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NATURE AND VALUES

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by

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PREFACE

THE MILITARY, ECONOMIC, RACIAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL battles of the twentieth century are too complex to be won by any single formula. Neither heredity, nor social or economic determinism, nor Freudian suppressed desires, nor the latest or the oldest view of revelation, nor even sin, whether original or acquired, can account for all our woes. "The whole head is sick, the whole heart faint." No hobby or fad can heal our civilization.

Nevertheless, those who say that all the varied forces of life turn about one central issue are not far wrong. That issue has been called the struggle of the spiritual man against the natural man, of idealism against materialism, of religion against worldliness, of light against darkness. "Faith and unfaith can ne'er be equal powers." It is difficult to see the issue exactly. Very few men or movements are all light or all darkness, and very few can judge their own faith or unfaith fairly.

I am convinced that the spiritual conflict underlying the social turmoils of our age can best be understood in the light of a philosophy of personalism. Personality is, as Professor William Stern often said, a "complex unity." Beneath the complexity of our age is the unity of personality, human and divine, with all complexities included in individual co-operating "experients"—to use James Ward's word for selves. The age is marked by a heightening tension between personalism, idealism, and theism on the one hand and impersonalism, dialectical materialism, and naturalism on the other.

Nature and Values is an attempt to help the reader to

understand some of the issues in this great struggle, and to see the grounds for a thoroughgoing personalism. He must decide for himself whether naturalism or personalism offers a better account of the energies and ideal possibilities of our universe. The problem of Nature and Values has been translated by events into that of Atomic Bombs and Personal Responsibility. Intelligent faith in personality is necessary to life itself.

The author is deeply indebted to President Umphrey Lee and Dean Eugene B. Hawk of Southern Methodist University for their gracious invitation to deliver the Fondren Lectures of 1945, thus giving him an opportunity to work out his thought on these vital problems. The courtesy and helpfulness of these gentlemen, as well as their willingness to allow the author to develop the book at greater length than the lectures, are deeply appreciated. A word should be added in gratitude to Dr. R. E. Diffendorfer of the Division of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Board of Missions and Church Extension. The germ of the thought of the present work is found in my chapter on "A Christian View of Nature" in the Merrick Lectures for 1943, *Christian Bases of World Order*. The development of its theme into the present work is partly due to Dr. Diffendorfer's encouragement.

Assistants and friends who have co-operated in preparing this book for publication are so numerous that they must be left nameless and thanked wholesale for their labors in these difficult times. Because of them it is to be hoped that the reader will find his task of reading somewhat less arduous than it might have been—although there is no road to thinking that is easy and simple.

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Chapter I

TWO WORLDS

"WAR," SAID HERACLITUS, "IS THE FATHER OF ALL AND king of all." Hobbes tells of a "war of all against all," Bunyan of a "Holy War." Man has always been at war against himself. Every human heart is a scene of warfare and struggle. Even when the individual seems to have achieved inner peace and unity, so that his instincts, impulses, and desires are all marshaled under a single united front, it is a front united against some enemy. He who is wholly devoted to his country is in a state of declared or undeclared warfare against his country's enemies, whether local traitors or foreign foes; he may even wage war against God, if God is inconvenient to his patriotic devotion. Again, he who is wholly devoted to God is committed to a holy war of the spirit against everything opposed to God's will. But very few men are wholly devoted to any cause. Behind the seemingly united front of the public façade of most human beings is the inner life of temptation, doubt, fear, and discord which the strongest feel yet hide. Whether sincere or insincere, strong or weak, wholly or partly devoted to a cause, man's life is a struggle.

Educators have for centuries been aware of man's divided nature and have been seeking for ways and means of taming it and bringing it to some sort of order and unity. From Moses, Confucius, and Plato down to European universities, the National Education Association, and the American Philosophical Association, teachers of humanity have been trying to instill into each generation

habits based on information, wisdom, justice, and co-operation. The results thus far have been what we see in the world around us—a strange mixture of good and evil. It would be as foolish to blame all of the evil on the educators as it would be to deny them all blame. The human situation is a result of many complex causes, and is continually being remade by new factors and new decisions. No one can deny that the educational leaders and educational systems have been prominent among the causes of the mingled defeat and victory which the human soul has experienced in the warfare between order and disorder. Even religious educators have fallen short.

The results of education are not unified, partly because education is not unified. John Ulric Nef has written a striking little booklet called *Universities Look for Unity*.[1] On its cover is a yang-yin symbol, with the upper portion inscribed, "Universities Look for Unity," and the lower portion, "Unity Looks for Universities." There are, it is true, many good, sound, respectable reasons why education should not be unified. Too much unity destroys freedom, imposes regimentation, crushes life and growth.[2] No thinking man would have felt at home in a Nazi university, where, according to the latest available catalogue, "every teacher must conceive and present his subject in the spirit of our [National-Socialist] World View." We can easily see the vice of too much unity, especially when it is the unity of a false view. We can also see that a compulsory unity based on truth (supposing that we know the truth) would be stagnating and stifling in its effects and would lead to wars just as deadly as those based on unity in error.

Over against the peril of too much unity (against which

[1] New York: Pantheon Books, 1943.

[2] See Aristotle's attack on communism (*Politics*, Bk. II, the early sections).

Aristotle warned) there is the counterperil of too little unity (which was Plato's chief enemy). It is this peril from which education has been suffering in the twentieth century. The growth of specialization, the subdivision of every field into lesser fields, the competing departments within universities, the demand for originality which may come to set a premium on difference and disunity, the emphasis on the free self-expression of each individual, and the exclusive reign of the experimental method in many quarters, could not fail to bear fruit in the minds and lives of young persons educated in such an atmosphere. All of the just-named factors making for disunity in our culture are, taken by themselves, admirable. The confusion cannot be banished by forbidding specialization, originality, and experiment. Nor can a ready-made cure for the disease be prescribed in some handy formula. The present book embodies an attempt to explore some of the grounds for disunity in modern culture and education and to test some possible remedies.

That serious disunity exists beyond the field of education needs no proving. But the disunity is well exemplified by our divided education; and the demands of a wartime economy have made that disunity glaringly evident. A large part of our education is devoted to understanding what we call nature, another part to man's ideal strivings in art, literature, music, morality, religion, and philosophy. According to the Bible, nature was created first, then man. In Greek philosophy, the Ionian physicists of Miletus studied nature (the Greek *physis*), and Pythagoras saw the numbers in the music of the spheres long before the Sophists and Socrates came to think that man or man's rational thought is the measure of all things. Democritus worked out a neat natural philosophy of materialism, but his theory of values was no more than a repetition of the best in the conventional mores of the Greeks. First nature,

then man and his ideal yearnings; this order is confirmed by the calculations of modern geology which deal with the scores of millenniums before man's appearance, in such manner that Sir James Jeans can compare the ages prior to man to the height of an obelisk, and the age of man to the thickness of a piece of paper placed on top of the obelisk.

The mere knowledge that nature precedes man is not by any means enough to account for the disunity in our culture. Not even primitive savages have believed that man is as old as nature, yet many primitive cultures are more unified and coherent than ours. It requires a developed civilization, as we call it, to engage in relentless, suicidal, brutal warfare—a warfare in which nature and ideals are involved in a common disaster: nature brings death; ideals are betrayed. Only a highly complex civilization can achieve the incoherence of our times—an incoherence all the more tragic because prophets, seers, poets, and philosophers of all races and ages have seen plainly the need of coherence and co-operation among men.

Whence the disunity? It is partly because the greatest theoretical minds of the race have been devoting themselves to a study of nature while neglecting the study of the good. Meanwhile the most powerful political and social leaders have neglected both nature and the good, and have made instinctive urges or economic ambitions the basis of their policy rather than a reasoned pursuit of the good. The race has put its mind on nature, while giving itself almost mindlessly to unexamined desires. We have forgotten the Socrates who taught that an unexamined life is not worth living as well as the Jesus who forbade casting pearls before swine. The result, in society and in the individual, is a divided soul. Man is arrayed against himself.

TWO WORLDS

I

Despite the struggle and division in human nature, the history of human culture has been the history of a search for unity. A primitive society forms itself into a relatively homogeneous whole, presenting a united front against nature and against other societies. The mores of the group are, in the main, a rigidly consistent system. When man's mind is eventually freed from the narrowly human and social and becomes concerned about the world of nature which nurtures all societies, the quest for unity becomes more pronounced, and Thales and the other Ionian physicists seek to find some one principle, or some one law, by which the diverse processes of nature may be unified. Water, air, number, *logos, nous,* God—whatever it be, there must be some unifying source and explanation of the whole.

The quest for nature's unity had its effect on the Greek, and Pericles, as Thucydides reports, saw in the Athenian a unified human being in whom a unified cultural heritage comes to its fruition. It is the proud heritage of democracy. "We Athenians," said Pericles, "decide public questions for ourselves." As Greeks strove for unity of understanding and unity of culture, so did the Chinese—in the Way, the Tao, of Lao-tse, or the ideal of the Superior Man, taught by Confucius. So did the Indians, in their sense of oneness with Brahma. So did the Persians, with their confidence in the victorious struggle of light (Ahura-Mazda) against darkness (Ahriman). So did the Hebrews, with their faith, "The Lord our God is one Lord." So did the Aztecs, who believed that the Infinite Ometeuhtli "penetrates equally the heart of man and the rocks." [3]

[3] See Ramos, *Historia de la Filosofía en México* (1943), pp. 10–15.

The quest for unity not only dominates races and cultures; it even transcends them. When the philosopher Diogenes was asked where he came from, he replied, "I am a citizen of the world"—a cosmopolitan. In a far nobler way Christianity transcended racial distinctions in its ideal of unity: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus." It soon became evident to Christians that this unity would not be attained in secular society, and that even the magnificent administrative unity of the Roman Empire was doomed to decay. Then St. Augustine descried the *civitas dei,* the City of God, as the true home of unity. The later effort to restore secular unity through the Holy Roman Empire turned out to be, as has often been said, neither holy nor Roman nor empire, and the working unity of the Middle Ages was not the Empire but the Roman Catholic Church.

Modern times began when the unity of the Church was confronted by the unity of the conscience, and the Reformation of Martin Luther was followed by the unity of scientific method in the exploration of nature. New unities arose: nations; world empires, like the British Empire; and sinister and aggressive unities—the unity of Fascist or of Shinto fanaticism, the unity of race ("the myth of the twentieth century"), or the unity of common hatred, greed, and revenge.

However these unities may be or have been intended, none of them have succeeded in obliterating the conflict and struggle of man's life, except in so far as certain experiences or moods—mystical, ecstatic, trustful—enable man for a while to rise above the conflict or to forget it. But the conflict is always there. In fact, there would be no need to seek for unity unless there were powerful forces of disunity at work.

II

We seek for unity, but we also recognize duality. Rather, we struggle for unity because duality tears us asunder. A fundamental fact of human nature is its civil war. William James tells of the sick souls and the healthy-minded, and he tells us that "in many persons, happiness is congenital and irreclaimable." [4] James is undoubtedly right in distinguishing two types of religious experience. There are the predominantly sick and divided souls, and the predominantly unified and happy. Again, there are happy nonreligious souls, who do not think of God but are happy because they have been cared for all their lives, protected from harm and sickness, provided with ample economic means, and isolated from imaginative sympathy with the underprivileged. Such was Prince Gautama before he left his palace and faced the woes of life. It must be admitted, then, that there are individuals, both religious and nonreligious, who experience almost unbroken happiness. Such individuals are, however, much rarer than James's statement would imply. Many who seem calmly happy are persons of iron will who control their emotions and temptations. Some have found divine power to conquer their lower selves. Some derive their happiness from the fact that they are protected by many others who slave, toil, and die in order that the privileged few shall not suffer. The point is that these healthy-minded souls provide no evidence against the view that conflict is the fundamental fact of life. Some are "healthy" because they have found how to face the conflict and win the victory over inner and outer enemies, some because others fight the battle for them. No one is happy merely because there is no conflict.

[4] *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902), p. 79.

The duality of life—the goals of our highest aspirations and the obstacles in the way to achieving them—has been felt by everyone. There is no human being who does not suffer and who does not sin. Many religions have made the duality of existence their central theme.[5] Ometeuhtli was bisexual. The Chinese have long believed in the yang and yin—the yang being the active, male principle representing heaven, light, and warmth, and the yin being the passive, receptive, female principle of earth, darkness, and cold. Crude as is this conception, it furnishes vivid symbols of the tensions and oppositions within the human world. The Persian religion, with its principles of light and darkness, has already been mentioned. The idea of Satan, as an adversary of God, doubtless came over into Judaism and Christianity from Persian sources. The dogma of original sin, whatever its further meaning may be, certainly expresses division, contrast, and struggle.

Our tradition of duality is not solely derived from the Orientals. It is, if anything, even more indebted to Plato, whose sharp contrast of the world of sense and the world of thought—of phenomena and noumena—has affected most religious philosophy down to the present. Plato's myth of the cave (in the seventh book of the *Republic*), contrasting the shadows of sense in the cave with the light of the sun of reason in the world above is known to every educated person, as is his figure (*Gorgias* 493A and *Cratylus* 400C) comparing the body with a tomb (*soma, sema*), in which the soul is buried for this life but from which it may be released. In addition to the dualities of sense and reason, soul and body, there is the equally famous duality of nature and art, which Aristotle sets forth in the first chapter of the second book of his *Physics*. Theologians have spoken of the realm of nature and the

[5] See the treatment of dualism in C. H. Toy, *Introduction to the History of Religions* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913), pp. 452–60.

realm of grace—contrasting what man is of himself and what he is with divine aid. Leibniz and Kant laid chief stress on the distinction between the moral order, which Leibniz called the realm of grace, and the natural order of the world of sense, a distinction which obviously roots in Plato as well as in the New Testament. Kant often speaks of the realm of freedom as opposed to the realm of nature—the intelligible world as opposed to the world of sense—and thinks of man, even while he lives in this world, as called to be a "citizen of a better world." Hegel contrasts, yet relates, Nature and Spirit.

In some form the duality of life appears in every philosophy. For example, Alfred North Whitehead teaches that every "actual occasion" has both its physical pole and its mental pole. An extensive literature has grown up around the idea of polarity. Man's life is a series of tensions: religion, philosophy, peace, war, social and individual experience, mental health with its normal control and mental disease with its mental disintegration—all bear united testimony to this truth. John Bunyan saw clearly when he compared the spiritual life to a "Holy War"; St. Paul was realistic in his emphasis on need for the "whole armor of God."

III

The facts of duality in human experience are far too complex to be reduced to a single formula. Nevertheless, a great many of those facts come to expression in the historically famous point of view called metaphysical dualism, in which mind and matter are set against each other as irreducible and forever distinct types of being. Our brief survey of the idea of duality has shown that Zoroaster and Plato held to a kind of dualism, but the term itself is relatively modern. Thomas Hyde seems to have

been the first to use the word "dualism" (in 1700), applying it to Zoroastrianism; Bayle and Leibniz continued to use it thus; while Wolff, later in the same eighteenth century, first took it to mean the theory that all reality is divided into mind and matter.[6] Belief in a sharp distinction between matter and mind is, however, much older than the word "dualism." It goes back at least, as has already been intimated, to Plato's view of an immaterial soul; reappears in Aristotle's distinction of form and matter; and acquires definite shape in St. Thomas' definitions of spiritual substance (soul) and physical substance, although Suarez makes clear that the soul and the body are incomplete or relative substances, as distinguished from a complete substance, which is an *ens per se existens* ("a being existing by itself").[7]

St. Thomas, however, was so much under the influence of Aristotle that he emphasized the interrelation of soul and body more than their distinctness. It was in Descartes that the modern "bifurcation of reality," as Whitehead calls it, really began. As a man of science in the times of Galileo, Descartes took physical science seriously; and his brilliant mathematical mind demanded exactness, clarity, and distinctness. He saw clearly that the laws of physics apply to a physical order and to a physical order only. The laws of matter are, therefore, the laws of things moving in space. Physical forces operate in a physical system and nowhere else; all transformations of physical energy are from one physical state to another. The physical energy of the system can be neither increased nor diminished. On the other hand, as a philosopher, Descartes was sufficiently acute to notice a truth quite different from the

[6] See the article "Dualism" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology,* and also in Runes's *Dictionary of Philosophy.*

[7] See "Substance" in E. Gilson, *Index Scolastico-Cartésien* (1913).

physical, namely, the truth of his own existence as a conscious being.

It is surprising how much vexation, annoyance, and confusion Descartes has elicited by his firm insistence that he, and every physicist or philosopher, is actually and certainly conscious. Descartes was not especially interested in what others thought of him. His life motto was *"Bene vixit qui bene latuit"* ("He has lived well who has hidden well"). All he cared about was to find what he could be sure of, and not deceive himself or be deceived. By his famous method of doubt he proved that he could doubt God, the existence of a physical world, and the existence of other men; but he found that it was impossible to doubt that he was doubting. The immediate testimony of consciousness could not be denied without destroying doubt itself. He then noticed what doubting really is: it is an "I doubt," and doubt is simply an instance of my conscious existence, and it follows that every instance of present conscious experience is just as certain as the experience of doubt. He used the term "I think" (*cogito, je pense*) to mean "I am conscious; I see, I hear, I imagine, I feel, I reason, I remember, I will, I believe, or I doubt." His fundamental certainty, then, was that of his own existence. Little did he imagine that if he should live until the twentieth century he would find himself assailed as a sort of Public Enemy Number One for his sincere attempt to find a solid basis for thought; but had he thus rivaled Methuselah he would have found that the Nazis and the late Archbishop of Canterbury were in perfect agreement in denouncing his certainty of the existence of the conscious self, although for different reasons. The Archbishop—and Roman Catholic prelates, too—would be troubled because Descartes was more sure of the human self, at the start, than he was of God; and the Nazis, because Descartes was surer of the individual than he was

of the race, the state, blood, soil, and totalitarianism.[8] Critics of Descartes are in the position of the man who did not want to admit that two and two make four until he knew what use the lawyer for the prosecution was going to make of it.

Descartes, it is true, did make troublesome and unreasonable use of his two theories, namely, that the physical world is a closed system of extended things and that the personal world is a closed system of conscious things. One certainty, the physical, came from experimental science. The other certainty came from immediate experience. The latter certainly was, it is true, more certain, more fundamental, more unchangeable in its absoluteness, than the former. There was a time when there was not any science, but there never was a time in history when human beings have not been conscious beings. Yet although the *cogito* (the "I think") is more certain than the things about which I think, there is no good reason for actual doubt of the results of physical science, however much hypothetical doubt we may indulge in.

Hence Descartes found himself in a dilemma. He had two undeniable realities on his hands: himself (all selves), and the physical world. On the one hand, the extended world cannot possibly affect the world of conscious selves: motion of matter cannot produce or change thought without contradicting the properties which all physics takes to be the sole fundamental properties of matter—mass and motion—for thought is neither mass nor motion nor any

[8] For the Archbishop's views see William Temple, *Nature, Man and God* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1934), Lecture III, entitled "The Cartesian Faux-Pas." For the National Socialist view see Franz Böhm, *Anti-Cartesianismus* (Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1938). It is one of the tragic casualties of these times that the house of Felix Meiner, publisher of the classic *Philosophische Bibliothek*—with Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Descartes himself—should be publisher of a work that not only repudiates Descartes but turns utterly against all allegiance to reason and free thought.

form or modification of them. On the other hand, the world of thinking selves, equally, cannot possibly affect the world of extended things, if thought is just what we experience it to be and things are just what physicists define them to be. How could mere thought cause a single atom in the brain or in the hand to deviate from its course, if atoms belong to a closed order of motion in space? Descartes was in despair, because he clearly saw that mind and matter could not possibly influence each other, while at the same time it is sure that they do. For how could we have any ideas about things unless the things influence our sense organs and our sense organs influence the nervous system and the nervous system influences the mind? It cannot be; yet it must be! What a dilemma!

Much modern philosophy has decided that it is best not to think about such matters; they are too troublesome. One of the popular proposals of twentieth-century American philosophy is that the way is "not through but around" the Cartesian dilemma. This is making a philosophy out of the too popular maxim "Forget it." Nothing is solved by being forgotten, and Descartes, poor man, knew it. His own solution is so unreasonable as to be fairly pitiful, but at least it was an attempt to say something. Being a physiologist as well as a physicist and mathematician, he became convinced that the pineal gland of the brain was the spot where the current of physical energy (*influxus physicus,* as he called it—"physical influx") affected the soul. What cannot possibly happen anywhere does happen in the pineal gland! Leibniz harshly remarks that "this is to hide a miracle under words that mean nothing." [9] We need not tarry with Descartes's forced, artificial solution of a profound problem; but we may pause to lament that there are so many modern thinkers—among materialists,

[9] See the article *"Influxus"* in Eisler, *Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe.*

realists, dualists, intuitionists, and theologians—who are too sure of themselves and too dogmatic to give a single thought to the problem. If matter has the properties and only the properties that physics (and the whole series of physicochemical-biological sciences) assigns to it, how can it produce or affect mind? How could mind arise even as a powerless shadow, an effect which causes nothing (as the school of "epiphenomenalists" takes it to be)? And if mind is the seat of all experience, how can it know or affect anything so utterly alien to it as matter is defined to be? Two self-sufficient economies seem to confront each other.

The common man does not trouble his head about theoretical difficulties. He may accept miracles without a quaver. Of course, he thinks, there are mind and matter; of course they are different; and of course they affect each other. But he thinks no more about them. He does not realize that the contemporary weakening of moral fiber and decay of religious faith are at least partly due to his unwillingness to grapple with the difficulties of dualism. If he has noticed Descartes, it is only to laugh at the pineal gland and pass on. Today we have reached a stage of thought and life where it is almost equally impossible either to laugh or to pass on. It may be that we need to reconsider first principles, and to conquer dualism. If the common man does not want to think about such things, at least his leaders must.

IV

It is not simply the dualism of mind and matter that has befuddled us. Thought has perceived another dualism —the dualism of fact and value, or, as the Germans have put it, of *Sein* vs. *Sollen* ("being" *vs.* "obligation"). Kant confronted the modern world with the sharp differentiation of the theoretical reason and the practical reason. The theoretical reason consists of the principles whereby

the mind understands the realm of sensation; it is reason as embodied in (Newton's) physics. The practical reason consists of an entirely different system of principles, namely, the principles of moral obligation. Through the theoretical reason we know what is and must be; through the practical reason we know what ought to be. Through the theoretical reason we know deterministic necessity; through the practical reason we know freedom and duty. Now Kant set these two worlds asunder as effectively as Descartes separated the two worlds of matter and mind. In the world of sense there is no freedom; in the world of morality there is absolute freedom. In the world of sense there are no principles of obligation; in the world of duty there are only principles of obligation. How can one mind divide its thinking so sharply? How can one world express itself so contradictorily? What *is* seems totally indifferent to what *ought to be;* what *ought to be* seems impotent to change the laws of what *is*. Kant's own solution of his dualism is on a much higher plane than the pitiful Cartesian pineal gland. Kant commits himself to "the primacy of the pure practical reason." Value, he here says, is more fundamental than nature; what ought to be (as Lotze later hints) is the explanation of what is. But unfortunately the import and bearing of this explanation is never fully worked out by Kant, and he leaves us with a mere phrase—although it is a phrase pregnant with thought and promise.

Because Kant did not explain wherein the primacy of value over nature consists, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries inherited a divided, dualistic culture. The great development of thought was destined to be in the field of the descriptive sciences, within the domain of the theoretical reason. The natural sciences rigidly excluded all consideration of good or bad, better or worse, from the subject matter of science. However noble the code and how-

ever devoted the conduct of scientists has been, the development of science has not shed any light on the nature of ideal value, although it has placed untold resources at the disposal of any individual or statesman, group or nation that cared to seek for the attainment of any ends it might happen to value. From the point of view of science, the nature of the good or of value was the forgotten problem. The methods of laboratory science do not apply to investigation of the good. The good was set aside as scientifically unintelligible.

It is true that values have been investigated, even by descriptive sciences. Sociology and anthropology refer to mores; history gives an account of moral values; psychology describes value experience; but none of these sciences has in itself any means of determining which value is better and which worse. Inquiry into such questions was turned over to the "normative sciences," so called—logic, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion—and the general name of axiology was given to the theory of the nature of values, ideals, and norms. At the same time, the tendency of many scientists has been to take normative sciences lightly. In fact, one often hears it said that science cannot by its methods deal with questions of value; then values are turned over to "philosophy"; then it is said that "philosophy" is vague, unintelligible, certainly unscientific, probably meaningless. Thus, for many, the dualism of fact and value results in a disciplined knowledge of fact and the most arbitrary and subjective feelings about value.

The same dualism appears in a very different form in theological tradition, especially in "neosupernaturalism," so called. Here the primary stress is laid on human sin. The dualism between fact and value means, for theologians of this type, the actual, incurable tendency of human nature to violate ideal values, whether by some hereditary necessity (original sin) or by voluntary choice.

Both from the scientific and from the theological points of view that have been mentioned, there is a fundamental cleavage between what is and what ought to be, or, to put it otherwise, between nature and value.

V

Over against this feeling of a hopeless division within man's knowledge and man's world, there has always been a tendency away from dualism toward some kind of monism. Yes, the mind of man admits, there are divisions, there are conflicts, there are varieties of experience, there are struggles and tragedies and defects; but it is all one world, common laws prevail everywhere, and there must be some common meaning, some unity, some purpose or principle which will give integrity to the mind and order to the universe. Great dualists like St. Thomas and Descartes had found in God the unifying substance, the one and only explanation of all the relative dualisms; but modern thought found their initial dualisms too extreme, and their views of God too abstractly remote from experience. The development of thought, according to Hegel, moves from an asserted dualism or duality, through struggle, to some sort of synthesis. Among the complex and conflicting interests of the human spirit, the desire for unity, expressed as a search for synthesis and reconciliation, has been a profound force influencing its development.

It might seem that the contrary was the case—that the demand for freedom, nationalism, and individualism was the chief force in modern times. The Protestant Reformation is often cited as a case in point. The Reformation was a breach in the unity of ecclesiastical organization; but it was occasioned by an already-existing breach within the conscience of man between his moral insight and the forms of the Church, and a breach between man and God

which could not be healed by priestly mediation. The Pilgrim Fathers who left England for Holland, left Holland for Plymouth, England, and then left Plymouth in old England for Plymouth in New England, were called Separatists. They separated from the English Church, not because they liked separation, but because they sought unity within their own souls and in their own community. Contemporary with them, Tommaso Campanella in Italy had a vision of unity, too. He thought that the truth must be one, and he related the revelation of truth in nature, the living book (*codex vivus*), to the revelation of truth in the Bible, the written book (*codex scriptus*). He raised doubts about the absolute authority of Aristotle. He dreamed of an ideal, unified state, the "city of the sun." In thanks for his aspirations, society kept him in prison for twenty-seven years of his life, in fifteen different prisons. He was tortured on the rack seven times, although he was freed in 1626. Humanity has paid dearly in the past for its search for unity. The wars of the twentieth century are part of the price that man has to pay for refusing to learn to conquer his dualisms.

