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Strategy for Survival

BY

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Cartography by
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This book is fondly
dedicated
to my father and mother
John and Laura Kieffer

PREFACE

IN ALL PROBABILITY this book will be called grim, controversial, terrifying, brutal, and callous. It may be all these and even more. When one starts to consider the subject of self-preservation in a potentially hostile world, he rapidly discovers that it can't be treated with levity or approached with nonchalance. This is even more apparent when the subject under consideration is the preservation of the nation in a world standing on the brink of war. Survival today is a serious, full-time business that can't be brushed aside, laughed off, or eliminated by the substitution of fairy tales, fine oratory, or wishful thinking. It's a problem that must be faced and resolved realistically.

There are some who may read a few pages and then toss this book aside as something to be read on a rainy week end or under the restrictions of a sickbed. Others may read two or three chapters and abandon it in favor of a well-written piece of fiction that pictures a world more closely akin to their unfulfilled desires than to reality. There will be many, however, who will read it to the end and then soberly reflect on its contents. It is for this latter group that this book has been written.

The saving grace in the world situation of today is that all over the globe people have started to think about the future in terms of survival. At long last the threat of Communism and the menace of the Soviet system are becoming a reality and a force with which John Q. Citizen must prepare to cope. The awakening from the

dream of an earthly paradise, so glibly sold as an inevitable aftermath of the last war, has come hard and not without a considerable number of twistings and turnings on the part of most individuals concerned. With this awakening has come the long anticipated rush for knowledge that characterizes the American people in any era of crisis and the determination to find out something, anything, about a subject hitherto neglected or belittled.

In my earlier book, *Realities of World Power*, I tried to indicate and explain the fundamental geopolitical premises upon which our present political world appears to be founded and to show the importance of various areas to Communism and the Democracies when these premises were applied. In the present book, I have endeavored to go one step further and indicate the basis of strategy upon which our survival depends. I admit that my concept of strategy may not agree with the classic ideas that have guided our international actions for so many decades, but I maintain that even strategy must change to keep pace with the other changes in our world and to meet the existing conditions. To expect to solve the problems of 1953 with the methods of 1898 is the poorest strategy of all.

No book on strategy can rightly be called the product of one man's mind; there are too many factors that must be taken into consideration, too many sources from which material must be drawn. Therefore, to all those who have contributed in any way, my deepest thanks. I am most grateful to Lieutenant General Thomas D. White, USAF, who encouraged me to think along the lines of the newer strategy and who contributed much to the background of this book by commenting on my views, to which he so patiently listened on many occasions. My thanks also to Colonel E. G. Cress, USA, who frequently took time to discuss my theories with me and who proved an excellent guide and companion on the many "map journeys" we made together. To Colonel William B. Keese, Lieutenant Colonel W. H. Bruce Erwin, Major Henry S. Beukema, and Major Francis C. Macken, all of the United States Air Force, who advised me or discussed and read certain chapters of this book, my thanks. It must be noted here that the opinions and views expressed herein are my own and do not neces-

sarily represent the views or endorsements of the military men to whom I express my gratitude.

Dr. Gerard Hinrichs, Lieutenant Colonel C. George Doyle, USAF, and Carl Pergler deserve special mention and appreciation for having read and criticized the manuscript and for having contributed many invaluable suggestions. My deepest thanks to Dr. John W. Campbell, Jr., distinguished scientist and editor of *Astounding Science Fiction*, for his kind permission to reproduce the "Campbell Characteristics of Ultimate Weapons" mentioned in Chapter XXI. This list originally appeared in Dr. Campbell's magazine for May, 1952. I am also deeply appreciative of the kindness of Commander William T. Greenhalgh, USN, who gave me permission to use certain material from his article, "One World For Stalin" appearing in *The Reserve Officer* for September, 1951. Other publications from which quotes have been extracted have been acknowledged in the text of the book. Mention must be made of the extremely fine service contributed by Mrs. Jewell C. McGalliard and Miss Shirley Mason, who patiently deciphered the miserable scrawl I substitute for normal handwriting and who assisted in the research and laborious transcribing of this book.

Finally, a most special paragraph of thanks must be written to my wife, Marie K. Kieffer, who not only cheerfully permits the rearrangement of our family life whenever the creative urge strikes but also carefully and sympathetically nurses me through every attack of this disease called writing. Her constant willingness to read, discuss, and correct the manuscript makes writing an easy task and a pleasure. Without her valuable criticism, suggestions, and encouragement I am afraid no book of mine would ever reach a concluding chapter.

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Strategy for Survival

Chapter 1

Why Strategy for Survival?

There are, at the present time, two great nations in the world, which started from different points, but seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to the Russians and the Americans. Both of them have grown up unnoticed; and while the attention of mankind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenly placed themselves in the front rank among the nations, [and] . . . these alone are proceeding with ease and celerity along a path to which no limit can be perceived. The American struggles against the natural obstacles which oppose him, the adversaries of the Russian are men . . . the conquests of the American are gained by the plowshare; those of the Russian by the sword. The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of the people; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

On a fine spring morning, May 11, 1831, to be exact, Alexis de Tocqueville, young magistrate, product of the aristocratic tradition of the Empire, student of government and political philosophy, stepped off the steamer *President* onto the streets of New York City. No ordinary tourist, De Tocqueville, but a trained observer who had, upon orders of his minister, come to our lusty young

republic to discover what made us tick. For four years he wandered the length and breadth of the United States studying our customs, our beliefs, our institutions, desperately searching for some sign that might point to our future position in the world, some indication of the place we would ultimately occupy in the family of nations.

He returned to France, in 1835, determined to try to capture on paper the scenes he had witnessed and the lessons he had learned from our country. Schooled as he was in European beliefs and tradition, it is only natural that when he attempted to express his ideas in terms familiar to his readers he should turn to a European nation for contrast. Thus, almost one hundred and twenty years ago, De Tocqueville closed the first volume of his great book, *Democracy in America*, with the words quoted above. Today, this prophetic passage, one of the most quoted of our time, has been transformed from an astute political analysis into stark reality, and we now live in the era De Tocqueville foresaw long before either Russia or the United States could lay claim to the title, "Great Power."

We were a young nation in the days of De Tocqueville, a brave, hopeful nation that turned its face to the sun with determination, confident the future would clearly demonstrate the superiority of our way of life, our system of government. We had fought two wars against Britain, extended our lands to the western ocean, and picked a precarious but successful path through the pitfalls and traps laid for us by the Great Powers of the Old World. Our example had inspired our neighbors in the south to throw off the yoke of Spain and declare for freedom and the rights of man. Our philosophy had even permeated the Mother Continent, and the countries whence our forebears had come were even then trembling on the era of great reforms.

All through the rest of that hectic nineteenth century, we struggled and fought our way upward toward our goal. We survived a devastating civil war that could have destroyed any nation and, as a result, established the concept of democracy more firmly than ever. Financial panics, economic crises, threats of war, diplomatic maneuvers—all these we met, battled, and defeated. Finally, with the dawn of the twentieth century, that century whose

auspicious start caused it to be hailed as the Golden Century, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that soon the world would be forced to accord the United States, infant no longer, the title of major power, so eagerly sought for by so many, attained by so few.

We learned many things during that century of growth, things Europe never seemed to be able to grasp. We learned that it was not so much tools and machines that counted, but how people used them. We learned that tolerance, particularly political tolerance, was vital to the success of any state. And we learned the one great lesson that so few governments have ever learned—truth will out, no matter how deeply men try to bury her, how tightly they try to chain her.

During the first fifty years of the Golden Century we watched the world around us struggle in the agony of political unrest and retarded development. We watched nations disappear and new ones take their places. We watched dictators crush liberty and mold the individual into the shape of a cog in a political machine that ultimately destroyed itself. We stayed aloof from all of this and all but two of the twenty-six wars that swept the first half of the century. We stuck to our last and kept our eyes on the future, as had been our practice since the inception of our country. Finally, when we least expected it and were least prepared for it, a sudden violent twisting in the pattern of nations hurled us to the exalted status of not only a major democracy but the leading democratic nation of the world. The "instrument of freedom" had carried us to great heights; the United States had arrived!

The pattern followed by Russia, whose destiny De Tocqueville had linked with ours, was different from that which influenced our progress. Born in oppression and fed on the "instrument of servitude," she too fought and struggled to the pinnacle of power. She fought revolutions that culminated only in further oppression of her people. She fought wars that ended only in defeat and more revolutionary movements. Where we offered freedom, she offered virtual slavery; where we offered progress, she maintained the iron grip of a feudal system, anachronistic to our times.

The dawn of the Golden Century found her not a happy progressive country but one seething with revolt and violence; one whose

future could be predicted as a continuing state of unrest and political chaos. Finally in 1917, she was caught up in the grip of her most horrible revolution, and, when the smoke caused by the burning of the hopes of 200,000,000 people had been washed away by the blood of those who resisted the experiments of her new order, she emerged as the champion of the new, fantastic political doctrine—Communism.

She, too, remained aloof from the affairs of the world during a long period of time, more so even than the United States. Behind her barred gates she developed the resources nature had given her, regimented her people as people had never been regimented before. She struck at all that we in the West hold dear—freedom, initiative, religion, the rights of the individual. Hidden from Western eyes, she progressed, according to her doctrine, until the same international upheaval that placed the United States in a position of leadership forced her to the forefront as the other Great Power in the world.

During those years of aloofness, she too learned many lessons and developed many techniques. She learned the value of sowing seeds of discontent when she found it to her interest to produce world unrest. She learned the art of penetration, of inducing treason, of undermining, and, worst of all, of aggression. She learned to prostitute the honor of the pledged word for the purpose of securing advantage over those to whom her promises had been given. She learned to disregard the rights of her sister states and to ride roughshod over their sovereignty. She learned the use of force, of terror, and of violence as instruments of international policy. And, where the passage of years had produced a love of liberty, tolerance, and peace in the United States, in Russia they had produced only an insatiable desire for world domination.

So today we have reached that era of bipolarity so clearly foreseen by De Tocqueville. At one pole stands the United States and all the nations who have freely associated themselves with us in a crusade to keep the world a free, peaceful place in which to live. At the opposite pole stands the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, surrounded by the puppet states she has enslaved and shackled to the great juggernaut of Communism. Truly we have reached that era when each of us, as De Tocqueville wrote, is "marked out

by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half of the globe."

But what happens now? The world cannot live under the burden of bipolarity; at least, it cannot live at peace. Alexis de Tocqueville predicted the bipolarity, but at this point the prophecy stops. Whatever powers he possessed that enabled him to see the world in 1952 did not, unfortunately, permit him to see beyond this date. What do we do? Do we draw an arbitrary line and build a wall between us; create a world one-half free and one-half slave? Is this the answer, the end of all our struggling, planning, and dreaming?

It requires no prophet, no seer, no mumbo jumbo to determine that this is obviously not the end of all political development. Our era is surely not the one selected to mark the end of the world or the end of progress. Beyond this, there must be a future, a continuation of the human race living in organized communities, each community at peace with every other one. What is the answer? What is the significance of the era in which we live?

The present uneasy times in which we exist could and probably do constitute the beginning of a political Armageddon in which man's faith in the future and his desire to remain free will be put to the acid test. Our period shows every likelihood of being "the last great fight of all" in a purely political sense, for it will be our era that makes the decision whether man shall continue free or slave, whether Democracy or Communism shall survive. It must be obvious that with one half of the world desiring peace and the other half desiring to dominate the world, there can be no true state of peace, or freedom either, for that matter. These two divisions of the world cannot simply stand and look at each other for generations, shooting stares of hatred across the invisible wall. Sooner or later something must break from the accumulation of international tension alone.

Therefore, it would seem that we must take stock of the situation and determine just where we stand in relation to it. We must ask ourselves a number of pertinent questions, and, what is more, we must also find the answers to them. We must determine if the Soviet Union is actually bent on world conquest, if it actually does want war. We cannot assume this; we must examine its actions, philosophy, and history to discover the positive evidence

of its intentions. We must consider the capabilities of each of the antagonists to meet such a war and study the battlefield upon which it will take place. We must know how this will affect us at home and abroad, our chances for victory, and what we will do if we win—this last one, of course, after we have determined that we can win. We must, from all this data, determine if we will be forced to humble democracy in the dust and watch it crushed under the heel of Communist might or if we are strong enough and determined enough to heed the warning of Kipling—"Make ye no peace with Adam-zad, the Bear that walks like a Man!"

Above all, we must determine once and for all what it is for which we are fighting. Is it for territory, for reward, for prestige, for power, or for national aggrandizement? Do we fight for democracy, free enterprise, Wall Street, the preservation of the British Empire, or the sheer love of battle? All these questions must be answered, and then we must answer one more; if we are convinced that we must fight, how do we do it? What is to be our strategy?

As in so many situations involving a number of questions it is, perhaps, easier to answer first a later question than an earlier one. There seems no doubt at this moment of the cause for which we fight or our motives behind the struggle. I have said there seems no doubt; actually there is no doubt in the minds of any who bother to think about the situation as it stands today. We are fighting for none of the things mentioned; it is something more fundamental than any of these. We fight for the right to survive!

Machiavelli, that wily master diplomat, once wrote: "There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things." Machiavelli, however, did not live in a war-weary twentieth century where people grasp so avidly for the peace that is unattainable—even the fiction of peace is sufficient excuse for them willfully to blind themselves to the coming danger. There is something even more difficult, more perilous, and less sure of success than the task Machiavelli deplores. In the Western Democracies today, it is the almost monumental task of convincing *all* the people that the real battle for freedom is not won; it has not even taken place; it is yet to come. It is to

convince people that this war that is rushing upon us is a war for survival, that it is a question of win it or perish.

We have no desire for more territory, riches, or power; we ask only to be allowed to live at peace with the world, raise our children in the ways of democracy, and enjoy what we have. This does not seem to be asking too much of life. Yet in the eyes of the Communist all these things are proscribed and must be stricken from the list of benefits obtainable by man. To him these simple desires are intrinsically evil and must be destroyed. They are the fruits of democracy, a philosophy to be hated and despised by all loyal servants of Leninism. By his concept the sooner these, all the other promises of democracy, and all who believe in them are eliminated, the better the world will be.

We, who have been reared under a democratic system, such as we know in the United States, and the people of our allies who have never known the pattern of oppression so well established for centuries in Eastern Europe, could never adjust ourselves to the rigid dictates of Communism. A country, having once known the true meaning of democracy, would rapidly weaken and perish under Communist control, and the ashes that remained from the dissolution of such a state would bear no resemblance to its former occupants. Therefore, we fight not merely for the victory that follows the successful prosecution of war; we fight for the preservation of democracy and for all the things that are associated with it. Without democracy we cannot survive. We fight, therefore, for survival—physical and political survival.

A war for survival can be a bitter one and one that could conceivably destroy the civilization of the world, plunging it back to the dark ages. Logically one could reason that such a war must be prevented. Under normal circumstances this might be correct, but the circumstances that exist today are not normal or logical or even rational. We must assume that those incidents that occur are real and the threat of things to come is real also, its rationality or logic notwithstanding. We must accept the threat that is implied when we find a nation whose sole ambition is world domination. To prevent a war both sides must be sincerely interested in peace, but the circumstances today, illogical as they may seem, are such that both sides are not sincerely devoted to peace.

The years since 1945 have clearly demonstrated that a sincere desire for peace is something that cannot be associated with the Soviet Union.

The pacifist might argue that we could at least partly preserve civilization by surrendering to the Communist ideology or by making a "deal" with it. This would be worse than defeat and preserve nothing. We have before us constantly the horrible example of those unfortunate states that succumbed to such false reasoning and disappeared behind the Iron Curtain. We have watched them undergo the change from friends, democracies or near democracies, or at least benevolent monarchies, into virtual slaves of the Kremlin and vessels of Red hatred for the ways of the West.

This leaves us only one choice: if we cannot prevent the war by a resolution of the difficulties, real and fancied, if we dare not make the futile and supreme sacrifice, and refuse to fight, then we must prepare to win a war for survival. There is only that one choice—fight to survive or die.

Victory in this war for survival requires much more than a passionate desire to win; it demands careful planning and efficient execution. When the enemy is Soviet Russia, victory itself is not enough to ensure world peace. The victory our democratic civilization demands is not that of the peace table, but that of the complete conquest and destruction of the Communist idcology. To defeat the enemy and settle the war by a negotiated peace would be to plant the seeds for a renewal of hostilities at a later date. There can be no victory or enduring peace so long as Communism exists.

This fact is clearly démonstrated in the fundamental Communist doctrine. Communism cannot live at peace with democracy because the very essence of democracy is a threat to the Communist way of life. Democracy cannot live at peace with Communism because Communism cannot, dares not, permit any other political system to exist if that system offers a better way of life than that offered by Communism. The triumph of Communism means the obliteration and eradication of democracy; the triumph of democracy must carry with it a like fate for Communism. Victory for democracy is survival; defeat means the

beginning of a new cycle of civilization, if we can call Communism and its evils civilization.

Since World War II, we have been living in a fool's paradise in which we have confused the real issues. We have been laboring under the impression that we wanted peace. We have designed all our policies, governed all our planning, and limited all our action by the general theme of peace. Laudable as this is, we have been confused. We don't want peace; we want survival. World peace can only be achieved through the establishment of a world-wide democratic medium in which peace can flourish. Such a medium can only be assured through the survival of the free world in the coming conflict. Therefore, the strategy we must devise is not a strategy for peace, but a strategy for survival in which we have peace because we have survived, not peace in which survival is a precarious thing at best. So long as we continue to be confused as to our objective, we live in danger of destruction. So long as we persist in believing that democracy is synonymous with security, we jeopardize our survival. Anything that places our survival in jeopardy jeopardizes democracy.

So we must prepare for Armageddon and devise a strategy for survival that will confound our enemies and ensure that democracy will continue in our world. Within this strategy for survival we will find many problems, many departures from our normal way of life and our normal ideas. To many of us this reorientation may even appear distasteful, but the distaste can be overcome by keeping the main issue in mind—we must survive. Through us must run the blood of democracy, and by our efforts this democracy must be preserved. This thought must be transmitted to all who believe in democracy, and on it we must base our plans for the coming conflict with Russia. Again, as Kipling has so appropriately written:

> So long as the Blood endures,
> I shall know that your good is mine: ye
> shall feel that my strength is yours:
> In the day of Armageddon, at the last
> great fight of all
> That our House stand together and
> the pillars do not fall.

Chapter 2

What Is Strategy?

The word *strategy*, like many other words in common use is, more often than not, misused. Constant misuse has forced it into the class popularized by Alice in her flight into Wonderland, and it has become one of those words that have been made to assume the meanings we desire rather than the meaning assigned to them according to source and definition. Frequently we use the word strategy when actually we mean *tactics* and thus we are confused when someone applies the words in a fashion we do not understand.

To make matters even worse, the word strategy is applicable to the small picture as well as the big one. We can speak with equal propriety of the strategy of a single complicated maneuver or of a broad, long-range series of maneuvers. We can talk of the tactics (i.e., the implementation) of our strategy and, under certain conditions, of the strategy (i.e., the plan or sequence) of our tactics! Like so many other words or conditions associated with geopolitics, strategy is one of those words that fall into the general class of "Confusion is normal." Because of all the misuse, confusion, and many facets of the word, we should determine exactly what we mean by its use and explore some of the conditions under which it is employed.

The conduct and successful conclusion of any undertaking is dependent upon the arrangement and execution of a related series of single, specific actions. If the undertaking could be accomplished

by a single action, no further subdivision or plan would be necessary. Most undertakings, however, require more than one action, and this is invariably true in the affairs of nations. Thus, from any undertaking requiring more than one action, two different but related activities spring: the single action that must be integrated into the big picture and the over-all plan of the big picture itself. Therefore, we are faced with individually arranging and conducting these single actions into a related series of actions and combining them with one another to accomplish our undertaking. Confusing, isn't it?

The process of conducting the single actions is called tactics. The technique of combining them with one another to accomplish the undertaking in the big picture is called strategy. If we should call these single actions engagements, we could produce a definition of strategy as "the use of the engagements to attain the objective of any undertaking." This, in fact, is the definition ascribed to strategy by the great German authority on war, Karl von Clausewitz, who writes, "Strategy is the use of engagements to attain the object of the war."

I know just what you are thinking at this point, so let's just drop the explanation where it is and try again. According to Webster, strategy is the science and art of military command, exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions. That defines the word in a restrictive sense, but it doesn't tell us much about it in the broad sense in which we are interested.

Strategy is not limited to purely military endeavors, even though that field is the one with which it is most commonly associated. We speak of political strategy, legal strategy, economic strategy, commercial strategy, and a dozen other different kinds of strategy, just as we do with the word tactics. Strategy, therefore, must be something that is applicable to a variety of fields of action and must have a definition that is not associated with generals poring over maps.

Let's bring it down to a homely, earthy example, within the experience of us all. Boy meets girl and says, "That's for me." Immediately he sets to work to plan how he can change that desire into an actuality. If the girl is smitten with the same happy thought, she does the same thing, but for the sake of clarity let's

follow the boy. Victory to him means getting the girl—this is his objective. His plan must be designed toward doing those things that will ensure his getting the girl all for himself. He takes her out, he feeds her in quaint restaurants filled with atmosphere, romance, and bad food. He buys her flowers, candy, and discreet presents at Christmastime. As the campaign progresses, he holds her hand, whispers sweet nothings into her ear, and in spite of the fact that he has already done enough to make her happy, he kisses her good night. Eventually he reaches the point where she will listen attentively while he pours out his soul to her, telling her his hopes, fears, dreams, and all about himself. He may even get around to the place where he lets her tell him about herself, but this is rare. In any event, if he plays his cards exactly right, she will say yes, and the wedding invitations are delivered. Boy's over-all plan that brings girl from his "That's for me" stage to her "I do" stage is *strategy*; all the flowers, movies, dinners, and the like are the *tactics* he uses to ensure the attainment of his objective.

Translating this example into a wider but no more important field of endeavor, we find that strategy is the over-all plan for accomplishing our objective or attaining our goal. It is the factor that aims each of our actions at its target. Strategy maps out or dictates the various plans of campaign and affixes or determines the series of acts that will lead to and ensure the attainment of the objective. It's the foundation upon which the series of actions in a plan are built. It's the framework that defines the tools and limits the acts that must be performed in order to win.

A note of caution should be injected here for the literal-minded reader. Having used the example of "boy meets girl" in a lecture course on geopolitics, I was a little disturbed to find that one of my students answered the question, "What is strategy?" by writing, "Strategy is how to get a girl." It is not that restrictive.

Many of the acts within the strategy are acts that can only be determined by supposition or assumption as to the enemy reaction. Because of this the tactics may change many times, so long as they are all designed to attain the objective and thus fulfill *the purpose* of the strategy. The unwary or the forgetful may be caught in the trap this tactical change produces and may easily confuse the tactical change for a change in the strategy.

So long as the basic objective is not changed, the methods employed are not inflexible and may always be modified to meet the need.

The Communists are the outstanding masters of the tactical change within basic strategy. At the very inception of the Communist regime in Russia the doctrine of the world revolution was adopted as the ultimate objective of Communism. To this day the objective of Communism has not changed. There have been, however, a variety of tactical changes to meet the changing world situation. When isolation furthered that objective, the Russians were isolationists; when international alliances were indicated, they became allies first of Germany, then, when she became a threat, of ourselves. These changes of pace were effected, not because the Russians desired to assist anybody else, but simply because it would help further the world revolution to smash a capitalist state, particularly by getting the assistance of all the world to do it. The results of this tactical move are apparent in Europe today.

A change in Communist tactics does not mean a change in Communist strategy. It has been our failure to realize this that has placed us in our present position. The Democracies have consistently interpreted changes in tactics as changes in strategy and in ultimate objective. There can be many changes in Communist tactics but only one change in strategy—namely, the voluntary abolition of world revolution and hence of Communism itself. So long as Communism exists, the doctrine of a Communist world ushered in by world revolution must also exist.

In addition to the necessity of basing tactical maneuvers on supposition or assumption, there are other tricky little things about strategy that are of vital importance. Some of the actions or plans do not materialize, and others must be substituted immediately in order to work out the purpose of the strategy. Many others cannot be decided until the very moment for their execution arrives, and this calls for snap judgment on the field of battle. Others in this series of acts or plans will be forced to undergo varying degrees of modification because of countermeasures by the enemy. Lastly, plans and acts have to be modified because of the interpretation of new factors. Because of all these conditions

strategy can never take its hand from its work or be permitted to falter. The objective must be precisely defined and all actions directed toward achieving this objective. Any plan of action that tends to deviate from the objective or to relegate it to a secondary role, even temporarily, must be discarded. Vigilance must be not only a watchword but the inflexible policy.

Not all strategy is successful. Frequently it fails because, while the objective is precisely defined and the plan excellent, the implementation of the plan is in the form of improperly conceived or poorly executed tactics. Merely having an excellent plan does not ensure success. Precision, common sense, and skill of execution are mandatory, and, above all, no single facet of the plan must be left to chance. Action is required, and this action must succeed.

Sometimes strategy fails because the enemy strategy or its implementation is superior. It must be obvious that one could have the most carefully conceived plan on paper and completely lack the resources to place it into operation. This type of strategic failure is well known in history and will probably continue to fill the pages of history books for centuries to come, assuming that after our time the writing of objective history will still be permitted. In spite of all the clichés concerning the good little man, a good little man can be defeated any time by a good big man. The side with the best strategy, the best implementation, and the best resources always wins.

A classic example of good strategy gone astray can be found in the German campaigns of World War I. Initially, based on the so-called Schlieffen Plan, the Germans contemplated an advance on the line Crefeld-Metz-Strasbourg-Colmar. The left, or south, flank was to remain stationary as far as Metz while the right flank attacked with lightning speed, pivoting on Metz and bearing down on Lille. By this plan the left flank would have kept the French Army occupied in Alsace and Lorraine while the right flank drove through neutral Belgium, forcing the French to the left and then eastward by pressure in their rear. This plan would have permitted an attack on Paris from the west and would have placed the Germans in possession of the rich industrial and agricultural districts of the north.

As basic strategy for a war against France the plan was excellent.

It had as its objective the defeat of France by the capture of Paris and French resource areas. It failed because of the inability of the German General Staff to keep the hand of strategy always at its work. The General Staff failed to modify its tactics to meet existing conditions. In short, the implementation was faulty.

The Schlieffen Plan contemplated only a war with France, not a war with France *and* England. In addition, it presupposed that the commander responsible for executing this attack had, as Banse expresses it, "first rate judgment, iron nerves and flexible intellect." If the plan had been executed against France alone, it would, in all probability, have succeeded, but with the entrance of the British it should have been changed. The German right flank should have been extended to the channel ports thus preventing the landing of even a few British troops. Such an action would have permitted the Germans to seize and hold the line of the Somme, thus nullifying the position of Paris as a key railway center and arsenal. This failure to seize the channel ports and the Somme line enabled the French to rush troops toward the channel faster than the Germans, once the latter had perceived their error. French success at the battle of the Marne can be attributed, among other things, to their ability to utilize the Paris railway center for rapid troop movement. British troops were able to attack or hold the German lines in the north and thus prevent the threat to the English coast that came about in World War II.

Ewald Banse, German geopolitician, feels that an initial seizure of the channel ports by the Germans would have kept Britain out of the war. If the coast of England had been menaced by the German Army plus the German Grand Fleet, the small British Army then existing would have been immobilized in Britain in an effort to beat off the threatened invasion. Banse further expresses the opinion that England might have concluded a speedy but reasonable peace at this point rather than have her country overrun by the Germans.

The second defect was the selection of a commander whose faulty decisions led to an attempt to water the Schlieffen Plan in a hurried effort and a hope that it might succeed *by chance*. German troops in Lorraine were strengthened at the expense of the important right flank, disregarding Schlieffen's admonition to



The Von Schlieffen Plan—Germany's basic plan for World Wars I and II. This plan will be used with modifications in the Soviet plan for World War III.

keep a strong right. These troops were unnecessary in Lorraine but vital to the right flank. A five-pronged invasion to the west, suddenly sweeping south to envelop the French Army and divide France into segments, was visualized. Even that might have succeeded if properly executed. However, the strong German Army in Lorraine, feeling itself superior to the French and anxious to show its strength, attacked, driving the French westward beyond a point where the proposed encirclement from the north was possible. Instead of outflanking the French and crushing them the Germans on the north found themselves forced to launch a series of frontal attacks against strong fortifications, unfavorable terrain, broad rivers, and a desperate, hard-fighting French Army.

Seeing its watered plan failing, the German headquarters lost its grasp on the situation and fell into a state of near panic. Crediting rumors of impending disaster, it permitted itself to be rushed into making improper decisions. Then came the inevitable final straw in the form of an excited and misinformed lieutenant colonel of the German headquarters who gave the order for a retreat to shorten the line of battle. A German general, competent but responding to a lifetime of rigid training, acted upon the order merely because the lieutenant colonel represented the high command. This action terminated the admirable Schlieffen Plan and, in the minds of many strategists, cost Germany the war. It was, as Bansc noted, an outstanding victory for German discipline!

Strategy must be kept abreast of the changing situation and the tactics modified to suit the occasion. This is true not only in a strategy for war but in a strategy for peace or one for survival. To attempt to fight all the world with a strategy that is effective against one country—as the original Schlieffen Plan would have been against France—is foolish. To attempt to apply a strategy for peace to a situation that requires a strategy for survival could well be fatal.

According to Clausewitz all, in strategy, is very simple but not on that account easy. Once we have determined just what our objective shall be, the way to it is easy to find. The great difficulty is to adhere to the strategy and develop the tactics necessary to implement it. To do this requires a strength of national character,

clear thinking, and an undiminishing will power coupled with a determination that could tax the entire nation to the breaking point. For the strategist it requires a greater strength of will to make a decision in strategy than in tactics; the latter is only a matter of the moment, while the former may be the life of the state itself. There is always the danger that we will become so bogged down in our tactics that we will lose sight of our basic strategy and, with it, our chances of success.

There are five basic elements in strategy that serve to condition its chances of success. To be successful any strategy must depend upon a careful integration of these factors. The first factor can be called the moral factor, which calls forth the mental and moral qualities of the people and serves as a basis upon which we must build our hopes. This factor embraces such things as the perseverance of the people, the will to fight or pursue the plan, the determination to win, and the capacity to resist the suffering that may be imposed by the plan. Close upon the heels of the moral factor is the second, or physical, factor. In this we consider our army and weapons and the physical military means and ability to pursue our prescribed path. Our lines of operations and our movement toward our objective are covered by the third, or mathematical, factor. This factor occupies itself with the concentric and eccentric movements insofar as their geometrical nature acquires any value in our calculations. It is perhaps in this phase that we first touch upon the actual battle plan for our chain of tactical efforts. The fourth factor is a restrictive one that we may call a geographical factor. To this we allot the influences of terrain, the mountains, climate, temperature, natural defenses, and the like, and it is in this factor that our control is the weakest. Here we must adapt our strategy to the restrictions nature imposes upon us; we cannot change the mediums of our operations to suit our strategy. Finally the last factor to condition our strategy is the so-called statistical factor, which takes into account the actual process of translating our ability to pursue our strategy, as represented by the physical factor, into actual practice. Here we are concerned with the actual production of a gun or a given product and with getting that gun into the hands of a soldier and in constant operation. As we will see, the second and the fifth factors

are almost one in modern warfare, for the former represents our war capability while the latter is our war potential.

It should become obvious now that strategy is not something involving generals alone but all the people of a state in any walk of life. A weakness in any phase of our strategy may so disrupt our chain of tactics as to destroy our whole plan. Therefore, the basis of our strategy starts with the moral qualities of the people and works on through the various factors and phases until it reaches a fever pitch—the combined, wholehearted co-operation, utilization, and will power of every facet of the nation's life. Strategy is a joint undertaking by all the people.

Bearing all these things in mind, what must be the basic characteristic of our strategy for survival? It must be devised with a definite concrete objective—that of the survival of democracy as we know it. This objective must be adhered to with an inflexibility of purpose but a flexibility of national will that will permit all the Democracies to change their tactics without allowing these changes to substitute a new objective. It must provide for men who are capable of clear thinking and possess the ability to substitute other tactical maneuvers for those originally planned when the situation so indicates. They must be capable of rendering snap judgment in moments of crisis, beating off the countermeasures of the enemy, and coping with the interjection of new factors. And our strategy must be devised to permit this. Above all, it must be a strategy capable of being perfectly implemented and executed within the ability and resources of the Democracies.

All these things are essential to our survival. So far, it would appear that the Communists have a slightly higher score in the game of strategy than the Democracies. This is due in part to the fact that they started playing the game well in advance of our entry into the field and partly because the Democracies, not being aware of the true nature of Russian strategy, were unable to discover exactly what the objective of their own strategy should be. However, it is definitely good tactics to get the jump on your adversary in the game of strategy, and it is superior strategy if he can be kept confused as to what his objective should be or what yours actually is. From the point of view of impartial evaluation, Communist strategy has been superior to ours, and we must over-

come the handicap this has imposed. If we are to survive, we must devise not only a strategy superior to his but one that will nullify his gains of the moment.

So many books, some good and some bad, have been written about strategy that it is almost impossible for us to keep track of them all. Most of them have been buried in obscurity with the passing of time. The basic ideas of all of them, however, still prevail and are incorporated into our thinking. The one primary point is this—to be successful, strategy must be good strategy to start with. Consequently, it should go without saying that our strategy for survival will only work if it is good, sound strategy, designed for the common good and supported by the common will. No halfway, indefinite planning will suffice. We must be completely aware of what we hold as an objective and then proceed toward our objective with a singleness of purpose that brooks no deviations, no excursions into realms of idealistic theory or noble experiments. The time for these has passed. The forces of Communism are on the march, and only successful strategy, superior to that of the Kremlin, will keep us free. Therefore, the first point in our plan for survival is to develop a good, workable strategy.

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Chapter 3

The Soviet Position

We, in the Democracies, have always been reluctant to face the facts of international life, particularly the fact that some dogmatists take their dogma seriously. Being practical democrats who have come to view our progress in somewhat materialistic terms, in spite of our equally strong disbelief in the dialectic materialism of the Communists, we have been unable to accept the idea that some dogmatists regard their doctrine as a science. To us it seems almost incomprehensible that our enemies could expose their plans to public view in the form of a "scientific" theory and then expect us to believe that this theory is their real plan of action.

During Hitler's day we missed and missed badly in this respect, even though his whole plan of action was exposed in such works as his own *Mein Kampf* and in the writings of men like Ewald Banse and Haushofer. Our reluctance to face the facts concerning Soviet ambitions, in spite of all Russia's efforts to make them perfectly clear to us, is parallel to the attitude we took on Hitler and his projects. It would appear that the ordinary citizen in the Democracies never learns and would rather delude himself than cope courageously with the problem at hand.

Let's face it squarely. The present policy of the Soviet Union and Communism has been singularly successful in bringing us closer to the world revolution that is the Communist objective. It might be said that the maneuvers that have accomplished this have been conducted with considerable skill and with no little

help from the Democracies because of our reluctance to face the true issues.

Would it be a shock, for example, for us to learn suddenly that the Communist program is designed to promote the interests of the Soviet Union and, to a somewhat lesser degree, world Communism? Would it come as a great surprise to know that the program of both the Soviet Union and the Communist Party is in no way designed to assist in any international project for world stability and progress that does not present a picture of the Soviet Union as the single power and the Communist Party as the one and only political party extant? Could we be convinced that the very essence of Communism precludes such assistance and that the program is designed to impede and prevent, whenever possible, world stability and progress? Some of us recognize these things, to others this information would be a distinct shock, and to a third group it would be beyond comprehension and belief. In which group are you?

The Soviet Union, through its international agency, world Communism, employs geopolitical strategy that exceeds anything ever approached by the Nazis. It does so with a virtuosity that has never before been demonstrated. It combines propaganda, fifth-column activities, and the threat of the force of arms into one powerful geostrategic weapon that holds the people of the Democracies at bay while the forces of Communism calmly undermine our world. The Soviet Union is today the personification of the perverted geopolitics of Hitler. It *is* what Hitler *tried to make* Germany. An analysis of the Soviet position will clearly demonstrate just what it is we in the Democracies must face.

The Soviet and the Communist views of the world are one and the same, are based on a series of assumptions characteristic of the geopolitical program any state bent on world domination must have. Primarily, and foremost in their thinking, is the assumption of the probability of war against the Soviet Union. The Soviet is well aware that it cannot continue to pursue indefinitely its present program without a war. This war, of course, regardless of any Soviet measures to bring it about, will be caused by the Democracies because of their refusal to permit themselves to be destroyed

by the Communists. This makes any war an attack on the Soviet Union!

Preparation for war, therefore, must take precedence over everything else in the Soviet Union. While, at the same time, war preparations in any other country must be inhibited or prevented. By way of preparation anything can be sacrificed, particularly if it does not affect the leaders of the state. Civilian welfare, comfort, and progress can be cast to the winds, and slave labor, if necessary, can be employed to promote the preparation.

An assumption of the probability of war against them necessarily leads to the assumption that there is an enemy, and in this, of course, all who are not interested in being communized and who resist it constitute the enemy. Some assumptions of comparative strength can be made to serve as an indication of what the Soviet must do to prepare and how much delay will be needed in order to bring these preparations to the necessary pitch of war readiness. They know, for example, that the free world is capable of producing, at the moment, 83 per cent of the world's steel, 74 per cent of its hard coal, 92 per cent of its crude petroleum, 86 per cent of its primary aluminum, 84 per cent of its electric power, and 97 per cent of the seagoing merchant tonnage. It knows that in Western Europe alone these figures would read 28 per cent, 32 per cent, 6 per cent, 17 per cent, 28 per cent, and 49 per cent respectively. From the standpoint of resources alone the picture indicates considerable delay.

Russia knows, however, that an offensive or preventive war will never be started against her, and she will be careful not to provoke one until she is completely ready. In the meantime, she can keep her people in line by her cold-war tactics. Furthermore, being well aware of the temperament of the Democracies, she can afford to brush off mere threats of military force because she knows we will not resort to military actions before she does. She has, therefore, everything to gain and nothing to lose by infiltration, penetration, and harassment tactics. There is no limit to which she cannot go, so long as she fires no shots.

Some observers feel that Russia may have fallen victim to her own vainglorious propaganda and the voluntary distortion of his-

torical fact with which she keeps her people in line. They are certain that she has forgotten the contribution of her ally, the United States, in World War II. This is a forlorn hope; Russia is well aware of her production deficiencies and has made every effort to provide for their correction.

It might be advisable to note here just what her problem is. During World War II it was estimated that the United States supplied her with 8,500,000 tons of military supplies, or a quantity sufficient to equip and operate 150 of her 350 fighting divisions in that war. These supplies, according to T. H. Vail Motter, reached her through the Persian Gulf route (23.8 per cent), the Siberian ports (47 per cent), and the Murmansk route (29.2 per cent), all of which will be closed to her in World War III. In addition to the purely military supplies, the United States shipped her 8,999,861 tons of so-called nonmilitary supplies between June 22, 1941, and September 20, 1945. Military supplies included 14,834 U.S. aircraft and 409,526 trucks. Mr. Motter estimates that the trucks alone represented "two years and seven months of the pre-war capacity of the . . . Soviet motor industry." This tremendous support will not be available to her in World War III, and she knows it.

To offset the industrial deficiency Russia has intensified her effort within the satellites. In Poland, for example, the government reported 1951 coal mining to be 120 per cent above the 1938 level; imports of machinery in 1951 constituted 32 per cent of her imports, and in 1950 she imported four and a half times as much machinery and eight times as many automobiles as in 1937. In 1950 Polish industrial production was 31 per cent above 1949; the 1951 production was 24 per cent above 1950. The heat is on all the satellites to increase production. It must be remembered that, by virtue of conquest of one type or another, Russia takes unto herself the output of Czechoslovakia and Manchuria. Stalin was well aware that there will be no help from the United States in World War III.

The Soviet Union assumes and possesses the great advantage of space, and space considerations loom large in her political and economic estimates and planning. Space in Russia's case has successfully influenced the outcome of two invasions, those of Napoleon

and Hitler, and, although air warfare has given new significance to peripheral space and emphasized depth, Russia holds a valuable trump in the area she dominates. Great space serves to increase the distance bombers must fly over antiaircraft fire and under attack to reach her vulnerable industrial areas. It is to be expected, therefore, that the industrial heart of the Soviet Union is in the Urals and Siberia and that it has priority for both industrial development and defense against attack over that granted to any other area of her country. The loss of the Don region industries in the war with Germany taught her a lesson Russia will not soon forget.

The Soviet Union's view of the relationship between Russia and the rest of the world is purely a geopolitical one. Geographically, her world starts with a solid core area comparable to Mackinder's heartland. This is an area extending approximately from the Arctic Circle to the Himalayas and the mountain regions of southern Asia, and from the Volga-Urals area to the Yangtze and mountain regions of the east.

According to geopolitical concepts, this area represents an almost impregnable stronghold, being subject to attack by land forces only under great difficulty and completely immune to attack by sea. Air attack constitutes the great threat, but the vast space under Russian control over which hostile planes must fly enables her to offer sharp effective defense. As a consequence of this, the solid core area, or heartland, offers an excellent site for Soviet industry, stock-piling, and concentrations.

Within her own borders but outside the solid core lies the extremely vulnerable peripheral space. This area, of relative unimportance on the east, is vitally important on the western side of her country, for it contains her capital and the roots of her European civilization. It is open to attack from the west, and its terrain characteristics are such that an attacker can make considerable inroads on her territory, even capturing Moscow, before a successful resistance can be effected. Twice this area has been penetrated, overrun, and occupied by forces from the west.

This vulnerability makes it unsafe to locate her major industrial concentrations in the area, and despite the location of several centers of raw materials in the periphery, the Soviet has shifted her industry, to a large extent, to the more secure regions of the Volga

and Urals. The shift, starting in World War II, has been one of her major enterprises since the end of the war. This, of course, requires the development of new resources areas, located nearer the new center of industry, the development of additional transportation facilities, and almost wholesale population shifts to meet the new demands.

Except for the southern part of her eastern limits, which at the moment is adequately protected by Manchuria and the Red Chinese, the Far Eastern periphery is without great significance to her defense efforts. Its principal value lies in its nearness to Alaska and its use as a site for air concentration. Vulnerable port areas are protected by Manchuria and the air bases in the Lenaland peninsula and Kamchatka.

Outside the peripheral space lies the so-called cushion space, or protective zone. On the west this consists of the European satellites, and on the east, Manchuria and China proper. The function of these zones is to serve as defensive areas for the Russian peripheral space and to augment Russian production. The vulnerability of these zones makes their value in terms of production in time of war problematical when one considers that they represent areas of first sacrifice should the occasion demand it. Located in the western area are the Skoda Works of Czechoslovakia, the Manfred-Weiss of Hungary, and the Resitza in Rumania along with the highly important but equally highly vulnerable Rumanian oil field. The Manchurian industry in the east is equally vulnerable to air attack. The role these industrial areas of the cushion space will play can be determined by the length of time Russia can exploit them before World War III, her ability to defend them, and our ability to capture them or render them useless.

Adjoining the cushion space is the contact space, or potential staging areas, of Germany, Austria, Japan, and Manchuria, some of which overlap into the cushion space or the prime target belt. These areas represent, for the most part, areas of extreme danger for Russia. Germany and Japan, for example, possess the potential industrial strength, given time and opportunity, and the proximity to be able to attack in either direction. Held by Russia, all these



The Satellite Area—the Soviet's western defense area.

areas represent powerful assets for defense or offense; held by her enemies, they represent a menace to Russian plans.

Part of Germany, the agricultural part, is under Soviet domination; Manchuria is hers by invasion and the domination of the Chinese Communists; but the presence of the United States in Japan and the Democracies in western industrial Germany gives Russia no peace of mind. Her position in Manchuria gives her an opportunity to invade Japan if necessary, and Russia is somewhat comforted by the knowledge that her invasion of Manchuria has stripped the Japanese of a vital industrial complex. Proximity is her only advantage in Eastern Germany, and this tends to minimize the industrial advantage the Democracies might hold in the occupied areas.

