relation to Thebes, by the same name of subjection by which the Lakonian cities[2] are described in relation to Sparta. We now see this parallel in all its fulness formally avowed as a principle of Theban politics. The Bœotian towns are to be mere Perioikoi of Thebes, no longer sovereign members of a Bœotian League, of which Thebes was at most a constitutional President. The comparison was equally daring in the claims which it made on behalf of Thebes and in the threat which it implied against Sparta. No such revolutionary words

Parallel between Thebes in Bœotia and Sparta in Lakonia.

[1] See Xen. Hell. vi. 3. 2.

[2] Isok. Panath. 179. Ὀνόμασι μὲν προσαγορευομένους ὡς πόλεις οἰκοῦντας, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν ἔχοντας ἐλάττω τῶν δήμων τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν. The whole passage is a curious picture of the position of the περίοικοι. Of course an Attic δῆμος, as such, was politically nothing, but its inhabitants severally were Athenian citizens; a Lakonian πόλις was also politically nothing, while its inhabitants severally were mere helpless subjects of Sparta.

The Lakonian πόλεις are mentioned in rather a different way in a curious passage of Herodotos (vii. 234) where Dêmaratos tells Xerxes of the many Lacedæmonian cities, among which he merely speaks of Sparta as the greatest, and inhabited by the bravest among the brave Lacedæmonians. Herodotos was not a politician like Thucydidês or Polybios, still less was he a pamphleteer like Isokratês; such a description was quite enough for his conception of a picturesque dialogue between Xerxes and Dêmaratos, without bringing in political distinctions which Xerxes would not have understood. But a mere "English reader" might be led seriously astray as to the political condition of Lakonia by reading this single passage of Herodotos by itself. Yet strange to say, Professor Rawlinson, who discusses at large the population of the city of Sparta, and who adds to the Book a learned dissertation about Alarodians and Orthocorybantes, does not vouchsafe the "English reader" the least information as to the real political condition of Amyklai and Epidauros Limêra.

On these Perioikic πόλεις see Grote, ii. 484 et seqq.

had ever before been heard in any Grecian congress. No Greek had ever yet questioned the absolute rights of Sparta over the Lakonian towns. No Spartan, probably no Greek, had ever before imagined that treaties requiring that every Greek city should be independent might be so construed as to make Amyklai independent of Sparta as well as to make Orchomenos independent of Thebes. Epameinôndas now put forth a principle which at once loosened the very foundations of Spartan dominion, and he lived to carry out his principle in the most practical shape. Before his work was over, he had rent away from Sparta half
B.C. 369. her territory, and had set up an independent Messênê in opposition to Sparta, as Sparta had set up an independent Plataia in opposition to Thebes. It is impossible not to rejoice even at the mere humiliation of Sparta, and still more so at the restoration
The claims of Thebes exclude all true Federalism in Bœotia. of the heroic commonwealth of Messênê.[1] But it is clear that the words of Epameinôndas contained a sentence of death against Bœotian Federalism or Bœotian freedom in any shape;[2] it is clear that, though he held back his unworthy countrymen from the grosser acts of oppression, yet his life was devoted to the mere aggrandizement of the one city of Thebes, and not to the general good of Bœotia or of Hellas.

Different as was the general character of our first and our second period of Bœotian history, the terminations of the two
B.C. 338. were strikingly alike. After the defeat of Chairôneia, Thebes
Restoration of the destroyed Towns. had to receive a Macedonian garrison into the Kadmeia, as she had before had to receive a Spartan garrison. Plataia, Thespia, Orchomenos, and Korôneia now arose again,[3] surrounding Thebes

[1] The restoration of Messênê however, except as a mere blow to Sparta, proved a failure. The career of the restored Messênians is inglorious, quite unworthy of the countrymen of the half-mythic Aristomenês, or of the gallant exiles of Naupaktos. The glory of Epameinôndas as a founder is to have been the creator of Megalopolis.

[2] Mr. Grote thinks that the words of Epameinôndas do not imply that he claimed that "Thebes was entitled to *as much power* in Bœotia as Sparta in Laconia" (x. 231, 234) but only that the Federal union of Bœotia under the presidency of Thebes should be looked on as being "an integral political aggregate" as much as Lakonia "under Sparta," or as Attica—he does not venture to say "under Athens." Surely there is no analogy between a Federal head of several independent cities, a despot city ruling over several subject cities, and a country where the whole, is so to speak, one city, while the smaller towns are mere parishes. Unless Epameinôndas meant his parallel between Thebes in Bœotia and Sparta in Lakonia to be exact in all points, it has no force at all, and it is open to an obvious retort. And certainly the position of Sparta in Lakonia was utterly inconsistent with Federalism or with freedom of any kind.

[3] Paus. iv. 27. 10; ix. 37. 8. He assigns the restoration to Philip, Arrian (i. 9. 10) to Alexander.

with allies of Macedonia even more zealous and hostile than they had been in their former character as allies of Sparta. The troops of these cities served heartily with Alexander in his campaign against Thebes,[1] and it was by their voices[2] that the tyrant city was devoted to the destruction which she had so often inflicted upon others. As Thebes had enriched herself with the territory of four of her Bœotian sisters, so, now that her own day was come, the Macedonian conqueror divided the whole Theban territory among his Bœotian allies. Thebes now vanishes for a while from among the cities of the earth. As one of the bulwarks of independent Greece against Macedonia we may lament her fate; but the special historian of Bœotian Federalism cannot weep for her.

Destruction of Thebes by Alexander, B.C. 335. Zealous co-operation of the Bœotian Towns.

The third period of Bœotian history may be more briefly gone through. The part played by Bœotia in the later history of Greece is almost always contemptible; and of the few important events in which she was concerned I shall speak elsewhere. Thebes did not long remain a ruin or a sheep-walk, an example of the fate to which she had herself once wished to reduce Athens.[3] As she had found a Macedonian destroyer, she now found a Macedonian restorer. Thebes was restored by Kassander;[4] it would seem with some sort of formal consent[5] on the part of the other Bœotian towns. They of course were deeply interested in a proceeding which might possibly threaten them with a mistress, and which, in any case, involved an immediate surrender of territory. On the other hand, to say nothing of the power of Kassander and of the general feeling of Greece in favour of Theban restoration, it is quite possible that the

Third Period, B.C. 335–172.

B.C. 405. Restoration of Thebes by Kassander B.C. 316.

[1] Arrian, i. 8. 8. Diod. xvii. 13. Arrian mentions also the Phôkians.

[2] Arr. i. 9. 9. Τοῖς δὲ μετασχοῦσι τοῦ ἔργου ξυμμάχοις (οἷς δὴ καὶ ἐπέστρεψεν Ἀλέξανδρος τὰ κατὰ τὰς Θήβας διαθεῖναι) τὴν μὲν Καδμείαν φρουρᾷ κατέχειν ἔδοξε, τὴν πόλιν δὲ κατασκάψαι εἰς ἔδαφος, καὶ τὴν χώραν διανεῖμαι τοῖς ξυμμάχοις. Cf. Diod. xviii. 11. Diodôros (xvii. 14), with much less probability, makes Alexander assemble and consult τοὺς συνέδρους τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὸ κοινὸν συνέδριον; that is, probably, the Corinthian Synod, or possibly, in so blundering a writer, the Delphic Amphiktyons. Compare p. 100, note 1 on the supposed agency of the Corinthian Synod or of the Amphiktyons, and p. 43 on the hatred of the Bœotian towns towards Thebes.

[3] Isok. Plat. 31. Ἔθεντο οἱ [Θηβαῖοι] τὴν ψῆφον ὡς χρὴ τήν τε πόλιν ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι καὶ τὴν χώραν ἀνεῖναι μηλόβοτον ὥσπερ τὸ Κρισαῖον πεδίον. Cf. Suidas under μηλόβοτος. See above, p. 125.

[4] Paus. iv. 27. 10; ix. 7. 1.

[5] Diod. xix. 54. Κάσσανδρος . . . πείσας τοὺς Βοιωτούς, ἀνέστησε τὴν πόλιν.

Bœotian cities found that they had really not gained by the destruction of the greatest of their number. Elsewhere the step was highly popular: Athens, the partaker in the later struggles of Thebes, gave zealous help towards her restoration; gratitude towards the city of Epameinôndas prompted help no less zealous on the part of Messênê and Megalopolis; contributions came in from various parts of Greece, and even from the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily.[1] Thebes thus rose again, and before long she again became the head of a Bœotian League,[2] but with powers very inferior to what she had possessed in the days of her might. The date of the reconstitution of the League does not seem certain, but, through the whole range of the history of Polybios, Bœotia is always spoken of as a political whole, just like Phôkis or Akarnania. But the revived Bœotian League cuts a very poor figure beside the Achaia of Aratos or the Sparta of Kleomenês. The Bœotians once ventured to join with the Achaians against the Ætolian brigands, but after a single defeat they gave up all share in general Grecian politics.[3] They seem even to have entered into some relation to the aggressors, inconsistent with perfect independence,[4] a relation presently to be exchanged for a yet more servile submission to Macedonia.[5] Nor did they atone for external insignificance by a vigorous and orderly government at home. The account of the internal state of the country given by Polybios is ridiculous beyond conception. The Bœotians did nothing but eat and drink; they ate more dinners in a month than there were days in it;[6] they let the administration of justice sleep throughout the land for twenty-five years.[7] Yet these Bœotian swine[8] seem to have

Restoration of the League with a modified Headship in Thebes.

B.C. 245.

Insignificance of Bœotia in later Greece.

B.C. 201–186 or 222–197.

[1] Paus. ix. 7. 1. Diod. xix. 54. [2] Bœotiæ caput, Liv. xxxi. 1; xlii. 44.

[3] Pol. xx. 4. Plut. Ar. 16.

[4] Pol. xx. 5. Ἐγκαταλίποντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς προσένειμαν Αἰτωλοῖς τὸ ἔθνος. Droysen (ii. 370) takes this to imply actual συμπολιτεία with the Ætolians, and undoubtedly the same word, in a slightly different construction, is used to express the annexation of Sikyôn to the Achaian League. ii. 43. Ἄρατος . . . τὴν πατρίδα . . . προσένειμε πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν. But this would seem to prove too much, and the words need not imply more than close alliance and slavish subserviency to Ætolia.

[5] Pol. xx. 5. Ὑπέταξαν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁλοσχερῶς Μακεδόσι.

[6] Ib. xx. 6. Ὥστε πολλοὺς εἶναι Βοιωτῶν οἷς ὑπῆρχε δεῖπνα τοῦ μηνὸς πλείω τῶν εἰς τὸν μῆνα διατεταγμένων ἡμερῶν.

[7] Ibid. Also xxiii. 2. Drumann (439) seems rather to misconceive this period. Surely Polybios describes a time of carelessness and corruption, rather than one of violence (Faustrecht).

[8] Pind. Ol. vi. 90. Ἀρχαῖον ὄνειδος . . . Βοιωτίαν ὗν.

possessed a Federal constitution to which the models afforded by neighbouring states had given a better form than it had possessed in the days of Ismênias or of Epameinôndas. Thebes was the head of the League, the place of meeting for the Federal Assembly,[1] but she no longer enjoyed the same tyrannical power as of old. At the head of the League, as at the head of other Leagues, there was a single General,[2] who probably stepped into the position originally held by the ancient Federal Archon. There were also Bœotarchs,[3] whose office now would answer pretty well to that of the Achaian Dêmiourgoi or Ministers; and, as in Achaia, there was a Commander of Cavalry.[4] There was a Federal Assembly in which we may gather from an expression of Livy,[5] that each of the confederate cities had a distinct vote. We hear nothing of any oppression on the part of Thebes,[6] nor very much of dissensions between the several cities. Not that Bœotia, any more than other Greek states, was free from party disputes, but they seem to have arisen almost wholly from questions of foreign policy. There was, in the war of Philip and Flamininus, a Roman and a Macedonian party, and Thebes was the stronghold of the Macedonian interest.[7] A stratagem of Flamininus[8] compelled the Bœotian League to embrace the Roman side. The factions and crimes by which this change of policy was followed are hardly worth recording. But at least the dissolution of the League was not the work of internal dissensions, but wholly of the insidious policy of Rome. To break up Federations and alliances among Grecian cities was always one of the main objects of any power, native or foreign, which aspired to supremacy or illegitimate influence in Greece. Thebes indeed for a moment, while Epameinôndas directed her counsels, pursued a nobler policy in Arkadia, but the isolation of the separate cities was an end usually aimed at by all who sought to bring Greece under the yoke. We have seen how successfully this policy was carried on by Sparta; it was continued by

Constitution of the League.

B.C. 198–7.

[1] Liv. xxxiii. 1.

[2] Pol. xx. 6. *ἔνιοι τῶν στρατηγῶν.* xxiii. 2. *στρατηγοῦντος Ἱππίου.* So Livy xlii. 43 talks of the Bœotian "Prætor," his regular translation of *στρατηγός.*

[3] Pol. xviii. 26. Liv. xxxiii. 27. Plut. Arat. 16.

[4] Pol. xx. 5.

[5] Liv. xxxiii. 2. Omnium Bœotiæ civitatum suffragiis accipitur.

[6] The only expression which looks like it (Pol. xxvii. 5) *Θηβαίους βαρεῖς ὄντας ἐπικεῖσθαι,* refers to the dissensions between the Roman and Macedonian parties just before the dissolution of the League.

[7] See Pol. xx. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 335 et seqq.

[8] Liv. xxxiii. 1. Thirlwall, viii. 336.

Dissolution of the League by Quintus Marcius, B.C. 171.

the Macedonian Kings; it was finally carried out in its fullest extent by the subtle machinations of Roman diplomacy. The course of the war with Perseus gave the Roman Ambassador Quintus Marcius an opportunity of bringing about the dissolution of the League of Bœotia, which I shall describe more at large in a future chapter. His combined intrigues and violence gradually induced the several cities to desert their Federal Union, and to place themselves, one by one, under Roman protection.[1] Thus did the Bœotian League fall asunder,[2] and I see no reason to infer from a casual expression of a single writer, that the political union between the Bœotian towns was restored at any later time.[3]

[1] Pol. xxvii. 1. 2. Liv. xlii. 43. 44. Thirlwall, viii. 437.

[2] Pol. xxvii. 2. Τὸ δὲ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἔθνος ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον συντετηρηκὸς τὴν κοινὴν συμπολιτείαν, καὶ πολλοὺς καὶ ποικίλους καιροὺς διαπεφευγὸς παραδόξως, τότε προπετῶς καὶ ἀλογίστως ἐλόμενον τὰ παρὰ Περσέως, εἰκῇ καὶ παιδαριωδῶς πτοηθὲν κατελύθη καὶ διεσκορπίσθη κατὰ πόλεις. The difference between ἔθνος and πόλις, in the political language of Polybios, is that between a Federal State and a single city. See xx. 3, and many other passages. Livy habitually represents the words by "gens" and "civitas." He also often uses "populus" in the sense of *State* or *Canton* as a member of a League.

Mommsen (i. 582) holds that the formal dissolution of the League did not take place till B.C. 146. I do not see how this can be reconciled with the words of Polybios and Livy. A Bœotarch is spoken of in the interval, but he is apparently a purely Theban magistrate — βοιωταρχῶν τηνικαῦτα ἐν Θήβαις. Paus. vii. 14. 6.

[3] Pausanias (vii. 16. 9—10), describing the results of the victory of Mummius (B.C. 146) adds, συνέδριά τε κατὰ ἔθνος τὰ ἑκάστων, Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὸ ἐν Φωκεῦσιν ἢ Βοιωτοῖς ἢ ἑτέρωθί που τῆς Ἑλλάδος, κατελέλυτο ὁμοίως πάντα. ἔτεσι δὲ οὐ πολλοῖς ὕστερον ἐτράποντο ἐς ἔλεον Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ συνέδριά τε κατὰ ἔθνος ἀποδιδόασιν ἑκάστοις τὰ ἀρχαῖα, κ.τ.λ.

From the former part of this passage Mr. Whiston (Dict. of Ant. art. Bœotarches), following Boeckh (i. 727), infers that Mummius found a Bœotian League to dissolve in B.C. 146, and therefore that the League must have been "partially revived" after its dissolution by Marcius in B.C. 171. But surely Pausanias, especially when using the pluperfect tense, may just as well refer to the dissolution under Marcius, or, as the pious antiquary is not the most infallible authority in strictly historical matters, Pausanias may even have forgotten that the dissolution of the Bœotian League was the work of Marcius and not of Mummius. It seems hardly worth while to extemporize a revival and a second dissolution without better authority. The latter portion of the passage, as referring to a nominal restoration later than B.C. 146, does not bear on the point. On the restoration there spoken of, see Thirlwall, viii. 502; Finlay, Greece under the Romans, 25. All these imaginary Confederations continued to exist, with their whole staff of Generals, Archons, Bœotarchs, Senates, etc. down to a surprisingly late period of the Roman Empire. This is abundantly shown by the inscriptions in Boeckh. But it is hardly worth enlarging on such mock constitutions in a History of Federalism, except when they either illustrate the institutions of earlier times, or when one gets such curious details as Pausanias gives (see above, p. 105) of the Amphiktyonic Council after the Augustan Reform Bill.

## § 3. *Of various attempts at Federal Systems—Ionia, Olynthos, Arkadia, etc.*

Besides these Federations of Phôkis, Akarnania, Epeiros, and Bœotia, all of which actually existed and flourished, we must not pass by some less successful attempts at the establishment of Federal Governments in ancient Greece. Several such efforts were made at various times, which bore no permanent fruit. Still they are important facts in Grecian history, and, as they serve to illustrate the history and the growth of the Federal idea, they form a natural portion of our subject.

Unsuccessful attempts at Federal Governments.

It may be doubtful how far we are entitled to reckon among such attempts the advice which, according to Herodotos,[1] was given to the Ionian Greeks by the philosopher Thalês when they were first threatened with Persian invasion. Some degree of union had always existed among the Ionian colonies in Asia, but there is no ground for believing that their union was of a kind which at all amounted to a real Federal Government.[2] They had indeed general meetings at the Panionion,[3] but those meetings were primarily of a religious kind, though undoubtedly they were often taken advantage of for political deliberations among the several cities. Their connexion in short seems to have been rather closer than that of a mere Amphiktyony, but it is clear that it came nearer to an Amphiktyony than to a true Federal union. It is a relation of a peculiar kind, a sort of developement of the old Amphiktyonic relation, of which we find some other instances, especially among the Greeks of the Asiatic colonies. It is a species of union which might naturally arise among settlers in a foreign land, mindful of their old home and of their common origin, but still in no way disposed to sacrifice any portion of their separate political being. Unions like those of the Asiatic Ionians and Æolians[4] were in fact Amphiktyonies instituted for

Advice of Thalês to the Ionians. B.C. 545.

Former Connection between the Ionian Cities.

Their relation essentiall Amphiktyonic.

[1] Herod. i. 170. Ἐκέλευε ἓν βουλευτήριον Ἴωνας ἐκτῆσθαι, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ἐν Τέῳ· Τέων γὰρ μέσον εἶναι Ἰωνίης· τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλιας οἰκεομένας μηδὲν ἧσσον νομίζεσθαι, κατάπερ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν.

[2] Mr. Blakesley, in his edition of Herodotos (vi. 7 et al.), seems to me greatly to exaggerate the amount of true Federal ideas in Ionia. A much truer picture is given by Bishop Thirlwall (ii. 115. 191), and still more clearly by Mr. Grote (iii. 345).

[3] See Herod. i. 142. 148.

[4] The Bœotian Amphiktyony of Korôneia would be a union of very much the same kind as these unions among the Asiatic Greeks, if we could conceive it existing independently of the political Bœotian union which had its centre at Thebes.

a special, and that partly a political, end. They differed from the Amphiktyonies of Old Greece in this. In an Amphiktyony of the elder kind, the union between the members simply exists for the sake of the temple. The common temple gives its name to a body which, except in reference to that temple, has no common being at all. In these unions among the Asiatic Greeks, this relation is reversed. The union is much more religious than political, still it is something more than the mere spiritual brotherhood of fellow-worshippers in a common temple. The union does not exist merely to protect the temple, but the temple, the Panionion, or the like, is itself built as the binding and consecrating symbol of an union already recognized as existing. Greeks of the same tribe, settled among barbarian neighbours or subjects, wished to recognize one another as kinsmen, and often stood in need of one another's help as allies. They founded a religious union as the badge of their mutual recognition, and as a means of promoting general harmony and good feeling among them. But they had no idea of carrying either national or religious brotherhood so far as to infringe on the inherent separate sovereignty of every Hellenic city. Indeed, the very isolation of the Ionian cities, and the greatness to which they speedily rose, would tend to make the feeling of town-autonomy, if possible, stronger than it was among the cities of Old Greece. Certain it is, if only from this very advice of Thalês, that the Ionian Greeks had no permanent union, cemented, as in the real Leagues, by a common Senate and Assembly. Thalês proposed to establish a closer union than already existed, but it may be doubted exactly how close he meant that union to be. The words of Herodotos may be construed in two ways,[1] and in any case his political language is not to be so strictly pressed as the political language of Thucydidês or Polybios. And indeed one can hardly suppose that Thalês himself, notwithstanding the evident wisdom of his advice, had attained to the clearness of political vision which distinguishes the two great political historians of Greece. The language of Herodotos, taken strictly, might imply that Thalês meant to recommend such an

Its difference from the elder Amphiktyonies.

No true Federal Union.

Advice of Thalês; its meaning.

[1] See Blakesley, Herod. i. 170. Professor Rawlinson, in his notes, passes by this most important passage without notice. In his translation he makes Thalês say: "Their other cities might still *continue to enjoy their own laws*, just as if they were *independent states* (καταπερ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν)." This is probably historically true, but it is hard to see what process of construing can get it out of the words of Herodotos.

union as that which had fused all the Attic towns into the one commonwealth of Athens.[1] Yet when we think of the greatness of some of the Ionian cities, and their distance from one another, it is hardly possible to believe that Thalês wished to merge them so completely into one commonwealth as had been done with the old Attic cities. No one could think of reducing Ephesos, Milêtos, and Kolophôn to the level of Marathôn and Eleusis. No one could think of asking Ephesians, Milêsians, and Kolophônians to cease to be Ephesians, Milêsians, and Kolophônians, and to become Teians instead. It is far more probable that Thalês designed each city to retain its separate being as an independent city, and only wished to form a Federal Council for common consultation and defence against the barbarians. If so, this advice of Thalês would be the earliest instance of a Federal Union being deliberately recommended to a group of separate states by a single political thinker. But it does not appear that the advice of Thalês produced the least practical effect. The Ionian Federation remained the mere vision of one philosophical Milêsian; in the mind of every other Ionian the Greek instinct of autonomous city-government was too strong for any such scheme even to obtain a hearing. We have here in short a striking comment on what has been already said as to the important bearing on our subject of the history of the Delphic Amphiktyony. The Delphic Amphiktyony is important in a history of Federal Government, just because it was not a Federal Government. So the advice of Thalês is important in the same history, just because it remained advice and was never carried out into action. The Delphic Amphiktyony came near enough to a Federal Union of all Greece to have suggested such a Federal Union, had the Greek mind in general felt any need of any union of the kind. That no such Union ever arose out of it is the surest proof how little such an Union was in harmony with Greek political feeling. Still more easily might the Ionic Amphiktyony have grown into an Ionic League, had the Ionians in general felt any need of an Ionic League. That they rejected the scheme when it was proposed to them shows more clearly than anything else how little progress true Federal ideas had made among them. To the philosophic mind of Thalês the

He probably intended a true Federal Union.

His advice not taken; its rejection a striking illustration of Greek political ideas.

[1] But for the marvellous translation of Professor Rawlinson, one would hardly have stopped to notice anything so obvious as that the word used by Herodotos is δῆμοι, or that δῆμοι here means (not "independent states," but) the local divisions of Attica. Even the antiquated translation of Beloe shows that its author understood at least thus much.

transition from an Ionic Amphiktyony to an Ionic League doubtless seemed easy enough. His countrymen from the various cities were in the habit of assembling for periodical religious meetings, and even of using these religious meetings, when occasion served, for real political conferences.[1] To improve these irregular conferences into a permanent Congress, with authority in all foreign affairs, would seem to him to be only a natural developement of a state of things to which every Ionian was already fully accustomed. But Thalês seems to have been the only Ionian to whom any such idea occurred. When he proposed to fix the seat of his Central Government at Teôs, he doubtless thought that he was providing for the liberties of his proposed League, that he was guarding against the very evils which had doubtless already begun to show themselves in Bœotia.[2] But Milêsian and Ephesian pride would not consent to surrender an atom of Milêsian or Ephesian Sovereignty to a Federal Council sitting at Teôs. This advice of Thalês, and its fate, also illustrates another remark which I have already made. It was precisely the greatest and most illustrious cities of Greece which clung the most pertinaciously to their separate town-autonomy. Sparta, Athens, and we may fairly add Thebes, were willing enough to bear rule over other cities; they were willing enough to be the chiefs of a body of allies more or less dependent upon them; Athens at least was once willing to incorporate other cities as it were into her own person; but neither Sparta, Athens, nor Thebes ever consented to unite with other cities in a free and equal Federal bond. It was only among the ruder and less advanced tribes of Greece that the true Federal principle had, in the days of Thalês, made any visible progress. We cannot doubt that necessity had already drawn the towns of Phôkis and Akarnania into those Federal unions which we find existing among them throughout the whole duration of Grecian history. But the Ionic cities were, in the days of Thalês, among the foremost cities of the Hellenic name. They were as little likely

[1] As, for instance, when the common revolt against Persia obliged an unusual amount of common action. Then we find (Herod. vi. 7) *πρόβουλοι* from the different cities meeting at Teôs, and we even find the words (ib. v. 109) *τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἰώνων*. We may well doubt whether such a formula was commonly used.

[2] Blakesley on Herod. vi. 7. "He would have selected Teôs somewhat on the principle on which the site of Washington was selected for the capital of the United States of America. Teôs could never become formidable to the independence of the members of the Confederation."

as Sparta or Athens to follow Phôkian or Akarnanian precedents of union; they were rather as fully disposed as Sparta or Athens could be to cleave to the full possession of all those sovereign rights which the Hellenic mind held to be inherent in every sovereign Hellenic commonwealth.

Projected league of OLYNTHOS [B.C. 382].

Far more important in Grecian history is the attempt made by Olynthos, shortly after the Peace of Antalkidas, to organize a general confederacy of the Greek and Macedonian cities in her own neighbourhood. Sparta, as the interpreter and executor of the Peace, made it her business to hinder any union, whether it took the form of Federation or of subjection, no less among the Chalkidic, than among the Bœotian, towns. A Spartan army was sent to Chalkidikê; Olynthos was besieged and compelled to surrender, and the Olynthian union was dissolved. The last great English historian of Greece has given to this Olynthian confederacy an interest which it certainly never possessed before.[1] There can be no doubt that, seen from a general Hellenic point of view, the dissolution of the Olynthian confederacy was one of the most calamitous events in Grecian history. An Olynthian League, or even an Olynthian Empire, would have given Greece a strong bulwark at the very point where a bulwark was most needed. An Olynthian League, or even a liberally administered Olynthian Empire, would have united all the purely Greek cities of the Macedonian border, together with the most civilized and most Hellenized portions of Macedonia itself. Such an united body might well have formed an effectual barrier against the advance even of Philip and Alexander. Sparta in truth, by her conquest of Olynthos, betrayed the Greeks of Thrace to the Macedonian King,[2] just as she had already, by the Peace of Antalkidas, betrayed the Greeks of Asia to the Persian King. It may indeed well be doubted whether, in a general view of the world's history, it would have been a gain to mankind to have cut off the energies of Alexander from any wider field than that of Illyrian and Scythian warfare. But, from a purely Greek point of view, there can be no doubt that the overthrow of the Olynthian power was a most unfortunate event for the whole of Greece. And there can be no more doubt as to the character of the Spartan intervention in Chalkidikê than as to the character of the

dissolved by Sparta, B.C. 379.

Fatal results to Greece of its Dissolution.

[1] Grote, x. 67 seqq.

[2] Ib. x. 94.

Spartan intervention in Bœotia. All our sympathies lie with Olynthos as against Sparta and as against Macedonia, just as all our sympathies lie with the Sacred Band of Thebes alike when it marched forth to victory at Leuktra and when it marched forth to defeat at Chairôneia. But it is another question whether we may not at the same time be called upon to sympathize with Akanthos and Apollônia against Olynthos, just as we sympathize with Plataia and Orchomenos even against the Thebes of Pelopidas and Epameinôndas.

Views of Mr. Grote, too favourable to the designs of Olynthos.

It certainly strikes me that Mr. Grote has drawn far too favourable a picture of the terms on which the Olynthian League, if League we are to call it, was designed to be formed. I cannot help suspecting that the great historian of Athenian Democracy has been a little carried away by admiration for a city which was at once a bulwark against Macedonia and a victim of Sparta. The facts of the case, the nature of the union which Olynthos sought to form, are known only from the speech made by the Akanthian envoy Kleigenês, when asking for

B.C. 382. Lacedæmonian help against Olynthos.[1] The whole circumstances of the story cannot fail to remind us of the later story of Poly-

B.C. 374. damas of Pharsalos coming to ask—this time to ask in vain—for Lacedæmonian help against Jasôn of Pherai.[2] In the one case indeed it is a threatening City and in the other it is a threatening Prince; but Akanthian patriotism seems at least as much

Proceedings of Olynthos as described by Kleigenês.

alarmed by the claims of Olynthos as Pharsalian patriotism was alarmed by the claims of Jasôn. Kleigenês, in the speech which Xenophôn puts into his mouth, describes the advances which Olynthos was making among all the cities in her own neighbourhood, both Greek and Macedonian.[3] She was drawing them

[1] Xen. Hell. v. 2. 11—19.

[2] Ib. vi. 1. 2. See above, p. 119.

[3] The extension of the Olynthian Union to Macedonian cities, and even to Pella, the greatest of Macedonian cities (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 13) must show either, 1st, That there was, as Mr. Grote (x. 70) suggests, a Greek population in these cities; or 2nd, That the Macedonian population of these cities, even of the inland Pella, must already have been largely Hellenized; or 3rd, That the Macedonians in general must have been by no means so far removed from Hellenic nationality as some writers think. The relation between Olynthos and her Macedonian neighbours is expressed in quite different language from her relations towards her Thracian neighbours. The Macedonian cities were to be set free from the Macedonian King (ἐπεχείρησαν καὶ τὰς τῆς Μακεδονίας πόλεις ἐλευθεροῦν ἀπὸ Ἀμύντου τοῦ Μακεδόνων βασιλέως. Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12), but the Thracians are spoken of as the merest subjects or tools (ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ γείτονές εἰσιν αὐτοῖς Θρᾷκες οἱ ἀβασίλευτοι, οἱ θεραπεύουσι μὲν καὶ νῦν ἤδη τοὺς Ὀλυνθίους· εἰ δὲ ὑπ'

all into close connexion with herself, some, it would seem, with their own consent, but others without it.[1] The nature of this connexion is described by the Akanthian orator in terms nearly the same as those in which the Plataian orator describes the connexion which Thebes attempted to force upon his own city.[2] The inhabitants of the allied towns were to be admitted to some kind of citizenship at Olynthos, they were to live according to the Olynthian laws,[3] and they were to possess common rights of intermarriage and of holding landed property in each other's territories.[4] Under many circumstances such terms as these would have been, as Mr. Grote calls them, highly liberal and generous. If they had been offered to conquered enemies, they would have been a wonderful improvement upon the Spartan, the Athenian, or the Theban way of dealing with conquered enemies. To Greek subjects of the Macedonian King, or to Macedonians striving after Hellenic civilization, it was clear political promotion to obtain the franchise of any Greek city on any terms. We are therefore in no way surprised to learn that the Macedonian towns thankfully accepted the offers of Olynthos. We are just as little surprised to learn that Akanthos and Apollônia, and seemingly the Chalkidian cities generally, altogether rejected them. Nor is it necessary to suppose, with Mr. Grote, that their refusal arose from a mere blind attachment to town-autonomy. It would be at worst a pardonable blindness to cleave to that innate political instinct of the Greek mind to which Greece in truth owed her whole greatness and glory. To expect a Greek city willingly to exchange its town-autonomy even for a free and equal Federal relation with other cities, would have been to expect all its citizens to be, like Thalês, wise beyond their age and country. But it does not appear that any really free and equal Federal relation with Olynthos was offered to Akanthos and Apollônia. Undoubtedly we have before us only one side of the case, and

Terms of union offered by Olynthos.

Acceptable to the Macedonian towns,

but rejected by the Greeks of Chalkidikê.

ἐκείνους ἔσονται, κ.τ.λ. Ib. 17). That is to say, the Macedonian allies were worthy of whatever measure of freedom Olynthos thought good to leave to her Greek allies; but Thracians, even though advanced enough to do without a King, were fit only for that subjection which was the natural lot of the barbarian.

[1] Xen. Hell. v. 2. 18. Αἱ γὰρ ἄκουσαι τῶν πόλεων τῆς πολιτείας κοινωνοῦσαι, κ.τ.λ.

[2] See the Plataian Oration of Isokratês (8—11) quoted above, p. 136.

[3] Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12. Ἐφ' ᾧτε χρῆσθαι νόμοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ συμπολιτεύειν.

[4] Ib. v. 2. 19. Εἰ μέντοι συγκλεισθήσονται ταῖς τε ἐπιγαμίαις καὶ ἐγκτήσεσι παρ' ἀλλήλοις, ἃς ἐψηφισμένοι εἰσί.

it would be well if we could compare the statements of the Akanthian Kleigenês with those of an Olynthian orator in reply. But one thing is plain; Olynthos offered her terms, liberal or illiberal, at the point of the sword.[1] If Akanthos willingly consented, well; if not, Olynthos would make war upon her. And what, after all, did Olynthos offer? Unless the misrepresentations of the Akanthian orator are most impudently flagrant, she offered, not equal union in a common Chalkidian League, but mere absorption into the particular commonwealth of Olynthos. What form this absorption would have taken may be doubted. A single expression of Dêmosthenês looks, so far as it is worth anything at all, as if Olynthos was intended to be the only City strictly speaking. The word which he employs[2] is that which denotes, not a League like Phôkis or even like Bœotia, but the union of the Attic cities with Athens. But even if, as in the case of Attica, the full Olynthian franchise was to be communicated to all the allied cities, still such a franchise must have proved a mere delusion. Mere distance, and the greatness of some of the cities concerned, would have effectually hindered an union after the Attic pattern. A Federal union was doubtless just what was wanted; such an union would have provided the needful bulwark against Macedonia without violating the independence of any Grecian city. But there is nothing that shows that any real Federal Council or Assembly was proposed. Akanthos is required to accept the laws and citizenship of Olynthos. The Akanthians naturally answer that they wish to retain their own laws and

Real nature of the terms offered, not Federal Union, but absorption into Olynthos.

[1] Xen. Hell. v. 2. 13. Πέμψαντες δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ πρὸς Ἀπολλωνιάτας οἱ Ὀλύνθιοι προεῖπον ἡμῖν ὅτι, εἰ μὴ παρεσόμεθα συστρατευσόμενοι, ἐκεῖνοι ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἴοιεν.

[2] Dem. Fals. Leg. 298. Οὕπω Χαλκιδέων πάντων εἰς ἓν συνῳκισμένων. Pausanias indeed (viii. 27. 2) uses the same word, and its cognate συνοικισμός of the foundation of Megalopolis, which was designed to be the capital of a real Federal State, and Polybios (iv. 33) uses it of the foundation alike of Megalopolis and of Messênê. But, both at Megalopolis and at Messênê, there was a literal and physical συνοικισμός. The inhabitants of several Arkadian towns migrated to the newly-founded Great City; and the scattered remnants of the Messênian people were gathered together from various quarters to fill the new Messênê. So Olynthos itself owed its first origin to another literal συνοικισμός (see Thuc. i. 58); but it is hardly possible that anything of the sort could now be contemplated; Akanthos and Pella were not to be destroyed, and their inhabitants transported to Olynthos. But, if the literal sense is excluded, the συνοικισμός can hardly mean anything except the merging of the political existence of all the other cities in the one commonwealth of Olynthos.

their own citizenship.[1] A Federal union would in no way have implied the surrender of either. In truth, the aspect of the whole case looks very much as if what Olynthos really wished was to reduce the Chalkidian towns to the condition familiar in Roman political language as the *Civitas sine Suffragio.*[2] They were to cease to be independent commonwealths, which, in a true Federal union, they would not cease to be; they were to accept the laws of Olynthos, and to receive the private rights of Olynthian citizens; but they were to have no political franchise, or at most one which was sure to prove quite illusory.[3] It is hard to see anything in the whole scheme but a design to promote Olynthian aggrandizement, by means, if need were, of Olynthian conquest. The Olynthian mode of conquest was certainly, as a mode of conquest, singularly mild and liberal; and all Greece, could it have seen the future, might well have rejoiced to see a powerful Greek state, whether an Olynthian Empire or a Chalkidian League, fixed as a boundary against

[1] Xen. Hell. v. 2. 12—14. Ἐφ' ᾧτε χρῆσθαι νόμοις τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ συμπολιτεύειν . . . . . ἡμεῖς δὲ . . . βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοπολῖται εἶναι.

[2] Thirlwall, v. 12. "They were admitted to that kind of political connection which the Greeks described by the word *sympolity*. Their citizens enjoyed all the civil rights of citizens of the sovereign city. They were capable of acquiring property in land in the Olynthian territory, and of allying themselves with Olynthian families; *but they were excluded from all the privileges which were exercised in the Olynthian assembly*, and were compelled to submit to the laws, and, it seems also, to adopt the constitution of the ruling state."

Without quite pledging myself to the words in Italics (for some illusory sort of Olynthian franchise seems quite conceivable), I certainly think that Bishop Thirlwall's picture of the Olynthian design is, as a whole, far truer than Mr. Grote's. So Drumann, though his exact view is somewhat different; "Wie die Thebaner in Böotien, so suchten die Olynthier in Chalcidice gewaltsam einen Städteverein zu gründen . . . ganz Chalcidice zu einem Städtevereine zu verbinden, dessen Haupt es wurde."—Verfall, 440. 1.

[3] Mr. Grote relies much on the saying of Kleigenês that the cities were then indeed unwilling to be incorporated with Olynthos, but that it would be difficult to separate them from the Olynthian connexion when they had once tasted its advantages. Very true, but what were the main advantages spoken of? Not the private or public rights of Olynthian citizens, but unlimited plunder under Olynthian banners. After mentioning the expected influence of the ἐπιγαμίαι and ἐγκτήσεις, he continues (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 19), εἰ . . . γνώσονται ὅτι μετὰ τῶν κρατούντων ἕπεσθαι κερδαλέον ἐστὶν, ὥσπερ Ἀρκάδες, ὅταν μεθ' ὑμῶν ἴωσι, τά τε αὑτῶν σώζουσι καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια ἁρπάζουσιν, ἴσως οὐκέθ' ὁμοίως εὔλυτα ἔσται. Of course the ἐπιγαμίαι and ἐγκτήσεις, even without any political franchise, would do something, but the main attraction is the prospect of gain through the contemplated conquests of Olynthos, just as the Arkadian allies of Sparta gained by service in the Spartan armies. This is hardly the notion of Federal union entertained either by Aratos or by Washington.

Macedonian aggression. But certainly the Olynthian scheme, as described in the only extant contemporary account of it,[1] does not seem to answer the description of a true Federal connexion nearly so closely as some much more obscure unions of Grecian cities which already existed.

Federal Union of ARKADIA, B.C. 370.

Little previous importance of Arkadia.

Shortly after this attempt at Federal union—if Federal union we are to consider it—in Northern Greece—a far more promising attempt was made to establish a Federal state in Arkadia. The decline of the Lacedæmonian power after the battle of Leuktra opened the way for political changes and new combinations in all parts of Greece. The Arkadian race, though one of the most ancient and most numerous divisions of the Grecian name, had hitherto been little heard of in Grecian history. Since the predominance of Sparta in Peloponnêsos had been firmly established, the Arkadians had chiefly appeared in the character in which they are described in the speech of Kleigenês of Akanthos, that namely of submissive allies of Sparta, following her banners for the sake of the plunder to be derived from Spartan conquests.

History of Mantineia; B.C. 420.

The city of Mantineia alone had, on several occasions, taken a more prominent and independent part in Grecian affairs. In the interval between the Peace of Nikias and the Sicilian Expedition, Mantineia appears, together with Argos and Elis, as a leader of anti-Spartan movements within Peloponnêsos.[2] In the second period of Spartan supremacy, after the Peace of Antalkidas, Mantineia incurred the wrath of Sparta to that degree that she, a Hellenic city, enrolled in the Homeric catalogue,[3] was degraded from the rank of a city, and her inhabitants were distributed among the four villages whose union, at some ante-historic and even ante-mythic period, was said to have been the first origin of the Mantinean state.[4] It may be that, as the Lace-

her destruction by Sparta, B.C. 386.

[1] We can hardly set against the contemporary description of Kleigenês such vague expressions as we find in the speech of Chlaineas in Polybios (ix. 28), ἦν τι σύστημα τῶν ἐπὶ Θρᾴκης Ἑλλήνων, οὓς ἀπῴκισαν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Χαλκιδεῖς, ὧν μέγιστον εἶχε πρόσχημα καὶ δύναμιν ἡ τῶν Ὀλυνθίων πόλις. Here, though the pre-eminent position of Olynthos is clearly set forth, we do find the word σύστημα, the technical name for true Federations like those of Achaia and Lykia, used to denote the relation between the Chalkidian cities and Olynthos. But a casual expression used so long after does not prove much, and moreover Chlaineas seems to be speaking of the times immediately before Philip, to which his language would be still less appropriate.

[2] See Thuc. v. 45 et seqq.

[3] Il. B. 607. Καὶ Τεγέην εἶχον καὶ Μαντινέην ἐρατεινήν.

[4] Xen. Hell. v. 2. 1—7. Καθῃρέθη μὲν τὸ τεῖχος, διῳκίσθη δ' ἡ Μαντίνεια τετραχῇ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ᾤκουν. Cf. Pol. iv. 27.

dæmonian partisan Xenophôn tells us, there were Mantineian oligarchs base enough to find a selfish satisfaction in this degradation of their native city.[1] It is more certain that, as soon as the Spartan power was broken at Leuktra, the members thus violently separated were again united. Mantineia appeared once more as a city, and again began to take an important part in the affairs of Arkadia and of Hellas.[2] Mantineian patriotism now took a bolder flight than it had ever taken before. The reunion of Mantineia was only to be the precursor of the union of all Arkadia. Up to this time there had been no real political connexion between the different branches of the Arkadian name. The different cities and districts had retained some vague notions of national kindred, and some degree of unity, as in Ionia and elsewhere, had been kept up by common religious rites.[3] Arkadia, in short, formed an Amphiktyony of its own, an institution perhaps the more needful for a people who had no share in the general Delphic Amphiktyony. But hitherto the connexion had been purely Amphiktyonic; we find no trace of any real political union between the several Arkadian towns. Mantineia and Tegea, the two chief among them, were frequently hostile to one another. At this very time we find them in marked opposition; Tegea adhered to the interest of Sparta, while Mantineia naturally attached herself to the rising power of Thebes. Under such circumstances, the formation of a general Arkadian Federation was at once a noble conception and a most difficult undertaking. Its author appears to have been Lykomêdês of Mantineia,[4] who certainly merits thereby a high place among the statesmen of Greece. His design for an Arkadian union embraced a plan for a real Federal Government, and it gave the Federal principle a much wider scope than had ever before been opened to it in Grecian affairs. The scheme of Lykomêdês was a noble and generous one, and, though it bore but little imme-

Its restoration, B.C. 370.

Plan of an Arkadian Federation.

Arkadian union hitherto merely Amphiktyonic.

Plans of Lykomêdês.

[1] Xen. Hell. v. 2. 7.

[2] Ib. vi. 5. 3. Ἐξ ὧν δὴ καὶ οἱ Μαντινεῖς, ὡς ἤδη αὐτόνομοι παντάπασιν ὄντες, συνῆλθόν τε πάντες καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο μίαν πόλιν τὴν Μαντίνειαν ποιεῖν, καὶ τειχίζειν τὴν πόλιν. This shows that Mantineian satisfaction at the διοικισμός must have been confined to a few oligarchs.

[3] See Grote, x. 284.

[4] Diodôros (xv. 59) attributes the first idea of the Arkadian union to a Lykomêdês of Tegea. This is probably merely one of his characteristic blunders, though it is curious that a misconstruction of a passage of Pausanias (viii. 27. 2) has led some scholars to a belief in a Lykomêdês of Tegea on quite independent grounds. See Thirlwall, v. 110.

diate fruit, yet its memory, no doubt, contributed hints to the great Federal statesmen of later Greece. It also served the cause of Federalism in another way; its one great result, the foundation of Megalopolis, gave Federal Greece some of the noblest of her leaders. Lykomêdês designed a Federal Government in the strictest sense; he did not, like the politicians of Thebes and Olynthos, seek for any invidious supremacy for his own city; his plans contemplated a free and equal union of the whole Arkadian name. The union was to be strictly Federal; the several cities were not to lose their existence as free Hellenic commonwealths, but Arkadia, as towards all other states, was to be one;[1] the united Arkadian body was to have a Federal Assembly, Federal magistrates, and a Federal army. To avoid all jealousies between existing cities, to cut off all rivalry between Tegea and Mantineia, all fear of the new constitution proving a mere cloak for a supremacy on the part of either, a new Federal Capital was to be founded as the seat of the Central Government of the Arkadian people. And all this was no mere vision; the success of the scheme was indeed but temporary, but it did succeed for a while, and it was no fault of Lykomêdês if more selfish politicians undid his noble work. For a few brilliant years Arkadia was really one; Mantineia did not envy Tegea, and Tegea did not vex Mantineia. Megalopolis, the Great City, arose as the Washington of the new Federation, and there the general Arkadian Assembly met to transact the general Federal affairs of the Arkadian nation. And if this great and wholesome change was not brought about absolutely without violence, it certainly was brought about with much less violence than any other change of equal moment in recorded Grecian history. A local revolution at the right moment[2] took away all danger from the Lacedæmonian tendencies of Tegea. Tegea joined the

Arkadian union to be strictly Federal.

Temporary success of the Federal scheme.

Foundation of Megalopolis, B.C. 370.

[1] Xen. Hell. vi. 5. 6. Ἐνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι τε πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικὸν, καὶ ὅ τι νικῴη ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων. The Lacedæmonian partisan is of course disposed to exaggerate the degree in which the Federal power trenched on the independence of the several cities. But in every Federal Government worthy of the name the central power is κύριος καὶ τῶν πόλεων in all matters coming within its own competence, and it is clear that the Arkadian κοινόν did not destroy the separate existence of the Arkadian cities as States or Cantons. It would have been well if Xenophôn had told us how the process of νικᾷν ἐν τῷ κοινῷ was effected, whether the majority of the Ten Thousand was ascertained by counting heads, or whether each city had a distinct vote. The latter is more consonant with Greek Federal practice.

[2] See the account of the Tegean revolution in Xen. Hell. vi. 5. 7 et seqq. Cf. Grote, x. 285.

League; nearly all Arkadia, and a few towns whose Arkadian character was doubtful,[1] entered into it with delight. Orchomenos indeed, and a few other towns,[2] still clave to their complete separate autonomy. That they were compelled by force[3] to share the common destinies of the nation was doubtless not abstractedly justifiable, but we could hardly expect it to be otherwise. There are no signs of general compulsion on one side and general unwillingness on the other, such as we have seen in the cases of Thebes and Olynthos. With what zeal the scheme was adopted in most parts of Arkadia, we learn from an incidental notice in the hostile Xenophôn.[4] Agêsilaos reached the Arkadian town of Eutaia, and found in it only old men, women, and children. Every male of the military age had gone to attend the Arkadian Constituent Assembly, and to take his share in the formation of the Arkadian Federal Constitution.[5]

General adhesion of Arkadia to the League.

For the details of the Arkadian constitution we are, as usual, left to incidental notices. Here we have again to deplore the loss of the great political work of Aristotle. All that is preserved of his account of Arkadian matters amounts to the fact that he mentioned the Assembly of the Ten Thousand; not a detail survives.[6] Xenophôn, the bitter Lacedæmonian partisan, could have told us everything if he had chosen, but he does not even record the foundation of Megalopolis. The existence of the Great City, like that of its sister Messênê, was so glorious for Epameinôndas, so disgraceful and calamitous for Sparta, that the renegade Athenian had not the heart to insert their names in his history. Yet it is from Xenophôn's occasional notices that we have to glean most of the little which we do know of the details of the Arkadian Federal system. The League had a Federal Assembly which met at Megalopolis, and was known as

Constitution of the League.

[1] Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 26. So vii. 4. 12 (B.C. 365). *Καταλαμβάνουσιν οἱ Ἠλεῖοι Λασίωνα, τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἑαυτῶν ὄντα, ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι συντελοῦντα εἰς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν.*

[2] Xen. Hell. vi. 5. 10, 11. [3] Ib. 13. 22. [4] Ib. 12.

[5] Ib. *Τοὺς ἐν τῇ στρατευσίμῳ ἡλικίᾳ οἰχομένους εἰς τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν.* See Grote, x. 287. Bishop Thirlwall (v. 117, note) seems to take another view, but is not this Assembly at Asea the same as the meeting which he himself describes in p. 110? If we suppose this Assembly to have been armed like some instances in Achaia and elsewhere (see p. 215), the Assembly and the army would in fact be the same thing, and there would be hardly any perceptible difference between the views of Bishop Thirlwall and Mr. Grote. It is not however likely (see p. 158, note 2) that this military character of the Assembly would be retained as a permanent institution. The instances in Achaia are rare, and are accounted for by special circumstances. [6] See Arist. Pol. (ed. Oxon. 1837), p. 300.

The Assembly of Ten Thousand; its Constitution.

the Ten Thousand.[1] As to the constitution of this Assembly there has been some doubt, but the most probable opinion is that which represents it as being, like the Achaian Assembly of later times, open to every citizen of every Arkadian city who chose to attend.[2] That it was a representative Assembly, in the sense of being composed of chosen delegates, seems unlikely, both from the greatness of the number, and because there is no parallel for such an Assembly of Delegates in any known Grecian commonwealth. The Assembly, especially during the enthusiasm of the first days of the League, would doubtless be largely attended, and ten thousand is a large attendance, when we remember that five thousand citizens was above the average attendance in the Athenian Assembly.[3] There is no need to infer from the name Ten Thousand that there really was any fixed number. The name was undoubtedly in familiar use, but it need not have been a formal title;[4] it is most likely only a vague, and probably an exaggerated, way of expressing the vast numbers of the Arkadian Assembly.

Powers of the Ten Thousand.

The functions of the Ten Thousand were those which were commonly vested in the sovereign Assembly of a Grecian commonwealth. The Ten Thousand made war and peace in the name of all Arkadia,[5] they received and listened to the ambassadors of other Greek states;[6] they regulated and paid the standing army of the Federation;[7] they sat in judgement on political offenders against the collective majesty of the Arkadian League.[8]

Probable existence of a Senate.

That they were assisted in their deliberations by a smaller Senate is not distinctly asserted; but we might fairly infer it from the analogy of other Greek states, and the results of antiquarian research have made it almost certain that the Arkadian Assembly did

[1] Οἱ μύριοι. Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 38 et pass. Dem. F. L. 220, etc. The name constantly occurs.

[2] This is the view of Mr. Grote (x. 317), and it seems more in accordance with general Greek notions on such matters. Bishop Thirlwall (v. 117) discusses several other views. I can hardly persuade myself either that the Assembly was an army, or that it consisted wholly of Megalopolitans. This last notion seems opposed to the whole nature of the League.

[3] Thuc. viii. 72.

[4] The common formula for a Greek Confederation, τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀρκάδων, is used as equivalent to οἱ μύριοι. Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 35, 38.

[5] Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 2. Ἀνκομήδης . . . πείθει τοὺς μυρίους πράττειν περὶ συμμαχίας πρὸς αὐτούς. Cf. vii. 1. 38, and Diod. xv. 59.

[6] Dem. F. L. 220.

[7] The ἐπάριτοι or ἐπίλεκτοι. Diod. xv. 62. Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 22, 33.

[8] See the trial of the Mantineian προστάται (were these Magistrates, or merely popular leaders?) in the passage of Xenophôn last quoted.

not depart from the usual pattern.[1] There were Federal Magistrates, whose titles are not recorded;[2] and at the head of the whole League there seems to have been, as in so many other cases, a single Federal General.[3] These Federal officers, we cannot doubt, were elected by the Assembly of the Ten Thousand. Federal Magistrates.

The Federal capital of Megalopolis was formed by the union of several villages or small towns,[4] the inhabitants of which were gathered together as citizens of the Great City. In a few instances we regret to hear that compulsion was employed,[5] but in most cases the inhabitants of the small Arkadian townships gladly accepted their offered promotion to the rank of citizens of the national capital.[6] It may perhaps be doubted whether the choice of any city as the place of Federal meeting was perfectly wise; a better place might perhaps have been found, as in the case of the Phôkian League,[7] under the shadow of some great Foundation of Megalopolis, B.C. 370.

[1] Pausanias (viii. 32. 1) speaks of the Θερσίλιον at Megalopolis, which he defines as τὸ βουλευτήριον ὃ τοῖς μυρίοις ἐπεποίητο Ἀρκάδων. Colonel Leake finds its ruins in the position, near the Theatre, pointed out by Pausanias, and concludes that, "though it may have been subservient to the uses of the Council of Ten Thousand, it could hardly have been employed for its actual assembly, as such a multitude could only have been seated in a theatre-shaped edifice." (Morea, ii. 39.) Bishop Thirlwall (v. 116) infers from this, with great probability, that there was a Senate, and that this Θερσίλιον was its place of meeting. This view is also confirmed by the use of the word βουλευτήριον by Pausanias. The Ten Thousand were not a βουλή, nor would they meet in a βουλευτήριον. The Ten Thousand themselves doubtless met, as Colonel Leake suggests, in the Theatre; but hard by their own place of meeting was the smaller βουλευτήριον, for the use of the βουλή, the Committee chosen, by lot or otherwise, from among the Ten Thousand, to discharge the usual functions of a Greek Senate. The word βουλευτήριον (see p. 239, note 2) does seem to be occasionally used for the place of meeting of the Achaian Assembly, but we have seen (p. 240) that there is reason to believe that the Achaian Assemblies were often much more thinly attended than the Arkadian Ten Thousand. But the Achaian Assembly also sometimes met in a theatre.

[2] Ἄρχοντες are mentioned, Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 24; 4. 33. Their formal title may or may not have been Archon.

[3] This seems implied in such expressions as (Xen. Hell. vii. 3. 1) Αἰνέας Στυμφάλιος, στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀρκάδων γεγενημένος; (Diod. xv. 62) Λυκομήδης ὁ Μαντινεύς, στρατηγὸς ὢν τῶν Ἀρκάδων.

[4] From the language of Pausanias (viii. 27. 7) and Strabo (viii. 8. 1) it seems that some of the cities were actually deserted, while others were simply reduced to the condition of dependent villages or perhaps of municipal towns. These last were, at a late time (see p. 489), restored to an equality with the capital, as independent cantons of the Achaian League.

[5] Paus. viii. 27. 5, 6. Οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄκοντες ἀνάγκῃ κατήγοντο ἐς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν, κ.τ.λ.

[6] Ib. viii. 27. 3—5. Ὑπό τε προθυμίας καὶ διὰ τὸ ἔχθος τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων πατρίδας σφίσιν οὔσας ἐκλιπεῖν ἐπείθοντο . . . . συνελέγοντο ἐς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν σπουδῇ, κ.τ.λ.

[7] See above, p. 113.

national sanctuary, such as the great temple of the Arkadian Zeus. But if Federal Arkadia was to have a capital at all, there can be no doubt as to the wisdom of the choice actually made. Here we may, with Pausanias,[1] discern the guiding genius of Epameinôndas. To have chosen Mantineia, Tegea, or any other of the ancient cities, as the Federal capital, would have opened the way to innumerable jealousies, and might even have led to the same evils of which the Arkadians had such a living example before their eyes among their own Bœotian allies. And Epameinôndas himself, when acting as the counsellor of the Arkadians, would doubtless see the danger as clearly as any Arkadian; in Arkadia he would advise for the good of all Arkadia, and not be warped by that narrow local patriotism which led even him to sacrifice the general welfare of Bœotia to the selfish interests of Thebes. Had the Ten Thousand met at Mantineia or Tegea, the noble scheme of Lykomêdês might only have led to the destruction of that which he had most at heart; he might have become the founder, not of a really equal Arkadian Confederation, but of a mere Mantinean or Tegean Empire over Arkadia. Such a danger was much less to be dreaded from a new city called into being at the will, and for the purposes, of the Confederation itself. And, besides this, the Great City, as its later history shows, occupied a most important military position. It commanded one of the main passes by which Sparta used to pour her troops into Arkadia. Some such bulwark as was supplied by Megalopolis was imperatively required for the safety of the country. And it was the more needed, because the other chief city of southern Arkadia, and that which commanded the other approach, was Tegea, so lately gained over from subserviency to Spartan interests, and still probably containing a party unfavourable to the national cause. These considerations might reconcile even distant members to the position of the Federal capital, not in the centre of the Confederation, but on its most exposed border. With Epameinôndas no doubt the chief object was effectually to shut Sparta in, Megalopolis keeping her in check from the north, and the other new city of Messênê from the west.

Advantageous position of the Federal Capital.

The Arkadian League, as an important Greek power, did not

Decline of the Arkadian League.

[1] Pausanias distinctly recognizes Epameinôndas as the true founder of Megalopolis. Paus. viii. 27. 2. *γνώμῃ μὲν τοιαύτῃ συνῳκίζοντο οἱ Ἀρκάδες, τῆς πόλεως δὲ οἰκιστὴς Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὁ Θηβαῖος σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καλοῖτο ἄν, τούς τε γὰρ Ἀρκάδας οὗτος ἦν ὁ ἐπεγείρας ἐς τὸν συνοικισμόν*, κ.τ.λ.

last long. We are not well informed as to the steps of its decline; but, before the death of Epameinôndas, Mantineia and Tegea were again hostile cities. Their positions, during the last stage of his warfare, are singularly reversed from what they had been eight years before. Mantineia is now the ally of Lacedæmôn, and Tegea is the stronghold of the Theban interest in Peloponnêsos. Megalopolis always remained a considerable city, though it did not wholly answer the intentions of its founders, either in its extent or in its political importance. At a later period we find it a zealous ally of Macedonia; later still it appears in the more honourable character of an important member of the Achaian League, illustrious as the birthplace of Lydiadas, Philopoimên, and Polybios. The Assembly of the Ten Thousand survived the loss of Lykomêdês and of Epameinôndas; Æschinês and Dêmosthenês pleaded before it;[1] and Dêmosthenês uses language which implies that it still at least professed to act in the name of the whole Arkadian people.[2] Dêmosthenês himself pleaded the cause of Megalopolitan independence before the Athenian Assembly,[3] when the Arkadian city was again threatened by Sparta and defended by Thebes,[4] and when a faction in Megalopolis itself, as before in Mantineia, desired the dissolution of the Great City and the restoration of their own influence over its former petty townships.[5] Later again, in the war between Agis and Antipater, all Arkadia except Megalopolis took the patriotic side; Megalopolis stood a siege in the interest of Macedonia,[6] and its losses were repaid by a pecuniary compensation levied on the vanquished cities.[7] Opposition to Sparta would naturally drive Megalopolis into alliance with Macedonia, and it may well be believed that, in the days of Macedonian domination, selfish interests may have made the position of a powerful city in close alliance with Macedonia appear preferable to that of a Federal capital of Arkadia. Certain it is that, from this time forward, the Macedonian interest was very strong in Megalopolis, and equally certain that no general Arkadian League existed when the Achaian League began to be organised. The great scheme of Lykomêdês, the most promising that any Grecian statesmen had yet designed, had altogether fallen asunder. And yet his labours were far

B.C. 362.

History of Megalopolis.

B.C. 347.

B.C. 353.

B.C. 330.

[1] Dem. F. L. 220. [2] See ib. 10, 11.
[3] In the oration ὑπὲρ Μεγαλοπολιτῶν. [4] See Thirlwall, v. 367—70.
[5] Thirlwall, v. 368. [6] Æsch. Ktes. 165. [7] Q. Curt. vi. 1. 21.

from being wholly fruitless. He had given a model for the statesmen of later generations to follow, and he had founded the city which was to give birth to the most illustrious Greeks of the last age of Grecian independence.

Pretended scheme of Federal Union in EUBOIA. B.C. 351.

Schemes of Kallias of Chalkis.

After this Arkadian Confederacy, which, if it had a poor ending, at all events had a grand beginning, it may seem almost ludicrous to quote a mere abortive scheme, or pretence at a scheme, our whole knowledge of which is contained in a single sentence of a hostile orator. Kallias, the Tyrant of Chalkis, he who was defeated by Phôkiôn at Tamynai, veiled, if we may believe Æschinês, his schemes of ambition under the pretext of founding a general Euboian Council or Assembly in his own city.[1] Not a detail is given us, but the words employed seem to show that a pretence at true Federalism was the bait. A Federal scheme proceeding from such a source would probably have borne more likeness to the abortive scheme of an Italian League put forth by Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, than to the noble works of Aratos and Washington. But in either case the bait of a Federal Constitution was an instance of the homage which vice pays to virtue. When a Greek Tyrant hit upon such a device to cover his schemes of aggrandizement, it is clear that the Federal principle was now gradually working its way to that influence over the Greek mind which it certainly did not possess in the preceding century, and which it emphatically did possess in the century which followed.

A.D. 1859.

Evidence of the growth of Federal ideas in Greece.

## § 4. *Of the Lykian League*

The LYKIAN League; its excellent Constitution.

I will end this chapter with a notice of one Federation more, one not within the limits of Greece, and whose citizens were not Greek by race, but which was so clearly formed after Greek models that it may, in a political history, fairly claim a place in the list of Greek Federal Governments. I mean the wise and well-balanced Confederation of Lykia, whose constitution has won the highest praise from Montesquieu[2] in the last century,

[1] Æsch. Ktes. 89. Καλλίας ὁ Χαλκιδεύς, μικρὸν διαλιπὼν χρόνον, πάλιν ἦκε φερόμενος εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, Εὐβοϊκὸν μὲν τῷ λόγῳ συνέδριον ἐς Χαλκίδα συνάγων, ἰσχυρὰν δὲ τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἔργῳ παρασκευάζων, ἐξαίρετον δ' αὑτῷ τυραννίδα προσποιούμενος. Cf. Dict. Biog. art. Callias.

[2] Esprit des Lois, ix. 3. "S'il falloit donner un modèle d'une belle république fédérative, je prendrois la république de Lycie."

and from Bishop Thirlwall[1] in the present. The antiquities and the language of Lykia have lately attracted the attention of scholars in no small measure. To the political inquirer the country is no less interesting, as possessing what was probably the best constructed Federal Government that the ancient world beheld. The account given by Strabo, our sole authority, is so full, clear, and brief, that I cannot do better than translate it. The "ancestral constitution of the Lykian League,"[2] is described by the great geographer in these words:—

Strabo's account of the Lykian Constitution.

"There are three and twenty cities which have a share in the suffrage, and they come together from each city in the common Federal Assembly,[3] choosing for their place of meeting any city which they think best. And, among the cities, the greatest are possessed[4] of three votes apiece, the middle ones of two, and the rest of one; and in the same proportion they pay taxes,[5] and take their share of other public burthens. And the six greatest cities,[6] according to Artemidôros, are Xanthos, Patara, Pinara, Olympos, Myra, Tlôs, which lies in the direction of Kibyra. And, in the Federal Assembly,[7] first the Lykiarch is chosen and then the other Magistrates of the League,[8] and bodies of Federal Judges are appointed;[9] and formerly they used to consult about war, and peace, and alliance; this now, of course, they cannot do, but these things must needs rest with the Romans, unless such action be allowed by them, or be found useful on their behalf; and in like manner also judges and

[1] ii. 116. "The Lycians set an example of the manner in which the advantages of a close federal union might be combined with mutual independence. . . . Had the Greeks on the western coast of Asia adopted similar institutions, their history, and even that of the mother-country, might have been very different from what it became."

[2] Strabo, xiv. 3. 2. Ἡ πάτριος διοίκησις τοῦ Λυκιακοῦ συστήματος.

Σύστημα (Pol. ii. 41) is one of the technical names for a Federation. The Lykians also used the more formal designation Λυκίων τὸ κοινὸν (C. I. 4279) and the equally familiar ἔθνος (C. I. 4239 et al.)

[3] Strabo, xiv. 3. 3. Συνέρχονται δὲ ἐξ ἑκάστης πόλεως εἰς κοινὸν συνέδριον. [For a list of the Lykian cities see Appendix II.]

[4] Ib. Τριῶν ψήφων ἐστὶν ἑκάστη κυρία.

[5] Ib. Τὰς εἰσφορὰς εἰσφέρουσι καὶ τὰς ἄλλας λειτουργίας.

[6] It would be worth inquiring whether all of these six great cities rejoiced in the title of λαμπροτάτη μητρόπολις τοῦ Λυκίων ἔθνους. It was certainly borne by Tlôs, Xanthos, and Patara. See C. I. 4240c, 4276, 4280 et al.

[7] Strabo, u.s. Ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ. On the word συνέδριον, see p. 263.

[8] Ib. Ἄλλαι ἀρχαὶ αἱ τοῦ συστήματος.

[9] Ib. Δικαστήριά τε ἀποδείκνυνται κοινῇ

magistrates[1] are appointed from each city, in proportion to the number of its votes.

His testimony to its practical working.

B.C. 29–A.D. 18.

On the practical working of this constitution Strabo bestows the highest praise. Lykia was, in his day, a Roman dependency, but it retained its own laws and internal government, which he himself beheld in as high a state of efficiency as was consistent with the dependent condition of the commonwealth in its external relations.

Merits of the Lykian Constitution; No Capital;

The merits of this Lykian constitution are obvious. It avoids nearly every error into which other Confederations had fallen. There is no capital, no Thebes, not even a Megalopolis: the Federal Assembly meets wherever it finds it convenient to do so. At the same time, it avoids the opposite evil, from which we shall find that even the Achaian League was not free, that of giving the greatest city no more weight in the Federal Assembly than the smallest. A League of cities must always find it very difficult to steer clear of both these opposite dangers. The Lykians seem to have done so very successfully.

The Assembly Primary not Representative.

There can, I think, be no doubt that the Lykian Assembly, like the Achaian and other Assemblies of the kind, was a primary and not a representative body. I cannot believe that it was composed merely of deputies from the several cities.[2] The words of Strabo seem to me to imply, not that each city sent one, two, or three representatives, but that each city had one, two, or three votes. According to the general analogy of the Greek and Italian commonwealths, every Lykian citizen[3] would have a right to attend, speak, and vote, but the citizens of each town would vote separately. Thus, in a government not Federal, the Roman Tribes voted separately; thus the Nations in the Scotch Universities do to this day. The vote of each City, Tribe, or Nation, is determined by a majority within itself, and the final vote is determined by the majority, not of heads, but of Tribes

[1] Strabo, u.s. Δικασταὶ καὶ ἄρχοντες. This of course means Federal Judges and Federal Magistrates, the ἀρχαί and δικαστήρια mentioned just before. Montesquieu perverts this into "les juges et les magistrats des villes." He has also misled Hamilton in the "Federalist," No. ix. (p. 48).

[2] Dr. Schmitz (Dict. Geog. art. Lycia), and Kortüm (Geschichte Griechenlands, iii. 313), seem to maintain this view.

[3] The democratic character of the League is clear both from the democratic character of the several cities, the local δῆμοι of which are constantly mentioned in the Inscriptions, and from the distinct testimony of one inscription at Tlôs (C. I. 4239) where an anonymous worthy is praised as εὐεργέτην τοῦ δήμου and διατηρήσαντα τούς τε νόμους καὶ τὴν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν.

or Cities. In the Primary Assembly of a large district some such arrangement as this is absolutely necessary, in order to put distant Tribes or Cities on an equality with those which are near the place of meeting. If the votes in the Roman Assembly had been taken by heads, the mob of the Forum could always have outvoted the genuine agricultural plebeians. But, in most of the ancient constitutions, each member, each Tribe or City, whether great or small, had only a single vote. This was manifestly unfair, and might easily lead to discontents. Thus the Italian Allies of Rome bitterly complained when they were, after the Social War, admitted indeed to the Roman citizenship, B.C. 88. but distributed among eight tribes only among the thirty-five.[1] They were equal in number to the former citizens, but, by this arrangement, they could, at the utmost, command only eight votes, less than one-fourth of the whole number. Thus, on any questions which concerned their special interests, they were left in a perpetual and hopeless minority. The Lykians avoided this danger by giving to their cities a greater or less number of votes according to their size, being the first recorded instance of an attempt to apportion votes to population. Those Xanthians who might be present in any Assembly determined the vote of Xanthos by a majority among themselves; that vote counted as three in reckoning up the decisive vote of the Assembly. The vote of a smaller city, ascertained in the same way, counted as two or as one.[2] But though such a system was not really representative, it was a very near approach to the representative principle.[3] No doubt, alike in Lykia, Achaia, and Rome, the vote of a distant Tribe or City was often canvassed at home, and perhaps practically decided, before the general Assembly met. At any rate those citizens of any city who were present would know and express the wishes of their fellow-citizens who remained

Apportionment of Votes to Numbers.

[1] Vell. Pat. ii. 20. 2.

[2] A small confederation (*σύστημα*), consisting of Kibyra and three other towns, in which Kibyra had two votes and the other towns one each, was probably a humble imitation of the Lykian League. Strabo, xiii. 4. 17. [Cf. the small confederation of Zug; see the French Continuation of J. von Müller's History of the Swiss Confederation, xiv. 226.] As Kibyra was always under Tyrants, though well disposed Tyrants (*ἐτυραννεῖτο δ' ἀεί· σωφρόνως δ' ὅμως*), one would like to know how the Monarchic and the Federal elements were reconciled. The mere use of the word *Tyrant*, and not *King*, implies republican forms.

Even the Gauls in Asia (Strabo, xii. 5. 1) seem to have made some rude approach to Federal ideas; but these utterly obscure constitutions are really matters of archæology rather than of politics.

[3] See Niebuhr, Hist. Rom. ii. 29, 30. Eng. Tr.

Approach to Representative Government.

at home. It would have been a comparatively small change, if each city had formally elected as many of its citizens as it had votes, and had sent them with authority to speak in its name in the Federal body. But the change does not seem ever to have actually been made. In this, as in so many other cases, the ancient world trembled on the very verge of representative government without ever actually crossing the boundary.[1]

A Senate not mentioned, but its existence to be inferred from analogy.

The description of Strabo does not mention a Federal Senate. But the universal practice of the Greek commonwealths may make us feel certain that there was a Senate, of some sort or other, in Lykia no less than in Arkadia. The several cities of Lykia had each their local Senates,[2] and we may be sure that the Federal Constitution followed the same universal model. It need not surprise us that a thing almost certain to be taken for granted is not directly mentioned. The Athenian Senate is not very often spoken of; it is never so prominent as at the moment of its destruction by the Four Hundred.[3] The very existence of the Arkadian Senate has, as we have seen, mainly to be inferred from the dimensions of an architectural monument. We may therefore be sure that the Lykian Assembly, like other Greek Assemblies, was assisted by a preconsidering Senate, but we cannot tell what the exact constitution of that Senate was.

Federal Magistrates.

As for the Federal Magistrates mentioned by Strabo, their titles are not mentioned, except that of Lykiarch, borne by the President of the Union.[4] The magistrates of the several cities may have borne the title of General; at least Diôn Cassius speaks of the General of a particular city,[5] as well as of the common army of the whole League.[6]

[1] See Mommsen's Römische Geschichte, ii. 347.

[2] The style of each city is commonly the familiar one ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος. C. I. 4270, 4303*h* et al. At Tlôs we find a formula which seems to imply two distinct Councils, Τλωέων ἡ βουλὴ καὶ ἡ γερουσία καὶ ὁ δῆμος. C. I. 4236, 4237, 4240. Γερουσία is a word used once by Polybios (xxxviii. 5) in speaking of Achaian affairs, meaning, as it would appear, the Council of Ministers. See Bachofen, Das Lykische Volk (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1862), p. 24. [3] Thuc. viii. 69.

[4] The Lykiarch seems to have borne the formal title of ἀξιολογώτατος (C. I. 4198, 4274), something like our "Right Honourable." This is a sort of orientalism of which we find no trace in proper Greece. Compare the attempt by the Senate in the first Congress of the United States to confer the title of "Highness" upon the President. See Marshall's Life of Washington, v. 238; Jefferson's Correspondence, iv. 14.

[5] Dion. xlvii. 34. Καὶ τοῦτο καὶ οἱ Μυρεῖς ἐποίησαν, ἐπειδὴ τὸν στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν . . . ἀπέλυσε[ν ὁ Βροῦτος].

[6] Ib. Τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Λυκίων στράτευμα.

The exact antiquity and origin of the Lykian League it might be difficult to discover. Bishop Thirlwall[1] hints that Federal Government may have been of very early introduction into Lykia. Yet we must remember that the Lykians were not Greeks, and that they seem not even to have had that degree of ethnical affinity to the Greeks which it is easy to recognize in Macedonians and Epeirots. We need not suppose a people who proved themselves so capable of receiving Hellenic culture to have been wholly of an alien stock; but till philologers are better agreed as to the nature of the Lykian language, it is hardly the part of a political historian to hazard vague conjectures about them. It is clear that the early Lykians were, in the Greek sense of the word, Barbarians; that is, that they spoke a language unintelligible to the Greeks, and that they were not then distinguished in any special way from the other Asiatic races which passed under the dominion of Persia. It is equally clear that they must have possessed latent powers of assimilating themselves to Greek models in a degree beyond all other Asiatic races. The later Lykians clearly adopted the Greek language, Greek art, and general Greek civilization. They doubtless followed and improved upon Greek models, in the developement of their admirable political constitution. Its details, as described by Strabo, probably belong only to the last period of Lykian history. But some germs of a Federal system must have existed earlier. Aristotle found the constitution of Lykia, no less than that of Thesprôtia, worthy of a place in his collection.[2] This seems to imply a Republic, and, in so large a country, most probably a Federal Republic. But the Lykian monuments help us to no information on the subject. Our real knowledge begins later. After the defeat of Antiochos, the Romans, in their division of the spoil, assigned Lykia and the greater part of Karia to their Rhodian allies.[3] Rhodes was governed by a prudent and moderate aristocracy, which one is surprised to find seeking after continental dominions. But it would seem that Theaitêtos and Philophrôn, who begged for the Lykians as a gift,[4] acted as little for the true interest of their island

Date and Origin of Federal Government in Lykia.

Relation of the Lykians to the Greeks.

Traces of Federalism before the subjection to Rhodes.

B.C. 188.

Lykia subject to Rhodes. B.C. 188-168.

[1] ii. 116. Cf. Drumann, p. 432. [2] Phôtios, Bibl. 104, 5. Ed. Bekker.

[3] Pol. xxiii. 3. Liv. xxxviii. 39.

[4] Pol. xxiii. 3. Ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοῖς δοθῆναι τὰ κατὰ Λυκίαν καὶ Καρίαν . . . . φάσκοντες Λυκίαν καὶ Καρίας τὰ μέχρι τοῦ Μαιάνδρου δεδόσθαι Ῥοδίοις ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἐν δωρεᾷ.

commonwealth, as Francesco Foscari did for the interest of his, when he made Venice a continental power. Perpetual disputes arose between Rhodes and Lykia; perpetual appeals were brought before the supreme power at Rome. The nature of the gift was disputed; the Rhodians looked on the Lykians as mere subjects; the Lykians maintained that they were at most dependent allies.[1] It is certain that the gift did not hinder the existence of some sort of Federal union. The Lykians, even while subject to Rhodes, retained the ordinary style of a Greek Confederation;[2] much more then must they have employed it during the earlier days of their independence. Polybios, too, in his whole narrative of these times, constantly speaks of Lykia as a national whole. Ambassadors appear at Rhodes, Rome, and Achaia, speaking in the name of the whole Lykian people,[3] in a way which implies a commission from some central power. But the Federal Union could not as yet have been quite perfect, as we also hear of Ambassadors being sent by the single city of Xanthos,[4] which would have been quite contrary to the principles of the constitution described by Strabo. At last, after the war with Perseus, the Rhodians were no longer in favour at Rome; they were deprived of their lately acquired continental dominions, and Lykia and Karia were declared free.[5] Now it was, doubtless, that some unknown Lykian Lykomêdês, some statesman who had carefully studied the working of all the existing Federal Governments of Greece, devised the constitution which so happily avoided all their errors. The Lykian Confederation steered its course

Lykia independent, B.C. 168.

Origin of the Constitution described by Strabo.

[1] Pol. xxvi. 7. Εὕρηνται Λύκιοι δεδόμενοι Ῥοδίοις οὐκ ἐν δωρεᾷ, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ὡς φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι. So Appian, Mithrid, 62. Πλὴν εἴ τινες Εὐμενεῖ καὶ Ῥοδίοις, συμμαχήσασιν ἡμῖν, ἔδομεν, οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ προστάταις εἶναι· τεκμήριον δ' ὅτι Λυκίους, αἰτιωμένους τι, Ῥοδίων ἀπεστήσαμεν.

[2] τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Λυκίων. See Boeckh, C. I. 4677 (vol. iii. 326), where the words occur in an inscription found in Egypt, the date of which comes between B.C. 188 and 181. So, immediately after the recovery of their freedom, the same *Commune Luciorum* dedicated its thank-offering at Rome. [See Boeckh, C. I. 5880 (vol. iii. 768), Λυκίων τὸ κοινὸν κομισάμενον τὴν πάτριον δημοκρατίαν, κ.τ.λ.] See Bachofen, p. 23.

[3] Pol. xxiii. 3. Οἱ μὲν Λύκιοι πρεσβεύοντες ἦκον. Pol. xxvi. 7. Ἡ σύγκλητος ἐχρημάτισε τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Λυκίων ἥκουσι πρεσβευταῖς, κ.τ.λ.

[4] Ib. Οἱ γὰρ Ξάνθιοι . . . . ἐξέπεμψαν πρεσβευτὰς εἴς τε τὴν Ἀχαΐαν καὶ τὴν Ῥώμην. These seem to be the same with the παρὰ τῶν Λυκίων ἥκοντες πρεσβευταί. Possibly Xanthos acted, by tacit consent, in the name of the whole nation.

[5] Pol. xxx. 5. Ἡ σύγκλητος ἐξέβαλε δόγμα διότι δεῖ Κᾶρας καὶ Λυκίους ἐλευθέρους εἶναι πάντας, ὅσους προσένειμε Ῥοδίοις μετὰ τὸν Ἀντιοχικὸν πόλεμον.

with admirable prudence through the Mithridatic and Piratic Wars. Its opposition to Brutus, and the consequent destruction of Xanthos,[1] was indeed a terrible calamity; but a calamity endured in such a cause was a special claim upon the favour of the Julian Emperors, and we find Lykia, as we have seen, in the days of Strabo, prosperous, well-governed, and enjoying full local independence.[2] But these happy days were not to last for ever. In the reign of Claudius internal dissensions,[3] seemingly of great violence, arose, of which that Emperor took advantage to destroy this remaining vestige of ancient freedom, and to reduce Lykia, like her neighbours, to the dead level of a Roman province. Such an ending, and for such a cause, is especially sad after so bright a picture of days so very little earlier. The last Greek Federation was now no more, and many centuries were to pass by before the world was again to see so perfect a Federal system, or indeed anything worthy to be called a Federal system at all. Liberty was gone from the earth, or lingered on, in an obscure and precarious form, on the Northern shores of the Inhospitable Sea.[4] But it is a pleasing thought that, as the Achaians and the Lykians are the nations who stand forth, in our first Homeric picture,[5] as the worthiest races of Europe and of Asia, so it was the Achaians and the Lykians who were the last to maintain, in Europe and in Asia, the true Federal form of freedom in the face of the advances of all-devouring Rome.

B.C. 88–63.

B.C. 43.

Destruction of the League by Claudius, A.D. 41–54.

[1] See Dion Cassius, xlvii. 34.

[2] Strabo, xiv. 3. 3. Οὕτω δ' εὐνομουμένοις αὐτοῖς συνέβη παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἐλευθέροις διατέλεσαι, τὰ πάτρια νέμουσι.

[3] Dion Cassius, lx. 17. Τούς τε Λυκίους στασιάσαντας, ὥστε καὶ Ῥωμαίους τινὰς ἀποκτεῖναι, ἐδουλώσατό τε καὶ ἐς τὸν τῆς Παμφυλίας νόμον ἐσέγραψεν. Suet. Claud. 25. Lyciis ob exitiabiles inter se discordias libertatem ademit. One would like to hear the Lykian version of these troubles. Disturbances are easily produced in a small state which a great neighbour wishes to annex.

[4] On the Republic of Cherson, see Finlay, Byz. Emp. i. 415 [History of Greece (ed. Tozer), ii. 350, 351].

[5] On the Lykians of Homer, see Gladstone's Homer, i. 181. If the Homeric Lykians (see Strabo, xii. 8. 5) do not occupy the same geographical position as the historical Lykians, so neither do (except quite incidentally) the Homeric and the historical Achaians. But it is hardly possible that the recurrence of the two names, Lykian and Achaian, in this way can be purely accidental. [Cf. the position of Lykians as the last teachers of Old Greek philosophy. Hertzberg, Geschichte Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Römer, iii. 508, 517, 518.]

## CHAPTER V

### ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE

It is no easy task to write the history of Greek Federalism with due regard at once to chronology and to geography. In my last chapter I have been obliged to carry on parts of my narrative down to a time even later than the suppression of the two great Federal Governments of Greece. It seemed, on the whole, the better plan to clear off both the earlier and the minor instances of Greek Federalism, before entering on any examination of the great Leagues of Achaia and Ætolia. But there is no reason to doubt that the Federal principle was as old in Achaia and Ætolia as in any part of Greece whatsoever. The history of the Achaian League, like the history of the Bœotian League, extends over the whole period during which we have any knowledge of Grecian affairs. But there is this important difference between the two, that by far the greater interest attaches to the earlier days of the Bœotian, and to the later days of the Achaian, League. We are led to trace the history of Bœotia to its dishonoured close only because of the borrowed interest reflected from the earlier days of Bœotian glory. We are led to examine into the obscure and scattered notices of the earlier days of Achaia only because of the surpassing interest which attaches to the full developement of the great Achaian Confederation. It is natural then to deal with the Bœotian Confederation as a whole before entering at all on the history of the Achaian and Ætolian Confederations. Again, the Arkadian and Olynthian Leagues were neither of them permanent; those of Phôkis, Akarnania, and Epeiros were always of minor importance; of Lykia, as a Federal state, we should never have heard at all, save from a single notice, and that left us, not by a historian, but by a geographer. On the whole therefore it seemed the

best arrangement, though at some sacrifice of chronological exactness, to deal first with all these comparatively imperfect instances of Greek Federalism, before entering on any description of Achaian or Ætolian politics. Having now cleared off these minor examples, we are in a position to enter upon the first of the great divisions of our subject, the first great developement of the Federal principle which the world ever beheld, and which forms the main centre of the last hundred and fifty years of Old Greek independence.

## § 1. *General Character of the History of Federal Greece*

Common neglect in England of the History of Federal Greece.

The later history of Greece has been, as it seems to me at least, unduly depreciated by most English scholars. The great work of Polybios lies almost untouched in our Universities. The mythical books of Livy are attentively studied, while those which record the struggle between Rome and Macedonia are hardly ever opened. The last great English historian of Greece[1] deliberately declines entering on the Federal period of Grecian history as forming no part of his subject. In Germany the case is widely different. The student who undertakes to master this period with the help of German guides will certainly not have to complain of any lack in point of number. He will rather be puzzled at the difficulty of choice between many candidates, and at the diversity of the paths through which they will severally offer to guide him. The importance of this period was strongly set forth by Niebuhr,[2] and few portions of history have ever met with a more enthusiastic and vivid narrator than the days of Alexander and his Successors have found in the eloquent pages of Droysen.[3] Every state, Macedonia, Achaia, Ætolia, Bœotia, has found in Germany its special historian. Of so vast a literature I am far from professing myself to be completely master; but, from such acquaintance with it as I can pretend to, I may say without doubt that the English scholar will find the best portions of the best writers carefully weighed in the balance by the unfailing accuracy and unswerving judgement of a countryman of his own. Bishop Thirlwall has continued his great task

Abundance of German writers on the subject.

[1] Grote, xii. 529.

[2] Lectures on Ancient History, iii. 352 (Eng. Tr.) et al.

[3] Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen; Hamburg. Geschichte des Hellenismus, 2 vols. Hamburg: 1836.

Narrative of Bishop Thirlwall.

to its conclusion with unflagging powers. With him Aratos and Kleomenês are as essential a part of Hellenic story as Themistoklês and Periklês. His last volume must always lie before the historian of Grecian Federalism as the best of comments on the work of the illustrious Greek who has handed down to us the tale, too often fragmentary, of the last days of his country's freedom.

Earlier Grecian history mainly the history of Athens.

The truth is that, in reading the earlier history of Greece, we are, for the most part, really reading little more than the history of Athens. We read events as chronicled by Athenian historians; we turn for their illustration to the works of Athenian philosophers, orators, and poets. We look at everything from an Athenian point of view; we identify ourselves throughout with that great Democracy which was the true mother of right and liberty, of art and wisdom. We trace her fortunes as if they were the fortunes of our own land; when we condemn her acts, we do it with that sort of reluctant feeling with which we acknowledge that our own country is in the wrong. Sparta comes before us as the rival of Athens, Macedonia as the destroyer of her greatness; of other states we barely think from time to time as their fortunes become connected with those of the school[1] and ornament of Greece. In turning to "the Greece of Polybios"[2] we feel a kind of shock at finding ourselves in what is in truth another world. It is still Greece; it is still living Greece; but it is no longer the Greece of Thucydidês and Aristophanês. The sea is there and the headlands and the everlasting hills; Athênê still stands, spear in hand, as the guardian of her chosen city; Dêmos still sits in his Pnyx; he still chooses Archons by the lot and Generals by the uplifted hand; but the fierce Democracy has sunk into the lifelessness of a cheerless and dishonoured old age; its decrees consist of fulsome adulation of foreign kings;[3] its demagogues and orators are sunk into beggars who wander from court to court to gather a few talents of alms for the People which once received tribute from a thousand cities.[4] Philosophers

Nullity of Athens in the Federal Period.

[1] Thuc. ii. 41. Ξυνελών τε λέγω τήν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παίδευσιν εἶναι, κ.τ.λ.

[2] Grote, xii. 528.

[3] Pol. v. 106. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ . . . τῶν μὲν ἄλλων Ἑλληνικῶν πράξεων οὐδ' ὁποίας μετεῖχον, ἀκολουθοῦντες δὲ τῇ τῶν προεστώτων αἱρέσει καὶ ταῖς τούτων ὁρμαῖς εἰς πάντας τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἐξεκέχυντο, καὶ μάλιστα τούτων εἰς Πτολεμαῖον, καὶ πᾶν γένος ὑπέμενον ψηφισμάτων καὶ κηρυγμάτων, βραχύν τινα λόγον ποιούμενοι τοῦ καθήκοντος διὰ τὴν τῶν προεστώτων ἀκρισίαν.

This is in B.C. 217. Compare, for a time seventy or eighty years earlier, Grote, xii. 529—30.

[4] Arist. Wasps, 707. Εἰσίν γε πόλεις χίλιαι, αἳ νῦν τὸν φόρον ἡμῖν ἀπάγουσιν.

still babble in her schools about truth and wisdom and virtue and valour; but truth and wisdom and virtue and valour have, not indeed fled from the earth, not indeed fled from the soil of Hellas, but they have passed from the birthplace of Solôn, of Aristeidês, and of Periklês to cities which they would have scorned to acknowledge as rivals, even to cities which had no place on earth when the warriors of Athens marched forth to victory at Marathôn and to defeat at Dêlion. A Greece in which Athens has ceased to be the first power, or rather in which Athens has sunk to be the most contemptible of all the cities of the Grecian name, seems, at first sight, to be unworthy to bear the name of Greece at all. We have to encounter unfamiliar names and to thread our way through unfamiliar boundaries and divisions. The first place among Grecian states is disputed between the obscure, if respectable, cities of Achaia, and the barely Hellenic[1] robbers of Ætolia. States known only as sending some small contingent to swell Athenian or Spartan armies, cities which had themselves sprung into being since the glory of Athens sank at Aigospotamos, now appear as powers of greater weight than the Athenian commonwealth. Feeble Akarnania, new-born Megalopolis, liberated Messênê, count for more in Grecian politics than the city of Thêseus. The circle of Hellas is enlarged to take in lands which Thucydidês and Dêmosthenês despised as barbarous; Chaonians, Molossians, Thesprôtians, take their place as members of an acknowledged Hellenic state; the Macedonian himself is indeed still dreaded as a King, but is no longer despised as a stranger of foreign blood and speech.[2] The very language itself has changed; fastidious scholars, fresh from the master-pieces of Attic purity, look down with contempt on the pages in which the deeds of Spartan and Sikyônian heroes are recorded by historians brought up in no politer schools than could be found at Megalopolis and Chairôneia.

It may at once be freely admitted that the later history of

[1] Liv. xxxii. 34. Ætolos, tanquam Romanos, decedi Græcia jubere, qui, quibus finibus Græcia sit, dicere non possint. Ipsius enim Ætoliæ Agræos, Apodotosque et Amphilochos, quæ permagna eorum pars sit, Græciam non esse.

[2] Liv. xxxi. 29. Ætolos, Acarnanas, Macedonas, ejusdem linguæ homines, leves ad tempus ortæ caussæ disjungunt conjunguntque; cum alienigenis, cum barbaris, æternum omnibus Græcis bellum est eritque.

Pol. vii. 9. Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα . . . Μακεδόνες καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων οἱ σύμμαχοι, κ.τ.λ.

Comparison between the earlier and later History of Greece.

Greece, "the Greece of Polybios," has nothing like the life and richness and freshness of that earlier state of things which we may call the Greece of Thucydidês. The one still enjoyed the native freedom of youth; the other at best clung to the recovered freedom of old age. The fervent lover of the earlier and fresher developement of Hellenic life is thus tempted to despise the records of a time which seems to him feeble and decrepit. Yet the recovered liberties of Achaia were a true shoot from the old stem;[1] they were the reward of struggles which would not have disgraced the victors of Marathôn or the victors of Leuktra; and the very circumstances which make the later fortunes of Greece less interesting in the eyes of a purely Hellenic enthusiast make them really more instructive in the eyes of a general student of the world's history. The early history of Greece is the history of a time when Greece was its own world, and when town-autonomy was the only form of political life known within that world. Beyond the limits of Hellas,[2] all mankind were Barbarians; they were to be ruled over or to be used as instruments, they were to be flattered or to be oppressed, but they were never to be admitted as the real political equals of the meanest man of Hellenic blood. Within the bounds of Hellas, the political struggle lay between single cities oligarchically governed and single cities democratically governed. In either case the independent city-commonwealth was the one ruling political idea. Monarchy was unknown or abhorred; Federalism was as yet obscure and undeveloped. The Greece of Polybios opens to us a much wider and more varied scene. Greece is no longer the whole world; Greece proper, Greece in the geographical sense, is no longer the world's most important portion. Rome and Carthage dispute the empire of the West; Syria and Egypt dispute the empire of the East; Greece and Macedonia stand on the edge of the two worlds, to be swept in their turn, along with all other combatants and spectators, into the common gulf of Roman dominion. But if Greece had lost her political pre-eminence, she had won for herself a wider and a more abiding empire. The Greek language, Greek art, general Greek civilization, were spread over the whole East, and were

Character of the later period.

Wide spread of Hellenic culture.

[1] Paus. vii. 17. 2. Ἀτε ἐκ δένδρου λελωβημένου, ἀνεβλάστησεν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τὸ Ἀχαϊκόν.

[2] Hellas, it should be remembered, is wherever Greeks dwell, not merely Greece—ἡ συνεχὴς Ἑλλάς—in the geographical sense.

before long to make a conquest only less complete of her Italian conquerors themselves. Philip, Alexander, and their Successors, the destroyers of Greek political greatness, had been everywhere the apostles of Greek intellectual life. The age of Polybios is, in fact, the age when the world's destiny was fixed for ever, when the decree of fate was finally pronounced that for all time Rome should be the political, and Greece the intellectual, mistress of mankind. It is, in its true place in universal history, a period of the very deepest and most varied interest. And to the historian of the Greek race and language, as distinguished from the historian of the soil of Hellas, no period in the whole range of Grecian history assumes a deeper importance. The age of Polybios is the age which connects the Greece of Mr. Grote with the Greece of Mr. Finlay. Philip and Alexander were in truth the founders of that Modern Greek nation which has lasted down to our own time. If they destroyed the liberties of Athens, they laid the foundation of the general intellectual dominion of Greece. By spreading the Greek language over lands into which Greek colonization could never have carried it, they did more than any other single cause to open the way for the preaching of Christianity. In founding Alexandria, Alexander indirectly founded the intellectual life of Constantinople. By permanently Hellenizing Western Asia, he conferred on the Empire of Constantinople its great mission as the champion of the West against the East, of Christendom against the Fire-Worshipper and the Moslem.[1] It is one of the many evil results of the shallow distinction popularly drawn between "ancient" and "modern" history that the whole later life of the Greek people, from Philip to our own day, is so utterly neglected. My present subject brings me only upon a very small portion of so vast a field. To the historian of Federalism the Polybian age is important mainly as the age of republican reaction in Greece itself against the Macedonian monarchy. And it is surely something, to put it on no other ground, to see what was the state of Greece herself in an age in which, though the freshness of her glory was gone, she was still important—no longer politically dominant, but intellectually more supreme than ever. The Greek history of this time is more like the history of modern times; it is less

Importance of this age in universal history,

and in the history of the Greek Race.

Effects of Alexander's Conquests.

Character of the age of Polybios.

[1] See the Edinburgh Review, vol. cv. p. 340, Art. Alexander the Great. History and Conquests of the Saracens, Chap. I. The World at the coming of Mahomet.

fresh than that of earlier days, but it is also less uniform, and for that very reason it is more politically instructive. It is no longer merely the history of single cities; it is the history of a complex political world, in which single cities, monarchies, and Federations, all play their part, just as they do in the European history of later times. It is a time of deeper policy, of more complicated intrigues; an age when men had lost the vigour and simplicity of youth, but had almost made up for the loss by the gain of a far more enlarged experience. Compare, for instance, the two great historians of the several periods. Thucydidês never went out of the immediate Greek world; but for his fortunate exile, he might never have gone out of the dominions of Athens; his reading was necessarily small; he spoke only one language; he knew only one form of political and civilized life. But an inborn genius, an intuitive wisdom, a life spent amid the full youth and freshness of the first of nations, set him at once above all who have come after him in ages of greater experience. Polybios,[1] on the other hand, is like a writer of our own times; with far less of inborn genius, he possessed a mass of acquired knowledge of which Thucydidês could never have dreamed. He had, like a modern historian, read many books and seen many lands; one language at least beside his own must have been perfectly familiar to him; he had conversed with men of various nations, living in various states of society, and under various forms of government. He had himself personally a wider political experience than fell to the lot of any historian before or after him. The son of a statesman of Megalopolis, he could remember[2] Achaia a powerful Federation, Macedonia a powerful monarchy, Carthage still free, Syria still threatening; he lived to see them all subject provinces or trembling allies of the great municipality of Rome. In his youth he bore to the grave the ashes of Philopoimên, a Grecian

Comparison of Thucydidês and Polybios.

B.C. 222 or 204.

B.C. 183.

[1] On the character of Polybios as a historian, see Mommsen, Römische Geschichte, ii. 427.

[2] Whether Polybios could, strictly speaking, remember all this, depends partly on the disputed question of the year of his birth. (See Dict. of Biog. art. Polybius.) B.C. 222 certainly seems too early, but there is no need to fix it so late as B.C. 204. The requirements on both sides would be met by such a date as B.C. 210. But even the reckoning which places his birth latest would bring all within his life, and the intermediate one would bring all within the compass of his possible memory. The intelligent child of a distinguished statesman would surely have some understanding of such an event as the battle of Zama at the age of eight years.

hero slain in purely Grecian warfare; he lived to secure some little fragments of Grecian freedom as contemptuous alms from the Roman conqueror. A man must have lived through a millennium in any other portion of the world's history, to have gained with his own eyes and his own ears such a mass of varied political knowledge as the historian of the Decline and Fall of Ancient Greece acquired within the limits of an ordinary life.[1] B.C. 145.

Beginnings of the Federal Revival, B.C. 280.

This revived life, this after-growth of Hellenic freedom, dates from about the year B.C. 280, a date marked out by Polybios himself[2] as signalized by the nearly contemporaneous deaths of some of the greatest Princes of the age. The elder form of Hellenic freedom and the universal empire of Macedonia were now alike things of the past. Those only who belonged to a generation already passing away could remember either the oratory of Dêmosthenês or the conquests of Alexander. The dominions of the great conqueror were divided for ever, and the first generation of his Successors had passed away. Antigonos and Kassander had long been dead; Dêmêtrios Poliorkêtês, Seleukos, Lysimachos, Ptolemy the son of Lagos and Ptolemy

[1] It is curious to see how Mr. Grote, in his depreciation of "the Greece of Polybios," looks at everything from a purely Athenian point of view. (See the close of his xcvith chapter, vol. xii. p. 527—30.) He sometimes almost reminds one of a remarkable passage of Polybios himself, which, to be sure, goes almost as much too far the other way. *Εἰ δὲ τηροῦντες τὰ πρὸς τὰς πατρίδας δίκαια κρίσει πραγμάτων διεφέροντο, νομίζοντες οὐ ταὐτὸ συμφέρον Ἀθηναίοις εἶναι καὶ ταῖς ἑαυτῶν πόλεσιν, οὐ δή που διὰ τοῦτο καλεῖσθαι προδότας ἐχρῆν αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους· ὁ δὲ πάντα μετρῶν πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἰδίας πατρίδος συμφέρον καὶ πάντας ἡγούμενος δεῖν τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀποβλέπειν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, εἰ δὲ μή, προδότας ἀποκαλεῖν, ἀγνοεῖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ πολὺ παραπαίειν τῆς ἀληθείας.* (xvii. 14.) In Mr. Grote's view, Athens has become contemptible; Greece is no longer the whole world; the autonomous city is no longer the single type of Grecian government. Therefore Grecian history has come to an end; or at all events Mr. Grote has no heart to continue it. The very passages in which Polybios (i. 3, 4; ii. 37) sets forth the greatness of his own subject, the connexion of the local history of his own land with the general history of the world, are quoted to prove that Polybios himself looked on later Greece as having "no history of its own." Mr. Grote, in earlier volumes, has pointed out with delight the beginnings of a Federal system in Arkadia and at Olynthos. One might have expected him to have gone on with equal delight to trace out its full developement in Achaia. But in Mr. Grote's eyes the whole charm of Grecian history passes away with the greatness of Athens. Mr. Grote's defence of the Athenian democracy has won him such everlasting gratitude from every true student of Grecian history, that it is much to be mourned that he should be so enamoured of that one object as to see the whole history of monarchic and Federal Greece from a distorted point of view.

[2] Pol. ii. 41.

B.C. 284–0. the Thunderbolt,[1] all died, mostly by violence, within three or four years of each other. Alexander's own line had long been extinct; his realm was left without an heir; usurper after usurper had seized upon the Macedonian throne; and a scourge more fearful than even the old Median invasion was bursting upon Macedonia and Greece alike. The storm of the Gaulish inroad swept all before it in Macedonia, but the arm of the Delphian Apollo[2] checked its progress, like that of the Persians of old, when it presumed to threaten the most venerated shrine of Greece. The fierce Ætolians, turbulent brigands as they too often showed themselves, stood forth, as before in the Lamian War, as the true champions of Hellas. The whole barbaric host was destroyed or took refuge in Asia, there, strangely enough, to learn some measure of Grecian civilization, and to be thought worthy, by strangers at least, of some approximation to the Grecian name.[3] After this deluge a new state of things arose. Its natural developement was, it may be, checked for a while by the splendid and erratic career of the one prince who seemed to have been preserved from the earlier period. Pyrrhos the Molossian, after threatening alike Rome and Sparta, died before Argos by an ignoble death. The removal of the Epeirot knight-errant left the field open for the growth of two opposing powers. Monarchic Macedonia began again to reconstruct herself, and again to aspire to dominion, under the able and ambitious prince who founded her last dynasty.[4] Antigonos Gonatas, son of Dêmêtrios Poliorkêtês, and grandson of Antigonos who fell at Ipsos, secured the Macedonian throne. He kept it, with one short interval, till his death; he carried out the Macedonian

Gaulish Invasion, B.C. 280–279.

B.C. 322.

Reconstruction of Macedonia and Greece. B.C. 289–272.

The Antigonids in Macedonia. B.C. 278–168.

[1] Ὁ Κεραυνός, like Hamilcar Barcas and Bayezid Yildirim. See Thirlwall, viii. 45.

[2] Paus. i. 4. 4; viii. 10. 9 et al. Cf. Herod. viii. 35 et seqq.

[3] Gallogræcia. Liv. xxxvii. 8. See above, p. 165.

[4] On the position of Macedonia in this age see Droysen's Hellenismus, ii. 553. Allowance must of course be made for the writer's ultra-Macedonian bias, just as for Mr. Grote's ultra-Athenian bias. When Droysen however goes on to compare the progress of Macedonia in Greece with the progress of Prussia in Germany, he forgets or despises the difference between small principalities and small republics. A German County or Bishoprick loses nothing, but rather gains, by being incorporated with a great German Kingdom; a Greek city lost everything by being incorporated with Macedonia. The sympathy which would attend the King of Italy in any uttempt to recover Rome and Venice—I might add Dalmatia and the Italian Tyrol—would not extend to an attempt to annex a Swiss Canton, even of Italian speech, or to an attempt to overthrow the immemorial liberties of San Marino.

policy during a long reign, and transmitted his crown and his Hellenic position to four successors of his house, three of them the natural heirs of his body. In the meanwhile the scattered members of the Achaian Confederation began to draw together again, and to form the centre of the revived political life of republican Greece. It is the varying relations between the great Greek monarchy and the great Greek Confederation, diversified by the strange phænomenon of Ætolia, at once a Democratic Confederation and an aggressive tyranny, and by the brief but splendid revival of Spartan greatness, which form the staple of the history of Federal Greece.

B.C. 278–239.

Revival of the Achaian League, B.C. 281.

The objects of these two rival powers, the Achaian nation and the Macedonian house,[1] were exactly opposite to each other. The aim of the Antigonid Kings was to reduce as large a portion of Greece as possible under either their immediate sovereignty or their indirect influence. The aim of the Achaian Federation was to unite the greatest possible number of Greek cities in the bonds of a free and equal League. In these later Macedonian Kings, though some of them were far from insignificant men, we must not look either for the personal greatness or for the political position of the old monarchs of the line of Hêraklês. Philip and Alexander made it their chief boast to be the chosen leaders of a Greek Confederacy. And, though Athens, Sparta, and Thebes were naturally of another mind, there can be no doubt that many of the smaller cities willingly accepted their supremacy.[2] It is true that neither Philip nor Alexander shrank from any act of severity which suited their purposes. Philip destroyed Olynthos; Alexander destroyed Thebes; if he expelled Tyrants from some cities, he established Tyrants in others. But during the reigns of the two great Kings there was no systematic interference with the internal independence of the Grecian cities. One or two fortresses only were held by Macedonian garrisons. The two great Athenian orators, during Alexander's lifetime, discussed the whole policy of Athens and Macedonia in a way which would have been offensive alike to Kassander the oppressor and to Dêmêtrios the deliverer. The

Opposite aims of Macedonia and Achaia.

Position of the Antigonid Kings.

B.C. 348.

B.C. 335.

Condition of Greece under Philip and Alexander.

[1] Polybios draws this distinction very forcibly (ii. 37); *περὶ δὲ τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους, καὶ περὶ τῆς Μακεδόνων οἰκίας.*

[2] See the passage from Polybios (xvii. 14) quoted in p. 177. The Megalopolitan historian, the hereditary friend of Macedonia, of course carries matters too far, but we are so apt to look at everything with Athenian eyes that it is well to stop sometimes to consider how things seemed to Greeks of other cities.

darkest times for Greece began when Alexander was gone. The unsuccessful, though truly glorious, struggle of the Lamian War laid Greece far more hopelessly prostrate at the feet of inferior masters. During the wars of the Successors, Greece became one of the chief battle-fields of the contending princes. The various cities were indeed often flattered and cajoled. First Polysperchôn and then Dêmêtrios—Dêmêtrios, it may be, for a while, in all sincerity—gave himself out as the liberator of Greece; but Polysperchôn and Dêmêtrios alike liberated cities only to become masters of them themselves. Generally speaking, each Greek town became a fortress to be struggled for, to be taken and retaken, by one or other of the selfish upstarts who were laying waste Europe and Asia in quarrels purely personal. At last, as we have just seen, about forty years after the death of Alexander, nearly sixty after Philip's crowning victory at Chairôneia, a more settled order began to arise out of the chaos. The field was now cleared for a second struggle between Macedonia and Greece, but between Macedonia under a new dynasty of Kings, and Greece represented by new champions of her freedom. Macedonia, lately a prize for every soldier of fortune to struggle for, became, if no longer mistress of East and West, yet at least a powerful Kingdom under a settled dynasty. Greece was no longer the battle-field of many contending rivals; she had one definite enemy to struggle with in the single King of Macedonia. The interests of Macedonian princes elsewhere, especially of the Egyptian Ptolemies, were rather linked with those of Grecian freedom. The Antigonid Kings were rivals whose power it suited them to depress, while the wise rulers of Alexandria were far too clear-sighted to attempt the acquisition of any supremacy in Greece for themselves. The history, then, of the growth of the Achaian League is the history, not only of a political struggle between Federalism and Monarchy, but of a national struggle of Greece against Macedonia. It is a struggle which at once recalls to mind the most glorious event of our own day. The Macedonian power in Greece in some respects resembled the Austrian power in Italy;[1] but, allowing for the difference of times and manners, it was by far the less hateful

B.C. 323, 2. Greece under the Successors. B.C. 323–281.

B.C. 280.

Position of revived Macedonia and Greece. B.C. 281–223.

[1] No historical parallel is ever completely exact. Macedonia, for our present purpose, has strong points of analogy to Austria; I have elsewhere pointed out resemblances between the position of Macedonia in Greece and that of Naples in Italy—some even between Macedonia and Piedmont itself. Oxford Essays, 1857, p. 154.

of the two. The Macedonian in Greece, like the Austrian in Italy, held part of the land in direct sovereignty, as an integral portion of his kingdom. Amphipolis and the Chalkidian peninsula were irrevocably annexed to the monarchy of Pella, and Thessaly, though nominally a distinct state, was held in a condition of dependence not easily to be distinguished from subjection.[1] Besides this extent of continuous territory, many strong detached points in various parts of Greece were held by Macedonian garrisons. In other cities the Macedonian King ruled indirectly through local Tyrants who held their power only through Macedonian protection.[2] Where no opportunity presented itself for any of these forms of more complete absorption, it was enough to do all that might be to prevent the growth of confederations and alliances, and to ensure that those states which still retained some degree of independence should at least remain weak and disunited.[3] This had been of old the policy of Sparta; it was the policy of all the Macedonian Kings; it is equally the policy of tyrants in our own time, when we see the despots alike of Paris and Vienna gnashing their teeth at every accession of strength to the free Italian Kingdom. The establishment of the Antigonid dynasty seems to have been accompanied by a special impulse given to the worst of all these forms of oppression; Antigonos Gonatas is described as relying more than any of his predecessors on the indirect way of ruling through local Tyrants.[4]

Comparison of Macedonia in Greece with Austria in Italy.

We can well believe that this last condition was far worse than incorporation with the Macedonian Kingdom, worse even than the presence of a Macedonian garrison. So in our own

[1] See above, p. 119. See Dem. Phil. iii. 42. Cf. Arr. vii. 12. 4. *Κρατερῷ δὲ . . . ἐκέλευσε* ['Αλέξανδρος] . . . *Μακεδονίας τε καὶ Θρᾴκης καὶ Θετταλῶν ἐξηγεῖσθαι, καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῆς ἐλευθερίας.* Thessaly is here clearly reckoned as an integral part of Alexander's dominions, not as part of the Hellenic Confederacy of which he was the elective head.

[2] Pol. ix. 29. *Τά γε μὴν Κασσάνδρῳ καὶ Δημητρίῳ πεπραγμένα, σὺν δὲ τούτοις 'Αντιγόνῳ τῷ Γονατᾷ, τίς οὐκ οἶδε; . . . ὧν οἱ μὲν φρουρὰς εἰσάγοντες εἰς τὰς πόλεις, οἱ δὲ τυράννους ἐμφυτεύοντες οὐδεμίαν πόλιν ἄμοιρον ἐποίησαν τοῦ τῆς δουλείας ὀνόματος.* The whole speech of the Ætolian Chlaineas, where these words occur, should be studied as a powerful summing up of the anti-Macedonian case.

[3] All this will be found drawn out at length by Polybios (ii. 41). The words of the historian speaking in his own person quite bear out the rhetorical expressions of the Ætolian orator just quoted.

[4] Pol. ii. 41. *Πλείστους γὰρ δὴ μονάρχους οὗτος* ['Αντίγονος] *ἐμφυτεῦσαι δοκεῖ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.* To "plant a Tyrant" (*ἐμφυτεύειν τύραννον*) seems to be a sort of technical term.

times, the Austrian annexation of Venice, the French occupation of Rome, have not involved the same permanent horrors as the local tyrannies of Parma and Naples. But the rule of Macedonia, sharp as the scourge doubtless was, was certainly in some respects less irksome than the rule of Austria. It was not so completely a rule of strangers. The Macedonian Kings, and doubtless their subjects too, at least studiously claimed to be Greeks; whatever the merits of the claim, it was prominently put forward on all occasions.[1] If not Greek by blood—and Philip and Alexander at least were Greek by blood—they were rapidly becoming Greek in language and intellectual culture. Doubtless it was a poor substitute for the true independence of old times for the Greek to be able to say that his master was half a countryman; but it at least makes a wide difference between the lot of Greece under the half-Greek Macedonian, and the lot of Italy under the wholly foreign Austrian.[2] Greece indeed soon found that Macedonia was far from being her worst enemy. During the whole of this period, ever since the Gaulish invasion, Macedonia at least efficiently discharged the functions of a bulwark of Greece against the restless barbarians on her northern frontier. And the time at last came when the Macedonian King was felt to be the champion of Greece in a truer sense than when Alexander marched forth to avenge Hellenic wrongs upon the Persian. Every patriotic Greek must have sympathized with the Macedonian nation, if not with its con-

[1] See above, p. 174. So Alexander, in his letter to Darius, talks of *Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα* (Arr. ii. 14. 4) and continues *ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμὼν κατασταθείς*, κ.τ.λ. So the style of the Confederacy of which Alexander was chief seems to have been *Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες*. Arr. ii. 2. 2, 3; i. 16. 7, cf. 6. Isokratês fully recognizes Philip as a Greek (Phil. 10), but a Greek reigning over foreigners (*οὐχ ὁμοφύλου γένους*. § 126)—foreigners, so far un-Greek as to need kingship (§ 125), but still carefully distinguished from mere barbarians —*φημὶ γὰρ χρῆναί σε τοὺς μὲν Ἕλληνας εὐεργετεῖν, Μακεδόνων δὲ βασιλεύειν, τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων ὡς πλεῖστον ἄρχειν*, κ.τ.λ. (§ 178). He was to conquer barbarians to give them the advantages of a Greek master. Cf. also Isok. Archid. 51. Arr. ii. 7. 4—7.

[2] I am of course speaking here solely of the modern sway of the so-called "Emperors of Austria," not of the old Teutonic Cæsars, whose Imperial title and bearings they venture to assume. Otto, Henry, and the Fredericks were Emperors of the Romans and Kings of Italy, recognized by all Italians, zealously supported by many. Frederick the Second, the greatest of them all, was himself an Italian by birth, language, and temperament; his Italian home was ever the dwelling-place of his choice. The Imperial claims doubtless gradually dried up into a mere legal fiction, but even a legal fiction is something different from the high-handed usurpation of modern Austria.

temptible King, in the final struggle between Perseus and Rome. Through the whole history our feelings lie, naturally and rightly, against Macedonia and for republican Greece. But there is no reason for looking upon Macedonia with any special abhorrence, or for representing her Kings as perfect monsters, or even as barbarian invaders. The Great Alexander, with all his faults, still stands forth, alongside of the Great Charles, among the heroes of whom human nature is proud. And, taking the common standard of royal virtue,[1] the merits of Antigonos Gonatas and Antigonos Dôsôn will assuredly not fall below the average. In extending their dominions and their influence they did but follow the natural instincts of their class, and Antigonos Dôsôn at least sinned far less deeply in accepting Akrokorinthos than Aratos and the Achaian Congress sinned in offering it.

Generous aims of the Achaian League.

The object of the Achaian League, on the other hand, was the union of all Peloponnêsos, or, it may be, of all Greece, into a free and equal Democratic Confederation. Such at least was the wide scope which it assumed in the days of its fullest developement, under Aratos, Philopoimên, and Lykortas. And surely no nobler vision ever presented itself to a Hellenic statesman. We shall soon see but too clearly the defects in the general constitution of the League, and the still greater defects in the personal character of its great leader. But the general objects of both were as wise, generous, and patriotic as any state or any man ever laboured to effect. Other Greek statesmen had worked mainly for the mere aggrandizement of their own cities; Periklês lived for Athens, Agêsilaos for Sparta, Epameinôndas for Thebes; but the worthies of Sikyôn and Megalopolis spent and were spent in the still nobler cause of Hellas. And they came at the right time. From one point of view we may be tempted to regret that their lot had not been cast in an earlier day, and that an effective Federal System had not been long before established in Greece. The establishment of such a system might indeed have saved Greece from many evils; but it was at once utterly impossible and, in the general interests of the world, utterly undesirable. How impossible it was we see by the whole

An earlier establishment of Federalism in Greece not desirable.

[1] "The station of kings is, in a moral sense, so unfavourable, that those who are least prone to servile admiration should be on their guard against the opposite error of an uncandid severity." Hallam's Constitutional History, ch. x. vol. i. p. 647, ed. 1846.

tenor of Grecian history, by the nullity of the Amphiktyonic Council, by the failure of attempts, like that of Lykomêdês, to establish even partial Federal Unions, by the little which, after all, Aratos and his successors were able actually to effect. And, if it had been possible, it was no less clearly undesirable. A Federal system in the days of Athenian and Spartan greatness might have spared Greece the miseries of Athenian and Spartan warfare; it might have saved her from Macedonian conquest;[1] it might even have warded off, or at least delayed, her ultimate subjection to Rome. But Greece united in a Federal bond could never have become the Greece which has challenged the love and admiration of all succeeding ages. The brilliant development of Hellenic greatness, alike in war, in politics, in art, in eloquence, and in poetry, was inseparably linked to the system of independent city-commonwealths. The dissensions and the wars of Greece are the price which she paid for becoming the world's teacher for all time. Again, had Greece never sunk beneath the armed force of Macedonia and Rome, she would never have won the Macedonian and the Roman as the permanent apostles of her civilization and intellectual life. It was well that Greece was disunited; it was well that Greece was conquered; but it was well also that she should revive, if only for a moment, to give the world the first great example of a political teaching of yet another kind. Greece had already done her work as the land of autonomous cities; she was now to give mankind a less brilliant, but more practical, lesson in the way of free government on a more extended scale. Positively indeed but little was done; all Greece was never united even in a nominal bond; even all Peloponnêsos was at best only nominally united after the true glory of the League had passed away. Yet it was something, even in its own day, to restore freedom to a considerable portion of Greece, to give the liberated cities some generations of free and orderly government, to render the inevitable fall of Greece at once more gradual and less disgraceful; and it was yet more, in the history of the world, to give to the political thinkers of after times one of the most valuable subjects for reflection which all ancient history affords.

Effects of the League.

B.C. 191.

[1] Droysen, Hellenismus, ii. 503. Hätte sich die delphische Amphiktyonie zu einer nationalen Verfassung auszubilden vermocht, so würde Philipp nicht bei Chaironeia gekämpft haben.

## § 2. *Origin and Early Growth of the League*

Growth of Federal ideas in Greece in the fourth century, B.C.

In the last chapter we have seen the growth of Federal ideas in many parts of Greece during the fourth century before Christ. The evils caused by the disunion of the great cities made the smaller ones at last understand the need of a closer union among themselves. We have therefore seen several attempts, unsuccessful indeed, but still marking the direction in which men's thoughts were tending, at establishing Federations in several parts of Greece. Then came the days of Macedonian conquest and Macedonian influence. The policy of the Macedonian Kings set itself against all Federations, against all unions of any kind. Even Philip and Alexander, chosen Captains of all Greece as they boasted of being, would have hindered any union among Grecian states which could in the slightest degree have interfered with their supremacy. Their Successors, the usurpers who rose and fell, even the more lasting and high-minded dynasty of the Antigonids, could afford still less consideration for Grecian freedom. They never ventured to put themselves forth as the chosen leaders of Greece, called to that rank by something which at least pretended to the character of a national vote. How they maintained their influence we have already seen, by fostering local divisions and by supporting local tyrannies. But this state of things naturally gave the Federal principle an influence which it had never before possessed. Modern Europeans, accustomed to the compact monarchies of modern Europe, are apt to look on the Federal system as a system of weakness and disunion; to a Greek of the third century before Christ, accustomed only to a choice between town-autonomy, local tyranny, and foreign bondage, it presented itself as a happy combination, by which freedom could be made to coexist with union, and therefore with strength. The Federal form of government henceforth became predominant, and at last almost universal, in the independent portion of Greece. Every city which achieved its own independence sought, by a natural instinct, to maintain that independence by an union with other cities. And that union was now freely made upon terms from which, a century before, nearly every Greek commonwealth would have shrunk as an unworthy surrender of its separate dignity and separate freedom.

Further Federal reaction against Macedonian influence.

Early History of Achaia.

Among the cities which had thus become disunited through Macedonian influence were the cities of the Peloponnesian Achaia. If we may trust the half mythical history of the Dorian migration, the Achaians of Peloponnêsos were the only independent remnant of that mighty race which, under the Pelopid Kings of Mykênê, had ruled over many islands and all Argos.[1] The Achaians fill the most prominent place in the Greece of Homer and in the Greece of Polybios, but in the Greece of Thucydidês they are utterly insignificant. Polybios, with a commendable national pride, collects several instances[2] to show that, if they were insignificant in power, they were at least highly respected for upright and honourable dealing. No people in Greece bore a higher character either for discretion or for good faith, and they were more than once called upon to act as mediators in the dissensions of more powerful states. We are, however, more concerned with the degree of union which may have existed among their several cities in times before the growth of the Macedonian power. That Achaia then contained twelve cities, democratically governed,[3] and united by some sort of Federal tie, admits of no doubt. But, as in the case of most of these early Greek Federations, we have no details of the old Achaian constitution. There is however no reason for the supposition that it was a religious rather than a political union, a mere Amphiktyony to the temple of Poseidôn at Helikê.[4] The whole history shows that a real Federal union existed among them, and that, even then, the League sometimes extended itself to take in cities beyond the strict limits of Achaia. Early in the fourth century before Christ we find the Ætolian town of Kalydôn not only an Achaian possession, but admitted to the rights of Achaian citizenship.[5] Naupaktos also appears as held by the Achaians, but on what terms is not so clear.[6] In every account of these transac-

Early Union among the Cities.

B.C. 391.

[1] Iliad, B. 108. Πολλῇσι νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ πάντι ἀνάσσειν.

[2] Pol. ii. 39. [Cf. Strabo viii. 7. 1.]

[3] Pol. ii. 41. Μετέστησαν εἰς δημοκρατίαν τὴν πολιτείαν. λοιπὸν ἤδη τοὺς ἐξῆς χρόνους μέχρι τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου δυναστείας ἄλλοτε μὲν ἄλλως ἐχώρει τὰ πράγματ' αὐτοῖς κατὰ τὰς περιστάσεις, τό γε μὴν κοινὸν πολίτευμα καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ συνέχειν ἐπειρῶντο. τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων.

[4] Dict. Antiq. art. Achaicum Fœdus.

[5] Xen. Hell. iv. 6. 1. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ ἔχοντες Καλυδῶνα, ἣ τὸ παλαιὸν Αἰτωλίας ἦν, καὶ πολίτας πεποιημένοι τοὺς Καλυδωνίους, φρουρεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο ἐν αὐτῇ. [So in Roman times a harbour in the region of Kalydôn belonged to Patrai; Strabo, x. 2. 21. Ἔστι δέ τις καὶ πρὸς τῇ Καλυδῶνι λίμνη μεγάλη καὶ εὔοψος, ἣν ἔχουσιν οἱ ἐν Πάτραις Ῥωμαῖοι.]

[6] Dêmosthenês says (Phil. iii. 44) that Philip promised to take Naupaktos

tions we find the Achaian people spoken of as one whole, acting with one will both in diplomatic and military affairs. They placed Federal garrisons in cities endangered by the enemy,[1] and commissioned Federal ambassadors to foreign powers.[2] At the same time it is easy to believe that the Federal tie may have been much less closely drawn than it was in the revived Confederation of after-times. Still that Confederation, as we shall presently see, was looked on as a mere revival of a past state of things interrupted for a while by foreign interference. We are hardly entitled to judge whether it was from any laxity in the formal constitution, or only from the fluctuations of parties so common in all Greek states, that the Achaian League did not, any more than that of Akarnania, invariably act as an united body throughout the Peloponnêsian War. When that war broke out, all the Achaian cities remained neutral, except Pellênê, which took the side of Sparta;[3] but at a later stage all twelve were enrolled as members of the Lacedæmonian alliance.[4] Yet, in an intermediate stage, we find Patrai at least on the side of Athens, and, under Athenian influence, extending herself by Long Walls to the sea.[5] During the wars of Epameinôndas, Pellênê adhered firmly to her Spartan policy, at a time when the other cities were, to say the least, less strenuous in the Spartan cause.[6] At the same time we also get some glimpses of the internal state of the several cities. We read of local oligarchies,[7] which Epameinôndas found and left in possession, but which the home

Probable greater laxity of the bond during the Old League.

Achaia during the Peloponnêsian War, B.C. 431.

B.C. 413.

B.C. 419.

History of Pellênê, B.C. 368.

from the Achaians and to give it to the Ætolians; *οὐκ Ἀχαιῶν Ναύπακτον ὁμώμοκεν Αἰτωλοῖς παραδώσειν*; Naupaktos, therefore, in B.C. 341, was an Achaian possession. But we read in Diodôros (xv. 75) that Epameinôndas, in B.C. 367, *Δύμην καὶ Ναύπακτον καὶ Καλυδῶνα φρουρουμένην ὑπ' Ἀχαιῶν ἠλευθέρωσεν*. If then we trust Diodôros, as Mr. Grote (x. 366) seems to do, we must suppose that the Achaians recovered Naupaktos between B.C. 367 and B.C. 341. But can we trust a writer who seems to think that Dymê needed deliverance from Achaian oppression?

[1] Xen. Hell. iv. 6. 1. *Φρουρεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο.*

[2] Ib. *Οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ πρεσβεῖς πέμπουσιν εἰς τὴν Λακεδαίμονα.*

[3] Thuc. ii. 9, cf. v. 58, where we find Pellênê supporting Sparta against Argos after the Peace of Nikias.

[4] Thuc. ii. 9. Cf. Arnold's note, and vii. 34, where the Achaians are incidentally mentioned as Lacedæmonian allies.

[5] Thuc. v. 52.

[6] Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 15, 18. Afterwards Pellênê is found on the Theban side. 2. 11.

[7] Ib. vii. 1. 42. *Στρατεύουσι πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐπ' Ἀχαΐαν, ἡγουμένου Ἐπαμεινώνδου. προσπεσόντων δ' αὐτῷ τῶν βελτίστων ἐκ τῆς Ἀχαΐας, ἐνδυναστεύει ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ὥστε μὴ φυγαδεῦσαι τοὺς κρατίστους, μήτε πολιτείαν μεταστῆσαι*, etc.

Government of Thebes thought good to expel, and to substitute democracies under the protection of Theban harmosts. This policy did not answer, as the large bodies of exiles thus formed contrived to recover the cities, and to bring them to a far more decided Spartan partisanship than before.[1] But these oligarchies, probably introduced by Spartan influence, seem to have formed a mere temporary interruption to that general democratic character of the Achaian polity to which Polybios bears witness. Certain it is that Achaia was democratic at the accession of Alexander. He established as Tyrant in Pellênê one of her own citizens named Chairôn.[2] This Chairôn was famous as a wrestler; he was also a Platonic philosopher, which leads Athênaios sarcastically to say that, in some of the worst features of his tyranny, he did but carry out his master's doctrines as to the community of goods and women.[3] How Pellênê had offended the Macedonian King we know not, but it appears that the establishment of the tyranny was accompanied by the expulsion of a large proportion of the citizens.[4] This seems to mark some special ground of quarrel with the particular city of Pellênê; for Alexander would hardly have thus punished a single town for the share which all Achaia had taken in the resistance to his father at Chairôneia.[5] The presence of this domestic Tyrant prevented Pellênê from joining with the other Achaian cities in the movement against the Macedonian dominion set on foot by Agis, King of Sparta.[6] After the disastrous battle in which

Tyranny of Chairôn at Pellênê, before B.C. 335.

B.C. 330.

[1] Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 41—3. Grote, x. 365. Helwing, Geschichte des Ach. Bundes, p. 225.

[2] Pseudo-Dêm. π.τ.π. Ἀλεξ. 12. Ἀχαιοὶ μὲν οἱ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ἐδημοκρατοῦντο, τούτων δ' ἐν Πελλήνῃ νῦν καταλέλυκε τὸν δῆμον ὁ Μακεδὼν ἐκβαλὼν τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς πλείστους, τὰ δ' ἐκείνων τοῖς οἰκέταις δέδωκε, Χαίρωνα δὲ τὸν παλαιστὴν τύραννον ἐγκατέστησεν. Paus. vii. 27. 7. Κατέλυσε [Χαίρων] πολιτείαν, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, τὴν ἐν Πελλήνῃ, δῶρον τὸ ἐπιφθονώτατον παρὰ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Φιλίππου λαβών, τύραννος πατρίδος τῆς αὐτοῦ καταστῆναι. This Chairôn could not therefore be, as Dr. Elder (Dict. Biog. art. Chæron) thinks, the same as the Chairôn who is mentioned by Plutarch (Alex. 3), for the latter was a citizen of Megalopolis, while both Pausanias and Athênaios distinctly mark Chairôn the Tyrant as a citizen of Pellênê.

[3] Athên. xi. 119. [509*b*.] Χαίρων ὁ Πελληνεὺς, ὃς οὐ μόνῳ Πλάτωνι ἐσχόλακεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ξενοκράτει· καὶ οὗτος οὖν τῆς πατρίδος πικρῶς τυραννήσας οὐ μόνον τοὺς ἀρίστους τῶν πολιτῶν ἐξήλασεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς τούτων δούλοις τὰ χρήματα τῶν δεσποτῶν χαρισάμενος, καὶ τὰς ἐκείνων γυναῖκας συνῴκισεν πρὸς γάμου κοινωνίαν, ταῦτ' ὠφεληθεὶς ἐκ τῆς καλῆς Πολιτείας καὶ τῶν παρανόμων Νόμων. [4] Pseudo-Dêm. u. s.

[5] Paus. vii. 6. 5. Τοῦ μὲν ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ Φιλίππου τ' ἐνάντια καὶ Μακεδόνων [πολέμου] οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ μέτεσχον.

[6] Æsch. Ktês. 165. Ἠλεῖοι δ' αὐτοῖς [Λακεδαιμονίοις] συμμετεβάλοντο καὶ

Agis fell, the Achaians and Eleians are said to have been condemned, by the anomalous body which then issued decrees in the name of Greece, to pay a hundred talents as indemnity to Megalopolis, which had embraced the Macedonian cause and had stood a siege at the hands of the allies.[1] The establishment of Chairôn by Alexander was the beginning of the system which was more fully carried out by the succeeding Macedonian Kings. Kassander held several of the cities with his garrisons, which were driven out by Aristodêmos the general of Antigonos from Patrai, Aigion, and Dymê.[2] In the case of Patrai and Aigion, this expulsion is spoken of by our informant as a liberation,[3] but the Dymaians resisted the liberators in the cause of what the same historian calls their independence.[4] Whatever we make of this language, it at least points to a difference of political feeling in the different cities. Dêmêtrios also, in the days when the son of the King of Asia gave himself out as the champion of Grecian freedom, expelled Kassander's garrison from Boura, and gave to that city also something which is spoken of as independence.[5] But when Dêmêtrios became King of Macedonia, he seems to have walked in the way of his predecessors, and both he and his son Antigonos are mentioned among the princes under whom some of the cities were occupied by Macedonian garrisons and others by local Tyrants.[6] At what moment the League definitely fell asunder it is hard to say: the process, doubtless, was gradual; but as Antigonos Gonatas[7] is mentioned

B.C. 314. Achaia under the Successors;

B.C. 303.

B.C. 294.

under Antigonos Gonatas, circa B.C. 288.

Ἀχαιοὶ πάντες πλὴν Ἱελληναίων καὶ Ἀρκαδία πᾶσα πλὴν Μεγάλης πόλεως, αὕτη δὲ ἐπολιορκεῖτο, κ.τ.λ.

[1] Q. Curt. vi. 1. 19, 20. They were condemned by the "Concilium Græcorum." So Diodôros (xvii. 73) speaks of τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων συνέδριον. That is to say, Alexander's synod at Corinth. See above, p. 100. Yet it is possible that Diodôros may here too have been dreaming of the Amphiktyons.

[2] Diod. xix. 66.

[3] Ib. Ἁτρας μὲν ἠλευθέρωσε . . . . τοῖς Αἰγιεῦσι κατὰ δόγμα τὴν ἐλευθερίαν βουλόμενος ἀποκαταστῆσαι.

[4] Ib. Ἱαρακαλέσαντες ἀλλήλους ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς αὐτονομίας.

[5] Ib. xx. 103. Δημήτριος . . . . Βοῦραν μὲν κατὰ κράτος εἷλε, καὶ τοῖς πολίταις ἀπέδωκε τὴν αὐτονομίαν.

[6] Pol. ii. 41. Pausanias (vii. 7. 1) strangely says that no Achaian city but Pellênê was ever under a Tyrant, seemingly confounding the time of Alexander with that of the Antigonids; τυράννων τε γὰρ πλὴν Ἱελλήνης αἱ ἄλλαι πόλεις τὸν χρόνον ἅπαντα ἀπείρως ἐσχήκεσαν.

[7] Antigonos Gonatas first began to play a prominent part during his father's lifetime, about B.C. 288, when he was left in command of Dêmêtrios' garrisons in Greece. This was probably the time when Antigonos completed the dissolution of the League. Its complete dissolution is expressed by Polybios (ii. 40, cf. 41)

among the Kings who had a hand in the evil work; and, as it was at no very advanced stage of his reign that the cities began again to draw together, it would seem that the period of complete isolation cannot have been very long, and that the work of reunion must have been found proportionably easy.

Final Dissolution of the old League.

Twelve original cities.

The twelve cities of the original League, as enumerated by Polybios,[1] were Helikê, Olenos, Patrai, Dymê, Pharai, Tritaia, Leontion, Aigeira, Pellênê, Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia. Of these Helikê seems to have been originally the chief; its great temple of Poseidôn[2] was the seat of the religious meetings of the Achaian people, and the city was probably also the seat of the Federal Government.[3] But Helikê was swallowed up by an earthquake, and its site covered by the sea, long before the dissolution of the old League.[4] Olenos also was deserted by its inhabitants[5] at some time before the revival of the League, so that ten cities only were left. Of these, since the loss of Helikê, Aigion was the greatest.[6] It was the seat of the Federal Government under the revived League in the very latest times,[7] as it most probably had been during the later days of the earlier one. Of the exact nature of the Federal union under the old system, of the titles and duties of

Loss of Helikê [B.C. 373] and of Olenos.

in the words *κατὰ πόλιν διαλυθέντος τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας βασιλέων*. The formula *ἐκ Μακεδονίας* may well express Dêmêtrios and Antigonos when they were not in actual possession of the Macedonian throne. Cf. Niebuhr, Lect. on Anc. Hist. iii. 259, Eng. Tr. Strabo, viii. 7. 1.

[1] Pol. ii. 41.

[2] See Strabo, viii. 7. 2. Paus. vii. 24. 5.

[3] Not necessarily, for Korôneia was the religious centre of Bœotia, while Thebes was the political head.

[4] Paus. vii. 24. 6, et seqq. Strabo, u.s. Pol. ii. 41. This destruction is by Pausanias ascribed to the wrath of Poseidôn at some suppliants being dragged away from his altar. In this, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 88) says, "we perceive a symptom of some violent political agitation."

[5] See Leake, Morea, ii. 157. Thirlwall, viii. 90. The expression of Strabo (viii. 7. 1), *οὐ συνελθούσης*, might, by itself, have inclined one to Colonel Leake's view that Olenos survived till the Roman times, and refused to join the revived Achaian League. But there can be no doubt that Bishop Thirlwall is, as usual, right. Had Olenos remained as a considerable city during the time of the second League, we could hardly fail to have come across some mention of it in the history of Polybios. And Polybios himself distinctly implies that Olenos had perished before his day. ii. 41. *τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐκ δώδεκα πόλεων, ἃς ἔτι καὶ νῦν συμβαίνει διαμένειν, πλὴν Ὠλένου καὶ Ἑλίκης τῆς πρὸ τῶν Λευκτρικῶν ὑπὸ θαλάσσης καταποθείσης*. It is an important point in the Federal history that the revived League was joined by all the Achaian cities which still existed.

[6] Paus. vii. 7. 2.

[7] Ib. vii. 24. 4.

the Federal magistrates, we know absolutely nothing. In a curious story told by Strabo when recording the destruction of Helikê, we find a distinct mention of the Federal Assembly as something appealed to and passing a vote; but we also find the vote as distinctly disobeyed by the contumacious canton of Helikê.[1]

Traces of Federal action under the Old League.

Thus, at the time of the Gaulish invasion, ten Achaian cities existed, but there was no Achaian League. The ten cities were ten distinct political units; some of them too were held by Macedonian garrisons, others by local Tyrants. It was the interest of every Macedonian prince to prolong this state of things; it was the interest of every Achaian, and indeed of every Greek, to put the speediest possible end to it. At last the favourable moment came. Several of the Kings were dead; Pyrrhos was absent in Italy; Macedonia was in utter confusion. The cities of Patrai and Dymê, which, since the desertion of Olenos, were the two most western cities of the Achaian shore, took the first steps towards the revival of the old confederacy.[2] The inland cities of Tritaia and Pharai soon joined them, and these four became the nucleus of the great Federal republic of Peloponnêsos. Their union was looked on so completely as a mere revival of a past lawful state of things that its terms were not publicly recorded on a pillar, as was usually done with treaties between separate Grecian states, and as was done in after-times on the accession of fresh cities to the League.[3] Of the circumstances of their union we know nothing; Polybios does not mention the presence either of garrisons or of Tyrants in these particular cities; his words might seem rather to imply that they were free from either scourge, but only that the circumstances of the time had led to an opposition of feelings and interests among them.[4] As to the

Beginnings of the revived League. Union of Patrai and Dymê [B.C. 280], of Tritaia and Pharai.

[1] The "Ionians expelled from Helikê;" that is, probably their descendants in Asia, ask either for the actual image of Poseidôn, or at least for leave to make a mod l of it. The people of Helikê refuse, the Ionians appeal to the Federal body (Strabo, viii. 7. 2), *οὐ δόντων δὲ, πέμψαι πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν· τῶν δὲ ψηφισαμένων, οὐδ' ὡς ὑπακοῦσαι.* If one can trust the details of such a story, the word *πέμψαι* might imply that the Federal Assembly was in session, and not at Helikê.

[2] Pol. ii. 41. See Clinton, Fast. Hell. ii. 204.

[3] Pol. ii. 41. *Οὐδὲ στήλην ὑπάρχειν συμβαίνει τῶν πόλεων τούτων περὶ τῆς συμπολιτείας.* Cf. xxv. 1; xxvi. 1. *Τοὺς ὅρκους, τοὺς νόμους, τὰς στήλας, ἃ συνέχει τὴν κοινὴν συμπολιτείαν ἡμῶν.*

[4] Pol. ii. 41. *Πατρεῖς ἤρξαντο συμφρονεῖν καὶ Δυμαῖοι . . . ἤρξαντο μετανοήσαντες συμφρονεῖν.* His general description does not imply that every city had

next stages of the process the historian is more explicit. Aigion had a garrison, Boura and Keryneia were ruled by Tyrants. Five years after the union of Patrai and Dymê, the people of Aigion themselves expelled their garrison and joined the Union. Boura was freed, and its Tyrant slain, by the people of the city, aided by their already liberated brethren.[1] Iseas, the Tyrant of Keryneia, watching the course of events and seeing that he would probably be the next attacked, voluntarily surrendered his power, and, having obtained security for his own safety, he annexed his city to what Polybios, now for the first time, calls by the proud title of the Achaian League.[2]

Union of Aigion [B.C. 275], Boura, and Keryneia.

Seven cities were now in strict union; we know not the steps by which the two eastern towns of Aigeira and Pellênê were recovered, but their annexation could not have been long delayed; and the inland city of Leontion, already hemmed in by the territory of the liberated towns, must have been recovered even sooner. The ten cities of Achaia Proper thus formed the revived League in its first estate, and for about thirty years they grew up in peace and obscurity. Their very insignificance was no doubt among their advantages, as sheltering them from the notice of enemies. A germ of freedom was thus allowed to grow steadily up in a corner of Greece, which, if it had appeared at Athens or Corinth, would have been at once crushed in the bud. One city indeed, immediately after the reconstruction of the League, suffered a blow which forms almost the whole of the external history of Achaia during this period. The people of Patrai crossed over to help the Ætolians, with whom they were then on friendly terms, in their struggle with the Gaulish invaders. The Patrian contingent suffered so severely that this loss, combined with the general poverty of the time, led most of the inhabitants to leave the city of Patrai, and to found smaller towns in the adjoining territory.[3] It does not however appear

Extension of the League to all Achaia.

Loss sustained by Patrai in the Gaulish War, B.C. 279.

either a garrison or a Tyrant. *Συνέβη πάσας τὰς πόλεις χωρισθείσας ἀφ' αὑτῶν ἐναντίως τὸ συμφέρον ἄγειν ἀλλήλαις· ἐξ οὗ συνέπεσε τὰς μὲν ἐμφρούρους αὐτῶν γενέσθαι . . . τὰς δὲ καὶ τυραννεῖσθαι.*

[1] The words *ἐξῆς δὲ τούτοις Βούριοι τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναντες* (Pol. ii. 41) followed presently by *ἀπολωλότα δὲ τὸν ἐν τῇ Βούρᾳ τύραννον διὰ Μάρκου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν* show the combined action of the Bourians themselves and of the confederate cities.

[2] Ib. *Προσέθηκε τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύστημα.*

[3] Paus. vii. 18. 6. *Κατὰ χώραν ὑπὸ φιλεργίας ἐσκεδάσθησαν.* He goes on to say that these small townships were all reunited to Patrai by Augustus Cæsar, and the restored city raised to the rank of a Roman colony. These townships

that this process at all affected the political position of Patrai as an Achaian city; the inhabitants of Argyra, Bolimê, and the other country towns, doubtless retained their Patrian franchise, just like Athenian citizens living in an Attic Dêmos. And indeed the Gaulish invasion itself, by its temporary overthrow of the Macedonian power, must have conferred indirect benefits on the League in general which far more than counterbalanced any losses sustained by the single city of Patrai. Unobserved, apparently, and uncared for, the ten Achaian cities had time to strengthen their habits of freedom and good government, to develope their political constitution, and gradually to prepare themselves for the day when their League was to step forward as the general champion of Grecian freedom and as one of the great political lights of Greece and the world.

Quiet and peaceful growth of the League, B.C. 280–251.

During this time there are only two names of individuals which we can connect with the course of our history; these are two citizens of the small town of Keryneia, Iseas and Markos. Of neither of them is much recorded, but quite enough to make us wish that we knew more. Of Markos we shall hear again, and always honourably; Polybios gives his whole career the highest praise;[1] twenty years after his first appearance he was chosen the first sole General of the League;[2] twenty-six years later still, the noble old man, still in the active service of his country, perished in a sea-fight against the pirates of Illyria.[3] But it is the earlier exploits of Markos which we desire to know more in detail. He would almost appear to have been the Washington of the original League, though his fame has been obscured by the later and more brilliant services of Aratos. A day came when the deliverance of Boura seemed a small matter compared to the deliverance of Sikyôn and Akrokorinthos; but, in the day of the deliverance of Boura, that small success was of greater moment than the greatest successes of later and more prosperous times. The very name of the hero, Italian rather

Names of individuals.

Markos of Keryneia.

B.C. 255.

B.C. 229.

Markos probably the true Founder of the League.

must be the Πατρεῖς καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο συντελικόν in Pol. xl. 3. Cf. v. 94, for a similar phrase about another town. Strabo (viii. 7. 5.) says that each of the original twelve cities consisted of seven or eight δῆμοι [ἐκ δήμων συνειστήκει ἑπτὰ καὶ ὀκτώ].

[1] Pol. ii. 10. Μάρκος ὁ Κερυνεύς, ἀνὴρ πάντα τὰ δίκαια τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματι πεποιηκὼς μέχρι τῆς καταστροφῆς.

[2] Ib. 43.

[3] Ib. 10.

than Greek,[1] raises curiosity as to his origin and history. He was a citizen of Keryneia, but we find him acting in the interests of the League, and apparently as the leader of its councils, at a time when Keryneia itself was still under the sway of its Tyrant. Markos was the chief leader[2] in the movement, of whatever nature it was, by which the liberated cities were able to extend their help to the patriots of Boura. It is impossible to believe that Markos can have been at this time an inhabitant of his native town; it can hardly be doubted that he was an exile in the cause of freedom, who offered his services to the infant League, and was most likely admitted to the citizenship of one of its members. Iseas again, the Tyrant of Markos' own city, is a man of whom we should gladly know more. He was the first of several Tyrants who had the wisdom and magnanimity to give up their ill-gotten and dangerous power, and to confine their ambition within the bounds of such honours as a free state can confer upon its citizens. If Markos was the precursor, in some respects the nobler precursor, of Aratos, Iseas may well have been the worthy precursor of Lydiadas. We must always remember what a Greek Tyranny was. It was royal, or more than royal, power possessed by one man in a state where monarchy was not the lawful constitution. It therefore necessarily implied the internal political bondage of the city. At this period of Grecian history a Tyranny also commonly implied, what in earlier times it did not, a state of external dependence on a foreign power. The Tyrant ruled under Macedonian protection, often by the help of Macedonian troops. The Tyrannies of this age were therefore, for the most part, something far worse than the earlier Tyrannies of Peisistratos or even of Periander. Two widely different periods, in both of which Tyrannies were common, are divided by a long interval. During the fifth century before Christ and the greater part of the fourth, Tyranny was rare in Greece proper, and almost unknown in the chief cities.[3] The Tyrant of the old times, Peisistratos of

Iseas of Keryneia abdicates the Tyranny.

Nature of the Greek Tyrannies.

Difference between the earlier and later Tyrannies.

[1] Brandstäter (Geschichte Ætoliens, 202) makes the true form Μάργος and not Μάρκος. But would not Μάργος be a name quite as strange on other grounds? I follow Thirlwall and Bekker's Polybios.

[2] Pol. ii. 41. Διὰ Μάρκου καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.

[3] Tyrants were common enough at this time in Sicily and elsewhere among the colonial Greeks, but there were very few in Old Greece between the fall of the Peisistratids and the age of the Successors. Euphrôn at Sikyôn and Timophanês at Corinth are the most famous exceptions. The Thessalian Tyrants have per-

Athens or Kleisthenês of Sikyôn, was a party leader, who commonly reigned with the good will of at least a part of the citizens; at all events nothing hindered him from seeking either the external greatness or the internal splendour of his city. Corinth was never so great as under Periander, or Samos so great as under Polykratês. But the Tyrant of the Macedonian age commonly obtained his power by sheer violence, and ruled simply by the spears of foreign mercenaries. Still it must be remembered that the mere word Tyrant, in its Greek use,[1] expresses only the illegal nature of the Tyrant's power, and does not necessarily imply any oppressive exercise of it. The Tyrant's position indeed offered every opportunity of oppression and every temptation to oppress, but the position itself does not necessarily convict a man of cruelty or rapacity. When the Tyrant came to his power by hereditary succession, the son would often be, like the younger Dionysios, if weaker, at all events less oppressive than his father. In the later period Tyrannies were less commonly transmitted from father to the son than in the earlier, but on the other hand it is easy to understand that absolute power may now, from another set of causes, have sometimes fallen into better hands, and have been employed for better purposes. Tyranny was now quite common and familiar; though hereditary dynasties were seldom founded, yet many cities were under the government of several Tyrants in uninterrupted succession; republican government may often have been unknown to two or three generations of citizens.[2] In such an age, a man ambitious of power, and to whom no nobler way of obtaining it presented itself, may have grasped at the Tyranny as his only path to greatness, without the least intention of inflicting any wanton oppression upon his countrymen.[3] It is clear that there were the same sort of differences among

B.C. 625–585.
B.C. 530–522.

haps more in common with the Tyrannies of the later period, of which they may be looked upon as the beginning.

[1] See above, p. 17. I do not see the gain of substituting, with Mr. Grote, the word "Despot" for "Tyrant" as the translation of the Greek *τύραννος*. Whichever we use must be used in a fixed technical sense, differing somewhat from its usual modern meaning. Europe now contains several Despots, but only one *τύραννος*.

[2] When Aratos delivered Corinth in B.C. 243, the Corinthians had not had the keys of their own city since the time of Philip—ninety-five years. Plut. Arat. 23.

[3] "The Tyrants consisting of his [Antigonos Gonatas'] partisans were men of very different characters: some were moderate and bearable persons, while others were extremely cruel." Niebuhr, Lect. on Anc. Hist. iii. 259.

the Greek instruments of Macedonia as we have seen in our own times among the Italian instruments of Austria.[1] No fair person would confound the government of the deposed ruler of Tuscany with the government of the deposed ruler of Naples. But Greece saw, what Italy has not seen, Tyrants prudent and noble-minded enough to lay down the Tyranny of their own will, and honestly to adapt themselves to a change which they could not, and may not have wished to, avert. Such was the noble Lydiadas of Megalopolis, whom we shall soon meet with as one of the brightest glories of the League. Such may well have been Iseas of Keryneia in its earlier days. And it must have required yet greater vigour in Iseas to set such an example[2] than it required in Lydiadas, a generation later, to follow it. For Iseas, when alarmed for the security of his power, did not fly, as many a meaner tyrant has done, and leave his city to its fate; he did not ask his royal patron for support against the encroaching spirit of freedom; he laid down his power, and, trusting to the faith of the Confederate cities, he himself annexed Keryneia to the League.[3] Of his subsequent career we know nothing; Polybios does not tell us whether Iseas, like Lydiadas and Aristomachos, lived to know how much really greater is the position

[1] An objection may be brought against a parallel between the Greek Tyrants and "legitimate" rulers like the deposed Italian Princes. But all the dynasties lately reigning in Italy reigned only by virtue of treaties contracted by foreign powers, to which those who alone were concerned were no parties. The Princes of Lorraine, though one of them was probably the best despot that ever reigned in Europe, had really less right in Tuscany than the old Visconti had in Milan. This sort of legitimacy was something quite unknown in old Greece, and I cannot help thinking that if a specimen had appeared, whether in the form of an individual ruler or a whole dynasty, Greek political thinkers would have set it down as a case of *τυραννίς* rather than of lawful *βασιλεία*.

[2] I know of only one clear example of a Greek Tyrant in the earlier period willingly surrendering his power. This is Kadmos, Tyrant of Kôs, contemporary with the Persian War, who gave up his Tyranny—*ἑκών τε εἶναι καὶ δεινοῦ ἐπιόντος οὐδενὸς, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης ἐς μέσον Κῴοισι καταθεὶς τὴν ἀρχήν* (Herod. vii. 164). He did not however, like Lydiadas, remain as a private citizen in the city where he had ruled.

There is also the story of the contemplated abdication of Maiandrios of Samos. Herod. iii. 142.

[3] The article Iseas in the Dictionary of Biography hardly does justice to our Keryneian Tyrant. Mr. Bunbury says that Iseas "judged it prudent to provid for his personal safety by voluntarily abdicating the sovereign power, whereupon Ceryneia immediately joined the Achaians," as if Iseas had no hand in uniting Keryneia with the League. Now the words of Polybios (ii. 41) are *ἀποθέμενος τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ λαβὼν τὰ πιστὰ παρὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀσφαλείας προσέθηκε τὴν πόλιν πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύστημα.* This surely implies that Iseas, just like Lydiadas, was himself the chief promoter of the union.

of the republican magistrate than that of the despotic prince. But the conduct of Iseas shows a prudence or a magnanimity, or rather an union of the two, which at once stamps him as no common man. And it is honourable to the otherwise insignificant town of Keryneia to have produced the only two men whose names we know during this first period of the League's history, and both of them men of whom the little that we know makes us anxious for a more intimate knowledge.

### § 3. *Of the Achaian Federal Constitution*

It must have been in the course of these years, during which the League was growing up in peaceful obscurity, that that Federal Constitution was formed which was afterwards extended over so large a portion of Greece. As usual, however, we have to frame our account of it from incidental notices, from general panegyrics, and from records of particular changes in detail. We cannot lay our hands on any one document, on any Declaration of Independence, on any formally enacted Federal Constitution, to act as a decisive authority in our inquiries. We may console ourselves with the thought that an inquirer at any equal distance of time will have to frame his picture of the British Constitution from information of exactly the same kind. Certainly he will not find any one authoritative document clearly setting forth the powers of King, Lords, and Commons, or exactly defining the Prerogative of the Crown, the Privilege of Parliament, and the Liberty of the Subject. Still less will he find any such document setting forth such hardly less important points as the nature of Government and of Opposition, or explaining the exact constitution of the Cabinet and the functions of the Leader of the House of Commons. But, though no such document has survived to our time, we have every reason to believe that the Achaian Constitution, unlike the British Constitution, was enacted and recorded by public authority. The first union of the four towns was looked on as a mere revival of the old League, probably on the laxer terms of union on which that old League seems to have been formed. We have seen that it did not hinder Patrai from acting independently of its confederates in the Gaulish War [1] just as we saw Pellênê, under the

[1] See above, p. 192.

Probable enactment of the Federal Constitution, B.C. circa 274.

old League, acting independently of its confederates in the Peloponnêsian War.[1] Such a course would have been contrary to every principle of the Federal Constitution in the days of its maturity. Most probably, when all the surviving Achaian towns were reunited, the union was intentionally made more intimate, and its terms were enacted and recorded by common consent.[2]

Sources of Information.

No such document however is preserved to us; and we have to form our ideas of the Achaian Constitution chiefly from the incidental notices and general comments of Polybios, and from such further incidental notices as are to be found in writers like Plutarch, Pausanias, and Strabo. Polybios unfortunately does not begin his detailed narrative till a later period, when in truth the most interesting portion of the League's history had passed by. Of its foundation and its earlier fortunes he gives a mere sketch, but it is a sketch for which we may well be thankful, a sketch clear and masterly as might be looked for from such a hand.

The Constitution formed for the Achaian Towns only.

We have abundant evidence to show that the Federal Constitution was formed while the League still embraced only the small towns of the original Achaia. The greater cities which afterwards joined the Union were admitted into a body the relations and duties of whose members were already fixed and well understood. This will plainly appear, if only from one or two points in the constitution which were suited only to the circumstances of the original Achaian towns, and which were found to be a source of inconvenience, and even of unfairness, when the Union was extended over a wider territory.

Democratic Constitution of the League.

The whole constitution of the League was Democratic. Polybios constantly praises it as the truest and purest of all Democracies.[3] Yet we shall soon see that Democracy in Achaia was practically a very different thing from Democracy at Athens. It is possible that Polybios might have looked upon the constitution of Athens as an Ochlocracy as opposed to the true Democracy of his own land. But the fact rather is that in theory Achaia was as strictly democratic as Athens, but that the circumstances of the League unavoidably tempered the Achaian Democracy in practice in a way in which nothing occurred to

[1] See above, p. 187.

[2] Thirlwall, viii. 89, 90.

[3] Pol. ii. 38. Ἰσηγορίας καὶ παρρησίας καὶ καθόλου δημοκρατίας ἀληθινῆς σύστημα καὶ προαίρεσιν εἰλικρινεστέραν οὐκ ἂν εὕροι τις τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὑπαρχούσης.

temper the Athenian Democracy. In both alike the sovereign power was vested in a Popular Assembly, in which every free citizen had an equal right to attend, speak, and vote. In both alike the People, and the People alone, enacted laws, elected magistrates, contracted alliances, declared war and peace. But in Achaia conditions which never arose at Athens modified this popular sovereignty in many ways. Far greater legal power was placed in the hands of particular magistrates. Far greater power of an indirect, though not an illegal, kind was thrown into the hands both of magistrates and other leading men. The Assembly indeed always remained the supreme and undisputed authority, but the powers even of that sovereign body would have appeared sadly curtailed in the eyes of a democrat whose ideas were formed solely on Athenian models.

Differences between Achaian and Athenian Democracy.

The constitution of the League was strictly Federal. The Federal form of government now appears in its fullest and purest shape. Every city remained a distinct State, sovereign for all purposes not inconsistent with the higher sovereignty of the Federation, retaining its local Assemblies and local Magistrates, and ordering all exclusively local affairs without any interference from the central power. There is no evidence that the Federal Government, in its best days, ever directly interfered with the internal laws, or even with the political constitutions, of the several cities.[1] We read, as elsewhere in Greece, of local parties and local dissensions, and, in one case at least, at Megalopolis after the fall of Kleomenês, of a purely local lawgiver.[2] Kynaitha, after her union with the League, retained her local Polemarchs,[3] and Aratos himself was once chosen General of the State of Argos,[4] as an office quite distinct from that of General of the

Independence of the several Cities, B.C. 221–218.

B.C. 223.

[1] On this subject see the excellent remarks of Schorn, p. 74 et seqq.

[2] Antigonos Dôsôn is said by Polybios (v. 93) to have given one Prytanis to the Megalopolitans as a lawgiver (ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς νομοθέτην). It was however by no means the policy of Antigonos to break through constitutional forms, and we may fairly conclude that Prytanis was named by the King at the request of the Megalopolitans themselves. His legislation however only gave rise to fresh disputes, and at last Aratos was sent by decree of the Federal Assembly (κατὰ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δόγμα) to reconcile the contending parties, which he effectually did. Here again there was no breach of the cantonal rights of Megalopolis. Aratos acted simply as a mediator. The two parties agreed on certain conditions, which the City of Megalopolis, not the Federal Government, caused to be engraved on a pillar in one of its temples. (Ἐφ' οἷς ἔληξαν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφορᾶς, γράψαντες εἰς στήλην . . . ἀνέθεσαν.)

[3] Pol. iv. 18.

[4] Plut. Ar. 44. Ἄρατος δὲ στρατηγὸς αἱρεθεὶς ὑπ' Ἀργείων ἔπεισεν αὐτούς. κ.τ.λ.

League. So little indeed did the Federal power meddle with the internal affairs of the several cities that it tolerated distinctions within their territories which seem hardly in accordance with the principles of universal equality on which the League itself was founded. That the League did not interfere with the peculiar relations between Patrai and her townships is not wonderful; they probably did not interfere with the full Patrian citizenship of their inhabitants.[1] But Megalopolis certainly,[2] and Corinth probably,[3] had subject districts, whose inhabitants appear to have had no direct share in the general Federal citizenship. We have seen this sort of relation among the aristocracies of Bœotia; we shall meet with it again among the Swiss Cantons, aristocratic and democratic alike. But one would hardly have expected to find it amid the Equality and Fraternity of the Achaian League. But the toleration of such inequalities is really a necessary deduction from the doctrine of the sovereignty of each State within its own limits, just like the toleration of the "domestic institution" of the Southern States of America by a Federation which scrupulously excludes the word Slave from its own Constitution. But, though the several cities remained internally independent, we cannot doubt that their close union for all external purposes strongly tended to assimilate them to one another in their internal constitution and laws. It can hardly be supposed that the political constitution of any member of the League was other than democratic. We see the same phænomenon in the United States. The Federal Constitution merely provides that each State shall have a republican government[4] and shall not grant titles of nobility;[5] within these limits it may be as oligarchic or as democratic as it pleases. Any State that chose might transact all its affairs in a primary Assembly like those of Athens or Schwytz, and might give its chief magistrate no higher powers than those of an Athenian Archon. Or

Districts subject to particular Cities.

Tendencies to assimilation among the Members of League, both in Achaia and America.

[1] See above, p. 192.

[2] Plut. Phil. 13. ὁ Φιλοποίμην ἀπέστησε πολλὰς τῶν περιοικίδων κωμῶν. See Droysen, ii. 464. Thirlwall, viii. 364. Whether these townships were strictly subject to Megalopolis will be found discussed afterwards, p. 488. It is possible that they may have been more analogous to the Patrian townships mentioned in p. 192.

[3] Strabo's account of Tenea in the Corinthian territory sounds very much as if it had been a κώμη περιοικίς of Corinth. viii. 6. 22. Τὰ δ' ὕστατα καὶ καθ' αὑτοὺς πολιτεύεσθαι· προσθέσθαι τε τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀποστάντας Κορινθίων. Cf. the Messênian districts mentioned by Polybios, xxv. 1.

[4] Art. iv. § 4.

[5] Art. i. § 10. 1.

it might, as far as appears, make as near an approach to monarchy as would be implied in the creation of a Polish King or a Venetian Doge. For the existence of those Princes was never held to destroy the claim of Venice and Poland to the title of Republics, and if any State chose to elect its Governor for life, he would certainly fill a position of greater power than either of them. Or, to come to differences which have really existed, the elective franchise in different States has at different times varied from universal suffrage and no property qualification to the requirement of a considerable freehold both in the elector and in the representative.[1] And the Federal Constitution respects all systems alike; the Federal franchise belongs to those, few or many, who possess the franchise in their own State.[2] But the different States have, since the establishment of the Federal Union, moved with remarkable unanimity in two directions. Nearly all have advanced in a democratic path by abolishing property qualifications, and all have advanced in what was once thought to be an aristocratic path by establishing two Legislative Chambers. So in Achaia a local oligarchy in any particular city could not possibly have kept its ground, while the constitution of the League itself and the local constitutions of the other cities were all of them democratic. It seems certain also that a citizen of any Achaian city was admitted to at least the private rights of citizenship, those of intermarriage and possession of landed property, in the other cities of the League.[3] But it is hardly likely that an Achaian citizen could, as a citizen of the United States can, exchange at will, or after a short time of residence, the franchise of his native State for that of another.[4] But the tendency to assimilation among the several cities was very strong. In the later days of the League it seems to have

[1] Smith's Comparative View of the Constitutions of the Several States, etc. (Philadelphia, 1796). Tables i. and ii.

[2] Art. i. § 2. 1. Cf. § 4. 1.

[3] Thus much at least seems implied in the words πολιτεία and συμπολιτεία, which are so often used. Accordingly we find that Aratos, a citizen of Sikyôn, had a house at Corinth. (Plut. Ar. 41. Kleom. 19.) So, when the League was broken up by the Romans, this intercommunion of property between different cities was forbidden. (Paus. vii. 16. 9.) It may be remembered that in the Olynthian Confederacy (see above, p. 151) these private rights were promised to the annexed cities.

[4] Aratos, as we have seen (p. 199), was once elected chief magistrate of Argos, but this was in a moment of great political excitement, and the fact hardly proves that a less distinguished Sikyônian could have held the office in an ordinary year.

developed with increased force, till at last Polybios could say[1] that all Peloponnêsos differed from a single city only in not being surrounded by a single wall. The whole peninsula employed the same coinage, weights, and measures, and was governed by the same laws, administered by the same magistrates, senators, and judges.

But while the Achaian Constitution strictly respected the local rights of the several cities, it in no wise allowed their local sovereignty to trench upon the higher sovereignty of the League.

The League really a National Government.

The Achaian League was, in German technical language, a *Bundesstaat* and not a mere *Staatenbund*.[2] There was an Achaian nation,[3] with a national Assembly, a national Government, and national Tribunals, to which every Achaian citizen owed a direct allegiance. The whole language of Polybios shows that every Achaian citizen stood in a direct relation to the Federal authority, and was in full strictness a citizen of the League itself, and not merely of one of the cities which composed it. The Achaian cities were not mere municipalities, but sovereign commonwealths.[4] But in all external matters, in everything which concerned the whole Achaian body and its relations to other powers, the Federal Government reserved to itself full supremacy. No single city could, of its own authority, make peace or war, or commission Ambassadors to foreign powers. But it would appear that the separate action of the several cities was not quite so rigidly limited in the last respect as it is in the American Union. The cause of the difference is obvious. The American States, before their union into a Federal Republic, had been mere Colonies, mere dependencies of a distant Kingdom. Independent diplomatic action was something to which they had not been accustomed, and which they could cheerfully do without. It was a great advance in their condition when the right of acting on their behalf in dealings with other nations was transferred from a King over whom they had no control to a Federal President in whose appointment they themselves had a share. But the cities of the Achaian League, those at

No independent Diplomatic Action in the several Cities. Comparison with America.

[1] See the famous passage, ii. 37. The identity there spoken of seems to me merely to express the result of the assimilation spoken of in the text. It need not imply any compulsory introduction of uniformity, still less any extension of the powers of the Federal body in later times.

[2] Helwing, p. 237. See above, p. 8. Cf. Tittmann, p. 675.

[3] Ἔθνος. See above, pp. 10, 144.

[4] In Greek phrase, πόλεις and not δῆμοι.

all events which lay beyond the limits of the original Achaia, had been, before their union, absolutely independent powers, accustomed to carry on wars and negociations in their own names without reference to any superior authority. Even the rule of a Tyrant did not destroy this sort of independence; a single citizen indeed usurped powers which belonged of right to the whole body of citizens, but they were not transferred to any individual or any Assembly beyond the limits of the city. When the Tyrant was overthrown, this power, with the other powers which he had seized on, at once reverted to the people of the city. The right of direct intercourse with foreign powers is one of the last which an independent city or canton is willing to surrender to any central power, as we may see by the history of both the Swiss and the Dutch Confederations. For Sikyôn, or Mantineia, or Megalopolis to forego this high attribute of sovereignty, and to entrust powers which it had once exercised without restraint to an Assembly in which it had only one voice among many, was really no small sacrifice for the public good. It is rather to be wondered at that it was so easily surrendered by so many Peloponnesian cities, and that the loss was for the most part so peaceably acquiesced in. But while an Ambassador sent to or from New York or South Carolina is a thing unheard of, an Ambassador sent to or from Corinth or Megalopolis was a thing rare indeed, and perhaps irregular, but not absolutely without precedent. The Corinthians, after their union with the League, received separate Ambassadors from Rome,[1] before Rome was dangerous. They came indeed on a purely honorary errand; another embassy had transacted the political business between Rome and the League; still, whether of right or of special permission, the single city of Corinth did give audience to the Ambassadors of a foreign power. It is quite possible that for a single city to receive an embassy was not so strictly forbidden by the Federal Constitution as it was for a single city to commission an embassy. This last, it is clear, was

Restriction less strict in Achaia.

B.C. 228.

[1] Pol. ii. 12. On this Embassy (see p. 327) the explanation of the apparent breach of rule is probably to be found in the religious character of the mission. The Roman envoys were received by the Corinthians, not as members of the Achaian League, but as administrators of the Isthmian games. In this character, they must have been in the constant habit of receiving the θεωρίαι of Greek cities. As the administration of the games always remained a matter purely of State, and not at all of Federal, concern, the reception of this political sort of embassy —necessary in the presidents of the games—must have been held not to interfere with the general external sovereignty of the League.

forbidden by the general law of the League, just as it is forbidden[1] by the Constitution of the United States. Cases however occur in the course of Achaian history alike of the law being dispensed with and of the law being violated.[2] We have a full account[3] of one very curious instance of a single city entering into diplomatic relations with a foreign power by special permission of the national Congress. The fact of such a permission being asked shows that, without it, the proceeding would have been unlawful, but the fact of the permission being granted equally shows that the request was not looked upon as altogether unreasonable and monstrous. The occasion was no other than the fatal application to Macedonia for aid against Sparta, which was first made by an embassy sent from the single city of Megalopolis, but with the full permission of the Federal body.[4] This is perhaps the only recorded case of a breach of the rule during the good times of the League; and this took place in a season of extreme danger, and was the result of a deeply laid scheme of the all-powerful Aratos. In later times, when unwilling cities were annexed to the League by force, and when Roman intrigue was constantly sowing dissension among its members, we shall find not unfrequent instances of embassies sent from particular cities to what was practically the suzerain power. The old law now needed special confirmation. It was agreed, in the first treaty between Achaia and Rome, that no embassy should be sent to Rome by any particular Achaian city, but only by the general Achaian body.[5] But this agreement was of course broken whenever its violation suited Roman interests. Sparta especially, and Messênê, cities joined to the League against their will, were constantly laying

Particular Embassies by licence of the Federal body.

B.C. 224.

Later exceptions under Roman influence.

B.C. 198.

[1] The Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 1) absolutely forbids all diplomatic action on the part of the several States, and the confederate Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 1) repeats the prohibition. The looser Confederation of 1778 only forbade the receiving or sending Ambassadors "without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled." Art. vi. § 1. Cf. § 5.

[2] Tittmann (678) mistakes these exceptions for the rule.

[3] Pol. ii. 48–50

[4] I shall narrate this curious proceeding in detail at the proper point of the history.

[5] Paus. vii. 9. 4. Ἀχαιῶν μὲν γὰρ εἴρητο ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ παρὰ τὴν Ῥωμαίων βουλὴν ἀπιέναι πρέσβεις, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἀπείρητο μὴ πρεσβεύεσθαι τὰς πόλεις ὅσαι συνεδρίου τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν μετεῖχον. See Thirlwall, viii. 90 (note). That this prohibition was an exception, and not simply the confirmation of an ancient rule rendered more needful on entering into relation with so powerful an ally, seems quite inconceivable.

their real or supposed grievances at the feet of the Roman Senate. Here again we may learn the lesson that a Federal body can derive no strength from the incorporation or retention of unwilling members.

The supreme power of the League was vested in the sovereign Popular Assembly. This was the Congress of the Union, differing from the Congress of the American Union mainly in this, that, according to the common political instinct of the Greek mind, it was a primary and not a representative Assembly.[1] The latter notion has indeed been maintained by two German scholars,[2] but no sound arguments are brought in support of their opinions, and it does not seem to have met with favour in any other quarter. There can be no doubt that every citizen of every city in the League, at all events every citizen who had attained the age of thirty years,[3] had a right to attend, speak, and vote. Every free Achaian, no less than every free Athenian, could give a direct voice in the election of the magistrates by whom he was to be governed, in the enactment of the laws which he was to obey, and in the declaration of the wars in which he might be called on to bear a part. The Achaian

The Assembly of the League.

The Democratic Constitution.

[1] It is spoken of as Ἀχαιοί, ἔθνος, σύνοδος, πλῆθος (Pol. iv. 9, 10, 14; v. 1; xxxviii. 2), οἱ πολλοί (xxxviii. 4; xl. 4; xxi. 7), ἀθροισθέντες εἰς ἐκκλησίαν οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, ἐκκλησία (Pol. xxviii. 3), ὄχλος (xxviii. 7), ἀγορά (xxviii. 7; xxix. 9). These expressions explain those like σύνεδροι (Plut. Ar. 35) and συνέδριον (Paus. u.s.) which might at first sight convey another idea, and which probably arose out of the practice of later times. See Niebuhr's Hist. Rome, ii. 30, Eng. Tr. Thirlwall, viii. p. 91, note. Tittmann, 680. The formal title of the body, as usual, is τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. Pol. xxviii. 7. Boeckh, C. I. no. 1542. Paus. u.s.

[2] Helwing, p. 229. Drumann, p. 463. The chief argument adduced in behalf of this opinion is a single place of Polybios, where he remarks that a particular Assembly, in the very last days of the League, was attended by a greater number of people, and those of a lower class, than usual (Pol. xxxviii. 4): καὶ γὰρ συνηθροίσθη πλῆθος ἐργαστηριακῶν καὶ βαναύσων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον οὐδέποτε. This is merely the sort of language which a Tory historian would use in describing the first Reformed Parliament. It evidently implies that these people had a right to be there, but that so many of them had never before been known to come. Helwing argues that their presence was "gegen Gewohnheit und Gesetz." It was doubtless "gegen Gewohnheit," but not "gegen Gesetz." Droysen, who is generally disposed to make the constitution of the League more aristocratic than it really was, fully admits the popular character of the general Congress (ii. 462). Cf. K. F. Hermann, § 186, n. 5, Eng. Tr. and the important note of Schorn, 371.

[3] So Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 91) infers from Polybios, xxix. 9, where he speaks of a σύγκλητος, ἐν ᾗ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν βουλὴν ἀλλὰ πάντας τοὺς ἀπὸ τριάκοντα ἐτῶν.

Constitution therefore is rightly called a Democratic Constitution. And yet nothing is plainer than that the practical working of Democracy in Achaia was something altogether different from the practical working of Democracy at Athens.[1] At the first glance we might almost be tempted to call the Achaian Constitution practically aristocratic rather than democratic. It is evident that birth, wealth, and official position carried with them an influence in Achaia which they did not carry with them at Athens. The Athenian Assembly was sovereign in the very highest sense; Dêmos was Tyrant, and he did not shrink from the name;[2] the Assembled People were not only a Parliament, but also a Government;[3] an eloquent speaker might wield the fierce Democracy at pleasure, but a private citizen could do so just as easily as the highest Magistrate. The Assembly, in short, was really a master, and Magistrates were its mere servants to carry out its bidding. But in the Achaian Democracy we find a wholly different state of things. We find a President of the Union with large personal powers, a Cabinet Council acting as the President's advisers, and a Senate invested with far higher functions than the mere Committee of the Assembly which bore the same title at Athens. In short, at Athens the People really governed; in Achaia they did little more than elect their governors and say Aye or No to their proposals.

Aristocratic Element in Achaia.

Contrast with Athens.

It will be at once seen that these differences all tend to make the Achaian Constitution approach, far more nearly than that of Athens, to the state of things to which we are accustomed in modern Republics and Constitutional Kingdoms. And they all spring from the different position of Democracy as applied to the single City of Athens and Democracy as applied to a Federal State embracing a large portion of Greece. The Athenian

Achaian Constitution a nearer approach to modern systems.

[1] Kortüm (iii. 158) gives the Achaian system the appropriate name of "die gemässigte Demokratie."