As has been implied in the foregoing, social dualisms and intellectual dualisms have been part of one and the same struggle. My present purpose is to sketch briefly how man has sought intellectually to overcome the perplexing dualisms of matter-mind and fact-value. The predominant aim of philosophy has been to conquer what Whitehead has called "the bifurcation of nature" for which Descartes is so largely to blame. The two main systems of thought which have striven for unity are called by the familiar names of idealism and materialism. To state the case oversimply, idealism is the view that everything, including matter, is mind; materialism is the view that everything, including mind, is matter. The two views have in common a rejection of dualism and a conviction that

what we call mind and what we call matter somehow belong together in one order.[10]

It is not the aim of the present chapter to explain or defend either of these views. The problem is before us. Natural science, history, psychology, and the social and individual experiences on which they are based, have revealed to us apparent dualisms—contradictions, wars, divisions. It has been said that a "house divided against itself shall not stand." Here is our problem. Is man's world broken into two worlds? Is his house such that it cannot stand? Are dreams of unity mere dreams? Or is our duality a nightmare from which we shall waken? Antonio Caso, the distinguished Mexican philosopher, has written a thoughtful book called *El peligro del hombre* (1942), *"The Peril of Man."* The learned Argentine Francisco Romero desires to found an "Institute of Crisis" for the study of the recurrent breakdowns of civilization. Man is indeed in peril, in constant crisis. Is there a way out of the crisis of his perilous world into a living unity?

[10] There is a third type of modern thought, chiefly represented by American neorealism, which seeks to achieve unity by denying that either mind or matter is ultimate, and by assuming that the truly real is made up of "neutral" entities, neither physical nor mental. This neorealistic view is no longer widely held. However, another standpoint, called logical positivism (a modern revision of Comteanism), has, in various forms, been adopted in many quarters. It is not an additional attempt to solve the problem of mind and matter or of fact and value, but is a bold denial that there is any such problem. A positivist holds that the only objects of knowledge are what we can perceive by sense; "matter" and "mind" and "values" are therefore all meaningless terms and there can be no dualistic conflict between things that do not exist. But the positivistic argument is self-contradictory. Positivists defend their view on the ground that only sense data can serve as a basis for communication among human beings, or, as they call it, "intersubjective intercourse." However, communicating subjects, or persons, are beings who think and understand. Thinking persons cannot be observed as sense data. That is, if positivism is true, it is impossible to argue for it on the ground of its utility as a basis for communication. In fact, positivistic writers have failed to show how positivism can avoid solipsism—the belief that nothing exists except the present moment of experience.

Chapter II

THE WORLD OF NATURE

WHEN MAN HAS FOUND HIMSELF CONFUSED AND TORN by divisions within himself, he has often turned to nature as a scene of dependable unity, which reveals order and fixed law to his harassed and perplexed spirit.

This turn to nature has happened repeatedly in history. In ancient Ionia, when the Greeks first began thoughtfully to search for meaning and order, Thales of Miletus looked to nature. His theory was crude enough, to be sure. Everything, he believed, is water in some of its many forms. Water is the source of life; it may appear as ice or snow or fog or ocean or life—lo, all is water! The achievement of Thales lay not in his peculiar aquatic theory but in his insight that beneath all the changes in nature there is something constant: nature is a realm of law and order on which man can depend. When Plato had divided his world into the shadowland of sensation (nature being mere appearance) and the unchangeable heaven of ideas, Aristotle turned to nature for living unity. Centuries later, when the humanistic Renaissance had revived every school and every emotion of the classical world, Copernicus and Galileo turned to nature for a more trustworthy objective reality. When Descartes in the seventeenth century had split his universe into mind and matter, Spinoza countered by reuniting the two in the one substance of nature, which he identified with God. When revolutions beset human history, Wordsworth turned to nature for calm and mystical elevation. In reaction from the idealistic philosophy of the first third of the

nineteenth century, modern thought turned to nature, and natural science experienced the most amazing development it had yet undergone. Thus nature has become a symbol of order, of life, of objectivity, of unity, of divine peace, of law, and of progress.

None of this, however, helps us to define exactly what nature is. John Dewey has truly said that the word "nature" is used in wide and loose senses. One can meet many thinkers who call themselves naturalists, but who are sincerely embarrassed and reticent when asked to define the "nature" of which their theory makes an "ism." All may well agree with Squeers in *Nicholas Nickleby*: "She's a rum 'un, is Natur." Many stop right there and fail to be much more exact than Squeers. The purpose of the present chapter is neither to debate the merits of naturalism nor to determine the degree of "rumness" in nature. Its purpose is simply to try to establish a meaning for the word.[1] If nature is a healing power, an all-unifier, a conqueror of all dualism and "bifurcation," then it is of the utmost importance to know what nature is, or at least to know what we mean when we use the word. Regardless of any merits or defects that we may ascribe poetically or philosophically to nature, we are always confronting nature, and we need to know at least what we think nature is.

I

The student of words turns first to their etymology. There is, of course, no magical revelation obtained through this means. To suppose that the earliest use of

[1] For an excellent discussion of the concept of nature (*physis*) in Greek philosophy, see Paul R. Helsel's article "The Beginnings of Personalism in Constructive Thought," in *The Personalist,* XXV (1944–45), 17–27. The reticence of naturalists in defining nature is well illustrated in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit,* ed. Y. H. Krikorian (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944).

a word reveals the ultimate truth about the object which the word refers to is to suppose that the first makers and users of language were omniscient. It is foolish to overestimate the value of philology. It is equally foolish to underestimate it, as some do, who argue that words are of little importance when compared with real things. In reply to this often-heard attack on "mere" words, let it be said that science, religion, morality, art, and social communication, yes, thought itself, would be vague and elementary, if not utterly impossible, without language in some form. Either we use symbols for what is absent, or we are confined to what is present. If we are confined to what is present, we cannot take it to *mean* anything, unless we have some language of interpretation—some words by which we think.

Here, now, is the word "nature," an English word taken from the French, which had derived it from the Latin *natura.* In the Latin (coming from *nascor,* "to be born") it originally meant birth, but it was early and much more frequently used figuratively to mean what was inherent in anything or anyone, and then it was extended to mean the order of the world. The root from which it is derived [2] is *gen-, gn-, gna-,* from which a whole family of words is derived, including genus, genius, pregnant, cognate, genesis, generate, native, and nation, as well as nature. All of these words carry with them, in some degree, the idea of birth. Nature, then, according to the word makers, is a scene of birth; she is Mother Nature. The Greek φύσις, from which our "physics" is derived, is equivalent to *natura* and comes from the verb φύω meaning "to bring forth," "to produce," or "to beget." In "physiology" we have the original association of the word with life, which has disappeared in "physics." But back of all

[2] According to C. T. Lewis, *A Latin Dictionary for Schools* (New York: American Book Company, 1916).

uses of the Latin and Greek equivalents is the idea of activity, of the process of coming into being, and along with it, implicitly, the idea of law and permanence. From the etymology we might gather that nature is what continually produces life; yet a more precise definition is needed than etymology suggests.

II

Kant remarks that "philosophy teems with defective definitions." [3] Had he lived today he might have said that our entire civilization, including philosophy, teems with lack of definitions. Kant was so generous as to hint that even defective definitions may be useful as approximations. Today it is the style to postpone all definition until the end of a discussion and then never to reach the end.

It is remarkable how many books have been written in recent times about nature without offering any definition of the subject under discussion. Many writers seem to presuppose that everyone knows the definition, so that it is not necessary to mention it. Socrates would be likely to comment on this attitude: "Certainly, everyone knows, and hence you know; so please tell me. I am the only one who needs enlightenment." Socrates would appeal in vain to many noted theologians and philosophers. Let us consider a few cases.

Theologians have written many books in which they treat of nature in its relations to God. For example, James Orr, the distinguished conservative, published in 1893 a work entitled *The Christian View of God and the World.* It is true that the word "nature" does not appear in the title, yet it would seem to be difficult to deal with the world without treating nature. It is also true that Dr. Orr remarks on page 4 that *Welt* ("world") in the German *Weltanschauung* ("world view") means more than physi-

[3] See *Critique of Pure Reason,* B759, note.

cal nature. Yet nowhere in Orr's entire book can be found an exact definition of either "world" or "nature." An even more remarkable instance is that of John Oman's book *The Natural and the Supernatural,* published in 1931. If anywhere in theological literature, one would expect to find in this work a definition of nature. How could one explain the adjective without explaining the noun? How could one say anything about the supernatural until he had said something about nature? Yet in the course of this learned and influential book, Oman has not formulated any definition either of nature or of the natural. To be sure, he says on page 2 that the natural and the supernatural "include all environment." Yet from that point on he leaves out all direct discussion of nature until page 156, where he alludes to "Kant's Newtonian phenomenal world," without telling whether or not it is what he himself means by nature. Chapter Fifteen is entitled "Evolution as a Process of the Natural," but definition is as conspicuously absent here as the very word nature is from the index. William Temple, the late Archbishop of Canterbury, wrote in 1934 his brilliant work *Nature, Man and God.* Here we find a volume explicitly devoted to an investigation of nature with no explicit definition of nature to be found in it. On page 267 the author speaks of "the World-Process" as being the "medium of God's personal action," but, so far as careful search reveals, no definition of nature is proposed.

Some philosopher is doubtless ready at this point to remark that lack of definition in the writings of modern Protestant theologians is not surprising. No philosopher, he is sure, would be so careless in his use of concepts. Let us test this supposition. Martin Heidegger, in 1929, wrote on *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics;* here one looks as vainly for a definition of nature as in theology. Perhaps American philosophers will be more exact than Germans.

If we consult John Dewey's famous Carus Lectures, *Experience and Nature* (1925), we find no clear or precise definition of nature. In fact, when commenting on his critics in P. A. Schilpp's volume, *The Philosophy of John Dewey,* Professor Dewey expresses the hope that his philosophy "does not tell much about the environing world which is discovered";[4] there is, therefore, hardly any hope of defining nature, on his view. In that same volume Dominique Parodi comes as near as possible to supplying the lack; he says that Dewey "conceives nature not as a totality of intelligible and necessary relationships, but as a succession of more or less continuous and coherent phenomena."[5] Parodi's statement is, however, a description rather than a strict definition, and so we are left about as we were.

Perhaps, someone will say, it was foolish to expect a definition from so antirationalistic and so empirical a thinker as John Dewey. Very well. Let us consult one of America's most exact and rational thinkers, Morris R. Cohen. In 1931 Professor Cohen published his most systematic and influential work, *Reason and Nature.* Here, surely, one would expect clear definitions. But the reader is astonished and disappointed to find much discussion of reasons and natures without any specific definition of either nature or reason.

It is not self-evident why there is this horror of definition among so many excellent thinkers. Whatever the ground for it may be, it is not that the meaning of the word "nature" is so clear that it needs no definition. George Boas, writing on nature in D. D. Runes's *The Dictionary of Philosophy* (1942), rightly begins his article by calling nature "a highly ambiguous term." One of the important tasks of philosophy is to remove ambigui-

[4] P. 533.
[5] P. 239.

ties from our language, and it must be said that many philosophers have failed in this important task, at least as regards the word "nature."

III

Not everyone has neglected to define what he means by nature. There has been a long tradition, both Oriental and Occidental, which more or less explicitly identifies nature with the whole of reality—all that there is. This tradition appears in its most striking and influential historical form in Spinoza, who treats nature, substance, and God as synonymous, and who teaches in Part I of his *Ethics* (Propositions XIV and XV) that "no substance can be given or be conceived besides God," and adds that "whatever is, is in God." The whole pantheistic tradition follows this line of thought. One is impressed that Wordsworth's mystical view of nature likewise assumes that nature and God are one and all. In the "Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey" the poet is "a worshipper of Nature," "knowing that Nature never did betray the heart that loved her." Nature is, or reveals

> A motion and a spirit, that impels
> All thinking beings, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things.

If we turn to twentieth century American writers, we find several who are quite explicit in their statements. Edward Scribner Ames in 1929 wrote in his book *Religion* that "the word 'natural' may be dismissed," his reason being that it has meaning only as an opposite to "supernatural," whereas Ames thinks it should be used as "synonymous with the real." [6] For him, therefore, nature means not only the "so-called physical and material" but also "the ideal, the mental, and the spiritual." Ames

[6] P. 174.

clearly sees that nature means nothing in particular when it means everything in general. Roy Wood Sellars likewise identifies nature with everything real. He says [7] that "nature is a collective term for[those] things and activities [which are empirically discoverable]." At the end of his discussion the conclusion is that "nature thus becomes identical with existence and reality." Sellars clearly believes that all that exists and is real is nature. C. Judson Herrick, the physiologist, adopts a similar usage. In an article on "What a Naturalist Means by Nature," [8] he quotes with guarded approval the statement of the late W. K. Brooks, "a naturalist of recognized authority," that "nature is everything that is," although he grants that Brooks's statement might be found to be "too inclusive and too dogmatic." Herrick himself proposes a more cautious expression, "Nature [is] the sum total of human experience." He does not seem to see that his own formulation is as much in danger of being too narrow as Brooks's is of being too inclusive. Herrick's words might be taken to mean that nature consists entirely of subjective human consciousness; but he makes clear that such is not his intention. It is a fair interpretation of his thought to say that for him nature means everything that is, in so far as human experience discovers or reveals or implies it. Nature, if not everything, is at least everything knowable or experienceable by man.

If nature really is everything there is, surely it is the part of an honest man to say so. Yet if the word is simply a synonym of "everything," there is little light shed by saying that everything is everything. There is another serious disadvantage in this terminology. If nature is everything, then, by definition, it is impossible that there

[7] In a valuable article, "Nature and Naturalism," in *The New Humanist,* VII (March-April, 1934), 1–8.

[8] *Ibid.,* (May-June, 1934), 1–6.

should be anything supernatural. But it is equally possible that all the realities that have been described as supernatural exist and are to be found as parts of the nature which has become all-inclusive by its verbal stretching. As a matter of fact, it is to be suspected that the identification of nature with all that there is turns out to be more than an innocent label. It may perhaps be an indirect way of saying that all that there is, is nature, and therefore there is no God. To dispose of God by means of a label is far too easygoing intellectually. If nature is merely a name for everything, the open-minded thinker will still seek to know whether "everything" includes such a being as men have called God.

On the whole, it is wisest to reject the undiscriminating, blanket use of the word, and to seek for a more specific meaning. It has been more usual to regard nature as an aspect of the total reality of the universe than to identify it with the whole. If it does have a specific meaning, it is better to save it.

IV

When one is looking for a specific definition of nature, he can at once call to his aid two stout allies—Immanuel Kant and Noah Webster. Kant, it is true, distinguished between different meanings of the word, as anyone must who has any respect for the historical usage. But his own fundamental meaning is based on the distinction between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom, already mentioned in Chapter I. Nature, in this sense, is the "object of all possible experience." These words need some explanation. "Possible," for Kant, means thinkable, that is, logically consistent. "Experience" means our sensations as ordered in space and time in accordance with such necessary principles as the law of cause and effect, which Kant calls categories. For Kant, then, nature is the object

to which we refer and of which we learn through our senses. In the famous passage in which Kant speaks of "the starry heavens above and the moral law within" as filling him with "ever-increasing wonder and reverence," the starry heavens symbolize nature, since we learn of the stars through our senses. The moral law, however, is not a part of nature, for it is not experienced by the senses and is not investigated by the sciences that are concerned with nature.

In harmony with Kant's use of the word is one of the numerous definitions of nature in *Webster's New International Dictionary*. Under definition 6 we read: "More narrowly, the totality of physical reality, exclusive of minds and the mental." Kant and Webster place before us a somewhat embarrassing dilemma. On the one hand, they clearly exclude from nature what cannot be perceived by sense or be logically inferred from it; hence they compel us to say that the moral life, and the personality as such, are not a part of nature. Thus we seem to be left with the dualism and bifurcation that were so troublesome in the previous chapter. On the other hand, Kant and Webster (and the historical development in general) make clear that if we do not accept some such distinction between what is nature and what is not, we shall be driven back to using nature as a synonym for everything in general. Yet it is clear that the sciences of nature are not investigating everything; they do not inquire into the meaning of the good, of right and wrong, of beauty, of holiness, of the Divine Being and his revelation. The investigations of science are directed toward what is sensuously observable. Kant and Webster are closer to scientific method than those who view nature as the whole of all possible reality.

One of the most thoughtful of recent philosophers of nature, F. J. E. Woodbridge, wrote an *Essay on Nature*

(1940). While his method of exposition inclines more to the intuitive and the mystical than to the exact, he implies a distinction between personality and nature when he speaks of the latter as "the familiar setting of human history." [9] He identifies nature with what we perceive by sense when he calls nature "pre-eminently the visible." [10] Knowledge, Tennyson had said, in harmony at once with Kant and Woodbridge and logical positivists, "is of things we see." It is debatable whether it is correct to restrict knowledge to our account of what the senses give us; but it is both clarifying and fruitful to identify nature, and therefore the object of the natural sciences, with the world of sense objects. In any event, this definition has the merit of being clear, and it is surely superior to the bad custom of talking about nature without deigning to explain what one means by the word, or using it to mean everything and then often speaking as though nature really designated something in particular as distinguished from what is not nature.

V

The convenience of having arrived at a short and useable definition should not blind us to the fact that there are questions that may be raised about the soundness of this definition. Let us face a few of them.

1. *Does not the very word "nature" falsely presuppose that nature is one being?* There is manifest among both scientists and philosophers a certain disinclination to use the noun "nature," especially against writing it with a capital letter. The naturalists who will not define nature are, of course, logically entrapped by their reluctance to abandon the adjective "natural" and its derivatives when they abandon the noun "nature." However, something

[9] P. 3.
[10] P. 60.

may be said for their position. They might argue: "We are confronting something vast, we know not what. It would be folly to define it until we have completed our investigation of it. But, although we cannot define the whole which we confront, we are able to define our methods of observation, hypothesis, experiment, and verification. These methods we call naturalistic." Many scientists will declare that their concern is not with verbal definitions, but with method. They do not care how concepts are to be carried out. They are pragmatists, experimentalists, operationalists. They make no preliminary assumptions about nature, they tell us, and they are not ready—perhaps never will be ready—with final results.

It is not our present task to deal at length with all the problems raised by this experimental and operationalist attitude toward nature. It will suffice for present purposes to point out that our proposed definition, far from being subject to the criticisms urged, is itself in harmony with the experimental method at an essential point. To say that nature is what is implied in sense experience is not to say that nature is one fixed being, or that we know from the start what that being is. Our definition serves only to identify the area in which dealings with nature begin. When we consider a quadratic equation, we are not experimenting with nature, because we are not dealing with sense data; we are dealing with objects of pure thought. When we contemplate the Golden Rule, we are not inspecting nature, although our intuition of the meaning of the Golden Rule may be clearer and more embarrassingly relevant to our duty than our sensory observation of the whole landscape which seems to rush past as we ride by it on a railroad train. But when we perform a physical or a chemical experiment, we are dealing with nature because the experiment and the apparatus used for it are objects that must be observed by the senses. Without accurate

sensory observations, there is no experiment performed in the natural sciences. We propose, therefore, to use the name "nature" for the area that can be approached through the senses.

2. *Is not this definition purely subjective?* If nature is defined as the realm of what is observable by sense, does that not reduce nature to sensation? When John Stuart Mill defined matter as a "permanent possibility of sensation," it seemed that a possibility was nothing until it was actual, and when it became actual, it was nothing but sensation. Mill, of course, was under the influence of Hume and Berkeley. Is not the proposed definition "pure Berkeleianism"? Or, to press the epithets, if we assert that the being of nature consists in sense perceptions (Berkeley's "*esse* is *percipi*"), have we not committed ourselves to that destructive adversary, that bête noire, solipsism, the theory that nothing exists except our own experiences?

There are two possible ways of dealing with this oft-raised objection. On the one hand, it may be said that sensations are not really, or exclusively, mental. A sensation may be a physical fact in the brain, or even the actual presence of a physical thing in the environment of the organism.[11] To be perfectly frank, this answer seems to me to be so false as to contradict both immediate experience and rational thought. Immediate experience is given as a process in the field of conscious attention. Furthermore, everyone who uses words with their ordinary meanings knows that when he is talking about sensations he is not talking about the things of nature. To say "I'll give you a dollar bill" makes sense. To say "I'll give you my sensations of a dollar bill" makes nonsense, and describes an impossible procedure. To say "I am experiencing sensa-

[11] This is in harmony with epistemological monism, as defined by D. C. Macintosh, for example, in *The Problem of Religious Knowledge* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1940).

tions of warmth" does not mean the same as to say "my brain is causing sensations of warmth." The former statement is immediate experience; the latter is theory, no matter how true the theory may be.

If sensations were really not in the mind, of course reference to sensations would not be subjective. But the denial of the mental character of sensation is too artificial and too contradictory a recourse to take, even for the laudable purpose of saving man from the monster Solipsism. There remains a far better alternative, which we shall state. Since sensations are in the mind, they must partake of, or be affected by, the character of mind. Two essential marks of mind are that it is able to develop powers of reasoning and that it refers beyond itself to other reality. (To use more technical language, mind is rational and it is epistemologically dualistic.) These two traits of mind dispose of solipsism. The solipsist supposes that whatever is in the mind has no meaning and no explanation beyond the mind in which it is located. But if the solipsist appeals to any meaning, he appeals to reason; and reason is coherence. Now, to suppose that sensations have no explanation beyond the mind in which they are located is to abandon all coherence; for sensations come and go in a most chaotic, formless, and incoherent manner —incoherent, that is, until the reasoning mind takes account of its act of referring beyond itself for its objects and for a rational basis for its existence. The hypothesis that sensations refer to objects of some sort, and that they are produced by some sort of reality other than the mind of their observer, is one that brings order and coherence into the realm of sensation. It is so natural a view that most people tend to resent being asked to consider the reasons for it. When one does consider the reasons one sees that to define nature as the object of the senses is in no way to be a subjectivist. Sensations are mental and

subjective; but they exist as processes in thinking minds which interpret them rationally and (after sufficient observation and experiment) refer them to their appropriate causes and define the objects to which they refer.

3. Next, someone will ask, granting all that has been said, *what becomes of psychology as a natural science?* If psychology is still the science of consciousness, even in part, and consciousness is not an object that can be perceived by the senses (as it surely cannot be), then consciousness is not a part of nature and psychology is not a natural science. As is well known, there has been a marked tendency among some psychologists to avoid this difficulty by confining psychology to what can be observed by the senses. Taken in a broad sense, their procedure is called objective psychology. The best-known form of objective psychology is behaviorism, which is the investigation of the behavior of organisms. Many behaviorists have not only excluded introspective method from psychology, but they have even denied that consciousness has any existence.

So far as our question is concerned, there is no doubt that psychology is a natural science, if behaviorism is psychology. But if the scientific character of psychology has to be purchased at the price of denying the reality of the actually experienced facts of consciousness, psychology would seem to be self-refuting and self-destructive. If there are no facts of consciousness, there are no objective observations of behavior, for every observation is a conscious experience. If there are facts of consciousness, the immediate experience of everyone will testify that there are many facts in the mind which are not sensory, such as reasoning, memory, self-identification, and creative imagination. Then we face a dilemma: either psychology is not a natural science, in which case a philosophy of the mind is needed to supplement psychology; or else it is

natural science, but omits from its consideration most—if not all—of the characteristic facts of mind. Such considerations led William Ernest Hocking some years ago to write a paper called "Mind and Near-Mind." [12] The gist of that paper was that in so far as psychology has been a natural science, it has achieved knowledge of "near-mind" —of something like, or related to, or derived from mind —but no knowledge of mind itself.

From Professor Hocking's paper, as well as from the development of modern psychology, we can infer that natural science may give us a great deal of valuable information about the environment of mind and some of the causes of mental processes. But the most complete knowledge of another person's behavior will not reveal to us his inner thoughts, his purposes, his memories, his true self. I do not understand myself chiefly by inspecting my bodily behavior, nor can I understand another by inspecting his, unless I supplement my observation of his behavior by postulates about his conscious self-experience derived by analogy from direct observations of my own conscious self-experience. We conclude, then, that psychology, in the sense of an adequate understanding of mind, is not a natural science, for the simple reason that when we are studying nature (what is perceived by the senses) we are not studying mind as a whole. It is certainly true that nature and mind are closely related; that sense experiences occur in a mind; and that nature, as the external source of sense experiences, acts causally on mind.

Many are distressed by the denial that mind is a part of nature; they fear lest mind thus becomes an orphan, and a lawless one at that. At this point we can only ask the

[12] See *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, ed. E. S. Brightman (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927), pp. 203–15.

reader to suspend judgment, bearing two points in mind: first, the certainty that *if* nature is what we perceive by the senses, mind is not a part of nature; and second, the possibility that this distinction between mind and nature may serve, in the end, as the best basis for understanding the relations between the two and for healing the breach made in our thought and life by dualistic theories.

4. *Is nature, defined as the object of sensory observation, all that there is?* One purpose of our definition was to avoid the uselessness of a term that was simply another name for everything. If nature means everything, it would be better to drop the word "nature" and simply say "everything." But if nature is restricted to what is observable by sense, then it is to be distinguished from what we learn through nonsensory experiences of personality, including our ideals and our values. There is, however, a considerable group of thinkers who welcome the identification of nature with sensory objects and who use that very identification to include in nature everything there is, or at least everything that is meaningful and knowable. Such seems to be the substance of the thought of many positivists and semanticists.[13] They argue that science deals entirely with observable sense data and (from the semantic standpoint) that any idea which does not point to a sensory "referent" is meaningless. By a play on words, all supposed referents other than those of sense experience, are called "non-sense." The universe, by this epistemological pun, is divided into sense objects and nonsense. Nature thus becomes all that there is, in spite of every effort to distinguish it from mind or nonsensory experiences of mind. Nature is; non-sense isn't.

It is, of course, obvious that what is not sensory is nonsensory; but it is not at all obvious that everything real is sensory. Not all experience is sensory. Even the positivists

[13] See note 10 in Chapter I.

and the most extreme semanticists grant the validity of logical processes, but they insist that logic gives no knowledge of the real. However, they overlook the fact that there could be no logic without a mind to think it. They base their case for the sensory character of all objects of knowledge on the argument that we human beings can understand each other clearly only when we speak in terms of physical (sensory) objects. They call this kind of understanding by the name of intersubjective communication, using a physicalistic language. But the whole argument falls to the ground unless we can start with "subjects"—that is, with personal minds. If there are no subjects, then there is no intersubjective communication. Now if we do start with personal minds, or subjects, intending to communicate with each other, we base our entire argument for the sole validity of sensation on facts (subjects, minds) that cannot be experienced by sensation. No evidence for positivism, therefore, can have meaning unless mind and its purposes have meaning; and if mind and purpose have meaning, then sensory objects are not the only meaningful referents. For meaning, we need more than sensory "facts"; we need purposeful ideas.

5. *Does the definition, then, drive us back to the bifurcation which Descartes made between thought and extension, mind and matter?* It surely does not. Our definition does not set up two irreconcilable and unrelatable orders of being. It merely points out how we know nature. To define nature as what is perceived by sense is very far from proposing any explanation or definition of the kind of energy at work in nature; the proposed definition tells *where* nature is without telling *what* it is. In one sense, however, it must be granted that the definition does imply a duality, or even a bifurcation, within man's experience. How, indeed, can we avoid admitting that sensory

experience is a definite kind of experience, differing from experiences of logical analysis and synopsis, or memory, or obligation, or norms, or self-consciousness? Surely there is an observable difference here, which no theory can properly deny.

The distinction between what is nature and what is not nature is, therefore, an empirically justified starting point for sound method in philosophy. Not only is this true, but also we may add that it affords an equally empirical basis for thought about the supernatural. If the natural is what is manifested to the senses, all experience other than the sensory is properly to be regarded as experience of the supernatural. This reinstatement of the supernatural is, of course, not identical with the traditional meaning of the supernatural, which includes a reference to technical additional theories about the "naturè" of physical and spiritual substances and about "human nature" and God. Those considerations, however, do not concern the present investigation. Regardless of them, we are left with a clear distinction between nature and what we may call supernature. We cannot avoid the further problem as to how they are related. In the present chapter no attempt is made to solve that problem.

