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Eton, W.

Title Survey of the Turkish Empire
1801

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S U R V E Y
OF THE
TURKISH EMPIRE.

IN WHICH ARE CONSIDERED,

ITS GOVERNMENT,
FINANCES, MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCE,
Religion, Hiftory, Arts, Sciences, Manners, Commerce, *and* Population,

II.

THE STATE OF THE PROVINCES,
Including the ancient Government of the CRIM TATARS,
The Subjeajon of the GREEKS,
THEIR EFFORTS *TOWARD* EMANCIPATION,
And the Intereft of other Nations,
Particularly of GREAT BRITAIN, in their Succesfs.

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THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF TURKEY,
And thole which tend to the PROLONGATION of its EXISTENCE,
With a Development of the Political Syftem of the late
EMPRESS OF RUSSIA.

IV.

THE BRITISH COMMERCE WITH TURKEY,
The Neceflity of abolifhing the LEVANT COMPANY,
And the Danger of our QUARANTINE REGULATIONS.
WITH MANY OTHER IMPORTANT PARTICULARS

BY W. ETON, Efq;

MANY YEARS RESIDENT IN TURKEY ANH IN RUSSIA,

THE THIRD EDITION.

LONDON:

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1801.

P R E F A C E

TO THE FIRST EDITION

I DO not offer to the Public a complete Treatise; I have indeed materials, of which I could have formed a much larger work; but these outlines will, I hope, represent in its true character the object to which I more immediately wish to fix the attention of my readers.

As I reason only from facts, I trust the impartial Reader will draw the same conclusions; and as I speak of countries in which I have been long resident, and of events, to many of which I was witness, I hope my testimony may have some weight. To show that I have had opportunities of being acquainted with the matters of which I treat, I will only observe, that in Turkey I have been a consul; that I have had indirect concerns in trade; and that, as a traveller, I have visited most parts of that empire; that in Russia I was, for several years, in the confidence of the late Prince Potemkin, and in a situation to know more of the secrets of the cabinet than most foreigners; and that for *five* years I did the business of secretary to his Majesty's minister at St.

Peterfhurgh : at the fame time I am convinced that I expofc myself to the cenfure of not being better informed, and to the rifk of incurring, though I am confcious of not meriting, the blame of betraying a confidence put in me; fo far however, from this being the cafe, I rather apprehend that the delicacy of my fituation, with refpect to the two countries, and particularly to my own, may have operated with too great reitrait on my pen.

Many writers and travellers have feen things in a different light; and I am fenfible that I may be accufed of treating the Turks too feverely,, and particularly by thofe who admire Lady Wortley Montagu's elegant defcriptions, and other iimilar productions of a warm imagination*, i draw conclufions from facts recorded in their own hiftory. Indeed, there cannot be a more horrible picture than that which they have delineated of thEmfelves. The fentiments excelled by the fultans and muftis, which will

* The bel: authors who have written on this fubjeel, *axcBuJbec*, *icundav*, *Monticuculli*, *Marfigli*, and *Ricaut*; they mew what the Turks were in their days. As to *CantEmir* though he had found an afylum in the very heart of the Ruffian empire, he wrote as *if* he ftiil had been at Conftantinople. Other more modern authors are *Bofcovifeb*, *Bufinello*, *Guys*, *Le Bret*, *Sir James Porter*, *Riedefel with Dobm's notes*, *Ludeke*, *Stæers*, *Fereieres*, and *Volney*, and their picture of the Turks is not more favourable than mine. There are others, who have compofed in their clofets excellent hiftories, &c, of this people

be found in the abridgement of their history, in their own words, are so repugnant to justice, to humanity, to every principle of virtue, and to those laws which all civilized nations have respected, that nothing worse can be said of them. The effects produced by this monstrous government in the provinces are shocking to behold. We seek in vain for a population, sufficient to compose those numerous kingdoms and states which flourished when the Turks usurped their dominion; we find the country literally a desert; we find vast cities reduced to beggarly villages, and of many hundreds of them no traces remain.

The government of the Turks has undergone considerable revolutions, which it will be necessary to investigate. The empire, in its flourishing state, was one vast camp. The first sultans dated, and their feeble successes still date, their decrees from the imperial stirrup. The iron (centre, imbrued in blood, could only be wielded by warlike sovereigns, the idol and the terror of the soldiery, whose discipline alone was their politics, and whose rapine alone their resources.

Achmet III. father of the late Abdul-hamid, first let the example of an effeminate reign; and by not going out himself at the head of his janizaries, he became so much the object of their contempt that they dethroned him.

Machmud, his nephew, terrified at the fate of

his predeceflbr, and finding .himfelf unable to govern, determined to defstroy the whole body of janizaries. The army, dreaded by the fultan, found in him an enemy more powerful than all the hqfts of Chriftenom; and he, unable to wield his fceptre without their co-operation, found an enemy in the other flaves whom he called in to affift him, ftill more deftructive of his own power. The prefent reigning fultan, Selim, has fallen *on* a more gentle method of abolifliipg the *janizariesy* but he ftill has the *ulema* to contend with.

The abftract of their hiftory is moftly from Iticault, whole antiquated, though faithful relation, I have often quoted in his own language, I have only cited a few facts to prove the truth of my general affertions ; were I to enumerate all the inftances of unprovoked aggreffion, breach of oaths, treaties, and capitulations, maflacres and acts of cruelty and oppreffion, to be found in the bloody pages of their hiftory, they would form a large volume of themfelves,

The firft part of thefe papers w;;s written fome time fince ; that which is political, about two years ago, on my return to my native country ; but it was not then defigned for the prefs. It may be objected, that there are matters in it which ought not to be made public, as it contains information which may benefit our enemies ; J anfwer (hat they being in poffeffion of

the information which the late government of France had procured, there is nothing essential in this book which will be new to them; nor had even that government, at any time, so many spies, or such exact intelligence, as the Directory now have.

With respect to the Greeks, there will be found much matter wholly new to the Public, but not to the Directory; for no one was better informed of the state of Greece than citizen (heretofore chevalier de) Truguet, lately minister of the marine department. He was for a long time employed in the Archipelago, under the direction of M. de Choifleul Gouffier, and was sent to Egypt to negotiate with the Beys for leave to trade to India through that country, and to counteract the Russian intrigues with them.

I have endeavoured to prove, that the interests of Great Britain and Russia are inseparable and reciprocal. This, indeed, has been generally granted; but whenever the aggrandizement of that empire at the expense of the Turks has been the subject of discussion, that case has generally been considered as an exception; on what grounds, I shall examine, and, I hope, plainly prove that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the re-establishment of the Greek empire, would be more advantageous to Britain

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than even to-Russia itself; that so far from being an usurpation, it is an act of justice ; and that; according to the laws of nations, the Turks have not, by length of possession, acquired a right to the dominion of the countries they conquered. The importance of the alliance of Russia appears every day more strongly, and I rifle now much less than I did a few years ago, when I maintained, that the salvation of Europe depended on engaging that power as a principal in the war. The views of the French with regard to Greece now too plainly appear, and the Emperor of Russia is in danger of being attacked in the Black Sea by a French fleet.

If it be said that we ought, as much as may depend on-us, to prevent the increase of naval power in every other nation ; without denying the proposition., I affirm, that it is not applicable to the present case : Russia never can be formidable in the Baltic; nature has forbidden it. In the Black Sea she may be so, and (she will, in spite of all we can do to prevent it. The question then is, since we cannot prevent it, what is the mode of its existence which will be least hurtful to us ? That the Greeks will emancipate themselves from the yoke of Turkey is also certain. If this event take place by the assistance of the French, we shall *certainly* have an *enemy in Greece* ; if through the interposition of Russia
and

and with our concurrence a friend. There is, indeed, a possibility, but not the least probability, that we may some time or other quarrel with them, but not for a length of time, as there will exist a mutual interest in friendship. Why make a vain attempt, which will certainly create us enemies, when at least we stand a fair chance of procuring friends ?

What I have said of Austria at that time, I leave as I wrote it; I see no reason to think I was then wrong.

The consistency of the conduit of his majesty's ministers, in first opposing the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and afterwards making a war with Russia a *casus foederis*, in the treaty of alliance with the Empress, in 1795, is fully proved by the different circumstances of the times. They have evinced, that they uniformly pursued the interests of their country, and did not obstinately adhere to a system, when it no longer accorded with those interests. Let their antagonists prove, that they themselves did not sacrifice the honour, as well as the interests of this country, in opposing, in an unprecedented manner, the measures adopted by its government; that they themselves are not the cause of those calamities which they attribute to misconduct in ministers.

I have added a few miscellaneous papers, without

out order or connection. They will fhew, in part, bow far the Emprefs's vaft views of aggrandizement extended—they went to the entire conqueft of all European Turkey, a part of which was to be given to the Houfe of Auftriaj. the re-eftablilhment of the Greek empire, and the placing her grandfon Conllantine on the throne of Conftantinople; of making Egypt an independent ftate ; of giving to Poland a Ruffian for a fovereign, and ultimately incorporating it into her own empire ; of making a conqueft of Japan and ,a part of China, and eftablifhing a naval power in thofe feas.

I have thought it neceffary to fay fomething of the charafer of the late Emprefs. Anecdotes of that Princefs appear daily in all languages. There are doubtlefs many truths in fome of them; but they are generally fo defective in the narration and with circumftances which fo totally mif-characterize the action, that few of them will ferve as materials for the accurate Biographer. Thofe who wifh to know her real character, and the character of the moft considerable perfons of her court, would do well to wait a little longer. As to the hiftory of her reign, there are many circumftances which cannot yet be difclofed. Thefe anecdotes have the appearance of having been learned in Ruffia, but not committed to writing, and the memory of the authors, overloaded with
abundance

abundance of materials, has confounded them together: they appear like mutilated statues restored by unskillful artists; we find the trunk of a Hercules or a Jupiter with the head of an Apollo and the feet of a Satyr

It is a difficult thing, at all times, to discover truth, amidst the misrepresentations of courts, of ministers, of commanders. Should any one write, for instance, the history of the last war between Russia and Turkey, he would take for his guide, in relating the first event, the siege of Ochakov, the accounts published by the court of Peterburgh, and the reports of the commanders. There he would find a brilliant victory gained by Prince Nassau over the Turkish fleet in the Liman; but if he could get the report made by Paul Jones to the Admiralty of Cherson, signed by all the commanders of the fleet, he would find that no engagement took place (except a distant cannonade) -, that the Turkish ships ran aground by their ignorance and bad manoeuvres; and that Nassau with *his flotilla*, instead of taking possession of them, set them on fire. This journal, which I have read, and taken an extract from, was forbidden by Prince Potemkin to be sent to Peterburgh; and the whole campaign, as it stands on record, is nearly a romance. The fortifications might have been taken the first of July with more ease than the 6th of December, and

the

the commander-in-chief knew it. I was at the opening of the trenches, and at the storming of the place, and therefore can speak of facts to which I was an eye-witness.

If, after all, I am mistaken, and have lost my way in the wilderness of politics, I have not intentionally deviated from the truth; nor have I been guided by any motive but the interest of my country: and here I must make a digression, which, I hope, will be pardoned.

A man who has been twenty years absent from his native country may, I hope, be permitted to express his astonishment at the changes he finds on his return—changes, which seem not to strike those so forcibly who have been witnesses to them when they severally occurred.

When I left England, no man would have dared to stand up to arraign his country, and publicly plead the cause of France; and its enmity then was friendship compared with its enmity now; he would have been deemed a traitor, and the people would have treated him as such.

I hear ministers accused of plunging the nation into a ruinous war, and persevering in it; I look to facts, and facts prove the contrary.

They are accused of not humiliating their country before the enemy, and procuring such a
peace

peace as muft soon make England a province of Finance. Of this charge I hope they are guilty

I hear it publicly aflerted, that the conftitution is changed; that liberty is annihilated that we are under a military government. I look to facts, and find a Hardy, a Thelwall, &c. &c. &c. cannot be puniftied. I fee acquitted, at Haverford, men who were aceufed by five witnefles of high-treafon, becaufe on their trial the witnefles cannot be *perfuaded* to fpeak out; and becaufe their firft pofitive, clear, and unequivocal depofition before a magiftrate cannot be admitted* Where is the military government? The circumftance of an invafion would have juftified it. How did they proceed in France, where liberty, equality, and fraternity are eftablifht? they punifht *en maffe*. At Toulon, all thofe *fittpetfed* of having favoured the Englifh were collefcted and fired on; at Lyons and other places, the fame. Where were the juries? the counfel for the prifoners? where was the book of laws? where was the judge, who durft not interpret them one fyllable beyond the letter? How would the French have proceeded, if they had been in our fituation? Not only the two men in queftion, but all the inhabitants of Fifguard, would have been driven to the place where the enemy landed by invitation, and tried and executed by a regiment of foldiers, *en maffe*.

They

They would have proceeded in the same manner with a Thelwall and his applauding audience. How did they proceed with the party in opposition to them ? (which was not an opposition to overturn the government it had sworn to maintain, but an opposition to stop the progress of despotic power.) The members of it were all seized, and sent without trial to some place, nobody knows where, into exile, perhaps to the bottom of the ocean.

In what page of history, ancient or modern, is such moderation to be found as in this insulted government of ours ? I see here, *proved by facts, men* subje^dV. only to the law, and that law more powerful than men. I find no such liberty anywhere else, neither in practice at this day, nor in the records of history.

Nor are my ears less shocked to hear a foreigner spoken by a part of the people of Britain. Our demagogues have translated the French words *liberte egalite, fraternity philanthropie, philofophie*, by the English words, liberty, equality, fraternity, philanthropy, philosophy; and because there is much resemblance in the sounds, they would persuade the people that there is also a resemblance in the ideas they convey,

Facts teach us, that *libere* signifies the most horrible tyranny, silencing all law, and violating
all

all property; that egalite fignifies murdering fo-
vereigns and the higher claffes and putting over
the people men ; the niott low, ignorant, and
wicked, inverted with power to infult, to enflave,
and to drive them in flocks to be flaughtered,
placing them at a greater diftance than there
exifted before between them and their fuperiors
by birth and education. *Fratemite*, in France,
fignifies being a Frenchman ; applied to other
nations, it fignifies, forcing on them a defpotic
form of government, plundering their property,
and ravifhing their wives and daughters. *Phi-
lantropk* is the profeffion of general love to all
mankind, and the practice of cruelty to every
individual. *Philofophie*, (which was the mother
of all the French virtues,) fignifies the comrnif-
fion of every crime without remorse ; the extinc-
tion of every fentiment religious and moral, of
every generous and fociai feeling; the diffolutioiv
of every tie of kindred and affection ; the anni-
hilation of every quality which ornaments and
diftinguifhes the gentleman, the fcholar, and the
man of tafte; the banifhment of chaftity, mo-
defty, fenfibility, and decorum from the female
(ex.

Every nation has thought it neceffary, in times
of public danger, to punifh crimes, when the
coimonlaw was inefficient, by a tribunal erected
for that purpofe; in Athens, this tribunal was
compofed of the people affembled ; in Rome

of

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of judges appointed by a decree of the people. Have not the good people of Britain a right to look to their representatives for protection against those who *openly* And *secretly* attack their government, and who *establish schools to disseminate sedition* into the minds of their children, and yet defend the revolutionary tribunals in France, and the military despotism of the Directory, on the ground of public danger? In all offences against the nation, might not (I ask, for I am not learned in the law) confidently with our sacred constitution, the representatives of the nation try and decide, rather than a jury of private persons?—such offences are not of a private nature between man and man;—or might not that body which represents the party injured, the nation, be the accuser, and the House of Lords the tribunal? If this manner of proceeding be unprecedented, the necessity of adopting it is equally fo

P R E F A C E
TO THE SECOND EDITION.

SINCE the first edition of this book was printed, considerable changes have taken place in the political situation of the Ottoman empire. The French have invaded one of its provinces. This act of hostility has produced a war with that nation

tion, and an alliance and co-operation between Turkey, Great Britain, and Ruffia. This I certainly regard as a very fortunate event; and though notwithstanding its zeal, but little exertion can reasonably be expected from the Porte, in its present deplorable situation, when a revolted city sets the whole power of this once mighty empire at defiance; yet it will stop the progress of revolution on French principles among the Greeks; and will, besides the advantages to our trade, be productive of other good.

In this situation of things, some of my friends lament that my book has appeared. When it was first published there existed no probability of such events taking place; and it was only owing to an accidental discovery, that the vizir had been bribed by the Directory, that the Porte has assumed the appearance of being resolved to prosecute the war offensively. Be that as it may, if we are to be connected with the Porte in friendship and co-operation, is it not equally prudent to know its real and its relative strength, as if we were to act against it? And after all, are, by its present connection with us, the usurpations of the Porte become less unjust? Is its tyranny over its subjects become less insupportable? Is its government, its religion become less abominable? Are the people become more humane, more virtuous, more tolerant? Are they less inimical to Christianity?

I avoided from the first, as much as possibly speaking of such situations of things, and of such events as can only occasion a temporary derangement in the effect of general causes, I have enquired what is the internal situation of the Turkish empire, and what rank in the scale of political importance it has obtained; and how its decline or annihilation would affect the interest of other states? Whatever changes may, after all, have since taken place, I have established, I hope, what is the real situation of that country at this day; and whatever changes may hereafter take place, this situation will serve as a criterion of comparison to any future position.

The emperor Paul is a prince of the most scrupulous honor and the purest integrity, incapable of taking advantage of the situation in which the boundless confidence of the Porte, as much as its terror, has voluntarily placed him. He has let the generous example of laying aside the individual interest of his own nation, and defending his natural enemy, to promote the interest he only has in common with all other sovereigns*.

When the present contest shall be ended, what will ultimately be the fate of so desirable a country, situated between powerful neighbours, and

* Such was Paul when he began his reign: he soon showed symptoms of deranged intellects, which gradually increasing, he became quite insane.

having no force of its own, no attachment of its Christian subjects, nor energy of government for its defence, may, without difficulty, be conjectured. But *how far distant* that period may be removed by the present changes in its favour, which have added another hair to sustain a little longer the suspended sword from falling on its head, no one can pretend to calculate, or to foretell what other circumstances may still occur to prolong its existence.

So much has lately been written on the subject of the French expedition to Egypt, that it would be superfluous to say any more.

I (shall, therefore, only observe, that more accurate knowledge of that country was to be expected from the French. They have totally mistaken the people, and have misunderstood the government of the Beys, which, notwithstanding their frequent rebellions, is the constitution given to Egypt by Selima I. which establishes a kind of independence.

Had the Directory followed the plan of the old cabinet of France, and offered to maintain the eighteen Beys in their respective governments, Bonaparte would have been received with open arms. The pasha of Acri, who has an army of 40 or 50,000 men, besides being in possession of part of the strongest country of the Druses; and who is as perfectly independent of the Porte as was his predecessor Shek Omar-ul-Daher,

would have joined in the league; for the country of Acrida and Egypt are always in alliance; Bonaparte then might have bidden defiance to the Porte and its allies.—The Directory might afterwards have served the beys as they have done the king of Sardinia.

The situation of this paper is, however, still deserving of particular attention at this moment.

The Monthly Reviewers, imagining that I had not been in Russia before the siege of Ochakof, have concluded that I knew little of the interior of the court of St. Petersburg. I hoped that I had said enough of myself in the Preface to the first Edition of this Book, which they seem not to have read, or not to have understood for what purpose this book was written.

Notwithstanding all the respect which is due to such learned critics, I cannot subscribe to the rules which they recommend, in translating proper names of men and places from the Russian language. After twenty-three years acquaintance with an alphabet, surely I may be allowed so much knowledge of it, as not to have written Orlov for Orloff through ignorance.

I wrote *Orlov*, *Romanzo*, and *woronzow*, because those persons, following the Polish, not the German orthography, spelled their names in this manner, when they wrote in the Latin character. Where I had no **fuch**, authority, I made

ufe of fuch Englifh letters as would produce *nearly* the Ruffian founds.

There is no fyllable in the German language which ends with *w*, except in a few names of men and places, where it is founded like their *u*, (not like our *vj* and even thefe are not original German words.

I fee no reafon why we fhould tranflate Ruffian words through a German medium. There are many Ruffian letters which Germans cannot pronounce, and confequently cannot exprefs the founds by their letters. The Englifh *ch* have exactly the found of the Ruffian *Y*, but the German *tfch* have not; nor can a German pronounce this found at all. This manner of writing, lately become fo frequent, caufes an Englifhman to pronounce wrongly; for inftance : *Kamtfckatka*, as if written *Kamt-jkatka*. We might with as much propriety write Arabic words, as Niebuhr has done : *Dfchjidda*, *Dfehjebbal*, &c. whereas our own orthography *Gidda* and *Gebal* produces exactly the Arabic found, which the German *Dfchj* do not. When the Ruffian *B* (*vedi*) begins a fyllable, it has the found of the Englifh *V*, but preceded by a confonant (as in *MOCKBA*) that of the German or Italian *U* at the end of a fyllable, when it is followed by either of the mute letters *b* or *6*, which give a hard or foft found to the final fyllable, it has the power of *ff'*, *v*, or *vc*. Mr. Smiraove, in his Survey of Ruffia,

has written proper names as they are pronounced, and he thinks that the *vedi* should always be expressed in English by *v* or *ve*. He writes his own name in conformity to his rule. He is a scholar, and a Russian born.

The Poles pronounce *ch* as we do *fn*; *cz* as we do *ck*, (hence Ochakof, not Qtchakof) but *c* alone like *ts*: *Potockh* pronounce *Pototjki*, &c.

Where the orthography of names is established by long custom, we must, I suppose, continue to use it. Moscow is become the English name for *Mosqua* (МОСКВА); Naples for *Napoli*; Leghorn for *Livorno* (anciently Lighorno). The French name for London is *Londres*, the Italian *Londra*, &c.

Where this is not the case, we must spell names as the natives do, if they make use of the Latin character; if they do not, we must either write their character, or make use of letters of our own alphabet that will produce, as near as possible, the same sounds; or, without any regard to the sounds that answer to their letters. I will not decide which method ought to be followed, or which is the real language of a people whose orthography is fixed, the oral or the written. I will only observe, that it is very difficult to render the principal sounds of one language by letters of another, not to mention modifications and this is particularly so to the English, whose vowels have a very uncertain pronunciation,

I cannot approve of *Suliaun* and *Turkiftaun*, &c. The Perfians, indeed, pronounce the *a* broad *j* but this is not always the case with other Orientals, nor does the accent always lie on the *a*. Sultan has the same letters as in the Oriental languages; the pronunciation of it thus written, is near enough, and this orthography is established through all Europe, as well as with us.

I have written Tatar, because there is no *r* in the first syllable, either in the writing or the pronunciation of the Orientals. The Russians always have written and pronounced Tatar; and the Germans have lately adopted this orthography.

I have carefully examined the character I drew of the late emperors, and I cannot discover one incorrect feature.

Prince Potemkin was born a gentleman, received a very good education at Moscow, and was a major-general in the army before he was promoted to the post of favourite. The comparison between the elevation of a Turkish vizir from the lowest station, with some few instances of a similar kind in Russia, does not prove a similitude in the spirit of the two governments. In Turkey, every one who rises to a high office rises from nothing. The fortunes of all officers of the empire (the ulema excepted) are inherited by the sultan, to the total exclusion of their children. There is no such thing as

family, or family fortunes in that empire. In Ruffia, notwithstanding the advantages persons of family and fortune naturally have, and must have in all civilized states; and, notwithstanding the very partial distribution of honours and rewards, and the fortunes made by some who enjoyed the personal favour of the sovereign in the late reign, merit was never excluded; and, upon the whole, there is no country in Europe where it is more sure of reward than in Ruffia, and where the *right* of rising by rotation, or by length of service, both in the civil and military departments, is better established: Mobility and great connections do not there engross every honourable employment, to the exclusion or depression of merit.

I find that I have not been sufficiently explicit in describing the method of making yeast: from split peas. The whole of the water in which the peas were steeped, as well as the froth, must be used as yeast. Some persons having taken only the froth, have not succeeded. It is also necessary in this country to let the peas steep much longer in water than in a warmer climate. A few trials will determine the exact time in winter and in summer, either by the quantity of froth produced, or by the taste and smell of the
Water,

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OF THE

TURKISH EMPIRE.

INTRODUCTION.

IT is the aim of the following sheets to delineate the moral and political state of a great empire, less accurately known to us than its contiguity and relative importance demand. The study of human nature, under the various influences of peculiar situation, laws, and customs, can in no case be uninteresting either to the politician, the moralist, or the philosopher. If we consider mankind merely as acted upon by science* as elevated to unusual splendor by the energies of intellect, or depressed to a fatal degradation by gross ignorance, it must render our speculations more accurate our judgment more distinct to try the standard of theory by the test of experience, and to view the effect produced on a large community by the degree of knowledge

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which they possess. If from science we turn to morals, and would contemplate the efficacy of religious doctrines, of legal institutions, or of popular opinions, these cannot be fairly tried but by referring to their effect on the nation at large in which they exist. Should it again be our desire to estimate justly the political advantages of external and internal administration, these are best tried by an appeal to facts: despotism or licentiousness appearing in their true colours give the surest, because the most rational means, of appreciating the advantages of good government.

No one can doubt that these ends will be greatly promoted by a review of the state of Turkey, which must present a picture no less interesting, from the magnitude of its objects, than from the peculiarity of their features. It may indeed be objected, that this subject has been treated by many writers, apparently well qualified to deliver faithful and complete information; but it is not improbable that the testimony of to eye-witnesses, furnished with a multitude of particular facts, would even in that case be a desirable addition to the mass of evidence which is brought before the public. The truth, however, is, that the multitude of testimonies, or the accuracy of information, is by no means such as to render further accounts unnecessary: In many

Very intending points the principal authors do not agree; some are swayed by personal or national interest, and some misled by superficial observation or unfounded caprice. We have proofs that even a long residence in that country, and in a capacity which would appear the best calculated to afford information, that of a public minister, is not sufficient. The numerous errors Sir James Porter has fallen into demonstrate this. As to merchants, their occupations seldom leave them leisure or curiosity to be informed of matters foreign to commerce, and distant from their places of abode* From travellers who run through a country, less is to be expected. "*Till a man is Capable of conversing with ease among the natives of a country, he can never be able to form an adequate idea of their policy and manners*"

It is obvious, that a considerable portion of time and study is requisite to obtain a full acquaintance with the moral and political state of a nation: he who would observe it with accuracy should have resided a long time in the country; he should have possessed opportunities of penetrating into the councils of the government, as well as of noticing the manners and genius of the people; he should have seen them in war and in peace, have noted their military skill and their Commercial system and, above all, it is

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neceffary that he fhould have an accurate knowledge of their language, fo as *to* be free from one great and almoft univerfal fource of error in accounts of foreign countries, arifing from the mifapprehenfion of the relator himfelf.

' In order;to form a juft ftandard for trying the comparative accuracy of different accounts, it will be neceffary to know thofe prejudices which are moft likely, in fpite of the beft intentions, to infinuate themfelves into an author's work from motives of private or of public intereft. With this view it will not be unacceptable to notice a few particulars relative to two or three works of the beft reputation, which have lately appeared, and which have treated of the Turkifh empire in general. Of earlier authors it is needlefs to fpeak.

I know of no book from which more may be learnt of the true charafter of that people, and the ftate of knowledge among them, than from *Af. De fait*. He fpoke their language perfedly, he enjoyed their confidence, and lived more intimately with them than any Chriftian has lately done. It does not appear that he has wilfully mifrepresented any one circumftance. I never faw him, but what I have heard of him is much in his favour. His book difobliged the French court, which did not with to fee them expofed. He has fpoken perhaps, too much *of* himfelf.

himself, and made the mod of what he did for the Turks, though the facts are indifputable. Theegotifm of modern travellers in relating incidents and adventures which might happen in any country, and which convey no information peculiar to th&t they are travelling in, is truly difguffing; they are at beft fubjeds for novels. Had he fatd lefs of himfelf, we (hduld have loft thofe little ftories, Ivhich give more infight into the true charader of the people with whom he was concerned, than could perhaps be obtained from volumes of differtations. His work is indifputably the beft and moft accurate account hitherto given of the general fyftem, as well as the peculiar features of Turkilh manners; and though it has been cenfured as a calumny, it is in fad a very moderate pidure of real events.

To this teftimony of De Tott is oppofed that of M. Peyflbnelj a man undoubtedly learned and fcientificj whose refidence in the empire and knowledge of its language render him deferving of great attention, though his opportunities of acquiring information were by no means equal to thofe of De Tott. Of M. Peyffonel two things are to be remarked, the fuffrage which he gives in favour of Tott, and the prejudices which were likely to affed his own teftimony. Ia fpeaking of the Baron, he readily admits,

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" *his profound knowledge of the government, laws, manners; customs and character of the Turks, derived from a long residence in the country, a close attention to the language, and from being employed in affairs of the greatest importance*" What he professes is only to point out, "*pulchro in opere nœvos* some imperfections in a valuable work, After this suffrage in favour of Tott, we need only refer to him for a picture of Turkey, faithful enough to be relied on, and yet sufficiently forcible to excite our disgust at such monsters in human shape. The same M. Peyffonel quotes, as writers of greater accuracy, Du Pan and Montefquieu, who, he acknowledges, wrote in their closets accounts of a people whom they had never seen.

In page 88 of M. Peyffonel's letter we see the true reason of his defence of the Turks: "*It is (says he) to endeavour to justify a nation, which has always been the ally of our own; with whom we carry on a commerce that is still the object of envy and the vexation of our rivals*"

Mouragia (now Chevalier d'Oraffon) is perfectly equal to the extensive work he has undertaken, which will contain more knowledge of Turkey than any book which was ever written; but he will not touch the subject of their decline and approaching fall: his object is to represent them in the most advantageous light, and

INTRODUCTION.

and he will not prove what they are, but what they possibly might have been: he is an Armenian, and the Turkish language is his mother tongue: he was once *literature's* a *fan's* culotte: his promising genius, when a boy, procured him the patronage of a rich Armenian merchant; intrigue, talents, and the protection of the French directory, raised him to the post *OF SORE* *dis* minister at Constantinople.

Other authors have only lightly touched on those matters which are the subject of this book, and which it is *my intention* to investigate more fully.

CHAPTER I

On the Turkish Government.

TO point out those relations which a country bears to its neighbours, or to the general interests of society, is perhaps no very difficult task: the features are striking, the moral and physical differences are easily discernible, and the standard of general politics is, perhaps, accurate enough (to determine with sufficient nicety, the result of such an analysis: But if we carry our investigation into those more minute causes which affect the prosperity or decline of a nation from internal circumstances, we shall find the question more deep and intricate, the decision more vague and doubtful, Without, however, examining into those causes, it is impossible to build up a moral or political speculation of any magnitude or importance; it is impossible to reason with accuracy on the great interests of nations, or to form grand and comprehensive plans embracing the general advantage of society. Nor is it less true, that internal causes are almost always the most immediate motors in national elevation or decay: as, on
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the one hand, no feeble ffiate was ever elevated to extraordinary eminence by the mere aid of alliances, however powerful ; fo on the other, fcareely any great nation ever periffed by means of external violence, urilefs it had fomething within itfelf vicious and unfound. I fhall, therefore, in a fubfequent chapter, take a view of the Turkiffh empire as it ftands related both to the general fyftem of Europe, and to the feveral European powers; -and in the mean while I will proceed to difcufe its internal fixation.

From the nature of man, from the exteht of his faculties, and the variety of his powers, it is evident that he is at the fame time operated upon by caufesthe moft heterogeneous and dif-fimilar. With the progrefs of fociety new powers and new faculties are daily called forth; they continually modify each other, and produce that a&ion and re-action which conftitutes the complexity of the vaft focial machine. To ab-ftraft and generalize thefe various motions, to reduce them to their primary and elemental principles, is the bufinefs of fcience; but it unfortunately happens too often, that the philofopher, who may with much care and obfervation have made this analyfis, will build upon it fpeculations not wholly founded upon rational principles. The error into which thefe dealers in fyftem frequently fell (an error which has
very

very unjustly thrown a general odium upon all the systematic labours of science) is to conceive that the divisions which they have themselves; established in theory are strongly marked in fact, or, in other words, that the different habits and customs of mankind are less intimately interwoven than experience daily proves them to be. When, therefore, we trace the distinct forces from which the peculiar character and circumstances of the Turkish nation have originated, we must be careful at the same time to remember, that the events which have flowed from those forces have been so mixed and compounded together, and act at the present day with such an aggregate force, as to produce a far greater effect by combination than by their separate power. So much is necessary to be observed before we begin to delineate the peculiar features of Turkish policy; we now proceed to the talk of discrimination.

The modern European, accustomed for the most part to consider all the subjects *of* one empire as alike entitled to the protecting care of government, alike invested with the political rights of citizens, can, with difficulty accommodate his feelings to a state, of manners refusing from the division of the political body into conquerors and conquered, oppressors and, oppressed. This is, however the distinction *most* broadly marked

marked in the Turkifh empire a diftinction fupported by every kind of prejudice which can influence focial manners, and confirmed by the inveterate habits of ages. To the celebrated governments of antiquity this exaltation of one part of the community upon the degradation of the other was by no means "unknown; we fee it inftanced in the *Helots* of Sparta, and in the inftitutions of many of thofe nations who moft loudly vaunted of their fancied liberty; happily for modern ages it has generally, in Europe, given place to political equality; but Turkey is the refuge of fanatical ignorance, the chofen feat where fhe has unfurled her bloody banner, and where, though torpid with age, fire ftill grafps her iron fceptre. That happy union, and equality of right to the protection of Laws, which tempers the variety of individual interefts for the general good, is the only bafis of focial happinefs. How far the dereliction of thefe principles in the Turkifh government weakens the power of the community, whilft it perpetuates the mifery of the individual, will appear from a comparative view of the different lefts in that country, and from a furvey of the ftate of its provinces.

The *Turks*, properly fo called, are the followers of Mahomet, defcended from the Tatarian Conquerors of thefe beautiful countries. Thefe
being

bring now the actual matters of the empire, and tile only perfons who feem to have a reat intereft in its exiftence, their fituation, moral and phyfical, firft demands our notice. The great outline of their character, as diftinguifhed from the other inhabitants of this etftenftve. empire, is the fuperiority which they claim on the gonads of conqueft and religion. To apply to a nation, barbarous as the Turks, any rule of yatioaal policy drawn from the law of nations, would, perhaps, be deemed abfurd; but the en- liftened obferver maft ever remark, that the fancied right of conqueft is nothing but the right of the fword, which is never legitimate fcut when fancioned by juftice. In the hiftory of the world there have been frequent inftances of mighty nations, who, after conquering their opponents by- force of arms, have received fitDm their captives the fofter yoke of fcience. It was thus that, in the words of Horace:

" Grsecia capta forum victorum cepit, et artes

" Intulit agrefti Latio"

Nor have there been wanting examples of the introduction of arts by the conqueror himfelf, who has thus ;tiade.amends, by the bleffing of civilization, for the havock which he had caufed by the fword. The Turks, however, like barbarians, invaded Greece, and fwept before them the monuments of ancient fcience; and, like barbarians,

barbarians, they hold their captives, to the present day, under the benumbing yoke of ignorance and slavery. Instead of promoting the mutual advantage of both nations, by an intercourse of knowledge and benevolence, they use the privilege of conquest only to the extinction of the common powers of intellect. A politic conqueror, in augmenting the happiness of his new subject, increases his own power; a barbarian invader weakens his own resources by the continued oppression of his captives. Abderahman (or Almanzor) who, in the middle of the eighth century, founded a kingdom in Spain of the provinces which had been subject to the kalifs, promoted intermarriages between Christians and Mahomedans. The Arabs, who had been as great enemies to the sciences as the Turks, not only cultivated them with great success, and had acquired a considerable portion of knowledge and politeness, while the rest of Europe was degraded by ignorance and barbarism. But the haughty Turk is not merely exalted above his subject Greek as a conqueror; he considers himself still more highly elevated as the favourite of heaven; and the greater part of his ferocity as a tyrant is owing to the arrogant dictates of his religion. It is in vain that the panegyrics of Turkey would assure us of the spirit of toleration, which, according to them, the disciple of the

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the sanguinary Mahomet cherishes in his boform. Every feature of the Turkish character, every circumstance of their public and private customs, contradicts the assertion, Mankind are not at the present day to learn, that the human character is formed by its education, and that a great and important branch of that education consists of political institutions. Were there any doubt of the truth of this principle, the strong exemplification of it afforded by Turkey would obviate every objection. There it is, more than in any other country, that the dogmas of the legislator and the priest are continually presented to the mind of youth as well as of age; that they occur in every rank and condition of life, and act with a force the more powerful, as they are united in one and the same code. Such are the observations which arise on the first view of the Turkish character: in proceeding to particularize its individual features, we have to contemplate the various causes, moral and physical, which have an influence upon it, either immediate or remote always remembering, that they are to be viewed, not merely as Ample powers, but as acting with that mutual and reciprocal force which so greatly augments their aggregate effect. The local and material objects which contribute to the life and fall, the importance or weakness of nations are, *climate,*

fiuation productions, And population, but these are in part or altogether fubject to the energies of mind, and mind takes its peculiar bent from religous and political inftitutions, from hiftorical events, from arts and fcienes, And from thofe general manner's which are' the refult of all the other caufes combined.

In the following fketch I fhall firft endeavour to developpe thefe *moral* caufes, and from their action it will not be difficult to account, in the fecond place, for the *natural* phenomena obfervable in the prefent ftate of Turkey.

The religion of the Turks is, perhaps, the predominating principle, which, above all others, ftamps the character of their minds; but as its power in this refpect is chiefly owing to its political authority, and as it is not my intention to enter into a nice inveftigation of a fyftem whofe abfurdity is obvious to all enlightened Europeans, I fhall confider this part of the fubject: as dependant *on* the political inftitutions, which will therefore firft demand our attention.

Political inftitution is a fpring always in action, a motor univerfally prefent, forming the character of the individual, and guiding the operations of the community. If then we would caft our eyes over the moral map of Turkey; if we would juftly eftimate the "internal powers of that nation, either as an *enemy* or ally, our

our notions must be regulated by the degree of purity or error observable in its political economy.

Much has been said in assertion and denial of the despotism of the Turkish government; and arguments the most absurd and far-fetched have been employed, rather to confound the meaning of terms than to establish the authenticity of facts. But if by despotism be meant a power originating in force and upheld by the *fame* means to which it owed this establishment; a power calculated to crush the growing energies of mind, and annihilating the faculties of man* in order to insure his dependence, the government of Turkey may be most faithfully characterized by that name. All permanent power extended over a large community, must have something more than the mere force of arms to rely on; or rather that very force must depend, in the ultimate resort, on popular opinion. It is a vain objection, therefore, that the despotism of the Sultan cannot extend beyond the superstition of the people: that very superstition serves it as a basis, and the more firmly rooted are their religious prejudices, the more terrible is the despotism which springs from them.

Equally vain and fruitless are the contests concerning the particular character of this despotism

potism .: It has been called a *military* government, from the nature of its origin, and the means most frequently employed in its administration; and it has obtained the denomination of a *theocracy*, because its fundamental code is the Koran. Each of these statements contains something that is erroneous. A military government supposes the dictates of an arbitrary chief, requiring implicit obedience in every inferior, and prescribing a certain punishment for neglect or transgression ; it excludes all formality and delay, and it is enforced by military power. In theocracies, the will of the leader has not (or at least pretends not to have) the direction of the state himself an instrument in the hands of a superior being, he communicates to the people, at various times, and as occasion requires, the commands of the Divinity. The Turkish government bears evident traces of both these systems, derived from the character of its founder ; but there are some points of difference which prove it to be, *fid generis* an heteroclitic monster among the various species of despotism. In the Mahometan system of policy we may trace' three series. The *first*, which was of that kind usually denominated a theodcracy, continued during the life-time of the prophet himself, who, like Moses and Joshua among the Jews, appeared in the double character

racter of a military chief and an inspired legislator. The *second* was the government of the Saracen kalifs, his immediate successors: they bore, indeed the double sceptre of temporal and spiritual power but as they pretended to no personal communications with the Almighty, all the sanctity of their character consisted in being the defendants of the prophet, and the guardians and expositors of his law :The present Turkish constitution forms the *third* gradation : like the preceding, it has an inviolable code in the sacred volume of its religion; likewise also its reliance is on the power of the sword, and the modes of its administration are military; but it has an essential difference in the separation of the temporal and spiritual authorities. This division of power originated in the political error of the Ottoman princes, who, eager only for military glory, and perhaps wishing to cast a specious veil over their usurpation, when they finally suppressed the kalifat, did not annex to themselves all its functions, but resigned into the hands of the theological lawyers the spiritual supremacy. No despotism was ever more profoundly politic than that, which, wielding at once the temporal and spiritual sword, converted fanaticism itself into an instrument of sovereignty, and united in one person the voice and the arm of the Divinity. But it must be

remembered,

remembeated, that when ;the poller of the kaifs began to-decline, other princes, besides thofe of the race of Othtman affumed an independent fevereigiityj and it is probable that moft of them, with a flow of moderation, which they thought politic, invefted the priefts with the adminiftration of ail their fpiritual affairs. Such was the origin of the authority given to the *ulema*, or body of lawyers, and their chief, the *mufti*, or high prieft, to whom is- entrusted the expofition of the Mohammedan law in all its branches. Thefe men poffeffing, like the priefts under the Jewifh theocracy, the oracles both of law and religion, not only unite in themfehres the power of two great corporations, thofe of the law and of the church, but alfo (hare with the fovereign the direct exercife of the legiflative, executive, and judicial powers. Previous to the Ottoman ara there were indeed muftis; but their power was only of a judicial, not of a political nature, exactly refembling that of the muftis, who are now appointed in the feveral provinces, and Whole office is fomething fimilar to that of kadi or judge ;for it muft not be forgotten, that the judicial and facerdotal characters are in Turkey the fame. The chief engine of this hierarchy is *the fetva* of the mufti, a fort of manifefto, which, like the bulls of the Roman pontiff, originating in ecclefiasti-

cal power has been applied to the: moft mpore

The katifs, with a view of enfuting *the prompt obedience of their fubject*, were accuftomed to give to the principal acts of, their government: the fanction of religion by affixing to their decrees (fuch as thofe of war and peace the facred feal, which affured to the true believers, acting under it, the; honour of fupporting their faith, if triumphant, or the palm of martyrdom in cafe of death. The Othman princes, in order to obtain a fimilar end, were obliged to require the aid of the priefthood, which they had eftablifhed. They applied, thereforfc, to the mufti, who, by the advice of the heads of the ulema, publifhed the facred ordinance called *fetva* which declares the act of government, to which it is affixed, confonant to the Koran, and obligatory on all true .believers. The power which the priefthood thus acquired was at firft inconfiderable i it refembled the enregiftering of edicts by the French parliaments, which was a meafure rather judicial than Jegiflative; but they doubtlefs perceived in it the feeds of future greatnefs and authority. So long as the fceptre was fwayed by warlike princes, the mufti was eafily made to fpeak as the fultan directed and the power of the ulema, under their warlike monarchs, was fcarcely perceived. It does not appear that
they

they attempted any resistance to the will of the sovereign before the reign of Amurath IV. That prince one of the most ferocious that ever sat on the Ottoman throne, irritated at the deposition of a minister caused him to be thrown into a huge mortar, and pounded to death. He invented this kind of punishment in order to obviate, by a cruel irony, the privilege which the ulema enjoyed, that no member of their body could have his blood shed as a punishment. This example sufficiently proves how little the men of the law were, at that time, able to oppose a sovereign whose despotism was supported by the scimitar.

But upon the decline of the military spirit of the sultans, that which was only a political spring in the hands of the sovereign, has become a fundamental law of the empire, creating and confirming a power, which, if not in actual opposition, is always in balance against him. The utility of such a balance of power in the more enlightened governments has been strenuously supported on the grounds of a liberal policy; but, whatever we may think of such arguments, they cannot apply to the state of Turkey, where the balance is only a balance of intrigue and artifice, whilst there is, in both parties, a perfect accordance of despotism, a mutual desire both of the means and inclination to benefit the

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community

community. On the part of the sultan, it may be observed that he would, long since, have become, the mere creature and tool of the mufti, but for the power which he has referred to himself, of nominating and deposing the holder of that dignity. This it is which gives him a counterpoise against the mufti, by creating for him, among the ulema, as many partisans as there are candidates aspiring to the pontificate. The ulema on the other hand, are, in their collective capacity, jealous of preserving the influence which they have thus obtained in the government; and that religion, which served the first sultans as a means of administration, has become a source of terror and subjection to their feeble successors. The fetva is now so indispensable a preliminary to any political act, that the sultan who should dare to omit it, would be declared an infidel by a fetva issued by the mufti himself; and such a proceeding would be sufficient to excite against him both the populace and soldiery, and to precipitate him at once from his throne. So far is this jealousy carried by the ulema, that they oppose, with all their power, the sultan's departure from the capital, lest, when at a distance from them, he should be able to conciliate the army to his interests, and assert his independence. The late sultan Mustafa, anxious to be at the head of his army, was
prevented

prevented from taking the field only by the fear of a revolt, which the *men of the law* could easily have excited in his absence

Another apparent check on the authority of the sultan, is formed by the *great council* consisting of the great military officers, the heads of the ulema, and the principal ministers of the empire. No important act of government can be undertaken without a previous discussion in this assembly, at which the grand vizier, or chief vizier, presides; but every question is decided by a plurality of votes. It is unnecessary to expatiate on this body, as forming a distinct political power, because, from the nature of its members, it must be swayed either by the party of the sultan, or by that of the priesthood, and it, therefore, serves rather to determine the relative power of those two distinct bodies.

That much political knowledge cannot be expected from the ministers of state, is evident from the manner in which they attain their situations. Rising from the meanest Ranks, they advance progressively to the highest posts; not by means of superior genius or knowledge, but by petty intrigue, and by flattering those on whom they depend. The vizier *Yusef* who commanded in 1790 against the emperor, was raised by Gazi Hafiz from a state of the most indigence. He sold soap in the streets, carrying it in

a basket on his head, before he became the servant of Haflan, who after employing him in that mental office, made him successively clerk in the treasury of the arsenal, his own agent at the porte, (*kapi kahfa*) pasha of the Morca, and, lastly, grand vizir.

There is, indeed, a regular establishment for educating youth for the service of the sultan in a school at Pera, called *Golota Serai*: when they come thither, they are placed in different classes, according to their abilities and the line to which, they are destined. But this institution has so far degenerated, that few but the sons of persons belonging to the seraglio are (sent thither, where their education is of small importance, as any one, whether he has passed through this college or not, may attain any office in the seraglio by means of intrigue and bribery. It may be worth while here to notice a singular error, which is generally entertained in Europe relative to the term *seraglio*, which is supposed to mean *the apartments, of the women*: it literally means *palace*, and is, therefore, applied by way of eminence to the vast range of buildings inhabited by the grand seignior, and all the officers and dependents of his court. Here is transacted all the business of government; the council itself is called the *divan*, and the place of public audience the *porte*, or the gate. Of the officers
of

of the seraglio the vizir is chief (as being the prime minister of the sovereign); this is also a term given to him by way of eminence, as it signifies a counsellor in general and every pasha of three tails (that is of the first class) is a vizir: the pasha or vizir who resides at the porte, or with the fultan is called the grand vizir, or vizir azem. Beside the vizir all the other great public officers of the empire, resident at Constantinople, inhabit the seraglio or, at least, have their offices there; all the ministers, pashas, &c. without exception, belong to it, and their possessions revert at their death to the fultan, their matter and their heir, of whom they are styled *the Jkves* (kul, or kool) so that their descendants have no advantage over those of the meanest mechanics, except what they may casually derive from the notice of the sovereign, or from having been introduced by their parents into the school of the seraglio.

From the preceding observations it appears, that the legislative and executive powers are, in the higher acts of policy, divided among different bodies : the executive acts of an inferior order are such as regard *financial* and *military* operations, or matters of general *police*. The two former of these branches, though of 'small import in the individual acts, are, each in its aggregate, of sufficient importance to claim a
 separate

separate consideration; to each of them, therefore, I shall devote a future chapter, and for the present pass on to a cursory view of the internal police; However distinct the *principle* of the Turkifli government, as it at present exists, may appear, its forms of administration, and all its internal police, are purely military. This is so thoroughly the case, that the grand seignior is still supposed to reign, as formerly, in the midst of his camp; he even dates his public acts from his *imperial firman*, and similar instances are discoverable in all his other formalities. The government of distant provinces is committed to *pashas*; their dignity is military, and the whole despotic power of the sultan is delegated to them. A flight view of the history of the janizaries will (show of what kind is the dependence placed on them, as well in the maintenance of the police as in the exercise of war. The force of arms first subjugated the countries which form their empire; the force of arms alone could retain them in submission; and it is owing to the decline of the military (power of the Turks, that the members of so vast a body are, at the present day, so feeble and disunited.—To wield the iron sceptre with effect required a warlike sovereign stained with blood, the scourge of his people, and alone the idol and the tenor of an obedient soldiery.

Such

Such were a long while the charaders of the fultans, and of the janiwiries, the faithful minifters of their defpotifm. From the moment that the latter beheld their chief no longer animated with a brave and warlike fpirit, the machine of government was thrown into difOrder; the moving power was no longer the, fpring which fhould have directed, and there-action of the exterior parts toward the centre was totally deftroyed. The janizaries, then, feized themfelves that power which a weak and cowardly fultan could not wield; they depofed their monarch, and placed upon the throne one in whole valour and abilities they had greater confidence; but a more refined policy on the part of the defpot annihilated the power of thefe pretorian bands, by a fyftem of corruption and enervation. The moft eminent of their leaders were taken off, either by fecret fraud or open accufation, and their places fupplied by the meaneft and moft devoted creatures of the court. In the meanwhile the corps itfeif was baftardized, and rendered contemptible by the introduction of a herd of the vileft of the people; men occupied in the loweft, employments, and even ftaineel with the moft infamous crimes, who would have been formerly expelled from the fervice

• Forturaet et pzæderaftia paffiva.

with

with the greatest indignation. The sultans have, indeed, succeeded in extinguishing every spark of that fire which they dreaded ; they have annihilated all traces of a military spirit; but they have, at the same time, civilized their own hands, and left themselves without the powers necessary for the support of a democratic government. Many of the pashas, having little to fear from the vengeance of the sultan, proceeded to the most violent abuses of their authority, and not unfrequently appear in open rebellion. The defection spreads from province to province, and little remains, in this vast empire, but the shadow of an union without real stability, and of an obedience which mocks the grasp of superiority. In the regular administration of government, however, the sultan is possessed of the most arbitrary power over the lives of his subjects, and executes criminal justice, either by himself or his vizirs, without process or formality.

In regard to property his power is more limited: over that of all his officers he has the fullest right; he is their lawful heir; but in regard to that of his other subjects, he is restricted by the laws to greater moderation* It is, nevertheless, easy to avoid such restrictions; and we shall, in fact, see that the insecurity of property in Turkey is one very powerful cause of the ignorance
and

and vices its inhabitants. The sultan delegates his power in this respect to the vizirs and pashas in the provinces, and in a less degree, to governors and officers' of different ranks and nominations. Pretexts and supposed crimes are always to be found to destroy or to ruin a subject. This part of the government is therefore truly despotic; and when the prince or his representatives are tyrants it is despotism in a form the most cruel and insulting to the right of mankind.

Much stress has been laid by some authors on the limitation of the sultan's power by law, with respect to the property of individuals, in order to prove that his governments not wholly despotic. The fact, however, is simply, that with regard to some kind of property, as houses which are possessed by inheritance, the sovereigns have sometimes thought it dangerous to violate the common law openly, by depriving the owner of them by force; in such cases, when the object has been definable, we have seen them take a shorter way, by putting the owner to death. Against this exercise of power no one objects; sometimes, however, they have submitted to the law to make their reign popular. This opposition to the will of the sultan, as has been observed, is not to be understood of the officers of the porte, for with these no ceremony is observed

ferved. the pafhas in-the'-provinces are, how ever, lefs ferapulous *than* the -fultan in the capital.

Having examined the legislative and executive branches of government, it remains to fpeak of *the judicial*. This branch is founded, like the others, on religion ; but a divifion fuited to the barbarous nature of its origin feems to obtain in it. The offences againft the ftatt, or fuch as affect the public peace, are wholly under the jurifdiction of the fovereign, and feem to be excluded from the judicial forms; whilft the difpenfation of juftice by formal procefs feems to be intended only for offences and difputes of a more private nature.

The excellence or defect of a judicial fyftem depends upon the *code* of law; upon the *commentaries* or precedents which are received as poffeffing authority; upon the *perfon*s appointed to adminifter juftice, and upon their *mode* of decifion. The fundamental law, civil and political, is the *koran*, the refpect to which is derived from its divine origin: from this is extracted a civil code, called the *multka*, to which are added certain commentaries called the *durer* and *halebi*; and befides thefe there are various collefions of *fetvas*, or ~~feftences~~ *feftences* of the moft celebrated muf-tis, all of which together form, it muft be confeffed, a collefion legal knowledge more than fufficient

fufficient for the inftruction of the judges. But as thefe judges are not bound by any preceding decrees, and have the application of the law in their own breadths, the more intricate it is rendered by the different compilations and commentaries, the more arbitrary is the power intrufted to them; Were the tribunals pure, and the mode of trial equitable, this laxity of interpretation would doubtlefe be an advantage to the caufe of juftice; but the contrary is fo notorious in Turkey, that the iniquitous decifions of the judges, are proverbial. Peyffonel complains of the unfairnefs of Baron de Tott in citing different inftances of Turkifh injuftice, and obferves, that fimilar examples may be found in the hiftory of every country; but it is not neceffary in Turkey to recur to paff ages, or to fing out particular examples; it is the prominent feature in the character of their tribunals, and every day's experience confirms the censure of Tott, by repeated inftances of corruption.

The dexterity of the Turkifh kadis, or judges, to decide in favour of thofe who have paid them, is often very ingenious; many pleafant ftories are told of them,' and it is generally a fubject for a kind of comedians, who act in coffee houfes or in private houfes, but without drefs or fcenery, one of them performing the part of a kadi, and two others the plaintiff and defendant. ..'.

An Arab who had hired out his camel to a man, to travel to Damascua, complied to a kadi, on the road, that he had overloaded his camel ' the other bribed the kadi, " What has he, loaded it with ?" asks the kadi —the Arab answers " *twitoi takut (coffee) and mahue i.e coffee at cetera* (changing the first letter into m makes a kind of gibberish word, which signifies *et cetera*) " *fogar and mugar, pots and mats, Jacks and macks,*" &c going through every article the camel was loaded with; " *he has loaded it twice as much as he ought;*" " then," says the kadi, " let him load the cahue and leave the mahue, the fugar and leave the tugar, the pots and leave the mots, the facks and leave the macks," and so on to the end of all the articles enumerated ; and as the poor Arab had told every article, and only added *et cetera*, according to the Arab custom, without their being any &c. he took up the same loading he had before.

A Christian, subject to the Turks, was carried before a judge at Aleppo, accused by a Sherif of having one evening in the bazar, or market place, knocked off his green turban, a crime punishable with death—the judge was himself a Sherif-(this race have in most places the privilege of a judge of their own.)' The Christian lent secretly bribed him, and informed him of the truth, which was that the Sherif's turban was

was of so dark a green that he took it for a dark blue, a colour which a Christian ignorant of his wote, and for whom he had taken him in the dark of the evening, and had knocked off his turban in a joke. The accused was brought before the judge and the plaintiff came into the judge's hail with a great number of other Sherife. The judge addressed them ; ; *Do you come here in such numbers to ask justice, or to take it yourselves ; go out all but those who are witnesses ; and you Christian*" said he, addressing himself to the accuser (who had been privately pointed out to him) "*go you out, Ifuppqfeym are a witness for the accused) you shall be called when you are wanted.*" The man exclaimed, that he was not only a Mahomedaa, but a Sherif, and the accuser himself! " What" says the judge, " you a Sherif* and wear a turban of a colour that I myself in-the day-time took for that of an infidel; how could the poor infidel in the dark distinguish it? You ought to wear the holy *graft green* of the prophet, and not be ashamed of it." He acquitted the Christian, and ordered the plaintiff to be bastinadoed for not wearing a proper green turban/ it would, without this turn, have been difficult to have appeased the violence of the Sherife assembled: but he was well paid for it, **and** for money they will run *any rifles*

1 If the Turkilh judges difplay great ingenuity in diftorting the rules of equity, it muft be owned that they fome times fhew equal fkill in the advancement of jufticer. When the famous Kuperly was grand-vizir, an old woman brought to an Armenian money-changer a casket; containing jewels of great apparent value, pretending they belonged to a fultana, and borrowed money on them, depofiting the casket after fhe had fealed it. The money was to be paid again in a certain time. The woman not appearing a long while after the time was expired, he opened the easket, in the prefence of feveral refpectable perfons, when the jewels were difcovered to be falfe. The Armenian went to the vizir and related the ftory, when it appeared that the fultana had not lent any jewels to be pawned. The vizir ordered him to remove from his fhop, in a private manner, every thing valuable, and on fuch a night to fet it on fire; that he would be near with proper people to prevent it fpreacj-ing; that then he fhould conftantly fit before his fhop, and lament *to* all who paffed his- having loft a casket of jewels of immenfe value in the fire. In a few days the old woman appeared, *and* demanded to releafe *her* jewels. She was carried to the vizir, who fhewed her her casket, and ,told her fhe fhould be immediately put to death by the moil terrible torments, if fhe, did

not

not' confefs the whole She difeovered her accomplices; they were put to death, and the Armenian got back his money, deducting the vizir's fhare. This fiuftis known at Conftantis nople.

The panegyrifts of Turkifh, jurisprudence adduce in its favour the cuftom which is railed *burning the mat*, by which any individual, whether Mahometan, Jew, or Chriftian, may appeal to the juftice of the grand feignior from the oppreffion or injuftice of his officers. The petitioner, on thefe occaion's, appears in the freet, tear the mofque to which the fultan is going, and has on his head a bit of burning mat, at the fame time bearing aloft his petition, which is lifted up to the officer, whole bufinefs it is. to receive and put it into a bag. The extreme of violence often produces a remedy no lefs violent in its nature j it is thus with the burning of the mat, which is never praftitfd but on great occafions, when a complaint is lodged, in a desperate manner, againft a vizir, or other great perfon, and the fultan is thereby cautioned to take the fuppliant under his protedion. Such petitioners have, generally, a party of malcontents to fupport them and they adopt this mock to warn the fultan of the danger of not receiving their complaints,, which, indeed, without fome filch precaution, feldom meet with any attention.

It stppdaft from the preceding confideratidrts, that the evils arifing from the mode of government afford little hope of reform. Such an attempt would in Tain be undertaken, even by a fovereign of the greateft abilities and moft patriotic inclinations.. Were a fultan, equal in military talents to Amurat the fourth, to fit on the Ottoman throne, it might be poffible to rekindle that martial genius in his forces, which *has* been fo long extinguished, and to reduce to fubmiffion thofe rebellious pafhas, who have been fo long independent. This indeed would be an herculean labour ; but even this would be rendered meffectual by the prevalence of the alema. A powerful priefthood, in oppofition to the fovereign, muft, in fuch a country as Turkey, thwart all his views, and render ineffectual his moft ftrenuous exertions. To introduce an unity into the government, this ambitious body fhould be wholly extirpated; but fuch a ftep as this fcarcely any fultan who has fat on the throne, would have dared to have taken: how much lefs is it to be expected from the daftardiy and enervated fovereigns who now fpring from the feraglio!

CHAPTER II.

On the Turkish Finances.

THERE is no part of the internal policy of a state which affords a wider scope for the display of abilities than finance: It is *not* the full application of its powers in this respect, that the rise and the continuance of a great empire is chiefly to be attributed; and from a failure in this great article may be deduced most of the evils which bring on its decay and downfall. It would be a narrow view of this subject, which should only regard the debtor and creditor side of the account, the positive or the relative magnitude of the imposts; it is *not* so much the *sum* raised or expended, as the *mode* of its levy and application, which is to be regarded as the test of political ability. The following sketch will, therefore, embrace a view of the different public treasuries, together with observations on the mode of raising them on their application, and on their present situation.

The Turkish system of finance may be divided into two great branches; the public treasury, or *miri*; and the sultan's treasury, or *kafni*;

each of which has its peculiar sources of revenue, and its particular appropriation of expenditure.

There are, indeed, other treasures of considerable magnitude, which deserve the attention of the politician, though not properly included in the system of finance: these are the treasures of the *ulema* and those of the *mofques*, sums taken from the active and efficient capital of the nation, and either wholly unemployed, or appropriated to uses which cannot be supposed to have a very direct relation to the necessities of the state.

- The public treasure, or exchequer of the state, first demands our attention, as that in which are to be expected the most methodical regularity, the greatest fairness in the imposition, and judgment in the application of the taxes. The revenues of this treasure are of two kinds, the fixed and the casual; the former of which may be divided into *the karach*, or tribute paid by Christians, and the farms of the empire in general; the latter consists of certain articles, which will be mentioned in the subjoined detail

The expenditure embraces a variety of objects—*viz.* the expenses of the army and navy, in war as well as peace; the pay of all officers, civil and military; the erecting and repairing
of

of fortifications, of public edifices, highroads, bridges, &c. together with a great part of the expences of the fultan's houfehold, and feveral other extraordinary driblements. The following detail will comprife the ordinary revenue and expenditure of the public treafury of the Ottoman empire, from the moft authentic documents, together with a view of its debts and credits in the year 1776, at the conclufion of a futnous war with *Ruffia*

ANNUAL REVENUE of the MIRI.

THIS comprehends the different tributes, taxes, and customs, called the *karach*, *mukata*, *bedeli-nduzoul*, *avaragi*, *Jjane'*, *gcbeluyan*, *gebeluyan-embak*, *gebi-humayun*, *havafi-humayun*, *eukaf-humayun*, *pifkes-zaife*, *meokuf*, *tarap-banei amire*, *haremein*, *fheifein hafmesi*, &c,

1. FIXED REVENUE.

The firft branch is the *karach*, a capitation tax, or annual redemption of "the lives of all thofe males above 15 years of age, who do not profefs the Mahometan religion—It is farmed in the different diftricts as follows ;

	Purfes Kumi of 500 dol- largor piaftres.
EUROPEAN CITIES and PASHALIKS.	
Conftantinople and its environs - - -	2,916
Thjs karach was augmented to this Aim in the Year 1776, by the addition of 360 purfes (or 180,000 piaftres) of which augmentation, only 100 went to the public treafury.	
Adrianople and its environs - - -	
Sophia? - ' - - -	320
Tatar-bazargik ' " -	250

	Purfes
	Rufmi.
Philippopolis	280
Salonico	- - - - -
Ufkiup	- '
Kiofdentil	- - - - -
Terhale	-
Yeniffher	Kinar - - - - -
Avlonia	- - - - -
Ohry	- - -
Delvine	- - -
Elbiffan	- - - - -
Bania	- - -
Kifria	- - - - -
Ozi (now in the poffeffion of Ruffia; called Oczakow by the Poles)	- , ' - - - - -
Silifoia	- - - - -
Varna.
Babadahg	- - - - -
Paravadi	• - - - - •
Karinabad	- - - - -
Egribozak	- - - - -
Rufchuk	. - - • - • - - . - -
Sbumna	- - - - -
Hezargarad	- „ - - - - -
Niceboli	. - - - -
Jlafimen	- - - • - • - - -
Wdin	- - - - -
Iflemie	- - - - -
Ufunge abad	Hafkioy - - - - -
Gallipoli	- - - - -
Orfe	- - - - -
Yenebanti	- - - - -
Negroponte	- - - - -
I f d i u	- - - - -
Belgrade	-----
Niffa.
Ataffonia	- - - - -
Tif.
Kiordos	- - - • - • - - -
Attend fScitin, or Land of Olim)	- - - - -
Yenike	- - - „ - - -
Napoli di Romania	- - - - -
H a t e v a n i s	- ' . - - - - -
Calamats	. - . - - - - -

	Purfes Rumi.
Sillily Kafry - . - * - *	170
Lwadia . . - - - . '	70
Tancara -----	
Doiitge ' -	80
Alexandria -	290
Bofnia with its dependencies (Bender and Hotin are not included)	1,495
Morea and its five jurifdictions -	3,560
	<u>20,015</u>

PROVINCES and CITIES of ANATOLIA.

Hade vendigihar Sangiaki -	280
The province of Kiatahie -	480
Gimis dizne of Efcifhehir -	120
Sultan Ony -	130
KaraHiffar -	160
The province of Angora -	190
The jurifdictioa of Tuffia -	180
of Boli	90
of Kiflin -	75
of Viran Shehir -	120
of Hiffar ony	120
of Akflie-Oiehir -	110
of Cara-fu	
of Ghiul Bazar -	
The government of Caftemony -	190
Thejuriididtion ofSinop -	
of Tyr -	50
of Sultatnony -	70
of Ghiufel Hiffar	
of Allafhehir -	90
of Met men	
The government of Mentefhe -	80
of Smyrna	80
The jurifdiftion of Aldhe Shehir	320
of Sahr'hHTar	120
The ifland Kufeh-adafi	
ThejurttdittioaofGilt	160
	306
ofYailirlufH	160
of&andoglu	50
The government of Breigha	160
of Caraffi	40

	Purges Ruml.
The government of Teké - - - - -	37
of Glayé - - - - -	210
of Kenghemid - - - - -	450
of Ala - - - - -	110
of Sivas - - - - -	490
of Tokat - - - - -	260
of Nikdé - - - - -	120
of Yenisherry - - - - -	210
of Yenni il - - - - -	90
of Amasia - - - - -	180
of Bozauk - - - - -	70
of Zurem - - - - -	150
of Diyunik - - - - -	120
of Dzanik - - - - -	300
of Arabkir - - - - -	320
The province of Caramania - - - - -	200
of Ahshery - - - - -	210
of Kaifaric - - - - -	120
of Akferai - - - - -	120
of Adana - - - - -	100
of Silis - - - - -	110
of Iz-il - - - - -	300
of Ekin - - - - -	90
Tripoly in Syria - - - - -	120
Damascus (or Sham Sherif) - - - - -	400
Aleppo (Haleb) - - - - -	600
Kelis - - - - -	120
Agras - - - - -	70
Meras - - - - -	200
Aqitab - - - - -	240
The government of Malatia - - - - -	120
of Rica - - - - -	200
of Ahmed - - - - -	110
of Hisni Mansar - - - - -	80
of Diarbekir - - - - -	300
of Muffri - - - - -	300
of Etzeron - - - - -	450
of Trebisond - - - - -	300
of Gelder - - - - -	200
of Van - - - - -	110
of Karis - - - - -	150
Bagdat, Bassora, Merdin, and environs - - - - -	500
The island of Tencos - - - - -	45

The ifland of Meteline	-				
Shio for Scio)	-	-	-	-	-
Stancnio	-	-	-	-	-
Candia	-	-	-	-	-
Kubrus (or Cyprus)	-	-	-	-	-
Tino	-	-	-	-	-
The iflands dependent on the Capitan pafha	-				
Cairo (or Meffir)	-	-	-	-	-
Several other revenues, of which is a feparate account					
Total for the Karach for Romelia and Anatolia					

*Or 19,538,500 piaftres.

The SECOND BRANCH of the FIXED REVENUE
 comprifes the following general T A X E S or
 F A R M S of the Empire.

Mukata, (farms regiftered in the Ba(h-muhaflebe, &c.)	
The Ogialik of Bulgaria pays	-
The Agalik of the Turkomani	-
The body of Chingani (Gyphies or Bohemians)	
Gebeluyan lokaf humayun render	-
Em laki humayun render	- - • - -
Gebeluyan of the Timar and Ziamet, poffefled by aged or infirm perfons	- -
Bedeli Nusul of the Timar and Ziamet of Romalia and Anatolia	- - - - . .
Avarigi Hane (<i>per centage, of immoveables</i>)	-
Of tobacco, the mines of filver, &c. contributions of the adminiftrators.	- . - - -
Mukata, mizan on filk, maftic, oil, &c. of the coun- try of Brufa-	- - .
Duty paid by the dealers in fheep	-
Salt pits or mines of Haflar	- ' ' -
Fifh, wdods, &c. of Metelino and Its ports; tax on weight at Cqnftantjnpple	
Paid for the Sultan's kitchen, by certain cities, towns, and villages	- - ' ' - '
By the company of butchers	.
The cuftom houfe of Conikntinople	-

	Purfes Rumi.
The duty on tobacco - - - -	2,287
N. B. This duty is assigned in the following manner:	
855 purfes to the proprietors of the Malikane .	
232 to the mufti.	
too to the imperial mint,	
Rent of the houfes belonging to the arfenal -	1,280
Duty on tobacco of Arabia and of Id -	700
Of which is attuned 400 to the proprietors above mentioned, and 300 to the imperial mint.	
Revenues of the farms belonging to Mecca and Medina - - - - .	2,800
Divers finall farms deftined for charity -	2,995
Annual Fixed Revenue -	75,871*
*Or 37,935,500 piafhes.	

II. UNFIXED REVENUE.,

From the Muagili and Muka ta •	
Duty on tobacco - - -	
Cafual confifcation and inheritances -	1,327
Farms of Cairo -	1,650
On tobacco by a new regulation -	400
The Zaeft paid by the vizir and other rainiflers for their offices - - .	1,800
Befides what is paid on the creating of a vizi*, and making other miniilers.	
† Or 44,942,500 piaftres. 89,885 †	

Total of *the* Revenue of the Empire or public treafury, called the *Miri* 44,942,500 piaftres, or about .4,494,250 feffling.

Since this calculation was made, the exchange is ftill more againft Turkey, or, more properly (peaking, this money has, been much debafed.

The Revenues of Wallachia and Moldavia are not included. They were to pay nothing during the firft three years after the peace with Ruffia was concluded.

<i>ANNUAL EXPENDITURE of the MIRI</i>		Purfes Divani.
Pay of the city guards or militia of Constantinople		22,700
Pay of the boilangis and of the people belonging to the fultan's kitchen - - -		700
Pay of the agas and officers of the fultan's palace -		1,700
To the harem of the old palace -		1,800
To the fultan's eunuchs - - - -		800
To the aga of the feraglio of Galata - -		501
Expences of the kitchen (purfes rumi) -		1,800
To the chief of the butchers -		600
Expences of the imperial tables -		600
Arbitrary alignments - -		<i>ia\$0</i>
A donation to Mecca and Medina		9,000
Pay of the failors of the fleet -		2,700
Provision for the fleet -		800
Expences of the admiralty.		1,800
Pensions of the fultanas and of the deposed khans of the Crim - - - -		1,372
Pay of the garrison of Vidin -		1,250
Pay of all the other fortresses of the Ottoman Empire		18,000
Pay of those of Bosnia .		1,970
For maintaining recruits -		
Expences of the lesser department called Kuchuk Kalem - - -		1,200
Pay of those who guard the Danube -		
Expences in maintaining the polls		1,700
 Total of the Expenditures of the Empire, paid by the public treasury or miri - ,		 76,236

•Or 36,968, 133.

