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

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The Balfour Lectures on Realism

Delivered in the University of Edinburgh

BY

A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON

LL.D., D.C.L.

FELLOW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND METAPHYSIC

IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

EDITED, WITH A

Memoir of the Author

BY

G. F. BARBOUR

D.PHIL. EDIN.

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PREFACE.

AMONG the writings of Professor Pringle-Pattison which never appeared in a permanent form during his lifetime the most important was the Third Series of Balfour Lectures. These were delivered early in 1891, six months before his transference from the Chair of Logic in the University of St Andrews to the corresponding Chair in Edinburgh. The history of the Balfour Lectureship, and some indications of the reasons which prevented Professor Seth, as he then was, from publishing these Lectures on Realism as the sequel to *Scottish Philosophy* and *Hegelianism and Personality*, will be found in Chapter IV. of the Memoir which forms the earlier part of the present volume. So they need not be set out at length here. But it is well to state in a sentence the reasons which have led to their publication now. They not only complete a series of Lectures the earlier instalments of which awakened keen interest at the date of their publication and for long after, but they fill a considerable gap in the record of Professor Pringle-Pattison's philosophical development, and show how he regarded the problems of Epistemology at the end of his first period as a teacher and writer. Although they have not before appeared in volume form, they were published in the *Philosophical Review*, under the editorship of Dr J. G. Schurman; and those responsible for

this volume desire to thank the present editor of the *Review*, and the authorities of Cornell University, by whom it is published, for their courtesy in allowing the Lectures to be reprinted here.

Although the Memoir is not a long one, the number of those who have helped in its preparation is very considerable. The contribution of those who have placed letters at my disposal will be estimated by the reader of the Memoir itself; but I wish to express my special indebtedness to Mr Norman Pringle-Pattison and other members of Professor Pringle-Pattison's family who have given the most generous assistance; to Mrs John MacCunn, Mr J. B. Capper and Mr R. P. Hardie for valuable information and other help; and to Mr William Menzies for the account of the St Andrews professorship which forms the greater part of Chapter V. I am also greatly indebted to Mrs Edgar Dugdale, who has given on behalf of the late Earl of Balfour's literary executors permission to make free use of the correspondence extending over many years between Lord Balfour and Professor Pringle-Pattison; and I would extend not less hearty thanks to Miss Haldane for similar permission to use letters to and from Viscount Haldane, and to Mrs de Glehn and Mr R. C. Bosanquet, who have kindly allowed me to include in Chapter XI. unpublished letters of great value from Mr F. H. Bradley and Professor Bernard Bosanquet respectively.

G. F. BARBOUR.

FINCASTLE, PERTHSHIRE,
September 1933.

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MEMOIR

OF

ANDREW SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON

BY

G. F. BARBOUR

CHAPTER I.

EARLY YEARS.

1856-1878.

ANDREW SETH—in later life ANDREW SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON—was born at 1 West Claremont Street, Edinburgh, on December 20, 1856. Unlike that great philosopher who would never acknowledge his birthday, because he felt that it linked him too closely to a vanishing and illusory world, Seth felt a quiet pride in those forebears whose life formed the background of his own. Nor can his character be fully understood without some reference to that vigorous, if austere, intellectual and religious life which throughout the nineteenth century sent forth so many lads of Scottish country stock to be leaders of thought and action in their own and other lands. The soil in which his life had its roots is described in the opening sentences of a brief Memoir of his younger brother James, which he wrote in 1925—sentences which may be quoted here, since they are equally applicable to himself.

He was the second son of Smith Kinmont Seth and Margaret Little, the eldest having died in infancy. "Although by birth a townsman, he came both on the father's and the mother's side of country stock. His paternal grandfather, William Seth, was a well-to-do farmer in the east of Fife, latterly at Rires, near Kilconquhar, and many of the boy's happiest memories

were of long summer holidays there and the noble prospect of the Firth of Forth which the place commanded. His mother's family had been connected for several generations with Langholm, on the Scottish Border, where they owned some land. His maternal grandfather, Andrew Little, after a voyage to America in 1805 to investigate prospects there, eventually settled near Lauder in Berwickshire, where, with the aid of one of his brothers, who remained unmarried, he purchased the farm of Middle Blainslie in 1814. The two brothers farmed the place together till 1848, when they found themselves able to retire to Edinburgh with a small competence. Margaret, the youngest but one of Andrew's children, was then in her eighteenth year. Smith Seth, her future husband, the youngest of a large family, had entered the service of one of the Scottish banks, and removed to Edinburgh about the same time, or soon after, on his appointment to a clerkship in the Head Office of the Commercial Bank there. The two were married in 1854, and . . . of their family of seven, four sons and two daughters grew up to manhood and womanhood." [1]

When Andrew was still in early childhood his father passed through a serious illness, and thereafter the parents were advised to move from the north of the city to a district on the south side, at a higher altitude and above the mist and 'haar' from the Firth of Forth which so often enshrouds the valley of the Water of Leith. His father's health improved, and after more than one move the family remained in the pleasant Grange district, where they were within easy reach of the home of the maternal grandparents in Dick Place. Through the seventies they lived at 13 Mansionhouse Road.

[1] *Essays in Ethics and Religion*, by James Seth, edited with a Memoir by A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *ad init.*

Andrew was from the first a child of bright and eager mind. He knew his letters at two, and could read in his fifth year. This suggests the precocious mental history of John Stuart Mill half a century before; but happily his subsequent development, though always rapid, became more normally so. When he went to school, his mother, though herself of notably active mind, found it hard to keep abreast of his reading. He seems to have escaped the critical intolerance which is a besetting fault of quickly developing youth, for his younger brothers and sisters, including two who were his juniors by twelve or fifteen years, always remembered his invariable humility and helpfulness, which they felt were inherited, not from one parent, but from both. The younger brothers and sisters of his friends were impressed by the same thoughtful kindness, and came to love him hardly less than did the members of his own family.

After attending a small private school near his home, he went to the Royal High School, associated with the early days of Scott, and one of the leading Secondary Schools of Edinburgh. His years there were filled with hard study, his chief recreation being the long walks on which he accompanied his father or school friends. Sometimes he played shinty, a form of hockey native to Scotland, and distinguished from the English game by its freedom from rules for the protection of life and limb.

The Rector of the High School in Seth's day was James Donaldson, afterwards Principal Sir James Donaldson of St Andrews. Another future Principal of a Scottish University, Sir George Adam Smith, was a pupil at the High School, but, though only a few weeks older than Seth, was a year ahead both at school and college. In the Rector's class in Classics, however, which comprised the two senior years, they found

themselves together. Another class-fellow, whose course ran *pari passu* with Seth's and whose friendship he valued increasingly during more than sixty years, was John Brainerd Capper, the son of an English artist in impaired health, who had settled in Edinburgh mainly for the education of his children. "We lived not far apart," Mr Capper writes, "and our evenings were often spent in coaching each other for examinations in which we were both to compete, all special knowledge individually acquired being thrown into a common stock."[1] In the final year in the High School (1872-3), Capper beat Seth by a very narrow margin in the comprehensive examination for the High School Club Prize; but neither gained the Dux medal, then awarded to the head of the Latin class alone. It went to a boy who concentrated for the purpose on that special subject, whereas the two friends aimed at a wider circle of attainment. In those days the Scottish schools and universities already treated English literature as a central subject, and it was often admirably taught —a feature of their work which did not a little to outweigh the more profound classical scholarship of the English Public Schools. The senior English master in the High School, John Merry Ross, was one of these thorough and inspiring teachers of English; and the love of Latin and Greek which Seth acquired in Donaldson's class was at least equalled by the appreciation of English poetry which Ross did much to awaken.

Seth went on with Capper and A. M. Stalker, another close friend, to the University of Edinburgh in the late autumn of 1873. More than fifty years later a distinguished colleague of Seth's, Professor W. P. Paterson, described how, as a younger boy at the Royal High School, he had watched "that colossal figure

[1] *Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison* (Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. xvii.).

leaving the School to pass on to the University, covering himself with glory." The University was in those days, as Professor Paterson added, "a remarkable nursery and feeding-ground of talent." It was passing through a period of change, though many years were still to pass before some of the more important developments were completed.

There was as yet no University Union or University residence; for most students there was little social and no athletic life. But the intellectual life was of the keenest, and there was full opportunity for independent reading, as well as unhurried companionship, in the long vacation which followed the six strenuous months of the winter. In the Faculty of Arts the graduation course was strictly prescribed, every student being required to pass in Humanity (Latin), Greek, English Literature, Logic and Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy, Mathematics, and Natural Philosophy (Physics). Only when these seven subjects had been gone through on the Pass standard was it possible to take additional subjects or to read for Honours. This standard was not, indeed, a severe one, and much of the work in the ordinary classes was of the type now covered in Secondary Schools; yet, for a student beginning at fifteen or sixteen, as was then usual, and proceeding to Honours, the course was exacting enough, and for the few who, like Seth, took two Honours groups, the years of student life were crowded and strenuous.

The professors in the Faculty of Arts in the seventies formed a distinguished group. Tait, the Professor of Natural Philosophy, was the friend and fellow-worker of Kelvin, and one of the greatest scientific teachers of his time. Blackie, in the Greek chair, was a picturesque figure, about whom many legends gathered. But the three professors who, by personality and teach-

ing, left a deep impress on the life of Andrew Seth were William Young Sellar, David Masson and Alexander Campbell Fraser. The training in Latin begun under Donaldson was continued under Sellar, a man whose genial and generous nature was clothed in something of the *gravitas* of the old Roman world, and whose friendship enriched the life of his pupil for many years. In visits to the home of Sellar and his brilliant wife, the foundation was laid of a later and lifelong friendship; for in after years one of the daughters of the house, Mrs John MacCunn, and her husband, the Professor of Philosophy in the University of Liverpool, took a special place in the inner circle of his intimates.

The Professor of English Literature was also a man of distinguished character and achievement, once described by Thomas Carlyle in these words: "David Masson, sincere and sure of purpose; very brave, for he has undertaken to write a history of the universe from 1608 to 1674, calling it a Life of John Milton." [1] Sellar's treatment of Lucretius and Virgil, and Masson's of Milton and Wordsworth, together led Seth towards that view of the unity of the highest poetic and philosophic insight which is implicit in much of his writing, and to which he gave deliberate expression in the Preface to his Gifford Lectures on *The Idea of God*. The teaching of these two men helped also to mould that admirable prose style—always clear and felicitous and not seldom eloquent—which never failed him during fifty years of authorship.[2]

But the master influence of his years at the University was that of Campbell Fraser, whose class he entered in 1874, and whom he succeeded as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics seventeen years later. In Sir James

[1] Quoted by Campbell Fraser, *Biographia Philosophica*, p. 246.
[2] Cf. Lord Haldane's tribute to these men, especially Sellar, in his *Autobiography*, pp. 6-8.

Barrie's *An Edinburgh Eleven* there is a witty description of the venerable professor who taught self-confident undergraduates to "wonder if they existed strictly so-called," and who "led his classes into strange places and said he would meet them there again next day." But he continues in a more serious vein, "Metaphysics may not trouble you, as it troubles him, but you do not sit under the man without seeing his transparent honesty and feeling that he is genuine. In appearance and in habit of thought he is an ideal philosopher, and his communings with himself have lifted him to a level of serenity that is worth struggling for."

Campbell Fraser's character and teaching are clearly reflected in his *Biographia Philosophica*, a book which is less known than its remarkable qualities warrant. Its opening chapter records the memories of a boy in the Highland manse of Ardchattan, first looking out on the wonder of the universe in days when George IV. was on the throne, and when it was still possible to talk with a venerable lady who had reached womanhood when her brother was killed at Culloden, or with a man who had guided Johnson and Boswell in their journey across Lorn. It ends with the retrospect of a philosopher who in his eighty-fifth year is able to say, "The perplexing doubts about the universe, in which I newly found myself in youth, have led to deeper faith in the immanent Divine Spirit, transforming death from a movement in the dark into a movement in Omnipotent Goodness; trusted when it withdraws us from this embodied life, still unable to picture what lies in the future."

But in 1874 the publication of Campbell Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism* was twenty, and of his *Biographia Philosophica* thirty, years off. He had not then given so clear a form to his ultimate philosophical convictions; but on the basis of his long study of Berkeley

he was gradually leading his abler students from an intellectual interpretation of the world as intelligible, orderly, trustworthy, to the further conviction that it subserved the ends of moral and spiritual beings. As the goal of their progress he pointed to a "rational Faith-venture," which he later summarised as the belief that "nature in experience is really the language of God, and that Divine Order is supreme and universal."

Andrew Seth's debt to Campbell Fraser is best understood from the words of his Inaugural Lecture on his return to Edinburgh in 1891. "Seventeen years ago I entered the Junior Logic class of this University, with a mind opening perhaps to literature, but still substantially with a schoolboy's views of existence; and there, in the admirably stimulating lectures to which I listened, a new world seemed to open before me. What the student most needs at such a period is to be intellectually awakened. . . . He has to be induced to ask himself the world-old questions, and to ponder the possible answers. Above all, the listener should be made to feel that the questions of which the Professor speaks are not merely information which he communicates—that they are to him the most real things in the world, the recurring subjects of his deepest meditation. All this his students found realised in Professor Fraser's teaching. . . . The sense of mystery and complexity in things, which he brought so vividly home to us, inspired a wise distrust of extreme positions and of systems all too perfect for our mortal vision. This union of dialectical subtlety with a never-failing reverence for all that makes man man, and elevates him above himself, lives in the memory of many a pupil as no unworthy realisation of the ideal spirit of philosophy. I shall count myself happy if, with his mantle, some portion of his spirit shall be found to have descended upon his successor. I hope that, in the days to come, the dingy but famous classroom will

be distinguished as of old by searching intellectual criticism and impartial debate, not divorced from that spirit of reverence and humility which alone can lead us into truth." [1]

Alongside or even in some measure counter to the placid stream of Campbell Fraser's Berkeleian theism, there flowed other currents in the philosophical thought of this decade in Edinburgh. For living in the city, though not teaching in the University, was Dr James Hutchison Stirling, whom Andrew Seth described a few years later as being "for distinctively metaphysical acumen probably not surpassed by any man living." [2] This may sound an exaggerated estimate, but it represented the writer's deliberate opinion of the first British thinker who expounded in a thorough and sympathetic way the philosophy of Hegel. It is true that the title of Hutchison Stirling's chief book, *The Secret of Hegel* (published in 1865, twelve years before Edward Caird's *Philosophy of Kant*), invited the easy witticism that the Secret had been successfully kept by the learned author; but to the keener and more penetrating students of those years, his pioneer work, followed by that of Green and Caird, made possible a new understanding of German idealism. This tendency, in contrast to the prevailing English empiricism, and to Campbell Fraser's *via media*, afforded full scope to the "searching intellectual criticism and impartial debate" referred to in the Inaugural Address just quoted. The chief scene of this debate was the Philosophical Society of the University. There the name of Robert Adamson, afterwards Professor of Logic in Glasgow University,

[1] *Man's Place in the Cosmos, and Other Essays*, p. 25 f. Later in the same volume (pp. 218 ff.) is reprinted a long appreciation, with hardly a note of criticism, of Campbell Fraser's *Philosophy of Theism*, which Seth contributed to the *Quarterly Review* in 1898.

[2] In an unsigned review in the *Scotsman* of Dr Stirling's *Text-book to Kant*.

who had graduated in 1871, was still mentioned with a respect not unmingled with awe by those who followed in the middle seventies; and of the brilliant group of that period, D. G. Ritchie, W. R. Sorley and R. B. Haldane became personal friends of Seth. Fifty years after, Seth wrote: "Haldane was an active member of this Society as long as he remained in Edinburgh, and it was there that I first made his acquaintance, though it was only later, after my own return from two years' study in Germany, that our acquaintance ripened into intimacy and a lifelong friendship." [1] Another of the group was Alexander Mitchell Stalker, who found his life-work in another field, as Professor of Medicine in University College, Dundee. Stalker had already at the High School been a class-fellow, and formed a third in the intimate friendship of Seth and J. B. Capper.

Before referring to the discussions in which the friends explored the high region where philosophy and theology meet, we may turn to Seth's tributes to two of the great writers who made an ineffaceable mark on his mind in these years. First stands the teaching of Carlyle, in whom the students of Edinburgh felt an almost personal pride. Thirty years later Seth wrote, in the Introduction to a volume of Carlyle's Essays which he edited: "The Rectorship of a Scottish University is no hall-mark of literary or philosophical distinction, but when Carlyle was elected Rector of the University of Edinburgh in 1865, by the students of his *alma mater*, it was instinctively felt to be the fitting tribute of eager and ingenuous youth to the greatest of living Scotsmen and one of the chief intellectual and moral forces of the century. In the seventies (I speak of my own undergraduate days) Carlyle's hold upon the younger genera-

[1] *R. B. Haldane* (Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. xiv.). For the influence of the Philosophical Society, cf. the Memoir of James Seth already referred to, pp. xvi f.

tion was in no way relaxed. The Goethean psalm of life, of which he was so fond—and which in his own rendering has a deeper organ-tone than the original—still chanted itself in many a youthful heart as a real 'road-melody or marching music of mankind.'"

The unique contribution to his spiritual development of the poetry of Wordsworth appears clearly in the record of his vacations of 1874 and the two following summers. This is preserved in long journals and journal letters, written in the minute but singularly clear handwriting which changed its character very little as the years passed. Earlier holidays had often been spent at Rires, his own description of which has already been quoted. In April 1874 he was there again for ten days. "The weather was superb to idle and loll about the fields," he notes. "I had *In Memoriam* and *Jane Eyre* with me. My eyes were weak, I remember, and I wore a green shade." Thus early, unremitting study had caused that weakness of eyesight which, although it never caused grave anxiety, troubled him at intervals throughout life and added to the burden of his work.

In autumn, after spending August at Largs on the Firth of Clyde, he was back at Rires, and it was then that, on Capper's recommendation, he took up the study of Wordsworth. The following winter was a crowded one, for it included some teaching as well as much study. During these months, while Campbell Fraser's lectures were opening the vistas of philosophic thought before him, "Carlyle's marching music of mankind" used to ring in his mind on his evening walks home. "For a long time," he continues, "that was my main spiritual food. All through the winter I was engaged in following out everything connected with the Wordsworths and so becoming acquainted with Coleridge and De Quincey. Judge of my delight when the Gray Essay was announced—subject, Wordsworth.

I discovered it one morning in the end of March just before going to Tait's [class], and at once resolved to write it; and the plan soon sprang up of a trip to the Lakes."

A few days later he crossed the Border for the first time on a solitary expedition to the Wordsworth country. After walking from Windermere Station to Ambleside, he found lodgings—" a delightful parlour and bedroom (white curtains and other things to match) for 10s. a week"; and his letter expressed the hope that his mother would not think the room too dear. For a week he tramped the valleys round, visiting Rydal, Hawkshead and the many other spots especially associated with the poet, and exploring the Langdale valley and the Kirkstone Pass. During the last three days of the expedition he covered much ground. On the first he walked by Dunmail Raise to Keswick; next day he visited Borrowdale and Southey's grave at Crossthwaite; and on the final morning he climbed Skiddaw before catching a train north at mid-day.

Through the summer, in the intervals of other work, Seth was engaged on his essay, which must have been one of considerable length; for it was not completed till late in August at Brodick in the Isle of Arran. The months of work which he gave to it wrought the poetry of Wordsworth into the fabric of his thought, and he speaks of the blending during these months of Carlyle's prophetic message with the Wordsworthian influence. This month in Arran (August 1875), like other West Coast holidays, he spent in reading, varied by some boating and fishing, two ascents of Goatfell, and other walks with his father and younger brothers and sometimes with other companions. Among these was Robert Todd, a friend of singularly gracious character whose early death not long after was a cause of great grief to the Seths' whole circle. Twice during the

month Andrew went off for two days—the first time alone round the north of the island, the second time with his brother James to the south. On this occasion they found a hospitable welcome in a farm at Corriecravie looking towards Ailsa Craig. The journal notes how heartily the two lads (aged eighteen and fifteen) were received, how they shared in the warmth of a glorious peat fire and "listened to the simple, mirthful talk" of their kind hosts, as all those who had been at work on the farm gathered in. Their bedroom, with its uneven clay floor, opened off the kitchen, and after a supper of scones, cheese and new milk, they lay in bed listening to the Gaelic speech in the kitchen, broken now and then by peals of hearty laughter.

Seth was no naturalist, for botany and zoology seldom entered into a liberal education in the Scotland of that day; but he was keenly observant of the broader effects of natural scenery as well as of much beauty in detail, and the influence of Wordsworth comes out in many a sentence describing light and shadow on hill and sea, or the changeful aspects of the sky. At one point he recalls the "absolute terror" which took hold upon him when, on an earlier visit to Arran in 1871, he first reached the top of Goatfell and looked down into Glen Rosa, 2000 feet below, and across to the jagged peaks which guard its head. His spirit was in a high degree receptive of the influences of nature in her various moods.

In the spring of 1876 Seth broke new ground by his first expedition to the Continent. With a fellow-student, Thomas Gilray, afterwards a professor of English Literature in New Zealand, he crossed from Leith to Rotterdam, whence they made their way to Cologne and the Rhine. A summer *semester* at the University of Heidelberg was the object of their journey; and from the first weeks of their residence Seth's letters are full

of appreciation of that German life with which a few years later he was to form the closest of personal ties. The beauty of the town and its surroundings, the inexhaustible walks along the valley of the Neckar, up the many side valleys which converge upon it, on the wooded hills above, and the rooms found by the two Scots lads with wide views from their lofty windows—these things and many more are described; nor does the furniture escape notice, for being less in quantity than in the British houses of the day, it can be well seen, and is all of fine quality. Other features appeal to him less, such as the unpunctual and casual ways of professors and others—for Prussian efficiency had not spread to the Rhineland sixty years ago—and, it need hardly be said, the custom of duelling. Church singing he feels too slow, and he weighs the arguments for and against the continental Sunday. "A great many people," he writes, "get no rest at all, so that upon the whole I think the continental peoples wrong themselves in not having a more complete day of rest. Scotland, of course, errs nearly as far in the opposite direction. England, perhaps, hits the mark more nearly."

At the university he highly appreciated the brilliant lectures of Kuno Fischer, and, soon after the *semester* began, reported that he could follow these quite easily. In July he was going through Fischer's *History of Modern Philosophy* at the rate of fifty pages a day, and by the end of the summer he had not only mastered German, but laid the foundation of the wide knowledge of the history of philosophy which served him well in later years. Through the writings of Carlyle he had already come to realise the greatness of Goethe, and closer study of his poems was undertaken as a preparation for a short visit to Frankfurt after the session closed.

His debt at this time to his mother's sister, Miss Isabella Little, ought not to pass unnoted, for a series

of long letters is addressed to his "learned aunt"; and it is clear that he owed to her not only occasional financial help, but the stimulating comradeship of an alert and enterprising mind. It is chiefly in his letters to her that he discusses such subjects as Sabbatarianism and the Old Catholic movement led by Dr Döllinger. At this time she was engaged in the study of Greek, and one letter from Heidelberg gave advice as to the peculiarities of verbs in $\mu\iota$. But eighteen months later, just when her nephew was about to graduate, she evidently threatened to navigate seas where he could no longer act as pilot and mentor, and he put in a note of warning: "I am afraid, speaking from report, that you will find Hebrew more difficult to tackle than Greek. We have an old Hebrew lexicon which you once bought. If you really begin, you shall get it on the first opportunity."

Before we complete this brief account of Seth's *Lehrjahr* in Edinburgh and pass on to his *Wanderjahr* —his second and longer time of study in Germany— it is needful to give some account of the trend of his religious thought. It was impossible for any serious student in Scotland during the seventies to disregard the effect of new scientific or philosophic theories upon the traditional religious beliefs of the society around him. The bearing on these of the Darwinian theory of evolution was being discussed on every hand. The summer of 1876, which Seth spent peacefully in Heidelberg, saw the Free Church of Scotland, to which he belonged, stirred by the beginning of the fierce and prolonged controversy aroused by the critical views of William Robertson Smith, then a young professor of Old Testament Language and Literature in the Church's College in Aberdeen. These two new lines of discussion—the evolutionary and the critical—were vigorously followed out by laymen as well as by experts, and

brought to a sharp issue the relation of the new learning to the old theology. Further, as we have already seen, the view of the world to which Campbell Fraser pointed the way had a theological as well as a strictly philosophical aspect; and the study of the German idealists brought Seth from another angle to see the importance of the Philosophy of Religion as linking metaphysics with theology. A survey written in July 1877, of his intellectual development during the three previous years, gives an intimate and moving view of the process by which he passed from the orthodoxy of his earlier upbringing to a religious outlook in harmony with the new knowledge of the time.

He notes that the spring of 1874 was that of the visit of Moody and Sankey, the American evangelists, to Edinburgh; and that their visit coincided with the time when he was beginning to think on serious matters. "They were not without some effect on me. I remember being deeply moved by their parting address." The following winter was that in which he entered Campbell Fraser's class; and he records that keen competition between A. M. Stalker and himself was accompanied by much friendly discussion of Berkeley, Hamilton and other thinkers, when "everything was delightfully fresh." The winter saw an increasing intimacy between Stalker, Seth and Capper; and the last-named, now the only survivor of the three friends, recalls in how purposeful a way Seth set himself to this task of revaluation —as in later life to more practical tasks—without outward clatter or disturbance, or visible evidence of *Sturm und Drang*, but with a quiet determination to go, in Plato's phrase, wherever the argument might lead.

A year later the influence of George Eliot and Matthew Arnold had become not less strong than that of Carlyle and Wordsworth. "In *Adam Bede* George Eliot first gained her prophetic hold over me. It was a time of

opening up, aided by the influence of nature around me and my studies in Wordsworth. The direction was pantheistic, and was not checked by Robertson, who supplied the moral element." [1] This refers to the holiday in Arran already described, which was continued with J. B. Capper and his parents at Ballachallan, a farm overlooking the Tay Valley some miles above Dunkeld. "Capper and I used to stroll for a quarter of an hour or so just before going to bed under the deep blue and sparkling lights of a September night, with the Tay gleaming in its shingly bed below: talk runs deep at such seasons . . . it turned a good deal on 'the All' and Personal and Impersonal. . . . I began *Romola*, which moved me profoundly and left its abiding mark on my life. I remember incidentally that we used to frighten Mr and Mrs Capper rather by our Berkeleianism and our firm conviction that it must be *either* spirit or matter, not *both*. Carlyle's essay on Novalis is also associated with these days." The fragment ends with the following winter in Edinburgh, when Seth had "devoured" *Literature and Dogma* and *God and the Bible;* and he and Stalker counted it a special privilege that they were enabled, through the exertions of Mr Capper, to hear Matthew Arnold lecture on Butler. He then adds an unconscious touch of hero-worship: "We handled his MS. afterwards in the reporter's hands."

Such were some of the influences that helped him on the first stage of his pilgrimage towards the theism which was his final creed. The next step appears in a remarkable passage of autobiography in *Hegelianism and Personality* (2nd ed., p. 63 f.), which probably describes the two years which followed his first visit to Germany. After referring to Green's view of the "eternal Self"

[1] F. W. Robertson of Brighton, whose *Sermons* and *Life* Seth was also reading.

as creating "the manifold individual selves" which we know, he continues :—

"Probably no one who has really lived in this phase of thought can fail to remember the thrill with which the meaning of the new principle first flashed upon him, and the light which it seemed to throw upon old difficulties. It had become impossible, with due regard to the unity of things, to conceive God as an *object*, as something quite external to ourselves; and, on the other hand, there seemed nothing but a relapse into ordinary Pantheism, with its submergence of self-consciousness, and all that hangs thereby, in a general life, which reason and conscience alike declare to be inferior to our own. But, in this dilemma, the universal consciousness seemed to rise upon us as a creative power which was not without us, but within—which did not create a world of objects and leave it in dead independence, but perpetually unrolled, as it were, in each of us the universal spectacle of the world. The world was thus perpetually created anew in each finite spirit, revelation to intelligence being the only admissible meaning of that much-abused term, creation. We had here a new and better Berkeleianism, for God in this system (so it seemed) was not an unknown Spirit, hidden, as it were, behind the screen of phenomena; God was not far from any one of us, nay, He was within us, He was in a sense our very Self."

CHAPTER II.

GERMANY.

1878-1880.

In the spring of 1878 Andrew Seth completed his five years' course at Edinburgh University, where his brother James was already following in his steps. He graduated with first class Honours both in Classics and in Philosophy, then a rare, and in later days an almost unknown, distinction at Edinburgh. The high promise which he had already shown was brought to the notice of Dr Martineau by Mr Jasper John Capper, the father of his friend, who had some acquaintance with the great Unitarian thinker; and this helped to secure for Seth a Hibbert travelling scholarship, after an interview in London in July. A similar scholarship was granted at the same time to a Canadian student, who had worked with him in the Honours classes during the previous winter, and who became a lifelong friend—Jacob Gould Schurman. Dr Schurman's later career was both varied and distinguished. He became a citizen of the United States and President of Cornell University, and like many other American scholars, achieved high distinction in the public service. He was chosen as President of the Commission to the Philippine Islands in 1899, and afterwards filled various diplomatic posts. After the war he was appointed

American ambassador, first to China and then to Germany.

During a holiday with his family at Pirnmill in Arran, we find Seth deeply engaged in a fresh study of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a preparation for his sojourn in Germany. In October the two Hibbert scholars set out, Schurman going to Heidelberg to study under Kuno Fischer, and Seth to Berlin, where his chief teacher was Zeller, the well-known historian of Greek philosophy. As regards his main object, a deeper understanding of the great German idealists, he found that the German universities had little help to give; for other forms of thought than the Hegelian were in the ascendant, and Kant was studied chiefly for the sake of his Theory of Knowledge, interpreted, in the main, in an agnostic sense.[1] This accounts for such impatient *obiter dicta* in his letters as that the worst place for the study of German idealism was Germany, and that lectures were to be looked on as "one of the main obstructives to study." "Study," in this sense, was provided for immediately after his arrival, when he spent £5, 2s. on complete editions of Kant and Hegel —a sum equal to the whole cost of his outward journey. Yet Zeller's learning and thoroughness impressed him, and he found the lectures of Paulsen, a leader among the younger thinkers, acute and stimulating, though he describes him as prone to give the latest scientific theory as a basis of philosophy—"not the deeper results of Kant and Hegel: for that a jest is enough." It is of interest to note that Seth heard him lecture in a semi-private conversational class on Hume's *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, which he himself made the starting-point a generation later of his most important book, *The Idea of God*. At the end of the year he recorded

[1] Cf. Lecture IV. in the present volume, "The Epistemology of Neo-Kantianism."

his impression that the younger thinkers, in their enthusiasm for the Darwinian conception of evolution, and their materialistic bent tinged with the metaphysical influence of Schopenhauer, had failed to gain that "mental equanimity tempered by reverence" for which he looked in the true philosopher.

The letter to A. M. Stalker in which certain of these intellectual impressions are expressed touches lightly on an experience which in the end influenced Seth more profoundly and contributed more to his life's happiness than all the lectures which he ever attended. This was his introduction to German home life in the family of Herr Albrecht Stropp, with whom he boarded. In earlier days Herr Stropp had been a manorial proprietor (*Rittergutsbesitzer*) in Silesia, not far from Breslau; but his capital had been dissipated by two serious losses, caused by the fault of one man and the misfortune of another with whom he had business relations. He then obtained a minor post in a Government office in Berlin, and struck Seth as "very gentle and kindly," but "a little crushed by the world." Frau Stropp was not less kindly, but of a more vigorous temperament, and for years had worked hard and cheerfully to repair the family fortunes. Their daughter Eva, who had received a good education among the Moravians, was interested in literature, French and English as well as German. Her first contribution to the philosophical studies of the young Scotsman was of a somewhat quaint kind. She knew something of the household of the celebrated von Hartmann, and evidently hinted that his pessimism might be attributed in part to domestic circumstances. Directed by Fräulein Stropp, Seth walked out to the northern suburbs of Berlin, and saw the great pessimist, much muffled in furs, studying in the winter sunshine on a veranda—a small man with an impressive head.

The friendship thus begun between Seth and Eva Stropp ripened steadily into a deeper attachment; and at the end of the winter Seth wrote to Capper that he had been reading the *Midsummer Night's Dream* and *Winter's Tale* with her, and sent him some original lines which let his friend see clearly the trend of his feelings. Another letter told that he had "read some of Shelley's splendid lyrics with purged eyesight." Next winter he was invited to come from Leipzig and share the Christmas festivities of the Stropp household as a welcome guest. His letters home said little at that time—perhaps significantly little—of the daughter of the house, but four or five years later he had the happiness of returning to claim her as his bride.

Neither this growing attachment nor his constant application to the work which had brought him to Germany prevented Seth from observing the political life around him. The old Kaiser had not long before escaped an attempted assassination, and great celebrations were organised to mark his next entry into Berlin. Seth was one of a large body of students who marched six abreast in the procession; but, while ready to show respect to the Emperor personally, he had little liking for the militarism which was even then dominant. He was shocked by the violent anti-Jewish feeling of the day, and by the severe Bismarckian régime which came near closing the university reading-room because two or three journals of a moderate socialist type were found there. The official attitude to Socialism is described in a letter to Stalker, which brings in a name, then scarcely known in Britain, but only too well known a generation later :—

"Treitschke's standing motto against the possibility of Socialism is, *Keine Kultur ohne Dienstboten—i.e.*, we must have a lower class to perform the *menial* services of life. This is not very convincing, for there is no degrada-

tion in the services themselves; and, as someone remarked to me: Why not reverse the motto and say, *Keine Dienstboten ohne Kultur?*"

At the end of this winter Seth expressed in a letter to his father what he then felt about a lifetime devoted to the study of philosophy:—

"The result of philosophy is to show us how much we know, and how much it is absurd to expect we should know. This merit of philosophy is especially insisted on by Kant. For the rest, there is no need to defend philosophy, as it has always existed and will continue to exist so long as men continue to think. . . . Nevertheless after a certain time one wishes to give up 'thinking about thinking,' to use a phrase of Carlyle's, and to grapple with more tangible material—in literature, history, politics, &c. I would not care to go on reading *pure* philosophy all my life or for very many years."

After Easter 1879 Seth went on to Jena, attracted, not by any special philosophical teaching—the day of Eucken was not yet—but by the association with Hegel, the opportunity which the quiet university town of about 8000 inhabitants gave for hard reading, and the neighbourhood of Weimar and the Thüringerwald. There he found John Haldane, a younger brother of his friend, studying science, and a group of Scots theological students which included John Herkless and Lewis Muirhead.[1] Living was cheap in Jena—£1 a week covered everything—and reserved seats in the little theatre cost only 6d. Haldane found Seth naturally shy and reserved, and only gradually came to know him well; but on May 7 he wrote to his brother Richard that he liked Seth much, and had taken him to Haeckel's

[1] I owe most of the facts in the two following paragraphs to Professor J. S. Haldane. The others named were afterwards known as Principal Sir John Herkless of St Andrews University and Dr L. A. Muirhead, author of *The Eschatology of Jesus*.

class. Haeckel began with "a sort of history of philosophy," laying much stress on the early Ionians, especially those who could be classed as Monists; and he had much to say about Kant's nebular hypothesis, but nothing about his philosophy. "He is a capital lecturer," Haldane added, "and has wonderful eyes." But the *beaux yeux* of Haeckel's then fashionable materialistic Monism did not tempt Seth away from his first love; and his approach to philosophy remained to the end what Carlyle and Wordsworth had made it—ethical and humanist, rather than scientific.

These two friends soon formed with the Scottish students of theology a circle which met for two hours a week to read Hegel's *Rechtsphilosophie*. It was from this *semester* that Seth's profound knowledge of Hegel began, though he confessed to Stalker that he found the *Logik* "an utterly inhuman book." His letters home told of a formidable working-day. The others frequently tried to entice him out, and Muirhead's triumph was great when he succeeded in bringing Seth down from the Absolute, represented by Hegel, to "the concrete," in the form of *Lichtenhainer* or some other light beer consumed in a country *biergarten* at the end of a walk through the surrounding woods. On these long walks many questions of theology as well as philosophy came under review; and the lectures which Seth most appreciated during this summer were those of Hilgenfeld, a New Testament scholar who sought to correct the critical excesses of the "Tübingen School" a generation before, and who gave him a new sense of the vital relation between the life-history of St Paul and his epistles.

The summer's work was broken by a visit to Weimar to hear the *Rheingold* and *Walküre*, then seldom performed even in Germany, in the famous little theatre. At Whitsuntide Stalker, who was studying medicine in

Leipzig, came for a walking-tour through the Thüringerwald, in the course of which Ilmenau, the Wartburg and other famous scenes were visited. A few lines may be quoted from a blank-verse lyric which Seth afterwards sent to his companion, which suggest that he had fallen under the spell of Tennyson as well as that of Wordsworth—

> Day after day our steps lay through the pines,
> Shut in a valley-land of old romance,
> Where German love flowed o'er in German song
> That lingers still, like bird-notes in the boughs.
> And looking from some hillside on the woods,
> As on a sea, we felt our life till now
> A far-off background, like the circling plain
> Seen through the distance in the sunny haze.
> And like a dim noise heard through dreams by one
> Who lays him in the grass beside a brook,
> And, while he leans his head upon his arm,
> Hears still the axe's stroke deep in the woods—
> So dim to us the sounds of men below,
> The clash of creeds, the traffic of the mart,
> The sage still pressing on to grasp the world
> And read the great God-mystery. So dim,
> Or as the jangling of the cattle-bells,
> Like faery music heard across the vale,
> They lulled us in our dream.

After the close of the session at Jena Seth made his way by Bayreuth and Nürnberg to Passau. From that splendidly situated old town he went down the Danube by river steamer, and from Vienna he turned westward to the Salzkammergut, where he had his first experience of walking in the Alps. In the course of one ascent he was overtaken by a rainstorm, which reduced his clothes and boots to a sodden and pulp-like condition. It proved a matter of some difficulty to secure a carriage to drive him into Salzburg, where his luggage with a much-needed change of raiment awaited him; and

he wrote that in his soaked and collarless state he was sure he had been taken for a tramp.

After a short visit to Scotland he returned for a winter in Leipzig and a summer with Schurman in Göttingen, which in some ways repeated the history of his year in Berlin and Jena. A hard winter of the Central European type gave notable opportunities of skating. Music was a great and growing delight; and philosophy allowed him a margin of leisure to take advantage of the musical gifts of the family with whom he lodged, as well as of concert and opera. A Mozart cycle and his first hearing of *Siegfried* especially delighted him. Muirhead was with him at both universities, and together they continued to read Hegel, and quoted *Faust* in Auerbach's *Keller*. Eight volumes of Fichte joined the Kant and Hegel on his bookshelf, and occupied much of his time through the early months of 1880. At the same time he built up a library of German literature, giving special attention to lyrical and ballad poetry; and as he was buying books for Schurman as well, the bookseller treated him with marked respect. When, as already mentioned, he revisited Berlin as the guest of the Stropp family, he saw somewhat more of Schurman, and wrote to Stalker regarding him: "He is a thoroughly good fellow, always fresh and enthusiastic. I had the greatest interest in talking to him: my heart warmed within me, even to the extent of wishing to write my Hibbert essay." Schurman took him twice to Zeller's house, where he was impressed by the gracious personalities of both Zeller and his wife—a daughter of the leader of the Tübingen School, Ferdinand Christian Baur. Of Zeller he wrote:—

"He is a simple, unassuming old man; Schurman says he is one of the few Germans who seem to have a real interest in philosophical problems as living questions. . . . Most, you know, look at them in a dead,

'history of philosophy' way. . . . Zeller seems to be very much at one with Strauss on most points—at least in spirit. Strauss was little more than mentioned, but one could trace the almost affectionate reverence with which he looked to him as to a more brightly gifted spirit. It was apropos of a letter he had written to Strauss urging him to undertake a life of Lessing."

It was the fame of Hermann Lotze which chiefly drew Seth, Muirhead and Schurman to Göttingen, and Seth had heard much of it from R. B. Haldane, who had studied there six years before. Schurman was already an enthusiastic admirer, and infected his companions with his own high hopes of what they might gain from the one great German idealist of that epoch. But, looking back after fifty years, Dr Schurman writes: "Unfortunately the great man gave in the summer *semester* of 1880 only elementary courses for beginners, and he had no *seminar*. After a short time we dropped out of the lectures, and concentrated on the writing of our theses for the Hibbert Trustees. . . . We owed much to Göttingen—but nothing to the professors." [1] This estimate may be supplemented by sentences from two letters to Stalker. On April 25, soon after reaching Göttingen, Seth wrote: "We have heard two lectures of Lotze's on *Praktischen Philosophie*. His face has the quaint old-fashioned intelligence of a little shoemaker, but is sweet in its expression. . . . The *Metaphysik* we leave because it would break up the forenoon, and read his book instead." Two months later he recorded a visit to Lotze, who was busy revising his *Logik*. "Mill he called a *langweiliger Schwätzer*, and said one could not afford to publish books like the *Logic* in Germany." "I have read," the passage concludes,

[1] Quoted by J. B. Capper in his Biographical Sketch of Pringle-Pattison—*Proc. of British Academy*, Vol. xvii. But cf. Haldane's notable tribute to Lotze, *Selected Addresses and Essays*, pp. 186-7.

" more than half the *Metaphysik*, most of it with sober profit."

Seth's attitude to Fichte at this time was not dissimilar, for a certain impatience had followed the enthusiasm of his first deep plunge into Fichte's thought the previous winter, and he found it " growingly unsatisfactory," while it proved a toilsome matter to make an abstract of the *Wissenschaftslehre*. Yet both Fichte and Lotze left a deep imprint on his thinking, Fichte by the intensely ethical character of his thought, and Lotze by his " undaunted reassertion of the fundamental truth of the view of the world implied in moral or spiritual experience." The permanence of Lotze's influence in particular is shown by the frequent references in Seth's later writings; and his deliberate judgment was that Lotze had " exercised a more pervasive influence than usually falls to the lot of any one who is not a thinker of first-rate originality and genius." [1]

Seth's attitude to Hegel at the end of his *Lehrjahr* in Germany can also be gathered from the letter to Stalker last quoted: " My essay is probably much more Hegelian in tone than I am myself, but it will only modestly insist towards the end that Hegel did not know everything. . . . The prevailing sentiment of the philosophical detachment of the Göttingen brigade is that passage in *Faust* (alas, in Mephistopheles' mouth)—

> 'Grau, theuerer Freund, ist alle Theorie,
> Und *grün* des Lebens goldener Baum.'

When shall we be able to pluck and eat of the fruit of that tree? "

Seth had an opportunity of relaxing from the intense application of these two years during some pleasant

[1] *The Philosophical Radicals, and other Essays*, p. 150—from a review of Jones' *Philosophy of Lotze*, originally published in 1895.

weeks spent in Paris in the early autumn of this year. He was joined by Capper, who had for some time been on the staff of the *Times*, and in his welcome company was able to compare the dramatic art of the *Théâtre français* with that of Leipzig and Berlin; nor did his love of things German blunt his sense of the charm of France. But at this point we must follow out the history of the Hibbert essay, which had gradually taken shape at Göttingen.