VI

We are left with a dilemma. Either nature is everything, or it is less than everything. If nature is everything, then God is simply another name for nature or for processes within nature, and there is nothing higher or better than the order of things perceived by the senses. In fact, God may be crowded out entirely. On this assumption there is no way of knowing or approaching truth except the methods of scientific observation and experiment, dealing with the visible world. The secret of the universe, if it is ever to be unriddled, will be disclosed in scientific

laboratories. Pure science and applied science are all that man needs, and all that he can have. All talk about the ideal, the invisible, the loyal, the fraternal, the perfect, should on this basis be rejected as meaningless. The social ideals of Auguste Comte cannot be derived from his positivistic method.

Those who try to assert that nature is everything rarely, if ever, hold consistently to their premises. They do not derive the motives and goals of their living from laboratory science. They do not and cannot find in observation of sense data any ground for human brotherhood. Yet it is a well-known fact that many naturalists and some positivists (especially the Comteans) are loyally devoted to social reforms, to human brotherhood, and to ethical living. If they declare that these ideals and devotions are a part of nature (as they usually do), they give up the identification of nature with the world perceived by the senses, and go back to using the word as a mere label for whatever we find in any and all kinds of experience.

If, on the other hand, we try to accept strictly the positivistic identification of nature with the realm that can be observed and verified by the senses and at the same time hold to ideals of goodness, truth, beauty, or worship, we are faced with an either-or. Either we have to admit that values are a realm beyond nature (as known by the senses) or else that they are part of nature. If we choose the first possibility, we have admitted the reality of the supernatural. If we choose the second, we have abandoned the exclusive appeal to sense experience. These alternatives are equally horrifying to a positivist.

Natural science gives us control, clarity, methods of experimental discovery, verification, and prediction; but it does not give us insight into values. It gives us means, but not ends. If the intellectuals tell us that there is no knowledge of values, there will always be aggressive in-

dividuals and societies on hand ready with a very determined intuition of their own values, and with a purpose to use science as a tool for enforcing their values on the rest of the world. Unintentionally our scientific culture has betrayed values. Ever since the scientific period of the Renaissance man has been concentrating on the mastery of nature. Unless he adds to his mastery of nature the mastery of his will by ideal values—justice, brotherhood, reverence, truth—he will find that his mastery of nature is self-defeating. A single act of true love is worth more than all knowledge of all the energies of nature without love.

Chapter III

THE WORLD OF PERSONALITY

TRADITIONAL THOUGHT IS DUALISTIC. AS WE SAW IN Chapter I, it lives in two worlds. It sets mind over against matter, personality over against nature. If this means only that nature is more than and other than any or all human personality, no one would want to question such dualism (except perhaps a solipsistic positivist, who is rare and unreasonable enough to be ignored). Many philosophers, however, carry their dualism much farther than a mere recognition of the "moreness" and "otherness" of nature. They believe that matter is a totally different kind of being from mind, belonging to a different order of existence. Mind is conscious; matter, they believe, fills space and moves unconsciously. Mind remembers the past; matter merely repeats the past unconsciously. There is, according to these philosophers, an ultimate "bifurcation" in reality. Furthermore, many of them believe that the existence of material, impersonal reality is just as certain as is the existence of mind itself. According to this view, every subject knows an object in the same experience and with the same certainty that it knows itself; and it knows or perceives directly that the object is itself a substance (or event) totally different in kind from all consciousness. Some, like the critical realists, ascribe this certainty to instinct or "animal faith." Others would derive it from an intuition; others from an immediate experience; others from "common sense."

Here, then, are three propositions: (1) Nature is more than and other than all human minds. (2) Matter be-

longs to an order of being wholly different from any mind or personality, human or divine. (3) The nonmental and impersonal being of matter is just as certain and as immediately given as is the conscious being of personality. All philosophers will accept the first proposition. Many will accept the second. Fewer, although a large number, will accept the third; but those who accept it hold to it with remarkable tenacity. If the third proposition be true, the first and the second necessarily follow. The first might be true, and the second and the third false. Also the first and second might be true, and the third false.

Descartes held the last-mentioned position. He was sure that nature (consisting of "extended things") is something totally different in its qualities from mind ("a thinking thing"). But he was sorely perplexed in his efforts both to prove the existence of matter and to explain how matter and mind could interact. He rejected the third proposition entirely; he held that we have no immediate certainty of the existence of material things—at least, no trustworthy and indubitable certainty. Any state of consciousness may be in error about anything, Descartes concluded, except about the fact that it is a state of consciousness. For him, consciousness, mind, or personality—"a thinking thing" engaged in a process of thought or doubt about the meaning of its experiences—is the one fundamental undeniable certainty. In personality is to be found all the evidence for our belief in a world of nature, of values, and of deity. All attempts to deny or ignore or minimize the importance of this fundamental insight of Descartes must fail when tested by the touchstone of experience. Every appeal to experience is an appeal to Descartes's starting point; and every departure from experience must find its rootage and its warrant in experience. The truth of every claim to an experience of immediate

certainty (proposition 3) must be tested by fuller, more rational experience.

Personality, then, is the fundamental basis for all our knowledge. It is the sole basis for science, philosophy, morality, and religion. When a person perceives or thinks, it is true that he always refers to an object and that the object referred to is usually not an actual ingredient of the person's experience. Certainly, when we know the past or the minds of others or the future or the causes of things, we are not merely knowing our experience, but we are using our experience as evidence of a world. The human person always reaches beyond himself. He sees, hears, smells, thinks, or believes something that is other than his own mind. Philosophers often call this fact the objective reference of thought, of the self-transcendence of personality. If we do not grant that mind can refer beyond itself to something other than the experience of the moment, we cannot give any coherent account of the experience itself. But if we forget that that reference is rooted in the evidence of the present conscious mind, we have no basis for knowledge or for belief in anything.

The complete denial of all dualism would consist in the assertion that nothing exists beyond the present moment of experience. This assertion is called solipsism. Solipsism is justly condemned as a theory that forbids theory. If the theory of solipsism be true, then there is no sense in having any theory at all; the present experience is final, it does not need to be explained, there is no one to explain it to, and there is nothing objective to explain. It follows that it is foolish to resort to any theory, even to solipsism. For solipsism, social life and communication are illusory, and discussion of solipsism is but soliloquy in a fleeting dream. He who is determined to accept as real nothing but what is here and now immediately present in his experience will be in an immovable position until he begins

to explain or defend his view. But when he starts to explain he has to appeal to experience, including reason and memory, and in this appeal he had already given up his solipsism.

The sum of our discussion thus far is that although we must start with our own personal experience, yet we must refer beyond it. What, then, is "our own personal experience"? A first inspection of any situation experienced, if it could be made with that perfect "innocence" of which Donald C. Williams has well written,[1] would reveal little, if anything, about its nature. Only when its powers are unfolded in action, its bodily organism developed, its past remembered, its future anticipated by purpose, its natural and social environment explored, can it come to a genuine knowledge of itself. Personality is not a fixed and complete entity that can be labeled and preserved in a museum. It is a life—a changing, actively functioning experience in constant interaction with its environment.

The word "personality" has been used in many different senses. Some take it to mean man's social relations. Others define it loosely as one's individual charm and power of attraction. Others take it to mean the human bodily organism, including its conscious experiences, so that the personality is psychophysical. Still others have omitted or denied the very existence of consciousness, and have restricted personality to the behavior of the organism. Gordon W. Allport, in his able work entitled *Personality* (1937), has reported fifty different definitions of personality.

In the presence of so great differences of opinion among authorities, it behooves one not to add needlessly to the differences. However, it should be remembered that different definitions are not always contradictory. The

[1] See "The Innocence of the Given," in *Journal of Philosophy*, XXX (1933), 617–28. See also my comments on it, *ibid.*, XXXI (1934), 263–68.

numerous definitions may all be correct definitions of various aspects of personality. One description might be more useful in one context, another in another. The physiologist, the sociologist, the clinical psychiatrist, and the individual psychologist might well need to emphasize different aspects of personality.

A philosophical definition, such as we are trying to formulate, must be consistent with all the truths about personality which are necessarily present in all contexts; and it must distinguish personality from all other possible objects, such as abstractions or material things. It must include what actual personal experience includes, and no more. The following is proposed as such a definition of personality (or person or personal self): *A personality is a complex but self-identifying, active, selective, feeling, sensing, developing experience,*[2] *which remembers its past (in part), plans for its future, interacts with its subconscious processes, its bodily organism, and its natural and social environment, and is able to judge and guide itself and its objects by rational and ideal standards.* This definition does not presuppose that all of the traits mentioned function at all times in any person; while remembering the past, for example, the person may not be planning for his future. The definition means rather that unless all the experiences described arise or can arise in the course of the development of experience, that experience, although it may still be called a self (or experient), is not a personal self. Thus, the consciousness of an amoeba or even of a very low-grade moron may be a self without being a person.

The definition is an attempt to give a true-to-life description of what we find to be the essential functions of personality as anyone experiences it in his own person. All

[2] "Experience" is used as synonymous with "consciousness" but is preferred as being a more concrete term.

experience is complex; yet at the same time all "my" experience is identified as "mine"—as belonging in the unity of one unique consciousness. Activity (striving or conation or creativity) and selection (choice) are essential personal experiences; we are always both doing and preferring. In every moment, both feeling (pleasure, pain, or indifference) and sensation are also in some degree present; even neutral indifference is itself a feeling. To say that personality is developing is to emphasize the experiences of time and growth; growth is movement toward a goal, of which the person may or may not be clearly conscious. Memory is necessary to the unity and identity of personality; when it fails we have amnesia or perhaps dual or multiple personality. Responsive striving is a mark of every conscious being; and, in a thinking being, purposes generate plans for their fulfillment. There is good reason to believe that our conscious personality is affected by subconscious processes. Hardly anyone doubts the influence of body on mind or of mind on body (however he may explain it). The body, in turn, is acted on by the whole natural environment which thus affects the person at every moment, and other persons (human, subhuman, superhuman) act on the individual through events in nature and (perhaps) through telepathy. The highest attribute of personality is its power to reason: it can "judge and guide itself and its objects by rational and ideal standards." This long-winded definition does not pretend to be exhaustive, but it may be said to be sufficiently complete to identify personality and to state its essential functions.

"Sufficiently," sighs the reader! By this time he doubtless has lost his patience with the complexity of the definition and is weary of its intricacies. But let him remember that personality is not a simple abstraction like a number, or a physical thing that one can grasp in one's hand.

Rather, it is a complex, manifold, and moving life, with unseen powers. Let him also remember that the proposed definition needs careful statement because it is psychologically unorthodox in so far as it restricts personality to actual conscious experience, and this requires an effort of thought. We easily identify a person with his body, and psychologists find it useful to deal with the (so-called) psychophysical organism.

The philosopher, however, must probe deeper than popular thought or scientific convenience. He must ask: Are the body and the consciousness truly one? They act together and so are a "functional unity," as we may call it; but everyone, when he consults his own experience, knows that he refers to quite different realms when he speaks of his body and his consciousness. His hand, his lungs, his pancreas, his aorta, his brain are never actually present in his consciousness; sense perceptions, or inferences from perceptions, are what is really present in the mind. Nevertheless the mind (the consciousness or the personality) both affects and is affected by bodily changes. The body is that organ of the universe which creates a personality, although the spiritual and the intellectual life are proof that a personality has powers that a merely material body does not possess and could not explain.

Nevertheless, body and mind are closely related. Why not say they are one? First, as we have seen, because we make a clear distinction between our experience of the body and the body itself; and, secondly, because it is unreasonable to identify a cause with its effect. To identify the mind with the body is as unreasonable as it would be to say that the refreshment we feel on drinking cold water is actually nothing but cold water. If we are to insist that the causes which are essential to the existence of personality are all a part of it, then the body, the subconsciousness, the air we breathe, the life-giving sun, in fact, the whole

of nature, must be parts of every person, and every person is all bodies, all minds, all things. In order to avoid the utter confusion that arises when causes and effects are identified, all things melt into one, and all distinctions are lost (as in certain kinds of absolute idealism and pragmatism), we have only to consult experience and reason. If we take our personality to be just what we experience it to be, we can identify our personality with our consciousness and also reasonably infer the interaction of personality with its surrounding world of body and nature and God, as well as their interdependence.

After all these explanations, it is perhaps safe to venture a more condensed definition: *A person is a unity of complex conscious changes,*[3] *including all its experiences—its memories, its purposes, its values, its powers, its activities, and its experienced interactions with its environment.*

I

Personality is fundamental to all human knowledge. Most of a person's knowledge is not about himself. But all the evidence for a person's knowledge of any object and all the verification of any hypothesis are to be found within the experience of some person.

Personality is the presupposition of all science. Logic for centuries was regarded as the science of thought. Today an attempt is being made to objectify it and divorce it from thought by calling it the science of necessary implication. However, "when me they fly, I am the wings." It is impossible to divorce logic from personality. Until a person sets up fundamental definitions and postulates and becomes aware of implications, logic will remain nonexistent as a science. Even more plainly do the empirical sciences root in personality. They require observation, hy-

[3] Cf. William Stern, *"Unitas Multiplex."*

pothesis, verification. Personal observers, definers of hypotheses, and verifiers are essential to physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, and other sciences. Experiment itself is always a personal purpose, personally devised and defined and remembered, and personally tested by personally observed and personally interpreted results. Nature, the object investigated by science, is believed to exist because persons trust their sensory experiences as disclosing a physical world.

It is often said that science is impersonal; but the very impersonality of science is a personal achievement. Impersonality in science means two things: (1) that the scientist ignores his personal desires and beliefs in the interest of truth; and (2) that the scientist is never satisfied with his own personal results until they have been tested by other competent scientists. In short, impersonality is loyalty to the personal ideal of truth and appeal to the experience of other loyal persons.

Not only is personality fundamental to all knowledge, but also, as will appear in the progress of this book, it may well be fundamental to all reality. If all experience is personal, perhaps the energies which produce and sustain it are also personal; perhaps nature itself is the experience and the energizing of a person who is more than nature. But at present, let this "perhaps" remain a mere suggestion while other aspects of the personal world are explored.

II

Paradoxical as it may seem, the world of personality is a larger world than the world of nature. The word "larger" here needs to be taken in a special sense. It does not mean greater in power: nature gives life to persons, and takes it away. It does not mean older: nature was in existence before human persons existed and will continue

when this world is no longer a habitation for personal beings. It does not strictly mean greater in space, for personality is not in space; space is simply one of the experiences of personality. However, personality may in a sense be said to be spatially "larger" than nature, for ideally a person might comprehend in his knowledge all the space of nature and infinite imaginary or geometrical spaces besides. When the world of personality is called larger than the world of nature, the meaning intended is different from any of those that have been mentioned.

Personality is larger than nature in the sense that it is more comprehensive. It covers a wider and broader scope. Nature is what is disclosed in sense experience. Personality, of course, includes sensations; but it also includes memory, anticipation, ideals, values, and self-identifying consciousness. Nature, as conceived by the physicochemical sciences, is impersonal; it is rigidly restricted to what is necessary to explain the movements of sense data, and other personal experiences, such as memory and the rest, are just as rigidly excluded from it. To put it otherwise, nature is a limited realm based on selected evidence. The real world must include nature and be larger than nature. It must include all of the personal world, and all that is necessary to explain and understand it.

III

The personal world, as is implied in the definition of personality, is a world in interaction with nature. Every human person is dependent not only on his body, but also on all the natural forces of his environment. Natural forces act continually on every person; and every person, by his choice and purpose, can direct natural forces, initiate movements, and within limits, control nature. Science, invention, medicine, and the influence of the mind on the body (Christan Science, yoga, and daily experi-

ence) constitute sufficient proof of interaction between persons and nature. All parallelisms and other attempts to evade interaction are relatively artificial and incoherent.

IV

The personal world is an invisible world. Here is another somewhat dark saying. Do we not talk to persons, hear them, smell them, feel them, as well as see them? Surely it seems that persons are visible and in other respects sensible.

If we recall the definition of a person as a complex unity of experience, we can understand what is meant by saying that persons are invisible. Bodies, perhaps, may be seen; but no sensations ever give us a direct perception of the experience in another's mind. In fact, it is very questionable whether sense alone can give us knowledge of the body. The visible (and all the sensible) consists of experience patterns within consciousness. In this sense, the visible itself is invisible to any external observer; only I can see and feel exactly what I do see and feel. The visible is, strictly speaking, visible only in and to the person seeing. But the sense patterns are signs and problems for thought, and in the presence of visible patterns the thinking person is able to infer the presence of other persons and of nature in its environment.

The invisibility of persons (and even of things) is a source of much error and confusion. Behaviorists, seeing that our knowledge of other persons rests chiefly on the behavior of visible sense patterns, have played—vainly—with the idea that all persons are nothing but behavior, an hypothesis sufficiently refuted by an immediate inspection of the field of consciousness present at any time. Semanticists and logical positivists have tried to restrict all meaning to the sensible; only what can be verified in sense

experience is supposed to mean anything at all. Imagine what human culture would be if this restriction were taken seriously, and all references to ideals, purposes, truth, and consciousness were actually supposed to be meaningless!

All great religion has been concerned with the invisible. "No man hath seen God at any time." "The things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are not seen are eternal." "Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." "What is seen has come into being from sources that do not appear." If we turn from the language of the Christian literature, we find in Chapter Three of the Katha Upanishad the following words: "Having realized that which is soundless, touchless, formless, imperishable, and also without taste and smell, without beginning or end, . . . immutable, one is released from the jaws of death."

Such language is native to religious souls in all ages and lands. Spirit is invisible; divine spirit and human spirit share in that trait. The visible may, indeed, as Plato and Hegel taught, somehow suggest or reveal or move toward the invisible. But spirit is visible only to the mind's eye, and "spirit with spirit can meet."

V

There are those who are greatly perplexed by the invisibility of spirit, and conclude that what is invisible is unreal. On the contrary, as we have shown, the visible itself is real only as an experience in and of the invisible, an effect of the invisible, a sign of its presence. To summarize our results, the invisible personality is fundamental for knowledge and reality, is inclusive of our whole experience and interacts with nature. It should now be added that the personal world is a world of purpose.

All persons, both as individual and as social beings, are "fighters for ends," to use William James's familiar

phrase. The personal world is a world of desire—fulfilled or unfulfilled. Persons look to the future, hoping and longing that in it what we love will continue to be, that what we hate [4] will cease to be, and that the future will be better than the past as long as betterment is possible. Desires may be blind, spontaneous, and instinctive; or they may be clear, carefully planned, and reasonably guided. Spontaneous desires are a welter of confusion; coherently ordered desires are rational purpose.

Try as we may, we cannot escape purpose in the personal world. Some, like the Buddhists, regard desire as the root of all evil, and seek the conquest of desire; but in truth, what they are doing is seeking to substitute a noble and unselfish purpose (such as they conceive Nirvana to be) for the low, selfish purposes of our ordinary petty life of sense. Even the purpose to abolish purpose (if that is what they mean) is a desire.

Others, like Bertrand Russell,[5] believe that desire, as "love, guided by knowledge," is the essence of the good life, but at the same time assert that desire (or purpose) sheds no light at all on the nature of reality. Persons are admitted to be purposive beings, but their purposes and desires are thought to shed no light on the world which produces them. Here we need to be reminded of the fact (mentioned earlier in this chapter) that persons are the only evidence we have of the world in which they arise. To reject the facts of desire as furnishing any such evidence, while clinging exclusively to the facts of sensation, is to manifest an unwarranted partiality. That the order of sense (or nature) and the order of purpose may and can be investigated separately is proved by the work of

[4] The terminology of "love" and "hate" in this connection is derived from Franz Brentano's theory of value.

[5] See his answer to critics in P. A. Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell* (Evanston: Northwestern University, 1944), and *What I Believe* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1925).

the natural sciences on the one hand, and of logic, ethics, aesthetics, and religion on the other. But need of the mind for coherence forbids that they should forever be investigated separately, and forbids equally that either should be dropped in favor of the other. A person is a perceiving being and a purposing being, and the personal world and its environment must include and explain both perception and purpose. Russell's repudiation of desire as a guide to knowledge is reasonable if he means only to criticize desires, but arbitrary if he means to exclude rational desires as evidence acceptable in the court of reason.

If the personal world is a purposive world, the question may well be asked: What is its purpose? Often the case for teleology is supported by any evidence in nature which tends to show the adjustment of anything to anything. Why those teeth? "The better to bite you with, my dear." Such purposes are a problem rather than a solution. The answer to the question of purpose is not to be found by a mere consideration of intricate adaptations in nature. The evidence and its meaning lie before us in the structure of personality. In personality is the only truly intrinsic value we know or can conceive; all values are but forms of personal experience. Truth, goodness, beauty, worship—these are nothing if a person does not apprehend, realize, enjoy, and develop them. Unknown truth is only a potential value until some person knows it; unheard music is no real music at all until it lives as sound and harmony in some personal spirit. What is goodness if no person is moral, or worship, if no person is reverent? Therefore the purpose of life is the full development of the noblest powers of the world of persons. Or, to state it more simply, it is persons living adequately and co-operatively. Still more simply, the purpose of life is reasonable love or loving reason—they mean the same thing. Love with-

out reason as well as reason without love is a maimed and self-defeating thing.

To use the ancient language of religion, the aim of life is the saving of souls—saving them from unreason, hatred, and indifference. The work of the Christian minister has been called "the cure of souls." Werner Jaeger has recently[6] called attention to the fact that this ideal of the cure of the soul goes back to Plato's *Apology* (29E and 30B), where Socrates is compared to the healing physicians. Man's life plainly has a purpose; plainly it is only partially realized. The world of persons needs all the healing physicians it can summon to its aid.

VI

Furthermore, the personal world is self-identifying. The experience of being a self or person is essentially the experience of memory. A person is the same person from day to day, despite all the changes in his experience, because he remembers that he is the same. Memory always includes the experience of self-identification. We often hear loose and inaccurate statements about memory. It is sometimes called the repetition of an identical or partly identical pattern from past experience. Apart from the fact that past experience is past and cannot be literally and identically repeated, there is another defect in this conception of memory. Let us suppose that a past experience is repeated exactly as it first occurred; this alone does not constitute memory. Not until I recognize the present experience as referring to my past experience is there true memory. When I am able to say, "That is how it looked to me when it happened, that is what he said, that is how I learned it," then, and then only, has memory occurred. When there is no memory, personality has disintegrated. Wherever there is personality, there is some memory,

[6] In *Paideia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1943), II, 39.

binding present experience with past thought or feeling or perception or will. Each person is a remembering identity, binding a multiplicity of experience into personal unity.

It follows from this that the personal world is a world of many persons, each a private individual, an identical self. When I remember, all valid memory is a memory of my experience. I cannot remember your experience, although I may well remember my experiences with you, and my feelings and beliefs about your experience. The testimony of memory warrants the proposition that no person can be regarded as identical with any other person or society or Absolute. There is a sense in which each self-identifying person is himself and himself only. This is not in any way refuted by the facts of multiple personality; for each "person" in the group of multiple persons is recognized as such by the very fact of the self-identifying memory to which reference has been made.

Only a brief statement is needed to call attention to the central importance of self-identity both for knowledge of nature and for knowledge of values. Without memory, no knowledge could be constructed or tested; no ideals could be defined or realized. Every moment of life would drop away into nothing, leaving nothing of meaning behind. Both knowledge and character require the constant strengthening of the principle of self-identity. It is because I remember and acknowledge my thoughts and commitments of yesterday that my life is of any worth today.

VII

The world of persons is also a social world. One might gather from the treatment of self-identity and privacy, that each person is a tight little isle by himself. It is true that a person experiences only himself, remembers only himself, and, of course, is only himself and no one else. But this very private person is also a social person. As has

already been stated, the world of persons interacts with nature; and each person in the world of persons interacts with many other persons in social relations. These social interactions are usually mediated through nature. We speak, and sound waves reach the ear of another, stimulate his auditory nerve and the auditory area of the brain —all parts of nature—before he is aware of what we said. Through language and other natural acts we communicate with others, and perhaps extrasensory perception also is possible.

It is not the present purpose to discuss the mechanics of communication. Everyone admits the fact that we do communicate. What is of present importance is to point out that communication and social experience are entirely consistent with self-identity and privacy as defined. I am myself. My experience is mine and no one's else. But within myself I find many experiences which I can explain only as due to the action on me of other persons in my environment. I am aware of sights and sounds and feelings which, although they are my experience, are certainly not produced by my effort or choice and which cannot be explained as a result of my experience up to this time. Every person has such social consciousness. But all social consciousness is within individual persons, is part of their life, and is no part of any "social mind" or even of a divine mind. God has made me a person and respects my privacy; but any person, and God most of all, may communicate with me without breaking down my identity and my personal responsibility. This view of the social world has further psychological, social, and religious implications which the reader may pursue for himself.

VIII

Running through the thought of this book is the theme of conflict. There are two worlds—the world of nature

and the world of values. Between these two realms and within each there is conflict. Personality is the arena in which all this conflict appears. The personal world is a world of conflict, both inner and outer. Persons and societies are in deadly conflict with each other and do not know how to stop. Their conscious and their subconscious lives conflict. Man is in conflict with the forces of nature, its storms, its germs, its poisons, its insects, its earthquakes and volcanoes. Worst of all is the inner conflict within each person. The soul is in conflict because of its desires, its knowledge, its ignorance and prejudice, its weakness, its strength, its ambitions, its fears, its ruthlessness, its conscience. One of the commonest facts of our modern, especially of our capitalistic and militaristic society, is the co-existence within the same soul of a highly refined technological intelligence and a beastly morality. Expert knowledge of nature and even of psychology is often accompanied by a conscienceless disregard of the rights of others and such savage aggressiveness as is manifested in Dr. Goebbels, a Ph.D. in psychology from Heidelberg.

Such, then, is the world of personality. It is fundamental to all knowledge and existence; it is a richer world than that of physical nature; it interacts constantly with nature; it is an invisible world; a world of purpose; a world of self-identifying, private individuals; a social world; and a world of conflict. In it is the key to our highest purposes and ideals; in it are depths of degradation. Personality is the soul to which religion offers salvation; and "modern man in search of a soul" [7] surely needs to be saved from himself as he is, in the interests of himself as he may be. Let us explore further the place of personality in the realm of nature and the realm of values.

[7] The words are the title of a book by Jung.

Chapter IV

THE WORLD OF VALUES

THUS FAR WE HAVE SEEN THAT MAN LIVES IN A WORLD of conflict. This conflict has many aspects and many sources, but we are here concerned with its roots in the relations between the realm of nature and the realm of ideal values. It is those roots that St. Paul had in mind when he wrote: "I delight in the law of God after the inward man: but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." Our present interest is not in the Pauline theology of sin, but rather in the realm of modern thought; nor is our interest chiefly in the human members, but rather in the whole of nature, of which our members are a part, and its relation to our spiritual aspirations. When we consulted the modern authorities, we found no agreement about a definition of nature. Many, we found, use the word as meaning the total universe of everything—all that there is. Such a usage is debasing to the term, leaves the word supernatural without any discussable meaning, and makes it possible that all the old distinctions between nature and the supernatural, mind and matter, soul and body, may be really distinctions within nature. Nature thus becomes a superfluous term, and for it should be substituted "all" or "everything." It seems better, then, to adopt the definition in which Berkeley, Kant, and modern positivists agree—namely, that nature is the realm disclosed to us through our sense perceptions.