Equal to about £4,49,225 sterling.
3,696,813

£. 797437 sterling

An ACCOUNT of the DEBTS and CREDITS of the MIRI
in 1776, after the conclusion of the RUSSIAN WAR.

The Miri owed,	Piastres.
To the treafury of Mecca and Medina	1,350,000
To the Hafne « - -	45,550,000
To the arfenal -----	6,500,000
Debts - - -	53,400,000
To the Miri was owing,	
From the tobacco cuftorrtte -	3,786,006
From feveral branches of the Revenue -	
A balance on the Yearly Payments to the trea- fury • • - - • - - " -	6,000,000
	7,280,480
' Credits - - -	17,066,480
Balance, being: the Debt of the Miri, or about £. 3,628-350 fterling -	36,333,520

The *hafne*, of private treafure of the fultan-, next claims our notice : in amount, indeed, it is vaftly fuperior to the miri, but it contributes little to the exigencies of the ftate, except in times of war, or fome other great eitergenify; and even then it is generally made a creditor of the public treafury to the amount of its contribution

The ordinary expenditure of this treafury is thieftly confined to the feraglio; it is, however, very confiderable, though greatly diminifhed fince the reform introduced by fultan Muftafa the third.

Its

Its Extraordinary expences' have, forrietimes keenimmente, large sums being occasionally paid to secure the fidelity of the janizaries in times of popular commotion, or on the accession of a new sultan to the throne amidst the struggle of contending factions; it has also, in some instances, contributed larger sums toward the prosecution of a war, than those for which it has been made creditor by the miri.

The receipts may be divided (as those of the miri) into fixed and casual; the former, however, are very inconfidable in comparison with the latter.

The fixed revenues of the hafne consist of the following tributes:

From Cairo	600,000	piastres.
Wallachia	230,000	
Moldavia	260 000	
Ragusa	20,000	

1,110,000 piastres, or £. 111,000 sterling,

These, however, have either ceased entirely, or are little to be relied on. The Ragusan tribute, which is the only one paid regularly, consists of 12,000 sequins, or 6,000 sterling every three years. Those of Moravia and Wallachia are annihilated when there is a war with Russia; and Cairo is so little subject to the porte, that instead of receiving a regular contribution from thence

thence, large sums are frequently sent thither to corrupt the begs, and to ensure their obedience to the porte, by fomenting quarrels amongst them.

The casual revenues of the

1st. The revenues of the mines, which have lately much diminished.

2d. The sale (for they are really sold) of all places and ports, which are also diminished, as they do not bring in so much as they did, owing to the wretchedness of the provinces. The pashalik of Cairo used to cost £75,000 sterling that of a cadî in a great city 2 to £5,000, and more.

3d. A duty of ten per cent, on all inheritances*

4th. The inheritances of the officers of the seraglio, and the porte (or empire,) the fulran being their heir, to the total exclusion of their children or relations. The ulema solely are exempted from this law.

5th. The confiscations of the property of all officers disgraced or put to death.

6th. The property of those who die without heirs, in herited by the law of escheat.

7th. Penalties.

8th. Presents from great officers and foreign courts.

Nothing can be more uncertain than a guess (for a calculation is impossible) of the amount of each of these branches of the private treasury; many of them are in themselves highly fluctuating others are subject to immense embezzlements. That they greatly surpass the revenues *miri* cannot be doubted, since it is the principal occupation of every pasha to

fuck out the very vitals of his province; and these men have no sooner amassed a great property, than they are cut off by the sultan to enrich his treasury.

Every sultan leaves what is called his treasure in the vaults of the seraglio, and thinks it his duty to leave as considerable a sum as he can—they attach even a vanity to it.

The personal hereditary wealth of the individuals of the ulema forms, in the aggregate, a very considerable fund, which, in the ordinary operations of government, cannot be applied to any uses of the state. The ulema, as we have seen, is the only body of men who hold offices in the Turkish empire, whose property is hereditary in their families. It may therefore be naturally supposed that they will become objects of the sultan's avaricious jealousy: such, however, is their power, that any invasion of their treasure would be attended with the greatest danger. The mere existence of such a treasure is, however, a subject of great importance, both as affecting the ordinary and extraordinary *th-cumstances* of the state.

In the former, it serves to support a body of friars invested with formidable power, in Opposition to the sultan; but as these same men have little connection of interest with the people at large, their wealth seems to be taken from the general flock only to nourish an additional body

of tyrants. In the event of any great convulsion, it cannot be doubted that even this treasure would be sacrificed to the preservation of the state; but it seems probable that this measure would not be adopted without some struggle on the part of the ulema, who will scarcely be willing to make such a sacrifice until it is, perhaps, too late.

The treasures in the mosques are very considerable: they arise from the revenues appropriated to them at their foundation, and by subsequent bequests; and as the superstition of the rich Mussulmans frequently leads them to such acts of ostentatious charity, the aggregate of these sums throughout the whole empire must be immense. The whole of this property, being under the seal of religion, cannot be broken in upon with impunity. The ordinary revenues are, or ought to be, expended in the support of the mosque, and in works of piety and charity; but there are besides, in some of their vaults, treasures which would be very considerable, were it not for constant misapplication on the part of the guardians. The whole of these treasures, though strictly forbidden by law to be applied to any other uses than those of religion, may be resorted to when the fate, of empire itself is in imminent danger, an event in which the interests of the Mahometan religion are supposed to be involved.

Such

Such are the funds, and; as nearly as it can be calculated; the amount of the Turkish revenue and expenditure. The mode of its collection and the probable consequences of its present situation, afford room for observations of the highest importance, which indeed, are sufficiently obvious to the enlightened European, but which the ignorant Turk would with difficulty comprehend, or arrogantly deride.

The want of clear and accurate views on the subject of finance gives the court that rapacity which spreads to all the subordinate officers, and tends to the impoverishment of the people, without augmenting (but on the contrary diminishing) the resources of the government. It has become a fixed source of revenue to set to public sale offices of every denomination ; nor is it only to the treasury that these fees, sometimes to a very high amount, are paid: in the intrigues of the seraglio, by which the disposal of all places is regulated, every thing is done by means of bribes \$ and if this is attended, as we have seen, with the worst consequences in the distribution of justice, it is not less pernicious in the department of finance.

Hence it is that the pashas, sent into the distant provinces, exert to the utmost their power of extortion ; but are always outdone by the officers immediately below them, who in turn leave room for the ingenuity of their subordinate

agents; and the circle is only completed by the *power* of the despot, who, from time to time, squeezes into his own coffers the sponge, with which this herd of plunderers had absorbed the property of the people.

As the Mahomedans themselves pay no persons! tax or capitation, and in general contribute very little to the revenues of the state, the pashas are obliged to find other methods of exacting money from them; but the Christians always suffer most.

The mildness of the Turkish government is argued from their permitting foreigners to pay lower duties than their own subjects; this circumstance is* however, only a proof of their ignorance in matters of commerce; for surely a wise and politic sovereign would, by all means, cherish the commercial spirit in his own subjects rather than in strangers. The duty paid by foreigners is 3 per cent; whilst that paid by the natives varies in different places from 5 to 7 and 10 per cent. The lowest is a duty of 5 per cent, paid at Constantinople and Smyrna, on some articles of foreign produce; but in most parts of the empire the legal duty on merchandise in general is, 10 per cent. Puffendorf, who corrects Tott on this subject, is himself so far from being accurate, that (contrary to his affection) the common duty is called *afhoria*, or the tenth (from the Arabic *afhir*.)

afhier.) But the legal imposts are but a small part of what the merchant pays: foreigners indeed are, in all countries, more liable to imposition than the natives; but that even, the latter are subjected to heavy impositions is certain, from the instances cited by Tott, which are by no means uncommon.

From the total reparation of the public treasury and that of the sultan, it results, that whilst the former is in the most impoverished state, and unable to pay for the most necessary expences of the empire, the latter abounds with money, which is lavished on the most frivolous objects. However the splendour of the sovereign may be supposed to be connected with the glory of the state, the necessities of the latter have surely a paramount claim; but in Turkey it is considered of more importance to provide diamonds for the sultan's harem, than to conduct the most useful operations, military or commercial. If the present state of the Turkish finances, seems incompatible with the permanence or prosperity of the state, the future prospect is still less promising.

The debt of the miri, in 1776, cannot be considered as very enormous, if we take into the account how great had been the exertion, and how ruinous the expence of the preceding war. The fleet, which had suffered *so* greatly from the disaster at Tchefme, was also re-established

lified on a more formidable footing than it had been previously to that; event, and the treasury seemed to have effected all its most burdensome operations. Nevertheless, the expenditure has since increased, and it is not probable that the miri can discharge its debts without a donation from the treasury of the fultan, a measure which does not enter into the policy of the seraglio. Here then we are to consider the probable consequences of a deficiency in its treasury, to a government which knows nothing of the financial provisions of modern politics, and, consequently, will be totally unprepared for such a conjuncture.

The revenues of the empire are diminishing, and as the extortions of the pashas increase, and the means of satisfying them decrease in a degree alarming to the porte, oppressive even to the Mahomedans, and flockingly distressful to the poor Christian subjects, some great crisis cannot be very far off, when the fultan muft (notwithstanding every reason he may have to the contrary) open the treasures of the seraglio, and, left of all, have recourse to the sacred deposits of the mosques, and the riches of the ulema.. What disorder, confusion, and alarm, this will occasion, what revolutionary events it may produce in the provinces, from the distress and consequent weakness of the porte, may be easily foreseen; universal anarchy muft prevail, and every pasha will aspire at being an independent sovereign.

That

That there are resources in the empire, no one can doubt; but to employ them would require another system of government—a system incompatible with the policy, the habits, and perhaps the fundamental laws of the Turkish government.

The revenues have lately been considerably augmented by improvements in the administration of the different branches, and particularly the farms.

The debasement of the current coin has sometimes been resorted to by foreigners as a measure of finance. In this point of view, the following observations on the Turkish money may not be unacceptable;

The alloy in the GOLD COIN is silver (not copper.)

The zurina chubuk of Constantinople, a gold coin of Machmut, Osman, and Mustafa, weighs 13 karats, and is 22½ carats fine

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1½ alloy silver. The mitkal, or 24 carats of pure gold, is worth 6½ dollars. These pieces go for 3½ dollars.

The zumahbubs of Abdulhamid and Selim are 19 carats fine, and go for 3 \ dollars.

Those of Cairo weigh 13 karats, and go in **Turkey** for 3¼ dollars; they are from 17, 18, to 19 carats fine.

The fundukli of Machmut and Mustafa weigh 17½ carats, are 23 carats fine, and go for 5 dollars.

SILVER COIN.

1 pound of silver equals 100 drachms.

In the piastres there are but 40 drachms pure in the pound. Those of Abdulhamid 34 drachms—they cheat a carat at the mint, by which the money is less than the standard.

That of Sultan Selim, the present reigning sovereign, is still worse.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Turkifh Military Force.

THE ftate of the Turkifh Military, forms a very interesting branch of enquiry, fince it is that by which their empire has riferi, and upon which it feems to depend. In developing the weaknefs of this diforganized mafs, I fhall firft recur to the caufes which formerly gave it power, and which, having ceafed to operate, leave it, at the prefent day, only the femblance of its ancient greatnefs. From this furvey we fhall turn to a delineation of its prefent ftate, and after giving a detail of the land forces, fhall confider their prefent military charafter, their tactics, and laws of warfare ; from the united confideration of which will be feen, what eftimation the Turkifh armies juftly deferve. The naval force will merit a feparate attention; and here we fhall notice thofe attempts at its amelioration, from which, if effectual improvement could be at all hoped in Turkey, it might have been, with fome probability, expedited. Laftly, I fhall notice the ftate of the Turkifh fortifications, particularly of thofe which are, or are fuppofed to be, of the laft importance to the defence of the empil

It is undeniable that the power of the Turks was once formidable to their neighbours, not by their numbers only, but by their military and civil institutions, far surpassing those of their opponents. These were never united in a rational system ; governed often by courtiers, priests, or women ; possessing no rational system of finance, no great resources in cases of exigency, no system of war even comparable to the Turks, a feudal government, internal dissensions, no wise or solid alliances amongst each other; and yet they all trembled at the name of the Turks, who, with a confidence procured by their constant successes, held the Christians no less in contempt as warriors than they did on account of their religion. Proud and vain-glorious, conquest was to them a passion, a gratification, and even the means of salvation, a sure way of immediately attaining a delicious paradise. Hence, their zeal for the extension of their empire, or rather a wild enthusiasm, even beyond the pure patriotism of the heroes of antiquity; hence their profound respect for the military profession, and their glory even in being obedient and submissive to discipline.

The Ottoman empire was governed by great men from Othman I. to Mahomed IV. The exceptions, if any, were always so short, that *the* military genius of the people did not decline,

cline, but was like a fire smothered, and always broke out in the next reign with redoubled fury. To Sultan Amurath I. is owing the rise of a permanent military among the Turks; he was, who, after extending the sphere of his conquests from the Hellespont to the Danube, formed the more politic project of preserving his empire by a body of militia, accustomed to discipline, and attached by peculiar privileges to the service.

For this purpose he took every *fifth child of the Christians* in his power, above fifteen years old, and committed them to the care of husbandmen for two or three years, to be inured to hard labour, and instructed in the Mahometan religion. They were then taught the use of arms, and to accustom them to Daughters they were made to practise the use of their labours on their prisoners or criminals. When every movement of compassion was worn out, they were enrolled in the body of *yenifheri*, i. e. *yeni afhkari*, (new troops) or janizaries, and formed the flower of the Turkish army. The institution of the janizaries gave at that time a decisive superiority to the Turkish arms, as they presented a system of discipline, and a permanency of organization, till then unknown in Europe. These haughty and celebrated legions were long the terror of surrounding nations, and continued

to

to be looked upon as formidable until the middle of the seventeenth century. At that time the Turkish power ceased to aggrandize itself ; it made a pause in its conquests, a pause prophetic of that downfall toward which it has since so rapidly verged, and which seems now to threaten a speedy approach. The steps which led to this degradation are easily discernible. The discipline of this ferocious soldiery could only be upheld by sovereigns equally ferocious ; no sooner did *the* sultans quit the fatigues of the camp for the debaucheries of the harem, than the janizaries, disdaining their command, broke out into sedition, and dethroned the monarch who appeared unworthy of empire. It was the policy of sultan Mahmud, who dreaded *their* military and turbulent spirit, to debase this corps; he therefore permitted the lowest and most infamous of the people to enrol themselves as janizaries; hence their number has been greatly swelled, but their character has been more than proportionally degraded, and many of them are notoriously stigmatized for cowardice, theft, and the vilest crimes, while others, enervated by a city life, and the practice of the lowest trades, have nothing military but the name of janizary. In the abstracts of their history will be seen the
 attempts

attempts that were made to cut them off entirely.

Peyffonel makes a pompous enumeration of the distinctions which take place in the army, and of the military canons of Sultan Soliman, which determine its regulation and discipline.

That there are such distinctions, follows from the very nature of an army; as *the sag kol*, and *fol kol* (right wing, and left wing;) the *ortas*, *buluks*) and *feymens* (different names for corps;) as also the titles of the officers, as *janizar aga*, *feymen bafhi*, *koul kiaiaffi*, &c.; but these forms prove nothing with regard to the minutiae of tactics. It is the general characteristic of the Turkish government to be loaded with forms and regulations, which are of no effectual service; thus the canons of Sultan Soliman indeed exist, but no one studies them, and to attempt enforcing them would be absurd.

I shall therefore proceed to state the following

CALCULATION of the TURKISH ARMY,

As far as its utmost extension at present admits, *from* the concurring testimony of several persons who had the most intimate acquaintance with it, from an application of many years, and with means of acquiring the best information,

INFANTRY.

I N F A N T R Y :

	Men.
1. Janizaries - - - - -	113,400
2. Topgees, artillery men; according to the ancient infitutions there fhould be 18,000, but there never exifted more than - - - - J	15,000
3. Gumbaragees, bombardiers - - - - -	2,000
4. Boftangees, guards of the gardens ; they now guard the palace - - - - - 12,000	
5. Mehtergees, who crect the tents and place the camp - - - - -	6,000
6. Meffirlis, fent from Egypt—infantry and cavalry	3,000
7. Soldiers, from Wallachia and Moldavia - -	6,000
8. Leventis, marines ; few in peace, in war at 1 mort - - - - -	50,000
Infantry - -	207,400

C A V A L R Y :

	Men.
1. Spahis—pay regulated - - - - -	10,000
2. Serragis, for the fervice of the infantry and their baggage enrolled by the pafhas in the provinces. They are a corps de referve in 6,000 great neceffities - - - - -	6,000
3. Zaims and timariots feudal troops - - - - -	132,000
4. Gebegis, armourers, who guard the powder, arms, and magazines, occasionally ferve as I a corps de referve of cavalry:—they fhould be, according to the canons of the empire, I 30,000 they now are fcarcely - - - - -	13,000

Carried over - - 161,000

9. Miklagis,

CAVALRY:

	Men.
Brought forward - -	161,000
5. Miklagis, who attend on the fpahis - - -	6,000
6. Segbans, who guard the baggage of the cavalry - - - - -	4,000
7. Volunteers, with their horfes; never more than	10,000
Cavalry - - -	181,000
Infantry - - -	207,400
Total - -	388,400

From thefe should be deduced,

- I. The leventis, who belong to *the* fleet, and can only be employed near the coaft where the fleet is - 50,000
2. For the garrifon of Conftantinople, though fo many in time of war are not always kept there - - - 20,000
3. Garrifons of the fortreffes and frontiers in Europe and Afia - - - 100,000
4. The boftangees, when the grand feignior does not go into the field 12,000 ,000

Troops to take the field - - 206,000

The miklagis and fuch as ferve the vizir, the beglerbeks, and paffas, never go into the battle, and only increafe the number; thefe may be computed nearly at - - - } 20,000

Total - - 186,400

The remainder of effective men will therefore amount only to - - - - - 186, 400 men.

As

As it will soon appear how little the Turkish arms are strengthened by discipline, the consideration of numbers becomes doubly important, and indeed it is upon them that the porte at present entirely relies. Yet even here its power evidently fails to an alarming degree: it has often found it difficult to assemble 100,000 men; and in 1774, with its utmost efforts, it could only bring into the field 142,000.

These numbers too are greatly lessened by desertion. In 1773, the porte sent 60,000 janizaries toward Trebizond, to be embarked for the Crimea, where not 10,000 arrived, the rest having dispersed themselves on their route. Besides these regular troops, the Turks were formerly assisted by numerous hordes of Tartars, whose mode of warfare exceeded even their own in barbarity: this supply is now cut off by their cession of the Tartar provinces to the empress, so that they will not in future be able to cope with Russia even in the number of their troops.

The last reliance of the porte is upon the volunteers; but a few observations will suffice to show how little confidence can be placed in such forces.

Formerly, when the whole nation was in some measure inflamed with the warlike genius of the janizaries, when the people were elated by success, and every one knew more or less the use of arms,

arms, these were often found useful and valiant troops; but at present they consist chiefly of an undisciplined rabble,' instigated either by a momentary rashness or a *desire of plunder*. Some go, because they are ashamed to stay at home, on account of the ridicule of their neighbours; others, to secure the privileges and pecuniary advantage which they derive from being attached to a chamber (or company) of janizaries; another part of these volunteers are robbers, and the outcast of the Turks, who plunder on their march, as well going as on their return, under the sanction of their military profession.

The mollahs and mouhazim cry from the minarets of the mosques, in time of war, that all good Mussulmans must go to fight against the infidels; with a long enumeration of the obligations on all true believers to take the field.

Hence, a young man is often seized with a fit of enthusiasm (I have personally known many such in Asia;) he takes a pair of richly furnished pistols (if he can afford it, for in the richness of their armour is their pride) a sabre covered with silver; and a carbine, and mounts his horse to conquer the infidels, and make them become Mussulmans, and to bring back with *him* young girls for his harem. If he does not
repent

repent and turn back before he fees the camp, nor when arrived at the army, he soon learns from others the danger there is, and the difficulty of vanquishing the infidels ; but when he has been a witness of it, and seen that there are only hard blows to be gotten, he generally sets spurs to his horse, and rides off. Thus by whole troops, in every war, these Volunteers return, plundering the poor peasants, and often murdering them, particularly if they are Christians, to be able to swear, when they return home, how many infidels they have killed. The Asiatic foot soldiers desert in the same manner, and by thousands, though they are most of them janizaries

There is, it is true, a considerable difference in the soldiery: the Turks of Europe are the best soldiers ; but far above all, those of Bosnia, Albania, Croatia, and towards the emperor's frontier; they are a very robust and warlike people, accustomed from their infancy to arms, and are almost continually fighting with one another, or against the porte, or plundering on the roads. The emperor had to do with a much worse enemy than the Russians; and besides, they had to defend their families and homes, and consequently had an interest in the war, which the Asiatic troops have not.

Many authors have contended, that it is possible

fible to inspire the Turks anew with their ancient military spirit, and to elevate their forces to their former superiority, by instructing them in European tactics. The attempts which have so frequently been made by French officers to this purpose, without the least success, are convincing proofs against such a supposition. The celebrated Bonneval, whose adventures were matter of much notoriety in the beginning of this century, laboured at this undertaking, as did the Baron de Tott, since his time ; yet, notwithstanding the ability and perseverance of the latter, all his pains were rendered fruitless by the unconquerable bigotry of the Turks themselves. An attempt is now making on a better principle ; not by endeavouring to discipline the old soldiery, but by raising a new corps, of which notice shall hereafter be taken, If these instances were not sufficient to show the impracticability of such an attempt, a very slight view of the real state of their force would suffice to set it in the clearest point of view.

Their force lies in their attack, but for that they must be prepared; taken unawares the smallest number puts them to flight. The Russians always conquer when they attack them, and therefore avoid being attacked, which is generally very easy- At present, even the attack of the Turks (terrible indeed as it appears to those
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who see it the first time) is no longer feared by the Ruffians; they know how to receive it, and therefore do not dread it. Had the emperor followed the Ruffian system, he would have been equally successful, in the beginning of the last War, as he was when he changed his plan of operation.

Besides that the Turks refuse all improvement, they are seditious and mutinous; their armies are incumbered with immense baggage, and their camp has all the conveniencies of a town, with shops, &c. for such was their ancient custom when they wandered with their hordes. When their sudden fury is abated, which happens at the least obstinate resistance, they are seized with a panic, and are not able to rally as formerly. In proportion as the march of the army, advancing in the field, was slow, so is it rapid in its retreat. They leave their baggage, abandon every thing *to* the enemy, and do not even nail up their cannon. The cavalry (which is the only part of their army that deserves the name of troops) is as much afraid of their own foot as of the enemy, for in a defeat they fire at them to get their horses to escape quicker*. In short, it is a mob assembled rather than an army levied. None of those numerous details of a well-organized body, necessary to give quickness, strength and regularity to its actions, to avoid confusion, to repair damages, to apply every part

to some use; nothing, as with us, the result of reasoning and combination; no systematic attack, defence, or retreat ; no accident foreign, or provided for.

To these reasons might be added the opinion of Gazi Haffan, the celebrated captain-pasha (of whom I shall have occasion to say much hereafter) who, after repeated endeavours to improve the army, found all his attempts ineffectual. He saw it was impossible to discipline the Turkish army, and gave up all hopes of it, but proposed a new order of battle.

He would have divided an army of 100,000 men into ten different corps, which were to attack separately, and so arranged that the retreat of the repulsed corps should not overwhelm and put in disorder those which had not attacked. He affirmed, that though the artillery of an European army would make great slaughter, yet no army could withstand ten Turkish attacks, which are furious, but (Hort if they do not succeed, and the attack of 10,000 is as dangerous as of 100,000 in one body, for the first repulsed, the rest, on whom they fall back, immediately take to flight But any one who; knows the turks would see the impossibility of leading on the other corps after a defeat of the first as the spirit of their army now is. The old janizaries are no more; besides the Christian army, encouraged by success, would have time

time to recover from any disorder. Haffan himself was as brave as a lion, but he could not inspire into the troops his own spirit; he tried nineteen years, and had all the time unlimited power. If he therefore performed nothing in a reign, where he virtually was sovereign What is to be expected now or hereafter? Centuries may pass away before another such man arises with such means.

The Turkish weapons require some notice The artillery which they have, and which is chiefly brass, comprehends many fine pieces of cannon; but notwithstanding the reiterated instruction of so many French engineers; they are profoundly ignorant of its management*.

* In speaking of their artillery, I ought not to omit mentioning an Englishman in the service of the porte his name is Campbell, and he is related to a great Scotch family. When very young, he came to Constantinople (the cause of his quitting Scotland is said to be a duel) and, without making himself known to any European, he went to the porte and turned Turk. He advanced by slow degrees till he became general of the bombardiers (the place which Bonneval had) and then only he became acquainted with his countrymen, and other Europeans. He was many years at the head of the foundry of ordnance; and though at home he knew nothing of the art of casting cannon, he soon far surpassed Mr. de Tott, over whom he had great advantages, as he is a Mahomedan. He is a good classical scholar, and speaks the modern languages with correctness. He is perfectly a gentleman, and is universally respected by Europeans for the honour, integrity, *prudence*, and *humanity* of his character. The turks know little how to esteem a man of so much worth; For after rendering the most important services to the porte, he was treated with ingratitude, and now, being advanced in years, is wholly neglected.

Their mufket-barrels are much efteemed but they are too heavy ; nor dp they poffefsany quality fuperior to common iron barrels, which have been much hammered, and are of very foft Swedtth iron, They are made in this manner: round a rod of iron they twift foft old iron wire, and forge it; then they bore out the rod, part of which often remains, according as the wire was thick or thin, and the bore large or fmall

The-art of tempering their fabres is now loft, and all the blades of great value are ancient ; however, their fabre is fuperior to any of ours in its form and lightnefs, It is a great error in all the eavalry in Europe to have heavy febres ; I have often heard old German foldiers complain of it, and an old foldier is a good judge. It feems prepofterous indeed to make all the fabres in a regiment of equal weight, without regard to the ftrength of the arm to ufe it ; befides, a *fharp light* fabre will make a deeper cut thap our heavy fabjres now in ufe. Among the Turks, every foldier Choofes his own fabre, and takes fuch a one as he can manage with cafe; thus, if he miffes his ftroke he can recover his guard, whilft a man with a heavy favre, is loft, The part graiped by the fingers in European fabres is much too thick, weakens the hold. There is a great deal faid in Europe of the balance of a fabre by
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making it heavy in the hand *; this cannot be the case in any degree, except the knob or pommel project out of the hand towards the elbow, by which the point may be raised up quick by the force of the wrist, after a blow is given; but the weight of the fall of the blow is diminished in both cases. Let any man strike a blow with a sabre heavy in the hand, and then take out the blade, and put on it a light small handle, and strike another blow with it, and he will find the difference. Let him strike with each fifty blows as quick as he can, and observe the difference of time, and the fatigue, and he will be convinced. The sharpness of the edge of the Turkish sabre, and the velocity which the arm gives to a light weapon, compensates for the weight of the sabre. All their attention has been paid to the sabre *for ages, with* it they conquered their empire, and it certainly deserves some attention. The edge of our sabres is never sharp enough, and the angle of the edge is too acute. From its crookedness it has an advantage, as a blow straight down gives a drawing cut; and if is a

* The fulcrum is the fore-finger, and the back part of the hand presses down the pommel but a man in battle does not keep his hand at one height; he lifts up his arm, and consequently has the weight of the handle of his sabre to lift up, and the power is in the elbow and shoulder, not in the wrist alone. It cannot be expected that men in action, particularly new troops, will use their sabres in the same manner they do on field days.

good defence, for the arm being held out horizontally with the fabre upright in the hand, a small motion of the wrift turning the edge to the right or left, covers the body by the Crook of the fabre; the fhoulder of the edge, not the edge itfelf, forms the parry. Fencing with the crooked fabre was formerly taught to the janizaries. The puff with the fabre is alfo a good attack. If however, the puff only is preferred for cavalry, the lighter and longer the fabre is the better, and the nearer it is to a fpear or lance, The blow upwards is efteemed the moft dangerous by the Turks, as it is the moft difficult to parry.

Many of their cavalry make ufe of the fpear, which, for a clofe regular front, is perhaps the beft weapon; but as the Turkilh horfe wheel round in full fpeed, and are never in a regular fraight line, perhaps no weapon is fo advantageous their light fharp crooked fabre, No body of cavalry that keeps together, and makes its evolutions without being broken (that is, keeping a clofe front in a line) can give a fhock to the Turkilh cavalry ; they wheel about and retreat much fafter than regular cavalry can advance, and this not in a body, but each man turns his horfe round in his place. Much might be feid for and againft their cavalry ; but it is foreign to my prefent purpofe, and would require

quire 'a long difertaition to put them and our cavalry in a comparative view. Only let it be remembered, that though their infantry can neither fee oppofod to European cavalry or infantry, nor their cavalry to European infantry, yet their cavalry is generally fuperior to all other they have been hitherto oppofed to 5 I mean their beft kind, which is now not very numerous, and can make *no* effectual oppofition to an European army of good infantry with cannon.

Their beft Turkifh fabres have one great defeft, brittlenefs ; they are apt to fly like glafs by a blow given injudicioufly, though a perfon ufed to cut with them will, without any danger of breaking a fabre, or turning its edge, cut through an iron nail as thick as a man's finger. Few accidents happen in confequence of fabres breaking among the Turkifh cavalry, but very frequently amongit e infantry, from ignorance of their ufe. In regard to this I will cite a fact which fell under my particular knowledge. At the ftorming of Oczakow, a lieutenant of the fleet of the Black Sea, an Englifhman, feirved as a volunteer, and fought at the head of the column in the front rank, with a Turkifh fabre; it was foon broken ; the foldiers fupphed him with others which they picked up from the ground, but from his want of *fkill*, he broke *theſe alfo*, till the enemy retreated. None of theſa

Turks

Turks had the least notion of parrying the blows.

As soldiers, even the best taught to use the crooked sabre, are not always, so calm in action as to make the best use of it, a blade tempered in the manner of the best blades in Europe is preferable, provided the edge be *perfectly sharp*, and the angle of it *not too acute*; and as to the crooked form, it also requires coolness and knowledge to use it, for if the part which bends most; forward and the point do not descend in a straight line (*i. e.* if the edge and the back do not descend in the same line) the point will turn the sabre sideways by its weight, as soon as the crooked part strikes, and prevent its cutting; for this reason a straighter blade, in an ignorant or timid hand, is preferable; but a light blade and thin hilt is absolutely necessary for *the* safety of the soldier. It may be remembered that the Romans, with their short swords, had a great advantage over the Gauls, whose long heavy sword soon tired them. A Turk, with his light short sabre proportioned to his strength (for they are not long taking the chord of the segment) will not tire so soon as an European with his long heavy sabre, I speak of cavalry, for the sabre, after the invention of the bayonet, is a bad weapon for infantry.

Their laws of war are the same with those of the most ferocious barbarians : believing, from the

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the 'prejudices of their religion, that they have a right to carry fire and sword at pleasure among the infidels, they are checked in their bloody career by no ideas of mercy. They have a right, as they imagine, to put to death all their prisoners, of whatever age or sex, whether they throw down their arms, capitulate, or by whatever method they are taken, and this right extends, not only to the moment of capture, but for ever afterward, unless the captive embrace the Mahometan religion. The heads of the enemy's subjects are valued by the government at a certain price, and for every one that is brought in five sequins are paid out of the treasury. This is frequently a source of the greatest crimes, as it is impossible to distinguish the head of an enemy from that of a wretched peasant or unfortunate traveller, who has been assassinated for the sake of the reward. It is the common custom after an action, when the grand vizir returns to his tent, for the soldiers to line the path with heads which have been thus chopped off.

The **barbarous** law of Turkish warfare, which condemns all their prisoners to death, is not indeed always practised but it is *not* humanity that prevents it; avarice or brutal desire are the causes of prolonging to the slave a miserable existence. At other times the ferocious conqueror butchers his captive in cold blood, or drags him along loaded with injury and insult, Such is the

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the faithful picture drawn by Count Ferrieres and others of the treatment of the Auftrian prisoners (many of them officers of diftinction) in their way to Conftantinople. Thofe who fell lick on the road, or appeared incapable of being converted to the purpofes of labour, were cruelly mangled by the *common waggoners*, who chopped off the heads of fome, and maimed others from the impulfe of mere barbarity; and this proceeding was lawful, and conformable to cuftom.

The Naval Force of the Turks is by no means considerable. Their *grand fleet* confided of not more than 17 or 18 fail of the line in the laft war, and thofe not in very good condition; at prefent their number is leffened. Their *gal/ies* are now of no ufe as fhips of war; but there are about twenty large veffels called *caravellas*, which belong to merchants, and in time of war are frequently taken into the fervice of the porte, and carry forty guns. Thefe were the veffels, of which feveral were loft, during the laft war, in the Limah, and between Kilburon and Ochak of, Their fhips in general are roomy, and larger, for the number of guns, than ours, They are built of good oak, but the timbers being too far afunder, they are very weak. From their flightnefs they are foon liable to become hogged; to prevent which they build *them* With their decks curved up, fo that when the two ends fettle, the

veffels

Vessels become freight. Such ships do not last long, and are subject to be leaky. In 1778, the finest ship in the fleet foundered in the Black Sea; being too weak, (he worked her caulking out, and leaked between all her planks. The famous captain pasha, Haffan, attributed it to the bad caulking, and when the fleet came back into the port of Constantinople, he ordered all the captains of the ships of war to attend in person the caulking of their own (hips, on pain of death. One of them, being one day tired of fitting by his (hip, went home to his house, not above a quarter of a mile off. The captain pasha happened to go himself to the arsenal to see the work, examined the caulking, found fault, and asked for the captain; the truth was obliged to be told him; he sat down on a small carpet, *sent* one man for his blunderbuss, and another to call the captain; as soon as the unfortunate man came near him, he took up his blunderbuss and (shot him dead, without speaking a word to him, " Take and bury him," he said," and let the " other captains attend him to the grave, and " the caulking be suspended till they return."

The shape of their ships bottoms is considered; by all those who are judges (such as French ship-builders and English seamen, whose opinions I have heard) as the most perfect. It is certain they are very fast vessels, but their upper works?

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are very inferior to the (hips of other nations 5 and it is for the fake of ftrengthening and improving them that they have fortietimes employed French fhip-builders. I was acquainted with Mr. Le Roy, who built them fome thips at Conftantinople; he affured me, that he took Turkifh veffels as models for the bottoms of them;

They build their (hips at Meteline, Stanchion Sinope, or at Conftantinople, Thofe at Sinope coft (a (hip of the line) only £.9,000, without their guns and rigging; Their guns are always of brafs. It appears therefore that the Turks might eafily have (hips of the beft conftruction ; but they have no nurfery for feamen. The Greeks navigate their veffels, together with a few Maltfcfe and other flaves, and thefe are very timorous, for on the fmalleft accident the captain hangs them. The Turks fight the guns, and fome of the loweft elafs affift in getting up the anchors, pulling at the end of a rope, &c. They, however, row and manage their narrow fharp boats in the channel of Conftantinople better than any other people. They get their beft failors from the coaft of Barbary, but not in great numbers; thofe employed in the trade of the Black Sea, and who belong to the coaft of Anatolia, are wretchedly bad they navigate veffels of the worft contruction poffible, which, **can never** fail but before the wind ; when the
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wind changes they run into port; this is the reason for many mercantile vessels are lost in the Euxine, and not from the dangerous navigation of that sea.

The famous captain pasha collected all the good sailors he could engage from Barbary, the Adriatic gulph, Idrea (famous for a fast sailing kind of cutters) and other parts, but still his fleet was badly manned, and without the Greeks never could have put to sea in 1778.

As the establishment of the navy has been mostly taken from the Christians, and has not the authority of their ancient institutions to plead for its abuses, there would be a great possibility of its improvement, were it not for that habitual indolence which leads the Turk quickly to abandon any arduous undertaking.

Never was there so great a prospect of improvement in the Turkish marine, as that afforded by the exertions of the celebrated Haffan, who was promoted to the important office of captain pasha or high admiral, for his military talents, and the bravery which he displayed at Chesme. He employed all the influence which his official and personal character gave him, and which, under sultan Abdul Hamid, was almost unlimited, to introduce various reforms into the Turkish navy, and, had he been properly seconded, would have certainly raised it to considerable

durable inimportance, though not to an equality **with** the Ruffian fleet now in the Black Sea.

I cannot avoid making a fhort digreffion relative to him. The name of Haffan being very common among the Turks, there have been feveral Haffan Pafhas, who have borne the fupreme command in their marine; it will therefore be proper to diftinguifh this illuftrious man by his furname *Gazi*, or Conqueror, given him by the fultan—this appellation exactly anfwers *to* Imperator during the Roman: republic. Two reafons particularly induce me *to* delineate his character; the afperfhons which have been cad upon it, and the ftriking inftances which it difplays of the inefficacy even of the greateft talents under fuch a government as that of Turkey. It is uncertain what country gave him birth. He was brought up at Algiers, where he raifed hrmfelf to a confiderable office in the fervice of the dey M. de Peyffonel, who is interefted in profenting the beft pictures of Turkilh manners, eagerly feizes the opportunity of mentioning this great man, and though in fome inftances rather too partially, he upon the whole gives a much more juft impreffion of his charafer than what we gather from Baron de Tott, who had a pergonal enmity to him. The natural abilities of **Gazi Haffan** Pafha were great; Ixis defeds were **thofe** of education. **In** perfon ftrong and vigorous,

ous, he improved; his constitution By temperance, and hardened it by the fatigues of a military life. The acts of bravery, which deservedly raised the name of Gazi Haffan above that of any modern Turk, are too numerous and striking to need repetition; they bordered indeed sometimes upon palhnefs; and it is, upon this account that Tott censures his daring attempt at Lemnos. His conduct, however, on that occasion well deserves the applause given to it by Peyffonel; it was one of those daring enterprises, which, by their audacity, seem to *ensure* success. The Russians were surpris'd, unarmed and unprepared, and were forced to embark with the most disgraceful precipitation; it seems however a mystery, why their fleet, formidable as it was, should yet fail, and it can only be accounted for from the panic with which the bold exploit of Haffan had filled them. It has been insinuated that he was addicted to the unnatural vices too frequent among his countrymen; but this aspersion is altogether unfounded: he had only one wife, and *no concubine*.

The ridicule which Tott has thrown upon him for a Want of scientific knowledge is no more than applies to his countrymen untravellers; but though possessing little science himself, he by no means despised it in others, and the improvements which he suggested in the Turkish marine

display, if not an extensive acquaintance with first principles, at least a bold and vigorous grasp of native genius. Cruelty also has been laid to his charge, but without sufficient allowance for the state of things in which he was placed. The command of an undisciplined and tumultuous force is not always to be preserved by lenient measures, his discipline therefore was severe, his punishments striking, and often sanguinary, but never wantonly cruel; he put suddenly to death, but never tortured.

Where severity was not called for, he displayed a clemency unusual in a Turk. Though strictly religious, he was mild and equitable to Christians in general; the inhabitants of the Greek islands under his dominion, ever found in him a protector, and the Greeks of the Morea, through his influence, were preserved from total extirpation. His respect for Europeans, proceeding from his acuteness and liberality, was known to all those resident at Constantinople, and to none more than to the British ambassador, who possessed his particular friendship and had great influence over him. The reforms and improvements which this great man introduced, and which he would have carried much farther, were very comprehensive, including both the construction of the vessels, the education of officers, and the supply of seamen.

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As to the vessels themselves, he entirely altered their rigging, and lowered the high poops, which held a great deal of wind, and were very unwieldy and inconvenient in battle; these improvements were conducted by an Englishman, who rigged the vessels after the manner of his Country.

He also gave them regular tiers of guns : formerly there were guns of all sizes on the same deck; they now only keep on the lower tier, two, four, or six of their large brass guns, some of which carry a shot of one hundred pounds, and are placed in the middle of the tier. What was of infinitely more importance to the Turkish marine, was the reform which he endeavoured to introduce in the mode of collecting- sailors, and keeping them at all times ready for service. It is usual, as soon as the fleet enters the port of Constantinople in autumn, to lay up the ships in the harbour, and dismiss the sailors, who all go to their homes till St. George's day, O. S. (4th May, N. S.); for in most maritime matters they follow the Greek calendar, their own year being composed of lunar months, and its periods subject to much variation. Before this day the fleet never sails, so that during the winter it lies quite defenceless, and the Russians might come down the Black Sea, and destroy it in the port of Constantinople without opposition.

Haffan, forefeeing this, propofed building a large edifice at Conftantinople for the failors to live in, as in barracks, that they might be always at hand. The porte not furnifhing the fums neceffary, he built one on a froaller fcale at his own expence; but it is little ufed fince his death, as the failors go to their own homes in different parts of the empire as before.

It is faid that the vizir, and other great officers of the porte, were fearful of feeing the grand admiral with fo great a force conftantly at his difpofal in the city. He, indeed, very probably had in view, to have a body of men at his command capable of keeping the janizaries in awe; though without this he was dreaded by them, and no riots happened, in his time, of confequence; the few that did, he quelled in an infant, and flew without mercy all the ringleaders. About the year 1776 he eftablifhed a feminary at Gonftantinople, for giving a regular education to young men as officers for the navy; but it came to nothiag, as all innovations in Turkey ever muft, from prejudice, from envy, jealoufy, and fear of feme unfoifeen and imaginary baneful confequence to the porte. Since that, time another fruittefe attempt has been made.

The beft mode of eftimitmg the importance of the Turkifh navy will be by a comparifon of its conduct with that of its opponents. For this
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purpose I shall subjoin a few observations on some of the most memorable naval transactions of the last and preceding wars.

Gazi Haffan Pasha, who so much distinguished himself in the memorable affair of Chesme, was at that time the Turkish admiral's captain, of *capitana*, called alio vice admiral by the Europeans, but improperly. That the conduct of Gazi Haffan on this occasion displayed equal judgment and resolution cannot be doubted; he would probably have succeeded in boarding and taking admiral Spiritof's (ship, but for the taking fire and blowing up of both vessels. This event has been attributed to the desperation of the Russians; but as I was informed by admiral Krufe (who was then captain of Spiritof's ship) it arose accidentally from the wadding of the Russian guns which set fire to the Turkish vessel. (See Peyffonel 101.) The event of the contest at Chesme is well known; the Turkish fleet was totally destroyed owing to the ill conduct of the captains, the cowardice of the men, and to the ignorance of Jaffer Bey, who was afterwards degraded from the post of captain pasha, and his place supplied by Gazi Haffan.

In the subsequent war, Gazi Haffan himself commanded in the Black Sea; yet not withstanding his exertions, his talents, and the great powers with which he was invested (more than

any of his predeceffors ever poffeffed) the Turkifh fleet remained in a ftate of impotence. During the whole of the fummer of 1788, the captain pafha lay with feventeen fail of the line off the ifland of Berizan, The Ruffian fleet, confifting of three fail of the line (with only their lower tier of guns on board) and a number of fmall veffels, lay at a little diftance from him, between Kilburon and Ochak of, to protect the liege, and block up the port of the latter place. The captain pafha knew very well that the guns from Kilburon Point could not hurt him, as they were malked by the Ruffian fleet; he was alfo well, acquainted with the channel, and poffeffed undoubted bravery himfelf; yet he never dared to fail in and attack the enemy, becaufe he could not rely on his own fhips doing their duty, and manoeuvring properly. The Ruffians expected an attack, and thought the event dubious. The remainder of their fleet lay in the port of Sebaftopolis, under the command of admiral Wainowitfc, and though¹ not one fourth as ftrong as the Turks, it failed to attack the captain pafha, who went out to meet it, and a running fight enfued, which ended to the advantage of the Ruffians, though they put back to Sebaftopolis; and even for this meafure the admiral was cenfured.

In the laft campaign of the war, the whole
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of the Turkifh and Ruffian fleets met, and engaged. Notwithftanding the very great inferiority of the latter, they were victorious, and purfued the Turks, who were flying ignominioufly before them into the Bofphorus of Conftantinople. The Ruffians were already in fight of the entrance, when a frigate reached their admiral with news of the conclusion of peace, which put an end to the purfuit.

I might have mentioned the action in the Liman the fame year, in which the Turks loft the greateft part of their veffels; but that was owing more to accident than any other caufe. If, fuch was the event of a conteft, when the fuperiority was greatly in favour of Turkey, what is not now to be expected, when the Ruffian fleet at Sebaftopolis is fo confiderably augmented? It is now ftrong enough to rife the lofs of one half of its numbers in an attack on Conftantinople, and the remainder alone will be more than a match for the whole navy of the fultan.

As the laft hope of the Turks lies in their fortreffes, particularly in thofe of the Dardanelles, which they believe impregnable, I fhall add the following obfervations *on* this fubject ;

They are ignorant of the art either of fortifying or defending, and, above all, of attacking places. They have not one fortrefs in the empire

well fortified by art; a few are strong by nature, but none so much so that the Russians could not now take them either by a regular siege or by assault. Prince Potemkin, had he pleased, could as easily have taken Ochakof on the 1st of July, when he appeared before it, as on the 5th of December, when he stormed it under augmented difficulties. It was a political siege.

The Dardanelles, said to be so formidable, may be easily passed by a fleet, or the castles may be beaten down by batteries erected on shore, or by sea, from situations on which the great artillery cannot bear on ships. There are, on each side the water, fourteen great guns, which fire granite balls: these guns are of mms, with chambers like mortars, twenty-two English feet long and twenty-eight inches diameter of the bore*; they are very near the level of the surface of the water, in arched port-holes or embrasures with iron doors, which are opened only when they are to be fired; the balls cross the water from side to side, as they are a little elevated. These monstrous cannon are not mounted on carriages, but lie on the paved floor, with their breech against a wall; they cannot be pointed, but the gunner must wait till the vessel

* " " A gentleman, who has measured them since I did, says, *they are only twenty .three inches*; One of us must have made

he intends to fire at is opposite the mouth, and they are at least half an hour in loading one of these guns. All vessels coming from Constantinople are obliged to stop at these castles, and (how their firman, or order, from the porte, to let them pass; but there are examples of vessels in bad weather failing through the channel without receiving any harm, though the Turks have fired at them. It is true, that in going with the stream, which with a northerly wind runs strong, it is easier for a vessel to pass them, yet with a southerly wind the current runs up, though not so strong, and I believe an English fleet with a brisk gale would pay little attention to these terrible batteries, the guardians of the Turkish capital; they are, like the Turks themselves, formidable only in appearance*. These are other batteries of good cannon, but by no means dangerous; some of them at such a distance, and on such high hills, that they are quite useless. The following circumstance proves that the batteries in the channel of Constantinople, and at the entrance from the Black Sea, cannot hurt a fleet failing in with a fair wind: In the first campaign,

* There is in the arsenal of Constantinople the Breech of a cannon which was niched in a fire a century ago, of a most enormous size (I am sorry I have not the measure of it) but those of the Dardanelles are diminutive in companion to it. It was one of those used at the siege of Constantinople.

one of the Ruffian Ruffian (a 64 gun fhip) was feperated from the fleet cruifing in the Black Sea, and being difmafted in a gale of wind, was forced into the channel of Conftantinople; though under jury-mafts, and moving flowly, the Turks, by an inceffant fire from all their batteries, were not able to fink, nor even to hurt her ; fhe caft anchor in the bay of Buyukdere, after having paffed all the moft dangerous batteries, and then Surrendered herfelf. The captain was an Englifhman ; he was blamed for not continuing his courfe, and failing quite through to the Archipelago.

Another fortrefs, whole importance has been the fubject of much difcuffion, is Qchak of (fpelt by the Poles Oczakow, and called by the Turks Ozi) I fhall therefore take occafion to rectify a common miftake refpe&ing it,

It is afferted by fome, and denied by others, that this fortrefs defends the entrance into the Lima. The report of matters of merchant veffels has been infilled on, on one fide, and that Q\$ thofe who have obferved the courfe fhips of war take, on the other fide. They were both in the right.

Merchant fhips, if they are fmall, as thole in the Black Sea generally are, may fail out of the channel, and go within reach of the guns of Ochakof, but the channel for fhips of war at
teaft

leaft four miles from Ochak of, and within fifty fathoms of the point of Killburon (not the caſtle) on which the Ruffians have erected ftrong batteries, the platforms of which are only two feet above the level of the ſea. Theſe batteries were erected after the Turkiſh fleet entered the Liman, in June 1788, and before all the remainder of it got out again after their defeat. The conſequence was, that not one large (hip did, after that, get out. Six of them attempted to force the paſſage, and were funk (though they were not large veſſels) oppoſite the batteries of the point. This obliged the remainder in the Liman, which were ſmaller veſſels, to take ſhelter under the guns of Ochak of, in a ſmall port on the oppoſite ſide, within the Liman, where they were burnt by the Ruffian fleet on the 1^{ſt} of July. That ſmall veſſels may fail out of the channel, and out of the reach of the guns at Killburn Point, and even of the fleet in the channel, the captain paſſa proved. On the 22^d of Auguſt, he ſent twenty-two ſmall veſſels (having 2,500 men on board, and proviſions for the garrifon) from his fleet, with a wind which prevented the Ruffian fleet going out to ſea to *meet* them, between the channel and the ſhore of Ochak of ; they arrived ſafe without the Ruffian fleet having fired one gun at them; two of them run aſhore near the town, the reſt failed out again as they came, the ſame night.

Had

Had the Ruffian batteries been conſtructed on the point of Killburn before the Turkiſh fleet entered the Liman, it could not have paſſed them till the Turks had made themſelves maſters of them : it follows that the point of Killburn, and not of Ochakof, is the key of the Borifthenes *.

The preſent reigning ſultan, Selim, has made an attempt to introduce the European diſcipline into the Turkiſh army, and to aboliſh the body of janizaries; an attempt, which, whatever ſucceſs it may ultimately be attended with, will form *a* memorable epocha in the hiſtory of the empire.

A trifling circumſtance gave riſe to it. The grand vizir, Yufef Paſha, in the late Ruffian war, had a priſoner who was by birth a Turk, but being carried early in his youth to Moſcow, he had become a Chriſtian, and found in a Ruffian nobleman a patron who gave him a good education, and placed him in the army. He was a lieutenant when he was taken priſoner, and had the reputation of being a good officer. The vizir took pleaſure in converſing with him, for he had not wholly forgotten his mother tongue. He repreſented the advantages of the Eurxipcan diſcipline, not only in battle, but in many other

* This place is often called Kinburn; its proper name in Turkiſh is Kill or Kull-buron; that is Hair-point; from its ſhape. The Ruffians write it Kilburn.

points of view, and particularly in securing the army from mutiny. By his persuasion the vizir formed a small corps, composed of renegades and a few indigent Turks, to whom the prisoner taught the European exercise, which they used to perform before the vizir's tent to divert him.

Peace being concluded, the vizir returned to Constantinople, and conducted this little corps with him. They were left at a village a few leagues from the capital. The sultan hearing of them, went to see *how the infidels fought battles* as he would have gone to a puppet-show; but he was so struck with the superiority of their fire, that from that instant he resolved to introduce the European discipline into his army, and to abolish the janizaries; he therefore caused the corps to be recruited, set apart a branch of the revenue for their maintenance, and finally declared his intention of abolishing the institution of janizaries. This step, as might be expected, produced a mutiny, which was only appeased by the sultan's conferring to continue their, their pay during their life-times, but he at the same time ordered that no recruits should be received into *their corps*

The new soldiery are taught their exercise with the musket and bayonet, and a few manoeuvres. When they are held to be sufficiently disciplined, they are sent to garrison the fortresses
on

on the frontiers. Their officers are all Turks, and are chosen out of those who perform their exercise the best.

What they may become in time it is difficult to foretell; at present there is no other knowledge in the army than is possessed by their drill ferjeants; nor indeed can more be expected from them, till they have gained experience in actual War; and it must be remembered that they are still Turks, a very different people from those whom Peter the Great taught to conquer the Swedes. Their ignorance of those manoeuvres, which, more than numbers or personal bravery, decide the fate of battles, will make their defeat easy to the Russians, should ever they become numerous enough to form an army, the first time they meet in the field: it will then be seen whether they can make a retreat, or are to be rallied, and whether the new discipline will not all at once be abandoned. They have hitherto no confidence in it; and they are devoid of the enthusiasm and *esprit de corps* of the janizaries. In the first campaign they probably will be driven out of Europe.

The mere institution of this militia is however an important event; and Selim may, perhaps, effect by policy, what several of his ancestors have attempted by force. Could he put himself at the head of a disciplined army, he would conquer

quer the ulema as easily as the janizaries, and the Turkish power, though it would never again be formidable to Europe, might be respectable in Asia. The ulema see their danger, and oppose these changes with all their might. The whole is too new, has too many difficulties to encounter, and has made too small a progress for us to form an opinion how far the Sultan will ultimately succeed.

The man who was the cause of this revolution in the military system, the Russian prisoner, and who had again become a Mahomedan, was rewarded for his services in the Turkish manner; for some misdemeanor, real or imputed, his head was struck off.

CHAPTER IV.

of the Turkifh Reeligion—Its Effects upon the Law, upon the Tranfactions of the Governments and upon the people at large. The Character, Learninig, and Diftinctions of the Ulema.

THE philofophic obferver of mankind regards, as a chief object of his fpeculation, the manners of a nation; it is from them, in general, that political inftitutions emanate, and it is to them that they always owe their efficacy. But manners themfelves will be found to be marked with the character of previous inftitutions, and of the hiftorical events of the people among whom they predominate. Thus there is a continual action and re-action of caufes ; and the human character is alike formed by general manners and by particular incidents. The connection between thefe is fo intimate, that we may almoft with certainty determine the ftate of the one from a knowledge of the other. The beauteous fabric of political liberty cannot be upheld by a corrupt, an effeminate, or a daf-tardly people; nor can defpotifm give birth to a noble and ingenuous frame of mind.

The moft ftriking, as well as the moft difgufting ftaturepf Turkifh manners, is that haughty conceit

conceit of fuperiority, arifing from the moft harrow and intolerant bigotry; There have been but too many inftances in hiftory, of nations who, having proudly arrogated to themfelves the title of favotrites of the Almighty, have on that account exercifed an irifolent difdain toward all who were without the pale of their religion. In no inftance, however, has this folly appeared more difguftingly confpicuous than in the Turkifh nation ; it marks the public and the private character; it appears in the folemnity of their kgal acts, in the ceremonies of the court, and in the coarfe rufficity of vulgar tranhers* As it *te* not my intention *to* enter into a metaphyfical difcuffion of the Mahomedan dogmas, I fhall, under the head of Religion, only enquire into the various operations of that extenfive principle throughout the different orders of fociety.

If we liten to the dictates of their law, dictates which ought to have been conceived with caution and uttered with calmnefs, we hear nothing but the accents of intolerance breathed forth with all the infolence of defpotifm.

Every *raya* (that is, every fubjeft who is not of the Mahomedah religion) is allowed only the cruel alternative of death or tribute; and even this is arbitrary fa the breaft of the conqueror. The very words of the formulary, given to their Chriftian fubjects on paying the capitation tax,

H import,

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import that the sum of money received, is taken as a compensation for being permitted to wear their heads that year.

The insulting distinction of Christian and Mahomedan is carried to so great a length, that even the minutiae of dress are rendered subjects, of restriction. A Christian must wear only clothes and head-dresses of dark colours, and such as Turks never wear, with slippers of black leather, and must paint his house black, or dark brown. The least violation of these frivolous and disgusting regulations is punished with death. Nor is it at all uncommon for a Christian to have his head struck off in the street for indulging in a little more foppery of dress than the fultan or vizir, whom he may meet incognito, approves.

I am here speaking of Christians, subjects of the Porte, Actual, and honorary drogomans have the privilege, of wearing yellow slippers. Christians serving in the Ottoman navy wear a kind of red shoes; One of this description being met by the present fultan, who was ignorant of the privilege, ordered his head to be struck off. Instances of such severity are most frequent at the beginning of a reign. There is no fixed rule the dress of European. At Constantinople. and at Smyrna they wear, the European habit. In some cities they wear whifkers and the Turkish dress, with a hat and wig. In other parts,

parts, to avoid Infults from the populace, they appear *in* the Turkifh or Arab habit, with a Tatar cap. In Arabia they generally drefs like Mahometans. A Mr. P.A. (now in London) returning to Constantinople from Brufa, where it is indifpenfably neceffary to wear the Turkifh habit, on his landing at Galata, found the grand feignior fitting incogriito at the cuftom houfe; who, ftruck with fome finery in his drefs, enquired who he was, and on being informed that he was a European, Selim ordered him to be immediately beheaded: the cuftomet and fome other confiderable perfons prefent; threw themfelvefc at his feet and with much difficulty faved the young man's life, but his clothes were torn, and he was otherwife ill treated.

A Chriftian may not kill a Mahomedan even in felf-defehce; if a Chriftian only ftrikes a Mahometan, he is moft commonly put to death on the fpot, or, at leaft, ruined by fines, and feverely baftinadoed; if he ftrikes, though by accident, a *fierif emir* in Turkiih, / . e, a defcendant of Mahomed, who wear green turbands) of whom there are thoufands in fome cities, it is death without remiffion.

The teftimony of Chriftiahs is little regarded in courts of juftice; at: beft, two teftimonies are but confidered as one, and are even overborne by that of a fingle Mahomadani, if reputed at all an honed man,

The Christians can build no new church, nor can they without great sums obtain a licence even to repair old ones. If a Mahomedan kills a Christian, he is in general only fined. At Conllantinople indeed they are (on account of the police necessary in the capital) sometimes punished with death. And this is always done if the crime be attended with robbery, by secret aflaffination, or in any manner fo as to difturb the police, which is properly the crime that is punished.

Sultan Muftafa, father of Selim, the present grand feignior, when he mounted the throne, propofed to put to death all the Christians in the whole empire; and was with difficulty dif- fuaded from doing it, on the ground of the lofs of capitation. This prince, however, in the courfe of his reign, appeared to be actuated by a love of the ftricteft juftice. What muft that religion and thofe principles be, which could induce a juft, at lead a well-iMentioncd man, to maffacre whole provinces of defencelefs fubjects !

It has been affirmed, that this conclufion cannot be univerfally true againft religion " what horrors," (it is faid) " moft not feen " committed by *princes*, " to have been well-intentioned, profefling the " moft benign religion that was ever adopted "by man ?"

That

That *fet* of the Roman Church whose doctrines permitted a fovereign to murder in cold blood all his fubjectss who were of a different perfuafion, cannot be laid to have professed a benign religion, or even the religion which Jefus Chriff taught to-mankind. The religion of fultan muf-tafe, and of the other Ottoman princes who were on the point of putting into execution their horrible defign, was the genuine religion of Mahomed; or at leaft, fuch as it has univerfally been professed for many centuries by orthodox muf-felmans. Mr. Park found the Moors fecluded in the very interior of Africa, actuated by the fame infernal principles.

It may be farther remarked, that there is not one inftance of a fetvi which declares the murdering of Chriffians to be contrary to the faith; or of any argument drawn from juftice, or religion, ufed to difTuade the fuitans from perpetrating fuch an enormity. The pleaders for mercy have been guided by policy or moved by compaffion only,

Moft of the fultans in Jitter times have *fhown* a grater difpofition to cruelty and intolerance ill the beginning of their reigns than afterwards, and this is eafy to be accounted for.

The fultans frequently give in marriage to Pachas princeffes of the Imperial family ; but the male children of fuch marriages are put to death as foon as they are born, What can the

advocates of the Mahomedan religion allege in defence of fuch a horrible cuftom ? Is the plea of ftate policy admiffible ?

It is fcarcely credible how far the littleneffs of pride is carried by the porte in all their tranfactions with the Chriftian princes. Whenever they concluded any treaty, the inftrument which remains in the hands of the Turks repreffents the other contracting powers as profftrated at the foot of the fultan's throne, and fupplicating his favour and protection. The preffents which are made to the fultan, on the arrival of an ambaffador, or on any other occafion, are regiftered in the archives of the empire, as tributes paid to the fublime port for its protection by fuch and fuch *infidel karats*, the Polifh or Slavonian name for king or prince, never given by the Turks but to infidels. Thefe treaties, fuch as they are, amount only to a temporary remiffion of that implacable enmity with which their religion infpires them againff every thing which is not Mahomedan. To fupport their faith, and to extend their empire, are the only law of nations which they acknowledge ; and in fupport of thefe principles they muft be ever ready *to direct* the Whole of their force againff the arms of the. 14

is indeed permitted them, Whenever their own fecucity is threatened to conclude a truce, for the fake of renovating their ffrength, and anabling themfelves more effectually to ferve the caufe of

Mahomed

Mahamad and this is the explanation which they give to their own most solemn treaties of peace. In this they are much assisted by the nature of the Arabic language, which they mix with the Turkish in their public acts, and which, by the various application, of its terms, literal and metaphorical, enables them to give whatever interpretation they please to any contract. Thus, *fulch chedy* properly signifies a perpetual peace; while *daim*, the term synonymous- to *ebedy*, signifies the same thing, but left forcibly: nevertheless it cost the court of Vienna, within this century, a long and difficult negotiation to substitute the first for the other in a treaty, which was, not long after, broken by open hostilities,

It has been contended by some writers with apparent probability, that the Turks, restless and distracted as they are at home, would be unwilling to augment their confusion by engaging in foreign contests; but there are two observations which may be made in answer to this argument; first, that the government itself is too ignorant and incautious to be swayed by such considerations, We must not look on the Porte as a cabinet under the guidance: of enlightened politicians but of a set of wretches continually fluctuating between, the hope of amassing plunder by means of war, and enjoying it in the tranquillity of peace or of hot-headed fanatics, who consider the destruction of infidels as the

mort meritorious duty of a muffled man. Secondly, it may be doubted whether policy would not lead the ministers of the party frequently to encourage wars, which would divert the turbulent spirits from domestic sedition to the hope of obtaining glory and plunder in a foreign contest.

I shall adduce but one instance, though there are many to be found in their history, in support of my opinion; it is the conduct of Turkey in the conquest of Cyprus, as defended by the faithful and eloquent pen of the bishop of Amelia.

Sultan Selim I I. who at that period sat on the throne, neither endeavoured to extend by conquest the empire his grandfather left him, nor to make it flourish by policy. He left all the management of affairs to his vizir, and gave himself up to excess in every kind of the most beastly debauchery. The people, discontented at his unambitious reign, murmured so loudly, that it was deemed necessary by the vizir to satisfy them: *they affirmed, that sultans were not set up to enjoy peaceably what their predecessors had left them; but to enlarge their empire by new conquests, and finally reduce the universe to the make-medam law; for this spirit of conquest and pillage is the spirit of the whole Turkish nation from the vizir to the peasant* It was resolved to make war on the Venetian, and to take

take Cyprus, though without any just pretence whatever.

The powers of Christendom were at variance among themselves, and differences of religion had caused domestic wars. France was allied with the porte ; Venice was in great confusion by the blowing up of its arsenal, supposed to be done by Turkish emiffaries ; there was a great scarcity of corn also in Europe ; so that the sultan, roused from his lethargy, thought now of nothing less than conquering all Europe, and began with Cyprus, *They solemnly assured the Venetians; that the preparations they were making at Constantinople were destined to assist the Moors in Spain; for oaths, and solemn assurances and protestations of public faith had always been, and are to this day, with them, state policy.* The vizir, who for personal reasons did not desire this war (he being bribed also by the Venetians) objected to the violation of a treaty which the sultan had so solemnly sworn to observe, The ulema were hereupon consulted, and unanimously answered, *" that a treaty made With the enemies of God and his prophet might be broken, there being nothing so worthy a Mahomedan as to undertake the entire destruction of chri Christians. This sentence stands on*

The manners of the Court itself tinged as those of all courts are deceit, are not sufficiently polished to avoid a conduct, not merely
 haughty,

haughty, but indecent, to the representatives of Christian sovereigns. The stupid and incorrigible ignorance of the Turk makes him his most favoured allies only as dependents, hence their ambassadors are received merely as deputies from tributary states. Every solemnity at which the foreign ministers assist in Turkey, occasions them, a new species of humiliation in which they are led from indignity to indignity, a spectacle to the stupid populace, who insult them with the coarsest language as they pass, and measure by, this scale the greatness of their sovereign. The minister, who is to obtain an audience of the sultan, must present himself at the porte by four o'clock in the morning, where after three or four tedious hours occupied in unmeaning ceremonies, he is informed that he may be permitted to see the resplendent face of the emperor of the world (*Gehan Padifha*) who among his other pompous titles bears that of *Alemum pennati*, *refuge of the world*; after which he is seated, in a solitary corner of the divan, on the left, near the door, and the vizir sends to the sultan a short note, called *talkifh* which is in substance that the "that

" sufficiently fed and decently clothed by the

" special grace of his sublime majesty humbly

" supplicates leave to come and lick the dust
 "beneath his illustrious throne". the talkifh-
 gee (or billet bearer) having returned with the
 answer

answer of the emperor, the vizir and all his assistants rise with respect at the sight of the sacred writing (*khal-igherif*), and the ambassador is conducted, to the audience, the ceremonies of which are too well known to need repetition, It may not, however, be amiss to notice, that the ministers and their suite, who go into the audience chamber, are invested with a *kaftan* or Turkish garment which covers entirely their own dresses, and reaches to the ground ; and that some writers have absurdly represented this robe as a mark of honour shewn to them ; the truth is, that the Turks wishing them to appear in every thing as vassals of their empire, obliged them formerly to be habited entirely in the Turkish dresses, except the head, which was covered with a hat, and to let their beards grow previously to admission into the sultan's presence, as their tributaries, the Raguseans, do at the present day. This humiliating masquerade was abolished by means of the ambassadors of England; and Holland, who acted as mediators in the treaty of Passarowitz (in 1718) and who took advantage of the dejected state of Turkey to establish the custom, that the European ministers should appear in their dresses. The investiture, of the *kaftan* is only a remains of the ancient usage, and is no more to be considered as an honour than the custom of wearing a hat at the audience;

ence, which is fo far from being a matter of favour, that no European minifter would be permitted to appear otherwife before the fultan or vizir. The Turks confider a European's pulling off hit hat exactly as we do a man's pulling off his wig.

Kaftans and garments lined with fur, are given to fubjects of the porte and to other perfons, on fome occafions, by the fultan, vizir, or pafhas, as marks of honour; but in that cafe the inveftiture takes place after, and not before the audience.

When a foreign minifter has an audience of the vizir, the drogoman of the porte (for the minifter's own drogoman is not fuffered to interpret, left he fhould not exprefs himfelf in terms fufficiently fubmiffive) while he is fpeaking to the vizir, affects to be convulged with fear, and fhakes his head and arms like a Chincfe figure, Though this is limply an etiquette, and certainly a moft ridiculous one, yet if the drogoman of the porte be not attentive to the eftablifhed phrafeotogy of the fublime porte, he may have real caufe to tremble with fear. The late count Ludolph (envoy from the king of Naples) who perfectly underftood Turkifh, thinking that the drogoman of the porte, at a public audience, made ufe of expreffions derogatory of the dignity of the reprentative of a fovereign prince,

interrupted

interrupted him, and told the vizir, that he had not made use of those words but of others, which he himself repeated in Turkish, The vizir answered: those words should have been yours, and if the drogoman of the porte had expressed himself as you have done, his head should have been struck off at your feet.

Particular instances of Turkish insolence, even to the representatives of their most powerful allies, are frequent and striking.

It is not fifty years since the grand vizir, Gin-Ali-Pasha, advised the divan to confine all the ambassadors to a small island near Constantinople, as lepers, or other infections and unclean persons.

In 1756, the Sieur Du Val, drogoman to the French ambassador, Mr. de Vergennes, having announced the double bond of alliance and marriage, which had united his court with the house of Austria, received from the reis-effendro other answer, than that "*the sublime porte did not trouble itself about the union of one hog with another.*" This marriage was not very agreeable news to the porte. A similar answer was given by the vizir Kiuperli to the French ambassador, Monflow de la Haye, **even** in the brilliant sera of Louis XIV. : when that minister announced the splendid successes of his sovereign over the Spaniards, **the** vizir replied, with the barbarous insolence

folence of an Ottoman fatrap, " *What care t
 " whether the dog eat the hog, or the hog eat the
 " dog, fo that the interefts of my fovereign profper.*"
 The fame vizir offered a more atrocious infult
 to the ancient ally of the porte, in the perfon of
 the fon of Monfieur de la Haye, whom he caufed
 to be thrown into a dungeon, after receiving
 publicly a blow, which broke one of his teeth.
 The fole caufe of this outrage, was the refufal of
 young De Ia Haye to explain a letter, which he
 had written in cypher to a friend at Venice.

It is not to be denied, that thefe degradations
 are frequently increafed by the fervility of the
 minifters themfelves, who, by a manly refiftance,
 might generally avoid fuch indignities; for the
 barbarous infolence of the Turks, which is aug-
 mented by timidity, flirinks into nothing before
 a refolute and dignified firmnefs. Such was the
 conduct of Monfieur de Ferioles, ambaffador
 from France in the laft century, who having
 taken his fword, either inadvertently or by de-
 fign, to the audience of the grand feignior, not
 only refufed to lay it afide, but gave a kick in
 the belly to an officer of the feraglio who at-
 tempted to take it from him by force; and find-
 ing that he was denied admiffion, thus armed, to
 the imperial audience, he returned with his fuite
to his houfe at Pera, after cafting off the kaftan
with which he had been iuvefted . Yet this am-
 baffador

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baffador remained a dozen years longer at Conflantinople, and tranfacted the bufinefs of his office with credit to himfelf and advantage to his country.

In 1766, the porte, wifhing to fhew fome mark of contempt to Poland, required the Polifh envoy to appear at the audience of the vizir without a fabre; with this demand he refufed to comply, declaring that the fabre was part of the Polifh drefs, and that as other minifters wore their fwords, he would not appear at any audience in a manner contrary to the ancient etiquette. The confequence of his firmnefs was a compliance on the part of the vizir, who received him with all the ufual ceremonies.

In the laft war, it was offered to fome Turkifh prifoners to ferve as volunteers in the Ruffian flotilla againft Sweden. On account of the pay, they accepted; the offer with gladnefs, and behaved very well in feveral actons. On their return they were afked, in my prefence, why they fought againft their friends? their anfwer was, "*They are all hogs alike to us, whether they wear 'green or blue coats?'*". The conformity of this anfwer with thofe, of the great officers of the porte is truly ftriking.

It is not only in the formalities of the law, or in the etiquette of the court, that a barbarous infolence is difplayed. The peafant, no lefs than
the

the fultah, thinks it unworthy of him *to* diffemble the contempt which he bears towards all unbelievers. The Very porter employed by a Christian merchant will return his addrefs with infult * and fo degrading is any connexion with infidels efteemed, that the janizaries employed as guards to a European have the general appellation of fwine-herds. No Turk of the loweft condition will rife from his feat to receive even an ambaffador: to avoid this incivility *irk* vifits from foreign minifters, the vizir, or other perfon, comes into the audience chamber after the minifter, and they both fit down at the lame time

As a proof of the contempt in which the Turks hold all foreigners, and their perfuafion of their own fuperiority, which they even imagine is granted by other nations, I fhall mention one or two anecdotes, of which I myfelf was a witnefs.