Its title then was "The Permanent Results of the Kantio-Hegelian Philosophy"; but before its publication early in 1882 the title was altered to "The Development from Kant to Hegel," and at the special request of the Trustees a second section was added on the Philosophy of Religion in the two great idealists. The book has been long out of print; but the chapters on the Philosophy of Religion were reprinted by the author twenty-five years later in *The Philosophical Radicals*.

The first impression that the book makes is that of a clearness and maturity very notable in an author, still under twenty-five, who is faced by a complex and abstract subject. The gift of lucid exposition which marked all his writings is already fully developed. The chapter on Fichte, which cost him so much labour, is the longest in the book, and is a model of clear statement and tempered appreciation and criticism. The chapter on Schelling alone makes a somewhat strict demand on the reader's attention, for even Seth's skill as expositor was hardly equal to the task of making his philosophy in its varied phases easily intelligible in sixteen pages. But when he passes to Hegel he is on ground which, difficult as it is, he has thoroughly explored, and over which he moves with freedom.

The fact that Seth had already grasped clearly the main principles of his future thinking and teaching may be shown by two quotations, one from each section

of the book. In his opening pages Seth deals with Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself, and asks whether "the Kantian demand to know noumena as something behind, and different from, phenomena, is anything more than the desire to know and not to know a thing at the same time," and continues: "For, if we merely exchange human thought for some other kind of thought, we are no better off than before as regards a knowledge of realities, seeing that the realities, in being known, must be equally coloured by the nature of this new thought." This argument that, while we try to criticise and systematise our knowledge, we must accept knowledge so criticised as a true avenue to the reality of things, and not as a misleading screen separating us for ever from them, runs through all Seth's writing on epistemology; and not less characteristic in another sphere is his account of the relation between the ethical and the religious consciousness. Without religious experience, he contends, man "is an atom struggling in vain with the evil of his own nature, and possibly, too, with the misery of surrounding circumstances. If he is to be successful in the struggle, he must be persuaded that he is not alone, or, in the language of religion, that God is for him, and that nothing, therefore, can be ultimately against him. The triumph that he only anticipates in himself and others he must conceive as secure of fulfilment—in fact, as already fulfilled in the eternal purpose of God." [1]

[1] *The Philosophical Radicals*, p. 270.

CHAPTER III.

EDINBURGH AND CARDIFF.

1880-1887.

IT was natural that Seth's brilliant record up to this point should gain him a post as a teacher of philosophy, and several months before he returned from Germany he was asked by Professor Campbell Fraser to succeed his friend, W. R. Sorley, in the position of class assistant in Logic and Metaphysics. He readily accepted, and his work in this capacity began in the late autumn of 1880.

A distinction which fell to him at this time was the Ferguson Philosophical Scholarship. It was much prized, as being open to graduates with Honours in Philosophy of the four Scottish universities. In holding it he was preceded by R. B. Haldane, and in 1882 his brother James gained the same honour. In this connection Lord Haldane tells in his *Autobiography* an incident which illustrates Andrew Seth's scrupulous loyalty to his friends. Haldane had decided to take the Degree of Doctor of Science in Philosophy, the only higher degree then open in Edinburgh to students with philosophical honours. He submitted for the purpose a thesis on Immortality, which was turned down by the examiners—on the instance, strangely, of a professor of Science with strictly orthodox religious views—not because it was philosophically incompetent, but because

it was theologically heterodox. Seth, he adds, was so moved by his friend's experience that he refused to send in a thesis of his own for this degree.

In a letter to Stalker, Seth speaks of an esssay on Immortality by Haldane—presumably embodying the chief part of the rejected thesis—as "indirect in treatment," but "a very closely and strongly reasoned essay." A passage in another letter to the same friend towards the end of 1882 indicates his attitude to a question constantly discussed in the seventies. Referring to Seeley's *Ecce Homo* he says: "Being fresh from Matthew Arnold I struck at the acceptance of miracles in the earlier part of the book. Now one can approach all these things in a more objective and historic interest."

Seth's work as assistant to Professor Fraser was largely tutorial, and involved much correcting of examination papers. It was congenial, in that it brought him into close touch with his old teacher, and placed him in a line of men who were rapidly gaining positions of influence in the philosophical world. But it gave little opportunity for independent lecturing, and the salary was only £40. So he turned to journalism to supplement it. J. B. Capper gave him an introduction to Charles Cooper, an able and forceful Yorkshireman, then editor of the *Scotsman*. From reviewing volumes of poetry and philosophy, Cooper soon promoted Seth to the writing of leading articles, and for nearly two years he contributed largely along both lines. Nor were either reviews or leaders of a flimsy nature. A column and a quarter (about 1200 words) was the standard length; for the newspaper reader of that period had greater determination and fewer distractions than his easily wearied successor of to-day.

Cooper expressed privately his warm admiration for Seth's journalistic gifts; and during one vacation

month—July 1882, the month of the bombardment of Alexandria—when he was almost unassisted in his editorial work, he asked Seth to come down night after night to work at the office. The harvest of that month's work included twenty-one leaders of the length named. Regarding German politics he was naturally well informed, and the following is worth quoting as an example of his foresight. Bismarck, he writes in May 1881, " has created a position so unique that it is next to impossible to imagine Germany without him. His retirement or death, when it occurs, will inevitably throw more power into the hands of the Parliamentary parties; but they have been tutored into submission so long that, when the strong hand is removed, they may be expected to stagger considerably before righting themselves."

In addition to foreign politics the young leader-writer was turned loose on the field of Scots ecclesiasticism, and took full advantage of the then attitude of the *Scotsman* to pillory the " unco guid," the ultra-orthodox and the extreme wing of Sabbatarians. A leader which combines sarcasm with psychological insight is on the Meeting of Extremes, in which he compares the characteristics of the farthest right wing of the Scottish Kirk with those of the Communist left in French politics, and tells a pleasant story of two French Communists who, wishing to mark their son as a true revolutionist, decided to call him Lucifer Blanqui Vercingetorix, and were virtuously indignant when the *maire* of their *commune* refused to register a child so amazingly named. Another leader, with the titles " Cardinals Begg and Manning," points out how much there was in common between the ultramontanism of Dr Begg, a once famous Edinburgh minister of extreme orthodoxy, and that of Cardinal Manning, who had claimed in a sermon delivered in Glasgow that Scotland

traditionally possessed not a few characteristic notes of Catholic truth.

In a graver mode are two other contributions to the *Scotsman*—the first a leader on the death of Carlyle, published in February 1881; the other, a long and elaborate critique of *Parsifal*, written after a visit to Bayreuth eighteen months later. Only a few sentences can be quoted from the conclusion of each.

"Carlyle was often unjust to the spirit of constitutionalism and of science, and he made light of their triumphs. But his impassioned denunciations were able to do no harm to what is good in these two great tendencies of modern life, while they had their use in impressing on men the essential importance of personal worth and effort as the sole source of moral health. . . . Many will remember at this time the noble words he spoke on the death of his own great master, Goethe, and will feel that here again they stand at the end of 'the being and the working of a faithful man.' Like Goethe, he had touched the extreme limit of human life, and in his case, too, the end came gently. His work remains, and the lessons he has taught us, even when the voice that uttered them is dumb."

Of *Parsifal* Seth wrote: "Wagner has certainly aimed very high. Whether he has produced a work which is an artistic whole, I can hardly say. . . . A dramatic character must certainly be denied to the work. The action that takes place is purely symbolical, and the interest of the hearer is concentrated on what may be called the decorative parts of the music—on the double celebration of the sacrament, the march of Gurnemann and Parsifal to the temple in the first act, and the sanctified glory of the spring in the third. In the whole of the last act, indeed, there is nothing which we would willingly part with in the music. But this bears out the criticism just made, for the act is simply

a succession of religious offices." After drawing a parallel with the Second Part of *Faust*, the writer concluded: "Wagner's musical genius has saved him to a great extent in spite of himself; but in adventuring upon the arid ground of a carefully calculated symbolism, he has certainly entered a territory dangerous to art."

These extracts show something of the range of Seth's interests at this time; yet he found time for other varied activities in the summer and autumn of 1882. For three weeks he took the senior Greek classes in the Royal High School while the rector was absent, and reported that he had "kept order and learned a great deal of Greek," but that, though he felt he had got on well with the boys, he was not drawn to the career of a schoolmaster. After returning from Bayreuth by Trêves and Paris, he joined the Campbell Frasers at Grasmere. He found there J. W. Mackail, a friend and class-fellow of five years before, and with his hosts met Matthew Arnold at Fox How.

About the same time reviews of *From Kant to Hegel* began to arrive from both sides of the Atlantic, and to his great amusement a professor from Providence, N.J., making a round of celebrities in the British universities, appeared on the author's doorstep. In autumn he summoned up courage to advertise a series of lectures for the ladies of Edinburgh on English poetry, and wrote to Stalker of the embarrassment which he felt when a large number of their mutual friends enrolled for the class: "Think also of lecturing on *Don Juan* next Monday in these circumstances. Your prayers, lieber Freund, your prayers!"

A venture of greater importance undertaken at the same time was a volume of Philosophical Essays. To understand its origin we must go back to the previous year, 1881, when a group of young Hegelians, including Adamson, Seth and R. B. Haldane, felt that some

step must be taken to show their profound dissatisfaction with the conduct of *Mind*, under the editorship of Professor Croom Robertson. Its general attitude was that of the empiricism so long dominant in England; nor was this unnatural, as it had been founded, and was largely financed and its policy controlled, by Alexander Bain, who since the death of John Stuart Mill had been the recognised leader of Associationist thought. In their desire for a fuller opportunity than was granted in its pages for the exposition of their own philosophical faith, the younger idealists had the moral support of T. H. Green, Edward Caird and Wallace; and it would appear that Sidgwick and Campbell Fraser gave them a more guarded encouragement. For a time the two youngest of the group, Seth and Haldane, thought of starting a new philosophical journal; but by the spring of the following year they had exchanged this plan for that of a volume which might serve in some manner as a manifesto of the younger idealists. This more modest scheme proved acceptable to those who controlled the policy of *Mind*, and Croom Robertson, who had been vigorously assailed by Seth in his letters to Haldane a few months before, promised to do what he could to further it.

At this point, on March 26, 1882, Thomas Hill Green died in his forty-sixth year; and this event formed one of the foci round which the thought of the essayists finally found its orbit, as the centenary of the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* formed the other. In reprinting twenty-five years later his own essay on "Philosophy as Criticism of Categories," with which the volume opened, Seth wrote as follows: "It was the first paper in a volume of *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, published in 1883, in somewhat belated connection with the centenary of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The volume was dedicated to the memory of

Thomas Hill Green, who died in the previous year, and some prefatory pages by Dr Edward Caird contained a fine tribute to the spirit of Green's life and teaching. . . . The second essay, on 'The Relation of Philosophy to Science,' was the work of the present Secretary of State for War, in collaboration with his brother, Dr J. S. Haldane. The other contributors were (to give them their later titles) Professor Bernard Bosanquet, Professor W. R. Sorley, Professor W. P. Ker, Professor Henry Jones, Dr James Bonar, Professor T. B. Kilpatrick of Knox College, Toronto, and the late Professor D. G. Ritchie of St Andrews. This, it will be admitted, was a band of which the editors had no reason to be ashamed. The ideas of the book were then comparatively unfamiliar, and the writing of the youthful authors was often, perhaps, unnecessarily difficult, but the critics were at least unanimous in recognising the sincerity and scientific purpose which animated the volume." [1]

The estimate in the last sentence quoted describes with accuracy Seth's introductory essay. The idea of Philosophy as making clear the order and relation of the various forms of knowledge by criticising the categories which they habitually use has often been worked out since; but it had then the merit of freshness, though his statement of it showed, as he himself hints, less than the usual lucidity of his philosophical writing. In the Preface to the volume, Dr Edward Caird stated that the essays were written quite independently, and that the unity which ran through the volume was due to "a certain community of opinion in relation to the general principle and method of philosophy." The double origin of the book naturally influenced its character. Its connection with the centenary of the *Critique* showed itself in the attention paid to the Kantian

[1] Preface to *The Philosophical Radicals.*

theory of Knowledge, a field in which Seth had already shown himself an expert. But more important was its character as a tribute to the memory of T. H. Green. The pervasiveness and depth of his influence stand out clearly when we recall that his two most important works, the *Prolegomena to Ethics* and the *Principles of Political Obligation,* were only published from his lecture notes after the essays were written, and that only four of the ten essayists had come under his personal influence at Oxford. Yet the spirit of Green's idealism runs through the volume; and its editors might well feel that, in bringing their notable band of contributors together within six months of his death, they had raised a fitting monument to one of the greatest teachers of ethics—of moral philosophy in the fullest sense—that England has ever known.

One incidental advantage to Seth was that part of the editorial work was done during a visit to the Haldanes' home at Cloan; and this beautiful spot on the slope of the Ochils, looking across Strathearn north and west to the higher hills of the Grampian range, became a frequent scene of holiday visits in later years. Another friendship which proved a decisive factor in his life began at this time. He had been impressed by reading Mr A. J. Balfour's *Defence of Philosophic Doubt,* published originally in 1879, and wrote to the young philosopher-statesman inviting him to give an address to the Edinburgh University Philosophical Society, of which we have already heard. Mr Balfour agreed to come, and a lasting friendship between the two thinkers was established, one early fruit of which was the foundation of the Balfour Philosophical Lectureship which will be described in the next chapter.

By the year 1883, Seth was anxious to secure an independent position. Young as he was, his name had already become widely known; and for a time he

thought of accepting a chair in California. But an opening occurred nearer home through the foundation of a philosophical chair in Cardiff. The steps by which Seth came to hold it may be told in the words of one who became a lifelong friend, Miss Price, afterwards Mrs Harding: "My father was one of the Governors of the newly founded University of South Wales and Monmouthshire in which we were all keenly interested; and he came home from the meeting at which Viriamu Jones had been appointed Principal full of admiration for the Scotch philosopher who had also put in for the post." But the chair of Philosophy to which Seth was appointed was much better adapted to his bent than the administrative work of the principalship would have been. Mrs Harding goes on to describe the excitement in the quiet town of Cardiff when all the new life poured into it. Mr Price was a great reader of philosophy, and as in those days hardly anyone in Cardiff shared his enthusiasm, he took the earliest opportunity to make Seth's acquaintance, and enrolled as a student of the new college in order to attend Seth's lectures, which he much valued and enjoyed. He often spoke of the perfection of his language, and said that if the professor paused it was never for lack of a word, but because he was choosing between several the one which would most accurately express his meaning.

Among his colleagues was one who was already a friend—W. P. Ker, in later years Professor of English Literature in University College, London. Ker was a brilliant and many-sided man, who had gone from Glasgow University to Balliol as Snell Exhibitioner, and who, before he made English Literature the subject of his life work, was assistant to Professor Sellar in the Latin chair in Edinburgh. His years at Balliol under Green and A. C. Bradley had given him a deep interest in the Philosophy of Art—the subject of

his contribution to *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*. Thus Seth and Ker had many links, in their friendship for the Sellar family, in their idealist creed, and in their common enthusiasm for literature, classical and modern, but especially for the great English poets. The friendship cemented in the four years of close co-operation at Cardiff lasted unbroken till W. P. Ker's death in 1923. It has been said of him that " the Cardiff years, strenuous as they were, lived on in his memory as a cheerful, not to say ' jolly ' affair of pioneers." " There is something good in education," he said in retrospect, " when it beats up a crew of adventurers and puts them in a stockade to hold against the enemy." [1]

Other friendships formed in Cardiff were with Professor Claude Thompson, an excellent field naturalist, whose long tramps with Ker were sometimes shared by Seth, and Mr W. P. James, afterwards High Bailiff of Cardiff, who combined with legal knowledge a keen and alert interest in philosophy. As was natural when a university college had been newly started in an area mainly industrial, there was only a restricted number of students who could fully respond to such teaching as that of Seth and Ker ; so the former founded a senior class of men who had passed beyond the undergraduate stage. Within this there was an inner circle formed for the study of Hegel, consisting of Seth, Ker, James and Roberts, then Professor of Greek at Cardiff and afterwards Principal at Aberystwyth. They never went beyond the Preface to the *Phenomenology ;* but of that they made a translation, which remained to show the spirit of thoroughness in which they approached that formidable work. Less exacting were the meetings of a literary society called ' The Fortnightly ' ; and there

[1] I am allowed by Mrs John MacCunn to quote, here and later, from a privately printed memorial volume, written by her husband and herself, entitled *Our Friend, W. P.*

were also reading parties in which Seth acted as one of the guides into the arcana of Browning, and shared with his friends his own enthusiasm for Heine.

Cardiff was within easy reach of much beautiful country even before the coming of the motor; and Seth often walked with members of the Price family and other friends over the heights from which the hills of Somerset and Devon could be seen across the Bristol Channel. On clear days the Brecon Beacons could be seen towering to the north; and the younger members of the party looked on with eagerness and amusement when W. P. Ker took off his hat to the mountains of Wales. Seth's beard already gave him a somewhat venerable appearance as a teacher, but Mrs Harding recalls him on these hill walks as "tall, lithe, active, full of talk and fun."

To this busy, friendly life he brought his bride in the autumn of 1884, and she was warmly welcomed by the whole circle. Andrew Seth and Eva Stropp were married in Berlin in July, and James Seth went from Jena, where he was studying, to support his brother on this occasion. The weeks immediately following the wedding were spent in Eva's home country of Silesia. In the Riesengebirge she was introduced to the pleasures of hill-climbing, then an unfamiliar occupation for German girls; and from Warmbrunn they went on to Gnadenfrei, where she had been at school among the Moravians. "We wanted to visit it together," her husband writes to his mother. "It lies pleasantly and is very quiet. We went to church this morning to the Herrnhuter service. The large hall so well filled was an interesting and impressive sight: all very simple. The only drawback we found was that we had to go in at different doors and sit in different parts of the church" —truly a hard fate on the second Sunday of their wedded life.

So began forty-four years of unity in heart and purpose, and so was laid the foundation of that home life whose development we shall trace in later pages. But if this year brought happiness almost unmingled, that which followed brought bereavement. In 1885 Vera Margaret, the eldest child of Andrew and Eva Seth, was born and died at Cardiff. When the child's illness had become serious, the father wrote to a friend that he was "weary with watching and anxiety," and felt unable to meet his class. A few days before Christmas the end had come, and the lives of the parents were deeply marked by this early sorrow. In the same year the death of Seth's father at the age of fifty-nine broke up the home in Edinburgh; and in 1887, after James Seth had been appointed to a philosophical chair at Halifax, Nova Scotia, his mother and her younger children followed him to make their home for a time beyond the Atlantic. Andrew Seth wrote that this parting from his mother seemed "almost like a foretaste of the final separation"; but happily, as a later chapter will show, the parting was only for a time.

Before the Seths left Cardiff another German bride joined the circle of friends associated with University College. Professor W. N. Parker, one of the scientists on the staff, married a daughter of the famous biologist, August Weismann, and Mrs Parker naturally received a warm welcome from her fellow-countrywoman and her Scottish husband.

During the series of political crises in the years 1885 and 1886, Seth had little difficulty in determining his course. His recent connection with the *Scotsman*, which now took a strong line against Home Rule, and his growing friendship with Mr Balfour, may have assisted him to do so. But his admiration for Mr Gladstone had always been of a qualified kind, and he now wrote that his feelings about him were "quite unphilosophical."

Yet his enthusiasm for the Unionist cause was not sufficient to take him to a meeting addressed by Mr Balfour, who was still introduced in the provinces as "a nephew of Lord Salisbury." Seth was content to wait at home till the speaker's effort was over and he had been driven round a great part of Cardiff by an inefficient cabman who had no idea of the young professor's whereabouts. There followed, however, a talk on philosophy, prolonged far into the night.

While at Cardiff Seth contributed a philosophical survey twice a year to the *Contemporary Review*, and also wrote several articles for the Ninth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*. One of these is mentioned in a letter dated November 30, 1886, to Dr S. S. Laurie, the first Professor of Education in the University of Edinburgh, to whose friendship Seth often acknowledged his debt, as well as to Laurie's *Metaphysica* and other philosophical writings :—

"I delayed acknowledging your *Lectures on Universities* till I could send you more than merely a message of thanks. . . . I must congratulate you on the production of a most interesting and useful book. I was specially interested in all you say about mediæval education, because I had some imperfect glimpses at the subject by the way in reading for my article 'Scholasticism' in the *Britannica*. I should have been quite glad to have had it then. . . . I venture to think it is well-timed with reference to the movement of University Reform in Scotland and possible legislation in the near future. Nothing could be better at such a time than to spread some knowledge of the actual history of such institutions.

"In reference to what you say—'We may yet see restored both in England and Scotland the hostels of the Middle Ages'—it may be of interest to you to know that the question of establishing a hostel for men has

been repeatedly under discussion here, the very name being used. We have one for women, called Aberdare Hall. It is probable that in course of time, if a general hostel is not established, the religious bodies may combine to have a hostel (or may separately establish hostels) for theological students coming to us for their Arts course. At Bangor, I believe, the Church has already established such a hostel. They don't quite trust the unlimited freedom of the Scotch system here."

From Cardiff, Seth's eyes were often turned northward; and though the part of his life spent outside Scotland was relatively small, his two years in Germany and four years in South Wales prepared him in many ways for his notable career as a teacher of Philosophy in the universities of his own land.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BALFOUR LECTURES.

1884-1891.

DURING Seth's residence in Cardiff he began to be known beyond the circle of specialists in philosophy to whom his first writings were addressed. This wider reputation came with the publication of *Scottish Philosophy* in 1885, followed by *Hegelianism and Personality* two years later. The latter was not, indeed, published until shortly after his appointment to St Andrews University in the autumn of 1887, but the lectures which it contained were given before he left Cardiff. Both series were delivered in Edinburgh University under the Balfour Philosophical Lectureship. We have seen how Mr Balfour was invited to deliver to the University Philosophical Society a paper, to which he referred long after as his first public lecture on a philosophical subject. In his *Chapters of Autobiography* (Ch. V.) he describes the sequel: "Out of this Edinburgh episode there sprung not merely the personal friendship to which I have referred, but also an arrangement under which Professor Pringle-Pattison delivered two sets of 'Balfour' Lectures, one devoted to Hegel, the other to the philosophers of the Scottish School. Since then he has made contributions to our philosophic literature, original in matter and admirable in style. But surely

the full promise of this later harvest was already given in the two modest volumes with which he began the series."

The Balfour Lectureship was unusual in that it was only held—and was only intended to be held—by one man. Mr Balfour may have wished to help forward a scheme then under discussion for the delivery of short courses of special lectures within the University by instituting one such course ; [1] but his main object undoubtedly was to draw out, or at least to hasten, the original contribution which he felt Seth had the power to make to philosophical thought. So Seth twice returned from Cardiff to deliver these courses in his old University. The first was inscribed " gratefully and affectionately " to Professor Campbell Fraser, who took an active interest in the progress of Mr Balfour's generous scheme.

In the opening paragraphs of *Scottish Philosophy* Seth indicates that his choice of subject has been in part influenced by patriotism, but his main reason is that " though the Idealists are constantly discharging their heavy artillery against the Empiricists and Agnostics, the matter does not seem, somehow, to be brought to a vital issue ; the cannonade appears to pass harmlessly over the enemy's head." This difficulty he traces in part to the unfamiliar and highly German form given by the Idealists to their argument—which suggests that two years' teaching in Cardiff had increased his sense of the value of lucidity—and he expresses the hope that " some progress may be made towards bringing the opposing armies within fighting range of one another, if we turn our attention nearer home."

With this in view he proceeds to survey the disintegration of knowledge in the development from Locke to Hume, and ends with the epigram : " Scepti-

[1] *Scottish Philosophy*, Preface.

cism is the bridge by which we pass from one system, or family of systems, found wanting, to another age with its fuller grasp of truth." This bridge—or at least some arches of it—he finds in the neglected writings of Thomas Reid; and in the central part of the book he sets himself to "interpret the much-abused Reid according to his better self." While making no claim that Reid's writings are comparable in depth or originality to those of Kant, he contends that Reid grasped the essential point of any effective answer to Hume, and that his "vindication of perception as perception" and his "assertion that the unit of knowledge is an act of judgment" supply important parts of the required answer.

The later lectures show how the relativism which still remained in Kant's Theory of Knowledge reappeared in Sir William Hamilton, against whom Seth argues that "in knowing the phenomenon, we know the object itself through and through—so far, of course, as we do know it, so far as it really has become a phenomenon for us." In the closing paragraphs of the book he adumbrates a position which, he claims, is in line with the best traditions in Scottish thought as "reversing the deductive method of Fichte and Hegel." "The ultimate unity of things is what we stretch forward to, what we divine, but what we never fully attain. It is our *terminus ad quem;* it is never so fully within our grasp that we can make it in turn our *terminus a quo*, and, placing ourselves, as it were, at the crisis of creation, proceed to deduce step by step the characteristics of actual existence in nature and in man." [1] This last thought was one to which Seth often recurred.[2]

The lectures were well received, and no tribute can

[1] 4th ed., pp. 96, 176, 220.

[2] Cf. *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, pp. 191, 227, 242 f.; *The Idea of God*, p. 165 f.

have given their author more satisfaction than that paid by the founder of the lectureship, whose appreciation was expressed in a letter as long and exhaustive as a review article. Seth had the pleasure *laudari a laudato* when he read Mr Balfour's judgment on the style: "It seems to me as nearly perfect as a philosophical style can be—concise; agreeable; extraordinarily lucid; never unnecessarily technical, yet never sacrificing the substance to the phrase; with none of the sonorous prolixity which has too often been the characteristic of Lectures on Philosophy, and especially (I am afraid) of *Scotch* Lectures on Philosophy." The matter of the lectures received the same generous recognition; and the writer went on to point out various difficulties not yet made clear—such as the bearing of Seth's view of knowledge on the Law of Causation and on the knowledge of other selves—as topics which might well be developed in a further course.

There is one criticism of *Scottish Philosophy* lying, as it were, on the surface which demands a word of comment. It may be asked whether it is not a paradox to treat Hume and Hamilton as being outside the main current of the Scottish philosophical tradition, and whether the stream does not reduce itself to a mere trickle when it is identified with the thought of Reid and Dugald Stewart. In reply it may be pointed out that in the nineteenth century, especially on the Continent, the 'common-sense' school founded by Reid was regularly referred to by historians of philosophy as the distinctively Scottish one, and that it had considerable influence on Cousin and others in France. But it is more important to note that in Seth's own view it had not ended with the early nineteenth century, but that, especially in the teaching of Campbell Fraser, there was found an idealism which was not for an intellectual *élite* only—an idealism which preserved the

rights of the common man by interpreting his ethical and religious experience, as well as by vindicating the fundamental trustworthiness of his knowledge of the external world. In this movement Seth now definitely took his place.

His early works were all largely occupied in treating the Kantian theory of knowledge; and a letter to Mr W. P. James in March 1886 shows the spirit, at once sane and humorous, in which he regarded the task of interpretation:—

"Certainly the phenomenalism and dualism are not the valuable part of Kant; they have to be dropped, if we are going to get any further. But they are so patently there in the historical individual called Kant that one wearies eventually of persistent attempts to minimise them. It is of no use to say 'This is Kant,' when somebody else constructs you quite another Kant and refuses to accept yours. The feeling then comes to be—show him for once as he is with all his imperfections on his head and then off to the lumber-room with him. Let us shape our philosophy as we please, but what is gained by calling it Kantianism? Nothing, so far as I can see, but endless historical disputation. To prove to you, however, that I am rigidly just to the two methods of treating Kant, it is enough to remark that I have myself used both—the developmental in an essay in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* and the bare historical in my Lectures on *Scottish Philosophy*. In this way I have it in my power to refer my critics from Philip drunk to Philip sober, leaving them to take their choice as to which is which."

As has already been stated, the Second Series of Balfour Lectures followed the first at an interval of two years, but there is a wide space between the two little books, both in respect of their method and of the impression which they made. For *Hegelianism and Personality*

had a polemical character not previously seen in Seth's writings.[1] The opening lectures, it is true, on 'Kant and Neo-Kantianism' and 'Fichte' showed the same traits—clearness of exposition and criticism as a propædeutic to ultimate construction—as his earlier essays in the same field. But when he went on to deal with Hegel and his successors, he showed that he could wield a keener blade than he had previously used; and to the surprise of many readers its edge was directed chiefly against aspects of that Hegelian or neo-Hegelian thought of which he had previously appeared as an exponent. It is true that he had never shown an uncritical or unqualified acceptance of Hegel's system as a system. In the closing words of *From Kant to Hegel* he had expressed his conviction that the strength of Hegelianism lay most of all in its philosophy of history. Hegel, he used to tell his students, possessed "probably the *richest* mind that had been devoted to philosophy since Aristotle";[2] and his appreciation of the light thrown by Hegel on many aspects of knowledge, history and art never varied. But this little book represented a change of emphasis of a quite decided kind. The influence of Mr Balfour's criticisms of contemporary transcendentalism was seen in this new attitude, though the main factor in causing it was Seth's own growing sense that certain tendencies in Hegel and post-Hegelian idealism imperilled those ethical and religious positions to which he always firmly adhered. Thus the spearhead of his argument was directed against such elements in Hegelianism as the attempt to deduce Reality from Pure Thought, the disparagement of the Time-process and of the struggle and progress of moral personalities within that process, the deification of the philosopher,

[1] The title orginally in view was "Hegelianism and Human Personality"; but, partly in deference to Campbell Fraser's opinion, it was shortened by the omission of the adjective.

[2] Cf. *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 94.

which carries with it the idea of God as deprived of self-existence and having "His only reality in the consciousness of the worshipping community." [1]

Against any such tendency to undervalue the experience of human striving personalities when it testifies to contact with a reality not fully defined by the processes of abstract thought, Seth launched not only argument but a succession of epigrams, such as: "A living dog is better than a dead lion, and even an atom is more than a category." "Both philosophy and religion bear ample testimony to the almost insuperable difficulty of finding room in the universe for God *and* man." "Each Self is an unique existence, which is perfectly *impervious*, if I may so speak, to other selves —impervious in a fashion of which the impenetrability of matter is a faint analogue." [2] These were among the most often quoted of his utterances; and the last phrase in particular aroused much pointed criticism, so that in his Gifford Lectures he felt impelled to qualify it carefully.[3] Indeed, the interval of twenty-five years between the Balfour and Gifford Lectures brought about a change of outlook both in physics and psychology which to a great extent robbed the analogy of its appositeness. But to the underlying idea of the moral Self as autonomous Seth always adhered.

A letter to Mr W. P. James in December 1887 throws additional light upon Seth's meaning:—

"My contention is that our knowledge of a thing, *even if supposed adequate*, is one thing and the existence of the thing itself is another. I do not mean to fall back into relativity: let our knowledge be as true as it likes, as correct a rendering of the essence of the thing, still it is a rendering of the thing, not the thing

[1] *Hegelianism and Personality*, 2nd ed., p. 197.
[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 131, 162, 227.
[3] *The Idea of God*, p. 389 f.

itself. I think this is pretty clear when we produce our own thought to infinity (as it were). Must it not also be true of the divine thought *qua* thought—at least in regard to anything that can be said in any sense to exist on its own account ?

" But you are quite at one with me when you say that ' the substance of a stone, even when transparently rational, is ultimately impervious ' ; and I in turn am quite at one with you when you try to imagine that ' our personalities might be in a still higher sense impervious though contained in the higher spirit.' I think I have expressed myself in very similar words somewhere in the book.

" Several passages may seem to assert absolutely independent individuals. That would be a philosophical absurdity quite contrary to my intention, but in combating an opinion one always tends to overstate the opposite view. I was aiming at some such higher spirit, but asserting within it a relative independence of lower spirits. Representing it metaphorically, we should be so many centres of personality contained within a being who would have his own great centre, distinct from the minor ones. Ordinary Hegelians seem to me to make one centre do duty for all, thus denying the separateness or imperviousness of the different selves. It is here, as I think, that the confusion of an epistemological with a metaphysical result comes in harmfully.

" At the same time I fully admit that the problem of this relative independence remains as dark as ever, and is not even touched in my book. Theosophy is a dreadful bog to get into. The British public won't stand it. Better write a treatise on golf than a third course on such a subject."

But before we pass on to the third course, we may note that the second found some of its most severe critics among those who had joined with Seth in writing

Essays in Philosophical Criticism only four years earlier. They felt, not unnaturally, that one of their leaders had, in Plato's phrase, "laid hands on his father, Parmenides," and that their own competence as philosophical thinkers had been somewhat sharply called in question. Into the controversy which followed there is no need to enter now. Seth said, in his Preface to the second edition of the book five years later: "The criticism it has encountered must be regarded as a wholesome stirring of the philosophic waters"; and later chapters will show that, whatever temporary coolness—or heat—may have followed its publication, several of Seth's former collaborators, not least the Haldanes, remained close friends long years after. Indeed, as early as November 1888, Richard Haldane wrote that, in view of a further statement by Seth, he was greatly relieved to find that they were "so nearly at one about Hegelianism"; and that, though he was far from accepting some elements in the book, he had never ceased to think that "as against constructive Hegelianism" it was the most formidable piece of work that had appeared. Another contributor to the early volume, Professor D. G. Ritchie, noted that in the second edition of *Hegelianism and Personality*, Seth modified his statement that separate individuals were "absolutely and for ever exclusive," and said instead: "Whatever be the mode of their comprehension within the all-containing bounds of the divine life, it is certain that, as selves, it is of their very essence to be relatively independent and mutually exclusive centres of existence." "With the revised version of this passage," Professor Ritchie added, "I am delighted to find myself in agreement." [1]

As soon as the second series of Balfour Lectures was

[1] *Darwin and Hegel* (1893), p. 100 n. The references in *Hegelianism and Personality* are: 1st ed., p. 64; 2nd ed., p. 69.

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published, Mr Balfour wrote, on December 20, 1887, saying that the success of the Lectureship had even exceeded his expectations, and suggesting that a third course should be given. He added considerately: "Take your own time about it." Seth availed himself both of the invitation and of the attached permission; and three years passed before he reported to Mr J. B. Capper that he was busy preparing the course, which, however, "showed a strange reluctance to get itself written." He also wrote to Professor Laurie: "My lectures, according to the shape they have taken, will deal mainly with our old friend (or enemy?) the external world. The Neo-Kantian treatment of 'the object' will come in for consideration . . . 'Knowledge and Reality or Idealism and Realism' would, I think, correctly describe the subject, but a double title is perhaps a mistake." Finally, the course was announced as on Realism. A few weeks before the lectures were delivered Seth wrote to Mr Balfour: "This epistemological question seems to me very ambiguously dealt with by modern Kantians and Neo-Hegelians, and equally so by empirical idealists—so that I hope what I have to say may not be altogether untimely."

As the Lectures form the latter part of the present volume there is no call for comment on them here, but a word is perhaps needed as to their subsequent history. Immediately after the delivery of the Lectures, Seth wrote to Professor Laurie: "I am determined to keep them in hand and work the subject out before publishing, treating all sides of it and guarding against misapprehension." But this intention was not fully accomplished. Later in 1891 Seth was appointed to succeed Professor Campbell Fraser in Edinburgh University; and Mr Balfour agreed that publication in the *Philoso-*

phical Review [1] would serve the immediate purpose of bringing them before the students of philosophy, until the writer should have time for the thorough revision which he had in mind. But the larger responsibilities which Seth found awaiting him in Edinburgh, and perhaps also some shifting in his central interest from epistemology to other branches of philosophy, caused this revision to be postponed. Although he still had it in mind in the summer of 1893, it was finally abandoned ; so it is only now that the third series of Balfour Lectures can take its place beside the familiar volumes containing the first and second series.

[1] The *Review* was edited by Dr Schurman, who was at this time Dean of the Sage School of Philosophy in Cornell University.

CHAPTER V.

ST ANDREWS.

1887-1891.

In the summer of 1887 the Chair of Logic, Rhetoric and Metaphysics in the University of St Andrews became vacant through the death of Professor Spencer Baynes, editor of the *Encyclopædia Britannica.* Seth applied for and was appointed to the chair, which embraced the two subjects of his special love, Philosophy and Literature. His departure caused great regret to his Cardiff friends, and he left them with a like regret, but with no hesitations, saying: "At last my own country sees fit to provide me with bread." Several of these friends found their way gladly to the Seths' new home, 'Mayfield,' during the years they remained in St Andrews — years of strenuous work and tranquil happiness.

Soon after arriving, Seth wrote to W. P. James: "I am not yet in a state to correspond with my friends, being involved for my sins in the mysteries of Celtic and Anglo-Saxon Literature. The former, I believe, is a nemesis for leaving Wales. . . . We like the place here, but often think back to Cardiff and Cardiff friends. The students are a pleasant set of fellows. I have 35 for Logic and Psychology and 24 for Literature." Among these was one from a Perthshire village, William Menzies,

afterwards one of His Majesty's Inspectors of Schools, to whom we are indebted for the vivid account of Seth's work and influence which follows.

* * * * * * * * * *

"Andrew Seth was at St Andrews in the late eighties of last century, the period during which I was fortunate enough to be a student there. His influence in these years was undoubtedly the strongest in the University, and for some of us it is not too much to say that the University was transformed by it. He was then in his early prime, and various circumstances no longer existing contributed to strengthen the authority he would normally have exercised anywhere in virtue of his personality and his outstanding gifts as a teacher and thinker.

"At St Andrews in those days life was quiet and favourable to meditation and study. The University dominated the little town. It was the townsfolk's chief concern, and living for the students was incredibly cheap and good. The great Girls' School was still quite small, and even golf was little talked of. It was possible to be acquainted with student golfers of championship form and to be scarcely aware that they played the game. The difference in the interest excited by golf then and now is well brought out by a small incident that occurred as late as the summer of 1890. Observing in the course of a walk across the links with Seth a large group of one or two hundred people, I said, "What crowd can that be?" The professor raised his eyes, and, after studying the group for some seconds, remarked, "I think that must be the Golf Championship." Besides golf there was football, and for some of us drilling or Saturday shooting practice in connection with the 'O.T.C.,' or the Volunteer Corps, standing in those days for the present-day 'O.T.C.'

Walking was the commonest recreation or means of taking exercise. Summer sessions were non-existent,

nor were there any women students, and tennis, dancing and evening parties were virtually unknown. University lecturing practically finished at two o'clock, and the afternoons and evenings were free. It was a simple mode of life, centred mainly round the intellectual activity of the University and ignoring many important social factors; but there was an absence of distraction about it and a not unwholesome austerity which assisted study and prepared us for a thorough appreciation of good teaching.

"Nor in the conditions prevailing within the University itself was there anything likely to hinder the immediate recognition of a new-comer of Seth's calibre. The Chair of Moral Philosophy was then held by William Knight, the well-known editor of Wordsworth, whose main interest was Literature. As a teacher of Philosophy he was not effective. Lewis Campbell in the Greek Chair was a revered figure. Attainments such as his would have graced any university, and his mere presence amongst us was an uplifting influence of singular value. But it has to be admitted that the best of Campbell was in his published works; his class lecturing was not comparable to Seth's. Later on Burnet in Campbell's Chair was a power in the University, but that was after Seth left. In my own time the strongest individual influence was undoubtedly Seth's. For some few of us he was almost the one thing that counted, and to all of us he meant a great deal.

"It must not be forgotten that at that time under the régime of the old seven subjects curriculum, since so unfortunately given up, Philosophy was an obligatory subject; and the influence of philosophy professors, therefore, embraced the whole body of students, and was not confined, as it might be now, to a limited section. Seth, moreover, was also Professor of English, and throughout his term at St Andrews he was thus doubly in contact with all Arts students, and that by means of two of the most important and vitalising subjects in the whole curriculum. The impression which he made on

his arrival was instantaneous, and it was lasting. From the first he seemed to embody all those qualities which the Scottish student most desires in his professor, and to which even the least thoughtful of them pay an instinctive homage. I can recall his inaugural address, the tall, slightly stooping figure, the measured delivery, the pensive youthful face and the thick hair abundantly sprinkled with grey; and I remember the ingenuous answer made me by a fellow-student on my referring after the address to those signs of age in one so young, 'When you have done as much "grinding" as him perhaps your own hair will be just as white.'

"A small matter worth noting, for it is a significant tribute to Seth's personality, was the invariably sober demeanour of the students in his classroom. Even in his absence they were relatively quiet, with a general avoidance of the noisy and harmless demonstrations common elsewhere. Indeed they behaved less like St Andrews students of those days than people waiting for a service in church.

"In thinking of his teaching at St Andrews the main characteristics that come back to me at this distance of time are: the extraordinarily convincing nature of his exposition, πειθώ τις ἐπεκάθιζεν ἐπὶ τοῖς χείλεσιν; the uniform lucidity and finish of his language; the closely knit coherence and cogency of his argument; and the inspiring level of sober eloquence to which it would insensibly rise on rare occasions under the pressure of the thought behind it.

"He did not disdain picturesque locutions, and the felicitous use of such expressions, whether his own or borrowed, was common enough with him to make it a feature of his lecturing style. 'The rivets of experience,' 'the spout behind the clouds,' show what is meant. The impression which his ordinary lecturing style merely as language made on the ear was peculiarly satisfying; and I am tempted to connect with this characteristic as in some degree accounting for it the practice implied in an admonition which he once gave

myself for the improvement of my class essays: 'You should first sound,' he said, 'each sentence to yourself before putting it down on paper.' He was not averse to poetical quotation and in his philosophy lectures quoted occasionally, though but sparingly and never merely for the sake of ornament. In his lectures on English, on the other hand, his taste for literature and his intense love of good poetry came fully and powerfully to light. It was this quality above everything else which inspired and shaped his English lectures, and would have lent them almost alone a perfectly adequate degree of life and character. His course was unpretentiously conceived—Seth was but an amateur in English—but the lecturer's great power of appreciation and his even more singular power of communicating his own appreciation to others were in themselves more than sufficient to make it a memorable experience.

"He was sensible to all kinds of poetry, and in those days showed a special fondness for Keats; but his temperamental affinity for the more elevated kind where Literature and Philosophy meet was obvious. With Wordsworth, Dante, Goethe and the Shakespeare of the Tragedies he was thus in his proper element, and I have heard him read out with fervour in his thrillingly beautiful voice—in what connection I cannot now recall—the whole of the great passage on the misery of Human Life from the Third Book of Lucretius. Verses of his own composition appeared on several occasions in the College Magazine. Their finished form and grave beauty of sentiment were highly characteristic, and Lewis Campbell, a fastidious judge, thought extremely well of them.

"In lecturing on the poets he quoted a great deal. In fact the more important the poet the longer and the more numerous became the passages quoted. It was as if his chosen method was to stand aside as far as possible and let us see or rather hear the poet for ourselves. Whatever the reason there is no doubt that in adopting this procedure he was happily inspired, if only

because of his voice, which was low, clear and instantly and faithfully responsive to every shade of thought and feeling—a voice in fact made for speaking verse just as it should be spoken. Lines said as *he* could say them would often impress themselves at once and permanently on the mind, and there were many I thus remembered. Here are a few—

> 'After life's fitful fever he sleeps well.'

> 'To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow,
> Creeps in this petty pace from day to day
> To the last syllable of recorded time.
> And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
> The way to dusty death.'

> 'Full on this casement shone the wintry moon
> And threw warm gules on Madeline's fair breast.'