If nature is the realm of sense, then it becomes evident

that it is not all that there is. We find that the realm of personality is far wider than the realm of sense. Personality is defined as the unity of consciousness, including sense perceptions, but also including, for example, memory, reasoning, purpose, and values. The conflicts of human life are thus personal conflicts—conflicts within persons, conflicts among persons, and conflicts between persons and their natural environment. We have yet to consider what nature may be "in itself," other than our sense experiences in which it is disclosed to us. Whatever it is, nature offers opposition to our ideal purposes and to will as means for attaining them. Let man's ideals be what they will—selfish or unselfish, lustful or spiritual, aggressive or co-operative, totalitarian or democratic—nature provides man with tools and instruments for attaining his ends, while at the same time setting limits of space and time and energy to which he must conform and beyond which he cannot go.

Having identified the arena of conflict—nature and personality—we turn to an examination of the prize, the goal, the "war aims" of the universe. That goal is to be found in the realm of true value. Ever since man has become conscious of himself and his powers, all races, and especially the wisest and greatest leaders of all races, have recognized a difference between right and wrong, between justice and injustice, and between higher and lower forms of life. Anthropologists can easily show that there has been and is great difference in different cultures about what is higher and what is lower; likewise they can show that there has been and is great difference about what is scientifically true or false. Not only is ancient science laughed at by moderns, but modern science is rejected and even despised in many contemporary cultures, which we look on as ignorant and superstitious. Differences or agreements among cultures do not settle ques-

tions of truth; and we can no more hand our values over to the anthropologists than we can hand our physics and astronomy over to them. All truth claims regarding facts or values must be referred to the supreme court of reason, which alone has jurisdiction in cases of truth; reason distinguishes true values from false value claims.

Let us now approach the tangled problem of value more closely, to see whether we can shed some light on the confusion, and perhaps discover some principles of order.

I

The best way to study anything is to begin with everyday facts of experience and proceed to find some orderly way of understanding them. For our starting point in the study of values, money and music will serve as typical everyday facts. We commonly regard both money and music as good or as valuable to us; but they are values in different senses. Money is valued for what it will buy. It will purchase food, shelter, and clothing. It will pay past bills. It will afford security for the future. It will even buy music: one may purchase radios, phonograph records, tickets to concerts or operas, musical instruments, or a musical education. Generally, then, we value money as a means to something else. Whatever is valued because it can secure us something other than itself is called an instrumental value or a means. A wealthy banker is called a man of means. However, if you want to understand a person, it is more important to know whether he loves music than to know whether he owns a bank. Music differs from money in that money is a means, but music is an end. You earn money in order to spend it for something else; you enjoy music for its own sake. Money, as we have seen, is an instrumental value, while music is an intrinsic value. Music satisfies the soul as money never can.

This distinction between money and music, and, in general, between means and ends—instrumental and intrinsic values—cannot be taken as absolute. Money may, for instance, be treated as an end by a numismatist, who collects coins for their historical or aesthetic interest. It may also be treated as an end by a miser, who views the accumulation of wealth as the chief aim of his existence. Likewise music may be an instrumental value for a professional musician, who earns his livelihood from music. Music, like other intrinsic values, is always instrumental to the extent that it supports other values. Music inspires and elevates character, thought, and religious devotion. It suffuses and integrates the whole personality. Thus it may be said that the instrumental and the intrinsic are points of view from which values may be regarded rather than absolutely distinct classes of value; but the fundamental meaning of value is to be found in its intrinsic aspect. It is the end that gives meaning to the means; music gives meaning to money, not money to music. We work for love's sake; we do not love for work's sake. Work doubtless is an intrinsic value, as well as love; the normal man enjoys his work, and society should be so organized that all work would be enjoyable. But the intrinsic value of work is certainly lower than that of love, and is more limited.

There are philosophers, especially naturalists, who object to any distinction between means and ends.[1] As John Dewey and Abraham Edel have pointed out, naturalists object especially to the idea that there are "fixed ends or goals in nature," which are ends only without being also means. For the most part, naturalistic criticisms at these points are flaying men of straw. As has been shown, the

[1] See the excellent essay by Abraham Edel on "Naturalism and Ethical Theory" in Krikorian, *Naturalism and the Human Spirit,* pp. 65–95, esp. p. 76.

distinction between means and ends is real, but not absolute. Means may become ends and ends become means. One does not have to be a naturalist to recognize this everyday fact. Indeed, idealistic philosophers of personality, with their emphasis on organic wholeness and interrelation in all personal-social experiences, may well have been Professor Dewey's chief teachers in this aspect of his doctrine. He has never entirely forgotten the lessons he learned from Hegel. Personalists and naturalists may well agree, then, that money, originally intended as a means, may become an end, and music, primarily an end in itself, may also serve as means, and that the processes of using means to realize ends is a living whole.

But when we come to the naturalistic protest against the idea of "fixed ends or goals in nature," we face more difficulty. First of all, there is the ever-haunting ambiguity of the word nature. If nature means the order revealed by sense, it is plain that no sense object need (or even can) be regarded as a "fixed goal." Sense objects are not fixed; they are in a constant stream; and a sense object is at best only part of anyone's goal. Sense objects are means; they enter into, or embody, or signify ends only when they are taken in a more-than-sensory context. A beautiful sense object is beautiful, not because it is sensory, but because it illustrates harmony, balance, development, unity in variety, or some other aesthetic principle, or expresses the artist's or the observer's soul.

Naturalists, however, do not often accept the limitation of nature to sense objects. They regard it as absurd, for much the same reason as idealists regard exclusive concentration on sense data and sense objects as absurd. Hence most naturalists prefer to regard nature as the whole of reality. Then "fixed ends or goals in nature" would mean "fixed ends or goals anywhere in the experienced universe." If naturalists deny any fixed goals any-

where they go far beyond the ancient Heraclitus. He taught that all things change *except* the law of change; they teach that all things change, *even* the law of change.

Is there really no fixed law of value? The value of the mark, the pound, the yen, the ruble, and the dollar changes; styles in music change. Chinese music, Hindu music, African music, jazz and grand opera—forms of music differ and every form changes. Is there then no fixed end? If there is none, it is strange that all our knowledge of human history, all our analysis of human experience, has led wise men of every civilization to act as if there were fixed ends. Today, with all their differences, naturalists and personalists agree [2] that there are at least two fundamentally unchangeable goals of all human action. They may be called intelligence and co-operation, or respect for truth and respect for personality, or reason and love (the *logos* and *agape* of the New Testament). We find these as fixed ends under different names in Plato, in Hindu faith, in Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism, in Voltaire, in Comte, in Kant, and in Marx. If you deny either one, you deny all possibility of value. If economic laws are not obeyed, or if money is used in disregard of human need, money has lost its value. If music—which is mathematics made audible—were composed without any regard to the laws of aesthetic harmony and dissonance, it would cease to be music. If music meant nothing to any person anywhere it would be of no value. Value is the fact that some person finds joy.

The distinction between the fixed and the changing leads to the very important distinction between values and ideals. An ideal is a conception of an end which may be realized, a goal which I acknowledge as my chosen good. As ideal it is no more than the definition of a value.

[2] This agreement has become evident in the meetings of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in New York (beginning in 1940).

It may define a possible value; it may be so fantastic as to define an utterly impossible value. On the other hand, a value is far more than a mere definition; it is the experience of a realized ideal. The value is an ideal plan carried out in personal life. That men ought to co-operate is an ideal norm; actual co-operation of Negroes and whites, Gentiles and Jews, Japanese and Chinese, is a value.

From this distinction important corollaries follow. A first corollary is that an ideal is not a value. The contemplation of the ideal of co-operation is not the value of co-operation; it may even be a hindrance to valuable co-operation if the contemplation is sufficiently dreamy and abstract. The ideal may be an enemy of value. One may argue that contemplation of an unrealized ideal is at least an instance of the value of contemplation, but even this value requires the actual presence of the ideal in the mind of some person. An ideal written in a dictionary, a sacred Scripture, a creed, a charter, or a treaty, is of no intrinsic value whatever until it is "made good," as we say, in personal-social experience.

A second corollary is that not all ideals are necessarily true or valid. If the reader defines in his own mind what he desires as a program for world peace, he may on reconsideration discover that his program involves so much injustice and compulsion or so much anarchical freedom as to be a very unreasonable ideal, which he must reject as false. Just as we may err in our scientific judgments about the sense world, and as we are subject to illusions of perception, so we may err in our judgments about ideals and be subject to illusions arising from our traditions, our race, or our economic status. Yet who would think of abandoning science because scientists sometimes err? And who, if he is thoughtful, can abandon ideals because idealists sometimes err or because ideals are often subject to correction? The search for truth must go on in

the field of ideals even more persistently than in the field of science, unless scientific knowledge is to continue to be enslaved to the service of false ideals of war, of racialism, of narrow nationalism, and of personal greed.

A third corollary is that true ideals must be distinguished from false ones. The word norm [3] has been proposed to designate a true ideal. A *true* ideal, did we say—absolutely fixed? All human knowledge is, of course, subject to correction; but within human knowledge one must distinguish between what is relatively uncertain and what is relatively both more certain and more fundamental. Many of our beliefs might turn out to be false, and no important difference would be made; others, when shown false, cause many a wrench in the readjustments of life. But there are yet other beliefs so fundamental that if they are supposed to be false, no readjustment is possible: all meaning is gone. Take, for instance, the norms of reason and love. If reason is not a true norm, all science is impossible; if love—respect for personality—is not a true norm, all value is wiped out, for all value is personal experience that is respected. Within the limits of human knowledge we are, therefore, justified in accepting these principles as true norms. Although no human being is fully reasonable or fully loving, reason and love define fixed directions in which humanity must forever move if it is not to destroy itself. Meanwhile, the naturalistic warning against fixed ends in nature is a useful caution against dogmatism about any specific values, and a sound prescription to subject all values to rational re-examination.

[3] It is granted that the word has other senses, especially in statistics. However, the established use of "normative" in connection with the "normative sciences" of logic, ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of religion, renders "norm" available. See Brightman, "Values, Ideals, Norms, and Existence," in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* IV (1943), 219–24. See also Dewey's article on "Norm and Normative" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.*

The second World War has been the occasion of attempts to set forth norms. The famous "Four Freedoms" are a suggested table of norms for humanity. They are freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.[4] It is easy to see that here we have an effort to make the norm of reasonable love (*logos–agape*) concrete; each of the freedoms is an expression of rational respect for personality. Every person should have his say; every person should worship (or not worship) as his conscience dictates; everyone should be assured that his fundamental needs will be met; and everyone should be free from fear of depredations or aggressions from others. Here, indeed, is a set of true ideals: true, but not yet realized, even if printed on one-cent postage stamps. The difference between these freedoms as proposed goals and a world in which they are principles of life for every individual and every society reveals vividly the vast chasm between ideal norms and actual values. It also sheds light on the intellectual and practical task imposed on religious and secular educators; legislators, executive and judicial authorities, and citizens of every land.

What, exactly, is freedom of speech? It must be limited by reason: hence, slander, libel, obscenity, and incitement to violence must be limited. What is freedom of religion? When the creed of any one faith implies or expresses the belief that that faith is the one and only way to worship God, how can believers in such a faith honestly grant freedom to other faiths without a certain condescension incompatible with respect for personality? Religious believers of all kinds, as well as persecutors of religion, have much to learn about applying the norm of freedom. What are the conditions of freedom from want and fear? Surely

[4] Formulated by President F. D. Roosevelt in an address to Congress, January 6, 1941.

one condition is a firm social control of the lawless freedom of those individuals or groups that prey on the weak and helpless without regard to norms and terrify men by their egoistic ruthlessness. Another condition is the planning of the production and distribution of goods so that the existence of all will be secure. Another condition is the end of exploitation of man by man and the respect of freedom by all employers, groups, and nations. What all this will mean to the capitalistic system, to the colonial system, and to nationalism, when it is carried out, no one can foresee; but everyone can see the difference between the acknowledgement of a norm and the creation of the values demanded by the norm.

Progress has been painfully, pitifully slow. Why? Because the intellectual, spiritual, and practical task of defining norms and building values has seemed so much more difficult than science and mechanical invention, the accumulation of wealth, or the devastations of war. Man has chosen the apparently easier way; and it leads to destruction. Some day man will become a spiritual person. He will listen then to the teachings of Moses, of Hosea, of Jeremiah, of Confucius and Buddha, and of Mohammed; Jesus will then become the Light of the world, and the Sermon on the Mount will be acknowledged as containing the constitutional norms of the kingdom of heaven on earth.

II

Humanity has found the building of values more difficult than science, invention, wealth, or war. To say this is not to deprecate these four historical achievements of man, much less to classify them together as on one level. The point rather is that all four are extraordinarily difficult; yet their difficulties have been heroically conquered. Men have sacrificed health and life itself for science, for

invention, for wealth, and for war. But when the sciences have been developed, the inventions applied, the wealth amassed, the wars won, man's nerve has failed. When the task of assuring personal rights, social justice, fair opportunity to all men looms ahead, all but a few prophets, saints, poets, philosophers, and reformers slump back in despair. That task, they say, is too difficult—unheard-of and impractical, especially in the peculiarly acute circumstances where the need is greatest. Even the most generous givers usually give their money to others who do the harder work of value building.

There are some—far too many—who have devised smug and comforting excuses for doing nothing to translate the world of norms into the language of living human values. In spite of man's needless inhumanity to man, there are many who say, in substance, that all the work has already been done, and there remains only the detail of acknowledging and appreciating the accomplishment. Plenty of theologians—not merely in the past—have, sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly, declared that, since Jesus paid it all, and since God has foreordained some to salvation and some to damnation, nothing that any man can do will change in the slightest the redeemed state of the saved or the condemned state of the lost. European theologians have often scored the "activism" of Americans who believe that man can and should do something to better the world's condition; but more recently even the hyper-Calvinistic Barth has yielded a point in favor of the duty of action (not, one suspects, because his theology made him practical, but because war forced a decision on him).[5]

Religious leaders have, it may be admitted, incurred a share of the responsibility for man's failure to grapple

[5] See, for example, Karl Barth, *The Church and the War* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944).

with the poverty of values in the world. It must be added with equal frankness that men of science also share this responsibility. Some scientists say that science has already rendered available to man the means to achieve welfare in the magical postwar world, like that pictured in the gorgeous advertisements of the magazine *Fortune*. Science has paid the price (they forget Jesus); science has guaranteed man's redemption. Yet at the same time, very many scientists in every field of investigation have adopted an attitude of "objectivity" which makes it a scientific duty to state the facts and a scientific crime to evaluate them. It is not to be denied that such objectivity is a useful and necessary phase of human thought, if man is to discover truth without prejudice; but it is a short-sighted and fragmentary view of personality to suppose that any person or any society ought always to live in that mood of objectivity, or, for that matter, could so live. In view of the great importance both of religion and of science, the problem will be more fully explored.

The whole relation of science to the world of values is in a state of chaos. Bertrand Russell, at once a scientist and a philosopher, as well as a (very remote) student of religion, has stated his views clearly. In his most systematic book on religion and science [6] he repeatedly tells his readers that science does not deal with the problem of value at all. In this and other writings [7] he sets forth the doctrine that science has to do with facts, and value has to do with desires. Since our desires have no relation to the facts—that is, do not shed any light on what the facts are—science has no relation to value. Man is entitled to

[6] *Religion and Science* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935).

[7] For example, in *What I Believe* and in his answer to critics in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*. In *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, ed. D. D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1943), he adds that even "good philosophy" has no practical consequences, no bearing on values (p. 227).

whatever realization of his desires he can achieve, within the limits of the facts; he may even defy the facts when they thwart his desires, as Russell did in his too-much-quoted essay "The Free Man's Worship." But science can yield no norms and interpret no values.

On the other hand, a man like E. G. Conklin, the distinguished biologist of Princeton University, is strongly opposed [8] to the idea that science cannot solve the problem of value. He pours ridicule on the idea that science has nothing to do with values, and he speaks of "the ethics of science" without intimating how physics or biology, for example, could establish any norms of conduct.

A different, and more moderate, view is expressed in the official *Bulletin* of the American Association for the Advancement of Science by Otis W. Caldwell, general secretary of the association. He says:

> "Science Remaking the World," when used by Dr. E. E. Slosson and myself as title for a book, was widely acclaimed, and was used by others as a fitting title. It seemed that science was the major factor in making a new world. That title is not now appropriate, indeed is almost misleading. Much larger than science is the whole of human achievement of which science is a highly important part. The significance of the proper uses of science greatly exceeds the importance of the body of established and organized knowledge which is called science. Mere increase in scientific knowledge is helpful or harmful in terms of the ultimate influences upon people. The worthy goal of discovery is human betterment. How can this be harmonized with science for destruction of men and things?
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> It is imperative that there be a new age of science and society in which those who cause science to grow accept their full part of the responsibility for the proper uses of knowledge No retardation in discovery, invention and scientific industry is likely to occur. There

[8] See his *Man, Real and Ideal* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), especially p. 171.

must be an unprecedented increase of understanding and loyalty to the services to be rendered to a confused and inadequately guided society, badly in need of clarity regarding enduring principles and methods of human betterment. Here is an area of research, a chaotic area as yet, whose demands will fully utilize the capacities, techniques, and patient faithfulness of workers of strictly major rank. Such workers will need even wider and more intensive personal education than is common even in good scientific research. The significance of returns from such research is likely to exceed those of so-called pure science.[9]

In Professor Caldwell's profound utterances we have something broader than Conklin's belief in the all-comprehending adequacy of science, and more constructive than Russell. Caldwell is nearer to Russell in perceiving that science, as hitherto understood, has failed to grapple with "the principles and methods of human betterment" —that is, with the problem of value. Whereas Russell disposes of value by saying that it is merely a matter of desire, Caldwell appeals tacitly to the humanities— to religion, ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy—for a "wider and more intensive personal education." He is plainly reaching for light on the norms that should guide the uses of science, and is acknowledging that the instrumental values of science are useless or worse than useless unless they are applied in the service of true intrinsic values.

What man needs is not science alone, and not fulfillment of his desires alone, but rather science used in the service of desires which have been purified and criticized by the tests of ideal norms. The sciences set forth what is, and what is possible. But physics and chemistry, geology and astronomy, and even psychology and sociology, taken together, do not of themselves and by their own methods disclose a single ideal by which man ought to live or for which he ought to die. Soldiers die by means of

[9] "Postwar Education—II. Science," in *A.A.A.S. Bulletin,* III (Jan. 1944), 2, 3.

physics and chemistry, not for them. Psychology may be used equally by a Jane Addams and a Josef Goebbels. The same sociology may be used by a ward politician and a Salvation Army lassie. But the norms by which Miss Addams and Dr. Goebbels, politicians and religious workers live and die are not to be found in psychology or sociology. All norms are, of course, psychological and sociological facts, but scientific method, which is constructed for the purpose of establishing facts and causes, is impotent to determine which ideals are true and which false. Light can come only by an appeal to coherent and inclusive reason, which means an appeal to philosophy and to its investigation of the norms of truth, goodness, beauty, and worship.[10]

Socrates, seeing that knowledge of physiology would never explain the springs of human action, turned to a study of the Good, and tried to persuade men to seek for rational norms of living.[11] The Greeks, being average men, gave Socrates the hemlock to drink, as the Roman authorities crucified Jesus. Immanuel Kant taught the doctrine of the primacy of the pure practical reason. This is his way of saying that the only ground we have for studying science or doing anything, is the development of human character. Kant was not martyred, but his central doctrine perished of neglect. Some have noticed it, and have concluded that Kant meant that the practical is more important than the rational; others have noticed it, only to pick flaws (they are there) in his formal doctrine of what practical reason is. But almost everyone has missed

[10] This is obviously a rejection of the view that anthropology and sociology furnish the criteria of norms by their descriptions of the mores of different civilizations and groups. This view, instead of giving us light about true ideals, is a complete repudiation of the notion that there are any true ideals. The able Argentine, Mario Bunge, has unfortunately revived the Comtean idea that ethics is "an aspect of sociology" in his article *"Qué es la Epistemología?"* in *Minerva,* I (1944), 40.

[11] See Plato's *Phaedo,* 97B–100B.

his main point—that the good life is devotion to reason in the realm of choice, which is something higher and more rational than devotion to reason in the realm of sense.

Thought about ethics and religion is both nobler and harder than thought about science; it is of a different order of difficulty. The only justification of science, according to Kant, is its utility in supporting and expressing good will. "In some sense," says John Dewey, in harmony with Kant, "all philosophy is a branch of morals." [12] The German Heinrich Rickert has expressed a similar view in saying that even logic is the ethics of thought.[13] But these acknowledgements of the imperative demands of ideal norms by philosophers are almost forgotten by the mass of men in much of their living. Especially is this true as regards the changes most needed to make this world a world of right. An astonishing number, even of great leaders of thought, despair of progress and regard the very idea as antiquated or unchristian. This is the sort of problem to which only an "existential" answer is relevant: by choosing to despair, man can block progress; by wise action, he can contribute to it.

III

Anyone who consults experience is aware that the life of value is a life of conflict. Not only is it difficult to realize norms; not only is it difficult to decide what are the true norms, and so the true values; not only are there sincere and often cruel differences between persons who choose conflicting values; not only is the realization of values dependent to some extent on favorable circumstances in the natural and economic order; but also in

[12] See Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), p. 33.

[13] *"Logik ist die Moral des Denkens."*

every individual's experience there is bitter conflict. There are goods and evils, values and disvalues. Whatever one's definition of value may be, it implies a distinction between value and not-value. If reason is a value, unreason is a disvalue; if love is a value, indifference or hate is a disvalue. The only thinkers who could fail to make a distinction between good and evil are either those who hold that everything is of no value, or those who hold that everything is of equal value. Both extremes are contrary to the experience of every human being who prefers life to death, food to starvation, beauty to ugliness, or who has any preferences whatever.

Values are satisfactions; but everyone who finds satisfaction also meets dissatisfaction. Values are joys; but everyone who feels joy also feels sorrow and pain. Values are purposes fulfilled; but everyone who experiences fulfilled purposes also experiences frustrated purposes. Value is order; but everyone who experiences order also experiences chaos. This does not mean that good by some sort of logical necessity requires or implies evil; the enjoyment of a good apple does not require logically the experience of rotten apples. The statements, then, are not declarations of some sort of fatalistic necessity which requires evil if there is to be good. They are simply empirical observations. No one has been completely satisfied at all times; nor has anyone always been joyful, always successful, always orderly.

The contrast of value and disvalue is made clearer if we look at typical norms. Already it has been noted that love and reason confront hatred, indifference, and unreason in actual experience. The characteristic forms which reason-love assumes in universal human thinking are the norms of truth, morality, the aesthetic, and the holy. When realized in experience these norms generate actual knowledge, actual goodness, actual beauty, actual wor-

ship. But the joy of knowledge is confronted by the pains of ignorance and error; man is a mixture of goodness and of moral evil; the fulfilled purposes of beauty are accompanied by frustrations which we call ugliness; and the same humanity that worships also indulges in irreverence and blasphemy.

The evils which mar the unity and harmony of human values arise from different sources, but may conveniently be classified as voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary evils are those which result from choice; involuntary evils are those which arise without, or in spite of, human choice. There are some, notably Socrates, who teach that man never voluntarily chooses evil. This view is false to common experience. Men often avoid acknowledged values when their realization would involve great toil and suffering. Men murder, wage war, and otherwise voluntarily destroy values. Sheer malice is an actual experience. The Germans call it *Schadenfreude* ("joy in destruction"), pure love of wrong for its own sake. Poe called it "the Imp of the Perverse." Any attempt to show that the evils are enjoyed and therefore are regarded as goods fails to take into account the fact that all of these evils have repeatedly been chosen by men who knew them to be evil and chose them nevertheless. Moral evil is always of this voluntary sort; it is impossible to do moral wrong unintentionally; and all voluntary evil is moral evil.

There are, however, many evils which are in the class of the involuntary. Much of man's ignorance and error is due to circumstances beyond his control. Much ugliness exists in the order of nature apart from man. Worship is as much a matter of education and tradition as it is of choice, and irreverence and blasphemy may often be socially conditioned rather than freely chosen attitudes. Experiences of sorrow, pain, frustration, and chaos seem to arise from the nature of things. Hence involuntary evil

has often been called natural evil, although the term is less descriptive and less accurate than "involuntary."

At the present stage of our thought, no attempt will be made to offer any explanation of these interrelated facts of value and disvalue. It suffices to make clear that both values and disvalues seem to be inherent in personality and its relations to nature.

IV

In the light of man's conflict in pursuit of values, his frustration and temptation by evils, it may seem doubtful whether this chapter is rightly called "The World of Values." A world is an order. It is a cosmos. It forms a whole. Since values exist only in persons, a world of values could exist only in fully integrated persons in a well-ordered society. Actual persons and actual society present no such picture of order as is implied by the expression "a world of values." Is there then no world of values?

Everyday experience is assuredly not a world of values. It is a chaos; desires clash. The mores of one group condemn you as a wretch if you decline to join in drinking alcoholic beverages; the mores of another group condemn you just as violently if you find the slightest value in alcohol. Economic life in the capitalistic system is war; and even under the communistic system international relations include war. Religious faith arouses bitter antagonisms. God has made men to be of different races (vague though the word "race" may be in its meaning), and racial differences lie at the bottom of much of man's present tragic situation. The facts of personal, economic, religious, interracial, and international chaos are so evidently traits of modern life that no extended diagnosis of the human situation is required to prove it. *Circumspice*: look about you. That suffices.

The problem of religion, of law, of statesmanship, of morality, and of philosophy and of science is all one. It is: How to build cosmos out of chaos.

There are various ways by which man tries to create a world of values when chaos threatens to overwhelm him. He may resort to violence and try to create by force the conditions necessary to support his values. To some extent force necessarily enters into all human relations, and physical violence has seemed necessary to restrain criminals. But a world of values cannot be sustained by violence alone. When man dimly grasps the suicidal nature of violence, he seeks to effect a compromise among the conflicting forces by methods of appeasment, that is, by granting violent men at least a partial fulfillment of their desires. History shows that this method only delays the day of reckoning; and logic shows that it is contradictory to erect a world of values on a foundation that denies values. This does not mean that compromise is always self-destructive and illogical; it means rather that any compromise which does not rest firmly on the principle of the best possible value is a betrayal of all value.

There remains only one method by which a world of values can be built. It is what Plato called "persuasion" and what Christianity calls "conversion"—the change of men by appeal to spiritual forces. It is the application of rational love in education. This method rests on the appeal to the best in every man—to his sense of fairness and his ability to think. Democracy, Christianity, and the future of the world rest on an appeal to universal norms, by application of which all men may realize values. The world of values, it is true, therefore lies in the distant future; but the world of norms may to some extent be grasped by every normal human being. The hope for the future lies in an increasing agreement about universal norms, and about their application.

V

There is already far more agreement about the world of norms than would appear from a first glance at conflicting philosophies, religions, and ethical theories. Even those who would substitute the debased coin of race and nationality for the universal brotherhood of man pay homage to the norm of love—although in a sadly mutilated form. Even those who would assert a nonrational or superrational way of deciding questions about value usually try to explain their views as rationally as they can. Science and music and worship are international and universal. Everywhere, in some way or other, tribute is paid to the norms of truth, goodness, beauty, and holiness; everywhere there is some vision, however distorted, of reason-love, which is the norm of norms. St. Paul called it "speaking the truth in love."

The world of norms is beautiful in its promise to man; but it is also perilous. There is the peril of abstraction; man may contemplate the norms and never apply them. There is the peril of smugness; man may be sure that his knowledge of the norms is adequate, and that the standards of his group need no correction. It is against this peril that naturalists inveigh when they deny the fixity of ends of nature. There is also the peril of radicalism; man may insist that norms be applied perfectly and immediately. And there is the peril of cynicism; men disguise their despair beneath a sneering exterior.