Beyond and in some places overlapping the potential staging area, or contact space, is the prime target belt, which also contains certain strategic points of interest to the Soviet as potential sites for the launching of air offensives against Russia. This belt includes the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, Pakistan, Western Germany, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Austria—all enemies or potential enemies to Russia. Of particular interest to Russia is the Kars Plateau of Turkey, from which air strikes could be made against Stalingrad, the Odessa-Rostov region, and the Rostov-Astrakhan region. Northwestern Iran also is of interest as a possible source of air strikes against the Krasnovodsk area. It is, of course, to the advantage of Russia to bring as much of the prime target belt under the Communist heel as is possible before World War III. This prime target belt has not been a fruitful one for Russia. She has lost Yugoslavia, the Austrians are resistant, and only constant pressure keeps the East Germans in line. In Greece and Iran she has only the pressure of local Communist movements and her threat of proximity to aid her. Russian efforts in Turkey are limited to propaganda and external pressures, nothing more.

The next belt, or secondary target belt, includes France, the Benelux nations, Spain, Italy, Great Britain, and French North Africa in the west, with India, Indo-China, and Indonesia on the east. Strangely enough, Russia has made more progress in these areas than in her prime belt, but this progress, except in southeast Asia, is limited to propaganda and local disturbances backed by

threats of war. There is an additional secondary belt to include the Scandinavian countries, but in this area the targets of pressure are purely opportunistic. Lacking a strong native Communist movement to assist her, Russia can only resort to threats in the vulnerable northern countries.

Lastly, there is the belt of ultimate targets, which includes the western hemisphere. In this area Russia has no hope of direct initial conquests by force and little hope of promoting revolution; hence, she must be content with harassing tactics and ineffectual propaganda, postponing any hope of the ultimate inclusion of these areas in the Communist world until all other nations have been subdued.

The Soviet Union assumes that strategic materials, being essential to warfare and being unfortunately where you find them, must be acquired by conquest or annexation as a right of the Communist mission in the world. This, of course, is simply a modification of the old German *Lebensraum* idea so popular in Hitler's day. If large deposits of these materials are near the Soviet Union, they become targets of direct attack. An example is found in the forced ceding of territory by Finland after World War II, by which Russia secured the most important nickel mines in Europe. Rumanian and Austrian oil were acquired in the same fashion, as well as the other valuable resources of eastern Europe.

In the case of resource areas lying comparatively far from the Soviet Union, dependence is placed on the local Communist parties to acquire control of the needed resources by legal means or, as is the case in the Far East, by terrorist means. Failing this, the local Communists are expected to prevent their use by any enemy of the Soviet. What the Soviet Union cannot use it will attempt to deny to anyone else.

The last major assumption of the Soviet Union is the inevitability of a two-front war, the formal military front and the internal class-war front in the Democracies. This is based on the belief that the Soviet Union is the principal asset of the Communists in their fight for world control, overriding and reducing all other considerations to a subzero role. The Soviet Union, therefore, is the heart of the Communist world, with the satellites and foreign Communists sworn to serve as a protecting screen,

ready to die or be expended at any time for the security of Russia. Under this assumption it becomes impossible for any non-Russian to be a Communist and, at the same time, be loyal to his own country.

The expectation of war and the cause of the world revolution presuppose the development of this new, separate, and distinctly different morality in which treason is a virtue so long as it's treason in behalf of Communism. This development and its control is an operation entrusted to the secret police, called NKVD or, since World War II, MVD. The world-wide system of discipline and direction wielded by the MVD makes it possible to effect rapid changes of position abroad and to keep the foreign party ranks purely dedicated to the advancements of Russian aims at all costs.

From these assumptions the Soviet Union and the Communists draw a number of startling conclusions that are reflected in their policies and practices. Foremost among these is the idea that time is on their side and they can afford to delay World War III until they are ready to launch it. This, of course, means until they are no longer able to make gains by nonviolent methods. They also conclude that since World War II has greatly reduced the number of strong anti-Communist states, introducing problems that can only be solved by a close economic co-operation among the Democracies, any capitalist war is no longer possible. Therefore, since the capitalists can no longer fight among themselves, it is inevitable they will combine and attack the Soviet Union. To prevent this it will be necessary for the Communists to create an anti-American feeling to lessen the chances of any coalition, while at the same time they attempt to bolster temporarily the economy of the capitalist states to prevent American capital from getting a foothold within the Democracies. This procedure, they conclude, should be followed until Soviet Russia is ready to launch World War III.

Apart from the internal second front, the Soviet Union would prefer a one-front war. This is a logical conclusion in view of the status of Soviet industry. It must be remembered that the Soviet Union has never been submitted to the acid test of being its own supply house in an all-out modern war. Neither the Communists

nor the Democracies can be certain that Russian industrial production will be able to support or maintain a prolonged single-front war, let alone a two-front campaign. The stress and strain of supporting a two-front war could easily defeat the Soviet Union if Russia's delicately balanced industrial structure broke down.

Russia, however, is faced with the peculiar situation of being almost certain of having to fight on two fronts, the east and the west. The Democracies certainly would not pass up the opportunity of attacking the Soviet Union through the back door of Asia in the event of war in the west. In preparation for this contingency Russia has taken two positive steps: she has enlisted the aid of the Red Chinese to guard her back door, and she has instituted a series of campaigns in Asia to deprive the Democracies of valuable natural resources, the lack of which should seriously handicap us in maintaining a two-front war.

If Russia can win, not in Korea, but in southeast Asia and possibly India, before the outbreak of World War III, she can count herself moderately safe from invasion in Asia. Such victories would give her virtual domination over the entire land mass, making the position of Japan, the Philippines, and Australia an extremely difficult one. The west-to-east route from Europe would be cut, and the sole source of supply of a Democratic army would be via the west-to-west route from the United States. European forces fighting in the Far East would be forced to sail the long route around Africa or travel the entire width of the Atlantic, United States, and the Pacific to reach their destination. Should Russia gain all of Asia, it is more than likely that the United States would make no attempt to penetrate in that area, and Chinese participation would be one of pacification and watchdog tactics, while at the same time supplying immense quantities of valuable raw materials to Russia. These, of course, would be produced by slave labor from southeast Asia.

It is relatively easy to see why the Communists prefer a later war to an earlier one, particularly as long as they are making such extraordinary progress toward their objectives without a war. So long as war can be delayed, the Soviet Union can continue to prepare for it. No matter how much a nation prepares, it is never completely prepared to fight a war. Delay, therefore, is most

advantageous to Russia. However, she cannot afford to accept serious setbacks at this point in her history. Considering her degree of control over her satellites, a serious setback at the hands of the Democracies might induce her to declare herself war-ready and launch an attack at once, hoping to catch her antagonists off guard and partially or completely unprepared.

Ideal from Stalin's point of view was a repetition of World War II, in which he could join a coalition of Democracies bent on smashing a sister Democracy. He would join in any coalition of this type without the slightest hesitation, for victory would remove one more capitalist country from the list of his foes without materially weakening Russia. To get the Democracies to do his work was always an objective of the wily old fox of the Kremlin. Unfortunately for him, however, the chances of a second World War II were not only remote but completely out of the question. At the moment the Democracies have no enemies except Russia, and even if there was internal dissension to the point of war, none of them could fight without seriously draining the resources of the United States or Russia.

Within the framework of these assumptions and conclusions the Russian position is formed, and from their point of view it is a simple one. In brief, it contains only a few salient points. First, to expand the area of Soviet control and influence by nonshooting methods beyond that already held while avoiding a shooting war. This must be done at the same time that Russia prevents or discourages or reduces the potency of any Democratic coalition against her. This second point is, in view of recent developments, a somewhat hopeless task. Thirdly, to encourage colonial rebellions, Korea-type incidents, and internal disturbances within the Democracies in order to keep them so occupied with their own problems they will have no time to hinder Russian moves. Next, she must take steps to weaken all uncontrollable areas to the point of impotency in order to render them ineffectual partners in any coalition against her. General war must be avoided, if possible, in order to gain the advantage of time. Lastly, a two-front war must be avoided, and plans and actions must be executed now to ensure a one-front war in the future.

A program such as this is a most ambitious one and in a less

regimented state would be virtually impossible. The Soviet Union, however, operating under rigid controls and aided by the foreign Communists, has a fair chance to succeed, so long as the Democracies have world peace as their primary objective. Within this framework, and materially aided by the reluctance of the Democracies to make any move that might precipitate war, the Communists can ride merrily onward to success. Every concession we make is a victory for the Soviet Union and another nail in our own collective casket.

It is barely possible that the Soviet Union would not go to war, if strongly checked by the Democracies at this late date. It is certain that two years ago she would have backed water rapidly, almost frantically, at any show of Democratic force. However, time is swiftly running out, and every day lessens our chances of delaying war beyond a few months from the original Soviet target date. We are the victims of our own foolishness, not necessarily the victims of Communist maneuvers. Our failure lies in our reluctance to face facts and in our willingness to bury our heads in the sands of wishful thinking. Now, we must be prepared to pay the price.

Strategy for survival dictates that we recognize the program of the Soviet Union and that even at this late date we take positive steps to circumvent it. There may still be time to throw Russia off balance and drive her menace back into its Red shell to gain for us the time we crave. It should be noted, however, that whenever we gain time the Soviet also profits. Sooner or later this whole issue must be forced out into the open and squarely met. Unless we can devise a strategy that completely circumvents the Russian program, we are very likely to lose by default. Her gains are and have been enormous. Her program has worked as she planned it. Now is the time, perhaps too late but nevertheless not hopeless, to stop her if we wish to survive.

Chapter 4

The Position of Russia

Quite apart from the *Soviet* position, which is conditioned by political ambitions for world domination and thus is an international position, is the position of *Russia* as an entity in geopolitics. If one penetrates deeply enough into the geography of the enemy's country and into the character of its people, one is not so likely to be deceived and underestimate the enemy's capabilities and courses of action in time of war or the courses that can be pursued against him. Wars are waged and won not only by military but also by geographical and psychological weapons. Thus, a brief look at Russian geography and the Russian people themselves may supply us, in addition to the answers to many of our questions, points of importance in our strategy for survival.

In spite of over two centuries of effort to Europeanize Russia, it still belongs more to Asia than to Europe, and its European position is no more than a connecting link or area of transition between the geography and culture of Europe and that of Asia. One might, with all propriety, call the western peripheral space the seat of a Eurasian culture. In this fact lies much of our difficulty.

A close examination of its geography discloses that Russia is mostly a long sweep of desert land, in the tundras, marshes, and forests of which few people would care to spend a lifetime. European Russian territory of importance consists of nearly all plain, with chains of low mountains composed of the sands of old

moraines, pushing their way skyward in the north and central regions. In the south there are numerous belts of low escarpments, all facing eastward and open to the west. With cross-country movement relatively easy, such features as marshes, marshy valleys, and rivers take on a new significance. These can normally be crossed without difficulty only during the long, bitterly cold winter season. Russia's climate can be considered to consist of two main seasons—a long, hot, humid summer and a long freezing-cold winter separated by two short and abrupt periods the principal characteristic of which is mud.

The area to the east can be considered to consist of three separate regions, Siberia, Turania, and Caucasia. The Siberian area is the one best known by name to the layman and runs from the mountains east of the Yenisei River to the Russia-in-Europe area whose eastern border is popularly conceived as stopping at the Urals. Siberia is characterized by a north-to-south progression of pinewoods to steppes to pinewoods again occurring on the extreme south. In the extreme north, or arctic, region lies the tundra, or frozen steppe area. The whole region, affected as it is by bitter winters and hot summers, is primitive, sparsely populated, and by our standards, economically undeveloped and retarded. Since World War II, however, almost frantic efforts have been made to remedy this latter deficiency.

The Turania region is largely desert with an occasional cultivated oasis. Its climate is mainly an extremely long, hot summer with little rainfall during the rest of the year. It is, of course, properly inhabited at the oases, and the remainder of the territory is given over to nomads whose allegiance to Russia is largely on papers in the Kremlin rather than in practice.

Contrasted to the Turania region is the Caucasian area of the south. Caucasia is a mountainous region alternating between almost unendurably hot plains and forest-covered alps whose crests are never free from snow. According to Banse, the inhabitants of the area are considered to be the most "variegated hodge-podge of peoples, crowded into the narrowest of spaces," in the world.

Russia has the longest coast line and one of the longest land frontiers in the world. Her coast line is largely useless because it borders on the Arctic Sea, whereas her land frontier on the south

Russia in Europe—showing possible dissident frontier areas.

The area is flat with almost no hills of significance; in the north is entirely flat plain. One outstanding physical condition must be taken into consideration—the Pripet Marshes.

The Pripet, or Pinsk, Marshes lie east of the present Polish border between the Bug and the Berezina rivers. Attacks due east from Warsaw will run head on into them. To avoid them means to move southward, attacking across the Dniester and Bug rivers and through the Dnieper heights. To the north one must cross the Niemen. Successfully to invade the peripheral space, the invaders must take the Pripet Marshes or undergo the extension of the campaign involved in by-passing them.

Most of the population of Russia is located in two general areas. In the triangle made by Leningrad, Kiev, and the greater elbow of the Volga is found the home of the Great Russians, the backbone of Soviet control. In the south is the home of the Little Russians, who have more eastern and Dinaric blood and as such are not as fanatically Russian as their northern east Baltic cousins. Two minor population centers are to be found: the desolate regions of the Caspian chiefly inhabited by nomads and the Great Russian settlements of the Siberian region. Since World War II artificial movements of population under government direction have increased the population areas east of the Urals.

Strictly speaking there is no Russian race or character, nor can they be referred to en masse as Slavs, for this term implies only a unity of language and not one of ethnological significance. Listing the population, we find Great Russians, Little Russians, White Russians, Sibiriaki, or the Russians who have migrated to Siberia, Finns, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Germans, Mongolians, and Mongoloid groups and Orientals and Middle Easterners of all varieties.

Outstanding in this heterogeneous collection are the Great Russians, who are fundamentally east Baltic stock mixed with Nordic and Mongolian. Banse believes that the influence of the Nordic and Scandinavian blood is responsible for the aggressive expansionist characteristic of this group. This, of course, may be conditioned by the Nordic supremacy doctrine present in Germany during his heyday. There is no doubt, however, that there are two distinct types in this group, the blond distinctly Nordic type and

the vast formless mass of the common people. The former type supplied the leaders while the latter type the followers.

The Nordic group, although small in number, are powerful in their control and are believed by some to be responsible for the fact that only the Great Russians have a distinct and separate history of their own. They definitely possess characteristics more European than Asian. The vast remainder of the Great Russians are a mixture of Nordic and Mongolian with the latter predominating, and it is in these that the so-called Russian temperament is found.

As a general rule the Great Russian dominates and assimilates easily. These mixtures of blood have, of course, produced a mixture of qualities and characteristics that appear strange in the eyes of the Westerner. One quality frequently neutralizes or contradicts another, making them a somewhat unpredictable people who are never certain of exactly what they want. Banse defines the Great Russians as a group that "oscillates helplessly between dreams and actions; it secretly kisses ikons with penetential devotion and then goes straight off and gets blind drunk on vodka."

The Great Russians are resigned and brooding and completely contradictory, frequently following up an action with one diametrically in opposition to the first. Characteristic of them is their surprising trick of springing from blank indifference into violent action. One minute they will appear to be dominated by abject stupidity and the very next present a demonstration of limitless imagination. One of their characteristics that has caused the West so much bewilderment is their ability to appear inferior and humble and then, without warning, do something that is almost absurdly arrogant. When force is ruthlessly applied, they retreat and submit, but they may break out into fits of ungovernable violence at slight provocation or fancied hurt.

Many authorities believe that the Great Russians are incapable of any progressive development or enterprise on their own initiative. Sheer weight of numbers and blind obedience enable them to accomplish much under firm, resolute leadership. Under a strong hand they are stable and reliable; without it their stability is dissipated, and the weaker side of their character dominates. The pressure of their mass is probably the real key to the secret of Soviet military and political power.

The Great Russians stand solidly behind those who lead them, irrespective of where they are led and at what price. They lack a conception of self and individualism and think only in terms of the mass. A smart leader can always depend upon two reactions: a complete acceptance of orders and a complete lack of critical appreciation that permits them always to support the man who has power and uses it ruthlessly. These two reactions produce blind, almost unfailing obedience in the soldiers and permit them to be sacrificed like sheep in the face of determined resistance and superior weapons. A second manifestation of these reactions permits them to accept almost cheerfully changes in government without realization of their meaning.

In spite of the altruistic approach of the Communist doctrine to equality and mass rule, there is still a ruling class in Russia, and for the most part it still comes from the Great Russian Nordic element. This ruling class lacks close rootstock ties with the basic east Baltic type and combines the Nordic, Germanic, and Scandinavian temperament. It is somewhat international in character with a Tatar-Caucasian strain presently creeping in. It owes its position to an appreciation of the fact that force is the only thing that can keep the lower mass of the Great Russians moving toward a common objective in a semblance of united effort. It is not joined to the masses by sympathy or common nationalistic bonds; the connection between the peasant and the ruling class is maintained only by the physical demonstration of authority. "The knout has always been the principal nexus between the people and their rulers," according to Banse.

Quite opposed to the Great Russian character is the more complex Little Russian. If possible this group is of an even greater admixture than their northern countrymen, at least five divergent races having contributed to their make-up. Basically, they are a gentler, more receptive and approachable group than the Great Russians, lacking the deep-seated suspicion and fear of foreigners found in the north. They tend to be more individualistic and are therefore less reliable from the Soviet point of view. Never having had a definite upper class or aristocracy, they are not as easily led, and a more recent separation from their nomad plainsmen an-

cestors has tended to make nationalistic sentiment less strong and the local tribal loyalty more pronounced.

The Soviet Union has come to regard this group in the Ukraine Republic as one of its definite danger zones. Measures of suppression having failed to whip the Little Russians into line as enthusiastic Communists, the Kremlin has deported millions to Siberia in an effort to destroy tribal unity by dispersing the tribe. This, of course, has heightened the resentment of the Little Russian, and a proper appreciation of his psychology may prove extremely valuable to the Democracies in World War III.

German attempts to employ this anti-Communist spirit during World War II failed largely because these attempts were more in the nature of exploitation than in the encouragement of free living. To replace Stalin's police with Hitler's appeared to be no change in the eyes of the Little Russians. Had Germany had a deeper appreciation of the national psychology of that people, her war against Russia might have had a different ending.

A brief historical note on the Ukrainians may serve to illustrate their position. The Little Russians accepted the protection of Russia in the eighteenth century and then only reluctantly. Prior to that time they were a free people whose chief livelihood was gained by chasing the Mongols away from Russia's borders, fighting the Turks or Poles, or performing whatever services Russia desired or could pay for. They settled originally in the Don, Donets, and Dnieper regions and are the famous Cossacks of legend and romantic fiction. It was they who brought the Ukraine into Russia, not Russia who took it. Their loyalty is still to their native soil, not to that of Moscow. They have made two bids for independence; once in 1917 during the Bolshevik Revolution and once during the German occupation of World War II. Neither succeeded, but perhaps one sponsored by the Democracies might, at the proper time, help strip Russia of a powerful economic advantage and the protection of her southern flank.

Other nationalities within the Soviet Union are entirely minority groups in the sense of widespread influence. To consider them all here would not be feasible. It should be noted, however, that the so-called solid front of Russian Communism is not setting so

solidly with many of the minor nationalities, who chafe and smart under the lash of the Greater Russians.

Russian ideas of defense depend, as has been shown, on space, the severity of the winters, and the passive character and vast number of the people, particularly the Great Russians. To win, the Soviet Union will retire from the western frontiers it now holds in order to set the factors of distance, climate, and the self-defensive instinct of the Great Russian at work. The Russian soldier becomes more formidable as he retires into his geographic and psychological shell. Such a retreat should be prevented if possible. Admittedly it will be difficult to prevent him from retreating into his geographical fortress, but the Democracies should make every effort to prevent the psychological retreat, particularly in the case of the Little Russians and the White Russians who inhabit Byelorussia. At the same time the geographical weakness should be exploited to the utmost.

Russia's failure to fulfill its objective of the "Russification" of the Little Russian and other minority groups could be the wedge the Democracies need to split the Soviet might. Such a plan would of necessity have to be based on the general premise that all Russians do not think alike, a fact seemingly difficult for us to realize. We cannot automatically ascribe a standard set of characteristics to the Russians, because they differ widely, one group from the other.

Survival strategy indicates that a study of these character differences should be made with an eye to exploiting them on a geographical basis. The possibility of being able to invade the Russian south flank from Turkey with the help of the remaining Little Russians should not be overlooked. In fighting and winning a war no possibility, however slight its chances of success may appear, can or should be overlooked. Strategy for survival demands and requires a complete analysis of every possible loophole for victory.

Chapter 5

Communism and the Big Lie

Any strategy, particularly a strategy for survival, must possess at the outset a clear picture of the enemy or antagonist and his objectives. Since 1946 there has been an almost endless debate on the subject, "Does Russia want war?"

In the Democracies all of us sincerely want peace. Any man who has known true freedom realizes that only in an atmosphere and climate of peace can freedom flourish. We thirst for peace as plants in an arid soil thirst for moisture; no man in his right mind desires war or the destruction, restrictions, and privation war produces. Yet, our passionate desire for peace has been turned against us by the forces of evil that manifest themselves in the Communist doctrine. Realizing far better than we do that war between the Democracies and Communists is inevitable, the Soviet Union continues to shout for peace as she prepares for war. In that respect, the Communists have created the Era of the Big Lie to soothe us while the war of her making rolls closer and closer.

A careful examination of Soviet and Communist strategy, tactics, and policy will lead inevitably to certain conclusions that some people in the Democracies find almost untenable. If we list these, they present us with a definite picture of what we may expect and against what we have to struggle:

1. The Communists have a single goal—world revolution (world domination by Communist ideology).

2. They assume this cannot be accomplished without violence —internal and external.

3. They lack the capacity to accept the idea that peace can endure from now on, and they expect and plan for another catastrophic war.

4. The Soviet Union is venerated as the mainspring and driving force of the world revolution and as such must be protected.

5. They fear a coalition against the Soviet Union by the Democracies for the sole purpose of crushing the movement.

6. Any federation or co-operative effort of the non-Communist world that would delay or prevent the world revolution is a threat to the Soviet Union.

7. The most modern and effective means of cold warfare must be utilized to weaken the non-Communists and strengthen Soviet Russia.

8. The Communist parties outside the Soviet Union are junior partners in the venture.

9. The tactics of the Communists are based on a definite theory and strategy, and the essential parts of that theory and strategy are unchanging.

10. Until the world revolution all international affairs are to be settled on the basis of power politics and not by negotiation.

Faced with these conclusions, derived from the Communist doctrine itself, we can see clearly why the Democracies will not be able to avoid the war and live at peace with Communism.

If we could pursue our policy of live and let live, it might be a different story. We in America, and it is also true of all of Western Europe, have no designs on Russian territory or preserves. On the contrary, we would welcome an opportunity to turn our minds from a state of uneasy peace that is almost worse than war and concentrate on our rehabilitation and the betterment of our people. If the Communists would keep their doctrine behind the Russian borders and not attempt to penetrate, to disrupt, and to destroy the system of democracy under which we live, we in America would certainly not attempt or even be interested in any campaign to wipe out their ideology. We have always subscribed to the idea that any nation's system of government is the business of its people. Unfortunately, this cannot be, for Communism is a doc-

trine with a built-in geopolitical program of world domination. This, by itself, precludes any possibility of world peace.

Any objective study of Communism rapidly discloses that the world is not dealing with a simple political ideology or philosophical basis of a system of government. It requires only a little study to discover that Communism has all of the attributes of a quasi-religious movement, a religion of evil, perhaps, but a religious movement nevertheless. It differs from our truly spiritual religions of the West in that it is purely a materialistic religion based on the ultimate rewards in this life instead of in the hereafter. In this it places just as great a premium on faith as does Christianity, but it goes one step further. It predicts that even if the material benefits it promises are not realized during the lifetime of its adherent, with the coming and conclusion of the world revolution his children will receive them in his behalf. Who among us would not sacrifice himself if he were promised his children would inherit the Kingdom of Heaven because of his sacrifice? That alone is tempting bait to a father or a mother.

Consequently, it imbues its adherents with a fanaticism that might do credit to an early Christian martyr. Its evangelists are moved by a spirit of determination that is ruthlessness personified. Its methods of conversion are varied, skillfully employed, and without shame or ethical sense beyond that contained in its unholy creed. In short, it is a religion of evil dedicated to a materialistic God, spread by violence, deceit, and treachery through the evangelistic doctrine of "Believe or perish."

To regard it as less than a quasi-religious movement is woefully to underestimate its force to a degree that is suicidal. To regard it as a movement that one can reason or collaborate with or ignore with impunity is folly. To regard it as a mysterious force that cannot be defeated is moronic. If we can, on the other hand, regard Communism in its true light as a quasi-religious movement, dominated by ruthless, self-seeking men, drunk for and with power, the objectives as stated in the utterances of its various prophets will take on a new significance.

Psychologically, the Russians offered the best breeding ground for the early growth and development of the Communist movement. Since they have never been able to rid themselves of an

age-old dread of the foreigner and since they are accustomed to centuries of oppression, a doctrine that would isolate the outsider and at the same time appear to grant liberty and progress was practically irresistible. Jean Gottman writes that the Russians are still hiding somewhere in the forest or anxiously guarding their territories recently acquired outside the familiar woods. In this he is correct. So deep are they in their national shell that nothing has been sufficient to blast them loose. To such a people Communism is a natural doctrine.

The history of their last few centuries, a history of internal oppression, lack of security, and constant defeats at the hands of powers less favored with human and natural resources, has produced a psychological block. In their past good has not come from the outside; therefore, they expect only evil to come from there in the future. Communism assures them they are right in their assumptions and capitalizes on this attitude. Anyone likes to have his opinions regarded as correct. To live in such an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust and to be ever watchful for invasion breed a state of mind that places great hopes in the future rather than in the present. Communism capitalizes on this idea and holds out the blessed peace and prosperity that will come after the world revolution as the bait for continued loyalty and subservience.

The present Soviet regime is, in certain respects, more oppressive and absolute than any the czars ever conceived or were able to enforce. Its disciplinary control is the *ne plus ultra* of all police states. According to the doctrine, however, this is not for the sole benefit of the rulers but for the cause—the great aim. To the Communist, and particularly the Russian Communist, this aim of world revolution is not world domination; it is the achievement of paradise with unlimited freedom, material equality and classlessness, and a happiness that would make the heaven of a Mohammedan pale by contrast. This, of course, will occur "presently," as soon as possible if all good Communists bend their backs to the work.

There is, however, one fly in the ointment. We in the Democracies are holding up the happy day. We are interfering, we are

intervening and planning to do all we can to prevent the Communist from reaching the promised land. This, of course, sets up the necessity for fighting the capitalist system of the West, destroying its power and wealth, which have made the Russians green with envy and jealousy ever since Peter the Great traveled westward. Thus, the final success or failure for Communism is placed on the shoulders of the western Democracies, which the Russian has always distrusted, envied, and feared. We and we alone stand in his way. He can achieve his goal if we permit him to. Our system is such that we selfishly prevent him in order to protect our own imperialist structure. His only hope, therefore, is to destroy us.

It's a much neater package than anything Hitler evolved, because if it succeeds, the success is due to the brilliancy of the leaders, and if it fails, the failure is attributable to the shortsightedness and selfish policy of the West. For this reason Communism bids to be far more difficult to uproot and eradicate than Fascism or National Socialism, both of which placed the burden of achieving Utopia on their own leaders. The humble men of the Kremlin will try, but if they fail, it's the fault of the Democracies. Of course, the way they'll try is through the world revolution.

To the Communist, belief in the idea of the world revolution is basic. The Communist believes that only when the whole capitalist world has surrendered to the insidious doctrine of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, has destroyed the capitalistic structure with the basic freedoms of democracy, and has instituted the false freedom of the dictatorship of the proletariat, will the mission of Communism be complete. This cannot be accomplished by evolution or peaceful transition but only by force and violence or by an internal upsurge of the Communist elements of any country as a result of which they assume control of the state. In the latter case, the violence is limited to the elimination of those who refuse to accept the Communist domination. The Communist visualizes that those states surrounded by or nearest to Communist states can be overthrown and controlled with less violence than the powerful capitalist states relatively far from the Communist center of power, the Soviet Union. Against such states only violence of uncontrolled fury and savagery can be effective. This latter group

embraces all the great Democracies of the West. The world revolution, then, must include a series of major wars with the Democracies.

This thought was made clear by Lenin in his speech to the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. "We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialistic states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before the end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable." As seen through Communist eyes, capitalist states, imperialist states, and bourgeois states are all the same—any state that is not a Communist slave state.

The idea that collaboration or co-operation is possible between the Communist states and the Democracies is one that has blinded many people throughout the world. Naturally, Russia finds it to her best interest to foster such an idea and to play upon it whenever possible. The fostering of this idea serves as an excellent cover for her geopolitical program, and it creates confusion in her enemy's camp by dividing public opinion, thus preventing a unified national effort to prepare for all-out war and resistance.

A brief examination of the Communist ideas on war should serve to make anyone think twice about the benefits to be derived from collaboration or co-operation with Soviet Russia. In 1920 Lenin, lifting a passage from the German Clausewitz, said, "First . . . war is the continuation of the policy conducted in peace, only by other means; second, the concessions which we grant, which we are forced to grant, are the continuation of war in another form, by other means. . . . It would be a great mistake to believe that a peaceful agreement about concessions is—a peaceful agreement with Capitalists. This agreement is equivalent to war." This statement reduces itself to the premise that war between the states is merely the continuation of the unending struggle between the Democracies and the forces of Communism seeking to dominate the world. It is no different than the German idea of geostrategy: "A continuous, restless, and relentless national strategy in which peacetime diplomacy and wartime military power are alike aimed at fighting the enemy."

The Communist doctrine envisages a perpetual enmity existing between the Communist states and the Democracies. This leads the Soviets to a firm conviction that there will be an armed intervention by the capitalist countries in the affairs of the Soviet Union, another well-established Russian fear. Such an intervention will be met by civil wars and revolutionary wars within the Democracies, at the instigation of the Communist Party, and armed conflict on a gigantic scale will occur. While armed intervention is specified, any other type of intervention, i.e., denying the Soviet something it desires, could easily afford an excuse for the gigantic conflict.

The Communist doctrine advances the idea that war is a class struggle. The Soviet is firmly convinced that intervention or war will cease to exist only with the complete downfall of all the Democracies who espouse the capitalist system, thus ensuring the final victory of the proletariat. War will not be possible then because there will be no classes of any kind to initiate class struggles. There will be only a single Soviet-dominated classless society of Communists. Promote the world revolution, abolish private property, hand over the world to the Soviet Union, and war is a thing of the past! With no war there can be no intervention in the affairs of Russia. This is the simple solution offered by the Kremlin.

War is also a good thing, according to the Soviet theoreticians, and it performs a positive useful function. It will tear down the outmoded forms of human and international relations that threaten the Communist State and beliefs. It will accelerate the world revolution and permit the ultimate victory of Communism. According to Lenin, the proletariat cannot disarm and seek peace until it accomplishes its sacred mission—the forceful disarming and conversion of the bourgeois. That, of course, is you. So much for the possibility of co-operation or collaboration for peace with the Soviet Union.

There are many who hold that the beliefs and remarks of Lenin have undergone severe modification since 1919 and that Comrade Stalin, the Great Democrat of World War II, has departed radically from his master's views. Be that as it may, in September, 1927, Comrade Stalin, in speaking with the first American Labor

Delegation, said, ". . . In the further progress of development of the international revolution, two world centers will be formed: the Socialist center, attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards socialism, and the capitalist center attracting to itself all the countries gravitating towards capitalism. The fight between these two centers for the conquest of world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and Communism throughout the whole world."

The Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, held in 1928, boldly stated that "the ultimate aims of the Communist International is to replace world capitalist economy by a world system of Communism." This same excellent document ends on a note that leaves little doubt as to Soviet Russia's ultimate goal. "The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their aims can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all the existing social conditions. Let the ruling class tremble at a Communist revolution. The Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win."

Of course these statements were made, one could argue, back in the dim, dark days between the World Wars, when Russia was isolated from the world and feared intervention from the Democracies. The tenor of Soviet remarks has not changed since that time, as one can easily see by reading the Cominform Manifesto (1947), Zhdanov's famous "International Situation" speech (1947), and other recent utterances of the Kremlin. Nor have the program and the fears. In 1946 Stalin informed the faithful that the main body of Communist ideas was intact and had not changed in any fundamental way. Indeed, in one of his most significant speeches since the close of World War II Stalin, in his February 9, 1946, speech, reaffirmed the basic doctrine of Marx and Lenin and frankly warned his countrymen to make extraordinary efforts to prepare for the inevitable war that must come between Communism and the Democracies, so long as capitalism existed. Such remarks were followed by exhortations by Zhdanov and Constantine Simonov to the intelligentsia of Soviet Russia to remember that "an ideological war on a world scale is now being waged with unexampled ferocity," and that "there can be no respite in the ideological war."

An evaluation of all the utterances of Lenin and Stalin on world relationships echoed by the lesser lights adds up to one conclusion—the Communists have but one goal—world revolution. In our less complicated language, based on the Communists' own writings and expositions of the term, world revolution means world war and the fight for the domination of the world.

The actions of the Soviet Union since the war are clearly indicative of the ultimate Soviet intention. It must be clear to even the most willfully self-blinded seeker for peace that the forceful changes of government in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria are by no means those of a nation bent upon living at peace with the world. Even the stanchest champions of collaboration with the Soviet Union are forced to admit that this extension of Soviet might and the wholesale conversion of the victimized states into industrial arsenals are not actions of a nation desiring to avoid future bloodshed. Our experiences with the Communists in Berlin, in France, in the United Nations, and in a variety of other situations do not in the least serve to reassure us of a peaceful future. They do fit, and fit neatly, the general pattern of Communist doctrine and the ultimate Soviet objective of world domination.

Nathan Leites in his *Operational Code of the Politburo* clearly demonstrates that Soviet Russia is following the classic pattern of geopolitical aggression, so well identified with the Nazis and now even more closely identified with the Kremlin. According to this code, anyone who is not a Communist is an enemy. The only safe way to deal with a capitalist enemy is to substitute a "Socialist encirclement of the capitalist countries for the capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union." Until this is done the Soviet Union, so believes the Communist, will always be in danger of annihilation. Stalin quotes Lenin's positive rule, "Either perish or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries . . . either we do it or they crush us."

It is easy to see how, following this line of reasoning, the Politburo arrives at the conclusion that "the only safe enemy is one whose power has been completely destroyed." We, the Democracies, are the enemy. Such reasoning does not sound the least bit reassuring as to Russia's desires for peace.

That the Politburo has adopted the basic principle of Lenin is undeniable. Equally undeniable is the fact that Russia still operates on the basis of Lenin's beliefs. The ultimate goal is still world revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, or as Lenin defines it, "War, much more cruel, much more prolonged . . . than any war has ever been."

One could go on quoting Lenin and Stalin almost indefinitely in order to demonstrate the Soviet intention to precipitate the inevitable war. It could be pointed out that Soviet foreign policy since World War II clearly indicates the assumption of inevitable war. It could be said that in this the Soviet Foreign Office has assumed an intermediate role between the Red Army on the one hand and the various Communist Parties on the other in creating the very conditions necessary for a Communist victory. It might be shown that in 1946, when the Democracies were following a somewhat shortsighted policy of rapid and almost catastrophic disarmament (remember the "Bring-back-my-daddy" clubs?), Nikolai A. Vozessensky, Chairman of the State Planning Committee, stated quite bluntly, "We must strengthen the armed forces of the Soviet Union; we must work tirelessly to provide them with the most modern equipment and to strengthen further the military and economic power of the Soviet State." A brief glance at the *Five Year Plan of Science* for the Soviet Union would show that the principal emphasis in research between 1946 and 1951 was to be placed on equipment for national defense. Do we still need someone to tell us against whom these forces, *started in 1946*, were to be directed?

To anyone who has bothered to make even a cursory study of Soviet Russia and the Communist doctrine the intentions of our former Russian allies are clear. To the man or woman trained in geopolitics these intentions are revealed beyond question. To many on the sole basis of the ever present hunch there is little doubt as to what Russia intends. Unfortunately, however, there are a great number of people here and abroad whose minds are still asleep or whose passionate craving for peace has blinded them to reality. "What about Russia's proposal for limiting the use of the atomic bomb?" they say triumphantly. "What about the Stockholm Peace Plan? How about her constant proposals for world peace.

Can you decry or belittle all of these." Some of the more enlightened ones, that is, enlightened by Soviet propaganda, point out that the journal *Bolshevik*, November, 1946, said on page 51, "The masses know that peace is possible only on the basis of co-operation among the existing states. . . . The Soviet Union is fighting to have the United Nations as effective as possible." It may be that this group missed the previous issue of the same journal, which said, on page 28, "It is hardly possible, however, that the contemporary gravediggers of sovereignty are so naïve as to believe in earnest that peace and harmony on earth can be obtained by the creation of an international parliament."

Soviet peace moves since 1946 have boiled down to the same general description—moves to throw the Democracies off balance, to confuse the population of the Western countries, and to deter, delay, and prevent, if possible, any active preparation for resistance against Soviet aggression. These "peace offensives" were, of course, accompanied by such peaceful moves as the Berlin blockade, the Korean war, the establishment of the East German slave state, the Vogeler incident, the Otis incident, etc., etc.

The Soviet's so-called peaceful intentions are the very things that give the name of the Era of the Big Lie to our present period. This proposal of peace by Russia would do credit to Adolf Hitler and to any geopolitical propagandist. That it has taken in a large number of well-meaning people cannot be denied, but it can be counteracted and for the most part has been. An analysis of the so-called "peace offensive" is given in the next chapter as clear evidence that there was no sincerity in Soviet objectives or policy.

It should be obvious that Soviet ideology and practice make the chances of world peace impossible. We in the Democracies cannot live under the constant threat of the world revolution, now that Russia has become one of the two Great Powers. At the same time it is not our desire to fight a preventive war. Therefore, we can follow only one course—prepare our strategy for survival when that war comes. It should be equally clear that short of the complete destruction of capitalism and western democracy there will be no satisfying the Soviet. If we are to survive, we must prepare now for the equally complete destruction of Communism.

In his speech on the thirtieth anniversary of the October Rev-

olution, Molotov said, "Capitalism has become a brake on human progress, and the continuation of the reckless policy of imperialism, which has already brought about two world wars, constitutes the major danger to the peace-loving nations. The great October Socialist Revolution has opened the eyes of the nations to the fact that the age of capitalism is drawing to a close and that reliable roads have been opened to universal peace and the great progress of nations. The feverish efforts of imperialists, under whom the ground is giving way, will not save capitalism from its approaching doom. We are living in an age in which all roads lead to Communism."

If this statement reflects the thinking of the leaders of the Communist states, and we have every reason to feel it does, then we in the Democracies must make our decision now. Shall our road of freedom, personal interest, and our reliance on the unguided strength and common sense of the people, so apparent to De Tocqueville, be abandoned for that of Communism and the servitude of the Soviet system with its single aim of an authoritarian society? This is our choice. To remain free we must want to remain free; we must be prepared to fight to remain free; we must plan and implement these plans while we have the opportunity. The desire for freedom and our present way of life is the first weapon in our arsenal in this Era of the Big Lie and a major point in our strategy for survival.

Chapter 6

The Peace Offensive and the Big Lie

To fight for his way of life a man must have faith in himself and in the ideal for which he fights. Destroy a man's faith in himself, and he finds nothing worth fighting for. Destroy the ideal or tarnish and besmirch it beyond restoration to its normal, gleaming self, and the chances of finding many men prepared to risk their lives in its defense are remote. These truths are by no means new ones. The world has known them for centuries. It remained, however, for geopolitics to develop them to their highest point of usefulness as a weapon of aggression: to make a man's mind, his ideals and desires, his enemies and weakness, rather than his strength and his allies.

It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that Russia and the Communist leaders, experts in the employment of the geopolitical techniques, should attach so much importance to this weapon. Propaganda is a powerful weapon, but its employment for the purpose of corrupting men's minds by implanting a false concept of their basic beliefs places it almost in the class of the ultimate weapon. One could not expect the Cominform to overlook so powerful a means for the destruction and enslavement of its victims.

While this weapon has been employed many times by both the Nazis and the Russians, the clearest example of its use is to be found in the now infamous and almost successful "peace offensive." The Communist peace offensive of 1948–50 was an act of

aggression just as surely as would be the atom-bombing of New York or the invasion of Western Germany by the Red Army. It was designed to destroy, to subjugate, and to conquer the minds of free people in order that they might be used for their own political, if not physical, destruction. Its creation and employment are irrefutable proof that the men of the Kremlin have no sincere desire for peace but are obsessed with the doctrine of world conquest.

In order fully to appreciate the purpose of the peace offensive it is necessary to go back to certain geopolitical concepts of the use of propaganda as developed by the Nazis. The finest authority on this subject is, peculiarly enough, a former Communist propaganda expert, Willi Muenzenberg, who studied the German system for the Comintern, that old established propaganda agency abolished by Stalin to make way for the Cominform. Muenzenberg's studies, reported in his book *Propaganda als Waffe* (Propaganda as a Weapon) could have served, and probably did, as specifically tailored plans for the peace offensive.

The basic premise of this mass corruption is to select as the instrument a subject near and dear to the hearts of the victims. By subtle word changes the basic ideas are corrupted, falsified, and distorted until they mean exactly the opposite of what they say. For example, "the purified democracy of the proletariat" actually means dictatorship; political slavery becomes changed to "the liberty of the proletariat"; and the slogan "peace for the world" serves to cover domination of the world by the Soviet Union. A slogan is then selected and repeated over and over again until the mock truth has penetrated so deeply into the consciousness of the people that it is accepted as the real truth.

This approach serves to cover an intention directly opposite to that expressed by the aggressor in his propaganda. Muenzenberg found that the louder Hitler cried for peace, the more feverishly he prepared for war; the more he protested friendship, the more certain he was to attack. By means of such propaganda devices the aggressor lulls his victim into a sense of false security, induces him to neglect his preparations for defense, and even persuades him that the aggressor has the same degree of peaceful

intention as the victim. In the case of the Communists, the peace offensive served to cover actual preparations for war.

While the peace offensive was launched against all the Democracies, its number-one intended victim was the United States. We were the prime victim, not only because Stalin must destroy us to win, but because we were likely to prove the most susceptible to such a campaign. If the Communists could have convinced the American people that the sole objective of Russia was world peace, World War III might have been removed from the Soviet Union's agenda of urgent projects.

Our history demonstrates us to be a peace-loving, nonwarlike people, ready to make great concessions for world peace. Our desire for peace is sincere and is coupled with a firm belief that all the world desires this happy state just as sincerely as we. Our allies, while not so convinced of the sincerity of the Soviet motives, are just as eager as the United States in their pursuit of a peaceful life. Should we accept the propaganda and allow ourselves to be convinced of Stalin's peaceful intentions, they would likely follow our lead in a disarmament race and abandon their plans for defense against aggression.

Malenkov faces a stiff enemy in the United States, in fact, in all the Democracies. The peoples of the Democracies are free to speak and to think. For decades, this freedom has strengthened our morale, sharpened our wits, and made our resistance to encroachment on our system a formidable bulwark. To defeat us he must defeat the individual, for it is the individual who constitutes the weakness in any geopolitical program. He must reduce or drain the morale of the people in the Democracies, make us distrust the motives of our governments, and convert us to treason and sabotage. He realizes that unless he does this he will be faced with a tenacious foe who may not even surrender when defeated and occupied.

Added to the sincere desire for peace and the strength of the individual in the Democracies is the fact that the influence of the United States is strong in those zones of the world Stalin had marked as his own. In order for Russia to be successful it is vital that Moscow destroy this influence in Western Europe, the Middle

East, and southeast Asia. Since World War II the United States has been championing the fight for world peace with a strength and patience that have been truly impressive, while the moves of the Soviet have clearly demonstrated an aggressive intent and, to those who know the Communists, an attempt to set the mechanism of world revolution in operation. The program, therefore, was triple purposed: first, to convince the world the Communists were the real champions of peace; secondly, to seize the mind of the individual and thus generate public opinion against his government; and, lastly, to brand the United States as the warmonger and true aggressor.