[2] Thuc. ii. 63. Τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτὴν [τὴν ἀρχήν]. Ib. iii. 37. τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν. Aristoph. Knights, 1111. Ὦ Δῆμε, καλὴν γ' ἔχεις Ἀρχὴν, ὅτε πάντες ἀν-Θρωποι δεδίασί σ' ὥς-Περὶ ἀνδρα τύραννον. Ib. 1330. δείξατε τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἡμῖν καὶ τῆς γῆς τῆσδε μόναρχον. Ib. 1332. χαῖρ', ὦ βασιλεῦ τῶν Ἑλλάνων. Isok. Areop. 26. Δεῖ τὸν μὲν δῆμον ὥσπερ τύραννον καθιστάναι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ κολάζειν τοὺς ἐξαμαρτάνοντας καὶ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων, τοὺς δὲ σχολὴν ἄγειν δυναμένους καὶ βίον ἱκανὸν κεκτημένους ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν κοινῶν ὥσπερ οἰκέτας. Aristot. Pol. ii. 12. Ὥσπερ τυράννῳ τῷ δήμῳ χαριζόμενοι. Ib. iv. (vi) 4. Μόναρχος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἰς ἐκ πολλῶν. [Compare the free democracy of Outer Appenzell and the action of the people in 1732; Müller, Hist. de la Confédération Suisse (Continuation) xiv. 186.]

[3] See above, p. 33.

Assembly was held at a man's own door; the Achaian Assembly was held in a distant city.[1] It follows at once that the Athenian Assembly was held much oftener than the Achaian Assembly and was much more largely attended by citizens of all classes. The Athenian Assembly was held thrice in each month; the Achaian Assembly was held of right only twice in each year. The poorest citizen could regularly attend at Athens, where a small fee recompensed his loss of time; the poor Achaian must have been unusually patriotic if he habitually took two journeys in the year at his own cost to attend the Assembly at Aigion. For the Athenian Treasury could easily bear the small fee paid to the citizens for attendance in the Assembly, but no amount of wealth in the Federal Treasury of Achaia could have endured such a charge as the payment of travelling expenses and recompense for loss of time to the whole free population of Argos and Megalopolis. The poor Athenian then was both legally and practically the political equal of his richer neighbour; the poor Achaian, though he laboured under no legal disqualification, laboured under a practical disqualification almost bordering on disfranchisement. The Achaian Assembly practically consisted of those among the inhabitants of each city who were at once wealthy men and eager politicians. Those citizens came together who were at once wealthy enough to bear the cost of the journey and zealous enough to bear the trouble of it. It was, in fact, practically an aristocratic body, and it is sometimes spoken of as such.[2] Its aristocratic character may have been slightly modified

Causes of the Difference, arising mainly from the greater extent of Territory.

The Assembly chiefly attended by rich men.

The Assembly practically Aristocratic.

[1] Some of the Attic Dêmoi are undoubtedly further from Athens than some of the old Achaian towns are from Aigion; but no point of Attica is so distant from Athens as Dymê, for instance, is from Aigion, so that, on the whole, the rural Athenians were nearer to the capital than the Achaians, even of the older towns, were to the seat of the Federal Government. Also the city of Athens and its ports must always have contained a very large proportion of the citizen population, while Aigion was merely one town out of ten or twelve. Still the old Achaia is not very much larger than Attica—in superficial extent it is probably smaller—and it might perhaps have been possible to have united it by a *συνοικισμός* instead of by a merely Federal tie. The essential differences between Athens and Achaia begin to show themselves most clearly when the League began to extend itself over much more distant cities, which no tie but a Federal one could, according to Greek notions, ever have connected.

[2] In Livy (xxxii. 21) the Achaian General Aristainos addresses the Assembly as *Principes Achæorum*. But, especially as it comes in a speech, we cannot be quite certain that this expression really answers to anything in Polybios or any other Greek author. But it would fairly enough express the class of persons of whom the Assembly was mainly composed, for *Principes* (see Livy, xxxiii. 14) does not always mean magistrates, but leading men, whether in office or not.

by the possible presence of the whole citizen population of the town where the Assembly met. But we may doubt whether even they would, on ordinary occasions, be so eager to attend an Assembly of such a character as they might have been if the democratic spirit had been more predominant in it. But, if they did, though some effect is always produced by the presence and the voices of any considerable body of men, still, as they could at most control a single vote, their presence would be of but little strictly constitutional importance. The Congress, democratic in theory, was aristocratic in practice. This contrast of theory and practice, which Aristotle[1] had fully understood long before the days of the League, runs through the whole of the Achaian institutions. By Continental scholars, less used to the working of free governments than those of our own land, it seems not to have been thoroughly understood. They have often imagined the existence of legal restrictions, when the restriction was in fact one which simply made itself. They see that the Assembly was mainly filled by members of an aristocratic class, and they infer that it must have been limited by law to a fixed body of representatives. They see that offices

Not understood by Continental Scholars.

Polybios (iv. 9) has the phrase *οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ἀχαιῶν*, but this evidently means the *Δαμιοργοί* as Presidents of the Assembly, not any aristocratic class. It is just possible that the words in Livy may be a formal address to the *Δαμιοργοί* as Presidents, like our "Mr. Speaker."

[1] Arist. Pol. iv. [vi.] 5. *Οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ὥστε τὴν μὲν πολιτείαν τὴν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους μὴ δημοτικὴν εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἔθος καὶ τὴν ἀγωγὴν πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ' ἄλλοις τὴν μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους εἶναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῇ δ' ἀγωγῇ καὶ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ὀλιγαρχεῖσθαι μᾶλλον.*

So again, in a passage which almost reads like a prophetic description of the League, and which indeed may have been true of the small Achaia of his times (Pol. v. [viii.] 8. 17); *μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἅμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν . . . τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐξεῖναι πᾶσιν ἄρχειν δημοκρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τοὺς γνωρίμους εἶναι ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἀριστοκρατικόν.* He says that this happens when offices are unpaid, as they were in Achaia.

Compare Hamilton's remarks in the "Federalist," No. lviii. (p. 318). "The people can never err more than in supposing, that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few. Experience will for ever admonish them, that, on the contrary, after securing a sufficient number for purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole society, they will counteract their own views by every addition to their representatives. The countenance of the government may become more democratic; but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic. The machine may be enlarged, but the fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which its motions are directed."

The Achaian Government however never deserved the name of an Oligarchy. It was an Aristocracy in the literal sense of the word.

were mainly confined to the rich and noble, and they infer that the rich and noble must have had a legal monopoly of office. To an Englishman both phænomena are perfectly simple. What happened in Achaia is merely what happens daily before our own eyes in England. Every Achaian citizen had a right to a seat in the Assembly, but practically few besides the high-born and wealthy exercised that right. Every Achaian citizen was legally eligible to the highest offices, but practically the choice of the nation seldom fell upon poor men. So the poorest British subject is legally eligible to the House of Commons equally with the richest, but we know that it is only under exceptional circumstances that any but a rich man is likely to be elected. Even while the property qualification lasted, it was not the legal requirement which kept out poor men, but the practical necessity which imposed, and still imposes, a standard of wealth much higher than that fixed by the old law.[1] And moreover, it is in the most purely democratic constituencies, in the "metropolitan" boroughs for instance, that a poor man has even less chance of election than elsewhere.

Analogies in England.

But though the Democratic Constitution of Achaia produced what was practically an Aristocratic Assembly, it must not be thought that Achaian democratic institutions were mere shadows. The working of the Federal Constitution was aristocratic, but it was not oligarchic. The leading men of Achaia were not a close and oppressive body, fenced in by distinct and odious legal privileges; their predominance rested merely on sufferance and conventionality, and the mass of the people had it legally in their power to act for themselves whenever they thought good. The members of the Assembly, meeting but rarely, and gathered from distant cities, could have had none of that close corporate feeling, that community of interest and habitual action, which is characteristic of the oligarchy of a single town. An Achaian who was led astray from his duty to the national interests, was much more likely to be led astray by regard to the local interests of his own city than by any care for the promotion of aristocracy or democracy among the cities in general. And, of whatever class it was composed, every description of the Assembly sets it

The Assembly aristocratic but not oligarchic.

[1] The original form of the property qualification had at least an intelligible object. The requirement of real property was meant to serve a class interest. It included the landowner, even of moderate estate, while it excluded the merely monied man, however wealthy. But the property qualification, in its later form, when real property was not required, seems to have been absolutely meaningless.

before us as essentially a popular Assembly, numerous enough to share all the passions, good and bad, which distinguish popular Assemblies. It had all the generous emotions, all the life, heartiness, and energy, and all the rash impetuosity and occasional short-sightedness, of a really popular body. So our own House of Commons may, if we look solely to the class of persons of whom it is still mainly composed, be called an aristocratic body; but, when it comes together, it shows all the passions of a really democratic Assembly. Contrast it with a Spartan or Venetian Senate; contrast it even with our own House of Lords. So the Achaian Congress, though the mass of those present at any particular meeting might be men of aristocratic position, was still in spirit, as it was in name, an Assembly of the Achaian People. Its members could not venture on any oppressive or exclusive legislation against men who were legally their equals, and who had a perfect right, if they chose to encounter the cost and trouble, to take their places in the same Sovereign Assembly as themselves. We cannot doubt, and we find it distinctly affirmed of one occasion,[1] that, in times of great excitement, many citizens appeared in the Assembly who were not habitual frequenters of its sittings. Extraordinary Meetings, summoned by the Government to discuss special and urgent business, would, as a rule, be far more largely attended than the half-yearly Meetings in which the ordinary affairs of the Commonwealth were transacted.[2] And we must always remember that each city retained its independent democratic government, its Assembly sovereign in all local affairs, and in which Federal questions, though they could not be decided, were no doubt often discussed.[3] In the Assembly of the State, if not in the Federal Congress, rich and poor really met on equal terms, and many opportunities must have arisen for calling in question the conduct of those citizens who took an active part in Federal business. A Federal politician whose votes at Aigion were obnoxious to his fellow-citizens at home might be made to suffer for his delinquency in many ways. Thus the people at large held many checks upon those who were practically their rulers, and it was legally open to them to undertake at any time the

Practical Democratical elements.

[1] Pol. xxxviii. 4. See above, p. 205. Compare the description of the tumultuous Assembly in Livy, xxxii. 22.

[2] See Pol. xxix. 9.

[3] Liv. xxxii. 19. Neque solum quid in senatu quisque civitatis suæ aut in communibus conciliis gentis pro sententia dicerent ignorabant, etc.

post of rulers themselves. One can hardly doubt but that those citizens of any particular town who attended the Federal Congress practically acted as the representatives of the sentiments of that town. Thus, though the mass of Achaian citizens rarely took any part in the final decision of national affairs, yet the vote of the national Assembly could hardly ever be in opposition to the wishes of the nation at large.

Votes taken by Cities, not by heads.

The votes in the Assembly were taken, not by heads, but by cities.[1] On this mode of voting I have already had occasion to make some remarks.[2] It was one common in the ancient republics, and it has become familiar to us by its employment in the famous Assembly of the Roman Tribes. Nor is it at all unknown in the modern world. It was the rule of the American Confederation of 1778,[3] and the present Constitution of the Union retains it in those cases where the election of a President falls to the House of Representatives.[4] In a Representative Constitution this mode of voting must be defended, if it be defended at all, upon other grounds; in a Primary Assembly, like that of Achaia, it was the only way by which the rights of distant cities could be preserved. Had the votes been taken by heads, the people of the town where the Meeting was held could always have outvoted all the rest of the League. This might have been the case even while the Assembly was held at Aigion, and the danger would have been greater still when, in after times, Assemblies were held in great cities like Corinth and Argos. The plan of voting by cities at once obviated this evil. It involves in truth the same principle which led the Patrician Fabius and the Plebeian Decius to join in confining the city-populace to a few tribes, and which has led our own House of Commons steadily to reject all proposals for an increase in the number of "metropolitan" members. The representative system would of course have effectually secured the League against all fear of citizens from a distance being swamped by the multitude of one particular town. But the representative system had not

Evils against which this system guarded.

[1] See Niebuhr, Hist. Rome, ii. 29, Eng. Tr. Thirlwall, viii. 92. Kortüm (iii. 160) maintains the contrary; but it is impossible to believe that passages like Liv. xxxii. 22, 23 and xxxviii. 32 merely mean that the citizens of the same town sat together in the theatre.

[2] See above, p. 165.

[3] Articles of Confederation, Art. v. § 4.

[4] Art. ii. § 1. 3, and the 12th Amendment. The Confederate Constitution preserves the same rule, and introduces it in another case, namely the voting of the Senate on the admission of new States. Art. iv. § 3. 1.

been revealed to the statesmen of Achaia, any more than to those of other parts of Greece. As matters stood, the only remedy was to put neighbouring and distant cities on an equality by ordering that the mere number of citizens present from each town should have no effect on the division. And of course the most obvious form which such a regulation could take was to give a single vote to each city. And probably, while the League was confined to the ten towns of the old Achaia, no bad consequences arose from this arrangement. Some of the towns were doubtless larger than the others, but there could have been no very marked disparity among them. But it was quite another matter when the League took in great and distant cities like Sikyôn, Corinth, Megalopolis, Argos, at last even Sparta and Messênê. It was clearly unjust that such cities as these should have no greater weight in the national Congress than the petty towns of the old Achaia. It was the more unjust, because we can easily conceive that questions might arise on which the old ten towns would always stick close together, and so habitually outvote five or six of the greatest cities of Greece.[1] While the personal influence of Aratos lasted, questions of this sort seemed to have remained pretty much in abeyance, but to provide a counterpoise to this undue weight of the old towns was one great object of the administration of Philopoimên. The most effectual remedy would of course have been to let the vote of each town count, as in the Lykian League,[2] for one, two, three, or more, according to their several sizes. But this was a political refinement which was reserved for a later generation, and it was one specially unlikely to occur to the mind of an Achaian legislator under the actual circumstances of the League. The cities external to the old Achaia were admitted, one by one, into an Achaian League, already regularly formed and practically working. In the earlier stages of its extension, above all when the first step was taken by the union of Sikyôn, the admission of new towns into the League was doubtless looked upon as a favour; in more degenerate times they were sometimes compelled to enter into the League by force. In neither of these cases was it at all likely that a city newly entering into the League should

Evils of the Achaian arrangement of votes.

[1] Schorn, p. 61. In dieser Hinsicht strebte der Bund nach völlig demokratischer Freiheit und Gleichheit, was zwar späterhin einer Aenderung bedurft hätte, damit nicht die Herrschaft und Gesetzgebung bei den Schwachen gewesen wäre.

[2] See above, p. 165.

receive any advantage over those cities which already belonged to it. To have given Sikyôn two votes and Corinth three, while the small Achaian towns retained only one each, would have been no more than just in itself—if indeed it would have reached the strict justice of the case—but it would have been a political developement for which there was as yet no precedent, and which we can have no right to expect at the hands of Aratos or of any other statesman.[1] It was a great step in advance of anything that Greece had seen, when new cities were admitted into the League at all on terms of such equality as the Achaians offered. Greece had already seen petty Leagues among kindred towns or districts; she had seen great Confederacies gathered around a presiding, or it may be a tyrant, city; but she had never before seen any state or cluster of states offer perfect equality of political rights to all Greeks who would join them. The League offered to its newest members an equal voice in its Assemblies with the oldest; it made the citizens of all alike equally eligible to direct its counsels and to command its armies. It is hardly fair to blame a state which advanced so far beyond all earlier precedent merely because it did not devise a further improvement still. Had that improvement been proposed, anterior to the experience which proved its necessity, it would have appeared, to all but the deepest political thinkers, to contradict that equality among the several members which was the first principle of the Federal Constitution. Had any patriotic Corinthian claimed a double vote as due to the superior size and glory of his native city, he would have seemed to threaten Dymê and Tritaia with the fate which Thespia and Orchomenos had met with at the hands of Thebes. Lykia made exactly the improvement which was needed, because her legislators had the past experience of Achaia to profit by. The Achaian principle was revived in all cases under the first American Confederation, and it is retained in one very important case in the actual Constitution of the United States. Nor is it in all cases an error; the principle of equality of votes for every State, great and small, has always been adhered to in one branch of the Federal Legislature, and it has always been rightly defended as a necessary check on the supremacy of mere numbers. In short, though the Achaian

No fair ground of blame against the League.

[1] See Schorn, 67, 68. His strictures are perfectly just in themselves, but they are rather hard on Aratos and the Achaians merely for not possessing premature wisdom.

General merits of the Achaian Constitution.

Constitution failed, in this respect, to attain to the full theoretical perfection of the Lykian constitution, yet the League fully merits the enthusiastic praises of its own historian as the body which, without retaining selfish privileges or selfish advantages, first freely offered Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity to every inhabitant of Peloponnêsos.[1]

Short and unfrequent Meetings of the Assembly.

The same causes which made the Achaian Assembly practically an aristocratic body served also to make its sittings short and unfrequent. The League had no capital and no court; there was nothing to tempt men to stay at the place of meeting any longer than the affairs of the nation absolutely required. Every man's heart was with his hearth and home in his own city: he went up to do his duty in the Federal Assembly, and to offer sacrifice to the Federal God; but to tarry half the year away from his own house and his own fields was an idea which never entered the head of an Achaian politician. The Assembly met of right twice yearly,[2] in Spring and Autumn. The Magistrates were originally elected at the Spring Meeting, afterwards most probably in the Autumn.[3] The Session was limited to three days.[4] Besides the two yearly Meetings, it rested with the Government to summon extraordinary Meetings, on occasions of special urgency.[5] From the shortness of the Assembly's

From B.C. 217.

[1] Pol. ii. 39, 42.

[2] The two yearly Meetings are clearly implied in Pol. xxxviii. 2, 3. The Roman Ambassadors come to the Autumn Meeting at Aigion (*διαλεγομένων τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν Αἰγιέων πόλει*, c. 2). It is agreed that, instead of the Assembly coming to a decisive vote, the Ambassadors should meet some of the Achaian leaders in a diplomatic conference at Tegea. Kritolaos meets them there, and tells them that he can do nothing without the authority of the next Assembly, to be held six months after (*εἰς τὴν ἐξῆς σύνοδον, ἥτις ἔμελλε γενέσθαι μετὰ μῆνας ἕξ*). This was, of course, mere mockery, as a special Assembly could have been called, or special powers might have been obtained from the Meeting at Aigion, but the pretext shows the regular course of things.

The Autumn Meeting appears in Pol. ii. 54; iv. 14; xxiv. 12; the Spring Meeting in iv. 6, 7, 26, 27, 37; v. 1. So seemingly in xxviii. 7, by the name of *ἡ πρώτη ἀγορά*.

[3] See Schorn, p. 210. Thirlwall, viii. 295. Cf. Clinton, Fast. Hell. A. 146.

[4] Pol. xxix. 9. Liv. xxxii. 22. Both of these are cases of an extraordinary Meeting (*σύγκλητος*). If this rule prevailed on such occasions, much more would it in the common half-yearly Meetings.

[5] Pol. v. 1. *ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος . . . . συνῆγε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς διὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων εἰς ἐκκλησίαν*. See below, p. 426. The words *κατὰ νόμους* in the next sentence show that this was a perfectly regular proceeding. Cf. Pol. xxiii. 10. 12; xxiv. 5.

In one case (Pol. iv. 7) we meet with a strange phænomenon of a Military

Sessions naturally followed certain restrictions on its powers, certain augmentations of the powers of the executive Government, which to an Athenian would have seemed the utter destruction of all democratic freedom. It has been thought, on the highest of all authorities,[1] that, in an extraordinary Assembly at least—and an extraordinary Assembly would, almost by the nature of the case, have to deal with more important business than an ordinary one—a majority of the Executive Cabinet could legally refuse to allow any question to be put to the vote. This seems at least doubtful;[2] but it is evident that, in a Session of three days, the right of private members to bring in bills, or even to move amendments, must have been practically very much curtailed. No doubt the initiative always practically remained in the hands of the Government. In an extraordinary Assembly it was so in the strictest sense, as such an Assembly could only entertain the particular business on which it was summoned to decide.[3] And in all cases, what the Assembly really had to do was to accept or reject the Ministerial proposals, or, it may be, to accept the counter-proposals of the leaders of Opposition.

Consequent Restriction on its Powers.

The Initiative practically in the Government.

The ordinary Assemblies were, at least during the first period of the League, always held at Aigion; but it seems to have been in the power of the Government to summon the extraordinary

Place of Meeting; first Aigion,

Assembly, an idea Ætolian or Macedonian rather than Achaian. The ordinary Meeting votes that the General shall summon the whole force of the League in arms, and that the army thus assembled shall debate and determine (*συνάγειν τὸν στρατηγὸν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ὃ δ' ἂν τοῖς συνελθοῦσι βουλευομένοις δόξῃ τοῦτ' εἶναι κύριον*). This looks like an unusually small attendance at the regular Assembly. Cf. Livy, xxxviii. 33.

[1] Thirlwall, viii. 91, 92.

[2] The passage referred to is Liv. xxxii. 22. See Schorn, 242. Here the *δαμιοργοί* are equally divided whether to put a certain question to the vote or not; but this does not prove that they had the power to refuse to put any question, because the objectors ground their refusal on the illegal nature of the particular motion. The case seems rather to be like the famous refusal of Sôkratês, when presiding in the Athenian Assembly, to put an illegal motion to the vote. See Xen. Hell. i. 7. 15. Cf. Grote, viii. 271.

[3] Liv. xxxi. 25. Non licere legibus Achæorum de aliis rebus referre, quam propter quas convocati essent.

It does not however follow from this that private members could not propose amendments, or even substantial motions, relating to that business, and it seems clear from a passage in Polybios (xxix. 9) that they might. (*τῇ δὲ δευτέρᾳ τῶν ἡμερῶν, ἐν ᾗ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἔδει τὰ ψηφίσματα προσφέρειν τοὺς βουλομένους, κ.τ.λ.*) In the Assembly which he describes two quite different motions are made and discussed. Most probably the Government proposals were made on the first day, those of private members on the second, and the vote taken on the third.

afterwards other Cities.

Assemblies, as at any time, so in any place, which might be convenient.[1] Aigion had been chosen as the place of meeting for the original League[2] as being the most important of the old Achaian towns after the destruction of Helikê. In after times it was at least as well adapted for the purpose for an opposite reason. It might be the greatest member of the original League, but it was insignificant compared with the powerful cities which were afterwards enrolled in the Union. Aigion was a better place for the Federal Government than Corinth or Megalopolis, for the same reason that Washington is a better place for the American Federal Government than New York. There was not the least fear of Aigion ever being to the League of Achaia what Thebes had, in times past, been to the League of Bœotia. Still, however, a certain dignity, and some material advantage, must have accrued to Aigion from the holding of the Federal Assemblies, and from the probable frequent presence of the Federal Magistrates at other times. This may well have aroused a certain degree of jealousy among the other towns, and we shall see that, at a later time, Philopoimên carried a measure which left the League without even the shadow of a capital, and obliged the Federal Assemblies to be held in every city of the League in turn.[3]

Advantages of Aigion.

B.C. 189.

I have several times, in discussing Achaian affairs, used the words Government, Ministers, Cabinet, and such like. I have done so of set purpose, in order to mark the most important of all the differences between the city-Democracy of Athens and the Federal Democracy of Achaia. In speaking of Athenian politics no words could be more utterly inappropriate; Dêmos was at once King and Parliament; the Magistrates whom he elected were simply agents to carry out his orders. This was perfectly natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly regularly met once in ten days. Another course was equally natural in a Democracy whose Sovereign Assembly regularly met only twice in each year. It was absolutely necessary in such a case to invest the Magistrates of the Republic with far greater official

Greater power of Magistrates in Achaia than at Athens.

[1] See Helwing, p. 227.

[2] Strabo, viii. 7. 3. Καὶ κοινοβούλιον εἰς ἕνα τόπον συνήγετο αὐτοῖς (ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Ἀμάριον) ἐν ᾧ τὰ κοινὰ ἐχρημάτιζον καὶ οὗτοι καὶ Ἴωνες πρότερον, and *ib.* 5. Αἰγιέων δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ Ἑλίκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ἄλσος τὸ Ἀμάριον ὅπου συνήεσαν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ βουλευσόμενοι περὶ τῶν κοινῶν.

[3] See Helwing, 227, 228. Thirlwall, viii. 393. That it was actually carried, though Tittmann (682) thinks otherwise, appears from Pol. xxiv. 12, where an ordinary meeting is held at Megalopolis.

powers than any Magistrates possessed at Athens from the days of Kleisthenês onwards. It was, in short, necessary to give them the character of what we, in modern phrase, understand by a Government, and to confine the Assembly to the functions of a Parliament. We must of course make one exception, required by the universal political instinct of Greece; the final vote on matters of Peace, War, and Alliance rested with the Assembly. This follows at once from the difference between a republican Assembly, sovereign in name as well as in fact, and the Parliament of a Monarchy, which in theory is the humble and dutiful Council of a personal Sovereign. All the differences between Athens and Achaia naturally flow from the differences between the position and extent of the two commonwealths. In the single City of Athens the democratic theory could be strictly carried out; in the large Federal territory of Achaia it could be carried out only in a very modified form. The extent of territory led to the infrequent Meetings of the Assembly; the infrequent Meetings of the Assembly led to the increased authority of the Magistrates; for a ruling power must be lodged somewhere during the three hundred and fifty-nine days when the Sovereign Assembly was not in being. We therefore find the Federal Magistrates of Achaia acting with almost as little restraint as the Ministers of a modern constitutional state. They are the actual movers and doers of everything; the functions of the Assembly are nearly reduced to hearing their proposals and saying Aye or No to them. And, as the Magistrates were themselves elected by the Assembly, we should naturally expect, what the history at every step shows us to have been the case, that the vote of the Assembly would be much oftener Aye than No. The Achaian Assembly was addressed by Ministers whom its own vote had placed in office six months before; it would, under all ordinary circumstances, give them a very favourable hearing, and would not feel that sort of jealousy which often exists between the American Congress and the American President. In fact, the relations between an Achaian Government and an Achaian Assembly were in some respects more like those between an English Government and an English House of Commons than the relations between an American President and an American Congress. The Achaian Magistrates, being Achaian citizens, were necessarily members of the Achaian Assembly; so in England the Ministers are, by imperative custom, members of

The Achaian Magistrates form a "Government."

Comparison with America and England.

Points of greater likeness to England.

one or other House of Parliament. In Achaia therefore, just as in England, the members of the Government could appear personally before the Assembly to make their proposals and to defend their policy. But in America the Ministers of the President are strictly excluded from seats in Congress,[1] and the President communicates with that body only by a written Message. Again, as Congress does not elect,[2] so neither can it remove, either the President or his Ministers; it therefore follows that the Legislative and Executive branches may remain, during a whole Presidency, in complete opposition to one another. In England the House of Commons does not either formally appoint or formally depose the Ministry, for the simple reason that the Ministry has no legal existence; but it does both in a way which, if indirect, is still highly effectual. In Achaia, the Government was, not indirectly but directly, chosen by the Assembly. There was not, any more than in America, any constitutional means of removing them before the end of their term of office; a Government which had ceased to enjoy the confidence of the House had therefore to be constitutionally borne with for a season. But, as their term of office was only one year instead of four, such a season of endurance would be much shorter than it sometimes is in America. Even in England, a Government must be weak indeed which, when once in office, cannot, by the power of Dissolution or otherwise, contrive to retain power for as long a time as an unpopular Achaian Government could ever have had to be borne with. Altogether the general practical working of the Achaian system was a remarkable advance in the direction of modern constitutional government. And it especially resembles our own system in leaving to usage, to the discretion of particular persons and Assemblies, and to the natural working of circumstances, much which nations of a more theoretical turn of mind might have sought to rule by positive law.

[1] Constitution, Art. i. § 6. 2. This restriction is modified in the Confederate Constitution.

[2] Congress never elects the President freely; under certain circumstances (see Amendment 12) the House of Representatives have to choose a President from among three candidates already named. The President again may be (Art. i. § 3. 6; ii. § 4) deposed by a judicial sentence of the Senate on an impeachment by the House of Representatives. But this of course requires proof of some definite crime; there is no constitutional way of removing him simply because his policy is disapproved.

The Achaian Government then, when its details were finally settled, consisted of Ten Ministers, who formed a Cabinet Council for the General of the Achaians, or, in modern language, the President of the Union. Besides these great officers, there was also a Secretary of State,[1] an Under-General,[2] and a General of Cavalry.[3] It is probable that the latter two functionaries were merely military officers, and did not fill any important political position. It is clear, for instance, that the Under-General, was, in civil matters at least, a less important person than the Vice-President of the American Union. The American Vice-President is ex-officio President of the Senate, and, in case of any accidental vacancy in the Presidentship, he succeeds to the office for the remainder of the term. But of the Achaian Under-General we hear nothing in civil affairs, and if the General died in office, his place for the remainder of the year was taken, not by the Under-General, but by the person who had been General the year before.[4] The active officers of the League in civil matters were clearly the General, the Secretary, and the Ten Ministers. The exact functions of the Secretary are not described, but it is easy to guess at them. He was doubtless, as Secretaries of State are now, the immediate author of all public despatches, and in minor matters he may often have been entitled, as Secretaries of State are now, to act on his own responsibility. It is evident from the way in which both Polybios and Strabo speak of it, that the office was one of high dignity and importance.

Federal Offices.

General of Cavalry.

Under-General.

Secretary of State.

[1] Γραμματεύς. Pol. ii. 43. Strabo, viii. 7. The office was as old as the League.

[2] Ὑποστράτηγος. Pol. iv. 59 ; xl. 5. In v. 94 one Lykos of Pharai is called ὑποστράτηγος τῆς συντελείας τῆς πατρικῆς. This I take to mean a local magistrate of some little confederacy formed by Pharian townships like those of Patrai. See above, p. 192. Or, in the particular place where the phrase occurs, it may refer to the temporary union of Dymê, Pharai, and Tritaia in B.C. 219. See below, Chapter viii. Either of these views seems more likely than that he was "commander of the pure Achaian forces, as distinguished from those of the whole League." K. F. Hermann, 186. 9. Such a distinction is quite alien to the whole spirit of the constitution. But no explanation seems quite satisfactory. The use of πατρικῆς seems so very strange that, when one remembers the expression in Polybios (xl. 3), Πατρεῖς καὶ τὸ μετὰ τούτων συντελικόν, one is strongly tempted to read Πατρικῆς. Yet would Πατρικός be a correct Gentile form, and could a citizen of Pharai be a Magistrate at Pharai? There is certainly the case of Aratos' State-Generalship at Argos. See p. 201.

[3] Ἱππάρχης. Pol. v. 95 ; x. 22 ; xxviii. 6. Schorn (p. 62) supposes that this officer took the place of the second General, when the number was reduced to two. This may well be true in his military, but hardly in his civil, capacity.

[4] Pol. xl. 2.

The Ten Ministers.

The Ten Ministers, the Cabinet Council of the President, are called by various names.[1] They seem to have been the Federal Magistrates of the League in its earlier and looser state. Their number ten, as several writers have observed,[2] evidently points to the reduced number of the old Achaian towns after the loss of Helikê and Olenos. This at once suggests a question as to the position of these Magistrates when new cities were added to the League. The number remained unaltered;[3] and it has hence been inferred that the Cabinet Council always continued to be filled by citizens of the old Achaian towns.[4] Yet it would be of itself almost impossible to believe that this important office was confined to citizens of the old Achaia, and that an Argive, a Corinthian, or a Megalopolitan would have been ineligible. Had such been the case, we should hardly have found Polybios, himself a citizen of a non-Achaian town, using such strong language as he does as to the liberality of the League in extending full equality of rights to every city which joined it, and reserving no exclusive privileges to the elder members.[5]

Probably chosen from all the Cities.

In conformity with these professions, the General, as we know, was freely chosen from any of the towns enrolled in the League, and indeed he seems to have been, oftener than not, a citizen of a non-Achaian canton. These arguments alone would almost lead us to believe that, when the League had attained its full developement, the old number Ten, though still retained, ceased to bear any practical reference to the ancient number of towns, and that

[1] Their formal title was δημιουργοί, δαμιοργοί, *Damiurgi*. Pol. xxiv. 5. Plut. Ar. 43. Liv. xxxii. 22; xxxviii. 30. Boeckh, C. I. 1542 (vol. i. p. 711, cf. p. 11). There were also local δαμιοργοί as Magistrates of particular cities. They are also more vaguely called ἄρχοντες, ἀρχαί (Pol. v. 1; xxiii. 10, 12; xxiv. 5; xxix. 9, 10; xxxviii. 4), and—with evident reference to their joint action with the General—συνάρχοντες, συναρχίαι (Pol. xxiv. 12; xxvii. 2; xxxviii. 5); also προεστῶτες (Pol. ii. 46; iv. 9), πρόβουλοι (?) (Plut. Phil. 21), and, apparently, οἱ τῆς γερουσίας (Pol. xxxviii. 5). See Thirlwall, viii. 92, 491. Neither Tittmann (683, 6) nor Kortüm (iii. 161) is perfectly clear about this last unusual title.

Polybios uses the verb συνεδρεύω to express a meeting of the Cabinet, xl. 4.

[2] Schorn, 62, 63. Thirlwall, viii. 91.

[3] Livy, xxxii. 22.

[4] I take this to be Bishop Thirlwall's meaning (viii. 111) when he says, "Strange as it appears, we are led to conclude that the places in both these boards continued to be filled by Achæans." [The rule in the Swiss Bundesverfassung as to the constitution of the Bundesrath is different. Art. 84. "Die Mitglieder des Bundesrathes werden von der Bundesversammlung aus allen Schweizerbürgern, welche als Mitglieder des Nationalrathes wählbar sind, auf die Dauer von drei Jahren ernannt."]

[5] Pol. ii. 38. Οὐδενὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπολειπομένη πλεονέκτημα τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἴσα δὲ πάντα ποιοῦσα τοῖς ἀεὶ προσλαμβανομένοις, κ.τ.λ. Cf. c. 42 throughout. Cf. K. F. Hermann, § 186, n. 10.

the office of Minister, as well as the Presidency, was open to every citizen of the League. It not uncommonly happens, in the growth of constitutions, that numbers of this sort are retained long after they have ceased to bear any practical meaning. So the Ten Achaian Ministers may have once really represented the Ten Achaian Towns, and yet, at all events after the accession of Sikyôn, they may have been chosen indiscriminately from any of the confederate cities.[1] But we are hardly left to argue the point from probabilities. There is a full description in Polybios of the proceedings in an Achaian Cabinet Council,[2] with the names of several of the members. Four of the Ministers are mentioned, and, of these, three, besides the General, are citizens of Megalopolis;[3] the fourth is a citizen of Aigeira, one of the old Achaian towns.

Relations of the Ministers to the General.

The exact relations of the Ten Ministers and of the Secretary to the executive Chief of the State are not very clearly marked. It must have been essential to the good government of the League that they should be able to work together in tolerable harmony, and that their differences, if they had any, should not go beyond a debate and a division among themselves. For Achaian statesmen had certainly not reached that pitch of refinement by which a division in the Cabinet is held to be a thing not to be thought of. They had not discovered that all differences of opinion must be compromised or concealed, or that, if this is impossible, the minority must resign office. This is a political refinement which can exist only where, as among ourselves, the whole constitution of the Ministry is something wholly conventional, where the Cabinet has no legal existence, and where the rights and duties of its members are regulated purely by usage. But the Achaian Cabinet was directly elected to a definite office to be held for a definite time; if differences of opinion arose among its members, they were simply to be

[1] The only expression which looks the other way, is that of *Damiurgi civitatium*. Liv. xxxviii. 30. On the other hand, in xxxii. 22, he calls them *Magistratus gentis*, which tells at least as much for their strictly Federal character.

[2] Pol. xxiii. 10, 12. These ἀρχαί, ἄρχοντες, summoned by the General, must be the council of Ministers. Indeed we find nearly the same story over again in Pol. xxiv. 5, where the formal word δημιουργοί is used, clearly as synonymous with ἄρχοντες.

[3] Aristainos the General, Diophanês, Philopoimên, and Lykortas, all from Megalopolis; Archôn from Aigeira. The General himself takes no part in the debate, but his party is outvoted.

settled by a majority, like differences of opinion in the Senate or in the Assembly itself. In the United States the President chooses his own Ministers, and that with a much greater freedom of choice than is allowed to any Constitutional King. The Achaian President had his Ministers chosen for him; but then they were chosen along with himself, at the same time, and by the same electors; the majority which carried the election of the President himself would probably seldom give him colleagues who were altogether displeasing to him. If, on some occasions,[1] we find the General and his Cabinet disagreeing, the special mention of the fact seems to show that it was something exceptional. Altogether the science of electioneering seems to have obtained a very fair developement in the League. Polybios in one place gives us a vivid description of an Achaian "Caucus,"[2] where several leading men of a particular party met to discuss the general affairs of that party, and especially to settle their "ticket" for the next election. They agreed upon a President and upon a General of Cavalry. It is not expressly said that they agreed upon other Magistrates as well, but we may reasonably infer that they did. At least we cannot infer the contrary from the sole mention of an officer who does not commonly appear in connexion with politics. One cannot help suspecting that the President alone would have been mentioned, if his subordinate officer had not chanced to be the historian himself.

The Ministers probably generally united among themselves.

An Achaian "Caucus.

In comparing the constitution of the Achaian League with the constitutions of modern free states, it is difficult to avoid speaking of its Chief Magistrate by the modern name of

[1] See Pol. xxiii. 10; xl. 4. But in the first case, the disagreement does not go beyond a division in the Cabinet itself.

[2] Pol. xxviii. 6. Nothing can be plainer than that this was simply what the Americans call a "Caucus." Yet two distinguished German scholars, Schorn (p. 64) and Droysen (ii. 463), have built upon this passage a theory that the δαμιοργοί (who are not mentioned) had the sole right of proposing candidates for the Presidency. Bishop Thirlwall of course sets them right (viii. 91). Indeed Schorn himself, by the time that he reached the event itself in his actual narrative (p. 354), seems to have better understood the state of the case. What Polybios here describes is simply the preliminary process which must go before every public election. This is one of the many cases in which a citizen of a free country has a wonderful advantage in studying the history of the ancient commonwealths. Many things which the subject of a continental monarchy can only spell out from his books are to an Englishman or an American matters of daily life.

President. But we must remember that his real official title was Stratêgos or General. In all the democratic states of Greece there was a strong tendency to strengthen the hands of the military commanders, and to invest them with the functions of political magistrates. Thus, at Athens, the Archons remained the nominal chiefs of the state, but their once kingly powers gradually dwindled away into the merest routine. The Ten Generals, officers seemingly not known before Kleisthenês,[1] became really the most important persons in the commonwealth, entrusted with as large a share of authority as Dêmos would entrust to anybody but himself. The transition between the two systems is clearly seen at the battle of Marathôn, where Kallimachos the Polemarch, one of the Archons, is joined in command with the Ten Generals. Earlier, he would have been the sole commander; later, he would have had no part or lot in the matter. In most of the later Grecian states, especially in the Federal states, we find the highest magistrates bearing the title of General. The number of Generals differed in different Leagues, but it was always much smaller than the Athenian Ten. The Epeirots had at one time as many as three,[2] but the Arkadians under Lykomêdês,[3] the Akarnanians,[4] and the Ætolians[5] had each a sole General. The Achaians, for the first five-and-twenty years of their renewed Confederacy, elected two Generals. Then an important change was made in the constitution by reducing the number to one. In the emphatic words of Polybios,[6] "they trusted one man with all their affairs." "Now," he continues, "the first man who obtained this dignity was Markos of Keryneia." Markos, it

The President or General.

Powers of Generals in other Greek states. B.C. 490.

Different numbers in different states.

Two Generals of the Achaian League reduced to One. B.C. 255.

[1] Grote, iv. 181. [2] See above, p. 118. [3] See above, p. 159.
[4] See above, p. 116. [5] See next Chapter.
[6] Pol. ii. 43. Εἴκοσι μὲν οὖν ἔτη τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πέντε συνεπολιτεύσαντο μεθ' ἑαυτῶν αἱ προειρημέναι πόλεις, γραμματέα κοινὸν ἐκ περιόδου προχειριζόμεναι καὶ δύο στρατηγούς· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἕνα καθιστάνειν καὶ τούτῳ πιστεύειν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων, καὶ πρῶτος ἔτυχε τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης Μάρκος ὁ Κερυνεύς. [Cf. Strabo, viii. 7. 3. εἶτα ἔδοξεν ἕνα χειροτονεῖσθαι στρατηγόν.] After reading this passage, and after considering the tendency in Federal Greece, in America, and in Switzerland, to give to every Federal body a single President, it is curious to find Calhoun (Works, i. 393) arguing against a single President, saying that no commonwealth ever retained freedom under a single President, wishing to bring the United States to a double Presidency, like that before Markos, and fortifying his position by the examples of the Roman Consuls and the Spartan Kings. It is curious to find all these American writers —Mr. Motley, indeed, is an exception—so thoroughly anxious to find classical precedents, and so constantly missing those which really bear upon their case.

will be remembered, was the gallant deliverer of Boura, and probably, more than any other one man, the true founder of the revived League. He obtained, like Washington, his due reward, to be chosen as the first chief of the land which he had delivered. The practical extent of the General's powers is here plainly set forth. Everything was entrusted to him; he was not indeed to rule, like a Tyrant, with unlimited powers, or even, like a lawful King, for an unlimited time; he was to govern for a single year with a commission limited by Law; but, while his term of office lasted, he was to be the Chief of the State in a sense in which no man, or body of men, had been chief under the elder Democracy of Athens. His will was indeed limited by the necessity of consulting his colleagues in the Government and of bringing all great questions to the decision of the Sovereign Assembly. The will of the most powerful Minister of modern days is limited by the same conditions. No Minister in a free state can legislate at his own pleasure, in his own name or in the name of his Sovereign; he can impose no tax, he can touch no man's life or estate: he may indeed, in his Sovereign's name, make war or peace without formally consulting Parliament, but he cannot venture to declare war or to conclude peace on terms which he knows will be offensive to the majority of the House. Yet it is not the less true that such a Minister may be practically all-powerful; that his colleagues in the Cabinet, and his fellow-members in the House, may accept all his proposals; that he alone may be the real mover in everything, possessed of a practical initiative in all matters, and leaving to other powers in the state a mere right to say No, which they probably never think good to exercise. Such is a powerful European Minister in our own time; such too was the General of the Achaians. The Republic trusted him with all its affairs; the Assembly of course reserved to itself the final power of saying Aye or No; but every earlier stage of every affair—the beginning of all legislation, the beginning of every negociation,[1] the bringing of all measures up to the point at which they could be brought forward as motions in the Assembly — everything, in short, which a modern nation looks for at the hands of a strong

Extensive powers of the Office.

Comparison with a modern First Minister.

[1] The process of negociation is clearly set forth in Pol. xxviii. 7. A diplomatic communication is first made to the General, who is favourable to it; he then brings the Ambassadors personally before the Assembly.

Government — all was left to the discretion of the General, in concert with a body of colleagues who commonly looked up to him as their natural leader. Now all this is utterly contrary to the practice of the earlier democratic states. Periklês exercised as great a power as Aratos; Periklês, like Aratos, was practically prince;[1] but Periklês ruled purely by the force of personal character and personal eloquence; Aratos ruled by virtue of a high official position. It is true that the official position of Aratos was the result of his personal character; it is true that Periklês, like Aratos, held the most important office in his own commonwealth; the difference is that the official position was necessary to the influence of Aratos and that it was not necessary to the influence of Periklês. Periklês was General of the Athenians, one General out of Ten; he was General, both because of his personal inclination and capacity, and because, in that stage of the republic, a man who pretended to advise measures was expected to be ready to carry them out himself. But the position of Periklês in the Athenian Assembly was not the result of his office; it was a position wholly personal; it was a position which was not shared by the other Generals; it was a position which it was soon found that a man might hold without being General. The Assembly listened to Kleôn as obediently as it listened to Periklês; Kleôn became, no less than Periklês had been, the leader of the People, the originator of all its policy; but Kleôn was simply a private citizen with no official character whatever; it was only towards the end of his days that he foolishly[2] took upon him an office for which he was unfit, and which had not been needed to support an influence which ended only with his life. Dêmosthenês again, without any official position, if he did not rule as effectually as Kleôn, yet contended on at least equal terms with the official chief Phôkiôn, and often succeeded in carrying measures of which Phôkiôn utterly disapproved. Now the power of Aratos undoubtedly rested on his personal character; the League trusted him officially because it trusted him

Comparison of Aratos and Periklês.

Influence of men without Office at Athens.

[1] Thuc. ii. 65. Ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή. The words ὁ πρῶτος ἀνήρ are not an official title.

[2] I do not refer to the expedition to Sphaktêria, for which Mr. Grote makes out at least a plausible case, but to his last expedition to Thrace. Probably his success at Sphaktêria had turned his head, and made him seek for an office which he had never before thought of.

personally; indeed it trusted him in a way in which it trusted no one else; other Generals, with the same legal powers, could never exercise anything like the same practical authority.[1] This is simply the difference, with which we are all familiar, between a weak Government and a strong one. But the influence of Aratos was nevertheless of a kind which could not be exercised without a high official position; he could not have ruled the League, as Kleôn ruled Athens, as a private citizen in the Assembly, any more than the greatest of statesmen and orators could govern England from the cross benches. During the whole history of Athens, we find the counsels of the Republic directed by eloquent speakers in the Assembly, who hold office or not as it happens to suit them personally. During the whole history of the Achaian League, we find its counsels constantly directed by those citizens whom it chose to its high magistracies. It is clear that an Athenian statesman could dispense with office if he pleased; it is equally clear that an Achaian statesman sought office as naturally as an English statesman; without it, he might indeed win fame as an opposition speaker, but he could not hope to be the real guiding spirit of the commonwealth. It is clear also that an Athenian General, though warfare and diplomacy formed his immediate department of the public business, was by no means the necessary originator of military and diplomatic measures. An Athenian General might, as Nikias and Phôkiôn were, be sent, without any loss of official dignity, to carry out plans against which he had, as a citizen in the Assembly, argued with all his force. It is equally clear that an Achaian General was the very soul of the League, the prime deviser of everything. Aratos did not often see his proposals rejected, though that might happen now and then. But it certainly never happened that he was ordered, like Nikias, to carry out the opposite proposals of anybody else.

Greater importance of Office in Achaia.

The whole history then shows that the Achaian General really stood at the head of the League, in a way in which no one stood at the head of any of the earlier Greek republics, but in a way very like that in which a powerful Minister stands at the head of a modern constitutional state. He

[1] See the account given by Polybios (v. 30) of the contemptible administration of Epêratos. Everybody despised him, nobody obeyed him, nothing was ready, etc.

resembled the American President in being formally elected for a definite time, while the position of an English Minister is at once conventional and precarious. But in many respects his duties came nearer to those of an English First Minister than to those of an American President. The main difference is one which has been already hinted at, namely that the Achaian President was a member, and the leading member, of Congress itself, while the American President is something external to Congress. The Achaian President did not communicate his sentiments by a Message, but by a speech from the Treasury Bench.[1] It follows therefore that he formally made motions on which the House voted, while in America the Houses vote first and send their conclusions to the President.[2] An Achaian Federal Law was a motion of the General passed by the Assembly; an American Federal Law is an Act of Congress confirmed by the President. In America, in short, there is no Ministry in our sense, because there is no King. Or, perhaps more truly, the President is a four-years' King, a King with very limited powers, but who, within the extent of those powers, really governs as well as reigns. Being a King then, he cannot be a member of his own Parliament; all he can do to recommend measures from outside, and, when they are passed, either confirm them or send them back for reconsideration.[3] Our monarchical forms really come nearer to the Parliamentary relations which existed in the Achaian Republic than is done by the Republic of the United States. An English Minister, being himself a Member of Parliament,

Comparison of the Achaian General, the American President, and the English First Minister.

Closer approach to the English system, owing to the General being himself a member of the Assembly.

[1] The first two Presidents, Washington and Adams, opened each Session of Congress with a speech; at other stages of the Session they sent messages. In both these respects they followed the common practice of Kings. Jefferson extended the custom of the written message to the opening of the Session (see Tucker's Life of Jefferson, ii. iii. 2). Such speeches were "King's speeches," proceeding from an external power, not "ministerial statements," proceeding from a Member of the House.

[2] The President may recommend measures to Congress (Constitution, Art. ii. § 3), just as a King does, but he cannot make a motion in Congress, like the Achaian General. Congress passes bills, and sends them to the President, for approval (Art. i. § 7. 2), as to a King. On the other hand, the Senate (Art. ii. § 2. 2) can confirm or reject many official acts of the President; but here the Senate is not acting in a strictly legislative character, and the House of Representatives is not consulted.

[3] The President has no absolute veto, but a measure sent back by him cannot be passed again except by a majority of two-thirds of both Houses (Art. i. § 7. 2). This is practically a more valuable power.

retains his power of making direct motions, and, as Minister, he practically acquires the sole right of making important motions with any chance of success. And, as the Royal Veto is never used, the decision of the Houses is practically as final as that of the Achaian Assembly.

Greater power in the General necessary in a Federal than in a City Democracy.

This lofty position of the Achaian General, as compared with that of any Athenian Magistrate, is the crowning example of those tendencies which naturally arise from the different position of a City Democracy and of a Federal Democracy. In either case the Republic needs some centre, some visible head. At Athens the Ten Generals were really that head; some of them were always on the spot; but if any unforeseen emergency took place, there was no need for them to act on their own responsibility; an ordinary Assembly of the People could not be many days distant, and an extraordinary one might, if need be, be summoned even sooner. In such a state of things there was really no occasion to give the Magistrates any large powers. But turn to Achaia; if an unforeseen emergency arose;—if a foreign Ambassador, for instance, arrived with important proposals; if King Kleomenês threatened or King Ptolemy made friendly advances—where was he to look for the Achaian League? The Athenian Dêmos was never very far from his Pnyx, but the League was, for three hundred and fifty-nine days in the year, scattered to and fro over all Peloponnêsos. In such a state of things there must be some one to represent the nation; some one who can be found at once; some one who can enter into negociations, who has authority to give a provisional answer, and who can summon the Assembly to give a final one. Such a representative of the nation the constitution of the League provided in its General. Every application was first made to him; he consulted his Ministers; in concert with them, he either brought the matter before the next ordinary Assembly, or, if the business was specially urgent, he called an extraordinary Assembly specially to consider it. In that Assembly his proposals were not merely those of an eloquent citizen, they carried with them all the weight of a modern Government measure. On any weighty matter, it was his business to come forward and declare[1] his mind, exactly as it is the business of the Leader

[1] Pol. xxviii. 7. Ἐκάλει γὰρ τὰ πράγματα τὴν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ γνώμην. Cf. Livy, xxxv. 25. *Multitudo Philopœmenis sententiam exspectabat. Prætor*

of the House in our own Parliament. The main difference is that, if by any ill luck his proposals were rejected, the General on the one hand could not dissolve the Assembly, and on the other he was not expected to resign his own office.

The same chain of reasoning, which shows the necessity of the large powers which were vested in the Achaian Government, leads also irresistibly to the conclusion that the members of that Government were always men of wealth and high social position. As every Achaian citizen was a member of the Achaian Assembly, so, in the absence of the slightest proof to the contrary, we cannot doubt that every Achaian citizen was legally eligible to every office in the Achaian commonwealth. But if only well-to-do citizens could habitually attend the Assembly, it is clear that only very wealthy citizens could be commonly chosen to the high offices of the State. There is commonly, even under the most democratic forms, a tendency in the people themselves to give a preference to birth and wealth. It is only in days of strong reaction against oligarchic oppression that this tendency utterly dies away. In most ages and countries the aristocrat of liberal politics is the most popular of all characters. Even in the Athenian Democracy, though low-born Demagogues[1] might guide the counsels of the Assembly, the office of General was almost always conferred on members of the old nobility. In the Achaian League this natural tendency must have become a practical necessity. There is no evidence that any public officer of the League was paid; there is distinct evidence that some important public officers were not paid;[2] and the office of General is distinctly spoken of as one which involved great expense.[3] Now none but men who were at once rich, ambitious, and zealous,

Members of the Government necessarily wealthy men.

Offices in the League apparently unpaid

*is tum erat, et omnes eo tempore et prudentia et auctoritate anteibat.* In both these cases the General, like an English Minister, does not speak till after several other speakers, and apparently not till the House began to call for him.

[1] I use this word in its original neutral sense, a Leader of the People, whether for good or for evil. An Athenian δημαγωγός in later times is a citizen, be he Hyperbolos or be he Dêmosthenês, who is influential in the Assembly without holding office. But Isokratês (περὶ Εἰρ. 126) applies the word to Periklês himself.

[2] This is clear in the case of the Senators. See Pol. xxiii. 7 and Thirlwall, viii. 92. Of course I suppose only the great magistracies to have been unpaid. In Achaia, as everywhere else, there must have been plenty of paid subordinates.

[3] Polybios (xxviii. 7) incidentally mentions the expensiveness of the General's office; διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἱκανὸν χρημάτων εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν δεδαπανηκέναι [Ἀρχωνα]. This passage alone would be enough to prove the unpaid nature of public office in Achaia.

would or could accept offices which involved onerous duties and large expenses, and which carried with them only honorary rewards. We are ourselves familiar with an unpaid Magistracy, an unpaid Parliament, a Government not unpaid indeed, but whose highest members receive salaries barely covering their expenses, and therefore do not seek for office as a source of personal gain. We therefore can fully understand the working of a similar system in Achaia. We can understand how the system might be safely left to its own practical working, how an unpaid Magistracy would necessarily be an aristocratic Magistracy, without the requirement of any property qualification. Here again, we see how great an advantage a student of ancient history derives from familiarity with the usages of a free state. One of the very best of German scholars,[1] finding that in practice the men who held the high magistracies and who filled the Federal Tribunals[2] were always rich men, has supposed the existence of a property qualification for office, of whose existence no proof or likelihood whatever is found in our authorities. Had such a qualification been enforced by law, Polybios could never have spoken as he does of the strictly democratic character of the Achaian constitution. Our own great historian of this period,[3] as usual, instinctively sees the truth of the case. Every Englishman knows that no law forbids the poorest man to become a Member of Parliament, or even a Cabinet Minister. Yet, though no law forbids him, the poor man is so far from being likely to be elected a member himself, that he has small chance of being listened to even as the proposer of a candidate. Even where there is a qualification, as in the case of Justices of Peace,

No property qualification.

Natural effect of unpaid offices.

[1] Droysen, ii. 461, 2. I am quite at a loss to guess what the use of the word κτηματικοί in one of the passages of Polybios (v. 93) which Droysen quotes has to do with the matter. The historian is speaking of a local quarrel between rich and poor at Megalopolis.

[2] One cannot doubt either that there were Federal Courts or that their members were commonly wealthy men. Poor men could not often appear in an unpaid court sitting at a distance. But I am not quite sure that the passage commonly cited in proof of the fact really bears on the matter. According to Plutarch (Phil. 7), the Knights (ἱππεῖς) were μάλιστα κύριοι τιμῆς καὶ κολάσεως. This is generally taken to mean that the judges or jurors—the Greek δικασταί are something between the two—in the Federal Courts were commonly men of the equestrian census. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 93. But I do not feel quite certain whether the κόλασις here spoken of may not be parliamentary rather than judicial, as the τιμή clearly refers to the influence of the equestrian class in disposing of the great Federal magistracies. See the parallel passage of Polybios, x. 22.

[3] Thirlwall, viii. p. 93.

a man is seldom appointed who does not possess much more—or at least who does not belong to a class whose members commonly possess much more—than the legal qualification for the office. In Achaia, as in England, these things doubtless settled themselves. There is everywhere a certain natural influence about birth and wealth, which does not spring from legal enactments, and which no legal enactments can take away. All that Democracy—legal and regular Democracy[1]—can do is to deprive birth and wealth of all legal advantage, and to let birth, wealth, talent, happy accident, all start fair and all find their level. This the Democracy of Athens and the Democracy of Achaia both did; only circumstances, not laws, fixed the practical standard of eligibility at a much higher point in the Democracy of Achaia than in the Democracy of Athens.

We will now attempt to gather what information we can from our authorities as to the exact legal powers of the Achaian General and his Councillors. It has been doubted[2] whether the power of summoning extraordinary Assemblies rested with the General or with the Ten Ministers. One can hardly doubt that it was vested in the General acting with the concurrence of his Ministers.[3] This union of a Governor and a Council is not unknown either in American States or in English Colonies. But the formal presidency of the Assembly, and the duty of putting questions to the vote, clearly rested with the Ten Ministers and not with the General.[4] The reason is obvious.

Power of summoning Assemblies vested in the General in Council.

The Ministers act as Speakers of the Assembly.

[1] A constitution which by legal enactments excludes any class, be that class the rich or the poor, the patrician or the plebeian, has no right to the name of Democracy—it is essentially Oligarchic.

[2] K. F. Hermann, § 186, p. 392, Eng. Tr.

[3] Pol. v. 1. (See above, p. 214, and below, 426.) Compare xxiii. 10 throughout. The General and ἄρχοντες meet the Roman Ambassador and decline to call an Assembly.

[4] See the passage in Livy (xxxii. 22) quoted already. If Bishop Thirlwall be right, as he clearly is, in thinking that οἱ τῆς γερουσίας in Pol. xxxviii. 5 mean the δαμιοργοί (viii. 92, 491), we find them distinctly acting as Speakers of the Assembly. They seem to be the ἄρχοντες mentioned just before, and ἄρχοντες in Polybios means the δαμιοργοί. They call the President of the Union, Kritolaos, to order for unparliamentary language. This was in very late, bad, and violent times; one cannot fancy Aratos or Philopoimên receiving or needing such an interruption, though doubtless they were legally open to it, just as an English First Minister may be called to order by the Speaker.

Drumann (p. 462) seems to confound this γερουσία with the βουλή or Senate. Tittmann (683) accurately distinguishes them, though he is not quite clear about their identity with the δαμιοργοί.

The General was necessarily an important speaker; he had to explain and to defend his policy; he would have been as unfit to act as President of the Assembly as the Leader of the House of Commons is to be at the same time its Speaker.[1] Theoretically the same objection might seem to apply to his ten colleagues; they were as responsible as he was for the measures on which they had to take the votes of the Assembly. But they were not so personally bound as he was to be active speakers on their behalf. Our own House of Lords presents a close analogy. The Lord Chancellor is Speaker of the House; he presides, and puts the question. But, unlike the Speaker of the Commons, he is also a member of the Government, an active member of the House; he can vote, speak, bring in bills of his own, just as much as any other Peer; one class of bills indeed it is his special duty to bring in rather than any other Peer. Still it is felt that the Speaker of the House cannot fittingly be the Government Leader in the House; some other Peer is always looked upon as the special representative of the Cabinet in the House of Lords. This division of parliamentary duty exactly answers to what I conceive to have been the division of duties in the Assembly between the Achaian Ministers and the Achaian General. Out of the House, the General and his Ministers doubtless acted in concert in all important civil business. On some great occasions we distinctly see the whole Government acting together. For instance, Aratos and his Ten Councillors[2] all went to meet King Antigonos, and to make arrangements with him for his coming into Peloponnêsos. In short, in all civil and diplomatic business the General acted together with the other members of the Government. He was chief of a Cabinet, and we know what powers the chief of a Cabinet has. He could not indeed get rid of a refractory colleague, as a modern First Minister can; but we may be sure that, in the good times of the League—the days of Kritolaos are another matter—a General who was in the least fit for his place could always command a majority among his colleagues, and a majority was all that was needed.

Joint action in diplomatic matters. B.C. 223.

[1] That in some other Federations, as those of Ætolia and Akarnania (see pp. 264, 484, note 1), the General presided in the Assembly shows the higher political developement of the Achaian System. The Achaian institution of the Ten Ministers seems to have no exact parallel elsewhere. To their existence it is probably owing that we hear less of the Senate in Achaia (see p. 239) than in some other commonwealths.

[2] Plut. Ar. 43. Ἅπηντα μετὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὁ Ἄρατος αὐτῷ.

In military affairs the case was different. The Ten were a purely civil magistracy;[1] the General, besides being the political chief of the state, was also, as his title implies, its military chief, and that with far more unrestrained power than he exercised in civil affairs. The Sovereign People declared war and concluded peace; but while war lasted, the General had the undivided command of the Achaian armies. The Achaians, as Polybios says, trusted their General in everything: they did not hamper his operations in the field in the same way as was too often done by the Venetian, Spartan, and Dutch Republics. There was not the same reason or temptation for doing so. The hereditary Kings of Sparta were naturally looked upon with jealousy by the Ephors, who represented another principle in politics. And Venice, in her land campaigns, had commonly to do with mercenary leaders, whose fidelity might not always be absolutely trusted. But if an Achaian General, a citizen chosen for a year by the free voices of his fellow-citizens, cannot be fully trusted by them, no man can ever be trusted at all. In fact he commonly was both fully and generously trusted. He was allowed to act for himself, subject only to the after-judgement of the Assembly, in which his proceedings might be discussed after the fact.[2] But it is in this union of the chief military and the chief political power in the same person that we see the main point of difference between the Achaian system and that of all modern states, republican or monarchic.[3] No First Minister of a constitutional monarchy thinks of commanding its armies; it is felt that his duties lie in quite another sphere. The American President is indeed, by the Constitution,[4] Commander-in-Chief of the Federal forces by sea and land; that is to say, they are necessarily at his disposal as the chief executive Magistrate; but it is not implied that the President shall always be the man personally to lead the armies of the Republic to battle. But in the Achaian League the General was really a General; his command in the field was as much a matter of course as his chief influence in the

Unrestrained power of the General in War.

Union of military and political functions unlike modern states.

[1] I only remember one instance (see p. 419) of the Ministers being mentioned in military affairs, and this is on the reception of a new city into the League, a business as much diplomatic as military.

[2] Thirlwall, viii. 102. "He wielded the military force of the League in the field with absolute, though not irresponsible, authority."

[3] I speak of the civilized states of Europe and America; I do not answer for Mexican or South American Republics.

[4] Art. ii. § 2. 1.

His title military, but his badge of office civil.

Assembly; his only official title[1] was a military one; though it should be noticed that the outward symbol of his office was one purely civil. We have seen a Theban Archon with nothing military about him, but whose badge of office was a spear;[2] we now find, in curious contrast, that the badge of office of the Achaian General was the purely civil symbol, a seal. The General kept the Great Seal of the League; and his admission to or resignation of office is sometimes spoken of as accepting or laying down the Seal,[3] much as we speak, not indeed of a Commander-in-chief, but of a Lord Chancellor. This union of civil and military duties, which was usual in the later Greek Republics, looks at first sight like a retrograde movement, after the experience of the Athenian commonwealth on the subject. At one time it was held at Athens that the functions of statesman and General should go together. In Miltiadês, Themistoklês, Aristeidês, we see the union in its fulness. In the next generation we discern the first signs of separation between the two. Periklês and Kimôn indeed still unite both functions; Periklês could fight and Kimôn could speak. But it is clear, that, though the functions were united, they were not united in equal proportions in the two men. Periklês was primarily a statesman and secondarily a general; Kimôn was primarily a general and secondarily a statesman. The military abilities of Periklês were considerable, but they were a mere appendage to his pre-eminent civil genius; and most certainly Kimôn was far more at home when warring with the barbarians than when contending with Periklês in the Assembly. It showed the good sense of both the rivals, when they agreed upon the compromise that Periklês should direct the counsels, and Kimôn command the armies, of the commonwealth.[4] In the next stage of things the schism between the two callings becomes wider and wider.

Athenian experience on the union of civil and military powers.

[1] Polybios is singularly fluctuating in the various titles which he gives to the Assembly and to the Ministers, but I do not remember that the General is ever called anything but *στρατηγός*, or, perhaps, its equivalent *ἡγεμών* (see iv. 11; v. 1); *προεστώς* (ii. 45) is hardly meant as a formal title.

[2] See above, p. 129.

[3] Plut. Ar. 38. *Ἐβουλεύσατο μὲν εὐθὺς* [ὁ *Ἄρατος*] *ἀποθέσθαι τὴν σφραγῖδα καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν ἀφεῖναι.* Pol. iv. 7. *Παραλαβὼν* [ὁ *Ἄρατος*] *παρὰ τοῦ Τιμοξένου τὴν δημοσίαν σφραγῖδα.* [So in Outer Appenzell. Müller, Hist. de la Confédération Suisse (Continuation), xiv. 213. Wetter, the Landammann, resigned his office; his son was elected in his stead and "reçut le sceau des mains de son père."]

[4] See Grote, v. 150.

The versatile genius of Alkibiadês indeed united both characters, or rather all characters; but Nikias was a professional soldier, whose position as a statesman is quite incidental, while the elder Dêmosthenês, an admirable soldier, does not appear as a statesman at all. On the other hand Kleôn and his brother Demagogues are mere politicians, who do not in any way profess to be military commanders.[1] In the next century the callings were utterly separated. Phôkiôn is the only man in whom there is the least approach to an union of them. Iphikratês and Chabrias were strictly professional soldiers, who eschewed politics altogether. Dêmosthenês, Æschinês, Hyperidês, never thought of commanding armies. Indeed in their days it was but seldom that the armies of Athens were formed of her own citizens and commanded by her own Generals; they were too commonly mere mercenary bands commanded by faithless soldiers of fortune. It may have been the remembrance of the evils inflicted on Greece by these hireling banditti, which induced both the Achaian League and the other later Greek commonwealths to fall back upon the old system, and to insist upon the union of military and civil powers in the chief of the state. The arrangement doubtless gave greater unity and energy to Federal action; but it undoubtedly had a bad side. It by no means followed either that the wisest statesman would be also the bravest and most skilful captain, or that the bravest and most skilful captain would be also the wisest statesman. Aratos was unrivalled as a diplomatist and parliamentary leader, but his military career contains many more failures than successes. Could he and Lydiadas have divided duties, as Periklês and Kimôn did, the League might perhaps never have been driven to become a suppliant for Macedonian protection. It is also clear that the union aggravated one difficulty which perhaps can never be entirely avoided in any government where magistrates are elected for a definite time. Once a year, or once in four years, what we call a Ministerial Crisis comes round as a matter of

Gradual separation of civil and military functions.

Employment of mercenaries.

The Achaian System a reaction.

Disadvantages of the system,

The Presidental in-

[1] Kleôn's command at Amphipolis is, as we have seen, something quite exceptional. But of course a Demagogue, like another citizen, might be called upon to serve in war. Hence the point of Phôkiôn's retort to a troublesome orator—*πολέμου μὲν ὄντος ἐγὼ σοῦ, εἰρήνης δὲ γενομένης σὺ ἐμοῦ ἄρξεις.* Plut. Phôk. 16. Compare also the story of Phôkiôn and Archibiadês in the same life, c. 10. Dêmosthenês and Æschinês both served in the army, and Æschinês gained some credit for personal gallantry, just as Sôkratês did, but no one ever thought of choosing any one of the three to the office of General.

terregnum aggravated by the union of powers.

course. It is felt to be a practical fault in the American system that the President is chosen so long before he actually enters on his office.[1] A practical interregnum of some months takes place; the incoming Government are still private men; the outgoing Government, though still invested with legal powers, cannot venture to use them with any effect in the face of their designated successors. A circumstance recorded by Polybios [2] shows that this difficulty was felt in Achaia also. The Ætolians chose for an inroad the time when the official year was drawing to its close, as a time when the Achaian counsels were sure to be weak. Aratos, the General-elect, was not yet actually in office;[3] the outgoing General Timoxenos shrank from energetic action so late in this year, and at last yielded up his office to Aratos before the legal time. We know not exactly how long the Achaian interregnum lasted, but it is evident that we here find the American difficulty, and that aggravated by the fact that the President had himself personally to take the field. At Rome the change of Consuls seems to have sometimes had the same effect; but, in the best days of Rome, the danger was tempered in two ways. It was lessened by that habitual devotion of every Roman to the public interest, to which neither Achaia nor America nor any other state can supply a parallel. And the custom, by which a Consul whose services were really needed was commonly continued in his command as Proconsul, prevented the occurrence of any interregnum at all in the cases where it would have been most hurtful.

B.C. 220.

Question of re-election of the President.

It may perhaps be doubted whether, in another point, the practice of the League diminished or aggravated an evil which has often been pointed out in the American system. The power given by the Constitution, and, at one time, often exercised in practice, of re-electing the President, at least for one additional term of office,[4] has often been made the subject of grave complaint. It places, it is argued, the Chief Magistrate of the Union in the somewhat lowering position of a candidate for the

[1] In the United States this evil is aggravated by the utter failure of the constitutional provisions for the double election of the President. The President not only does not enter on office immediately on his legal election, but, long before the legal election takes place, it is already practically decided who will be elected, and the interregnum at once begins.

[2] iv. 6, 7.

[3] See below, p. 397.

[4] The Constitution puts no restriction upon re-election; in practice no President has ever remained in office for more than two terms.

suffrages of the citizens; it causes him too often to adopt a policy, which may not be in itself the best, but which may be the most likely to lead to re-election; and it causes the latter part at least of a Presidency to be often spent in canvassing rather than in governing.[1] The Achaian President held office for a year only; he was incapable of immediate re-election, but he might be chosen again the year after.[2] In conformity with this law, Aratos, during his long ascendency, was commonly elected seemingly quite as a matter of course, in the alternate years. In those years when he was not himself in office, he was often able to procure the election of some partisan[3] or kinsman,[4] whose policy he practically guided. We may well believe that, when he was not General, he often filled some other high office, and indeed it is not clear whether he was not sometimes, in defiance of the law, himself re-elected in consecutive years.[5] It is certain that he was once, and that while another citizen was in office, elected by a thin Assembly to the anomalous post of General with Absolute Power,[6] and that, in that character, he

Achaian General incapable of *immediate* re-election.

B.C. 223.

[1] On the other side see the ingenious arguments in the "Federalist," No. lxxii. p. 390. Doubtless, as in most political questions, there is something to be said on both sides, but practically the disadvantages of re-election seem decidedly to predominate. This view is strongly taken by Tocqueville, i. 228 et seqq., and Jefferson (see his life by Tucker i. 281) strongly objected to the power of re-electing the President, on the ground that a re-eligible President would be always re-elected, and would in fact become a Tyrant. That this fear was chimerical in America was proved by Jefferson's own case, but it was a very real one in Greece. See p. 238. The new Southern Confederation has made the President incapable of re-election, but has given him a longer term of office, namely, for six years. Art. ii. § 1.

[2] Plut. Ar. 21. Ἐπεὶ μὴ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἐξῆν, παρ' ἐνιαυτὸν αἱρεῖσθαι στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν [τὸν Ἄρατον], ἔργῳ δὲ καὶ γνώμῃ διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν. So 30. 38. Kleom. 15. Three of these passages are strangely quoted in the Dictionary of Antiquities (p. 5, art. Achaicum Fœdus) to show that "persons of great merit and distinction were sometimes re-elected for several successive years." So Kortüm, iii. 162. The law may sometimes have been broken—it certainly was once in the case of Philopoimên (Liv. xxxviii. 33)—but Plutarch clearly means that the law forbade immediate re-election. (See Thirlwall, viii. 191. Droysen, ii. 438.) παρ' ἐνιαυτόν, to make any sense, can only mean "every other year."

[3] Timoxenos (Pol. iv. 6, 7. 82. Τὸν Τιμόξενον . . . τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Αρατον εἰσαγόμενον), Hyperbatês, etc. seem mere nominees and instruments of Aratos. Even with Lydiadas and Aristomachos he interferes in a strange way.

[4] As his son the younger Aratos. Pol. iv. 37; v. 1.

[5] See Droysen, ii. 438. I shall examine this question in a note at the end of Chapter viii.

[6] Plut. Ar. 41. Τῷ δ' Ἀράτῳ συνῆλθον εἰς Σικυῶνα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν οὐ πολλοί [but Sintenis in his text gives οἱ πολλοί], καὶ γενομένης ἐκκλησίας ῥηθῆ στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, καὶ περιεστήσατο φρουρὰν ἐκ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ πολιτῶν. See Thirlwall, viii. 194. On the position of the στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, see below, p. 377. The

was, for a while at least, attended by a body-guard like a Tyrant. A man at once so fond of power, and so fully trusted as Aratos was, may probably have now and then ventured on violations of the letter of the law, especially when they took the form of illegal motions passed by the Sovereign Assembly. The question as to the working of the law against re-election was probably of more importance before the rise, and after the death, of Aratos. Where office is held for so short a time as a year, there is only one way which will absolutely prevent a Magistrate from shaping his conduct with a view to re-election. This is the extreme measure of forbidding the same man to hold office more than once in his life. An election in the next year but one is near enough to come pretty closely before his eyes and practically to influence his conduct in office. But the prohibition of re-election at any time, however distant, may lead to still worse evils. It was tried at Rome in the case of the Consulship,[1] but it was afterwards given up. Such a rule, it is obvious, might often deprive the State of the services of its best citizens at the very time when they were most wanted. But the Achaian system of forbidding immediate re-election, though it could not entirely remove, probably did a good deal to lessen, the evil complained of in America. And it effectually stopped what was really the danger in Greece, that of the same man being elected, year after year, till he contrived to convert a permanent Presidency into a Tyranny. Aratos indeed, even when not in the highest office, was the practical ruler of the League; still the alternation of official and non-official years at least marked the distinction which separates the republican leader, however great his official power and personal influence, from the Tyrant reigning by force. If his government once, for a moment, assumed something like the outward form of Tyranny, even that extreme measure had some shadow of constitutional sanction, and it was ventured on only in a moment of extreme danger to the Union and its chief. The laws of the Achaian commonwealth allowed an able and eloquent statesman to exercise an almost unbounded influence,

Special position of Aratos.

title was one familiar at Athens (see Thuc. vi. 26), but an Athenian *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* had no larger powers than an ordinary Achaian *στρατηγός*. It meant merely that exemption from the interference of colleagues and that absence of all instructions in detail which distinguish an Achaian from an Athenian General. On the other hand this title was the first step of Dionysios of Syracuse to the Tyranny. But the guard of Aratos was at least a guard of citizens, not of mercenaries.

[1] Liv. Epit. lvi.

but they supplied an easy means of checking him if he displayed the least tendency to abuse his power. Every alternate year at least he had to descend to the legal rank of a private citizen, and it rested wholly with his fellow-citizens whether he should ever rise above it again. It is clear that the Achaian League did not, as Republics are sometimes charged with doing, exhibit any jealousy of distinguished men. The whole career of Aratos shows the contrary. After his death no one inherited his full influence; but we always find the Federal President a person high in both personal and official position. Unless it were during the few wretched years before the final Roman Conquest, the best men in the country never shrank from public affairs or stood aloof from the great offices of the State. Achaia, like all other countries, was not free from personal jealousies and party divisions; but the several parties seem commonly to have fairly striven to place their best men in the chief office of the Commonwealth. It is only twice or thrice, and that, in one case at least, through an overwhelming foreign influence, that we find a confessedly incapable President set at the head of the League.[1] It is a great problem in government to secure power enough in the rulers without trenching on the rights of the whole body. This problem the Achaian League seems very satisfactorily to have solved.

Position of succeeding Generals.

Between the Government and the Popular Assembly there stood, as in all other Greek commonwealths, a Senate. Of this Senate we have less knowledge than we could wish. Its mention in our authorities is not so frequent as one might have expected, and in some passages it is hard to distinguish its action from that of the Popular Assembly.[2] There are however other passages which make it clear that the Senate was a distinct body.[3]

The Senate

[1] As in the case of Epêratos. Pol. iv. 82; v. 1, 30, 91. Cf. xi. 8.

[2] Pol. iv. 26; xxviii. 3 (a passage which I shall deal with hereafter), where *βουλή* might almost be taken for one of the many synonyms of the Assembly. So in xxiii. 9, *βουλευτήριον* seems to be used for the place of Meeting of the Assembly, which elsewhere is a theatre. xxix. 10; xxxviii. 4. Cf. Tittmann, Staatsverfassung, 684.

[3] In Pol. ii. 37, the *βουλευταί* are clearly mentioned as distinct Federal officers, just like the *ἄρχοντες* and *δικασταί*, with whom they are joined. So in ii. 46, xxiii. 7, 8, xxix. 9, the *βουλή* seems to be a distinct body. In xxiii. 7, 8, indeed, the *βουλή* of Polybios answers to the *σύνοδος* of Diodôros (Exc. Leg. 13), but it is dangerous to make constitutional inferences from Diodôros. Cf. Tittmann, 685.

The apparent confusion between the two may arise from the fact that the Senate was essentially a Committee of the Assembly, and that a meeting of the larger body probably always involved a previous meeting of the smaller. But we know not the exact nature of its constitution, nor do we know anything of its times of meeting, except so far as they were determined by those of the Assembly. But we do know, from a most curious incidental notice,[1] that it consisted of one hundred and twenty unpaid members. If this number points to the original ten or twelve Achaian towns, we must believe that the Senate also, as well as the inner Cabinet, was afterwards opened to all citizens of the Union. This Senate discharged the usual functions of a Greek Senate. The Government brought their proposals before it, to be discussed, and perhaps amended, by this smaller body, before they were submitted to the final decision of the Assembly.[2] Ambassadors were introduced to it before their audience of the assembled Nation, and perhaps in some cases they transacted business with the Senate alone.[3] In other cases again the Senate might be invested by the Assembly with delegated powers to act in its name. And it is really not unlikely, especially in the latter times of the League, when assemblies were being constantly summoned at the caprice of Roman officers, that a summons to a Public Assembly may often have been answered by few beside those citizens who happened to be Senators.[4] These

[1] Pol. xxiii. 7, 8. See above, p. 229.

[2] The joint action of the three bodies, Ministers, Senate, and Assembly, seems clearly marked in Pol. ii. 46. Οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματος . . . συναθροίσαντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔκριναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς.

[3] In Pol. iv. 26, the ordinary meeting—ἡ καθήκουσα σύνοδος—is held; King Philip attends it, but he seems only to have addressed the Senate (προσελθόντος τοῦ βασιλέως πρὸς τὴν βουλὴν ἐν Αἰγίῳ).

[4] In Pol. xxix. 8, a body meets which is called σύνοδος and ἀγορά, and we hear of τὸ πλῆθος and οἱ πολλοί. Presently another special Meeting (σύγκλητος) is held, at which Polybios remarks, as if it were something unusual, that not only the Senate, but everybody, attended; ἐν ᾗ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν βουλὴν ἀλλὰ πάντας τοὺς ἀπὸ τριάκοντα ἐτῶν. (See above, p. 205.) The former meeting can hardly have been anything except a Public Assembly, summoned as such, but at which few or none but Senators had actually attended.

By the present Constitution of the University of Oxford, Convocation and Congregation are two distinct bodies, Congregation consisting of a certain class of the Members of Convocation. On exciting occasions a large body of Members of Convocation is drawn together, but it often happens that a meeting of Convocation is attended by none but Members of Congregation.

So, in Cathedral Chapters, the smaller body of Residentiaries, by constantly

last two considerations may help to explain the cases where the Senate and the Public Assembly seem to be confounded. In either case, the Senate would practically discharge the functions of the Assembly, and the body so acting might be roughly called by either name. The Achaian Senate was no doubt legally possessed of higher and more independent powers than the Senate of Athens; still we doubt whether it exercised any very formidable check on the will of an able and popular General. For the analogy of other Achaian institutions would lead us to believe that the Senators were appointed together with the Magistrates at the ordinary Spring Meeting, and that they were really elected by the Assembly, and not left to the lot, as at Athens. If so, the party in the Assembly which carried the election of a General and his Ten Councillors would doubtless be able to carry also the election of Senators of whom a large majority would be of the same way of thinking.

Financial and Military Policy of the League.

On the financial and military systems of the Achaians it is hardly my business to enlarge. But a few points must be mentioned which have a direct bearing on the Federal Constitution. That the Achaian League was essentially a national Government, that its laws and decrees were directly binding upon Achaian citizens, can admit of no reasonable doubt. But it is not equally clear that it had in all cases advanced beyond that system of requisitions from the particular members, instead of direct agency on the part of the Federal power, which, in modern politics, is held, more than anything else, to distinguish an Imperfect from a Perfect Federation.[1] It would hardly have been in harmony with the common instincts of the Greek mind to have scattered an army of Federal officers, in no way responsible to the local Governments, over all the cities of Peloponnêsos. And, in truth, questions of taxation by no means held that important place in an ancient Greek commonwealth which is

acting in the name of the whole body of Canons, has gradually drawn into its own hands nearly all the powers of the Chapter.

So again, in England, when a Privy Council is held, it is not attended by all the Privy Councillors, but by those only who are immediately connected with the Government.

In these last two cases the attendance of the whole body is so unusual that it would doubtless be resisted as something irregular. At Oxford, the whole body is contented to leave many matters in the hands of one class of its members, but it reserves to itself the undoubted power of assembling in full force whenever it pleases. The relations between the Achaian Senate and Assembly seem to have been very similar.

[1] See above, p. 9.

System of Requisitions probably more convenient.

attached to them in every modern state. Probably, under the circumstances of the League, the requisition system was the more convenient of the two; but it is perfectly plain that the Federal Assembly and the Federal Magistracy were powers to which every citizen owed a direct obedience, and not merely an indirect one through the Government of his own city. We once get a glimpse of the Federal system of taxation, when we find certain cities, and those too cities of the original Achaia, refusing to pay the contributions which were due from them to the Federal Treasury.[1] This seems to show that the Federal Assembly, or the Government acting by its authority, assessed each city at a certain sum, which the city had to raise by whatever form of local taxation it thought best. And really, though the United States prefer a system of more strictly Federal taxation, there seems nothing in the other method necessarily inconsistent with the strictest Federal Unity.[2] In military matters, we find the Assembly sometimes requiring particular cities to furnish particular contingents,[3] and sometimes investing the General with power to summon the whole military force of the League.[4] Beside these citizen soldiers, the League, according to the custom of the age, made large use of mercenaries, whose pay must have come out of the Federal Treasury. But they seem to have been kept strictly under the orders of the Federal General and his subordinate officers; we never see Achaia, like Florence and other Italian states, at the mercy of a hired Captain. Out of these two classes of citizen and mercenary soldiers, the League kept up a small standing army, enough at least to supply a few important places with Federal garrisons. The immeasurable importance of Akrokorinthos caused a Federal garrison to be kept there, after the deliverance of the city,[5] as regularly as a Macedonian garrison had been kept during the days of its bondage. We also read of garrisons being kept in one or two cities, like Kynaitha[6] and Mantineia,[7] whose loyalty to the

Military Contingents ordered by the Assembly.

Mercenaries.

Federal Garrisons.

B.C. 243–223.

[1] Pol. iv. 60. Συνεφρόνησαν ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸ τὰς μὲν κοινὰς εἰσφορὰς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς μὴ τελεῖν. Cf. v. 30, 91. In v. 1, we see the Federal Congress distinctly voting supplies, but we have no hint as to the way in which they were to be levied. [2] See above, p. 11. [3] Pol. v. 91.

[4] Pol. iv. 7. Ἐψηφίσαντο . . . . συνάγειν τὸν στρατηγὸν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις. See above, p. 215.

[5] Four hundred heavy-armed foot, fifty hounds, and fifty huntsmen. Plut. Ar. 24.

[6] Pol. iv. 17. Φυλακὴν ἔχοντας τῶν τειχῶν καὶ στρατηγὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐξ Ἀχαΐας.

[7] Three hundred Achaian citizens and two hundred mercenaries. Pol. ii. 58.

League was doubtful, or whose local Governments required Federal help against a discontented party.[1] But, beside what was necessary for these purposes, the League is not likely to have kept any force, whether of citizens or mercenaries, constantly under arms. But the extensive military reforms of Philopoimên[2] show that the citizens must have been in the habit of frequent military training, or he would hardly have had the opportunity of introducing such considerable changes as he did into both the cavalry and the infantry of the League. B.C. 210, 207.

General Comparison between the Achaian League and the United States.

In considering the constitution of the Achaian League, it is impossible to avoid comparing it, almost at every step, with the constitution of the United States. If I have pointed out some points of diversity, it is because the general likeness is so close that the slightest unlikeness at once makes itself felt. The two constitutions are as like one another as, under their respective circumstances, they could be. They arose in different quarters of the globe, among men of different races and languages, and with an interval of two thousand years between the two. The elder Union was a Confederation of single Cities, which had once been strictly sovereign Republics, invested with all the rights of independent powers. The younger Union was a Confederation of large States, which had hitherto been mere colonies of a distant Monarchy, and which, before the War of Independence, never thought of pretending to sovereign rights. Even the New England colonies, though the circumstances of their foundation gave to their early days much greater independence than European colonies commonly possess, were still colonies, and fully recognized their allegiance to the mother-country. With this difference of position to start from, it is much more remarkable that there should be any considerable degree of likeness between the two constitutions than that there should be some considerable degree of unlikeness. The chief differences between them are the natural results of the difference between a Confederation of Cities and a Confederation of large States. From this distinction at once follows the main difference of all, that the Achaian Congress was a primary Assembly, while the American Congress is a Representative Assembly. From this again follow certain differences of detail; the American Congress

Close general resemblance between the two.

Differences arising from the difference between a Confederation of Cities and

[1] A similar power is given by the Constitution of the United States. Art. iv. § 4.

[2] Plut. Phil. 7, 9.

a Confederation of States.

could be, and is, bi-cameral, which the Achaian Congress could not be; the Achaian President was chosen by Congress, or by the nation, as we choose to put it, while the American President is legally chosen by special electors; the Achaian President was a member, and the leading member, of Congress, while the American President is a power external to Congress. On this latter very important point we have seen that the practical working of our own Constitutional Monarchy makes a nearer approach to the Constitution of Achaia than is made by the Constitution of the United States. From a Primary Assembly, where every citizen has a right to appear, it is obviously impossible to exclude the Chief Magistrate of the State. So the forms of a modern Constitutional Monarchy require the actual, though not the avowed, wielder of the royal power to be himself a member of one or other House of the Legislature. But such a position would be hardly consistent with the office of a President whose kingly functions are conferred on him by Law and not by an unwritten conventionality. Still the general position of the Chief Magistrate in the two constitutions is strikingly alike, and the more so when we remember that the historical origin of the two offices was wholly different. The American President, like the Athenian Archon or the Roman Consul, inherited, under the necessary limitations of a republican system, the powers of which the King was deprived by the Revolution. He answers very exactly to the Athenian Archon in his second stage, when a single Chief Magistrate was chosen for ten years. The powers of the President are essentially kingly; he lacks indeed the power of declaring war, but it is his function to negociate treaties of peace; he has the command of the national forces; he has the mass of the national patronage; and he possesses a legislative veto, which is the more practical because it is only suspensive. All these powers are strictly royal; only, when put into the hands of a republican magistrate, they are necessarily limited in various ways. In some cases the confirmation of the Senate is legally required for the validity of the President's acts; he is, like the Consul, the sole mover and doer, but another power in the State possesses the Tribunician function of forbidding.[1] In all cases his power is practically

Analogies and diversities in the position of the President.

Different origin of the office in the two Systems.

Kingly powers of the American President.

[1] This analogy is not quite perfect. The President's acts have to be formally confirmed by the Senate; the Consul's acts needed no formal confirmation from the Tribunes. All that the Tribune did was to step in with his Veto when he

limited by the temporary tenure of his office, and by his personal responsibility[1] for any illegal act. Still, limited as they are in their exercise, the powers are in themselves kingly;[2] the President stepped into the King's place;[3] he has really more power than a Constitutional King has personally, though less than belongs to a powerful First Minister acting in a Constitutional King's name. But the Achaian General did not succeed any King; if there ever was one King over all the Old Achaian cities it was in a long past and mythical time; the single General succeeded to the functions of the two Generals whom the League originally elected. There was therefore nothing kingly about his origin; the Achaians deliberately decided that one Chief

Nothing royal about the Achaian General.

thought good. But the right of confirmation, in the hands of a body which can originate nothing, is practically reduced to a right of rejection.

[1] I mean responsibility in the old Greek and in the *legal* English sense, not in that in which we often speak of Ministers being "responsible to Parliament." This last phrase simply means that the House of Commons may discuss their acts, and that, if it disapproves of them, it can easily drive them to resignation. But a Greek Magistrate was, and an American President is, liable to legal trial and punishment for his official acts. So is an English Minister, but not as a Minister. If it can be proved that the First Lord of the Treasury has been guilty of malversation at the Treasury, if it can be proved that he has, as a Privy Councillor, given the Sovereign illegal advice, the Law can in either case touch him, by impeachment or otherwise. But as "Prime Minister," with a good or a bad "policy," the Law cannot touch him, because it knows nothing of his existence. In our system, Parliamentary responsibility has become so effective as to make strictly legal responsibility nearly a dead letter. But in the American system, there is no such thing as Parliamentary responsibility; ten thousand votes of censure cannot displace the President, but an impeachment can.

[2] Hamilton, in the "Federalist" (No. lxix. p. 371), labours hard, as his argument requires, to show the points of difference between the elective and responsible President and the hereditary and irresponsible King. That is, he brings forward the republican limitations of the President's powers more strongly than the kingly nature of the powers themselves. He then compares the President with the Governors of particular States, showing that the President's powers do not, on the whole, exceed theirs. But the powers of a State Governor are no less kingly within their own range, and they are also kingly in their origin. The Governor of the independent State succeeded the Governor of the dependent Colony, and he, whether elected or nominated, was essentially a reflected image of Kingship. The Governor of the State retained the position of the Governor of the Colony, with such changes as a republican system necessarily required. It may be doubted whether republics which had had no sort of experience of monarchical institutions would have invested any single magistrate with the large powers possessed by the American Governors.

[3] The fact that the chaotic period of the old Constitution, 1776-1789, intervened makes but little difference. The memory of Kingship had not died out, and the anarchy of the Confederation proved the need of a head of some kind. The Federalists were always charged by their Republican opponents with endeavouring to restore Monarchy, and, in a certain sense, the charge was undoubtedly true.

Magistrate was better than two, and that it was well to clothe that Chief Magistrate with powers unknown to earlier Democracies.[1] But the general resemblance between the Heads of the two Unions is obvious; whatever may be the differences in detail, we see, in both cases, that a highly democratic constitution can afford to invest a single chief with nearly the whole executive power, and we see, in both cases, that so great an extent of legal power may be sufficient to gratify the ambition of the citizens who are successively raised to it. Neither Union hesitated to create something like a temporary King, and neither Union ever fell under the sway of anything like a permanent Tyrant.[2] In both these respects the Achaian and American Democracies stand together, and are distinguished alike from the earlier Democracies of Greece and from the Democracies of mediæval Italy. Florence indeed, and other Italian cities, invested their magistrates with far greater powers than those of either the Achaian General or the American President. But those powers could be safely vested only in a Board or College; a single chief came in only as a temporary Dictator,[3] and the temporary Dictator often contrived to convert himself into a Tyrant. The Achaian and the American Confederations stand together as the two Democracies which have entrusted a single Chief Magistrate with the greatest amount of power, and those in which that power has been less abused than anywhere else.

General resemblance of the two Presidents.

The American Senate is an institution to which there is no exact parallel in the Achaian system. The founders of the American Constitution adopted the general principle of a Second Chamber from the constitution of the mother-country. They adapted it to republican ideas by making its seats elective instead of hereditary, and they invested it with some powers which the British House of Lords does not possess. It is the constitutional

No exact parallel in Achaia to the American Senate.

[1] The days when Athens had a single Archon were of course long before she became a Democracy. In fact the gradual advances of Democracy were largely made at the expense of the Archonship.

[2] The doubtful stretches of authority on the part of the President during the present struggle can hardly fail to remind us of the irregular proceedings of Aratos in the crisis of the Kleomenic war. See below, Chapter vii. But I see as little reason to suspect Mr. Lincoln, as there was to suspect Aratos, of any real intention to establish a Tyranny.

[3] The Podestà of so many cities, the Roman Senator, and so forth, were originally Dictators required by special emergencies, though those emergencies sometimes lasted so long as to convert the Dictatorship into a permanent Magistracy. I do not remember any magistrate in a democratic city really analogous to the American President.

check on the power of the President, and it is the special guardian of the rights of the several States. Each State, great and small, has its two Senators, while in the House of Representatives members are carefully apportioned to population. Where the Assembly is primary, a Second Chamber, in the same sense as the British House of Lords or the American Senate, cannot exist. It is of the essence of such a Chamber that its members should not be at the same time members of the Lower House. But in a constitution like that of Achaia, no citizen, whatever office he may hold, can cease to be a member of an Assembly whose very essence is that it consists of all the citizens. A Senate is necessary for many purposes; sometimes it prepares measures for discussion in the Assembly, sometimes it acts independently by commission from the Assembly; but in either case it is a mere Committee of the sovereign body, a portion of its members acting on the behalf, and by the authority, of the whole. The special duties of the American Senate were, in Achaia, part of the duties of the Sovereign Assembly itself. The Assembly finally confirmed the treaties which the General negociated; the Assembly, in which each city had an equal voice, was itself the natural guardian of State independence. The principle of State equality which America confines, in most cases, to one branch of her Legislature, was applied in Achaia, in a more rigid form,[1] to her single Assembly. The Achaian Senate is more analogous to the Norwegian Lagthing than to anything in the constitution either of England or of America. The Norwegian Storthing is, like most other European Assemblies, Representative and not Primary; it is indeed doubly representative, being chosen by indirect election. But it so far approaches to the nature of a Primary Assembly that there is no distinct Second Chamber. The Storthing chooses a Lagthing from among its own members, and the body thus chosen discharges several of the functions of a Senate or House of Lords.[2] But even here the analogy is very imperfect; for the Lagthing, being a mere portion of the Storthing, exists only while the Storthing is sitting, while it is of the essence of a Greek Senate to act when the Public Assembly is not sitting. A less important difference

A Second Chamber impossible in a Primary Assembly.

Analogy of the Norwegian Lagthing.

[1] In the Achaian Assembly, each city, great or small, had one vote. In the American Senate each State, great or small, sends an equal number of Senators, but the votes are not taken by States; the two Senators of a State may vote on opposite sides of the question, like the two members for an English county or borough.

[2] Constitution of Norway, § 74-6 (Latham's Norway, ii. 87).

between the Achaian and American Constitutions may be seen in the far higher legal position of the Ministers or Councillors of the Achaian General, as compared with the Cabinet of the American President. But, even here, we have seen that, in all probability, the Achaian Ministers were practically almost as much the General's chosen Councillors as if they had been of his own nomination. Here again the difference arises from the different origin of the two offices. The Achaian Ministers were a Magistracy more ancient than the General, by whose powers they must have been thrown somewhat into the background. But of the President's Cabinet the American Constitution makes no distinct mention at all. The different departments of administration were arranged by an Act of the first Congress.[1]

Higher position of the Achaian Ministers [Δαμιοργοί]

Such are the chief points of likeness and of unlikeness between the two great Federal Democracies of the ancient and the modern world. It is singular that that which was practically the less democratic of the two should be that which had theoretically the more democratic constitution.[2] Every Achaian citizen was himself a permanent member of Congress, with a voice in all Federal legislation, in declaring peace and war, and in electing the Magistrates of the Union. The American citizen, on the other hand, has only a vote in electing the Representatives of his State, in electing electors of the President, in electing the State Legislature which again elects the Senators of his State. Yet nothing is clearer than that the tone and feeling of government and policy is far more democratic in the United States than it was in ancient Achaia. Here again comes in the difference between the Primary and the Representative system. The Primary system, theoretically the most democratic system possible, that which invests every citizen with a personal share in the Federal Government, becomes, in a large territory, practically the less democratic of the two. The franchise which it confers can be exercised only under circumstances which act on the mass of the people as a practical property qualification.[3] The franchise which the American Union confers on every citizen is far more restricted in its powers, but it is one which every citizen can exercise without cost or trouble. The real power of the mass of the people is therefore far greater; the franchise is

Achaia the more democratic in theory and America in practice.

[1] Marshall's Life of Washington, v. 228 et seqq.
[2] See above, p. 208.
[3] See Federalist, lviii. (p. 318) quoted above, p. 208.

universally exercised, or abstained from only by the very class by which the Achaian franchise was almost solely exercised. Two constitutions, framed two thousand years and seven thousand miles apart, naturally present no small diversity. Yet, after all, the diversity is trifling compared with the likeness. Probably no two constitutions, produced at such a distance of time and place from one another, ever presented so close a resemblance to each other, as that which exists between the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Achaian League.

The American Constitution not a conscious imitation of the Achaian.

The question then naturally arises, Was the younger of these two Constitutions, so like in their provisions, so distant in time and place, in any degree a conscious imitation of the elder? I am inclined to think that it was not. The founders of the American Union were not scholars, but practical politicians. They were fully disposed to listen to the teaching of history, but they had small opportunity of knowing what the true and uncorrupted teaching of Grecian history really was. Those chapters of the "Federalist"[1] which are devoted to the consideration of earlier instances of Federal Government show every disposition to make a practical use of ancient precedents, but they show very little knowledge as to what those precedents really were. It is clear that Hamilton and Madison knew hardly anything more of Grecian history than what they had picked up from the "Observations" of the Abbé Mably. But it is no less clear that they were incomparably better qualified than their French guide to understand and apply what they did know. Mably's account of the Achaian League,[2] like his account of the Amphiktyonic[3] Council, is in the style of the French scholarship of the last century. How that looks by the light of English and German scholarship of the present century, hardly needs to be told. Of course the Amphiktyonic Council appears as the "States-General" of a regular Confederation, which is paralleled with the Confederation of Switzerland. In treating of the Achaian League, Mably confounds the Assembly with the Senate;[4]

Remarkable treatment of the Achaian history in the "Federalist."

[1] Federalist, No. xviii. p. 91.

[2] Observations sur l'Histoire de Grèce. Œuvres de Mably, iv. 186, ed. 1792.

[3] Ib. iv. 10. See above, p. 110.

[4] "On créa un sénat commun de la nation; il s'assembloit deux fois l'an à Egium, au commencement du printemps et de l'automne, et il étoit composé des députés de chaque république en nombre égal. Cette assemblée ordonnoit la guerre ou la paix," etc., p. 187. The confusion is the more curious, because in matters of mere detail, like the two yearly meetings, Mably is accurate enough.

Mably's account of the League, followed by the American writers.

he has hardly any notion of the remarkable powers vested in the General, or, as he calls him, the Prætor;[1] finally, he loads Aratos with praises for that act of his life which Plutarch so emphatically condemns, which Polybios has so much ado to defend, his undoing his own work and laying Greece once more prostrate at the feet of a Macedonian master.[2] The comments of the American statesmen on such a text are curious, and more than curious; they are really instructive. Their vigorous intellects seized on, and practically applied, the few facts which they had got hold of, and even from the fictions they drew conclusions which would be perfectly sound, if one only admitted the premisses. They instinctively saw the intrinsic interest and the practical importance of the history of Federal Greece, and they made what use they could of the little light which they enjoyed on the subject. One is at first tempted to wish that, instead of such a blind guide as Mably, such apt scholars had had the advantage of the teaching of a Thirlwall, or that they had been able to draw for themselves from the fountain head of Polybios himself.[3] Had they known that, in the Achaian Assembly, Keryneia had an equal vote with Megalopolis, how dexterously would they have grappled with the good and evil sides of such a precedent. How they would have shown that the principle of State equality which the Achaians thus affirmed was amply secured by the constitution of the Senate,[4] while the unfairness which could not fail to attend this part of the Achaian system was carefully guarded against by the opposite constitution of the House of Representatives.[5] Had they fully realized the prominent position of the Achaian General, so different from any-

He had evidently read his books with care, but without the least power of understanding them.

[1] He does indeed say (p. 190), "Elle fit la faute heureuse de ne confier qu'à un seul préteur l'administration de toutes ses affaires." This is of course a translation of those famous words of Polybios to which I have so often referred; but no words ever stood more in need of a comment.

[2] "On ne peut, je crois, donner trop de louanges à Aratus pour avoir recouru à la protection de la Macédoine même, dans une conjoncture fâcheuse où il s'agissoit du salut des Achéens. Plutarque ne pense pas ainsi," etc., p. 197. This very curious argument goes on for several pages. Polybios had praised Aratos a little; Mably was determined to praise him much.

[3] The elder President Adams seems to have gone to Polybios, at least in a translation. He gives a long extract on the Achaian history. Defence of the Constitution, etc., i. 298. But he is far from entering into its practical value like the authors of the "Federalist."

[4] See Federalist, No. lxii. (p. 334).

[5] Ib. liv. (p. 298).

thing in earlier Democracies, what an example they would have had before them to justify those large powers in the President for which they so strenuously contend.[1] But it was really better for mankind, better for historical study, that the latter of these two great experiments was made in practical ignorance of the former. A living reproduction, the natural result of the recurrence of like circumstances, is worth immeasurably more than any conscious imitation. It is far more glorious that the wisdom and patriotism of Washington and his coadjutors should have led them to walk unwittingly in the steps of Markos and Aratos, than that any intentional copying of their institutions should have detracted ought from the freshness and singleness of their own noble course. Had it been otherwise, the later generation of patriots might have shone only with a borrowed light; as it is, the lawgivers of Achaia and the lawgivers of America are entitled to equal honour. In truth the world has not grown old; the stuff of which heroes are made has not perished from among men; when need demands them, they still step forth in forms which Plutarch himself might have pourtrayed and worshipped. The dim outline of Markos of Keryneia grows into full life in the venerable form of Washington; a Timoleôn, unstained even by Tyrants' blood, still lives among us under the name of Garibaldi; it remains for us to see whether the modern world can attain to another no less honourable form of greatness, whether, among the rulers of later days, one will ever be found who shall dare to enter upon the glorious path of Lydiadas.

An unconscious likeness to the ancient parallel more valuable than a conscious one.

[1] Ib. lxix. (p. 371 et seqq.).

## CHAPTER VI

### ORIGIN AND CONSTITUTION OF THE ÆTOLIAN LEAGUE

THE Achaian Confederation is an object of such surpassing interest, both in Grecian history and in the general history of Federal Government, that I have dwelt upon its smallest beginnings and its minutest constitutional details at a length which seemed no more than their due. But, alongside of the League of Achaia, there existed, during nearly the whole time of its being, a rival Union, differing from it but slightly in constitutional forms, equal or superior to it in military power, but whose general reputation in the eyes of the contemporary world was widely different. The League of Ætolia preceded that of Achaia in assuming the character of a champion of Greece against foreign invaders. But, in that period of Grecian history with which we are most concerned, the League of Ætolia most commonly appears as an assemblage of robbers and pirates, the common enemies of Greece and of mankind. The Achaian and the Ætolian Leagues, had their constitutions been written down in the shape of a formal document, would have presented but few varieties of importance. The same general form of Government prevailed in both; each was Federal, each was Democratic; each had its popular Assembly, its smaller Senate, its General with large powers at the head of all. The differences between the two are merely those differences of detail which will always arise between any two political systems of which neither is slavishly copied from the other. Both are essentially Governments of the same class. If therefore any general propositions as to the moral effect of particular forms of Government had any truth in them, we might fairly expect to find Achaia and Ætolia running exactly parallel careers. Both Achaia and Ætolia were alike Federal states; both were alike Democracies in theory; both were alike tempered in their practical working

General Resemblances and Differences between the Leagues of Achaia and Ætolia.

by an element of liberal Aristocracy. If therefore Federal states, or Democratic states, or Aristocratic states, were necessarily weak or strong, peaceful or aggressive, honest or dishonest, we should see Achaia and Ætolia both exhibiting the same moral characteristics. But history tells us another tale. The political conduct of the Achaian League, with some mistakes and some faults, is, on the whole, highly honourable. The political conduct of the Ætolian League is, throughout the century in which we know it best, almost always simply infamous. The counsels of the Achaian League were not invariably enlightened; they were now and then perverted by passion or personal feeling; but their general aim was a noble one, and the means selected were commonly worthy of the end. But the counsels of the Ætolian League were throughout directed to mere plunder, or, at most, to selfish political aggrandizement. Some politicians might tell us that this was the natural result of the inherent recklessness and brutality of democratic governments. If so, the same evil results should have appeared in the history of the Democracy of Achaia. If it be said that Achaia was saved from such crimes by the presence of an aristocratic element, Ætolia should have been saved in the like manner. For the tempering of democratic forms by aristocratic practice is as visible in the history of Ætolia as in the history of Achaia. If, on the other hand, it is argued that a Federal Union is necessarily weak, and that even Achaian history contains instances of such weakness, it is easy to answer that no Monarchy, no indivisible Republic, ever showed greater vigour and unity than the original Ætolian Confederation. There are absolutely no signs of disunion, no tendency to separation, visible among any of its members. If Ætolia fell, and fell before Achaia, it fell through causes wholly unconnected with its Federal constitution, through war with an irresistible foreign foe, through grievous errors of its own committing, but errors to which Consolidated and Federal states, Monarchies and Republics, Oligarchies and Democracies, are all alike equally liable. The history of Ætolia indeed shows that the Federal form of Government is no panacea for all human ills; it shows that a well-planned constitution at home is no guaranty for wise or honourable conduct in foreign affairs; but these propositions are so self-evident that we need hardly go to Ætolia for the proof of them. But the combined history of the two great Greek Confederations certainly does show the utter fallacy of

Illustrations which they give of the emptiness of general propositions in politics.

all general propositions as to the good or evil moral effect of political forms. It proves, above all, the utter fallacy of the declamations in which it is fashionable to indulge against Republican, and especially against Federal, Governments. National character, national circumstances, no doubt both influence the political constitution and are influenced by it. But the two things are essentially distinct from one another. The Achaians, an upright and highly-civilized people, capable of noble and patriotic designs, but somewhat deficient both in moral and military vigour, lived under nearly the same political constitution as the Ætolians, an assemblage of mountain hordes, brave, united among themselves, and patriotic in a narrow sense, but rude, boastful, rapacious, and utterly reckless of the rights of others. The forms of a Democratic Federation did not hinder, among either people, the developement of its characteristic virtues and vices. Neither have we any reason to suppose that their developement would have been hindered by the forms of a pure Democracy, of an Oligarchy of birth or of wealth, or of a Monarchy either despotic or constitutional.

Early History of Ætolia.

B.C. 426.

The early history of the Ætolians is very obscure, and it is hard to say at what time a Federal system was first organized among them. Our chief knowledge of them in ante-Macedonian times comes from the account which Thucydidês gives of the unlucky campaign of the Athenian Dêmosthenês in their country.[1] They there appear as the most backward portion of the Hellenic race; their language was difficult to understand, and their greatest tribe, the Eurytanes, were said to retain the barbarous habit of eating raw meat.[2] Above all, they still lived in detached and unfortified villages.[3] Indeed at no time do the Ætolians seem to have attained to the full perfection of Greek city-life. When their League was at the height of its power, we still find but small mention of Ætolian towns; indeed we may distinguish the Ætolian League, as an union of districts or cantons, from the Achaian League, which was so essentially an union of cities.[4] Some sort of union would seem to have existed

Probable early

[1] Thuc. iii. 94 et seqq.

[2] Ib. Ἀγνωστότατοι δὲ γλῶσσαν καὶ ὠμοφάγοι εἰσίν, ὡς λέγονται. See Niebuhr's Anc. Hist. iii. 270.

[3] Ib. Οἰκοῦν δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτειχίστους καὶ ταύτας διὰ πολλοῦ.

[4] Strabo, ix. 4. 18 seems to make the opposite remark as to the Homeric Ætolians. Αἰτωλοὺς δ' Ὅμηρος μὲν ἀεὶ ἑνὶ ὀνόματι λέγει, πόλεις, οὐκ ἔθνη τάττων

among them even in the fifth century before Christ. Thucydidês speaks of the Ætolians as a nation,[1] and his whole narrative shows that they were not quite capable of combining for common defence against an invader. The historian however gives no description of their form of government, except that he incidentally mentions one Salynthios as King over one of their tribes, namely the Agraians.[2] The Ætolians of this age certainly do not seem at all in advance of their Epeirotic neighbours; yet Thucydidês fully accepts them as Greeks; at least he never applies to them the name Barbarian, which he freely bestows on the Chaonians and Thesprôtians. In after times indeed we find the Hellenic character of a large portion of the nation called in question,[3] and that, strange to say, by the last Philip, who, unlike his earlier namesake, would certainly have had great difficulty in tracing up his own pedigree to any Hellenic stock.[4] In the period dwelt with by Xenophôn we hear but little of Ætolia. He mentions the occupation of Kalydôn by the Achaians,[5] and he tells us that the Ætolians were anxious to obtain possession of Naupaktos, which also was then in Achaian hands. This they hoped to gain through the agency of Agêsilaos,[6] but it does not appear that it ever came permanently into their possession, till it was given them by Philip after the battle of Chairôneia.[7] The language employed in speaking of this cession shows that the Ætolians already formed one body, capable of receiving and holding a common possession. So, before that time, there were public monuments at Thermon, dedicated in the common name of the Ætolian nation.[8] On the other hand,

union among the Ætolian tribes.

Kingship not extinct in the fifth century, B.C.

B.C. 391.

Ætolian acquisition of Naupaktos, B.C. 338.

*ὑπ' αὐτοῖς, κ.τ.λ.* This is one of several signs that the historical Ætolians had gone backward, at all events comparatively, from their position in the heroic ages. The distinction between the Achaian Federation of Cities and the Ætolian Federation of Districts—the *Städtebund* and the *Bauernbund*—is well put by Kortüm, Geschichte Griechenlands, ii. 146. Cf. 149, 166.

[1] Thuc. iii. 94. *Τὸ γὰρ ἔθνος μέγα μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον.*

[2] Ib. 111.

[3] Pol. xvii. 5.

[4] Pol. v. 10. *Ὁ δὲ [Φίλιππος] ἵνα μὲν καὶ συγγενὴς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ Φιλίππου φαίνηται, μεγάλην ἐποιεῖτο παρ' ὅλον τὸν βίον σπουδήν, ἵνα δὲ ζηλωτὴς, οὐδὲ τὸν ἐλάχιστον ἔσχε λόγον.*

[5] Xen. Hell. iv. 6. 1. See above, p. 186.

[6] Ib. 14.

[7] Dem. Phil. iii. 44. *Οὐκ Ἀχαιῶν Ναύπακτον ὀμώμοκεν [ὁ Φίλιππος] Αἰτωλοῖς παραδώσειν*; Strabo, l. ix. c. 47. *ἔστι δὲ [Ναύπακτος] νῦν Αἰτωλῶν, Φιλίππου προσκρίναντος.* See Thirlwall, vi. 20.

[8] See the inscription which Strabo, x. 3. 2, quotes from Ephoros, a writer contemporary with Philip;

*Ἐνδυμίωνος παῖδ' Αἰτωλὸν τόνδ' ἀνέθηκαν*
*Αἰτωλοὶ σφετέρας μνῆμ' ἀρετῆς ἑσορᾷν.*

See Thirlwall, viii. 226.

B.C. 335. Arrian speaks of Ætolian embassies to Alexander in a way which has been supposed to imply that no Ætolian Confederation then existed.[1] But the passage may be explained in other ways, and it is clear that, if the League did not exist at the beginning of the reign of Alexander, it had acquired a good deal of consistency before his death. The acquisition of Naupaktos was only the beginning of a long series of Ætolian annexations, which stand out prominently in the later history of Greece. While Alexander was conquering Persia, the Ætolians had compelled Oiniadai and some other portions of Akarnania to unite themselves, on some terms or other, with the Ætolian body.[2] Vengeance for this aggression was strongly denounced against the offenders by Alexander himself,[3] and either he, or Antipater and Krateros after him, formed the scheme of transporting the whole Ætolian nation into some distant part of Asia.[4] Certain it is that either dread of Macedonian vengeance, or, as we may hope, some nobler feelings of Hellenic patriotism, led the

The League in the Reign of Alexander, B.C. 336–323.

Share of the Ætolians in the Lamian War, B.C. 323–2.

[1] Arrian, 1. 10. 2. Αἰτωλοὶ δὲ πρεσβείας, σφῶν κατὰ ἔθνη, πέμψαντες ξυγγνώμης τυχεῖν ἐδέοντο. [Arrian's κατὰ ἔθνη is the exact opposite of Strabo's remark about πόλεις.] On this Schorn (p. 25) says, "In der ersten Zeit der Regierung desselben [Alexanders] fand diese [die Conföderation] noch nicht Statt; denn als sie sich ihm unterwarfen, schickte jeder Stamm für sich Gesandte zu dem Könige." So Manso, Sparta, iii. 292. But considering the evidence the other way, one might rather be tempted to suppose that the Ambassadors were sent on behalf of the whole Ætolian nation, but that it was thought desirable that there should be an Ambassador from each tribe. Kortüm (iii. 149) takes the ἔθνη to be the three chief tribes, which he holds to have themselves formed separate Leagues (Sonderbünde). This would agree with a common use of the word ἔθνος, and would make the League of Ætolia, at this time at least, something like that of the Grisons. [Cf. Pol. xvii. 5 Αὐτῶν γὰρ Αἰτωλῶν οὐκ εἰσὶν Ἕλληνες οἱ πλείους· τὸ γὰρ τῶν Ἀγραῶν ἔθνος καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀποδοτῶν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν Ἀμφιλόχων οὐκ ἔστιν Ἑλλάς.] Cf. above, p. 126, on the constitution of the Bœotian League.

[2] Plutarch (Alex. 49) speaks of τὴν Οἰνιαδῶν ἀνάστασιν, and Diodôros (xviii. 8) of Αἰτωλοὶ τοὺς Οἰνιάδας ἐκβεβληκότες ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος. But Pausanias, in enumerating the Greeks who took part in the Lamian War, speaks of Ἀκαρνᾶνες ἐς τὸ Αἰτωλικὸν συντελοῦντες (i. 25. 4). This would seem to show that some at least of the conquered Akarnanians had been incorporated (on whatever terms) rather than expelled or extirpated.

[3] Diod. u.s. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ βασιλεὺς ἠπειληκὼς ἦν ὡς οὐκ Οἰνιαδῶν παῖδες ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐπιθήσει τὴν δίκην αὐτοῖς. So Plut. u.s.

[4] This was agreed upon by Antipater and Krateros in the Lamian War (Diod. xviii. 25), but Bishop Thirlwall (vii. 218) hints, with every look of probability, that such may have been the mind of Alexander himself. Such a scheme was quite in the spirit of Alexander's other plans (Diod. xviii. 4. Thirlwall, vii. 141); but it hardly suits either the position or the character of Antipater or Krateros to devise it, though they might be quite ready to carry it out, if already conceived by Alexander.

Ætolians to be foremost, along with the Athenians, in the brave but fruitless struggle known as the Lamian War. By the result of that war, Athens was, for the first time since the days of the Thirty, deprived of freedom as well as of greatness; she had to surrender her orators, to restrict her franchise, to receive a foreign garrison, humiliations which Philip and Alexander had never inflicted on her. The Ætolians were more fortunate; when the course of the war had turned utterly against them, they were delivered by the necessity under which Antipater and Krateros found themselves of resisting Eumenês in Asia. They were left wholly untouched, partly, it would seem, because it was still hoped, some day or other, to carry out the sentence of deportation against them.[1] In the later wars of the Successors, the Ætolians play a considerable part, and they are always spoken of as a single people, acting with a common purpose. But the glimpses afforded us of their internal state and constitution are few and feeble. On one occasion we find an Ætolian army leaving the field for a while to go home and discharge the duties of citizens in the National Assembly.[2] In another passage we find our first personal mention of an Ætolian General;[3] in others we see the Ætolian Federal Assembly discharging its proper function of commissioning Ambassadors in the name of the whole nation,[4] and of listening to the representatives of foreign powers.[5] In the defence of Greece against the Gauls we again find the Ætolians honourably prominent. Here also we obtain one or two more glimpses of their internal condition and their foreign policy. The year before the invasion they had compelled the Trachinian Hêrakleia to enter into their Con-

Ætolia during the Wars of the Successors.

Glimpses of the Ætolian Constitution at this time.

Share of the Ætolians in the Gaulish War, B.C. 280–279.

[1] Diod. xviii. 25. Διεγνωκότες ὕστερον αὐτοὺς καταπολεμῆσαι καὶ μεταστῆσαι πανοικίους ἅπαντας εἰς τὴν ἐρημίαν καὶ πορρωτάτω τῆς Ἀσίας κειμένην χώραν.

[2] There can hardly be any doubt that this is the true meaning, as argued by Droysen (i. 73) and Thirlwall (vii. 197), of the expression διά τινας ἐθνικὰς χρείας, in Diod. xviii. 13. Ἔθνος is the set formula, in Polybios at least, for a Federation, and ἐθνικαὶ χρεῖαι cannot be so well translated as by the words "Federal purposes." But it would be a strange phrase indeed to describe an Akarnanian inroad, as Schorn (3) and Kortüm (iii. 150) suppose.

[3] Diod. xviii. 38. Ὢν ἦν στρατηγὸς Ἀλέξανδρος Αἰτωλός. This need not imply a General of the League; but, as we find a single General soon afterwards, it seems most natural so to interpret it.

[4] Ib. xx. 99. Τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἀποστείλαντος πρεσβευτὰς περὶ διαλύσεων.

[5] Ib. xix. 66. Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἀριστόδημος . . . . ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν δικαιολογησάμενος προετρέψατο τὰ πλήθη βοηθεῖν τοῖς Ἀντιγόνου πράγμασιν.

Annexation of Hêrakleia.

federacy, and they now, says our informant, fought for it as for a possession of their own.[1] We also come across the names[2] of several Ætolian officers, and apparently of at least one General of the League. Every mention of the people gives the strongest impression of national unity.

Earlier Developement of Ætolia in some points.

It appears then that, if we looked only at the Federal period of Grecian history, we might be inclined to give the palm of antiquity to the Ætolian rather than to the Achaian League. The Federal system of Ætolia was clearly in full working before the first four cities of the original Achaia had begun to draw together. The whole Ætolian nation was united, as one body under one head, for years before the ten Achaian cities invested Markos of Keryneia with the Presidency of the whole Achaian nation. But this was merely the natural result of the violent separation of the Achaian cities by the Macedonian power. The Achaian League was the revival of an ancient union after a season of forced disunion. No such blow ever fell upon Ætolia, though, as we have seen, a heavier blow still was threatened. The Ætolians were thus enabled to improve and to enlarge, at a time when the Achaians were driven to rebuild from the foundation. It is not wonderful then if some steps in the developement of Federalism were taken in Ætolia earlier than they were in Achaia. It is certain that Ætolia was united earlier than Achaia under the presidency of a single General, but it appears, on the other hand, that the legal powers of the Ætolian Chief Magistrate were more restricted than those of his Achaian brother. It should be remembered that the precedent of a single General at the head of a Federal State had been long before set by the Arkadians in the days of Lykomêdês.[3]

Its causes.

Closer union among the Ætolians.

There can be no doubt that the union among the members of the Ætolian League was still closer than the union among the members of the Achaian League. This is clearly true of all the original Ætolians, whatever may have been the case with the

[1] Paus. x. 21. 1. Ἔτει γὰρ πρότερον τούτων οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ συντελεῖν τοὺς Ἡρακλεώτας ἠνάγκασαν ἐς τὸ Αἰτωλικόν· τότε οὖν ἠμύνοντο ὡς περὶ πόλεως οὐδέν τι Ἡρακλεώταις μᾶλλον ἢ καὶ αὐτοῖς προσηκούσης.

[2] Ib. 20. 4. Αἰτωλοὺς δὲ ἦγον Πολύαρχος καὶ Πολύφρων τε καὶ Λακράτης. Polyarchos was probably the General of the League, and Polyphrôn and Lakratês his subordinates. Another General, Eurydamos, is more distinctly mentioned by the same writer. Ib. x. 16. 4. Εὐρύδαμον δὲ στρατηγόν τε Αἰτωλῶν καὶ στρατοῦ τοῦ Γαλατῶν ἐνάντια ἡγησάμενον ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Αἰτωλοί.

[3] See above, p. 159.

non-Ætolian states which were afterwards admitted or forced into the Confederacy. This is the natural result of the difference between an Union of Tribes and an Union of Cities.[1] It has been already more than once remarked that Federalism took root earliest among those portions of the Greek race which were in every way the least advanced, and which were furthest removed from the ideal perfection of Greek city-life. When several closely-allied tribes occupy a continuous territory, the feeling of political independence in each will be weaker, and the feeling of national unity in the whole body will be stronger, than it can be in the case of several cities, each capable of, and accustomed to, the exercise of the fullest rights of sovereignty. To unite cities which have once tasted of full autonomy is far more difficult than to unite districts where either there are no cities or else the cities are quite secondary. Thus, in England, the distinctions between the old Anglian, Saxon, and Jutish Kingdoms were soon and easily effaced; but it has required many more centuries, and the teaching of a long and bitter experience, to bring the great cities of Italy to act as members of one united nation. Hence, though the union of the Achaian Cities was never so close as the union of the Ætolian Tribes, yet it was a far greater triumph of the Federal principle to bring Corinth, Sikyôn, and Megalopolis to act together at all, than it was to bring about a much closer union between this and that horde of Ætolian plunderers. For, after all, the close union of the Ætolian Tribes was little more than the union of a band of robbers, faithful to each other, and enemies to the rest of the world.[2] It would be hard to say exactly how close that

The Ætolians a League of Districts rather than of Cities.

[1] So Brandstäter (p. 306): "Vielleicht hätte es sonst den Aetolern förderlich sein können, dass sie ursprünglich nicht sowohl ein Städtebund (wie die Achäer) sondern mehr ein Völkerbund waren, und folglich nicht in so viele einzelne Interessen sich zertheilen durften." [Compare in Switzerland the strict union of the Three Cantons, as compared with the rest.]

Tittmann (723) remarks that there is no recorded instance of separate action on the part of any Ætolian canton, while, in every other League, some instances do occur.

[2] Compare what Isokratês says of the Lacedæmonians (Panath. 245): *ὥστ' οὐδεὶς ἂν αὐτοὺς διά γε τὴν ὁμόνοιαν δικαίως ἐπαινέσειεν, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς καταποντιστὰς καὶ λῃστὰς καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀδικίας ὄντας· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ὁμονοοῦντες τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπολλύουσιν.* He then goes on to liken them to the Triballians, *οὓς ἅπαντές φασιν ὁμονοεῖν ὡς οὐδένας ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, ἀπολλύναι δ' οὐ μόνον τοὺς ὁμόρους καὶ τοὺς πλησίον οἰκοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὅσων ἂν ἐφικέσθαι δυνηθῶσιν.* He might have said nearly the same of the Ætolians.

union was, and what measure of independence was left to each of the constituent members of the League.[1] But it seems probable that those cities which were incorporated with the League did not lose those rights which were essential to the existence of any Greek city. The exact terms of admission will be discussed presently; but it would be far easier to believe that Naupaktos and Hêrakleia were reduced to the condition of dependencies, without any share in the general deliberations of the Ætolian nation, than that they lost the universal rights of local legislation and free choice of local magistrates.[2] The relation of dependent alliance was familiar in Greece; the sacrifice of local independence in exchange for a share in the general government was an idea confined to the pre-historic statesmen of Attica.

Democratic character of the League,

The constitution of Ætolia was Democratic in the same sense in which the constitution of Achaia was Democratic. That is to say, the supreme power was vested in the Popular Assembly, the Panaitôlikon,[3] in which, as in Achaia, every citizen had a vote.[4] But it is evident that, in so large a country as even the

[1] Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 226) goes so far as to say, "Nor indeed is it quite certain that it is more correct to consider the whole body as a league than as a single republic." 'What follows at least is true. "It seems that the union of the Ætolians was still closer than that of the Achaians; that there was a deeper consciousness of the national unity, and a greater concentration of power in the national government."

[2] In the two inscriptions 2350, 2351, in Boeckh (C. I. ii. 280), the Canton of Naupaktos (ὁ δᾶμος ὁ Ναυπακτίων) votes all the private rights of citizenship to the people of Keos; δεδόσθαι δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ πολιτείαν ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ καὶ γᾶς καὶ οἰκίας ἔγκτασιν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ὥνπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ναυπάκτιοι μετέχουσιν, τοὺς Κείους μετέχειν. But the Ætolian Union (ἔδοξε τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς) seems to promise them nothing more than exemption from plunder at the hands of all Ætolians and all persons sharing in Ætolian citizenship (μηθένα ἄγειν Αἰτωλῶν μηδὲ τῶν ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ πολιτευόντων τοὺς Κείους). It may however be that a grant of citizenship lurks in the words ὡς Αἰτωλῶν ὄντων τῶν Κείων.

[3] Παναιτωλικά (Boeckh, C. I. ii. 632) or *Panætolicum*, Liv. xxxi. 29. Livy (xxxi. 32) seems to use the word *Pylaïcum* as synonymous. Possibly *Panætolicum* means an Ætolian Assembly, if held in its proper place in the old capital Thermon, or seemingly even at Naupaktos (Liv. xxxi. 29, 40), while *Pylaïcum* is the same body held, as it sometimes was, at Hêrakleia or elsewhere in the neighbourhood of Thermopylæ.

[4] See Schorn, p. 26. Thirlwall, viii. 226. Diod. u.s. (see p. 257). Τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, τὰ πλήθη. Pol. iv. 5. Ἡ κοινὴ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν σύνοδος.

The nature of the Ætolian Assembly is plainly set forth in the description of Livy (xxxvi. 28, 29). *Censebant et ex omnibus oppidis convocandos Ætolos ad concilium; Omnis coacta multitudo*, etc. This comes from Polybios (xx. 10), γράφειν ἔδοξεν εἰς τὰς πόλεις καὶ συγκαλεῖν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς χάριν τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τῶν προσταττομένων. He goes on to speak of τὸ πλῆθος, οἱ πολλοί, etc. Yet Dean Liddell (Hist. of Rome, ii. 10) talks of "deputies," and seems to think that the Assembly had nothing to do but "to elect a Captain-General."

original Ætolia, the same causes must have been at work which infused so strong an aristocratic element into the Democracy of Achaia. One may however easily conceive that members of robber hordes would be more easily drawn from their mountains to arrange schemes of plunder, than the orderly citizens of Achaia would be drawn to discuss subtle points of diplomacy, which were safely left in the hands of those who were practically their representatives. It is probable then that an Ætolian Congress was, as a rule, more largely attended than an Achaian Congress. But in such a state of society the feelings of clanship and of personal attachment are always strong. A freebooting chief, at whose call many warriors had enriched themselves with plunder, would command a deference blinder and more devoted than was paid in Achaia or at Athens to the wisest and most eloquent statesman. It is easy to believe that the decisions of the Assembly were yet more completely in the hands of a few leading men than they were in Achaia.[1] It is evident from the history that expeditions, or rather wars, could be undertaken with impunity by popular chiefs without any commission from the Assembly or any one else.[2] The regular meetings of the Assembly were less frequent than they were in Achaia; at least we have not, as we have in Achaia,[3] any evidence for the existence of a second yearly Meeting besides that at which the Magistrates were elected. This last, in Ætolia, was held at the autumnal equinox.[4] But it seems that, as in Achaia, it was in the power of the General to summon extraordinary Meetings for the discussion of urgent affairs.[5] The Assembly possessed the usual powers of a Greek National Assembly. Besides electing

tempered with Aristocratic elements.

Influence of leading men.

Powers of the Assembly.

[1] Brandstäter (Gesch. Æt. 272), who is inclined to make out as good a case as he can for the Ætolians, allows "dass die mangelhaften Gesetze des Bundes und der allzu grosse Einfluss einzelner hervorragender Charaktere in demselben die Räuberei zum Vortheile der Einzelnen gestatteten, und insofern auch begünstigten."

[2] See the whole history of Skopas and Dorimachos, Pol. iv. 5.

[3] See above, p. 214.

[4] Pol. iv. 37. Τὰς γὰρ ἀρχαιρεσίας Αἰτωλοὶ μὲν ἐποίουν μετὰ τὴν φθινοπωρινὴν ἰσημερίαν εὐθέως, Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ τότε περὶ τὴν τῆς Πλειάδος ἐπιτολήν.

[5] This seems implied in Livy, xxxi. 32, and Pol. xx. 10. On certain limitations of the powers of Special Assemblies in Ætolia, see p. 476. Such an Assembly, at least up to B.C. 200, could not make war or peace. The restriction seems a strange one, as one would have thought that a Special Assembly was most likely to be called when some sudden emergency demanded a warlike or peaceful decision. The Law was probably altered in B.C. 200, as afterwards, in B.C. 189 (see p. 495), we find a Special Assembly summoned to decide on the great question of submission to Rome.

The Senate or Apoklêtoi.

Magistrates, it made peace and war; it commissioned Ambassadors; it received the Ambassadors of other states.[1] The body called the Apoklêtoi [2] seem to have been the Senate, and to have discharged the usual functions of a Greek Senate. They were a numerous body, for we hear, in one case, of a Committee of Thirty being appointed from among them.[3] This Senate, as usual, considered matters before they were brought forward in the General Assembly;[4] in concert with the General, it summoned the Assembly to discuss proposals which needed its sanction;[5] and sometimes, whether by commission or by usurpation, it acted in the name of the nation without consulting the Assembly at all.[6] That it represented particular noble families,[7] or that it was an aristocratic body in any other sense than that in which all

[1] Boeckh, C. I. (ii. 632), No. 3046. Ἐπεὶ Τήιοι πρεσβευτὰς ἀποστείλαντες . . . . παρεκάλεον τοὺς Αἰτωλούς, κ.τ.λ.

[2] Pol. iv. 5; xx. 1. 10. So Livy, xxxv. 34. Apocletos (ita vocant sanctius concilium; ex delectis constat viris).

[3] Pol. xx. 1. Τριάκοντα τῶν ἀποκλήτων προεχειρίσαντο τοὺς συνεδρεύσοντας μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. Liv. xxxv. 45. Triginta principes, cum quibus si qua vellet consultaret, delegerunt.

This election was made by the Assembly. See Schorn, 27, note 4. Thirlwall, viii. 226.

A passage in Livy (xlv. 28) might lead one to believe that the Ætolian Senate was a body so large as to contain more than 550 members of one party. In B.C. 167 the Romanizing leader Lykiskos procured the murder, by Roman hands, of that number of citizens of the patriotic party. "Quingentos quinquaginta principes ab Lycisco et Tisippo, circumsesso senatu per milites Romanos, missos a Bæbio præfecto præsidii, interfectos; alios in exsilium actos esse." It is however possible that the meeting may really have been one of the Popular Assembly, and that Livy uses *Senatus* vaguely, as Polybios once at least (xxiii. 9) does βουλευτήριον. Still a Senate of a thousand members, the number most naturally suggested, is quite possible according to Greek ideas.

[4] This seems implied in the words of Polybios (iv. 5), οὔτε κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν προσδεξάμενοι σύνοδον οὔτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμμεταδόντες, κ.τ.λ. and (xx. 10) ἔφη γὰρ αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀποκλήτους ποιήσειν τὰ προσταττόμενα, προσδεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ τῶν πολλῶν, εἰ μέλλει κυρωθῆναι τὰ παραγγελλόμενα. Drumann (p. 504) says, "Die Apocleten unterschieden sich darin von den Demiurgen der Achäer, dass sie in dringenden Fällen im Namen des Volkes beschliessen durften." But the Achaian parallel to the Apoklêtoi is not the Dêmiourgoi, but the Senate, which doubtless did often receive such a delegated power from the Assembly.

[5] Pol. xx. 10. Liv. xxxvi. 28, 29. See above, p. 260.

[6] See Livy, xxxv. 34. The Apoklêtoi here decree certain important military expeditions, for which secrecy, or rather treachery, was needed.

[7] Schorn, p. 27. "Dieser [Rath] scheint die edlen Geschlechter vertreten und aus den Häuptlingen bestanden zu haben." If Schorn, as Bishop Thirlwall suggests, gets his "Häuptlinge" from Livy's *Triginta Principes* just quoted, it is really a very slight foundation to build on. The word *Principes* is constantly used by Livy to denote men of influence in a commonwealth, whether actually in office or not.

Ætolian and Achaian institutions may be called practically aristocratic, is an idea supported by no evidence whatever. Of other Magistrates, besides the General, we find but few notices. There was a body called Synedroi,[1] and another body called Nomographoi.[2] It would be a natural guess that the Synedroi were, like the Achaian Dêmiourgoi, the Accessors or Ministers of the General, but our only notice represents them as a Court acting with the General to take cognizance of cases of piracy.[3] In Ætolia such a function may well have been vested in the Executive Government of the League; probably no inferior power would have been able to act with efficiency on those occasions when the national interest required that the national tendency to plunder should be restrained. It is at least evident that the Synedroi were a permanent Magistracy, and not merely appointed on occasion. The language used about the Nomographoi[4] seems to show that the Ætolian state-papers were revised at certain times, when these officers had to insert such laws, treaties, and other public acts, as had been passed since the last revision. It certainly implies that they were a regular permanent Magistracy. Therefore when we read of Dorimachos and Skopas[5] effecting large changes in the Ætolian laws by virtue of this office, we may believe that they were appointed Nomographoi with enlarged and unusual powers, but not that the office itself was something extraordinary or occasional.

Magistrates.

B.C. 205.

At the head of the League, as in Achaia and elsewhere, stood the Federal General. His main powers, civil, military, and diplomatic, were much the same as those of the General of the Achaians. He commanded the armies of the League, and repre-

Powers of the General.

[1] Boeckh, C. I. 2350, 3046 (vol. ii. p. 280, 632), cf. i. 857.

[2] Ib. 3046.

[3] The Têians in the one case and the Keians in the other obtain from the Ætolian Assembly letters of protection against Ætolian inroads. Any cases of infraction are to be referred to the General and Synedroi. 2350. *Εἰ δέ τις κα ἄγῃ τοὺς Κείους, τὸν στραταγὸν ἀεὶ τὸν ἐνάρχοντα τὰ ἐν Αἰτωλίαν καταγόμενα καταδικάζοντα κύριον εἶμεν, καὶ τοὺς συνέδρους καταδικάζοντας τοῖς Κείοις τὰν τῶν ἀγόντων αὐτοὺς ζαμίαν, ἄγ κα δοκιμάζωντι, κυρίους εἶμεν.* 3046. *Εἰ δέ τίς κα ἄγῃ ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ τὰ ἐκ τᾶς πόλιος ἢ χώρας, τὰ μὲν ἐμφανῆ ἀναπράσσειν τὸν ἐγδικήσαντα πρὸς συνέδρους ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐνάρχους.*

[4] The Têian decree is thus ordered to be enrolled. Ib. 3046. *Ὅπως δὲ καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους καταχωρίσθῃ ἃ ἀνιέρωσις καὶ ἃ ἀσυλία, τοὺς κατασταθέντας νομογράφους καταχωρίξαι, ἐπεί κα αἱ νομογραφίαι γίνωνται, εἰς τοὺς νόμους.*

[5] Pol. xiii. 1. *Οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ . . . οἰκείως διακείμενοι πρὸς καινοτομίαν τῆς οἰκείας πολιτείας, εἵλοντο νομογράφους Δορίμαχον καὶ Σκόπαν, . . . οἳ καὶ παραλαβόντες τὴν ἐξουσίαν ταύτην ἔγραψαν νόμους.*

sented it in negociations with foreign powers. But what we may call his parliamentary functions seem to have been somewhat different from those of the Achaian chief magistrate. In Achaia we have seen that the General was required to be an effective speaker in the Assembly, like our own Leader of the House of Commons, while the formal Presidency was vested in his Ministers.[1] In Ætolia, on the other hand, the General appears to have been strictly the President of the Assembly,[2] and, being President, he was expressly forbidden to give any opinion on questions of peace and war.[3] We may take for granted that an Ætolian General would be far more likely to take the warlike than the peaceful side of any such question; such would doubtless be the bias of the mass of the Assembly also; it was therefore wisely provided that they should not be exposed to have their passions yet further roused by inflammatory harangues from the chief magistrate of the commonwealth. But the restriction seems also to point to a certain feeling of jealousy towards the General and his high powers of which we find no trace in the Achaian body. As President of the Assembly, he could, as we have seen, summon extraordinary Meetings.[4] He was elected[5] at the regular Autumnal Congress, and he seems to have entered upon his office the same day,[6]

[1] See above, pp. 231-232.

[2] Liv. xxxi. 32, where the General Damokritos clearly acts as President.

[3] Liv. xxxv. 25. Bene comparatum apud Ætolos esse, ne Prætor, quum de bello consuluisset, ipse sententiam diceret.

Some editions have *Achæos*, but it is clear that no reading but *Ætolos* has any force. On the causes of the restriction, see Thirlwall, viii. 227.

[4] See above, p. 261.

[5] Tittmann (Staatsverfassung, 387) and Dr. Schmitz (Dict. Ant. art. Ætolicum Fœdus) infer from an obscure passage of Hêsychios (v. *κυάμῳ πατρίῳ*) that "the Assembly nominated a number of candidates, who had then to draw lots, and the one who drew a white bean was strategus." The passage in Hêsychios is, *Κυάμῳ πατρίῳ. Σοφοκλῆς Μελεάγρῳ, ὡς καὶ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς κυαμευόντων· διεκλήρουν δὲ αὐτὰς κυάμῳ, καὶ ὁ τὸν λευκὸν λαβὼν ἐλάγχανεν· ἀνάγει δὲ τοὺς χρόνους, ὡς καὶ ἐν Ἰνάχῳ κυαμοβόλον δικαστήν.* There is not a word here about the Assembly nominating candidates who drew lots. If the words of Hêsychios prove anything, they prove that the election of all Ætolian magistrates was left wholly to the lot. To make us accept so improbable a story, we should need some much better authority than Hêsychios. The lot was never applied, even at Athens, to really important offices, like that of General, and we hear nothing of it in Polybios or any trustworthy author. No doubt Sophoklês, as usual, transferred the practice of Athens in his own day to the mythical days of Ætolia, and Hêsychios, by way of explanation, transferred it to historical Ætolia also.

[6] Pol. ii. 3. *Δέον τῇ κατὰ πόδας ἡμέρᾳ γενέσθαι τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν παράληψιν τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθάπερ ἔθος ἐστὶν Αἰτωλοῖς.* iv. 67. *Παρὰ δὲ τοῖς*

without the delay which took place between the election of an Achaian General and his actual entrance upon office. Besides the General, there were, as in Achaia, a Commander of Cavalry and a Secretary of State. These three seem to be spoken of as the three chief officers of the Republic.[1]

Commander of Cavalry, and Secretary of State.

Our notices of the internal constitution of Ætolia are so slight, and they present so few important points of contrast with that of Achaia, that a more interesting field of inquiry is opened with regard to the foreign policy of the League. One point which calls for special examination is the relation of the League to those non-Ætolian states which were induced, or more often compelled, to become, in some sense or other, members of it. The history of Ætolia is conspicuously a history of annexation. So, it may be said, is the history of Achaia also. From Markos to Philopoimên the League was ever extending itself over a wider territory, ever increasing the number of the cities which formed its component members. Some of the Achaian annexations may have been unjust and impolitic; those at all events were so which were effected against the will of the annexed cities. But it does not appear that any city, when once admitted, by whatever means, into the Achaian League, was ever placed in a position of dependence, or of any kind of formal inferiority to those cities which were in the League before it. The object of the League was to unite Achaia, Peloponnêsos, if possible all Greece, in a single free and equal Federation. The end at least was noble, even if over-zeal sometimes misled Achaian statesmen into the employment of questionable means. But it is hardly possible, by the widest stretch of charity, to attribute such a broad and enlightened patriotism to the brigands of the Ætolian mountains. It is true that their character is known to us only from the descriptions of enemies, and something may fairly be abated from the general pictures of Ætolian depravity[2] which we find in our Achaian informants. But the facts of the case plainly show both that powerful men in Ætolia

Foreign Policy of the League.

Contrast with Achaia.

Αἰτωλοῖς ἤδη τῶν ἀρχαιρεσίων καθηκόντων στρατηγὸς ἠρέθη Δωρίμαχος, ὃς παραυτίκα τὴν ἀρχὴν παραλαβών, κ.τ.λ.

[1] Pol. xxii. 15. Liv. xxxviii. 11. The Ætolians (B.C. 189) are required to give hostages to Rome, but these three great officers are exempt.

[2] Pol. ii. 45. Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν, κ.τ.λ. Cf. ix. 34 et seqq. xviii. 17, and especially iv. 3. θηριώδη ζῶσι βίον, κ.τ.λ. The favourite process of "rehabilitation" has not failed to be extended to the

could venture upon the grossest breaches of International Law without any fear of restraint from the national Government,[1] and also that the avowed policy of the Government itself was seldom swayed by any regard to good faith or to the rights of others. Notwithstanding the gallant behaviour of their ancestors both in the Lamian and in the Gaulish War, the Ætolians of the times with which we have most to do could make less claim than any other people in Greece to a character for extended Hellenic patriotism. The Greek commonwealth which deliberately introduced the strong arm of Rome into Grecian warfare[2] was far more guilty than even the commonwealth which gave up Akrokorinthos to the Macedonian. Long before that time, Ætolia had agreed upon a partition, first of Akarnania and then of Achaia, with a Macedonian King;[3] she now agreed with Rome to make a series of conquests at the expense of Akarnania[4] and other Grecian states, in the course of which the soil of the conquered countries was to remain an Ætolian possession, while the moveable spoil was to be carried off by the barbarians of Italy.[5] Aratos made at least no such infamous

Ætolian Treason against Greece.

B.C. 211.

Ætolians. They have found vigorous advocates in Lucas (Ueber Polybius Darstellung des Aetolischen Bundes. Konigsberg. 1827) and Brandstäter (Die Geschichten des Aetolischen Landes, Volkes, und Bundes. Berlin. 1844).

No doubt the judgement of Polybios about the Ætolians, just like his judgement about Kleomenês, must be received with some caution; but I see nothing to shake one's general confidence in his narrative. The worst deeds attributed to the Ætolians are too clear to be denied.

[1] See above, p. 261. Compare the curious declamation of Philip in Pol. xvii. 5. Τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἔθος ὑπάρχει μὴ μόνον, πρὸς οὓς ἂν αὐτοὶ πολεμῶσι, τούτους αὐτοὺς ἄγειν καὶ τὴν τούτων χώραν· ἀλλά, κἂν ἕτεροί τινες πολεμῶσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὄντες Αἰτωλῶν φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι, μηδὲν ἧττον ἐξεῖναι τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς ἄνευ κοινοῦ δόγματος καὶ παρεῖναι ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πολεμοῦσι καὶ τὴν χώραν ἄγειν τὴν ἀμφοτέρων· ὥστε παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς μήτε φιλίας ὅρους ὑπάρχειν μήτ' ἔχθρας, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι περί τινος ἑτοίμους ἐχθροὺς εἶναι τούτους καὶ πολεμίους. Brandstater (272) calls on us to distinguish between the piratical doings of individuals and the national action of the League, but the charge is that the Federal Government did nothing to stop the piratical doings of individuals.

[2] The first diplomatic intervention of Rome in Grecian affairs was indeed made at the intercession of Akarnania (see the next Chapter), and, curiously enough, it was in support of Akarnania against Ætolia. But the Ætolians were undoubtedly the first to bring Roman fleets and armies into Greece, and the first to plan and carry out the destruction of Grecian cities in partnership with Roman commanders.

[3] Pol. ii. 43, 45; ix. 38. See the next Chapter.

[4] Pol. ix. 38; xi. 5. So Livy, xxvi. 24. Darent operam Romani ut Acarnaniam Ætoli haberent.

[5] Pol. ix. 39. (Speech of Lykiskos the Akarnanian.) Ἤδη παρήρηνται μὲν Ἀκαρνάνων Οἰνιάδας καὶ Νῆσον, κατέσχον δὲ πρώην τὴν τῶν ταλαιπώρων Ἀντι-

terms as these with his Macedonian patron. In all this we see a system of mere selfish aggrandizement, quite different even from the mistaken policy which occasionally led Achaian statesmen to enlarge their League by the incorporation of unwilling members. The annexations made by Achaia were at least made on terms of perfect equality; the annexations of Ætolia were, in many cases, simple conquests by brute force. As might be expected, there were wide differences in the condition of the annexed countries, and in their relation to the Ætolian state. That relation seems to have varied, from full incorporation on equal terms, to mere subjection, veiled under the specious forms of dependent alliance. It should be remembered that the Achaian League, besides the generous principles which it professed, and on which, in the main, it acted, had a great advantage in the continuity of its territory. The League gradually spread itself over all Peloponnêsos; under more favourable circumstances it might have spread itself over all Greece; in either case its territory would have been one continuous sweep, an inestimable advantage in the process of fusing the whole into one political body. No Achaian citizen, however remote, had, in the best days of the League,[1] to cross a foreign territory in order to reach the seat of the Federal Government. No Achaian citizen, with the single exception of the people of Aigina, had to expose himself, even during the shortest voyage, to the risk of capture by sea. Achaia then knew only two forms of political connexion—the alliance of wholly independent powers on equal terms, and the incorporation of cities as equal members of the national Achaian League. But the Ætolian possessions and alliances were scattered over all parts of Greece, inland and maritime. Mantineia[2] in her Arkadian valley, Keôs in the middle of the Ægæan, Kios[3] on the shores of the Propontis, all were com-

Comparison between Ætolian and Achaian annexations.

Continuity of the Achaian territory; scattered nature of the Ætolian.

κυρέων πόλιν, ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι μετὰ Ῥωμαίων αὐτήν. καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπάγουσι Ῥωμαῖοι, πεισόμενα δηλονότι ἅπερ εἰκὸς ἐστι πάσχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν ἀλλοφύλων πεσοῦσιν ἐξουσίας· τὰ δ' ἐδάφη κληρονομοῦσι τῶν ἡττυχηκότων Αἰτωλοί.

[1] The outlying cantons of Pleurôn and Hêrakleia are exceptions, but they were united to the League only in very late times.

[2] As also Tegea and Orchomenos. Pol. ii. 46.

[3] As also Lysimacheia and Kalchêdôn. Pol. xv. 23. Kios had an Ætolian Governor; στρατηγοῦ παρ' Αἰτωλῶν ἐν αὐτῇ διατρίβοντος καὶ προεστῶτος τῶν κοινῶν. This is something more than the mere commander of a Federal garrison.

pelled, or found it expedient, to enter into some relation or other, be it subjection, alliance, or incorporation, with the Ætolian Federation. Nor was the League less busy in extending its borders nearer home. I have already had occasion incidentally to mention some of the Ætolian acquisitions in central Greece, such as Naupaktos, Hêrakleia, Stratos, and Oiniadai. Even the whole Bœotian League at one time entered into relations with Ætolia which seem to have been more intimate than those of mere alliance between two independent powers.[1] Delphi must have been seized upon in some B.C. 220. way or other, as the Temple and the Amphiktyonic Council are spoken of as at one time needing deliverance from Ætolian bondage.[2] Now these annexations were made in various ways. Variety of relations in the Ætolian League. Some of them were simple conquests; in others, including, strange to say, Mantineia,[3] the inhabitants are said to have deliberately preferred the Ætolian to the Achaian connexion. Between these two classes would come two others; namely those cities which, like Hêrakleia, were united indeed by force, but still on terms which, nominally at least, included political incorporation,[4] and those which, like Teôs and Keôs, merely found some sort of connexion with the Ætolian League to be better than exposure without defence to unrestrained Ætolian incursions. It almost naturally follows that allies or subjects gained in so many different ways were admitted to union with the League on widely different terms. But it does not follow that the nature of their relation to the League was always determined solely by the way in which they were acquired. Geographical position would have a good deal to do with it. It is evident that Naupaktos and Hêrakleia could be really incorporated as component members of the League, and it is equally evident that Teôs, Kios, and Mantineia could not. And again, in many cases of absolute conquest or of forced adhesion, the existing inhabitants may well have been wholly or

Mommsen (Röm. Gesch. i. 513) seems to take him for the General of the League.

[1] Pol. xx. 5. *Προσένειμαν Αἰτωλοῖς τὸ ἔθνος.* See above, p. 142, and the next Chapter.

[2] Pol. iv. 25. See above, p. 110.

[3] Pol. ii. 57. *Μαντινεῖς . . . ἐγκαταλιπόντες τὴν μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείαν ἐθελοντὴν Αἰτωλοῖς ἐνεχείρισαν αὑτοὺς καὶ τὴν πατρίδα.*

[4] On Hêrakleia see above. Compare their attack on Medeôn, Pol. ii. 2. *Αἰτωλοὶ οὐδαμῶς δυνάμενοι πεῖσαι Μεδεωνίους μετέχειν σφίσι τῆς αὑτῆς πολιτείας ἐπεβάλοντο κατὰ κράτος ἑλεῖν αὐτούς.*

partially expelled, and their place supplied by Ætolian settlers.[1] Thus, under the terms of the Ætolian treaty with Rome, the inhabitants of Aigina, and doubtless of other conquered places also, were regarded as part of the movcable spoil, and were sold, or put to ransom, by their Roman owners.[2] The Ætolians must therefore, in some cases at least, have entered on possession of empty cities and districts, which they doubtless speedily filled with the inhabitants of their own nation. An Akarnanian town which, by such a process, became Ætolian, was doubtless freely admitted to equal rights with the other Ætolian cantons. And, even when the former inhabitants were allowed to retain possession, it is easy to imagine cases in which incorporation on equal, or nearly equal, terms may have suited Ætolian policy better than simple dominion. Important points like Naupaktos and Hêrakleia could not be safely left in the hands of discontented subjects; their inhabitants must either be expelled[3] or be converted into willing Confederates. These various considerations, combined with such little direct evidence as we possess, will lead us to prefer, among the various opinions on the subject, that which holds that the relation between the acquired territories and the original Ætolia varied from absolute equality to absolute subjection. Cities on the Ætolian border, whether repeopled by Ætolian settlers or not, were fully incorporated with the League; their inhabitants are spoken of as Ætolians,[4] and Ætolian Federal Assemblies were held within their walls.[5] Distant cities, which could not be really incorporated, to which the

Differences of position among the conquered States.

[1] In Pol. ix. 39 the word κληρονομεῖν at once suggests the Athenian κληρουχίαι.

[2] See Pol. ix. 42; xi. 6; xxiii. 8.

[3] This would seem to have been the case with the Phthiôtic Thebes. This city was held by the Ætolians (Pol. v. 99. κατεχόντων αὐτὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν), when it was taken by King Philip, the inhabitants enslaved (Pol. v. 100), and Macedonian settlers put in their places. As Philip and his allies had engaged to liberate all cities annexed to Ætolia against their will, either the then population of Thebes must have been Ætolian, or else Philip must have been guilty of a greater breach of faith than seems likely at that stage of his reign. On the whole, the explanation less creditable to Philip seems the more probable. See p. 430.

[4] In the Inscription in Boeckh, No. 2352 (vol. ii. p. 382), which contains the Keian decree in return for the Naupaktian and Pan-Ætolian decrees already quoted, the Naupaktians are at least included under the word Αἰτωλοί. In fact we shall, as we go on, find two Naupaktian citizens, Kleonikos and Agelaos, among the most eminent men in Ætolia; Agelaos even rose to the office of General.

[5] The Federal Government, and apparently the Federal Assembly also, transact business at Hypata. Pol. xx. 9; xxi. 2, 3.

offer of the Ætolian political franchise would have been simply a mockery, received charters of security against Ætolian rapine, together with admission to the private rights of citizenship, either throughout Ætolia or in some particular Ætolian canton. The Têian or Keian ally had probably no great desire for a vote in the Ætolian Federal Assembly which he could hardly ever exercise. But it was a great matter for him to be guaranteed, even if it were by payment of tribute, against the ravages of Ætolian privateers; and it was something for him to find himself, at that point of Ætolia which he was most likely to visit, dealt with, not as a foreigner, but as one clothed with all the private rights of a Naupaktian citizen. Important outlying points, inland or maritime, points suited to act as checks upon enemies or to be made the starting-points for plundering excursions, seem to have been seized upon without scruple; and these, whether their inhabitants received any sort of franchise or not, were held as Ætolian outposts, defended by Ætolian garrisons, and, sometimes at least, paying tribute to the Ætolian Treasury.[1] Such was certainly the case with the Arkadian town of Phigaleia;[2] such was also most probably the case with the island of Kephallênia.[3] These various kinds of relations between a dominant country and its dependencies are familiar enough in our own political experience. The inhabitants of Kephallênia and of the other Ionian Islands are held by our own nation in a condition of dependent alliance, which, in the opinion of the weaker ally, does not differ from absolute subjection. The inhabitants of Malta and Gibraltar legally possess all the rights, public and

Comparison with the different relations of British Dependencies.

[1] The Ætolian garrison and governor of Kios have been already mentioned. So the allies in the Social War speak of the cities in their several territories which the Ætolians have seized (*εἴ τινα κατέχουσιν αὐτῶν Αἰτωλοὶ χώραν ἢ πόλιν*), and go on to speak of Ætolian aggressions in general; *παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν ἠναγκασμένους ἀκουσίως μετέχειν τῆς Αἰτωλῶν συμπολιτείας, ὅτι πάντας τούτους ἀποκαταστήσουσιν εἰς τὰ πάτρια πολιτεύματα, χώραν ἔχοντας καὶ πόλεις τὰς αὑτῶν, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἐλευθέρους ὄντας, πολιτείαις καὶ νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις.* (Pol. iv. 25. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 232.) Flathe, whom Thirlwall quotes, calls these expressions "Redensarten" (ii. 237), and retorts on Macedonia as an enslaver of Greeks no less than Ætolia. It is however hard to see how this perfectly fair *tu quoque* affects the fact of Ætolian domination.

[2] Pol. iv. 3. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 232.

[3] Schorn, 29. Thirlwall, u.s. Schorn's argument seems to me to prove that Kephallênia was not admitted to even a forced *συμπολίτεια*. It does not follow that some cities which were, like Phigaleia, nominally incorporated — for Phigaleia was *συμπολιτευομένη τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς*—may not have been practically in the same subject condition.

private, of British subjects, but they have no opportunity of receiving anything more than that general protection which is equally afforded to the Ionian ally. The inhabitants of Guernsey, Jersey, and Man, though their islands are not formally incorporated with the United Kingdom, are not looked on as foreigners; their position practically combines the advantages of protection and of incorporation, they unite the strength of a great monarchy with the local freedom of a small commonwealth. We can thus easily understand the great variety in the practical condition of the various states which formed the outlying portions of the Ætolian Federation. And besides these dependencies and half-incorporated members, Ætolia of course had, like other states, equal allies, united only by the ordinary bonds of international engagements. The ancient connexion between Ætolia and her supposed colony Elis lasted down to the latest days of Grecian history; and, though the weaker state doubtless often humbly followed the lead of the stronger, it does not seem ever to have deviated, in form at least, from the nature of a free alliance between two independent and equal powers.

Comparison between Ætolia and Switzerland.

I have, in my last Chapter, endeavoured to trace at some length the points of analogy and diversity between the League of Achaia and the United States of North America. There are several points in which the League of Ætolia suggests a similar comparison with the Swiss Confederation. But the parallel between Ætolia and Switzerland is far from being so close as the parallel between Achaia and the United States. That the part played by Switzerland in modern Europe is far more honourable than the part played by Ætolia in ancient Greece is a distinction not directly to the purpose, as we are not discussing the moral characters of nations, but their political constitutions. But it is certainly only in the weaker points of the Swiss constitution, and in the less honourable features of the Swiss character, that we find the chief points of likeness to Ætolian models, while the likeness between Achaia and America is mainly shown in those points which are most honourable to both nations. In most of those respects in which the League of Ætolia differs from the League of Achaia it approaches to the old constitution of Switzerland. The Ætolians, like the Swiss, were a nation of mountaineers, and their League, like that of Switzerland, was originally an union not of cities, but of tribes

Ætolia and Switzerland resemble each other in their worst points, Achaia and America in their best.

or districts. The oldest members of the Swiss League, the famous Forest Cantons, contained, and still contain, no considerable town; they still remain the most perfect examples of rural Democracy which the world ever saw. A mountain Democracy of this sort is something very different from the Democracy of a great city; it is sure to be brave and patriotic, but it is also sure to contain a stronger conservative, not to say obstructive, element than can be found under any other form of government. Nowhere does the wisdom of our forefathers meet with greater reverence than in a small community of democratic mountaineers. That the Ætolians lagged behind the rest of Greece, that the rural Cantons lag behind the rest of Switzerland, is no more than any one would naturally expect. In Switzerland, the accession of considerable towns to the original League of the Forest Cantons, probably saved the whole body from reproducing some of the worst features of Ætolian life. When Bern attached herself to the mountain alliance, it was as if Athens or Corinth had joined the Ætolian League and had become its ruling spirit. Even the earlier accession of the much smaller town of Luzern had a considerable effect on the character of the League. This civic element in Switzerland saved her both from remaining in perpetual obscurity, like some of the Leagues of Northern Greece, and from obtaining an importance purely mischievous, like that of Ætolia. And, even as it was, the history of Switzerland exhibits only too many instances of an Ætolian spirit. The tendency to serve as mercenaries, regardless of the cause in which they serve, is the least disgraceful form which this spirit has taken. The purely conservative and defensive history of Switzerland is the most glorious portion of modern European history. It is one tale of unmixed heroism, from the day when the heroes of Morgarten first checked the course of Austrian tyranny, to the day when their descendants calmly appealed to admiring Europe against the base perfidy of their own apostate citizen, who had robbed them of the bulwark which Europe had guaranteed, and which the robber himself promised to respect up to the very moment of the consummation of his crime. But the warmest admirer of the brave Confederation cannot deny that, at the only time when Switzerland played an important part in general European affairs, it was a part conceived far too much in the spirit of Skopas and Dorimachos. The Swiss too often appeared in the Italian wars of the fifteenth

Both originally Leagues of Tribes not of Cities.

Later civic element in Switzerland.

A.D. 1352.

A.D. 1332.

Grandeur of the conservative history of Switzerland, A.D. 1315–1860.

Aggressive warfare of the Swiss in Italy.

and sixteenth centuries in a character not very unlike that in which the Ætolians appeared in the days of Aratos and Philopoimên. The betrayal of Lewis Sforza by his Swiss Guards was an act which required the devotion of the Swiss Guards of a later Lewis to atone for it. The territories south of the Alps, whether possessed by the Confederation at large or by particular Cantons, were won by aggressions as little to be defended as the annexations of either Buonaparte. Now that the Canton of Ticino enjoys equal rights with its German and Burgundian[1] fellows, no one would degrade the citizens of a free republic into the subjects even of an Italian King; but history cannot forget that there was a time when the Switzer was to the Lombard as truly an alien master as the Gaul, the Spaniard, or the Austrian. It is in relation to these subject districts that the resemblance between Ætolia and Switzerland becomes most close. The union between the original Ætolian tribes was indeed far closer than that between the old Thirteen Cantons, closer even than that between the Achaian cities or the American States. But while Achaia, like America, admitted no members to the League except on terms of perfect equality,[2] Ætolia, like Switzerland in her old state, possessed allies and subjects in every conceivable relation, from equal friendship to absolute bondage. The state of things under the old Swiss League—the various positions of Confederate States, Allied States, Protected States, Districts subject to the League as a whole, Districts subject to this or that Canton, Districts subject to two or more Cantons in partnership—relations, all of them, which a Greek might well express by his elastic word *Sympolity*—all this teaches us, better than anything else, what was the real condition of the cities, districts, and islands, which were brought into connexion with Ætolia in such various ways and on such various terms. The Swiss territory, Confederate, Allied, and Subject, was indeed continuous, or nearly so,[3]

A.D. 1500.

A.D. 1792.

A.D. 1503–1512.

Subject districts of Switzerland and of Ætolia.

Swiss territory

[1] *Burgundian*, not *French*. No one who regards either the past or the future, will ever apply, as is too often done, the name "French Switzerland" to that part of the Confederation where a Romance language is spoken. See above, p. 24.

[2] The peculiar circumstances of the District of Columbia prevent it from being looked on as a real exception, and a "Territory" is simply an infant State.

[3] Mühlhausen was an isolated ally of Switzerland, which, after the French annexation of Elsass, was entirely surrounded by French territory;—we are now unhappily driven to use nearly the same language of Geneva itself. Mühlhausen, by more recent arrangements, has been handed over to the same fate as Colmar and Strassburg.

continuous, Ætolian not so.

while the allies and subjects of Ætolia were scattered over the whole mainland and islands of Greece. This is the natural difference between a purely inland country, like Switzerland, and one which, like Ætolia, always possessed some sea-board, and soon found means to acquire more. But, if our analogy fails in this purely external and physical point, the experience of our own nation, or of any other nation which has conquered or colonized by sea, steps in to supply the deficiency. Thus does history ever reproduce itself, at all events within the great circle of European civilization. The Greek, the Swiss, the Englishman, are all beings of the same nature, all possessed of the same good and evil qualities, ready to be called out by the recurrence of the same excitements and temptations. Till we learn wholly to cast away the silly distinction of "Ancient" and "Modern," and freely to employ every part of history to illustrate every other part, we shall never fully take in the true unity of the political life of Europe, or realize as we should that the experience of man in times past, alike in great empires and in single cities, is no mere food for antiquarian dreams, but is the truest and most practical text-book of the philosopher and the statesman.

# CHAPTER VII

## HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE FOUNDATION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE TO THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA. B.C. 281—222

I DO not propose to give, in this and the following Chapters, any complete narrative of the later history of Greece. Such a task belongs to the historian of Greece or of the Greek people, not to the historian of a particular class of governments. But a certain amount of direct narrative seems essential at this stage of my subject. We have now traced out the origin and the political constitutions of those two great Federations which became the leading powers in the last days of independent Greece. It seems necessary to the completeness of the subject to show their systems actually at work, and to give some account of the eminent men who guided their internal developement and their foreign policy. With this view I propose to go through the last century and a half of Old Grecian history, passing lightly over such points as do not concern my immediate subject, but stopping to narrate and comment in detail when we come across things or persons directly interesting to a student of the history of Federalism.[1]

[1] Of this period, as of so many others, we have no complete contemporary history: for a great part of it we have no contemporary history at all. Polybios narrates in detail from the beginning of the War of the Leagues in B.C. 221; of the earlier times he gives merely an introductory sketch. But we have Polybios' history in a perfect state only for about five years; from B.C. 216 onwards, we have only fragments, though very extensive and important fragments. Down to B.C. 168, we have the history of Livy, who, in Greek matters, commonly followed, and indeed often translated, Polybios. From B.C. 168 to B.C. 146, that is, till the final loss of Achaian independence, we have only the fragments of Polybios. We have also Plutarch's Lives of Aratos, Philopoimên, Agis, Kleomenês, and Titus Quinctius Flamininus. These are largely derived from contemporary writers now lost, especially from Phylarchos, a strong Kleomenist writer, and from the Memoirs of Aratos himself. We are thus often enabled to hear both sides of a question. There are also occasional notices in Pausanias, Strabo, and other

## § 1. *From the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Deliverance of Corinth*, B.C. 281—243

Revolution of Greece and Macedonia during the first years of the League. B.C. 281–272.

The first years of the growth of the Achaian League are contemporary with the invasion of Macedonia and Greece by the Gauls and with the wars between Pyrrhos and Antigonos Gonatas. Pyrrhos, for a moment, expelled Antigonos from the Macedonian throne, which Antigonos recovered while Pyrrhos was warring in Peloponnêsos. By the time that Pyrrhos was dead, and Antigonos again firmly fixed in Macedonia, the League had grown up to maturity as far as regarded the cities of the old Achaia. For the next ten years also Antigonos had his hands full in other quarters. He was engaged in a war with Athens, in the earlier stages of which the republic had the support of Sparta and Egypt. He had also a much nearer and more dangerous enemy in Alexander the son of Pyrrhos, who had succeeded his father on the throne of Epeiros. Alexander inherited all Pyrrhos' enmity towards Antigonos, and, like Pyrrhos, he actually succeeded in expelling him for a short time from Macedonia.[1] The war with Athens, known as the Chremônidean War, ended in the capture of Athens, the placing of Macedonian garrisons in the city and its ports, and apparently in the destruction of the Long Walls.[2] This was the last blow to the little amount of power which Athens still retained. Of the Peloponnêsian cities, many, especially Sikyôn and Megalopolis, were held by Tyrants in the Macedonian interest. Corinth was in the more singular position of being held, not by a native Tyrant, but by a Macedonian prince of the royal house, who was, virtually at least, independent of the King.[3] It was held successively by Krateros (half-brother to Antigonos through his mother Phila), by Alexander son of Krateros, and by Alex-

B.C. 273.

c. 272.

B.C. 272–263.

B.C. 268–263.

Circa B.C. 264.

State of Peloponnêsos.

writers, which, in the case of Pausanias, often swell into considerable fragments of history. It is evident therefore that to study this period in detail is a very different business from studying the history of the Peloponnêsian War, where a man has little more to do than to read his Thucydidês, and then to turn for illustrations to Aristophanês and Plutarch. In the later period, not merely the illustrations, but the history itself, has to be dug from a variety of sources. The English scholar will generally find it enough to read Bishop Thirlwall's last volume, accompanied by those portions of Polybios and those Lives of Plutarch which belong to the subject. Having compared every word of Bishop Thirlwall's narrative with the original writers, I can bear witness to its unfailing accuracy, as every reader can to its unswerving impartiality and wisdom.

[1] See Thirlwall, viii. p. 98. [2] Ib. p. 100. [3] Ib. p. 118.

ander's widow Nikaia. Sparta remained independent, with her old constitution and laws, with her two Kings, her Ephors, and her Senate; but she was sadly fallen both from her Hellenic position without and from the purity of her Lykourgeian discipline within. The old spirit however, as we shall soon see, was still there, and she was able to drive back Pyrrhos from her gates with as much energy as a hundred years before she had driven back Epameinôndas. Still it marks the decay alike of her power and of her discipline that she had gates from which to drive him back. Thus far, then, circumstances had favoured the quiet and peaceful growth of the League. Achaia was surrounded by enemies, but all were so occupied with what appeared more important matters that there was little fear of their meddling with her. Such a period of danger, ever threatening, but never striking, was admirably suited to strengthen the feeling of union, and to give an impulse towards good government and improvement of every kind. This period embraces the first twenty years of the League, during which, beyond the gradual growth of the League itself, we have not a single notice of its history. Then follow ten years during which all Greece is nearly a blank to us, but in the course of which one most important change was effected in the Achaian polity.

State of Sparta.

B.C. 272.

Favourable position of the Achaian League.

B.C. 281–261.

B.C. 261–251.

It was in the twenty-fifth year of the revived League that, instead of the two Generals who had hitherto been yearly chosen, the Achaians for the first time placed at the head of the Federal Commonwealth a single General or President with full powers. Markos of Keryneia, as he deserved, was the first citizen thus called upon to wield in his own hands the full authority of the state. Polybios[1] records the fact and its date, but he gives no explanation of the causes which led to this great constitutional change. In those threatening times, the feeling of union among the members of the League must have been growing stronger and stronger. To vest the chief power of the nation in one man's hands expressed a clear national conviction of the advantage and the need of unity of purpose and vigour of action. It is easy to conceive that practical evils may have arisen, especially in a Federal state, from the existence of two supreme magistrates with equal powers. The working of the Ætolian League, which, with all its faults, was a model of united and vigorous action, may well have taught the Achaians that, in this

Institution of the sole Generalship, B.C. 255.

[1] ii. 43.

respect, their constitution was inferior to that of their neighbours. Be this as it may, the change was made, and it was made at a time when it led the way to still greater changes. From this time forward, the history of the League becomes mainly the biography of several eminent men, who, in their turns, presided over its councils. This personal character of the Achaian history gives it a peculiar kind of interest, an interest more like that of modern history, and one widely different from the feeling with which we study the records of aristocratic commonwealths. In the stately march of the Roman annals, greater men, it may be, than any that the League produced seem as nothing beside the superior greatness of the commonwealth in and for which they lived. The Roman polity did not derive its impress from them, but it stamped its own impress upon them. The Achaian League, on the other hand, derived, as we can hardly doubt, its first character from Markos of Keryneia; there can be no doubt whatever that, in its wider and more ambitious form, it was essentially the work of Aratos of Sikyôn.

Biographical character of the Achaian history.

Up to this time the League had been confined to the ten cities of the original Achaia. We have no reason to suppose that its extension beyond those limits had ever presented itself to the mind of any Achaian statesman. Within those narrow bounds, it had doubtless given an example of all those republican virtues of equality and good government for which Polybios gives it credit; it had already displayed, on a small scale, that generous zeal for freedom, that readiness of exertion for the freedom of others,[1] which he claims for it as its distinguishing virtue. But the Achaian League had hitherto been strictly an Achaian League; it had not aspired to become a League of all Hellas, or even of all Peloponnêsos. It was now to receive a new member and a new citizen, who were to impress upon its policy a wholly different character, or, more truly, to find for its original character a wider field of action. The League, by receiving Sikyôn into its fellowship, ceased to be Achaian in any strict ethnical sense; it might now consistently advance till it embraced all Peloponnêsos or all Hellas. And by receiving Aratos along with the city which he had delivered, it received the citizen who was, for nearly forty years, to be the guiding

Results of the annexation of SIKYÔN to the League.

[1] Pol. ii. 42. Ἀντὶ πάσης τῆς ἑαυτῶν φιλοτιμίας, ἣν παρείχοντο τοῖς συμμάχοις, ἀντικατηλλάττοντο τὴν ἑκάστων ἐλευθερίαν καὶ τὴν κοινὴν ὁμόνοιαν Πελοποννησίων. Cf. c. 38, and Plut. Ar. 9.

spirit of its councils, and who was to do, for Achaia and for all Greece, more good and more evil than any other man of his age. ARATOS; his lasting influence.

Aratos, like his precursor Markos, had learned love of freedom and hatred of tyranny in the school of exile. His native city Sikyôn had once stood high among Grecian commonwealths of the second rank, and, inferior as it was to Thebes or Sparta or Athens, it held a position far above any of the towns of the Achaian shore. The prevailing blood among its citizens was Dorian, and its ancestral government, when not interrupted by periods of tyranny or revolution, was the old Dorian aristocracy. In early times indeed that aristocracy had been supplanted by one of the most splendid lines of Tyrants in all Grecian history. The reigns of Orthagoras and Myrôn and Kleisthenês form the most brilliant period in the Sikyônian annals, and the last of the dynasty had the honour of transmitting his blood and name to the founder of the Democracy of Athens.[1] In later times we find another Sikyônian statesman, whom the ruling oligarchy branded with the name of Tyrant, but whom the mass of his fellow-citizens worshipped as the founder of their freedom.[2] Euphrôn founded a Democracy; what was its later history, or how long it outlived its founder, we know not. We read vaguely of factions and demagogues,[3] but we get at no details till, in the Macedonian times, the unhappy city was handed over from one oppressor to another. During the wars of the Successors Sikyôn had its share of calamities as well as other Grecian cities. At one stage of those days of sorrow, Sikyôn had to endure the ignominy of being ruled by a female usurper. Kratêsipolis, the widow of Alexander, son of Polysperchôn, held possession of the city, and proved herself a worthy rival of her fellow-oppressors of the other sex.[4] At another time it was garrisoned for five years by Ptolemy, when he liberated Greece.[5] When Dêmêtrios came to liberate Greece back again,[6] he not only expelled Ptolemy's garrison, but persuaded the Sikyônians to change the site of their city and even to alter its name to Dêmêtrias. This innovation probably lasted no longer than the power of its author.

History of Sikyôn.

Its early Tyrants, B.C. c. 680–580.

Euphrôn founds Democracy, B.C. 365.

Sikyôn under the Successors, B.C. 308–301.

[1] Kleisthenês of Sikyôn was, through his daughter Agaristê the wife of Megaklês, the grandfather of Kleisthenês of Athens. See Herod. vi. 126-131.

[2] Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 44. Diod. xv. 70.

[3] Plut. Ar. 2. *Εἰς στάσεις ἐνέπεσε καὶ φιλοτιμίας δημαγωγῶν.*

[4] Diod. xix. 67.

[5] Ib. xx. 37.

[6] Ib. xx. 102. Plut. Dêmêtr. 25.

Period of Local Tyrants, B.C. 301–251.