All of these perils are signs that the building of a world of values is an eternal task. Nature reveals a suffering God and personality reveals a sinning humanity. But the task of the control of suffering and of redemption from sin are goals of eternal divine purpose—goals in which the norms are laws of health and joy and growth. This vision is not popular in the modern world.

Chapter V

ONE WORLD: NATURALISM

WILLIAM JAMES SAID THAT PHILOSOPHY HAS BEEN called "the vision of the world's unity." [1] James knew that the phrase was not an adequate definition of philosophy—least of all, of his own pluralistic, helter-skelter philosophy. But it points toward the great truth that every human being must have some first principles to live by, and that these first principles must be in some sort of harmony with each other. Every person is complex; but if he is merely complex, he may well become a victim of complexes. Without unity and order in its aims, a personality suffers conflict, disintegration, and despair. An integrated personality is an integer—a whole number. A man of integrity is completely sound, completely reliable through and through. As we say, you always know where you will find him. James is right in hinting that the philosopher aims at integrity and unity. But James was more fascinated by variety than he was by unity; yet his conclusion was that the real aim of our intellect is totality. To achieve totality, it is certain that the whole mind must confront the whole world; and this is the goal of the philosopher, as it is of the saint who prayed, "Unite my heart to fear thy name."

The philosopher is not able to dictate to the truth and measure out in advance how much unity and how much variety the truth shall contain. The philosopher must face the facts of experience and the laws of reason, and be

[1] See *Pragmatism*. (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1907), pp. 129–30.

guided by them. Like Jesus, he will pray to Real Being, "Not my will, but thine, be done." But the philosopher can not be open to truth, nor can the worshiper be open to God, unless he is completely devoted. Complete devotion means not only complete sincerity, but also sincere completeness. That is, without a facing of all possible evidence of experience, without search for every available ray of light, the thinker is not genuinely philosophical and the devotee is not genuinely religious. In the sense of completeness, totality, wholeness, both philosophy and religion require a quest of the world's unity as a basis for the soul's unity.

In his brilliantly simple phrase, "one world," Wendell Willkie stated a remarkable fact. The human world is one world, Mr. Willkie implied, whether we know it or not. The means of production and distribution, the means of transportation and communication, the interdependence of peoples, the very law of cause and effect, bind isolationists, enemies, soldiers, pacifists, Jews, Negroes, Mohammedans, British, Indians, Americans, Japanese into one human world. Science is international, interracial, interconfessional: the world of science is one world. The needs of men everywhere for life, for growth, and for freedom are essentially one. The goal of mystics is some sort of oneness with God, "that they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." Or it may be described in the language of the Katha Upanishad, "As pure water poured into pure water becomes the same, so becomes the self of the sage, O Gautama, who knows the unity of the Atman." The less mystical, more practical man of action finds unity in moral law. Confucius said that "the principle of righteousness is the same in all cases," and it is written in Lao-tse's *Canon of Reason and Virtue* that "the holy man has not a heart of his own. The hundred families' hearts he makes

his heart." With all its variety, this is truly "one world."

William James, in leading up to his remarks about "the vision of the world's unity," confessed that, after "long brooding," he had come to regard the problem of "the one and the many" as "the most central of all philosophic problems." [2] There is no denying its importance; but if the world is evil, it makes little difference to me whether it is ruled by one devil or many devils. Important as statistics may be, the nature of the things counted is more important than the count. Quality is more fundamental than quantity; quantity gets its importance from quality. What kind of one and what kind of many? —this is the question I want answered above all. What I want to know more than anything else is whether the world of nature and the world of persons are on the side of life's highest values or are ruthlessly indifferent to them.

This problem may be stated in another way. Since values exist only in and for persons, the problem of nature and values takes this form: What is the relation between nature and personality? Is personality an unintended product of an essentially purposeless nature, or is nature itself simply a phase or expression of personality and its highest values? Many will tell us that the question is unanswerable, or answerable only by some revelation from beyond reason and experience. But it is foolish to refuse to experiment because many tell us not to; and the first step of experiment is definition of the problem, the step which we are now taking.

Some hold that mind, spirit, or personality is the real energy of this universe, and that concern for values and their development in every conscious being is at the root of every natural process, all life, all evolution, the entire cosmos. Those who hold this view may be called idealists,

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 129.

in the broadest sense of the word, for they think that ideas and ideals are the controlling forces of the universe. In this broad sense, the chief Hindu philosophers, the Hebrew prophets, Jesus and Paul, Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, Berkeley and Hegel, and countless others of every race and religion are all idealists. They all believe in the supremacy of mind and values in the eternal processes of all being.

Others hold that unconscious matter or some collection of unconscious immaterial entities or unconscious energy is the basal reality and the unconscious source of all life, mind, and values. Again using terms in a very broad sense, we may call the proponents of this standpoint materialists. They usually believe that mind exists only in living organisms, and that if organisms were to perish, consciousness and values would at the same time be wiped out. This materialistic view has been held (with greater or less modification) by Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, even by the Christian Father Tertullian, by Hobbes and Holbach and Feuerbach, by Büchner and Dühring, as well as by Karl Marx.

The most important question that any one has to decide, both theoretically and practically, is whether he is to be an idealist or a materialist. Experience shows that a theoretical idealist may be a practical materialist, and that a theoretical materialist may be a practical idealist. But it may be doubted whether either compromise can meet either the theoretical or the practical needs of man in the long run.

In order to sharpen the problem for the necessarily restricted purposes of this brief discussion, and to modernize it, we shall not usually speak of idealism and materialism. We shall usually treat of idealism in its contemporary aspect as personalism, while, instead of referring to materialism, we shall usually speak of modern

naturalism. Our procedure will be to treat of naturalism in the present chapter and of personalism in the following one—each as a typical example of the great spiritual struggle of mind to find "one world."

First, then, we shall try to understand naturalism. It is rendered singularly difficult to discuss because of the lack of clear self-definition by naturalists. The most authoritative presentation of naturalistic thought to appear in recent years is the symposium edited by Yervant H. Krikorian and called *Naturalism and the Human Spirit,* to which fifteen representative naturalists have contributed essays. Frequent references will be made to this remarkably able and instructive volume. At present it will suffice to quote the revealing words with which the publisher opens a description of the book on its dust jacket. He says: "There are almost as many definitions of 'naturalism' as there are writers of essays in this volume." He goes on, it is true, to allude to the "remarkable community of temper" which prevails; but the reader may find it difficult to put his finger on a community of temper which eludes exact and consistent definition.

Perhaps the fairest preliminary statements about naturalism, in the light of the Krikorian volume as well as other writings would be the following. Modern naturalists tend to regard nature as all that there is, and abstain from defining it more exactly than as a synonym for "everything given or implied in experience." Naturalists do not approach problems from the standpoint of the proposed definitions of "idealism" and "materialism," but tend to regard scientific method as the only method of arriving at truth. It is therefore a form of what Ralph Barton Perry has called "the cult of science." It is very influential in the modern world.[3]

[3] There are three excellent works in which the problem of nature and values is discussed from a naturalistic point of view. The reader is re-

ONE WORLD: NATURALISM

I

The "one world" of modern naturalism is very different from that of classical materialism, but is firmly directed against all philosophical idealism, theism,[4] or personalism. Yet most naturalists today would not say that they were trying to refute idealistic metaphysics by offering another and better metaphysical system. They would declare, rather, that idealism is excluded by scientific method. Scientific method is experimental and is therefore opposed to any dogmatic metaphysics. In fact, naturalism is more fundamentally a revolt against dogmatism than it is a revolt against personalism. "The quest for certainty," as Dewey has called it, is futile; naturalism requires that all views be held tentatively and subject to further experimental testing.

When one considers the history of doctrine in any religion—be it Hindu, Buddhistic, Jewish, Christian, Mohammedan, or any other—he finds much that is repellent equally to the scientific mind and to the devout religious consciousness. Anyone who turns over the pages of the history of Christian thought[5] discovers not merely uncritical and authoritarian use of Scripture, not merely im-

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ferred to M. C. Otto, *Things and Ideals* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1924); John Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," in *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939) Vol. II, No. 4; and Ray Lepley, *Verifiability of Value* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944). Dr. Lepley's work contains a chapter closely relevant to our present study, namely "Idealism and Naturalism," pp. 226–38. It also is provided with an extensive and useful, yet far from complete, bibliography on value, which is defective in the field of religious values.

[4] It is true that Henry Nelson Wieman speaks of his view as a theistic naturalism, but he seems to use the word "theism" in a sense which excludes belief in God as a personal consciousness.

[5] For example, see *Documents of the Christian Church,* ed. H. Bettenson (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), No. 495 in "The World's Classics" series.

moral doctrines like that of the atonement as a price paid to Satan, but also the most intolerant restrictions on freedom of thought. Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, declared: "I am determined not to write to the Arians. I anathematize their heresy." [6] Theodosius I said that heretics "will suffer in the first place the chastisement of the divine condemnation, and in the second the punishment which our authority, in accordance with the will of Heaven, shall decide to inflict." [7] Church authorities and Councils for many centuries have anathematized, excommunicated, subjected to the tortures of the Inquisition, and burned alive those whose doctrines were deemed heretical. Even the great thinker St. Thomas Aquinas, "the Angelic Doctor" and the recognized philosophical authority of the Roman Catholic Church today, could write: "If forgers of money or other malefactors are straightway justly put to death by secular princes, with much more justice can heretics, immediately upon conviction, be not only excommunicated but also put to death." The Church, he grants, should have mercy and should try to convert offenders; but the stubborn heretic is to be excommunicated and left to the secular court "to be exterminated from the world by death." [8] Almost the only utterances for centuries on the subject of religious liberty came from heretics, such as Julian the Apostate, who wrote that "men should be taught and won over by reason, not by blows, insults, and corporal punishments." [9]

It is no wonder that Albrecht Ritschl, the famous historical theologian, broke out in such words as the following: "One needs a sound and strong faith in the invisible in order to keep before one's eye the advancing power of Christ over the world in the presence of the chaos, the

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 27.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 186–87, quoting *Summa theologica*, II–II, Q. xi, art. 3.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

abominations, and the wretchedness of Church history." [10] In the face of the record and of Ritschl's judgment on it, who can blame modern naturalists, humanists, and other heretics for revolting against the methods of anathema and extermination in favor of the methods of experimental truth seeking? Who can well deny that the Jesus who said, "By their fruits ye shall know them," is closer to the experimental temper of naturalists than to the ecclesiastical temper of inquisitors?

Naturalists, however, have revolted not merely against intolerance and dogmatism, but also (to a great extent) against Christianity and religion itself. They are not willing to treat the Bible as a laboratory manual of spiritual experience and experiment. They find (as a rule) no middle ground between the most extreme traditional literalism and the most extreme rejection of religious faith.

In particular, the naturalistic revolt against dogma is directed against two abuses which naturalists regard as inherent in traditional religion, namely, the view that nature is evil, and the antisocial attitudes of the church (although many naturalists are almost completely ignorant of the church).

It is true that there are elements in the religious traditions of Christianity, as well as of Judaism, Hinduism, and Zoroastrianism, for example, which face frankly the evil in nature. Nature, these traditions tell us, is under a curse, or is maya, or is partly the work of a demon. As a matter of fact, naturalists themselves dwell emphatically on the evils of nature when they wish to attack the belief in a good God. Nature (and especially human nature), they contend, is much too vile a thing to have been created by a loving heavenly Father; Bertrand Russell reiterates this theme. But when these same naturalists are in the

[10] Translated by the writer from A. Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* (4th ed.; Bonn: A. Marcus, 1895), III, 434.

mood of defending nature, they resent very much the frankness with which religious believers acknowledge that human nature is infected with something they call the fall of man. Neither war, nor economic exploitation, nor race prejudice, nor alcoholism, nor sexual perversions, nor subconscious desires, nor Oedipus complexes will wring from a naturalist in his antireligious mood the confession that men of religion are right when they see something evil in nature. Mr. Dewey seems to regard the church's insistence on man's fallen estate a mere trick of trade to guarantee that the church will always have customers for salvation.[11] This is hardly fair. If, honestly, there is evil in nature when a naturalist is attacking theism, then, honestly, theists should be allowed the right to admit and interpret that evil. If naturalists think they can conquer this evil by a glorious faith in human ideals, let them not forget that their quixotism is more than matched by the religious faith that the Creator is the Redeemer. There may be far more in religions dogma than naturalists admit, although there may be far less in dogmatism than traditionalists claim.

The naturalistic attack on antisocial attitudes of the church has enough truth in it to cause a social historian to shudder. Too often the church has sided with the oppressor, if the oppressor patronized and supported the church. Too often the church has hesitated to speak out against injustice to the poor, when outspoken courage would be criticized by the wealthy and powerful. Too often the church has supported war and been indifferent about its causes and its cure. Too often the oppressed have been befriended by atheists (for instance, Communists), while the church has denounced the sins of the poor and has regarded the injustices they suffer as no concern of the church. These things have happened and con-

[11] See, for example, John Dewey's remarks in Krikorian, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

tinue to happen. The church has often been blind to the social values of science, to the economic plight of the common man,[12] and to the universal brotherhood of man regardless of race. All this must be granted. In reply, however, it should be said that whenever religious believers are antisocial or socially indifferent they are being false to the first articles of almost universal religious faith—the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man—whereas, when a naturalist or atheist espouses the cause of humanity the case is very different. The naturalist can find no reason in his theory of nature for his devotion to freedom and progress. He derives his ideals either from the religious tradition that he rejects or from the goodness of his heart which God gave him. The naturalist cannot, therefore, use the antisocial behavior of churches as an argument against religion; rather, it is an argument that churches should become more religious and that naturalists should acknowledge the religious roots and implications of their own ideals.

To sum up: naturalism is a revolt against dogmatism. It is right in this revolt in so far as it insists on finding and testing the grounds of all "dogmas," all beliefs, in the actual experiences of life. It is wrong, however, in the idea that religion means a debased view of human nature or an indifference to human need.

II

In one positive respect, modern naturalism is a marked advance over ancient materialism or even over nineteenth century mechanism and atomism. From Democritus to "nineteenth century physics," the atom was the fundamental unit of materialism. The atoms were solid, im-

[12] For example, it eloquently blames juvenile delinquency on "the home," without looking into its causes in the economic, the social, the educational, and the religious systems of society.

penetrable, and eternal; they were in constant motion, although there was no clear reason why they should move. But from the middle of the nineteenth century on—under the combined influence of Darwin, of Marx, and of the new physics—materialists began to see that the old solid atoms were superfluous; they began to talk of a world of energy, of fields of force, or of events. Materialism became "Diamat" (dialectical materialism) or naturalism, with the stress on evolution and activity. Atoms ceased to be solid; they became fields of force. Modern naturalists, like R. W. Sellars, think of existence as activity.[13] W. R. Dennes speaks of the shift in recent naturalism "from such categories as matter and motion to the categories 'event,' 'quality,' and 'relation.' " [14] Such writers as Samuel Alexander and John Dewey, as well as R. W. Sellars, have developed an "evolutionary naturalism" which lays stress on what has become well known as "emergent" evolution. Naturalists are, of late, also emphasizing continuity among the activities or processes of nature; [15] and they are no longer regarding that continuity as merely mechanical.[16]

In so far as naturalists regard nature as a world of living activity, evolution, and continuous process, they are moving away from traditional naturalism to points of view which have been characteristic of idealists, and especially of personalists. Berkeley, Leibniz, Hegel, Lotze,

[13] See the expressions "what, in existence, is a local activity" and "the activations of agents" in Sellars, "Dewey on Materialism," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* III (1943), 383.

[14] See Dennes in Krikorian, *op. cit.,* p. 271.

[15] See the discussions of continuity by Thelma Z. Lavine (citing and supporting Dewey) and Herbert W. Schneider, in *ibid.,* pp. 183–84, 124–25.

[16] Life as "purposive behavior" is not to be "turned into mechanism," nor mechanism into life. Such is the substance of Y. H. Krikorian's view, *ibid.,* p. 245.

and Bowne have consistently defined being as activity. The conception of development became dominant in modern philosophy through Hegel. The law of continuity (the *lex continui*) was a contribution of the panpsychistic personalist, Leibniz. Some of the modern thinkers for whom the idea of emergent or creative evolution has come to be of central importance started out with more or less naturalistic bias, but have moved far in the direction of idealism or personalistic theism. This is true of Bergson,[17] of Lloyd Morgan,[18] and of Whitehead.[19]

It appears, consequently, that the first two traits of naturalism which we have examined are strongly emphasized by naturalists and are sometimes claimed by them as their sole property, but that they are in no sense purely naturalistic. In truth, the revolt against dogma and the belief in nature as a realm of continuous, living, evolving activity are characteristic of idealism and are accepted by most philosophical theists. No one need regret that there are increasing signs of what Bosanquet once called "the meeting of extremes in contemporary philosophy." On the other hand, it would be a great mistake to suppose that the extremes have met, that naturalism has become idealism, and that there is no longer any issue at stake between them. Naturalism is one world and idealism is another; but recent developments have made it increasingly difficult to define the limits of each. Naturalism is no longer what its defenders or its critics in the nineteenth century took it to be. It is today in a state of ferment and transition. If it is "one world," it may well be called a world of confused issues. Let us try to find some order in the chaos.

[17] *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1935).

[18] *Emergent Evolution* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1923).

[19] *Process and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929).

III

Naturalism, we have just said, is a world of confused issues. The root of the confusion, as has been pointed out already, lies in the failure of naturalists to arrive at a clear definition of what they mean by nature. When they identify nature with the physical world disclosed by the senses, nature is easily contrasted with supernature, the physical with the spiritual. Obviously we do not perceive duty or love of God by our senses. When naturalists hold that nature defined as the object of sense perception is all that there is, their denial of the supernatural has a meaning: namely, that all experiences which are not sensory are illusory or purely subjective. But if naturalists define nature as all that there is, without giving any other definition of nature than mere inclusiveness or allness, then it is meaningless for such naturalists to attack supernaturalism. If nature is all, then, conceivably, God and prayer and miracles are realities or processes within nature, and they could not intelligibly be called supernatural. Until naturalists become more exact in definition this area of confusion will remain unclarified, and no one will know clearly what they assert when they assert nature or what they deny when they deny the supernatural.

There is a second area of confusion when naturalists talk about scientific method. When a man of science, undefiled by naturalistic philosophy (or any other!), speaks of scientific method, he usually means first of all the method of his own science, whether it be physics or chemistry or biology or geology or astronomy. Some sciences, such as logic and mathematics, are chiefly concerned with the principles of necessary deduction; their methods are independent of any particular sensory experiences, and rest solely on the experiences of reasoning. Hence they are called formal. Usually when we speak of scientific

method we mean the method common to the natural sciences. Their scientific method includes observation (of sense data or objects), accurate description, hypothesis, prediction, and experiment.[20] The description, the hypothesis, and the experiment are more scientific the more accurate they are; and in most sciences mathematics is the best possible measure of accuracy. Yet scientific method varies with the subject matter. In astronomy, experiment is impossible; the heavenly bodies are observed but not tampered with. Nevertheless astronomy is perhaps the most remarkable of all sciences in its predictions. Geology, likewise, must forego experiment, but it also foregoes prediction, except in a very rough sense; its use of mathematics is not comparable with that in physics or astrophysics.

Scientific method, therefore, cannot rightly be conceived in any narrow sense. For many years I have been convinced that one of the chief obstacles both to understanding among scientists and also to understanding between scientists and the general public is the tendency of some scientists to judge other fields in terms of the methods used in their own field. Some sociologists interpret mathematics and morals solely from the sociological point of view; some psychologists interpret philosophy and religion solely from the psychological point of view. This tendency results in nothing but confusion and misunderstanding. The sociologist who thinks of morals only as mores or the psychologist who supposes that all religion is only rationalization will never understand either morals or religion. His method prevents him from trying to understand them. Any provincial restriction, which requires the exclusive use of one scientific method and one only for all types of subject matter, is worthy of being called

[20] For an important treatment of the topic by a logical positivist, see Hans Reichenbach, *Experience and Prediction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

methodological dogmatism.[21] A physical dogmatist would insist that numbers and thoughts must be treated as matter in motion; and he would rightly be laughed out of court as being incompetent in the fields of mathematics and psychology.

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, to distinguish what is common to all scientific method from what is peculiar to the methods of one field. As we have seen, naturalists rightly reject the method of anathema and of authoritative pronouncements in favor of an appeal to experience, if not always to experiment; for no experimental operations can be performed on the sun or the geological past. If naturalists mean by their appeal to scientific method no more than that all beliefs must be tested by a clear and exact appeal to experience, I quite agree with them. Their method is the method of Jesus, who said, "By their fruits ye shall know them," and their appeal is the appeal of the man born blind: "Whereas I was blind, now I see." [22]

The great trouble with naturalists, however, is that as soon as they begin to talk about scientific method they begin to manifest symptoms of methodological dogmatism. Y. H. Krikorian, the editor of naturalism's most comprehensive manifesto, illustrates this in his chapter on "A Naturalistic View of Mind." [23] He defines naturalism as holding a "basic belief" in "the universal application of the experimental method," which he calls objective. Since he goes on to criticize Hocking and Maritain, who recog-

[21] See E. S. Brightman, "What Constitutes a Scientific Interpretation of Religion?" in *Journal of Philosophy,* XXIII (1926), 250–58, where the subject is discussed more fully.

[22] See John 9:25. Because of my appeal to experience, I have been called a naturalist by one theological reviewer, and another has expressed doubt whether I was a naturalist or a liberal. The present book should clear the fog.

[23] *Op. cit.,* pp. 242–69, especially the first pages of the chapter.

nize something "supersensible," it is clear that Krikorian means by "objective" the same as "sensible" or "sensory." But if experimental method be of "universal application," why not apply it to supersensible experience? Krikorian has committed the fallacy of methodological dogmatism, because he has called his method "universal" and then restricted it to the field of his special interest.

Method means, literally, a "road after," that is, a pursuit of something. Scientific method is a pursuit of facts, laws, and truths in special fields. Philosophical method is a pursuit of facts, laws, and truths pertaining to experience as a whole. If naturalists make a philosophy out of a method which excludes all facts except those accessible to our senses, they contradict the very nature of philosophy and mutilate experience by refusing to admit experiences which are not of the kind which they prefer. Each science must, of course, exclude facts irrelevant to it; physics must exclude all moral, religious, and metaphysical judgments from its experiments and laws. But to declare that facts which are irrelevant to the particular purposes of physics, or of any other special science, are therefore not facts is to deny the very evidence of experience. It is both unusual and encouraging to note that Ray Lepley in a recent book has declared that verification should not be restricted to "empirical [sensory] operations of testing," but should include methods of "critical reflective thinking . . . and the like." [24]

Naturalists, we see, are confused about whether scientific method restricts us to the physical and sensory or allows a more adequate view of experience. They are also confused about the results of scientific method. Their confusion at this point is not purely arbitrary but rests on a dilemma which experience forces on everyone. On the one hand we have to act: existential theologians and prag-

[24] See his *The Verifiability of Value,* pp. 20–21.

matists would agree with personalists at this point. Life demands decisions. On the other hand, life does not furnish sufficient light for perfect decisions. Only in purely formal sciences, like logic and mathematics, is there logical necessity; but all judgments about persons or societies or things or values are to some extent tentative. The evidence is never all in. Neither science nor philosophy, much less common sense, can give us absolute knowledge.

Here is the dilemma. We must decide; yet we never can decide with perfect knowledge. If we decide to wait for perfect knowledge, even that decision is imperfectly grounded. If we decide to act without perfect knowledge, we may be wrong. This dilemma is inherent in the human situation and there is no escape. We cannot avoid the necessity of decision; and we cannot avoid the possibility of being wrong. If someone tells us that he has perfect knowledge, we, just as we are, have to decide whether to believe him; and a Protestant conscience always has to decide whether or not to accept Catholic theory.

There is, therefore, a sense in which all decisions made by man must be tentative, subject to further light. Science and religion agree in principle on this point. The scientist holds all his hypotheses lightly, being perfectly willing to abandon any hypothesis which is refuted by new experimental evidence. The religious believer knows that his beliefs are something seen "through a glass, darkly," and are "but broken lights of Thee." All human decisions and creeds are subject to divine correction. God knows it better.

Naturalists, however, take this truth of the tentativeness of all human knowledge and press it to extremes, or, rather, they treat it arbitrarily. In so far as they see—like Dewey in *The Quest for Certainty* or Bosley in *The Quest for Religious Certainty*—that we cannot attain absolute finality, they are on solid ground. But when they infer

that, because the scientific method requires open-mindedness, it therefore prohibits any commitments, they become confused.

This confusion is especially manifest in the fields of ethics, religion, and metaphysics. If the tentativeness of scientific methods means that commitment is forbidden, then no consistent naturalist could be depended on to keep a contract, to be loyal to his country, or even to believe sincerely in the operational method. Ethical decisions are necessary, even in the absence of perfect knowledge. So, too, it is necessary to decide what attitude one is to assume toward religion, and in principle a naturalist who commits himself to irreligion is in at least as precarious a position as one who commits himself to religion; and, practically speaking, everyone must commit himself to one or the other of these views. The typical naturalistic tentativeness manifests itself especially in regard to metaphysics. Naturalistic refusal to pass any metaphysical judgments is called positivism.

At this point there is a basic confusion about the meaning of tentativeness. If tentativeness means a complete suspension of judgment and a refusal to try any experiment, it means total cessation of thought and of progress; and this is exactly what consistent positivism means regarding knowledge of God and even of human personality, to say nothing of nature itself. But if tentativeness means search for the truth, commitment to truth now apprehended, and willingness to learn new truth as well as to criticize old beliefs, then it is at least as sound to have faith in God in this spirit as it is to develop a science or to be committed to naturalistic method.

By way of summary, it may be said that we find among naturalists a twofold confusion about scientific method: an uncertainty about the restriction of that method to sensory data and an uncertainty about the practical effects

of the open-mindedness inherent in scientific method. When scientific method is allowed to face all the facts including values and ideals, and when open-mindedness is seen to include and require decisions and commitments, naturalism is greatly weakened. It ceases to be an effective foe of theistic belief.

A third area of confusion in naturalistic thought centers about the conception of reason. Naturalists talk much about intelligence, meaning by intelligence the application of scientific method. At the same time, many naturalists are very dubious of system and of any attempt at inclusiveness in thought.[25]

The best way to clarify the situation here is to propose an inclusive definition of reason, as distinguished from the special applications of reason to one field or another. We suggest that reason is an ideal of completely coherent thinking and living, never fully realized, never merely static, yet always imperative in its claims. It is the supreme court of the mind. It consists of the following norms:

Be consistent (eliminate all contradictions).

Be systematic (discover all relevant relations).

Be inclusive (weigh all available experiences).

Be analytic (consider all the elements of which every complex consists).

Be synoptic (relate all the elements of any whole to its properties as a whole).

Be active (use experimental method).

[25] There are, of course, exceptions to this. Naturalists like R. W. Sellars or D. C. Williams aim sincerely to be systematic and inclusive. Ernest Nagel, following Duhem, holds that "only systems of beliefs can be put to a definitive test," and he calls this "a commonplace" (see Krikorian, *op. cit.*, p. 240). Abraham Edel hopes for "the most systematic account of the field" (*ibid.*, p. 69). But Sidney Hook would rule out system and inclusiveness by assigning values to "the viscera" (*ibid.*, p. 41; but cf. p. 57). See Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940), pp. 232–33, n. 34.

Be open to alternatives (consider many possible hypotheses).

Be critical (test and verify or falsify hypotheses).