Capitalizing on our desire for peace, the Communists attempted to twist it in a way that would obtain at least a moral sanction for their own acts. If, they reasoned, they could induce us to believe that they were the peace lovers and our leaders were the warmongers and potential war criminals, it would definitely deprive the Democracies of one of their most powerful resources. They calculated that a wave of public opinion would rise up against the various governments, sweep across the free world, stalling, if not terminating, defense preparations, and render us easy victims for the Red Army and the Communist "liberation." Once the peace offensive got a foothold in America the world was to be the Soviet oyster.

As applied against the United States, the peace offensive was expected to accomplish three great feats within our boundaries. Primarily, we were to be lulled into a feeling of false security and one of brotherly love for our great "peace-loving" adversary so that we would be unprepared for the blow when the Soviet elected to strike. While the lulling process was going on, we were to be propagandized to the point of instituting by public pressure the destruction or reduction of our atomic-bomb program while the Soviet Union maintained and increased hers. Finally, we were to be forced by strikes and acts of sabotage in key defense industries and in transportation to curtail defense efforts as part of our protest against the "imperialistic, warmongering policies" of our government. The principal targets in this conversion to resistance against the government were to be scientific personnel, labor unions, and industrial specialists, who, it was expected, would

offer ever greater assistance by voluntary espionage on behalf of that great champion of world peace—the Soviet Union.

One may well wonder if such a transparent program had any hopes for success or could expect to enjoy a favorable reception. There are still some politically blind, well-intentioned, would-be collaborators with Russia who point to the peace offensive as positive evidence that war is not inevitable between the East and West. The list of prominent persons who endorsed the movement is substantial. It should be noted, however, that all who still adhere to the folly that the peace offensive is proof of Soviet Russia's peaceful intentions represent the faction that swallowed the Red propaganda hook, line, and sinker. On them it worked.

This is its story. In 1947 a group of twelve Soviet publicists and writers including Alexander Fadeyev, Constantine Simonov, whom we met in a previous chapter, and others of the old guard of Soviet literary prostitutes, wrote an open letter to "Writers and men of culture in the United States of America" exhorting them to "raise your voices against the new threat of fascism, against the instigation of war." The American comrades, fellow travelers, and self-appointed world saviors for Communism rose to the bait, and a reply of endorsement appeared in the magazine *Masses and Mainstream* for May, 1948, and in *Soviet Literature No. 7*, 1948. In reality, the whole thing had been engineered by the newly created Cominform, which had replaced the defunct Comintern.

Once the movement was launched by this preliminary gesture, a World Congress of Intellectuals was held in Poland in August, 1948, and the fight was on in earnest. The Congress established the International Committee of Intellectuals in Defense of Peace to conduct the international crusade. Needless to say, the very first country to approve and join in the peace offensive was the Soviet Union, while the Communist Party sternly instructed its members in other lands to support the "strivings of the intellectuals to unite in the struggle for peace."

The initial Congress did attract some reputable individuals, such as Bryan J. Hovde and Dr. Julian Huxley, but they soon discovered the true intent of the movement and promptly disassociated themselves from it. Would that others had had their foresight. Of the assembled speakers, Mr. Hovde alone spoke in

defense of American democracy, and as he described it, "No speaker at the congress got a colder reception." *

Hear the comforting words of Soviet Delegate to the Cominform, Comrade M. Suslov, who reported to that agency at its 1949 meeting! He stated that the World Congress had been hailed and endorsed by the Wroclaw Congress of the Democratic Women's Federation (Budapest, 1948) and the World Congresses of Paris and Prague, "representing 600,000,000 organized fighters for peace." According to the comrade, the Second World Trade Union Congress (Milan, 1949) approved the manifesto issued by the Paris Congress "and drew up a concrete program of action for the 72,000,000 trade unionists organized in the World Federation Trade Unions."

Speaking with the authority of Moscow, Suslov informed the Cominform that "particular attention should be devoted to drawing into the peace movement trade unions, women's, youth, cooperative, sport, cultural, educational, and other organizations, and also scientists, writers, journalists, cultural workers, parliamentary, and other political and public leaders." He directed that Communists penetrate and subvert non-Communist organizations and spread the offensive by "mass demonstrations, rallies, meetings, petitions, protests, questionnaires, and peace committees."

The big 1949 move was directed against the United States and came in March of that year when the Dove of Peace, Russian style, came to rest in the Hotel Waldorf-Astoria. It should be mentioned that the Communists, ever the champions of the proletariat, the common man, and the simple, equal life, never miss an opportunity to patronize the best and most expensive hotels, shops, and restaurants when visiting the Democracies. This is not done because of similarity of such places to existing Russian counterparts—quite the contrary. It is the Communists' duty to patronize these places in order to collect valuable information on the shocking

* Facts and statistics used in this chapter were extracted from "Report on the Communist Peace Offensive—a Campaign to Disarm and Defeat the United States," an official report of the Committee on Un-American Activities! This report, containing a detailed account of the Peace Offensive, with a complete list of American sponsors, patrons, etc., is available from the Committee or the Government Printing Office.

behavior of the wasteful capitalists. Hence, New York's finest hotel as a meeting site was not incompatible with the Communist ideology.

The medium for the attack was the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace, arranged by the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions. This sponsoring agency was the lineal descendant of the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, which, according to the public boasts of the Communists, owed its birth to the Communist Party. At least forty-seven of the sponsors of the New York Conference had been members of or affiliates in the Independent Citizens Committee.

This supermobilization of Communists, fellow travelers, and parlor pinks had, from the Russian point of view, five objectives: to provide a propagandist forum against the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty defense plans, and American foreign policy in general; to gain support for Soviet foreign policy; to mobilize American intellectuals to the point of civil disobedience against the government; to discredit American culture and extol the virtues of Soviet letters; and to prepare for subsequent world peace conferences. Participation was widespread, and in spite of active picketing by outraged loyal American groups, the meetings attracted large attendance. While it is not feasible to list the names of the sponsors here, entirely on account of lack of space and not fear of lawsuit or reprisal, the list discloses that the old stand-by front men for the Communist and Communist-front organizations were in the van. According to official government figures one sponsor had been or was affiliated with no less than 85 Communist-front groups, 3 with 71 to 80, 4 with 51 to 60, 8 with 41 to 50, 10 with 31 to 40, 27 with 21 to 30, and 245 had been associated with 5 to 10 Communist-front organizations. At least 20 were definitely known to have been outright members of the Communist Party, while no less than 49 had given open support to Communist candidates for office. These were not foreigners or agents smuggled into the country but American "intellectuals." Just a nice, quiet group of loyal champions of American democracy, Russian style. To help matters along Comrade Henry Kassyanowitz, broadcasting news of this conference from Warsaw stated, "Notably it

testified to the fact that the Communists are the vanguard of the world peace movement."

The conference did some very important things and made some startling contributions to world peace. Foremost among these important things is the fact that its clever advance propaganda enticed a large number of sincere, well-meaning people to lend their names thoughtlessly to the spectacle, thus helping to cloak it with an air of respectability it failed to deserve. Some of them have since publicly admitted they were duped, but many more are still attempting to brazen it out or are misguidedly protesting their innocence while defending the sincerity of the conference. Lincoln once said, "If this country is destroyed it will be from within, not without."

Its actions and business were strictly in the interests of preserving world peace and international integrity! It adopted a resolution defending the eleven top Communist leaders then on trial before a Federal Court for teaching and advocating the overthrow of the American government by force and violence. It entertained a well-known American Communist speaker who, in the name of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry D. Thoreau, proposed outright advocacy of civil disobedience. It urged that "it is the duty of Americans to defy an American government intent on imperialist war" and cheered Ladislov Stall, Dean of the Academy of Political and Social Science of Prague, when he said, "We must unite for the destruction of the old order and the bringing on of the new." It witnessed one of the famous public Soviet-inspired self-criticism and self-debasement acts in the confession of the Russian musician, Shostakovich, who publicly acknowledged his "well-merited" dismissal from the Moscow Conservatory of Music for his failure to produce music to "which workers can beat time and hum as they try to accelerate production." It heard a brilliant American playwright, who has made a tidy sum for his dynamic portrayals and descriptions of the life of the common man in America, accuse the United States of "one of the greatest frauds ever perpetrated against the American people; the fraud that the Soviet Union is making a war against the United States" and later come out with the bland, innocent statement, "I cannot blame the Soviet Union because an

apocalyptic beast is running loose in our world today and its name is Money, Money, Money." This from the son of wealth whose royalties have been munificent. And finally, it enjoyed a denunciation of the Marshall Plan as being designed to "block a real revolution in the economic institutions of Western Europe." It closed on the note that "the machinery of the American Government is set for war." Such were the "peace" efforts of the Conference.

Some of the informed Communist comments abroad might prove of interest. Boris Lavrenev, *Literary Gazette*, described the meeting as taking place in a country where "the sinister plans of new world war are being mustered." Vladimirov, Soviet commentator: "The Congress is a serious warning to the provokers and instigators of a new war—they will not be supported by the masses." And "A wave of strikes broke out over the entire country in protest against those who persecute the upholders of peace." The impact of this conference shook America to the very core—according to Moscow.

Paris was the next port of call for the peace offensive, and the original Moscow cast, augmented by the stellar American performers, played to capacity houses. The loyal party members thronged in by the dozens to hear Fadeyev say he found the United States in a "feverish armament drive" and laud the "peaceful efforts of the Soviet Union." After Fadeyev, Ehrenburg, and a number of loyal American intellectuals finished, the general consensus was that the one way to ensure world peace was to destroy the United States. The Paris slogan was "We shall not ask for peace of the warmongers but impose it on them." It did do one constructive thing. It condemned any paper, book, or any other organ that discussed Soviet aggression as a dissemination of "propaganda for a new war . . . [as an attempt] by the bourgeois to slander the Soviet Union." This took care of any embarrassing questions the incautious might ask.

Leaving Paris and the simultaneous meeting at Prague, the road show moved to Mexico City in September, 1949. Same cast, same show, same crusade. After several smaller outbursts and semi-one-night-stand affairs, Stockholm was invaded, and the famous "Stockholm Peace Plan" for stopping atomic warfare came into being.

The whole company planned to finish triumphantly at Sheffield, England, in November, 1950, but the "unsympathetic and warlike" denunciations of Clement Attlee forced the company to move to Poland for the grand finale—the Second World Peace Conference—where the public, hysterical side of the crusade petered out. The undercover campaign and the petition drive now could begin.

The sinister petition campaign is probably the best-known instrument of the entire peace offensive. Under the nominal leadership of Joseph Starobin, foreign news editor of the *Daily Worker*, in his capacity as Chairman of the U.S. Communist Party's Peace Committee, the campaign occupied a place of considerable prominence in 1950. With the peculiar line of reasoning found only in the Communists, Gus Hall, General Secretary of the Communist Party, U.S.A., suddenly came to the conclusion that every precaution should be taken to prevent the possible identification of the peace offensive with the Communist Party! This, after two years of intensive efforts to launch the Party as the champion and sponsor of the movement. As a result of his decision the Party focused its efforts on drawing in masses of Americans with special emphasis on those who "differ on or oppose Communism, non-Communists, and even anti-Communists." The objective was 5,000,000 American signatures endorsing Stalin's bid for "peace." The Communists claim a world-wide total of 293,000,000 signatures.

The cleverly worded petition was designed to attract the unwise, the unwary, and the unthinking. Basically it contained four demands: the outlawing of atomic weapons as instruments of aggression, strict international control to enforce this measure, the branding of the first government to use atomic weapons as war criminals, and an appeal to "all men and women of good will" to sign the petition. Back of the petition and its demands there is a different story. By arousing public opinion against the use of the atom bomb it was hoped American defenses would be weakened. Strict international control is impossible without equally strict inspection of plants by an international authority. The United States had already proposed such a plan to the United Nations, and it had been accepted by every nation *except* Soviet Russia

and her satellites. The war-criminal clause was designed to tie our hands in the case of aggressive action by Russia or the Communist states. Lastly, the "men and women of good will" would find themselves in the position of endorsing the Soviet's acts in Korea.

While it failed to have the desired results, it did provide important benefits to the Communists. The names and addresses of the signers provided the Party with a huge world-wide mailing list for propaganda. In the smaller countries it provided a definite list of the "enemies of Communism," recorded for their refusal to sign. It provided a pressure instrument in the satellite states for further regimentation—anyone who refused to sign was labeled as "an accomplice and henchman of the warmongers." It is interesting to note that, according to Communist claims, 17,046,000 East Germans out of approximately 18,500,000 freely signed the petition, while across the artificial border only 2,000,000 out of 49,700,000 West Germans affixed their names. What caused the difference in percentages? The Communists, incidentally, claimed 1,350,000 signers in the United States.

The campaign in America was not a success. Such loyal organizations as the American Legion, the American Federation of Labor, the C.I.O., the International Confederation of Trade Unions, and others immediately started an all-out educational campaign that produced results. Such front organizations as the American Peace Crusade, the Committee for Peaceful Alternatives to the Atlantic Pact, Maryland Committee for Peace, Mid-Century Conference for Peace, National Labor Council, and the like soon found that the game was up, and the peace offensive crawled back into the Communist woodwork whence it came.

The detailed story of the nasty, nauseating spectacle of the Communist attempt to promote "world peace" by the destruction of the Democracies from within is much too long to treat properly here. Every thinking American, every sincere believer in democracy, every person interested in preserving his freedom should become thoroughly familiar with the pattern of this movement, for it and similar moves threaten our national security and that of the free world. We must familiarize ourselves with the Com-

munist approach so that we can all recognize the obvious efforts of a ruthless enemy to seduce us from the defense of our way of life.

As a move for peace, the so-called peace offensive was merely a trap designed to betray the free world into a state of easy destruction. If the Dove of Peace ever alighted at a single one of the many Communist-inspired conferences, it did so out of sheer exhaustion resulting from overwork in its efforts to find a sincerely peaceful desire in any of them. Even then, it probably rested uneasily on one foot, ready for a quick getaway. There was as much real peaceful intention in the peace offensive as there was in the Korean peace talks or the Battle of the Bulge. Russia's protestations of peaceful intention toward the world are the Big Lie. Her objective is world peace through a Communist domination of the world and the destruction of democracy.

Recognition of the enemy strategy, both open and covert, is essential to victory. When dealing with the Soviet, that which is essential to victory is essential to survival. It is not enough that we know the enemy's strength, the size of his army, or his military capability. The defeat of any geopolitical plan of world conquest requires a knowledge and recognition of the enemy's every technique and the situations in which each may be employed. It requires vigilance and calm thinking, firmness of purpose and resistance to false promises, glittering frauds, and propaganda. Lincoln was right. America and her allies cannot be destroyed from without, but the enemy boring from within can succeed where guns and violence might fail. We must know our enemy—the Soviet Union and her Communist legions. This is essential in our strategy for survival.

Chapter 7

The Position of the Democracies

The position of the Democracies is a problem that has perplexed not only the Russians but also, from time to time, our own people. To one unfamiliar with the basic tenets of democracy and its methods of operation, our actions must frequently appear as somewhat disoriented and haphazard gropings in a feeble effort to find a suitable course by which to steer the ship of state. Quite often even we who are schooled in the democratic process are bewildered by governmental actions that we find difficult to fathom or to reconcile with the situation at hand. However, what weaknesses may be disclosed by an examination of our policies are minor and will not deter a people that is firm in its resolve to remain free.

What the Communist finds almost impossible to understand is what he considers a complete lack of direction in our basic program. For him, unless a political philosophy has rigid rules for achieving an objective, rules that require suppression of the individual in the interest of the state and of an inflexible all-important purpose, it is no philosophy. This is due to the fact that the Communist cannot realize democracy is not primarily an ideology but a practical way of life. He fails to realize democracy as a political theory is one thing and democracy as a practical, applied system of living is quite another. One can make mass rules for the theory of democracy, but its very tenets of free expression, equality, freedom of action, and free will show the sense in which we apply

these mass rules to everyday life. In theory we are dogmatists; in practice we are realists and individualists.

To the Communist there can be only one kind of Communism and one kind of Communist state. Any variation from either is a deviation and hence a crime against the doctrine. This line of thought makes it impossible for him to visualize that the United States, with a two-house legislature and a strong president, England, with a king and a legislature in which one house is virtually without power, and France, with its multiple parties and premier system, are politically all one and the same in that they are all Democracies. How, he asks himself, can you have a variety of systems and call them all the same thing? He fails utterly in his attempt to understand, because he cannot realize that democracy is a system of faith and ideals, not a system of organization, regimentation, and bureaus. Under his type of training he is incapable of attaining an appreciation of our basic concepts.

Toleration of the opposition is beyond his comprehension. Under his system, where the government and the party in power are identical entities, opposition can only mean revolution. That we in the Democracies can have a party of the administration and a party of the opposition with both parties equally loyal to the state and neither desiring to revolt against the other is a condition not only fantastic but impossible. One is either for the administration or against it; if one is against it he is a revolutionist because he opposes it; to oppose the administration one endeavors to overthrow it. *Ergo*, opposition parties are parties of the revolution. That administrations can be changed by political actions is equally incomprehensible to the Communist because he doesn't really understand politics.

The party system in the Democracies is a thing of wonder and beyond all comprehension to the Communist. In the United States he sees two groups, each carefully labeled and each standing for different things, in theory at least. Beyond that he cannot see. The most important party that actually decides the issues of the electorate—that one which Lord Shaftesbury called the great "party mobile," or mass of independent and unregimented voters who shift from side to side—is invisible to him. Should he be able to visualize the "party mobile" at all it would be in the dress of the

"mob" to which it was reduced after the days of Lord Shaftesbury. To the Communist it could only mean a vicious, disorganized group bent on mischief, violence, and defiance of the state. That it represents public opinion in the Democracies he cannot conceive, for he knows nothing of public opinion formed by argument instead of propaganda. As he sees it, this great third party should be suppressed and destroyed as an enemy to the peace and harmony of the state.

For the Communist, democracy is a thing without purpose, program, or objective. It does no good to tell him that all of these things are incorporated in the single word freedom, for while he knows the word, he has never learned its meaning. To him freedom is a material thing, not a spiritual quality or a state of mind. He cannot understand freedom in terms of free enterprise, the people over the government, and individual preference as the rule. This is not freedom, this is madness! How do the people know what to do, what to produce, what to buy, unless the state tells them?

For all of these reasons and more the Communist thinks of us as poor, betrayed, starvelings who drift in an endless sea of confusion, near-hysteria, and despair. Neither he nor any other believer in a totalitarian system ever understood democracy, and therein lies one of our greatest sources of potential strength. This failure to understand democracy has led the Communist to underestimate both the power and the capacity of the Democracies, and this underestimation spells defeat for him. That we can bring order out of this chaos and visible lack of regimentation is impossible; all he has to do is present a strong united front, and we will fall apart like a stack of logs before the onslaughts of a bulldozer. He is partly right; we will fall but not apart. We will fall together and crush him in a unified effort. We need no stylized assumptions or conclusions; we need merely to see the threat clearly and the response will be forthcoming.

As is to be expected, war as an instrument of national policy is repugnant to us and a method of settling disputes we turn to only under extreme provocation. This repugnance on the part of the Democracies has become so closely allied with our philosophy that Mackinder once wrote, "Democracy refuses to think strategically

unless and until compelled to do so for purposes of defense." Not since the end of the nineteenth century have the Democracies undertaken long-range strategic planning to ensure possible advantages in wars of the comparatively distant future.

Professional war strategy results from a joint action of the scientific and military mind, working on a level of equality. Such joint action evolves a national theory of war and the strategy necessary to meet the crisis when it comes. This is fine in theory and probably works in reality. However, there is one characteristic of democracy that denies us the opportunity to prove the theory. Except for a rare few, our military minds are usually busy elsewhere on duties of a political or diplomatic nature, while our scientific minds are almost entirely concerned with research designed to ease the lot of man, prolong his life, and further human progress in general. Not until war is upon us do we effect a hasty union of forces, and this only after a stubborn and determined resistance to the idea of conflict.

Beside the prolonged and painstaking planning and research of the so-called professional military nations our efforts must seem somewhat amateurish. Thus far in the twentieth century our successes in the realm of warfare have been due largely to our overwhelming natural resources and inventiveness rather than to our superiority in planning. World War II, however, has taught us that this approach can be suicidal, and steps have been taken to avert disaster by assigning more time and attention to the planning function.

Major Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson, a distinguished military writer, has made the pithy statement that "poor planning is due to an amateur rather than a professional military viewpoint." No truer words have been written, but it is unlikely that they will make a profound impression on the Democracies. Military amateurism is largely due to the lack of any definite theory of warfare. Democracy, as an institution, cannot find room within its house for any formalized theory of this type. When the occasion demands, the civilian abandons his peacetime pursuits, dons a uniform, and becomes a soldier. What he lacks in training and experience he makes up for in courage and determination. Years of freedom have developed the competitive spirit, traits of leadership, and initiative

far in excess of that found in the nondemocratic nations. While these are hardly sufficient to win a modern war, they are valuable assets.

The general dislike of war so prevalent in the Democracies has developed a pattern of nonsupport for armed forces in peacetime, and we have operated on the theory that no nation's economy can afford to maintain a large standing army in idleness. We have evolved the minimal defensive force theory that permits us, in our own minds at least, to maintain far less of a corps of fighting men than we need to win a war and barely enough to hold off an enemy while we hastily train for battle. This minimal defensive force system produces a constant pattern of action when employed against a more militaristic enemy. The first 50 per cent of the war period records desperate fighting, with the Democracies making a rather poor showing, followed by a relatively short phase of sharp vicious fighting, with our newly trained war machine beating back the enemy. At the conclusion of this phase we embark on a phase of exploitation and prolonged occupation to round out the war. *The ultimate result is that our preparation, having been so hastily conducted, has no time left to include postwar planning, and we virtually lose the peace.*

The naïve belief that avoiding advance preparation for war will prevent war is, perhaps, not too far from the truth, if our war is to be *fought against another democracy*. When the war is against a state of a geopolitical character, however, this belief is not only invalid but fatal. So long as everyone plays by the same rules, the game is fair; when a newcomer introduces a new set of rules, we can either play by rules that effectively counter his or abandon the game. To do the former under pressure of time is to operate at a disadvantage; to do the latter is to surrender all we hold dear. This is a lesson we are now learning, but it remains to be determined whether we will be graduated from the school of experience in time to apply our knowledge to the coming war.

One very serious drawback to our defensive development has been the almost universal ignorance of related facts and geography that seems to characterize the statesmen of democracy. Today there is a constant conflict between overriding political considerations and overriding military considerations, with the former

winning most of the time, as can be seen in the many arenas of varied conflicts in which we now engage the Soviet Union. It would appear that the Democracies' statesmen are able "neither to envision proper protective prewar diplomatic alliances, nor to anticipate war and develop the necessary geographic pattern for it." We still cling desperately to the idea that if enough words are spoken we can avert war. Armed with this fallacy, we go bravely out to meet the enemy for whom words and treaties have no significance unless they are words of surrender and treaties of capitulation. If this is to be our sole defense, our position is precarious, and our strategy for survival a thing of no substance.

Economically there is no combination of powers on earth that can match the output, resources, and productive potential of the Democracies. On this cheerful bit of news we rest assured that Russia cannot win. Like so many of the gilt and plaster gods in which we put our faith this misconception engenders a false sense of security. Since the stormy days of the Bolshevik revolution Russia has turned rapidly from a backward agricultural state to a backward state of tremendous industrial potential. While we have no accurate knowledge of the extent of Russian technical development, we can hazard a fair estimate on the basis of one very significant fact. At the outbreak of World War II the Soviets were far enough advanced in their development to be able to seize upon every advantage of the *most advanced technical ideas* of the Western Powers and adapt them to the use of Russia. This would indicate that she could be a worthy and formidable opponent in a war where economic factors dominate the scene.

While the war potential and the warmaking powers of the Democracies are great, only those of the United States are secure enough to be counted upon for the maximum yield *after* the shooting war begins. Those of Europe, for the most part, are under the hammer and can be expected to be subjected to annihilating bombardment, once the hot phase of war begins. This means that their maximum value to the cause must be extracted before, not after, the battle is joined.

Economic assistance rendered Europe has been designed to rehabilitate her industry in order to derive the maximum peacetime benefit. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the Democracies

will receive the full benefit because European production is still below that required. This will ultimately throw the whole burden on the United States. It is expected, of course, that Russia will lose the production of the satellites early in the war so that the shooting phase should be reduced to a private war of production between the Soviet Union and the United States. The nation producing the most will win.

There is one really vulnerable spot in the position of the Democracies—the rise of neutralism in Europe. Neutralism is not quite appeasement; it is in some respects even worse, for it is based on the general idea of ignoring the menacing, contemptuous actions of a would-be aggressor. Its philosophy is found in the premise that what we refuse to see or acknowledge won't harm us. One must not register moral indignation or utter sharp words; this might offend Russia. One must not take decisive action; this might offend Russia. One must simply go on as if nothing has happened. On the other hand, one must denounce any decisive action taken by others and be squarely on the record as a strictly peaceful nation, deploring any maneuvers designed to give offense, directly or indirectly, real or fancied, to the Communists.

Neutralism had its birth in the left wing of the Labour Party under the leadership of that wily politician, Aneurin Bevan. Knowing, as we do, Bevan's reputation as a fighter, we may wonder if neutralism was not a political device to embarrass both the Churchill and Attlee factions in order to carry Mr. Bevan to power. It is difficult to visualize Bevan meekly submitting the British Empire to this sort of thing with sincerity.

If this is merely a political device, it is a dangerous one, for it has offered another temporary escape to Europe and to the British electorate, and public opinion may force Bevan into pursuing a policy his conscience and his good sense tell him is wrong. It might even drive him so far as to make it necessary for him to deny the United States the privileges we have gained by treaty. Constantine Brown poses the question of what a British government dominated by Labour neutralists might do to American air units based in England if they were ordered to undertake a retaliatory mission against Russia. There is a precedent for refusing them permission to take off—France did it to Britain at Marseille in 1940, when

Britain ordered its squadrons based there to bomb Northern Italy.

While the type of protest Bevan has been sponsoring smacks of political maneuvering, his doctrine of neutralism has gained some converts on the continent. Needless to say, active Communist parties have lost no opportunity to encourage neutralism, for such a doctrine only serves to further their position. Although the movement is gaining converts, it is not beyond control, and strong United States propaganda and action could materially weaken it.

In spite of everything, the European Democracies are surely, if somewhat reluctantly, moving toward a more unified defense effort. The contractual agreement with Western Germany, while not eagerly hailed by France, has given promise of additional fighting men whose previous exploits have gained for them the respect of European soldiery. Although camaraderie and service with them may be repugnant to the French, Belgians, Dutch, and Italians, it must be admitted that the German forces represent, or will when they are formed, a rather comforting addition to the defense of Western Europe.

The integrated one-uniform-one-objective European Defense Community, although it may fall short of its mark, is at least a step toward a unification of effort and objective that may be important in future planning. It definitely indicates a theoretical desire, if not an actual one, to offer unified resistance, which will not give much comfort to the Russians. It is entirely possible that with these two steps we may see a temporary breakdown in the mechanism of resistance based on traditional enmity that has prevented closer collaboration among our allies.

Political maneuvering designed to promote party or individual prestige on the basis of postponing the war must be stopped. The man in the street, both at home and abroad, whether or not he will admit it, knows in his innermost heart that war is somewhat more than a possibility. Now, if his politicians and political opportunists can be induced to see the light and the internal struggles for power temporarily sidetracked in the interest of the common good, it is entirely possible that we might one day achieve a united front.

One pleasant note can be sounded. Communism, if not on the



The NATO Area.

wane in Western Europe, is at this writing, being much better controlled. The French police blue-dye policy, that of spraying blue dye on rioters in order to facilitate apprehension later, and the arrest of Duclos, coupled with the inability of the Communists to stage successfully a general strike marking the arrival of Ridgway, have done much to weaken the efforts of the Reds in France. In June of 1952 the usual pattern of self-castigation and condemnation that indicates a weakening in the party structure was instituted by the Communists in France. Étienne Fajon, a leading Communist, launched out against the Politburo and the Central Committee of France for the reverses suffered by the Party. There were the usual charges of deviation, sectarianism, opportunism, lack of vigilance, and submission to democratic illusions that are associated with the ever present purges *within the Party* for failures to achieve Party objectives.

It is interesting to note that one of the charges levied was that of "tactical errors" in the calling of a protest strike after the arrest of Duclos. Fajon pointed out that the February 12 protest strike against Ridgway, in failing, should have demonstrated the uselessness of such tactics. This, coupled with charges of loss of influence among the workers, decline in Party press circulation, and the Party's inability to delay the production or transportation of arms, is an open confession of weakness within the Party.

With internal Communism sustaining losses in the Western Democracies, with the dubious Swedes learning the lesson of the price of even tacit or passive nonresistance to the Soviet, perhaps a renewed effort to instill courage in Western Europe might swing the balance to a more favorable position for all the Democracies. It is not for want of a fighting spirit or the will to fight but rather the need of firm leadership and a firm nonappeasement policy on the part of the United States that has kept Europe in milling bewilderment since World War II. It is entirely possible that in the near future, things will be definitely looking up in Europe. When the balloon goes up the European Democracies will be on the fighting line; there's no doubt of that. To have them there ready, able, and *prepared* to fight is another problem.

The position of the United States is somewhat better. Not being as close to the problem as our European allies, we are not subject

to the same fears or worries. If anything, we are not worried enough. We have an almost indolent attitude about the whole problem of Russian aggression. As in Europe, the issue of Communism has become a political football here at home, and our politicians, being little different from their European counterparts, have not neglected their opportunities to kick it around.

The Democracies have suffered from too much dependence on individual actions and not enough real co-operation. This has led us to the sad state of having a 180-horsepower motor with each horse pulling in its own separate direction. Potential power we have to spare; it's unified power we lack. What is needed is a cohesive policy in which all the Democracies work hand in hand in a realistic manner. Only this can stop Russian aggression effectively. To accomplish this objective at this late date may take a bit of doing but it is not impossible.

Many people have placed their faith in the United Nations as the principal weapon of defense in our relations with the Soviet. To these the UN represented the end product in the evolution of world co-operation. Again we were wrong. The UN is a most necessary institution that should be encouraged, studied, and developed, but it is not the end product of international organization any more than was the Concert of Vienna, the Holy Alliance, the Triple Entente, or the League of Nations. It is just one more step toward a goal that may be reached a hundred years or a hundred generations from now. We should work through it so long as it can do the job. When it fails, we should keep it in existence as a laboratory in world organization but resort to more effective means for our defense.

Success can never be achieved by employing ineffectual tools. One of the most effectual tools of the Democracies is their understanding of the geographical relationship existing between them and the Soviet Union. Having considered the geopolitical aspects of the Communist world in an earlier chapter, we should now examine the geopolitical position of the Democracies. The primary difference lies in the fact that whereas Russia starts with a centralized power aided by an international movement, the Democracies must consider power in much wider terms. This decentralized power factor may prove a weakness in the long run, and we



THE DEMOCRACIES VIEW OF THE WORLD

may find that somewhere in the middle of hostilities the Democracies will have to gather up the loose ends into some form of centralized control.

At the center of the Democracies' world stands the United States with Canada—the arsenal of democracy. In any war where the European production centers face certain destruction those of the United States become of paramount importance. Our chief defensive mission will be the protection of this arsenal. The function of the arsenal is to furnish *all* those things necessary for the military success of the Democracies when the other areas are not able to supply them. We are the reservoir of material factors as well as of spiritual and moral, for faith and leadership must be counted as resources.

Extending around the world, between the tenth and sixtieth parallels, is the belt of world power, or the arena of conflict. This belt includes, as may be seen from the map, the United States, western and central Europe, the Balkans, the satellites, and the population centers of Russia and Asia. Most of the world's people, the greatest part of its important natural resources, almost all of its industry, and all of the power lie in this belt. All who live within or adjoining it are, of necessity, subject to the power changes and power conflicts that occur within its limits. They cannot remain aloof.

On the east and west of the arsenal, but almost entirely within the power belt, lie the so-called outer defense zones. That on the west includes Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, and New Guinea, along with the neighboring islands. This zone is also called the outer crescent. Between the eastern outer crescent and the arsenal, the islands of the Pacific form the eastern inner crescent, or auxiliary defense belt. To the east of the arsenal lies the western outer defense zone consisting of the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and North Africa, each area possessing a special function. Britain serves as the marshaling area; France, the bridgehead; Spain, the defensive bastion; and North Africa, the final defense space. Between the arsenal and the western outer defense zone lies the western inner crescent, consisting of the islands of the Caribbean, Iceland, and Greenland, the latter two falling outside the power belt.

These various zones guard the approaches to the arsenal and its vulnerable appendages such as the Panama Canal. Their function is to serve as successive lines of defense against attack from abroad and as areas for way stops in any outward thrusts from the arsenal. The continental character and proximity to the arsenal make the western outer crescent and the western inner crescent the more vulnerable complex, and hence the one with the highest defensive priority. Primarily, the offensive character of this western outer crescent is to serve as a forming point for our ground forces, a launching site for air forces and guided missiles, a training ground, and a stock-piling area of supplies needed for immediate use.

Next to the outer defense zone, and in some places adjoining or overlapping it, is the complex major contact space, or forward contact area. This space can serve as a battlefield, a launching site for ground actions, a defensive zone for the adjoining outer defense zone, or as the Democracies progress toward victory, an adjunct for the outer defense zone. It is divided into a number of subspaces or subareas whose functions vary. The Benelux nations, Scandinavia, Western Germany, Italy, and Austria are assigned to the prime contact zone, or that zone most likely to be the primary object of attack in total war originating in the east. This is by far the most critical zone of the Democracies, for it is here we must make our initial stand against all-out Russian aggression.

The nations bordering the eastern Mediterranean exercise a special flank protective function of great importance in that they not only guard the strategic Suez Canal, the British life line, and the strategic Turkish Straits, but the entire control of the eastern Mediterranean is vested in their armies and navies. *It is significant to note that no east-west attack has ever succeeded against Europe unless the eastern aggressor holds these areas.* When only Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey are referred to, the complex is called the southern contact space. When we add Cyprus, Malta, Egypt, Libya, and the Middle East countries bordering the inland sea, we refer to the complex as the eastern Mediterranean guard.

East of the southern contact space lies the long stretch of the Asiatic contact space, which takes in the Middle East, the subcontinent of India, and southeast Asia. This area is primarily a

resource area, but it can be converted to areas of attack or defense if the situation demands. Since it is protected for most of its length by high mountains, except for southeast Asia, its vulnerability quotient is low, while its defensive quotient is among the highest on the globe.

Adjoining the prime contact space is the so-called cushion space of the satellites, also called the initial target zone, whose function is to protect Russia from any attack originating in the west of Europe. This area, by virtue of its function, becomes one of importance to the Democracies. It is across this area that the Democracies must attack to come to grips with Russian troops on Russian soil. In the Far East, the initial target zone function is fulfilled by China and Manchuria, along with a part of eastern Siberia. Because of the extreme distances from the Russian center of production and the inadequacy of transportation to this center, the ground aspects of this Far East zone are secondary, except when a threat to Japan, southeast Asia, or Alaska is involved.

Between the initial target zone and the Volga-Urals area of Russia lies the vulnerable space, at the mercy of the Democracies' ground forces once passage has been secured through the initial target zone. The vulnerability of this area has already been discussed in an earlier chapter, and its effect on Russia's war potential has been noted. The Asian or Siberian counterpart of this vulnerable space is of minor importance and will not be discussed.

Beyond the vulnerable space lies the area variously known as the heartland, the coreland, the ultimate target space, or the final assault space. In this area, immune from sea attack, offering the maximum defense against ground attack, and subject only to intensive air assault, Russia could make a final determined stand for an indefinite period of time. The area possesses adequate natural resources, a vast agricultural complex, a newly developed and highly organized industrial complex, and space for Russia's entire population now residing in the vulnerable space. Her stand here is conditioned only by the ability of her government to hold the people in line.

Australia, New Zealand, southern Africa, and South America fall within the secondary space zone and, except for Australia and New Zealand, are of secondary power importance. South America

has the potential of increasing the power belt to include her, but the day for this is yet in the future. Resources in this zone are of great importance and cannot be ignored in an all-out struggle. Russian attacks against these areas are remote in possibility except for possible aggression against the Australian area should the Chinese Communists secure southeast Asia. South Africa's most important contribution lies in protecting the sea route round the Cape to the Far East. This, of course, would only be used if the Communists could effect closure of the Mediterranean–Suez Canal route.

The geographical relationship between the Democracies and between them and Russia definitely points to an advantage for the free powers. Superficially it would appear that Russia and the satellites possess the greater advantage against an attack from the West. Deeper examination will reveal that this is not so. The only ground guard between the Soviet Union and the West is the cushion space of satellites; once this line is passed, the vulnerable space becomes a liability for the Communists and the Kremlin faces a frittering away of its manpower and supplies, defending it or retreating to the fastness of her "*Festung* heartland," facing a protracted war of ten or twenty years or more. Once bottled up in the heartland, she is in a relatively secure military position, but she is also virtually a prisoner of the world; we cannot break in—she cannot break out.

Geopolitically speaking, the cushion space is not ideal for Soviet defense. History has demonstrated that wars move rapidly over this terrain, and lines of resistance to attacks from the West are few. Added to this geographical factor is the dependence on the slave states for support. In spite of all her efforts, force, and propaganda, the Soviet Union can never be certain that internal difficulties, sabotage, and revolution will not be her lot in the cushion space during time of war.

The Democracies, on the other hand, possess a definite advantage in the terrain of Western Europe where numerous broad rivers, mountainous areas, and forests make the area suitable for defense against attack from the east. That Russia realizes this is apparent from the emphasis she is now placing in her training program on river crossings and amphibious operations. Should the

Democracies seize the initiative and attack against the Soviet forces in the cushion space, they might be aided by the same internal disorders Russia must fear. Russia is also vulnerable to attack through the Black Sea, an advantage for the Democracies that is somewhat lessened in power by the fact that Turkey is equally vulnerable to sea-borne attack. In spite of this, the greater surface naval strength of the Democracies tips the scale in our favor. To land an assault force by submarine fleet is difficult if not impossible.

Balancing all factors, the Democracies, if they can unite their efforts effectively, have the greater over-all advantage and the greater opportunity for victory. Victory, from a position standpoint, will depend on the ability of the Democracies to produce a cohesive policy of action, on their greater potential and actual production, on firm leadership but not dictatorship by the United States, on the realization of the enemy capabilities and intention, and on the proper exploitation of Russia's spatial and economic weaknesses. It will not be achieved by mere words, by the actions of the United Nations, or by individual efforts of the allies.

It is not yet too late to correct the deficiencies in our strategy, but there is no more time for dawdling, experimentation or bickering over minor issues. Action is required now; the time for talk later can be assured if we act promptly to mend our fences and unite our policies and efforts to survive.

Chapter 8

The Changing Face of War

Every war kills men, wreaks havoc and destruction, and finally terminates in the fervent hope and firm belief of mankind that each one is the last one. Beyond these constant characteristics, each war is a separate entity, set apart from all others by the special conditions and situations the ever changing march of civilization injects into the panorama of man's progress. The face of war is by no means a placid, static face but one constantly moving and shifting, linked to the previous war only by its common characteristics of death, destruction, and hope and the overlapping of its military techniques.

The startling inventions and innovations and the radical departures in strategy and tactics of one war are the commonplace instruments of the next. The lessons learned are but historical records, and the high strategy, so brilliantly executed by the victor, is but a series of tactical exercises for the more brilliant strategy of the future. The changing face of war introduces new problems, new situations, new limitations, and new lessons in tactics to be learned at bitter cost to both victor and vanquished. One never reaches the point where it is possible to say, "This is the pattern for all wars."

But death, destruction, and hope are always with us, particularly the latter allied with the oh-so-firm belief that at last we have made an end to war. I remember playing on the floor, as a very small boy, while my uncle assured my father that when the

French and English had defeated the Kaiser's forces, war would be a dead thing for which no resurrection was possible. I remember several years later standing for one long weary day on a street corner near the White House, watching the mammoth spectacle of the victorious First Division as it paraded its might up Pennsylvania Avenue. I remember my father's admonition to look well because this was probably the last time in my lifetime such a sight would ever be witnessed. Tanks, poison gas, and the airplane, spelled aeroplane in those days, had made all future wars impossible. I remembered that day some twenty-odd years later as, stark with fear, I clawed my way into the depths of a muddy ditch beside the road that ran through the ruined village of Gravelotte in an almost frantic effort to get away from the heavy artillery of Hitler's army. I remember also that, in spite of my fear, I found time to thank God my sons would never know that fear, never have to grovel in the mud of war. Death, destruction, and hope are always with us, particularly hope allied with the oh-so-firm belief that this war is the last one.

And, in certain respects, that firm belief is a true one, for each war is the first of its type and the last one of that nature to be fought. Few people in 1346 thought the defeat English archers inflicted on French armored knights at the battle of Crécy would mark the end of feudal warfare and that men thereafter would depend upon mobility and maneuvering for success in warfare instead of body armor and single combat. There was no requiem mass sung at the battle of Fontenoy in 1745 when France and England buried the last vestige of romance and chivalry that could be found in war. "Gentleman of the French Guard, fire first," said Lord Hay. "Sir," replied the Comte d'Auteroches, "we never fire first, please to fire yourselves." Warfare ceased to be a gentleman's profession at that point and started its change to the brutal, all-out, total war of our day. Thus, World War III threatens us with a new war of a type never witnessed before and one probably never to be witnessed again. This war may be that last one we have waited for and dreamed of throughout the centuries.

Because of this ever changing face of war, good strategy dictates that we be prepared for it in every way possible. To survive we must know its restrictions, its limitations, and the special problems

it imposes. Without such knowledge we might go out to meet the enemy as we met Rommel in the deserts of Africa or Hitler's commanders at Falaise, the Bulge, or the Moselle. We might fall into the same trap that has ruined many a general and destroyed many an empire, the fatal error of fighting next year's war with last year's strategy. Who would be so foolish as to do that? Napoleon in the Hundred Days, Louis Napoleon in the Franco-Prussian War, the German General Staff in World War I, and Hitler in World War II, to name only a few of the more recent casualties. To win World War III and to survive we must know how to fight it and what to expect.

World War III will be as much a battle for men's minds as for the men themselves. In the past, wars have been fought for territory, for gain, for property, for markets, and for the sheer glory of fighting and winning. Not so with the coming war. Here the challenge will be different, greater, for a victorious Soviet Union and her Communist legions would take over, not only the lands, bodies, and worldly possessions of their victims, but also their minds and souls as well. Defeat at the hands of Communism would mean the disappearance of our way of life and the violent imposition of a materialistic slave civilization based on force and delusions. Therefore, the great and significant difference between World War III and any previous war is that we fight to preserve our territories, our lives, our minds, our souls, and our very civilization. No higher prize has ever been offered in any previous war. Now comes the question of how we do all this; what significant changes in warfare will we meet in World War III.

The changes that will condition our strategy for survival, with one exception, all took root in World War II and have grown to significant stature since that time. The exception was noted first in World War I, partly dealt with in World War II, and now occupies the status of the most important conditioning factor in World War III. These changes are more than mere improvements in the family of weapons used in combat or in over-all tactical maneuvers; they are fundamental changes in the theory and the basis of strategy for war.

The first significant change might be found in our concept of the definition and objective of war itself. Germany entered World

War I steeped in the classic idea that war is an act of force to compel the adversary to do the antagonists' will. This was strictly the theory of Clausewitz, who had hastened to add that force in this case was physical force; no moral force was considered to be involved or admissible. The object of the use of force was to disarm the enemy as the ultimate military aim. Certainly this was a simple enough definition and objective for World War I. In this concept, war is a series of passages at arms between troops, continuing until one side or the other surrenders and the conditions of peace are established.

The concept for World War II was somewhat different. Ewald Banse furnished the concept for Hitler's legions. "Warfare," he wrote, "is the art of employing the military resources of the state, its concentrated striking power, against the enemy in such a way that he submits to your will. . . . War [aims] at the annihilation of the other country, . . . can only render the progress of one party possible by destroying the other." There is no question of merely using force until the adversary is prepared to disarm and surrender; this is the use of all resources—the Germans considered all resources as military resources—for the systematic annihilation and destruction of the enemy until he submits unconditionally to the will of the aggressor. The adversary can only be disarmed by his annihilation; his surrender can only be accomplished by his destruction.