> 'If this fail,
> The pillared firmament is rottenness
> And earth's base built on stubble.'

> 'Yet some there be that by due steps aspire
> To lay their just hands on that golden key
> That opes the palace of eternity.'

These are only a few among many lines of English poetry which I have never read since without being reminded of Seth and the exact tone of voice in which he delivered them when I first heard them read out by him in the English classroom at St Andrews. One small circumstance connected with his reading of the passage from Marlowe's *Tamburlaine* beginning—

> 'The thirst of reign and sweetness of a crown
> That caused the eldest son of heavenly Ops
> To thrust his doting father from his chair,'

lingers in my memory. In the course of this passage occur the words: 'Still climbing after knowledge in-

finite.' Seth must have felt their force very strongly; for, after finishing the passage, he returned to them for a moment and kept repeating them in a half whisper to himself. They had evidently struck a highly sympathetic chord in his imagination

"In both Philosophy and Literature Seth's own predilection was for depth and solidity rather than mere extensiveness, and wide discursive reading on the subjects of his lecture was not a habit which he much encouraged. Acting himself on the principle of *multum non multa*, he led us to think that it was much better for us at that stage to spend our time in wrestling for ourselves with the problems of Philosophy, as they occurred in the writings of two or three representative thinkers, than in reading what had been said about them by commentators and historians. So, though he did not actually dissuade us from discursive accessory reading and indeed recommended at the beginning of each course a number of works for consultation and reference, he would in his own lectures refer to these but slightly, confining his attention almost entirely to the class-books prescribed. What these were in the Ordinary Class I cannot recall. In the Advanced Class, which was the really important one, for it was in it that the professor gave of his best and that the significance of Philosophy was first revealed to us, the works studied were: Mill's *Logic*, the *Theætetus* in the Greek, and, much the most important of all, *The Critique of Pure Reason*. Seth, I remember, was very sympathetic with Mill and very good and full on the *Theætetus*, the subject of which probably had a special attraction for him at the time because of his own preoccupation with the question of Epistemology. It was on Kant, however, approached by a series of excellent lectures on his predecessors from Descartes downwards, amongst which the lectures on Leibnitz and an impressive and elevated exposition of Spinoza stand conspicuously out in my recollection, that the main part of the professor's work

in this course was concentrated. He gave us lecture after lecture on the *Critique* in the endeavour to make us realise by different methods of approach that with this work we had reached the great clearing-house of modern Philosophy and were in living contact with all its main problems.

" In the course of the session we wrote several essays, one of them on the difficult subject of Kant's conception of Causality. The degree of reflection and research involved in such work no doubt benefited us considerably, but what I chiefly remember in connection with it were the professor's elucidations. Whatever else our own efforts had failed to effect, they had at least the advantage of putting us into the best possible state for comprehending and appreciating at something like its full value the sure and illuminating treatment of the subject given by the professor on the return of each essay.

" It was possible for Honours students at St Andrews in those days to be in quite exceptionally intimate contact with their professors. Very few men thought of Honours then. In some subjects, indeed, and these standard Arts ones, Moral Philosophy for example, no Advanced Courses were held at all, and there were none in Logic either till Seth started them. The briefness of his stay in St Andrews did not, I think, give him time for more than two, the first of which was the one I had. In these courses the relationship between the professor and his pupils was all the warmer and more fruitful for the fact that the classes were so small. I think the class of the year succeeding my own numbered but three or four, the keenest of whom were David Irons and John Smart, both for different reasons conspicuous figures amongst their fellow-students. Smart was known as a man of literary bent, he was editor of the College Magazine and played a leading rôle in the Students Representative Council; while Irons was at first probably better known as an athlete than as a scholar. Smart's true vocation was literature, and before his

death a few years ago he had acquired with the discriminating scholarly public a high reputation for critical insight and scholarship of the soundest type. He first made a name for himself by a book on *The Ossianic Question*. A fine study of Milton's Sonnets followed, and a posthumous work on Shakespeare, embodying the results of much reflection and original research, was widely and warmly welcomed. Smart's deflection from his ingrained constitutional bent for letters was but temporary, but that it occurred at all serves to show the strength of the attraction exercised by Seth.

"Irons' case was more striking. Unlike Smart, he had a strong natural affinity for Philosophy, but it was an affinity which but for Seth's happening to be in St Andrews he might never have discovered. He entered Seth's class and suddenly found himself. From that moment Philosophy seemed to him the one way of life worth following, and follow it he did with single-minded and unswerving ardour until his early death in America many years ago. When I knew him, the two overmastering interests in his life were his passion for Philosophy and his devotion to Seth, the two being almost indistinguishably fused in his mind.

"But though probably none of his St Andrews students felt Seth's influence quite so much as Irons, he was not the only one to feel it strongly. And, indeed, there was something quite out of the common about Seth's sheer effectiveness as a teacher of Metaphysics in those days. This showed itself not merely in ability to command attention and to stimulate interest or intellectual curiosity. Any other teacher who to similar knowledge and talents united an equal or nearly equal devotion to the subject might have managed as much as that. But Seth did more. He made Metaphysics not merely interesting but exciting. The really distinguishing feature of his teaching was the glowing and fervid character of the interest he had the power of arousing in us by what was nevertheless an appropriately severe and strictly

logical treatment of his subject. I can recall, for example, the state of tumultuous emotion in which I found Irons and Smart immediately after a certain lecture on Spinoza, which in the tense absorption of all concerned had insensibly lengthened out from the regulation period of one hour to two.

"I once heard Pringle-Pattison say that great metaphysicians could be divided into two classes, according as in each case the prime motive, the original impulse to Speculation, could be regarded as mainly ethical or mainly intellectual. His own place, unless I am mistaken, would be in the first group among thinkers such as Plato and Spinoza. In his metaphysical speculations the ultimate ethical interest, I think, might always be felt as the essential and fundamental source of their vitality. It was beyond us then to discern this characteristic or its bearings with any clearness; but, if it was real, as I believe it was, its existence would have to be reckoned with as perhaps the strongest single factor in his power over us as a teacher. It was a power which could serve in itself as a concrete refutation of that common view of Philosophy expressed in the words of a well-known French writer: 'The great weakness of Philosophy will always lie in its inability to appeal to the feelings.'"

* * * * * * * * * *

It seems appropriate to add to Mr Menzies' account of the years during which Seth taught English Literature as well as Philosophy, three from the slender sheaf of poems which won praise from Lewis Campbell, and which their author printed years after for his children. The first was written in 1880, and the second and third date from the St Andrews days.

St Denis.

When I have gazed upon the storied tombs
Reared o'er the famous dead, in hallowed crypt
Have seen the velvet rotting round their bones—
Then have I longed, in thinking of my end,
For sun and sky, sweet air, and breeze-blown grass.

Lay me where the whispering trees
  Net the sunlight over me ;
  Green and gold my pall shall be
'Neath their sylvan traceries.

Let the brown bird o'er my head
  Call his mate among the leaves ;
  When the reaper binds his sheaves,
His smooth song shall lull the dead.

The Day After.

But yesterday, through mist and gloom,
  We bore him to his rest ;
To-day the joyous sunshine floods
  The bay from east to west.

It sleeps upon the time-worn towers
  And on the new-made grave,
And out to sea the white-winged gull
  Flashes along the wave.

O Life that cradlest all our lives !
  We wake and then we sleep ;
For life or death thou wilt not break
  Thine ancient silence deep.

SALVE, MAGNA PARENS!

Birthplace of our immortal years
  Dear Earth, upon whose breast we played,
Whose streams we strayed by, in whose lanes
  We wandered once as man and maid——

Dear as first love thy fields and woods,
  The flush of spring and June's deep green,
And dear the autumn-purpled moor,
  The far-off peak in wintry sheen.

The flying splendours of the morn,
  The pools that keep the evening light,
The silver sickle of the moon
  And star-sown spaces of the night.

Mother beloved, O not in vain
  Our spirits' nurse, thou ancient Earth!
Thy beauties fade not from our sight,
  Where'er our souls again have birth.

Deep in our hearts they mirrored lie,
  Beyond the mists of death they shine;
The winds that blow about thy hills
  Still, still will stir our pulse like wine.

. . . . . .

Else were we dead in very sooth,
  Or ghosts within a ghostly land,
Where the unavailing shadows flit
  Cheerless along the dusky strand.

CHAPTER VI.

FIRST YEARS IN THE EDINBURGH CHAIR.

1891-1897.

WHEN Professor Campbell Fraser resigned the Chair of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, Seth at once became a candidate. His most formidable competitor was Robert Adamson, at this time Professor in Owens College, Manchester, and afterwards in the University of Glasgow. Adamson's learning and penetrating intellect had long before won the respect of his fellow-philosophers, and not least of Seth himself; but he had published very little during the previous decade, while Seth's recent volumes had marked him out as a thinker whose originality and critical power found fitting expression in a singularly apt and lucid literary style. On July 8, 1891, the result was known, and Seth wrote to Professor Laurie :—

"It is in every way very gratifying. Be sure that I do not forget how much your untiring efforts have contributed to the result. I do not lose sight either of the serious aspects of the thing, for it is undoubtedly a serious matter to reflect that one has reached the goal of one's ambition. It remains to make a good use of the position, and I think with the fresh stimulus and the greater leisure in summer, I may: I hope I have not yet ceased to think and to learn."

Seth's thirty-fifth year had indeed brought him, not only to the climacteric of his life—in Dante's phrase, *il mezzo del cammin*—but to the position in the academic world towards which he had long looked. For nearly ten years he had been recognised as a coming leader of idealistic thought. For four years he had taught in the oldest university of his native land. But now he entered on his main life-work, following that of the man to whom he owed his first impulse to philosophy. Campbell Fraser's own feeling regarding the appointment stands on record in the last chapter of his *Biographia Philosophica*: "My hope for the Chair of Hamilton, and through it for the university as well as for philosophy in Scotland, was happily realised in the appointment of my distinguished successor, who fitly represents philosophy in the city of David Hume, Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart, Sir William Hamilton and James Frederick Ferrier."

Among his colleagues in the Faculty of Arts, Seth found several who had been his teachers fifteen years before. Henry Calderwood occupied the Chair of Moral Philosophy, and in spite of wide differences of outlook and philosophical method, the two men worked together for six years harmoniously and with mutual respect.[1] Masson, Tait and Blackie also remained; and before long Seth received from Blackie an invitation to join a circle for the study of Greek tragedy, addressed in a handwriting which must have been the despair of many a postman, especially as the writer always placed beside the address a short text or quotation in Greek. On July 24 Seth wrote to a Cardiff friend that he would now be free from the heavy work as an external examiner, which had hitherto occupied much of his time: "It is

[1] Seth's estimate of Calderwood as a philosopher will be found in his Memoir of James Seth, p. xv, where he especially notes Calderwood's "fine natural courtesy."

a grand thought that I have had my last bout with exam. papers, at least on that colossal scale. . . . And I have an assistant too in the winter! The letters I get from that assistant are like precious ointment, and enable me, more than anything else, to realise my new dignity." The assistant was Mr R. P. Hardie, afterwards Reader in Ancient Philosophy in the University, who had brought back from Oxford to his native city a deep interest in Greek thought and especially in Aristotle, and who proved not only an invariably helpful colleague but a close and valued friend during nearly forty years.

Three months after Seth's election to the Edinburgh chair Mr Balfour became Chancellor of Edinburgh University. So in the service of the University another link was formed, which lasted for the same long period. The new Chancellor took a keen interest in everything that concerned the teaching of philosophy; and a few years later, when Seth launched a scheme for the founding of an Honours Philosophy Library—now associated with the name of Lord Haldane—he was one of the first contributors.

Seth's Inaugural Address in the chair which he adorned for twenty-eight years was delivered on October 26, 1891.[1] It began with the tribute to his predecessor and the account of the awakening of his own interest in philosophy which have been already quoted, and went on to describe the threefold discipline, in logic, psychology and the history of philosophy, which lay before those who entered on the course. Now that Seth had emerged from his short experience of the teaching of that English Literature which he never ceased to study with delight, he was able to direct fuller attention than before to psychology in its modern developments; though from the outset he looked forward to the appoint-

[1] Reprinted in *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 24 ff.

ment of a specialist Lecturer in Psychology, which took place fifteen years later.

The Inaugural Address made it clear that he looked on the study of the metaphysical systems of the past as " one of the richest parts of the training afforded by a philosophical chair," and ended with a deeply felt confession of his own philosophic faith. After acknowledging the grandeur of Hegel's interpretation of the progress of life and mind to its culmination in man, he went on to say: " The achievements of the world-spirit do not move me to unqualified admiration, and I cannot accept the abstraction of the race in place of the living children of men. Even if the enormous spiral of history is destined to wind itself at last to a point which may be called achievement, what, I ask, of the multitudes that perished by the way? ' These all died, not having received the promises.' What if there *are* no promises *to them?* To me the old idea of the world as the training-ground of individual character seems to offer a much more human, and, I will add, a much more divine, solution than this pitiless procession of the car of progress." To many old students these words will recur as giving the keynote of the deeper teaching of their old master in the well-remembered Logic Classroom.

Nor did they fail to awaken echoes from other centres of thought. One of the most significant came from Hegel's old University of Jena, in a letter bearing a signature destined to become widely known during the two following decades—that of Rudolf Eucken. The leader of ' activist ' idealism in Germany acknowledged the pleasure with which he had received the Inaugural Address of one whom he greeted as a fellow-worker in the cause of a fundamental refashioning of the spiritual life of mankind (*eine durchgreifende Reform in dem Geistesleben der Menschheit*). He went on to congratu-

late him on his transference to the University which was considered in Germany the most notable in the English-speaking world (*die Universität die bei uns in Deutschland für die bedeutendste aller Universitäten englischer Zunge gilt*); and remarked that traditional rôles were reversed when Germans had become distrustful of metaphysics (*Antimetaphysiker*), and looked to England for a new impulse in philosophy. This impulse Eucken found and welcomed in the closing passages of the Address.

Seth's conscientiousness in preparing for his class lectures comes out in a letter written during his third winter in Edinburgh to Professor Samuel Alexander, who had inquired about the third series of Balfour Lectures: "I can well believe you have been full of work this session. I find myself still absurdly occupied with my lectures from day to day, and have registered a solemn vow to do some steady work this summer towards putting them into better shape."

When Andrew and Eva Seth moved from St Andrews in the autumn of 1891, they settled in the house at 16 Churchhill, which became the Edinburgh home of the family for just forty years. They had now four children—Marjorie, Norman, Ernest and Elinor; and in the six years that followed the two youngest sons, Siegfried and Ronald, were born. The new home was not far from the home of Seth's student days, at a higher point of the ridge which slopes gently westward from the base of Arthur's Seat to the Boroughmuir, where in old days was the rallying point of Scottish armies. Close by was the Bore Stone, where the King's standard was set up, and but little farther away was Merchiston Castle, the venerable building in which John Napier invented logarithms early in the seventeenth century, and which two hundred and fifty years later became a

famous school. To it the two younger boys went at a later time.

The garden of the Seths' new home sloped to the south, and beyond it were other large gardens containing not a few fine trees. Over these could be seen the western end of Blackford Hill, and to the south-west the noble line of the Pentlands above Swanston—the scarped ridge of Caerketton and the green dome of Allermuir. Seth's study was on an upper floor, and the whole wide sweep of the hills was within view as he sat at his desk.

In April 1892, Seth returned to St Andrews to receive the degree of Doctor of Laws, and was heartily welcomed by students and former colleagues; and a year later he and his wife carried out a plan which had been several times made and postponed—to visit her mother. Ten weeks were spent in Germany, and on June 17 he wrote to Professor Laurie from Suderode in the Harz Mountains: "It does one's heart good to see hills again after the endless sandy flats of which North Germany mainly consists. I could not bring myself to go near any of the Berlin professors. These ceremonial visits interrupt a holiday frame of mind. I like to travel 'in the strictest incognito' (as one reads in the newspapers), and keep my evenings for the opera and the play. Four evenings were accordingly devoted to the Wagnerian cycle—the *Ring der Nibelungen.*"

A pleasant glimpse of the Seth family during an Argyllshire holiday in August 1895 is given in a letter from Professor Campbell Fraser, who was himself revisiting his native country by Loch Etive: "I must send a few words of gratitude for the happy hours I spent with you, and the beautiful picture of your rural life which they have left in memory. It was delightful to see the family bathing procession, and the youngsters in the woods as I drove back to Loch Nell."

In 1896 Seth was invited by Mr Balfour to join the 'Synthetic Society,' which had been formed to "contribute towards a working philosophy of religious belief." The members at this time were Balfour, George Wyndham, the Bishop of Rochester (Edward Talbot), Charles Gore, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, R. H. Hutton of the *Spectator*, R. C. Jebb and Wilfrid Ward. At each meeting a short paper was read and discussion followed. Seth was often prevented from attending the meeting of the 'Synthetic' by the work of his chair, but when he could do so he highly appreciated the opportunity of meeting men whose interpretation of religion differed widely in detail, but who brought to these discussions not only great ability but a common serious purpose.

The field of academic ceremonial made little appeal to Seth, as is shown by the letter to Professor Laurie lately quoted, though no man could carry through his part with greater dignity. But in 1896 he made one exception. The 'College of New Jersey,' which was founded in 1746, was preparing to celebrate its hundred and fiftieth anniversary by assuming formally the title which it had commonly borne for long—that of the University of Princeton. Throughout its earlier history it was marked by a Puritan tradition largely derived from Scotland. Two of its most distinguished Presidents were John Witherspoon, a Scottish Calvinist divine and teacher, who was appointed in 1768 and steered the young College firmly through the troubled waters of the American War of Independence; and James M'Cosh, author of a book on Scottish Philosophy, who took office exactly a hundred years later. It was thus natural that Princeton should wish to have a representative from a Scots university among those who came to her Sesquicentenary, and that Seth should be warmly welcomed as representing especially the Scots tradition in philosophy. His colleague, Professor Calderwood, urged

him to go, and, along with Mr Hardie, made his absence possible by taking his classes when the session of 1896-97 opened.

Seth crossed the Atlantic at the end of September, and before going to Princeton visited Cornell, where his brother James had just become Sage Professor of Moral Philosophy, and where he gave a public lecture on ' Optimism and Pessimism.' On this occasion President Schurman was able to introduce his friend to an American audience. By the middle of October, Andrew Seth reached Princeton, where the days preceding the actual celebration were devoted to a series of lectures by distinguished guests. The three lecturers from Britain were Professor (now Sir) J. J. Thomson, Professor Dowden, and Seth himself, whose contribution was published under the title *Two Lectures on Theism.* At the Graduation Ceremony he again stood as ' one of three.' This time he advanced with Professors William James of Harvard and G. T. Ladd of Yale to represent Philosophy, in face of a great company of scholars and scientists who also received honorary degrees.

There were other functions—an address from President Cleveland, a procession of alumni and the inevitable torch-light procession; and in an account of the ceremonies contributed to the *Scotsman* on his return, Seth described in detail the Princeton yell at an inter-collegiate football match. He was more seriously impressed by the recital of an ode by Dr Henry Van Dyke, and the response to a speech at the final banquet, in which Professor Goldwin Smith of Toronto pled for greater mutual trust between the United States and the British Empire. Only three years had passed since President Cleveland's message on the Venezuela dispute had stirred bitter feelings on both sides of the Atlantic; but so profoundly was the audience moved by Goldwin Smith's " sombre and mournful eloquence "

that his speech ended with cheers for Old England raised in the body of the hall. As the reader of to-day looks through the report of the gathering in the Princetonian journal, that which awakens his keenest interest is a eulogy entitled ' Princeton in the Nation's Service ' by a young Professor of Law. It ends with a glowing description of the university of the speaker's dreams, and with the question : " Who shall show us the way to this place ? " The speaker was Woodrow Wilson.

Seth summed up his impressions in a letter to Mr Balfour : " I had a thoroughly enjoyable time on the other side, not only at Princeton, but at Harvard, Cornell and other places, including Niagara. The kindness and hospitality one received everywhere was unbounded, and the interest of the visit was very great." Towards the end of a stormy homeward passage on the *Lucania* he wrote in a similar strain to his brother at Cornell, and told how the discomfort of the voyage had been lightened by the presence of other delegates returning from the celebration, and not less by the reading of *Sentimental Tommy*, then newly published.

Early in 1897 *Two Lectures on Theism* and *Man's Place in the Cosmos* both appeared. These volumes may be taken as placing the copestone on Seth's work as a thinker up to this point, and both contain much of his most polished and incisive writing. Although the *Two Lectures* are avowedly only an outline, they definitely point the way towards an ethical theism set free from the defects of Pantheism on the one hand and Deism on the other. The larger volume in its original form contained the Inaugural Address of 1891 and essays published during the five following years on Huxley's Romanes Lecture, Balfour's *Foundations of Belief*, Münsterberg's theory of psychological automatism and Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*. In an enlarged edition published in 1902 there were added an apprecia-

tion of Campbell Fraser's Gifford Lectures and a long paper on "The Life and Opinions of Friedrich Nietzsche," which appeared at a time when Nietzsche was still imperfectly understood in this country.

The territory traversed in these essays is wide, and they show Seth's power of constructive criticism in fields that were not primarily his own—ethics in the essay on Nietzsche and psychology in that on Münsterberg. In the short essay on Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*, with which the volume opens, there is one of the comparatively rare passages in which he allows his latent moral passion to appear, as he dismisses in a few scornful sentences the immoralist theory of the family.

Seth himself claimed that there was an underlying unity in the book, for all the essays treated at bottom the same theme—"man's relation to the forces of nature and to the absolute ground of things, or, in the words of the title, man's place in the cosmos."—(*Pref.*) This shows the movement, already noted, of his thought at this time from epistemology to ontology; yet the two lay not far apart, and the first lecture in *Theism* gave effective expression to the contention which he always maintained, that "the knower is in the world which he comes to know, and the forms of his thoughts, so far from being an alien growth or an imported product, are themselves a function of the whole" (p. 19). His criticism of Mr Bradley also dealt in part with the theory of knowledge. It called forth widespread interest, not only for its matter but because of its effective form. A writer had now appeared who could meet that master of philosophic wit and raillery with "a fine-edged irony" (to borrow a phrase of Seth's regarding Berkeley) hardly less dexterous and penetrating than his own.

The original publication of the articles gathered in *Man's Place in the Cosmos* brought to the author several letters of more than passing interest. Mr William

Blackwood, the head of the famous house which had already published two of his books, wrote welcoming him as a contributor to 'Maga.' Dr Martineau, then in his eighty-ninth year, wrote on November 29, 1893: "I have read your essay on 'Man's Place in Nature' with the keenest interest, and with all but unqualified assent to its reasoning and its critical estimates throughout. I would fain express to you, if I could, the happy confidence with which, at the end of life, I anticipate from you the much-needed reaction from the dominant Hegelian form of Idealism. My hopes in this respect used to rest, as I often told him, on Thomas Hill Green, whose noble moral nature was always pressing him in that direction. And now it is my fancy that his mission has devolved on you. It is a great trust; and may be executed with full acknowledgment of the lofty influence, intellectual and ethical, exercised by his genius and Edward Caird's during their period of ascendancy. But they have not said the last word in philosophy, and would be the first to repudiate the pretension."

The same day's post brought a long letter from a thinker of a very different school, Mr Leslie Stephen, to whose work reference was made in the article which dealt primarily with Huxley's Romanes Lecture. "I used to suppose that men of your way of thinking were bound to hold that men of my way of thinking were fools, and also to suppose that we were bound to return the compliment. I am very glad to take your article as an indication of the growing tendency—and I hope growing on both sides—to greater courtesy and better appreciation of each other. . . . I cannot help believing for my own part that there is more agreement between us than appears—perhaps rather more than either of us can precisely see at the moment. I wish that I were in the position to have the advantage of an occasional

talk with you; when I am sure that I should learn—even though I am growing rather too old and stiff in the joints to change my habits of mind or body. I now and then see your friend Haldane, when he is not immersed in briefs or parliamentary warfare; and it is always a great pleasure to meet him." Professor Huxley wrote at the same time: "Accept my cordial thanks for defending me and still more for understanding me. I really have been unable to understand what my critics have been dreaming of—when they raise the objection that the ethical process being part of the cosmic process cannot be opposed to it. They might as well say that artifice does not oppose Nature, because it is part of Nature in the broadest sense."

So also Mr Balfour, three years later, when the article on his *Foundations of Belief* first appeared: "You have done a real service, both to me and to any of my readers who were fortunate enough to see what you have written, by giving so admirable a summary of the general line of argument which I have endeavoured to set forth. I had almost gone to the length of saying that you are the only critic of any importance who has taken the trouble to find out what that line of argument really is; the rest seem chiefly interested in discussing such fragmentary portions of the work as happen to be in collision with their own private views."

But the essay which called for the largest body of appreciative comment was that entitled "A New Theory of the Absolute." Mr Bradley himself wrote on November 17, 1894: "It is a great pleasure to see that you estimate my work at so high a value. I hope my book will be useful as to some extent drawing conclusions explicitly which many were drawing in private, and as raising those questions which many were feeling should be pressed to an answer one way or the other." He went on to admit the justice of some of Seth's criticism, while

soon after he sent an elaborate answer to a number which he could not so accept.

Regarding the two books which Seth had sent him, Baron Friedrich von Hügel wrote: "I have rarely indeed seen anything with which I have found myself in more constant sympathy and grateful agreement, or which seemed to me as full of the most reverent spirit, combined with a noble breadth of knowledge and of outlook. . . . I was glad when I was staying at Jena with my close friend Professor Eucken, to find how well he and his students know and love your work. . . . Scattered about Europe I have some nine or ten philosopher friends and admired writers: among these you count, if I may admit it, as one of the latter."

Dr John MacCunn's appreciation has a lighter touch than the rest: "Many thanks for a valuable and valued book. I have hardly had a moment's time to look into it. So that this is grace before meat, and by no means meant as a substitute for the thanksgiving which I know I shall feel impelled to render after partaking. Your treatment of Huxley is the most justly appreciative yet firmest I have read. And I welcome, I think, almost everything you say about the new psychology. I daresay it may come of psychological ignorance on my part; but I never meet the diagrams and the physiological fluencies about 'paths of discharge' and suchlike without the feeling that, having set out to pursue philosophy, I had fallen helpless into a natural science ambuscade."

Seth's helping hand was welcomed by many in a like predicament.

CHAPTER VII.

THE HAINING.

1898-1914.

ANDREW SETH had now reached his forty-second year, and the future seemed to lie clear before him with no prospect of any sharp deviation from the path which he had hitherto followed. But at this point a change occurred which, to his friends at least, was sudden and unlooked-for; and he and his wife found themselves in possession of a new home in the heart of the Border country, and with it of the surname by which they were henceforth known. To explain this change of scene and of name we must go back for several generations.

During more than two centuries the estate of Haining —the original Scots meaning of the name is 'enclosure,' part 'hained off'—lying close to the ancient burgh of Selkirk, belonged to a branch of a widely known Border family, the Pringles. The lairds of Haining were men of note in the eighteenth century, as one of them was raised to the Scottish Bench in 1729 with the life title of Lord Haining, and later his son, a judge of exceptional eminence, assumed that of Lord Alemoor. But during the nineteenth century the family fortunes and influence declined, and the male line died out. Twice the estate passed to a daughter, and in each case her husband placed the name Pringle before his own. Thus

it came about that first Mrs Pringle-Douglas, and then her daughter, Mrs Pringle-Pattison, lived at the Haining. Mrs Pringle-Pattison had no children, and she bequeathed all her possessions to her husband if he survived her without issue. But it remained to provide for the event of his dying before her; and she and her husband knew something of the Seth family, with which he was distantly connected through the Littles. So, in view of the great promise shown by Andrew, then a lad of about sixteen, she decided to insert his name in her will.

During the years that followed he heard occasionally of or from Mrs Pringle-Pattison through his mother or one of her sisters; but if any expectation that he would finally receive The Haining was aroused in his own mind, he kept it concealed there. While he was at St Andrews John Pringle-Pattison died, and ten years later his wife, whose later years were clouded by persistent illness, died also. Only then did the surprising fact become known that she had bequeathed her whole estate to her husband's distant cousin, on the condition that he assumed the name Pringle-Pattison. The terms of her will were clear; but its provisions were so unusual that they could hardly be expected to pass quite unchallenged. More than one counter-claim was raised, but, largely on the initiative of Pringle-Pattison (as he had now become), these were settled without recourse to the courts; and he agreed as an act of grace to pay annuities to two claimants who were advanced in years.

The way was thus clear for him to enter upon his new domain. Its possession had both an attractive and a burdensome aspect. Its situation in a land of romance, at the very gates of the town in which Sir Walter Scott held office for a generation as Sheriff of Ettrick Forest, and within riding, or even walking, distance of Abbotsford and Melrose, appealed both to the poet in him and to his patriotism as a Borderer by descent. "On another



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side," Mr Capper has said, "the change in his position appealed to his sense of humour, and he made a solemn expedition to a distant burial-place of the Pringles, to visit, as he told me, 'the tombs of his new ancestors.' His young family were of an age to profit to the full by their enlarged opportunities of country life and to grow up familiar with its society and pursuits; while they, in turn, brought sunshine into a mansion which had seen no children for a hundred years." [1] Nor was it only within The Haining gates and by the wood-encircled loch lying just beyond the house that their presence brought about a change. The townsfolk of Selkirk, who had for long watched the slow decay of an ancient house, welcomed heartily the vigorous, clean-blooded, young life which now found a home there.

Haining House, like many Scottish country houses, was built at two different periods, and in contrasted, not to say incongruous, styles. The original part, probably about four hundred years old, was a fine example of the traditional style of the country, with rough-cast walls and small windows. Part was demolished in 1794, and there was added to what was left standing a new part in the classical style, with a large portico at the entrance, and high windows opening on a lawn which sloped steeply down to the loch.

The main part of the estate lay south of the Ettrick Water, looking down upon Philiphaugh, where Yarrow and Ettrick meet, and where the hitherto unbeaten Montrose suffered his first defeat one misty morning in 1645. To the south-east it extended to the Water of Ale, the perilous crossing of which figures in the tale of Sir William of Deloraine's ride in the *Lay of the Last Minstrel*. There were also three outlying portions. One was north of the Tweed, Fairnilee, whose peel tower inspired a romantic tale by Andrew Lang. A second,

[1] *Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. xvii.

Alemoor Farm, was twelve miles to the south, by the moorland loch from which the Ale flows; and it was from this that Andrew Pringle, the second of the judges already mentioned, took his title, Lord Alemoor. The third, also an upland farm, was named Adderstoneshiels, and lay to the south-east not far from the Limekilnedge pass, by which Dandie Dinmont, like his creator, Sir Walter himself, used to ride into Liddesdale.

The management of this scattered estate of over 7000 acres would have made a heavy call on the means and time of its owner, even if the property had previously been well maintained. But during the long period when Mrs Pringle-Pattison was unable to supervise it, the work of maintenance had been neglected, and her successor found heavy arrears awaiting him. At once he set himself to master the problems of estate management, for which his previous academic life had in no way prepared him. He had an able adviser in Mr Curle of Melrose, one of a family distinguished by their knowledge of archæology as well as of land. But he never believed in delegating tasks which he could perform himself, and he soon established a direct contact with those who gained their living from the land which had so unexpectedly come to him. Just as invitations to stay at The Haining were generally written in his own hand, so he attended in person to requests for repairs and improvements on the estate. The public burdens on agricultural land were not, indeed, as heavy in the early years of his proprietorship as they became later; but they were already considerable, and, along with the other circumstances mentioned, made his task far from easy on the financial side. He had to gain experience from the outset in this sternly practical school —one fact that he mentioned as having surprised him was the large proportion of the estate revenue which went in fencing alone—but his friends watched him as

he applied his clear and resourceful intellect to a quite unfamiliar situation, and gradually solved the problems which confronted him. After some years he was able to sell Fairnilee and Adderstoneshiels. To part with Fairnilee was a real sacrifice to him; but when this was done he found himself at last with a sufficiency of free capital to finance the remaining portions of the estate.

As Pringle-Pattison gradually and patiently cleared away the entanglements which met him when he first went to The Haining, the interest of the work grew upon him. In other directions he prepared for his new station in life. He took riding lessons, though he did not follow up his new accomplishment; and in spite of his indifferent eyesight he became a reasonably good shot, and before many summers had passed his two elder boys were able to join him in shooting over the estate.

Among the letters which arrived after the new ownership of The Haining was announced was one dated March 15, 1898, from 10 Downing Street:—

"My dear Seth—or perhaps I ought to say now, Seth Pringle-Pattison,—

I am delighted to hear of your good fortune, which I should certainly not be if I thought it would cause you, even for a moment, to abandon philosophy. I hope, on the contrary, that you will now be able to choose precisely the circumstances most favourable to original work.—With every congratulation, Believe me, Yours very sincerely,

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR."

In August of the same year Professor Campbell Fraser wrote:—

"Let me thank your wife and you very much for our three charming days at The Haining, the impression of

which will not leave us soon. It was indeed a satisfaction to see you all so happily settled amidst such surroundings; and you with an added career opened to you, not less responsible than an academical one, associating Scottish philosophy with a romance unprecedented in its history. Long may you all enjoy and benefit by it in every way."

Next to welcoming his friends at The Haining there was no part of Pringle-Pattison's life there which delighted him so much as the care of the beautiful trees on the estate and the planning of fresh plantations. Pruning and felling, especially round the house, he carried out as far as possible himself, with the help of his boys and of any guests to whom this occupation might appeal. In his first months at The Haining he collected a formidable outfit of axe, bill and various types of saw, including a fearsome instrument known as the pole-saw for the pruning of high branches. When he could form a small forestry party, he supplied each with a different tool; and, when he was obliged to go alone, he carried a smaller selection for his own use.

Other interests were provided by the customs and traditions of Selkirk, handed down through several centuries and still practised. As in other Border burghs, the great day is that of the Common Riding in June, when the Cornet for the year rides, suitably attended, round the ancient Marches or boundaries of the town's land. There is also the ancient Forest Club, consisting largely of neighbouring landowners, of which Pringle-Pattison was elected a member. The members meet for dinner twice a year, clad in the traditional costume of buff waistcoat and evening coat of archer green. The fact that Sir Walter Scott was a member of the Club appealed strongly to Pringle-Pattison's historical sense.

His wife's early memories of her home in a Silesian manor made it natural for her to take up the thread of

country life after long residence in cities, and she entered fully into her husband's new interests. Their summer home became a centre of wide hospitality, and sometimes unexpected guests found their way there. One photograph from the first years of the century shows the commanding figure of General Booth along with The Haining family and guests. He had come for a night when addressing a series of meetings in the Border towns, but no record survives of any theological discussion between himself and his host. Many of those who found their way to The Haining have already been named in this Memoir, for no man was ever more loyal to old friends than Pringle-Pattison. His own kinsfolk came, and his early companions Mr Capper and Professor Stalker brought their families, as did Dr Schurman when visiting Europe. The MacCunns came, and, with them or alone, Professor W. P. Ker. Lord Haldane came when his official duties allowed, and his close friend, Professor Hume Brown, for long Pringle-Pattison's valued colleague in Edinburgh University where he held the Chair of Scottish History and Palæography. In later years the Cardiff friend, already named, Mr W. P. James, found his way to The Haining; and there were many more, including from time to time former members of Pringle-Pattison's classes.

On first arrival, one of these friends has said, there was sometimes a slight passing feeling of constraint, due to the native shyness of the host; but very quickly this passed, and in half an hour talk would flow freely. The circle was not dominated by either husband or wife, but both together formed its centre, her invariable kindness being set in relief by a shrewd judgment of people and things, as his was by the "occasional and delightful causticity" of his remarks, as well as by the "sudden bursts of hilarity" of which another friend has spoken. His laugh, like that of some other habitually

serious men, had an explosive quality, which made it singularly infectious.

But the deepest impression made on those who came to know The Haining well was that described by one of them as "its extraordinary atmosphere—patriarchal, united, natural." The professor's intellectual life pursued its own course, for he remained the only member of the family who was interested in formal philosophy, but this formed no barrier against the truest sympathy between the children and both their parents. Even with friends who had for long shared his own dominating interests, the sharing was so complete that it could often dispense with words. Mrs MacCunn has described the "perfect silent understanding" between three of the circle—her husband, Pringle-Pattison and W. P. Ker; and after the death of the last-named, Pringle-Pattison set down his memory of one occasion when a large party had climbed the Eildon Hills, and "W. P. very characteristically insisted on our taking the three heights in their order. We rested on the third, and a little apart from the young party W. P. crouched on a rock, and, going near, I heard him chanting to himself the 'Flowers laugh before thee in their beds' verse of Wordsworth's *Ode to Duty*."

With this we may join an account given by Professor MacCunn in *Our Friend, W. P.*: "Perhaps the happiest social function at which I have ever assisted was the Yarrow Show of 1908. He [W. P. Ker] was staying with us at Dryhope on St Mary's Loch, and we were amused at his determination that we should all go to this gathering. He was eager to meet his friends the Pringle-Pattisons—when was he not anxious to meet his friends?—and to see Will Ogilvy's noble horsemanship. The holms of Yarrow on a clear autumn day have a spell all their own; but for him behind all these were memories of *Christ's Kirk on the Green* and *Peebles to the Play*."

Expeditions such as those described to the triple summit of the Eildons, or up Yarrow to Newark Castle and St Mary's Loch, or to the still lonelier recesses of Ettrick, or eastward as far as Dryburgh and Smailholm Tower, were characteristic of summer days at The Haining. The waggonette would convey the older members of the party with generous provision for all (unless a country inn formed the goal of the expedition), while the younger would walk on ahead or act as scouts and skirmishers on a generous supply of bicycles. But that the push-bicycle had displaced the ponies of an earlier day, Lockhart's description of the expeditions which Sir Walter organised and led from Abbotsford to the Eildons or Ettrick would apply almost unchanged to those from The Haining nearly a century later.

If in the present section little attention has been paid to chronology, this is due to the fact that life at The Haining in spring, in summer, or at Christmas—when the Christmas tree was honoured with an enthusiasm worthy of Mrs Pringle-Pattison's native land—changed only as the growth of the sons and daughters enabled them to take a fuller share in the activities which their parents planned. There was, however, one landmark, for in the year 1909 a double event took place, which called out the goodwill of the townsfolk of Selkirk as well as those who lived on the estate itself—the Silver Wedding of the parents and the Coming-of-age of the eldest son.

Two years later history in the making knocked suddenly and somewhat rudely at the doors of The Haining, bringing some premonition of the events of 1914. Richard Haldane, who had shortly before gone to the House of Lords as Viscount Haldane of Cloan, had arranged to come for a week-end visit in the latter part of August. He duly arrived, but at that moment the Agadir crisis, following a sudden railway strike, became acute. The

local post-office was accustomed to take its Sabbath rest undisturbed, and it took all the authority of the Minister for War to persuade the reluctant officials that their day of rest must on this occasion be sacrificed, and all Sunday a steady stream of telegrams came and went. To describe the course or ending of the crisis is no part of our purpose here; but it is worth noting that even the pressure of these critical days did not wholly thrust philosophy aside, for Lord Haldane wrote on August 30 from Cloan: "I have copied out the passage in the smaller Logic which seems to me to contain the kernel of Hegel and to which I referred when we were talking. I much enjoyed our talk. It is rarely one meets in these days a fellow pilgrim."

CHAPTER VIII.

UNIVERSITY TEACHING AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH FRIENDS.

1898-1914.

IT was only for a few months in 1898 that the title 'Professor Seth' was in abeyance in the philosophical department of Edinburgh University. We have seen how it came to be relinquished by its previous holder, but by the end of the year it was taken up again by his brother James on his appointment to the Chair of Moral Philosophy. The change may have been somewhat confusing to those who were members of the University before it took place; but to the students of later years there was a certain advantage in the fact that two brothers, teaching closely related subjects, possessed different surnames. Yet, if the truth must be told, even those who most profoundly admired the elder seldom troubled to use in ordinary talk any designation longer than the convenient symbol, SP^2.

The appointment of James Seth as colleague to his brother inaugurated a collaboration which was perhaps unique, and which brought great benefits to the University during the next twenty-one years. At the end of the previous year Pringle-Pattison (as he shortly afterwards became) wrote to ask the advice of Mr Balfour on the situation caused by the death of "my good kind colleague, Calderwood," and to find out how he would

regard the candidature of his brother, then at Cornell, for the Moral Philosophy chair—a step which was urged by the three veteran philosophers of Edinburgh: Campbell Fraser, Hutchison Stirling and Laurie. In a most judicial reply, Mr Balfour stated his view that James Seth was the strongest of the probable candidates, and so, on the principle that the post should go to the best available man, was entitled to receive it. But, on the other hand, he raised the questions how the prospect of having two brothers in the professorships of philosophy was likely to impress the electors, and whether students of philosophy might not be deprived by this arrangement of the *variety* of teaching which they were entitled to expect, even though each brother maintained his originality and independence.

Finally, James Seth decided to stand, moved in part by the persuasions of his friends in Edinburgh, and in part, as his brother expressed it, by "an inextinguishable yearning to return to his native land." He was appointed to the vacant chair; and with the brothers were intimately associated in the philosophical department for many years Mr R. P. Hardie as Lecturer in Ancient Philosophy, and Mr Henry Barker, who had recently won the Shaw Philosophical Fellowship, as Lecturer in Ethics and, till 1906, also in Advanced Psychology.

One happy result of James Seth's return was that he could now rejoin his mother, who had come back from Canada to Scotland some years before. "His return in honour to his native city gave her keen satisfaction. She was a woman of remarkable force of character, in whom depth of feeling was happily mated with a lively sense of humour, and till her death in 1911 at the age of eighty she presided over her son's household and entertained his guests."[1] These words were written

[1] A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *Memoir of James Seth*, p. xxv. f.

by her eldest son fourteen years after her death; and later still he wrote acknowledging a friend's description of an evening in her society, and added: "My mother's laughter (to tears) and her interested face as she followed the conversation round the table are eminently characteristic." It is, perhaps, not out of place to add that successive generations of students who even for a short time met the venerable mother, alert, dignified, kindly, felt that they had discovered one main secret of the distinction of the sons.

As such students look back, they will be in almost complete agreement that there was little ground for any fear that the philosophical teaching given by the brothers in Edinburgh University would lack variety. Both, indeed, held the same idealistic creed, though not in exactly the same form. Both were single-minded, disinterested, generous; and the old words were true of them, *par nobile fratrum*. Yet they showed their greatness as teachers in markedly different ways. From the start there was a difference in temperament; for, while both were naturally sensitive, the elder was at once the stronger and the more reticent. James Seth had a companionable nature, and was ever eager to pass on his own cherished beliefs and enthusiasms to younger men. Pringle-Pattison expressed his deeper convictions with a certain hesitancy; but even because of this, those who had caught anything of the undertones of his thinking felt his moments of self-expression all the more memorable.