After this, we find Sikyôn in the hands of local oppressors, whose appearance seems to have nearly coincided with the fall of the power of Dêmêtrios at Ipsos.[1] Tyrant now succeeded Tyrant, and Tyrants, we may well believe, of a very different order from Orthagoras and Kleisthenês.[2] At last a gleam of better things appeared for a moment. Kleôn, the reigning Tyrant, was slain, seemingly in some popular movement, and two eminent citizens, named Timokleidas and Kleinias, were placed by common consent at the head of affairs.[3] The exact nature of their office is not described; our brief notice of it reads like an extraordinary commission, for life or for some considerable time, to reform and govern the commonwealth.[4] Under their administration something like settled order and prosperity had begun once more to appear, when Sikyôn unhappily lost both her patriotic magistrates. Timokleidas died; Kleinias was murdered by a citizen named Abantidas, who seized the Tyranny and again subjected Sikyôn to a reign of terror. The friends of Kleinias were for the most part banished or put to death; his young son,[5] Aratos, then seven years old, was destined to the same fate;[6] but he found a friend in the family of his persecutor. Sôsô, the sister of Abantidas, was married to Prophantos the brother of Kleinias; the child sought refuge in his uncle's house, and Sôsô found means to shelter him

Administration of Timokleidas and Kleinias.

Tyranny of Abantidas, B.C. 264.

Escape of Aratos.

[1] Schorn (p. 69) ingeniously infers this from the statement of Plutarch (Ar. 9) that, at the return of Aratos in B.C. 251, there were Sikyônian exiles who had been nearly fifty years in banishment. These fifty years go back exactly to the date of the battle of Ipsos.

[2] Droysen (ii. 304, 5) stands up for them on the ground of Strabo's expression (viii. 6. 25), *ἐτυραννήθη δὲ πλεῖστον χρόνον· ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τοὺς τυράννους ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας ἔσχεν· Ἄρατον δ' ἐπιφανέστατον, κ.τ.λ.* It is much more likely, though Droysen despises the notion, that Strabo was thinking of the old Orthagorids; and, if his words are to be construed quite literally, Aratos himself must be reckoned among the Tyrants. It is very likely that some of these Tyrants may have been patrons of art—we know that one of the worst of them was something of a philosopher—but what then?

[3] By some strange confusion, Pausanias (ii. 8. 2) makes Timokleidas, after the fall of Kleôn, reign as joint-Tyrant with a certain Euthydêmos. The people under Kleinias rise and expel them.

[4] Plut. Ar. 2. *Εἵλοντο Τιμοκλείδαν ἄρχοντα καὶ Κλεινίαν. . . . ἤδη δέ τινα τῆς πολιτείας κατάστασιν ἔχειν δοκούσης Τιμοκλείδας μὲν ἀπέθανε, κ.τ.λ.*

[5] In after times, the local legends of Sikyôn attributed to the deliverer a miraculous origin, like that of Aristomenês and Alexander. The God Asklêpios had visited his mother Aristodama in the form of a dragon. Paus. ii. 10. 3; iv. 14. 8.

[6] Paus. ii. 8. 2. *Ἄρατον δὲ Ἀβαντίδας φυγάδα ἐποιήσεν, ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπεχώρησεν Ἄρατος ἑθελοντής.* He was now seven years old. Plut. Ar. 2.

from her brother, and to send him in safety to Argos, where his father had many powerful friends. Here he was brought up till his twentieth year. His literary education seems to have been neglected, but it is quite possible that the neglect may have been no real loss. That Aratos was an eloquent and persuasive speaker we need no proof; without eloquence of some kind no man could have remained for life, as he did, at the head of a Greek commonwealth. Perhaps the very absence of rhetorical and sophistic training may have left room for something more nearly reproducing the native strength of Themistoklês and Periklês. His physical education was well cared for; the future deliverer of Sikyôn and Corinth contended in the public games, and received more than one chaplet as the prize of bodily prowess. It is possible that this devotion to bodily exercises may not have been without influence on his future career. The discipline of the athlete and the discipline of the soldier were inconsistent,[1] and these early laurels were perhaps won at the expense of future defeats of the Achaian phalanx. Further than this we have no details of his early life; but we find him, at the age of twenty, vigorous, active, and enterprising, full of zeal, not only against the Tyrants who excluded him from his own home and country, but against all who bore usurped rule over their fellows in any city of Hellas.

Education of Aratos at Argos.

Meanwhile matters in Sikyôn went on from bad to worse. Abantidas had a turn for those rhetorical exercises which Aratos neglected; he frequented the school of two teachers of the art named Deinias and Aristotelês, who, from what motive we are not told, one day assassinated the Tyrant in the midst of his studies. His place was at once filled by his own father Paseas, who was in his turn slain and succeeded by one Nikoklês. The eyes of men in Sikyôn now began to turn to the banished son of their old virtuous leader. Aratos was looked to as the future deliverer of his country, and Nikoklês watched his course with a degree of suspicion proportioned to the hopes of those whom he held in bondage. But, as yet, the Tyrant deemed that he had little to fear from the personal prowess of the youth. Indeed Aratos purposely adopted a line of conduct suited to throw Nikoklês off his guard. He assumed, at all events when he knew

Succession of Tyrants at Sikyôn.

B.C. 252–1.

Expectations from Aratos.

[1] See Plut. Phil. 3. The remark however is as old as Homer. Il. xxiii. 668-671. Certainly Alexander of Macedon (Herod. v. 22) and Dôrieus of Rhodes combined the two characters (see Grote, viii. 217 and cf. x. 164), but one can hardly fancy Periklês stripping at Olympia.

that agents of the Tyrant were watching him, an appearance of complete devotion to youthful enjoyments and frivolous pursuits. Men said that a Tyrant must be the most timid of all beings, if such a youth as Aratos could strike fear into one.[1] But the real fears of Nikoklês were of another kind. He did not so much dread the personal prowess of Aratos as the influence of his father's name and connexions. The position which the family of Kleinias must have held is marked by the fact that the Kings both of Macedonia and Egypt were among his hereditary friends.[2] We may see also the first signs of a weakness which pursued Aratos through his whole life, when we hear that he at first hoped to obtain freedom for his country through royal friendship. To look for the expulsion of a Tyrant at the hands of Antigonos Gonatas was a vain hope indeed.[3] It appears however that the King did not absolutely refuse the new character in which the inexperienced youth prayed him to appear: he put him off with fair words; he promised much, but performed nothing. Aratos then looked to Ptolemy Philadelphos of Egypt, whose rivalry with Macedonia seemed to guarantee his trustworthiness as an ally of Grecian freedom, and whose actions did not always belie his pretensions. But in leaning on Egyptian aid Aratos soon found that he was leaning on the staff of a broken reed; whatever might be the good intentions of Ptolemy, he was far off, and the hopes which he held out were slow to be fulfilled. The young deliverer at last learned no longer to put his trust in princes, but only in the quick wits and strong arms of himself and his fellow-exiles. A Sikyônian exile named Aristomachos, and two Megalopolitan philosophers named Ekdêmos and Dêmophanês,[4] are spoken of as among his principal advisers. The details of the perilous night-adventure by which Aratos and

Early Schemes of Aratos.

-er-ance of

[1] Plut. Ar. 6.

[2] Schorn (p. 70) suggests, ingeniously enough, that the connexion between the house of Kleinias and the Ptolemies began during the Egyptian occupation of Sikyôn in B.C. 308–3. But how came the same family to be on such terms with both the rival dynasties at once, with the descendants of Ptolemy and with the descendants of Dêmêtrios?

[3] Something may be allowed to the inexperience of a youth of twenty; it is indeed hard measure to hint, as Schorn (p. 70, note) does, that Aratos at first merely wished to be Tyrant himself instead of Nikoklês. Every act of his life belies the imputation. Niebuhr (Lect. Anc. Hist. iii. 277, Eng. Tr.) does Aratos more justice.

[4] The names are variously given. They are Ekdêmos and Dêmophanês in Pol. x. 22. (25). Plut. Phil. 1. Suidas, v. Φιλοπολιμην; Ekdêlos and Mega-

his little company surprised and delivered Sikyôn have all the interest of a romance.[1] Here, in the last days of Greece, our path is strewed with tales of personal character and personal adventure, such as we have met with but seldom since we lost the guidance of Herodotos. For our purpose it is enough that all Sikyôn lay down at night under the rule of Nikoklês, and heard at dawn the herald proclaim to the delivered city that Aratos the son of Kleinias called his countrymen to freedom. Never was there a purer or a more bloodless revolution; Sikyôn was delivered without the loss of a single citizen; the very mercenaries of the Tyrant were allowed to live, and Nikoklês himself, whom public justice could hardly have spared, contrived to escape by an ignoble shelter. Never did mortal man win glory truer and more unalloyed than the young hero of Sikyôn. Sikyôn by Aratos, B.C. 251.

Sikyôn was now free, but she had dangers to contend against from within and from without. Antigonos, to whom the youthful simplicity of Aratos had once looked for help, now hardly concealed his enmity.[2] The infection which he thought he could afford to neglect while it spread no further than the petty Achaian townships, was now beginning to extend itself to cities of a higher rank. And, within the walls of Sikyôn, Aratos had to struggle against difficulties which were hardly less threatening. With the restoration of freedom came the return of the exiles. Under this name are included both those who had been formally banished, and those who had voluntarily fled from the city, during the days of tyranny.[3] Nikoklês, during his short reign of four months, had sent eighty into exile; those whose banishment dated from the days of earlier Tyrants reached the number of five hundred. Some of these last had been absent from their country fifty years.[4] External and internal difficulties of Sikyôn.

lophanês in Paus. viii. 49. 2; Ekdêlos in Plut. Ar. 5. Suidas also turns Nikoklês into Neoklês.

[1] One is strongly tempted to tell the tale once more; but the Greek of Plutarch, the German of Droysen, and the English of Thirlwall are enough. It should be remembered that all the details rest upon good authority, namely the Memoirs of Aratos himself.

[2] Plut. Ar. 9. Ἐπιβουλευομένην μὲν ἔξωθεν καὶ φθονουμένην ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνου τὴν πόλιν ὁρῶντι [τῷ Ἀράτῳ] διὰ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ταραττομένην δ' ὑφ' αὑτῆς καὶ στασιάζουσαν.

[3] The word φυγάς includes both classes. Many fled to escape death, but some were formally banished. τοὺς μὲν ἐξέβαλε, τοὺς δ' ἀνεῖλεν [ὁ Ἀβαντίδας]. Plut. Ar. 2. [Cf. Cicero, De Off. ii. c. 23.]

[4] So says Plutarch (Ar. 9); but why did they not return during the administration of Kleinias and Timokleidas?

Many of these men had lost houses and lands, which they naturally wished to recover, but which their actual possessors as naturally wished to keep. Doubtless, in so long a time, much of this property must have changed hands more than once, so that the actual possessor would often be an honest purchaser, and not a mere grantee of a Tyrant's stolen goods. The young deliverer was expected to satisfy all these opposing claims, as well as to guard his city against Antigonos and all other enemies. What was chiefly wanting for the former purpose was money; and here the friendship of King Ptolemy really stood him in good stead. He obtained, at various times, a sum of one hundred and seventy-five talents, partly, it would seem, as a voluntary gift,[1] partly as the result of Aratos' own request, for which purpose he made a voyage to Egypt in person. By the help of this money he contrived to satisfy the various claimants. Some of the old owners were glad to accept the value of their property instead of the property itself; some of the new ones were willing to give up possession on receiving a fair price for what they resigned. We are told that by these means he succeeded in pacifying the whole city.[2] It is added, as a proof of his true republican spirit, that, on being invested with full and extraordinary powers for the purpose, he declined to exercise them alone, but, of his own accord, associated with himself fifteen other citizens in the office.[3]

Internal pacification by Aratos.

Against danger from without Aratos sought for defence by that step which first brings him within the immediate sphere of this history. He annexed Sikyôn to the Achaian League.

[1] Plut. Ar. 11. Ἦκε δ' αὐτῷ καὶ χρημάτων δωρεὰ παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως.

[2] See Plutarch (Ar. 9-14) and the well-known passage of Cicero (De Off. ii. 25), who winds up, as a Roman of his day well might, "O virum magnum, dignumque qui in nostra republica natus esset. Sic par est agere cum civibus, non (ut bis jam vidimus) hastam in foro ponere, et bona civium voci subjicere præconis."

[3] Plut. Ar. 14. Ἀποδειχθεὶς γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ διαλλακτὴς καὶ κύριος ὅλως ἐπὶ τὰς φυγαδικὰς οἰκονομίας μόνος οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, ἀλλὰ πεντεκαίδεκα τῶν πολιτῶν προσκατέλεξεν ἑαυτῷ, κ.τ.λ. So Cicero "Adhibuit sibi in consilium quindecim principes." This is hardly done justice to by Schorn (p. 72) in the words, "Nach Hause zurückgekommen setzte er eine Commission nieder, an deren Spitze er selbst trat."

These internal measures of Aratos, or some of them, seem to have been later than the annexation of Sikyôn to the League. But it seemed better to finish the account of the deliverance and pacification of Sikyôn before entering on the career of Aratos as a Federal politician.

Annexation of Sikyôn to the Achaian League, B.C. 251.

This of course implies both that he prevailed on his own countrymen to ask for admission to the Achaian body, and that he persuaded the Achaian Government and Assembly to grant what they asked. It is much to be regretted that no record is preserved of the debates either in the Sikyônian or the Achaian Assembly on so important a proposal. The step was a bold and a novel one. For a Greek city willingly to surrender its full and distinct sovereignty was a thing of which earlier times presented only one recorded instance. Corinth and Argos had once removed the artificial limits which separated the Argeian and the Corinthian territory, and had declared that Argos and Corinth formed but a single commonwealth.[1] But so strange an arrangement lasted only for a short time, and it was offensive to large bodies of citizens while it did last. Still Argos and Corinth were, at least, both of them Doric cities; their citizens were kinsmen in blood and speech, sharing alike in the traditions of the ruling race of Peloponnêsos. It was a far greater change when Sikyôn, a city of the Dorian conquerors, stooped to ask for admission to the franchise of the remnant of the conquered Achaians.[2] Federalism, as we have seen, was nothing new in Greece, but the Federal tie had as yet united only mere districts or very small towns, and those always districts or towns of the same people. For one of the greater cities of Greece to enter into Federal relations with cities belonging to another division of the Greek race was something altogether unknown. But now the Doric Sikyôn was admitted into a League consisting only of small Achaian towns,[3] any one of which singly was immeasurably her inferior, and whose united strength hardly equalled that of one of the great cities of Greece.[4] The Sikyônians were to lose their national name[5] and being; Sikyôn indeed would survive as an inde-

B.C. 393.

Importance and novelty of the step.

[1] Xen. Hell. iv. 4. 6. See Grote, ix. 462. The change, in the opinion of Xenophôn and the Corinthian oligarchs, amounted to a wiping out of their city; *αἰσθανόμενοι ἀφανιζομένην τὴν πόλιν*. The whole description is very curious.

[2] Paus. ii. 8. 4. *Τοὺς Σικυωνίους ἐς τὸ Ἀχαιῶν συνέδριον ἐσήγαγε Δωριεῖς ὄντας.*

[3] Plut. Ar. 9. *Δωριεῖς ὄντες ὑπέδυσαν ἑκουσίως ὄνομα καὶ πολιτείαν τὴν Ἀχαιῶν οὔτε ἀξίωμα λαμπρὸν οὔτε μεγάλην ἰσχὺν ἐχόντων τότε· μικροπολῖται γὰρ ἦσαν οἱ πολλοί, κ.τ.λ.*

[4] Ib. *Οἱ [οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ] τῆς μὲν πάλαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀκμῆς οὐδὲν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, μέρος ὄντες, ἐν δὲ τῷ τότε μιᾶς ἀξιολόγου πόλεως σύμπαντες ὁμοῦ δύναμιν οὐκ ἔχοντες.*

[5] Ib. So Polybios (ii. 38), *πῶς οὖν καὶ διὰ τί νῦν εὐδοκοῦσιν οὗτοί τε καὶ*

pendent canton, untouched in the freedom of her local government; but in all dealings with other states the name of Sikyôn would be sunk in the name of Achaia. The warriors of Sikyôn would be commanded by Achaian Generals,[1] and her interests would be represented in foreign Assemblies and at foreign courts by Ambassadors commissioned by the whole Achaian body.[2] Such a change must have given a complete shock to all ordinary Greek feeling on such subjects. The accession of Sikyôn to the League was the beginning of a new state of things in Greece. No more striking testimony could be borne to the prudent and honourable course which the League had hitherto followed within its own narrow limits.[3] This first extension beyond the limits of Achaia at once put the League on quite a new footing. Hitherto it had been a merely local union; it now began to swell into Pan-hellenic importance.[4] When once Sikyôn had joined the League, other cities were not slow in following her example. From the moment of the admission of Sikyôn, it was an understood principle that the arms of the League stood open to receive any Grecian city which was willing to cast in its lot among the Confederates. The League now became the centre of freedom throughout all Greece; the supremacy of Macedonia in Peloponnêsos was doomed.

Beginning of a new Epoch.

General extension of the League and its Objects.

Sikyôn admitted on equal terms.

Sikyôn was admitted to the League on perfectly equal terms. She was subjected to no disqualifications as a foreign city, and she claimed no superiority on account of her power and fame being so vastly superior to those of any of the old Achaian towns. Like other Achaian cities, she obtained one vote, and no more, in the Federal Congress. The evil of this arrangement

τὸ λοιπὸν πλῆθος τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἅμα τὴν πολιτείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν μετειληφότες;

[1] Plut. Ar. 11. Ὁ δ' Ἄρατος . . . καίπερ συμβολὰς τῷ κοινῷ μεγάλας δεδωκὼς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δόξαν καὶ τὴν τῆς πατρίδος δύναμιν, ὡς ἑνὶ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων χρῆσθαι παρεῖχεν αὑτῷ τῷ ἀεὶ στρατηγοῦντι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, εἴτε Δυμαῖος, εἴτε Τριταιεὺς, εἴτε μικροτέρας τινὸς ὢν τύχοι πόλεως.

[2] Aratos seems to have gone to Alexandria in a purely private character to ask help of King Ptolemy as a friend of his family.

[3] See Plutarch's panegyric on the League (Ar. 9), and Polybios *passim*, especially ii. 38 and 42.

[4] Droysen, ii. 369. "Durch den Beitritt von Sikyon und durch Aratos Verbindung mit Aegypten war die Rolle, welche die Achaier zu übernehmen hatten, bezeichnet; Arat war es, der die Thätigkeit des Bundes zuerst und vielleicht nicht ohne Widerstreben der bisher nur für die innere Ruhe und Selbstständigkeit bedachten Eidgenossen nach Aussen hin wandte."

has been already[1] spoken of. It was right that Sikyôn should possess no privilege which could endanger the common rights of all; it was wise to avoid making Sikyôn the seat of government, or in any way giving her the character of a capital; but it was not abstractedly just that her large population should possess in the national Assembly only the single vote which belonged equally to Dymê and Tritaia.[2] Sikyôn, whose strength must have been equal to half, or more than half, that of the League as it then stood, could at any moment be outvoted ten times over by the petty Achaian townships. Not that we are at all entitled to blame, or even to wonder at, the omission. Federalism was then, not indeed exactly in its infancy, but still making its first experiment on a large scale. It could not be expected to hit upon every improvement at once, and this particular improvement had been as yet suggested by no practical necessity. To give Sikyôn a double vote would have seemed to sin against the great principles of freedom and equality among all the members of the League. We may well believe that, though the accession of Sikyôn was such a clear gain to the League, there were Achaians who looked on its admission on any terms as a sort of favour. A proposal for giving Sikyôn a double vote in the Federal Congress would doubtless have met with great opposition, and would probably have shipwrecked the whole scheme of annexation. It is still more probable that the thought of such a proposal never occurred either to Aratos or to any one else.

B.C. 251–245. Position of Aratos.

For five years Aratos remained, either officially or through his personal influence, at the head of the local Sikyônian government, the Governor, so to speak, of the State of Sikyôn, but only a private citizen of the Achaian League. Now it was that he pacified the factions in his native city; now it was that, while serving in the Achaian cavalry, he won the admiration of his new countrymen by his strict discipline and punctual obedience

[1] See above, p. 212 et seqq.

[2] Niebuhr, Lect. Anc. Hist. iii. 277. "The Sicyonians made a great sacrifice in joining the Achaeans, because each of the insignificant Achaean towns had the same rights and the same votes as Sicyon, which was itself as large as several of the Achaean towns put together. Achaia, on the other hand, gained considerably by the accession." This is perfectly true as a statement of one side of the case; but it is evident that Sikyôn gained also by the union, even if it were not made on perfectly equitable terms.

to orders. The deliverer and leader of Sikyôn was never wanting, as his biographer tells us, even when command was vested in citizens of the pettiest Achaian towns.[1] We can well understand with what eyes King Antigonos watched his growing fame. He did not however profess open enmity; he rather professed his admiration of the young statesman; he showed him marked personal honours;[2] he talked ostentatiously of his good will towards him, and professed to believe that Aratos entertained an equal good will towards himself. Thus he hoped either really to win over Aratos to his interest, or at all events to make him suspected at the court of Alexandria. This last effect was actually produced, at all events for a season.

His relations to Antigonos and Ptolemy.

At last Aratos received the noblest tribute of confidence which his new countrymen had it in their power to pay; he was raised to the highest office in the Achaian commonwealth. At the age of twenty-six he was chosen General of the Achaians, that is, as we have seen, President of the Achaian United States. He thus became, not only the executive chief of the League in all civil and diplomatic affairs, but also its parliamentary leader and its personal Commander-in-chief. This office, from that day onwards, he held, as a general rule, in alternate years, till the day of his death, thirty-two years later. During all this time he was the soul of the League,[3] the first man of independent Greece. As such the merits and defects of a singularly mixed character had full scope for their developement.[4]

Aratos elected General of the League, B.C. 245.

His permanent position and influence.

[1] See above, p. 286.

[2] Plut. Ar. 15. Ἀντίγονος δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀνιώμενος ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ βουλόμενος ἢ μετάγειν ὅλως τῇ φιλίᾳ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἢ διαβάλλειν πρὸς τὸν Πτολεμαῖον ἄλλας τε φιλανθρωπίας ἐνεδείκνυτο μὴ πάνυ προσιεμένῳ καὶ θύων θεοῖς ἐν Κορίνθῳ μερίδας εἰς Σικυῶνα τῷ Ἀράτῳ διέπεμπε. This presence of Antigonos at Corinth is puzzling. It was certainly not actually in his possession till after the first Generalship of Aratos. The explanation of Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 118) must probably be adopted, though it is not without difficulties. Plutarch may easily have made some confusion, but what other place near enough to Sikyôn was in the possession of Antigonos?

[3] Plut. Ar. 24. Οὕτω δὲ ἴσχυσεν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ὥστ' . . . ἔργῳ καὶ γνώμῃ διὰ παντὸς ἄρχειν. Pol. ii. 43. Μεγάλην δὲ προκοπὴν ποιήσας τῆς ἐπιβολῆς ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ λοιπὸν ἤδη διετέλει προστατῶν μὲν τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους, κ.τ.λ.

[4] See the character of Aratos drawn by Schorn, p. 66. He is however altogether too severe. It is surely too much to say, "Demgemäss besass Aratus nicht ein grosses hellenisches, sondern nur ein enges achäisches Herz." (This is curiously contrasted with Plutarch's words, οὐ Σικυωνίων οὐδ' Ἀχαιῶν κηδόμενος, ἀλλὰ κοινήν τινα τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὅλης, κ.τ.λ. Ar. 16.) The vision of Aratos was often blinded as to means, but surely, as to ends, no man ever had a more purely Pan-hellenic patriotism. Droysen (ii. 376, 7) is still more severe, and his language raises the indignation of Kortüm (iii. 168), who likens Aratos, perhaps not alto-

That Aratos remained so long at the head of a free people, who could, at any time, simply by not electing him, have reduced him to a private station—that for so long a time he could guide the councils, not of a single city only, but of a great Federation, and could guide them alike for good and for evil—all this is of itself proof enough that he possessed many of the highest qualities of a statesman. It shows at once that he had the gift of persuasive eloquence, that he understood the management of popular bodies, and that he was master alike of the domestic and the foreign affairs of the Confederation. It speaks also, especially in Greece, for the possession of some very high moral qualities. It shows that his fellow-citizens knew that in him they had one whom they could thoroughly trust, one who would not, wittingly at least, betray their interests for personal profit or personal ambition. Like Periklês, like Nikias,[1] Aratos was utterly inaccessible to bribes; and doubtless the confidence of his countrymen in his perfect pecuniary probity had much to do with his long-continued influence. He conformed so far to the evil practice of his time as to accept, both for himself and for his country, presents from friendly Kings;[2] but all that he derived from this source, aided by large contributions from his private fortune, was always freely devoted to the public service.[3] He was zealously devoted to the cause of freedom; to overthrow a Tyranny, to set free a commonwealth, to extend the area of free Greece, in a word, to win new confederates for the Achaian League, became the ruling passion of his soul.[4] In that cause Aratos spared neither personal cost nor personal exertion; for the liberties of Greece he was ever ready to spend and to be

Character of Aratos.

Civil Merits of Aratos.

gether without reason, to William the Silent. Niebuhr (iii. 275) is much fairer than Schorn or Droysen.

[1] On the pecuniary probity of Nikias and his consequent political influence, see Grote, vi. 387.

[2] Besides the large present at the beginning of his career, he received a yearly pension of six talents from Ptolemy. Plut. Ar. 41. This was seemingly paid by both Philadelphos and Euergetês. I see no ground for Flathe's suspicion (Gesch. Mak. ii. 156) that this Egyptian subsidy was the chief cause of Aratos' influence over the League.

[3] See Plutarch (Ar. 19, 34), for his large contributions towards the deliverance both of Corinth and of Athens.

[4] Pol. ii. 43. Διετέλει . . . πάσας τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ πράξεις πρὸς ἓν τέλος ἀναφέρων. τοῦτο δ' ἦν τὸ Μακεδόνας μὲν ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, τὰς δὲ μοναρχίας καταλῦσαι, βεβαιῶσαι δ' ἑκάστοις τὴν κοινὴν καὶ πάτριον ἐλευθερίαν. Plut. Ar. 24. Ἑώρων γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐ πλοῦτον, οὐ δόξαν, οὐ φιλίαν βασιλικὴν, οὐ τὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ πατρίδος συμφέρον, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῆς αὐξήσεως τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπίπροσθεν ποιούμενον.

spent. And again, in this also resembling Periklês, he was wholly free from the fault which upset so many eminent Greeks, which ruined Themistoklês, Pausanias, and Alkibiadês, to say nothing of Alexander and Dêmêtrios—incapacity to bear success. Aratos, like Aristeidês and Periklês, remained, till his last day, the contented citizen of a free commonwealth. Even in the times of his worst errors, we can still see the difference between the pure gold of the republican chief and the tinsel of the Kings and courtiers with whom he is brought in contact. But these great and good qualities were balanced by several considerable defects. The ambition of Aratos was satisfied with being the first citizen of Achaia and of Hellas, but he could as little bear a rival near his throne as any despot. It was, in his view, absolutely essential, not only that Achaia should be the first power of Greece, but that Aratos should be the first citizen of Achaia. National envy made his foreign policy unjust to Sparta; personal envy made his home policy unjust to Lydiadas; a mixture of the two converted a national struggle between Sparta and Achaia into a personal rivalry between Kleomenês and Aratos. His hatred to Tyranny, his zeal for freedom, his anxiety for the extension of the League, often carried him too far. He did not scruple to seek noble ends by dishonourable means; he did not avoid the crooked paths of intrigue and conspiracy; he was thus led into many unjustifiable, and some illegal, actions. And, clear as his hands were of actual bribes, he cannot be acquitted of fostering, or at least of not withstanding, the most baleful habit of his age. He allowed his countrymen to look to foreign aid, when they should have looked only to their own wits and their own arms; he allowed them to trust to foreign mercenaries and foreign subsidies, and, for their sake, to practise an unworthy subserviency to foreign princes. As long as this subserviency took no worse form than that of flattering successive Ptolemies, the nation was indeed humiliated, its feelings of independence were weakened, but no actual danger to freedom could arise from friends at once so distant and so prudent. But had not Aratos and the Achaians already acquired the habit of looking to Ptolemy, they might never have fallen into the far more grievous error of looking to Antigonos. This fatal habit of putting trust in princes, combined with national and personal envy carried to an extreme point, led Aratos at last to the great error of his life, the

Faults of his civil character.

Ill effects of his connexion with the Ptolemies.

undoing of his own work, the calling again of the Macedonian into Greece.

Such was Aratos as a man and a statesman. As a military commander, the contradictions in his character are more glaring still. No man was more skilful or more daring in anything like a military adventure; no man risked his life more freely in a surprise, in an ambuscade, in a night assault; no man knew better how to repair failure in one quarter by unexpected success in another. But then no man who ever commanded an army had more need of the faculty of repairing failures. When Aratos led the Achaian phalanx to meet an equal enemy in a pitched battle, he invariably led it to defeat. It was not the fault of the men whom he commanded. Their discipline indeed was, in his age, very defective, but they had good military stuff in them, and Philopoimên, when it was too late, converted them with very little trouble into efficient soldiers. Nor was it mere want of military skill in Aratos himself. The true cause lay deeper. Strange as it sounds, this man, so fearless in one sort of warfare, the deliverer who scaled the walls of Sikyôn and Corinth, was, in the open field, as timid as a woman or a slave who had never seen steel flash in earnest. One understands a similar phænomenon when irregular troops are suddenly called on to practise a mode of warfare to which they are unaccustomed. In the Greek War of Independence, some of the warriors who were most valiant in their own way of fighting, where personal strength, personal daring, and personal skill were all that was wanted, fairly ran away when they were expected to stand still in a line to be shot at. But Aratos was not a klepht from the mountains; he was a soldier and a general of a civilized Greek state; and if he and his countrymen had not reached the full perfection of Spartan or Macedonian discipline, they must at least have known the ordinary tactics common to all Peloponnêsian armies. The marvellous inconsistencies of Aratos' military character were the subject of much curious disputation in his own age;[1] it may be left either to soldiers or to philosophers to explain the fact how they can; but history puts the fact itself beyond doubt—Aratos in the open field was a coward. And he was worse than a coward, he was a meddler. Accustomed, in political life, to exercise unbounded influence even when not in office, he carried the same habit into the camp, and

Character of Aratos as a General.

His skill and daring in adventures.

His incapacity and cowardice in the open field.

[1] See Plut. Ar. 29.

often interfered with and spoiled the plans of commanders more skilful and more daring than himself. Anyhow, as his devoted admirer Polybios is driven to confess, he allowed Peloponnêsos to be filled with trophies commemorating not his victories but his defeats.[1] That the League could not reap the benefit of his political skill, without at the same time reaping the evils of his military incapacity, is a speaking comment on that part of the Achaian system by which the functions of Commander-in-Chief and of Leader of the House of Commons were inseparably united. And yet it would naturally take a long time, and would require much sad experience, before a nation could fully realize that the deliverer of Sikyôn and Corinth was a man utterly unfit to command an army in the open field.

Effect of the union of civil and military powers.

First Generalship of Aratos, B.C. 245–244.

War between Achaia and Ætolia.

The first official year of Aratos was not to pass away without actual service; but as yet it was service of a kind which did not reveal his deficiencies. The two great Greek Leagues were at war; we know not whether the quarrel was of older date than the union of Sikyôn with the Achaian body, or whether a feud between Ætolia and Sikyôn had grown, now that Sikyôn was Achaian, into a feud between Ætolia and Achaia. It is certain that the Ætolians had made an attempt upon Sikyôn in the time of the Tyranny of Nikoklês;[2] it is certain that the two Leagues were now in such a state of hostility that the Achaians ventured on offensive operations on the other side of the Corinthian Gulf. One can hardly fancy this happening without previous Ætolian incursions into Achaia, and the good character which Aratos had already won, as a private horseman or as a subordinate officer, was probably won in resisting some of their plundering expeditions. It was more likely at this time than at any other that the Ætolian League made its famous agreement with Antigonos for the partition of the Achaian territory.[3] On the other hand the League was in alliance with Alexander, the Macedonian Prince of Corinth. Aratos had contemplated an attempt to drive out so dangerous a neighbour,

Alliance of the Achaians with

[1] Polybios records (iv. 8) his chief exploits, and continues, *ὁ δ' αὐτὸς οὗτος ὀπόταν τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποιήσασθαι βουληθείη, νωθρὸς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις, ἄτολμος ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἐν ὄψει δ' οὐ μένων τὸ δεινόν. διὸ καὶ τροπαίων ἐπ' αὐτὸν βλεπόντων ἐπλήρωσε τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καὶ τῇδέ πῃ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀεί ποτ' ἦν εὐχείρωτος.*

[2] Plut. Ar. 4.

[3] Pol. ii. 43, 45; ix. 34. See Thirlwall, viii. 116. Niebuhr (iii. 282) places it after the deliverance of Corinth, and Droysen (ii. 387) later still.

but Alexander seems to have proffered his friendship to the League,[1] an act which, under such circumstances, was equivalent to throwing off all allegiance to his royal uncle. This friendly position of Corinth must have been a great advantage in any movement of the Achaian troops either by land or sea, but it does not appear that either Alexander on the one side or Antigonos on the other took any active part in the war. This struggle was therefore more strictly a Social War, a War of the Leagues, than the later war to which the name is usually confined. The belligerents were the three Leagues of Achaia, Bœotia, and Ætolia, the Bœotians having entered into an alliance with Achaia against the common enemy. Aratos crossed the Gulf; he ravaged the coast, from Kalydôn, the old Achaian outpost,[2] now again an Ætolian city, to the Ozolian Lokris, now in willing or forced union with the robber League. He was then about to march into Bœotia to join his allies; but the Bœotarch Amaiokritos[3] did not wait for him; he engaged the Ætolians at Chairôneia; he himself fell, and his army was utterly defeated. The Bœotians now joined the Ætolian alliance,[4] and sank for ever into utter insignificance. Whether the failure of the intended meeting between the Achaian and Bœotian forces was the fault of the Achaian or of the Bœotian commander does not very clearly appear;[5] but probably Aratos was thereby saved from a defeat in his first year of command. Had he had an opportunity of displaying his characteristic weakness so early in his official career, the course of the subsequent history might have been greatly changed.

Alexander of Corinth.

Defeat of the Bœotians at Chairôneia.

The Achaian constitution, as we have seen, did not allow the immediate re-election of the General; but after the necessary lapse of one year,[6] Aratos was again placed at the head of the state. The year of his second Generalship was one of the most memorable in the history of the League. Four new cities, one

Second Generalship of Aratos, B.C. 243.

[1] Plut. Ar. 18.

[2] See above, p. 186.

[3] Ἀμαιόκριτος, Pol. xx. 4. Ἀβοιώκριτος, Plut. Ar. 16.

[4] See above, pp. 142, 268.

[5] Plutarch says that Aratos ὑστέρησε τῆς μάχης (Ar. 16). Polybios, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 117) says, clearly lays the blame on Amaiokritos. See his whole description, xx. 4, 5.

[6] Plut. Ar. 16. Ἐνιαυτῷ δὲ ὕστερον αὖθις στρατηγῶν. This is explained by the constitutional passage in cap. 24. Polybios (ii. 43) says, ὀγδόῳ δὲ πάλιν ἔτει στρατηγὸς αἱρεθεὶς τὸ δεύτερον, that is, the eighth year from the deliverance of Sikyôn.

of them the most important point in Peloponnêsos, were added to the Achaian Union. We left the League at war with Antigonos, and on friendly terms with his rebellious vassal Alexander of Corinth. We know nothing of Alexander's personal character or of the nature of his government; but we may believe that the rule of a kinsman of the royal house, one too who came of a good stock, the grandson of Krateros and Phila, may have been some degrees less irksome than the rule of mere local oppressors like the Tyrants of Sikyôn. However this may be, Alexander died just at this time, poisoned, as some said, by the emissaries of Antigonos. His widow Nikaia succeeded to his power; the King of Macedonia did not scruple to make her the victim of a ludicrous deception, by which he contrived to win Corinth for himself.[1] The enemy was now brought to the very gates of the League, and Aratos' own city was the most exposed of all. Another brilliant enterprise of his own peculiar kind, a night-adventure as perilous as that which had rescued Sikyôn, restored Corinth to freedom.[2] For the first time for nearly a hundred years the Corinthians were masters of their own city.[3] Aratos easily persuaded them to join the League;[4] their mountain citadel now became a Federal fortress[5] instead of a stronghold of the oppressor. The port of Lechaion at once shared the fate of the capital; that of Kenchreia remained for a time in the hands of the enemy.[6] So great a success raised alike the fame and the power of the Achaians and their General. Megara was occupied by a Macedonian garrison;[7] its people now revolted, probably with Achaian help, and at

Position of Corinth under Alexander,

and his widow Nikaia.

Acquisition of Corinth by Antigonos, B.C. 244.

Deliverance of Corinth and its accession to the League, B.C. 243.

Accession of Megara,

[1] The tale is well told by Plutarch, Ar. 17. It naturally moves the indignation of the Macedonian Droysen (ii. 371). According to him the story comes from Phylarchos, and therefore is not to be believed. Why may not Phylarchos have sometimes told the truth? and why may not the story have come from the Memoirs of Aratos?

[2] Plut. Ar. 18–23. The tale is brilliantly told by the biographer. Cf. Pol. ii. 43.

[3] Plut. Ar. 23. See above, p. 195, note 2.

[4] The scene in Plutarch (c. 23) is a fine one. Aratos, weary with his night's labour, appears in the Corinthian theatre leaning on his spear, unable for a while to speak, amid the cheers of the delivered people. Then, *συναγαγὼν ἑαυτὸν διεξῆλθε λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τῇ πράξει πρέποντα καὶ συνέπεισε τοὺς Κορινθίους Ἀχαιοὺς γενέσθαι.*

[5] Plut. Ar. 24. See above, p. 242.

[6] It must have been acquired soon after, as we find it Achaian a few years later. Plut. Ar. 29.

[7] Plut. Ar. 24. *Μεγαρεῖς τε γὰρ ἀποστάντες Ἀντιγόνου τῷ Ἀράτῳ προσέθεντο.* Cf. Pol. ii. 43.

once joined the League. Within Peloponnêsos, the cities of Troizên and Epidauros[1] followed their example. The territory of the fifteen Confederate cities now stretched continuously from the Ionian to the Ægæan Sea, from Cape Araxos to the extreme point of the Argolic peninsula. The key of Peloponnêsos was now in the hands of the Union—the fetters of Greece[2] were broken. Troizên, and Epidauros.

But, immediately beyond the new Achaian frontier, two of the most famous cities of Greece were still in bondage. To win Corinth, Athens, and Argos to the League in a single year would have raised Aratos to a height of glory which the heroes of Marathôn or Thermopylæ might have envied. Athens, fallen as she was, still retained her great name and the shadow of her ancient freedom, and she was now beginning to assume the character which she held under her Roman lords as the sacred city of literature and philosophy. How far this last claim spoke to the heart of the Sikyônian athlete it is hard to say, but certain it is that to win Athens to the cause of Grecian freedom was an object on which the heart of Aratos was always strongly bent. To Argos he was bound by still closer ties; his youth had been spent within her walls; her deliverance was the payment which he owed her for the shelter which she had given him in the days of his adversity.[3] The condition however of the two cities was different. Athens seems to have been at this moment in possession of as much liberty and democracy as was consistent with the presence of Macedonian troops, not indeed in the City itself, but in the other fortresses of the Attic territory.[4] The League was at war with Macedonia; and Attica was, under such circumstances, clearly liable to be dealt with as an enemy's country. Attica was once more, as in the days of Archidamos, invaded by a Peloponnêsian army; even the isle of Salamis occupied as it was by a Macedonian garrison, was ravaged by the Achaian troops. But Aratos took care to show that it was not against Athens, but against her oppressors, that he was warring. He released all his Athenian prisoners without ransom. This, it must be remembered, was, according to the Position of Athens and Argos. Achaian Invasion of Attica.

[1] Plut. Ar. 24.

[2] Corinth, Chalkis, and Dêmêtrias, so called by the last Philip.

[3] Plut. Ar. 25. Ἀργείοις δὲ δουλεύουσιν ἀχθόμενος ἐπεβούλευεν ἀνελεῖν τὸν τύραννον αὐτῶν Ἀριστόμαχον, ἅμα τῇ τε πόλει θρεπτήρια τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀποδοῦναι φιλοτιμούμενος καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς προσκομίσαι τὴν πόλιν.

[4] See Thirlwall, viii. 99, 100.

received rules of Grecian warfare, a piece of extraordinary favour. The ordinary fate of prisoners of war was to be sold as slaves; even to put them to death, though a rare and extreme act of severity, did not actually violate Greek International Law.[1] It was not likely that Aratos should show any special harshness towards a people who were enemies only through their misfortune; but his extreme lenity might fairly be expected to call forth some marks of Athenian gratitude. Aratos doubtless expected by this means to open negociations which might lead to the union of Athens with the League.[2] No such result happened; Athens gave no sign. Fear of Antigonos may well have been a stronger feeling than hope from Aratos, but this was not all. The Federal charmer always charmed in vain in Athenian ears. No Greek city ever needed the help of Confederates more than did Athens in the days of Aratos; but the Athens of the days of Aratos had, unluckily for herself, not quite lost the memory of the Athens of the days of Periklês. The once imperial city could not bring herself to give up the shadow of her old sovereignty; she could not endure to see her citizens march at the bidding of a General from Sikyôn; she could not endure to exchange absolute independence for a place in a Peloponnêsian Assembly where the vote of Athens might be neutralized by the vote of Epidauros or of Keryneia. A degrading subserviency to Macedonia and Rome, an abject worship of every foreign prince who would send alms to her coffers, was not inconsistent with a nominal independence and a nominal Democracy. Incorporation with the League would have given her the substance at the expense of the shadow; Athens would have been once more really free, and the borders of liberated Greece would have been advanced to Kithairôn and Orôpos. But the shadow of independence must have been surrendered, and to that shadow Athens clave to the last.

Vain attempt to attach Athens to the League.

The position of Argos was different. That famous city was now ruled by a Tyrant named Aristomachos. Either he had first risen to power, or else the character of his government had become more distinctly oppressive, since the days when Aratos himself dwelt at Argos and there organized his schemes for the deliverance of Sikyôn. When Pyrrhos attacked Argos, the

Condition of Argos; succession of the Argeian Tyrants.

B.C. 272.

[1] See above, p. 45.

[2] Plut. Ar. 24. Ἀθηναίοις δὲ τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκεν ἄνευ λύτρων ἀρχὰς ἀποστάσεως ἐνδιδοὺς αὐτοῖς.

supreme power was disputed between his partisan Aristeas and Aristippos a partisan of Antigonos.[1] But it does not appear quite certain whether Argos had been continuously ruled by Tyrants ever since.[2] There may have been an interval of freedom there, like that at Sikyôn under Kleinias and Timokleidas. But at any rate Argos was now subjected to a grinding tyranny; Aristomachos forbade the possession of arms by the citizens under heavy penalties.[3] Against Aristomachos Aratos did not think it necessary to employ the same means of open warfare which he had employed against Antigonos and the Ætolians. He found men in Argos willing to take the Tyrant's life, if they could only get swords to take it with. The General of the Achaians presently provided them with daggers. We must not judge of this action by our modern English notions. English feeling revolts against assassination under any circumstances. Sometimes it goes so far as to see more guilt in the conspirator who plots the slaughter of a single public enemy than in the conspirator who plots schemes of treason which involve the slaughter of innocent thousands. Greek feeling was very different. The Tyrant, that is, the successful conspirator, the triumphant plotter of a *coup d'état*, the man who had overthrown the freedom of his country, who had sacrificed the property, the liberty, and the lives of his fellow-citizens, was looked on as no longer a man but a wild beast. He who had trampled all Law under his feet, whose power rested wholly on the destruction of Law, had no claim to the protection of Law in his own person. As his hand was against every man, so every man's hand might righteously

Tyranny of Aristomachos the First.

Aratos encourages conspiracies against him.

Greek view of Tyrants and Tyrant-slayers.

[1] Plut. Pyrrh. 30.

[2] Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 124) suggests that Aristomachos was the son of Aristippos. The order of the names, Aristippos, Aristomachos, Aristippos, Aristomachos, certainly looks very like a family succession, and Phylarchos, as quoted by Polybios (ii. 59), distinctly calls the second Aristomachos a descendant of Tyrants (*πεφυκότα ἐκ τυράννων*). On the other hand, had Aristippos the Second been the son of Aristomachos the First, one might have expected Plutarch to introduce him with some mention of his kindred to his predecessor, and not simply as a worse Tyrant than he was (*ἐξωλέστερος ἐκείνου τύραννος*. Ar. 25). The enterprise of Aratos on Sikyôn also seems to show that Argos was free, or at least not under any very oppressive or inquisitorial government, in B.C. 251. Still, if the dynasty was a hereditary one, we may well believe that it was less oppressive than the common run of Tyrannies, till the advance of Aratos and the League began to put all Tyrants on their guard. If Aristomachos had any border feud with Nikoklês, especially if he thought that Aratos merely intended to substitute himself for Nikoklês as Tyrant of Sikyôn, he might even have encouraged his design.

[3] Plut. Ar. 25.

be against him. Against a criminal who, by the very greatness of his crimes, was placed beyond the reach of ordinary justice, every citizen was entitled to act as at once accuser, judge, and executioner. As Tyranny was the greatest of crimes, if for no other cause than that it involved all other crimes,[1] so the slaying of a Tyrant was looked on as the noblest of human actions.[2] The Tyrannicide, the man who had broken the yoke, who had jeoparded his life to free his country, who had abolished the dominion of force and had brought back the dominion of Law, received honours among the foremost benefactors of mankind. In such a cause the ties of blood went for nothing; the rights of a man's kindred weighed as nothing against the wrongs of his country; Timoleôn himself, the purest of heroes, the deliverer of Corinth and the deliverer of Syracuse, scrupled not to slay the brother who held his native city in bondage.[3] The glory of the deed admitted of no doubt or controversy; Tyrannicide was as undoubtingly inscribed on the list of Hellenic virtues as Tyranny was inscribed on the list of Hellenic crimes. The Tyrant-slayer had votes passed in his honour by free commonwealths; philosophers argued, and rhetoricians declaimed, in his praise; poets twined their choicest wreaths of song upon his

[1] Pol. ii. 59. Αὐτὸ γὰρ τοὔνομα [τὸ τύραννος] περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν, καὶ πάσας περιειλῆφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας.

[2] Mr. Grote (iii. 37) has collected some of the most important passages bearing on Greek feeling towards Tyrannicide. So also Isokratês (περὶ Εἰρ. 91), τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀρχόντων ἔργον ἐστὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους ταῖς αὑτῶν ἐπιμελείαις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονεστέρους, τοῖς δὲ τυράννοις ἔθος καθέστηκε τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων πόνοις καὶ κακοῖς αὑτοῖς ἡδονὰς παρασκευάζειν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς τοιούτοις ἔργοις ἐπιχειροῦντας τυραννικαῖς καὶ ταῖς συμφοραῖς περιπίπτειν, καὶ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν οἷά περ ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δράσωσιν. So also Polybios, ii. 56. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τοὺς πολίτας ἀποκτιννύναι μέγιστον ἀσέβημα τίθεται καὶ μεγίστων ἄξιον προστίμων· καίτοι γε προφανῶς ὁ μὲν τὸν κλέπτην ἡμοιχὸν ἀποκτείνας ἀθῷός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τὸν προδότην ἢ τύραννον τιμῶν καὶ προεδρείας τυγχάνει παρὰ πᾶσιν. Ib. 60. Οὐδ' Ἀντιγόνῳ προσαπτέον οὐδ' Ἀράτῳ παρανομίαν, ὅτι λαβόντες κατὰ πόλεμον ὑποχείριον τύραννον στρεβλώσαντες ἀπέκτειναν, ὃν γε καὶ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν εἰρήνην τοῖς ἀνελοῦσι καὶ τιμωρησαμένοις ἔπαινος καὶ τιμὴ συνεξηκολούθει παρὰ τοῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένοις. Two things are remarkable in this last passage. Polybios goes beyond all ordinary Greek feeling in justifying torture as applied to a captive Tyrant; he also recognizes in the *King* Antigonos as much right to chastise a *Tyrant* as in Aratos himself. The facts of the case will be considered hereafter.

[3] The debates held at the time on the conduct of Timoleôn (Plut. Tim. 5–7) are among the most instructive pieces of evidence on the subject. Men doubted whether Timoleôn was a fratricide or a Tyrannicide; that is, they doubted whether he had killed Timophanês from patriotic motives or to gratify a private grudge; but no one doubted that, if he did kill him from patriotic motives, the deed was praiseworthy. It is worth notice that Timoleôn could not bring himself to kill his brother with his own hand (ib. 4).

brow; men sang his praises at their festal banquets, and, in their brightest pictures of another world, they spake of him as dwelling in the happy island among the heroes and demigods of old. Englishmen cannot enter into the feelings with which the Greek looked upon the Tyrant-slayer, because Englishmen have never in any age known the full bitterness of Tyranny. We have had our oppressors and unrighteous rulers, our evil Kings and their evil Ministers, but we have never seen a power which wholly rested on the utter trampling down of law and right. We have seen bad laws and unjust judgements, we have seen civil wars and revolutions, but no age of English history ever beheld a Government which was founded solely on perjury and massacre. The nation has always had strength to resist by the might either of reason or of armed force. Our oppressors have been overthrown in peaceful debate, or they have been smitten to the earth upon the open field of battle. They have been sent to the block by sentences, sometimes, it may be, unjust, sometimes, it may be, illegal, but which still, by the very form of a judicial process, showed that the dominion of Law had not utterly passed away. Kings and rulers have indeed died by private murder, but such murder has always been a base and needless crime, condemned by the unanimous voice of the nation. No English Doctor of the fifteenth century would have ventured, as was done in contemporary France, to defend one of the basest assassinations on record by the abstract doctrine of the lawfulness of slaying Tyrants.[1] Once only, when a power, illegal indeed and founded on force, but neither degrading nor practically oppressive, showed some faint likeness to the Tyrannies of earlier and of later days, did Englishmen ever venture to maintain the thesis that there are times when Killing is no Murder.[2] With the feelings naturally produced by such a past

The Greek view unintelligible to English men, because of the circumstances of English history.

A.D. 1408.

A.D. 1657.

[1] When Lewis, Duke of Orleans, was murdered in 1407 by John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, the act was defended in an elaborate discourse by John Petit, a theologian, who lays down the abstract doctrine of Tyrannicide, and justifies it by many examples, most of them very little to the purpose. See the whole speech in Monstrelet, cap. 39, p. 35, ed. 1595. Cf. Jean Juvenal des Ursins, A. 1407. p. 191, ed. 1653. Certainly the likeness between Duke John and Timoleôn is not striking. [But long before John Petit, John of Salisbury had asserted the abstract doctrine of tyrannicide: Policraticus, iii. 15. "Tyrannum occidere non modo licitum est sed æquum et justum." The whole passage should be read.]

[2] The famous pamphlet bearing this title is well known. In 1662 we find a Captain Thomas Gardiner petitioning Charles the Second "for relief;" besides his services in the Civil War, he pleads as a title to the King's bounty that he "in 1657, intended an attempt on Cromwell, but was taken in the Gallery at

history as this, if our sympathy does not lie absolutely with the Tyrant, it lies strongly against the Tyrant-slayer. When seen through the mist of ages we do not refuse him a kind of reverence; we respect the names of Ehud, of Brutus, and of William Tell;[1] but we shrink from him as an assassin when he appears in the form of a man of our own age. We must learn to put aside a morality which arises mainly from the conditions of our own past history, if we wish to judge aright of a Greek of the days of Aratos. That the slaughter of Aristomachos at the hands of any citizen of Argos would have been a virtuous and noble action no Greek politician or moralist could have doubted for a moment. Whether Aratos was justified in having any hand in such a transaction is quite another matter. Aratos was the chief magistrate of a commonwealth with which Aristomachos was not at war, and to which apparently he had done no injury. And, if he had been at war with the League, the assassination of an open enemy was deemed as odious in Greek warfare as it is deemed now; Aratos would never have thought of employing assassins against the General of the Ætolians or even against the King of Macedonia. We can hardly be wrong in saying that, however praiseworthy the slaying of Aristomachos might be in an oppressed Argeian, it in no way became the President of the Achaian League to encourage plots against his life. But in the mind of Aratos the hatred of Tyrants had become a kind of passion, under the influence of which he often forgot the dictates both of honour and of prudence. And Argos was all but his native city: there he had spent his youth; thence he had gone forth to his great work; the freedom of Argos was as dear to his heart as the freedom of Sikyôn, and he felt towards a Tyrant of Argos all the intensity of hate which would glow in the bosom of a native Argeian. In his eyes the Argeian Tyrant was not a mere foreign power, a national rival, capable either of honour-

In the estimate of their own time the Argeian conspirators were praiseworthy, Aratos not so.

Aratos' special position with regard to Argos.

Hampton Court with two loaded pistols and a dagger, kept 12 months a prisoner, and only failed to be sentenced to death by want of evidence on the trial." Calendar of State Papers, 1661–2, p. 623. We may doubt whether Aristomachos and Aristippos let conspirators go so easily.

[1] I trust to have a more fitting opportunity for discussing the story of the first deliverance of Switzerland. It is enough here to say that, in the tale as commonly told, the old Swiss Revolution appears as one of the purest of all Revolutions; there is only one act which the most rigid moralist could denounce as a crime, namely the slaughter of Gessler by William Tell. Now, strange to say, this one doubtful action is the one feature of the tale which has permanently fixed itself in popular memory; and it is never spoken of without admiration.

able peace or of honourable war; he was a common enemy of mankind, against whom all means were lawful; he might be picked off from behind a tree or ensnared in a pitfall, with as good a conscience as men would pick off or ensnare a wolf or a tiger. Antigonos was a King, an enemy, not always, it may be, a very scrupulous or honourable enemy; but he was still an enemy, entitled to be dealt with according to the laws of war and the laws of nations. Let him only keep within his own realm, and nothing hindered him from being the friend, or even the ally, of the Achaian commonwealth. Alexander of Corinth, a Prince and a Macedonian like himself, and the immediate ruler of a Grecian city, had not been deemed unworthy of the closest friendship of the League. Towards the Macedonian King of Egypt Aratos and his countrymen were only too lavish of their honours. But the Tyrant of Argos could, in the eyes of Aratos, never be an ally, a friend, or even an honourable enemy. No Law of Nations could protect him whose very existence was the contradiction of all Law. With him short rede was good rede; the only question was how to get him out of the way with the least cost of time and trouble. Aratos, with these feelings, mingled without scruple in all the Argeian plots against Aristomachos. Those plots failed; the conspirators quarrelled and denounced one another. Soon after indeed Aristomachos was killed by his own slaves, but Argos was not delivered. In his stead arose a second Aristippos, a Tyrant, we are told, yet more cruel than himself.[1] Aratos seized, as he thought, the favourable moment. He entered Argolis with such Achaian troops as he could collect at so short a warning, hoping that the Argeians themselves would at once rise and join him. But Tyranny had done its work, the worst of all its evil works; men's hearts were bowed down by oppression, and they had not courage to meet the deliverer. Aratos was of course in no position to undertake the conquest of Argos with his hurried levies, raised probably without any formal authority from the Achaian Assembly. He retired; had he succeeded, the technical error in his proceedings would doubtless have been forgiven, and the deliverance of Argos would have been reckoned as glorious as the deliverance of Corinth. As it was, he earned only the questionable reputation of having led the Achaian troops against a city with which the Achaian League was not at

Death of Aristomachos the First; succession of Aristippos the Second.

Vain attempt of Aratos on Argos.

[1] Plut. Ar. 25. See above, p. 297.

war.[1] This breach of international right was referred, according to a custom not uncommon in Greece, to the arbitration of a friendly city. Aristippos pleaded his cause before a Mantinean tribunal;[2] Aratos, who did not appear, was condemned to a small fine. The condemnation shows that the Mantineian judges appreciated the formal wrong of which Aratos had been guilty; the insignificant amount of the penalty showed equally that they appreciated the circumstances and motives which extenuated his conduct.

Suit at Mantineia between Aristippos and the League.

Ptolemy Philadelphos becomes the ally of the League.

It would seem also to have been during this second Generalship of Aratos, that Ptolemy Philadelphos, hitherto the ally of Aratos and of Sikyôn, was prevailed on by him to become the ally of the Achaian League. The King was, in return, invested with the supreme command of the Achaian forces by land and sea.[3] The title and office were of course purely honorary; the only way in which Ptolemy could really help his Greek friends was by subsidies in money. We have seen how efficacious his aid in that way had been in the local affairs of Sikyôn. Either then or now Aratos accepted a yearly pension of six talents from the King.[4] This has an ill look; but the only real evil was the habit of looking to Kings at all. Six talents a year could never have been meant as a bribe to the man who had spent sixty to achieve the deliverance of Corinth. The interests of Ptolemy,

[1] Plut. Ar. 25. Τῶν δὲ πολλῶν [τῶν Ἀργείων] ἤδη διὰ τὴν συνήθειαν ἐθελοδούλως ἐχόντων, καὶ μηδενὸς ἀφισταμένου πρὸς αὐτὸν, ἀνεχώρησεν ἔγκλημα κατεσκευακὼς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὡς ἐν εἰρήνῃ πόλεμον ἐξενηνοχόσι.

[2] We must suppose (see Thirlwall, viii. 126) some treaty or agreement, general or special, by which the Mantineians were recognized as arbiters between Argos and the League. The way in which Plutarch tells the story implies that, though Aratos did not appear, the League did not at all decline the authority of the judges. The suit too was against the League, though the sentence was against Aratos personally. (Plut. Ar. 25. Δίκην ἔσχον [οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ] ἐπὶ τούτῳ παρὰ Μαντινεῦσιν, ἣν Ἀράτου μὴ παρόντος Ἀρίστιππος εἶλε διώκων καὶ μνῶν ἐτιμήθη τριάκοντα.) This seems to show that Aratos had acted without due authority from the League. Schorn's (p. 94) wild notion that the tribunal here spoken of was a Macedonian court to which all the Peloponnêsian Tyrants held themselves responsible, is well refuted by Droysen (ii. 399). Aristippos might accuse before such a court, but neither the Achaian League nor any Achaian citizen would acknowledge its jurisdiction; indeed one can hardly fancy Aristippos being so foolish as to accuse Achaians before it. What the story does prove is that Mantineia, in B.C. 243, was independent, and neither Achaian, Ætolian, nor Macedonian.

[3] Plut. Ar. 24. Πτολεμαῖον δὲ σύμμαχον ἐποίησεν [ὁ Ἄρατος] τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἡγεμονίαν ἔχοντα πολέμου καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν.

[4] See above, p. 289, note 2.

of Aratos, and of the League were all the same; the pension was simply a sum placed at the personal disposal of Aratos for the common good of all.

Aratos' pension from Ptolemy.

In these two years of office the League had abundant opportunity of testing the character of its new chief. The events of the first two Presidencies of Aratos brought into full light all his great qualities and many of his defects. He had abundantly displayed his zeal for the League and for Greek freedom in general, his liberality and self-devotion, his skill and daring in warfare of a particular kind. He must also have shown, although, except the scene in the Corinthian theatre, no details are preserved to us, parliamentary and diplomatic powers of the highest order. On the other hand he had shown that his zeal against Tyranny could sometimes carry him too far, and could place both himself and the League in positions not altogether honourable. He had also set the first example of that fatal habit of looking to foreign help, which, in such an age, was possibly excusable, but which in the end proved fatal both to himself and to his country. His two greatest defects did not as yet appear. He had no opportunity of showing his marvellous gift of losing pitched battles, because, the only time when a pitched battle was fought, he came too late to join in it. He had no opportunity of showing his incapacity to endure a political rival, because no political rival had as yet appeared. His administration had not been crowned with perfect success, but on the whole it had been glorious. Macedonia had become an open enemy; but the wealth, if not the strength, of Egypt had been won to the side of the League. The alliance of Bœotia had been lost; but Troizên, Epidauros, Megara, above all Corinth, had been incorporated with the Achaian body. Aratos had taught Ætolia and Macedonia that the new power could venture to strike at both of them on their own ground. His campaign in Attica had utterly failed of its ulterior diplomatic object, but, as a campaign, it was successful, if not specially glorious. His only total failure was the unlucky attempt on Argos. On the whole, the League found itself, under his guidance, raised to a height of power and reputation which, a few years before, it had never dreamed of. The local Union of Achaia, aiming at nothing beyond its own independence, had grown into a great Pan-hellenic power, the centre of Grecian freedom, the foe of Tyrants and the refuge of the oppressed.

Survey of the first two Generalships of Aratos.

No wonder that the author of such a change won and kept the boundless confidence of the whole League; that he was elected to the supreme magistracy as often as the Law allowed; and that, even when out of office, he still guided the councils of the republic, and that the actual holder of the highest office was looked upon as little more than his vicegerent.

Illustration of the Achaian Constitution supplied by these years.

The events of these important years clearly show how great and important was the office of the Federal chief in the Achaian constitution. Aratos seems to do everything; the Achaian people seem to do nothing. Doubtless this appearance arises in a great degree from the form in which our information as to these years has come down to us. What we know comes from the brief sketch of Polybios and from the Life of Aratos by Plutarch. But this is not all. In the analogous sketch by Thucydidês, and in Plutarch's Life of Periklês, the Athenian People are not thus overshadowed by their leader. The difference arises mainly from the difference between Athenian and Achaian Democracy, and especially from the totally different position in which each placed its first citizen. Periklês was practically the master of the Athenian Assembly, because that Assembly habitually voted as he counselled it. Legally he was the servant of the Assembly, bound to carry out whatever the Sovereign People had decreed. Aratos was practically as great as Periklês, and he was legally much greater. It was the Assembly which determined war and peace; but the whole plan of every campaign, where he would go and where he would not go, was the General's own affair. It is clear also that the details of diplomatic proceedings were left to his discretion, at most after conference with his Cabinet Council. It is evident that many of the things done and attempted by Aratos during these two years could not possibly have been debated beforehand in the Federal Assembly, or even in the Federal Senate. Achaia was at war with Antigonos; Antigonos held Corinth; whether to make a night-attack on Corinth or to forbear was a question for the General to settle on his own responsibility. That responsibility, like that of a modern Minister, came after the fact. These great powers vested in a single man undoubtedly tended to give the policy of the League a character of unity and consistency, above all of secrecy, where secrecy was needed, which could not possibly exist under the older form of Democracy. On the other hand, an officer holding such great powers was

Great powers of the Federal General.

exposed, almost by the Constitution itself, to a constant temptation to overstep them. The invasion of Argos, if not a crime, was certainly a blunder; but it was a blunder which no Athenian General could ever have been tempted to make.

## § 2. *From the Deliverance of Corinth to the Annexation of Argos*

B.C. 243—228.

Aratos may now be looked upon as the permanent chief of the League. He filled the highest magistracy in alternate years, and, even when out of office, he was still practically the guiding spirit of the commonwealth. In his third year of office we find the League still at war with Ætolia, but now in close alliance with Sparta. Agis was now one of the Spartan Kings, Agis the pure enthusiast and the spotless martyr, who perished in a cause than which none could be either nobler or more hopeless, the attempt to restore a corrupted commonwealth to the virtue and simplicity of times long gone by. His whole career is one of the most fascinating pieces of later Grecian history; but his attempts at reform, his selfish adversaries and his no less selfish friends, the beautiful pictures of his domestic life, of his self-sacrifice and his martyrdom, do not directly bear on the history of Achaian Federalism. It is enough for our purpose that Sparta and the League were now closely allied, that the Ætolians were expected to enter Peloponnêsos by way of the Isthmus, and that Agis appeared at Corinth at the head of a Lacedæmonian contingent.[1]

Third Generalship of Aratos, B.C. 241. King Agis.

Relations of the League with Sparta.

[1] Those who have studied the history of these times know well that the circumstances of this war are involved in much confusion. According to Pausanias (ii. 8. 5) the League was, some time or other, at war with Agis, who took Pellênê, and was driven out by Aratos. This account Droysen (ii. 380) adopts, and supposes that the alliance between Sparta and the League was concluded after this campaign, because the Lacedæmonians, in Pausanias, depart *ὑπόσπονδοι*. Pausanias also elsewhere (viii. 10. 5—8; 27. 13, 14) tells us of a siege of Megalopolis by Agis, and also of a pitched battle near Mantineia, in which Aratos and Lydiadas command the Achaians, and in which Agis is killed! This tale is utterly absurd; all the world knows that Agis was not killed in any battle at Mantineia or anywhere else. The whole question has been thoroughly sifted by Manso (Sparta, iii. 2. 123), who is confirmed by Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 127, 148). The supposed capture of Pellênê by Agis is a stupid perversion of the real capture of Pellênê which will presently be mentioned. His imaginary Arkadian campaign comes from a confusion between this Agis and his predecessor of the same name in the century before (see above, p. 188), who really besieged Megalopolis and fell in battle near Mantineia. I might add that the details of the battle in Pau-

The two allied commanders were singularly contrasted. Agis was a hereditary King, yet he was, in a certain sense, a revolutionist; Aratos was a republican chief, the sworn enemy of Tyrants, and no lover of Kings, but he was at the same time a politician essentially conservative and aristocratic.[1] Both were reformers; the reforms of both consisted in restoration not in innovation, but while Aratos aimed at, and succeeded in, possible political reforms, Agis dreamed of social changes, the restoration of a past state of things, which it was as hopeless to attempt as to turn back the planets in their courses. Both were young—Aratos was still only thirty—but Aratos, even ten years before, had an old head on young shoulders, while Agis had all the best qualities of youth, its hopefulness, its daring, its pure and unselfish enthusiasm. One is tempted to believe that Aratos looked on Agis as a hare-brained fanatic, and that Agis looked on Aratos as a cold-blooded diplomatist, intriguing, disingenuous, and cowardly. The gallant young king longed for an opportunity to win credit for himself and his army; military renown would be of all things the most valuable towards his ulterior objects at home; to his Spartan heart war meant victory or death in the open field; schemes, surprises, night-adventures, were not his element; above all, if Lakonia had just before been pitilessly ravaged by these very Ætolians, every feeling of honour and revenge led him to wish for a decisive action. Aratos, on the other hand, looked on a battle as the last resource of an ignorant general; he had never fought a pitched battle yet, and he was not going to fight one now to please the young man from Lacedæmon. Let the Ætolians come; the

Contrast between Agis and Aratos.

Difference in their plans for the campaign.

sanias seem to be a mixture of those of the battle last mentioned and of those of the battle of Ladokeia, to be hereafter spoken of, where Aratos and Lydiadas did command against a Spartan King, though that King was not Agis but Kleomenês.

There is also a story, alluded to more than once, but never directly narrated, both by Polybios and by Plutarch (Pol. iv. 34; ix. 34. Plut. Kleom. 18), about a great Ætolian inroad into Lakonia, in which the plunderers carried off a wonderful amount both of spoil and captives. No date is given; Schorn (p. 91) and Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 135) place it later than this. It is, to say the least, very tempting to put it, with Droysen (ii. 387), about this time. It seems to agree well with a time when Sparta and Achaia are allied against Ætolia. This is one of the many things which make us wish that Polybios had begun his detailed history earlier.

[1] I have already often shown that the Achaian Democracy was practically an Aristocracy in the best sense of the word, an ἀριστοκρατία as distinguished from a mere ὀλιγαρχία.

harvest was gathered in; the country people might take refuge in the towns till the storm had passed by; the enemy could not do so much damage in a passage through Achaia as they would do if they won a battle at Corinth.[1] Agis, unconvinced, yielded to the superior authority of the Achaian General,[2] and, soon after, for some reason or other, he and his army retired.[3] The common feeling of the Achaian army was strongly with Agis. Aratos had to bear many bitter reproaches on his supposed weakness and cowardice.[4] But military and constitutional discipline prevailed; the chief of the League was obeyed. The Ætolians passed the Isthmus undisturbed; they passed through the Sikyônian territory; they entered the old Achaian land; they burst on the city of Pellênê, took it, fell to plundering, and were scattered about the town, fighting with one another and carrying off the spoil and the women.[5] This was doubtless the moment for which Aratos had waited; in a surprise he was as much in his element as in a battle he was out of it. The plunderers soon heard that the Achaians were in full march; before they could recover discipline and form in order of battle, they were attacked by Aratos and utterly routed. The whole army retreated, and we hear no more of Ætolian incursions for some time.

Agis retires.

Capture and recovery of Pellêne.

The result in this case was of course held to approve the foresight of Aratos. It is certain that he obtained a great and lasting success at a comparatively small price. But we may doubt whether it is the part of a patriotic ruler to stand by and allow even one city of his countrymen to be sacrificed rather than run the risk of defeat in the open field. And we may feel

Estimate of the conduct of Aratos in this campaign.

[1] Here Plutarch definitely quotes the Memoirs of Aratos. (Agis, 15.) Βέλτιον ἡγεῖτο, τοὺς καρποὺς σχεδὸν ἅπαντας συγκεκομισμένων τῶν γεωργῶν, παρελθεῖν τοὺς πολεμίους ἢ μάχῃ διακινδυνεῦσαι περὶ τῶν ὅλων.

[2] Ib. Ἔφη [ὁ Ἄγις] . . . ποιήσειν τὸ δοκοῦν Ἀράτῳ, καὶ γὰρ πρεσβύτερόν τε εἶναι καὶ στρατηγεῖν Ἀχαιῶν, οἷς οὐχὶ προστάξων οὐδὲ ἡγησόμενος, ἀλλὰ συστρατευσόμενος ἥκοι καὶ βοηθήσων.

[3] Aratos dismissed them — τοὺς συμμάχους ἐπαινέσας διαφῆκε (ib.). But why? Droysen (ii. 390) makes Aratos afraid of the revolutionary principles of his allies. This is quite possible; but it seems simpler to suppose with Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 128) that Agis, "considering his presence useless if no battle was to be fought," "requested leave to withdraw," and received it.

[4] Plut. Ar. 31. Πολλὰ μὲν ὀνείδη, πολλὰ δ' εἰς μαλακίαν καὶ ἀτολμίαν σκώμματα καὶ χλευασμὸν ὑπομείνας οὐ προήκατο τὸν τοῦ συμφέροντος λογισμὸν διὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αἰσχρόν. How differently would Plutarch have had to write if the policy of Aratos had failed; Κλέων Προμηθεὺς ἐστὶ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα.

[5] See the pretty story of the daughter of Epigêthês. Plut. Ar. 32.

sure that, if the policy of Aratos had been unsuccessful, had he failed to recover Pellênê, or even failed to deal some decisive blow at the enemy, such failure would have been probably far more disastrous, and certainly far more ignominious, than any possible defeat in a pitched battle. The case is not like that of Periklês allowing the Lacedæmonians to ravage Attica undisturbed. Athens was strong in her fleet, but utterly unable to resist the Peloponnêsian land-army. To be passive by land and active by sea was her only means of defence. But the combined forces of Sparta and the extended League ought to have been a fair match for any Ætolian invaders, and probably any other General than Aratos would have fought a battle at the Isthmus. Aratos, whether in prudence or in cowardice, judged otherwise. He ran a greater risk than that of any battle, but he succeeded, and, of course, as he succeeded, he added to his fame.

Truce with Antigonos. Alliance between the two Leagues. Death of Antigonos Gonatas, B.C. 239. The Dêmêtrian War.

This relief of Pellênê and defeat of the Ætolians was in its results a very important event. Antigonos[1] concluded a truce with the League, which remained in force till his death. With the Ætolians the League, either then or soon after, concluded not only peace but alliance. This was brought about by Aratos and Pantaleôn, who is spoken of as the most powerful man in Ætolia, and who was doubtless the General of the year.[2] After the death of Antigonos, the combined forces of the two Leagues carried on a war with his successor Dêmêtrios,[3] of which hardly any details have been preserved. It was now, most probably, that the Ætolian power extended itself over so many of the towns of Thessaly and the Phthiôtic Achaia.[4] It is certain that Aratos fought a battle with the Macedonian Bithys, at a place which there is every reason to believe was in Thessaly.[5] This seems to have been his first pitched battle, and he lost it. It is also certain that the Bœotians, for fear of an invading Macedonian army, now forsook the Ætolian for the Macedonian alliance.[6]

[1] This is implied in Plut. Ar. 33. Σπονδὰς πεποιημένων αὐτῶν πρὸς τοὺς Μακεδόνας, κ.τ.λ.

[2] Ib. Πανταλέοντι τῷ πλεῖστον Αἰτωλῶν δυναμένῳ συνέργῳ χρησάμενος [ὁ Ἄρατος]. Cf. Pol. ii. 44.

[3] Pol. ii. 44, 46. Ὁ Δημητριακὸς πόλεμος.

[4] See Schorn, p. 88. He reckons up Hypata, Lamia, the Phthiôtic Thebes, Melitaia, Pharsalos, Larissa Kremastê, and Echinos.

[5] Phylakia. Plut. Ar. 34. See Thirlwall, viii. 133, for an examination of several small controversies which have arisen about the details of the Dêmêtrian War, but which do not at all bear upon the subject of this history.

[6] Pol. xx. 5. See above, p. 142.

Altogether, the little that we hear of this war does not give us the notion of any great glory won by the Achaian arms in warfare so far from home, nor does it supply any details which illustrate constitutional questions. It is far more interesting to trace the progress of the League in Southern Greece.

Unsuccessful attempt of Aratos on Peiraieus, B.C. 239.

The two objects dearest to the heart of Aratos were still the deliverance of Athens and the deliverance of Argos. Over and over again did he attempt both.[1] Peiraieus was still held by its Macedonian garrison. Even before the death of Antigonos, while the League was still at peace with Macedonia, Aratos did not scruple to cause one of his agents to attempt a surprise of the fortress. In his own Memoirs he strove to make the world believe that this man attacked Peiraieus on his own account, and that, when he was beaten back, he affirmed that Aratos had sent him. His name was Erginos, a native of Syria, but doubtless of Greek or Macedonian descent, who had been one of the instruments of Aratos in the capture of Akrokorinthos.[2] He was therefore a tried and trusty agent of the Achaian General, very likely to be employed by him on such an adventure, but hardly the man to attempt to capture cities on his own account. So unlikely a story met with no credit at the time, and Aratos suffered somewhat in reputation among his countrymen[3] for bringing on the League the discredit of a breach of truce. This piece of information is valuable on many grounds. It shows us the true position of Aratos as chief of the League. It illustrates the great powers which were vested in an Achaian General. The attack on Peiraieus must have been made wholly on Aratos' own responsibility, or he could never have attempted to throw off that responsibility on the shoulders of a private foreigner.

Illustrations of the position of Aratos.

Aratos had undoubtedly exceeded his legal powers, but it was only the legal extent of those powers which gave him the opportunity or the temptation of exceeding them. But it also sets him before us as the really accountable chief of a free commonwealth. Great as Aratos was, he had to undergo the free criticism and censure of a popular Assembly, and to meet and answer orators who evidently did not scruple to withstand him to his face. But it would seem also that the Assembly was satisfied with such criticism and censure; the permanent influence of

[1] Plut. Ar. 33. Οὐ δὶς οὐδὲ τρὶς ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ οἱ δυσέρωτες.
[2] Ib. 18, 33.
[3] Ib. 33. Διεβλήθη καὶ κακῶς ἤκουσεν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.

Aratos was clearly not diminished, nor is it certain that there was any intermission in the practice of electing him President in alternate years.[1] We may also observe that the international morality of the League is higher than that of its chief. Aratos did not scruple at a breach of treaty which the feeling of the Achaian Assembly evidently condemned. We may remark again the different feelings with which a King and a Tyrant were looked upon. King Antigonos has his rights; he is entitled to all the advantages of International Law; the League at once feels that any breach of treaty towards him is a stain upon the national honour. But it does not appear that what we should call the far more dishonourable attempts of Aratos upon the Argeian Tyrants called forth any such indignation at home, and we have seen how lenient was the censure pronounced upon them even by neutral judges. When war again broke out with Macedonia, Aratos was able to renew his attempts on Athens in a more honourable form. He took a personal share in repeated, but always unsuccessful, invasions of Attica, in one of which he received a severe wound.[2] After his defeat in Thessaly two rumours were afloat, one that he was taken prisoner, the other that he was dead. The former was that which reached King Dêmêtrios, who sent a ship from Macedonia to bring the captive to his presence. But in Athens and Peiraieus men believed that Aratos was dead, and the inference was somewhat hastily drawn that the Achaian League had died with him. Diogenês, the Macedonian commander in Peiraieus, at once summoned Corinth to surrender; Aratos was dead, and the Achaians would do well to retire quietly. In Athens men wore crowns at the report of his death, as their forefathers had done at the report of the death of Philip. A certain amount of real repugnance to union with the League was probably mingled with a certain amount of flattery towards their Macedonian masters.[3] But Aratos, alive and within the walls of Corinth, himself dictated the answer to the summons of Diogenês, and the Achaian army, with its General at its head, presently advanced as far as the Academy.

Various attempts on Athens, B.C. 239–229.

Feeling towards Aratos at Athens.

[1] The whole question of the Presidential years of Aratos will be discussed in a note at the end of the next chapter.

[2] Plut. Ar. 33. Ἄπαξ δὲ καὶ τὸ σκέλος ἔσπασε διὰ τοῦ Θριασίου φεύγων· καὶ τομὰς ἔλαβε πολλὰς θεραπευόμενος καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἐν φορείῳ κομιζόμενος ἐποιεῖτο τὰς στρατείας.

[3] Ib. 34. Πᾶσαν δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι κουφότητα κολακείας τῆς πρὸς Μακεδόνας ὑπερβάλλοντες ἐστεφανηφόρησαν, ὅτε πρῶτον ἠγγέλθη τεθνηκώς.

The would-be deliverer was cut to the heart that Athens should look, or even pretend to look, upon him as an enemy; but he allowed himself to be persuaded by an Athenian embassy, and he retired without doing hurt to the city or its suburbs[1].

Attempts of Aratos on Argos, B.C. 243–229.

Meanwhile the Achaian leader was not a whit less anxious to restore freedom to the city where he had spent his own days of exile. After Aratos' first attempt in his second Presidency, a constant warfare seems to have gone on, not so much between Argos and the League as between Aristippos and Aratos.[2] The Tyrant was always plotting the death of the patriot, at which indeed we cannot wonder when we remember that the patriot had equally plotted the death of the Tyrant's predecessor, possibly his father. But one would rather not believe that King Antigonos was a fellow-conspirator, and it may well be that the report to that effect was only an unauthorized conjecture of Aratos himself.[3] On the part of Aratos, every sort of attack, secret or open, was employed for many successive years. The war was of the usual kind; Aratos fought and lost one or two pitched battles, but in diplomatic dealings, in surprises, in night-marches, he was as skilful and as daring as ever. In the open field, by the banks of the river Charês, the General of the Achaians ran away, when victory was declaring for his army;[4] yet the same General could in his own person scale the walls of Argos, fight hand to hand with the Tyrant's mercenaries, and only retire when disabled by a severe wound.[5] Bitter was his disappointment when he found that the Argeians, whom he came to deliver, stirred not hand nor foot in his behalf, but sat by and looked on at his exploits as if they were sitting to adjudge the prize in the Nemean Games.[6] But if he ran away at the Charês, if he had to retire from Argos, he presently gained the city of

[1] Plut. Ar. 34. Πρὸς ὀργὴν εὐθὺς ἐκστρατεύσας ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἄχρι τῆς Ἀκαδημείας προῆλθεν· εἶτα πεισθεὶς οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν.

[2] See the comparison in Plutarch (Ar. 25, 26) of the position of the two. Compare also the description of the private life of Aristippos with that of Alexander of Pherai in Plut. Pel. 35. Alexander however has a wife, Aristippos has only an ἐρωμένη with a complaisant mother.

[3] "Συνεργοῦντος Ἀντιγόνου. Plut. Ar. 25,—perhaps only a suspicion expressed by Aratus in his Autobiography." Thirlwall, viii. 126.

[4] See the whole story in Plut. Ar. 28.

[5] Ib. 27.

[6] Ib. Οἱ μὲν Ἀργεῖοι, καθάπερ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐκείνων ἐλευθερίας τῆς μάχης οὔσης, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸν ἀγῶνα τῶν Νεμείων βραβεύοντες, ἴσοι καὶ δικαιοὶ θεαταὶ καθῆντο τῶν γινομένων πολλὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντες. This, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 126) says, is probably Aratos' own comparison.

Kleônai joins the League.

Death of Aristippos the Second. Tyranny of Aristomachos the Second.

Kleônai as a member of the League. When the Tyrant marched against this new acquisition, Aratos, by a forced march, forestalled him, entered the city, sallied forth vigorously, drove back the enemy, chased them to Mykênê, and left Aristippos dead upon the field. The victory, however, was for the present fruitless; a second Aristomachos, perhaps the son of Aristippos,[1] seized upon the government with Macedonian help,[2] and Argos was as far from deliverance as before.[3]

[1] See above, p. 297, note 2.

[2] Plut. Ar. 29. Ὁ δὲ Ἄρατος, οὕτω λαμπρῶς εὐτυχήσας . . . ὅμως οὐκ ἔλαβε τὸ Ἄργος οὐδὲ ἠλευθέρωσε, τῶν περὶ Ἀγίαν καὶ τὸν νεώτερον Ἀριστόμαχον μετὰ δυνάμεως βασιλικῆς παρεισπεσόντων καὶ κατασχόντων τὰ πράγματα. Agias was doubtless the Macedonian commander.

[3] The accession of Aristomachos involves a question of some importance. Was this the time mentioned by Polybios (ii. 59), when Aratos entered Argos, but retired on finding that the Argeians did not support him, on which Aristomachos put eighty of the chief citizens to death with torture as adherents of the Achaians? The point is worth examining, for this Aristomachos was afterwards General of the League, and one naturally wishes to know whether any man who held that office had ever been guilty of such a monstrous crime. Droysen (ii. 436) and Bishop Thirlwall—the latter perhaps not quite positively—place it at this time. (See the narrative and note, Thirlwall, viii. 134.) According to this view, Aratos pressed on in his pursuit to Argos itself, and entered the city; but Aristomachos had already seized on the government, and, as soon as Aratos had retired, he murdered the eighty citizens. I confess that the narrative of Plutarch does not give me the idea that Aratos continued the pursuit beyond Mykênê, and the words of Polybios do not give me the idea that the massacre was the very first act of the rule of Aristippos. It may well be doubted whether the story in Polybios and the story in Plutarch have anything to do with one another. Dr. Schmitz, in the Dictionary of Biography (art. Aristomachus) places the massacre much later, in the time of the Kleomenic War, after Aristomachos had joined the Achaian League, and again forsaken it. I can find no point in the history of those times which suits the events, and the whole language of Polybios points to the days when Aratos was trying to deliver Argos from the Tyrants, not to the days when Argos was a revolted city of the Achaian Union. Schorn, on the other hand (p. 118), throws out a hint which seems to me to have great probability. "Das Verbrechen, welches ihm [Aristomachus] der genannte Schriftsteller [Polybius] (2, 59, 8 f.) zur Last legt, hat jener wahrscheinlich nicht begangen. Aus Plutarch (Arat. 25 und 27) lässt sich vermuthen, dass Polybius den jüngeren Aristomachus mit dem älteren oder vielmehr mit Aristippus verwechselt hat." That Polybios has thus confounded Aristomachos with one of his predecessors seems really very likely. The description which he gives of Aratos entering Argos, and retiring because he found no help from the citizens, agrees with nothing which is elsewhere mentioned of the reign of Aristomachos the Second. But it very well agrees with the first passage quoted from Plutarch by Schorn, in the time of Aristomachos the First, and still more with the second one, in the time of Aristippos. The question then arises whether Polybios could have made such a mistake. We must remember that Polybios, in this part of his work, is writing of events which happened before his own birth, and that Plutarch had before him the same contemporary writers that Polybios had. The difference between the authority of the two is therefore not so very great. And Polybios does not men-

Accession of Kleônai to the League. Its effects.

The accession of Kleônai, though in itself an inconsiderable city, must have added somewhat to the position of the League in general estimation. The Kleônaians were doubtless willing and zealous confederates. Their city had hitherto occupied a position with regard to Argos somewhat like that which had been occupied by Pisa with regard to Elis. As the Pisatans claimed to be the lawful presidents of the Olympic festival, so the Kleônaians claimed to be the lawful presidents of the Nemean festival. But, for ages past, their rights had been usurped by their powerful neighbours of Argos, who seem to have held Kleônai in the condition of dependent alliance. Accession to the League was, to a city in such a position, promotion in every sense. The League knew of no distinctions between its members, and Kleônai was doubtless admitted as an equal confederate, on a perfect level with Sikyôn and Corinth. And, more than this, the Kleônaians were now, for the first time, able to vindicate their rights, and to celebrate their own Nemean Games. The League, numbering Corinth and Kleônai among its members, had now two out of the four great national festivals of Greece celebrated within its territory. But the Argeians did not tamely surrender their privilege. Like the Eleians, when the Arkadians celebrated Olympic Games under Pisatan presidency,[1] they ignored the Kleônaian festival, and celebrated Nemean Games of their own. It was part of the International, or rather of the Canon, Law of Greece, that all competitors on their way to or from any of the national games had free passage, even through the territories of states with which their own cities might be at war. This immunity is said never to have been violated before; but now all competitors at the Argeian Nemeia who passed through any Achaian territory—and none could come by land from Northern Greece without doing so—were seized by the Achaians and sold as slaves.[2] This unjust and cruel act was doubtless vindicated on the technical ground that the Argeian Nemeia were not the true festival, and that therefore competitors going to or

B.C. 364.

Rival celebrations of the Nemean Games.

tion this massacre in any part of his own regular narrative, but as an *obiter dictum* in a somewhat rhetorical attack on the historical credibility of Phylarchos. In the very next chapter (ii. 60) there is a flat contradiction as to the fate of this very Aristomachos between Polybios and Phylarchos followed by Plutarch. It therefore really does not seem so very unlikely that Polybios may have here confounded the younger Aristomachos with one of his predecessors.

[1] Xen. Hell. vii. 4. 28 et seqq. On this occasion the claimants came to a regular battle within the sacred precincts, of which we do not hear at Nemea.

[2] Plut. Ar. 28.

coming from them had no right to any privilege. But anyhow they were travellers from friendly or neutral states, who were not injuring the League or any of its cities. Plutarch calls this proceeding a proof of Aratos' inexorable hatred[1] towards Tyrants; it was at all events a strange and pitiful way of showing it.

Extension of the League in Arkadia.

We must now trace the progress of the League on the side of Arkadia. It is evident that the old Arkadian Union, the work of Lykomêdês, had now utterly passed away. No Assembly of Ten Thousand could, for many years past, have been gathered together in the theatre of the Great City. The Arkadian cities now appear altogether single and disunited, and many of them were ruled by Tyrants. And, up to this time, those cities which had joined either of the two great Confederations had, whether by choice or by compulsion, attached themselves to Ætolia rather than to Achaia. It must be remembered that, inaccessible as Arkadia and Ætolia look to one another on the map, the close alliance which always existed between Ætolia and Elis gave the Ætolians constant opportunities of meddling in the internal affairs of Peloponnêsos.[2] Tegea, Phigaleia,[3] Orchomenos, became Ætolian allies or subjects. Kynaitha, on the other hand, at some time of which we do not know the exact date, had joined the Achaian League. This city had been torn to pieces by internal struggles, till at last the party which had the upper hand asked for Achaian help, and received a garrison under an Achaian commander.[4] This precaution does not show that Kynaitha was admitted to the Union on any but the usual equal terms; for we have already seen that a Federal garrison was also kept at Corinth, which was beyond doubt an independent and highly-important member of the League. Other Arkadian towns were also won to the League, as Stymphalos, Kleitôr, Pheneos, Kaphyai, Hêraia, and Telphousa, but generally we know nothing of the time or manner of their acquisition, but

Ætolian acquisitions in Arkadia.

Accession of Kynaitha and other Arkadian towns to the Achaian League.

[1] Plut. Ar. 28. Οὕτω σφοδρὸς ἦν καὶ ἀπαραίτητος ἐν τῷ μισεῖν τοὺς τυράννους.

[2] Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 136) connects these Arkadian acquisitions of Ætolia with the great Ætolian invasion of Lakonia. See above, p. 306.

[3] Pol. iv. 3.

[4] Ib. 17. See above, p. 242. We may suppose that the failure of Aratos before Kynaitha, mentioned incidentally by Polybios (ix. 17), took place at some early stage of these events. Aratos was νέος ἀκμήν, which can only refer to the time of one of his earliest Generalships, or possibly to some subordinate command before he was General. See Brandstäter, p. 237.

learn the fact only from afterwar
spoken of as Achaian towns.[1] Mantineia went throu
of revolutions, of which we should like to know the exact dates.[2] She first united herself to the Achaian body, and then—our first recorded instance of secession—deserted it for a connexion, on whatever terms, with Ætolia. We have no certain information when this revolt took place, except that it was before the war with Kleomenês, and therefore at some time within our present period. Mantineia was perhaps induced to forsake the League, when the League admitted to its fellowship a city which was Mantineia's special rival. For we have now reached the time when the League made, in point of actual strength, its greatest acquisition since that of the Corinthian Akropolis, and one which proved in its results the greatest of all its acquisitions since that which made Aratos himself its citizen. Megalopolis, the Great City, once the Federal capital of Arkadia, now became a single canton of the Federation of Achaia. No greater gain did the Achaian Union ever make than this which gave her one of her greatest cities, and a long succession of her noblest citizens. It was a bright day indeed in the annals of the League which gave her Philopoimên and Lykortas and Polybios, and, greater than all, the deathless name of Lydiadas.

tions of Mantineia.

Before B.C. 227.

Union of MEGALOPOLIS with the Achaian League, B.C. 234.

Lydiadas, Tyrant of Megalopolis, and thrice General of the Achaian League, is a man of whom but little is recorded, but that little is enough at once to place him among the first of men.[3] We know him mainly from records tinged with the envy of a rival, and yet no fact is recorded of him which does not in truth redound to his honour. In his youth he seized the Tyranny of his native city, but he seized it with no ignoble or unworthy aim. We know not the date[4] or the circumstances of his rise to sovereign power, but there is at least nothing to mark him as

Character of LYDIADAS.

[1] See Pol. ii. 52. 55; iv. 19. Polyainos (ii. 36) records a stratagem by which the Achaian General Dioitas obtained possession of Hêraia. It is a silly story enough, and Polyainos shows how little he understood the Achaian constitution, by making the Hêraians offer themselves as *subjects* of the Achaians; ἱκετεύοντες ἀπολαβεῖν τὴν πατρίδα, ὡς εἰσαῦθις ὑπήκοοι γενησόμενοι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. But the tale preserves to us the name of an otherwise unknown Achaian General. On the date of the acquisition of Hêraia, see p. 470, note 1.

[2] Pol. ii. 57.

[3] Besides the account of Lydiadas in Plutarch's Lives of Aratos and Kleomenês, and the brief mention of Polybios (ii. 44), there is an admiring picture of him drawn by Pausanias, viii. 27. 12.

[4] Droysen (ii. 372) places it about B.C. 244, soon after the seizure of Corinth by Antigonos, but this date rests on no certain evidence.

re the destroyers of freedom. He ..ou to us as a midnight conspirator, plotting rebellion against a state of things which made him only one free citizen among many. Still less is he painted as the chief magistrate of a free state, bound by the most solemn oaths to be faithful to its freedom, and then turning the limited powers with which his country had entrusted him to overthrow the liberties of which he was the chosen guardian. We do not read that he rose to power by driving a lawful Senate from their hall by the spears of mercenaries, or by an indiscriminate massacre of his fellow-citizens in the streets of the Great City. We do not read that he reigned by crushing every nobler feeling, and by flattering every baser passion, of his subjects; we are not told that every man of worth or talent shrank from his service, and left him only hirelings and flatterers as the agents of his will. There is no evidence that the dungeons of Megalopolis or the cities of free Greece were filled with men whose genius or whose virtue was found inconsistent with his rule. We do not hear that his foreign policy was one of faithless aggression; that he gave out that Tyranny should be Peace, and then filled Peloponnêsos with needless wars. It is not told us that he seized on city after city, prefacing every act of plunder with solemn protestations that nothing was further from his thoughts. Still less do we find that he ever played the basest part to which Tyranny itself can sink; that he stretched forth his hand to give a hypocritical aid to struggling freedom, and then drew back that he might glut his eyes with the sight of a land wasted by anarchy and brigandage to which a word from him could at any moment put an end. No; Lydiadas was, in the sense of his age and country, a Tyrant, but it was not thus that he either gained or used a power which in formal speech alone deserved to be called a Tyranny. Others had reigned in the Great City far less worthy to reign than he; he felt within himself the gifts and aspirations of the born ruler; and, in a city which had long been used to the sway of one, the vision of his youthful imagination took, pardonably enough, the form not of a republican magistrate but of a patriot King. Men told him that the sway of a single man was best for times like his, that his heart and arm could better guard his native land than the turbulence of the many or the selfish narrowness of the few. He looked on sovereign power as a means of working his country's good and of winning for

himself a glorious name; he would fain be a King of Men, a Shepherd of the People, like the Kodros of legend or the Cyrus of romance. He grasped the sceptre, and for a while he wielded it. But he soon found that his dreams of patriotic royalty were not suited to the land or the age in which he lived. And soon a nobler path stood open before him. He saw the youth of Sikyôn enter upon a higher career than that into which he himself had been deluded. He saw that a man might rule by better means than an arbitrary will, and might rest his power on better safeguards than strong walls and foreign mercenaries. He saw Aratos, the chosen chief of a free people, wield a power greater than his own, purely because his fellow-citizens deemed him the wisest and the worthiest among them. He saw how far higher and nobler a place in the eyes of Greece was held by the elective magistrate of the great Confederacy than by the absolute master of a single city. He heard himself branded by a name which he shared with wretches like Nikoklês and Aristippos; he saw the arm raised against him, which was, whenever the favourable moment came, to hurl him from power by a doom like theirs. Aratos had already marked Lydiadas for the next victim, and Megalopolis as the next city for deliverance.[1] The Lord of Megalopolis, like Iseas at Kerynela, had now his choice to make, and he made it nobly and wisely. He called his rival to a conference, he laid aside his power, he dismissed his guards, he went back to his house, Tyrant now no longer, but one free citizen of the free commonwealth of Megalopolis. The first act of that commonwealth was naturally union with the Achaian League; the name of Lydiadas was passed from tongue to tongue through every city of the Confederation,[2] and at the next annual election of Federal magistrates, the self-dethroned Tyrant of Megalopolis was raised to the highest place in his new country as the General of the year. Lydiadas, in resigning absolute power, did not wish to resign power altogether, but only to hold it by a tenure at once worthier and safer. He lived to be three

Lydiadas chosen General, B.C. 233.

[1] It should be noticed that Plutarch, following doubtless the Memoirs of Aratos, puts this motive far more prominently forward than Polybios and Pausanias, who represent Megalopolitan traditions. The words of Pausanias are especially strong; *ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤρχετο φρονεῖν, κατέπαυεν ἑαυτὸν ἑκὼν τυραννίδος, καίπερ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἤδη οἱ τῆς ἀρχῆς καθωρμισμένης.*

[2] Paus. viii. 27. 12. *Μεγαλοπολιτῶν δὲ συντελούντων ἤδη τότε ἐς τὸ Ἀχαϊκὸν, ὁ Λυδιάδης ἔν τε αὐτοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν Ἀχαιοῖς ἐγένετο οὕτω δόκιμος ὡς Ἀράτῳ παρισωθῆναι τὰ ἐς δόξαν.*

times General of the League, to distinguish himself alike as a statesman and as a soldier, and at last he died in battle within sight of his native city, and was honoured in death by a conquering enemy whose career was only less noble than his own.

Effects of the acquisition of Megalopolis.

The acquisition of Megalopolis as an Achaian city, and of Lydiadas as a leading Achaian citizen, were important in many ways. The League was now brought into the very thick of central Peloponnêsian politics; an increased impulse must have been given to its extension throughout Arkadia, and the Tyrannies which still remained in the Argolic peninsula must have become more completely isolated. But the acquisition of Megalopolis and the conversion of Lydiadas had two results which were more important still. They made the territories of the League continuous with Lakonia, and they gave Aratos a rival. Hitherto the policy of Aratos and the policy of the League have been the same thing; except the one obscure mention of Dioitas, we hear the name of no other Achaian statesman; Markos was still living, still serving his country; we may well believe that he was placed in the chief magistracy in some of those years in which Aratos could not legally hold it, but he has well-nigh passed out of memory, and there is nothing which brings either him or any one else before us as a rival of the recognized chief of the League. We read indeed that some acts of Aratos brought on him a certain amount of censure in the Assembly, but none of them had given any lasting shock to his predominant influence in the commonwealth. The accession of Lydiadas to citizenship, his election to the chief magistracy, at once gave Aratos his match. Lydiadas was as ambitious and as energetic as himself, and, as events proved, a far abler soldier. Placed at the head of the armies and the councils of the League, he had not the slightest intention of acting as the instrument of another man. Our account of their disputes comes doubtless from the Memoirs of Aratos himself; it must therefore be taken with the necessary allowances, as we have no counter-statement from the side of Lydiadas. We can well believe that two veins of feeling ran through the Achaian public mind, as men spoke of the great citizen whom they had just adopted. Admiration would be the first feeling. The man who had voluntarily given up sovereign power, who had deliberately preferred the position of a republican magistrate to that of an absolute ruler, would be extolled as a hero indeed, as the very first and noblest of the

Rivalry of Aratos and Lydiadas.

friends of freedom. And of a truth the angel of freedom might well rejoice over such a repentant sinner, more than over a Markos or a Washington who needed no repentance. But, on the other hand, it is easy to believe that there were men who held that the Ethiopian could never change his skin, that the man who had once been a Tyrant would be at heart a Tyrant still, and that the destinies of a free Confederation could never be safe in the hands of a man who had once wielded an absolute sceptre over one of its cities.[1] By such men every action and every word of Lydiadas would be subjected to a far more rigid scrutiny than had ever attended the political or military career of Aratos. That Lydiadas was thrice chosen General—once at least in the teeth of Aratos' strongest opposition[2]—that, when that opposition prevented further re-elections, he still served the League faithfully in subordinate commands, is quite proof enough that all such suspicions were utterly unfounded. We are told that he was constantly exhorting the League to needless undertakings,[3] which the superior wisdom of Aratos discountenanced. Considering what we know of the two men, it is hardly going too far to explain this as meaning that Lydiadas was ever the champion of open and vigorous action, in opposition to the surprises and diplomatic triumphs in which his rival delighted. But when we find Lydiadas charged with trying to induce the League to attack Sparta, we can more readily believe that we are here listening to a true accusation, and that Aratos had really found out the weak side of the Megalopolitan hero. Most certainly, as events a few years later proved, Aratos was, of all

Second Generalship of Lydiadas, B.C. 231.

Lydiadas' enmity to Sparta.

[1] Plut. Ar. 30. Ἀπερρίφη καὶ παρώφθη πεπλασμένῳ δοκῶν ἤθει πρὸς ἀληθινὴν καὶ ἀκέραιον ἀρετὴν ἀμιλλᾶσθαι. καὶ καθάπερ τῷ κόκκυγί φησιν Αἴσωπος ἐρωτῶντι τοὺς λεπτοὺς ὄρνιθας, ὅ τι φεύγοιεν αὐτὸν, εἰπεῖν ἐκείνους, ὡς ἔσται ποτὲ λέραξ, οὕτως ἔοικε τῷ Λυδιάδῃ παρακολουθεῖν ἐκ τῆς τυραννίδος ὑποψία βλάπτουσα τὴν πίστιν αὐτοῦ τῆς μεταβολῆς. This curious comparison probably comes from Aratos himself.

[2] Ib. Καὶ τό γε δεύτερον ὁ Λυδιάδης στρατηγὸς ᾑρέθη, ἀντιπράττοντος ἄντικρυς Ἀράτου καὶ σπουδάζοντος ἑτέρῳ παραδοθῆναι τὴν ἀρχήν.

[3] Ib. Ἄλλας τε πολλὰς πράξεις οὐκ ἀναγκαίας εἶναι δοκούσας καὶ στρατείαν ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους παρήγγελλεν. Droysen (ii. 446) conjectures that these needless proposals of Lydiadas had reference to changes in the constitution of the League, especially to a reform in the Council of Ministers, which Droysen supposes to have been still confined to the old Achaian towns. But surely the words used sound much more like military expeditions than political changes, and why should there be any feud between Aratos and Lydiadas upon the point supposed by Droysen? Any Constitutional advantages possessed by the Ten Cities were a wrong to Sikyôn as much as to Megalopolis, and, if Aratos could counterbalance them by purely personal influence, Lydiadas might hope to do the same.

men, the last who ought to have brought such a charge; but we can well understand that Lydiadas might advocate even an unjust war with Sparta, and he may have exhorted the Assembly to operations in that quarter, even to the discouragement of Aratos' darling schemes upon Athens and Argos. Megalopolis, the creation of Epameinôndas, had been at deadly feud with Lacedæmon ever since it had been a city, and we can well imagine that the hope of gaining the help of the League against this ancient enemy had been one motive which had led Lydiadas to unite his birthplace to the Achaian body. At all events we find a rivalry, a constant opposition of projects, between these two great citizens, which at last grew into a deep personal enmity. Aratos—for Plutarch here speaks as the mouth-piece of Aratos—tells us how Lydiadas' charges against him were rejected as the ebullitions of false virtue contending against true.[1] Lydiadas unfortunately left no memoirs; but even Aratos lets us know that his own opposition to Lydiadas was, by some at least, attributed to envious feelings against a greater rival.[2] Before our tale is over, we shall find the two chiefs contending on points both of policy and of war, and in neither case shall we have much doubt in pronouncing Lydiadas to have been the sounder and the nobler counsellor.

Affairs of Northern Greece.

We must now turn our eyes for a while to Northern Greece. Dêmêtrios is still reigning in Macedonia; the two Leagues, Achaian and Ætolian, are still on friendly terms with each other; Dêmêtrios is hostile to both, though we hear nothing of any vigorous warfare. His attention seems to have been mainly occupied by those barbarous tribes on his northern frontier, in repelling which Macedonia undoubtedly acted as an outpost of Greek civilization. Against the Achaians he seems to have worked chiefly by dispensing lavish subsidies among the petty Tyrants of Peloponnêsos;[3] these were doubtless devoted to the maintenance of mercenaries to act as guards against the plots of Aratos. It was about this time that Epeiros was transformed from a hereditary monarchy into a Federal Republic.[4] Dêïdameia, the last of the line of Achilleus, found herself unable to withstand the revolutionary spirit of the nation; she surrendered her royal powers to the people, retain-

Revolution in Epeiros, B.C. 239–229.

[1] Plut. Ar. 30.

[2] Ib. Ἐνιστάμενος δὲ ὁ Ἄρατος αὐτῷ φθονεῖν ἐδόκει.

[3] Pol. ii. 44. [Δημήτριος], ὃς ἦν αὐτοῖς [τοῖς ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ μονάρχοις] οἷονεὶ χορηγὸς καὶ μισθοδότης.

[4] See above, p. 117.

ing only the property and the honorary privileges of her forefathers. It was a bad beginning of freedom, and one which shows that the Epeirots had neither an Aratos nor a Lydiadas among them, that this innocent princess, the descendant of victorious Kings and deified heroes, was soon afterwards murdered in a temple in which she had taken sanctuary. The Democracy which succeeded is spoken of as turbulent and unruly,[1] as we can well believe it to have been among a people only half Greek, and utterly unaccustomed to regular freedom. The young Republic soon became involved in a chain of events which brought quite new actors upon the stage of Grecian politics. The pirates of Illyria now begin to be heard of, and a common interest in repressing their depredations first brings the Greek commonwealths into any practical relations with the Senate and People of Rome. These were, in their results, great events in the history of Greece and of the world. But just now we are more interested in the glimpses which are given us of the political life of the Confederation of Ætolia. We are introduced not only to a siege by an Ætolian army, but to an election and a debate in the Ætolian Assembly. Characteristically enough, the army and the Assembly are but the same persons invested with two different functions, and the subject of the debate turns, as we might have expected, on questions of plunder and annexation.[2]

Character of the Epeirot Republic.

First political intercourse with Rome

The restless hostility of the Ætolians towards their neighbours of Akarnania seems to have been in no way relaxed by the friendly relations between Ætolia and Achaia. Not long before, at least at some time during the reign of Dêmêtrios, the Akarnanians had, in a fit of desperation, applied for help to the great commonwealth on the other side of the Hadriatic. They alone, so they pleaded, among all the Greeks, had no share in the war waged by Greece against the Trojan ancestors of Rome; the Akarnanians were not enrolled in the Homeric Catalogue even as an independent people, much less as countrymen or subjects of their Ætolian oppressors.[3] The Akarnanian embassy

Hostility of the Ætolians towards Akarnania.

Akarnanian Embassy to Rome, B.C. 239-229.

[1] Paus. iv. 35. 5. Ἠπειρῶται δὲ ὡς ἐπαύσαντο βασιλεύεσθαι, τά τε ἄλλα ὁ δῆμος ὕβριζε καὶ ἀκροᾶσθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ὑπερεώρων. Cf. Justin, xxviii. 3. One would like however to hear the answer of a democratic Epeirot to this charge.

[2] Pol. ii. 2–4.

[3] Strabo, x. 2. 25. Οἱ Ἀκαρνᾶνες σοφίσασθαι λέγονται Ῥωμαίους . . . λέγοντες, ὡς οὐ μετάσχοιεν μόνοι τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς προγόνους τοὺς ἐκείνων στρατείας· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τῷ Αἰτωλικῷ καταλόγῳ φράζοιντο, οὔτε ἰδίᾳ. Cf. Justin, xxviii. 1.

to Rome produced much the same effect as the Ionian embassy to Sparta in the days of Cyrus.[1] In both cases the power appealed to interfered by a haughty message, but sent no effectual aid. Rome ordered the Ætolians to desist from all injuries towards Akarnania,[2] a mandate which only led, in mockery of the barbarian interference, to a more cruel inroad than Akarnania had ever before suffered. At the time which we have now reached, we find the Ætolians engaged in their usual business of extending their Confederation by force of arms. They were besieging the Akarnanian town of Medeôn, which had refused to become a member of their League.[3] While the siege was going on, and when the inhabitants were already counted on as a certain prey, the autumnal equinox brought round the time for the yearly election of the Ætolian Federal Magistrates. The Assembly summoned for that purpose was evidently held beneath the walls of Medeôn. The Ætolians had come with their whole force,[4] and, under such circumstances, with Ætolians, as with Macedonians, the army and the nation were the same thing. Doubtless those citizens of Ætolia proper who remained at home would be summoned; but it is clear that the outlying cities incorporated with the League could have no share in a Meeting so collected. In this Assembly of citizen-soldiers, the General who was going out of office—his name is not mentioned—set forth his hardships before his hearers. He had begun the siege of Medeôn; he had brought it to a point at which no man doubted of the speedy capture of the city; had it been taken within his year of office, he would have been entitled to the disposition of the spoil and to have his name inscribed on the arms which were preserved as trophies.[5] It would be an injustice unworthy of a nation of soldiers, if

Siege of Medeôn by the Ætolians, B.C. 231.

Ætolian Assembly in the camp before Medeôn.

[1] Herod. i. 141, 152.

[2] The evidence for this Roman embassy to Ætolia seems quite sufficient. Justin—that is, Trogus Pompeius—doubtless, as Niebuhr says (Kl. Schr. i. 256), followed Phylarchos. But it involves an apparent contradiction to a passage of Polybios, in which he seems to imply that the Roman Ambassadors who not long after visited Ætolia and Achaia were the first of their nation who had visited Greece in an official character. (See Pol. ii 12; Niebuhr, u.s.; Thirlwall, viii. 140.) But I am not certain that the words of Polybios positively, or at all events intentionally, deny the fact of this earlier embassy. As it led to no results, it probably was not in his thoughts, and even his words need hardly imply any direct contradiction of the story in Justin.

[3] Pol. ii. 2.

[4] Ib. *Στρατεύσαντες οὖν πανδημεί.*

[5] Ib. *Δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὴν οἰκονομίαν τῶν λαφύρων, ἐπὰν κρατήσωσι, καὶ τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τῶν ὅπλων ἑαυτῷ συγχωρεῖσθαι.*

another commander should be allowed to step in, and to reap the fruits which he had sown amid so much of danger and of endurance. He therefore prayed the Assembly to decree that, whatever might be the result of the election, these honours and advantages might be reserved to himself as the true conqueror of Medeôn. Other speakers, especially those who were themselves candidates for the chief magistracy,[1] took the other side. Let the spoils and the honours go, according to the law, to him to whom fortune shall assign them. Some man of moderate views must have proposed a compromise; for the Assembly finally voted that the disposition of the spoil and the inscription of the name should be shared by the outgoing General with the General about to be elected. This discussion occupied that day; on the next day the new General was to be chosen, when, according to Ætolian law, he would enter upon his office at once.[2]

Relief of Medeôn by the Illyrians

But that very night help came to the besieged. King Dêmêtrios was the ally of Akarnania; his help took the same shape as the support which he gave to the Peloponnêsian Tyrants, but it proved in this case very effectual. No Macedonian army marched to raise the siege of Medeôn; but Dêmêtrios had, by a subsidy, engaged the Illyrian King Agrôn to send a large body of his subjects by sea. The fleet, a hundred of the light piratical vessels of Illyria, must have entered the Ambrakian Gulf and landed the troops at Limnaia. By a swift and well-concerted march, they surprised the Ætolians, apparently while actually engaged in electing their General. This attack, supported by a sally from the city, completely routed the besiegers. Great spoil fell into the hands both of the Illyrians and of the people of Medeôn. The latter presently in turn held their Meeting, and the Medeônian Assembly voted that the decree of the Ætolian Assembly should be duly carried out, and that the names both of the outgoing Ætolian General and of his successor should be inscribed on the trophy raised by the victorious Akarnanians.[3]

[1] Pol. ii. 2. Τινῶν δὲ, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν προϊόντων πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἀμφισβητούντων πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα. [2] Ib. 3. See above, p. 264.

[3] Brandstäter (269) derides what he calls "das Episodische und Unwesentliche dieser Anekdote." I confess to being thankful for so life-like a report of an Ætolian debate.

The independent action of the Medeônian Assembly (ἐκκλησία) should also be noticed. Akarnania formed one commonwealth in all dealings with other nations, but, just as in Achaia, the canton of Medeôn had its own local Assembly, with full sovereignty in local matters.

Ravages of the Illyrians in Peloponnêsos.

The Illyrian King Agrôn, and his widow Teuta, who presently succeeded him, were emboldened by this success over such renowned warriors as the Ætolians to carry on their piratical excursions on a yet wider scale. They ravaged the coasts of Elis and Messênia, as they had often done before. Both countries had a long sea-board, and the principal towns were inland, so that invaders by sea could gather a large booty without danger of resistance.[1] They now ventured on a bolder achievement. A party of them had occasion to land near Phoinikê in Chaonia. This place, one of the greatest cities of Epeiros, had been entrusted to the care of eight hundred mercenary Gauls, who betrayed the town to the Illyrians. This form of national defence certainly gives us no very favourable impression of the wisdom of the new Epeirot Republic. Nor had its native armies another Pyrrhos at their head; they utterly failed in the attempt to recover Phoinikê. The young League of Epeiros now applied for help to the elder Leagues of Ætolia and Achaia.[2] Help was sent, but no battle was fought; the cause of inaction is not mentioned, but Aratos was General of the year. Phoinikê however was restored on terms to its owners, and the Epeirots, together with the Akarnanians, concluded an alliance with the Illyrians, by virtue of which they for the future helped the barbarians against their benefactors from Southern Greece.[3] The two Leagues were now generally looked to as the protectors of Hellas. Epidamnos, Apollônia, Korkyra, were all attacked or threatened. All three are spoken of as independent states, from which we may infer that Korkyra, which had formed part of the Kingdom of Pyrrhos, did not form part of the Epeirot League.[4] Of these three cities, Epidamnos had gallantly beaten off an Illyrian attack; Korkyra was actually besieged, when a joint embassy from all three implored the help both of Ætolia

Illyrian capture of Phoinikê, B.C. 230.

Alliance of Epeiros and Akarnania with the Illyrians.

[1] Pol. ii. 5.

[2] Ib. 6. Ἐπρέσβευον πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος.

[3] Pol. ii. 6, 7, where the matter is discussed at length. Mommsen (Rom. Gesch. i. 369) says, "Halb gezwungen halb freiwillig traten die Epeiroten und Akarnanen mit den fremden Räubern in eine unnatürliche Symmachie." The Leagues of Akarnania and Epeiros thus became hostile to Achaia. The next time we hear of them (see pp. 383, 389), they are Achaian allies. The probable explanation is that the two northern Leagues became allied with Macedonia as soon as Macedonia became hostile to Ætolia, and, as Macedonian allies, became Achaian allies along with Antigonos. As they had no direct cause of enmity towards Achaia, they could have no repugnance to the Achaian alliance, as soon as Achaia was again unfriendly to Ætolia.

[4] See Dict. of Geog. art. Corcyra.

and of Achaia.[1] The petition was listened to with favour by the Assemblies of both Leagues, and ten Achaian ships, manned with contingents from both nations,[2] were sent to the help of Korkyra. Lydiadas was now General; there was therefore no delay, no shrinking from action. Whether he himself commanded is not recorded, but the ships were sent at once,[3] and they were sent, not to intrigue or to lie idle, but to fight. This is the first time that we hear of any naval operations on the part of the League, and that, singularly enough, at a moment when its chief was an Arkadian landsman. The Achaians of the original towns, though dwelling on a long sea-board, seem never to have been a maritime people; their coast had no important harbours,[4] and we hear nothing of any Achaian exploits by sea. But the acquisition of so many maritime cities, above all of the great Corinth with its two havens, would naturally tempt the League to aspire to the character of a naval power. And it would well agree with the lofty spirit of its present chief to seek to win glory for his country on a new element.[5] The original Ætolians too were essentially a still more inland people than the Achaians, but the possession of Naupaktos would naturally give a maritime impulse to them also. The treaties with distant cities like Teôs and Kios[6] show that Ætolian pirates infested the Ægæan and even the Propontis, but the language of Polybios seems to imply that the Ætolians had no Federal navy, while the Achaian League habitually kept ten ships.[7] This combined naval enterprise of the two Leagues unluckily failed. The Achaian squadron, with its half Achaian, half Ætolian crews, was defeated by the combined fleets of Illyria and Akarnania. Among other ships lost or taken, a quinquereme was sunk which carried Markos of Keryneia, the original founder of the League, still, in his old age, rendering faithful service to a commonwealth of which he had long ceased to be the guiding spirit. Korkyra

Joint expedition of the two Leagues to relieve Korkyra, B.C. 229.

Death of Markos of Keryneia.

[1] Pol. ii. 9.

[2] Ib. Οἱ δὲ [Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ] διακοίσαντες τῶν πρέσβεων καὶ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς λόγους ἐπλήρωσαν κοινῇ τὰς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν δέκα ναῦς καταφράκτους.

[3] Ib. Καταρτίσαντες δ' ἐν ὀλίγαις ἡμέραις ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας, ἐλπίζοντες λύσειν τὴν πολιορκίαν.

[4] Plut. Ar. 9. Θαλάττῃ προσφώκουν [οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ] ἀλιμένῳ, τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ ῥαχίας ἐκφερομένῃ πρὸς τὴν ἤπειρον. Yet Patrai has become a great port in later times.

[5] This may well have been among the πράξεις οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι proposed by Lydiadas.

[6] See above, p. 268.

[7] This seems implied in the words τὰς δέκα ναῦς.

had to surrender; she received an Illyrian garrison, commanded by a man who was one of the chief pests of Greece and the neighbouring lands, Dêmêtrios of Pharos. This man, a Greek of the Hadriatic island from which he took his name, here began a career of treachery which lasted for many years. He was now in the service of Queen Teuta, but he soon found that her cause was not the strongest. Rome had declared war against the pirate Queen, in what was in truth the cause of all civilized states on both sides of the sea. The Consul Cnæus Fulvius came against Korkyra with the Roman fleet; Dêmêtrios, who was already out of favour at the Illyrian court,[1] joined the citizens in welcoming the invaders, and surrendered the Illyrian garrison to Fulvius. Korkyra and, soon afterwards, Apollônia and Epidamnos, became the first Roman Allies[2]—a condition which so easily slid into that of Roman subjects—on the Greek side of the Ionian Sea. The Illyrian kingdom was dismembered, and the adventurer Dêmêtrios suddenly grew into a considerable potentate, a large portion of the dominions of Teuta being conferred upon him by the Roman conqueror.[3] In the small part of her kingdom which she was allowed to retain, she was hampered with conditions which effectually hindered her from being any longer dangerous to Greece. Not more than two Illyrian ships, and those unarmed, might appear south of Lissos.

Dêmêtrios of Pharos.

Interference of Rome.

Korkyra, Apollônia, and Epidamnos become Roman allies. Humiliation of Illyria.

This is the first real interference of Rome in Grecian affairs. The former haughty message to the Ætolians had no effect. But now Rome appeared as an active, though as yet only as a beneficent, actor on the Greek side of the sea. She had broken the power which was just then most dangerous to Greece, and had delivered three Greek cities from a barbarian yoke. The wrongs of Akarnania and the defiance of Ætolia were doubtless by this time forgotten. Ætolia, like Rome, was an enemy of Illyria, while Akarnanian galleys, if they had not sailed to Troy at the bidding of Agamemnôn, had undoubtedly swelled the numbers of the pirate fleet of Teuta. Aulus Postumius, the

[1] Pol. ii. 11. Ἐν διαβολαῖς ὢν καὶ φοβούμενος τὴν Τεύταν.

[2] Polybios (u.s.) uses a somewhat different word for the reception of each of the three. Οἱ Κερκυραῖοι . . . αὐτοί τε σφᾶς ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἔδωκαν παρακληθέντες εἰς τὴν τῶν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν. . . . Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ προσδεξάμενοι τοὺς Κερκυραίους εἰς τὴν φιλίαν ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀπολλωνίας . . . καὶ τούτων ἀποδεξαμένων καὶ δόντων ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν, . . . Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς Ἐπιδαμνίους παραλαβόντες εἰς τὴν πίστιν προῆγον, κ.τ.λ. [For Roman "faith" cf. below chap. ix. p. 494.]

[3] See Thirlwall, viii. 140, note.

final conqueror of the Illyrian Queen, sent Ambassadors to the two Leagues, who explained the causes of the war with Teuta, and of the appearance of Roman armies in a quarter where their presence might seem threatening to Greece.[1] They then related the events of the campaign, and read out the treaty which had just been concluded, the terms of which were so favourable to the interests of every Greek state. The Roman envoys were received, as they well deserved, with every honour in the Assemblies of both Confederations. The political embassy was followed by one, apparently of a religious or honorary character, to Corinth and to Athens. The Corinthians bestowed on the Romans the right of sharing in the Greek national festival of the Isthmian Games.[2] This was equivalent to raising the Roman People from the rank of mere barbarians to the same quasi-Greek position as the Epeirots and Macedonians.[3] It shows also that the administration of the Isthmian Games was still in the hands of the State of Corinth, and had not been at all transferred to the general Achaian body. As administrators of those games, the Corinthians might lawfully receive and honour a Roman Embassy which was charged with no political object, but merely came on a pilgrimage to Corinth and its holy places. Such an Embassy in no way interfered with the Federal sovereignty in matters of foreign negociation; those had been already dealt with by the Federal Assembly.[4] And truly Rome might just then seem worthy of any honours on the part of Greece. Not but that a feeling of shame[5] might arise in the breast of

Roman Embassies of the Two Leagues, B.C. 228.

Honorary Embassies to Corinth and Athens.

[1] This seems implied in the expression of Polybios (ii. 12), *ἀπελογίσαντο τὰς αἰτίας τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τῆς διαβάσεως.*

[2] Pol. ii. 12. *Ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς καταρχῆς Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν εὐθέως ἄλλους πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστειλαν πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους· ὅτε δὴ καὶ Κορίνθιοι πρῶτον ἀπεδέξαντο μετέχειν Ῥωμαίους τοῦ τῶν Ἰσθμίων ἀγῶνος.*

"Soon afterwards the Romans sent other embassies to Corinth and to Athens, with no other object, so far as appears, than of introducing themselves to some of the most illustrious states of the Greek name, which many of the Romans had already learned to admire." Arnold's Rome, iii. 40.

[3] Arnold, u.s. Thirlwall, viii. 140. The act, though done by a body of less authority, had somewhat the same effect as the admission of Macedonia to the Amphiktyonic franchise.

[4] *Τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος.* Pol. ii. 12, of the other embassy. See above, p. 203.

[5] "Man kann fragen, ob der Jubel in Hellas grösser war oder die Scham, als statt der zehn Linienschiffe der achaeischen Eidgenossenschaft, der streitbarsten Macht Griechenlands, jetzt zweihundert Segel der Barbaren in ihre Häfen einliefen und mit einem Schlage die Aufgabe lösten, die den Griechen zukam und an der diese so kläglich gescheitert waren." Mommsen, Röm. Gesch. i. 371.

any patriotic Greek, when he thought that the freedom of three cities, which the two greatest powers of independent Greece had in vain attempted to deliver, had now to be received as a gift from a barbarian conqueror.[1] The conduct of Rome throughout this war was thoroughly just and honourable; there is no reason to charge either the Senate or individual Roman leaders with any ulterior views of selfish aggrandizement; but it is clear that, when the Roman arms had once been seen before a Greek fortress, when the wiles of Roman diplomacy had once been listened to by a Greek Assembly, a path was opened which directly led to the fight of Kynoskephalê and to the sack of Corinth.

Eventual results of Roman interference.

Inaction of Macedonia.

The inaction of Macedonia during all these events is remarkable. Since Dêmêtrios first engaged the Illyrians to help Medeôn, we hear of absolutely no Macedonian interference, either warlike or diplomatic, in matters which would seem to have very directly touched Macedonian interests. We are not told with what eyes Macedonian statesmen looked upon the first appearance of so formidable a power as Rome in lands so closely bordering upon their own. Nor do we hear that Rome thought it necessary on this occasion to enter into any relations with the Macedonian Kingdom. Roman embassies went on political errands to Aigion and Thermon, and on honorary errands to Corinth and Athens, but no envoy seems to have been dispatched in either character to the court of Pella or to the sanctuary of Dion. This apparent temporary insignificance of a power lately so great, and soon to be so great again, is explained by the unusual activity of the restless northern tribes, and by the commotions which commonly attended a change of sovereign in Macedonia.[2] The reign of Dêmêtrios ended about the time when the Romans first crossed into Illyria.[3] He appears to have died in battle with the Dardanians; certainly he had lately been defeated by them.[4] The heir to his crown was his young son

Death of Dêmêtrios, B.C. 229.

[1] "In the course of this short war, not only Corcyra, but Apollonia also, and Epidamnus, submitted to the Romans at discretion, and received their liberty, as was afterwards the case with all Greece, as a gift from the Roman people." Arnold, iii. 39.

[2] See Flathe, Gesch. Mac. i. 143 et seqq.

[3] Pol. ii. 44. Δημητρίου δὲ βασιλεύσαντος δέκα μόνον ἔτη καὶ μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον περὶ τὴν πρώτην διάβασιν εἰς τὴν Ἰλλυρίδα Ῥωμαίων.

[4] See Thirlwall, viii. 141.

Philip, but the royal authority was assumed—first, it would seem, as Protector and then as King for life[1]—by Antigonos, surnamed Dôsôn,[2] a distant kinsman of the royal house, but with a distinct reservation of the rights of young Philip as heir-apparent. A new King of Macedonia seldom ascended the throne without some disturbance, and a King reigning on such terms as these was even less likely than usual to find his power perfectly undisputed. We hear vaguely of fresh Dardanian inroads, of commotions in Macedonia itself, and even of some movements in Thessaly of which one would gladly know something more.[3] All these it appears that the energy of Antigonos sufficed to put down; but his hands, like those of Dêmêtrios during the last years of his reign, must have been far too full for him to give much attention to the advance either of Achaia or of Rome.

Protectorate and Reign of Antigonos Dôsôn, B.C. 229–221.

It is evident that the death of Dêmêtrios, and the events which followed it, must have greatly shaken the Macedonian influence in Southern Greece, and must have given a proportionate advantage to the cause of Greek independence.[4] The two great desires of Aratos were now to be gratified; Athens and Argos were both to be delivered. It would seem that Aratos and the Athenians had at last come to an understanding. The Achaian chief was no longer looked on as an enemy at Athens, and he no longer pressed for the incorporation of Athens with the League. Both sides agreed to be satisfied if all Macedonian garrisons were withdrawn from Attica, and if Athens, again restored to freedom, became the ally of Achaia. The way in which this desirable end was brought about curiously illustrates the position and character of Aratos. He was not then in office, the Presidency of the League being held by his rival Lydiadas.[5] But it was not to Lydiadas, but to Aratos, that

Advance of the League after the Death of Dêmêtrios.

Deliverance of Athens, B.C. 229.

[1] Justin, xxviii. 3.

[2] Ὁ Δώσων, he who is about to give, that is, he who promises and does not perform. It does not appear how he came by the nickname, as his general conduct is honourable and straightforward.

[3] Justin, xxviii. 3. See Thirlwall, viii. 164.

[4] Pol. ii. 44. Δημητρίου δὲ . . . μεταλλάξαντος τὸν βίον . . ἐγένετό τις εὔροια πραγμάτων πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιβολὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. Plut. Ar. 34. Καὶ Μακεδόνων μὲν ἀσχόλων ὄντων διά τινας προσοίκους καὶ ὁμόρους πολέμους, Αἰτωλῶν δὲ συμμαχούντων, ἐπίδοσιν μεγάλην ἡ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐλάμβανε δύναμις.

[5] So Flathe, ii. 156. Plutarch (Ar. 34) says only ἑτέρου μὲν ἄρχοντος τότε τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, but it clearly was Lydiadas. This year, B.C. 229, is that of his third and last Generalship.

the Athenians applied for help.[1] To them Aratos, whether as friend or as enemy, had always appeared as the one representative of the League; we hear of no application to the Achaian General, of no audience given to Athenian Ambassadors by the Achaian Assembly; he who had delivered Sikyôn and Corinth is prayed to deliver Athens also somehow or other. Probably the Macedonian garrisons would have hindered the progress of avowed Athenian envoys on such an errand; but nothing need have hindered Aratos from communicating the message which he had secretly received, if not to the Assembly or to the Senate, yet at all events to the Chief Magistrate of the year. But so to have done would have been to run the risk of winning glory and influence for a rival; it would have been giving the rash ex-Tyrant a fresh opportunity to propose some of his needless enterprises. Lydiadas might have gone the length of an open attack on the Macedonian garrisons, and have exposed the armies of the League to all the hazards of a pitched battle. Aratos, as ever, is zealous for the deliverance of a Greek state, above all for the deliverance of Athens; to promote that deliverance he is ready to undergo any amount of personal cost, personal exertion, and personal danger; he will gladly free Attica from the presence of the stranger, but he must be allowed to free her himself, and to free her in his own way. This time he did not try a night escalade; a long illness, which obliged him to be carried in a litter, prevented him from leading an attack on Peiraieus or Mounychion; probably, as the Macedonians occupied four distinct fortresses, even a successful attack on one garrison might have done little more than increase the watchfulness of the others.[2] His way of compassing his end was simple but daring. He went in his litter to a private conference with Diogenês, the Macedonian officer of whom we have already heard,[3] and negociated a bargain, by which, in consideration of a sum of one hundred and fifty talents, Diogenês restored Peiraieus, Mounychion, Sounion, and Salamis to the Athenians. At this particular juncture the position of Diogenês must have been very precarious and ambiguous. Macedonia had lost her King, and was in a state of utter confusion; he could expect no

Application of the Athenians to Aratos when out of office.

Aratos buys the Macedonians out of Attica.

[1] Plut. Ar. 34. Οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι συμφρονήσαντες αὐτοῦ [Ἀράτου] τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐπεὶ Δημητρίου τελευτήσαντος ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἐκεῖνον ἐκάλουν.

[2] Paus. ii. 8. 6. Οὐ γὰρ ἤλπιζε δύνασθαι πρὸς βίαν αὐτὰ ἐξελεῖν.

[3] See above, p. 310.

aid from home, nor could he tell what might be the policy of the new reign. The idea of such independence as Alexander had enjoyed at Corinth might have occurred to him, but one hundred and fifty talents in ready money may well have seemed more valuable than such a hope accompanied by so many risks. The money was paid; Aratos himself contributed a large sum,[1] either out of his private estate or out of the accumulations of his Egyptian pension. The Macedonians departed; Athens was again free, but her incorporation with the League was not pressed. Aratos had won a victory after his own heart; he had achieved one of the foremost and noblest objects of his ambition. He had delivered a famous city, and had won a new ally for his country, and that without shedding a drop of blood, and at no one's risk or cost but his own. But we can well understand that Lydiadas might be displeased at seeing a private citizen do even such good deeds, without deeming the Chief Magistrate of the League worthy of any share in them; and he may have looked on the deliverance of Greek cities by gold instead of steel as an unworthy substitution of the merchant's craft for that of the warrior.

Progress of the League. Union of Aigina and Hermionê.

Though Athens had not actually joined the League, yet this exploit of Aratos, and the consequent close alliance of Athens, greatly raised the Achaian credit and influence. Aigina at once joined the League;[2] Xenôn, Tyrant of Hermionê, followed the example of Lydiadas, laid down the Tyranny, and made Hermionê another member of the Achaian body.[3] We may also infer from a vague notice in Plutarch that some more of the Arkadian towns were gathered in at the same time.[4] And now came the great acquisition of Argos. In the narrative of this event we have the rivalry between Aratos and Lydiadas more vividly set before us than ever. Lydiadas was General of the League; but Aratos did not think it inconsistent with the duty of a good citizen to make private advances to Aristomachos, to send messages to him, to invite him to follow the example of Lydiadas in laying down his Tyranny and uniting his city to the Achaian League. Private action of this sort had long been familiar to Aratos, and it had never been, at all events when successful, very severely scrutinized by his countrymen. But then the chief place in the

Unauthorized negociations of Aratos with Aristomachos of Argos.

[1] Twenty talents, according to Plutarch (Ar. 34); twenty-five, according to Pausanias (ii. 8. 6). [2] Plut. Ar. 34. [3] Plut. u.s. Pol. ii. 44.
[4] Plut. u.s. Ἡ τε πλείστη τῆς Ἀρκαδίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς [Ἀχαιοῖς] συνετέλει.

League had never before been filled by a personal rival, and a rival who was at least his equal in ability and ambition. Aratos continued his negociations with the Argeian Tyrant; he enlarged to him on the miseries of absolute power, and on the far loftier position of a General of the Achaians, a post which, on the union of Argos with the League, Aristomachos might aspire to fill as well as Lydiadas. Aristomachos agreed to the proposal, on condition of receiving fifty talents to pay off his mercenaries. Money seems never to have been any difficulty with Aratos; he undertook to provide this large sum, and began to collect it, from what sources we know not. Large as was doubtless his private estate, and inexhaustible as was the wealth of his friend King Ptolemy, it was a bold undertaking so soon after his large contribution towards the ransom of the Attic fortresses. While the money was collecting,[1] the negociation came to the ears of the Achaian General. As Chief Magistrate of the League, Lydiadas was naturally and rightfully offended that a private citizen should undertake these unauthorized negociations with foreign powers. As the personal rival of Aratos, we can hardly blame him for wishing that the glory of winning Argos, especially in his own year of office, should fall, not to Aratos, but to himself.[2] He entered into communication with Aristomachos; Plutarch—that is, of course, Aratos—tells us that he counselled the Argeian Tyrant to trust him, Lydiadas, the ex-Tyrant, rather than Aratos the sworn foe of Tyrants.[3] However this may be, Lydiadas simply did his duty, as head of the League, in taking the matter into his own hands. His position was that of an American President or an English Foreign Secretary who should find that his predecessor in office and rival in politics was busily engaged in planning treaties and alliances with foreign states. Lydiadas arranged the terms of union with Aristomachos; he laid them before the Assembly for confirmation, inviting Aristomachos himself, as his own Ambassador, to plead his own cause before the Achaian People.[4] A proposal was thus made, in the most regular and constitutional way, to bring about an object

Lydiadas interferes as General.

His proposal for the Union of Argos

[1] Plut. Ar. 35. Τῶν χρημάτων ποριζομένων.

[2] Ib. Φιλοτιμούμενος ἴδιον αὐτοῦ πολίτευμα τοῦτο πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς γενέσθαι.

[3] Ib. Τοῦ μὲν Ἀράτου κατηγόρει πρὸς Ἀριστόμαχον ὡς δυσμενῶς καὶ ἀδιαλλάκτως ἀεὶ πρὸς τοὺς τυράννους ἔχοντος.

[4] Ib. Αὐτῷ δὲ πείσας τὴν πρᾶξιν ἐπιτρέψαι προσήγαγε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Helwing (p. 102), the idolater of Aratos, sees in all this only a very improper interference with Aratos on the part of Lydiadas.

which had been for years one of the darling wishes of the heart of Aratos, and which he had himself been endeavouring at some sacrifice to effect. We can understand the natural disappointment of Aratos at seeing the accomplishment of his own cherished scheme transferred to his rival; but this in no way justifies the factious and unpatriotic conduct to which he now stooped. What arguments could have been brought, above all by Aratos, against a Government proposal for the annexation of Argos, history does not tell us, and it is certainly very hard to guess them by the light of nature. He could hardly have had the face to argue that the General of the League had no right to discharge one of his constitutional functions, because a private citizen or an inferior magistrate[1] wished unconstitutionally to usurp it. But it is certain that Aratos spoke in strong opposition; that on the division the Noes had it, that the Government motion was thrown out, and that Aristomachos was dismissed from the Assembly, apparently with a degree of disrespect which, Tyrant as he was, he certainly had not deserved.[2] But, before long, things are quite altered; Aratos is again General;[3] he has made his peace with Aristomachos; he brings forward, and triumphantly carries,[4] the very motion which a few months before he had caused to be ignominiously thrown out; Argos is united to the League; and, at the next election of Federal Magistrates, Aratos is succeeded in his office, not, as had now become the rule, by Lydiadas, but by Aristomachos himself. This election was doubtless made through the personal influence of Aratos, and the narrative seems rather to imply that it was part of the bargain between him and Aristomachos. Along with Argos and Aristomachos, Phlious and its Tyrant Kleônymos[5]

rejected at the instance of Aratos [B.C. 229–8],

but carried on the motion of Aratos as General, B.C. 228.

Aristomachos General, B.C. 227.

[1] It is always possible that Aratos may have filled some other Federal magistracy in the years when he was not General.

[2] Plut. Ar. 35. Ἀντειπόντος μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ [Ἀράτου] δι' ὀργὴν ἀπήλασαν τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἀριστόμαχον.

[3] See Flathe, ii. 157. Thirlwall, viii. 166. The Assembly at which Lydiadas produced Aristomachos was probably the regular Spring Meeting of the year 228. At that meeting Aratos would be elected General for the year 228–7. When he came into office, he might either summon a special Assembly for the discussion of the question, or might introduce it at the regular Autumnal Meeting.

[4] Plut. Ar. 35. Ἐπεὶ δὲ συμπεισθεὶς πάλιν αὐτὸς ἤρξατο περὶ αὐτῶν διαλέγεσθαι παρὼν, πάντα τάχεως καὶ προθύμως ἐψηφίσαντο καὶ προσεδέξαντο μὲν τοὺς Ἀργείους καὶ Φλιασίους εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐνιαυτῷ δὲ ὕστερον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστόμαχον εἵλοντο στρατηγόν.

[5] Pol. ii. 44.

Union of Phlious with the League.

were also admitted into the League, which thus included all Argolis. By these annexations Aratos doubtless gained much fame, but it was at the expense of his true honour. Plutarch tells us of the wonderful proof of the national goodwill and confidence which the Achaian Assembly showed to Aratos.[1] One who is not a professed biographer of heroes might be tempted to say that neither Aratos nor the Assembly ever showed themselves in a more paltry light. It is perhaps not quite unknown in other constitutional governments for a statesman's view of a measure to differ a good deal, according as he is in office or in opposition. But to an impartial spectator this proceeding of Aratos will perhaps appear an extreme, not to say shameless, case of such sudden conversion. One cannot help wondering how any Assembly could be got to follow him to and fro in such a course. But, granting that some ingenious misrepresentations, some fervent declamations, had once beguiled the Assembly to reject the proposal of Lydiadas, yet afterwards to accept the proposal of Aratos was, on the part of the Assembly, whatever we say of Aratos himself, merely a return to common sense.

Estimate of the conduct of Aratos.

Commanding Position of the Achaian League, B.C. 228.

The League was now at the height of its glory. Days were indeed in store when its territorial extent was to be far greater, but those were days when its true greatness and independence had passed away for ever. But now it was wholly independent of foreign influences; the Egyptian connexion did not practically hamper its action, and, in the political morality of those times, it carried with it no disgrace. The League was now the greatest power of Greece. A Federation of equal cities, democratically governed, embraced the whole of old Achaia, the whole of the Argolic peninsula, the greater part of Arkadia, together with Phlious, Sikyôn, Corinth, Megara, and the island of Aigina. Within this large continuous territory we hear of no discontent, no hankering after secession, save only in the single turbulent city of Mantineia. Achaians, Dorians, Arkadians, had forgotten their local quarrels, and lived as willing fellow-citizens of one Federal state. Tyrants and Tyrannicides confined their warfare within the limits of parliamentary opposition, and appeared in alternate years at the head of the councils and armies of the League. The rival League of Ætolia was still a harmonious ally; its alliance carried with it the alliance of Elis; Athens was bound to the

[1] Plut. Ar. 35. *Ἔνθα δὴ μάλιστα φανερὰν ἐποίησαν οἱ σύνεδροι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸν Ἄρατον εὔνοιαν καὶ πίστιν.*

League by every tie of gratitude; the breed of local Tyrants had ceased to exist; some had been extirpated, others had been converted into Achaian citizens and leaders. Macedonia was doubtless not friendly, but she was not in a position to be actively hostile; Rome herself, a name which doubtless already commanded a vague respect, though as yet no servile fear, had entered into the friendliest relations, cemented by the choicest honours on either side. The work of the League seemed to be done; Greece, all Greece at least south of Thermopylæ, was free; all her noblest cities enjoyed freedom from foreign garrisons and foreign tribute; none of them was hostile to the League; many of them were incorporated as its principal members. Never did the League itself stand so high in power and reputation; never had Greece, as a whole, so fair a prospect of peace and good government. The time was now come when the man who had done all this good for his native land was to undo it with his own hands.

## § 3. *From the Beginning of the War with Kleomenês to the Opening of Negociations with Macedonia*

B.C. 227—224

Condition of Sparta. B.C. 371–227.

The one possible rival of the Achaian League within Peloponnêsos was Sparta. That famous city had now indeed, for nearly a hundred and fifty years, utterly fallen from her ancient greatness. The day of Leuktra had not only cut her off from all hope of retaining or recovering her old supremacy, it had cut off the fairest portion of her home territory from her dominion. The President, we might almost say the Tyrant, of Greece was brought down to the rank of one Peloponnêsian city among many. Instead of sending her armies to lord it over Thebes and Olynthos, she was hemmed in on one side by her new-born rival Megalopolis, on another by her own liberated serfs of Messênia. As for her internal state, we are told of corruptions of every kind; the Laws of Lykourgos had become a name; all power and all property were centred in a few hands; Kings and people alike were held in bondage by the ruling oligarchs. And yet, on the whole, the history of Sparta during this age is more honourable than that of any other of the great Hellenic cities. Her supremacy, her greatness, had passed away; but, within the narrow bounds in which she was pent up, she preserved her

independence and her dignity in a way that Thebes and Corinth and Athens had failed to do. During the times of greatest violence and confusion, she had been free alike from foreign conquest and from domestic revolution. She could not indeed always defend her territories from invasion; still she had never
B.C. 338. seen either a native Tyrant or a Macedonian garrison. Philip had marched along her coasts, he had contracted her borders, but his phalanx had never appeared before her unwalled capital.[1] The democratic hero of Thebes and the royal hero of Epeiros had alike been driven back when they assaulted her in her own hearth and home. She had never recognized the Macedonian as chief of Greece; she had sent no deputies to the Corinthian Congress; her name was formally excepted in the inscriptions which described Alexander and all Greeks, save the Lacedæmonians, as victorious over the Barbarians of Asia. But she was not dead to the cause of Greece; her kingly Hêrakleids could still command armies on behalf of Hellenic freedom; one Agis had died fighting in a vain attempt to break the Macedonian yoke; another had come ready, if Aratos would but have let him, to fight as bravely to free Peloponnêsos from the robbers
Her internal condition. of Ætolia. At home, whatever were her political or social corruptions, they were the mere gradual decay of old institutions, not the lawless usurpations of high-handed violence. Her Kings, her Ephors, her Senate, her Assembly, were no longer what they once were; but the venerable names and offices remained unchanged. No Spartan King had ever trampled on the rights of Senate or People, none had even ventured to resist the far more doubtful pretensions of the despotic Ephors. And, on the other hand, Sparta had seen no usurping citizen holding her in bondage by a mercenary force, nor had she ever acknowledged any chief but her own lawful and Zeus-descended Kings. Sparta lay quiet, seldom touched by the revolutions of the rest of Greece, fallen indeed, but neither crushed like Thebes, enslaved like Thessaly, nor degraded like Athens. She was still independent within her own borders; she might yet again become powerful beyond them. And now the day had come when Sparta was once more for a moment to stand forth as the first of Grecian states, and, after a short career of glory, to sink into a state of degradation, both within and without, almost lower than that of Athens itself.

[1] [See Thirlwall, vi. 114. Cf. Strabo, viii. 5, 6.]

First came Agis the reformer, Agis the martyr, the purest and noblest spirit that ever perished through deeming others as pure and noble as himself. Then, for the first time, internal revolution began in Sparta, and the hand of the executioner was raised against the sacred person of a Hêrakleid King. But his memory died not; a successor and an avenger arose from the very hearth of his destroyer; Sparta had at last a King indeed;[1] no Tyrant, no invader, but a Spartan of the Spartans, a Hêrakleid of the divine seed; one who grasped the sceptre of Agis with a firmer hand, and who scrupled not to carry out his schemes by means from which his gentle spirit would have shrunk in horror. Kleomenês burst the bands with which a gradually narrowing oligarchy had fettered alike the Spartan Kings and the Spartan people. He slew the Ephors on their seats of office, and summoned the people of Sparta to behold and approve the deed. An age which has condoned the most deliberate perjury and the most cold-blooded massacre which history records is hardly entitled to be severe on the comparatively mild *coup d'état*[2] of the Lacedæmonian King. He put out of the way by violence, because Law could not touch them, men who, there is every reason to believe, had put to death his own royal colleague, and then charged him with the deed.[3] The slaughter of the Ephors was a stroke in which Agis or Epameinôndas would have had no share, but it was one at which Ehud, Tell, or Timoleôn could not consistently have scrupled. The Ephors, the real Tyrants, once gone, Kleomenês stood forth as the King of a free people, the General of a gallant army. He was no longer the slave of a narrow caste of ruling families; he was the beloved chief of a nation, which, recruited by a large addition from the subject classes, was now a nation once more. A people thus springing

Reform and fate of Agis, B.C. 241.

Reign of KLEOMENÊS, B.C. 236–222.

Revolution of Kleomenês, B.C. 226–225.

[1] The character of Kleomenês has been a subject of warm dispute both in his own days and in ours. Polybios, as a Megalopolitan, of course draws him in the darkest colours; in Plutarch we find the counter-statement of his admiring contemporary Phylarchos. I do not feel called upon minutely to examine questions which are matters of Spartan, not of Federal, history; but I believe that my notion of Kleomenês will be found quite in harmony with the views of Bishop Thirlwall. See his History, viii. 160–183.

[2] Four of the Ephors were killed, with ten persons who attempted to defend them. Eighty citizens were banished, that is, not sent to some Spartan Cayenne, but allowed to live in any Greek city except Sparta, retaining their rights of property, and encouraged by a promise to be allowed to return home at some future day. So small an allowance of bloodshed and confiscation would be counted a very poor day's work at the "inauguration" of an Empire or a Red Republic.

[3] See Thirlwall, viii. 172. Cf. 163.

into a revived life is sure to be warlike, if not positively aggressive. The discipline of victory—and only a chief like Aratos can lead such a people to defeat—is needed to teach it to feel its own powers; it is needed to efface all divisions, all hostile memories, by common struggles and common triumphs in the national cause. How was Peloponnêsos to contain two such powers, each in the full vigour of recovered freedom, each fresh with all the lofty aspirations of regenerate youth? What were to be the mutual relations of the revived League and of the revived Kingdom? Above all, what were to be the personal relations of two such chiefs as Aratos and Kleomenês? Free and equal alliance would be the bidding of cold external prudence. Sparta, such a counsellor would say, is far too great to become a single city of the League; Achaia, on the other hand, is far too free and happy as she is to be asked to admit the slightest superiority on the part of Sparta. Live in friendship side by side; and hang up your shields till the Ætolian again proves faithless, or till the Macedonian again becomes threatening. Advice sound indeed, advice at once prudent and benevolent, but advice which two ambitious chiefs and two high-spirited nations were never likely to take.

Relations between Sparta and the League.

Causes of war between Sparta and the League.

The war between Sparta and the League began before Kleomenês had accomplished his great revolution at home. There can be no doubt that it was a war which was equally acceptable to the leaders on both sides, and that in no case could peace have been kept very long. It was like the old Peloponnêsian War between Sparta and Athens; in both cases war was the natural result of the position occupied by two rival powers;[1] in both cases the grounds of warfare which were alleged on either side were at most the occasions, and not the real causes, of the struggle. In the eyes of Aratos, Sparta was a power which stood in the way of his darling scheme of uniting all Peloponnêsos into one Confederation.[2] On that object his mind had dwelt so long that he had begun to regard himself as having a mission to compel as well as to persuade the refractory; the

[1] Thuc. i. 23. Τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι, μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν· αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερὸν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἵδ' ἦσαν ἑκατέρων. This is as true of Orchomenos and Athênaion as of Epidamnos and Korkyra.

[2] Plut. Kl. 3. Ὁ γὰρ Ἄρατος . . ἐβούλετο μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν ἀγαγεῖν Πελοποννησίους, κ. τ. λ.

deliverer was at last beginning to share some of the feelings of a conqueror. Elis, Sparta, and some Arkadian towns[1] were still wanting to the completion of his great work. Now Sparta, and Elis also, stood in a wholly different position from the cities which Aratos had incorporated with the League in earlier days. Sikyôn, Corinth, Megara, Argos, had every reason to rejoice in their annexation. Instead of foreign or domestic bondage, they obtained freedom within their own walls, and true confederates beyond them. Sparta had no such need; she had no foreign garrison, no domestic Tyrant; she lived under a Government which, whether good or bad, was a national Government, resting on the prescriptive reverence of eight hundred years. No enemy threatened her, and, had any enemy threatened her, she was fully able to resist. She was far greater than any one city of the League; indeed the event proved that she was able to contend on more than equal terms with the League's whole force. Her immemorial polity, the habits and feelings of her people, were all utterly inconsistent with the position of a single member of a Democratic Confederation.[2] What was deliverance and promotion to Corinth and Argos would to Sparta have been a sacrifice of every national feeling, and a sacrifice for which no occasion called. Sparta was never likely to enter the League as a willing member, and Aratos had yet to learn that none but willing members of a League are worth having. Sparta was too strong to be herself directly attacked; but she might be weakened and isolated, till she was either actually conquered, or else led to think that accession to the League would be the less of two evils. On this point Aratos, Lydiadas, and Aristomachos would be of one mind. To Lydiadas the matter would seem very simple: Sparta was the old enemy of his city; Sparta and Megalopolis had, as usual, border disputes; territory was said to be unjustly detained on either side;[3] the hope of Achaian help against Sparta was doubtless one among the

Different position of Sparta from the cities delivered by Aratos.

[1] Plut. Kl. 3. Ἀπελείποντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ Ἠλεῖοι καὶ ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίοις Ἀρκάδων προσεῖχον — that is, doubtless, Mantineia, Tegea, and Orchomenos. Phigaleia, too, and perhaps some other Arkadian towns, were not yet incorporated. He should also have added Messênê.

[2] See the remarks of Schorn, p. 96.

[3] Plut. Kl. 4. Ἐμβολὴ δὲ τῆς Λακωνικῆς τὸ χωρίον ἐστὶ, καὶ τότε πρὸς τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας ἦν ἐπίδικον. Pol. ii. 46. Τὸ καλούμενον Ἀθήναιον ἐν τῇ τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν χώρᾳ. To the Megalopolitan historian the right of Megalopolis to Athênaion did not seem open to those doubts which were intelligible at the distance of Chairôneia.

objects which had led him to join the League at all. To Aristomachos, if he had in him a spark of the old Argeian spirit, Sparta would be the object of a hatred no less keen than it was to Lydiadas. The day was at last come when the old wrong might be redressed, when Argos, if not, as of old, the head of Peloponnêsos, might at least see Sparta brought down to her own level. The three chief men of the League would thus be agreed, or, if there was a difference, it would be a difference as to the means rather than the end. We can well believe that, while Aratos was weaving his subtle web, Lydiadas and Aristomachos would be clamouring for open war with Lacedæmon, and setting forth the standing border-wrongs of their several cities. To Kleomenês, on the other hand, war was just as acceptable as it could be to the most warlike orator at Aigion. He had not as yet appeared as a revolutionist; he was a young and orderly King, humbly obeying his masters the Ephors. But he was doubtless already meditating his daring plan of carrying out the dreams of Agis with the strong hand. A war in which he might win the popularity and influence which attend a victorious general, a war in which he might show himself forth as the retriever of Sparta's ancient glory, was of all things that which best suited his purpose.[1] He rejoiced at every hostile sign on the Achaian side, and nourished every hostile disposition among his own people. Small as was the actual authority of a Spartan King, all Spartan history shows that his position was one which allowed an able and active prince to acquire a practical influence in the state far beyond the formal extent of his royal powers.[2] Kleomenês, even thus early, was evidently popular and influential; Sparta felt that one of her old Kings, a Leônidas or an Agêsilaos, had again arisen to win back for her her ancient place in the eyes of men.

War acceptable on both sides.

The position of the Ætolian League just at this time is singular and ambiguous. If we may believe Polybios, that is, doubtless, the Autobiography of Aratos, Ætolian intrigue was at the bottom of the whole mischief. The Ætolians, urged by their natural injustice and rapacity,[3] stirred up Kleomenês to

Ambiguous relations of Ætolia to Sparta and to Achaia.

[1] Plut. Kl. 3. Οἰόμενος δ' ἂν ἐν πολέμῳ μᾶλλον ἢ κατ' εἰρήνην μεταστῆσαι τὰ παρόντα συνέκρουσε πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν αὐτοὺς διδόντας ἐγκλημάτων προφάσεις. The whole state of the case could hardly be more tersely expressed. See also Droysen, ii. 478.

[2] See Oxford Essays, 1857, p. 154.

[3] Pol. ii. 45. Αἰτωλοὶ διὰ τὴν ἔμφυτον ἀδικίαν καὶ πλεονεξίαν φθονήσαντες, κ.τ.λ.

make wrongful attacks on the Achaian League; they once more plotted with Macedonia to partition the Achaian cities; it was only Aratos who, by skilfully winning over Antigonos to the Achaian side, saved the League from being overwhelmed by three enemies at once. On the other hand, we have the facts that the two Leagues were still on friendly terms, and that there had been, to say the least, no open war between Achaia and Macedonia since the beginning of the reign of Antigonos. It might be doing the Ætolians too much honour to suppose that a scrupulous regard to the faith of treaties would have kept them back from any aggression which might be convenient at the moment. But there is the fact that the Ætolians did not strike a blow throughout the whole Kleomenic War, even though the Achaians were, at one stage of it at least, at war with their cherished allies of Elis. There is the other fact, which we shall come to presently, that Aratos himself, before he took the final step of asking for Macedonian help, first asked for help from Ætolia. Had the two Leagues been on the same cordial terms on which they were a few years before, that help would never have been refused; but had the Ætolians been such bitter enemies to Achaia as Polybios represents, that help would never have been asked for. In the latter case they would doubtless have taken an open part against the League long before. The truth doubtless is[1] that the Ætolians were jealous of the progress of the Achaian League in Arkadia, but that, just now, Peloponnêsian affairs seemed to them of secondary moment. Their hands appear to have been at this time full of enterprises for extending their power nearer home. They were hostile to Macedonia, and were occupied in some of their Thessalian conquests. This extension of their continuous territory was a more important object than the retention of a few inland towns in Peloponnêsos. They were doubtless well pleased to see the two great Peloponnêsian powers at war with one another; they may even have taken such steps as were likely to embroil them together; but their agency was clearly something quite secondary throughout the matter. It is evident that, in the explanation given by Polybios of the causes of the war, we have not the historian's own statement of matters of fact, but only the best apology which Aratos could think of for his own unpatriotic conduct. In fact, no very remote causes need be sought for to

Inaction of the Ætolians throughout the Kleomenic War.

Ætolian acquisitions in Thessaly.

[1] See Thirlwall, viii. 168.

account for the Kleomenic War; Sparta and Achaia, Kleomenês and Aratos, were shut up within one peninsula; and that was enough.

Spartan acquisition of the Ætolian towns in Arkadia, B.C. 228.

It will be remembered that the Ætolians had certain possessions in Arkadia, the nature of whose relation to the League, whether one of real confederation or of subjection, is not very clear.[1] One of these towns, Mantineia, had, as we have seen, from whatever cause, forsaken the Achaian for the Ætolian connexion. Mantineia now, together with Tegea and Orchomenos, was, on what ground or by what means we know not, induced by Kleomenês[2]—he is already always spoken of as the chief doer of everything—again to exchange the Ætolian for the Lacedæmonian connexion. On what terms these towns were united to Sparta, whether as subjects, as dependents, or as free allies, does not appear. But in any case their new relation was one which involved separation from the Ætolian body. The Ætolians however made no opposition, and formally recognized the right of Sparta to her new acquisitions.[3] Such distant possessions were doubtless felt to be less valuable to the Ætolian League than the certainty of embroiling Sparta and Achaia. For it is evident that their occupation by Sparta was a real ground for alarm on the part of the Achaians. As the territory of the League now stood, these cities seemed naturally designed to make a part of it. As independent commonwealths, or as outlying dependencies of Ætolia, they had doubtless been always looked upon as undesirable neighbours. But it was a far more dangerous state of things now that a long wedge of Lacedæmonian territory had thrust itself in between the two Achaian cantons of Argos and Megalopolis.[4] But however much such a frontier might in Achaian eyes seem to stand in need of rectifi-

Achaian interests involved in this annexation.

[1] Pol. ii. 46. Τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχούσας ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολιτευομένας τότε πόλεις. See above, p. 270.

[2] Ib. Κλεομένους πεπραξικοπηκότος αὐτοὺς [τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς] καὶ παρῃρημένου Τέγεαν, Μαντίνειαν, Ὀρχόμενον.

[3] Ib. Οὐχ οἷον ἀγανακτοῦντας ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀλλὰ καὶ βεβαιοῦντας αὐτῷ [Κλεομένει] τὴν παράληψιν . . . ἑκουσίως παρασπονδουμένους καὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀπολλύντας πόλεις ἐθελοντί. The sentence of which these extracts are parts is one of the longest I know in any language.

[4] "Durch sie war plotzlich das Spartanergebiet tief in den achäischen Bereich hinein vorgeschoben; die Eidgenossenschaft musste inne werden dass sie auf das Gefährlichste bedroht sei." Droysen, ii. 480. So Kortum (iii. 183); "Auch blieb jene [die Eidgenossenschaft der Achaer], welche das Gefährliche einer fremden keilförmig in die Bundesmark hineingeschobenen Ansiedelung vollkommen erkannte, keineswegs ruhige Zuschauerin."

cation, no formal injury was done to the League by the Lacedæmonian occupation of Orchomenos and Tegea, cities which were not, and never had been, members of the Achaian body. Mantineia indeed might, to an Unionist of extreme views, seem deserving of the chastisement of rebellion, but it was rather late in the day to take up such a ground, after quietly seeing the city—seemingly for several years—in Ætolian occupation. But nations and governments are seldom swayed by such considerations of consistency. Any nation, any government, would have been stirred up by seeing the frontier of a rival power suddenly carried into the heart of its territory, and that by the occupation of one district at least to which it could put forth some shadow of legal right. The course taken by Aratos was characteristic. He and the other members of the Achaian Government[1] determined that war should not be declared against Sparta. A declaration of war would have required the summoning of a Federal Assembly and the public discussion of the state of affairs. But it was determined to watch and to hinder the movements of Kleomenês. The mode of watching and hindering was doubtless left to Aratos himself. He began to lay plans for gaining Tegea and Orchomenos by one of his usual nocturnal surprises.[2] The policy of such a scheme is clear. If Tegea and Orchomenos were gained, Mantineia would be isolated, and the rebel city would be at his mercy. The justice of the scheme is another matter. The League was not at war with Tegea, with Orchomenos, or with Sparta, nor were those cities oppressed by Tyrants or occupied by Macedonian garrisons. But Tegea and Orchomenos contained a party favourable to the Achaian connexion,[3] and this, or much less than this, was always enough to blind Aratos to every other consideration, when he had the chance of winning new cities for the League.

Deliberations of the Achaian Government.

Attempt of Aratos on Tegea and Orchomenos.

[1] Pol. ii. 46. Ἔγνω δεῖν εἰς ταῦτα βλέπων οὗτός τε [ὁ Ἄρατος] καὶ πάντες ὁμοίως οἱ προεστῶτες τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτεύματος πολέμου μὲν πρὸς μηδένα κατάρχειν, ἐνίστασθαι δὲ ταῖς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβολαῖς. The joint action of the President and his Cabinet is here well marked. In this particular year it is unlikely that Lydiadas was even in subordinate office.

[2] I follow Bishop Thirlwall in the narrative (viii. 168, 9) which he seems to have put together by a comparison of Plutarch (Kl. 4) and Polybios; that is, of Phylarchos and the Memoirs of Aratos. There is no contradiction between the two, but each naturally dwells on different points in the story. Polybios tells us that the Achaian Government determined to hinder the further progress of Kleomenês; Plutarch tells us in what way it was that they sought to hinder it.

[3] Plutarch (Kl. 4) calls them προδόται, a touch clearly borrowed from Phylarchos.

Kleomenês fortifies Athênaion, B.C. 227.

But Aratos had at last met with his match abroad as well as at home. Kleomenês found out what was going on, and, with the consent of the Ephors, he fortified a place called Athênaion, in the frontier district which was disputed between Sparta and Megalopolis. At the same moment the night attacks on Tegea and Orchomenos failed; the party favourable to Achaia lost heart, and Aratos had to retire amid the jeers of his rival.[1] Kleomenês was anxious for a battle, or at least for what, with the numbers on both sides,[2] would rather have been a skirmish. For this of course Aratos had no mind, and Kleomenês was recalled by the Ephors.

Achaian Declaration of War.

Aratos, on his return home, procured a declaration of war against Sparta, on the ground of the seizure of Athênaion. The passage of this proposal through the several stages of the General and his Cabinet, the Senate, and the Public Assembly, is, happily for our knowledge of the Achaian constitution, described by the historian with more than usual formality.[3]

The language of Polybios would lead us to believe that the Assembly at which war was declared was an Extraordinary Meeting summoned for the purpose. It was probably not till after the declaration that Aratos was enabled once more to enlarge the League by the acquisition of a new, though not a very important, member. He got possession of the Arkadian town of Kaphyai.[4] If, as seems likely, Kaphyai was then in the position of a subject district of Orchomenos, its citizens would doubtless embrace with delight the opportunity of entering the Achaian Union as an independent state. War now began in earnest; but the first important campaign fell in a year when Aratos was not at the head of the Federal armies.

Aratos annexes Kaphyai to the League.

Generalship of Aristo-

It was the year when Aristomachos, the Ex-Tyrant of Argos, was General. The election of Aristomachos at such a moment

[1] See the curious correspondence in Plutarch (u.s.). It would be a relief if diplomatic dispatches were more commonly written in so amusing a style.

[2] Plut. u.s. Κλεομένει μετὰ ἱππέων ὀλίγων καὶ πεζῶν τριακοσίων ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ στρατοπεδευομένῳ.

[3] Pol. ii. 46. Τότε δὴ συναθροίσαντες τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔκριναν μετὰ τῆς βουλῆς ἀναλαμβάνειν φανερῶς τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἀπέχθειαν.

[4] Plut. Kl. 4. Plutarch does not mention the declaration of war, Polybios does not mention the taking of Kaphyai, but this seems the most natural order of events, if the Meeting at which war was declared was an Extraordinary one. If Kaphyai was taken before the declaration, it would be easier to suppose that war was declared at the regular Spring Meeting, when Aristomachos was elected General.

machos, B.C. 227–6.

merits some consideration. There could not be a stronger proof of the bitterness of the feud between Aratos and Lydiadas. War had been declared on account of a violation of the Megalopolitan territory; a Megalopolitan citizen was one of the foremost men of the League; he had thrice filled the office of General; we cannot doubt that he aspired to it a fourth time; we cannot doubt that he would have the strong support of his own city, now that the main business of the General would be to defend the Megalopolitan territory. Everything, one would have thought, specially pointed to Lydiadas as the man fitted above all others to be the General of this important year. But his claims were rejected, and the defence of Megalopolis and of all Achaia was entrusted to that very Aristomachos, the glory of whose admission to the League had been so unfairly snatched by Aratos from Lydiadas himself. Many men and many cities have deserted the cause of their country on much slighter provocation. We can well believe that Kleomenês would willingly have purchased the alliance or the neutrality of Megalopolis by the surrender of the petty territory in dispute. It is even possible that Kleomenês was, in the plan of his campaign, partly guided by that subtle policy which has often led invading generals to spare the lands of their special rivals.[1] An attack on Megalopolis would seem the natural object for a Spartan commander in such a campaign, as indeed the later course of the war plainly shows. But Kleomenês first carried his arms into the territory of Argos, the country of the newly-elected General, and though he seized on one point, Methydrion, in the Megalopolitan district, yet it was one in a remote part of the Canton, and which did not immediately threaten the capital. One can hardly avoid the suspicion that Kleomenês was expecting either to gain over Lydiadas and his countrymen, or at least to discredit them with the other members of the League. If so, his policy utterly failed; not a word of secession was breathed by the Megalopolitan leader or his countrymen. As for Aristomachos, his fault was that he was afraid to act independenly of Aratos.[2]

Designs of Kleomenês.

[1] The most famous cases are those of Archidamos and Periklês, Thuc. ii. 13; and of Hannibal and Fabius, Liv. xxii. 23. Plut. Fab. 7. Others are collected by the commentators on Justin, iii. 7. Tacitus (Hist. v. 23) calls it *nota ars ducum*.

[2] The narrative has here to be made up from two accounts in Plutarch. Ar. 35 and Kl. 4.

Campaign of Aristomachos.

He took the field with an army far superior in number to the enemy,[1] whom he naturally wished to engage. But he did not venture to do so without consulting his patron. Aratos was at Athens, on what business we know not, and he wrote thence strongly warning the General against running such terrible risk. Aristomachos was a brave man, and was now high in popular favour;[2] he was anxious to distinguish his Generalship by some exploit, and even aspired to an invasion of Lakonia. The temptation to do something might have been too strong for Aristomachos to resist, had not Aratos now appeared in person, and, as it would seem, pretty well relieved[3] the constitutional chief of the League of his command. The two armies met face to face near Pallantion, between Megalopolis and Tegea; but Aratos seems to have thought that one Spartan would be more than a match for four Achaians, and the host of the League departed without striking a blow. A loud cry of indignation was raised against the cowardly meddler who had hindered the General of the League from doing his duty with every prospect of success.[4] That Lydiadas was foremost in such accusations[5] we are not surprised to hear. So loudly did public opinion make itself heard against Aratos that the Megalopolitan chief ventured on a step on which no man, probably, had ever ventured before. The Generalship in alternate years had, with one doubtful exception,[6] belonged to Aratos ever since he had been General at all; it was enough if Markos or Dioitas or Lydiadas or Aristomachos held the office when Aratos could not legally do so; no man had yet appeared as an opposition candidate when Aratos himself could lawfully stand. Now, trusting to the general feeling aroused by the disgrace of Pallantion, Lydiadas ventured on this extreme course; he stood forward, at the next Federal election, as a candidate to succeed

Battle hindered by the interference of Aratos.

Indignation against Aratos.

Lydiadas stands against Aratos for the

[1] The Achaians had 20,000 foot and 1000 horse; the Lacedæmonians were under 5000. Kl. 4.

[2] Ar. 35. Εὐημερῶν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς καὶ βουλόμενος εἰς τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐμβαλεῖν.

[3] Ib. Ὡρμημένου δὲ πάντως [τοῦ Ἀριστομάχου] ὑπήκουσεν [ὁ Ἄρατος] καὶ παρὼν συνεστράτευεν. Kl. 4. Φοβηθεὶς τὴν τόλμαν ὁ Ἄρατος οὐκ εἴασε διακινδυνεῦσαι τὸν στρατηγόν.

[4] Kl. 4. Ἀπῆλθε λοιδορούμενος μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, χλευαζόμενος δὲ καὶ καταφρονούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οὐδὲ πεντακισχιλίων τὸ πλῆθος ὄντων. This clearly comes from Phylarchos.

[5] Ar. 35. Ὑπὸ Λυδιάδου κατηγορήθη. Was this a legal impeachment, or merely an opposition speech in the Assembly?

[6] See note to Chapter viii.

Aristomachos in the Generalship.[1] But the indignation of the Achaian people against Aratos was never a very lasting feeling; he had the same gift of recovering a lost reputation that he had of retrieving a lost battle. Lydiadas stood for the Generalship in vain; the force of habit was too strong; to elect Aratos in alternate years was so old a prescriptive custom that it seemed to have the force of law. And thus the man who dared not look an enemy in the face on the field of battle was for the twelfth[2] time chosen General of the Achaians.

General-ship, B.C. 226.

Twelfth (?) General-ship of Aratos, B.C. 226–5.

The campaign opened by an attack on Elis on the part of Aratos.[3] How the Eleians had become engaged in the war does not appear.[4] Their close connexion with Ætolia would seem to show either that the Northern League was already looked upon as hostile, or else that the Ætolians were held to be so completely occupied with Thessalian and Macedonian affairs that their hostility was not dreaded. The Eleians are not said to have asked for help from Ætolia, but they did obtain help from Sparta. Kleomenês marched to their aid; the Achaian army was now on its return from Elis,[5] and its course seems to show either that Aratos entertained offensive designs against Sparta or else that he found it necessary to take measures for the safety of Megalopolis. The two armies met unexpectedly near Mount Lykaion, in the western part of the Megalopolitan territory; Aratos could not avoid a battle; the Achaians were utterly routed; Aratos himself escaped, but for several days he was believed to be dead, just as after his former defeat at Phylakia.[6] This battle, one of the most disgraceful failures of Aratos, was characteristically followed by one of his most brilliant successes. He had lost a great battle; he would atone for it by recovering a great city. With such portions of his scattered army as he could collect, he marched straight upon Mantineia, where no one expected an attack from a routed army

Aratos' campaign in Elis.

Kleomenês defeats Aratos at Mount Lykaion.

Aratos surprises Mantineia.

[1] Ar. 35. Περὶ τῆς στρατηγίας εἰς ἀγῶνα καὶ ἀντιπαραγγελίαν αὐτῷ [Λυδιάδη] καταστὰς [ὁ Ἄρατος] ἐκράτησε τῇ χειροτονίᾳ καὶ τὸ δωδέκατον ἠρέθη στρατηγός.

[2] According to the reckoning of Plutarch. I shall elsewhere give reasons for supposing that it was more probably the tenth.

[3] Plut. Kl. 5.

[4] "Die Aitolier hâben ihren alten Verbündeten keinen Beistand geleistet; war es nur ein Raubzug, den Arat gemacht? oder versuchte er auch die Elier zum Eintritt in den Bund zu nöthigen?" Droysen, ii. 482.

[5] Plut. Kl. 5. Περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον ἀπιοῦσιν ἤδη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐπιβάλων ἄπαν μὲν ἐτρέψατο καὶ διεπτόησεν αὐτῶν τὸ στράτευμα.

[6] Ib. Ar. 36 (cf. 34).

and a dead General. The city was taken, probably not without some co-operation from an Achaian party within.[1] This was the first time that the League had to deal with a city guilty of the sin of Secession. But Aratos treated the conquered Mantineia almost as gently as he had treated the rescued Sikyôn or Corinth.[2]

Mantineia readmitted to the League,

He summoned a Mantinean Assembly; he neither inflicted nor threatened any hardship; he simply called on the citizens to resume their old rights and their old duties as members of the Achaian League. But he did not trust wholly either to their gratitude or to their good faith. There was at Mantineia a class of inhabitants[3] who did not possess the full political franchise. These Aratos at once raised to the rank of citizens.

with some changes in its constitution,

He thus formed a strong additional party, attached by every tie of interest and gratitude to himself and to the Union. From a Mantinean commonwealth thus reconstituted it was not difficult to obtain a petition to the Federal Government[4]

[1] The expressions *κατὰ κράτος* (Pol. ii. 57) and the like do not exclude this supposition, which is so probable in itself.

[2] I again form my narrative from the different statements of Polybios (ii. 57, 58) and Plutarch (Kl. 5. Ar. 36). Here too the colouring is different, but there is no actual contradiction. Plutarch does not enlarge on the free pardon given to the revolted city, on which Polybios is so emphatic; neither does Polybios mention the changes in the Mantinean constitution which Plutarch distinctly records.

[3] Plut. Ar. 36. *Τοὺς μετοίκους πολίτας ἐποίησεν αὐτῶν.* What *μέτοικος* means at Athens everybody knows. Everything at Athens fostered the growth of a large class of resident foreigners, whose children, though born in Attica, were, according to Greek notions, no more citizens than their fathers. Thus there arose at Athens, mainly in the city itself and its ports, a large class, personally free, but enjoying no political rights. But can we conceive the growth of any large class of *μέτοικοι* in this sense in an inland city like Mantineia? One is tempted to think that Plutarch here uses the word *μέτοικος* loosely, in much the same sense as *περίοικος*. He seems to do the same in a following chapter (38), where he speaks of Kleomenês as *πολλοὺς τῶν μετοίκων ἐμβαλὼν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν.* Now any large class of *μέτοικοι* in the Attic sense is still less likely to have existed at Sparta than at Mantineia. And in the parallel passage in the Life of Kleomenês (c. 11) Plutarch himself says, *ἀναπληρώσας τὸ πολίτευμα τοῖς χαριεστάτοις τῶν περιοίκων.* I am therefore inclined to think that these Mantinean *μέτοικοι* were really *περίοικοι,* inhabitants of districts subject to Mantineia, like those subject to Megalopolis and other cities spoken of already. See above, p. 200. According to Appian (Mithr. 48), Mithridatês, besides the usual policy of enfranchising slaves and abolishing debts, gave citizenship to the *μέτοικοι* in the Asiatic cities which submitted to him. This reads like the proceedings of Aratos at Mantineia, but the existence of a considerable class of *μέτοικοι* in the Attic sense is far more likely in the great commercial cities of Asia than in an inland Arkadian town.

[4] Pol. ii. 58. *Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, προορώμενοι τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς στάσεις καὶ τὰς ὑπ' Αἰτωλῶν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιβουλὰς, πρεσβεύσαντες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἠξίωσαν*

asking for a permanent Federal garrison.[1] Polybios extolls, and it was natural that he should extol, the wonderful magnanimity of the Achaians and their General towards the revolted city. Undoubtedly it stands out in honourable contrast to the cruel treatment of revolted dependencies at the hands of Athens. But he does not clearly bring forward the fact that this magnanimity was mainly exercised on behalf of the Achaian party in Mantineia itself. Indiscriminate massacres or banishments in a city where there was one class already favourable to the League, and another which could easily be attached to it, would have been no less impolitic than cruel. It was enough to change the constitution in a way at once liberal in itself and favourable to Achaian interests, and to secure the domination of the Achaian party by the presence of a Federal garrison.

and secured by the presence of a Federal garrison.