The World War III concept differs greatly from either of these in that it is much more complex. It is not dependent upon either the use of complete physical force or the use of annihilation but rather on a subtle mixture of a variety of stimuli and forces. Speaking purely objectively, the World War III concept brings the geopolitical concept of war to its highest point of development. In this concept physical force is to be the last weapon employed! We might define war as a state in which all the resources of a nation, the economic, military, intellectual, and physical forces, are brought to bear upon an enemy to accomplish his defeat and disappearance as an independent political entity. We do not desire him to disarm, to do our will, or to be destroyed; we merely insist that when the war is finished, he no

longer continue to exist in the same political and cultural state he enjoyed prior to the war.

If our adversary's fate can be sealed by any other method than an act of physical force, so much the better for us. If, on the other hand, all our efforts to achieve our objective fail, physical force of arms must then be employed. There is a vast difference between the two earlier concepts and a very significant one, for it admits the possibility of an actual state of war without the adversary's ever being aware of it.

Under this concept we launch a cold war in which our objective is to induce the enemy not only to do our will and submit to our authority but to do these things almost voluntarily without the use of physical force or violence. We induce him by the power of words, economic sanctions, or propaganda voluntarily to encompass his own destruction. We bore from within, employ fear of defeat as a weapon, corrupt the enemy's people and government, and finally hope for a quick bloodless victory. If this is not forthcoming, we attack with physical force.

This type of warfare is presently being conducted by the Soviet Union against the Western Democracies with varying degrees of success. It is a very convenient type of warfare because it involves little or nothing in the way of capital outlay on the part of the aggressor and it shifts the burden of work onto the victim. It does not require that the victim be completely routed; he may only be required to refrain from fighting in any fashion against the aggressor. The wave of so-called neutralism that is sweeping Europe at the moment of writing is an example of the technique. If England, France, and the other Democracies of Europe can be persuaded to take no action in common with the United States to stop the aggression of Russia, their mere failure to participate causes them automatically to aid her against the United States. A more positive action in this newer concept of warfare is found in the peace offensive that was an aggressive act of a mental or intellectual character designed to produce the capitulation and subsequent destruction of the victim.

The use of physical force itself has undergone marked changes of the most significant nature. Banse has placed the beginning of

this concept in World War I, but it is possible that it began earlier. It is equally possible that it was not completely applied in World War II. Warfare has changed from a military venture to an economic one, and we think now in terms of warmaking potential, rather than in terms of military campaigns, as being decisive in war. To a certain extent the day of the decisive battle is past, and the day of the strategic checkmate looms before us.

Under the Clausewitz theory one army fought the other until one surrendered. When the adversary's troops were no longer able to continue the fight in a military sense, the war was over, and the talking started. This was largely the type of warfare of 1914–18. Attacks on the enemy's production and resources were limited to sabotage. With the advent of the airplane it became possible to attack behind the enemy lines and knock out the factories that supplied his armies. The theory largely pursued by both sides in World War II was, by contrast to what will be required in World War III, almost indiscriminate destruction of resources and industry. This must change—and has changed.

In World War III we must be primarily concerned not with destroying the enemy's armies but with destroying his ability to make war. At the same time we must not destroy his economic potential so completely as to render him a public charge on the world when his defeat has been accomplished. Therein lies the trick. Under this system his steel mills, his factories, his communications, his bridges, his coal mines, and every facet of his national life that could be put to use in aiding him to prosecute the war become targets. These are not part of his armed forces at the front but targets behind his lines, connected with his warmaking ability or his warmaking potential. Merely to beat back his armies, soldier by soldier or tank by tank, is not sufficient. We are not interested in denying him the right to replace his soldiers but to prevent him from giving that soldier a gun, ammunition, food, clothing, and a tank to replace the ones we have destroyed. Therefore, we have to strike more deeply into his territory.

At the same time we cannot afford to indulge in a wasteful campaign of sheer mass destruction, for the enemy must be left in such a position that at the end of the war his economy can be swiftly rehabilitated in order to take its place in the economic

chains that connect all the countries of the world. Our experiences in World War II and the subsequent period of rehabilitation and reconstruction, from which we will not emerge before World War III is upon us, clearly demonstrate the folly of indiscriminate destruction. Unless we are thoroughly prepared to destroy only those parts of the enemy's key resources that make it possible for him to make war, those and no others, we may find ourselves not in the relationship of victor to vanquished but in that of decaying to destroyed. Hence, the Banse theory of destruction and annihilation is gone and the newer concept of warfare based on the minimum destruction of the enemy's warmaking ability necessary to make it impossible for him to fight is the theory that should govern our actions in World War III.

This concept opens up a host of changes in the face of war and the strategy and tactics involved. We must, for example, be prepared to prevent the enemy from destroying our warmaking ability while we are destroying his; we must prevent him from acquiring new warmaking resources while at the same time we are augmenting ours. This will involve careful long-range planning of the finest order.

New values will be placed on targets, and strategic resources will be enlarged to include material heretofore ignored. To the mind of the layman this might suggest a new science that must be developed—a science of national survival that does not confine itself simply to the invention or application of new weapons but that builds up a body of knowledge derived from the earth, the air, industry, transportation, communications, a study of national and individual psychology, and a host of other factors. To the geopolitician this is an old story, for such things are the essence of his field, and his science is the science of national survival. As Banse has phrased it, "Now that wars are waged by whole peoples they will no longer be fought with bayonets alone but with corn and meat, oil and fats, iron and nickel, wood and cotton, railways and lorries, distances and atmospheric pressure, character and souls—and most of all, with souls, for alongside the separate armies march their country and their people, of whom they are merely the weapons."

The selection of what must be destroyed is another change in

the face of war, for it will be found that it is not always best to destroy the obvious. Consider a steel mill employing 10,000 workers whose function it is to produce steel for a tank factory employing 20,000 craftsmen. The steel mill gets its iron ore from nearby fields and its coal from more distant ones; both commodities, however, require rail transportation. Let us run our railroad across two or three rivers and through one or two tunnels and let it be the only line that supplies the steel mill. What target shall we destroy to inflict the maximum blow to the enemy warmaking ability with the minimum amount of actual destruction? If we bomb the mills or factory, we stop production, and we may kill a number of workers. Of course, we may have to rebuild these at our own expense. If we bomb the mines we accomplish the same. What is the effect if we bomb the railroad bridges and the tunnels? Mines, mills, factories, and trains are intact, but nothing works. The miners can continue to build up a reserve of coal but with no source of iron ore or coal the steel mill cannot operate; thus its workers are unemployed. This is true also of the tank factory. So, where we would incapacitate only the mill if we bombed it, by this method we cripple production, reduce morale, and produce unemployment without destroying the mills.

This is, of course, a very simple and perhaps not too valid example, but it serves to illustrate the complexity of planning that has been introduced by the new concept of limited destruction of the warmaking ability. The maximum damage is not always inflicted by the maximum destruction. Industrial production and warmaking ability are based upon a number of involved chains. In World War III we must select the link in each chain that will enable us to inflict the maximum damage with the minimum destruction.

If territorial gains and the destruction of forces are now no longer of primary importance, what mission does a ground army have? The concentration on the destruction of the enemy warmaking ability does not remove the necessity for ground action and territorial gains. It is not the territory that is important but what it contains that counts. Ground forces are essential to the securing of additional warmaking facilities that once belonged to the enemy. By acquiring these a two-fold blow is struck: the

enemy's warmaking ability is decreased, and ours is augmented. If this concept is applied, we find a newer, broader use of the strategy of battle.

By way of example, although this subject will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, let us consider how we could fight the Russian ground forces on our present lines in Western Europe with the objective expressed above. There are a variety of ways. First, it might be possible to attack and drive him back, thus securing a part of his resources. Secondly, we might contain him in his present position while we destroyed his warmaking ability at home. Thirdly, we might fight a delaying action to draw him away from the source of his warmaking ability. Lastly, we might effect a combination of all these. A decision of this type faces any army, any general staff, any planner; and any nation fighting for survival in World War III will permit only one decision. If we make a mistake in our initial move, the boon of a second chance may never be granted. Our first trial may be our last.

These are only a very few of the changes that have occurred in the concept of war since the last time this nation was plunged into combat, but from these it can easily be seen that our whole point of view must undergo serious changes if we are to cope with these new conditions. Changes such as these require the most skillful planning by expert planners and completely remove any mad, fanatical plunging into a hastily prepared-for war. Planning for survival must be considered as an intrinsic part of our natural, national resources and must be treated as such.

For the last few years the American public has been almost obsessed with the potency of the atomic bomb or the size of our armed forces. We have felt somewhat secure in our knowledge of our strength, the efficiency of our production, and the ability of the average man to resist encroachments on his freedom. All of these things do represent powerful factors in our defense and should contribute to our sense of security. At the same time, however, we must not put all our trust in material things. We must be aware of the many changes that have taken place in warfare, and we must design our plans to cope with them.

Failure to recognize these changes could well be fatal to our

country and to our allies in the struggle against Communism. To attempt to organize our plans solely on the basis of lessons learned in World War II is to court defeat. Successful, modern planning, based on recognized changes in war, will ensure our victory. Planners capable of recognizing this fact must be developed and must be permitted to plan. In a war for survival, where the planner is of necessity a part of our resource complex, the side with the best planners is the side most likely to survive.

Chapter 9

Concepts and Techniques of World War III

Changes in the theory of warfare since World War II lead to changes in concepts and techniques that must be met and incorporated into any strategy devised for World War III. A simple example of this is found in the concept of space. Space does not mean mere distance or area but distance or area in terms of geographic factors, psychological factors, economic factors, cultural factors, etc., which may be found within any given area or exert an influence within the area. In short, space may be loosely defined as a given area and all that it contains. In terms of space thus understood, certain areas of the world, as we have already seen in previous chapters, have a distinctly different meaning for the Soviet Union than for the Democracies; that is, space works differently for each. These differences must be included in our strategy, and our concepts of war must be modified to meet them.

There is little or no difference in our approach to the areas in question. Some areas of intrinsic primary importance to Russia are of secondary importance to the Democracies. However, if Russia regards them as of primary importance to her plans, we, of necessity, must give them a high priority in ours simply to prevent her from acquiring them. Thus, for example, should Russia place emphasis on securing Afghanistan, Tibet, or Nepal, we must take steps to deny her the possibility of securing them. Therefore, we find ourselves in the position of fighting for areas which, in themselves, are of no value to us in order to prevent Russia from utiliz-

ing them in her plan where they are of value. This concept coupled with the vast number of vitally strategic areas widely scattered throughout the world has removed geographical limitations from World War III and forces us to consider warfare on a global scale.

The day of limited-area war is gone, perhaps never to return. The intensity of modern warfare and its strong economic character have extended it far beyond an isolated series of engagements between two or a few powers. As has been pointed out elsewhere, power runs in a regular, somewhat sharply defined belt. Any nation near or adjoining this belt is bound to be involved to a greater or lesser degree. The size of the nation, its degree of civilization, and its prestige position in world affairs no longer serve to govern its importance in time of war. The factor now involved is, what can it produce that we can utilize in our fight? Thus, warfare has become global in character, and on this basis we must devise our strategy. To do less would mean to ensure defeat.

Global warfare necessarily requires that we fight on a number of fronts and in a variety of places. Some of these will be purely military fronts where we fight for strategic location in terms of military advantage. A second group will be purely economic fronts where military force is employed to obtain certain critical natural resources needed by our war effort or to prevent the enemy from securing them to augment his war potential. While this latter group could otherwise be secured by treaty, if any of the members fall near the power belt or in areas equally accessible to the antagonists it is unlikely they can escape military action. The third group will consist of political fronts where the war is rarely fought with weapons but rather with propaganda. The efforts here will be directed against nations relatively far from the power belt and will be designed to induce the state to remain aloof from the struggle, enter the struggle on one side or the other, refuse to supply needed items of production or raw materials to one side or the other, or to sell exclusively to one side or the other.

In any event, the day of strict neutrality is past, for even by remaining aloof from the conflict every state will be aiding one of the antagonists, directly or indirectly. In World War III it will be impossible for any state to say, "We have taken no part in this

war." The entire world will be involved, one way or another, and the conflict will be truly global in character.

This triple-headed modern war monster, presenting a military, economic, and political front, requires entirely different planning from that in any previous war; areas apparently having no direct interest in the conflict may find themselves subjected to bombardment by air simply to prevent them from giving aid and comfort to one of the antagonists. This, of course, creates new problems in alliances and forces all nations to align themselves with one side or the other as fighting participants or for the protection that can be offered by one side against the onslaughts of the other. No matter how sincerely a state may desire to refrain from participation, it will be drawn inevitably into the maelstrom. Global warfare dictates that those states who support one side are the enemies of the other. Those who refuse to support either side are the enemies of both. In short, those who are not with us are against us; there can be no middle ground, for all states have something that one or the other of the antagonists needs for the war effort.

Global war requires the development of new techniques in securing alignments. Not only must all states in an alliance be protected, irrespective of the part they play, but the major states in any alliance will find themselves expending huge sums of money to develop the weaker members in order that these may ultimately make the proper contribution. Such help may take the form of outright loan of troops, military assistance in the form of equipment and advisers, financial assistance, technical advisers, machinery, raw materials, or assistance of a hundred different forms. Anticipated help to be received by the major powers may be on the basis of immediate aid or long-term aid.

Normal common sense dictates that such an involved system of alliance cannot be built up after war begins but must be accomplished considerably before the outbreak of hostilities. In a sense, the outbreak of actual fighting cannot occur until these alliances are made and producing what is necessary. This, of course, leads to the use of propaganda, economic sanctions, and even force to beat the reluctant states into line.

Of all the newer techniques this concept is probably the best

understood by both sides. Both Russia and the United States are rushing frantically, not only to secure allies, but to ready these allies for the coming struggle. The Soviet Union has employed propaganda and force to bring her allies under control and has installed comparable systems of government, subservient to and co-ordinated by her own, in all the areas that she has decided are essential to her victory. The United States has resorted to more peaceful devices, such as the Marshall Plan, ECA, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Point Four Program. The final outcome of World War III will probably determine which plan is best and will probably set the pattern for the future.

Among the old stand-bys of past wars that will have to be radically modified by the newer concepts is the hoary doctrine of the build-up and the decisive battle. According to theory, war broke out with both sides suffering from lack of preparation. While the initial fighting was progressing, both sides built up their strength in what was known as the build-up phase. This phase terminated when one side or the other secured definitive mastery of the situation, a fact that was demonstrated by the fighting of the decisive battle. From that point on the winning side went into a phase of decision, exploitation, and occupation while the losing side went into a phase of weakening defense, decline, and defeat.

During the European phase of World War II our build-up phase continued until shortly after D-Day, when we gained mastery of the air. Once the Luftwaffe was swept from the skies, the war was, to all intents and purposes, decided. The decisive battle does not bring the end of the fighting; it simply marks the point at which the enemy's chances for ultimate victory have been reduced to zero. Why does he continue to fight? Because decisive battles are decided by historians after the war is over, not by generals while they are going on. Both field commanders may have the idea that such and such a battle was decisive, but neither dares to take a chance. The winner goes on to pursue his victory in an effort to shorten the war while the loser continues to fight desperately, hoping against hope for the miracle that will turn the tide in his favor. Sometimes it happens, and history comes up with a new decisive battle.

Who would have suspected in 1916 that Germany had lost the war at the Marne? Who could have predicted that Gettysburg was the decisive battle of the Civil War? Had the Battle of the Bulge succeeded for Germany, the decisive battle of World War II might have been Bastogne.

The World War III situation may be entirely different and, in all likelihood, will be. The build-up phase will not depend solely on the training of troops and committing them to battle but on the ability of the antagonists to supply them with the tools they need to fight. With this in mind, there could conceivably be a war with no build-up phase, on account of the fact that the initial air raids on one or the other of the antagonists could constitute the decisive battle of the war! Should, for example, the initial Russian raid so cripple American industry and productive forces as to render our supply ability and potential inadequate, we would continue to fight until our stock pile was gone and then be defeated. The decisive battle would have been fought before we realized the battle had been joined. The same could be true vis-à-vis Russia.

The fact that the decisive battle of World War III will be fought against production and warmaking potential rather than against men puts an entirely different light on warfare. The build-up phase must be accomplished *before* war breaks out, not after. To delay this build-up means defeat. Troops must be trained, huge stock piles must be created, industry geared for war, and all the tremendous effort associated with the post-M-Day period must be accomplished prior to M-Day, or the day war begins. Therefore, R-Day, or the readiness day for war, is prior to M-Day; D-Day, or the day on which we anticipate the beginning of the drive that will turn into the decisive battle of the war, must be the same as R-Day. We must be ready to fight at any time, and we must be ready to make that initial fight the decisive battle of the war! Time is on the side of the attacker not the defender. Paul Ehrlich used to say, concerning scientific research, "Chance favors the prepared mind"; today a good geopolitician will say, "The chance of victory favors the prepared."

Whether R-Day and D-Day are identical in determining the outcome of the war, the fight will go on until one antagonist can

no longer fight. Thus we must make preparations for what will happen after the initial strike. This, of course, gives rise to the many, many theories advanced so far as to how we will fight World War III. This does not mean how the troops will be maneuvered or where they will actually shoot their rifles or drop their bombs but what shall be the over-all methods pursued.

We have seen that the proposed war is one in which the economic factor is at the top of the pinnacle. We have also noted that indiscriminate destruction would be suicidal for the Democracies and is to be avoided. This is not true from the Russian or Communist point of view. If the Democracies win World War III, they will still remain separate and distinct sovereign powers not subject to unified control from any one source and faced with the problem of not only straightening out the economic chaos war produced in their own houses but also that produced in Soviet Russia and her satellites. Therefore, our campaign against her must be based on the theory of inflicting the maximum damage with the minimum of destruction in order that the postwar free world can get back on its feet again.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has no such problem. Victory for her means a completely organized Communist world wherein she calls the tunes, political, economic, and social. Under such a system she has at her command a dictated economy in which all states can be directed to produce for a common pool. In this structure, France might find herself producing only agricultural products, perhaps even a single crop, while Britain produced nothing but railroad track or dishpans or automobiles. It is unlikely that any of the defeated European Democracies would be permitted to work toward an integrated local economy of their own or to attempt to achieve anything approximating self-sufficiency.

Because of her size the United States would continue production of all types, as she does today, with a greater emphasis on industry, all under strict Communist supervision. By so doing she could produce enough foodstuffs to sustain her people on the minimal subsistence level while at the same time supplying much of the Communist world with manufactured items not produced abroad. In other words, the United States would exist in a state

of minimal self-sufficiency plus. This would take care of three very important factors in the Communist structure: it would remove any concern about the support of the United States, and by forcing the export of everything above the minimal standard would prevent her from ever preparing for revolt, while at the same time part of the world's needs would be cared for, thus reducing the problem of supply in less productive areas. In short, we would continue economically in much the same fashion as we do now, except we'd be under Communism, constantly exploited, and with just enough to live.

The differences in the two outlooks make a great deal of difference in the methods of fighting the war. In order to understand this perhaps we should become familiar with the World War III definitions of four common military terms. First, attrition. This is the process of wearing down, by all sorts of tactics short of annihilation, the warmaking ability of any state. The faster the warmaking ability is worn down the sooner the war ends. This does not envisage complete destruction but rather the scientific destruction of key industries, which will force the antagonist to divert some of his warmaking potential to local uses, reconstruction, etc., thus making it impossible for him to devote all his activities to supplying the war effort. The greater the diversion from the war effort to local use, the less effective will be the war machine. In other words, in attrition we wear down the enemy's ability to produce what he needs to fight.

Opposed to this is annihilation, which is based on complete, indiscriminate destruction of resources, production, and man power alike without any thought of rebuilding or reconstruction at a later date. This involves no such thing as scientific destruction, and nothing is exempt from attack. Cities, villages, military targets, and nonmilitary targets are all the same and receive like treatment. The motto is destroy.

Between the next two the line of distinction is a fine one and many strategists and geopoliticians consider them as one and the same. There is, however, sufficient difference to warrant their being considered as two separate techniques. The terms in question are interdiction and denial. Interdiction means to forbid the use of any given facility to the enemy by armed action not neces-

sarily involving destruction of the facility. Its use may result in attrition of the war effort, but it does not necessarily fall under attrition as such. For example, let us say the enemy has excellent submarine pens in Harbor X. Here it is possible for him not only to build and repair submarines but also to equip and launch them on their way against our fleet. We can do several things. We can bomb out the pens, destroying them so their use is forbidden the enemy, or we can keep the harbor under constant air attack so that while his pens are intact, he is forbidden to use the only means he has to send the submarines on their way. The harbor has been interdicted. Nothing is worn down in his war effort; little has to be rebuilt; he simply can't use the facilities he has because we have forcibly forbidden it. This is interdiction.

Earlier the example of destroying the train tracks to enforce idleness in a number of industries was cited. This is another form of interdiction. In this we have forbidden the use of the factories by destroying communications. If he refrains from using them for the war effort, we shall not destroy the factories. If he repairs the tracks and continues to use the facilities, we shall continue to forbid their use by destroying his communications anew. This, then, enters into the realm of attrition or the wearing down of his facilities to repair tracks. It means he must use steel badly needed elsewhere to repair the forbidden lines.

Interdiction may also be used against the enemy outside of his own country in instances where we should blockade a source of supply of raw material, thus forbidding him access to it, or where we should destroy lines of communication, thus preventing him from utilizing the resources by his inability to get them to his industry. In short, interdiction does not necessarily mean destruction of the major objective; it is simply the forbidding of use.

Denial, on the other hand, is somewhat different, although it may take on the character of interdiction at several points and may even fall under the heading of attrition. Let us say that the enemy draws his source of power from a huge hydroelectric plant, supplied by a correspondingly big dam. Should we destroy his dam we should deny him the use of it while at the same time we interdicted or forbade the use of the hydroelectric plant we didn't bomb. This in turn would prevent his utilizing all the factories

dependent upon the plant. His efforts to repair the dam under repeated bombings would bring the situation under the technical heading of attrition. At the same time, let us say, the damming of the river for power had permitted an agricultural area to spring up in otherwise arid soil. Destruction of the dam would destroy this area, thus denying it to him because of the water flooding it or it might be rendered useless because of the lack of water that formerly was diverted into irrigation systems leading from the dam. Denial usually implies direct destruction of the major objective or the rendering of the objective completely useless to the war effort by constant bombing, artillery barrage, or radioactive dust.

It can also be used to designate an action taking place outside the enemy area. Should the enemy import raw materials from another country in his own ships, for example, we could deny him the area by constantly sinking the ships, destroying the ports, or bombing the resource areas themselves.

In some ways, these definitions differ from the way the words were employed in World War II, but the changes in warfare coming in World War III indicate a need for different and more precise definitions, if only to soothe public opinion. Should Russia overrun France, American public opinion might be more favorable to an interdiction of Paris than a denial of Paris by destruction.

The Democracies' war must be fought on the basis of attrition, interdiction, and denial, while Russia may use all three and annihilation in addition. While we shall fight in such a way as to prevent annihilation of any area for both economic and humane reasons, this consideration will not trouble her, except in the case of the United States. When one is master of the world, a few millions or even a few hundred millions of people are not important; all those annihilated represent so many mouths less to feed, so many consumers less to use the resources, so many potential sources of revolt less.

It can be expected that Russia will employ tactics of annihilation against many areas in which our tactics would be less rigid or cruel. For this reason she may, in the long run, fight a cheaper war and a shorter one. Her tactics may increase the ultimate cost of war for us and may render economic recovery for the victorious

Democracies a more precarious and costly undertaking. So widespread may be her annihilation tactics that the Democracies may find themselves the victors over a useless, destroyed world that will stand as a mute, decaying monument to the end of our civilization. In this case, she might win, for we may find that the only solution to postwar problems would be the adoption of a communal, integrated, rigidly controlled economy closely akin to the Communism we sacrificed all to destroy. Only time can give us the answer.

The case is not hopeless, however, and much of the annihilation can be prevented. This calls for strong defenses in all quarters likely to be marked for annihilation, an early victory by destruction over her air arm and her aircraft industry, an early destruction of her atomic capabilities, and the creation of a superior air arm of the Democracies to gain these early victories. So far, this air arm has not been forthcoming at the rate necessary for air superiority on R-Day. Unless this is corrected, we may find ourselves in difficulty at the outset and faced with almost insoluble problems at the conclusion of the war.

Our strategy for survival demands that we learn and train ourselves to become masters of the global technique as rapidly as possible. Our build-up period must not be delayed, and this realization should be drummed into all the people of all the Democracies without regard for injuring delicate Communist sensibilities. Anything that interferes with it must go and go quickly. A superior striking force must be built and must be prepared not only to counter Soviet annihilation tactics but to ensure our survival by winning the decisive battle on the day war begins.

Chapter 10

The Armed Forces for Conflict—The Enemy

Up to this point we have placed most of the emphasis on the economic, psychological, or political aspects of World War III. What of the machine that must do the actual fighting? We know that World War III will require millions of soldiers, sailors, and airmen as well as all the civilian manpower available to prosecute the war, and, while physical numbers are not the sole basis for the final decision, the fighting man will play a most important role, if not the primary one.

Since the early days of the Soviet Union there has been every indication that one of its objectives was the creation of armed forces that would be the greatest in the world. Economy, finance, foreign policy, and the life of the state itself have been adjusted to the attainment of this goal. The Soviet military machine is a truly formidable one. We know that the Soviet Union possesses today the largest standing army of any nation in the world, the largest air force in existence, the greatest submarine fleet, and an industry geared to the all-out production of matériel for war.

The exact figures are difficult to come by because the effective operation of the Iron Curtain has made the securing of such information a precarious task. Reports and information filter out from behind the wall of secrecy and reach the Democracies in a roundabout fashion. Deserters and political refugees, among them officers and soldiers of the Red Army, also supply some valuable facts. However, these sources can supply us with only an approxima-

tion of Russian strength rather than the vitally important statistics we need.

While much of the information is undoubtedly true, no one can be certain of the absolute veracity of the information so indirectly received. The Russian penchant for boasting and for propaganda also tends to discredit the information we come by in the normal course of events. There is, however, one thing we know and know well: the Russian military machine is gigantic, trained, well equipped, and almost ready for war!

Present estimates place the Russian strength at about 175 divisions with 40,000 tanks and 20,000 aircraft. Based on World War II figures, this means more than 3,000,000 and less than 5,000,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen under arms at this moment. As a standing peacetime army, this figure is almost astronomical in comparison to the combined armed forces of the free world now facing Russia in Western Europe.

During World War II Russia inducted approximately 25,000,000 men, of whom at least 20,000,000 were under arms at one time. Russian 1945 plans indicated an ultimate force of 550 divisions for combat, should the war demand them. This goal was not reached, but the mere calculation of such a force is indicative of the Soviet Union's potential.

The combined strength planned for by Britain and the United States was an absolute maximum of 140 divisions. While the two allies did not reach their goal, the percentage of attainment of their final objective was equal to that of the Soviet. What is important is that the United States planned only 25 per cent of the Soviet objective and *still did not reach its target!*

In addition to its standing force the Soviet Union has a reserve of approximately 15,000,000 trained men whose entry into service is contingent upon the supply of arms available. Greenhalgh estimates an annual conscription of 1,000,000 men who serve from three to five years. Soviet arms are further augmented by the "*Dorsarm*," or "All Union Volunteer Society for Co-operation with the Army." This is a group of six to eight million youngsters who are enlisted for constant military training at about fifteen years of age. Recruited from the Communist Youth Movement (*Kom-*

somol), they are pledged for service in one of the paramilitary organizations sponsored by the Kremlin and form a pool of partly trained personnel for the Red Army.

While the satellite armies cannot be considered genuine assets for the Soviet, the handicap of lack of equipment that has plagued them is being rapidly overcome by increased Russian production and industrialization in the captive states. Should war be delayed another two years it is likely that any liability of this character will be eliminated. This, however, still leaves their will to fight against the Democracies as a dubious factor in Russian planning.

The greatest manpower in the satellite forces is found in the Polish Army. Under the guidance of Soviet Marshal Rokossovski and 6,000 Russian officers with Polish-sounding names, the Polish forces have been developed to 16 full divisions with 7 more anticipated during 1952–53. Of the present divisions, at least 2 are light armored and a minimum of 4 are motorized. All are equipped with the latest Soviet weapons, including at least 100 medium-sized bombers in the Polish Air Force. The Russian language has been taught as the official military language of Poland, as well as in the other satellites, and standardized tactical training has been instituted. Political training and rigid discipline have been instituted, and attempts have been made to secure an oath of loyalty to the Soviet Union.

Czechoslovakia has made the greatest progress of any satellite in her rearmament. Under the general leadership of Dr. Cepicka, Minister of Defense in 1950 and later a general in the Czech Army, her forces were built to fourteen full divisions with more planned for. Cepicka, a devoted follower of the Kremlin, left no doubt as to the Russianization of his forces. "Soviet military science," he said, "is being applied in our army as well as Soviet military art." Again efforts were made to secure loyalty oaths.

There is little doubt that, under the guidance of the occupying forces of the Soviet, the armies of Hungary and Rumania have become puppet forces of Russia. Hungary has furnished at least four divisions with a minimum of six coming from Rumania. Added to these vassal forces are the 120,000 men who constituted the Bulgarian National Army, now part of the Russian slave con-

tingent. With the newly programmed army of the East Germans in the making, Russia can count on better than a million soldiers from the satellites.

The Chinese Communist forces may be counted as well over four million battle-trained troops. The mission of bringing the Chinese irregular forces into line was entrusted to General Zhukov, temporarily in eclipse in Moscow. Reports have placed his headquarters in Mukden, but more recently he is believed to have been restored to favor and is supposed to be in Moscow once more. The training Zhukov's Chinese have received against the United Nations in Korea may be evaluated in the Far Eastern campaign of World War III.

While the satellites can supply these numbers, there is always the question of making them fight. The most reliable satellite military leaders are believed to be those former Prussian generals who have been called from retirement to lead the East German "volunteers." Other than these, unless Russian officers are supplied, it can be expected that some difficulty will be encountered by the Soviets in their effort to make the captive states a source of sacrifice troops. This, however, is sheer speculation and may be found to be at odds with the demonstration of purpose made by these troops at the time of fighting. The Democracies cannot count on divided loyalties and front-line desertions as material factors in rendering the satellite troops impotent.

The general plan of deployment of the Soviet forces is that of six separate and distinct, self-contained army groups, based on the defense of specific geographical zones. In theory, the army group draws all it needs from within its geographical area. While this is an excellent paper theory, practice may demonstrate that Russia does not have the capacity to create six military "states" each capable of performing the military functions of a separate nation.

In spite of its size, the Red Army can be said to be lacking in top-flight generals, or rather, few Soviet generals dare to present themselves as outstanding leaders. Stalin has adopted an almost standard procedure for rewarding outstanding leaders by causing them to disappear mysteriously or by finding them guilty of deviation and anti-Communist leanings. Since 1946 at least sixteen

World War II generals have been executed or imprisoned, have disappeared or have been sent to Siberia. Of these Zhukov alone appears to have made an unusual comeback.

Two factors may be considered as adverse to the success of Russian ground arms: the method of Russian assault tactics and the lack of leadership from the bottom. To nations dedicated to the principle of keeping casualties at a minimum, the Russian casualty reports of World War II are indications of poor tactical control. This, however, is not true. The Russian system is based on the general battering ram principle, which dictates an attack without regard to casualties. It is the boast of Russian field commanders that Soviet infantry will attack across a mine field or against a fortified position as if these deadly obstacles did not exist. Losses suffered are explained away as being only equal to those that would be sustained if the enemy had attacked or had used machine guns instead of mines. Such a method is disastrous in a prolonged war, for it depletes the trained manpower more rapidly than the rate at which the abilities of the recruits can be brought to a fighting peak.

While the Russian soldier is possessed of a physical toughness that permits him to endure and survive the worst battlefield conditions, toughness is not enough to win. It is recognized and conceded that he is loyal and filled with a patriotic fervor approaching fanaticism. World War II has demonstrated that he is somewhat self-reliant and resourceful, and his deeds have marked him as being ruthless, contemptuous of death, and filled with a deep personal hatred for his enemy. While all of these may be admirable qualities in a soldier, the system of free men imparts to the soldier of the Democracies a quality unknown to our current enemy—that initiative which permits the so-called leadership from the bottom.

Under this system we have an ever increasing pool of leaders who work their way up from the ranks to assume command of small units in time of emergency or when their commanders have been stricken on the field. This is a phenomenon associated with democracy, where every man has always had the chance of lifting himself above his present position. Such a system cannot be developed in a police state where fear serves as the deterrent to ambi-

tion and individual progress. This fact, in view of Russian field tactics, may cost the enemy dear in his all-out efforts and could conceivably exercise an influence on the course of the war.

The Russians have been known for their fierce and tenacious defense of Russian soil, so long as their morale is high. Against a defeated retreating army they are ferocious. However, as yet there has been no demonstration of their capacity for resistance on alien soil when undergoing attack by a determined force or when retreating under pressure in areas not Russian. Peculiar as it may seem, in all the Soviet experience with war the Red Army has never met conditions such as those that confronted the forces of the United States, Britain, and France during World War II. In a purely academic sense it will be interesting to see if the Red Army can achieve the ultimate in military proficiency under such conditions and if Communist ideology and psychology can produce the character, courage, and mental stamina hitherto only demonstrated in free men fighting for their liberty.

Russian economy has undergone serious modifications to provide for the industrial demands of the Red Army, and this modification has produced a somewhat unusual economic condition. Today, the Soviet Union stands unique as the one nation in the world whose heavy industry exceeds her light industry. Such a priority for military purposes is known in the Democracies only after a war has been in progress for a considerable time and is, even then, only a brief temporary expedient. In Russia industrial mobilization for World War III began in 1920, was experimentally developed during the years before World War II, tested during the last war, and is now ready to produce and is producing all that is demanded of it.

Soviet capabilties indicate an annual production of 40,000 excellent tanks—some of them considered to be the best in the world. It is estimated that full production under pressure could result in a two-year-plus supply of war equipment in a single year. Under the Russian system there is no competition between guns and washing machines; the needs of the military are satisfied first. If there is anything left, the consumer can have it.

Among the weapons and war material produced by Russia and worthy of note is the T-34 tank, which not only resisted American

antitank weapons in Korea but drove us back to the drawing boards and factories in search of a new counterpart. New automotive equipment has occupied much of Russia's time and has resulted in the new Soviet jeep—the Gas 67; two new four-wheeled trucks—the Gas 51 and 63 with capacities of 7,200 pounds; and two new high-capacity four-wheelers—the Sis 150 and the Jas 200. The Sis 150 carries 8,500 pounds, and the Jas 200 carries 13,000. The Soviet aim is a mechanized army.

Backing the powerful Red Army is an equally powerful air force, which is estimated at approximately 20,000 planes, ranging from the long-range bomber, the TU-4, down to the MIGs made famous or infamous by their activities in Korea. Present estimates credit the Soviets with an air force numbering something over 700,000, backed by an unknown reserve. To this, of course, must be added the air arms of the satellites.

Any analysis of the Red Air Force must start with the ability of the force to be supplied. Nothing is more futile than an air force without planes unless it is planes without pilots to fly them and ground crews to keep them in shape to fly. Like any other set of figures regarding the Soviet Union those dealing with aircraft production must necessarily fall under the heading of "guestimates." According to general opinion, however, it would appear that the Russian aircraft industry is centered around something in excess of thirty-seven plants, twelve of which are devoted to the production of motors while the remainder produce the planes. It is estimated that almost a half million workers are employed in the industry with the capacity for producing close to 35,000 planes per year. During the last two years of World War II Soviet aircraft production reached an all-time Russian high with three-quarters of a million workers producing 40,000 planes per year.

As is to be expected production estimates vary from 30,000 per year to as high as 60,000 or higher. Some authorities estimate that the four-engine bombers are produced at a rate of twenty per month. One should not forget that to any Russian figure must be added the combined output of the Walter, Henkel, Dormer, Junkers, and Messerschmitt plants, which the Soviets have in the satellites. These are now all in operation.

The planes themselves are worthy of note. The only atom-bomb

carrier is believed to be the four-engine TU-4, which is designed along the lines of the American B-29. This plane may be considered to be the mainstay of Russian strategic air power. Perhaps one day the TU-4 may possess a dreaded familiarity for Americans. While it was felt initially that Russia might be slow and ineffectual in developing supersonic aircraft, present Soviet jets have been tracked at over six hundred miles per hour. The MIG-15 of Korean fame has been variously estimated and judged as a high-speed, highly maneuverable interceptor. Many believe it to be superior to the American F-80 and F-84 but lacking the ability and performance of our F-86. The F-86 holds the speed records at the time of writing and is believed to be capable of outflying the MIG.

Various reports have described or have alleged to describe other Russian aircraft. It is believed that the Soviets have developed an almost superfighter, the YAK-21, along the lines of the old Junkers JU8-248 "target defense" interceptor, which fell into her hands at the end of World War II. Claims for the YAK-21 include a speed of 670 miles per hour and a climb rate of 12,000 feet per minute. Counterreports, however, tend to discredit these claims and point out that it is unlikely that the YAK-21 flying endurance will extend beyond twenty minutes. These claims, both pro and con, can only be proved by actual operations. The last plane of note in the Russian stable is the advanced Soviet version of the MC-163, a Messerschmitt World War II interceptor that originally could climb about 50,000 feet in 3½ minutes. Data concerning Russian improvements on this model have not been made available to the public.

The Soviet Air Force, according to General Vandenberg, has a relative efficiency to the American Air Force of about 20 to 100 in strategical knowledge, effort, and competency. He adds, however, that the Russian pilot is working diligently on instrument flying, night flying, and bombing in order to meet American standards. Contrary to popular opinion the Russian makes a good pilot, being temperamentally and psychologically adapted to flying. Although Russian air technique and technocracy have been materially aided by the knowledge of captive German scientists, there are still serious deficiencies in the Soviet air arm. These deficiencies are to be found in gunnery, night flying, blind flying,

bombing through overcasts, and, frequently, in single-combat technique. As yet they have not equaled the ability of the American or Western European pilots.

The Russian Air Force is believed to be divided into twelve air armies. Two air armies are assigned to each group of land armies to complete the six regional arrangements mentioned earlier. The first group is believed to have its headquarters at Leningrad, facing Scandinavia. The second faces Germany and is directed from Kalingrad. That group aimed at the Balkans is believed to be commanded from Odessa. The fourth group, which faces Turkey and Iran, has its headquarters at Tiflis. The fifth with headquarters at Tashkent faces India and Afghanistan. The last, the Far East Group, is located with control at Chita. The Air Force is under the general direction of the Commissariat of the Army.

Rumor has it that a fantastic-science-fiction-type underground air depot has been built at Kharbarovsk near the Manchurian-Siberian border. This base, presumably a strategic air force center, is supposedly completely resistant to the atom bomb. Should such a base be in existence it would modify the distribution of the air force as noted above.

In spite of all that may be said for the Soviet Air Force as a modern military machine there is much that could be improved. Political mortality among its leaders has been high, and a large number of the purged generals and marshals have been from its ranks. Rumor has it that many of its top-flight designers are anti-Communists who are retained in service because of lack of replacements. This rather rapid change-over of leadership is no benefit to the development of an effective air arm. Some question may also be raised as to the advisability of concentration on the tactical air arm, a natural outgrowth of army control, as opposed to the large strategic air arm so necessary for warfare of a highly economic character. At the time of this writing it would appear that the Soviet air arm, for all its claims, is not the equal of its counterpart in the Democracies.

Even in the days of Russia's imperial glory her navy was never one of her finer, more choice possessions. For some reason, the Russian Navy has always been pretty much of a problem child,

and there are a number of classic cases in international law that testify to its troublesome character. One in particular, the famous Dogger Banks case, is somewhat amusing and bears recital. During the Russo-Japanese war a Russian admiral whose fleet was steaming across the Dogger Banks off Britain mistook the Hull fishing fleet for the Japanese Navy! Opening fire, he covered the Russian Navy with anything but glory. It will be recalled that the early trouble preceding the Bolshevik Revolution started in the Navy. It is no wonder that the Kremlin is sensitive about its sea power and harbors an unfulfilled desire to have it achieve fame in the coming war.

While the Soviet Navy ranks fourth in the world at the present time, Russia lacks the capacity to build and maintain what the Western Powers conceive to be a balanced naval arm. As a result of this there is little likelihood that she will present a challenge to the sea power of the Democracies or that there will be any such outstanding naval actions in the coming war as the Battle of the Coral Sea. This should not lead us to be so incautious as to underestimate the potential value of the Russian Navy, for it can play an important part in the next war, if only from the standpoint of harassing tactics.

While her present force is mostly composed of small craft, she has at least 3 battleships, 12 cruisers, and 110 destroyers. There is every possibility that 4 more 35,000-ton, 29-knot battleships have been or are being completed. These will mount 9 16-inch guns. At least 2 aircraft carriers are known to be in process of construction or have been completed.

During World War II, the United States transferred at least 585 small vessels to Russia, and 459 of these are in her hands at the time of writing. These include submarine chasers, torpedo boats, mine sweepers, and similar craft. In addition, it is known that large numbers of these types of vessel are under construction in order to augment her program of making the Baltic a Russian lake and for the protection of the Black Sea.

Total tonnage of the Russian bloc, including the satellites, would run about 3,000,000 gross tons and include about 1,000 ships. Balanced against this is the United States with 3,500 vessels amounting to 26,000,000 tons and 7,500 Western European craft

with a tonnage of about 42,000,000 gross tons. Marine building in Russia has been given a high priority, and a greater emphasis has been placed on Soviet sea power than might be imagined. Stalin has given every indication that the Kremlin by no means underestimates the strength of the free world on the sea.

The one real and present threat from Soviet naval power lies in the Russian submarine fleet. In 1948 reports credited her with a fleet of 250 submarines and a potential of producing large numbers of undersea craft superior to the German World War II vessel. By the autumn of 1951 estimates placed her total brood at 360 with a planned figure of 1,000 submarines to be available by the end of 1952. While these figures are subject to discount for propaganda, it is a conservative estimate when we say that the Soviet Union has at least three times the number Germany had at the beginning of World War II. This is, indeed, a formidable prospect to face.

More important than the quantity of undersea craft available to Russia is the possibility that she may possess a large number of the Type XX[1] submarine designed by Germany and an almost unknown number of the new Russian peroxide-driven craft. Experts have estimated that at least 300 of the Type XX[1] were in operation by the end of 1952. The so-called Pravda class of submarine is known to be 319 feet in length and armed with 10 torpedo tubes, 2 AA guns, and 2 deck guns. It is believed that most of these are also equipped with snorkels for subsurface breathing.

There can be too much of a good thing, and this is what has happened to the Soviet submarine program. According to informed sources, her submarine production now exceeds her ability to supply the proper manpower for crews. Not just any sailor can be a submariner. An intensified recruiting campaign was conducted in the satellites, with particular concentration on Germany, in an effort to eliminate this deficiency. In spite of high pay and favorable conditions the hoped-for results were not forthcoming. This lack of personnel could seriously cripple the Russian undersea fleet.

Some attention should be paid to the ever increasing Soviet amphibious-force training operations, which clearly indicate her intention in World War III. An almost constant exercise in both

offensive and defensive tactics has been conducted during the last three years, and a well-trained amphibious force has been developed as a result of it. Considering the coasts of England, France, Germany, the Benelux and Scandinavian countries as logical landing places, the Russian amphibious program bears watching.

The atomic capacities of the Soviet Union have been a source of much concern to the citizens of the Democracies, and there is no doubt that, thanks to the efforts of traitors in the free world, Russia is producing atomic bombs at a fairly interesting rate. It is estimated that the Communists had between 25 and 30 bombs in 1951. At the rate of 2 per month, a figure advanced by experts, it is estimated that the Soviets produced nearly 50 bombs by the end of 1952. An expected rise to 5 per month is anticipated for 1953.