Hence it came about that the contrast between Campbell Fraser and Calderwood, noted in Barrie's *Edinburgh Eleven* twenty years earlier, was repeated in the case of their successors. Each had his own enthusiastic adherents. As in the earlier time, the Moral Philosophy Class appealed to those whose philosophical interest was only nascent or was of a practical type;

for Seth had an unusual power of reading the mind and awakening the interest of the beginner in philosophy, and he seldom allowed his attitude to a thinker or a problem to remain in doubt. Pringle-Pattison, while at least as clear in exposition, was slow to pronounce final judgments, and his aim was rather that his students should themselves seek solutions than that they should accept conclusions because he held them. Hence it was a commonplace that James Seth was at his best in the Ordinary Class, while Pringle-Pattison's finest teaching was reserved for the comparatively small number who proceeded to Honours.

In one respect only did their special gifts fail to find the most advantageous exercise; and that was due, not to any defect in either, but to the position of their respective classes in the normal Arts curriculum. James Seth's special gift was that of initiating the new-comer into philosophy, while Pringle-Pattison's teaching—and perhaps also the character of his subject—called for a more definite philosophical interest and a more sustained attention. Yet it was the Logic class which was for long the larger, and which the majority of students took first. It was not subject to the waves of disorder which sometimes swept over other large classes in the Scottish universities of the day; yet among the two hundred men and women who composed it, there were some who had little bent for philosophy, and who at times complained of the lecturer's pauses as he arranged and rearranged the large sheets of manuscript on the desk before him. But a much larger number realised that he was steadily re-thinking, as he lectured, the ideas towards which he sought to lead his hearers, and that he never gave less than his best; while there were not a few who came growingly to understand the range, the fineness and the balance of his philosophical outlook. He did not use the *Seminar* method of discussion, which

was brought from America and successfully practised by his brother; but in a different, and perhaps a subtler, way he made his abler students feel that they were taken into a true partnership in the quest of truth.

It was not his way to make the initial steps too easy, and his Ordinary class opened with a month of Formal Logic, which he believed to have real value as a discipline in exactness of thought. Next came the section of the course on Psychology. Though not an original worker in this field, he knew well what was being done by others, and traced its outlines with his usual clarity of phrase and illustration. As he advanced to such topics as Association, Memory and the Concept, and showed how they were treated in the period from Descartes to Hume, he led up to the transition to the Theory of Knowledge.

The last two months of the winter session were devoted to a masterly introduction to the History of Metaphysics. This opened with a discussion, running through three or four lectures, of the object and method of philosophy. It was differentiated, he held, from science as dealing with the whole of knowledge and providing a "criticism of categories." It was organic, moving as a whole, and so no part of it could be regarded as settled and done with. The course of speculative thought had made it clear that many solutions of metaphysical problems, once accepted, were illusory, since their consequences had proved untenable. Yet the value of the historical study of philosophy was not merely negative, for, though certain main types of thought recurred at different epochs, the return to them was made at a higher level. From this introduction Pringle-Pattison passed on to a clear and stimulating survey of Greek philosophy, and then after a rapid glance at the Hellenistic and mediæval period, to a treatment of modern philosophy as far as Hume. In the Honours class he built on this

foundation an exposition of Kant and post-Kantian idealism and of Advanced Logic, with special reference to the work of Bradley and Bosanquet.

Such was the main current of his teaching during the first fifteen years of his professorship in Edinburgh. There were minor variations from year to year; but in 1906 there came a much larger change with the institution of the long-hoped-for Lectureship in Psychology, of which the late Dr W. G. Smith was the first holder. This allowed Pringle-Pattison to concentrate on the portions of his wide subject in which he was most at home, and it also reduced his Ordinary class to a more manageable size than before. There followed a further change by which professors in the Arts Faculty began to lecture during the summer session, which had till then taken a quite subsidiary place in the Arts curriculum. At the same time lectures in winter were reduced from five to three days a week. This rearrangement, though desirable on many grounds, appeared to Pringle-Pattison as a somewhat mixed blessing; since he had always felt at home in the older Scots system of a long summer vacation for study, thinking and preparation, in view of the concentrated activity of teaching in the winter months.

The interpretation of Modern Philosophy which he gave to his students may be gathered in detail from his books, and his gifts in this direction were well known. Yet his power of interpreting Greek thought was not less notable, though it only appeared in his last two books, especially in the chapter entitled "Pre-existence and Immortality in Plato."[1] The ethical passion in Plato, as well as "the large serenity of outlook" of which Pringle-Pattison there spoke, struck responsive chords in his own mind. But intellectually he was as much an

[1] *The Idea of Immortality, Lecture iii.*; cf. *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, Ch. vi. and vii.

Aristotelian as a Platonist, for he had a profound belief in development, while the study of history in its widest sense rather than reasoning of the mathematical order seemed to him the surest path to philosophical truth.

One memory which remains clear in the present writer's mind, as he looks back over thirty years, is that of the aptness and impressiveness of Pringle-Pattison's quotations, although in his Edinburgh classes he naturally quoted more sparingly from the poets than in the lectures on Literature of his St Andrews days. One such quotation in the Honours class was the passage from Lotze's *Mikrokosmos* on the trustworthiness and spiritual significance of knowledge which he reproduced in his Gifford Lectures.[1] Another well-remembered quotation came into his introductory course. He had reached the "incomplete Socratics," and pointed out that, opposite as the theories of Cynic and Cyrenaic appeared, they had a certain point of contact in an attitude to the world which separated both from the uncriticised views of the ordinary practical man. Then he continued in the words of Pater: "The saint, and the Cyrenaic lover of beauty, it may be thought, would at least understand each other better than either would understand the mere man of the world. Carry their respective positions a point further, shift the terms a little, and they might actually touch.

"Perhaps all theories of practice tend, as they rise to their best, as understood by their worthiest representatives, to identification with each other. For the variety of men's possible reflections on their experience, as of that experience itself, is not really so great as it seems; and as the highest and most disinterested ethical *formulæ*, filtering down into men's everyday existence, reach the same poor level of vulgar egotism, so, we may fairly suppose that all the highest spirits, from whatever

[1] *The Idea of God*, p. 120 f.

contrasted points they have started, would yet be found to entertain, in the moral consciousness realised by themselves, much the same kind of mental company." [1]

These words represented a deep and persistent element in Pringle-Pattison's own thinking. There was in it a recurrent sense of the *more* that lies beyond and above logical formulation, of the horizon that is never enclosed by the frame of the picture. If only this surrounding territory, as yet so little entered upon, could be patiently explored by thinkers each of whom sought steadily to appreciate points of view divergent from his own, the hope of a large measure of ultimate agreement indicated in the letter quoted from Leslie Stephen (above, p. 80 f.) might at last be realised.

This recollection of Pringle-Pattison's teaching is especially associated with the day, or days, in the Honours class when he touched on the final relation of the ethical and the religious experience—of the contrast between the Good as in partial and painful process of achievement, and the Good as already achieved and waiting to be appropriated by the finite spirit. Here his teaching had much in common with that of F. H. Bradley.[2] He attempted no formal reconciliation; but no student who carefully followed his thought could fail to realise how real and essential both points of view were to himself, and how fully he believed that they would be found at one in some form of experience wider in its span than ours, and were indeed implicitly at one in the highest reaches of our present experience.

Two impressions of his teaching may here be added which were placed on record by men who studied under

[1] *Marius the Epicurean*, Ch. xvi., "Second Thoughts." If my memory is not at fault, Pringle-Pattison linked with this Ch. ix., "New Cyrenaicism."

[2] Cf. the concluding chapter of *Ethical Studies*, especially pp. 319, 329 (2nd ed.), with Seth's early statement quoted p. 32 above, and with *The Idea of God*, p. 396, written more than thirty years after.

Pringle-Pattison, one at the beginning and the other during the later part of his Edinburgh professorship. Professor H. R. Mackintosh, writing in the *Scotsman* on the day after his death, thus described his Honours class: "That famous higher course, some of us readily own, was the best lecturing we have ever heard. He spoke conversationally, at times with a hesitation that added piquancy to the thing said, and he used no stale words. His method was to develop his own view by way of exposition and criticism of the greater thinkers, the criticism being of that higher order which forces an author to review himself in the light of his own assumptions."

Professor H. F. Hallett has thus recorded his impression of Pringle-Pattison's teaching at a later time: "He possessed in the highest degree the power of going straight to the heart of an abstruse problem. There was never a clearer-headed university professor, yet his ability was not overwhelming to his students. The slight hesitancy of his manner, the complete absence of the learned volubility that often conceals 'learned ignorance,' put the young student at ease with his subject, if not altogether at ease with his professor. . . . Further, he was a great teacher of philosophers: there must be at least half a dozen professors of philosophy at present in the universities of Great Britain alone who owe their first initiation as philosophers to Pringle-Pattison; but I should say that no two of them belong to the same school of thought. They were not so taught." [1] To which it may be added that his pupils have held chairs of philosophy not only in Great Britain, but in India, Canada, Australia, South Africa and the United States; and that many of those who have become theological teachers have shown his

[1] Professor Hallett allows me to quote, here and later, from the appreciation which he contributed to *Mind*, N.S., No. 166 (April 1933), pp. 137 ff.

influence hardly less than the philosophers. Witness such a book as Professor John Baillie's *The Interpretation of Religion*.[1]

Before we leave the "old Logic Classroom," there is one memory which students of the years before 1905 or thereabouts will readily recall. On the closing day of the winter session Professor Campbell Fraser used to come in from his beautiful home at Gorton, between Hawthornden and Roslin, to present the medals in the Logic class and to wish its parting members well as they passed on to another stage of philosophy or of life. He and Pringle-Pattison, either of whom might have sat for the portrait of the ideal philosopher, were more than ordinarily impressive when they were seen together, the one with snow-white, the other with silver, hair and flowing beard. If there was more of command in the features of the older man, the younger had the greater benignity.

Both before and after graduation, Pringle-Pattison's students found him, as they found his brother, ready to take endless trouble to advise regarding lines of study or research. This eagerness to help and unconsciousness of the dignity of his own office found an outlet in a small trait which many will remember during talks in his study. When a book was mentioned, instead of merely characterising it he would rise from his chair, search for it in his bookshelves and place it in the hands of his companion, until the latter, embarrassed by the mounting pile of volumes at his elbow and ashamed to find the philosopher thus persistently fetching and carrying for a quite undistinguished guest, would register a resolve to mention no more books for that evening at least.

[1] Dr Baillie now holds a chair in Union Theological Seminary, New York. Cf. also an appreciation of Pringle-Pattison's life and work in the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy* for December 1931, by Principal E. N. Merrington of Knox College, Dunedin, who was a post-graduate student of philosophy in Edinburgh.

Pringle-Pattison the man has been portrayed by Professor Hallett from an angle all the more significant that it would not so readily have been chosen by a compatriot: "Andrew Seth was essentially an Edinburgh man, by birth, by training, by residence for the greater part of his life, and it may also be said by temperament and native bias. To one at least of his students, coming to the Scottish metropolis from over the Border, he seemed the very incarnation of the spirit of Edinburgh. His broad and easy culture, scholarly reserve, and intellectual piety, with not a little of the scepticism of mental attitude and distaste for enthusiasm associated with that other great Edinburgh philosopher whose monument adorns the Calton Hill, found an ideal setting in the austere beauty of the city of castle and college, palace and kirk."

University administration did not in itself appeal strongly to Pringle-Pattison's temperament or interest, but, in this sphere as in others, what he undertook he carried out conscientiously and with thoroughness. Sir Richard Lodge, who was for long his colleague as Professor of History and Dean of the Faculty of Arts, has contributed the following note on his work in the Senatus, and also for several years in the University Court: "There were three topics in which he took special interest. He sought to maintain for the philosophical subjects their time-honoured place in the Arts curriculum. He opposed, with what seemed to me curious tenacity, all encroachments on the sanctity of the vacations. And he was a consistent champion of the modern languages against the active protagonist on the other side, Henry Butcher. This was, so far as I remember, the only matter on which he appeared as the leader of a party. His usual attitude was that of a neutral and rather aloof critic. He certainly never desired or claimed to be an academic reformer, and he viewed with some

distrust the excessive loosening of the curriculum. When he took part in debate, he spoke with force and dignity, and he was always listened to with respect."

Regarding the revision of the Arts curriculum, there are many who now hold that Pringle-Pattison's attitude of caution was justified, and that at this period its balance and its cultural value were jeopardised by the indefinite extension of 'options,' many of which were imperfectly co-ordinated. In November 1908 he wrote to Professor Alexander: "We are kept uncomfortably busy here working out the arrangements for new curricula under the far more elastic conditions of our new Ordinance. Psychology, now in the hands of W. G. Smith, will be a central subject for the teachers who constitute about seven-tenths of our total numbers in Arts, but it has yet to be seen how the almost complete freedom introduced will affect the study of philosophy proper."

During the years covered by this chapter more than one additional honour came to Pringle-Pattison. The degree of LL.D., which St Andrews and Princeton had already conferred, was followed in 1902 by that of D.C.L. from the University of Durham; and two years later he was elected a Fellow of the British Academy.

One matter in which Pringle-Pattison's philosophical record and sound judgment inevitably gave him a leading voice was the appointment of Gifford Lecturers in the University. In the years covered by this chapter there were four courses of Gifford Lectures which gave him especial satisfaction: those by William James, Laurie, Bosanquet and Bergson. Of these, the first and last involved him in a good deal of work and responsibility. William James' appointment was made about two years after he and Seth first met at the Princeton celebrations in 1896. But in the end of 1898 James had a serious breakdown, and the following autumn, when he was in Europe seeking health, a grave degree of heart weakness

showed itself. This made it necessary to postpone the Lectures twice; and they were finally delivered in the Summer Terms of 1901 and 1902, though even in the latter year the great psychologist was forced to lecture seated. During the trying period of uncertainty, both Professor and Mrs James acknowledged with the sincerest gratitude the consideration and helpfulness which their friend showed in arranging for these postponements. In October 1899 Mrs James wrote from Nauheim: "You have been so very kind that I find myself turning gratefully to you as one of the beneficent influences in a very hard year. A wife's judgment of her husband's work must be taken sceptically, but I hope to appeal to your own a few months hence to confirm it, for William has never done anything better than these lectures. He has grown so wise in all these weary months of illness." Two months later James himself wrote: "I am applying for a second year of furlough from Harvard, and between me and eternity there is nothing to look at except Gifford Lectures, the subject of which fascinates me more and more."

When, after these delays, the lectures on *The Varieties of Religious Experience* were at last given to the world, many others felt the fascination of the subject; and not least Pringle-Pattison, whose range of sympathy was wider than that of some fellow idealists. He had long valued and used freely in teaching psychology William James' pioneer work in that field; and he welcomed also his Gifford Lectures with their fresh and stimulating treatment of the religious life.

An attempt was made with the co-operation of Dr Edward Caird, then Master of Balliol, to secure Mr F. H. Bradley as Edinburgh's next Gifford Lecturer. Mr Bradley's health prevented his accepting nomination; but eight or nine years later Dr Bernard Bosanquet accepted the appointment. He wrote to Pringle-Pattison

expressing his appreciation of the fact that he had been nominated, and that the initiative had been taken by one whose views had often diverged from his own. In spite of this divergence regarding the relation of finite personality to the Absolute, no one who had the privilege of seeing them together at this time could fail to realise that they were men of essentially kindred spirit. Between them controversy left no bitterness.

Following Dr Bosanquet's tenure of the Gifford Lectureship came the appointment which caused wider interest—one might truthfully say, excitement—than any other, that of M. Bergson. His name was then on all lips, and his views were being expounded in all degrees of dilution in popular no less than scientific and philosophical journals. The invitation to deliver the Gifford Lectures was sent towards the end of 1911 ; and M. Bergson wrote at once to the Secretary of the University, Sir Ludovic Grant, accepting the appointment, and at the same time expressed to Pringle-Pattison the pleasure which he felt in the prospect of meeting one whose works he had known for long.

Although M. Bergson was a brilliant linguist as well as thinker, there were questions of some difficulty to determine regarding the language in which the lectures were to be given. The first suggestion from the side of the University was that the majority should be in English ; but this raised a difficulty for M. Bergson, whose method it was to lecture *ex tempore* and afterwards write what he had spoken. Finally, it was decided that the lectures should be in French—save two, which were read by the lecturer in English. In these and other arrangements Pringle-Pattison took an active and characteristically helpful part.

In the summer of 1913 he and his wife and children visited the Rhine and Switzerland. For a time they were a united party, and after two of the elder children

had to return home, the others went on to the Oberland, Zermatt and Chamonix. When on his way home, Pringle-Pattison had the interest of spending an evening in M. Bergson's home at Auteuil. Six months later M. Bergson reached Edinburgh. He had been asked to send in advance a synopsis of his earlier lectures to be translated and issued at the opening of the course; and when the proof reached him he wrote to Pringle-Pattison: "Il est si parfaitement traduit oue je vous soupçonne d'être l'auteur de la traduction. Je serais vraiment confus de vous avoir donné cette peine."

The course was delivered in the Natural History Classroom, the largest in the University, and was closely followed by the most varied as well as the largest audience which had ever assembled to hear a series of philosophical lectures in Edinburgh. The subject was "The Problem of Personality," and not only the material of the lectures but the personality of the lecturer made a strong appeal —the spare figure, intellectual face with eyes of unusual brilliance, animation of manner, lightness of touch, all combined with the marvellously clear French style to form a unique impression. On one occasion M. Bergson dined with Lord Haldane and others at 16 Churchhill; and on another he agreed to meet the members of the University Philosophical Society in an informal discussion at the house of James Seth—a discussion of which Pringle-Pattison left a short record.[1] From every point of view M. Bergson's visit was a memorable one for those interested in philosophy in Edinburgh; and a somewhat melancholy interest now attaches to a letter dated from the University Club on May 16, in which he thanked Pringle-Pattison and his wife for their friendly welcome, and provisionally fixed May 10, 1915, for the first lecture of the second course. In this M. Bergson had promised to pass on from psychology, to which his

[1] *The Idea of God*, p. 380 n.

contribution was well known, and to break new ground in the application of his leading ideas to the central problems of ethics and religion. But the strain of the war, during which he undertook much heavy work at the instance of the French Government, left his health so impaired that the first course was never published nor the second delivered.

This account of the sixteen years before 1914 may draw to a close with some account of Pringle-Pattison's continued friendship with three men whose names have been often before us—Professor Campbell Fraser, Mr Balfour and Lord Haldane. In September 1899, when Professor Campbell Fraser reached his eightieth birthday, Pringle-Pattison wrote: "It is given to few to look back in the unimpaired vigour of all their powers upon eighty years of a life so full of honour and usefulness as yours has been. Health and happiness have also been yours. Deep delight in nature, unfailing interest in history and in the general movement of the world have contributed to make life rich and full. I have often thought within the last ten years that, besides what we owe to your philosophical teaching, you give in your own person a notable example of how good a thing human life can be or can be made." The reply contained these words: "I am too conscious that the ideal which your words suggest has not been realised by me, but the fact that you suppose this must make me more earnest in the *endeavour* to realise it during the days which may remain for me in this passing world."

Seven years later it fell to Pringle-Pattison to organise a meeting in celebration of the jubilee of Campbell Fraser's appointment as successor to Sir William Hamilton; and three years later still he joined with Lord Rosebery, Mr Balfour and many of the old philosopher's

former students in an address of congratulation on his ninetieth birthday. To this Campbell Fraser replied in a letter which ended :—

"To me the retrospect awakens a deep sense of work left undone which ought to have been done—opportunities lost which God has given to me.—With grateful regard to all my too indulgent friends, Ever affectionately yours, A. CAMPBELL FRASER."

One more letter reached Pringle-Pattison in the autumn of 1910, in which Campbell Fraser said : "I have been confined to bed for the last few days, but am now emerging. This is due, they say, to a week of (for me) pretty heavy work in revising my 'Selections from Berkeley' for a sixth edition at the urgent request of the Clarendon Press." Regarding this, the last philosophical task of his long life, which ended four years later, Professor James Seth told the writer that, having gone over the proof-sheets at Professor Campbell Fraser's request, he found that all the alterations made by the unwearied old man gave added clarity and point to what he had written long before.

In January 1899 Pringle-Pattison wrote to Mr Balfour : "I have just been reading Wilfrid Ward's paper for the next meeting of the Synthetic. . . . The paper is very nicely worked out till the Church (for which we have all been waiting) suddenly steps out on the last page. I fear the analogy between scientific authority and authority in religion will not hold. We accept scientific authority simply to save ourselves the trouble of verifying the conclusions for ourselves—or the trouble of educating ourselves till we are able to test it all. This is purely provisional and a matter of personal convenience. Whereas the religious authority is supposed to deal with matters which reason is incompetent to

settle, and accordingly puts forward claims to permanent submission. Again, so far as a 'revelation' is a revelation of spiritual truth, I do not see that it needs any authority behind it. Its authority lies in its own content. It appeals to the spiritual nature of man, and the response it evokes is its verification. Spiritual truth is judged by the spiritual nature of man just as intellectual truth by his intellectual nature, and neither in the one case nor in the other is there ultimately a place for external revelation or external authority. The only Church Catholic is—

> The human soul of universal earth
> Dreaming on things to come."

Two years later Mr Balfour told Pringle-Pattison that he had in mind to write a new preface to the cheap edition of *The Foundations of Belief*, which appeared that year, and added: "I hope you will allow me to send you a copy of this in proof. Now that Henry Sidgwick is gone, you are the only philosopher to whom I should care to show it." A few months later he wrote again: "There is no man living whose opinion in matters philosophical I rate so high as yours, or whose spirit in dealing with them I more admire."

On August 29, 1904, Pringle-Pattison wrote from The Haining to thank Mr Balfour for a copy of his Presidential Address to the British Association: "I think I may claim to be an exception to the indifferent world of whom you speak on p. 20, for the idealistic and teleological argument which you suggest in the concluding pages seemed to me in *The Foundations of Belief* a constructive position of the most important kind. But I am afraid it is the force with which you develop the sceptical implications of natural selection and the rest of the evolutionary creed that obscures in the mind of

most readers the constructive sequel—which so many critics of your book insisted on taking as an inconsequent afterthought rather than an integral part of the total argument."

In November 1902 R. B. Haldane wrote to Pringle-Pattison regarding the second edition of *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, and especially the essay on Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, which was there reprinted : "I felt myself away from *Hegelianism and Personality*, but very close to your conclusions here. I think it is the most powerful thing you have written, and one of the best essays on the speculative standpoint, in any language, of our time. I wish you could find time to write a book, not on Hegel, but on Hegelianism, in detail. No one alive could do the work as you could. I refer specially to the limits of the doctrine of Degrees of Reality—the key, to my mind, of the whole matter.

"I am glad that you have quoted *Das Göttliche* in the beginning. It embodies a power of wisdom."

A few weeks later Pringle-Pattison wrote regarding the first series of Haldane's Gifford Lectures in St Andrews, entitled *The Pathway to Reality* :—

"I must not delay any longer sending you a few lines of thanks for your Gifford Lectures, not only for the gift of the volume, but for the contents. Of the soundness and importance of the doctrine you know already that I am well convinced, but I am greatly charmed with your manner of presenting it. There is a personal flavour all through the book which gives it a character of its own. This, I think, will be generally felt, but to me there is the added flavour of reminiscence wafted from its pages every now and then. I think you have been most happily inspired, and I hope you will follow the same method of large free utterance in your second course. . . .

"What distressing news this is of Ritchie's death. By

a strange coincidence it is the very week, and day of the week, when Adamson died with almost equal suddenness last year."

Both at this time and a year later, when the second volume of *The Pathway to Reality* appeared, Pringle-Pattison reviewed his friend's work in the *Times;* and on the latter occasion Haldane wrote: "With the hand of a master you have set out the very pith and kernel of these Gifford Lectures in to-day's *Times.* I am more grateful to you than I can easily say, for what I wanted most badly was to get before busy people the real point of what we have to say in common to them. There it is in two columns—as I could not have done it myself." During the same month (April 1904) Pringle-Pattison received the following, and pencilled on it, "Note this letter":—

"Your letter gave me very great pleasure. For there is no one whose judgment I set alongside of yours, and we have worked side by side, so to speak, at these problems, and are now near the same result. Like you, I would not foreclose the personal continuance, simply because to do so is to set up the other side of the antinomy. Despite his faulty scheme, Kant was not far from the root of the matter when he sought to call in an Intelligible World to redress the balance of this empirical world. But as you say, there are 'substantial interests which yield a present satisfaction,' and so give us the same thing in another form.

"I think there is large region, pretty well untrodden, to be investigated. It has to be shown *in detail* how the ends which shape the modes of thinking in spirit, which though free is finite, determine the aspects of the world. Something towards this has been done in the sphere of Logic by Bradley and Bosanquet. But I feel that they have only got to the verge of the ground. I

know no one else who could do the hard thinking the work requires as you could, and I hope you will. I doubt whether there is very much more to be extracted from Hegel. We want more systematic treatment of detail. However, I think I shall read over again the *Phænomenologie*, starting from this basis: 'Taking myself as just the realisation of this particular purpose, a meaning of Absolute Mind, how do I work out beyond it?'

"I hope we may manage to have a long talk before a great interval has passed. With much gratitude, Yours ever, R. B. HALDANE."

In their political as well as philosophical views the two men had drawn nearer. In the years after 1906 the Irish question was for a time in abeyance, and Pringle-Pattison was in full sympathy with the social policy of the Cabinet of which his friend was a member. When he wrote to congratulate Haldane on his renewed return for East Lothian in January 1910, the latter replied: "The old and great Parliament is gone, and the task in this new one is a task which will be very difficult indeed. It is to me a very great satisfaction to feel that you are so keenly with us—I feel it like a moral judgment in our favour."

On February 3, 1913, six months before Lord Haldane's 'lightning visit' to Montreal to address the American and Canadian Bar Associations, Pringle-Pattison wrote:—

"MY DEAR HALDANE,—Many thanks for remembering, in the midst of all you have to do, to send me your Bristol address. It is extraordinarily wise and sane, and there is a serenity of optimism about it which is very comforting because one feels it comes from breadth of view and is born not of indolence but of a spirit girt up for strenuous endeavour. I feel too that the civic

university is one of the most encouraging features of our time, and that we in the Scotch Universities have to learn from the spirit of these newer institutions.

"I see your visit to Canada is now publicly announced. If anything comes in my way which might be of use in your address, I will not fail to report it.—Yours always, A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON."

CHAPTER IX.

GIFFORD LECTURES ON THEISM.

1912-1917.

FOR twelve years after Pringle-Pattison's succession to The Haining he wrote comparatively little. As years went on his eyesight troubled him more, and at times of pressure his younger daughter used to read examination papers aloud to relieve the strain on his eyes. The long summer vacation, formerly free for original work, was now largely taken up by other and hardly less absorbing duties. But in 1907 a volume entitled *The Philosophical Radicals* appeared. Along with reprints of earlier writings it contained articles based on Leslie Stephen's *English Utilitarians*, Benjamin Kidd's *Western Civilisation*, Herbert Spencer's Autobiography and the Life of James Martineau. The first two essays showed with how firm a step the author moved in the field of social ethics; and the essay on Martineau drew forth a letter of warm appreciation from a distinguished thinker with whom he had much in common, M. Emile Boutroux. One sentence may be quoted here, since a French appreciation of style has a quite distinctive value: "D'un bout à l'autre la clarté, la netteté, la prècision scientifique de votre exposition rendent la lecture aussi attachante que fructueuse." Along with numerous reviews, and the introduction to the volume of Carlyle's

essays referred to in the first chapter of this Memoir, *The Philosophical Radicals* represents the literary harvest of the decade ending in 1910.

During these years Pringle-Pattison's pupils and friends continued to hope for a philosophical work on a larger scale than he had yet attempted; and various friends, including Balfour and Haldane, urged him to set his hand to the task. But, as in the case of other noted thinkers, including the two philosopher-statesmen themselves, it was his appointment as Gifford Lecturer which caused the final crystallisation of ideas long present to his mind and previously expressed in less systematic form. When Mr Balfour heard of his friend's appointment to lecture in the University of Aberdeen, he wrote: "I have long wished to see you Gifford Lecturer; and am delighted to hear that the obstacles which at one time rendered your appointment difficult have been swept away. After all, you are the man in all Britain most qualified for the post."

During the two years which elapsed between the appointment in April 1910 and the delivery of the first course in the Summer Term of 1912, Pringle-Pattison worked hard at the Lectures. It was fortunate that he had by this time withdrawn from the University Court, and that the changes indicated in the last chapter had somewhat reduced the work of his chair; yet one so conscientious as he could not treat its duties lightly, even for a time, and his family were conscious that he was living under a heavy strain.

But if the preparation of the Lectures was arduous, the warm welcome which he received in Aberdeen made their delivery pleasant. He was glad to renew an old friendship of school and college days with Principal Sir George Adam Smith; and they shared a memory even older than that of the Royal High School. Nearly fifty years before the Gifford Lecturer went to Aberdeen,

four small boys, George and Dunlop Smith, Andrew and James Seth, sat near to one another on Sundays in the New North Church in Edinburgh,[1] and the Smiths, who suffered from an excess of animal spirits which made sitting still in church doubly difficult, looked on the Seths as almost too well-behaved for an imperfect world. Sir George Adam Smith had left his chair of Old Testament Language and Literature in Glasgow three years before Pringle-Pattison gave his first course; and he afterwards told a friend how great a refreshment of spirit it had been to escape for a time from the details of university business into the atmosphere of strenuous thinking and high idealism which pervaded these Lectures.

Pringle-Pattison's judgment of his own work was always stringent, not less as regards form than matter; and the Lectures were not only revised but in parts recast before publication. This process occupied many months, and was extended by the preoccupations and anxieties of the war. In June 1916 the manuscript was finally in the hands of the Oxford University Press. In the interval, on November 28, 1915, Pringle-Pattison wrote to Lord Haldane:—

"I have read your paper with the greatest interest. You have swept a great deal into your net besides the New Realism, and the discussion seems to me throughout most valuable. What you say about Bergson exactly represents my own feeling: any amount of stimulus, but impossible to put the system together, and useless to appeal to intuition unless one takes intuition as equivalent to the larger reason.

"I agree also that Idealism must be broadened sufficiently to include within itself what is sound in the Realist contention, and as you say, Bosanquet has stated the case about as well as it can be stated in his

[1] The second in the quartette was the late Sir James Dunlop Smith, K.C.S.I., a distinguished soldier and administrator in India.

criticism of Alexander. I think the Realists are right as against 'the Berkeleian fallacy,' or what they call 'the ego-centric predicament.' And their argument applies to Green no less than to Berkeley. In both cases I think we only arrive at a formal Ego, and really nothing is gained by such a point of subjectivity. But however much of a Realist one may be epistemologically, when it is a question of the individual knower, I still hold, ultimately or metaphysically, to what you call 'the over-reaching subject-object relationship.' It is, as you say, simply impossible to take the relation of compresence in time and space as final.

"I have tried in one of my Gifford Lectures [1] to disengage Idealism from Mentalism, but I fancy I shall have to add a further note in the present state of the controversy."

The Preface to the volume was dated December 20, 1916, and a few weeks later it appeared with the full title, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy*. The last words indicated that, as he explicitly stated in the Preface, the author linked his own thought closely with the current thought of his time, and followed, as he had always done, the method of "construction through criticism." He added: "I do not claim that it is the best method; I simply desire that its nature be recognised." In expressing his thanks to the Senatus of the University of Aberdeen for his appointment to the Lectureship, he said: "It has enabled me to bring together the reflections of many years, and I have striven, in return, to give them of my best."

Even amid the stress of the third year of war—perhaps, in the case of some readers, all the more because of this stress—the book received an immediate welcome. It was widely recognised that the writer had indeed "given of his best." His own feeling in regard to it was ex-

[1] Lecture X.: *The Idea of God*, pp. 190 ff.

pressed in a letter to Professor A. M. Stalker on April 29, 1917 :—

" I just want to acknowledge the pleasure your letter gave me. It was no small achievement to read a set of Gifford Lectures through in these days, and therefore also no small compliment. I am so glad you felt them 'human' throughout, for indeed I put a good deal of myself into them at places and I wanted to state results broadly.

" It is a satisfaction to me to have brought things together to the extent I have done, and I am content to leave the matter so. I get some spontaneous letters which gratify me, but the press notices so far, though generally complimentary enough, have been disappointing—*i.e.*, they would be disappointing, if one attached much importance to them."

Two months later he wrote to Professor J. H. Muirhead, a brother of the companion of his student days in Germany :—

" It was a great pleasure to me, and a sincere satisfaction, to receive your spontaneous letter about my book. After taking pains with a book there is a certain hunger in an author to know what appeal it makes to other minds, and that hunger is ill fed by perfunctory reviews in the daily and weekly press. So it was a good deed to write as you did.

" You praise the volume too generously, but I am so glad to find you approve of the method I have followed and that you are in agreement with my main contentions. From some of your recent writing I felt confident you would be, as you say, in sympathy with the criticism of Bosanquet's treatment of self-hood, which is, in a way, the centre of my second series of lectures. Bosanquet appears to me at times to suffer from a negative bias, or at least a negative form of expression, due, I think, partly to revulsion from an

orthodoxy thrust upon him in his youth. I certainly think it is important to present Idealism in a more human-hearted fashion, and you encourage me to think I have now succeeded in doing so without relapsing into a pluralism of 'impervious' individuals."

To Lord Haldane he wrote in March 1917: "I am greatly cheered to know that you feel yourself so much in sympathy with my book and its conclusions. You would recognise, I daresay, in some of the last pages of all, the echo of some of our conversations at Cloan in the early days of 1915—the passage from Hegel, the reference to Faust, &c." Six months later he wrote further: "That you should go back to my book so often and not be disappointed is indeed high praise, and I value it accordingly—though I am well aware that you must often piece out my presentation from your own store, and, of course, no one knows so well as an author the *lacunæ* in his own treatment. Still you greatly encourage me, and I am grateful for your good offices in bringing the book to the notice of eminent persons. The Archibshop's letter (and what you report of him) is most interesting, and I am glad to be allowed to keep it.[1]

"I am glad to infer from the Archbishop's letter that your 'dear and honoured mother,' as he most truly calls her, is still enjoying her beautiful old age. Please —as opportunity offers—remember me to her warmly and reverentially."

While it is needless, and would perhaps be inappropriate, to attempt either a summary or an estimate here of this book, which contains Pringle-Pattison's fullest treatment of those problems of epistemology and ontology which had occupied him for forty years, it may be well to indicate how his thought had moved in

[1] The Archbishop of Canterbury (Dr Randall Davidson) had been with Lord Haldane at Cloan a few days before.

the later portion of that time. Those passages, especially Lectures VI. and VIII., in which he returns after a long interval to the Theory of Knowledge, show that he remained firmly convinced of the truth which he had all along emphasised, that knowledge is not something interposed between the mind and reality, nor does it inevitably distort that which it professes to transmit. Just as he denied in his first lecture at Princeton that the "knowing subject stands outside the real universe altogether," or "comes to inspect it from afar with mental spectacles of a foreign make," so he now denies that Mind is "condemned to circle round the circumference of the real world, put off with outside shows, and unable to penetrate to its essential core" (p. 132). The letter to Lord Haldane, written in 1915 and already quoted, shows in what sense he had been, and still remained, a Realist.[1]

But in regard to the great ontological problems, especially that of the relation of the man's finite personality to the Whole in which it is set, there was certainly a change between his attitude in *Hegelianism and Personality* or even the *Two Lectures on Theism* and his treatment of the same issues in *The Idea of God*. It was a change of emphasis, not of fundamental principle; but it was sufficiently real to bring him back into contact with those early fellow-workers in the Hegelian movement who still survived. Nor can one feel sure that, if William James had lived to read the Gifford Lectures, he would have said, as he said to Dr Merrington: "I claim Pringle-Pattison as on my side."[2] In what, then, did this change consist? Not in any weakening of his conviction as to the central significance of human personality, or the true witness borne by the highest values

[1] Cf. Professor Hallett's comments in *Mind*, April 1933, p. 144.
[2] See the article already referred to in the *Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy*.

in our experience to the innermost nature of Reality. His view regarding Human personality was restated at length as against Bosanquet's position, and he never wrote with a graver eloquence than in such passages as that which ends: "Beauty and goodness are not born of the clash of atoms; they are effluences of something more perfect and more divine." [1]

But the distinctive greatness of man's spiritual experience is now interpreted less as a stoical opposition to the material forces encompassing him, and more as a relation of harmony with nature and a fulfilment of what is imperfect in sub-moral life. There is, indeed, a striking passage on the second last page of the book in which the writer speaks of nature as "an element, savage and dangerous, into which the human being is thrown to show what stuff he is made of—an element testing with merciless severity his powers of courage and endurance, but drawing from him thereby the utmost of which he is capable." But the main emphasis is on man as the interpreter of nature, and human life as the consummation, thus far, of a process which, without the light thrown backwards along it by our spiritual experience, would have been dark and meaningless. The idea of "Man as organic to the World," the title of the Sixth Lecture, runs through the book, and continuity rather than conflict is its key-thought. To express the change in different terms, it is a movement from the ethicism of Kant and Fichte to the larger humanist view which represents one meaning of the adjective, 'Hegelian.' In this later period Pringle-Pattison would hardly have repeated his words at Princeton: "It is in the will, in purposive action, and particularly in our moral activity, as Fichte, to my mind, conclusively demonstrated, that we lay

[1] P. 42; cf. pp. 236 ff.

hold upon reality." Or rather, if he had repeated them, it would have been with some addition, softening their exclusiveness and extending their range. Thus in one of the later lectures he speaks of "the divine idea of a 'mind and life'" as "the very life itself, experienced as significant because experienced as a whole, and what is more, as part of the meaning of the all-inclusive whole." [1]

The words last quoted occur in the lecture on "Time and Eternity." Here, as in certain other passages, the author broke definitely new ground. He argued that "the eternal view of a time process" is the view of its stages "as elements or members of a completed purpose." In following this out he used the analogy of a tragedy or a symphony. To some whom he taught this may suggest the regret that he never approached, save incidentally, the problems of Æsthetic. If he had dealt with these deliberately and on a large scale, his appreciation of music, poetry and natural beauty, and his finely developed sense of form, might well have resulted in a contribution of unique value to a branch of thought with which British philosophy has been but little engaged.

But this crowning volume of Pringle-Pattison's career, together with the later Gifford Lectures of which an account has still to be given, covers so large a field and contains so much of high philosophical and religious value that it savours of ingratitude to reflect on further regions which the author might under other circumstances have explored. *The Idea of God* stands out with two other series of Gifford Lectures delivered within the same years (1907-1915): Professor James Ward's *Realm of Ends* and Professor Sorley's *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. Though differing in treatment and at times in

[1] *Two Lectures on Theism*, p. 46; *The Idea of God*, p. 363.

outlook, the three books have a solid core of agreement. Together they form an impressive summary of the theistic argument, as it developed in English and Scottish thought in answer to the materialism which sprang from the triumphs of science in the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER X.

THE WAR YEARS.

1914-1918.

THE outbreak of the Great War, which brought so severe a strain on numberless British families, fell inevitably with an even greater weight on the few homes which were as closely linked with Germany as that at The Haining. For both husband and wife there was a sudden rending of old and intimate bonds, but happily there were two facts which helped to make this more bearable than it would otherwise have been. Mrs Pringle-Pattison was an only surviving child, and her parents had passed away years before; so she had now no family ties with her native land. More important still, she was at once and completely convinced of the righteousness of the Allied cause, and looked and hoped throughout for an Allied victory. Thus she was entirely at one with her husband and children in their war-time sympathies and efforts.

Even before the outbreak of war the family at The Haining had a twofold military connection. The eldest daughter, Marjorie, had married Lieutenant (afterwards Major) Webster, R.A.M.C., and the third son, Siegfried, was at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, preparing for a commission in the Cameron Highlanders. When war broke out the second son, Ernest, who had completed his medical course a few months before, followed

his brother-in-law into the Army Medical Corps. How the other two sons and, later, a second son-in-law took their part in war service can best be told by three or four letters written by Pringle-Pattison at intervals between 1915 and 1918. These will both give a series, as it were, of cross-sections through the unceasing and varied activities of the sons, and will also show the patient uncomplaining courage of the father, even when the great blow fell midway through the war, and the youngest, Ronald, fell on the Somme.

On the first Sunday of the war Pringle-Pattison wrote from The Haining to A. M. Stalker: "Yes, it is sad to think of German civilisation going down in a bath of blood, as it seems bound to do, but, as you say, her spiritual heritage will remain and perhaps shine out more clearly. It is the German hegemony of the Prussian military caste that must go. I have been thinking of Carlyle's welcome to this same German hegemony in 1870, but it has not been good for Europe. The old Germany we knew gave place to the Bismarckian gospel of force and *vae victis* (as they have already begun to cry in Germany before realising who the conquered were likely to be). I did not believe in the inevitableness of this war, but now I believe. I think it will be a changed Europe that we shall see when it is all over.

"Do you remember the constant prophecies and speculations of the old *Spectator* about what would happen when the Austrian Emperor died? Will the old man live to see the final dismemberment of his kingdoms?"

During the spring of 1915 Pringle-Pattison watched with growing indignation the campaign of calumny and innuendo against Lord Haldane which finally excluded him from office. Four years earlier he had written when his friend went to the House of Lords: "I have been much gratified, as all your friends must

be, to see how frank and universal has been the tribute to your work as War Minister even in quarters mostly given to carping criticism. It seems to me indeed as if you were in danger of the Biblical woe, when all men speak well of you ! Permit me to join in the chorus of congratulations and good wishes. May this turning-point in your career be only the starting-point for a fresh period of fruitful activity."

Now, however, the position was completely reversed, and Pringle-Pattison wrote on June 7, 1915 :—

" I have had it in mind to write you ever since the reconstruction of the Government was announced. I have been very sorry that stupid and malicious clamour should have made you feel it right to resign an office to which destiny had led you by a devious path and which you were so specially fitted to adorn—had, indeed, already adorned. I have felt keenly the injustice of it, seeing that it is precisely to you that we owe the organisation of the expeditionary force on the one hand and the territorial army on the other, which have made the successful prosecution of the war possible. Winston Churchill, I am glad to see, has been saying in Dundee what all your friends have been thinking.

" The war has had a most extraordinary effect in unsettling people's judgment. I meet many men and women, whom I should have thought eminently sober and reasonable, cherishing almost insane delusions. It has been a very curious revelation.

" But I am sure you feel that right-thinking people do you justice, and meanwhile a period of rest from the intense labours of so many years past may be well, and the O.M. is, I think, the kind of honour you would most appreciate."

To this letter Haldane replied that he counted himself well off, as he was able to throw himself into judicial work, as well as philosophy and work for education.

He added: "I have more peace and time for meditation than I have had for long."

At the end of the year Pringle-Pattison sent this reply from Edinburgh to a letter of Christmas greeting from W. P. James at Cardiff:—

"It was good to get your friendly inquiry and the good wishes which the season brings round. It is, indeed, as you say, with trembling that one writes in these days to friends from whom one had not heard for a while.

"I am thankful to say that our circle is still intact. Our third boy was wounded at Loos on September 25, and had a most marvellous escape. A bullet passed through his throat, *just* missing the vital parts. All those who examined the wound exclaimed at the narrowness of the escape. Having missed, it left only a clean wound which healed nicely. We got him home before the middle of October, and he had over six weeks' leave partly at The Haining and partly here, which was a great joy to us. . . . Our eldest son, Norman, was sent to the Dardanelles in August, but he succumbed to the maladies of the place in October (enteritis and jaundice), and was lucky enough to be sent home to convalesce. He arrived on November 9, and on the next day, a Sunday, we had the very extraordinary good fortune of having all our four sons together again under one roof.