A Turkifh prifoner of Ochakof, meeting at Cherfon, where he had liberty *to* walk about the town without reftraint, a Ruffian officer on a narrow pavement where only one perfon could pafs, and the ftreets being exceedingly dirty (over the (fhoes) when he was within a few yards of him, the Turk, as if he had been in the ftreets of Constantinople, made a fign with his hand

* That *il*, if he fay to him, *pace to you*, or ufe any falutation

fo the offier to defcentd from the pavement into the dirt. This appeared to the officer fo exceedingly ridiculous, that he burft out into a fit of laughter, upon which the Turk abufed him in the groffeft language, fuch as is ufed to infidels in Turkey, and ftill infifted on the officer's going Out of his way ; her not being a violent man, only beckoned to a foldier, who pufhed him headlong off the pavement; to this the Turk fubmitted with filent refignation; but, unluckily for him, it was near the houfe of the governor, who had feen and heard the whole ; he reprimanded the fellow for his infolence, and was threatened with the fame treatment as the Ruffian prifoners endure at Constantinople. The Turk' s anfwer was, "*They are infidels, but I am a Mahmedan.*" This procured him a good drubbing, but he all the while hollowed out that it was not lawful to ftrike amufelman; and as foon as he was fet at liberty, he went away fwearing vengeance againft the firft infidel he fhould meet when he got back to Turkey.

Some of the Turkifh prifoners, who were faved from the fury of the Ruffian foldiers at the florming of Ochakof, were put the next day, out of compaffion, promifcuoufly, into a warm fubterraneous room among the Ruffian Wounded, When afterwards an officer came to remove them, and diftribute them to different parts, fome Turks ftood up, and with an authoritative voice

objected to the company being separated except in such parties as they dilated. Had their language been that of entreaty they would have been listened to, for they wanted to put relations and acquaintances together; Nothing certainly is more cruel than in such circumstances to separate friends and relations when it can be avoided. Prince Potemkin who was a very humane man, had ordered expressly to alleviate in this respect the hard destiny of the captives. They were reminded of their own savage conduct on similar occasions, Where wives and daughters were separated from husbands and fathers, and how otherwise they were treated. The answer was, "*they were not Mohomedans.*" Several of the women said to the Turks, "*LET THEM do as they will, they are our masters now.*" In the two first words they expressed the same notion of their superiority as the men had done, but the remainder of the sentence is not uncharacteristic of Turkish women in general,

I have often been surpris'd, at different exertions of the empire, and from different classes of people to receive answers in exactly the same words; for example, every Turk will tell you, vizir or porter, at Belgrade or Bagdad, that they gained the empire by the sword, and by the sword they will defend it; and *centuries ago* they said

The enervation of mind, so common among the
Turks,

Turks, *makes* them, at once superstitious and disinclined to bear up against the evil which advances with giant strides against their fate. In the moment of popular apprehension prodigies and predictions are easily forged ; to these the credulous Turks eagerly listen ; the lower orders are at the present day persuaded that the Russian standard will enter Constantinople through a certain gate, said to be pointed out by an ancient prophecy, and the great men are so *fat* from opposing this, weakness by superior energy, that they look to the Asiatic shore as a secure retreat from the fury of the conquerors

It seems a kind of moral paradox that the same people who are thus averse to taking the necessary precautions against evils of such magnitude, should nevertheless bear them, when they arrive, with a fortitude and resignation bordering upon apathy, The cause of this extraordinary Conduct is to be found in the predestinarian dogmas of their religion operating upon their minds, disposed by habitual inactivity and incessant warnings of the instability of fortune under their despotic government, to acquiesce in what appears to be the will of providence, An instance which occurred to me is too remarkable not to deserve notice

The Turkish women and children (in number about 400) who were brought out of Ochakof,

1 2 when

When the *city* was *taken*, to the head-quarters of the Ruffian army, Were put all together the first night under a tent. Nobetter accommodations could, under the pressure of the circumstances, be made for them, though it froze exceedingly hard, and they suffered dreadfully from cold and nakedness, and many from wounds. As I spoke TurkMh, I had' the guard of that post, and the superintendance of them that night. I observed that there reigned a perfect silence, among them, not one woman weeping or lamenting, at least loudly, though every One, perhaps, had lost a parent, a child, or a husband. They spoke with a calm and firm voice, *and* answered the questions I put to them apparently without agitation. I was astonished, and knew not whether to impute it to inflexibility, to the habit of seeing and hearing of great vicissitudes of fortune, or to a patience and resignation inculcated by their religion; and at this day I am equally unable to account for it. One woman set in a silent but remarkably melancholy posture, in which I was induced to *offer* her some consolation. I asked her why *she did* not take courage, and bear to misfortunes like *myself*, as her companions did? She answered in these striking words, " *I have seen my father my husband,*

"Here!"

" Here she calmly said, and pointed to a child by her side, which had just expired.: I and those with me burst into tears, but she did not weep at all. Letook that night into my warm comfortable room as many of these miserable, women and children wounded and perishing with cold, as it would contain; they staid with me twelve days, during all which times none of them either complained aloud, or showed any signs of excessive internal grief* but each told me her story (both old and young) as of an indifferent person, without exclamation, without sighs, without tears.

Patriotism and public spirit are not to be sought for in the Turkish character. It is a spirit of ostentation and superstition which has led to the foundation of so many mosques, colleges, and caravanaries, and in those who have lesser means, to the erection of numerous praying places for the use of travellers, called *namas-ghieh* which point out the direction of Mecca, as well as of fountains, in the public roads and streets.

Having viewed the effects of the Religion itself on the manners of the different ranks, it remains only to make some observations on the teachers of that religion, especially as, combining in Turkey the offices of* priest and lawyer, they form a body of so much importance in the state.

The institutions of the clergy cannot but have
I 3 great

great influence on the manners of a nation, and this influence is so much the greater by how much the superstition on which it is founded is stupidly gross and universally prevalent. In Turkey their political power, it has been seen, is firmly rooted ; nor have they omitted any *means perpetuating it which could be founded on the ignorance of the people.* To found mosques and endow them with trustees held to be one of the most meritorious works of a muselman ; and further provision is made for the education of youth destined to the service of religion and law, by the establishment of *medreffes* or colleges,

These medreffes are usually endowed, at the time of founding a mosque, for the instruction of youth in the elements of science. They have professors and they confer degrees, from the scholar or student to the *muderris* or principal of a college ; but in fact this is a mere parade of terms. Children are admitted from the *maktebs* or common schools, where they learn their alphabet, to seminaries which, far from resembling the colleges of Eaton or Westminster, much less of Oxford or Cambridge, are scarcely equal to the lowest of our village school. A professor, for the most part ignorant of the first principles of science, superintends the instruction and it is supposed to be necessary for the members of the

the

the ulema to go through all the *rutbes* or degrees of office, both in the colleges and in the higher departments, which gradually lead to the station of *mufti* or high-priest. These degrees are *fohta* or student, *tnuderris* or principal of the college, *naib* or judge's secretary, or judge, *molah* or supreme judge, *kiabe-molahfi* judge of Mecca, *ijmbol-effendist* or chief magistrate of Constantinople and *kadilaskir* or military judge, of which there are two, one for Europe and one for Asia.

Intrigue and party connections, however, render it easy for the most ignorant and inexperienced to attain the rank of *mufti*, Peyffanel affects, that the pontificate has become a sort of heritage in some great families ; but there are no families which can properly be called great ; it is *trape* there are a *few* who have, by means of cabal, had some of the great offices of the ulema in their families for two or three generations. Though this corps has acquired a degree of stability, the members of it are far from resembling families in Europe, whose estates are hereditary. The sultan is continually detaching members of the ulema, by tempting them to accept offices of the porte, when they become his *kouls* or slaves, and he their heir at law. Nor is it only the sons of the ulema who enter into that corps by a regular progression through the offices: vizirs and pashas often get their relations into the ulema,

to secure an inheritance for their families after their death, of what they have given them in their life-times.

In the colleges, indeed, there is a pompous detail of sciences which are professed to be taught, but which scarcely any one understands. The pupils are few; those of the law have the greatest pretensions to learning, but even they are grossly ignorant. In their libraries, indeed, exist some valuable books, but they are unnoticed, except perhaps now and then by a man of a singularly illudious turn.

As to the particular sciences, their jurisprudence and theology consist only of commentaries on the Koran; their astronomy is astrology, and their chemistry alchemy; of the history and geography of other countries they are perfectly ignorant. Metaphysics, rhetoric, and grammar, are indeed taught, but not upon rational principles. It is scarcely palatable for an European not to over-rate their learning, by reading these details of initiations, and the names of sciences taught

Were I, in short, to describe the learning of a mufti, a kadi, or other regularly educated man of the law, in terms corresponding to his knowledge, when compared with English literature, the picture would be nearly as follows: he has, perhaps, read the Bible, and learnt enough of
Greek

Greek to conftrue the Greek Teftament, without however knowing the grammar of the language, or being able to read the other authors. He has not learnt Latin, or purfued any claffical ftudies ; but ~~has~~ merely confuted fome old *commentaries on felect* parts of the fcripture, and is either a thorough defpifer of religion altogether, or a bigotted enemy to freedom of enquiry refpecting any of its articles. Befides thefe, he has probably met with tales of ghofts, genii, and the like, all which he implicitly believes; he has met with fome old fabulous hiftorian, like Geoffiry of Monmouth, to whom alfo he gives credit; and as well in hiftory, as in every other fcience, believes all the abfurdities which the people at large receive, and which I (hall hereafter delineate.

Of monks, that exift in Turkey, the great line of divifion is into thofe who refide in monasteries and thofe who have no fixed habitation; the former are called *mewliahs*, the latter *bektachis*, and each is divided into different orders, with their peculiar 'cuftoms and laws. The mewliahs are chiefly diftinguifhed by the different ceremonies which they perform, fome howling until they fpit blood with the great exertions of their lungs, and others turning round to the found of mufic until they become delirious with the motion. Some perform hocuftpoqis tricks with knives, hot irons, &c.

Of the bektafhis, fome attach themselves to the service of the pafhas, fome to the different artas or companies of janizaries, and fome are mere ftrollers, denominated fhehhs (or fantons),: who pretend to miracles, prophecies, &c, and, roaming about the country, commit the greateft enormities under the cloak of religion. Thefe fhehhs are more highly efteemed in Afia than in Europe, and moft of all in Egypt. They pretend to be infpired, or frantic, and in thofe circumftances they feize on any woman in the ftreets in Egypt, and oblige her to fubmit to their embraces; to which indeed no opposition is made. The people cover the couple with mats for the fake of decency, and this conduft is looked on with reverence; the woman, fo far from being difhorioured, is complimented on the occafion, even by her huiband, In Conftantinople this would not be permitted ; the Ihehh would be privately put to death; but they never are febed with thefe frenzies in Europe; the utmoft Eberties they take there is to feign madnefs, and madmen (if they are not fo bad as to be obliged to be confined) are confidered as holy and infpired; in this ftate they often tell the truth with great freedom to the vizir, and fometimes even to the fuitan; but as there is ftill fome rifk in that, they generally confine their liberties to thofe who have lefs power over their heads.

To (how what regard is paid to madmen in Turkey, I will relate a circumstance which happened *at* Aleppo while I was in that city. A young Dutchman of the name of Van Kerckhein ran into a publick bath, while women were bathing; and after flopping an infant, ran out again, hoping to escape before an alarm was given; but the women's shrieks were so loud that they were heard in the neighbouring houses; several Turks came out into the street, and stopping the young man, drew their daggers to stab him. Luckily there was a prudent man, with whom he had been walking, standing in the street, who affecting a fit of laughter, told the Turks that he was a madman. " He should be " confined in a mad-house," they replied. " I " was carrying him to a mad-house, and beg you " to assist me," he answered. No other answer could have appeased the Turks and the women, and have saved the young man from infant death. One of the Turks assisted in conducting him to the Consul's house.

The toleration of the Mahomedans has been much vaunted. Historians have said; " *The prudent policy of the Mahomedans, the only enthusiasts that ever united the spirit of toleration with the zeal for making proselytes, offered the inhabitants of the countries they conquered, their religion and law on condition*

condition that they paid the established capitation; and such as embraced the religion of the conquerors were entitled to all their privileges, &c." A simple statement of their conduct, as it appears proved by historical facts, will show whether their religion is tolerant or intolerant

They pretend to the right of sovereignty over the whole earth, and to convert mankind to their religion.

Regardless of treaties, oaths, and all other obligations, without provocation they attack every country, when they see a prospect of success.

When they have conquered, they put to death all ages, ranks, and sex; or they spare a few, who are reduced to a state of slavery, and annually obliged to ransom their lives; they are deprived of the rights of citizens of the country they were born in; their property is taken from them; they are marked with infamy, are debarred all friendly intercourse with the conquerors, and are continually persecuted and maltreated if they do not deny their God and become apostates; their children are brought up in the Mahomedan faith, and made to fight against their fathers and their fathers religion; for many imaginary or real crimes, some of which, in Mahomedans, are not punishable at all, they have the option only of death or apostacy.

At present, however, they do not take children born in the country, from their parents, to recruit the corps of janizaries. This custom ceased, when the sultans wished to weaken that militia.

To cut off all the Christians in the empire, who will not embrace Mahomedanism, has frequently been the subject of serious discussion at the porte;

Every honour and advantage is offered to those who change their religion, and every Species of misery and humiliation attends them and their posterity, if they do not do it. Is this tokratiw?

CHAPTER V,

An Hiftorical View of the Turkifh Power

IN the detail of caufes which modify the cha-
 ii after of nation it will frequently be found
 neceffary to trace back the pages of hiftory, and
 purfue the chain of events through fucceffive
 ages, prcfenting thofe ftriking events, whofe ope-
 rations continue when their records are fcarcely
 to be found.

If the Ottoman empire is ftill vaft and: exten-
 five» if it ftill attrad the fear or the admiration
 of its neighbours, and fwell with ftupid vanity
 its fuhjects thefe effects are not furely to be at-
 tributed to the wifdom of its counfels, or to the
 valour of its forces, as they now exift, but arife
 from the fplendor of its former exploits, and the
 merited celebrity of its ancient character. It is
 true that thefe exploits were difgraced by perfidy
 and treachery, and ftamed by violence and ra-
 pine ; and while their crimes exhibited an energy
 in purfuit and a brilliancy in fuccefsy the claim
 of the Turks to national pre-eminence flood un-
 diluted; but in the the
 forocious conqueror has degenerated in to a torpid
 barbarian, whofe only marks of former prowefs
 are to be traced in the infolence of his prefent
 demeanour,

demeanour, and the follen affectation of his fancied dignity.

The Ottoman power and name originated in *Qtkmm* (according to the Arabic pronunciation, or *Ofman* according to the Turkifh and Pepfau) Who, about the year 1300, affumed the title of *fultan*, and eilablifhed his empire at Prufa in Bithynia: but in order to 'take a View of the progrefs of the Turks we muft trace their hiftory ftill higher up, and confidsr not only their own origin, but that of the, Samsen kalifs Whom they fupplanted,

The vaft extent of continent, which,fpfeading from the eaftern parts of Europe and the north of Africa, comprehends the greater part of Afia, has been the fource of many populous nations, and the feat of many extenfive empires, which have arifen with a rapidity only to fall as quickly into ruins, In the early hiftory of thefe countries, new irruptions and new conquerors continually fucceeded each other, and the power of founding an empire feems feldom to have been attended with the fkill requifite for maintaining it Some, however, among the numerous hordes which then fuceffively prevailed, arofe to a greater height, and eftablifhed a more lafting name than others; The Afferent branches of Tartars, (there properly Tatars)

ans from the fouth,carried their arms over extent-
five

five regions, and founded great and permanent empires.

It will not here requifite to follow the victorious prophet Mahomed, who, by the fafoination of his religion, as much as by the terror of his fword, fubjected fo many nations ; fuffice it to fay, that his empire, fo founded, was within 200 years after his death, extended by his ftrctefjors, the kalifs of Commanders of the; faithful, oyer the north of Africaattd great part of Afia: befides which they had made great progrefe in the of Europe having overrun almoft all Spain, and entered Sicily, Italy; and France The feat of their government was eftablifhed at Bag^dywhejaceiffued the mandates of their fpiritual defpotifm over this wide extent of territory; but at an empire fo haftily raifed, and fo unconnected in its parts, was not eafily held together, and as the commander of the faithful with the increafe of power acquired alfo habits of luxury ill adapted to the art of governing; their power was foon deftined to fall under the fword of more

fyeh competitors were found in the Tatar na-

ders of their rule fanocious Their name has been very generally applied to the inhabitants

fpreading from China to the Dantobe, and 'who, whether of fimilar of different origin, have at various times poured out their fwarms on all the furrounding countries. The Turkmans, or Turks, were a tribe of thefe Tatars, whose original feat was beyond the Cafpian fea, from whence, incited by ,the defire of plunder; they defcemied about the year 860, and feized upon Armcaia from them called Turcorttanin;

At this time the Perfian empire was roled by governors, who were nominally fubject to the Saracen kalifs; but Mahmud, the Gaznevide, one of thefe governors, having extended his empire* from Trantoxiana to Ifpahan, and from the Cafpina fea to the Indus, was invefted by the kalif with the title of fultan Upon the fuceffion of his *fon* Maffud † to this dignity, a body of Turks under Tongrul or Togrul Beg (known in fome of our hiftories by the name of Tangrolipin) either invited by the Perfians as auxiliance, or attacking them as invaders (for the hiftoried accounts differ) obtained poffeffion of that king dom. It is fuppofed to be about the time that the Turks *embraced* the religion of Malaned,

againft the rebellious

torious *Tongral* *Emperial* *der*

*der of the faithful**. From this dignity the step was ihbrt to the attainment of the whole power of the kalifat, to which a defcendant of Gengis-khan finally put an end, in the perfon of the kalif Muftizem -†.

Meanwhile new opponents were rifmg againft the Turks, who, fcarce fettled in their new conquefts, were obliged to yield them to frelh hordes of invaders. The more northern Tatars preffing upon the Turks, as one fwarm of thofe barbarians inceffantly protruded another, harafied them in their newly acquired Periiian empire, and finally obliged them to relinquilh it in purfuit of freih coiicucts to the fouth. It was about the year 1200 that the Turks yielded the kingdom of Perfia to the Tatars; but previoully to this they had themfejves, extended their arms over the greater..part of Alia Minor, whither they now. retreated, and fixed the ..feat of their empire at Iconium, inCHkia, fince.Karamania. Here tod they were preffed by the Tatars, and it, was at Ibis .time that the European mania of the cru- des having a fecond time broken out, the Turks found :themfelves obliged to cede the whole of Paleftine to the Chriftians‡;. It was not long before they regained this country, taking Jerufalem § and putting to fhe fword, without dif- tinction mercy,man woman child.

* A .D 1055 † A.D. 1239,
‡ A.D. 1229. § A.D. 1234.

The government which the celebrated Salah-uddin, (or Saladin) had established, was also about this time overthrown by the Mamluks" (who retained the independence of that Country till the beginning of the 16th Century) and various other contests arising in the Turkish empire, it fell for a time into small independent sovereignties, and remained without a head until the rise of Othmah, who first assumed the name of Sultan, and from whom therefore our account of the Ottoman race properly begins.

Before we proceed to an historical detail of the acts of the several Sultans, I shall briefly notice the causes of the former greatness of the Turks; which may be reduced to the following heads ;

1st. Their constant thirst after universal monarchy, looking on the whole world as their property ; and the propagation of their religion, excited by spiritual as well as temporal motives, never neglecting to seize on an advantage, as they were unrestrained by any scruples of injustice, or of breach of faith, oaths, or treaties.

2^{dly}. Their concord in matters of religion and state.

3^{dly}. Their personal courage in war, still increased by success, and by the enthusiasm of religion,

4^{thly}. Their general devotion to their sovereign, and the obedience of the soldiery and

people to their superiors and commanders, to a degree hitherto unknown in history.

5thly. Their strict observance of their ancient military discipline, their military education, and the early acquaintance with arms, not of the soldiery only, but of the whole people.

6thly. Their great temperance, and consequent health and vigour of body.

7thly. The plunder of their enemies, the great rewards attending extraordinary valour, the crown of martyrdom waiting for those who died in battle, and the road of honour and power being open to every common soldier, who might hope to become grand vizir, and even to be allied to his sovereign.

8thly. The severe and never failing instantaneous punishment inflicted on disobedience, disloyalty, disorder, or cowardice*

9thly. The military genius of their sovereigns, who always were at the head of their armies, and their power unrestrained either by civil or religious laws.

10thly. Their great resources for recruiting their armies, every Mahomedan thinking himself obliged, when called upon to take the field, at the same time that they had a continual supply of troops in the children of their Christian captives, whom they educated in the Mahomedan religion, and trained to the use of arms.

Hence it is very easy to account for the wide extent of their victories; nor ought we to be astonished, that they conquered the whole dominions of the kalifs, the Greek empire, Macedonia, Epirus, Peloponnqfus, Servia, Bofnia, Bulgaria, Syria, Paleftine, Egypt, &c. particularly when we recoiled that their opponents were moftly very inferior to them in all the requifites for military excellence.

In thofe barbarous ages,, when the Chriftian States, governed by courtiers, priefts, or women, difplayed no traces of intellectual energy; when theirfeudal government, their ignorance of political œconomy, and their want of fyftem in finanrcial and military arrangements, rendered them individually weak and contemptible j and when extended views of general politics, of mutual alliances, and of a balance of power, being unknown, they could not be consolidated into one powerful confederacy; it was then that the Turks exhibited a fuperior brilliancy of character, and built up a mighty and extenfive erhpire. Their civil and military institutions were far fuperior to thofe of their cotemporaries; their temperament of mind and body, naturallyaident, was inflamed by the precepts of a fanguinary religion, which incited them to tonqueft by the mod flattering promifes of fenfual gratification; and they; were led,- by chiefs of Singular fkill,

bravery, to ambition, against enemies they despised. The Ottoman empire, governed by a succession of great men, from Othman I. to Mahmoud IV. with scarcely a single exception, thus obtained an eminent reputation whilst it widely extended the limits of its territory.

It must be owned that their fame, however great as conquerors, has never entitled them to any other homage, has never ranked them among the benefactors or instructors of mankind; they scarcely deserve even to be reckoned among the species. Intent upon victory, *they have sought at no means to prosecute their plan of universal monarchy; violating every principle of justice and national faith; attacking their neighbours without provocation, without delay without even alleging a reason for their conduct; treating the vanquished without pity, or sparing their lives only to force them to avow the degradation of their wives and daughters, selling or dishonouring them, regardless of the domestic misery of the unhappy sufferers;*

We have seen, in other countries, particular reigns or epochs marked with actions as disgraceful; but that period or that reign was ever beheld by the nations itself at least by their virtuous part of it, with the indignation it deserved; but here is a system of wickedness and abomination transferred from the origin of the nation to its posterity to this very day, confirmed by their religion, and
approved

approved by those: who call themselves the priests . of God. Wherever the-Turks have established their dominion, science and commerce, the comforts and the knowledge of mankind, have alike decayed. Not only have they exemplified barbarism and intolerance in their own conduct but they have extinguished the flame of genius, and knowledge in others, breaking and defacing even the monuments of ancient art with a kind of lavage exultation, and proving themselves the real scourges of the human race.

We now proceed to an historical survey of the usurpations of their sovereigns, beginning with

OTHMAN I.

It was by degrees that this prince (a descendant of *the* celebrated Gengis-Khan) reduced under his subjection most of the toparchies, or petty sovereignties, into which the Turkman empire of Karmania had fallen, When he first assumed the title of sultan, he possessed the sovereignty of a small district, the capital of which was *Karachi*. Here he established his government, and pursuing his conquests, took *Prusa in Bithynia*, and made it the seat of the Ottoman empire or kingdom (for not till the taking of Constantinople did the sultans the title of emperor) which now extended over the greatest part of

Afia Minor. He died in 1328 and was succeeded by

OKKHAN.

This prince having taken Nike by surprize, and made slaves of all its inhabitants, removed his court thither. When he had extended his conquests to the Hellespont; his ambitious and insatiable desire to propagate Mahomedanism would not suffer him to stop there; he crossed it; and took Gallipoli. He died in 1559, having been a most unjust and inveterate enemy to the Christians.

AMURAT I.

Succeeded to his predecessor's projects of usurpation of the country, and extirpation of the religion of the Christians.

He took Adrianople in 1302, and made it the capital of his empire, as most conveniently seated to extend his conquests on the Christians. Amurat, as has been before observed, formed the celebrated body of soldiers called *yenikari* or *janizaries*, which afterwards became the strength of the Turkish army. He took Servia, and its capital Nisse, and Apponia near Mount Athos. Having quarrel with the sultan of Karamania he subdued his country, but did not dethrone him, as he was his son in law, but thus laid the foundation of the extensive empire of the Ottomans in Asia.

Amurat

Amurat was stabbed, in 1390, by a wounded Christian soldier, after he had gained a great battle, in which he gave no pardon, and *massacred afterwards an incredible number of Christians*. Ever since this event, all Christian ambassadors and their suite, admitted to the sultan's presence, are held by both their arms by two chamberlains, during the time they are in the audience room. He subdued a great part of Thrace (or Rumania) leaving to the Greek emperor little more than the city of Constantinople.

BAYAZET I.

On his accession to the throne he immediately *strangled his young brother Jacob*, This was the first instance of the sanguinary custom, afterwards so frequent, of putting to death princes of the royal blood. -

In the first year of his reign he took Cratova in Servia, which was yielded to him on condition that the Christian inhabitants should depart with life and liberty ; but he sent soldiers after them, and *murdered them all without mercy* He entered into Bosnia, and brought away all the inhabitants whom he judged useful, and made slaves of them . He crossed the Danube (the first time the Turks passed it) and committed horrid cruelties in Walachia, from which he afterwards exacted a yearly tribute. He besieged
Constantinople.

Constantinople twice, and had nearly taken it; but the great Tamerlane came to its relief, and overcame Bayazet in the greatest battle that was ever fought. Being taken prisoner, he was put into an iron cage (as he told Tamerlane he would have done by him had he been his prisoner) against the bars of which he beat out his brains in 1399. Nature has not produced many more cruel and merciless tyrants, nor ever a more inveterate enemy to Christians, or to all countries he thought he could conquer. The Turks were now arrived at the height of cruelty, treachery, and thirst of conquest. .

MAHOMET I.

Soon after his accession he killed his brothers in some of them not till after a long civil war. He regained all his father had lost, but had not time to augment it much, as he died in 1422.

AMURAT II.

Eldest son of Mahomet. He strangled his brother Muftafa.' In 1432, he took Theffalonica (or Salonica) *and pit men, women, and children, to the sword* except those reserved for lust or hard labour. The cruelties here committed cannot be described, any more than the horrid ravages which he made in Hungary. He invaded and subdued Servia (contrary to his league with prince of it, his father-in-law) *defeating all before him.*

him. He entered into Tranfilvania and *killed men, women, and children, as far as he penetrated* ; he did the fame in Walachia, and burnt the vil- lages and towns; all kinds of tortures, and cruelty in its mod dreadfuifliape, were practifed on the Chriftians. The famous Scanderberg, a native of Epirus, greatly-checked him.

In 1445, Amurat took Peloponnefus and all Greece; he facrificed 600 prifoners to the foul of his father, ravaged the country, and deftroyed every thing plsafarrt,; beautiful, or grand, and repeating his accuftomed cruelties. He greatly enlarged theTurkilh dominions, augmented the body of janizaries, and made them more formidable than they had been before. This cruel -tyrant and invader of Chriftian ftates died of age, and grief at his ill fucefs againft Scanderberg, in Auguft 1450; he was, however, more faithful in obferving treaties than any ofhispredeceffors, or even than his opponent the King of Hungary ; but [let it](#) be obferved, that he never made treaties but in diftrefs, and when he de- fpaired of conquering.

MAHOMET IL

The greateft warrior of all the Turkifh fultans, and the moft cruel tyrant that ever fate on the throne of the Ottomans, or on any other throne. Mahomet II. eldeft fon of the late Amurat, began
his

his infamous reign by the murder of his two brothers. His next act was to offer a league with the emperor of Constantinople and the despot of Servia, his grandfather by the mother's side, but at the same time he made preparations for the siege of Constantinople. He never kept his word, his promises, his leagues, or even his most solemn oaths on the Koran, longer than suited his purpose. He was a monster of perfidy, of cruelty, and injustice, and he is "*the glory of the amah of the Ottoman race.*"

He took Constantinople the 29th of May 1453. "The emperor was, happily for him, killed in defending it. The barbarians entered the city, howling more horribly than the beads of the forest with thirst of blood; they flew defenceless men, women, and children, by thousands, without the least respect to dignity or beauty, to age or youth, to sex or condition. All who could, fled to the church of St. Sophia, hoping that the sacredness of the place would inspire respect for the duties of man, of whatever religion he be; they were there all slain, except a very few, reserved for purposes worse than death; and the church was converted into a stable, Every common soldier had permission, for three days, to massacre, to violate, and to pillage without restraint. Riches were worse than poverty, and beauty worse than deformity. A hundred thousand bar-

barbarians satisfied their avarice, their savage cruelty, and their brutal lust, or all. No tongue can describe their misery. Three long days and three long nights the air was shaken with their cries. The sultan heard them in his camp, and they lulled him to sleep. The dogs ran into the fields howling with companion, or leaped into the sea.

" After three days, the few Christians, spared for the cruel purposes of the conquerors, were driven like hogs into the fields. The sultan entered the city ; his horse was flopped ibmetimes by heaps of the slaughtered, and ibmetimes waded through pools of blood. He made in the holy temple of St. Sophia a sumptuous feast for his pashas and officers, and as he sat banquetting he caused to be killed, for his diversion and that of his guests, great numbers of his prisoners of the first distinction for birth, eminence, and learning, among whom were many of the late emperor's relations; and these feasts he repeated daily till he had destroyed all the Grecian nobility, priests, and persons of learning or note who had fallen into his hands of both sexes and all ages. Many Venetian senators, and Genoese nobles, and rich merchants, were among the prisoners ; they were in like manner murdered for his diversion while he was feasting, and to entertain his court.

Thus

Thus ended the Greek empire ! Thus was founded the feat of the Turkifh empire, which fome Chrifian princes have fince thought it juftice to defend from the attacks of other Chrifian princes,- and from the ftruggles of the wretched remainder of an injured and.unhappy people, ever fince living in miferable bondage !

Unprovoked, the Turks attacked them, and never ceafed till they had ufurped the throne of their empire; as they had done thofe of fo many ether ftates and kingdoms, murdering millions in cold blood, and by tortures of the moft unheard of barbarity.

He took Servian and the empire of Trapizonde, *putting all the family of the emperor to death*, After triumphing over the Venetians, he took Otranto in Italy,and murdered all the inhabitants, according to the Turkifh cuftom, except a few he chofe out to make flaves of.

Hedied (by poifon it is fuppofed) in the year 1481, after having put to death above 800,000 Chrifians of both fexes.

BAYAZET II

Eldeft fon of the late fultan,hada long civil war to fustain againft his brothers, whom he had not fen opportunity of feizing and putting to death when he fucceeded to the throne. He formed a project of pitting to death the whole corps of janizaries,

janizaries, but, as it was discovered, it became impracticable. He attacked without provocation the Venetians, and committed horrid rnaflacres: he also attacked the Egyptians. After a troublesome reign, he was deposed by his son, and poisoned, in 1512.

SELIM I.

The greatest monster of this monstrous race. After poisoning his father, he strangled his elder brother, and murdered his five sons; he caught another brother, and strangled him also. He made great conquests over the Persians, and in Asia, and took Cairo after a hard struggle with the Mamaluks. After a bloody reign, he died a lamentable death of a cancer in his reins as he was planning an attack on Italy and Rhodes, in September 1520. He commanded his son to turn his arms against the Christians, and left him many wise but dreadfully sanguinary precepts.

SOLIMAN II

Having freed himself from apprehension on the side of Persia and Egypt, he directed his attempts against the Christians, and soon took Rhodes from the knights of St; John, who had held it for two hundred years. The sentiments of the Turks may be gathered from his speeches to the
grand

grand mafter, after he had figned, and fworn to obferve, the capitulation.

" Although I might juftly and worthily infringe
 " the articles I have prefcribed with fuch an ene-
 " my (*that is, a Chiftian*) from whofe deferred
 " punifhment *neither faith nor oath ought to ftay* a
 " moft juft conqueror ; yet I have determined to
 " be gracious and liberal to thee if thou wilt, by
 " well-doings, amend thy life, and to give thee
 " great preferment in my fervice," &c. The
 grand mafter in a noble fpeech answered, " that
 be preferred death ;" which fo aftonifhed Soli-
 man, that he promifed to obferve the articles of
 the capitulation. On the grand matter's depar-
 ture from Rhodes, Sotiman told him, " What
 " I have done unto thee was not for hatred, but
 " defire of fovereignty."—" I need not war for
 " riches but for honour, fame, and immortality
 " and the extenfion of my empire ; for it is the
 " property of a fovereign, royally defcended, by
 " ftrong hand to take from others, and to in-
 " vade others, not from a covetous mind, but
 " from the honountbte defire of rule and fove-
 " reignty ; for while my neighbour ftandeth I
 " count it juft by force of arms to remove him."

He then attacked Hungary, took Buda, and
murdered the garrifon which had *capitulated** He
 entered into Auliria with fire and fword: " *The*
:ald were ftain, the young led into captivity, women.

" *ravifhed*

" ravished before their husband's faces, and then slain
 " with their children, infants ript out of their mother's
 " wombs, others taken from their breasts, cut in
 " pieces, or thrust upon pointed flakes, and other incre-
 " dible cruelties" He laid siege to Vienna, but find-
 ing a most desperate resistance raised the siege,
 "and before he withdrew massacred all his prisoners,
 men, women, and children. This siege cost him
 80,000 men. He made John king of Hungary
 tributary to him, - entered again into Austria,
 and repeated his cruelties, killing at one time
 4,000 prisoners. He took, in 1534, Bagdad,
 all Assyria, and Mesopotamia, formerly separate
 kingdoms, but then belonging to Persia. He sent
 200,000 men into Macedonia, to be transported
 into Italy, and finally landed a part of this army
 in Apulia, and took Castro. Turning his forces,
 however, from Italy against the Venetians, he
 besieged Corfu, but not succeeding, he carried
 away 16,000 young people of the island into per-
 petual slavery, yet he made other conquests on
 them during a long war. He again came to
 Buda, and converted Hungary into a Turkish
 province, making an alliance with the French
 to attack the Emperor. He made a fruitless
 attempt on Malta, but carried off from Gozo
 6,300 young people into slavery. The Turks
 then attacked and took Tripoli, belonging to the
 order of Malta, but did not keep the capitula-
 tions,

tions, as they said *no faith was to be kept with dogs*. Ali pasha of Buda invaded Upper Hungary, and took Temeswar, and, *contrary to the capitulation, murdered the garrison*.

Soliman, being suspicious of his son Muftafa, caused him to be strangled in his presence, but afterwards found he was innocent; he strangled also Muftafa's son, Chihangar, another son of Soliman, killed himself in despair. He caused a third son Bayazet, together with five of his children, to be strangled. He sent a fleet and army against Malta, attacked it a second time, and took the fort of St. Elmo; but meeting with great loss raised the siege. In short, after doing in various parts of the world much mischief to the Christians, and committing every where great cruelties, he died of a bloody flux, the 4th of September 1566. This prince has been much extolled by many Christian writers.

SELIM II.

Set the ruinous example to his successors of not going himself to the wars, and of carrying them on by lieutenants. He soon fought a pretence to declare war against the Venetians, who, in this bloody contest, lost Cyprus and a part of Dalmatian. The Turkish character no where appears in a worse light than in the history of this war. He sent an army into Moldavia against the waywode. At last a peace was made, to which the
Turks

Turks fwoore *feven times* ; yet the waywode was murdered by the pafha, unmindful of his oaths. They then overran Moldavia, putting all the nobility, and many thoufands of others, to the fword; and all Walachia fell into their hands in 1574. The 9th of December this fame year Selim died.

AMU RAT III

Eldeft fon of the late fultan, whofe death was concealed, as was ufual, till the new fultan arrived, fucceeded to the throne. The janizaries, who had a cuftom in interregnums to plunder and even maffacre their fellow-citizens, the Chriftians and Jews, were difappointed and murmured, and he was obliged to give them large funis to appeafe them. On his acceffion, he caufed five of his brethren to be ftrangled in his prefence. Though he was of a peaceful temper, he continued his father's wars, becaufe he feared to be thought to degenerate from the Ottoman princes, but went not himfelf into'the field. In October 1575, he penetrated into Ruffia and Poland, and made great daughter. It was debated in the divan, whether the league with the Chriftians or that with the Perfians fhould be broken; for they hold it lawful, when it is' in the intereft of the empire, to break all oaths and treaties with thofe of a different faith with themfelves. It was determined to make

war againft Perfia. The event of this war was favourable to him. It was attended with their ufual cruelties. The janizaries having now loft their fubmiffion, and in a great part their difcipline* began to kill their commanders whenever they wtre diifatisfied with them. Amurat had permitted their children to be enrolled in their corps. He made war on the emperor of Germany, and, as ufual, caufed much deiolation. He died the 18th of January 1595.

MAHOMED III.

Eldefl fon of the late fultan. He put to death all his brothers (in number nineteen) and ten of his father's wives, whom he iuppofed might be with child. The janizaries, notwithstanding the new fultan's preference, plundered the city, and had nearly plundered the palace alio, and killed the fultan. He at firft carried on his wars againft the German emperor by his palhas, but not being fucefsful, he went himfelf to Buda with 200,000 men, and having taken Agri, returned to Conftantmople. This war was conducted with various fucefs, but with great fury. When the Turks took Aiba-regalis, by capitulation, the Chriftians were to march out in fafety with their arms, but the Turks put them all to death, as well inhabitants as 3,000 foldiers. The infolence of the janizaries became very great, and they WERE
con-

continually mutinying and fighting with the other foldiers. The pafhas in many provinces rebelled, and the fultan through fear made peace with them, pardoned them, and confirmed them in their offices; but he put to death other pafhas who were in his power, which caufed thofe who had any thing to apprehend to rebel again. He put to death his own fon and his fon's mother, on fufpicion of a defign to dethrone him. The janizaries attempted to depofe him. Whilft treating with the emperor of Germany for peace, he died at Conftantinople, in January 1604.

ACHMET I.

The fecond l'on (the eldeft having been ftrangled by his father) fucceeded to the throne at the age of fifteen. The Turks were not earneft with the negotiation for peace, but wanted to deceive and fall on the Germans; the war therefore continued, but at length peace was concluded in 1607. There was nothing very remarkable in his other wars with different nations. In his 23d year, he beat his fultana, who was mother of a daughter, and wounded and trod on her, becaufe Jhe had ftrangled one of his fitters flaves, of whom he had become enamoured. The fultana, having heard of this amour, fent for her, ftrangled her, and put her clothes on one of her own flaves, whom the fent to the fultan, and on her return

frangled her alfo, as fhe had done many others, who appeared to be with child by the fultan.— *This anecdote fhews the d'fpotifm of this government even among the women of the feraglio.* He died 15th November 1617.

MUSTAFA I.

The brother of the late fultan, who had been preferred, but with fuch fecrecy that it was fcarcely known whether he was alive or dead. During his brother's reign, the council had determined he fhould be preferred, as Achmet was but fifteen years old, and there were only thefe two heirs to the throne, but that he fhould be kept in clofe confinement. Muftafa, being twenty-five years of age, was drawn out of a cell, and proclaimed fultan. He became uncommonly cruel; he caufed young Ofman, eldeft fon of Achmet, to be confined under a ftrong guard, and put to death the other fons of Achmet. He offered many indignities to the Chriftian ambafladors—indeed, in the laft reign, the Europeans in Conftantinople were all ordered to be flain, but the vizir and other great officers diffuaded the fultan from this ftep. When Achmet had children of his own, it was determined to put Muftafa, his brother, to death; and though // *was concluded in the council of the divan,* yet Achmet was diverted from it by omens.

When

When an emperor mounted the throne, it was usual to put to death his brothers and nephews ; but when he had children grown up, he entrusted them with governments and the command of armies; this custom had now ceased. When the father died, the vizir kept his death, if possible, secret till the new sultan arrived, who generally contrived to seize his brothers and put them to death ; some times they fled, but they were generally caught sooner or later and put to death. It is for this reason, that the sultan always goes to some mosque in the city to public prayers every Friday, or shows himself in public, for otherwise the people imagine he is dead, and make a rebellion.

When the late sultan, Achmet, found death approach, his counsellors advised him to settle the succession, his own children being young. He sent for his brother, and told him his resolution of making choice of him to succeed to the throne, which much amazed him, as the empire belonged to his own son. He recommended to him the children he had by the sultana, entreating him to use them as he had done *him, leaving the children he had by concubines to his discretion.*

Muftafa, nearly an idiot, by his cruelties became so odious, that the grand vizir, who was gone against the Persians, returned with his army, surprised him, sent him to his prison again, not

having reigned a year, and placed Ofman on the throne.

OSMAN I.

He sent a fleet into the Mediterranean, landed at Manfredonia, and carried off 1,600 Haves. He made war against Poland, and marched himself at the head of 300,000 men, with 300 field pieces and 100 double cannon, but he had no success, and was reduced to sue for peace.

Contrary to the advice of his ministers, the sultan married, without any pomp, the granddaughter of a sultana who had been married to a palha, only for her beauty; but a bad construction was put on this action, his ancestors of late years not having usually taken wives of a Turkish race, on account of their relations.

The sultan, who had been discontented with the janizaries ever since his disgrace in Poland, meditated revenge against them, and at last determined to abolish a corps now grown too formidable, and having lost their ancient discipline and subordination, had become mutinous and interfered with the affairs of government. Contrary to their institution, they had married, and entered into trades; their children were also janizaries, a privilege conceded to them in a former reign, and they were more pleased to stay at home, than to face the dangers of a foreign campaign,

campaign. His vizir promised to provide him a new foldiery of the Curds (who inhabit the mountains between Smyrna and Mount Lebanon,) 40,000 of whom were to be enrolled as his body guards; the pashas of the provinces were to train up to arms a certain number of the inhabitants, to be ready to serve in foreign wars, and to constitute a greater army than any of his predecessors, and enable him to make greater conquests at far less expence. It was agreed between the sultan and vizir, that the former should go into Asia on some pretence, as that of going to visit Mecca, or to reduce Sidon, which had rebelled; but the sultan was not cautious enough in his preparations, melting metals, conveying away all his treasures, and using imprudent expressions and threats to the janizaries. In the meantime the vizir had provided 20,000 men in Asia, on whom he could depend, besides all the force of the emir of Sidon, whom he had gained, under pretence of a war against Persia. At Damascus, the sultan was to cut off all his guards, and stay there till he had regulated his new army, then to return to Constantinople, to destroy the janizaries, pashas, tamariots, and all their officers, to settle a new government, and change the name of the city. He then hoped to conquer all Christendom; in the mean time he was to live in friendship with all powers.

Certainly

Certainly this was a well-grounded design, and the reformation of the army had become necessary; the empire languished under indolent and lazy slaves, and the sultan found himself dependent on the janizaries for life or death, peace or war. A civil contest, however, would have been produced; for the soldiery in Europe would have fet up another sultan; but he had all the treasure. If he succeeded, he would have saved an immense expence; for the janizaries now consumed almost all the revenues of the empire.

The soldiery, however, opposed the departure of the sultan, and threatened to fet up another in his place. They ran to the seraglio, but without arms, and demanded that he should remain in Constantinople; that he should deliver up the vizir and other great officers accused by them of conspiring against the state. The sultan contented not to go to Ada but refused to deliver up those whom they demanded, and persuaded them to stay till Saturday, which was council day—this happened on Wednesday, 7th May 1622.—The next day the tumult began again, and the vizir advised the sultan to go to Afon, in his own boats, but refused. The vizir appeared in order to appease them, but they cut him in pieces. The emperor then too late endeavoured to cross over to Asia, and not succeeding he hid himself in a private place. The rebels

bels demanded their fultan and more facrifkes, and faid they muft have a fultan, and that if he would not appear, they would make another : having waited fome time, they refolved to enter the palace, but took a folemn oath not to plunder it ; they there killed the kiflar-aga, and not finding fultan Olman, they demanded Muftafa, who had been dethroned ; they found him in a vault, where Ofman had put him, with two negro women. They carried him to the old feraglio and there left him ; Ofman came out after their departure, andii aving confulted with fome of his friends, it was refolved to fend to the women of the old feraglio to put Muftafa to death ; but he had a party among thefe women, whofe noife alarmed the guard, who relcued him. The next day Ofman went to the college of the janizaries, and by entreaties had nearly prevailed, but for the indifcretion of the janizary-aga, in beginning to threaten the janizaries, who thereupon flew him and others who came with the fultan. They carried Ofman to the new fultan, who only nodded confent to what they propofed, and he was fent as a prifoner to the Seven Towers. The new vizir made by Muftafa knew that the fform might pafs over if Ofman lived ; a confultation therefore was held by the chief officers, and it was determined to fearch how many of the royal blood were left alive, that if two remained Of-
man'

man should be put to death. Two of his brothers were found ; one about twelve the other about (*even* years of age, and the vizir then went with executioners to the prison, and strangled Ofman. The soldiers, who did not intend to go so far, soon repented. The pasha of Erzerun broke out in open rebellion, and declared himself the avenger of his prince's blood.

M U S T A F A I. (*re-enthroned.*)

On Saturday, the 6th June 1622, the capi-aga or major-domo, having received a secret order to remove the brothers of the late sultan Ofman from their lodgings, and in the night to strangle them ; as he was performing his command, aided with a few of his executioners, and carrying away the princes, they cried out ; the pages running to the noise, and encouraged by the kishlar-aga, who had some suspicion, without further examination killed the capi-aga, almost every order of men having now risen against their own chief. That night they went secretly to the janizaries and spahies. The soldiers returned in fury to the court in favour of the pages, and demanded justice against those who thus would have made an end of the Ottoman race, only this Mustafa being left alive, who was become so holy a saint that he would not people the world with sinners, nor endure any woman near him. The innocent sultan protested he knew
nothing

tooth of the matter ; and that if such a command was procured, it was obtained fraudulently. He was easily believed himself, but his mother (another Livia) and Daout Pashaj, who had married her daughter, were vehemently opposed. This tumult was however appeased. The state of the empire was deplorable: the sovereign an idiot, the next heir a child, and all the great men and best soldiers either destroyed, or become mutinous and corrupted.

The Persians seized this opportunity to recover the province and city of Bagdad. Had the Christian princes opened their eyes, they might also have regained much that they had lost.

The vizir took occasion to blame the janizars, and to have him and some other pashas sent into exile, to be afterwards strangled, to make room for deposing Mustafa, and placing on the throne Marat, a child, and brother of Osman, who had a Wrong party. The janizaries rescued their aga. A new faction now arose between the partisans of Mustafa, the reigning sultan, and of Murat. The vizir retired. No security was left for any man; the rebellious soldiers having the government in their hands. They adhered to the sultan of their own creating ; but the lawyers and churchmen (the ulema) planned a revolution, and affirmed publicly, that the constitution **was subverted, the sultan unlawful,** and

and all- thofe who adhered to him guilty of heſefy, in having deſpifed the infittations of Mahomed; and theſe notions ſcfoey ſpread over all the empire by correſpondence with their own body, ſo that the whole nation was divided in ſentiment.

The ſoldiers ſtill continued in their mutinous difpoſition even in Conſtantinople, and their infoience grew to ſuch a height, that, going in troops to the court, they demanded all offices of profit -, inſiſted on being ſtewards to the revenues of the moſques, (which are great) -, demanded the farms of the cuſtoms, and committed inferable outrages. The vizir durſt deny them nothing ; they drank wine in the ſtreets contrary to their law, and flood in companies in the open day, exacting of all Chriſtians who paſſed, money to pay for their wine, {tabbing without mercy thoſe who refuſed to ſubmit to their extortions, None dared to remonſtrate with men who had killed their own ſovereign. At Smyrna the janizaries aſſaulted the Chriſtian confute, and took money from them ; nor did they without difficulty eſcape with their lives. Rebellion appeared in ſeveral provinces, and the treaſures were exhausted by the immense ſums given to the janizaries ; each new acceſſion to the throne, and by the burden of ſeveral expenſive wars.

The ſpahies demanded juſtice for the death of the late ſultan, and the puniſhment of the *vizir* who
who

who had murdered him, but who had since abdicated his office. The janizaries protected him, but at length consented to his punishment, and he was carried to the same chamber where the fultan was strangled, and there met his fate; he even pointed out the corner where the regicide was performed, and desired to die there, which was granted.

On 20th January 1622, a peace with Poland was signed by the mediation of the English ambassador.

The soldiers, when they wanted money, now openly plundered people, so that it was thought prudent to remove the royal mint into the seraglio, (where it has remained to this day) and coin all the metal that could be found to satisfy them.

The pasha of Erzerun, with some other pashas, raised a great army, and marched towards Constantinople, declaring his intention to reduce the janizaries of the city to obedience and discipline -, to punish those who had murdered the late fultan Ofman, and to appoint lawfully a new fultan, who should be able to govern; asserting at the same time that Mustafa was an idiot, governed by a woman and by his vizir. The army at Constantinople refused to march against the pasha of Erzerun, and the empire was from *one* end to the other in confusion.

The

The chief cause of this evil was, that their three last emperors had not gone into the field themselves, excepting once, when Mahomet III, for the maintenance of his credit with the foiediery, went to Hungary, and took Agria. The people and ministers were desirous of deposing Muftafa, and placing on the throne Murat, brother of Ofman ; but they feared that the vizir, who was in effect emperor, assisted by the janizaries, would maintain the sovereign they had placed on the throne, and they knew that the low state of the finances would not allow of giving the usual sums to the janizaries at the accession of a new sultan ;, but the report that the pasha of Erzern had declared himself the avenger of the late sultan, and had put to death all the janizaries that fell into his hands, with their wives and children -, that he was advancing with an army ; and that the soldiers sent against him had disbanded, struck the janizaries at Constantinople with such fear, that they joined the civil power to depose Muftafa, and place Arnurat on the throne, and even consented to relinquish the usual donations made to them on such an occasion. Muftafa was therefore re-conducted quietly to his prison, and

SULTAN AMURAT IV. (or MURAT)

In 1623, ascended the throne, being only fourteen years of age. The vizir sent against the pasha
of

of *Erzerun* to till or would 'do' nothing ; for the *beglar* Beg of Anatolia had joined the *paſha*, and *the* *fahies* were on his ſide,

The *Coffaks* at this period entered the *Bosphoros* with 150 ſmail ſhips and boats, and deſtroyed *Buyukdere* and *Yenikoi*, Within about twelve or fifteen miles of *Conſtantinople* on the European, to *Stania* on the *Aſiatic* ſide. They returned the next night quietly, having greatly alarmed the capital The *paſha* of *Erzerun* and the king of *Perſia* ravaged the Countries in *Aſia*. *Algiers* and *Tunis* began to caſt off their allegiance to the *porte*, and to become independent ſtates. The *paſha* of *Erzerun*, however, was pardoned, and admitted to another *paſhalik*, that of *Boftrtia*; for the *porte* thought it dangerous to bring matters to the utmoſt extremity, ſo low was it fallen ; beſides, it did not wiſh to ſee the *janizaries* triumphant, nor Was the grand ſeignior; ſecretly, diſpleaſed at the *paſha's* conduct.

A . D . 1630, The government of the empire was chiefly in the hands of four *paſhas*, who had married inkers of the *fultan*. He himſelf was much given to wine, and often expoſed himſelf to the public in a diſgraceful manner with debauched young men, which created ſuch diſguſt that conſpiracies were formed againſt *him* The people were diſcontented with burthenſome taxes ; the ſoldiers diſorderly, without diſcipline,

and infaloafc at receiving no pay; the pafhas in the provinces were almoft independent fove-reigns, and the empire fhook on its weak foun-dation.

. The head of the fpahilar (general of the fpahies) being cut off, the fpabies rebelled and the janizaries joined them; they threw ftones at and wounded the vizir, whom they with threats obliged the fultan to depofe, and deliver up to them, when they cut him; in pieces. They next caufed the mufti to be depofed, and demanded to fee the brother of the grand feignior, which was granted ; they then charged the new vizir and mufti to become fecurity for his life ; nor was the fedkion appeafed till the foldiery had ftain more yictims.. The fultan, in the mean time, was contriving how he could get rid of them, and kill his brother, but the guarantee of the vizir and mufti faved the prince. He however made another vizir, and confulted with him how to weaken the foldiery ; and he really cut off a great number of fpahies and janizaries fecretly, fending them on various pretences to different parts, and affaffinating them by night.

A. D., 1631. Being now become more manly, he appeared often on horfebaickt with a martial air and exercifing his foldiers perfon, he reduced them to more obedience. But in Afia and in *Hungary there were ftill feditions amongft*

the janizaries, who, because they did not receive *their* pay, killed their commanders;

A. D. 1632. Amurat had now a seventh daughter; and though he was much troubled that he had, no son of his favourite slave, yet he was so much in love with her that he would have created her sultana, had not his mother protested against it, on the ground of its not being usual for any woman to be honoured with that title before she had secured the inheritance by the birth of a male child.

He put to death two Chiefs of the pashies, and eight principal janizaries, thinking thereby to extinguish the spirit of sedition; but fearing another insurrection, he retired to the old seraglio at Scutari, and fortified himself,

He was so little regardful of the laws of nations, that he seized the French ambassador into prison and impaled his interpreter, besides committing other violences. Soon after he made peace with the Persians, but broke it again immediately. He also made peace with *the* emperor of Germany,

A. D. 1633, *Afingular* fight was maintained between two English merchant ships loading corn (which, was then prohibited) in the gulph of Vola, against the whole fleet of the captain pasha's galleys. They *killed* 1,200 *slaves* and **a great number of Turks, among whom was the**

captain upon a bar himself, and when they could maintain the fight no longer, they blew themselves up. They sunk three galleys, and forced the fleet into port to repair. This action is remembered, and talked of to this very day in Turkey. The matter was compromised at the port for 40,000 dollars; the English only paid one-third of the sum, the French and Venetians paid the other two-thirds, for what reason is not known.

A. D. 1634. Murat, being now twenty-five years old, took the government entirely into his own hands, and determined to make himself feared. He was severe with his officers, and extremely so with the soldiers, declaring that he expected implicit obedience. The people mutinied at some taxes, when he beheaded fifty of the ring-leaders. He then hanged a kadi, to the great displeasure of the ulema; and went then to Prusa; whence he dispatched a boat to Constantinople to bring to him the mufti and his son, both of whom he immediately strangled. These examples struck terror into the whole empire for the former emperors but rarely put the muftis to death. The particular death allotted for muftis is, braying them in a vast mortar, used only for that purpose; but it is seldom practised. Murat reflecting on the ill effect that wine had upon him, and on the danger of allowing it to be drunk
by

by'the people, ordered, on pain of death, all the wine in the town to be ftaved out into the ftreets.

He hanged a Venetian merchant far having on the top of his faotife a high gallery, becaufe he fupposed he might thence look into the gardens of the feraglio; and imprifoned, without affigning any rea'fon, all the European merchants, who were not releafed till they paid 40,000 dollars. He feached the houfes of all the foreign minifters for arms, and took away even the fword of the Englifh ambaffador. He attacked the Poles without declaring war. An ambaffador was fent from Poland; Murat, contrary to cuftom, fpoke himfelf, and told him, " *that all* " *Chriftian kings ought either to receive the Ottoman* " *laws or pay him tribute, or try the fharpnefs of his* " *fword.*" He then ordered war to be declared againft Poland, though his war with Perfia ftill continued; but the Poles beat the Turks, and made "them fue for peace, which the Poles re* fufed, till the pafhai who entered their country, and fome others, were put to death. Peace was then concluded. The captain pafia meeting the new French ambaffador at fea, going to Conftantinople, infulted him, and caufed him to go on board his (hip. After his arrival at Conftantinople, the French drogoman, who had brought complaints againft the capitaift pafia, was hanged by order of the fultan, and the ambaffador forced

fuddenly and unekpectedly on board a fhip, and obliged *to* depart,

In April 1634, Murat fet out himfelf for the war in Perfia, at the bead of 100,000 men. When he reached Erzerun, he muttered his army, and found it confift of 300,000 fighting men, well difciplined, and rendered obedient by his feverity; he himfelf now fet them an example of frugality and patience, and became temperate, He took Rivan, but entering further into Perfia, *loft* a yaft number of horfes, He utterly destroyed Tauris by fire and fword, and returned *in* December 1635, leaving his army at Aleppo and Damafcus, After his departure, the Perfians recovered what they had *loft*, and the people rmjrmured again at Conftantmople. The janizaries were difpleafed at feeing the Boftpngees take their places as guards of the gran4 feignior; and the ulema were enraged, that feveral of their body, kadis, and others, had beer* fceheaded on pretext of faction.

Hiving however now completely eftablifhed his authority oyer the military and ulema, he gave loofe to the violent feverity of his temper on the moft trifling occafions, He punifhed the ufe of *tobacco* with death, and inflic:ed the fame *punifhment* on his cook, for not feafoning a difh according *to* his palate. To defstroy his fabiects formed his daily amuferment; either *by*

{hooting

flooting them with arrows, as he fate in his kiofk on the fhore of the Bofphorus, or by firing a carbine at any one who looked out of window at him when failing in his boat. To thefe crimes were added the loweft debaucheries, and his chief companions in drunkennefs were the revolted Perlian general, who had delivered up Revan, and an Italian of the feraglio. Murat's uncontrollable violence now prompted him to attack at once Ruffia and Perfia. Railing, therefore, a vaft army, he fet out on an expedition againfi the latter country, but previoufly caufed one of his brothers to be ftrangled, leaving alive only Ibrahim, the fole furvivor of the Ottoman race, but weak both in mind and body.

It was now that the vigour of Murat's difpofition appeared in its full light. He took the field in May 1638, reviewed his forces with care, difmiffed* the invalids on half pay, heard and determined all difputes in the army, and preferred fuch ftrict difcipline, that the countries through which he paffed fuffered none of thofe dreadful hardfhips ufually attending the march of a Turkifh army. The refult of this campaign was the capture of Bagdat, which event wasfoon fucceeded by a peace, and Murat returned in triumph to Conftantindple, on the 10th--June 1639,

The Venetians having greatly fuffered by the
M 4 piracies

piracies of the Algerines and Tunifines, ventured to make some reprisals, which so much offended Murat, that he issued an immediate order to put to death the Venetian ambassador, and all his countrymen in Turkey; and though, this order was, by the prudent management of the vizir, recalled, yet Venice was threatened with a war, which they only averted by paying 5150,000 sequins. The language of the *kaimakan*, on this occasion, was, " we know that the other " powers of Christendom are too weak to assist " you, take your choice therefore; we sell you " peace at this price ; if you think it not worth " your money, refuse it," While Murat was intent on new hostilities, and raising forces, though he had not determined whom to attack, he returned to his former debaucheries, and was suddenly carried off by them, on the 8th of February 1640, in the 17th year of his reign, and 31st of his age.

Thus perished one of the most ferocious despots that ever insulted and disgraced humanity, breathing vengeance against whole nations, he threatened to subdue all Christendom, and impose on it the yoke of Mohomedanism, and this not from motives of superstition, since he despised, the dictates of that religion, and seldom fasted in Ramadan, or kept any other of its ordinances. So entirely was he a stranger (to family affection, that

that he not only murdered his uncle and two of his brothers, but often expressed a wish to be the last of his race, and actually destined the crown for the khan of the Krim Tatars. The activity and energy of his mind had enabled him to suppress rebellion, and to render himself completely absolute; but this power he used only to the gratification of his own avarice, dying possessed of fifteen millions of gold, though the country was in a state of poverty.

IBRAHIM. (A.D. 1640.)

Notwithstanding a donation of the crown to the Tatar khan, made by Murat, in one of his fits of drunkenness, Ibrahim was unanimously raised by the pashas to the throne. This prince, who was deformed and weak in body, had his natural imbecility augmented by the long confinement which he had undergone in a small room, with only a single window at the top. Coming thus unexpectedly to liberty and empire, he was intoxicated by the new pleasures which they presented, and giving up the administration of government to the former ministers, he devoted himself entirely to the luxuries of the harem. The vizir, thirsting for military glory, projected an attack on the Russian fortresses of Afac (or Azof) but this ended feebly in disgrace. The following year, however, (1642) re-animated
the

the Turks by the birth of an heir to the Ottoman throne . A peace was concluded with the German emperor, and a league with Persia. The German peace was soon broken by the Turks, who made an unsuccessful attempt to surprize the fortrefs of Rab (now called Giavanne.) The fears for the extinction of the Ottoman race were still further removed in 1643, by the birth of two more sons to Ibrahim, who daily devoted himself, with renewed avidity, to sensual excesses, exceeding whatever is related of Sardanapalus and Heliogabalus. The restless disposition of the divan led them, in 1644, to plan an attack on the island of Candia; but being then at peace with the Venetians, they concealed their design under the semblance of amity, until their fleet was fitted out, and had failed toward that island. The Turks then threw off the mask, and in June 1645, landed 74,000 men in Candia, where, in their first campaign, they took the strong city of Canea with their usual violence and slaughter, and- thus began in injustice, long and bloody contest, which lasted until the end of that century; ,

The sultan, in the mean time, disregarding every thing but his pleasures, continued to give a loose to the most unbounded sensuality; and carrying, his desires beyond the limits of the harem, went at length so far as to seize the daughter

daughter of the mufti; This outrage was the caufe of his downfall. The great officers of ftate and the foldiery embraced the caufe of the venerable divine, and his ecclefiastical power Was made the inftrument of vengeance againft the tyrant. A fetva was iffued by the mufti, charging the fultan to appear, and adminifter juftice to his people; and this being treated with contempt, was followed by another, declaring," that he who obeyed not the law of God was no true mufelman ; and though the perfon were the emperor himfelf, yet being become by his filthy aftions an infidel, he was, *ipfo facto*, fallen from his throne." Upon the authority of this fetva, the janizaries quickly depofed Ibrahim, and fent him to his former prifon, where, after fome days, he was ftrangled, and his fon Mahomet exalted to the throne. The weight and efficacy which, in this tranfaction, appeared to be given to the fetva, was in faft owing to the previous concurrence of the great officers of ftate, and to the general contempt into which the fultan, by his fenfuality and cowardice, had fallen.

MAHOMET IV.(A.D.1650.)

This emparor being but feven years old at the deposition of his father, it was determined that his minority fhould continue ten years longer, during which time his mother, affifted by the
principal

principal pafhas, was to conduct the affairs of government. The Venetian war Was refolutely piirfued abroad; but at home great diffenfions took place between the different factions. Murat, the predeceflbr of Ibrahim, a warlike prince himfelf, had promoted only braveandable men to command in the diftant pafhaliks; but thefe, during the reign of his weak and timid fuceflbr, had affumed fo much power as to become almoft independent. To this fource of divifion was added the mutual jealoufy of the fpahies and janizaries, the former afferting themfelves as avengers of the death of fultan Ibrahim, alid claiming a precedency over the latter in affairs of government. The feraglio itfelf was farther divided by different parties, fupporting the oppofite claims of the mother and grandmother of the young fultan to his guardianfhip; all thefe cafes concurred to render in a great meafure ufelefs the mighty preparations of the Turks to purfue the war in Candia.' The minority of the fultan was one continued fcene of difcord and revolt.

In 1651, the fpahies of Afia marched toward Conftantinople, demanding the heads of the vizir and janizar aga; but this affair was compomifed by the difcharge of thofe officers from their Employments.

In 1652, a rebellion broke out in Egypt and at
Damafcus,

Pamafeus, but was soon, quelled ; and the following year the pasha of Aleppo, marched with a great body of insurgents against Constantinople. This pasha, after causing great terror in the capital, settled the business by treaty, and though a rebel, he was so highly esteemed for his abilities, that on the death of the vizir, in 1655, he was elevated to that important office.

The ill successes of the Turkish arms in the Venetian war so much irritated the inhabitants of Constantinople, that they came in a body to the gates of the seraglio, tumultuously demanding peace; nor was this rebellion subdued by the divan without great difficulty, and by the sacrifice of the new vizir.

In the year 1656, while new preparations were making for war, a sedition, more terrible than any of the preceding, broke out at Constantinople. The spahies and janizaries uniting, under pretence of reforming abuses of the state, ran in arms to the divan, and deposed the grand vizir and other officers, They entered the imperial palace, plundered the treasury of two millions of gold and even threatened to depose the sultan. The city was, for several days given up to all the horrors of pillage, until the rebellion beginning to abate, through a want of union and of settled views among the ringleaders, authority returned to its former channel } the celebrated Kiuperli, pasha of Damascus, was called, at the

age of eighty, to the post of vizir, and the grand feignior himself, attended by his chief (officers, rode through the city to put to death the rioters, and to restore public tranquillity.

1657. The grand feignior from this time took the government into his own hands, and employed himself in forwarding the military preparations ; but finding the janizaries mutinous on account of the non-payment of their arrears, he attempted to quell them, by punishing the ringleaders with death. The discontents at Constantinople, however, were augmented by the success of the Venetians, Until the vizir, going himself at the head of a very great force, took the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos which succeeded elevating the grand feignior, he went with great pomp to Adrianople, where he conferred peace to the Venetian envoys on Condition of their surrendering Candia and Cliffia, in Dalmatia, and paying 3,000,000 crowns of gold ; but this offer was too unreasonable to be accepted

1658. The grand feignior was for a while deterred from his intended invasion of Dalmatia by the defection of the pasha of Aleppo, who having revolted, and marched toward Constantinople, which was at that time afflicted with the plague, proclaimed a youth that was with him Sultan, as son of Sultan Murat, and refused to listen to any terms of accommodation

1659. The power of the pasha increasing, rapidly,

rapidly, vizir" march'd at the head of a large army to give him battle, but was defeated with great loss, and the grand seignior himself being oblig'd, to take the field, the pasha offer'd to treat with him, which the sultan accepting, sent one of his creatures, who, under pretence of negotiating, assassinated the pasha. Some others, who afterwards attempted to prosecute the plans of the deceased pasha, were artfully defeated and reduced by the artifices of the vizir.

1660, The porte now turned their efforts against the Venetians; but they being assisted by a supply of French forces, prosecuted the war with vigour.

1661. The porte having, under pretence of the rebellion of Ragotzki in Transylvania, reduced the important fortresses of Varadin, contrary to the general peace concluded between the emperor and the grand seignior, a cause of war arose between Turkey and the German empire. This did not immediately break out, though the pasha of Buda, entering Transylvania, raised a faction in favour of Turkey and overthrew the leader, of the opposite party, The old vizir Kruparli now advised the grand seignior to remove his court to Adrianople, where he himself soon died, but not till after he had procured the nomination of his son to succeed him, who was no sooner elevated, than he began to remove his most potent enemies

enemies by death or banishment. During these commotions the Venetian war was but faintly continued on.

1662. The revolt of the pasha of Buda and of the Georgians occupied the porte for some time, and the vizir being also employed in establishing his own influence more securely, the views of hostility against the German empire were not prosecuted with much ardour, until at the latter part of the year, the commotions being mostly terminated, the vizir earnestly prepared for war, and the pasha of Buda laid waste great part of Transylvania, though it was subject to the porte.

In 1663, after deceiving the Germans for some time with a show of pacific intentions, the sultan openly declared hostilities, by marching at the head of his forces from Constantinople; and though the Germans made fair offers of peace, they were haughtily rejected by Mahomet. The sultan proceeded with the army as far as Adrianople, and then the vizir taking the command marched toward the confines of Hungary. An instance of his cruelty on this expedition deserves notice.

A chosen body of 8,000 Germans having attacked the Turks by night, and committed great slaughter, were at length repulsed, with the loss of 400 killed and 1,800 prisoners. These latter the

the fanguinary vizir condemned to death, and mained himfelf a fpectator of their murder on the fcaffold, until the murmurs of his army obliged him to defift,, after having-ftruck off 1,400 heads.

The Turkifli forces, continuing to advance, ftruck fuch terror into the emperor,, that he retreated from Vienna with the recrdrs and qther articles of importance ; and by this timidity, no lefs than by the diftracted ftate of his councils, contributed much to exalt the arrogance of the Turks ; but at length the valour of the German generals, and of their confederates the French, having turned the tide of war, and the vizir being beaten with great lofs, a peace was concluded, by which the Turks reduced their former infolent propofals to the ceffion of the fortrefs of Nieu Haufel.

This affair being fully fettled, in 1665, the fultan began to turn his thoughts to the poffeffion of the Ifle of Candia, and returned to Gonftantinople, to prepare for the profecution of his defign. Hoftilities proceeded in the following year with much vigour on both fides, and the vizir with a great force landed in Candia.

The year 1667 opened with an embaffy from Poland, to complain that the Tatars, fubject to the fultan, had invaded that country, and carried off *an hundred thou/and* perfons into flavery; but of thefe complaints no notice was taken.

On the 11th of May, in this year, began *the* famous sieg of Candia, by an army of 70,000 Turks, provided with every necessary for the attack of such a place, and furnished with cannon some of which carried balls of 120 pounds weight. So certain were the Turks of success, that great preparations were made at Constantinople for illuminations and other rejoicings, on the capture of Candia; but that place resisted the most furious and repeated attacks with heroic firmness, and the vizir was obliged to continue the whole of the winter in the trenches. A second year passed in a repetition of the same furious attacks, and the same obstinate resistance. In two assaults, the Turks lost 30,000 men; but by continual supplies of men and ammunition, they were still enabled to press forward, and at length carried the outworks of the Christians.

The sudden finding, in the year 1669, that the great expence and exertion fruitlessly made in this sieg produced nothing but disgrace, began to apprehend the elevation of his brothers to his throne, and therefore sent orders to have them strangled; but the people of Constantinople taking up arms in their favour, for the present, prevented his designs being put in execution. From these fears he was at length released by the surrender of Candia by a capitulation, which formed the basis of a treaty of peace with the Venetians. In this celebrated sieg it was com-
puted

puted that 40,000 Christians, and nearly 120,000 Turks, were destroyed,

In 1670, the vizir returned home in triumph, and joined the grand seignior in taking steps for the removal of his brothers. To this end it was judged necessary to dispatch the most turbulent of the janizaries on an expedition against the Polish frontiers, and during their absence prince Orkhan was privately strangled.

"The year 1672 was signalized by the Polish war. The sultan levying a great force, and being joined by numerous bands of Tatars, entered Poland, speedily conquered the Ukraine, and obliged the Poles to pay a yearly tribute of 22,000 ducats. The Turks and Tatars had killed or carried into slavery more than 300,000 Polish subjects. The divan was, however, dissatisfied with this peace, and obliged the sultan to recommence the war, notwithstanding the menaces of the czar of Russia, who endeavoured to interest all the sovereigns of Europe in the defence of Poland. The domestic disturbances had occasioned a great levy of troops, so that the Turkish army was very numerous, yet the Poles repelled this second irruption more bravely than the former; but in the succeeding campaign, the Turks swept away all the inhabitants of the countries they invaded, distributing the captives of both sexes as slaves among the soldiery.