The loss of Mantineia was a heavy blow to the Spartan interests, at least as Spartan interests were understood by Kleomenês. Now that Mantineia was again Achaian, Orchomenos was left quite isolated, and the hold on Arkadia which had been gained by the possession of the three contiguous districts was utterly lost. There was a party in Sparta, of whom the Ephors were at the head, who opposed the war, and who doubtless looked with special jealousy upon the young conqueror of Lykaion. The loss of Mantineia depressed the national spirit; and it required the use of every sort of influence[2] on the part of Kleomenês to obtain leave from the

Results of the recovery of Mantineia.

Temporary depression at Sparta.

δοῦναι παραφυλακὴν αὐτοῖς. This seems to imply a petition to the Achaian Assembly (such is the general meaning of οἱ Ἀχαιοί) or at any rate to the Senate, and some little time must have elapsed between the taking of the city and the sending and answering of such a message. Plutarch (Ar. 36) says that Aratos φρουρὰν ἐνέβαλε (so in Kl. 5, εἶλε τὴν πόλιν καὶ κατέσχε) before he goes on to mention anything else. Probably Aratos left some troops at once, as a mere military precaution, and this more solemn embassy came somewhat later.

For Mantineia, now once more a city of the League, to send Ambassadors (πρεσβεύσαντες) to the League, as if to a foreign state, has an odd sound, but we shall find the expression again. Why, it may be asked, could not the business be despatched by those Mantinean citizens who might attend the Assembly? Probably, when a city of the League wished to obtain some special object at the hands of the National Government, it was thought that more weight would attach to the demand, if it were made by citizens specially deputed by the State Government, than if it were brought forward as an ordinary motion by those citizens who might be present in their Federal capacity. [In Art. 81 of the Swiss Bundesverfassung, it is specially provided that the Initiative which belongs to every individual member of the Nationalrath and of the Ständerath may be also exercised by the Cantons, by correspondence.]

[1] On the Achaian Federal garrisons, see above, p. 242.

[2] He is said to have bribed the Ephors; his mother Kratêsikleia married

Ephors to continue the war. But it was continued.[1] Kleomenês now directly attacked Megalopolis; he took the border town of Leuktra, and threatened the Great City itself. Aratos could not refuse help, and the whole force of the League marched to its defence. Close under the walls of Megalopolis, at a place called Ladokeia, the armies again met face to face. Aratos again shrank from battle. Lydiadas and his countrymen demanded it; they at least would not tamely see their lands ravaged, their city, it might be, taken, because an incompetent commander had been preferred to their own gallant and true-hearted hero. And doubtless the men of Megalopolis did not stand alone; in the wide compass of the League other cities must have sent forth warriors as little disposed as Lydiadas himself to turn themselves back in the day of battle. The fight began; the Lacedæmonians were driven to their camp by the light Achaian troops; the heavy-armed were marching to support their brethren, now broken in the pursuit, and perhaps engaged in plunder.[2] But when they reached a torrent-bed, the heart of Aratos failed him, and he made them halt on the brink. This was too much for the gallant soul of Lydiadas; to be called on, at the bidding of a successful rival, to throw away a victory at the very gates of his native city, was a sacrifice to strict military discipline which it was hardly in human nature to offer.[3] He denounced

Battle of LADOKEIA, B.C. 226.

the powerful Megistonous in order to secure his influence on her son's side. Here also comes in the story of Archidamos, the King of the other house, murdered, some said by Kleomenês, some said by the Ephors. I will not enter at large into the question, but I see nothing to inculpate Kleomenês. I must again, on matters not immediately bearing on Federal history, refer generally to the History of Bishop Thirlwall. See also Droysen, ii. 484, 5.

[1] Droysen (ii. 483) infers, though doubtfully, that a truce was concluded with the League. But this rests only on the expression of Pausanias (viii. 27. 15), Κλεομένης ὁ Λεωνίδου Μεγάλην πόλιν κατέλαβεν ἐν σπονδαῖς. But Pausanias deals with the history of Kleomenês much as he deals with the history of Agis. The battle of Ladokeia and the death of Lydiadas in B.C. 226 are jumbled up with the capture of Megalopolis by Kleomenês in B.C. 222.

[2] Plut. Ar. 37. Περὶ τὰς σκηνὰς διασπαρέντων.

[3] Schorn (p. 110) seems to expect it of him. Helwing (p. 131), the worshipper of Aratos, gets quite indignant that any one should doubt his hero's valour. "Lysiades aber, der beständige Gegner des Arat, beschuldigte den Feldherrn, der bei Sikyon, Korinth, und Argos genugsam persönliche Tapferkeit bewiesen hatte, offen der Feigheit," etc. In the next page Lydiadas is "der unvorsichtige Lysiades," "der unbesonnene Befehlshaber," etc. It is hard for a brave and good man to be maligned after so many ages.

the cowardice of the General; he called on all around him not to lose a victory which was already in their hands; he at least would not desert his country; let those who would not see Lydiadas die fighting alone against the enemy follow him to a certain triumph.[1] At the head of his cavalry[2] he dashed on, but at the head of his cavalry alone; the Lacedæmonian right wing gave way before them; the ardour of pursuit carried them upon ground unsuited for the action of horse; the fugitives turned; they were reinforced by other divisions of their army,[3] and by the King in person; and, after a sharp struggle, Lydiadas fell fighting within sight of the walls of Megalopolis.[4] The rout of the cavalry followed the loss of their chief, and the rout of the cavalry carried with it the rout of the heavy-armed, who seem to have stood all the while on the other side of the torrent-bed, without striking a blow or advancing a step. The victory on the side of Kleomenês was complete; the Achaians fled in every quarter; and their army finally marched away, bitterly accusing the cowardice of Aratos, and openly charging him with the wilful betrayal of his valiant rival.[5] The charge was doubtless groundless; Aratos acted at Ladokeia only as he acted in all his battles; the torrent-bed and the enemy together were obstacles too fearful to be encountered, and personal courage and common sense alike deserted him. Lydiadas was left to perish by an act of combined cowardice and folly, but there is no reason to believe that, while he was fighting in the forefront of the hottest battle, the Achaian phalanx was bidden to retire from him that he might be smitten and die. But the noblest spirit of the League was gone; the best life of the nation was sacrificed to the incompetence of its chief; Lydiadas had fallen, and it was left for an enemy to honour him. The hero of Sparta could recognize a worthy foe in the hero of Megalopolis;

Death of Lydiadas.

Utter defeat of the Achaians.

Indignation against Aratos.

[1] Plut. Ar. 37. Ὁ δὲ Λυδιάδης περιπαθῶν πρὸς τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὸν Ἄρατον κακίζων ἀνεκαλεῖτο τοὺς ἱππεῖς ὡς αὐτόν.

[2] Was Lydiadas ἱππάρχης of the League, or only commander of a Megalopolitan contingent?

[3] Plut. Kl. 6. Ὁ Κλεομένης ἀνῆκε τοὺς Ταραντίνους καὶ τοὺς Κρῆτας ἐπ' αὐτόν. That is, not natives of Tarentum, nor necessarily natives of Crete, but descriptions of troops so called, like modern Hussars and Zouaves. See Thirlwall, viii. 298.

[4] Plut. Ar. 37. Ἔπεσε λαμπρῶς ἀγωνισάμενος τὸν κάλλιστον τῶν ἀγώνων ἐπὶ θύραις τῆς πατρίδος.

[5] Ib. Αἰτίαν δὲ μεγάλην ὁ Ἄρατος ἔλαβε δόξας προέσθαι τὸν Λυδιάδην.

and the body of Lydiadas, clothed in purple and with a garland of victory on his brow, was sent by Kleomenês to the gates of the Great City.[1] The robe of royalty which he had thrown away in life might fittingly adorn his corpse, now that he had gone to the Island of the Blessed to dwell with Achilleus and Diomêdês and all the Zeus-born Kings of old.

Assembly at Aigion.

Almost immediately after the defeat of Ladokeia an Assembly was held at Aigion. The account of it in our only narrative reads as if the army had itself formed this Assembly, or had compelled the General to summon it against his will.[2] Never had the Achaian people come together with such feelings of indignation against their Chief Magistrate. Bitter indeed must have been their regret when they remembered the results of their last election. Aratos had been preferred to Lydiadas; and now the choice of Aratos had led to two disgraceful defeats, and Lydiadas was gone, some said betrayed to death by his rival, at any rate sacrificed to his rival's cowardice and incompetence. The indignation of the Assembly spent itself in a strange vote, which, while it shows their intense present dissatisfaction with their General, shows also the marvellous sort of fascination which he had acquired over the national mind. The Assembly passed a resolution that, if Aratos thought good to go on with the war, he must do it at his own cost; the Achaian nation would give no more contributions and would pay no more mercenaries.[3] This vote is not to be looked upon as a mere sarcasm. Aratos had carried on so many wars at his own cost and risk that for him to carry on a private war with Sparta seemed a thing by no means impossible. It would only be doing on a great scale what they had over and over again seen him do on a smaller one. They would not take upon themselves to run directly counter to his judgement on a matter of war and peace; he might, if he chose, go on with the war in his own style; he might win over Orchomenos or Tegea or Sparta herself either by diplomatic wiles or by nocturnal surprises; his own wealth and the contributions of King Ptolemy might possibly supply

Strange vote of censure on Aratos.

[1] Plut. Kl. 6.

[2] Ib. Ar. 37. Βιασθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀπερχομένων πρὸς ὀργὴν ἠκολούθησεν αὐτοῖς εἰς Αἴγιον.

[3] Ib. Ἐκεῖ δὲ συνελθόντες ἐψηφίσαντο μὴ διδόναι χρήματα αὐτῷ μηδὲ μισθοφόρους τρέφειν, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ πορίζειν, εἰ δέοιτο πολεμεῖν.

him with the means; if they did, the Federal Assembly would not stand in his way; but it should be his war and not that of the Achaian people; they would neither serve themselves, nor yet pay mercenaries, merely that Kleomenês might set up trophies against Aratos. Some such line of thought as this would seem to be the most natural explanation of a resolution, which at first sight seems the very strangest ever passed by a sovereign Assembly.

Aratos contemplates resignation.

Aratos was naturally bitterly mortified at this vote of the Assembly. His first impulse was to resign his office—to lay down his seal[1]—and to leave those who censured him to take the management of affairs into their own hands. But on second thoughts he determined to bear up against the popular indignation. The very terms of the resolution showed his extraordinary influence over the nation, and that influence was, before long, busily at work again. Deference to Aratos was too old a habit for the League to throw off, and the national indignation had no doubt in a great measure spent itself in the mere passing of the vote of censure.[2] Before long that vote was either formally or practically rescinded, and Aratos again, in the year of Lykaion and Ladokeia, found himself at the head of an Achaian army. Orchomenos was now, after the recovery of Mantineia, the natural object of attack;[3] Aratos did not take the town, but he gained some advantages over the Spartan troops in its territory. By the end of the official year, he seems to have been as powerful as ever. When the time of the elections came round, the office of General fell, not to Aristomachos—he might possibly have taken an independent course—but to a certain Hyperbatas, who is described as a mere instrument of Aratos,[4] and who was doubtless chosen at his nomination.

He recovers his influence.

Generalship of Hyperbatas, B.C. 225–4.

Kleomenês' Revolution at Sparta, B.C. 225.

The year of Hyperbatas is also the year of Kleomenês' revolution at Sparta. Its details belong to Spartan history; for our subject it is important mainly on account of the increased strength which it gave to the Spartan King in his

[1] Plut. Ar. 38. *Ἀποθέσθαι τὴν σφραγῖδα.* See above, p. 234.

[2] Compare the remarks of Grote, vi. 337.

[3] But why did not Kleomenês attack Megalopolis immediately after Ladokeia?

[4] Plut. Kl. 14. *Ἐστρατήγει μὲν γὰρ Ὑπερβατᾶς τότε, τοῦ δὲ Ἀράτου τὸ πᾶν ἦν κράτος ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς.*

war with the League. Up to this moment he had had to manage how he best could a body of Magistrates who disliked the war, and who were specially jealous of himself. When the one blow had been struck, Sparta and her King could put forth their full strength. The revolution itself came as a sort of episode in the war. Kleomenês was marching to and fro through Arkadia, he took Hêraia on the confines of Elis and Alea on the confines of Phlious;[1] he introduced supplies into Orchomenos; he pitched his camp near Mantineia; thence, with a chosen band, he hastened to Sparta, slew the Ephors, justified himself to the people, enfranchised a multitude of new citizens, divided the lands, and marched back into Arkadia, the chief of a regenerated Lacedæmonian people, to plunder at will the lands of Megalopolis and to receive the voluntary surrender of Mantineia. The Lacedæmonian party in that city had now recovered its superiority; the Achaian garrison was massacred or expelled;[2] Kleomenês was introduced by night, and, in the language of the party now dominant, the ancient laws and constitution of Mantineia were restored.[3] That is, the city became again attached to Sparta instead of to the League, and the citizens enfranchised by Aratos probably lost their newly-acquired rights. Unchecked at home and successful abroad, Kleomenês now ventured to carry the seat of war into the enemy's own hearth and home. Passing through the whole breadth of Arkadia, he entered the old Achaia, and at a place called Hekatombaion, in the canton of Dymê, in the very north-west corner of Peloponnêsos, he met the Achaian army, under the nominal command of Hyperbatas, but under the dominant guidance of Aratos. A total defeat, yet more overwhelming than all that had gone before,[4] was the result of this first meeting of Achaians and Spartans upon Old-Achaian ground.

His successes in Arkadia.

Mantineia revolts to Kleomenês.

Third victory of Kleomenês at Hekatombaion, B.C. 224.

[1] Plut. Kl. 7.

[2] Massacred according to Polybios (that is Aratos), ii. 58; expelled, according to Plutarch (that is Phylarchos), Kl. 14.

[3] Plut. Kl. 14. *Τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἀποδούς.*

[4] Polybios (ii. 51) clearly distinguishes the three defeats of Lykaion, Ladokeia, and Hekatombaion as three stages in a climax. *Οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠλαττώθησαν περὶ τὸ Λύκαιον συμπλακέντες κατὰ πορείαν τῷ Κλεομένει, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐκ παρατάξεως ἠττήθησαν ἐν τοῖς Λαδοκείοις καλουμένοις τῆς Μεγαλοπολίτιδος, ὅτε καὶ Λυδιάδας ἔπεσεν, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὁλοσχερῶς ἔπταισαν ἐν τῇ Δυμαίᾳ περὶ τὸ καλούμενον Ἑκατόμβαιον πανδημεὶ διακινδυνεύοντες.*

Aratos now utterly lost heart.[1] For years he had been the chief of the League, the first man of Peloponnêsos and of all independent Greece. He had done and suffered more in the cause of Grecian freedom than any man of his own age, almost more than any man of any other age. There was no longer a Tyrant or a foreign garrison from Thermopylæ to Tainaron. The worst faults that could be laid to his charge were a certain unscrupulousness as to means while pursuing the most glorious of ends, and an unwillingness, after a long career of undivided power, to share his commanding position with another. This he had shown alike in his domestic rivalry with Lydiadas and in his foreign rivalry with Kleomenês. He had led the League into a war with Sparta, in which the Achaian arms had been utterly unsuccessful. It was now clear that, whatever might be the result of the struggle, Sparta would never stoop to become a single city of the League, and that Kleomenês would never willingly be anything but, what he now was, the first man of Peloponnêsos. For the League to continue the war by its own unassisted force was utterly hopeless; another such campaign as those of the last three years would throw all Peloponnêsos at the feet of the conqueror. And Kleomenês was not only winning battles, he was also everywhere winning hearts. We may feel sure that Aratos, besides his national and personal rivalry, honestly condemned the proceedings of the Spartan chief. In his eyes he was a bloody and usurping revolutionist; he had changed himself from a lawful King into a Tyrant;[2] he had ventured on the final stroke of revolution, the general redistribution of lands. To a politician like Aratos, whose feelings were essentially conservative and aristocratic, nothing could seem more to be abhorred or more to be dreaded. The general opinion of Greece was evidently quite otherwise. Kleomenês appeared as something different from domestic Tyrants, from

Position of Aratos.

[1] The state of things at this time is set forth by Droysen (ii. 496 et seqq.) with his usual power and eloquence. But he is, as usual, unduly hard both upon the League and upon Aratos personally.

[2] Pol. ii. 47. Τοῦ μὲν Κλεομένους τό τε πάτριον πολίτευμα καταλύσαντος, καὶ τὴν ἔννομον βασιλείαν εἰς τυραννίδα μεταστήσαντος, χρωμένου δὲ καὶ τῷ πολέμῳ πρακτικῶς καὶ παραβόλως. Paus. ii. 9. 1. Κλεομένης . . . . Παυσανίαν ἐμιμεῖτο τυραννίδος τε ἐπιθυμῶν καὶ νόμοις τοῖς καθεστηκόσιν οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος. A string of the usual charges follow. The introduction of Pausanias at least is singularly unlucky. The Achaian view of Kleomenês reminds one of the Papal view of Manfred or the Norman view of Harold.

Popularity of Kleomenês.

Macedonian conquerors, or even from veteran diplomatists like Aratos himself. The hero-King, the model of every soldier-like virtue,[1] was something more attractive than any of them. Instead of founding a Tyranny, he had put one down;[2] he had restored both himself and his people to their ancient rights; his very division of lands was not a revolutionary interference with private property, it was the restitution of a lawful state of things which only modern corruptions had done away with.[3] There was in every city a party which only wished that Kleomenês would come and divide the land there too as well as at Sparta. Even the leading men, those who filled the Senate and the subordinate magistracies, and who had the predominant influence in the Assembly, were getting sick of the long-continued rule of a single man, a rule which had of late led only to such unparalleled national dishonour.[4] Men were weary of Aratos, weary of the war; if the war went on much longer with Aratos at its head, the League was clearly doomed. Each city would make what terms it could with the conqueror, rather than go on submitting to defeat after defeat, in the cause of the League, or, more truly, in the cause of its General. The cry for peace on any reasonable terms became universal throughout the Achaian cities.

General dissatisfaction with Aratos.

Position of Kleomenês.

Kleomenês, on the other hand, was nowise disposed to push the League to extremities. That he had joyfully entered upon the war there can be no doubt; but he could say with perfect truth that he had been forced to enter upon it by the attempts of Aratos upon Tegea and Orchomenos. The war on his part had been a series of victories. He had won three pitched battles; he had taken several fortresses and smaller towns; and, if he had lost one great city, he had recovered it with its own good

[1] See the description of his camp, Plut. Kl. 12, 13.

[2] See his speech to the Lacedæmonian people, Plut. Kl. 10.

[3] Whether an equal division of lands had ever really existed at Sparta is another matter; the point is that men believed that it had existed, and that Agis and Kleomenês professed to be only restoring the ancient and lawful state of things. See Grote, ii. 521–7, cf. 465. Kortüm (iii. 186 et al.), through forgetfulness of this distinction, misrepresents the position of Kleomenês and his party, as if they were at all like modern Socialists.

[4] Plut. Kl. 17. Ἐγεγόνει δὲ κίνημα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀπόστασιν ὥρμησαν αἱ πόλεις, τῶν μὲν δήμων νομήν τε χώρας καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐλπισάντων, τῶν δὲ πρώτων πολλαχοῦ βαρυνομένων τὸν Ἄρατον. This description indeed belongs to a later time, when the tendency to secession had become much stronger, but the causes of discontent here mentioned must have already been busily at work.

will. He was in a position to dictate what terms he chose, but neither inclination nor policy prompted him to dictate severe terms. The main object of both sides was, in a certain sense, the same. Both Aratos and Kleomenês wished to unite all Greece, at any rate all Peloponnêsos, into one free Greek Commonwealth. That they differed irreconcilably as to the form which such a Commonwealth should take was only the natural result of their several positions. Aratos, a republican leader, sought to bring about the union through the forms of a republican Confederation, and, had not Sparta been so incomparably greater than any other Peloponnêsian city, he would probably have succeeded in so doing. Kleomenês, a hereditary King of Sparta, started with the greatness of Sparta and her King as his first principle; he would unite Peloponnêsos by joining the Achaian League, but he would join it only with Sparta for its recognized chief city, and with the Spartan King for its recognized constitutional head.[1] That he wished to establish a Kingdom of Greece,[2] in the sense that there was a Kingdom of Macedonia, and had been a Kingdom of Epeiros, seems in no wise probable. It is far more likely that he wished to fall back upon the state of things which had existed in the days of Sparta's truest greatness, before the Peloponnêsian War. In that state of things the Harmost, the garrison, and the Dekarchy were unknown; Sparta was the constitutional president of a body of free allies. Those allies were perfectly independent in their separate governments; they did not surrender the right of separate war and peace with states not belonging to the Confederacy; each state had a voice, and an equal voice,[3] in deciding the policy of the Confederacy itself. But Sparta was still a recognized and effective head; the Spartan people deliberated apart, like a Senate, before the opinions of the other allies were asked;[4] the Spartan King was the hereditary General-in-chief of the forces of the whole alliance. This was probably the sort of supremacy which Kleomenês demanded for himself and his city. Such a supremacy would of course be utterly fatal to the most cherished principles of the Achaian constitution. The

Schemes of Kleomenês.

Probable nature of the supremac claimed by him.

[1] Plut. Kl. 15. Ἐκέλευεν αὐτῷ παραδιδόναι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν.

[2] As Schorn (p. 115) seems to think, but there is much force and truth in his general description of the position of Kleomenês.

[3] See Thuc. i. 125. So 141, πάντες τε ἰσόψηφοι ὄντες.

[4] See ib. 79, 87, 119. Cf. Grote, vi. 105.

Inconsistent with the Achaian Constitution,

but moderate under the circumstances.

Attractions of the Achaian name to a Hêrakleid King.

essential equality of the cities would be destroyed; the chief of one city, and that chief a hereditary King, would possess the powers which had hitherto belonged to a magistrate yearly chosen by the votes of all. For it is evident that, were such a supremacy once recognized in Sparta, if the League continued to elect a Federal General at all, he would be for the future a mere Vicegerent of the Lacedæmonian King. The demands of Kleomenês were such as the Achaians could not be expected to agree to till they had undergone so severe a discipline at his hands; but they were demands which could not but be looked upon as mild and generous when proceeding from one by whom such a discipline had been inflicted. The demands of Kleomenês did not require that the League should be dissolved, or that any of its members should become Lacedæmonian subjects; he did not claim to increase the Spartan territory, or to enrich the Spartan treasury, at its expense; he was ready to restore conquests which he might have annexed to his own dominions, and to release captives whom he might have sold towards defraying the expenses of the war.[1] The League was to exist, it was apparently to retain its name and position as an Achaian League; but he, Kleomenês King of the Lacedæmonians, was to become its chief. We must remember that Kleomenês, as a Hêrakleid, was himself of old Achaian blood,[2] and that he had largely enfranchised the subject population of Lakônia, doubtless, in some measure at least, of Achaian blood also.[3] The Achaian name was consecrated by all the old associations of the Homeric poems; Kleomenês might dream that he was setting up again the throne of Tyndareôs or of Agamemnôn, and that he was about to reign, as an Achaian King, over the Achaian cities of Sparta and Argos and Mykênê. He proposed a scheme less noble and generous, it may be, than the pure republicanism of

[1] Plut. Kl. 15. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους εὐθὺς ἀποδώσων καὶ τὰ χωρία.

[2] Ὦ γύναι, ἀλλ' οὐ Δωριεύς εἰμι ἀλλ' Ἀχαιός, says the earlier Kleomenês to the Athenian Priestess (Herod. v. 72). If Mr. Blakesley be at all right in his explanation of the designs of that Kleomenês in Herod. vi. 74, they were not so very different from those which I attribute to the great Kleomenês. But Mr. Grote (v. 59) takes a view which is easier and simpler, and at least I do not understand Mr. Blakesley's chronology, when he talks of "The Achæan League of nearly 400 years later"—than B.C. 509. Professor Rawlinson, as usual when the civilized world is concerned, gives no help.

[3] This of course partly depends on the view taken of the origin of the Lakônian Perioikoi. Mr. Grote (ii. 491) holds them to have been Dorian, contrary to the general opinion.

Aratos in his best days, but a scheme as noble and generous as a conquering King ever proposed to conquered enemies; a scheme which was at least better for Peloponnêsos than to become a dependency of Macedon, or to be again parcelled out among local Tyrants.

Aratos looked on things with different eyes. We have now reached the time when the deliverer of Greece was so strangely transformed into her betrayer. Rather than submit to the slightest supremacy on the part of Kleomenês, he would call in Antigonos to protect the League against him. He would undo his own work; he would again bring Macedonian armies into Peloponnêsos; he would even endure to see a Macedonian garrison holding that very Akrokorinthos which he himself had freed. We have no reason to believe that he desired any such thing for its own sake, still less that he was actuated by any personal motives meaner than the jealousy which blinded his eyes. He would rather have resisted with the unaided force of the League; he would rather have called in the help of the sister League of Ætolia;[1] but rather than yield to Kleomenês, he would submit to become dependent upon Antigonos. Nor was it hard to call up plausible sophisms by which the worse cause might be made to appear the better. Plutarch, at his distance of time, saw the matter exactly as we do;[2] but it is clear that Polybios did not so see it;[3] still less would it appear in the same light in the eyes of Aratos himself. The fear of Ætolia, on which Polybios enlarges, was doubtless put forth by Aratos both in his speeches and in his Memoirs; but it was a fear which the state of things did not justify.[4] There is not the least sign of any understanding between Kleomenês and the Ætolians; what was most desirable in Ætolian eyes was doubtless to see Sparta and Achaia weaken one another. The real question was, If the League was to become dependent on some one, should it become dependent on Kleomenês or on Antigonos? To Plutarch, to a modern writer, both removed from the petty passions of the time, there seems no room for any doubt. If you must have a President, or even a King, take the Greek, the Spartan, the Hêrakleid, the gallant soldier, the generous con-

Aratos begins to look to Macedonia.

Difference between his view and that of Plutarch or of modern writers.

[1] Plut. Ar. 41. See above, p. 341.
[2] He sets forth the case strongly and eloquently; Ar. 38. Kl. 16.
[3] Pol. ii. 47 et al.
[4] See Thirlwall, viii. 187.

queror. To Aratos the case may not have been so clear. To humble himself and the League before Kleomenês was a far deeper personal and national humiliation than to do the like to Antigonos. Kleomenês was a neighbour, a rival, a border enemy; Antigonos was a great King at a distance, submission to whom would be far less galling. And Kleomenês really demanded submission; he asked for a place in the League itself which would utterly destroy its constitution. Antigonos as yet demanded nothing; Aratos might still flatter himself that the Macedonian King would step in as an equal ally, a friendly power external to the League, one with whom all matters of common interest would have to be debated, but whose alliance need in no wise interfere with the constitutional functions of the General, the Senate, or the Assembly. Kleomenês was the enemy of the moment; his was the power which was actually threatening; Antigonos came indeed of a hostile line, but he had never been personally an enemy; national feuds need not last for ever; the loss of Akrokorinthos might by this time be forgiven and forgotten. It was not more unpatriotic in Achaia to call in her ancient enemy against her ancient friend than it was in Sparta and Athens, after fighting side by side at Salamis and at Plataia, to call in the Mede as an ally or a paymaster against their old comrades. When the Captain-General of Greece marched forth against Persia, the vows of every patriotic Greek were on the side of the Barbarian. And, if Aratos had been gifted with prophetic vision, he might have gone on to behold the League of Switzerland in alliance with Austria and the Seven United Provinces in alliance with Spain. Why then should an alliance with Macedonia be so specially disgraceful to the League of Achaia? And Kleomenês was a Tyrant, a revolutionist, the subverter of the laws of his own country, the apostle of every kind of mischief elsewhere. Antigonos was a King; the legitimacy of his title might be doubtful, but he was a King and not a Tyrant; he had upset no Senate, he had murdered no Ephors, he had divided no lands among a revolutionary populace; he was a steady, respectable, conservative Monarch, who might not object to act in concert with a steady, respectable, conservative Republic. Anyhow he was much better to be trusted than the young firebrand at Sparta, to calculate on whose eccentric doings baffled even the experienced diplomacy of Aratos himself. Such may well have been the process of

self-delusion by which the deliverer of Corinth and Athens persuaded himself that to call in the Macedonian was no treason against Greece. As for Akrokorinthos, doubtless Aratos at first contemplated no such sacrifice; it was only after a terrible struggle, when it was at last clear that none but Macedonian aid was to be had, and that Macedonian aid was not to be had on any milder terms, that even Aratos, much more that the Achaian People, finally agreed to pay so fearful a price.

## § 4. *From the Opening of Negociations with Macedonia to the End of the War with Kleomenês*

B.C. 224–221

In the spring then of the year 224 before Christ, Kleomenês stood completely victorious over the armies of the League. He was willing to conclude peace on what, as proceeding from a conquering enemy, could only be called most favourable terms. But Aratos, rather than admit the slightest supremacy in the Spartan, had made up his mind to seek for help from the Macedonian. From this time, two sets of negociations are going on side by side, one between the League and Kleomenês, the other between Aratos and Antigonos. The successive steps in each are clearly marked by our authorities,[1] but the chronological parallelism of the two is less easy to follow. The first proposals of peace seem to have come from Kleomenês. The Spring Meeting of the year apparently followed not very long after the rout of Hekatombaion. It is not certain whether Spartan ambassadors were then actually introduced to the Assembly, but it is probable that negociations had already begun. Possibly they were not yet in a state advanced enough to allow of a formal vote being taken. Certain it is that the final decision was adjourned to a Special Meeting to be held at or near Argos.[2]

Twofold negociations with Sparta and Macedonia, B.C. 224.

Beginning of negociations with Kleomenês.

[1] Plutarch—that is, mainly Phylarchos, but Phylarchos compared with the Memoirs of Aratos—gives us the internal history of the League and the negociations with Kleomenês. On these last Polybios is quite silent, but, as a native of Megalopolis, he describes at full length the intrigues of Aratos with Antigonos, in which his own city was so deeply concerned, and the facts of which are almost lost amid Plutarch's declamation, eloquent and righteous as it is.

[2] Εἰς Ἄργος. Plut. Ar. 39. Εἰς Λέρναν. Kl. 15. Is not this last a confusion

But it is clear that public opinion declared itself strongly in favour of peace with Sparta,[1] and that the conduct of Aratos was discussed with considerable freedom.[2] Still long habit, or the peculiar way in which the votes were taken, caused the usual custom to be followed, and Aratos was elected General for the following year. For the first time in his life, as far as we know, he declined the office, and the choice of the Assembly then fell on a partisan of his[3] named Timoxenos. Perhaps he really shrank from the personal responsibility of office at such a moment, a cowardly failure in duty for which he is indignantly rebuked by his biographer.[4] Or perhaps he merely hoped to carry on his intrigues with the more ease when unfettered by the trammels of office. Certain it is that, while public negociations were going on between Kleomenês and the League, a counter-negociation was going on between Antigonos and one of its cities, and that with a sort of licence from the National Congress itself. This was a very singular transaction, which illustrates several points both in the constitution of the League and in the general politics of Peloponnêsos.

Aratos declines the Generalship.

First Generalship of Timoxenos, B.C. 224–223.

I have said in a former Chapter[5] that the general Law of the League forbade all diplomatic intercourse between foreign powers and any particular city of the Union. Foreign Ambassadors were to be received, and Achaian Ambassadors were to be commissioned, by no authority short of that of the League itself. I mentioned also that instances were occasionally met with both of the law being dispensed with and of the law being broken. Here we have a case of dispensation.[6] Aratos did not venture to propose with his own mouth to the Assembly that the King

Beginning of negociations with Antigonos.

arising from the fact (Ar. 39) that Kleomenês, when on his way to Argos, got no farther than Lerna? Lerna was not a city, and it seems a strange place for a congress.

[1] Kl. 15. Βουλομένων δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις δέχεσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις.

[2] Ar. 38. Ἐδόκει δὲ ἡ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ὄχλους ὀργή, κ.τ.λ.

[3] See Pol. iv. 82. Cf. above, p. 237.

[4] Plut. Kl. 15. Οὐ καλῶς οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι πραγμάτων μείζονι μεθεὶς ἑτέρῳ τὸν οἴακα καὶ προέμενος τὴν ἐξουσίαν. Cf. Ar. 38.

[5] See above, pp. 203, 204.

[6] "Allerdings war mit solchen besonderen Verhandlungen einer einzelnen Gemeinde das Wesen der Eidgenossenschaft und ihrer Verfassung gefährdet." Droysen, ii. 501. This is true, but hardly the whole truth. An American commentator would here be more valuable than a German.

of Macedonia should be invited into Peloponnêsos; he artfully contrived to throw the responsibility of taking the first step upon a city, which, of all the cities of the League, might seem the least likely to be under any irregular influence on his part. Megalopolis, the city of Lydiadas, would seem to speak with more independence than any other; and, as the city more immediately threatened by Sparta, it had more claim than any other to be heard.[1] With the help of two hereditary friends in Megalopolis, Nikophanês and Kerkidas, Aratos planned his whole scheme. These men appeared in the Megalopolitan Assembly, and there moved and carried a resolution for their own appointment with a special commission to the Federal Assembly. They were to ask leave, in the name of the State of Megalopolis, to go into Macedonia and to ask Antigonos for help.[2] A more cunningly-devised scheme could not have been hit upon. Megalopolis was more closely connected with Macedonia than any other Peloponnêsian city; there had been no slight interchange of good offices between the two states,[3] and Megalopolis had actually stood two sieges in the Macedonian interest.[4] Had Megalopolis been a wholly independent commonwealth, it would have been nowise monstrous, as seen from a local Megalopolitan point of view, to ask for Macedonian help against a Spartan enemy. Consequently the motion in the Federal Assembly, unexpected as it doubtless was, would not strike the hearers as something so utterly strange and unnatural as if it had proceeded from Corinth or Megara, or from Aratos himself. The Megalopolitan commissioners probably appeared at the meeting at which Timoxenos was appointed General, that is, the Spring Meeting of the year 224.[5] They obtained the

Dealings of Aratos with Megalopolis.

Commissioners sent from Megalopolis to the Federal Assembly, B.C. 224.

[1] Plut. Ar. 38. Οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο τῷ πολέμῳ μάλιστα, συνεχῶς ἄγοντος αὐτοὺς καὶ φέροντος τοῦ Κλεομένους. So Pol. ii. 48.

[2] Pol. ii. 48. Ῥᾳδίως διὰ τούτων ὁρμὴν παρέστησε τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις εἰς τὸ πρεσβεύειν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ παρακαλεῖν πέμπειν πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον ὑπὲρ βοηθείας. οἱ μὲν οὖν Μεγαλοπολῖται κατέστησαν αὐτοὺς περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη καὶ τὸν Κερκιδᾶν πρεσβευτὰς πρός τε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς κἀκεῖθεν εὐθέως πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίγονον, ἂν αὐτοῖς συγκατάθηται τὸ ἔθνος. The same account, according to Plutarch (Ar. 38), was given by Phylarchos. On these special commissioners from particular cities to the Federal Assembly, see above, p. 349.

[3] Pol. u.s. Σαφῶς δὲ γινώσκων οἰκείως διακειμένους αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἀμύντου Φίλιππον εὐεργεσιῶν.

[4] One against Agis, B.C. 330; another against Polysperchôn, B.C. 318. See above, p. 161.

[5] I do not feel at all certain as to the exact date. It should be remembered that we have no *annals* of these transactions. Polybios gives, almost incidentally,

permission for which they asked, permission namely to go into Macedonia, not as Federal, but as Megalopolitan, envoys. One would be well pleased to have some record of the debate which must have followed on such a request; but it is easy to understand that it would not meet with the same strenuous opposition which would certainly have befallen a proposal to send a regular Federal Embassy on such an errand. Megalopolis had a fair claim to ask for Macedonian help; if Antigonos chose to bestow on the hereditary friends of his house a body of troops for their protection, or a few talents to hire mercenaries for themselves, the League, as a League, might not seem to be dishonoured or endangered. But Aratos had gained his first point, that of familiarizing the Achaian Assembly with the notion of Macedonian help. He seems now to have withdrawn for a moment from public life; he refused to resume office, alleging that he felt the public indignation against him too strongly to allow him to serve with honour.[1] Such a plea, coming from the deliverer of Sikyôn and Corinth, the man who had been twelve times General, would be, of all others, the most likely to touch the hearts of his hearers, and to pave the way for his speedy restoration to his old influence. The avowed negociations between the League and Kleomenês must have been going on at the time when Nikophanês and Kerkidas, probably carrying with them much less of the public attention, went on their strange errand to Macedonia. They reached the court of Antigonos; they briefly set forth their ostensible commission from their own city; they described its dangers, and asked help from their old ally. They then went on to tell at much greater length the tale put into their mouths by Aratos.[2] The interests of the League and of the House of Macedon were the same; Kleomenês and the Ætolians together threatened Achaia, they threatened all Greece, they indirectly threatened Macedonia. Nothing short of a

They are allowed to go as Megalopolitan envoys to Macedonia.

Their interview with Antigonos.

the account of the Macedonian negociations; Plutarch gives the account of the Spartan negociations. Each narrative is clear enough in itself, but it is hard to arrange the two series side by side, and to fit each stage into its exact place. Some of the expressions of Polybios (ii. 51) might make one think that this whole negociation took place before the battle of Hekatombaion, but the passage, if construed strictly, might imply that it took place not only before Hekatombaion, but also before Lykaion, which it is impossible to believe.

[1] Plut. Ar. 38. See above, p. 362.

[2] Pol. ii. 48. *Σπουδῇ δὲ συμμίξαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Νικοφάνη τῷ βασιλεῖ διελέγοντο περὶ μὲν τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖα διὰ βραχέων καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῶν ὅλων κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτου καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις.*

general supremacy over all Greece would satisfy the ambition of the Spartan, and that supremacy could not be his without a previous triumph over the Macedonian power. Which was the wiser policy for Antigonos? To forestall so dangerous a competitor, to meet him at once, in Peloponnêsos, in a struggle for the supremacy of Greece,[1] with Bœotia and Achaia as Macedonian allies, or to fight in Thessaly for the possession of Macedonia itself, against the combined force of Lacedæmon and Ætolia, swelled, as by that time it would be, by the force of conquered Achaia and Bœotia? The Ætolians[2] were indeed outwardly neutral, they still professed unbroken friendship for the League; if they kept to these professions, the Achaians would still do their best to maintain the struggle against Kleomenês without foreign help. If Ætolia should interfere, or if all resistance should appear hopeless, then the League would call on the King for help. Aratos would pledge himself that Antigonos should receive every needful security, and he would himself point out the proper moment for action.

All this, it must be remembered, was altogether private and unauthorized dealing between Aratos, now a private citizen, and the Macedonian King. The only public character in which Nikophanês and Kerkidas appeared at Macedonia was that of envoys from the single city of Megalopolis. They were not Ambassadors from the League, nor in any way entitled to speak in its name. Antigonos, strictly respecting constitutional forms, sent back the envoys with a letter to the commonwealth of Megalopolis, promising aid, if the Federal Assembly agreed to it.[3] The Megalopolitan Assembly were delighted at the favourable reception which their royal friend had given to their request. At the next Federal Assembly—or more probably at a Special Meeting called for the purpose[4]—the royal letter was read, first

Favourable answer of Antigonos to the envoys from Megalopolis.

[1] Pol. ii. 49. Μετ' Ἀχαιῶν καὶ Βοιωτῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πρὸς Κλεομένη πολεμεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας. "No arguments could have been devised better suited to the purpose of convincing and persuading the king. It is only surprising that Aratos, while he suggested them, should not have felt that they were so many reasons which ought to have deterred him, as a patriotic Greek, from the prosecution of his attempt." Thirlwall, viii. 188.

[2] See Droysen's note, ii. 500.

[3] Pol. ii. 50. Ἔγραψε δὲ καὶ τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις ἐπαγγελλόμενος βοηθήσειν, ἐὰν καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦτο βουλομένοις ᾖ.

[4] Ib. Μετεωρισθέντες οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται προθύμως ἔσχον ἰέναι πρὸς τὴν σύνοδον τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. Such a state of mind would hardly allow of waiting for the Autumn Meeting, and Timoxenos, who was probably in the secret, would be ready to summon a meeting if Aratos wished it.

The letter from Antigonos read in the Federal Assembly.

to the Senate[1] and then to the Assembly; Megalopolitan orators urgently pressed the application for Macedonian help, and the inclination of both Senate and People was clearly favourable to them. Whether any formal resolution was passed does not appear.[2] The League could not decently apply in its own name for Macedonian help while negociations were going on with Kleomenês; but it is not impossible that the Assembly may have passed a vote authorizing Megalopolis to receive assistance on its own account. At any rate, it was on the reading of this letter that Aratos made his first public appearance in the business. No longer the chief of the League, apparently not even one of its Senators, he stepped forward as a private citizen to address the Assembly. In such a character he would be heard, if possible, with even greater favour than when he spoke with the weight of official authority. The reaction on which he had reckoned was now beginning to set in. The whole state of the case had been fully set before him by Nikophanês; everything was going on exactly as he wished; the name of Macedonian help was becoming familiar to the Achaian people, but Aratos had not appeared as its first proposer. He wished to avoid having recourse to it, if possible; but if need—the supposed need of doing anything rather than submit to Kleomenês—drove the League to such a course, it should be the act of the League, not the act of Aratos; it should not even be the act of the League on the motion of Aratos.[3] If Antigonos should come, if he should conquer Kleomenês, if he should alter the Federal Constitution,[4]—it was more tolerable, it seems, to have it altered by a Macedonian than by a Spartan—no man should say that it was his doing; Megalopolis and the whole League must bear the responsibility of their own acts. Thus fortified, he came forward in the Assembly; he expressed his pleasure to hear of the good will of the King, his satisfaction at the present disposition of the

Speech of Aratos in the Assembly.

[1] Pol. ii. 50. The Senate (*τὸ κοινὸν βουλευτήριον*) and the *πλῆθος* or *πολλοί* to whom Aratos speaks, seem here, as Droysen (ii. 503, note) says, to be clearly distinguished. But *βουλευτήριον* is, as we have seen (see above, p. 239), sometimes used for the place of meeting of the Assembly.

[2] Ib. 51. *Ἔδοξε μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποκειμένων.*

[3] Ib. 50. *Μάλιστα μὲν γὰρ . . . . ἔσπευδε μὴ προσδεηθῆναι τῆς βοηθείας· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τοῦτο δέοι καταφεύγειν, οὐ μόνον ἠβούλετο δι' αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τὴν κλῆσιν, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.*

[4] Ib. *Εἰ παραγενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ κρατήσας τῷ πολέμῳ τοῦ Κλεομένους καὶ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀλλοιότερόν τι βουλεύσοιτο περὶ τῆς κοινῆς πολιτείας, μή ποθ' ὁμολογουμένως τῶν συμβαινόντων αὐτὸς ἀναλάβῃ τὴν αἰτίαν.*

Assembly; but he warned them not to be too hasty; let them make one more struggle to save themselves by their own exertions; it would be much better to do so if they could anyhow manage it; if they failed in the attempt, let them then call in the help of their royal friend. The Assembly applauded the speaker; they agreed to save themselves if they could—if not, to ask King Antigonos to save them.

To account for this disposition of the Achaian Assembly, we must suppose that the favourable intentions of Kleomenês, of which Polybios says not a word, were not as yet generally known. The General Timoxenos, as a partisan of Aratos, would doubtless conceal them as long as he could. But when it was known how mild a supremacy Kleomenês sought for, men began once more to doubt whether Antigonos would not, after all, be more dangerous as a friend than Kleomenês was as an enemy. A Special Assembly was called to meet at Argos.[1] Public opinion throughout the League was now so strongly in favour of Kleomenês that there could be little doubt that peace would be concluded on his own terms, that is, that the Spartan King would be accepted as Chief of the League.[2] It marks the diplomacy of the time that Kleomenês, like Aristomachos,[3] was to plead his own cause before the Achaian Popular Assembly. A sudden illness on the road rendered him incapable of speaking. As a sign of his good will, he released the chief among his Achaian prisoners, and the Meeting was adjourned till he was able to attend. This illness of Kleomenês decided the fate of Greece.

Negociations with Kleomenês.

Strong feeling in his favour.

Negociation interrupted by Kleomenês' illness.

It was probably during this interval that Aratos, having found the Macedonian King a less implacable enemy than he had expected, ventured to enter into direct communication with him. He no longer needed the roundabout way of dealing through Nikophanês and Kerkidas. He sent his own son, the younger Aratos, as ambassador—seemingly his own private ambassador[4]—and arranged all necessary matters with Antigonos.[5] To be sure there was one difficulty; Antigonos was no

Mission of young Aratos to Antigonos.

[1] See above, p. 361.

[2] Plut. Kl. 15. Βουλομένων δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις δέχεσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις καὶ τὸν Κλεομένη καλούντων ἐς Λέρναν, and (still more strongly) Ar. 39, πέμπειν εὐθὺς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίᾳ τὸν Κλεομένη καλοῦντες ἐς Ἄργος.

[3] See above, p. 332.

[4] Pol. ii. 51. Πρεσβευτὴν τὸν υἱὸν ἐξαποστείλας Ἄρατος πρὸς Ἀντίγονον ἐβεβαιώσατο τὰ περὶ τῆς βοηθείας.

[5] Plut. Kl. 17. Ἤδη διωμολογημένων αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν Ἀντιγόνον τῶν μεγίστων.

Antigonos demands Akro-korinthos.

more disposed than later potentates to do his work for nothing. The price which he set on that work was one most natural for him to ask, but most unnatural for Aratos to pay, the reunion to Macedonia of Akrokorinthos. No one can blame Antigonos for making the demand. He had not volunteered to meddle in Peloponnêsian affairs; Kleomenês had done him no harm, and the Achaians had done him no good; if any sentimental tie bound him to Megalopolis, it did not extend beyond that single city, and indeed it might be held to be cancelled by the union of Megalopolis with the League. It was as much as could be expected if the King of Macedonia merely sat still, and did not attack a people who had destroyed so large a portion of the influence of his house; at any rate, he could not be expected to serve them for nothing. The terms on which his services were to be had were simply that Aratos should restore to Antigonos Dôsôn the invaluable fortress of which he had deprived Antigonos Gonatas. In all this Antigonos acted in a perfectly straightforward way, worthy of a ruler of the nation who called a spade a spade.[1] Macedonia did not profess to make war for an idea; her King made no rhetorical flourishes about liberating Peloponnêsos from the Isthmus to the Cretan Sea. Antigonos, like an honest trader, named his terms; his price was fixed, no abatement would be taken from the simple demand of Akrokorinthos. But how was Akrokorinthos to be had? Aratos seems to have been ready even then to make the sacrifice; but it would be hard to carry through the Achaian Senate and Assembly a resolution for surrendering the most important Federal fortress; it would be harder still for the League to compel the Corinthians to admit a foreign garrison into their city. Was Aratos to reverse the exploit of his youth, and once more to scale the mountain citadel, but this time to drive out an Achaian, and to bring in a Macedonian, garrison? And, beside this, the Achaian people were evidently ready to accept Kleomenês as their chief; if his terms were once accepted, Akrokorinthos could be won only by a struggle for life and death against the combined force of Sparta and Achaia. Aratos seems not to have dared to make any open proposal to the Assembly; but he contrived that such deadly offence should be given to Kleomenês[2] that the Spartan King

[1] Plut. Apophth. Phil. 15. Σκαιοὺς ἔφη [ὁ Φίλιππος] φύσει καὶ ἀγροίκους εἶναι Μακεδόνας καὶ τὴν σκάφην σκάφην λέγοντας.

[2] The Accounts given by Plutarch in his two biographies (Ar. 39 and Kl. 17)

broke off the negociations, and, instead of appearing personally to plead his cause in the Assembly at Argos, he sent a herald to declare war against the League. Here again Aratos contrived to get his work done for him by other hands. All hope of a fair accommodation with Kleomenês was now at an end. Aratos would not now have to endure the disgrace of seeing the Spartan youth installed as his acknowledged Federal superior; he was several degrees nearer to the more pleasant prospect of acting as the counsellor or the slave of a foreign master. And the final step, the breaking off of all negociations, the last blow, as it seemed, to any plan of union between the League and his rival, had come, not from Aratos, but from Kleomenês himself. Kleomenês breaks off the negociations.

In all this web of cunning intrigue the practised diplomatist of Sikyôn had overreached himself. What he had really done was to proclaim the dissolution of the League. The Achaian Union had hitherto advanced and prospered by strictly adhering to its principles of perfect brotherhood and equality. Every city, great or small, old or new, had equal rights; each member was alike precious to the whole body; an injury done to one was an injury done to all, and to be redressed by all alike. By this course of action Aratos had, now for nearly thirty years, won honour and power and influence for himself and for the commonwealth at whose head he stood. But he had now gone away backwards; he was not only willing to bring foreign armies into Peloponnêsos; he was ready to give up, as the price of their aid, a city of the League, one of the great cities of Greece, a city which was the very gem and flower of the Con- New position of Aratos.

do not exactly agree. The first makes Aratos send ambassadors (*πρέσβεις*) to Kleomenês, who had advanced with his troops as far as Lerna, bidding him come, as to friends and allies, with only three hundred followers, and offering hostages, if he felt any distrust. The other version is that he was to come alone, and to receive three hundred hostages. This, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 192) hints, looks like a confusion with the number of followers in the other story, which, though Droysen (ii. 507) thinks otherwise, seems decidedly the more probable. But one does not see in either story, as told by Plutarch, any ground for the excessive indignation which he attributes to Kleomenês. There must have been something specially offensive in the tone or form of the message. This was followed by some more epistolary sparring between Kleomenês and Aratos, such as Plutarch gave some specimens of at an earlier time. The two chiefs seem at last to have got very abusive towards one another, and that on very delicate points; *ἐφέροντο λοιδορίαι καὶ βλασφημίαι μέχρι γάμων καὶ γυναικῶν ἀλλήλους κακῶς λεγόντων.* (Ar. 39.) We know nothing of the domestic life of Aratos, but what could any man have to say about the noble wife of Kleomenês?

federacy, a fortress which was the key of the whole peninsula, a spot whose name always suggested the most glorious exploit of his own life. The moment it was suspected that the surrender of Corinth had been hinted at by a Federal politician, the tie was at once broken, a whole storm of concealed passions burst forth. Secession, as Secession, had never been dreamed of; but if the League was about to cede its cities to the Macedonian, it was high time for those cities to take care of themselves. No one wished to separate from a League of free and equal Greek cities, but, if they were to have a master, men would have Kleomenês for their master rather than Antigonos. The Assembly had not deemed it its duty to hinder a single Canton, which it could not protect, from asking and receiving aid from a hereditary friend. But the Assembly had never dreamed that a measure apparently so harmless really meant the surrender of Akrokorinthos to the Macedonian King. If Corinth was to be thus betrayed, who could answer for the freedom of Sikyôn or of Argos? Even a conservative Federal politician might consistently argue in this way: The object of the League is to preserve the liberties of its several cities; if the League fails to discharge that duty, those cities are at once absolved from their Federal allegiance. And now parties began to show themselves, which, in the quiet days of the League, had kept themselves concealed. The practical working of the Achaian Constitution threw all power into the hands of respectable well-to-do citizens, led by chiefs whose ambition looked no higher than the rank of an elective and responsible magistrate. Tyrants, oligarchs, Red Republicans, were all alike without sympathizers in the Achaian Congress. The two extremes of political faction, hitherto kept in check by the legal restraints of the constitution, now burst forth.[1] There were powerful men who hated the sway of Law in any shape, who would fain rule as Tyrants or as members of some narrow oligarchic body. Then there were extreme Democrats, Socialists, men of wild theories or of broken fortunes, who longed for the abolition of debts and the division of lands.

Universal indignation at the thought of surrendering Corinth.

Appearance of extreme factions in the Achaian Cities.

[1] Plut. Ar. 40. Ἠτρέμει γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἑστεργεν ἐπὶ τοῖς παροῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Σικυωνίων αὐτῶν καὶ Κορινθίων ἐγένοντο πολλοὶ καταφανεῖς διειλεγμένοι τῷ Κλεομένει καὶ πάλαι πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἰδίων ἐπιθυμίᾳ δυναστειῶν ὑπουλῶς ἔχοντες. Kl. 17. Ἐγεγόνει δὲ κίνημα τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ πρὸς ἀπόστασιν ὥρμησαν αἱ πόλεις, τῶν μὲν δήμων νομήν τε χώρας καὶ χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς ἐλπισάντων, τῶν δὲ πρώτων βαρυνομένων τὸν Ἄρατον, ἐνιῶν δὲ καὶ δι' ὀργῆς ἐχόντων ὡς ἐπάγοντα τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ Μακεδόνας.

Others, of all ranks and parties, were thoroughly tired of Aratos, and thought Kleomenês, if only as a novelty, the more promising leader of the two. The disappointed men of rank and wealth hoped that Kleomenês, whose foes called him a Tyrant, might, like Antigonos Gonatas, patronize Tyranny everywhere, and might set them up to lord it as his vassals over their several cities. The populace, on the other hand, heard of his revolutionary doings at home; they longed for the day when a bonfire of promissory notes should be kindled in the market-place of every city,[1] and when the lands of the wealthy should be divided into equal lots for the benefit of the poor. Both parties mistook their man. Whatever Kleomenês had done at Sparta professed to be the restoration of the old laws and discipline of the country; it therefore by no means followed that he would appear as an apostle either of Tyranny or of confiscation anywhere else.[2] And it is easy to conceive that another set of motives, different from any of these, might attract some partisans to the side of Kleomenês. The question was no longer whether certain terms should be agreed upon between Kleomenês and the League as a whole; it now was whether each particular city should adhere to the Achaian connexion or should embrace that of Sparta. Now the schemes of Kleomenês, if they were at all grounded on the old Pan-hellenic position of Sparta, would hardly include a true Federal Union, a *Bundesstaat*. The tie by which he would unite his conquests would be alliance rather than incorporation; they would form a Confederacy rather than a Confederation.[3] Into such a Confederacy it was indeed quite possible that the Achaian League, retaining its internal constitution, might enter as a single member; it was highly probable that the ten towns of the old Achaia would, if they entered it at all, enter it as a

Both extremes lean to Kleomenês.

The schemes of Kleomenês appealed to Town-Autonomy against the Federal Principle.

[1] Plut. Agis, 13. Καὶ τὰ παρὰ τῶν χρεωστῶν γραμματεῖα συνενέγκαντες εἰς ἀγορὰν, ἃ κλάρια καλοῦσι, καὶ πάντα συνθέντες εἰς ἓν συνέπρησαν. ἀρθείσης δὲ φλογὸς οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι καὶ δανειστικοὶ περιπαθοῦντες ἀπῆλθον, ὁ δὲ Ἀγησίλαος ὥσπερ ἐφυβρίζων οὐκ ἔφη λαμπρότερον ἑωρακέναι φῶς οὐδὲ πῦρ ἐκείνου καθαρώτερον. Cf. Kl. 10, 11.

[2] Kortüm (iii. 188 et seqq.) seems throughout to picture Kleomenês as if he were at the head of a sort of Socialist Propaganda. For this notion I can see no evidence whatever. Kleomenês, from his own point of view, was as conservative as Aratos or Antigonos.

[3] The cities which went over to Kleomenês became, according to Plutarch (Kl. 17), σύμμαχοι Λακεδαιμονίων, ἔχοντος ἐκείνου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. This is the old Lacedæmonian system, something wholly different from the συμπολιτεία of the Achaians or even of the Ætolians.

single member; but it was far more natural for the great cities which had only lately joined the League to revert, under such circumstances, to the principle of Town-Autonomy. A Confederacy of cities under Spartan supremacy might easily give to each of its members a greater measure of purely local independence than it possessed in the Federal Union. The position of the citizen would be lowered; he would sink into a citizen of one particular city instead of being a citizen of the great Achaian League; he would have far less direct influence in the general affairs of the proposed Confederacy than he had in the general affairs of the existing Confederation. But so long as Sparta remained a president, and did not become a despot, the mere principle of State Right would gain rather than lose.[1] However this may be, out of the several discontented elements which the cities of the League contained, a strong Kleomenizing faction began to show itself everywhere. In the cities which had been united to the League during the administration of Aratos,[2] the Federal administration quite lost its hold. In Sikyôn itself, in Corinth, above all in Argos, large parties called aloud for Kleomenês. Nearly all the cities of Arkadia[3] and all the cities of[4] Argolis fell away; Kaphyai, Phlious, Pheneos, Kleônai, Epidauros, Hermionê, Troizên, were all lost to the League; some towns Kleomenês took by force, others willingly went over to him.[5] Megalopolis, almost alone among the Southern members of the League, stood faithful, if not to the Federal bond, at least to its love of Macedonia and its hatred of Sparta. Even Pellênê, in the old Achaia, was taken, and received a Lacedæmonian garrison.[6] Nor was a greater prize long delayed—

Kleomenês wins the Arkadian and Argolic cities.

[1] Much the same view is taken by Droysen, ii. 495.

[2] Plut. Ar. 39. Ὅλως οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἐπικτήτων βέβαιον ἦν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, ἀλλὰ θορυβὸς πολὺς ἄφνω περιειστήκει τὸν Ἄρατον ὀρῶντα τὴν Πελοπόννησον κραδαινομένην καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐξανισταμένας ὑπὸ τῶν νεωτεριζόντων πανταχόθεν.

[3] We may gather from Polybios (ii. 55) that Stymphalos and Kleitôr remained faithful; Kynaitha also is not mentioned among the conquests of Kleomenês.

[4] Plut. Ar. 40. Προσγενομένων αὐτῷ τῶν τὴν λεγομένην Ἀκτὴν κατοικούντων καὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐγχειρισάντων.

[5] Pol. ii. 52. Ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης καταπληξάμενος τοῖς προειρημένοις εὐτυχήμασι λοιπὸν ἀδεῶς ἐπεπορεύετο τὰς πόλεις, ἃς μὲν πείθων, αἷς δὲ τὸν φόβον ἀνατεινόμενος.

[6] Droysen (ii. 508) makes Kleomenês occupy Pellênê with the goodwill of the inhabitants. They rose, he says, and aided the Spartans against the Federal troops. This must be grounded on the odd expression of Plutarch (Kl. 17), τοὺς φρουροῦντας ἐξέβαλε μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν. But this would be a strange way of expressing a very unlikely fact; in the old Achaia at least Kleomenês had no

indeed it preceded the fall of its own smaller neighbours. Argos, the old rival of Sparta, Argos, which no Spartan King had ever been able to subdue, Argos, which Pyrrhos had found as unconquerable as Sparta herself,[1] now opened her gates to a Lacedæmonian master. The Achaian force had been withdrawn from the city to protect the Federal interest in Corinth and Sikyôn, and Aratos had gone with it, armed with some strange arbitrary commission, how obtained we know not.[2] Kleomenês appeared before Argos; Aristomachos, the former Tyrant, and late General of the League, espoused his cause;[3] he hoped, so his enemies said, to gain more by submission to Kleomenês than by fidelity to the League. Through his influence the city was surrendered, hostages were given, a garrison was received, and Argos was admitted as an ally of Sparta, recognizing her supremacy. The whole Argolic peninsula followed its example. Meanwhile Aratos, armed with his new authority, put to death some whom he called traitors in his native city[4]—the first recorded instance of civil bloodshed in the name of the Federal power. He then went on a like errand to Corinth, but there he found the whole city stirred up against him. He and his Federal troops were at once ordered to depart;[5] according to one account he had to flee for his life.[6] The Corinthians then sent for Kleomenês;[7] he entered the city, and besieged Akrokorinthos,

Kleomenês wins Argos, B.C. 223.

Violent proceedings of Aratos at Sikyôn.

Corinth calls in Kleomenês.

partisans. Possibly *οἱ φρουροῦντες* may mean the mercenary garrison, and *οἱ Ἀχαιοί* the citizen militia. Was Timoxenos (see Schorn, 118) then in Pellênê, or does Plutarch use the words *ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν* (Ar. 39) loosely for the Federal commander in the town?

[1] Plut. Kl. 18. *Οὔτε γὰρ οἱ πάλαι βασιλεῖς Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὰ πραγματευσάμενοι προσαγαγέσθαι τὸ Ἄργος βεβαιῶς ἠδυνήθησαν, ὅ τε δεινότατος τῶν στρατηγῶν Πύρρος εἰσελθὼν καὶ βιασάμενος οὐ κατέσχε τὴν πόλιν*, κ.τ.λ.

[2] Ib. Ar. 40. *Ἐξουσίαν ἀνυπεύθυνον λαβών*. Polybios (ii. 52) speaks of him at this time as *στρατηγῶν*, seemingly meaning the same thing, for Timoxenos was still General, as appears by Plutarch's (Kl. 17) mention of the Nemean Games, which took place earlier in the year than the Federal elections. See Thirlwall, viii. 192–4.

[3] Pol. ii. 60. *Ὁ δ' ἐπιλαθόμενος τῶν προειρημένων φιλανθρώπων παρὰ πόδας, ἐπεὶ μικρὸν ἐπικυδεστέρας ἔσχε τὰς ἐλπίδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐν Κλεομένει, τήν τε πατρίδα καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ προαίρεσιν ἀποσπάσας ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀναγκαιοτάτοις καιροῖς προσένειμε τοῖς ἐχθροῖς*. Plutarch does not mention Aristomachos in the business.

[4] Plut. Ar. 40. *Τοὺς μὲν ἐν Σικυῶνι διεφθαρμένους ἀπέκτεινε*.

[5] Pol. ii. 52. *Τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων τῷ μὲν Ἀράτῳ στρατηγοῦντι καὶ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς παραγγειλάντων ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸν Κλεομένη διαπεμπομένων καὶ καλούντων*.

[6] See the story in Plut. Ar. 40. Kl. 19.

[7] Pol. u.s. Plut. Ar. 40. *Οἱ Κορίνθιοι . . . μετεπέμψαντο τὸν Κλεομένη καὶ παρέδοσαν τὴν πόλιν*, κ.τ.λ.

Megara joins the Bœotian League.

whose Federal garrison still held out.[1] The possession of Corinth by Kleomenês cut off Megara from all communication with her confederates. She did not revolt to the Spartan, but attached herself, by leave of the League, to the now nearer Federation of Bœotia.[2] We hear nothing of Aigina, which was equally cut off. As Kleomenês had no fleet, it may have retained its allegiance—it was again Achaian some years later—but there must have been a temporary suspension of communication between it and the other cities. The League was now reduced to nine Old-Achaian towns—Pellênê being lost—together with Sikyôn, Megalopolis, and a few other places in Arkadia. Kleomenês had been provoked into becoming an enemy; he had been rejected as a Federal chief; he now came as a conqueror, but, in most places, as a conqueror willingly received.

No real argument against Federal Government to be drawn from these events.

No better opportunity can be conceived for declamations on the weakness of Federal States than this general break-up of the most flourishing Federal State that the world had yet seen. But a little consideration will show that the events which I have just been recording really prove nothing of the kind. The true question is, not whether a Federal Government can be warranted to stand firm against every shock, but whether there are not times and places in which a Federal Government is more likely to stand firm than any other. It may be freely granted that some of the special evils and dangers which beset Peloponnêsos in the year 224 arose from the Federal form of the Achaian Government. But it is easy to see that any other form of Government would have brought with it evils and dangers greater still. The peculiar form taken by the dispute between Sparta and the League could not have arisen except between a single State and a Federation; but we may be quite certain that a Prince in the circumstances in which Kleomenês found himself would soon have attacked, or been attacked by, his neighbours, whatever might be their forms of government. Again, the

[1] Plut. Kl. 19. Ar. 40.

[2] Pol. xx. 6. Ὅτε δὲ Κλεομένης εἰς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν προεκάθισεν, διακλεισθέντες προσέθεντο τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς μετὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν γνώμης. Megara afterwards again left the Bœotian for the Achaian connexion (Pol. ib.). In Roman times Megara was again Bœotian. Caius Curtius Proklos, whom we have already met with (see above, p. 107, note 1) as a Megarian Amphiktyon, was also a Megarian Bœotarch. Boeckh, C. I. No. 1058. Among his merits was that of treating the Megarians to a show of gladiators, a sight which would have somewhat amazed either Kleomenês or Aratos.

proposal to cede Corinth to Antigonos derived its chief sting from the peculiarities of the Federal relation. For a League to pretend to cede to a foreign power one of the Sovereign States which compose it is clearly more monstrous, more threatening to the rights of every other portion of the whole, than it is for a Monarch to cede one of the provinces of his Kingdom. It is, as the event showed, far more likely to excite general indignation and rebellion. Yet it is easy to conceive that, even under a Monarchy, the cession of a province might raise serious disturbances, and might even lead other provinces to offer their allegiance to a master who seemed better able to protect them. And, after all, for a Federal power to pretend to cede one of its members is not more iniquitous than the practice, so common among Princes, of disposing of territories with which they have not even a Federal connexion, without consulting either their rulers or their inhabitants. Federal Government, like all other human things, is imperfect, and there is a certain pressure to which it will give way. But could any other form of government have stood the trial better in that particular time and place? A Kingdom of Peloponnêsos was not to be thought of; the idea would have shocked every feeling of the Greek mind, and it could not have stood for an hour on any ground but that of naked brute force. Town-autonomy had had its fair trial; it had been found to mean, in that age, the presence either of local Tyrants or of Macedonian garrisons. But the League had hitherto completely excluded both evils; even in the degenerate days on which we are now to enter, it completely excluded one and greatly restrained and modified the other. And the cities which fell off from the League asked neither for Monarchy nor for strict Town-autonomy; they were ready for a relation with Sparta, which, if not in accordance with the most perfect Federal ideal, might still be called Federal as distinguished from either of the other systems.

No other form of Government then possible in Greece.

The truth is that, if the Federal Government of Achaia now gave way, it gave way only because it for a moment deserted its own principles. There was clearly no general wish to secede, no wish to exchange the Achaian for the Spartan connexion, as long as those who were at the head of the League did their duty as Federal rulers. When they were guilty of treason against Greece by invoking Macedonian help, when they added the special treason against Federal Law implied in the proposal to alienate a Sovereign State of the Union, then, and not till then, did the

Real teaching of the history in favour of Federalism.

Union begin to fall asunder. The fact that a Federal Government, hitherto united and prosperous, fell in pieces as soon as it deserted strict Federal principles, is surely rather an argument for the Federal system than against it. And, after all, the breaking-up of the League was very partial. Except at Corinth, where no explanation need be sought for, the tendency to Secession was confined to those cities which had lately joined the League, and which may not as yet have become fully accustomed to Federal principles and habits. The Old-Achaian towns stuck closely together through the whole tempest; Megalopolis stood firm, like an isolated rock against which every wave dashed in vain. Even in the seceding cities the party which desired separation from the League on any respectable political ground seems to have been nowhere the strongest. Everywhere Secession was brought about mainly by the very worst of political factions, by those classes whose impotence up to that moment is the most speaking witness to the general good government of the League. The opponents of Federalism are perfectly welcome to ally themselves either with the would-be Tyrants of Sikyôn or with the Socialist rabble of Argos. It was only at Corinth, in the city which Aratos offered to betray, that the names of Aratos and his League stank, as they deserved, in the nostrils of every citizen. Everywhere else the movement towards Secession was either merely partial or merely temporary. It is clear that at Sikyôn the mass of the inhabitants still clave to their old deliverer amid all his short-comings;[1] at Argos we shall presently see that the very party which urged Secession soon turned about and repented of it. The League, in short, was, before long, reconstituted, with somewhat diminished extent and with greatly diminished glory, but still in a form which, imperfect as it was, was better either than absolute bondage to Macedonia or than Town-autonomy, as Town-autonomy had in that age become.

Secession only partial and temporary.

Effects of the loss of Corinth, B.C. 223.

The loss of Corinth—the remark is that of Polybios, in other words that of Aratos himself—was felt by Aratos as a gain.[2] It took away all difficulties and all scruples as to the contemplated

[1] See the description of the state of feeling at Sikyôn in Plut. Ar. 42, a remarkable contrast to the reception of Aratos at Corinth.

[2] Pol. ii. 52. Τοὺς δ' Ἀχαιοὺς ἀπέλυσε τοῦ μεγίστου προβλήματος; and, directly after, παρεδόθη τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀφορμὴ καὶ πρόφασις εὔλογος, κ.τ.λ.

surrender of Akrokorinthos. The Corinthians were now rebels with whom no terms need be kept; their mountain-citadel was now a fortress held by Achaian troops in an enemy's country; it could now be handed over to the King without let or hindrance, if only he would come with his army and take it. The loss of Corinth and of so many other cities had also another result;—Aratos could now do what he pleased in the Federal Councils. He had no longer to deal with a great Peloponnêsian Confederation which gave him rivals like Lydiadas and Aristomachos; the Achaian League once more meant ten cities on the Corinthian Gulf. Their citizens, or some of them, met at Sikyôn, elected Aratos General with absolute power, and voted him a guard for the defence of his person.[1] To such a depth of degradation had the deliverer fallen, that now, after living for thirty years as citizen and magistrate of a free state,[2] he needed a Tyrant's precautions to defend his life. And yet Aratos was not a Tyrant; he was not intentionally a traitor; he was simply blinded by a mischievous and obstinate prejudice, by a pride which, even in such a moment, could not stoop to submission to Kleomenês. He had brought his country into a state where her only choice was a choice of evils; he now stubbornly persisted in choosing the greater evil; he sacrificed the external independence, he risked

Aratos invested with absolute power and defended by a Guard B.C. 223.

[1] See above, p. 237.

[2] Plut. Ar. 41. Τριάκοντα μὲν ἔτη καὶ τρία [I shall consider these numbers elsewhere] πεπολιτευμένος ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς πεπρωτευκὼς δὲ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ δόξῃ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τότε δ' ἔρημος καὶ ἄπορος, συντετριμμένος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ναυαγίου τῆς πατρίδος ἐν τοσούτῳ σάλῳ καὶ κινδύνῳ διαφερόμενος. I need not stop to show how utterly unconstitutional all this was. But I may observe that this was not the regular election for the year B.C. 223-2, nor was that election held at the Meeting at Aigion to be presently mentioned, which comes too late in the year. (See the τρεῖς μῆνας in Plut. Ar. 41, for which Kleomenês besieged Sikyôn, compared with the date supplied by the mention of Nemean Games which were celebrated in February in Kl. 17. See p. 373, note 2.) The regular Spring Meeting of the year B.C. 223 must have come between the two. At it Timoxenos (see Pol. ii. 53. Thirlwall, viii. 196) was re-elected General for the year—another unconstitutional act—Aratos seemingly still retaining his extraordinary powers.

During the siege of Charlestown in 1780, Governor Rutledge of South Carolina was made στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, like Aratos. The Legislature of the State passed an act, "delegating to Governor Rutledge, and such of his council as he could conveniently consult, a power to do everything necessary for the public good, except taking away the life of a citizen without a legal trial." (Marshall's Life of Washington, iv. 185.) Aratos (see above, p. 373) seems not to have felt himself under even this last restriction.

The appointment of a Dictator was also contemplated, though not carried out, in Virginia, both in 1776 and in 1781. See Tucker's Life of Jefferson, i. 162.

The Roman formula, "Dent operam Consules ne quid Respublica detrimenti capiat," is familiar to every one.

the internal freedom, of his country, but he was no wilful conspirator against her. It was probably because he felt in his own heart no wish to tyrannize that he did not scruple to assume the power and the outward garb of a Tyrant. He soon showed his strict personal integrity, perverted as was the form which even his virtues now assumed. Kleomenês spared[1] his house and property at Corinth;[2] he made him splendid offers; twelve talents a year, double his Egyptian pension,[3] should be the reward of the surrender of Akrokorinthos. Nay, in this hour of success, he lowered his terms; let the League, or what remained of it, acknowledge his supremacy, and he and they should garrison the key of Peloponnêsos in common.[4] In attempting to bribe Aratos, Kleomenês showed that he failed to understand the man with whom he had been so long contending. Sad as were the passions and weaknesses with which the mind of Aratos was now clouded, mere personal gain was wholly absent from his thoughts. He would not sell the least atom of his pride or his prejudice, because such a sale would have been in his eyes a sale of his country. His answer was enigmatical; Circumstances were not in his power, but he was in the power of circumstances.[5] This reply was not satisfactory to the Spartan, whose rejoinder took the form of an invasion of the Sikyônian territory, and a siege of Sikyôn itself. In this deplorable state,[6] Aratos sought for allies, perhaps merely to satisfy his own conscience and the opinion of his countrymen, by showing that the application to Antigonos was really unavoidable. He asked, but of course he asked in vain, for help from those very Ætolians, whose expected hostility had been so prominently put forward in justification of his course.[7] He stooped so low as to ask for aid from Athens,

Aratos refuses the offers of Kleomenês.

Aratos asks for help of Ætolia and Athens.

[1] Compare the instances quoted above, p. 345.

[2] On Aratos' possession of real property at Corinth, see above, p. 201, note 3.

[3] Plut. Ar. 41. Kl. 19. The Egyptian pension must now have been stopped. Ptolemy was now on the side of Kleomenês; Πτολεμαῖος ἀπογνοὺς τὸ ἔθνος Κλεομένει χορηγεῖν ἐπεβάλετο. (Pol. ii. 51.) He naturally would take his side as soon as he knew of the dealings of the League with Macedonia.

[4] He used, as his agent for this offer, not one of his own subjects, but a Messênian named Tritymallos (Plut. Kl. 19). This employment of a neutral envoy is a clear sign of moderation, and may be compared with the practice (see above, p. 302) of referring disputes to the arbitration of a neutral state.

[5] Plut. Ar. 41. Ὡς οὐκ ἔχοι τὰ πράγματα, μᾶλλον δ' ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἔχοιτο. So Kl. 19.

[6] See an eloquent description of his position at this time—more fair towards him than is usual with the writer—in Droysen, ii. 511.

[7] Plut. Ar. 41. See above, p. 341.

as if Athens could again occupy Pylos or Kythêra, or could again win naval triumphs in the Corinthian Gulf. Incredible as it sounds, we are told that the Athenian people, who had once worn crowns on the report of Aratos' death, were now ready, in their gratitude, to send him help—such help as Athens could give. Two orators, named Eukleidês and Mikiôn,[1] persuaded them not to run the hazard, and Aratos was left wholly without allies. And now there was no other hope—the die was cast. An Assembly was called at Aigion ;[2] Aratos—cut off from the place of meeting by the Lacedæmonian occupation of Pellênê—made his way thither by sea ;[3] and the Federal Rump, doubtless at his motion,[4] passed the final resolution to invite the help of Antigonos and to cede to him Akrokorinthos as the price of his help.

Final vote of the League to invite Antigonos and cede Akrokorinthos, B.C. 223.

Thus it was that the deliverer of Greece became, deliberately and in the face of every warning, her betrayer. It would indeed be unfair to judge Aratos by our light, or by the light of Plutarch, but by this time he had been taught lessons which ought to have opened his eyes. He had passed a long and honoured political career as the chosen chief of a free commonwealth ; he had had to face parliamentary rivals and to undergo occasional rebuffs and censures ; but on the whole his career had been one of prosperity and honour singularly uninterrupted. The League, his own work, had held together as long as he adhered to the principles on which it was founded ; it fell asunder only when he deserted the cause to which hitherto his life had been devoted. The moment Macedonian intervention is named, city after city falls away ; he is driven to demand an unconstitutional authority from the wretched remnant that is left ; and, in his own city, the city whence he had expelled the Tyrant, the deliverer cannot venture to appear without a guard. From that moment the glory of the League passes away. It still survived ; it still honourably discharged many of its functions ; it still secured to a large part of Greece exemption from border wars and a good and equitable

Estimate of the conduct of Aratos.

Lowered position of the League from this time.

[1] These must be the same as Eurykleidês and Mikôn (Paus. ii. 9. 4), whom Philip is said to have poisoned. See Thirlwall, viii. 196.

[2] Plut. Ar. 42. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀχαιοὶ συνελθόντες εἰς Αἴγιον ἐκεῖ τὸν Ἄρατον ἐκάλουν. The meeting therefore was not summoned by himself as στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ, but by the regular General Timoxenos.

[3] With ten friends and his son. (Plut. u.s.) These then formed the Sikyônian contingent to the National Congress. What were its whole numbers ?

[4] Plut. Kl. 19. Ψηφίσασθαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἔπεισεν Ἀντιγόνῳ παραδιδόναι τὸν Ἀκροκόρινθον. Cf. Ar. 42.

form of internal government. It still produced wise and patriotic statesmen, and one chief of its armies far greater than Aratos himself. But Achaia never again became the independent bulwark of Greece, the unassailable and incorruptible home of freedom. It almost ceased to be an independent power; its future warfare, even its future legislation, was carried on by the sufferance, first of Macedonia and then of Rome. Its constitutional forms lightened the yoke of either master; they made the fall of Greece more gradual and less dishonourable; and so far the work of Markos and Aratos was even then not in vain. But the free and glorious League of so many equal cities acting by a common will, the League which had warred with Kings and had overthrown or converted Tyrants, had now become a thing of the past. And the fabric had been overthrown by the very hands which had reared it; the Creator, the Preserver, and the Destroyer, had been united in a single man.

Comparison of Cavour and Aratos.

We have in our own days beheld a sight in some respects alike, but on the whole the parallel affords more of contrast than of likeness. The deliverer of Peloponnêsos, the founder of the Achaian League, was also the man who surrendered a great Achaian city into the hands of the greatest enemy of independent Greece. So we have seen a statesman as subtle and as full of resources as Aratos himself, the deliverer of Italy, the founder of the Italian Kingdom, surrender two provinces of his native land into the grasp of the common enemy of Italy and mankind. That sad and subdued debate in the Italian Parliament which confirmed the cession of Savoy and Nizza to the Tyrant of Paris may give us some idea of what took place in that Assembly at Aigion which voted the cession of Akrokorinthos to the King of Macedon.

Character of Antigonos.

In one respect indeed the modern side of the parallel is the darker of the two. Antigonos was a King, and not a Tyrant; he had broken no oaths, he had destroyed no freedom, he cloaked his ambition by no hypocritical pretences; when asked to interfere in a quarrel not his own, he—from his own point of view naturally and rightfully—demanded the restoration of a fortress which had been but twenty years before wrested from his predecessor. He did not trouble the world with Ideas and Questions and Solutions and Complications; he asked straightforwardly for a city which he had some decent pretext for looking upon as his own. Antigonos was a King, a Macedonian, the enemy of Greece and the enemy of freedom; but he

was a fair and honourable enemy, openly seeking the natural interests of his order and of his nation. He would have been in his place as a member of the Holy Alliance, he might consistently have helped to partition out Europe at Vienna; but he would never have stooped to dictate pamphlets about mountain slopes and natural boundaries, or to ground his right to Akrokorinthos on the vote of a Corinthian Assembly, called on to say Yea or Nay beneath the shadow of the Macedonian sarissa. But if one would shrink from placing Antigonos Dôsôn in the same rank with Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, one would no less shrink from placing the act of Cavour on a level with the act of Aratos. There is indeed much likeness in the character and career of the two men; each sought the noblest of ends, but neither was so scrupulous as strict morality could wish as to the means by which those ends were to be compassed. Each was, in his own age, unrivalled for parliamentary and diplomatic skill; each indulged in the same dark and crooked policy; each could, when he chose, throw himself, in all freedom and openness, on the vote of a popular Assembly. But Cavour was never tried as Aratos was. The laws of his country did not require its parliamentary leader to act also as its military chieftain. While he himself spoke and plotted, he could use the sword of Garibaldi, of Cialdini, of the King of Italy himself. Cavour was thus spared the humiliation which always waited on the arms of Aratos, from Phylakia to Hekatombaion. Cavour again was never tried by the severest of all trials, the opposition of a rival on really equal terms, such as Aratos found, in different ways, in Lydiadas and in Kleomenês. But the cession of Akrokorinthos was a deeper sin against freedom even than the cession of Savoy and Nizza. Both the Achaian and the Italian statesman surrendered a portion of the land which he had saved into the hands of a foreign despot; one surrendered his own ancestral province, the other surrendered the scene of his own most glorious exploit. Each deed was equally the betrayal of a trust, the narrowing of the area of freedom. But the circumstances of the two acts differed widely. The cession of Savoy and Nizza was indeed a doing of evil that good might come; it was seeking to compass a glorious purpose by a base means; still it was the price paid for help which, hypocritically as it was given, was real help against a real enemy. It might be fairly argued that to liberate Lombardy with the aid of France was a less evil than to leave Lombardy helpless in

Likeness between Aratos and Cavour.

Greater advantages of Cavour.

Greater error in the cession of Akrokorinthos than in the cession of Savoy.

the jaws of Austria, and probably even Cavour's sagacity did not foresee the base perfidy which drew back long before it reached the Hadriatic and left Venice in the grasp of the oppressor. To make the bondage of Savoy and Nizza the price of the freedom of Lombardy was a sin against all abstract morality; but, striking the balance in a mercantile way, the gain was on the side of freedom, and a patriot not over scrupulous as to means might not shrink from the bargain. But the surrender of Akrokorinthos was simple treason;—not wilful or corrupt treason, but treason nevertheless; it was the price paid not for freedom, but for subjection; it was not doing evil that good might come, but doing evil for the further promotion of evil. It doubtless required some personal and some national sacrifice to admit the claims of Kleomenês; but it was a sacrifice which patriotism dictated, when the choice lay between Kleomenês and Antigonos. To have modified the constitution of the League so as to make Kleomenês its chief would have been a far less sin against freedom generally, even a far less sin against its special Federal form, than to retain the constitution in its outward integrity, but to make the League itself a mere dependency of a foreign power. It would be hard to find in all history an instance of so sad a fall as that from the Aratos of the year 251 to the Aratos of the year 223. He saved his country, he raised it to the highest pitch of glory, and then pulled it down to the dust. Yet at heart he was not a traitor; he was only the saddest of all instances of the way in which pride, passion, and obstinacy will sometimes darken the judgement even of honourable and illustrious men.

Change in the character of the war, B.C. 223–222. Kleomenês now the champion of Greece.

From this time the war loses its interest, or rather it assumes an interest of quite another kind. Hitherto it has been a struggle between two Grecian powers for ascendency in Peloponnêsos; it now changes into a struggle for Grecian freedom waged by one of the last and noblest of Grecian heroes against the overwhelming power of Macedonia. Our hearts now go along with Kleomenês, as with Leônidas of old or with Kanarês and Botzarês in the days of our fathers. Antigonos was indeed a foe of a nobler stamp, but he was as truly the foe of Greece as Xerxês or as Omar Brionês. Aratos the deliverer of Greece, and the remnant which still clave to him, have sunk from being the bulwark of Hellas into the rank of a medizing Theban at Plataia.

Kleomenês had been refused as a chief, and now Antigonos came as a master, or rather as a God. He was declared chief of all the allies;[1] the Achaian League was now merged in a great Confederacy together with the lesser Leagues of Bœotia, Phôkis, Akarnania, and Epeiros, together also with the Thessalians, who were hardly better than Macedonian subjects. The League deprived itself of the common rights of independent sovereignty; no letter or embassy was to be sent to any other King without the consent of the King of Macedon. King Ptolemy had been a friend and a paymaster; King Antigonos was a master who required heavy wages for his services. The Macedonian army was maintained and paid at the cost of the League. As for Antigonos himself, sacrifices were offered to him, games were held in his honour, and Aratos had to appear as something like the High Priest of this new Divinity.[2] All this impious flattery was indeed no more than the age was used to; Athens had long before set the example towards Antigonos' own ancestor Dêmêtrios;[3] but Athens at least did not take to King-worship till Dêmosthenês had ceased to guide her councils. Who would have dreamed, when Aratos scaled Akrokorinthos to expel the garrison of one Antigonos, that the same Aratos would live to welcome another Antigonos with the honours due to Zeus and Poseidôn? That much that Aratos beheld and did he beheld and did most unwillingly[4] we may most fully believe. But he was only reaping a harvest of his own sowing, a harvest whose nature any eyes not blinded by passion would have foreseen from the first.

Degradation of the League.

Monstrous flattery of Antigonos.

The military details of the war between Antigonos and Kleomenês are worthy of careful study, and nothing in Grecian or any other history is more attractive than the whole personal career of the last Spartan King. For these I will refer to the

[1] Pol. ii. 54. Κατασταθεὶς ἡγεμὼν ἁπάντων τῶν συμμάχων. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 202. This was at the Autumn Meeting of B.C. 223.

[2] Plut. Ar. 45. Ἐψηφίσαντο δ' ἄλλῳ μὴ γράφειν βασιλεῖ μηδὲ πρεσβεύειν πρὸς ἄλλον ἄκοντος Ἀντιγόνου, τρέφειν τε καὶ μισθοδοτεῖν ἠναγκάζοντο τοὺς Μακεδόνας, θυσίας δὲ καὶ πομπὰς καὶ ἀγῶνας Ἀντιγόνῳ συνετέλουν. So Kl. 16. Διαδήματι καὶ πορφύρᾳ καὶ Μακεδονικοῖς καὶ σατραπικοῖς προστάγμασιν ὑπέρριψε μετὰ τῆς Ἀχαΐας αὐτὸν, ἵνα μὴ Κλεομένει ποιεῖν δοκῇ τὸ προσταττόμενον, Ἀντιγόνεια θύων καὶ παιᾶνας ᾄδων αὐτὸς ἐστεφανωμένος εἰς ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ φθόης κατασηπόμενον. Helwing (p. 148, 9) seems to think the whole thing all right and proper, and takes Plutarch severely to task for his freedom of speech.

[3] See the details in Athênaios, vi. 62–4, especially the Ithyphallics in c. 63.

[4] Plut. Ar. 45. ᾐτιῶντο πάντων ἐκεῖνον . . . ἐπεὶ φανερῶς γε πολλὰ τῶν πραττομένων ἐλύπει τὸν Ἄρατον.

general historians of Greece and to Kleomenês' own special biographer. A few points however stand out which more immediately bear on my own subject.

Recovery of the revolted cities, B.C. 223 222.

The combined forces of Antigonos and the League had little difficulty in recovering the cities which had revolted from their Federal allegiance. Some were taken by force, others received the conquerors, with what amount of willingness or unwillingness it would be hard to say. In one case a remarkable internal revolution restored the greatest of the seceding cities to its place in the Union. At the very beginning of the war, before Antigonos had entered Peloponnêsos, while Kleomenês was still master of a strong force at the Isthmus, and was still besieging the Achaian garrison in Akrokorinthos, Argos, his greatest prize, returned of its own accord to the Achaian connexion. The party which had invited Kleomenês to Argos was dissatisfied because the Spartan King had not proclaimed the abolition of debts among his new friends.[1] At the persuasion of one Aristotelês, the multitude rose, and called in Aratos and the allies. Now it was that Aratos, still, it would seem, Absolute General of the League, was elected local General of the State of Argos.[2] Aristomachos, once Tyrant of Argos, afterwards General of the League, was put to death,[3] with the sanction, if not by the com-

Argos returns to the League, B.C. 223.

Execution of Aristomachos.

[1] Plut. Kl. 20. Ὁ δὲ πράττων ἦν τὴν ἀπόστασιν Ἀριστοτέλης· καὶ τὸ πλῆθος οὐ χαλεπῶς ἔπεισεν ἀγανακτοῦν, ὅτι χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς οὐκ ἐποίησεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Κλεομένης ἐλπίσασι.

[2] Ib. Ar. 44. Ἄρατος δὲ στρατηγὸς αἱρεθεὶς ὑπ' Ἀργείων. See above, p. 199.

[3] Phylarchos asserted, and Plutarch (u.s.) repeats the assertion without expressing any doubt of its truth, that Aristomachos was put to death by torture, a thing utterly repugnant to Grecian feeling. Polybios (ii. 59, 60) denies the fact, and his denial is perhaps worth more because he argues that Antigonos and Aratos would have been fully justified if they had done so. (See above, p. 298.) It was no crime to torture a Tyrant, especially one who had himself tortured to death eighty of his own citizens. But whatever Aristomachos had once been, he was not a Tyrant now; in strong Unionist eyes he might be a rebel, but torture was no Greek punishment for rebellion. Moreover this charge of torturing the eighty Argeians is in itself very doubtful (see above, p. 312, note 3), and, even if true, it could not be decently urged against him by Aratos. Whatever were the old crimes of Aristomachos, the League had condoned them by admitting him as a citizen and electing him as its Chief Magistrate.

The fate of Aristomachos, whatever it was, lies at the door of Antigonos and Aratos; but we may gather from a later allusion of Polybios (v. 16) that the Macedonian Leontios was guilty of deeds of slaughter of some kind or other without the authority of either. Aratos recounts the crimes of Leontios, and, among them, τὴν γενομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν [τῶν περὶ τὸν Λεόντιον] ἐν Ἄργει σφαγήν, ἣν ἐποιήσαντο μετὰ τὴν Ἀντιγόνου χωρισμόν.

mand, of Aratos. It was a hard sentence. Aristomachos had united a great city to the League; he had been chosen its Chief Magistrate; in that character he seems to have shown no fault except over-deference to Aratos; his only crime now was that, in the unavoidable choice of masters, he had preferred a Spartan to a Macedonian.[1] The property of other "Tyrants and traitors," whoever they may have been, was voted by the Argeian commonwealth, on the motion of its new General, as a benevolence or a testimonial to the King of Macedonia.[2] The recovery of Argos was the turning-point in the war; as soon as this first step took place, but of course before Aratos and his master had sated their vengeance, Kleomenês deserted his position at Corinth in order to relieve his troops in the Argeian citadel. Aratos was thus able to fulfil his pledge, and to surrender Akrokorinthos to his royal ally. Twenty years of freedom had succeeded a hundred years of bondage; thirty years more of bondage now began; after that freedom was to be once more restored to Corinth, but this time not by the hands of a Grecian deliverer, but as a gift from the Roman conqueror of Macedon and lord of Greece.

Antigonos put in possession of Akrokorinthos. B.C. 338–243. B.C. 243–223. B.C. 223–196.

The other cities of Argolis and Arkadia were easily recovered during the autumn of the year 223 and the spring of 222.[3] The fate of the three Arkadian towns which had given the first occasion to the war, Tegea, Orchomenos, and Mantineia, calls for some remark. The Mantineians, in the eyes of Antigonos or at least of Aratos, were double-dyed traitors; they had revolted once to the Ætolians and once to Kleomenês; no terms therefore were to be offered them. Their city was taken, its inhabitants were slain or sold,[4] and the "lovely Mantineia" was handed over to the Argeians as a reward for their repentance[5] and amendment. Its new masters planted a colony there, of which they chose their General Aratos as the Founder. His own native Sikyôn had once been called Dêmêtrias; the name

Fate of Mantineia B.C. 222.

[1] Plut. Ar. 44. Τὸν δὲ Ἀριστόμαχον ἐν Κεγχρεαῖς στρεβλώσαντες κατεπόντισαν, ἐφ' ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα κακῶς ἤκουσεν ὁ Ἄρατος ὡς ἀνθρωπον οὐ πονηρὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κεχρημένον ἐκείνῳ καὶ πεπεισμένον ἀφεῖναι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ προσαγαγεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τὴν πόλιν ὅμως περιδὼν παρανόμως ἀπολλύμενον. The Chairôneian, at his distance of time, does not share the passions of the Megalopolitan.

[2] Ib. Ἔπεισεν αὐτοὺς [ὁ Ἄρατος] Ἀντιγόνῳ τά τε τῶν τυράννων καὶ τὰ τῶν προδοτῶν χρήματα δωρεὰν δοῦναι. This sounds like the form of the decree.

[3] Pol. ii. 54.

[4] Plut. Ar. 45. Pol. ii. 58.

[5] Pol. ii. 53. Γενναίως μὲν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φιλοτίμως δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων ἐκ μεταμελείας αὐτὸν [Κλεομένη] ἀμυναμένων.

had been lost, if by nothing else, by his own exploits as her deliverer; as if now to wipe out the error of his youth, he now changed the name of his refounded city to Antigoneia.[1]

Tegea united to the League. Antigonos keeps Orchomenos.

Tegea and Orchomenos were also taken. To the people of Tegea Antigonos restored the constitution of their fathers,[2] a strange boon, if what is meant is union to the Achaian League, of which they had never been members. Orchomenos the Macedonian King kept to himself; Polybios[3] complains that it was not united to the League. It is hard to see on what ground any such complaint could be made. It had never belonged to the League; if conquest confers any rights, Antigonos had a perfect right to keep it, and, as Polybios himself shows, he had excellent reasons for so doing.

Meanwhile Megalopolis had, through the whole war, steadily adhered to the Federal cause. The war had been originally undertaken in its defence, and, through its whole course, it had, more than any other city, borne the brunt of it. At last, in almost the latest stage of the war, when Kleomenês, shorn of all his allies and conquests, was bearing up alone with the soul of a hero and the skill of a general, a blow, well timed and ably struck, made him master of the Great City.[4] Lydiadas was gone, but Megalopolis contained a citizen worthy to take his place, in Philopoimên the son of Kraugis. He, while the mass of his countrymen fled to Messênê, headed a diversion which secured their retreat. He, when Kleomenês offered to restore their city unhurt on condition of their forsaking the League, exhorted them to endure everything in the cause of their country and their allies.[5] Kleomenês, when his offers were rejected, utterly destroyed the city which, for a hundred and fifty years, had been at once the memorial and the pledge of Spartan humiliation.

Kleomenês takes Megalopolis, B.C. 222.

First mention of PHILOPOIMÊN.

[1] Plut. Ar. 45. Τῶν γὰρ Ἀργείων τὴν πόλιν παρ' Ἀντιγόνου δωρεὰν λαβόντων καὶ κατοικίζειν ἐγνωκότων αὐτὸς οἰκιστὴς αἱρεθεὶς καὶ στρατηγὸς ὢν ἐψηφίσατο μηκέτι καλεῖν Μαντίνειαν, ἀλλ' Ἀντιγόνειαν, ὃ καὶ μέχρι νῦν καλεῖται· καὶ δοκεῖ δι' ἐκεῖνον ἡ μὲν ἐρατεινὴ Μαντίνεια παντάπασιν ἐξαληλίφθαι, διαμένει δ' ἡ πόλις ἐπώνυμος τῶν ἀπολεσάντων καὶ ἀνελόντων τοὺς πολίτας. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 204.

[2] Pol. ii. 70. Ἀποδοὺς τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν. This was after the battle of Sellasia, but the city was taken before. See c. 54.

[3] iv. 6.

[4] Pol. ii. 55. Plut. Kl. 23.

[5] So says Plutarch (Phil. 5. Kl. 24), who makes the Megalopolitans inclined to accept Kleomenês' offer till they are dissuaded by Philopoimên. Phylarchos, whom Polybios (ii. 61) seems to follow, describes them as hardly needing such dissuasion. They would not hear Kleomenês' letter to the end, and could hardly be kept from stoning the bearer.

Battle of Sellasia, B.C. 221.

It was on the field of Sellasia,[1] one of the saddest names in Grecian history, that the final struggle took place between Sparta and Macedonia for the headship of Greece. One hardly knows whether to count it as an aggravation or as an alleviation of the blow that it was partly dealt by Grecian hands. Philopoimên and the Achaian cavalry had a distinguished share in winning the victory. Philopoimên, like Lydiadas at Ladokeia, charged without orders, but he was somewhat better supported by Antigonos than his great countryman had been by Aratos.

Defeat and exile of Kleomenês.

After a valiant struggle, the Lacedæmonians were defeated; Kleomenês endured to survive, and to wait in vain, in the despotic court of Egypt, for better times. Sparta now, for the first time since the return of the Hêrakleids, opened her gates to a foreign conqueror. Antigonos treated her with the same politic lenity which he had shown everywhere except at Mantineia. It would be his policy to represent the war as waged, not against Sparta, but against her so-called Tyrant. The innovations of Kleomenês were done away,[2] but Sparta was not required to join the Achaian League. Her compulsory and useless union was reserved for a later stage of our history.

Antigonos' treatment of Sparta.

Death and character of Antigonos, B.C. 221.

The death of Antigonos soon followed his settlement of Peloponnêsian affairs. Aratos, who had sung pæans in his honour, gave him a bad character in his Memoirs.[3] It is hard to see the reason for this in his acts, and it clearly was not followed by Polybios. Antigonos, a King and a Macedonian, was far less blameworthy than Aratos, a Greek and a republican leader. An

[1] The battle of Sellasia is commonly placed in the year B.C. 222; but the succession of summers and winters given by Polybios (ii. 54) would rather bring it to 221, in which it is placed by Bishop Thirlwall. On the whole, B.C. 221 seems the most probable date; at the same time it requires the battle of Sellasia, the settlement of Sparta and some other cities, the return of Antigonos to Macedonia, his death, the accession of Philip, and the events which led to the Social War, to have followed one another with unusual speed. And in Pol. iv. 35, the Spartans are said, seemingly in B.C. 219, to have been πολιτευόμενοι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια σχεδὸν ἤδη τρεῖς ἐνιαυτοὺς μετὰ τὴν Κλεομένους ἔκπτωσιν. This, however, might possibly be satisfied by a period of two years and a fraction. As the exact date does not bear very immediately on my own subject, I would recommend the question to the attention of professed chronologers.

[2] Pol. ii. 70. Πολίτευμα τὸ πάτριον αὐτοῖς καταστήσας. Cf. Plut. Kl. 30.

It is doubtful whether Antigonos did, or did not, leave Brachyllas the Theban, for a time at least, with some authority at Sparta. See Pol. xx. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 218. If he did, it must have been only with some temporary commission, like that of Prytanis at Megalopolis.

[3] Plut. Ar. 38. Ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι λοιδορῶν διετέλει. Kl. 16. Ἀντίγονον εἰρηκὼς κακὰ μυρία δι' ὧν ἀπολέλοιπεν ὑπομνημάτων. But see Pol. ii. 70.

opportunity was offered him for recovering an old and precious possession of his house, and of vastly extending the power and influence of his Crown. That he accepted it no man can wonder; one would be half inclined to blame him if he had not. And, if we do not see in his career the wonderful magnanimity ascribed to him by Achaian admirers, it was at least something to win so many cities with so little needless cruelty. Both Sparta and Athens, in the days of their power, had shed Grecian blood far more freely. Altogether Antigonos Dôsôn was a King who need not shrink from a comparison with any but the selected few, the Alfreds and the Akbars, among those whom the accident of birth has called to rule over their fellows. Himself only a distant kinsman of the royal house, born a subject, and called to the throne by popular election, he better knew how to deal with freemen than the mass of Kings and their satraps. We shall soon see how both Macedonia and Greece could be made to suffer at the hands of one born in the purple.

B.C. 281–221. We have thus, for sixty years, traced the growth of the League, from the union of two small Achaian towns, till it became the greatest power of Peloponnêsos and of Greece. We have seen it fall from its high estate through the envy of the man who had done most to raise it. We leave it now restored nearly to its full extent, with the exception of that mountain citadel, that key to its whole position, without which its extent was a mockery, and its freedom little better than a name. We have still, in the following Chapter, to continue its history for another period of seventy-five years, retaining its internal constitution, vastly increased in territorial extent, but, in external affairs, with only a few very short intervals, reduced almost to the condition of a dependent ally, first of Macedonia and then of Rome.

New position of the League.

B.C. 221–146.

# CHAPTER VIII

## HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE BATTLE OF SELLASIA TO THE PEACE OF EPEIROS. B.C. 221—205

THE Macedonian intervention in Peloponnêsos, and the results of the battle of Sellasia, had wholly changed the aspect of Grecian affairs. The greater part of Greece was now united in an alliance, of which the King of Macedonia was the real, if not the acknowledged, head. Beside the Macedonian Kingdom and the Achaian League, this Confederacy included all the Federal powers of Northern Greece,[1] with the exception of Ætolia. The spectacle of so many Federal Commonwealths thus closely allied, both with one another and with a Government of another kind, gives this Confederacy a special interest in the eyes of a historian of Federalism. The formal relations between the several allied powers were apparently those of perfect equality. The extraordinary authority which the Achaians had conferred upon Antigonos seems to have lasted no longer than the duration of the Kleomenic War. It certainly did not descend to his successor Philip. But Achaia and other republican members of the Confederacy were exposed to all the dangers which commonly attend alliances between the weak and the strong. It would be too much to say that they stood to Macedonia in the relation of dependent alliance; but they seem to have stood practically in the same sort of subordination in which the Peloponnêsian allies stood to Sparta at the beginning of the great Peloponnêsian War.[2] Sparta had now, by the fall of Kleo-

State of Greece after the fall of Kleomenês.

Grand Alliance under Macedonian headship.

[1] Pol. iv. 9. Ἔτι γὰρ ἔνορκος ἔμενε πᾶσιν ἡ γεγενημένη συμμαχία δι' Ἀντιγόνου κατὰ τοὺς Κλεομενικοὺς καιροὺς Ἀχαιοῖς, Ἠπειρώταις, Φωκεῦσι, Μακεδόσι, Βοιωτοῖς, Ἀκαρνᾶσι, Θετταλοῖς. Ib. 15. Ἦν δὲ τὰ δόξαντα τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ταῦτα, πρεσβεύειν πρὸς Ἠπειρώτας, Βοιωτούς, Φωκέας, Ἀκαρνᾶνας, Φίλιππον. The Thessalians, as nominally independent, were enrolled in the alliance; but, as practically Macedonian subjects, they were not thought worthy of a formal embassy being sent to them.

[2] See above, p. 357.

Relations of the other Greek States.

menês, been reduced to an unwilling union with the Allies.[1] Messênê was friendly to the Allies, but was not formally enrolled among them.[2] This enumeration includes pretty nearly all Greece, except Athens, of which we have just now no mention, and Elis, which of course retained its old connexion with Ætolia. As for Ætolia itself, notwithstanding all that we have heard of danger from that quarter, the old alliance between the Achaian and Ætolian Leagues was not held to be dissolved by the new engagements of the Achaians.[3] In like manner Ætolia stood towards Messênê also in a relation which is spoken of as one of friendship and alliance.[4]

Internal and external condition of the Achaian League.

As for the Achaian League itself, its internal constitution remained unchanged. Its General, its Senate, and its Assembly still continued to exercise their old functions. There is no reason to suppose that their practical working had at all degenerated. Achaia still retained its mixture of moderate Democracy and moderate Aristocracy, its freedom from the rule alike of mobs, Tyrants, and Oligarchs. There is no evidence that the relations between the Federal Government and the several States were in any way altered. We hear of no discontents, even in those cities which had fallen away to Kleomenês and had been recovered by Antigonos.[5] Nor does it appear that, with the single exception of Mantineia, the position of any of those cities had become worse by reason of their temporary secession. In all this the work of Markos and of Aratos still bore its fruit. An orderly democratic Federation still held together a large number of Grecian cities, to which no other system could have given any measure of peace and good government. But for their Federal Union, those cities might either have been held in bondage by local Tyrants or else occupied by foreign garrisons;

[1] Sparta does not occur in the list, but its relation is spoken of in the same passage (Pol. iv. 9) by the name of *συμμαχία*. So also c. 23.

[2] The Messênians (Pol. iv. 9) ask for admission to the Confederacy (*ἡ κοινὴ συμμαχία*), which the Achaians cannot grant without the consent of the other allies.

[3] Pol. iv. 15. *Ὄντες γὰρ αὐτοὶ* [*οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ*] *σύμμαχοι καὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τῶν Μεσσηνίων.* Cf. iv. 7. *Κατετόλμησαν* [*οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ*] *ἐπιβῆναι στρατοπέδῳ τῆς Ἀχαΐας, παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας.*

[4] Ib. 15. So c. 6. *Οὔτε τῆς ὑπαρχούσης αὐτοῖς* [*Αἰτωλοῖς*] *ἐκ παλαιῶν χρόνων πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους φιλίας καὶ συμμαχίας οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν ποιησάμενοι πρόνοιαν.* So c. 3. *Μεσσηνίων . . . φίλων ὄντων καὶ συμμάχων.*

[5] Megalopolis of course does not come under this head, and the dissensions of which we shall presently hear there (Pol. v. 93) seem to have been purely local, and not to have been at all connected with Federal questions.

or, if free, they might have abused their freedom and wasted their strength in ceaseless border-warfare with one another. The League, even as it now stood, was a power with which Macedonia, and Rome herself, felt it prudent to deal cautiously, to respect constitutional forms, and to abstain, for a long time to come, from high-handed acts of violence. But the old strength and dignity of the League were gone. Its dimensions were curtailed; Megara was now Bœotian, and, what was of far more moment, Corinth was now Macedonian. Orchomenos too, in the heart of the Federal territory, was held as a Macedonian outpost. The whole position of the League was changed; it well nigh lost its power of independent action, when it sank into a single member of a great Alliance under Macedonian headship. The Achaian League, in short, still remained an important and well-governed Federal Commonwealth, more important than Akarnania, better governed than Bœotia. But it had wholly given up its old and glorious office as the destroyer of Tyrants, the humbler of Kings, the deliverer and the uniter of Hellas.

Undiminished influence of Aratos.

Aratos still retained his old position and his old influence. One would think that he must have bitterly repented the day when he preferred Antigonos to Kleomenês. One might have expected that the events of the Kleomenic War would have utterly overthrown his power. But he still remained, the same man in the same place. He was still the chief of the League, regularly chosen to its highest Magistracy as often as the Law allowed his election. He still retained his faculty of losing battles in the field and his faculty of winning votes in the Assembly. We find indeed a party hostile to him,[1] which, as before, could take advantage of his errors to raise a momentary storm against him. But, so often as this happened, he was still able to display his peculiar gift of allaying complaints and of strengthening his position by every attack made upon him. For his old career of surprising cities, of overthrowing or converting Tyrants, the present state of things allowed no room. It gave him instead an opportunity of displaying his peculiar powers in a way, less glorious indeed, but, as affairs now stood, no less indispensable.[2] The republican chief had stooped to become a courtier and a Minister; he had to act, if sometimes as the

[1] Pol. iv. 14. Τῶν ἀντιπολιτευομένων κατηγορούντων αὐτοῦ, κ.τ.λ.

[2] Plut. Ar. 48. Ἐδόκει τε πᾶσιν ὁ Ἄρατος οὐ μόνον δημοκρατίας ἀλλὰ καὶ βασιλείας ἀγαθὸς εἶναι παιδαγωγός.

Relation of Aratos to the Macedonian Kings.

obsequious flatterer, yet sometimes also as the honest adviser, of two successive Kings. Putting aside his one great error, assuming the ignominious position in which his own fault had placed both himself and his country, his conduct in his new office is honourable enough. We must now look on him as a sort of Minister for Peloponnêsian Affairs, first to Antigonos and then to Philip. In this position, we find his obsequiousness mainly confined to acts of homage which, if degrading, were merely formal. The counsels which he gives are commonly both prudent and honourable; even in his new and fallen position, the personal worth and dignity of the old republican leader stand forth in marked contrast to the utter villainy of the Macedonian courtiers. He paid the penalty of royal friendship;[1] like the Jehoiada of Jewish, and the Seneca of Roman, history, he undertook the guidance of a lion's whelp whose harmlessness was confined to the days of childhood.[2]

Character of PHILOPOIMÊN.

Yet at this very moment the League possessed a citizen, perhaps not endowed with all the varied gifts of her old chief, but a man, on the whole, of higher aims, and especially eminent in those very respects in which Aratos was so lamentably wanting. Megalopolis, the city of Lydiadas, had produced, in Philopoimên, a worthy successor of that hero. Assuming, as a native of Megalopolis could hardly fail to assume, that Kleomenês was to be resisted to the uttermost, Philopoimên had displayed, in the last stage of the Kleomenic War, every quality of a great citizen and a great soldier. A discerning historian has well remarked that the natural places of the two successive chiefs of the League seem to have been transposed by fortune.[3] Had Philopoimên been in the place of Aratos, fewer surprises and diplomatic triumphs might have been won; but the Achaian phalanx and the Achaian General would never have become the laughing-stock of Peloponnêsos. What Philopoimên might have made of the Achaian army in better times we may judge by seeing what he did make of it when Achaian armies were beginning to be useless. As a general, he needed only a wider field to have been the rival of his contemporaries Hannibal and Scipio. The man who at once transformed such military materials as Aratos had left him

[1] Plut. Ar. 52. Ταῦτ', εἶπεν, ὦ Κεφάλων, ἐπίχειρα τῆς βασιλικῆς φιλίας.

[2] Æsch. Ag. 699. Ἔθρεψεν δὲ λέοντα, κ.τ.λ. Aristoph. Frogs, 1427. Οὐ χρὴ λέοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν.

[3] Thirlwall, viii. 406. Cf. Liddell's History of Rome, ii. 80.

into an army capable of winning a pitched battle over Lacedæmonians was, in his own sphere, as great a commander as either of them. His policy, as well as that of Aratos, sometimes erred on the side of too great eagerness for the extension of the League. This error took a characteristic form in each of the two men. Aratos sometimes pushed the arts of the diplomatist almost to the verge of treachery; Philopoimên sometimes pushed the honest vigour of the soldier beyond the verge of violence and vindictiveness. In internal Federal politics, we find him the author of reforms designed to carry out in greater fulness the true ideas of Federal union and equality. These great qualities might have been of eminent use in the days of Aratos; in the days of Philopoimên they were nearly thrown away. During a great part of his life, all that he could do was, by a policy neither servile nor obstinate, to mitigate the bitterness of Roman encroachment, and to ward off the day of final bondage. For this purpose we can hardly doubt that the unrivalled diplomatic powers of Aratos would have been more useful than the straightforward energy of Philopoimên. He was a brave soldier and an upright citizen, but he had no special gift of influencing the minds of Macedonian Kings or Roman Proconsuls. Philopoimên, in short, was one of the heroes who struggle against fate, who are allowed to do no more than to stave off a destruction which it is beyond their power to avert.

Comparison between Philopoimên and Aratos.

It is very remarkable that, for several years after the beginning of our present period, we lose sight of Philopoimên altogether.[1] His conduct at Sellasia procured him the marked notice of Antigonos. The King made him the most splendid offers;[2] wealth and high command were ready for him, if he would only enter the Macedonian service. That Philopoimên utterly refused to sell himself for all that Macedonia could give is no more than we should have expected from his general character. But his conduct in other respects is not so intelligible. He went into Crete to learn the art of war amid the constant local struggles of that island. While there, he contrived to do his country some at least apparent service, by extending her alliance among the

Temporary withdrawal of Philopoimên from Peloponnêsos.

[1] Brandstäter (358) strangely introduces him, without any explanation, into the middle of the Social War, transferring thither an exploit which happened ten years later. See Plut. Phil. 7. Thirlwall, viii. 290.

[2] Plut. Phil. 7. He refused, according to his biographer, *μάλιστα τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν καταμαθὼν πρὸς τὸ ἄρχεσθαι δυσκόλως καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔχουσαν.*

Cretan cities.[1] But if Philopoimên wanted a field of action, why did he not seek it in Peloponnêsos? Why did he refuse to his own country the direct advantage of his skill and valour in the struggle with Ætolia which we are just about to record? History gives no answer to this question; but an obvious conjecture presents itself. Philopoimên absented himself from Peloponnêsos during the whole remaining life of Aratos; shortly after his death he returned. Was he warned by the example of the great citizen whom Megalopolis must still have been bewailing? Did he see that it was as hopeless for him as it had been for Lydiadas to depose Aratos from the first place in the League, and that, while Aratos held the first place in the League, his own great qualities would be as much thrown away as those of Lydiadas had been? He may have had no mind to enter on a vain rivalry, which was certain to issue in his being baffled and rejected in the Assembly, which was not unlikely to issue in his being forsaken, or even betrayed, on another field of Ladokeia. He might do his country more real service by winning foreign states to her alliance, and by gaining, in a school of foreign war, the military experience which might one day be useful to her. Possibly the highest patriotism of all might have bid him devote himself to the immediate service of his country, at all hazards, under whatever difficulties, and in however subordinate a post. But the conjecture on which I have ventured seems to explain, in a way neither improbable nor wholly dishonourable to Philopoimên, a line of conduct which at first sight seems altogether inexplicable.

Probable explanation of his conduct.

The death of Antigonos so soon after his victory at Sellasia seemed to promise some of those disturbances and revolutions which commonly attended a change of rulers in Macedonia. Young Philip however succeeded to the throne without opposition, but the accession of a prince who had scarcely emerged from boyhood opened a prospect to those who hoped to profit by any momentary weakness of Macedonia and her allies. It was, according to Polybios, the restless rapacity of the Ætolians which seized on so favourable an opportunity for the ravages which led to the struggle known as the Social War.[2] As we now have the direct narrative of Polybios, and no longer his mere introductory sketch, we know far more of the details of this war than of that

Accession of Philip, B.C. 221.

Causes of the Social War.

[1] See Thirlwall, viii. 287.

[2] Ὁ συμμαχικὸς πόλεμος. (Pol. iv. 13.) The War of the Leagues, or rather of the Confederacies, might perhaps better express the meaning.

which ended at Sellasia. But its inherent interest is far less. It has none of the heroic charm which attaches to the names of Lydiadas and Kleomenês; and the Achaian League itself no longer acts the primary part. It will be enough for our purpose here, as throughout the history, to run hastily over the purely military events, stopping only to comment on points which either illustrate Federal politics or throw light on the characters of the great Federal politicians.

## § 1. *The Social War*

### B.C. 221—217

We have seen that most of the Ætolian possessions in Peloponnêsos had fallen into the hands, first of Kleomenês, and then of the Achaians or their Macedonian protector. The Ætolians however still retained the smaller city of Phigaleia, lying on the confines of Arkadia, Messênê, and Elis. The town stood to the Ætolian League in that doubtful relation in which we find so many of its outlying possessions; its inhabitants bore the name of citizens,[1] but their condition probably approached nearer to that of subjects, or, at best, of dependent allies. Phigaleia could not have been valuable to Ætolia in any way but as a military post; it was held by an Ætolian Governor,[2] and therefore doubtless by an Ætolian garrison also. Soon after the accession of Philip, Dorimachos, the Ætolian commander at Phigaleia, began to be guilty of various acts of plunder on the neighbouring and friendly territory of Messênê. A strange diplomatic quarrel followed,[3] which led to the most bitter hatred on the part of Dorimachos towards those whom he had injured. In conjunction with a kinsman and kindred spirit named Skopas, and with the connivance of the Ætolian General Aristôn,[4] but without any

Timoxenos General of Achaia, B.C. 221–220.

Phigaleia held by the Ætolians.

Dorimachos plunders Messênê, B.C. 221.

[1] Pol. iv. 3. Ἐτύγχανε δὲ τότε συμπολιτευομένη τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς. But we soon afterwards (iv. 79) find the Phigaleians dissatisfied with the Ætolian connexion, which there is called *συμμαχία*.

[2] Dorimachos was sent, according to Polybios (iv. 3), λόγῳ μὲν παραφυλάξων τήν τε χώραν καὶ τὴν πόλιν τῶν Φιγαλέων, ἔργῳ δὲ κατασκόπου τάξιν ἔχων τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πραγμάτων. Brandstäter (342) asks, with some simplicity, "War das etwas so Schlimmes?" There is something really amusing in this writer's half apologies for his clients.

[3] See Pol. iv. 4 and, more briefly, Thirlwall, viii. 233.

[4] Aristôn had some bodily infirmity (διά τινας σωματικὰς ἀσθενείας) which disqualified him from service; he was a kinsman of Dorimachos and Skopas; practically the chief power was in the hands of Dorimachos. Pol. iv. 5.

sort of authority from either the Popular Assembly or the Senate,[1] he planned a series of incursions which amounted, as Polybios expresses it, to a declaration of war against Messênê, Achaia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Macedonia, all at once.[2] Various acts of aggression on all these states followed; among other things, a fort named Klarion, in the territory of Megalopolis, was seized upon, but the Ætolians were soon driven out by the Achaian General Timoxenos, with the help of Tauriôn, the Macedonian commander at Corinth. An Ætolian army also passed through the western cantons of the old Achaia; its leaders indeed disclaimed all hostile intentions, but their followers passed on to Phigaleia, plundering as they went, and from Phigaleia they began the devastation of Messênê in good earnest.

Extensive incursions of the Ætolians.

The narrative of these events brings forward one or two points of political interest, of which I have already spoken in my general description of the Achaian Constitution. The Ætolians chose for the time of their inroad the season when the Achaian official year was drawing to its close, when Achaia, in short, was in the throes of a Presidential election. Timoxenos, the General actually in office, was a friend and partisan of Aratos, and apparently no opposition was expected to the election, according to the usual custom, of Aratos himself as his successor.[3] Still the Ætolians

May, B.C. 220.

[1] Pol. u.s. Κατὰ κοινὸν μὲν οὐκ ἐτόλμα παρακαλεῖν τοὺς Αἰτωλούς, κ.τ.λ. οὔτε κοινὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν προσδεξάμενοι σύνοδον οὔτε τοῖς ἀποκλήτοις συμμεταδόντες, κ.τ.λ.

[2] Pol. u.s. Κατὰ δὲ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁρμὰς καὶ κρίσεις διαλαβόντες ἅμα Μεσσηνίοις, Ἠπειρώταις, Ἀχαιοῖς, Ἀκαρνᾶσι, Μακεδόσι, πόλεμον ἐξήνεγκαν. Of course this does not imply, but excludes, any formal declaration of war by Ætolia against all these powers.

[3] Polybios' (iv. 6) words are, ἐν ᾧ λοιπὸς ἦν Τιμοξένῳ μὲν ὀλίγος ἔτι χρόνος τῆς ἀρχῆς, Ἄρατος δὲ καθίστατο μὲν εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπιόντα στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, οὔπω δὲ ἔμελλε τὴν ἀρχὴν ἕξειν. These words, by themselves, would most naturally imply that Aratos was already actually General-Elect. But, directly after (c. 7), ἡ καθήκουσα ἐκ τῶν νόμων σύνοδος—that is, surely, the regular Spring Meeting of the year B.C. 220—comes together. At this Meeting the injured cantons complain of the Ætolian aggression; the inroad therefore must have been before the actual day of meeting. After the Meeting, Timoxenos is still actually in office, though Aratos is known to be his successor. We must therefore infer that Aratos was formally elected at the meeting mentioned in c. 7, and that the words of Polybios in c. 6, only imply that his election was, before the Meeting, an understood thing, to which no opposition would be made. He was then, at the time described in c. 6, not General-Elect, but what some people would call General-Designate.

So in the American Presidential interregnum there are two stages. There is first the interval between the election of electors (which practically determines the

knew[1] that even so slight a change would cause some additional weakness in the Government, and that the holding of the regular Spring Assembly for the election would draw away most of the leading men from the defence of their homes. At this moment the Ætolians marched, plundering as they went, through the cantons of Patrai, Pharai, and Dymê. The Assembly met; Aratos was elected General for the next year, but he would not, by Achaian Law, immediately enter upon his office. The Assembly also decreed that help should be sent to Messênê, that the existing General should summon the whole military force of the nation in arms, and that the body thus gathered together should be invested with the ordinary powers of the regular Assembly.[2] Timoxenos was unwilling to enter upon any important business, whether civil or military, just before the end of his term of office.[3] Moreover he distrusted the military efficiency of his countrymen; their defeats in the early part of the Kleomenic War, and the habit of looking for Macedonian help which had grown upon them during its later years, had greatly relaxed the courage and discipline of the nation.[4] Timoxenos therefore delayed carrying out the resolution of the Assembly. Aratos, on the other hand, seems to have been seized with a sudden fit of military enthusiasm. He who had been the quench-coal to the warlike ardour of Lydiadas and Aristomachos now

Invasion during a Presidential Election.

Aratos General, B.C. 220–219.

election of the President) and the formal election of the President himself; there is secondly the interval between the formal election of the President and his actual "Inauguration."

[1] That the Ætolians really had an eye to all this, is manifestly implied in the words of Polybios (iv. 6), *παρατηρήσαντες τὸν καιρόν*.

[2] Pol. iv. 7. See above, pp. 215, 216. The small attendance at the regular Meeting may be understood, if no opposition was to be offered to the election of the General.

[3] Pol. iv. 7. *Ὅσον οὔπω λῃγούσης τῆς ἀρχῆς*. In the American War, in the year 1777, we find the operations of part of the American force hampered by a cause which, though not exactly the same, reminds one of this affair of Timoxenos and Aratos.

"The usual difficulty of obtaining the service of the militia was at this time very much increased, by an event by no means common. The time for which the governor [of New Jersey] was elected had expired, and no new election had been made. The late executive, therefore, did not think himself authorized to take any measures as an executive, and had not General Dickinson ventured to order out the militia by his own authority, they could not have been put in motion." Marshall's Life of Washington, iii. 206.

[4] Pol. u.s. *Ἅμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ ῥᾳθύμως αὐτοὺς ἐσχηκέναι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις γυμνασίαν, κ.τ.λ.* So Plut. Ar. 47. *Ἐθισθέντες γὰρ ἀλλοτρίαις σώζεσθαι χερσὶ καὶ τοῖς Μακεδόνων ὅπλοις αὐτοὺς ὑπεσταλκότες ἐν ἀργίᾳ πολλῇ καὶ ἀταξίᾳ διῆγον*.

began to complain of the delays and lack of energy of Timoxenos.[1] He felt sure that nothing effectual could be done till the reins of power were again in his own hands. He at last actually prevailed on Timoxenos to give up to him the seal, the badge of the Presidential office, five days before the legal time.[2] Aratos at once issued his summons to the several cities;[3] the military Assembly met under arms at Megalopolis, and acted in all respects as if it had been the regular Assembly at Aigion.[4] It received Messênian Ambassadors who asked for the admission of their city to the Grand Alliance.[5] The Achaian Government[6] answered that the Achaians could not admit them without the consent of the other members of the Confederacy, but that they would themselves help them on the delivery of hostages to be kept at Sparta. The campaign which followed displayed, on the part of Aratos, something which even Polybios can only describe as the height of folly.[7] He was not only beaten in the field as usual, but he had the incredible folly to send away the greater part of his army, and to allow himself to be altogether outgeneralled. He underwent a defeat at Kaphyai, which was almost as destructive as any which he had undergone at the hands of Kleomenês. The Ætolians traversed Peloponnêsos without opposition, and at last returned home by way of the Isthmus.[8]

Aratos enters on office before the legal time.

Military Assembly at Megalopolis, B.C. 220.

Disgraceful campaign of Aratos.

His defeat at Kaphyai.

[1] Pol. u.s. Σχετλιάζων καὶ παροξυνόμενος ἐπὶ τῇ τόλμῃ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν θυμικώτερον ἐχρῆτο τοῖς πράγμασιν. The ἀλλοτριότης spoken of directly after means hostility to the Ætolians, not to Timoxenos. See Lucas, p. 98, note.

[2] Pol. u.s. So Plut. Ar. 47. See above, p. 234.

[3] Pol. u.s. Πρὸς τὰς πόλεις ἔγραφε—This is the usual formula.

[4] Polybios calls them πλῆθος (iv. 9) and ὄχλοι (iv. 7), just like the regular Assembly.

[5] Pol. iv. 9. See above, p. 390. Drumann (p. 464) mistakes this for an application for admission to the Achaian League. For that purpose the word used would have been πολιτεία or συμπολιτεία, not συμμαχία.

[6] Pol. iv. 9. Οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, that is, the δημιουργοί. The proposal for the Messênian alliance being contrary to treaty, the δημιουργοί would not put it to the vote; but the promise of Achaian help must have required a vote of the Meeting.

[7] Ib. 11. Οἱ δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἡγεμόνες [he tries to veil the real culprit by the plural form] οὕτω κακῶς ἐχρήσαντο τοῖς πράγμασιν ὥσθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀνοίας μὴ καταλιπεῖν.

[8] Ib. 13. Κατὰ τὸν ἰσθμὸν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν. So Schorn (142), "Kehrten nach Verheerung der Gegend von Sicyon durch den Isthmus nach Hause zuruck," and Thirlwall (viii. 238), "Returned home by the Isthmus." Lucas (p. 103) seems to take the words ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ἀπόλυσιν in the sense of "disbanded" or "separated"—"gingen auf dem Isthmus auseinander." He adds, "wo also für sie, etwa in Megara, freundliches Gebiet sein musste." But Megara was now (see above, p. 374) part of the Bœotian Confederation, therefore

Accusation and defence of Aratos in the Assembly.

An Achaian Assembly was held a few days after the departure of the Ætolians. The national feeling was strong against Aratos. He had displayed unusual zeal for action; he had seized on office prematurely and illegally; and his haste had led only to greater national ignominy, and to the display of greater military incapacity, than ever. His political adversaries strongly pressed all the disgraceful points of the campaign, in accusations of which Polybios has preserved to us the heads.[1] One would be still more anxious to read the answer of Aratos. For answer he did, and with wonderful effect. Helpless as he had been on the battle-field of Kaphyai, in the parliamentary campaign of Aigion he was irresistible. We gather from Polybios that he denied some of the charges, asked indulgence upon others, and was eloquent about his old exploits. Anyhow he contrived, as he had so often done before, to turn the tide of popular feeling in his own favour. He succeeded in diverting the public indignation from himself to his accusers, and he again found himself directing the counsels of the League with all his old influence.[2]

Votes of the Achaian and Ætolian Assemblies.

At the same time the Assembly passed a series of decrees for the conduct of the war.[3] The General was to gather a fresh army, and to concert measures with the Governments of Lacedæmon and Messênê for the common defence against the Ætolians. Ambassadors were also sent to all the members of the Grand Alliance,[4] at once asking for help and proposing the admission of Messênê into the Confederacy. An Ætolian Assembly was held about the same time, and it passed a decree which, on first hearing, sounds incredibly strange and contradictory.[5] The Ætolians, allies of the Achaians, allies of the Messênians, voted to keep the peace with the Lacedæmonians, Messênians, and everybody else, the Achaians included, unless the Achaians admitted the Messênians into their alliance. This last course

part of the Macedonian Confederacy. Also the Isthmus would be in any case a strange place to disband, with a Macedonian garrison at Corinth, and the hostile territory of Bœotia to be passed through.

[1] Pol. iv. 14.

[2] Pol. u.s. Περὶ τῶν ἐξῆς πάντα βουλεύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν Ἀράτου γνώμην. Schorn (p. 142) might have spared the remark, "Wie anders würde sein Loos ausgefallen sein, wenn er ein Athener gewesen wäre!"—at least if it is meant as a censure upon Athens. Surely Athenian confidence in Nikias and Phôkiôn was wellnigh as blind as Achaian confidence in Aratos.

[3] Pol. iv. 15.

[4] See above, p. 389.

[5] Pol. iv. 15. Πρᾶγμα πάντων ἀλογώτατον. Lucas (p. 104) seems to see nothing wonderful in it.

they would look upon as a *casus belli*. Such a decree, in its naked form, seems so preposterous that we cannot help suspecting that there must be something behind, which our Achaian informants have not told us. The terms of alliance between Ætolia and Messênê may well have contained some provision which would be infringed by an alliance between Messênê and Achaia. The alliance between Ætolia and Achaia was of course an equal alliance, a partnership on equal terms between two great Confederations of nearly equal power. As allies on such terms, Ætolia and Achaia had, in better days, appeared side by side as the defenders of Greece against barbarian inroads. But we may doubt whether an alliance between Ætolia and Messênê was an alliance on perfectly equal terms. Messênê was not annexed; it did not become part of the Ætolian League;[1] it retained a perfectly distinct Government of its own.[2] But all this is quite consistent with a state of practical, and even formal dependence. Messênê may well have stood to Ætolia in much the same relation in which Chios and Mitylênê had once stood to Athens.[3] Had Sparta, even when Sparta was the friend and ally of Athens, interfered, either in a friendly or in a hostile way, in Chian or Mitylênaian affairs, such interference would certainly have been looked upon by Athens as a breach of friendship and alliance on the part of Sparta. If the present case was at all similar, we can understand the otherwise unintelligible vote of the Ætolian Congress. Their motive was doubtless what Polybios tells us; they wished to isolate the several Peloponnêsian states, in order that each, when isolated, might be the better exposed to their rapacity. But nations and governments do not commonly avow such motives, however commonly they may act upon them. The Ætolians may have been robbers and pirates, but they were not fools or madmen; their Federal

Probable explanation of the Ætolian Vote.

Relations between Ætolia and Messênê.

[1] The word used to express the connexion between Ætolia and Messênê is always *συμμαχία* not *συμπολιτεία*. Neither of these words implies anything as to the terms of union, but each implies a union of a different kind. Σύμμαχοι may be either equal or dependent allies; *συμπολῖται* may be either really equal citizens or *cives sine suffragio*. But *σύμμαχοι* are always mere allies of some kind; *συμπολῖται* are always actual citizens of some kind. Συμμαχία is union (forced or willing) in a mere *Confederacy*, *συμπολιτεία* is union (forced or willing) in a *Confederation*.

[2] The Messênian Government at this time was oligarchic (Pol. iv. 32); the chief magistrates bore the Spartan title of Ephor (Pol. iv. 4). Polybios applies the term *συναρχίαι* to their meetings, as to those of the Achaian *δημιουργοί*. See above, p. 220.

[3] See above, p. 19.

Assembly would hardly have passed a resolution utterly repugnant not only to International Law, but to common sense. The received policy of Ætolia was not so much to do acts of avowed injustice by the national authority as to connive at gross misconduct on the part of individual officers. The doings of Dorimachos and Skopas at this very time had all been done without any commission from the Ætolian Senate or Assembly. Those bodies might affect to be ignorant of what had happened, or even, as the words of the resolution may perhaps imply, gravely to condemn it. The historian tells us, doubtless with great truth, that the Ætolians rejected all demands for reparation, and rejected them with mockery.[1] But such mockery may well have taken a diplomatic form. No mockery could be more bitter than a grave answer that the Federal Government of Ætolia was guiltless of inroads on Achaia or Messênê; that, if Ætolian citizens had misconducted themselves—say, by plundering Messênian lands or by defeating the Achaian General at Kaphyai—such Ætolian wrong-doers, while on Achaian or Messênian territory, were subject to Achaian or Messênian law. An Ætolian Assembly, in such a frame of mind, when it heard of the application of Messênê to be admitted into the Achaio-Macedonian Alliance, might well vote any such admission to be a breach of friendly relations with Ætolia. In all this there would be not a little solemn and transparent hypocrisy. But it is with such solemn and transparent hypocrisy that international disputes are most commonly carried on, very seldom with the monstrous and irrational impudence which the words of the Ætolian resolution seem at first sight to imply.

Achaian Embassies to Macedonia and Epeiros.

The Achaian Embassies to King Philip and to the Epeirot League were so far successful that both those powers gave their consent to the admission of Messênê into the alliance.[2] But neither Epeiros nor Macedonia as yet sent any succours. All Greece, we are told, was so familiar with the evil deeds of the

[1] Pol. iv. 16. Οὐδ' ἀπολογίας ἔτι κατηξίουν [Αἰτωλοὶ] τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσεχλεύαζον εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ἐς δικαιοδοσίας προκαλοῖτο περὶ τῶν γεγονότων ἢ καὶ νὴ Δία τῶν μελλόντων.

[2] Ib. Οἱ δ' Ἠπειρῶται καὶ Φίλιππος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἀκούσαντες τῶν πρεσβέων τοὺς μὲν Μεσσηνίους εἰς τὴν συμμαχίαν προσέλαβον. That is, they gave their consent to their admission; they could not admit them of their own act, any more than the Achaians could. Their formal admission would take place at the General Congress of the Confederacy of which we shall presently hear.

Ætolians that they did not excite any particular emotion. Both the King and the League refused for the present to declare war.[1] The Ætolians therefore continued their career of iniquity. They procured Skerdilaidos the Illyrian and Dêmêtrios of Pharos to ravage the coasts of Peloponnêsos, while three Ætolian leaders, Dorimachos, Skopas, and Agelaos,[2] pressed on into the heart of the peninsula. They carried with them Ætolian troops in vast numbers; it was in fact an invasion of Achaia by the whole force of Ætolia.[3] Still there was no avowed national action; all was the private piracy of particular Ætolian chiefs; it was Agelaos who, of his own authority, made an alliance with Skerdilaidos; it was Dorimachos who, of his own authority, besieged and sacked a city of the Achaian League. The Ætolian Government knew nothing about it; the Ætolian President sat still at home, wondering what all his countrymen were gone after, and professing that he at least had no war with Achaia, but was at peace with all the world.[4] Polybios argues that such conduct was extremely foolish;[5] so it doubtless was on the principle that honesty is the best policy; but it really was little more than a stronger case than usual of an attempt to throw dust into men's eyes by diplomatic insincerity. Meanwhile Dorimachos pressed on. He was invited by a party[6] in Kynaitha, that turbulent Arkadian city whose internal dissensions have been already mentioned.[7] We left Kynaitha an Achaian city, occupied by a Federal garrison. The ruling party were well

Ætolian incursions in Peloponnêsos.

Insincerity of the Ætolian Government.

Affairs of Kynaitha.

[1] Pol. u.s. Ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν πεπραγμένοις παραυτίκα μὲν ἠγανάκτησαν, οὐ μὴν ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐθαύμασαν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν παράδοξον τῶν εἰθισμένων δέ τι πεποιηκέναι τοὺς Αἰτωλούς. διόπερ οὐδ' ὠργίσθησαν ἐπὶ πλεῖον, ἀλλ' ἐψηφίσαντο τὴν εἰρήνην ἄγειν πρὸς αὐτούς· οὕτως ἡ συνεχὴς ἀδικία συγγνώμης τυγχάνει μᾶλλον τῆς σπανίου καὶ παραδόξου πονηρίας.

[2] This seems to be the same Agelaos of Naupaktos whom we shall afterwards find acting in a more honourable character.

[3] Pol. iv. 16. Συναθροίσαντες πανδημεὶ τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς ἐνέβαλον εἰς τὴν Ἀχαΐαν μετὰ τῶν Ἰλλυριῶν.

[4] Ib. 17. Ἀρίστων δ' ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν στρατηγὸς, οὐ προσποιούμενος οὐδὲν τῶν γιγνομένων, ἦγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας, φάσκων οὐ πολεμεῖν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀλλὰ διατηρεῖν τὴν εἰρήνην. The comment of Lucas (p. 105) is curious. "Wenigstens hatten die Aetoler den Krieg gegen die Achäer *nicht angefangen* und ihn selbst *jetzt* nur für den Fall erklärt, wenn die Bundesgenossenschaft mit den Messeniern eingegangen würde. Behauptete ihr Strategos, doch wohl öffentlich, nur in *diesem* Sinne, dass die Aetoler Frieden gegen die Achäer hielten."

[5] Ib. Εὔηθες καὶ παιδικὸν πρᾶγμα ποιῶν.

[6] Ib. 16. Πραττομένης αὐτοῖς τῆς τῶν Κυναιθέων πόλεως. It is clear however from the narrative which follows that the Ætolian faction was only a small party in the city.

[7] See above, p. 314.

affected to the present state of things, and the exiles professed anxiety to return home and dwell peaceably as citizens of the Achaian League. With the consent of the Federal Government,[1] the exiles were readmitted. At the same time the Federal garrison was withdrawn; it had been a necessary precaution in days of dissension; it was no longer needed now that Kynaitha was again a united commonwealth. Some of the exiles were leading citizens, who had in former times held the office of Polemarch.[2] The reconciliation was in appearance so perfect that the exiled Polemarchs were restored to their office. But the confidence both of the Kynaithaians and of the Federal Government was infamously abused. The office of Polemarch involved the care of the city-gates; the restored Polemarchs slew their colleagues, and opened the gates to Dorimachos. They gained little by their perfidy; the Ætolians plundered, slew, and even tortured[3] all parties without distinction; they then offered the town to their Elcian friends, who prudently declined it; next, they left it in the hands of an Ætolian garrison; finally, on hearing of the approach of Macedonian succours, the garrison burned the city and departed. Meanwhile Dorimachos continued his devastations. He summoned Kleitôr to revolt from the Achaian League, and to become an ally of Ætolia.[4] But here the citizens gallantly resisted. Aratos, all this time, remembering, doubtless, his unlucky rashness earlier in the year, did nothing at all. The Ætolians again returned home undisturbed; but Tauriôn won over the faithless Dêmêtrios to the Macedonian interest, and the Pharian's share in the campaign ended with a devastation of the coast of Ætolia.

Return of the Kynaithaian exiles.

Kynaitha betrayed to Dorimachos.

Horrible sack of Kynaitha by the Ætolians.

Unsuccessful attempt or Kleitôr.

[1] Pol. iv. 17. Οἱ κατέχοντες τὴν πόλιν ἐπρέσβευον [on this word see above, p. 349] πρὸς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος, βουλόμενοι μετὰ τῆς ἐκείνων γνώμης ποιεῖσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις. ἐπιχωρησάντων δ' ἑτοίμως διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι σφίσιν ἀμφοτέρους εὐνοήσειν, κ.τ.λ.

[2] From the description given of their duties, one may doubt whether the Polemarchs were the chief magistrates of Kynaitha. The Athenian Polemarch it may be remembered, completely changed his functions at an early stage of the Democracy.

[3] Pol. iv. 18. Ἐστρέβλωσαν δὲ πολλοὺς τῶν Κυναιθέων, οἷς ἠπίστησαν ἔχειν κεκρυμμένον διάφορον ἢ κατασκεύασμα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν πλείονος ἀξίων. On this excess of cruelty, so unusual in Grecian warfare, I have made some remarks in my second Chapter, p. 44.

[4] Ib. 19. Ἀποστάντας τῶν Ἀχαιῶν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς συμμαχίαν. This sounds as if the Kleitorians were offered mere alliance, and not incorporation on any terms. But see above, p. 395, note 1.

Philip at Corinth.

The young King of Macedonia had by this time made up his mind to assist his allies in earnest. He marched with an army to Corinth—now his own city—but he came too late; the Ætolians were already gone. He then sent letters summoning a general Congress of all the allies at Corinth, and he meanwhile advanced into Peloponnêsos as far as Tegea, with a view of settling the affairs of Lacedæmon. We here sadly feel our want of a Spartan historian, or at least of one not writing wholly in the Achaian interest. During the Kleomenic War, Plutarch's Life of the Spartan King gives us at least an echo of the reports on the Spartan side; but now we have to trust wholly to Polybios. In his view, Antigonos and the Achaians had been the greatest of benefactors to Sparta; they had freed her from a Tyrant, and had restored to her her ancient constitution and laws.[1] Sparta was bound to the Macedonian Alliance by every tie of thankfulness, and every step on her part contrary to Achaian or Macedonian interests was a sin of the blackest ingratitude. Since the departure of Kleomenês, the throne had been carefully kept vacant,[2] a fact which may surely be taken as implying that Sparta still looked upon him as her lawful King. Kleomenês was not a Harold or a Sebastian, living only in the fond imagination of a heart-sick people; the hero of Sparta still lived, dwelling indeed in the house of bondage, but not without hope of being one day restored to his home and kingdom.[3] The government was in the hands of a College of Ephors, whose opinions are described as being divided, three favouring the Ætolians and two favouring the Allies.[4] The Ætolian party was also the Kleomenic party, not assuredly out of any love towards Ætolia for her own sake, but because Ætolia represented opposition to Philip and the Achaians. In this

Affairs of Sparta, B.C. 222–220.

[1] Pol. iv. 16. Οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, προσφάτως μὲν ἠλευθερωμένοι δι' Ἀντιγόνου καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν φιλοτιμίας, ὀφείλοντες δὲ Μακεδόσι καὶ Φιλίππῳ μηδὲν ὑπεναντίον πράττειν. He repeats the words προσφάτως ἠλευθερωμένοι δι' Ἀντιγόνου in c. 22, and in the same chapter, in the speech of Adeimantos, we read of Μακεδόνας τοὺς εὐεργέτας καὶ σωτῆρας.

[2] Ib. 22, 35. The later passage is more emphatic; πολιτευόμενοι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια σχεδὸν ἤδη τρεῖς ἐνιαυτοὺς μετὰ τὴν Κλεομένους ἔκπτωσιν, οὐδ' ἐπενόησαν οὐδέποτε βασιλεῖς καταστῆσαι τῆς Σπάρτης. A strange turn is given to the fact by Pausanias (ii. 9. 3); Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἅσμενοι Κλεομένους ἀπαλλαγέντες βασιλεύεσθαι μὲν οὐκέτι ἠξίωσαν.

[3] Pol. iv. 35. Οὐχ ἥκιστα διὰ Κλεομένη καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἐκεῖνον εὔνοιαν, ἐλπίζοντες ἀεὶ καὶ προσδοκίαν ἔχοντες τῆς ἐκείνου παρουσίας ἅμα καὶ σωτηρίας.

[4] Ib. 22.

divided state of things, troops were sent to support Aratos in his unlucky campaign, but Polybios implies that there was no real intention of giving the Achaians any effective help,[1] and he even goes so far as to charge the Lacedæmonians—that is, doubtless, the majority among the Ephors—with concluding a secret treaty with the Ætolians.[2] More violent measures now followed; Adeimantos, one of the philippizing Ephors, was murdered, together with some citizens of his party, with the connivance—so our Achaian historian tells us—of his colleagues of the other party.[3] Other citizens of Macedonian politics fled to Philip, who gave audience at Tegea both to them and to an Embassy from the *de facto* Government.[4] The envoys affirmed that the persons who had been killed had been the real cause of the disturbance, and they professed their own full intention to discharge towards the King every obligation of faithful allies.[5] The debate which followed is well worthy of attention. It sets Philip before us in a light personally honourable, but it shows how effectually Aratos had done his evil work. The Macedonian King sits in one Greek city to decide the fate of another. That it rests with him to preserve or to destroy Sparta no one seems to doubt. Everything is made to depend on the King's personal sense of justice and expediency; we as yet see only Philip sober and are not introduced to Philip drunk, but we see that, drunk or sober, Philip is equally master of Peloponnêsos. There were not wanting counsellors who exhorted him to make an example of Sparta, such as his great predecessor had made of Thebes. No reasonable man could doubt that those now in power at Sparta were wholly in the interest of Ætolia, and that the victims of the late disturbance had perished solely on account of their attachment to Macedonia. Sparta had once been spared; she had abused the mercy of Antigonos; her day of grace was now past, and her destruction would be only an act of exemplary justice. But the counsels which finally prevailed with the young King were of a milder kind. According to Polybios, Aratos was their inspiring spirit.[6] This we may well believe,

Disturbances at Sparta.

Philip sits in judgement on the Spartan parties at Tegea.

[1] Pol. iv. 9. Ἐφέδρων καὶ θεωρῶν μᾶλλον ἢ συμμάχων ἔχοντες τάξιν. So c. 19, στοχαζόμενοι τοῦ δοκεῖν μόνον.

[2] Ib. 16.

[3] Ib. 22.

[4] Ib. 23. Οἱ προεστῶτες τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων: a formula applied to the Spartan Ephors, as to the Achaian δημιουργοί.

[5] Ib. Πάντα δ' ὑπισχνοῦνται ποιήσειν αὐτοὶ τῷ Φιλίππῳ τὰ κατὰ τὴν συμμαχίαν

[6] Ib. 24.

but we may also well believe that Philip, young and as yet uncorrupted, was himself disposed to take the more generous part.[1] Aratos, save in that one terrible year of Secession, had never been a man of blood or an advocate of violent measures. We may fairly ascribe to him the answer which was finally given by the King, one which forestalls some principles of international right which modern diplomatists are only just beginning to understand. As such, it does him the highest honour. But one cannot help wishing that it had been dictated by him in the Assembly at Aigion, as a free President of the Achaian League, rather than suggested in Philip's council-chamber at Tegea in his new character of Macedonian Minister for Foreign Affairs. King Philip was made to answer that the Lacedæmonian Government had been guilty of no crime against the common Alliance; that he accepted their professions of faithfulness to it, and exhorted them to continue in the same mind; that the internal crimes and revolutions of any allied city were matters which did not come under his cognizance, so long as the city itself adhered to its public obligations. He might exhort and recommend as an ally, but he was entitled to go no further, except when the common alliance was violated, and then only in concert with all the other allies.[2] Sounder doctrines were never put forth in any age; pity that their accomplishment depended solely on the will of a youth, of precocious talents indeed, and who had as yet given no signs of any but generous dispositions, but who was in danger, as the event proved, of being led astray by the corrupting influence of unrestrained power, and by the advice and example of some of the worst counsellors with whom any prince was ever cursed.

Declaration of Philip in favour of Sparta.

Aratos' liberal views of International right.

Meanwhile the deputies of the allies were assembling at Corinth. King Philip presided at the Congress; each member of the Confederacy set forth its own wrongs, and war was agreed

Congress at Corinth. War agreed upon, B.C. 220, Autumn.

[1] So Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 243), "Philip was of the age to which popularity is most attractive, and a liberal sentiment most congenial."

[2] Pol. iv. 24. Ὁ γὰρ Φίλιππος τὰ μὲν κατ' ἰδίαν τῶν συμμάχων εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀδικήματα καθήκειν ἔφησεν αὐτῷ μέχρι λόγου καὶ γραμμάτων διορθοῦν καὶ συνεπισημαίνεσθαι· τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν ἀνήκοντα συμμαχίαν ταῦτ' ἔφη μόνα δεῖν κοινῆς ἐπιστροφῆς καὶ διορθώσεως τυγχάνειν ὑπὸ πάντων. Philip and Aratos here keep the just mean between meddling interference in the affairs of foreign countries and the ostentatious selection of great public criminals as special objects of personal honour.

upon by common consent. Juster grounds for war no state ever had; every one of the allied powers had wrongs to complain of, any one of which would be looked upon by the most peacefully disposed modern nation as supplying abundant reason for appealing to arms. Achaia, Epeiros, Phôkis, Akarnania, Bœotia, each had to tell of some territory ravaged, some venerated temple despoiled; Philip himself had as good a grievance as any; a Macedonian ship had been seized by Ætolian pirates, and the crew sold into slavery.[1] The decree passed by the Congress was worthy of the occasion. The Allies agreed to recover whatever territory any of them had been deprived of by the enemy since the death of King Dêmêtrios; to set free all cities which had been joined to the Ætolian League against their will;[2] and to restore to the Amphiktyons their lawful authority over the Delphian Temple, which the Ætolians had usurped. But the Treaty still needed ratification by the sovereign Assemblies of the several Federations which made up the Alliance.[3] While Embassies were sent round to obtain their assent, Philip wrote a spirited letter to the Ætolians. If they had any real defence to make, let them send and make it; but he and his allies could not listen to any excuses of the old sort. It would no longer do, when Ætolian fleets and armies were ravaging all Greece, to say that it was the mere act of private men, for which the Ætolian Government was not responsible. They must not expect either to escape by means of such transparent sophistry, or to throw upon the Allies the odium of beginning the war. The Ætolian Government, in answer, proposed a Conference at Rhion, expecting that Philip would not come. But when they

Opening of the Social War.

Decree of the Congress of Corinth.

Philip's Letter to the Ætolians.

Shifts of the Ætolian Govern ment.

[1] Pol. iv. 6. Πειρατὰς ἐξέπεμψαν, οἳ παρατυχόντες πλοίῳ βασιλικῷ τῶν ἐκ Μακεδονίας περὶ Κύθηρα τοῦτό τε εἰς Αἰτωλίαν καταγαγόντες αὐτανδρον, τούς τε ναυκλήρους καὶ τοὺς ἐπιβάτας, σὺν δὲ τούτοις τὴν ναῦν ἀπέδοντο. Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 234), as any one would, translates ἀπέδοντο, "sold." Schorn and Helwing pass it by. Brandstäter (p. 345) objects to this translation, and would have us believe that ἀπέδοντο here means only "released on the payment of ransom" (*Die Seeräuber . . . geben dann in Aetolien nur gegen Lösegeld Schiff und Mannschaft frei*). Be it so; the barbarity would, on this showing, be somewhat less, but the breach of the Law of Nations would be just the same.

[2] Ib. 25. Παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν καιρῶν ἠναγκασμένους ἀκουσίως μετέχειν τῆς Αἰτωλῶν συμπολιτείας, ὅτι πάντας τούτους ἀποκαταστήσουσιν εἰς τὰ πάτρια πολιτεύματα, χώραν ἔχοντας καὶ πόλεις τὰς αὐτῶν, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἐλευθέρους ὄντας, πολιτείαις καὶ νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις. See Thirlwall, viii. 232, note.

[3] Pol. iv. 26. Οἱ δὲ σύνεδροι παραχρῆμα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστελλον πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους, ἵνα παρ ἑκάστοις διὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπικυρωθέντος τοῦ δόγματος ἐκφέρωσι πάντες τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας πόλεμον.

heard that he was really on the road, they sent to say that they could do nothing without the authority of the Federal Assembly.[1] The ordinary electoral meeting of that body took place shortly after, and its principal act was to elect Skopas, one of the chief wrong-doers, to the place of General of the League for the following year.[2]

Skopas Ætolian General, B.C. 220–219.

Achaian Assembly (Autumn, B.C. 220) ratifies the decree.

The deputies from the Corinthian Congress meanwhile went round to the allied powers to obtain their ratifications of the decree against the Ætolians. The regular Achaian Assembly was now held at Aigion; Philip appeared in person in the Senate,[3] and spoke at length. He made, as he deserved, a favourable impression, and all the honours voted to his predecessor were renewed to him. The Assembly unanimously ratified the decree, and proclaimed general licence of reprisals against Ætolia.[4] Philip then returned to Macedonia, to spend the winter in preparations for the campaign of the next year, leaving behind him in Greece the best possible expectations from his reign.[5]

Behaviour of Akarnania,

Macedonia and Achaia, the two most important members of the Alliance, were thus zealous in the common cause. Akarnania too, though the most exposed of all to Ætolian ravages, gave in her adhesion faithfully and without reserve.[6] But the Ambassadors from the Congress were not equally successful everywhere.

Epeiros,

The Epeirot League played a double part. The Federal Assembly ratified the decree, and voted to begin hostilities as soon as Philip himself should begin them. But at the same time they assured—secretly, we must suppose—some Ætolian Ambassadors who were present, that it was their full purpose to remain at peace. Of the Bœotian and Phôkian Leagues we hear nothing.

[1] Pol. iv. 26. Ἀπέστειλαν [οἱ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἄρχοντες] γραμματοφόρον διασαφοῦντες ὡς οὐ δύνανται πρὸ τῆς τῶν Αἰτωλῶν συνόδου δι' αὑτῶν οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ὅλων οἰκονομεῖν. [2] Ib. 27.

[3] Ib. 26. Προσελθόντος πρὸς τὴν βουλήν. Did he not address the Assembly also? Or was this one of those Meetings where few but Senators attended? See above, p. 240.

[4] Ib. Τό τε δόγμα πάντες ἐπεκύρωσαν καὶ τὸ λάφυρον ἐπεκήρυξαν κατὰ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν.

[5] Polybios, when, at a later stage of his history (vii. 12), he records the degeneracy of Philip, can hardly find words to express the admiration which he excited in Greece at this time; καθόλου γε μὴν, εἰ δεῖ μικρὸν ὑπερβολικώτερον εἰπεῖν, οἰκειόταθ' ἂν οἶμαι περὶ Φιλίππου τοῦτο ῥηθῆναι, διότι κοινός τις οἷον ἐρώμενος ἐγένετο τῶν Ἑλλήνων διὰ τὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως εὐεργετικόν.

[6] Ib. 30. It is now that the historian pronounces that emphatic eulogy on the Akarnanian people which I have quoted in an earlier chapter. See above, p. 114.

It has been aptly remarked that what remained of independent Phôkis was actually surrounded by the Ætolian conquests, and that the Bœotians, like the Thessalians, were too dependent on Macedonia to have a real voice in the matter.[1] At Messênê, though it was really in defence of Messênian interests that the war was first undertaken, the envoys met with an ambiguous and chilling answer. The mass of the people were well disposed towards the allies; but the oligarchic chiefs, led by the Ephors Oinis and Nikippos, caused an answer to be given, saying that the possession of Phigaleia by the Ætolians hindered Messênê from joining the Allies till the Ætolians should be driven out of that dangerous post.[2] At Sparta the Ambassadors had to depart without any answer at all.[3] Other envoys were sent to King Ptolemy, not to ask his alliance, but merely to request him to send no money or help of any kind to the enemy.[4] This last embassy seems to have been successful, as the neutrality of Egypt was strictly preserved throughout the war.

Messênê, and Sparta.

These diplomatic proceedings illustrate one or two very obvious truths. It is clear that the actual strength of Ætolia was far inferior to that of the Allies. It is equally clear that the Ætolian League derived from its strong national unity an immeasurable advantage over the scattered members of the Macedonian Confederacy. The policy of Ætolia was determined by a single vote of a single Assembly; the Allies, before they could act in concert, had first to gather together the representatives of half-a-dozen powers, and then to send about to ask for ratifications—which, after all, might be refused—from a King here and an Assembly there.[5] We may also see the danger of

Comparative strength of Coalitions and Single Powers.

[1] "Die noch selbstständigen von den Phociern waren ringsum von ätolischer Herrschaft eingeschlossen; von der Erklarung der Böoter kann nicht die Rede sein, denn sie gehorchten ohne Widerrede den Befehlen ihrer Schutzherren." Schorn, p. 148.

[2] Pol. iv. 31.

[3] Ib. 34. Τέλος γὰρ τοὺς παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων πρέσβεις ἀναποκρίτους ἀπέστειλαν.

[4] Ib. 30. I do not at all understand Brandstäter's comment (p. 357). "So war es also allem Ansehn nach nur ein Kampf des Philipp und der Achäer mit Hülfe eines illyrischen Seeräubers gegen die Aetoler, da Ptolemäus Philopator, der neue König Aegyptens, nicht die Freundschaft seines Vaters für Kleomenes fortsetzte, und, mehr durch eigne Angelegenheiten als durch Philipps Bitte bewogen, dem Kampfe fern blieb." Does this refer to the winning over of Dêmêtrios of Pharos by Tauriôn (see above, p. 403), or what?

[5] Dr. Arnold (History of Rome, ii. 245), comparing the strength of Rome and of Samnium in the fourth century B.C., says:—

Warning against general inferences as to forms of Government.

drawing general inferences for or against particular forms of government. Monarchy never looked better than it did at the Congress of Corinth; we there see a King acting as moderate and honourable a part as any man could act. We shall soon see this same King degenerate into a cruel and faithless tyrant. Single city-commonwealths, in the form of Messênê and Sparta, appear in the poorest possible light. But we have whole centuries of earlier and later history to set against any rash inferences against Town-autonomy in the abstract. Federalism appears in every sort of light at the same moment. The disreputable filibustering of the Ætolians, the double-faced policy of the Epeirots, the honourable unanimity of the Achaians, and the heroic devotion of the Akarnanians, all proceed from nations whose political constitutions were very nearly the same. All alike were citizens of Democratic Federations. The only inference to be drawn is that Federal Governments, like all other Governments, are capable of any degree either of good or of evil. But the perfect unity and vigour, alike of Akarnania for good and of Ætolia for evil, is quite answer enough to the common talk about Federal Government being necessarily weak government. That the Ætolian Government did not restrain Dorimachos and Skopas was no sign of weakness. It was the received policy

"A single great nation is incomparably superior to a coalition; and still more so when that coalition is made up not of single states but of federal leagues; so that a real unity of counsels and of public spirit is only to be found in the individual cities of each league; which must each be feeble, because each taken separately is small in extent and weak in population. The German empire alone, setting aside the Spanish, Italian, and Hungarian dominions of the house of Austria, could never, even with the addition of the Netherlands, have contended on equal terms with France."

Our present narrative amply confirms Dr. Arnold's general remarks upon coalitions, but it hardly bears out what he says specially about Federal coalitions. In the present case the states in which a "real unity of counsels and of public spirit" is most clearly wanting are certainly the non-Federal cities of Sparta and Messênê.

See also Lord Macaulay's vivid description (Hist. of England, iv. 12, 13) of the difficult position of William the Third as chief of the coalition against France in 1691:—

"But even William often contended in vain against those vices which are inherent in the nature of all coalitions. No undertaking which requires the hearty and long continued co-operation of many independent states is likely to prosper. . . . . Lewis could do with two words what William could hardly bring about by two months of negociation at Berlin, Munich, Brussels, Turin and Vienna. Thus France was found equal in effective strength to all the states which were combined against her."

of the nation, such as it was. It was not the power that was lacking, but the will.[1]

But the Ætolians, strong as they already were, both in their own power and in the fears of their neighbours, were not to remain much longer without allies in Peloponnêsos itself. If the soil of Ætolia was fertile in robbers and pirates, it was also by no means barren in able diplomatists. While Dorimachos and Skopas undertook the plundering department, a certain Machatas was the ordinary representative of the League towards foreign powers. He easily persuaded Elis, the old ally of Ætolia, to declare war against Achaia.[2] His mission to Sparta is more worthy of notice, as it is closely connected with important changes in that now turbulent and revolutionary city. Political parties in Sparta seem now to have been mainly determined by the respective ages of their members.[3] In the present condition of the city this was just what one could expect. To the old men Kleomenês had from the beginning naturally seemed a reckless innovator; they would now as naturally argue that his innovations had led to nothing but the ruin and disgrace of the state. We may perhaps doubt whether they felt that fervent gratitude towards Macedonia which the historian attributes to them;[4] but they would certainly wish to adhere to the Macedonian alliance, if only as the side of quiet—they might add, in the immediate dispute with Ætolia, undoubtedly the side of justice. To the young, on the other hand, Kleomenês was the hero of Sparta and of Hellas. His kingly and soldierlike virtues had won every heart; his single deed of violence was atoned for by its motives and by its results; his victories had revived the old feeling of Spartan glory and greatness; his defeat, after a hard contested struggle against overwhelming odds, had assuredly diminished nothing from his fame. But the fight of Sellasia, and its results, had made the names of Achaia and Macedonia, of Aratos and Antigonos, hateful in the ears of every true-hearted Spartan. As long as Kleomenês lived, though in exile or in bondage, he was still their King; when the news of his death was announced, they would no longer crouch under the timid yoke of oligarchic Ephors; they would again have Kings according to the old laws

Ætolian Embassies in Peloponnêsos, B.C. 220–219.

Machatas wins over Elis.

State of Sparta; parties of Old and Young.

Effects of the death of Kleomenês.

[1] What a well-disposed Ætolian General could do we shall see presently. See Pol. v. 107.

[2] Pol. iv. 36.

[3] See the frequent mention of *πρεσβύτεροι, νέοι, νεανίσκοι*, etc. Ib. 22, 34, 35.

[4] Ib. 34. *Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τινὲς ἐπιστήσαντες τὸ πλῆθος ἐπί τε τὰς Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Μακεδόνων εὐεργεσίας, κ.τ.λ.*

of Sparta,[1] Kings who should be as Agis and as Kleomenês, Kings who should reform every wrong at home, and who should again lead them forth to avenge the loss of Sellasia, and to make Sparta once more the head of a regenerate Greece. It was not wonderful if, in the existing state of things, they did not shrink, in the hope of attaining such ends, either from violent measures at home or from the friendship of disreputable allies abroad. Ætolia, whatever were her crimes, was the type of hostility to Macedonia and Achaia; to Ætolia therefore the popular party at Sparta, the party of the young, the party of Kleomenês, clung as to their natural ally. Our glimpses of the Spartan government at this time set before us the Ephors as the ruling magistrates; but they set before us also a Senate and a Popular Assembly, which the Ephors, like the ruling magistrates of other Greek states, were bound to consult in public affairs. All these were old Spartan institutions; the Ephors were doubtless revived when Antigonos restored to Sparta her ancient constitution; the Senate and the Assembly had equally their place in that constitution, but the Assembly at least was now a very different body from what it had been in times past. In the old state of things it had been lifeless, and almost nominal; but it had been restored to vigour by the reforms of Kleomenês, and the Spartan Assembly is now spoken of in the same language as the Assemblies of democratic Athens and Achaia.[2] The negociations were begun by the Kleomenist party in Sparta, who, doubtless through some secret agency, requested the Ætolians to send an Ambassador to their city. The Ephors now in office, as the historian distinctly mentions, were the successors of those who had pleaded their cause before Philip. They were themselves of the Macedonian party,[3] but they were kept in awe by the prevalent tendencies of the citizens the other way. The Ætolian Government was not likely to refuse an invitation which came from what was really the dominant party in Sparta. Machatas appeared as an Ætolian Ambassador, and was admitted to an audience with the Ephors. At the instigation doubtless of his Spartan confederates, he exhorted the Ephors to restore the Hêrakleid Kingship as the

State of the Spartan Government.

Intrigues of the Kleomenists with Ætolia.

First and unsuccessful mission of Machatas.

[1] Pol. iv. 35. Ἅμα δὲ τῷ τὴν φήμην ἀφικέσθαι περὶ τῆς Κλεομένους τελευτῆς, εὐθέως ὥρμησαν ἐπὶ τὸ βασιλεῖς καθιστάναι τά τε πλήθη καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον.

[2] Τὸ πλῆθος, οἱ πολλοί, are the terms used by Polybios, iv. 34.

[3] Pol. u.s. Δυσαρεστούμενοι τοῖς ὅλοις πράγμασιν.

only lawful constitution of Sparta, and he demanded an audience before the Sovereign Assembly of the Lacedæmonian people. The Ephors feared to refuse; they would consider about the restoration of royalty; but in any case the Ætolian Ambassador might address the Spartan Assembly. The Assembly was summoned, and Machatas addressed it. He strongly called on the people to embrace the alliance of Ætolia; he enlarged on the merits of his own countrymen and on the crimes of the Macedonians; that his speech was impudent, false, and unreasonable[1] in the eyes of Polybios we are in no way surprised to learn; but we have neither the speech itself, nor the comments of an Ætolian or Kleomenist historian. The debate began; some Lacedæmonian speakers strongly advised their countrymen to throw in their lot with Ætolia. The old, the prudent, spoke—so we are told—of the mercy of Antigonos, and of the old wrongs wrought by Ætolian hands against Sparta;[2] let Sparta remain as she was, and observe the terms of her alliance with the Macedonian King. Age and prudence prevailed; the Assembly resolved to adhere to the Macedonian alliance, and Machatas departed unsuccessful. But presently—we are reading the accounts of enemies—the party which had been defeated in argument had recourse to violence; they murdered the Ephors and certain Senators of the same party, disregarding in the act even the sanctity of their venerated temple of Athênê.[3] They then chose Ephors of their own party; they voted an alliance with Ætolia; and—Kleomenês being now dead—they determined on the restoration of royalty. Two Kings, according to the old precedent, were chosen, Agêsipolis and Lykourgos. Agêsipolis was the lawful heir of the Agid Kings, and, as he was a child, he was placed under the guardianship of an uncle who bore the auspicious name of Kleomenês. The other royal house was not extinct; but Kleomenês had passed it by when he took his own brother Eukleidas for his colleague. The second throne was therefore filled by election;—Polybios says by bribery, and adds that Lykourgos was no Hêrakleid by birth, but became one by

Revolution at Sparta, B.C. 220–219.

Agêsipolis and Lykourgos chosen Kings.

[1] Pol. iv. 34. Συναχθέντος δὲ τοῦ πλήθους παρελθὼν ὁ Μαχατᾶς παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων αὐτοὺς αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν πρὸς Αἰτωλοὺς συμμαχίαν, εἰκῇ μὲν καὶ θρασέως κατηγορῶν Μακεδόνων, ἀλόγως δὲ καὶ ψευδῶς ἐγκωμιάζων τοὺς Αἰτωλούς.

[2] See above, p. 306.

[3] The temple of Athênê of the Brazen House (Χαλκίοικος), famous in the history of the Regent Pausanias. See Thuc. i. 128, 134.

Second mission of Machatas. Sparta joins the Ætolian alliance, and begins war with Achaia.

paying a talent to each of the new Ephors.[1] On hearing of this revolution, Machatas gladly returned to Sparta, and exhorted the Ephors and Kings, now the allies of Ætolia, at once to declare war on the Achaians. According to our Achaian informants, Lykourgos first made incursions into Argolis, took some towns and failed before others, and then, and not before, the Lacedæmonians publicly proclaimed licence of reprisals against the Achaian League.[2]

Beginning of the Social War, B.C. 219.

Character of the war.

Virtues and military skill of Philip.

The Social War now fairly began. On the one side was the whole Macedonian Alliance; for Epeiros joined with some zeal as soon as the war actually began, and Messênê joined also as soon as its course had removed the bugbear of Phigaleia. On the other side was the Ætolian League, with Elis and Lacedæmon as its Peloponnêsian allies. The war lasted between two and three years, and many of its military details are highly interesting, those especially which illustrate the extraordinary and precocious genius of the young King of Macedonia. His quick and enterprising spirit, his rapid marches, his winter campaigns, no less than his as yet generous and conciliatory demeanour, all marked him as a worthy successor of the Great Alexander, and make us the more deplore the fall which followed upon such a beginning. The daring and successful generalship of the young prince seems to have taken his contemporaries by surprise, much as the disciples of German military routine were taken by surprise at the irregular victories of the first Buonaparte.[3] And this glory at least was wholly his own; Aratos may have prompted many of his just and conciliatory actions, but it was certainly not in the school of Aratos that Philip learned the art of war. But this very aspect of the Social War gives it a less attractive character in the eyes of a historian of Federalism or of Greek freedom in any shape. We cannot dwell on it with the same interest as on the parliamentary strife between Aratos and Lydiadas, or on the diplomatic and military strife between Aratos and Kleomenês. The foremost figure of the picture is no longer a Greek citizen, but a Macedonian King. Greece has lost both her heroes; her practised and wily diplomatist survives,

[1] Pol. iv. 35. Ὃς δοὺς ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐφόρων τάλαντον Ἡρακλέους ἀπόγονος καὶ βασιλεὺς ἐγεγόνει τῆς Σπάρτης. [2] Ib. 36.

[3] See Macaulay's Essays (Moore's Life of Byron), p. 146, 1 vol. Ed. On Philip's campaigns see Pol. iv. 67. Finlay's Greek Revolution, i. 109.

but he has sunk from the President of a free people into the Minister of a foreign sovereign. Philip is palpably the master; he is not as yet an unjust or an ungenerous master, but he is a master still. He acts as Commander-in-Chief of the whole Alliance; he dispatches orders to the Achaian cities,[1] which, five years before, they would have received from none but the General of their own choice. The General himself becomes little more than his Vice-gerent, and receives orders from him as from his superior.[2] On one occasion Aratos himself, the deliverer of Sikyôn, the father of Peloponnêsian freedom, had to stand as something like an accused criminal before the throne of his master.[3] He was indeed honourably acquitted, but that did not in the least diminish the ignominy of being tried. The influence of Aratos can hardly be said to have been sensibly weakened; but his influence was now exercised far more in the way of private counsel in the closet of the Macedonian King than of open parliamentary eloquence in the Federal Congress at Aigion. When the sunshine of royal favour was for a moment withdrawn from him, popular favour was withdrawn also, and the President of the League was chosen at the bidding of Philip, no longer at the bidding of Aratos.[4] The true hero of Achaia was absent; Philopoimên was studying his art, and indeed serving his country, in the distant field of Crete; the state of things in Peloponnêsos, between the Macedonian King and his Sikyônian counsellor, left no room for the true successor of Lydiadas.

Paramount importance of Philip.

The war was spread over the Presidencies of three Achaian Generals, of the younger Aratos, of Epêratos of Dymê, and of Aratos himself for the fourteenth time.[5] The younger Aratos, the son of the deliverer, was chosen to succeed his father at the Spring Congress of the year 219, just as the war was beginning in earnest. Philip was on his march from Macedonia; the Ætolians, under their General Skopas, were continuing their depredations against Epeiros and Messênê, states which as yet did not venture to stir in their own defence.[6] King Lykourgos of Sparta, in imitation, we are told, of Kleomenês,[7] began his

Generalship of the younger Aratos, B.C. 219–218.

[1] Pol. iv. 67; v. 17, 102. (?) [2] Ib. iv. 67. [3] Ib. 85.
[4] Ib. 82.
[5] According to the arrangement of the Presidential years of Aratos to be hereafter discussed. [6] Ib. 37.
[7] Ib. Λυκοῦργος ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων βουλόμενος ἄρχεσθαι Κλεομένει.

part by a second seizure of the Megalopolitan Athênaion. The Cretan cities, at war with one another, sent help to their several allies, and received help in return,[1] but their movements do not greatly affect the general story. The year was distinguished by many brilliant successes on the part of Philip. The young King was everywhere; from a career of victory in Epeiros and Ætolia he returns to drive a horde of barbarians out of his own kingdom, and then astonishes all Greece by a rapid and successful winter campaign in Peloponnêsos. The Achaian General was far from being the compeer of the Macedonian King. He fully shared all his father's military defects, and there is no sign of his displaying any share of his father's abilities, either military or civil.[2] His neglect is said to have been the cause of a remarkable transaction which I have already spoken of.[3] Of all the territories of the League, the most exposed to Ætolian incursions were the western Cantons of the old Achaia. They were open to easy attack by sea, and by land they were almost hemmed in by hostile territory, by Elis, by Psôphis, now incorporated with Elis,[4] and by the district of Kynaitha, which, if not in actual Ætolian possession,[5] must have been at least open to the free passage of Ætolian troops. Euripidas, the Ætolian commander at Elis, constantly ravaged the territories of Dymê, Pharai, and Tritaia, and defeated Mikkos of Dymê, the Vice-General of the League,[6] at the head of the whole force of the three Cantons. He then occupied a fort called Teichos, in the territory of Dymê, near Cape Araxos, and kept all Western Achaia in dread. The three cities sent pressing messages[7] to the Federal General, ask-

Successes of Philip.

Ætolian ravages in the Cantons of Dymê, Pharai, and Tritaia.

[1] Pol. iv. 55.

[2] Ib. 60. Καθόλου τε ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοῦ πολέμου πράγμασιν ἀτόλμως ἐχρῆτο καὶ νωθρῶς.

[3] See above, p. 219.

[4] Pol. iv. 70. Ἐπίκειται δ' [ἡ Ψωφὶς] εὐφυῶς τῇ τῶν Ἠλείων χώρᾳ μεθ' ὧν συνέβαινε τότε πολιτεύεσθαι αὐτήν. As Elis was not a Federal state, but a single city-commonwealth with an unusually large territory, this seems to imply that Psôphis had become a municipal town, possessing an Eleian franchise of some sort or other. Whether it possessed, like the Attic towns, the full franchise of the capital, or whether it had merely a *civitas sine suffragio*, is not implied in the word πολιτεύεσθαι. See above, p. 400.

[5] For the Ætolians had burned the city the year before. See above, p. 403.

[6] Pol. iv. 59. Ὑποστράτηγος τῶν Ἀχαιῶν.