Be decisive (be committed to the best available hypothesis).

This analysis of reason speaks for itself. The inevitable conclusion is that if one appeals to reason he appeals to systematic thought; if he does not appeal to reason he cannot be reasoned with. Naturalists need to give much more consideration to the structure and function of reason.

A fourth confusion in naturalistic thought is its inability to choose between positivism and metaphysics. A consistent positivist is a kind of idealist: all knowledge is based on verifiable sensory experience. This is Berkeleianism minus God. But on the other hand, constant traffic with sensations leads naturalists toward materialism or at least toward "physical realism," and so to an anti-idealistic metaphysics. The naturalist is in unstable equilibrium between subjective idealism and objective materialism. Whichever decision the naturalist makes leads him to conflict with many of his own principles and with fellow naturalists.

A fifth confusion, closely related to the fourth, is concerned with consciousness. Among many naturalists, extreme behaviorism is popular, with its denial of consciousness, although many others are willing to grant to consciousness a place in nature. Yet there is a peculiar aversion to facing the facts of consciousness. Mr. Dewey, for example, in the Krikorian volume has spoken about "alleged facts of and about mind, consciousness, self, and so forth." [26] He objects not only to "subject" and "person," but even to "sensations" and "sense-data." Krikorian declares that "mind must be analyzed as behavior" and as

[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

"anticipatory response," yet he freely admits "consciousness"; [27] with one breath he concedes that there are "immediate feelings," and with another he identifies the unity which is "the whole mind" with "the biological organism." [28] Is an immediate feeling a biological fact? Further confusion in this connection lies in the use of the word "experience," which Dewey, in *Experience and Nature*, used so broadly as to include under it many processes of nature which do not fall in any sense within human consciousness. Clarity can be achieved only if our consciousness is recognized to be exactly what we experience in our awareness, and is not confused or identified with its causes or objects or setting, either in the bodily organism or in the wider system of nature.

The sixth confusion in the world of naturalism is one in which all the other confusions culminate—confusion about God.

Naturalists reject belief in God as "unverifiable," yet they stretch their concept of verification to include knowledge of the past and of the interior of the moon. As applied to God, verification is taken rigorously; as applied to the past and the moon, it is taken loosely. They reject belief in God as supernatural; yet many of them admit the validity of values and ideals which are at least supersensible, and they are not prepared to define "supernatural" clearly. They object to the commitment required by faith in God, but do not hesitate to commit themselves to human love, democracy, and operational method. They avow experimental method, yet refuse to extend it to spiritual realms, and decline to experiment with God. It is almost true that the Orient has experimented only with God, and the Occident only with nature. Nothing but confusion can arise from this one-sidedness! Naturalists re-

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 252.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 269, cf. p. 266.

ject God because he is connected with ecclesiastical tradition. They do not appear to see that it is just as irrational to reject a belief merely because it is traditional as it is to accept it for the same reason. Nor do they seem to realize adequately either the value of social institutions or the need of reforming them if they are in error. Naturalists argue that belief in God is unimportant even if true, because they hold that the belief makes no practical difference. They thus ignore the practical differences made by love to an eternal Friend, by the peace and power that arises in mystical union (call it yoga or *unio mystica* or what you will), by prayer, by heightened confidence in the triumph of ideals, by religious fellowship in social institutions.

In so far as naturalism is a caution against superstition and wishful thinking it is a wholesome force. In so far as it is a skeptical rejection of God, it is based on confusion.

IV

This chapter is not a complete account or a complete criticism of naturalism. Yet enough has been said to warrant the conclusion that the proud assumption of naturalists, that their view is both predominant and true,[29] rests upon weak foundations.

The weakness of naturalism may be summarized briefly in three propositions: (1) *It is too abstract.* In centering on the sensuous, the physical, the biological, it abstracts from personality and value and leaves them only a sub-

[29] In a characteristically able article, Donald C. Williams writes: "Naturalism, Santayana has observed, is the native and inveterate philosophy of the United States, antedating and underlying all our more highfalutin academic and churchly confessions." (See "Naturalism and the Nature of Things," in *Philosophical Review,* LIII, 417.) In endorsing Santayana's cynical remark, Mr. Williams has impugned the sincerity of all Roman Catholics, all Protestants, all Jews, and all idealists. Such sweeping charges are good materials for the much-needed Institute for Propaganda Analysis.

ordinate place. (2) *It places certainty above adequacy.* In spite of the naturalistic emphasis on the tentative, the demand for sensory verification prevents the naturalist from giving due recognition to the nonsensory aspects of experience. The surest beliefs may be the least adequate. (3) *It restricts experiment unduly.* By confining the experimental method to the realm of natural science, naturalism discourages experiments in the realm of spiritual depth and spiritual values. In this realm, the Occident has much to learn from the Orient, and the Nordics have much to learn from the Latins.

Naturalism is a grandiose attempt to build "one world" out of the materials of human experience. With all of its sincerity, its wholesome revolt against dogma, and its emphasis on life, growth, and development, it has failed to propose clear answers to the questions which it raises. If the reader is still perplexed about what this naturalism is, let him not blame me. Let him blame the naturalists. Naturalism is much like the Republican or the Democratic party: numerous, full of antipathies, but vague about first principles.

Chapter VI

ONE WORLD: PERSONALISM

WHEREVER CIVILIZATION HAS REACHED THE STAGE OF reflective thought, there has been a conflict between materialists and idealists, or—to use more modern terms—naturalists and personalists. In Greece there were Democritus and Plato; in India were the materialistic Charvaka system and the idealistic Vedanta systems,[1] and Gautama, a naturalistic positivist, had Mahayana idealists among his later followers; in China were the idealists Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming and the primitivistic naturalist Chuang Tzu.[2] In Rome, Lucretius wrote *De natura rerum* ("On the Nature of Things") and Cicero *De natura deorum* ("On the Nature of Gods"). In Germany the materialist Feuerbach opposed the idealist Hegel. In the America of today John Dewey is a great naturalistic leader and William Ernest Hocking a great idealist. Throughout the ages, as we have seen, man has lived in two worlds, and not yet has he achieved unity. His world is still divided—with divisions not merely in wars and their aftermaths but among the most sincere seekers of truth.

It has been traditional to view materialists and naturalists as men without lofty aspirations, as men who sought to tear down everything noble and sublime and reduce it to the mean and the low. The very word idealism has suggested that those who bore the banner of that cause were,

[1] See C. A. Moore, *Philosophy—East and West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 15 *et passim.*

[2] See *ibid.*, pp. 62–65, 44–48.

or thought they were, the sole defenders of ideals in a world of sin, "starry-eyed" though they might be. This tradition is not wholly groundless. When men have wished to indulge the flesh at the expense of the spirit and to gratify their selfish desires at the expense of others, they have, as a rule, turned to some form of materialism as the best justification for a life of groveling in vice. Rarely have they appealed to idealism or personalism when they wished to revolt against man's higher nature. When that appeal has occurred, as in Adolf Hitler's description of himself as an "instrument of the Creator of the universe," it has been with the intention of convincing the masses that the revolt against ideals was itself idealistic— "the work of the Lord," as Hitler described his anti-Semitism.[3]

In the confused contemporary struggle, modern naturalists earnestly and sincerely proclaim their devotion to values. The ancient Democritus was a man of lofty, if traditional and uncritical, moral ideals. Auguste Comte defended a naturalistic positivism and at the same time proclaimed social ideals of order, progress, and love. The Communists advocate dialectical materialism, and act more effectively for the relief of exploited labor than many idealists have done. To call the roll of leading American naturalists like Max C. Otto, Laurence Sears, Irwin Edman, Roy Wood Sellars, Sidney Hook, and John Dewey, is at the same time to name some of America's noblest fighters for a better world. When fifteen naturalists recently united to set forth their program, they chose the title, *Naturalism and the Human Spirit,* as if to indicate that their chief concern was with the place of the spiritual life in nature.

Between naturalists and personalists today there is no real difference about the validity of human and social values. There is no attempt to discredit or destroy values in

[3] See the 10th German edition of *Mein Kampf,* pp. 234, 70.

either camp. The issue is not whether ideals are valid, but it now takes other forms. Men are asking: How can we reconcile our view of nature with our acceptance of values? and What is the range of values to which we should be devoted? Is there, for example, place for worship, prayer, mystical communion with God, devotion to divine purposes, and faith in immortal life? Naturalists have no clear and unified answer to the first question, and offer at best a vague and predominantly negative answer to the second. The unsatisfactory state of naturalism was shown by a debate in which Santayana called Dewey's naturalism "half-hearted" and Dewey called Santayana's "broken-backed";[4] by the great differences expressed in the above-mentioned symposium, *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*; and by such polemic as that between Roy Wood Sellars and Sidney Hook.[5] Differences of opinion within a school of thought, it is true, do not discredit the school. Christians differ about many things, but all Christians follow Christ. Naturalists differ so radically that all naturalists seem not to accept any distinctive ideas in common except that they reject belief in a personal God. Personalism, it will be argued, is clearer, truer to experience, and more reasonable in its interpretation of values than is any form of naturalism.

In the broadest sense, personalism is the belief that conscious personality is both the supreme value and the supreme reality in the universe. In this sense, practically all theists are personalists, whether they be scholastics, Barthians, religious realists, or idealists. Even Hitler was a perverted kind of personalist; he made personality—of "Aryan" type—the supreme value and even the supreme reality.

But beneath this surface agreement, there are impor-

[4] See *Jour. Phil.*, XXII (1925), 680, and XXIV (1927), 58.
[5] See *ibid.*, XLI (1944), 533–51.

tant disagreements. They turn about the questions: Is reason the test of truth? and Is all reality personal? Some personalists are suspicious of reason and regard confidence in reason as a form either of sinful pride or of cowardly weakness. Some personalists reject idealistic metaphysics and the postulate that all reality is personal. This book sides with those who defend reason and idealism on the ground that a rational idealistic personalism is truer to the facts of experience and to man's ideal aspirations than is naturalism or neosupernaturalism. Since the conflict with naturalism is more fundamental and more universal than that with neosupernaturalism, the chief stress will be laid on the former. Neosupernaturalism is confused truth; naturalism is confused error.

I

In the remainder of this discussion, accordingly, personalism will be taken to mean the belief that the universe is a society of conscious beings, that the energy which physicists describe is God's will in action, and that there is no wholly unconscious or impersonal being. Everything that is, is a conscious mind or some phase or aspect of a conscious mind. To speak religiously, the universe consists of God and his family. Nature is divine experience.

Personalism is sometimes taken to be a denial of the objective reality of nature. Nothing could be further from the truth. Personalism presupposes the validity of science and the objective reality of nature; but personalists believe that they are able to define that reality more coherently than do the naturalists and the realists. We have dwelt on the conflicts, the struggles, the values, the insights of life. According to personalism, all conflict and all knowledge are within and among persons. Our only experience is personal experience; our only environment is

other personality. The arena of conflict is personality. Victory or defeat must come in that arena.

This personalistic metaphysics is offered as a rational faith. There is no suggestion that it is the only thinkable view; naturalism is thinkable and so are other systems. It does not pretend to be absolutely proved. No one who understands the meaning of absolute proof will suppose that any absolute proof of anything can be found until that distant and unattainable day when all possible hypotheses have been weighed, all possible facts considered, and perfect reasoning carried out to the end (if it have an end). More humbly, personalism is proposed as a reasonable faith, a working hypothesis that meets the test of experience. Perhaps a little less humbly, but still open-mindedly, it is proposed as more reasonable and more empirical than the naturalisms which are so popular today, and so negative in their effects on vital religion.

II

Let us now examine a little more closely the challenge of personalism to naturalism.

Personalism is, in the first place, more empirical than naturalism. Naturalism tends either to neglect or to deny the most essential characteristic of all experience, namely, that it is personal[6] consciousness. Persons are the only directly experienced reality. All the evidence for belief in nature or in God or in other human beings is found in personal consciousness. All that nature ever gives to us or takes from us is personal consciousness. Anyone who asserts that there is any unconscious and impersonal matter is inventing something for which there is no evidence in

[6] Technically a distinction should be made between self and person. A self is any conscious being, while a person is a self able to judge its experiences by ideal norms. In the text, since reference is chiefly to persons, this distinction will be overlooked.

experience. He is resorting to tradition, or instinct, or "animal faith," as Santayana calls it. He is not consulting experience. To quote Hans Vaihinger, "Materialism does not in any wise rest on pure experience." [7] The situations which we experience are all conscious situations; if we wish to believe that there are unconscious situations, we do so at our own peril without warrant of experience. There is, of course, much that we are unconscious of; but that truth provides no evidence of anything that no one is conscious of—God or man.

In the second place, personalism is more inclusive than naturalism. It may readily be admitted that modern naturalism is more inclusive than the older materialism. Materialism reduced reality to the motions of atoms in space. It left no place even for the vivid qualities of sensation, to say nothing of ideals and values. Although modern naturalism with its evolutionary levels is richer than the barren materialism of former years, and although its exponents assert that mind and value are products of nature, yet materialists are not willing to regard mind and value as evidence for nature. Naturalists derive their definitions of nature from the sciences which deliberately omit personality and value from consideration, while concentrating on physical objects, especially on biological organisms. Thus, with all their good intentions, naturalists exclude personality and value from their data, or at best study them only as biological facts. Naturalism, in effect, whittles experience down to its bare spatial properties almost as completely as did the old materialism. Personalists, on the other hand, regard personality and value as the most essential clues to reality and as essential to the interpretation of all sense observations. Personalism is, therefore, more inclusive and more factual than materialism. Naturalism is an agreement to forget.

[7] *Philosophie des Als Ob* (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1911), p. 315.

In the third place, personalism is more social than naturalism. The structure of experience is social; on this personalists and naturalists agree. But, for naturalism, society and social relations are manifestations of a nonsocial reality. For personalism, on the other hand, reality is social through and through. Every personal experience includes something which the person did not invent or create, but which he received from his interaction and communication with other persons. For personalism, social categories are ultimate. Although the Divine Personality does not require other persons for his sheer existence, his moral nature is love, and love needs comradeship. God, then, is not a solitary, self-enjoying mind. He is love; he is the "Great *Socius*," the Great Companion. The personalistic philosophy therefore interprets nature itself as an area of social communication between God and other persons. Not only does this attach a broader validity to social categories than does naturalism, it also suggests a deeper foundation for democratic social philosophy. If the universe is a society of interacting persons, all partly determined and partly free, then democracy is an attempt to live politically "in tune with the Infinite."

Personalism is, in the fourth place, equally scientific with naturalism. The great strength of naturalism is supposed to be its strict adherence to science; but it is entirely incorrect for naturalists to lay claim to a monopoly on science. Every personalist respects science, and relies on the results of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and all the other sciences, as trustworthy formulations of the results of sound methods and as the best knowledge now attainable of the fields in question. The difference between personalists and naturalists at this point is not that naturalists are scientific and personalists unscientific. The difference, rather, is that naturalists seem to assert that science is all that man can know or hope to know. Science

is knowledge; science is philosophy; science is religion. Again, naturalism is what Ralph Barton Perry has called "the cult of science."

It is well to consider the reasons which move personalists to reject this cult of science. Science is a description of phenomena and their verifiable causal laws. Personalists, along with most philosophers who are not committed to naturalism, believe that there are certain questions which no science and no combination of sciences raises, but which must be raised if the human mind is to understand itself and to see science in perspective. Such are questions like these: What are the presuppositions of science? What does it take for granted? What, if anything, does it omit? What is the place of science in relation to other human interests and activities—such as social life, art, and religion—and to the unity of consciousness? What is the nature, structure, criterion, and basis of knowledge? How can we determine what is truly good, just, beautiful, holy, or true? How can we relate the results of the sciences to each other and to the true goal of human striving? How can we rightly define the total reality that is disclosed by our whole experience—scientific and extrascientific? Some scientists object to these questions because they cannot be answered by the methods of experiment and causal explanation. Some assert that there can be no knowledge of the good or of God. But as long as the experiences of knowing, of questioning, of valuing, and of worshiping continue, it is arbitrary to discount these experiences merely because they cannot be evaluated by scientific method, or because naturalists do not wish to discuss them.

The naturalist is one who pushes aside, or at least minimizes, experiences and problems which cannot be dealt with by scientific method. To the personalist it seems that this procedure is essentially foreign to the truth-loving, liberal, and empirical spirit of science itself. To respect

science is one thing; to regard science as man's only road to truth is another. The former is essential to intelligent living; the latter is exclusive, dogmatic, and narrowing in its effects.

An American student in Germany once commented that the Germans seemed to think that the whole universe was to be found in German scientific laboratories. The Germans seemed to forget that laboratory method cannot answer the question: What is good?

There is another respect in which personalists interpret science differently from naturalists. Naturalists regard conscious personality as a minor and incidental product of an essentially unconscious and impersonal universe. Naturalists base this contention on their understanding of science. Are not atoms, electrons, protons, fields of force, and all the other ultimates, essentially unconscious entities or events? Even personalists must freely concede that science does not ascribe mind or personality to nature. But at this point the vital question emerges: Why is science silent on the great issues of religion and metaphysics? Why can science never discuss the problem of whether the cosmos is a realm of Other Mind or a realm of mindless stuff? The answer is clear: Scientific method deliberately sets aside all questions about the nature and source of matter and energy, in order to restrict itself to observation and experiment in the field of verifiable laws.

At this point the personalist calls attention to certain fundamental presuppositions of science. All the evidence for the existence of a world of nature is to be found in the conscious experience of persons. All experimental observation, all interpretations of experiment, all of the knowledge which constitutes science, is to be found in the purposive conscious experience of persons. Experience shows that the only evidence for "physical energy" is to be found in certain observed changes of the patterns of conscious

personal experience. The personalist, having weighed these presuppositions of science, offers the hypothesis that the energy which always reveals itself in conscious and personal effects is itself a conscious and personal cause. There is nothing in science that can either prove or disprove this hypothesis; nevertheless, it is consistent with all the facts and methods of science, and it can be tested, if not by scientific experiment, yet by its ability to organize and interpret the total evidence of personal life—its unity, its values, its purposes.

Stated in other words, the personalistic faith is that all the energies of nature are activities of a cosmic mind—the mind that our value experiences reveal to be the eternal God. Every law of nature is a law of God, every energy of nature a deed of God. The naturalist may retort at this point: Call it God if you wish, but what have you done other than to baptize nature? What do you gain by calling it God? To this oft-repeated challenge, two simple answers suffice. First, we gain an integrated world; we are able to think of nature in such a way as to relate it to our ideal values. If nature is God in action, we have grounds for the reasonable faith that personal values are the goal of God and that even if nature were to perish and God were to act in totally different ways, personality and value would survive. Love is "creation's final law." Secondly, we gain a basis for religion. Religion is essentially worship and prayer and their fruits in life. Worship and prayer directed to an unconscious system of nature are not only dissatisfying to the soul; they are essentially unreasonable. Hence, most naturalists either do not pray at all, or, if they do, they use language and adopt attitudes which are rational only if nature is the deed of a conscious, personal God. A praying naturalist is an anomaly. In closing the discussion of this point, let it be repeated that the personalistic faith is entirely harmonious with

the scientific spirit. No scientific law or method has to be modified if nature is God in action. But personalists think that science is not the whole truth. Life is more than science.

It has been argued at some length that personalism is equally scientific with naturalism. Now, in the fifth place, let it be added that it is more religious than naturalism. It is true that naturalists often (although far from always) may feel lofty devotion to spiritual and social values and may experience sensitive mystical adoration of the source of all being. One cannot deny that naturalism can be religious when one confronts the life and thought of a man like Henry Nelson Wieman, who calls himself a naturalistic theist. He is devout and mystical; he is devoted to Christ and to the Christian church; he finds the basis of all his values in a power beyond him that he calls God. Then why is he a naturalist? Because his God is an unconscious order of impersonal energy in nature rather than an eternal conscious spirit transcending nature.

At that point any man, however noble, finds a barrier. An unconscious God restricted to nature cannot be regarded in the same light as a conscious personal God who includes but far surpasses nature. The world of nature, revealed by sense, is wonderful; but the world of spirit, revealed by man's ideal experiences, is sublime. He who finds God only in nature narrows the work of the spirit. Naturalism may be a somewhat wholesome protest against a religious asceticism that repudiates nature in favor of the spirit alone. In America, however, such a protest is not needed. Asceticism is not a national peril. Perhaps it is such in India. Perhaps the Swami Vivekananda went too far when he found the real germ of religion in "the struggle to transcend the limitations of the senses." [8]

[8] See Swami Vivekananda, *Jnana Yoga* (New York: Ramakrishna-Vedanta Center of New York, Inc., 1933), p. 4.

Yet the Indian swami seems far nearer to the heart of religion than does the American naturalist. He who sees God in nature alone sees far less than he who seeks spiritual concentration, mastery, and development. It may be that an even deeper insight is found in the words of the Chinese sage Mencius, who said: "He who has exhausted all his mental constitution knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows Heaven." [9] Mencius suggests that if we completely explore both our senses and our spiritual life, God will be revealed to us.

Personalism is based on faith in the union of nature and spirit. Such a faith opens the way to co-operation with God on the highest mystical, ethical, intellectual, and social levels. It offers a God who can be trusted to understand and meet the needs of the humblest and the wisest, of the solitary soul and the world society. Historical religion has often left metaphysics and science unexplored, and modern personalism deals with many problems which were untouched in the past. Nevertheless, the God of personalism is far closer to the righteous God of the prophetic movement and to the Heavenly Father of Jesus than any naturalistic God could be. This alone is, of course, no proof that personalism is true; but if personalism can be shown on other grounds to be true, this fact constitutes a great religious advantage. A God who loves, who delivers man from spiritual sin and poverty, who co-operates with man in history, and who responds to his search for communion, is a God worthy of man's highest religious devotion.

III

Personalism is a higher synthesis than naturalism. It is, we have tried to show, more inclusive, more coherent,

[9] *The Four Books*, tr. J. Legge, p. 932.

more synoptic, more objective than naturalism. It is now time for a more explicit statement of the personalistic view of nature.

There are many alternatives which personalism excludes. It excludes skepticism, and substitutes for it a rational faith. It excludes illusionism—all purely subjective philosophies—and substitutes a firm confidence in the reality of nature as objective. It excludes dualism, although it finds great variety among persons and within every personality, and substitutes for dualism the postulate that all reality—nature and spirit—is of one sort, namely, personal consciousness. It excludes neutralism—any view which holds that nature is neither physical nor mental, neither good nor evil—and affirms that the apparent neutrality of nature is but the impartiality of a just, personal God. It excludes pantheism; while including all physical nature within God, it sharply distinguishes persons from each other and refuses to admit that any human person is a part of God.

Nature, for personalism, is mind but it is not a complete mind. The whole of nature is but one flash of color from the infinite variety of the prism of Divine Personality. As A. Seth Pringle-Pattison has written: "The world of nature cannot be understood by an intelligent theist otherwise than as the ever-present working of a divine power." [10] To call nature the working of a divine power is to emphasize the personalistic point that God is more than all his work in nature, however wonderful that work may be.

Why do personalists believe that nature is mind? First, because all the evidence for nature is personal conscious-

[10] *The Balfour Lectures on Realism* (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, Ltd., 1933), p. 257, cited with approval by the late W. Temple in *Nature, Man and God,* p. 266.

ness;[11] secondly, because we believe in the objectivity of nature primarily on the ground that it resists, yet responds to, our will; thirdly, because nature is mathematically constructed; and fourthly, because nature expresses purpose. These lines of thought lead to the hypothesis that nature is conscious, rational, purposive will—in short, personal experience.

In order to understand the personalistic view, it is necessary to be clear about an important corollary of it. It follows from personalism that nature is in mind, not mind in nature. Nature is in the Divine Mind; nature is God's working, his activity, his experience. It is nothing external in which he dwells or on which he acts. It is part and parcel of his very being. For the human mind the situation is less clear. The sensations which are the basis of our knowledge of nature are, clearly enough, in our own minds. But it seems as though our mind were in our body, and hence embedded in nature. Yet the popular idea that mind is in body is inaccurate. If mind is in body, then it should be *somewhere* in body; and there's the rub. Search through the body; explore the nervous system and the brain; and all you can find will be body. You will find nerves, muscle, gray matter. Nowhere will you find conscious personality. The reason is that mind is not a part of body and is located nowhere in the body. Mind is exactly what we experience it to be—a personal consciousness. This personality we rightly judge to be dependent on nature, and so partly a product of brain, partly a stimulator and guide of brain. Mind, then, interacts with and is dependent on body; which, for the personalist, means that human personality interacts with and is dependent on Divine Personality; for body is in nature and nature is God

[11] Hence it is quite unfair for realists like R. B. Perry to make much of the "ego-centric predicament." That we are conscious is more than a predicament; consciousness is the very stuff of all given reality.

in action. A brain is the Divine Personality in action at the point of the continual creation of a human personality. Mind is not in nature, but nature in the Divine Mind is God's way of creating human mind.

To take the opposed view, namely, that mind is in nature, leads to a sense of bondage and to a feeling that spirit is weak as compared with nature. The distinguished Argentinian philosopher, Francisco Romero, on these grounds thinks of spirit as the latest and frailest offspring of nature. Plato, thinking of nature as essentially unspiritual, described the body as a tomb, from which one day the soul might rise. Liberation from such views comes when we see not merely that God is greater than all nature, but also that all nature is in God and is under the control and in the service of the Divine Spirit.

This leads to another revision of terminology. In the past, philosophers and theologians have often spoken of the immanence of God in nature. Such language suggests that nature is something external to God, into which he enters or in which he may dwell. But personalism leads to the insight that nature is nothing foreign to God, but is one of the areas of his personality. Hence it becomes more reasonable to speak of the immanence of nature in God than of the immanence of God in nature. When thought is "in nature," it is already "in God," and needs only to realize the implications of the divine presence.

In view of the vast ranges of experience, the mind must choose its orientation. It must choose between debasing God to the level of the sensuous or the unconscious and elevating nature to the level of spirit. The personalist chooses to elevate nature to spirit, and thereby he gains insight into both. The naturalist, by his choice to restrict spirit to nature, limits his understanding of both and renders the highest reaches of personal experience all but incomprehensible. To put it simply, in the words of Plato's

Diotima in the *Symposium,* the personalist decides "to deem beauty of souls more precious than beauty of body" (210C). Beauty of body, at worst, is a miraculous chance product of unconscious nature; at best, an incomplete vision of the divine purpose. In either case, soul is the key to the meaning of bodily beauty. Personalism transcends naturalism.

IV

It is now time to ask what light personalism can shed on the problem of nature and values. In opposition to Descartes and all other dualists, and in agreement with Whitehead, personalists reject the "bifurcation of nature," and hold that the universe is essentially one order of being—a personal order. What is commonly called nature, and the human organisms that are parts of it, as well as human and animal consciousness, are all in some sense manifestations of one interacting order that is essentially personal. Nature has no existence of any kind apart from divine personality. Nature is in divine personality, as part of its conscious experience. "All the choir of heaven and furniture of earth," with its inexhaustible variety of the organic and inorganic, is contained within the unity of the Divine Personality. As has been repeatedly shown, nature is within God as part of the immensity of his eternal being.

From this idealistic first principle, a personalist is able to draw the conclusion that nature is subordinate to values. Whatever is in any mind derives its ultimate meaning from the purposes and rational values of that mind, and the other minds to which it is related. It is easy to forget the relation of nature to values. Science rests on the command to forget values for the time being. As a result, science and modern culture have taken God piecemeal and, not finding God in the parts, have concluded that there

is no God in the whole. In a mood devoted to mastery of the world, man must needs forget God. Hocking and the mystics have set forth the principle of alternation, what may be called the swing of the pendulum of attention from God to the world, back and forth. A religious man or woman must have the qualities, alternately, of both Mary and Martha. But the pendulum does not swing of itself. A personal act of will may seize the weight and cause its movement to stop. This is what has happened to modern culture and in some degree to the modern church. It has become secular, worldly, naturalistic, and in many respects practically atheistic. The pendulum has become petrified at the extreme point of removal from God.