The fine country of the Ukraine was rendered at defert. The Turks took Human, and of above 100,000 men who were in it, very few efcaped.

In 1676 died the vizir *Athmet Kiuperli*, to whom was chiefly to be attributed whatever fucefs had attended the reign of Mahomet, and whose merits were moft admirably exemplified, by being contrafted with the vices of his fuceffor *Kara Muftapha*. This new vizir practifed every fpecies of rapine and fraud to enrich and ftrengthen himfelf, and thinking war moft favourable to his influence (that with Poland being ended) in 1680, he called together a moft folemn council, in which he ufed every argument to prove, that a war would highly conduce to *' *the honour and advantage of the jlate*" this being the only ftandard of political morality in Turkey. Though he was unfucefsful at this council, he prevailed with the grand feignior the following year; perfuading him that the circumftances enabled him to fall on the emperor of Germany with advantage, and that the French court would favour his views. This may be called the crifis of the Othman power, when having attained the acme of its fame and fplendor, its own inordinate ambition, and the prevalence of evil councils, pu(hed it onward rapidly to its decline.

- The porte and the emperor were united by % league or truce of twenty years, three years of

which remained yet unexpired, and the infraction of this treaty was the first step toward that low state of degradation, in which the present age beholds this once mighty empire.

As the present historical sketch is intended principally to exhibit the means of violence and blood, by which the Turkish sceptre has been sustained; and as we have now reached the period of its widest extension, the remaining part of its history will require but flight notice; it will be sufficient to point out those leading events in the reign of the succeeding sovereigns which most immediately affected the political state of the empire.

The imperial war was long and bloody; the Turks, at first successful, penetrated to Vienna, and laid siege to that capital, but were forced to raise it by Sobieski. The tide of their fortune now turning, Mahomet was deposed by the janizaries, but the war was continued, though with no better success, by the two following sultans, Achmet II. and Muftapha II. The latter, indeed, attempted to reanimate his subjects with a military spirit, by taking the field in person, but being defeated by the famous Prince Eugene, he concluded the peace of Carlowitz in 1699, by which Transylvania was ceded to the emperor.

These circumstances conspiring with others

to render Muftapha unpopular, he was depofed, and fucceeded by his brother Achmet III. who forced the Ruffians, by the imprudence of their czar, to cede, at the peace of Pruth, many important fortreffes. The inordinate ambition of this prince next led him to attack the Venetians and other Chriftian powers; but his fuccefs herein was widely different, being reduced, by repeated defeats, to conclude, at Paffarowitz, in 1718, a peace highly difgraceful to the Turkifh empire.

His war with Kouli Khan, the Perfian ufurper, proved no lefs unfuccefsful; and the event of all thefe difgraces was, at length, a revolt, in which he was depofed, and fucceeded by Mahomet V.

The events of the year 1730, which produced the rebellion of the janizaries, the depofition of *Achmet*) and the elevation of his nephew *Makomet*, in their confequences were alfo productive of a confiderable alteration in the mode of carrying on the government.

From the time of Mahomet II. it had been ufual to delegate the whole adminiftration to the vizir, but as this and the preceding rebellion had originated in the overgrown power and ambition of thofe who held that office, Mahomet, by the advice of his *kiflar-aga*, an experienced man, took the power into his own hands, and determined to change his vizirs frequently.

Mahomet,

Mahomet, however, afterwards confided much in the fucceflbr of this kiflar-aga, a man of the utmoft rapacity and infolence, who extending his attacks both againft the janizaries and the ulema, thofe bodies confpired his overthrow, and began to (how their intentions, by fetting fire to Conflantinople. The frequent repetition of thefe fires:at length arousing the fultan, he confulted with the mufty, and by his advice fecrificed the kiflar-aga and all his dependents, and feized on their ill-gotten treafures, including a vaft quantity of precious ftones, and above, 39,500 purfes (£.1,900,000) in money, which were paid to the hafne.

The death of the *kiflar-aga* gave another change to the interior government. His fucceffor entered into a clofe connection with the vizir, which lafted till 1754, when, on the death of *Mahometry* his brother *Ofman* came from confinement to the throne j and the *kiflar-aga* and his fecretary, the *jazigi-effendi*, gained the confidence of the new fovereign, and aflumed their former power.

On the death of *Ofman*, in 1757, *Muftapha*, thefonof *Achmet* (before-mentioned) fucceeded, and he placing au implicit confidence in the vizir *RagibMehemety* followed his counfel, and deprived the *kiflar-aga* of his place and influence, and attached to the vizirat great part of the

nearly 50,000 who deserted the army in its tumultuous retreat.

Prince Gallitzin retiring with honour, resigned the command to General Romanzow, who having speedily over-run Moldavia and Walachia, and received the oaths of allegiance, readily offered by its inhabitants, gained two splendid victories over the Turkish forces, on the 18th of July and the 2d of August, 1770.

The enterprising spirit of the empress led her to adopt the more striking and novel measure of sending a fleet into the Mediterranean, and thus attacking the Turkish empire on both sides and this measure was crowned with success. The inhabitants of the Morea flew to arms on the approach of the Russians. But the most brilliant action of this naval campaign was the victory of Chesme, an harbour on the coast of Natolia, into which the Turkish fleet being driven, were all destroyed by fire-ships. Had count Orlov followed the advice of admiral Elphinston, a brave and experienced officer in the empress's service, the Russian fleet would have failed to Constantinople immediately after the destruction of the Turkish ships at Chesme. These, and other successes of the Russians, forced the Turks, to conclude a dishonourable peace on the 21st of July, 1774, shortly after the death of Muftapha, and the accession of his brother Abdulhamid.

We have thus brought down our view of the Turkish history to our own times : the peace of 1774, was the first great step toward the limitation of an empire, which, as we have seen, was originally founded on rapine and injustice. This blow was effectually followed up by the succeeding war, which was terminated so favourably to Russia, in 1790; and it is scarcely to be doubted, that another war, conducted on similar principles, must totally extinguish the Turkish power in Europe; an event desirable to almost all Christian states, and particularly to that of Great Britain.,

I have ceased enumerating all the massacres and breaches of faith the Turks have committed for this last century and a half. Their conduct has been uniform, Cyprus and Candia would furnish 3 volume, ,

CHAPTER VI.

Of Arts and Sciences, Commerce, and General Manners.

HAVING traced the outline of those grand leading causes of national importance or decline, which arise from religions and political institutions and from the events of past ages, it may not be amiss to turn our view to the more domestic circumstances or prejudices of a people, their knowledge or prejudices relative to commerce and the arts, and their habits of mutual intercourse and association.

From what has already been said of the causes affecting the Turkish character, it must be evident that it affords but a sterile foil for the culture of the arts. All their habits tend to an indolence little favourable to the emanations of genius; hence results a want of a curiosity for the objects of science in general; and to these must be added the restraints of their religion and government.

A religion abounding in the grossest ignorance and superstition, and which, at the same time, teaches its followers that they alone are the favoured of God; that as their faith is the purest, so are they, themselves, the wisest of mankind, precludes them from copying their more enlightened

lightened neighbours, and even leads them to conclude that the pursuits of infidels must be at least frivolous, if not immoral.

The superstitions of this religion have not, like the splendid mythology of ancient Greece, or the > religious pomp of modern Rome, any medium of communication with the arts, such as would be supplied by the decoration of temples, or the pageantry of public games and processions: Mahomed strenuously and successfully combated the idolatry of his countrymen, and through fear of their relapse, strictly forbade any appeal to the senses by statuary or painting. However, the Persians, and some of the Arab kalifs only considered this prohibition as relating to the representation of figures as the object of worship.

It is true, that this religion has not universally acted with so much force to the extinction of intellect. Under the splendid reign of Abdurrahman, the founder of the Arabian monarchy in Spain, it assumed a more civilized form. That political sovereign promoted intermarriages between his Mahomedan and Christian subjects, and favoured the natural propensity of the Arabs to literature and science, at a time when the rest of mankind were sunk in ignorance and barbarism: but in all these proceedings he departed widely from the spirit of intolerance and bigotry,

gotry, which the Turks have uniformly attached to their religion, and he is to be viewed more in the light of a liberal politician than of a religious enthusiast. The lively manners and ardent minds of the Arabs tempered the influence of a religion fundamentally barbarous and gloomy ; but the Turks have not only given to superstition its full sway, but have even augmented its influence by circumstances of additional barbarism.

The suspicions of despotism must ever tend to degrade and brutalize its unhappy subjects. Few are the inducements which the torpid Turk has to apply himself to science, and those few are annihilated by the fear of exciting distrust in the government. ' Travelling, that great source of expansion and improvement to the mind, is entirely checked by the arrogant spirit of his religion; and intercourse with foreigners among them, further than those immediately in their service, by the jealousy with which such intercourse is viewed in a person not invested with an official character.

The present sultan is the first Turkish sovereign who has condescended to send ministers to reside at foreign courts.

General knowledge is, from these causes, little if at all cultivated ; every man is supposed to know his own business or profession, with which

it is esteemed foolish, and improper for any other person to interfere. The man of general science, a character so frequent and so useful in Christian Europe, is unknown; and any one, but a mere Artificer, who should concern himself with the founding of cannon, the building of ships, or the like, would be esteemed little better than a madman. The natural consequence of these narrow views is, that the professors of any art or science are themselves profoundly ignorant, and that the greatest absurdities are mixed with all their speculations.

I (shall elucidate this by detailing the opinions received, not only by the populace, but even by the pretended *literati*, in various branches of knowledge.

ASTRONOMY.—From the mufti to the peasant it is generally believed, that there are seven heavens, from which the earth is immoveably suspended by a large chain; that the sun is an immense ball of fire, at least as big as a whole Ottoman province, formed for the sole purpose of giving light and heat to the earth; that eclipses of the moon are occasioned by a great dragon attempting to devour that luminary; that the fixed stars hang by chains from the highest heaven, &c. &c. These absurdities are in part supported by the testimony of the Koran; and the astronomers, as they are called, themselves all pretend to astrology, a profession so much esteemed,

esteemed, that an astrologer is kept in the pay of the court, as well as of most great men.

GEOGRAPHY, — Of the relative situation of countries they are ridiculously ignorant, and all their accounts of foreign nations are mixed with superstitious fables. They distinguish different Christian states by different "appellations of contempt.

EPITHETS which the Turks apply to those who are not Osmanlis, and which they often use to denominate their nation.

<i>Albanians</i>	-	gut-fellers	- - - -	(<i>giguirgee</i>)
<i>Armenians</i>		bird-eaters, dirt-eaters, also, pack-earners		(<i>bokchee</i>)
<i>Bosniaks</i> and :	,	- - vagabonds	- • - - -	(<i>poür</i>)
<i>Bulgarians</i>				
<i>Christians</i>	- - - -	idolaters	- - - -	(<i>purpureft</i>)
<i>Dutch</i>	- - "	cheese-mongers	- - -	(<i>penirgee</i>)
<i>EngUJIt</i>	- -	atheists	(<i>dinfis</i>)	i. e. having no religion.
<i>Flemmings</i>	- - - ~	panders	(<i>felamink, pexevink</i>)	
<i>French</i>	- - - - -	faithless	- -	(<i>franjis, imanfis</i>)
<i>Georgians</i>	- - - -	house-eaters	- - -	(<i>bitycyedfi</i>)
<i>Germans</i>	- - -	infidel blasphemers"	"	(<i>gutur hiafer</i>)
<i>Greeks of the islands</i>	- -	hares	. - - •	(<i>tawfhan</i>)'
<i>Italians or Franks</i>	-	many-coloured	-	(<i>firenfo, haffarrenki</i>)
<i>Jews</i>	- - - - -	mangy dogs	- - .-, '-	(<i>chefut</i>)
<i>Moldavians</i>	- - - -	drones	- -	(<i>bogdan, nadan</i>)
<i>Poles</i>	- - - - -	inherent infidels	-	(<i>fudulguiaur</i>)
<i>Ruffians</i>	- - -	mad infidels	- -	<i>ruş, wenhius</i>)
<i>Spaniards</i>	- - - - -	lazy	- - - - -	(<i>tembel</i>)
<i>Tatars</i>	- . - - -	carrion-eaters	- - -	(<i>lafhyeyedgee</i>)
<i>Walachians</i>	- - - -	gypsies	- - - -	(<i>chingani</i>)

Before

Before the Ruffian fleet came into the Mediterranean, the minifters of the porte would not believe it poffible for them to approach Conftantinople but from the Black Sea. The captain pafha (great admiral) affirmed, that their fleet might come by the way of Venice. From this, and a thoufand fimilar and authentic anecdote?, their ignorance of the (kuation of countries is evident; and as to the (lories which they univerfally believe, they are fuch as the following: that India is a country far diftant, where there are diamonds, fine mufflins, and other ftuffs, and great riches; but that the people are little known; that they are Mahomedans moftly, but do not acknowledge the kalifat of their fultan; that the Perians are a very wicked people, and will be all damned; that they will be changed into afles in hell, and that the Jews will ride on them i that the Europeans are all wicked infidels, knowing an art of war, which is fometimes dangerous, but will all be conquered in time, and reduced to the obedience of the fultan ; that their women and children ought to be carried into captivity ; that no faith is to be kept with them, and that to mafiacre them is highly meritorious, if they refufe to become Mahomedans; (yet they have among them a prophecy, that the *Jons of yellownefs*, which they interpret to be the Ruffians, are to take Conftantinople;)

that the Englifh are powerful by fea, and the French and Germans by land; that the Ruffians are the moft powerful, and they call them the *great infidels*; but they are acquainted with no details of thefe countries.

ANCIENT HISTORY.—They have heard of an Alexander, who was the greateft monarch and conqueror, and the greateft hero in the world. The Tultans often compare themfelves to him in their writings. Sultan Mahomed IV. in his letter to the Ruffian czar, Alexis Michaelovitz, calls himfelf "*majler of all the univerfei and equal in power to Alexander the Great*" They talk of him always as the model of heroifm to be imitated, but they know not who he was. Solomon, they fay, was the wifeft man, and the greateft magician, that ever exifted, and the Palmyra and Balbek were built by fpirits at his command.

POETRY and GENERAL LITERATURE.—They have a few poets, as they are called, whofe competitions are moftly little fongs and ballads; but in thefe, as well as their profe writings, they differ widely from the fimplicity of the Arabs, as they abound with falfe conceits; and the language is a barbarous mixture of the Turkiſh with the Perfian and Arabic, not unlike that "*Baby-hnijli dialect*" of our puritans, which Butler compares to "*juftian cut onfatht*"

Of the general taste of the Turks, Tott has given a just description, when he says, "*a double meaning, or a literal transposition, forms the extent of their studies and literature, and every thing that can be invented by false taste, to fatigue the mind, constitutes their delight, and excites their admiration,*"

This leads me to a consideration of the Turkish language, a point on which I shall make some observations rather more at length, as it has not been hitherto treated with any degree of accuracy. The origin of the Turkish language was the *Zagutaiy* a dialect of that Tatarian tongue, which has been spread so widely by the hostile incursions of different barbarians.

The conjectures of Tott on this subject are justly corrected by Peyffonel, whose observations on the different origin of these languages are deserving attention. Among the barbarous hordes that have at different periods overflowed Europe and Asia from the north and west, he distinguishes three great and distinct nations, differing in origin and in language, the Celts or Teutons, the Fens or Slavonians, and the Huns or Tatars. It may be doubted, whether in the first class he does not confound two very different tribes, as the remains of the Celtic and Teutonic languages still existing in Europe bear every mark of an original difference. These, however, he thinks (with justice) were the first of the barbarian

barian invaders, including the Vandals, Goths, Oftrogoths, Vifigoths, &c. who all iffued from the countries between the Northern Ocean and the Baltic Sea. The fecond in order of time were the Fens, Venni, or Slavonians, who inhabited the borders of the Danube and the Euxine, and from whofe language the Slavonian, Ruffian, and Polifli of the prefont day are derived. The lateft of all were the Huns or Tatars, who, proceeding from what has been called the Platform of Tatory, have fpread from the fea of Japan to the frontiers of Poland, and have at different periods feized upon the Chinefe, Indian, Perfian, and Turkifh empires.

The Zagatai language, as muft neceffarily be the cafe with a tongue fpoken by fuch barbarians, was poor and confined, and its deficiencies have been fupplied by the adoption of terms from the Arabic and Perfian.

The Turkilh language is the eafieft of any one "We are" acquainted with, becaufe it is the moft regular. It has only one conjugation of the verbs (excepting a difference of *ek* and *ak* in the infinitive, which the ear foon learns to diftnguifh) and but one declenfion of the nouns. There is no exception, nor any irregular verb or noun, in the language. The cafes and perfons are denoted by the termination, as in Latin,* but the phrafeology is much more eafy, and the tfrmfpbfition is not carried to fo difficult a length.

The

The Turkifli language has no gender. Woman, and some of the situations of women, are distinguished by different words ; as wife, daughter: but a fitter is called a girl-brother. The titles of women are the same as those of men: *Fatima Sutton* (not *Sultana*, which is an Italian word) ; mother-fultan is the queen (or princefs) mother. The word Sultan, applied to the sovereign, and the males of his family, precedes their proper names; all other titles follow the name: *Ga/ga Sultan, Mahomed Pafha, Ali Effendi*, They have compound words, as in Greek, though they are more limited in their use. It is true, the Turkifti language is not very copious, yet it is manly, energetic, and fonorous. To fupply the want of words, or more frequently, from a defire of appearing learned, their writers introduced Arabic and Perfian, and these languages are now confiderably mixed with the dialects spoken at the feraglio (or court,) and at the bar (or majkami). The Arabic is mostlly intermixed in topics of ethics, religion, or law; and the Perfians, in subjets of gallantry, poetry, and at the feraglio. Had they only naturalized foreign words, and adapted them to the grammar of their own language, as we do in English, they would have enriched it, without making it more difficult, and have preserved its character ; but these words and phrases preserve the grammar

of the language they belong to, which creates real 'difficulty, and renders it necessary, in order to read a *firman*, or a piece of poetry, to know something of the Arabic and Persian grammes. This will best be demonstrated by an example : Supposing the Latin to be Arabic, and the Persian French, a Turk would write, if English were his language, in the following manner:

Language of a Mufti or Doctor.

I do not love *deplorare vitam*, as many, and // *docti, fapeseerunt*; nor do I repent that I have lived at all, because I have *ainfi vecu*, as not *frustra me natum et iustum*: I do not affect that *tœdium vita* proceeds taibre from want of steadiness in our true "religion, than from *atra bilis*. If a man destroys himself, he is either *infimus*, and a holy fool, or one possessed *demonis*, or he is *nu athee*—an infidel, or a Frank. Pray *deusn* that he may preserve you against those who blow *on nodos fuum* and whisper in the ear.

Language of a Turkish Poet.

The eyes of *l'abbreuveuse* * indubiate me more than *le vin*, and *fes fleches* penetrate *In moele de mes os* quicker than those from the "bow.

This is the first couplet of a Tong in pure

• She who pours out the wine.

Arabic :(compofed by an Arabian,) which I have thus written, to fhew how a Turk would exprefs the fame fentiment with refped: to the language; the genuine Turkifh compofitions are ridiculously hyperbolical.

it muft be obferved, that very few of thofe, who lard their writings or difcourfes with Arabic or JPerfian .phrafes, are much acquainted with thofe languages; but they have learnt the phrafes and terminations moft in ufe, and know the meaning of a fentence, without underftanding each word feparafely, or having much idea of the grammar.

It is aftonilhig that they have not perfected their alphabet. They write generally without points, and it is then impoffible to read their writing without -knowing the language well. When they fead foreign words or names,, two people.feldom read themalike. If the perfection of a written charactfeerbe to reprezent words in a clear and unambiguous mannerto the eye, they certainly are farther from it than any other nation, and they have remained in this ftate of imperfection, without making the leaft attempt to improvement, fo long, that no effort is now to be expected from them. Many of the letters have each three different forms, when they begin, are in the middle, or end a word. The Arabic printed in Chriftian countries, and on Mount Libanus by the Maronities, is more diftinct and

more easily read than the written, though this is more elegant in its appearance, which is but a secondary quality. It requires great practice to be able to read the Arabic character quick.

Upon these different circumstances relating to the Turkish language are grounded the different opinions of the Baron de Tott and M. de Peyffonel, the former of whom justly ranks among the obstructions to science in Turkey, the difficulty of writing and reading the language. To this Peyffonel opposes the facility with which the Baron himself acquired a knowledge of the Turkish language, without observing that this knowledge only extended to *speaking* it, a task which was comparatively easy. Mr. de Tott never acquired *skill* enough to read it readily. Peyffonel also adduces, as an additional argument, the ability of several European interpreters, whose names he mentions; but this eulogium was only applicable to the celebrated M. Muragia, and not even to him in its full extent; nor does this prove any thing in favour of the Turks themselves, since the advantage which they possess as natives is more than counterbalanced by their habits of apathy and indolence. Peyffonel is equally incorrect in comparing the different characters of the Turks to the different hands, the italic, running hand, engrossing, &c. used in other parts of Europe.

In those countries, the different hands have
all

all such a degree of familiarity, that few are able to write, and none to read them at all; and a person who had learned one hand, in a few hours might learn the others; but in Turkey, scarcely any person is versed in the different characters, except the *prof''ejjed* writers, and even among them these characters are employed each for its distinct and peculiar purpose: the *nefhki* is used in works of science; the *tealik*, for poetry; the *divani*, for state papers, commissions, and epistolary correspondence; and the *falus*, for inscriptions, devices, &c. If the difficulty presented by these various characters seems at first view light, it must be remembered, that a slight obstacle, thrown in the way of an indolent Turk, becomes insuperable from his general disregard of science.

The art of *printing*, though often attempted, has never been introduced among the Turks. This is not owing to the difficulty of forming Arabic types, as has been by some alledged, (for the Christians of Mount Lebanon, as well as we, print books with Arabic characters) but the true cause of this neglect, is the Turkish indolence and contempt for all innovations.

Is it not matter of astonishment, that since the first establishment of their manufactory of carpets, they have not improved the designs, and particularly as they are not forbidden to imitate
flowers?

flowers ? The fame may be faid of their embroidery, and of the fluffs made at Prufa, Aleppo, and Damafcus. Their carpets owe their excellency only to the materials they are made of.

In all the Turkifh arts, the traces offuperftition are obfervable. Their *arckitatture* does not imitate that of ancient Greece, nor have they corre&ed one fault, or conceived any idea of proportion, from the .perfett models they have daily before their eyes. In ihort, they have never ftudied architecture.; and as to the practice of Europeans, it would be derogatory to the muelman dignity to copy infidels. They have taken their notions of general forms fromthe Arabs, but have added nothing of their own. The church of St. Sophia, however, after it became a mofque, is the model by which moft of the other mofques in Conftantinoplle have been built; and this perhaps was owing to the architects employed by the Turks being Greeks or Armenians. Though many of thefe have fome notion of the rules of their own art, they are not permitted to purfue them beyond what the Turks conceive to be the *mahomedan* form ; they look indeed with akind of reverence on the noble ruins of Greece, believing them to have been built by devils or genii; they are alfo jealous of Europeans, who wifh to obtain poffeffion of any parts of thofe re-

mains ; but the only use they themselves make of them, is to pull in pieces the marble edifices to burn them into lime. The plaſtei: of their walls, made of this lime, is very beautiful; but it is to be lamented that to produce it, the divine works of Phidias and Praxiteles have been conſigned to the furnace. This marble lime, mixed with pounded marble unburnt, forms a plaſter Superior in whiteness to the indian chмам, but unequal to it in polish and hardness. Among the mosques and public buildings at Constantinople, are to be found many fine edifices ; but they are copied from the Arabian buildings in Asia, where there are much grander structures than at Constantinople, though of as late a date.

On the origin of the mosque and gothic architecture many learned dissertations have been written. It is not to my present purpose to make extracts from them, and I should have nothing new to say on the subject. With respect to the general form of the mosques, baths, caravansaries, bazars, and kiosks, in the different parts of the empire, the fact is, notwithstanding many striking defects, grand and imposing; the particular parts are devoid of all proportion; their columns have nothing of their true character, being often twenty and thirty diameters high, and the intercolumniation frequently equal to the height of the column. The capitals and entablatures

tablatures are the mod whimsical and ridiculous*.

The noble productions of *fiatuary* and *painting* are still more fully suppressed. These arts are anathematized as irreligious; because a blind and stupid fanaticism has declared that it is impious to emulate the works of God. Hence the incitements to virtue and animation, -which we experience in viewing the statues or portraits of the benefactors of mankind, are wholly lost; hence too, the Turk can never be aroused by those flames of genius, those glowing energies of mind, which the historic pencil, in describing some important scene, arrests and renders immortal. So far is this bigotry carried, that

* St. Sophia, at Constantinople, there is little doubt, was the model which the European architects copied, when they introduced the cupola upon four arches, than which nothing can be more preposterous. Those who chuse to see the false principles of these buildings exposed, and how far they differ from the grandeur and simplicity of the ancients, may read *Frise's Saggia sulVArchitefiura Gottica, Livorno*, and in an excellent little German treatise annexed to the translation of it, the peculiar excellencies of the gothic pointed out, exclusively of its defects.

It is worthy, however, of observation, that the interior of St. Sophia appears much larger, and that St. Peter's, at Rome, appears infinitely smaller than it really is. The cupola of this latter church is of the same size as the Pantheon.; the members of the entablature, which runs round the lower part of the cupola or lantern, are marked on the pavement below by different coloured marbles; but no one can, without actual measurement, be persuaded of this truth.

neither

neither the effigy of the fovereign, nor the representation of any imaginary being (as in the ancient medals) is permitted to be imprinted on their money.

The only ufe of thefe arts which is allowed, is the imitation of inanimate nature, in carving or painting the interior of a room. Even here they frequently ufe as ornaments paflagcs from the Koran ; but they generally paint the walls with flowers or landfcapes. Their ingenuity is, however, merely mechanical ; and of fcientific rules they are perfectly ignorant: perfpctive is totally unknown to the painters themfelves.

The fcience of the Turks in making aqeducts, has been vaunted by fome authors; but left it fhould thence be concluded that they have a knowledge of hydraulics, I will here ftate in what this fcience confifts. When water is to be conduced, they begin by laying pipes of burnt clay underground, to the diftance of about *a* quarter of a mile, they then ereft a fquare pillar, and continue the pipe up till they find how high the water will rife j then they carry the pipe down the other fide, (leaving the top open) and continue it under ground to the next pillar; and fo on till they have brought the water to the place intended to be fupplied with it. It fometimes happens that all their labour has been in vain; and they find by experience that the place

to be fupplied is higher than the place whence they wanted to bring the water.

The principles of levelling are unknown to them* It would be in vain to tell them that the furface of water is not perfectly flat, that there is fuch a thing as refraction; and that a levelling inftrument alone will not tell them the height to which water will rife. The moft learned man among the ulema does not know, that as the whole fine is to the angle of refraction, fo is the diftance of the object to its apparent elevation by refraction. They have *no* means of calculating the latter preffure of arches or of cupolas; though they generally err on the right fide, yet accidents fometimes have happened. I once fucceeded in making a Turkifh mathematician underftand the principle of a catenarian arch, by fufpending a chain; but when he endeavoured to explain it to an architect, who was erecting a confiderable building for the late captain pafha, Gazi-Haflan, he received for anfwer, that the figure defcribed by a chain hung up by the two ends might be applicable to the conftruction of the bottom of a fhip, but not to that of an arch of mafonry.

It is a certain fact, that a few years ago a learned man of the few having loft an eye, and being informed that there was then at Conftantinople an European who made falfe eyes, not to be diftin*

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guifhed

guished from the natural, he immediately procured one; but when it was placed in the socket, he flew into a violent passion with the eye-maker, abusing him as an impostor, because he could not see with it. The man, fearing he should lose his pay, assured him that in time he would see as well with that eye as with the other. The effendi was appeased, and the artist liberally rewarded, who having soon disposed of the remainder of his eyes, left the Turks in expectation of seeing with them.

The use of wheel carriages is almost unknown in Turkey. There is a kind of cart, used at Constantinople* and in some few other parts, mostly for women to travel in. In most parts of the Asiatic provinces they have no idea of a wheel. All their merchandize is carried by horses, mules, or camels, in every part of the empire.

The fultan has a coach or carriage, exactly of the shape of a hearse in England, but without any springs; it was, when I saw it, drawn by six mules. The pole was of an enormous thickness as well as every other part. I enquired the reason, the answer was, that if the pole, or the axletree, &c. broke, the man who made it would lose his head. The fultan never uses a carriage as any kind of state, it is only in excursions into the country that it follows him.

The people in Moldavia and Walachia, on
the

the Contrary, conftrutt waggons for carrying merchandize on very juft principles of mechanics. Cafks too are not in ufe except among the Greeks.

It may be inferred from Peyflbnel that the fcience of medicine has made confiderable advances, and commands a high degree of refpect in Turkey, when we find that the dignity of firft phyfician to the grand feignior is marked by the title of *hakim bachl effendi*; that he wears the large round turban called *eurf*, the fame as that borne by men of the higheft rank in the law; and that the Mahometan who attains this dignity muft have paffed through the *medreffes*, and have reached the order of the *tnuderris*; but the fact is, that the ftate phyfician is a mere nominal dignity enjoyed by men of no fkill in this fcience, whilft the man to whom the care of the fultan's health is entrusted is always a Greek, a Jew, bran European, and it is merely for form fake that the content and prefence of the *hakim bathi* muft be obtained for the adminiftration of remedies, ¹of whofe medical properties he is in general profoundly ignorant, When the Turks take a purgative medicine, they never commend it except it be molt violently cathartic. They have no notion of the falutary effects of a gentle laxative.

No one has the leaft idea of navigation and the ufe of the magnet, but the people of the navy, and they know fo little, that their compaffes are

are made to point to the true north with the variation allowed, and by the same compasses they steer their ships in all seas. Very few in the navy can take a meridian observation.

It is not necessary for the grand-admiral to have any professional knowledge, or even to have been on board a ship before he sails with the fleet. It is the same with the heads of other departments, and many of the inferior officers. An officer appointed to superintend the gunpowder mills, was highly offended with a merchant who offered to contract for the delivery of brimstone ; he took the offer as an insult, not knowing that brimstone entered into the composition of gunpowder.

The only people who have the smallest idea of navigation, are the Algerines in the service of the Porte ; and even theirs is chiefly practical knowledge. They rely on the Greeks to navigate their ships of war. Their merchant-ships take care not to lose sight of land ; and hence it is that so many of them are called away on the coast of the Black Sea.

The want of field-pieces among the Turks, which induced Baron de Tott to undertake a new foundry, is a complete proof of the inactivity of this people. It is true that they had foundries of large brass cannon ; but they had not even attempted to call those of a smaller kind,

or of a different metal, although their furnaces are of a fine, which is particularly adapted to the Casting of iron. To the present day they are ignorant of this art, even for bomb-fuels; and this is the reason why all the Turkish cannon, both for land and sea service, are of brass.

Though they have many fine large cannons at present, they are defective in the make of the carriages, particularly for field-pieces; and whilst other nations are making daily improvements in this respect (by the construction of flying artillery, &c.) the Turks, from their ignorance of mechanics, employ artillery the most awkward and inefficient.

The defective state of general science in Turkey is owing to that want of means of communication and of union amongst its branches, and to that deficiency of combination, both in theory and practice, the causes of which I have already traced out; but in every country individual exertion will do much, and insulated facts will be every where discoverable, like the casual flowers of the desert, which show what the human mind is capable of attaining, even in despite of accumulated obstacles. The great advantage which a highly civilized country possesses, is in the quick and ready combination of these facts, and in forming out of them general principles, which abridge the labour and facilitate the progress of the artist
and

and the philofopher. It frequently happens, however, that the moft barbarous people poffefs, in particular branches of art, an accuracy of principle, or a dexterity of operation, even fuperior to their more polifhed neighbours -, and hence it will be found of ufe to colled detached information of this kind from every part of the globe; In the intercourfe of mind, fomething is to be gleaned from a foil the moll unpromifing; I fhall, therefore, make no further apology for the introduction of fome unconnected remarks on detached inflances of ftill among the Turks in Various arts and fcienes;

It might reafonably be expected that a nation of warriors fhould have expert furgeons at leaft, and that they fhould have paid attention to the improvements and difcoveries made by other nations. Nothing of this, however, is the cafe. They perform no operations, nor will they confent to an European's making an amputation, though the lofs of life be a certain confequence of omitting it. Their art is fimply confined to healing, and at moft extracting a ball and a fplinter of a bone. It muft be confeffed that, as their habit of body is generally healthy, nature performs often wonderful cures. They rely much on balfams, mummy, &c. There is in Conftantinople a Perfian extraordinarily expert in the art of healing. The Arabs bury a perfon, who has

received a wound in his body, up to the neck in hot fand for twenty-four hours; and apply with fucefs the adual cautery for the dropfy.

I faw in the eaftern parts of the empire, a method of fetting bones pradifed, which appears to me worthy of the attention of furgeojis in Europe. It is by inclofing the broken limb, after the bones are put in their places, in a cafe of plafter of Paris (or gypfum) which takes exactly the form of the limb, without any preffure, and in a few minutes the mafs is folid and ftrong. If it be a compound frafture, the wounded part out of which an exfoliated bone is to come, may be left uncovered, without any injury to the ftrength of the plafter encafement. This fub-
•bilance may be eafily cut with a knife, and removed, and replaced with another. If, when the fwelling fubfides the cavity is too large for the limb, a hole or holes being left, liquid gypfum plafter may be poured in, which will perfedly fill up the void, and exadly fit the limb. A hole may be nlade at firft by placing an oiled cork or bit of wood againft any part where it is required, and when the plafter is fet, it is to be
•removed. There is nothing in gypfum injurious, if it be free from lime; it will foon become very dry and light, and the limb may be bathed with fpirits, which-will penetrate through the covering.. Spirits may be ufed inftead of water,

or

or mixed with it (or vinegar) at the first making of the plaster.

I saw a case of a most terrible compound fracture of the leg and thigh, by the fall of a cannon, cured in this manner. The person was feated on the ground, and the plaster case extended from below his heel to the upper part of his thigh, whence a bandage, fattened into the plaster, went round his body. He reclined back when he slept, as he could not lie down. During the cure, where they saw matter or moisture appear through the plaster coating, they cut a hole with a knife to dress the wound, or let out the matter more freely.

On this occasion I cannot help mentioning the treatment of parts frozen in Russia, not by the surgeons, but by the common people, the success of which I was an eyewitness to in several cases, as well as to the failure of the common mode of treating frozen parts by the most able surgeons of the army. I shall simply state the facts I relate to.

After Ochakov was taken, I received into my subterranean lodging as many prisoners as it would contain, all of whom were either wounded or had a limb frozen. Among them were two children, one about six and the other about fourteen years of age ; the latter had one of her feet frozen to the ankle, the other all the toes, and

the sole of one of her feet. On the first day, they were not much observed; but on the second, the parts appeared black. The French surgeon, whom Prince Potemkin had sent for purposely from Paris, and who was a man of note, ordered them to be constantly bathed with warm camphorated spirits; the elder was removed to the hospital, when a mortification began; the younger I kept with me, and as we removed into winter-quarters, I carried the child with me. The mortified parts separated, the bones of the toes came off, and, after a long time, the sores healed. I should have observed, that the surgeon was for immediately amputating both the limbs.

In a subterranean room, not far from mine, were several women, whose feet had been in like manner frozen; but as no surgeon attended them, the Russian soldiers and waggons undertook the cure. It was also the second day when they applied their remedy, and the parts were perfectly black. This remedy was goose-grease, with which the parts were smeared, warm, and the operation often repeated: their directions were, never to let the parts be dry, but always covered with grease. The consequence was, that by degrees the circulation extended lower down, and the blackness decreased, till, last of all, the toes were only discoloured, and at length circulation was restored to them.

I can account for this no otherwise than that the fat kept the pores shut, and prevented the air from promoting putrefaction; in the mean time the vessels were continually absorbing part of the stagnated blood, till by degrees the whole circulation was restored. It is known that extravasated and stagnated blood will remain a long time in the body without putrifying, if it be not exposed to the air, I conclude also, that in these cases of frost, the mortification first begins on the surface, which is in contact with the air.

I only mean, however, to relate facts, and leave it to others to account for them,

This is a general practice of the peasants throughout all Russia; but if a part is discovered to be frozen, *before the person comes into a warm room*, the frost may be extracted by plunging the part into cold water, or rubbing it with snow till the circulation returns.

The wherries or boats of Constantinople are constructed much on the principle of the Deal boats, they are more sharp and curved, but not so light, and are apt to overturn if people shift their places in them unwarily. Their shape is very elegant. The boatmen have a large marble weight for ballast, which they place after the passengers are seated, Though they are large, they row exceedingly fast, and were always esteemed the quickest going boats in Europe; but I saw a

gondola, brought to Conftantiople by a Venetian ambaffador, keep pace with them. The gondolas, every body knows, are built on a contrary conftruction, being quite flat at bottom. The boftangibafhee (matter of the police) has a boat of twelve oars, which rows with furprifing velocity; but no one is permitted to build on that conftruction: this boat goes nearly twice as faft as the common ones, and confequently as the gondolas. They are dangerous fea boats, though they fail faft. It is not many years fince they were brought to fuch perfection, as may be feen by a boat now preferved, (I think, of fultan Achmet III.) the merit, however, is their own. The Turks row in general better than the Chrif-tian or Jew boatmen.

The Turks ufe copper veffels for their kitchen utenfils, which are tinned with pure tin, and not, as in moft parts of Europe, with folder, compofed of tin and lead, which is much fooner corroded by acids and fat; and though it has not been obferved that any violent diforders have been produced by the veffels in common ufe, except from the copper itfelf, as the quantity of lead dif-folved is fmall, the admixture of tin rendering lead more difficult of folution, yet many chronic maladies, and particularly of the nervous kind, may be owing to this baheful metal getting into the habit in fmall quantities; There is no. coun-try

try in Europe where the quantity of lead used in tinning is so great as in this island; an abuse which certainly merits the attention of this government, as it did some years ago that of France, which prohibited at the same time, under pain of death, the use of all preparations of lead in wine, or other liquors'; a regulation *very necessary* in England; as is also the establishment of some means to prevent such part of the tea being sold which comes in immediate contact with the lead, in chests where it happens to be corroded, as is frequently the case.

Nothing can be more clumsy than the door-locks in Turkey, but their mechanism to prevent picking is admirable. It is a curious thing to see, particularly in Asia, wooden locks upon the iron doors of their caravanfaries, and other great buildings, as well as on house doors. The key is composed of a square flick, with five or six iron or wooden pins, about half an inch long, placed at irregular distances, towards the end of it, and answering to holes in the upper part of the bolt, which is pierced with a square hole to receive the key. The key, being put in as far as it will go, is then lifted up, and its pins entering the corresponding holes, raise other pins which had dropped into these holes from the part of the lock immediately above the bolt, and which have heads

heads to prevent their falling lower than is necessary ; the bolt, being thus freed from the upper pins, is drawn back by means of the key; the key is then lowered, and may be drawn out of the bolt. To lock it again, the bolt is only pushed in, and the upper pins fall into the holes in the bolt by their own weight. This idea might be improved on, but the Turks never think of improving

The Greeks have a very curious manner of painting in fresco, which has many advantages. I also saw the ancient method of painting with wax, and fixing the colours by heat, practised by a Greek, and at a place I left expedited it, at the Dardanelles ; for at Constantinople it is unknown. Whether this be exactly the encaustic painting of the ancients it is hazardous to affirm, though I myself have not the least doubt respecting it. Thus much is certain, that it has, with regard to facility, very considerable advantages over the oil-painting now in use; it has all its freedom, and the vivacity of its colours, added to solidity, and the durability which the experience of twenty centuries has proved wax painting to be possessed of. It was my intention to have treated on it in this place; but as it does not regard Turkey, the immediate subject of this work, and would be a dissertation of considerable length, I intend shortly to print it separately,

with the Greek manner of fresco painting, in which all colours may be used on a lime-wall.

The Armenian jewellers set precious stones (stones, particularly diamonds, to much advantage, with a foil, which, under roses, or half-brilliant, is remarkably beautiful, and is not subject to tarnish. Their method is as follows : an agate is cut, and highly polished of the shape desired; in a block of lead is formed a cavity of about its own size ; over this is placed a bit of tin, of the thickness of a strong brown paper, scraped bright. The agate is (then placed on the tin, over the cavity, and struck with a mallet. The beautiful polish the tin receives is scarcely to be imagined. This is in general kept a secret, and such foils sell for half and three-quarters of a dollar each.

The jewellers, who are mostly Armenians, have a singular method of ornamenting watch-cases, and similar things, with diamonds and other stones, by (simply glueing them on.

The stone is set in silver or gold, and the lower part of the metal made flat, or to correspond with the part to which it is to be fixed; it is then warmed gently, and the glue applied, which is so very strong that the parts never separate.

This glue, which may be applied to many purposes, as it will strongly join bits of glass or polished steel, is thus made :

Dissolve five or six bits of mastic, as large as
peas,

peas, in as much spirit of wine as will suffice to render it liquid; in another vessel dissolve as muchisinglafs, which has been previously foked in water (but the water must not be used) till it is swollenandfoft, in French brandy, or rum, as will make two ounces, by measure, *qfffrong gfae*, and add two small bits of gum galbanum or ammoniacum, which must be rubbed or ground till they are dissolved; then mix the whole with a sufficient heat. Keep it in a phial flopped, and when it is to be used fet it in hot or boiling water.

Cotton at Smyrna is dyed with madder, in the following manner:—The cotton is boiled in common olive-oil, and then in mild alkali; being cleaned, it will then take the madder dye : and this is the fine colour we see in Smyrna cotton-yarn. I have heard that the sum of five thousand pounds was given, in England, for this secret.

A remarkable instance occurred to my knowledge of an individual fact, which might have been of the utmost use to society, but which, owing to the state of knowledge and government in Turkey, was wholly lost to the world. An Arabian, at Constantinople, had discovered the secret of calling iron, which, when it came out of

Some persons have prepared and sold this composition, under the name of Armenian cement, but it is much too thin, and the quantity of mastic in it is too small. It must be like *flrung cat-patters' glue*,—Note to the d edition,

the

the mould, was as malleable as hammered iron; some of his fabrication was accidentally (hewn to Mr. de Gaffron, the Prussian charge d'affaires, and Mr. Franzaroli (men of mineralogical science) who were struck with the fact, and immediately instituted an enquiry for its author. This man, whose art in Christendom would have infused him a splendid fortune, had died poor and unknown, and his secret had perished with him ! His utensils were found, and several pieces of his casting, all perfectly malleable. Mr. Franzaroli analyzed them, and found that there was no admixture of any other metal. Mr. de Gaffron has since been made superintendent of the iron-manufactory at Spandau, where he has in vain attempted to discover the process of the Arabian.

Europeans are much struck to see the Turks work fitting at every art or handicraft where there is a possibility of it; carpenters, for instance, perform the greatest part of their labour fitting. It is deserving of remark, that their toes acquire such a degree of strength by using them, and by their not being cramped up in tight shoes, that they hold a board upright and firmly with their toes, while with their two hands they guide a saw, fitting all the while. These people are able to stand on the end of their toes, which will support the whole weight of their body.

We have, in Europe, certainly false ideas with
respect

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refpeft to the utility of fhoes, in preventing the feet of children from becoming too broad. The Arabs, who when children wear no fhoes, and when they are grown up, only fandals or flippers, have the mod beautiful feet.

In fome parts of Afia, I have feen cupolas, of a confiderable fize, built without any kind of timber fupport. They fix firmly in the middle a poft, about the height of the perpendicular wall, as the cupola is to be a larger or fmaller portion of a fphere; to the top of this is fattened a ftrong pole, fo as to move in all directions, and the end of it defcribes the inner part of the cupola; lower doWn is fixed to the poft another pole, which reaches to the top of the outer part of the perpendicular wall, and defcribes the outside of the cupola, giving the difference of thicknefs of the mafonry at top and bottom, and every intermediate part, with the greateft poffible exactnefs. Where they build their cupolas with bricks, and inftead of lime ufe gypfum, finishing one layer all round before they begin another, only fcaffolding for the workmen is required to clofe the cupola at top.

At Baflbra, where they have no timber But the wood of the date-tree, which is like a cabbage ftalk, they make arches without any frame. The mafon with a nail and a, bit of firing'defcribes a femicircle on the ground, lays his bricks, fattened

fattened together by a gypfum cement, on the lines thus traced, and having thus formed his arch, except the crown brick, it is carefully raifed, and in two parts placed on the wall. They proceed thus till the whole arch is finifhed. This part is only half a brick thick; but it ferves them to turn a ftronger arch over it.

The cities of Bagdad and Bafibra are moftly built of bricks dried in the fun, which ftand ages, if kept tolerably dry. The clay is ufed in almoft a dry ftate, and beaten into the moulds with mallets. This gives them a wonderful degree of hardnefs.

At the entrance of the defert, coming front Aleppo, I found a village built in a very fingular manner; each room was a cupola, artd refembled a hay ftack, fome of them a fugar loaf. The whole was of earth, as they have no wood. The inhabitants faid their town had been built by Abraham; that is, they did not remember when the oldeft houfes were built. They faid they were never out of repair, but that they fometimes plaftered the upper part, or rather beat earth on it. The walls were compofed of elay and gravel, and were exceedingly hard. The method they ufe is, to beat each layer of earth till it is very hard.

Such a method is ufed in' the province of Lyons in France, where they build houfes of
 feveral

feveral ftories, and very fpacious. The walls are always plafiered with lime and fand, and Hand fome centuries. Thefe arc very fuperior to the mud walls of cottages in fome parts of England, where the earth is ufed very moift, and mixed with ftrow. The ancient Romans built in the fame manner as in France, The excellence of the Venetian plafter floors, fo much admired for their hardnefs and beautiful polifh, depends entirely on their being ftroingly beaten. The compofition is only frefh lime and fand, with pieces of marble, ufed almoft dry, and beaten till they are quite hard, then ground even and polifhed. Common earth as well as lime-mortar acquires an incredible degree of hardnefs by compreffion, if it contains no more moifture than is neceffary to make its parts unite. A kind of artificial ftone may be made of gravel with a little lime, very ftroingly preffed, or beaten into moulds.

I have feen practifed a method *of filtering water* by afcenfion, which is much fuperior to Dur filtering ftones, or other methods by defcent, in which, in time, particles of the ftone, or the finer fand, make a paffage along with the water.

They make two wells, from five to ten feet or any depth, at a fmall diftance, which have a communication at bottom. The feparation muft be of clay well beaten, or of other fubftances
impervious

impervious to water. The two wells are then filled with sand and gravel. The opening of that into which the water to be filtered is to run, must be somewhat higher than that into which the water is to ascend, and this must not have sand quite up to its brim, that there may be room for the filtered water, or it may, by a spout, run into a vessel placed for that purpose. The greater the difference is between the height of the two wells, the faster the water will filter; but the less it is the better, provided a sufficient quantity of water be supplied by it

This may be practised in a case, tub, jar, or other vessel. The water may be conveyed to the bottom by a pipe, the lower end having a sponge in it, or the pipe may be filled with coarse sand, and would be useful on board ships.

It is evident that all such particles, which by their gravity are carried down in filtration by descent, will not rise with the water in filtration by ascension.

The Arabians and the Turks have a preparation of milk, which has similar qualities to the curds of the Kabnuks: by the first it is called *Ubon*, by the Turks *yawrt*.

To make it, they put to *new* milk made hot over the fire some old laban (or yaourt.) In a few hours, according to the temperature of the *air* it becomes curdled, of an uniform consist-

ence, and a most pieafafft acid ; the cream is in great part feparated, leaving the curd light and femitransparent. The whey is much lefs fubjeft to feparate than in curds made with rennet with us, for the purpofe of making cheefe.

. Yaourt has this fingular quality, that left to ftand it becomes daily fourer, and at laft dries, without having entered into the putrid fermentation. In this ftate it is preferved in bags, and in appearance refembles preffed curds after they have been broken by the hand. This dry yaourt, mixed with water, becomes a fine cooling food or drink, of excellent fervice in fevers of the inflammatory or putrid kind. It feems to have none of thofe qualities which make milk improper in fevers. Frefh yaourt is a great article of food among the natives, and Europeans foon become fond of it.

• No other acid will make the fame kind of curd: all that have been tried, after the acid* fermentation is over, become putrid. In Ruffia they put their milk in pots in an oven, and let it ftand till it becomes four, and this they ufe as an article of food in that ftate, or make cheefe of it, but it has none of the qualities of yaourt, though, when it is new, it has much of the tafte. Perhaps new milk curdled with four milk, and that again ufed as a ferment, and the fame procefs continued, might, in time, acquire the qualities

lities of yaourt, which never can be made in Turkey without some old yaourt*.

They give no rational account how it was first made; some of them told me an angel taught Abraham how to make it, and others, that an angel brought a pot of it to Hagar, which was the first yaourt (or leban.)

It merits attention as a delicious article of food, and as a medicine.

I will here relate the manner the Tatars and Kalmuks make their kumis, or fermented mare's milk.

" Take of mare's milk of one day any quantity, add to it a sixth part of water, an eighth part of the fourth cow's milk that can be got, but at a future period a smaller portion of old kumis will better answer the purpose of souring; cover the vessel with a thick cloth, and set it in a place of moderate warmth; leave it to rest for twenty-four hours, at the end of which the milk will have become sour, and a thick substance gathered at top; then with a stick, made at the lower end in the manner of a churn staff, beat it

• I have, since this was written, learnt that yaourt may be made in the following manner:—Put into a basin a spoonful of beer yeast, or wine lees; pour on it a quart of boiling milk when it is formed into a curd, and is become sour, take of it a table spoonful and a half to serve as a ferment to a fresh quart of milk, in the same manner as the yeast. This, after a few repetitions, will become good yaourt, and lose the taste of the yeast by degrees,

till the thick substance above-mentioned be blended intimately with the subjacent fluid ; let it rest twenty-four hours in a high narrow vessel like a churn. The agitation must be repeated as before, till the liquor appears to be perfectly homogenous, and in this state it is called kumis (or koumis) of which the taste ought to be a pleasant mixture of sweet and sour. Agitation must be employed every time before it is used. When Well prepared in close vessels, and kept in a cold place, it will keep three months or more without any injury to its quality.

" It serves both as drink and food j is a restorative to the stomach, and a cure for tyerous disorders, phthisis, &c."

The Tatars distil this fermented milk, and obtain from it a spirituous liquor, which they drink instead of brandy.

The butter, which is mostly used in Constantinople, comes from the Crimea and the Kuban. They do not fait it, but melt it in large copper pans over a very slow fire, and seum off what rises ; it will then preserve sweet a long time, if the butter was fresh when it was melted. We preserve butter mostly by faking. I have had butter, which when fresh was melted and churn'd in the Tatar manner, and then falted in our manner, which kept two years good, and fine tailed. . Washing does not so effectually free
butter

butter from the curd and butter-milk, which it is necessary to do, in order to preserve it, as boiling or melting; when then fait is added to prevent the pure butyrous part from growing rancid, we certainly have the best process for preserving butter. The melting or boiling, if done with care, does not discolour or injure the taste.

To the lovers of coffee, a few remarks on the Turkish manner of making it, in the best way, may not be unacceptable.

Coffee, to be good, must either be ground to an almost impalpable powder, or it must be pounded as the Turks do, in an iron mortar, with a heavy pestle. The Turks first put the coffee dry into the coffee pot, and set it over a very slow fire, or embers, till it is warm, and sends forth a fragrant smell, making it often; then from another pot they pour on it boiling water (or rather water in which the grounds of the last made coffee had been boiled, and set to become clear); they then hold it a little longer over the fire, till there is on its top a white froth like cream, but it must not boil, but only rise gently; it is then poured backwards and forwards two or three times, from one pot into another, and it soon becomes clear: they, however, often drink it quite thick. Some put in a spoonful of cold water to make it clear sooner, or lay a cloth dipped in cold water on the top of the pot.

The reason why our West India coffee is not so good as the Yemen coffee is, that on account of the climate it is never suffered to hang on the trees till it is perfectly ripe; and in the voyage it acquires a taste from the bad air in the hold of the ship. This may be remedied in Italy, by exposing it to the sun two or three months : with us, boiling water should be poured on it, and let to stand till it is cold, then it must be washed with other cold water, and, lastly, dried in an oven. Thus prepared, it will be nearly as good as the best Turkey coffee. It should be roasted in an open earthen or iron pan, and the flower it is roasted the better. As often as it [crackles.it](#) must be taken off the fire. The Turks often roast it in a baker's oven while it is heating.

The preservation of yeast having been a subject of much research in this country, the following particulars may perhaps deserve attention. On the coast of Persia my bread was made, in the English manner, of good wheat flour, and with the¹ yeast generally used there. It is thus prepared; take a small tea cup or wine glass full of split or bruised pease, pour on them a pint of boiling water, and set the whole in a vessel all night on the hearth, or any other warm place ; the water will be a good yeast, and have a froth on its top next morning. In this cold climate, especially at a cold season, it should stand longer

to., ferment, perhaps twenty-four or forty-eight hours, and the quantity of peafe fhould be larger: experience muft determine this. The above quantity made me as much bread as a half quarter loaf, the quality of which was very good and light.

A fpnng, which operates both on the individual and national character of the modern European with a force fecond only to that of political infitution, is commerce. Upon the views entertained on this fubjed by a people ; upon the extent and modes of their practice, and upon the charafter which they maintain with refpect to it, depends much of their importance as a nation.

With regard to the general ideas entertained by all ranks in Turkey, relative to commerce, they are nolefs narrow and abfurd than all their other opinions, " We fhould not trade," lay they, " with thofe beggarly nations, who come " to buy of us rich articles of merchandize, and " rare commodities, which we ought not to fell " to them, but we fhould trade with thofe who " bring to us ufeful and valuable articles, with- " out the labour of manufacturing, or the trou- " ble of importing them on pur part." Upon this principle it is that Mocha coffee is prohibited to be fold to infidels. It is therefore no wonder that the foreign commerce of the Turks

is comparatively trifling; their trade is moftly from province to province, and even this is inconceivably narrowed by the want of mutual confidence, and the ignorance and fhort-fightedneft of their views. They have few bills of exchange, or any of thofe modes of tranfating bufinefs which the ingenuity and enterprife of commercial nations have invented for the facilitation of Commercial intercourfe.

The effects which the infecurity of property, and the watchful avarice of the government produce upon commerce, are ftill more ftriking. In an extenfive trade capital and credit muft be alike great, but from both of thefe the Turk is cut off; he dares not make a difplay of wealth; and if he has been fo fortunate as to accumulate A large fufri of money, his firft care is to conceal jf from view, left it fhould attraft the blood-fuckers of power. The neceffary confequence *pi* this is, that credit, that vital fpring of commerce, cannot be created, and inftead of thofe pornmercial connexions which in this part of Europe ramify fo widely, and render commercial operations fo eafy, all bufinefs is tranfafted either by principals themfelves, or their immediate factors, in a way little different from the barter of the rude ages.

Nor is it only the infecurity of property white fying whiph readers the Turk fo averfe to engage

in

in undertakings of great extent and contingent advantage; the disposition of it by will affords them little means of self gratification in viewing their inheritance transmitted to posterity. The merchants, and others of inferior rank, know, that a splendid fortune, at the same time that it renders their children objects of suspicion, will not raise them to posts of honour and respect, without putting them in a situation not to be able to transmit it another generation *to* their posterity *i* those who hold any office of the port, know that they have the sultan for their heir, and Jais padi as or other officers for their executors ; hence it is that posterity is of so little consequence in the eyes of the Turk, that he is seldom induced to consult much their welfare; and the hospitals, caravanfaries, fountains, bridges, &c. built for charitable purposes, only originate in the ostentation or superstitious fears of their founders, who build them for the repose of their souls, or *to* perpetuate the reputation of their piety,

The natural result of this combination of circumstances is, that commerce is every where checked; no emulation takes place, no communication of discoveries, no firm and solid association of interest; their mechanical arts are in many instances worse cultivated now than they were a century ago, particularly the tempering of fabrics; and some of their manufactures have gone entirely to decay.

It

it remains only to speak of the moral character which they maintain as traders ; and this has been variously reprinted. All ranks of people have some flight kind of commerce, or rather a sort of pedling trade among themselves, and consequently the distinctive character of the different ranks will appear in this as well as in other circumstances. Amongst all of them a certain degree of artifice is common, and is scarcely thought dishonourable, such as the corrupting of brokers and all those who are concerned in making bargains; but the officers and dependents of the port are universally remarked as the most venal and cheating set of men on the face of the earth.

Honesty, however, it is said, in some measure distinguishes the Turkish merchant: this may perhaps be true, if we compare him with the crafty Greek, or still more subtle Armenian* who, from the unjust oppressions under which they labour, are induced to retaliate by artifice, on their imperious masters, the source of half that tricking and deception commonly laid to the charge of the lower orders of society.

Much of the civilization of modern Europe has been with justice attributed to the influence of female society; to this are owing the high and noble passions which excite mankind to deeds of active patriotism and benevolence, and the softer pleasures which ornament and endear the
facial

facial circle. It will be worth while to confider how far then woman, " *loft and beft of alt God's works*" made to foften the ferocity of man, was made in vain for thefe barbarians; whofe love is fenfuality without friendfhip or efteem.

Polygamy is generally found to be deftructive to the finer feelings; it is fo in Turkey. The rich man (who alone is enabled to fupport feveral females) regards them only as the inftruments of his pleafure, and fees their fociety with no other view; hence the women themfelves have no cultivation of mind, but live a ftupid folitary life, furrounded by flaves, or by women as ignorant and fpiritlefs as themfelves. Moral virtue and intellectual eminence are alike uncultivated by them, and the defcriptions of elegance and tafte difcoverable in their amufements, their gardens, and apartments, exift only in the imagination of travellers, who, like Lady M. Montague, aim rather to aftonifh than to inftruit.

The women in general only want an opportunity to become unfaithful to their hufband, and the propofition generally comes from them; but it is attended with great danger. If a common Mahomedan prostitute even be caught with a Chriftian, fhe is put into a fack and drowned, and the man put to death, except he become a Mahomedan, which will not always fave both their lives. Chriftian* of the country have often preferred death.

^Marriage is with the Mahomedans merely a civil contract; the wife brings no portion to the husband, but the husband stipulates in the marriage contract, which is executed before a judge, to allow a certain portion to the wife. The contracts are of two kinds, the *nikiak* and the *kapin*; the former is the proper legal marriage, and every Mahomedan is restrained by the koran to four wives of this description. This contract specifies a certain sum, which is to be given to the wife in case of repudiation, or of her husband's death. The other contract is only an agreement to live together for a certain period, at the expiration of which a specified sum is to be given to the woman. It is a just observation of Baron de Tptt, that the *kapin* or temporary marriage is a necessary consequence of the general institution of polygamy. A separation may be demanded by either party; if it be by the woman, she goes before the judge, and pronounces the following formula: "*Nikia-hum khalal, bafhum uzad*" i. e. "My dowry given up, my head is free." The husband, who repudiates his wife, must repeat it either three several times, or three times together, after which he cannot take her back until he has submitted to a peculiar indecent and immoral ceremony.

In conversation the Turks sometimes display good natural sense; but the wit for which, they have been celebrated is nowhere to be found.

This

This is sufficiently evident from the existence of the *mufakibs*, or professed speakers, who are indeed little better than buffoons, but who are hired by the opulent to amuse their company. Can there possibly be a greater imputation on the mental powers of a people, than their adoption of such a practice? They cannot or dare not speak (so as to keep up amusing or instructive conversation, and they therefore? call in the aid of hired talkers. Dervishes, particularly those who have the reputation of being mad, but who generally are more rogues than fools, often attach themselves to the great, and amuse the company. These people sometimes take very great liberties in their speeches, which is excused in them on account of their holy frenzy.

A free people are a social people, fond of friendly intercourse. Cheerful converse and unreserved communication of sentiment soften the nature, refine the manners, expand the heart, and enlarge the understanding. Freedom of speaking and acting is the source of civilization.

A nation of slaves is a nation disunited; no social ties, no unbending of friendship, suspicion and fear is in every breast; conversation is uninteresting, and consequently not sought after; hired buffoons and low jesters are the speakers to the gloomy audience, or they fit in sad and stupid solitude, smoking a narcotic herb, or taking
lethargic

lethargic opium; insulting haughtiness and ridiculous pomp take the place of that elevation of sentiment, and dignity of character, which alone exalts the man of high birth or office above his fellow citizen; disgust and gloom hang over their countenances, and innocent mirth is deemed indecent.

When a Turk drinks wine, it is with an intention of being intoxicated; he therefore swallows a large portion at one draught, and repeats it till he is beautifully drunk; or if he is fearful of being seen in a state of drunkenness, the quantity he prescribes to himself to make him *contented* (as they call it) he drinks off all at once. Such a method of drinking wine, and with such a view, certainly entitles drinkers to the contempt they are held in in Turkey.

From these circumstances, which may be considered as forming the more ornamental part of the manners of a nation, we pass to those more important points which constitute the basis of their moral character.

And here it must be observed, that so wide and various an empire as Turkey cannot but have striking varieties in the morals of its inhabitants; they, however, mostly agree in the great leading points, and the variations are to be accounted for from peculiar circumstances of situation, origin, and habits, I shall therefore first notice
generally

generally those vices and virtues which belong to the Turks as a nation, and then point out a few of the most striking differences observable in the various provinces of the empire.

The moral character of the Turks has been represented in a favourable light by some authors upon two principles; the one, a connexion of interest between the Turks and their own country' (which is the case of most of the French writers except Volney) and the other, from a wish to expose the vices and follies of other European nations by the contrast. Of the writers themselves I shall hereafter have occasion to speak; the chief points of their descriptions will be included in the following observations.

Much has been said of the equity of the Turks. If we look to the example of their sultans, viziers, pashas, and judges, selling justice, can it be supposed that these examples have not corrupted the people, though they were naturally good. The truth is, that they have so little idea of justice themselves, that when they go to law (that is, appeal to a kadi) they rely more on bribes and cabal than on impartial judgment. Where the judge is not influenced, he is naturally just; no man scarcely was ever so corrupted but he would be so. The European merchants, who have a better opportunity of knowing them than foreign ministers, complained almost wholly to,
their

their refidcrice, and ignorant of the country, of than travellers paffing haftily through the country, unanimoufly aifure us, that they find them very cunning in their dealings, and full of deceit.

The people are faid to be humane : the peaceable citizen may be fo, as in other parts, or as man naturally is; but the diftates of their religion, and the examples they fee,-muft blunt their feelings; and this citizen, in regard to an enemy, is as favage as a tiger. There is, after all, a ferocity in them which mayeafily beroufed, and when they ftrike, it is with a dagger to the heart.

The temperance of the Turks, which is owing in a great meafure to their religion, produces its ufual good effed in rendering their intellects clear; theif grofs ignorance is not' to be attributed to their want of natural fenfe; the foil muft not only be in itfelf rich, it muft be cultivated. The Turk has indeed a good capacity, and an habitual prudence, but his government and religion are eternal bars to his improvement. Opennefs of mind and benevolence cannot exift where defpotifm renders every man fufpicious, nor can the votary of an intolerant and fanguinary religion cultivate liberality and fcience.

As to the politenefs afcribed to the Turks by fome authors, I never could difcover it: the Turkifh ferocity, perhaps, excited fear in them,
and

.and produced refpect : if a man found himfelf alone with a tiger, and efcaped unhurt, he would fay it was a good-natured animal. The afluming fuperiority of the meanef Turk, the deference which is paid to him by all infidels who approach him, and by your own interpreters, impofe and create refpect; if the beaft then only growls, but does not bite, he is praifed for his civility. If you know their language, you will obferve the difference of their expreffions and their manners from thofe they ufe to their brother Mahomedans; you will obferve, at beft, an infulting condescendence, which plainly befpeaks their contempt of you : they are ignorant of, and above praftifing the true principles of politenefs, Madame de Genlis fays, politenefs confifts in making others appear every thing, yourfelf nothing; a Turk makes himfelf every thing, you nothing, We have only to obferve the ambaffadors they fend to foreign courts (who are all people very low in office;) they neither learn the language or gain any more knowledge of the country than the poft-horfcfs which draw them through it : when they return* they repreftent the men as monkies, becaufe they are aftive, and the women as proftitutes, becaufe they are unveiled, and live in fociety with men. Not one word of this is exaggerated. The language and the addrefs of the politeft minifter of the porte to a foreign ambafr

fecjor very much refembles the civility of a polite German baron to his vaffal.

Even their moft ftrenuous admirer, Peylibnel, - acknowledged that Turkey remains two centuries behind the reft of Europe in refped to fcience ; that it has neglected naval and military tactics and difcipline; and that it allows vices in many parts of its adminiftration to go uncorrected.

That there is a confiderable difference of chara&er and morals in the different parts of the empire has been before obferved : the worft are the people of Anatolia, particularly thofe bordering on the Black Sea; they are cowardly, treacherous, robbers, aflaffins, and indecent; thofe of Conftantinople are foftened by a city life; thofe of Aleppo are the molt refined and civil among themfelves, and remarkably decent, but, like all the Afiatics, hold Europeans in great contempt, and even hatred; at Damafcus they are furious zealots; the people of Smyrna are favage and dangerous ; in European Turkey they have fewer prejudices againft Chriftians, becaufe they know more of them, or rather becaufe they are lefs bigoted enthufiafts than at Damafcus, or in Egypt; at Bagdad they are lefs prejudiced by their religion, and more open to inftruition, than in othef parts of Afiat; the people of Baffora, a mixture of Arabs, Perfiansj and a few Turks, are miM and docile. It is Angular, that thefe people,
from

from their communication with India and with Europeans, know infinitely more of our manners, arts, and arms, and are more inclined to adppt them, than thofe in the frontier towns in Europe, who are fill prejudiced, infolent, and proud. The .Arabians of the defert generally pay nearly as much refpedl to a European as to one of their own country, and more than to a Turk, whom they mortally hate.

I could here wifli to refcuc the Arabs of the Great Defert from the imputation of robbery, I think no nation lefs deferves it. I however except the *borderers*, and thofe who wander into countries whofe inhabitants have fixed habitations, as Egypt, &c. I have lived with them; I know their habits, and the fhnplicity and honefty of their hearts ; I have feen them in their peaceable habitations, and when they have been attacked I have gone with them into the battle, as their laws of hofpitality require.

They religioufly obferve their laws of peace and war: it is from ignorance of them that their conduct has been mifconftrued. Thefe laws agree with thofe which fome European nations have eftablifhed in their maritime code ; that a neutral flag protects an enemy's property. If the conductors of caravans or other leffer bodies are friends, the perfons and property of enemies are fuffered to pafs unmolefted; they even enjoy all

the rights of hofpitality in common with their friends.

But the Arabs confider the Turks as enemies, and all unknown nations as Turks; when thefe therefore travel alone, or with other Arab nations with whom thofe that they meet are at war, the latter attack them, and if they conquer, ftrip them naked. They neither kill their prifoners nor make flaves of them, as the Turks do, but they tell them to go to their nation and provide themfelves with arms to meet them again in battle.

It is true that people thus ftript often die of thirft or hunger ; but it is from ignorance of another cuftom of the Arabs, which is, to bargain with their enemies to conduft them to fome place, where the fum ftipulated is to be paid, and which is generally very moderate. The Arabs in this manner carry their prifoners to Bagdad, Baffora, or whatever place is agreed on, where, the money being paid, the government fuffers the Arabs to depart unmolefted : this contract is never violated, as the confequence? would be fatal to others.

With a large caravan, when there are wars in the defert, there are generally condu&ors who are of other nations, befides that of which it is compofed, who appear as chief conductors alternately, according to the nation they meet. This evafion is fome times difcovered, and the caravan plundered,

CHAPTER VII.

On the State of Population in the Turkish Empire,

THE aim of all rational politics is to augment the numbers, and increase the happiness of mankind; and hence the state of population is generally the most accurate standard of political error or improvement. From the preceding pages we (shall have seen sufficient reason to apprehend that the population of the Turkish empire cannot be, in the present day, at all proportioned to the extent of its territory. The religious distinctions which depress into so abject a state of slavery one great part of the community, and the insecurity of property, which affects every rank and condition, are both causes, whose combined operation must greatly subtract from the numbers of a people, which form the vital strength of a state. Where the cultivator is not sure of reaping the corn which he sows, he will sow only what the immediate necessity of subsistence requires; the political state of the country prevents his accumulation of capital, and even that small portion which he may chance to possess, he will not hazard in speculations of so very uncertain profit. In this languishing state of domestic agriculture, Constantinople looks for a supply of corn to foreign channels, particularly

Egypt, Moldavia, Walachia, the Crimea, and Poland.

From a view of the state of Egypt, it will appear that little dependence can be placed on the permanence of this supply; still less would a wife-government look to markets, which, like the others which I have enumerated, are either immediately under the direction of a hostile state, or perpetually liable to its incursions. The Russians are, indeed, wise enough, in time of [peace](#), to encourage their own agriculture, by supplying Constantinople with corn from their provinces. The Crimea, on which the port used greatly to depend, has been deserted by most of its Tatar inhabitants since it fell under the imperial dominion; but the Russian and other adventurers, who now occupy it, are making great endeavours to revive its commerce and agriculture; these, however, as well as the supplies of Poland, are in the hands of Russia, and in the event of a war she can not only withhold them, but easily cut off the supplies of Moldavia and Walachia, thus exposing the Turkish capital to the utmost distress. Notwithstanding these evident consequences of their present system of policy, the divan pursue those methods of supply which give them the least immediate trouble, totally regardless both of the decay of their own agriculture, and of the future destruction
which

which this fyftem threatens to their very exiftence as a nation. It is not only in theory that thefe evils are to be apprehended ; a!comparifon of the prefent and paff ftate of the Turkiſh population will evince the truth of the foregoing propositions

We know not what was the population of this vaſt empire in very remote ages—from the evidence of hiftory it appears to have been very considerable—at prefent it is far from being fo; Without going farther back than the memory of perfons now living, it is eafy to prove that *depopulation* has been, in latter times, aftonifhingly rapid.

In earlier times the chafm was in fome meafure filled by the inhabitants they carried away from the countries they conquered, or into which they made their barbarous incurfions. Hungary and Poland have furnifhed them with millions.

The great cafes of this depopulation are the following :

1 ft. The plague, of which the empire is never entirely free.

2dly. Thoſe terrible diforders which almoſt always follow it, at lead in Aſia.

3<ily. Epidemic and endemic maladies in Aſia, which make as dreadful ravages as the plague itſelf, and which frequently viſit that part of the empire.

4thly. Famine, owing to the want of precatation in the government, when a crop, of corn fails, and to the avarice and villany of the paftias, who generally endeavour to profit by this dreadful calamity,

5th and laftly, the ficknefles which always follow a famine, and which occafion a much greater mortality.