[7] Ib. 60. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔπεμπον ἀγγέλους πρὸς τὸν στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, δηλοῦντες τὰ γεγονότα καὶ δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξαπέστελλον τοὺς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀξιώσαντας. A distinction is here evidently drawn between the ἄγγελοι and the πρεσβευταί. The ἄγγελοι may have been mere messengers, bearing any sort of hasty and informal message;

ing for help. But he was not in any position to help them. Achaian military affairs were, at that moment, at a very low ebb. We have seen how much the military spirit of the national troops had decayed, and the League had just now great difficulty in obtaining the services of mercenaries. Large arrears of pay were still owing to those who had served in the war with Kleomenês; and, under these circumstances, few were disposed to enlist under such bad paymasters. Thus deserted by the Federal authorities, the three States most in danger set up a sort of *Sonderbund* of their own. They were among the oldest members of the League. It was the union of Dymê with Patrai which had been the first step towards its reconstruction,[1] and all three were among the four whose union had formed the nucleus of the revived Federation. Perhaps they may have felt themselves specially aggrieved, when the Sikyônian strangers whom they had allowed to become their citizens and their Presidents either could not or would not help them in their need. They did not secede; they did not proclaim a new Confederation or a new President; but they did agree to refuse for the time being all contributions to the Federal Treasury.[2] The money thus saved was to be spent in hiring mercenaries, horse and foot, for their own defence.[3] The historian gravely censures this act,[4] which

"Sonderbund" of the three Western Cities.

the *πρεσβευταί*, one would think, were regularly commissioned by the State Governments of the three cities. They remind one of the *πρεσβευταί* whom we have seen, on one or two occasions (see above, pp. 349, 363), commissioned by the State Governments, to the Federal Congress. At the same time, Polybios uses the word *πρεσβευτής* somewhat loosely; in one place (v. 27) he applies it to the persons who carried a message to King Philip from a division of the Macedonian army, and he calls the messengers sent by Flamininus to the Roman Senate *πρέσβεις*. xvii. 10; xviii. 25.

[1] See above, p. 191.

[2] Pol. iv. 60. See above, pp. 11, 241.

[3] If these cities could hire mercenaries when the Federal Government could not, are we to infer that in Achaia the credit of particular States stood higher than that of the Union?

[4] Pol. u.s. *Τοῦτο δὲ πράξαντες ὑπὲρ μὲν τῶν καθ' αὑτοὺς πραγμάτων ἐνδεχομένως ἔδοξαν βεβουλεῦσθαι, περὶ δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τἀναντία· πονηρᾶς γὰρ ἐφόδου καὶ προφάσεως τοῖς βουλομένοις διαλύειν τὸ ἔθνος ἐδόκουν ἀρχηγοὶ καὶ καθηγεμόνες γεγονέναι.* He then draws out this position at some length.

Schorn (p. 153) says, "Polybius tadelt zwar diesen Schritt, aber wie kann man es den Städten verdenken, dass sie nicht länger zahlen wollen, da das Geld nicht zweckmässig angewandt wurde!" This is rather dangerous ground to be taken by tax-payers, in any state, Federal or otherwise.

Brandstäter (p. 360) goes further still; "Der Geschichtschreiber ereifert sich gegen diesen Entschluss der drei Städte mit dem grössten Unrechte, indem er nur den Vortheil des Bundes im Auge hat." What else should he have in view? This is the doctrine of Secession with a vengeance.

he looks on as specially unworthy of cities which might claim the honour of being the founders of the League. In such an emergency they were, he holds, justified in hiring mercenaries on their own account,[1] but not in refusing to pay their Federal taxes. Such a refusal was not Secession, but it was Nullification; it was, as Polybios says, dangerous as a precedent for any who might hereafter wish to secede. The Federal General, who was unable to protect them, was naturally equally unable to punish them. Their separate union probably lasted no longer than the immediate occasion. At the next election, a citizen of one of these very cities [2] was chosen President of the Union, and, soon after that, the Ætolians were expelled from their post by King Philip, and the fort restored to the Dymaians.[3] The choice of a Pharaian General, while it was probably an act of special concession to these cities, shows that they were not looked upon as rebellious or suspicious members. The Western Sonderbund, if it is ever mentioned again, is mentioned only in one very obscure passage,[4] and then not in a way which implies that it was looked upon as a hostile or unconstitutional body.

Loss and recovery of Aigeira.

Among the military exploits of this year the most interesting, from our point of view, is one in which we find an Achaian city really acting for itself, and not begging for Macedonian, or even for Federal, help. The main body of the Ætolians,[5] under three of their chief leaders, Dorimachos himself being one, fell upon the Old-Achaian town of Aigeira, the defences of which seem to have been strangely neglected. The enemy were admitted in the night by a deserter,[6] and, while in the full swing of massacre, they were attacked and driven out by the people of Aigeira themselves. This reminds one of Aratos' old exploit at Pellênê,[7] only the people of Aigeira had not wilfully allowed the enemy to occupy their city. Two of the Ætolian leaders,

[1] They would almost be justified by the provision in the American Constitution (Art. i. § 10. 2) which forbids any State to keep troops or engage in war, unless actually invaded, etc. But the same article specially forbids any State to enter into any agreement or compact with any other State. Neither American nor Achaian foresight provided for the particular grievance of which these cities complained, namely that of an incapable Executive presiding over a bankrupt Treasury.

[2] Epêratos of Pharai. Pol. iv. 82.

[3] Ib. 83.

[4] Ib. v. 94. See above, p. 219.

[5] Ib. iv. 57. Τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Αἰτωλῶν.

[6] An Ætolian, who had deserted to the Achaians, and who now sought to win his pardon at home by this double treason. Pol. iv. 57.

[7] See above, p. 307.

Alexander and Archidamos, were killed; Dorimachos escaped, and his reputation among his countrymen does not seem to have been permanently damaged, for at the next election he succeeded his friend Skopas as General of the Ætolian League.[1] Skopas had distinguished his year of office by an inroad into Macedonia and a barbarous devastation of the Macedonian sanctuary of Dion.[2] Dorimachos began his year by a still more flagrant breach of Hellenic religion, the destruction of the venerated temple of Zeus at Dôdôna.[3] Philip's brilliant campaign in Peloponnêsos is chiefly interesting to us, because, on the surrender of the once Arkadian, but now Eleian, town of Psôphis, he made it over, with many expressions of good will,[4] to his Achaian allies. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we must suppose that Psôphis, like other Achaian acquisitions, was admitted as a member of the League, with a vote in the Achaian Assembly. But, as in other cases where strategic position or doubtful loyalty required the precaution, both the citadel and the town were secured by the presence of Federal garrisons.[5] Psôphis was, as Philip took care to inform his friends, a valuable gift.[6] An Achaian garrison there would do something to cover the exposed canton of Tritaia, and to hinder any more Ætolian visits to that of Kynaitha. But it does not appear that Philip now made over to the League any of the other cities which he took in Triphylia and the Eleian territory.[7] Phigaleia itself, the cause of the war, soon after the cession of Psôphis, dissatisfied with the Ætolian connexion, gladly surrendered to Philip.[8] Apparently he kept this important position in his own hands. In short, between Corinth, Orchomenos, and the Triphylian towns, the League was pretty well hemmed in by outlying Macedonian possessions. In all this there is nothing for which Philip can reasonably be blamed; but who had caused the presence in Peloponnêsos of Kings or of Macedonians at all?

Dorimachos Ætolian General, B.C. 219–218.

Sacrilege of the Ætolians at Dion and Dôdôna.

Psôphis annexed to the Achaian League.

Philip's conquests of Phigaleia and Triphylia.

[1] Pol. iv. 67. [2] Ib. ix. 62. [3] Ib. 67.

[4] Ib. 72. Ἀπελογίσατο δὲ καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν ἣν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ ἔθνος.

[5] This was done by authority of such of the Ἀχαϊκοὶ ἄρχοντες (Pol. u.s.) as were present. The word would properly mean the δημιουργοί, but I do not remember another instance of their interfering in purely military affairs.

[6] Pol. u.s. Τὴν ὀχυρότητα καὶ τὴν εὐκαιρίαν ἐπεδείκνυε τῆς πόλεως πρὸς τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον.

[7] The Triphylian towns remained Macedonian till B.C. 208, perhaps till B.C. 198. See Livy, xxviii. 8. Cf. xxxiii. 34.

[8] Pol. iv. 79.

B.C. 219–218. It is also during the presidential year of the younger Aratos that we come across the beginnings of a remarkable story, which forms the best illustration of the unhappy policy of his father. We have seen that the alliance between Achaia, Macedonia, and the other allies was, in name at least, an equal alliance. The King of Macedonia seems, as a matter of course, to have been accepted as Commander-in-Chief of the whole Confederacy, but, whatever might be his practical powers, whatever might be the final results of so dangerous a partnership, nothing had yet been done which formally violated the independence of the League. The King of Macedonia might recommend, and it might be imprudent to neglect his recommendations; still the Achaian Assembly really discussed and voted upon them; the Achaian General was still the independent chief of an allied army, not merely the officer in command of a Macedonian division. The prudence, perhaps the generosity, of Antigonos had respected constitutional forms; the lord of Corinth knew that his friendship or enmity was of vital moment to the League, and that any direct interference with its liberties would not repay the cost and the shame of the undertaking. Philip was young; the evil that was in him had not yet shown itself; he had accepted Aratos as his chief counsellor. The Sikyônian, with all his faults, was not a wilful traitor; he had no pleasure in undoing his own glorious work; he had no temptation to sacrifice the dignity or the interest of his country, now that there was no Kleomenês to awaken national and personal rivalry. He had brought his country into what was practically a state of bondage, but he at least did what he could to lessen the bitterness of that bondage. As the adviser of the young King, he preached strict observance of justice and mercy, strict fidelity to treaties, strict respect for the rights of the Achaian League, and of every other power, allied or hostile. There were no more Tyrants whom it was lawful to get rid of at all hazards, and, when dealing with Commonwealths or with lawful Kings, Aratos was as sensible as any man of the obligations of International Law. There was nothing galling in all this either to the mature prudence of Antigonos or to the youthful generosity of Philip. But to some of the Macedonian courtiers such a state of things was eminently unpleasing. In their eyes the Macedonians were the natural masters of the world; at all events they were the natural masters of Greece; they had not come all this way to spend their blood and toil and

Relations between Philip and the League.

Relations between Philip and Aratos.

Dissatisfaction of the Macedonian courtiers.

treasure, merely as the equal allies of a cluster of petty republics. The Achaian League was, after all, little more than an association of rebels against the Macedonian Crown; the restoration of Corinth had only put that Crown into possession of a part of its just rights; no satisfaction had been made for the original insult and injury of its capture, or for all the other sins of the League and its chief against the dignity of Macedon. It was unworthy of the successor of Alexander to act on terms of equality with republican Greeks; if the Achaians wished for Macedonian help, let them become Macedonian subjects. They might keep their constitutional forms, if they pleased; they might amuse themselves by electing a General and meeting in a Federal Assembly. The Thessalians did something of the kind; they too fancied themselves a republic, and piqued themselves on their republican freedom.[1] But they were practically Macedonian subjects all the same. The Achaians must be reduced to the same level. No one had thought of consulting a Thessalian Assembly as to any wrongs which Thessaly might have suffered from the Ætolians, nor must the King of Macedon be any longer exposed to the indignity of consulting an Achaian Assembly either. The Thessalians obeyed the royal will without dispute or examination, and the Achaians must learn to do the like. Such thoughts, we may be sure, passed through the mind of many a Macedonian courtier and captain, beside him to whom the historian directly attributes the scheme for upsetting the liberties of Achaia. This was Apellês, one of the great officers whom Antigonos had left as guardians of the young King, and who naturally had great influence with him. With the view of breaking in the Achaians to slavery, he began to encourage the Macedonian soldiers to insult and defraud their Achaian comrades in all possible ways. Meanwhile he himself constantly inflicted corporal punishment on Achaian soldiers for the

Plots of Apellês against Achaian freedom.

[1] Pol. iv. 76. Βουληθεὶς τὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνος ἀγαγεῖν εἰς παραπλησίαν διάθεσιν τῇ Θετταλῶν . . . . Θετταλοὶ γὰρ ἐδόκουν μὲν κατὰ νόμους πολιτεύειν καὶ πολὺ διαφέρειν Μακεδόνων, διέφερον δ' οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ὁμοίως ἔπασχον Μακεδόσι καὶ πᾶν ἐποίουν τὸ προσταττόμενον τοῖς βασιλικοῖς. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 255. We have seen already an illustration of their position in the fact that they were enrolled in the Macedonian Confederacy as an independent power, but that no one thought it necessary to ask for the consent of the Thessalians to any of its acts. See above, pp. 389, 400, 409. In another place (vii. 12) Polybios speaks of Thessaly almost as of an integral part of the Macedonian Kingdom; μετὰ τὸ παραλαβεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τά τε κατὰ Θετταλίαν καὶ Μακεδονίαν καὶ συλλήβδην τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀρχὴν οὕτως ὑπετέτακτο, κ. τ. λ.

His ill-treatment of the Achaian soldiers.

slightest faults, and sent to prison any one who ventured to interfere. The free citizens of the Achaian towns had not been used to this kind of treatment, either at the hands of their own Generals or at those of Philip's predecessor. We hear of no public remonstrance on the part of the League or of its President; but a party of young Achaians laid their wrongs before the elder Aratos, and the elder Aratos, in his private capacity as Philip's adviser, laid the matter before the King. Philip's heart was still sound, or the influence of Aratos was still paramount. He strictly ordered Apellês to abstain from his injurious conduct towards the allies; he was to give no orders to the Achaian troops, and to inflict no punishment upon them, without the consent of their own General. It is as yet a just master who is speaking, but it is a master all the same.

Redress obtained by Aratos from Philip.

Fresh schemes of Apellês against Aratos.

Apellês now saw that his course of action must be changed. Nothing could be done to effect his evil purpose as long as Aratos retained any measure of influence with the King. He therefore made it his business to do all he could to undermine him in the good opinion both of Philip and of his own countrymen. He impressed on Philip's mind that, while he listened to Aratos, he could be nothing more than the limited chief of a free Confederacy; he must treat the Achaians strictly according to the terms of the alliance. But if he listened to him, he might soon become absolute lord of Peloponnêsos. A more honourable tribute to Aratos could hardly be paid; the old deliverer is again appearing, though on a humbler and feebler scale, as the champion of Grecian freedom. Apellês also made common cause with the political opponents of Aratos—for such there were—in every city of the League. He diligently sought them out, he admitted them to his own friendship, and presented them to the King.[1]

Philip's interferences

He prevailed on Philip so far as to induce him to appear at the Spring Meeting of the Federal Congress at Aigion, and to give his countenance to the party opposed to Aratos. This was not

[1] Pol. iv. 82. Ἐξετάζων τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον, τίνες εἰσὶν, ἑκάστους ἐκ τῶν πόλεων ἐπεσπάσατο, καὶ λαμβάνων εἰς τὰς χεῖρας ἐψυχαγώγει· καὶ παρεκάλει πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φιλίαν, συνίστανε δὲ καὶ τῷ Φιλίππῳ, προσεπιδεικνύων αὐτῷ παρ' ἕκαστον ὡς ἐὰν μὲν Ἀράτῳ προσέχῃ, χρήσεται τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς κατὰ τὴν ἐγγραπτον συμμαχίαν, ἐὰν δ' αὐτῷ πείθηται καὶ τοιούτους προσλαμβάνῃ φίλους, χρήσεται πᾶσι Πελοποννησίοις κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ βούλησιν. Were these opponents of Aratos—ἡ ἐναντία στάσις, as Plutarch (Ar. 48) calls them—remnants of the oligarchic or tyrannical faction which appeared at Sikyôn and elsewhere during the Kleomenic War?

Philip's first appearance before an Achaian Assembly; but hitherto he had only appeared, as personal sovereign of Macedonia, to discuss matters of common interest with the many-headed sovereign of Achaia. To this there could be no more objection than to the appearance of a Macedonian Ambassador for the same purpose; it was a sign both of earnestness and of ability on the part of Philip, and the members of the Assembly were probably gratified at the opportunity of talking with their royal ally face to face. But it was another matter when the King of Macedonia appeared at the Meeting which was held for the purely domestic purpose of electing the Federal Magistrates. This seems to have been felt; and a rather lame excuse was made about the King being on his road through Aigion on his way to a campaign in Elis.[1] Apellês himself was less scrupulous; he busied himself about the election[2] with all the zeal of a native partisan. For some reason which is not mentioned, the elder Aratos did not appear this time, according to custom, as a candidate to succeed his son. His interest was given to Timoxenos,[3] who had already twice held the seal of the League. He was an old partisan, and he had by this time apparently forgiven whatever wrong Aratos had done him two years before. When the Congress came to vote, Timoxenos was unsuccessful, there being a small majority[4] in favour of Epêratos of Pharai. This is attributed by Polybios wholly to the intrigues of Apellês, but it must be remembered that Epêratos was a citizen of one of those Cantons which the neglect of the younger Aratos had driven to the unconstitutional foundation of the Sonderbund.[5] There can be little doubt that a wish to regain the confidence of the three western cities had something to do with the choice made by the Assembly on this occasion. These two views are in no way inconsistent with each other. Apellês, in influencing Achaian politicians, must have appealed to some

with the Achaian Election, May, B.C. 218.

Generalship of Epêratos. B.C. 218–217.

[1] Pol. iv. 82. Πείθει Φίλιππον παραγενέσθαι πρὸς τὰς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀρχαιρεσίας εἰς Αἴγιον ὡς εἰς τὴν Ἠλείαν ἅμα ποιούμενον τὴν πορείαν.

[2] Ib. Περὶ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν εὐθὺς ἐσπούδαζε. Cf. Plut. Ar. 48.

[3] Ib. Τιμόξενον . . . τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον εἰσαγόμενον. See Schorn's note, p. 157. He remarks that this illustrates the forgiving temper of Aratos spoken of by Plutarch (ἐχθρὸς εὐγνώμων καὶ πρᾷος,—ἔχθρας ὄρῳ καὶ φιλίας ἀεὶ τῷ κοινῷ συμφέροντι χρώμενος. Ar. 10), looking on Timoxenos as an opponent of Aratos, because of their dispute in B.C. 220. But surely this is making too much of a mere passing quarrel.

[4] Pol. iv. 82. Μόλις μὲν ἤνυσε, κατεκράτησε δ' οὖν ὅμως.

[5] See above, p. 417.

Connexion of this choice with the events of the preceding year.

Achaian political feeling. He could hardly have practised bribery on so gigantic a scale as to secure by that means a majority of votes in a majority of the cities. If he had some hired partisans, neither he nor they could well attack Aratos avowedly because he was the friend of Achaian freedom. But the neglect of the Western Cantons by the outgoing General would form an admirable cry for a dissatisfied party. A certain amount of genuine and reasonable discontent would doubtless exist, which Apellês and his creatures would turn to their own purposes. We can thus see also why Aratos did not stand himself, but put forward Timoxenos as his candidate. The administration of the two Aratos', father and son, had, for two successive years, brought nothing but disgrace on the League. But the Generalship of Timoxenos, three years earlier, had witnessed some little success in the form of the recovery of Klarion,[1] and he had appeared as an advocate of prudence during Aratos' momentary fit of rashness.[2] Altogether we can understand that Timoxenos was, just now, a better card for his party to play than Aratos himself. It was probably on the question of relief to the western cities that the division ostensibly turned, and we may believe that the majority of the Assembly, ignorant of the intrigues of Apellês, honestly meant the election of Epêratos to be a deserved vote of censure on those who had neglected them.

B.C. 221–220.

Philip recovers Teichos.

It falls in with this view that, immediately after the election, Philip marched to recover the fort of Teichos in the Dymaian territory.[3] It was small, but strongly fortified;[4] but its defenders were Eleians and not Ætolians. They at once surrendered to the King, who gave over the fortress to its lawful owners, and then proceeded to lay waste the territory of Elis. The cause which had led to the discontent of the Western Cantons was now effectually removed.

Further schemes of Apellês.

Apellês was naturally elated at his success. He had, as he thought, effectually poisoned the royal mind, and he had seen an Achaian President chosen at his own nomination.[5] He now made another attack on whatever influence Aratos may still have retained over the mind of Philip. He now charged him with treason to the Grand Alliance. Philip had, among other

[1] P. 396. [2] P. 397. [3] See above, p. 416.

[4] Pol. iv. 83. *Χωρίον οὐ μέγα μὲν ἠσφαλισμένον δὲ διαφερόντως.*

[5] Ib. 84. *Δοκῶν ἠνυκέναι τι τῆς προθέσεως τὸ δι' αὐτοῦ καθεστάσθαι τὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγόν.*

Eleian prisoners, captured Amphidamos, the General of the Eleian commonwealth.[1] He dismissed him without ransom, and employed him as a messenger to invite his countrymen to exchange the Ætolian for the Macedonian alliance, promising in such case to respect their liberties and constitution.[2] These offers were rejected at Elis, but the transaction seems to have awakened some suspicions against Amphidamos in the minds of his countrymen, for, shortly afterwards, while Philip was ravaging the Eleian territory, they determined to arrest him and send him prisoner to Ætolia. Meanwhile Apellês accused Aratos to the King as the cause of the refusal of the Eleians to treat. He had, so his accuser said, dealt privately with Amphidamos, and exhorted him to use his influence on the anti-Macedonian side, because it was against the common interest of Peloponnêsos for Philip to become master of Elis.[3] This last was certainly, in itself, a proposition too clear to be disputed by any patriotic Peloponnêsian, and it was quite reason enough for keeping Philip out of Greece altogether. Still such arguments would not, in the actual position of Aratos, have justified him in underhand dealings contrary to the general interests of the Confederacy. On this charge, Aratos, the deliverer of Peloponnêsos, the man who had been thirteen times President of the Achaian League, had to stand something like a trial before the Macedonian King.[4] He and his country could not have been subjected to greater indignities, if they had made up their minds to submit to the Federal headship of Kleomenês. Apellês brought his accusation; he even ventured to add that the King, having met with such ingratitude at the hands of Aratos, would

Affair of Amphidamos.

Apellês accuses Aratos of treason.

[1] Pol. iv. 84. Ὁ τῶν Ἠλείων στρατηγός. This need not necessarily imply that this General was the chief magistrate of Elis, and in earlier times the Eleian magistrates bore other titles. See Tittmann, p. 366. Still it is not unlikely that the Eleians, though their constitution was not Federal, may now have so far imitated the practice of other Greek states as to place a single General at the head of their commonwealth.

[2] Ib. Αὐτοὺς ἐλευθέρους, ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, χρωμένους τοῖς ἰδίοις πολιτεύμασι, διατηρήσει. The words are nearly the same as those used in the decree of the Allies (c. 25) for liberating the cities in subjection to Ætolia. They were probably a common formula for such occasions.

[3] Ib. Λέγειν ὅτι κατ' οὐδένα τρόπον συμφέρει τοῖς Πελοποννησίοις τὸ γενέσθαι Φίλιππον Ἠλείων κύριον.

[4] Ib. 85. Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον Φίλιππος δεξάμενος τοὺς λόγους καλεῖν ἐκέλευε τοὺς περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον καὶ λέγειν ἐναντίον ἐκείνων ταῦτα τὸν Ἀπελλῆν. The οἱ περὶ seem to include both father and son, for directly after ὁ πρεσβύτερος Ἄρατος speaks.

explain matters to the Achaian Assembly, and then retire from the struggle to his own kingdom. All that Aratos could do at the moment was to ask Philip not to condemn him on the mere assertion of Apellês, but to search into the truth by every possible means before he laid any such charge before the Assembly. Philip had justice and candour enough to suspend his judgement; Apellês could bring forward no evidence to support his charge, while Aratos was soon able to bring forward a most convincing witness to his innocence. This was no other than Amphidamos himself, who, at this opportune moment, took refuge with Philip at Dymê. The King now fully restored Aratos to his favour and confidence, and began to look with equal displeasure on Apellês. It was about the same time that the Achaians gave the King a signal proof of the influence which their old chief still retained over their minds. Unless Apellês wished, as he probably did, merely to weaken the League by giving it an incompetent head, the election of Epêratos had proved a mistake. The Pharaian President was a man of no skill or daring in the field, and of no weight in the Assembly.[1] A special Meeting had been called by the Achaian Government at Philip's request,[2] in which the King appeared and asked for supplies. The wishes of Epêratos had no influence, and Aratos and his party, if they did not openly oppose, did not at all support Philip's request.[3] In such a state of things no supplies were granted. Philip now perceived the importance of the friendship of Aratos. The Assembly had been held at Aigion, the usual place of meeting; the King persuaded the Achaian Government to adjourn it to Sikyôn.[4] This was in itself a compliment to Aratos, and in the interval he fully confessed his errors both to the father and the son.[5] He threw the whole

Aratos restored to Philip's favour.

Influence retained by Aratos in the Achaian Assembly, B.C. 218.

[1] Pol. v. 1. Τὸν δ' Ἐπήρατον ἄπρακτον ὄντα τῇ φύσει καὶ καταγινωσκόμενον ὑπὸ πάντων. We must allow a little for Polybios' admiration of Aratos.

[2] The expression of Polybios (u.s.) is a strong one; ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς Φίλιππος, ἐνδεὴς ὢν σίτου καὶ χρημάτων εἰς τὰς δυνάμεις, συνῆγε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς διὰ τῶν ἀρχόντων εἰς ἐκκλησίαν. This last phrase is the formula used elsewhere (see above, p. 214) to express the calling of an Assembly by the Federal General. [Cf. the relations of the Swiss Federation with France in 1777, and the Diet at Solothurn, summoned at the instance of Louis XVI., Bluntschli, Gesch. des schweiz. Bundesrechtes, i. 293–4.]

[3] Pol. u.s. Ὁρῶν τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὸν Ἄρατον ἐθελοκακοῦντας διὰ τὴν περὶ τὰς ἀρχαιρεσίας γεγενημένην εἰς αὐτοὺς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀπελλῆν κακοπραγμοσύνην.

[4] Pol. v. 1. Ἀθροισθέντος δὲ τοῦ πλήθους εἰς Αἴγιον κατὰ τοὺς νόμους . . . πείσας οὖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας μεταγαγεῖν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν εἰς Σικυῶνα.

[5] Ib. Λαβὼν τόν τε πρεσβύτερον καὶ τὸν νεώτερον Ἄρατον εἰς τὰς χεῖρας.

blame upon Apellês, and begged them to be his friends as of old. Such an appeal was irresistible. In the adjourned Congress at Sikyôn the influence of Aratos was used on behalf of Philip, and a liberal money-bill was the result.[1]

Treason of Apellês against Philip.

Apellês now took to schemes which, in a Macedonian officer, were even more guilty than any of his former evil deeds. He now entered on plans of direct treason against his own sovereign. He had already alienated the King's mind from Alexander and Tauriôn, two of his best officers, and both of them among the guardians named by Antigonos. He now, in concert with the other two, Leontios and Megaleas, devised a plot by which all Philip's enterprises might be thwarted, till he should at last be sufficiently humbled to put himself wholly under their guidance. The details of this vile scheme, and the general details of the campaign, belong rather to Macedonian than to Federal history. Philip and the Achaians fitted out a fleet and attacked Kephallênia, which had long acted as the Ætolian naval station. An all but successful assault on Palai, one of the towns in that island, was hindered by the arts of the traitors. Philip was as ubiquitous as usual; he invaded Lakônia; he invaded Ætolia, and avenged the destruction of Dion by the destruction of Thermon.[2] By rare prudence and forbearance he gradually discovered, crushed, and punished the hateful plot of which he had been the victim. Throughout, Aratos acted as his wisest counsellor, and was therefore made the constant object of insult, sometimes growing into personal violence,[3] at the hands of the conspirators. It is interesting to trace, in the course of the

Campaign of B.C. 218.

Philip crushes the plot.

The relations between Philip and the younger Aratos gives us one of those strange glimpses of Grecian manners which we come across ever and anon. Ἐδόκει δ' ὁ νεανίσκος ἐρᾶν τοῦ Φιλίππου. (Plut. Ar. 50.) Compare the relations of Kleomenês with Xenarês (Kl. 3) and with Panteus. (c. 37.)

[1] Fifty talents down, as three months' pay for his army, seventeen talents a month as long as he carried on the war in Peloponnêsos, and corn in abundance (σίτου μυριάδας, Pol. v. 1).

If the Federal Government, a year before, could not pay its mercenaries (see above, p. 417), where did it find the materials for such a subsidy now? But the passage is remarkable as showing the full power of taxation which was in the hands of the Federal Congress. It is a pity that we are not told how the money was to be raised. See above, p. 241.

[2] Polybios (v. 9–12) censures this act at great length, and doubtless with good reason. Yet it is not fifty years since British troops destroyed the public buildings of Washington, and much more lately we have heard the savage yells of English newspapers crying for the destruction of Delhi and Pekin.

[3] Pol. v. 15. Plut. Ar. 48. Brandstäter's comment (p. 374) is curious, "Aratus wurde von der anti-achäischen Partei fast gesteinigt und nur durch des

story, several notices of the substantial, though perhaps rather unruly, freedom which the Macedonians still enjoyed under their Kings. Polybios carefully points out the almost equal terms on which the Macedonian army, not of assumption but of ancient right, addressed their sovereign,[1] and we find one of the culprits, just as in the days of Alexander, tried and condemned by the military Assembly of the Macedonians.[2]

Weak administration of Epêratos, B.C. 218–217.

It is more important for our subject to trace one or two points connected with the domestic history of the League. The Pharaian General did not secure the safety even of his own and the neighbouring cantons. His utter incapacity, and the general lack of discipline which prevailed during his year, are strongly set forth by Polybios.[3] Doubtless we here read the character of Epêratos as given by his political opponents, but, though there may be some exaggeration, there must be some groundwork for the picture. The Ætolians in Elis continued and increased their devastations in the western districts, and the cities in that quarter paid their contributions to the Federal Treasury with difficulty and reluctance.[4] The expression however shows that they were paid, so that the most objectionable resolve of the Sonderbund of the year before must have been rescinded.

Aratos General, B.C. 217–216.

At the next election the elder Aratos was chosen General,[5]—we now hear nothing of Macedonian influence either way—and then things began to brighten a little. Incapable as Aratos was in the open field, his genius was admirably adapted for winning back men's minds, and he seems easily to have allayed all discontents. He

Königs specielle Theilnahme gerettet; über die Beweggründe sind verschiedene Vermuthungen möglich."

[1] Pol. v. 27. Εἶχον γὰρ ἀεὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ἰσηγορίαν Μακεδόνες πρὸς τοὺς βασιλεῖς. See above, p. 16.

[2] Ib. 29. Πτολεμαῖον . . . κρίνας ἐν τοῖς Μακεδόσιν ἀπέκτεινε. Cf. Diod. xvii. 79, 80. Arrian, iii. 26. 2; iv. 14. 2.

I have cut short these details, as not bearing immediately upon Federal history. The narrative is given at length by Polybios, and the English reader will, as usual, find the best of substitutes in the History of Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 258–68).

[3] Pol. v. 30. Τοῦ δ' Ἐπηράτου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καταπεφρονημένου μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτικῶν νεανίσκων κατεγνωσμένου δὲ τελέως ὑπὸ τῶν μισθοφόρων, οὔτ' ἐπειθάρχει τοῖς παραγγελλομένοις οὐδεὶς οὔτ' ἦν ἕτοιμον οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν τῆς χώρας βοήθειαν. Cf. c. 91. Had Aratos or Timoxenos any hand in making it so?

[4] Ib. Αἱ μὲν πόλεις κακοπαθοῦσαι καὶ μὴ τυγχάνουσαι βοηθείας δυσχερῶς πως εἶχον τὰς εἰσφοράς. Patrai is now mentioned as well as Dymê and Pharai. Cf. c. 91, where the same seems to be said of the cities generally.

[5] Ib. 30, 91.

summoned an Assembly,[1] and procured a series of decrees for the more vigorous prosecution of the war. The number of troops to be levied, both of citizens and mercenaries, was fixed, and the number and nature of the contingents from at least two of the cities, namely Megalopolis and Argos, were made the subject of a special decree.[2] No reason is given for the special mention of these particular States, but we know that the troops of Megalopolis were in every way more efficient than those of any other city of the Union.[3] But these decrees illustrate the thoroughly sovereign power of the Federal Congress in all matters of national concern. At the same time another decree, passed apparently in the same Assembly, shows no less clearly how careful the Federal power was to abstain from any undue interference with the State Governments in matters properly coming within their own sphere. It was now that, as has been mentioned in an earlier chapter,[4] Aratos went as mediator to Megalopolis. Violent local disputes had arisen; there was a dispute about the laws which had been enacted by Prytanis; there was a still more dangerous dispute between the rich and the poor, arising out of the restoration of the city after its destruction by Kleomenês. Aratos was sent, by decree of the Federal Assembly, to mediate between the contending parties, and he succeeded in bringing them to terms of agreement. He then returned to hold another Assembly; the Ætolians, as before,[5] watched this opportunity for an inroad, but this time Aratos was beforehand with them. He had entrusted the care of the exposed districts to Lykos of Pharai,[6] with a strong body of mercenaries, at whose head Lykos gained a complete victory over the invaders. He afterwards, when the Ætolians had left Elis, retaliated the invasion by ravaging the Eleian territory in company with Dêmodokos the Federal Master of the Horse,[7] at the head of the mercenaries, together with the citizen force of

Decrees of the Achaian Assembly, B.C. 217.

Full Federal sovereignty combined with strict regard to State rights.

Aratos' mediation at Megalopolis.

[1] Pol. v. 91. Παρακαλέσας τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, καὶ λαβὼν δόγμα περὶ τούτων.

[2] See above, p. 242.

[3] Pol. iv. 69. See Brandstäter, 365.

[4] Pol. v. 93. See above, p. 199.

[5] Ib. 94. Ὃς [Εὐριπίδας] τηρήσας τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύνοδον. See above, p. 397.

[6] Polybios (v. 94) gives as a reason for this selection, διὰ τὸ τοῦτον ὑποστράτηγον εἶναι τότε τῆς συντελείας τῆς πατρικῆς. These words are not very clear, and their meaning has been disputed (see above, p. 193), but one can hardly avoid the suspicion that they have something to do with the late Sonderbund. See above, p. 418.

[7] Ib. 95. Τὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἱππάρχην.

Dymê, Pharai, and Patrai. Meanwhile Philip was dealing far severer blows at the Ætolian power in Northern Greece. One great success was the capture of the Phthiôtic Thebes; but it is painful to read that, instead of liberating the city according to the agreement entered into at the beginning of the war,[1] he sold the inhabitants as slaves, planted a Macedonian colony in the town, and changed its name to Philippopolis. This was perhaps the first downward step in a career which had hitherto promised so brightly.

Philip's success in Northern Greece.

Mediation of Chios and Rhodes, B.C. 218–7.

The Social War was brought rather suddenly to an end during this official year of Aratos. Before the year of Epêratos had ended, Ambassadors from Chios and Rhodes appeared before Philip at Corinth, offering their mediation towards a peace.[2] Those islands were now independent and important states. Rhodes especially was governed by a prudent and moderate aristocracy, whose career is among the most honourable things in later Grecian history, and which preserved the independence of the island after that of continental Greece was lost. Panhellenic patriotism united with the natural interests of commercial republics[3] to prompt both Chians and Rhodians to desire the restoration of peace. Philip, in the full tide of success, had no real wish for peace; but he could not decently refuse the proffered mediation. He professed his willingness to treat, and bade the envoys go to Ætolia and offer their mediation there. They returned with an Ætolian proposal for a thirty days' truce, and for a meeting at Rhion to discuss the terms of peace. Philip accepted the truce, and wrote to the several members of his Alliance to send deputies to a Conference.[4] The Ætolians were perplexed; the whole war had taken a turn quite different from anything that they had expected; they had looked upon Philip as a mere boy,[5] over whom victory would be easy; they had found

[1] The words used by Polybios (v. 99, 100) certainly seemed to imply that the people of Phthiôtic Thebes were entitled to its benefits; *κατεχόντων αὐτὴν τῶν Αἰτωλῶν—παρέδοσαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι τὴν πόλιν.* These expressions certainly sound like the presence of an Ætolian garrison in an unwilling city.

[2] Pol. v. 24.

[3] See Thirlwall, viii. 265.

[4] Pol v. 28. *Τοῖς μὲν συμμάχοις ἔγραψε διασαφῶν πέμπειν εἰς Πάτρας τοὺς συνεδρεύσοντας καὶ βουλευσομένους ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς διαλύσεως.*

[5] Ib. 29. *Ἐλπίσαντες γὰρ ὡς παιδίῳ νηπίῳ χρήσασθαι τῷ Φιλίππῳ διά τε τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν, τὸν μὲν Φίλιππον εὗρον τέλειον ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς καὶ κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, αὐτοὶ δὲ ἐφάνησαν εὐκαταφρόνητοι καὶ παιδαριώδεις ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ μέρος καὶ τοῖς καθόλου πράγμασιν.*

in him a great King and a successful general. But he was just now hampered by the conspiracy of his great officers, out of which they hoped that something might turn to their advantage. The result of their doubts and procrastination was that, when the appointed day came, no Ætolian representative appeared at Rhion. This exactly suited Philip; he could now continue the war, without incurring the odium of refusing offers of peace.[1] He had done his part, and the impediment came from the other side. Envoys had already arrived from some at least of his allies, but, instead of discussing terms of peace, they received an exhortation to vigour in the war from the lips of their royal Commander-in-Chief.[2]

Failure of the proposed Conference.

The Chians and Rhodians however did not at once give up their praiseworthy scheme of restoring peace to Hellas. Their Ambassadors again appeared in Philip's camp, immediately after his conquest of the Phthiôtic Thebes. They were now accompanied by the representatives of two other powers; envoys from the King of Egypt and from the republic of Byzantion accompanied those of the islanders.[3] There is no reason to doubt that Ptolemy Philopatôr had strictly observed that neutrality which was all that the Allies had asked of him at the beginning of the war.[4] He might therefore appropriately join his voice in favour of peace to that of the maritime republics. Philip, on this second occasion, made much the same answer as he had done upon the first; he had no objection to peace; let the Ambassadors again go and try the mind of the Ætolians.[5] At that moment Philip had still no real mind for peace; in truth, a young monarch, in the full tide of success in a thoroughly just war, may be forgiven if in his heart he longed for still further triumphs. But before the matter could be discussed, before

Second mission from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantion, and Egypt.

[1] Pol. v. 29. Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ἀσμένως ἐπιλαβόμενος τῆς προφάσεως ταύτης διὰ τὸ θαρρεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ πολέμῳ, καὶ προδιειλημφὼς ἀποτρίβεσθαι τὰς διαλύσεις, τότε παρακαλέσας τοὺς ἀπηντηκότας τῶν συμμάχων οὐ τὰ πρὸς διαλύσεις πράσσειν ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, κ.τ.λ.

[2] I have not enlarged on Philip's campaign in Phôkis, or on his general relations to the Phôkian League. There are some good remarks in Schorn, p. 164, note. Between Ætolian enmity and Macedonian protection, it would seem that the Phôkians had pretty well lost their independence. They are reckoned among the States which needed liberation after Kynoskephalê. Liv. xxxiii. 32. Cf. c. 34 and Pol. xviii. 30.

[3] Pol. v. 100.

[4] See above, p. 409.

[5] Schorn (169) remarks that the war injured Ptolemy by hindering him from hiring Ætolian mercenaries as usual. Cf. Pol. v. 63, 4.

indeed the mediators returned, tidings had reached him which changed his purpose. He was as anxious for war, as ambitious of conquest, as ever; but his heart now began to be bent on war on a greater scale than the limits of Hellas could afford; he began to dream of conquests greater than the destruction of Thermon or the colonization of Phthiôtic Thebes. Other Greek Kings had before now sought glory and conquest on the other side of the Hadriatic. Alexander of Epeiros had lost his life in battle against the invincible barbarians of Italy. Pyrrhos himself, after useless victories, had returned to confess that the Macedonian sarissa had at last found more than its match in the Roman broadsword. But the might of Philip was far greater than the might of either of the Molossian knights-errant. As King of Macedonia and Head of the Greek Alliance, he might summon the countrymen of Alexander and Pyrrhos as merely one contingent of his army. And Italy was now in a state which positively invited his arms. While he, the namesake of the great Philip, the successor of the great Alexander, the unconquered chief of an unconquered nation, was wasting his strength on petty warfare with Ætolia and Lacedæmon, Hannibal was advancing, in the full swing of triumph, from the gates of Saguntum to the gates of Rome.

Philip turns his mind towards Italy.

B.C. 332–326.

B.C. 280–274.

It is with a feeling of sadness that the historian of Greece turns at this moment to behold the mighty strife which was waging in Western Europe, the struggle between the first of nations and the first of men. He feels that the interests of Achaia and Ætolia, of Macedonia and Sparta, seem small beside the gigantic issue now pending between Rome and Hannibal. The feeling is something wholly different from that paltry worship of brute force which looks down on "petty states," old or new. The political lessons to be drawn from the history of Achaia and Ætolia are none the less momentous because the world contained other powers greater than either of the rival Leagues. Still it is with a mournful feeling that we quit a state of things where Greece is everything, where Greece and her colonies form the whole civilized world—a state of things in which, even when Greece is held in bondage, she is held in bondage by conquerors proud to adopt her name and arts and language—and turn to a state of things in which Greece and Macedonia form only one part of the world of war and politics, and that no longer its most important part. We have already

Opening of a new period. Close connexion of the history of Eastern and Western Europe from this date.

seen the beginning of this change; we have seen Roman armies east of the Hadriatic; we have seen Greek cities receive their freedom as a boon from a Roman deliverer.[1] From this point the history of the two great peninsulas becomes closely interwoven. Greece and Macedonia gradually sink, from the position of equal allies and equal enemies, into the position, first of Roman dependencies and then of Roman provinces. We have now entered upon that long chain of events reaching down to our own times the History of Greece under Foreign Domination.[2] Our guide has already begun diligently to mark the synchronisms of Greek and Roman history. Hannibal first cast his eyes on Saguntum at the same time that Philip and the Congress of Corinth passed their first decree against the Ætolians.[3] He laid siege to the city at the time that the younger Aratos was chosen General.[4] He took it while Philip was on his first triumphant march through Ætolia.[5] He crossed the Alps about the time that the first Chian and Rhodian envoys came to Corinth.[6] He defeated Flaminius at Lake Trasimenus while Philip was besieging Phthiôtic Thebes.[7] The news was slow in reaching Greece; a letter—from whom we know not—brought the important tidings to the King; it was sent to him in Macedonia, and, not finding him there, followed him to Argos, where he was present at the Nemean Games.[8] His evil genius was at his side; Dêmêtrios of Pharos, the double traitor to Illyria and to Rome, expelled from his dominions by the Romans, had taken refuge with Philip, and was gradually supplanting Aratos as his chief counsellor. To him alone the King showed the letter; the adventurer at once counselled peace with Ætolia and with all Greece; but he counselled it only in order that Philip might husband all his strength for an Italian war. Now was the time, now that Rome was falling, for the King of Macedonia to step in at once and to claim his share of the prize. We could have wished to see the arguments of the Pharian drawn out at greater length. He could

Synchronisms of Greek and Roman history. B.C. 220. Spring, B.C. 219. Autumn, B.C. 219. B.C. 218. B.C. 217. Philip at Argos, B.C. 217. Influence of Dêmêtrios of Pharos. He counsels interference in Italy.

[1] See above, pp. 326–328.

[2] This subject is at last concluded in the two final volumes of Mr. Finlay's great work, the most truly original history of our times.

[3] Pol. iv. 28. [4] Ib. 37. [5] Ib. 66.

[6] Ib. v. 29. [7] Ib. 101.

[8] Ib. 101. The Nemean Games must therefore have been restored to Argos (see above, p. 313). When Argos became a city of the League, the Federal power could have no interest in asserting the rights of Kleônai, one of the smallest members of the Union, against Argos, one of the greatest.

not have looked upon Rome as completely overthrown; for in that case Macedonian intervention would have been mere interference with the rights of conquest on the part of Carthage. Hannibal's position must have seemed not so perfectly secure but that he would still be glad to accept of Macedonian help, and to yield to Macedonia a portion of the spoil. As Philip gave himself out as the champion of Greek interests, the liberation of the Greek cities in Italy and Sicily would afford him an honourable pretext for interference.[1] To unite them to his Confederacy, perhaps covertly to his actual dominion, would be a natural object of his ambition. The Greek cities of Italy, which Carthage had never possessed, would naturally fall to the lot of Macedonia. Even Sicily would hardly prove a stumbling-block. The surrender of the old claims of Carthage to dominion in that island would hardly be thought too dear a price for an alliance which, by rendering Italy no longer dangerous, would effectually secure the Carthaginian dominion in Spain and Gaul. But the views of Philip at this time are mere matters of speculation. Before he actually concluded any treaty with Hannibal, the state of affairs had materially changed.

Opening of the Congress of Naupaktos, B.C. 217.

When Philip was thus disposed, the negociation of peace was not difficult. Without, as it would seem, even waiting for the return of the mediating envoys, he entered into communication with the Ætolian Government,[2] and gathered a Congress of his own Allies at Panormos.[3] But he was determined that no man should think that he sought peace because he dreaded war. He again ravaged the territory of Elis; and, while waiting for the arrival of the plenipotentiaries, he made the important conquest of Zakynthos. The Ætolian Assembly[4] met at Naupaktos; the Congress of the Allies was assembled on the opposite shore of Achaia. Philip sent over Aratos[5]—such is the language now used—with his own general Tauriôn; their mission soon led to

[1] See Flathe, Geschichte Makedoniens, ii. 279. Thirlwall, viii. 278, note. See also the speech of Agelaos just below.

[2] This was done through Kleonikos of Naupaktos, the *πρόξενος* of Achaia in Ætolia, who was therefore exempted from slavery. See above, p. 45, note 3. The employment of Kleonikos for such a purpose is like the similar employment of Amphidamos of Elis. See p. 425.

[3] Pol. v. 102. *Ἱρὸς μὲν τὰς συμμαχίδας πόλεις γραμματοφόρους ἐξαπέστειλε, παρακαλῶν πέμπειν τοὺς συνεδρεύσοντας καὶ μεθέξοντας τῆς ὑπὲρ τῶν διαλύσεων κοινολογίας.*

[4] Ib. 103. *Τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς πανδημεὶ συνηθροισμένοις ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ.*

[5] Ib. *Ἐξέπεμψε πρὸς τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς Ἄρατον καὶ Ταυρίωνα.*

an Ætolian embassy, inviting Philip to cross with all his forces and to discuss matters face to face. He did so, and encamped near Naupaktos. The Ætolian Assembly—only distinguished from the Ætolian army by not being under arms[1]—took up a position near him. The details of the negociation required many meetings, many messages to and fro; but at last all seems to have been settled without any serious difficulty. The principle of the *Uti Possidetis*,[2] one highly favourable to Philip and his allies, was soon agreed to on both sides. The most remarkable event in the course of the Conference was a speech by Agelaos of Naupaktos, the substance of which has been preserved to us by Polybios. It shows the strange union of elements in the Ætolian character, that this very Agelaos, whom we have seen concerned in some of the worst deeds of Ætolian brigandage,[3] should now appear as a profound statesman, and even as a Panhellenic patriot. "Let Greece," he says, "be united; let no Greek state make war upon any other; let them thank the Gods if they can all live in peace and agreement, if, as men in crossing rivers grasp one another's hands,[4] so they can hold together and save themselves and their cities from barbarian inroads. If it is too much to hope that it should be so always, let it at least be so just now; let Greeks, now at least, unite and keep on their guard, when they behold the vastness of the armies and the greatness of the struggle going on in the West. No man who looks at the state of things with common care can doubt what is coming. Whether Rome conquers Carthage or Carthage conquers Rome, the victor will not be content with the dominion of the Greeks of Italy and Sicily; he will extend his plans and his warfare much further than suits us or our welfare. Let all Greece be upon its guard, and Philip above all. Your truest

Speech of Agelaos.

[1] Pol. v. 103. Οἱ δ' Αἰτωλοὶ χωρὶς τῶν ὅπλων ἦκον πανδημεί.

[2] Ib. Ὥστ' ἔχειν ἀμφοτέρους ἃ νῦν ἔχουσιν.

[3] See above, p. 403. It was worth noticing that the only two negociators mentioned on the Ætolian side, Agelaos and Kleonikos, are both of them citizens of Naupaktos. It is thus clear that that city was now incorporated with the Ætolian League on really equal terms, but we can well believe that the arts of statesmanship and diplomacy were more flourishing among its citizens than among the boors and brigands of the inland country. Of the diplomatic powers of Agelaos we have seen something already when he persuaded Skerdilaidos to join the Ætolians.

[4] Pol. v. 104. Συμπλέκοντες τὰς χεῖρας καθάπερ οἱ τοὺς ποταμοὺς διαβαίνοντες. This curious comparison shows that we really have a genuine speech.

defence, O King," he continued,[1] "will be found in the character of the chief and protector of Greece. Leave off destroying Greek cities; leave off weakening them till they become a prey to every invader. Rather watch over Greece, as you watch over your own body; guard the interests of all her members as you guard the interest of what is your own. If you follow such a course as this, you will win the good will of Greece; you will have every Greek bound to you as a friend and as a sure supporter in all your undertakings; foreign powers will see the confidence which the whole nation reposes in you, and will fear to attack either you or them. If you wish for conquest and military glory, another field invites you. Cast your eyes to the West; look at the war raging in Italy; of that war you may easily, by a skilful policy, make yourself the arbiter; a blow dealt in time may make you master of both the contending powers. If you cherish such hopes, no time bids fairer than the present for their accomplishment. But as for disputes and wars with Greeks, put them aside till some season of leisure; let it be your main object to keep in your own hands the power of making war and peace with them when you will. If once the clouds which are gathering in the West should advance and spread over Greece and the neighbouring lands, there will be danger indeed that all our truces and wars, all the child's play with which we now amuse ourselves,[2] will be suddenly cut short. We may then pray in vain to the Gods for the power of making war and peace with one another, and indeed of dealing independently with any of the questions which may arise among us." [3]

The way in which Polybios introduces this remarkable speech leaves hardly room for doubt that it is, in its substance at least, a genuine composition of the Naupaktian diplomatist.[4] It displays a Pan-hellenic spirit, sincere and prudent indeed, but lowered in its tone by the necessities of the times. The policy of

[1] I have thrown the somewhat lifeless infinitives of Polybios into the form of a direct address, but I have put in nothing, of which the substance is not to be found in his text.

[2] Pol. v. 104. Τὰς ἀνοχὰς καὶ τοὺς πολέμους καὶ καθόλου τὰς παιδιὰς ἃς νῦν παίζομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

[3] It is amusing to see Justin's version of this speech (xxix. 2, 3), which he puts into the mouth of Philip.

[4] The mere use of the *oratio obliqua* throughout so long a speech would seem to show that it is not, like so many other speeches, a mere rhetorical exercise or an exposition of the historian's own views.

Agelaos is substantially the old policy of Isokratês [1] a hundred and thirty years before. Let Greece, say both Agelaos and Isokratês, lay aside her intestine quarrels, and arm herself, under Macedonian headship, for a struggle with the barbarian. But the policy which, in the days of Isokratês, was a mere rhetorician's dream, had become, in the days of Agelaos, the soundest course which a patriotic Greek could counsel. In the days of Isokratês, the barbarians of Persia were not real enemies of Greece; they in no way threatened Grecian independence; it was only a sentimental vengeance which marked them out as objects of warfare; the real enemy was that very Macedonian whom Isokratês was eager to accept as the champion of Greece against them. In the days of Agelaos, the barbarians of Rome and Carthage were, if not avowed enemies of Greece, at least neighbours of the most dangerous kind, against a possible struggle with whom Greece was bound to husband every resource. As Greek affairs then stood, an union under Macedonian headship was probably the wisest course which could be adopted. But such a course was now the wisest, simply because of the way in which Greece had fallen within a single generation. Thirty years before, but for Ætolian selfishness, all Greece might have united into one compact and vigorous Federal commonwealth. Ten years before, but for Achaian jealousy, Greece might have been united under the headship of one of her own noblest sons, a King indeed, but a King of her own blood, a King of Sparta and not of Macedon. Both these opportunities had passed away, and an union under Philip was now the only hope. Philip at least spoke the tongue of Greece, and affected to regard himself as the Greek King of a Greek people.[2] Macedonia had long been the bulwark of Greece against Gaulish and Thracian savages; she was now called upon to act in a yet higher character as the bulwark of Greece against the civilized barbarians of Rome and Carthage. But the scheme of Agelaos required greater patriotism and greater clearness of vision than

Policy of Agelaos compared with that of Isokratês.

Union under Macedonian headship now desirable.

[1] See the oration or pamphlet of Isokratês, called "Philip," throughout.

[2] In Philip's treaty with Carthage (Pol. vii. 9) we find throughout such phrases as Μακεδονίαν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα, Μακεδόνες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες. So, in his conference with Flamininus (Pol. xvii. 4), he says κάμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων. Cf. Arrian, ii. 14. 4. So in the speech of Lykiskos (Pol. ix. 37–8), we find the Achaians and Macedonians called ὁμόφυλοι, while the Romans are distinguished as ἀλλόφυλοι and βάρβαροι. So in Livy, xxxi. 29. *Ætolas, Acarnanas, Macedones, ejusdem linguæ homines, etc.*

was to be found either in Greece or in Macedonia. A noble career lay open before Philip, but he was fast becoming less and less worthy to enter upon it. He was fast obscuring the pure glory of his youth by schemes of selfish and unjust aggrandizement; he had already taken the first downward steps towards the dark tyranny of his later years. Agelaos' own countrymen were even less ready than Philip to merge their private advantage in any plans for the general good of Greece. We shall soon see Ætolia appearing in a light even more infamous than any in which she had appeared already. Achaia indeed presented more hopeful elements. We shall soon see her military force assume, when too late, an efficiency which, a generation earlier, might have been the salvation of all Greece. But that force was now to be frittered away in petty local strife, or in partnership with allies who took the lion's share to themselves. Peace was concluded. For a few years Peloponnêsos enjoyed rest and prosperity. Athens was delivered from her fears of Macedonia, and from the necessity of thinking at all about Grecian affairs. She and her demagogues, Eurykleidês and Mikiôn, had now abundant leisure for decrees in honour of King Ptolemy and of all other Kings from whom anything was to be got by flattery.[1] Ætolia at first rejoiced at the conclusion of a war which had turned out so contrary to her hopes; in a sudden fit of virtue the League elected Agelaos himself as its President, on the express ground of his being the author of the Peace. But the Ætolians, we are told, soon began to complain of a chief whose government kept them back from the practice of their old enormities, and who had negociated peace in the interest, not of Ætolia only, but of all Greece.[2] But a vigorous chief of the League had much power, and, for once, power in Ætolia was placed in hands disposed to use it well. Agelaos had the honour of hindering, at least during his year of office, all violation of the repose of Hellas on the part of his countrymen.

Peace of Naupaktos, B.C. 217.

Agelaos Ætolian General, B.C. 217–216

## § 2. *From the End of the Social War to the End of the First War with Rome*

B.C. 217–205

The Peace of Agelaos may be compared with the Peace of Nikias in the great Peloponnêsian War. Each proved little more

[1] Pol. v. 106. [2] Ib. 107.

than a truce, a mere breathing-space between two periods of warfare. Within a few years, the Leagues of Achaia, Akarnania, Bœotia, and Epeiros were again engaged in war with Ætolia, Sparta, and Elis. And, just as happened in the second part of the Peloponnêsian War, so, in what we may really look on as the second part of the War of the Leagues, new allies step in on both sides, and a wider field of warfare is opened. In the earlier instance, Athens, strengthened by the alliance of Argos, added Syracuse and nearly all Sicily to the number of her enemies, and saw the treasures of the Great King lavished to bring about her destruction. So now, Philip and his allies ran themselves into dangers greater still, and called mightier combatants upon the stage than Greece had ever before beheld. Except so far as Persian gold came into play, the Peloponnêsian War remained throughout a purely Hellenic struggle; but the war in Greece now sinks, in a general view of the world's history, into a mere accessory of the mighty struggle between Hannibal and Rome. Macedonia and her allies enrolled themselves on the side of Carthage, while Ætolia was supported by the alliance of Rome and Pergamos. But the bargain between Hannibal and Philip proved in practice a rather one-sided one. It does not appear that Philip and his allies were in the least degree strengthened by the friendship of Carthage, while they undoubtedly did Hannibal good service by calling off some portion of the Roman force to the other side of the Gulf. Rome indeed, while Hannibal was in Italy, was not able to carry on a Macedonian war with the same vigour as in aftertimes. But even a slight exertion of Roman power was enough to turn the scale in Grecian affairs; and, what was of far more moment than any immediate success, Macedonia and Greece were now fairly brought within the magic circle of Roman influence. It was now only a question of time, how soon, and through what stages of friendship or enmity, both Macedonia and Greece should pass into the common bondage which awaited all the Mediterranean nations.[1] Nothing could be more impolitic

Analogy between the Peace of Agelaos and the Peace of Nikias. [B.C. 421.]

Connexion of the Macedonian and Punic Wars.

Beginning of Roman influence in Greece.

[1] The gradual steps of the process by which Rome gradually and systematically swallowed up both friends and enemies is perhaps best set forth in the History of Mommsen. But the reader must be always on his guard against Mommsen's idolatry of mere force. Rome seems never to have definitely annexed any state at once; all had to pass through the intermediate stage of clientship or dependent alliance. See Kortüm, iii. 276.

Impolitic conduct of Philip.

than the conduct of Philip throughout the whole business. With all his brilliant qualities, he was far inferior to his predecessor. Had Antigonos Dôsôn survived,[1] we may feel sure that the course of Macedonian politics would have been widely different. So prudent a prince would either have kept out of the struggle altogether, or else have thrown himself heart and soul into it. So now, Hannibal and Philip together might probably have crushed Rome. The Roman broadsword triumphed alike over the horsemen of Numidia and over the spearmen of Macedon. But it could hardly have triumphed over both of them ranged side by side. And where Hannibal was weak, Philip was strong.[2] Hannibal, unconquered in the open field, was baffled by the slightest fortress which had no traitors within its walls. Philip had the blood of the Besieger in his veins, and he had at his command all the resources of Greek military science. He could have brought to bear upon the walls of Rome devices as skilful as those with which Archimêdês defended the walls of Syracuse. Aratos himself was not so old but that he might, on some dark night, have led a daring band up the steep of the Capitol, as he had, in earlier days, led a daring band up the steep of Akrokorinthos. But Philip shrank altogether from vigorous action; he did not deal a single effective blow for his Carthaginian ally or against his Roman enemy. He simply provoked Rome to a certain amount of immediate hostility, and caused himself to be set down in her account as one who was to be more fully dealt with on some future day. Probably Hannibal really cared but little for his aid. Whether by accident or by design, Philip did not conclude any treaty with the Carthaginian till after the crowning victory of Cannæ had made his assistance of far less value.[3] Probably he waited to see the course of events, and waited so long as to cut himself off from any real share in their control. The adventures of his Ambassadors, as recorded by Livy,[4] form a curious story in themselves, and they supply an apt commentary on some points in the Law of Nations, which have lately [5] drawn to themselves special importance. But they concern us less immediately than some points both of the form and of the matter of the Treaty.

Philip too late to interfere with effect, B.C. 216.

Of this Treaty we have what seems to be the full copy pre-

[1] See Kortüm, iii. 203.
[2] See Arnold, iii. 158, 241, 265.
[3] Thirlwall, viii. 277. Cf. Flathe, ii. 273.
[4] Liv. xxiii. 33, 34, 39. App. Mac. 1.
[5] January, 1862.

served by Polybios,[1] and we have notices in Livy[2] and later authors. It is an offensive and defensive alliance between Carthage on the one side and Philip and his allies on the other. Each party is to help the other against all enemies, except where any earlier obligation may stand in the way. The Romans are not, in any case, not even if they conclude peace with Carthage, to be allowed to retain any possessions, whether in the form of dominion or alliance, on the eastern side of the Hadriatic. This is simply all, as it stands in Polybios; and a treaty concluded on such simple terms seems to have somewhat puzzled later writers, both ancient and modern. As it stands, there seems so little for either party to gain by it. The person really to profit by its stipulations would seem to be Dêmêtrios of Pharos, who would regain his lost dominions. Philip was to help Carthage in the war with Rome, and it is not said that he was to receive any payment for his labours. It has excited surprise[3] that no provision is made either for the independence of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks or for their transference from Roman to Macedonian rule. On the other hand, later Greek writers[4] have supposed provisions for the annexation of Epeiros and the rest of Greece to the Macedonian Kingdom. But the explanation of the Treaty as it stands does not seem difficult. The key to the whole position is that Philip was too late; he had missed the favourable moment; he was negociating after Cannæ instead of before it. At an earlier time, Philip's help might well have seemed worth buying at the cost of a considerable portion of Italy; but, if it ever had been so, it was so no longer. Hannibal now deemed himself strong enough, perhaps absolutely to conquer Italy by his own forces, at all events to weaken Rome thoroughly and permanently. In the case of complete conquest, he would not be disposed to divide the spoil with an ally who stepped in only at the last moment. But if Rome were not to be conquered, but still to be dismembered, those parts of her empire which Philip would have the best claim for demanding as subjects or allies, namely Sicily and Greek Italy, were also exactly the parts which Carthage also would most naturally claim to have transferred to her dominion or protection. Still Philip, though not now of the importance which he once was,

Philip's Treaty with Hannibal, B.C. 216.

Terms of the Treaty in Polybios.

Various statements and conjectures of later writers.

Probable explanation of the Treaty.

[1] Pol. vii. 9. [2] Liv. xxiii. 33.
[3] Flathe, ii. 279. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 278, note.
[4] App. Mac. 1. Zônaras ap. Thirlwall, viii. 279, note.

was not to be wholly despised. He was no longer needed as a principal; still he might, especially with his fleet,[1] be useful as an auxiliary. For such services it would be reward enough if the Roman possessions in his own neighbourhood were to be transferred to himself or his friends, and if Carthage, in any future war, gave him such help as he was now to give Hannibal. This seems to be the simple meaning of the Treaty in Polybios, and its terms agree very well with the position of things at the time.

Position assumed by Philip in the Treaty.

In this Treaty, Philip negociates as a Greek King, the head of a great Greek alliance. How far he was justified in so doing, that is, how far his negociations were authorized by the Federal Assemblies of Achaia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Bœotia, we have no means of judging. We have now lost the continuous guidance of Polybios, and we have to patch up our story how we can from the fragments of his history combined with the statements of later and inferior writers. Happy it is for us when the Roman copyist condescends to translate the illustrious Greek of whom he speaks in so patronizing a tone.[2] But whether authorized or not, Philip speaks in this treaty as the head of a Greek alliance, almost as the acknowledged head of all Greece. As such, he demands that Korkyra, Epidamnos, and Apollônia be released from all dependence on Rome. Probably they were to be formally enrolled as members of the Grand Alliance; practically they would most likely have sunk to the level of Thessaly, or even to that of Corinth and Orchomenos. As chief of such an alliance, Philip may not have been unwilling to stipulate for Carthaginian aid in any future struggles with Ætolia. All this would practically amount to making himself something like chief of Greece, a chief who would doubtless be, in name, the constitutional head of a voluntary alliance, but a chief whose position might easily degenerate into practical Tyranny, or even, before long, into avowed Kingship. But no such schemes could possibly find a place in a public treaty concluded by Philip in his own name and in that of his Greek allies.[3] In the later

[1] Liv. xxiii. 33. Philippus Rex quam maxima classe (ducentas autem naves videbatur effecturus) in Italiam trajiceret.

[2] Ib. xxx. 45. Polybius, *haudquaquam spernendus auctor.* Ib. xxxiii. 10. Polybium secuti sumus, *non incertum auctorem.*

[3] One of Philip's envoys (Liv. xxiii. 39) was a Magnêsian. Does this simply show the utter subjection of Thessaly to Philip, or was Sôsitheos armed with any commission from an imaginary Thessalian League?

writers, the simple terms recorded by Polybios gradually develope into much larger plans of conquest. The Treaty in Polybios provides for a joint war with Rome, but it contemplates the possibility of that war being ended by a treaty with Rome, and it provides that, in such a case, certain definite cessions shall be made to Philip or his allies. After this, if Philip ever stood in need of Carthaginian help, Carthaginian help was to be forthcoming. In the copy in Livy these terms swell into something widely different. Italy is to be definitely conquered for the benefit of Carthage by the joint powers of Carthage and Macedonia; the allied armies are then to pass over into Greece; they are to wage war with what Kings they pleased, and certain large territories, somewhat vaguely expressed, are to be annexed to Macedonia. Philip is to take all islands and continental cities which lie anywhere near to his Kingdom.[1] All this has evidently grown out of the stipulated cession of Korkyra and the Greek cities in Illyria. Appian goes a step further. In his version the Carthaginians are to possess all Italy, and then to help Philip in conquering Greece.[2] This was just the light in which the matter would look to a careless Greek writer of late times, who probably had his head full of Dêmosthenês and Alexander and the earlier Philip, and who had no clear idea of the real position of the Greek states at this particular time. Philip no doubt aimed at a supremacy of some sort over Greece, but, when negociating in the name of a great Greek Alliance, he could not well have publicly asked for Carthaginian help for the subjugation of Greece. In Zônaras we reach a still further stage; Hellas, Epeiros, and the islands are to be the prize of Philip, as Italy is to be the prize of Carthage. Now, in the genuine copy, Philip counts Macedonia as part of Hellas, and acts in the name of the Allied Powers, of which Epeiros was one. To ask for the subjugation of Hellas and Epeiros would have been quite inconsistent with his own language. There may of course have been secret articles, or the Romans may have tampered with the treaty; these are questions to which no answer can be given. But the copy as given by

Livy's version of the Treaty.

Appian's version.

Version of Zônaras.

[1] Liv. xxiii. 33. Perdomita Italia, ... gerent in Græciam, bellumque cum quibus Regibus placeret, gererent. Quæ civitates continentis, quæ insulæ ad Macedoniam vergunt, eæ Philippi regnique ejus essent.

[2] App. Mac. 1. Φίλιππος . . ἔπεμπε πρὸς Ἀννίβαν . . ὑπισχνούμενος αὐτῷ συμμαχήσειν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν, εἰ κἀκεῖνος αὐτῷ συνθοῖτο κατεργάσασθαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

Polybios seems perfectly to suit the conditions of the case, and the variations of later writers seem to be only exaggerations and misunderstandings naturally growing out of his statements.

Importance of this Treaty in Federal History.

This Treaty had the effect of placing all the Federal States of Greece, except Ætolia, in a position of hostility towards Rome. It is therefore an event of no small moment in a general history of Federalism. It was the first step towards the overthrow of the earliest and most flourishing system of Federal commonwealths which the world ever saw. From the moment that any independent state became either the friend or the enemy of Rome, from that moment the destiny of that state was fixed. The war which I am about to describe made Achaia the enemy, and Ætolia the friend, of Rome; but the doom of friend and of enemy was alike pronounced; as it happened, the present friend was the first to be swallowed up. On the eve of such a struggle, a struggle in which the republican Greeks had certainly no direct interest, one would be glad to know how far the different Federations really committed themselves to it by their own act, and how far Philip merely carried out Apellês' principle of dealing with Achaia and Epeiros as no less bound to submission than Thessaly herself. However this may be, the Treaty was, in its terms, one which Philip contracted on behalf of his allies as well as of himself; Rome therefore, as a matter of course, dealt with all the allies of Philip as with enemies. It was however some time before the war directly touched any of the states of Peloponnêsos. Philip's immediate object was to secure those cities on the Illyrian coast which were in alliance with Rome. They were to be, in any case, his share of the spoil; if he still cherished any thoughts of an expedition into Italy, their possession seemed necessary as the first step. But he still found leisure to meddle in the affairs of Peloponnêsos, for which his possession of Corinth, Orchomenos, and the Triphylian towns[1] gave him constant opportunities and excuses. His character was now rapidly corrupting; his adviser was no longer Aratos, but Dêmêtrios of Pharos. The first time that we hear of his presence is at Messênê. In that city, the oligarchical government, which was in possession during the last war,[2] had lately been overthrown by a democratic revolution.[3] But there was a powerful discontented

Philip's relations with Peloponnêsos.

Affairs of Messênê, B.C. 215.

[1] See above, p. 419. [2] See above, p. 401. [3] Pol. vii. 9.

party, and new troubles seemed likely to break out. Both the King of Macedonia and the President of the Achaian League, a place now filled by Aratos for the sixteenth[1] time, hastened to Messênê, both, we may suppose, in the avowed character of mediators. Certainly neither of them could have any other right to interfere in the internal quarrels of a city which was neither subject to the Macedonian Crown nor enrolled in the Achaian Confederation. Aratos, we may well believe, went with a sincere desire of preventing bloodshed, and not without some hope of persuading both parties that their safety and tranquillity would be best secured by union with Achaia.[2] With what views King Philip went was soon shown by the event. He arrived a day sooner than Aratos, and his arrival is spoken of in words which seem to show that he was anxious to outstrip him.[3] The day thus gained he is said to have spent in working on the passions of both parties, till the result was a massacre in which the magistrates and two hundred other citizens perished.[4] The younger Aratos did not scruple to express himself strongly about such conduct;[5] but the father still retained influence enough to persuade Philip, for very shame, to drop an infamous scheme, proposed to him by Dêmêtrios, for retaining the Messênian citadel in his own hands.[6] The next year Philip's crimes increase; he sends Dêmêtrios, on what pretence we know not, to attack Messênê, an attempt in which the perfidious adventurer lost his life.[7] We next find him charged with adultery with

Interference of Philip and of Aratos.

Disturbances caused by Philip.

Last influence of Aratos over Philip.

Philip's second attempt on Messênê, B.C. 214.

[1] Or *fifteenth*. See note at the end of the Chapter.

[2] Plutarch's (Ar. 49) expression of *βοηθῶν* may mean anything or nothing.

[3] Pol. vii. 13. *Ἀράτου καθυστερήσαντος*. Plut. Ar. 49. *Ὁ μὲν Ἄρατος ὑστέρει*. Cf. above, p. 293.

[4] It seems quite impossible to reconcile the details of Plutarch's story (Ar. 49) with the direct statements of Polybios (vii. 9). Plutarch makes Philip ask the magistrates (*στρατηγοί*) if they have no laws to restrain the multitude, and then ask the multitude if they have no hands to resist tyrants. A tumult naturally arises, in which the magistrates are killed. This story implies an oligarchic government, yet it is clear from Polybios that the government of Messênê was now democratic, and Plutarch himself gives the magistrates the democratic style of *στρατηγοί*, not the aristocratic style of *ἔφοροι*. Still it is perfectly credible that Philip played, in some way or other, a double part between two factions, and encouraged the worst passions of both.

[5] Plut. Ar. 50. *Ὁ νεανίσκος . . . . τότε λέγων εἶπε πρὸς αὐτὸν, ὡς οὐδὲ καλὸς ἔτι φαίνοιτο τὴν ὄψιν αὐτῷ τοιαῦτα δράσας, ἀλλὰ πάντων αἴσχιστος*. (See above, p. 426, note 5.) Was the subsequent business of Polykrateia at all meant as revenge for this insult?

[6] See the story in Pol. vii. 11. Plut. Ar. 50.

[7] Pol. iii. 19. See Thirlwall, viii. 282, note. Cf. Paus. iv. 29. 1, who

Polykrateia, the wife of the younger Aratos, and lastly, stung by the reproaches of her father-in-law for his public and private misdeeds, he filled up the measure of his crimes by procuring the death of the elder Aratos by poison.[1] Aratos himself believed that such was the cause of his death; he spoke of his mortal illness as the reward of his friendship for Philip.[2] Philip was no doubt, by this time, quite degenerate enough for this or any other wickedness; but one regrets to hear that his agent was Taurion, whose conduct has hitherto stood out in honourable contrast to that of the other Macedonian chiefs. Either now, or at some later time, Philip carried off Polykrateia into Macedonia, and gave her husband drugs which destroyed his reason.[3] In short, the gallant young King and faithful ally has degenerated into a cruel tyrant and a treacherous enemy.

Death of Aratos, B.C. 213.

Thus died Aratos, the deliverer and the destroyer of Greece, while General of the League for the sixteenth or seventeenth time. His career had been spread over so long a space, it includes so many changes in the condition of Greece and of the world, that one is surprised to find that at his death he was no more than fifty-eight years of age.[4] Sad indeed was the fall of Philip's friend and victim from the bright promise of the youth who, thirty-eight years before, had driven the Tyrant out of

Last days of Aratos, B.C. 213.

characteristically confounds Dêmêtrios the Pharian with Dêmêtrios the son of Philip.

[1] Pol. viii. 14. Plut. Ar. 52.

[2] Polybios (viii. 14) makes him say simply, *ταῦτα τἀπίχειρα τῆς φιλίας, ὦ Κεφάλων, κεκομίσμεθα τῆς πρὸς Φίλιππον.* In Plutarch (Ar. 52) this becomes, *ταῦτ', ὦ Κεφάλων, ἐπίχειρα τῆς βασιλικῆς φιλίας.* Here there seems to be a slight touch of the rhetorical horror of Kings, which is hardly in character in the mouth of Aratos. On the probability of the story of the poisoning, see Thirlwall, viii. 283. Niebuhr, Lect. iii. 364.

[3] Plut. Ar. 54. Liv. xxvii. 31. Uni etiam principi Achæorum Arato adempta uxor nomine Polycratia, ac spe regiarum nuptiarum in Macedoniam asportata fuerat.

This comes in incidentally five years after. One is tempted to believe that Livy had never heard of either Aratos till he came to the events of B.C. 208.

[4] Niebuhr (iii. 364 and elsewhere) talks of "old Aratos." So one is led to fancy both Philip himself in aftertimes, and still more the Emperor Henry the Fourth, as much older than they really were, because of the early age at which they began public life. Livy (xl. 5, 54) calls Philip *senex*, and even *senio consumptus*, when he was not above sixty; he makes (xxx. 30) Hannibal, at forty-five, call himself *senex*, and talks (xxxv. 15) of the *senectus* of Antiochos the Great, at about the same age. So historians almost always lavish the epithets "old" and "aged" upon Henry, who died at the age of fifty-six. On the other hand Justin (xxx. 4) makes Flamininus call Philip *puer immaturæ ætatis*, when he was about thirty-eight.

Sikyôn. Yet, granting his one fatal act, his later years had been usefully and honourably spent, and he retained the affections of his countrymen to the last. His own city of Sikyôn and the League in general joined in honours to his memory; at Sikyôn he was worshipped as a hero; he had his priests and his festivals, and his posterity were held in honour for ages.[1] He was cut off when he might still have hoped to keep his place for some years longer as at least a spectator of some of the greatest events in the world's history. But he made way for a nobler successor, though one possibly less suited for the coming time than he was himself. The crafty diplomatist, the eloquent parliamentary leader, the cowardly and incapable general, passed away. In his stead there arose one of the bravest and most skilful of soldiers, one of the most honest and patriotic of politicians, but one who lacked those marvellous powers of persuasion by which Aratos had so long swayed friends and enemies, and had warded off all dangers except the poisoned cup of Macedonian friendship. The new hero of the League was Philopoimên, a hero worthy of a better age. He fell upon evil days, because the Fates had cast his lot in them. If the days of Aratos were few and evil, they were so by his own choice.

Comparison of Aratos and Philopoimên.

Meanwhile the Roman war had begun, though as yet the Achaian League had no share in it. The storm first broke upon the Federal States of north-western Greece, but it was not long before Achaia herself learned how terrible was the danger into which her royal ally had led her. Philip began by attacking the towns of Orikon and Apollônia on the Illyrian coast. He took Orikon; but, while besieging Apollônia, he fled ignominiously before a sudden attack of the Roman Prætor Marcus Valerius Lævinus.[2] This happened between Philip's two interferences at Messênê, and this was doubtless the expedition in which Aratos, disgusted with the King's conduct, refused to take any share.[3] Lævinus continued for some years to command on the Illyrian station, and he effectually hindered Philip—if indeed Philip had any longer any such intention—from crossing over to Italy or giving any sort of efficient aid to Hannibal. But Rome had as yet no Grecian allies; her condition was still such as hardly to make her alliance desirable. But to win allies in the neighbourhood of any prince or commonwealth with whom Rome was at

Beginning of the Roman War, B.C. 214.

Roman policy of Alliances

[1] Plut. Ar. 53, 54. [2] Liv. xxiv. 40. [3] Plut. Ar. 51.

war was an essential part of Roman policy. No line of conduct was more steadily adhered to during the whole period of her conquests. In each of her wars, some neighbouring power was drawn into her alliance; his forces, and, still more, his local knowledge and advantages, were pressed into the Roman service; he was rewarded, as long as he could be of use, with honours and titles and increase of territory; and at last, when his own turn came, he was swallowed up in the same gulf with the powers which he had himself helped to overthrow. In the wars between Rome and Macedonia this part, alike dishonourable and disastrous, fell to the lot of Ætolia. The momentary fit of virtue which had placed Agelaos at the head of the League had now passed away. Skopas and Dorimachos were again in their natural place as the guiding spirits of the nation. Skopas was now General, and Dorimachos retained his old influence.[1] It does not appear that Philip or his allies had done the Ætolians any wrong, and the only intercourse between Rome and Ætolia up to this time had certainly not been friendly. A time had been when Rome had threatened Ætolia with her enmity, if she did not scrupulously regard the rights of her Akarnanian neighbours.[2] But Rome had now forgotten the claims of Akarnania upon the forbearance of the descendants of the Trojans. Ætolia bade fair to be a useful ally, and Rome was again giving signs of being a power which it was worth the while of Ætolia, or of any other state, to conciliate.[3] Rome had survived the defeat of Cannæ; her prospects were brightening; Fulvius had recovered Capua, and Marcellus had recovered Syracuse. Lævinus now opened a negociation with Skopas and Dorimachos, possibly with other leading men in Ætolia,[4] and he was by them introduced to plead the cause of Rome before the Ætolian Federal Congress. He enlarged on the happy position of the allies of Rome; Ætolia, the first ally beyond the Hadriatic, would be the most happy and

Position of Rome.

B.C. 216.

B.C. 211.

[1] Liv. xxvi. 24. Scopas, qui tum prætor gentis erat, et Dorymachus princeps Ætolorum.

*Princeps*, in Livy, as I have already observed, implies political influence, whether with or without official rank.

[2] See above, p. 322.

[3] The connexion between Rome and Ætolia is well summed up by Julian, Cæsars, 324. Τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν [Γραικῶν] ὀλίγον ἔθνος, Αἰτωλοὺς λέγω, τοὺς παροικοῦντας ὑμῖν, οὐ φίλους μὲν ἔχειν καὶ συμμάχους ἐποιήσασθε περὶ πολλοῦ, πολεμωθέντας δὲ ὑμῖν, ὕστερον δι' ἀσδήποτε αἰτίας, οὐκ ἀκινδύνως ὑπακούειν ὑμῖν ἠναγκάσατε; Alexander is speaking to Cæsar.

[4] Livy, u.s. Temptatis prius per secreta colloquia principum animis.

honoured among all the allies of Rome. No Samnite or Sicilian orator was present to set forth the dark side of Roman connexion, nor was there any envoy from Apollônia or Korkyra to assert the claims of his own city to be Rome's earliest ally in the Hellenic world. A treaty was agreed upon, that infamous league of plunder which made the name of Ætolia to stink throughout all Greece. Rome and Ætolia were to make conquests in common; Ætolia was to retain the territory, and Rome to carry off the moveable spoil.[1] But the great bait was Rome's old ally, Akarnania. What in modern political jargon would be called "the Akarnanian question" had always been a matter of primary moment in the eyes of Ætolian politicians. The moment of its solution seemed now to have come; the gallant little Federation was to be swallowed up by its powerful and rapacious neighbour. The negociators of Rome and Ætolia forestalled the utmost refinements of modern diplomacy. Ætolia revindicated her natural boundaries; the reunion of Akarnania was decreed upon the highest principles of eternal right.[2] An end was to be put to the intolerable state of things which assigned to Ætolia any frontier narrower or less clearly marked than that of the Ionian and Ægæan Seas. Elis, Sparta, King Attalos of Pergamos, and some Illyrian and Thracian princes,[3] might join the alliance if they wished. The Romans began in terrible earnest. They invaded Zakynthos, occupied all but the citadel, captured the Akarnanian towns of Oiniadai and Nêsos, and handed them over to their allies. Early in the next spring the Lokrian Antikyra shared the same fate; the inhabitants were carried off as slaves by the Barbarians, and the Ætolians possessed the deserted city.[4] Meanwhile the hosts of Ætolia set forth to take possession of the devoted land of Akarnania. The march of their whole force, while Philip was, as usual, occupied with his barbarian neighbours, seemed destined to bring this troublesome Akarnanian question to the speediest of solutions.

Alliance between Rome and Ætolia, B.C. 211.

Plots for the "reunion" of Akarnania.

Roman conquests. B.C. 211. B.C. 210.

Invasion of Akarnania.

[1] Pol. ix. 39. Liv. xxvi. 24. See above, p. 266.

[2] Liv. u.s. Acarnanas, quos ægre ferrent Ætoli a corpore suo diremptos, *restituturum* se in antiquam formulam jurisque ac dicionis eorum.

[3] Skerdilaidos we have met with already; on Pleuratos, see Thirlwall, viii. 284.

[4] Pol. ix. 39. Ἤδη παρῄρηνται μὲν Ἀκαρνάνων Οἰνιάδας καὶ Νῆσον, κατέσχον δὲ πρώην τὴν τῶν ταλαιπώρων Ἀντικυρέων πόλιν, ἐξανδραποδισάμενοι μετὰ Ῥωμαίων αὐτήν. καὶ τὰ μὲν τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀπάγουσι Ῥωμαῖοι, πεισόμενα δηλονότι ἅπερ εἰκὸς ἐστι πάσχειν τοῖς ὑπὸ τὰς τῶν ἀλλοφύλων πεσοῦσιν ἐξουσίας· τὰ δ' ἐδάφη κληρονομοῦσι τῶν ἡττυχηκότων Αἰτωλοί.

But the invaders met, at the hands of a whole people, with a resistance like that of the defenders of Numantia or of Mesolongi. Every inhabitant of Akarnania stood forth with the spirit of a Hofer or an Aloys Reding. Akarnania was a Federal Democracy, but here at least Federalism did not imply weakness, nor did Democracy evaporate in empty vaunts. Women, children, and old men were sent into the friendly land of Epeiros; every Akarnanian from sixteen to sixty swore not to return unless victorious; their allies were conjured not to receive a single fugitive; the Epeirots were prayed to bury the slain defenders of Akarnania under one mound, and to write over them the legend, "Here lie the Akarnanians, who died fighting for their country against the wrong and violence of the Ætolians."[1] Not that this heroic frame of mind at all led them to despise more ordinary help; they sent messengers praying King Philip to come with all speed to their aid. The invaders shrank and paused when they found the frontier guarded by men bent on so desperate a resistance.[2] When they heard that Philip was actually on his march, the invincible Ætolians, harnessed as they were, turned themselves back in the day of battle. They departed, apparently without striking a blow, to enjoy the easier prey which the Roman sword had won for them, and the difficulties and complications of Akarnania remained for the present unsolved.

Heroism of the Akarnanians.

Retreat of the Ætolians.

Among the Peloponnêsian states, Elis and Messênê readily joined the Roman and Ætolian alliance;[3] but it was an important object with both sides to obtain the adhesion of Sparta. A series of revolutions had taken place in that city, some of them while the Social War was still going on, and some since its conclusion. One Cheilôn, a member of the royal family, who deemed himself to be unjustly deprived of the kingdom, raised a tumult, beginning his revolution with what was now the established practice of killing the Ephors. But he failed in an attempt to surprise King Lykourgos, and, finding that he had no partisans, he fled to Achaia.[4] A short time afterwards, the Ephors suspected King

Condition of Sparta.

Sedition of Cheilôn, B.C. 218.

[1] Liv. xxvi. 25. Hic siti sunt Acarnanes, qui, adversus vim et injuriam Ætolorum pro patria pugnantes, mortem occubuerunt. Cf. Pol. ix. 40.

[2] Liv. u.s. Ætolorum impetum tardaverat primo conjurationis fama Acarnanicæ; deinde auditus Philippi adventus regredi etiam in intimos coegit fines.

[3] Pol. ix. 30.

[4] Ib. iv. 81.

Lykourgos himself of treason, and he escaped with difficulty into Ætolia.[1] Afterwards they found evidence of his innocence, and sent for him home again.[2] The other King Agêsipolis is said to have been expelled by Lykourgos after the death of his guardian uncle Kleomenês.[3] Certain it is that he is found as an exile and a wanderer many years after. Lykourgos left a son, Pelops,[4] who seems to have retained a nominal royalty in common with a certain Machanidas, who is of course branded by Achaian writers with the name of Tyrant.[5] We must remember that the same title is freely lavished on Kleomenês himself.[6] It was during the reign of Machanidas that the Ambassadors of the rival Leagues of Ætolia and Akarnania came to plead their respective causes at Sparta. Machanidas, Tyrant as he was, must have respected popular forms, for it is clear that the speeches given by Polybios on this occasion[7] were addressed to a Popular Assembly. The Ætolian envoys were Kleonikos,[8] of whom we have before heard, and Chlaineas, who was the chief speaker. He sets forth the good deeds of Ætolia, which are chiefly summed up in her resistance to Antipater and Brennus, and also the evil deeds of Macedonia, which fill up a much longer space. He tells the Lacedæmonians that whatever Antigonos had done in Peloponnêsos was done out of no love either for Achaian or Spartan freedom, but simply out of dread and envy of the power of Sparta and her victorious King. The speech of Lykiskos, the envoy from the Federal Government of Akarnania,[9]

Banishment and return of Lykourgos, B.C. 218–217.

Agêsipolis.

Pelops.

Machanidas.

Ætolian and Akarnanian Embassies at Sparta, B.C. 210.

Speech of Lykiskos.

[1] Pol. v. 29. It is worth notice that the *νέοι*, who always figure conspicuously in the Spartan revolutions of this age, appear on this occasion on the side of the Ephors. The young were the party of Kleomenês, and Lykourgos was suspected of unfaithfulness to his principles.

[2] Ib. 91.

[3] Such must be the meaning of Livy, xxxiv. 26. But he confounds this Kleomenês with the great Kleomenês; *Pulsus infans ab Lycurgo tyranno post mortem Cleomenis, qui primus tyrannus Lacedæmone fuit.* But what shall we say to a writer who tells us that Sparta had been subject to Tyrants *per aliquot ætates*? Livy's *several generations* stretch from the great Kleomenês to B.C. 195, about thirty years.

[4] About Pelops, see Manso, iii. 369, 389. I do not however see the contradiction between the two passages, Livy, xxxiv. 32, and the fragment of Diodôros, 570 (iii. 105, Dindorf). But the matter is of very little importance.

[5] I can see no ground for the violent description of Machanidas given by Mr. Donne in the Dictionary of Biography. He seems to fancy that Machanidas was a Tarentine by birth, heedless of Bishop Thirlwall's warning, viii. 298.

[6] Pausanias (iv. 29. 10), by a strange confusion, makes Machanidas immediately succeed Kleomenês.

[7] Pol. ix. 28–39. [8] Ib. 37. See above, pp. 45, note 3, 434, note 2.

[9] Ib. 32. See above, p. 115.

is more remarkable. It is an elaborate accusation of Ætolia and eulogy on Macedonia. It is worth notice, as showing that there was, on every question, a Macedonian side, which was really taken by many Greeks, and that we are not justified in looking at the whole history purely with Athenian eyes. In the eyes of Lykiskos, the representative of one of the most honourable and patriotic states in Greece, Macedonians, Spartans, and Achaians are equally Greeks;[1] the elder Philip is the pious crusader who delivered Delphi from the Phôkian;[2] Alexander is the champion of Hellas against the Barbarian, the hero who made Asia subject to the Greeks.[3] Antigonos is of course the deliverer from the Tyranny of Kleomenês, the restorer of the ancient constitution of Sparta.[4] The speaker sets forth with more force the services of Macedonia as the bulwark of Greece against Illyrian and Thracian Barbarians.[5] The old sins of Ætolia against Akarnania, Achaia, Bœotia, Sparta herself, are all strongly put forward;[6] the orator enlarges on the late infamous treaty with Rome, the capture of Oiniadai and Nêsos and Antikyra, their inhabitants carried off into barbarian bondage, and their desolate cities handed over to Ætolian masters.[7] He warns his hearers against the common peril; war with Achaia and Macedonia was, after all, a struggle for supremacy between different branches of the same nation; war with Rome is a struggle for liberty and existence against a barbarian enemy. The Ætolians, in their envy and hatred against Macedonia, have brought a cloud from the west,[8] which may possibly overwhelm Macedonia first, but which will, in the end, pour down its baleful contents upon the whole of Greece.

The eloquence and the reasoning of Lykiskos were of no avail against that feeling of hatred towards Macedonia and

[1] Pol. ix. 37. Ἐφιλοτιμεῖσθε πρὸς Ἀχαιοὺς καὶ Μακεδόνας ὁμοφύλους. Cf. above, p. 437. Cf. Dion. xi. 13. Μακεδόνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν συστρατευόντων Ἑλλήνων.

[2] Pol. ix. 33.

[3] Ib. 34. Ὑπήκοον ἐποίησε τὴν Ἀσίαν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν.

[4] Ib. 36. Ἐκβαλὼν τὸν τύραννον καὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ πάτριον ὑμῖν ἀποκατέστησε πολίτευμα.

[5] Ib. 35. Μακεδόνες οἱ τὸν πλείω τοῦ βίου χρόνον οὐ παύονται διαγωνιζόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀσφαλείας. Cf. Pol. xviii. 20.

[6] Ib. 34. See above, p. 306.

[7] Ib. 39. See above, p. 449.

[8] Ib. 37. Ἐπισπασάμενοι τηλικοῦτο νέφος ἀπὸ τῆς ἑσπέρας. The same metaphor is found in the speech of Agelaos at Naupaktos seven years earlier. See above, p. 436.

Achaia, which had been the ruling passion at Sparta ever since the Kleomenic War. Sparta joined the Ætolian alliance; under her sole and enterprising King—I see no reason to refuse him the title—she soon began to take a vigorous share in the war. Achaia was now pressed by Sparta and Elis, just as she had been in the Social War. But she soon found that she had also to deal with an enemy far more terrible than any that could be found on her own side of the Ionian Sea. Publius Sulpicius now succeeded Lævinus in the command of the Roman fleet. He and Dorimachos first attempted to relieve Echinos, one of the Ætolian possessions on the Maliac Gulf, which was now besieged by Philip. The attempt failed, and the city soon after surrendered to the King.[1] An easier enterprise was presented by the Achaian island of Aigina. The city was taken; by the terms of the treaty, the moveables belonged to Rome, the real property to Ætolia. Thus the whole Aiginêtan population became slaves, and it was with a very bad grace that Publius allowed them even to be ransomed.[2] As for the soil and buildings of the island, those the Ætolians sold for thirty talents to their ally King Attalos.[3] Thus did an illustrious Greek island, a Canton of the Achaian League, see its inhabitants carried away by barbarian conquerors, and its soil become an outlying possession of a half-barbarian King. Meanwhile Machanidas was attacking the Achaian territory from the south, and the Ætolians were, as usual, plundering the north-west coast.[4] The President Euryleôn, whatever may have been his political merits, was in warfare only too apt a disciple of the school of Aratos.[5] The League was once more driven to ask help from Philip.[6]

Sparta in alliance with Ætolia.

Naval warfare of Sulpicius, B.C. 210.

Desolation of Aigina.

The League asks help of Philip, B.C. 209.

Possibly they might have dispensed with his help altogether; at all events they might have confined themselves to asking for a fleet to guard their coasts. The League was now fully able to contend single-handed against any enemies that Peloponnêsos could send forth. If a new Kleomenês had arisen to threaten her southern frontier, that frontier was now guarded by a new Lydiadas, and there was no Aratos to thwart or to betray the plans of the new-found hero. Now that Aratos was dead, Philopoimên had returned to his native land. He was at once elected

Philopoimên General of Cavalry.

[1] Pol. ix. 42.
[2] Ib. Cf. xi. 6.
[3] Ib. xxiii. 8.
[4] Liv. xxvii. 29.
[5] Pol. x. 21 (24). Εὐρυλέων ὁ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγὸς ἄτολμος ἦν καὶ πολεμικῆς χρείας ἀλλότριος.
[6] Liv. xxvii. 29.

to the office of Master of the Horse, or Commander of the Federal Cavalry,[1] a post which was generally understood to be a step to that of General of the League.[2] The whole military system of Achaia had become utterly rotten during the long administration of Aratos, but the ease with which Philopoimên was able thoroughly to reform it shows that the nation must have had in it the raw material of excellent soldiers. He began, as a wise man should do, by reforming his own department. His predecessors had allowed every kind of abuse. Some had mismanaged matters through sheer incapacity, some through misguided zeal;[3] some had tolerated lack of discipline to serve their own ambitious purposes. The cavalry was composed of wealthy citizens, of those whose favour had most weight in the disposal of political influence, and whose votes would commonly confer the office of General.[4] Some Masters of the Horse had knowingly winked at every sort of licence, hoping to make political capital out of a popularity so unworthily gained. Men bound to personal service were allowed to send wretched substitutes, and the whole service was in every way neglected. Philopoimên soon brought the young nobles of Achaia to a more patriotic frame of mind. He went through the cities of the League;[5] by every sort of official and personal influence he worked on the minds of the horsemen, he led them to take a pride in military service, and carefully practised them in the necessary lessons of their craft. An efficient body of Achaian cavalry seemed suddenly to have sprung out of the ground at the bidding of an enchanter.[6]

Abuses in the Achaian Cavalry.

Philopoimên's reforms.

[1] Ἱππάρχης. See above, pp. 219, 429.

[2] This is implied by Polybios, x. 22 (25); οἱ δὲ τῆς στρατηγίας ὀρεγόμενοι διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἀρχῆς, κ.τ.λ. Cf. Plut. Phil. 7.

[3] Pol. x. 22 (25). Διὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀδυναμίαν . . . διὰ τὴν κακοζηλίαν, κ.τ.λ.

[4] See above, p. 230, note 2.

[5] Plut. Phil. 7. Τὰς πόλεις ἐπιών.

[6] Paus. viii. 49. 7. Ἐπανήκων δὲ ἐς Μεγάλην πόλιν αὐτίκα ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ᾑρητο ἄρχειν [καὶ] τοῦ ἱππικοῦ καὶ σφᾶς ἀρίστους Ἑλλήνων ἀπέφαινεν ἱππεύειν.

Philopoimên was more fortunate in his reform of the Achaian cavalry than Washington in his attempt to raise a volunteer cavalry of the same sort in 1778.

"Sensible of the difficulty of recruiting infantry, as well as of the vast importance of a superiority in point of cavalry, and calculating on the patriotism of the young and the wealthy, if the means should be furnished them of serving their country in a character which would be compatible with their feelings, and with that pride of station which exists everywhere, it was earnestly recommended by Congress to the young gentlemen of property and spirit in the several states, to embody themselves into troops of cavalry, to serve without pay till the close of the year. Provisions were to be found for themselves and horses, and compensation to be made for any horses which might be lost in the service. This resolution

The Achaians had placed the worthiest man of Greece in the second place of their commonwealth, with every prospect of rising before long to the first. The rival League meanwhile made a stranger election. The Achaians had once given to a Ptolemy the nominal command of all their forces;[1] the Ætolians now invested Attalos with what seems to have been meant to be a more practical Generalship.[2] For, as the King of Pergamos was taking an active part in the war, his election was quite another matter from the purely honorary dignity which the Achaians had conferred upon Ptolemy Philadelphos. Attalos first sent troops into Phthiôtis, and then came in person to what was now his own island of Aigina. Philip, on his march towards Peloponnêsos, defeated near Lamia a combined Roman, Ætolian, and Pergamenian force, and compelled the defeated Ætolians to retreat into the city. Things had strangely turned about since the days when Lamia had been the scene of a war in which Macedonians appeared as the oppressors, and Ætolians as the defenders, of Greece. Before Attalos had reached Aigina, ambassadors from Egypt, Rhodes, and Chios appeared in Philip's camp to offer their mediation; and one almost smiles to read that the diplomatic body was on this occasion swelled by an envoy or envoys from Athens. We seem to be reading over again the history of the Social War. All parties seemed inclined for peace; men's eyes began to open to the folly of letting Greece become the battle-ground of Macedonia, Rome, and Pergamos.[3] The Ætolians brought forward as a mediator a power of whom we have seldom before heard in Grecian affairs, Athamania and its King Amynander. This chief was the prince of a semi-Hellenic tribe, whose territories were surrounded by those of the Ætolian and Epeirot Leagues and of the Thessalian

King Attalos chosen General of Ætolia, B.C. 209.

B.C. 323–322.

Attempts at mediation on the part of Rhodes, etc.

did not produce the effect expected from it. The volunteers were few, and late in joining the army." Marshall's Life of Washington, iii. 492.

[1] See above, p. 302.

[2] Livy's statements are exceedingly confused. He says first (xxvii. 29), *Attalum quoque Regem Asiæ, quia Ætoli summum gentis suæ magistratum ad eum proximo concilio detulerunt, fama erat in Europam trajecturum.* Presently (c. 30) we find *Ætoli, duce Pyrrhia, qui prætor in eum annum cum absente Attalo creatus erat.* This might mean either that Attalos was chosen to be the regular General of the League, with Pyrrhias for his Lieutenant, or that Attalos was made στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ (cf. above, p. 377), Pyrrhias being the regular General of the year. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 288.

[3] Liv. xxvii. 30. *Omnium autem non tanta pro Ætolis cura erat . . . quam ne Philippus regnumque ejus rebus Græciæ, grave libertati futurum, immisceretur.* So, just after, *Ne caussa aut Romanis aut Attalo intrandi Græciam esset.*

dependents of Philip. The Athamanians took a share on the patriotic side in the Lamian War,[1] but since then their name has not been mentioned. Probably the tribe rose to independence during the decay of the Molossian Kingdom, and, on its fall, continued to form a separate principality, instead of joining the Epeirot League. Of Amynander himself we shall often hear again. Under his mediation, a truce was agreed upon, and a diplomatic Conference was appointed to be held at Aigion, simultaneously, it would seem, with a meeting of the Achaian Federal Assembly.[2] Any treaty which might be agreed upon could thus be at once ratified by the two most important members of the Macedonian alliance, by Philip himself and by the Achaian League. Meanwhile King Attalos was to be warned off or hindered from an attack on Euboia, which he was supposed to meditate. Philip spent the time of truce at Argos. It would have been very hard for any member of the Antigonid dynasty to make out his descent from the old Macedonian Kings, but, on the strength of such supposed connexion, the Argeian origin of Philip was asserted and allowed. In compliment to this mythical kindred, Philip was chosen to preside both at the local festival of the Hêraia and at the Pan-hellenic Games of Nemea.[3] The management of this great national festival was wholly a matter of Cantonal and not of Federal concern; it was a vote of the Argeian people, not of the Achaian Government or Assembly, which conferred this high honour upon Philip.[4] Between the two celebrations, the King attended the Conference at Aigion. But meanwhile Attalos had reached, not indeed Euboia, but his own island of Aigina; the Roman fleet also had reached Naupaktos; the presence of such powerful allies drove away any feelings of Pan-hellenic patriotism which were beginning to arise in the minds of the Ætolians. The war had certainly not been glorious for them; all that they had done had been to enter into possession of empty cities conquered for them by the

Philip at Argos.

Conference at Aigion, B.C. 209.

[1] Diod. xviii. 11. [On the Athamanians cf. Strabo, ix. 4. 11.]

[2] This seems to be the meaning of the two expressions of Livy (xxvii. 30). *De pace dilata consultatio est in concilium Achæorum; concilio et locus et dies certa indicta.* And, just after, *Ægium profectus est* [*Philippus*] *ad indictum multo ante sociorum concilium.*

[3] See above, pp. 313, 433.

[4] As in the case of the Isthmian Games, when Corinth was Achaian. See above, p. 327.

Roman arms. Philip had taken Echinos in their despite; he had beaten them and their allies before Lamia; their attack on Akarnania had been baffled by the heroism of the Akarnanians themselves. But, with the forces of Rome and Pergamos on either side of Greece, they recovered an even greater degree of presumption than usual. It was perhaps through an affectation of disinterestedness that they made no demands for themselves, but they made very inadmissible demands on behalf of their several allies. Besides some cessions of barbarian territory to their Illyrian friends, Atintania was demanded for the Romans, and Pylos for the Messênians. It is not very clear in whose hands Atintania then was; it was demanded for Rome as a "reunion,"[1] yet it does not seem ever to have been in the possession of the Republic; at an earlier time it seems to have been Epeirot,[2] at a later time we shall find it Macedonian. At all events, Philip, who so ardently desired to expel the Romans from Apollônia and the neighbouring cities, and who had so lately defeated Romans, Ætolians, and Pergamenians both in sieges and in the open field, was not willing to allow a strip of Roman territory to be interposed between himself and his Epeirot allies. And, whichever Pylos is intended,[3] it is hard to see on what grounds Messênê could just now claim an increase, or even a restitution, of territory. A spontaneous offering on the part of Philip might have been a graceful atonement for former wrongs; but it was hardly a cession which could be demanded of a victorious prince at a diplomatic conference. It is not wonderful that, on the receipt of such an *ultimatum*, Philip abruptly broke off the negociation. He retired to Argos, and there began the celebration of the Nemean Games, when he

Demands of the Ætolians.

Negociations broken off.

[1] Liv. xxvii. 30. Postremo negarunt dirimi bellum posse, nisi Messeniis Achæi Pylum redderent, Romanis *restitueretur* Atintania, Scerdilædo et Pleurato Ardyæi.

[2] See Pol. ii. 5, 11. It was admitted to Roman *friendship* in B.C. 229; hardly ground enough for the phrase *restitueretur* twenty years later.

[3] According to Livy, the *Achaians* were to surrender Pylos. But it is quite impossible that either the Triphylian or the Messênian Pylos can now have been in the hands of the League. Philip had conquered Triphylia in the Social War, and he had not yet given it to the Achaians. (Liv. xxviii. 8.) It is quite possible that Philip may have seized on the other Pylos in one of his Messênian expeditions, but it is still harder to conceive that this can have been an Achaian possession. Whichever Pylos is meant, it is clearly of Philip that the cession was demanded. Here, as throughout the period, we have to deplore the loss of the continuous narrative of Polybios. Schorn (p. 185) accepts the Achaian possession of the Messênian Pylos.

heard that Sulpicius had landed between Sikyôn and Corinth. With that activity which he could always show when he chose, he hastened to the spot with his cavalry, attacked the Romans while engaged in plunder, and drove them back to their fleet, which retired to Naupaktos. He returned to Argos, finished the celebration of the festival, and then, casting aside his purple and diadem, affected to lead the life of a private citizen in the city of his ancestors. But, if he laid aside the King, he did not lay aside the Tyrant; he made his supposed fellow-citizens suffer under the bitterest excesses of royal lust and insolence.[1] He was roused from his debaucheries by the most threatening of all news for the Achaian cities, the news that an Ætolian force had been received at Elis.[2] The luxurious Tyrant was at once changed into the active King and the faithful ally;[3] he marched to Dymê, where he was met by Kykliadas the General of the League, and by Philopoimên, who was still the Commander of the Federal Cavalry.[4] In a battle by the river Larisos, the Ætolians were defeated, and Philopoimên slew with his own hand Damophantos, who filled the same post in the Eleian army which he himself did in that of Achaia.[5] In another battle, the allies unexpectedly found that they had Romans to contend with as well as Ætolians and Eleians, and after a sharp struggle, in which Philip displayed great personal courage, they had to retreat.[6] The advantages of the fight however seemed to remain with the allies, who ravaged Elis without let or hindrance. One of the constant invasions of Macedonia by the neighbouring barbarians called Philip back to the defence of his own kingdom,

Philip repulses the Romans.

His alternate debauchery and activity.

Exploits of Philip and Philopoimên.

[1] Pol. x. 26. Liv. xxvii. 31. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 289.

[2] Livy's notions of Grecian politics may be estimated by his idea that Elis was a State which had seceded from the Achaian League; *Eleorum accensi odio, quod a ceteris Achæis dissentirent.* (xxvii. 31.) What can he have found and misunderstood in his Polybios?

[3] "Durch die Verhältnisse gezwungen erduldeten die Bürger unwürdige Schmach und Beschimpfung; denn Philipp war ihr Schutzherr gegen Feinde, denen der Staat die Spitze nicht bieten konnte." Schorn, 189.

[4] One is almost tempted to believe that Philopoimên filled the office of Master of the Horse for two years together, as we shall find that he afterwards did with the Generalship itself. But, if we accept the belief of Schorn (210–4), considered probable by Thirlwall (viii. 295), that the Achaian Federal elections were now (ever since B.C. 217) held in the Autumn, it is possible that all the reforms and exploits of Philopoimên may have taken place during the one Presidency of Kykliadas, from November, 210, to November, 209. There would not however be the same political objection to the re-election of the ἱππάρχης which there was to that of the στρατηγός.

[5] Plut. Phil. 7. Paus. viii. 49. 7.

[6] Liv. xxvii. 32.

and about the same time Sulpicius sailed to meet Attalos at Aigina. The two great Leagues were thus left to fight their own battles, and the Achaians had now learned how to fight theirs. In a battle near Messênê, the Ætolians and Eleians were now defeated by the unassisted force of Achaia.[1] Such was the difference between Achaian troops commanded by Aratos and Achaian troops commanded by Philopoimên.

Character of the last years of the war, B.C. 208–205.

The war continued for about four years longer with various success. It is needless to recount all the gains and losses on both sides. The Ætolians continued their ravages in Western Greece, while the combined fleet of Rome and Pergamos cruised in the Ægæan, descending on any favourable points, sometimes for conquest, sometimes merely for plunder. Once or twice, on the other hand, we get a momentary glimpse of a Punic fleet making its appearance in the Grecian seas, as an ally of Philip and the Achaians.[2] Philip himself shines here and there like a meteor, now giving help to his allies in Greece, now defending his own frontier against the Northern Barbarians.[3] Notwithstanding all his crimes, it is impossible to refuse all sympathy to so gallant and active a prince, and one who was becoming more and more truly the protector of Greece against the Barbarians of the West as well as of the North. Only one of his many brilliant expeditions and forced marches need be recorded here.

Philip's attempt on Hêrakleia, B.C. 207.

An Ætolian Assembly, or perhaps only a meeting of the Senate,[4] met at Hêrakleia to discuss the interests of the League with their ally and chief magistrate, King Attalos. The King of Egypt and the Rhodians were also renewing their praiseworthy attempts

[1] Liv. xxvii. 33.

[2] Ib. 15, 30; xxviii. 7.

[3] Polybios (x. 41) gives a vivid description of the various calls made upon Philip's energies at one moment during the year 208. His own kingdom was threatened by Illyrians on one side and by Thracians on the other; he received at the same time applications for help from Achaia, Bœotia, Euboia, Epeiros, and Akarnania. Livy (xxviii. 5) translates Polybios.

[4] Pol. x. 42. Πυθόμενος δὲ . . . τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας εἰς Ἡράκλειαν ἀθροίζεσθαι χάριν τοῦ κοινολογηθῆναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστώτων, ἀναλαβὼν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκ τῆς Σκοτούσης ὥρμησε σπεύδων καταταχῆσαι καὶ πτοήσας διασῦραι τὴν σύνοδον αὐτῶν. τοῦ μὲν οὖν συλλόγου καθυστέρει. Liv. xxviii. 5. Eo nuntiatum est, *concilium* Ætolis Heracleam indictum, Regemque Attalum, ad consultandum de summâ belli, venturum. Hunc conventum, ut turbaret subito adventu, magnis itineribus Heracleam duxit. Et *concilio* quidem dimisso jam venit.

Both Schorn (191) and Thirlwall (viii. 292, 293) take this meeting for a General Assembly. Certainly σύνοδος and *Concilium* are the regular words for such an Assembly, yet the words of Polybios seem to imply that the ἄρχοντες themselves formed the σύνοδος, and did not merely summon it.

to bring about a peace, and their envoys, as well as others from Rome, sent doubtless on an opposite errand, were present at the meeting at Hêrakleia.[1] We have before seen the Ætolians select the time of meeting of the Achaian Federal Congress as the time best suited for a safe and profitable inroad into the Achaian territory.[2] Philip now sought to repay them in their own coin; he hoped to surprise them in the act of debate, as the Medeônians had once surprised them in the act of election.[3] He came however too late; the meeting, whether of the whole Ætolian body or only of the Senate, had already dispersed. The Egyptian and Rhodian ambassadors still continued to labour for peace, but it is almost impossible to follow their movements in detail,[4] and as yet both the contending parties still preferred to make themselves ready for battle. We soon after find Philip at Aigion at an Achaian Assembly. He there made over to his allies certain Peloponnêsian districts which had been in Macedonian possession since the Social, some perhaps even since the Kleomenic, War.[5] These were the Arkadian city of Hêraia, which had once been a member of the League,[6] and the whole district of Triphylia,[7] which had never before been part of the Achaian body. Philip also restored to the State of Megalopolis the town of Alipheira, which he had taken in the Social War. This was an old possession of Megalopolis, which Lydiadas, in the days of his Tyranny, had exchanged with the Eleians for some compensation which is not distinctly explained.[8] This increase of territory would extend the boundary

Philip's cessions to the Achaian League, B.C. 208.

[1] Liv. xxviii. 7. [2] See above, pp. 397, 429. [3] See above, p. 323.

[4] Livy (u.s.) makes the Egyptian and Rhodian envoys meet Philip at Elateia; he tells them that the war is not his fault, and that he is anxious for peace; the conference is broken up by the news that Machanidas is going to attack the Eleians during the Olympic Games. Philip goes to oppose him, Machanidas retreats, and Philip then goes to Aigion.

Now this is evidently one of Livy's confusions. The Eleians were allies of Machanidas and enemies of Philip. Livy's narrative also gives no place for the speech of the Rhodian envoys (Pol. xi. 5) addressed to an Ætolian Popular Assembly (*οἱ πολλοί*, c. 6), which cannot be the one at Hêrakleia, because the presence of Macedonian ambassadors (*οἱ παρὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου πρέσβεις*) is distinctly mentioned.

I can really make nothing of the account in Appian, Mac. ii. 1, 2. See Thirlwall, viii. 295. One thing however is clear; from about this time (Livy, xxix. 12) Rome, Pergamos, and Carthage take no active share in the war; it is reduced to the old Greek limits of the Social War.

[5] Pol. ii. 54; iv. 77 et seqq. [6] See above, p. 314.

[7] Liv. xxviii. 8. See above, p. 419.

[8] Pol. iv. 77. *Ἠλεῖοι προσελάβοντο καὶ τὴν τῶν Ἀλιφειρέων πόλιν, οὖσαν*

of the League to the Ionian Sea, and would interpose part of Achaia between Elis and Messênê. If it was really made over to the League at this time,[1] it was an important acquisition, and one made at an opportune moment. The League could now, as of old, afford to liberate Grecian cities, for it was now able to withstand any Grecian enemy by its own unassisted force.

Philopoimên was now at last chosen General of the League.[2] For the first time since Markos and Lydiadas the Achaians had at their head a man capable of fighting a battle. Aristomachos, it may be remembered, had once wished to fight one, but he was hindered by Aratos.[3] During the long administration of Aratos, pitched battles were rare, and victories altogether unknown. The Old-Achaian cities had never been distinguished for martial spirit; and the Arkadian and Argolic members of the League seem generally, on becoming Achaian, to have sunk to the Achaian level. At Megalopolis and Argos indeed things were in a better state; we have seen the League, on one occasion, calling, in a marked way, for Argeian and Megalopolitan contingents;[4] and the Megalopolitan phalanx had been, even in the days of the Kleomenic War, reformed after the Macedonian model.[5] Elsewhere, whatever military spirit there was had died away under Aratos. His successors, Euryleôn, Kykliadas, and Nikias, seem to have been as incapable as himself of commanding in the open field, and not to have redeemed the deficiency by his diplomatic powers or his skill in sudden surprises. Polybios[6] speaks with utter contempt of the Generals of this time, and we have seen

Philopoimên General of the League, B.C. 208–207.

Inefficiency of the Achaian army.

ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπ' Ἀρκαδίαν καὶ Μεγάλην πόλιν, Λυδιάδου τοῦ Μεγαλοπολίτου κατὰ τὴν τυραννίδα πρός τινας ἰδίας πράξεις ἀλλαγὴν δόντος τοῖς Ἠλείοις.

[1] I speak thus doubtingly, because we find these towns, at a later time, again in the hands of Philip, and again ceded by him to the League. Liv. xxxii. 5; xxxiii. 34.

[2] See Schorn, 195; Thirlwall, viii. 295. That Philopoimên commanded at Mantineia as General of the League is clear from the whole story, and follows from Plutarch's words (Phil. 11), στρατηγοῦντα τὸ δεύτερον, which otherwise are not very clear. According to Schorn's view, he would be elected in November B.C. 208, so that he would be best called the General of the year B.C. 207; whereas, under the earlier system, the greater part of the official year fell in the same natural year as the election. The succession seems to have been 211–0 Euryleôn; 210–9 Kykliadas; 209–8 Nikias (Liv. xxviii. 8); 208–7 Philopoimên.

[3] See above, p. 346.

[4] See above, p. 429.

[5] Pol. iv. 69. See Brandstäter, p. 365.

[6] He says (xi. 8) that there are three ways of attaining to military skill, by scientific study (διὰ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκ τούτων κατασκευῆς), by instruc-

that one common path to the highest office in the state was a course of gross and wilful negligence in the administration of the post next in importance.[1] The League had learned, in the early days of Aratos, to trust to Egyptian subsidies, to diplomatic craft, or, at most, to midnight surprises; latterly they had trusted to Macedonian help,[2] and to mercenaries, who never fought with real zeal in the service of a commonweath.[3] But the League had now at its head a man who was a native of the most military city of the Union, who had given his whole life to the study of the military art, and whose most ardent desire was to see the League really independent. Philopoimên longed to see his country defended by the arms of her own citizens, not by mercenaries indifferent to her cause, or by foreign Kings who used the Achaian League only as an instrument for their own purposes. As Master of the Horse, he had reformed the Achaian cavalry; as General, he determined to reform the whole military system of the League.[4] After so long a period of neglect, reform might have seemed almost hopeless. Philopoimên had first to carry proposals for improvement through a democratic Assembly; he had then to impose a course of severe discipline upon men who were in the least favourable condition for it. He had not, like his contemporary Hannibal, to bring brave but untutored warriors under the restraints of military order; he had the more difficult task before him of making soldiers out of the citizens of a highly-civilized and somewhat luxurious nation. The forms of the Achaian constitution probably helped him in his work. If he gained his first point, he gained everything. In the three days' session of the Achaian Assembly, it was possible that his proposals might be wholly rejected; it was not likely that they

Philopoimên's Reforms.

tion from men of experience, and by actual experience of a man's own. The Achaian Generals at this time were altogether unversed in any one of the three; *πάντων ἦσαν τούτων ἀνεννόητοι οἱ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν στρατηγοὶ ἁπλῶς.*

[1] See above, p. 454.

[2] Plutarch (Phil. 8) gives a good picture of the state of things in these respects.

[3] Pol. xi. 13. Under a Tyranny, he tells us, mercenaries fight well, because their master will reward them, and will use them, if victorious, for future conquests; but citizens fight ill (cf. Herod. v. 78), because they fight for a master and not for themselves. Under a Democracy, on the other hand, citizens fight well, because they fight for their own freedom, but mercenaries fight ill, because, the more successful the commonwealth is, the less it will need their services.

[4] The admirable summary of Philopoimên's reforms by Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 295–8) makes one almost shrink from going again over the same ground. I have tried to bring out a few special points into prominence.

should be criticized, spoiled, patched, and pared down in detail. When his proposals were agreed to, it was doubtless a hard task to carry out his scheme in practice; yet his position had several marked advantages. He had already reformed the service which was filled by the highest class, and he had something like a model infantry to show in the contingent of his own city. And, when he had once received the necessary authority from the assembled People, he had almost unlimited powers for the execution of his plans. There was no King and no Ministry to thwart him; there were no Councillors or Commissioners to meddle; there was no mob of a metropolis to be cringed to; above all, there were no Special Correspondents to vex the soul of the hero.[1] He had simply to deal with a people whose intellect he had already convinced, a people who had themselves raised him to his high office, a people whose fault was certainly not that of disobedience, fickleness, or ingratitude towards the leaders whom they placed at their head. One vigorous speech in the Assembly[2] —probably at the Meeting where he was chosen General— settled everything. Let the Achaians, he told them, retain their fondness for elegance and splendour; but let it be turned towards fine arms rather than towards fine clothes and fine furniture;[3] let men vie with one another, not in objects of mere luxury and show, but in those whose possession would of itself prompt them to vigorous and patriotic action. Eight months of severe training put Philopoimên at the head of an Achaian phalanx which he could really trust. Their short spears and small shields were exchanged for the full panoply and long sarissa of the Macedonians; they were practised in every evolution of the phalanx; and, before his year of office was over, Philopoimên assembled at Mantineia a force with which he did not dread to meet the power of Sparta in the open field. He did not wholly give up the use of mercenary troops, but strangers and citizens had now changed places. His mercenaries were now mainly Illyrian and other light-armed soldiers; the real strength of his army lay in the native phalanx and native cavalry[4] of the League.

[1] Contrast the good luck of Philopoimên in these respects with the position of a Spartan, Byzantine, Venetian, or Dutch General in past times, or of an English or American General in our own day.

[2] Pol. xi. 10. [3] Pol. xi. 9. Plut. Phil. 9.

[4] As the Tarentines (Pol. xi. 12. Liv. xxxv. 28, 29. Thirlwall, viii. 298) on both sides were not natives of Tarentum, but only a particular sort of cavalry,

The Three Battles of Mantineia;

With this new force the Achaian General met the Spartan King in a pitched battle near Mantineia.[1] It was the third great battle fought on the same, or nearly the same, ground.[2]

B.C. 418.

Here, in the interval between the two parts of the Peloponnêsian War, had Agis restored the glory of Sparta after her

B.C. 362.

humiliation at Sphaktêria; here Epameinôndas had fallen in the moment of victory; here now was to be fought the last great battle of independent Greece. One regrets that, at such a moment, the forces of the two worthiest of Grecian states should have been arrayed against each other; still it cannot be without interest that we behold the last act of the long drama of internal Hellenic warfare. Rome, Carthage, Pergamos,[3] even Macedonia, had for a while withdrawn from the scene; the struggle was to be waged, as of old, between Grecian generals commanding Grecian armies. If there were foreigners engaged on either side, they were mere auxiliaries, like the barbarian troops which had appeared in Peloponnêsos even in the days of Epameinôndas.[4] And we have no reason to doubt that Machanidas was a worthy foe, even of Philopoimên. His name of Tyrant he shares with the great Kleomenês; but he was as clearly a real national leader as Kleomenês himself. It is the old strife, the old hatred, between Sparta and the city founded by Epameinôndas. Machanidas marched forth, expecting a certain victory; like earlier chiefs of his nation, he looked upon Arkadia as his destined prey.[5] And no doubt it was with a special feeling of delight that Philopoimên, the follower of Epameinôndas,[6] stood ready, with the force of Megalopolis and the whole Achaian League, to engage a Spartan King on the ground on which his model had conquered and fallen. The details of the battle are given at length by Polybios,[7] who probably heard them from

Third Battle of Mantineia, B.C. 207.

there is no reason why they may not have been a citizen force on both sides. Polybios does not imply that they, but rather that the *εὔζωνοι*, were mercenaries. And, in any case, Philopoimên would have the native Achaian cavalry, which he had himself organized.

[1] Polybios (xi. 10) uses the name *Mantineia*, which doubtless still remained in familiar use, and not the more formal title of *Antigoneia*.

[2] On the three battles of Mantineia, see Leake's Morea, iii. 57–93.

[3] Attalos had been called back to his own kingdom to repel an invasion of Prusias, King of Bithynia. Liv. xxviii. 7.

[4] Dionysios sent Celts and Iberians to the support of Sparta. Xen. Hell. vii. 1. 20.

[5] Herod. i. 66. *Ἀρκαδίην μ' αἰτεῖς; μέγα μ' αἰτεῖς· οὔ τοι δώσω*, κ.τ.λ.

[6] Plut. Phil. 3.

[7] Pol. xi. 11–18. Cf. Plut. Phil. 10. Paus. viii. 50–2.

Philopoimên himself. It is enough for my purpose to say that, after a hard fought field, victory remained with the Federal army. At the battle of Larisos, Philopoimên, Master of the Horse of Achaia, slew with his own hand the Master of the Horse of Elis; now, as General of the League, he slew with his own hand the King of Sparta. Had he been a Roman, he might have boasted of the *Spolia Opima*, like Romulus and Cossus and Marcellus. The death of Lydiadas was now avenged; but we regret to find that the Achaians, in their day of victory, were far from showing the same respect to a fallen foe which Kleomenês had shown to their own hero. The corpse of Lydiadas had received royal honours from his conqueror; the head of Machanidas was cut from his body, and held up as a trophy and an encouragement to the pursuers. It was a victory indeed; four thousand Lacedæmonians lay dead; as many were taken prisoners; the whole spoil remained in the hands of the victors; and all this was purchased by the most trifling loss on the Achaian side. In point of military glory, it was the brightest day in the history of the League.

Complete victory of the Achaians.

For a Lacedæmonian army to be defeated in a pitched battle, for Lakônia to be ravaged at will by an invader, were now no longer the miraculous events which they had seemed a hundred and sixty years before. But the fight of Leuktra and the Peloponnêsian campaigns of Epameinôndas were hardly more wonderful than for a Spartan army, bred up in the school of Kleomenês, to be defeated by a native Achaian force, commanded by an Achaian General, without the presence of a single Macedonian soldier, and without the help of a single Egyptian talent. The Achaian army, with its General at its head, now marched as freely through Lakônia as had been done by Epameinôndas, by Pyrrhos, by Antigonos, or by either Philip. A prouder moment in a soldier's life can hardly be conceived than when Philopoimên crossed the hostile border at the head of the army of his fellow-citizens which he himself had trained to victory.

Philopoimên ravages Lakônia.

The remaining events of the war may be hastened over. Machanidas was succeeded at Sparta by one Nabis, a Tyrant in every sense of the word, but who did not as yet make himself formidable to the League. Philip, now that the Romans and Attalos were gone, easily drove the Ætolians to a separate

Nabis Tyrant of Sparta

Peace between Ætolia and Macedonia, B.C. 205.

peace, a proceeding on their parts which gave deadly offence at Rome.[1] It was certainly a breach of the engagements towards Rome into which they had entered at the beginning of the war, but the fault lay with the Romans themselves, who had wholly neglected their Greek allies for two years.[2] Shortly afterwards the Proconsul Publius Sempronius landed at Epidamnos. Unable to persuade the Ætolians to break the peace—a rare scruple, which shows how much they must have suffered in the war—and unable to contend against Philip without their help, he gladly listened to proposals of peace. They first came from the Epeirots, who, if it be true that Philip had possessed himself of Ambrakia,[3] once the capital of their great Pyrrhos, had almost as much reason to complain of him as of Romans or Ætolians.

Conference at Phoinikê.

Conferences took place at Phoinikê in Epeiros between the Proconsul Sempronius, the Kings Philip and Amynander, and the Magistrates of the Akarnanian and Epeirot Leagues. The lead in the negociation was taken by the Epeirot General Philip, supported by his two colleagues Dardas and Aeropos.[4] By the

General Peace, B.C. 205.

terms of the peace Rome obtained some Illyrian districts; Philip obtained Atintania, hardly to the advantage of the mediating power; and it was probably now that he made over to King Amynander[5] the island of Zakynthos, his own conquest during the Social War.[6] The best modern guide to these times[7] marvels, and with reason, at this last "rectification" of territory. Amynander's kingdom lay wholly inland, and he could not possibly visit his new dominions without the goodwill of the possessor of Ambrakia. It was even stranger than for a Duke of Savoy, who was at least master of Nizza, to be made King of Sicily or Sardinia.[8] The other allies seem to have had no representatives in the Conference, but they were equally included in the treaty. Philip stipulated for his own Thessalian dependents, for Prusias of Bithynia, whom it was needful to secure against his neighbour Attalos, and for the Leagues of Achaia and Bœotia, as well as those of Epeiros and Akarnania. The allies on the

[1] Cf. Pol. xviii. 21. Liv. xxxi. 29.
[2] Liv. xxix. 12.
[3] See App. Mac. ii. 1. The Ætolians had taken it some time before.
[4] Liv. xxix. 12. See above, p. 118, note 3.
[5] Liv. xxxvi. 31. It was the price of a free passage through Athamania.
[6] Pol. v. 102. See above, p. 434.
[7] Thirlwall, viii. 300.
[8] It was as if the Prince of Montenegro should receive one of the Greek Islands still in Turkish bondage, as compensation for the Turkish military road through his dominions.

Roman side were Elis, Athens, Messênê, King Attalos, King Pleuratos in Illyria, Nabis the Tyrant,[1] and Rome's metropolis Ilion. This last piece of mythical diplomacy rivals the claims which Akarnania had once made for Roman support. The Ætolians were enrolled on neither side; Philip had granted them peace, but not alliance; Rome looked on allies who had made peace without her sanction as unworthy of her protection or care. This was the first great lesson which the Greeks learned in the school of Roman diplomacy. To become the ally of Rome was the first step towards becoming her subject; it involved the entire sacrifice of independent action. The peace was confirmed by the Roman Senate and people; it was accepted, tacitly at least, by the allies on both sides, and the land had rest for a short space.

[1] It was afterwards pretended that the treaty was concluded, not with Nabis, but with the lawful King Pelops. Liv. xxxiv. 32.

## NOTE ON THE GENERALSHIPS OF ARATOS

It is not easy to reconcile the number of Generalships attributed to Aratos by Plutarch with the distinct assertion (see above, p. 237) of the same writer that Aratos was elected General in alternate years, because the Law did not allow the retiring General to be immediately re-elected. Droysen (ii. 438) holds that the Law was broken in favour of Aratos, and that he served for several consecutive years. Schorn (107) rather suspects an error in Plutarch's enumeration.

Aratos was first elected General in B.C. 245;[1] in 226 he was, according to Plutarch (Ar. 35), General for the twelfth time; in 213 he died, according to the same authority (c. 53), in his seventeenth Generalship. Among the intervening years, there are some when Aratos is mentioned as General, some when other persons are mentioned, and some where the name is not preserved. The statement that he died in his seventeenth Generalship would, in itself, present no difficulty; if he was elected in alternate years beginning with 245, then 213 would be his seventeenth year. But it is certain that his alternate re-election, though the common rule, was not adhered to so strictly as to exclude occasional deviations (see Plut. Ar. 38 and Pol. iv. 82 compared with iv. 37), and the twelfth Generalship in 226 cannot possibly agree with a system of alternate elections beginning with 245. Aratos was General in 245, 243, and 241. We then lose the succession for some years, and recover it in 234. From that date onwards we have as follows:

234 Aratos (viii.)
233 Lydiadas (i.)
232 Aratos (ix.)
231 Lydiadas (ii.)
230 Aratos (x.)
229 Lydiadas (iii.)
228 Aratos (xi.)
227 Aristomachos.
226 Aratos (xii.)

If 226 were Aratos' twelfth Generalship, it follows that 234 was his eighth. But, as 241 was his third, the six intervening years, 240, 239, 238, 237, 236, 235 do not give room for the four required Generalships (fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh), in alternate years. If Plutarch be right in calling 226 the twelfth Generalship, it follows that Aratos must have held office for four out of those six years, a clear violation of the law as stated by Plutarch himself. Droysen (ii. 435. 8)[2] truly adds that in those years, only one General besides Aratos, namely Dioitas, is mentioned.[3] Again, though the seventeenth

[1] By the year of a General, I mean the year B.C. in which he was elected; his official year took in parts of two years of our reckoning. Thus the Generalship of B.C. 234 extends into B.C. 233, and so throughout.

[2] [iii. 2. 33, 2nd edition.]

[3] Polyainos (ii. 36, see above, p. 315, note 1) mentions Dioitas as General, but gives no clue to the year to which his Generalship should be referred.

Generalship in 213 would agree perfectly with a system of alternate re-election throughout the whole time, yet the first three Generalships are in odd years, 245, 243, 241, while the series beginning with 234 are in even years. Aratos must therefore, between 241 and 234, have either been in office or out of office for two years together. Again, he was not regular General in 224, nor General at all in 218, which, on the alternate system, he should have been. He certainly was General in 220, 217, 213. In 221, 219, 218, 216, we find other names. If then Plutarch be right in calling 226 his twelfth, and 213 his seventeenth, Generalship, we must not only supply two more Generalships in the years 222 and 215, but we must also suppose four Generalships between 241 and 234, that is, we must suppose, as Schorn says, that Aratos held the Generalship for three years together, in manifest breach of the law.

But, by supposing two slight and easily-explained errors in Plutarch's reckoning, it is possible to arrange the years, so as not to imply any breach of a Law so distinctly stated by Plutarch himself. His mention of a seventeenth Generalship in 213 may have been a mere careless inference from the number of years and the common practice of alternate election. Or it may be explained in another way. The twelfth Generalship in 226 is the great difficulty. If for *δωδέκατον*, in Plut. Ar. 35, we might substitute *δέκατον*, we should then have to suppose that, between 241 and 234, Aratos, instead of being in office for three years together, remained once out of office for two years together,[1] as we know that he once did at a later time. We have then to suppose that Plutarch counted Aratos' Extraordinary Generalship in 224–3 [2] (Ar. 41) as one of his regular years, and we have, between 224 and 213, to place Generalships in those years where it is allowable, namely in 222 and 215. This gives sixteen Generalships without any two being in consecutive years. Now in 219 the younger Aratos was General, and Plutarch may easily, in running his eye over a list, have mistaken his year of office for another year of his father's, and so have made the whole number seventeen. The whole list would then stand thus:

---

[1] That this should be the case is not at all unlikely, when we remember (see above, pp. 309, 310) the indignation excited by his attempt on Peiraieus during the truce with Antigonos. That attempt must have been made either late in the official year B.C. 241–0 or early in B.C. 239–8. It is not an improbable conjecture that it was made when Aratos was General in 239, and that, in consequence of the popular feeling against him, he remained out of office during the years 238 and 237, and was elected for the fifth time in 236.

On the other hand it should be remarked that the time to which Droysen attributes the illegal elections of Aratos, and to which, if they occurred at all, they must be attributed, is precisely that when the power of Aratos was most unbounded. From 241 to 234, from the acquisition of Corinth to the acquisition of Megalopolis, Aratos was, with the exception of his temporary discredit about Peiraieus, at the very height of his glory. Earlier, he was merely growing into power, later, he had rivals in Lydiadas and others.

[2] Aratos' election as *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ* (see above, p. 377) was in the natural year B.C. 223, but before the expiration of the official year 224–3.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 245 | Aratos (i.) | 228 | Aratos (ix.) |
| 244 | — | 227 | Aristomachos. |
| 243 | Aratos (ii.) | 226 | Aratos (x.) |
| 242 | — | 225 | Hyperbatas. |
| 241 | Aratos (iii.) | 224 | Timoxenos (i.) |
| [1]240 | — | 224–3 | Aratos (στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ) (xi.) |
| 239 | Aratos (iv.) ? | 223 | Timoxenos (ii.) |
| 238 | — | 222 | Aratos (xii.) ? |
| 237 | — | 221 | Timoxenos (iii.) |
| 236 | Aratos (v.) ? | 220 | Aratos (xiii.) |
| 235 | — | 219 | Aratos the Younger. |
| 234 | Aratos (vi.) | 218 | Epêratos. |
| 233 | Lydiadas (i.) | 217 | Aratos (xiv.) |
| 232 | Aratos (vii.) | 216 | Timoxenos (iv.) |
| 231 | Lydiadas (ii.) | 215 | Aratos (xv.) ? |
| 230 | Aratos (viii.) | 214 | — |
| 229 | Lydiadas (iii.) | 213 | Aratos (xvi.) |

The question reduces itself to this. Was Plutarch more likely to go wrong in a reckoning of figures or in a distinct statement of constitutional practice ? To me the former supposition certainly seems the easier of the two.

That Plutarch is by no means infallible in his chronology of the life of Aratos is plain from his strange remark that Aratos had been, in 224, for thirty-three years[2] an Achaian politician (τριάκοντα ἔτη καὶ τρία πεπολιτευμένος ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς, Ar. 41), whereas, in 224, only twenty-seven years had elapsed since the very beginning of his career in the deliverance of Sikyôn. The only marked period of thirty-three years in the life of Aratos is that between his first Generalship in 245 and his death in 213 ; this is probably what Plutarch was thinking of. A mistake in reckoning up the Presidential years is one of exactly the same kind, and it is one, I certainly think, far more likely to occur than a direct and often-repeated blunder on a point of constitutional law, committed by one who had the Memoirs of Aratos before him.

[1] The Generalship of Dioitas would come in one of the years 240, 238, 237 or 235, but I know of no evidence to fix it to any particular year.

[2] I do not at all know what Mr. Fynes Clinton means (iii. 36) by transferring this remark from the year 224 to 222, and adding "The thirty-three years of Aratos must be computed from the first prætor Marcus, B.C. 255." What have the years of Markos and Aratos to do with each other.

# CHAPTER IX

## HISTORY OF FEDERAL GREECE, FROM THE PEACE OF EPEIROS TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE. B.C. 205—146

Character of the period.

WITH the interference of Rome in Grecian affairs, the main interest of our Federal history ceases. Hitherto we have seen Greek Federalism in the days of its glory; we have seen Greek Federal commonwealths acting as perfectly independent powers, and we have seen them acting in close union with Greek states possessing other forms of Government. What is now left to us is to trace Greek Federalism in its decline; a decline, indeed, in no way peculiar to the Federal states, but one which they shared with all powers, whether kingdoms or commonwealths, which once came within the reach of Rome's friendship or enmity. The chief importance of this period for our purpose is indirect. We have now come within the life-time of Polybios; we shall soon come within the range of his personal memory. His narrative of events which he had seen himself, or had heard of from his father, is naturally much fuller than his narrative of events which rested on the traditions or the written records of a past generation. Unfortunately we now have his history only in fragments, but the fragments are often of considerable length, and there are also several narratives in Livy which are evidently translated from Polybios to the best of Livy's small ability. As these later transactions were recorded by Polybios at great detail, the fragments of his history of these times contain a great mass of political information, and supply many constitutional details which we might otherwise never have known. We have several vivid pictures of debates in the Achaian and Ætolian Assemblies, such as we do not get in the history of earlier times. Still, when we read minute reports of debates in which Aristainos and Kykliadas, or Kallikratês and Archôn, were the chief speakers, we cannot

Importance of the period in Federal History chiefly indirect.

restrain a wish to exchange them for equally minute reports of the parliamentary combats of Aratos and Lydiadas. I shall therefore touch comparatively lightly on this last period of Greek Federal history, leaving, as before, the details of warfare to the general historians of Greece and Rome, and stopping only at those points where the narrative affords us any important constitutional information.

## § 1. *From the Peace of Epeiros to the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus*

B.C. 205—194

Aggressive proceedings of Philip, B.C. 202–200.

We left Greece at peace; that she did not long remain so was again the fault of the King of Macedonia. Philip, whose youthful promise had been so bright, was gradually sinking from bad to worse. It was open to him to play the part of Piedmont in Greece; he preferred, of his own choice, to play the part of Austria. Every step that he took alienated some old friend, or provoked some new enemy. In defiance of his treaty with Rome, he still continued his dealings with Hannibal, and Macedonian soldiers are said to have fought for Carthage at Zama.[1]

B.C. 202.

In defiance of his treaty with Ætolia, he attacked various cities, in Asia and elsewhere, which were allies or subjects of the League,[2] and, by his cruel treatment of his conquests, he degraded himself, in the eyes of all Greece, almost below the level of the Ætolians themselves.[3]

His dealings with the Achaian League.

He seems to have defrauded his old allies of Achaia of the Peloponnêsian districts which he had professed to cede to them during the Roman war;[4] he is even charged with an attempt to poison Philopoimên,[5] as he was believed to have poisoned Aratos. He engaged in hostilities, which seem to have been altogether unprovoked, with the Rhodian Republic,[6] with Ptolemy Epiphanês of Egypt, and with

[1] Liv. xxx. 26, 33, 42. But Polybios does not mention them.

[2] Lysimacheia, Kalchêdôn, Kios. See Pol. xv. 22; xvii. 2, 3.

[3] See Pol. xvii. 3. Cf. the somewhat later siege of Abydos, Pol. xvi. 29–34. Liv. xxxi. 16, 17.

[4] See above, p. 460. That they were detained or recovered by him is clear by his again restoring, or pretending to restore, them at a later time. Liv. xxxii. 5.

[5] Plut. Phil. 12. Ἔπεμψεν εἰς Ἄργος κρύφα τοὺς ἀναιρήσοντας αὐτόν. This need not imply that poison was the means to be used.

[6] Philip's war with the Rhodians produced several important sea-fights. See the description of those of Ladê and Chios. Pol. xvi. 1–9.

Attalos of Pergamos, the cherished ally of Rome. He engaged in a war with Athens, for which something more like an excuse could be pleaded;[1] but he shocked the universal feeling of Greece by practising the same barbarous and useless kind of devastation of which he and his Ætolian enemies had alike been guilty during the Social War.[2] Athens, politically contemptible, was already beginning to assume something of that sacred and academic character which she enjoyed in the eyes of the later Greeks and Romans. The destruction of Athenian temples and works of art doubtless aroused a feeling of general indignation even stronger than that which followed on the like sacrilege when wrought at Dion and Thermon. It was this attack on Athens which finally drew Rome into the strife. The justice of the Roman declaration of war cannot be questioned. Philip had clearly broken the Treaty; he had helped the enemies of Rome and he had injured her allies. He had put himself in a position which enabled the Romans to assume, and that, for a while, with some degree of truth and sincerity, the character of the liberators of Greece. It was wholly Philip's own fault, that a Roman, a Barbarian, was able to unite the forces of nearly all Greece against a Macedonian King, and to declare, at one of the great Greek national festivals, that all Greeks who had been subject to Macedonia received their freedom from the Roman Senate and their Proconsul. There is no need to suspect the Senate, still less to suspect Flamininus personally, of any insincerity in the matter. That liberty received as a boon from a powerful stranger can never be lasting is indeed true. But it does not follow that the philhellenism of Flamininus was a mere blind, a mere trap for Greek credulity, or that the gift of freedom was deliberately designed from the beginning to be only a step towards bondage. One might as well suppose that the servants of the East India Company who first mingled in Indian politics and warfare deliberately contemplated the Affghan war and the annexation of Oude.

Philip's devastation of Attica, B.C. 200.

Justice of the war on the Roman side.

Philhellenic feelings of Flamininus and other Romans.

The second Macedonian War—the second Roman War, as we may call it from our point of view—was carried on by three successive Roman commanders, Publius Sulpicius, Publius

Second Macedonian War, B.C. 200–197.

[1] Two Akarnanians were put to death at Eleusis for an unwitting profanation of the mysteries. The Akarnanian League complained to their ally King Philip, who invaded and ravaged Attica. Liv. xxxi. 14.

[2] See above, pp. 419, 428.

Villius,[1] and Titus Quinctius Flamininus.[2] Of these three, Titus became something like a Greek national hero. Plutarch[3] does not even stop to argue whether Titus or Philopoimên deserved the larger share of Grecian thankfulness; the merits of the Roman allow of no dispute or comparison. Titus[4] shone alike as a diplomatist and as a warrior; he showed himself as superior to Philip in the conference of Nikaia[5] as he did upon the hill of Kynoskephalai. His real goodwill towards Greece there seems no just reason to doubt. He lived at a time peculiarly favourable to the growth of such a feeling. In earlier times the Romans despised the Greeks with the contempt of ignorance. In later times they despised them with the contempt of conquerors. Even Titus himself lived to change from the friend into the patron, and from the patron there are very few steps to the master. But, just at this moment, all the products of Grecian intellect were, for the first time, beginning to be opened to the inquiring minds of Rome. Greece was a land of intellectual pilgrimage, the birthplace of the art, the poetry, and the science, which the rising generation of Romans were beginning to appreciate. The result was the existence for a time of a genuine philhellenic feeling, of which the early conduct of Titus in Greece is the most illustrious example.[6] Titus Quinctius was a Roman, and we may be quite certain that he would never have sacrificed one jot of the real interests of Rome

Real goodwill of Flamininus towards Greece.

[1] I take Villius, in Greek Οὐίλλιος, to be the name intended by the Ὀτίλιος of Pausanias (vii. 7, 9). See Schorn, 240.

[2] For Φλαμινῖνος, Pausanias (u.s.) and Appian (Syr. 2) have Φλαμίνιος; Aurelius Victor (c. 51) and, after him, Orosius (lib. iv. f. iii. ed. Venice, 1483) turn the *nomen* Quinctius into the *prænomen* Quintus, so as to change Titus Quinctius into Quintus Flaminius. Aurelius moreover makes him the son of Caius Flaminius who died at Trasimenus. This is not very wonderful in a late and careless compiler, but it is wonderful to find the error repeated by a scholar like Schorn, p. 237.

[3] Comp. Phil. et Fl. 1.

[4] One can hardly help, when writing from the Greek side, speaking of him by his familiar prænomen, as he is always called by Polybios and Plutarch. It is not every Roman who is spoken of so endearingly.

[5] See Pol. xvii. 1–10.

[6] Mommsen, in his Roman History, very clearly brings out this fact, but he is very severe both on Flamininus and on his countrymen for yielding to such foolish sentimentality. I confess that I cannot look on a generous feeling as disgraceful either to an individual or to a nation. But Mommsen's history of this period, as of all periods, is well worth reading, if the reader will only reserve the right of private judgement in his own hands.

A truer and more generous estimate of Flamininus will be found in Kortüm, iii. 251.

to any dream of philhellenism. But, within that limit, he was disposed to be more liberal to Grecian allies and less harsh to Grecian enemies than he would have been to allies or enemies of any other nation. He would have Greece dependent on Rome; but he would have her dependent, not as a slave but as a free ally; the Greeks should be Plataians and not Helots; the connexion should be one, not of constraint, but of affection and gratitude for real favours conferred. He wished in short to make Rome become, what Macedonia ought to have become, the chosen head of a body of free and willing Greek confederates. For a few years he really effected his object. Macedonia did not retain a single ally, except the brave League of Akarnania, ever faithful to its friends in their utmost peril. The two great Leagues of Achaia and Ætolia did good service to the Roman cause; Epeiros and Bœotia, though not friendly in their hearts, did not venture openly to oppose it. Consistently with his whole system, Titus never pushed any Greek state to extremities. Philip received what, after such provocations as his, may be called favourable terms. When the Ætolians, like the Thebans after Aigospotamos, called for the utter destruction of Macedonia, Titus showed them how expedient it was that Macedonia should remain independent and powerful, the bulwark of Greece against barbarian inroads.[1] Philip was deprived of his conquests, and prevented from injuring the allies of Rome, but the original Kingdom of Macedonia suffered no dismemberment. Nor do we hear of the exercise of any severities against Philip's gallant allies of Akarnania, a marked contrast to the later treatment of the Epeirot cities after the fall of Perseus. A like indisposition to deal harshly with any Greek state may even account for Flamininus' over-lenity towards the Tyrant Nabis, the portion of his career which, at first sight, is the most difficult either to justify or to understand.[2]

Union of Greek States under Rome.

General moderation of Flamininus.

The way in which the several Federal States of Greece stood affected to Rome during this war throws a good deal of light on Federal politics. It will therefore be worth dwelling on a little more fully than the purely military history. The Ætolians were the first among the Greek Leagues to embrace the Roman cause. They had good grounds for anger against Philip, because of his

Relation of the Federal states to Rome.

ÆTOLIA.

[1] Pol. xviii. 20. See above, p. 452.
[2] Liv. xxxiv. 34, 49.

destruction of Kios and other of their allied or subject towns. On the other hand, they were not allies of Rome, and they had no special reason to be friendly to her after she had so carefully excluded them[1] from the Peace of Epeiros. Ætolia was perhaps just now a little more inclined to peace than usual. One main element of confusion in the country, Skopas, was absent.

Condition of Ætolia.

It was just after the Peace that he and Dorimachos received their special commission as legislators, and their legislation seems to have led only to internal commotions.[2] Skopas was now at Alexandria, in the service of the young Ptolemy Epiphanês,[3] and we just now hear nothing of Dorimachos. The General in office, Damokritos, seems to have been a moderate man, which was perhaps the reason why he was suspected of being bribed by Philip.[4] During the first campaign of Sulpicius, an Ætolian Assembly was held at Naupaktos,[5] under his presidency, which listened to Macedonian, Athenian, and Roman ambassadors, but came to no definite vote.[6] The policy of Damokritos was to wait a little longer, and to see to which side success was likely to turn. He therefore exhorted the Assembly to pass no vote either way just yet, but to entrust the General with the power of calling a Special Assembly, when he should think fit, to settle the question of peace or war.[7] Shortly after, when the Roman arms seemed to have decidedly the advantage, Damokritos called his Assembly, and procured the adhesion of the people to the Roman cause.[8] The Ætolians, after this, took a prominent part in the war, and their cavalry contributed not a little to the victory of Kynoskephalai.

B.C. 200. Damokritos General. Indecisive Meeting at Naupaktos.

Ætolians join the Roman side, B.C. 200.

[1] See above, p. 467.

[2] See above, p. 263. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 302. [3] Pol. xiii. 2.

[4] Ib. xxxi. 32. Pecunia, ut fama est, ab Rege accepta.

[5] Ib. 40. [6] Ib. 29–32.

[7] Liv. xxxi. 32. Cum legibus cautum esset, ne de pace bellove, nisi in Panætolico et Pylaico concilio, ageretur, decernerent extemplo, ut Prætor sine fraude, cum de bello et pace agere velit, advocet concilium; et quod tum referatur decernaturque, ut perinde jus ratumque sit, ac si in Panætolico aut Pylaico concilio actum esset.

This seems to mean that, by the Ætolian constitution, only the regular Annual Meeting could entertain questions of war and peace; a Special Meeting, whatever were its powers, could not do that. The Assembly now passes either a general law for the future or a resolution for this particular case, allowing the General to call a Special Meeting with the full powers of the regular Assembly.

On the *Panætolicum* and *Pylaïcum*, see above, p. 260, note 3.

[8] Livy (xxxi. 40) says *proximo concilio*. This cannot possibly mean the next Annual Assembly.

ACHAIA.

Importance of Philopoimên. B.C. 205–204?

In Achaia the struggle with Sparta still continued; but whether the League acted vigorously or not in any matter depended wholly on the presence of Philopoimên in office. He was twice General between the first and second Macedonian Wars. It seems to have been during his second Generalship[1] that the Megarians, disgusted with the state of things in the Bœotian League, of which they then formed a part, returned to their old connexion with Achaia.[2] As for Nabis, he continued his piracies, robberies, and domestic cruelties, on a scale such as Peloponnêsos had never before seen. But he received several defeats from the Federal arms. The Tyrant surprised Messênê, when Lysippos was General. Lysippos, like another Aratos, would do nothing, but Philopoimên, at the head of the militia of his own city, made him retreat.[3] Next year, being himself again General, he gathered the forces of the whole League together by a secret manœuvre, and then, suddenly entering Lakônia, defeated the Tyrant in a considerable battle.[4]

Reunion of Megara with the League.

War with Nabis. B.C. 203–202.

Deliverance of Messênê. B.C. 202–201.

The policy of Philopoimên was to keep the League, as far as might be, independent of all foreign powers. With this object he endeavoured to procure a peace between Philip and the Rhodians by Achaian mediation before the Romans stepped in.[5] But Roman policy kept the allies of Rome from all separate negociations; his labours were therefore fruitless. He was succeeded in the Presidency by Kykliadas, a man devoted to Philip. Philopoimên seems then to have thought that Peloponnêsos was no longer a place for him, and, as in the days of Aratos, he went to find employment among his old friends in Crete.[6] As before, one may be inclined to think that he would have acted a more truly patriotic part by staying to defend his country against Nabis, if only as a single soldier in the ranks; but there is at least no ground for supposing that Philopoimên was offended because he was not allowed to hold office two years together.[7] During his absence, while Kykliadas was still

Generalship of Kykliadas, B.C. 201–200.

Philopoimên goes again to Creet.

[1] Plut. Phil. 11. Thirlwall, viii. 303. It was in this Generalship that he exhibited his phalanx at the Nemean festival.

[2] Pol. xx. 6. See above, p. 374.

[3] Plut. Phil. 12. Τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ πολίτας ἀναλαβών. This means, I suppose, the citizens of Megalopolis only. So Thirlwall, viii. 305.

[4] See the whole story in Polybios, xvi. 36.

[5] Pol. xvi. 35.

[6] Plut. Phil. 13. Paus. viii. 50. 6.

[7] Schorn (p. 230, cf. Kortüm, iii. 237) says, "Ein dritter ungünstiger Umstand war die Erbitterung Philopömens, welcher vergebens darnach gestrebt hatte, die Strategie noch ein Jahr zu behalten." This is, to say the least, a great deal to get

in office, an Achaian Assembly was held at Argos.[1] This was, seemingly, a little before the first Roman Embassy to Ætolia. At this Meeting Philip suddenly appeared. He offered to carry on the war with Nabis on behalf of the League, if the Achaians would serve in his garrisons at Corinth and in Euboia. That is, he asked them to take his part against Rome.[2] This the Assembly was not ready to do; so Kykliadas, to save appearances with his patron, put aside the King's request on a point of order. The Meeting was a Special one, summoned to consider the war with Nabis; at such a Meeting nothing could lawfully be discussed except the war with Nabis.[3] The present Assembly therefore was incompetent to declare war against Rome, or even to engage to send Achaian soldiers to Corinth or Chalkis. With this answer Philip was obliged to be content.

Philip at Argos; his vain attempt to gain the League.

The League preserved its neutrality for some time longer. During the Consulship of Villius, Philip made another attempt to secure the fidelity of the League[4] by ceding, or at least pretending or promising to cede, those Peloponnêsian districts which he had once already professed to cede to Achaia.[5] To the Triphylian towns his present offer added the yet more important cession of Orchomenos,[6] which had not been mentioned on the former occasion. It would seem that the League did not, even now, really obtain possession of them,[7] but the mere hope may have prevented the Achaians from actually joining the Roman side. This final step did not take place till the Consulship of Flamininus. The then President, Aristainos,[8] was a strong

His pretended cession of Triphylia and Orchomenos, B.C. 199.

out of the words of Pausanias (u.s.), Φιλοποίμην δέ, ὡς ἐξῆκέν οἱ στρατηγοῦντι ὁ χρόνος, καὶ ἄρχειν ἄλλοι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἤρηντο, αὖθις ἐς Κρήτην διέβη, or out of those of Plutarch, φυγομαχῶν ἢ φιλοτιμούμενος ἀκαίρως πρὸς ἑτέρους. I do not rely so much as I should have done at an earlier time on the unconstitutional nature of the scheme attributed to Philopoimên, as there is one instance somewhat later—whether by a change in the law or by a breach of it—of his actually holding office two years together.

[1] Liv. xxxi. 25.

[2] Liv. u.s. Cf. Pol. xvi. 38. Ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος ὁρῶν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς εὐλαβῶς διακειμένους πρὸς τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον, ἐσπούδαζε κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐμβιβάσαι αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀπέχθειαν.

[3] Liv. u.s. See above, p. 215.

[4] Liv. xxxii. 5. He adds, *Ita enim pepigerant, quotannis juraturos in verba Philippi.* Livy has probably misunderstood the oath of adhesion to the Grand Alliance.

[5] See above, p. 460.

[6] This town had been a Macedonian possession since its capture by Antigonos in B.C. 223. See above, p. 386.

[7] See Livy, xxxiii. 34.

[8] I know not why Kortüm (iii. 238) calls him "*Pa*rainos."

Roman partizan, and Kykliadas already had been banished, seemingly on account of his Macedonian politics.[1] Of the debate in the Assembly at Sikyôn which finally decreed the alliance with Rome, we have a vivid description in Livy,[2] which is evidently translated from Polybios. It is a narrative of the utmost importance, as being one of our best authorities for several essential points in the Federal constitution. The General appears, not as Speaker, but as Leader of the House; the ten Ministers preside and put the question;[3] and the vote is distinctly taken by States, not by heads.[4] The Meeting lasts three days. On the first day the Assembly listens to the rival Ambassadors, first to those of Rome and her allies, and then to those of Macedonia. On the second day, as no other speaker rises, Aristainos, as Leader, first tries to draw forth the opinion of the House, and then, as silence is still kept, he himself speaks strongly in favour of the Roman alliance.[5] His speech is received with different feelings in different parts of the House, some loudly applauding, others expressing disapprobation—in what particular form we are not told.[6] The Ministers, when about to put the question, are found to be equally divided among themselves on a point of order—no bad argument, it may be thought, for the institution of a single Speaker. An unrepealed law forbade any Magistrate to put any question contrary to the Macedonian alliance.[7] On this ground five of the Ministers refuse to put the question of alliance with Rome.[8] On the third day, when the vote must be taken or not at all,[9] one of the protesting five, Memnôn of Pellênê, yields to the entreaties and threats of his own father; a majority in the Cabinet is thus obtained in favour of putting the question. The question is put, and carried by a large majority, perhaps by an unanimous vote[10]

The League joins the Roman Alliance, B.C. 198.

Constitutional details supplied by the account of the debate.

[1] Liv. xxxii. 19. Cycliadam, principem factionis ad Philippum trahentium res, expulerant. [2] Ib. 19–23. [3] Ib. 22.

[4] Ib. 22. *Omnibus fere populis haud dubie approbantibus.* So c. 23. *Celeri populi confirmarunt.*

[5] Cf. Pol. xvii. 13. Μετέρριψε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς Ἀρίσταινος ἀπὸ τῆς Φιλίππου συμμαχίας πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων.

[6] Liv. xxxii. 22. Murmur ortum aliorum cum assensu, aliorum inclementer assentientes increpantium.

[7] Ib. Lege cautum testabatur, ne quid, quod adversus Philippi societatem esset, aut referre magistratibus aut decernere concilio jus esset.

[8] See above, p. 215.

[9] Liv. u.s. Tertio (die) lex jubebat decretum fieri.

[10] It must be remembered that, according to the Achaian system of voting, an

of those cities which voted at all. For the citizens[1] present from Dymê and Megalopolis, and most of those from Argos, withdrew[2] from the Assembly before the vote was taken. Dymê had been, but a few years before, rescued by Philip from conquest by the Romans.[3] Megalopolis was the old ally,[4] Argos was the supposed metropolis, of the Macedonian royal family. Dymaians, Argeians, Megalopolitans, could not be expected to vote against Philip; the other party, and the Romans themselves, did not expect it of them.[5] The alliances with Attalos and with Rhodes were at once concluded; that with Rome was voted provisionally, subject to the approval of the Roman People. The Treaty seems to have contained a clause, often violated by Rome in after days, providing that, according to the first principles of the Federal Union, Rome should receive no envoys from any single city of the League, but only from the League itself.[6]

Terms of the Alliance.

Share of the League in the War.

The League now took a considerable share in the war. Achaian envoys appeared at the side of Titus at the conference of Nikaia,[7] and though we do not hear of Achaian warriors at Kynoskephalai, yet they served the cause effectually elsewhere. Now that the League was at war with Macedonia, hopes arose of recovering Corinth. The city was besieged by the Romans under Lucius Quinctius, the Consul's brother, aided by the whole Federal force. But it was vigorously and successfully defended by the Macedonian garrison, by the Italian deserters, and by the Corinthian citizens themselves.[8] This last fact surprises the reader, as it seems to have surprised Lucius and

Unsuccessful siege of Corinth by Lucius Quinctius.

unanimous vote would not imply the actual consent of every man present, but only a majority among the citizens present from every city.

[1] It is strange to find such a scholar as Mommsen (Röm. Gesch. i. 528) talking about "Gesandten." When Dr. Liddell (ii. 25) talks, in the same way, about "Representatives," one is less surprised.

[2] Dr. Liddell says that they "withdrew *under protest*;" but there is not a word to that effect in Livy. Kortüm's "*stillschweigende* Verwahrung" (iii. 239) is another matter.

[3] See above, p. 458.

[4] The friendship between Macedonia and Megalopolis was indeed of old standing, but Livy can go back no farther than the capture of Megalopolis by Kleomenês, twenty-four years before, which he thinks happened *avorum memoria*.

[5] Liv. xxxii. 22. Neque mirante ullo nec improbante.

[6] Paus. vii. 9. 4. See above, p. 204.

[7] Aristainos and Xenophôn; the banished Kykliadas accompanied Philip. Pol. xvii. 1. Liv. xxxii. 32.

[8] Liv. xxxii. 23. Uno animo omnes, et Macedones tamquam communem patriam tuebantur, et Corinthii ducem præsidii Androsthenem, haud secus quam civem et suffragio creatum suo, imperio in se uti patiebantur.

Aristainos at the time. But the resistance of the Corinthians does not show that they had any abstract repugnance to reunion with the League.[1] To be captured by a combined host of Romans and Achaians was a different matter from being delivered by Aratos without foreign interference. The Macedonian governor, Androsthenês, was personally popular, and the Corinthians may have remembered the fate of those cities which fell into the joint hands of Rome and Ætolia. Anyhow, the Macedonian Philoklês was able to reinforce the garrison, and Lucius, by the advice of King Attalos, raised the siege.

Argos, Dymê, and Megalopolis had declined to join in voting the Roman alliance. It does not however appear that the citizens of Dymê or of Megalopolis thought that this justified them in treason against the Achaian League. A Dymaian citizen, Ainêsidamos by name, commanded a Federal garrison which had been lately placed in Argos.[2] But the Macedonian feeling was strong at Argos;[3] the city was betrayed to Philoklês; Ainêsidamos, after stipulating for the safe retreat of his troops, himself stayed with a few companions and fought to the last.[4] The Argeians soon paid the penalty of their treason. In the course of the next year, Philip, in hopes of winning over Nabis to his side, made over his ancestral city to the Tyrant.[5] After a short show of demagogic tricks,[6] the oppressions of Nabis soon reached a pitch far beyond the worst excesses of Philip.[7] Thus both Corinth and Argos, once two of the greatest cities of the League, were now, as in still earlier days, dangerous outposts of

Argos betrayed to Philip, [B.C. 198,

and ceded by him to Nabis, B.C. 197.

[1] See Schorn (243), who enlarges on the fact that Corinth, as a member of the League, had only one vote alongside of Keryneia, etc. But Corinth, as a Macedonian outpost, had no vote anywhere.

[2] Liv. xxxii. 25. Præsidium erat Achæorum nuper impositum, quingenti fere juvenes delecti omnium civitatium.

[3] The way in which it was shown was curious. In the Argeian Assemblies the Generals of the State (*Prætores*, Liv. u.s. See above, p. 199) pronounced the names of Zeus, Apollo, Hêraklês, and King Philip. Philip's name was now left out. The people demanded its restitution, which was made amid loud cheers.

[4] Liv. u.s.

[5] Ib. xxxii. 40.

[6] Nabis really did at Argos, what Kleomenês was in vain expected to do; he abolished debts, divided land, etc. This marks the difference between the two men. The innovations of Kleomenês at Sparta were held to be restorations of the old state of things; at Argos he did not feel called on to innovate at all. Nabis, who merely sought a cloak for his own tyranny, carried out the most extreme Socialist measures in both cities. See above, p. 372, and cf. Kortüm, iii. 234.

[7] Liv. xxxii. 40. Pol. xvii. 17.

Exploits of the Achaian troops.

its enemies. But the Achaian troops had so greatly improved under the teaching of Philopoimên that, under any tolerable generalship, they were now capable of winning a battle for themselves. Androsthenês, the Macedonian governor of Corinth, ravaged all the neighbouring Achaian Cantons at the head of his mixed host of Macedonians, Corinthians, Thessalians, Bœotians, Akarnanians, and mercenaries of various kinds. At last Nikostratos, the successor of Aristainos in the Generalship, defeated him in a battle near Kleônai, and cleared all the territory of the League of his plundering bands.[1] This happened about the same time as the great fight of Kynoskephalai, and lovers of coincidences affirmed that the two victories were won on the same day. About the same time, also, an Achaian contingent aided in delivering the Rhodian Peraia [2] from Philip's General Deinokratês.[3] One cannot read the narratives of these successes of the Federal arms without again and again forming the vain wish that Philopoimên and Aratos could have changed places.

Victory of Nikostratos at Kleônai, B.C. 197.

Achaian troops in Asia.

Such was the position of the Achaian League during the second war between Philip and the Romans. Among the other Federal states of Greece, we just now hear but little of Epeiros. Soon after the first landing of Flamininus, while he and his army were waiting on the banks of the Aoös, an attempt was made, as before, to bring about a peace under Epeirot mediation.[4] This time, however, the attempt was unsuccessful. The Epeirot General[5] Pausanias, and the Master of the Horse, Alexander, brought the King and the Consul together. But the demands of Titus, namely the liberation of every Greek state, were such as Philip could not bring himself to yield before Kynoskephalai.[6] The League, as a League, remained neutral; but Charops, one of the leading men of the nation, though seemingly not in office at the time, acted as a strong partizan of Rome. It was by his

EPEIROS.

Attempt at Peace, B.C. 198.

Charops acts for Rome.

[1] Liv. xxxiii. 15.

[2] That is, the small Rhodian territory on the mainland, increased in B.C. 188 (see above, p. 167) by the addition of all Lykia and the greater part of Karia (Καρίας τὰ μέχρι τοῦ Μαιάνδρου. Pol. xxiii. 3).

[3] Liv. xxxiii. 18.

[4] Ib. xxxii. 10. *Spes data Philippo est, per Epirotarum gentem temptandæ pacis.* Cf. above, p. 466.

[5] On the number of the Epeirot Generals see above, pp. 118, 466. There were three seven years before.

[6] Liv. xxxii. 10. Quid victo gravius imperares, T. Quincti?

help, like that of Ephialtês at Thermopylæ, that Titus was enabled to turn Philip's strong position among the mountains.[1]

BŒOTIA.

The Bœotian League, meanwhile, was strongly attached to the cause of Philip. It was probably confirmed in its Macedonian politics by the loss of Megara. It would seem however that the Bœotarch Antiphilos was in the Roman interest;[2] at all events, Titus and his troops contrived to enter Thebes, so that the Federal Assembly, which was presently held there, could do nothing but accept the Roman alliance by the unanimous vote of all the cities.[3] But the heart of the nation was still Macedonian. Bœotian soldiers served under Androsthenês at Corinth and under Philip himself at Kynoskephalai.[4] The treatment of Bœotia by Titus after his victory hardly bears on our subject; it shows at once the strong anti-Roman feeling of the people, and the sort of contemptuous magnanimity which a Roman philhellen could, under such circumstances, afford to display.[5]

Bœotia constrained to join the Romans, B.C. 197.

AKARNANIA.

Akarnania was the home of a nobler race. That gallant people, who never betrayed a friend or evaded a treaty,[6] clave to Philip to the last. They had seen only the brightest side of Macedonia and the darkest side of Rome. To them Philip, the Tyrant of Greece, was the true friend who had defended them against the Ætolians and who had avenged their wrongs on Athens. To them Titus, the deliverer of Greece, was but a chief of those barbarians who had carried off their citizens into slavery, and handed over their cities to their brigand neighbours. Shortly before Kynoskephalai, Lucius Quinctius contrived to gain over some leading Akarnanians to the Roman interest. An Assembly was called at Leukas,[7] at which a sham vote of alliance with Rome was hurried through the House.[8] But the national

Firm adherence of the Akarnanians to Philip.

B.C. 197.

[1] Liv. xxxii. 11.

[2] Ib. xxxiii. 1.

[3] See above, p. 143.

[4] Liv. xxxiii. 27.

[5] Ib. 27–30.

[6] See above, p. 114. So Livy (xxxiii. 16): Duæ autem maxime causæ eos tenuerant in amicitia Regis; una *fides insita genti*, altera metus odiumque Ætolorum.

[7] Cf. above, p. 115.

[8] Liv. xxxiii. 16. Eo neque cuncti convenere Acarnanum populi: nec iis, qui convenerant, idem placuit. Sed et principes et magistratus pervicerunt, ut privatum decretum Romanæ societatis fieret. Id omnes qui abfuerant ægre passi.

The distinction between *Principes* and *Magistratus* is again to be noticed. The former are men of influence, whether in office or not, in this case clearly not in office.

feeling was too strong to be cheated in this way. A real Assembly was held, in which the Roman decree was repealed and the alliance with Philip was re-enacted. The leaders of the Roman party were condemned as traitors, and the General Zeuxidas was deprived of his office, because he had put the question of the Roman alliance to the vote.[1] The condemned, with a spirit worthy of their nation, refused to fly to the Roman post at Korkyra; they appeared before the assembled People, they pleaded their own cause, and procured the reversal of the sentences against them. But the League still firmly adhered to Macedonia. Leukas presently stood a siege at the hands of Lucius, and was taken only by the treachery of some Italian exiles. But the result of Kynoskephalai soon made all resistance hopeless; all Akarnania now submitted, and the country seems to have been treated by Titus with his usual politic lenity.

Submission of Akarnania, B.C. 197.

Proclamation of Grecian Freedom, B.C. 196.

The settlement of Greece, and the famous proclamation of Grecian liberty at the Isthmian Games, was a work worthy of the spirit which undoubtedly prompted Titus himself, and which we have no right to assume was wholly absent from the minds of all his countrymen. All Greece was to be free. The proclamation of course enumerated those states only which had been in bondage to Philip; it would have been an insult to independent allies of Rome to have proclaimed the freedom of Ætolia or Achaia. Roman garrisons remained, but only for a season, in the three fortresses which were called the Fetters of Greece, Akrokorinthos, Dêmêtrias, and Chalkis.[2] Under this settlement, several new Federations arose in Thessaly and Euboia, but it is really needless to enter into the details of commonwealths whose independence was so nearly imaginary. Still they are important as showing how completely Federalism was the received type of freedom in Greece in that age. And their establishment reflects high credit upon their founder, who may have had to contend against some degree of local prejudice in the liberated towns themselves, and who certainly had to overcome that national instinct in himself and his countrymen by which every Roman strove to make every Greek city weak and isolated.[3] Of this

New Federations in Thessaly and Euboia.

[1] Liv. u.s. Zeuxidæ Prætori, quod de ea re retulisset, imperium abrogaretur. This seems to show that the Akarnanian General, like his Ætolian, but not unlike his Achaian, fellow, presided in the Assembly, and put questions to the vote.

[2] Pol. xviii. 28.

[3] See Kortüm, iii. 250.

policy, so predominant a few years later, we see no signs in the administration of Titus. Corinth was at once restored to the Achaians, and the League at last received the long promised possessions of Hêraia and Triphylia.[1] A joint campaign of Romans under Titus and Achaians under Aristainos, now again General, recovered Argos for the League.[2] The same expedition also separated from Sparta several of the Lakônian cities, which, if not absolutely incorporated with the League, were at least placed under Achaian protection.[3] Nabis however was allowed to retain possession of Sparta itself.[4] This recognition of the Tyrant was seized on as a grievance by the Ætolians. They complained also that some of the Thessalian cities which Philip had taken from them had not been restored.[5] Yet, as Phôkis,

Recovery of Argos, B.C. 195.

Nabis retains Sparta.

[1] Liv. xxxiii. 34. Some words have dropped out of the text of the parallel passage of Polybios (xviii. 30) which, as it stands, gives Corinth and Triphylia to Eumenês. Orchomenos is not mentioned, but it was probably joined to the League at the same time.

[2] Liv. xxxiv. 40, 41. According to Livy, one Timokratês of Pellênê commanded for Nabis in the citadel of Argos, but was let go by the Argeians, *quia clementer præfuerat.* The presence of an Achaian citizen in such a position is inexplicable, and one is tempted to suspect one of Livy's usual confusions.

[3] Ib. xxxv. 13. Achæis omnium maritimorum Laconum tuendorum a T. Quinctio cura mandata erat.

This would strictly imply that these Lakônian towns stood to the Federal Government in a relation like that of Geneva or Mühlhausen to the old Swiss League. But as the League came to embrace all Peloponnêsos, and as equal annexation was its unvarying principle, one cannot help thinking that they must have been admitted as States, if not now, yet afterwards, under the administration of Philopoimên. When Pausanias (vii. 13. 8) speaks of one of these towns as Ἀχαιῶν ὑπήκοον, it is probably simply the ignorance of a late and careless writer. These towns seem to be the same as those afterwards known as the Eleutherolakônic cities. (See Paus. iii. 21. 6 et seqq.) There were originally twenty-four, but, before the time of Pausanias, six of them had been recovered by Sparta.

[4] The conference between Titus, Nabis, and Aristainos (Liv. xxxiv. 31–3) is curious. Aristainos tells Nabis of divers Tyrants, probably Iseas, Lydiadas, and Aristomachos, who had, of their own act, descended to a private station. As if even Aristomachos had been at all like Nabis, or as if Nabis could have borne, or been borne in, a private station like Lydiadas.

One remark of Nabis (c. 31) is worthy of notice in an age when Consuls and Presidents grow into Emperors. "Tum me Regem a vobis appellari memini; nunc Tyrannum vocari video. Itaque, *si ego nomen imperii mutassem, mihi meæ inconstantiæ*, cum vos mutetis, vobis vestræ reddenda ratio est."

[5] Liv. xxxiii. 34, 35; xxxiv. 22, 23. Pol. xviii. 21. In the first of these passages Livy makes one of his most curious blunders. He found in Polybios (xviii. 31) that Cnæus Cornelius went to the Ætolian Assembly at *Thermon*; ἦκον ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Θερμικῶν σύνοδον. Livy first transfers the scene to *Thermopylæ*, and then seemingly confounds the Ætolian Congress with the Amphiktyonic Synod; *Cornelius Thermopylas, ubi frequens Græciæ statis diebus esse solet conventus, (Pylaicum appellant) venit.* See Brandstäter, 433, 4.

Discontent of the Ætolians. Withdrawal of the Roman Garrisons, B.C. 194.

Lokris,[1] and Ambrakia[2] were recognized as parts of the Ætolian body, they hardly seem to have suffered. At last, when his whole settlement was finished, Titus withdrew the Roman garrisons from the three great fortresses,[3] and left Greece to the enjoyment of such peace as Nabis and the Ætolians might allow.

## § 2. *From the Settlement of Greece under Flamininus to the Death of Philopoimên*

### B.C. 194—183

B.C. 194–191.

For about three years Greece was left to herself. Of the two great Leagues, the Ætolians were brooding over their real or supposed wrongs, and were planning how to raise up new enemies against their late allies. The Achaians were occupied with the war with Nabis and with some internal reforms. The

Affairs of the Achaian League.

nature of our information at this time is peculiar; the fragments of Polybios leave many deplorable gaps, but, when we have any knowledge at all, our knowledge is very full. The fragments are enough to give us a tolerable view of the state of parties in the Union, and to set clearly before us the characters of several

Eminence of Megalopolis. Parallel of Virginia.

Federal politicians. It cannot fail to strike every reader that the City of Megalopolis held at this time the same sort of position in the Achaian League which the State of Virginia held in the first days of the American Union. Without any sort of legal pre-eminence, without at all assuming the character of a capital, Megalopolis was clearly the first city of the League, the city which gave the nation the largest proportion of its leading states-

Megalopolitan Presidents.

men. Megalopolis, like Virginia, was "the Mother of Presidents," and that too of Presidents of different political parties. As Virginia produced both Washington and Jefferson, so Megalopolis, if she produced Philopoimên and Lykortas, produced also Aristainos and Diophanês. Megalopolitan citizens are also constantly found in other posts of honour. We have already heard

B.C. 184.

of a case,[4] though we have not yet reached it in chronological order, in which the Cabinet Council of the League contained at least four Megalopolitans out of eleven. Men of the same city seem, oftener than any other, to have represented the League as

[1] Liv. xxxiii. 34. Pol. xviii. 30.
[2] Pol. xxii. 9.
[3] Liv. xxxiv. 49–51.
[4] See above, p. 221.

its Ambassadors abroad, and to have acted as its subordinate Magistrates at home. Now we must remember that all or most of these offices were conferred by an Assembly in which Megalopolis had only a single vote; we must also remember that these Megalopolitan statesmen were constantly opposed to one another, and therefore could not have represented any local section. We may thus recognize at once an honourable witness to a city which contributed so many members to the national Government, and a proof of the way in which the other cities rose above local prejudices, and kept the Union from the curse of geographical parties.