The controlling factor is, of course, the supply of uranium available to her. Should this be equal to that of the Democracies the results could be extremely serious. In the light of this fact, Communist control of Czechoslovakian and German uranium becomes a factor to be reckoned with in any strategy for survival. While the extent of deposits in these two areas is not known, it is believed that they are considerable. It is further believed that these sources are being depleted at a rapid rate, which could mean that Russia is producing bombs at an equally rapid rate or that our estimates of the extent of her uranium supplies have been faulty. This is one case where it would be pleasant to be wrong in our estimates.

How much does this huge military program cost Russia and what does it do to her economy? Her 1951 budget called for an outlay of almost 24 billion dollars, an increase of 22 per cent over the 1950 budget and 42 per cent over that of 1949. This is approximately 21.2 per cent of her total budget! This by no means ends her spending, for many of her defense items are disguised in her budget. If her military expenditures were to be evaluated realistically we should probably find that these expenditures amounted to nearly 50 per cent of her budget.

Her budget figure only covers such items as housing, food, upkeep, and salaries. Armament, planes, atomic piles, and battleships are covered by a national economy fund. The sum allotted for civilian construction adequately covers the building of strategic

highways and cantonments, a purpose for which it is almost entirely diverted, and new industries for war can be masked quite easily by the simple term, "capital investments." If we consider the fact that the present standard of living in Russia is less than half as high as that of the United States, we find that the Kremlin can support two and one-half times the military personnel on the same amount of money required to support one soldier in America.

That the Communists have created a truly gigantic and formidable military machine goes without saying, as does the fact that we in the Democracies will eventually have to meet this machine in decisive combat for our survival. How we could have been so blind as not to see that she was building this force at a time when the rest of the world was reducing theirs is hard to understand. We, of course, had some help from Communists and Communist sympathizers operating within the Democracies, but in the final analysis the fault is ours. One can pursue a desire for peace to such a point that it becomes the peace of death. Russia now has attained the highest peak of military power in her history, and destiny has given to us the task of reducing it and her to impotency. Will the Democracies be ready to meet the challenge when it comes? There can be but one answer. Our strategy must prepare for this day, or for us there will be no survival.

Chapter 11

The Armed Forces for Conflict—The Democracies

Tell the average American that it is easier to obtain fairly detailed information about the Red Army than it is to obtain even general information about the armed forces of the Democracies, and he will laugh at you. Stop and think for a moment. How much do you actually know about the strength, composition, and effectiveness of equipment of the United States Army? How many men are fighting under the UN banner in Korea? How many are at grips with the enemy in Indo-China, Malaya, or Burma? Ridiculous as it seems, it is true that we in the United States know more about the Russian forces than we do about our own.

And this is as it should be. Published figures concerning Russian strength furnish little or no information to the Communists. The mere act of publishing them shows the Soviet that, in spite of all her precautions, we still acquire information from behind her Iron Curtain. This in itself is disquieting to her. However, information published on the forces of the Democracies may supply the enemy with much valuable information she does not have. Every piece of information Russia receives is a weapon against us. Therefore, if the information contained in this chapter is not to your liking or as detailed as you think possible, accept it as constituting that which could be published without offering aid and comfort to your enemy. Let's not take a chance with your life just to satisfy your curiosity.

Let's look at the American forces first. Our total over-all

strength, including Army, Navy, Marines, and Air Force, is estimated at 3,586,670 men and women. Of this figure, 1,558,000 are in the Army, 820,000 in the Navy, 235,320 in the Marines, and 973,350 in the Air Force. This does not include the organized reserves, cadets, midshipmen, the 21 divisions of the National Guard not on active service, or the ROTC. This figure represents actual forces on active duty.

At the moment our army has approximately twenty divisions numbering about 14,500 men per division. The word division applies strictly to infantry troops, who represent the basic fighting unit. It does not include the armor, artillery, combat engineers, antiaircraft, tank destroyers, or other troops necessary to support the infantry and keep them in action. These troops outnumber the infantry roughly four to one, but inasmuch as the infantry is the basic ground-force fighting unit, we employ it as the index of fighting strength.

The American soldier is literally all over the free world. Five of our divisions, with their supporting troops, are in Europe as a part of the defense bulwark against Russian invasion. Eight more are in the Far East in Japan or fighting in Korea. With the remaining seven we garrison the United States, the Canal Zone, Alaska, and Hawaii. Some are in Puerto Rico or isolated little islands whose names are unfamiliar to us. Some are engaged in building air bases abroad or on duty in areas such as Iceland. Others are serving as instructors and advisers in foreign countries as part of the tremendous program to create the armed forces of the free world necessary to stop the Communist horde. Many are garrisoning air bases in Morocco, England, Canada, Greenland, or the Middle East. Over 60 per cent of our naval forces are at sea or overseas. This is a wide area to be covered by three and a half million troops. Therefore, if the figure of twenty divisions looks small and the cost of their upkeep seems high, remember the job they must do.

Twenty divisions by no means constitutes our fighting strength. Behind these combat-ready divisions stands a well-trained National Guard, some of whose divisions are already in Federal service, and a large reserve of personnel from World War II, a vast number of whom have kept active contact with our defense establish-

ment as members of the Organized Reserve. In time of need these can be called upon for service against the enemy.

The divisional strength of approximately 14,500 men serves generally as a model for the various Democracies who make up the regional security forces such as NATO. Facts pertaining to the American division, therefore, can be regarded within certain limits as approximately those applicable to the forces of the other Democracies with whom we are allied. Thus, if we become familiar with the key factors in our own divisions, we can approximate the picture of the others.

Based on actual numbers, the American infantry division is somewhat larger than that of the Communists. The ratio is somewhere in the neighborhood of 2 to 3, that is two American divisions are approximately the same size as three Russian divisions. To match Russia's 175 divisions in being the Democracies would need approximately 118 American-type divisions of which the United States is prepared to furnish twenty at the moment. The chief difficulty lies in the fact that the Russian divisions are all concentrated behind the Iron Curtain while ours are scattered on the business of our various commitments.

But manpower alone is not the sole criterion of an army, nor is it a good one. The degree of training efficiency must be taken into consideration, and in this the American troops excel. Our troops may not be the best trained or constitute the best operating military machine, but our educational system, our emphasis on individual and team sports, and our political environment that permits initiative and leadership to develop supply us with the ability to shake down faster into a finer degree of battle efficiency than is possible for any other nation, particularly our current enemy.

Wherever the American soldier has fought, he has come to be feared by the enemy. We are not vicious or unnecessarily cruel; but our men fight with an impersonal, dispassionate fixity of purpose that has the quality of wearing down the enemy resistance and striking at the heart of his morale. To the average American soldier who has never watched himself go into battle, this may appear to be "stuff for the birds," but to those who have observed

him or met him in combat the fact remains that his fighting ability is wondrous to behold.

To fight effectively a man must have the tools necessary for his mission, and in this department the United States can truthfully say she leads the world. Given a good rifle and good ammunition, almost anyone can learn to shoot, but in the hands of the American infantryman this combination means swift and certain death. Despite all the training he has received, the G.I. still throws a hand grenade like a baseball and makes a liar out of all the experts with his deadly accuracy. The quality of his small arms and his expert employment of them make the enemy think twice before standing up to the American infantryman.

We approach combat in the same spirit as we approach any other unpleasant task—it's a bad job that has to be done, and the sooner we do it, the less time we have to spend on it. There are no wild statements of patriotic fervor or inspirational speeches that move the American soldier to fight. The political commissar would have short shrift in the American service. It's rather a simple "Oh, my aching back, let's get the job over with and get the hell home" attitude that keeps him going.

He is capable of the patriotic gesture but in half-shy manner that makes him seem almost ashamed of his emotion. Crossing on the *Queen Mary* in the very early days of World War II, I witnessed what was for me the most unusual sight of the whole war. One night some unidentified G.I. sat down at the piano in the lounge and started to play. He played the usual odds and ends of popular music, interrupted by brief selections from Chopin and Bach. Finally, tiring, he started to leave the piano and as he did so he was struck with an idea. Turning back to the keyboard, he struck up "The Star-Spangled Banner," almost timidly at first, and then as the men around started to sing, crashing out with magnificent chords that shook the instrument.

Gradually the anthem swept through the decks. More and more men joined in the singing until it seemed as though every soldier on board was straining his lungs to outdo his neighbor. From the depths of the ship the waves of song came up to meet those set free on the upper decks, and it was almost as if the ship itself

sang. Not everyone knew all the words, and there was some dispute about the exact tune, but everybody sang. Then, as abruptly as it had started, the anthem stopped, and there was a deep silence for a long minute while we all looked sheepishly at each other, a little embarrassed by our outburst. When we returned to all the little things we were doing to pass the time, the ship seemed like a happier but more determined vessel. I think I learned a lot about the G.I.'s love of country that night, and I stopped wondering if only those who understood why we were fighting would fight well.

Wars are fought with weapons and are won by the ability of the user to employ them to their maximum efficiency. The effectiveness of any fighting force can be measured by the firepower it delivers. While firepower alone is a dangerous yardstick, it can give a graphic representation of the comparative efficiency of an American and Soviet division. Among the factors to be considered are accuracy, rapidity of fire, volume of fire, flexibility (change of aim), range, and the ability to sustain and support; all of these are implied in the magic word—firepower.

The M-1 rifle (the Garand) is capable of firing 16 rounds per minute as compared with the capacity of 10 rounds per minute of the Soviet bolt-operated rifle. Moreover, the automatic character of the M-1 permits the user to keep his eye on the target, thus combining greater accuracy with rapidity of fire. The Soviet rifle requires its user to displace his eye from the target each time he operates the bolt. We are now thinking in terms of an even better rifle.

In addition to greater accuracy and speed the American soldier is capable of sustaining himself for a much longer period than the five days allotted to the Soviet rifleman before he must be resupplied with ammunition from nondivisional sources. This is due to the organization of the American division, which permits resupply from divisional rear echelons rather than from the nondivisional sources of supply open to the Russian soldier. While the American system requires additional transportation and the services of 1,500 men to perform the task, the American fire is constant and not subject to interruption on account of lack of ammunition. It should be noted here that there are 4,500 addi-

tional men in the American-type division not engaged in front-line missions but in keeping the front line in action.

In our heavier weapons such as artillery and mortars the American fire-control system gives the U.S. division a greater advantage over the Soviet troops in terms of effective rounds delivered on the target. Constant research in the ordnance field has served to increase the firepower of the division in the area of heavier weapons. Our Korean experiences have caused us to add nine light machine guns to the battalion, two 105-mm. recoilless rifles to the heavy-weapons company, and to replace 1050 accurate, rapid-firing, but short-ranged carbines with the heavier M-1 in each division. If firepower alone were the sole criterion, the U.S. division would have an over-all firepower of one and one-half times that of the Soviet division with approximately the same number of men on the line of action.

Comparing the two divisions more specifically, we find that in quality and manufacture the Soviet weapons are good and compare favorably with our own. However, the grouping and employment is inferior to that of an American division. Therein lies the story of why the equivalent of 13 American-type divisions operating in Korea have been able to fight to a standstill 82 Communist divisions organized and equipped in accordance with the Soviet organizational concept.

In individual weapons, rifles, pistols, submachine guns, etc., the U.S. division has almost twice as many as has the Soviet. The Soviet divisions have more submachine guns per division, which increases their firepower at close range but handicaps them at distances over seventy-five feet. In crew-served weapons, automatic rifles, light and heavy machine guns, the American division has 1570 more than the enemy's division. We also have almost 15 times the number of .50-caliber machine guns per division; while these are primarily used for antiaircraft protection, they are effective as a ground weapon. Our advantage in mortars is not so great. While we have 45 per cent more per division, the Soviet mortars are preponderantly of the heavy type. These are employed by the Russians in much the same way that our howitzers of the same caliber are used and are extremely effective against personnel.

Much was written in the last war about the tremendous Soviet artillery concentrations. Almost every newsreel and documentary carried vivid shots of Soviet artillery in action, and all of us quivered and shivered over its deadly effect. What most Americans don't realize is that the American artillery is more deadly and much more powerful. The total number of field artillery pieces in the American division not only exceeds the number in the Soviet division by 60 per cent, but they are weapons of a much heavier caliber. While the Soviet lighter 76- and 85-mm. weapons are of a high velocity and useful against tanks, the Soviet has yet to develop a successful counterpart of the recoilless guns used as both field and antitank weapons by the United States. We need have no fears that our artillery is not the equal or the master of that of our enemy.

Our antiaircraft artillery has twice as many guns per infantry division and is somewhat more effective on the individual gun basis. We have a clear superiority in rocket launchers, with four times as many per division as the Soviet forces are allotted. Where tanks are concerned, our divisions have twice as many tanks as the Soviet combined total of tanks and self-propelled guns per division.

This advantage of firepower carries over into the armored division as well. Here we find the U.S. division with 40 per cent more individual weapons, twice as many crew-served automatic weapons, seven times more heavy .50-caliber machine guns, and about the same number of mortars. Our armored field artillery and AA artillery have over 50 per cent more weapons and these are of a heavier caliber than those of the enemy. The Soviet division has no counterpart of our armored rocket launcher and has 50 per cent less tanks than are found in the U.S. armored division.

This one and one-half times firepower advantage tends to reduce the threat of Soviet divisions even further. It requires one and one-half Soviet divisions to deliver the firepower of one American-type division, and this delivery is limited to a five-day period because of Soviet organizational delivery. Thus 118 American-type divisions are the equivalent of 175 Russian divisions in firepower as well as personnel, although the men firing on both sides are approximately the same in number.

Sir Halford Mackinder, in a paper written in 1943, made a profound statement about air power that should be kept uppermost in the minds of everyone planning for survival. "Some persons today seem to dream of a global air power which will liquidate both fleets and armies. I am much more impressed, however, by the broad implications of a recent utterance of a practical airman: 'Air power depends absolutely on the efficiency of its ground organization. . . .' It can only be said that no adequate proof has yet been presented that air fighting will not follow the long history of all kinds of warfare by presenting alternations of offensive and defensive tactical superiority, meanwhile effecting few permanent changes in strategical conditions." If the great geopolitician were alive today, he might revise his statement to include the fact that the United States has recognized the importance of the first fact and is preparing to disprove the assumption contained in the second. In these two postwar modifications to air strategy is to be found much of the power of the United States Air Force.

The USAF is the most modern and highly developed air arm in the world at the present time. With an approximate strength of 973,350 officers and men, equipped with 14,000 excellent planes and a 6,000 reserve, it demonstrates the results that can be obtained by the infusion of new, vital thinking into the doctrine of war. Because of the highly classified nature of its work the average layman may not know of its efficiency before World War III becomes history; but this much can be told now—the Air Force is equal to any task presented to it within the limits of the groups now at its disposal. When production permits its expansion to the proposed strength, there will be no air force capable of withstanding it.

Present production rates call for an annual delivery of 10,000 planes per year, with this figure being raised to 15,000 annually by the end of 1953. This may seem inferior to the Russian rate, but it should be noted that every plane delivered will *leave the ground* with a thoroughly trained pilot at the controls and will perform its mission with as much efficiency as an excellent machine and an expert crew can be expected to produce. It is not "planes on the ground" that will decide the battle but "planes

in the air," expertly handled. This, in itself, constitutes an overriding advantage in contrast to the enemy's capabilities.

Recognizing that the air arm is the corps of specialists, the men who designed our modern air force have taken every precaution to ensure that an adequate supply and reserve will be available. The list of specialists embraces a score or more fields ranging from electronic experts to meteorologists and political scientists. The Air Force truly meets the exacting requirements of a union between the military and scientific mind that geopoliticians have insisted is vital for success in combat.

Emphasis has been placed on the strategic air concept rather than on the tactical concept, although the latter has not been neglected. By the strategic concept we mean the expert destruction of the enemy's warmaking powers as already discussed. Following the doctrine of inflicting the maximum damage with the minimum destruction, a successful implementation of this formula by the USAF could introduce the permanent changes in the science of warfare called for by Mackinder.

The bombing force of the United States is a well-equipped, well-trained, highly technical institution calling for a variety of specialists in its ground organization and on whose studies and determinations the security and success of the United States depend in time of war. Of necessity, the composition and activities of such a force are highly secret and must be so in order to prevent the enemy from securing any details that might enable him to provide a defense against it. At this time it should suffice to say that the Strategic Air Force is equipped with the best bombers of any air force in the world and a staff of experts more than adequate to cope with Russia.

The Tactical Air Force is designed for support of the ground troops in action and, in spite of certain adverse publicity, has proved itself in Korea. Equipped with fast maneuverable fighter planes it serves both as an offensive and defensive weapon for combat. The relative destruction rate between American and Communist aircraft in Korea testifies to the efficiency of the tactical fighting planes of the United States. It should be noted that one of the reasons given for our failure to obtain more information on the Russian bombers and MIG fighters is the fact that they are

almost all shot down *behind* the enemy lines. The real significance of this fact is often lost. What it means is that American planes are carrying the war to the enemy's territory rather than waiting for him to invade the air space above ours.

In spite of the efficiency and ability of the American air arm we cannot permit ourselves to underestimate the enemy. We have not yet reached the point where we have air superiority or 100-per-cent air security. The Soviet Air Force is excellent; ours, it is believed, is better. However, in certain areas of aircraft efficiency the Soviets have the advantage. Pilots who have met the MIG in Korea testify that this plane is well designed with heavier armament and a faster rate of climb than our best jets; it has been called one of the two best jets in the world today. We, however, retain the advantage of superior gunnery and air discipline.

The Soviet challenge facing American air power is simple to define. Good pilots, good aircraft, and a rate of military aircraft production in excess of that presently enjoyed by the Democracies serve as the basis. Join this threat with guided missiles, the atomic bomb, and determined research in the field of air power, and the threat looms large. When all these factors have been mixed with the Soviet determination on world conquest the challenge becomes one the Democracies cannot afford to meet with any degree of carelessness or complacency. To win we must be superior to Russia in every aspect of air warfare.

Some comfort may be found in the statement of General Vandenberg, "While our monopoly of atomic energy has been broken, we still retain leadership in this field by a wide margin. And while our leadership in military air power is now seriously challenged, our experience and knowledge in the use of the air is unequaled. I, for one, can find no reason for a pessimistic view. If we so will, it lies within our means not only to regain our former position of supremacy in the air but also retain it." Our strategy for survival demands such supremacy.

Without question, the United States Navy is the outstanding naval force in the world today. In manpower it numbers 820,000 plus 235,320 marines. As befits a navy, 66 per cent or more of our sea forces are always at sea or in overseas waters. Actual ship strength numbers 2,518 of all types in active service and 1,646 in

reserve. To replace all the physical property of this naval force would cost us 71 billion dollars based on 1951 costs.

Back of this regular force are many hidden assets the taxpayer rarely sees or considers. The trained Naval Reserve, for example, numbers 785,000 officers and men, exclusive of Marine Reserves. The Navy has a training capacity of 200,000 recruits per year, the number actually processed during 1951. This training capacity coupled with the large reserve affords American sea power a constant flow of trained personnel and a potential for augmenting our sea forces to a greater degree than that possible by any other power.

Within the Navy there is a full-scale commercial shipping line known as the Military Sea Transport Service, or popularly as MSTS. The MSTS, vital in war and peace, operates 535 craft of all types. In the last two years this service has transported 48 million measurement tons of cargo and 28 million long tons of petroleum. To a nation such as the United States, whose wars are fought on foreign soil and who must supply its forces and those of its allies via a sea route, this nucleus of wartime supply lines may hold the key to the question of success or failure.

The Naval Air Force, the protective screen of the fleet and a most valuable defensive arm for the security of the United States, numbers 8,500 operating aircraft. While greater emphasis has been placed on fighter aircraft, Navy fighter-bombers have given an excellent account of themselves in Korea. Naval aviation represents a most potent threat to the Communists.

The greatest menace of the Russian Navy lies in its submarines. Against this threat the Navy is almost our sole defense. The long U.S. supply lines and our vital coastal shipping render us easy prey to the undersea enemy unless the Navy can assure us domination of the sea. This superiority must be secured at the outset of the war and must be ours from the day the first Russian submarine rears its ugly snout in or near our convoys. World War III naval action will be largely defensive and protective; unless we can meet the challenge of the Russian undersea craft, we've had it.

While much has been written concerning the atomic warfare capabilities of the Russians, the United States is still believed to

be further ahead in both production and new developments. At this moment the atomic-powered submarine is no longer a drawing-board creature but a reality in the shape of the U.S.S. *Nautilus*. Atomic artillery is also within the scope of our arsenal. During the summer of 1952 contracts were let for construction of gigantic atomic-powered engines suitable for use in naval craft, and atomic-powered aircraft will not be long in coming into use.

So much for the United States end of the Democracies' forces; now let's look at our allies. As a result of the contributions of various nations to the Korean enterprise there have been many expressions of disappointment at the alleged disinterest or lack of ability on the part of Europe to supply what some of our people deem "adequate support." Much of this is due to wrong information or lack of it that has grown out of the necessary security regulations surrounding the Korean struggle. Some of this disappointment has been produced by carefully timed local and foreign Communist propaganda that has subtly led us to believe our allies were shirking their responsibility.

It is doubtful at this time, considering the other commitments involved and the lack of adequate equipment, if our allies could do more than they have done. At the moment France has over half of her standing army overseas in various areas. Approximately 150,000 of these troops are battling Communists in Indo-China, and her losses in both officers and men have been acute. A large percentage of her forces are on duty in Germany, helping to hold the line against Russia. Britain has over 175,000 troops outside Europe and a large number on duty in Germany. She, too, is fighting her own private war in southeast Asia against the Communists in Malaya, and some estimates place her troops in this area as high as 40,000 men. Italy is not involved in the Korean war because of her former status and her lack of membership in the UN. Turkey and Greece have both made large contributions in spite of their urgent need for troops at home. The other UN members have never been large military powers.

At the moment seventeen nations are involved in the UN command, including the United States. Apart from the United States forces and those of the Republic of Korea, the largest con-

tingent comes from Britain, with 2 brigades and 2 air squadrons, the total exceeding 22,000. Canada has contributed a brigade group and various naval craft; Turkey, Greece, and Ethiopia along with the Philippines have sent regimental combat teams. Battalions have come from France, Australia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Thailand, Luxembourg, and Belgium. An air squadron was sent by the Union of South Africa, and navy units came from Colombia. All in all there is the equivalent of 13 U.S.-type divisions, including the forces of the Republic of Korea itself.

While this is a respectable force in size, it is admittedly not all that could be sent, but it is all that can be spared and equipped at the moment. We must realize, as must Europe, that so long as we proceed on a formula of "butter and Buicks 70 per cent, guns 30 per cent," we can only make a 30-per-cent effort at rearmament or defense. There is no point in just sending men; these men must have more than words with which to fight. Until all the Democracies get on a war footing and prepare in earnest for combat, our efforts will continue to be tokens.

Admittedly, the steel strike of 1952 did our defense efforts little good, but would you, a representative of the great American public, accept the restrictions necessary for complete defense arming in time of alleged peace? Would you go without not what you need but what you desire at this moment in order to reduce the 70-per-cent-butter factor? If you answer that question truthfully, you may find in your own words the reason why Europe has not contributed more. Building for defense is a matter that requires everyone to sacrifice; have you been ready to do so?

Who would take care of the vital rebuilding of European industry if Europe sent more troops? That is the second question to be answered. Earlier it was pointed out that the chief value of European industry was in its prewar production. Once hostilities begin in Europe the sources of the Democracies' production in that area are likely to be destroyed by the Soviet. Now is the time to squeeze out every last ounce of industrial production in Western Europe, and this requires manpower.

A superficial examination of conditions in some of the European countries will reveal some startling information about the conditions under which they must prepare to defend themselves. It

must be remembered that the figures quoted here are those released for public consumption and are thus not completely accurate. They represent the minimum rather than the average or actual strengths.

In the British budget for 1951–52 the sum of £1,026,050,000 (over $2,800,000,000) was set aside for defense purposes. Considering her indebtedness, the cost of her heroic defense in World War II, and the necessity of rehabilitating and reconstructing her war-shattered industry, it can be seen without difficulty that such an expenditure can be made only by rigid austerity and sacrifice. When this is considered in the light of her reduced trade with both the Far East and Central Europe and her financial losses involved in the creation of India and Pakistan, one wonders how she is able to appropriate even this much.

A conservative estimate places the strength of her army at 527,000 officers and men on active service, at least 60,000 of whom are now fighting; a regular navy of 143,500; and an excellent air force of 225,000. Her immediate target is 10 regular-army divisions. In addition to her regular army she has a so-called Territorial Army, or the equivalent of our National Guard, of 6 infantry divisions, 2 armored and 6 airborne divisions, and 5 antiaircraft groups, a total of 77,206 men. Her plans call for an increase of this force to 12 divisions, fully equipped. Of her once vast colonial forces only 65,000 colonial and Gurkha troops remain. The Pathans, Sikhs, and other almost legendary troops of old India are now in the service of Pakistan and India and denied to Britain.

On these figures Britain must build her defense yet keep her industry in operation. She must supply troops for Korea, Egypt, Aden, Malaya, and other outposts of empire. She must garrison Germany, Austria, Trieste, and Gibraltar. Her troops must protect Malta and Cyprus, and she must retain adequate forces to protect her homeland against surprise attack from the colossus of the East. Quite a task for a country whose manpower, resources, and finances have been so greatly depleted.

The British are excellent, hard-fighting, if somewhat unspectacular, troops, capable of enduring great hardships in combat and holding a line with the dogged determination to succeed that has

always characterized Tommy Atkins. Their system of fighting places even a greater emphasis on the conservation of manpower than that found in the American forces. For this reason their advances may be somewhat slower than those of the American infantryman but nonetheless sure.

The situation in France is not any more favorable at the moment than that of Britain; if anything it is more critical. The French budget cannot afford to support a military expenditure in excess of 30 per cent of the total appropriations. According to her 1951–52 budget, 738 billion francs were allocated for military purposes. The minimum cost of operating her forces during the period was 750 billion francs or a deficit of 12 billions. The cost of equipping one armored division is estimated at 100 billion francs and that of an infantry division at somewhat less than that figure. When all is said and done, France is able to allot only 84 billion francs over and above current operating costs for the purchase of new matériel for her ground forces.

Such a situation is indeed critical and threatens the military preparation of the Democracies. Even with the 84 billion francs she requires large deliveries under the Marshall Plan, and U.S. production is not meeting these demands soon enough. Our 70-per-cent-butter policy is extended to our allies overseas both to their detriment and to ours. The butter factor must be reduced and the gun factor increased if we are to fulfill our role as the arsenal of democracy.

The last public figures assign France an army of 525,000, an extremely low estimate, with a paramilitary organization—the gendarmerie—of 60,000 men. Her naval strength is estimated at upwards of 50,000. While her navy receives its whole appropriation for operating expenses, it cannot rebuild its lost ships on the sum allotted. Her air force is a struggling infant, lusty but still an infant, that is barely able to maintain itself on its share of the appropriation. Her planning called for 1,000 planes by the end of 1952, which was a somewhat optimistic figure.

Lieutenant Colonel de Fouquieres, writing in the *Revue de Défense Nationale*, described her armed forces as consisting of "an army without prestige, a navy without ships, and an air force without production." This, in view of her gallant defense in Indo-

China, seems a somewhat harsh charge. For the last five years France has financed and conducted a bitter fight in this contested area that is by no means a strictly colonial affair but rather a local struggle that has become absorbed in power-bloc politics in the Far East. The figures associated with this struggle are somewhat disturbing. It is estimated that almost one-third of her military budget, or 220,000,000,000 francs, are expended annually in this fight. So far the Indo-Chinese war has cost France 37 per cent of her officers and 27 per cent of her noncommissioned officers. Five of her divisions are committed along with the personnel required to provide cadres for ten more divisions, a total of about 150,000 men.

France is fortunate in having some of the finest colonial troops in the world and a more than adequate supply of colonial manpower should she be able to finance and equip the new divisions that could be built from this source. The Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan infantry units are ferocious fighting aggregations whose prowess in battle has shaken the resolution and morale of many European armies. The Senegalese and the Foreign Legion are almost legendary in their exploits.

Having served for short periods with both North African and Metropolitan French troops, I am, perhaps, an enthusiast. I do not by any means share the opinions of some American and British officers of World War II who were inclined to disparage the French as soldiers. Granted their ways are different than ours, I found that once one became accustomed to the differences it was possible to regard French troops in a new light and with considerable respect. They are capable of stubborn, almost fanatical resistance, and, as is true with almost any highly civilized and well-trained force, they are entirely dependable when well led. In my opinion they constitute a definite asset and a valuable contribution to the military forces of the Democracies.

The remainder of our allies in Europe are not so well fixed but give every indication of improving in military forces. Italy, as specified by the treaty of peace, has an army of 170,000, a navy of 22,500, and an air force of 25,000. Denmark maintains a regular force of about 6,000 men and a territorial army program modeled after that of Britain, which should be of value at a later date.

Of the remainder of the nations Belgium has about 5,000 in her armed forces, Holland somewhat less, with 2,000 from Luxembourg to round out the Benelux corps. Norway musters 8,000 effectives at the moment.

Our allies in the eastern Mediterranean offer somewhat more substantial contributions. Greece has, at the moment, at least three army corps of two divisions each and a growing air force. Many of these troops have been battle-trained in the type of fighting best fitted to the area and are familiar with Communist tactics in warfare. In a certain sense, the Greek civil war of the late forties rendered a definite service to the Democracies in helping to develop a fighting Greek Army.

Turkey is a real military power by contrast to some of the European states. Her present army of 22,000 is backed by a reserve of 350,000 men. She has at least 6 infantry divisions, 6 armored divisions, and 3 cavalry divisions. Her air force consists of 1,000 modern planes and 8,500 men. The Turks are excellent soldiers with a traditional deep-seated hatred of the Russians. In time of war, Turkey could produce her wall of "two million bristling bayonets" as she has done in the past.

Canada is the only other NATO country besides the United States whose lands are not in the European zone. Her military budget of $425,000,000 annually supports an army of 21,831 men, a navy of 9,600 with a reserve of 4,688, and an air force of 17,430 whose fame gained in World War II is known around the world. In addition she has a so-called special force of 9,000 men who are a part of the army.

So far as the strictly NATO forces are concerned, it must be admitted that they are a disappointment. Originally it was agreed at Lisbon that the European contribution would consist of 50 divisions and 4,000 aircraft by the end of 1952. Twenty-five divisions were to be immediate combat-ready troops, while the remaining twenty-five were to be subject to call on 24 to 72 hours' notice. It was planned to have 100 divisions ready to meet the critical period, believed by many military men to be coming in 1954. However, like so many well-laid plans the NATO forces program suffered a setback and was virtually abandoned in mid-

summer 1952. It is now anticipated that a delay of at least two years will be needed before the 1952 goal is reached.

There are several factors that have contributed to this cutback. Primarily, Britain led the way with an announcement that her armament production would be steered away from equipping her own troops and into the open market for sale abroad in order to alleviate her economic plight. France also declared her intention to cut back her rate of equipping and training her troops for financial reasons. Coupled with the purely economic reasons are the delays in German rearmament as a result of the slowness of Western Germany to ratify the Contractual Agreement and a growing belief, traceable to the efforts of the neutralists, that the danger of Soviet aggression has diminished.

To some extent the United States can be blamed for a part of this cutback. European sources charge that we have been slow in our delivery of arms and have cut our military assistance budget below the promised figure. American sources have countered with the contention that Europe has not made the maximum efforts agreed upon. Irrespective of the correctness of either or both charges, it cannot be denied that strikes in critical defense industries, particularly in steel, had a powerful influence on the whole subject of rearmament. Without intending to be critical of labor's case and its right to secure better wages and working conditions it would seem that labor's leaders and those of capital could have buried their grievances temporarily in the interests of the nation and its defense. Perhaps it is such things as the steel strike that Lincoln had in mind when he said this country could be destroyed from within. In any event, the NATO goal has been moved back two years.

This delay will, of course, be reflected in the formation of the military forces of the European Defense Community, or EDC, which was conceived to permit the military participation of Western Germany. Under the EDC plan France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Western Germany are to contribute forces for an international army. These forces are to be formed into *groupements* of 12,000 to 17,000 men, by nationalities. Three to four *groupements* are to constitute a defense corps in which

no more than one *groupement* of any nation will be assigned. Command of the defense corps is to be by an international staff and commander, selected because of ability rather than nationality.

Other than the forces already mentioned there remain those of Portugal, Yugoslavia, and Spain. The former is a NATO country with a low manpower figure and almost unequipped for war. The Yugoslav forces are formidable in number but badly lacking in equipment. Steps are being taken to remedy this deficiency, and it may well be that the Yugoslav army will constitute one of the most valuable contributions to the Democracies' military efforts. Spain is, at this writing, an almost unknown factor. Her military manpower is available and plentiful, but her forces are poorly equipped and trained. Her contribution will depend upon the ability of the United States to arrive at a working agreement with her and on the quantities of arms we shall be able to deliver.

These constitute the sources of manpower and the forces in being to be thrown against Russia's 175 divisions, 40,000 tanks, and 20,000 planes. One could hardy say the present military might of the Democracies is reassuring or contains positive guarantees of victory. Should the war be held off long enough, we will surely, if slowly, build up our forces to the strength required to win. The only question is—will Russia wait? The Democracies have the potential and the ability to win, but, if the blow should come tomorrow, their capacity for victory is doubtful. A much greater effort is needed before we can be certain that our numbers are sufficient to hold the enemy hordes.

Our strategy for survival must include ground control, air superiority, and naval supremacy over submarines. These things can be ensured by the Democracies only if we have the arms and equipment necessary to achieve them. In order to do this all the Democracies must reduce the "butter" percentage and increase that of the "guns." This cannot be done if labor unions vital to defense indulge in strikes or if the people of the Democracies refuse to tighten their belts, make the sacrifices, and pay the taxes required to do the job. Will it be a sacrifice now or slavery later? It's as simple as that.

Chapter 12

When and Where

When will the inevitable war with the Soviet Union begin? That is a question being constantly asked all over the democratic world today. Unfortunately, we are forced to call it the $64 question, because radio and television, those industries whose main function seems to be the discovery and introduction of superlatives into our language, have not yet come up with a descriptive term to denote a more pressing measurement than $64. For the time being, however, the date for war with Russia must be classed as *the* $64 question.

The prediction of M-Day for the world revolution has been a strategic problem for Communism ever since the Russian revolution and, as such, has been carefully guarded from us. It's not good strategy to tell the victim when he is to be slaughtered. Just let him be constantly assured that he will be and keep him worrying about the day—that's good strategy, for his worry can be used as a weapon against him.

Neither the Russians nor the Democracies need be completely in the dark, however, for Lenin generously furnished a basic equation that both sides may use. Stalin himself used this formula from time to time as a somewhat cryptic answer to the constantly repeated question, "When do we fight the Democracies?" If it's good enough for Comrade Stalin, it certainly shouldn't be completely snubbed by us.

> We may consider [wrote Lenin], that the time is ripe for the decisive struggle: When all the class forces arrayed against us are in a state of confusion, are sufficiently embroiled one with another, have been sufficiently weakened in combats for which their strength is inadequate; when all the vacillating, unsteady, unstable intermediate elements have exposed themselves enough before the people, have made a sufficient parade of their utter bankruptcy; when there has arisen and spread widely among the proletariat a strong feeling in favor of decisive and unhesitating bold revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie. Then the time is ripe for revolution. Then, if we have kept good account of the aforementioned conditions and have chosen our moment well, our victory is assured.

An analysis of this formula produces a startling, inescapable conclusion that should make us sit up and take notice. The answer, with the exception of one premise, comes out *now!* Let's examine it point by point.

"When all the class forces arrayed against us are in a state of confusion." It's almost pointless to amplify that one. If it is possible for the Democracies to be in a greater state of confusion than we are in at the moment, it's simply because we haven't yet found the way. Never fear, we will before we are finished. Right at the moment all our houses are split into a variety of factions and political views almost too numerous to mention. In the United States we are attempting to fight a war without using the full force of military might, preparing for a war without raising an army or spending the needed sums on defense in a wise manner, neglecting our opportunities to score while at the same time deploring every victory of the enemy, and promoting a world-wide foreign policy on the basis of contradictory actions.

The picture in the Democracies as a whole is even worse. In Britain, for example, as this is being written, one political force is apologetically explaining why we must continue our fight in Korea and at the same time pushing for an immediate cessation of hostilities with creditable vigor. A second political force heartily condemns any forceful action against the enemy while at the same time it criticizes the party in power for its failure to win. The high point of confusion is reached in the third group that

constantly points out the menace of Russia while strongly advocating a negotiated trade agreement that will enable Britain to sell to her enemy the very war matériel she herself needs in spite of the fact that it may be used against British and allied troops. Added to this is their constant advocacy of neutralism in all Britain's dealings on the subject of Russia.

In France we find a verbal determination to fight the enemy while, at the same time, we encounter a firm resolve not to make the necessary strong preparations for fear of offending her. The Swedes vigorously denounce Russian encroachments on Swedish sovereignty and flatly refuse to participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization designed to protect that sovereignty. If a state of confusion is requisite to war, from the Communist point of view, we have it now.

"Are sufficiently embroiled one with another." This criterion we also meet. France wants protection but at the same time refuses to yield or yields reluctantly to German participation because Germany is a traditional enemy. Britain, France, and the United States fail to see eye to eye on Spain, Iran, Egypt, North Africa, and a half-dozen other spots in the world, and petty vicious bickerings occur between all the Democracies, threatening to produce disunity, distrust, and even failure.

"Have been sufficiently weakened in combats for which their strength is inadequate." So far we have made a poor showing in Korea, Indo-China, Burma, and any other area where Communist forces are at work. We won out in Greece, but that is only one of many areas. The Communists are entitled to feel that we have been weakened, that the strength of the Democracies is inadequate for combat, for not once since World War II, with the exception of the Berlin air lift, have we taken a positive, decisive course of action to demonstrate our strength. It might be only fair to add here that our compliance with the first two points of Lenin's formula has seriously interfered with demonstrations of our adequacy and strength.

"When all the vacillating, unsteady, unstable intermediate elements have exposed themselves enough before the people, have made a sufficient parade of their utter bankruptcy." With this factor we have more than complied. We have demonstrated, be-

yond any reasonable doubt, that our interpretation of democracy is not sufficiently well founded to inspire our adherents to have the courage of the convictions democracy should produce. We have permitted our democratic instruments to be bent to cover Communist activities against us to our detriment. We have permitted ourselves to be obsessed with the idea that democratic freedom means automatic security. We have fallen victims to the insidious doctrine of state paternalism, a major point in Communism. We have shown our inability or lack of desire to unify in order to prevent inflation. Class domination, be it capital or labor, has not been eliminated to the equal benefit of all people, and we have become the victims of fancy economics, brain-trust meddling, and a variety of noble experiments that have plunged us into almost astronomical debt. There are, perhaps, several thousands of examples that could be cited to supply the Communists with the inference that we have complied with this part of the formula.*

Only one part has not been fulfilled, that part that goes, "When there has arisen and spread widely among the proletariat a strong feeling in favor of decisive and unhesitating bold revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie." This and this alone stands between us and World War III. The enemy hasn't yet recognized our condition. Or, has he?

There are many who, postulating their analysis on the newer concept of war, claim that World War III is already here and insist that this war may be lost to the Democracies by default. It is most difficult for a geopolitician to disagree with this line of thought. To those people who are capable of visualizing war only as a violent upheaval of military forces—the so-called shooting war —what is happening at the moment is incomprehensible. One explains very carefully that Russia won't shoot so long as her demands are met and this in itself is war, only to receive the somewhat bland reply, "I know, but when does the shooting start?"

The shooting war may never come if we are prepared to surrender abjectly without strong resistance. Why should Russia fight

* It is only fair to state that the Eisenhower administration, come to power since this was written, shows every indication of attempting to correct the situations described above.

if she can achieve her objectives without shooting? So long as we in the Democracies persist in our folly of compromise and appeasement, we can delay the shooting war until the day we are no longer able to fight. Then it will come, and wave after wave of Communist troops will sweep over our lands to officiate at the burial of democracy and many of us. This, of course, will not be a shooting war, it will be a modern slaughter of the innocents, a massacre of the unwise and the foolish. We can escape a shooting war but we cannot escape the massacre that will take its place.

Just what has Russia actually accomplished in her cold-war phase of this conflict we call World War III? Her conquests to date are the greatest in history, for she has imposed her will on 600,000,000 people in five years! Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, East Germany, and China are gone. India, Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and all southeast Asia are tottering toward Russian domination. Iran, Jordan, Iraq, and the Middle East appear to be likely victims of Russian aggression. It's a very neat trick, this cold war. No shooting war has ever accomplished so much in so short a time.

In the United States, France, Britain, Italy, Japan, West Germany, and Scandinavia the fifth-column forces of Communism labor mightily, nearly always protected by their victims, to prepare for the day when the final blow will be struck. South America has been penetrated, and the comrades are hard at work driving their wedges into hemispheric solidarity. No shooting war could so undermine an intended victim.

While we in the Democracies prepare for a shooting war, cold-war tactics have brought the Communists the second largest industrial complex in Europe—the satellites. All but the fringe of southeast Asia has been brought into her empire without the cost of one Russian life. The rest of the world is being prepared for a similar fate. When will World War III start? It started five years ago, but few recognized it. All that's left is the shooting phase.

In this phase Russia has the advantage, because she alone knows when the shooting phase must be started. The Democracies will never act as the aggressors. We will sit and wait to be attacked. This is our way, and to change it would be a violation of all our

principles. This attitude is not necessarily fatal so long as we follow the old admonition to trust in the Lord and keep our powder dry. We must be prepared when it comes, for we will have no warning.

Don't be misled. The final outcome of the present series of international events will be a shooting war and while we will not be the aggressors, our actions could precipitate it. Sooner or later, strong men will arise among us, men who have the courage to say *no*. When this happens, the Communist march to easy victory will cease, and the proletariat will then decide the time has come for "decisive and unhesitating bold revolutionary action against the bourgeoisie." Then we will have war as the shooting-war devotee visualizes it. Until this time comes, we must fight the battles of the cold war.

In spite of this unintentional precipitation of war by the Democracies the war will not come until Soviet Russia is ready for it and willing to start it. If it were simply a question of mere provocation, there have been many actions of the Democracies thus far that could have been used as an excuse by the Soviet. Russia could have seized on our efforts in Korea as a threat to her future. Such actions as the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Defense Army might well have served as the basis of her reasons for plunging the world into war. The sole requirement will be the failure of the Democracies to meet her demands at the exact moment when Russia feels her war readiness has reached a sufficient peak to enable her to take on all comers.

There's not much choice between being defeated in a cold war or in a shooting war; it's not the method of defeat that counts —it's the defeat itself. There's no consolation in knowing that we have been defeated by either method. There is, however, this difference. Pursuing our present tactics of permitting Russia to win the cold-war battles can only end in complete defeat for the Democracies. We have a better than equal chance of winning the shooting war and in removing the menace of Communism from the world. While Russia can exist indefinitely against cold-war tactics, she cannot stand up under shooting-war tactics launched against her by the Democracies. Therefore, our chance of survival

depends upon the very thing we fear—the shooting war. Knowing this, Russia has launched a campaign to keep up from recognizing that fact.

This is not advocacy for a preventive war, for there's no such thing. No one prevents a war by starting one. This is advocacy for complete recognition and preparedness against the day when the Soviet shooting war may be launched. Russia and Russia alone knows when that will be, and we must not be caught asleep at the switch.

Our strategy for survival dictates that we must have all the information about Russian intentions as far in advance of the execution of her plans as is possible. This requires an excellent, well-trained, and well-equipped intelligence service. There is a natural reluctance in the Democracies to create or employ a widespread espionage service; we don't regard it as quite "sporting." This attitude could cause us serious difficulty, if not defeat. Unless we can secure the information we need, we are going to be caught unawares.

Obviously, this service cannot be completely performed by nationals of the Democracies, and we must consider the establishment of an underground movement within the enemy's house to keep us informed. In other words, we must carry the enemy's warfare into his own territory, employing the methods of espionage he himself uses against us. This need not be done with too great secrecy. While our agents must be kept carefully covered, the fact that we are conducting an espionage campaign against the Communists can be a powerful weapon in itself. Knowledge that such a campaign was in progress could cause the enemy to restrict his moves, sow distrust and suspicion in his camp, and produce uneasiness in his conferences and decisions. This must not be done as a propaganda campaign but must be an actuality. He cannot be deceived by words; they represent a weapon with which he is more familiar than are we. He must be shown that we are getting his secrets in spite of his precautions.