"Ernest, the second, who had spent the winter in Rouen in R.A.M.C. and had afterwards been at the front attached to a regiment, was invalided home during the summer, and after two months' leave was put temporarily on home duty in Ayrshire. Ronald, the youngest, who left school last summer, went to Sandhurst in August for the four or five months' training they now give officers."

The letter goes on to tell of the marriage during the previous June of Norman Pringle-Pattison to Doris Tweedie, and the presence at 16 Churchhill of Marjorie

(Mrs Webster) with her baby boy, and continues: "My younger daughter's *fiancé* has been fighting with the 1st Royal Scots near Ypres and elsewhere since March, and when his regiment was ordered to the East lately and he could not get leave, my daughter accompanied his mother to Marseilles to see him before he went—rather an adventure in these days. They were rewarded by seeing him for two days and a half, but although they parted on November 27 they have had no word of him since.

"Well, well, this is almost too much of a domestic chronicle, but you brought it upon yourself. . . . When one thinks of the poor Sorleys[1] and so many others known and unknown, one feels undeservedly happy, but as the war goes on without any sign of ending, one feels often strangely old as if one belonged to a bygone generation. With so many pledges, one is afraid to look into the future—and yet one hopes."

During these months several letters arrived in M. Bergson's beautiful handwriting, dealing with the postponement of the Gifford Lectures already referred to, telling of his own work for the Allied cause and his confidence in ultimate victory, and containing messages to the family of his friend. One of these ran: "Laissez-moi vous féliciter, et de tout cœur, d'avour trois fils sue le front, et un quatrième sur le point d'y aller. Laissez-moi aussi vous dire quels vœux je forme pour qu'ils reviennent sains et saufs."

In May 1916 Pringle-Pattison wrote to Stalker telling him that Norman was on light duty near Innerleithen; Ernest had just returned to France, destination unknown; Siegfried had been passing through a strenuous time in the trenches near Loos; Ronald was guarding the wire-

[1] Charles Hamilton Sorley, author of *Marlborough and Other Poems*, who fell at the age of twenty, was the son of Pringle-Pattison's old friends, Professor and Mrs W. R. Sorley.

less station at Stoneywood, near Aberdeen; Marjorie was still at Malta with her husband; while Clement Nimmo-Smith, Elinor's *fiancé*, had been "cutting down trees and scouting on the mountains near Salonika."

So the anxious months dragged on, and the anxiety became greater in the end of July, when Ronald, aged just nineteen, went out to join his regiment, the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, somewhere in the neighbourhood of Amiens. He had been a keen member of the O.T.C. at Merchiston Castle, and had twice shot for the Ashburton Shield at Bisley. He and his parents had planned that he should go to Oxford on leaving Merchiston, but, like so many more, he heard a far sterner call. His fate was strangely different from that of his brothers, who went through month after month of heavy fighting; for his battalion only went into the line in the last days of August, and on September 6 he fell in a position which, according to the testimony of a brother officer, could only have been reached by one of rare courage. At first he was posted as missing, but in a very few days it was known that he had fallen. His brother, Siegfried, returning home after being again wounded, brought the final news. For three days after hearing it at Rouen he carried it with him silently, until his parents met him in Edinburgh, and he found that they also knew.

When *The Idea of God* appeared in the early days of 1917 it bore this dedication :—

TO
MY WIFE
AND THE DEAR MEMORY OF
RONALD
OUR YOUNGEST SON
WHO GAVE HIS LIFE WILLINGLY
AT GINCHY ON THE SOMME
6TH SEPTEMBER 1916

A few weeks earlier (October 30, 1916), Pringle-Pattison wrote to W. P. James: "The enclosed was addressed to you a long time ago, but I kept it back intending to accompany it by some more personal words of thanks for your kind letter and also some details about us. Unfortunately my eyes have been more than usually weak and troublesome and have kept me from all but the unavoidable minimum of writing." Referring to Ronald, he went on: "His life was unclouded from beginning to end, and the end was instantaneous. I will not enter into our grief. It has been a comfort to have his brother Siegfried, next to him in age, with us since we got the news."

After mentioning a visit from Marjorie, who had spent the summer at home and returned to Malta, the writer added: "She has left with us her little son of a year and a half, who is the brightest spot in the house and very good for us all, especially his grandmother."

During the months that followed he wrote for his family and a few close friends an account of Ronald's short brave life. In June 1917 he wrote to Professor J. H. Muirhead:—

"I am touched by your feeling reference to the loss of our dear boy. It still colours our lives, and can never cease to do so, and alas! so long as the war goes on, we are constantly in anxiety about our other sons, two of whom are now at the front in France. I wish we met sometimes, but Lewis tells me you are rarely in Scotland, and I am not often in London or anywhere in England. My wife and I were in London last week, however, as our third son was getting his Military Cross presented."

This sharp personal bereavement was not the only loss which fell on Pringle-Pattison during the year 1916. The Principal of the University, Sir William Turner, who had carried on his duties with rare dignity and

distinction to the age of eighty, passed away; and, among other losses in the Senatus, one which touched him deeply was the passing at a comparatively early age of William Ross Hardie, the Professor of Latin, a brilliant scholar and a highly valued colleague.

By this time the war had made many gaps in the ranks of his former students. Among these there was none of whose future work in philosophy he cherished higher hopes than John Handyside. Like himself, Handyside came up from the Royal High School to Edinburgh University. After gaining a brilliant First Class and the Ferguson Scholarship at the age of twenty, he went on to Balliol, where his career was equally distinguished. From 1907 he worked for four years as Pringle-Pattison's assistant (for the latter part as lecturer also), and a like period was spent as Lecturer in Philosophy in the University of Liverpool. He then resigned his post in order to take a commission in a Liverpool regiment, and in October 1916 was mortally wounded "while gallantly rallying his men in a particularly awkward and desperate situation." Handyside had published next to nothing in his lifetime, but soon after the war Pringle-Pattison compiled a small volume of his philosophical papers,[1] and prefixed to them a Biographical Note which began: "The papers here brought together are all that remains of the work of one of the acutest and most thoughtful of the younger generation of philosophical teachers. Their author fell in the war, being one of those who counted his life a little thing to give in so great a cause."

In January 1918 he wrote again to W. P. James: "I am very thankful to say that no further evil has befallen us during the course of last year. (Did I write to you at all during its passing?) Our three sons are alive and well, all at the present moment in France. They have

[1] *The Historical Method in Ethics and Other Essays* (1919).

all, including the medical one, been in bad fighting on the Ypres front near Paschendaele, but have come through safely. Norman, the eldest, was also in the Cambrai advance—when it *was* an advance—and saw the tanks and the cavalry take Cantaing, one of the hamlets nearest Cambrai itself."

The letter then tells of the sons-in-law—for Elinor Pringle-Pattison was now married—one of whom was in France and the other on military duty at home with his arm in a sling, and continues: "My resolution is unimpaired, but as regards the next few months it seems to me emphatically a case of 'wait and see.' . . .

"W. P. Ker looked in upon us here for an hour about the New Year. Otherwise we have seen few old friends: it is so difficult for anyone to get about now. I am selling wood to the Government and trying to prevent them taking too much—also ploughing up grass parks" —*anglicé*, permanent pasture—"for the nation's food, which is a difficult enough business when one has neither horses nor labour enough for the task. Still we are doing something.

"I often think of Dunster and Cornwall—hope we may meet again in happier times. Brecon would do very well: with time I daresay I could still get to the top of the Beacon."

As the last sentence suggests, the writer had by no means lost his powers of walking. One day towards the end of the war he walked with a friend from a point in Leaderdale, not far from the former home of his mother's family, over the Lammermuirs to Humbie. Arriving in the late afternoon, they found that the last train had gone, and they had to walk six miles farther to Pencaitland before they could get a horse and trap to take them to a point from which trains were running to Edinburgh.

During the German advance in April 1918 another

period of great anxiety occurred, especially on Siegfried's account. He had been sent from the Camerons to act as second-in-command in the trenches to the 1st Black Watch, and was for days together in the fierce fighting near Givenchy. It was a cause of profound thankfulness to his parents when a note came from him in hospital at Camiers, and they knew that for the time he was safe.

This war-time chronicle of loss and anxiety unflinchingly borne may end with extracts from two letters after the Armistice. To Stalker, who had himself lost a son, Pringle-Pattison wrote on November 16: "How suddenly it has all come and how great the victory—a *Weltgericht* indeed. One has hardly got used to the feeling of relief in the mornings when there are no more bulletins to scan and anxiously awaited letters to look for. I trust your news has been good up to the last from France and Salonika and from your airman. We have been wonderfully spared these last months, for Siegfried is still with us, doing a nine weeks' staff course in Edinburgh, and Norman's job has kept him in this country till now, and Ernest is near Boulogne.

"The end of the long struggle brings back more keenly those who have died to secure the victory. I have no doubt you have been thinking much of Dan this week as we have been of Ronald. But we can at least rejoice that they and the whole noble band—so many one knows—have not died in vain. . . . I hope victory will give the Allies, and especially ourselves, internal strength to resist Bolshevism in all its varieties, and make the necessary transformations of society in a patient and orderly way."

On December 26 he wrote to W. P. James: "The relief at the ending of the long strain is indeed great—so great indeed that one has difficulty in realising that

the nightmare is actually at an end. How suddenly it came too at the last, the end almost as sudden as the beginning, and what a chaos the world is and is likely to be for some good time to come. Still I think we have right in this country to a chastened optimism. *O passi graviora,* as Virgil encourages us."

CHAPTER XI.

LATER GIFFORD LECTURES.

1919-1923.

In the last months of the war the time-table of Pringle-Pattison's working year had returned to the order with which in earlier days he had been familiar—a winter session of steady lecturing, five days a week, and a long vacation extending from the beginning of April to October. But his classes were in numbers a mere shadow of those in former days. With the return of peace it was certain that there would be a rapid increase in the number of students, accompanied by much heavy work in reorganising the department; so the question arose whether he should himself enter on this new period, or leave its responsibilities to a younger man. At first it was his intention to resign in 1920, when forty years would have elapsed since he first taught in the University; but further thought convinced him that it would be better to hand over a year earlier the Chair from which he had taught philosophy with the highest distinction during twenty-eight years. So his resignation was intimated to take effect in the summer of 1919. His feelings as he sent it in were expressed in a letter to Professor Stalker on May 13:—

"If you look in the *Scotsman* to-morrow you will probably see in the Report of the University Court's

proceedings a notice of the fact that I am resigning my Chair at the close of the present session. It is a step I have had in contemplation more or less for some years (I completed my thirty years as a Scotch professor in 1917), and though it naturally involves a wrench and a certain amount of mental and emotional disturbance, the longing for freedom has grown very strong, and I think it is wise in a teacher to go before his natural strength is altogether abated.

" I thought I should like you to hear this from myself rather than come across it casually in the newspapers or hear it from others. It is thirty-nine years this autumn since I started teaching philosophy here as Fraser's assistant."

When his successor was appointed, it was a great satisfaction to Pringle-Pattison to know that his Chair was to be filled by a former student of his own in St Andrews—one who was so fully able to maintain its fine traditions as Professor Norman Kemp Smith.

The Edinburgh home at 16 Churchhill was still maintained, and was occupied during the greater part of the winter, but The Haining now became, even more than before, the focus of family life. By the autumn of 1919 the sons and daughters had settled down to their various post-war activities. Ernest, like his elder brother-in-law, retained his commission in the Royal Army Medical Corps ; Siegfried, whose mind had been set on a military career from his school-days at Merchiston Castle, remained in the Cameron Highlanders with the rank of Captain ; while Norman Pringle-Pattison and Clement Nimmo-Smith resumed legal work as Writers to the Signet in Edinburgh. In September of this year Pringle-Pattison enjoyed exploring the Roman wall with his old friend, A. M. Stalker ; and a few days later, during the disquiet of the railway strike, a walk took place from The Haining, the end of which was beautifully

depicted in a letter from W. P. Ker to his friends the MacCunns: "We ended September 30 with a walk at sunset, and later, over from the Tweed near Ashestiel—A. S. P.-P. and me. It was dark before we got off the hill—I am gloating still—it was like the happy days of childhood in a story: coming down in darkness and hearing burns running, and steering by the light thrown up from waters, and lights of Selkirk town on its hill across the water."

Pringle-Pattison's first publication after the war took him on to unwonted, though not unfamiliar, ground. It was a pamphlet entitled *The Duty of Candour in Religious Teaching*, and contained an address delivered in October 1920 as President of the Theological Society of New College, Edinburgh.[1] He was not the first layman to be asked to act in this capacity, for Lord Haldane had done so some years earlier; and he had many links with the college. His brother, James, had studied there, as had many of his own most distinguished students; and the Principal, Dr Alexander Martin, had been a friend since they went through the philosophical classes together in the seventies. At the outset he explained that he had not come to address the members on any academic topic, but to give "a plain practical talk on the present situation of the Churches in regard to their inherited creeds and theological systems." He knew that his words would carry weight with such an audience; and he set out from the disquieting facts brought out by inquiries during the war as to the meagre, and often distorted, ideas of Christian teaching held by most soldiers in the citizen armies of Great Britain. On these facts he based a vigorous appeal to those who had themselves accepted the main results of biblical criticism to practise candour, and to carry the sense of reality

[1] Then the Theological College in Edinburgh of the United Free Church of Scotland, and now of the Church of Scotland.

gained in war service into the services and teaching of the Church. "I believe," he said, "that it is the bounden duty, as well as the plain interest, of the Churches at the present time to undertake a campaign of instruction in regard to the Bible, and primarily in regard to the Old Testament. . . . The growing ignorance gives you an excellent opportunity for real instruction. You will be telling your hearers much that is new to them, and while you will often have occasion to emphasise the primitive and rudimentary elements in the early stages of Hebrew religion, the general effect of your instruction ought to be to give them back the Old Testament as a living book and a true *praeparatio evangelica*." In this short address, as in his last book, to which we must soon refer, Pringle-Pattison showed that he had not lost his grasp of those theological and religious questions which he had studied and discussed nearly fifty years before in Edinburgh, Jena and Göttingen; nor had his belief diminished in the value of the interpretation which a liberal theology afforded.

One of the authors whom Pringle-Pattison had studied closely from early days, and to whose writings he often referred, was John Locke, and some years after his retirement he prepared an abridged edition of Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, with an Introduction. But before this a train of events was in motion which led to the writing of his two last books. He tells in the Preface to *The Idea of Immortality* that, in a Symposium of the Aristotelian Society held in 1918, certain statements in *The Idea of God* led to an animated discussion on "the place and destiny of the finite individual." "When," he proceeds, "Principal Jacks conveyed to me in 1920 an invitation from the Hibbert Trustees to deliver a short course of lectures in Oxford, and intimated at the same time a strong desire that I should take Immortality as my subject, it seemed

almost incumbent upon me to endeavour to meet the wish thus expressed." The delivery of six lectures in Manchester College in the Lent term of 1921 proved a pleasant occasion in more than one way, for Pringle-Pattison found himself again associated with the Trust under whose auspices he had studied in Germany and produced his first book forty years before; and it was no small satisfaction to have the opportunity of lecturing in Oxford and of meeting there other students and teachers of philosophy.

Meanwhile his former colleagues in the University of Edinburgh took the earliest occasion to ask him to deliver the Gifford Lectures there. The request, he said, took him completely by surprise, as he felt that he had already said his say as Gifford Lecturer in Aberdeen. But it enabled him to join Edward Caird and James Ward in the select company of those who have delivered two double courses of Gifford Lectures in different Scottish universities. It also gave such of his former students as were within reach of Edinburgh the rare and unlooked-for pleasure of seeing him again at his familiar desk, and hearing his voice in the classroom surrounded by the names of former medallists from the days of Sir William Hamilton onward—his own one of the greatest.

The Hibbert Trustees readily agreed that Pringle-Pattison should expand the course of lectures delivered in Oxford early in 1921 to form the Edinburgh course of the following winter. So *The Idea of Immortality* took shape, and appeared in book form at the end of 1922. It was written in circumstances of greater leisure than the earlier Gifford Lectures, and this perhaps accounts for the impression of unity which it gives. The march of the argument is steady and unbroken, and every illustration, whether from poetry or the history of thought, makes its contribution to the final conclusion. The writer's conviction is patent, yet he is careful

not to overstate the importance of Immortality in the theistic scheme of things. He quotes with approval, as he had quoted before, Sir George Adam Smith's statement: "The Old Testament is of use in reminding us that the hope of immortality is one of the secondary and inferential elements of religious experience"; and he denies that we should "make it the centre and foundation of our whole world theory." [1] Nor does he found his thesis on any quasi-Platonic conception of the soul as an indestructible substance. He essays the more difficult task of founding it on the Aristotelian idea of the soul as the "entelechy or fulfilment, the complete account, of the living body" (Lecture IV.). Immortality, he holds, is only a belief of value, if it harmonises with our experience of the complex unity of the human individual. Even those who cannot accept the conclusion of the book, or its final estimate of human destiny, may well feel that its argument gains force from its very temperateness and the avoidance of any philosophical short-cut to its conclusion.

A few months after its publication Pringle-Pattison restated some part of his main conclusions in a letter to an American correspondent [2]:—

"It does not follow that we are to think of personal immortality as an inherent possession of every human soul, or a talismanic gift conferred indiscriminately on every being born in human shape. A true self comes into being as the result of continuous effort, and the same effort is needed to hold it together and ensure its maintenance; for the danger of disintegration is always present. If a man is no more than a loosely associated group of appetites and habits, the self as a moral unity has either flickered out or has never yet come into

[1] *The Idea of Immortality*, p. 185; cf. *The Idea of God*, p. 43 f.

[2] Dr Arthur J. Brown of New York, who has allowed me to quote the letter here.

existence. To the constitution of such a real self there must go some persistent purpose, or rather some coherent system of aims and ideals, and some glimpse at least, it would seem, of the eternal values. Eternal life, as a present experience, lent no support, we saw, to the view that such experience is limited to the present life, nor to the view that it tends in any way to bring about its own cessation by dissolving the finite personality. It does, however, certainly suggest that the further life is to be regarded as the sequel and harvest of what began here. . . .

"Where life is lived entirely on the animal level, there seems no reason whatever to suppose that the life does not come to an end with the death of the body. But where there are any stirrings of higher things, such desires, faint and flickering as they may be, seem to justify the admission of the individual to further opportunity when this earthly stage is ended."

The Idea of Immortality was dedicated to the Earl of Balfour, who wrote in acknowledgment: "Your book has given me much pleasure; pray accept my warmest thanks. I am delighted to have my name associated in any capacity with a work of yours." Among other friends to whom Pringle-Pattison sent it were Dr Bernard Bosanquet and Mr F. H. Bradley, and each acknowledged the gift in a closely reasoned letter. That from Dr Bosanquet expresses his final thoughts on the great subject of immortality, for it was written only a few days before the beginning of his last illness and a month before his death on February 8, 1923. It runs as follows:—

"13 HEATHGATE,
GOLDERS GREEN, N.W. 11.
Jan. 8, 1923.

"MY DEAR PRINGLE-PATTISON,—I received your new book on Saturday, and having a quiet Sunday yesterday read it through. I don't mean to say that I can have

done it justice in such a rapid reading, but it was so interesting that I could not lay it down.

"I think it is very good indeed. On all the points where moral dangers appear to me to lurk in popular views of the great subject, it satisfies me pretty completely. I welcome it as sound and lofty teaching, and am unfeignedly glad that your great authority and your excellent exposition should be used in helping the public to such conceptions.

"You will not, of course, expect that I should alter my own position, or entirely acquiesce in your representation of it. But I do not expect that I shall recur to the subject in public, mainly because I foresee no special occasion for doing so, and I am very content to leave the matter to the consequences which may emerge from the temper of our times and the general influences at work, including your books and mine, of which yours will be by far the more influential.

"If I did return to the subject, there is one point I should stress more than I have done before; and if, as I think you mean to, you return to it, it would be valuable if you would say an explicit word on it. It is the influence, on the general feeling about a future life, of the change from the orthodox tradition to modern speculation, and also modern superstition. (See *Value and Destiny*, 272 ff.) When I think of the belief in which I, and I suppose you, were brought up, as expressed by our hymns and liturgy—'Who are these arrayed in white,' &c.—I feel that it was a symbolism of something splendid and great, though untenable. Probation was to end with death; by a miracle, one was to be lifted into realisation of close proximity with deity.

"That idea I think is going, and must go. Both more spiritual views, as your own teaching about 'eternal life,' with the effort to banish remoteness and mystery from the idea of the future life, and more material views

like those of the 'spiritualists,' are bringing about an assimilation between 'this' life and 'the other.' The presumption in favour of conditions of spiritual progress in the 'other' life, differing in principle from what obtain 'here,' is tending, it seems to me, to vanish. If we can be as near God in this life as in another, it seems to follow that we can be as far from him in another as in this. And in views borrowed from the succession of lives on this earth, there is a strong presumption (in spite of M'Taggart) against any transmission of experience or character from one life to its successor. And such views are increasingly influential.

"With such an atmosphere as this, I do think our attitude must inevitably change. The certainty formerly offered to hope is gone. There is nothing anywhere but probation. There are, in a sense, as you suggest, 'elect' souls; but who can be confident that he is of the number? I don't know if Jones had dealt anywhere with Browning's lines—'There's a fancy some lean to and others hate' (*Old Pictures in Florence*)—but I think they represent a point of view which will become more and more influential.

"However, my point is just the new idea of the future, which seems to me to be gaining ground. If it is what the world is really coming to, so far as it holds to a future, I can hardly think that it will maintain itself. I think that a view like Bradley's in the conclusion of *Truth and Reality* will replace it. But I wish very much that you would say what you think about it in public. —Yours very truly, B. BOSANQUET."

The letter from Mr Bradley was written some months later:—

MERTON COLLEGE, OXFORD,
May 22-23.

"DEAR PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON,—I have just finished reading your *Idea of Immortality*, which you

so kindly sent to me and which I left on one side too long. And I must send you a few lines to congratulate you on what seems to me such an excellent piece of work, and to thank you for the pleasure and profit which has come to me in reading it. I have seldom, if ever, read any book on such a subject which carried me with it throughout so fully. In fact I am not sure that I have to dissent anywhere from your conclusions, if, that is, I have understood them rightly.

"I did not look at M'Taggart's criticism in *Mind* until I had read your book, and I do not think he has understood you, but on the contrary has very seriously failed to do so.

"But first let me notice the two places where you have criticised myself. In the first of these (p. 128) I accept your criticism without reserve, and agree that I was wrong. In the second (pp. 156-9) I cannot go so far as that. What I said is, I think, defensible, except so far as I laid an undue emphasis on one side of the matter. I don't think that I denied or even forgot the other side, but I agree that what I wrote was such as to produce in the mind of the reader a one-sided and incorrect impression. The mood in which my book was conceived and executed was, in fact, to some extent a passing one. And, if this was regrettable in one sense, in another sense and from the literary side it was, I suppose, otherwise. And I cannot alter the book now, though I would not repeat all of it. And in particular I certainly would *not* say now that 'a future life must be taken as decidedly improbable' (*Appearance*, p. 506).

"As to M'Taggart, he does not see that what we call 'matter' and mere material causation is from your point of view an abstraction which in the end is not real or true. He does not see that every real consequence involves a larger concrete whole and that hence in reality new consequences come as 'emergents' from

that, however inexplicable these may be from a merely abstract view such as is matter and mechanical causation. . . .

" The real question with you, I understand, is *not* as to ' survival ' but as to ' survival exactly *as what.*' Our ' personality ' even in life involves always a ' more,' and so again after death. And the question is as to whether and how far this ' more ' is such as to supersede what we call our personality, as such, or whether this ' more ' still more or less and in some sense still preserves it. And the question of *degree* comes in here as important, especially in the case of more or less worthless personalities.

" I might perhaps put the matter thus. *Every* self has a claim to complete self-realisation, and this must even include ' happiness.' *Every* self *is*, in a sense, so realised even in life—but how, and in what sense, and how much of what it calls its ' personality ' is involved in such complete self-realisation ? So far as the personality is one with what we call ' the bad self '—what are we to say ?

" And, as in life, so after death.

" Where I think we are agreed is that to answer these questions is not possible. But for practical purposes we may come nearest to the truth by embracing the idea of a personal survival and progress after death—continued so long as is best for us and for the Whole. We admit that this is not the entire and full truth—which is in detail beyond us, and we don't defend the idea of progress to complete personal perfection as being more than one aspect of the whole truth, an aspect which we don't pretend to combine harmoniously with other aspects—but which is still the best idea compared with any other alternative in our reach, and is therefore defensible. I can go as far as this, and I think that perhaps you will say that this is far enough.

"As to the difficulty with regard to the body, I agree that the longer we live, the less our bodies as mere matter ought to count. They ought to be implied in our 'personality' to a less and less degree even as a condition of that. I, however, feel some difficulty as to a wholly bodiless personality, one in which the body has come to be only a *past* condition. And, however much I dissent in general from the idea of a 'spiritual body,' I am inclined here to fall back on our ignorance about 'matter' and the variety of what may exist unknown to us, because beyond our actual senses. I should hence be willing to agree to the possibility of selves which after death would be perceptible by and recognizable by one another, and would so far have something in the way of a body. I see that here we are on horribly dangerous ground, but still total and absolute bodilessness—without loss of personality as such—gives me difficulty. And I am not quite sure as to your position here. Of course, one shrinks from anything that looks like an adoption of what is called 'spiritualism.'

"But I have tried your patience, I fear, too much already, and you will not, I hope, think yourself called on to answer this letter—which was meant to be only a message of congratulation and of thanks.—Yours truly,

"F. H. BRADLEY."

This letter forms a remarkable culmination to a friendship between two thinkers who had at one time occupied standpoints that seemed far apart, and whom the single-minded pursuit of truth had brought at the end to a large measure of agreement. In the year in which Pringle-Pattison received it, he gave his last course of Gifford Lectures. Its title was "Religious Origins and the Philosophy of History," but he soon came to feel that these topics could hardly be moulded

into an effective unity; so he summarised what he had said on the latter subject in a lecture on the "Philosophy of History" published in the Proceedings of the British Academy for 1924, and spent the following five years working over the earlier part of the course, adding to it a treatment of the development of ethical religion in Judaism and Christianity. Finally, after this long process of revision, the book appeared in the summer of 1930, with the full title, "*Studies in the Philosophy of Religion*, partly based on the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh in the year 1923." The somewhat unusual phrase "partly based on" indicates the extent to which the original lectures had been altered and extended before publication, as does the division of the book into seventeen chapters instead of the familiar ten lectures. Throughout, the treatment is historical. Especially in the first six chapters, which deal with primitive and early religion, the ground covered was new to the writer, but his own interest in exploring it, and the power of exposition which never deserted him, lend vividness to his survey. At intervals the argument is lit up by a flash of insight focussed in a terse phrase, as when he says that, even for the polytheist, "there is a kind of implicit monotheism in the very act and attitude of worship"; or that Jesus "did not merely teach the fatherhood; he lived the sonship" (pp. 86, 168). The last six chapters deal with the New Testament and early Christianity, and the last, entitled "The Christ of the Creeds," takes the writer into a theological region which he had hardly entered before. Yet this return, from the historical point of view, to the Philosophy of Religion, which he had treated in his first book from the standpoint of the great modern idealist systems, makes manifest the underlying unity of his thinking during fifty years.

CHAPTER XII.

CLOSING YEARS.

1923-1931.

In the summer of 1923 Professor W. P. Ker died suddenly while on a walking tour in Switzerland. This was a blow which Pringle-Pattison felt keenly, and on July 22 he wrote from The Haining to Mr W. P. James: "I feel I must write to you in our common sorrow, for I know Ker's death must touch you very closely. For myself I can think of nothing else since I saw the fact, so terrible in its total unexpectedness, in Thursday's paper. Somehow one took it for granted that he would go on to a serene old age like his father's between eighty and ninety. One saw others growing older and felt the advance of years oneself, but he seemed *ewig jung*, so full of the zest of life and the love of all beautiful things, that one had no fears or anxieties for him and never dreamt of outliving him. And now the curtain is drawn through a little over-exertion on the mountains. It is indeed a lamentable calamity to all his friends. . . . I saw him for the last time on February 5, when we parted in the Oxford railway station after a most happy week-end when he entertained me at All Souls. . . .

"We were in hopes of inducing him to spend some time here later in the autumn, and I had been thinking how pleasant it would be to have you here at the same

time after so long an interval. I have not seen you since we parted after that Cornish expedition in the spring of 1914. You remember how Ker walked round every point of rock, while most of us were contented to take the base line of the triangle? Alas! alas! for all that has happened 'twixt then and now, and especially for this last impoverishment. But will you not, perhaps all the more, try to come to us for a week and interchange thoughts and renew old memories? . . . Do think of it: I cannot say whether we may be here next summer; we might find it desirable to let the place. But this year at any rate we are here, and the children and grandchildren are coming to us in relays. In the end of September we hope to see our soldier son back from Chanak. 'W. P.' was a household word with all the children, and they understand what we have lost in him."

Just a year later, when Professor James Seth, who had resigned the Chair of Moral Philosophy a few weeks before, was calling to inquire for an invalid friend in Edinburgh, he suddenly passed away. His heart was known to be gravely affected, but the shock to members of his family was none the less great. Not only had he been a close comrade of his elder brother in their activity as thinkers and teachers, but he had never married, was a frequent visitor to The Haining, and had been with the family there or at Churchhill during many of the tense and sorrowful moments of the war. The short Memoir which Pringle-Pattison wrote the following year as an Introduction to the volume, *Essays in Ethics and Religion*, shows, even through its characteristic restraint, in how close a unity the two brothers lived and worked.

Although such empty places were multiplying in the circle of Pringle-Pattison's contemporaries and fellow-workers, there were many others of his own time and

among his pupils who were eager to acknowledge their debt to him. So, during the following winter, he was asked to give sittings to Mr A. E. Borthwick, A.R.S.A., who painted a portrait of much dignity and expressiveness, in which he is represented standing in his robes as a Doctor of Laws. The portrait was presented in the Senate Hall of the University on March 7, 1925. Professor W. P. Paterson, Dean of the Faculty of Divinity, who had known Andrew Seth at the High School and had in later years been for long his colleague and friend, presided over the gathering. He said that the portrait was that of one "known throughout the English-speaking world as the most distinguished theologian of Edinburgh University—a philosophical theologian." The presentation was made by an Honours student of thirty years before—Mr H. P. Macmillan, K.C., now Lord Macmillan—who emphasised, as the Chairman had already done, the fact that his career was a distinctively Scottish one. Mr Macmillan also said that no teacher could make the science miscalled "crabbed metaphysics" more human and inspiring than could he, while his written studies never failed to sound the note of optimism.

Pringle-Pattison's reply was in part reminiscent, in part a defence of the place of philosophy as an integral part of a university curriculum. After summarising the view of life which he had always tried to set before his students, he said that he had always considered the life of a university teacher as "one of the happiest and most memorable that could fall to any man's lot. His responsibilities were great, but his reward was also great. If he loved his subject—and it was presumably the subject of his choice—he would be in no danger of finding it grow stale; it would always be showing new sides of itself and opening up new vistas of delight."[1] The simple ceremony will live in the memories of Pringle-

[1] *Scotsman*, March 9, 1925.

Pattison's old students who were fortunate enough to form part of the little company as a very fitting consummation of his long service to the University, and especially they will treasure the words of his reply.

A year before this presentation Professor and Mrs Pringle-Pattison paid a long-planned visit to Italy, and a year later they revisited Germany—an experience which, he said, he had hardly hoped again to enjoy. But Dr Schurman was now Ambassador of the United States in Berlin, and an invitation to spend ten days at the Embassy in the city which they seen together as students nearly half a century before was an opportunity too good to miss. The resulting visit was described in a letter to Lord Haldane on May 27, 1926 :—

" We had a delightful fortnight with the Ambassador in Berlin, the second half of April, and enjoyed summer-like warmth, while, according to reports, you were shivering with cold both in Scotland and England. We met a number of interesting people at the Embassy, including Luther, the Chancellor, Einstein, Professor Liebeck (President of the *Kant Gesellschaft*), Ludwig Stein (editor of the *Archiv für Geschichte d. Philosophie*), who sent you his warm regards, and many others. Schurman had a very high opinion of Luther's wisdom and honesty and also of Zimmerman's ability. He maintains cordial relations with them and others, and is, I think, a *persona grata* all round.

" The amazing differences between the Germany of to-day and Germany as we used to know it is, of course, the total disappearance (submergence at all events) of the military class. You remember the tall arrogant officers with their flowing cloaks and clanking spurs monopolising the pavement in Unter den Linden. Now not a uniform, other than a policeman's, to be seen in Germany except the British khaki in Wiesbaden (where

we wound up our stay) and the scarlet mess-jackets of the officers dancing in the evenings in the hotels there. If this state of things is allowed to go on for any length of time, it cannot but profoundly affect the spirit of the people, and I should doubt whether it would ever be possible to reimpose conscription upon the nation when the mass of the people have tasted freedom.

"We had a short but pleasant visit to Göttingen towards the end of April—'we' in this case meaning Schurman, the Rev. Lewis Muirhead and myself. Schurman had notified the 'Curator' of the University of our intended visit, and we were met at the station by him and his 'Magnificanz,' the Rector and an American professor on the staff—all in tall hats, who whisked us off to a meeting of the *Akademie der Wissenschaften*, which happened to take place that afternoon, thence to supper and then to a 'Bier-abend' of the professors in residence, where a speech of welcome by the Chairman, to which Schurman replied, was followed by informal conversation washed down by beer. Next morning they brought two cars and showed us all the chief sights of the University, including our own signatures in the Matriculation Album of 1880!—and after they had entertained us to a most friendly lunch (at the Curator's house) we left the same afternoon. . . . It is a busy hive of learning, and the University, with its many institutes, has grown out of knowledge since 1880. The very face of the rather dull country round has been changed by judicious planting.

"From Berlin my wife and I went to Weimar for part of three days, on one of which we went along to Jena and lunched in the *Bär*, where John [Dr J. S. Haldane] and I lunched together for a whole *Semester* in 1879. From Weimar we went on to Eisenach, but just as May came in the weather changed to dull and cool, and we were obliged to give up the idea of further

exploration in Thüringen. So we did not penetrate to Ilmenau; in fact we only got up to the Wartburg in a closed motor an hour or so before we left Eisenach.

"We went on to Wiesbaden hoping for the warmth and sunshine one usually gets there, but the same type of weather continued, and the Strike also came to unsettle our plans, so we simply remained in a comfortable hotel there till the way was clear for return.

"The good temper of the nation during the [General] Strike and the way in which it was terminated greatly increased our prestige on the Continent. If only something similar could be achieved in the Coal Strike!"

The loyalty of Pringle-Pattison to old friends has already been noted. One characteristic instance occurred when Professor MacCunn's eyesight had seriously failed, and his wife was suffering from a throat affection which for the time prevented her reading to him. Hearing of this, Pringle-Pattison, though in poor health himself, crossed Scotland in mid-winter to visit and cheer them.

In these years at The Haining the grandchildren more and more played the part which had been played by the sons and daughters when Pringle-Pattison and his wife first made their home there. He had lost none of his interest in his trees, and when any required pruning round the house or beside the loch he was wont to do the work himself. Sometimes his venerable figure might be seen disappearing into the woods with a small grandson, immensely proud of his dignity and looking forward to a lesson in woodcraft, marching on either side, all three being armed with hatchet, bill or saw. The eldest grandson, Harry Webster, lived regularly for some years with his grandparents in order to attend Merchiston School. There were also the two families in Edinburgh; and shortly before the end of 1925 the second son, Ernest, who had married in India, came home with his wife and child. So the circle enlarged;

and, even in the last months, when Pringle-Pattison's physical strength began to ebb, no one could see him in its midst without feeling how much he remained its active centre.

The spring of 1928 brought grave anxiety. His wife's health, on which the anxiety of the war years had undoubtedly placed a severe strain, broke down in May, and after several months of illness she passed away at The Haining on October 25. In the words of Mr Capper : " It was a blow of extreme severity, and although her husband bore it with his customary patience he never recovered from the shock." A few weeks would have brought them to the fiftieth anniversary of their first meeting and the beginning of their love for one another ; and for forty-four years they had shared all life's experiences as man and wife. After so long and perfect a union the parting could not but leave him who survived weary and lonely, though ever courageous. Even in regard to his physical strength, those who were nearest noticed that the heart trouble which had been apparent earlier now grew markedly worse.

The severance of a friendship of more than fifty years came in the same year, for on August 19, 1928, Richard Burdon Haldane passed away at Cloan. A few months later Pringle-Pattison wrote a long biographical article for the Proceedings of the British Academy. This appreciation of Lord Haldane's work, public and philosophical, showed his gifts as an author still unimpaired —his admirably balanced judgment, and his power of describing men and events in rapid summary without baldness and of expressing heartfelt admiration with no forced or exaggerated note.

The death of Lord Haldane was followed after eighteen months by that of Lord Balfour. Again Pringle-Pattison was asked to write an account of the philosophical work of one whom he had known for so long and whose friend-

ship he so highly valued. He felt the importance of the task—his last, as it proved—and it occupied him closely through the early months of 1931. When his last illness began, it was complete, save for the final revision of the closing portion, and at the date when this Memoir is written it awaits publication.

In the last three lonely years his children and grandchildren were able to do much to fill his days with varied interest. He enjoyed runs by motor to many of the beautiful and historic places round Edinburgh with one or other of his children, including his son Siegfried, who spent part of this time with his regiment at Redford, just outside the city. In March 1929 Norman Pringle-Pattison snatched a few weeks from the claims of business and started with his father for Naples. Pringle-Pattison had long wished to see that region, and entered with zest into the exploration of the enchanted country surrounding the Bay of Naples—Pæstum, Pompeii, Amalfi, Sorrento, Capri. Then they turned north, towards Rapallo, and had one day in Rome. Here he was able to act as guide to his son (he had visited Rome some years earlier with his wife), and showed the same enthusiasm in taking him round the Forum, the Palatine and St Peter's. From Rapallo Norman Pringle-Pattison returned home, but his father remained on the Italian Riviera with a party which included three old friends—Professor and Mrs Sorley and Mrs Ross, whose husband, Dr David M. Ross, had been a senior friend in the philosophical classes in the seventies. Unfortunately influenza descended upon the party, and although Pringle-Pattison escaped, his return had to be made alone by sea from Genoa.

The following year, as has been noted, saw the publication of his last book. Of the philosophers of his own generation few now survived. But when the name of one, Professor Alexander, appeared in the King's

Birthday Honours List as receiving the Order of Merit, he at once wrote: "Very hearty congratulations on the much coveted and well bestowed honour just conferred on you. I am glad both for your own sake and the sake of philosophy."

In the early summer of 1931 Pringle-Pattison embarked on his last foreign journey, a cruise to the Northern Capitals with his youngest and only surviving brother. For Mr John Seth it was a time of very real anxiety; for the bodily strength of his elder brother proved less than had been anticipated, and very much less than the determination of his will. With his gentleness had always gone an unusual tenacity of purpose; and even now he was unwilling to miss any opportunity of seeing the historic cities at which the steamer successively called. At Copenhagen he collapsed on the quay after landing, and had to be assisted up the companionway to his cabin. Finally, the care and watchfulness of his brother brought him safe home; but on his return to The Haining his strength began slowly to ebb. One of his last messages, written in pencil, was sent as a birthday greeting to his oldest friend, Mr Capper, and included the two words, "No pain." The end came peacefully in the early morning of September 1 in the library at his beloved Haining, and three days later his body was laid to rest in the city which he also loved, and in which his greatest work as a teacher was accomplished.

It is too soon, even if this were the appropriate place, to assess the rank which the books of Pringle-Pattison may finally hold among the philosophical writings of his time. He himself assuredly made no claim to rank among the *di majores* of philosophy. He was content, as the title of his chief book shows, to identify his thinking closely with that of his time, and to answer its questions in the form which his contem-

poraries gave to them. At times he even seemed to spend his strength in the discussion of views set forth by men less in intellectual stature than himself; and these portions of his work may be compared to the vine whose branches bear a nobler fruit than that of the trees by which they are supported, and from which they take their direction. Essentially he was of those who, in words which he would not have disowned, "serve their own generation by the will of God."

Yet the value of his work will assuredly extend beyond his own generation, and even that of those who learned from him. It summarised, and in some sense brought to a close, a development of two centuries in Scottish philosophy; and it may well prove to have a vitality and an interest for thinkers of generations still distant, so that future searchers for a sure basis of theistic belief may turn to it for light on the problems of their own day.

But one thing admits of no dispute—the service which this great teacher accomplished by what he was, not less than by what he taught. In the words of Professor Hallett: "His personal dignity was a discipline, his interest a sufficient reward, his commendation an inspiration to new effort, and to those who were fortunate enough to win his friendship—a gift not lightly bestowed—he was an unfailing support in illness and in effort, in the more dignified forms of social intercourse and in the studious adventures of the intellectual life. As a philosopher his intellectual humility was only matched by his native acumen and scholarly industry. Nothing would have been easier than for him to set up for a great philosopher; for there was nothing of the eclectic about him, in spite of a method of exposition suggesting eclecticism to the unwary. He thought through all his convictions, yielding nothing to their peremptoriness that was not supported by their intellectual transparency, and laboured to place them in due order in a

consistent system, keeping ever in mind the necessary limitations of human thought and the high responsibilities of his chosen vocation."

He himself expressed the governing principles of his own work as a teacher on the occasion already described in March 1925, by saying that his effort had not been to impose on his pupils dogmatic solutions of his own; rather he taught them first to appreciate the difficulties and complexities of the questions raised, yet suggested in the end that "to think the worst of the universe and its Author was not necessarily to come nearest the truth." "Truth, goodness, beauty, love," he concluded, "are realities as well as values; and how can we explain their existence save in a world which is fundamentally spiritual?"

Sixteen years earlier he wrote lines regarding his friend, Simon Somerville Laurie, which, along with the sentences just quoted, may well stand as his final message:—

We lay in earth the weary heart,
The massive labouring brain,
Mindful how firm and clear his faith,
The spirit lives again.

Within some higher sphere, he taught,
New truth shall greet our view;
If God is God and worth our trust,
Death shall our life renew.

And shall we say his faith was vain,
Friends round his grave here met?
For us he lives, a Presence still,
How then should God forget?

THE
BALFOUR LECTURES ON REALISM

Delivered in the University of Edinburgh in 1891

BY

A. SETH PRINGLE-PATTISON

[Throughout the Lectures, the footnotes in square brackets are taken from the Author's annotated copy except where otherwise marked.—ED.]

LECTURE I.

PSYCHOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS.