Absence of geographical parties.

Philopoimên had now returned from Crete. He soon again became the chief man of the League, and, though he never attained the boundless influence of Aratos, yet he was felt to be the bulwark and glory of the nation. He filled the chief magistracy eight times, and died in office at the age of seventy, retaining the confidence of his countrymen to the last. He had fallen upon days in which it was clear that the fate of Achaia, or rather of the world, depended on the will of Rome. His policy, under such circumstances, was at once prudent and dignified. It was the wisdom of the weaker state to abstain from all offensive boasts, from all needless opposition or provocation, but, at the same time, to keep up its position as an independent commonwealth, to give way to the unmistakable will of the Roman Senate and People, but not to make the laws of the League yield to the passing caprice of every Roman officer. He saw that Greece was doomed; but he held that a course at once modest and dignified might stave off the evil day, and might make the blow less heavy and less disgraceful when it did come. The Romans themselves would not think the worse of a people who were in form their equal allies for preserving a decent degree of self-respect. But abject prostration before every insult would only make insults come thicker, and would bring on the final destruction sooner than need be.[1] He thus endeavoured to preserve for the League a respectable position both towards Rome and towards other powers. He strove to strengthen her at home both by constitutional reforms and by the accession of new members to the Union. It was this last branch of his policy which revealed the weak side both of his political plans and of his personal character.

B.C. 194. Influence of Philopoimên.

His moderate policy towards Rome.

His internal policy.

[1] Pol. xxv. 9.

Other Federal statesmen.

Lykortas.

Of the other Achaian statesmen the most important were Lykortas, Aristainos, and Diophanês, all of them citizens of Megalopolis. Lykortas, the father of Polybios, was, both in war and politics, the pupil and follower of his illustrious fellow-citizen. He pursued the same policy, possibly now and then carrying his opposition to Rome somewhat further than his master.[1]

Diophanês.

Diophanês was a military scholar of Philopoimên, a good officer,[2] whose head seems to have been turned by the credit which he won when

B.C. 190.

commanding the Achaian troops in Asia.[3] He conceived an unworthy jealousy of a greater man than himself, and he seems to have sometimes wantonly thwarted Philopoimên's policy out

Aristainos.

of mere spite. Aristainos, whom we have already seen twice in office, was not a military man; he was a good speaker, and skilled in civil business; he does not seem to have been either corrupt or wilfully traitorous,[4] but he held that the interests of the League required complete submission to the slightest hint from

The Macedonian party extinct.

Rome. His policy therefore was directly opposed to that of Philopoimên. The Macedonian party, once headed by the banished Kykliadas, vanishes altogether.

Discontent against Philopoimên at Megalopolis, B.C. 194.

Philopoimên's long absence in Crete had given great offence in his own city. The war with Nabis had brought Megalopolis to great straits, and it was held, not without reason, that the best soldier of Megalopolis and of Greece ought not to have been absent from his country at such a time. There was a strong disposition among his fellow-citizens to deprive him of their franchise.[5] The Federal body however stepped in; Aristainos was then General, and he was sent, like Aratos on a former occasion,[6] to compose matters at Megalopolis. Aristainos was, afterwards at least, a political adversary of Philopoimên, but it does not follow that he was a personal enemy, and he may well have wished to save his native city from the disgrace of disfranchising the greatest man in Greece. The mission of Aristainos was successful, and Philopoimên remained a citizen of Megalopolis.[7] It is strange to read that it was out of revenge for this insult that Philopoimên assisted several places which had

[1] See Thirlwall, viii. 401.

[2] Pol. xxiii. 10. Διοφάνης ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης, ἄνθρωπος στρατιωτικώτερος ἢ πολιτικώτερος.

[3] Pol. xxi. 7. Liv. xxxvii. 20, 21.

[4] See Schorn, p. 323.

[5] [On this power of disfranchisement by a Canton, see Bluntschli, Gesch. des schweiz. Bundesrechtes, i. 530.]

[6] See above, pp. 199, 429.

[7] Plut. Phil. 13.

hitherto been incorporated with Megalopolis in obtaining the rank of independent members of the League.[1] This explanation can only come from writers who did not understand the measure. Philopoimên's internal policy was to promote the most perfect equality among the several cities of the Federation. If these townships were strictly subject districts, their emancipation may have been sought simply as an act of justice, like the liberation of Vaud from the yoke of Bern. And there was another motive which might well be present to the mind of an Arkadian politician. It is clear that, up to this time, the Old-Achaian towns had possessed an undue preponderance; their ten votes might still outweigh the interests of several of the greatest cities in Greece. The plan which Philopoimên steadily pursued was well adapted to counteract this evil. To erect these dependent townships into independent Cantons was to give several more votes to the Arkadian portion of the League, and thus to make the geographical balance more equal.[2] But this more remote advantage would be much less perceptible to local politicians at Megalopolis than the immediate loss of dominion sustained by their own city. Even if we suppose these townships to have been, not mere subject districts, but municipalities sharing in the Megalopolitan franchise,

He raises the smaller Megalopolitan townships into independent Cantons.

[1] See above, p. 200. Plutarch (Phil. 13) does not mention the names of these townships, but numismatic evidence supplies the names of Alipheira, Asea, Dipaia, Gortys, Pallantion, and Theisoa. There are extant coins of all these places as independent Achaian cities. The list nearly agrees with that given by Pausanias (viii. 27. 7) of those places among the towns united in the *συνοικισμός* of Megalopolis, which were not absolutely deserted. They remained in his time as villages only (*ἔχουσιν οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται κώμας*), except Alipheira (and perhaps Pallantion), which retained the rank of a city. Alipheira was the district which had before been disputed between Megalopolis and Elis. See above, p. 460.

[2] See Thirlwall, viii. 364. If the Eleutherolakônic towns were really all admitted into the League, each with an independent vote (see p. 485), it would be as necessary to strengthen the Arkadian interest against any undue influence on their part as against that of the Old-Achaian cities.

This system of dividing large States is recognized by the American Constitution, which provides that it shall be done only by the joint consent of Congress and of the Legislature of the State interested (Art. iv. § 3. 1, a provision re-enacted in the Confederate Constitution). Accordingly several new States have been formed, at various times, within the old limits of Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, and Massachusetts. Just now (December, 1862) a bill is before Congress for the unconstitutional recognition of part of Virginia as a district State—unconstitutional, because the requisite consent of Virginia is not given.

It must be remembered that the territory of Megalopolis was at this time far larger than that of any other member of the League. The other two great States of Elis and Messênê were not yet incorporated. We here see yet another point of likeness between Megalopolis and Virginia. Each might be called the Mother of States as well as the Mother of Presidents.

still their separation would offend a strong vein of local patriotism, which is to be found everywhere. The dismemberment of the Great City would seem to many to be an evil which more than counterbalanced the real strengthening of the Arkadian interest in the Assembly.[1] We can therefore well understand that such a proposal may have made Philopoimên for a while unpopular at home, and may have given his enemies an opportunity of branding him as a traitor to his native town. How the proposal was carried, we know not, but carried it evidently was. Philopoimên steadily adhered to his policy, and it was followed both by him and by Lykortas on other occasions.[2]

Philopoimên's fourth Generalship, B.C. 193–192.

But if Philopoimên was just now somewhat under a cloud in his own city, he certainly was not so in the general estimation of the League. We have seen the Assembly and the General interfering on his behalf, and the next election once more raised him to the chief magistracy. Nabis continued to make inroads into the Federal territory, and he was now besieging Gythion, one of those Lakônian towns which were at least under Achaian protection, if not actually members of the League. Philopoimên waged war against him with great success, varied only by a defeat at sea, where the Arkadian was out of his element. These campaigns were waged wholly without Roman or Macedonian help. The League acted independently in everything. An Assembly at Sikyôn refused to postpone the war till the Roman fleet could arrive, even though a letter from Titus was produced in which that course was suggested.[3] During the same year a Congress of Allies was held at Tegea, in which Achaians, Epeirots, and Akarnanians planned and carried out the campaign as freely as could have been done in the days of Markos or Aratos.[4]

War with Nabis.

Independent action of the League.

Antiochos invited by the Ætolians, B.C. 192.

Meanwhile the Ætolians were intriguing to bring a new foe of Rome into Greece. Antiochos of Syria had long been threatening war with Rome; the Ætolians now induced him to cross at

[1] It may be doubted whether the State of New York would willingly be cut up into four or five small States, in order to obtain eight or ten Senators, or whether Liverpool or Birmingham would choose to purchase an increase of Members at the price of being divided into several small boroughs.

[2] On the Lakônian towns see above, p. 485. The Messênian towns will be mentioned presently. Also Pagai, the port of Megara, coins as an independent Canton, which shows that the like policy was pursued there, either at the reunion of Megara or at some later time.

[3] Liv. xxxv. 25.

[4] Ib. 27.

once into Europe. Titus had now returned to Greece with a sort of general commission to look after Greek affairs, but formally as Ambassador along with several colleagues.[1] An Ætolian Assembly was held, to which Titus first sent Athenian envoys to speak for Rome, and afterwards came himself.[2] The majority of the Assembly was inclined to refuse him an audience, but the counsels of age and wisdom prevailed thus far.[3] These counsels however did not hinder the Assembly from passing a vote to invite Antiochos to come and liberate Greece, nor the General Damokritos from telling Titus, when he asked for a copy of the decree, that he should have one dated from the Ætolian camp on the Tiber.

Treacherous resolution of the Ætolian Senate.

This absurd vaunt in the Public Assembly was followed by a resolution in the Senate of the Apokletes,[4] such as could hardly have been carried, or even brought forward, in the councils of any other people. In former times the Ætolian Magistrates had often been charged with conniving at the robberies and piracies of their countrymen. They now openly adopted the principle on which they had so long secretly acted. It was decreed to seize Dêmêtrias, Chalkis, and Sparta on one day. The attempt on Dêmêtrias succeeded, that on Chalkis failed. To Sparta Alexamenos of Kalydôn led a body of horse and foot, who had received orders from the Federal General implicitly to obey their leader in everything. Nabis had asked for Ætolian help, and he believed that Alexamenos had brought it. For a while the Ætolians behaved themselves as allies, but presently they murdered Nabis at a review. Tyrant as he was, they were not the fitting ministers of vengeance. The blow was dealt so suddenly that it was only the national love of plunder which hindered them from seizing and holding Sparta, according to their commission. As it was, they entered the city, but, while they were scattered in search of booty, the Lacedæmonians rallied, and slew Alexamenos and most of his followers. A few only wandered into the Achaian territory, to be there seized and sold as slaves. The Achaian General was not a man to

Murder of Nabis by the Ætolians.

[1] Liv. xxxv. 23. [2] Ib. 32, 33.

[3] Ib. 33. Principum maxime seniores auctoritate obtinuere ut daretur iis concilium.

[4] Ib. 34. See above, p. 262. Schorn (p. 274) says, "In dem Rathe der Apokleten, *welcher fast unabhängig vom Volke regierte*, wurde demnach der Plan entworfen." Why? The Ætolian Assembly was clearly sovereign, but it did not follow that it should regulate every detail of every campaign.

Philopoimên unites Sparta to the Achaian League, B.C. 192.

lose such an opportunity. He hastened to Sparta with some troops; the city was in utter confusion; he got together an Assembly of some kind or other,[1] and procured a vote by which Sparta was united to the Achaian League.

The union not forcible, yet contrary to Spartan feeling.

It does not appear that on this occasion any violence was used, or any unjustifiable change made in the laws or constitution of the new State.[2] Sparta, after her first admission to the League, retained so much of her old discipline as had survived the many revolutions of the last fifty years. Nor can it be said with strict truth that Sparta was forced into the League. All that Philopoimên did was to take advantage of an unusually favourable moment, and we can well understand the arguments by which he might, at that particular moment, easily carry the majority[3] of a Spartan Assembly along with him. But, even if we did not know what followed, it would be hard to believe that union with the League was the deliberate wish of the Lacedæmonian people. Sparta, shorn of all her rank and power, deprived of all her subject territory, was called upon to enter a Federation which had long been her bitterest enemy. She had to enter it as a single town, with a single vote, as the compeer of the petty Cantons of the old Achaia, perhaps even of the Lakônian townships which had just been set free from her own yoke. Such a position must have been felt by every Spartan as irksome and degrading. For a moment, after the Tyranny and the wars of Nabis, the change would be felt as a relief; but the very return of peace and prosperity under the Federal Government would bring with it aspirations after a higher national being than the position of a single Achaian city could satisfy. That position might do for Phlious and Sikyôn, it might do even for Argos and Corinth, but it would not do for the Sparta of Agêsilaos and Kleomenês. Little more than thirty years had passed since a Spartan King had seen all Peloponnêsos at his feet; the wars of Machanidas, and even of Nabis, had shown that the military spirit of the city still survived. And, beside these feelings of special dislike to the Achaian Government, a succession of revolutions had filled Sparta with elements of confusion inconsistent with lasting quiet under any Government.

[1] Liv. xxxv. 37. Evocatis principibus et oratione habita . . . societati Achæorum Lacedæmonios adjunxit.

[2] See Schorn, p. 277.

[3] Plut. Phil. 15. Τῶν μὲν ἀκόντων, τοὺς δὲ συμπείσας, προσηγάγετο καὶ μετεκόσμησεν εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν.

To Philopoimên and the Achaians it naturally seemed the greatest and most glorious of all acquisitions, when the city which had so lately threatened the whole League, was, without striking a blow, by the mere effect of a speech from an Achaian magistrate, changed into a peaceful member of the Federal body.[1] As matters now stood, Greece needed union above all things; to join all Peloponnêsos into one body was a patriotic and a generous project. Unhappily it proved the greater of two evils. Sparta, as a member of the League, proved more troublesome than she had ever been as a border foe. Her affairs as an Achaian Canton gave a more constant handle for Roman intervention, and for intervention in a worse form than they ever could have done had she retained the position of an avowed enemy.

Antiochos elected Ætolian General, B.C. 192.

The annexation of Sparta took place before Antiochos landed in Greece. On his coming, he was elected General—seemingly General-Extraordinary [2]—of the Ætolian League, with thirty of the Apokletes [3] to assist him in the duties of his office. It will be remembered that Attalos had preceded him in a similar post;[4] and that, even in Achaia, the same office had been conferred, nominally at least, on an Egyptian Ptolemy.[5] He now strove to win the other Federal states to his side. Achaia would have nothing to say to him; his Ambassadors were heard at Aigion; Titus himself was heard in answer to them; the Assembly voted to have no friends and enemies but those of Rome, and, with zeal perhaps a little premature, it actually preceded Rome in declaring war against both Antiochos and the Ætolians.[6] But Bœotia openly joined the invader; he went to Thebes, he appeared in the Federal Congress, and a vote was passed receiving him as an ally, though without formally casting aside the Roman

His relations with Achaia,

Bœotia,

[1] Plut. Phil. 15. *Θαυμαστῶς μὲν εὐδοκίμησε παρὰ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς προσκτησάμενος αὐτοῖς ἀξίωμα πόλεως τηλικαύτης καὶ δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ ἦν μικρὸν Ἀχαΐας μέρος γενέσθαι τὴν Σπάρτην.*

[2] Liv. xxxv. 45. *Imperatoremque Regem appellandum censuerunt.* (The formula carries one on some centuries.) As Brandstäter (p. 446) says, *Imperator* probably translates *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*. Phaineas, the regular General, would hardly be deposed.

[3] Liv. u.s. Pol. xx. 1. See above, p. 262. Brandstäter (446) says, "Es ist wohl gewiss, dass diese dreissig mit den Apokleten dieselben sind." But Polybios says *τριάκοντα τῶν ἀποκλήτων*, showing plainly that the Apokletes were a larger body, and that these thirty were only a Committee of them. See Tittmann, 727.

[4] See above, p. 455. [5] See above, p. 302. [6] Liv. xxxv. 48–50.

Epeiros,

Akarnania,

and Elis.

Defeat of Antiochos at Thermopylæ, B.C. 191.

Ætolian War, B.C. 191–189.

Submission of Ætolia to the Roman "Faith."

connexion.[1] Epeiros, under Charops,—so lately the friend of Rome—played a double part; the answer given to the King was that the Epeirots would join him, if he came to their country, otherwise they were too near Italy to expose themselves.[2] Akarnania was divided: Antiochos bought over one of the leading men named Mnasilochos, who won to his side the General Klytos. By a stratagem they put Medeôn into the hands of the King, and some other cities joined him.[3] He also besieged Thourion, but he raised the siege on hearing that the Roman Consul, Manius Acilius Glabrio, had entered Thessaly. In Peloponnêsos, the Eleians openly took his side, and asked for troops from him for their defence.[4]

The hopes of Antiochos and the Ætolians were shattered by the victory of the Consul Manius at Thermopylæ. Among the results of that battle, the point which mainly interests us is the submission of the Ætolians to Rome. The whole story is well worthy of study as an illustration of Roman diplomacy, and it is far from lacking in military interest. Ætolians, fighting on their own soil for their national being, were enemies whom even Rome could not afford to despise. The sieges of Hêrakleia, Naupaktos, Ambrakia, and Samê in Kephallênia gave a foretaste of what was to be done on the same ground in our own days by the defenders of Mesolongi. One or two constitutional points are also well brought out in the narrative. One of the most striking scenes in the war is when the Ætolian Ambassadors, with the General Phaineas at their head, unwittingly handed themselves over to the Roman Faith.[5] They knew not that, in Roman technical language, this implied an unreserved surrender of themselves and their country. Manius was not a foe of the school of Titus, and he presently began to exercise the rights of conquest in their harshest form. The Ætolian General found out his mistake, and affirmed that, though he and the Apokletes were ready to submit, yet the National Assembly alone had

[1] Pol. xx. 7. Liv. xxxv. 47; xxxvi. 6. [2] Pol. xx. 3.

[3] Liv. xxxvi. 12. Aliis sua voluntate affluentibus, metu coacti etiam, qui dissentiebant, ad Regem convenerunt. Quos placida oratione territos cum permulsisset, ad spem vulgatæ clementiæ aliquot populi Acarnaniæ defecerunt.

[4] Pol. xx. 3. Οἱ δὲ Ἠλεῖοι παρεκάλουν πέμπειν τῇ πόλει βοήθειαν.

[5] Liv. xxxvi. 27, 28. Pol. xx. 9. Οἱ δ' Αἰτωλοὶ . . . ἔκριναν ἐπιτρέπειν τὰ ὅλα Μανίῳ, δόντες αὑτοὺς εἰς τὴν Ῥωμαίων πίστιν, οὐκ εἰδότες τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει τοῦτο, τῷ δὲ τῆς πίστεως ὀνόματι πλανηθέντες, ὡς ἂν διὰ τοῦτο λειοτέρου σφίσιν ἐλέου ὑπάρξοντος. παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἰσοδυναμεῖ τό τε εἰς τὴν πίστιν αὐτὸν ἐγχειρίσαι καὶ τὸ τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν δοῦναι περὶ αὐτοῦ τῷ κρατοῦντι.

power to assent to such terms.[1] By the intercession of Lucius Valerius, Phaineas was allowed a truce, in order to consult the supreme authority of the nation. He first consulted the Apokletes, and then, by their advice, summoned the Assembly.[2] The people altogether scouted the notion of submission, and would listen to no reasoning on its behalf.[3] The war therefore went on. The three elements in the Ætolian constitution here come out very plainly. We see the action of the General, of the Apokletes, and of the National Assembly, the Apokletes filling the place both of the Cabinet Council and of the Senate in the Achaian system.

Working of the Ætolian Constitution.

By the treaty, if treaty it may be called, which ended the Ætolian War, the League lost its independence for ever. It became the dependent ally of Rome. It was the first state, within the proper limits of Old Greece,[4] which entered into that degrading relation. It might indeed be said that all the Greek allies of Rome were practically dependent allies. But such was not their formal position; in name Achaia and Rome contracted on equal terms. But Ætolia, though retaining its internal independence, became subject to Rome in all external relations. In the well-known phrase of Roman Law, the League bound itself to reverence the Majesty of the Roman People.[5] This leadership in servitude was a fitting punishment for the Greek state which had been the first to bring Roman fleets and armies into Greece.[6] The loss of dignity was accompanied by an equal loss of territory. The League gave up all claim to the cities which had been taken from it during the war;[7] Ambrakia and other towns became independent commonwealths;[8] Oiniadai

Ætolia becomes the Dependent Ally of Rome, B.C. 189.

Dismemberment of Ætolia.

[1] Pol. xx. 10. See Brandstäter, p. 470, note.

[2] Ib. See above, pp. 260, 262, 264.

[3] Ib. Οὕτως ἀπεθηριώθη τὸ πλῆθος ὥστ' οὐδ' ἀπαντᾶν οὐδεὶς ἐπεβάλετο πρὸς τὸ διαβούλιον.

[4] I mean in continental Greece, south of Epeiros and Macedonia. Korkyra and the Greek cities of Illyria were already in this, or a still closer, degree of dependence on Rome.

[5] Pol. xxii. 15. Ὁ δῆμος ὁ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὴν δυναστείαν τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀδόλως τηρείτω. Liv. xxxviii. 11. *Imperium majestatemque Populi Romani gens Ætolorum conservato sine dolo malo.* Livy makes one of his usual mistakes in reporting one of the terms of this treaty. The deserters and prisoners were to be given up τῷ ἄρχοντι τῷ ἐν Κερκύρᾳ; that is clearly to the Roman officer in command there. Livy turns this into *Corcyræorum magistratibus*, as if it meant the magistrates of the Korkyraian commonwealth.

[6] See Thirlwall, viii. 392.

[7] Pol. xxii. 15. On the date fixed see Thirlwall, u.s.

[8] See Liv. xxxviii. 44. Schorn (p. 301) remarks, "Griechenland aber ward

and his territory was restored to the Akarnanian League;[1] Pleurôn was annexed by the Achaians, who had given considerable aid during the war, and it was probably now that they acquired the still more important and more distant possession of Hêrakleia.[2] As her own share of the spoil, Rome, besides her general suzerainty over Ætolia, took Kephallênia as part of her immediate domain. The island was excluded from the treaty,[3] and was presently conquered, after a long resistance at the hands of the people of Samê.[4]

Union of Elis and Messênê with the Achaian League, B.C. 191.

Within Peloponnêsos, the Achaians had already been rewarded for their adhesion to the Roman cause[5] by permission to unite Elis and Messênê to the League. Since the annexation of Sparta, these two were the only cities of the peninsula which still retained their distinct existence. The relations between Messênê and the League had commonly been friendly, and it was not very long since Philopoimên had rescued the city from the grasp of the Tyrant Nabis.[6] Elis, on the other hand, as the ally of Ætolia, had always been hostile; some of the most famous victories of Philopoimên had been won at the cost of Eleian enemies. Yet Elis now seemed less unwilling to enter into the League than Messênê. If, in the course of the various Messênian revolutions, the oligarchic party had now gained the upper hand, the apparent unwillingness of Messênê is easy to be understood. Later events clearly show that there was in the city an Achaian and an anti-Achaian party, and that these were respectively the parties of democracy and of oligarchy. However this may be, the Achaian invitation to join the League received no answer but a declaration of war, and it was only by the interposition of Titus himself that Messênê was at last induced, with a rather bad grace, to enter the Achaian Union. Titus added that, if

noch mehr zerstückelt, als es bisher war; denn die den Aetolern abgenommenen Orte wurden frei und bildeten fur sich unabhängige Staaten." This device was of course part of the Roman policy.

[1] Pol. u.s. Liv. xxxviii. 11.

[2] See Paus. vii. 11. 3; 14. 1. Schorn (301) adds, "Wahrscheinlich war der erstere von den Achäern erobert worden und der andere freiwillig in die Sympolitie getreten."

[3] Pol. xxii. 15. Περὶ δὲ Κεφαλληνίας μὴ ἔστω ἐν ταῖς συνθήκαις.

[4] Liv. xxxviii. 29–30.

[5] According to Plutarch (Cat. Maj. 12) there was a party in Achaia, at least at Corinth, Patrai, and Aigion, which openly supported Antiochos. If so, the movement was a merely local one, and was easily stifled. Schorn (pp. 279, 289) seems to make too much of it.

[6] See above, p. 477.

they ever had reason to complain of the conduct of the Federal Government towards them, they had only to appeal to him.[1] If this was said in the character of a Roman officer, it was a direct breach of the first principles of the Federal relation; it directly violated the article in the Treaty with Rome which provided that Rome should receive no diplomatic agent from any single city of the League. Titus was, it may be, by this time awaking from his dream of philhellenism, and sinking into a Roman's common way of looking on the rights of other nations. Or rather perhaps, as the personal deliverer of Greece, he would have all Greece look to him as its personal patron and protector. He, Titus Quinctius, not the Roman Senate and People, would be the judge in all Grecian quarrels, and would order everything for the good of the nation which he loved. But, in either case, he was not disposed to allow any claims of the League to stand in the way of direct Roman interests. The League had bought the island of Zakynthos of a certain Hieroklês, who had commanded there for its sovereign Amynander, and who, on that prince's fall, seems to have thought that he had a right to dispose of it for himself.[2] The morality of such a transaction seems doubtful, and the right of the League to a possession so acquired might well be disputed either by Amynander or by the Zakynthian people. But it is hard to see on what ground Rome could put in her claim to an island which she had neither purchased nor conquered. So however it was; Titus, in that quaint parabolic vein which he sometimes affected,[3] undertook to prove that the possession of Zakynthos was not expedient for the League itself. The League was a tortoise, safe as long as it kept within its shell of Peloponnêsos, but in danger as soon as it stepped beyond that limit. The same argument would have applied with more force to the Achaian acquisition of Pleurôn and Hêrakleia a little later, to which Titus seems to have made no objection. But Zakynthos, Korkyra, and Kephallênia were all of them possessions which the Romans, like later protectors of Greece, thought good to trust in no hands but their own.[4]

Dealings of Flamininus with Messênê.

Annexation of Zakynthos prevented by Flamininus.

[1] Liv. xxxvi. 31. *Si qua haberent, de quibus aut recusare aut in posterum caveri sibi vellent, Corinthum ad se venirent.* Cf. Schorn, p. 291.

[2] Ib. [3] Ib. 32. Cf. xxxv. 49.

[4] "The League drew in its head, and the island was given up to the Romans." Thirlwall, viii. 387. Cf. Liddell, History of Rome, ii. 42.

Mr. Grote has remarked that the acquisition of territory by purchase is much

The League extended over all Peloponnêsos, B.C. 191.

The League had thus, in the days of its decline, attained the widest measure of territorial extent to which it could ever have reasonably looked forward in the days of its greatness. It had fallen to the lot of Diophanês to put the finishing stroke to the work of Markos, Aratos, Lydiadas, and Philopoimên. All Peloponnêsos, together with several places out of Peloponnêsos, was united under a single Federal Government. Unluckily this consummation, so desirable in itself, came a hundred years too late. Things might have run a different course, if the Achaia of Philopoimên had sprung at once to life under the hands of Markos of Keryneia. But the Achaia of Philopoimên had to deal with an ally whose friendship was more deadly than the enmity of all the Kings and Tyrants against whom Markos and Aratos had to struggle. The bright vision of philhellenic generosity was fast passing away from the mind of Rome, perhaps even from the mind of Titus himself. The position of Achaia with regard to Rome was one which it shared with Rhodes, and practically with Macedonia, though Macedonia had now formally sunk to the state of dependent alliance. The League was far too weak to contend against Rome, or to maintain a really equal alliance with Rome, but it was far too strong to become Rome's mere abject flatterer, like so many contemporary Kings and commonwealths. As territory went in those days, the territory of the League was large; most of it lay compactly together; its inhabitants still retained their patriotism and their self-respect; their friendship was still eagerly sought for by foreign powers;[1] they still had statesmen and generals among them, and an army trained to victory under one of the three great captains of the age.[2] Such a nation needed much heavier reverses than any that they had yet met with to bring them down to the level of the Kings of Bithynia and the Demagogues of Athens. Roman vanity was wounded by the existence of a people whom it was impossible to treat as slaves, and whom there was no excuse for treating as enemies.[3]

Relations between Achaia and Rome.

rarer in Old Greece than in mediæval Europe. We have seen several approaches to it in the course of our history, as the sale of Aigina to Attalos (see above, p. 453). The contemplated acquisition of a new State by purchase finds its parallel in the purchase of Louisiana by the United States under Jefferson in 1803.

[1] See the account of the embassies from Syria, Egypt, and Pergamos in Polybios, xxiii. 7 et seqq. Cf. Thirlwall, viii. 396.

[2] Philopoimên, Hannibal, Scipio. See Liv. xxxix. 50, 52.

[3] [Cf. Justin, xxxiv. 1. Soli adhuc ex Græcia universa Achæi nimis potentes tunc temporis Romanis videbantur, etc.]

The Roman Senate did not scruple to make use of every mean and malignant art to degrade and weaken a power which, throughout two dangerous wars, had always shown itself the faithful ally, though never the base flatterer, of Rome. The subtle diplomacy of the Senate soon found where the weak point of the League lay. The Achaian, Arkadian, and the Argolic members of the Union were now firmly welded together by the Federal tie. Among them we hear of no dissensions, no hankering after separation. These were doubtless those golden days of Peloponnêsian welfare and harmony upon which Polybios grows so eloquent.[1] But the newly-acquired members, joined in some degree against their own will, furnished admirable materials for Roman intrigue.[2] It was easy to hearken to every complaint, to fan every flame of discontent, to seize upon every opportunity of meddling in the internal affairs of the League, upon every opportunity of encouraging sycophants and discouraging patriots. Sparta, as we have seen, had been, not indeed forced, but in a manner surprised, into the League. Among the various parties in that divided city, none perhaps heartily loved the Achaian connexion, and some certainly were altogether hostile to it. At Messênê, though the mass of the people seems to have been Unionist, there was a strong oligarchic faction bent upon Secession. Had the Achaian Government been left to itself, a generation, or less, of prudent administration might have healed all these differences. But the Achaian Government had no such chance allowed it. Possibly too the character of Philopoimên, brave soldier and honest patriot as he was, was less suited for so delicate a task than the irresistible diplomacy

Roman intrigues with the newly-annexed Cities.

[1] Pol. ii. 37, 38. [Cf. also xxvi. 3. Thirlwall, viii. 503.]

[2] I cannot help protesting against the way in which this whole period is dealt with by Mommsen in his Roman History. He really seems unable to understand that a small state can have any rights, or that a generous or patriotic sentiment can find a place anywhere except in the breast of a fool. Flamininus is called names because, at one time at least of his life, he was really well disposed towards Greece. Philopoimên himself is mocked at, because, being unfortunately a citizen of a small state, he was loyally attached to that state. We are even told (i. 568) that the base traitor Kallikratês was a wiser man than he. The manifest fact that Rome did stir up strife in Greece, a fact plainly written in every page of later Grecian history, is dismissed amid a torrent of hard words against those who assert it. Such men are mere "politisirende Philologen." As the words "politisirende Philologen" do not seem to be German, Greek, or any other language, it is hard to know their exact meaning, but they are clearly used as an expression of contempt. But whatever they may mean, an English scholar may be quite contented to be set down as one member of the class, so long as Bishop Thirlwall is another.

of Aratos. But Aratos himself might have failed, when every one who had a grievance was encouraged to carry it at once to Rome or to the nearest Roman officer. Whatever decision might be given, the mere entertaining such complaints was an insult to the majesty of an equal ally, and a direct breach of the treaty between Achaia and Rome. As Lykortas once ventured to tell Appius Claudius, Rome had no more to do with the way in which Achaia chose to deal with Sparta than Achaia had to do with the way in which Rome chose to deal with Capua.[1] Nevertheless the history of this time is to a great extent the history of the embassies which went to and fro about the affairs of Sparta. Of this long web of intrigue I shall attempt only a short summary.

First disturbances at Sparta composed by Philopoimên, B.C. 191.

Disturbances began early, indeed while the fate of Ætolia was still undecided. A movement showed itself at Sparta; the General Diophanês, accompanied by Titus himself, marched thither to preserve order. This step was contrary to the advice of Philopoimên, who held that, while the war between Rome and Antiochos still continued, the League had better remain quiet. As his counsel was unheeded, he himself hastened to Sparta, composed the differences there by his personal influence, and left no excuse for either the Roman Ambassador or the Achaian General to enter the city.[2] Two years later, when Philopoimên himself was General for the fifth time, the Spartans, dissatisfied with their new and narrow boundaries, attacked Las, one of the towns separated from Sparta by Titus.[3] The Federal Government naturally interfered; an Assembly was held, which heard the complaints of the people of Las, and Philopoimên, as President of the Union, required of the State Government of Sparta that the authors of the outrage should be given up to the Federal authority for trial. The Lacedæmonian answer took the form of the murder of thirty Spartans of Unionist principles; this was followed by a formal vote of Secession,[4] and by a

Spartan attack on Las, B.C. 189.

[1] Liv. xxxix. 37.

[2] Plut. Phil. 16. Τόν τε στρατηγὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ τὸν ὕπατον [Titus was no such thing] τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἰδιώτης ὢν ἀπέκλεισε. I follow Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 384) in his explanation of these words.

[3] Liv. xxxviii. 30.

[4] Ib. 31. Furentes igitur ira, triginta hominibus ex factione, cum qua consiliorum aliqua societas Philopœmeni atque exsulibus erat, interfectis, decreverunt renuntiandam societatem Achæis.

Secession of Sparta.

further resolution to hand over the city to the Roman Faith. The League then declared war by the unanimous vote of every city.[1] But, while winter hindered its vigorous prosecution, the Consul Marcus Fulvius stepped in; an Assembly was held at Elis to meet him, at which Lacedæmonian deputies were heard. Fulvius at last obtained that war should be put off till both parties could send embassies to Rome. The Federal Ambassadors were Lykortas and Diophanês, both of them citizens of Megalopolis, but an ill-matched pair. Lykortas stood on the right of the Union to deal as it would with a seceding State, and on the duty of Rome to leave the rights of an allied power uninjured. Diophanês was ready to submit everything to the judgement of the wisest of arbiters, the Roman Senate. They brought back a reply which is not given at length, but which was so ambiguous that both Unionists and Secessionists interpreted it in their own favour.[2]

Embassy to Rome, B.C. 189–188.

November, B.C. 189. Philopoimên's two successive Generalships, B.C. 190–188.

Philopoimên was re-elected General for the next year.[3] Either the old law which forbade immediate re-election had been repealed, or else the emergency was held to be ground for dispensing with its observance.[4] As soon as the season allowed of military operations, he marched to Kompasion on the Lacedæmonian frontier, where the Federal army was reinforced by multitudes of

[1] Liv. xxxviii. 32. Omnium civitatium, quæ ejus concilii erant, consensu bellum Lacedæmoniis indictum est.

[2] Ib. Ceterum responsum ita perplexum fuit, ut et Achæi sibi de Lacedæmone permissum acciperent et Lacedæmonii non omnia concessa iis interpretarentur.

[3] Ib. 33. *Philopœmeni continuatur magistratus.* See Schorn, p. 304. Cf. Pol. xxii. 23; xxiii. 1. This passage strongly confirms the view (see above, p. 214) that the General was now elected late in the year. Livy clearly implies that the *veris initium* (of 188) was not many months after Philopoimên's re-election.

[4] Perhaps, however, it is not absolutely necessary to adopt either alternative. The name of the General for the years 191–0 is not recorded. It is not impossible that it was Philopoimên himself, that the General of the year 190–89 died early in his official year, and that he was, according to law (see pp. 219, 506), succeeded by Philopoimên for the remainder of the year. If Philopoimên was thus only *suffect* General in 189, he might be re-elected General for the year 189–8, as Lykortas was in 183. (See p. 506.) He would thus be in office for nearly three years together without breach of the Constitution.

The eight Generalships (see p. 505) of Philopoimên are not very easy to arrange. According to the conjecture just hazarded, the Generalship of B.C. 189–8 might be called either his sixth or his seventh, according as we count the suffect Generalship or not. If it is reckoned as the sixth, he may have filled a seventh Generalship in 187–6. He could not be re-elected in 188–7, and we know that Aristainos was General in 186–5, and Lykortas in 185–4. In 186–5 (see p. 510) Philopoimên was one of the ten δημιουργοί. We may suspect that he commonly was so in the years when he was not General.

Lacedæmonian exiles. The General of the League repeated his demand for the surrender of the aggressors on Las, and promised them a fair trial. They appeared, but the violence of the Spartan exiles could not be restrained, and seventeen of the accused fell in a tumult. The judicial sentence, by which sixty-three more were executed next day, was probably hardly a more regular proceeding.[1] But, considering the aggression on Las, the formal vote of Secession, and the murder of their own Unionist fellow-citizens, it is not likely that they would have found any more lenient treatment before the most solemn tribunal that the League could have supplied. The General now declared his will or that of the League. The walls of Sparta were to be destroyed; the mercenaries of the late Tyrant, and the slaves enfranchised by him, were to leave the country by a fixed day, on pain of being sold as slaves;[2] above all, the Laws of Lykourgos, the laws under which Sparta had lived through so many ages, the laws which had reared Leônidas, Agêsilaos, and Kleomenês, were to be exchanged for the institutions of Achaia. The League also, by a fresh vote of the Federal Assembly at Tegea, decreed the restoration of all the Spartan exiles.

Execution of Spartans at Kompasion, B.C. 188.

Change of the Spartan laws.

Severity of this kind may not have been abstractedly unjust, but nothing could be more impolitic.[3] It at once suggests the question—one of the most important of questions in our own time—whether a Federal Government either can retain, or ought to try to retain, unwilling members in its Union. The Achaian Government would have failed in its duty, if it had not secured Las against Spartan aggression, and it was hardly to be expected that it should tolerate the establishment of a revolted Spartan commonwealth in the midst of the cities of the League. But the time was emphatically a time for mercy, it was no time for hasty or irregular execution even of the most guilty traitors. Above all, the conduct of the Achaian Government was impolitic,

Impolicy of Philopoimên's treatment of Sparta.

[1] Liv. xxxviii. 33. Sexaginta tres postero die comprehensi, a quibus Prætor vim arcuerat, non quia salvos vellet, sed quia perire caussa indicta nolebat, objecti *multitudini iratæ*, cum aversis auribus pauca locuti essent, damnati omnes et traditi sunt ad supplicium.

This trial seems to have been held before the military Assembly, held, in wartime, to be invested with the authority of the regular Assembly of the League. See above, p. 214, note 5.

[2] It would probably be held to be against Federal Law for a single city to hire mercenaries. See above, p. 418.

[3] See the remarks of Kortüm, iii. 282.

as holding out a fresh handle for Roman meddling.[1] And one or two pettier matters followed, from which it would seem that Philopoimên, while dealing with the old enemy of his city, forgot that he was an Achaian President and only remembered that he was a Megalopolitan citizen. Many of the mercenaries, staying beyond their time, were seized and sold; but their price was applied, not to any national object, but to rebuild a colonnade at Megalopolis which had been destroyed by Kleomenês. Megalopolis also recovered the disputed territory of Belbinê. Philopoimên seems to have carried the Assembly with him in all these things, as he probably would have carried it with him in any proposals for the humiliation of Sparta. But the whole business was utterly unworthy of such a man. It shows how difficult it was for any Greek to rise above petty local passions, and it may perhaps lead us to a still greater admiration of the Achaian statesmen, who usually rose above them in so great a degree. We must bear in mind that Philopoimên could remember a time when Megalopolis was an independent city, if not under a free government, yet at least with Lydiadas for her master, and also that he had before his eyes the work of Epameinôndas as the great model of his imitation.

From this time onwards, the connexion of the League with Sparta was the standing difficulty of Achaian politics. Ceaseless disputes arose; Spartan factions complained at Rome against one another and against the Federal Government; the very exiles whom Philopoimên had restored shared the old Spartan spirit, and could not endure that the city which had once been mistress of Greece should be cast down to the rank of a single Achaian Canton.[2] At one time, four different sets of Spartan envoys

Continued disputes at Sparta.

[1] See Thirlwall, viii. 396.

[2] See Pol. xxiii. 4, 12; xxiv. 2. Liv. xxxix. 33. Some expressions of Polybios (xxiii. 12) are remarkable. The Spartan envoys complain that the city has lost its security and independence—*ἐπισφαλῆ καὶ ἀπαρρησίαστον καταλείπεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν, ἐπισφαλῆ μὲν ὀλίγοις οἵοις, καὶ τούτοις τῶν τειχῶν περιῃρημένων, ἀπαρρησίαστον δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ μόνον τοῖς κοινοῖς δόγμασι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πειθαρχεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπηρετεῖν τοῖς ἀεὶ καθισταμένοις ἄρχουσι.* These words need not imply any unconstitutional acts on the part either of the Federal Government or of individual magistrates. The Federal constitution vested larger powers in the chiefs of the League than Sparta had ever vested in her own Kings, and among those chiefs, we may be sure, no Spartan at this time ever found a place. Without supposing any real oppression, the humiliation of receiving orders from Megalopolis was enough. Compare the praise bestowed by Plutarch on Aratos (Ar. 11) for his loyal obedience to the Federal magistrates, even when citizens of insignificant townships.

B.C. 184. appeared at once before the Roman Senate.[1] It should however be remarked that none of them asked for complete separation from the League; their complaints were against one another, or against particular acts of the Federal body. A moderate Spartan politician would probably see the vanity of attempting to maintain the existence of Sparta as a wholly independent commonwealth. But every Spartan would naturally revolt at the violent change in his ancestral institutions and at the destruction of the walls of his city. A position of equality with Messênê and Megalopolis, to say nothing of Las and Gythion, was irksome, but it might be borne. But the special changes of Philopoimên reduced Sparta below the level of other Achaian cities; they violated that internal independence which the Federal Constitution promised to every member of the League. It was natural therefore that every Spartan should wish to obtain the repeal of these insulting ordinances; but it was equally natural that every wise Spartan should wish to preserve the connexion of his city with the rest of Peloponnêsos. When the Spartans themselves did not speak of Secession, Rome could not decently suggest it. But a little later, during the Messênian troubles, the Senate tried the trick of an affected neutrality. One of its rescripts ran that the affairs of the League were no affairs of the Roman People; if Sparta or Corinth or Argos thought good to secede, Rome would not feel herself called on to interfere.[2] The meaning of this was plain enough; Rome would be well pleased to see the Peloponnêsian Confederation fall asunder.[3] Corinth and Argos however knew what was good for them far too well to be led away by the insidious hint; and even Sparta soon afterwards—Philopoimên was then no more—definitively renewed her connexion with the League, and set up her pillar like the other Achaian cities.[4]

Policy of the Moderate party at Sparta.

B.C. 183.

Roman intrigues for the Dissolution of the League.

Formal Reunion of Sparta, B.C. 182.

Of the other two Peloponnêsian cities lately annexed, Elis

[1] Pol. xxiv. 4. Liv. xxxix. 48. Thirlwall, viii. 402.

[2] Pol, xxiv. 10. Ἀπεκρίθησαν δὲ διότι οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ Κορινθίων ἢ Ἀργείων ἀφίστηται δῆμος, οὐ δεήσει τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς θαυμάζειν ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς αὑτοὺς ἡγῶνται. Is it possible that the use of the word δῆμος instead of πόλις was itself an insidious hint to the assumption of increased independence by the several cities?

[3] Ib. Ταύτην δὲ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐκθέμενοι κηρύγματος ἔχουσαν διάθεσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις ἕνεκεν Ῥωμαίων ἀφίστασθαι τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν πολιτείας.

[4] Ib. xxv. 2. Μετὰ ταῦτα στήλης προγραφείσης συνεπολιτεύετο μετὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἡ Σπάρτη.

seems to have been the scene of no disturbances, but to have settled quietly down into its place as an Achaian Canton. There is no sign that the Eleians distrusted the Federal Government, or were distrusted by it. We have seen a Federal Assembly held in their city,[1] and the Ambassador sent by Philopoimên to Rome to excuse his doings at Kompasion was an Eleian named Nikodêmos.[2] At Messênê the question of Union or Secession had become identical with the question of Democracy or Oligarchy in the State Government. When Messênê was admitted to the Union, some changes in the State constitution were made by the influence of Philopoimên,[3] which, we cannot doubt, were changes in a democratical direction. But there was a strong oligarchic party, which hoped to recover its power by Roman help. Its leader was one Deinokratês, who is described to us as a good soldier, but as, in other respects, a man of profligate and frivolous, though showy, character.[4] This man visited Rome as an envoy,[5] seemingly not from the Messênian Government, but merely from his own party. He received no open encouragement, yet he contrived to obtain a certain degree of countenance from Titus himself. He returned to Greece in his company, and presently he caused a revolution at Messênê and proclaimed Secession from the League.[6] Philopoimên, in his seventieth year, after forty years of political life, was now General of the Achaians for the eighth time.[7] He was then lying sick at Argos, but he roused himself at the news. He at once sent Lykortas to reduce the rebels. He himself hastened to Megalopolis, and there collected the cavalry of his native city, the sons of the men who had fought beside Lydiadas at Ladokeia and had followed himself to victory at Sellasia. But it was the last campaign of the old hero. His immediate object was to relieve a loyal Messênian town—either Korônê or Kolônides[8]—lying to the south of the revolted capital. In a skirmish with Deinokratês, he was at first successful, but afterwards, surrounded by numbers, the Achaian General was thrown from his horse, and was carried

Quiet incorporation of Elis.

State of parties in Messênê.

Revolt of Messênê under Deinokratês, B.C. 183.

Capture and execution of PHILOPOIMÊN at Messênê, B.C. 183.

[1] Liv. xxxviii. 32. See above, p. 501.

[2] Pol. xxiii. 1.

[3] Ib. 10. Τὸ τοῦ Τίτου διάγραμμα καὶ τὴν τοῦ Φιλοποίμενος διόρθωσιν.

[4] Ib. xxiv. 5.

[5] Ib. Παραγενόμενος εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην πρεσβευτής. On the vague use of the word πρεσβευτής, see above, p. 417.

[6] Plut. Phil. 18.

[7] Pol. xxiv. 8, 9. Plut. Phil. 18.

[8] Plut. Phil. 18. Κώμην τὴν καλουμένην Κολωνίδα. Liv. xxxix. 49. *Ad præoccupandum Coronen.* See Thirlwall, viii. 405.

a prisoner to Messênê. But it soon became evident that popular feeling was wholly in his favour; Deinokratês and his Senate therefore hastened to remove their noble captive to a surer keeping. Philopoimên drank the cup of hemlock[1] in a subterranean dungeon—the last hero of Achaia, the last hero of Greece, the last whom Plutarch has thought worthy of a place on the beadroll of the worthies of his country.

According to the Achaian constitution, Lykortas, who had been General of the year before, succeeded Philopoimên in office for the remainder of his term. This seems to have been near the end of the official year, and he was re-elected at the next regular Meeting of the Assembly, which was shortly afterwards held at Megalopolis.[2] It was soon evident that the revolt of Messênê and the death of Philopoimên were the work of a mere faction, and that the guilt was in no way shared by the mass of the Messênian people.[3] In the course of the next year, popular feeling compelled Deinokratês to sue for peace.[4] It was granted, as was just, on favourable terms. Lykortas, by the advice of his Cabinet,[5] required the surrender of the guilty persons, the reception of a Federal garrison into the citadel of Messênê, and the unreserved submission of all questions to the Federal Assembly. The persons surrendered died, at Lykortas' order, by their own hands, and the Assembly[6] decreed the readmission

November, B.C. 183.

Readmission of Messênê to the League, B.C. 182.

[1] Plut. Phil. 20. Liv. xxxix. 50. Plutarch adds that some of the Messênians proposed to torture him to death, and that they were afterwards stoned to death at his tomb (c. 21). There is no authority for either statement in Polybios or Livy [cf. Pol. xxvi. 2.] It reminds one of the crimes which Quintus Curtius and writers of that kind have impartially heaped alike upon Alexander and upon his enemies.

[2] This seems to me the only way to reconcile the statement of Plutarch that Lykortas was *elected* General (ἑλόμενοι στρατηγὸν Λυκόρταν, Phil. 21) soon after Philopoimên's death, with what we know, from the direct witness of Polybios (xl. 2, see above, p. 219), to have been the constitutional practice of the League. By the death of Philopoimên, Lykortas, as General of the year B.C. 185–4 (see Livy, xxxix. 35, 36), became at once, without election, General for the remainder of the year B.C. 184–3. But, if the death of Philopoimên took place very shortly before the November Meeting of B.C. 183, Lykortas would need an almost immediate re-election to continue him in office during the year B.C. 183–2. See Schorn, 318, 21.

[3] Liv. xxxix. 49, 50. Plut. Phil. 19, 20. Pol. xxiv. 12.

[4] Pol. xxiv. 12.

[5] Ib. Ὁ στρατηγὸς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν παραλαβὼν τοὺς συνάρχοντας.

[6] Ib. Ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες συνέβαινε τότε πάλιν συνάγεσθαι τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς εἰς Μεγάλην πόλιν ἐπὶ τὴν δευτέραν σύνοδον. This I take to be the regular Spring Meeting of B.C. 182. Now that the official year began in November, the May Meeting would be the δευτέρα σύνοδος.

of Messênê to the League. In consideration of the damage done to its territory by the war, the restored State was, seemingly at a later Assembly, exempted from all Federal taxes for three years.[1] But, in accordance with the policy which Philopoimên had followed even with his native city,[2] three of the smaller Messênian towns, Abia, Thouria, and Pharai, were detached from the capital, and were admitted to the Union as independent States, each setting up its own pillar like Argos or Megalopolis.[3] These towns all lie between Messênê and the Lakônian frontier,[4] a district which it was specially important to occupy with members attached to the Union both by gratitude and interest. B.C. 182. Three Messênian towns admitted as independent States, B.C. 182.

It was during this eventful Presidency of Lykortas that Sparta was, at a Meeting at Sikyôn, finally reunited to the League.[5] The news was announced at Rome both by a Federal and by a Lacedæmonian Ambassador, the latter, one Chairôn, being probably sent by consent of the League.[6] It must have been in a later year that this same Chairôn entered on a series of demagogic measures at Sparta with an evident view to the Tyranny. When the State Government instituted an inquiry into his conduct, he procured the murder of the chief commissioner.[7] The Federal power now interposed. The General, probably Lykortas, went, by order of the Assembly, to Sparta, and procured the condemnation of Chairôn, seemingly by a Spartan tribunal. Schemes of Chairôn at Sparta, B.C. 180?

Our direct information during the period between the war with Antiochos and the death of Philopoimên chiefly relates to those external affairs of the League of which I have just attempted a summary. But many important constitutional points are brought out incidentally in our narratives. The detail at which Constitutional notices, B.C. 191–183.

[1] Pol. xxv. 3. *Συνέθεντο τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Μεσσηνίους στήλην, συγχωρήσαντες αὐτοῖς πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις φιλανθρώποις καὶ τριῶν ἐτῶν ἀτέλειαν.*

[2] See above, p. 489.

[3] Pol. xxv. 1. *Ἰδίαν δὲ θέμεναι στήλην ἑκάστη μετεῖχε τῆς κοινῆς συμπολιτείας.* Schorn (p. 321) says with truth, "Diese Anordnung kann als ein Fortschritt in der Ausbildung der Bundesverfassung betrachtet werden."

[4] They form the district which Augustus afterwards took from Messênê and added to Lakônia. Pausanias, iv. 30. 2.

[5] See above, p. 504.

[6] Pol. xxv. 2. Cf. above, p. 204. This Chairôn had once appeared at Rome (Pol. xxiv. 4) as the representative of one of the discontented parties. His Federal colleague was Bippos, an Argeian.

[7] Pol. xxv. 8. *Τὸν ἐπιφανέστατον τῶν δοκιμαστήρων Ἀπολλωνίδην.*

Polybios now writes gives us a minute account of everything of which we have any account at all, and we constantly see the working of the Federal system far more clearly displayed than in earlier times. One important change was introduced by Philopoimên, when President for the fifth time, in the year of the Secession of Sparta. Hitherto, though Special Meetings had been called wherever the Government thought fit, the two regular yearly Assemblies had always been held at Aigion. It was now that Philopoimên carried his law by which these Meetings were to be held in each city of the League in turn.[1] Aigion, a natural centre enough for the old Achaia, was a most unnatural centre for all Peloponnêsos; and Philopoimên understood Federal principles too well to give the League the curse of a capital anywhere else. The change too, as tending to equalize all the members of the Union, quite fell in with his policy. It was part of the same plan which led him to sacrifice somewhat of the apparent greatness of his own city by raising her dependent towns to the rank of equal members of the League.[2]

Yearly Meetings removed from Aigion, B.C. 189.

It is from an incidental notice during this period that we learn the constitution of the Achaian Senate. The Kings of Egypt and Asia still continued to seek the friendship of the League. Many costly gifts were offered by them, which were refused by the Assembly whenever they were thought derogatory to the national honour and independence. One offer from Eumenês of Pergamos, made during the second Presidency of Aristainos, was of a very strange kind. He offered to give the League one hundred and twenty talents, which sum was to be put out to interest, and the proceeds applied to pay wages to the Federal Senators at the times of Assembly.[3] The proposal must be taken in connexion with the fact that the Senators so often really formed the Assembly, so that the offer was very like a scheme for taking the whole Achaian League into pay.[4] The

Constitution of the Senate.

Rejection of Eumenês' offer to pay its members, B.C. 185.

[1] See above, p. 216.

[2] Liv. xxxviii. 30. Philopoimên summons an Assembly—seemingly a Special Assembly—at Argos, to entertain this question. The Ministers summon another at Aigion. All the world goes to Argos; the Roman Consul Marcus Fulvius, whom the people of Aigion had called in to stop the change, goes there too. The national will is so plain that Fulvius ventures on no opposition, and Philopoimên's bill is passed. The Roman, as usual, is found hostile to any measure tending to increase the strength and harmony of the League.

[3] Pol. xxiii. 7. Μισθοδοτεῖσθαι τὴν βουλὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς συνόδοις [and Diod. xxix. 17 (Exc. de Leg. 13, p. 319) ὀψωνιάζεσθαι τὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν σύνοδον].

[4] See above, p. 240.

offer was rejected; the League had no mind to see its Senators pensioners of Eumenês; the law forbade either magistrates or private persons to accept such presents; how then could it be borne that the whole Senate should be bribed in a body?[1] These arguments were forcibly pressed by an orator named Apollônidês of Sikyôn; the feelings of the Assembly were also strongly stirred up against the King by one Kassander of Aigina,[2] who set forth how his native island, once a free Canton of the League, was now in bondage to the very prince who offered them this tempting bribe.[3]

Legal resistance to Roman encroachments.

We have already seen that the Achaian laws required that a Special Assembly should be summoned only to discuss some definite business, and that it could entertain no proposition alien to that business.[4] This law was more than once appealed to by Philopoimên in order to escape from the unauthorized interference of Roman officers. When a duly commissioned Roman Ambassador came with any definite communication from the Senate, an Assembly was summoned, as a matter of course, to hear what he had to say. His communication of itself formed business to be laid before the Assembly according to the law. But both Flamininus and others of his countrymen seem to have thought that it was the duty of the Achaian Government to summon an Assembly whenever any Roman of distinction took a fancy to address the Achaian People, whether he were the bearer of any real communication from the Senate or not. The law just mentioned afforded a good means of refusing such

[1] Pol. xxiii. 8. Τῶν γὰρ νόμων κωλυόντων μηθένα μήτε ἰδιωτῶν μήτε τῶν ἀρχόντων παρὰ βασιλέως δῶρα λαμβάνειν κατὰ μηδ' ὁποίαν πρόφασιν, πάντας ἅμα δωροδοκεῖσθαι προφανῶς, προσδεξαμένους τὰ χρήματα, πάντων εἶναι παρανομώτατον, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις αἴσχιστον ὁμολογουμένως. τὸ γὰρ ὀψωνιάζεσθαι τὴν βουλὴν ὑπ' Εὐμένους καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος, καὶ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν κοινῶν καταπεπωκότας οἱονεὶ δέλεαρ, πρόδηλον ἔχειν τὴν αἰσχύνην καὶ τὴν βλάβην.

It will be seen how completely equivalent bribing the Senate is held to be to bribing the whole Assembly.

[2] Ib. Did the Aiginêtans, though their city was enslaved, retain their Federal franchise, or had Kassander been admitted to the franchise of some other Achaian city? This speech of an ἄπολις ἀνήρ (see Herod. viii. 61) reminds us of Kanarês and Garibaldi in our own times.

[3] It was probably now that the decree was passed to abolish all illegal and unseemly honours (τὰς ἀπρεπεῖς τιμὰς καὶ τὰς παρανόμους) which had been voted to Eumenês. Two Rhodians, Sôsigenês and Diopeithês, who held some judicial office which it is not easy to explain (δικαστὰς ὑπάρχοντας κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν καιρὸν), were set to carry out this decree. A private grudge against Eumenês led them to exceed their commission, and to abolish all honours whatsoever which had been granted to the King. Pol. xxviii. 7. See Schorn, 339.

[4] See above, pp. 215, 478.

B.C. 185.

requests. In the same second Presidency of Aristainos, just after the Assembly which declined the gift of Eumenês had dispersed, came Quintus Cæcilius, who had been sent as Ambassador into Macedonia, requiring that an Assembly should be called together to hear what he had to say about the affairs of Sparta.[1] He seems to have been ordered to go into Peloponnêsos on his return from Macedonia,[2] but he clearly brought no definite instructions with him. Aristainos, as President, summoned a Cabinet Council[3] at Argos, in which we incidentally learn that three citizens of Megalopolis were present beside himself.[4] Cæcilius spoke, strongly blaming the conduct of the Federal body towards Sparta. Aristainos was silent, showing, as Polybios says, by his very silence that his sentiments were on the side of Cæcilius.[5] Diophanês openly took the Roman side; Philopoimên, Archôn, and Lykortas—all the speakers mentioned, except Archôn, are Megalopolitans—stood up for their country. The demand of Cæcilius for an Assembly[6] was at last met by a request to know what were his instructions from the Senate; if he had any to produce, an Assembly should be held to discuss them, otherwise the law did not allow one to be summoned. Cæcilius had no instructions to show, and he departed without his Assembly. He afterwards complained so bitterly at Rome of the supposed insult which he had received, that it was thought prudent to send Philopoimên and Lykortas to defend the conduct of the Achaian Government before the Senate. They were told that, as the Roman Senate were always summoned to hear the Ambassadors of Achaia, so a hearing before the Achaian Assembly ought never to be refused to an Ambassador of Rome.[7] The sophism is obvious; it was one thing to assemble the Senators of the Roman City; it was another to get together all the citizens, or even all the Senators of Achaia, scattered, as they were, over the whole face of Peloponnêsos. And, after all, the

The demand of Quintus Cæcilius for an Assembly refused.

Discussion thereon at Rome.

[1] Pol. xxiii. 10. Liv. xxxix. 33. [Cf. Paus. vii. 9.]

[2] Liv. u.s. Peloponnesum quoque adire jussi.

[3] Pol. u.s. Συναγαγόντος Ἀριστaίνου τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς τὴν τῶν Ἀργείων πόλιν. This is clearly a Meeting of the Ministers only, not of the whole Senate (Rath) as Schorn (p. 310) makes it.

[4] See above, p. 221.

[5] Pol. u.s. Δῆλος ὢν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ σιωπᾶν ὅτι δυσαρεστεῖται τοῖς ᾠκονομημένοις καὶ συνευδοκεῖ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Καικιλίου λεγομένοις.

[6] Pol. u.s. Ὁ δὲ Καικίλιος, ὁρῶν τὴν τούτων προαίρεσιν, ἠξίου τοὺς πολλοὺς αὐτῷ συνάγειν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν.

[7] Pol. xxiii. 12. Liv. xxxix. 33.

Roman Senate and the Achaian Assembly did not answer to one another. Great as were the powers of the Roman Senate, it was not, like the Achaian Assembly, the body which actually declared war and peace. That last attribute of sovereignty belonged to the Roman People in their Tribes, and they were certainly never assembled to hear the communications of an Achaian envoy.

Similarly, when Titus himself, on his way to a mission in Asia, took the Messênian Deinokratês back with him as far as Naupaktos, he wrote thence to the Achaian Government, requiring an Assembly to be summoned. Philopoimên was now in the last year of his office and his life. The answer sent was the same as that given to Cæcilius; the Assembly should be summoned if Titus would, according to law, state the business which he had to lay before it. Titus had no statement to make, and the Assembly was not held.[1]

An Assembly refused to Flamininus, B.C. 183.

## § 3. *From the Death of Philopoimên to the Conquest of Macedonia and Epeiros*

B.C. 183—167

With Philopoimên died out the old race of Achaian statesmen, the race which had seen the League in the days of its glory, and indeed of its growth. Philopoimên was born about the time of the deliverance of Sikyôn and the first great extension of the League. He was born when Megalopolis was still a detached unit, the subject of some of the earlier and baser Tyrants who preceded Lydiadas. He was a grown man when his native city joined the League; his youth was contemporary with the last days of Markos and with the full prime both of Lydiadas and Aratos. And he had lived to see a state of things which might have made him wish that either Kleomenês or Antigonos could come back again as lord over Peloponnêsos. But he was taken away before the worst evils came on the land he loved; he had gone through the allotted span of man's life; it was well for him that he was not reserved for the sad old age of Isokratês. And

B.C. 253.

B.C. 234.

[1] Pol. xxiv. 5. Ἐπεὶ . . ἔγραψε τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, κελεύων συνάγειν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς εἰς ἐκκλησίαν, ἀντέγραψαν αὐτῷ διότι ποιήσουσιν, ἂν γράψῃ περὶ τίνων βούλεται διαλεχθῆναι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς· τοὺς γὰρ νόμους ταῦτα τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἐπιτάττειν· τοῦ δὲ μὴ τολμῶντος γράφειν, κ. τ. λ.

Condition of the League at the death of Philopoimên.

he left the League, if not what it had once been, yet as flourishing and as independent as any state could hope to be in those evil times. Achaia was still the first of existing republics, the compeer of any existing kingdom. The League was still spared the worst forms of Roman interference; some respect was still paid to the constitution and laws of an equal ally; and the internal administration was less meddled with by Rome than it had been by Philip. Philopoimên too left his country to the care of statesmen formed in his own school, who had imbibed his prudent maxims of avoiding at once indiscreet defiance and still more indiscreet servility. Lykortas of Megalopolis had the state as it were bequeathed to him by his great fellow-citizen, and Lykortas' son Polybios, to whom we owe our best knowledge of these times, carried the urn of the hero at his funeral pomp. Thus three men's lives embrace the whole history of Federal Greece. Polybios sat at the feet of Philopoimên, and Philopoimên may have sat at the feet of Markos of Keryneia.[1]

B.C. 281–146.

Parties in the League; the elder Roman party not wilfully unpatriotic.

Growth of the extreme Roman party under Kallikratês.

The exact age of Lykortas is not known; he must have been much younger than Philopoimên, but still quite old enough to remember when the Achaian League was a really independent power. The statesmen of his generation differed, as we have seen, among themselves; the policy of Aristainos and Diophanês was less dignified, and really less prudent, than the policy of Philopoimên and Lykortas; still Aristainos and Diophanês were certainly not wilful traitors. But, under the debasing influence of Rome, a brood of men was growing up throughout Greece who knew nothing of republican or patriotic feelings, and whose only thought was to advance their own selfish interests by the basest subserviency to the dominant power. Such, among the Achaians, was Kallikratês of Leontion, such, in Epeiros, was the younger Charops. These were men of essentially the same stamp as those whom, a century before, the Macedonian Kings had set up as Tyrants in the Peloponnêsian cities. Rome was a Republic; she therefore could hardly establish her slaves as Tyrants, and probably they served her better by exercising a practical Tyranny under republican forms. Charops, it is clear, was the author of

[1] Polybios was contemporary with Philopoimên, and Philopoimên contemporary with Markos, as grown men. This alone is really fit to be called contemporary existence. If a child born just before Chairôneia is reckoned as contemporary with Isokratês, three men's lives might be spread over a much wider space.

cruelties hardly inferior to those of Nabis himself;[1] but Law reigned in Achaia down to the moment of her fall; Kallikratês could not rob or banish or murder; he could only act as a vile cross between Tyrant and Demagogue, the opponent of every patriot, the supporter of every measure which could exalt his own power at the cost of the national degradation. We first hear of this wretch under the Presidency of Hyperbatos,[2] himself seemingly a man of the same stamp, or perhaps only of the school of Aristainos. At any rate, he agreed with Kallikratês in openly avowing the doctrine that no constitutional impediment ought to stand in the way of implicit obedience to the Roman Senate.[3] This doctrine, of course, had to be maintained in the teeth of a strong opposition on the part of Lykortas and the patriotic party. The immediate occasion on which Kallikratês is first introduced to us is one of the interminable disputes about the Lacedæmonian exiles. The Senate required their restitution, which Lykortas opposed as unconstitutional. It was determined to send an embassy to Rome to lay the objections of Lykortas before the Senate. By what chance it happened that Kallikratês himself was nominated one of the envoys does not appear.[4] Perhaps he had not yet displayed himself in his full colours, and it may have been thought desirable that the embassy should not wholly consist of avowed partizans of Lykortas. Of his colleagues we know only that they bore the most glorious names in the history of the League; they were Lydiadas of Megalopolis and Aratos of Sikyôn.[5] Kallikratês of course betrayed his trust; he invited the Senate to exercise a more direct authority in Achaia and the other Grecian states; there were in every city men who were ready

Presidency of Hyperbatos, B.C. 180–179.

Slavish doctrines of Hyperbatos and Kallikratês.

Opposition of Lykortas. B.C. 179.

Embassy of Kallikratês to Rome.

[1] Pol. xxx. 14; xxxii. 21.

[2] Ib. xxvi. 1. Hyperbatos is probably a grandson of the person of the same name who was General in B.C. 224. See above, p. 353. Plutarch however writes the name Ὑπερβατᾶς and Polybios Ὑπέρβατος.

[3] Ib. Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ὑπέρβατον καὶ Καλλικράτην πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς γραφομένοις παρῄνουν, καὶ μήτε νόμον μήτε στήλην μήτ' ἄλλο μηδὲν τούτου νομίζειν ἀναγκαιότερον.

[4] Schorn (p. 323) says, "Anstatt aber den rechtschaffenen Lykortas, welcher den Rath gegeben hatte, an die Spitze der Gesandtschaft zu stellen, erwählte *die Regierung*, wie von einem Dämon verblendet, zu diesem Posten den Kallikrates." Why "die Regierung"? Surely Ambassadors were elected by the Assembly. See Pol. xxix. 10.

[5] Aratos was certainly (see Pol. xxv. 7) grandson of the great Aratos, and son of the younger General of that name. And analogy makes it almost certain that Lydiadas was grandson of the illustrious Tyrant.

to do its work; these men ought to be encouraged, and the men who talked about oaths and laws and pillars should in like manner be made to feel the displeasure of Rome.[1] The Senate hardly needed such counsel;[2] yet it is clear that from this moment there begins another marked change in the way in which Rome treated the Grecian commonwealths. While Philip and Antiochos were formidable, Achaia was treated as an equal ally; with their fall she sank to the position of a dependent ally; now she had to feel what it was to be, in all but name, a subject dependency. From this time forth, Kallikratês and his fellows received their orders from Rome, and communicated them to the Assemblies of the several states. Kallikratês himself came back with a rescript from the Senate, ordering the restoration of the exiles, and recommending himself as the model for all Greek statesmen.[3] The Senate wrote also to the four other Leagues—Ætolia, Epeiros, Akarnania, and Bœotia,—and to Rome's humble slaves at Athens, bidding them all co-operate in restoring the exiles, that is, bidding them all to pick a quarrel with the Achaians if they could. The patriots were awed, and Kallikratês brought with him a new means of influence, of which we have as yet heard nothing in the history of Greek Federalism. At the next election the traitor was raised to the Presidency, and the historian directly attributes his success partly to deception and partly to bribery.[4] As soon as he entered upon his office, he at once restored the exiles both at Sparta and at Messênê.

Rescript of the Roman Senate.

Kallikratês elected General, B.C. 179–178.

Our next business is to trace the way in which the Federal states of Greece were affected by the war between the Romans and King Perseus, the Third Macedonian War of Roman history. In the course of that war, three of the Greek Leagues were wiped out of the list of independent states, and Achaia received a blow from which she never recovered. By this time Greece had learned what Roman friendship and alliance really meant. The philhellenic dreams of Flamininus on the one side, the feeling of gratitude for recovered freedom on the other, had

Effects of the war with Perseus on the Federal states, B.C. 172–168.

[1] Pol. xxvi. 2. [2] Thirlwall, viii. 414.

[3] Pol. xxvi. 3. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ Καλλικράτους αὐτοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν, παρασιωπήσασα τοὺς συμπρεσβευτὰς, κατέταξεν εἰς τὴν ἀπόκρισιν διότι δεῖ τοιούτους ὑπάρχειν ἐν τοῖς πολιτεύμασιν ἄνδρας οἷός ἐστι Καλλικράτης. We may infer from this that Lydiadas and Aratos had acted somewhat more worthily of their illustrious names.

[4] Ib. Καταπληξάμενος καὶ συντρίψας τοὺς ὄχλους διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἰδέναι τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κατ' ἀλήθειαν εἰρημένων ἐν τῇ συγκλήτῳ τοὺς πολλοὺς, πρῶτον μὲν ᾑρέθη στρατηγὸς, πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοις κακοῖς καὶ δωροδοκηθείς.

now utterly passed away. Things had so changed since the famous Isthmian Games that Rome was now felt to be the enemy of Greece, and Macedonia to be her natural bulwark. Macedonian and Roman lordship had both been tried, and the yoke of Macedon had been found to be the lighter of the two. And indeed, with Rome standing by the side of both, Macedonian headship over Greece was not now likely to be oppressive. If not Perseus personally, yet at least the gallant nation which he so unworthily ruled, was felt to be the champion and bulwark of republican Greece. Some states openly espoused his cause; in others it is clear that every patriotic heart wished well to him.[1] Perseus, though free from most of his father's vices, had vices of his own, which, though they left him a better man, yet made him, at such a moment, decidedly a worse King. He is described as temperate in his life, and just in his government, and, till he lost his wits among his misfortunes, we hear nothing of any personal cruelty. He was sagacious in laying plans beforehand both in politics and war, but when the moment for action of either kind came, his heart always failed him. Philip, with all his crimes, retained some hold on men's regard, on account of his gallant and kingly spirit, always rising highest in time of danger. Perseus was about as fit to command in a pitched battle as Aratos; and he had not, like Aratos, the art either of improving a victory or of making up for a defeat. Above all, he was basely and even treacherously covetous, descending to the lowest tricks to gain or to save money. Upon such a prince, the recovered resources of Macedonia, and the general goodwill of Greece, were utterly thrown away.

Greek patriotic feeling now on the Macedonian side.

Character of Perseus.

As in all the Roman wars of this period, two or three incompetent commanders waged two or three unsuccessful or indecisive campaigns, till the right man came and restored to Rome that superiority which was inherent in her arms whenever they were rightly directed. The war was spread over the Consulships of Publius Licinius, Aulus Hostilius, Quintus Marcius, and Lucius Æmilius Paullus. The part played by Titus Quinctius in the war with Philip was played by Lucius

Character of the war with Perseus. B.C. 171–168.

[1] On the popularity of Perseus in Greece, see Pol. xxvi. 5; xxvii. 7; Liv. xlii. 63; and especially Appian, Mac. ix. 1, 4. He is accused at Rome, ὅτι πρὸς πολλῶν ὀξέως ἐν ὀλίγῳ ἀγαπῷτο καὶ ἐπαινοῖτο, and again ὅτι πολλοῖς ἔθνεσι κεχαρισμένος, καὶ φιλέλλην, καὶ σωφρόνως ἀντὶ μέθης καὶ τρυφῆς ἄρχει. This is certainly rather hard measure.

Character of L. Æmilius Paullus.

Æmilius in the war with Perseus. Æmilius seems to have been quite as well disposed towards Greece as Titus, but his personal goodwill had no longer the same influence, and he was often made the unwilling instrument of cruelties which he abhorred. As before, I will not enter upon the military details of the war, but only trace its events so far as they bear upon the politics of the Federal states of Greece.[1]

Dependent condition of ÆTOLIA.

We have seen that Ætolia was as yet the only commonwealth of continental Greece which had entered into any formal relations of dependence upon Rome. Achaia, Bœotia, Epeiros, Athens, were all, in name, equal allies of Rome; but Ætolia had agreed to reverence the Majesty of the Roman People, and to have no friends and enemies but theirs.[2] Ætolia, then, was now a Roman dependency, free in its internal administration, but, in all its foreign relations, bound to follow the lead of Rome without inquiry. This state of things had at least the advantage of hindering the Ætolians from practising their old piracies upon other Greek states; but, according to our Achaian and Roman informants, it had at home only the effect of turning their arms against one another.[3] The forms of the constitution were trampled under foot,[4] and the strife

Civil dissensions, B.C. 173.

[1] After the fall of Perseus Macedonia was divided into four Republics. The size of each district, and some expressions of Polybios and Livy, may lead us to believe that the internal constitution of each had something of a Federal form. Polybios speaks of their *δημοκρατικὴ καὶ συνεδριακὴ πολιτεία*, xxxi. 12, cf. xxxv. 4; xxxvii. 4. (This *συνεδριακὴ πολιτεία* must be distinguished from the *βασιλέως συνέδριον*, or *Μακεδόνων συνέδριον*, in iv. 23 and xxvii. 8, which is merely the King's Privy Council.) Livy (xlv. 18, 29) speaks of the *Concilium* of each commonwealth, a word which he commonly applies to the Assemblies of Federal states. He afterwards (xlv. 32) speaks of *Synedri* as the Senators of the several commonwealths. On the whole then it is most probable that each of the four new Republics had some shadow of an internal Federal constitution. But I doubt the theory of Brandstäter (490) that the four together formed a Federation of four Cantons. This probably comes from the words *commune Concilium gentis* in c. 18, and *Macedoniæ concilium* in c. 32; but the former must be explained, or perhaps held to be cancelled, by the more detailed description in c. 29, and in the latter the *concilium* is the *βασιλέως συνέδριον* mentioned above. There was no *connubium* or *commercium* between the Macedonian districts (Liv. xlv. 29), and it suited the general policy of Rome to isolate them from one another. Cf. Kortüm, iii. 311. Probably Livy had no very clear idea of the matter himself.

[2] See above, p. 495.

[3] Pol. xxx. 14. Liv. xli. 25 or 30; xlii. 2.

[4] Pol. u.s. *Ἑτοῖμοι πρὸς πᾶν ἦσαν, ἀποτεθηριωμένοι τὰς ψυχάς, ὥστε μηδὲ βουλὴν διδόναι τοῖς προεστῶσιν.* It is not easy to see exactly what this means.

of factions led to mutual bloodshed. It does not appear that these contending parties exactly coincided with the respective favourers of Rome and of Macedonia; debt is mentioned as one cause of dissension;[1] it is hinted that both parties appealed to Perseus as an arbiter;[2] it is certain that, when the Roman envoy Marcellus contrived to appease their differences, he took hostages of both parties alike.[3] There were however in Ætolia the same parties as elsewhere. The place of Kallikratês and Charops was filled there by one Lykiskos, who was elected General through Roman influence.[4] Hippolochos, Nikander, and Lochagos seem to have answered, as nearly as Ætolians could, to Kephalos and Lykortas. Ætolian troops served against Perseus under the Roman Consul Licinius, but, when he was defeated by the Macedonian cavalry, the Ætolians made convenient scape-goats; the blame of the defeat was laid on Hippolochos and his friends, and they, with two other Ætolian officers, were, at Lykiskos' suggestion, sent off to Rome.[5] After this, Caius Popillius and Cnæus Octavius visited both Ætolia and other Grecian states, with a decree of the Senate, forbidding supplies to be furnished to any Roman officers without its authority. In the Assembly held at Thermon to receive them, they asked for hostages, which they did not obtain. At this Meeting, Lykiskos and Thoas raised insinuations against the patriotic party, and were guilty of gross flattery towards the Romans. A tumult arose; Thoas was pelted; and Popillius had the pleasure of rebuking the Ætolians for the breach of order.[6] Soon afterwards Perseus himself entered Ætolia. The calumnies of Lykiskos had driven a leading citizen named Archidamos openly to take the Macedonian side. He offered to admit the King into Stratos, but the other chief men of that city shrank from so bold a step; they called in Popillius from Ambrakia, and Perseus came before the town only to find it in the hands of his enemies. Deinarchos, the Ætolian Master of the Horse, had also been on the point of joining Perseus, but he soon found it expedient to change sides, and to join the

Roman and Macedonian parties.

Lykiskos General, B.C. 171.

B.C. 171.

B.C. 169.

Perseus in Ætolia, B.C. 169.

One is tempted to guess that some Magistrates had tried to procure, either for themselves or for some other accused persons, a legal trial before the Apokletes, but that popular fury prevented them by a massacre.

[1] Liv. xlii. 5.
[2] In the speech of Eumenês, ib. 12.
[3] Ib. 5.
[4] Ib. 38.
[5] Pol. xxvii. 13. Liv. xlii. 60. App. Mac. 10.
[6] Pol. xxviii. 3, 4. Liv. xliii. 17.

Part of the country joins him.

Roman army which he had come to oppose.[1] But, though Stratos was lost, and occupied by Popillius, the whole district of Aperantia, where Archidamos had great influence, openly joined Perseus, and Archidamos himself appears among those who clave to the Macedonian King to the last.[2] In the rest of Ætolia, Lykiskos, with a comrade named Tisippos, continued his career. After the battle of Pydna, Æmilius was met in Thessaly by a crowd of suppliant Ætolians, who told him how Aulus Bæbius, a Roman officer, had, at the instigation of Lykiskos, massacred five hundred and fifty Senators or leading men in the council-house,[3] how he had driven others into exile, and seemingly divided the property of both classes among the chiefs of the Roman party. The Roman Commissioners—the hands of Æmilius are clear from such iniquity—sat at Amphipolis, confirmed both the banishment and the murders, and merely punished Bæbius for employing Roman soldiers on such a business.[4] Other Ætolians, suspected of patriotism, were summoned to Rome to take their trial there, and a leading man named Andronikos was beheaded on the spot for having borne arms on the Macedonian side.[5] It has been supposed that the Ætolian League was now formally dissolved;[6] at all events the country sank into utter insignificance; we only hear that civil strife continued till the death of Lykiskos; when the land was rid of him, it enjoyed a time of at least comparative prosperity.[7]

Massacre by A. Bæbius, B.C. 167.

Dissolution of the League, B.C. 167? Death of Lykiskos, B.C. 157.

Affairs of ACARNANIA. B.C. 171. B.C. 169.

Of Akarnania we hear but little. That gallant and faithful ally of Macedonia was warned at the beginning of the war[8] that she had now an opportunity of wiping out her old errors by loyal adherence to Rome. Two years later we find the Roman Commissioners, Popillius and Octavius, meeting an Akarnanian Assembly at Thourion,[9] which was divided between two parties

[1] Liv. xliii. 22. [2] Ib. xliv. 43. [3] Ib. xlv. 28.

[4] Ib. 31. Cf. Pol. xxx. 10.

[5] Liv. ib. Duo securi percussi viri insignes; Andronicus *Andronici* filius Ætolus, quod, patrem secutus, arma contra populum Romanum tulisset, et Neo Thebanus.

One is strongly tempted to read *Archidami* for *Andronici*, as we have heard nothing of any Ætolian Andronikos. The persons of that name in Liv. xxxvii. 13 and xliv. 10 seem to be native Macedonians.

[6] Brandstäter (493) and Kortüm (iii. 315) quote, from Justin (Prol. xxxiii.), the words *Ætolicæ civitates ab unitate corporis deductæ*. In every edition that I know of they stand simply, *Ætoli oppressi*.

[7] Pol. xxxii. 20, 21. [8] Liv. xlii. 38.

[9] Pol. xxviii. 5. Liv. xliii. 17 or 19.

answering to those of Lykortas and Kallikratês in Achaia. The Roman party, led by one Chremês, went further even than their Achaian counterparts, as they asked for Roman garrisons in the Akarnanian towns. The patriots, led by Diogenês, pleaded that Akarnania was the friend and ally of Rome, and that none of her cities needed to be dealt with like conquered enemies. The Roman hesitated for the present, but, after the defeat of Perseus, when the Roman Commissioners at Amphipolis sat in judgement on all the states of Greece, Akarnanian as well as Ætolian victims were sent off to Rome. But no change was made in the constitution of the League, except that its capital Leukas was taken from it.[1] Chremês afterwards played in Akarnania the same part as Lykiskos in Ætolia, and his country was delivered from him about the same time.[2]

Debate in the Akarnanian Assembly.

Leukas separated from Akarnania, B.C. 167. B.C. 157.

Epeiros and Bœotia suffered yet more severely during and after the war with Perseus. In Epeiros we find the same parties as elsewhere, namely the three described by Livy,[3] devoted partizans of Rome and of Macedonia, and the moderate men who simply wished to retain as much dignity and independence for their country as such evil times allowed. The Lykortas of Epeiros was Kephalos: its Kallikratês was one Charops, a grandson of the elder Charops,[4] whom Polybios describes as the vilest of his vile class.[5] Of Kephalos as a politician we hear the best possible character. He was an old friend of the house of Macedon, but he knew that Epeiros was the ally of Rome; he prayed that peace might endure between the two powers; if war did come, he was ready to discharge towards Rome the duties of an honourable ally, but not to degrade his country by any base subserviency.[6] Theodotos, Antinoös, and Philostratos represented the more decided Macedonian party.[7] At first,

State of Epeiros.

Parties in Epeiros, Kephalos and Charops.

[1] Liv. xlv. 31, 34. [2] Pol. xxxii. 21.

[3] Liv. xlv. 31. Tria genera principum in civitatibus erant; duo, quæ adulando aut Romanorum imperium, aut amicitiam Regum, sibi privatim opes oppressis faciebant civitatibus; medium unum, utrique generi adversum, libertatem et leges tuebatur.

This is candid for a Roman, but the adherents of Rome and of Macedonia must not be put on a level.

[4] See above, p. 482.

[5] Pol. xxx. 14. Ἐφ' ὅσον γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων [ἐν Ἠπείρῳ] μετριώτεροι τὴν κατὰ τὴν Αἰτωλίαν ἦσαν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὁ προεστὼς αὐτῶν ἀσεβέστερος καὶ παρανομώτερος ὑπῆρχε τῶν ἄλλων. δοκῶ γὰρ μὴ γεγονέναι μηδ' ἔσεσθαι θηριωδέστερον ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ σκαιότερον Χάροπος.

[6] Ib. xxvii. 13. [7] Ib. 14. Cf. Liv. xlv. 26.

Epeiros was true to Rome;[1] that she did not remain so was the fault of the ultra-Roman party. The constant calumnies of Charops, the fate which they saw fall upon their fellow-patriots in Ætolia, at last drove Kephalos and his adherents openly to take the Macedonian side. Some of the more zealous partizans of Macedonia went so far as to make an attempt, in which they nearly succeeded, to seize the Roman Consul Aulus Hostilius and deliver him up to Perseus.[2] During the war, the different districts of the League seem to have been divided. While Phanotê in Chaonia stood a siege in the Macedonian interest, Thesprôtian auxiliaries served in the Roman army against it.[3] But, on the whole, Epeiros decidedly took the Macedonian side. Molossis had to be conquered as a hostile country by the Prætor Lucius Anicius. Theodotos and Antinoös died in defence of the old capital Passarôn, and Kephalos himself in defence of the Molossian town of Tekmôn.[4] The vengeance of Rome was terrible, and it was marked by equal baseness and cruelty. Lucius Æmilius, a man whose heart abhorred the vile business on which he was sent,[5] was the unwilling instrument of the wicked will of the Senate. By the foulest treachery all suspicion was lulled to sleep, and, in one day, seventy towns, mostly in Molossis, were destroyed, and one hundred and fifty thousand persons sold into slavery.[6] An Assembly was then held, representing what was left of the Epeirot League; some selected victims were carried to Rome, and Charops was left to tyrannize over the rest. What constitutional forms were preserved for him to abuse, we know not;[7] practically life and property were at the mercy of an oppressor who, whatever may have been the title he bore, was essentially of the same class as Nabis and Apollodôros.[8]

B.C. 170.

Geographical parties in Epeiros, B.C. 169.

Conquest and desolation of Epeiros, B.C. 167.

Tyranny of Charops, B.C. 167–157.

The fate of Bœotia was the most remarkable of all. It most

[1] Liv. xlii. 38; xliii. 5.

[2] Pol. xxvii. 14.

[3] Liv. xliii. 21 or 23.

[4] Ib. xlv. 26. To judge from Livy's account, the heroism of the chiefs would seem not to have been shared by the people. But one would like to have an Epeirot historian.

[5] Plut. Æm. 30. Αἰμίλιος τοῦτο πράξας μάλιστα παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἐπιεικῆ καὶ χρηστὴν οὖσαν.

[6] Pol. xxx. 15. Liv. xlv. 34. Plut. Æm. 29.

[7] In Pol. xxxii. 22, οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ Φοινίκῃ condemn certain men as enemies of Rome. Does this action on the part of a single city imply the formal dissolution of the League?

[8] See the details of his cruelties in Pol. xxxii. 21, 22.

clearly illustrates the detestable Roman policy of sowing dissension among the Grecian cities, and it shows how much the forms of the Greek Federal constitutions stood in the way of such intrigues. The Bœotian Confederation was not a threatening or a powerful state; but it was a little stronger and a little more independent than any or all of its cities could have been separately. Roman policy therefore seized with delight on any prospect of dissolving the League of Bœotia, as it would have seized with still greater delight on any prospect of dissolving the more powerful League of Achaia. The Bœotian League alone, among all the Greek states, had ventured to contract a formal alliance with Perseus.[1] This was before the war between Rome and Macedonia broke out; but of course the act was looked on at Rome as an act of hostility. On the first mission of Marcius and Atilius, they were met in Thessaly by Bœotian envoys, who were doubtless chosen from among the partizans of Rome. When they were rebuked for the dealings of the League with Macedonia, they had the indiscretion not only to lay the blame on Ismênias, the chief of the other party, but to add that the decree of alliance with Perseus had passed the Federal Assembly against the will of several of the cities.[2] The Roman caught eagerly at this opening; he would give every city of Bœotia an opportunity of speaking for itself; he would thus know which cities had really opposed the Macedonian alliance.[3] Some of the discontented cities at once sent separate embassies to Marcius.[4] What little Bœotian patriotism was left spent itself, after much tumult, in the election of Ismênias to the post of Federal General, and in an effort, under his management, to procure the Roman acceptance of a formal surrender of the League as a whole.[5] It was hoped that, by this step, the utter

Condition of Bœotia.

Bœotian alliance with Perseus, B.C. 173.

Intrigues of Q. Marcius, B.C. 171.

[1] According to the speech of Eumenês, Liv. xlii. 12.

[2] Ib. 38. Cum culpam in Ismeniam, principem alterius partis, conferrent, et quasdam civitates dissentientes in caussam deductas.

This of course only means that the votes of those cities were given against the Macedonian treaty. Such a minority would be in the position of the New England States during Madison's war with England.

[3] Liv. u.s. Appariturum id esse, Marcius respondit, singulis enim civitatibus de se ipsis consulendi potestatem facturos.

[4] Ib. 43.

[5] See Pol. xxvii. 1, 2 for an account of the whole dissension and tumult. The Thespian envoys come with a separate surrender, Ismênias comes with a surrender in the name of the whole League, which was just what Marcius wished to avoid; *κατὰ κοινὸν πάσας τὰς ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ πόλεις διδοὺς εἰς τὴν τῶν πρεσβευτῶν πίστιν. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἐναντιώτατον τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάρκιον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ πόλιν*

Dissolution of the League, B.C. 171.

dissolution of the Union would be avoided, at the expense of its becoming, like Ætolia, an acknowledged Roman dependency. This was exactly opposite to the wishes of Marcius, who contrived to obtain separate surrenders from all the cities, except Korôneia and Haliartos, which clave desperately to the cause of Perseus, and suffered the extremities of Roman cruelty in his behalf.[1] The Bœotian League, as a body with the least shadow of political independence, thus passes away for ever.[2]

Achaia during the war with Perseus.

Thus four out of the five Greek Federations vanish from the field of history. It remains to trace the fate of the Achaian League from the beginning of the war with Perseus to the extinction of Greek independence. Achaia was far more powerful, and enjoyed far more consideration, than any other state in Greece. All Peloponnêsos was united under a single free constitution; and, allowing for Spartan and Messênian dissatisfaction, it was still moved by a single will. Such a power was not altogether to be despised, least of all on the brink of a war with Macedonia. It might even have been thought that something like real goodwill and gratitude was due to faithful allies, who had served Rome well against Philip and Antiochos, and who were now so far from taking the side of Perseus that they had —on what special ground we know not—passed a decree forbidding any sort of intercourse between Achaia and Macedonia.[3] The result was that Achaian slaves ran away into Macedonia, and that there was no means of getting them back. Perseus, anxious to win the favour of the League, collected as many of the runaways as he could, and sent them back with a letter to the Achaian people, hinting that there was a way by which such losses could be hindered for the future. The President of the League was Xenarchos, whom Livy describes as a private partizan of Philip,[4] but, as he was the brother of Archôn, we may probably set him down as a statesman of the school of Lykortas. The greater part of the Assembly wished to repeal the decree; some were favourable to Macedonia; others wanted their slaves back again. Kallikratês of course opposed the

Decree of non-intercourse between Achaia and Macedonia.

Debate on its proposed repeal, B.C. 174.

διελεῖν τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς οἰκειότατον. So below, Marcius' object is said to be διαλῦσαι τῶν Βοιωτῶν τὸ ἔθνος καὶ λυμήνασθαι τὴν τῶν πολλῶν εὔνοιαν πρὸς τὴν Μακεδόνων οἰκίαν. So Liv. xlii. 44. *Id quod maxime volebant, discusso Bœotico concilio.*

[1] Liv. xlii. 63; xliii. 4.

[2] See above, p. 144.

[3] Livy, xli. 23.

[4] Ib. Qui privatæ gratiæ aditum apud Regem quærebat.

repeal; Archôn supported it. Achaia was the ally of Rome, ready, if war broke out, to assist Rome against Macedonia. But that was no reason why Macedonia should be thus politically excommunicated, why the same international courtesy should not take place between Achaia and Macedonia as between Achaia and any other power. The repeal however was deferred; Perseus was thought to have treated the League disrespectfully by merely sending a short letter and not an Embassy.[1] Presently he did send an Embassy to the next Federal Congress at Megalopolis, but the Roman party prevailed so far that his envoys were not allowed to address the Assembly. The next year Marcellus summoned an Achaian Assembly, and praised the League[2]—it had sunk to that point—for its refusal to repeal the anti-Macedonian decree.

Mission of Marcellus, B.C. 173.

Two years later, while Marcius and Atilius visited the Northern states, two Lentuli, Publius and Servius, went through the cities of Peloponnêsos, praising them for their constancy to Rome in the wars with Philip and Antiochos, and hoping that they would continue to follow the same path in the coming war with Perseus.[3] This diplomatic intercourse between a foreign power and particular cities was a manifest breach of the first principles of the League. It was worse even than the reception of envoys from discontented cities; it was a direct attempt to stir up discontent where no discontent existed. To exhort this or that city, and not the League as a whole, to retain its fidelity towards Rome was to recognize in each city a capacity for separate political action which the Federal Constitution forbade. One cannot doubt that the Lentuli would have been as well pleased to see the Achaian cities fall away from their Federal Union as their colleagues Marcius and Atilius were to see the like disruption take place in Bœotia. We may suspect that it had been arranged between them thus to labour for the same end in different parts of Greece. The cases indeed were different; Bœotia had concluded a treaty with the enemy; Achaia was so firm a friend of Rome as to refuse to Macedonia even common international courtesy. But a natural instinct led every Roman of the vulgar stamp to do all he could to weaken Greek Federalism, as being the source of all Greek independence and power. But, in this case, the insidious attempt wholly

Mission of the Lentuli, B.C. 171.

Roman dealings with individual cities.

[1] Liv. xli. 24 or 29.
[2] Ib. xlii. 6. Collaudata gente.
[3] Ib. 37.

failed; no Achaian city was tempted to fall away; the mission of the Lentuli excited only indignation mixed with contempt. For, in going through the several cities of the League, they addressed their praises of past fidelity to several commonwealths where they were wholly out of place. Elis and Messênê, which had fought for Antiochos against Rome, and, we may suppose, Sparta also, came in for the same praises as the elder cities of the League.[1]

Demands of Atilius and Marcius.

Shortly afterwards, Atilius and Marcius themselves came into Peloponnêsos. They had an interview with the Achaian General Archôn and his Ministry,[2] and demanded a body of a thousand Achaians to act as the garrison of Chalkis till the Roman army landed. To this Archôn consented. Considering the alliance between Achaia and Rome and the large powers of the Achaian General, this course was perhaps not absolutely illegal; Archôn was one of the sounder Achaian statesmen, and he was not likely to yield to any requests which directly contradicted the Federal Constitution. But it was a dangerous precedent for the Government thus to act upon its own responsibility, at the bidding of a foreign power. This again, like the mission of the Lentuli to the separate cities, may be looked at as another blow struck at the unity, and thereby at the independence, of the Achaian body.

Mission of Popillius and Octavius, B.C. 170.

Next came the mission of Popillius and Octavius,[3] which was ostensibly designed to stop such requisitions for the future. Such an order was in its place when addressed to Ætolia, which had become a Roman dependency, but it was a monstrous insult when it was addressed to an equal ally like the Achaian League.

[1] This is the meaning which I get out of Livy's words (xlii. 37), *Achæis indignantibus eodem se loco esse . . . quo Messenii atque Elei, etc.* Livy, as usual, does not understand Federal politics. The Achaians could not complain that two of their own cities were put on a level with themselves; but the whole body might complain that particular cities were dealt with at all, and the other cities might complain that such inappropriate praise was addressed to Elis and Messênê. Livy does not fully realize that Elis and Messênê were now Achaian cities, much as he once before (p. 458) fancied Elis to be an Achaian city before it became one. Cf. Schorn, p. 342.

[2] Pol. xxvii. 2. Ἐχρημάτισαν ταῖς συναρχίαις ταῖς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ παρεκάλεσαν Ἄρχωνα τὸν στρατηγόν, κ.τ.λ. This language clearly implies that it was an act of the General and his Cabinet (the δημιουργοί) only. Livy indeed says, Argis præbitum est iis *concilium*, ubi nihil aliud a gente Achæorum petierunt, etc. (xlii. 44). He probably misunderstood the term συναρχίαι, which is equivalent to συνάρχοντες, and that to δημιουργοί. See above, pp. 220, 506.

[3] See above, p. 518.

The decree forbade any city to grant military help to any Roman officer, except by order of the Senate.[1] This clearly implied that it was the duty of every Greek state to obey every order which really had the Senate's authority. Again, in defiance of all Federal rights, the Roman envoys went through the several cities, publishing the decree, enlarging on the virtues of the Senate, and threatening all who were not avowed supporters of Rome.[2] It was not till after this that they condescended to attend the Federal Assembly at Aigion. It was currently believed that they came with the design of accusing Lykortas, Polybios, and even Archôn, before the assembled People, as enemies of Rome. But they did not venture upon an accusation for which they found that there was absolutely no pretence. They therefore did not appear before the Assembly, but contented themselves with addressing a few words of compliment and exhortation to the Senate.[3]

Further inroads on Federal rights.

The intentions of Rome towards the League were now made manifest. Every Achaian statesman who was not Rome's abject slave might feel himself threatened by the behaviour of the Roman envoys both in Achaia and in other Greek states. The leading men of the moderate party now held a Convention, to settle their general course of action, and, among other things, to determine what candidates they would propose at the next Federal elections.[4] Lykortas exhorted to strict neutrality; it was not advisable to help either Rome or Macedonia in a struggle in which it was certain that the conqueror, whichever he might be, would prove a dangerous foe to Grecian freedom. On the other hand, to oppose Rome would be too great a risk; he at least would not venture on it; he had already too often opposed the most distinguished Romans and with too little success. Apollônidês of Sikyôn and Stratios of Tritaia took a

Convention of the Moderate Party, Autumn, B.C. 170.

[1] Liv. xliii. 17. Senatus-consultum . . . per omnes Peloponnesi urbes circumtulerunt, Ne quis ullam rem in bellum magistratibus Romanis conferret, præterquam quod Senatus censuisset.

[2] Pol. xxviii. 3.

[3] This seems on the whole to be the most likely meaning of the narrative in Polybios, where there certainly seems a marked opposition between *συναχθείσης τῆς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐκκλησίας* and *συναχθείσης αὐτοῖς τῆς βουλῆς*. But it is possible that it might be one of the cases (see above, p. 239) where the members of the *βουλή* practically discharged the functions of an *ἐκκλησία*, so that the body assembled might be called by either name. Livy (xliii. 17) is amusingly brief.

[4] Pol. xxviii. 6. This is the passage which I have already mentioned (p. 222) as having been so strangely misunderstood.

bolder line; they would not oppose Rome, but they would openly and vigorously oppose those among their own citizens who served Rome for their own private advantage. Archôn, on the other hand, argued that they must yield to the times, and give their enemies no occasion for calumny, lest they should share the fate of the Ætolian Nikander and his companions. The majority of the meeting, including Polybios himself, agreed in this view, and it was determined to support Archôn as a candidate for the Generalship, and Polybios for the office of Master of the Horse. This description of a private debate among the chief men of an Achaian party[1] is one of the most precious glimpses into Federal politics which the fragments of Polybios afford us. What would one not give for similar details of the political life of the League in earlier days?

Archôn General, B.C. 170–169.

Archôn then was elected General, with Polybios as his second in command, and the policy of the League was to be strict adherence to the Roman alliance, without any slavish subserviency to Roman dictation. Presently there came a communication from Attalos, brother of King Eumenês of Pergamos, asking for the restoration of his brother's honours.[2] As the President was favourable to the request,[3] the Ambassadors were introduced to the Assembly at the Spring Meeting.[4] The attendance was large; the multitude[5] was divided; many speeches were made; the restoration of the honours was opposed by a large party on both public and private grounds. Then followed loud calls for Archôn, who, as Head of the Government, was held to be bound to speak on such a subject.[6] He spoke, and that favourably to the proposal, but he spoke briefly; he had spent large sums on his costly office,[7] and he feared lest any strong support should be attributed to hopes of private advantage from a grateful monarch. Polybios then spoke himself; he showed that the decree under which the honours of Eumenês had been taken away had been misconceived, and carried out in a way not intended by

Embassy from Attalos, May, 169.

Debate on the restoration of Eumenês' honours.

[1] The names mentioned by Polybios are, Lykortas, Polybios, Arkesilaos, and Aristôn from Megalopolis; Archôn from Aigeira; Stratios from Tritaia; Xenôn from Patrai; Apollônidês from Sikyôn; and Polyainos, perhaps from the Triphylian Kyparissia (see Pol. xi. 18). Others of course may have been present.

[2] Pol. xxviii. 7. See above, p. 508.

[3] Ib. Προθύμως αὐτῷ κατανεύσαντες [οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄρχωνα] ὑπέσχοντο συμπράξειν ὑπὲρ τῶν παρακαλουμένων. See above, p. 224.

[4] Ib. Εἰς τὴν πρώτην ἀγοράν. But see p. 506, note 6.

[5] Ib. Ὁ μὲν ὄχλος ἄδηλος ἦν ἐπὶ τίνος ὑπάρχει γνώμης.

[6] See above, p. 228.

[7] See above, p. 229.

its original authors. It had never been intended to abolish all the honours voted to the King of Pergamos, but only such as were either formally illegal or else in some way disparaging to the dignity of the Achaian nation. A vote was accordingly passed to that effect, and the honours of Eumenês, with the necessary exceptions, were restored to him.[1] The account of this debate also, though its immediate subject is not very important, is one of the most valuable fragments of our history. The mode of conducting diplomatic business, the constitution of the Assembly, the position of the General, the costliness, and therefore the unpaid nature, of his office, are all clearly set forth in the incidental language of a historian who is now describing his own actions.

Negociations with Marcius, B.C. 169.

But much more important business was done in the same Assembly. Quintus Marcius was now in Thessaly. A decree was accordingly passed, on the motion of the General himself,[2] to help the Romans with the whole force of the League. This being carried, a series of more detailed resolutions were passed. It was voted that the General should collect the army, and make all preparations; that Polybios and some others should go as envoys to Marcius, offering the services of the League; that, if he accepted them, the other envoys should return with his message, but that Polybios should remain to undertake the commissariat department, and to provide supplies in all the towns through which the troops would have to pass. Marcius was found in the act of crossing over Mount Olympos into Pieria, when fresh troops were not what he most wanted. The Achaian envoys shared the difficulties of his passage,[3] and had a final interview with him when he had safely reached the Macedonian Hêrakleion. The other ambassadors now returned, but Polybios stayed with the Roman army. Presently Marcius heard that Appius Claudius, who had been lately defeated in Illyria, was asking the Achaians for five thousand men.[4] Marcius bade Polybios go and take care that the request of Appius should be refused—whether out of care for the Achaians or out of spite against Appius, Polybios does not venture to

[1] Pol. xxviii. 7, 10. Envoys were sent at the same time to the coronation (ἀνακλητήρια) of the young Ptolemy Philometôr, renewing the old friendly relations between his dynasty and the League.

[2] Ib. 10. Εἰσήνεγκαν οὖν [οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἄρχωνα] εἰς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς δόγμα.

[3] See Liv. xliv. 2 et seqq.

[4] Pol. xxviii. 11.

determine.[1] Polybios returned to Peloponnêsos; an Assembly at Sikyôn discussed the request of Appius. What was he to do? He could not venture to disobey the secret injunctions of the Consul, neither could he venture to reveal them. He had to oppose a Roman demand, without having any manifestly unanswerable reason to bring forward. At last he took the line that the request of Appius was contrary to the decree of the Senate brought by Octavius and Popillius. It was voted to refer the matter to Marcius, that is, to refuse the request of Appius. The Senate and the Consul were thus obeyed, but Polybios felt that his enemies had gained an excellent handle for calumniating him to Appius Claudius.

Polybios opposes Appius Claudius.

Embassy from the Ptolemies, B.C. 169–168.

The League had, as we have seen, just renewed its alliance with Egypt. In the course of the winter, envoys came from the two young Ptolemies, Philomêtôr and Euergetês, who were now reigning as joint Kings, asking for help against Antiochos Epiphanês of Syria. They asked for one thousand foot and two hundred horse, for Lykortas as commander of the whole force, and for his son Polybios as commander of the cavalry.[2] This sort of request plainly shows that, as compared with any power except Rome, the League still held a high place among nations. This embassy at once caused an open division between the two Achaian parties. Kallikratês, supported by Diophanês and Hyperbatos, were for refusing the required help; Lykortas, Archôn, and Polybios were for granting it. The matter was discussed in an Assembly at Corinth, at which few except Senators seem to have been present.[3] Kallikratês pleaded the general necessity of keeping quiet,[4] especially while the war between Rome and Macedon was still undecided. Lykortas and his son pleaded the Egyptian alliance, the benefits received from

[1] Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 464) adds, "But it might not be an improbable or unjust surmise, that he also wished to entrap the Achæans into a refusal which might afterwards be used as a ground of accusation against them."

[2] Pol. xxix. 8.

[3] See above, p. 240. From the context this would seem to have been an ordinary and not a special Meeting. If so, we have to choose between the Autumn Meeting of B.C. 169 and the Spring Meeting of B.C. 168. The words Κοΐντου τοῦ Φιλίππου [Quintus Marcius Philippus] τὴν παραχείμασίαν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ ποιουμένου, look like the earlier date, and the reference to the embassy of Polybios to Marcius as having taken place the year before (τῷ πρότερον ἔτει, c. 9) looks like the later. But τῷ πρότερον ἔτει may mean in the last *official* year, and on the other hand the παραχειμασία of Marcius seems to have practically lasted till the arrival of Æmilius.

[4] Pol. xxix. 8. Φάσκοντες δεῖν καθόλου μὲν μὴ πραγματοκοπεῖν.

the Egyptian Kings, and the fact that the Roman Consul had declined the offer of Achaian reinforcements. When the feeling of the Assembly seemed decidedly on the side of Lykortas, Kallikratês appealed to the presiding Ministers not to put the question, alleging some formal ground which hindered the present Assembly from entertaining it.[1] But, after a while, a Special Meeting was held at Sikyôn which was very largely attended.[2] Here the subject was fully discussed. Polybios set forth his case. The Romans did not need their help; the Consul Marcius had declined it; even if they needed it, twelve hundred men sent to help an old ally from whom they had received many benefits, would not hinder a state which could bring thirty or forty thousand soldiers into the field[3] from still helping Rome effectually. On the second day the formal proposals had to be made. Lykortas moved that the proposed auxiliary force be sent to Egypt. Kallikratês moved an amendment that, instead of troops, Ambassadors be sent to reconcile the Ptolemies with Antiochos. According to the forms of the Achaian Assembly, the decisive vote would not be taken till the next day,[4] but it was clear that the feeling of the House was strongly with Lykortas.[5] Kallikratês and his party now sought to compass their end in another way. A messenger, whose coming was probably preconcerted, entered the theatre with a letter from Marcius, requesting the Achaians, at the wish of the Senate, to send Ambassadors to reconcile the Kings. Polybios and his friends, not choosing directly to oppose a letter from a Roman Consul, withdrew their motion.[6] The amendment of Kallikratês was carried; three Ambassadors, Archôn of Aigeira, Arkesilaos and Aristôn of

Debate at Sikyôn on the Egyptian question, B.C. 168.

[1] Pol. xxix. 9. Οἱ περὶ τὸν Καλλικράτην ἐξέβαλον τὸ διαβούλιον, διασείσαντες τοὺς ἄρχοντας ὡς οὐκ οὔσης ἐξουσίας κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἐν ἀγορᾷ βουλεύεσθαι περὶ βοηθείας. I do not profess to know what the impediment was. Tittmann (684) supposes it to refer to some religious objection to the ἀγορά as a place of Meeting. The next Assembly (c. 10) was held in the theatre. Considering what follows, one might think that the objection was to the smallness of the attendance, but it is not easy to see why a thinly-attended Meeting, or one attended only by Senators, should be called ἀγορά.

[2] Ib. Μετὰ δέ τινα χρόνον συγκλήτου συναχθείσης εἰς τὴν τῶν Σικυωνίων πόλιν, ἐν ᾗ συνέβαινε μὴ μόνον συμπορεύεσθαι τὴν βουλήν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τοὺς ἀπὸ τριάκοντα ἐτῶν. See above, pp. 205, note 3, 240, note 4.

[3] Ib. Καλῶς γὰρ ποιοῦντας αὐτοὺς καὶ τρεῖς ἄγειν καὶ τέτταρας μυριάδας ἀνδρῶν μαχίμων.

[4] See above, p. 215, note 3.

[5] Ib. Πάλιν δὲ τῶν διαβουλίων προτεθέντων ἀγὼν ἐγίγνετο νεανικὸς, πολύ γε μὴν ὑπερεῖχον οἱ περὶ τὸν Λυκόρταν.

[6] Ib. 10. Ἀνεχώρησαν ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων.

Megalopolis, were to be sent on an errand which Roman diplomacy had failed to effect.[1] Then the Alexandrian envoys handed to the presiding Ministers[2] a letter from the Kings which they had ready for the purpose, asking that Lykortas and Polybios might still be sent, seemingly to help with their counsel in the war with Antiochos.

## § 4. *From the Conquest of Macedonia to the Dissolution of the Achaian League*

B.C. 167–146

Effects of the Conquest of Macedonia on the relations between Rome and Achaia.

The discussion on the proposed aid to Egypt took place in the early part of the year 168, before the coming of Æmilius and the battle of Pydna. That great victory marks another stage in the demeanour of the Romans towards the Greek states. The defeat of Antiochos emboldened them to treat their allies as dependents; the defeat of Perseus emboldened them to treat their dependents as slaves. We have seen how they dealt with other Greek states; how Leagues were dissolved and cities destroyed; how the citizens of independent commonwealths were summoned before Roman tribunals, and sent off to Rome to meet with such justice as they might find there. The Achaian League could hardly be dealt with in quite so summary a way. If no gratitude was felt for its signal services, some little respect was still felt for a commonwealth which could arm forty thousand soldiers, and whose alliance was eagerly sought for by the Kings of Egypt and Asia. Achaia could indeed be conquered, like Macedonia, and conquered doubtless more easily than Macedonia had been. But it might need to be conquered; it was not clear that the League would, like the feebler states, at once obey any orders which Rome might please to issue. Kallikratês indeed hastened to Amphipolis, along with his kindred spirits from Ætolia and Epeiros;[3] but the suspected Achaians were not summoned along with the suspected Ætolians and Epeirots. The reason is plain; they would most likely not have come, if they had been summoned, and Kallikratês and the other slaves of Rome might have been endangered by the demand. And in

[1] Pol. xxix. 10. Οἱ γὰρ περὶ τὸν Τίτον [Νεμέσιον?] ἀδυνατήσαντες διαλύειν ἀνακεχωρήκεισαν εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην ἄπρακτοι τελέως.

[2] Ib. Ἀνέδωκαν τοῖς ἄρχουσι.

[3] Ib. xxx. 10.

truth there was no sort of excuse for summoning them; nothing had been found among the papers of the fallen King which implicated any Achaian citizen.[1] Therefore, instead of the Achaians being sent for like the other Greeks, two of the Roman Commissioners, Cnæus Domitius and Caius Claudius, were sent as Ambassadors to the Achaian Assembly. The share of Æmilius in this business was wholly against his will; he was an honest man and hated wretches like Lykiskos and Kallikratês.[2] But his colleagues were too much for him, and here, just as in Epeiros, he was made the instrument of iniquity which he abhorred.

Embassy of Domitius and Claudius, B.C. 167.

The envoys came, but unluckily no contemporary account of their reception has been preserved. There is here a sad gap among the fragments of Polybios, and we have no longer so much as Livy's translation to fill up the blank. Our sole authority for details is the late and careless antiquary Pausanias. According to him, one Roman Commissioner, whose name he does not mention, was introduced into the Assembly by Kallikratês.[3] The Roman affirmed that the chief men of Achaia had helped Perseus during the war with supplies of money and in other ways. He called on the Assembly to condemn them to death; when they were condemned, he would name them. An Assembly whose older members could remember the days of Aratos had not quite sunk to such degradation as this. If any Achaians had aided Perseus, let the Romans name them; at all events no citizen of the League should be condemned unheard. Prompted by Kallikratês, the envoy answered that all the former Generals of the Achaians were guilty, all were partizans of Macedonia.[4]

Demand of the Romans

Up started Xenôn of Patrai, a name already known to us as a statesman of the moderate party;[5] "Then I am one who come under the charge; I have been General of the Achaians; yet I have never done any wrong to Rome or shown any favour to

Challenge of Xenôn.

[1] Pol. xxx. 10. So Livy, xlv. 31.

[2] Ib. Ὁ στρατηγὸς [Λεύκιος Αἰμίλιος] . . . . οὐκ εὐδοκούμενος κατά γε τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ταῖς τῶν περὶ τὸν Λύκισκον καὶ Καλλικράτην διαβολαῖς.

[3] Paus. vii. 10. 7. Ἕνα δέ τινα ἐξ αὐτῶν, ἄνδρα οὐδαμῶς ἐς δικαιοσύνην πρόθυμον, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα προσεποιήσατο ὁ Καλλικράτης ἐς τοσοῦτον ὥστε αὐτὸν καὶ ἐς τὸ συνέδριον ἐσελθεῖν τὸ Ἀχαιῶν ἔπεισεν. On συνέδριον see above, p. 205, note 1.

[4] Ib. 10. 9. Ἀπετόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς οἱ ἐστρατηγηκότες Ἀχαιῶν ἐνέχονται πάντες τῇ αἰτίᾳ. But it must be meant, as Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 466) says, of those only who had been Generals since the beginning of the war. Kallikratês himself had filled the office.

[5] See above, p. 526, note 1.

Perseus; I am ready to be tried on such a charge by the Assembly of the Achaians or even by the Romans themselves." The conscious innocence of Xenôn had carried him too far.[1] The Roman caught at the imprudent challenge; he demanded that all whom Kallikratês named should be sent for trial to Rome.

Deportation of the Thousand Achaians, B.C. 167.

Sent to Rome they were, above a thousand of the best men of Achaia; whether they were carried off by sheer force, or whether the Assembly was so cowed as to pass the required vote, does not clearly appear. Most probably some sort of vote was passed; for the Senate had the mean hypocrisy to reply to one—perhaps the first—of the many Achaian embassies sent on their behalf, that they wondered at the Achaians applying in favour of men whom they had themselves condemned.[2] Now the Achaian Assembly had most certainly not condemned these men; it had at most sent them to Rome for trial, though indeed to send them to Rome for trial might be looked on as much the same thing as condemning them. Still such an answer seems to imply an Achaian vote of some kind; even the diplomatic impudence of the Roman Senate could hardly have ventured on such an assertion, if the victims had been carried off by mere Roman violence. It is clear that the Achaians were simple enough to believe that their countrymen would receive some sort of trial; nay, as there was really nothing whatever to compromise them, they seem to have gone so far as to hope that a trial would prove their innocence, and that they would be restored to their country. Instead of this they were quartered—under what degree of restraint does not appear—in various Etruscan towns, in a dull provincial solitude, out of the reach of either Greek or Roman political life.

Embassies on behalf of the exiles, B.C. 164–151.

Several embassies applied in vain for their release. One, which is described by Polybios, pleaded, in rejoinder to the Senate, that the exiles had never been condemned, and directly begged that the Senate would either bring them to trial itself, or allow the Achaians to try them. Nothing could less suit the Senate's purpose. A fair trial, whether at Rome or in Achaia, could only lead to an acquittal; and a release of the victims, whether after trial or without, was held to be dangerous to the interests alike of Rome herself and of the Roman party in Achaia.

Insidious reply of the Senate.

The Senate, thus driven to unmask itself, distinctly declared that their release was inexpedient both for Rome and for Achaia.

[1] Paus. vii. 10. 10. Ὁ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ συνειδότος ἐπαρρησιάζετο ἀγαθοῦ.

[2] Pol. xxxi. 8.

But, in the very form of its answer, it took care to strike another blow at that Federal unity which it so deeply hated and dreaded. The legal description of the Union was carefully avoided, and a form of words[1] was employed which could only be meant as another insidious attempt to stir up division. At this answer the people everywhere mourned, not only in Achaia but throughout all Greece.[2] But Kallikratês, Charops, and their fellows rejoiced, and ruled everywhere still more undisturbed, while the flower of the Greek nation languished in their Etruscan prisons.

Position of Polybios at Rome.

One only among these victims of Roman treachery seems to have been less harshly dealt with than his fellows. Polybios, through the friendship of Æmilius and his son the younger Scipio, found a shelter in that great patrician house,[3] and there, by familiar intercourse with the greatest men of Rome, he had those wide views of politics and history thrown open to him of which we reap the fruit in his immortal work. But by thus becoming a citizen of the world, his patriotism as a citizen of Achaia was somewhat dulled. He still loved his country; he lived to do her important services; but, from this time onwards, his tone becomes Roman rather than Achaian. He looks at Greek affairs rather with the eye of a Roman philhellen, a Flamininus or an Æmilius, than with the national patriotism of Philopoimên or Lykortas or himself in his earlier days. The Senate refused his release and that of Stratios,[4] when they were the only men of importance surviving. Yet it was at last through his influence[5] that, in the seventeenth year of their bondage, after many fruitless embassies,[6] such of the exiles as still survived, now less than three hundred in number, were allowed to return to their homes.[7]

Release of the exiles, B.C. 151.

The treatment of these kidnapped Achaians was probably the most brutal and treacherous piece of tyranny of which a civilized state was ever guilty towards an equal ally which had faithfully

[1] Pol. xxxi. 8. Ἔγραψαν ἀπόκρισιν τοιαύτην, ὅτι ἡμεῖς οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνομεν συμφέρειν [οὔτε ἡμῖν] οὔτε τοῖς ὑμετέροις δήμοις τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς οἶκον. Now οἱ ὑμέτεροι δῆμοι can only mean the several cities separately. But the interest of the several Achaian cities was no affair of the Roman Senate. It was only with the ἔθνος or κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν that they could have any lawful dealings.

[2] Pol. u.s. Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα διαγγελθείσης τῆς ἀποκρίσεως τῆς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς δεδομένης ὑπὲρ τῶν καταιτιαθέντων, τὰ μὲν πλήθη συνετρίβη ταῖς διανοίαις, κ.τ.λ.

[3] Ib. xxxii. 9.

[4] Ib. 7.

[5] Plut. Cat. Maj. 9.

[6] Paus. vii. 10. 11. Pol. xxxiii. 1, 2, 13.

[7] Paus. vii. 10. 12.

Dealings of Rome with foreign nations.

discharged all the duties of alliance.[1] Rome, in her dealings with foreign nations, knew neither mercy nor justice. It is in this unfavourable light that the City and most of her citizens appear to a student of Grecian history; but it must not be forgotten that Roman vices and Roman virtues sprang from the same source, and that the men who sacrificed the rights of other nations to the interests of Rome were often equally ready to sacrifice themselves and all that they had in the same cause. The man who, in dealing with strangers, appeared only as a brutal conqueror or a base intriguer, often retained every old Roman virtue at the hearth of his own house and in the forum of his own city. It had long been held to be the duty of every Roman to use every means to break the power of any state which still retained strength or independence inconsistent with Rome's claim to universal dominion. The deportation of the Achaian patriots was only one act, though the basest, in a long series of treacherous attempts against the union and freedom of the League. It is even possible that it was only with a sinister purpose that the Senate at last consented to their release. Their advocate Cato obtained their enlargement by an appeal to the contemptuous pity of his hearers rather than to any nobler feeling.[2] It may be that the Senate foresaw what would come, and set free its victims mainly in order to secure fresh opportunities for intrigue and for final conquest.

Fresh intrigues of Rome.

Even while the flower of the nation was thus detained in Italy, Rome did not cease from her intrigues against the integrity of the Achaian Union. It is impossible to conceive a greater tribute to the importance and benefit of the Federal tie than these constant attempts to dissolve it on the part of the enemy of all Grecian freedom. The discontent of Sparta, never perhaps fully appeased, once more furnished the occasion. There was a dispute about frontiers between the Cantons of Sparta and Megalopolis,[3] perhaps the old dispute which Philopoimên had

Dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis.

[1] Mommsen, who cannot understand that a weak state can have any rights against a strong one, does not forsake his friends even in this extremity. The deportation of the Achaians is recorded by him (i. 596) without a word of disapproval; indeed he seems to think it all right and proper; the object was "die kindische Opposition [is that German?] der Hellenen mundtodt zu machen."

[2] Plut. Cat. Maj. 9.

[3] Pol. xxxi. 9. Pausanias (vii. 11. 1) makes it a dispute between Sparta and Argos. See Schorn, 377. Considering that the maritime towns of Lakônia were

somewhat arbitrarily decided in favour of his own city.[1] Caius Sulpicius Gallus, one of the most distinguished Romans of his time, was going into Asia to collect accusations against King Eumenês;[2] for friendly Kings, when they had served their turn, fared no better at the hands of Rome than friendly commonwealths. He was ordered to stop and settle this little matter on his way, and also, if report says truly, to detach as many cities as he could from the Achaian League.[3] Sulpicius thought it beneath him personally to decide a matter which, as Pausanias remarks,[4] the great Philip had not thought beneath him; he bade Kallikratês judge between the two contending Cantons. The other part of his commission almost wholly failed. All the cities of Peloponnêsos—Sparta, it would seem, included—knew their interest too well to listen to any intrigues against an Union to which they owed whatever amount of freedom and prosperity they still retained. The Ætolian Pleurôn alone, an outlying Canton unnaturally attached to the Peloponnêsian Confederacy, asked for licence to secede. Sulpicius bade his envoys go and ask leave of the Senate, which of course gladly granted it.[5]

Mission of C. Sulpicius Gallus, B.C. 166–159.

Separation of Pleurôn from the League.

Yet even now the League retained a degree of power which made its alliance or enmity of importance to foreign states. And in truth the union of all Peloponnêsos formed a power which could have held its own against any kingdom or commonwealth then existing, except Rome itself. There was now a war between Rhodes and Crete. Each party asked for Achaian help; the Ambassadors were heard;[6] the Assembly was strongly disposed to assist Rhodes; but Kallikratês said that the League ought not to make war or alliance with any one without the consent of Rome. No such engagement had ever been entered into: Achaia was not a dependency like Ætolia, but an equal ally; and nothing in the treaty with Rome forbade the League to take any part it chose in such a quarrel. But the voice of Kallikratês was cer-

Debate on the Cretan alliance, B.C. 152.

now independent of Sparta, it may be doubted whether the Cantons of Sparta and Argos were conterminous.

[1] See above, p. 503.

[2] Pol. xxxi. 10.

[3] Paus. vii. 11. 3. Προσεπεστάλη δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς τῷ Γάλλῳ πόλεις ὁπόσας ἐστὶν οἷός τε ὡς πλείστας ἀφεῖναι συλλόγου τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν.

[4] Ib. 11. 2.

[5] Ib. 11. 3. Ἐπετράπη δὲ ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων συνεδρίου τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν ἀποστῆναι.

[6] Pol. xxxiii. 15. We here get a glimpse of the mode of transacting business of this kind. The Ambassadors of both sides are heard; then they retire, and the citizens debate the question among themselves. The Cretan envoy Antiphatas

tainly the voice of prudence; hated as he was—for men shrank from the commonest social intercourse with him [1]—the Assembly listened on such occasions to the man who spoke the will of the Roman Senate.[2]

Return of Stratios and Polybios, B.C. 151.

At last the exiles returned; it might have been better for Greece if they had died in their bondage. Except Polybios and Stratios, no man of any eminence or experience survived among them. The rest had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and they came back full of a deadly hatred towards Rome, which a sojourn among her Italian allies was perhaps not likely to diminish. Stratios returned, to play, almost alone in the last days of Achaia, the part of a prudent and honest statesman. Polybios returned also, but only for a season. Probably he found that he could do his country more real service by acting as her advocate with his powerful Roman friends than by mingling personally in the affairs of a commonwealth between whose leaders and himself there could now be little sympathy.[3] From this moment the violent anti-Roman party had the upper hand in the councils of the League. We have now reached the beginning of the series of events which brought about the final overthrow of the last remains of Grecian independence.

Causes of the final war with Rome. Disputes between Athens and Orôpos, B.C. 156–150.

As Athens was the immediate cause of the war between the Romans and Philip,[4] so Athens was the immediate cause of the war between the Romans and the League. The strange relations now existing between Athens and Orôpos do not concern our purpose except in two points. The independent action of Orôpos throughout the story bears witness to the utter extinction of the Bœotian League, and we may see another attempt of Rome to reduce the League of Achaia to the same level, when the Senate thought proper to nominate the single city of Sikyôn as arbiter of the dispute.[5] Here, as in the mission of Gallus, and indeed in every other act of the Roman Government, we see the same insidious endeavour to tempt the Achaian cities to separate

was, by the favour of the General, allowed to return and make a second speech; but the proceeding was clearly irregular.

[1] See the curious details in Pol. xxx. 20. The boys in the streets hooted after Kallikratês and Andrônidas as traitors; men would not bathe in the same water with them.

[2] See Thirlwall, viii. 472.

[3] See Ib. 476.

[4] See above, p. 473.

[5] Paus. vii. 11. 4.

political action, contrary to the constitution of the League. At a later stage in the dispute, the injured Orôpians brought their wrongs directly before the Federal Assembly.[1] The Assembly had no wish for a needless war with Athens, and declined to interfere in the matter. But the League had now fallen so low that its Chief Magistrate was open to a bribe. The present General was a Spartan named Menalkidas, a fact which shows that there was at least no open dispute at this time between Sparta and the Federal power. The Orôpians promised this man ten talents, as the price of his bringing an Achaian army to their help; Menalkidas prudently promised half his gains to Kallikratês; and, by the joint influence of the two, a decree was passed for assisting Orôpos against Athens. Menalkidas however, Spartan as he was, proved a General of the school of Aratos rather than of that of Kleomenês. Like Aratos in Bœotia,[2] Menalkidas came too late; the Athenians had pillaged Orôpos before he got there. Then Menalkidas and Kallikratês wished to invade Attica, but the troops, especially the Lacedæmonian contingent, refused to serve for such a purpose. They might well plead that a defensive alliance with Orôpos, which was probably all that the Assembly had decreed,[3] did not justify offensive operations against Athens. The army thus returned without doing anything; but Menalkidas took care to exact his ten talents from the Orôpians, and took equal care not to pay the five which he had promised to Kallikratês.[4] As soon as Menalkidas' official year was over, Kallikratês impeached him before the Assembly on a charge of treason.[5] He had, so his accuser said, gone as an Ambassador to Rome—doubtless a private Ambassador from Sparta—and had there acted against the interests of the League, by trying to separate Sparta from

A Spartan General of the League.

Achaian interference at Orôpos, B.C. 150.

November? B.C. 150.

[1] Paus. vii. 11. 7.

[2] See above, p. 293.

[3] Compare the relations between Athens, Korkyra, and Corinth. Thuc. i. 44.

[4] I tell the story as I find it in our only authority (Paus. vii. 11. 7—12. 3). But narratives of secret corruption, though probable enough in the main, are always suspicious in their details, and are likely to contain as much of gossip as of real history. It is especially hard to understand how Menalkidas could have exacted the money from the Orôpians against their will—*ὅμως ὑπὸ Μεναλκίδα τὰ χρήματα ἐξεπράχθησαν.*

[5] Paus. vii. 12. 2. *Παυσάμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς Μεναλκίδαν ἐδίωκεν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς θανάτου δίκην.* It is dangerous to draw political inferences from the language of Pausanias in the way that we do from that of Polybios. Do the words *παυσάμενον τῆς ἀρχῆς* imply something like an Attic *εὐθύνη* at the end of the Presidential year, or are we to infer that the President could not be impeached while he remained in office?

it. Now, as Menalkidas could hardly have done this during his term of office, it would have been more seemly to have brought these charges a year sooner, as reasons against electing him to the Generalship. Diaios of Megalopolis succeeded Menalkidas as General; his predecessor now gave him three of his talents to get him off the charge. This the new General did, and incurred much unpopularity by so doing.

Generalship of Diaios, B.C. 150–149.

The impeachment of Menalkidas seems to have stirred up once more the old Spartan dislike to the Achaian connexion. We now hear of yet another Lacedæmonian embassy to Rome about the disputed frontier. The real rescript of the Senate is said to have ordered Sparta to submit to the judgement of the Federal Assembly on all matters not touching life and death.[1] This answer must have been pleaded on the Spartan side at a meeting of the Assembly. Diaios then affirmed that the exception was not genuine; he maintained that the lives of the Lacedæmonians present were at the mercy of the Assembly, and he seems to have called upon them at once to stand their trial on a charge of treason.[2] The Spartans proposed to appeal to the Roman Senate; the President quoted that great and primary article of the Federal Constitution, engraved no doubt on every pillar in every city, which forbade any single State to hold diplomatic intercourse with foreign powers.[3] War now broke out between the League and its troublesome member, though Diaios took care to affirm that he made war, not on Sparta, but on the disturbers of her peace.[4] The Spartans, unable to resist the whole force of the Union, sent private embassies to the General and to the several cities. They got the same answer everywhere; no city could refuse its contingent to an expedition lawfully ordered by the Federal General.[5] Diaios now advanced on Sparta. By this time any real Unionist sentiment which existed there must have been pretty well stifled; the State

Disputes with Sparta, B.C. 149.

[1] Paus. vii. 12. 4. Καταφεύγουσι δὲ αὐτοῖς προεῖπεν ἡ βουλὴ δικάζεσθαι τὰ ἄλλα πλὴν ψυχῆς ἐν συνεδρίῳ τῷ Ἀχαιῶν.

[2] Ib. 5. Οἱ μὲν δὴ δικάζειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ἠξίουν καὶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἑκάστου ψυχῆς.

[3] Ib. Ἀχαιοὶ δὲ ἀντελαμβάνοντο αὖθις ἄλλου λόγου, πόλεις ὅσαι τελοῦσιν ἐς Ἀχαιοὺς μηδεμίαν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς καθεστηκέναι κυρίαν ἄνευ τοῦ κοινοῦ τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν παρὰ Ῥωμαίους ἰδίᾳ πρεσβείαν ἀποστέλλειν. See above, p. 204.

[4] Ib. 6. Ἔφασκεν οὐ τῇ Σπάρτῃ τοῖς δὲ ταράσσουσιν αὐτὴν πολεμήσων ἀφίξεσθαι.

[5] Ib. Αἱ μὲν δὴ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ αἱ πόλεις ἐποιοῦντο τὰς ἀποκρίσεις, οὔ σφισιν ἔξοδον ἐπαγγέλλοντος στρατηγοῦ παρακούειν εἶναι νόμον.

Government[1] however did not venture on open resistance. They asked the General to name the guilty persons; he named twenty-four of the chief citizens of Sparta. One Agasisthenês, a leading Spartan, then suggested an ingenious way of at least staving off the danger. Let the twenty-four at once fly to Rome, where they would undoubtedly find means of restoration. When they are gone, let the Spartan Government condemn them to death, and so save appearances with the League. So they did; and Diaios and Kallikratês were sent to Rome after them by the Federal Government. Kallikratês died on the road; Pausanias doubts whether his death at such a moment was a gain or a loss to his country.[2] It is at least possible that he might have prevented some of the evils which followed. Diaios and Menalkidas disputed before the Senate, and carried off a rescript, which either must have been singularly ambiguous, or else one party or the other must have lied even beyond the usual measure of diplomatists. According to Pausanias, the real answer was simply that the Senate would send Ambassadors to settle all differences on the spot. But Diaios affirmed in the Federal Assembly that the Lacedæmonians were ordered to submit to the Federal power in everything. Menalkidas meanwhile affirmed in the State Assembly of Sparta that the Senate had decreed that Sparta should be wholly separated from the League.[3] Damokritos now succeeded Diaios in the Generalship, and made vigorous preparations for war with Sparta.

Diaios before Sparta.

Death of Kallikratês, B.C. 149.

Damokritos elected General, November, B.C. 149.

Rome was just now engaged in a fourth Macedonian War. The four Republics, as might be expected, did not answer;[4] a claimant of the crown, a real or pretended Philip, arose, and ran through a brief alternation of victory and defeat, much like those of the other Philip and of Perseus. The war ended in the

Fourth Macedonian War, B.C. 149–148.

[1] Pausanias (vii. 12. 7) calls them *οἱ γέροντες*. If one could feel sure that he found this word in Polybios, one would infer that the old Spartan constitution had been partially restored since the innovations of Philopoimên.

[2] Ib. 8. *Οὐδὲ οἶδα εἰ ἀφικόμενος ἐς Ῥώμην ὠφέλησεν ἄν τι Ἀχαιοὺς ἢ κακῶν σφίσιν ἐγένετο μειζόνων ἀρχή.* Dr. Elder (Dict. Biog. art. Callicrates) somewhat oddly translates this, "His death being, for aught I know, a clear gain to his country."

[3] Ib. 9. *Τοὺς μὲν δὴ [Ἀχαιοὺς] παρῆγεν ὁ Δίαιος ὡς τὰ πάντα ἔπεσθαι Λακεδαιμόνιοι σφισιν ὑπὸ τῆς Ῥωμαίων βουλῆς εἰσὶν ἐγνωσμένοι· Λακεδαιμονίους δὲ ὁ Μεναλκίδας ἠπάτα παντελῶς τοῦ συνεδρεύειν ἐς τὸ Ἀχαϊκὸν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων αὐτοὺς ἀπηλλάχθαι.*

[4] Pol. xxxi. 12. *Συνέβαινε γὰρ τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἀήθεις ὄντας δημοκρατικῆς καὶ συνεδριακῆς πολιτείας στασιάζειν πρὸς αὐτούς.* See above, p. 516, note 1.

Mediation of Q. Cæcilius Metellus.

reduction of Macedonia to a Roman Province. Just at this moment, the Prætor Quintus Cæcilius Metellus, who fills in this war the place of Flamininus and Æmilius in the former wars, entered Macedonia. Metellus was a man of much the same stamp as his two great predecessors, a brave and skilful soldier, a faithful servant of Rome, but evidently disposed to deal as gently with Grecian enemies as he could. As some Roman Ambassadors were passing by on their road to Asia, they turned aside, at his request, and asked the Achaian Government [1] to suspend hostilities till the Commissioners should come from Rome to settle the differences between Sparta and the League. Damokritos would not hearken, and by this time the old Spartan spirit was aroused. A pitched battle took place; the Spartans, far inferior in numbers, were utterly routed; Damokritos, it was thought, might have taken the city if he had chosen. He was tried as a traitor, perhaps when his year of office had expired,[2] and was condemned to a fine of fifty talents. He went into exile, and Diaios succeeded him as General. Metellus now sent another embassy, again asking the new General to refrain from any further action against Sparta till the Roman Commissioners should come. He promised to obey, and he did obey so far as not to carry on any open hostilities; but he left Federal garrisons in those Lakônian towns which were now independent members of the League, and which were doubtless the bitterest enemies of Sparta to be found in the whole compass of the Union.[3] We may well believe that neither the citizens of these towns nor the Federal garrisons placed in them were very strict in observing the armistice. Menalkidas was now General of the seceding State; he took and plundered Iasos, one of these free Lakônian towns, and thus was guilty of a more direct breach of the truce

Victory and banishment of Damokritos, B.C. 148. Second Generalship of Diaios, B.C. 148–147.

[1] Paus. vii. 13. 2. Τοῖς ἡγεμόσι τοῖς Ἀχαιῶν ἐς λόγους ἐλθεῖν. If this were in Polybios, I should take this to mean that a message was delivered to the Achaian Cabinet without summoning the Assembly; but it is dangerous to make inferences from Pausanias. On the word ἡγεμών cf. p. 234, note 1.

[2] See Ib. 5. Thirlwall, viii. 486.

[3] This must be the meaning of the words of Pausanias (vii. 13. 6), τὰ ἐν κύκλῳ τῆς Σπάρτης πολίσματα ἐς τὴν Ἀχαιῶν ὑπηγάγετο εὔνοιαν, ἐσήγαγε δὲ ἐς αὐτὰ καὶ φρουράς, ὁρμητήρια ἐπὶ τὴν Σπάρτην Ἀχαιοῖς εἶναι. Pausanias presently speaks of Iasos as *subject* to the Achaians—Ἀχαιῶν ἐν τῷ τότε ὑπήκοον. See above, p. 485, note 3. Of this Iasos I can find no mention elsewhere. Probably it was one of the six Eleutherolakônic towns which were reannexed by Sparta, and which therefore do not appear in the list given by Pausanias.

than Diaios himself.[1] Popular indignation was aroused against him at Sparta, and he put himself out of the way by poison. Suicide of Menalkidas, B.C. 147.

At last the Roman ministers arrived. By this time the Macedonian War was ended, and its successful conclusion, just like those of the wars with Antiochos and Perseus, enabled the Romans to take a higher tone than ever with their Greek allies. Hitherto the Senate had clearly temporized, and had used designedly ambiguous language. It now spoke out plainly enough. The Ambassadors — judges[2] they are called by Pausanias — came to Corinth, the head of the legation being Lucius Aurelius Orestes. They began, if the words of our informant are to be taken literally, by a more daring breach of all Federal right than any on which they had yet ventured. Instead of communicating their errand, first to the Federal Government, and then to the Federal Assembly, they summoned an utterly unconstitutional meeting of the magistrates of the several cities,[3] who had no sort of authority to receive communications from foreign powers. The message with which they were charged was the most daring attack on the integrity of the Union that had yet been made. The Roman Senate thought it good that neither Lacedæmon nor Corinth nor Argos nor Hêrakleia nor Orchomenos should any longer form part of the League. None of them were really Achaian cities; all were

Embassy of L. Aurelius Orestes, B.C. 147.

Extravagant demands of the Romans.

[1] Pausanias (vii. 13. 8) thus sums up his character; Μεναλκίδᾳ μὲν τέλος τοιοῦτον ἐγένετο, ἄρξαντι ἐν τῷ [ἑαυτοῦ νῷ] τότε μὲν Λακεδαιμονίων ὡς ἂν ὁ ἀμαθέστατος στρατηγὸς, πρότερον δὲ ἔτι τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν ἔθνους ὡς ἂν ἀνθρώπων ὁ ἀδικώτατος.

There was not however much to choose between the Secessionist and the Federal commander. It must have been shortly before this time that Diaios caused one Philinos of Corinth and his young sons to be tortured till they died, on a charge of dealing with Menalkidas. (Pol. xl. 5.) These horrors are quite unknown in the better days of the League, unless in the single doubtful case of Aristomachos. See above, p. 384, note 3.

[2] Paus. vii. 14. 1. Οἱ ἀποσταλέντες ἐκ Ῥώμης Λακεδαιμονίοις δικασταὶ καὶ Ἀχαιοῖς γενέσθαι.

[3] Ib. Τούς τε ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ Δίαιον ἐκάλει παρ' αὐτόν. Justin, xxxiv. 1. *Omnium civitatium principibus Corinthum evocatis.*

It is hard to see who can be meant by this description, except the local magistrates. Of course to address them, instead of the Federal Cabinet, would be quite in the spirit of the Roman policy. It was doubtless hoped, by the compliment thus paid to State, at the expense of Federal, authority, to awaken any lurking Secessionist tendencies which might exist among the cities. The proceeding itself, in point of constitutional right, was as if a foreign power, in transacting business with the United States, should address itself to the several State Governors.

late additions to the Confederation.[1] The cause for the selection of these particular cities is not quite obvious. If we count the accession of Corinth and Argos from their recovery in the days of Flamininus,[2] all these cities were late acquisitions, and, in a certain sense, they were all Roman gifts. But so, in the same sense, were Elis, Messênê, and the Triphylian and Lakônian towns, none of which are mentioned. It may be that the Senate counted on a lurking feeling of disloyalty in Elis and Messênê, while to cut away Argos and Corinth was to cut away the very vitals of the League. At Argos and Corinth any tendency to Secession had yet to be awakened; the Corinthians especially, though their fathers had fought valiantly against forcible reunion,[3] were now equally strenuous against forcible separation. The irregular Assembly which the Romans had got together knew not how to act or how to answer; they could hardly bear to hear the insolent barbarian to the end of his speech. They then rushed into the streets, and gathered together what they called an Assembly of the Achaian People, but which was really an Assembly only of the Corinthian mob.[4] Its fury spent itself in acts of violence against all Spartans who chanced to be present in Corinth, and seemingly against some persons who were falsely taken for Spartans. The Roman envoys themselves were not actually hurt, but they were at any rate frightened, and the sanctity of their domicile was violated, Spartans or supposed Spartans being dragged from the house where Aurelius lodged. These breaches of International Law formed an admirable handle for the Romans, and Aurelius did not fail to warn and protest. When the people came a little to their senses, the real Lacedæmonians were put in prison, while the strangers who had merely the ill luck to wear Lacedæmonian shoes[5] were let go free. Presently an embassy, headed by Thearidas, was sent to Rome;

Tumult at Corinth.

[1] Paus. vii. 14. 2. Schorn (389) observes that all these cities had been under the power of Philip, which is hardly true of Sparta.

[2] See above, p. 485.

[3] See above, p. 480.

[4] Paus. vii. 14. 2. Ταῦτα Ὀρέστου λέγοντος, οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, οὐδὲ τὸν πάντα ὑπομείναντες ἀκοῦσαι λόγον, ἔθεον ἐς τὸ ἐκτὸς τῆς οἰκίας καὶ ἐκάλουν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐς ἐκκλησίαν. Of course such an Assembly was utterly illegal, as no notice had been sent to the several cities. But it may be observed that, if the magistrates of each city were really present, there was something like a representation of the several members of the League.

[5] Ib. Συνήρπαζον δὲ πάντα τινά, καὶ ὃν Λακεδαιμόνιον σαφῶς ὄντα ἠπίσταντο, καὶ ὅτῳ κουρᾶς ἢ ὑποδημάτων εἵνεκεν ἢ ἐπὶ τῇ ἐσθῆτι ἢ κατ' ὄνομα προσγένοιτο ὑπόνοια.

—possibly ful Assembly had been got together in the meanwhile, ...e Achaian envoys met yet another Roman embassy on the road.[1] Aurelius had taken care to represent the insults which he had received, not as the sudden act of an excited mob, but as a deliberate and preconceived affront to the majesty of Rome.[2] Sextus Julius Cæsar[3] now came, with instructions to use very mild words. The last Punic War was still dangerous,[4] and it was desirable that an Achaian War should at least be put off till that was finished.

Embassy of Sextus Julius Cæsar, B.C. 147

Thearidas and his colleagues returned to Peloponnêsos with Sextus. The Roman envoys were introduced to an Assembly at Aigion, perhaps that in which Diaios was succeeded in the Generalship by Kritolaos, a still more bitter and unreflecting enemy of Rome.[5] Sextus used very conciliatory language, which had more effect upon his hearers than suited the schemes of Diaios and Kritolaos.[6] They then hit upon a strange stratagem. It was agreed that a Conference of some kind or other should be held at Tegea, at which representatives of Rome, Achaia, and Sparta should meet and decide matters. The language of Polybios—for we have now happily for a little time recovered his guidance—does not distinctly imply who were to appear on the Achaian side, but it seems most probably to have been the Council of Ministers. It was determined by Kritolaos and his party, seemingly in a session of that Council,[7] that nobody should go to Tegea except Kritolaos himself. Thus the President appeared at the Conference as the sole representative of the

Kritolao elected General, Autumn B.C. 147

Sham Conference at Tegea, B.C. 147

[1] Pol. xxxviii. 2. Paus. vii. 14. 3. [2] Pol. xxxviii. 1.

[3] He and Orestes had been Consuls together, B.C. 157.

[4] It is clear from Polybios (xxxviii. 1, 2) that the general belief in Achaia attributed the apparent lenity of the Romans to this cause, though he himself holds it to have been genuine. But, in all these later fragments, Polybios seems mainly to speak the language of his Roman friends. And of course it is quite possible that men of more generous minds, such as his friends were, might now and then be able to carry through the Senate a vote less brutal and treacherous than usual. But that the abiding policy of Rome was to break up the League by every sort of intrigue, however base, is too plain a fact to be evaded. Men like Scipio, Æmilius, and Metellus could at most only stop the torrent for a moment. See Thirlwall, viii. 488.

[5] Paus. vii. 14. 4. Τοῦτον δριμὺς καὶ σὺν οὐδενὶ λογισμῷ πολεμεῖν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἔρως ἔσχε.

[6] Pol. xxxviii. 2. (The whole chapter.)

[7] Ib. 3. Συνεδρεύσαντες οἱ περὶ τὸν Κριτόλαον ἔκριναν, κ.τ.λ. This seems to be the most probable meaning. See p. 548. The word σύνεδρος and its cognates are constantly used by Plutarch and Pausanias to express the Assembly, but not by Polybios. See above, pp. 205, note 1, 220, note 1.

League, and told Sextus that he had no power to act without the Assembly, and that he would refer matters to the next Meeting to be held six months hence.[1] This was mere mockery, and the Romans naturally departed in great indignation. Kritolaos himself spent the winter in proceedings almost as unconstitutional as anything that the Romans themselves had done. He went through the several cities of the League;[2] he held local Assemblies in each, nominally to announce what had been done at Tegea, but really to excite the people everywhere against Rome. He even went so far as to order the local magistrates[3] to stop all proceedings against debtors till the war was over. No wonder the President and his war policy were highly popular.

Unconstitutional proceedings of Kritolaos, B.C. 147–146.

At this stage of the proceedings it is almost as hard to sympathize with the Achaians as with their enemies. It is one of those cases in which a nation or a party, whose cause is essentially just, contrives, by particular foolish and criminal actions, to forfeit the respect to which it is otherwise entitled. Now, in its last moments, the Federal Government of Achaia had, for the first time, fallen into the hands of a mere mob, led by a President who showed himself a demagogue in the worst sense of the word. The class of men who had hitherto directed the affairs of the League, the old liberal aristocracy, leaders and not enemies of the people, men who had both character and property to lose, were no longer listened to. They were naturally averse to a war in which success was hopeless, and it was therefore easy for Kritolaos to hold them up to popular hatred as traitors. At the next Spring Meeting, held at Corinth, an Assembly was gathered together such as had never before been seen. It was attended by a multitude of low handicraftsmen, both from Corinth and other cities, such as seldom

Tumultuous Meeting at Corinth, May, B.C. 146.

[1] Pol. xxxviii. 3. See above, p. 214. Pausanias (vii. 14. 4, 5) makes this answer of Kritolaos be preceded by a request of Sextus that a regular Assembly might be summoned at once. This Kritolaos pretends to do, but, together with his formal summons, he sends secret instructions, in conformity with which nobody came. This is not easy to believe, and it reads like a misconception of Polybios' account, as if Pausanias had been led astray by the ambiguous word *συνεδρεύσαντες*. It would be easier to believe, though still very unlikely, that the Meeting at Tegea was to be a full Meeting of the Assembly, and that Kritolaos prevented it in this way. Polybios clearly makes the sham summons—to whatever kind of meeting—take place before Kritolaos reached Tegea, while Pausanias places it afterwards.

[2] Pol. u.s. *Ἐπιπορευόμενος κατὰ τὸν χειμῶνα τὰς πόλεις, ἐκκλησίας συνῆγε.*

[3] Ib. *Παρήγγειλε τοῖς ἄρχουσι.* This must mean the local magistrates.

appeared in the Federal Congress.[1] At this Meeting Metellus made yet one more effort. Cnæus Papirius and three other Roman envoys[2] appeared at Corinth, and addressed the Assembly in the same conciliatory tone as had been employed by Sextus. Hitherto the Achaian Assemblies seem to have been fairly decorous parliamentary bodies, but such a multitude as had now come together was not disposed to listen to any one but its own leaders. The place of meeting made matters worse, as the Corinthian people were the fiercest of all,[3] doubtless through indignation at the proposal to separate them from the League. The Roman Ambassadors were received with a storm of derision, and left the Assembly amid the shouts and insults of the multitude.[4] The Achaian People then went on in due order to discuss the proposals of the envoys to which they had not listened. A few only took their side.[5] Kritolaos made a fierce speech against the Romans, which might not have been out of place in the mouth of Kykliadas fifty years sooner. Could we believe in their personal purity, we might have some sympathy for the last champions of Greece, even when such championship had become madness.[6] But we have seen that Diaios was not above a bribe, and now Kritolaos went on in a strain very unworthy of the successor of Markos and Philopoimên. One or two sentences indeed of his speech might have been in place in the mouth of either of those great men.[7] But he went on to attack the moderate party, to attack the presiding

Efforts of Metellus to preserve peace.

Violence of Kritolaos in the Assembly.

[1] Pol. xxxviii. 4. See above, p. 205. This is the Meeting spoken of by Pausanias, vii. 14. 5. He leaves out the account of Kritolaos' doings during the winter.

[2] Aulus Gabinius, Caius Fannius, and a third whose name appears in the text of Polybios in the corrupt form τὸν νεώτερον ἀλίωνα μαῖνον. This suggests some such name as Aulus Mænius.

[3] Pol. u.s. Πᾶσαι μὲν ἐκορύζων αἱ πόλεις, πανδημεὶ δὲ καὶ μάλιστά πως ἡ τῶν Κορινθίων.

[4] Ib. Χλευάζοντες δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις μετὰ θορύβου καὶ κραυγῆς ἐξέβαλλον. Bishop Thirlwall (viii. 490) refers to the somewhat confused account in Strabo (lib. viii. cap. 6, vol. ii. 215), which seems to apply to this time. According to him, the Romans were pelted with mud.

[5] Pol. xxxviii. 4. Ὀλίγοις δέ τισι καὶ λίαν ἤρεσκε τὰ λεγόμενα διὰ τῶν πρεσβευτῶν.

[6] Paus. vii. 14. 6. Τὸ μὲν δὴ ἄνδρα βασιλέα καὶ πόλιν ἀνελέσθαι πόλεμον καὶ μὴ εὐτυχῆσαι συνέβη φθόνῳ μᾶλλον ἔκ του δαιμόνων ἢ τοῖς πολεμήσασι ποιεῖ τὸ ἔγκλημα· θρασύτης δὲ ἡ μετὰ ἀσθενείας μανία μᾶλλον ἢ ἀτυχία καλοῖτο.

[7] Pol. u.s. Φάσκων βούλεσθαι μὲν Ῥωμαίων φίλος ὑπάρχειν, δεσπότας δ' οὐκ ἂν εὐδοκῆσαι κτησάμενος· καθόλου δὲ παρῄνει, λέγων ὡς, ἐὰν μὲν ἄνδρες ὦσιν, οὐκ ἀπορήσουσι συμμάχων, ἐὰν δ' ἀνδρόγυνοι, κυρίων.

Ministers,[1] and, when called to order by them,[2] he appealed to his soldiers[3] to stand by him, and dared any man, magistrate or not, to touch the hem of his garment. He ended by accusing two of the presiding Ministers, Evagoras of Aigion and the honest old patriot Stratios of Tritaia, of revealing the secrets of the Cabinet to Papirius.[4] Stratios in vain denied the charge. At last Kritolaos carried two resolutions through the Assembly; one declaring war against Sparta, that is, as Polybios truly says, against Rome; the other investing the General for the time being with absolute power, that is, as the same writer adds, making himself Monarch of the League.[5]

Beginning of War with Rome, B.C. 146.

War now broke out. The report of Sextus and his colleagues, and the letter of Metellus, determined the Senate to send the newly-chosen Consul Lucius Mummius with a land- and sea-force against the League. Rome had now got, in the insults offered to her successive ministers, that which she had doubtless long aimed at getting—a good technical ground for war. But the long-suffering of Metellus made yet one more effort. His real goodwill to Greece was now sharpened by a personal consideration. Mummius was coming; Metellus would fain finish the struggle, either by war or by diplomacy, before his arrival. He neither wished Mummius to rob him of the credit of subduing Achaia as well as Macedonia, nor yet to see a nation which he was anxious to spare as far as he could handed over to one who was disposed to deal with it far more harshly. Once

Further efforts of Metellus.

[1] Pol. xxxviii. 4. *Κατανίστατο μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων, διέσυρε δὲ τοὺς ἀντιπολιτευομένους.*

[2] Ib. 5. *Τῶν δὲ τῆς γερουσίας βουλομένων ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, κ.τ.λ.* See above, p. 231, note 4.

[3] Ib. *Περισπασάμενος τοὺς στρατιώτας κατανίστατο, κελεύων προσελθεῖν.* Were these soldiers citizens or mercenaries? In regular times one cannot fancy mercenaries being present in the Assembly at all, nor citizen soldiers in any military dress or character. But in these days of violence any breach of order may have happened.

[4] Ib. *Ἔφη γὰρ . . . πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα δι' ἀπορρήτων ἐν ταῖς συναρχίαις διασαφεῖν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Γναῖον.*

[5] Ib. *Προσεμέτρησεν ἕτερον ψήφισμα παράνομον, ὥστε κυρίους εἶναι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὓς ἂν ἐπὶ στρατοπεδείᾳ αἱρήσονται· δι' ἃ τρόπον τινὰ μοναρχικὴν ἀνέλαβεν ἐξουσίαν.* See above, p. 377, for the appointment of Aratos, as *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ.*

One might almost infer from Pausanias (vii. 14. 6) that the Theban Bœotarch Pytheas was present in this Assembly. But his words do not absolutely imply it, and Polybios could hardly have failed to mention it. He merely makes Kritolaos tell the Achaians that several Kings and commonwealths are ready to help them.

more, seemingly on his own responsibility, he pledged himself for the safety of the Achaians, if they would give up the cities which Aurelius had required to be separated from the League.[1] Ignominious as these terms were, they would have left the League in possession of a larger territory than it held during the Social War. But Kritolaos would listen to no terms, and the mass of the people shared his passions. War had been declared against Sparta, but it was begun in another quarter. Among the cities which the League was called on to surrender, no disaffection is spoken of, nor is any likely to have existed, at Argos or at Orchomenos; the Corinthians, as we have seen, were the fiercest Unionists in all Peloponnêsos; one city only, besides Sparta, hearkened to the Roman call to Secession. This was Hêrakleia, a distant and outlying Canton, which it was foolish to have ever annexed to the League at all. Against these new Secessionists Kritolaos now led his army.[2] On his march he was joined by the whole force of Thebes under the Bœotarch Pytheas.[3] The Thebans had been sentenced by Metellus to pay damages to Phôkis, Euboia, and Amphissa for various wrongs done to those several states.[4] They were therefore ready for any risk. The combined Achaian and Theban force sat down before Hêrakleia, but, on hearing of the approach of Metellus, they raised the siege. A battle took place at Skarpheia near Thermopylæ, in which the Greek army was utterly routed. A chosen reinforcement from Arkadia was overtaken by the Romans at Chairôneia; all, a thousand in number, perished. Kritolaos himself, after the defeat at Skarpheia, disappeared; Pausanias is inclined to think that he drowned himself; according to Livy, he took poison.[5] At any rate, no more was seen of him, and Diaios, as the General of the year before, assumed his command, according to Law.[6] He seems to have ventured on many arbitrary measures, such as exacting benevolences, and requiring the emancipation and military equipment of twelve

Secession and siege of Hêrakleia.

Battle of Skarpheia. Defeat and death of Kritolaos.

Diaios succeeds to the Generalship.

[1] Paus. vii. 15. 2. That is, Lacedæmon, Corinth, Argos, Orchomenos, and Hêrakleia. See Schorn, 396, and Thirlwall, viii. 492.

[2] Paus. vii. 15. 2. Ἡράκλειαν δὲ προσεκάθηντο πολιορκοῦντες οὐ βουλομένους ἐς τὸ Ἀχαϊκὸν συντελεῖν.

[3] Cf. Paus. vii. 14. 6 with 15. 9. Polybios (xl. 1) gives Pytheas a bad character.

[4] Paus. vii. 14. 7.

[5] Ib. vii. 15. 4. Livy, Epit. lii.

[6] Pol. xl. 2. See above, pp. 219, 506. Livy (u.s.) says, less accurately, *ab Achæis dux* [why not *Prætor*?] *creatus.*

thousand slaves.[1] He summoned the whole force of the League to assemble at Corinth. But the whole land was in a wretched state; Elis and Messênê refused their contingents;[2] we may suppose that their Achaian loyalty had never been very fervent, but they had for years at least acquiesced in their position in the League; they were not however prepared, like the Corinthians, to die for it. Patrai and its dependent towns[3] had suffered so severely at Skarpheia that they had no contingent to furnish. Diaios however raised four thousand men, whom he sent, under Alkamenês, to garrison Megara and to check the further advance of the Romans.[4] Meanwhile the Vice-General Sôsikratês had entered into negociations of some sort with Metellus.[5] One Andrônidas had gone as envoy; he now returned with Philôn, a Thessalian, still bearing kind words and promises from the Roman General. Meanwhile Metellus advanced; Alkamenês and his garrison escaped to Corinth,[6] and the Megarians, deprived of all Federal aid, surrendered their city to the Romans. Diaios held an Assembly at Corinth; he was confirmed in his office,[7] and the returning envoys, Andrônidas and Lagios, were dragged to prison with every sort of insult. Philôn was indeed allowed to speak, but the aged Stratios in vain implored Diaios to hearken. The President then held a meeting of his Cabinet[8] among whom were the former President

Negociation between Sôsikratês and Metellus.

[1] Tittmann (677, 8, and 686) relies too much on this clearly illegal act as proving a habit, if not a right, of occasional arbitrary interference on the part of the Federal power.

[2] Pol. xl. 3. Ἠλεῖοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ Μεσσήνιοι κατὰ χώραν ἔμειναν, προσδοκῶντες τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ στόλου κίνδυνον.

[3] Ib. Πατρεῖς καὶ τὸ μετὰ τούτων συντελικόν. See above, p. 193.

[4] Paus. vii. 15. 8.

[5] Pol. xl. 4. Paus. vii. 15. 11. We know this mission only in its results. The words ὅτι προστατήσαι τοῦ διαβουλίου (Pol. xl. 5), which imply the putting of a question to an Assembly, show that Andrônidas was sent by the authority of some deliberative body or other, under the presidency of Sôsikratês. Possibly Sôsikratês may have collected the Senate, or have done his best, however unsuccessfully, to summon a regular Assembly.

[6] Paus. vii. 15. 10, 11.

[7] Pol. xl. 4. Καθεσταμένου στρατηγοῦ διὰ τῶν πολλῶν. After Polybios' clear exposition of the law in c. 2 this seems a needless ceremony, and it is impossible to suppose that we have reached the Autumn Meeting of B.C. 146, and this was a regular election to the Generalship of B.C. 146–5. This supposition would drive all the remaining events of the war far too late in the year. (See Clinton, in an.) Considering the whole story, the suggestion presents itself whether Sôsikratês had not been set up by his party as Provisional General in opposition to Diaios, so that a formal confirmation would be desirable.

[8] Pol. xl. 4. Συνεδρεύσαντες. See above, p. 543. These Ministers were

Damokritos, and Alkamenês—the real traitor, if any one. The result of their deliberations was to drag the Vice-General before some High Court of Justice or other.[1] He was accused of treason, and condemned to death, and he died under the tortures which were inflicted upon him to extort a confession. This spectacle roused the indignation of the people; their patriotism was unreflecting and unruly, but they were not prepared for such monstrous cruelty and injustice. Andrônidas and the other intended victims were spared on payment of bribes to Diaios.

Cruelty and corruption of Diaios. Death of Sôsikratês.

By this time the Achaians had no longer to deal with Metellus, but with a very different foe. Mummius was now at their gates. He was far from being a Roman of the school of Flamininus and Æmilius. He was a plebeian, a man of no hereditary distinction, with a character marked by many of the virtues and vices of the old plebeian character. He was rough and ignorant, but devoid neither of native eloquence nor of a certain practical skill in administration; ferocious in war, while war lasted, but not inclined to needless oppression when conquest was once secure. Mummius now came to the Isthmus with the Roman army, and with some Pergamenian auxiliaries, led against the Achaian League by an officer who, strangely enough, bore the name of Philopoimên.[2] He was, it is said, joined by the inhabitants of the Corinthian territory of Tenea,[3] apparently a subject district glad to throw off the yoke of the capital. A slight advantage puffed up Diaios and his troops;[4] he marched forth to a pitched battle at Leukopetra;[5] the cavalry fled without a blow;[6] the infantry fought bravely, but in vain. Diaios fled to his own city of Megalopolis, killed his wife, perhaps set fire to his house, and lastly poisoned himself.[7] Of the rest of the army many

Mummius at the Isthmus.

Battle of Leukopetra and sack of Corinth, September? B.C. 146.

perhaps elected at the violent Spring Meeting at Corinth, which accounts for their being mere creatures of Diaios, while their predecessors (see above, p. 546) did what they could to restrain Kritolaos. The time of election of the Ministers need not have been changed with that of the General.

[1] Pol. xl. 5. Καθίσαντες δικαστὰς τοῦ μὲν Σωσικράτους κατεδίκασαν θάνατον.

[2] Paus. vii. 16. 1.

[3] Strabo, viii. 6. 22. See above, p. 200, note 3. This district must have somehow escaped the liberalizing reforms of Philopoimên and Lykortas.

[4] Paus. vii. 16. 2. Yet it is impossible to believe the tales of their excessive presumption in Justin, xxxiv. 2. See Thirlwall, viii. 496.

[5] Aurelius Victor, c. lx.

[6] They were, as Bishop Thirlwall says (viii. 496), "all belonging to that class which was opposed to the measures of Diæus." Yet it is an inglorious ending for a service which had shone so under Lydiadas and Philopoimên.

[7] Paus. vii. 16. 4–6. Aur. Vict. u.s. See Thirlwall, u.s. note.

took refuge in Corinth, and thence escaped in the night along with a large portion of the Corinthians themselves. The city, though it offered no resistance, was sacked and burned; of the few people who were left in it, the men were slaughtered, the women and children were sold. The history of the Achaian League, as an independent power, was over.

Achaia not yet formally reduced to a Province.

It is commonly said that Achaia was now reduced to the form of a Roman Province. It would seem that this assertion is not strictly accurate.[1] No Roman Prætor was sent into Greece till a much later time;[2] but the Governor of Macedonia continued to exercise the same sort of protectorate over the country which we have seen Metellus exercising for some years past. In fact it was not the policy of Rome to reduce any conquered state to the form of a province at the conclusion of the first war against it. This we may see by the history of Carthage, Macedonia, and Ætolia. But Achaia was reduced to a state of dependence which differed only in form from the provincial condition, and which makes it quite needless for me to continue my history any further. Achaia now surrendered herself to the will of Rome,[3] as Ætolia had done forty years before. And the arm of the conqueror fell more heavily upon Achaia than it had done upon Ætolia. That Achaia, like Ætolia, sank to the level of acknowledged dependency is involved in the nature of the case; and the Roman interference with internal institutions was incomparably greater than it had been in the case of Ætolia. Mummius of his own authority, before the usual Board of Commissioners arrived from Rome, imposed a fine upon the League for the benefit of Sparta,[4] and destroyed the walls of all

Settlement of the country, B.C. 146–145.

[1] See Dr. Smith, Dict. Geog. art. Achaia. Mommsen, ii. 46. Kortum, iii. 338.

[2] Plutarch (Cim. 2) says, of the time of Lucullus, ἡ κρίσις ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῆς Μακεδονίας, οὔπω γὰρ εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ῥωμαῖοι στρατηγοὺς διεπέμποντο. Compare also the language put by Appian (Mithrid. 58) into the mouth of Sulla towards Mithridatês: Μακεδονίαν τε ἡμετέραν οὖσαν ἐπέτρεχες, καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀφῄρου· οὐ πρίν τε ἤρξω μετανοεῖν, οὐδ' Ἀρχέλαος ὑπέρ σου παρακαλεῖν, ἢ Μακεδονίαν μέν με ἀνασώσασθαι, τὴν δὲ Ἑλλάδα τῆς σῆς ἐκλῦσαι βίας. Here is a marked distinction drawn between the position of Macedonia and that of Greece, one which a late and careless writer like Appian would hardly have introduced, if he had not found it in his authorities. But see Thirlwall, viii. 503.

[3] Liv. Epit. lii. *Omni Achaia in deditionem accepta.*

[4] Either now, or in the arrangements of the next year, the Lakônian towns (see above, p. 485) must have been reunited to Sparta. They remained subject to Sparta till the reign of Augustus; they therefore had no share in the nominal

the cities which had taken a share in the war[1]—that is, of all except Elis, Messênê, and perhaps Patrai. When the Commissioners came, they entirely abolished the Federal Constitution, with its Assemblies and Magistracies, and, in each particular city the constitution was changed from Democracy to what the Greeks called Timocracy, that is, that species of Oligarchy in which wealth, and not birth, is the qualification.[2] Everywhere else throughout Greece, whatever vestiges of Federal Union still survived were swept away in like manner.[3] Greece was to contain only separate cities, each of them a dependent and tributary ally of Rome. Each city was to be wholly isolated from its neighbours; no common Assemblies were to bring men of different cities together, nor could the citizen of one city any longer hold land in the territory of another.[4] But, when they had thus rooted up the dangerous elements of Federalism and Democracy, when every city was condemned to weakness and isolation, when each was reconstructed with a form of government which was sure to make it the humble slave of Rome, neither Mummius nor his colleagues seem to have been disposed to push the rights of conquest to any specially tyrannical extreme. They called in Polybios as the law-giver of the new commonwealths;[5] no man could have been better suited for the office. He alone was equally familiar with Achaian and with Roman politics; he alone, in his calm and capacious intellect, combined a sincere wish to benefit his country with an utter absence of all merely sentimental patriotism. He did not shrink from making the best of a bad bargain, nor refuse to serve his country because she had fallen from the position which she had held in his youth. During the crisis itself, he was better away; he could not have hindered the war, and he might have been tortured to death like Sôsikratês and Philinos. But now, in his peculiar position, the friend alike of the living Scipio and of the dead Philopoimên, he could mediate, as no other man could, between the conquerors and the conquered. Freedom, greatness, glory he could not restore to his country; but it was something to

Dissolution of the League and abolition of Democracy in the Cities.

Polybios legislates for the Achaian Cities, B.C. 145.

revival of the League. Augustus separated twenty-four towns, but six of them had been recovered by Sparta before the visit of Pausanias.

[1] Paus. vii. 16. 9.

[2] Ib. *Δημοκρατίας μὲν κατέπαυε, καθίστα δὲ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων τὰς ἀρχάς.*

[3] Ib. , See above, p. 144.

[4] Ib. See above, p. 201.

[5] Pol. xl. 10. Paus. viii. 30. 9.

give to her cities such laws as secured to them internal peace and as high a degree of well-being as their condition allowed. And we may well believe that it was owing to his influence that, after a while, both the Achaians and the other Greeks were allowed to resume something like the forms of their old Federal institutions.[1] The Romans, perhaps the Greeks too, called it a restoration of liberty,[2] when the Achaian League once more arose, with its Federal General, its Federal Cabinet, and as near an approach to its Federal Assembly[3] as the new oligarchic State-constitutions allowed. But its existence was now purely municipal, or rather it was something less than municipal. Town-Autonomy and Federalism, Aristocracy and Democracy, were now, all alike, shadows and pageants. The League lingered on in this shape for some centuries; the exact moment of its final dissolution it would be hard to fix, and it would be useless for my purpose to inquire. It is enough that the history of the Achaian League, as a contribution of the slightest value to political knowledge, ends with the last and most unhappy Presidency of Kritolaos and Diaios.

Nominal revival of the League.

Achaia fell ingloriously; in her last years there is nothing to admire, except the determined, even if misdirected, patriotism of the mass of the people. They may well be pardoned if Kritolaos and Diaios seemed to them as Lydiadas and Philopoimên. They listened to constitutional leaders who had at least the formulæ of patriotism on their lips, and they fought to the death against the invader, when the aristocrats of the cavalry fled without striking a blow. Thrice in the world's history have the gallant people of Peloponnêsos risen like a nation of heroes, and found no leaders worthy of them. They faced the Roman beneath the headland of Leukopetra; they died sword in hand upon their mountains when Byzantine priests and nobles cringed before the conquering Ottoman; and, in our own day,

Devotion of the Peloponnêsian people.

Later parallels.

B.C. 146.

A.D. 1454.

[1] Paus. vii. 16. 10. See above, p. 144, note 3. The expression of Polybios (xl. 10) that he gave the cities τοὺς περὶ τῆς κοινῆς δικαιοδοσίας νόμους seems to imply that some part of his legislation took place after the restoration of Federal forms.

[2] See Boeckh, C. I. i. 712. Thirlwall, viii. 502.

[3] The title of the oligarchic Assembly of the revived League seems to have been συνέδριον. This accounts for the constant use of that word and its cognates by Plutarch and Pausanias to express the Democratic Assembly of the old League. In Polybios, as we have seen (see p. 220, note 1), they are applied to meetings, not of the Assembly, but of the Cabinet Council.

they have wrested their independence from the same enemy, in spite of, rather than by the help of, the native rulers and captains of their land. And, at the very moment that I am thus summing up the long history of Greece, a new Revolution, as pure and glorious as any that expelled Macedonian or Ottoman from her soil, has again made Greece the centre of the admiring gaze of Europe. Let us hope that, this time at least, Greece may find leaders worthy of her people, and that her fourth struggle for freedom and good government may be crowned with a more lasting success than any that has gone before it. It at least augurs well for Greece that her Revolution has not been the work of the mob of a capital, but is, if ever revolution was, the deliberate expression of the will of a whole people. And a historian of Federal Greece may be allowed to rejoice when he hears the revived voice of Grecian freedom first sounding from the lands of his old love. The homes where Greek freedom lingered longest have been those where it has been the first to rise again; Achaia, Akarnania, Ætolia, have been foremost in the good work, and the name of Roufos of Patrai bids fair to win a place alongside of that of Markos of Kerynela. Through the days of Bavarian corruption, just as through those of Roman conquest and of Turkish tyranny, the heart of the Achaian people has still been sound. And, in all cases alike, the most blameworthy points in the character of the oppressed have been mainly the work of the oppressor. That the Achaian League fell, in its last days, from its ancient dignity—that the place of some of the noblest of men was filled by some of the most contemptible—that the seal which had been borne by Markos and Lykortas had passed into the hands of the traitor Menalkidas and the coward Damokritos—all this was mainly the fruit of Rome's own insidious policy. Her arts had tried, and tried in vain, to divide a people which had so well learned the benefits of union. When those arts failed, she shut up the best life of the nation in her Etruscan prisons, and so cut off that stream of uninterrupted political tradition which alone can be trusted permanently to maintain the needful succession of statesmen and of captains. If Achaia died ill, it was mainly the fault of her murderer; and, if she died ill, she had at least lived well. For a hundred and forty years—no short space in any nation's life, and a very long space among the few centuries which we call Ancient History—the League had given

A.D. 1821–1827.

A.D. 1862.

Errors of the League mainly the result of Roman intrigue.

B.C. 281–146.

General results of the Achaian League.

to a larger portion of Greece than any previous age had seen, a measure of freedom, unity, and general good government, which may well atone for the lack of the dazzling glory of the old Athenian Democracy. It was no slight achievement to weld together so many cities into an Union which strengthened them against foreign Kings and Senates, and which yet preserved to them that internal independence which was so dear to the Hellenic mind. It was no slight achievement to keep so many cities for so long a time free alike from foreign garrisons, from domestic mobs, domestic Tyrants, and domestic oligarchs. How practically efficient the Federal principle was in maintaining the strength and freedom of the nation is best shown by the bitter hatred which it aroused, first in the Macedonian Kings and then in the Roman Senate. It was no contemptible political system against which so many Kings and Consuls successively conspired; it was no weak bond which the subtlest of all diplomatic Senates expended so many intrigues and stratagems to unloose.[1] And, if the League fell ingloriously, it at least fell less ingloriously than the kingdoms and commonwealths around it. Better was it to be conquered in open battle, even with a Diaios as its leader, than to drag on the contemptible life of the last Kings of Bithynia and Pergamos or of the beggar Democracy of Athens. The League did its work in its own age by giving Peloponnêsos well nigh a century and a half of freedom; it does its work still by living in the pages of its own great historian as the first attempt on a large scale to reconcile local independence with national strength. Ages must pass away before the course of our history will show us another so perfect and illustrious an example of a true Federal Constitution. And never, up to our own day, has Federalism, the offspring of Greece, appeared again in its native land. Yet, when we look at the map of Greece, and see each valley and peninsula and island marked out by the hand of nature for an independent being—when we think of the varied origin and condition of the present inhabitants of its several provinces—when we think of the local institutions, democratic here, aristocratic there, which preserved the life of

Roman opposition a witness to its value.

The Achaian League the natural model for liberated Greece.