In addition to possessing the advantage of selecting the exact time of attack Russia also possesses that of being the sole authority on the selection of the site of the attack. While a well-developed intelligence service could materially aid us here, the problem of

where the attack will come is not as difficult or as hypothetical as the time of attack. In spite of the size of the globe, the areas suitable for Russian attack are somewhat limited. The big difficulty is to know when the attack has been launched in earnest or when it it is merely a Korea-type incident.

There are certain fundamental considerations that can be said to govern this situation in some respects, although they cannot be said to indicate beyond any calculated risk a certainty that the attack is exactly as it seems. For example, what might appear to be a Korea-type attack could easily be the beginning of the major conflict instead of a feint. Therefore, we are somewhat beset with the problem of what constitutes the all-out effort.

The Korea-type attack may be defined as any attack made through the agency of a satellite or associated Communist state against an area that the Democracies would not be likely to defend in force to the extent of risking an all-out global conflict, or for whom their efforts would consist of a purely local holding action without attacking the territory of the aggressor. Thus, as we have seen in Korea, at the time of this writing the United Nations action has been characterized by a stubborn attempt to contain the Chinese in North Korea without actually bombing or inflicting damage on the mainland of China. Further, this type of action is supported by only sufficient force to perform the holding mission and not sufficient force to gain a decision. A third characteristic is the willingness of the Democracies to confine the action to a semistatic state while engaging in long periods of discussion.

It would be entirely within the realm of possibility for Russia to promote a concentrated Chinese attack on Indo-China, Thailand, or India without immediately involving her own forces. It is doubtful if the Democracies, under their present line of thinking, would go beyond the action they have taken in Korea. Once their troops were committed, they would engage in a holding action while they sought to negotiate an armistice on the grounds that it was not wise to risk precipitating World War III over what could be considered a minor issue. While the Democracies concentrated their attention on such an action, Russia could easily launch her real offensive elsewhere in the world or swiftly come to the aid of her satellite with overwhelming force and decisively

defeat the Democracies in the area, thus throwing them off balance at the very outset of World War III.

This type of masked action could be easily launched in southeast Asia or even in the Middle East. If the pattern of this type was sufficiently well established by several Korea-type incidents that were not used to precipitate World War III, Russia might lull the Democracies into believing that an attack by Bulgaria on Yugoslavia or Greece was merely another Korea incident instead of what it actually was—the outbreak of World War III. To be caught off balance at the outset of the war could easily prove disastrous to the Democracies.

There will be no difficulty involved in recognizing the outbreak of World War III if the Korea-type action is not involved, and certain fundamental principles can be laid down to differentiate all-out war from its deceptive companion. Primarily, we can prescribe an almost arbitrary geographical factor, an arbitrary intensity factor, and an equally arbitrary tactical factor.

No attack launched against the metropolitan territory of the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, Japan, Italy, Austria, or the Scandinavian countries could be considered as anything but the introduction of all-out war. This would be equally true of any attack against Western Germany. It is highly unlikely that the Soviets would be so capricious as to toy with one of the major centers of democratic resistance from which swift and sure retaliation could be expected. Should an attack be launched against any of these areas, it would be a clear and unmistakable sign that the shooting phase of World War III had begun.

Any attack launched against Turkey, Greece, or Yugoslavia by Russia or her satellites *should* be regarded as the beginning of an all-out war or the preliminary move to such a war. No attack from east to west has ever been successful unless the aggressor has held this vital southern flank. So long as Russia holds the Baltic in the status of a Soviet lake, any attack or aggressive action to obtain control of the Mediterranean flank is indicative of the outbreak of the shooting phase of World War III thereafter.

Any attack by Russian or East German forces on Berlin might be interpreted as the initial attack of World War III or it might merely indicate a preparatory measure for the initial attack, which

would take place at a later date. This would depend upon the condition of the Democracies at the time of the attack. If, for example, the Democracies are strong and it is definitely known that they would resist in force any aggression against Berlin, the Russian act would be a fair bid for the opening of total hostilities. This, of course, would also indicate that Russia felt she had reached a sufficient state of preparation and war readiness to force the issue. On the other hand, if the Democracies were weak or in their present state of almost blissful confusion, an attack on Berlin might represent simply an opportunist bid on the part of Russia to extend her control without running the risk of precipitating World War III.

Russian attacks launched against the Middle East could be Korea-type incidents *or* total war. If the attacks came in force and were pursued with determination, it would be a definite sign of Russia's total war intent. Simultaneous attacks against two or more Middle East countries would also indicate total war on the horizon, for Russia would never make an attempt to seal off the Middle East and Asia proper unless she was well prepared for total war. The advantages she would gain by possessing the Middle East would be too great to permit trifling or probing attacks by her. On the other hand, attacks against Iran by Kurd tribesmen, Soviet Azerbaijan, or the Tudeh faction would be Korea-type actions that could lead to World War III unless met by firm resistance and swift retaliatory action.

An attack by the Soviets through Afghanistan *might* be the signal for total war but would more probably be an attempt to seal off southeast Asia from India eastward. Again the determining factor would rest with the Democracies and their known state of preparedness, war readiness, and morale. It is not likely that the Democracies would be prepared to accept the Russian challenge in this area unless their status was that of at least minimum war readiness. It is equally unlikely that Russia would risk an attack in this direction unless she was assured of no more than token resistance from the Democracies. The problem of whipping India's teeming millions into line while at the same time fighting all the Democracies would be too much even for Russia.

Local attacks by the Chinese against any area in southeast Asia,

unaccompanied by the use of Russian troops or simultaneous attacks in other areas of the world outside of southeast Asia, would be Korea-type actions designed to secure the rich advantages of the area for the Soviet without precipitating general war. One firm decisive resistance by the Democracies against the Korea-type action would ensure its abandonment as a tactical device. On the other hand local attacks employing Russian troops or coupled with either satellite or Russian attacks in other areas of the world would be indicative of all-out war. Russia would not commit her own troops in Asia unless she intended to pursue the route of Japanese conquests of World War II. This, of course, would involve Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand as potential victims in addition to all of southeast Asia.

Any Russian or Chinese attacks on Japan would indicate all-out war by invoking the fulfillment of the Japanese–U.S. treaty, which requires the United States to defend Japan. Attack on Formosa might force all-out war because this action would penetrate the American defensive outer crescent of the Pacific. This same holds true for the Philippines. If such attacks were launched solely by the Chinese, World War III would develop gradually; the Chinese would not undertake such an action without Russian assurances of assistance when the vast resources of the United States were brought to bear on China. Thus, while the initial stages might appear to be a local bilateral war between China and the United States, World War III would not be far behind.

The intensity factor is also important as an indicator of total war. Russia will not launch World War III on less than the blitzkrieg basis. Her one chance of victory is to destroy the critical items of the Democracies' warmaking power in her early attacks. Air raids against the Democracies will, therefore, not be limited to attacks on single areas or countries but will be multiple in nature. She will not launch an attack of a few divisions; but when she moves, her whole armed machine will move at one time in a variety of directions. Therefore, should her attacks be weak ones, unless they are launched against mandatory-war areas, which is unlikely, the attacks will represent Korea-type incidents. Strong attacks in force or attacks against mandatory-war areas will announce the opening of World War III.

While Russia herself fears a two-front war, the outbreak of World War III will be signalized by a two-front attack. The Chinese will open an all-out front in southeast Asia while Russia and the satellites attack through Europe or the Middle East. Any attempt to divide the strength of the Democracies can automatically be interpreted to mean World War III has begun.

One other factor must be considered in identifying World War III. When such an event occurs, it will be accompanied by internal violence of a revolutionary character in an effort to force the Democracies to fight on both an internal and external front. Russia will not risk the extinction of her agents abroad unless she has decided to make the all-out effort of total war. Premature revolutionary effort would be futile, deprive her of valuable allies, and cause her to lose face with her own people by permitting the destruction of Communists short of an all-out effort. On the other hand, Communist uprisings in an all-out war could seriously cripple the Democracies and deny them the possibility of committing a maximum effort against an initial attack. Thus, when armed violence by Communist parties takes place within the Democracies, the shooting phase of World War III is here.

From all of this we may gather certain fundamental characteristics that can be used as indicators of the shooting phase of World War III.

1. The initial attack will be launched in force against one or more of the major Democracies, and the United States will be an initial target.
2. Any attack against the Mediterranean flank will be indicative of total war.
3. Any two-front war or attack will be indicative of total war.
4. Any attack against Western Germany or Japan will be indicative of total war.
5. Any attack using Russian troops will be indicative of total war.
6. World War III will begin with blitzkrieg action.
7. World War III, in its initial phases, will be accompanied by or preceded by internal disturbances and violence by the Communist parties in the areas against which the all-out attack is launched.

8. Korea-type incidents, depending upon the location and intensity of attack, may mask the outbreak of World War III.

9. The local strength or condition of the Democracies' war readiness may modify these characteristics to a greater or lesser degree.

That Russia holds all the counting cards in the game cannot be denied. She will decide when and where World War III will begin, and it will not begin until she is completely ready to start it. These facts must be recognized by the Democracies as an important item in their strategy. The old system of a time lag in most countries enabling last-minute preparation while one or a few nations make a desperate stand to gain time must be dropped from our strategic concepts. War will break with unholy fury, and time will be conspicuous by its absence. The war readiness of the Democracies and their defenses must be equal to the warmaking power of the enemy.

The Democracies must have as much information as possible concerning Russian intentions. No matter how much we have it will not be enough. This calls for a highly developed intelligence service working on a completely realistic basis as an active arm of defense. Any strategy that fails to include or appreciate such an arm is handicapped from the start.

Every effort must be made to counter the Russian cold-war moves while we prepare for the shooting war, not with the goal of using cold-war weapons against her but with the intention of defeating her successful employment of these weapons against the Democracies. Unless we do so, we may never reach the advantageous position of having a better than even chance of defeating her in the shooting war.

In spite of her obvious advantages of time and place, she can be defeated by the Democracies and defeated decisively. To do this we must devise a strategy of survival that is realistic in its recognition of the forces in play against us and expertly implemented in its tactical applications. The days of planning for hypothetical wars are passed; today we must plan for an actual struggle to survive. There is only one question—can our strategy for survival be readied in time?

Chapter 13

The War on the Home Front

The citizen in World War III, perhaps far more so than in any way since the dark ages, will be an integral part of the fighting machine, exposed to the physical buffetings of the enemy as well as to the economic and psychological factors he has come to accept as his lot. He will find that World War III will involve all the people of all the nations, not simply their armies, navies, and air forces. He will witness attacks on his cities, his livelihood, his shipping, his industrial productivity, and his morale, to say nothing of attacks on his person. He will find that he fights an enemy within his gates as well as one on the battlefield, and this internal enemy will fight him with sabotage, labor disturbances, propaganda, treason, and even revolution if Russia has her way. World War III will truly be the war of the citizen soldier even though the smaller percentage of the population will constitute the uniformed force.

There are certain political prophets, statesmen, and leaders in every country, who attempt to allay public feelings of insecurity by assuring the people that World War III will be launched on the extreme opposite side of the world and be confined to its birthplace. The home front, they tell us, will always be safe—a beehive of production for the tools of war so necessary to the unfortunate people whose unhappy country is torn by the conflict. This view is not only fallacious; it is morally and ethically wrong. The first blow of war can and will fall without warning in that

area deemed most suitable by the enemy. It could easily be here!

I would rather prophesy that World War III would be partially fought in my own country and endure the jibes of my countrymen, should I be proved a false prophet, than to reassure them of the remoteness of combat conditions and know that I had deluded them into unpreparedness, should the blow fall here. No man today has the moral right to guarantee the absolute or even partial safety of his own country. In all fairness to the people he must inform them of the possibilities that confront them.

Any worthwhile strategy for survival will include detailed plans for the combat on the home front as well as on the line of battle. Not to include such plans would be to fail to devise strategy that would ensure the survival of the nation. Why delude ourselves? When the Soviet Union launches World War III, she will employ as great a variety of tactics as her resources permit, just as her cold-war tactics keep the planners of the Democracies on edge by their constantly shifting, varied character. There is no reason to suppose Russia will settle down to conventional warfare after all the energy she has devoted to building up the nonconventional machine.

Modern warfare, the advanced warfare of World War III, knows no distinctions between the war of the front line and that of internal security. National economy, industrial centers, communications, and workers are all fair game and military objectives. Whatever may be employed against them to diminish or render impotent their efficiency is a weapon to be employed. The interrelationship between the home front and the combat front is such as to make the separate entities almost indistinguishable. Whatever effects one exerts a pressure on the other. Should the combat front falter, the burden is shifted to the home front; should the home front falter, the efficiency of the combat front is reduced.

As we have seen, there are two wars operating simultaneously in the newer concept of warfare—a hot war and an economic war. When the vulnerability of the home front increases and the enemy power to attack it consequently multiplies, the scope of economic warfare enlarges, affecting the combat front almost beyond measurement. The reverse is true of the combat front. Decisive defeats, annihilation of units, and corresponding losses or consumption of

equipment enlarge the arena and increase the demands at home. Both fronts must be protected, must be planned for.

For the sake of clarity we may divide the enemy efforts against the home front into two general classes: enemy efforts originating outside the home front and those produced within. Of the two, the latter could easily become the more insidious and the more potent. In any war between the Soviet Union and the Democracies the tactics to be employed against the United States would necessarily be those of attrition and denial. The former would be a remorseless, ruthless grinding down of men, machines, and material, while the latter would consist of a flat denial of resource areas outside the United States or the rendering of those within our borders untenable or useless. The instruments that produce these may come from within or without.

Defending the United States against attacks originating outside our boundaries is the function of the armed forces, aided by the civilian defense units. The layman's part in this is one of strict co-operation. It may be, however, that combined activities, in which local Communist units participate, will require some sort of a home-guard unit.

There are three lines of defense against attack from without. Soviet aircraft, depending upon the route followed, could be intercepted by carrier-based naval aviation far from our shores. As the attacking force nears our shores, the job is primarily one for the Air Force fighters and interceptors. When the enemy is actually over our territory, it becomes a combined task of ground units in the form of antiaircraft, air units in close combat, and civilian defense units performing appropriate functions.

We can expect air raids employing both atomic bombs and conventional bombs and probably guided missiles. Direct landings on American continental territory would probably not occur because of the logistic difficulties such an invasion would incur. Ewald Banse writes that the distance from the old world and the size of the United States renders any invasion unlikely. He feels that any invasion force would be greeted by an army embracing the entire population of the country, and even an initial landing force of a million enemy soldiers would not be enough to gain decisive results.

One danger does offer itself and must be considered. Suicide task forces of paratroops could be landed to accomplish purely local missions against areas like the Niagara frontier, the Detroit industrial complex, or the west coast industrial complex. Presumably those who escaped could be concealed by local Communists and be further employed in the war within. Such a possibility cannot be discounted or de-emphasized but must be guarded against. This same thing applies to casual air drops of germ-warfare specialists, underground leaders, organizers, and tacticians as well as Soviet couriers to the Communist units. While it is presumed that these elements could be handled by the regular armed forces and police, it might be found necessary, as has been noted, to form a civilian part-time fighting unit to cope with the situation.

While all this may seem fantastic and the reader may have difficulty in visualizing these things happening, they are entirely possible. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg has pointed out, "The fact is plain that Soviet Russia is primarily vulnerable to air power—both land and carrier based. The same holds true for continental United States; apart from the ravages which could be inflicted upon our maritime lines of communications by the Soviet submarine fleet and a minelaying campaign."

It should be noted that Soviet air bases of the strategic force lie perilously close to the shores of United States. Early in January, 1952, the Soviet Strategic Air Force occupied its forward base on the Kamchatka Peninsula, and there are numerous northern Russian air bases from which Soviet planes could fly over the Pole on death-dealing missions against United States cities and industrial areas. It should be pointed out that the twenty-four-hour air watch instituted in July in our urban areas and industrial centers was not just a practice run; it has real significance.

In spite of its fantastic character, the war from without seems much easier for the average American to swallow than does the idea of the war from within. There are still millions of Americans who cannot conceive of an internal Communist threat or will not even permit themselves to admit any Communist penetration. This group constitutes a menace almost as dangerous to the security of the nation as do the Communists, their pooh-poohing

of the threat tends to reduce the necessary vigilance of their countrymen. Their cries of "Fascist, warmonger, and Red baiter" against those who do recognize the threat drive many sincerely concerned people to cover.

In 1947, it was estimated that there were 74,000 known Communists in the United States. Experience has shown us that the easily identified known Communists only reflect one-tenth of the actual number, exclusive of non-Party-member sympathizers and on-the-fence fellow travelers, many of whom could be persuaded to take an active part in any hostile activities against the United States during a war with Soviet Russia. In July, 1952, J. Edgar Hoover estimated that the approximate membership in the Communist Party at the end of 1950 was 51,785, which had dwindled to 37,000 by the end of 1951. He did not, however, believe the Communist Party was losing force but rather that these figures represented a general move of the party underground. Rather than decrease the efforts of the F.B.I., Mr. Hoover called for increased vigilance by everyone.

This F.B.I. report points out a gradual change in Communist tactics. Naturally a segment of the party will remain above ground for propaganda purposes, but the indications are that the greater percentage of the party is going underground. This is borne out by the increase in clandestine activities. "For example," states the report, "courier services were utilized wherever possible, public meetings were discouraged and, when held, were disguised as other than Communist meetings; party records which reflect the identity of the membership continued to be destroyed; meetings between two or three members were not to be held at the home of any member, and attempts were made to develop alternate leaders in the event present leaders were arrested." It is not the visible Communist we must fear but the invisible agent working against our democracy.

Has there been a successful penetration in the United States? Definitely there has. Several areas have been openly penetrated, as may be clearly shown. While organized labor, for the most part, has resisted Communist efforts or has dislodged Communist leaders once they have been disclosed, the influence of the party is

still strong. During the so-called peace offensive days, labor played a prominent part in developing the offensive.

On April 13, 1949, the *New York Times* carried an advertisement arguing against the North Atlantic Treaty and urging the United States to make peace with Russia. This was entitled, "Labor Wants Peace Talks Not a Pact for War." It was signed by 269 union members representing 78 different unions or locals. The publication on the peace offensive mentioned in another chapter lists seven pages of the names of union sponsors of the "Call to a National Labor Conference for Peace" held in Chicago in 1949. The committee for this movement alleged that it had obtained the signatures of 1,500 local union officers for its protests against the Atlantic Pact and that organizing efforts had been successfully pushed in "36 key industrial areas." An alleged 1,245 delegates attended the Chicago meetings, representing unions in 26 states. On June 14, 1950, 30 delegates of the conference presented the United Nations with a scroll carrying 150,000 signatures endorsing the Stockholm peace plan. To cap the climax, on August 2, 1950, 2,000 demonstrators staged a "riot for peace" in Union Square in New York, under the auspices of the New York Labor Conference for Peace.

To list the activities of but one Moscow-trained labor operative who, although a candidate on the Communist Party ticket for the post of alderman in the 1931 New York City elections, refused to testify to affirm or deny his Party membership on the grounds of self-incrimination, will give an idea of the depth of penetration. This worthy gentleman admits to being a founder of a union that had units in numerous navy yards and strategic plants and industries associated with the electrical, aircraft, steel, shipbuilding, locomotive, and navigation instruments industries, a union later identified as strongly pro-Communist by the House Un-American Activities Committee. He further admitted having served as a business manager, international representative, and educational director for a union later expelled by the C.I.O. for strong Communist character. He also admitted organizing a union at a university engaged in research work on the atomic bomb. He was identified as a graduate of the Lenin Institute in Moscow.

This is only one case of many. Again it is urged that every reader of this book read the pamphlet on the peace offensive listed in the bibliography for a clearer picture of Soviet and Communist intentions.

In 1939 a former Communist and graduate of the Lenin School testified as to the training he had received. The subjects he was taught included military training, science of civil war, revolutionary uprisings, conspiratory type of warfare, development of local and general strikes, development of city, state, and national uprisings. In connection with utilities and public service he learned to concentrate on the food supply, warehouses, water, gas, electricity, communications, railways, local transportation, telephone, and telegraph. His training in sabotage included how to wreck a train, close down factories, destroy cargoes, and various other contributions. Quite a formidable list for a labor organizer.

Can you visualize what the effects of a general strike would be in time of war? Imagine what your city would be like without gas, water, food, telephone service, and electricity and the effect it would have in wartime. While organized labor is working sincerely to clean its house and may succeed in completing the task before war comes, there will always be the danger of sabotage within the war effort. Labor is on the front line of the war within, and strategy for survival demands the closest co-operation between loyal American workers and the authorities in cleaning out the Communists and remaining ever watchful in time of peace as well as in time of war.

The Communist penetration has aimed at the young. As far back as 1936, when I taught at a large Midwestern university, I personally witnessed efforts to penetrate the student body. It was amusing then to watch the Communist students' leagues or the old League against War and Fascism parade behind the ROTC battalions every warm spring Wednesday afternoon. How many students were recruited or went forward into industry, their minds infected with seeds of treason, is impossible to calculate and not so amusing today.

Since the war, I have witnessed a number of attempts on the part of Young Communist agitators to usurp control of student organizations and to use discussion classes in political science,

economics, and sociology as forums of a closed type in which they dominated the discussion with Communist propaganda. I have also witnessed attempts by professors to use their rostrums as sites for the dissemination of propaganda discourses against democracy, the defense of the nation, and in praise of the Soviet way of life. All this under the guise of academic freedom.

As an editorial comment let me go on record as saying I firmly subscribe to academic freedom but abhor the abuse of it. The Communist is not free to make up his own mind or to formulate the doctrine he preaches. His is a dictated position. Therefore, the professor who uses his position to preach and advocate Communism does not do so from his free will but by order of his Communist superiors. There is no issue of academic freedom involved in this; it is the abuse of academic right in order to propagate a doctrine against the student's own interest and his country's interest at the order of someone who is not entitled to the academic freedom of the university at which his stooge is pouring out Moscow's doctrine.

In view of the war within, should we expose the American college student and the American public to knowledge of Communism? Knowledge, yes; advocacy, no. How can you combat something you do not know? How can you recognize its insidious evils unless they are pointed out to you? When the Communist doctrine is taught objectively, its fallacies become apparent to anyone. When it is taught as propaganda, it is possible to gloss over the fallacies and present the doctrine in a light that will corrupt all but the strong and sensible. Teach it for what it is that all of us may recognize it and the need for fighting against it; prevent it being advocated as the way of life we should substitute for our own.

This, naturally, leads us to the old question of the loyalty oath so roundly battered these last few years. What is a loyalty oath? It is nothing more than you, as a citizen of the United States, require of your President, the officers and enlisted men of your armed forces, the employees of your government. It is a simple reaffirmation of our belief in the tenets of democracy and our willingness to abide by them. What is so terrible about that? Does the mere fact of having to stand forth and say, "I love the United

States; I believe in its democracy and its constitution; I will defend it," encroach on the liberty or freedom of thought and speech of any of us? It is a thing in which we should have pride, not fear or shame. Its principal opponents include some worthy, sincere citizens among their numbers. Opposition also includes the American Communist who still retains a shred of decency and who has not wholly sold himself to Moscow; those who have a slightly guilty conscience, obtained by sampling too deeply of the forbidden fruit; and those politically unconscious individuals who are dupes for any innovation that appears to advance mankind.

Many of the protesting voices raised against loyalty oaths are raised in complete ignorance of the question or issues involved. Any American who fears to stand up and be counted on his sworn word as an American cannot complain if he is watched henceforth. The true Communist will have no qualms about swearing to a lie, so refusal to accede to a loyalty oath does not necessarily flush out the Communist, but it does put pressure on the conscience of the near or potential Communist to decide one way or the other. It is high time for the public to require the academician —who is by training so open-minded that he is inclined never to make up his mind—to recognize that his position is comparable to that of a public officer of our government and to commit himself to a declaration of his loyalty to our institutions. This implies not that he should be restricted in his thinking or his teaching but that he should be denied the right to abuse a public trust by employing his prerogative of office to present just one side of the case for purposes of subverting his charges.

Would the Communists go so far as actually to promote revolution or internal warfare in the event of a war with Russia? Yes, they would. Personal experiences in France with the underground and the Resistance during World War II disclosed that while the French Communist fought against the German he did so primarily for Moscow and secondarily for France. Had Moscow directed no resistance, the French Communist would have stopped fighting. American and British arms given to French Maquis of Communist persuasion frequently found their way into Red caches to be held secretly against the day of the world revolution. Several of the officers of the battalion with which I was associated were

subsequently attached to a Communist-controlled regiment where they suffered various indignities, one to the point of insanity and hopeless crippling and two to the very edge of execution, for their refusal to take part in any effort to build up the Communist arsenal of the future. Many loyal French Maquisards fought almost as desperately against French Communists during the Resistance days as they did against the Nazis.

This, of course, was France, and such a thing could not happen in the United States. Oh, no! As early as 1937 I was invited by a prominent Philadelphia Communist to consider myself a candidate for early execution, "when we take over the country, as we will, the first time the United States fights Russia." He didn't smile either. Of course we can expect armed disorder and probably full-scale civil war if they can get it rolling. So can any other Democracy where a strong Communist party is at work. As has been said, Communism is a quasi-religious movement subscribed to by fanatics. They are beyond our concept of patriotism, loyalty, and honesty. They belong to the revolution as prescribed by Russia, and for that they will fight; they will not fight for us. Should Moscow decide the time was ripe for violence in United States, we'd have it. Let's stop kidding ourselves. To paraphrase the slogan of one of the popular radio programs—"Wake up America, time to stump the experts" in sabotage, treason, and violence.

It would be sheer folly to plan an irresistible strategy for survival for the war without and neglect to provide for the war within. What would we gain by winning in Europe, Asia, or the Middle East, only to lose at home? Any strategy devised must include plans to fight the two-front war as visualized by Russia—the Soviet forces abroad, the Communist forces at home. This requires the development of a new technique for us. Perhaps it's not so new; maybe we just forgot we ever had it.

We must stop all this shilly-shallying and name calling and get down to business on the subject of Communism in the United States. Running around madly denouncing it as an evil is no answer. Neither is a policy of attempting to explain why they behave like tools of Moscow or finding legal loopholes and excuses for permitting Communists to continue their activities

against us. The victory in the war within could be won today—before the shooting war without ever started—if we'd recognize the menace for what it is and squelch it. Some innocent people are bound to be hurt, but better a few innocent ones now than thousands later. Innocent people always suffer in time of war, and this is war!

I think I could reconcile myself to losing one of my sons in the line of battle, as so many fathers have done in the past. I could never reconcile myself to having one of them killed by an act of sabotage, a Communist uprising, or lack of food or medicine as a result of Communist internal war. The one killed in battle would at least have had a fighting chance. The little one killed at home would never know why, never know it was because of his father's stupidity or failure to take a decisive stand when it was necessary. But I'd know and so would you if it was your kid. It would be too late then.

One does not nourish a cancer voluntarily. One does not find excuses for a rattlesnake or voluntarily encourage the growth of a loathsome disease so that it may attack his loved ones. Why, then, should we not take definite steps to ensure our security against internal, Communist-promoted warfare? There's not much difference in the end result.

There are those who say we can defeat this menace by precept and education. Give the Communist a good example, they say, and he will follow it. Our success in this policy abroad has been remarkable for Russia. At the risk of being labeled a Fascist or some other horrible thing, I'd like to suggest we whip 'em first and educate them afterward—starting at home first.

The American people and the peoples in all the Democracies must make a strong united stand against any further encroachment on their liberties and way of life by the Kremlin and its adherents, both at home and abroad. This means labor and capital, education, social workers, professional men, and teachers, and every man, woman, and child who believes in democracy must bury his personal differences and hew to the line of freedom for the duration. By this means alone can we win the war within.

If some labor leader, suffering with delusions of grandeur, visualizes a labor state in America with himself as President, that's fine.

If he can do it by constitutional means let him do so, but let's not do it now. Let's wait a few years until the Communist menace is removed before we precipitate a new revolution. If a group of capitalists visualize a return to the days of the Robber Barons—that's their right, but let's postpone such a cataclysmic struggle until the world is free of a greater menace. If one of my former colleagues wants to dabble in the speculative theory of a utopia in which every individual has strawberries and cream for breakfast whether he likes them or not—more power to him, but don't teach it until the student has a chance to evaluate it apart from propaganda aimed at self-destruction. In other words, let's get together for a change and defeat the obvious menace before we invent a dozen new ones.

The war within will come as surely as the war without. Our strategy is aimed now at an effective defense against attack originating on foreign soil. Millions, yes, billions of dollars are being expended to prevent this attack from materializing. But have we done all we can to get a grip on the snake's head at home? Does our strategy include adequate defense against the war within? Unless it does, it's no strategy for survival.

Chapter 14

Global Warfare and the Theater of Operations

"Battle is the pay-off!" These words were true in relation to the Axis in 1941, and they are true today in considering the termination of the series of episodes with Soviet Russia. Any strategy for survival designed by the Democracies will have to include a definite plan for meeting the Communists on the field of battle. The cold-war tactics, as we have noted, will come to an end one day, and on that day we must be prepared to meet the onslaughts of the Soviet horde.

On the day the cold war ends, history will, in a sense, repeat itself, for another new horde will be added to the many that have swept out of Asia, and what is now Russia, to overrun Europe in an attempt to defeat our civilization. Since the second century Europe has fought off or absorbed the Magyars, the Huns, the Alans, the Golden Horde, Blue Horde, White Horde, and now in this twentieth century we can count on meeting what might be the last of these—the Red horde. This time the horde from the steppes proposes to sweep, not only over Europe, but over all the world.

While Russia will select the time and place of her initial attacks, hoping to catch us by surprise, the world is small enough so that we may hypothecate general areas in which these attacks could be isolated. Common sense dictates that if we prepared now to defend ourselves in these areas, we could hope to offer a much more stubborn resistance and ensure ourselves a greater chance

for victory. Unfortunately we recognized this fact a little too late, and the economic cost of adequately preparing all these areas appears more than we can bear at the moment. Consequently, we have selected what seem to be the most obvious areas of attack and are devoting our efforts to putting them into fighting shape.

While we speak of global war and we like to visualize the coming conflict as being characterized by wave after wave of the forces of the Democracies sweeping over enemy aggression in all parts of the world, wars aren't fought that way. The over-all plan may be global, but the individual actions will be fought in theaters of operations, just as they were in World War II. The theaters will be integrated segments of the global plan, and the conduct of the battles in each one will depend upon the threats offered in each by the Soviet. Some will be the scenes of vicious land fighting coupled with unceasing air bombardments; others will be characterized by air actions almost exclusively; and still others by relatively minor actions. The result of all these actions, if successfully carried out by the free world, will spell victory for democracy.

Back in the good old days when, by contrast, war was almost a sport, theaters were based on geography and designed to serve as the focal points of enemy threats against areas of vital interest and concern to the national security of the home team. Today, we cannot base the limits of all theaters on geography alone. With the advent of the airplane and its ability to eat up great distances, the limits of geography are defied, and our concepts concerning theaters have changed. Today, it's not unusual for a pilot, based in Japan, to have breakfast with his family, take off for Korea, dump his bomb load, and be home to eat a slightly late dinner under his own roof. If we try to define a theater on the basis of geography alone, we'd have to include the whole world. The modern World War III idea of a theater will be based ultimately on at least two factors—the job to be done and the area in which it must be accomplished.

We recognize two general areas of enemy territory, the periphery or the border areas around his country, where resistance to land forces will be the strongest, and the heartland, where his industry and warmaking ability are concentrated. Those actions directed

against his periphery are called peripheral actions; those against his heartland are called heartland actions. Attacks against the enemy heartland are attacks against his over-all strategic ability, and by common custom we call these strategic attacks. Strategic attacks can be made only by planes that are able to strike at the heartland without becoming involved with the enemy at his borders. They must be fast, high flying, and capable of traveling great distances. The air commands entrusted with missions of this type are called strategic air commands, and the vast theater in which they operate, defying geography and distance, could be called a theater of strategic operations.

Obviously, it is not practicable to base these planes in one area. If possible a ring of air bases must be acquired around the enemy's territory so that the strategic bombers shall be required to travel fewer miles. It is equally clear that they should all be controlled from a single headquarters, where the over-all strategic attack plan will be maintained. It would not be to the best interest of the plan if these planes were subject to diversion from the strategic mission by subordinate commanders to perform some task deemed important by them in attacking the enemy's periphery. Such diversion might upset the whole war plan and prolong the war. Therefore, even though they may be based in an area where peripheral action is taking place, they are not part of the forces for combat assigned to that area unless the situation is so urgent that the supreme commander deems the diversion essential.

I suppose, by habit, we'll still continue to apply the name theater of operation to the area in which peripheral action is taking place. While the heartland action is designed to bring about a decline in the ability of the enemy to make war, forcing him to surrender, the peripheral action has a different purpose. Peripheral actions are specially designed to create or develop actions and situations that are favorable to or help promote the strategic action. The theater of tactical operation is not directly concerned with the long-range plan of destroying the enemy's warmaking ability but with the destruction of his peripheral forces in order to make him divert more forces, both air and ground, from the defense of his heartland resources to the defense of his borders. A commander in the European theater, for example, would try to prevent the

enemy from acquiring new resources in his area while the strategic forces bombed out the enemy's homeland resources.

The function of strategic air power and the actions taking place in a theater of strategic operations are easy to understand; the questions arise when we consider the actions taking place in the theater of tactical operations. Why, if the mission of destroying the enemy's warmaking ability is the primary objective, do we bother to mass huge armies on the enemy's border? Why not just concentrate on strategic air power? One could also point out that there is a type of air fighting force known as the tactical air force and ask why it's necessary.

Until recent times, and the development of air power, all wars were peripheral in character, and contact was on the borders of the enemy country. No attempt was made to destroy his warmaking ability until his forces in being had been overcome and defeated. This was a slow, laborious process, and wars depended in duration upon the manpower of the conflicting states. Blockades and trade strangulation were common, and gigantic land and naval battles characterized the struggle. There was no differentiation between the tactical and strategic forces, and the theater of operations was the primary arena of combat.

The emergence of air power changed this, and we began to see that all the fighting could not be done within the theater. Our defense lines must be set at our own boundaries, and much of our attack power must originate at home. Where once war had been land-bound or seabound, it now became possible for an attack to be launched directly against the enemy heartland without neutralizing his peripheral defense forces.

The ascendancy of air power has thus changed the character of the theater and of warfare as a whole. Today there are many strategists who believe that the airplane has become the dominant instrument of war and the focal point of all strategy. It has been said that the final stages of warfare are only reached when air power has created the tactical and strategic conditions necessary to permit our land forces to close with the enemy on our own terms.

However important air power may be, modern war will not be won by a single arm or a single weapon. According to General J.

Lawton Collins, "Victory is won only by a proper combination of various powerful weapons—primarily infantry, artillery, armor and air properly supported by the other arms and services. It is as important to recognize the importance of the battle team as it is to recognize that much of the success of the team depends upon the support it receives." Warfare is still, and probably always will be, a teamwork proposition. Dependence upon any one arm as the focal point of all battle strategy will be a sure way to defeat. The tasks at hand should, however, be the determining factors in deciding the composition of the battle team and the strategy to be used, rather than any hard and fast division among land and sea and air forces.

The theater of tactical operations or, as it has been called traditionally, theater of operations, is a vital one, and the role it plays in global war is one with which we cannot dispense. Primarily, the theater forces try to contain and immobilize the enemy armies and prevent them from advancing outside their own periphery. By this action the theater forces hold territory that may be of strategic value to the enemy, denying him its use. This process we call containment. On the other hand, the theater forces may, by careful withdrawals, try to make the enemy extend his forces and lengthen his supply lines so that he becomes more vulnerable and has to divert more forces to the defense of his borders. This, of course, requires him to take forces away from his homeland and lessens his defense against strategic attacks. A third task might be to attack the enemy with the objective of rolling up his lines, occupying his resource areas, and throwing his war effort into confusion.

Theater forces have a protective or defensive mission. They supply protection to local strategic air command bases and facilities. They repulse enemy strategic attacks against the warmaking ability of the area in which they are operating. Theater antiaircraft batteries along with tactical aircraft may assist in the defense of our own homeland by intercepting enemy strategic bombers bound on raids against us. In some theaters, theater forces would be assigned to protect and defend natural resources vital to the Democracies. In short, when the layman visualizes war it is the theater of tactical operations that he sees—an area in which armed

men are clashing with each other, artillery is plowing up the landscape, and fighter planes are blotting out the sun with dogfights.

With this in mind let's examine some of the factors that condition theater activities. Theater operations are always strongly influenced by such things as geography, climate, terrain, politico-psychological factors, the extent of resources available, and the interplay of tactical and strategic actions in the global plan. These operations are never static but are always active and changing in type or intensity. They are affected by conditions in both the enemy homeland and in our own. The mediums of operation are threefold—land, air, and sea—and the actions taking place in these mediums are, of necessity, carefully integrated and co-ordinated.

The theater is dependent upon several factors: first, on long lines of communication to the homeland from which it receives its supplies. Any stoppage will produce a decline in results in theater action. Secondly, the theater requires and depends upon security from air attack in order that its lines of communications, its ports, and its supply installations can be defended against enemy action. Without such security, movement is restricted, effective forces are depleted, and its whole mission placed in jeopardy. Lastly, it is dependent upon the mobilization effort of its homeland for a constant supply of manpower and matériel.

As has been said, its actions depend upon a precise teamwork plan. The land forces, subject to the restrictions of geography, must depend upon the efforts of air and sea to achieve missions not within the powers of land-bound forces to perform. Tactical air power must give the land forces cover and protection for their maneuvers. Sea forces must secure and maintain the sea lanes of communication, intercept beach landings, and aid both land and air forces where the tactical situation permits or requires. The three arms must work together, each performing the tasks set by its medium of operations in order to aid the other two.

While the ground forces are land-bound, because of their intrinsic character the naval forces can operate in two mediums—sea and air. Sea-surface actions, while characterized by a high degree of mobility, are vulnerable to air attack, and if constant sea-surface actions are required, air superiority must be achieved.

Thus, naval air power must protect the fleet and at the same time aid the air force against tactical land objectives when feasible. This lesson we learned well in Korea.

The air force in any theater has a variety of missions. Foremost among these is counter air attack, which may be performed by either the strategic or tactical air forces depending upon the location of the target. General Vandenberg has summarized counter air and its influence and importance in precise terms. "At the present state of the air defense art," he said, "even the most efficient radar-interceptor-antiaircraft system cannot guarantee immunity from determined enemy air attack in force. The only sure defense against air attack is a retaliatory attack that will wipe out the threat at its bases. Hence the counter air attack becomes the first charge upon our military resources—our first priority task." Tactical counter air attack consists of a series of air actions designed to gain control of the air in order to prevent enemy aircraft from harassing our troops and installations. They are launched against enemy aircraft, air installations, personnel, vehicles, or any facility directly aiding the enemy. At the same time counter air must protect friendly installations and forces against enemy attacks.

Next to the counter air mission the most important mission of theater air power is denying the enemy his battle sustenance. This means attacking his supply lines, his reinforcements, his battle-zone, rear-echelon stock piles, and the like. This function may be by interdiction or denial so long as the enemy is prevented from resupplying himself.

Other missions include reconnaissance, search, rescue and recovery, air lifts of freight and supplies, diversions and deceptions, airborne operations, countermeasures against electronic controls, etc. In addition, theater air flies close combat-support missions with the ground troops.

At this point you may well ask the question that has been forming ever since this chapter began. "All this technical stuff is probably of interest to the soldier and strategist but why write a chapter like this for my benefit? I don't give two hoots about this junk." From your point of view, at the moment, you probably don't, but in World War III you will. *You live in a theater of*

operations! Your life depends upon "all this technical stuff!"

World War III presents the possibility of five distinct theaters of operation, each with a separate mission and requirement, yet all integrated into the global strategy. To ensure final victory, the Democracies have to ensure separate victory in each theater. While it is recognized that all these theaters are not of the same importance, overwhelming defeat in any of them could prolong the war. In fact, an overwhelming defeat in certain of them would terminate the war abruptly with victory going to the Soviet Union. Based on their degree of importance to the Soviet Union we have the United States, Canada, and Latin America constituting the theater of strategic operations; Europe constituting a theater of combined strategic and tactical operations; the Middle East, southeast Asia with the South Pacific, and finally the Far East constituting primarily theaters of tactical operations.

These five theaters, therefore, offer five separate objectives for Russia and, in consequence, five separate missions for the Democracies. In the case of the United States and Canada, Russia must seek to take out the arsenal of democracy; therefore, we will call this action Operation Arsenal. In Western Europe, where the fury of the Soviet attack may be unchecked, we are faced with staving off complete annihilation of the warmaking ability of our allies; therefore, we refer to the action in this section as Operation Annihilation. The Middle East and southeast Asia offer valuable strategic resources and geographical advantages to both sides; hence, Operation Pivot and Operation Lotus. Should Russian tactics succeed in unifying the hordes of eastern Asia and turning them into a fighting force in her behalf, she would go far toward winning the war. To this area we assign an action called Operation Red Dragon.

The land, sea, and air forces, the missions and employment we have been discussing, are not limited to Europe or southeast Asia; they apply right here at home. That the United States can be removed from the status of a potential theater of war in World War III is extremely doubtful. Russia's one chance, repeat, one chance, to win World War III is to carry the war to the United States more effectively than the United States can carry it to Russia.

All this business about counter air, destruction of electronic devices, shore batteries, and the like that you have been mentally visualizing as methods to be employed against Russia are tactics that will be employed against *you* in *your theater.* World War III will be fought here in New York, Chicago, Cleveland, and Paducah Center! Now, does it make sense? These tactics aren't limited to the United States Air Force; they're Russian tactics, also.

Here in the false fastness of our ocean-bound fortress we've followed a number of wars occurring in other parts of the world without even realizing that one day combat and destruction could take place in our country. A great many of us have reconciled ourselves to minor bombings of our industries and factories, but few of us have stopped to consider what happens if Russia takes up a forward airhead position in Canada, Alaska, or even Maine! Our situation changes, and we may even become a theater of tactical operations.

For our own morale and peace of mind we should know that retreats are not of the same significance in all theaters and that victories or gains are not of equal value in all theaters. For our own security at home we should face the probability, not possibility, that the United States will be an active theater of operations as were Britain and France in World War II. This thought may come as a blow to many people, but it's one that cannot be forced into the dark recesses of a little-used portion of our brain and forgotten. It's one that must be faced, and an answer to its challenge must be found.

Now, in the light of what we have read concerning theater operations and war in general, let's look at the various theaters and examine the situations for which our strategy for survival must plan. Let's start with our own theater first and examine Operation Arsenal. Remember this is Theater Number One. In this theater we have to win. To win in all the rest and lose here is not only impossible but would be catastrophic. To win here and lose in all the rest would still give us a bare chance to remain free a few years longer. If we lose, the free world loses; if we win, civilization and posterity win; even the defeated Russian people eventually win by our victory. Let's look at Operation Arsenal.

Chapter 15

The Battlefield—Operation Arsenal

Operation Arsenal will be the most important and significant operation of World War III; on it will depend the difference between defeat and victory. Should Russia achieve her objective in this operation, the cause of the Democracies is doomed to a slow but certain death; should the Democracies achieve their objective, Communism and the threat of Russian domination of the world will disappear. Operation Arsenal is the operation in which the forces of Russia and the United States come to grips to decide whose warmaking ability shall prevail. The side winning this struggle wins the war.

In the generally accepted sense, Operation Arsenal cannot be described as taking place within the confines of a definite theater of operations, for it fails to conform to the geographical and tactical conditions usually associated with a theater. Yet as an integrated segment of the global strategy, a segment of such importance that the whole strategy hinges upon it, Operation Arsenal must be considered as taking place within a definitely defined theater or, if you like, supertheater.