In what is called in the widest sense 'philosophical' discussion it is tolerably well known by this time that a fruitful source of confusion and controversy has been the mixing up of psychological with strictly philosophical or metaphysical questions. This is one of the current criticisms upon the English school of thinkers as represented by Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and their successors in the present century like the Mills. It is said that when we ask them for a philosophical theory of knowledge and existence, they reply with an account of the growth of consciousness in the individual sentient organism. There is a great measure of truth in this criticism. The fault of these philosophers lies, however, not in their exclusively psychological attitude—for in that case their theories would stand as psychology, and we should look for our philosophy elsewhere—but in their unconscious shifting from one point of view to the other. They are far from being pure psychologists; there is a great deal of philosophy or theory of knowledge in Locke, Berkeley and Hume. But they speak sometimes from one point of view, sometimes from the other, without being aware that the two points of view are different. This criticism, however—though it is specially true of English philosophy—applies more or less to philosophical writers in general, and hence it is encouraging to note that within quite recent times a

sense of the need of greater precision has shown itself in the most varied quarters, English as well as continental, among empiricists as well as transcendentalists. Strenuous attempts have been made to differentiate the various questions embraced under the general term 'philosophy,' and assign each as a subject of inquiry to a separate science or discipline.

In this way there has been constituted what, so far as the name goes, is a new science, though the inquiries grouped under it have formed part of philosophical investigation since a very early time. This is the science which, for the last thirty years or so, the Germans have come to call distinctively *Erkenntnisstheorie*, or theory of knowledge. Theory of Knowledge has been the circumlocution largely adopted by English writers who have wished to enforce the distinction between these inquiries and the investigations of psychological science. But as the distinction has come more to the front, the need of a single word has been felt—were it only, as Hamilton pointed out in the case of psychology, that we may be able to form an adjective from it—and accordingly just as psychology supplanted the more cumbrous designations such as science or philosophy of mind, so the excellent and in every way unobjectionable title of epistemology will, in all probability, permanently take the place of the less convenient designation "theory of knowledge."

But it will be asked what is the subject of this new science, or rather what particular philosophical inquiries are to be isolated and grouped under it? To this it may be answered generally that epistemology is an investigation of knowledge as knowledge, or, in other words, of the relation of knowledge to reality, of the validity of knowledge. This, at least, is the fundamental question to which other epistemological discussions are subsidiary. The precise bearing of this definition is

best seen by a contrast between epistemology and psychology in their mode of dealing with the same subject-matter; for, in a sense, the fact of knowledge belongs to psychology as much as to epistemology. This contrast has been lucidly expounded within the last few years by several writers. But the difference in point of view is very fairly stated by Locke, though he was one of the worst sinners in practically confounding what he had theoretically distinguished. The distinction between psychology and epistemology, indeed, is the distinction between the Second Book of the *Essay* and the Fourth, and this Locke explains in his Introduction as follows: "First, I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them." This is pure psychology—what, he asks, are the mental states which constitute the individual mind, and into what elementary facts may they be analysed—of what primitive facts may the more complex be the result? "Secondly [he proceeds], I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas, and the certainty, evidence and extent of it." This is the question of epistemology: What knowledge can I have of the world of men and things, by means of my mental states?

Psychology, according to Locke's way of putting it, deals with 'ideas,' which he defines as "the immediate objects of the mind in thinking";[1] it treats ideas as mental facts which have an existence of their own in consciousness. Epistemology deals with the 'knowledge' which we reach by means of these ideas or immediate

[1] Second Letter to the Bishop of Worcester. So, again, *Essay*, Bk. II., c. 8, 8: "Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought, or understanding."

mental facts. It takes the ideas not as themselves bits of fact, but as signs or symbols of some further reality; it takes them, in short, as ideas *of* things. Hence the word 'idea,' taken even in the wide sense in which it is used by Locke, is not a good one to employ in a psychological reference; for it inevitably contains this epistemological implication, this reference of the mental state to something beyond itself. "States of consciousness," as Mr Ward suggests, would be a more appropriate and colourless designation for the objects of psychological science. The psychologist deals with psychical events merely as such; the world of conscious states is the reality with which alone he is concerned, and each state of consciousness is a real fact in that world—a fact occurring at a definite time and in a definite set of connections with other psychical facts. The interconnections of this factual world, the laws of the happening of psychical events, are what the psychologist has to investigate.

It is only for the psychologist, however, that mental states are interesting on their own account, as subjective realities or facts. To everyone else they are interesting only for what they *mean*, for the knowledge they give us of a world beyond themselves. Viewed in themselves, the mental states are, as it were, only instrumental; *by* them, as Locke says, the understanding hath knowledge. They are merely a mechanism by which a world of men and things is somehow revealed to me. It is only for the psychologist, I say, that the investigation of this mechanism, as a mechanism, has an interest. To all the rest of mankind ideas or presentations are interesting only for the knowledge they give us of a reality beyond themselves. In point of fact, we never pause to consider them as what they are in themselves—we treat them consistently as significant, as ideas of something, as representative or symbolic of a world of facts. Now

it is from this latter point of view that epistemology considers ideas.

Of course this distinction, even the manner of stating it, is far from being new. Not to go farther back, it is drawn with great clearness in the writings of Descartes and his followers. In fact, considerable emphasis is laid upon it in the Cartesian philosophy, and a special terminology is employed to designate it. "Ideas," says Descartes himself,[1] "may be taken in so far only as they are certain modes of consciousness," and so regarded, "they all seem in the same manner to proceed from myself." That is to say, they are all subjective functions or psychical events. But they may also be considered "as images, of which one represents one thing and another a different." So far as the idea is taken simply as an act or function of the mind, a subjective fact, it is said by the Cartesians to have "*esse formale seu proprium*"; so far as it is taken in its representative capacity, as standing for some object thought, it is said to have an objective or vicarious being—*esse objectivum sive vicarium*. There is a tendency in the Cartesian school to appropriate the term 'idea' in the first or psychological sense, and to use 'perception' in the epistemological reference. Perception is certainly a term which should be the exclusive property of the epistemologist; and it is satisfactory, therefore, to note that the most recent psychologists seem inclined to substitute for it the term 'presentation.' But the term 'idea' also, as we have seen, belongs more appropriately to epistemology, and so pre-eminently, of course, do such terms as 'knowledge' and 'cognition.' As already indicated, the best general psychological equivalent is states of consciousness, mental states, psychical functions.

In accordance with what has been said, Epistemology may be intelligibly described as dealing with the relation

[1] Third Meditation.

of knowledge to reality. Of course, if we take reality in the widest sense, our cognitive states are also part of reality; they also *are*. The wildest fancy that flits through the mind exists in its own way, fills out its own moment of time and takes its individual place in the fact-continuum which constitutes the universe. But, as we have seen, this aspect of mental facts may be conveniently neglected, and hence reality in the above phrase comes to be used in a narrower sense. It means not necessarily physical or material realities, but realities which have a different fashion of existence from the fleeting and evanescent mode of psychical states—beings or things which are in some sense permanent and independent, which at all events have a reality different in kind from that of mental states. This reference of ideas to a world of reality beyond themselves is what is meant when knowledge is contrasted with reality, and when question is made of the relation of the one to the other.

This way of putting the epistemological problem may be said to beg the question at issue between Idealism and Realism—inasmuch as the terminology is incompatible with those idealistic theories which deny, or seem to deny, the existence of any such extra-conscious reality as is here spoken of. In truth, however, this is not so; for in any case this dualism *seems* to exist, and so, if not justified, it has to be explained away. Subjective idealism, accordingly, must have an epistemology of its own, even if it be only of a negatively critical character. For indeed no theory can deny the contrast between the present content of consciousness and that which it symbolises or stands for. No theorist takes the particular mental state as independent and self-sufficient; he cannot avoid referring it beyond itself. But if he is a subjective idealist, say like Mill, he will try to avoid the acknowledgment that this reference of present consciousness beyond itself carries

us *beyond consciousness altogether.* He will explain it as a reference of a particular mental state to a permanent law of connection between mental states, and thus convey the impression that the reality to which the subjective consciousness refers is still in a manner *within* that consciousness. This does not appear to me to be an adequate account of the facts, but what I am concerned to show just now is only that the epistemological question is not determined out of hand by the way in which it has been defined. The essential epistemological contrast is as fully recognised by Mill as any Realist could wish to see it. Take his own words in evidence: "The conception I form of the world existing at any moment, comprises, along with the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation. . . . These various possibilities are the important thing to me in the world. My present sensations are generally of little importance, and are, moreover, fugitive; the possibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, which is the character that mainly distinguishes our idea of Substance or Matter from our notion of sensation." This reference of the 'fugitive' content of consciousness to a 'permanent,' which is somehow beyond it (a reference which Mill admits and emphasises), is just what we ordinarily mean by knowledge, and as such it constitutes the problem of epistemology. But the unavoidable acknowledgment of this contrast, of this reference, does not imply any decision as to the nature of the 'permanent,' or the precise sense in which the 'beyond' is to be understood. It may be Mill's permanent possibilities of sensation, it may be the unconscious matter of popular philosophy, it may be an infinite number of monadic consciousnesses, or it may be a system of divine or objective thought. These are further questions, to be determined partly by epistemology, partly by metaphysics, but they all equally presuppose that

epistemological dualism which can be denied only by a theory which would be content with the momentary presentations of sense, as they come and go in hopeless entanglement and disarray.

To recapitulate, then. Psychology, assuming the existence of a subject or medium of consciousness, seeks to explain, mainly by the help of association or processes practically similar, how out of the come-and-go of conscious states, there are evolved such subjective facts as perceptions, the belief in an independent real world and the idea of the Ego or subject himself. It investigates how such ideas and beliefs come to pass, but it does not touch the further question whether they are well-founded or no. They may be a correct account of the real state of things, or they may be illusions; but anyway they are beliefs, subjective facts which may be shown with probability to have arisen in a certain way. And that is enough for psychology which, so far as it sticks to its own last, does not seek to go beyond the inner world of the subject. The external world, so far as psychology treats it, is simply a complex presentation in consciousness, a subjective object: with the extraconscious or trans-subjective psychology *ex vi termini* can have no concern. Belief in a trans-subjective world may, indeed —must, in fact—be treated by the psychologist. But that belief, again, he treats simply as a subjective fact; he analyses its constituents and tells us the complex elements of which it is built up; he tells us with great precision what we do believe, but so far as he is a pure psychologist he does not attempt to tell us whether our belief is true, whether we have real warrant for it. On that point he is dumb.

If it is objected that this view of psychology, as limited to the subjective world, is insufficient, seeing that in great part of his work the psychologist is bound to assume the correlation of mind and body, and the

existence of an external cause of impressions, I reply that, on its physiological or experimental side, psychology simply places itself at the point of view of the other sciences. It is now as purely objective as it was before purely subjective. It takes up its position in the object from the outset, and treats subjective facts themselves as objective, *i.e.*, as mere appendages or accompaniments of the objective facts of nerve and brain. Psychology is thus either purely subjective or purely objective [1] in its standpoint, according as we look at it. What it does *not* deal with is the nature of the relation between the subject and the object, which is exemplified in every act of knowledge.

Now it is the essential function of epistemology to deal with this very relation, to investigate it *on the side of its validity, its truth.* With what right do we pass beyond our subjective states? What is the ground of our belief in an independent world? Our cognitive states appear to refer themselves to a reality which we know by their means. Epistemology does not, like psychology, rest in the appearance. It seeks to determine whether the appearance is true, and, if true, in what sense precisely it is to be understood. The point on which psychology is dumb, forms the central problem of epistemological science. What is reality, the epistemologist asks.[2] Is there any reality beyond the conscious states themselves and their connections? If there is, in what sense can we be said to know it? Is knowledge, inference, or belief, the most appropriate word to use in the circumstances? The fundamental question of external perception thus broadens out into a general consideration of the foundations of belief. And, accordingly, the whole inquiry might be fitly enough so described in a

[1] [But this objective or natural science psychology neglects the implication of a subject.]

[2] [Rather the metaphysician.]

more generalised fashion—namely, as an inquiry into "the foundations of belief." So it is described by Mr Arthur Balfour in the sub-title of his *Defence of Philosophic Doubt*, a book which may be regarded as one of the most brilliant of recent English contributions towards an epistemology or theory of knowledge in the strict sense of these terms. Mr Balfour expressly defines his subject-matter as "a systematic account of the grounds of belief and disbelief," and he is at pains in his introductory chapter to distinguish the inquiry most carefully from psychology, on the one hand, so far as that investigates merely the growth and causes of a belief, and on the other hand from metaphysics or ontology.[1]

[1] As regards a name for the inquiry thus isolated and defined, Mr Balfour proposes the term Philosophy, acknowledging at the same time that this application is not exactly sanctioned by usage. If it were at all possible to appropriate the general term, Philosophy, in a specific sense, there might be much to say for this innovation. Many arguments in its favour might be drawn even from the vague sense which the term bears in current usage. In modern times, and within the present century in particular, Philosophy is very frequently used in the schools as equivalent to Epistemology or Theory of Knowledge. But in spite of this, it seems to me hopeless (and undesirable) to cut ourselves loose from the tradition of more than two thousand years, which associates the term irrevocably with metaphysical or ontological speculation. By metaphysics or ontology I mean some kind of theory or no-theory of the ultimate nature of things. Such a metaphysical theory is that to which all other philosophical inquiries lead up—that in which they culminate—and it seems to me undesirable to define philosophy in such a way as to exclude from its scope what has hitherto been considered its heart and soul. I confess, indeed, that if we are to narrow the term at all, I should be inclined to identify philosophy rather with metaphysics or ontology. The claim on behalf of epistemology, as I take it, is that it lays the substructure; it is the necessary preliminary alike of science and of metaphysics. But it may as fairly be argued on the other side that the ultimate or culminating science has the best claim to the time-honoured title. Happily, however, we are not reduced to an aimless wrangle of this description, for Epistemology is just the single term we want. Philosophy will doubtless remain in its indefiniteness as a generic title, associated now more closely with theory of knowledge, now more closely with metaphysics; while epistemology (overlapping into logic), metaphysics or ontology, and ethics (which as metaphysic of ethics is connected in the most intimate way with any ultimate theory of things)—while these three at least, to mention no more at present, are covered by her ample ægis.

For on this side also the line requires to be drawn. If epistemology is not to be confounded with psychology on the one hand, neither is it to be identified with metaphysics on the other. The prevalent confusion in English philosophy between the two first has been well exposed by Kantian and Hegelian writers, but some of them have themselves fallen into a new confusion between epistemology and metaphysics. A considerable section of my last course of Balfour Lectures [1] was devoted, indeed, to showing that English Neo-Kantianism, as it has come to be called, seeks to establish metaphysical positions by arguments which are purely epistemological, and therefore unconvincing when stretched beyond their proper application. And in this respect I have seen no reason, during the years that have elapsed, to change the views I then expressed. For it must not be forgotten that the question which epistemology finds before it is the relation of the *individual* knower to a world of reality—a world whose very existence it is bound to treat at the outset as problematical. How, or in what sense, does the individual knower transcend his own individual existence and become aware of other men and things? It is this relatively simple and manifestly preliminary question which epistemology has to take up. Subjective states are plainly our data; it is there we have our foothold, our *pied à terre*; but unless we can step beyond them, metaphysics in any constructive sense can hardly make a beginning. Epistemology, if its results are negative, necessarily leads to a thorough-going scepticism; but if its results are positive, it only clears the way for metaphysical construction or hypothesis. The mere fact that we believe ourselves to have successfully made the leap from the subjective to a real which is independent of our subjectivity, does not reveal to us offhand the ultimate ground or essence

[1] *Hegelianism and Personality.*

of that real. Epistemology, in short, has to do entirely with the relation of the subjective consciousness to a trans-subjective world which it knows or seems to know. Metaphysics has to do with the ultimate nature of the reality which reveals itself alike in the consciousness which knows and the world which is known. The categories of the one are subjective and trans-subjective (conscious state and real being); the categories of the other are pre-eminently essence and appearance.

It is true we use some categories in both connections; but if we look more carefully we shall find that they bear a totally different sense in the two cases, and grievous is the damage that has ensued to philosophy from the failure to keep the two senses separate. The much-abused term 'phenomenon' is one of those double-faced words; phenomenon in a metaphysical reference is the manifestation or revelation of an essence or indwelling reality. When the poet speaks of "a Presence which disturbs him with the joy of elevated thoughts, a motion and a spirit which impels all thinking things, all objects of all thought," he is metaphysically contrasting the essential Spirit with the universe of intelligences and intelligibilia, which are its manifestation or phenomenon. *Natura naturata*, in the old phrase, is the phenomenon of *natura naturans*. If, with Goethe, we say that nature is the garment of God by which we see Him, we make nature the phenomenon of a divine essence. If we take atoms and the void as our metaphysical principia, then the human consciousness and the variegated face of nature as it appears to that consciousness are phenomena of what Berkeley calls the materialist's "stupid thoughtless somewhat." If we say with the Hegelians that Thought is the ultimate reality which manifests itself alike in nature and man, we are engaged with the same metaphysical contrast; if we say Will with Schopenhauer or the Unconscious with

Hartman, it is still the same—it is a metaphysical contrast, a metaphysical problem, which engages us. But phenomenon has also come to be used in an epistemological reference, and then it means, and ought to be restricted to mean, the subjective state as contrasted with the trans-subjective reality known by means of that state. In that sense, familiar to us from Kant, to say that we know only phenomena means that we know only our own conscious states and cannot know 'things-in-themselves,' that is to say, the trans-subjective realities of which our states are the evidence. Here it is obvious the use of the term 'phenomenon' is quite a new one. Nor is the epistemological thing-in-itself to be identified with the metaphysical essence. For even if we possessed that knowledge of trans-subjective realities which Kantianism denies, we should still be dealing only with phenomena in the metaphysical sense —with the particular existences of the universe, not with the essence or universal of which they are the expression. When such a serious ambiguity is discovered lurking in a term which is so freely bandied about as 'phenomena,' it may well be doubted whether the controversialists are always clear as to the sense in which they mean it to be taken.[1]

But, indeed, the time-honoured title of Idealism itself covers a *double entendre* of a similar description, according as it is used metaphysically or epistemologically. Metaphysically, Idealism is opposed most ordinarily to Materialism; in the widest sense it is the opposite of what may be called the mechanical and atheistic view of the universe, whatever special form that may

[1] A fuller analysis of the use of the term 'phenomena' in Kantian and positivistic thought would bring some of these inconsistencies instructively to light. For the plausibility of the *quasi*-scientific agnosticism which is so widely spread in our periodicals and popular philosophy depends in great part on a systematic confusion between the two different senses of the word.

take. Is self-conscious thought with its ideal ends—the True, the Beautiful and the Good—the self-realising End that works in changes and makes it Evolution? or are these but the casual outcome of a mechanical system —a system in its ultimate essence indifferent to the results which in its gyrations it has unwittingly created and will as unwittingly destroy? Is thought or matter the prius? Is the ultimate essence and cause of all things only "dust that rises up, and is lightly laid again"; or is it the Eternal Love of Dante's Vision—"the love that moves the sun and the other stars"? That is the fundamental metaphysical antithesis. If we embrace the one alternative, however we may clothe it in detail, we recognise the universe as our home, and we may have a religion; if we embrace the other, then the spirit of man is indeed homeless in an alien world. In the plain, impressive words of Marcus Aurelius—"the universe is either a confusion and a dispersion, or it is unity and order and providence. If it is the former, why do I care about anything else than how I shall at last become earth? But if the other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm and I trust in Him who governs." Marcus Aurelius expresses the difference from the religious or practical side; from the speculative side the difference is, as I have said, a metaphysical one, and all the theories which support the latter alternative may be embraced under the generic name of Idealism.

Quite distinct from this metaphysical Idealism, however, is the epistemological Idealism which is opposed, not to Materialism, but to Realism. Here the question at issue is not the problem of the ultimate constitution of the universe; it is the question of the theory of knowledge—in its most obvious and easy form—the question of the external world and the nature of the existence we are prepared to assign to it. Has it any

existence beyond the minds of the conscious beings who perceive it, or is *percipi* its whole *esse?* Does the actual and possible experience of conscious beings constitute an exhaustive account of its *modus essendi?* Is it a mere phenomenon, a mental appearance, or does it possess in some sense an extra-conscious reality of its own? The question might be more exactly formulated, for as soon as we essay a solution we find that it involves not only the existence of what we usually call the external world, but all existence whatever beyond my conscious states. It includes, therefore, the validity of my belief in the existence of other conscious beings. But the question itself and its details are not at present before us: we are not called upon at this stage to do more than indicate its general nature. It is obvious that we are here in the presence of a set of problems of a widely different range and import from the metaphysical problem indicated a minute or two ago. We are dealing with the preliminary question of the extent and validity of knowledge—in a word, with epistemology, not with metaphysics or ontology. It is equally obvious that epistemological Idealism does not coincide with the metaphysical Idealism sketched above. Berkeley is usually classed as a subjective Idealist in the epistemological sense; and if we accept this classification, we might say that in his case the two senses of Idealism *happen* to fit the same person. But Berkeley is NOT a consistent subjective idealist: he is only an immaterialist. He believes in the real trans-subjective existence of other finite spirits, and of God the infinite Spirit, and it is his epistemological *Realism* in these respects that enables him to reach his metaphysical Idealism—his conviction of order and reason at the heart of things. Consistent epistemological idealism must be Solipsism at the best; indeed, it is Hume, not Berkeley, that is in this sense an idealist of the

purest water, and Hume is not so much as a Solipsist. It might easily be shown that epistemological Idealism inevitably conducts us in consistency to scepticism of the Humian or an essentially similar type. Where a so-called Idealism fails to reach this goal, it is in virtue of the realistic elements which it inconsistently adopts into its system. Such a line of argument would form a convincing proof from history of the distinction on which I am insisting between epistemology and metaphysics. For scepticism is, of course, so far from being allied to *metaphysical* Idealism that it would rather require to be bracketed with materialism. Though, of course, not dogmatic like the latter, it ranks with it as a philosophy of despair. If epistemological Idealism is thus twin brother of Scepticism, it is plain, on the other hand, from what I have said, that a thinker may be, epistemologically, a strenuous Realist, and at the same time an Idealist in the broad metaphysical sense of the term. He is such an Idealist if he recognises that all the real individuals whose trans-subjective existence he maintains are " moments in the being " of an intelligently directed Life. Indeed, as has been hinted, it is *only* in virtue of epistemological Realism that we can avoid Scepticism and so much as begin our journey towards metaphysical Idealism.

It follows, therefore, that nothing can be more essential to clear thinking than to keep these two sets of questions apart ; yet I am afraid that they are constantly interchanged. In particular it seems to me that this is the case with many of the English thinkers, who profess a general allegiance to Kant or Hegel. The English neo-Hegelians convey the impression that in order to reach a metaphysical, or, as they call it, a spiritual, Idealism, it is at least necessary to deny the reality of ' things-in-themselves.' Metaphysically they mean by this, as I perfectly well understand, that the external world is

not to be taken as an independent fact, existing, so to speak, on its own account, and having only accidental relations with the rest of the universe. The universe is once for all a whole, and the external world, as the Hegelians put it, is essentially related to intelligence; in other words, it is not a brute fact existing outside the sweep of the divine life and its intelligent ends. In all this I most heartily agree with the neo-Hegelians. Whether we can absolutely *prove* so much or no, it is certain that so much is involved in every constructive system of metaphysics; and certainly we cannot *believe* less without lapsing into scepticism. If we put this metaphysical sense upon the words, then I most certainly believe, in Berkeley's phrase, that "the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning." There is no metaphysical thing-in-itself, no *res completa*, except the universe regarded as a self-existent whole. The thinker who leaves anything *outside* in this way makes confession of speculative bankruptcy. But though the unrelated thing-in-itself can have no place in metaphysics, it is quite otherwise with the epistemological thing-in-itself, if we are to designate trans-subjective reality by this ill-omened phrase. The existence of the latter must be asserted as strenuously as that of the former must be denied. All my fellow-men are things-in-themselves to me in the epistemological sense—extra-conscious realities—and I fail to see how we can draw any hard and fast line at them.

Hence, as I have argued on a previous occasion, anything which tends to confuse the two questions is to be deprecated: we cannot deal with the two in the same breath without confusing the issues. Our epistemological premises will not bear our metaphysical conclusion. Epistemology starts, and must start, from the individual human consciousness—the only consciousness known to

us. If, however, it be pointed out to a neo-Hegelian that the epistemological assertions which he makes as to the relation of knower and known are plainly untenable as applied to this consciousness, we are met by the rejoinder that they are not meant to be understood of any subjective or individual consciousness, but of a so-called universal or divine consciousness. It is not my purpose at this stage to discuss the satisfactoriness of this hypothetical divine epistemology as a metaphysic of existence, but I would point out that by this procedure, illegitimate as I consider it, the real question of epistemology is burked. That question is very fairly put by Professor Huxley in a page of his little book on Hume. In pursuance of a favourite line of thought, he is skilfully balancing Idealism and Materialism against one another in such a way as to leave both problematical, and in stating the case in favour of what he calls Idealism, he uses the following expression: "For any demonstration that can be given to the contrary effect, the 'collection of perceptions' which makes up my consciousness may be an orderly phantasmagoria generated by the Ego, unfolding its successive scenes on the background of the abyss of nothingness."[1] With Professor Huxley's own view we have nothing to do here, but simply with the statement quoted, namely, that there is no logically coercive proof of any real existence beyond the subjective consciousness. Idealism is used by Professor Huxley in its epistemological sense, and is equivalent with him to Solipsism. His position amounts to this: that reason does not force us to go beyond the circle of our own consciousness: all that is may be a skilfully woven system of my individual presentations and representations. This is the true question of epistemology; that, at least, which it has first to settle. But to judge from the writings of the neo-Kantians and

[1] *Hume* (English Men of Letters), pp. 80-81.

Hegelians, one would hardly gather that individual knowers existed at all. The subjective consciousness seems suppressed; they often speak as if knowledge were not a subjective process at all. In Hegel himself, just for this reason, there is no epistemology; we hear nothing of individuals, but only of the universal process in which objective thought comes to consciousness of itself.

Hegelianism, in fact, offers an eminent example of the confusion between Epistemology and Metaphysics on which I am dwelling. With Hegel the essence of the universe is thought here in the subject and thought there in the object; and there is some temptation therefore to think that this metaphysical identity absolves us from the epistemological inquiry. But that is not the case. However much the objective world and the individual knower may be identical in essence, the objective thought which he recognises is still trans-subjective to the individual knower, just as much beyond his individual consciousness, as if it were the crass matter of the Natural Dualist; and the question how we reach this trans-subjective, how we transcend the individual consciousness, has still to be faced. The epistemological dualism, in other words, remains in full force, and only if that is satisfactorily surmounted, can we have any guarantee for our metaphysical monism, for the asserted identity of thought and being. Far be it from me to say, however, that Hegel and the neo-Hegelians are the only sinners in this respect. If Hegel swamps Epistemology in Metaphysics, the Realism of Scottish philosophy often errs as much in an opposite direction. In answer to Hume it insists (most rightly, as I think, in principle, though not always happily in point of expression) upon an epistemological dualism of subject and object as the fundamental fact of knowledge. But when it proceeds forthwith to treat this

epistemological dualism of knowledge and reality as a metaphysical dualism between mind and matter, between two generically different substances, it falls at once into most unphilosophical crudities. Dualism in knowledge is no more a proof of metaphysical heterogeneity than identity of metaphysical essence in Hegel's sense can be taken as eliminating the epistemological problem.

The problem of knowledge and the Real, then, is the question which Epistemology has to face. As stated by Professor Huxley, and indeed as stated in any form, it is apt to appear fantastical and frivolous to the common-sense mind; but if it were so, it would hardly have formed the central problem of modern philosophy. I am convinced at least that unless it is probed to the bottom, we can have no clearness as to the foundations of knowledge and belief; and without such clearness we can hardly expect to make satisfactory progress in philosophy.

LECTURE II.

THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMOLOGY.

THE problem of epistemology arises from the very nature of knowledge. Knowledge implies a reference to that which is known, and which is therefore to be distinguished from the knowledge itself considered subjectively as an act or process of the being who knows. What is known, the object of knowledge, may be styled most generally Reality. Knowledge bears in its heart, in its very notion, this reference to a reality distinct from itself. No idealist will deny, at all events, that knowledge *seems* to us to carry this reference with it. Hume himself speaks of it as " the universal and primary opinion of all men," it is " a natural instinct or presupposition," [1] so that if its validity is not accepted, the *illusion* will at least require explanation. Knowledge as knowledge points beyond itself to a reality whose representation or symbol it is. This holds true, as a careful analysis would show, even in what is called self-knowledge, the reflective knowledge of one's own states, in which the act of knowledge and the object known might seem to fall together. But, without insisting at the outset on this refinement, let us take the general or typical case, in which the knowledge is knowledge of beings other than ourselves, a knowledge of the facts of the world around us. Here the very function of knowledge, as ordinarily understood, is to disclose to

[1] *Enquiry*, section 12.

one being the nature of beings and things with which he is in relation, but which are different; *i.e.*, numerically and existentially distinct from himself. One being or individual cannot go out of himself, so far as his being or existence is concerned. He is and remains himself so long as he exists at all. But though every individual, *quâ existent*, remains thus anchored upon himself—rooted to his own centre, to the locus, as it were, assigned him in the process of the universal life—yet by the influence of other realities upon him and the response of his own being to these influences—in other words, by means of his own subjective states, and without therefore performing the impossible feat of stepping out of himself—he becomes aware of other existences, or, as we say, he comes to know that other beings or things exist besides himself, and also what their nature is. *This knowledge, as knowledge, is necessarily subjective,*[1] for no being can be present *in existence* within another being. In existence things necessarily remain apart or distinct: we *can* know things, therefore, only by report, only by their effect upon us.

That, then, is the problem or crux of knowledge which has vexed philosophers. Knowledge is necessarily subjective, so far as it is state or process of the knowing being; but it as necessarily involves an objective reference. If it is not an illusion altogether, it is a knowledge of realities which are trans-subjective or extra-conscious; *i.e.*, which exist beyond and independently of the consciousness of the individual knowing them. But all through the modern period philosophers have been turning the subjectivity of knowledge against its objectivity, and in the last resort converting the very notion of knowledge into an argument against the possibility of knowledge. If they have not gone to this extreme length, the possibility of real knowledge has been an

[1] [Italics in the author's annotated copy.]

ever present difficulty to modern thought—a difficulty that has seemed to grow greater instead of less in the hands of successive thinkers, till it may be said since the time of Hume and Kant to have been the main subject of philosophical debate. Now, it can scarcely be doubted that in this respect philosophy has largely created the difficulties which it finds so hard to surmount, but at the same time we cannot wonder at or regret the time and labour expended on this question; for it is the business of philosophy to doubt wherever doubt is possible, and to probe its own doubts to the bottom, in order to discover whether they are really fatal to the faith we repose in the act of knowledge. A theory of knowledge or a philosophy of belief is a necessary preliminary of all scientific and metaphysical inquiry.

In endeavouring to establish such a theory, we must start from the ordinary consciousness. What does the plain man believe about perception and the real world of physical things? He believes that his senses, especially sight and touch, put him in immediate relation with real things. He has only to open his eyes or to stretch out his hand, and he is face to face or in actual contact with the realities themselves. The objects which he perceives are not dependent upon his perceiving them, which is a purely accidental fact both in their life-history and in his. Just as he himself existed as a real being before the act of perception, so they existed independently before he turned his eyes upon them, and they continue to exist after his vision is averted. He believes, in short, that he sees and touches the real thing as that exists in itself independent of perception. He draws no distinction between the existence of the thing in itself and its existence for him in the moment of perception. The appearance *is* the reality. "The vulgar," as Hume says, "confound perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct continued existence to

the very things they feel or see."[1] "'Tis certain," he says again, "that almost all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real body or material existence. 'Tis also certain that this very perception or object is supposed to have a continued uninterrupted being, and neither to be annihilated by our absence nor to be brought into existence by our presence."[2]

No doubt this is, as Hume says, the belief of "*the* vulgar"; it is what Mr Spencer calls Crude, and what other writers call naïve or uncritical, Realism. As such, it contains much that is untenable, and much that requires more careful sifting and definition. But what we have to note is that it is a primary, instinctive and irresistible belief of all mankind, nay of the whole animal creation. Hume himself characterises Realism as "a natural instinct or prepossession" which operates "without any reasoning or even almost before the use of reason."[3] Even the sceptic, he says again, "must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, though he cannot pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteemed it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasons and speculations."[4] It may be matter for consideration at a later stage whether the mere fact of this universal, primary and ineradicable belief is not itself an element in the problem; except on the hypothesis of universal irrationality may it not be argued that the provision of nature in this respect is hardly likely to be a carefully organised deception?

[1] *Treatise*, Part IV. section 2.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Enquiry*, section 12.
[4] *Treatise*, Part IV. section 2.

But here we are merely concerned with the *fact* of what Mr Spencer calls the priority of Realism. It cannot be too strongly insisted that in this respect Realism holds the field. As Mr Spencer puts it, "I see no alternative but to affirm that the thing primarily known, is not that a sensation has been experienced, but that there exists an outer object."[1] Mr Spencer's position here is not essentially different from that of Reid when he insists in opposition to Hume that we do not start with ideas or, as Hume calls them, perceptions—unrelated mental states—but with judgments. Judgment, he argues, is the primitive act of mind and a knowledge of sensations *per se* is only reached at a much later stage "by resolving and analysing a natural and original judgment." As I put it on a previous occasion, "we do not begin by studying the contents of our own minds and afterwards proceed by inference to realities beyond. We are never restricted to our own ideas, as ideas; from the first dawn of knowledge we treat the subjective excitation as the symbol or revealer to us of a real world."[2]

Mr Spencer, in the chapter from which I have quoted,[3] gives an admirable exposure of the fallacy which underlies the opposite view. "The error has been in confounding two quite distinct things—having a sensation, and being conscious of having a sensation." Certainly, sensations must be given as the conditions of perception or knowledge; they are unquestionably the immediate data upon which the perceptive judgment reposes. Mr Spencer, it is true, guided by his idea of evolution, projects his imagination into "the dark backward and abysm of time" and seems to teach that "the simple consciousness of sensation, uncomplicated by any con-

[1] *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. ii. p. 369.

[2] *Scottish Philosophy*, p. 103 (2nd ed.). [In the 4th ed. (p. 102), the phrase "as ideas" is altered to "as mental states."—Ed.]

[3] *Principles of Psychology*, Part VII. Ch. 6.

sciousness of subject or object, is primordial," and that as he puts it, " through immeasurably long and complex differentiations and integrations of such primordial sensations and derived ideas, there develops a consciousness of self and a correlative not-self." But, as he adds, " it is one thing to say that in such a creature the sensations are the things originally given, and it is quite another thing to say these sensations can be known *as sensations* by such a creature." Such an argument " identifies two things which are at the very opposite extremes of the process of mental evolution." It is, in fact, only the psychologist who in his reflective analysis is conscious of sensations as sensations distinguished from and referred to their external causes. And we have here an example of what Professor James has dubbed " the psychologist's fallacy *par excellence* "—the confusion by the psychologist of his own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. Mr Spencer lays his finger most effectively upon the fallacy in the present case. But for myself, I question whether he does not go too far in admitting an undifferentiated sensuous consciousness as the primordial fact in the evolutionary process. It is in vain that we project our imaginations towards such a hypothetical beginning : it has nothing in common with what we understand by knowledge, and is therefore perfectly unrealisable by us. Being thus totally heterogeneous, it cannot form a step on the road to knowledge : I mean that it does not in any sense pave the way for it or render the emergence of cognition easier to conceive. Whether we interpolate this hypothetical sensuous consciousness as a time-prius or not, the appearance of perception or cognitive consciousness—the consciousness we know—remains equally an unexplained beginning, an absolute *μετάβασις εἰς ἀλλὸ γένος*.

It is not an essential point in our present argument,

but I am disposed to question whether any animal consciousness can be fairly described as a "simple consciousness of sensation"—that is to say, a state of pure internality, of diffused inward feeling, without a germinal consciousness of distinction between the feeling self and its surroundings. There is no question here of the developed or reflective[1] consciousness of Ego and non-Ego, but only of that animal awareness of objective facts which is seen in reaction upon stimuli and in purposive adaptation of act to circumstance. It is in action that we have the surest clue to the early stages of the animal and the human consciousness. Knowledge in such creatures exists simply in a practical reference. Consciousness would be a useless luxury unless as putting them in relation to the surrounding world and enabling them to adapt their actions to its varying stimuli. In point of fact, this practical consciousness, so far as we can judge, accompanies animal life from the outset. At least we cannot even imagine a consciousness without the objective reference—*i.e.*, without a felt distinction between the feeling subject and an object which it feels—something different, of whose presence to it it is aware. Once more let it be repeated, we are not speaking of the reflective realisation of those distinctions which comes so much later—which comes to the non-human animal not at all, and to human beings only intermittently; we are speaking of the instinctive or direct consciousness which all living creatures possess (in greater or less degree) for the practical ends of living, to enable them to respond to external stimulus and to adapt themselves to their surroundings. Put on this broad ground, it may be said that the *reaction* of the sensitive organism is the practical recognition of an independent object—it is the first or earliest form which that recognition takes.

[1] ["reflected" in the original.—ED.]

Further, there seems no reason to doubt that it is the contrast of activity and passivity—of resistance encountered and instinctive effort put forth against the resistance, to which may be added the contrast of want and satisfaction, of restless craving and the stilling of appetite by its appropriate gratification—it is these contrasts which awaken and intensify the distinction between the sensitive subject and objects independent of itself. The infant whose pains of deprivation are ended by the presentation of the mother's breast, the snail which puts forth its horns and comes in contact with an object in its path,[1] are alike in a fair way towards realising the existence of independent objects. It may be taken as pretty generally acknowledged that the consciousness of independent externality is given chiefly in the sense of effort and the phenomena of resisted energy. Here we see the category of causality, as it were, alive before us in instinctive action. Hence, as Mr Spencer says, "the root-conception of existence beyond consciousness becomes that of resistance *plus* some force which the resistance measures."[2] Of such a simple quasi-reflex character are the experiences which "yield subject and object as independent existences."[3] We do not require to go for them to the rational consciousness of man. In reacting upon a stimulus, the sensitive subject projects or reflects its feeling out, interprets it as the sign of an independent somewhat. In this sense we may agree with Mr Spencer that "the Realistic interpretation of our states of consciousness" is "deep as the very structure of the nervous system, and cannot for an instant be actually expelled";[4] or, as Professor Laurie puts it, the affirmation of independent externality is a necessary reflex movement of

[1] An example of Professor Laurie's.
[2] *Principles of Psychology*, Part VII. Ch. 18.
[3] *Ibid.*, Ch. 13.
[4] *Ibid.*, Ch. 14.

sense. "By a *reflex* action of consciousness things are constituted objects and external. This movement, moreover, lies in the heart of consciousness; and through it alone is consciousness possible." [1]

This being so, then—Realism being incontestably prior—philosophical reflection supervenes, and subjects this primitive and instinctive consciousness to a sceptical criticism, which aims either at establishing some form of Idealism or at reducing us to complete Scepticism. This criticism, as already remarked, is both salutary and necessary; for if Realism is to justify itself it must do so at the bar of Reason: it cannot save itself by a mere appeal to instinctive or unreasoned belief, especially when that belief may be seen at a glance to involve a number of unscientific and untenable assertions. Reflective criticism brings to light important and undeniable distinctions which are ignored in the primitive realistic beliefs of the race. The philosophical thinker will avail himself gladly of these distinctions to purge the crude or instinctive doctrine of the unscientific elements which bring it into discredit, while at the same time he endeavours, in view of this idealistic criticism, to state in an unexceptionable form the indestructible elements of truth which he believes the original belief to contain. In regard to this indestructible basis of truth he must meet the criticisms of the idealist by showing that Idealism as an epistemological doctrine *only exists as a criticism of Realism*, and derives any plausibility it possesses from the surreptitious or unobserved importation into its statement of our ineradicable realistic assumptions. Were it not for these assumptions the idealistic theory could not be stated in words. Idealism is really an attempt to obliterate the distinction between knowing and being, which it finds established in common belief and in the realistic theories. The gist of episte-

[1] *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta*, p. 74 (2nd ed.).

mological Idealism is that the knowing[1] is the thing known; that being known to different consciousnesses is the only being or existence of the object; that cognitive states of a number of conscious beings exist, but that the 'it,' the object which we ordinarily suppose these cognitive states to refer to—which we suppose to be known by means of these cognitive states—is nothing beyond the cognitive states themselves.[2] Now on such a theory it is pretty evident that the distinction of Knowing and Being, of independent subject and object, would never have arisen, and would not have required therefore to be explained away. Hence, it may be repeated, Idealism exists only as a criticism of Realism. When developed itself as a substantive theory, it leads to a view of existence which is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the doctrine in question. By such a line of argument Realism is left in possession of the field, and a critical or carefully guarded Realism is established as the only satisfactory, indeed the only sane, theory of knowledge.

The considerations on which a sceptical idealism, or an idealistic scepticism, founds are sufficiently obvious, and by no means profound. As Hume puts it, the "universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the *slightest* philosophy."[3] Possibly, therefore (to adapt Bacon's maxim), if a little philosophy inclines men's minds to idealism, depth in philosophy may bring them back to Realism. "The slightest philosophy teaches us," Hume proceeds, "that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object."

[1] [state of knowing.]

[2] Obviously on such a hypothesis the designation 'cognitive' applied to the states is no longer appropriate, since they have ceased to be the instruments of knowledge.

[3] *Enquiry*, section 12.

In other words, and to put it more modernly, the special arguments by which idealism is enforced are drawn from the physiology of the sense-organs. The general position on which it rests is that, physiologically, knowledge has for its immediate conditions certain processes in every organism, and, psychologically, knowledge consists of certain subjective experiences *in me* (whatever that may precisely mean, some denying the *me* and asserting simply the subjective experiences as such). As Hume says, we never get "any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object." Consciousness, as such, is shut up to its own contents or constituents. What transcends consciousness—*i.e.*, any existence which is other than consciousness cannot be *in* consciousness; albeit the ordinary naïve idea seems to be that consciousness, as it were, goes out of itself, and actually lays hold of things, or throws its net over them. In literal fact, however, this is not so. The psychical experiences which constitute knowledge are one thing, and, according to the doctrine of a Realism that understands itself, the thing known is another. Their distinction is undeniable, though an ill-advised Realism and an ill-advised Idealism alike try to undermine it or to explain it away. In fact, as we saw at the outset of this paper, the distinction may be said to be involved in the very nature or notion of knowledge. Knowledge means nothing if it does not mean the relation of two factors, knowledge *of* an object *by* a subject. But knowledge is not an entity stretching across, as it were, from subject to object, and uniting them; still less is knowledge the one reality of which subject and object are two sides or aspects. Knowledge is an activity, an activo-passive experience of the subject, whereby it becomes aware of what is not itself. The cognitive state is thus related psychologically to the subject whose state it is, and epistemologically to the object of which it is the know-

ledge. Epistemologically there is a union of subject and object : the knower and what he knows are in a sense, as Aristotle says, one. But ontologically, or as a matter of existence, they remain distinct—the one here and the other there—and nothing avails to bridge this chasm. The chasm, it is true, is not an absolute one, otherwise knowledge would be forever impossible. Across the inane there is no bridge. Both subject and object are members of one world. That may be taken as the ultimate and unavoidable presupposition. But separation and difference are the very conditions of knowledge ; if it were not for the difference where would be the need of knowledge ? Each thing would actually *be* everything else, or rather ' each ' would be an impossible conception. The ὁμοῦ πάντα of Anaxagoras would be realised in a more intimate and literal sense than its author ever imagined ; all things would be together, an indistinguishable conglomerate of mutual interpenetration. It is individuation, distinctness in existence, that calls for knowledge and gives it scope. Feelings, images, ideas, beliefs, volitions—these are the components of consciousness, they have an existence of their own, but it is a mode of existence generically distinct from that we attribute to things as real beings, whether material or spiritual. By *means of* certain of these conscious facts—those called cognitive—the being in whom they occur believes that he is made aware of the existence, nature and actions of existences other than himself. But he cannot by any possibility step out of himself and pass over into these other existences, or draw them into himself. In this respect Matthew Arnold's lines are as true as they are poignantly beautiful :—

> Yes ! in the sea of life enisled,
> With echoing straits between us thrown,
> Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
> We mortal millions live *alone*.
> The islands feel the enclasping flow,
> And then their endless bounds they know.