[1] A remarkable passage of Justin (xxxiv. 1) gives a clear and forcible summary of the whole Roman policy towards the League: "Achæi nimis potentes Romanis videbantur, non propter singularum civitatium nimias opes, sed propter conspirationem universarum. Namque Achæi, licet per civitates, veluti per membra, divisi sint, unum tamen corpus et unum imperium habent, singularumque urbium pericula mutuis viribus propulsant."

the nation through ages of Turkish bondage—we may well ask whether ancient Achaia or modern Switzerland may not be the true model for regenerate Greece, rather than a blind imitation of the stereotyped forms of European royalty. It may be that the favourable moment has passed for ever; it may be that it is now too late to dream of a Federal Republic in a land where thirty years of Bavarian corruption have swept away those relics of ancient freedom which the very Ottoman had spared. However this may be now, there can be little doubt that, a generation back, the blood of Botzarês and the life of Kanarês would have been better given to found a free Hellenic Federation than to establish the throne of any stranger King. And let us pass beyond the bounds of Greece herself, to look at that whole group of nations of which Greece is only one among many, although in some respects the foremost. We may be sure that a day will come when the rod of the oppressor shall be broken; we need no prophet to tell us that wrong and robbery shall not always be abiding, that all the arts of Western diplomatists cannot for ever maintain the Barbarian on the throne of the Cæsars and the Infidel in the most glorious of Christian temples. A day will come when the Turkish horde shall be driven back to its native deserts, or else die out, the victim of its own vices, upon the soil which it has too long defiled. Then will Greek and Serb and Albanian and Rouman and Bulgarian enter upon the full and free possession of the land which is their own. Already does Greece, free and extending her borders, Servia and Wallachia held in only nominal vassalage, Montenegro, if crushed for a moment, yet unsubdued in heart, all point to the full accomplishment of the glorious dream. And, when the full day has dawned, are those lands to remain utterly separate and isolated, or are they, so many peoples, nations, and languages, to be fettered down by some centralizing Monarchy which would merely substitute a Christian for an Infidel master? Here would be the grandest field that the world has ever seen for trying the great experiment of Monarchic Federalism. The nations of the Byzantine peninsula, differing in origin, language, and feeling, are united by common wrongs, by a common religion, and by the common reverence of ages for the Imperial City of the Basils and the Constantines. For nations in such a position, the Federal tie, rather than either more complete separation or more close connexion, seems the natural relation to each other. But the tradi-

Future of South-Eastern Europe.

Monarchic Federalism probably the true solvent.

tions of Servia and Bulgaria are not Republican; the mere size of the several provinces may seem, in the Old World at least, to surpass the limits which nature has in all ages marked out for European commonwealths. One set of circumstances points to Federal Union, another set of circumstances points to princely government. A Monarchic Federation on such a scale has never yet existed, but it is not in itself at all contradictory to the Federal ideal. When the day of vengeance and of freedom shall have come, it will be for the people of those noble and injured lands—not for Western mediators or Western protectors—to solve the mighty problem for themselves.

# CHAPTER X

## OF FEDERALISM IN ITALY

Recapitulation.

IN the foregoing pages I have traced the history of the Federal system of Government, alike in its rudest forms and in its most perfect developement, both in Greece itself and in those countries whose political institutions were evidently formed after Grecian models. In the Achaian League we saw one of the four great Confederations of history stand forth as the restorer of freedom in the Grecian world; we beheld its work alike in the deliverance of Peloponnêsos from foreign Kings and local Tyrants and in the establishment of the most formidable obstacle which the encroaching power of Rome ever encountered. In Lykia we beheld a Federal state to which circumstances denied the same prominence as that of Achaia, but which, like Achaia, long preserved an oasis of freedom in the midst of surrounding bondage, and which possessed a constitution still more perfect, forestalling some of the subtlest inventions of modern political science. In carrying the history of Achaia and Lykia down to their absorption into the dominion of Rome, we finished for ever, as far as the past is concerned, the History of Federal Government in the land east of the Hadriatic. The Hellenic and Hellenized states formed a world of their own, and their political life has had but little direct effect upon the later history of mankind. The indirect influence of Grecian politics, as of Grecian literature and art, it is indeed impossible to overrate. But no direct chain of cause and effect connects with Greece in the way in which all mediæval and modern history is connected, as an uninterrupted continuation, with the history of the Republic and Empire of Rome.[1] There is no reason to believe that the constitution of

Indirect influence of Greece; direct influence of Rome.

[1] I have to thank the writings of Sir Francis Palgrave for first opening my eyes to this all-important truth, without which all mediæval history is an insoluble puzzle. Notwithstanding the constant eccentricity and frequent one-

any state of Western Europe was ever directly derived either from the Athenian Democracy or from the Achaian Confederation. It is this very lack of direct connexion which gives to their later reproductions a value which could never have attached either to worn-out traditions or to conscious imitations. In closing the history of Greek Federalism we draw a wider line than will separate any other two portions of our subject. Switzerland, Holland, the United States, the lesser Federations which I shall have to group around them, all belong to one world, to one political system, to that system which arose out of the fusion between the Roman Empire and its Teutonic conquerors. Before, then, we enter upon the history of any of these later commonwealths, we must look back to the common source of all European history, the Roman Empire and the Roman Republic. Rome indeed never formed a Federal state, but many of her institutions approached the borders of the Federal idea, and there can be little doubt that to these *quasi*-Federal elements Rome owed no small share of her greatness. And in the slight glimpses which Roman history gives us of the older Italian states, we can see that the rude germs of Federalism were no less widely spread in Italy than in Northern Greece, and that, in some cases at least, these rude germs grew up in something coming very near to a true Federal commonwealth. Again, in the mediæval history of Italy there is at least one moment when a Federal Union would have been the true remedy for the evils of the time, when a large portion of Italy seemed on the very brink of forming such an Union, though, like the projected Unions of Ionia and Chalkidikê,[1] the scheme, if it ever amounted to a scheme, never took effect. And, lastly, in our own day, the plan of an Italian Confederation has been, with different objects and with different meanings, proposed alike by friends and by enemies of Italy as the proper mode of uniting the different portions of that so long divided land. Thus, though no true Federal Government has ever existed in Italy in strictly historical times, still a Chapter on the history of Federalism in that country forms a natural branch of my general subject, and it will act as a sort of transition from the purely Hellenic to the purely mediæval portions of the work.

Connexion of Italian history with the subject of Federalism

Italian history a transition between the Greek and the mediæval Federalism.

sidedness of his writings, Sir F. Palgrave deserves the gratitude of every student for having done more than any other man to demonstrate the true unity of history.

[1] See above, pp. 145, 147.

## § 1. *Of the Federations of Ancient Italy*

Prevalence of Federalism in Ancient Italy. Its causes.

The same causes which made Federal Government, or some approach to it, common in the ruder parts of Greece, seem to have had the same effect in many parts of the Italian peninsula.[1] A number of small neighbouring communities, politically independent, but closely allied in blood, language, and religion, retained, among whatever amount of local differences, some general sense of national unity; the feeling of brotherhood was kept up by common sacrifices in a common temple, by occasional common deliberations on matters of common interest, and by occasional help given to one another when threatened by foreign enemies. Such a group of kindred towns or districts naturally forms a religious Amphiktyony; the religious Amphiktyony easily grows into a lax political League, and the lax political League may, if fortune favours, easily grow into a regular Federal Government. Indeed we have no reason to suppose that the operation of these causes was at all confined to Greece and Italy; they are causes of universal application in every land which is cut up into small independent communities. And the further the people are removed from the perfection of city life, the stronger is the inducement towards national union, and the slighter the repugnance towards the necessary sacrifice of full local independence. It was easier for the rural cantons of Ætolia and Samnium to enter into a Federal bond than it was for the great cities of Athens and Milêtos or Rome and Capua. It therefore almost necessarily follows that, in the less civilized countries of Europe, where the approaches to city life were incomparably feebler than in the rudest parts of Greece or Italy, the Federal principle, in some of its laxer forms, is likely to have made considerable advances in very early times. Wherever we find several towns or districts acting together as a single people, especially when, as among many peoples of Spain and Gaul, the

These causes of general application.

Instances of Confederations beyond Greece and Italy.

[1] Cantù, Histoire des Italiens, i. 82 [Storia degli Italiani, i. 118, ed. 1874]. "Les états gouvernés par un seul ou plusieurs . . . continuent entre eux les luttes commencées entre les tribus; les plus forts envahissent les plus faibles; les montagnards se précipitent sur les habitants des plaines, et les uns pour se défendre, les autres pour attaquer, forment des confédérations. Cette forme, très ancienne en Italie, est naturelle dans un pays divisé par des montagnes et des fleuves; aussi n'y trouve-t-on pas les conditions propres aux vastes empires qui furent pour l'Asie une cause de servitude, ni l'unité nationale qui a rendu puissants quelques peuples modernes."

government clearly was republican, it is impossible not to suspect the presence of some sort of an approach to Federal union.[1] In this way we may get glimpses of rude Confederations in many parts of the ancient world, any special examination of which the political historian may be content to leave to the minuter researches of the antiquaries of the several countries. We have no evidence for any constitutional details, and the commonwealths themselves are of no direct importance in history. It is enough for my purpose barely to record their existence, as illustrations of the working of a general law. But the Federations of Ancient Italy stand on a different footing. It is indeed almost as impossible to recover any political details as in the obscure commonwealths of Gaul and Spain; still the fame, even if partly mythical, of Etruria, Latium, and Samnium, and their intimate connexion with the history of Rome, and thereby with the history of the world, make some slight mention of those Leagues, at once so famous and so obscure, an appropriate portion of a general survey of the progress of Federal ideas.

Greater importance of the Italian Leagues.

I must, once for all, decline all inquiries into the ethnology of the early Italian nations. On no subject have more daring and more unprofitable speculations been hazarded; on no subject have they more fully met with their due reward. Ingenious men have striven to reconstruct a lost history from their own power of divination, and to reconstruct a lost language from a single unintelligible inscription. But their crude theories have been scattered to the winds by the wit and wisdom of the same hand which has since dashed in pieces the still frailer fabric of

Uncertainty of the ethnology of Ancient Italy.

[1] Thus the Ædui in Gaul had a Republic under a yearly President with large powers, called a Vergobret (Cæsar, Bell. Gall. i. 16), and Mr. Merivale (i. 302) does not hesitate to apply the name of Confederation both to their commonwealth and to that of the Arverni. Cæsar also speaks of a *Concilium Galliæ* (vi. 3) and even *totius Galliæ* (i. 30). Here we have the familiar Federal formula. Doubtless, as Mr. Merivale says, the word *totius* is not to be construed very strictly, but the expression at least points to some sort of union, however lax, among several Gaulish states. The Druidical religion seems also to have united a considerable portion of Gaul in a religious Amphiktyony (Cæs. vi. 13), which might easily form the germ of a political League.

Of course when I apply the words "Federal" and "Union" to these obscure commonwealths, I do so in the laxest sense of the words, not as implying the existence of regular constitutions, like those of Achaia and Lykia. It is here important to mark any approaches, however distant, to the Federal system, just as when treating of the Delphic Amphiktyony, it was important to distinguish between such mere approaches and a perfect Federation.

Egyptian and Babylonish delusion.[1] It is but lost labour to dispute, and it is profoundly indifferent to my subject if ascertained, whether the Etruscans were Lydians, Rhætians, or Armenians[2]; whether the Tyrrhênians were the same people as the Rasena or a subject Pelasgian race. All that concerns me is that, in the course of Roman history, we find glimpses which are quite enough to convince us that a near approach to Federal ideas was made, at an early time, by more than one Italian people. We see clear indications of the existence of Leagues of some kind among the Etruscans, Samnites, Hernicans,[3] and Volscians,[4] while we can hardly doubt that the Thirty Cities of Latium were united by a tie which came nearer still to our conception of a true Federal Government. Our evidence indeed comes immediately from the suspicious records of half-mythical times, records which it is impossible to trust for details, and whose testimony must at once be cast aside whenever it bears the stamp of falsification in the interests of national or family pride. But incidental testimonies to the constitution of foreign states are far less suspicious; such accounts are more open to unconscious error, but much less so to wilful misrepresentation. And we must not forget that these early constitutions did, in some sort, survive far down into strictly historical times. The Italian states were not incorporated with Rome; they remained distinct, though dependent, commonwealths as late as the wars of Marius and Sulla. They were in much the same position as the dependent commonwealths of Greece, and retained much the same sort of shadow of their ancient freedom. Etruria, till her conquest by Sulla, retained her internal constitution and her native literature. Samnium, in the very last stage of the war, brought Rome nearer to destruction than she had been brought

Early existence of Federations in Italy.

Nature of the evidence.

Late preservation of old Italian Constitutions. B.C. 91–82.

B.C. 82.

[1] Sir G. C. Lewis, Credibility of the Early Roman History, 1855. Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients, 1862.

[2] The Armenian Origin of the Etruscans, by Robert Ellis, B.D., London, 1861.

[3] Of the Hernicans Livy uses exactly the same formulas which he applies to the Federal states of Greece. Concilium populorum omnium habentibus Anagninis in circo quem Maritimum vocant, præter Aletrinatem, Ferentinatemque, et Verulanum, omnes Hernici nominis populo Romano bellum indixerunt. Liv. ix. 42. Cf. the Bœotian dissensions, xlii. 38 (above, p. 521).

[4] Dionysios (viii. 4) describes a Federal Congress of the Volscians, from which Niebuhr, Roman History (ii. 28, Eng. Tr.), endeavours to extract some details as to the Volscian constitution. In this I cannot follow him; but that Dionysios looked on the Volscians as a Federal state is clear beyond doubt.

by Hannibal himself. Even the Latin commonwealths in the later sense, Roman colonies and dependencies as they were, still kept up a faint shadow of the famous Latin League of earlier days. The historians who serve as our authorities had therefore in their hands better materials than might at first sight appear for a knowledge of the constitutional antiquities of the old Italian states. Livy indeed was too careless, and Dionysios too wedded to preconceived theories, ever thoroughly to understand what they saw or what they read; still Livy and Dionysios wrote with earlier and better informed writers before them, writers who had themselves seen Etruria and Samnium in the condition of separate, although dependent commonwealths. We may therefore fairly look in their writings for occasional hints which may give us some general notion of the constitution of these ancient republics. Minute details it would of course be hopeless to expect.

League of ETRURIA.

I pass by the traditions of Etruscan settlements, and indeed of Etruscan Confederations, in Campania and in Cisalpine Gaul.[1] These traditions are indeed highly probable in themselves, but they belong to an age before the faintest approaches to authentic history. I confine myself wholly to the well-known Etruria on the banks of the Tiber and the Arnus. Here we find a picture, the general outlines of which are surely trustworthy, of twelve cities, each forming an independent commonwealth, but all united by a lax Federal bond. The number twelve is so constantly given[2] that there can be no doubt of its accuracy; "the Twelve Cities" was evidently a familiar formula, and it is confirmed by the existence of twelve as a political number in the most remote parts of the world.[3] And it derives confirmation from the fact that the number twelve is one not easy to reconcile with the lists of the Etruscan towns as handed down to us.

The Twelve Cities.

[1] Liv. v. 33. Polyb. ii. 16, 17. See K. O. Müller, Etrusker, i. 131, 136, 345. Niebuhr, i. 88, 95.

[2] Liv. u.s. So iv. 23, where *duodecim populi* is used as equivalent to the Etruscan State. See also Dionys. Hal. vi. 75; cf. ix. 18 and Niebuhr, i. 94 sqq. The Federal style of *populi* remained in use in the Hannibalian War both in Etruria and Umbria. Liv. xxviii. 45. It remained even in Imperial times, when we meet with *Hetruriæ quindecim populi* (see Müller, i. 358), an increase reminding one of the Augustan Reform of the Amphiktyonic Council. See above, p. 105.

[3] As in Palestine, Egypt, Achaia, Ionia. We might add the "Twelve Peers" of mediæval or romantic France.

More than twelve towns are spoken of in our narratives; either then the number must, as in some other Federations, have fluctuated from time to time, or the twelve sovereign members of the League could not in every case have consisted of a single city only.[1] Either the several States may have themselves consisted of smaller Confederations, or the great cities may have had smaller towns attached to them, whether as subjects, as dependent allies, or as municipalities sharing in the franchise of the capital. Our Greek experience has supplied us with examples of all these various relations.[2] The States, however constituted, seem to have preserved strict Federal equality among themselves; except in the mythical days of Lars Porsena, we hear nothing of any predominant capital. Indeed the Federal Meetings, like those of Phôkis and of Akarnania in early times,[3] seem not to have been held in a town at all, but within the precincts of a venerated national sanctuary. The Etruscan League has every appearance of being one of those political Unions which grew out of an earlier religious Amphiktyony.[4] The religious centre of Etruria was the temple of Voltumna,[5] a place whose site is uncertain, and there the political assemblies of the nation were held also. The religious synod was doubtless held at stated times; whether every religious synod involved also a political Congress, or whether secular affairs were dealt with only from time to time as occasion served, is a question which it would be dangerous to determine either way. But it seems that a power was vested somewhere to summon special meetings, as we find them held both at the request of particular cities[6] and at that of foreign allies.[7] Of the constitution of the Federal Assembly we can say nothing, except that it doubtless was, like the constitutions of the several

Constitution of the States.

Amphiktyonic origin of the League.

Constitution of the Federal Assembly.

[1] This is suggested by Müller, i. 352, 360.

[2] See above, pp. 126, 200, 489.

[3] See above, pp. 113, 114.

[4] Mommsen (i. 86) calls Volsinii the "Metropole" of Etruria, but he explains it to be so only in a religious sense, "namentlich für den Götterdienst," and he strongly asserts the independent position of the States.

[5] Liv. iv. 23, 25; vi. 2. He regularly uses *Concilium* for the Federal Assembly and *populi* for the States, just as he does when speaking of Achaia.

[6] Ib. iv. 23. Cum duæ civitates, legatis circa duodecim populos missis, impetrassent ut ad Voltumnæ fanum indiceretur omni Etruriæ concilium.

[7] Ib. x. 16. (Samnites) Etruriam pulsi petierunt; et quod legationibus nequicquam sæpe tentaverant, id se tanto agmine armatorum, mixtis terrore precibus, acturos efficacius rati, postulaverunt principum Etruriæ concilium. The Assembly is held, the Samnites address it, and we read presently after (c. 18), Tusci fere omnes consciverant bellum.

Traces of Federal Kingship.

cities, strictly aristocratic.[1] In mythical times we hear of Kings in the several cities, and of a sort of a Federal King, at least in war time, attended by a lictor from each of the Confederate towns.[2] This is a state of things which is by no means improbable in itself, though it would be dangerous to set it down as a piece of authentic history. We may feel sure that, in Etruria, as well as in other parts of Italy and Greece, kingly government existed before Aristocracy; the further change from Aristocracy to Democracy seems in Etruria never to have been made. There is a remarkable story in Livy that the Veientines, weary of the excitement of annual elections, fell back upon Kingship, and thereby offended the other cities. The rest of the League at once disliked royalty and had personal objections to the particular King chosen.[3] This is a sort of story which neither Livy nor any other Roman annalist was likely to insert; we doubtless have here, however much spoiled in the telling, a genuine bit of internal Etruscan history. The Federal tie between the several States seems to have been lax. If we may venture so far into detail, it would seem that the relations among the Etruscan cities with regard to peace and war were nearly the same as those among the members of the Lacedæmonian Confederacy.[4] They were however modified by the absence of any city possessing the presidential and pre-considering powers of Sparta. War might apparently be decreed by the Federal body, in which case every city would doubtless be bound to send its contingent.[5] In such a case it seems to have been held to be a breach of Federal Law for any city to conclude a separate

B.C. 400?

Laxity of the Federal tie.

Power of war and peace in the League,

[1] See Müller, i. 356, 362. Livy constantly uses the word *Princeps*, with which we have been so familiar in the history of Federal Greece, to designate the members of the Etruscan Assemblies. Dionysios (iii. 5) speaks of an ἐκκλησία at Tarquinii in mythical times, and it has been thought, by a very doubtful refinement, that this ἐκκλησία is opposed, like the Roman *Plebs*, to the γένη or Patrician houses. See Niebuhr, i. 99. Müller, i. 362. But nothing can be plainer than that Dionysios, as Niebuhr himself suggests, merely transferred Roman language to Tarquinii.

[2] Dion. iii. 61. Τυρρηνὸν γὰρ ἔθος ἐδόκει, ἑκάστου τῶν κατὰ πόλιν βασιλέων ἕνα προηγεῖσθαι ῥαβδοφόρον, ἅμα τῇ δέσμῃ τῶν ῥάβδων πέλεκυν φέροντα· εἰ δὲ κοινὴ γίνοιτο τῶν δώδεκα πόλεων στρατεία, τοὺς δώδεκα πελέκεις ἑνὶ παραδίδοσθαι τῷ λαβόντι τὴν αὐτοκράτορα ἀρχήν.

[3] Liv. v. 1. Veientes contra tædio annuæ ambitionis, quæ interdum discordiarum causa erat, Regem creavere. Offendit ea res populorum Etruriæ animos, non majore odio regni, quam ipsius Regis.

[4] See above, p. 357.

[5] Dion. iii. 57. Ψήφισμα ποιοῦνται πάσας Τυρρηνῶν πόλεις κοινῇ τὸν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πόλεμον ἐκφέρειν· τὴν δὲ μὴ μετέχουσαν τῆς στρατείας ἔκσπονδον εἶναι.

peace with the enemy.[1] But it is clear that the several cities retained, under all other circumstances, the right of separate diplomatic and military action. If the Federal body neglected to take up the quarrel of any particular city, that city might, alone or with such cities as chose to join it, carry on war on its own account.[2] One narrative, if we may trust it, describes the Federal body as, on one occasion, refusing to declare war in the name of the League, but expressly authorizing the service of volunteers from any Confederate city, seemingly whether such city itself declared war or not.[3] Altogether, the picture which Dionysios and Livy give us of the state of things in Etruria must be taken at what it may be worth, according to the amount of authentic materials which we may hold to be preserved in their writings. They are of course not to be received as containing a trustworthy narrative of events which are placed before the beginning of authentic history. The question is, How far did the annalists whom they followed carry back into these times the real constitution of Etruria in later times? The general picture which they draw is quite consistent with what we know of other states in a similar position, and does not need to be pieced out by any random conjectures or attempts at divination. It sets before us the perfectly probable spectacle of twelve cities, united by a strong religious and national feeling, fully accustomed to common political action, but among which the Federal tie was not strong enough to extinguish the separate action of the States or to weld Etruria together into a perfect Federal commonwealth like Achaia. The Etruscan Union, as described to us, was laxer even than that of the United States under their first Confederation; but it may well have been as strong as that which unites the members of the existing Confederation of Germany, or even as strong as the union of the Swiss Cantons in some of its earlier and laxer forms.

and also in the States.

B.C. 479?

The accounts of our authorities how far trustworthy.

Probable scheme of the League.

Of the Samnites, the worthiest foes whom Rome ever met

[1] Dion. ix. 18. Τυρρηνῶν αἱ μὴ μετασχοῦσαι τῆς εἰρήνης ἕνδεκα πόλεις, ἀγορὰν ποιησάμενοι κοινὴν, κατηγόρουν τοῦ Οὐϊεταν̂ων ἔθνους, ὅτι τὸν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους πόλεμον οὐ μετὰ κοινῆς γνώμης κατελύσαντο.

[2] This seems clear from several of the passages already quoted from Livy, and indeed from the whole history of the wars between Rome and Veii.

[3] Dion. ix. 1. Συνήχθη εἰς κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὸ ἔθνος· καὶ πολλὰ Οὐϊεταν̂ων δεηθέντων συναίρεσθαι σφίσι τοῦ κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πολέμου, τέλος ἐξήνεγκαν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς βουλομένοις Τυρρηνῶν μετέχειν τῆς στρατείας.

League of SAMNIUM.

within her own peninsula, we know even less than we know of the Etruscans. There can be little doubt that they possessed a Federal Constitution, but of its details we can say absolutely nothing. There was, in war-time at least, a military head of the League, with the title of *Embratur* or *Imperator*;[1] but we know not whether he was merely a Commander-in-Chief appointed for the occasion, or whether Samnium, unlike Ætolia and Achaia, possessed a permanent Federal President. That the Samnite Government was Federal we might almost infer from the mere extent of the country without any further evidence. The Samnite nation constantly acts as a whole; but a consolidated republic on such a scale would be without parallel among the ancient commonwealths, and it is still clearer that Samnium was not a case of a single city ruling over a subject or dependent territory. The names of two Cantons, the Caudini and the Pentri,[2] are distinctly mentioned by Livy; the Hirpini,[3] Caraceni,[4] and Frentani[5] are added by modern writers with more or less of probability. But the great city of Capua,[6] though a portion of its inhabitants were of Samnite blood, seems at no time to have been a member of the Samnite League. This was a most important fact in Samnite history. It debarred the Confederation from

Absence of details.

The Samnite Cantons.

[1] Liv. ix. 1. *Samnites eo anno Imperatorem C. Pontium, Herennii filium, habuerunt.* Mr. Bunbury (Dict. of Geog. Art. Samnium) infers from Livy, ix. 3, viii. 39, the absence of a Federal Diet, which Niebuhr (iii. 108) assumes without hesitation. It is hard to see how Mr. Bunbury's references bear upon the point. In Liv. ix. 3 Caius Pontius consults his father on a military question, which was surely within the competence of the Imperator; in viii. 39, I should rather have found a distinct proof of the existence both of Federal and local Assemblies. The words *omnia concilia* may well imply the latter, while the Federal Assembly seems implied in *De eo coacti referre Prætores decretum fecerunt.* A Senate too seems implied in the phrase, οἱ πρόβουλοι τῶν Σαννιτῶν, Dion. Fr. ii. (Exc. de leg. p. 739 *c*). See Niebuhr, ii. 25.

[2] Liv. xxiii. 41. *Agrum Hirpinum et Samnites Caudinos.* xxiv. 20. *Caudinus Samnis gravius devastatus*, cf. ix. 1, et seqq. So ix. 31, *Bovianus . . . caput Pentrorum Samnitium.* xxii. 61, Samnites præter Pentros.

[3] See Mr. Bunbury's Article "Hirpini" in the Dictionary of Geography. The Hirpini are never distinctly mentioned during the days of Samnite independence, but throughout the Hannibalian War they appear as a distinct people. Doubtless Rome had practised the same system of dismemberment in Samnium of which we have seen so much in the Greek Federal States.

[4] See Dict. of Geog. in voc.

[5] Dict. of Geog. in voc. Niebuhr, iii. 107. The Frentani appear in history only as a non-Samnite people.

[6] Livy describes the Samnite occupation of Capua in iv. 37. In vii. 38 the people of Capua pray for relief against Samnite incursions. The original filibusters must therefore have quite separated themselves from the Samnite League.

both the good and the evil which might have sprung from the presence of one of the great cities of Italy within its borders. It freed Samnium from all fear of a predominant or tyrant city, such as Thebes became in Bœotia; on the other hand it must have cut off the Samnite people from many of the civilizing influences to which other parts of Italy were open. Samnium remained an isolated mountain district, without a sea-board [1] and without any city of importance.[2] Its position resembled that of the original Ætolia and of the original Switzerland. Civic life, that is, among the ancient commonwealths, the only fully civilized life, must, in such a country, have lagged far behind its developements, not only in the Greek cities of Italy, but in Rome, Etruria, or Latium. The long struggle of the Samnites with Rome, never flinching, never yielding while hope of success lasted, sinking only before irresistible force, and rising again whenever the least glimmer of hope or help appeared—the war which lasted, we may say, from the days of Valerius Corvus to the days of Sulla, is worthy of the men of Morgarten or the men of Mesolongi. Their resistance to the conqueror ceased, as we shall see, only with the devastation of their land and the extermination of their race. The Pontius who led Rome's army and whom Rome led in chains and beheaded,[3] and the Pontius who, generations after, fell in the last struggle by the Colline Gate,[4] remind us of the Reding who first taught the Austrian despot what freemen could do and suffer, and the Reding who struck the last blow for the true Democracy of the mountains against the sham Democracy of the bloody city. The internal history of such a people, could we recover it, would be a contribution of the highest value both to the general history of the world and to the general history of Federalism. It would of course be vain to dream of perfection in Samnium any more than elsewhere. We must never let the external heroism of a nation delude us into the hope that we should find its internal history free from those dissensions and crimes which disfigure every history. What we know of the Samnite League sets its people before us in a far fairer light than the kindred League of Ætolia; still we cannot

Effect of the separation of Capua.

Analogy with Ætolia and Switzerland.

Samnite struggle against Rome.

B.C. 340–82.

B.C. 319.

B.C. 82.

A.D. 1315.

A.D. 1798.

[1] Unless possibly the district afterwards known as that of the Picentes. See Niebuhr, iii. 543–4.

[2] Bovianum is called by Livy (ix. 31) *longe ditissimum et opulentissimum armis virisque.* But could Bovianum have been compared to Rome and Capua or the great Etruscan cities?

[3] See above, pp. 45, 46.

[4] See below, § 2.

Lessons of Samnite history.

suppose that it was wholly free from those errors which are common to all political communities, kingly and republican, Federal and Consolidated. But, just as in the case of Ætolia, the long endurance of Samnium, the abiding energy displayed by its people, the absence of any sign of wavering on the part of any section of the people—all show that the Samnite League formed a really united people, acting with a common national will against a common enemy. Thus the history of Samnium supplies another of the many answers with which our history abounds to shallow declamations about the inherent weakness of Federal states. The utter lack of all detailed history of such a Federation—a Federation too, like that of Ætolia, mainly rural and not urban—is one of those losses which the student of ancient history will ever lament, but which, if he is wise, he will not attempt to supply by arbitrary conjectures or divinations of his own.

League of LATIUM.

Of all the principal Italian powers, that which, as far as our scanty information goes, has the best claim to be looked on as a real Federal Government is the League of the Thirty Cities of Latium. Our position with regard to the Latins is exactly opposite to our position with regard to the Samnites. We have abundance of details, if we could only bring ourselves to look upon any of those details as trustworthy. Dionysios, if we choose to believe him, is ready to give us an account of the Latin League almost as minute as Polybios could give us of the Achaian League. He knows the name and date of its founder, the objects of its foundation, and the earlier models which the founder had before his eyes. Servius Tullius founded the Latin League in imitation of the Amphiktyonies of Greece,[1] and he accompanied his foundation by an Inaugural Address, full of political precepts which might have fallen from the lips of Markos or of Hamilton.[2] Into this mythical abyss I must decline to plunge; nor yet can I undertake to correct the ever-fluctuating lists of the Confederate Cities, even with the help of the divining-rod of Niebuhr. Such minute descriptions of unhistoric times are worth incomparably

Abundance of untrustworthy details.

[1] Dion. iv. 25. See above, p. 96.

[2] Ib. 26. Λόγον διεξῆλθε παρακλητικὸν ὁμονοίας, διδάσκων ὡς καλὸν μὲν χρῆμα, πολλαὶ πόλεις μίᾳ χρώμεναι γνώμῃ· αἰσχρὸν δὲ, ὕψις συγγενῶν ἀλλήλοις διαφερομένων, αἴτιόν τε ἰσχύος μὲν τοῖς ἀσθένεσιν ἀποφαίνων ὁμοφροσύνην, ταπεινότητος δὲ καὶ ἀσθενείας καὶ τοῖς ἰσχυροτάτοις ἀλληλοφθονίαν.

less than those genuine bits of information which are ever and anon to be extracted from the unconscious witness either of chroniclers or of poets. About Latium indeed we have one piece of real direct evidence in the form of the treaty concluded between Rome and Carthage in the first year of the Republic, a document which serves to refute so much of what has commonly passed for Roman history. This treaty, whose genuineness there is no reason to doubt, was read by Polybios in its own obsolete Latin, and is preserved by him in a Greek translation.[1] But unluckily it tells us nothing as to Latin Federal history; the Latin cities which it speaks of are described, not as Confederates, but as subjects of Rome.[2] Still the Thirty Cities of Latium, like the Twelve Cities of Etruria, are mentioned far too often, and in far too regular and formal a manner,[3] to leave any reasonable doubt that there really was a group of thirty Latin towns, united together by a Federal tie. That tie, there is every reason to believe, was much closer than that which united the Twelve Cities of Etruria. And, as the Latin towns, though most of them were small, seem to have occupied the country far more thoroughly than the few and scattered towns of Samnium, we may well believe that the Latin Confederation presented much more likeness to a real League of Greek cities than anything to be found either in Samnium or in Etruria. The Latin League clearly had common religious and political meetings,[4] and, in war-time at least, a common chief with the title of Dictator.[5] The number of Thirty

Treaty between Rome and Carthage, B.C. 508.

Nature of the League.

[1] Pol. iii. 22.

[2] Ib. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ μὴ ἀδικείτωσαν δῆμον Ἀρδεατῶν, Ἀντιατῶν, Λαυρεντίνων, Κιρκαιτῶν, Ταρρακινιτῶν, μηδ' ἄλλον μηδένα Λατίνων, ὅσοι ἂν ὑπήκοοι· ἐὰν δέ τινες μὴ ὦσιν ὑπήκοοι, κ.τ.λ. The heading of the treaty indeed speaks of Rome and her *σύμμαχοι*, but *σύμμαχοι* is a flexible word, which must be explained by the more definite *ὑπήκοος*. That word implies something more than the mere *προστασία* of a League spoken of in Dionysios.

[3] Dion. iii. 34; vi. 63, 74, 75. See Niebuhr, ii. 18.

[4] The *Feriæ Latinæ* survived, as a well-known Roman Festival, till very late times. See Dion. iv. 49; viii. 87. The political meetings come out in iii. 34, *αἱ δὲ τῶν Λατίνων πόλεις ἰδίᾳ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίναντο πρὸς τοὺς πρέσβεις, κοινῇ δὲ τοῦ ἔθνους ἀγορὰν ἐν Φερεντίνῳ ποιησάμενοι, ψηφίζονται μὴ παραχωρεῖν Ῥωμαίοις τῆς ἀρχῆς*, v. 61 *συναχθείσης ἀγορᾶς ἐν Φερεντίνῳ ὅσοι τοῦ Λατίνων μετεῖχον γένους κοινῇ τὸν κατὰ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἀναιροῦνται πόλεμον*. So in Liv. vii. 25 we hear of the *Concilia populorum Latinorum*, and in viii. 3 of the *decem principes*. In Dion. (v. 61) we also read of a *κοινὸν Λατίνων δικαστήριον*.

[5] The Alban or Latin origin of the Dictatorship was asserted by Licinius, quoted by Dionysios, v. 74, and the Dictator thus spoken of could hardly fail to have been a Federal Magistrate. There were also local Dictators in particular towns (like the local *στρατηγοί* of Achaian towns, see above, p. 199, note 4) down to very

The Thirty Cities.

Cities seems confirmed by the prevalence of the same number in so many Roman institutions, the thirty Tribes, the thirty Curiæ, the thirty Latin Colonies of a later time. That the list fluctuated from time to time we may well believe.[1] Etruscan and Volscian wars may have often caused the frontier to vary, so that the same town may have been Latin at one time and Volscian at another. And the position of Rome itself must have had even more influence upon the condition of the League. For Rome, whatever Etruscan or Samnite elements may have mingled with its religious or political life, was undoubtedly, primarily and essentially, a Latin city which had outgrown all its fellows.[2] If so, we can well believe the picture which represents Rome, at different times, in an endless variety of relations to the Latin League. Sometimes, as in our most authentic piece of evidence,[3] she appears as an absolute mistress, sometimes as a Federal head, sometimes as the equal ally or the equal enemy of the League as a whole, sometimes as incorporating various Latin towns within the borders of her own citizenship. We can well believe that the League was more than once dissolved, and more than once restored before its final dissolution after the great war with Rome. But we must remember that Rome, though essentially a Latin city, speaking the same language, using the same names of men and of offices, employing the same political numbers, and subjecting its armies to the same discipline, still never appears as the mere capital of the Latin League. As far as the faintest glimmerings of history go back, Rome holds a position towards Latium far more lordly than even that of Thebes towards Bœotia. She must have so soon outstripped all other Latin cities, that she appears, at the very beginning of her history, as something more than the first of Latin cities, as a power able to make war and peace with the Latin League on equal terms, sometimes to hold particular cities, if not the League itself, in a state of absolute subjection. Rome, according to a highly probable conjecture,[4]

Relations of Rome to the League.

B.C. 334.

late times; Milo, the friend of Cicero, had been Dictator of Lanuvium (Cic. pro M. 10). But in Dion. iii. 34 we read of two στρατηγοί, and in Livy viii. 8 of two *Prætors* as the chief magistrates of the League. In the various fluctuations of the League their number and titles may well have varied. There can be no doubt that the oldest Roman offices, *Prætor* and *Dictator*, were of Latin origin. The name *Consul* is much more recent.

[1] See other lists of thirty in Dion. v. 61, and Pliny, Nat. Hist. iii. 9. See Niebuhr, ii. 23.

[2] See Mommsen, cap. iv. Die Anfänge Roms.

[3] As in the treaty quoted above from Polybios.

[4] Mommsen, i. 32.

was originally an outpost of Latium on the Etruscan frontier, in old German political language, a *Mark* against Etruria. Her extraordinary developement has its parallels in the case of similar frontier states elsewhere. Brandenburg, the *Mark* of Germany against the Slave, and Austria, her *Mark* against the Hungarian, have gradually grown into the dominant German powers to the exclusion of older and more glorious names. So Paris, once the *Mark* of Gaul against the Northman, has grown into the capital, or rather the tyrant, of the whole land.[1] It is no wonder that a League of small towns could not permanently bear up against a single great city[2] of their own race, whose strength equalled their united strength, and which was more liberal of its franchise than any other city-commonwealth ever was. The last time that Rome and Latium negociated together, the Latin proposal was that the League should be merged in the City, that the name of Latins should be sunk in that of Romans, but that the chief magistrates of the united nation should be chosen in equal proportion from the single City of Rome and from the Thirty Cities of Latium.[3] Such a proposal shows how slight must have been the national distinction between Romans and Latins;[4] it shows also how close must have been the union among the Latin cities themselves; it shows that the Latin League was a case in which a long-standing Federal connexion had prepared its members for a more intimate union.[5] Had the Latin offer been accepted, the Thirty Cities could no longer have kept their place as sovereign members of a Federal body; they must have sunk into Roman tribes, possessing indeed their distinct votes in the Roman Assembly, but retaining no local independence except of a purely municipal kind. All that was stipulated was that the new citizens should have an equal share with the old in the honours of their common country, a stipulation which the struggle, so lately decided, between the Patrician and Plebeian orders, showed to be absolutely necessary, if the Latin citizens were to receive common justice. And these were not terms offered at the end of a war, when Latium was dis-

Probable origin of Rome.

Latin proposals of union with Rome, B.C. 337.

Close union of the Latin towns illustrated by this proposal.

[1] See Edin. Rev. July 1860. Nat. Rev. Oct. 1860. Megalopolis might have been added, as it certainly was designed as a *Mark* against Sparta (see above, p. 159), had it not been also designed as a capital from the beginning.

[2] See Arnold's Rome, ii. 137, 245, and cf. above, p. 410.

[3] Liv. viii. 3–5. Arnold, ii. 132.

[4] Liv. viii. 8. Nihil apud Latinos dissonum ab Romana re præter animos erat. See Arnold, ii. 136.

[5] See above, p. 88.

heartened by repeated defeats; they were the Latin *ultimatum* before war began, when the League was still in a position to treat or to fight on equal terms. They therefore clearly show what sort of union was looked on as just and desirable in the eyes of Latin patriots. Rome of course despised any such terms, and, when her arms proved victorious, she followed exactly the same line of policy which she afterwards followed in Greece.[1] It was the Federal Union which had made Latium strong; the League was therefore dissolved, and its several cities, as isolated units, were admitted, one by one, to various degrees of citizenship, dependence, or subjection.[2]

Dissolution of the League, B.C. 334.

## § 2. *The Roman Commonwealth and the Italian Allies*

Rome not a Federal state;

That the Roman Commonwealth had not, at any period of its authentic history, a real Federal Constitution is a fact so obvious that I need not dwell upon it. Rome was essentially a city-commonwealth; it was the greatest of all city-commonwealths; as a Latin city independent of the Latin League, it may even have owed its origin and its greatness to secession from a Federal Union. Yet the constitution of Rome is an object of some importance in a History of Federalism. Though Rome was a city-commonwealth, yet it differed in many points from the city-commonwealths of Greece, and all the points in which it differed are approaches to the Federal type. The Roman state contained *quasi*-Federal elements, and to these *quasi*-Federal elements she largely owed her greatness and permanence. From the first moment of her history to the last, Rome is ever incorporating new bodies of citizens, who have gradually less and less to do with the local city.[3] We see this in her authentic history, we see it in the border-land between history and legend, we see it equally in the mythical narratives of her earliest days. With so consistent a picture before us, we cannot doubt that it displays a real tendency which distinguished Rome from her very birth. The mythical tales themselves, worthless as they are for facts and dates and persons, may fairly be cited as cumulative evidence of the tendency which they illustrate in common with authentic history. In the very first days of the City we hear of Romulus and Titus Tatius reigning, side by side, over two

but containing *quasi*-Federal elements.

Gradual incorporation of other states with Rome.

[1] See above, pp. 144, 551.
[2] Liv. viii. 14. Arnold, ii. 195 et seqq.
[3] See above, p. 23.

peoples united by a Federal tie. The States are presently consolidated, and the two peoples sink into two Tribes of a single people. A third Tribe is added, formed, doubtless, out of the inhabitants of some allied or conquered city; it is admitted at first with a certain inferiority of position; it gradually raises itself to an equality with the elder Tribes. Then comes in a whole mass of new citizens, a new people in truth, the famous *Plebs* or Commons, who long formed in many respects a distinct commonwealth from the elder citizens, and whose long and successful strivings after equality with them form the internal history of Rome for several ages. We then find Rome forming alliances on equal terms with various neighbouring states, as the Latins and Hernicans, alliances so intimate as to occupy a sort of border-ground between Confederations and mere Confederacies. In process of time, the members of those alliances, by various steps and various events of war and peace, were admitted to Roman citizenship. When we reach the time of perfectly authentic history, we find, in the Italy which was invaded by Pyrrhos and Hannibal, a body of which Rome is the acknowledged head. The inhabitants of the peninsula fall into three great classes. There were Romans, men possessing the full Roman franchise, not the mere inhabitants of the Roman City, but all the free inhabitants of a large territory, which had once contained independent commonwealths and whole Federal Unions. There were Latins,[1] imperfect citizens, not sharing in the full franchise, but capable of being raised to it by an easy process, by removing to Rome under certain conditions, or by serving certain magistracies in their own towns. Finally, there were the Italians, the allied states, retaining their internal independence, but united to Rome by the terms, more or less burthensome, of dependent alliance.[2] Their actual position answered

Three great classes in Italy; Romans, Latins, and Italians.

[1] I need hardly say that the Latin Colonies of the later Roman history do not represent the old Latin League, either in blood or in geographical position. A city enjoying the Latin franchise might be anywhere, and its citizens might be of any race. They might be real Latins; they might not be real Latins; they might be Romans who by migration had sunk to the Latin level; they might be Italians or Provincials who had been raised to it. Still the origin of the *Jus Latii* or *Latinitas* undoubtedly was that these cities were admitted to that position to which the real Latins had been admitted; they were artificial Latins, just as many Romans were artificial Romans. The number of thirty colonies, too, in the Hannibalian War must surely have come from the tradition of the thirty cities of the old League.

[2] On the general relation of dependent alliance, see above, p. 18 et seqq.

very closely to that of the dependent allies of Athens; but the Marsian or the Samnite had one great advantage over the Chian or the Rhodian. The Athenian allies had hardly more chance of being raised to citizenship than the Helots of Sparta; but the gradual advance from Italian to Latin, and from Latin to Roman rank, was the regular reward of merit, whether in individuals or in communities. At last the Roman citizenship was spread over the whole peninsula, and finally over all the Provinces of the Roman Empire. The Quirites, the Commons, the Latins, the Italians, the Provincials, all gradually merged themselves in the common name of Romans. And all these incorporations, all these struggles, were strictly geographical; the strife between Patrician and Plebeian was a strife of communities rather than of classes; it had far more in common with the strife between Romans and Latins than with the strife between the Senate and the populace in later times. The true Plebeians, as distinguished from the mob of the Forum, were the inhabitants, gentle and simple, of conquered or allied states, which had received the then imperfect franchise of the Roman Commons, just as, a few generations later, they might have received the imperfect franchise of a Latin Colony. The Patrician stood to the Plebeian, not in the relation of *Eorl* to *Ceorl* or of *Gentilhomme* to *Roturier*, but in the relation of a Swiss citizen of a ruling Canton, whether aristocratic or democratic, to the inhabitant of a subject district. When the strife of classes really came, in the days of Marius and Sulla, of Pompeius and Cæsar, it put on a very different form. Patricians of heroic and divine descent, a Catilina, a Clodius, a Cæsar, appeared as conspirators, demagogues, and Tyrants, while the defence of the aristocracy—when aristocracy had become synonymous with freedom—was left to Plebeian Catuli, and Metelli, to the Latin Cato and the Volscian Cicero. It is at once clear that this history of the City of Rome is something altogether different from the history of the City of Athens. The system of incorporation which Athens practised only in her earliest day was continued by Rome during her whole historic lifetime. Now, in all this, there is no real Federalism; the relation of the Tribes to each other was not a Federal relation, because all the Tribes were members of the one ruling common-

The nature of the struggle between Patrician and Plebeian.

On the allies of Rome, see Arnold, Late Roman Commonwealth, i. 164. Merivale, Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 78.

wealth, and did not form sovereign commonwealths themselves. Nor is the relation between Italians, Latins, and Romans a Federal relation; because in those points which would have been delegated to the common Federal power the Romans decided for the Latins and Italians as well as for themselves.[1] Still the existence of these marked geographical divisions among the various classes within the Roman dominions, the local independence retained by each, the fair hope which each class had of being raised to the class above it, all form a broad contrast between Rome and other city-commonwealths, and every difference is a difference in a Federal direction. The Tribes were not members of a Federal Union, because they were mere municipalities retaining no separate State-sovereignty. But they were not mere artificial divisions. Till they were corrupted by the enfranchisement of slaves and strangers, they remained strictly local;[2] the Tribe was often a Latin or Volscian district, which by its incorporation lost all independent sovereignty, but which acquired a distinct vote in the Roman Assembly, and retained a large measure of municipal independence at home. Cicero had two countries, Rome and Arpinum;[3] Milo, a Roman playing a prominent part at Rome, was Dictator of his native Latin town of Lanuvium.[4] And when the Tribes actually met in the Comitia, their position was exactly the same as that of the Achaian Cities;[5] each Tribe had its independent vote, exactly as if it had been a sovereign Canton; its non-Federal and non-sovereign position is to be found in the absence of any independent Government at home. Thus the *quasi*-Federal position of the Tribes is to be looked for in the way in which they shared in the supreme power; the *quasi*-Federal position of the Allies is to be found in the retention of their separate local governments. In the Roman policy, each of these privileges was held to exclude the other; had the two been allowed to co-exist, a real Federal system would have been the result. Had the Samnite and

*Quasi*-Federal nature of the Roman Tribes.

Near approach of the Roman system to Federalism and to Representation.

[1] See above, p. 20.

[2] At Athens, the real local division, round which local patriotism centred, was the δῆμος; but the δῆμος was not a political body. The Tribe, the political body, consisted of certain δῆμοι, but those δῆμοι were not continuous, as if expressly to hinder strictly local action in public affairs.

[3] See Cicero, De Legg. ii. 2, where the *duæ patriæ* are discussed at length, and the analogy of the Attic συνοικισμός appropriately quoted. On this use of *patria* or πατρίς, see above, p. 15. Cicero's *patria* was Rome, or Arpinum, or both, but in no case Italy.

[4] See above, p. 570.

[5] See above, p. 211. Niebuhr, ii. 29.

Etruscan cities, in addition to their local independence, possessed votes in the Roman Assembly; had the Latin and Volscian towns, in addition to their votes in the Roman Assembly, possessed the same local independence as Etruria and Samnium, then Roman Italy could have formed as true a Federal Government as Lykia or Achaia. As it was, the Roman Constitution was neither Representative nor Federal, but it trembled on the verge of being both. And surely it was by thus extending the Roman franchise so far beyond the local Roman City, by constantly calling up allies to the rank of citizens, and subjects to the rank of allies, by thus continually strengthening the commonwealth by the infusion of new and vigorous blood, that Rome maintained her independence and her power so incomparably longer than almost any other commonwealth on record.[1] And the elements which were thus the main cause of Rome's greatness are precisely those which I have ventured to call her *quasi*-Federal elements. They are precisely those which at once distinguish Rome from those commonwealths which knew no distinctions except those of citizens of the local city and the inhabitants of lower standing to it in the relation of subjects or dependent allies.

The greatness of Rome mainly due to her *quasi*-Federal elements.

Of the many struggles among these different component elements of the Roman world, there is one which fairly claims some comment at my hands, for, if the defeated side had proved victorious, the establishment of a Federal Government over a large part of Italy must have followed. I mean the great struggle between Rome and her Italians in the early years of the first century before Christ. This, like a widely different struggle in Grecian history, is generally known as the Social War. This struggle and its results are really among the most important events in the history of the world. They have affected the condition of Italy, and thereby of the rest of Europe, ever since. The Social War was the last time that Rome had to fight for her dominion, and even for her existence, and never, between

The SOCIAL WAR, B.C. 90–89.

Its historical importance.

[1] No state in Greece or in ancient Italy can be at all compared to Rome in the long retention not of mere being but of real greatness. The Athenian commonwealth may have existed as many years as the Roman, but for several centuries it existed and no more. The commonwealths most truly rivalling Rome are Carthage, Venice, and Bern. In the case of Carthage we must allow something for Semitic tenacity, and in the other two cases for the slower march of events in modern times.

the days of Brennus and the days of Alaric, was she brought so near to the brink of destruction. That Rome remained the head of Italy and the world, that her influence has extended over every succeeding page of history, that the dominion of her Cæsars and her Pontiffs, of her laws and of her language, has lived on, in one form or another, through every later age—all this is due, before all other men and all other causes, to the unbending and ruthless energy of her preserver Sulla.[1] It is impossible for us to judge what would have been the result, had the one ruling City of Rome made way for a free Confederation of all Italy. Many an immediate wrong would have been righted, many a victim of oppression would have blessed the day of deliverance, many a subject land would have regained the freedom which Rome had wrested from her—a King might again have sat on the throne of Alexander, and a free Assembly have again been gathered within the theatre of Megalopolis—but all those wise ends which the dominion of Rome has accomplished in the general history of mankind must have remained for ever unfulfilled. An Italian Confederation could never have maintained the supremacy which Rome had held over the Provinces; it is indeed one of the merits of Federal States that they are less capable than other States of holding their neighbours in bondage. Federal Italy would have been far freer and happier than Italy in subjection to a single City, but then Federal Italy never could have been, like that single City, the mistress of the world throughout all time. The Social War is therefore one of the turning-points of history; that it stands out less conspicuously than its importance deserves is owing to the misfortune that no worthy history of it has been preserved, even if any ever existed.[2] We are driven to patch up our accounts of it from late compilers and biographers, writing of course from

B.C. 387. A.D. 410.

Probable results of success on the Italian side.

Nature of the Authorities for the period.

[1] See National Review, January 1862, p. 66.

[2] Our materials for this period are: the regular narrative of Appian, a late and often careless writer, but who is more valuable now than in earlier times; the summaries of Velleius Paterculus and Florus; some considerable and important fragments of Diodôros and some smaller ones of Diôn Cassius; Plutarch's Lives of Marius, Sulla, Sertorius, and others; finally, a few incidental allusions in Cicero, Pliny, and other writers. Of these Cicero, who does not tell us much, is the only contemporary; he, as a young man, served his first and only campaign in the war. Of the regular historians Diodôros comes nearest to the time, and might have conversed with contemporaries. Plutarch seems to have mainly followed the Autobiography of Sulla, so that what he says must be received with caution. The best writers—for Cicero hardly comes into the

Roman materials; on the side of the conquered we have no evidence except that of a few coins. Still we have materials enough to form a general notion of the nature and objects of the struggle, although we sigh at every step for the guidance of a Thucydides, a Polybios, or a Tacitus.

Character of the Roman dominion.

Rome, it must be remembered, vast as her empire had now become, still remained essentially a city-commonwealth.[1] The defence and administration of a large part of three continents were still entrusted to the municipal magistrates of a single town, elected by that town's hereditary burghers. Rome had indeed liberally extended her franchise, but the only franchise which she could offer was one purely municipal, a vote in the local Assembly of the Roman People, and the chance of being chosen to the high offices of the Roman City. That City, as we have seen, ruled over a world of dependent communities, Latin, Italian, and Provincial. The Italian allies retained their local constitutions as separate city-commonwealths, but, in all external matters, they were the passive slaves of Rome. And, beside this condition of formal dependence, they had often to endure much irregular insolence and oppression at the hands of Roman magistrates and even of private men.[2] Each city too was isolated from its fellows; no league, no alliance, no inter-communion of franchise was allowed; and the cities thus isolated and weakened were watched by Roman and Latin colonies placed in all the most important points, and which, under a less invidious name, discharged the duties of Roman garrisons. Still the Roman dominion brought some advantages with it. Italy was at least free from the scourge of internal war, and, since the days of Hannibal, it had been equally free from the scourge of foreign invasion. And, if the Italians were bound to shed their blood in the endless foreign wars of Rome, if, in those wars, their officers never rose above very subordinate commands, if they

Condition of the Italian Allies.

comparison—are Velleius, the descendant of an Italian who remained faithful to Rome, and Diôn, who, though the latest of all in date, understood Roman affairs better than any Greek writer since Polybios. But Velleius is unluckily very brief, and the fragments of Diôn for this period are but few.

[1] We must however remember that the Empire was still far from having reached its full extent. The European conquests of Cæsar, the Asiatic conquests of Lucullus and Pompeius, were yet to be won. The Roman dominions did not as yet surround the whole Mediterranean.

[2] Aulus Gellius (x. 3) has collected some of the worst instances from a speech of Caius Gracchus. Cf. Mommsen, ii. 211.

reaped none of the direct fruits of victory, still they were by no means left without some indirect profits. If no Italian community, as such, shared in the glories of Scipio or Æmilius, still many individual Italians reaped both booty in their wars, and the reward of Roman citizenship was never beyond the hopes of a deserving soldier. The whole Roman Empire too was open to Italian mercantile enterprise; the Italians, subject as they might be at home, were a favoured, and almost a ruling, race as compared with the Provincials, and they were included in the hatred which Provincials and foreigners bore towards the citizens of the ruling commonwealth.[1] Subjects who were so nearly on a level with their masters, who had had so great a share in raising their masters to their present greatness, naturally aspired to perfect equality with them. What form was the equality which justice undoubtedly demanded, to take between the Roman and the Italian ally?

Claim of Roman citizenship for the Allies.

The most obvious form, and that which the demand commonly took, was that of admission to the full franchise of the Roman citizen, with all its political rights and personal immunities. This was the form most in accordance with earlier precedent, and with the general political notions of antiquity. It was also the only form in which the allies could make the demand without infringing, or threatening to infringe, the sovereignty of Rome. A demand for admission to Roman citizenship was therefore the form which the claims of the allies always took both in their own mouths and in those of their Roman advocates.

Advantages and disadvantages of such admission.

But we can hardly doubt that many of the Italians saw that there were two sides to the question, and that admission to Roman citizenship would not be an unmixed gain. Rome had, as it was, extended her franchise too far for good government on the municipal type. Her popular Assemblies, attended by thousands of citizens, had become scenes of riot, bloodshed, and open battle. In one point of view the admission of the Allies would have been the greatest possible gain for the Romans themselves. The enfranchisement of the stout yeomen of the Samnite mountains, of the refined nobles of the Etruscan cities, of the burghers of the smaller towns throughout all Italy, would refresh the degenerate Roman People by the infusion of some

[1] Mithridatês ordered the massacre throughout all Asia, not only of the Roman citizens, but of all Italians—*ὅσοι γένους Ἰταλικοῦ*. See Appian, Bell. Mith., 22, 23. Cf. Sallust, Bell. Jug., 26.

new and vigorous elements. But, unless the Roman Assembly had changed its constitution in some way for which there was as yet no precedent in political history, every fresh infusion of citizens would only make that ungovernable body more ungovernable than before. A dweller at the other end of Italy might not be greatly attracted by admission to a vote in such an Assembly, combined with the shadowy possibility of the fasces and the curule chair for some remote descendant. And by admission to Roman citizenship, an Italian town lost its local independence; it sank into a purely municipal existence; it fell from the functions of a Colonial Parliament to the functions of an English Town-Council. The leading men would lose the influence of the local magistracies with but little chance of sharing in the magistracies of Rome. The citizens at large would lose the power of managing their local affairs as a separate commonwealth, and receive in exchange a place in the Roman Assembly which was sure to be almost illusory. It is no wonder then that the feeling on the subject differed widely in different parts of Italy. The states nearest Rome, differing little from Rome in blood or language, simply wished for admission to that Roman franchise which had been already conferred on so many of their neighbours. They had no wish to destroy Rome or to weaken her power; they only wished to share her greatness by becoming Romans themselves.[1] But Samnites and Lucanians looked at matters with different eyes. To them, at their distance, with their foreign speech and foreign feelings, the offer of the Roman franchise was little better than a mockery. In them the old spirit of national independence and national hatred to Rome had never died out. They might accept Roman citizenship as a last resource, if there was no alternative but citizenship or dependence; but what they really wished for was not Roman citizenship but Samnite and Lucanian freedom; they were ready at any moment to fight against Rome; they were ready, if need were, to wipe out her name from among the nations. On the other hand some parts of Italy, or at least the ruling classes in them, seem really to have preferred the position of dependencies to either independence or citizenship. When the struggle came, Etruria and Umbria took hardly any share in it. And

Difference of feeling among the Italians. Among the states near Rome; among the Samnites and Lucanians;

among the Etruscans and Umbrians.

[1] Cic. Phil. xii. 11. *Non enim ut eriperent nobis civitatem, sed ut in eam reciperentur, petebat.* This is said specially of the Marsians. Dr. Liddell (ii. 282) makes the Marsian a Samnite, and puts his speech into the mouth of a Roman.

the reason is easy to be understood. The Roman dominion preserved at once the internal and the external tranquillity of the Etruscan oligarchies. Etruria, under the shield of Rome, was safe against Gaulish inroads, while the policy of Rome retained the proud and luxurious nobles of the Etruscan cities in their full domination over the rest of their countrymen. It might prove a dear bargain, were they to exchange this local dominion for a mere plebeian franchise at Rome, where they would be massed in some Tribe along with their own dependents, where they would cease to be Etruscan Lucumos, and would have small chance of becoming Roman Prætors and Consuls.[1] These differences of opinion doubtless existed all along, though they did not make themselves prominently seen till the war actually broke out. Of course till war did break out, the only cry that could be raised was the claim of Roman citizenship for the Italian allies. That claim was successively urged by various men and various parties in Rome. Undoubtedly the true course would have been, not to admit the Allies to the mere municipal franchise of Rome, but to unite Rome and all Italy by Federal or Representative institutions. But such a change would have been contrary to every Roman feeling and tradition; it is no matter for blame or for wonder that no Roman was found sharp-sighted enough to dream of it or daring enough to propose it. And, failing this more sweeping reform, the demand of citizenship for the Allies was the demand of perfect justice.[2] If their cause was taken up as a tool by some factious demagogues, it was also taken up, as the cause of justice, by some of the best men both of the Senatorial and the Popular party. The proposal ran counter to the worst prejudices of both sides. The vulgar oligarch feared that his path to the Consulship would be made more doubtful if he were exposed to the additional competition of the nobles of the allied states, of the Lucumos of Etruria and the Imperators of Samnium. The vulgar democrat feared that his vote would lose half alike of its political importance and of its market value, if the number of citizens who

Federal or Representative institutions the true remedy.

The claim of the Allies

opposed by the worst,

[1] See Cantù, i. 407.

[2] Florus, iii. 18. Quum jus civitatis, quam viribus auxerant, socii *justissime* postularent. Velleius, ii. 15. Quorum, ut fortuna atrox, ita caussa fuit justissima. Petebant enim eam civitatem, cujus imperium armis tuebantur: per omnes annos atque omnia bella, duplici numero se militum equitumque fungi, neque in ejus civitatis jus recipi, quæ per eos in id ipsum pervenisset fastigium, per quod homines ejusdem et gentis et sanguinis, ut externos alienosque, fastidire posset.

shared his rights were at once to be doubled. And the proposal also offended a vein of dull conservatism in both parties, that blind clinging to things as they are, under pretence of reverence for antiquity, when to make a change would be simply to imitate the best precedents of that antiquity for which reverence is professed. But there were men of both parties who rose above such narrowness and blindness. The Gracchi, the purest of popular leaders, favoured the cause of the Allies as the cause of justice. The younger Scipio, the purest of aristocrats, stood up for the brave soldiers who had shared his toils and victories, in defiance of the howls of the mongrel populace of the Forum.[1] Caius Marius, as yet the Third Founder and not the destroyer of his country, himself a Volscian yeoman whose grandfather had not been a free citizen, naturally felt far more sympathy for the cause of Italy at large than for the arrogant pretensions of the local Rome. On the whole, the Italian cause gained a good deal of favour among the better class of the Senators and among the more uncorrupted portions of the people;[2] but it was bitterly opposed by the high aristocrats, by the low populace, and by the most selfish class of all, the money-making order of Knights. Its last champion before the war began was that most perplexing of statesmen, the second Marcus Livius Drusus. In the lack of contemporary and impartial evidence, his character and schemes must for ever remain mysterious; still we are attracted towards a man whose plans embraced portions of the policy of both contending parties, and who accordingly won for himself the unextinguishable hatred of the vulgar mass on both sides. Perhaps, had not the assassin's knife prematurely cut him off, he might not have shrunk from actual violence any more than Caius Gracchus or than his enemies. As it was, he put himself at the head of a wide-spread conspiracy which it was impossible that any Government should tolerate. He was not satisfied with pressing the Italian claims, lawfully and honourably, in the Roman Senate

and supported by the best men of both parties at Rome.

Tribuneship of Marcus Livius Drusus, B.C. 91.

[1] App. Bell. Civ. i. 19. Val. Max. vi. 2. 3. Aurel. Vict. de Vir. Ill. lviii. 8. *Taceant quibus Italia noverca est, non mater* are the famous words said to have been uttered by him. They plainly imply that he looked on the *turba forensis* as a mere mob of freedmen and enfranchised strangers, far less worthy of the Roman name than allies of Italian blood. The facility with which citizenship was granted to freedmen in preference to themselves was alone enough bitterly to incense the Italians. Cf. the story of the Cretan mercenary in Diodôros, Exc. Vat. lib. xxxvii. 18.

[2] See Arnold, Later Roman Commonwealth, i. 179, note.

and Assembly; he bound his partizans throughout Italy by a personal oath to himself which we can hardly look upon as consistent with the character of a Roman citizen and magistrate.[1] This oath shows how widely spread the disaffection was throughout Italy, even while disaffection sheltered itself under the legal demand for the Roman citizenship. Another story shows that, even during the lifetime of Drusus, the Allies were ready to fall back upon force, if lawful means failed them. A body of the Italians formed a plan, which they did not scruple to communicate to their Roman champion, for murdering the hostile Consul Philippus among the solemnities of the Alban Mount.[2] Drusus might perhaps not have shrunk from civil war, but he had no mind to be an accomplice in an assassination, and his warning saved his rival from the threatened danger. At last, when Drusus was killed,[3] and when several eminent Romans were prosecuted, and some of them condemned, for favouring the Italian claims,[4] the Allies saw that they had no hope except in their own swords. A plot which must have been widely spread through the peninsula was prematurely discovered;[5] the unwise threats of the Proconsul Servilius at Asculum[6] raised a popular commotion, and every Roman in the town was slain. The sword was now drawn, and it was time to fling away the scabbard.

Beginning of the Social War, B.C. 90.

All unenfranchised Italy, save Etruria and Umbria, now took up arms. One final embassy was sent to Rome, and, when its demands were contemptuously rejected, the Seceding States

[1] Diod. Exc. Vat. [xxxvii. 11]. *Ὄμνυμι τὸν Δία κ.τ.λ. τὸν αὐτὸν φίλον καὶ πολέμιον ἡγήσεσθαι Δρούσῳ, καὶ μήτε βίου μήτε τέκνων καὶ γονέων μηδεμιᾶς φείσασθαι ψυχῆς, ἐὰν μὴ συμφέρῃ Δρούσῳ τε καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ὅρκον ὀμόσασιν. ἐὰν δὲ γένωμαι πολίτης τῷ Δρούσου νόμῳ, πατρίδα ἡγήσομαι τὴν Ῥώμην καὶ μεγίστην εὐεργέτην Δροῦσον.*

[2] Aur. Vict. de Vir. Ill. lxvi. 12. Florus, iii. 18. 8.

[3] He seems (App. Bell. Civ. i. 36) to have in some degree lost the affections of the Italians. They thought themselves threatened by his law for founding colonies, which they feared might be endowed at their own expense. Drusus, in fact, offended all parties in turn—one of the best proofs of his honesty, though perhaps not of his worldly wisdom.

[4] App. Bell. Civ. i. 37. Aur. Vict. de Vir. Ill. lxxii. 11.

[5] The immediate discovery (see App. u.s. 38) was caused by the sending of a hostage from Asculum in Picenum to another town. This was of course a direct attack on the Roman system of isolating the several cities. Livy (Ep. lxxi) seems to have given a full account of the internal movements in the Italian states—*Eorum coitus conjurationesque et orationes in conciliis principum.*

[6] Liv. Ep. lxxii. App. Bell. Civ. i. 38.

proceeded to organize a Government for themselves. Their position was, in everything but its geographical aspect, singularly like the position of the North American Colonies in 1775.[1] What the colonists demanded was, not separation from the mother-country, but an acknowledgement of their claim to all the natural rights of Englishmen. What the Italians demanded was, not separation from Rome, but admission to the full privileges of Romans. Of course the form of the demand was not the same in the two cases. The Italians asked for closer incorporation, the Americans asked for fuller acknowledgement of local liberties. This difference was the natural consequence of the geographical difference. The Italians demanded Roman citizenship; the analogous demand on the part of the Americans would have been a claim for representation in the British Parliament. Had England and America formed one peninsula, they probably would have demanded it; but, with the Atlantic between the Colonies and the mother-country, American patriotism necessarily took another shape. But, in other respects, the relations between the ruling country and its dependencies were closely analogous in the two cases. In both cases, the dependent commonwealths possessed a large share of internal independence, while their external affairs were ordered for them by a power over which they had no control. In both cases they were kept isolated from one another, with no common bond save that of common dependence on the dominant power. Even the complaints as to the position of the Italian allies in the Roman armies find a parallel in the complaints made by the Provincial officers in America as to the superiority over them claimed, even on their own soil, by officers of the same rank who bore British commissions.[2] In both cases no doubt there were men who foresaw and desired separation from the first; in America indeed such foresight and desire were confined to a few individuals, while in Italy they clearly extended to whole commonwealths: still separation was neither openly sought for, nor probably generally desired, till all constitutional means had failed, till separation was forced upon the discontented dependencies by the conduct of the ruling state. The Americans, as being not conquered enemies but British colonies, clave longer than the Italians did to the names of loyalty and union. Still,

Analogy between the Italian Allies and the American Colonies.

[1] See Mommsen, ii. 216.

[2] See Marshall's Life of Washington, ii. 36.

when Congress had once raised troops, when the Allies had once set up their counter-Government, the ruling state in each case had no choice but to yield every point at issue, to acknowledge the independence of the seceders, or to reconquer them by force. As the policy of Rome and England differed, so the event of the war differed; but between the origin and the earliest stages of the two there is a close likeness.

Federal Constitution of the seceding States.

The Constitution which the seceding Allies now established was beyond doubt intended to be a Federal one. This is taken for granted by most modern writers,[1] and it seems involved in the nature of the case. The various nations which joined in the revolt might indeed stoop to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome or to merge themselves in the Roman Commonwealth, but they were not likely either to acknowledge the supremacy of any other state or to merge their national differences in an Italian Republic one and indivisible. They chose a particular city as the seat of the Federal Government; but there is no evidence that it was intended to be anything more than the seat of the Federal Government.[2] Their new capital was Corfinium, in the Pelignian territory, a position admirably central for the whole of Italy, and probably chosen in the hope that the northern states which as yet stood aloof would before long join the League. As the Federal capital, Corfinium exchanged its old name for that of Italicum.[3] The League took for the present the form of a Confederation of eight[4] States, each doubtless retaining its full internal sovereignty, and some of them probably assuming a Federal form in their internal constitutions.[5] In the details of the central Government they closely followed the Roman pattern, a pattern in truth in no way inconsistent with Federal institutions. For, had each of the Roman Tribes possessed the internal

Italicum the capital of the League.

Constitution of the Federal Government borrowed from that of Rome.

[1] See Merivale, Fall of the Roman Republic, p. 84. Cantù, Hist. des It. i. 408. Cf. Mommsen, ii. 216–17, 220–21. Diodôros (Exc. Phot. l. xxxvii.) uses the Federal word *σύνεδροι*.

[2] Mommsen (ii. 221) seems to think that every citizen of the League received the citizenship of Italicum. I see no proof of this.

[3] *Ἰταλική*, Strabo, v. 4. *Italicum*, Vell. ii. 16.

[4] The number *eight* seems to rest on good numismatic evidence. The lists vary in different authors. Livy's list is *Picentes, Vestini, Marsi, Peligni, Marrucini, Samnites, Lucani.* Add the Hirpini, who appear as a distinct people from the Samnites (App. i. § 1; see above, p. 566, note 3), and we have the eight states needed.

[5] The several states of Samnium and Lucania, isolated by the Roman policy, could hardly fail to return to the old Federal connexion, and the Samnites and Lucanians act throughout as wholes. On Leagues within Leagues, see above, p. 126.

sovereignty which belonged to each Achaian City, the power of the Consuls, the Senate, and the Assembly would have been a good deal curtailed, but all three would have been just as necessary as they were under the actual system. At the head of the League stood two Consuls and twelve Prætors, and the affairs of the Confederation were administered by a Federal Senate of five hundred.[1] This was the nearest approach to a Federal union of the whole peninsula which Italy has ever beheld.

Rome the great obstacle to a permanent Italian Federation.

It might be a matter for curious speculation what would have been the result if the Italians had finally conquered, as at one stage of the war they seemed likely to do. Rome, so far greater in every way than any other Italian city, would perhaps have been found to be an insuperable obstacle in the way of any lasting Federation of all Italy. Had the Roman armies been finally overthrown, had Rome, instead of admitting the allies to citizenship, been driven to seek admittance into the Italian League, she could never have sat down as an equal and contented member of a Federal body. It would have been as when Sparta, in the later days of the Achaian League, was required to sit down as an equal confederate alongside of her own revolted subjects of Messênê and the Eleutherolakônic towns.[2] The Samnite Pontius gave utterance to a real, though terrible, truth when he said that, if the Italians would be free, they must root up the wood which sheltered the wolves which so long had ravaged Italy.[3] He, we may be sure, had looked to separation from the first, and had held the rejection of the Italian claims by the Roman Senate to be matter for nothing but rejoicing. As it was, it is hard to say whether Rome conquered or was conquered; but it is certain that, so far as she can be looked upon as successful, her victory was due far more to her diplomacy than to her arms. As usual, I must decline entering into military details. It is enough for my purpose to say that Rome drew on all her resources both in Italy and in the Provinces. As the British Government strove to reconquer America by the help of German mercenaries and of Indian savages, so Rome called to her help the fierce warriors of Numidia and Mauretania. As the revolted colonists sought for aid from France, so

The Social War, B.C. 90–89.

[1] Diod. Exc. Phot. l. xxxvii. 2.

[2] See above, pp. 485, 492.

[3] Vell. ii. 27. 2. Telesinus dictitans adesse Romanis ultimum diem, vociferabatur eruendam delendamque urbem; adjiciens numquam defuturos raptores Italicæ libertatis lupos nisi silva, in quam refugere solerent, esset excisa.

the revolted Italians sought for aid from Mithridatês. But, in the case of Italy, these extraneous aids had less influence on the struggle than they had in the case of America. The Numidians were rendered lukewarm in the Roman cause by an ingenious stratagem,[1] and Mithridatês, less wise than the counsellors of Lewis the Sixteenth, gave the Italians no effectual support.[2] The Roman and Italian armies, thus left to themselves, were, on the whole, equally matched; and the victories and defeats on the two sides were nearly equally balanced. Indeed, as long as the League retained its full proportion, the Italians had clearly the advantage. Their successes emboldened the Etruscans and Umbrians; that is, most probably, the mass of the people in those states, whose interests lay in separation, showed that they would no longer be kept down by the local aristocracies, whose interests bound them to the Roman connexion. At all events, Secession began to be threatened among the Etruscan and Umbrian commonwealths.[3] The Senate now yielded; citizenship was offered to the Latins, to the Allies who had remained faithful, finally to all the seceders who should lay down their arms.[4] That is to say, Rome was really defeated, but she contrived to preserve the appearance of victory. The Allies had in truth extorted from her at the point of the sword all that any of them had openly demanded, all that many of them had actually wished

Successes of the Allies.

Movements in Etruria and Umbria.

The Senate yields the demands of the Allies.

[1] App. Bell. Civ. i. 42.

[2] Diod. Exc. Phot. l. xxxvii. 2. Ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης ἀπόκρισιν δίδωσιν ἄξειν τὰς δυνάμεις εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἐπειδὰν αὐτῷ καταστήσῃ τὴν Ἀσίαν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔπραττε. Out of this Dr. Liddell (ii. 282) makes the following: "He bade the Samnites hold out firmly; he was, he said, at present engaged in expelling the Romans from Asia; when that work was done, he would cross the sea, and assist them in crushing *the she-wolf of Asia.*" The wolves of Pontius Telesinus speak for themselves; those of Dr. Liddell are wholly inexplicable.

It should be observed that this application to Mithridatês was only made in the last stage of the war, by the Samnites and other real enemies of Rome. Probably those states which sincerely sought for Roman citizenship would not have consented to such a negociation.

[3] App. Bell. Civ. i. 49.

[4] Ib. Δείσασα οὖν ἡ βουλὴ . . . Ἰταλιωτῶν τοὺς ἔτι ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ παραμένοντας ἐψηφίσατο εἶναι πολίτας. This must be the *Lex Julia.* See Cic. pro Balbo, 8. Merivale, p. 92. The words of Appian do not distinctly mention any offer of citizenship to those who should lay down their arms; but it seems implied in the fact that those who did so did receive it (see Arnold, i. 174), and perhaps in the words of Velleius (ii. 16), Paullatim deinde recipiendo in civitatem, qui arma aut non ceperant, *aut deposuerant maturius,* vires refectæ sunt. Probably promises to that effect were made, of which the later *Lex Plautia-Papiria* (see Cic. pro Archia, 8. Merivale, p. 94) was the formal confirmation.

for. But that policy which never failed the Roman Senate was able to put another face upon the matter. Rome no doubt well knew the real diversity of objects which lurked under the apparent unanimity of the seceders. The commonwealths nearer Rome, to which she was an object of envy rather than of hatred, had now all that they had wished for freely offered to them—offered to them, it might well be said, as the reward of their own prowess in arms. Citizenship was what they had all along striven for; they had been driven into revolt and the establishment of a rival Government only by the pertinacious refusal of the wished-for gift. When citizenship was really to be had, there was no need to prolong the struggle for their own sakes, and the Italian Confederation was hardly old enough for them to wish to prolong it for the sake of the Union. It would have been an excess of self-sacrifice beyond all parallel, if Marsians and Pelignians, when their own point was gained, had gone on fighting purely for the sake of Samnites and Lucanians. With the exception of those two gallant nations, all the revolted states gradually returned to their allegiance, and received the full citizenship of Rome. And, received as they were, one by one, often after some success of the Roman arms, Rome was even now able formally to maintain her own principle of yielding nothing to those who resisted and negociating only with the conquered. But the Samnites and Lucanians still held out; when they had once taken up arms, when they had once again won victories and suffered defeats, their old enmity towards Rome was not so easily quenched. The Confederation was now reduced to two members, but those two members still resisted; Italicum sank again into Corfinium, but the Samnite town of Æsernia succeeded to the rank of the Federal capital.[1] Sulla himself, notwithstanding several victories, failed wholly to subdue them; they still prolonged a *guerrilla* warfare, hoping that, among the factions of the Roman state, some favourable opportunity might still turn up, or that the great King of Pontos might at last land in Italy, and summon them to his banners, as Pyrrhos and Hannibal had summoned their fathers.

The other States accept citizenship,

but Samnium and Lucania still hold out, B.C. 89.

And for a while they were not wholly disappointed. The Social War had now dwindled into such small proportions that it might be left to a subordinate commander, while the

[1] Diod. Exc. Phot. l. xxxvii. 2. But App. c. 51 calls Bovianum the *κοινοβούλιον τῶν ἀποστάντων*.

threatening aspect of Mithridatês demanded all the attention of the Republic and its chiefs. Metellus Pius was left to deal with the remnants of war[1] which still lingered in Samnium and Lucania, while the great prize of the Eastern command was disputed between Marius and Sulla. It fell to Sulla; he was chosen Consul, and bidden to recover Rome's Eastern dominions from her terrible enemy. But just then arose the disputes and tumults which attended the legislation of Publius Sulpicius. The Allies had been admitted to the Roman franchise; but they had been admitted to it in a shape which made its political rights wholly illusory. The new citizens were equal in number to the old; but they were all massed together, in eight Tribes only, so that, according to the Roman manner of voting, they could, at the outside, command eight votes only out of thirty-five, perhaps only out of forty-three.[2] Considering their numbers and weight, they were fully entitled to command twice as many.[3] They were naturally discontented with their position, and their

Legislation of P. Sulpicius, B.C. 88.

Illusory nature of the franchise granted to the Allies.

Their discontent.

[1] App. Bell. Civ. 68 *τὰ λείψανα τοῦ συμμαχικοῦ πολέμου.* Cf. capp. 53, 91.

[2] It is by no means clear whether the new citizens were all placed in eight of the existing Tribes, or whether eight new Tribes were created to receive them, making the whole number forty-three. The latter course would have been in harmony with the ancient custom by which so many allied or conquered states had been converted into Roman Tribes. The words of Appian (i. 49) are, *Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν δὴ τούσδε τοὺς νεοπολίτας, οὐκ ἐς τὰς πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα φυλάς, αἳ πότε ἦσαν αὐτοῖς, κατέλεξαν· ἵνα μὴ τῶν ἀρχαίων πλέονες ὄντες, ἐν ταῖς χειροτονίαις ἐπικρατοῖεν. ἀλλὰ δεκατεύοντες ἀπέφηναν ἑτέρας, ἐν αἷς ἐχειροτόνουν ἔσχατοι.* This can only mean the creation of *ten* new Tribes, though *δεκατεύω* is a very odd word to express it. Velleius (ii. 20. 2) says, "Cum ita civitas Italiæ data esset, ut *in octo tribus contribuerentur* novi cives; ne potentia eorum et multitudo veterum civium dignitatem frangeret." This would most naturally be understood of distributing the new citizens among eight of the existing Tribes, but it might perhaps be taken the other way, and the *eight Tribes* of Velleius coincide most temptingly with the *eight States* of the Italian League. Mr. Merivale (p. 96) takes for granted that the Tribes, whether eight or ten, were additional. Dr. Liddell (ii. 289) thinks Appian's statement "clear and consistent," and explains the diversity by supposing that "several plans were afoot, but that none was actually carried into effect." Now nothing can be plainer than that the plan, whatever it was, was carried into effect, and that the Italians were dissatisfied with the result. (See Merivale, p. 104.) Appian (u.s.) goes on to say, *πολλάκις αὐτῶν ἡ ψῆφος ἀχρεῖος ἦν, ἅτε τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα προτέρων τε καλουμένων, καὶ οὐσῶν ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ.* It may be worth a thought whether their special exasperation was not caused by the election of Sulla and Pompeius to the Consulship for B.C. 88—doubtless in the teeth of every Italian voter.

[3] Some slight preference to the old citizens could not be helped. In our own Reform Bill old boroughs were allowed to retain their one or two members by the possession of a much smaller population than was required for new boroughs to claim them.

just cause found a vehement advocate in the great Caius Marius. The Volscian yeoman had always taken their side; his heart had always been Italian rather than Roman; when constrained to fight against them in the Social War, he had gone forth with only half a heart, and he had waged war in a very different way from that in which he had waged it against the Numidian and the Teuton.[1] Marius, we have no reason to doubt, honestly embraced the cause of men whose friend he had been through life; but he was an ambitious, and now a disappointed man, and he of course looked for the grateful support of the new citizens in any future struggles with his rival. Their cause was also taken up by Sulpicius, then a Tribune of the Commons, a celebrated orator, a man hitherto of aristocratic politics, and whose character is certainly not to be estimated by the unfavourable reports of it which have been handed down to us by the Sullan party.[2] A law was proposed to distribute the new citizens among all the Tribes; when the Consuls threw vexatious obstacles in the way of its passing, Sulpicius, by a bolder stroke still, proposed another law, transferring the Mithridatic command from Sulla to Marius. The Civil War now began; Sulla entered Rome as a conqueror; Sulpicius was killed and Marius fled for his life; and Sulla at last departed for the East, leaving the Marian Cinna in possession of the Consulship, and Samnium and Lucania still unsubdued. The details of the Civil War do not concern me; it is enough for my purpose that the new citizens, Marsians and Etruscans alike, stedfastly clave to the Marian cause,[3] and that Samnium and Lucania still continued their anti-Roman warfare. Attempts were made to conciliate both the avowed foes and the discontented citizens. The Italians who had accepted the franchise were at last distributed among the thirty-five Tribes,[4] and so gained their proper position in the commonwealth. Their part in the struggle is no longer that of enemies of Rome, but merely of partizans of one of the two Roman factions. But in Samnium matters were very different. An attempt was made by Metellus to bring the rebels to terms; citizenship was offered; the Sam-

Their cause embraced by Marius

and Sulpicius.

The Civil War, B.C. 88–2. B.C. 87.

The Samnite War still continues.

B.C. 87.

[1] See Merivale, p. 90. National Review, Jan. 1862, p. 63.

[2] Plut. Mar. 35. Sulla, 8. Lau (Lucius Cornelius Sulla, p. 193) has thrown much light on the real character of Sulpicius and his designs. They have been much misunderstood, through trusting too implicitly to reports which, it is clear, represent only the Sullan version of the story. See National Review, January 1862, p. 64.

[3] App. c. 64, 86.

[4] See Merivale, p. 120.

nites professed to accept it, but they clogged their acceptance with conditions to which Rome, even in her distracted state, could not yield without dishonour, [1] and the negociation came to nothing. Probably it was only in mockery that the Samnites had professed to listen, hoping to prolong the struggle till some more favourable time. At last the moment came; Rome was utterly divided against herself; Sulla and the younger Marius were at the head of hostile armies, waging a war in which no mercy was shown on either side. Pontius the Samnite and Lamponius the Lucanian now marched on Rome, with the avowed purpose of destroying the tyrant city or of perishing in the attempt.[2] They were received as allies by the Marian army —an act of treason against their country which almost drives our sympathies to the side of Sulla. But, viewed from the Samnite side and with the memories of old Samnite glories in our minds, this march of the last Pontius is the one heroic scene which redeems the black annals of the Civil War. Rome had now at last to struggle for her existence at her own gates; Pontius and Lamponius brought her nearer to her overthrow than Hannibal or Pyrrhos. And the brave Samnites might boast that, in this last hour of their national being, victory was in some sort theirs. In the battle before the Colline Gate, Pontius drove Sulla himself before him; had fortune been equally favourable to his Roman allies, he might have avenged the wrongs of his forefather, and have entered Æsernia with the proudest of the Cornelii led in chains before his car of triumph. But it was not in the Fates that Rome should fall in this the hour of her deepest danger. The star of Sulla the Fortunate was dimmed but for a moment; the whole Samnite host died on the field, or were slaughtered after the battle by the merciless conqueror.[3] In a word, Sulla had delivered

Last stage of the war; the Samnites before Rome, B.C. 82.

Battle at the Colline Gate.

[1] App. c. 68. Diôn, fr. 166.

[2] Vell. (ii. 27. 1) introduces them with more sympathy than a Roman writer often shows to a noble enemy. At Pontius Telesinus, dux Samnitium, vir domi bellique fortissimus, penitusque Romano nomini infestissimus, contractis circiter quadraginta millibus fortissimæ pertinacissimæque in retinendis armis juventutis, Carbone et Mario Coss. abhinc annos cxi. Kal. Novembribus ita ad portam Collinam cum Sulla dimicavit ut ad summum discrimen et eum et rempublicam perduceret. See also Florus, iii. 21. 22. App. c. 90-93. Liv. Ep. lxxxviii. Plut. Sull. 29. Arnold, i. 221–7, and a singularly fine passage of Merivale, pp. 129, 30.

[3] App. c. 94, cf. 87. Vell. ii. 27. Diôn, fr. 135, 6. Arnold, i. 226.

Rome, and had thereby fixed the future history of the world for ever.

Permanent devastation of Samnium by Sulla.

The conqueror had now only to gather in the spoil. Heavy indeed was the hand that fell alike upon Samnium and upon Etruria. Sulla had saved Rome, and all Italy was henceforth to be Roman. The Samnite people were, as far as might be, exterminated, and their cities reduced to desolation.[1] Rome had never again to fear an Italian enemy; but the effects of Sulla's devastation of Southern Italy remain to our own day. The rooting out of that noble people of brave soldiers and hardy yeomen has been the main cause of that difference which, in every later age, has been visible between the Southern and Northern parts of the peninsula. The policy of Sulla was well nigh the same as that by which, in our own times, another lord of Rome has doomed the same lands to anarchy and brigandage. But, if Sulla wasted Samnium, he at least did it in the cause of Rome's dominion; it was reserved for another Saviour of Society, the Eldest Son of the Church, the patron of the Holy Father, to renew the same evil work in the cause of Rome's subjection to a foreign enemy.

## § 3. *Of the Lombard League*

Gradual incorporation of the Provinces with Rome.

Our history has now to take a leap of more than twelve hundred years. The victory of Sulla established the permanent dominion of Rome over Italy, and over all the Mediterranean nations. Or rather, what was finally accomplished was not so much the dominion of Rome, as the incorporation of Italy and the Provinces with Rome. Under the Republic indeed, and under the early Cæsars, the local Rome still kept her place. But gradually all mankind, from Egypt to Britain, became equally entitled to the name of Romans, and to whatever pre-eminence that once proud name still implied. As classes were gradually mingled together within the Roman dominions, as new nations gradually arose, capable of fighting and negociating with Rome on equal terms, the pre-eminence attached to the Roman name ceased to be the pre-eminence of a particular order within the Empire, but the supposed pre-eminence of all the subjects of the Empire over all the nations beyond its borders.

[1] Strabo, v. 4, 11. Οὐκ ἐπαύσατο πρὶν ἢ πάντας τοὺς ἐν ὀνόματι Σαυνιτῶν διέφθειρεν ἢ ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐξέβαλε.

The Roman was now opposed not to the Italian or the Provincial, but to the Persian and the Goth. The Emperors, commonly Provincials by birth, learned to care less for the City and more for the Empire; and, as barbarian enemies began to threaten, the presence of Cæsar was needed almost anywhere rather than in the ancient capital. Province after province was lopped away, but no province of the West seems ever to have willingly seceded from the Empire till the Empire had ceased to be Roman in more than name. Strangers established themselves within the Empire: barbarian dynasties reigned in Britain, in Gaul, in Spain, in Africa, in Italy itself. The style and title of Augustus was handed on from one stranger to another; it was assumed by a Frank and disputed by a Greek or a Slave; yet Rome was never without a Cæsar; there was always some Prince whom she acknowledged as the lawful bearer of the Imperial title, whose claim was never denied in theory, however carefully his authority might be evaded in practice. Rome had her Cæsar, but, from the fourth century onwards, he dwelt anywhere rather than in Rome itself; at Milan, at Ravenna, or at Pavia; at Nikomêdeia or at Byzantium; at Aachen, at Goslar, at Gelnhausen, or at Palermo. This absence of the Emperors was one main cause of the difference between the history of the Old Rome and of the New; the presence of the Eastern Emperors at Constantinople preserved the Imperial authority both in Church and State; the absence of the Western Emperors from Rome left room for the growth of those sacerdotal and republican powers whose developement forms the history of mediæval Italy. From the days of the Lombard invasion there was also an acknowledged Kingdom of Italy, whose sovereign, from the days of Charles the Great, was commonly either a vassal of the Emperor or the Emperor himself. But the royal authority was never extended over the whole peninsula; the Eastern Emperors still retained a considerable province in the South, and here and there a Lombard Duke or a Saracen freebooter contrived to maintain himself in independence of all kings and Emperors whatsoever. The King of Italy commonly dwelt, as at this day, in a remote corner of his Kingdom[1]; when, under the great

Rome forsaken by the Emperors

The Imperial succession always maintained.

The Kingdom of Italy, A.D. 568–1250. 774.

[1] The perplexing history of the Italian Kings between 888 and 961 may be studied in that most amusing book, Liudprand's Antapodosis (printed both by Pertz and by Muratori), and in several chronicles in Muratori's second volume. Some of them bore the title of Emperor (see, for instance, the Chronicle of Farfa, col. 416 of Guido, and 460 of Berenger), but their history is mainly confined to Northern

Union of the Crown of Italy and Germany, 961.

Weakness of the royal authority, 1039–1056.

Otto, the crown of Italy was definitely annexed to that of Germany, the King of Italy became at once a stranger, a pluralist, and a non-resident. The consequence was that the royal authority was weaker in Italy than anywhere else, and that it required an unusually vigorous King, an Otto or a Henry the Third, to maintain any authority at all. Italy thus changed, far sooner than Germany, far more permanently than France, into a system of independent principalities and cities, owning little more than a nominal allegiance to their King and Emperor. By the middle of the twelfth century the notion of a Kingdom of Italy had become almost nominal. The southern part of the peninsula had been converted into an independent monarchy, whose Norman Counts and Kings did not scruple to acknowledge themselves as the vassals of the Pope, but rejected all claims to even a formal supremacy on the part either of the Eastern or of the Western Cæsar. In other parts of the peninsula smaller princes reigned, nominal vassals, no doubt, of the absent Emperor, but practically no less independent than the Sicilian King. Rome was in an anomalous state, sometimes a republic, sometimes almost a Papal possession, anything rather than a loyal city of the Cæsar and Augustus, who, once in his reign, fought his way to a coronation within its walls. Northern Italy had split up into a multitude of practically independent states; some of them were feudal principalities, but the dominant element in the country was the Cities.[1] It is their greatness, their rivalries, and their fall, which make the history of mediæval Italy the most living reproduction in later times of the history of ancient Greece.[2] During the constant absence of the Emperors from Italy, the Lombard cities had become practically sovereign. They not only chose their own magistrates and administered their internal affairs without royal interference, but they exercised all the rights of independent commonwealths; they levied war and they made peace, they sent and received ambassadors, they entered into treaties and alliances, without any reference whatever to the will of the distant prince whom they still acknowledged as their lawful Emperor and King.[3]

The Normans in Apulia and Sicily, 1021–1194.

Condition of Rome.

Northern Italy in the twelfth century.

Predominance of the Cities.

Their practical independence.

Italy. The most exceptional is King Hugh's unlucky expedition to Rome. See Liudprand, iii. 44-5.

[1] On the greatness of the Cities, and the way in which they had absorbed nearly all the feudal nobility, see the description of Otto of Freising, ii. 12, 14.

[2] See above, p. 24.

[3] I do not enter into any question as to the Roman or the Teutonic origin of

The amount of authority retained by the Emperors in Italy fluctuated infinitely according to the character and position of the reigning prince. Henry the Third, nearly absolute in Germany, was hardly less so in Italy, but Kings like the Saxon Lothar and the Frankish Conrad retained hardly any authority at all. By the middle of the twelfth century, the Imperial power in Italy had sunk to the lowest ebb. But about that time several circumstances combined to bring about a reaction in its favour. The study of the Civil Law was reviving, and with it there revived a certain feeling of reverence for the power which possessed the titles, and claimed the prerogatives, of Theodosius and Justinian. The independent princes looked with jealousy on the advances of civic freedom, and hoped that the authority of a king would be exercised in favour of feudal chiefs rather than in favour of revolted commonwealths. The cities again, divided against each other, did not always refuse a common master as an arbiter of their quarrels; small commonwealths oppressed by great ones eagerly invoked Cæsar as their protector against the other tyrants; several cities, above all, the old Lombard capital of Pavia, were bound to the Imperial cause by an attachment as loyal and enthusiastic as any that bound their rivals to the cause of the Church or to the cause of freedom. And, above all, Milan, Cremona, and Tortona themselves still acknowledged the Roman Emperor and King of Italy as their lawful sovereign. They might be anxious to limit his royal rights to the smallest possible amount, but that they had a King in Cæsar, and that Cæsar had some rights over them, the stoutest Guelf in Lombardy never dreamed of denying. When therefore the choice of the German and Italian[1] electors had filled the throne of Charles and Otto with a prince really worthy to walk

Reigns of Lothar II. 1125–37. Conrad III. 1137–52.

Imperialist reaction.

Election of Frederick, 1152.

Italian municipal freedom, or whether any civic constitutions can trace their being as far back as Otto the Great. It is enough for my purpose that the cities were practically independent at the accession of Frederick Barbarossa.

[1] Otto of Freising (ii. 1) distinctly says that Frederick's election was made *non sine quibusdam ex Italia baronibus*. We know not who they were, or by what commission they came, but it is important to mark that the election was not exclusively the work of Germans. So at the election of Frederick's uncle, the late King Conrad, in 1137, the consent of Italy was given through the mouth of a Papal Legate. See Otto Fris. Chron. vii. 22, "Præsente Theodwino Episcopo Cardinali, ac sanctæ Romanæ Ecclesiæ Legato, summi Pontificis, *ac totius Romani Populi, Urbiumque Italiæ* assensum promittente." It should also be remembered that this same Conrad had already been actually chosen and crowned King of Italy at Milan in 1128, in opposition to Lothar, who was then reigning in Germany. See Otto Fris. Chron. vii. 17, "Conradus a fratre ac quibusdam

in their steps, the revival of the Imperial dominion in Italy seemed to follow as a matter of course. Frederick of Hohenstaufen, famous by his Italian nickname of Barbarossa, was the greatest and noblest sovereign of his age.[1] He rose as high in

aliis Rex creatus, . . . a Mediolanensibus . . . honorifice suscipitur, et ab eorum Archiepiscopo Anselmo Modoyci sede, Italici Regni in Regem ungitur." Of course Conrad intended to become King and Emperor of the whole Empire, if he could, and not merely to reign as a local King of Italy, but the fact is worth notice as showing not only that the right of Italy to a voice in the choice of its sovereign was not denied, but also that the Milanese did not look upon a German King as being necessarily a foreign oppressor.

This election of Conrad was just after the Milanese conquest of Como.

[1] The authorities for the reign of Frederick are numerous, but unluckily some of the best fail us long before the end of his reign. By far the best historian of that time is Otto, Bishop of Freising, Frederick's uncle, whose history of Frederick (a distinct work from his Chronicle) unluckily reaches only to the year 1156, and the continuation of Radevic, a Canon of his church, only to 1159. They therefore give us no direct help for the history of the Lombard League. Prefixed to Otto's history is a letter from Frederick himself to his uncle, describing his first campaign. Otto and Radevic are printed in the sixth volume of Muratori's Rerum Italicarum Scriptores. There is also a fine old edition printed at Strassburg in 1515, at the end of which (in my copy) is added the poetical account of Frederick's campaigns by Gunther, otherwise Ligurinus. There is also a contemporary Chronicle by Otto of St. Blaise, printed in the same volume of Muratori. The contemporary poems contained in the collection called Gedichte auf König Friedrich, published by Jacob Grimm (Berlin, 1844), are very curious. Of Italian writers, we have, on the Imperialist side, the very valuable Chronicle of Otto Morena of Lodi, carried on by his son Acerbus and by a nameless continuator down to 1168. The shorter Chronicle of Sire Raul or Ralph of Milan is of course strong on the other side; it takes in Frederick's whole reign. These are also in Muratori's sixth volume. In his seventh volume we have the contemporary Chronicle of Romuald, Archbishop of Salerno, primarily devoted to Sicilian history, but which deals at length with several stages of the struggle between Frederick and the cities. A few things may also be gleaned from the Pantheon of Godfrey of Viterbo, and the Chronicle of Sicard of Cremona in the same volume. All these are contemporary. To the next century belongs the Chronicle of Conrad, Abbot of Ursperg, printed at Strassburg, 1537, edited by Philip Melanchthon. The life of Pope Alexander the Third by Nicolas, Cardinal of Aragon, in Muratori's third volume, though not compiled till the fourteenth century, is very important, as giving the strictly Papal, as distinguished from the Imperialist, the Lombard, or the Sicilian view, of the history. The abundance of our materials for these times makes us the more sigh over the sad deficiency of them during a large part of the time dealt with in this volume. If all mediæval writers were like Lambert of Herzfeld and Otto of Freising, we should not have also to lament the inferiority of our store as well as to rejoice at their abundance.

Between original authorities and modern writers may come the work of Sigonius, an Italian scholar of the sixteenth century, De Regno Italiæ. As he professes to have searched diligently the archives of various cities, he probably had materials before him which are not now available, and may therefore be looked on as occupying a place somewhat like that of Plutarch, Pausanias, and Appian in our earlier history. Of modern writers there is of course the second

every moral quality above Henry of Anjou and Philip of Paris, as he perhaps fell below them in some purely intellectual gifts.[1] Firmly believing in his rights, supported in that belief by all Germany and by a large part of Italy, he devoted every energy of his soul, every resource of his kingdoms, to the assertion of the claims which he had inherited from the Kings and Emperors before him. Stern and merciless while opposition lasted, but faithful to his word[2] and generous in the hour of victory, Frederick stands forth in honourable contrast to most conquerors of his own or of any other age. He was a King contending against Republics; therefore all our noblest sympathies lie with his enemies; but we must never allow ourselves to look on the Italian history of the twelfth century in a light reflected only from the passions of the nineteenth. Never must we confound the claims of the Saxon, Frankish, and Swabian Cæsars with the imposture of yesterday, which ventures to assume their title and to deck itself with their Imperial ensign. Frederick was indeed a stranger in Italy, but he was not more a stranger than Henry of Anjou was a stranger in England, than Lewis of Paris was a stranger in Aquitaine. His royal title was acknowledged by all; his royal rights were zealously asserted by many; his personal qualities won the enthusiastic love of multitudes of Italian as well as German partizans.[3] His position, as lawful Emperor of the Romans, lawful King of Germany, Italy, and

Character of Frederick.

His position not to be confounded with that of modern Austria.

volume of the great work of Sismondi, and Raumer's Geschichte der Hohenstaufen, the second volume for the narrative, and the fifth for the political antiquities. A good deal may also be learned from the fifth volume of Cantù's Histoire des Italiens. The Histoire des Révolutions d'Italie, by Ferrari (Paris, 1858), is, I must confess, beyond my understanding. I will only say that the author throughout uses the word "Federal" in a sense quite different from its usual meaning, and one which I have been quite unable to catch.

[1] On the character of Frederick, see National Review, Jan. 1861, p. 61 et seqq.

[2] The only breach of faith—in a very faithless age—with which Frederick stands distinctly charged is his attack on Alexandria during a truce in 1174. But there is no reason to believe that this was an act of deliberate treachery, as might be inferred from the words of Romuald (*imaginaria treuga*, etc. col. 213) and the Life of Alexander (*insidiator, perversa proditio*, etc. p. 464). Ralph of Milan, a hostile witness, distinctly attributes the Emperor's breach of faith to the impatience of his Italian allies (*accensus ira et dolore Longobardorum*, col. 1192), ever foremost in acts of cruelty against their neighbours. See above, pp. 42, 43. It is hard to see how Frederick was guilty of any breach of faith, however much he may be open to the charge of harshness or cruelty in the destruction of Milan in 1162. Yet the charge seems to be brought by Romuald, col. 203. Cf Ralph of Milan, col. 1187.

[3] See the character of Frederick as he seemed to a German admirer in Radevic,

Burgundy, had no one point of likeness to the position of the Austrian or Lotharingian Archduke who insults Germany and Italy by his usurpation of the Imperial title, and who acts the practical wrong of detaining by brute force an Italian province in which his sway is hateful to every native. The struggle between Frederick and his Italian subjects was hardly a national struggle at all; it undoubtedly called forth a bitter and lasting hatred between German and Italian, but that hatred was the effect of Frederick's warfare rather than its cause. The notion of nationality was still very vague; many of the Italian nobles had not yet forgotten their German origin; any hatred between Italian and German as such was as nothing compared with the bitterness which raged between neighbouring and rival cities.[1] The war between the Emperor and the Lombard commonwealths was such a war as would have taken place in every kingdom in Europe, had the cities everywhere been able to develope themselves to the same degree as the Italian cities did. That age and the age which followed it, beheld a vast movement in favour of municipal independence everywhere. In most countries the cities were so weak, and their claims so modest, that the Kings rather favoured them as a useful counterpoise to the more dangerous power of the feudal nobles. But wherever, as in Provence[2] and Flanders, the cities threatened to grow into independent Republics, a struggle took place between the commonwealths and the local sovereign differing only in scale from the great warfare which tore Italy in pieces. Most of the feudal lords of Italy stood by the side of the Emperor against their common enemies; in the next age Frederick's own grandson and namesake showed as little love for civic independence in Germany as himself or his grandfather showed in Italy.[3] To look on Frederick Barbarossa as a mere foreign intruder in Italy, or as affording the slightest parallel to Italy's modern French and Austrian oppressors, is to catch at one of the most superficial of

The War not strictly a national struggle,

but a struggle between royalty and municipal freedom.

lib. iv. c. 80, and for his portrait by a no less zealous Italian adherent, see Acerbus Morena, col. 1115.

[1] One of the most striking passages on this head is in Acerbus Morena, col. 1141. "Bene sciebat [Landenses] Mediolanenses nullam pietatem de ipsis habere, quam de rabiosis canibus haberent, et si manus aliorum inimicorum effugerent, ipsorum tamen Mediolanensium manus nequaquam evadere valerent."

[2] On the Provençal Republics, see Sismondi, Histoire des Français, part iv. c. 410 (vol. iv. p. 281), William de Nangis in An. 1257 (Pithou, Hist. Fr. Scriptt. Vet. ed. 1596, p. 446), 996, ed. Bruxelles.

[3] See Kington's History of Frederick the Second.

resemblances and to forget the essential unlikeness which lies below.

Frederick enters Italy, 1154.

Frederick then, already elected at Frankfort and crowned King of Germany at Aachen, entered Italy, not as an external invader, but to assume, in the regular order of things, the crown of the Italian Kingdom at Monza or Milan,[1] and the crown of the Roman Empire at Rome. He came too to settle the affairs of a Kingdom long deserted by its Kings, and specially to redress the wrongs of certain injured commonwealths which cried to him for help against their oppressors.[2] His alleged royal rights came into collision with the alleged rights of various Italian cities, but neither party denied the existence of some rights in the other. The difference seems to have been mainly this — Frederick, though willing to allow to the cities a large amount of municipal independence, understood his royal rights as implying a direct and immediate sovereignty over them. Milan and her confederates, on the other hand, were willing to acknowledge the external suzerainty of the Emperor, but claimed to themselves all the essential powers of sovereign commonwealths. They excepted his royal rights in their manifestoes, they recognized his royal title, they were ready to pay him a royal tribute,[3] and to show him all royal honour,[4] but they would both be sovereign within their own walls and capable of making war and peace with their neighbours. Frederick's policy, on the other hand, strictly forbade all private war and all private alliances[5] between any communities within his realm. In his first campaigns he was successful, as much through the zealous help of his Italian partizans as through the forces which he

Collision of claims between the Emperor and the Cities.

Early successes of Frederick, 1154–62.

[1] Such was the regular course of things. In point of fact Frederick was crowned King of Italy not at Milan, but in the loyal city of Pavia. Otto Fris. ii. 20.

[2] Compare the contrasted descriptions of Otto Morena and of Ralph of Milan at the opening of their respective chronicles.

[3] The Imperial claim of *Fodrum* (see Ducange in voc. and Otto Fris. ii. 12) amounted to a tribute for the time being, though it was only required when the King went to Rome to receive the crown of the Empire.

[4] Rom. Sal. c. 221. Nos gratanter Imperatoris pacem, salvo Italiæ honore, recipimus, et ejus gratiam, libertate nostra integra remanente, præoptamus. Quod ei de antiquo debet Italia, libenter exsolvimus, et veteres illi justitias non negamus; libertatem autem nostram, quam a patribus nostris, avis, et proavis hæreditario jure contraximus, nequaquam relinquemus.

[5] Sigon. de Reg. It. 584. Volumus etiam ut cum nulla civitate conjurationem injussu nostro ineatis [Cremonenses].

brought from the other side of the Alps. Pavia triumphed over her rival; the despiser of Cæsar and his rights[1] was, like Thebes, levelled to the ground by her exulting neighbours, and her inhabitants, like those of Mantineia, were distributed among four unwalled villages.[2] Lodi rose again, like Messênê under the hands of Epameinôndas,[3] and the royal power was as fully acknowledged in Lombardy as in any kingdom in Europe. What called forth that spirit of resistance which triumphed in the end was the oppression exercised in Frederick's absence by many of his German lieutenants, which the Emperor himself, on his return to Italy, failed to chastise as his royal duty required.[4]

Destruction of Milan, 1162.

Oppression of Frederick's agents.

And now came one of those moments which have offered themselves at long intervals in the history of the world for the realization of the great vision of our own times, the formation of a free and united Italy. Twice has the opportunity offered itself in the form of a national Monarchy, twice in that of a Federal Republic. We have seen the attempt made to establish an Italian Confederation in the days of Sulla and Pontius Telesinus; we can hardly say that the attempt was again made, but most certainly the opportunity was again offered, in the days of Frederick Barbarossa and Alexander the Third. In the next age the chance came from the opposite side. It would have deprived Florence and Genoa of some ages of splendour, but it would have saved Italy, as a whole, from many more ages of oppression, if all Italy had been, in the thirteenth century, united under the sceptre of Frederick's descendant Manfred. In all these cases Rome, Republican, Imperial, or Papal, has been the greatest difficulty in the way. So we see it in our own day, when a fourth opportunity has offered itself, when, as far as Italy is concerned, that opportunity has been vigorously seized upon, and when the delay in the full victory of right is owing

Four opportunities for the Union of Italy;

in the Social War;

under the Lombard League;

under Manfred;

under Victor Emmanuel.

[1] Gedichte auf König Friedrich, p. 65:

> De tributo Cæsaris nemo cogitabat,
> Omnes erant Cæsares, nemo censum dabat;
> Civitas Ambrosii velut Troja stabat,
> Deos parum, homines minus, formidabat.

[2] Rom. Sal. col. 299. Otto St. Bl. col. 875. Divisis in quatuor partes civibus, regione inculta ipsis ad inhabitandum concessa, quatuor eos oppida ædificare jussit, ipsosque, ut dictum est, per partes divisos ea incolere fecit. Cf. above, pp. 154, 155.

[3] Rad. Fris. iii. 27. Otto Mor. col. 1011, 1087. Cf. above, p. 140.

[4] See Vit. Alex. iii. 456. Acerbus Mor. col. 1127, 1131. Cf. Conrad Ursp. p. 309. Acerbus gives large details, and the witness of so warm an Imperialist proves a great deal.

wholly to the selfishness of avowed foreign enemies and to the baser hypocrisy of pretended foreign friends. Among the four cases, the second was, in some respects, the least favourable, because the union of the whole peninsula would have been, in the twelfth century, an idea utterly chimerical. At any one of the other three periods, an united Italy would have included, as we have seen it include in our own times, southern Italy, as well as northern. In the twelfth century, the idea of Italy as a national whole, including Apulia and Calabria no less than Lombardy and Tuscany, did not enter the mind of any party. Southern Italy formed no part of the Italian Kingdom. Held by the Eastern Emperors, by independent Dukes, and now by the powerful Norman Kings of Sicily, the modern Kingdom of Naples had very little share in the revolutions of the northern part of the peninsula. It was indeed in Campania that the first Italian Republics arose. But Naples, Gaeta, and Amalfi, like Venice in another part of Italy, were really Byzantine dependencies, whose allegiance, distant and isolated as they became, was best retained by allowing to them a large amount of practical freedom. Their freedom was like that of Cherson at the other end of the Empire, or like that of Bourdeaux and Bayonne in the fifteenth century, when they found in loyalty to the distant King of England their surest safeguard against the despotism of the Valois. The Republics of Campania had no connexion with those of Lombardy, and, in the days of Frederick, they had sunk into mere municipalities of the Sicilian Kingdom. During the war with Frederick, both the Eastern Emperor and the Sicilian King were zealous in the cause of the Lombard commonwealths; but this was simply because they were both the enemies of the Western Emperor. William[1] and Manuel had no more natural love for Lombard freedom than they had natural friendship for one another. They settled their own differences in the face of the growing power of Frederick, and, under this strange combination of circumstances, the Lombard Republics found three powerful protectors against their own sovereign. The Pope, the Eastern Cæsar, and the Sicilian King were all zealous in their cause; yet we can hardly doubt that any one of the three would have been more ready to swallow

Distinction of northern and southern Italy.

The Campanian Republics, 839–1138.

The cities supported by the Pope, the Eastern Emperor, and the King of Sicily. 1166.

[1] William the Bad and his son William the Good, different as they appear in the internal history of Sicily, can hardly be distinguished in their relation to northern Italy.

them up than Frederick himself, if a common dread of his power had not for a moment united their interests with those of freedom.[1]

Parallel with the Revolt of the Netherlands.

As in the liberation of the Belgian provinces from Spain, so in the struggle of the Lombard cities against Frederick, the movement did not begin in the quarter in which it was most vigorously carried on to the end. The revolt against Philip the Second did not begin with Holland and those other provinces which, in the end, won and maintained their freedom. During the earlier stages of the war, the main centre of interest lies in those southern provinces which at last fell back under the Spanish yoke. So the first movements against Frederick now began in a corner of Italy which, both before and after, played quite a secondary part. Verona had indeed, nine years earlier, acted vigorously against the Emperor,[2] but both Verona and the neighbouring cities have called for but little of our attention compared with Milan, Cremona, and Tortona. It was probably because the north-eastern cities had suffered so much less than the others in the first part of the war that they are found the foremost in beginning the second. The first group of cities which leagued together for the recovery of their liberties consisted of Verona, Padua, Vicenza, and the great island commonwealth of Venice.[3] This last city, it should be remembered, was no part of the Kingdom of Italy. Venice had never admitted the claim of the German Kings to the style of Roman Emperors; she had found her account in cleaving to the nominal supremacy of the Cæsars of Byzantium till she became, as she now was, strong enough to dispense with any acknowledgement of vassalage to either of the Lords of the World. She must therefore be looked on throughout as an external ally, almost on the same footing with William and Manuel. According to the Byzantine version, the movement was first suggested by the Eastern Emperor, who sent his Ambassador Nikêphoros Chalouphês to Venice, and other agents to the smaller Italian cities, in order to

First movements in the Veronese March, 1155.

Beginning of the LOMBARD LEAGUE, 1164.

Relations of Venice and the Lombard Cities.

Action of the Emperor Manuel.

[1] This peace was concluded soon after the accession of William the Good. Rom. Sal. col. 1166.

[2] Otto Fris. ii. 27. Rad. Fris. iii. 45. Otto Mor. col. 991.

[3] Acerbus Mor. col. 1123. Iisdem temporibus Veronenses et Paduani et Vicentini, certique [cæterique] de illa Marchia, præter paucos Imperatoris, fieri contra Imperatorem rebelles exstiterunt, partim propter pecuniam Venetiæ acceptam, quæ jam ante Imperatori resistant [resistebat] Rad. Mil. 1189. Eadem quoque hyeme Veronenses cum omnibus de Marchia illa juraverunt cum Venetibus, et facti sunt Imperatori rebelles. Cf. Vit. Alex. iii. 456. Sicard, 600.

unite them against the rival Cæsar.[1] There is nothing improbable in the story; Byzantine troops and Byzantine gold play an important part throughout the narrative, and Manuel was an ally of far more moment than might seem to those who are accustomed only to vulgar commonplaces about "Greeks of the Lower Empire." The Byzantine power was indeed no longer what it had been under the great Macedonian Emperors, but the vigorous rule of the Komnênian princes had recovered a large portion of Asia from the Turk,[2] and in Eastern Europe, the Cæsar of Constantinople, after his Servian and Hungarian victories, no longer met with a rival on equal terms. Manuel was no statesman, and he was perhaps more of a knight-errant than a general; his Empire was weakened by his very victories; still, under him, the Eastern Empire presented a splendid and formidable appearance in the eyes of Europe. He aspired to reunite the rival Churches and the rival Empires; he, the true Emperor of the Romans, aspired to reign once more in the capital of his predecessors instead of the northern Barbarian who presumptuously usurped the titles of Roman sovereignty.[3]

Condition of the Eastern Empire.

Manuel aspires to reunite the Empires.

[1] Joan. Kinnamos, Hist. lib. iv. (p. 298, ed. 1652). *Ὅθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔθνη τὰ τῇδε καὶ κόλπου ἐντὸς ἵδρυται τοῦ Ἰονίου, τῶν ἀσημοτέρων τινὰς ἀφανῶς ἐκπέμπων, τῆς Φρεδερίκου τε αὐτὰ ὑπομιμνήσκειν ἐκέλευεν ἀπληστίας, καὶ πρὸς ἀντίστασιν ἤγειρεν. εἰς δὲ τὸ Οὐεννέτων ἔθνος Νικηφόρον σὺν χρήμασι τὸν Χαλούφην ἔπεμπε, πειρασόμενόν τε εἰς αὐτὸν τοῦ ἔθνους εὐνοίας, καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ Ῥωμαίοις συμφέροντι τὰ τῇδε διοικησόμενον.*

[2] I mean, of course, the Seljouk Turks of Ikonion; the Ottomans had not yet appeared.

[3] The language of the Byzantine and Papal writers on this head is very curious. The schismatic Greek now becomes *Magnus et excelsus Constantinopolis Imperator* (Vit. Alex. iii. 458, 60). Manuel sends his Ambassador Jordan; "Nihilominus quoque petebat ut, quia occasio justa, et tempus opportunum atque acceptabile se obtulerat, Romani corona Imperii a sede Apostolica sibi redderetur, quoniam non ad Frederici Alamanni, sed ut suum jus asseruit pertinere" (458). And again, "rogat et postulat, quatenus prædictæ Ecclesiæ adversario Imperii Romani corona privato, eam sibi, prout ratio et justitia exigit, restituatis" (460). Cf. Godfrey of St. Pantaleon (Freher, Rer. Germ. Scriptt. vol. i.) in A. 1172. "Imperator . . . conquestus de Italicis et illis qui partibus favebant Rulandi, quod coronam Romani Imperii Græco imponere vellent." (This was just after the special alliance between Pisa and Constantinople. See Sismondi, ii. 190.) In Kinnamos (lib. iv. pp. 247, 8) we see the same side from the home point of view. *Φρεδερίκῳ τῷ ῥηγὶ Ἀλαμανῶν ἐπὶ μέγα ἑκάστοτε τὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐχώρει καὶ ηὔξανεν . . . Φρεδερίκος Ῥώμης ἤδη περιγεγονὼς, ἄλλα τε πολλὰ ἐνεωτέρισε, καὶ δὴ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν τῇδε ἀρχιερέα τοῦ θρόνου κατασπάσας, Ὀκταβιανὸν ἀντεισῆξεν ἐντεῦθεν οἶμαι τοῦ Ῥωμαίων αὐτοκράτορος προσαρμόσειν αὐτῷ τὸ ἀξίωμα οἰηθείς . . . . Φρεδερίκος τῇ αὐτοκράτορος πάλιν ἐποφθαλμίζων ἀρχῇ, κ.τ.λ.*

More than one embassy was sent from Manuel to Alexander demanding a Roman Coronation, and though this request was, as might be expected, always evaded, still the Eastern Emperor continued, throughout the war, to give important help to every enemy of his Teutonic rival. That Manuel then was actually the first mover in the formation of the Lombard League is a statement which we may readily accept. But if it were so, his promptings were merely the occasion and not the cause; his embassies and his gold did but enable the discontented cities to do a little sooner and a little more effectively what they would assuredly have done sometime without his help. Manuel caused the formation of the Lombard League only in the sense in which
B.C. 394. the Persian King caused the Corinthian War;[1] the Italians received his gold as Aratos received the gold of Ptolemy, as Algernon Sidney received the gold of Lewis, merely as the contribution of an ally towards a purpose which suited the objects
Growth of the League, 1164–8. of both. Anyhow the League,[2] such as it was, was formed, and grew, till it included most of the Lombard cities. Pavia indeed stood firm in her loyalty; but Cremona,[3] lately almost as zealously Imperialist, was not long in embracing the cause of freedom; Lodi, small, weak, and isolated, clave to the cause of
Accession of Lodi, 1167. her Imperial founder, but, when her existence was perilled, she unwillingly became a member of the Confederacy.[4] Milan, destroyed like Mantineia, rose again, like Mantineia, from her ruins;[5] and, as if to repeat every detail of the Arkadian parallel, the combined powers of the League founded what might seem to
Foundation of Alexandria, 1168. be meant as a Federal city, a second Megalopolis.[6] The new city received the name of Alexandria, in honour of the Pontiff whose cause was incidentally linked with that of Lombard freedom. But Alexandria resembled Megalopolis only in its strategic position; it stood as an outpost against Pavia, as Megalopolis stood as an outpost against Sparta, but it never was meant to become a Federal capital or a member of a true Federal body in any shape.

[1] Xen. Hell. iii. 5. 1. 9. See Grote ix. 400.

[2] The Confederacy is at first *Veronensis Societas* (Vit. Alex. iii. 456), afterwards *Societas Lombardiæ* or *Lombardorum, Lombardorun Communitas* or *Confederatio* (ib. 461, 4, 7), *Societas Lombardiæ et Marchiæ et Veronæ et Venetiæ.* (Conventus Venetus ap. Pertz, iv. 151.)

[3] Vit. Alex. iii. 456. Acerbus Morena, 1133.

[4] See the details in Acerbus Morena, 1135–43.

[5] Acerbus Morena, 1135. Otto St. Bl. c. 20, 22. Cf. Ursperg, p. 309.

[6] See above, p. 159.

Indirect importance of the Lombard League in Federal History. Analogy with America and the Netherlands.

For in fact the importance of the Lombard League in Federal history is of exactly the same kind as the importance of the Amphiktyonic Council. It is important simply because it never became a Federal Government. Yet its beginnings closely resembled the beginnings of two of the great Federations of history. The Lombard League was analogous to the union of the Belgic Provinces or the American Colonies before their respective Declarations of Independence. The oaths of the Confederate cities may be paralleled with the early acts of the American Congress, with the early engagements among the Provinces of the Netherlands, such as the separate alliance of Holland and Zealand,[1] or the general agreement of all at the 1575. Pacification of Ghent.[2] 1576. All agree in being unions of revolted subjects against Princes whose authority, within its lawful bounds, there was no avowed, and probably no real, intention of shaking off. All alike are they distinguished from the struggle of the Peloponnêsian towns against Macedonia, where of course no sort of legal right was acknowledged in the oppressor. The Lombards indeed guarded the rights of the Prince against whom they were contending, even more scrupulously than the Americans or the Netherlanders. The cities agree to maintain strict alliance with each other, to wage war against the Emperor with their united forces, to make no peace or truce with him except by common consent, but all is done with the most careful reservation of their faith and allegiance to the Empire itself.[3] The Lombard League,

[1] Recueil des Traités, iii. 397.

[2] Ib. iii. 366. Motley's Rise of the Dutch Republic, iii. 85 (ed. 2).

[3] This feeling appears strongly in the first beginnings of the League, but it seems gradually to have been weakened, though the event shows that the idea of perfect independence of the Empire could never have been reached. The rights of the Empire are formally reserved on the accession of Cremona and Lodi to the League. According to Sigonius (l. 14, p. 595) the Confederates describe themselves to the Cremonese as *non Friderico adversaturi, sed communem libertatem adversus inhumanem præfectorum ejus impotentiam tutaturi*, and the agreement with Lodi is made *salva fide Friderico Cæsari data* (Ib. p. 596). This last fact at least rests on the sure authority of Acerbus Morena (1143): *Fœdus . . . salva Imperatoris fidelitate, sicut palam tunc dicebatur, inierunt.* In the oath of the cities in 1167, given in Muratori's Antiquitates Italicæ (Diss. 48, vol. iv. p. 262), the formal reservation is not made, but the rights of the Empire are implicitly reserved. They agree to resist any addition to their obligations as they stood at the accession of Frederick *contra quod velit nos plus facere quam fecimus a tempore Henrici Regis usque ad introitum Imperatoris Friderici.* This language clearly implies that *some* obligations towards the Empire were recognized. Also in this oath they do not bind themselves to make war on the Emperor by name, but only on any one who may violate their rights, *contra omnem hominem quicumque nobiscum facere voluerint guerram aut malum.* But in the later oaths they engage to make

in short, was not a Federal union, even of the laxest kind, it was a mere temporary agreement of certain cities to employ their united forces to accomplish a common object. While the war lasted, the League had its Congress;[1] the Rectors[2] of the Confederate cities met, as, in the nature of things, some one must have met, to arrange the measures to be taken by the Confederacy. Now and then they seem to have interfered in disputes between two Confederate cities, to defend the weaker against the stronger.[3] But there was no Federal Government, no formation of an united state, nothing, in short, but an alliance of an unusually close kind.[4] Why then should such an ephemeral union claim any place in a history of Federalism? Because, I would answer, it is instructive to mark the contrast, and the causes of the contrast, between the subsequent fate of the Lombard, the Belgian, and the American Confederacies. The early stages of all three were remarkably alike. But, in the two later cases, a lasting Federal Government rose out of what was, in its beginning, a mere Confederacy for a temporary purpose. At first sight the circumstances of Italy might seem just as favourable for the formation of such a Government as the circumstances of America or the Netherlands. Why then did not a real Federal State grow up out of the promising elements of the Lombard League such as grew up out of the elements—at one time not more promising—which developed into the Belgian and American Confederations?

Several causes at once present themselves; one of them indeed

Congress of the League.

The League not a true Federation.

Why the League did not develope into a true Federation.

war on him by name, and to make no peace or truce with him, his sons, or his wife, without the common consent. See Sigonius, pp. 606, 607, 613. Muratori, Ant. iv. 266, 271. I transcribe Muratori's comment (279): "Ceterum antea Societas Lombardorum propriam tantummodo tutelam in suis fœderibus præferebat, volebatque illæsam *fidelitatem Imperatoris*. At hic sine ulla tergiversatione ab eo discedit, atque ipsum ejurat, hostemque decernit. Eum nempe uti depositum et anathemate perculsum ab Alexandro III. Papa jam tandem omnes exsecrabantur."

[1] Vit. Alex. III. 461. Pontifex . . . ad Lombardos literas et nuntios festinanter direxit, et eorum dubia et nutantia corda firmavit, ut ex singulis civitatibus *unam discretam et idoneam personam, quæ vicem generalitatis haberet*, ad ejus præsentiam destinarent . . . . . Unde factum est quod quidam fideles et sapientes viri a Lombardorum communitate sunt electi, etc.

[2] Ib. 466. Rectores civitatum Lombardiæ.

[3] Cantù (Histoire des Italiens, iv. 558) quotes a case in which the Congress of the League annulled a sentence of the Consuls of Bellagio to the prejudice of the people of Civenna and Lamonta. Would they have ventured on such an act of justice, had the offender been Milan or Verona? This whole chapter of Cantù should be read, especially the remarks on subject districts in p. 563 et seqq.

[4] See Sismondi, ii. 184–9. Cantù, iv. 531.

lies quite on the surface. Frederick Barbarossa was more under the dominion of reason than either Philip the Second or George the Third. When Frederick saw that the maintenance of his claims in their full extent was hopeless, he had the wisdom to surrender a part in order to save the rest. The Belgian and the American insurgents had to do with princes who would yield nothing till they were obliged to yield everything. Thus the original demand for just and legal government gradually changed into a demand for total separation. The prudence of Frederick prevented matters from reaching this stage. But this personal difference by no means touches the root of the matter. The Lombard League was renewed against Frederick the Second, by which time one might have thought that the need of union would have been more strongly felt; but the second League was, if anything, still further removed from a true Federal Government than the first. It is indeed possible that, had the struggle with Frederick Barbarossa gone on much longer, the cities might have been tempted to throw off their allegiance to the Empire altogether. In that case an united Government of some sort, whether a League or a national Kingdom, could hardly fail to have taken its place. As it was, the Imperial power in Italy died out gradually, without any definite act either of revolt or of abdication at any particular moment. There was therefore no particular moment when it was clearly imperative to substitute any other Government for it. There was therefore no such distinct opportunity or rather necessity for the formation of a real Federation in Italy as there was in America and in the Netherlands. And, what was of still greater moment, there was not in Italy the same predisposition towards union of any kind which there was in the other cases. The Lombard cities were in truth in a position far too closely resembling that of the old Greek cities to feel the need of union. Their feelings and their patriotism were more strictly local than in the Netherlands or in the American colonies. In Italy we have to do with cities; in the other two cases with provinces. The Dutch cities indeed retained a most extraordinary amount of independence, still the immediate component members of the Confederation were not cities but provinces. Again, the Lombard cities, in the practical abeyance of the royal power, had actually exercised all the rights of independent sovereignty; probably no wrong seemed to them so great as when the Emperor required them to give up their

Personal character of Frederick.

He yields in time.

Second Lombard League, 1228.

No definite moment of separation in Italy.

No such tendency to union in Italy as there was in the Netherlands and in America.

The Lombard cities really sovereign;

the Dutch and American provinces not so.

darling privilege of private war. But the American Colonies had never possessed any sovereignty at all; and the separate sovereignty of the Belgian Counties and Duchies—sovereign at any time only with the reservation of the rights of the Empire [1]—had been altogether lost since their union under the House of Burgundy. There may have been local jealousies in either case, but there was nothing like the bitter hatred which reigned between Milan and Lodi. The American and the Dutch States had infinitely more to gain than to lose by union; the Italian cities, like those of old Greece, would have lost by any effective union all that was dearest to them. In days when the names of Rome, and Cæsar, and Augustus had not yet lost their magic influence, we can almost believe that a more complete subjection to the Empire would have been felt as less irksome than the establishment of a Federal Government strong enough to deliver Lombardy from the curse of local warfare. To have preached Federalism to the Italians of the twelfth century would have been like preaching it to the Greeks before the days of Alexander. Indeed it would have been a vainer attempt still, for experience did at least teach a large portion of Greece the necessity of union, while Italy never learned the lesson till our own times.

1429-33.

Vigour and constancy of the Confederates.

The Lombard League then was a mere Confederacy, a mere close alliance to obtain a common object; a Confederacy so close that it might easily have been developed into a real Confederation, but which, in point of fact, never was so developed. As a Confederacy, it claims our deep admiration for the unity and vigour with which so many independent cities acted together during so long a struggle, for the constancy with which they refused all offers of separate terms, all temptations to break the ties which bound them to their external allies, the Pope, the King of Sicily, and the Emperor of the East.[2] It was only when the war was over, when they had seen Cæsar himself fly before them, that any of the true Lombard cities began to fall away.

[1] Of the Crown of France in Flanders; of the Empire everywhere else.

[2] See Vit. Alex. iii. 965, 6, told with much papal partiality. It was however forbidden for any particular city to make any private agreement with the Eastern Emperor. See the oaths in Cantù (iv. 516). *Et ego nullam concordiam feci vel faciam cum imperatore Constantinopolitano.* The League might negociate with Manuel as an external power; for a single city to negociate with him could hardly fail to involve an admission of his sovereignty, which would be at once dangerous for the other cities, and inconsistent with the rights which they still acknowledged in the Western Emperor.

Peculiar policy of Venice.

Venice indeed seems to have put a laxer interpretation on her engagements; but then Venice stood in quite a different position, and was actuated by quite a different spirit, from the cities of the mainland. Venice did not scruple to aid Frederick the enemy of the League against Manuel its ally, when Frederick attacked, and Manuel defended, her commercial rival Ancona.[1] Perhaps, as Ancona was not a member of the League, the island city did not actually violate the letter of any engagement; still her conduct at least displayed something like sharp practice on the part of her merchant princes.

Siege of Ancona, 1174.

Course of the war.

Siege of Alexandria, 1174-5.

The details of the war are matter of Italian history. At one time, before the decisive stroke which ended the war, there seemed a fair hope of settling matters by peaceful negociation. Frederick had failed—the only failure in his life which can be called disgraceful—before the mud walls of Alexandria. A pitched battle seemed impending between the Imperial army and the forces of the League. But, gallantly as they had resisted him when he appeared as an aggressor beneath their walls, the Italians still shrank from meeting their King and Emperor as an enemy on the open field. Negociations were opened; each side was ready, saving its own rights, to entrust its cause to the decision of chosen commissioners.[2] The question to be debated would of course have been as to the extent of the Imperial rights, as no one denied the Emperor's possession of some rights. As far then as Frederick and the cities were concerned there seems no reason why the disputed points might not have been settled then as well as nine years later. That they were not so settled seems to have been no fault either of the Emperor or of the Republics. Possibly indeed Frederick was not yet humbled enough to make such concessions as he afterwards made. But it was neither by King nor Commonwealth that the negociations were actually broken off; the cities might have made terms with Cæsar, but the Church was unwilling to make terms with the schismatic.[3] The war was renewed; the next year saw the

Negociations between the Emperor and the Cities (1175)

broken off by the Papal Legates.

[1] Kinnamos, p. 314. Otto St. B. c. 20. Sismondi (ii. 195) seems to me to attach far too much value to the account of the siege by Buoncampagno (in Muratori's sixth volume), a rhetorical critic of the next century, to whose rhetoric he now and then adds a touch of his own.

[2] Vit. Alex. iii. 465. See the text of the *Concordia Imperatoris et Societatis Lombardiæ* in Pertz, iv. 145.

[3] Alex. iii. 466. Cf. Rad. Mil. 1192. Romuald, 216.

Battle of LEGNANO, defeat of Frederick, 1176.

famous fight of Legnano, where, for perhaps the only time since the days of old Roman conquest, the Italian overcame the German in the open field. Not sheltered by ramparts, not strengthened by auxiliaries, the forces of some half-dozen Lombard cities, gathered round the *carroccio* of Milan, put to flight the armies of the Roman Empire.[1] Cæsar himself was left to skulk, unattended, and, like Aratos,[2] already mourned as dead, to the shelter of his still faithful Pavia. Frederick now knew that he was vanquished; the plans of more than twenty years were utterly shattered; from that day he no more drew his sword against Italian freedom; he confined his exertions to securing by diplomatic skill as large a portion as he could of his disputed rights. Then followed long negociations which we have the advantage of having narrated in detail by an eye-witness and principal actor.[3] A year earlier the cities had seemed less inflexible than the Church; now that Frederick was prepared to renounce his schism, Alexander did not escape the charge of forsaking the cause of the cities.[4] In that famous and much misrepresented interview at Venice,[5] Frederick received absolution from Alexander and came to terms with his temporal enemies. He concluded a separate peace with Venice,[6] as an independent power, and the Republic thereby incurred some ill-will on the part of the Lombards for what was held to be a desertion of her allies.[7] He also concluded a truce for fifteen years with the King of Sicily, and entered into negociations with the Lombard League.[8] The cities set forth their claims; they were ready to acknowledge in the Emperor all such rights as had been held by his predecessor Henry the Fifth. These

Change in Frederick's policy. Negociations for Peace, 1176–7.

Frederick reconciled with Venice and the Church, 1177.

Rights of the Empire as understood by the Lombards.

[1] Vit. Alex. iii. 467. Rad. Mil. 1192. Otto St. B. c. 23. The Ursperg Chronicle (p. 310) has a curious euphemism. Imperator rursus impugnare cœpit Lombardos, commissumque est prœlium inter eos prid. kal. Julii. *De quo tamen sine victoria recessum est.*

[2] See above, p. 310.

[3] Rom. Sal. 217–240. This Prelate was the Ambassador from the King of Sicily at the Congress.

[4] Rad. Mil. 1193. Deserendo fidem quam Longobardis promiserat.

[5] The strange Venetian fables about this interview are refuted by Sismondi (ii. 227) and Raumer (ii. 218). They are accepted by Daru (Hist. de Venise, lib. iii. c. 18), and revived by Cantù (iv. 552).

[6] See the text of *Pax cum Venetis* in Pertz, iv. 151.

[7] Rom. Sal. 222. Lombardi autem e diverso suspectos habebant Venetos, asserentes illos pacis cum iis initæ fœdera violasse, et sæpe Imperatoris nuncios contra hoc quod statutum inter eos fuerat recepisse. This of course includes earlier breaches of the engagement, as in the case of Ancona. See above, p. 609.

[8] See Pertz, iv. 151–7.

rights they seem to have limited to the personal services and personal gifts which were usual when the King of Germany came to claim the Italian crown at Milan and the Imperial crown at Rome.[1] They claim, on the other hand, to retain their League with one another, and to retain the fortifications of their cities; the right to choose their own consuls they do not claim —they seem to have so completely taken it for granted. This was asking more than Frederick was at once prepared to yield; peace was not made, but a truce for six years was agreed on between the Lombard League on one side, and the Emperor and the princes and cities of his party on the other.[2] And, now that the war was over, the Emperor regained his advantage; the magic of the Imperial name, the attraction of Frederick's personal character, began again to do their work. More than one city of the League forsook the common cause, and made private terms with its now gracious and placable sovereign. Cremona had returned to its Imperialist loyalty even before the Congress of Venice.[3] And, in the interval between the truce and the final peace, Tortona, which Frederick had destroyed, and which had been rebuilt in defiance of his power;[4] Alexandria, whose very existence was a standing record of enmity to his cause, were both admitted to Imperial favour. Alexandria, the city of the patriotic Pontiff, submitted to be formally refounded, and to receive from her Imperial parent the name of Cæsarea.[5] At

Truce for six years between the Emperor and the League 1177.

Various cities join Frederick. Cremona, 1176. Tortona, 1183.

Alexandria, 1183

[1] See Rom. Sal. 221 et seqq. and the *Petitio Societatis* in Pertz, iv. 169. On the Royal rights see Raumer, v. 78, and Cantù, iv. 509. Frederick's agents demanded the rights as they stood under Henry the Fourth (Third of Italy), but the Italians insisted on the standard of Henry the Fifth, *Henricus posterior, postremus* (Pertz, 151, 169), a description which evades the difference between Italian and German reckoning. They rejected Henry the Fourth as a tyrant and schismatic. — *Item Imperator Henricus (salva auctoritate Imperii) non dicebat Dominus sed Tyrannus vocari*, etc. Rom. Sal. 223.

[2] See the *Treuga cum Lombardis*, Pertz, iv. 155.

[3] Vit. Alex. iii. 469. In diebus illis Cremona respiciens retro absque gravamine turpiter dejerando a confœderatione aliarum civitatum impudenter recessit, et ad Imperatorem non sine magna infamia se convertit; unde indignationem Ecclesiæ et aliorum Lombardorum odium et inimicitiam iuste incurrit. The *Reconciliatio Cremonæ* in 1186 (Pertz, iv. 183) must not be confounded with this. It belongs to much later events, which will be found in Sicard's Chronicle, 603, and Sismondi, ii. 620.

[4] See the *Reconciliatio Terdonæ*, Pertz, iv. 165. The Cardinal of Aragon (Vit. Alex. iii. u.s.) goes on to say, "Terdona quoque ... *ation post multum temporis* id ipsum reprehensibiliter fecit, et eadem infamia con... tumeliose se involvit." It is clear, however, that an interval of seven years, including the whole negociations at Venice, came between the reconciliation of Cremona and that of Tortona.

[5] Sigonius (p. 632) places the reconciliation of Alexandria in 1184 after the

Peace of Constanz, 1183.

last, terms of peace were agreed on in a negociation at Placentia,[1] which led to the final conclusion of the Peace of Constanz, that famous Charter which closes the great volume of the Civil Law.[2] It shows how great was the abiding influence of the Imperial name that this treaty, concluded by a prince with rebellious subjects, by whom he had been defeated in battle, and to whom he yielded all their most important demands, was at last drawn up in the form of a pardon. The merciful Emperor extends his grace to certain cities which had offended him, and he grants them certain rights and privileges of his Imperial favour.[3] But

The treaty takes the form of a pardon,

Peace of Constanz, and the same date is given in Pertz, iv. 181. But as Cæsarea is reckoned among the allies of the Emperor at the Peace (see Pertz, iv. 180 and note), Sismondi (ii. 242) is doubtless right in placing it in 1183.

The change of name from Alexandria to Cæsarea may be likened to the changes from Mantineia to Antigoneia, from Sikyôn to Dêmêtrias, and from Thebes to Philippopolis. See above, pp. 279, 386, 430, 464, note 1. None of these changes seems to have been permanent. New Amsterdam, however, has kept its name of New York.

[1] See Pertz, iv. 167–175.

[2] It is to be found at the end of the Corpus Juris Civilis, Amsted. 1663; also in Pertz, iv. 175. Cf. Sigonius, 629.

[3] The Charter begins thus: Imperialis clementiæ mansueta serenitas eam semper in subditis suis dispensationem favoris et gratiæ habere consuevit, ut quamvis districta severitate excessuum delicta debeat et possit corrigere, magis tamen studeat propitia tranquillitate pacis et piis affectibus misericordiæ Romanum Imperium regere et rebellium insolentiam ad debitam fidem et debitæ devotionis obsequium revocare. Ea propter cognoscat universitas fidelium Imperii tam præsentis ætatis quam successuræ posteritatis, quod nos solita benignitatis nostræ gratia ad fidem et devotionem Lombardorum qui aliquando nos et Imperium nostrum offenderant, viscera innatæ nobis pietatis aperientes, eos et Societatem eorum et fautores in plenitudinem gratiæ nostræ recepimus, offensas omnes et culpas quibus nos ad indignationem provocaverant clementer eis remittentes, eosque propter fidelia devotionis suæ servitia quæ nos ab eis credimus certissime recepturos, in numero dilectorum fidelium nostrorum computandos censemus. Pacem itaque nostram quam eis clementer indultam concessimus, præsenti pagina jussimus subterscribi, et auctoritatis nostræ sigillo communiri.

It is almost more amusing to mark the high Imperialist tone of the Swiss writer Tschudi in the sixteenth century. A Landamman of Glarus might have been expected to sympathize with the Confederates, but the Swabian blood and speech were too strong in him. He tells the tale thus:

"Anno Domini 1183 hielt Keiser Fridrich Barbarossa ein grossen Richstag sambt sinem Sun Künig Heinrichen dem Sechsten zu Costenz in der fürnämbisten Statt Alamanniæ, und beschreib daselbshin alle Fürsten, und namhafftisten in ganzem Lamparten, ouch aller desselben Lands-Stetten fürnämiste vollmächtige Gewalthaber und Rats-Botten, dass Si allda Im und sinem Sun huldetind von des Richs wegen. Also warend Si gehorsam, erscheinend alle zu ingehndem Christmonat December genant, und schwurind Inen nachfolgenden Eidt, wie Si von Recht und alter Gewonheit zu tun schuldig warend den Römischen Keisern und Künigen." Tschudi, Chron. Helveticum, i. 90. (Basel, 1734.)

The Abbot of Ursperg, nearer the time, lets out a little more. "Eo tempore

these rights and privileges extended to an entire abolition of all direct sovereignty on the part of the Emperor. From this moment the King of Italy became a mere external suzerainty to his Lombard subjects, and, in the course of less than a hundred years, his very suzerainty died away. Frederick recognized the complete internal independence of the Lombard commonwealths;[1] they were to choose their own Consuls; the Consuls, however, and all the citizens, were to swear allegiance to the Emperor,[2] and in the more important civil causes there was to be an appeal from the magistrates of the cities to the Emperor or the Judge whom he should appoint. Further than this, the royal rights were limited to the ancient services due on the Imperial progress to Rome. On the other hand, the cities retained the right of fortification, and the Lombard League was to be retained and renewed[3] as often as its members thought good. The League is distinctly recognized as a contracting power—somewhat more distinctly in the oath of allegiance[4] than in the lofty language of the Charter itself. Still every magistrate and every citizen recognizes Frederick and his successors as Emperors and Kings; they will bear them true allegiance; they will reveal all plots

but amounted to a surrender of all direct sovereignty.

jam bellis nimis fatigatus Imperator, Lombardis omnibus condixit curiam apud Constantiam ubi Principes et potestates eorum se repræsentaverunt, et pacta quædam de faciendo servitio Imperatori de singulis civitatibus Lombardiæ ibidem statuta sunt, quæ adhuc dicunt se tenere in scriptis nec ad serviendum ultra hæc compelli volunt. Sicque pax reformata est" (p. 311).

[1] This is clearly the effect of the first two clauses of the Charter. 1. "Concedimus vobis, civitatibus, locis, et personis Societatis, regalia et consuetudines vestras tam in civitate quam extra civitatem, . . . videlicet ut in ipsa civitate omnia habeatis sicut hactenus habuistis vel habetis. 2. Extra vero omnes consuetudines sine contradictione nostra exerceatis, quas ab antiquo exercuistis vel exercetis. 3. Scilicet . . . *in exercitu, in munitionibus civitatum,* in jurisdictione tam in criminalibus caussis quam in pecuniariis, intus et extra, et in cæteris quæ ad commoditatem spectant civitatum."

[2] This oath might easily sink into a mere form, or, at most, would only exclude violent and avowed enemies of the Empire. The essential power of choice remained to the cities. Frederick's own claim, in the days of his power, had been much wider. Ab omnibus judicatum et recognitum est in singulis civitatibus Potestates, Consules, ceterosque magistratus assensu populi per ipsum [Imperatorem] creari debere. Rad. Fris. iii. 6. But even this allowed the citizens some share, though it is not clear what, in the choice of their magistrates.

[3] Clause 20, 28. Sigonius (p. 637) describes the renewal of the oaths two years later.

[4] Pertz, iv. 180. Pacem Domini Friderici Imperatoris et filii ejus Regis Heinrici et suæ partis *factam cum Societate Lombardorum,* et civitatibus ejus Societatis. This makes the League, as a League, far more prominent than it is in the passages already quoted. A body so spoken of was surely on the high road to becoming a real Federation if the need of union had been felt in the least.

against them; they will preserve to them the crown of the Empire and of the Kingdom;[1] if they should lose either, they will help them to recover it. But all these obligations were, as the terms of the Charter itself show, consistent with practical independence on all those points on which independence was prized most dearly. By the Peace of Constanz the kingdom of Italy, in the old sense, was reduced to a mere name, and no Federal Republic, no national monarchy, was substituted for it.

The Second Lombard League 1228.

As the importance of the Lombard League in Federal history is so purely negative, it is hardly necessary to follow out its career, when it was revived in the next century against Frederick the Second.[2] I have dwelt on its first period at some length, because it seemed important to show how a real Federal system might arise, or might fail to arise, out of circumstances very closely analogous. The Peace of Constanz took away all excuse for the formation of any central Government; each city gained the acknowledgement of that full local sovereignty which it prized far more dearly, without giving up its formal allegiance to the Prince whose lofty titles Italy still reverenced. A true Federal Government therefore never arose in Italy. In the next century we again find a Lombard League fighting against an Emperor and on the side of a Pope. But the circumstances of all three are greatly altered. The struggle of the twelfth century was primarily a struggle for freedom; the ecclesiastical question came in only as something quite accessory. Though the League itself was not formed so soon, yet the war began before Frederick had any dissensions with the Church at all. That, in a disputed election to the Popedom, the Emperor took one side, and the cities another, was the natural result of their several positions, but the quarrel had in no sort an ecclesiastical origin. In short, Frederick Barbarossa was an enemy of the Roman Church only

The First League primarily political.

1159.

[1] Pertz, iv. 180. "*Honorem coronæ*," *Coronam Imperii vel Regni*. The still more distinct phrase, *Regnum Italiæ et honorem coronæ*, which occurs in the separate oath of Tortona (Pertz, iv. 166), does not occur in the general oath imposed by the Charter.

[2] It is worth notice however that, in the reconciliation between Frederick and the Lombard cities (Pertz, iv. 258), while the Lombards themselves set forth the League strongly as a whole (*Rectores Societatis Lombardiæ, Marchiæ, Romaniolæ totaque ipsa Societas*), the Emperor seems to recognize them only as separate cities—*Quidam de civitatibus, locis, et personis de Lombardia, Marchia et Romaniola*. This is quite in harmony with Frederick's policy in his German Kingdom, which I shall have to speak of hereafter.

in so far as he attached himself to the Pontiff, who in the end failed to be successful. But the strife between Frederick the Second and the successive Popes, Gregory the Ninth and Innocent the Fourth, was primarily an ecclesiastical strife. The Pontiffs did not ally themselves with cities which had already revolted; they rather stirred the cities up to revolt for their own purposes.[1] In fact while, in the twelfth century, Italian unity, or an approach to it, would have been best found in a Confederation of Republics, in the thirteenth century the fairest hope for Italy seemed to lie in union under the sceptre of Frederick or of his son. This union was hindered by Papal ambition; the result was a period of unrivalled glory for three or four fortunate Republics, combined with the handing over of Southern Italy to a foreign invader and of Northern Italy to domestic tyrants. Venice, Florence, Genoa, Pisa were far greater, far more glorious, as independent Commonwealths, than they ever could have been as cities of an Italian Kingdom or even of an Italian League. But the worst cemented Italian League, the worst governed Italian Kingdom, would at least have relieved Milan and Naples and countless smaller cities from the far worse oppression of the Visconti, the Angevin, and the Spaniard. The truth is that the idea of Italian nationality is an idea of purely modern growth; it is an idea which has arisen only through the experience of long ages of foreign oppression and internal discord. The cause of Italian union is one to which every lover of freedom must wish Godspeed in our own times, but we shall read history wrong if we carry back the conception, or any inferences derived from it, into the days of the Hohenstaufen. Italian patriotism, like old Greek patriotism, was felt only for a city and not for a nation. The days of Macedonian dominion taught Greece the need of Union; the longer ages of French, Spanish, and Austrian oppression have at last taught the same lesson to the Italy of our own day. But, long after Greece was comparatively united, the Macedonian still held the Fetters of Greece,[2] and they were wrested from his grasp only to be handed over to the stronger hand of Rome. And, now that one realm stretches from the Alps to the Libyan Sea, a baser oppressor than Antigonos or Philip still holds the Fetters of Italy. Let us hope that the day may yet come when Italy shall recover her own, not by the gift

The Second League primarily ecclesiastical.

Union of Italy under Frederick or Manfred hindered by the Pope.

Good and evil which such union would have prevented.

Italian nationality a purely modern idea.

1849–63.

[1] See Sismondi, ii. 474–7, iii. 1 et seqq.

[2] See above, p. 484.

of another Flamininus, but by the might of a strong arm and a righteous cause.

Question of Italian Confederation or Consolidation.

One word more before I take leave of Italian history. From my point of view, the question can hardly fail to present itself whether a Federal Union, instead of a consolidated Kingdom, would not have been the proper form for the regenerate Italy of our own times. For the practical statesmen it is enough to answer that the Italians, who alone have the right to decide the question, have already decided it otherwise. But this answer is hardly enough for the political historian. That the name of Federalism has a bad odour in Italy no one can wonder; for the word has passed through the lips of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte. When Italy was striving to be united, her bitterest enemy, like Kallias of old, preached up a sham Federation as a means of perpetuating weakness and disunion. And, repulsed as he was at the time, the Tyrant seems never to have quite given up this darling scheme of mischief; his pamphleteers have ever and anon brought it forward again as what, in their detestable jargon, is called "the Solution of the Italian Question." Of course, from the day when the betrayer of Italy proposed an Italian Confederation, with the Pope at its head, and the Austrian for one of its members, the very name of Federalism has been utterly discredited in Italy. But all who have ever spoken or dreamed of an Italian Confederation must not be involved in his condemnation. Long before Magenta and Solferino, long before the freedom of Milan and Florence had been purchased by the bondage of Savoy, while all Italy, save the little realm of Piedmont, groaned under foreign or domestic tyrants, an Italian Confederation was the cherished hope of some of Italy's warmest friends. The historic greatness of her cities, the wide diversities among her several provinces, the difference in feelings, manners, and even language, between Sicily, Rome, Tuscany, Venice, and Piedmont, all pointed to a Federal Union as the natural form for Italian freedom to assume. It seemed, on every ground, to be the form of unity under which Italy might look for the highest amount of internal prosperity and contentment.[1] On the other hand stood the question, whether the greater strength of a consolidated Government might not be needed to resist the brute force of Austria and the hypocritical friendship of France.

Italian Federation discredited by L. N. Buonaparte.

Arguments on behalf of Federalism in Italy.

Arguments against it.

[1] See Oxford Essays.

Between these two opposing arguments, the Italians, who alone had the right to choose, have made their choice, and those who once hoped for a Federal Union of Italy have no right to complain. It may be indeed that, when they see the difficulty with which the several provinces are welded together, when they see the jealousies aroused among the great Italian cities as to the choice of a capital among them, they may be tempted to think that, after all, something was to be said on behalf of a scheme by which these difficulties at least would have been altogether avoided. But it is too late to recommend an Italian Federation now; Italy has chosen to be a consolidated State, and she must improve and develope herself as such. The rule with which I set out[1] here applies. Federalism is in its place whenever it appears in the form of more perfect union; it is out of place whenever it appears in the form of separation of what is already more closely united. But it is not too late to say that the true policy of the Italian Kingdom will be to approach as near to the Federal type as a Consolidated state can approach. It should keep as far as possible from the deadening system of French centralization; it should give every province, every city, every district, the greatest amount of local independence consistent with the common national action of the whole realm. Naples and Florence and Milan must not be allowed for a moment to feel themselves in bondage to an upstart rival like Turin. It is only by establishing perfect equality, and therefore perfect local independence, through every corner of his realm that the King of Piedmont can grow into a true King of Italy, or can make good his claim to a yet more glorious title. For we must hope that the Tyrant of the West may one day pass away along with his Barbarian fellow, and that the Old and the New Rome may alike open their gates to the chosen Princes of free peoples. Then will the title which has been too long degraded by the impostors of Paris, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Elba, Mexico, Brazil, and Hayti pass of right to the true successor of Charles, of Berenger, and of Frederick. And none will be more ready than those who once looked forward to a Confederate Italy, once more to wish Life and Victory to an Augustus crowned by God, a King of Italy and Emperor of the Romans.[2]

The question decided by the will of the Italians.

Federalism no longer appropriate in Italy;

but Local Independence still its true policy.

Future restoration of the Empire.

[1] See above, pp. 83–85.

[2] See National Review, January 1861, p. 68.

# FRAGMENT

## OF THE KINGDOM AND CONFEDERATION OF GERMANY

A CONSIDERATION of those imperfect approaches to Federal Union, which are all that the later history of Italy contains, has involved some mention of the great central point of all mediæval history, the continued existence of the Roman Empire.[1] And the great Imperial idea, without a full understanding of which all mediæval history is nothing but an insoluble puzzle, has had an effect on the destinies of Germany even more important and more permanent than the effect which it has had on the destinies of Italy. The German Kingdom and the Roman Empire were indeed at all times distinguishable in idea. But, from the days of Charles the Great onwards, the history of the two institutions cannot be separated, and, long before the final dissolution of both, the Empire and the Kingdom had come to be two inappropriate names for something which had become quite different from either. In the full-grown conception of the mediæval Empire, three Kingdoms were inseparably attached to the Imperial Crown. The Emperor of the Romans was of necessity King of Germany, of Italy, and of Burgundy. Four separate coronations[2] were needed to put the chosen King and Cæsar in full

Influence of the Empire on Germany.

The three Imperial Kingdoms.

[1] Since my last chapter was written, the whole subject of the *Holy Roman Empire* has been treated with wonderful power and clearness in Mr. Bryce's volume bearing that name, a volume which originally grew out of an Oxford Prize Essay. To that volume, as the best—indeed the only—English exposition of the whole matter, I refer once for all. I had myself, before Mr. Bryce's book appeared, dealt with several portions of the subject in various articles in the (now defunct) National Review, to some of which I have referred in earlier chapters. I would also venture to refer to a review of Mr. Bryce's book in the North British Review for February 1865. I had once dreamed of attempting the History of the Western Empire as a distinct work, but I am glad to leave so great a subject in younger hands.

[2] At Aachen for Germany, at Monza for Italy, at Arles for Burgundy, at Rome for the Empire. The Burgundian coronation however was commonly omitted. Frederick Barbarossa however was crowned at Arles in 1178 (Vit. Alex. III. ap.

possession of all his realms. But the constitutional relations of the three Kingdoms to the Empire differed from one another, and the historical destinies of the three Kingdoms differed more widely still. Germany was the hearth and home of the Empire. The German King, elected by German Princes only, claimed the crowns of the Empire and of the two other Kingdoms by virtue of that sole election. Italy was a distinct, in some sort a dependent Kingdom;[1] the King of Germany, as such, assumed the Crown of Italy as his right, and, as King of Italy, presided in Italian Diets wholly distinct from those of his native Kingdom. In Italy therefore the Imperial power gradually died out, without any formal separation of the Kingdom from the Empire. Emperors who were strangers to the soil of Italy, and who never permanently resided within her borders, gradually ceased to exercise any effective authority over their Italian Kingdom. The Kingdom of Italy thus split asunder, and in its stead there arose a system of independent principalities and commonwealths, not united by the bond of any common Assembly, nor owning any common head or centre, whether Federal or monarchic. The Kingdom of Burgundy,[2] whose connexion with Germany was in theory far closer than that of Italy, split asunder also, but in a somewhat different way. Most of its provinces gradually fell away from the Empire by annexation, formal or practical, to some other power—the Kings of Paris taking the lion's share. But those Burgundian States which still remained attached to the Empire were in some measure incorporated with the German Kingdom. No Burgundian Prince indeed held the rank of Elector, but those who retained their allegiance to the Empire

Germany

Italy,

and Burgundy.

Closest connexion between Germany and Burgundy.

Murat. tom. iii. p. 447), and so, strange to say, was Charles the Fourth (1365). The four seats of Empire are well described by Godfrey of Viterbo (Murat. vii. 418):

"Scribere vera volens, quot sint loca prima coronæ,
Quatuor Imperii sedes video ratione,
Nomina proponam, sicut et acta sonant.
Primus Aquisgrani locus est, post hæc Arelati,
Inde Modoëtiæ regali sede locari,
Post solet Italiæ summa corona dari.
Cæsar Romano cum vult diademate fungi,
Debet Apostolicis manibus reverenter inungi."

[1] The different positions of Italy and Burgundy are well explained by Pütter.

[2] See above, p. 24. For the various uses of the word Burgundy, see Mr. Bryce's Appendix.

retained with it their seats and votes[1] in that Assembly which might now be looked upon indifferently as representing either the Roman Empire or the German Kingdom. But the third Imperial realm, the German Kingdom itself, the *Regnum Teutonicum*, the Kingdom of the East-Franks, underwent a very different fate. Its connexion with the Empire was, from the beginning, closer than that of either of the other Kingdoms, and this close connexion gradually grew into identity. As Burgundy and Italy fell away, the Roman Empire of the West became identified with the German speech and the German nation, just as, by the loss of Egypt, Syria, Africa, and Latin Italy, the Roman Empire of the East became identified with the Greek speech and the Greek nation. After the great Interregnum of the thirteenth century, the Emperor of the Romans remained simply a German King, who, once in his reign, travelled out of his realm to receive a ceremonial exaltation which added not a jot to his real power. He might even omit the journey and the ceremony altogether, and the only consequence was that he remained only King of the Romans, and did not venture to assume the title of Emperor. From the sixteenth century onwards journey and ceremony were permanently disused, and the King of Germany, by virtue of his German election and German coronation, received the formal title of Emperor-Elect,[2] the popular title of Emperor without any qualification at all. The Empire, thus become conterminous with the German Kingdom, was driven to express the anomaly of its twofold position, practical and formal, by that most paradoxical and yet most accurate description—"The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation."

Connexion between Germany and the Empire growing into identity.

With the Holy Roman Empire, distinctly as an Empire, the historian of Federal Government has no concern. But,

[1] Thus, for instance, the County of Burgundy, the inheritance of the Empress Beatrice, remained formally an Imperial fief till its final annexation by France in 1679. But, held as it was successively by the Kings of France, the Dukes of Burgundy, and the Kings of Spain, its connexion with the Empire was very slight for several centuries. Savoy again always remained an Imperial fief, but its connexion in various ways with Italy, France, and Switzerland was much more important than its allegiance to the Empire. Of that large part of the Burgundian Kingdom which was gradually incorporated with the Swiss Confederation I shall speak elsewhere. But even Allies of the Confederation, such as the Bishop of Basel, retained their position as members of the Empire down to the wars of the French Revolution.

[2] "*Erwählter* Römischer Kaiser," "Romanorum Imperator *electus*."

indirectly, the position of the Empire has had no small share in producing a state of things which the Federal historian cannot leave unnoticed. Germany, at the present hour, calls itself a Confederation; its Princes and Commonwealths profess to be united by a Federal tie. That tie is, even in theory, a very lax one; what it has become in practice Germany and the world know too well. At the very best, the German Confederation is no *Bundesstaat*—the German language alone can express the distinction[1] in a single word—but only a *Staatenbund* of the laxest kind. Still a *Staatenbund* it does profess to be; it has Federal Laws, administered by a Federal Diet, to whose authority, within its own competence, every member of the League is, in theory, bound to yield obedience. That the mass of the German States are practically dependent on two of their own number, does not affect the Federal theory; every interference of Austria or Brandenburg with the lawful authority of the German Diet is, in Federal theory, as undoubted rebellion[2] as the secession of Messênê or the secession of South Carolina. Small as is the competence of the Federal power in Germany, within that competence it is as much entitled to the loyal obedience of every member of the League as the Federal powers of Achaia, America, or Switzerland. Germany then, in its present state, is a phænomenon which an historian of Federalism cannot pass by. It forms an essential, though a secondary, part of his subject, if only to point out the difference between its awkwardly constituted arrangements and the better ordered Federal systems of other lands. And here two important differences present themselves between the German Confederation and any other Confederation on record. First, the mass of its members are not Commonwealths but Principalities. Secondly, it arose, not, like other Confederations, through States which had once been more widely separated seeking a closer union, but through States which had once been more closely connected gradually falling apart. In both these respects, but especially in the latter, the present condition of the modern German Confederation has been largely influenced by the history of the defunct Holy Roman Empire.

The German Confederation;

a lax *Staatenbund*;

its theory and its practice.

Peculiarities of the German Confederation.

First, most of its members are principalities.

Secondly, it arose from the splitting up of a more united State.

These two peculiarities are closely connected with each other; indeed the first may be looked on as, in some sort, a result of

[1] See above, pp. 8, 9.

[2] See above, p. 89.

the second. A Confederation, as I have already remarked,[1] stands at an intermediate point between a system of wholly independent States, and a consolidated Kingdom or Commonwealth—in German political language, an *Einheitsstaat*. In theory, it is clear that this middle point may be approached alike from either extreme; but while, in all other cases, the middle point of Confederation has been reached by detached units making advances towards closer union, Germany has reached it by the opposite process of members of an once more united body detaching themselves partially, but not wholly, from the central power.[2] All other Confederations have been formed by the union of previously independent States;[3] the German Confederation alone has been formed by the dissolution of the German Kingdom. Long before that Kingdom was formally dissolved, the relation between its several members had become much more truly a Federal one than anything else, and this fact was ever and anon revealed to the world, either by the industrious researches of a native jurist,[4] or by the insolent plainness of speech of a foreign conqueror.[5] From the Peace of Westphalia onwards the Kingdom of Germany was in truth no Kingdom, but a Confederation, and that a very lax Confederation. The princes and commonwealths which composed it possessed and exercised independent powers at least as extensive as those

Process of disunion in Germany.

Germany really a Federation from the Peace of Westphalia, A.D. 1648–1806.

[1] See above, pp. 69, 79.

[2] Of course, at the actual moment when the present Federal compact was drawn up, the powers which united to form it were, in theory, absolutely independent. At that particular moment no common tie, Imperial or Federal, held them together. But the beginnings of the German Confederation must be looked for, as we shall soon see, in much earlier times. The years between 1806 and 1814 must be looked on as an anomalous period, like the Athenian *ἀναρχία*, interposed between two periods of regular order. The final establishment of the Confederation in 1814 was the natural sequence of the dissolution of the Empire in 1806, and, in point of fact, the dissolution of the Empire was actually followed (or, more accurately, preceded and caused) by the establishment of a professed Federal system in the shape of the elder Buonaparte's *Rheinbund*.

[3] The States of the American Union were, in theory, absolutely independent during the ideal interval between their rejection of British authority and their union in a Federal body. The States of Achaia and Switzerland had of course been historically, as well as theoretically, independent. And the Federal Union did historically bring the American States into a much closer union than existed in the Colonial period when they had no tie but that of a common dependence.

[4] See the very remarkable chapter in Pütter's *Teutsche Staatsverfassung*, vol. iii. p. 156, especially pp. 159, 161.

[5] See Buonaparte's Supplement to the Act of Formation of the Rheinbund: "Le lien *fédératif* (between the States of the Empire) n'offrit plus de garantie à personne," etc., etc.

possessed by a Dutch Province or a Swiss Canton.[1] The only difference was that the German Confederation still continued to give to its elective President the sounding titles of King and Emperor, Cæsar and Augustus, titles which, while they gave him the first place among the princes of the earth, clothed him with less real power than was held by a Dutch Stadtholder. The Acts of 1806 and of 1814 were in truth only the formal acknowledgements of a state of things which had practically existed ever since 1648, and the germs of which may be seen centuries earlier.

The Kingdom of Germany.

In truth the disunion of Germany has lasted so long, the authority of its central power, Imperial or Federal, has so long been hardly more than nominal, that men in general find a difficulty in understanding that these severed states, feebly united by a feudal or Federal tie, are merely the scattered members of an once united Kingdom. It is hard to make men believe that there was a time when the Kingdom of Germany was as united as contemporary England, far more united than contemporary France. The three countries, in short, started from nearly the same point, and have diverged in three different directions. The Kingdom of England was formed by the gradual welding together of various independent, though kindred principalities. The King of the West-Saxons obtained a certain external supremacy over his neighbours: a dependent King of Mercia or Northumberland succeeded an independent one. In the next stage the dependent King gave way to an Earl, possessing vast local authority, but still a subject, though often a turbulent subject, of the one King of the English. The Kingdom of the Franks, the Empire of Charles the Great, was formed by nearly the same process. Dukes of Saxony and Bavaria, of Burgundy and Aquitaine, succeeded to the ancient Kings; or, if the royal dignity was allowed to survive, it was confined to princes of the royal house, who held their dependent Kingdoms as appanages with the head of the family and the Empire.[2] Eastern and

Comparison with England and France.

800–836.

878–954.

Origin of the German Kingdom, 483–888.

[1] The Confederations of Switzerland, America, and the United Provinces, are the analogies specially chosen by Pütter to illustrate the constitution of the Empire. Switzerland and America were then (1786) under their older and laxer Federal system.

[2] Thus Charles the Great made his sons Kings over Aquitaine (Einhard, Annales, sub A.D. 781, Pertz, i. 161) and Italy, and towards the end of the Carolingian period we find a whole crowd of these *reguli*. So in England Kent for some generations was held by a King of the royal house of Wessex.

Western *Francia*—Germany and modern France—fell asunder;[1] after the partition of 888 no King ever reigned over both together. But much the same state of things existed in both Kingdoms. In both the King was only the first among several Princes, who held their Duchies and Counties of him as of their feudal superior. But the later history of England, France, and Germany differed widely. In England the tendency to union, which had been at work ever since the days of Ecgberht, was powerfully strengthened by the Norman Conquest. The Kingdoms shrank into Earldoms, and the Earldoms shrank into territorial administrative divisions. The Earldom of Chester and the Bishoprick of Durham alone retained some faint shadow of the independence of continental Dukes and Prelates. In France the great vassals became, for every practical purpose, independent sovereigns;[2] the utmost amount of submission obtained by the nominal King was to have the years of his reign used as a date. Normandy was in a constant state of war with France; France and Aquitaine seem for long periods to have forgotten one another's existence. With the thirteenth century a change began; the forfeiture of Normandy was the first of a long series of annexations, which, by conquest, by inheritance, by marriage, by escheat, by every conceivable means, fair or foul, gradually[3] reunited the great Duchies and Counties to the Royal Domain. In Germany the case differed from either. In the tenth century, under Otto the Great, and in the eleventh, under Henry the Third, the Teutonic Kingdom was undoubtedly the most united realm of the three. A Duke of Saxony or Bavaria, like an Earl of the Mercians or the Northumbrians, might be a very powerful and a very troublesome subject; but he was still a subject liable to be called to account, to be judged and punished, by his Sovereign and the assembled Estates of the Realm. But it would be an abuse of language to call the lords of Rouen and

Different history of England, 800–1087,

France, 888–1202,

and Germany, 936–973, 1039–1056.

Circumstances which strengthened the royal authority in Germany.

[1] A German poet uses (with perfect truth) a stronger word, which has since become technical:

> "Et simul a nostro *secessit* Gallia regno,
> Nos priscum regni morem servamus."
>
> Ligurinus de Gest. Frid. lib. i.

[2] On this whole period see Edinburgh Review, July 1860.

[3] The favourite French phrase of *réunion* is perfectly admissible when applied to provinces which had ever been, even in name, fiefs of the Parisian Crown; it is objectionable only when applied to provinces pilfered from Germany or Burgundy. A *réunion* of Barcelona would have been one degree less intolerable than a *réunion* of Savoy.

Bourdeaux the subjects, though they might be the nominal vassals, of the King of Laon or of Paris. Germany, like England, always retained her national Assemblies. The *Witenagemot* and the *Marzfeld* gradually developed, without any sudden change, into the British Parliament and the Imperial Diet. But in West-France, after the great partition, a national assembly was something unheard of[1] till Philip the Fair devised the States General as an invention wholly new, not a developement out of something old. The German Kings again long retained a domain which was scattered through various parts of the Kingdom; the French Kings retained nothing but their own Duchy of Paris and some districts conterminous with it. Again the system of Imperial Cities, holding immediately of the King, and acknowledging no inferior lord, made the German King at once at home in all the chief towns of his dominions. Again the great ecclesiastical Princes, naturally more loyal or more subservient than the lay Princes, all held in Germany immediately of the King. In France the Archbishops of Rouen and Bourdeaux and the Cities of Rouen and Bourdeaux stood in no relation whatever to the King; whatever powers and possessions either Prelates or citizens might enjoy, were held of their immediate lord, the Duke of Normandy or of Aquitaine. Through all these means the authority of the German King and the unity of the German Kingdom were kept up, while the King of the French retained no authority beyond Paris and Orleans, and the Kingdom itself seemed fast hastening towards utter dismemberment. There can be no greater contrast than between a German King,[2] ever in motion, ever visiting every corner of the land, holding a national Assembly in one City, keeping an ecclesiastical festival in another, appointing this Bishop and

Retention of National Assemblies in Germany and England, but not in France. 888–1302.

The Royal Domain.

The Free Cities.

The Ecclesiastical Princes.

Contrast between the German and the French Kings.

[1] This expression may perhaps sound too strong for the period between 888 and 987, when Assemblies of some kind were certainly held, for instance that which elected Hugh of Paris in 987. (See Richer, iv. 12.) But that they were really national assemblies, like those of England or Germany, seems very doubtful. Hugh was made King over "Gauls, Bretons, Danes, Aquitanians, Goths, Spaniards, and Gascons," but the counties south of the Loire seem to have had no hand in the matter. After the accession of the Parisian dynasty there seems to have been no pretence at anything like a national Assembly.

[2] The amazing activity of the German Kings is familiar to every one who has read the national chronicles. Take for instance one year of Henry the Fourth as recorded by Lambert of Herzfeld. He kept the Christmas of 1073–4 at Worms, thence he went to Herzfeld, held an Assembly at Goslar, kept Lent at Worms and Easter at Bamberg, met Papal Legates at Nürnberg, set out on an expedition into Hungary, but turned back at Regensburg for fear of "Willehelmus cogno-

deposing that Duke, and a King of the French, retaining a dominion smaller than that of many of his vassals, never stirring beyond the three or four cities of that immediate domain, never presiding in any national Assembly, with no Free Cities, no immediate Prelates, no detached royal possessions, nothing to make the existence of the King practically felt in the furthest corners of his Kingdom. But the great point of difference of all is that Germany retained her National Assemblies, while France lost hers. From this cause, more than from any other, though the royal authority in Germany sank to a mere name, yet the national unity never utterly perished. The Kingdom changed into a Confederation, the King changed into a President; but the Confederation and its President still remained, and formed a bond of union which hindered utter separation. The France of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, where no National Assembly ever brought King, Nobles, and People together, did not even stop at the half-way house of Federation; the practical separation was total. France indeed was reunited, and, when once reunited, France became far more closely united than Germany. But this closer union was in truth rendered possible only by her former disunion. The King of the French conquered or inherited a Duchy, and that Duchy was at once incorporated with the royal dominions. It might retain some local rights and customs, but it retained no means of communication with those Duchies which remained independent. Step by step did the Royal Domain and the Kingdom become coextensive; but national unity was purchased at the cost of both national and local freedom. In France, in short, the Princes fell into complete isolation, and the Crown swallowed them up one by one.[1] In Germany the Princes reduced the royal authority to a shadow; but they never threw aside either their formal allegiance to the Crown or their formal brotherhood towards one another.

Contrast between the later history of the Kingdoms.

Thus, in a word, the early disunion of France led to her later

mento Bostar (sic) Rex Anglorum," kept Pentecost at Mainz, went on divers affairs to Andernach, Aachen, and Worms again, then invaded Hungary, returned to Worms, thence to Regensburg, and spent the rest of the time till Christmas in going through the cities of Bavaria and Swabia.

[1] It was doubtless a great advantage to the French Kings that some of their annexations took the form of national wars. Thus the Duke of Aquitaine was also King of England, and Aquitaine was won for France in a national war against England.

centralization; the early union of Germany hindered Germany from ever becoming centralized. So far from her Principalities being absorbed into the Royal Dominion, they gradually changed from fiefs of a Kingdom into members of a Federal body. No other Kingdom on record has gone through the like process. And why was Germany destined to a fate which placed it, in point of national strength, below all other Kingdoms? Mainly, I believe, because Germany was the first and noblest of Kingdoms, because her crown was inseparably united with the crown of the Roman Empire. One obvious cause greatly contributed to the diminution of the royal power in Germany; the crown of Germany was elective, while the crown of France was hereditary. That is to say, of the two elements which were united in the idea of the ancient Teutonic Kingship, one triumphed in Germany and the other triumphed in France. The old Teutonic kingship was hereditary so far as that, under all ordinary circumstances, the King must needs be the descendant of Kings; it was elective so far as that there was no distinct law of succession, but the will of the people or of his chiefs selected the worthiest member of the royal house. Of these two principles, Germany developed one till no hereditary claim was acknowledged, France developed the other till the idea of election was wholly forgotten. Several causes combined to strengthen the elective element in Germany and to strengthen the hereditary element in France. The son of the last King had everywhere a marked preference over every other candidate,[1] and every King of the French, like every King of Judah, left, for three hundred years, a son of his loins to sit on his throne. In Germany, on the other hand, one royal house after another became extinct, or was continued only in illegitimate or female representatives. This cause doubtless had its weight in determining the elective character of the German Kingdom; but this cause was by no means all; of all the combining circumstances none so decisively influenced the course of events as the fact that the King of Germany was, or had an exclusive right to become, Emperor of the Romans. Now the Empire was elective in its very nature. It had been elective both in the Old and in the New Rome, and

Causes which led to the disunion of Germany.

The crown of Germany elective,

through several causes,

chiefly because of its connexion with the Empire.