From the Russian point of view, the target United States falls within definite geographical limits, but to reach this target Russia may find herself faced with the necessity of destroying forces that are based outside the geographical limits of the target. The United States, on the other hand, will find herself launching attacks on Russian and satellite industries that, tactically at least, fall within

the geographical limits of the European theater, using strategic aircraft that may be based in any one of several theaters.

Operation Arsenal is strictly a strategic operation and, as such, does not fall within our present semantic concept of a theater. It is not likely that Russia will attempt to invade the United States; therefore, we are not likely to witness the tactical maneuvering of field armies such as will be found in Europe. It is equally unthinkable that forces based in the United States would be dispatched to invade Russia independently of those attached to the European theater. The fighting in this theater will be rigidly strategic, that is, designed to destroy the ability of the antagonists to make war rather than the destruction of armies.

Control of these strategic operations will be vested in strategic air forces that operate quite independently of the theater commander in whose area they may be based. It is true that from time to time they may undertake missions suggested by the theater commander, but, in general, their missions will not depend upon the situation existing in the European theater. The control element of the Russian Strategic Air Force will, in all probability, be in Moscow or in the previously mentioned science-fiction base in Asia. In any event, it will be on Russian soil. Control of the American Strategic Air Force and perhaps that of all the strategic air of the Democracies could be in the United States, France, Britain, Africa, or any area from which the most efficient direction could be given. Russian planes will, in general, be based on Russian soil or Russian-controlled soil. Ours will be based in the United States, Britain, France, Morocco, the Middle East, the Far East, and any other available area found to be advantageous.

Operation Arsenal will be fought in what we may call a strategic theater and thus not be subject to the geographical or tactical restrictions usually imposed by the term theater of operations. In any event, it is the results achieved that count, not what we call the area in which they are achieved or the methods employed. If the use of the term bothers those of you who are purists, the answer is simple: don't refer to Operation Arsenal as taking place in a theater of operation. Call it what you please.

Having made this concession to the technical mind, let's go on and examine the operation and its peculiarities. We know that

this operation is aimed at the destruction of the warmaking ability of the antagonists. We know also that the United States must fight its offensive part of the operation on the basis of the maximum damage with the minimum destruction. It should also be clear, for reasons advanced elsewhere, that the type of warfare Russia will wage against the United States may be bound, to a certain extent, by the same formula. There is this difference. The American interpretation of the formula will extend to people as well as material things. Because of this we shall probably refrain from bombing any area that is not strictly within the limits of the warmaking ability. This means that residential districts will be avoided. Russia, on the contrary, cannot be expected to avoid purely residential districts because her interpretation of warmaking ability will include people as part of the natural-resources complex; her political doctrine regards people as the servants of the state rather than the reverse as is found in democracy.

A second area of difference is found in the internal war. There is little possibility of the United States conducting extensive campaigns of strategic sabotage against the Russian war effort, either in Russia or her satellites. We have no puppet party or American-controlled group of Russian subversives to do our bidding in the Soviet Union. Nor have we any previously prepared plan for such a campaign. Such sabotage as does occur will be a purely local effort, uncontrolled by the Democracies. Russia, on the other hand, has the facilities of the Communist Party in the United States, which she may employ, and has already planned to employ, in sabotaging American war efforts. Therefore, where she fights only the American threat from without, we in the United States fight both an external and internal enemy.

Because it is presumed that the Soviet Union will strike the first blow in total war and because such a blow must include an air strike against the United States, we'll consider the Soviet air offensive against American warmaking ability first. By consulting the map (page 176) it will be clear that the Soviet Union has bases within a radius of 5,000 miles of America's industrial areas. Many of these are, in fact, well under 5,000 miles; Murmansk is only 4,000 miles from the east-coast industrial complex, and the bases on the Chukotski Peninsula are less than 4,000 miles from



Probable Sources and Routes of Soviet Air Attack on the United States—based on the use of a 5,000-mile bomber.

the Detroit-Chicago industrial complex and approximately 3,500 miles from the west-coast complex.

The present Russian TU-4, believed to be the Russian counterpart of the U.S. B-29 and probably the Soviet atomic-bomb carrier, has a range of 5,000 miles. To bomb American industry successfully and return to base, the TU-4 cannot exceed a 2,500-mile flight from its home base. Initial raids, therefore, should be classed as suicide raids in which the crew of the TU-4 has no intention of returning home. Once the mission is accomplished the crew will either parachute or land, throwing themselves on the mercy of the American forces as prisoners of war, or crash the plane and themselves on an industrial objective. A third possibility would be for the crews to attempt evasion and to join forces with the Communists in the United States, continuing as a part of the underground army.

Such a drain on Russian production of TU-4's would not be practicable over a long period of time and should give way to two other types of operations. Efforts will probably be made to cross over into Alaska, by direct invasion or by airborne action, for the purpose of seizing bases in the Alaskan Peninsula and northern Canada. Success in this venture could place Soviet aircraft within a 2,500-mile range of Detroit and Chicago. A successful airborne invasion of Greenland and Iceland would bring Russia within 2,500 miles of the east-coast industrial complex. It is doubtful if invasion attempts will be made against the North American Continent at points other than these. The Soviet Union, despite her manpower, is still not strong enough to undertake a wide-scale invasion of the continental United States. She could, however, conduct a number of limited invasions of the northern areas for the purpose of securing forward air head positions from which to pound American industry.

A second type of operation is the employment of guided missiles, with or without atomic warheads. Present Russian advances in this field are, of course, not public property, but it seems reasonable to assume that her booty from World War II included some of the V-1 and V-2 specialists who could be pressed into service in developing guided missiles for the Soviets. As yet, there is no public knowledge concerning the pin-point accuracy of either

United States or Soviet guided missiles, but it is not unreasonable to assume that considerable progress and improvements on the World War II "buzz bomb" have been made. It is safe to assume that we will see some of these landing in American cities in World War III.

Augmenting the air arm and guided-missile attacks will be the Soviet submarines. These are capable of deployment on both the east and west coasts and against the Panama Canal and could launch guided missiles against our coastal cities. In addition they could seriously interfere with coastal and transoceanic shipping, so vital to our forces overseas and to our allies.

Russian occupation of Alaskan and Canadian bases would menace Canadian production and strategic resources vital to the Democracies' war effort. Discovery of oil in Canada has helped lift the gloom imposed by trouble in the Middle East, and Canadian uranium and nickel are vital to our war industry. Loss of these resources would be catastrophic, if resources in other theaters were likewise under Russian attack or control. Successful Soviet invasion of Greenland and Iceland would not only deny the United States two valuable guardians of the approaches to our continental territory and that of Canada, but would also deny us the northern air route to Europe and bases for retaliatory raids on Russia. Furthermore, their loss would supply Russia with bases from which to harass Atlantic shipping. Because of the multiple function of these areas they should be held at all costs.

There may be some question as to Russian ability to invade and occupy the areas noted. It must be pointed out that all of these are within easy flying distance of Russian air bases, all of them being less than two thousand miles from the nearest Soviet field. In many instances the bases in the invaded areas will already exist as part of the United States defense network, and if the Russians are successful in landing, these fields could be used against us. It would not be necessary for Russian aircraft, returning from raids on the United States, to land at the captured bases; they could be refueled in flight by planes operating from them. It is not unreasonable to assume that Russia has made as much progress in in-flight refueling as have the Democracies.

Should it be impossible for Russia to occupy some or all of

these areas, they are still near enough to her bases to make them convenient targets for constant attack. This, of course, does not take into consideration the efficiency with which the bases would be defended by their American occupants. It goes without saying that Russia would meet with strong resistance against either invasion or attack if our war readiness permitted us to prepare these bases and areas adequately in advance of the outbreak of war.

What areas of the United States are apt to be primary targets? This should be decided easily by almost any reader. Obviously our industrial areas are number-one targets. These would include Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Detroit, Chicago, Buffalo, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Newark and the New York area, Philadelphia, New England, and any area within Russian bombing range where industry is concentrated. Ports would also be primary targets because of the part they play in the warmaking ability of a nation. Hydroelectric plants such as those located at Niagara Falls would be certain to be bombed for the effect their destruction would have on industry and morale. Railroad centers, strategic inland canals such as those in use in the Great Lakes, coal- and iron-mining areas, storage depots, and production centers of atomic bombs would all be on the list.

I am not so convinced that the nation's capital would be under constant attack. There would be several morale raids against Washington but probably not to the degree of intensity or frequency of the raids against the industrial areas. This operation, it must be recalled, is against the warmaking ability of the United States. Raids against Washington would be costly and not economically sound in terms of destroying production. Our system is such that the destruction of our capital would not terminate our war effort. Washington may be the political and military nerve center of the nation, but, unlike European capitals, it is not the industrial nerve center or that of communications.

Unless Russia secured bases in Alaska, northern Canada, and Greenland, it is doubtful if her attacks would go south of the fortieth parallel except on the west coast. While southern industry is of great importance to the American war effort, it is too widely scattered to make suicide raids economically or militarily sound. If, however, Russia could acquire bases in North America she

would extend her selection of targets proportionately to the south.

It is not unlikely that bacterial warfare raids will be made on agricultural areas and centers of population in an effort to curtail civilian capacity and production. A map of the United States will clearly indicate the vulnerable states north of the fortieth parallel, and it must always be remembered that the entire Canadian agricultural complex is vulnerable to Russian attack. This is also true of Canada's industrial complex.

Russian attacks at the moment could cripple, if not destroy, American warmaking ability. Should we lose the industrial, agricultural, and power production within the present suicide-bombing range, the remaining production ability of the south would not be sufficient to support the nation, let alone our allies or our war effort. This much must be clear: Russia will try, she has no other choice, and she will use the atomic bomb wherever she can.

So much for the external war; now, what about the Communist internal efforts? Primarily the methods employed will be sabotage rather than serious revolutionary tactics. There is no doubt that some frank civil disturbances approaching revolution may be tried, particularly if the American Communist Party should be augmented by invading Soviet air crews or parachutists. For the most part, however, these will be closely localized efforts designed more for their nuisance effect rather than for serious determined efforts to overthrow the government. These must not be minimized, for there is every possibility that, should the war be prolonged or the Democracies' defeats drastic, the Communists might attempt to capitalize on our misfortunes and seek to push a local action onto a state or national scale. While this is a remote possibility, it is one for which we must provide. War with Russia is an all-out, ability-taxing effort, and any diversion of men or equipment from the main effort could be costly in terms of final results or duration of the war.

In a country the size of the United States sabotage is a much more practical weapon than is revolution. Most Americans visualize sabotage as the somewhat spectacular gestures popularized by the propaganda stories of World War I. Here we seemed concerned with plots requiring elaborate planning and which extended from eliminating tremendous numbers of American soldiers

by introducing ground glass into their oatmeal to placing a bomb in the umbrella stand of the White House. Communist sabotage will be much more deadly, if less spectacular, in World War III. For this reason it is necessary that we watch for it in less obvious places than the munitions plants or troopships.

In all probability attempts will be made against American heavy industry, but most likely these attempts will be made against plants producing the essential parts rather than the principal weapons. Ball-bearing factories, instrument plants, and the like offer excellent opportunities for sabotage, particularly since the failure of small-parts plants to produce the essential items would cause a slowdown or stoppage in many industries and seriously cripple production. Extraneous materials introduced into molten steel could reduce the effectiveness of the metal and slow down production. Improperly compounded alloys would also exert a comparable effect. In short, industrial sabotage will be directed against the plants whose failure in production would tend to cripple or paralyze a large number of dependent plants.

There will also probably be the classic acts of sabotage against troopships, most of which will not succeed because of the great caution and thorough protection that characterizes our troop movements. Bacterial warfare could also be carried on against isolated camps or small groups of soldiers with some degree of success. Undoubtedly, we will witness service-installation fires and attempts to blow up munition dumps at these installations, but sabotage of this type is not likely to be widespread or, if past experience is a guide, successful.

In spite of these possibilities, I am concerned more with acts of sabotage against masses of people and against the over-all war effort rather than with acts against specific industries. The fields of transportation and communication offer excellent possibilities. The destruction of railroad bridges and tunnels, for example, could seriously retard the United States' warmaking ability. The successful planting of a bomb on a strategic bridge in one of our defense highway systems, such as the Wilmington Memorial Bridge between Delaware and New Jersey, the Bay Bridge across the Chesapeake, the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco Bay, or any of a hundred other critical bridges all over America, could be

devastating. A blocked tunnel on the famous Harrisburg-Pittsburgh Turnpike could slow down motor transport to an alarming degree. All of these damaged facilities would have to be repaired, and these repairs would be made at the expense of the war effort.

During World War II attempts were made to alleviate the petroleum shortages by constructing pipe lines from the source of supply to the areas of greatest consumption. These still function and supply huge quantities of petroleum to industrial areas. Running for hundreds of miles, these pipe lines present excellent targets for acts of sabotage, and if they were to be put out of operation even briefly, the effect of the petroleum shortage would make itself felt throughout the war effort.

These are only a few of the many examples that could be cited in the field of transportation and communication. To them we could add the oldest form of sabotage—the strike: railroad strikes, truck strikes, telephone and telegraph strikes, longshoremen's strikes, and a variety of others, each with its far-reaching effect on our war effort. In time of war or national crisis strikes in any industry could constitute an act of sabotage against the whole people. The danger of the employment of this weapon will be much greater in World War III because of the known penetration of the labor unions by Communists, many of whom have been specifically and expertly trained in all forms of sabotage techniques. In no previous war has the United States had to contend with an underground movement in labor equal to the present threat.

We can expect that special attention will be paid to urban facilities servicing large concentrations of people. Power plants, waterworks, transport facilities, and subway systems, heating plants and elevator mechanisms in large buildings, sources of cooking fuel, and the like are all potential targets for sabotage. What would New York or Chicago be like if the subway systems were paralyzed and gasoline was in short supply? What would Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Los Angeles, or Buffalo do without running water or electricity?

Food sources, canneries and processing plants, dairies, milk-collecting stations, public freezer lockers, and any industry or business connected with supplying food to the public can also be

regarded as potential targets for sabotage. Man can tighten his belt just so far before his efficiency drops and his morale shatters. In spite of all our public-health measures there are still millions of Americans who are not immune to typhoid. Most of us are susceptible to the vast number of organisms producing dysentery and gastric complaints. Food poisonings are fairly common in peacetime—think what could happen if sabotage took the form of deliberately introducing harmful organisms at the source of our food supply?

All of these things sound far-fetched, and perhaps some of them are—but none of them is impossible, and many of these acts of sabotage will be practiced against us. The general tendency of all mankind is to assume the "it-can't-happen-here" attitude and blithely relegate such ideas to a mental burying ground. That's what makes sabotage possible. Once vigilance is relaxed the enemy agent can move in and institute his insidious undercover war.

Another act of internal warfare, which may actually take place outside our continental limits but not outside the theater in which Operation Arsenal is being fought, is the probability of interference with our sources of raw material in South and Central America. Communist penetration has been fairly successful in certain Latin American countries—far more successful than we like to acknowledge. While the superficial objective is to turn these states into Communist nations, the deeper purpose of Communist penetration is to render them unavailable as sources of raw materials for the Democracies' war effort. States such as Bolivia, which supplies us with tin; Venezuela, which supplies us with oil; Chile, which supplies us with nitrates; and others of our southern neighbors play a critical part in our industrial program. Lack of access to their resources would be a serious handicap to our war-making ability.

But enough of what could happen to the United States during a war with Russia. The big question now is what do we do about the Russian onslaught, how do we fight against it, how do we prevent it? While many of our people are blissfully ignorant of the whole situation, many more are aware of the possibilities, and this faction represents our saving grace.

The American armed forces have two primary missions insofar

as the over-all war effort is concerned: first, the protection of the United States, and secondly, the destruction of the Soviet war-making ability. The first mission will be accomplished by all three services, the latter by the Air Force based at home and abroad and the forces of the Democracies in the various overseas theaters. While admittedly these latter forces will be concentrating on tactical rather than strategic missions, the war cannot be fought without their co-operation, if we are to win.

The protection of the United States calls for a ring of air bases manned by the Air Defense Forces, which will guard the approaches to the critical arsenal. This ring of bases must, in effect, be a series of concentric semicircles extending from the North Polar regions to the southern limits of the United States in order to provide defense in depth. By way of consolation it is comforting to know that such a system exists in part at the present time. Added to this and surrounding the whole country must be an effective radar screen and air-warning system along the air approaches to the United States. There must be no loopholes open to the enemy's penetration by air.

This program calls, of course, for a strong Air Defense Command capable of fighting against enemy planes and guided missiles anywhere within our theater. It calls also for strong radar-controlled antiaircraft protection to be supplied by the ground forces around all critical industrial areas. It calls for a strong naval cover off both coasts for defense against submarines and for interception of enemy aircraft by both sea-surface units and naval air. It calls for a civilian defense corps of trained air spotters and possibly for civilian antiaircraft gun operators such as were organized in Britain during World War II. It calls for a civilian fire service to battle fires produced by bombings, a requirement learned by the European nations at terrible cost in World War II. It calls for the complete co-operation of every man, woman, and child in United States.

The farther away from our critical areas the enemy can be intercepted, the better the chance of our victory. Because we know that the enemy can penetrate almost any defense line, we must establish our defense facilities in depth in order that we may intercept him at every mile of his flight. In this effort the people and

the forces of Canada and the United States must be as one, united in a common objective. It is not a question of who brings him down; it's enough that some fast, maneuverable, high-powered fighter causes the enemy to plummet earthward short of his target. We must set up a ring of death to guard North America.

Having protected the North American continent from attack we can turn our attention toward the Soviet. Here we find two missions of such high priority that it is difficult to choose between them. Russia's warmaking potential and ability must be destroyed. At the same time, her death-dealing air bases within striking distance of our industrial complex must also be destroyed. Which shall be first? If her industry is eliminated, her air bases will be useless, but while we are attacking her warmaking ability, these air bases can supply the planes to inflict punishment on us. If we concentrate on her bases and neglect her industry, she will continue to produce for war and the conflict will be prolonged. Would you care to make the decision?

Actually we must attack both with an almost equal priority, giving the slight edge to the elimination of her bases. By so doing we help fulfill the first part of our mission—the protection of the United States; and we render the second part—the destruction of her warmaking ability—easier by removing her defenses. Turning back to the map (page 176), we can see clearly which bases lie within attack distance from the United States and which can be more easily reached by plane, both strategic and tactical, based in other areas. Considering Greenland and Iceland as fixed aircraft carriers, unsinkable and beyond the necessity of maneuvering, and Norway and Britain as northern strategic advance areas, we can determine the bases we shall be able to attack successfully, based solely on distance.

The question of the ability of American planes to cover the required distance must be considered. We have a number of long-range bombers that could be assigned to this task as well as to the program of destroying the Soviet warmaking ability. The B-29 has a 4,600-mile maximum range carrying 10,000 pounds; the so-called Flying Wing can travel 4,000 miles; the massive B-36 can go 10,000 miles with 10,000 pounds; and our famous Stratojet can make a 3,000-mile flight. All of them are capable of flying at heights

over 34,000 feet, and one of them, the B-36, will go to 45,000 feet. Other long-distance planes are under consideration, and some, like the B-50, with a range over 6,000 miles at 40,000 feet, have already been delivered. The speed of these planes runs from 400 m.p.h. to as high as 600 m.p.h. There is no doubt of the ability of the American plane to do the job.

Our attacks on Russian warmaking resources must include attacks on Murmansk, Archangel, Smolensk, Moscow, Dnepropetrovsk, Stalingrad, Batum, Baku, Bryansk, Grozny, Kuibyshev, and Magnitogorsk, to mention but a few. Obviously, this cannot be done entirely by planes based in the United States, so provision must be made for a ring of air bases around the Soviet Union. Raids on Soviet industry must be of the round-the-clock character and continued until the over-all mission is accomplished. In this mission we must have the co-operation of our allies in the form of planes to participate in the raids and in the use of air bases.

Meanwhile, the Navy must see to the approaches by sea. Part of this is a home-fleet job, part an overseas theater job. Mine fields must be sown by naval planes and mine layers in the Kuriles and the Baltic to deny the use of these waters to submarines and Russian naval craft. An incessant warfare against submarines must be carried on for the defense of both our coasts and our transocean surface routes. Russian aircraft using air approaches over sea lanes must be intercepted and shot down, and navy carriers must be moved into position to take part in short-range strategic bombing missions if needed and feasible. Primarily the Navy's job is a protective one, but the carrier may be found to be a valuable aid to strategic bombing plans.

Defense against the internal war at home is a task for the F.B.I., the labor unions, and all the people. Upon the outbreak of war, all known Communists must be rounded up and placed in the custody of our prisons. While this will reduce the number of Communists available for acts of sabotage, it will not eliminate all of them. Vigilance and adequate protection of all likely targets must be constant. Everyone must help. It will probably be found necessary to go against the wishes of the idealists, something we have not seen fit to do so far, and outlaw the Communist Party in order to furnish grounds for arresting its members before they

can damage our efforts. There will still be an outcry of "antidemocratic methods," but after the bombing of the first American city there will be fewer idealists and a great many more realists whose eyes will be open for the first time. War is grim and bitter, and victory depends upon realistic methods rather than idealism. It is to be regretted that some of the vision and clear thinking we acquire under the buffetings of war cannot be manifested in times of peace. We might save ourselves regrets if it could be done.

Insofar as South and Central America are concerned the solution is simple. Anything that we fail to do prior to the outbreak of war will not be successfully accomplished after war begins. The time to bind our Latin neighbors to the cause is now, not on D + 30 or D + 100. A realistic program must be devised to bring all these countries into the democratic fold and keep them there. The man in the street has failed to realize the significance and the importance of Latin America to our war effort, and he must wake up to the fact that we need the support of these peoples and their governments. It could happen that the early stages of the war could go so strongly against us that South and Central America would represent the principal area of strategic resources outside the arsenal. Now is the time for developing hemisphere unity of purpose, not when our backs are to the wall.

There you have it—the skeleton of Operation Arsenal. Sounds grim, even fantastic, doesn't it? Even while you read it, such thoughts as "The lad is nuts," "Wonder what he smokes?" "When do the little men in the white coats come?" may be running through your head. But deep down inside, you know that everything written here is possible. That's what you're afraid of, isn't it?

It would be pleasant if this could be a bad dream, and we could all go back to the days when a war in Europe was an unpleasantness three thousand miles away, and a conflict from which we could expect at least two years of staggering profits before it hit here at home. But those days are gone forever. The scenes you recall of the London blitz, Coventry, and the bombing of Berlin are likely to be repeated with you as the participant on the receiving end. If you look at a Mercator projection, Russia's on the other side of the world but if you look at a true representation on a polar projection, she's at your back door! Only the Arctic

is between us. Those air bases on the Arctic Sea weren't put there to fight off polar bears or Eskimos; they are there to be used against *you* "when the balloon goes up." You're no longer safe behind your oceans—you're on the firing line!

There's been a lot of speculation about where the first blow of World War III will fall, and almost everyone is a self-constituted expert on the subject. There's still room for a lot more speculation, but one thing is certain—you've got a reasonable chance of witnessing it in person or at the least hearing about it along with the sound of the air-raid siren that tells you Stalin's planes are on their way against your home town.

What do we do? Do we panic? Do we run? Do we petition Washington to appease the madmen of the Kremlin? Some of you may, but most of us won't. We start in, belatedly, to prepare in earnest to repulse this first raid. We stop grumbling about the cost. We go full speed ahead and build our defenses. We come down out of the clouds and stop this false toleration of enemy agents. We make both labor and capital know that public opinion is not going to be tolerant of strikes that interfere with our defense efforts and gain little or nothing for the working man but lots of prestige for the strike leader and his boss. We convince everyone concerned that the laborer and the soldier have certain things in common; neither has a moral right to strike or refuse to fight in his own way in time of war. We get ourselves into a civilian-defense unit and learn where and how we can be the most useful, and then we train to be sure we can do the job perfectly. But first of all we design our strategy for survival so that we can win the first battle in Operation Arsenal. There could be only one, you know!

Chapter 16

The Battlefield—Operation Annihilation I

The European theater, in which Operation Annihilation will be fought, will be the scene of the most paradoxical actions of any of the five theaters. From the point of view of military history the results of combat in this theater may answer some of the questions that have plagued historians since the days of Napoleon. We may find, for example, the answer to such questions as, would the Von Schlieffen Plan, properly modified, have ensured victory for Germany in World Wars I and II; could Napoleon have won the Napoleonic Wars by invading England; or does the invasion and occupation of Britain necessarily doom the Continent to defeat? We are also likely to find out if it is essential for the victor to hold the Scandinavian and Balkan flanks to invade Western Europe successfully. From a purely geopolitical and strategic laboratory point of view the campaigns in this theater should prove most illuminating.

However, while the fighting is actually going on, the Democracies will not be interested in such academic questions, for our attention will be directed toward much more fundamental problems. We will be primarily concerned in preventing the Russians from maneuvering themselves into positions from which the academic questions can be answered. Should we be unsuccessful in this, our problem will be one of unseating the Russians from these positions and driving them back to Soviet territory.

The paradoxical character of Operation Annihilation will be

found in the methods employed by the Soviet Union to attain its immediate objective. Russia wants Western Europe in as nearly an undestroyed condition as is consistent with her desires for victory. However, this desire will not prevent her from completely annihilating the European industrial complex if she cannot take it without destroying it. Basically, the Soviets want the land mass and resources of Western Europe—destroyed or undestroyed—to be incorporated into the body of world Communism, thus forcing the United States to fall back to her own shores and convert her continental holdings into a veritable fortress from which the survivors of the Democracies will have to "go it alone."

The important, over-all objective of the Soviet Union is the defeat of the United States and its forceful conversion to Communism. So long as we are the stronghold of democracy, world Communism will be denied success, and the world revolution will be impossible. Only by subjugating America can Russia truly win. Therefore, the physical condition in which she finds Western Europe at the termination of a successful Russian campaign is of no special significance. She would, of course, prefer to find France, Italy, and Britain still capable of producing under a Russian plan and still able to raise armies to be thrown, upon Russian orders, into an all-out war against the United States. However, in the Soviet plan the United States is the doughnut and Western Europe the hole. With the Soviet eye on the doughnut, the ultimate physical condition of the hole is relatively unimportant.

The complete loss of Western Europe to the Democracies would be followed rapidly by the loss of the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and Africa. Under such conditions it is doubtful if the southeast Asia–South Pacific theater could hold out or any action to the betterment of the Democracies' position take place in the Far East theater. In short, if Western Europe falls to the Soviet, Russia could carry the other three almost by default. This would then place at her disposal the resources, natural and otherwise, of all these areas and, under Russian domination, ally almost the entire world against the United States and its Western Hemisphere allies. It is not likely that the remaining partners of the democratic coalition could resist such pressure indefinitely.

With this in mind, the degree of destruction to be visited upon

Western Europe will be determined largely by the character of the resistance offered by the Democracies. Should the early stages of the campaign clearly foretell a Russian victory, the industrial complex of France, Italy, and Britain would be spared from annihilation so that it might be put to Russian use. On the other hand, should it be apparent that the Democracies are going to be able to hold back the Red horde on land, Russian air can be expected to make every attempt to annihilate the warmaking powers of Western Europe in an effort to achieve a Soviet victory in the shortest possible time. This is the paradox; the more successful the Democracies' resistance, the greater the damage to themselves; the less they resist, the less the degree of destruction to their countries.

One normally fights to defend one's property and territory, not to ensure its destruction. In this case, however, the reverse seems to be true. Nevertheless, the price that Western Europe would have to pay to preserve her material wealth is far beyond that which the average citizen would be willing to pay. A lack of resistance would presuppose that the man in the street is prepared to surrender himself, his liberties, his possessions, and posterity to Soviet slavery. It should be apparent that this is one thing Western Europe is not prepared to do. If this were within the realm of possibility, there would be no world crisis at the moment and no threat of World War III. The mere fact that the Western European nations are preparing to resist is evidence in itself that Operation Annihilation will be fought in all its destructive bitterness and horror.

The Democracies' big hope of nullifying Russian effort to annihilate the warmaking ability of Western Europe lies in one possibility—that of an allied success in achieving air superiority at the very outset of the war or in a relatively short time thereafter. In order to accomplish her mission, Russia must be able to bomb out such areas as Paris, Le Havre, London, Birmingham, Manchester, and other industrial centers. If her bombing craft can be stubbornly thrown back before they reach their targets her objective will not be attained.

The Air Defense Force of the NATO area in Europe must be as strong, if not stronger, than that of the United States. Russia has

more bombers capable of making strikes at Western Europe from Russian and satellite fields than she has capable of making strikes against the United States. If the Democracies are forced to withdraw to the west, the number of these fields increases and their distance from western targets decreases. A powerful air defense force plus a powerful tactical air force to render Russian forward bases untenable will be the Democracies' greatest hope of saving the Western European industrial complex. Air superiority will eventually prove to be the decisive factor in World War III.

The European theater will also be the area of the greatest land fighting as Russia attempts to augment her resources destroyed at home by the Democracies' strategic bombers by acquiring those held by the various NATO countries. She will endeavor to force the surrender and occupation of the Western European states by land and water invasions of their territory. Every mile of ground she gains will offer additional possibility of her success and will deny the Democracies the advantages contained in the territory she successfully occupies. This move, of course, must be prevented by the Democracies and indicates the creation of ground and naval forces in Western Europe capable of rebuffing Red advances.

The general plan of the Democracies for this area, then, boils down to a simple one, simple at least on paper. Russian ground and air advances in Western Europe must be stubbornly resisted and delayed while the Strategic Bombing Commands eliminate Russian warmaking ability in her homeland and satellites. When the strategic bombers have successfully completed their mission, the forces of the Democracies must attack, invade Russian territory, and force her unconditional surrender. The first phase of World War III in Europe could be accomplished and terminated in as little time as a year, granting initial successes to the Democracies' Strategic Air. The second phase, however, could drag on for some years before it was brought to a successful conclusion. Russia is a geographical colossus, and pockets of resistance could continue on a limited scale long after her general warmaking ability was destroyed. Again there is always the possibility of the development of a partial warmaking ability within the famous Heartland of Mackinder, or coreland, the warmaking ability not sufficient

to win the war but strong enough to prolong it through years of bitter, desperate fighting.

There are four ways in which the Democracies' ground troops could fight against the Russian armies in an effort to keep them from conquering Western Europe. We could endeavor to hold them at their present satellite line, refusing to yield an inch; we could fight a planned withdrawal or delaying action, drawing them farther and farther away from the satellite borders at our discretion; we could employ a combination of the tactics of containment and withdrawal, starting with the first plan and shifting to the second when our position became untenable; or we could stage an attack to throw them off balance and keep them that way. One of these four we must employ, for the alternative is to panic and run for the cover of Britain or North Africa thus yielding Europe permanently or temporarily to the Communists. Each of these has its advantages and its disadvantages. They have one thing in common; no matter which plan we follow, the Strategic Air Commands will be endeavoring to destroy the Russian warmaking ability at the same time that the land armies are locked in desperate struggle.

On the surface, the plan of containment would seem to be the best plan to follow. If this were successful, the Democracies would hold the Soviet at a line running from the Baltic to Greece, marking the western borders of the satellites. The countries of Western Europe would be spared the carnage of the battlefield, and apart from the damage inflicted on the Democracies by air, all war damage would be limited to Russian and satellite soil. This would sharply limit the amount of reconstruction necessary in Western Europe after the war and reduce the economic waste, enabling the Democracies to extract the maximum from their sources of production. No industries, resource areas, or communication facilities would be destroyed or interrupted by Communist occupation.

Success in a containment action would depend largely on three factors: sufficient ground divisions in being and on the line of action to beat back the initial Russian advances; air superiority to prevent Russian aircraft from destroying the vital areas to our rear and to deny the tactical air arena to her; and naval superiority

to prevent Russia from effecting landings on our flanks or in our rear in Italy, Belgium, Holland, or Denmark. At the moment the first is nonexistent, the second doubtful, and the third only partly prepared.

As has been noted earlier, the Democracies have only a fraction of Russia's 175 divisions with which to oppose her. Even the overall objective of 50 divisions in Europe by 1953, which will not be met, leaves the manpower advantage in her favor. With this total we must plan to oppose all of Russia's might on the 1,500-mile front. This obviously is impossible at the time of writing. Should war come before the NATO forces objective is reached, it is obvious that present divisions in being would be under 25. Public opinion and cost would be the two strongest factors in opposition to increasing the number of divisions presently opposing Russia.

These figures, of course, do not include forces that would be furnished by Yugoslavia or Spain. Needless to say, however, the effective strength of the former depends upon our ability to supply the necessary equipment, while that of the latter is dependent upon many factors of which lack of equipment and training are only two.

Obviously, with our present ground strength, we cannot expect to contain Russia in her present line. We could, however, make a definite and perhaps even decisive showing on a much shorter front. This fact alone dictates that the plan of containment be abandoned in favor of one calling for a line farther west.

Our air strength, combined with that of the Western European nations, gives us a somewhat better than even footing with the Soviet. With this we must supply a defensive force to protect the Western European industrial complex as well as a tactical striking force to launch against Russian front-line positions, supply lines, and other objectives. By thus splitting the available forces we could not hope to achieve air superiority at the outbreak of the war. This becomes even more apparent when we note that the present French Air Force would not be capable of even defending its own areas without American assistance.

Such superiority as we may have would lie in the sea forces, but even here we would not have enough to defend the North Sea,

the Channel, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic against a stubborn Russian sea-surface and undersea attack. Not with the great demands being made on our naval forces for missions in all parts of the world.

The second plan of action would be that of withdrawal, in the form of a delaying action, to establish a line on a much shorter front. While this would give us a much greater advantage, a far better chance to defend ourselves, and a fair chance to stop the Russian forces short of a complete victory in Europe, there are certain pertinent disadvantages of far-reaching proportions. Perhaps a discussion of the advantages of such a plan would be a more optimistic approach.

Apart from the ultimately shorter front, this type of campaign would increase the length of the Russian lines of communication almost to the breaking point of Russian logistic ability. Railroad trains loaded in Russia would have to be unloaded and their contents transferred to other trains west of Berlin and Prague. This is due to the fact that the Russian gauge differs from the Western European gauge, and no through trains are presently possible. Needless to say, the Communists could not undertake to convert captured lines to Russian gauge during a full-scale war. Every point of transfer would mark a permanent target for free world air actions.

Once the Russian supply lines left the satellite boundaries, they would run through hostile country, necessitating constant protection against sabotage and probable guerrilla action. Such a situation calls for large rear-area concentrations and necessitates the removal of appreciable numbers of troops from either the fighting front or the defense of the Russian homeland. This could momentarily tax the Russian strength, in view of other factors.

Under normal conditions a delaying action or strategic withdrawal favors the defenders, provided the withdrawal can be controlled. In such a situation the defenders select the time and place of each battle and have a certain opportunity to prepare their positions in advance of action. The forces of democracy withdrawing from the satellite line could force the Russians to contest every river to be crossed. Contests could be expected at the Weser and Aller lines, the Rhine, the Moselle, and every other river

Russian forces might be required to cross in order to come to grips with the withdrawing Democracies. Once back on French soil, the defenders could employ the series of escarpments nature has provided in order to deter the Russians even more.

A delaying action could be fought across Germany and France, while allied forces withdrew to Spain, Italy, Britain, and North Africa, if necessary. Ultimately, under such conditions the Democracies would have to duplicate the World War II campaigns in Italy and France, when sufficient manpower and organization to return to the Continental arena were available. Meanwhile, the Russian position would be the equivalent of that of Germany in World War II—tremendous areas to defend with comparatively limited resources to do the job.

Extension of the Russian forces into the hostile countries of the West would open the enemy lines to flank attacks from both the north and south and necessitate fighting that would be comparable to a three-front war in a one-front area. Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia, with possibly Italy, could make life miserable for Russia's southern flank. The North Sea area provides excellent opportunities for commando raids and even small-scale invasions to harass the Russian flanks. The nearness of air bases in Britain, Spain, and North Africa could make the Russian position unenviable.

Should such an action be selected as the best means of defense against the Reds, Russia would have to plan on simultaneous initial drives into Scandinavia and Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey as well as into Western Europe. Such a wide-scale advance might well be outside her powers and would definitely reduce the number of troops she could throw against the armies defending the French border.

Advantageous as such a plan may seem, its disadvantages are many. Its success would depend upon the ability of the Democracies, particularly the United States, to produce sufficient quantities of war supplies and trained personnel to invade Europe at a later date. This could only be done if the United States succeeded in destroying Russia's warmaking ability while at the same time preventing Russia from destroying hers. The plan presupposes that the Democracies would be able effectively to control the with-

drawal over long routes of march, a thing most difficult to do under any circumstances. Retreating armies lose sight of the final objective under constant withdrawal; morale wanes and finally cracks, precipitating panic, flight, and defeat.

Natives of the countries abandoned to the aggressor also lose hope and doubt the ability of the defenders to return. This leads inevitably to collaboration, thus reducing the chances of effective guerrilla actions and immeasurably increasing the enemy's chances of victory. Such countries supply manpower for industry and for the invader's army to be used against their friends, as we witnessed in France during World War II. Man will take a terrible amount of punishment so long as he has hope; rob him of hope, and he will turn his support to his oppressor.

A delaying action would be particularly dangerous with the Russians as enemies because of the already well-organized Communist parties existing in the areas through which the Democracies must retreat. Not only would the withdrawing forces face constant sabotage and espionage, but there is every possibility that a dispirited people might yield to Communist pressure at home and throw one of the areas into revolution, forming a Communist state in one of the nations at our rear. This would mean loss of our supplies in that area, defections, and even mutiny within the ranks of our allies and would place us between two fires—the Red Army at our front and a local Red government at our rear.

Such an action could cut off a possible route of withdrawal, forcing us to change our plans in mid-action, or lessen our combat strength by necessitating the dispatch of forces to quell rebellion along the line of retreat. If our forces panicked at such a time, the defeat would be overwhelming.

A delaying action presupposes that the Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks could successfully hold the Russian and satellite forces in that area while the Western Powers withdrew. This would depend upon the adequacy of their supplies, armies, and equipment; for it would mean they would fight in virtual isolation until the Western forces were evacuated from the Continent. Failure to hold would mean loss of the eastern Mediterranean, possibly Italy, threats and harassment of our escape routes to North Africa, and a repetition of the World War II campaigns in the desert. Undoubtedly,

failure to hold in these three countries could cost us the Middle East.

Perhaps the great disadvantage of the delaying action and withdrawal is found in the fact that every mile of the route the Democracies follow will have to be covered again when their forces return to invade Russia. Every weary yard, every river, every town will have to be retaken, and at what cost in life and property! What has not been made clear by the term withdrawal, what is only implied to the layman and known well by the strategist, is the manner in which such a withdrawal would have to be conducted and the task presented by the recovery of the territory temporarily forfeited to the Reds.

Withdrawal in World War III is not merely the movement of troops rearward to previously prepared positions; it is much more than that. With it must go a scorched-earth policy, the like of which the civilized world has never seen before. Nothing of the slightest possible value can be left to the advancing Red horde. Every factory in our line of retreat must be destroyed. Every mile of railroad track must be ripped up. Every bridge, railroad, and highway alike must be blown. Every tunnel must be blocked with high explosives and rendered useless. Coal mines, iron mines, and every other form of natural resource must be turned into rubbish heaps. Hydroelectric plants, dams, and canals must be rendered noneffective. Fields must be flooded, dykes destroyed, and the countryside laid waste so that the Russians may profit by nothing they have occupied. What makes this action even worse is that we shall be doing these things to our friends, to our allies. It will be their factories, their mines, and their lands that will be devastated.

Once the Russians have taken up occupancy, these former friendly areas will be subject to the fury of the Democracies' air power, and in every village that houses a Red installation the terror of our planes will be known. Every acre we lose is an acre we must destroy, lest it be converted into a Communist asset; and we, the Democracies, the defenders of liberty, shall take our places with the great destroyers of history.

And what we destroy we shall have to rebuild. When the war

is ended and we have triumphed, we shall be faced with the same barren wastelands that we surrendered to Russia; and our allies will demand that they, who suffered so much and served democracy so well in this suffering, be restored to their former position and fertility. This is why many authorities have said there can be no real victor in World War III but merely nations with varying degrees of loss. But the price that will be paid will not only be justified but cheap. Man can live free and happy even amid destruction, while he cannot retain his freedom, happiness, or self-respect in slavery, even if he is surrounded with luxury. There is no danger of luxury if the Communists triumph—just the slavery.

Let's by-pass the combined containment-withdrawing action for a moment and consider the possibility or rather impossibility of the Democracies launching a surprise attack at the outset of the war in order to throw the Russians off balance. I am almost reluctant to discuss this action because while my firm belief in democracy tells me it is inconsistent with this belief, the dictates of my profession assure me that such an action could probably ensure our victory at a cheaper price than that demanded by any other method. It is sometimes extremely difficult to believe fervently in the institutions and ideals of democracy and, at the same time, be a geopolitician.

The Democracies will not launch the surprise attack in an effort to catch Russia napping and off balance, for we will not permit ourselves to be labeled by history as the aggressors. Apart from this, we could not under our present program even begin to think of such an action. We do not have, nor have we planned for, the men, equipment, and detailed program required by such a move. Had we anticipated such a course of action, our efforts should and would have begun along these lines at least five years ago. When a surprise attack against half the world is on the menu, the cooking, like that of *tripe à la mode de Caen*, must be begun well in advance of the meal.

It would, indeed, be a tremendous undertaking for the Democracies suddenly to launch several columns, accompanied by several airborne operations, across the satellite boundaries and drive inland with lightening speed to come to a temporary halt close to the

Russian border, if not on it. The psychological effects alone would throw the Soviet into a panic that might shorten the war considerably.

Picture a mass air raid on Russian industry, timed to a nicety with airborne actions toward the eastern edges of the satellites while columns from Western Germany, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey simultaneously dashed across Central Europe to surprise the Russian troops, so arrogantly sure that the decadent Democracies will sit by and patiently wait for the powerful Red Army to add them to the Kremlin's collection of defeated, enslaved states. It's a picture that might excite the blood of George Patton and his racing Third Army.

But we won't do it; we can't do it; so don't expect it. We do not have the men or equipment or the desire. Besides, it is impracticable. To launch such an attack would mean to marshal huge stocks of supplies and masses of men along with a tremendous air and sea fleet. All this would have to be done under cover of secrecy, and that is the hitch. We do not have an Iron Curtain to shield our movements. The very preparations themselves would tip our hand to the enemy, and the necessary element of surprise would be lost. It is worth noting, however, that Russia could undertake such an action, and it is against this that we must guard.

The line of action that appeals most to me is a combination of the containment-withdrawal maneuver, designed to give Russia the maximum difficulty with the minimum destruction to ourselves. Under this plan we should establish a main line of resistance at a strategically located spot and begin to mass our troops at that point at once. Such a spot should be selected to give us the maximum advantage while placing the Russians at a disadvantage. The plan should provide for defense in depth so that our main line of resistance could be a belt twenty to thirty miles wide and should extend from the North Sea to the impassable fastness of the Alps. It should be relatively short, thus forcing the Russians to maneuver their masses in a small space, a maneuver that can only be done with difficulty and one that is rarely successful.

The area selected should provide a broad river as its eastern margin, thus forcing the enemy to attack across a bad natural barrier at the outset of his main atttack, and should have a diffi-

cult mountain range or series of escarpments as its westward margin, thus forcing the Russians to attack uphill all the way. Advantage should be taken of all terrain difficulties that could be employed against an enemy attack. If possible, man-devised natural modifiers such as dykes or flood-control gates should be included within the defense area for use where indicated.

The free world troops should be concentrated in the area, but an adequate number of divisions should be placed well forward in Western Germany, and at strategic satellite contact points where available, in order to provide a stubborn resistance in their withdrawal, requiring the enemy to fight every inch of the way. The withdrawal should be accompanied by a minor scorched-earth policy that would be confined to bridges, railroad systems, and industrial plants. Wherever possible, the enemy should be forced to fight a river crossing.

Flank attacks should be made from the Democracies on the south, and if possible, the Yugoslavs, Greeks, and Turks should attempt attacks into Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. A diversionary action against Russia proper should be attempted in the Black Sea for the psychological effect of having allied troops on Russian soil and thus require Russian forces to be diverted to south Russia, away from the line of major conflict.