The plague is more mortal in proportion as it vrfits a country feldom. At Constantinople it continues often for a great number of years together: it is fcarcely perceived in winter, and frequently fhips fail to Europe with *clean bills of health*, though it is lurking in infected clothes, and in diftant and little frequented parts of the city. In fpring it breaks out again. No calculation can be formed of the numbers that die of it in the capital; for their lots is never long perceived, there being a conflant influx of people from the country to the capital. Some years the mortality does not appear to be considerable, but at other times they have what is called a *great ftcknefsy* which carries off an aftonifhing number. The confumption of provifions has been reduced, during fuch a plague, to three-fourths of what it was whell it began to rage.

It vifits mod parts of Afia every ten or twelve years, and carries off an eighth or tenth of the inhabitants, and fome times a fourth or more.

The

The farther east a country is situated, the less frequently it is visited. It is said, it never goes where the olive tree does not grow. It reaches Baffora only about every ninetieth year; but then this scourge is most dreadful. The last plague carried off nine-tenths of the inhabitants, and that city had been ninety-six years free from it. Farther east it has not been known to go.

The plague, like the small pox, is a disorder never generated by foul air, or the like, but always produced by contact. It, doubtless, comes from Egypt, though in Egypt it is frequently received back from Constantinople.

Dr. Ruflel says, the plague which afflicted Egypt in 1736, and of which it was said that 10,000 died in one day at Cairo, " *was the only one that happened in this century, which was believed by the people of Cairo to have been brought from Upper Egypt; the others were always thought to have been imported from Constantinople or Candia, but never from Syria or Barbary*"

How easily would a regular quarantine and *shutting up* deliver Turkey from this terrible scourge!—but what is to be expected but devastation from the Turks? No city has more favourable situations for lazarettoes than Constantinople—I allude to the Princes Islands. When the capital has been really free from it, it always is brought thither either directly or indirectly
from

from fegypt, generally by the way of Smyrna Many people, ndt attending to this circumftance, have concluded that it was generated in Conftantinople, and talk much of the bad air produced by the naftinefs of the ftreets, which ii without foundation. The air of Conftantinople is exceedingly pure and healthy; but no infe&ed or impure air, loaded with the miafmaof Putrefaction,&c. will produce the plague, though it may fevers, both contagious and mortal, in a high degree.

It does not appear from Plutarch's account of the plague at Athens, that it really was this diforder which afflifted that city in Pericles time. The true plague is never in the air, perhaps (for I fay this with fome doubt) not in the breath of a pefliferous perfon, at leaft the breath cannot convey it above a few feet, as the Ruffian furgeons have fufficiently proved, when the plague was at Mofqua (Mofcow) and at Cherfon more particularly, where thofe furgeons, who touched nothing in the hofpitals, and pulled off their (hoes on going out, all efaped.

The phyficians at Conftantinople fay, the pjore they fludy the plague the lefs they know of k; and as it is there almoft every year, they have more opportunities of feeing this diforder than any others of the profeffion. We learn nothing from the Ruffian phyficians, who ex-
pofed

posed themselves very much in the plague at Moscow, in 1771, and in that which broke out in 1783 at Cherfon. (See Meckens's Observ. and Orreus's Descriptio Pestis; also Samoillovits's Memoire sur la Peste.) Doctor Miltzer, a physician of Moscow, has written, in German, a large book on the plague, which contains a great number of cases that came under his observation; but as they all tend to support a system which he has adopted, it is to be apprehended that *the* power of prepossession in favour of his system has often misled his judgment. Nor is there any thing very satisfactory with respect to the cure to be learned from Dr. Ruffel's elaborate treatise on the plague, nor from the more ancient authors. It is said that friction with oil has lately been discovered, in Egypt, to be a preservative, and even a cure; so much is certain, that the plague is unknown to those nations whose custom it is to rub their bodies with oil. It has been observed at Constantinople, that those who used mercurial frictions never caught the plague, how much soever they were exposed to the contagion. May this not have been owing to the grease rather than to the mercury ?

Mr. Matra (who is now agent at Morocco) gave James's powders to an Armenian family, about twenty years ago at Constantinople, and they recovered. I also thought I had performed

cures

cures With this famous medicine ; but it has had a fair trial in Ruffia, without producing any salutary effect, farther than what was to, be expected from an emetic- There is, however, some reason to believe that it may prevent the plague, if administered *immediately after the infection*, though perhaps any other fudorific would be equally serviceable.

There is one circumstance, of which it is of importance to determine the truth, as it is of consequence with respect to quarantine; this is, whether the plague communicated *per fomitem*, (that is, by substances which, having imbibed the pestiferous effluvia or miasma, retain them in an active state for some time,) be of a more mortal kind than that by immediate contact with a diseased body; and particularly whether the *fornes* become of a more deadly quality by its being long retained in the substance, than when newly imbibed by it.

Dr. Cullen says, " *It appears to me probable that contagions, as they arise from fomites, are more powerful than as they arise immediately from the human body.*"

Dr. Lind says, " *From a fixt attention to this subject for many years, I say these last (wearing apparel, dirty linen, &c. long retained in that impure state) contain a more concentrated and contagious poison than the newly emitted effluvia or excre-*

" *tiom*

" tions from the Jick." Van Swieten was of the same opinion.

On the other hand, Dr. Ruffel, in his Treatise of the Plague, thinks differently; he says (page 205) "*I should be inclined to doubt that the pestiferous effluvia of a person labouring under the plague, after the having been flint up some time in a substance fitted to imbibe and confine them, would act more pozverfully on a person disposed to infection, than the same effluvia would have done at the instant of their emanation from the morbid body.*"

It certainly would be a ridiculous presumption in one, who is not a medical man, to decide between such great professional authorities; but do not facts, mentioned by Dr. Ruffel himself, decide the question? Page 97. speaking of the first of the six classes, under which he arranged the cases which fell under his immediate observation, he says, "*None of the sick recovered, and most of them died the second or third day; a very few lived to the fifth.*"—" *These destructive forms of the disease prevailed most at the RISE of the plague in 1760, and its RESUSCITATION in the spring of the two subsequent years, DECREASING ALWAYS AS THE DISTEMPER SPREAD: and though they were found dispersed in every stage of the pestilential season, yet the number of subjects of this class was proportionably very small, compared with that of others*" Again (page 209) "*But a greater*

" greater-difficulty than that of persons not being equally
 " fufceptible of infection, arifes from the ceffation of
 " the plague at a period when the fupposed contagious
 " effluvia, preferved in apparel, furniture, and othier
 " fomites at the end of a peftilential feafon, muft be
 " allowed not only to exift in a much greater quantity
 " than can be fupposed to be at once accidentally im-
 " ported by, commerce, but in aji ate alfo of univerfal
 " difperjion over the city"

It is an incontrovertible fact, in which every author agrees, that the plague having ceafed in fummer or in autumn, breaking out again in the fpring, (or at fome other time of the year, whether communicated by infedious fomites remaining in apparel, &c. in the fame city, or brought in merchandize, &c. from other parts,) that in the beginning fcarcely any one recovers; that the diforder gradually becomes lefs mortal; and laftly, that it entirely ceafes.

Quere ? May it not be thence concluded, that the reafon of the mortality in the beginning of the plague is owing to the fomites having been confined a longer time, and become thereby more poifonous; that when the plague has raged fome time, and the infection taken from peftiferous bodies, or effects *lately impregnated with frefh* fomites, this is the reafon why it is lefs malignant; that the diforder thus becomes milder, and at length ceafes to be infectious, till the fomites

have again acquired an increased degree of malignity by time; that the examples mentioned by Dr. Ruffel, (page 97.) of cafes of the first and mortal clafs, which fometimes were found at every feafon, were cafes where the fick had caught infedion from old fomites. This cannot be affirmed, but it cannot, I believe, be contradided, and it would appear, from the gradual decline in malignity of the plague, to be probable.

It would appear that the plague, when it firft breaks out, and is very mortal, not one in ten, and fometimes in forty, recovering, is not fo catching as when it is fpread over the whole city. Perhaps later in the year, when the pores are more open by the warmth of the feafon, people are more liable to be infeded. Mertens (Hiftoire de Ia Pefte de Mofcow en 1771) fays, "*The great cold which reigned during the Ia ft two months of the year, fo enervated the peftilential miasm, that thofe who affifted the fick, and buried the dead; were le/s eqfily attacked by the contagion, &c.*" It appears alfo from him, that froft will in a very (Hort time entirely deftroy the fomites: he fays, "*Dr. Poparetjky told me, that the carriers of the dead clothed themfelves witkjheepjkim, which had been worn by thofe who had had the plague, after having been expofed to a fevere ftoft forty eight hours, and not one of them caught the plagued*

It

It is natural to conclude, that the plague (hould be more mortal in hot weather than in cold; but it would seem as if the degrees of its poison depended not so much on the state of the air as on the old or recent state of the fomites; and that the power of the poison was diminished by propagation, till it became at last little if at all mortal; at least experience, in all places where the plague has raged, seems to prove this.

It also appears, that the fomites may be preferred a long time in infected things, which are not exposed to the air. Dr. Ruflel quotes a singular instance of this from Dr. Mackenzie of Constantinople; it is too interesting not to be repeated: "*Count Cajlillane had, for three years running, persons attacked in the same manner, in the months of July and August, notwithstanding all possible precaution used in cleaning the room, and even white-washing it. At last, by my own advice to his excellency, he built a flight count er-wall, since which there has been no accident in that room, now five years ago*" It has never been determined how long the miasma or effluvia of the plague, when shut up in merchandize or effects, may remain active; there is reason to believe that it may many months; there are, indeed, proofs of it in every lazaretto in the Mediterranean, (as well as the contagion brought so far as Holland and England in former times) where
 • often

often accidents happen to those who open cotton bales and other packages ; and this fumes, probably, was only the perspiration or effluvia from infected persons, who laboured at the packing, or perhaps had lain down on such merchandize* or fumes attached to their clothes, though they themselves were not infected; but if by some accident cotton imbued with the pus of pestiferous buboes or carbuncles should be (which is not impossible) packed into the cotton sent to Europe, how long such dried pus would retain its infectious quality is not known, but it is to be feared that it might be very long, though it is to be hoped that, like the matter of the small pox, it may lose its contagious quality of itself in a certain time without airing.

It is, however, evident that exposure to the air will destroy this infectious quality; that great cold (as has been seen in the instances quoted from Mertens) will destroy it very suddenly ; and it would seem also, that the rays of the sun and a drying wind will also, though not so rapidly, arrest its poison, and destroy it. *On* this is grounded quarantine, the utility of which no rational man can now doubt, though formerly such doubts have existed. But all quarantines are of no effect where the merchandize are not *opened and aired*; and as that is not the case in England nor in Holland, those lazaret houses are of no kind of use ; they retard trade without secur-

ing the country from infection. The quarantines in the Mediterranean only are efficient.

In a feparate chapter, treating on the Levant trade, I fhall have occafion to fpeak more at large on quarantine, and the neceffity of making, other regulations in this country, than thofe which at prefent exift. Dr. Ruflel, indeed, has collected every thing that has been faid by others, and has treated this matter fo ably and fo fully himfelf, that it may feem fuperfluous to fay more on that head ; but it appears to me, that he has not .repreffented the danger fo fhrongly as he faw it ; there now exifts a neceffity of fpeaking out more plainly.

We may add another caufe of depopulation, the tyranny of the paffias, who, in fome parts of Aria, fo much impoverifh the people, that they prevent marriages being fo frequent as they are where there is lefs danger of being unable to maintain a family ; and this gives rife to an abominable vice, which brings ftrictity with it, and when men are fo degraded as to become habituated to it, they lofe the natural inftinct in man for the fair fex.

Polygamy itfelf is an inftitution experience proves to be fo little favourable to population, that the Chriftian families are generally obferved to be much more prolific than the Mahomedans.

Depopulation is firft perceived in the country.

Cities

Cities are filled up with new recruits of inhabitants from the country ; but when the cities become desert, and that not merely by the decay of a particular branch of commerce or manufacture, or any other similar cause, but for want of people to emigrate from the country, we may easily believe that depopulation has reached nearly its last stage. This is the case even in those parts of the Turkish empire where manufactures exist; where there is bread for those who will seek employment -, even in these places the country is also desert, villages uninhabited, and fields, and gardens, and orchards, lying waste.

Let us take a view of the present state of some of the most considerable cities of Asia.

Aleppo (Haleb) is the best built city in the Turkish dominions, and the people are reputed the most polite. The late Dr. Ruffe! (in his Natural History of Aleppo) calculated the number of inhabitants, in his time, at about 230,000; at present there are not above 40 or 50,000. This depopulation has chiefly taken place since 1770. As this city is built of a kind of marble, and the houses are vaulted, they are not subject to decay and fall in ruins, though they remain uninhabited; they stand a monument of the destruction of the human race : whole streets are uninhabited and bazars abandoned. Fifty or sixty years ago were counted forty

large villages in the neighbourhood, all built of (lone; their ruins remain, but not a fingle peafant dwells in them. The plague vifits Aleppo every ten or twelve years. About four years ago it experienced one of the mofl dreadful famines ever known.

The whole coaft of Syria, which a few years ago was tolerably populous, is now almoft a defert. Tripoli, Sidon, Laodecia, are infignificant places, and the country around them almoft abandoned. Maundrell, about a century ago, complained of the rapid depopulation of Syria ; but from his account it was then in a flourifhing condition compared with its prefent ftate.

Moful has loft half its inhabitants, and is in a ininous ftate.

Ditirbehir was the moft populous city in the Tnrkifli empire but a few years ago; it might fill have been counted among the firft cities in the world for magnitude, and, notwithstanding the exaggerated accounts of Cairo and Conftantinople, it contained more people in its walls than either of thefe cities. In 1756, there were 400,000 inhabitants, at prefent there are only 50,000. In 1757, fwarms of locufts devoured all the vegetation of the furrounding country, and occaioned a famine; an epidemic ficknefs followed, which carried off 300,000 fould

in the city of Diarbekir, besides those who perished in the adjacent villages. The plague visits this country every thirty or forty years.

At *Mer din* there are about 1,000 souls. The sickness of 1757 was fatal to this city and its environs: the greatest part of the town is uninhabited; it is subject to endemical sicknesses.

Bagdat contained from 125 to 130,000 inhabitants; at present there are scarcely 20,000. The plague of 1773 carried off two-thirds of the people. Here likewise are seen whole streets and bazars desolate.

Bajfora (or Balfora, i. e. Bi-al-fura, called by the Arabs often Al-fura) contained, twenty years ago, nearly 100,000 inhabitants; the last accounts from thence mention only 7 or 8,000,

Between *Angora* and Constantinople there is a constant communication by caravans: there are old people at Constantinople who remember forty or fifty villages in the road, of which no vestiges now remain. In these parts the buildings are not durable, being chiefly timber frames filled with brick or earth, and plastered over. An English merchant of my acquaintance, whose trade as well as his father's was between these two cities and Smyrna, has a list in his books of all the towns or villages in the road, of which about fifty are not known, even by name, to the present conductors of caravans. No longer

ago than 1768, it was aflerted, that upwards of two hundred villages in this part of the country had been forfaken., on account of the oppreffions exercifed over the inhabitants.

Though we fhould admit that the people in Turkey multiply as much as it is poffible for the human fpecies to do (which is however very far from being the cafe) yet ftill it is impoffible that the fruitfulnefs of the women can keep pace with the mortality of the plague, and the other ficknefs which afflid this empire, particularly in Alia, If ftill there be a considerable number of people difperfed over this vaft trad of country, what muft not the population have been a few centuries ago ? Colledivcly indeed the number is fomewhat confiderable, but each (Jiftrid, confidereti feparately, is a defert compared with the moft thinly inhabited region in Europe.

If we proceed to a regular calculation, and take for a duumi the greateft number of inhabitants thefe countries could maintain four centuries ago, and allow the greateft number of births experience of the moft prolific nations will juftify ; and, on the other hand, dedud at every period they are vifited by the plague and other ficknefses the number of deaths which then take place., the refult will be a much fmaller number of inhabitants than there now really exifts; if we reafon *a pofteriori*, we fhall find that

four centuries ago there were a much greater number than it is possible there could have been in fact.

It is therefore reasonable to conclude, that depopulation could not formerly have made so rapid a progress as at present; and that in a century more, things remaining in their present situation, the population of the Turkish empire will be nearly extinct.

Smyrna is the only city in Turkey where depopulation does not appear; but how often are not its inhabitants renewed? It is the only place of considerable trade in Turkey, and from the resort of foreign ships, as it is the centre of the export and import trade, it must long continue to flourish.

It is worthy of remark, that the Kurds in the mountains, and other independent or rebellious tribes, who do not mix with the Turks, are exempt from the mortality occasioned by all the calamities which afflict the countries more immediately under the iron sceptre of the Porte.

I should have mentioned a part of Bulgaria, and a great part of European Turkey, except the countries towards the Adriatic and Hungary, as almost destitute of inhabitants. This state of the country is particularly striking on the road from Belgrade through Sophia, Philippopolis, and Adrianople, to Constantinople. The north or north eastern part of Bulgaria is populous,

In taking a separate view of European Turkey, of Greece, and of Egypt, we shall find similar traces of that devastation, occasioned by the complicated evils under which this empire has so long groaned; at present I shall pay a particular consideration to the state of the capital itself.

Constantinople is the more deserving of our enquiry, because, erroneous as calculations of the number of inhabitants in great cities usually are, none have been more exaggerated than the population of this city,

The causes of this error were probably various, as, first, the situation of the city on the ascent of a hill, which, showing every house in it, and hiding the voids between them, makes it appear to the greatest advantage possible.

Secondly, the crowd of people appears to be prodigious in the streets leading to the custom-house, to the harbour, (to cross which the boats are all stationed at a very few landing places or *pales*) to the great bazars or markets, to the porte, to the baths, and to the principal squares; but it should be observed, that these are all situated in the same part of the city, and that every one who goes out, either for business or pleasure, passes through these streets, and travellers very rarely go farther into the city, where they would find streets nearly deserted, and grass growing in many of them, notwithstanding their narrowness;

Thirdly,

Thirdly, strangers (and I include most foreign ministers, who are grossly imposed on by the ignorance of their dragomans or interpreters) are misled by the accounts they receive of the number of janizaries, of boftangees, of boatmen, of artificers, of shopkeepers, &c. without knowing that one and the same person is commonly in two or three of these capacities; for instance, almost every boatman is a boftangee or a Janizary, and the greatest part of the shopkeepers and artificers are janizaries. We must rely on a real calculation.

First calculation.—In Constantinople and its environs there are daily consumed from nine to eleven thousand kilos of corn. Experience has proved, that one person consumes nine kilos a year, one with another. One kilo of wheat is twenty-two okes, which renders eighteen okes of flour, of which they make twenty-seven okes of bread, as their bread is very moist, made into flat cakes seemingly half baked. An oke is about two pounds and three quarters English avoirdupois weight. (In France, one pound of wheat produces exactly one pound of bread. This was the rule observed by their government with respect to the price of bread.) According to this calculation, the medium number of inhabitants would be 426,000 souls; and this misled Sir James Porter, formerly English ambassador

baffador

baffador at the porte, as it has done many others, who rely on the information received from interpreters.

It is the policy of the porte, or rather of the vizirs, to keep the price of bread low at the capital -, and it is generally cheaper there than at a day or two's journey distant. The *miri* solely distributes the corn, not to the city only, as people have concluded, but to all its suburbs, as *Pera*, *Calaisia*, the neighbouring villages, to the city of *Scutari* (*Efcudar*,) and all along the channel of Constantinople, which is bordered with large villages to *Kuckuk-Chikmagi*, commonly called *Ponte-piccolo*, and thence in a line to *Borgos* and to *Donnifikre*, on the coast of the Black Sea, to the *Princes Islands*, to nine large villages in Asia behind Scutari, and thence in a line north, to all the country as far as the Black Sea.

Some years, from 14 to 16,000 kilos of corn have been consumed. A considerable quantity must be allowed for the consumption of vessels of all denominations that frequent the port, and when corn is dearer in the country than the price at Constantinople fixed by the *miru* it may reasonably be supposed that some little contraband is carried on.

From all this it must appear, that not above one half of the corn is consumed in Constantinople, and that the number of inhabitants does
not

not exceed 213,000; and if we take for our rule those years in which 16,000 kilos were consumed (and which by the bye have always been those when corn was dear in the country) still the number will be but 292,000; the medium between the highest and the lowest year, when there was no remarkable plague, is 230,000, which I believe to be nearly the real number of inhabitants*

Second calculation.—The *kajfab bafhi* (or chief of the butchers) through whose office all cattle for slaughter must pass, distributes to Constantinople, Scutari, &c. from 2,500 to 3,000 sheep a week, or 130,000 to 156,000 a year. It must be observed, that the Turks eat very little beef; some fish indeed, and fowls, but the quantity is trifling to the mutton. At Paris they consumed 10,400 sheep a week, besides beef, and 630 hogs, salt-fish, &c, and one million pounds of bread daily. The annual consumption of Paris was about 12,800 muids of corn (36,864,000 pounds), 77,000 oxen, 120,000 calves, 32,000 barrels of herrings, 540,000 sheep, and 32,400 hogs, besides other articles.

Suppose the French to eat only the same quantity of bread as the Turks, (and I believe there is not much difference,) the calculation, applied to Paris, would make the number of inhabitants to be about one million.

There are, however, a few sheep killed by contraband,

traband, that have not passed through the hands of the *kaffab bajhi*, and the butchers dependent on him, but their number is very small, as the practice is attended with dangerous consequences, and the profit arising from it inconsiderable.

This calculation of meat produces fewer inhabitants than that of corn and we must take rice into the account to make it anywise adequate ; but it at least proves the former not to have been too low.

Third calculation.—From about 1770 to 1777, there was no plague at Constantinople, The dead, which were carried out of the gates of the city, where a regular register is kept (except when, in time of the plague, they surpass one thousand a day, after which they are not counted) amounted only to 5,000 one year with another, This number, multiplied by 36, the largest number which possibly can be taken, though Constantinople is very healthy, and the Turks temperate, gives only 180,000 inhabitants. It must be observed, that some considerable people are buried in the city, in their gardens or private burial grounds, and some are carried to the Cemeteries of Pera and Scutari, an account of all of which is not taken, as several on that side of the city do not pass the gates: if we allow 1,000 a year for these, which is certainly much beyond the truth by this calculation there would appear

pear to be 216,000 inhabitants. As to the fuburbs of Pera and Galata, if they are to be included as making a part of Conftantinople, they are not very confiderable, confiding only of a few long ftreets. The number of houfes they contain I have forgotten, and my memorandum is miflaid : I counted the houfes.

Fourth calculation.—The ground on which Conftantinople (lands is not fo extenfive as Paris. Count Choiffeul-Gouffier, the French ambaflador, had an exact plan made of it by a Mr. Kauffer, a very good geometrician, which proves this fact; and whoever walks acrofs the city in different directions may convince himfelf of its accuracy. The ftreets in Paris are very narrow, the houfes four and fix ftories high, and inhabited from top to bottom; the ftreets in Conftantinople are alfo narrow. The churches, hotels, &c. of Paris, do not take up near fo much ground as the mofques, baths, palaces, gardens (of which whole ftreets on the upper and back parts have one to each houfe), the feraglio, houfes of the great, (hops, and bazars, where people do not live, &c. The houfes in Conftantinople are fpacious, and have a yard in the centre, except the very crowded quarter by the water fide; they are compofed of a ground-floor (*rez de change*) which comprifes the kitchen, ftable, wafti-houfe, ftore-rooms, and a room to receive ftangers;

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over this there is but one story, where the family lives. This is the general construction of all the houses; they differ only in size and the number of apartments. It is a very unusual thing for two families to live in one house; it would be an indecency, and amount almost to a crime, except it be two brothers, or a father and a son, among the poorer people. Hence it follows demonstratively, that there cannot be above one-fourth of the number of inhabitants in Constantinople, which there are in Paris; and whatever objection may be made to my other calculations, this cannot be confuted.

We may therefore conclude, that the population of Constantinople is less than 300,000 souls at present, and that it never could have been much more within the walls, with their mode of building houses.

In the year 1777, there were 5,700 private and public boats of all sizes in the port of Constantinople, and in all the villages to the Black Sea. This number is great, but the situation of the city must be considered, and that every one must go in a boat who goes into the country, at least to the part frequented, which is across the water, or to the villages, all built by the water side, and almost inaccessible by land; that there are scarcely any kind of carriages; that the inhabitants of Constantinople take great pleasure in
going

going on the water, and great numbers have boats of their own, almost all who can afford it; and that they make no use of carriages. In Paris, there were 12,500 coaches or carriages, and infinitely fewer people go in carriages in Paris, than they do in boats in Constantinople.

The Turks tell you indeed, and perhaps believe it, that there are 72,000 mosques in Constantinople. The Christians out of vanity, to make their fact appear considerable, magnify their own numbers, but no credit is to be given to them> these assertions cannot be opposed to calculations founded on facts:

Cairo is another city, the magnitude of which has been much exaggerated. Volney says, the number of inhabitants are 250,000 souls. I had an account of the population of Cairo from a very sensible Armenian, who had lived twelve years there, which agreed nearly with Volney's; he made the number to be 230,000, Volney further says (on what foundation he does not mention) that all Egypt contains 2,300,000 souls-however, the population is there better known than in other parts of Turkey.

The people of the country tell us of 300,000 dying in a year of the plague, in Cairo, but no reliance is to be placed on their calculations.

Various are the opinions of writers and travellers with respect to the number of inhabitants in
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the Turkifh empire, and difficult, certainly it is, to make a calculation with any degree of accuracy, in a country where there are no registers kept of births and burials, (except at Conftantinople,) or other events which concern the general Mahomedan population of the cities, and where, in the country, not only the fize, but the number of villages is unknown ; there are, besides, wandering tribes and independent diftricts, fuch as the mountains inhabited by the Curds, as wholly unknown in Turkey as in Europe.

With refpect to Chriftians and Jews the cafe is different -, they keep regular registers of their births and burials i but as they remain in the feveral places they are made, and no account of them is tranfmitted to the government, it is impoffible for any individual. to collect them ; nor indeed can one always rely on the affirmation of the bifhops or other perfons, who have the registers, without actual infpection of the books ; for fometimes out of vanity they augment the ftatement of their population, and fometimes out of policy, with regard to the Turks, they diminifh the account of their numbers, as they are often taxed or fined *in a body*, to pay certain fums to a pafha, (fuch.unjuft demands. are called *avantias*,) and the fmaller their numbers appear, they hope the lefs will be the fum impofed or!" them i it therefore requires addrefs even. to get

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at these registers, which, after all, have not the accuracy of similar documents in Christian countries.

The only datum which we can in anywise form a calculation upon, is the *karatch*, or capitation tax, on all male Christians and Jews above the age of fourteen or fifteen. ' By knowing "the sum this tax is farmed at (which is less than the sum the Collectors receive, and therefore not very accurate) and, the sum each male pays, we have some kind of data to reason from. This calculation gives nine millions of souls; but it is to be remembered, that there is a part of the empire in which the inhabitants are independent, and consequently pay no capitation, as will be seen in the next chapter. The Greeks calculate their numbers to be seven millions in all parts of the empire, and there are not many in the distant provinces ; but they certainly exaggerate.

The only method of calculating the Mahomedan inhabitants would be, the proportion they bear to the Christians in the different^v cities and provinces, and of which there are some vague accounts. In many places there are ten Christians to one Mahomedan, and in others *ten* Mahomedans to one Christian; in some, their numbers are nearly equal. Were I to make a guess (for a calculation I could not call it) my opinion with respect to the whole population

lation of the Mahomedans in the empire would as widely differ from the generally received notions, as it does with respect to the particular population of Constantinople.

If their numbers have greatly decreased, we need seek no other cause to account for it than the plague, though there are many others co-operating with great destruction.

If we take for granted, that there were fifty millions of people on the continent two centuries ago; that the births are to the burials as twelve to ten, or that one in thirty-six die every year, in the common course of mortality, or that the number of births to the living are as one to 26, 27, or 28, or any calculation more favourable to the increase of population, we shall still find that the mortality occasioned by the plague taken on an average (as its ravages are dated in these pages) would reduce these fifty millions to little more than ten at this day.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the State of the Turkifh Provinces,

IT is not enough to confine our view to the metropolis, in order to form an accurate judgment of a great empire; there, indeed, is the centre of government and of opulence, there are placed the springs which guide the whole, and thither are brought the products of the general exertion; but it is not from the apparent tranquillity and greatness of the capital that we can form a just idea of the state of the provinces. Lulled into a fatal security within the recesses of his palace, the tyrant frequently knows not the scenes of ruin and devastation which, under sanction of his name, are acted at a distance by his creatures; he perceives not the increasing uneasiness and disaffection of his oppressed subjects, until the tempest of rebellion, rolling rapidly forward, breaks over his astonished head.

The relaxation of the bands of power has gone too far in the Turkifh empire not to be, in some degree, perceived by the porte; it cannot but feel the weakness of its authority over most of the distant *pajhalih* ; but as ignorance is always confident, they, perhaps, over-rate their remaining power, and trull to the shadow of a name whose terror has long since palled away,

Still, it muft be acknowledged, that there are circumftances which counterad the tendency of their political fytem to fall in ruins; there are prejudices, habits, and local peculiarities, which ferve to hold together the barbarous inhabitants of thofe extenfive regions. In order to judge of their importance, it will be neceffary to confider, in detail, the fituation of the different provinces, moral and phyfical; to trace "*mores, hominum*" "*multoram et urbes,*" not merely the ftrength and extent of the countries, but the fpirit, manners, and difpofitions of the people.

Of the dependent provinces of the Turkish empire, the firft rank; in the eye of an enlightened European will be he)dd by the defendants of that people from whom emanated the fcience and the refinement of our hemifphere; of the Grecians,, therefore, I fhall treat at large in another part of this work; and I propofe to confider them feparately, becaufe the diftindions, religious and political, exifling between them and their Mahomedan conquerors, together with the relations they bear to the Chriftian ftates in general, will furnifh ample matter for a feparate difcuffion; I fhall here only remark, that the captain pafha, or grand admiral, is pafha of the Archipelago, and the fleet, or a divifion, goes annually to collect the tribute: it is then that the poor Greeks moft feel the weight of the iron fceptre that governs them,, and all the infults and oppreffion. of
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the vile fatraps of the tyrant. When a (hip of the fleet arrives in a port, all the people who can, fly to the mountains or into the country, others (hut themselves up in their houfes, without daring to flir out. Every one on the roads are plundered by the foldiers and failors of the fhips, and if they are not cut, or wounded with a piftol ball, or killed outright, they efteem themfelves happy; even in the ftreets it is the fame. Thus the poor Greeks pay another contribution to the fleet, which is heavier to thofe on whom it unhappily falls than that to the fultan.

If a woman or a girl, or even a boy, is met by them in any place not immediately under the eye of their officers, or where they might beexpofed to refiftance, they are infallibly viſtims to their brutality. In weak towns and villages this fometimes happens in the ftreets. The officers cannot always, and often will not, refrain them, except where the crime is too public, and complaint might be made to the porte. The captains and officers raife contributions for themfelves on the principal inhabitants under various pretences. The Greeks are generally prevented from complaining, out of fear that the next fhip which comes will take revenge. When the fhips of war are met at fea, they are little better than pirates *po* the Greeks and Ragufans.

- With regard to the other countries which are,

or have recently been, subjoined to the Turkish yoke, I shall here give them a brief consideration, from which it will appear that their situation, relatively to subordination and internal management, is such as might reasonably be expected from the wretched system of policy which we have previously investigated.

Casting our view over the pashaliks or governments most immediately connected with the seat of empire, we shall find them distracted, disorganised, and scarcely yielding more than a nominal obedience to the sultan ; such are the pashaliks of Asia Minor and Syria. With regard to the more distant provinces, they may be considered as connected with the Porte rather by treaty than as integral parts of the empire. In this light I view Moldavia and Wallachia on the north, and Egypt on the south. These unfortunate countries (unfortunate in their political regulation, however blest by the bounty of nature) suffer* though in different degrees, from the harsh touch of Turkish despotism. I shall consider them singly, and add to these observations a review of the state of the Crimea, with some remarks on those Tatar hordes, whose ferocity has either been softened or subdued by a subjection to Russia.

A slight sketch of the state of rebellion or independence of the chief pashaliks, will easily de-

feonfrate the weaknefs and inefficacy of the prefont political fyftem of Turkey.

The great pafthialik of Bagdad ha9 been in reality independent, except at very fhort intervals, ever fince the days of Achmet Pafha, who defended it againft Nadir Shah, the famous ufurper of Perfia. The fultan only confirms the pa/ha, whom the people, and principally the foldiery of Bagdad, have appointed to govern them with defpotic power ; the firman, however, *font* on thefe occafions, always mentions the pafha as being nominated by the fublime porte to this high and trufthy office, in confideration of his virtues, and fome fignal fervice he has rendered to the empire; and this farce is kept up by a new firman font every year to continue him in office, as if the porte really had the power to remove him. The porte draws no revenue from this extenfive province. The pafha, who has always a large army in his pay, and entirely devoted to him, fends regularly an account of the revenue of his government. This he always proves is totally abforbed by the expences of the army, which he ftates as neceffary to be kept on a formidable footing, to ferve the empire againft any attacks of the Perfians or Arabs, and by the reparation of fortrefles, that formerly exifted, and of which no veftige now remains, &c. Whenever there is a war with an European power, and the pafha

of Bagdad is called on to furnish his quota of troops, he pretends the necessity of keeping them all at home, to defend the province against the attacks of the Arabs, and finds means to provoke some Arab nation to war; or, in connivance with the prince of the Moptefiks, an Arab nation on the bank? of the Euphrates, carries on a (ham war. In short, the sultan is the nominal sovereign of Bagdad, but the pashia has the real sovereign independent power in his hands.

In Armenia Major, and all the neighbouring countries, there are whole nations or tribes of independent people, who do not even acknowledge the porte, or any of its pashas.

The three Arabias do not acknowledge the sovereignty of the sultan, who only possesses, in these countries, a few unimportant towns.

The pasha of Ahifka cares very little for the porte; and the famous Haggi-Ali-Yenikli-Pasha, of Trabifonde, was the mailer of all that country; he could bring a large army into the field, and often set the porte at defiance.

In the country about Smyrna, there are great *agas*, who are independent lords, and maintain armies, and often lay that city under contribution. The porte never gains but a temporary influence, by sometimes intermeddling in their quarrels.

All the inhabitants of the mountains, from Smyrna to Paleftine, are perfectly independent, and are confidered by the porte as enemies, whom they attack whenever there is an opportunity. They are compofed of different nations, who have their own fovereigns or lords, and are even of different religions. Thofe near Smyrna. are Mahomedans; farther down come the Curdes, u very ferocious and faithlefs people. In the neighbourhood of Aleppo there are various *fe&t\$* of religion. The mountains of Antilibanus are inhabited by Drufes and Chriftians, and have, at times, been formidable to the porte; they have more than once taken Damafcus, and plundered it.

.The- nation of Drufes would here deferve particular mention; but as there are accounts of them already publifhed, which appeared to me, when I was in that country, very exact, I (hall forbear.faying more about them; I cannot, however, avoid taking notice of a great miftake the Ruffians made in the laft war but one, in attacking thofe people in conjunction with Shech Omar-al-Daher, of Acri, between whom there never exiftsd much harmony- Had they reconciled their difference, which they might have done,they would have had for allies all the countries from Egypt to the Curdes, who, probably, would havetjoiaed the league, and the army they could

could have brought into the field would have been more numerous than that of the fultan ; they would have been mafters of Damafcus, Aleppo, and all that part of the empire*

The very considerable country, which was for fo many years under the jurifdiction of the Shech of Acri, never paid any revenue to the porte, and was by it even confidered as an independent ftate. Shech Dahar was befieged in his capital, after the conclufion of the war, by the famous great-admiral, Haffan Pafha; he himfelf was killed, and the country reduced to obedience. The porte appointed a pafha to govern it, and he has now become as independent, and more formidable, even than was Dahar himfelf.

Between the country of the Drufes and that of Acri, there is a nation inhabiting the mountains on the back of Tyre, (which alfo belongs to them, though there are no houfes now flanding on that once famous fpot,) called *Metuali* y they are of the feci: of Ali, and are fuch inveterate enemies to the Turks, that they murder every one who comes into their country, or that they can furprize.

On the coaft of Syria, the fultan only virtually poffeffes the ports of JLatachia (Laodicea) a fmall (hallow harbour and a ruined town ; Alex-' apdretta or Scanderon (the porte of Aleppo,) a miferable village, the air of which' is fo bad,
that

that it, perhaps, has not its equal in the world for infalubrity; Tripoli and Sidoh, Jaffa, and a few very insignificant places. The caravans, which go from Scanderon to Aleppo, are obliged to go by the way of Antioch, as all the country through which the direft road leads, belongs to the Curdes, who will not fuffer the Turks *to* pafs it.

All Egypt is independent. The pallia fent to Cairo is in effect a prifoner during his government, which is only nominal; the porte draws little or no revenue from it, and no troops, except a few fanatics in time of war with the Chrifians. The Turks have at different times got poffeffion of Cairo, but never could maintain themfelves in the government. The laft inftance of their fubjecting the capital was by the late Kaftan, captain pafha, but it was foon loft again5 yet Conftantinople depends very much on Egypt for provifions, and above all for rice. The Rufians, when they had a fleet in the Mediterranean, very much diftreffed the porte, by cutting off the communication with Egypt, and might have done it much more, had they not permitted many neutral veffels to fupply them.

In Europe, the Morea, Albania, Epirus, and Scutari, are more or lefs in a ftate of rebellion; Bofnia, Croatia, &c. obey the porte only as long as it fuits them, and the fultan reaps little benefit
from

from them. These latter countries afford the stoutest and warlike soldiers in the empire » they are accustomed to arms from their infancy, as they are continually fighting among themselves, district against district, and often even village against village, besides individual quarrels of families. These troops would be of great use to the Sultan in his wars, but they will not go far from their homes, and serve only, when it is to defend their own country: the Emperor of Germany has had to contend with them, while only the enervated and dauntless soldiery of Asia has been opposed to Russia.

Lately we have seen almost all European Turkey in arms against the Porte, Adrianople in imminent danger, and even Constantinople itself trembling for its safety.

I have said that Egypt is independent; a few words on the peculiar relation of that country to Turkey will not perhaps be improper. The division of the spiritual dignities of the Mahomedans took place, A. D. 970, in an early period of their religion, and the Fatimite kalifs established themselves in Egypt, claiming to themselves the title of *commander of the faithful*, heretofore borne by the kalifs of Bagdad.

Both these kalifs successively yielded to the force or policy of the Turkish princes. The last of the Egyptian kalifs called in the Turks to his assistance

affiftance againft the Chriftian cruftkders, which fervice being accomplifhed, the new allies *turned, againft the kalif himfelf, and ftrangled him*, A. D, 1171, when a new dynaftly commenced in the perfon of Salahud-din.

The Egyptian princes long maintained an independent power by the affiftance of their Mameluk troops, until, in 1518, they were reduced to fubjection by Selim the fon of Bayazet, and have ever fince remained attached, nominally at lead, to the porte ; but as their beys were not deprived of their power, and to this day each is governor, or rather fovereign of a diftrict, thefe in fact exercife a tyranny of the worft kind over a country, which would be one of the mod productive in the univerfe, were property protected, while they render little either of tribute or fubmiffion to the porte.

This corps of *Mamaluks* is kept up, to this day, by *flaves* bought from the fame countries as heretofore, viz, Georgia, Circaffia, Abafta, and Mingrelia, and moftly purchafed at Conftantinople; for their children; born in the country, are not admitted into the corps ; indeed it is affirmed, and it is very remarkable, that they have but few children, and their families never extend beyond two generations. This is accounted for by their being greatly **addicted to au unnatural vice.**

The

The actual power resides in the Mamaluks; and the bey, who has most of them in his suite, is consequently the most powerful. As to the pashia sent by the porte, he has at different times had more or less influence, but is in general a mere cypher, obliged to submit to the will of the beys, who dismiss him when they please. They have sometimes entirely thrown off all appearance of submission to the porte; and at present, as well as generally, their obedience is only nominal, and the pasha is in reality a prisoner in the castle of Cairo, which is the place fixed for his residence.

The tribute which Egypt ought to send the porte is frequently withheld, or, if transmitted, it is diminished by deductions for the reparation of canals, fortresses, &c, at the will of the beys, Yet a long procession of mules and camels sets out annually from Egypt, with the pretended revenue for the sultan, which, instead of silver, consists mostly of bags of rice, and, not unfrequently, stones.

The janizaries and Arab soldiers in the service of the porte are but little able to enforce its authority, as they are few in number, and mostly *tompokd* of artisans and persons unaccustomed to arms. The Mamaluks, on the contrary, must be allowed to be most excellent cavalry.

In the beautiful country and climate of Egypt,
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it is difflreffing to confider how little the advantages of nature are cultivated, and how much its evils are augmented by the ignorance and unaccountably grofs fuperftition of its inhabitants.

From a furvey of Egypt I turn to the northern part of the empire, to contemplate the provinces of Walachia and Moldavia, which, like the laft-mentioned country, are rather attached to the empire by treaty than by abfolute fubjection, and which retain at leaft independence as to matters of internal regulation ; their inhabitants are, however, more oppreffed than perhaps any people in the empire; nor could they poffibly bear fuch exactions, were it not for the wonderful fertility of their foil.

Their way wodes (or princes as they are generally fill called) are Greeks, who purchafe their offices for large fums of money, the porte generally receiving about 80,000 pounds fterling for every nomination, and who are obliged to maintain themfelves in their polls, by continually feeing thofe who can ferve or hurt them at Conftantinople; for, befides the complaints which frequently are made againft them, other Greeks are conftantly caballing at the porte to get them removed, and to obtain their-places. The way-wodes muft, befides raifing large fums to defray all thefe expences, and live in affluence with a large train of dependents, who follow them from

Conftan*

Constantinople, hoard up fufficient to fecure' a fefe and fplendid retreat to themfelves when recalled from their waywodefhips to their formes homes, where, though the fear of punifhment is ever hanging over them, and deftroying their re- pofe, they maintain within their own houfes a weak and oftentatious magnificence. It is eafy to conceive how much the milerable fubjects of their defpotifm, while in office, muft fuffer from the impofitions neceffary to anfwer fuch calls of rapacity.

The boyars are obliged to furnifh money. to the waywode, and they in return opprefs the people by all kinds of exactions, exclufively of the public taxes, which go immediately into the waywode's purfe, and which are multiplied ad infinitum, and exafted with the utmoft feverity: thefe taxes, which are not in proportion to the property of the people, aggravate them beyond defcription; they murmur, but muft fubmit and pay.

.. Among the hardhips of the Moldavians may be reckoned their being obliged to furnifh a fupply of corn to Conftantinople, at a certain price fixed, when they firft came under the Turk- ifti yoke : this was originally eftablifhed as a favour to thofe countries, but has now become an intolerable burthen, as the price now bears no proportion to the prefent value.

Another great caufe of complaint is the paf- fags

fage through their country, orreidence in it, of a Turkidi army in time of war. The excbles which thefe undifciplined hordes commit are beyond defcription, plundering and laying walle the country, and often deftroying whole villages, and malTacring their defencelefs inhabitants ; hence it is not unufual for the inhabitants to flee with their mod valuable effects to the woods and mountains for concealment, as foon as they hear of the approach of an army : I was myfelf a witnefs of the terror of the Moldavians for a iimilar event. Being a prifoner, in i778, at Galaz (when hoftilities had taken place in fome parts, •between Ruffia and the Turks, which had nearly ended in a war) I was awakened one night by the cries of women, and the noife of the preparations made by the whole town to flee, on a rumour (which proved groundlefs) of the approach of a Turkifh army. I then learned that every family was provided with a waggon and one or more horfes, to efcape in cafe of danger.

The Turkifh foldiery, if they (lay but a fhort time in a place, caufe fo much havock, that the unfortunate Moldavians and Walachians, returning to their homes after thefe monfters have withdrawn, are for a confiderable time unable to rebuild their houfes, and procure feed and other requifites for the cultivation of their corn-fields and vineyards, which the Turks have rooted

up
 uThe

The following circumstances will prove how much reason the Moldavians in particular have to prefer the dominion of Russia to that of Turkey.

At the peace of Kainargi it was stipulated, that the waywode should not be removed without the consent of the court of Russia, in order to deliver the people from the oppression necessarily attendant on a frequent change of their rulers. The Porte, however, in 1777, sent to the waywode Gica a particular friend of his, who, pretending illness, requested Gica to pay him a visit, under pretence of communicating to him affairs of secrecy; the attendants of the waywode were sent out of the room, when a band of ruffians rushed into the apartment from a private door, and murdered this unhappy credulous man. A successbr was immediately appointed, without consulting the court of Russia, or its minister at Constantinople. This is the nation whose scrupulous observance of treaties is so much vaunted by some writers.

While Moldavia was in the hands of the Ruffians, during the last war, Prince Potemkin treated the inhabitants with the utmost indulgence, and exempted them from all kind of taxes, so that they returned with great reluctance under the Turkish yoke. It is little consolation to them to be governed by princes or governors of their own religion; for their situation, if not their inclination.

inclination, makes them as rapacious as Turks. The contemptuous and humiliating treatment all ranks meet with from the Turks is impatiently borne by a race of people naturally haughty, and aspiring for liberty and independence, and particularly the Boyars, who are treated by the Russians as equals and as gentlemen, and, if they emigrate, are admitted into the civil or military service.

If there were any deficiency of proof to establish the miserable debility of the Turkish government, with regard to its distant provinces, and the horrible devastation to which those provinces are subjected, we should find it in the history of Turkey, Mr. Peyffonel. He was French consul in the Crimea, in 1758, when a rebellion broke out, occasioned by the extortions of the officers of the porte, relative to the *ichetirah*, or transporting of corn. The rebellious Tatars, to the number of eighty thousand, pillaged and overran, in seven days, the province of Moldavia, carried off forty thousand slaves, spread terror and desolation on all sides, and the porte had no other means of settling this disturbance than by deposing the reigning khan, Alim Guerrai, and placing in his room Krim Guerrai, the rebel chief. At this time, says Mr. Peyffonel we saw the plains of Kichela covered as far as the eye could reach, with male and female

flaves, of all ages, cattle, camels, horfes, fheep, and all kinds of plunder, heaped together. The whole of this booty was taken from a Chriftian province fubjed: to the porte, Krim Guerrai, in return for his exaltation, endeavoured to caufe the effects to be reftored to their proprietors, and the prifoners to be fet at liberty; but, notwithstanding the vigorous and determined meafures of this prince, he could only wreft from the rapacious banditti under his command a fmall part of their plunder. Of the flaves, many were fecreted or fold, and many died from brutal treatment, fo that only half the number of prifoners returned to their country, f his is the account of Peyflbnel, the friend of Krim Guerjfa i but it is well known, that he himfelf had a part of the plunder, and that only fuch were fent back, whofe age rendered them unfit for their purpofes. I was informed, in Moldavia, from the regifters, that there were above thirty thoufand fouls, the flower of their youth, who never returned. Surely this picture of defolating barbarity fufficiently marks the character of the Tatar hordes ; and if we add, that they were conftantly making incurfions into Ruffia, Poland, Circaffia, &c. to carry off the inhabitants, plunder and burn the villages it fufficiently juftifies the court of Ruffia in taking poffeffion of this neft of thieves and murderers. and reducing them

them to something like social order and subordination. Instead of being blamed, as the emperor has been, by those Christians, who always sympathise with Turks, and by those politicians who think the duration of their usurped empire a desirable object, (he ought to deserve the thanks of all men, of whatever nation, and particularly of Christians, who are not degraded by prejudices, or corrupted by the practice of similar enormities. The whole reign of the Tatars has been an insult to mankind, and a disgrace to human nature, not inferior to that of the Ottoman sultans. Was it to be expected that a power like Russia should suffer itself to be thus insulted by a horde of savages, when she could redress the grievance? and had (he not a *right* as sovereign, as a Christian, and as a friend to humanity, to protect her feeble neighbours, who had no other support to look to, and whose plunder and depopulation strengthened her enemy as well as theirs? She had a sacred right, and the mouth is unholy which dares to arraign it.

The connection of the Tatar hordes with the Turks, both in origin and religion, induces me to review the fate of their most celebrated feat, the Crimea (or Krim) though it has now passed under the dominion of Russia, and has been abandoned by a great part of its former inhabitants.

To this I am the more prompted by the erroneous ideas which have been propagated in Europe relative to that measure, to the country in general, and to the nature of their ancient government, hitherto so little known. What much surprises me is, that M. de Peyffonel, who had so good an opportunity of gaining the most accurate information on this subject, has totally neglected it, and speaks of the Tatar government conformably to the commonly received notions of it. It often happens that the most attentive travellers go into a country with false notions of things, and if nothing occurs to undeceive them, they remain in their error. To explain all this, it may be necessary to present a sketch of the Tatar modes of warfare, and their present degree of civilization, and to notice the improved state of manners and commerce which is arising under the fostering care of Russia.

. The name of Tatar, not Tartar, is common to a vast number of those roving and uncultivated tribes, who inhabit the wide extent of country from the northern frontier of China to the borders of Hungary, and from among whom, have arisen, in darker ages, the conquerors and the founders, of many mighty empires. The tribes on the north of the Euxine had; like many other countries bordering on the Turkish empire, been subjected to a kind of dependence they yielded
 little

little in time of peace, and in war supplied only a predatory banditti, little less terrible to their friendly neighbours than to the hostile power.

In very early ages the empire of the Crimea (the ancient Cherfoneflis Taurioi) arose out of the ruins of the still more ancient and extensive dominion of the khans of Kaptchak. It took its name from the town of Krim, of which some vestiges now remain; it is at present called Efki-Krim (Old-Krim) and was a place of great trade in the year 1237, when the Mongul Tatars established their dominion in this peninsula. These princes were wholly independent* until the Genoese, having established themselves there in the 15th century for the sake of commerce, obtained such an ascendancy as to depose or elect the native khans at pleasure. Over the principal gate of Kaffa there still exists a Genoese inscription, in bad Latin-, and the arms of the republic. The Turks having expelled the Genoese, began in like manner by respecting the independence of the khans, especially as they had embraced the Mahomedan religion but they soon assumed the right of confirming their election, and finally, of nominating them to office. Under the hands of Turkey, the Black Sea, which had formerly been the scene of a very active commerce, was shut up by the narrow policy of the divan, and the ports of the Krim

gradually loft that fplendour and magnificence now attefted only by their ruins. No friend of humanity can do otherwife than rejoice that fuch matters have, by the events of war, been difpoffeffed of this important country, and that it has fallen under the control of a power, whose more liberal and enlightened views tend to revive a decayed commerce, to polifh barbarian ferocity, and to render a portion of the globe, which had been almoft a defert, again fertile and productive.

Immediately as the cmprefs got poffeffion of the Krim, (he projected the recal of trade &nd manufactures to a fpot fo well fituated for them ; fhe immediately, and at a great expence,, formed new eftablifhments for that purpofe, fent a number of troops to prated her new dominions, and allowed the reigning khan to retire on a liberal penfion.

The following account of the former government of that country, which I had, in 1781, from Seid-Effendi, vizir to Shaheen Guerrai, the reigning khan, and which I found by other information to be perfectly accurate, I prefent as the more deferving notice, as no juft account of that government has hitherto appeared. To compare it with the ancient feudal governments, and to offer a number of conjectures which would arife from an inveftigation of that fubjed, would be
foreign

foreign to my present purpose, and a task I am not qualified to undertake, but it may furnish matter for the speculations of others.

The khan was always the eldest male of the *Guerrai* family, descended from *Gengis Khan*, except there was some natural incapacity which excluded him from the succession, or that the country, which sometimes happened, interfered, and elected another, but always one of the *Guerrai* family; and the eldest and nearest to the right line of descent. Afterwards this family became very numerous, and it was difficult to determine who had the best claim, so that the khans were latterly wholly elective. Those most concerned in the election were the beys and the murfas; but the general opinion of the nation was also considered, as the nomination of an unwelcome or unpopular khan would occasion an opposition on the part of the people.

After the Turks became formidable to the Krim Tatars, the porte established a right of approving the election, and afterwards of appointing the khan solely. The beys and principal murfas (or myrfas) sometimes wrote to Constantinople to solicit the sovereignty for the prince whom they preferred, and sometimes the candidates bribed the porte.

The khan retained his sovereignty only during the pleasure of the Ottoman sultan, and annually

nually a capugee-bafhi was fent from ConfUritinople with a firman confirming him for the year to come. By the peace of Kainargi, in 1774, the Krim was declared independent, and the Tatars reftored to their privilege of elefting their own fovercign.

If the khan was depofed, it was by a firman (*or* hatt-i-herif) of the fultan, brought from Conftantinople by a capugee-bafhi. His depofition was often the confequence of complaints againft him by the principal people of the Krim, or of difatisfaction on the part of the porte of his conduft in time of war, or tardinefs in fupplying the capital with corn; but he was never put to death.

The laft unfortunate khan, who reigned when I received this information, was an exception, He quitted Rufiia, and retired to Conftantinople, where he was at firft received with great diftinction, then exiled, and afterwards put to death.

The depofed khans were fometime exiled to a diftant part of the empire, or one of the Greek iflands, but generally the porte gave them a *ehiftlik*, or kind of farm, confifting of a country-houfe and cultivated lands, between Conftantinople and Adrianople, whither they carried with them their domeftics, and fuch as were attached to their fortunes. There are at prefent nearly

three hundred princes of the family residing in those parts, who sometimes render the roads unsafe, as they or their people cannot entirely abandon their old custom of plundering. They are the next heirs to the Ottoman throne, and the reigning family has often been nearly extinct. At present there are, besides the sultan, only two sons, still very young, of his late uncle Abd-ul-hamid. Selim himself has no children: he is much addicted to a vice which generally carries with it this punishment.

When the Sultan appointed a khan, he wrote to the four beys, informing them that he had named such a prince for their sovereign.

The khan was as despotic as the Ottoman sultan in the execution of the law, which in common cases was that of the koran; in extraordinary cases, or where he did not choose to appeal to the law, there was no restraint on his power, except with respect to the beys' families, as shall be hereafter mentioned, and in affairs which concerned the nation at large.

The khans had no land of their own, except a very little about Baghdad.

All the sons of the Guerrai family are styled *Julians*.

There was a council, or rather estate (*etat*) composed of the four, eldest persons of four families, who have the title of bey (the same as the Arabic

Arabic beg) or prince. The names of these families are Sherin, Barin (or Baron,) Manfur, and Sigevut,

The first family is very numerous; of the second, two persons only were living in 1782; of the Manfurs there are also many, but of the Sigevuts few. The Sherinsj who are esteemed the most noble, and to whom the sovereignty would devolve, were the Guerrai family extinct, frequently marry daughters of the Guerrais, and sometimes, though not often, out of the most considerable Myrfas families.

The khan was, by the constitution of the government, obliged to consult the beys in matters which related to peace and war, and to general concerns of the nation; and they confirmed, by their signature, all letters on important affairs written by the khan to Constantinople, or to other courts*.

The khan could not put to death any one of the families of the beys, without permission from Constantinople; he could only imprison them. Formerly they were judged by the other beys and the khan, and if the other beys were implicated in the crime, by the murfas, or body of landholders.

Neither the beys, nor any of their family, could serve the khan in any office whatever.

A bey could not sell, or otherwise alienate the family

family lands and possessions, which were inherited, not by his children, but by his successor in office or dignity. The money and moveable effects the beys could leave to whom they pleased, and it was in this manner that they provided for their children. All the individuals of the beys* families were called Murfas, except the person invested with the dignity of bey.

In criminal cases, the beys as well as the murfas, on whose lands the crime was committed, seized the offender, and sent him to the khan or other officer of justice. This is to be understood of capital offences; in cases of less importance they might punish by beating.

There was another estate, composed of the murfas or proprietors of land, and who considered themselves as a separate class from the people; their ideas of distinction on this head exactly correspond with those received in Europe, of *gentlemen* or *nobles*. The word murfa (in Persia *mirfa*) signifies lord, or seigneur, and we should translate it *esquire*, *lord of the manor*, or *lesser baron*, while the beys are the *great barons* or *peers*.

The eldest sons of the murfas inherited their fathers' lands, and not the eldest males of the family, as was the case with the beys. Of their money or other effects they disposed as they pleased to their younger children. They had the same jurisdiction as the beys in cases of offences

fences committed on their lands, that is, beating or-imprifoning, and fending the offenders to the \$dian or other tribunals.

The khan might put to death a muria, but he always, when the nature of the cafe admitted delay, judged the offender before the beys, or an afsembly of the murfas, or fuch of his friends who infited on feeing juftice done to him according to the koran.

In matters of national concern, or which might occafion a general difconterit, the khan ^ffembled the *murfas* as well as the four *beys*; the latter acting always as a check on the great power of the khan, and on the other hand reftraining the power which an union of the murfas fometimes had rendered too didtatiner. In former times the beys and the murfas depofed their fovereign, when his condud had occafioned a general difconterit ; but this was coniidered as fo dangerous 3 ftep, that it was never recurred to, except in very urgent neceffities.

The peafants or country people, who formed the body of the nation, were free.

The peafant, who farmed a piece of land for agriculture or pafture, paid to the bey or murfa, who was the owner, twenty per cent, of the produce for rent.

If the land was his own, he paid only ten per cent. to the bey or murfa, in whofe diftrict it lay.-

The

The peasant disposed of his property as he pleased ; if he died intestate, the law of the Koran decided the succession.

When the khan raised an army for war, he sent a summons to the beys and murzas to furnish their quota, which was fixed in proportion to the number of people who dwelt on their possessions. Every bey or murza commanded the body he brought into the field. The khan gave the soldiers neither pay nor provisions; their officers or themselves provided what was necessary till they passed their frontier, when they subsisted on plunder, whether the country belonged to a friendly or an inimical power. Almost every Tatar had a horse and arms of his own.

A part of the booty, which they always made whenever they passed their frontier, belonged to the khan, a part to their bey or murza, and the remainder to themselves, which was generally the most considerable.

Neither the beys nor the murzas were permitted to make war with one another; and the people were forbidden to take a share in their personal quarrels.

There was another class of the people, who dwelt in cities and towns, and who paid no rent to the beys or murzas for the ground their houses stood on, or their gardens or fields, which belonged

to

to themselves, or they hired of other proprietors, as these lands or grounds belonged to the city or town i nor were, they subjedl to be called out to war; though they often, for the fake of plunder^ voluntarily joined the corps of some bey or jnurfa,

There were some other persons in the Krim, who had the title of bey, but they did not belong to the *efate* or *etat*, and were in efled only conir mon murfas.

There was a class of people also called *courtiers*, *kapu-kkalki*, people of the *porte* or gate, that is, the court, because justice was anciently administered by" the judge fitting, at his gate; they consisted of the vizir, khuznadar-bafhi, defterdar, akhtagibey, kapigi-bafhi, &c. The khan appointed any person the pleased to these offices, as muFfas or their sons, merchants, Turks, &c. and when they had-an office, if they were of an insignificant family, they were called aga, but their sons took the title of murfa* The beys and great murfas fometimes gave their daughters in marriage to courtiers, if they were become persons of consequence ; but, however, this was rare, and generally by the folicitation of the khan.

This instance of a *fon* becoming a gentleman because his father, who was not noble, held an honourable poll, bears a strong resemblance to ancient feudal government, and to the present custom of most European nations.

The

The great officers of the ftate were,

i. **G ALGA-SULTAN.** He was governor of the city of Akmedfchit, and its diftrift, where he always refided. He was always of the Guerrai family, and had, in his diftrift, power of life and death, as the khan himfelf. No perfon older than the reigning khan could be appointed to this office. He had a court, and officers of the fame denomination as the khan, viz. a vizir, khaznadar, &c. It has been always understood by thofe who have treated of the Krim, that galga-fultan was the khan's eldeft fon ; this was never the cafe,

2. **NURUDDIN-SULTAN.** He alfo could be of no other family but of the Guerrai. He had the fame privileges as galga-fultan, but could not put to death; he refided. always with the khan, but had no part in the adminiftration of juftice, or any other department, farther than giving his advice, or tranfacting for the khan in his name fuch bufinefs as he entrusted him with. His office feems to have been a kind of occafional lieutenant to the khan, always at hand.

3. **OR-BEY** (or ore-bey is it is pronounced lived at Perekop, called Or. His privileges were the fame as thofe of gaiga-fultan; except that he could not put to death; he was not always of the Guerrai fefitiy, but fometimera* Sfeerin, in which cafe he had no vizir, but he had all

the other officers of his court the *fattie* as a *fultan*.

4. AK-KIRMAN-SERASKIH was always a *fultan*, and Had power of life and death. He resided at *Akkirman*, before the Turks took possession of *Befarati*; he was also governor of the *Nogai-Tatars* before they emigrated from the plains on the north of *Perekop* to the *Kuban*; he had the same officers as *galga-fultan*<

5. KUBAN-SERASRIR had the same power and privileges as *galga-fultan*, being always a *fultan* of the *Guerrai* family, Besides, every tribe of the *Kuban-Tatars* had a *scraflur*, who administered justice in the tribe, but was under *Hhn-ferafkifi* and could not pay to death.

Besides these there were,

1. The *MuFTI* in the *Krim*, appointed by the *khan*, and who resided with him at *Bagchiferrai*, but there was no body of *ulema* to check the power of the government, as at *Constantinople*. When the Turks were in possession of *Kaffa*, they had a *mufti* there, but he never was consulted by the *Tatars*, or suffered to meddle in their affairs.

2, A *kadilaikir-or* (*kazialkir*) in like manner appointed by, and residing with the *khan*.

3. Twenty-four *kadis* (or *kazis*) one in every considerable district, besides *kadis* in the *Kuban*, where.

Where every kadi had a diftrict of feveral villages or encampments of tents.

Thus this Angular government feems originally to have beeffi feudal, but was afterwards, when the Tatars became Mahomedans, modified by the adoption of the laws of the kotan. The Tatars acknowledged the fultan of Conftanti-iople as kalif and head of their religion. They never could be perfuaded to leave off eating horleflefli, which is forbidden by the Mahomedan law to Mufelmans. The Turkifh muftis Wifely decided, that horfeflefh was forbidden to iall other Mahomedans to eati but not to the Tatars, as they had been accuftomed to it, and that thereby it ceafed to be a fin.

The REVENUES of the reigtiing Khans Were,

1ft. TEN PER CENT, of the corn the Nogais ferew.

2, The prodiice of the SALT LAKES—very little faJt was the property of individuals—they tendered him about one hundred thoufand dollars a year, that is, about twelve thoufand five hundred pounds fterling.

3. The fluty on imports and exports, which iifually amounted to the fame fum of one hundred thoufand dollars, or twelve thoufand five Juindred pounds fterling:

4. SUBSIDIES, which the Ottoman portend to the *khan* in time of war, and frequently other sums, to assist in armaments, and to keep the Tatars in good humour.

5. The sums annually sent by the Ottoman Sultan to defray the expenses of Galga-fukan's court, and to pay the officers of the khan's court, as vizir, khafnadar, &c. with a view to render them more dependent.

6. The pay of the *feimans*, a body of troops of about 1,600, who served as guards to the khan, was always sent from Constantinople. .

The Turks, in return, could always rely on a body of auxiliary cavalry from the Krim and the Kuban«

The Christians and Jews paid a capitation tax, as in Turkey, to the beys or murfasj but they were infinitely less vexed than in Turkey, enjoyed more protection, and were treated with less insolence and indignity.

The revenue of Shaheen -Guerrai-Khan, in 1781, amounted to 900,000 dollars, without calculating the sums usually sent from Constantinople; this sum makes about £.112,500 sterling.

The number of inhabitants was then reduced to about 100,000 souls in the Krim, and 600,000 souls in *the* Kuban ; two-thirds of the inhabitants

inhabitants had emigrated to Turkey since the beginning of that khan's reign, which was the kft. In the autumn of 1777, the Tatars of the Krim alone met the Ruffian army, under prince Proforofsky, in the plains of Salguir, with forty thousand men, all well mounted and arme'd. In 1782, the large city of Kaffa confifted only of 450 houfes inhabited.

It may not be inappofite to fay a few words on the reign of the laft khan of the Tatars, and the final extinction of the Tatar dominion in the Krim.

In the treaty of peace of Kainargi, concluded in July 1774, the independence of the Krim was ftipulated in thefe words. Art. III. " *All the Tatar people, thofe of Crimea, of Budgiac, of the Kuban, the Ediffans, Geambouiluks and Edifchkuls, fhall, Without any exception, be acknowledged by the two empires as free nations, and entirely independent of any foreign power, and fhall be governed by their own fovereign of the race of Gingis-Khan, elected and raifed to the throne by all the Tatar people; who fhall govern them according to their ancient laws and ufages, rendering no account whatever to any foreign power; it is for this reafon that neither the court of Ruffia nor the Ottoman porte ought to meddle, under any pretext whatever, in the election of the faid khany nor in their affairs, domeftic, politic,*

X 3

' " civil,

" civil, and interior; but, on the contrary, acknow-
 " ledge and confider the/aid Tatar nation in its potifp:
 " tical and civil ftate, on the fame footing as other
 " powers, which govern by themfelves, and are de-
 " pendent on, God alone. With respect to the cere-
 " * monies of religion, as the Tatars profefs the fame
 " worship as the Mufelmans, they fhall regulate them-
 " felves with regard to his highnefs, as grand kalif
 " of Mahometanifm, according to the precepts which
 " their law prefcribes to them, without, however,
 " any prejudice to the confirmation of their civil and
 " religious liberty, &c"—" Ruffia engages to with-
 " draw its troops, &c.. and the fublime porte to relin-
 " quifh all right whatever, which it might have to
 " the foftrejes, cities, habitations, &c. in Crimea, the
 " Kuban, or in the ifland of Taman, and not to keep,
 " in any of thofe place garrifons, or other armed
 " people, &c. &c."

In confequence of this ftipulation *Shaheen Guerrai* was elected khan by the beys and murfas, and with the approbation of the people, as it feemed, for no difcontent appeared among them.

The new khan, however, did not Jong keep his popularity. He wifhed to civilize his people, and introduce the European difciplinfe among his troops. He would have fucceeded, had he paid more respect to the deep-rooted prejudices of the nation. He began by entirely abo-
 lifhing

liffing the old form of government; he raifed new foldiers, paid them, and appointed murfas for their officers. They had no ftanding army before, but every man was a foldier, He diminifhed the rent paid by the people to the murfas for their land, and appropriated it to his own ufe, allowing fuch murfas as would ferve in the army Jiandfome falaries, He affected too much the manners of the Chriftians or Ruffians, though he obferved with punctuality all the ceremonies of his religion. His expences were thus increafed beyond his income, and he could not, like hi* predeceffors, apply for pecuniary affiftance to the Ottoman Porte, which had ceafed to pay the /alaries of the officers of his court, He ftruck a new coin at an enormous expence, and fent for a German to conduct the mint. He farmed out the different branches of the revenue to people who exacted the payment with a rigour hitherto unknown, He eftablifhed a corps of artillery, and endeavoured to form a marine; but want of revenue prevented him fucceeding in any one Undertaking,

The Turks faw with jealoufy the independency of the Tatars, and lamented being deprived, in all probability, *of* their affiftance in any futur^e war, as the khan declared his intention of re-inaining neutral, as the only means of making his people formidable, and maintaining his in-

.x4 dependence.

dependence. The Turks laboured incessantly by their emissaries, who were mostly religious enthusiasts, to stir up the people to rebellion. They succeeded in raising such a spirit of discontent, that the khan, fearful of his personal safety, called in a body of Russians, and placed small corps in different parts of the country. The Turks had, previously to this, sent troops to Taman, and beheaded one of the khan's commanders.

I arrived at the Russian fortrefs of Janikali, in October 1777, and was setting out for Baghferai, when news arrived that the Tatars had suddenly fallen on the dispersed Russians in every part of the Krim and the Kuban at the same time, and had cut them all off; but that the khan himself had escaped to the Russian headquarters. The Ottoman Porte, at the same time, had appointed a new-khan, and sent him to the port now called Sebastopolis, with five (ships of the line. A Russian army soon entered the Krim; the Tatars were defeated, and during the winter reduced again to obedience to their khan. The Russians are accused of committing some cruelties on this occasion. If they cannot be justified as Christians for following the law of retaliation, they are at least men, somewhat excusable.

The Tatars, though reduced to obedience,
could

could not be kept in that state by the few troops the khan could rely on; he was therefore obliged to have an auxiliary army from Ruffia, and the porte made several attempts to excite a fresh rebellion. The empress, at last tired out by the continual alarms they occasioned, and determined no longer to suffer her subjects to be exposed to the calamities the incursions of these barbarians occasioned, seized on the Krini and Kuban in 1783. The khan retired to Kaluga, in Ruffia-Minor, where he was allowed a very large pension by the empress, and treated in every respect as a sovereign; but, unaccustomed to a quiet and inactive life, he quitted Ruffia, and went to Constantinople, where at first he was received with great distinction, but was soon sent into exile to a Greek island, and one day, as he was in his bath, he was seized and strangled, and his head sent to Constantinople;

I beg the reader will excuse a short digression respecting myself, as it may throw some light on the character or morals of the people I was among. The 44-th December, 1777, I sailed from Janikali, in a small vessel, for Kaffa, (the road by land being unsafe) which had just been taken by the Ruffians, under Gechai Balmaine, by storm, and many Turks, who were at Kaffa, had been put to the sword by a Greek corps from Janikali, who

who alfo robbed my fervant of all my baggage, to a very considerable amount, and which I never recovered. Inftead of making the port of Kaffa, we were driven by a ftorm along the fcoaft, and after lofing our bowfpnt and all our anchors, we were in great diftreffs for water, being eighty perfons oil Koatfd, all military men. We piade feveral defeents" on the coaft to procure water, but were always beaten off by the Tataras* at laft we paffed Belaklava, and lay to in the gulph of Giofleve, oppofite the port of Sebaftopdis, where we faw the Turkifh fleet at anchor. The mafter of a Turkifh merchant fhip came out to us, and we bargained with him, for about fifty pounds fierling, for a calk of water, which *he* promifed to bring us off in the night; but as foon as he got oft fhore, we difcovered one of the Turkifh frigates loofening her topfails to come out, It was pearly night, and we put to fea and bore away for the Danube the only port we could reach with the wind we had, preferring to perifh by thirft, rather than throw ourfelves on the mercy of the Turks. I was thp only perfon in the veffel who could navigate her out of fight of land, The captain, who was a Greek had become mad, | found two Turkifh charts of the Black Sea, which differed in the latitude of the Danube a degree, I examined the coaft of Anatolia, which

I had

I had furveyed that fummer from Conftantinople fo Kitros, and by that judged which was the beft.