[1] In England the eldest son of the late King seems to have been regularly chosen, unless there was some manifest reason to the contrary. For instance, an adult brother was always preferred to a minor son. The succession of William Rufus and Henry the First is perhaps the only case of a younger son being preferred to an elder.

it remained equally elective at Aachen and at Frankfurt. In the fully developed conception of the mediæval Empire an hereditary Emperor would have seemed as great an absurdity as an hereditary Pope. The Lord of the World, the temporal chief of Christendom, held a place which could never be left to the accidents of hereditary succession; it must be, like the office of his spiritual colleague, held forth as a prize for the worthiest of the faithful, an object of possible, however remote ambition, for every baptized freeman. In this case, as in the whole history of the Empire, the very grandeur of the theory was the immediate cause of utter weakness and failure in practice. Because the King of Germany was also Roman Emperor, Cæsar, Augustus, Lord of the World, he came to have less authority in his own Kingdom than any other King. He was in fact too great to act with effect as the local King of a particular Kingdom. His functions as Roman Emperor and King of Italy led to constant absences from Germany, to constant defeats and humiliations in his Italian progresses, which could not fail greatly to lessen the weight of the royal authority in Germany itself. And, as the Empire was essentially elective, the Emperor King saw his authority exposed to diminution from another cause. When a Kingdom is elective, the electors will soon learn to make terms with the candidate as the price of his election, and the royal power will be diminished with every vacancy. This will be especially the case when, as in Germany, the election is vested in a small oligarchy, each member of which is strong enough to make his personal influence distinctly felt. Again, when estates fall into the Crown by escheat or forfeiture, it is the manifest interest of an hereditary King to incorporate them with the royal domain. The utmost that he will do in the way of alienation will be to use them as mere appanages for the younger members of the royal house. But, when an escheated or forfeited fief falls into the Crown in an elective monarchy, the King, uncertain of his son's succession, is tempted to employ the vacant benefice, not to enrich the Crown, which may pass to a stranger, but to provide his son with something to fall back upon in case he fails of a Kingdom. From these, and from many other causes, the royal power in Germany dwindled away. The Kingdom changed into a Confederation, and its change into a Confederation was owing to no cause so much as to the fact that the Kingdom aspired to be an Empire.

The Empire essentially elective.

Ways in which the Imperial and elective character of the German Crown diminished the royal authority.

The other point of peculiarity in the German Confederation, as distinguished from all others, is, as was before said, that the great majority of its members are, and always have been, not commonwealths, but principalities. A few Free Cities still exist, and a far larger number once existed; still, even in the most flourishing days of the Hanseatic League, princely government was the rule, and the republics were the exception. This peculiarity of character is, as was before said, closely connected with the other peculiarity of origin. It may be doubted whether a group of perfectly independent Princes would ever have joined themselves together in a Federal Union; but it was not unnatural that Princes who became sovereign only by the gradual weakening of a central monarchy should stop at the point of Federalism, and shrink from asserting their absolute independence. Setting aside the Free Cities, whose course runs parallel with that of the Princes, the division of the German Kingdom took place through the acquisition, first of an hereditary right of succession, then of all the practical rights of sovereignty, by officers who, in their origin, were merely magistrates appointed by the King and liable to be removed by him. Counts, Dukes, Palsgraves, each class designed as a check on the encroachments of the other, all followed the same law. Counts, Dukes, Palsgraves, all gradually grew into sovereign Princes. The Count[1] was originally a royal officer, and the Duke a royal officer with authority superior to that of the Count. But the Duke gradually grew into an immediate hereditary vassal of the Crown, and the Count gradually grew into an hereditary under-vassal of the Duke. The Duchies, in most cases, became extinct, and the Counts became immediate vassals of the Crown. But by that time the relation of immediate dependence on the Crown had become a relation of practical independence. Thus each principality, great and small, gradually acquired the practical rights of sovereignty; the only common tie was the common Diet of the nation, still presided over by the common Imperial head of all. But when that Diet came to consist mainly of sovereign, though nominally vassal, Princes, it became something far more like a Federal Congress than a National Parliament. Then, by the very fact of its origin, the German Diet was essentially a Congress of Governments only. Except so far as the Free Cities

The other point of peculiarity; the German Confederation mainly a Confederation of Princes.

Connexion between this characteristic and the other.

Origin of the German Principalities.

Royal officers become sovereigns.

The Diet a Federal Congress rather than a National Parliament.

[1] *Graf* is the same as the Old English *gerefa*, *grieve*, *reeve*, a magistrate or officer of any sort, great or small.

Governments only, not peoples, represented in the Diet.

formed a partial exception, the German Diet in no way represented the German people. The modern Diet of the Confederation represents them as little as the old Diet of the Empire did. In like manner the Old Swiss Diet of the Thirteen Cantons, the first American Congress of the Thirteen States, immediately represented the Governments, and not the people, of the States which composed the Confederations. But then those were Governments on which the people, or, as in the oligarchic Cantons, a certain class of the people had more or less of influence. A German Prince represented only himself;[1] the people were not represented directly or indirectly, unless the personal wisdom and patriotism of this or that Prince made him practically the representative of his subjects. Gradually both the Emperor and the Princes left off personal attendance, and the Imperial Diet became, what the Confederate Diet still remains, a mere Congress of Ambassadors. The one body which professes to speak in the name of Germany still represents nothing but the policy of German sovereigns; the voice of the German people has no constitutional means of utterance.

The Diet sinks into a diplomatic Congress.

Other peculiarities of the German Confederation.

One or two other general peculiarities in the nature of the German Confederation may here be mentioned. Every observer must be struck with the great number, even after many reductions, of the independent States of Germany and at their striking disproportion in extent and power. Every careful observer will also remark the way in which ancient landmarks have been wiped out through the greater part of Germany. The States which make up the present German Confederation, the States which made up the German Kingdom at the time of its dissolution, in no way answer to those great national divisions which existed before the formation of the Kingdom, and which remained as the chief provincial divisions long after its formation. In no country have the old historical divisions more utterly perished than in Germany. In England several of the old Kingdoms still survive as Counties, with their old names and pretty nearly with their old boundaries. Others have been divided into several Counties. But those Counties, in a large part of England, represent ancient Principalities subordinate to

Loss of the ancient divisions.

Comparison with England,

[1] Some of the votes given in the Diet, those of the Benches of Prelates for instance, were representative of the class, but not in any way representative of the people or of any part of it. There is something analogous in our own Parliament, in the position of the Scotch and Irish representative Peers.

the ancient Kingdoms. Even where the Counties are of later origin the Kingdoms have been, for the most part, simply subdivided; the ancient and the modern divisions do not often cross one another; it seldom happens that a modern English County runs into two ancient English Kingdoms.[1] So in France, as the Crown annexed one great fief after another, those fiefs remained as local divisions, Provinces, or Governments, retaining, in some cases, very extensive local liberties. It was only the revolution of 1789 which wiped the ancient names from the map, and even then, as in England, the ancient divisions were, for the most part, only subdivided and not confused. But in Germany, though most of the old names remain on the map, they have lost their meanings, and, in many cases, they have changed their places. The modern Kingdom of Saxony has not a rood of ground in common with the Saxony which was subdued by Charles the Great. Modern and ancient Bavaria do indeed contain a large territory in common; still the modern Kingdom takes in a great deal which was not part of the ancient Duchy and leaves out a great deal which was part of it. Lotharingia has vanished; Swabia, Franconia, Westphalia, survive only as new-fangled provincial divisions of upstart monarchies. The modern German Confederation is not a Confederation of the ancient national Duchies; it is not a Confederation of the old Electorates; it is not a Confederation of the Circles of Maximilian. All these successive divisions have vanished. The modern Confederation is an union of States, great and small, which have been formed by endless partitions and endless annexations, but all of which have assumed their present shape in very recent times. In short, not only the Kingdom, but the Duchies which formed the primary divisions of the Kingdom, have been split up into fragments, and those fragments have often been conjoined with fragments of other Duchies. The German law of succession allowed of endless partitions of territory, endless treaties and family arrangements, through which, in this case, one State has been divided into several, in the other case several States have been united into one. Changes of this sort took place regularly and peaceably according to the Laws of the Empire. But to these we have to add the high-handed doings

and France.

Splitting up of the ancient Duchies.

Constant partitions and annexations.

[1] Several of the Western Counties of Mercia had a portion of Welsh territory added to them when the Principality and its Marches were finally settled under Henry the Eighth.

of the present century. This principality has been mediatized[1] altogether; that, rather too large for such a process, has been compelled to surrender half its territory to the greed of a more powerful neighbour; princes who had been compelled to yield their own dominions to the common enemy have indemnified themselves at the expense of their own weaker brethren. Bishopricks have been secularized; Free Cities have been deprived of their freedom; and every change, just or unjust, expedient or inexpedient, has involved the removal of some ancient landmark, the wiping out of some ancient memory. Thus were formed States like Prussia, Hannover, and Baden, answering to no ancient divisions, suggesting no ancient associations, and which would seem as strange in the eyes of a Saxon or Frankish Emperor as to see one portion of Swabia forming part of an independent republic and another incorporated with a hostile monarchy. But though so much of this geographical confusion is owing to very modern arrangements, the change had largely taken place long before the dissolution of the Kingdom. This striking peculiarity in German historical geography, as compared with that of France, has its origin in that gradual splitting of the Kingdom and its great divisions which had been going on for ages.

1814–5.

1801.

In England then the process of dissolution never took place; in France a temporary total dissolution was followed by the closest of reunions; in Germany dissolution stopped at a certain point. It is an important difference between Germany and France that in France the Crown was able to annex the great fiefs as wholes, before the mediate vassals had found time and opportunity to make themselves independent of their immediate lords. In Germany the vassals of the Dukes became immediate vassals of the Crown at a time when immediate vassalage was fast becoming synonymous with sovereignty. The smallest tenant-in-chief acquired, or at least strove after, independence; and his independence has been at all times much more liable to be endangered at the hands of some more powerful neighbour than at the hands of the common suzerain. Again, each of these

Different position of the *arrière* vassals in France and in Germany.

[1] The German phrase of *mediatization* is as delicate an euphemism as the French phrase of *réunion*. To the student of constitutional law there is something singularly grotesque in the use of the word after the dissolution of the Empire, when no such distinction as "mediate" and "immediate" any longer existed.

small principalities was liable either to be subdivided or to be united with any other. Hence follows the vast number of the German States and the diminutive size of so many of them. Even now that so many of them have been swallowed up by larger States, the mention of some of them almost raises a smile; and, before the dissolution of the Kingdom, they were incomparably more numerous and some of them incomparably smaller. Hence again follows the wiping out of ancient landmarks, and the singular disproportion in extent and powers between the different members of the former Kingdom and now Confederation. The ancient Duchies of Saxony, Swabia, and Bavaria fairly balanced one another; but there is no proportion between Prussia and Lippe-Detmold. Here, as we shall see, lies the great vice of the existing Confederation. Most of the existing States are purely artificial; they answer to no national, geographical, or historical divisions. Again their disproportion in size is so great that even the secondary States cannot hope to maintain their independence by their own strength; their only hope—a faint hope indeed—lies in the mutual jealousy of the two dominant powers. A great disproportion indeed has often existed between the several members of Federal bodies, between Megalopolis and Tritaia, between Bern and Zug, between Virginia and Rhode Island. But nowhere has disproportion been carried to so great a pitch as in modern Germany. And the Federal and brotherly feeling which has tempered the disproportion in republican Confederations is hardly to be looked for in the sovereigns of either great or small German States. The only parallel is to be looked for in the worst arranged and most unfortunate of the Greek Confederations. Germany, tossed to and fro between Austria and Brandenburg, is like the Bœotian League in the days when Thebes had not yet definitely got the better of Orchomenos.

Vast number of the German States.

Their singular disproportion in size.

Position of Austria and Prussia.

Parallel with Bœotia.

# APPENDIX I

## 1. NOTE ON THE CITIES OF THE ACHAIAN LEAGUE[1]

(See Head, Historia Numorum, p. 350 *sqq*, and Leicester Warren, Greek Federal Coinage)

IN the following list of the cities of the Achaian League, those are marked with an asterisk for which numismatic evidence exists; those whose existence as members of the League is known only from the evidence of coins are put in Italics. It may be stated here that on the obverse of the Federal silver coins the head of Zeus Homagyrios was represented; on the reverse the Achaian monogram X, and around it "various letters, monograms, local symbols, names of magistrates or of cities, usually abbreviated," all surrounded by a wreath of bay. The bronze coins have the name of each city in full, preceded by the name of the Achaians (*e.g.* ΑΧΑΙΩΝ ΔΥΜΑΙΩΝ). On the obverse is a "full length figure of Zeus Homagyrios holding Nike and leaning on sceptre"; on the reverse "Demeter Panachaia (?) seated, holding wreath and resting on sceptre."

| NAME OF CITY. | DATE OF ACCESSION. B.C. | | PAGE. |
|---|---|---|---|
| Patrai | 280 | | 191. |
| Dymê | 280 | | 191. |
| Tritaia | c. 279 | | 191. |
| Pharai | c. 279 | | 191. |
| Aigion | 275 | | 192. |
| Boura | 275 | | 192. |
| Keryneia | 275 | | 192. |
| Leontion | — | | 192. |
| Aigeira | 274 (?) | | 192. |
| Pellênê | 274 (?) | | 192. |
| Sikyôn | 251 | | 285. |
| Corinth | 243—223. | 196—146[2] | 294, 484. |
| Megara | 243—223. | 204—146[2] | 294, 477. |

[1] This note, with the list of cities, appeared in an Appendix to the original edition, but has been recast by the Editor. The other notes in this Appendix are added by the Editor.

[2] Corinth was out of the League from 223 to 196, and Megara from 223 to 204. (Freeman.)

| NAME OF CITY. | DATE OF ACCESSION. B.C. | PAGE. |
|---|---|---|
| Troizên | 243 | 295. |
| Epidauros | 243 | 295. |
| Hêraia | Between 240—235. 208 ? | 314, 460. |
| Kynaitha | — | 314. |
| Stymphalos | — | 314. |
| Kleitôr | — | 314. |
| Phenεos | 234 | 314. |
| Alea | — | 354. |
| Telphousa [1] | — | 314. |
| Mantineia before 222 | — | 315. |
| Mantineia or Antigoneia | 222 | 315. |
| * Megalopolis | 234 | 315. |
| Aigina | 233 (?)—210 | 331, 453. |
| * Hermionê | 229 | 331. |
| * Kleônai | 229 | 312. |
| * Argos | 228 | 333. |
| * Phlious | 228 | 333. |
| * Kaphyai | 227 | 344. |
| * Tegea | 222 | 386. |
| Psôphis | 219 | 419. |
| * *Pagai* | 208 ? [2] | 489. |
| * *Phigaleia* [3] | 208 or 196 | |
| Lepreon [4] | 208 or 196 | 460, 478, 484. |
| Orchomenos | 199 or 196 | 478, 484. |
| * *Alipheira* | 194 | |
| * *Asea* | 194 | 488. |
| * *Dipaia* | 194 | |
| * *Elisphasioi* | 194 | |
| * *Gortys* | 194 | 488. |
| * *Kallista* | 194 (?) | |
| * *Pallantion* | 194 | 488. |
| * *Theisoa* | 194 | 488. |
| * *Sparta* | 192 | 492. |
| * *Elis* | 191 | 496. |
| * *Messênê* | 191 | 496. |
| * *Korônê* | 184 | 506. |
| Hypana | ? | |
| * *Lusoi* | ? | |
| * *Methydrion* | ? | |

[1] Spelt Thelpusa on coins.

[2] Pagai most probably became a distinct State on the second incorporation of Megara. (Freeman.)

[3] Phigaleia was probably annexed along with Triphylia. (Freeman.)

[4] I insert the name of Lepreon as the only *city* in Triphylia. (Freeman.)

| NAME OF CITY. | DATE OF ACCESSION. B.C. | PAGE |
|---|---|---|
| *Teuthis* | ? | |
| Abia, Thouria, Pharai | 182 | 507. |
| Gythion ?, Teuthrônê ?, Asinê (in Messenia) ?, Pyrrhichos ?, Kainêpolis ?, Oitylos ?, Leuktra ?, Thalamai ?, Alagonia ?, Gerênia ?, Asôpos ?, Akriai, Boiai ?, Zarax ?, Epidauros Limêra ?, Brasiai ?, Geronthrai ?, Marios ?, Iasos ?? | 195 | 485, 540. |

## 2. NOTE ON THE CITIES OF THE LYKIAN LEAGUE

(See Head, Historia Numorum, p. 576 *sqq*)

Strabo states that twenty-three cities belonged to the Lykian League. This statement corresponds exactly to the numismatic evidence. We have Federal coins issued by twenty-three cities, viz. Antiphellos, Apollônia, Apulai, Araxa (?), Arykanda, Bubon, Gagai, Kragos, Kyanê, Kydna (?), Limyra, Masikytos, Myra, Olympos, Patara, Phellos, Pinara (autonomous coins of Federal type), Podalia, Rhodiopolis, Tlôs, Trebenna, Tymena, Xanthos. Strabo states that Phasêlis was not a member of the second Lykian League; and this "is not contradicted by numismatic evidence" (Head). We have also Federal coins of Trabula and Telmêssos, but only in conjunction with Kragos. This shows the existence of monetary leagues or *Sonderbunds* of separate pairs of towns which are supposed to be meant by the words συμπολιτευόμενοι δῆμοι which occur in Lykian inscriptions (Le Bas-Waddington, As. Min., 1290–92).

## 3. THE FEDERAL COINAGE OF AKARNANIA

(See Head, Historia Numorum, p. 278 *sqq*)

In the fifth century, after the formation of the Akarnanian Confederacy, the coast towns issued Corinthian staters (obverse, Head of Pallas; reverse, Pêgasos). The towns of the interior, including Stratos, the chief city of the Confederacy, issued small silver coins with their own types. In the end of the third century we find a regular Federal coinage (obverse, Head of the river god Achelôos; reverse, the Actian Apollo) instead of the Corinthian staters. Leukas was probably the place where these coins were struck, as (about 300 B.C.) it had taken the place of Stratos as the most important Akarnanian town. In 167 B.C. Leukas was separated from Akarnania, and issued her own coins. Thyrrheion continued for some time the type of Federal coinage, though not in the name of the Confederacy, but on her own account.

## 4. THE FEDERAL COINAGE OF ÆTOLIA

(See Head, Historia Numorum, p. 283 *sqq*)

The Federal coinage of Ætolia began soon after the invasion of that country by the Gauls. None of the Ætolian towns issued coins of their own.

# APPENDIX II

## ADDITIONAL NOTES BY THE EDITOR

P. 35. "THERE was nothing at Athens at all analogous to what we call 'Office' and 'Opposition.'"

On the *δήμου προστάτης* at Athens and Syracuse, see Mr. Freeman's *History of Sicily*, vol. iii. p. 116, where he says: "The *δήμου προστάτης* comes nearest to the Leader of Opposition, but with this difference, that the Leader of Opposition, though not at the time in office, is sure to belong to the official class."

P. 53. As a fourth "exception to the representative system in modern Europe and America" we may count the Referendum in Switzerland.

P. 56. "Election of the American President." Mr. Bryce has described (*American Commonwealth*, i. 52) how it has happened that "the presidential electors have become a mere cogwheel in the machine." Their voting is now a mere matter of form.

Ib., note 1. South Carolina is no longer an exception since 1868.

P. 74. Since Mr. Freeman wrote, a Federal monarchy has come into existence, namely, the German Empire. See remarks in Editor's Preface.

P. 104, line 6 from foot. Insert "as" between "such" and "merely."

P. 105. W. Vischer, in a valuable review of the *History of Federal Government*, published in the *Neues Schweizerisches Museum* (iv. pp. 281-328), and reprinted in the reviewer's *Kleine Schriften*, i. 534-587 (to which reference is here made), pointed out that light is thrown on the condition of the Delphic Amphiktyony, before its reform by Augustus, by an inscription found at Delphi by C. Wescher. At the time of this document there were twenty-four votes (as in the time of Aischinês) among seventeen peoples, distributed in such a way that ten peoples had one vote each, and the remaining seven two votes each. The possessors of two votes were the Delphians, Thessalians, Phôkians, Boeotians, Phthiôtic Achaians, Magnêtes, Ainianes; while those with one vote were the Dorians of Parnassus, Dorians of Peloponnêsos, Athenians, Euboians, Malians, Oitaians, Dolopians, Perrhaibians, Epiknêmidian Lokrians, Western Lokrians. Thus the Dorians, the Ionians (Athenians and Euboians), and Lokrians, who were originally classed as one people and gave one vote, had been severally divided into two.

At an earlier period, about the beginning of the third century, Ætolian influence was predominant at Delphi. See below p. 651, note on p. 257.

P. 112. See Vischer, in the review mentioned in last note, p. 553-4. He refers to the inscription, found in the Troad and now in Cambridge, which was published by E. Curtius in Gerhard's *Archaeol. Zeitung*, 1855, p. 33 *sqq.*, where κοινά of the Oitaian Dorians, the Ainianes, the Athamanes, the Oitaians, the Eastern Lokrians, are mentioned. For the Phôkian League too there is now new epigraphic material available, in the Delphic inscriptions, published by Wescher and Foucart.

P. 118. Vischer criticizes Mr. Freeman for denying that there was any real Federalism in Thessaly (p. 554). Cf. his account of a "Bundesorganismus" in Thessaly, in an essay "Ueber die Bildung von Staaten und Bünden" (*Kleine Schriften*, i. p. 335 *sqq*). But after reading Vischer's strictures, Mr. Freeman thought that the difference between his own view and that of Vischer was mainly one of words.

P. 125. The remarks in the text on the use of "Theban" and "Bœotian" should be modified, as Vischer (p. 558) pointed out. "Was den Namen des Gesammtstaates betrifft, so scheint er officiell als der thebanische bezeichnet worden zu sein, οἱ Θηβαῖοι. So wenigstens steht in der bekannten Steinurkunde jener Zeit über den unter Archon Nausinikos geschlossenen grossen athenischen Bund, der einzigen mir bekannten, wo eine officielle Unterschrift sich findet. [See Rangabé, *Antiq. Hell.* n. 381 and 381 b.] Damit stimmt auch wohl überein, dass, während bei Thukydides, also in den Zeiten des peloponnesischen Krieges, Boiotien als Staat immer mit Βοιωτοί bezeichnet wird, und bei Xenophon bis zur Zeit des antalkidischen Friedens der Gebrauch zwischen Βοιωτοί und Θηβαῖοι schwankt, seit der Befreiung vom spartanischen Joch bei diesem Θηβαῖοι das regelmässige ist, und ebenso bei den Rednern immer Θηβαῖοι vorkommt." He explains Xen. *Hell.* vi. 3. 19 in the same way as Mr. Freeman, but from his own different standpoint; and deprecates stress being laid on the expressions of Diodorus (κοινὴ σύνοδος τῶν Βοιωτῶν, xv. 80, and κοινὸν τῶν Βοιωτῶν, xvi. 85), who was not always accurate in his terms.

P. 134. Vischer (p. 557 *sqq.*) plausibly argues against the view of Grote that in 378 the Thebans "revived the Bœotian Confederacy,"—a view which Mr. Freeman accepted as the theoretical, but not as the practical, aspect of what happened. Vischer holds that the Thebans tried to introduce in Bœotia the same state of things which had prevailed in Athens since Theseus. As all the inhabitants of Attica were Athenians, so all the inhabitants of Bœotia were to be Thebans; and he quotes the passage in Isokratês *Plat.* § 8 (quoted p. 136, note 2) in support of his theory. But Vischer's observations, while they considerably affect Grote's statement of the case, affect Mr. Freeman's account but little.

P. 143. For the constitution of the Bœotian League in the Third period, see the investigations of M. Holleaux in the *Bulletin de Correspondance*

*hellénique*, xiii., 1 *sqq.*, and 225 *sqq.* The President of the League was called ἄρχων. There were functionaries called ἀφεδριατεύοντες, apparently seven in number, and delegated by the cities. No city could send more than one; but the right of sending them seems to have been confined to a certain number of the cities. Orchomenos, Thebes, Plataia, Tanagra, Thespiai, were always represented. Bœckh identifies these officials with the Bœotarchs of Polybios and Livy; but there is not yet sufficient evidence to decide this point.

P. 145-6. Stein, one of the best interpreters of Herodotus, takes a somewhat different view of the passage, i. 170. "Thales schlug für den ionischen Städtebund eine Bundesverfassung vor, nach der sich die einzelnen Städte ihrer politischen Selbständigkeit begeben und einem Bundestage (βουλευτήριον) sich unterordnen, daneben aber nach wie vor als gesonderte Stadtgemeinde bestehen bleiben (οἰκεομένας) und in ihrem Verhältniss zur Bundesstadt so angesehen werden sollten (νομίζεσθαι) wie anderswo (z.B.) in Attika die Landgemeinden (δῆμοι od. κῶμαι) zur Stadtgemeinde (πόλις). Kurz er wollte an die Stelle des bisherigen Städtebundes eine Bundesstadt (und zwar Teos) setzen." Stein evidently thinks that the proposal of Thales involved a much greater loss of independence for the cities of the Federation than is assumed by Mr. Freeman. It is not clear that in using the word δῆμοι Herodotus was necessarily thinking of the demes of Attica.

P. 156. Arkadia seems to have tried Federal Government before any other part of Greece. There are Federal coins which seem to date from the sixth century (see *Essay on Federal Coinage* by the Hon. Leicester Warren, now Lord de Tabley, p. 11; where it is also pointed out how the foundation of Megalopolis gave a great impulse to coinage in the Peloponnêsos). It is significant that of Federal coins dating from the period of the Achaian League, twenty-three were struck in Arkadian towns, twenty-eight in the rest of Peloponnêsos. M. Dubois (*Les ligues étolienne et achéenne*, p. 53) notices that the Arkadians were those who were most zealous to join the second Achaian League (see Pausanias, *Arcadica*, 6. 1), and concludes that "it is impossible to give too much weight to the Federal antecedents of the Arkadian people."

P. 187, notes, line 7. "Can we trust a writer who seems to think that Dymê needed deliverance from Achaian oppression?"

M. Dubois (p. 20) replies that at this period Achaia was divided and governed by local oligarchies which Epameinôndas permitted to continue in order to keep the Peloponnêsos disunited (the Arkadian union being the sole exception). This consideration may explain the odd phrase of Diodôros.

P. 188. M. Dubois writes (p. 57): "M. Freeman s'étonne qu'Alexandre ait traité si rigoureusement les Achéens de Pellène; il suffit peut-être de rappeler que la ligue des villes d'Achaïe avait combattu contre son père Philippe à Ché[illegible]ée." A reader would naturally infer from this that Mr. Freeman had ignored or forgotten the action of the Achaian League in 338 B.C. But if M. Dubois had read on to the next sentence he would have seen

that Mr. Freeman mentions the fact, and considers it to be an insufficient explanation.

P. 192. M. Dubois complains that Mr. Freeman (as well as other historians of the period), in discussing the origin and significance of the Achaian League, has not given sufficient weight to the Peloponnêsian history of the previous century. He regards the union of 281 B.C. as the final result of a series of struggles of the lesser Peloponnêsian peoples to throw off the yoke of Sparta. "De l'ensemble de ces luttes sortira l'union fédérale qui sera le triomphe d'une vieille tradition de haine contre Lacédémone" (p. 55). If this statement goes a little too far, we may still be ready to believe that the "tradition constante d'indépendance et de groupement" in Peloponnêsos, on which M. Dubois justly insists, was a condition in the absence of which the second Achaian League could hardly have come into being. It is conjectured by Mr. Mahaffy (*Greek Life and Thought*, p. 8) that the sudden rise of the Achaians and Ætolians into prominence in Greek politics is to be accounted for by an influx of wealth acquired by them in mercenary service in the wars of Alexander.

P. 194, note 1. It is now generally believed that Margos, not Markos, is the right form of the name of the Founder of the League, and Μάργος appears in modern texts of Polybios. As, however, Mr. Freeman had evidently given the matter his consideration, I have not ventured to change "Markos" in his text, though I have no doubt that Margos is correct.

P. 197. On the constitution of the Achaian League there are two special treatises, Merleker's *Achaicorum libri tres* (1837) and Wahner's *De Achæorum fœderis origine atque institutis* (1857). Mr. Freeman does not refer to them, and probably made no direct use of them, but they are still worth consulting. The most recent exposition of the Achaian constitution is in the work of M. Dubois already quoted.

P. 198. "The greater cities . . . were admitted into a body the relations and duties of whose members were already fixed and well understood."

But it must be remembered that each town which joined the League had to sign a special Federal treaty, and it is highly probable that in lesser details the conditions of membership were sometimes modified. (See Dubois, p. 92.) For an example of a Federal treaty, see below, p. 647.

P. 202. "No independent diplomatic action in the several cities." While Mr. Freeman thinks that the rule was that no state could of itself send ambassadors to foreign powers, but that the Federal Government might sometimes dispense from this rule, M. Dubois (p. 181, 182) holds the rule to have been that each city had perfect liberty to commission ambassadors, but that the League could restrain this liberty in special cases. (Cf. p. 183, "En matière de relations extérieures, l'autonomie de chaque Etat restait intacte, pourvu que l'union ne fût pas compromise.") Pausanias, vii. 9. 4, is not decisive, as it may be interpreted to suit both opinion (see above, p. 204, note 5). M. Dubois supports his view by the circumstance that the Spartan embassy to Rome in which the restored exiles Areos and Alkibiadês took

part, is not censured by Polybios as illegal, but solely on the ground of ingratitude to the League and Philopoimên (Pol. xxiii. 11. 7, 8). There does not seem to be sufficient evidence for deciding the question definitely.

In this connexion it is interesting to observe that each city might have its own proxenoi, independently of the League. See *Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique* iv. p. 98.

P. 205. "The Assembly of the League."

P. 239. "The Senate."

M. Dubois takes a very different view of the Assembly and Senate, and their relation to one another. He has not expounded his view very clearly, but as far as I understand him he holds that

(1) The Assembly or Congress (*σύνοδος*) was composed of four classes: (*a*) the Βουλή; (*b*) the Γερουσία, another "senate," of which we hear and know very little; (*c*) the people, οἱ πολλοί; (*d*) the Federal magistrates.

(2) The influence of these four bodies varied at different periods in the history of the League; but the importance of the Βουλή was the most abiding. In the early years of the League the presence of the Βουλή was what constituted a Congress. Other citizens, not members of the Βουλή, could come if they chose, but as a rule they did not attend, and the Congress practically meant the Βουλή acting in conjunction with the magistrates. So far, the view of M. Dubois is not opposed to that of Mr. Freeman.

(3) The Βουλή was not a body chosen at the Federal Assemblies (consisting, as Merleker held, of magistrates, ex-magistrates, and prominent citizens), but was a regular Chamber of Representatives, chosen from time to time by each state in its local Assembly. The evidence on which M. Dubois chiefly relies for this is apparently Livy xxxiv. 48, where we read of *omnium civitatium legationes in concionis modum circumfusas* at the Congress of Corinth in 194 B.C. (cf. xxxii. 22), combined with the fact that a regular Congress sometimes seems to have consisted altogether of the Βουλή—the presumption being that this could not have happened unless every city was represented in the Βουλή.

(4) Each city sent more than one Representative—how many, or of how many the whole Senate consisted, is unknown. These Representatives were like our Members of Parliament. Although they were chosen by the cities because they were practically pledged to certain lines of policy, they were permitted to exercise their private judgment. They were not mere mouthpieces of the assemblies which appointed them. See Livy xxxii. 22, where the Argive Representatives are divided in opinion (Dymæi ac Megalopolitani et *quidam Argivorum*, priusquam decretum fieret, consurrexerunt ac reliquerunt concilium).

(5) I do not feel quite sure whether M. Dubois holds that the Βουλή had functions outside the Assembly or not; whether it was like the Βουλή at Athens, a body which prepared measures for the Assembly to consider, or whether this was exclusively the business of the Demiurges. He states that the *βουλευτήριον* was the place where the Assembly deliberated, not (as some suppose) a special council chamber of the *βουλευταί* (see above p. 239).

(6) The election of Representatives must have taken place shortly before each meeting of the Assembly. The candidates for the office of Senator probably discussed in the city assemblies the questions which were to come before the Federal Assembly; and it may have sometimes happened that opposite local parties secured the return of members representing their several views, so that the different shades of opinion which existed in a city were reflected in its group of Representatives.

(7) If all the states were represented at the Assembly by delegates, the question arises, what part was played by the citizens present, who were not members of the Βουλή? The presence of such citizens (*οἱ πολλοί, τὸ πλῆθος, ὁ ὄχλος*) at the Congress is constantly mentioned, although it was not invariable. As every citizen of each community had an opportunity of discussing Federal matters and making his opinion felt in the election of Representatives in the assembly of his own city, and as the votes in the Federal Assembly were by cities and not by heads, there might seem to be little reason for an Achaian citizen, who was not a Βουλευτής, to attend the Federal Congress. Nevertheless ordinary citizens did constantly attend the Congress, and, moreover, exercised considerable influence at it, as there is evidence to show. M. Dubois does not present any clear solution of this problem. He seems to think that the chief end of the presence of private citizens, who were neither magistrates nor members of the Βουλή, was to advise their Representatives in case any unexpected business came before the Assembly.

Now it must be admitted that there is no positive evidence whatever for what may be considered the generally received opinion that the Senators were appointed by the Federal Assembly. Mr. Freeman says (p. 240) "we know not the exact nature of its constitution," but alleges (p. 241) "the analogy of other Achaian institutions" as rendering it probable that "the Senators were appointed together with the Magistrates at the ordinary Spring Meeting, and that they were really elected by the Assembly, and not left to the lot, as at Athens." But, on the other hand, the only positive indications which can be found point rather to the Βουλή being composed of groups of Representatives elected by the several cities. It may be shown, I think, that this arrangement would have been reasonable, and that it is *a priori* probable. If the view of M. Dubois is right we have in the Achaian constitution an interesting example of *a Federal Assembly which is both Primary and Representative.*

The Greek idea of an *ἐκκλησία* was an assembly at which every citizen possessing certain qualifications (age, income, etc.) had a right to attend, speak, and vote. The Federal *ἐκκλησία*, accordingly, was a Congress at which every Achaian citizen over thirty years of age was entitled to be present and exercise his opinion. But it could not be expected that all the Achaian citizens of each Federal State, or even that most of them, would attend the meetings of their own accord. Thus each state would naturally have to make some provision that she should be represented at the meetings of the Assembly. As the voting was by cities and not by heads, it mattered little whether two or a hundred Dymaians presented themselves at Aigion, provided that two

knew and represented the views of their fellow-citizens. The Federal Constitution formally secured the representation of each city by the institution of the Βουλή, consisting of a definite number of Representatives, so many from each city. We must suppose that when a new city joined the League, the number of the Βουλή was proportionably increased. Thus even if no private citizens attended the Congress, the Βουλή formed an Assembly which fairly represented the interests and views of each city.

We have no information as to the forms of voting at the Congress; we have only chapter and verse for the main fact that the voting was by cities and not by heads. It is also certain that the non-Senators, when they were present, were able to exercise influence on the results. I venture to suggest the following mode of procedure.

To fix our ideas, let us suppose that each city chose ten Senators. The Senate would then have numbered a hundred members, when the League consisted of the ten Achaian towns. Let us conceive a congress at which no citizen of Dymê, except its ten Representatives, was present. When the votes were taken on the third day of the Congress, the vote of Dymê would be the vote of the majority of its ten Representatives. Let us suppose that the same Congress was attended by ten private citizens from Patrai; then the vote of Patrai would be determined by the voting of the majority of the twenty men from Patrai present—that is, of the ten Representatives and the ten private citizens. It cannot be supposed that the vote of a Representative would count more than that of a private citizen, for such an arrangement would have been inconsistent with the idea of a Primary Assembly.

The frequent presence of private Citizens at the Congresses, notwithstanding this arrangement, which ensured the representation of each city, need not be a matter of surprise. It can be accounted for in this way. It would have been, as a rule, impossible for a minority in any city to secure the return of a sufficient number of members of their own party to determine the Federal vote of their city. As a rule, all the Βουλευταί, or a majority of them, would represent the views of the majority of their fellow-citizens. The natural consequence would be that some of the minority would attend in person at the Federal Assembly in order, if possible, to outvote the Representatives. And this would necessarily force the majority, on their part, to attend Congress also, in order to support their Representatives and frustrate their political opponents.

That the Senate had functions outside the Assembly (both in Achaia and Ætolia) there can, I think, be no doubt. It seems hardly possible that a number of men who had no obligation or right to deliberate as a separate body should have been called a Βουλή.

M. Dubois has neglected to point out what seems to me a strong confirmation of his general view. Though we have no positive proof of the representative character of the Achaian Senate, we have distinct evidence for the representative character of the Ætolian Senate (see below, note to p. 262). This fact, taken in connection with the general analogy which exists between Greek Federal constitutions, prepares us to find a similar device in Achaia.

P. 205, note 1. "The formal title of the body, as usual, is *τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν*."

This statement was criticized by Mr. H. J. Smith in his notice of *Federal Government* in the *Edinburgh Review*. Bishop Thirlwall wrote as follows in reply to a question of Mr. Freeman: "It seems to me that there are not sufficient data to determine whether *ἀγορά* or *τὸ κοινόν* or some other word was the proper 'formal' or 'constitutional' title of the Achaean General Assembly, or perhaps even whether there was any such title; but I agree with Mr. Smith that *ἀγορά* would be—if not *the*—*a* proper name for the thing, whereas *τὸ κοινόν* would be properly the commonwealth, and could only have been applied to the Assembly in a secondary sense as the commonwealth by representation. For of course, though the Assembly was primary, as not elective, it could only represent the whole body of the nation."

It may be observed that in Polybios the terms *σύγκλητος*, *ἐκκλησία* and *ἀγορά* generally designate the Congress (though not always, as *e.g.* *ἀγορά* xxix. 9. 5). The precise term for a regular annual Congress was *καθήκουσα σύνοδος*.

P. 211. For the cases when the election of a President devolves upon the House of Representatives, see Mr. Bryce, *American Commonwealth*, i. 58.

Pp. 212, 213. "The admission of new towns."

The act by which the city of Orchomenos was annexed to the Achaian League (for date see below, note to p. 386) came to light since Mr. Freeman wrote, and was published by M. Foucart in the *Revue Archéologique* (new series, xxxii. p. 96) in 1876. The inscription is mutilated, but most of it can be restored satisfactorily. The importance of the document is so great for the constitutional history of the Achaian League that I subjoin the text (after Hoffmann, in Collitz's *Sammlung*, ii. 2, 148). The beginning, in which the Orchomenians were admitted as Achaian citizens, and doubtless empowered to confer Achaian citizenship on individuals, and bound to keep the laws of the League, has unluckily been lost. The first clause of the extant part provides that if any one propose anything dangerous to the union, or if any magistrate summon the people to vote on such a proposal, he shall pay a fine of thirty talents, which shall be consecrated to the Hamarian Zeus, the special god of the League. An oath was taken on both sides, Orchomenos being represented by its local magistrates, and the League by the General, the Hipparch, the Navarch, and, if M. Foucart's supplement be right, "the *σύνεδροι* of the Achaians," which is supposed to mean all the Representatives or members of the *Βουλή*. If this be so, it is highly interesting; but I cannot regard the restoration as "perfectly certain," with M. Dubois. One would like to think that Representatives of all the cities solemnly assembled to receive the new member into their federation.

In order to secure the fidelity of Orchomenos, a number of Achaian Klêruchoi were settled there, and had houses and lands assigned to them. This policy seems to have been often adopted where the entry of a new city into the League was compulsory rather than voluntary. It was adopted by Aratos after his first occupation of Mantineia.

The text of the act (as restored by Hoffmann) is as follows :—

ραιν
. . . . μον πέμπ[η]ι εἴτε ἄρχω[ν . . . .
. . . . ιέοι εἴτε [ἰ]διώτας ψαφοφορέοι . . . .
ὀφλέτω] τριάκοντ[α τά]λαντα ἱερὰ τοῦ Διὸ[ς τοῦ Ἀμαρίου καὶ ἐξέστω τῶι βουλομένωι αὐ-
τῶι δίκαν θ]ανάτου εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τ[ῶν Ἀχαιῶν . . . . . .
ὀμνυόντων τὸν
ὅρκον τὸν αὐ]τὸν οἱ Ὀρχομένιοι καὶ οἱ Ἀχαιοί, ἐμ μ[ὲν Αἰγίωι οἱ σύνεδροι τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ ὁ στρατ]αγὸς καὶ ἵππαρχος καὶ ναύαρχος ἐν δ[ὲ Ὀρχομένωι οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν Ὀρ-
χομενίων.] ὀ[μ]νύω Δία Ἀμάριον, Ἀθάναν Ἀμαρίαν, Ἀφ[ροδ]ί[ταν καὶ τοὺ]ς θ[εοὺς πάντας
ἥμαν ἐμ] πᾶσιν ἐμμε[ν]εῖν ἐν ταῖ στάλαι καὶ ταῖ ὁμολογίαι καὶ τῶι ψαφίσματ[ι τῶι γενο
μένωι τῶι κοι]ν[ωι] τῶι τ[ῶ]ν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ εἴ τίς κα μὴ ἐμμένηι [τοὐκ ἐπιτρέψω εἰς δύναμ[ιν
καὶ εὐορκέ]οντι μέν μοι εἴη τἀγαθὰ ἐπιορκέοντι δὲ τἀναντία. τῶν δὲ λαβόντων ἐν Ὀρ[χο
μενίοις ἢ] κλᾶρ[ο]ν ἢ οἰκίαν ἀφ' οὗ Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγένοντο μὴ ἐξέστω μηθενὶ ἀπαλλοτριῶ
σαι ἐντὸς ἐτ]έων εἴ[κ]οσι. Εἰ δέ τι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθε χρόνων ἢ οἱ Ὀρχομένιοι Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγέ-
νοντο .... ] Νε[ά]ρ[χωι] ἔγκλημα γέγονεν ἢ τοῖς υἱοῖς, ὑπότομα εἶμεν πάντα καὶ μ
ὴ δικαζέσ]θω μή[τε] Νεάρχωι μηθεὶς περὶ τῶμ πρότερον ἐγκλημάτων ἢ οἱ Ὀρχομένιοι Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγ
ένοντο καὶ] ὅ[στις δικάζοιτο ὀφλέτω χιλίας δράχμας καὶ ἃ δίκα ἀτέλης ἔστω . Περ
ὶ δὲ τᾶς τραπέζ]ας τᾶς χρυσέ[α]ς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὁπλοσμίου ἃγ καταθέντες ἐνέχυρα οἱ Μεθυ
δριεῖς οἱ μεταστή]σαντες ε[ἰ]ς Ὀρχόμενον διείλοντο τὸ ἀργύριον καί τινες αὐτῶν ἀπέ
φασαν ἀποδιδόναι ἐ]αμ μὴ ἀποδίδωντι τὸ ἀργυριον τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις καθὼς ε
ἰκὸς ποτὶ τὰμ πό]λιν τὰν Ὀρχομενίων ὑποδίκους εἶμεν τοὺς μὴ ποιοῦντας τὰ δίκαια.

Some other decrees of the Achaian League and its cities have been discovered (unfortunately all in a fragmentary state), and published by J. Martha in the *Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique*, vol. ii. (1878). They will be found in Collitz, *Sammlung der gr. Dial.-Inschriften*, ii. 2, *Die Inschriften Achaia's*, edited by O. Hoffmann. In one of these the Achaian citizenship is granted on certain conditions. In another sentence of death is pronounced by an Achaian town. From these decrees we derive the names of various local magistrates : *θεόκολος*, *προστάτας*, *βούλαρχος*, *γραμματιστάς*, *δαμοσιοφύλακες*. The existence of *polemarchs* we already knew from Polybios, at least for Kynaitha (iv. 18), and of *stratêgoi* from Plutarch, for Argos (Arat. 44).

An inscription in Megarian dialect found at Epidauros (Collitz, *Sammlung, etc.* iii. 1, *Die Megarischen Inschr.*, edited by Bechtel, p. 16, No. 3025) records a decision of the Megarians, who were asked by the League to mediate in a territorial dispute between two of its States, Epidauros and Corinth. As

Corinth belonged to the League between 243 and 223 B.C., the date of the document is limited to twenty years. The General in office is named: ἐπὶ στραταγοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν Αἰγιαλεῦς (l. 1). We hear nowhere else of Aigialeôs, but as we know who the Generals were from 234 to 223 (although the exact distribution over these years is not quite certain; see p. 468 *sqq.*), the date is limited further to the eight years, 243-235. Of these 243 and 241 are excluded, as Aratos was General in these years.

P. 214. "The Assembly met of right twice yearly, in Spring and Autumn."

The time of the Spring Assembly was the rising of the Pleiades, and it has been shown that this was 11th May. Thus we get 11th November, or thereabouts, for the Autumn Assembly. These dates permitted the Achaian farmers to discharge their political duties without sacrificing their private interests. The May Assembly was just before the beginning of harvest; the November Congress followed the autumn sowing.

P. 214 and p. 231 (cf. p. 426). In Polybios, v. 1, the ἄρχοντες, whom Philip got to summon the Ekklêsia, are not the δαμιοργοί alone, but rather the δαμιοργοί and the Ministers; cf. Pol. xxiii. 5, where Flamininus writes τῷ στρατηγῷ καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, bidding them call an Assembly. (See Vischer, p. 572, and cf. Mr. Strachan-Davidson's *Prolegomena* to his *Selections from Polybius*, p. 46.)

P. 218. "In America the Ministers of the President are strictly excluded from seats in Congress." That is, they cannot vote in Congress; but they have the right of attending and speaking in both Houses. Mr. Bryce points out that the exclusion of the Ministers tends to weaken the legislative efficiency of Congress. The American Ministers, it must be observed, are not really a government, but rather "a group of heads of departments" (Bryce, i. 123).

P. 219. "Under-General." M. Dubois supposes that there was not a single Ὑποστράτηγος but a number of ὑποστράτηγοι, who were appointed by the League to organize the military contingents of the several cities—possibly the same as the οἱ κατὰ μέρος ἡγεμόνες mentioned by Polybios. I cannot see the evidence.

Besides the officers mentioned on p. 219 there were also Ἀποτέλειοι (mentioned once by Polybios, x. 23. 9), who assisted in the military organization; and there was the *navarch* or admiral of the fleet—a permanent office.

P. 219, note 2, line 13. *Erratum.—Read* a Magistrate of Patrai (*for* a Magistrate at Pharai).

Ib. (cf. p. 429, note 6). Bishop Thirlwall, writing to Mr. Freeman in reference to this difficult expression, will only commit himself so far as to state his opinion that there must have been something special in the case, and that the συντέλεια, of which Lykos was ὑποστράτηγος, was "some partial union."

It may be remarked that Mr. Freeman's conjecture of a proper adjective would require Πατραικῆς (and so Vischer).

M. Dubois (p. 166) observes that if the text is correct the words διὰ τὸ might possibly be explained by supposing that there was some strange law,

that if the stratêgos were obliged to leave the army he should consign the command to the hypostratêgos, on whose territory he happened to be. This passage seems to be the sole prop of his theory of a number of ὑποστράτηγοι.

P. 220. There is no doubt that, as Mr. Freeman has shown, in opposition to Thirlwall and Schorn (and Merleker), all Achaian citizens, to whatever city they belonged, were eligible as Ministers, although the number of the Ministers was a survival from the time when the League consisted of the Ten Achaian towns. But it is very tantalizing that there is absolutely no evidence, direct or indirect, bearing on the mode in which the Ministers were elected. It is impossible to suppose that they were nominated by the stratêgos, and it is difficult to imagine how they could be elected by the Assembly without causing jealousies among the cities. In Polybios, xxiii. 10, three of the Ministers are Megalopolitans.

P. 220, note 1. οἱ προεστῶτες is used in different senses in Polybios. In iv. 9. 3 it means the Damiorgoi, in ii. 46. 4 the βουλευταί. This is natural enough, for both Magistrates and Senators belonged to the same class of leading men, and προεστῶτες was not an official term.

P. 221, note 1. *Damiurgis civitatium, qui summus est magistratus* (Livy xxxviii. 30). This looks like local Magistrates. But Livy is certainly referring to Federal Magistrates, and M. Dubois has acutely proposed to punctuate *Damiurgis, civitatium qui summus est magistratus.* This gives the sense required: *civitatium* being the cities collectively, that is, the League.

There were, however, also local damiurgi, cf. p. 220, note 1. We find them in Arkadian towns, for example at Tegea. See *Bull. de Corr. hell.* vii. 492 and xiii. 287.

P. 229. "There is distinct evidence that some important public officers were not paid." I cannot think that the passages (notes 2 and 3) in which Mr. Freeman finds this evidence are decisive. Archon may have spent a large sum from his private means in addition to the pay of his office. Modern instances could be cited. Pol. xxiii. 7 certainly does not prove that the Senators were not paid. (Cf. Dubois, p. 149.)

P. 230. "No property qualification." It is conceivable, however, that only those who possessed property, however small, received the Achaian (Federal) citizenship. This is the opinion of Wahner, but it cannot be proved. Polybios, v. 93. 6, does not help us.

P. 231. It is hard to feel quite certain that "the formal presidency of the Assembly" was vested in the ministers, as Mr. Freeman thinks. M. Dubois has no hesitation in ruling that the General presided at the debates (pp. 153, 154).

P. 231, note 4. οἱ τῆς γερουσίας, Pol. xxxviii. 5. This is the only distinct mention of the Γερουσία. Drumann identified it with the Βουλή. Merleker and Wahner supposed it to be a distinct administrative council, somewhat like the Ætolian Apoklêtoi. If so, it is strange indeed that we do not hear of it again, except perhaps in Pausanias vii. 12. 7, where the γέροντες ask Diaios

a question. The truth is, we have not sufficient data to justify us in identifying the Gerusia either with the Magistrates or with any other known body.

P. 240. The passage of Polybios (xxiii. 7. 8), which Mr. Freeman adduces to prove that the Senate "consisted of one hundred and twenty unpaid members," does not prove so much (as was pointed out by Vischer, p. 573. 4). It is there related (see p. 508) that Eumenês offered the Achaians a hundred and twenty talents to pay the Senators at the times of Assembly, but it is not stated that each Senator was to receive a talent; so no deduction as to the number of Senators can be made. Nor, strictly speaking, can it be inferred that the Senators were unpaid. Vischer, however, agrees with Mr. Freeman in thinking so, as against Hermann and Schömann.

P. 241. "Financial policy of the League."

Two interesting points have come out through inscriptions published since the original edition of *Federal Government* appeared. (1) The Central Government could exercise a control over the finances of the Cities, in order to secure its own interests. This appears in the act admitting Orchomenos as a member, where it is expressly provided that Orchomenos shall pay a sum of money for the Methydrians, whose cause they had supported. Another case of interference in a financial affair will be found in Polybios xxv. 8. (2) The League could impose a fine on any of its members. A fine was imposed on the Lacedæmonians for offences against the Megalopolitans. See inscription published in the *Archaeologische Zeitung*, 1879, p. 127, περὶ τᾶς ζαμίας δι ἐζαμί[ωσαν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ τὸν δᾶμον τὸν Λακε]δαιμονίων. From the same document it appears that when disputes between Achaian towns were decided by outsiders, the arbitration was invited not by the towns concerned, but by the League.

P. 245, note 2. See the contrast drawn by Mr. Bryce (*American Commonwealth*, ii. 149) between the President and State Governor.

P. 254. In 426 B.C. the Ætolians were not hindered by Dêmosthenês from seizing Molykria, although he saved Naupaktos. The occupation of Molykria, situated at the narrowest point of the Gulf of Corinth, was important because it gave them a vantage-point for plundering Peloponnêsos.

P. 256. It is clear that Mr. Freeman regarded the Ætolian League as existing before the death of Alexander, and probably even at the beginning of his reign. He did not accept as certain the inference of Schorn from the passage of Arrian quoted in note 1. It is very strange to find M. Dubois ascribing to him exactly the opposite opinion. "Schorn et M. Freeman ont vu dans le texte d'Arrien une preuve établissant que l'Etolie était encore, à cette époque, un groupe de peuples indépendants les uns des autres." M. Dubois himself holds, and I think rightly, that the old League had not ceased to exist.

P. 257. "Share of the Ætolians in the Gaulish War.'

Interesting testimony to the part played by the Ætolians on this occasion

is furnished by recently discovered decrees, in which other Greek states express their gratitude to the Preservers of Delphi. The Ætolians founded a feast, called *Sôtêria*, at Delphi in commemoration of the deliverance, and asked the Greek States to recognize it. We have the favourable replies of Athens and Chios. The Athenian decree will be found in the *Corpus Inscr. Att.* ii. 323, that of Chios in the *Bull. de Correspondance hellénique*, v. p. 305 *sqq.*

The influence won by the Ætolians at Delphi is amply attested by the inscriptions found there, and appreciated in M. Foucart's monograph, *Mémoire sur les ruines et l'histoire de Delphes.* See above, note to p. 112.

The Ætolians often deposited at Delphi copies of their decrees.

P. 260, note 3. "Seemingly even at Naupaktos." M. Dubois interprets the statement of Livy, on which this is founded, as follows: "Après les désastres de la guerre contre Macédoine et le sac de l'ancienne capitale, le siège de l'assemblée annuelle semble avoir été transporté pour quelque temps à Naupacte." Extraordinary assemblies were held at such places as Lamia, Hêrakleia, and Hypata.

P. 261. "Powers of the Assembly." We possess in an incomplete form a decree of the Ætolian Assembly, in reply to a letter of Vaxos in Crete. The Vaxians wrote in favour of a citizen of their own who was residing at Amphissa, asking the Assembly to make him an Ætolian citizen. (The inscription was published in 1882 in the *Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique*, vol. vi.) The Vaxian letter begins:

'Οαξίων οἱ κόσμοι καὶ ἁ πόλις Αἰτωλῶ[ν σὺνέδροις] καὶ τῶι στραταγῶι καὶ τῶι ἱππάρχαι χαίρειν.

It is interesting to observe that the Captain of Horse is specially named in the greeting.

P. 262. "The body called the Apoklêtoi seem to have been the Senate." The "council" of the Apoklêtoi must, I think, be distinguished from the Senate. The Apoklêtoi were the Federal executive, and the General was the president of this body, which fulfilled somewhat the same functions as the Achaian Dêmiourgoi. The difference is that there were only ten Dêmiourgoi, but over thirty Apoklêtoi. Mr. Freeman is certainly right in the view that the Synedroi did not correspond to the Dêmiourgoi. M. Dubois puts forward the view that they were the Bouleutai, and that the magistrates (that is, the Apoklêtoi) were designated as προστάται τοῦ συνεδρίου.

The Assembly then would have consisted of (1) the Senators, sometimes called σύνεδροι, (2) the Ætolian citizens, who chose to attend, (3) the executive council composed of the General, the Hipparch, the Secretary (γραμματεύς), and the Apoklêtoi.

We can say definitely in the case of the Ætolian League what could only be put forward tentatively in the case of the Achaian, that the Senate consisted of Representatives chosen by the States. The evidence for this is found in an inscription which was unknown to Mr. Freeman: a decree of

the Ætolians ordaining that two towns, Melitaia (now Ἀβαρίτζα) and Pêrea, which had previously formed one State, should be separated and form two States. The representation in the Senate is provided for as follows: (l. 17) *εἰ δέ κα ἀποπολιτεύωντι Ηηρεῖς ἀπὸ Με[λι]ταέων περὶ μὲν τᾶς χώρας ὅροις χρήσθων τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἔχοντες ἀποπορευέσθων βουλευτὰν ἕνα καὶ τὰ δάνεια συναποτινόντω ὅσα κα ἁ πόλις ὀφείλῃ, κατὰ τὸ ἐπίβαλλον μέρος [τ]οῦ βουλευτᾶ, καὶ ἐμφερόντω τὰ ἐν τοὺς Αἰτωλοὺς γινόμενα κατὰ τὸν βουλευτάν.* (I take the text from Fick's edition of the Ætolian Inscriptions in vol. ii. part i. of Collitz, *Sammlung der gr. Dialekt-Inschriften*, p. 22.) The inscription belongs to the end of the third century. We learn from it that the Secretary was the eponymous officer of the Assembly. The witnesses of the act are (l. 34) *τὸ συνέδριον Α[ἰτωλ]ῶν τὸ ἐπὶ γραμματέος Λύκου καὶ οἱ προσστάται τοῦ συνεδρίου κ.τ.λ.*

P. 263, note 3. The improved reading of the sentence quoted from the Keian decree is as follows (Fick, *op. cit.* p. 18):

*εἰ δέ τίς κα ἄγει τοὺς κείους τὸν στραταγὸν ἀεὶ τὸν ἐνάρχοντα τὰ ἐν Αἰτωλίαν καταγόμενα [ἀναπράσσ]οντα κύριον εἶμεν κ.τ.λ.*

In the Têian decree Fick reads (p. 19): *τὰ μὲν ἐμφανῆ ἀναπράσσειν τὸν σ[τρ]ατα[γὸν] καὶ τοὺς συνέδρους ἀεὶ τοὺς ἐνάρχους.*

Ib. note 4. Omit ἁ before *ἀνιέρωσις* and *ἀσυλία*, and read *ἐν τοὺς νόμους.*

P. 264. A. Mommsen has shown (*Philologus* xxiv) by a careful examination of Delphic inscriptions that the strategic year of the Ætolians began—that is, the General came into office—in the Delphic month Boathoos, which the Ætolians therefore called *προκύκλιος*, the month beginning the cycle of office. It corresponds partly to our September.

P. 268, line 10. "Delphi must have been seized in some way or other." See above, note to p. 257. An Ætolian decree found at Delphi (published in 1881 in the *Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique*, vol. v.) enacts that none of the Delphians shall be exempt from the money requisition unless such immunity be granted by the city of Delphi. See Dittenberger, *Sylloge* 325, and Fick in Collitz, *Sammlung der gr. Dial.-Inschr.* ii. 1. 18.

*στραταγέοντος Τιμαίου ἔδοξε τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς· μηθένα τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς συνοίκων ἀτελέα εἶμεν, εἴ κα μὴ δοθῆι παρὰ τᾶς πόλιος τῶν Δελφῶν ἀτέλεια κ.τ.λ.*

If this Timaios be the same as he who is mentioned in a Messênian inscription (see below, note to p. 342), the date of this decree would be roughly determined between 240 and 220 B.C.

P. 268, line 20, "Teôs"; line 31, Teôs; and p. 270, line 5, "The Têian ally." It is doubtful whether Teôs was ever really a member of the Ætolian League, with right of voting in the Assembly at Thermon. The inscription (*C. I. G.* 3046) on which Mr. Freeman relies (cp. p. 263) only proves that Teôs had a special treaty with the Ætolians, securing to her immunity from depredation by pirates (*ἀσυλία*) and compensation in case of such depredation.

P. 290. "The habit of looking to Ptolemy." M. Dubois (p. 60) urges in defence of Aratos that the Achaians had really no other resource, and reminds us that the Egyptian navy was very powerful in the Ægean at

this time. Cp. Homolle in the *Bulletin de Correspondance hellénique* vi. 161.

P. 292. "It was more likely at this time [245-244 B.C.] than at any other that the Ætolian League made its famous agreement with Antigonos for the partition of the Achaian territory."

This agreement seems to have also included a partition of the Ionian possessions of the Ptolemies. We learn of the activity of the Ætolians in those regions from chance notices of Polyænus and Frontinus. The Greek writer mentions that the Ætolian Timarchus disembarked in a populous part of Asia, and burned his ships to make his soldiers fight; he was completely successful (*Strat.* v. 25). In Bk. iii. (2) of the *Strategemata* of Frontinus, the stratagem by which Timarchus obtained possession of Samos is related. These distant enterprises, as M. Dubois remarks (p. 32), showed that Ætolians possessed a considerable marine power. He thinks that the extant treaties with Keos and Teôs must be placed between 240 and 220 B.C., and suggests that Lysimacheia and Chalkêdôn were annexed about 240.

P. 318. Among the effects of the acquisition of Megalopolis must also be reckoned the decided adoption by the League of the Megalopolitan tradition of hostility to Sparta. See Dubois, p. 63: "dans la politique d'Aratus et de ses successeurs Philopœmen, Lycortas, Polybe, l'antagonisme contre la Laconie devint un fait constant." This new policy was started through the influence of Lydiadas (above, p. 319). M. Dubois tries to show that as a consequence of this the policy of the League becomes exclusively Peloponnêsian, and the Achaians cease to dispute with the Ætolians the Gulf of Corinth.

P. 334. "The League was now the greatest power of Greece." M. Dubois, who has taken the Ætolians under his special protection, demurs to this, and suggests that the northern League was stronger. He seems also to think that the Achaians were not stronger now than Macedonia or Sparta. It seems to me that at this time the four powers were pretty equally balanced.

P. 342. In illustration of the influence possessed by the Ætolians at this time in the Peloponnêsos, I may refer to a decree of the Messênians accepting the terms of an agreement proposed by the Ætolians to regulate the frontiers of Messênê and Phigaleia, and other relations between the two cities. The inscription will be found in Le Bas et Foucart, *Inscriptions du Peloponnèse* No. 328[a].

P. 359 (line 4 from foot "To Plutarch;" cp. p. 361, note 1). M. Dubois (p. 65) warns us against trusting too much to Plutarch, who would have us believe that the revolution of Kleomenês was merely a return to the laws of Lycurgus and "ancient virtue;" and would explain the policy of Aratos by the disgust which the Lacedæmonian cloak and black bread inspired in a wealthy citizen of Sikyôn. "C'est là un pur roman philosophique." We must certainly always remember that the narrative of Plutarch is strongly biassed by the influence of Phylarchos (although he used Aratos' Memoirs as well).

As for Phylarchos, a decree of the Arkadian League has been discovered in honour "of Phylarchos, son of Lysikratês the Athenian," enacting that he shall be "the proxenos and benefactor of all the Arkadians." M. Foucart (who published it in the Mémoires of the *Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres*, vol. viii.) supposes the Phylarchos of this decree to be identical with Phylarchos the historian and enemy of Aratos. He thinks that there was a strong Lakônian party in Arkadia, and that this decree was a manifesto against Aratos and in favour of Kleomenês. M. Dubois has shown the uncertainty of the combination (p. 65). The inscription will be found in Collitz, *Sammlung* etc., i. p. 339, No. 1181, or Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, No. 167.

P. 372. "Kleomenês wins the Argolic cities."

A very mutilated inscription of Troizên, in which τὸ κοινὸν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν is mentioned, is supposed to date from shortly before this event. *Bull. de Corr. hell.* (1886) p. 136 *sqq.*

P. 385. The statement that the Argives received Mantineia from Antigonos and founded the colony Antigoneia depends on the reading in Plutarch's Aratos, 45 (cited in the note), τῶν γὰρ Ἀργείων. But E. Curtius reads Ἀχαιῶν, which is adopted in the text of Sintenis.

P. 386, line 10. "It [Orchomenos] had never belonged to the League."

It seems to me (cp. Dittenberger in *Hermes* xviii. 178 *sqq.*) that the words of Polybios, iv. 6. 5 [ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίγονος] Ὀρχομενὸν κατὰ κράτος ἑλὼν οὐκ ἀποκατέστησε τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀλλὰ σφετερισάμενος κατεῖχε imply that Orchomenos did belong to the Achaian League before; and this is confirmed by the expression of Livy when he tells how in 199 B.C. Philip sent envoys *qui redderent Achæis Orchomenon* (xxxii. 5).

If so, Orchomenos was twice admitted into the Achaian League: (1) before 222 B.C. and (2) in or after 199 B.C.; see above, p. 478. The question arises, to which occasion are we to refer the act of union, of which I have printed the text in note to p. 212. Dittenberger decides for the first, and suggests the year 234-233 B.C. as the date. Foucart, who first published the inscription, had only taken into account the second possibility.

P. 393. M. Dubois defends Philopoimên's withdrawal to Crete. "Les guerres qu'il fit en Crète à la tête d'une troupe de mercenaires ne furent sans doute pas si inutiles à sa patrie qu'on l'a dit souvent. Nous verrons plus tard que les tyrans de Sparte recrutèrent souvent des soldats et des marins dans cette île: Philopœmen servait peut-être très efficacement les intérêts de la ligue en lui gagnant des partisans crétois." For connexion of Crete and continental Greece, cp. Polybios, iv. 55.

P. 395. For Phigaleia and the Ætolian League, cp. above, p. 653, my note to p. 342.

P. 443, note 1. But "bellumque cum quibus *regi* placeret," (that is, the enemies of King Philip were to be the enemies of the League) is the right reading, which now appears in all good texts. The text must be modified

accordingly. The words "to wage war with what kings they pleased" should be "to wage war with whatsoever states Philip pleased."

P. 446, note 3. Bishop Thirlwall, in a letter already referred to, says a word for Livy. "I think it possible that, though he had known and remembered all about the two Aratuses, he might still, in order to enhance the enormity of Philip's conduct, have indulged in the slight rhetorical exaggeration of calling the injured husband 'the foremost man of all the Achaeans' (*princeps*, as you well remark in your note, p. 336 [262], having nothing to do with official dignity); and in a matter which concerned the honour of the family, the father and the son might be not very improperly treated as one."

P. 458, note 2. In the letter already quoted Bishop Thirlwall suggests that what looks in this passage of Livy like a blunder "may be nothing more than looseness of expression in a case which did not call for greater exactness." Although "one could not even compare Livy's expression to that of one who should say that the Danes were angry with the Holsteiners because they would not make common cause with the rest of Denmark," yet "considering the time *at* and *for* which Livy wrote, I should not think it very unnatural, if, although aware of the real state of the case, he here used *Achœis* in the sense in which it was most familiar to his readers, as equivalent to Peloponnesus."

P. 470. "The question reduces itself to this. Was Plutarch more likely to go wrong, etc.?"

But it must be remembered that Mr. Freeman's conjectural solution assumes not only that Plutarch went wrong in mistaking an official year of the younger Aratos for a year of his father's (which he might easily have done), but also that a mistake has crept into Plutarch's text, δωδέκατον having taken the place of δέκατον in *Aratos* 35. Remembering Mr. Freeman's strong protest against "text-tinkering" in the preface to vol. iii. of his *History of Sicily*, I doubt whether he would have, in later years, considered his solution an admissible one.

P. 484. "New Federations." On the Federation of the Magnêtes much light has been recently thrown by inscriptions. (See P. Monceaux in the *Revue archéologique* (1888) xii. 301; P. Wolters in *Mittheilungen des deutschen Inst. in Athen* (1889) xiv. 51 and (1890) xv. 283; G. Fougères in *Bulletin de corr. hell.* xiii. 271.)

The President was the στρατηγός (=*princeps magistratuum*, Livy xxxv. 31). He was assisted by a συναρχία of Ten, also termed στρατηγοί, who were elected annually. There were also a Hipparch and a Navarch; a ταμίας (Secretary of Finance); and a board of civil magistrates, νομοφύλακες. The legislative council, who have a special secretary (γραμματεύς), are always called οἱ σύμβουλοι; and the decrees which they propose are afterwards put to the Assembly in which the legislative power resides. Thus the decrees always describe the proceedings in the meeting of the Synedroi, and conclude

with the formula ἔδοξεν καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ. Dêmêtrias was the seat of the Federal Government, and Zeus Akraios the chief divinity of the League.

P. 495. "The League gave up all claim to the cities which had been taken from it during the war."

Not only those which had been taken, but also those which voluntarily entered into friendship with Rome (φιλίαν ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς Ῥωμαίους, Polybios, xxii. 13. 4 and 15. 13). Which were these? M. Dubois thinks they were "les cités comprises dans la proclamation de liberté de Corinthe et plus particulièrement les cités thessaliennes reformant un κοινόν auquel on avait ajouté l'Achaïe Phthiotide" (p. 43).

P. 539. Diaios, as Mr. Strachan-Davidson remarks, can hardly have gone on the embassy until his term of Presidency had expired (in August).

P. 541. Mr. Freeman's view that this meeting in 147 B.C., on the occasion of the embassy of Aurelius, was not a Federal Assembly, is questioned by Mr. Strachan-Davidson (*Proleg.* to *Select. from Polybius*, p. 43). "I think that the words of Pausanias (vii. 14. 1 τούς τε ἐν ἑκάστῃ πόλει τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἔχοντας τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ Δίαιον ἐκάλει παρ' αὐτόν) cannot be pressed so far, and what he says in the next section—ταῦτα Ὀρέστου λέγοντος οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν Ἀχαιῶν οὐδὲ τὸν πάντα ὑπομείναντες ἀκοῦσαι λόγον ἔθεον ἐς τὸ ἐκτὸς τῆς οἰκίας καὶ ἐκάλουν Ἀχαιοὺς ἐς ἐκκλησίαν—seems to point rather to one of the regular half-yearly meetings of the Senate and Assembly of the League. The local magistrates in the various cities may very likely have been *ex officio* members of the Senate (Βουλή)."

P. 548. Mr. Freeman is hardly right in supposing that this was an extraordinary Assembly. It must have been the regular Autumn Assembly at which Diaios was regularly elected President; and what it proves is that the Autumn Assembly was not as late as November. Diaios held office after the death of Kritolaos for the remainder of Kritolaos' year of Presidency, but was also elected on his own account for the following year. See Mr. Strachan-Davidson, *Proleg.* to *Selections from Polybius*, p. 42, who points out that "everything falls into order if we assume that a new arrangement came into force after the war with Perseus, so that the assemblies were now held in February and in August, and the elections (followed immediately by entry on office) at the August Meeting."

That the President was always elected at a stated Meeting seems almost certain.

P. 552. As to the date of the nominal restoration of the League by the Romans, see Hertzberg, *Gesch. Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Römer*, i. 301 (note 21[a]).

P. 568. It is to be observed that the technical phrase for the Latin group of peoples was *nomen Latinum*; whereas *populus* was always used of the single town. Cf. *C. I. L.*, x. 797, sacra principia p. R. Quirit. nominisque Latini quai apud Laurentis coluntur. See Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, iii. 609.

P. 569, note 4. For the *Feriæ Latinæ* see also Diônysios, vi. 95.—For political meetings—the *concilium*—cf. also Diônysios, v. 50, Livy, i. 50.

P. 568, note 5. The Dictator was the Alban king, and existed until the fall of Alba, after which the presidency of the League was vested in the two prætors, mentioned in this note. Cp. also Diônysios, v. 61.

P. 571, note 1. These articles were afterwards published in *Historical Essays*, first series.

P. 572. Dissolution of the Latin League. Cf. also Cincius quoted by Festus, *s.v.* prætor.

P. 573. We must distinguish between two different kinds of Latin citizenship; the better kind which was possessed by the *prisci Latini*, that is, by all Latin towns before 268 B.C., and the inferior kind which was granted to the Twelve Colonies, of which the first, Ariminum, was "deduced" in that year. The former kind, never bestowed after 268 B.C., may be distinguished as that of the *prisci Latini*; the latter, as that of the *Latini coloniarii* (cf. Gaius, 1. 22) or the *Jus* of Ariminum. The exact difference between these two forms of *Jus Latinum* has not been recorded. The first form vanished for ever after the Social War, as all the communities which possessed it received full Roman citizenship. Under the Empire there are no Latin communities except in the provinces, and the *Jus Latinum* conferred on provincial towns, whether in Republican or Imperial times, is always the *Jus* of Ariminum.

P. 577, note 1. This article was afterwards published in *Historical Essays*, second series. Cf. p. 590, notes 1 and 2.

P. 593, note 1. The phrases in the Chronicle of Farfa (Muratori, *S.R.I.* ii. b.) are, col. 416, Guido Imperator constituitur; col. 460, Berengarius Imperator Augustus.

P. 594, line 4 from foot, *for* "levied" *read* "waged."

P. 595, note 1, "at Milan" should be strictly "at Monza and at Milan." Conrad was crowned and anointed at Monza by the Milanese and then crowned again at Milan.

P. 613, line 3 from top, *for* "suzerainty" *read* "suzerain."

P. 617, note 2. Afterwards published in *Historical Essays*, first series.

P. 618, note 2. Mr. Freeman's MS. has "at Milan for Italy." I believe that this was a mere slip, and have ventured to substitute *Monza* for *Milan*. Coronations sometimes took place at Milan, but usually at Monza; and in the lines which he quotes from Godfrey there is no mention of Mediolanum, only of Modoetia. So too on p. 599 (l. 6 from top) I have inserted the name of Monza. In earlier times Pavia was the place of coronation for Italy. See Bryce, *Holy Roman Empire* (ed. 7) p. 193.

P. 624, note 2. See note to p. 571, note 1.

P. 625, line 4 from top, *for* "Marzfeld" *read* "Märzfeld."

P. 626, notes, line 8 from foot. "Willehelmus cognomento Bostar Rex Anglorum." *Bostz* · of course means the Bastard; it is a curious corruption. The passage of Lambert will be found in Pertz, v. p. 216.

# INDEX


AACHEN, seat of Imperial Government, 593
crowning place of the Kings of Germany, 618 *note*
Abantidas, his Tyranny at Sikyôn, 280
assassinated, 281
Abia, independent member of Achaian League, 507
Acerbus Morena, 596 *note*, 598 *note*
Achaian Assembly, its democratic constitution, 205, 209, 210
contrast with the Athenian, 206
aristocratic elements in, 206, 207, 209
not oligarchic, 209
voting in, 211
evils of the system, 212
short and unfrequent meetings of, 214
restriction of its power, 215
places of meeting, *ib.*
its relations with the Government, 217
as to power of summoning, 232
military contingents ordered by, 242
passes vote of censure on Aratos, 352
Megalopolitan embassy to, 363
account of debate at Sikyôn, 479
yearly meetings moved from Aigion, 508
Achaian General, answers to President, 219, 223
his relations to the Ministers, 221, 231
number reduced to one, 223, 245, 277
his powers, 224, 226, 228, 231, 304
compared with a Prime Minister, 224, 226, 227
with the American President, 227, 246
his unrestrained power in war, 233
Achaian General, as to the union of military and civil powers in, 233-235
his badge of office, 234
incapable of *immediate* re-election, 237
no kingly powers, 245
Achaian League. *See* also Achaian Assembly, General, Magistrates, Senate, 508
a great example of Federal Government, 4
Federal taxation in, 11, 241
a League of Cities, 77
Primary Assemblies in, 77, 80
aims of, opposed to those of Macedonia, 179
its generous aims, 183
its effect on Greece, 184
history of the Old League, 185-191
beginning of the revived League, 179, 191
joined by all the Achaian Cities, 190 *note*
extended to all Achaia, 192
effect of Gaulish invasion on, 193
Constitution of, 197
its democratic nature, 198, 205
compared with that of Athens, 199, 206, 216
tendency to assimilation in, 200
a National Government, 202
no independent diplomatic action in the Cities, 202-205 *seqq.* *See* also Achaian Assembly
admission of new Cities into, 212, 646
as to the arrangement of voting, *ib.*
power of the Magistrates, 216
Federal offices in, 219, 229. *See* also Achaian General
its financial and military policy, 241
mercenaries employed by, 242

Achaian League, compared with United States Constitution, 243 *seqq.*
as described in the "Federalist" and by Mably, 249
compared with that of Ætolia, 251, 258, 264 *seqq.*
continuity of its territory, 267
its biographical character, 278
results of the annexation of Sikyôn, 278, 286
its war with Ætolia, 292
its alliance with Alexander of Corinth, *ib.*
extension of its territory, 295
suit of Aristippos against, 302
its alliance with Ptolemy Philadelphos, *ib.*
powers of the General, 304, 309
its alliance with Sparta, 305
truce concluded with Antigonos, 308
its alliance with Ætolia, *ib.*
its international morality, 310
effect of the accession of Kleônai, 313
extension in Arkadia, 314
accession of Megalopolis, 315
and its effects, 318
joins Ætolia on behalf of Korkyra, 325
failure of naval operations, *ib.*
Roman embassy to, 327
alliance of with Athens, 329-331
further extension of, 331, 333
union of Argos with, 331-333
its commanding position, 334
causes of the war with Sparta, 338, 342
declaration of war, 344
union of Kaphyai, *ib.*
Mantineian embassy to, 349 *note*
schemes of Kleomenês fatal to, 357
Spartan negociations with, 361
Megalopolitan embassy to, 363
grants leave to appeal to Macedonia, 364
letter from Antigonos read to, 366
negociates with Kleomenês, 367
Kleomenês declares war against, 369
secessions from, 372-376
votes absolute power to Aratos, 377
invites the help of Antigonos, 379
its position henceforth, *ib.*
recovers seceded cities, 384
Tegea united to, 386
Achaian League, its relation to Macedonia, 389-391
its embassy on behalf of Messênê, 399, 401
ratifies decree for Social War, 408
contribution to refused by Western States, 417
Psôphis annexed to, 419
its relations with Philip, 420
Macedonian feeling against, 422
combines Federal sovereignty with State rights, 429
effects of the Treaty with Hannibal on, 444
attacked by Rome and her allies, 453
asks help of Philip, *ib.*
military system reformed by Philopoimên, 454, 462
defeats Ætolians and Eleians, 459
cessions to, by Philip, 460
dealings of Philip with, 472
his attempt to win over, 478
joins Roman alliance, 479, 480
its share in Macedonian War, *ib.*
policy of Flamininus towards, 485
its independent action against Nabis, 490
Sparta annexed to, 492
declares war against Antiochos, 493
Elis and Messênê united to, 496
alleged party of Antiochos in, *ib. note*
buys Zakynthos, 497
its right to, disputed by Flamininus, *ib.*
extended over all Peloponnêsos, 498
its relation with Rome, *ib.*
Roman intrigues against, 499, 504
declares war against Sparta, 501
treatment of Sparta, 502
Messênê revolts against, 505
readmits Messênê, 506
yearly meetings of, removed from Aigion, 508
refuses the offer of Eumenês of Pergamos, *ib.*
resists Roman encroachments, 509-511
its condition at the death of Philopoimên, 512
Roman party in, *ib.*
its action towards Lacedæmonian exiles, 513, 514
change in the treatment of, by Rome, 514

Achaian League, decrees non-intercourse with Macedonia, 522
letter and embassy of Perseus to, 522, 523
Roman dealings with individual cities, 523
further inroads on Federal rights, 524, 525
restores Eumenês his honours, 526, 527
its negociation with Marcius, 527
refuses the request of Appius, 528
appealed to by Egypt for help, *ib.*
debate on the question, 528-530
Roman policy towards, 530
demands of the Roman embassy, 531
Achaians sent to Rome for trial, 532
fresh Roman intrigues against, 534, 536
its debate on the Cretan alliance, 535
its wars with Sparta, 538, 540
Roman embassies to, 541, 543
dismemberment of, demanded by Rome, 541
its war with Rome, 546-550
becomes a dependency of Rome, 550
dissolution of, 551
nominal revival of, 552
its errors due to Roman intrigues, 553
general results of, 554
the natural model for liberated Greece, *ib.*
list of the cities, 635-637
coinage of, 635
decrees of, 647
Achaian Magistrates, their power greater than the Athenian, 216
form a "Government," 217, 219
their relation with the Assembly, *ib.*
Ministerial offices, 219
their number and election, 220
their relation to the General, 221, 232
necessarily wealthy, 229
no property qualification for, 230
act as Speakers of the Assembly, 231
compared with American Cabinet, 248
Achaian Senate. its functions, 239-241
compared with Norwegian Lagthing, 247 ; its constitution, 241, 643
Adeimantos of Sparta murdered, 405
Ædui, confederation of, 560 *note*
Aeropos and Dardas, 466 and *ante*
Aeropos of Epeiros, 466 *ante*
Æschinês, pleads before the Ten Thousand, 161
Æsernia, Federal capital of Italy, 588
Ætolia, its early history, 254 *seqq.*
Ætolian League, compared with that of Achaia, 252, 258, 264 *seqq.*
a union of districts, 254, 259, 271
early history of, 256-258
its democratic character, 260
meeting of the Assembly, 260 *note*, 261
the Senate, 262, 651
Magistrates, 263
and General, *ib.*
powers of the General, 232 *note*, 264
its foreign policy, 265
hostages given to Rome by, 265 *note*
its treason towards Greece, 266, 292
scattered nature of its territory, 267
variety of relations in, 268 *seqq.*, 273
compared with those of British dependencies, 270
compared with Swiss Confederation, 271 *seqq.*
its war with Achaia, 292, 305 *seqq.*
its agreement with Antigonos, *ib.*
its alliance with Achaia, 308
its acquisitions in Arkadia, 314
its war with Akarnania, 321-323
sends help to Epeiros, 324
and to Korkyra, 325
Roman embassy to, 327
its relations with Sparta and Achaia, 340
acquisitions of, in Thessaly, 341
acknowledges Spartan acquisitions in Arkadia, 342
Aratos asks help from, 378
extensive invasions by, 396
strange decree passed by, 399-401
its relation with Messênê, 400
its ravages in Peloponnêsos, 402
its diplomatic insincerity, *ib.*
sacks Kynaitha, 44 *note*, 403
war declared against, at Corinth, 407
Philip's letter to, *ib.*
shifts of, in answer 407, 408

Ætolian League, its comparative strength, 409
sends embassies to Peloponnêsos, 411
ravages of, in Achaia, 416
invaded by Philip, 427
defeated by Lykos, 429
Chian and Rhodian embassy to, 430
its action at the Congress of Naupaktos, 435
elects Agelaos General, 438
effect of the Treaty with Hannibal on, 444
an ally of Rome, 448, 449
invades Akarnania, 449
sends an embassy to Sparta, 451
chooses King Attalos General, 455
demands of, at Aigion, 456
makes peace with Philip, 466
treatment of, by Rome, 467
joins Rome against Philip, 475, 476
submits to Rome, 484
invites the help of Antiochos, 490
answer of, to Titus, 491
treacherous resolution of the Senate, *ib.*
elects Antiochos General, 493
defeated at Thermopylæ, 494
its action towards Antiochos, *ib.*
submits to the Roman "Faith," *ib.*
becomes a dependent ally of Rome, 495, 516
its dismemberment, *ib.*
bidden by Rome to restore Lacedæmonian exiles, 514
civil dissensions in, 516
Roman and Macedonian parties in, 517
Perseus in, *ib.*
dissolution of, 518
Roman dealings with, 519
its analogy with that of Samnium, 568
coinage of, 638
Agasisthenês of Sparta, 539
Agelaos of Naupaktos, his ravages in Peloponnêsos, 402
his speech at Congress of Naupaktos, 435
his policy compared with that of Isokratês, 437
elected Ætolian General, 269 *note*, 438
Agelaos of Naupaktos, his Peace compared with that of Nikias, 439
Agêsilaos, King of Sparta, resists the claims of Thebes, 132, 138
finds Eutaia deserted, 157
Agêsipolis chosen King of Sparta, 413 exiled, 451
Agis, King of Sparta, his action against Macedonia, 188
confounded with the later Agis, 305 *note*
Agis II., King of Sparta, his character, 305
his alleged Arkadian campaign, 305 *note*
compared with Aratos, 306
withdraws with his army, 307
his reforms and death, 337
Agrôn, King of Illyria, relieves Medeôn, 323
invades Peloponnêsos, 324
Aigeira, loss and recovery of, 418
Aigina, treatment of inhabitants by Rome, 269
joins Achaian League, 331
sold to King Attalos, 453
Aigion, seat of Achaian Assembly, 121, 190, 207, 215
in the original Achaian League, 190
drives out Macedonian garrison, 189, 192
joins the Union, 192
Assembly held at, 352, 379
conference at, 456
alleged party of Antiochos in, 496 *note*
yearly meetings removed from, 508
Ainêsidamos of Dymê, 481
Akanthos seeks help from Sparta, 150
rejects Olynthian terms, 150-153
Akarnanian League, notices of, 114, 115
its constitution, 116
its coinage, 116, 638
the General acts as President, 232 *note*
partial incorporation with Ætolia, 256
applies to Rome for help against Ætolia, 321
fresh Ætolian inroad, 322
helped by Dêmêtrios and the Illyrians, 323
its alliance with Illyrians, 324

Akarnanian League, promises to join in Social War, 408
plots for the reunion of, 449
heroism of, 450
sends embassy to Sparta, 451
seeks help against Athens from Philip, 473 *note*
adheres to Philip, 475, 483, 484
Akrokorinthos, Federal garrison at, 242
demanded by Antigonos Dôsôn, 368
besieged by Kleomenês, 373
Kleomenês, proposals as to, 378
ceded to Antigonos, 379
surrendered to him, 385
Roman garrison in, 484
Aktion, inscription found at, 116
Alexamenos of Kalydôn, his attack on Nabis, 491
slain, *ib.*
Alexander III. Pope, Frederick Barbarossa reconciled to, 610
Alexander the Great, as to his alleged election by the Amphiktyons, 100 *note*
destroys Thebes, 141
effects of his conquests, 175
his policy towards Greece, 179
tyranny established at Pellênê by, 188
as to Ætolian embassies to, 256
his threatened vengeance on Ætolia, *ib.*
Alexander, son of Pyrrhos, King of Epeiros, his attempt against the Akarnanian League, 115, 266
his war with Antigonos Gonatas, 276
Alexander, son of Krateros, Tyrant of Corinth, 276
his alliance with Achaia, 292
position of Corinth under, 294
his death, *ib.*
Alexander, guardian of Philip II. of Macedonia, plots against him, 427
Alexander of Ætolia, 419
Alexander of Epeiros, 482
Alexander of Pherai, 119
Alexandria, effects of its foundation, 175
Alexandria (Alessandria), foundation of, 609
siege of, 609
joins Frederick Barbarossa, 611
Alexandria (Alessandria), name changed to Cæsarea, *ib.*
Alipheira, restored to Megalopolis, 460
an independent member of the League, 489 *note*
Alkamenês sent to garrison Megara, 548
Amaiokritos of Bœotia, 293
Ambrakia, an independent commonwealth, 495
America, United States of. *See* United States
other confederations in, 6
America, North, demands of the colonists compared with those of Italian allies of Rome, 584
Amphidamos, General of Elis, acts as an agent of Philip, 425
witnesses on behalf of Aratos, 426
Amphiktyonic Council not a true Federal Government, 95-97
a religious not a political body, 97
only one of many in Greece, 98
its incidental political functions, *ib.*
instances of its action, and crusades, 99
no inherent force in its decrees, 100
its importance in the history of Federalism, 101, 147
its close approach to a Federal system, *ib.*
ecclesiastical but not clerical, 102
a union of tribes, not of cities, 103
compared with the unreformed British Parliament, 104
feeling of reverence towards, *ib.*
its championship of Philip, 105
reforms in, under Augustus, 105-108
approach to Representative forms in, 108
in no sense a Government, *ib.*
its political nullity, 109-111
as a literary body, 110 *note*
its authority over Delphi, 407
Amphiktyonies, among Asiatic Greeks, 145
in Etruria, 563
Amphiktyony of Arkadia, 155
Amphiktyony of Bœotia, its places of meeting, 124, and *note*

Amphipolis, Roman Commission at, 518, 519, 531
Amphissa, damages paid to, by Thebes, 547
Amsterdam, predominance of, 121
Amynander, King of Athamania, mediates on behalf of Ætolia, 455
at the Conference of Phoinikê, 466
Zakynthos ceded to, *ib.*
Ancona besieged by Frederick Barbarossa, 609
Andrônidas, popular hatred of, 536 *note*
his embassy to Metellus, 548
treatment of by Diaios, 548, 549
Andronikos of Ætolia beheaded at Rome, 518
Androsthenês, Governor of Corinth, 481
ravages Achaia, 482
Anicius, L., conquers Molossis, 520
Antalkidas, Peace of, 131
Antigoneia, name of Mantineia changed to, 386
Antigonids in Macedonia, 178, 180
their aim and position, 179 *seqq.*
their rule compared with that of Austria in Italy, 181 *seqq.*
Antigonos Dôsôn, King of Macedonia, sends Prytanis to Megalopolis, 199 *note*
his protectorate and reign, 329
Aratos seeks help from, 359 *seqq.*, 363
Megalopolitan embassy to, 364
answer laid before Federal Assembly, 365
mission of young Aratos to, 367
demands Akrokorinthos, 368
his terms agreed to, 379
his character, 183, 380, 387
honours paid to, 383
his war with Kleomenês, 383 *seqq.*
recovers Akrokorinthos, 385
keeps Orchomenos, 386
his victory at Sellasia, 387
his treatment of Sparta, *ib.*
his death, *ib.*
his offers to Philopoimên, 393
Antigonos Gonatas, King of Macedonia, supports local Tyrannies, 181
his action towards the Achaian League, 189
Antigonos Gonatas, King of Macedonia, his war with Epeiros and Athens, 276
fails to help Aratos, 282
his relations towards him, 283, 288
his alliance with Ætolia, 292
takes Corinth, 294
his truce with Achaian League, 308
his death, *ib.*
his alleged conspiracy against Aratos, 311
Antikyra taken by Rome, 449
Antinoös of Epeiros, supports Macedonia, 519
his death, 520
Antiochos the Great, King of Syria, called *Senex* by Livy, 446 *note*
invited to liberate Greece, 490
elected Ætolian General, 493
action of other Federal states to, *ib.*
his defeat at Thermopylæ, 494
Antiochos Epiphanês, King of Syria, his war with Egypt, 528
Antiphatas, Cretan envoy to Achaia, 535 *note*
Antiphilos of Bœotia, supports Rome, 483
Apellês plots against Achaia, 421
ill-treats the soldiers, 422
restrained by Philip, *ib.*
plots against Aratos, 422, 424
accuses him of treason, 424-426
plots against Philip, 427
Apollônia, rejects Olynthian terms, 151
threatened by Illyria, 324
her alliance with Rome, 326
besieged by Philip, 447
Apollônidês of Sikyôn, inveighs against the offer of Eumenês, 509
his action towards Rome, 525
Appian, his version of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 443
an authority for the Social War, 577
Apulia, Normans in, 594
Aratos, the elder, his property at Corinth, 201 *note*
his position compared with that of Periklês, 225
and of Kleôn, 226
his military career a failure, 235
as to his re-election as President, 237
his special position, 239
legend of his miraculous origin, 280 *note*

Aratos, the elder, escapes from Sikyôn, 280
brought up at Argos, 281
his early schemes, 282
delivers Sikyôn, *ib.*
his internal measure of pacification, 284, 287
annexes Sikyôn to Achaian League, 278, 285
his relation to Antigonos and Ptolemy, 284, 288
elected General of the League, 288
his character, civil and military, 289-292
his action against Ætolia, 293
delivers Corinth, 294
invades Attica, 295
his lenity to his prisoners, *ib.*
encourages conspiracies in Argos, 297, 300
his vain attempt at deliverance, 301
condemned for breach of international right, 302
his pension from Ptolemy Philadelphos, 289 *note*, 302
contrasted with Agis, 306
his action in the campaign against Ætolia, 306-308
his attempt on Peiraieus, 309
feeling towards, at Athens, 310
his attempt on Argos, 311
his rivalry with Lydiadas, 318
brings about the deliverance of Athens, 329-331
his negociations with Aristomachos of Argos, 331
his action in the matter of the union of Argos, 333
his feelings towards Sparta, 338
his conduct as regards the declaration of war, 343, 344
annexes Kaphyai, 344
indignation against, for withdrawing from Pallantion, 346
his campaign in Elis, 347
his treatment of Mantineia, 348
his conduct at Ladokeia, 351
vote of censure on, 352
contemplates resignation, 353
his position after the battle of Hekatombaion, 355, 356
begins to look to Macedonia, 359, 363
declines the Generalship, 362
his dealings with Megalopolis, 363 *seqq.*
Aratos, the elder, his speech on the letter from Antigonos, 366
sends his son to Antigonos, 367
his policy towards Kleomenês, 368, 369 *note*
his doings at Sikyôn, 373
driven out of Corinth, *ib.*
invested with absolute power, 377
refuses the offers of Kleomenês, 378
asks help of Ætolia and Athens, *ib.*
estimate of his conduct, 379
compared with Cavour, 380, 381
elected General of the State of Argos, 199, 201 *note*, 384
surrenders Akrokorinthos, 385
re-names Mantineia, *ib.*
his undiminished influence, 391
his relations to Macedonian Kings, 392, 406, 415, 420
compared with Philopoimên, 393
elected General 220 B.C., 397
takes office before legal time, 398
his defeat at Kaphyai, *ib.*
accused before the Assembly, 399
his liberal views of international right, 406
schemes of Apellês against, 421, 422
obtains redress against Apellês, 422
Apellês accuses him of treason, 424, 426
restored to Philip's favour 426
his mediation at Megalopolis, 199 *note*, 429
sent by Philip to Congress of Naupaktos, 434
influences Philip on behalf of Messênê, 445
reproaches him for his misdeeds, 446
his death, *ib.*
his latter years, 446, 447
compared with Philopoimên, 447
as to his Generalships, 468-470
Aratos, the younger, his mission to Antigonos, 367
his Generalship, 415, 416
protest against Philip's conduct at Messênê, 445
Philip carries off his wife, 446
driven mad, *ib.*
Aratos of Sikyôn, son of above, his embassy to Rome, 513
Archenoos recovers Amphiktyonic rights for Argos, 107 *note*

Archidamos, King of Sparta, as to his murder, 350 *note*
Archidamos of Ætolia, 419
supports Perseus, 517, 518
Archôn of Achaia withstands the demand of Cæcilius, 510
his policy towards Rome, 526
elected general, *ib.*
his speech as to the restoration of Eumenês' honours, *ib.*
supports the cause of the Ptolemies, 528
Archôn of Aigeira, his embassy to Egypt, 529
Archons at Athens, election of, 116
Federal and Local in Bœotia, 128
Areus, King of Sparta, his crusade against Ætolia, 99 *note*
Argolis, secessions from to Sparta, 372
cities of, recovered by the League, 385
invaded by Lykourgos of Sparta, 414
Argos and Philip, 481 *note*
Argos, amphiktyonic rights recovered for, by Archenoos, 107 *note*
Tyranny of Aristomachos, 296 *seqq.*
as to the succession of Tyrants at, 297 *note*
special feeling of Aratos for, 300
attempts of Aratos on, 301, 311
claims right to celebrate Nemean Games, 313, 433 *note*
competitors seized by Achaians, 313
joins Achaian League, 331-333
won by Kleomenês, 373
returns to the League, 384
re-peoples Mantineia, 385
special decree as to its troops, 429
honours paid to Philip by, 456
Achaian Assembly at, 478
supports Philip, 480
betrayed to Philip, 481
ceded to Nabis, *ib.*
recovered by Achaia, 485
Aristainos, Achaian General supports Rome, 478, 479
recovers Argos, 485
his conference with Nabis, 485 *note*
his policy opposed to Philopoimên, 488
his mission to Megalopolis, *ib.*
a Council to consider the demands of Cæcilius, 207 *note*, 510
Aristippos I., Tyrant of Argos, 297 *note* 2
Aristippos II., 297 *note* 2
becomes tyrant, 301
brings a suit against Achaian League, 302
his warfare with Aratos, 311
his death, 312
Aristocracy in Greek Commonwealths, 17
Aristodêmos, General of Antigonos, 189
Aristomachos I., his Tyranny at Argos, 296 *seqq.*
conspiracies against, 297, 300
his death, 301
Aristomachos II., his Tyranny at Argos, 312
as to his alleged massacre, 312 *note*
negociations of Aratos with, 331
pleads before the Achaian Assembly, 332
his proposals rejected, 333
elected general of the League, 333, 334
his campaign against Sparta, 346
submits to Kleomenês, 373
his execution, 384
Aristomachos, Sikyônian exile, helps to deliver Sikyôn, 282
Aristôn, General of Ætolia, 395
Aristôn of Megalopolis, his embassy to Egypt, 529
Aristotelês of Argos, 384
Aristotelês of Sikyôn assassinates Kleinias, 281
Arkadia, policy of Epameinôndas towards, 143
Federal union of, 154 *seqq.*
Amphiktyonic union of, 155
Constitution of the League, 157
decline of the League, 160
Ætolian acquisitions in, 314, 342
extension of Achaian League in, 314, 331
Spartan acquisitions in, 342
secession from, to Sparta, 372
cities recovered by the League, 385
Arkesilaos, his embassy to Egypt, 529
Arles, crowning-place of Kings of Burgundy, 618 *note*
Arthmios of Zeleia, proscribed by Athens, 99
Arverni, Confederation of, 560 *note*
Asea, an independent member of the League, 484 *note*

Assemblies, primary and representative, 77, 78, 247, 248
Astakos, city of, 115
Athamania, mediates on behalf of Ætolia, 455
Athênaion fortified by Kleomenês, 344
seized by Lykourgos of Sparta, 416
Athenian Assembly, compared with the House of Commons, 31 *seqq.*, 67
with the Florentine Parliament, 31
its direct ruling and diplomatic powers, 35, 36
their effect on individual citizens, 36
compared with that of Achaia, 206 *seqq.*
influence of men without office in, 225
Athens, relations of her allied cities to, 19-21
incorporates the old Attic cities, 22
aristocratic position of the citizens, 29
position of slaves in, 30 *note*
connexion of her history with Federalism, 32
citizen of, compared with an English member, 32 *seqq.*
highest type of a city-commonwealth, 37, 47
intensity of patriotism at, 39
her degradation in later days, 40
her enmity towards neighbouring cities, 43
bribery at, 65
a model of democratic government, 68
relations of, to Amphiktyonic body, 103
her repugnance to Thebes, 137
helps to restore Thebes, 142
averse to Federalism, 148
her importance in Early Greek history, 172
her nullity in the Federal period, *ib.*
Democracy at, compared with that of Achaia, 198, 206
power of the Magistrates compared with those of Achaia, 216
union and separation of military and civil powers in, 234, 235
mercenaries employed by, 235
results of Lamian War on, 257
capture of, by Macedonia, 276
Athens, treatment of her prisoners by Aratos, 295
keeps aloof from Achaian League, 296
report of death of Aratos at, 310
his threatened attack on, 311
Roman embassy to, 327
delivered by Aratos, 329-331
Aratos asks help from, 378
offers mediation to Philip, 455
devastated by Philip, 473
bidden by Rome to restore Lacedæmonian exiles, 514
her disputes with Orôpos, 536
Atintania, its cessions demanded by Ætolia, 457
ceded to Philip, 466
Attalos, King of Pergamos, Aigina sold to, 453
chosen General of Ætolia, 455
defeated near Lamia, *ib.*
warned off from Euboia, 456
confers with Ætolia at Hêrakleia, 459
his war with Philip, 473
concludes alliance with Achaian League, 480
Attalos, brother of King Eumenês, his embassy on his brother's behalf, 526
Attica, towns of, their relation to Athens, 22 *note*, 123
extent of, compared with Achaia, 207 *note*
invaded by Aratos, 295, 310
Austria, Emperor of, use of the title, 75 *note*, 182 *note*
her analogy with Macedonia, 180
the *Mark* of Germany, 571
analogy with Thebes, 633
Augustus Cæsar, reforms the Amphiktyonic Council, 105
restores Patrai, 192 *note*

BADEN, State of, 632
Bæbius, A., 518
Ballot, vote by, 66
*Barbarians*, Greek feeling towards, 174
Basel, Bishops of, their connexion with the Empire, 620 *note*
Bavaria, kingdom of, how far identical with the Duchy, 631
Belbinê, 503
Belgium, its separation from Holland, 72

Bern, seat of government at, 121
influence of, on Swiss League, 272
compared with Rome, 576 *note*
Besançon, 24 *note*
Bippos of Argos, 507 *note*
Bœotarchs, how apportioned, 125, 126
their office, 126
their diplomatic action, 128
in the revived League, 134, 135 *note*, 143
Bœotia joins Achaia against Ætolia, 142
intimate relations with Ætolia, 268
joins Ætolian Alliance, 343
"Bœotian," use of, by Thucydidês and Xenophôn, 125
Bœotian League, evils of a preponderating capital in, 121, 123
three periods in, 124 *seqq.*
both religious and political, 124
its Constitution, 125-126
supreme power in the Four Senates, 127
the Archôn the nominal chief, 128
secessions from, 129, 131
dissolution of, 132
nominal revival of, 134
subjection of, to Thebes, 22 *note*, 135 *seqq.*
reconstitution of, 142
insignificance of, in later Greece, *ib.*
its constitution, 143
compelled to support Rome, 143, 483
dissolved by Quintus Marcus, 144
defeated at Chairôneia, 293
joins Ætolian League, *ib.*
its alliance with Macedonia, 308
joins Antiochos, 493
ordered to restore Lacedæmonian exiles, 514
its alliance with Perseus, 521
Roman intrigues against, *ib.*
dissolution of, 522
Borough, English, democratic nature of, 59 *note*
Boroughs Contributory, a later form in the Amphiktyonic Council, 103 *note*, 106
Bousa, garrison expelled by Dêmêtrios, 189
in the original Achaian League, 190
liberation of, 192, 193
Brachyllas, the Theban, 387 *note*
Brandenburg, a *Mark* of Germany, 571
Bretwaldas, 96
Bribery, different forms of, 65
Bryce, J., his Holy Roman Empire, 618 *note*
Buonaparte, L. N., his election as emperor, 55
his scheme for a Confederation of Italian princes, 75
compared with Antigonos Dôsôn, 380, 381
undesignedly discredits Italian Federation, 616
Burgundy, county of, 620 *note*
Burgundy, kingdom of, defined, 24 *note*
its close connexion with Germany, 619
Bute and Caithness, sent members alternately to Parliament, 107 *note*
Byzantium, seat of Imperial Government, 593

CABINET GOVERNMENT. *See* Ministry
Cæcilius, Q., his demand for an Achaian Assembly refused, 510
Cæsar, Sextus Julius, his embassy to Achaian League, 543
Cæsarea. *See* Alexandria
Caithness and Bute, sent members alternately to Parliament, 107 *note*
Campanian Republics, 25, 601
Cannæ, battle of, 440
Cantons, Swiss, Confederation of. *See* Swiss Confederation
Capital, the, its position and influence in a large State, 50-51
dangers arising from, 120-122
Capua, 566
Caraceni, the, *ib.*
Carolina, South, 56, *note*, and 639
appoints Governor Rutledge dictator, 377 *note*
Carthage, Treaty of, with Philip and his allies, 439, 441
Treaty of, with Rome, 569
compared with Rome, 576 *note*
Cathedral Chapters, attendance at, 240 *note*
Cato, his reply to Aulus Postumius, 110 *note*
obtains release of Achaian exiles, 534
"Caucus," Achaian, 222

Caudini, the, 566
Cavour, compared with Aratos, 380-382
Chairôn, Tyrant of Pellênê, 188
Chairôn of Sparta, *ib.*
Chairôneia, Bœotian defeat at, 293
Chalkidikê, Greeks of, reject Olynthian terms, 151
Spartan intervention in, 149 *seqq.*
Chalkis, Roman garrison in, 484
Ætolian attempt on, 491
Chalouphês Nikêphoros, 602
Chambers, two, impossible in Primary Assemblies, 247
Chancellor, Lord, his position in the House of Lords, 232
Channel Islands, their relation to Great Britain, 271
Chaonians, the, 116
Charês, battle of the, 311
Charles the Great, his execution of Saxon prisoners, 46 *note*
Charles IV., Emperor, crowned at Arles, 619 *note*
Charops, of Epeiros, supports Rome, 482, 494
Charops the Younger, of Epeiros, his Tyranny, 512, 519, 520
Cheilôn of Sparta, 450
Cherson, Republic of, 25, 169
Chios, nature of its alliance with Athens, 19, 27 *note*
position of slaves in, 30 *note*
mediates in the Social War, 430-432
offers mediation to Philip, 455
Chlaineas of Ætolia, his embassy to Sparta, 154, 181 *note*, 451
Chremês of Akarnania, 519
Chremônidean War, 276
Christianity, Alexander the Great, the pioneer of, 175
Chur, its privileged position in the Gotteshausbund, 126 *note*
Cities, dependent, condition of, in Greece, 18
compared with Federal commonwealths, 19
with English colonies, 20
Cities, Free. *See* City-commonwealths
Cities, Free, of the Empire, 625
City-commonwealths, characteristics of, 15-28
full developement of, in Greece, 16, 24
City-commonwealths in Italy, 23
in mediæval Europe, 24
general view of the system, 26 *seqq.*
varieties in internal constitution, 26
in external relations, 27
varying relations with surrounding territory, 28
position of the individual citizens in, 29, 36, 38
system of, a political education, 37, 48, 64, 80
highest type of, at Athens, 37, 47
intensity of patriotism in, 38
bad side of the system, 39
in the Middle Ages, 42
constant warfare among, *ib.*
results of the system in war, 43
bitterness of political enmities in, 48
the Amphiktyonic Council a witness for, 101
strong feeling for, among Ionian Greeks, 146
and among great Greek cities, 148, 151
union among, compared with that of districts, 259
Clackmannan and Kinross, sent members alternately to Parliament, 107 *note*
Claudius, Emperor, Lykian League destroyed by, 169
Claudius, Appius, Lykortas' answer to, 500
demands help from Achaia, 527
refused by the League, 528
Claudius, C., 531
Clergy and Laity, no such distinction in ancient times, 102
Coalitions, as to the strength of, 410 *note*
Colonies, English, compared with Greek dependent cities, 20
relations to the United Kingdom, 59 *note*
Columbia, district of, 273 *note*
Commons, House of, compared with the other Assemblies, 209, 210, 217 *seqq.*
Commonwealths. *See* City and Federal commonwealths, 4
Confederation, Swiss. *See* Swiss Confederation. German. *See* Germany
Confederations, examples of, 4-6

Confederacy, a, as distinguished from a Confederation, 8
Congress, its relation to the President, 218, 227 *note*, 244
compared with Achaian Assembly, 243 *seq.*
Conrad III., Emperor, his position in Italy, 595
as to his election, 595 *note*
Conrad of Ursperg, 596
Constanz, Peace of, 612
Constitution, British, gradual growth of, 197
Corfinium. *See* Italicum
Corinth, subject districts of, 200
position of under Alexander, 276, 294
taken by Antigonos, 294
delivered by Aratos, *ib.*
joins Achaian League, *ib.*
Roman embassy to, 203, 327
grants Rome admission to Isthmian Games, *ib.*
drives out Aratos, 373
calls in Kleomenês, *ib.*
effect of its secession, 376
Congress at, summoned by Philip, 404, 406
besieged by Lucius Quinctius, 480
restored to Achaia, 485
alleged party of Antiochos in, 496 *note*
Roman ambassadors at, 541
tumults at, 542, 544
sacked by Mummius, 550
County, English, aristocratic nature of, 59 *note*
Cremona, attitude of Emperor, 595
joins Lombard League, 604
joins Frederick Barbarossa, 611
Cretans, use of the name, 351 *note*
Crete, Philopoimên withdraws to, 393, 477
asks help against Rhodes from Achaia, 535
Cromarty and Nairn, sent members alternately to Parliament, 107

Damokritos, Ætolian General, his policy towards Rome, 476
his answer to Titus, 491
Damokritos, elected Achaian General, 539
defeats the Spartans, 540
banished, *ib.*
Damophantos, slain by Philopoimên, 458
Dardanians, 328
Dardas of Epeiros, 466
Davos, its position compared with that of Thebes, 126 *note*
Dêïdameia of Epeiros, resigns her power, 320
murdered, 321
Deinias, 281
Deinarchos of Ætolia, 517
Deinokratês defeated at Peraia, 482
Deinokratês of Messênê procures the secession of Messênê, 505
puts Philopoimên to death, *ib.*
sues for peace, 506
Delphi, Amphiktyony, 98
Delphi and Ætolia, *ante* and 268
Demagogue, use of the word, 229 *note*
Dêmaratos, 139 *note*
Dêmêtrias, name of Sikyôn changed to, 279
Dêmêtrias, Roman garrison in, 484
seized by Ætolia, 491
Dêmêtrios, King of Macedonia, his policy towards Greece, 180, 189
frees Sikyôn, 279
his war with Achaia and Ætolia, 308
sends a ship for Aratos, 310
grants subsidies in Peloponnêsos, 320
subsidizes Illyria to keep Medeôn, 323
his death, 328
Dêmêtrios of Pharos, surrenders Korkyra to Rome, 326
Illyrian lands granted to, *ib.*
ravages Peloponnêsos, 402
and Ætolia, 403
advises Philip, 433, 444, 445
his death, 445
Democracy, absolute and constitutional, 12
at Athens, 29, 32, 37, 47, 198, 206 *seqq.*, 231
weak point of, in Greece, 30 *note*
in Achaia, 80, 198, 205 *seqq.*, 231
in Switzerland, 80
in Achaian cities, at the dissolution of League, 551
Dêmophanês, 282
Dêmodokos, 429
Dêmosthenês reconciles Athens and Thebes, 137

Dêmosthenês on the Olynthian League, 152
pleads before the Ten Thousand, 161
and on behalf of Megalopolis, *ib.*
*Despot*, use of the word, 195 *note*
Diaios, elected Achaian General, 538
makes war on Sparta, *ib.*
embassy to Rome, 539
embassy of Metellus to, 540
tortures Philinos of Corinth, 541 *note*
his arbitrary measures, 547
his cruelty and corruption, 549
his defeat and death, *ib.*
*Dictator*, origin of the office, 369 *note*
Diogenês, Macedonian commander in Peiraieus, 310
restores it, Salamis, etc., to the Athenians, 330
Diogenês of Akarnania, 519
Dioitas, Achaian General, 315 *note*, 468
Dion, Ætolian sacrilege at, 419
Diophanês of Megalopolis, his jealousy of Philopoimên, 488
extent of the League under, 498
marches against Sparta, 500
his embassy to Rome, 501
supports the demand of Cæcilius, 510
opposes Egyptian appeal for help, 528
Diopeithês of Rhodes, 509 *note*
Dipaia, 489 *note*
Dôdôna, destroyed by Dorimachos, 419
Domitius, Cn., 531
Dorians, Amphiktyonic votes assigned to by Augustus, 106
Dorimachos, Ætolian General, plunders Messênê, 395
further incursions of, 396
his invasion of Achaia, 402
sacks Kynaitha, 403
attacks Aigeira, 418
destroys Dôdôna, 419
Lævinus negociates with, 448
attempts to relieve Echinos, 453
his special legislature, 263, 476
Droysen, his history of Hellenism, and his Macedonian sympathies, 178
Drusus, M. Livius, his Tribuneship, 582
his death, 583
Dymê, 424, 479, 480,
expulsion of Macedonian garrison, 189
Dymê, ravaged by Ætolia, 416
*Sonderbund* formed by, 417
supports Philip, 480

ECHINOS, siege of, 453
Egypt, offers mediation to Philip, 455
sends embassy to Achaia, 528-530
Ekdêmos of Megalopolis, 282
Electors, ignorance and corruption among, 64-67
Elis, pays indemnity to Megalopolis, 189
its connexion with Ætolia, 271, 314
its action with regard to Nemean Games, 313
campaign of Aratos in, 347
declares war against Achaia, 411
ravaged by Philip, 424
rejects Macedonian offers, 425
ravaged by Lykos, 429
joins Rome and Ætolia, 450
receives the Ætolians, 458
supports Antiochos, 494
united to Achaian League, 496, 505
refuses contingent against Rome, 548
Emperor, synonymous with τύραννος, 17 *note*
Emperors, Roman, their relations with city-commonwealths, 25
forsake Rome, 593
succession of, always maintained, *ib.*
amount of authority retained by, 595
Empire, Eastern, influence of Alexander's conquests on, 175
its identity with Greece, 620
Empire, Western, right of, recognised by Lombard League, 605 *note*
its influence on Germany, 618
three kingdoms attached to, 618, 619
its identity with Germany, 620
Free Cities of, 625
and Germany, 627-628
essentially elective, 628
England, civil wars in, 47 and *note*
her relations towards Wales and Scotland, 59 *note*
union with Scotland, 76
compared with Germany, 623 *seqq.*, 630-632
retention of National Assemblies in, 625

England, as to royal succession in, 627 *note*
survival of Kingdoms in Counties, 630
Epameinôndas, his career, 134
his claim on behalf of Thebes, 139
his policy towards Arkadia, 143
the true founder of Megalopolis, 160 and *note*
Epeiros, early form of constitutional monarchy in, 16, 116
Epeirot League, formation of, 117, 320
coinage of, 117
Achaian Embassy, 401
its double dealing towards Philip and Ætolia, 408
joins the alliance, 414
proposes peace to Philip, 466
attempts to mediate between Rome and Philip, 482
answer of, to Antiochos, 494
bidden restore Lacedæmonian exiles, 514
Macedonian and Roman parties in, 519, 520
conquest and desolation of, by Rome, 520
Epêratos of Pharai chosen General of Achaian League, 418, 423, 424
his election a mistake, 426
his incompetence, 226 *note*, 239 *note*, 428
Ephialtês, 99
Epidamnos repulses the Illyrians, 325
her alliance with Rome, 326
Epidauros joins Achaian League, 295
secedes to Sparta, 373
Erginos, 309
Etruria, League of, its position under Rome, 561, 580
its constitution, 562-564
threatens secession from Rome, 587
Euboia, scheme of Federal Union in, 162
new in Federation, 484
damages paid to, by Thebes, 547
Eukleidas, King of Sparta, 413
Eukleidês of Athens, 379
Eumenês, King of Pergamos, his offer to the Achaian League, 508
honours granted to, abolished, 509 *note*
as to the restoration of his honours, 526
Roman intrigues against, 535
Euphrôn, Tyrant of Sikyôn, 194 *note*, 279
Euripidas of Ætolia, his ravages in Achaia, 416
Eutaia, 157
Evagoras of Aigion, 546

Fabii, the, Consuls chosen from, 117
Fannius, C., 545 *note*
*Federal* and *National*, dispute as to the terms, 10 *note*
Federal Commonwealths, examples of, 4-6
relations of the members, 7
two classes of, 8-12
classification of government in, 12
Federal Government. *See* Federalism
Federalism, a compromise, 1, 13, 14, 69, 78
definition of, 2
examples of, 3-6
conditions of true Federalism, 8, 11
early approaches to, in Greece, 16, 112 *seqq.*, 145
its connexion with Athenian history, 32
approach to, in English relations with Scotland, 59 *note*
advantages of, 69
only suited to certain conditions, 70
popular prejudice against, *ib.*
American civil war no proof against, 71, 72
testimony of the Southern States to, 72
whether possible in monarchies, 74
viewed as an intermediate system, 77-79
as a political educator, 80, 83
favourable to local Self-Government, 82
desirable in certain circumstances, 83
inappropriate in others, 84
results of, in the United States, 85
its alleged weakness, 87 *seqq.*
facilities for secession, 89
example of the system in Switzerland, 92
close approach of the Amphiktyonic Council to, 101, 147
dangers of an overwhelming capital to, 120-122
Thalês' advice in favour of, 145-148

Federalism, evidence of the growth of, in Greece, 162
history of, in Greece neglected in England, 171
German writers on, *ib.*
revival of, in later Greece, 177
early establishment of, in Greece not desirable, 183
a reaction against Macedonia, 185
fullest and purest shape of, in Achaia, 199
unwilling members a source of weakness, 205
argument as to, deduced from break-up of Achaian League, 374-376
importance of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 444
in Greece, swept away by Rome, 551
monarchic, the true solvent for the Byzantine peninsula, 555
germs of, in ancient Italy, 558-559
in Spain and Gaul, 559
in Italy, agreements for and against, 616
in Germany, 621, 622
"Federalist," the, on the Amphiktyonic Council, 110 *note*
treatment of Achaian history in, 249
Feudalism, approach to kingly Federalism in, 74
Flamininus, T. Quinctius, his legislation in Greece, 120
his philhellenism, 473, 474
his moderation, 475
his terms refused by Philip, 482
proclaims the freedom of Greece, 484
his settlement of Grecian matters, 484-486
withdraws his garrisons, 486
his letter to Achaian Assembly, 490
his embassy to Greece, 491
his dealings with Messênê, 496
with Zakynthos, 497
marches against Sparta, 500
his demand for an Achaian Assembly refused, 511
Flanders, a fief of the Crown of France, 25 *note*
the common battle-ground of France and Austria, 63
Florence, dependencies of, 23
Parliament of, 31, 53 *note*
powers of the magistrates, 246
Foscari, Francesco, 168
France, civil wars in, 47 and *note*
frequent changes of government in, 86
local divisions represent ancient fiefs, 601
Kingdom of, compared with that of Germany, 623 *seqq.*, 630-632
as to National Assemblies in, 625
process of re-union in, 626
Kingship hereditary in, 627
Franconia, 631
Francis II., Emperor, calls himself "Emperor of Austria," 75 *note*
Frankfort, German confederation meets at, 122
Frederick Barbarossa, Emperor, as to his election, 595 *note*
authorities for his reign, 596 *note*
his character, 597, 607
his position not to be confounded with that of modern Austria, 597
his alleged breach of faith, 597 *note*
his war with the Lombard Cities, 598, 599
besieges Ancona, 609
defeated before Alexandria, *ib.*
negociates with the League, 609, 610
his defeat at Legnano, 610
reconciled to Venice and the Church, *ib.*
his truce with the King of Sicily, *ib.*
with the League, 611
joined by various Cities, *ib.*
concludes the Peace of Constanz, 612
crowned at Arles, 618 *note*
Frederick II., Emperor, his strifes with the Popes, 614
Frentani, the, 566
Fulvius, Cn., delivers Korkyra, 326
Fulvius, M., intervenes between the League and Sparta, 501
at the Special Assembly of Argos, 508 *note*

GABINIUS, A., 545 *note*
Gallus, C. Sulpicius, 535
Gardiner, Capt. Thomas, his plea to Charles II. "for relief," 299 *note*
Gauls, rude approach to Federalism among, in Asia, 165 *note*
invade Ætolia, 178, 192
and Macedonia and Greece, 178, 257
Confederations in, 559, 560 *note*

Gelnhausen, seat of Imperial Government, 593
Generals, Greek, powers of, 223
Genoa, dependencies of, 23
Germany, influence of the Empire on, 618, 621
its close connexion with Burgundy, 619
its identity with the Empire, 620, 627
Confederation of, 5, 10, 75, 122, 621, 622
process of disunion in, 74, 622, 627, 630-632
compared with England and France, 623 *seqq.*
origin of the Kingdom, 623
power of the royal authority in, 624
retention of National Assemblies in, 625, 626
a Confederation mainly of princes, 629
Diet of, *ib.*
loss of its ancient divisions, 630
its *arrière* vassals compared with those in France, 632
vast number of its states, 633
paralleled with Bœotia, *ib.*
Gessler, Tell's slaughter of, 300 *note*
Gibraltar, its relation to Great Britain, 270
Glabrio, M. Acilius, his campaign against Antiochos, 494
his treatment of Ætolia, *ib.*
Godfrey of Viterbo, 596 *note*
Gortys, 489 *note*
Goslar, seat of Imperial Government, 593
"Government" the, use of the name in England, 34 *note*
Gracchi, the, supports the cause of the allies, 582
*Graf*, original meaning of, 629 *note*
Grand Alliance under Macedonian headship, 389
Messênê asks for admission to, 398, 399, 401
holds a Congress at Corinth, 406
its strength compared with that of Ætolia, 409
Congress of, at Panormos, 434
Philip's Treaty with Hannibal as head of, 442
Great Britain, its union with Ireland, 76
Great Britain, dependencies of, compared with those of Ætolia, 270
Greece, small Federal States in, 5
city-commonwealths in, 13, 15-18, 24, 101
early forms of Constitutional Monarchy and Federalism in, 16, 112, 145
Civic Tyrannies in, 17
condition of independent cities in, 18
warfare in, compared with that of mediæval times, 44
republics of, a model for mankind, 67
position of the Amphiktyonic Council in, 98, 99
indisposed towards Federalism, 101, 102
results of Theban supremacy for, 134
results of dissolution of Olynthian League, 149
earlier and later history of, 172, *seqq.*
change in the language of, 173
wide spread of her culture, 174
effects of Alexander's conquests on, 175
Gaulish invasion of, 178, 257
under Philip and Alexander, 179
under the successors, 180
and under the Antigonids, 180-182
early Federalism in, undesirable, 183
effects of the Achaian League on, 184
Illyrian invasion of, 324
state of, after fall of Kleomenês, 389
alliance in, under Macedonian headship, *ib.*
becomes gradually dependent on Rome, 432, 433, 439
Roman goodwill towards, 473, 474
freedom of, proclaimed by Flamininus, 484
acquisition of territory in, by purchase, 497 *note*
Federalism in, swept away by Rome, 551
Revolution of 1862, 553
the Achaian League, the natural model for, 554

Greeks, no desire for real Federalism among, 147 (see *ante*)
Gregory IX., Pope, his strife with Frederick II., 615
Grote on autonomous city-communities, 15
on the Olynthian League, 150
his depreciation of the "Greece of Polybios," 177 *note*
Guernsey, its relation to Great Britain, 271
Gunther, his account of Frederick's campaigns, 596 *note*
Gythion, besieged by Nabis, 490

Hague, the, meetings of United Provinces at, 121
Haliartos, 522
Hannibal, his campaign against Rome, 433
his alliance with Macedonia, 439, 441 *seqq.*
called *senex* by Livy, 446 *note*
Hanover, State of, 632
Hanse Towns, League of, 6
Hekatombaion, battle of, 354
Helikê, 190
Hellas, wide signification of, 174 *note*
Henry III., Emperor, 595
Henry IV., Emperor, regarded as an old man, 446 *note*
his activity, 625 *note*
Hêraia joins Achaian League, 314, 315 *note*
taken by Kleomenês, 354
ceded to Achaia, 460
joined to Achaia, 485
Hêrakleia, Trachinian, annexed by Ætolians, 257
relation of, with the League, 260, 268
Ætolian Assembly at, 260 *note*
acquired by Achaia, 496
secedes from Achaian League, 547
besieged by Kritolaos, *ib*
Hermionê joins Achaian League, 331
secedes to Sparta, 372
Hernicans, traces of a League among, 561
Hierokles of Zakynthos, 497
Hieromnêmones, the, 102, 104 *note*, 108
"Highness," attempt to confer the title on Washington, 166 *note*
Hippolochos of Ætolia, 517
Hirpini, the, 566
History, "ancient" and "modern," as to the evil result of distinction between, 175, 274
Hostilius, A., 520
Hugh Capet, his election, 625 *note*
Hypata, 269 *note*
Hyperbatas, Achaian General, 353
Achaian General, his policy towards Rome, 513
opposes Egyptian appeal for help, 528

Iasos, plundered by Menalkidas, 540
Illyrians relieve Medeôn, 323
their ravages in Peloponnêsos, 324
occupy Korkyra, 326
kingdom of, dismembered by Rome, *ib.*
Innocent IV., Pope, 615
Ionian Islands, their relation to Great Britain, 270
Ionians, advice of Thalês to, 145, 146
Amphiktyonic relation of their colonies, *ib.*
feeling of town-autonomy among, 146
their request to Helikê, 191 *note*
Ireland, *quasi*-Federalism not to be desired for, 70
its union with Great Britain, 76
Iseas of Keryneia abdicates the Tyranny, 192, 194, 196 and *note*
Ismênias of Bœotia, 521
Isokratês, his policy compared with that of Agelaos, 437
Isthmian games, administration of, not Federal, 203 *note*
Romans admitted to, 327
Italians, ancient, their relations to Rome, 573, 578
claim Roman citizenship, 579 *seqq.*
their war with Rome, 576, 587-590
difference of feeling among, 580
their claims supported at Rome, 582
compared with the American colonists, 584
League formed by, 585
receive citizenship of Rome, 588
nature of the franchise, 589, 590
Italicum, capital of Italian League, 585
becomes Corfinium again, 588
Italy, Federalism in, 5, 558-561, 585

Italy, city commonwealths in, 15-18, 23, 24
designs of Philip V. of Macedonia on, 432, 434
uncertainty of its ethnology, 561
three great classes in, 573
Rome the great obstacle to permanent Federation in, 586
kingdom of, 593
union of with Germany under Otto the Great, 594
four opportunities for the union of, 600
no tendency to union in, 607
as to a union under Frederick II. or Manfred, 615
Italian nationality a modern idea, *ib.*
as to a Federal union in, 616
local independence the true policy for, 617
its connexion with the Empire, 618, 619

JASÔN of Pherai, 119, 151
Jersey, its relations to Great Britain, 271
John, Duke of Burgundy, his murder of Lewis, Duke of Orleans, 299 *note*
John of Salisbury, his defence of Tyrannicide, 299 *note*
Jus Latii, origin of, 573 *note*, 657

KADMOS, Tyrant of Kôs, 196 *note*
Kalaureia, Amphiktyony of, 98
Kallias, Tyrant of Chalkis, 162
Kallikratês of Leontion, growth of Roman party under, 512
his embassy to Rome, 513
his election as General, 514
opposes Egyptian appeal for help, 528, 529
at the Assembly of Amphipolis, 530
supports the demands of Rome, 531
opposes an alliance with Crete and Rhodes, 535
popular hatred of, 536 *note*
supports the appeal of Orôpos, 537
impeaches Menalkidas, *ib.*
sent to Rome, 539
his death, *ib.*
Kalydôn occupied by Achaia, 186, 255
Kaphyai joins Achaian League, 314, 344
secedes to Sparta, 372
Kaphyai, Aratos defeated at, 398
Karia subject to Rhodes, 167
set free, 168
Kassander, King of Macedonia, restores Thebes, 141
garrisons Achaian cities, 189
Kassander of Aigina inveighs against the offer of Eumenês, 509
Keians, their dealings with Ætolian Assembly, 263 *note*, 652
Kenchreia, 294
Keôs, 267, 268
Kephallênia, its relations with Ætolia, 270
with Great Britain, *ib.*
attacked by Philip, 427
taken by Rome, 496
Kephalos of Epeiros, his policy towards Rome, 519
joins Macedonia, 520
his death, *ib.*
Kerkidas, his embassy to Macedonia, 363 *seqq.*
Keryneia, in the original Achaian League, 190
joins in the revival, 192, 196
Kibyra, 165 *note*
Kimôn, his military powers pre-eminent, 234
Kinnamos, on Western and Eastern Emperors, 603 *note*
Kingship elective, tends to weaken royal authority, 628
Kinross and Clackmannan, sent members alternately to Parliament, 107 *note*
Kios, Ætolian dealings with, 267, 325
Kirrha, plain of, Spartan Crusade about, 99 *note*
Klarion, 396
Kleigenês of Akanthos, 150
Kleinias of Sikyôn, 280
Kleisthenês of Sikyôn, 279
Kleitôr joins Achaian League, 314
cleaves to it, 372 *note*
withstands Dorimachos, 403
Kleomenês, King of Sparta, his revolution, 337, 353
position as regards Achaia, 340
fortifies Athênaion, 344
invades Argolis, 345
his victory at Mount Lykaion, 347
his alleged murder of Archidamos, 350 *note*

enês, King of Sparta, attacks egalopolis, 350
ictory at Ladokeia, *ib.*
reatment of the body of Lydiias, 352
uccesses in Arkadia, 354
ictory at Hekatombaion, *ib.*
opularity in Greece, 355
policy and schemes, 356-358, 71
negociations with Achaian eague, 361, 367
llness, 367
ks off negociations, 369
Arkadian and Argolic cities, 72
ed by Argos and Corinth, 373
offers to Aratos, 378
champion of Greece, 382
war with Antigonos, 384 *seqq.*
s Megalopolis, 386
lefeat and exile, 387, 404
t of his death, 411, 413
enês, guardian of King Agêsilis, 413, 451
his position in the Athenian ssembly, 225, 235
of Sikyôn slain, 280
i joins Achaian League, 312
ns presidency of Nemean Games, 13
des to Sparta, 372
le of, 482
kos of Naupaktos, 269 *note*
ipted from slavery, 45 *note*, 434 *ote*
ongress of Naupaktos, 434
mbassy to Sparta, 451
mos, Tyrant of Phlious, 333
, Akarnanian General, 494
sion, 501
ra, among the worst of Greek mmonwealths, 47
ged by Illyrians, 324
enders, 326
nce of, with Rome, *ib.*
ia, meeting of Bœotian Amiktyony near, 124
royed, 136
ored, 140
ious centre of Bœotia, 190 *note*
orts Perseus, 522
os, Tyrant of Corinth, 276
ikleia, 349 *note*
ipolis of Sikyôn, 279
Kritolaos elected Achaian General, 543
his action at the Conference of Tegea, 544
his unconstitutional proceedings, *ib.*
his violence in the Assembly at Corinth, 545
besieges Hêrakleia, 547
his defeat and death, *ib.*
Kykliadas, Achaian General, joins Philip against Ætolia, 458
supports Philip, 477, 478
banished, 479
Kynaitha, Polemarchs of, 199, 403
Federal garrison at, 242
joins Achaian League, 314
return of the exiles, 403
sacked by the Ætolians, 44 *note*, 403
Kynoskephalai, battle of, 476

Ladokeia, battle of, 306 *note*, 350
Lævinus, M. Valerius, repulses Philip, 447
at the Ætolian Federal Congress, 448
Lagthing, Norwegian, 247
Laity and Clergy, no such distinction in ancient times, 102
Lakônia, towns of, their relations to Sparta, 22 *note*
mentioned in Herodotos, 139 *note*
Ætolian inroad into, 306 *note*
ravaged by Philopoimên, 465
towns of, granted to Achaia by Flamininus, 485
Lamia, victory of Philip near, 455
Lamian War, 257
Lamponius of Lucania, 591
Larisos, battle of, 458
Las, Spartan attack on, 500
Latin Colonies do not represent Latin League, 513 *note*
Latins, the, their relation to Rome, 573
Latium, League of, 5, 95 *note*, 568-572
Lechaion, 294
Legnano, battle of, 610
Lentuli, Publius and Servius, their mission to Peloponnêsos, 523
Leontion, 190, 192
Leontios of Macedon, his crimes, 384 *note*
plots against Philip, 427

Lerna, 362 *note*
Leukas, Akarnanian Assembly held at, 115, 483
besieged by Lucius, 484
separated from Ætolia, 519, 638
Leukopetra, battle of, 549
Leuktra, battle of, 137
Lewis, Duke of Orleans, his murder, 299 *note*
Licinius, P., his campaign against Perseus, 515, 517
Limoges, massacre at, 46 *note*
Lincoln, Abraham, 246 *note*
Liudprand, his Antapodosis, 593
Livy, his version of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 443
Lochagos of Ætolia, 517
Lodi, 604
Lokrians, the Amphiktyonic votes assigned to by Augustus, 106
Lombard Cities, predominance of, 594, 607
at war with Frederick Barbarossa, 598 *seqq.*
League formed by, 602
their internal independence recognized by Frederick Barbarossa, 613. *See* also Lombard League
Lombard League, beginning of, 602
growth of, 604
its indirect importance in Federal History, 605
analogy of with America and Netherlands, *ib.*
obligations towards the Empire recognized by, 605 *note*, 610
its congress, 606
not a true Federation, *ib.*
renewed against Frederick II., 607
a mere Confederacy, 608
sovereignty of Manuel not admitted by, 608 *note*
negociates with Frederick, 609, 610
victory of, at Legnano, 610
truce made with Frederick, 611
recognition of by Peace of Constanz, 613
revived under Frederick II., 614
first League primarily political, *ib.*
second primarily ecclesiastical, 615
Lombardy, the battle-ground of France and Austria, 63
Lords, House of, its analogy to the Achaian Assembly, 232
Lot, appointment by, 129 *note*
Lothar II., Emperor, 595
Louisiana, its purchase by the United States, 498 *note*
Lucanians, their feelings towards Rome, 580
hold out against her, 588, 590
Luzern, influence of on Swiss League, 272
Lydiadas of Megalopolis, his character, 315
gives up his Tyranny, 317
chosen General of Achaian League, *ib.*
his rivalry with Aratos, 318, 331, 345
his enmity to Sparta, 319
sends help to Korkyra, 325
his action with regard to the union of Argos, 332
declaims against Aratos, 346
stands against him for Generalship, 347
his death at Ladokeia, 351
treatment of his body by Kleomenês, 352
Lydiadas of Megalopolis, grandson of above, his embassy to Rome, 513
Lykaion Mount, battle of, 347
Lykian League, 6, 162-169
list of the cities, 163, 637
merits of the Constitution, 164-166
origin and history, 167, 168
destroyed by Claudius, 169
method of voting, 165, 212, 213
Lykians, their relation to the Greeks, 167
of Homer, 169 *note*
last teachers of old Greek philosophy, *ib.*
Lykiarch, President of Lykian League, 166
Lykiskos of Akarnania, 451
Lykiskos, Ætolian General, 517
instigates the massacre of Bæbius, 518
his death, *ib.*
Lykomêdês of Mantineia, 155 *seqq.*
Lykomêdês of Tegea, 155 *note*
Lykortas of Megalopolis supports Philopoimên's policy, 488, 490
his answer to Appius Claudius, 500
his embassy to Rome, 501
sent against Messênê, 505
his treatment of the rebels, 506

Lykortas of Megalopolis withstands the demand of Cæcilius, 510
his embassies to Rome, 510, 513
exhorts to strict neutrality, 525
supports Egyptian appeal for help, 528, 529
Lykos of Pharai, his office, 219 *note*
defeats Ætolians, 219
and ravages Elis, 429
Lykourgos chosen King of Sparta, 413
invades Argolis, 414
seizes Athênaion, 415
his banishment and return, 451
Lysippos, Achaian General, 477
Lyons, a free city of the Empire, 24 *note*

Mably on the Achaian League, 229
Macedonia, early form of constitutional monarchy in, 16
represented in the Amphiktyonic Council, 106
her supremacy over Thessaly, 119
her dealings with Olynthos, 150 *seqq.*
alliance of Megalopolis with, 161
Gaulish invasion of, 178
under the Antigonids, 178, 180, 189
aims of, opposed to those of Achaia, 179
her power in Greece compared with Austria in Italy, 181 *seqq.*, 196
Federal reaction against, 185
result of Achaian annexation of Sikyôn, 286
the Dêmêtrian War, 308
inaction of, 328
bought out of Attica by Aratos, 330
Megalopolitan Embassy to, 204, 366 *seqq.*
Achaian Embassy to, 401
feelings of, towards Achaian League, 421
relation of the army to the kings, 428
becomes gradually dependent on Rome, 433, 439
union under, desirable for Greece, 437
allied with Carthage, 439
first war with Rome, 447 *seqq.*
second war with Rome, 473 *seqq.*
policy of Flaminius towards, 475
third war with Rome, 514 *seqq.*
Greek feeling on behalf of, 515 *seqq.*
Macedonia, divided into four Republics, 516 *note*
intercourse with, forbidden by Achaia, 522
fourth war with Rome, 539
becomes a Roman province, 540
Machanidas, king of Sparta, 451
attacks Achaia, 453
his defeat and death at Mantineia, 464, 465
Machatas wins Elis over to Ætolia, 411
his embassy to Sparta, 411-413
success of his second mission, 414
Malta, its relation to Great Britain, 270
Man, its relation to Great Britain, 271
Mantineia, destroyed by Sparta, 154
its restoration, 155
hostile to Tegea, 155, 161
ally of Sparta, 161
Federal garrison at, 242
joins the Ætolian League, 268
suit at, between Argos and the Achaian League, 302
revolutions of, 315
joins Sparta, 342
taken by Aratos, 347
readmitted to League, 348
as to the μέτοικοι at, 348 *note*
and the embassy to Achaian Assembly, 349 *note*
revolts to Kleomenês, 354
taken by Aratos, 385
his treatment and renaming of, *ib.*
battles of, 464
Manuel Komnênos, Eastern Emperor, his action towards the Lombard Cities, 602
aspires to reunite the Empires, 603
his sovereignty not admitted by Lombard League, 608 *note*
defends Ancona, 609
Marcellus, Roman envoy, 517, 523
Achaian negociations with, 527
his letter to the League on the Egyptian question, 529
Marcius, Q., dissolves the Bœotian League, 144, 521
Marius, C., supports the cause of the allies, 582, 590
his war with Sulla, 590

Markos of Keryneia, chosen General of Achaian League, 193, 223, 277
his death, 325
Marks, instances of the growth of, 571
Marseilles, a free city of the Empire, 24 *note*
Medeôn, Ætolian attack on, 268 *note*
besieged by Ætolia, 322
relieved by Illyria, 323
decree of the Assembly, *ib.*
betrayed to Antiochos, 494
Mediatization, use of the phrase, 632 *note*
Megaleas of Macedonia, plots against Philip, 427
Megalopolis, city of, no separate international existence, 7, 78
helps to restore Thebes, 142
foundation of, 152 *note*, 156, 159
Θερσίλιον at, 159 *note*
advantageous position of, 160
later history of, 161
indemnity paid to, by Achaia and Elis, 189
subject districts of, 200
joins Achaian League, 315, 317
her disputes with Sparta, 339, 344, 534
attacked by Kleomenês, 350
death of Lydiadas at, 351
commissioners from, to Federal Assembly, 363
her embassy to Antigonos, 204, 364
envoys' report to Assembly, 365
cleaves to the League, 372, 376
taken by Kleomenês, 386
military assembly at, 398
special decree as to its troops, 429
mission of Aratos to, 199 *note*, 429
Alipheira ceded to, 460
supports Philip, 480
discontent in, towards Philopoimên, 488
his dismemberment of the townships, 489
her pre-eminence in the League, 486, 489 *note*
designed as a *Mark* against Sparta, 160, 571 *note*
Megara, Athenian enmity towards, 43
joins Achaian League, 294
joins Bœotian League, 374
Megara, later secessions of, 374 *note*
rejoins Achaian League, 477
surrenders to Metellus, 548
Megistonous, 350 *note*
Mêlos, massacre of, 46
Memnôn of Pellênê, 479
Menalkidas, Achaian General bribed, 537
impeached by Kallikratês, *ib.*
plunders Iasos, 540
commits suicide, *ib.*
Mercenaries, employment of, 235, 242
Messênê, helps to restore Thebes, 142
foundation of, 140, 152 *note*
plundered by Dorimachos, 395
her relations with Ætolia, 399
asks for union with Grand Alliance, 390 *note*, 398, 401 *note*
action as regards Social War, 409, 414
disturbances in, caused by Philip, 444, 445
joins Rome and Ætolia, 450
delivered by Philopoimên, 477
united to Achaian League, 496
secedes from the League, 505
execution of Philopoimên at, *ib.*
readmitted to the League, 506
her exiles restored, 514
refuses to wage war with Rome, 548
Metellus, Q. Cæcilius, mediates between Achaia and Sparta, 540
again attempts to preserve peace, 545
his efforts on behalf of Achaian League, 546
his sentence on the Thebans, 547
his negociations with Sôsikratês, 548
Metellus Pius, his war with Samnium, 589, 590
Methydrion, taken by Kleomenês, 345
μέτοικοι, as to, at Mantineia, 348 *note*
Mikiôn, persuades Athenians not to help Aratos, 379
Mikkos of Dymê, 416
Milan, destruction of, 43, 600
seat of Imperial government, 593
joins Lombard League, 604
crowning-place of kings of Italy, 611, 657
Ministry, English, its position, 33

Mithridatês, gives citizenship to μέτοικοι in Asia, 348 *note*
supports Italians against Rome, 587
Mitylênê, nature of its alliance with Athens, 19, 27 *note*
massacre of, 46
Mnasilochos, 494
Molossis, constitutional monarchy in, 117
conquered by the Romans, 520
Mommsen, on the philhellenism of Flamininus, 474 *note*, 499 *note*
Monarchies, secessions in the case of, 72
Monarchy, Federal, scheme of, 75
approaches to, 74, 75
Monza, crowning-place of Italian kings, 596 *note*, 618 *note*, 599, 657
Morena, Otto, 596
Mounychion restored to Athens, 330
Mühlhausen, 273 *note*
Mummius, L., sent against Achaian League, 546
his victory at Leukopetra, 549
sacks Corinth, 550
fine imposed on League by, *ib.*
Mure, Colonel, on the Amphiktyons, 97 *note*
Mykalêssos, massacre at, 44 *note*
Mysôn of Sikyôn, 279

Nabis, Tyrant of Sparta, 465
defeated by Philopoimên, 477
Argos ceded to, 481
his socialist measures, 481 *note*
allowed to retain Sparta, 485
his conference with Titus and Aristainos, 485 *note*
besieges Gythion, 490
murdered, 491
Nairn and Cromarty, sent members alternately to Parliament, 107
National and Federal dispute as to the terms, 10 *note*
National Assemblies, retention of, in Germany and England, 625, 626
Naupaktos, held by Achaia, 186
acquired by Ætolia, 255, 268, 269 *note*
relations of, with the League, 260
congress of, 434
peace of, 438
Ætolian Assembly at, 476
Nemean Games, rival claims to celebration of, 313
restored to Argos, 433 *note*
Nêsos, taken by Rome, 449
Netherlands, United Provinces of. *See* United Provinces
New York, state of, no separate international existence, 7
its position compared with that of Megalopolis, 78
not the seat of government of United States, 121
Niebuhr, sets forth the importance of Greek Federalism, 171
Nikaia, widow of Alexander of Corinth, 277, 294
Nikander of Ætolia, 517
Nikias, peace of, compared with that of Agelaos, 439
Nikodemos of Elis, his embassy to Rome, 505
Nikoklês, Tyrant of Sikyôn, his dread of Aratos, 281, 282
escapes from Sikyôn, 283
Nikomêdeia, seat of Imperial government, 593
Nikophanês, his embassy to Macedonia, 353 *seqq.*
Nikopolis, 106
Nikostratos, Achaian general, his victory at Kleonai, 482
Nizza, cession of, compared to that of Akrokorinthos, 380
Normans in Apulia and Sicily, 594
Norway, its position compared with greater states, 40
its union with Sweden, 76
Numidians, support Rome against the Italians, 586

Octavius, Cn., sent as Commissioner to Ætolia, 517, 518
to Akarnania, 518
Offices, unpaid, effect of, 230
Oiniadai, hostile to Athens, 115
joined to Ætolian League, 256
taken by Rome, 449
restored to Akarnania, 495
Olenos, 190
Oligarchy, definition of, 231 *note*
Oligarchy and democracy, 133, 134
Olpai, seat of the Akarnanian Council, 115
Olympian Games, rival claims to celebration of, 313

Olynthos attempts to form a League, 149-151
its dissolution fatal to Greece, *ib.*
views of Mr. Grote on, 150
her relations with Macedonia and Thrace, 151 *note*
real nature of her "League," 152
Onchêstos, 124 *note*
Orchomenos (Bœotian), secedes from Bœotian League, 131
destruction of, 136
restoration of, 140
Orchomenos (Arkadian), compelled to join Arkadian League, 157
joins Ætolia, 314
joins Sparta, 342
attempt of Aratos on, 343, 353
kept by Antigonos, 386
pretended cession of, by Philip, 478
Roman demand concerning, 541
Orestes, L., his embassy to Achaian League, 541
protests against a breach of International Law, 542
Orikon taken by Philip, 447
Orôpos, disputes of, with Athens, 536
appeals to Achaian Assembly, 537
help decreed to, *ib.*
Orthagoras of Sikyôn, 279
Otto the Great, Emperor, union of Italy and Germany under, 594
Otto of Freising, 596
Otto Morena, *ib.*
Oxford University, meeting of congregation and convocation, 240 *note*, 241 *note*

PADUA joins Lombard League, 602
Pagai, 490 *note*
Palermo, seat of Imperial government, 593
Pallantion, 346, 489
Panormos, congress at, 434
Pantaleôn of Ætolia, 308
Papirius, Cn., his embassy to Achaian League, 545
Paris, kings of, extent of their power, 74
the *Mark* of Gaul, 571
Parliament, British, members of, compared with the Athenian citizen, 32, 33, 34
its analogy to Amphiktyonic Council, 104
Paseas of Sikyôn, 281
Passarôn, 117
Patrai, an ally of Athens, 187
expulsion of Macedonian garrison, 189
in the early Achaian League, 190
joins Dymê in reviving the League, 191
helps Ætolia against Gauls, 192, 197
restored by Augustus, 192 *note*
alleged party of Antiochos in, 496 *note*
Patricians, their strife with the Plebeians, 574
Patriotism, confined to the city in ancient Greece and Italy, 15
its intensity in small states, 38
Paulus, L. Æmilius, his character, 516
Ætolian appeal to, 518
sent to devastate Epeiros, 520
his friendship towards Polybios, 533
Pausanias on the Amphiktyonic Council, 105
mentions the Phôkian League, 113
Pausanias of Epeiros, 482
Pavia, seat of Imperial government, 593
Peace, internal, secured by large states, 61
Peiraieus, attempt of Aratos on, 309
retired to Athens, 330
Pelopidas, career of, 134
Peloponnêsian War, neutrality of Achaia, 187
Peloponnêsos, 202, 552
extension of the League in, 498
Pelops, king of Sparta, 451
Pellênê, an ally of Sparta, 187, 197
of Thebes, 187 *note*
tyranny of Chairôn at, 188
in original Achaian League, 190
recovered by League, 192
supposed capture of by Agis, 305 *note*
taken by Ætolia, 307
recovered by Aratos, *ib.*
occupied by Kleomenês, 372
Pentri, the, 566
Peraia, Rhodian, 482
Periklês, his position compared with that of Aratos, 225
his civil powers preeminent, 234
Periklês, the younger, his dialogue with Sôkratês, 130 *note*

Perseus, King of Macedonia, effect of his war with Rome on Federal Greece, 514 *seqq.*
his character, 515
Ætolians said to have appealed to, 517
enters Ætolia, *ib.*
Bœotian alliance with, 521
his letter to the Achaian League, 522
Petit, John, his defence of Tyrannicide, 299 *note*
Phaineas, Ætolian General, 494
Phanotê, siege of, 520
Pharai, member of the Achaian League, 190
ravaged by Ætolia, 416
*Sonderbund* formed by, 417
an independent member of the League, 507
Pheneos, joins Achaian League, 314
secedes to Sparta, 377
Phigaleia, its relations with Ætolia, 270
joins Ætolia, 314
held by Ætolia, 395
surrenders to Philip, 419
Philinos of Corinth, tortured by Diaios, 541 *note*
Philip of Macedon, enforces Amphiktyonic decrees in Phôkis, 100, 105
his embassy to the new Bœotian League, 134 *note*
founder of the modern Greek nation, 175
his policy towards Greece, 179
Philip, son of Dêmêtrios of Macedon, 329
succeeds Antigonos, 394
his treatment of the Phthiôtic Thebes, 269 *note*, and above
summons a congress at Corinth, 404, 406
deals with Spartan affairs at Tegea, 404-406
his letter to the Ætolians, 407
speaks at the Achaian Assembly, 408
his military skill, 414, 416
and paramount importance, 415
restores Teichos to Dymê, 418, 424
his Peloponnêsian campaign, 419
annexes Psôphis to Achaian League, *ib.*
his relations with the League, 420
Philip, son of Dêmêtrios of Macedonia, his relations with Aratos, *ib.*
redress obtained from, by Aratos, 422
influence of Apellês on, *ib.*
interferes in Achaian election, 423
Apellês accuses Aratos to, 425
his action in the matter, 426
Apellês plots against, 427
attacks Kephallênia, and destroys Thermon, *ib.*
his success in Northern Greece, 430
embassy from Chios and Rhodes to, 430, 431
his designs on Italy, 432
hears of Hannibal's successes, 433
advice of Dêmêtrios to, *ib.*
gathers a Congress at Panormos, 434
his negociations with Ætolia, 435
regards himself as a Greek, 437
concludes peace, 438
his alliance with Hannibal, 439 *seqq.*
his impolitic conduct, 440
position discussed by, in the Treaty, 442
disturbance at Messênê caused by, 444
his second attempt on Messênê, 445
charges brought against, 446
regarded as older than he was, 446 *note*
attacks Illyria, 447
besieges Echinos, 453
his victory near Lamia, 455
embassies of mediation to, *ib.*
honours paid to, at Argos, 456
at the Aigion Conference, *ib.*
breaks off negociations, 457
repulses the Romans, 458
defeats the Ætolians, *ib.*
his attempt on Hêrakleia, 459
his cessions to Achaian League, 460
makes peace with Ætolia, 466
at the Conference of Phoinikê, *ib.*
his aggressive proceedings, 472
his dealings with Achaian League, *ib.*
devastates Attica, 473
his war with Rome, 473-475
attempts to gain over Achaia, 478
Philip, General of Epeiros, at the Conference of Phoinikê, 466
Philippopolis, name of Phthiôtic Thebes changed to, 430

Philoklês of Macedonia, 481
Philomêlos of Phôkis, 114
Philôn of Thessaly, envoy of Metellus, 548
Philophrôn of Rhodes, 167
Philopoimên, 212
and Assemblies, 216
his military reforms, 243, 454, 462
first mention of, 386
his share in the victory of Sellasia, 387
his character and policy, 392, 393
refuses the offers of Antigonos, 393
withdraws to Crete, *ib.*
compared with Aratos, 447
chosen general of Achaian cavalry, 453
his exploits against the Ætolians, 458, 459
chosen General of the League, 461
his victory at Mantineia, 464
slays Machanidas, 465
ravages Lakônia, *ib.*
Philip's alleged attempt to poison, 472
exhibits his phalanx at Nemea, 477 *note*
drives back Nabis, 477
delivers Messênê, *ib.*
retires to Crete, *ib.*
his policy towards Rome, 487
feelings against at Megalopolis, 488
his policy of equality among the townships, 489
his war with Nabis, 490
unites Sparta to the League, 492
as to his Generalship, 501 *note*
withstands the demand of Cæcilius, 510
his embassy to Rome, *ib.*
refuses Titus' demand for an Assembly, 511
Philostratos of Epeiros, 519
Phlious joins Achaian League, 333
secedes to Sparta, 373
Phoibidas, his seizure of the Kadmeia, 100, 133
Phoinikê, Illyrian capture of, 324
restored to Ætolia, *ib.*
Conference at, 466
Phôkian League, described by Pausanias, 113
Phôkian League, probably revival of an older League, *ib.*
Phôkians, 431 *note*
Phôkiôn, his position in the Athenian Assembly, 225
Phôkis, Amphiktyonic decrees enforced by Philip, 100, 105
votes restored to, by Augustus, 106
damages paid to, by Thebes, 547
Phôtos Tzabellas, 117 *note*
Pindar, his use of *βασιλεύς*, 27 *note*
Pisa claims presidency of Olympian Games, 313
Placentia, negociations of peace at, 612
Plataia secedes from the Bœotian League, 129
subsequent fate of, 131
her restoration, 133
destroyed by Thebes, 136
restored by Macedonia, 140
Plebeians, their strife with the Patricians, 514
Pleurôn annexed by Achaia, 496
secedes from Achaian League, 535
Plutarch, his account of the Theban Archon, 129
Poland, election of kings of, 53, 54, 55 *note*
nature of the nobility, 54
institution of hereditary monarchy, 55
Polybios, his mention of the Amphiktyonic Council, 110 and *note*
his account of Bœotia, 142
neglect of, in English Universities, 171
character of the age of, 175
compared with Thucydidês, 176
as to date of his birth, *ib.*
his Macedonian bias, 179
his sketch of the Achaian Constitution, 198
on unity of Peloponnêsos, 202
his account of an Achaian Cabinet Council, 221
of a Caucus, 222
of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 441
at the funeral of Philopoimên, 512
his speech as to the restoration of Eumenês' honours, 526
chosen Master of the Achaian Horse, *ib.*
his embassy to Marcius, 527

Polybios opposes Appius Claudius, 528
supports Egyptian appeal for help, 528, 529
sent for trial to Rome, 533
effect of sojourn at Rome on, *ib.*
his return, 536
legislates for Achaian cities under Rome, 551
Polydamas of Pharsalos, 151
Polykrateia carried off by Philip, 446
Polyphrôn of Pherai, 119
Polysperchôn, his policy towards Greece, 180
Pontius of Samnium, his march against Rome, 591
Popillius, C., sent as Commissioner to Ætolia, 517, 518
to Akarnania, 518
Postumius, his excuse as to writing in Greek, 110 *note*
his embassies to the two Leagues, 326
Prætor, Latin origin of the office, 570 *note*
Presidency, easily developed into Empire, 135
President, agreement against a single President, 223 *note*
President of the United States, method of his election, 56
his relations to Congress, 218, 227 *note*
compared with Achaian General, 227, 244 *seqq.*
evil of the interregnum after his legal election, 236
question as to his re-election, *ib.*
longer term of office in the Southern Confederation, 237 *note*
Congress, 244
his kingly powers, *ib.*
Prime Minister compared with Achaian General, 224, 227
his position compared with that of American President, 245 *note*
Principalities, small, on the incorporation of, 178 *note*
Prisoners of war sold as slaves, 45
Privy Council, attendance at, 241 *note*
Proklos, a Megarian Amphiktyon, 107 *note*
Proklos, Caius Curtius, 374 *note*
Property, intercommunion of, in the Achaian League, 201 *note*
Property qualification, 209
non-existent in Achaian League, 230
Provence, 25 *note*
Prussia, formation of, 632
Prytanis of Megalopolis, 199 *note*
Psôphis, its incorporation with Elis, 416 *note*
annexed to Achaian League, 419
Ptolemies, Philomêtôr and Euergetês, appeal to Achaian League for help, 528
embassy sent to, 529
Ptolemy, garrisons Sikyôn, 279
Ptolemy Epiphanês, King of Egypt, his war with Philip, 472
Ptolemy Philopatôr, fails to keep Aratos, 282
his gifts of money, 284, 302
suspicions with regard to, 288
gives Aratos a pension, 289 *note*, 302
his alliance with Achaian League, 302
supports Kleomenês, 378 *note*
mediates, 430-442
Pylagoroi, the, 102, 104 *note*, 108
Pylos, its cession demanded by Ætolia, 457
Pyrrhos of Epeiros, 178
his wars with Antigonos Gonatas, 276
Pytheas, Theban Bœotarch, 546 *note*

Quinctius, L. (brother of Titus Flamininus) besieges Corinth, 480
wins over some Akarnanians, 483
Quinctius, T. *See* Flamininus

Radevic, continuer of Otto of Freising, 596 *note*
Ralph of Milan, 596 *note*, 597 *note*
Ravenna, seat of Imperial government, 593
Representative Government, approach to, in the Amphiktyonic Council, 108
Representative system, necessary in large free states, 52
exceptions to, in Europe and America, 53
Republics, usually confined to small states, 13

Republics not necessarily Federations, 73
small, on the incorporation of, 178 *note*
Requisitions, inadequacy of the system, 10
system of, in the Achaian League, 11
common under despotisms, 11 *note*
system of, in Achaian League, 241 *seqq.*
Réunion, use of the phrase, 624 *note*
Rhodes, subjection of Lykia and Karia to, 167
deprived of this power, 168
mediates, 430-442
offers mediation to Philip, 455
its war with Philip, 472
concludes alliance with Achaian League, 480
asks help against Crete from Achaia, 535
Rhion, proposed conference at, 407, 430
Rome, effects of incorporation at, 23
power of the Assembly compared with that of Athens, 37
bribery at, 65
voting of the Tribes, 164
embassy of, to Corinth, 203
embassies to, of Achaian cities, 204
ambassadors from, at Aigion, 214 *note*
change of Consuls, 236
as to re-election of Consuls, 238
Ætolian hostages to, 265 *note*
Ætolian agreement with, 266
Akarnania applies for help against Ætolia, 321
mandate of, to Ætolia, 322
declares war against Illyria, 326
Greek alliances made by, *ib.*
dismembers Illyria, *ib.*
sends embassies to Greece, 327
honours granted to by Corinth, *ib.*
result of her interference in Greece, 328
history interwoven with that of Greece, 433
beginning of her influence in Greece, 439
effect of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 444
her policy of alliance, 447
her connexion with Ætolia, 448
her alliance with Ætolia, 449
Rome, her conquests in Greece, 449, 453, 456
repulsed by Philip, 455, 458
cessions at Peace of Epeiros (Phoinikê), 466
her treatment of the Ætolians, 467
declares war against Philip, 473
philhellenic feeling at, 473, 474
union of Greek States under, 475 *seqq.*
campaign of, against Antiochos, 494
treatment of Ætolia, 494-496
her Treaty with Ætolia, 495
retains Kephallênia, 496
her intrigues against the Achaian League, 499, 564
Achaian and Spartan embassies to, 501
her encroachments resisted by the Achaian League, 509-511
requires the restitution of the Lacedæmonian exiles, 513, 514
war of, with Perseus, 514 *seqq.*
action of, towards Ætolia, 518
towards Akarnania, 519
conquers and devastates Epeiros, 520
intrigues of, in Bœotia, 521
dealings of, with Achaian cities, 523
her further inroads on Federal rights, 525
her policy towards Achaia, 530
demands the condemnation of the chief Achaians, 531
her treatment of the exiles, 532, 533
her dealings with foreign nations, 534
her intrigues against Eumenês and the League, 535
her 4th Macedonian War, 531 *seqq.*
sends an embassy to Corinth, 541
demands dismemberment of the League *ib.*
treatment of, by Kritolaos, 543
her war with Achaian League, 546-550
reduces Achaia to a dependency, 550
treatment of the country, 550-552,
*quasi*-Federal elements of, 558, 572 575
intrigues, *ante*, 553
treaty of, with Carthage, 508 B.C., 569

Rome, her relations of the Latin League, 570
probable origin of, 571
Latin proposals for union with, *ib.*
dissolves the League, 572
her gradual incorporation of other states, 572, 592
importance of the Social War, 576
character of her dominion, 578
as to the claim of citizenship with, 579 *seqq.*
analogy of this claim with that of American Colonies, 584
the great obstacle to a permanent Italian Federation, 586
yields to the demands of the allies, 587
wars of, with Samnium, 588, 590-592
provincial policy, 592
forsaken by the Emperors, 593
Roman "Faith," 494
Romuald of Salerno, 596 *note*
Rotation, appointment by, 129 *note*
Roufos of Patrai, 553
Rutledge, Governor, absolute power granted to, 377 *note*

Sainte Croix on the Amphiktyonic League, 97
Salamis in Cyprus, kingdom of, 27 *note*
restored to Athens, 330
Salynthios, King of the Agraians, 255
Samnites, their feelings towards Rome, 580
hold out against her, 588, 590
their defeat by Sulla, 591
devastation of their country, 592
Samnium, League of, its position under Rome, 561
League of, 565-568
Savoy, cession of, compared to that of Akrokorinthos, 380-382
a fief of the Empire, 620 *note*
Saxony, Kingdom of, not identical with ancient Saxony, 631
Scipio supports the cause of the allies, 582
Scotch Universities, voting of the Nations in, 164
Scotland, her relations with England slightly Federal, 59 *note*
*quasi*-Federalism not to be desired for, 70
its union with England, 76
Seal, badge of office in Achaia, 234
badge of office in Outer Appenzell, 234 *note*
Self-Government, local, in Federal states, 82
Sellasia, battle of, 387
Sempronius, Publius, lands at Epidamnos, 466
makes peace with Philip, *ib.*
Senate of Achaian League. *See* Achaian League
Senators in the United States, 19 *note*
Sforza, Lewis, betrayed by his Swiss Guards, 273
Sicard of Cremona, 596 *note*
Sicily, Tyrannies in, 18
Normans in, 594
Sigonius, *de regno Italiæ*, 596 *note*
Sikyôn joins Achaian League, 278, 285-287
sketch of its history, 279 *seqq.*
admitted on equal terms, 286
traitors at, killed by Aratos, 373
cleaves to the League, 376
Federal Assembly at, 377
alliance with Rome, decreed at, 479
debate at, on the Egyptian question, 529
nominated to arbitrate between Athens and Orôpos, 536
Skarpheia, battle of, 547
Skerdilaidos of Illyria, 402, 435 *note*
Skiônê, massacre of, 46
Skopas, 263
of Ætolia, 315
his ravages in Peloponnêsos, 402
destroys Dion, 419
elected general, 408
Lævinus negociates with, 448
legislation of, 476
at Alexandria, *ib.*
Slavery, a necessary condition of pure Democracy, 30 *note*
Slaves, prisoners sold as, 45
Social War, causes of, 394
decreed at Corinth, 407
beginning of 414
between Rome and Italians, 576, 583-587
Sôkratês, his dialogue with Perikles the younger, 131 *note*
Soldiers, citizen and professional, compared, 44-46.
Solôn, sacred war under, 99

Sôsigenês of Rhodes, 509 *note*
Sôsikratês, his negociations with Metellus, 548
tortured to death by Diaios, 549
Sôsitheos of Magnêsia, envoy of Philip, 442 *note*
Sôsô, shelters Aratos, 280
Sounion, restored to Athens, 330
Spain, absorption of the various kingdoms in, 76
Confederations in, 559
Sparta, position of the Lakônian towns under, 22 *note*
her relations to her Peloponnêsian allies, 27 *note*
position of slaves in, 30 *note*
her rivalry with Athens, 43
disregards the Amphiktyonic fine, 100
as such, not a member of the Amphiktyony, 103
her policy at the Peace of Antalkidas, 132
her garrisons in the Bœotian cities, 133
Thebes puts herself on a level with, 139
humiliation of, by Epameinôndas, 140
averse to Federalism, 148, 149
dissolves the Olynthian League, 149
destroys Mantineia, 154
and Megalopolis, 204
repulses Pyrrhos, 277
its alliance with Achaian League, 305
her independence, 335
causes of war with Achaian League, 338 *seqq.*
acquires Ætolian towns in Arkadia, 342
Achaians declare war against, 344
effect of loss of Mantineia on, 349
its supremacy sought for by Kleomenês, 357
treatment of, by Antigonos, 387
joined to the Confederacy, 389
political parties in, 404, 411
disturbances at, 405
Philip's judgment with regard to, 405, 406
vouchsafes no answer to Corinthian Congress 409
Ætolian embassy to, 411, 412
Sparta, state of the Government, 412
refuses Ætolian alliance, 413
revolution in, *ib.*
joins Ætolia against Achaia, 414
Ætolian and Akarnanian embassies to, 451
joins Ætolia, 453
retained by Nabis, 485
Ætolian attempt on, 491
annexed to Achaian League, 492
Philopoimên settles differences at, 500
attacks Las, *ib.*
secedes from the League, *ib.*
treatment of by Philopoimên, 502
continued disputes at, 503
formal reunion with League, 504
exiles from, restored, 514
her dispute with Megalopolis, 534
sends an embassy to Rome, 538
at war with the League, 538 *seqq.*
Roman interference in the matter, 541
war declared against by Kritolaos, 546
Lakônian towns reunited to, 550
Spear, badge of office of Theban Archon, 129, 234
Special Correspondents, 463
Spence, Mr., on the American Union, 111 *note*
State Composite, the, 9
States, large and small, system of, 13
definition of, 14
small and large, definition of, 14, 49 *seqq.*
large, definition of, 14, 50
intensity of patriotism in, 38
common fallacy as to small ones, 40
results of the system of, 50-53
influence of the capital in, 51
general view of the system, 57
local diversity in, 58
advantages of, 61-64
disadvantages of, 64-67
balance in favour of, 67
large, not necessarily monarchical, 73
large division of, 489 *note*
States Confederated, system of, 8, 9
Storthing, Norwegian, 247
Strabo, his account of the Lykian League, 163

Stratiôs of Tritaia, 525
sent for trial to Rome, 533
released, 536
accused of treason, 546
Stratos, seat of the Akarnanian League, 115
Stymphalos joins Achaian League, 312
Stymphalos, 377 *note*
Successors, wars of, 180, 257
Achaia under, 189
Suffrage, Universal Napoleonic, 55
Sulla, L. Cornelius, his war with Samnium, 588
with Mithridatês, 589, 590
with Marius, 590, 591
overthrows the Samnites, 591
and devastates Samnium, 592
Sulpicius, Publius, his naval warfare in Greece, 453
repulsed by Philip, 458
Commander in Second Macedonian War, 473
his legislation, 589
supports the cause of the allies, 590
killed, *ib.*
Swabia, 631
Sweden, its union with Norway, 76
Swiss Confederation, 4, 5, 6
action of, as regards external matters, 10
its action as regards Napoleonic aggressions, 41 *note*
as to its seat of government, 121
sketch of its history, 271-274
compared with Ætolian League, 271 *seqq.*
its diet not representative of the people, 630
Swiss Cantons, dependencies of, 23
Switzerland, its position compared with greater states, 40
both primary and representative Assemblies in, 77 *note*, 80
problem as to its government solved by Federalism, 92
League, its analogy with that of Samnium, 567
"Switzerland, French" a misnomer, 273 *note*
Synods, Christian, compared with the Amphiktyonic Council, 98, 99, 102
early representative forms in, 109
TARENTINES, use of the name, 351 *note*, 463 *note*
Tarquinii, Consuls chosen from, 117
Tauriôn, Macedonian commander, 396. 403
plots against Philip, 427
sent to negociate with Aratos, 434
his share in the poisoning of Aratos, 446
Taxation, Federal system of in Achaia, 242
Taxes. *See* Requisitions
Tegea, its relations with Mantineia, 155, 161
joins the Arkadian League, 156
ally of Thebes, 161
joins Ætolia, 314
joins Sparta, 342
attempt of Aratos on, 343
united to Achaian League, 386
Philip at, 404, 405
Congress of, 490
sham Conference at, 543
Têians, their dealings with Ætolian Assembly, 263 *note*
Teichos, occupied by Ætolia, 416
restored to Dymê, 418, 424
Tell, William, his slaughter of Gessler, 300 *note*
Telphousa joins Achaian League, 314
Tenea joins Metellus, 549
Teôs, suggested by Thalês as a seat of government, 145 *note*, 148
its connexion with Ætolia, 268, 270, 325, 652
Teuta, Queen of Illyria, invades Peloponnêsos, 324
treatment of, by Rome, 326
Thalês, his advice to the Ionians, 145, 148
Theaitêtos of Rhodes, 167
Thearidas, his embassy to Rome, 542
"Theban," use of, by Thucydidês and Xenophôn, 125
Thebes, her greatness, 16
her position in the Bœotian League, 22 *note*, 122, 129
her enmity towards Athens, 43
destruction of, *ib.*
seizure of the Kadmeia, 100
effects of her position on Greek history, 123
her superiority represented by two Bœotarchs, 126 *note*

Thebes, Archon of, a mere pageant, 129
her treatment of Thespiai and Plataia, 130, 131
her claims at the Peace of Antalkidas, 131
oligarchic government in, 133
becomes the centre of Democracy, 134, 135
results of her supremacy, 134
destruction of smaller towns by, 136
general Greek hatred of, 137
claims the headship of Bœotia, 137, 138
puts herself on a level with Sparta, 139
claims exclude true Federalism, 140
Macedonian garrison in, *ib.*
destroyed by Alexander, 141
restored by Kassander, *ib.*
her modified headship, 142
supports Macedonia against Rome, 143
Federal Assembly meets at, *ib.*
her policy towards Achaian cities, 188
Thebes, Phthiôtic, treatment of by Philip, 269 *note*, 430
name changed to Philippopolis, 430
Theisoa, 489 *note*
Theodotos of Epeiros, supports Macedonia, 519
his death, 520
Thermon, public monuments at, 255
Ætolian Assembly at, 260 *note*, 517
destroyed by Philip, 427
Thermopylæ, Roman victory at, 494
Thespiai destroyed by Thebes, 130, 136
restored, 140
Thesprôtis, constitution of, 116 *note*
early republican development in, *ib.*
Thessaly, contributory boroughs to, in the Amphiktyonic Council, 106
no real Federalism in, 118
Tagos of, 118, 119
a dependency of Macedonia, 119, 181, 421, 442 *note*
legislation of Flamininus, 120
Ætolian conquest in, 341
new Federations in, 484
Thirlwall, his *History of Greece*, 171
Thirty Years' War, character of, 64
Thoas of Ætolia, 517
Thouria admitted to Achaian League, 507
Thourion, meetings of Akarnanian League at, 115
besieged by Antiochos, 494
Roman Commission at, 518
Thrace, her relations with Olynthos, 150 *note*
Thucydidês, his use of "Bœotian" and "Theban," 125
compared with Polybios, 176
Thyrrheiom, her coinage, 638
Ticino, Swiss annexation of, 273
Timocracy, definition of, 64 *note*
Timokleidas of Sikyôn, 280
Timokrates of Pellênê, 485 *note*
an Argeian Amphiktyon, 107 *note*
Timoleôn, as to his slaying his brother, 298
Timophanês, Tyrant of Corinth, 194 *note*
Timoxenos, General of Achaian League, 236, 362
re-elected General, 377 *note*, 396
his unwillingness to proceed against the Ætolians, 397
Aratos makes him resign office, 398
his unsuccessful candidature, 423, 424
Tisippos of Ætolia, 518
Tittmann on the Amphiktyonic League, 97
Titus Flamininus. *See* Flamininus
Tocqueville, de, on the Greek republics, 32 *note*
on the Amphiktyonic Council, 110 *note*
Tortona, attitude to the Emperor, 595
joins Frederick Barbarossa, 611
Town-autonomy. *See* City-commonwealths
Tribunes, power of, 244 *note*
Triphylia, conquered by Philip, 419
pretended cession of, by Philip, 460, 478
joined to Achaia, 485
Tritaia, in the original Achaian League, 190
joins in the revival, 191
ravaged by Ætolians, 416
*Sonderbund* formed by, 417
Tritymallos of Messênê, 378 *note*

Troizên, joins Achaian League, 295
seceders to Sparta, 372
Twelve, its existence as a political number, 562
Tyrannicide, Greek view as to, 27, 297, 298
French and English defence of, 299 *note*
Tyrant, Tyranny, meaning of the word, 17 and *note*, 195
"to plant," use of the term, 181 *note*
nature of, in Greece, 194, 297
earlier and later compared, 194
voluntary abdication by, 196 and *note*

UMBRIANS, their relations towards Rome, 580
threaten secession from Rome, 587
United Provinces, their union, 4, 5
meetings of, at the Hague, 121
compared with Lombard League, 602, 605, 607
United States, their union, 4, 5
their action as regards external matters, 9, 10
method of electing the President, 56
civil war in, no proof against Federalism, 71
nor against the Union, 72
a league of countries, 77
representative Assemblies in, *ib.*
scale of the States compared with those in Europe, 78
results of the Union, 85
the Union compared with government in France, 86
evils hindered by the Union, *ib.*
war between North and South, 91
seat of government at Washington, 121
tendency to assimilation in, 200
difference of franchise in, 201
diplomatic action compared with that of Achaia, 202 *seqq.*
relation of Congress and the President, 217, 218
election and deposition of the President, 218 *note*
general comparison of, with Achaian League, 243-251
as to the Senators' votes, 247 *note*
democratic feeling in, 248
United States, not an imitation of Achaian League, 249
as to Presidential interregnum, 396 *note*
its provision as to dividing large States, 489 *note*
first Congress (of thirteen States) not representative of the people, 630

VALERIUS, L., 494
Veientines, their resort to Kingship, 564
Venice, dependencies of, 23
her relations to the Eastern Empire, 25
her degradation in later days, 40
Great Council of, 53 *note*
new relations with the Lombard cities, 602
her policy towards the two Empires, 609
concludes peace with Frederick Barbarossa, 610
Verona, march of movement in, against Frederick Barbarossa, 602
Vicenza joins Lombard League, 602
Villius, P., 474
Virginia, appointment of a Dictator contemplated, 317 *note*
analogy of, with Megalopolis, 486, 489 *note*
Volscians, traces of a League among, 561 and *note*
Voltumna, the religious centre of Etruria, 563
Votes, apportionment of, to members, 105, 164, 211, 212

WAR, constant state of, among City-commonwealths, 42
severity of the Laws of, 45
evils of, lessened in large States, 62
Washington, George, his attempt to raise a volunteer cavalry, 454 *note*
Washington, seat of government of United States, 121, 216
Westphalia, 631
Peace of, 622
William, the Bad, 601 *note*
William, the Good, 601 *note*

XANTHOS, embassies sent by, 168
destruction of, 169

Kenarchos, Achaian General, 522
Xenôn of Hermionê gives up his tyranny, 331
Xenôn of Patrai, challenges the Roman envoys, 531
Xenophôn, his use of "Bœotian" and "Theban," 125
bare mention of Arkadian League in, 157
Xerxes, his dialogue with Dêmaratos, 139 *note*

ZAKYNTHOS taken by Philip, 434
Zakynthos, invaded by Rome, 449
ceded to Amynander, 466
dealings of Titus with, 497
Zama, battle of, 472
Zeuxidas, Akarnanian General, 484
Zônaras, his version of the Treaty between Philip and Hannibal, 443
Zug, canton of, 165 *note*
City of, compared with Thebes, 126 *note*
Zürich, Canton of, no separate International existence, 7

THE END

*Printed by* R. & R. CLARK, *Edinburgh*.