There are those who view the present extreme swing as a sign of decline and death. They are fatalistic and hopeless. Spengler is one of the chief among the prophets of decline, although for a while before his death he drew fallacious hope from the rise of National Socialism in Germany. The student of history, of psychology, of religion, and of philosophy will be more likely to agree with Ralph Tyler Flewelling's faith as expressed in his *The Survival of Western Culture* and *Creative Personality*. Will, he holds, is "the supreme act of personality." [12] Recent writers in theology are doing well to emphasize the crucial importance of "decision." Since nature is (for personalists) within personality, nature is subject to will: persons can decide their attitude toward natural events and can choose, within limits, what to do about nature. Human choices, it is true, would be empty and without effect if divine choices did not precede, accompany, and follow every human choice. But no one who shares the conviction of personalists can regard any stage of history as final or any mood of death and despair as the doom of a fatal destiny. Man and his values are a very small part

[12] *Creative Personality* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926).

of a great universe: but that great universe is creative, purposive, and committed to the conservation and increase of values. We have populated the universe with fictions born of our despair for the sake of pushing God away. But God cannot be removed. A reality cannot be destroyed by forgetting it.

In this discussion our thought has been moving from belief in God to confidence in values and their supremacy over nature. This is the metaphysical order: God is first. It is not the psychological or the developmental order. Man starts as an ignorant infant. He experiences wants and their satisfaction, joy and love, before he can even think of God. As he grows older he learns that others have experienced joy and love, and also pain and sorrow and sin, and have come through heights and depths of experience to faith in God. The majestic beauty of sun and moon and stars; the extraordinary forms of life, the worm of the dust, leviathan, behemoth, man; the sense of justice, sacrificial love; the consciousness of divine presence in mystic visions and revelations—all these are values in human experience which point to God. D. C. Macintosh and others have supposed that personalists believe in God simply because they desire that these values be conserved.[18] Such is not the case. Personalists see in man's most rational values a disclosure and revelation of God's power on the level of purpose, just as they see in man's sensations a disclosure and revelation of God's power on the level of nature.

When the personalist moves from nature to God and from values to God, he is following the line of reason. Man's experience starts in confusion and far too often remains in confusion. But all progress—all religion, morality, government, science, and invention—has been a

[18] See Macintosh's review of Brightman's *Religious Values* in *Journal of Religion,* VI (1926), 318.

movement from confusion to order, or, as the ancients wisely put it, from chaos to cosmos. The earth originally was "without form, and void." Then "the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters," and light came, the natural order arose, and divine reason prevailed over chaos. The world today suffers from at least two kinds of confusion—theoretical and practical. Theory tends by its abstraction to separate what belongs together. Practice tends by its haste to put together what doesn't belong together. Personalistic philosophy seeks a union of theory and practice in what Kant calls "the practical reason," by which it becomes increasingly possible to see things in true perspectives. Nature is then seen as instrumental to spiritual values, and spiritual personality is seen as the true reality of all things and the goal of all striving.

V

Personalism, as here presented, is very close to the thought of such men as Berkeley, Lotze, and Bowne, and it also has affiliations with the ideas of Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Hocking, and Whitehead, to mention only a few. It is not, however, the only philosophy of nature which has found a place for values and hence for religion. In fact, some alternative systems have been very widely acclaimed. The case for personalism, however, does not rest on Gallup polls of popularity; it rests on a rational examination of the evidence of experience. In the previous chapter the claims of naturalism were tested by this criterion, and were found to lack the cogency which naturalists have thought was the great merit of their system. Further light may be shed on personalism by a brief comparison between it and other leading religious philosophies.

Most critics of idealism direct their barbs against absolutism and assume that they have thus refuted personalism. Personalists agree with many of the points made

against absolutism and believe that the critics are careless and inaccurate in supposing that arguments against absolutism dispose of personalism.

Let us look at the situation more closely. Idealistic absolutism is the doctrine that the entire universe is one perfect and all-inclusive mind (or at least a mindlike unity); everything that is, whether in nature or in human individuals and societies, is a phase, an aspect, a stage—that is, in the broad sense, a part—of the one absolute mind. This view is essentially pantheistic, although its exponents, Hegel, for example, do not care to be called pantheists. Absolutism makes an appeal to thinkers because of its logical unity and to saints because it exemplifies so clearly the saying, "I am the vine, ye are the branches." Absolutism thus seems to be the coherent outcome of both logic and religion, and both the Hindu religion and Christianity have been profoundly influenced by it. When one reads the Pseudo-Dionysius, one hardly knows whether one is in India, Palestine, or Attica. Absolutism has produced sublime systems of thought, and has made a permanently valid contribution to the philosophy of nature. For all absolutists, nature is the experience of God—whether God's "play" (*lila*), as some Hindus think, or his creative will or his knowledge. That physical nature is within God as one aspect of his own experience is one of the loftiest ideas of the human mind. There is nothing in science or philosophy to cast serious doubt on it. The conception brings God near to man and breaks down artificial barriers between science and religion.

No serious question need then be raised about the absolutist's philosophy of nature. But when thought turns to the fundamental problems of personality and value, a totally different picture is disclosed. Human persons are conscious of ideal norms; they are also conscious of their very imperfect realization of these norms and even, at

times, of a deliberate repudiation of them. Error, imperfection, and moral evil or sin, are undeniable facts of human experience. The absolutist (such as Royce) will say: "Yes, they are facts, but in the Absolute the error, imperfection and sin, are present, but overcome. The imperfect is made perfect; the sin is conquered." At this point the personalistic critic of absolutism raises his objection. He will say to the absolutist: "If error and evil are wholly overcome in the Absolute, then they do not exist in the Absolute as they do in me, the human person. In me, error is really taken to be truth and evil is really chosen instead of good. What there is in me cannot possibly be in the Absolute as I experience it. My ignorance cannot mean that the Absolute is ignorant. And since all of my life is to some extent imperfect, none of my personality can be in God as a part of him." The "pluralistic" personalist—who holds that the universe is a society of persons dependent on, but not a part of, the Supreme Person —has here a conclusive logical argument against all types of absolutism. There is an ineradicable logical contradiction in saying that man the imperfect is a part of God the perfect. There is no contradiction in saying that man the imperfect and God the perfect live in social interrelations or that God understands man's imperfection, its causes, and its cure.

Religiously also absolutism is defective. While absolutism seems to be harmonious with the mystical sense of oneness with God (the *unio mystica*), it imperils other sides of religion. If the soul is literally one with God in its very being, then man's responsibility and his moral life as a person are at an end. Only God is responsible for God. To cancel moral endeavor is to cut the root of prophetic religion everywhere and to destroy the tie between religion and human character. The absolutistic assertion of literal unity with God, moreover, makes even

the mystical experience meaningless, for absolutists think that man is essentially one with God, whether he has achieved realization of this unity in mystical experience or not. The very idea of communion or co-operation with God is meaningless unless at least two persons are communing or co-operating—God and man. Absolutism, which seems at first so favorable to mystical experience, destroys both the motive and the meaning of that experience. Personalism, however, with its fundamentally social philosophy, retains the separateness and the dignity of all personalities, while finding profound meaning in oneness of purpose, worshipful communion, and loving co-operation between God and man.[14]

Since 1910 there has been a marked increase in the popularity of a type of philosophy known, in general, as realism. While terms are unfortunately used in different senses in different contexts, realism may be defined as the belief that nature consists of, or includes, entities or processes that are wholly unconscious, impersonal, and non-mental. Naturalism, materialism, neorealism, and metaphysical dualism are all more or less realistic philosophies. Realism, in some form, is probably the most natural way

[14] Two somewhat technical points may be relegated to a footnote. The view of personalism will be recognized by students of Hindu thought as a type of what in India is called "dualism" (the view that man and God are not identical), while absolutism is either qualified or absolute "non-dualism." It will also be rightly inferred by students of philosophy that personalism is based on a rejection of so-called epistemological idealism, or idealistic epistemological monism, as it is called, and an acceptance of a thoroughgoing epistemological dualism. Let the reader consult E. S. Brightman, *An Introduction to Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1925), pp. 74–93, and his *A Philosophy of Religion,* esp. pp. 347–49. Needless to say, the Hindu "dualism" and the epistemological dualism referred to have nothing to do with metaphysical dualism, which our personalism excludes. Personalism is the view that all reality, including all of nature, is of one kind, namely personal experience; whereas metaphysical dualism is the theory that mind and matter are two irreducibly different types of reality.

of thinking, and it is currently fashionable. Man, as a thinking being, is supposed to face a world of things that do not think. Personalism is opposed to all forms of such metaphysical realism. The case of realism must be examined by anyone who seeks to understand the relations of personality and values to nature, or who has any interest in the development of philosophy.

Realism is not necessarily naturalistic. Both neoscholasticism and neorealism are hostile to naturalism and materialism. Because neorealism is highly technical and more remote from ordinary ways of thinking, we shall refer the interested reader to the writings of Ralph Barton Perry and the late E. G. Spaulding, and turn briefly to neoscholasticism.

The word "neoscholasticism" at once suggests great names like those of Cardinal Mercier, Étienne Gilson, and Jacques Maritain, who have interpreted the realistic philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas for our age. Scholastics proudly call their system the *philosophia perennis*, "the perennial philosophy." There is much reason for this pride. Thomism is a magnificent synthesis: a profoundly rational theism is the climax of its search for truth. In fact, the system has so much in common with personalism that many scholastics are now calling themselves personalists. It does yeoman service against the naturalism and the subjectivism which undermine the thinking of many people today.

For the purpose of the present discussion, however, our concern is not with the merits of scholasticism so much as with its essential difference from personalism. That difference lies in its doctrine of substance. According to the scholastics, there are two fundamentally different, although interrelated, kinds of substance, namely, material substance and spiritual substance. Since substance is supposed to mean that which exists per se, the idea was from

the start in unstable equilibrium. Matter and spirit could be regarded as substances only by leaving God out of account. But God is always there. St. Thomas expressed this by calling God "supersubstantial." Descartes was clearer and followed Suarez in distinguishing between complete and incomplete substances: soul and body, he held, are incomplete substances. Yet "incomplete substance" can hardly be thought of as existing in itself, and so it really contradicts the idea of substance. Naturally Spinoza came to the conclusion that God or nature is the only substance. Meanwhile Locke had shown that the scholastic concept of substance is indefinable, and refers to "I know not what."

At this point, personalism sets in with its criticism, which is twofold: (1) The concept of substance, even of spiritual substance, is realistic; it goes beyond anything that can be experienced to a permanent, independent something that lies beyond and beneath experience. The personalist argues that such substance is unverifiable; nothing like it can be found in experience. (2) The scholastic assertion of a material substance, acceptable as it may be to common sense, is in the nature of the case even more unverifiable and fictitious than spiritual substance. All verification occurs in conscious experience, where all evidence for the real is also found. Personalists escape from the verbal net of scholasticism by banishing the traditional idea of substance and finding the key to independence and permanence in the self-experience of the person, his memory, and his anticipation. They avoid the "bifurcation of nature," and the mystery of how two utterly different substances could interact, by conceiving the whole of nature as experience of the Cosmic Person interacting with and supporting human persons. Scholastic realism invents unexperienceable substances to explain experience. Personalism assumes that human experience is explained

and supplemented by the experience of the Eternal Person.

All forms of metaphysical dualism—even the most plausible ones, as held by J. B. Pratt and D. C. Macintosh —are theories which create unexperienceable objects to explain the experienced. It is true, of course, that human experience is not complete or intelligible by itself. There must be an objective source of experience; but no clear light is shed by the realistic dogma that that objective source of experience must be in every respect an order of being totally different from any experience. The personalistic thesis is that "my" experience is explained by the existence of other experience—both human and divine—which constitutes a society of intercommunicating persons. When a recent writer stridently urges that he needs matter to retain his sanity, the reader wonders what contribution unconscious stuff can make to the maintenance of conscious experience and especially to sane thinking. The only value of the concept of unconscious matter is to help the mind to form pictures and to emphasize objectivity. But pictures are not thought, and other mind is the most rational sort of objectivity.

Other forms of realism, such as physical realism (naturalism) and neorealism are subject to the same criticisms, and do not require detailed examination at this point. So-called religious realism is no more than a term to emphasize the objective reference of man's religious experiences and is entirely compatible with personalism at this essential point.

Realism in general is an attempt to distinguish between mind and what is not mind; and modern secular realists tend to make what is not mind by far the greater and more potent part of the universe. In so doing, realists make mind itself an alien in its world. If the nonmental order is intelligible, mind is a chaos and a mystery. If the

personal order is intelligible, matter is a chaos—provided that matter means something wholly unexperienced, impersonal, and nonmental. As soon as we see that the trouble arises from a purely fictitious and unverifiable idea of matter, we shall be able to see that the reality and the laws of what we call material things are better described by calling them constants of divine experience than by calling them unconscious substances or events.

Absolutism and realism are hostile to personalism, but they are less dangerous to it than the rampant irrationalism which is now eating away the very marrow of our civilization—in social and political philosophy, in theology, and in practical life. When man ceases to give a reason for the hope that is in him, and when he ceases to test his faith by its fruits, he is subject to every fanaticism and demonic urge of his instinctive nature. Sex, superstition, violence, religious excesses, naturalistic self-indulgence all flow through the floodgates when the person ceases to be a person through surrender of the controls of reason. Fortunately absolutists, realists, and personalists present a common front against this modern foe—a foe ancient as well as modern.

All civilization rests on law, moral and civil—both rational. Religion rests on the justice and love of God—both rational. Where reason breaks down, we have the vile phenomena of the worst Canaanitic religions or of the most depraved sects of Hinduism; we have the fanatical nationalism of Shintoism and Naziism, with mad plans of world conquest. True it is that God is above man, and that his ways are mysterious. When Tacitus reported, in his *Germania,* that the Germans "call by the names of gods that mysterious something [*secretum illud*] which they see by reverence alone" he was not ascribing utter folly to the old Germans. Yet they moved nearer folly when they voted (still according to Tacitus) that "it was

more holy and reverent to believe in the acts of deity than to understand them." And when they held to *sancta ignorantia* ("holy ignorance"), the folly was complete. Ignorance may always be necessary, but it is never holy. Wherever faith has repudiated reason—whether in the most extreme utterances of Tertullian or in the double truth of the Middle Ages or in the revolt of Kierkegaard and Karl Barth against the pride of reason or in the Nazi defiance of reason and truth and its praise of fanaticism —we have a phenomenon that assails the integrity of the mind and breaks down the unity of personality.

It needs to be reasserted that God is a God of truth; that personality is able to reach its highest only when it is devoted to truth; and that all the claims made by the conflicting interests of human life need to be adjudicated before the Supreme Court of reason. To appeal to reason is to appeal to God. The God of the New Testament is essentially *logos* and *agape,* reason and love, or, better still, reasonable love. A personalism built on this foundation can make a universal appeal to all races and creeds of men. Any religion or society based on irrationalism can only create partisan feuds and bitter divisions. Personalism respects and dignifies personality—not merely as an individual and social ideal, but as the clue to a reasonable and inspiring philosophy of nature and of values. Personalism is not science, but it is a sane philosophy of science. Personalism is not religion; but it is an introduction to the understanding of religious experience and religious revelation. The personalist cannot assert that his is the only thinkable philosophy; but he can view it as offering light on many of the dark places of the world's thought and life.

Chapter VII

THE RESULTANT PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

OUR WORLD IS ONE, BUT IT IS NOT ONE. IT IS DIVIDED both in theory and in practice. The attempt to "bifurcate" it into matter and mind is one sign of a house divided against itself; matter and mind, once separated, seem incapable of reunion. Nature seems to be at war with ideal values. Persons, who are citizens of two worlds—the world of nature and the world of values—exploit the world of nature for weapons in the war for values or supposed values. The social scene is that of class war, economic war, international war, and petty feuds. Periods of peace are mostly unstable, insincere, and unintelligent. Our world is a world of conflict.

Such is a so-called "realistic" picture of man's plight. From it, many a realistic observer is led to infer that one way of life and one only is appropriate—"every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost." But this is no real way out, for several reasons. The "realistic" philosophy of life turns out to be a philosophy of death. It is impossible for all individuals to defy each other, live purely selfish lives, and hope to survive. The continued existence of the selfish depends on the labor and care of the unselfish. If everyone were "realistic," very soon no one would be left. Furthermore, the picture of conflict is not the whole truth. There is, of course, conflict; but there is also love of peace, love of truth, and love of God. Science, philosophy, and religion express man's undying faith that the conflict has a meaning; that beyond all war

there is peace, beyond all chaos there is order, beyond all seeming contradictions there is coherent truth. Everything noble in human history grows out of some dim apprehension of this truth. If there is no unity, every person and every event is entirely unrelated to any other. There is no law, no order, no cosmos. But this description runs counter to all the achievements of science, morality, art, and religion; it is refuted by friendship, by sunrise and sunset, by the tides and the storms, and by the daily acts of self-sacrifice which are so common that they are taken for granted. There is surely some sort and degree of unity. But what sort, what degree? That is the question.

The philosophical naturalists have tried to find a kind of unity. To summarize very briefly the results of our study of naturalism, we may say that the unity of a naturalistic world is such unity as scientific method applied to sense data can yield. This alone is supposed to give objective knowledge. Values and personality must lie on this procrustean bed or be cast into outer darkness. If the world of naturalism is a unity, it is a mutilated unity. In spite of Dewey's efforts to find a place for values in nature, all naturalistic systems exclude from the unity of nature any important contributions from the experience of values, of purpose, or of personality. The naturalistic world is a reduced world. It must contain what the methods of the natural sciences reveal, and no more. Since the natural sciences from the start exclude personality and ideal values from their consideration, the most complete unity of the sciences can never give a complete view of the meaning of experience.

Over against naturalism, personalism is a philosophy which rests on and demands a consideration of the whole range of experience. The building of science is always an act of a person who experiences more than his scientific

operations and for whom science itself would be worthless (except for the sheer fun of knowing) were science not used in the service of peace, justice, brotherhood, and the worship of God. Personality includes all the sense data and their scientific explanation, and also all the ideal purposes and aspirations of man's noblest side. Personalism as a philosophy can include all the truth that naturalism can include, transformed and elevated by its membership in a society of persons with a supremely rational and supremely loving Person as its center and sustainer—God, the only Eternal Person. Naturalism is a philosophy whose interpreters seek for unity yet avoid the facts and the conditions which alone will create unity. Personalism is a philosophy whose interpreters seek for a unity that includes all the facts—the facts of value and personality as well as the facts of the sense order. Civilization must choose.

I

First of all, let us face the dire need of mankind for a philosophy of life. To have a philosophy of life is to be aware of the principles by which one lives and to try to make those principles as reasonable, as true, and as worthy as possible. Or one may say that a philosophy of life is a growing understanding of the ends and means of life and their relations; or again, it may be called one's understanding of the true value of personality.

Wherever a modern man turns, he finds a cry for a philosophy of life. Students and teachers alike express their need for it. Poets reach for it. Edwin Markham once stated that he hoped never to write a poem which did not express a sound philosophy. America and England and Russia and China all are desperately in need of a "foreign policy," as is so often said. The United Nations, for lack of such a policy, might easily become disunited;

the "Good Neighbor" policy might become a bad neighbor policy. And what is foreign policy but a name for a philosophy of life? A nation's foreign policy expresses what it lives for and must be based on its convictions about values and about personality. So is it too with the burning questions of labor policy and race policy—national, international, local, personal. Gilbert K. Chesterton once said that when a landlady was contemplating a prospective boarder all she really needed to know about him was, not his age, sex, sect, or race, but simply his philosophy of life.

It is true that the present age is an age in which philosophy is in considerable disrepute. Nevertheless philosophy is indispensable for life. There are many who ridicule theory and passionately praise practice. One would like to see a person of that sort try to build a subway or a ship, or try to fly an airplane by practice without theory. We do, alas, see him daily living his life without any principles, and we see the triumph of practice over theory in loose living, loose drinking, and loose thinking. Meanwhile those who have a theory, be it good or bad, develop gigantic power. The power of Russia has rested on the philosophy of dialectical materialism; the power of Nazi Germany, on "the National Socialist world view"; that of the Roman Catholic Church, on the philosophy of St. Thomas and the principles of revelation as interpreted by Church Councils; and that of America and all democratic nations, on a democratic philosophy of life. Never was philosophy of life more powerful, and never have philosophies been more in need of rational criticism, than today. A philosophy of life is indispensable for great living, individual or social; and a truth-seeking philosophy is indispensable for true living.

No philosophy which does not satisfy his whole mind will permanently satisfy man. Since Plato first saw this

principle and used it as a pulverizing weapon against sexual sin, it has been a cornerstone of any sound philosophy of life. But what is sound is not always immediately effective. A tragic feature of human life is displayed in the violence with which man opposes his own permanent good in the interest of his temporary good, or supposed good. Passion and greed are blind but intense; and they often sweep away the power of the truest and highest ideals as if they were no more than thin air. A philosophy of life must always be realistic in the sense of taking all the facts into account—the uncomfortable ones as well as the comfortable ones.

Jane Taylor, in the early part of the nineteenth century, wrote verses for "infant minds" and "essays in rhyme." At least one of her quatrains is worth remembering:

> Tho' man a thinking being is defined,
> Few use the grand prerogative of mind:
> How few think justly of the thinking few!
> How many never think, who think they do!

Yet even Jane Taylor concedes the existence of a "thinking few" and would, if urged, doubtless admit that their number could be increased by wise moral, philosophical, and religious education. As long as men see and hear, feel and suffer, they will be driven to think. If they did not think at all, men would live in mere herds, with no social order above the level of instinct, no science, no art, no philosophy, no religion—no sacrifice of pleasure for truth.

In 1812, at just about the time when Jane Taylor was composing her rhymes, a great German, Hegel, was also writing on the subject of thought and its rarity. Miss Taylor merely bemoaned the lack of thought. Hegel accused the Prussia of his day of justifying the lack of thought. In the preface to his *Science of Logic* he declared

that Kant's "exoteric doctrine" was being used to support the renunciation of speculative thought. He went on:

> This popular doctrine [of renouncing metaphysics] was supported by the slogans of modern educational theory and the practical needs of the times, which direct our attention to the immediate necessities of life. Just as experience (without metaphysics) was taken as the basis of knowledge, so theoretical insight was taken to be really harmful to skill in public and private life. Practical activity and technical training were taken to be the only essential and the only profitable aims. While philosophy and "common sense" were thus playing into each others' hands with the aim of destroying metaphysics, there was produced the strange spectacle of an educated people without metaphysics—like a well-adorned temple without a Holy of Holies. Theology, which in earlier days was the guardian of the speculative mysteries and of metaphysics (even if the latter was a handmaid of theology), had now given up philosophy in exchange for feeling, for a practical, popular message, and for pedantic historical scholarship. In harmony with the times, solitary mystics disappeared—those men who had lived apart from the world in order that there might be a contemplation of the eternal and a life devoted to it alone, not for the sake of practical results, but for the sake of blessedness.[1]

Who would suppose that these words were written before the days of logical positivism and pragmatism and before the differences of opinion between John Dewey and Robert M. Hutchins? At any rate, Hegel is the spokesman, in a sense, for both Dewey and Hutchins, for Plato, and for the sage who wrote: "As he thinketh in his heart, so is he." Hegel sees that a man's deepest beliefs—his metaphysical convictions—are the source of his activity. Out of the heart are "the issues of life." All practical decisions arise from a man's purposes. The case for phi-

[1] Translated, somewhat freely, by the writer. It is noteworthy that this biting criticism of Prussia is written by the Hegel who is falsely accused of glorifying Prussia as the very kingdom of God on earth.

losophy rests on the need for wise, farsighted purposes aimed at goals that are in harmony with the real.

Those who scorn philosophy are themselves philosophers in disguise. A student who refused to register for any course in philosophy admitted, on questioning, that philosophy was essential but that she desired to form her own philosophy without any influences from others. She resembled a child who wants to learn to read without being hampered by any knowledge of how Mr. Webster or anyone else spells or defines words. She was a kind of philosopher: she had to have a philosophy of life even if she created it out of nothing. Yet what folly to build a philosophy of life without taking into account the wisdom of the best men and women and all the self-disclosures of the divine truth which can be found! As a parallel to the student, there is the scientific faculty member who looks askance at philosophy and thinks that philosophical ideas are mysteries known only to God: but that very man, when he forgets his prejudices, lays down as a first principle that whenever an experiment is proposed he wants to know its purpose; and wanting to know the purpose is the essence of a philosophy of life.

Philosophy cannot be escaped, yet men try to escape it. Very well: let us see what happens to life if we try the experiment of abjuring philosophy. Let us try to retain our science and our religion without philosophy. Then our sciences will be knowledge of facts and their laws without any purpose or value in the service of which they can be applied; or if there is any purpose, it must consist of such chance and instinctive ends as happen to occur to us. If the purpose were rationally ordered or the ends rationally criticized we should have a philosophy, and that would violate the terms of our experiment. Similarly, if we try to have religion without philosophy, we shall believe and never ask for reasons; we shall accept tradi-

tion and never question it. We shall have faith without reason, unrelated either to science or to practical life by any principles which can be stated and defended. Such principles would be philosophy. It seems that man is in the position of struggling against the inevitable when he tries to cast off philosophy. Perhaps he longs for the profits of philosophy without the labor of thought. Unfortunately for him, the labor theory of value holds in every realm; without labor no value is achieved and no profit is earned.

Yet modern man so fears his own higher destiny that we find many struggling to cast off the ideals and the obligations of both religion and philosophy and to emasculate every philosophy of life until there is nothing left except raw life—primitive instinct, undisturbed by thought or ideals. It is true that even such primitives are usually too cannily selfish to propose the complete abandonment of science, with its inventions, its conveniences, and its healing of the sick. The avowed fanaticism of the National Socialist world view, with its scorn of truth and its devotion to " blood and soil," is an example of this reversion of cultured man to the primitive.

If the revolt against philosophy be taken seriously, then certainly religion with any claim to truth will have to be given up, along with philosophy. A world in which the problems of philosophy are consistently ignored is a world in which there is no religion, Protestant or Catholic, Christian or non-Christian. Not only that, but it is a world in which moral ideals have no meaning and democracy no truth or rational basis. It is a world in which there would be no reason for making any plans or pursuing any goals. No normal human being sincerely desires such a world as that. Every attempt to escape philosophy drives man back to it.

Life forces us to think. In order to cope with nature, we

have to think scientifically. When we do, we ignore ideal values. But when we study history or anthropology, sociology or economics or psychology, we discover that man's existence is a conflict of values, and we are driven to think about values. War and religion are alike in that both exemplify a conflict of creeds about the value of life. Although these bitter conflicts raise tremendous problems, one fact remains constant in all the experiences of human life. Man is always and everywhere a valuer. The struggle for existence may destroy individuals and whole races. Particular values may be crushed. But it is the verdict of experience that as long as man exists his search for value cannot be destroyed, nor can his confidence in eternal standards of ideal value be destroyed. Here, in human nature itself, we find a testimony to the divine and a ground for faith in the deathlessness of the human spirit.