But, as I have said, to wish to overpass these limits is to rebel against the very nature of selfhood, and epistemologically to kick against the very notion of knowledge. That very self which is a principle of isolation in existence is the principle on which all communion, all fellowship rests, alike in knowing and in feeling. But knowledge is not a fusion of knower and known, nor is it all explained by being regarded as a kind of physical continuity or immediate contact between the knowing subject and the object known. Though science may prove all perception to be dependent on the existence of a physical medium between the object perceived and the sense-organs, thus reducing all the senses to varieties of touch, the psychical facts which result are yet totally different, and as it were apart from the series of physical movements from which they result. Physical nearness or remoteness does not affect the epistemological question. The table which is in immediate contact with my organism is as completely and inexorably outside the world of my consciousness as the most distant ' star and system ' visible upon the bosom of the night. Though I press my hand against it, it is no more *present in* consciousness than is the friend on the other side of the globe whose image rises at the moment in my mind. There are in fact two worlds, and to that fundamental antithesis we return. To the one world belong, in Berkeley's language though not in Berkeley's sense, all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, to the other the thoughts and feelings of the individual who is consciously aware of this system of things in which he himself draws his breath and has his place. To use the well-worn words, there is the macrocosm and there is the microcosm. Ontologically or metaphysically, the microcosm must necessarily be viewed as a dependent part or function of the mighty whole ; but epistemologically the microcosm rounds itself off within itself, and constitutes in perfect strictness a little world of its own.

The world of consciousness, on the one hand, and the (so far hypothetical) world of real things, on the other, are two mutually exclusive spheres. No member of the real sphere can intrude itself into the conscious sphere, nor can consciousness go out into the real sphere and as it were lay hold with hands upon a real object. The two worlds are, to this extent and in this sense, totally disparate.

As soon as this is clearly recognised—and as Hume says, no very profound philosophical reflection is needed to reach this stage—it becomes evident that Realism cannot be maintained as a philosophical hypothesis in the uncritical form which it assumes in the mind of the plain man. And so far as the Realism of Scottish philosophy is merely an uncritical reassertion of our primitive beliefs, it is not to be wondered at that succeeding philosophers have so frequently treated their speculations as a negligible quantity. Immediacy must be given up before any tenable theory of perception and any philosophical doctrine of Realism can be established. The truth of the idealistic contentions must be acknowledged. It must be granted that in passing from the real to the ideal there is a solution of continuity, a leap, a passage from one world to another. The world of real things is transcendent with reference to the world of consciousness ; the world of objects (as we customarily, though ambiguously, speak of it) is trans-subjective or extra-conscious. In other words, it falls absolutely outside of, or beyond, the little world of consciousness, and the conscious being cannot in the nature of things overleap or transcend itself. The knowledge which we call most immediate or direct is only relatively so ; so far as it is knowledge, it is mediate, or the result of a process. Knowledge puts a man in relation with things through the medium of his perceptions, but his perceptions are not the things ; he does not pass over into the

things, nor do the things pass over into him. At no point can the real world, as it were, force an entrance into the closed sphere of the ideal; nor does that sphere open at any point to receive into itself the smallest atom of the real world, *quâ real*, though it has room within itself *ideally* for the whole universe of God.

A critical Realism must start then with the acknowledgment of this fact. This is the truth which both Locke and Kant had got firm hold of. It is the basis of Locke's hypothetical Dualism, and, so far as our present argument is concerned, Kant's relativistic phenomenalism with its inferential background of things-in-themselves is substantially a similar theory with the sceptical suggestions of Lockianism unfortunately emphasised. From Locke and Kant as centres the epistemological speculations of modern philosophy may be conveniently viewed. Now, unquestionably, the transcendence of the real does give scepticism its opportunity. Scepticism takes up its position in the gap thus apparently made between the ideal and the real, and asks how we know that we know the *real* things, what assurance have we that the world of real things is as it appears to us to be, nay, in the last resort, what assurance have we that there is a world of real things at all. This sceptical insinuation requires to be fairly met, for, however little it avails to shake our practical certainty, the theoretic possibility of such a doubt lies in the very nature of the case. So long as the knower and that which he knows are not identical, so long is it possible that his knowledge may not be true—*i.e.*, may not correctly render the nature of what is. Hence a succession of attempts to dispense with the otherness or transcendency of the object known. Thus we find Berkeley inveighing against this "groundless and absurd notion" as "the very root of scepticism."[1] The arguments used

[1] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, section 86.

by sceptics in all ages, he says, depend on the supposition of external objects.[1] The temptation accordingly is to abolish the independent world of real existences altogether, and to manipulate our perceptions or ideas in such a way as to make them stand in its place. This is the plan we find adopted by Berkeley partially, and in more thorough-going fashion by Hume. Berkeley and Hume have been modernised by Mill. It was this sceptical development of Locke's "way of ideas" that drove some Scotch philosophers to seek refuge in the theory or no theory of Immediate Perception. By thus putting the mind with its nose up against things (to use a homely but graphic phrase of Von Hartmann's) they sought to cut off the very possibility of doubt. But this is to cut the Gordian knot in an inadmissible way. The doubt has been raised and is plainly possible. This is fully admitted and stated with admirable clearness by Hamilton, even while insisting most strenuously upon the testimony of consciousness to a duality of existence. "The facts of consciousness," he says, "are to be considered in two points of view, either as evidencing their own ideal or phenomenal existence, or as evidencing the objective existence of something else beyond them. A belief in the former is not identical with a belief in the latter. The one cannot, the other may possibly be refused. In the case of a common witness we cannot doubt the fact of his testimony as emitted, but we can always doubt the truth of that which his testimony avers. So it is with consciousness."[2] Hence to shout Immediate Perception is no reply. It is to seek an imaginary security by shutting one's eyes to the danger, instead of boldly facing it. A more legitimate method is to show the inadequacy of the idealistic substitutes for a trans-subjective real world, to show,

[1] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, section 87.
[2] *Lectures on Metaphysics*, I. p. 271.

as I said before, that it is only in virtue of their borrowings from Realism that they can be stated and discussed. This indirect proof, proceeding by the exclusion of other possible theories, is declared by Hartmann[1] to be the only way in which a critical Realism can be firmly established; or, to put it otherwise, the doubt must be redargued by showing its ultimate scope. This is to a certain extent what Reid does, and it is in his criticisms of the ideal theory conceived in this spirit, and not in his dogmatic assertion of immediate perception, that we must recognise his philosophical merit and his philosophical importance.

[1] See his *Kritische Grundlegung des transcendentalen Realismus*, and his *Grundproblem der Erkenntnisstheorie*, *passim*.

LECTURE III.

EPISTEMOLOGY IN LOCKE AND KANT.

LOCKE's hypothetical Realism or problematical Dualism is, as such, a sounder theory than the vastly more acute and subtle theories of his critics. But in Locke's hands the theory is stated in such a way that Berkeley and Hume become logical necessities; if they had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent them. Locke's rudimentary psychology, his inextricable commingling of psychological, epistemological and metaphysical questions, are mainly to blame for this. Above all must be signalised the atomic sensationalism which he places in the forefront of his theory, though he himself is the last man to abide consistently by it. Readers of Green's massive Introduction to Hume will remember the constantly reiterated criticism that Locke habitually uses idea or simple idea as equivalent to "idea of a thing." The simple idea, says Green, is thus represented as involving a theory of its own cause; it is not a mere sensation, but the idea of a quality of a thing; it is referred to a permanent real world of which it is representative or symbolic. Beyond doubt this is precisely what Locke does. One has only to open the Essay to find Locke continually passing from the one order of phrases to the other. "The senses," he says, "let in particular ideas" and furnish the yet empty cabinet; but Locke says with equal readiness they "convey into the

mind, several distinct perceptions of things." The particular ideas bare of all reference, a drip, drip of discontinuous sensations, so many present existences in consciousness, each testifying to itself alone, are transformed without a qualm into " ideas of things without." Locke apparently does not see the difference between the two sets of statements. But if the difference is *ignored* in Locke, we find it explicitly denied by Hume that there is any difference : " To form the idea of an object and to form an idea simply is the same thing ; the reference of the idea to the object being an extraneous denomination, of which in itself it bears no mark or character." [1] Green, I take it, does not mean that Locke was wrong in taking up this second position, and in beginning his theory of knowledge, not with a simple idea of sensation—a mere sensation—but with a judgment in which a causal reference and the distinction of self and not self are implicit. Green's point is that Locke on his own avowed principles is not entitled to the second and sounder position, a position which may be shown to involve many consequences which no sensationalistic philosophy can admit. Green seeks to pin Locke down to his sensationalistic formulæ, interpreted with the utmost rigour of the law, in the light of Hume's deductions, whereas it is apparent on every page of the Essay that Locke never dreamt of their bearing such a meaning. Hence it is that Green is less than just to Locke and deals only with his inconsistencies. Professor Campbell Fraser's reconstruction is far truer to his spirit and intentions. In truth Green's interest is not with Locke's theory as a whole, but with English sensationalism as that first disclosed its features in certain definitions and statements of the *Essay*. Locke's first way of stating the case implies that false substantiation of the bare particulars of sense which issued in the

[1] *Treatise*, I. p. 327 (Green's edition).

agnostic sensational atomism of Hume. It leads directly to the ideal theory and the so-called doctrine of representative perception in the objectionable form in which it is attacked by Reid. "It is evident," says Locke, "the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them." So far he is on perfectly safe ground, except that the word 'intervention' has already a subtle *suggestio falsi*. But the formula which Locke places at the very opening of Book IV. (and which therefore naturally takes a prominent place in the mind of the student as determining the sense of what follows) is far from being equally unobjectionable; though the difference may seem so slight as to be almost imperceptible, and the danger that lurks in it is probably only apparent to us in the light of subsequent events. "Since the mind," says Locke, "in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no *other immediate object* but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate, it is evident that *our knowledge is only conversant* about them."—So, again, in the opening of Chapter II., he repeats that all our knowledge consists "in the view the mind has of its own ideas." Now it is one thing to say that the mind knows things only by the intervention or by means of the ideas it has of them, and another thing to say that ideas constitute the "immediate object" of the mind, and that "our knowledge is only conversant about" ideas. The last is so far from being true that it might be more correct to say that our knowledge is never conversant about ideas—ideas never constitute the object of the mind at all—unless in the reflective analysis of the psychologist. Otherwise, our knowledge is always conversant about realities of some kind; to say that we know by means of ideas is simply to say that we know; but ideas are naught except as signs of a further reality, and from the first they are taken not *per se*, but in this symbolic

capacity. As Locke himself puts it in his excellent chapter on the Reality of Human Knowledge, "It is the knowledge of things that is only to be prized. . . . If our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them and reach no farther . . . our most serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of a crazy brain."—Locke's shifting statements show us, indeed, "the psychologist's fallacy" in full blast. If we once yield ourselves to his first line of thought; if we admit a start from ideas *per se*, a custom-woven, private, ideal phantasmagoria will be our only substitute for the common or objective world of real persons and things. We get a theory of Representative Perception that is totally indefensible; the ideas are taken as really intervening *between* the mind and things; the mechanism of knowledge is converted into an elaborate means of defeating its own purpose. It becomes a *tertium quid*, a kind of screen which effectually shuts off the knower from what he desires to know. We are supposed, first, to know the ideas on their own account as mental states or mental entities, and subsequently, by a process of conscious inference, to refer them to real causes and archetypes. If knowledge at any stage did terminate thus in the ideas themselves, it is difficult to see either what considerations could suggest to us the step beyond their charmed circle or on what grounds it could be justified. This is in fact the point of the idealistic and sceptical criticism which Berkeley and Hume brought to bear upon Locke's hypothetical Realism. Berkeley, as Green puts it, tries to avoid Locke's inconsistencies by dropping the reference to transcendent real objects altogether: for idea of an object he deliberately substitutes idea simply. To him the ideas *are* the objects, sensible things are clusters or collections of ideas—actual and possible perceptions of intelligent beings. "The table I write on exists, that is, I see and feel it;

and if I were out of my study, I should say it existed—meaning thereby that, if I was in my study, I might perceive it or that some other spirit actually does perceive it." In his recurring phrase, the being of things "is to be perceived or known," or, as he puts it even more strikingly, "the object and the sensation are the same thing." "An idea can be like nothing but an idea" and the supposition of independent originals of our ideas is gratuitous. "If there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it." The supposition of such bodies is, in short, not only "groundless and absurd," but "is the very root of scepticism; for so long as men thought that real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth *real* as it was *conformable to real things*, it follows that they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be *known* that the things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind?"[1] As Hume clinched the matter afterwards: The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. Hence Berkeley proceeds, "All this sceptical cant follows from our supposing a difference between things and ideas. . . . The arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects."[2] He is resolved himself to make a clear riddance of all such sceptical cant. On Berkeley's principles there is no opening for doubt either as to the existence of a real world or as to the truth of our knowledge of it, because the knowledge, the immediate conscious fact, *is* the existence and (along with a possibility of similar conscious facts) the whole

[1] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, section 86. [Also sections 3-8 and 20.—ED.]
[2] *Ibid.*, section 87.

of the existence. "That what I see, hear and feel doth exist, *that is to say, is perceived by me*, I no more doubt than I do of my own being." Unquestionably not, for if existence be understood in this sense, the two facts are simply identical. Doubt cannot touch the existence of a present feeling while it is being felt. But if I thus reduce the existence of a permanent external world to unreferred feelings, Hume is, of course, at hand to apply the same argument to "my own being" which Berkeley here and elsewhere treats as a fundamental certainty. These same perceptions or ideas whose presence in consciousness I have asserted to *be* the existence of sensible things, constitute the evidence of my own existence: in fact they *are* my existence. As Berkeley himself says, "the duration of any finite spirit must be measured by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind; . . . and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the *existence* of a spirit from its *cogitation* will, I believe, find it no easy task."[1] My own being, in fact, as something more than the existence of my present conscious states, will be found by a sound philosophy to rest ultimately on a process of rational construction substantially similar to that which establishes the existence of an independent *object* of knowledge. Hence an Idealism or Spiritualism which does not guarantee the rights of the object is a lop-sided theory which has no defence against the further inroads of its own logic. Put forward as a short and easy method with the sceptics, Berkeleianism only preluded to the sceptical nihilism of Hume.

Humianism, so far as that is necessary to our argument, may best be dealt with in the modernised version of Mill. But before doing so, it will be instructive to trace the very similar process of criticism by which the realistic

[1] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, section 98.

elements were eliminated from the original theory of Kant, and we shall see how their elimination leads to similar sceptical results.

It is important to observe that Kant's starting-point is a hypothetical dualism in many respects similar to that of Locke. Our knowledge refers to things which are other than our knowledge and may be said, in that sense, to lie beyond it. This further reference (which we have some reason to believe essential to the very nature of knowledge) Kant certainly starts with; and whatever results his theory leads him to as regards the *kind* of knowledge we have of things, he never loses hold of what he calls the thing-in-itself as that which alone gives meaning to the cognitive effort. Our knowledge of things may be imperfect and coloured by the infusion of subjective elements, but if there were no 'things-in-themselves,' the whole process of knowledge would be a completely unmotived excursion into the void. Hence, as Kant puts it in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique*, with his whole system explicitly in view, "while we surrender the power of cognising, we still reserve the power of thinking objects as things-in-themselves. For otherwise we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance without anything that appears—which would be absurd." In other words, our cognitions may be *Erscheinungen*, merely phenomenal, but as phenomena—as cognitions—they imply real objects, of which they are the cognitions. It is, of course, the peculiarity of the Kantian scheme, that our knowledge is so organised as to defeat its own purpose and cut us off from a knowledge of things as they really are. So far as our knowledge of it is concerned, the thing-in-itself shrinks, therefore, for Kant into a mere unknown somewhat; but in that capacity it remains as the necessary presupposition of the knowing process.

It would be superfluous to multiply quotations in support of a position which even those who try to explain it away must admit to have been held by Kant. I will, therefore, quote only one typical passage from the *Prolegomena* in which he elaborately distinguishes his own doctrine from that of Idealism :—

" Idealism consists in the assertion that there are no other than thinking beings ; that the other things which we believe ourselves to perceive are only ideas in thinking beings—ideas to which in fact there is no correspondent object outside of or beyond the thinking beings. I, on the contrary, say, Things are given to us as objects of our senses, external to us ; but of what they may be in themselves we know nothing, knowing only their appearances—that is, the ideas which they cause in us by affecting our senses. Accordingly I certainly admit that they are bodies external to us—that is, things which, although wholly unknown to us as regards what they may be in themselves, we yet know through the ideas which their influence upon our sensibility supplies us with, and to which we give the appellation body : which word signifies, therefore, only the appearance of that to us unknown, but not the less real, object. Can this be called Idealism ? Surely it is precisely the opposite." He declares roundly elsewhere " that it never entered his head to doubt the existence of independent things (*Sachen*)." Kant (in the passage quoted and elsewhere) assumes independent things not only as existent, but as the trans-subjective cause of our sense-affections. How else, he says, could the knowing faculty be roused to exercise, if not by objects which affect our senses ? The position is to Kant so much a matter of course that he does not stop to argue it. And so it remained to the end. To interpret such statements as preliminary or provisional on Kant's part is completely unwarranted. If they had been a piece of exoteric condescension or

accommodation to the untrained minds of his readers—if he had been merely educating these readers up to a point of view which would transform their whole conception of the universe and render the thing-in-itself an unnecessary adjunct—then Kant must have given us some hint at least of this pedagogic use of language, instead of leaving such expressions staring at us from page after page of his works in a perfectly unqualified way. They appear not only in works written while he is supposed to have been working his way towards his own deeper view, but are to be found quite as unambiguously in writings composed long after his whole scheme lay clearly outlined before his mind. A few statements [1] may certainly be pointed to, mostly obscure in their drift and phraseology, which, *if they stood by themselves*, might be interpreted in an idealistic sense. But when they have to be placed against the mass of counter-evidence—the numberless explicit assertions of the realistic position and the vehement disclaimers of Idealism—which may be quoted from Kant's writings, it is manifest that the Idealism that seems to the eyes of later-born critics to shimmer in the words was not present to Kant in writing them, and that, whatever their meaning may be, an interpretation must be sought not inconsistent with the fundamental Realism of the authentic Kantian philosophy, whether that is formulated in the first edition or the second, in the *Prolegomena* or in Kant's express statements in later years. Of these last I will only refer to his rejoinder to Eberhardt in 1790, the year of the *Critique of Judgment*, and his public declarations in regard to Fichte and his

[1] The chief passages that seem opposed to a realistic interpretation occur in the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena in the first *Critique*; but Kant is there speaking in another reference. He is speaking not of the existence of things-in-themselves, but of a non-sensuous intuition of them. Besides, his subsequent declarations are sufficient to show that they are not intended to throw doubt on the existence and causal activity of things-in-themselves.

system in the year 1799. Publicly invited by Fichte to disclain the derivation of sensation from the impression of things-in-themselves, the aged philosopher hastened to disown the Fichtean idealism which he characterised in the newspaper as a pure logic from which it was a vain hope ever to extract a real object. The *Wissenschaftslehre*, he had said in a letter to a friend the year before, impressed him "like a kind of ghost." "The mere self-consciousness, or, to be more correct, the mere form of thought without matter—consequently without the reflection having anything before it to which it could be applied—makes a queer impression upon the reader. When you think you are going to lay hold on an object, you lay hold on yourself instead; in fact the groping hand grasps only itself."

It may seem strange that a system with such a firm realistic basis should have been the parent of so many idealisms, whether we look to the constructive Idealism of his immediate successors, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, to English Neo-Hegelianism or to the sceptical and positivistic idealism of many German Neo-Kantians. But the reason is not far to seek. If Kant starts from, or implies throughout, a hypothetical dualism of the Lockian type, he likewise accepts in the most unqualified way the doctrine which we found in Locke and Hume of the subjectivity of knowledge—the necessary limitation of the mind to its own ideas. This doctrine we saw to be true in what it affirms; it forms, indeed, the first step in philosophical reflection. Consciousness cannot, in the realm of fact or existence, pass beyond itself; its own states are, therefore, all that is immediately present to or *in* the mind. But if it be forthwith concluded from this, that it is impossible by means of certain facts in my consciousness indirectly to reach, or in other words to *know*, a world of other facts beyond my consciousness, we are arguing with more haste than

caution. The two propositions, at all events, do not mean the same thing. That knowledge is, and must be, a subjective process is not of itself sufficient to discredit its results and stamp its efforts in advance as unavailing. Yet historically the two statements are generally found together, as if they were two sides of the same truth: knowledge is subjective, *therefore* it can never give us the object as it really is. So it was with Hume, and so it is with Kant.

By Kant the position is not usually stated quite so broadly. He does not usually say in so many words that, because knowledge is subjective, it can bring us no true report of real objects. To Kant it is the sensuous or receptive character of our perception that invalidates it. Our perception is derivative; it depends for its matter upon an affection of our sensibility by the object. This is what Kant constantly emphasises as stamping our knowledge with phenomenality. Sensations are subjective affections which nowise express or reveal the nature of the object but only its relation to us. As the sun melts wax (to use an example of Locke's), so the thing produces a certain effect upon my sensibility: I am internally modified in a certain way. But such a modification of *my* nature, however it may be set up in me by the thing, cannot possibly reveal the nature of the thing as it is in itself. In Kant's own words, we know "only the mode in which our senses are affected by an unknown something" (*Werke*, IV. 63). "Supposing us to carry our empirical perception even to the very highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby advance a step nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things-in-themselves. For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of our own mode of perception, that is, of our sensibility" (III. 73). "It is incomprehensible," he explains elsewhere (IV. 31), "how the perception even of a present object should

give me a knowledge of that thing as it is in itself, seeing that its properties cannot migrate or wander over (*hinüberwandern*) into my presentative faculty."

This is further emphasised by the contrast, which Kant again and again recurs to, between our sensuous or receptive intelligence (*intellectus ectypus, derivativus*) and a creative, or as he otherwise terms it, a perceptive understanding (*intellectus archetypus, originarius*). The latter, he explains in the celebrated letter to Marcus Herz, must be conceived as all activity or spontaneity; its ideas, therefore, will have creative efficiency. They will not be passively related to foreign objects; they will themselves *be* the objects, and such a being's knowledge would, of course, be entirely *a priori*, as the world known would be entirely self-produced. In complete contrast with such an intelligence, we may conceive a being entirely passive or recipient in its relation to the object. In this case, the ideas of the subject would be altogether empirical or *a posteriori*, due to piecemeal communication from the side of the object. And, as we have already heard Kant say, they would in such a case give only the way in which the subject is affected by the object—only certain 'passions' or sensuous modifications of the subject, accompanied by a causal reference to an (otherwise unknown) object.

Now, according to Kant, the human mind is neither purely active nor purely passive; human knowledge is a compound of receptivity and spontaneity. Kant assumes, on the evidence of mathematics and pure physics, that part of our knowledge possesses universality and necessary validity, and, as universality and necessity cannot be yielded by sense, that the principles of such knowledge must be *a priori*, drawn in the act of knowledge from the nature of the mind itself. Hence it comes that the crucial question for Kant is, Granted these *a priori* principles, these notions of the under-

standing, how can they apply to objects which are given independently of them? If our mode of perception were intellectual or spontaneous throughout, creating its objects whole (both form and matter), there would, of course, be no such difficulty. But our perception being sensuous, dependent for its matter upon foreign objects that exist in their own right, what guarantee have we that ideas which have their source in the mind may be validly applied to independent objects? To the question as thus put there is but one answer—we have no guarantee at all. Kant's way out of the difficulty, therefore, was, in effect, to renounce the attempt to know the real objects and to rest content with the subjective modifications of his own sensibility. That these *a posteriori* subjective affections should range themselves under the *a priori* forms of sense and understanding no longer presents any difficulty; on the contrary, it is obvious that the structure of the mind must impress itself on whatever it receives into itself. This fusion of *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements yields us the so-called objects of sense—the subjective objects, the phenomena or appearances in us—to which Kant applies the term experience, and to which he limits the scope of our cognition.

It will be seen from what has been said that it was not primarily the subjective origin of the *a priori* principles that led Kant to pronounce our knowledge merely phenomenal. It is rather to our sensuous or receptive attitude in cognition that the phenomenalistic taint is due. It is due to this fundamental characteristic of human intelligence, rather than to any defect inherent in themselves, that the categories are strictly limited to a phenomenal or subjective world; they are empty, as Kant says, without the filling of sense. But though Kant's phenomenalism has thus its roots in his view of the *a posteriori* even more than in his account of the *a priori*, his theory of the *a priori* is unquestionably

what gives his system its distinctive character. But for mathematics and physics and Hume's sceptical analysis of necessary truth, Kant might have remained content with a theory like Locke's. Locke gives a substantially similar account of *a posteriori* knowledge, but the sceptical implications of 'the theory of ideas' have not yet developed themselves. The connection is closer between the ideas and their real causes or prototypes—which Locke, indeed, believes them faithfully to represent, so far at least, as the primary qualities are concerned. The elaboration of the *a priori* element by Kant, and the prominence given to it in the constitution of the so-called object of sense, inevitably widens the gulf between ideas and things, between the phenomenon and the thing-in-itself. The phenomenal object, drawing so many of its determinations from the subject, becomes detached from the object whose appearance it is supposed to be, but which, be it observed, it no longer represents. It becomes a satellite of the mind, a mental object. And eventually, under cover of the ambiguous terms 'object' and 'experience,' it assumes a quasi-independence of the mind also, and is then ready to do duty for the real things of science and common life.

We need not wonder, then, that in the course of the exposition, the thing-in-itself, the transcendent cause of our experience, falls into the background. It falls into the background not because it is any the less supposed to be there, but because Kant is not interested in the particular matter of sense of which it is the source and explanation. He is altogether absorbed in vindicating, in view of Hume, the universal and necessary elements of experience. He has to show how by the aid of certain mentally supplied principles of synthesis—and only by their aid—the discontinuous and unconnected particulars of sense are worked up into 'experience-objects,' and, generally, into an experience-cosmos in space and

time. The deduction or exposition of this *a priori* system may be said to constitute Kant's whole industry in the *Critique*. The *a posteriori* element, though equally necessary to experience as a living fact, he is content to refer to simply as *given*—given from another source, as he says somewhat curtly in the press of his investigation into the *a priori*. The infrequency of reference to this other source is the less to be wondered at, seeing that the thing-in-itself had become attenuated, under the influence of Kant's presuppositions, into no more than the unknown cause or correlate of our sense-impressions—"a notion so imperfect," according to Hume, "that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it."[1] As nothing could be said of the sense-matter until it was formed, the thing-in-itself seemed merely to furnish the prick of sense that set the *a priori* machinery in motion. Kant himself says in the Aesthetic, with a kind of naïve triumph, that the thing-in-itself is never asked for in experience. In short it is completely obscured, and its place practically taken, by the subjective or experience-object which Kant constructs, and which he interposes, as it were, between us and it.

It is high time, therefore, to inquire narrowly into the nature of this 'experience' which tends to swallow up everything else in Kant, and which, in the mouths of his more recent followers, becomes a magic and all-sufficing formula.

Experience is distinguished, on the one hand, from mere sensation. Kant holds, and rightly holds, that from particular impressions of passive sensation alone no knowledge could possibly arise. These sensations, if they exist, are unknowable; they become elements of knowledge only when actively seized and rationally interpreted by the mind. Knowledge implies, besides

[1] *Enquiry*, section 12.

the stimulus of sense, a nucleus of primitive judgments, which involve the basal category of cause and ultimately the whole structure of reason. If, therefore, sensation, or the sense-stimulus, be styled subjective or merely subjective, then the cognitions or perceptions[1] which are thus constituted out of the impressions by the *a priori* resources of the mind may be said to be, in comparison, objective—that is to say, they are not merely internal states of the subject, indistinguishably fused, as it were, in its inner life; they are objects or presentations which have a relative permanence, and which may be contemplated, so to speak, at arm's length. They are objective, however, only as thus compared with sensations (which may be hypothetically defined as the states of a being in which the contrast of subject and object has not emerged, and for which consequently the fact of knowledge does not yet exist). In themselves, as perceptions, they are still subjective, still modes of my consciousness. Their objectivity is an immanent or subjective objectivity, as compared with the transcendent or trans-subjective objectivity of independently existing things. Indeed, to call them objects is perhaps to invite misconception. These phenomenal objects are more probably described as percepts, and no percept carries me, so far as its own existence is concerned, beyond the ring-fence of the self. Whatever reference to a trans-subjective world my percepts may carry with them, they are, as percepts, in me; they are my ideas, in the wide Lockian sense of the word, my *Vorstellungen*, as Kant so often says. Adopting the favourite Kantian expression, we might say that experience, just because it is experienced, is *eo ipso* a subjective fact. Mediately, of course, my experience is the only means I possess of passing beyond my individual subjectivity

[1] Kant's distinction between cognitions and perceptions is not here in point.

to the trans-subjective universe of other men and things. But in its immediacy, as a fact of consciousness doubt of which is impossible, it cannot bridge the gulf between the subjective and the trans-subjective. The sceptical question would never have been asked, if trans-subjective reality were already present—immediately present in the heart of consciousness. But it is presuming too much upon the ambiguity of words to ask us to accept the immanent object as actually *being* the transcendent object—the real thing. The subjective object is certainly, like faith, the evidence of that trans-subjective world. It is, we may hold, the substantial and sufficient evidence, but the one is not the other. If the one were the other, doubt, as I have said, would be impossible and to lead evidence would be ridiculous.

Hence when Kant argues, as he so often does, that his system is immeasurably superior to the problematical Idealism of most philosophers, his speech bewrayeth him. His very insistence on the fact that, in his system, doubt of the existence of material things is impossible—that he is as certain of the existence of objects in space as he is of any fact of the internal sense—only proves that these material things in space are simply my spatially arranged perceptions. Space and all its contents, as he is so fond of saying, are only phenomena of my consciousness, only ideas in me. Kant's immediately known real things in space recall, in fact, Berkeley's very similar protestations that he is placing reality upon a firmer basis than ever before. Others may doubt whether matter exists or not; for his part, he has immediate certainty on the point. Berkeley plainly availed himself in this of something like a *double entendre*; he endeavoured to substitute the perception, or the object immediately present to consciousness, for the trans-subjective real of which it is the perception. But the trans-subjective to which all subjective facts refer

is not thus to be got rid of. Berkeley restores it in another form; Hume himself, in the *Enquiry*, seems inclined to leave it standing in the attenuated form of "a certain unknown, inexplicable something"; and in this shape it is retained by Kant as the thing-in-itself. For the counterstroke of all this somewhat mystifying talk on Kant's part about real things in space is his reminder that these objects are, after all, only phenomena in consciousness. Their reality is only empirical; and as the only empirical reality of which we can intelligibly speak is the process as it passes in my consciousness or yours, Kant stands practically on the same ground as Berkeley. The only difference between Berkeley's ideas of sense and Kant's empirically real phenomena lies in Kant's more adequate account of space and of the intellectual elements involved in perception. This difference is, of course, fundamental, and Kant's analysis may probably be used so as to make subjective idealism definitely untenable; but in such Kantian passages as those to which I have referred, it does not lift us at all beyond the Berkeleian standpoint.

I have just said that the only sense in which we can intelligibly speak of empirical reality is to designate the process as it passes in my consciousness or yours. But does Kant always use empirical reality and experience (*Erfahrung*) in this sense? Certainly he sometimes does, and perhaps always intended to do so—though good intentions cannot be credited in philosophy. In addition to many incidental statements, emphasising the subjective character of these so-called objects, reference may be made to a passage which has all the appearance of being a carefully weighed official declaration on the subject. I mean the sixth section of the Antinomy of Pure Reason, where Kant, according to the title, brings forward his "transcendental idealism as the key

to the solution of the cosmological dialectic." Here Kant repeats a great number of times and in the most explicit fashion this purely subjective and individualistic interpretation of experience. "It has been sufficiently proved in the *Aesthetic*," he says, "that everything which is perceived in space and time—all objects, therefore, of our possible experience—are nothing but phenomena, that is, mere ideas, which, as represented, that is to say, as extended beings or series of changes, have no self-subsistent existence beyond our thoughts. . . . The realist in a transcendental sense makes out of these modifications of our sensibility self-subsisting things—makes *mere ideas*, consequently, into things in themselves." But for transcendental idealism "space itself and time and all phenomena are not in themselves *things*. They are nothing but ideas, and cannot exist at all beyond our mind (*ausser unserem Gemüth*). . . . That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no man has ever perceived them, must certainly be allowed; but that only means that we might meet with them in the possible progress of experience; for everything is real that stands in one context with a perception according to laws of empirical progress. They are real, therefore, if they stand in an empirical connection with my actual consciousness, although that does not make them real in themselves, that is, apart from this progress of experience. . . . There is nothing really given us except the perception and the empirical progress from this perception to other possible perceptions. For in themselves phenomena, as mere ideas, are real only in perception, and perception is in fact nothing but the reality of an empirical idea, that is, a phenomenon. To call a phenomenon a real thing before it is perceived means either that in the progress of experience we must meet with such a perception, or it means nothing at all.

. . . Phenomena are not anything in themselves but mere ideas, which when they are not given to us (in perception) are not met with anywhere at all."

This elaborate passage might be reinforced by many emphatic expressions on Kant's part to the same effect. Thus he warns us that "all objects without exception with which we busy ourselves are in me, that is, determinations of my identical self." He speaks of the mind as prescribing laws *a priori* to nature, and of nature as submitting to the legislation of the understanding; but he smooths the paradox for us by reminding us that "this nature is in itself nothing but a sum of phenomena, consequently not a thing-in-itself but only a number of ideas in my mind (*eine Menge von Vorstellungen des Gemüths*)." In such passages there is no mistaking Kant's meaning; even in his phraseology he recalls Berkeley and Mill, except that for associated sensations we have rationally constructed perceptions. Otherwise Kant's phenomenal world of present perceptions and possible perceptions corresponds exactly to Mill's world of actual sensations and permanent possibilities of sensation or Berkeley's world of actual and possible sense-phenomena. The recurring phrase of the *Critique*, "possible experience," is itself significant of the affinity of standpoint. It may be observed also that when this view is firmly held, as in the long section quoted from the Dialectic, "the non-sensuous cause of these ideas"—"the transcendental object"—reappears, as if Kant, like Berkeley, found it necessary to give a permanent background to what would otherwise be too palpably a flickering, intermittent and disconnected existence in the shape of experiences of this or the other individual consciousness.

But it is equally certain that, at other times, the non-sensuous cause falls into the background with Kant, and he speaks of the phenomenal objects in a way that ill accords with the purely subjective existence which is

all he here allows them. Kant has told us himself that material objects, or the phenomena of the external sense, "have this deceptive characteristic about them that, as they represent objects in space, they detach themselves, as it were, from the soul, and appear to hover outside of it"—"although (as he proceeds) space itself in which they are perceived is nothing but an idea, whose counterpart is not to be met with in the same quality outside of the soul."[1] In spite of this caveat about the subjectivity of space, it is impossible to read the *Critique* carefully without becoming aware that this deceptive characteristic of our spatial perceptions—this subtle detachment of themselves from consciousness—has its influence upon Kant himself. Kant does *not* habitually think of his phenomenal objects as merely subjective experiences, a moment here then gone, till a similar experience occurs in my own or in some other human subjectivity. He talks with some scorn of those who "hypostatise ideas and transfer them outside of themselves as real things,"[2] but he may easily be shown to fall under his own censure. It is already dangerous to speak, as he does in the Aesthetic, of ideas as having external things for their objects, when the true state of the case, on the Kantian theory, is that the ideas—*i.e.*, our spatial perceptions—*are* the external things. So, a few pages later, he defines our perception as the idea or representation of phenomenon (*Anschauung = Vorstellung von Erscheinung*), where the perception is not identified with the phenomenon, but is said to be a perception of it, as if the phenomenon existed independently of the conscious process. Such questionable expressions might be quoted in large numbers, but that is the less necessary, seeing that the fallacy is traceable to the leading determinations of his

[1] *Werke*, III. 608 (ed. Hartenstein).
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 611.

own scheme in the Analytic. It is in the Analytic that the ambiguous use of the terms ' object ' and ' objective,' to which reference has been made, reaches its height—one consequence of which is that the real thing to which reference is made in knowledge is temporarily shouldered out of the system. We are told that objects are made by the superinduction of the categories and the forms of intuition upon the matter of sense. Such objects, it is true, are still phenomenal or purely subjective—subjective matter of sense shot through with subjective forms of thought—but they are insensibly thought of as having a permanence which does not belong to the come-and-go of our subjective experiences ; we are led to regard them, not as individual perceptions of individual subjects, but as objects valid or existent for all. This idea of objectivity as universal validity—validity for all human beings or for consciousness in general—becomes of determining importance for the Kantian thought, and in it all the ambiguities of the system meet.

Recognition by other consciousnesses, it may be freely admitted, is an all-important *test* of trans-subjective reality. That which is recognised by others certifies itself to me as an objective or trans-subjective fact, not a subjective fancy. The recognition is a decisive *ratio cognoscendi* of its independent existence, but, conversely, it is the existence of a trans-subjective reality that is the *ratio essendi* of the recognition. That, at any rate, is the only hypothesis which can be got to work with more than superficial plausibility. Because an independent fact exists, everybody recognises it ; but no multiplication of subjective recognitions can in themselves manufacture a real object in any other than a Berkeleian sense. To Kant, however, by the help of this conception of validity, the phenomenal object

acquires a quasi-independence; it seems to become more than the actual and possible subjective experiences of individual conscious beings—something of which the individuals have ideas, and to which their ideas must conform. *Erfahrung*, or experience, a term which should expressly emphasise the subjectivity, comes to signify for Kant, perhaps unconsciously, a stable and connected world of things, identified neither with the intermittent cognitions of individual subjects on the one hand nor with the admittedly trans-subjective world of things-in-themselves on the other. Sometimes, as in the passages already quoted, Kant rouses himself and emphatically declares that this world of experience is only "a play of ideas" in us; but at other times he clothes it with all the permanence and independence which the ordinary man attributes to real things. And when he says that no inquiry is made in experience after the trans-subjective reality, that is true only because he has virtually installed the phenomenal object in its place. If the phenomenal object were consistently understood as the percept or cognition of an individual subject, it would be absurd to say that in experience we rest content with that; its dependent and explanation-craving character would be too apparent.

It need hardly be added that there is no justification for the intermediate position of quasi-independence insinuated by Kant. The object of consciousness in general, or the social object, is in itself a pure abstraction. It expresses an agreement in content between a number of cognitions which, as far as they are real facts, exist in as many numerically distinct consciousnesses. There is no 'consciousness in general,' and consequently its object cannot be an existent entity but only an *ens rationis*. But although this seems tolerably plain when thus stated, it is beyond question that *Erfahrung* or the

world of phenomena which plays such an important part in Kantian literature is a hybrid conception due largely to the ambiguity of the words object and objective which has just been explained. The development in the hands of the Neo-Kantians of this conception of experience as the exclusive reality will show us the danger of departing from the trans-subjective reference in knowledge. But that subject must be pursued in a separate lecture.

LECTURE IV.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF NEO-KANTIANISM AND SUBJECTIVE IDEALISM.

In a preceding lecture I traced the insidious extension given by Kant to the term 'experience,' in virtue of which it comes to mean a quasi-independent world, identified neither with the facts of subjective consciousness nor with trans-subjective realities. We have now to follow the development of this conception of experience in the hands of the Neo-Kantians. In their hands it soon comes to figure as the exclusive reality, and the nature of their results will show us the danger of departing from the trans-subjective reference in knowledge.

In Kant, as we have seen, this reference remains, but the experience-object thrusts the trans-subjective reality more and more into the background. Its existence became, therefore, the first point upon which the Kantian system was assailed. Jacobi, Aenesidemus-Schultze, Maimon and Beck agree in pointing out the inconsistency of the thing-in-itself with other fundamental principles of Kant's philosophy. Jacobi's saying is well known, that "*without* the supposition of the thing-in-itself it is impossible to find one's way into the system, and *with* this presupposition it is impossible to remain in it." For if causality is a category of subjective origin and merely immanent application, it must be a flagrant transgression of the first principles of Criticism to apply it, in this transcendent reference, to the action of things-

in-themselves. To Fichte it was simply incredible that Kant could ever have meant to make such an assertion ; and accordingly he regarded the thing-in-itself as posited by the ego—that is to say, merely as a reflection of the ego, as a moment in the ego's own creative thought. The development of speculative thought which immediately followed Kant in Germany presents, indeed, an interesting parallel in some respects to the fate of Lockianism in England—a parallel which may just be alluded to in passing. If Kant with his fundamental dualism may be regarded for a moment as a new edition of Locke, then Fichte may be compared to Berkeley. Like Berkeley his main polemic is against the object as a thing-in-itself, but he leaves, or seems to leave, the subject as a metaphysical reality and force. With Hegel, however, the subject—" the empty ego," as he calls it—is merged in the process of its own predicates ; and the way in which the Hegelians of the Left substantiate categories as the only real existences recalls Hume's resolution of the universe into naked ideas. But the Neo-Kantians belong to our own generation, and the lesson of their speculations will, therefore, be more instructive.

Neo-Kantianism admits the necessary reference of perception to a thing-in-itself, but this very reference, the Neo-Kantians go on to say, is itself a subjective necessity. It is a form of our thought, comparable to the necessity we feel to employ the category of substance to unify qualities or the category of causality to bring connection into a world of detached objects. In like manner, the thing-in-itself is the ultimate notion or category by which we round off external experience. In short, Kant has proved that *the idea of the thing-in-itself* or the transcendental object is a necessary element in experience ; but to treat this idea as a thing is a lapse into Dogmatism at which the Neo-Kantian holds up his hands in pious

horror. In support of this rendering of the critical theory, several passages are adduced from Kant which, though susceptible of an entirely different interpretation, undoubtedly seem to favour such a view. Thus, for example, in the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena in the first edition of the *Critique*, Kant speaks of " the transcendental object " as " a something = x, of which we know nothing at all and can know nothing (according to the present structure of our understanding), *but which can only serve as a correlate of the unity of apperception*, to establish that unity of the manifold in sensuous perception, by means of which the understanding unites that manifold in the conception of an object. This transcendental object cannot be separated from the data of sense, because in that case nothing remains over by which to think it. It is therefore not an object of knowledge in itself, but *only the idea of phenomena under the conception of an object in general*, which is determined by the manifold of the phenomena." I have italicised the most striking phrases, and it will be observed that there is little here to distinguish the so-called " transcendental object " from that permanent in perception (*substantia phenomenon*) which Kant proves elsewhere to be the foundation of our experience of objects and a correlate or reflex of the unity of apperception. The thing-in-itself is described as the correlate of the unity of apperception, and the functions of the two are not distinguished. Both the unity of apperception and the transcendental object are there " to establish a unity in the manifold of sense-perception."