We arrived fafe off Sulina-mouth, but the wind not permitting us to enter, a Turkifh boat came put to us; and here I cannot enough commend the humanity we experienced from the crews of feveral Turkifli merchant veffels. We had only a hawfer and a boat-anchor to hold the (hip. The water was very fmooth. It was al, ready night. They fent our five large boats manned to tow us in, if thgre fhould be any danger, and they remained with us all night. We got fafe into the river in the morning.

The next day I fet off for Galatz, intending to go by land to Ruffia., In the river I fopnd two new Turkifli 50 gun fhips, without their guns or crews. I had known the captains at Coijftantinopie, and was received with kiadneft by them.

The 1 ft January, 1778, I went to the Greek governor to pay him a complimentary yift: I found a very cold reception from him ; he was feated on his fopha with a Turk, in appearance of fome diftinction, who immediately produced a warrant from the pafha of Ebrahil to cut off my head, and thofe of 26 perfons who were come with me from the veffel. The executioner was ftanding in the room, with a bag to put our
heads

heads in, and a heap of sawdust was laid in the court before the house to absorb the blood. My Greek interpreter was so terrified, that he could utter; no other word than *quel fatto*, pointing to the bag in which his head was to be put. Luckily I was not intimidated; but I was obliged to speak for myself as well as I could, and with great difficulty persuaded the officer, who was filikataf (sword-bearer) to the pasha, that I was an Englishman, and came with no ill intentions; that were I an enemy, in the situation in which we came into the Danube, the custom of all nations granted us an asylum. He then told me, we were accused of coming into the Danube with a design to burn the two Turkish ships of war. In short my arguments, and a few thousand dollars in Russian bank notes, prevailed on him to go back to the pasha for fresh instructions, and to send to the captains of the Turkish ships of War, who engaged to answer with their heads that I was an Englishman, and a friend of the captain pasha's. It was a lucky circumstance that they had seen me with the captain pasha, and knew that I really was an Englishman.

I afterwards learnt that the Greek governor, who had at first received me with great civility, was our accuser.

We remained prisoners at large in the town three months, when an order from the captain pasha

palha came to let us depart, and " *that we should* " *be so little molested, that if a bird perched on the* " *waft-top it should be driven away* "

While I was in the quarantine at the Ruffian frontier, in September 1778, there passed 75,000 Christians, obliged by the Ruffians to emigrate from the Crimea (35,769 males.) The Armenian women, who came from Kaffa, were more beautiful, and, I think, approached nearer that perfect form which the Grecians have left us in their statues, than the women of Tino. These people were sent to inhabit the country abandoned by the Nogai Tatars, near the west coast of the sea of Azof (Palus Maeotis) but the winter coming on before the houses built for them were ready, a great part of them had no other shelter from the cold than what was afforded them by holes dug in the ground, covered with what they could procure : they were people who all came from comfortable homes, and the greatest part perished; seven thousand only were alive a few years ago. A colony from Italy to the banks of the Borysthenes, in 1783, had no better fate, owing to the bad management of those who were commissioned to provide for them, and not to the climate; nor have colonies of Germans been more fortunate in Ruffia—but this is a digression.

I shall here take the opportunity of correcting a few

a few errors into which some writers of celebrity¹ have fallen.

With respect to the title of *fultan*, borrowed by the Genglikhan family, and to that of *khan* (written frequently by the French, who do not distinguish the sound of an *to* from an *n* when not followed by a vowel, *kam* and *cham*, as they write Edimbourg, &c.) Baron de Tott has made some observations which require correction. His errors, which are not entirely cleared up by Peyssonnet, arise from not having observed the different force which these words have in the different countries where they are used. They are both words of command, and (contrary to Tott's assertion) are used by the Turkish emperors to express sovereignty, as is evident from the Arabic inscriptions on the Ottoman money: *Sultan, ebn ulJulian* AbduJhamid khan, dame mulkhu Sultan, Jon of a fultan, Abdulhamid the khan, whose reign be perpetual*. These terms, however, are used very differently in Persia; *shah*, which among the Tatars is equivalent to *khan* or king, is the only title taken by the Persian monarch: in that country *khan* answers to the Turkish *pasha*, and is therefore taken by the governors of provinces, whilst *fultan*, which there signifies simply commander, is a title given to a captain of horse; In my time, a man was made *khan*: or governor of Banderik,

Benderrik, and his fon, who commanded a body of cavalry, was Called *fultan*. I ſpeak of the perfect acceptation of theſe words, not of their more ancient ſignification

Tott is erroneous in ſaying, that the bey of the Sherins conſtantly repreſents the five other beys, In the *kingufhes*) or extraordinary aſſemblies, as well as in all the public convocations, the bey of the Sherins, though firſt in rank, repreſents only his own family; the beys of the other houſes are alſo preſent, and repreſent each their own family.

The *hiſtorical journal* of the affairs of the Krim, which was kept at *Bagtjikiferrai*, is probably a valuable document: Peyſſbnel ſeems to doubt of its exiſtence, or At leaſt to ſuppoſe, that it is little more than a compilation from general traditions, made by ſome Tatar of learning; it is, however, certain that ſuch a journal was regularly kept there by a family, who have handed it down from father to ſon with the ſame regularity as a Similar journal is kept at the porte at Conſtantinople; the khans often referred to it.

The caverns found in different parts of the Krim, particularly at Tepekkman, half a league from Bagtthiferrai, have given riſe to many curious ſpeculations: from their ſituation on the ſides of ſteep, and often perpendicular rocky mountains.

mountains as well as from the regularity of their structure, it is evident that they have been excavated by human art, but whether as sepulchral monuments, as fortresses, or as places of refuge for cattle in time of invasion, or for whatever other use, is at the present day doubtful. The objection of Mr. Peyfibnel, who thinks it impossible for cattle to have climbed to such a height, is certainly erroneous as to its practicability, since the Tatars at present actually do put herds of goats every night into some of them, by means of steps cut in the rock, of which, had he passed a night, as I did, in that beautifully romantic vale, he might have been an eye-witness; others, indeed, have no such access, and might serve as a refuge to the matters of the flocks themselves.

What has been said sufficiently illustrates the political state of the Tatars. In their education, there is little to supply the mind with knowledge, and whatever marks of sagacity are discoverable among them, are to be attributed to natural genius, and the effect of an active mode of life, which, even among savages, bestows a sharpness and accuracy of intellect. Their acquired information is very limited : reading and writing, constitute their highest branches of education, and in the sciences in general they are less informed even than the Turks themselves. Like
most

most barbarians, their own country is to them as once the pattern of excellence and the boundary of knowledge; and the chief officers of state themselves were ignorant of the geography or relative situation of every other Country.

The Tatar mode of fighting has no resemblance to European tactics; it is one continued scene of confusion and tumult, though it gives occasion to the display of great agility, and no small portion of a barbarous kind of skill. Alternately flying and advancing in detached parties, many kinds of contest are carried on at once; the sabre, the pike, and fire-arms, are all employed, and they fight alike on horseback or on foot, though the former is their most common mode. The regularity and discipline of the modern European battles has greatly contributed to produce a correspondent mildness towards the conquered; but in this desultory warfare the passions of the individuals are let loose, personal fury augments the savage horror of the scene, and the enemy is never spared, unless he be sufficiently unhurt to become valuable as a Slave.

It is not surprising, that on the empire's obtaining possession of the Crimea, a great number of its Tatar inhabitants should, emigrate from their country. Besides the religious prejudices of these people, their unfettered and turbulent

habits rendered them little adapted to that industry and civilization, which it was her endeavour to introduce into her newly-acquired dominions. Those who chose to leave the country, had leave to sell their lands and other property, which was protected by the Russians. She did not deal with them as the Turks and Tartars ever did to the inhabitants of the countries they conquered; those who chose to remain, were left in the quiet possession of their property and their religion, "and enjoyed every protection and privilege as a Russian Christian subject.

The Tatar hordes now no more follow the Turkish army, nor mark their road with smoking-villages laid in ashes, and murdered inhabitants; those hordes, who penetrated even into Prussia and Silesia, ravaged Poland, Hungary, and Russia, destroying by fire and sword every habitation, every living creature they could not carry off, tying their prisoners to their horses' tails, and those prisoners were the flower of the youth of Christian nations, led away, never more to return from slavery and violation to their friends or their country; these hordes are now either dispersed among their brother savages in Asia, or civilized by their conquerors.

CHAPTER IX.

The Political State of Greece.

THE political state of Greece has long announced to the attentive observer that explosion which late events seem to have rapidly promoted. Greece can no longer submit to the Turkish yoke; she pants for emancipation, and already aspires to be ranked among the independent States of Europe. The rise, or rather the renovation, of her power, will form an important era in European politics: to appreciate its probable consequences; we must consider the past and present circumstances of that famous country; we must recur to the eclipse of her former splendor by the Turkish conquest, to the long night of barbarism and oppression in which she has been whelmed, and to those struggles which of late years have shown that she is about to awake to the assertion of her native rights.

It is not here my intention to trace the details of classic story, to describe those heroic ages, when the splendor of genius and the illumination of science seemed to be concentrated within the narrow boundaries of Greece, and by their irradiation to communicate animation and im-

r %

provement

provement to furrounding* nations; it will fee? fufficient for me to call to the remembrance of the fcholar fame of the brigheft pages in the liiftory of mdbkind ; it will be fufficient to cite the names of thofe poets and orators, thofe ftatefmen and moralifts, wbofe iliuftrious deeds, and whofe admirable precepts ftill extort the applaufes of the univerfe. To (Greece belonged an Homer and a Demofthenes, a Phocioii and an Ariftides, a Socrates, a Plato, an Ariftotle, a Phidias, and an Apelles: in fhort, in whatever path the ardent and eccentric imagination of man has fought for fame, in that the Grecian name ftands eminently confpicuous, if not arrogating to itfelf an unrivalled fuperiority.

India and Egypt had for many preceding ages cultivated the arts; but thefe countries were only the cradle of knowledge; when tranfmitted to the genial climate of Greece, foftered by her political freedom, and animated by her vivacity and enterprife, it quickly attained the fublimed heights, and invefted the human character with a dignity before unknown. By what gradations their ancient Simplicity, temperance, m6defty, and good-faith funk away, and how the decay of their virtues involved the ruin of their genius, their hiftory will fhew: let the philanthropift, perufing the inftructive leffon, weep over the fall of human greatnefs, or rather

let him collect from the fatal example, new incentives to energy and perseverance in the cause of private and public virtue.

Ancient Rome, the victorious rival of Greece in arms, caught from her captive the inspiration of genius but she never reached a similar degree of sublimity; she imitated, but never equalled, the poets, the orators, the historians, the artists of Greece, according to the ingenuous acknowledgment of the first of Latin poets

" Excudent alii spirantia mollius sera,

" Credo equidem : vivos ducent de marmore vultus;

" Orabunt causas melius, coelique meatus

" Describent radio," &c.

Indeed, no nation ever arrived so nearly at perfection in every branch of science. The genius of the ancient Grecians seems to have been endowed with as preternatural a strength as the bodies of Homer's heroes. Their poetical imagery was splendid and sublime, their oratorical tropes bold and energetic, their speculative philosophy manly and comprehensive. Of the effect of their paintings we can judge only from history, but their statues have reached to the present times; they possess a dignity more than human; they seem the *ne plus ultra* of genius, taste, and execution, and though often imitated, defy the hand of the copyist.

Such a nation could not have fallen under the yoke of a Turkifti conqueror, had ſhe not been prepared for that difgrace by a long period of debafement and ſuperftitipn. When this laſt and raoft terrible cataſtrophe arrived, ſhe ſaw her cities and palaces laid in aſhes, and the magnificent monuments of her ancient glory leveled with the duſt by the rude ſtrokes of thoſe ferocious barbarians; ſhe ſaw her ſons, a race who had graced and dignified ſociety, Slaughtered without diſtinction and without mercy, or ſubjected to a captivity ſtill worſe than Slaughter; but yet her weeping genius ſeemed to linger among the melancholy ruins, and reluctantly to leave them, to carry with her the faint remnants of learning and taſte into more fortunate regions, where ſhe ſowed the ſeeds of that civilization and ſcience which at the preſent day ſo eminently flouriſh in Europe,

Conquered Greece poliſhed Rome, but the conquerors were Romans. Copquered Greece did not poliſh Turkey, for the conquerors were Turks, The inſeifibility of theſe barbarians is aſtoniſhing: living amid the effulgence of genius, they have not caught one ſpark; they gaze with iinfeeling ſtupidity on the wonder and boaſt of art, on their glorious monuments, on their temples, and conclude they were built by genii, and then, deſtroy them to burn the marble

ble for lime to make ftucco for their own tafte-
 lefs houfes; whence the fine arts are banifhed;
 where ignorance, tyranny, fuperftition, and grofs
 fenfuality only dwell, in lad and ftupidly folemn
 pomp, or iffuing out with favage fury, lay wafte
 the country round, and imbrue their hands in
 the blood of the helplefs, murdering without re-
 morfe thofe they have conquered. Thus the
 fined countries in the world are become deferts;
 part inhabited by favage beads, and part by more
 favage men; the poor aborigines flunking in
 hiding places like the timid hare (which epithet
 the Turks give them in derifion) while thofe
 beads of prey roam abroad.

Every object, moral and phyfical, the fair
 face of nature, and the intellectual energies of
 the inhabitants, have alike been blafted and de-
 filed by the harpy-touch of Turkift tyranny.
 As an inftance of thofe changes which the coun-
 try has undergone, we need only confuler* the
 ifland of Cyprus, now an almoft uninhabited
 defert, which was, not only in ancient times,
 but when it was taken by the Turks from the
 Venetians, populous and exceedingly rich. The
 gentry lived like princes in fplendor, and even
 the; peafants had each of them at leaft a filver
 cup, fpoon, knife, and fork. The number and
 excellency of its productions were wonderful.
 At prefent only a little cotton, fome filk and

wine, and a few drugs, are its produce, all to no great amount, Even the falines (or falt-works) which' were fo great a branch of revenue and commerce to the Venetians, have produced nothing fince the Turks have been poffeifed of the ifland.

Of the defefts of the Grecian character fome are doubtlefs owing to their ancient corruptions; but moft of them take their rife in the humiliating ftate of depreffion in which they are held by the Turks, This degradation and fervility of their fituation has operated for centuries, and has confequently produced an accumulated effect on the mind; but were this weight taken off, the elaflicity and vigour of the foul would have wide room for expansion, and though it cannot be expected that they would at once rife to the proud animation of their former heroes, they would doubtlefs difplay energies of mind, which the iron hand of defpotifm has long kept dormant and inert, It is rather aftonifhing that they have retained fo much energy of character, and are not more ctbafed;- for like noble courfers they champ the bit, and fpurn indignantly the yoke; when once freed from thefe, they will enter the courfe of glory,' The truth of thefe obfervations will appear, whether we confider the Greeks in their common character as one
people,

people, or whether we confider them according to their local and peculiar diftinctions.

When we view the Greeks in their more comprehensive character as a nation, their fuperiority over the Turks in knowledge is furprifirigly great; they poffefs a great degree of genius and invention, and are of fo lively an imagination, that they cannot tell the fame ftory twice without varying the embellifhrnents of circumftance and diftion; added to this, both men and women fpeak ntich, and with wonderful volubility and boldnefs, and no people are. fuch natural orators; numbers of them fpeak Italian, but all have an aftivity and fpightlinefs which ftrongly contrafts with the ftupid and pompous gravity of the Turks; an European feels himfelf as it were at home with them, and amongft creatures of his own fpecies; for with Mahomedans there is a diftance, a non-affimilation, a total difference of ideas, and the more he knows their language the more he perceives it; on the contrary, the more intimately he knows the Greeks, the more fimilar does he find them in habits and manners to other Europeans: their bad reputation is more owing to the flander of the French (their mortal enemies) than to fo great a degree of demerit. In general, they are an agreeable and a ferviceable people, but they are much given to levity, are immoderately ambitious,

and

and fond of honourable distinctions; but this very ambition, now a weakness, when they have nobler objects to pursue, will lead them to greatness.

t From the account given by Tott (vol. i. p. 118) of the disturbances excited by the patriarch *Kirilo*, it would appear that the Greeks have not yet entirely abandoned that spirit of superstition and bigotry, which was, perhaps, the main cause of their former downfall.

It must be observed, however, that these disputes are not so much fostered among themselves, as they are owing to the efforts of the Latin church, which was the case in the instance alluded to, where the foundation of the contest was a bull of the pope, directed against the Greek church.

They bear the Turkish yoke with greater impatience than other Christians (who have long ceased to struggle against it) and possess a spirit of enterprise which, however ridiculed by some authors, often prompts them to noble achievements. Their ancient empire is fresh in their memory; it is the subject of their popular songs, and they speak of it in common convention as a recent event,

That they possess a firm and manly courage, notwithstanding the insinuations of their calumniators, has been too often testified to be in the least doubtful; the instances which they have
displayed

displayed in the Ruffian service have been truly striking. They are passionate, and sometimes given to assassination; but, except in Zante and Cephalonia, the fletto is not so frequent with them as with the Italians, whom they in general resemble; the best of them, if we add more energy, being very similar in character to the Venetians, and the worst to the Genoese.

The most observable difference in the Grecian character is between those of Constantinople and their countrymen of the islands. The merchants and lower orders of the Constantinopolitan Greeks have indeed no very marked character; they are much the same as the trading Christians in all parts of the empire, that is to say, as crafty and fraudulent as the Jews, but less so than the Armenians, who are the most subtle of all usurers.

But there is in *Zfubitr* called the Fenar, a race of Greeks who call themselves nobles, and affect to despise those of the islands; they are certain opulent families, from which are generally appointed the dragomans of the porte, and the waywodes of Walachia and Moldavia. They have kept these places among them, as they are most ally allied together, and keep up a constant conjunction with the officers of the porte. They are continually intriguing to get those in office removed, and obtain their places; even children Cabal against their fathers, and brothers against brothers.

brothers. They are all people of very good education, and are polite, but haughty, vain, and ambitious to a most ridiculous degree, considering the contempt they are treated with by the Turks. As to their noble extraction, it is a matter of great uncertainty; most of them bear the names of those families which were illustrious when the Turks took Constantinople, but they would find it difficult to prove their descent. They have in general all the vices of the Turks of the seraglio; treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, and intrigue which flows at no means. While they are drogomans of the porte, they are obliged to behave with great caution and prudence -, but when they become waywodes, they are in nothing different from Turkish pashas in tyranny; nor is it to be wondered at, when men are obliged to look up 'not only to tyrants, but to the very servants of tyrants, for honour and consequence, to flatter their ignorance and stupidity, their foibles and their vices, and to tremble for their lives at their frowns, that cunning takes the place of wisdom, vice of virtue, and treachery of fortitude. *In* such a situation the mind must lose its vigour, the heart its generosity : the abasement of man by such causes was never more strongly exemplified than in the instance of the Greeks of the Fenar ; they do not weep over the ruins which
they

they cannot reftore, nor glow with emulation to rear others of equal magnificence.

Strange as is the infatuation which induces thefe Greeks to aim at the poft of way wodes, it is perhaps not more aftonifhing than many examples which daily occur, in other nations, of the power of ambition. Though ftyling themfelves noble, and affecting a fuperiority over the other Greeks, they only have totally relinquifhed the ancient Grecian fpirit; they feem not anxious, as the iflanders are, for liberty, but delight in their falfe magnificence, and in the petty intrigues of the feraglio; and their pride is to appear in their drefs like Turks; and yet the fituation which they are thus eager to obtain is befet with perils, and fcarcely one who holds it efcape depofition and punifhment. No fooner is a way wode appointed, than he fets out in great ftate for his government, attended by a crowd of relations and dependents, for all of whom, as well as for his own fplendor, he muft provide, by oppreffing the unhappy fubjeds of his tyranny. Meanwhile his countrymen at Conftantinople are engaged in continual plots for his removal, and it becomes neceffary for him to accumulate a large fum to bribe the minifters and others *on* his return, and to avert the perfecution which continues for years afterward to hang over him.

Thofe of Macedonia, &c. are robuft, courageous,

rageous, and' fomewhat ferocious; thofe of Athens and Attica are fill remarkably witty and fharp; all the illanders are lively and gay, fond of fmging and dancing to an excefs, affable, hofpitable, and good-natured; in fliort, they are the beft: thofe of the Morea are much given to piracy; but it is not to be wondered at, confidering the cruel treatment they have met with, and the ftruggles they are continually making againft the Turks. Thofe of Albania, Epirus, and, in general, the mountaineers, are a very warlike brave people, but very favage, and make little fcuple of killing and robbing travellers; a Turk cannot venture in their country alone; there is no one in it but would make a merit of (hooting him, fo deeply is their hatred to their ppprefTors rooted.

The Greeks of Zante and Cephalonia, (ubje<5t to the Venetians, are notorious for ftabbing with knives.

In fome iflands the people are not handfome. In Metaline, the women are remarkable for very large breads. In Tino, the women are almoft all beauties, and there the true antique head is to le found.

In general, the people of the iflands have grand and noble features. From different faces you may put together, in walking through a

market-place, the heads of Apollo and of the finest ancient statues.

It is scarcely possible for any person not to be mistaken in judging of the conduct of the Porte towards its provinces, by any analogy from the political operations of other European nations. Amongst us, the unsuccessful revolt of a whole province would indeed give birth to some additional rigour, and to some striking example of punishment, but the ferocious Turk proposes nothing short of extermination, in order to free himself from the fear of future defection, was thus that, when the inhabitants of the Morea, who, inflamed by the desire of liberty, had taken up arms in favour of Russia, returned under their yoke, a deliberate proposal was made in the divan to Slaughter them all in cold blood, innocent and guilty, of whatever age or sex. Nor was this the first time that the massacre of the whole Greek nation had been seriously debated: it was, however, in the present instance, successfully opposed by Gazi-Haffan, both on motives of humanity and policy. The chief argument which he used, and which alone carried conviction to his hearers, was: *if we kill all the Greeks, we shall lose all the capitation they pay*. Even without such a provocation, Sultan Mustafa, predecessor and brother of Abdulhamid, on his accession to the throne, proposed to cut off *all the Christians in the empire,*

empire, and was with difficulty diffuaded from it. Is this a nation which merits that Britain fhould enter into a war for its defence ?

It is wholly incomprehenfible to me, that any European nation can regard the Turks as the lawful poffeffors of the countries over which their baneful dominion extends. Such opinion can only proceed from a total ignorance of the ftate *of* the people whose fovereignty thefe ferocious Tavgas have ufurped, and of the circumftances which attended their fubjection.

Right to a country is acquired either by treaty or by long poffeffion. Treaty can only apply to a portion of a country ceded, whether voluntarily or compulfatively, by the fovereign power.

It has been faid, that as long poffeffion of a country gives an iridifputable right of dominion, and that as this right of the Turks to their poffeffions has alfo been acknowledged by all nations in their treaties, the aborigines have loft all claim to independence.—As to treaties between the Turks and other nations, who had no right to difpofe of the countries ufurped by the Turks, - they cannot be binding to the Greeks, who never were confulted, who never figned fuch treaties, nor confented to their being figned.

When one nation conquers another, and they become incorporated, by having the fame rights, **the** fame religion, the fame language, and by being.

being blended together by inter-marriages, a long series of years renders them one people. Who can in England distinguish the aborigines from the Romans, Saxons, Danes, Normans, and other foreigners? They are all Englishmen.

The Greeks were conquered by the Turks, but they were (like all other nations they conquered) attacked by them without provocation. It was not a war for injury or insult received, for jealousy of power, or the support of an ally, contests which ought to end when satisfaction or submission is obtained: it was a war, having for its aim conquest, and for its principle a right to the dominion of the whole earth; a war which asserted that all other sovereigns were usurpers, and that the deposing and putting them to death was a sacred duty. Do the laws of nations establish that such a conquest gives right of possession? They, on the contrary, declare such conquest usurpation.

The conquered were never admitted by the Turks to the rights of citizens or fellow subjects, unless they abjured their religion and their country; they became slaves, and as, according to their cowardly law, the Turks have a right at all times to put to death their prisoners, the conquered and their posterity for ever are obliged annually to *redeem their heads*, by paying the price set on them. They are excluded from all

offices in the ftate; it is death for a conquered Greek to marry a Turkifh woman, or even to cohabit with a common proftittite of that nation; they are in every refpect ftill treated as enemies; they are ftill called and diftinguifhed by the name of their nation, or rather of the religion they profefs, and a Turk is never called a Greek, though his family fhould have been fettled for generations in that country; nor is a Greek called a Turk, though his anceftors had lived centuries in a Turkifh province. ' The testimony of a Grsek is not valid in a court of judicature, when contrafted with that of a Turk. They are diftinguifhed by a different drefs; it is death to weaf the fame apparel as a Turk; even their houfes are painted of a different colour; in fine, they are in the fame fituation they were the day they were conquered, totally diftinf as a nation, and they have, therefore, the fame right now as they then had, to free themfelves from the barbarous ufurpers of their country, whofe condud to all the nations they have conquered merits the eternal execration of mankind.

In the war between Ruflia and Turkey, which continued from 1769 to 1774, wherever the Rufians appeared the Greeks took up arms and joined them. The hiftory of this war, and the part which the Greeks took in it, are too ;well known for it to be neceffary that I fhould enter
here

here into any particulars. The progress that was made against the Turks was very considerable, and their fleet being destroyed at Chifme, the capital might have been attacked by the victorious Ruffians. Had the Ruffian admiral been a man of any experience, or of an enterprising character, that war must have terminated in the expulsion of the Turks from Europe.

Nothing can place the Turks in a more despicable light, than the progress the Ruffians did make, notwithstanding the slowness of all their motions, their never profiting of any advantage, the opportunities they lost: of striking decisive blows, the want of plan or combination in every enterprise, and the unmilitary conduct in the execution; the bravery of their troops indeed, when there was a possibility of success, always secured them victory. The Ruffians and Greeks, to this day, make reproaches to each other of misconduct; but as the accounts hitherto published are taken from the relation of Ruffians, we may safely conclude that justice has not been done to the Greeks. In this last war, when they acted alone, they fought like true descendants of their heroic ancestors in the little diversions they made.

It was solemnly stipulated in the 17th article of the peace of Kainargi (signed ¹⁰/₂₁ July, 1774) that " *The empire of Ruffia restores to the*

*"fublime porte all the iflands of the Archipelago,
 " zvhick are under its dependence; and the fublime
 " porte, on its part, promifes, 1ft To obferve SA-
 " c REDLY, with refpect to the inhabitants of thefe
 " iflands, the conditions ftipulated in the firft article,
 " concerning a general amnefty and eternal oblivion of
 " all crimes whatever, committed or fufpected, to the
 " prejudice of the fublime porte, 2dly. That neither
 " the Chriftian religion, nor its churches, fhall be ex-
 " pofed to the fmalleft oppreffion, and that no hint-
 " drance fhall be put to their conftruction or repara-
 " tion; nor fhall thofe who officiate in them be op-
 " preffed or infulted. 3dly. That no payment fhall be
 " exacted from thefe iflands of the annual taxes to
 " which they were fubjected, viz. fince the time
 " which they have been under the dependence of the
 " Ruffian empire, and alfo, in confideration of the
 " great loffes which they have Juffered during the
 " war, for the time of two years to come, to count from
 " the time of their refforation to the fublime porte,
 " 4thly. To permit thofe families which would quit
 " their country, and eftablifh themfelves elfewhere,
 " to depart freely with their goods ; and to the end
 " that thofe families may put their affairs in order,
 " the term of one year is granted to them for this
 " free emigration, counting from the day of the, ex-
 " changing of the prefent treaty."*

Notwithftanding this folemn engagement, **the**
 Turks, almoft as foon as the Ruffian had eva-
 cuated

cuated their conquests, and, relying on the faith of treaties, had delivered up the inhabitants to their domination, fell upon their victims, unprepared to resist them, and massacred an incredible number, particularly in the Morea, where their vengeance fell with all its weight. Whole districts were left without a single inhabitant, and this fine country is now almost a desert. The Greeks upbraid the Russians with abandoning them; the Russians answer, they relied on the faith of treaties. They ought to have known, that the fetva of the mufti had often announced, that *no faith is to be kept with Ghrijiam*; history furnished them with numerous instances of their putting in practice this precept; indeed I know of no instance when they have not, if it appeared to them that it was their interest to do; and yet we find writers who vaunt the scrupulousness of the Turks in observing their treaties; they should always have added, *when it was their interest*, and their statement would have been just.

So ardent was the wish of the Greeks to regain their liberty and independence, that neither discouraged by the abandonment of the Russians, nor deterred by the apprehension of again incurring the dreadful vengeance of the Turks, as soon as a fresh war broke out between those powers they again took up arms.

A fleet was fitted out at Cronstadt, and failed

for the Archipelago under the command of a brave, prudent, and experienced officer, Admiral Greig, an Englishman, who had served in the former war, and greatly distinguished himself under Count Orlow, who, from an officer in the guards, where he saw no other *honorable* service than quelling a riot at a brandy shop, was raised to the supreme command of a fleet and an army, and entrusted with an expedition which required the greatest experience and talents. The king of Sweden rendered to the empress the essential service of detaining her fleet in the Baltic, by attacking it in that sea, and thereby putting into her hand the naval superiority which, by its absence, would have passed into his. This ill-timed diversion of the king of Sweden retarded the fate of Turkey, and the interference of other courts saved it for this time; at least they obliged the empress to make peace; but that peace would have been but of a few months duration, had not the death of Prince Potemkin and some other circumstances intervened.

In the mean time the empress sent manifestos to all parts of Greece, as (he had done in the former war, inviting the inhabitants *to take up arms, and co-operate with her in expelling the enemies of Christianity from the countries they had usurped, and regaining them their ancient liberty and national independence.*

A Greek

A Greek of the name of Sottiri was sent to Epirus and Albania, to distribute manifestoes, and combine an insurrection with the chiefs. An army was soon raised; their head-quarters were at Sulli. They marched against the pasha of Yanina (janina) and completely defeated his army in a pitched battle, in which his son was killed, and despoiled of his rich armour.

The Greeks collected a sum of money by voluntary subscription of individuals, and fitted out at Trieste an armament of twelve small ships, under the command of Lambro Canziani, a Greek, which sailed to the Archipelago. They were every-where victorious, and the impression was so great and alarming to the Porte, that it had nearly drawn the whole Turkish navy out of the Black Sea, and left the capital exposed to the attack of a formidable Russian fleet, then in the ports of the Krim.

The Emperor had sent a captain Pfarò to Sicily, to establish magazines for the fleet coming out under Admiral Trepas, and several other persons, to furnish the Greeks with money and ammunition, and to remove the difficulties the Venetians, still unwilling to offend the Porte, had thrown in their way by obstructing the communication with the Russians by means of the port of Preval, the nearest to Sulli. In this state of things the Greeks sent three deputies,

to St. Peterburgh, with complaints againft the perfons commiffioned to this fervice by the emprefs. They prefented the rich armour of the pãfha of Yanina's fon to her impèrial majefty ; Bat were prevented, by the intrigues of thofe who feared an enquiry into their fcandalous peculations, for feveral months from prefenting their pètition, and explaining the bufinefs of their miffion ; at length they fucceeded in obtaining a private audience of the emprefs, to which they were çonduâed by Mr. Zoubov, the favourite. They prefented a mémorial in Greek, with a tranflation in French, of which the following are exact copies :

Τη υψολότατη, ένδοξοτάτη, κ̃ Δεοσεβεςάτη
 Αυτοκρατοριση, κ̃ Βασιλισση πασιών τών
 Ρωσιών, κ̃ τα εξ. κ̃ τα εξ. κ̃ τα εξ.

ΚΑΙ τάτο ἔ̃ προς ἕτερον τι εἰ μὴ τὸ δια μακρος χρόνος, ματίως δευθέντες, τοῖς ὑπεργοῖς τῆς ὑμέτερας Αυτοκρατορικῆς Μεγαλειότητος προς ἀποκρισιν, ἀναφορᾶς ἂν προχρονα αυτοῖς προσεφίραμεν. ἐκ ἀπειτισάμενοι δὲ, καὶ μάλα, ἐν ἐυχάτη ἀπελπισίᾳ φερόμενοι διανοῶντες τας φρικτὰς συμφορὰς, ἃς ἡ ταύτης βραδυτης προξενισιασ τοῖς ἡμετεροῖς συμπατριotes, οἱ γαρ ελκυθηντας παρὰ τῶν προδηλων κλίσεων τῆς αὐτῆς Αυτ. Μεγ. ἔφερον τὰ ὄπλα κατα τῆ κοινῆ ἰχθρῆ τῆ Χριστιανικῆ ὀνομάτος, ἀπειγναι ἔ̃ νῦν ἡμᾶς προσφέρειν, τοῖς ποδοῖς τῆ υψηλῆ αὐτῆς

αὐτῆς θρόνου ὡς σημεῖον καὶ δῶρον τῆς ἡμῶν ευλάβειας, τὴν ζῶν καὶ περισίαια αὐτῶν.

Ναι Βασιλίσσα καὶ Κυρία· τῆτο εἰ πρὸς τί ἕτερον ἡμῶν ἀπολολόντες πάσαν ἐλπίδα μίας ταχέως ἀποκρίσεως, τολμῶμεν γόνυ κλίνοντες προσφέρειν τὴν ταπεινὴν ἡμῶν, ἀναφοράν, πρὸς τὰς πόδας τῆς αὐτῆς Αυτ. Μεγ. ὅπως τῆς ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡμῶν αἱμάτων ρυακας ξηρήναι, οἱ ἤδη ἀναμφιβόλως εἴσιν.

Ἔτερον Ἐν ἱερὸν ὄφλημα ἡμῶν τὸ καὶ κύριον εἶδος τῆς ἡμῶν παραγγαλιίας, οὗ καὶ ἠρίθησε ἡμῶς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ τολμειρᾷ ἐπιχειρήσει, εἰς ὅπως ἐξαπατήσομεν, τὴν αὐτῆς Αυτ Μεγ. ἐξ ὧν ἐτολμισαν ἀπατεῖν (ὡς δε καὶ οἱ μεγιστάνες αὐτῆς) ἐγνωμεν γαρ, ὅτι ὁ ὑππεύς Ψάρας ἀνὴρ βδελυροτατος ἐκ τῶ ἡμῶν ἔθνους, ἐνεκεν τῆς κραιπαλῆς αὐτῆ, ἄς ἐξήλθεν καὶ εἰς ἂν εὐρίσκειται. Ὁ γαρ δὲ ἐὰν μὴ πλαιῶν, ἀνεπισχειντως, τῆς ὑπεργῆς αὐτῆς πρισὴν αὐτοῖς ἑαυτὸν, ὡς ἄξιου μεγάλων κατορθυμάτων, εἰ ποτὶ καὶ ἔποιησε. ἔτος ἐν καὶ ἐτι ἐγείρεται ὡς ἀρχων καὶ ὁδηγός, τῶ ἡμῶν ἔθνους, καύχομενος ὅτι ἐμίνυμεν τὴν παρῆσιαν αὐτῆ ἐπὶ τῆς ἡμῶν γῆς, ἵνα κυρήξομεν ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀρχιερατιγον. καυχῆσεις ἄς μόνον γράφει καὶ ἄκ ἐργαζέται. Θεωρισεῖαν ἡ αὐτῆς Αυτ. Μεγ. ἐν τῇ ἡμῶν ἀναφορᾷ τί ἔτος ἔποιησε ἡμῖν, ἐγνωκαμεν γαρ ὅτι, αὐτὸς λαβὼν ἀπείρους ποσοτήτας χρημάτων, φημήζει ὅτι ἔδαπανησε αὐτὰ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. δυναμθα πληροφορησαι τὴν αὐτῆς Αυτ. Μεγ. ὅτι ἔδε αὐτὸς ἐδὲ τίς ἄλλος οὐκ ἄς ἡμῶς ἀπελάθη ἐκ τῶν σῶν υπεργῶν δέδωκε ἡμῖν Ἐν μόνον ρέμπλιον. ἡ μικρὰ φλοτίγλια, καὶ ἕτερε καὶς τῆ Λάμπρη, κατεσκευάθησαν καὶ ὄπλισθησαν διὰ τῆς τῶν ἡμῶν χρημάτων δαπάνης. εἰς μόνος ἐξ ἡμῶν ἕστας

ἕασας τὴν κρηνικὴν αὐτῆ κοίτην, ἔδαπανησε δέκα καὶ δύο χιλιάδας χρυσὰ νομίσματα ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτῆ χρημάτων, ὀπίστας δύο ναῦς, ἐνεκεν τῆς οἱ Ὀθωμανοὶ ἀπεκτείνειν τὸν ἀδελφὸν καὶ τὴν μητέρα αὐτῆ, τῷ ἔλεηλατησαν τὰ ὑπαρχοντα καὶ τῷ ἐφθείραν τῆς αγρῶς.

Οὐκ ἔτησαμεν ποτὲ καὶ ἐκ ἔτημεν τῆς σῆς Θεσαύρας, ἐκ ἔτησαμεν εἰμὴ πύριον κόνιν καὶ σιδήρικας σφέρας (α ἡδυναμεθα οὐκ ἔτι) καὶ ἐν σῷ οὐρανῷ ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν μάχην.

Ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀπέσπλαν ἡμᾶς προσφέρειν σοὶ τὴν ζωὴν καὶ τὰ κτήματα αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐκ ετεῖν τῆς σῆς Θεσαύρας.

Νεύσον, ὃ κρατεὰ Βασιλιῆσσα, δόξα τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων πίστεως, νέυσον θεόμεθα ἀναλινύσκειν τὴν ταπεινὴν ἡμῶν ἀναφορὰν. Ὁ Οὐρανὸς ἐφυλάξεν τὴν ἡμέτεραν ἀπολύτρωσιν πρὸς δόξαν τῆς σῆς Αὐτ. Μιγ. ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτῆς προεσπίαν, προσδοκῶμεν λυτρώσαι, τὴν αὐτοκράτοριαν ἡμῶν χρωμένην, τὴν πατριαρχίαν καὶ ἡγεσίαν Θεσηκίαν, καταφρονιθίσαν καὶ καταπατιθίσαν ἐκ τῶν βαβήλων, καὶ βαρβάρων Ὀθωμανῶν· προσδύκωμεν σοι, λυτρώσαι τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ Λακαϊδεμονίων ἀπογόνους, τῆ τυρρανικῆ ζυγῆ, τῆτων τῶν ἀγρῶν, ὑφ' ὧν γενάζει, Ἐν ἔθνος, καὶ το πνεῦμα κα ἀπισθείη, καὶ ὁ ἔρωσ υπερκολεῖ τῆς ελευθερίας, κα ἔδυσθησαν γὰρ αἱ σιδηραὶ αλίσαι τῶν βαρβάρων ἀποσθένειν, ἔχει δὲ πρὸ τῶν αὐτῆ ὀμμάτων τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν ηρωικῶν πρᾶξεων τῶν αὐτῆ προπατορων ἕως νῦν.

Αἱ λαμπραὶ ἡμῶν ἠχοδομαὶ ἀναγινώσκου ἡμῖν τὴν πᾶλειαν ἡμῶν μεγαλιότητα· οἱ ἄπειροι λιμεναὶ, ἡ ευφυη τῶν αγρῶν μᾶς, ὁ Οὐρανὸς ὁ αἰνῶτως γελῶν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, ἡ ἀκρα Σερμύοτητα τὴν ἡ φύσις ἐμπνέει κα μόνον τοῖς νέοις ἀλλὰ,
καὶ

καὶ τοῖς πεδωκαμένοις γηραλέοις ἡμῶν, λέγει ἡμῖν ὅτι μας ἔστι πρόχειρη ὡς καὶ πρὸς τὰς προγόνους ἡμῶν.

Νεύσον ἔν Κυρία δίδόναι ἡμῖν σὸν ευγχοῦσα Κουσαυτίου δια ἀνάγκη ἡμῶν, τῆτο μόνον τὸ γένος ὅλον ἡμῶν ἐπέδουμενον (γένος γὰρ τῶν ἡμῶν αυτοκρατορῶν ἀποσβέση) καὶ ἴσεται ὡς τῆς προγόνους αὐτῆ.

Ἡμεῖς καὶ ἐσμὲν ἐκ τῶν ἀπατιλῶν οἱ τίνες ἐτόλμησαν ἀπατίσαι τὴν μεγαλοφροσύνην τῶν ἀνάκτων· ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν οἱ ἀπέλαλμένοι τῶν λαῶν τῆς Ἑλλάδος προσηθευμένοι ἀπολυτὴ δυνάμει, ὡς δὲ τοιαῖοι προσπιπτόντες τοῖς ποσὶν αὐτῆς ἦν μετὰ Θεὸν σωτήρα ἐλπίζομεν, ὠμνῶμεν δὲ ἴσεσθαι μέχρι τελευτίας ἡμῶν ἀνάπνοης,

Οἱ τῆς ὑμετέρας Αυτοκρατορικῆς Μεγαλιότητος
πιστότατοι δέλοι, καὶ τα εἶ.

Πετραπολη,
Ἀπριλιῦ, 1790.

Πανος Κίρη,
Χρίστος Λαζοτῆ,
Νικολαος Πάνκαλος.

" Madame,

" Ce n'est, qu' après avoir folicité long-tems en vain, les ministres de VOTRE MAJESTÉ IMPÉRIALE, pour une responce au mémoire, que nous avons eu l'honneur de leur prefenter, et poufsès au dernier déféfpoir par la reflexion des malheurs affreux que ce retard pouira produire à nos compatriotes, qui, invités par les [manifestes](#) de V. M. I. ont pris les armes contre l'ennemi du
nom

nom Chfetien, et nous ont depute poar porter l'offre de leurs vies et de leurs biens aux pieds de Votre Trone Imperial: ce ft'eft qu' apres avoir perdu tout efpence d'avoir autrement tine prompts reponfe pour arreter les ruiffeaux du fang de nos freres, qui fans doute coulent deja a caufe de ce retard, que nous ofons, prof- ternes a SES PIEDS, prefenter a ELLE-MEME notre tres humble memoire.

Un autre devoir, egalemeut facre pour nous, ct qui etoit un objet principal de notre miffion, nous porte a cette demarche hardie: de defabufer V. M. I. qui on ofe tromper, ainfi que fes miniftres: nous avons appris, avec indignation, que le chevalier Pfaro, homme abhorre de notre nation, de Ia crapule de Ia quelle il eft forti *, et ou il feroit refte, fi, en trompant les miniftres de V. M. I. avec une audace inouie, il ne s'etoit pas fait valoir par Ia representation des exploits qu'il n'a jamais faits, s'erige aduellement, en chef et conduvfleur de notre natioft. S'il n'y auroit de mauvaifes fuites que pour lui, nous attendrions avec patience, qu'il fe preferitat dans nos contrees.—Fanfaronnade cependant, qu'il ne fera jamais que dans fes ecrits. Comme, il a agi envers nous V. M. L verra dans notre memoire. Nous entendons qu'il a pris de fommes

* This man had been a livery fervant in Peterfburgh.

immenses, qu'il pretend avoir depente pour nous : nous affurons V. M. I. que, ni lui, ni perfonne de VOS officiers envoyes a nous, nous ont donne un feul rouble. La flotille et les autres arme-mens de Lambro ont ete fait a nos fraix : un de nous a abandonne fon foyer pailible ; a arme a fes fraix deux vatffeaux; a depenfe 12,000 zechins pour des armemens, et les Turcs ont mafacre fa mere, fon frere, ont rafe fes poffeffions et defole fes terres.

Nous n'avons jamais demande Vos trefors: nous ne les demandons pas actuellement: nous n'avons jamais demande que de la poudre et des balles (que nous ne pouvons pas ache ter) et d'etre menes en bataille. Nous fommes venus pour *offrir* nos vies et nos biens; pas pour *demande* des trefors.

Daignez, O GRANDE IMPERATRICEI GLOIRE DE LA FOI GRECQUE ! daignez lire notre memoire. Le ciel a reserve notre delivrance pour le regne glorieux de V. M. I. C'est fous Vos aufpices que nous eferons de delivrer notre empire ufurpe, et notre patriarchat, et notre faint religion infultees, des mains des barbares Mahometans; de delivrer les defcendants d'Athenes et de Lacedernon du joug tyrannique de ces ignorans fauvages, fous lequel gemit une nation dont le genie n'est pas eteint, que Famour de la liberte inflame, que le joug de fer des barbares n'a pas avilie ; qui a devant fes yeux,
 toujours

toujours present, l'image de ses anciens héros dont l'exemple anime ses guerriers encore aujourd'hui.

Nos superbes ruines parlent à nos yeux de notre ancienne grandeur : nos ports innombrables, nos beaux pays ; le ciel qui fut nous fournir toute l'année ; l'ardeur de notre jeunesse, et de nos décrépits vieillards mêmes, nous disent que la nature nous est aussi propice qu'elle l'étoit à nos ancêtres. Donnez nous pour souverain Votre petit-fils CONSTANTIN, c'est le vœu de notre nation (la famille de nos empereurs est éteinte) et nous ferons ce qu' étoient nos premiers ayeux.

Nous ne sommes pas de ces gens qui ont osé tromper LA PLUS MAGNANIME DE SOUVERAINES ; nous sommes les *Députés*, munis de pleins pouvoirs et d'autres documens, des peuples de la Grèce ; et comme tels, prosternés au pied du Trône, de CELLE, qui, après DIEU, nous regardons comme notre SAUVEUR, nous protestons d'être jusqu' à notre dernier soupir.

MADAME, De V. M. I.

Les plus fidèles et les plus
dévoués ferviteurs,

St. Peterfcourg,
April, 1790.

(L. S.) PANO KIRI.

(L. S.) CHRISTO LAZZOTTI.

(L. S.) NICCOLÔ PANGALO."

TRANSLATION.

Madam,

It was not until we had long solicited in vain Your Imperial Majesty's ministers for an answer to the memorial, which we had the honour of presenting to them; it was not until, driven to the utmost despair by the reflection of the dreadful evils which this delay might produce to our countrymen, who (invited by the manifestoes of Your Imperial Majesty) have taken arms against the enemy of the Christian name, and deputed us to lay the offer of their lives and their fortunes at the foot of Your Imperial throne; it was not till we had lost all hopes of otherwise obtaining a speedy answer to stop those streams of the blood of our brethren, which doubtless flow already through this delay, that we have at length dared to prostrate ourselves at Your feet, and to present our humble memorial to Your Imperial Majesty in person.

Another duty equally sacred, and which was a principal object of our mission, induced us to take this daring step: it was to undeceive Y. L. M. whom (as well as Your ministers) there have been people audacious enough to mislead. We have learned with indignation, that the chevalier Pardo now erects himself into a chief and conductor of our people; a man abhorred by our nation, out of the dregs of which he rose, and
 where

where he would have remained, if he had not with an unheard of audacioufnefs deceived Your Imperial majefly's minifters, and affumed a reputation by attributing to himfelf exploits he never performed., If no ill confequences would enfue but .to himfelf, we fhould patiently await his appearance in our, country, a boaft however .which he never will perform but in his writings. How he has acted to wards us Y. I. M will fee in our memorial. ,, We hear.that.he.has received immense fums, which pretends to have expended for us. We affure Y,I.M., that neither he, nor any of your officers fent to us,, ever paid us a fingle rouble, The flotilla and the other armaments of Lamro, were equipped at our own expence. One of us (deputies) abandoning his peaceful home, fitted out .two veffels at his own expence, and expended in armaments 12,000 zechins, whilft: the Turks maffacred his mother and his brother, levelled with the ground his poffeffions, and deflated his lands.

We never afked for Your treafures; ,we do not afk for them now; we only afk for powder and balls (which we cannot purchafe) and to be led to battle. We are come to *offer* our lives and fortunes, not to *afk* for Your treasures.

Deigi O'Great Emprefs! Glory of the Greek faith! deign to read our memorial. Heaven has referved our deliverance for the glorious **reign**
of

of Y, I. M. It is under Your aufpices that we hope to deliver from the hands of barbarous Mahomedans our empire, which they have ufurped, and our patriarchat and our holy religion, which they have infulted; to free the defcendants of Athens and Lacedemon from the tyrannic yoke of ignorant favages, under which groans a nation whose genius is not extinguifhed -, a nation which glows with the love of liberty i which the iron yoke of barbarifm has not vilified; which has confantly before its eyes the images of its ancient heroes, and whose example animates its warriors even to this day.

Our fuperb ruins fpeak to our eyes, and tell us of our ancient grandeur; our innumerable ports, our beautiful country, the heavens which fmile on us all the year, the ardour of our youth, and even of our decrepid elders, tell us that nature is not lefs propitious to us than it was to our forefathers. Give us for a fovcreigo Your grandfon CONSTANTINE: it is the wife of our nation (the family of our emperors is extinct*) and we fhall become what our anceftors were,

We

* In Europe we are apt to think that thofe who bear the names of Comnenos, Paleologos, &c. are defcendants of the imperial family : the Greeks, however, themfelves have no fuch notions; they are either Chriftian names given them at their baptifm, or that they have taken afterward*, and they only de-

We are not perfops who hâve dared to impofè on the *moft magnanimous offovereigm*: we are the deputies of the people of Greece, furnifhed with full powers and other documents, and as fuch proftrated before the throne of HER, whom, next to Gop, we look on as our favour; we déclare that we fhall be till our lateft breath,

MADAME, YOUR IMPÉRIAL MAJESTY'S

Moft faithful and moft
devoted fervants,

St. Peterfburgh, (L. S.) PANO KIRI.
April, 1790. (L. S.) CHRISTO LAZZOTTI.
(L. S.) NICCOLO PANGOLO.

As thefe people are out of the reach of Turkifh vengeance, I hâve not fcrupled naming them.

fcend to the fécond génération. A man is called Nicolaos Papudopulo; the former is his name received in baptifm, and the latter a furname, becaufe he was the fon of a prieft; his fons take the furname of Nicolopulo (fon of Nicolaos) added to their Chriftian name, and their children the father's Chriftian name as a furname. Thofe of Fanar hâve, particularly lately, affected to keep great names in their families, which were only Chriftian names, or names which they hâve taken of themfelves, or were afterwards given them by their parents, relations, or friends. The famé may be faid of fome names in the Archipelago, particularly where the family has preferred for fome générations more property than their neighbours; but their names do not add to their refpect among the other Greeks, who all know the origin of them, and hâve not the leaft notion that there is any lineal defcent to be traced of their ancient impérial or noble families, notwithstanding the pretenfions often of fome of them, who bear their names when they come to Europe.

THE emprefs received them very graciously, and promised them the assistance they asked. They were then conducted to the apartments of her grandsons, and offering to kiss the hand of the eldest grand-duke, Alexander, he pointed to his brother Constantine, telling them, it was to him that they were to address themselves; they represented to him in Greek the object of their mission, and concluded by doing homage to him as their emperor. He answered them in the same language, *Go, and let every thing be according to your wishes.*

With this memorial they presented a plan of operation, from which I shall extract only a few particulars:—They proposed, after the emprefs had furnished them with cannon, and enabled them to augment the squadron under Lambro Canziani and sent them engineers to conduct the siege of strong places, to begin their first operations by marching from Sulli, where the congress was held, and whence they had a correspondence with all Greece,—Their route was to be first to Livadja and to Athens, dividing into two corps. In their march they were to be joined at appointed places by troops from the Morea and Negroponte, To this island the fleet of Lambro was to sail. They were then to proceed in one body to Theflalia and to the city of Salonichi, where they would receive large

reinforcements from Macedonia. The whole army being then assembled, they were to march to the plains of Adrianople, with (as they calculated) three hundred thousand men, to meet the Russians, and proceed to Constantinople, where they hoped the Russian fleet would be arrived from the Crimea; if not, they esteemed their own force sufficient to take that city, and drive the Turks out of Europe and their islands.

In this plan the establishment and the disposition of magazines, and retreats in case of disaster, were provided for. The force of the Turks in different parts, and the different movements to oppose them, were calculated. All their resources, and the amount of the troops each place had engaged to furnish, were plainly stated, as well as the means they had adopted to carry on a secret correspondence with all parts of the country, both with respect to their own allies and the movements of the Turks. To enter more into particulars would not be justifiable in me.

The empress sent them to the army in Moldavia, to Prince Potemkin, giving them 1,000 ducats for their journey thither. They left Peterburgh the ¹³/₂₄ May 1790. In August they were sent to Greece by the way of Vienna, and Major General **Tamara** with them, to superintend the

the whole expedition, and furnish them with the assistance they required.

It merits attention, that the king of Prussia had polled an army of 150,000 men, in June 1790, on the frontier of Bohemia; that the convention of Reichenbach was signed the 27th of July. The sentiments of the court of London respecting the war, and its probable interference in as serious a way as Prussia had done, were known at St. Petersburg. It is to these circumstances we must attribute the disappointments with which the projects of the Greeks were fructified; They were assured that they should have every succour they required, and much more: money was sent, but not much of it disbursed & they were enjoined to prepare every thing, but to undertake nothing, till the proper moment should arrive for their acting, which, they were told, depended on many circumstances of which they were ignorant. Lambro in the meantime acted by himself; but could undertake nothing of any consequence. Things remained thus till after the campaign was ended, and Prince Potemkin came to St. Petersburg;

The fate of the armament commanded by the gallant Lambro deserves to be mentioned.

The Greeks proved on this occasion their love of liberty; their passion for glory, and a perseverance in toils; obedience to discipline, and con-

teiopt of danger and death, worthy of the brighteft; pages of their hiftory ; they fought with, and conquered, very fuperior numbers; and when at laft they were attacked with an inequality of force, as great as Leonidas had to encounter, they fought till their whole fleet was funk, and a few only faved themfelves in boats.

Lambro had only refources left to fit out one fingle fhip: the news of a peace arrived; but boiling with indignation at the negleit he had experienced from the Ruffian agents, and thirfting for revenge, he railed notwithstanding, and attacked and deftroyed feveral Turkifh veffels : he was declared a pirate, and diffavowed by Ruffia—but he was not intimidated—at length he was again overpowered; he difdaiited to ftrike; his veflel funk under him, and he again efcaped in Iris boat, and took refuge in the mountains of Albania.

The concluft of the Ruffian agents to him was the moft fcandalous. The peculation of all thofe entrusted at a diftance with the emprefs's money was become fo glaring and common, that they looked on it as their own property. Lambro was fuffered to be imprifoned for debts contracted for his armaments, and was only releafed by the contributions of his countrymen.

In the' fpring of 1791, an armament was prepared in England to fail for the Baltic, to force
the ,

the empresses to make peace. The king of Prussia was ready to operate by land instead of the fleet, Mr Fawkenor arrived at Peterburgh; it was still undetermined, by the empress, whether she should brave England and Prussia (though from the turn affairs had taken in England, and the arrival of another ambassador, she was assured she had little to fear from our fleet, and, consequently, little from the Prussian army) or make peace with the Turks on the conditions (she had consented to when she was more seriously alarmed).

In this uncertainty a courier was kept ready to depart with instructions to General Tamara. The king's envoy was informed of this circumstance, and would have learnt immediately the contents of the dispatch, which would have made him acquainted with the empress's resolution respecting the prosecution of the war, or consenting to peace. The courier, however, was not dispatched. The business was terminated with the king's joint envoys. Prince Potemkin departed for the army, and on his road learnt the victory gained by Repnin over the Vizir's army, and the signing of the preliminaries of peace. Secret orders had been sent to Repnin, as soon as the empress had resolved to conclude a peace, which he fortunately executed; and it is certain that he received a copy of the arrange-

meat made with the king's minifies before he signed the preliminaries. Impediments were thrown in the way of the departure of the messenger dispatched to Constantinople, so that he did not arrive till any interference of our ambassador could be of no effect.

It is plainly to be seen, that though the empress pretended she had of her own accord (and before the arrangement with His Majesty was known to her general) concluded a peace, the interference of His Majesty in bringing about that *event* had a weighty effect.

When the news of the signing the preliminaries reached the Russian fleet, it had beaten the Turks in the Black Sea, and was pursuing them into the channel of Constantinople, where they must inevitably have been destroyed. Had the Russian admiral been a man of more experience, they might all have been taken in the engagement.

Thus ended a war, which, had it not been for the interference of Great Britain and Prussia, would have placed the empress's grandson on the throne of Constantinople, and, had not circumstances imperiously prescribed to them the part they acted, we should have had, in Russia and Greece, allies which would, long ago, have enabled his majesty and the emperor, in all human probability, to have humbled a foe, which now
threatens

threatens all Europe with total subversion, and even to become the instrument of emancipating Greece from the Turkish tyranny; not to become an independent people, but to be oppressed by a worse tyranny, under the name of liberty.

The Suliotes still maintain their independence; they were often attacked by the Turks, but were as often successful; they fought seventeen battles or skirmishes, the most considerable of which had nearly been fatal to them, as appears by the following paper, communicated to me by a drogoman, now in the British service, which will throw much light on the character of the inhabitants of Epirus; and it contains, besides, very curious and interesting matter. The authenticity of what he relates cannot be called in question, as it very exactly agrees with every other account I have received.

' In 1792, being in the French service as interpreter, I was sent from Salonico by the French consul, Mr. Cosenery, on some business regarding the consulship, to Ali Pasha, at Yanina, the capital of Epirus. I arrived there the 1st of May, and found the pasha making great preparations for war. I found also there the French consul of Preveza, Mr. de la Sala (a descendant of the Salas, who betrayed the Morea to the Turks, when in the possession of the Venetians) and acting as commissary, not only to provide timber

in Epirus for the French navy, but also for *revolutkm'ttirig* that country.

' He? communicated *to the* his commission, insinuating, that if I would assist him, I might expect great rewards. One day, when we were with Ali Pasha, our conversation turned upon the French revolution, which was always introduced with a view to excite him to throw off all obedience to the porte. The pasha said to us—
 " *Ton will see that Ali Pasha, the successor of Pires*
 " *(Pyrrhus) will surpass him in every Mind of enter-*
 " *prize."*

' The pasha continued to assemble troops without making known his intentions. In July, his army consisted of 20,000 good Turkish soldiers, who were the more formidable, they were all Albanians, He then declared, that his design was to attack the Mahomedan town of Argirocastro, situated twelve leagues distant from Yanina, which would not be governed by a person he sent for that purpose, nor anywise submit to him. With this excuse he wrote to Captain* Bogia and Captain Giavella, two of the most considerable of the chiefs of the Greek inhabitants of *the* mountain of Sulli, praying them to meet him with all their soldiers or companions, to assist in his expedition, His letter was in modern Greek, of which the following is a copy, which Finfert,

* The Greeks call their chiefs captains.

that

that the learned reader may see how much, or how little, it differs from the ancient.

Φίλοι μου Καπιτάν Μπόγια καὶ Καπιτάν Τζαβέλλα, ἐγὼ ὁ Ἄλι Παλιάς σας χαιρετῶ, καὶ σας φιλοῦ τὰ ματιά, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ξέρω πολλὰ καλὰ τὴν ανδραγαθίαν σας καὶ παλλικαρίαν σας μὴ φαίνεται ναχω μεγάλην χρείαν ἀπὸ λογύσας, λοιπὸν μὴ καρτετε ἀλλίως παρακαλῶ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ὅπως λαβέτε τὴν γραφὴν μῆ, νὰ μαζοξέτε ὅλασας τα παλλικάρια καὶ νὰ ἐλθέτε νὰ με εὔρετε διανὰ παγω, να πολεμησω τὴς ἐχθρῆς μῆ. τῆτη ἵναι ἡ ὄρα καὶ ὁ καιρὸς ὅπως ἔχω χρείαν ἀπὸ λογύσας, καὶ μένω νὰ εἰδῶ τὴν φιλιαν σας καὶ τὴν ἀγάπην ὅπως ἔχετε διὰ λογῶ μου ὁ λοφισας θελει ἵναι δυπλὸς ἀπ' ὅσου δίδω εἰς τῆς Αρβανιτας δια τὴ καὶ ἡ παλλικαριάσας ξέρω πῶς ἵναι πολλὰ μεγαλότερη ἀπὸ τὴν ἐδικὴν τῆς. λοιπον ἐγὼ δὲν πάγω νὰ πολεμήσω πρὶν νὰ ἐλθετε ἐσεῖς, καὶ σας καρτερω ὀλλιγορα νὰ ἐλθετε. ταῦτα καὶ σας χαιρετῶ.

VERBAL TRANSLATION.

"My friends, Captain Bogia and Captain Giavella, I, Ali Palha, salute you, and kiss your eyes, because I well know your courage and heroic minds. It appears to me that I have great need of you, therefore, I entreat you immediately, when you receive my letter, to assemble all your heroes, and come to meet me, that I may go to fight my enemies. This is the hour and the time that I have need of you. I expect to see your friendship, and the love which you have for me. Your pay shall be double that which I give

to the Albanians, because I know that your courage is greater than theirs; therefore I will not go to fight before you come, and I expect that you will come soon. This only, and I salute you"

'I was prefat when the pafha's Greek fecretary wrote this letter, and I took a copy of it, it not appearing to him or to me as a matter of fecrecy.

'Ali Pafha is an Albanian of Tepe-dellen; fori of Veli Patha, who governed a part of Albarnia, though a Mahomedan, he understands Very little Turkifh, and speaks only Greek and the Albanian language, which is a mixture of Slavonian, Turkith, Greek, and a few old French words, but peffectly unintelligible to thofe who understand all thefe languages.

'On receiving this flattering letter, the chiefs held a council with their *men*. Captain Bogia and the majority of the foldiers; thought the pafha's proposal was only a stratagem to get them into his power, and make himfelf master of their mountain. Captain Bogia, in confequence, wrote to the pasha, 'that he received his letter with great respect and fubmiffion, and was himfelf ready to obey his orders; but as he could not perfuade his people to follow him, it was unnecessary for him to go alone. Captain Giavella, either through avarice or ambition, was induced to comply with the pallia's request,

and

and went to his army, though only with feventy men. He was received with great marks of friendfhip. The pallia and his army marched four leagues on the road towards Argirocaftro, and encamped ; but he fent an advanced poft, confiding of 400 men, under a bulukbafee, as far as the town, and the people making a fortie, a fkirmifh enfued. Giavelli and his men were now perfectly convinced of the pafha's defign, and laid afide all fufpicion; but fix days afterwards they were all feized unawares, as they were difperfed in the Turkifh camp, and put in heavy irons, except three, who, getting their arms, defended themfelves till they were flain. The men were fent to Yanina, and imprifoned in the fmall ifland which is in the Acherufian Lake, on the banks of which Yanina ftands; but Giavelli was kept in the camp. The pafha immediately turned his march towards Sulli, and arrived before the mountain the next day, The Suliotes, who are always on their guard, had notice of the pafha's approach, and of the fate of their countrymen, fix hours before he arrived. They affembled, and gave the command in chief to Captain Bogia, whole abilities they knew.'

The mountain of Sulli, or Caco-fulli, fo called on account of the ill the Turks have experienced from them, is fituated eight leagues from Santamaura (or Leucas) in the Ionian Sea, having

Prevafa

Prevafa (Nicopolis) to the fourth-west, distant ten leagues; Yanina to the east, twelve leagues; and fourth-east, Arta, distant eight leagues.

To the fourth, this mountain joins the Chimæra mountains, which are inhabited also by independent Greek Christians, allies of the Sullites. On the east, at the foot of the mountain, is a fine plain of about six square leagues, which is very fertile; in it they have built four villages, for the purpose of cultivating the land, but in time of danger the inhabitants fly to the mountain. There being no water in the plain, they have sunk cisterns or reservoirs to collect the rain.

The mountain is a natural strong fortress. Three sides are perpendicular precipices to the bottom. The top of the mountain they call Tripa, which signifies a cavity. There is only one narrow steep passage to ascend to it, and it is defended by three towers, nearly a mile distant from each other, situated on eminences, where the road is most difficult. The ascent is about three miles long. In the first mile there is a village called Kapha, which signifies top or summit.

On the side towards Chimæra there is a small brook, formed by the melting of the snow of those mountains, from which, in case of need, the inhabitants of Sulli get water, by letting down sponges, as the sides are not even enough

to let down any kind of bucket or other vefsel and this Water cannot be cut off by the Turks, as it is defended by the heights of the mountains.

' Captain- Bogia ordered corn to be carried from the villages to the Tripa, for fix months provifion, as it is always kept in readinefs to be tranfported; the four villages were then evacuated; half of the inhabitants went to Kapha, and the others to Tripa, their laft afylum, which will contain ten thoufand men. Thefe difpofitions being made, he threw into the cisterns hogs and lime, and other naftinefs, to prevent the Turks ufing the water.

' The pafha encamped in the villages, and furrounded the mountain at a diftance, to prevent their receiving affiftance of troops from the Chimæriotes, or ammunition from St. Maura or Prevafa, whence they are always fupplied. The main body of the Turkifh army in the villages was commanded in perfon by the pafha; the corps towards Chimera by his fon Mokhtar, pafha of Arta (of two tails) and Captain Prognio, a chief of the Paramathian Albanefe; the fide towards Prevafa, by Mamed Bey and Ofman Bey his brother; that on the fide of Arta, by Soliman Ciapar, another chief of the fame Albanian town of Paramathia, a man of eighty-five years of age, tall, and of a fine gigantic ftature,

having

having no appearance of age but the snowy whiteness of his beard ; he had with him eleven sons from thirty to sixty years of age, all tall and strong like their father: their bodily strength and personal courage caused them to be looked on as heroes, and gave them a remarkable superiority among their countrymen: they went together, that if one fell the others might revenge his death; for among these people it is the custom, that relations go to the war together to revenge each others death. Those who have the greatest number of relations are the most powerful families, and the fathers of the principal families are their chiefs.'

I will speak a little on the subject of these Paramathian Albanese, Their town is situated twelve leagues distant from Yanina; they possess a territory of twelve leagues in circumference, and can bring into the field 20,000 men. Their country is so mountainous and inaccesible, that they have never been conquered by the Turks. How they became Mahomedans they do not know themselves exactly ; some of them say, that when the Turks first invaded these countries, they made peace on condition of becoming Mahomedans, and preserving their independence. They speak Greek, and know no other language; they look on the Turks and other Albanians as effeminate, and hold them in
the

the utmost contempt. They have no regular government; each family or relationship (clan) administers justice among themselves. The largest clans have the most influence in the country in all public or general matters; They are careful not to kill a person; of another kindred, as the relations revenge his death; and when once bloodshed is thus begun, it goes on till one of the clans is extinct. They always carry their guns with them, whenever they go out of their houses, and never quit them; even at home they are not without pistols in their girdles; at night they put them under their pillows, and lay their gun by them beside. The same precautions are observed in all these parts, except in the town of Yanina; *There are among the Paramathians, however, a considerable number of Greek Christians, who all live in the same manner. Those who are Mahomedans know little of their religion, or pay little regard to it; their women are not veiled; they drink' wine, and intermarry with the Christians, It is true; indeed, that they will not eat pork; but if the husband and wife are of different religions, they make no scruple of boiling in the same pot a piece of pork and a piece of mutton.*

All strangers, Turks, Europeans, Greeks, or others, who happen to pass on their territory, or are caught by them, are carried to their public market, and there sold.

' Being one day Yanina at the Greak archbifhop houfe, I faw a prieft who travelling in thefe parts, had been feized by the Paramathians, and fold; his ftory, as related to me by the prelate, is as follows soliman Ciapar *being at his houfe one day on a vifit*, told him, that he had bought a Father for four piaftres, but that he was good for nothing *and* though he beat him daily, he could not *make* him do life

therefore, he faid, when he got home, kill him as a ufelefs beaf to. The archbifhop offered to buy him for the four piaftres he had coft, and to pay the money immediately, if Ciapar : Would, give fecurity (for here no one tnifts another) The bargain being fettled, the Frank was fent: he *proved to be a man* of learning and the archbifhop eftablifhed a fehool under his at Yanina, for Greek children. When I was there, he gained fifty and *fixty piaftres* a month, and was fo pleafed with his fituation *and* the kindnefs of the archbifhop; that *he* had refolved to remain in that country, and marry.'

A ftranger might travel into thefe mountains, and Would be treated hofpitably by the inhabitants, if white he was in a neighbouring country, he put himfelf under the protection of a Paramathina, who would give fecurity for his being brought back fafe.

' But to return to the pafha's expedition. The fecond day after the army had encamped in the plains of Sulli, the pafha caufed Captain Giavella to be brought before him, and told him, that if he would inform him h6w he could get poffeffion of the mountain, he would not only spare his life, but make him beluk-bafhee of the province. Griavelli answered, that if he would fet him at liberty, he would go to the mountain, and engage his party, and at leaft half the inhabitants, to fubmit to him, and take up arms againft Bogia; that by thefe means he could introduce the pafha's troops into the Tripa, When the other party would alfo be glad to make their peace without fighting. The pafha afked him what fecurity he would give for his performing his promifes. Giavella answered, he would give him as an hoftage his only fon, a boy of twelve years of age, who was dearer to him than his own life, that if he deceived him he might put his fon to death. Giavella accordingly called his fon down from the mountain; but as foon as he got to the mountain himfelf, he wrote to the palha as follows:

" Ali Pafha, I am glad I have deceived a traitor; I am here to defend my country againft a thief. My fon will be put to death, but I will defperately revenge kirn before I fall myfelf. Some men, like yoy,

B B 2 Turks,

Turks, will say I am a cruel father to facrifiëe my fin for my own safety. / anſwer, if you took the mountain my fon would hâve been killed, with all the reſt of my family and my countrymen; then I could not hâve revenged his death If we are victorious, I may hâve other children, my wife is young. If my fin, young as he is, is not willing to be facrificed for his country, he is not worthy to live, or to be owned, by me as my fon. Advance, traiter, I am impatient to be revenged I am your fworn enemy. Captain Giavella."

The Greek original was :

Αλι Πασια, χαιρομαι ο̃π̃ε̃ η̃γελασα̃ εναν̃ δολιον, ει̃μαι
 δ̃ω̃ τα̃ διαφεν̃εινω̃ τ̃ην̃ πατριδα̃ μη̃ εναντιον̃ ει̃ς εναν̃ κλει̃π̃ην.
 ο̃ υ̃ος̃ μη̃ θ̃ιλει̃ αποθανει̃ εγω̃ ο̃μως̃ ακ̃ιλι̃σι̃ως̃ θ̃ελω̃ τον̃
 εκ̃δικει̃σω̃ πριν̃ να̃ αποθανω̃. κα̃ποιοι̃ Τ̃υρκοι̃ καθ̃ως̃ ε̃σ̃ε̃να̃
 θ̃ελω̃ν̃ απ̃εν̃ ο̃τι̃ ε̃μαι̃ ασ̃πλα̃χ̃νος̃ πα̃τερικ̃ς̃ με̃το̃ να̃ θυ̃-
 σιασω̃, τ̃ον̃ υ̃ον̃ μη̃ δια̃ τ̃ον̃ ει̃δικον̃ μη̃ λι̃τρομον̃ αποκ̃ρινο̃μαι,
 ο̃τι̃ αν̃ ε̃γω̃ πα̃ρ̃αι̃ς̃ το̃ β̃εν̃ον̃ θ̃ελ̃ης̃ σκο̃τοσης̃ του̃ υ̃ον̃ μη̃
 με̃ το̃ επι̃λι̃πον̃ της̃ φα̃μιλιας̃ μη̃ η̃ τ̃ας̃ συν̃πα̃τρι̃οτες̃ μη̃,
 το̃τες̃ δεν̃ θα̃ μπο̃ρει̃σω̃ να̃ εκ̃δικη̃σω̃ τον̃ θ̃ανα̃τον̃ τη̃ α̃μη̃-
 αν̃ εκ̃η̃σω̃μαι̃ θ̃ιλει̃ ε̃χω̃ α̃λλα̃ π̃ο̃δια̃ η̃ γ̃εν̃ε̃ικα̃ μη̃ η̃ναι̃ νεα.
 ε̃αν̃ ο̃ υ̃ος̃ μη̃ νε̃ος̃ καθ̃ως̃ η̃ναι̃ δεν̃ με̃νει̃ ευ̃χα̃ρι̃στι̃μος̃ να̃
 θυ̃σιαση̃ θε̃ικ̃ τ̃ην̃ πα̃τριδα̃ τη̃, αυ̃τος̃ δεν̃ η̃ναι̃ ε̃ξι̃ος̃ να̃
 ε̃ψη̃ η̃ να̃ η̃γνω̃ρι̃ζεται̃ ως̃ υ̃ος̃ μη̃. προ̃χο̃ρη̃σε̃ ο̃πι̃ς̃
 ει̃μαι̃ εν̃υ̃πο̃μο̃νος̃ να̃ εκ̃δικη̃τω̃.