The development of a wholesome philosophy of life is hampered by many forces, not the least of which is the power of fashions and fads in molding social behavior. This power is illustrated by the slogans of advertising and publicity and propaganda campaigns; by styles in clothing, speech, and popular songs; by the craze of the Sinatra "bobby sock" brigade, which is comparable in hysterical excitement to the Children's Crusades; and by the gambling mania, which breaks down responsible economic values and invades homes, schools, and even churches. Unfortunately the principles of social psychology which are manifest in such forms of irrational imitation create grave dangers in the field of religion, unless religious believers find poise and balance in a sane philosophy of life.

Educated men and women usually look with pity or contempt on the more fanatical forms of religion; yet it must be granted that extremists are often convincingly sincere and emotionally effective. One of the acutest problems of modern civilization is how to combine emotional

power with critical intelligence. It is absurd to suppose that mankind must suspend reason or repeal truth in order to develop concentrated loyalty to a cause, although it is plainly easier to develop enthusiasm when the critical powers are undeveloped or paralyzed. But neither a sound government nor a sound religion can prosper where thought is choked.

The educated leadership of religion may be quite immune to the more vulgar forms of fanaticism but still be subject to fads and fashions which cause unreasonable vacillations of basic policy. At least one national religious body could be mentioned which swings back and forth from naturalism to neosupernaturalism, depending on what leader at the moment happens to be most influential or what speaker has addressed the most conventions. In a living world, there will, of course, be developments of thought; but these will not be wholesome or permanent if they burn like a prairie fire for a season, and next season are burned out. It is equally important to beware of fads and to beware of fixed traditionalism.

Two slogans that have been heard recently are "Down with mere theism" and "Down with personalism." Neither should be respected because it is popular; both should be examined. "Down with mere theism" is heard from both the orthodox and the naturalistic side. There is a sense in which it expresses a good idea, just as "down with the mere multiplication table" is a good idea. No one should spend his entire life thinking about either the multiplication table or theism. But to discount theism, either because it does not include all revealed truth or because it goes beyond physics and chemistry, is to follow a fashion rather than to understand the fundamental importance of rational faith in God. A little reflection will show that theism may make a real contribution to world unity. Faith in one supreme God, if properly emphasized

in the spirit of reason and love, might contribute much toward developing more appreciative co-operation not only among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, but also between these and Hindus, Mohammedans, and Mahayana Buddhists. A sound philosophy of life will teach that God is one, by whatever name he may be called and however much his children may differ in their opinions and practices.

The other slogan, "Down with personalism," is legitimate in the mouth of anyone who is convinced that there is no personal God, or that value is not personal, or that matter is not the personal energizing of God. Too often, however, this slogan arises, not from a reasoned impersonalistic philosophy of life, but from impatience with the name or from dislike for some advocate of the view. Surely it is not wise to unlearn, for no good reason, all the lessons taught by Berkeley, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Lotze, Bowne, James Ward, and more recent personalists. There must be some balance in a view of which some declare that it is too religious, others that it is not religious enough; of which some complain that it is too simple, others that it is too metaphysical. In any case, a philosophy of life should not be accepted or rejected because it is in or out of fashion. It should be tested by its power to interpret and guide life coherently and to see through fads and fashions.

We require a philosophy of life for another reason, namely, because life needs practice in rigorous thinking. Good intentions are not enough: hell is paved with them. Loyalty to the church is not enough: many loyal souls are not able to think clearly enough to see that their beliefs, their behavior, or their attitudes repel and offend more people than they win to the church. It takes grace and grit to criticize one's self; but it takes another quality, the power to think. Most religious men and women are

practical, tending to discount thought in favor of action. They sometimes forget that wise action requires thought and knowledge. They are like a medical student who leaves medical school before his training is completed, in order to heal the sick. Who would trust his sick child to an untrained physician? And who would trust his soul to the ministrations of an untrained pastor? Training, it is true, is not always or necessarily acquired by schooling. Experience is itself a school. But he who has not come to a thoughtful understanding of the soul and God cannot lead others or himself aright.

II

Having established the dire need of a philosophy of life, let us go on to a more constructive task. We are to seek for first principles, and, after our previous discussions, it is clear that they will be the first principles of a personalistic philosophy of life.

Let us propose as the first principle: *respect for personality*. If we are to live a good life, we should reverence personality. This does not mean that we are to approve of every person as he is. No intelligent person would want a baby always to remain a baby, no matter how lovable the little one may be. Much less would a good person want a sinner to remain a sinner. To respect a sinner's personality does not mean to respect his sin. It means to love him, not for what he is, but for what he may be, or even to love him as he is in order that he may become better. The greater the love for the person, the greater the hatred for his sin.

Respect for personality rests on the foundation of self-respect. If one does not respect personality in himself, it is hard to see how he can respect it in others. It is true that the desperate and hopeless man may look with admiration on a person far better than himself in character. But such

admiration is not sincere respect unless the poor creature can say to himself: "That man is better than I am now; I know he is better, because I have something in me that tells me what is good and tells me that I, too, can be better." The most pessimistic or the most sinful person in the world can be pessimistic or sinful only if he has found within himself something worthy of respect—and then has despaired of it or has rejected it. Jesus spoke with profound wisdom when he said, "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Self-love, in the sense of an earnest longing for that which is truly best for one's self, is a necessary foundation of character, responsibility, and social welfare. My self-respect is reverence for that which is highest in myself—reason and love—and it implies a determination never knowingly to violate either my reason or my love. It is the sense that my duty will never be done unless I do it and that my love will never be given to needy humanity unless I give it. Every person is unique and every man is an indispensable man in a personalistic universe. The man who lives so that he will not be missed when he goes has failed in self-respect as well as in social obligations. Anyone who attempts to uplift society without respect for his own conscience and his own character actually contributes an evil social influence while trying to do social good.

The same considerations which inspire us to self-respect also command us to respect all other human beings. We respect ourselves in so far as we find in ourselves some traces of reason and love, that is, something that links us at once to all other men. No one can rightly claim any basis for self-respect unless he is willing to grant the same right to all others. No one can rightly assert his own individual freedom unless he is willing to join with others in the co-operative building of a free society. It has been said that reason and love—*logos* and *agape,* the twin

principles of Christian faith and life—link us to others. This is obvious in the case of love. Christian love, reasonable love, is universal. It goes out to every human being, regardless of his present character, as a sincere desire for his well-being and as action intended to promote it. Reason, likewise, binds us to others. Logic and mathematics, the realm of "pure" reason, are universally accepted by every mind capable of grasping them. Everyone can understand consistency, justice, and fairness.

It is true that both love and reason cause divisions, too. Persons who are unable or unwilling to love or to reason often rebel against the demands of those principles. Then comes the acid test of the principle of respect for personality. Those who are committed by their philosophy of life to that principle will never entirely despair of making some appeal to love in the unloving and to reason in the unreasonable. Often enough it turns out that what seems to be hate or irrationality rests on a sad misunderstanding, which patience can remove. Still oftener it turns out that there is fault on both sides. In the end, every human problem will find its best solution when all concerned maintain their respect for personality in the others.

If all doctrinaire formulas and social theories could be held so loosely and lightly that the principle of respect for personality becomes the touchstone for every other theory, a new day would dawn. Vested interests, property rights, privileges of corporations, institutions, and social customs can be defended only in so far as they maintain respect for personality and tend to produce better personal living for all. To favor the few at the cost of the many is to violate the principle of personality. John Ruskin had this principle in mind when he said that the profits of the mills of England were to be measured, not in pounds sterling, but in the kind of personal lives the mills produced in their owners and their workers. Persons

are the only profits. This principle is the test of the use of money. Money has been called "coined life": its value comes not merely from the labor and sacrifice given to "making" the money, as we say, but chiefly from the kind of personal-social growth, character, and enjoyment that arises from the use of the money.

If war can possibly be justified, this can be done only by showing that respect for personality can be defended and increased by its means—and in no other way. One may not, perhaps, condemn too harshly the chaplains who, in the presence of ferocious brutality by the opposing forces, are reported to have abandoned even the pretense of Christian love to enemies. But, whether one blames them or not, one must see clearly what these chaplains are doing. In the heat of battle they are abandoning the principle of respect for personality which is the only possible justification of any battle and is the heart of all religion.

The personalistic philosophy of life applies its first principle, that of respect for personality, not only to the self and to other human persons, but also to the Divine Personality. Human beings, we have said, are not respected chiefly for what they are, but for what they may be. God, the Divine Person, can always be respected for what he is. He is always perfect love, perfect goodness, and perfect wisdom. He has never failed in perfect allegiance to the highest ideals. We respect him for what he always is. Yet there is a sense in which we also respect God for what he will be. If he were to give us no future either in this world or in the world to come, our respect for him would change into horror. Faith in God means that he can be respected because he himself always will respect personality. Through all man's agonies and sins and despairs, God will never abandon hope for humanity and will never refuse his aid.

The Moslem Sufis have a saying that worldliness lies,

not in possessions, but in forgetting God. We may add also that disrespect for divine personality does not lie so much in open blasphemy or in atheism as it does in forgetting God. The blasphemer and the atheist pay God the respect of their attention, such as it is. The real enemy of God is the one who does not even care enough to be a live enemy: the real enemy is the indifferent one who forgets God.

The principles of reason and love—or rather the one principle of reasonable love—on which all respect for personality rests must receive attention and expression or they perish. When man feels reasonable love to God he expresses it in at least three ways—by understanding, by worship, and by service.

By understanding, first of all. Indeed, one may well ask, can man understand God? "My thoughts are not your thoughts, . . . saith the Lord." Surely, no human wisdom can grasp the mind of God. St. Paul, however, believed that knowledge of God was possible. He says: "Now, brethren, if I come unto you speaking with tongues, what shall I profit you, except I shall speak to you either by revelation, or by knowledge, or by prophesying, or by doctrine? . . . . For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?" He adds later: "I will pray with the spirit, and I will pray with the understanding also: I will sing with the spirit, and I will sing with the understanding also." St. Paul evidently thought well of the understanding. He did not suppose that he understood everything: "we see through a glass, darkly." But he did suppose that he could know something about God, which was sufficient as a basis for salvation and fellowship.

The need for understanding is part of the very nature of love. When human beings love each other we often say that they have come to an understanding. This does not

mean that they have complete and perfect knowledge of each other; it means only that they know enough about each other to serve as a basis for co-operative growing love. So it is in love for God. We know enough about his revelation of himself in history and in nature to be able to come to an understanding with him. Furthermore, love always seeks more perfect understanding; and one might almost say that love for God drives the soul to seek all possible means of understanding him. The study of the Bible, the study of history, of psychology and sociology, of physics and chemistry, of all the sciences, as well as of theology and philosophy, are avenues to the understanding of God which love will explore as fully as its powers permit. There is no danger of our knowing too much about God or of our understanding him too well. Without any understanding, we do not "know whom I have believed"; we love without any idea of whom we are loving. A certain degree of understanding is a necessary factor in respect for any personality, human or divine.

While understanding is necessary to love, it is not sufficient for it. To understand a person is not always to show respect for him. A psychologist can analyze a person's mind without the slightest respect for the person whom he is picking to pieces. In choosing a psychologist as an adviser, one should consider his knowledge of the subject; even more should one consider his attitude toward persons. So is it also in man's relation to God. A scholar may be gifted with exceptional theological or philosophical understanding, yet he may at the same time lack any sort of personal relation to God. In addition to understanding, man's love of God needs expression in worship.

What is worship? It is the most intimate personal relation of the soul of God. It is not identical with church attendance; an "order of worship" may be more order than worship. Church ritual and architecture may aid

worship, but they are not worship. Worship is disciplined adoration; for consecrated adoration requires discipline. There are four aspects of worship, all of which require constant practice until they become second nature: they are contemplation, revelation, communion, and fruition.

The first aspect of worship is contemplation; after one has reached some understanding of God, God should become for him a theme of frequent meditation. The soul is easily distracted, its interests are divided, and it becomes entangled with the world. Periods of the practice of concentration on God bring calm and unity to the divided soul and relate all its interests—all its good and all its evil—to the holy will of God.

Contemplation leads to the second aspect of worship, which is revelation. In various ways, God opens the eyes of the worshiper and reveals his presence and his love. Occidental mystics have often called this experience "illumination"; Quakers speak of "the inner light." Oriental mystics have named it "realization." By whatever name it is called, it is a high moment, not to be achieved at will, not subject to routine, not conforming always to our prescription or our expectation. It is also a dangerous experience, unless it is tested both by our best understanding and by its consequences. It is especially dangerous if the high moment of the revealed presence of God be made the sole end and aim of worship. But no high places can be reached without danger. One great weakness of the Protestant churches is their feebleness in seeking the highest mystical revelation, evidenced by their lack of depth in their experience of Holy Communion; one great strength of the Catholic church is its skill in the cultivation of this aspect of worship through the mass and through such disciplines as the *Spiritual Exercises* of St. Ignatius Loyola. Protestants have much to learn here, not only from Catholics, but also from Indian mystics.

In the moment of highest illumination the worshiper is sometimes so carried away by the Divinity that he forgets himself, his body, and his earthly relations. He seems almost to be merged into the very being of God. If a soul yields to the emotional pantheistic impulse at this stage, it may happen that the luxury of worship can destroy its true life; for the life of worship is not the absorption of the worshiper into God, as "the dewdrop slips into the shining sea," but rather continuing fellowship in love. The third aspect of worship, therefore, may be called communion. This is a co-operative experience, which often occurs in prayer, but may, and ideally should, accompany every activity in life. Every experience of the worshiper should become a shared experience with God. Communion is the profound sense of membership in God's universe and of participation in God's plan. Even the theologian Ritschl, whose chief emphasis was on the moral and social aspects of religion and who wrote a book against Pietism, could say: "The fellowship which sinners may have with God is as close as that between the head and the members of a family."[2] The limits of communion with God in prayer and in life cannot be set by any formula. A field of spiritual experiment and adventure is open to those who are willing to pay the price of the intellectual, moral, and religious disciplines which are required.

Contemplation, revelation, and communion taken together do not exhaust the meaning of worship. In fact, they may be sterile unless they lead to the fruits of the spirit in life. Worship is life, and life must be productive. Worship is love, and love must express itself. Where the life and love of worship are real and not merely formal, they will arouse in the worshiper a new desire to share the best of life and love with all of God's children, of ev-

[2] For Ritschl's view see Brightman, *Religious Values* (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1925), p. 182.

ery race and creed and kind. The fruits of the spirit—love, joy, peace—will grow both in the inner life and in social relations. Worship is a means of bringing "a new heaven and a new earth."

Thus worship leads to the third expression of love. Understanding prepares for worship and worship prepares for service. The impatient, practical social worker may ask: "Why all this preparation? Why wait for worship before service?" But the social worker should be the first to know that social work requires some preparation. A person cannot serve unless he has something to offer. And experience shows that a full knowledge of the techniques of social work may lead only to barren and mechanical social activities, unless the worker has inner resources. The service of humanity will be maintained in the long run by those who can see men in perspective—not merely in the immediate setting of their physical, economic, and social need, but also in the more distant perspective of their highest possibilities. Faith in those possibilities is much firmer when sustained by understanding and worshipful respect for divine personality.

From the ecclesiastical side there come voices of a very different sort, voices which proclaim the self-sufficiency of the church. The church itself conducts service every Sunday, and what further service is necessary? Those who seek God should come to church; the church is heated and lighted and its doors are open at stated times. The church has done its duty when it has kept itself alive, paid its bills, and has left others to do the same, if they wish. The church as á self-contained unit is as unspiritual and barren as is the social worker without religion. Such churches and such social workers alike are lacking in respect for personality. A church should be a body of men and women who love God. If they love God, they cannot restrict their service to their local church, their denomination, their

race, or their nation. When a church narrows its service, prophets arise to condemn its forms, its sacrifices, its priests, and its money-changers, in the name of service to human needs. Respect for divine personality requires respect for human persons. To love God truly is to love his children.

Before leaving the first principle of a personalistic philosophy of life, we should add a word on the ways in which we can identify the action of divine personality in our experience. God is presence, power, and purpose. We can find God as a presence at all times. He is available as a companion of all our joys and sorrows, our sickness and our health, our peril and our safety. He is present, whether we recognize him or not, both as sustainer of our existence and as source of what is given to us from beyond ourselves. Yet his constant presence is also a proof of his absence; since he is with all and in all, he is more than is ever disclosed in our experience. He exists as absent from us because he is present in all pasts, all futures, all beings everywhere. In adoring him, we adore a presence that is more than presence and an absence that is never wholly absent.

The Divine Personality is presence; he is also disclosed as power. The religious man finds God most readily in the power that works with him in the soul-transforming experiences called by the historic names of conversion and sanctification. Unhappily, the emphasis on power has led many to think of the divine power as magical, as if salvation could be guaranteed by some form of incantation—some orthodox belief, some rite or ceremony, emotional outburst. It should be remembered that the power of God is personal, not magical; and because personal, it is a mingling of the rational, the moral, and the emotional, controlled by purpose. Divine power, then, is not magical; much less is it lawless or arbitrary; and it is mistaken to

regard it as absolutely omnipotent. God's power is best described as sufficient for man's need. God is man's fellow sufferer. He dies every Good Friday but rises every Easter. He experiences new Calvaries and new tombs whenever men suffer and die; but his power is never defeated, and he is able to create new life in this world and new life in the world to come. This experience and this faith are what the power of God means.

In experiencing God, we find that presence and power are recognized as divine only when they express purpose. The self is "a fighter for ends." William James's formula conveys the idea that human life is through and through purposive. But the ends for which men fight are often contradictory, unreasonable, selfish, or impossible of achievement. A human purpose is not necessarily also a divine purpose. How, then, can we tell when the purposes of our life are in harmony with the purposes of God? A personalistic philosophy of life does not offer us absolute knowledge; but it gives us assurance that we are moving toward the divine purpose when we respect personality in ourselves, in others, and in God. To put it otherwise, we discover divine purpose in so far as our human purposes are ruled by the New Testament principles of *logos* and *agape*—reason and love. A life ruled by those principles finds that "all things work together for good to them that love God." Existence can have no higher purpose than that of a society of creative and reasonable love, in which God and man co-operate in the building of nobler and better personalities. Participation in the presence and power and purpose of the eternal God opens endless possibilities of joy and of development to every person in the universe.

III

The first principle of a personalistic philosophy of life is respect for personality. This has been discussed at

length. The second principle is: *nature as a revelation of Divine Personality.*

There are those whose religion is man-centered. For them, nature is either man's enemy or man's instrument. Even some orthodox believers look on nature as a lower level of being than spirit.

But a God-centered religion will see God revealed through nature. Such a religion will not view human personality as an alien in an impersonal universe, nor (with Francisco Romero) think of spirit as the latest and feeblest product of evolution. A God-centered religion is cosmic. For it, the whole frame of nature is, in some sense, God's work. This thought has often been expressed by saying that God is immanent in nature; but a personalistic philosopher will find it clearer and truer to say that nature is immanent in God. For personalism nature is quite literally God's work—that is, it is God's will directing, shaping, controlling the phenomenal area of God's conscious experience. Nature is thus an integral part of the Divine Personality, although only one area of that inexhaustible consciousness of love and beauty and goodness whom we worship as God.

The principle of nature as a revelation of Divine Personality serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it points the way to a union of science and religion. All the laws of nature which science discovers are laws of God—the same God who is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ and is revealed in man's highest spiritual experiences. On the other hand, this principle opens the door to what may be called a personalistic nature mysticism. Those who find inspiration and exaltation in communion with nature may be aware that they are being stirred, not by impersonal forces, but by the very presence and life of the personal God.

Personalism applied in this way leads to a sacramental

view of nature. According to the *New Catholic Dictionary,* a sacrament is "a sensible sign, instituted by Christ, to signify and produce grace." The sixteenth of the Methodist Articles of Religion speaks of "sacraments ordained of Christ" as "certain signs of grace and God's good will toward us." In the strictly literal sense, then, nature is not a rite instituted or ordained by Christ, but from the personalistic point of view nature is surely "a sensible sign . . . of grace and God's good will toward us." And if Christ be taken as a revelation of God, from Paul's point of view—"by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth"—then there is a spiritual sense in which we may say that nature really was instituted by Christ. It is sound philosophy to treat nature as "an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace" in two senses. It both reveals the grace of God and also is a medium for expressing the graces of spiritual life in man.

If this principle be applied to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, it may be that Protestants can experience a deepening of their view of that sacrament and even approach to some appreciation of the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. The bread and the wine are commonly regarded by Protestants as symbols of the body and blood of the Lord, and that they are. But they are more than that, for they are parts of nature, as was the body of Christ. On the view that we are proposing, every part of nature is a part of God; and those parts that are singled out in the sacrament are truly the actual presence of the same God who was revealed in the body of Christ. This, of course, is not the intent of the Catholic doctrine. According to it, the substance of the bread and wine are miraculously changed into the substance of Christ's own body; whereas, according to the personalistic view, the substance of the elements and of Christ's body is a mani-

festation of the very personality of God. No miraculous change of natural substance occurs, on this view. The miracle is, rather, a transformation of the human soul from spiritual blindness to spiritual vision, so that it can see in the bread and wine the very God who was in Christ and who is the soul and ruler of all nature.

In a word, the only substance of nature is the Divine Personality. All of nature is God in action. From this insight, taken by personalists as a fact, unspiritual men may draw evil consequences, and, notably in India, have done so, contrary to Hinduism's highest insight. The basest and vilest abuses may ensue when every natural object and every natural process and function is viewed as divine. It is therefore essential to avoid nature worship and to remember that every part of nature, and even nature as a whole, is entirely unworthy of our adoration. When we are dealing with a person, we violate the first principle of respect for personality unless we take every act and word of the person we are confronting in the light of his whole personality. So nature cannot be viewed as a religious object until every item of nature is related to the presence, power, and holy purpose of God—his *logos* and his *agape*, which together are the essence of his Spirit. When the miracle of spiritual transubstantiation occurs in man, he can see that the obscurest phases of nature are parts of the divine plan. "I was blind," he can say, "now I see." The humblest work becomes divine; and the area of holy communion is vastly enlarged. Labor is a sacrament; there are the sacraments of agriculture, of industry, of the laboratory, of marriage and home, and of natural beauty and sublimity. Woe to a civilization that forgets the sacramental purpose of nature!

The personalistic attitude toward nature has mystical, practical, and theoretical aspects. When we think of nature as conveying to us the love of God, we confront it

with something of the adoring devotion of Wordsworth's nature mysticism; and who can view the Grand Canyon, the plains and prairies, the mountains or the ocean, without some sense of the beautiful love of the Great Spirit?

When we think of nature as the will of God in action, we experience it as the challenge of God to human achievement and the evidence and promise of God's cooperation with man. Here we find a metaphysical basis for the Christian doctrine of stewardship; all material property not only belongs to God, but actually is a part of God himself. Man's use of property is his use of God. God allows man to abuse him; he allows man to use him for pride, for profit, for adventure, or for sin; but God holds man and nature within limits and persuasively leads his universe toward his divine goal of infinite love and infinite bliss.

When we think of nature as divine intelligence—a realm of order, system, and purpose—we see in it the reason of God, and we perceive that the highest human thinking in science, theology, philosophy, or in social administration of churches, nations, and world organization, are forms of communion with God. The life of reason, as discovery of truth, as creativity, and as personal integration, is a movement of man toward God. Thought is a development from incoherence to coherence and thus is an inexhaustible approach to the divine reason.

To conform to the second principle—nature as a revelation of Divine Personality—is to open many doors, to enlarge life, to deepen spirituality, and to unify science, religion, and philosophy.

IV

The third principle of a personalistic philosophy of life is *spiritual liberty*. The whole of history is man's struggle for freedom. Too often freedom has meant only the

power to do as we please or the right to do wrong. Man has often resented restrictions on his vices more than he has resented restrictions on his conscience, his worship, his art, or his search for truth. The National Socialist party could never have risen to power in Germany were this not to some extent true. The spiritual liberty of a personalistic philosophy of life is not merely the fact and the privilege of freedom of choice, although that is presupposed. It is more than political democracy. It is in essence the freedom which comes through a life in touch with the sources of truth and power. The freedom to indulge all of man's naturalistic tendencies is petty in comparison with the freedom that is experienced in building life on the basis of spiritual values. "The truth shall make you free."

Spiritual liberty cannot be achieved alone. Alfred North Whitehead's famous saying that "religion is what a man does with his solitariness" remains true as an acid test of sincerity and as an emphatic statement that religion is, first and foremost, traffic between the soul and God. Yet solitariness is itself the achievement and the need of a social being, and would be empty and worthless were it not an oasis of refreshment between long stretches of social toil. It is a rest camp to renew strength for new battles. Spiritual liberty can be won only through co-operative toil. There must be co-operation with human society and its institutions, yet without surrender to the entrenched evils of society and without anarchical demands for idealistic perfection which lead only to cynical and futile revolt. There must be co-operation with God, yet without dogmatic identification of God with one institution, one tradition, or one philosophy.

The history of man's struggle for spiritual liberty may begin on the materialistic level of Deuteronomic thought, where freedom and divine favor are evidenced

by prosperity, health, and wealth. It then may move to the miraculous level, where freedom from materialism and earthly routine is achieved by occasional remarkable events and powers, healing or speaking with tongues; on this level, religion tends to be identified with the extraordinary and even the irrational. It may then rise to the far higher level of the inner life, the level of Jeremiah's new covenant, of the Sermon on the Mount, and of the mystics and saints of all ages and religions. The soul that has traversed all three of these levels has learned something on each level. The materialistic level ceases to be materialistic when all matter is seen to be God in action; on the miraculous level there is the truth that God is sometimes present in special ways in unusual events; the inner level emphasizes the spiritual nature of all religion.

But true spiritual liberty is found only when the pilgrimage of the soul leads it to the fourth level—the level of co-operation. On the co-operative level, man's will is freed from bondage to selfishness and is able to gain the joy and strength that come from shared work—as man works with and for his fellow man with and for his God. On this level, the other levels come to their fullest development. On this level, too, *logos* and *agape,* reason and love, can find the best soil for their growth. Here is the kingdom of God in which all races and creeds can meet, learn, and respect each other in religious liberty.

For all its liberalism, spiritual liberty is a principle of unity. It is based on the first principle of respect for personality. That principle provides unity; yet within that unity there is room for wide differences of opinion and of cultures, so long as there is agreement about respect for the personality of all. In the Christian faith, Jesus Christ is the very incarnation of that principle. His heart was warm toward Jews and Greeks, Samaritans and Gentiles. He taught a gospel to be preached in the whole

world. Slowly and painfully his teaching of love, in beautiful harmony with the highest spiritual insights of Oriental sages, is making itself felt in the aspirations for men for democracy and world-wide co-operation.

Yet it must be freely granted that all men have much to learn about the principle of spiritual liberty. Orient and Occident, North and South, Anglo-Saxons and Latins, Protestants and Catholics, Jews and Mohammedans, liberals and conservatives, all have far to travel before they experience the full unity of religious liberty. The goal will draw nearer when religion ceases to be something partisan and divisive. Whatever differences there may be in creed, religious men and women should be one in heart. The tragic fact that religious divisions have been among the fiercest and most fatal in history is one more proof of the need of facing the problem of nature and values. Yet the profoundest fact about religion is not its separations and divisions: the profoundest fact is that religion, like science and philosophy, is a search for unity and that it is a faith, which science and philosophy too often ignore or lack, that the source of all being is in the unity of divine personality, divine ideals, and divine liberty.

Any philosophy or religion or political theory that pushes the principle of personality to one side, represses it, or seeks to destroy it, is a source of peril to humanity. Any philosophy or religion or political theory that treats personality seriously and sacredly has in it the seeds of hope—hope that humanity may see that nature and values are one world, a world which can be realized effectively only by the labors of reason and love, human and divine.

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