Founding on this and similar passages, and combining them, as he believes, into a consistent meaning, Cohen says that the transcendental object, as distinct from the idea of the transcendental object, does not concern us at all. Such an object would be transcendent, and in this positive sense is to be denied. The object is called

transcendental to signify that, by the constitution of our thinking function, it necessarily intrudes itself. But this notion of an object-in-general which underlies, as it were, all particular empirical objects is nothing but the formal unity of consciousness expressing itself through the categories, and now reflecting itself back from the objective world of perception thus constituted. He quotes a passage from Kant which, taken by itself, agrees almost verbally with what he has just said: "The pure notion of this transcendental object (which really in all our cognitions is the same $= x$) is that which in all our empirical notions is able to yield reference to an object—that is, objective reality. Now this notion can contain no definite percept, and will therefore refer to nothing except the unity which must be met with in a manifold of cognition, so far as it stands in relation to an object. *This reference, however, is nothing else than the necessary unity of consciousness.*"[1] "When the Copernican criticism," Cohen proceeds, "brought to light the true movement of the object round the forms of the mind, it disclosed at the same time the ground of the natural phenomenon that we make the common correlate[2] our senses and our understanding into an absolute (*zum Absoluten der Natur*). And this phenomenon of our thought proves itself to be *so* natural that, although it is recognised, it still retains its deceptive power. Just as, in spite of Copernicus, the sun still appears to the senses to move, so the transcendental illusion of the absolute object remains, although we know perfectly well that it radiates from the forms of our self." "The noumenon of substance is, and is intended to be, nothing more than the extended category (*die erweiterte Categorie*)." "The object in the background, the absolute thing-in-itself, the supposed cause of the

[1] *Deduction of the Categories* in the first edition. *Werke*, III. 573 (ed. Hartenstein, 1867).

[2] [The word "of" appears to have dropped out.—ED.]

phenomenon . . . has shown itself to be the veritable creature of the understanding—has shown itself indeed so veritable a creature that the illusion cannot be dispelled. In possible experience, that is, in constructive perception and in the self-thought (*selbstgedachten*) notions of the understanding, lies all reality, even that reality which would fain be more." [1] In exactly the same spirit, Lange, who was largely influenced by Cohen, denies that our perceptions come about through affection of the sensibility by transcendent things-in-themselves; he only allows that our mental organisation is such that it appears so to us. Our whole experience is in Lange's phrase, "the product of our organisation." "A judgment referring to the thing-in-itself has no other meaning than to round off the circle of our ideas." [2]

So far, however, the ego still remains as a reality—a bearer or supporter of this subjective world of experience; or, to use the Copernican metaphor of which Cohen is so fond, the ego remains as the central sun round which objects revolve. And certainly it does not at first appear how this self-contained subjective world is to subsist without at least this amount of foothold upon reality. That only proves, however, that we have not realised the inexorable logic of this line of thought. It will be noticed that Cohen is careful, in the above quotations, to speak of Kant's discovery as making the objects revolve "round the forms of the mind," round notions, not round the ego or subject. To speak of the ego in this explicit fashion as a reality would be to assert the existence of the ego as something more than simply a function or aspect of conscious experience; and that would be to commit the unpardonable sin (in Neo-

[1] *Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung*, p. 253. I quote from the first edition of 1871. I do not know how far Professor Cohen may have modified his views or expressions subsequently. I am concerned with his position only as illustrating the consistent development of a particular line of thought.

[2] *Geschichte des Materialismus*, II. 126.

Kantian eyes) of "overstepping the bounds of possible experience," and setting up a transcendent thing-in-itself as substance or cause. For, in point of fact, the reality of the subject stands here upon exactly the same basis as the reality of the object. The transcendental *object*, according to the argument we have just followed, is merely a notion or category which gives the finishing touch to our subjective experience-world—by which, as Lange says, we round it off—but which cannot possibly carry us out of this experience-world to a Beyond. According to this purely immanent Criticism, such a Beyond simply does not exist. Now the *subject* is in like manner a notion or category—the notion of notions, the category of categories, if you will—but still just the ultimate notion which puts the dot upon the *i*, and gives the finishing touch to experience. Many passages may be quoted from Kant as evidence that he regarded the transcendental unity of apperception as a form evolved in the process of experience, and a pure abstraction, therefore, when separated from the process whose formal unity it constitutes. Ignoring the difference which exists for Kant between the transcendental unity and the noumenal self, Cohen is not slow to utilise such passages. "The ego," he says, "is so far from being a substance, understood as a special productive faculty, that it is resolved into a process in which it arises and which it is. The unity of the action is at the same time the unity of consciousness."[1] He recalls to us that Kant even abstracts from the actual existence of the ego—in his frequent references—namely, to the 'I think' which must be *capable* of accompanying all my thoughts. What kind of faculty is that, asks Cohen, whose actual existence or non-existence may be disregarded? Taking Kant's own example, he proceeds: "The transcendental ego is a form of synthesis. . . .

[1] *Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung*, p. 142.

The unity of consciousness arises in the synthesis of the drawing of a line, and this synthesis consists in the notion of quantity under which the line is subsumed. Thus the transcendental apperception falls together with the synthetic unity which is contained in the category. . . . As space is the form of external perception and time of internal, so the transcendental apperception is the form of the categories. . . . The synthetic unity is the form which lies as a common element at the basis of all the separate kinds of unities thought in the categories. The transcendental unity of apperception (in Kant's own words) is *the unity through which all the manifold given in perception is united in a notion of the object.*"

Here the wheel has come full circle. The transcendental object was first reduced to a radiation or reflection of the subject, and now the subject has become merely the unity of the object. Both, in fact, are simply forms assumed by this " one all-embracing experience " (to use a phrase of Kant's on which Cohen naturally lays stress). They are not really separate facts or even separate forms ; they are the Janus-faces of a single fact called experience. Subject and object are forms which this experience necessarily takes, and, as such, they are described as transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience, but they have no existence or meaning apart from this immanent reference to the experience whose forms they are. As Cohen says, summarising his own position, " the form is not a primitive action ; it is a form in the sum of psychical occurrence (*im psychischen Gesammtgeschehen*), a form which presupposes other processes and coincides with part of them."[1] The transcendental subject, therefore, as a real source and locus of experience, goes the way of the transcendental object. It is just a form which the

[1] *Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung*, p. 162.

current of psychical events has a way of taking, but from which we can infer no real being behind the psychical flux, whose the experience is, or to whom the appearance appears. As soon as we attempt to do so, we become the victims, according to Neo-Kantianism, of an illusion precisely similar to that described by Cohen in the case of the object. But though Cohen, as we have seen, follows the same line of argument in both cases, and reduces subject and object alike to forms of thought to which no trans-subjective reality corresponds, he stops short of branding the subject also as an illusion. He does not write in a sceptical interest; he proposes this self-rounding world of *Erfahrung* or experience as the one and all-sufficient reality. Kant's supposed "theory of experience" is consistent Criticism—the latest birth of philosophy; and accordingly it would be stultifying himself to speak of illusion, in so many words, in connection with the supreme form of experience.

Nevertheless it is perfectly apparent that the whole structure hangs in the air. This purely immanent reference of the categories and forms of thought leaves us with no real being whose the experience is. This 'experience' or *Erfahrungswelt* has no locus; it evolves itself *in vacuo*, and in the course of its evolution evolves the form of personality. Lange, who otherwise adopted Cohen's results as true Kantianism and true philosophy, was disturbed by this lack of any real basis, and entered a mild protest against it. "If the emphasising of the merely transcendental standpoint be carried too far, we arrive at the tautology that experience is to be explained from the conditions of possible experience in general—that the synthesis *a priori* has its cause in the synthesis *a priori*."[1] By the merely transcendental standpoint Lange means what I have just called the

[1] *Geschichte des Materialismus*, II. 126, 131.

purely immanent or inward reference of the categories and forms of thought—the proof, for example, which deduces a unity as the condition of synthesis, but which can say nothing of the unity apart from the act or movement of synthesis of which it is, as it were, the moving form. Such a proof, Lange says, in analysing experience or knowledge into conditions which are confessedly abstractions except as realised in the act or fact of knowledge, is really explaining experience by itself—is at all events giving no account of the *real conditions* on which the existence of experience at all depends. Hence, he says, if the transcendental deduction is to be more than the tautology indicated above, "the categories must necessarily be *something more* than simply conditions of experience." In other words, he is seemingly not content to speak with Cohen of 'the notions' round which objects revolve. The realistic basis of the categories lay for Kant himself, of course, in the noumenal self; but for this Lange proposes to substitute 'the physico-psychic organisation' as the source from which spring all the forms, notions and Ideas which give rise to the appearance of a world in space and time. The physico-psychic organisation is thus the cause or ground of the appearance, and at the same time it is that to which the appearance appears, and thus we seem to secure a certain anchorage. But Lange has learned his Neo-Kantian lesson too well to admit that this organisation is a thing-in-itself. The physico-psychical organisation is itself only an appearance or phenomenon, though it *may* be the appearance of an unknown thing-in-itself. Hartmann has wittily but not unjustly dubbed this position of Lange's mere Confusionism.[1] If the organisation is mere appearance, we are no better off than we were with Cohen; if, on

[1] In his *Neukantianismus, Schopenhauerianismus und Hegelianismus* (1877).

the other hand, we are going to speak of a real being at all, this problematical way of referring to it is absurd. It is impossible to blow hot and cold in this fashion with a 'perhaps.' Our view must either be frankly immanent, in which case the subject is merely an epistemological category, or it must be frankly transcendent, in which case the subject is the real being in whom and for whom the whole process of experience or knowledge takes place.

Lange's recoil from the consequences of Cohen's reasonings throws an instructive light upon the nature of these consequences, and therefore I have dwelt upon his position perhaps longer than its own merits justify. This whole Neo-Kantian point of view is reduced to consistency by Vaihinger,[1] who exposes the contradiction latent in Lange's idea of the physico-psychic organisation. He points out with inexorable logic that to hypostatise the subject, even in this half-hearted way, is to fall back into what Cohen calls Dogmatism; the subject has in this respect no prerogative over the object, both being alike epistemological categories, limitative conceptions. So far, it may be said, Cohen had already gone. Vaihinger differs from him, or advances beyond him, in that his attitude is essentially sceptical. "Critical Scepticism," he says, is the real result of the Kantian theory of knowledge. The result of Criticism is purely negative; it is the self-dissolution of speculation (*Selbstzersetzung der Speculation*), inasmuch as it restricts us rigorously to the immediate world of subjective states. All philosophy, he says again, has only intra-subjective significance; all thought moves in subjective forms whose objective validity can never be verified, and whatever instruments we employ to know reality, they are still subjective in their nature. Criticism, therefore, or consistent Kantianism denies the trans-subjective validity of every category and form of thought, and thus brings us back,

[1] In his book, *Hartmann, Dühring und Lange* (1876).

in a more refined form perhaps, to the position of Hume. Hume devoted the greater part of his industry to showing how *the illusion* of a real world and a real self would naturally arise, in the absence of the corresponding realities; how these illusions would weave themselves out of the dance of detached and homeless ideas. Similarly Hartmann has appropriately labelled this last result of Neo-Kantian thought Illusionism. "Ideas," said Reid, in view of Hume's results, "were first introduced into philosophy in the humble character of images or representatives of things. . . . But they have by degrees supplanted their constituents and undermined the existence of everything but themselves. . . . These ideas are as free and independent as the birds of the air. . . . Yet, after all, these self-existent and independent ideas look pitifully naked and destitute when left thus alone in the universe, set adrift without a rag to cover their nakedness." In exactly the same way, though along different lines, 'experience,' which was introduced into philosophy in a doubly dependent character, as the experience by a real being of a real world—experience, which by the very structure of the term seems to cry aloud for a real subject and a real object—has substantiated itself as the sole reality. First the object disappears before negative criticism, and the world, as Hartmann puts it, is transformed into the dream of a dreamer; at this stage we have a purely subjective Idealism or Solipsism. Then the subject shares the fate of the object, and the dream of a dreamer becomes a dream which is dreamt by nobody, but which, if one may say so, dreams itself, and among its other dream-forms dreams the fiction of a supposed dreamer.[1] This self-evolving, unsupported, unhoused illusion is all that exists.

[1] Cf. Hartmann's *Kritische Grundlegung des transcendentalen Realismus*, p. 47.

I am not aware that absolute scepticism or absolute illusionism admits of any direct logical reply. But it has hitherto been regarded, not only by the common sense but by the enlightened common reason of mankind, as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the line of thought which leads to it. It is a result which we deliberately refuse to accept as true. In face, however, of such a sceptical dissolution of reality, we do not merely intrench ourselves in this deliberate refusal, leaving the sceptic in possession of the intellectual field. The nature of the result leads us to examine the nature of the premises and the principles of argumentation which have led to it. This was what Kant and Reid both essayed to do in face of the Humian scepsis. Now that a definite development of the Kantian Criticism brings us face to face with a subtler scepsis of the same description, a similar course must be adopted ; we must endeavour to lay our hand upon the fundamental presuppositions which predetermined the evolution of thought toward this end. In a preceding lecture we saw reason to believe that this was to be found in the unwarrantable extension given by Kant to the term ' experience,' and in his view of the merely immanent use of the categories and forms of thought. It is this idea of immanence which, in the hands of his idealistic followers, swallows up the transcendent reference involved in knowledge—a reference still maintained by Kant himself—and leads to the fiction of an experience which is experienced by nobody and is an experience of nothing.

The first essential, then, is to restrict ' experience ' to its true and proper meaning. As soon as this is done, it becomes apparent how impossible it is to take experience as something self-contained, self-explaining and self-existent. Those who profess to do so make matters plausible only by illicitly importing into their professedly pure experience a multitude of trans-subjective elements.

Where, then, is the boundary-line to be accurately drawn between pure experience and what transcends experience, between the subjective and the trans-subjective? It is accurately drawn only when by pure experience is understood my own conscious states—the 'stream' of ideas which constitutes my mind in a phenomenal or psychological reference. Everything else is trans-subjective or extra-psychological—*i.e.*, epistemologically transcendent. Limiting ourselves thus, let us look at the nature of this immanent world. There is a passage in Clifford's well-known essay "On the Nature of Things-in-themselves" which seems to me to illustrate in an apt and vivid way the characteristics of our actual consciousness. It may be quoted without prejudice, as it is introduced by Clifford and used by him in quite another reference. "In reading over a former page of my manuscript," he says, "I found suddenly upon reflection that, although I had been conscious of what I was reading, I paid no attention to it; but had been mainly occupied in debating whether faint red lines would not be better than blue ones to write upon; in picturing the scene in the shop when I should ask for such lines to be ruled, and in reflecting on the lamentable helplessness of nine men out of ten when you ask them to do anything slightly different from what they have been accustomed to do. This debate had been started by the observation that my handwriting varied according to the nature of the argument, being larger when that was diffuse and explanatory, occupied with a supposed audience, and smaller when it was close, occupied only with the sequence of propositions. Along with these trains of thought went the sensations of noises made by poultry, dogs, children and organ-grinders, and that diffused feeling in the side of the face and head which means a probable toothache in an hour or two."

Now all this sounds perfectly intelligible when the different elements in the section of consciousness examined are referred to their real causes, and recognised as the effects of an independent world of causally connected things. But the richly variegated scene which Clifford conjures up may serve to bring home to us the hopelessly disconnected appearance which the simultaneities and sequences of our psychological life would present, were they not constantly pieced out and connected—interpreted in a thousand ways—by reference to a system of extra-psychological realities. If the train of thoughts and images seems to proceed for a time with a certain orderliness, under the guidance of association, this sequence is accompanied by a mass of changing organic sensations, which arise and disappear without any reference to the chain of thoughts, and so far as consciousness is concerned, have an absolute beginning out of nothing and an absolute end. Or it may be that our meditations are abruptly interrupted by a sight or a sound—the sound of a street-fight, the entrance of a friend, " the noises made by poultry, dogs, children and organ-grinders "—by a percept of some kind, in short, which, so far from having any connection with my immediately preceding states of consciousness, is shot from a pistol, as the saying is—projected headlong into their midst in an utterly inexplicable fashion. The same discontinuous and irregular character of subjective experience as such is exemplified every time I turn my head and bring into view objects undreamt of the moment before. It seems hardly necessary to add that this complete incoherence of the contents of consciousness as such is recognised by modern psychologists as irresistibly impelling us to the hypothesis of a world of trans-subjective realities.[1] It requires, in fact, a

[1] Cf., for example, Mr Stout's article on the Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality. *Mind*, XV. p. 32.

strong effort of abstraction to realise at all what the state of affairs would be without such a supposition; for we involuntarily read a trans-subjective meaning into these apparitions of our perceptive consciousness. An intruding percept, which has no causal connection with what preceded it in my consciousness, we yet accredit as a messenger from a world beyond—the sign of a fact whose appearance just at this particular time and place is perfectly determined by the real causal connections of the trans-subjective world to which it belongs. It is only as thus correlated with an orderly trans-subjective world that I can possibly bring order and connection into my psychological experiences. Without this reference they are fitly compared to "a feverish dream, which constantly breaks off and tacks on afresh, without any indication how the individual pieces are connected with one another, or whether they are connected at all."[1] To talk of immanent causality as existing in such a world is an abuse of language. Nobody asserts a causal connection between his idea of the sun and his idea of the warmed stone. The percept of the sun may often undoubtedly precede the percept of the stone, but just as often I may see the stone first and the sun second. Moreover, I often have the percept of the sun without that of the stone, and, similarly, I may perceive the stone and a multitude of things may intervene to prevent my perceiving, or even thinking of, the sun. Between the one idea and the other there is no regular connection, and indeed no man thinks of asserting a causal relation between them. The causal relation is between the real facts which are the condition of these two ideas—between the trans-subjective sun and the trans-subjective stone. In this sense all our causal judgments are transcendent, until we begin, as psychologists, to study the subjective mechanism on

[1] Hartmann, *Grundproblem der Erkenntnisstheorie*, p. 55.

its own account. It is doubtless simultaneities and sequences among our ideas that put us upon the track of these trans-subjective connections; but, once established, no appearance of A in consciousness without B, or of B without A, or of A and B separated by various intervening ideas—no one, in short, of the hundred casualties to which the conscious sequence is exposed—shakes in the least our belief in the continued validity of the relation in the real world. And, it may be added, unless from the beginning we transcended the immediate data of consciousness—unless from the outset they were taken not for what they *are*, but for what they *mean*—we should not fasten either upon the regularities or upon the irregularities of our experience as calling for explanation. There would be nothing to explain; we should simply take everything as it came. We should be mere *historians* of the course of conscious occurrences that had made up our individual existence.[1]

Such then is pure experience; this is what is actually immanent. The actual world of subjective experience only requires to be exhibited thus in its nakedness to have its essentially dependent and symbolic character recognised. It is only when related to a world of independent realities that these subjective phenomena become intelligible. Nay, it is only in this relation that *knowledge*, or the very conception of knowledge, could arise. Such an independent and essentially trans-subjective world is therefore necessarily assumed by every philosophy. An examination of the various

[1] So Volkelt says that 'knowledge' from the purely immanent point of view would consist simply "in einem Erzählen der von Moment zu Moment in seinem Bewusstsein vorkommenden Einzelvorstellungen." Properly speaking there would be neither thought nor knowledge "sondern lediglich ein Berichten über den absolut zusammenhangslosen Spectakel den ich unbegreiflicherweise in meinem Bewusstsein antreffe." Compare the fourth section of his *Immanuel Kant's Erkenntnisslehre*, to which I am indebted in the foregoing paragraph.

theories of pure experience or pure immanence would show that, however they may disguise it from themselves, they all make this realistic assumption. But it is not necessary for us to go further than Mill's well-known 'psychological theory of matter'—the modern version of Berkeley and Hume. Berkeley's own theological idealism is, of course, not here in point, because sense-phenomena are there referred to the divine will as a trans-subjective real cause, and so the all-important epistemological step is made. But Mill, with Hume's example before him, will not wittingly overstep the line which severs experience from what is and must be beyond experience. He has thus to supply a background to the tangled confusion and abrupt inconsequences of our actual sensations and at the same time to seem to avoid making the epistemological transition from sensation to something different in kind from sensation. Though, not itself actual sensation, this explanatory supplement must be in a manner homogeneous and continuous with sensation; though *ex hypothesi* not itself experience, it must hoist the colours of experience, and so avoid the appearance of transcendency which your true Empiricist shuns like the very plague.

Mill states the necessities of the case in a sufficiently candid way, "What is it which leads us to say that the objects we perceive are external to us and not part of our own thoughts? We mean that there is concerned in our perceptions something which exists when we are not thinking of it, which existed before we had ever thought of it, and would exist if we were annihilated; and further, that there exist things which we never saw, touched, or otherwise perceived, and things which never have been perceived by man. This idea of something which is distinguished from our fleeting impressions by what, in Kantian language, is called Perdurability; something which is fixed and the same while

our impressions vary; something which exists whether we are aware of it or not—constitutes altogether our idea of external substance. Whoever can assign an origin to this complex conception has accounted for what we mean by the belief in matter." [1] Mill's own explanation is his celebrated theory of 'Permanent Possibilities of Sensation.' No undue stress need be laid here on the use of the term 'sensation,' as we are not discussing the merits or demerits of a purely sensationalistic theory of knowledge. Let us take it without prejudice in the widest sense as equivalent to percepts; for we find a substantially similar theory in some of the German Neo-Kantians, who refer in this connection to Mill, and use indifferently such expressions as 'potential sensations,' 'potential perceptions,' 'possibilities of perception,' 'possible consciousness.' [2] It is altogether, therefore, upon the 'permanent possibilities' that the stress is here laid. Mill makes matters so far easier for himself at the outset by the trans-subjective assumption of other selves. He then proceeds to resolve the physical universe into actual and possible sensations, repeating Berkeley's analysis in so many words: "I see a piece of white paper on a table. I go into another room. . . . Though I have ceased to see it, I am convinced that the paper is still there. I no longer have the sensations which it gave me; but I believe that when I again place myself in the circumstances in which I had those sensations, I shall again have them; and further that there has been no intervening moment at which this would not have been the case. . . . The conception I form of the world existing at any moment thus comprises, along with the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation. . . . These

[1] *Examination of Hamilton*, p. 221 (3rd ed.). [Ch. XI., "The Psychological Theory of the Belief in an External World."]

[2] For examples compare Volkelt, *Kant's Erkenntnisstheorie*, pp. 160-189.

various possibilities are the important thing to me in the world. My present sensations are generally of little importance, and are moreover fugitive ; the possibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, which is the character that mainly distinguishes our idea of Substance or Matter from our notion of sensation." " These certified or guaranteed possibilities of sensation "—possibilities guaranteed not only for me but for other human beings —constitute, then, according to Mill, all that is real in the physical world, when we abstract from the actual sensations being experienced by the aggregate of sensitive creatures at any given moment.

We cannot, however, too carefully bear in mind that, according to the immanent view of subjective idealism, these possible sensations or perceptions are only actual —*i.e.*, only *exist*—in the moment of actual perception. Minds and the experiences of these minds are, with Mill as with Berkeley, the only two modes of existences (if, indeed, Mill would distinguish between the mind and its ' states of consciousness ') ; the essence of sensations is *percipi*. Consequently possible sensations are not to be conceived as constituting a separate *genus* or mode of existence ; a sensation unfelt, a perception unperceived, is a contradiction in terms. The possibilities of sensation have, therefore, a merely imaginative or fictitious permanence, for, so long as they are not realised, they simply do not exist at all—they are nothing. That is, be it understood, what consistency imperatively dictates. They cannot be more than this, unless we leave the ground of immanency altogether and pass to the real thing of which sensation is the evidence. It is certain, however, that to Mill the permanent possibilities mean a great deal more than the ' naked possibilities ' [1] which consistency allows him.

[1] The phrase is Mr Stout's, in an acute criticism of Mill's doctrine (*Mind*, XV. 23-25), to which I am indebted in this paragraph.

Mill's possibilities have functions assigned them which only real existences can discharge. Modifications take place, Mill tells us, in our possibilities of sensation, and these modifications "are mostly quite independent of our consciousness and of our presence or absence. Whether we are asleep or awake, the fire goes out, and puts an end to that particular possibility of warmth and light. Whether we are present or absent, the corn ripens and brings a new possibility of food. Hence we speedily learn to think of Nature as made up solely of these groups of possibilities, and the active force in Nature as manifested in the modification of some of these by others." Now, we may fairly ask how a change can take place in a possibility at a time when it is admittedly only a possibility—that is to say, at a time when it does not exist. "A change in nothing," as Mr Stout puts it, "is no change at all." Equally baseless is the notion of one of these possibilities causally modifying another at a time when, *ex hypothesi*, both are non-existent. The truth is that, under cover of the ambiguous term 'possibility,' Mill has covertly reintroduced the trans-subjective reality. Real things may very well be described, in reference to our experience, as 'permanent possibilities of sensation'—that is to say, they are the permanent real conditions which, in appropriate circumstances, are ever ready to produce sensations. We may even go further and say that, if anyone is determined to be a purist and to define things solely in their relation to sensitive experience—solely from the effects which he finds them to produce—this definition of them as permanent possibilities of sensation is, perhaps, the most accurate we can hope for. And, of course, if Mill's phrase is to be so understood, there is no further difficulty about the extra-conscious existence and the extra-conscious causality of these possibilities, for we are back again upon the solid ground of trans-subjective

reality. But it is plain enough that this cannot have been Mill's conscious meaning. "Otherwise," as Mr Stout says, "he would have committed a *circulus in definiendo* of the most inexcusable kind." It is equally evident, however, that though Mill may not have intended it, no other meaning will suit the assertions he makes about his possibilities. Under cover of the ambiguity of language, and impelled by the realistic instinct, Mill has simply reinstated the trans-subjective reality in a different form of words. "*Ungefähr sagt das der Pfarrer auch, nur mit ein bischen andern Worten.*" The theory, therefore, which seems so ingenious and plausible indicates in truth the breakdown of subjective idealism. The realist may feel tolerably easy when the talk is of 'modifications' taking place in our possibilities of sensation "mostly quite independent of our consciousness and of our presence or absence." But he would be a pedant indeed, who, instead of talking of real things, insisted on substituting the circumlocution 'permanent possibilities of sensation.'

It is not difficult to see how Mill, from his general standpoint in these matters, was led to the phrase and the theory. It is only in sensation, or say rather in perception, that the thing reveals its existence to me or to others. I can only describe it, therefore, in terms of preception; when I do not perceive it, it does not exist for me. So far as experience goes, I can thus manifestly never get beyond the rubric of perception, past, present, or to come. Hence Mill identifies the thing itself with present and possible sensations. Exactly the same line of thought leads to the substantiation of experience and possible experience in the writings of the Neo-Kantians. The nature or predicates of the thing can only be learned in experience; the Neo-Kantian accordingly generalises his different experiences of any trans-subjective thing, and substantiates these as a pheno-

menal object. The world of such objects assumes with him the same independent and trans-subjective position as Mill's world of permanent possibilities, and with just as little right. What we are to think of this professedly immanent world we have already seen. This phenomenal world, which will neither be subjective appearance nor the frank trans-subjective thing, but suspends itself *in vacuo* between the two, is a philosophical hybrid to which no real existence or fact corresponds. These so-called phenomena, in complete detachment from the subjective consciousness of mankind, are epistemologically transcendent, not immanent, and the causality which obtains between them is likewise transcendent; it is the causal action of one real thing upon another.

Is it not the case, in short, that the term 'experience,' as used throughout this espistemological discussion, whether by Neo-Kantian or by English Empiricist, covers a huge *petitio principii?* The question at issue is the possibility of a *knowledge* of the trans-subjective, but I cannot *experience* the existence of another being. I can be aware that another being exists, but its existence can be experienced by itself alone. I know that you exist; my experience furnishes ground for believing as much. But you are not part of my experience: I do not experience your states. In short, I am not you. Similarly, I know that something which I call the table exists, because it resists the pressure I exert against it. The table is the trans-subjective explanation of certain features of my experience; the table itself cannot strictly be said to be experienced. The reality of everything beyond my own existence is thus of necessity beyond experience, for the experiences of each being are simply its own states, its own life. By the use of this term, therefore, in connection with knowledge, the trans-subjective reference is cut off in advance before the formal discussion begins.

This is so neatly illustrated in our home-grown philosophy that I make no apology for using Professor Bain's position to drive my argument home. Professor Bain shall be answered out of the mouth of Mr Spencer. As is well known, Professor Bain lays great stress, and rightly so, on the contrast between passive and active sensation as a source of our belief in an external world. "Movement," he says, "gives a new character to our whole percipient existence." "The sense of resistance is the deepest foundation of our notion of externality." [1] In this Mr Spencer is quite at one with him. But Mr Spencer accepts this experience as the sufficient evidence of 'an existence beyond consciousness'—of 'something which resists.' Professor Bain is more subtle. The sense of effort and of effort resisted is no doubt contrasted with 'purely passive sensation,' but the contrast is still within consciousness. Our experiences of resistance are, after all, just so many 'feels,' so many subjective changes. "The exertion of our own muscular power is the fact constituting the property called resistance. Of matter as independent of our feeling of resistance, we can have no conception; the rising up of this feeling within us amounts to everything that we mean by resisting matter." Those 'feels,' then, *are* the material world. "We are not at liberty to say without incurring contradiction that our feeling of expended energy is one thing, and a resisting material world another and a different thing; that other and different thing is by us wholly unthinkable." [2] Or as he puts it more generally—"knowledge means a state of mind; the notion of material things is a mental fact. We are incapable even of discussing the existence of an independent material world; the very act is a contradiction." [3]

[1] *Senses and the Intellect*, pp. 376-7.
[2] *Mental Science*, p. 199.
[3] *Senses and the Intellect*, p. 375.

All that Professor Bain asserts is true, is even obvious. Unquestionably, so far as experience goes, actual and possible perceptions sum up the case, and in the present instance our feelings of impeded effort are all the experiences we have to show. The independent thing, the 'something which resists,' is admittedly a rational construction, a hypothesis to explain our experience; *ex vi termini*, therefore, it is beyond experience, though necessary to it as its causal explanation. In short, the Berkeleian analysis of Mill and Professor Bain is absolutely true *as psychology;* but that the attempt should have been made to substitute the psychological facts for their trans-subjective conditions, and thus to pass off psychology as ontology or metaphysics, is one of the strangest results of super-subtle analysis. As Mr Spencer puts it, "the very conception of *experience* implies something of which there is experience."[1] The 'contradiction' of which Professor Bain speaks is of his own making, and lies in the impossible nature of the demand he formulates. Mr Spencer's retort is simply to state what the position amounts to. It amounts to "a tacit demand for some other proof of an external world than that which is given in states of consciousness"—"some proof of this outer existence other than that given in terms of inner existence."[2] States of consciousness, in short, not only exist, as experience; they have a meaning, an evidential value, and can testify to the existence of that which they are not. Only in this respect, as symbolic and self-transcendent, are 'mental facts' to be called knowledge. But this whole aspect of consciousness is suppressed in advance by Professor Bain, who is really dominated by the curious but deeply rooted idea that, in order to know a thing, it is necessary actually to *be* the thing.

[1] *Principles of Psychology*, II. 349.
[2] *Ibid.*, II. 444.

The horror of the transcendent, which we have thus seen alike in followers of the English and of the Continental tradition, undoubtedly owes its wide diffusion at present very largely to the influence of Kant, with whose idealistic followers it has become a philosophic superstition. But their doctrine of immanency, it may be added, completely obscures the truth that is contained in Kant's doctrine of the categories. These principles of reason were originally intended to lift us out of the subjective individualism of Hume or any purely empirical theory. This purpose is necessarily frustrated if they are taken entirely in an immanent reference. Subjective matter of sense may be transfixed as we please with subjective principles of thought, but two subjectives do not make an objective;[1] the outcome is as purely subjective as Hume's, though it bears a different complexion. Kant's own expressions, however, are not so unambiguously immanent as his idealistic followers would have us believe. They waver in a way which is significant of two conflicting lines of thought in his mind; and in his doctrine of judgment, and of the categories as the forms of judgment, he was at one time upon another track. In truth he had struck here upon the only path which can lead us out of subjectivity. The passivity of sense does not carry us beyond ourselves; only the activity of reason avails to do so. Mental activity is summed up in the judgment and the categories are different forms of judgment. In them reason expresses its own necessities—its necessities of connection and explanation. Through them it may be said both to posit an objective world as an explanation of experience and progressively to render that world

[1] It is this difficulty, doubtless, which leads Kant at one time to say that it is the addition of the categories to the pure subjectivity of sense that yields us objects, while at another time he tells us that it is their application to the matter of sense which confers objectivity on the categories.

intelligible. In perception the conscious judgment reaffirms the instinctive judgment of feeling, and refers the subjective affection to its origin in the real. From the outset the stimuli of sense are thus projected—attached as predicates to a real world, of which they are at once the qualities and the effects. In this primitive judgment the categories of substance and cause are combined, and these basal categories involve all the rest. In this causal judgment we once for all overpass the limits of the individual self. It was not without reason, therefore, that Kant recognised in the judgment, and in the thoughts of which judgment is the vehicle, the instrument of our enfranchisement from subjective bonds. But it becomes so only when it is frankly taken in this trans-subjective reference. The categories do construct for us an objective world, but only when they are transcendently employed. Transcendental Realism rather than transcendental Idealism was the result to which the Kantian theory of judgment fairly pointed, and many of his expressions may be read in this sense. "All experience," [1] he tells us, for example, "in addition to the perception of the senses by which something is given, contains besides a *notion* of an object which is given, or which appears, in perception." So he says again, "Cognitions consist in the definite reference of given ideas to an object." [2] The notion of the object is doubtless itself subjective, as Neo-Kantian subtlety urges; how, we may ask, could it be otherwise? But it is the notion of a real object, a trans-subjective thing. It is the presence of this notion that differentiates what Kant calls knowledge, cognition or experience from sensation or what he calls mere perception. Or, as we have been led to express it in the last few pages, the

[1] *Werke*, III. 112 (ed. Hartenstein). Experience is here used in the specific Kantian sense as opposed to mere perception and the associative play of ideas in the soul.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

trans-subjective reference constitutes the very essence of knowledge as distinguished from experience as a series of subjective happenings which take place but which mean nothing. Kant himself did not consistently follow out this line of thought. But it is perhaps not too much to say that a fresh interpretation of the categories in the realistic sense just indicated is at the present time the only promising basis of a sound philosophy.

CONCLUSION.[1]

So far, it may be said, we have not got further than the knowledge *that* a trans-subjective exists; that is to say, our trans-subjective world is merely Kant's thing-in-itself or Mr Spencer's Unknowable—an undetermined causal somewhat, "a notion so imperfect," according to Hume, "that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it." But this sceptical relativism is due to a misconception. If our categories are competent to tell us *that* a trans-subjective world exists, they are also competent to tell us what its nature is. It is true that our categories are subjective, if it be subjective to express the necessities of connection and explanation which reason imposes upon us. But that they are *merely* subjective is, in the nature of the case, incapable

[1] [The preceding Lectures appeared in the *Philosophical Review*, Vols. I., Nos. 2 and 5, and II., Nos. 2 and 3, between the dates March 1892 and May 1893. The author contributed to the same *Review*, Vol. III., No. 1 (January 1894), a discussion entitled "Epistemological Conclusions," the first part of which was occupied by a reply to certain criticisms of his Lectures by Professor John Watson. He then went on: "I will take the liberty of appending here a few paragraphs in continuation of my four articles on Epistemology in this *Review*. When the articles were originally given as a course of Balfour Lectures in Edinburgh in the spring of 1891, these paragraphs followed immediately upon what has already appeared in the *Philosophical Review*. They were omitted at the close of the last article because the article already exceeded the usual length and had reached a point at which its more immediate subject seemed concluded. But I am now inclined to regret their omission, because by returning upon the general argument I think they tend to place the scope of the whole inquiry in a clearer light and to emphasise the precise nature of the conclusion reached."

These paragraphs are accordingly restored to their original place as the Conclusion of the Third Series of Balfour Lectures.—ED.]

of proof. They are principles of mental synthesis; but why should they not be at the same time principles of real connection in a trans-subjective world—a world whose real connections the mental synthesis only renders or reconstructs? The possibility of doubt, of course, always remains; for if we cannot prove dogmatically that the forms of thought do *not* apply to reality, neither can we prove that they *do* apply. The feat of comparing our percept with an unperceived thing is, as Berkeley incisively argued, for ever impossible; we cannot get behind our own knowledge and know without knowing. Proof of this sort being impossible, we are thrown back upon a species of trust or presumption—a trust that knowledge in its fundamental characteristics renders correctly the world of existence, or, to put it otherwise and perhaps more simply, a trust that things exist as we know them. In presence of an ultimate sceptical doubt of the nature indicated, we are necessarily reduced to a balance of probabilities. Now, to suppose an absence of correspondence between the forms of knowledge and the forms of existence—to suppose the *mere* subjectivity of the former—is to suppose that the mechanism of knowledge has been expressly devised to defeat its own purpose. If we take the universe for a bad joke, such a supposition will have much in its favour, but it seems to me incompatible with any belief in the rationality of existence. In other words, the probability in favour of such a view is so small as to be a negligible quantity.

The idea of merely subjective validity is a kind of speculative nightmare, for which we have largely Kant to thank. Yet we can see how it had been preparing all through the modern period. The problem of knowledge, when it comes into the foreground, inevitably tends to separate the knowing subject from the whole world of objective reality. The philosophical antithesis is no

longer between the whole and the part, between the permanent unity and its dependent manifestations, as it is when the line of thought is metaphysical or ontological. The antithesis is now between the subjective consciousness and the world of real things. The subject is, therefore, placed upon one side and the whole trans-subjective universe upon the other, and a chasm is made between them. The knower is practically extruded from the real universe ; he is treated as if he did not belong to it, as if he came to inspect it like a stranger from afar. His forms of thought come thus to be regarded as an alien product with no inherent fitness to express the nature of things. Things are rather conceived as in themselves independent of these forms, so that the forms, when applied, are treated as an unauthorised gloss, a distorting medium. A little reflection, however, tells us that to conceive matters thus is to convert the necessary duality or opposition which knowledge involves into a real or metaphysical dualism for which there is no kind of warrant. We are the victims of metaphor, if we allow ourselves to think of the individual knower as standing outside of the universe in this way, or if we imagine a real chasm or gulf between him and the objects he knows. The knower is in the world which he comes to know ; and the forms of his thought, so far from being an alien growth or an imported product, are themselves a function of the whole. As M. Fouillee puts it : " Consciousness, so far from being outside reality, is the immediate presence of reality to itself and the inward unrolling of its riches."[1] When this is once grasped, the idea of thought as ' a kind of necessary evil ' ceases to have even a superficial plausibility.

For I desire to repeat here, what was indicated in the first of these articles, that the epistemological Realism, the transcendency, the duality, of which so much has

[1] *L'Evolutionnisme des Idées-forces*, p. 291.

been said, are not to be taken in the metaphysical reference just alluded to. The two substances "separated by the whole diameter of being,"[1] which modern philosophy inherited from Descartes, I take to be no better than an invention of the enemy. It was the most unfortunate error of the Scottish philosophers that they identified the epistemological and the metaphysical position. Their reassertion, as against Hume, of the necessary trans-subjective reference in knowledge was unfortunately supposed by them to be equivalent to a reinstatement of the abstract opposition between mind and matter as two absolutely heterogeneous substances. But, if matter is defined as the precise (metaphysical) opposite of mind—if we start with the presupposition that they have nothing in common, that the one just is what the other is not—the growth of the subjective nightmare is perfectly intelligible. There is no reason why we should expect the mandate of reason to run in a completely foreign domain. No sort of knowledge, indeed, would be possible of a world of things whose relation to consciousness and the forms of thought was conceived as mere negation. The opposition had already led legitimately, in the history of modern philosophy, to the denial of the possibility of knowledge, and was not to be overcome by a mere assertion of the immediate presence of the one to the other in the knowing act. A real metaphysical dualism would cleave the universe in two, leaving two absolutely non-communicating worlds. The possibility of knowledge becomes, on the other hand, the surest guarantee of metaphysical monism —of a unity which underlies all differences.

The metaphysical position of Cartesianism into which the Scottish philosophers thus relapsed was connected, there can be little doubt, with the old mechanical or deistic conception of creation and of the relation of

[1] Hamilton's *Lectures on Metaphysics*, II. 120.

God to the world of nature—matter being looked on as something absolutely dead, absolutely undivine, except that once upon a time an immense quantity of it was 'created' and set in motion, since which time it continues to exist as a kind of brute fact so long as its 'being' is not terminated by another special fiat of its Creator. I confess I know as little as Berkeley what is meant by the being or existence of such matter, nor can I conceive the possibility of any existence placed outside of the divine consciousness and will in the manner suggested. The feat is one which even a divine being could not perform; there is no region outside of God into which he could extrude his creature and cut it adrift from himself. The world of nature cannot be understood by an intelligent theist otherwise than as the ever-present working of a divine power. This is a lesson which most of us have learned, as children of the nineteenth century. But the abstract dualism of metaphysics was in its way a counterpart of the mechanical theology which banished God from his own world, and so made that world an unintelligibility to thought. The world conceived thus, as a mere brute fact, is formulated in philosophy as the unknowable thing-in-itself. It was a survival of this dualistic feeling in Kant which led him to scout, as he did, the idea of what he calls a preformation system, or pre-established harmony between the mind and things, in respect of the categories and forms of thought. He means by the phrase the possibility that the forms of thought are both subjective and objective, forms of the subjective intelligence and forms of the real world at once. This supposition, which we have seen to be so eminently reasonable, Kant sets aside with an ill-concealed impatience that is somewhat difficult to understand. But if the metaphysical heterogeneity of the two sides is tacitly presupposed, then unquestionably the notion of a pre-established harmony

does become no better than a *deus ex machina*, and you have no guarantee that any such friendly, and as it were miraculous, interposition has taken place. And in this way, it seems to me, Kant's contemptuous treatment of the idea may be understood. But the error lies in the original supposition of heterogeneity ; it is this abstract dualism which necessitates the mechanical idea of a special interposition to establish correspondence. If the first unfounded supposition is dropped, then harmony does not require to be established by special decree ; it has the presumption on its side. We may go further, and say that when the matter is duly considered, this is the necessary assumption of metaphysical thought. Epistemological investigation, therefore, if it is not to lead us back to the sceptical idealism, or to the *impasse* of an Unknown and Unknowable, must tacitly presuppose this metaphysical unity of the subjective and the objective, or, to put it more strictly, the harmony of the subjective function with the universe from which it springs. Starting from this basis, Epistemology may afterwards return to prove its own assumption, so far as we can talk of proof in such a case. Epistemology supplies the indirect proof that this is the only hypothesis which can be consistently thought out without dissolving in absurdity or contradiction.

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