Εγω̃ ο̃ ομο̃σ̃με̃νος̃ ε̃χ̃θ̃ρος̃ ση̃,

Κα̃πι̃ται̃ν̃ Τ̃ζ̃ια̃βε̃λλας̃.

' The

' The pafha did not think proper in his rage to put the hoftage immediately to death, but fent him to Yanina, to his fon Velim-rbey, who governed in his abfence. I was prefent when the boy was brought before him: he answered the queftion put to him with a courage and audacioufnefs that aftonifhed every one, Velim-bey told him, he only waited the pafha's orders to roaft him alive I don't fear you, the boy answered; my father will do the fame to your father or your brother if he takes them. He was put in a dark prifon, and fed on bread and water.

' The pafha attacked the village of Kapha, and was repulfed three different times with great lofs, but Captain Bogia confidering the difparity of numbers, as the Suliotes had only 900 men in the Tripa, refolved to abandon this poft, which the Albanefe took poffeffion of the next time they attacked it, though with confiderable lofs, the Suliotes firing at them from among the rocks in fafety.

' The pafha's troops, fuffering very much through want of water, which was brought to them fix leagues on horfes, as all thofe who attempted to fetch water from the brook under the Sulli mountain were killed by ftones the women rolled down on them, or fhoot by the men, began to mutiny; the pafha therefore determined to ftorm the Tripa the next day, and

having affembled the principal officers, and chofen 800 Albanians, he difplayed all his treafure in his tent, which confifted of Venetian ducats, and told them, it fhould all be diftributed among them if they took Tripa ; and that, befides, they fhould have all the immense riches which it was known were there. The next day the 800 Albanians, having at their head Mehineteraber, and in the main body two fons of Soliman Ciapar, and in the rear Captain Brogno, marched to the affault, and drawing their fables, declared they would hot fheathe them till they were victorious.

' Captain Bogia left 400 men to garrifon Tripa, and fent four hundred to lie in ambufcade in the foreft *on* each fide of the road, with Orders not to attack till the fignal agreed on was made from the fecond tower, in which he faut himfelf up with fixty men, and from whence, by means of fignals, he commanded the movements. Giavella went with the troops into the foreft like a common foldier, the better to take his meditated revenge. The ambufcade was commanded by Demetrius, Bogia's fon.

' The head *of* the Albanian column advanced without moleftation as far as the fecond tower, which they furrounded, and fummoned Bogia to furrender. He replied, he could not truff himfelf to them, but Would fubmit to Captain Brogno when he arrived ; they therefore marched
further

further up towards Tripa, leaving him, as they thought, a prisoner. the pasha's army, seeing the Albanese had advanced without resistance to the top of the *mountain*, and fearing to be deprived of a share of the plunder of Tripa, left their tents, and ran tip the mountain with shouts of victory. When Bogia saw that the enemy, in number; about 4,000, had advanced to the third tower, Which was near the Tripa, he rang a bell, the signal for a general attack, which was a general slaughter : the ambuscade prevented any returning, They were in every part exposed to the fire of the Suliotes, who were covered by the rocks or the trees, and from the second tower Bogia made great havoc. The women from the heights rolled down great stones, which for that purpose are always piled up. The enemy defended themselves, when the Suliotes came out to meet them, with great obstinacy ; they were, however, all killed, except 140, who surrendered themselves prisoners. Among them was a son of So--man Ciapar, and many officers. The Suliotes had fifty seven killed and twenty-seven wounded. Giavella was among the slain. After shooting from the ambuscades a great number of the enemy, he sallied out with some of his friends, to avenge the supposed death of his son, and to fight till all the enemy were killed, or he himself fell, After making a great havoc among the enemy, into the thickest of whose ranks he had

run forward with desperate valour, he fell, covered with wounds, and surrounded by heaps of slain.

' The bodies being thrown down from the rocks into the Turkish camp, struck the remainder of the army with such a panic that they fled with great precipitation towards Yanina, and abandoned the pasha. Bogia profited of their disorder to send 200 men, who, falling on the rear, cut off great numbers. The pasha himself escaped with difficulty, and killed two horses before he got back to Yanina. All the baggage, ammunition, arms, provisions, and the pasha's treasure, fell into the hands of the Suliotes, besides four large cannon, which they drew up to the Tripa, and which were a great acquisition to them.

' The other corps, towards Preveza, Arta, and Chimæra, followed the example of the main body, and reached Yanina, in great haste. So great indeed was their panic, that none of them stopped till they got within the walls of the city, thinking they were still pursued by the Suliotes.

' In the mean time, the communication being opened with the Chimærites, the Sulian army increased in two days so much, that they found themselves strong enough to offer the pasha battle in the open plains. They marched to an estate of the pasha's near Yanina, and took possession of it, whence they sent him a letter, threaten-

threatening to take him prisoner in his haram. They pursued the Paramathians into their country, where they cut down the trees, and drove away vast herds of cattle and flocks of sheep to Sulli.

' The pasha, apprehensive for the safety of his capital, sent a bishop to propose peace to the Suliotes, It was concluded on the following conditions :

' 1. That the pasha cedes to the Suliotes all the territory as far as Dervigiana (six leagues from Yanina) inclusively.

' 2. That all the Suliotes, who were prisoners, should be set at liberty. (Thus Giavella's son returned safe to Sulli.)

' 3. The pasha should pay 100,000 piaftres as a ransom for the prisoners the Suliotes had made.

' With the Paramathians they concluded a separate peace, as they are not dependent on the pasha.

' The conditions were, that they should in future be allies, and that they should on all occasions succour the Suliotes, both with men, arms, and provisions, when they were at war.

' Returned home to their mountain, the Suliotes divided the booty, and the 100,000 piaftres, into five parts: one was destined to the repair of churches, which the Turks had damaged, and to build a new one on the Tripa, dedicated

dedicated to the holy virgin; the second part was put into the public box for the service of the community; the third was equally divided among all the inhabitants, without distinction of rank or age; the two other parts were distributed to the families of those who had lost men in battle.

' This peace was soon broken by the pallia, who was twice afterwards defeated, and the Suliotés gained still greater honour.'

The writer of this journal further says, that in this country there are ten Greeks to one Turk; that the Sulian army always consists of about 20,000 men, including their nearest neighbours on the Chimæra mountains. He points out how easy it would have been for them to have put in effect what their chiefs had concerted with the Ruffians. But I avoid entering into particulars, as I might give information to those who would make a bad use of it.

It was afterwards discovered, that the French consul, Mr. de laSalas, had advised the pasha to get possession of Sulli and Ghimæra, as then he would have nothing to fear from the porte, if he threw off all obedience; and that the French could then supply him with artillery and ammunition, &c. Mr. de la Salas was one day shot dead in the street at Prevasa; by a captain of Lambro's fleet.

CHAPTER X.

The Turkish Empire considered, with regard to its Foreign Relations.

THE preceding pages have shown the internal situation of the Turkish empire; they have traced the progress of a power founded in violence and rapine, growing up in tyranny and injustice, and ultimately verging to corruption and decay. But it is not enough to expose the defects of internal constitution and administration; to the politician it must be matter of serious enquiry to learn what are the foreign relations to which these domestic arrangements give birth; what rank in the scale of political importance such an empire has obtained; and how its existence has affected, and its approaching annihilation will affect the interests of other states. This view of the subject must, however, be taken with great caution.

In the system of Europe, great and important changes have taken place, and the balance of power, once a subject of so much contention and jealousy, has received, and is daily receiving, such shocks as seem to threaten its total subversion.

In the midst of this chaos we may still, however, perceive the outlines of two grand combinations

nations of interests dividing Europe by their mutual opposition. At the head of these confederacies may be placed the two ancient rivals in opulence and glory, Great-Britain and France; and however we may be inclined, with philosophers, to lament that there exist irreconcilable interests, or political prejudices, which sow eternal discord between nations, on account of their Vicinity and power, it must be reluctantly acknowledged, that such interests and such prejudices not only do exist, but are likely to become still stronger on the part of the French republicans, who, while they preach universal liberty, fraternity, and toleration to all mankind, act with a spirit of inveterate hatred, despotism, and insufferance, which the narrowest prejudices, and the deepest depravity of human nature could only produce.

It may be observed, that these two powers, as well as most of those that rank in the first class, have nearly the same relationship of interests as heretofore; but the inferior states are mostly thrown from their balance, many of them either totally or partially annihilated, and several inclined to form alliances diametrically opposite to their former principles of policy.

In order to explain the connection of Turkish politics with the general system of Europe, it will be necessary to take into consideration the particular

ticular interests of the different powers, and to show their relation to the present or any future state of that empire. Previously to this, however, a general sketch of the present situation of things may tend to elucidate our further disquisitions.

The attachment of France to Turkey is rationally founded on the great commercial advantages which she enjoys from that nation ; on the use she makes of the porte to form a diversion in her favour, whenever the situation of her affairs on the continent requires it ; and on her particular jealousy of Russia, which, by obtaining possession of the passage from the Black Sea, might send a naval force into the Mediterranean, to the evident diminution of the French power and commerce. The local situation of the possessions of the house of Austria has ever made it an object of jealousy to France ; she has, therefore, laboured to crush, or at least to curb that power, and finds an additional bond of friendship with the Turks in their hostility to the emperor. Much light is thrown on this subject by the papers printed at Paris since the revolution, entitled *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l' Europe pendant les Regnes de Louis XV. et XVI.* It there plainly appears (did we want proofs to convince us) that France considers Spain, Prussia, and Turkey, as its best and most natural allies ; and that whenever it was connected in bonds of amity with Austria, it

never

never considered that alliance otherwise than as a temporary convenience, and secretly entertained sentiments hostile to the prosperity of that house; that it regarded the preservation of the Turks, as a matter infinitely more important to her than Poland or Sweden; that its jealousy and hatred to Russia, even when it courted her friendship, and concluded a treaty of commerce with her, could only be equalled by its hatred and its jealousy of Great Britain. We have no reason to believe, that the republic thinks differently.

France then being by system the avowed or secret enemy of the two imperial courts, it is to her that the powers which have to dread either of those courts will naturally look for support.

Prussia, whose views of aggrandisement depend in a great measure on the ruin of the house of Austria; and Sweden and Denmark, who both look with envy or apprehension on the still growing power of the Russian empire, must be induced by such motives to attach themselves, when they dare, to France, and of consequence must be inclined to support the Ottoman power.

It is by other views of policy that the nations in the south of Europe are directed in forming their alliances with France. Most of the Italian states, by their comparative insignificance, are rendered

rendered necessarily dependent, and by their situation must be led either through fear or policy, to court the protection of that power; while Spain, ever jealous of the British naval superiority, ever apprehensive for the fate of her colonies, sees in France alone an ally sufficiently powerful to dispel her fears and to defend her interests.,

The reasons alledged for the connection of different nations with France will, in their converse, point out the motives for alliance with Britain. Among the secondary powers attached to us are Portugal and Naples; the one by long commercial habits, and a fear of its more potent and dangerous neighbour, Spain; the other, by a like apprehension of the French enmity, secret or avowed.

On the side of Austria we see an ancient ally again united to us by a recent treaty, and by a similarity of interest, which must continue as long as the secret or avowed connection subsists between France, Prussia, and Turkey,

Russia, which has risen to its present importance, even more by the policy of its monarchs than by the greatness *of* its population or territory, vast as they are, may in some measure be considered as removed, by its northern situation, so far from the sphere of European politics, that it may occasionally, and at its option, either en-

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ter into them, or preserve a neutrality, as best suits its purpose; an advantage which no other state possesses, and of which the empress is, perfectly aware, having frequently avoided taking part in those very contests which tended to promote her interests. Though Russia has not long been raised to the situation she now occupies, her army is the most formidable, and has many advantages over every other military establishment in Europe : besides a great naval force in the Baltic, she has obtained a complete superiority over the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea, both by the number and excellence of her ships, and the skill and courage of her sailors, so that she can open to herself a passage into the Mediterranean, and is now possessed of all the means, so long and so perseveringly pursued from the time Peter the first took Moscow to this day, of annihilating the monstrous and unwieldy despotism of the Ottoman sceptre in Europe. The empress has also conceived the vast and generous design of delivering Greece from its bondage, and of establishing it under a prince of its own religion, as a free and independent nation. It was not long ago the policy of the British cabinet to counteract these schemes of the empress (with what reason we will not now consider) ; but a conviction of the similarity of her interests with her own now prevails ; the Turkish clause
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(in all preceding treaties) was given up in the treaty of 1795, and a war between Ruffia and Turkey now becomes a *casus foederis* with Great Britain, and she is justly considered as our most valuable and most natural ally.

If this general sketch of the system of Europe be just, it will afford a clue to the motives which have actuated, and are likely to actuate the conduct of different powers in their individual relations.

To return to FRANCE.—This nation, ever versed in intrigue and fertile in politicians, has appeared under all circumstances to be best instructed with regard to the real state of Turkey, and has shewn a conviction of the weakness of its ally, at the very time when it was most necessary to support its importance. Thus it was, that when the Count de Vergennes (who by a long residence at the porte as ambassador, had obtained a thorough knowledge of the resources of the empire) was directed by the Duke de Choiseul to excite the Turks to war against Ruffia, he stated the most forcible reasons for an opposite line of conduct. These reasons, which were conclusive with the minister, were founded on the real weakness of the Ottoman empire, and the false ideas of its strength entertained by several courts in Europe, which it would have been so impolitic in France to have re-

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moved,

moved, by suffering the Turks *to* engage in a war destructive of their reputation. The same Count de Vergennes, when he became minister, instructed Monfieur de St. Priest, to use every argument which might induce the Turks rather to yield to the demands of Russia than to engage in a war.

The arrangement of the dispute with Russia in 1778, was attended with some Angular circumstances. The Turks had, contrary to the treaty of Kainargi, appointed a new khan of the Crim, and sent him with a fleet of ships of war, in the latter end of 1777, to the port now called Sebastopolis, to support the Tatars, whom they had before excited to rebel against their lawful khan, Shaheen-Guerrai. *On* these grounds a war had nearly broken out, when the porte, after holding a secret divan, suddenly resolved on peace, and notified their determination to Mr. Stachief, the Russian envoy. He applied to the English ambassador, Sir Robert Ainslie, to assist at the conference to be held, and act as mediator at the signing of the accommodation. Sir Robert, however (doubtless for good reasons) refused, and Monfieur de St. Priest was sent for, who readily accepted the office, and France appeared, on no other ground than the refusal of our ambassador, as mediatrix. From this time Monfieur Stachief was so much

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governed

governed by the French ambaffador, that his court thought it neceffary to recal him, as the emprefs by his conduct plainly perceived the tendency of the French councils to fupport Turkey.

In 1783, when Ruffia found it abfolutely neceffary for her own fafety, and the tranquillity of her fubjects, who were continually expofed to the incurfions of the Tatars, to take poffeffion of the Crim, and annex it to the empire, the French ftill perfuaded the Turks to yield for the time to neceffity, and rather to give up the Crim than run the rifk of lofing Conftantinople itfelf.

The late emperor Jofeph had formed with the emprefs the plan of expelling the Turks from Europe, and had obtained, as he thought, the acquiefcence of France; but that artful power, unwilling to hazard, and at that moment unable to fupport an open conteft in favour of the Turks, employed all its engines in fecret manœuvres for their caufe,

The imperial courts difcovered thefe defigns, but not before France had prevailed on Sweden to declare war againft Ruffia, after the porte had imprudently, and contrary to their advice, done it, and had by means of M. de Choifeul-Gouffier negotiated a fubfidy from Turkey to the Swedifh monarch. The part which France alfo took, not only in acquiefcing, but in urging Great Britain

and Prussia to oppose the progress of Russia, and support the king of Sweden in that war, was well known to the two imperial courts.

Since that time Austria and Russia (other circumstances having intervened) turned their views to an alliance with his Britannic Majesty, and which has still been strengthened by the declaration or triple alliance signed in September 1795. Towards them, therefore, France must retain an hostile disposition, while her connections with Spain, Prussia, Sweden, and Turkey, result from mutual and natural interests, as that with other states does from motives of dependence and self-preservation.

SPAIN, notwithstanding the extent of her territories, and the immensity of her resources if well managed, seems to have been degraded almost to the rank of a secondary power. Her colonial possessions, the source of her apparent splendor and of her political degeneracy, have become an object of so much apprehension to her, that, unable to rely on her own force for their preservation, she must court the alliance of a more powerful neighbour. Of the two chief naval powers, Britain excites the greater jealousy, as pretending to the command of the sea, and appearing ever intent on the extension of her commerce and foreign possessions. This antipathy is heightened, on the one hand, by the resentment

ment with which Spain views on her own coast the British fortrefs of Gibraltar, as, on the other, her attachment to France has been cherifhed by intimacy, and by the mutual intereft which they have, to keep the northern powers out of the Mediterranean.

Of the influence of political opinions (whether monarchical or republican) in confolidating the union of the different parties, I forbear at prefent to fpeak, becaufe the principles which are here laid down as the bafis of fuch union, apply to the countries under whatever form of government they exift. So long as different nations retain the fame relations, commercial and political, which they now bear to each other, fo long will the general outlines of the fyftem of Europe, and its grand divifions of intereft, remain nearly as they are here reprefented. Opinion may, in fome inflances, be a motive more forcible than the permanent diftindtions of intereft, as in the cafe of the late war between Spain and France for the re-eftablifhment of monarchy ; but thefe caufes are merely temporary, and however the difpute may terminate, recurrence will ever be had to thofe principles, which, being founded on local and effential diftinctions, have the greateft poffible degree of permanency. The French republic have proved, that they have the fame notions with refpect to the alii-

ance with Spain as the monarchy had; (the family compact was framed entirely by intercft;) they look on it as " *the moft effential as well as the* " *moft natural which France can form*" Were monarchy to be re-eftablifhed in France, fhould we have made,an ally of Louis X V I I I or a friend of one fingle emigrant ? I fpeak here with refpect to political connection.

PRUSSIA, which has been led/forward to its prefent eminence by a train of fortunate events, muft choofe that ally which will beft enable it, not only to preferve its fituation, but purfue its never-ceafing projects of aggrandizement: it has, perhaps, fometimes to choofe between France and Ruffia; but it cannot rely on the latter; tranfitory events may unite their interefts for a moment, perfonal prediiection of fovereigns may influence the option for a time, but no folid alliance can be formed; and befides, the partition of Poland has fown the feeds of difcord, which, fome day or other, will ripen. With France no fuch circumftances exift; it is the country which can procure to Pruffia more advantages than any other, and in return receive more from it. From Ruffia and from England it has drawn occafional means of aggrandizement, but it has always, even in the moment of receiving their affiftance, looked on them with a fufpicious eye. Should Pruffia be ferioufly allied with Ruffia,

Auftria

Auftria muft be leagued with France; and fhould then a quarrel take place between the two former, Pruffia might not have it in its power to break the Auftrian alliance, and join France in the moment of diftreff. It is not probable that this wily cabinet will throw itfelf into the hands of a power, on which, from many circumftances, it can never for any length of time rely. The aggrandizement of Pruffia muft be at the expence of the Houfe of Auftria, and the fyftem of the cabinet of St. Peterfburgh never will be to ruin that houfe.

Pruffia will temporize with the emprefs, but its prefent and future fyftem undoubtedly will be an alliance with France; for if Ruffia at any time be ill-difpofed to it, it has no other refource to rely on. The jealoufy of Auftria, at this moment, muft be excited to the higheft degree, by the concurrence of Pruffia with France in endeavouring to annihilate the Germanic confederacy. This conduct muft leave Pruffia without any other fupport but the directory, and, however matters terminate, will leave a deep rooted enmity in every part of Europe, which may ultimately have fatal confequences, and renew a combination againft a country which has loft its tutelar genius. To preferve his dominions from his powerful neighbours required all the talents of the great Frederic, and even he

with difficulty was able to save it from destruction. Such talents are not again to be expected in a sovereign. That both France and Prussia consider themselves as *the most* natural allies is obvious ; that they considered themselves so, even while other alliances existed, is equally obvious. We need only to look to what has, in the latter part of this century, happened between France and Austria—between Russia, Austria, and Prussia—to be convinced that natural alliances will ultimately prevail over temporary systems. It would be superfluous to enter into details so well known. If the king of Prussia joined Austria in the present war, it was to secure the friendship of the monarchy, which he then thought would be restored ; when he ceased to think that event practicable, he as readily allied himself with the republic; his object was the same, an alliance with *France*. Prussia by this conduct prolonged the miseries of humanity ; (for she caused a campaign to fail, which would have ended them, and turned a defensive war in France to an offensive war out of it, which has nearly ruined Europe. What is the fruit she has reaped ? In this one campaign she lost the consequence which forty years of success had given her. The seeds of democracy and rebellion are sown in Prussia; most of the literati spread them broadly, not to say a very great portion of

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the officers of the army, and there is not a country in Europe more ripe for revolution. The treasures which the great Frederic left behind, and, what is still a much greater loss, that spirit in the army, that emulation of glory, that devotedness to their sovereign's cause, which, more than its discipline, made it so formidable, have totally disappeared.

In 1791, the king of Prussia had a (standing army of above 200,000 men ready to act ; the people satisfied with the government and attached to their king; the army had still the warlike spirit which the great Frederic had breathed into it, and the treasures he left were not yet dissipated ; he had supplanted the empress in her influence in Poland, which was become formidable.

SWEDEN would scarcely be esteemed of any consequence in Europe, did not its local situation enable it to make a diversion in favour of Turkey, by a war with Russia; to France it, therefore, has always appeared in the light of an useful ally, and has ever been assisted by her with subsidies, and supported with all her interest; but, since its decline, the services it is able to render are thought inadequate to its burthen, and the old connection is supported, rather to prevent its forming new ones, than from the real assistance it can afford.

If Sweden would purfue a line of ftrict neutrality, Ruffia has little temptation to difmember it any further; but another war would, moft proboble, make the Gulph of Bothnia the frontier. It is to be hoped that Sweden now knows her real intereft, which is, to be well with Ruffia, and to fuffer patiently what fhe cannot avoid. Such a fituation is humiliating; but has {he reffources in herfelf to rife above it ? Certainly not, and that fhe has not is her own fault; a worfe fituation muft follow from a contrary conduct; and it is doubtful whether France and Pruffia united could, were they to turn all their force to fupport her, fave her from the talons of the Ruffian eagle.

However humiliating this ftate of dependence may be to the country, it is, undoubtedly, the only fecurity of the *crown* of Sweden. The people have received, by their connections with the French, during the minority of the prefent king particularly, fuch an augmentation of their former republican notions, that they are become, perhaps, more fanatic than many of the provinces of France. In the winter of 1795, the theatre at Norkoping was fhut up; the people obliged the mufic to play *ca-ira*, of which they have an excellent Swedifh tranflation (by one of the profeffo of their univerfity) which they all fung in chorus.

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It may not here be an improper digression, to take a flight view of the conduct of the late king of Sweden, in declaring war against Russia, at a time when the empress fully relied on his neutrality, and had every reason to do, considering the interest of Sweden itself. That monarch, impelled by the common infatuation of ambitious princes, was eager to act a distinguished part on the theatre of Europe, and to imitate the quixotism of his illustrious predecessor, Charles XII. He seized the moment which appeared most favourable to his projects, when the armies of the empress were drawn down towards the south, to oppose the Turks; but this very circumstance made his aggression so glaring, even to his own subjects, that the war was universally reprobated, and the Swedish and Finland armies actually protested against it. So fully indeed had the empress relied on his neutrality, that the frontiers of her empire, on that side, were left without a force sufficient for their defence; and it afterwards appeared that the king, could he have relied on the fidelity of his armies, might have marched without opposition to St. Peterburgh, and made himself master of the imperial residence by *a coup de main*. Luckily for his country he only alarmed the empress, and the report of the cannon of his fleet only shook the windows of her palace. Had he effected his

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plan, whoever knows the empress, knows she would never have laid down her arms till she had taken ample vengeance.

The inconsiderate ambition of the king of Sweden appeared in the eagerness with which he attacked the Russian squadron on its way to the Mediterranean ; had he suffered it to proceed to its destination, the Swedish fleet would have remained masters of the Baltic.

It was in May 1788, that the Swedish fleet sailed from Carlscrona with sealed orders, to be opened in the latitude of Gothland, to act offensively against Russia; but the king's declaration of his motives for hostility, though dated on the 21st of July in the same year, was not published till August. These proceedings, contrary as they were in themselves to the maxims which are generally acknowledged among civilized states as the law of nations, were grounded upon reasons equally nugatory and unjust. They are conceived in the following terms: "*The declaration of war made by the sublime Ottoman Porte against Russia, was a new motive for the latter to redouble its efforts in sowing confusion and trouble in the bosom of Sweden, which, united by an ancient and permanent treaty with the Ottoman Porte, concluded in 1739, and obliged by that treaty not to abandon so ancient an ally appeared formidable to Russia, &c.*" .

"His majesty, never deviating from his pacific inclinations, is still desirous of peace, provided that the emperors shall offer him an honourable one, and that the king shall be assured of procuring for the Ottoman Porte a firm and permanent peace"

The treaty of 1739, by which the king pretended that he was bound to the Turks, was not offensive, but defensive ; and even this was declared null and void by the first article of the treaty of Abo, concluded with Russia in 1743, and the porte was, at that time, officially informed of its abolition and non-existence.

The late king of Sweden, guided by the same motives as the king of Prussia, was preparing to take an active part against the French republic, to secure the friendship of the reinstated monarchy. After his death, the regent, looking on the republican government as permanently fixed, pursued a different conduct, but having the same view as his brother, an alliance with France.

The conduct of Sweden during the regency has been more hostile to the allies than is consistent with the neutrality it professed ; and had the allies listened to the insinuations of the emperors, it would have been severely punished for its partiality. Had a war with Sweden in these circumstances taken place, in vain would Sweden have relied on the co-operation of the Danish fleet; the emperors might either have prevented the

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the junction, or, with a little assistance, if not alone, have cruised their combined force. The island of Bornholm lies ready for her to seize upon, and though at present it can boast no harbour, that defect might be easily remedied. From such a station the Russian fleet would be able to go to sea six weeks earlier than the Swedish from Carlscrona, and consequently prevent their junction.

The English politician may object, that it is the interest of this country to prevent Sweden being swallowed up by Russia: be that as it may, neither this country nor France can serve Sweden more essentially, than by endeavouring to keep it well with Russia. Notwithstanding the support of the most powerful allies, the ruin of Sweden must be ultimately the result of a contest with its powerful neighbour.

DENMARK, we have seen, in the present war, which has involved the interests of all Europe, pursuing the same path of neutrality with Sweden, and united to it by a treaty; we have seen their combined fleets parading the Baltic and the North Sea, and professedly directed by the same views, not of neutrality only, but almost an open espousal of the French interest, in defiance of the allied powers, whose resentment they would have felt, had, as I have already mentioned, his Britannic Majesty not had more
 forbearance

forbearance than the emperors. It would have been easy to have detached a squadron from our fleet to have joined that of the emperors, and put at once an end to the dispute, by annihilating the united Danish and Swedish navies. If they have escaped, the danger they have run ought to make them more prudent in future.

The conduct of Denmark to the emperors has been very ungrateful as well as imprudent.

Sleswick, which in 1762 threatened to draw upon Denmark the vengeance of the Russian arms, in 1776 was, at the instance of the emperors, guaranteed to that country by the two imperial courts, and since, this guarantee has become still stronger by the accession of his Britannic Majesty to it, in the triple alliance of 1795. On this subject (he is, therefore, perfectly easy; but the local situation and the relative weakness of that kingdom must make it ever dependent on Great Britain and Russia. The alliance with Sweden can be but a temporary arrangement, however ardently the court of Copenhagen may wish to make it permanent, through the support of France. Small states must, in external relations, be dependent on greater: an equality of power among sovereigns is as visionary as among individuals. Has this levelling mania seized the kings of Denmark and Sweden as well as their subjects?

SARDINIA deserves particular confideration as its importance seems to have been falsely estimated. To secure the passes of Italy against the inroads of the French was indeed a point of the utmost importance ; but the ability of the court Of Turin to second such views has long ceased, and its interests seem at present *to* take a contrary direction. The question is no longer whether Savoy shall be preserved ; that Country was disaffected long before the French revolution it was governed with a rod of iron ; the nobility and the peasantry were alike dissatisfied, and it was a general complaint, that the name of Savoyard was an insurmountable bar to promotion in every department of the state : such was its Situation when it was attacked by France ; and besides this internal disaffection, it had other causes of weakness, arising from preceding political events.

During the long contests between France and the House of Austria, the former wishing to gain admittance into Italy, the latter to prevent it, the alliance of Sardinia was courted, as possessing the command of so strong a barrier. Hence arose the importance of the court of Turin, which, in changing allies as opportunity presented itself, gained something by every treaty, and was enabled, by subsidies, to discipline and keep on foot a formidable force but when
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the French refigned all pretentions to the Milanefe and to the grand duchy of Tufcany, the king of Sardinia, who *no* longer found himfelf courted by contending parties, neglected that military force, which he had neither motive nor ability to fupport, and funk by degrees into a flate *of* comparative infignificance. From this he was for a fhort time called, and enabled to ait a more diftinguifhed part, by the alliance of Auftria and the fubfidies of Britain; but thefe proving insufficient, the paffes of Italy have fallen into the hands of the French. It is to be expected that Sardinia will always remain an ally, *if not become a province of France*, on whom it is now entirely dependent. In fad, it always was a fecret enemy to Auftria, and never favoured its caufe, but temporarily for the fake of aggrandizement, and the aggrandizement it moft coveted was at the expence of that houfe.

NAPLES is capable of poffeffing a confiderable marine, and might become a naval power of no fmall importance in the Mediterranean. The reafons which influence Spain to take part with France have no weight with the Neapolitan court ; it has no colonies to lofe, no jealoufy of our trade, or of our influence in the Mediterranean. The former fituation of Naples, under the immediate influence of Spain, has no relation to its prefent, or to its true intereft. To it

Great Britain muft appear as a valuable ally. France has long been its fecret enemy, and has ufed every exertion to prevent it from becoming a naval power. It muft ever remain in a ftate of dependance and fubjection, if England and its allies are excluded from the Mediterranean. Every augmentation of naval force in that quarter, which can cope with the fleets of France and Spain, muft therefore be a defirable object to Naples, as on that alone her fafety and profperity depend. No country has fo much to lofe by the eftablifhment of French influence in Italy as Naples.

AUSTRIA, the ancient, and (at leaft at prefent) the moft natural ally, after Ruffia, to Great Britain, the natural protector of Germany and Italy, and the natural balance againft France, has evinced her exertions in the prefent war, her firmnefs in fupport of the common interefts fhe has with this country. The fupport which fhe derived from the finances of Great Britain was, indeed, neceffary for her to make fuch exertions. Her armies were brave, well difciplined, and numerous; her refources in men inexhauftible; but her treafury was inadequate, and (be entered upon a difaftrous conteft under circumftances peculiarly "difadvantageous. Pruffia, without being the friend, acted on this occafion as the ally of Auftria. If any caufe was of fufficient magnitude

tude to have silenced their jealousies and consolidated their plans, surely it was that in which they were embarked, by an interest hitherto unknown in the annals of history, a general interest, which crushed all individual interests of nations, and which appealed no less to the passions of monarchs than to the policy of all civilized states. The sequel, alas! is too well known. The French have succeeded in dissolving the alliance, by convincing the king of Prussia that their government was unshakable; they recurred to their old policy, *divide et impera*.

Prussia has entered into their project of separating the members of the Germanic body; the French monarchy guaranteed their union; but the aim of both was the same, the humiliation of the House of Austria. This they in part effected by the peace of Westphalia, the war preceding which, borrowing the pretext of religion, was in effect a war of policy; nor have they since that period neglected this grand object, either in the open exertions of war or the more subtle efforts of intrigue; hence it is, that we shall ever find the Turks in all their contests with the emperor, however unjust, strengthened by the aid and assisted by the councils of France; and hence it is, on the other hand, that the House of Austria must look with confidence to the steady support of Great Britain. Indeed we

may not only with justice contend for the preservation of the emperor's present possessions, but favour their extension, for the purpose of strengthening him on the coast of the Adriatic and in European Turkey, a part of which more naturally belongs to him than to Russia or the Greeks, were the Turks driven out of Europe.

RUSSIA, the most powerful, the most natural, and the most useful of our allies, has so intimate a connection of interests with us, that the soundest policy must dictate to us an union of design and a co-operation in action. Her commerce with Great Britain is of the utmost consequence to her, as it produces a clear annual balance in her favour, from a million to a million and a half sterling. In the course of last year, there entered into the port of St. Peterburgh alone 533 British ships, which carried thence Russian products to the value of £. 2,400,000 sterling; at the same time, the greatest number of vessels employed by any other nation was eighty-six (Danish ships) and the greatest value exported was £. 80,000 sterling by the Portuguese. Yet is the Russian trade of great importance to England, as she thence draws most of her naval stores, and employs therein several hundred vessels, and many thousand seamen. Since the empress has added to her dominions the rest of those countries where hemp is produced, we
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are more dependent on her than heretofore; yet not so much, perhaps, as the Russian ministry imagine, for reasons which it is easy to point out, but which it would be foreign to the purpose of this treatise to specify. When the trade of France to Russia is put in comparison with this, it will be found very inconsiderable indeed. The year after their treaty of commerce, in which they had all the advantages they could wish, the French took from Russia exports only to the amount of £. 50,000 sterling. They have full liberty to extend their commerce to the Russian ports in the Black Sea, but it has been hitherto too inconsiderable to deserve notice, or to be put in comparison with the loss of trade they would sustain were the Turks driven out of Europe. Trifling however as their exports are, their imports are very considerable, not only in articles which come direct from France by sea, but rich fuffs and jewels, and other articles of luxury, which go either by land, or to the German ports in the Baltic, and thence find their way into Russia, a considerable part of which are smuggled.

Russia is not our rival on the seas, nor we her's on the continent; she stands in need of our assistance at sea, and we of her's by land; her interest dictates to her the same alliances as our interest dictates to us; we are rivals in nothing the prosperity of the one country is the increase

of strength in the other; with her alliance we can protect our friends on the continent, or humiliate our enemies; with our alliance her fleets may fail in safety to all parts of the globe, and chastise those who have provoked her. Even in the trade between the two countries there is no rivalry; her products, partly manufactured and partly raw, brought by a long land carriage from distant provinces to her ports (which is in itself a beneficial branch of commerce) find in our merchants the *only* purchasers; they transport them to our ports in our own ships: neither in this is there any rivalry, for Russia has no mercantile navy; but to compensate that circumstance the balance of trade is immensely in her favour. In short, there is no single point in which we can be rivals, except it be, which should be more arduous in cultivating the ties of friendship.

It is the interest of this country, as must appear from what has been laid, that the empire should keep Sweden and Denmark in awe, as well as the Prussian ports, to prevent them from supplying France with naval stores, &c. in time of war. On the other hand, our interest requires that she should have the command in the Black Sea, in order not only to open its ports to us, but to send us succours into the Mediterranean, to oppose the formidable combination of France and

and Spain. Indeed it is difficult to conceive, amid the variety and discordance of political interests, the existence of two great powers, between which there are so many mutual dependencies and so few causes of jealousy.

The empress of Russia has been accused of inconstancy in her alliances, of inconsistency in her politics, and of only having had in view to profit by the circumstances of the day. It must, however, *now* be obvious, that though she used different means to accomplish her ends, she never deviated from the system she adopted the first year of her reign, and that, if she changed her friends, it was because she thought that she could no longer depend on them.

In every political connection she formed, she had constantly in view the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the restoration of the Greek empire. As long as the power she had allied herself with seemed to favour these projects, she was steady in her attachment to it; the instant it discovered jealousy of, or opposition to them, she sacrificed every other consideration, and became its secret enemy. Nor has the present empress alone had in view the accomplishing of this vast design; Peter the Great first conceived the idea of its being some day practicable, and the cabinet of St. Petersburg has never lost sight of it during the succeeding reigns, *to* this day.

The empress declared unequivocally her intentions, in her manifestoes to the Greeks, during the war which took place with the Turks soon after her accession to the throne, in consequence of her interference in the affairs of Poland, which was only a preliminary step to subjugating the Turks. It was necessary to secure to herself the resources for her armies, which Poland afforded. Subsequent accidents have indeed annihilated the government and independence of that country.

The ardour with which his Britannic Majesty espoused the cause of the empress in that war, by the assistance afforded her fleet, and in forcing France and Spain to consent to its entrance into the Mediterranean, by a positive declaration that a refusal would be considered by His Majesty as an act of hostility to him, attached her so zealously to the cause of Great Britain, and fixed in her mind a predilection, not only for its government but for individuals, that nothing could shake it but an opposition to her favourite measures, which she considered as her dearest interests, and which were to crown her reign with eternal glory.

Her devotedness to Great Britain excited in the cabinet of Versailles the highest jealousy, and it laboured incessantly, by every means, to weaken the connection. It would be an endless task

tafk to recite all the manoeuvres of the French till they unluckily fucceeded: they reprinted our trade with Ruffia as a monopoly, ruinous and infulting to its fubjects; they excited doubts of the fincerity of our attachment to Ruffia, and of our hearty co-operation in her favourite fchemes; they insinuated that our views were only to keep her navy in fuch a ftate of dependance as not to be able to act without our concurrence, and to proceed in its fucceffes only as far as we chofe to permit it; at length they formed, at an enormous expence, a party in the emperfs's cabinet to counteract us.

The emperfs's fecond grandfon was born in January 1779. He was named Conftantine, Greek women were given him for nurfes, and he fucked in with his milk the Greek language, in which he afterwards was perfected by learned Greek teachers; in fhort, his whole education was fuch as to fit him for the throne of Conftantinople, and nobody then doubted the emperfs's defign.

In this fame year (1779) the emperfs had determined on giving his Britannic Majefty an *effective* affiftance againft his rebellious fubjects in America, fupported by the *crown Of France*. Prince Potemkin, who to the laft day of his life affirmed that the fuccefs of the enterprize againft Turkey depended on the alliance with Great Britain,

Britain, had the sole management of this business, and without the concurrence of Count Panin, the minister for foreign affairs, and the partisan of the French, who, suspecting, or having some information of what was going on, employed a Mademoiselle Guibal, governess to one of Potemkin's nieces, to steal the papers from under the prince's pillow, and after seeing the contents, to replace them so carefully that it was some time afterwards before he discovered how he was betrayed. Count Panin found means to retard the signing of the instrument already drawn up, and produced another project, which flattered the empress's vanity more, the *armed neutrality*, which was first conceived by the late king of Prussia. This Potemkin opposed with all his might ; the argument he used was, that if the other neutral nations, who had good vessels and experienced sailors, were to enjoy the same privilege as the Russians had by the treaty with Great Britain, of carrying hemp, &c. to France in time of war, Russian ships would never be employed ; but that a contrary conduct would create a Russian mercantile navy, which then did not exist. He was over-ruled. No argument could withstand the assurance Count Panin gave, that the French entered heartily into the project of the empress with respect to the Turks (whom, unable any longer to defend, they had abandoned)

done) and that the British court never would consent to it. The conduct of the prince on this occasion was not candid: when he could not carry his point, he ranged himself with his adversaries, and received from the empress a present for his share of the labour in bringing about the armed neutrality (as was mentioned in the ukase.) He did not communicate it to Sir James Harris (who had conducted the negotiation in the most able manner) till it was signed, and a system adopted highly inimical to the interests of Great Britain. The empress soon after went to Mohilov to meet the emperor Joseph; Mr. de Vergennes had persuaded him, that France had given up the cause of the Turks, and he led the empress into an error, which Prince Potemkin lamented to the day of his death.

The empress, and particularly Potemkin, were very anxious to obtain from His Majesty a cession of the island of Minorca, which was intended as a station for her fleet, and a rendezvous for the Greeks. Soon after the proposal was made it was taken from us. The empress might have asked it of the king of France, had it been taken in his name, to prove the sincerity of his friendship. The time it was attacked, and the circumstance that it was so, in the name of the king of Spain, shows that the court of France had good information from Peterburgh.

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The conduct of Mr. de Vergennes (one of the most indefatigable and universally intriguing ministers, as well as most perfidious, that ever presided in a cabinet) should have opened the eyes of our coalition ministers in 1783. After he had founded them, and found that they would not assist the Turks nor the Russians, he not only promised to the emperor the opening of the Scheld, but the exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria; and the empress was so hearty in his cause, that she ordered her minister at Frankfort to make a formal proposal of this exchange to the Duke of Deux Ponts. Had we then rightly understood our interest with respect to Turkey, we should have joined in the league with the two imperial courts to effectuate this exchange. The offer would have been eagerly accepted; we should have completely duped the court of Versailles, whose inability to act was perfectly well known at Vienna and Peterburgh; and Mr. de Vergennes equally well knew, that if Prussia, Great Britain, and Holland, opposed the exchange, it would not take place, notwithstanding the serious face he might put on in the comedy he was then acting; he was not only easy on that head, but he had the satisfaction to widen the breach between his Britannic Majesty and the two imperial courts. The king of Prussia saw into the true views of the French

court, and was under no apprehension of offending it ultimately, while he was purfuing with all his might his own intereft, in preventing the very confiderable augmentation of power which would have accrued to the Houfe of Auftria,

I have fince learnt that the emprefs even then began to conceive fufpicions of the fincerity of the profeffions of France, and never could be perfuaded by the emperor, that, though their finances were in the worft ftate poffible, they might not have tent an army to him to prevent the Dutch oppofing the opening of the Scheld-

The emprefs, with great dexterity, on this occafion, became a guarantee to the treaty of Weftphalia, and by it acquired a right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Germanic empire.

From that period to the ever-memorable Rufian armament in England, the cabinet of *St. Peterburgh* acted in the moft unfriendly manner to us. France had concluded a treaty of commerce with Ruffia, from which great advantages were expected; but it proved that all the encouragement given to it could not increafe it; on the contrary, the trade of Great Britain, oppreffed in the moft unjuft manner, was confiderably augmented. The alliance between the two imperial courts and France, and the great partiality fhown to the latter; the apprehenfion of the Turks being driven out of Europe under
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circumftances highly dangerous to this country, and fuch an arrangement for a partition being made as would have greatly increafed the power of France, and made the bonds of amity, thus nearer drawn together, durable, were fufficient reafons with His Majefty's minifters to take that meafure. The dignity as well as the intereft of the country required it at that particular period, though that was not the cafe before, nor has it been fince; and it muft appear evident, that we cannot *now* reafon on the principles we did *then*, and that we now muft clearly fee our intereft both with relpect to Ruffia and Turkey. After the fleet was fitted out, and the objed declared, it became the dignity of the nation to have let it fail, and if Mr. Fawkener was to be fent, he fhould have gone with it.

The friends of Mr. Fox pride themfelves much in having prevented the fleet's failing; but let them be ever filent on the partition of Poland, for their meafures undoubtedly occafioned it *. What might have been the event of fuch a war it is difficult to forefee; much conjecture may be made; I will only mention one circumftance, the naming of which is alarming, however it may be treated as romantic: the em-

* Since this was written, the empress is dead, and I have no feruple now of declaring, that that unfortunate monarch accuses them of it; and there are thofe in England who can produce proofs of what I affirm.

prefs had firmly refolved to attempt to fend an army through Bochara and Cafhmeir, to place the Mogul on the throne of India, and drive the Britifh out of their poffeffions, and there were then in Ruffia Frenchmen, who had been fent into thofe parts by Mr. de Vergennes, and who offered to conduct the army. If Mr. Fox's friend, Mr. Adair, had the intereft of his country at heart, and not the removal of Mr. Pitt, why did he make no advantage of the ardent defire Prince Potemkin then had of feeing his court allied with Great Britain ? Though he was not accredited from the *Court* of London, he entered into political difcuffions with that prince, who in fpeaking with me about Mr. Adair, expreffed this defire in the ftrongeft terms. The emperfs then knew the treachery of France. She made the difcovery in the autumn of 1788, by the intrigues of the French at Stockholm (where fhe always had a ftrong party) and this was proved to her in a fill ftronger manner by the difcovery that was made of the part which the Count de Choifeul Gouffier had in the negotiating a fubfidy from the porte to Sweden ; yet the emperfs was too high fpirited to confefs (he had been duped, though fhe wifhed fecretly to change her alliance with France for one with this country. This fortunate event has at lengthy taken place, and with no degrading circumftances to the

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country. His Britannic Majesty has given up the Turkifh claufe, and a war with Turkey is become a *cafus foederis*, a condition without which fhe never would fign any treaty with any power. That His Majesty's prefent miniftry faw the real intereft of the Britifh and the Ruf-fian empires, when that claufe, *fine quod non*, of the treaty was given up, I hope muft appear evidently, as well as that their conduct has been uniformly guided by the true intereft of their country, which they followed as it varied, and neither loft fight of that nor of its honour, an object furely every true Briton confiders as dear.

To enter into a long detail of circumftances to prove what is here advanced would be fuperfluous, as it muft appear fo very confpicious to every one, except to thofe whom no arguments can convince, and who pronounce declamatory fentences inftead of inveftigating facts. If thofe who oppofed the vigorous and once neceffary meafures of this country will pleafe to talk of inconfiftency, I am ready to meet them on that ground, and perhaps I may be able to prove more than inconfiftency on their part.

Of later events I fhall not now fpeak: the fituation I have been in might involve me in a cenfure of breach of confidence.

How far the king of Pruffia had an under-
{landing in this bufinefs with the French court I
have

have no documents to prove; but facts prove that he did second its views admirably well, both with respect to Auftria and Turkey. His conduct towards others needs no animadversion: he first encouraged the Poles to form their new constitution; then he made it a crime in them to have formed it; and lastly, he joined with the emperors to overthrow it. The emperors accuse him of being the first to inflame on the final partition as a *fine qua non*, and as the price of his co-operation against France; a circumstance not then known to his Britannic Majesty's ministers. The emperors knew too well their sentiments to risk the communication of such a transaction. How completely the court of Berlin has duped all those who have been connected with it (France only excepted) not only in its engagements to his Britannic Majesty and to the emperors, on this occasion, but in every other, is so striking, that it ought by this time to have convinced the courts of London and Peterburgh of the imperious necessity of cementing, by every possible tie, the present connection with the House of Auftria, and making its interest their own. A deviation from such a conduct by either of the powers must obviously be the ruin of Europe.

Russia, however, in the eyes of the body politic of Europe, is a new power; they still seem

to regard her only as a huge unformed mass, giving a rude flock to the countries which her frontier touches; they do not yet seem to perceive her Aiding into every transaction on the continent of Europe, and planning in the dark and with unremitting perseverance pursuing projects which are to ripen at once, and to astonish by their effect, not on her neighbours, not in our days only, but on the most remote regions of the globe, and in future ages. Something of this lately flashed on them like lightning; they perceived that the present empress had become, they scarcely knew how, a party in the treaty of Westphalia, concluded before Russia politically existed, and that her guarantee entitles her to interfere in the affairs of the German empire. The flash, which afforded a transitory view, dazzled the eyes of some, and they seem now more blind.

The means of this sovereign are vast and incalculable, and her will can employ them without opposition: her financial resources, so far from being exhausted, are not touched*; a population of more than thirty millions, of whom not one half has been called on to contribute to the exigencies of the state; a peasantry looking on the monarch as a divinity, and styling him

* I do not speak of present temporary embarrassment, but of real resources, which have not yet been recurred to, and of which I shall treat on another occasion.

God of the earth (zemnoi bog); ignorant of any government but a despotic sceptre, and of any condition but vassalage; happily deprived of all means of evil information, and secured from rebellion by the want of communication and the distance of places : a foldiery content with rye-biscuit and water, blindly obedient to discipline, and suffering privation and hardship with a patience unknown to other nations; active, and peculiarly docile, they are easily taught the use of arms; the habit of conquering inspires them with contempt of their enemies, and raises a courage naturally inherent in robust constitutions, if not to heroism, to actions worthy of heroes. If tactics have been lately neglected, it has been owing to the unskillfulness of their officers, of late promoted almost entirely by favour, and serving only to obtain rank, and then retire; but this may be easily restored by a commander in chief, or a sovereign, though possessed of much less military capacity than a Frederic : a nobility unable to offer the least opposition to the crown, depending on it for every honourable distinction of rank, civil or military, conferred, but not inherited ; without which neither birth nor fortune give consideration, and which he who bestows can take away, while they who suffer must bless his name: not united by any common tie as a collective body, their interests are merely those of individuals.

There is no law but the "*express command*" of the monarch, who can debase the highest subject to the condition of a slave, or raise the lowest to the first dignity of the empire ; but this autocratic sceptre exercises no despotism over the subject insulting to mankind. The Russian monarch is not, like the stupid Ottoman, seated on a throne involved in black clouds of ignorance, supported by cruelty on one hand, and by superstition on the other, at whose feet sits Terror, and below Terror, Death. No sovereign in Europe is possessed of more information, has more judgment to digest it, or in whom the result is more consummate wisdom. So far from the reign of the empress being a reign of terror, its fault is, too much lenity to her subjects, particularly to the great. No princes have received a better education than her son and grandchildren, and the court which surrounds them is as brilliant and polished in manners as any in Europe.

The gloomy melancholy and solemn appearance of the Turks is as little observable on the countenance of a Russian, as the murderous ferocity and enthusiastic fury which distorts the cadaverous physiognomy of others; there is a smile diffused over the face of the whole country. I appeal to all those who have travelled in Russia, whether they ever saw more
hilarity

hilarity in any part of the world. I do not mean to recommend for imitation such a state of things to make men happy; those who have been removed from it cannot go back again; but I affirm, that the whole mass of the people appear to be more happy (and it is a hard thing to make a man laugh when he is not pleased) than any I have seen in three parts of the globe. There is no medium in liberty with respect to the happiness of the people; to be happy, a nation must be perfectly free or perfectly passive. Perfect liberty excludes licentiousness: a people cannot be said to be free where there exists a power to annoy with impunity either them or their magistrates; a little liberty, like "*a little learning, is a dangerous thing,*" because it is not understood. Liberty has been nowhere understood (no not in Athens) but in this happy island. Here our government is founded on reason, and reason will support, or, if any part of it goes to decay, amend it; it is the glory of the human understanding; it is the pride of the most enlightened people on earth, whose happiness is its object, and it will stand for ever, if it have only reason to combat,

After having considered the external situation of TURKEY in various points of view, in each of which it seems little to deserve the approbation of the enlightened, or the support of the

politician, we come to observe it as a member of this grand confederation of the nations of Europe, whose interests and political connections I have cursorily passed in review

Its dominion was founded in blood ; it is upheld by systematic terror and oppression, and the tyrants themselves, enervated by the licentiousness of their rapacity, and lost in the gross ignorance of habitual despotism, are as weak and ignorant at home, as they must appear abroad contemptible and insignificant. Interested views, it is true, have caused their alliance to be courted by France, but it is by no means improbable that that country, when it finds itself unable to defend its ally, may, with its usual versatility, readily join in their destruction. Great Britain can only anticipate such an *event* by cultivating the friendship of Russia and of the Grecian state, which must arise from the ruins of the Turkish power. Strengthened by such an alliance, we should maintain that ascendancy in the Mediterranean, of which the union of France and Spain threatens to deprive us.

That Turkey must very soon be overwhelmed by the empires, appears from a comparison of her financial resources, her army and her marine, with those of the Ottoman power. Constantinople itself cannot be considered as a tenable post ; and when the disaffection of the enslaved
Greeks

Greeks is taken into the account, little doubt can be entertained, that the followers of Mahomet will be entirely driven from the countries in Europe which they have usurped, whether England consent or not.

How they came to decide on the late war appears very enigmatical. That their French counsellors were better informed than to have recommended such a step is certain. It has been attributed to the advice of the English ambassador; but this has been contradicted, both by his solemn denial and by the express declaration of his court, that no such instructions were given him. Among the Turks themselves it was regarded, by every man of information, as rash and impolitic; and the great captain-pasha, Gazi-Haffan, was in the highest degree offended at the proceeding. The declaration of war took place while he was absent in Egypt. His plan was, to subjugate the rebellious or disaffected provinces, which he wisely considered as a necessary preliminary to the engaging in any foreign contest. He began with Egypt. The vizir Yufuf, and his party in the divan, hurried on the declaration of hostilities, when it was *too* late in the season for any hostile movement to, be made, except the insignificant and ill combined attack on Kilburn, unprepared as the Turks were. In the winter, when the Boş

was frozen over, the garrison of Ochak surprised a Ruffian village on its banks, and murdered all its defenceless inhabitants, consisting of above a thousand souls, *not one* of whom was spared. This wanton piece of cruelty cost them dear at the capture of that place. The Ruffian army, which went in the spring to besiege it, was led through the village in files, and the streets still stained with the blood of its harmless inhabitants. I mention this circumstance, because I was a witness of it, and because the Ruffians have been accused of cruelty, unjustly *at least with respect to the Turks*. Had Great Britain and Prussia not interfered, the emperors would not have made peace. How far that interference was politic, *considering the situation we then stood in with the emperors*, has been already explained; but I think it must be sufficiently obvious, that the existence of the Turkish power in Europe can *now* no longer be considered as propitious, either to the particular interests of this country, or to the general advantage of mankind.

In the conduct of the war, a very short time would have led the emperor to the gates of Constantinople, had he boldly pursued a plan of offensive operation; but Joseph, influenced by the irresolution of his character, acted solely on the defensive until he had lost the opportunity
of

of crushing his enemies, and was himself involved in the troubles of his Hungarian dominions.

Humanity itself is disgraced by the prolongation of Turkish despotism, and justice with an imperious voice demands the liberation of the oppressed Grecians, and their re-establishment in the seat of their heroic ancestors. But it is not only on the removal of existing evils that we have to speculate; we may contemplate with proud exultation the substitution of a new system of things, founded on principles more equally just and liberal. Who can look forward without animation to the revival of learning, of arts and arms in Greece, when the iron yoke, under which she now bows, shall be broken? A Grecian state, the free and independent ally of Britain and Russia, will form a connecting link in the social bond of commerce; will be fitted, by the favourable circumstances of its situation and the genius of its inhabitants, for bold and successful enterprise; and, in fine, will quickly attain a proud pre-eminence among nations. Britain is particularly interested in cherishing these hopes: her trade with Turkey is trifling and insignificant; with Greece she will stand in the relation of a favoured ally, and her commercial connections will consequently be more intimate and extensive. The free navigation of the Mediterranean, a point which this country has so long laboured to secure,

Cure, will be firmly established by a confederacy of naval powers, able to resist the domineering spirit of France and Spain. How high this object has ever ranked among the views of English politicians, may be inferred from their anxiety in acquiring, and pertinacity in maintaining Gibraltar, Minorca, and various other stations in that sea; but in the event to which we allude, the whole Archipelago will be friendly to us, and the support of our trade will be allured, not only by Russia, but Greece itself, which was ever a prolific nursery of seamen, and which at present supplies reluctantly the greater part of the Turkish marine forces.

Nor is it only to the Mediterranean that we may look for an extension of our commerce: the coasts of the Black Sea present a mine of wealth hitherto untried by the British adventurer, but from which we may derive the most solid advantages, when those countries are in the hands of free and independent states, our friends and allies. The French had, previously to the present war, a considerable trade in this sea, by their vessels sailing under Russian or Turkish colours; and this they will again enjoy on the return of peace, through the favour of their Turkish allies.

The conclusion then, which is most obvious from a view of Turkey, both in its actual state,
and

and as it presents itself to the eye of speculation, is, that the subversion of its despotism (an event which must inevitably soon arrive, and which it requires not the gift of prophecy to foresee) will be productive of the most beneficial effect, in substituting an active and commercial power, for one immersed in sloth and barbarism. In these deductions, Britain finds herself particularly interested, from the great advantages, commercial and political, which such an event holds out to her, and which, if she does *not* embrace, her influence and weight in the Mediterranean, and, perhaps, in the scale of Europe, must speedily sink.

Turning our views again to the side of Italy, we shall there perceive new reasons, which dictate to Britain the necessity of allying herself most intimately with Russia in accomplishing the liberation of Greece. The influence of France must here be almost universally predominant, and in the maritime states she will find a most prolific nursery of seamen. She has however foreseen, that the entrance of a Russian fleet into the Mediterranean will prove a most serious obstacle to the aggrandizement of her power, and has therefore endeavoured to prevent the progress of the Russian arms. The only hope that Britain can entertain in that as in every other quarter, must be founded *on* her naval superiority ; and this

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the co-operation of a Greek and Ruffian fleet promifes moft effectually to maintain. Late events have, indeed, made the danger of the French ufurpations in Italy more evident and more alarming; it appears that they aim not merely at extending their influence but their empire; their conquests have been vaft and rapid, and refemble in every feature thofe made by their allies the Turks; fcarcely lefs ftriking is the terror which awaits on their name, than the devaftation which follows their fword; Genoa may be confidered as theirs; and even for Venice itfelf no vain apprehenfions may be entertained. What an acceffion of power is here to be acquired! By what bounds can we pretend to limit their progrefs?

If they fucceed in Italy, they will change their politics with refpect to Turkey. They are perfectly acquainted with the ftate of Greece, and the difpofitions of its inhabitants. Turkey can be of no more *ufe* to them; they will therefore erect Greece into a republic under their protection, and derive from it infinitely more advantages than from the Porte, which is unable any longer to make a diverfion in their favour, without battening the epocha of its own deftruction. Ruffia never can fubmit to fee fuch a ftate of things. Had the emperrefs never before turned her thoughts to the liberating of Greece, as an
object

object of glory, she must now do it from motives of self defence, and an interest; she had not before.

The vast increase of power the French will acquire, particularly in the number of sailors, and the excellent ports of the Archipelago, will enable them to annihilate at their pleasure the Russian fleet and its establishments in the ports of the Black Sea, and shut them for ever out of the Mediterranean. All the fair views of prosperity in the southern provinces, as well Russian as Polish, will vanish, and Russia must depend solely on the pleasure of France for the exportation of its products.

Such a state of humiliation, neither the high mind of the empress nor the country at large will ever brook; it would be injustice to themselves, cruelty to the Greeks, and ruin to all Europe. Much more even might be said of the destructive consequence of suffering the French to intermeddle with the Greeks, and of not immediately seizing the opportunity of making them a free and independent nation.

P O S T S C R I P T .

THESE papers, as I have said, were written nearly two years ago, though all the political part was not meant for the press, circumstances have occurred, which permit more of them being laid before the public than was at first intended.

A great event has since happened ; the empress of Russia is no more ! and considerable changes have taken place in the situation of several countries in Europe, but far from weakening, they greatly strengthen these arguments, and elucidate their deductions.

Histories and anecdotes have appeared of the life of that great princess, and the revolution which placed her on the throne. It is time that the voice of truth be heard. That contemporary sycophants and vile hirelings should have vindicated one of the most horrid transactions that stain the pages of history is not altogether to be wondered at ; but indignation is raised in the breast of every honest man, to see that after the death of the empress there exist beings contemptible enough to traduce the memory of an unfortunate prince, a victim to the undefining openness and integrity of his heart; a prince, whose answer to the precautions which were recommended

commended to him by the late king of Pruffia, was, " *I do good to all the world, and with that what have I to fear ?*" a prince who was the benefactor of his country, and whose laws (those very laws which were brought in accusation against him as crimes!) have been religiously observed as models of wisdom and humanity, and without which the reign of the empress would have been less glorious, and her people less happy. That a Frenchman, that a Rulhiere, should abuse him, we need not be surpris'd : " *Peter the third was a friend to the English, and he discontinue the use of the French language at his court.*" But can any man believe that this vindication of the dethroning Peter the third was the book which withstood the temptation of Catharine's gold, and the menace of the Bastille ? Whoever has been in Russia knows (or might have known) the facts, and can contradict this ridiculous misrepresentation of them—the transaction is but thirty-seven years old.

Many powerful interests were combined to bury in oblivion this horrid event, but let foreigners and individuals learn, that TRUTH *will one day appear*. The emperor owes a duty to a father, to a sovereign, to his own security, and to that of other princes ; the Russian nation owes to its own character the justification of the memory of their injured monarch, in whose ca-

tastrophe

taftrophe they were not implicated. The weight of the guilt will fall on a few; the lapse of time does not diminish or change the nature of the crime.

The reign of the empress was a fertility of successes; it was as glorious as fortunate. She extended the frontier of her empire, and augmented its force by a great acquisition of territory and population; (he created a powerful navy, and established a complete sovereignty in the Black Sea; (he obtained both by sea and land such a decided superiority over the Turks, that in the very next spring she could with ease have driven them into Asia. The dreadful revolution which has shaken the governments of Europe to their very foundations did not affect her; in the general madness her subjects remained uncontaminated, and by her position and undiminished strength she became the arbitress of the whole continent. The document was drawn out, the signing of which would have decided the contest; would have crowned her reign with solid and eternal glory, and have blotted out every spot in it; would have made a people, who scarcely more than a century ago were reckoned among the barbarous hordes of Tatars, the liberators of the civilized world, the restorers of order, of justice, of the government of laws, of the independence of nations, the protectors of property,

of

of innocence, of religion, of morality, and of the dignity of mankind ; the pen was in her hand, when—myfterious Heaven !—(he died*.

The private character of the empress and her domeftic conduit are foreign to the fubjeft of papers wholly political. As a fovereign, fhe will make a great figure in hiftory. Her information proceeded from an extenfive and minute acquaintance with the prefent and paff ftate of nations, their actual and relative fituations, and with the perfonal character and private interefts of fovereigns and individuals; fhe was indefatigable in gaining intelligence and making partizans, and fpared neither money nor means to fucceed; *fhe* was aftonifhingly rich in refources; fhe had wonderful talents to combine and deduce, fo as to forefee with certainty future events, or be prepared for fuch as mere accident produces ; it was thence that fhe was enabled to profit by every fault or misfortune of other ftates, as well as of what inevitably followed in the common courfe of things; (he was never duped, but when, through complaifance or confidence, (he had relied on the knowledge of Others ; her projects were always vaft, their ob-

* That day or the next fhe was to have figned the document for furnifhing 65,000 men immediately. which would have been only the beginning of her co-operation ; (he would, in all human probability, have been as fuccefsful againft the Jacobins as fhe was againft the lefs favage Tatars;

ject her own glory; her perseverance was inexorable ; opposition or difficulty only excited greater exertions of talent; she never gave up one single pursuit when it was known to the world that she had determined to follow it, unless it could appear that she ceded from motives of generosity, and not from compulsion or invincible obstacle; success never dazzled, nor danger or embarrassment oppressed her; on all occasions she had equal firmness, courage, and presence of mind; she was always great; even in the smallest actions she was a sovereign; sudden impressions excited sometimes in her violent anger, as it were by surprise, though never in public; but she commanded her passions in an instant, and put on her habitual smile. She was remarkably temperate, applied indefatigably to business, and was of a healthy constitution of body. She could temporise, and use every art of political intrigue, but she had too high notions of the dignity of a sovereign to debase herself, or prostitute publicly her words so that whenever her honour was openly concerned in fulfilling an engagement she might be relied on. When the gratification of her personal enmity or esteem coincided with her politics it was shown, when not, silenced.

She uniformly pursued one line of politics, and she never would have changed her alliance

With

with Great Britain, had we understood them* or our own interest, fopner. We need not say how unjustifiable her conduct has been towards Poland; but it cannot be denied, that the whole blame does not lie on her. As to the Crim, she must have the approbation of all those who do not approve a system of rapine, and plunder, and barbarous rage wreaked on poor defenceless cottagers, whole fons, and wives, and daughters, - were constantly exposed to be carried into slavery from all the neighbouring countries.

It is only in foreign politics that she appears great, and because there only she governed alone; there her ministers were literally her secretaries; she heard their advice sometimes, and sometimes took ideas from them, but she alone judged and decided, and no one dared propose a measure till they had first discovered her sentiments on it; to do this was the great art of keeping in favour.

As to the internal government of the empire, it was left to the great officers. The presidents of colleges and the governors of provinces were sovereigns, and they inordinately abused their power with impunity; hence a most scandalous negligence and corruption in the management of affairs in every department, and a general relaxation of government from Peterburgh to Kamchatka. The empress rewarded with great munificence; but merit, unless it was very con-

prominent to the world, had but a little share of it; every thing was given to favour, and what is given to favour, is taken from merit: one good, however, resulted to *her*, personally, from the impunity which those in office enjoyed; she was free of their attachment to her government, as the more they abused their power, the more they dreaded a successor. She knew their conduct, but was deaf* and almost inaccessible to complaint.

Her code of legislation did not contain *laws*, but *forms* of judicature; the institution of general governments was a new burthen on the people of fifty millions of roubles more than the ancient simple regulations* a sum equal to three fourths of the whole revenue of the empire; the increase of vexation was still greater.

Her finances were ill understood, and worse managed; she got into embarrassments when (she had incalculable resources,) and the means used to remedy them were childish.

Years had not impaired her talents* nor cooled the ardor of her ambition; it seemed* on the contrary, to increase, as other passions gradually subsided.

She had, in short, a capacity equal to the government of a vast empire, and to give it in the world that consequence which its natural strength entitled it to. Had she paid the same attention

to its internal, as she did to its political administration, her reign would have been as productive of happiness to her people as it was of glory to herself.

The empress was at length on the eve of accomplishing her great design; the Turks were left alone, without any support; all the powers in Europe were engaged in the great contest, except the kings of Prussia and Sweden. It was not in the power of the latter to make any diversion. The French had paid to the court of Stockholm a considerable sum of money to enable it to fit out the fleet, but so low were its finances, that it was all immediately employed, except a few thousand rix-dollars, for more pressing exigencies of the state. The empress had a fleet in the Baltic, infinitely superior to the combined fleets of Sweden and Denmark; she wished, as has been said, to annihilate them; with our concurrence or consent it would have been but a single blow. As to the land forces of Sweden, they were then not in a condition to make the empress uneasy; the alarm they had occasioned in the last war had put her on her guard. She was, however, at the same time endeavouring, by a marriage of her granddaughter with the young king of Sweden, to conciliate the interests of the two countries: though she had no apprehension on that side, yet she wished rather

ther to avoid a quarrel, and required ortly a ftrict, neutrality on the part of Sweden. As to Pruffia alone, in the ftate it was with refped to the newly acquired provinces in Poland, and trembling at the repentment of the emprefs, it certainly underftood its interefts .too well to quarrel with her. The emprefs, in a war with the king of Pruffia, would have found infinite refources in Poland; the king, an enemy in every fubjed he had acquired; almoft every Pole would have taken the field againft him, fo much were they irritated at his paff conduct. The king of Pruffia had alfo interefts in Germany to look after, which concerned him nearer y and certain it is, that he paid the mod fubmiffive court to the emprefs, who on her fide was perfectly unapprehenfive of any oppofition from him; all that he might have tried to effect would have been, to obtain fome little indemnification as the price of his complaifance in acquiefcing in her projects.

She was now in poffeffion of every refource. (he required of Poland for her army, in acting againft the Turks on the European continent. The government of the acquired provinces was fo firmly fettled, that (he had no apprehenfion of difturbances ; her army was fo formidable, that fhe could have marched beyond her frontiers at lead three hundred thoufand effective men; and fhe had raifed 150,000 men to recruit it.

Her

Her fleet in the Black Sea was much fuperior to the whole Turkifh navy, and there was a flotilla of fmall veffels built for the purpofe of landing troops in three feet water, which could have concluded, in three days, fixty thoufand men within a few miles of the capital of the Turkifli empire. The firft blow would have been the definition of the Ottoman fleet in its own port, and the attack of Conftantinople by land at the fame time. All this might have been done early laft fpring.

A great army had paffed Derbent; an arrangement would have immediately taken place with the Perfian khans, in whofe quarrels, without any apparent intereft, fhe had intermeddled -, and this army would have fallen on the Turkifh Afiatic provinces, the confequence of which would have been, that all the Afiatic troops, which compofe the garrifons of their fort relies in Europe, would have quitted them, and 'fled to fuccour their own country, and have left the road to Conftantinople defencelefs.

It was a project of Prince Potemkin, in the laft war, to have carried the war into Alia, and he began by taking Anapa. Had that prince not died, the war was on the point of breaking out again. I fpeak of this from a knowledge of fafts.

Nor would the fending an army of fixty-five

thoufand men to attack the French in Alface have prevented her marching another army againft the Turks. If fhe had any apprehenfions of the king of Pruffia fiding with the French, this meafure would have put it in her power to have afted more offenfively againft him. However it may have been conftrued by fome, this meafure was a fure indication of her intention of; attacking the Turks in the fpring; for as long as, fhe was not certain of meeting no oppofition to that meafure, fhe conilantly declined taking an active part by land againft the French. ;

In ihort, every preparation was made, and every obftacle removed -, we did not want the publication of a manifefto to be informed of her' intentions; and indeed the intentions of fovereigns are better known by the ftate and movements of their armies, or the preparations for their movements, by a knowledge of their interefts, and the difficulties they have to encounter in the execution of their projects, than by manifeftoes, or by the language of their courtiers.

It is worthy of recording, that the empress declared, that though His Majefty and the Emperor of Germany made peace with the French, fhe never would acknowledge the French republic, or any ftate that had rebelled againft its, fovereign. She never would acknowledge America to the laft, though fhe permitted fhips coming

ing from America, under American colours, to enter her ports, and trade on the same footing as other nations having no treaty.

The president of the congress, not knowing this circumstance, appointed a consul, in 1795, to reside in St. Peterburgh; on his arrival he requested an audience of the vice-chancellor, to deliver his credentials; but the next day he was told, the emperors did not know of any such power as the United States of America.

Since it has appeared, that His Majesty's consenting to at least, if not co-operating with the emperor's projects against Turkey, was the *fine qua non* of an alliance with her, and of her taking an active part in the war against France, the public has shown great anxiety to learn why she did not come forward immediately after signing the treaty in February 1795, in which a war with Turkey is a *casus foederis*, and what measures had removed the impediment, which kept her back two years, and induced her to come forward at last; but these events are too recent to be spoken of; •

Whilst I am writing this Postscript, another great event has taken place.

The emperor of Germany has made peace; the emperor of Russia has lost a glorious opportunity to immortalize his name; it might have been said to him:

Sire,

Ton have afcended the throne of the great eft empire in the worlds under fuch aufpices as never attended any monarch before you.

A glory is referved for you, Sire, fuch as never yet JJwne round the throne of any fovereign on earth.

You may be the benefactor, not of Riifia only, but of all Europe.—Hiftoryflialfay, Alexander conquer-^{}ed a world, Paulfaved a world.*

You have begun your reign by atls which befpeak your wifdom, your juftice, your humanity—You HEAR EVERY ONE.*

You have felt with indignation the unneceffitaied apoftacy of the court of Berlin; its alliance with re~guides to difmember the German empire.

You are called on, Sire, to crufti with the irrefiflible weight of your armies the enemies of religion, morality\ and focial order.

Peace with them will be more dangerous than 'war. Itheir doclrines will have freer courfe ; and their doclrines have done more than their armies. "They have fubverted the order, and confounded even the names of things. Virtues with them have the appellations of vices, and vices the appellations of virtues.

Can Ruffia, in all its extended provinces, when

* Every perfon in the empire may now write to their fove-
rign, and if they receive no anfwer, may addrefs themfelves
perfonally to him.

every foreign contagion will be poison; when every breath, except from the frozen ocean, will be full of miasma, escape the contagion? None will escape but the elder brethren of Jacobinism, the Turks, whoh equally monarchs, though less dangerous tyrants, has for so many centuries insulted mankind, trodden under foot the laws of nations, and blasphemed Christianity; who, unprovoked, attacked, conquered, and slaughtered nations without number, murdered their sovereigns, and spilt every drop of royal blood, massacred their priests at the altar, extirpated nobility, plundered the opulent, and bound the wretched remains of the people in fetters of perpetual and hereditary slavery. They alone, till the reign of Jacobinism, had made property a crime, the violation of property a legal resource of government, and the lives and possessions of men the right of tyranny; they alone had hitherto confounded the hereditary ranks among mankind, had depressed genius, learning, and the Christian religion, and governed their barbarous empire by slaves and assassins. Like the Jacobins, they taught Christian children to fight against their fathers and their father's God, they too hold it lawful to murder prisoners in cold blood; they too possess a claim to every country in the universe, and a sacred right to subvert all people to their law; they too hold all other sovereigns as usurpers, and dethroning them as*

* See the institution of the Janizaries, who were originally Christian children.

the higheft merit. But fill the furies have a religion, and though it permits them number/ejs enor milies to their own feci, and all enormities to others, they acknowledge a God, and many moral duties. Not the contagion of their dotfrinewas to be feared, tut their cruel /word, which once threatened the conqtteft of the univerfe, and the extinction of all virtue, dignity, and fdenee in the world; yet was not this firft monfer Jo tremendous, in the infolence of his fewer, as an enemy, as is this fecond monjier, in the ixfolence of his fuceffes, as a brother.*

Tayou, Sire, kings lift up their hands, and bow tfseir anointed heads; to yon, Sire, the priests of Cod, to you orphans of murdered nobles, to you violated virgins, despoiled pojjejjbrs, enfaved nations firetch out .their arms, and implore your aid-, thai fpirits of martyred royalty call to you from above for vengeance.'

The noble project of your glorious anceftor, Peter, the Great, was nearly consummated when you mounted his throne; it was referved for his nephezv to accompli/h the liberating of a Chriftian people from the moft infamous bondage. It is worthy of the ju/lice and humanity which mark the beginning of a reign, on which more true glory awaits than ever was referred for any Jovei-eign in the records of hiftory.

This might with truth have been laid to him.

In Augufl 1796, Pruffia concluded with the French Secret articles for the difm^mberment of Germany.

Germany. The late king had allured the emperors, "on his word of honour* and on the word of afovereign" that no such articles existed. On the accession of his present imperial majesty to the throne of Prussia, the king sent Count de Bruhl to compliment the emperor on the occasion. This nobleman had the honour of being personally known to his imperial majesty, and, it was believed, was much esteemed by him.

The court of Berlin, soon imagining that the emperor Paul was blindly attached to its interests, ventured to give a copy of these articles. That subtle cabinet was for once mistaken. The emperor felt the indignity of the action, and, himself a man of honour, and a monarch respectful of the sacredness of a sovereign's word, he answered the communication as became the descendant of Peter the Great. Prussia submitted, and the project was abandoned. Prussia was actually preparing to assist Austria effectually, when the Emperor, who was ignorant of this and several other favourable circumstances, seeing his capital menaced by Buonaparte, unluckily signed the preliminaries of peace with France ! I shall make no comment on this unfortunate event, which no one had reason to expect, and certain it is, that a few days, perhaps a few hours, delay would have prevented it. The emperor of Prussia was greatly and justly offended.

It

If he have any predilection for Prussia, certain it is, that he is incapable of entering into measures iniquitous in themselves and baneful in their consequences, tending to the dismemberment of Germany; and the only obstacle which now seems to prevent his stepping forward with that first weight of power he commands, is the uncertainty of the political system adopted by the young king of Prussia* While the old ministers continue in office, can it be presumed that their system is not that which the king approves? Is it to be expected that a young prince has energy of mind, and knowledge of affairs sufficient, by his arguments to convert or to over-rule the opinions of a whole cabinet? We must judge of the system of a prince by the known system of his ministers in office.

If, however, because the emperor has made peace, we make peace, and such a peace as the bloated insolence of the enemy dictates to us, we shall be shut out of every port, from the Elbe to the coast of Africa; we shall soon be driven out of India. France, and its allies, will soon have a naval power superior to that of Great Britain, and, *qui mare teneat eam necesse rerum potjri. Cie.* Without our trade how is our navy to exist? how are our funds to be raised? If we disband our armies, we shall be attacked unprepared ;

prepared; if we do not, what ceconomy will there be in a peace ?

It now remains, therefore, to be seen, whether the love of our country and of liberty, which fired the breasts of our ancestors, and led them on to those glorious exertions, which procured us our happy and *free constitution*, be transmitted to their descendants; and whether we will spill our blood to defend what they spilt their blood to purchase for us. It remains to be seen whether we are still free Britons, or humiliated slaves, ready to receive with open arms the deathful hug of French fraternity, and submit to the despotic five-handed sceptre of French liberty.

February 1798.

CHAPTER XL

Of the British Trade with Turkey.

FORMERLY the trade to Turkey was of considerable importance to this country, but of late years it had been languishing, and at last dwindled into a state of insignificance, when the present war entirely put a stop to all communication with the ports of the Levant.

As *this* trade will be again opened when a peace takes place, an investigation of the causes of its decline, and the means to give it its ancient extension, may not, in the mean time, be unimportant to the government and to the merchants of this country.

The causes of its gradual decline are, 1st, the rivalry of other European nations; 2dly, the diminution of the consumption of our manufactures in Turkey, by the impoverished state of the country; 3dly, some branches of trade being got into other channels; and, 4thly, - the monopoly of the Levant company in London.

With respect to the rivalry of other nations, that cause will be considered when I speak of the Levant company. As to the impoverished state of Turkey, it must affect the trade of other European nations as well as our own; if we are not, therefore, to expect to see it again in that flourish

flourishing ftate in which it was when there were forty Englifh houfes of trade at Aleppo (at prefent there is but one) we may at leaft expedt to have *the fame proportion* of it as we then had; and if we acquire only this, our trade to the Levant will ftill be a national, objeft. Some branches of trade are got into other channels; this regards principally certain imports from Turkey, and particularly of (ilk from Aleppo, whence formerly larger quantities of Perfian filk came,, which is not now brought thither, but the Eaft India Company fupply our market cheaper and more abundantly. Confiderable quantities of cotton and drugs come from Holland and from Italy, which formerly came direct. This will alfo be accounted for in the next confideration, the monopoly of the Levant company.

It is often neceffary, and where merchants undertake to open to the country a new branch of trade, and where the expence and rilk is great, it is jpfth, to grant theiqa exclusive privileges, or monopolies, for a certain limited time, to prevent others from reaping the harveft they had fown, and to fecure their laudable induftry as far as poffible from rilkj but when that rilk exifts no more, and when they have reaped their harveft over and over again, and have had a full cpj-npenfation,, for their rilk, their induftry, and,,

their experience the country at large has a right to a participation of *the* trade. There may indeed, sometimes exist circumstances of a peculiar nature, which give *them* a claim to a longer indulgence for their monopoly, particularly where that monopoly is not injurious, but, on the contrary, beneficial to the country in general (and such is the case of the East India company;) but in a trade where the merchants have no *common stock*, and can urge none of the above reasons in defence of their monopoly; where they cannot prove that *any particular profits* would accrue to them by abolishing it; Where it has operated as a restraint on the trade, and confined it to narrow bounds; and giving a decided superiority to their rivals of other nations, to the almost total exclusion of the products and manufactures of their country from that to which their privilege exclusively permits them to trade; ought, in former times (Says, such a monopoly to exist? The Levant company is truly become *the dog in the manger*; it does not operate so much¹ to the profit of the company, as to the loss of the country.

This monopoly is of a singular nature: it has none of the advantages of a common stock, in which many individuals risk their all, but which in the aggregate amount to a vast capital than any one merchant or set of merchants possess, or would contribute to rise: a common

flock

*f*tock to which any one may contribute, and which thereby strictly, speaking be a monopoly; it is a Privilege granted to certain persons to trade to Turkey, each with his own capital, and for his own particular account and risk, without any assignable reason why they should be preferred to others his majesty's subjects: it has all the disadvantages of other monopolies ;. it has not one of their advantages.

In speaking thus freely of the company, I solemnly declare that I have no private motive, no rancour against any individual, and no inducement for writing on, this subject but the advantage of the country. The few members of the company with whom I am, acquainted, I personally respect and highly esteem: on this subject they must differ with me; they are bound by oath to support the interests of their body.

The trade of all other nations to Turkey is free, and they have experienced the advantage of being liberated from the fetters of exclusive privileges. Let every obstacle be removed in this country to an equally free commerce, and the *superior industry, skill, and riches* of our manufacturers, our traders, and our navigators, will again restore to us our lost Turkey trade.

It may be said, that at present the Levant company is not a monopoly as any one, by pay-

ing *twenty* pounds, may become members of it. When the trade was ahead ruined, it was imagined that this regulation was equivalent to laying the trade open (a proof that government have thought it necessary to *abolish the* monopoly); but the bye-laws of the company, and the power to enforce them, were permitted to exist, and these do fetter the trade to *new adventurers*, that few have found their account in pursuing it, and the trade still remains a monopoly in favour of the old houses.

It will be necessary to pass in review these bye-laws, which have operated so injuriously to the trade in general, and to show how they have gradually effected its total ruin, and the introduction of rivals, who have gotten possession of what we have lost.

By one of the bye-laws, for instance, it was enacted, that all merchandize brought from Turkey, and imported into England, should be the produce of goods exported from England to Turkey. The following-are the words of the bye-law:

" That upon entering goods received in *England from Turkey or Egypt*, every member shall in like manner subscribe the following affirmation ; *videlicet* :

" *I affirm, by the oath I have taken to the Devant*
 " *company, that the goods above mentioned are for*
 " *account*

" account of myself, or others free of the said com-
 "pany, or of such as now have their licence to trade,
 "and are beyond the seas; and that the said goods,
 "nor any part of them, are not, to the best of my
 " knowledge, the produce of gold or silver, either in
 "coin or bullion, sent into Turkey ; but that the said
 " goods are purchased by merchandize, or monies
 " arising or to arise from the sale of merchandize
 " sent into Turkey or, Egypt, from Europe, or from the,
 " British settlements in America, on account of free-
 " men of the Levant company, or such as have their
 " licence to trade, and of which regular entries have
 " been made with the company, or are purchased by
 " freight received in Turkey or Egypt, by ships na-
 " vigated according to law, which freight is entirely
 " the property of members of the company, or such as
 " have their licence to trade"

And every merchant or factor in Turkey or Egypt is required to make a similar, affidavit, on exporting goods from Turkey for England, and to give, on oath, an exact account of every kind of transaction or business, direct and indirect, so that all his affairs become known.

The object of this law is evidently to encourage the exportation of cloth; and when we had *no* rivals it produced no bad effects; but it soon produced rivals, *and it continued in force till they had nearly got possession of the whole cloth-trade.* Such a law, indeed, was sufficient to ruin any

trade. One *houfe* may deal in exports, another in imports; *due* may combine its Italian With its Turkey trade; another may fend veffels for the carrying trade; but if every individual houfe be obliged to keep an exact rgifter, on oath, and under a penalty of 20 per cent, called " *a broke*" of all its exports and imports, and to balance them exactly, how is fuch a trade to proffer, where the profit are reduced by the rivalfhip of foreign nations? This bye-law at length, when it had produced the full effect of its ill tendency, was repealed ;but the trade was not revived ; fo difficult is it to turn'back commerce from channels into which it has run.

It will be afked then, what are the itfraints which now lie on the trade?

The fubjedion to the control of the company; {he neceffity of making entries with it of all their tranfacions, on oath; *and not being able to Ik concerned in any wife with others not free of the company, of foreigners* the power in the company, for the leaft violation of their rules, to inflict a penalty of 20 per' cent.; the *idea* of reftraint, and the apprehenfion of violating a folemn oath, have made many determine to trade with Turkey through foreignri and tfrcuitouS channels, without becoming free of the company; witnefs the very large quantities of cottons and drugs, &c. which come from Holland and Italy, as the Cuftom-houfe

houfe books. prove. This was the cafe till our trade to Holland and the Mediterranean was ftopped by the war, and in that feme fituation we fhall be when a peace takes place.

The drugs, &c .which are imported from Italy, were carried thither from, Turkey; they had already given a profit, to the Italian factor in Turey; to the importer, and to the purchafer in Italy, who cleans, afforts, repacks, and often adulterates them; to the commiffioner, who purchafe them for his, correpondent in England; to *which* add charages, and intereft of money for fo long a difburfement, which the different people through whofe hands the merchandize has gone have all calculated, as well as their profits, double freights, and loading and unloading, &c &c,

Cottons ,are imported from Holland, becaufe the company cannot import themfelves enough for the confumption; find the reafoa why they do not is, becaufe the old members, who ate under no appnehenfions of the bye-laws, FIND OTHER ARTICLES ENOW TO EMPLOY THEIR

WHOLE CAPITAL, AND BEYOND THAT THE

TRADE *CANNOT INCREASE.* This is the rea- fon as will be feen hereafter more fully, why the trade in exports as well;as imports, is confined within fuch narrow: bounds

The Britifh merchants; in Italy and other to-

reign countries, not being members of the company (and to become free of the company they muft come to England) cannot trade with Britifh houfes in Turkey, and thefe, if they will trade to Italy, muft trade with foreigners: thus all combinations of the trades are prevented. Englifh veffels in the Mediterranean might often make a voyage fo Turkey, inftead of lying in an Italian port, and return time enough' to take in their cargoes for England.

The great preference given to Britifh veffels in the Mediterranean would affure them an employment whenever they want freights. This carrying or carring trade is fo extenfive, that, befides the French, the little ftate of Ragufa has no left than 400 veffels in it:

Were the mafters of fhips, their owners, and the Englifh merchants in Italy and Turkey, under no reftraint in regard to the Levant company, people-would rift more readily the fending their veffels to the Mediterranean to get employment in this carrying bufinefs, and their peculation in trade being free they would find means to employ their veffels in the intervals of their being Without freights; the mafters, owners, and correspondents might combine their own fpeculations in merchandize with thei carrying bufinefs, and thus keep them conftantly employed It is the want of- thefe refources to our fhips, that prevents

vents Englifh owners from fending their fhips into the Mediterranean to *feek* freights, and prevents the few which do go thither from profiting fo much by it as thofe of other nations, whofe Eoufes of trade are nearer, and whofe trade is under no reftridtions.

Had the Turkey trade in England never been a monopoly, the French would never have got poffeffion of almoft all the cloth trade; and the laying it open will be the only means of our coming-ill again for any confiderable fhare of it. There is a greater demand in Turkey for the light Languedoc cloths than for any other fort. The Turks clothe their fervants twice a year, and the French cloth, made into loofe garments (which laft much longer than the tight European drefs) is ftrong enough for their purpofe, and its cheapnefs caufes it to be preferred; poorer people, who form the great body of confumers, buy it alfo for economical reafons. Englifh broad-cloth, called *mahoot* (of a light quality, made purpofely for the Turkey market) is only worn by thofe in eafier circumftances. Confiderable quantities of cloth have alio of late years come to Turkey *from Germany*

It is the opinion of many people well acquainted with thefe matters, that the Englifh manufacturers might make the fame fort of cloth as the Languedoc, and as cheap as the French ; but

as long as the Levant company exists, who is to undertake it? Were the trade laid entirely open, it is probable that all kinds of English manufacturers would send people (called inders) to Turkey to seek for, commodities, as they do to all parts of Europe. This practice, *though not very agreeable to English merchants* (which however may not be the case in Turkey, as they may find the mediation of merchants necessary) would greatly increase the vent of English commodities; and these industrious people might possibly be the means of our regaining the cloth-trade.

The few merchants who are in the true ferret of the Levant trade can employ in it their wHOLE CAPITAL advantageously, and therefore do not seek for new branches, or how to recover old ones which are lost—This is the great secret .

The French do not get their wool cheaper than we do; the price of labour may be less but will not be superior to skill and industry, with larger capitals, compensate this single circumstance against us? Experience in other articles shews it, as in the manufactures of Manchester Sheffield, and Birmingham.

It is very worthy of attention, that the French cannot make so cheap as we can the same kinds of cloth, which our people bring to the Turkey market; it is not that they cannot make them so fine, for they make in France much finer cloth

than that kind of broad cloth made *in* England purpofely for the Tarkey market. There is alfo a coarfe Urong cloth brought to Turkey from England, called *londras*; thefe the French cannot make fo cheap neither; nor are their (balloons fo cheap. In fhort, there is no fort of woollen-ftuff made in the two countries, of the fame quality, which the Englifh do not fell cheaper than the French. The faft feems to be* that the French invented a kind of cloth morfe proper for the general consumption of Turkey than that which the Englifh had brought thither, and the Englifh never attempted to follow their eftartiple, but continued carrying to the market a fort of cloth which at laft got almoft out of ufe. *Whenever the Englifh fhall have made and brought to Turkey the fame kind of cloth as the French^ and cannot afford it fo cheapo then with certainty we may conclude that the French have an advantage over m; but till then it ought to be doubted, and certainly it merits the trial; but a fair trial never can be made till the Levant trade is entirely free.*

But even fuppofing that we cannot regain the doth trade, there are very many other objeds worth attending to, and *which may be of great national advantage**

The Manchefter ftuffs would find a great vent \n all parts of Turkey. The nunufactories of
Aleppo

Aleppo and Damafcus are almoft ruined, and if the Manchefler people were to imitate the Turkifh patterns of their fluffs, they could certainly afford them cheaper. Imitations of the Surat and Bengal goods of (ilk and cotton, which are enornnouflly dear, would find alfo. a ready fale in Turkey, and cotton velvets, velperets, &c. Birmingham and Sheffield wares would be articles of importance. The Turks, both in Europe and Afia, have a great partiality for all thefe kinds of Englifh manufactures, and in general the epithet Englifh is fynonymous with excellent.

Thefe articles at prefent are ndt attended to; but the mafters of fhips, who bring out their *little ventures* to Turkey in a contraband manner in thefe kind of things, make great profits; they can, however, bring only fmall quantities, left the Levant company fhould take umbrage at it. A few of thefe goods alfo find their way to Turkey from Italy, but greatly enhanced in their price from the many hands they go through, and therefore this channel does not afford a great vent for them. Linen may likewife be an article of exportation for Turkey. The Turks wear linen of a hard twilled thread, very open and unbleached, which comes moftly from Egypt, and is exceedingly dear, but is the naoft pleafant kifrd to wear -in hot weather. No, European jfiatiotf'has yet undertaken to imitate it,,but
it

'it is probable it might be made in Ireland infinitely, cheaper than in Egypt: if this was the case, it would be of great importance. The German linens begin to be sold in considerable quantities in Turkey, but they never will supply the place of the Egyptian, on account of their quality. Vast quantities of the above-mentioned articles come from Venice and Germany, where they are dearer, and of worse quality, than those manufactured in England.

Were I to enter into an enumeration of all the English manufactures that could be sold in Turkey, and particularly in the interior parts of Asia, and point out the different ports to which they might be sent, the detail would be too long for a general representation \ but collectively it must be very obvious, to every person acquainted but generally with the trade of Turkey, that our exportation to that country must become of great importance in a few years, were the monopoly removed, and the agents of the Manufacturers sent to travel through the country, and get *certain information* of the state of its trade and manufactories. . ,

Salt-fish, could the Newfoundland ships; &c. go directly to Turkey as they go to Italy, would be a very important branch. •

The East India company could supply the Turkey market with muslins much cheaper than they

they are brought by it the way of Baffora, of Gidda, and Suez; which trade is entirely in the hands of their servants: the trade has been successfully made; but the members of the Levant company have other steles now in which to invest their whole capitals. Other nations now bring large quantities of muflins to Turkey. Britifla muflins (*i e.* manufactured in Britain) alio fell to confiderable profit.

Let all this be mere fuppofition* is not the objed. of importance enough to give it a fair trial? and does not common fenfe fay, that a trade freed from obftacles muft flourifh more than when clogged with the moft unfupportable fhackles, or with any fhackles at all? May it not be aiked, what juft right have the members of the Levant company to Jay restraints on this trade by their bye-laws? I have heard this fubject difcufl'ed in Turkey, where people certainly understand the trade of the country better than in England, and I never heard one plaufible rea- (ba alleged in favour of the company. Sophistical arguments may be produced in London, which may appear plaufible to thofe who are not informed of the real ftate of matters in Turkey.

To fhew what little efforts have been made by the company to extend the trade, and how little they deviate from, the footsteps of their forefathers, I will cite two striking inflances;

Mr.

Mr. John Humphry*, of Constantinople, was the first, who, a few years ago, imagined that English shalloons might be sold in Constantinople, and they soon became a very important article for exportation to Turkey. The French have not been able to make them so cheap.

Mr. Peter Took, of Constantinople, only about twenty years ago, discovered that he might buy raw silk from the first hands at Brusa (the hills behind this city are visible from our merchants' houses in Pera) and thus make his returns direct to England. Before that period, from the first existence of the company, the merchants of Constantinople had always sent their money to Smyrna to be invested in silk, which the Turks and Jews of Smyrna bought at Brusa.

There is a great demand in Turkey for Staffordshire earthenware, which would become a very important article of commerce.

Perhaps the greatest importation of British articles into Turkey would be by foreigners*, or natives of the Turkish provinces, as is the case in many branches of our commerce, where such restraints on foreigners do not exist for instance; every one knows that not one-tenth part of our exports to Russia are on account of the Russian company in London, or of the British factory in Russia, These articles are sent to Russia for account of foreigners settled in Russia, or Russians,
and

and some part for account of our manufac-turers. With respect to Germany this is still more the case.

The Levant company exact a duty on all merchandise exported to and imported from Turkey, besides a consular charge in the ports of Turkey on all the exports and imports in British vessels. This consular charge is a very heavy burthen on our trade, and particularly when it is considered that some other nations *pay none*. The following are the words of the company's bye-law:

„^c *At a general court, &c. the following orders were established as proper and expedient for the*
 " **SUPPORT OF THE COMPANY'S AFFAIRS,**
 " *and for the government of the trade; and they*
 " *were confirmed at a general court, held 3d of*
 " *March 1775**

" *It was resolved and ordered; That all goods*
 ** *exported from Turkey or Egypt for Great Britain*
 " *shall pay three consular charges and one-half, or seven in*
 " *the hundred, according to the rates of the company's*
 " *tariff of duties of the grand seignior's coin as*
 " *his officers receive for customs; which consular*
 " *charge shall be paid, one-half in thirty days, and the other*
 " *half in sixty days, after the departure of the ship,*
 " *&c ; and the company's officers are not to take*
 " *any notes or obligations for the, payments of con-*
 " *sular charges, but they are to insist upon being paid in*
 " *money when it is due.*

" *That*

*li That all goods imported, tec. into Great Britain
" fhall pay one impofition according to the company's
" rates, tec. except cotton and emery-ftones, tec.*

*" That all goods imported into Turkey or Egypt,
" from Leghorn, or any other port or ports of Chrif-
*c tendom, BY BRITISH SUBJECTS OR BRITISH
" SHIPS, FOR ACCOUNT OF FOREIGNERS, fhall
" pay a confulage of TWO in the hundred, tec.*

*" That all goods exported from Conjlantinople,
" Smyrna, and Aleppo, to Leghorn, or any other fo-
" reign port or ports of Chrifiendom, by Britifh fub-
" jecls, ON FOREIGN SHIPS, on account of Britifh
" fubjects, fhall pay a confulage of ONE in the hun-
" dred, tec.*

*" That all goods imported into Turkey or Egypt,
" by firangers, upon Britifh flips, from any foreign
" port, &c, fhall pay two in the hundred, tec. and
" in like manner exported, two in the hundred" &c.*
and feveral other regulations for the paying of
confulage, of leffer importance, which I omit for
brevity.

*" April 29th, 1785. // is refolved and ordered,
" &c.*

*" That all goods, excepting razvjilk, mohair-yarn,
" and drugs, exported from Turkey and Egypt, in
" the time of the plague, to Malta, Ancona, Venice,
" Meffna, Leghorn, Genoa, or Marfeilles, for the
" purpofe of performing quarantine, and which are
" to be re-shippead on the fame fhip for Great Britain*

" or behind, *fliall pay a cmifulage of twa in the hundred only.*"

Befides this revenue* the company have for many years received an affiftance from government of five thoufand pounds a year. All thefe fums are expended for paying a part of the falary of the ambaftadors at Conftantinople, the confuls at the feveral ports in Turkey, the chancellors and drogomans (or interpreters) and for defraying of the expences attending vifits from the ambaftador to the porte, and of the confuls to pafhas, befides extraordinary prefents made at the firft audience of a new ambaftador and of a conful; for paying *avanijs* (or money extorted by falfe accufations) and public entries of confuls, which were formerly very coitly; and finally, for the expences of the company and its officers at home.

Were our trade put on the fame footing as the Ruffian, the five thoufand pounds government now pays would perhaps more than iuffice for all the expences which then would be neceffary; and that our trade could be put on the fame footing, I fuppoze nobody will deny. The Ruffian trade to Turkey is free to every one; there is no tax on it, either under the appellation of confulship or otherwife; no fee is taken at any ambafador's, conful's, or chancellor's office, for documents neceffary for the difpatch of trade;

no presents are made by consuls to pashas or other officers; no avania is submitted to.

A consul at Smyrna only is necessary. Vice-consuls in the other ports would answer every purpose for the protection of trade; and there would be found merchants enough, who would be glad of the office without pay, for the honour of it, which in Turkey is considerable. There is at this day no necessity for consuls living in such great state as they did a few years ago. The foreign ministers at Constantinople have very considerably retrenched their expences.

The power of an ambassador and of a consul in Turkey is very great; it extends even to life and death. By one of the articles of the *capitulations* (or treaty with the porte) it is stipulated, that in all criminal cases wherein subjects of the porte are not concerned, ambassadors or consuls (shall punish the criminal according to the laws of their country. In the Dutch capitulations this is expressed still stronger. As crimes committed in a state are crimes immediately against that state, the cognizance of them belongs to it alone. The sultan delegates his power to the ambassadors and consuls; and if in punishing the criminal they exceed the rule prescribed by the laws of their own country, they are only answerable for their conduct to the sultan; but the sultan takes no cognizance of it, therefore

they are without control, and their power is despotic. It is indeed true, that they generally send such offenders home to their country ; there have, however, with other nations, been examples where an European has killed a subject of the porte, and justice being demanded, the ambassador or consul has put the criminal to death. Should it happen that an Englishman killed a Turk, it would certainly be better that the ambassador or consul should cause him to be hanged by his own people, than that he should deliver him up to the Turks, for justice being demanded, there is no other alternative; if he escaped, the consequence might be a general massacre; we have lately had an example at Smyrna exactly of this nature, which cost the lives of many hundreds, and caused the European quarter to be reduced to allies. There is no possibility of sending the criminal home if the populace demand justice.

The company have given also another power to the ambassadors and consuls over merchants, which free traders may not approve of. Their bye-law is, "*If any factor or factors shall have any dealings with any person battulated by the lord-ambassador, or the consul of any of the Scales (ports, Scala Italian) in Turkey, with the advices of the respective factories, such factor or factors shall pay a fine for every offence, to the amount of*

**

"thru

" *three confidages upon the value of the tranfaſſion*
 " *by or with ſuch battulated perſon, without ap-*
 " *peal,," &c. Battulation* with them ſignifies in-
 terdiction of all commerce with the perſon *bat-*
filiated. The intention was to prevent the fac-
 tors or merchants having dealings with litigious
 perſons of the country; but this power has been
 abuſed.

The ambaſſador formerly had a conſiderable
 revenue from protections granted to ſubjects o!
 the porte; under the title of Baratli, or honorary
 drogomans; but theſe protections having been
 totally diſregarded by the preſent ſultan, who
 without any ceremony has beheaded ſeveral per-
 ſons poſſeſſed of them, both that income and
 that ſource of conſtant litigation with the porte
 are partly done away. It were to be wiſhed that
 this privilege was wholly abolifhed. The French
 ſeveral times propoſed giving it up, and at a
 time when it was reflected, and lucrative to their
 ambaſſadors.

The French alſo, on the repreſentation of their
 ambaſſador, M. de St. Prieſte, laid the Levant
 trade open; the conſequence was, that immenſe
 quantities of French goods were carried to Turkey
 by ſubjects of the porte; but the company at
 Marſailles found means to get their exclusive
 privilege renewed; they had ſuffered, but the
 country had gained. At preſent every one lias

liberty to trade, and fince our fleet has left the Mediterranean, their commerce is revived, and, except the trade to Great Britain be equally free when a peace takes place, we (hall have little chance of being able to rival them ; but we muft not wait till that period arrives to lay our trade open; it muft be done immediately.

As all communication with the Levant by fea is cut off, there remains no refource to our merchants, but to carry on their trade through Ruffia; and though this be a circuitous way, it is not by far fo expenfive as might be imagined. The freights to the Baltic are very low, as half the fhips go out empty. The carriage from Riga to Cherfon, or Niccolai on the Bog, is moftly by water, and the land-carriage in Ruffia is not one-fourth of the price it is in Germany. The expence on cloth would be trifling, and on cheap and bulky goods even would not be equal to the enormous price of infurance paid for armed fhips, which *run the voyage* at prefent, and which is not equal to the rift; it is indeed fo great, that government fhould, perhaps, interfere. At Cherfon there are good veffels to be found, which in three days may carry the goods to Conftantinople at a reafonable freight.

But in order to open fuch a communication, liberty muft be obtained of the emperor of Ruffia to fend merchandize in *tranjito* (without pay-

ing duty) across Russia; and there is no doubt but that a sovereign, who has studied Adam Smith's book on the Wealth of Nations, and who is perfectly acquainted with the principles of commerce and navigation, would see the very great advantage which would accrue to Russia by such a trade, both on account of the funds which would remain in the country for expences of carriage, the employment of a number of people, and also the encouragement it would be to the Russian navigation in the Black Sea; but he never would *grant* such a privilege to a part of the British nation exclusively, and shut out from it the Russian merchants, who carry on a branch of commerce so advantageous to his empire* nor exclude his own subjects from it. Before this can be done, the Turkey company must be abolished.

At present a few goods, I am informed, have been sent to Hamburg, thence to Vienna, and down the Danube, where they are shipped for Constantinople. The freight to Hamburg is dearer than it is to Riga; the charges across Germany ten times as much as across Russia. At the mouth of the Danube there are only bad Turkish or Greek vessels to be freighted, on which no regular insurance can be made. At Cherfon there are some hundreds of vessels, among which many equal those to be found in

the ports of other seas, and a reasonable insurance may be made on them by safe underwriters; but the route through Germany does not necessitate an abolition of the Levant company.

Refuting the Inefficacy of the Quarantine Regulations in GREAT BRITAIN.

IT has been said, " if every kind of vessel have leave to go to the Levant, we shall run a greater risk of having the plague imported, than while the company exists. In the latter case there are fewer vessels, and those vessels belonging to the company, who having an interest that they perform the voyages prescribed to them, it can always be known where they have been, and under what circumstances; and such vessels being addressed to factors in Turkey, members of the company, and under its direction and the control of the consuls, they cannot in an irregular manner leave Turkey without their destination being known, and without having attestations from the consuls, (showing the state of the health of the port in the Levant from which they sailed."

In answer to this it may be observed, that in the ports of the Mediterranean, not only vessels belonging to those ports, but of all other nations,
arrive,

arrive, without any previous notice, to perform quarantine, and the length of their quarantine is regulated by the bills-of-health which they bring, and the knowledge which the officers of the health-offices have of the state of the plague in every part of Turkey.

Can it be supposed that vessels can arrive in the ports of Great Britain, without its being known whence they came? The regulations of the quarantine and of the custom-house, as they now exist, are sufficient to put this beyond doubt; besides, free vessels must bring from the Levant the same papers, showing the state of the country with respect to health, as are now required of the company's ships; the risk will not therefore be augmented by laying the trade open.

But it may be necessary to examine a little more narrowly how far our quarantine regulations secure us at present from the plague. After all that has been (aid by Dr. Ruffel, it may appear indeed superfluous to touch this subject again, but since his excellent treatise has produced no amelioration of these regulations, his arguments cannot be too much enforced. I affirm, not only from my own knowledge of the nature of lazarettos, but from the opinion of officers of the health* offices at Malta, Leghorn, and Marseilles, whom I consulted on the subject, THAT OUR QUARANTINE REGULATIONS ARE WHOLLY INEFFECTUAL*

FACTUAL, AND THAT WE ARE CONSTANTLY EXPOSED TO THE DANGER OF HAVING THE PLAGUE IMPORTED FROM TURKEY BY EVERY VESSEL WHICH COMES DIRECTLY FROM THAT COUNTRY.

1st. It is beyond all doubt established, that the miasm, effluvia, or whatever it may be called which produces the plague, may remain in an active state, so as to occasion infection, for a much longer time than is required for a vessel to load in Turkey, make her voyage, and perform quarantine in Great Britain.

2. It is equally certain that these fomites, or the impregnation of substances with pestilential miasmata, cannot be destroyed but by airing a certain time, by fumigating, by washing, by moistening with such liquors as are anti-pestilential, or by exposing to a severe cold the substances infected. Some of these means destroy the miasm in a short time, some require a longer.

3. It appears from Dr. Ruffel's remarks (and he has been delicate on this subject too) that notwithstanding all the fidelity and diligence of consuls, infected goods may be shipped without detection, and that vessels may sail for Britain with a *fair bill-of-healthy* having infected goods on board.

Now as merchandise performing quarantine in Britain and in Holland (where the regulations are

are still worse) are never opened and properly aired, it follows that such quarantines are not sufficient to destroy the fomites; nor are they of any service whatever, further than by lengthening the time; and if this be the object of our quarantines, the length of the voyage ought to be taken into consideration in establishing the length of the quarantine to be performed; nor are these quarantines safe with regard to other circumstances; for communication with those who supply the passengers and ship's crew with provisions, &c. is not sufficiently guarded against, and the passengers and the crew, though they were not infected in Turkey, are liable every day, by touching the cargo or their effects, to catch the plague, and communicate it to others; nor is smuggling impossible as the lazarettos now are established.

It does not appear that the laws of this country will permit such a police to be observed in lazarettos as is indispensably necessary to secure the country from the plague.

The officers of health have, in the Mediterranean, a power of putting to death immediately all those who violate the laws of the quarantine in such a manner as that contagion may be communicated, and their power is independent of the civil magistrate or any other authority. For the most trifling thing smuggled, or endeavoured to be smuggled, out of the lazaretto,

the

the offenders are shot dead the instant they are detected. A person escaping from the lazaretto, were it but one hour before expiration of the quarantine, is equally punished with immediate death, &c. &c. &c.*

There are neither proper places, nor buildings, nor regulations, for performing quarantine in safety in Great Britain, nor is the nature of quarantine understood in our lazarettos.

It may be asked, how have we escaped the plague since the year 1666, when the last plague in London entirely ceased? I answer, chiefly by not admitting ships with foul bills-of-health from the Levant, and obliging them to perform quarantine in the Mediterranean *since* that regulation took place, and by God's mercy only that vessels with clean bills-of-health have not brought it.

What are we to do, to be more secure in future? will then be asked. The answer is very short and obvious; to oblige all vessels coming from the Levant, whether with *fair* or with *foul bills-of-health*, to perform quarantine in Malta, in Leghorn, or in Marseilles, &c. and then with the proper attestations of the health-officers, signed also by His Majesty's consuls in those ports, to

* The humane Leopold, when Grand Duke of Tuscany, though he would not suffer a murderer to be put to death, did not alter the quarantine laws.

admit them into Great Britain without performing a fecond and ufelefs quarantine.

Trade would gain by this regulation, and we fhould be under no apprehenfion of the plague. The charges are fmall in the Mediterranean, and not more for us than for our rivals in trade.

Malta is by far the beft port to perform quarantine in; the regulations are even more *to* be relied on than at Leghorn, as they are in fome refpects more fcrupulous; it lies more in the road of veffels coming home from any part of Turkey. It is true that mailers of veffels, for many private perfons, which do not benefit their owners or the freighters, prefer going to Leghorn; but this port is confiderably out of the track of their voyage, and in war-time flips are much expofed to be captured: by the enemy. In every point of view Malta offers greater advantages *to* our trade than any other port in the Mediterranean.

With regard to Holland, moft certainly, Turkey goods, and cottons in particular, ought not to be admitted thence till they have been well aired; nor need we ever have imported fuch vaft quantities, or any quantity at all from Holland, or from any other place, had the Turkey trade been free in Britain.

A P P E N D I X .

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS.

THESSE fragments are extracts and translation. from original documents; they will serve to elucidate and confirm some passages in the preceding pages.

Of EGYPT.

TH E French have it in their power either to seize Egypt, or to make such an alliance with the beys as will open to them a communication with India.

The beys would eagerly embrace any offer which would secure to them a perfect independence of the Ottoman porte; or they would even become tributary to any other sovereign or state, who would maintain them in their separate governments, and protect the one against the other, and the whole country against the Turks* They have frequently made such offers.

Had not the domestic affairs of France engaged all the attention of that cabinet, the effects of M. de Truguet's mission to Cairo, and the treaty he concluded with Murat Bey, the 7th of February 1785, would, long ago, have been visible.

Were the Turks driven out of Europe, their force would be more concentrated; they would be stronger, and more able than they are now, to reduce to obedience those provinces, which

which at present are either in a state of open rebellion or virtual independence, and from which the Porte draws neither troops nor money; they would then be able to reduce Egypt, and to defend it against the French. In such a state of affairs, the French might perhaps obtain from the Turks a commercial communication through Egypt to India, which then would be attended with less rifle, though not with much less expence than it now is. It is not, however, probable that the Porte would, so readily as the begs, permit troops to be sent across Egypt*.

Volney says, that memorials have been kiid before the French cabinet, on the expediency of obtaining possession of Egypt. These memorials are now no secret.

The principal force of Egypt consists in 8000 horse; the Janizaries are not to be estimated as soldiers. There are not four cannons to defend the Pharos or castle of Alexandria, which, according to the regulations, should be garrisoned by 500 Janizaries, but there are never half the number. A single frigate might beat down these fortifications. This greatest difficulty a foreign army would have to encounter in keeping possession of Alexandria, is the want of water; this city has none but what is brought in canals to their cisterns when the Nile overflows. The Egyptian cavalry[^] if it had the prudence never to come to a general engagement, might render the passage across the deserts perhaps impracticable to an European army.

* Abolishing the Levant company in England, and supplying, by means, of the East India company, all parts of the Turkish empire with India goods (as some of the foreign India companies do in part) would put an end to the clandestine trade of the company's servants, and to the commercial speculations of the French, except so far as regards their own consumption; because the English East India company is able to send from London, and sell in Turkey, these goods at a cheaper rate * in they can be brought by the Red Sea or the Persian Gulph, which always must be attended with much expence and considerable risk.

When Great Britain is at war with France, this communication may easily be stopped, and the necessary steps may be taken during a truce. The extraordinary expence would not be great.

The revenues of the begs confift in a tax on land and the cuftoms, which produce about two millions fterling, of which the porte receives *very* little. Uncertain revenues are extortions under various pretexts, and thefe are not inconfiderable.

Suez is a mod miferable and defenccefs place; it has no water nearer than ten miles, and that is very brackifh, and drawn from a well. No fhips can approach Suez nearer than three miles.

Egypt produces a confiderable quantity *of* fugar, of a very good grain. Were that country under a better government, it might fupply Europe with a great quantity. The fugar-cane grows alfo very well in Candia and in Sicily, where, if the inhabitants were more induftrious, or were there enterprifing people of capital among them, this would become a product of much confequence. The fame may be faid of a great part of the coaft of Barbary.

There is a coffee-tree growing in the open air at Malta, in the garden of the French minifter, and the fruit ripens perfectly. The French have tried the experiment in Candia, and it fucceeded; probably it would grow in Sicily. It is thought that it would become more hardy, and ripen earlier, were it grafted on other trees or fhubs, and that it might be naturalized co climates lefs warm than thofe in which it is now produced, in the greateft perfection. We know that re-production has made many plants refill a colder climate better than when the parent plant was firft imported. There can be no doubt of the coffee tree's growing in Egypt. Egypt alio produces excellent flax and hemp.

Indigo has been cultivated with fuccefs on the eaftern coaft of the Adriatic, near Zante, till the planter, it is not known by whom or for what reafon, was affaffinated. Were the French poffeffed of Egypt, they might abandon their Weft India iflands.

The French court, a very few years ago, paid much attention to thefe fpeculations.

ifi. Respect-

1st. Respecting PERSIA.

THE internal disorders of Persia are favourable to Great Britain, and to assist any party, so that it should gain a preponderance, which might end in a subjugation of the whole country, is acting contrary to the English interest. The weakness of Persia is the security of India.

The Agwans (or Afgansyand Abdali being of the sect of Omar, are enemies to the other Persians, who are followers of Ali; they are now distinct nations, and have their own independent sovereignties. They are not concerned in the civil wars in Persia. They are powerful enough to impede the marching of a Russian army through Bochara to India, or the Persians from crossing the Indus. They themselves may, however, be dangerous, acting in concert with any Indian power. England should avoid quarrelling with them; but prevent, as much as possible, their having any connection with India, or receiving artillery from any quarter.

While Great Britain is firmly allied with Russia, she need not fear either the Persians, Afgans, or Abdali. A diversion made by Russia would prevent, at all times, their sending an army to India, or meddling with the disputes in that country.

A war with these Asiatic nations should be a *casus foederis* in the treaty with Russia. At present it is an exception.

2d, Respecting PERSIA.

THERE are three Persian ambassadors in Russia: one from the khan of Ghilan, one from the khan of Derbent, and one from Jafeer, khan of Ispahan.

These two last came to Kremenchuk, in the summer of 1787, after the departure of the empress, and had a pompous public audience of Prince Potemkin. The minister of the khan of Derbent was exceedingly well received by the

prince; but the other, not conforming entirely to an etiquette, which he thought was to be observed only in an audience of the empress herself, was received, and afterwards treated, with great coolness. The minister from the khan of Ghilan did not obtain permission from the prince to come to him, or to go to Peterburgh, till a little time before his death, when he sent for him to Yaffy; but on the road, hearing of the prince's death, he stopped, and obtained leave of the empress to go to Peterburgh.

The object of the mission of all these ministers was to solicit the assistance of the empress for the party of their masters, *on her own conditions*. Probably the prince kept them in suspense till he saw which party would prevail. That of Derbent will be always of importance on account of the pass it commands, and which is the only one on that side of the Caspian by land.

Almost every governor of a province in Persia has set up for himself, and refuses to take part in the quarrel, which has greatly lessened the power of the two great competitors, Mahomed Khan (son of Haffan Khan) of Maianderan, and Jafet Khan, in the fourth, and who resides at Isfahan. Mirhamud Khan is of the race of the ancient family of the Shahs, but was made an eunuch by the late Karim Khan, regent of Persia.

Since the death of Achmet Shah, of the Afgans, the country is much weakened by the partition he made of it among his three sons. Prince Naflau and M. de St. Genie proposed to gain over the Afgans to the interest of Russia, in 1791, during the dispute with Great Britain, when they proposed to the empress to send an army through Bochara to the [north of India.

They want artillery very much in Persia, and the Russians refuse selling them any at Artrakan.

Tibet Shah, of the Abdali, asked a train of artillery of the English East India company, about the time that Count Kerricrc* was sent into Persia by M. de Vergennes. He intends! to employ it against the Bocharians, who, doubtless,

Would have been affited by Ruffia. He offered to the Englifh a body of 25,000 cavalry to act againft the Mahrattas. This cavalry is excellent, and 15,000 beat near 200,000 Mahrattas in a pitched battle, fome years ago.

The French offered, by M. de Ferrieres, a large train of artillery to Jafir, khan of Ifpahan, to fecure his friendfhip. A fmall French fleet did actually come up the Perfian gulf, in June 1781, with a confiderable number of cannon on board, but Ferrieres, for want of addreff, did nor. fucceed in his million, which was as hoftile to Raffia as Britain.

Bochara, at prefent, is divided into almoft as many fove-reignties as there are villages, and there is no union among them. It is a country without ftrength, except fome enemy were to attack them in fuch a manner as to oblige them to unite.

The friendfhip of the Abdalt may be of confequence to the Englifh to cultivate, as the moft effectual check on thofe who would pafs through Bocara to invade India.

The Perfians, diffracted as their ftate is, ftill remember that they have conquered India. Timur entered India in 1398, Nadir Shah in 1738, Abdallah feveral times from 1748 to 1765.

Since this paper was written, fome changes in the fituation of thefe countries have taken place, and fuch as to make a great attention to thefe people neceffary.

3d. *Refpecting* PERSIA.

IN 1780, Prince Potemkin framed a project of opening B trade through Perlia to Bender-Bufhier, and India. Count Mark Wainovich failed in July 1781, with a fquadron of four frigates and two armed floops from Aftrakan. He ! ftopped and examined the iflands of Shiloy and Oguizzin, but found them, barren fpots; he proceeded to Afterabad ; the commodioufnefs of the harbour and the fruitfulnefs of the country, induced him to enter into a negociation with the

khan of Afterabad, who deceived him. The Ruffians, however, erected, to defend the harbour, a small fort, about fifty miles from the city of Afterabad. The caravans from Bochara, Tibet, and India, pass through Mefhd. The fleet wintered there, and returning, furveyed the bay of Bulkan, and the inlet of Karabogas.

The death of the regent (Vakiel) Karim Khan, threw all Persia into such a disorderly state, that the prince abandoned his project; but there still exists a Ruffian fortrefs at Zinzeli, with a small but sufficient garrison to defend it. A consul resides there, who is also the commandant.

Of a PROJECT, which the EMPRESS of RUSSIA had formed, to attack the ENGLISH in INDIA.

WHEN the British fleet was about to sail for the Baltic, to force the empress to make peace, Prince Nassau, who was then in favour with her imperial majesty, presented a project of sending an army through Bochara to Cashmir, and thence to Bengal, to drive the English out of India. This project was conceived and drawn up by a Monsieur de St. Genie (the person whose agents set fire to the Dutch arsenal, &c. and had formed a similar project for destroying the British dockyards and ships, &c.)

By a manifesto to be published, the empress declared that she sent the army to re-establish the mogul on the throne of India.

Little difficulty was foreseen in passing through Bochara; it was even hoped, seeing the object was to re-establish on the throne of India a prince of their religion, that they would be friendly to the enterprise: however, were they not, little apprehension was entertained of a people so divided among themselves, and who tremble at the name of Russia.

St. Genie pretended, that there were passes through the mountains, and that he had people who had been, in the country,

country, sent by M. de Vergennes. He presented with his project a map, and a *marche-route* for the army.

The emperors highly approved the plan : Prince Potemkin turned it into ridicule, because he did not wish a serious quarrel with England. Had a war taken place, it is difficult to say what the emperors might not have undertaken, if not effected, at that period.

They counted on being joined in the north of India by the discontented from all parts.

Republishing some PROJECTS *of the* RUSSIANS *on*
CHINA *and* JAPAN.

1st PAPER,

CAPTAIN BILLINGS, who was formerly with captain Cook round the world, is returned to Peterburgh, from the north-east part of Russia, and the continent of America, whither the emperors sent him nine years ago.

One of his instructions was, to find a port for establishing an admiralty; *i.e.* a port for building, putting into dock, and fitting out (ships of war and other vessels).

A captain of the navy was also sent to join him in 1787, and to examine the coast as far as the mouth of the river Amur, and to fix on a port. One, not far from the mouth of the Amur, was fixed on. Also, on the south of the Amur, they found a very fine port beyond the Chinese frontier. At length, it was determined to fix the admiralty on the American coast, either at Prince William's Sound, or Comptroller's Bay. They also found many other very fine harbours on the American coast. The emperors wrote, in 1787, to these captains, and to the commander of the Russian fortresses, that he had sent six ships from the Baltic to Kamtschatka, to co-operate with a powerful army that was to go down the Amur, and take possession of its banks to its mouth, and all the country to the left.

A great faving would accrue to the Ruffians by fending by water provifions for their fettlements, which now go by land to Kamtchatka, &c at a great expence, and two-thirds of them are often fpoiled. Beides, they propofe to open this way a trade with Japan, China, and India, and to have in thofe feas a naval force fufficient to make themfelves refpected.

Two fmall fquadrons were fitted out at Cronftadr, for Kamtchat'ca, but were prevented from failing by the Swedifh war. One of them was commanded by captain Trevanion, an Englifhman, and was to go round Cape Horn; the other by captain Malofskoi, who was to go round the Cape of Good Hope.

The einprefs acted in conjunction with the court of Spain, it feems, for Malofskoi was to go to the Philippines, and to purchafe large vcfels from the Spaniards.

The Ruffians claim the coaft of America to a confiderable diftance fouth; they have not themfelves determined how far; this probably will be fixed by the utility the claimed country may promife to be of.

id PAPER.

IN Auguft 1792, Profefibr Laxman conducted to St. peterburgh, a Japanefe mailer of a veffel, that, had fome years ago been fhipwrecked on the Ruffian coaft; they were in all fixteen failors and the mafter; five of the failors only are now alive. It was net thought proper to fend them back till they had learned enough of the Ruffian language to communicate what knowledge of their own country they were poffefed of. The mafter is a very intelligent man, but it is only by ftealth that he can be fpoken with, as the government is very watchful over him. He has brought with him a chart of the coaft of Japan, which differs fomething from thofe made in Europe,

3d PAPER,

THE emprefs has appointed the fort of Profeflor Laxman to conduct the Japanefe, in a Ruffian (hip, back to their own

own country, and to reside there as her charge d'affaires, if he is received. He has considerable presents with him, and is accompanied by several engineers.

4th PAPER.

THE charge d'affaires is returned from Japan, and has obtained leave for the Russians to send a vessel every year, to trade with the natives under the same restrictions as the Dutch.

The islands on which the Russians have possessions extend within 300 miles of Japan. They think *some day or other* they may be matters of the islands of Japan also, as they conceive the force they could bring could not be withstood by such a people.

With respect to China, an attack was much nearer; preparations *t'ov* taking possession of the Amur were actually making at Nerzhinsk, where the Russian gold and silver mines are; the chief difficulty was want of timber. The death of Prince Potemkin put a stop to this expedition:—when it will be resumed is not known; it is supposed that 10,000 Russians could march through China*.

A PROJECT of the late PRINCE POTESKIN, of purchasing from a private proprietor the Islands of LAMPEDUSA and LINOSA in the Mediterranean, and obtaining the Suzerainty of the Court of NAPLES.

WHETHER any overture was made to the court of Naples respecting this object I do not know. The project was drawn up, some time after Minorca was taken by the French, and was much approved of by Prince Potemkin, as well as by the emperors. The following particulars were extracted

* A particular account of all these matters, and a description of the countries here alluded to, from original documents, will shortly be published by Mr. Arrowsmith, with valuable maps, charts, &c.

extracted from the original paper in his possession. It probably was laid aside when the king of Naples consented to receive the Ruffian fleet into his ports in Sicily.

It was proposed to establish an order of knighthood, similar to that of Malta, for Ruffians and Greeks, but proofs of ancient nobility were not to be required. The particular institution of the order I never saw; but the empress was to be the grand mailer, and the governor of the island, for the time being, her deputy.

DESCRIPTION *of the Island of* LAMPEDOSA.

T H I S island is in Africa, in 35 degrees and 30 min. latitude; it is about twelve miles long, and five to eight broad; it is flat, exceedingly fertile, and has plenty of water; the sea on the south side is not very deep, and a vessel may anchor at a considerable distance from land; to the north it is deep all round, and the shore very bold. There is a rock a league from the W. S. W. point, but it is easily known, and may be marked: a ship may sail safely between it and the land. Three leagues off there is a high great round rock in the sea, which is a good mark. To the south there is an exceedingly fine bay, where vessels may anchor in fifteen to eighteen fathoms water, shut in from all winds except the south and south-west; the bottom is a soft sand. There is a great abundance of fish in this bay.

The shore may be easily defended all round by forts and entrenchments. At the bottom of the bay is a creek, which is capable of being made a very fine harbour, and at a small expence, nature having already done the greatest part of the work. The entrance is from the S. S. W. There is fifteen fathoms water at its mouth, ten in the middle, which gradually decreases to six, and at the extremity there is only one fathom. To the left, halfway up *the* creek, there is a point which projects half across it, behind which small vessels may anchor with safety, when the wind blows strong directly into the harbour, at which time there is a great swell in

other

other parts of it. To the left, from the entrance to the part where there is ten fathoms water, there is a shallow bay, land-locked, in which there is only three to five feet water, with a soft sandy bottom: this bay may be shut up with a temporary wall, and the bay sunk to any depth, at a small expence, and continued a great way into the island, so as to form a large port for ships of any draught of water, the land being but a little above the surface of the water, and of a proper kind to admit of digging. Docks may also be formed by simply excavating the earth. The surface of this bay is never more than ruffled by the most violent gales of wind.

The entrance of the creek or port is ninety fathoms broad, and half a mile in length; the right-hand shore is a rock, and near it is a hill of stone with a church on it; this being fortified, would defend the harbour and command the land.

Vessels may anchor in the bay all the summer; and in winter, when too violent a storm comes on from the south or south-west, they may go to the north, round the island, and keep in as close under shore as they please; when the wind has changed, they may safely run in; they may also bear away for Linosa, about twenty miles distant, and which lies exactly in the direction these winds blow. The coast of Linosa is so bold, that ships may fall on shore; large vessels are, however, not more exposed at Lampedosa than in the road of Leghorn.

There are only ten or fifteen inhabitants on the island: they are Maltese; one of them is a priest, and they have a passport of protection from France. The Barbary cruisers go often into this port as well as the Maltese vessels, and ships which come from Turkey with the plague on board, till the sickness has ceased, when they return to Turkey, and thus save their ships and cargoes from being burned, which would be the case were they to go into any harbour where there is a quarantine.

The situation of Lampedosa is the most advantageous possible; it is 100 miles from Sufa in Barbary, from Gior-
genti

genti in Sicily and from the great port of Malta; 600 from Toulon, from Algiers, and the entrance into the Archipelago j from Gibraltar, Alexandria, and Conftantinople, 950; from Tripoli, Tunis, and the fourth point of Sicily, 160 miles.

ADVANTAGES *to* RUSSIA *in poffeffing this Ifland.*

IT is the bed fituation of any in the Mediterranean; in that respect it has all the advantages of Malta for the ftation of a fleet in time of peace or war ; Leghorn is quite out of the way ; every thing is exceedingly dear there, and the motions of the fleet are almoft immediately known in Italy and France. It is farther from France than from the Archipelago, and is in the paffage of all veffels that go to or come from the Levant.

In time of war, if the iftand fhould be in danger of an invafion, and being attacked by a fuperior fleet, the veffels ftationed there may retire to Malta or Sicily, &c. however, a fleet drawn up near the fhore may be protected by the land batteries.

It is the beft ftation for protecting trade. Veffels fcorning either from the ftraits of Gibraltar or from the Levant may be met by frigates, this ifland being in the middle way.

Magazines of naval ftores may be formed here from the Black Sea, inftead of purchasing them at enormous prices in Italy, in war-time.

Provfions will be produced in the ifland, but till that is the cafe, they may be had from Sicily or the coaft of Barbary, even in time of war, as Malta is fupplied thence, and more than two-thirds of the coft at Leghorn faved.

The Barbary powers will be kept in great awe by its vicinity, and prevented from ever daring to commit hoftilities againft Ruffia: their ports may be kept blocked up. If Malta would *cruize ferioufly* againft thefe ftates, in conjunction with the Ruffians, the Algerine cruizers could never pafs beyond thefe iflands, and Tunis and Tripoli may ho continually blocked up.

It

It is also the best situation for an emporium for Ruffian products brought from the Black Sea, for supplying the Mediterranean, and for collecting articles of return,

A lazaretto must be built, and thereby the expences of quarantine will be saved to Ruffia.

Maxims of Government to be observed.

A colony and a province of the empire are to be governed by opposite maxims.

1. The colony must manufacture nothing that can be manufactured in Ruffia, not even the raw products of the colony,

2. The colony must produce only rare articles, which Ruffia does not produce, or such as Ruffia is in need of, or its vessels.

3. The colony must take from Ruffia every thing it wants if Ruffia can furnish them.

4. The colony must trade with no other country. Ruffia must receive its produces, and either consume them or send them to other nations, and must reap the advantage of exportation and navigation.

5. The inhabitants must be drawn as much as possible from other countries, not to diminish the population of the mother-country.

6. A colony must be distant enough from the mother-country to become a nursery for seamen, but not so far off as that the voyage may injure their health: its climate must be healthy, that its advantages may not be counterbalanced by the loss of those of the mother-country who visit it. It must be in a different climate from the mother-country, or these maxims will be oppressive.

Laws for the Colony.

IN establishing the government, regard must be had to the genius, customs, and morals of the neighbouring Christian nations,

1. No duty whatever shall be paid, neither on importa-

tion nor exportation of any kind of merchandise. Duty is to be paid in the Ruffian ports as now, or with such diminutions as shall be judged necessary.

2. It is prohibited to make use of, or to have, any utensil or instrument of iron, brass, &c. or any cloth, linen, or fait-cloth, not made and imparted from Ruffia, with the exception of silks and other merchandize not produced or manufactured in Ruffia, which may be had from the neighbouring countries, of which a list shall be made.

3. No foreign vessels (except in time of war, and by stress of weather) shall be permitted to enter the port, except it be empty of all kind of merchandize, and then it shall have no communication with the colonies, till after it has been visited by the Ruffian vessels, in need of assistance, shall receive it; but they shall be considered as in quarantine as long as they stay, Passengers, after the quarantine has been performed, according to the place they came from, may land with their baggage, but not with merchandize.

4. Foreigners may purchase merchandize in the island, except the products of the islands, and export them in their own vessels, which arrived empty.

5. Foreigners or Ruffians may import into Lampedosa merchandize from Ruffia or elsewhere, only in Ruffian vessels,

6 Only Ruffian vessels may export products to Ruffia, "The cargo unloaded in Ruffia must correspond to the note of the cargo given by the government of the island, and they must not carry it elsewhere, nor sell any to pay charges in port they may by distress put into, but they may mortgage the produce of the sale in Ruffia.

7. The products of the island must be registered before the harvest, or the bringing them into warehouses from the fields.

8. Any person, of whatever nation or religion, may become an inhabitant of the island, and leave it when he thinks proper; but his residence in it shall not give him a right to have the Ruffian flag for a vessel, large or small.

9. Every

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9. Every individual, who shall be possessed of a house, or land cultivated, to the Value of five hundred roubles, shall be entitled to have the Russian flag for one vessel of forty tons; if he possesses house or land to the value of 1000 roubles, one of eighty tons; and for larger possessions, one or more vessels in the same proportion. Who lends his name to others shall forfeit the value, and the borrower shall forfeit the vessel. Property, which has given a right to have the flag, shall not be sold before the passports of the vessels have been delivered up to the government, and the vessels return to the port of the island. No proprietor of a vessel is obliged to go himself to sea with his vessel.

'10. He who shall send his family to Russia, or another family in its stead, consisting of a male under thirty-five years of age and a woman under twenty-five, or a man of any age and a woman under thirty years of age and one child, or of thirty-five with two children, or the man and woman of any age with three children, who shall become naturalized subjects of the empress, and shall buy in Russia immovable property for 500 roubles, under the same restrictions as property in the island with respect to the sale, such sender shall have the Russian flag for a vessel of any size under 200 tons, and for a larger vessel in proportion for several. Neither the persons sent to Russia shall be answerable for the conduct of the sender, nor the sender for the conduct of the sent.

In the year 1779, a project, of a peace with the Barbary States was presented to the empress by Prince Poiernkin, who was at that time very ardent in promoting the trade of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean in Russian vessels. There were no humiliating conditions in this arrangement, as there are in most of the treaties of other nations. The empress gave for answer, that she would never make any arrangement whatever with those powers; that *if* they took her mercantile vessels, she would know how to force the porte

to oblige them to observe the stipulations of the treaty of peace; and that rather than send a negotiator to them, they would send a fleet of frigates-

The number of failors in the different ports of Italy is much greater than is generally imagined; there are above 10,000 in the two Sicilies? Maka generally furnishes to Spain 6000 excellent seamen.

From the Coast of the Adriatic, about Ragusa, Preveza, &c. the French have for many years imported a great quantity of the most excellent oak-timber; there is, indeed, no finer timber any where to be found for the purpose of (ship-building, than that which grows in those parts in great abundance.

A PLAN *for attacking the* TURKISH FLEET IN *the Port of* CONSTANTINOPLE;

IT will serve no good end to publish the details of the intended operations of the Russian fleet in the last war. The following particulars will sufficiently shew the probability there was of their being crowned with success.

The channel of Constantinople is of different breadths; from about one to three miles, and runs between high hills, at the foot of which are batteries, from the entrance at the Black Sea to Serrieri (a village near Buyukdere.) The north and north-east winds blow down the channel nine or ten months in the year. The southerly winds, which blow up the channel when they reign, seldom last more than two or three days at a time; the north and north-east winds, on the contrary, are generally constant for two or three months, so that a fleet coming from the Black Sea at the proper season

Son is almost certain of a fair wind to enter the channel and the port of Constantinople.

The current is very strong from the Black Sea, except when the wind has blown two or three days from the south, when there is a current from the Sea of Marmora. The stream divides at the point of the *feraglio*; a part of the water runs into the sea of Marmora, and a part is forced into the port, making, on the Constantinople side, a tolerably strong current, which runs towards the bottom of the port, and coming out again on the Galata side, and by an under-current, occasions an eddy or still-water in the middle; hence it is, that ships cannot fail at once from the port, but must be towed or warped in the still-water close to the shore of Tophana, till they are so far up the stream (that is, to the northward) that they can make fall without danger of being carried against the *feraglio* point (as has sometimes happened) and where there is a perfect torrent.

From this description it is evident, that a fleet coming from the Black Sea down the channel of Constantinople, with the wind and current in its favour, could with ease fall straight into the port; that the Turkish fleet in the port cannot go out to meet it in the middle of the channel, but by towing (slowly up the shore, while the enemy's fleet coming down will have, within a few fathoms of it, the wind and current in its favour, and will be able to cast anchor, and form in whatever manner the commander may judge most advantageous.

If the Turkish fleet is not in the port, but lies in the channel in the stream, where it usually is stationed before it falls in the spring (or the Archipelago, three or four miles above the port, the Russian fleet may anchor at what distance it pleases from it, either to attack or not, while the Turkish ships cannot possibly advance against the current, not even by warping. In such a situation they are exposed to fire-ships, and if any part flip their anchors to avoid being burned, they cannot again get into the line; the rest must follow them, if they will preserve their line;

As

As to the batteries on the two shores, they may be passed so rapidly, and at such a distance, that nothing is to be feared from them ; but as the water is deep enough to admit line-of-battle ships to lie quite close to them, and the shore is perfectly clean, they may be soon silenced, and particularly as only one or two guns in the flanks can bear on a ship before it comes opposite to them. The stones of which they are built are hard and exceedingly brittle; they are also so low and so exposed, that a ship with grape-shot may soon drive out the gunners.

In the first winter of the last war, a Russian sixty-four gun ship was dismasted in a violent storm in the Black Sea, and the officers being ignorant of the Turkish ports on the coast of Anatolia, saw no other means of saving their lives than by running into the channel of Constantinople. The ship entered it with a fair wind, but having only jury-masts, she sailed very slowly, yet the Turkish batteries, though they kept up a constant fire on her, did her not the least injury ; when she had run by all the batteries, she cast anchor in the bay of Buyukdere, and surrendered herself. The captain was afterwards blamed for not sailing by Constantinople, and attempting to run between the forts of the Dardanelles, and get into the Archipelago.

This example puts the matter beyond doubt, as to the possibility of a fleet sailing by these batteries, reputed so tremendous.

STATE of the RUSSIAN ARMY, January 1795,
according to the Registers of the College of
War, from the Reports of the different Corps.

Regiments.	Number in	of Men pay
19 of artillery	38,110
11 grenadiers, of 4075 men each.	- - -	
3 grenadiers, of loop to 3000. men each		

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Regiment*.	in	Number of Men pay
51 mufketeers, compofed of 10 companies of mufketeers and 2 companies of grenadiers, each regiment being compofed of 2,424 men - - - - -		139,592
7 mufketeers wthout grenadiers - - -		
x mufketeers, of 4 battalions, 4,143 men - New arquebufiers, fo called - - - - -		5,879
12 battalions of mufqueteers, of 1,019 men		16,653
3 battalions of mufqueteers, of 1,475 men		-3
48 battalions, infantry in garrifon on the frontiers		7 82,393
10 in the country - - - - -		3
9 corps of chafTeurs (jager) of 4 battalions of 998 men, each 3,992 - - - - -		35,928
3 battalions of chafTeurs - - - - -		2,994
5 cuirafliers (of 6 fquadrons) of 1,106 and 1,125 men - - - - -		5,490
10 dragoons (of 10 fquadrons) of 1,882 men -		
2 with huffars and grenadiers mounted - -		23,575
8 carabiniers (of 6 fquadrons) of 1,106 men -		,
8 carabiniers (of 5 fquadrons J of 938 men		
2 huffars, of 1,119 men -		
5 fquadron huffars 1		2,722
I fquadron huffar de corps - - - - -		
4 regiment chaffeurs a cheval, of 1,838 men -		7,352
5 light-horfe (of 6 fquadrons) of 1,047 men -		5,235
6 cavalry of the Ukraine, of 1,047 men - - -		6,282
16 regular Cofack cavalry - - - - -		30,883
Troops to guard the country (marechauffee) -		22,216
In the new provinces acquired from Poland at the firft partition, viz.		
6 brigades of 1,819 men - - - - -		
5 brigades light-horfe, of 1,098 men }		23,360
4 of infantry, of 1,447, &c. in all - - - - }		
Invalids in garrifon - - - . . . -		3,864
Soldiers'fons at fchool for fervice - . - -		16,8x6
Troops to affift the commiflaries, &c. - - -		1,258
Total regular troops - - Men		541,737
K K		Irregular

	Number of Men,
Brought over -	541,731
Irregular Coffaks cavalry - - - - 21,625	} 46,601
Irregular troops of the Don Coilàks cavalry, ail in actual fervice - - - 24,976	
A great number of other irregular troops, all cavalry, as Calmuks, Balkirs, &c. &c. not enrolled, but ready when called out ; they receive no pay ; at leaft - - - - • - .	} 100,000
Men - -	688,332

Of the regular troops there are about 300,000 men, who may be fpared for foreign fervice,

The cavalry is never complete in horfes, and particularly in Poland.

The irregulars are generally over-complete in time of wari both men and horfes.

In 1796, there were 150,000 recruits raifed for the infantry.

The prefent emperor has ordered all the régiments to be completed ; and has eftablifhed fuch régulations that his orders muft be obeyed. He has corrected all the abufes that exifted in the army, which is now infinitely more formidable than it was when he afcended the throne.

A very great part of the empire has not yet contributed in furnifhing troops for the army, fo that the number of regular troops may be greatly increafed, whenever a fill *more* formidable military eftablifhment may be neceffary.

LIST of the RUSSIAN FLEET, fitted out at Cronftadt, to cruise in the Baltic, in 1795.

<p>100, gun (hips, Evfevie. Vladimir. Saint Nicholai. Saratov. Refteflav. Jre Erarkov.</p>	<p>74 gun fhips. Pobedoflav. Prince Guftaf (Swecjiw) Boris. Sophia Magdalena (Swedilb) Vfeflav. Jaroilav.</p>
<p>74 gun (hips, Makfim Izpovednik, Sifoi Velikoi. Conftantine. Saint Peter.</p>	<p>66 gun (hips. Omgeten (Swedifh) Proxor. fobedonocets (hofpital (hip)</p>

FRIGATES.

<p>Archangel Gabriel, Simeon. Patrick.</p>	<p>Pomofhnoi. Raphael. Venus,</p>
<p>2 cutters, Volkov and Sokole.</p>	

A LIST of the AUXILIARY FLEET, which the Emprefs of Ruffia fend to England in 1795.

<p>74 guns Pamit Eflafei. Kleb. Peter. Helena.</p>	<p>66 guns. Jona. Philip. Pimen. Parmen. Nrkonor. Revifan (Swedifh (hip) of oak.</p>
<p>66 guns. No. 82 (fo called) Graf Orlov.</p>	
<p>FRIGATES.</p>	
<p>The Archangel Michael." The Reval. The Riga.</p>	<p>The Narva, The Archipelago. The Cronftadt.</p>

CUTTERS.

<p>Mercury,</p>	<p>Letuchie,</p>
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STATE of the RUSSIAN FLEET at Sebaftopolis, in the Spring of 1796, all the old veffels being-condemned.

	Number of guns.
1 fhip of 90 guns - - - - -	90
1 — 80	80
3 — 74.	222
6 — 64.	384.
11 fhips of the line - - - - -	776
8 large frigates - - . - - - .	362
19	1,138 guns.

Befides thofe on the ftock?, which are now finifhed.

The flotilla at Odiua, or Khogia-bay.

Twenty-five very large and fixty fmaller veffels to tranfport troops.

They are iixty-four to feventy feet long, draw fix feet water when loaded, and carry one very large gun. They have a latine mainfail and gib, and twenty-four oars; befides thefe there are a great number of other tranfnorts, bomb-veffels, &c.

Since 1796 the fleet has become much more formidable.

Feb. 1798.

F I N I S .