All available allied air should be directed against the Russians during their advance toward our main line of resistance, using both conventional and atomic bombs. Russian intermediate supply lines should be pounded, and severe allied counter air measures instituted. It might be that at least one small leg on the coveted air-superiority trophy could be won during this withdrawing action.

The Russian advances should be split into two, or if possible three, columns in order to prevent a solid front from ultimately reaching the main line of resistance. Naval air and allied warships in the North Sea could aid in harassing the enemy. A minor flanking feint could even be undertaken in the north. Attempts should be made to force one column to the north, one to the south, and one to the center, thus dividing the advancing firepower and increasing the supply difficulties.

When the attacking force has reached our main line of resistance it should be composed of enemy troops, tired from battle,

poorly supplied, and presumably short of ammunition. The withdrawal should be timed in units of four days so as to catch the enemy at the low level of his divisional supply of ammunition, thus increasing the difficulties of his nondivisional supply plan. The launching of a full-scale counterattack by fresh troops, plentifully supplied with ammunition and adequately supported by air power, should successfully break up the initial enemy drive and could conceivably mark the limit of his western advances.

I believe this main line of resistance can and will be held. In other words, the Soviet ground forces can be stopped on the general line of the Rhine, and the course of the war consequently should be so planned and conducted.

There are, of course, a number of imponderables that cannot be evaluated until the moment the battle is joined.

In the event that, for any reason, it turns out to be impossible for the Democracies to contain the enemy here, attempts should be made to split his attacks so as to force him to operate in several sectors. One column of the Democracies' forces should endeavor to draw him across France to the Breton redout; another should draw him toward the channel, where he could be pounded by naval and air forces while our ground forces are evacuated to Britain; a third should attempt to draw him south toward the Mediterranean, preferably through Italy where the going is rough; a fourth should attempt to draw him toward the Pyrenees. Final lines of resistance should be established at the Pyrenees and, if possible, in the Alps, while the remainder of the Democracies' troops are withdrawn to Britain and North Africa for re-equipping, regrouping, and training for invasion of the Continent.

Should we be driven from the Continent or down into the Iberian and Italian peninsulas we would have no choice but to continue to pound him by air, even though this meant visiting destruction on the territory of NATO states. Withdrawal from the Continent must be accompanied by a scorched-earth policy.

Withdrawal to marshaling or staging areas should be accompanied, if possible, by renewed attacks from Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, which would call for re-enforcements from the Democracies. This, plus constant air attack, should help keep the enemy off balance and prevent consolidation of his gains. Once

the war has started, the Russian forces must be kept constantly fighting and given no chance to rest. Russian World War II tactics appear to indicate that the Soviet system requires the committing of far more forces than the mission requires. If the Communists can be kept constantly active, their forces can be worn down by relatively small forces from the Democracies.

Meanwhile, guerrilla activity in the occupied NATO countries must be encouraged and psychological-warfare tactics must be pursued to the utmost. Occupied areas must be constantly assured that we will be back and that the Democracies will win the war. While guerrilla tactics will only serve to harass the enemy without doing great damage, their mere existence will furnish a symbol of hope that can be translated into real assistance at the time the free world forces return. Invasions are materially aided by friends on the inside or by fifth-column activities.

The area that presents itself as the most suitable site for the main line of resistance is that area of France and Germany lying between the Rhine and the French escarpments. This strip has witnessed many of the colossal battles of European wars and is well known to all military strategists as an excellent arena of combat, from the defenders' point of view. It offers excellent possibilities for supply lines from the channel ports and through the French railroad nets. It is so constructed, geographically, that it can be held by the minimum number of troops, and throughout most of the line the attackers fight an uphill battle. Its weakest point is in the north, but here the defenders would have the Lowlands' canals and dykes to aid them in their defense.

This area will mark the scene of the hardest fighting in the European phase of the war, regardless of the over-all plan pursued. The familiar names of the Moselle, Metz, Strasbourg, Belfort Gap, and the Ardennes will again figure in our headlines. If the defense goes badly, we may even find ourselves reading of the battles at the Albert Canal, the Marne, the Oise, Château-Thierry, and Ypres. May the results in World War III be as significant for the Democracies as they have been in previous wars fought in this area.

It would appear, from analysis of the theater and the terrain, that Russia's initial attack might be a four-pronged affair. It is



Detail of the Area of the Main Line of Resistance—showing the three probable routes of Soviet attack against France and Belgium.

certain that she will undertake a drive across the north German plain in an attempt to reach the channel ports for an invasion of Britain. If she achieves the ports, she will attempt to invade. Such an invasion must be broken up or beaten off, for the loss of Britain would be serious to our invasion of the Continent. Her plan of attack would be logically a modification of the Von Schlieffen Plan described earlier. A second column will attempt to penetrate the Scandinavian area to provide bases closer to Western Europe and additional sites for an invasion of Britain. This maneuver should be kept under control by allied air and naval forces. Column number three will attempt to take out Yugoslavia and Greece, while a fourth column will attack through Bulgaria to invade Turkey. These last two columns should be largely satellite troops with Russian components in the minority. These columns should be adequately handled by the Yugoslavs, the Greeks, and the Turks, provided they are given the equipment they need for the job.

The early action in Western Europe will be purely defensive, and from the point of view of the Democracies, brilliant victories and military successes will be measured in terms of how long the enemy can be held to a certain line rather than how much territory can be gained by the forces of the free world. In these days, dark days at best, the courage of all the Democracies will be sorely tried as unit after unit is forced back to the main line of resistance or even to the final defense lines. Faith, courage, determination, and the will to win will be the most valuable qualities the "folks at home" can offer the fighting troops at such a time. The strategy of creating and maintaining a high level of morale is as important to our ultimate victory as the carefully conceived plans of the military strategists. Plans for this important task must be made prior to the day when they are needed. In World War III plans to solve the problems of the civilian on the home front cannot be made as a matter of expediency but must be made as a part of the basic war plan. In fighting the weary "road back," the way is frequently longer and more difficult for the civilian than for the soldier. Strategy for survival must provide for this contingency.

Chapter 17

The Battlefield—Operation Annihilation II

Probably this chapter should be entitled "The Road Back," but inasmuch as I am not convinced the forces of the Democracies will be driven from the Continent, such a title would be a misnomer. Our road might be the road forward, taken after the Russian forces had been stopped at the main line of resistance. If these happy circumstances were created, our action, of course, would be to seize the initiative as early as was consistent with victory and commence our drive eastward.

Much has been said, perhaps more has been written in pessimistic terms, concerning the ability of the Soviet forces to race from the satellites to the Atlantic in two weeks, one week, twenty-four hours, or what have you. This presupposes that the enemy would be capable of crossing hotly defended, unfavorable terrain and covering distances, in some areas exceeding 750 miles, with a speed that might be compared to lightning, considering the masses of troops that must be moved. Having crawled and walked over some of this terrain, fought over a lot of it, and studied all of it, I am convinced that the Russians could not move the promised million-man army unopposed across this area in trucks in the time allowed by the most extreme of the dolorous predictions.

Road-bound forces move as fast as road conditions permit. While the roads across France are good, they are not in the superhighway class. Fill these roads with the confusion caused by fleeing refugees, erect strong points at the critical places, subject them

to air bombardment, and a much different picture is presented. World War III may move rapidly, but it won't move that rapidly. I would be willing to hazard a guess that even our present forces in Europe could not be pushed back to Cherbourg in two weeks.

In considering the Democracies' successful campaign and subsequent invasion of Russian territory we have three basic situations to plan for: one, the maneuvers to be followed if we have to begin the long road back from points outside the Continent; two, those to be followed if we are driven back to the final protective lines in Spain and Italy; and three, those to be followed if we are successful in stopping the westward drive at the suggested main line of resistance. The first situation presents the most difficulties and should be considered before the less difficult ones.

Let us say that we have lost Western Europe and are forced to drop back to Britain and North Africa to reform and rebuild. In this event, we shall be approximately where we were when World War II broke on the United States. We shall be faced with the problem of destroying the Russian warmaking ability, gaining air superiority, rebuilding our forces, forming an invasion force—all the problems of World War II repeated. In addition, we may even have to duplicate the war in the desert if things go badly for us in the Middle East. We overcame all these difficulties against Germany, an enemy that many of us regard as more formidable at that time than Russia is today, and went on to win the war. Having done it once, we can do it again.

Our first and perhaps our major problem will be found in providing adequate defenses for Britain and the North African bases. Most certainly we shall have to beat off or break up a threatened invasion of the United Kingdom. Russia is well aware that in two previous attempts Germany placed herself in a vulnerable position by her failure to invade England, and the Soviet is unlikely to repeat the German mistakes. Therefore, the earliest step in our return is to forestall invasion of our marshaling areas.

Step number two is not so simple to define, for there are a number of actions that must take place simultaneously, some of which may have to continue into later phases of our return operation. We must, of course, continue our strategic bombing of Russian warmaking ability, but we must add to this the destruc-

tion of all her newly acquired resources and production that we lost when the Democracies left the Continent. To accomplish the missions imposed by this new burden we may have to divert part of our tactical air facilities and direct them against these new strategic targets. Naval aircraft carriers can assist materially in this new mission.

At the same time we must make a steady drive to gain air superiority; no invasion of Europe can be attempted until the Democracies command the air. While the gaining of air superiority may appear to be a tactical mission, the strategic air commands will play a major role in this campaign by destroying aircraft factories. Russia must have planes in the air to oppose our drive for superiority. Therefore, we may witness a concentration on aircraft factories and allied production, permitting Russia to build up her stock piles of ground weapons, which we will have to meet in later battles.

While all this is taking place, if we do not already possess it, the Navy must secure the freedom of the Atlantic from Russian submarines. With an invasion forecast we cannot safely move troops and supplies abroad until we do control the sea routes. The estimated size of the Russian submarine fleet promises that this mission will be a lengthy one. Much of the action will take place in European waters, in the North Sea or the channel, in an effort to intercept Soviet undersea craft before they can emerge in the Democracies' "lake." For a while the Atlantic will be no place in which to take a pleasure cruise.

As soon as the threat of Russian invasion of Britain and North Africa is eliminated and the Atlantic is brought under our control, we can begin our build-up for invading the Continent. This procedure will convert Britain and North Africa into veritable marshaling yards, a task that will tax the patience and the facilities of the civilian population to the breaking point. Based on the time required to accomplish the same job in World War II, we can estimate that it will be at least two years at the very minimum before we can seriously plan on launching our invasion.

Meanwhile a propaganda campaign must be launched to the occupied areas and directed against the occupation forces. Guer-

rilla activities, underground movements, and revolutionary efforts will have to be sponsored in the occupied countries where, by this time, Communist governments backed by the Red Army will be in control. This presents the heartbreaking problems of supplying the resistants with equipment, picking up the pieces of betrayed cells, and starting over again a hundred times, restraining their impatient efforts to speed up the invasion and dealing with the host of problems that arise whenever partisan tactics are found necessary.

We may or may not be able to hold out in Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. This depends largely on our ability to stop Russia in the Middle East, retain our control of the Mediterranean, prevent Communist uprisings in the countries concerned, and present Russia with so many problems in the areas she has occupied that she cannot send sufficient troops to enable the satellites to overcome the southern allies. Of course those three countries will have to be kept at a high level of supply, and Western troops will have to be dispatched to increase their fighting strength.

If we have been able successfully to accomplish the missions set out above, in about two to three years after we have been driven from Western Europe we should be able to return or at least to attempt a return. We must succeed on our first attempt or face additional years of hardship, austerity, and preparation. Economically, the Democracies could not survive more than one failure, and even one might make us as badly off as the vanquished at the termination of the war.

Invasion of the Continent will, in general, follow the same pattern as in World War II with two significant differences. New invasion points will have to be selected because those used against Germany are too well known and will be too well protected. Invasion should be made from both the north and the south simultaneously in order to permit us to fall on the Russian center and flanks at the same time. If we have been unable to hold the southern contact space, it may be that, at the same time or shortly thereafter, a third invasion will have to be made through Greece or Turkey in order to provide an additional problem for

the Kremlin. If we have been able to hold on to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, attacks from these areas must be forthcoming.

If our invasion efforts are successful in Western Europe, the fighting will proceed along routes comparable to World War II. France will be cleared of the enemy, who will be pushed back to the Rhine, our air superiority providing the advantage needed to do this. A campaign may be conducted in Italy comparable to World War II, but it is possible that, after laying it waste, the enemy may voluntarily withdraw his troops in this area to meet the threat in the north. We may find that an action will take place in the Spanish peninsula comparable to that fought against Cherbourg in World War II. In this case, invasion could be made from North Africa; or Spain could be allowed to wait until France had been partly cleared, thus using the isolation of Russian forces in the peninsula as a punitive weapon to encourage surrender.

Plans for meeting the second course of action, that in which we retreat behind the Pyrenees and the Alps, are somewhat different. In common with the first situation we must proceed to destroy the Soviet warmaking ability; gain air and sea superiority, if we do not already possess either or both; and reform and rebuild those forces that have left the Continent. The principal differences lie in the fact that while we are preparing our forces and the theater for all the steps found in situation one, short of actual invasion, we must fight defensive actions at all our final protective lines. This means that the campaigns must continue at the Pyrenees and the Alps and possibly in the area of western France known as the Breton redout.

Apart from the strategic bombings of Russian industry and resources there will be a semi-tactical-strategic bombing of areas occupied by the Soviet. Once an area has been evacuated by the Democracies and occupied by the Communists we shall be forced to regard it in the same light as Russian territory. This means that we will find ourselves in the unhappy position of launching air warfare against territory, cities, and people formerly under the jurisdiction of our allies. Thus, in either of the first two situations we will find Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Hamburg, Antwerp, Amster-

dam, and other cities of the same general area being subjected to devastating bombardment by the air arm of the free world.

As a rule of thumb, we may find ourselves adopting the practice of destroying any industrial or resource area in the occupied territory that could be used advantageously by the enemy. This will impose great hardship on the areas so treated and pose severe economic handicaps on the ultimately victorious Democracies. However, to refrain from such a course could impose upon us the onerous burden of defeat. There will be a struggle with our sentimental approach to this necessity, but in the end we will capitulate and deal out the destruction drastic action demands.

While the air arm is achieving air superiority, the ground action will consist of two general programs. The first of these will be the building up of forces sufficient to make a general attack on the Communist armies. Training, forming, and equipping will take place in Britain and North Africa, and upon completion of these tasks, units will be moved into the lines in Spain, Italy, and possibly France to be held against the day of all-out attack.

Meanwhile the second program, one of holding and harassing tactics, will be under way. Under this plan we will hold the enemy at our final protective lines and at the same time make limited probing attacks from behind our natural fortresses in order to keep him off balance. Commando operations may be tried against the long coast line of the north, a coast line that will cost the Russians dearly to defend but one they dare not leave undefended. A diversionary attack may be attempted in southern France along the Riviera or up the valley of the Rhone. Parachute operations may also be attempted in areas in which Russian defenses are weak and local guerrilla action is strong.

Comparable probing attacks will be conducted from Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey; and, if the action in the west is severe enough, these may meet with considerable success. It is doubtful that Russia would deploy her national troops away from the main enemy concentrations in Western Europe to aid the satellites in resisting the nuisance value attacks in the southern contact space. If we can keep Russia occupied in the west, the southern flank will be left almost entirely to the satellites. Unless the political pressure of the Kremlin is physically backed by the

Red Army, satellite resistance is not likely to be intense and probably will be overrun and forced back by the combined Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish armies.

Should a combination of the pressure of the three allies from without, internal guerrilla pressure, and an unwilling or dispirited resistance by drafted satellite troops prove sufficient to encompass their defeat or to drive them back against the Soviet main line of communication, Russia will be forced to modify her tactics. This modification would consist of re-enforcing her weak southern flank with Red Army troops. To do this she will have to reduce partially her strength in Western Europe or reduce her defenses at home. Her action will probably be the former.

To secure the shock troops necessary to bolster the crumbling satellite front in the south the Red Army can either thin its lines in the western area or shorten them by drawing back to positions in central France. Either action is the signal for an all-out attack by the Democracies in their effort to force the Communists out of Western Europe and back across the Rhine and the north German plain.

Briefly, the outline of the plan for the second situation would be to hold and probe at the final protective line while the Yugoslav, Greek, and Turkish forces penetrated the satellite-held southern flank. When the Red Army moved to defend itself in the south, launch all-out attacks from the west to force Russia to retreat to the east and north.

The third course of action—that in which we are able to hold the enemy at our main line of resistance defined in the preceding chapter—is also the final phase of situations one and two. In other words, once we can stabilize our lines along the Rhine, and in Alsace and Lorraine, the plan of action is identical, irrespective of whether we have been forced off the Continent, forced back to our final protective lines, or have rebuffed the enemy at the main line of resistance. From here on in our course is clear.

We shall not be able to progress beyond this line until we have two definite advantages: unchallenged air superiority and a marked reduction, if not total incapacity, of Russia's warmaking ability. I am inclined to think that the best we can hope for is an attenuation of the Soviet warmaking ability; a complete de-

struction of its capacity is unlikely. Under these circumstances we can expect the final phase of the European war to be difficult, bloody, and prolonged. It is, however, safe to say that the end of the European phase will mark the end of World War III.

Granted the two advantages, how do we proceed? A brief look at some of the conditions in Germany may indicate the course of action to be followed. The German countryside is not of uniform physical structure. The lowland plain in the north is broad, marked with low hills and few natural obstacles. Numerous rivers run in a north-to-south direction or in a northwest-southeast direction; however, because of the eastward frontage they are better defended from attack to the west than against attack originating in that quarter. The Germans have concentrated most of their rail facilities in the north because of the relatively flat terrain, and their center of industry lies in this area. According to Banse, an army could live off the north German country but not south Germany.

Of all the areas in north Germany, Berlin is the best protected from the point of view of natural defense positions. Flanked by the remains of old moraines in the north and south, by the Elbe and Oder along with their tributaries, and by innumerable swamps and lakes on the western and eastern sides, Berlin constitutes a natural fortress. Such weakness as may be found lies to the east rather than to the west, an advantage for Russia. To reach Berlin, the Democracies will have to fight across marshy river valleys and low mountains.

The southern side of the lowland belt is less easy to defend than the northern side. Here the plain joins the highland areas in a region where the transition is affected by masses of thickly populated hills and valleys. The western front on the northern half of the plain is well secured by the Buertanger Moor and the line of the Ems River with its marshes, bogs, moors, and woods. While the southern frontier is well secured at parts of the western boundary, there are several disadvantages. Existing road facilities in the south almost all lead northward to Berlin rather than eastward to the fastness of Czechoslovakia. All the railway lines lead to the capital, and nearly all of them pass through narrow passes in the mountains that could be effectively closed

by allied air action. Apart from the Black Forest area, the southern frontier is difficult to defend, with definite points of weakness in the Saar basin, the Rhine area, and the Palatinate. In the Vosges sector the allies could sit on the mountains and look across the broad German plain, thus possessing a definite advantage.

The geographic picture indicates that the Russian stand will be made in the northern half of the lowland plain. This calls for invasion and attack by the Democracies through the Ardennes, the Lorraine gate, the Belfort Gap; northeast through the rolling woodlands of the Palatinate, and due north from Italy. This plan calls for direct attack from the west and a flank attack from the south and north, the latter coming by sea or through Denmark. An attack such as this, coming from three directions, would render Germany untenable to the Soviet, forcing the Red Army back beyond the Polish border.

Once Russia retires into Poland the Democracies will find the old German plan of the eighties to be an effective one. This called for a two-pronged attack through East Prussia and Galicia. Such a plan has long been known as "the Polish Mousetrap," and it is unlikely that the Russians will plan a stubborn resistance in the area. In all probability the campaigns in Poland will be a series of Russian delaying actions, as they defend one river after another until they have retreated behind the Pripet Marshes on to Russian territory. Perhaps the first stubborn Russian stand will be made on the line Kovno-Brest-Lutsk-Mogilev, but from this line, while well protected by marshes and rivers, the Russians will be soon forced to retire eastward if intensive allied pressure is brought to bear.

When the Red Army retires behind the Pripet Marshes, the armies of the Democracies will split. One column will move along the Baltic in an effort to secure Leningrad, Russia's "Window on the Baltic," liberating Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. A second column, moving north of the marshes, will proceed generally along the line of the Moscow-Warsaw railroad in an effort to capture Moscow. The third will move southeast along the river Bug to join forces coming from Turkey and the south. This column will then swing east against Stalingrad. Other columns

will skirt the marshes and strike east to do battle at the Dnieper, the Central Russian Heights, and the Don.

Russian forces will be unable to hold in any of these areas, if the attacks are severe, and will be forced east of the Urals and the Volga into the vast Russian heartland. From this point on the tactical situation is anyone's guess, and the war will be fought in a semistalemate fashion for what could be a seemingly unending number of years. For all practical purposes, however, Russia's position as a world threat and a major power will end with the retreat of the Red Army east of the Volga-Urals line.

Obviously the plan given above is merely a brief sketch; a detailed plan could easily be the subject of one or several books, which would provide interesting reading only for the strategist. The general plan of the terminal phase of World War III, a phase that can only end in victory for the Democracies, consists of allied sweeps along the northern lowlands and sweeps around the west side of the Black Sea to join a column moving between the Bug and the Carpathians. Russia cannot be defeated unless she is invaded. Victory will be lost if the Democracies attempt ground action from the west against the heartland beyond the Urals. We must be satisfied with the defeat of the enemy in Russia-in-Europe and his containment within his natural Asiatic fortress where, virtually a prisoner of democracy, his power will dwindle away.

There are, perhaps, many facets of the Russian defeat that have been passed by without comment. Nothing has been said, for example, concerning possible guerrilla action in the satellites or of parachute operations behind Russian lines. These, of course, are the tactical operations that will be employed when the opportunity arises. It is not my purpose to write a timetable for World War III or yet a possible "score card for the game." The plan suggested here is but one plan—the classic one—and it may not be the one the high command of the Democracies elects to pursue. There has been so much talk about *if* Russia can ever be defeated that it seems advisable to point out that Russia cannot win if the Democracies employ positive thinking rather than that of a negative character.

All this business of picturing the Democracies as a group of benevolent, patient nations who are never going to attack is fine for political speeches, vote-getting, and propaganda, but it's not much good as a part of a practical strategy for survival. Even in this enlightened day and age one has to consider the necessity of staying alive. Here in America we have to supply the ration of hope for the whole world in order that we may all survive. The plan given here is an indication of how the Kremlin can be defeated in Europe. Maybe it's not the best plan, but it's infinitely better than the prevailing wail of "How can we defeat a power as big as Russia?"

Geopoliticians, as a rule, are analysts not devotees of the crystal ball. To predict that any nation will walk down a given road is always precarious. However, in the case of war against Russia the roads to be followed are limited, and the area in which these roads run is not as great as it seems on paper or to the fertile imagination. In spite of its size, Europe offers only a few battlefields, most of which have been covered in this and the preceding chapter. It is my humble opinion that much of our fighting in Europe will take place as I have described it. After all, why shouldn't it? We or our allies fought over these same areas a dozen times before. Strategy may change, but geography is rigid. In prior days Russia has never held up under concerted attacks from the west; she won't this time if our strategy for survival is adequate for our task.

Chapter 18

The Battlefield—Operation Pivot

Napoleon, drawing on years of experience and a fine sense of logistics, expounded a simple theory that characterized the pre-mechanized warfare era. "An army," he said, "travels on its stomach." The importance of supplying food and ammunition is no less today than in the time of the Emperor, but we've mechanized the whole procedure. Today we can say that an army travels on a pathway deep in oil.

Without oil to drive our machines, supply fuel for our ships, trucks, and planes, and fulfill the thousand and one demands made upon it we are helpless in either war or peace. Oil is to all intents and purposes the pivot around which modern war revolves. Possession of it tips the scale of war in favor of victory; lack of it ensures defeat. The areas wherein oil is found become the most critical to our war plan and are automatically elevated to a rank of high strategic importance. They become pivotal areas—pivots of power!

In World War III the pivot of power—the site of Operation Pivot—will be the Middle East. The Middle East as a geographic entity does not exist; it is purely a political entity in the maelstrom of power politics, referred to by a variety of names in the various chancelleries of the world. As the site of Operation Pivot, however, we can enumerate its component parts as Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Transjordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and a number of minor states and provinces whose names are less

familiar to us. The area is dominated by the faith of Islam, and the sons of the Prophet outnumber all others to such an extent we often forget that any other faith is represented. This religious domination gives the teeming millions of the Middle East kinship with all Moslems, wherever they may be, extending their influence all over the civilized and partly civilized world. Events in the Middle East and their impact on the Moslem faith create repercussions that can be felt in Africa, India, Tibet, China, the Philippines, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Lackawanna, New York; and in the heart of Soviet Russia itself. It is the axle around which the faith of millions of Mohammedans revolves. Truly it is a pivot of power.

The Moslems were one of the earliest resistants to the Communist movement, and while this resistance was centered in west and central Asia, its effects were felt in the Holy City of Mecca. Attempts by the Bolsheviks to seize lands, herds, and mosques arbitrarily, particularly at Bokhara, center of Moslem culture in west Asia, resulted in a mass slaughter of Moslems, and when the furore died away, a total of six million had been killed or deported. Islam has no love for Communism, and the hatred and fear engendered by early Communist mistakes has permeated to every corner of the Moslem world.

On the other hand, the countries of the West are held in no great esteem by the Moslem world. The mark of Britain, France, Italy, and the Netherlands has been placed on the Islamic countries, and the pressure exerted by the Western European states has been felt for decades from one end of Islam to the other. Even at the moment, the struggle of the Moslems to rid themselves of the control exercised by the NATO countries is causing serious international repercussions.

Caught in the vise between Communism and the Democracies, Islam wages a continuing fight for the right to have its states accepted as free, sovereign nations. Nationalism, since World War II, has become almost as powerful a creed as that of the Prophet, and, as the jaws of the vise tighten, the fight for freedom becomes more and more bitter.

In the very center of the Moslem world, the Middle East, lies the site of Operation Pivot, the location of over 50 per cent of

the world's oil. If the Democracies can retain the Middle East or induce it to fight on the side of the West, the oil in this area would, when added to that already controlled by the free world, amount to 86 per cent of the world supply. Should the Middle East throw in its lot with the Communists, the Democracies could count on controlling less than 36 per cent of the world's total.

Quite apart from the quantity of oil located in the Middle East, the area is vital to the West in a geographic sense. Not only do all the sea routes between Western Europe and the treasure chest of southeast Asia pass through the land areas dominated by the Middle East, but all the available land routes cross the countries included in the region. The Middle East is a gigantic land bridge between Europe and Asia. In addition, it is the guardian against back-door attacks on Turkey and Greece. Loss of this area would materially retard the Democracies' war effort and their security.

The key to the present situation in the Middle East is Iran, the seat of the most fervent anti-West, pronationalist outbreak that has taken place anywhere in the Moslem world. Should Iran fall to the Communists, it would be little short of a miracle if any other country in the Middle East failed to collapse along with it and submit itself to the rule of the Red fist. Today we must expect that as Iran goes so goes the Middle East, and, at this writing, Iran appears to be going fast.

No one can say that there are any grounds for an optimistic point of view about the Middle East. Egypt is suffering from severe growing pains, and while the party of the coup that sent Farouk into exile may outwardly demonstrate signs of strength, Moscow is diligently at work in the land of the pyramids. Saudi Arabia, the one relatively stable country in the Middle East, while friendly to the United States, does not trust our allies and could be forced by Soviet pressure in Iran to dissociate herself from the Democracies. Iraq, a relatively calm, wealthy state, might grasp at the chance to rid herself of British influence and control of the oil. The remaining countries would go with the strongest, nearest wind. This is the area in which Operation Pivot must be fought!

As has been said, Iran is the key, for more reasons than one. Aside from her most valuable oil, which the West needs badly, her strong nationalist movement is being eagerly watched by her sister states. The actions taken in Iran by the Democracies will determine our relations with the rest of the area. Iran is not only the crucible of Islamic nationalism; she is the test tube in which the reaction between Christian needs and Moslem demands will take place. Win in Iran, and we win all; lose in Iran, and we have lost the most valuable single resource area in the West's catalogue of warmaking resources. So acute is the situation that it can be predicted safely at this time that unless Britain accepts as a *fait accompli* the loss of control over Iranian oil, Iran will end up in the Soviet orbit as a voluntary vassal of Russia.

Geographically, Iran is also the key. Her country is the crossroads between Europe and Asia, both by land and sea. More important, however, is the fact that Iran and the Persian Gulf constitute one of the most vital and strategic corridors in any containment of Soviet power. So important is this corridor in the defense of the eastern Mediterranean and the life line to the east that it is frequently referred to as second only to the Turkish Straits.

During World War II the Allies recognized the strategic importance of Iran to the extent that we built modern railroads and highways across her land to the U.S.S.R. Numerous airfields were constructed throughout Iran, and modernizations of all types were made. These are still in good condition and offer excellent facilities for the Soviet, should she win Operation Pivot.

Iran's army of approximately 120,000 is American trained and partially equipped. It has been estimated that this force could be expanded to 250,000 in one year by either Russian or American direction. It requires no great knowledge of tactics or logistics to realize that the Iranian Army could not defend itself against the Red horde for more than a relatively few days, particularly now that an almost symbiotic relationship exists between the nationalists and the Tudeh Party, Stalin's minions in Persia.

The history of Communist penetration in the Middle East is too lengthy to give in detail, but it must be noted in order that

we may all understand that the enemy has stolen a march on us. Iran has long been a bone of contention between England and Russia, and throughout the last one hundred and fifty years the efforts of these two states to gain dominance over her are well known. The so-called Testament of Peter the Great bade his successors "excite continual war . . . in Persia . . . seize upon little pieces . . . penetrate as far as the Persian Gulf." In 1796 Catherine the Great attempted to pursue this legacy, but death intervened to prevent her from fulfilling her plan. The Emperor Paul planned and even mobilized troops for a similar undertaking, and fifty-seven years later General Khruleff recommended to his Czar an advance through Iran. General Kuropatkin, in 1885, conceived a "Schlieffen Plan" of such importance and possibility for a Russian conquest of Iran that it exercised a profound effect on British-Russian policy in Iran until the Versailles Peace Conference after World War I! That Russia has wanted Iran for decades is no secret.

Communism first appeared in Iran about 1918, and while the Tudeh Party, the Communist Party of Iran, has suffered many reverses, it has never disappeared since its inception. Its initial strength was approximately 8,000, with firmly entrenched cells in Tabriz and Teheran and among Iranian oil workers in Baku, an oil region in the Russian Caucasus. Today it numbers 60,000 or more active fanatic members who constitute the advance guard of Russian action in Operation Pivot.

Attempts were made early in the Bolshevik days to occupy part or all of Iran by force and were narrowly defeated by British-led troops. Other encroachments have occurred since that day, and during World War II Russia actually occupied portions of the northern area of Iran. It was over the removal of these troops that the first serious breach between Russia and the Democracies occurred.

Britain's record is almost as aggressive as that of Russia but of a somewhat different style. What Russia tried to accomplish by force, Britain attempted by shrewd political maneuvering, high-level diplomacy, and perhaps a little bribery thrown in. History records several attempts on Britain's part to annex or assume

protectorate control of Iran; at least one successful attempt to partition Persia into spheres of influence; and an endless recital of exploitation, political interference, and domination.

At the moment, Britain's star is setting in Iran, and it appears likely that her days of Middle East domination are over. At the same time, however, that of Russia is rising, and her two-century-old dream of control is coming precariously near fulfillment. The balance is controlled at present by the United States. If we can abandon a somewhat Anglophilic approach and persuade Britain to accept a realistic settlement, we may yet drive the Russian Bear back over the mountains. If we do not succeed, we can expect to have the Soviet flag blotting out the banner of the Prophet in the most valuable resources area in the world.

The problem in Operation Pivot, therefore, is both political and military, and our strategy must be devised to solve both phases. The first phase, the political, has been under way for some years, and so far the Democracies cannot be considered in the winner's column. The solving of the British-Iranian question is only one part of the whole Middle East problem, although it is our most important obstacle at the moment. Success for the Democracies in the Middle East depends on their ability to convince the Moslem world that there will be no further attempts on the part of the Western powers to gain control over Moslem countries. We must go even further than that; we must be prepared to give assurances and guarantees that these states will be permitted to develop and to exercise complete sovereignty over their peoples, resources, and governments. In this day and age a formal treaty is only the beginning; demonstration of sincerity is the accepted method at the moment.

Suitable demonstrations of sincerity will cost money and lots of it. In addition to this, the Democracies, at least the United States, may find themselves faced with the necessity of a complete reversal of policy. Realistic propaganda will be necessary to break the chains Moscow is rapidly forging around this critical area, and we cannot expect to gain the all-essential popular support of the man in the street if our actions run contrary to our words. Without the popular support we stand no chance of breaking such combinations as the nationalist-pro-Iranian-Tudeh group now in the

ascendancy in Iran. This is not a problem for the United States alone but one that requires the support of all the Democracies. The day of the Robber Baron has disappeared, and colonialism is a political policy of a dead age. The sooner this is recognized the better off the whole world will be. There is a sharp difference among assistance, protection, and domination.

Phase two of Operation Pivot is a military phase, and here we are on less precarious ground. We can, to a certain extent, predict Russian actions and the routes over which these actions will take place. It must not be forgotten, however, that lurking always in the background and casting its formidable shadow over every move of Russia or the Democracies is the all-powerful political situation.

Russia would rather take Iran and the rest of the Middle East intact instead of destroyed. To utilize the resources of the area they must be in operable condition, not in such shape that they would require a year or two of rebuilding or repairing. Therefore, Russia's campaign will probably be a purely tactical one, and any destruction of strategic resources that is visited upon the Middle East will probably be inflicted by the Democracies after we are certain that the area is lost to us.

The Communists would much rather capture the area by political maneuvering than by violence, if this is possible. It is extremely unlikely that any Russian attack will be forthcoming so long as there is decided unrest upon which Russia can build her program of absorption. As soon as the situation has crystallized, however, and there appears to be an irrevocable swing to the Western orbit, fireworks of the noncelebrating variety can be expected. This move will be inevitable, and the Democracies should be prepared for it at any time.

The Middle East is a unit, culturally and politically, so far as likes and dislikes go. As a unit these states should be organized into an effective fighting bloc comparable to NATO or any other regional defense arrangement. The Democracies, of course, will insist on an over-all command of such defense forces and rightly so. No objection to such an arrangement will be forthcoming from the Middle East if the Democracies are wise enough to adopt a realistic attitude. The Middle East will not accept any national of a colonial or former colonial power as the commander. They

have had enough of this type of leadership. This, of course, rules out Britain, France, Italy, and Turkey, the latter because of her former sovereignty over the area. This leaves not too broad a choice for command. An American staff would be highly acceptable, a Scandinavian would not be refused, and a Spaniard might make the grade. But the resistance to the appointment of a Briton, Frenchman, Italian, Turk, or national of the British Commonwealth would upset the apple cart. Difficult as it may be, the door in the Middle East must be firmly but politely closed to these allies.

Moslems, as a rule, make excellent soldiers, and their capacity for fighting is world famous. Given proper equipment and an incentive for fighting, they will make the finest defense possible. The equipment and leadership will have to come from the West; the incentive is already in the Middle East, if it can be properly nourished and developed.

The seeds for a holy war might be found in the proper exploitation of the old Bokhara incident coupled with the fact that Communism and Mohammedanism are completely incompatible. Russia's stand on religion is well established and widely known. No religion as dynamic and deeply seated as Islam could be eradicated without eliminating its adherents. The Moslem, within his own creed, is devout and tied to his faith by a passion that could well be emulated by many Christians. Capitalize on the danger Communism offers to the faith of Islam, and the Moslem will be a fanatic in his fight against the Red horde.

Russia has constructed a chain of air bases from the southern tip of the Caspian Sea to Afghanistan, all of which border on the northern boundaries of the Middle East countries. Because of the mountains guarding the approaches to the Middle East and the general terrain, these air bases are the key to the type of warfare Russia can be expected to launch. The Middle East could be the scene of the greatest airborne invasion in history.

If General Alexei Markoff, former Soviet commander, can be believed, the Soviet war plan against the Middle East consists of a four-pronged invasion of Iran, two by land and two by sea, starting with an airborne attack to cut the oil lines in west Iran and an air bombardment of all industry, barracks, military installations,

and airfields. Oil fields are to be carefully avoided in this initial barrage. General Markoff estimates that fifteen divisions and approximately seven hundred planes should do the job!

Careful study of any reasonably accurate map of the Middle East discloses that there is a limited number of routes available to the Russians, and these pass through Iran or Turkey. The latter routes are the ones the Russians would necessarily avoid because of the chances of bloody massacres by the Turks in the narrow passes of their northern mountains. This leaves Iran as the selected area to be invaded by the Red Army.

The initial moves of any Russian attempts to invade Iran would be simple to accomplish. Lightning strikes by small numbers of heavy bombers will remove all the warmaking potential and ability of Iran, destroy the British warships hovering in the Persian Gulf, and go a long way to securing air supremacy, an easy task against the tiny Iranian air arm. Simultaneously, parachute troops, aided by the Tudeh Party, could be dropped in the vicinity of the pipe lines and railroads to the west and southwest, airfields, and refineries. Such a move would deny the Democracies an overland rail route to re-enforce Iran and cut off the supply of oil to the west.

Striking from Turkestan, two Russian columns will invade Iran from the northeast, one to capture Meshed, near the Russo-Afghan border and Iran's sixth largest city, and the other to strike at the lines of communication between Teheran and Meshed. Once Meshed is secure, the two columns will unite in an attack against Teheran, burning and destroying as they go. During the time this is taking place an amphibious force will attack Bandar Shah at the southeast corner of the Caspian Sea. The Iranian Navy is almost nonexistent, and coastal defenses are so poor this should be a comparatively simple task. Bandar Shah, terminus of the Trans-Iranian railroad that originates at the Gulf, is connected with Teheran by a first-class highway across the Elburz Mountains and should provide the Russians with both rail and overland access to the capital city.

Meanwhile, attacks in the west will be comparable to those described, that is, one by sea and one by land. The sea attack against Pahlevi at the southwest corner of the Caspian, the other



The Arena of Operation Pivot—showing Soviet attack routes against the Middle East.

major inland Iranian port, will come simultaneously with that on Bandar Shah. Pahlevi has the best Iranian harbor and has a population of about 37,000 persons, who were under Russian occupation during World War I. Since that time they have been propagandized liberally by the Communists. At one time in 1920, the Communists occupied the area around Pahlevi including Resht, and from the latter city proclaimed the Persian S.S.R. of short life and bitter memory. World War II did nothing to diminish Russian propaganda or prestige in the area, and thus resistance against a Soviet landing would be negligible. Landing forces here would be joined by troops coming overland around the west shore of the Caspian.

The principal overland assault in the west will be against Tabriz via the Caucasus. Tabriz will offer no resistance and, in fact, will welcome the Russians. The city is opposed to the Iranian ruling family and, further, enjoyed the status of provisional capital of the Communist government set up in the area after World War II. Kinship is claimed by Tabriz with the Azerbaijan S.S.R. across the border, and only strong measures by the Shah prevented it from joining the Soviet at the end of World War II. The population of the area is composed largely of Kurds, who tried to revolt in 1946 and who are strongly pro-Russian on the basis that liberation by the Soviet will mean independence from Iran.

In all probability all columns, except the Tabriz force, will rendezvous at Teheran before striking south to the Gulf. The Tabriz column, taking advantage of the friendly Kurds, will probably head directly south along the border between Iran and Iraq, recruiting as it goes. This would have the effect of setting up a solid Communist bloc between Iraq and interior Iran that would render assistance from the west somewhat difficult, as well as pose a threat to Iraq. The Teheran force will then fan out and strike overland toward the Gulf.

General Markoff believes that these forces will be highly mobile and operate under the cover of an air umbrella. While living off the country is impossible, supply by air should not be too difficult. Present plans, according to Markoff, call for the attack, invasion, and occupation of Iran in a period not to exceed five weeks.

Resistance in Iran, unless the present difficulties are resolved,

should be closely akin to a token effort. The Tudeh Party will provide a valuable fifth column for Russia and probably carry the members of the present coalition with it. Needless to say, the present leaders of Iran will be immediately replaced by those whose nationalism calls for Soviet control rather than freedom for a strong Persian state.

Once on the Persian Gulf the Russians will be in a position to make life extremely miserable for the Democracies. Iraq and Saudi Arabia will collapse or declare neutrality under Soviet influence. The countries of the Levant will be swept aside without ceremony, and in short order Russia will control the Suez, the back door to Turkey, thus becoming a decided menace in the eastern Mediterranean. Active assistance from Turkey, pressed between Red forces on two flanks, will be reduced if not completely eliminated. All the effectiveness of the Turkish support would be lost to the Democracies. This could also be true of Greek support. In addition, the inevitable loss of Egypt will open the way for a campaign in the desert comparable to that of World War II, exposing the Democracies' North African areas to attack and possible capture.

On the east, Russian occupation of Iran would pose a serious threat to Pakistan and India as well as the other states on the Indian Ocean. Loss of Iran could well mean loss of all Asia as well as the Middle East. Such a situation would be well-nigh disastrous for the Democracies.

Once Iran fell into Russian hands, invasion to recapture her for the Democracies would be economically unsound and virtually militarily impossible. With the control of all the Middle East and the lines of communication to Asia in Red hands, any democratic invasion would have to be launched from distant bases, supplied over hazardous routes, and operated over most unfavorable terrain. It is unlikely that a countermove of this type would even be considered by the Democracies.

If Russia plays her part carefully, she can succeed in inflaming all the Arab states against the Democracies. This will mean renewed outbreaks in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya, all vital to the successful war effort of the free world. This could create a score of difficulties with which the Democracies could not cope while fighting an all-out war in Western Europe.

In view of these factors our strategy for survival must be based on retaining the Middle East. Such a program calls for adequate armament and equipment for adequately trained troops. This is not something that can be accomplished next year or a year later, but a course of action that must be followed now. As in the area of Western Europe, time is essential, and delays will be costly in terms of years of prolonged warfare.

Above all the countries of the Middle East, Iran must be made ready. She must be placed in a position to protect her two invasion ports and to render effective resistance to land invasion. Her army must be built up to a 250,000 minimum and trained to use the tanks and artillery she will require. She must be given small numbers of fighter planes and adequate antiaircraft weapons to resist the initial phases of the Russian attack.

There is, however, a limit to what can be expected of her, and beyond this limit the Democracies must be prepared to step in and assume the burden of active defense. Powerful American air fleets must be based in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the Levant and poised as a threat to Russia's Baku oil fields. At the first sign of a Russian movement toward Iran these fields must be destroyed. This will require an attack in force, for the first blow must be the telling one.

American Navy aircraft carriers should be assigned to the Persian Gulf and, if possible, to the Black Sea areas as a constant reminder that we will brook no attack on the Middle East. American warships in the Black Sea might also exercise a deterent effect on Moscow. In addition, troops should be scheduled to re-enforce the Iranian Army if we cannot secure the consent of Iran to station them there now.

Above all else we must concentrate on winning the political phase of Operation Pivot. Unless this can be accomplished, there will be no military phase; Iran and the Middle East will go to Russia by default. With Russia pulling the strings, the political action in the Middle East is of vital importance to the Democracies.

I cannot agree that Operation Pivot is less vital than Operation Annihilation. They appear to be of equal weight if for different reasons. The same high priority should be given to the Middle

East as has been given to Western Europe. There are areas of the world the Democracies might sacrifice, but the Middle East is not one of them. We cannot afford to lose it, for with it we lose over half the world and the major areas of strategic natural resources. Costly as it may be, what is done for Europe must also be done for the Middle East. Operation Pivot is not only an important factor in our strategy for survival; it is an essential part of the plan that dictates our victory and future freedom.

Chapter 19

The Battlefield—Operation Lotus

If the Soviet Empire could add to its present strength either the industrial resources of Western Europe or the manpower and raw materials of southern Asia we could no longer ignore the possibility of a war for world conquest." So spoke Morgan Phillips, Secretary of the British Socialist Party, during an address at Copenhagen in June, 1950, just before the Communist threat in Asia was transformed into a violent attack on the Republic of Korea. Mr. Phillips was correct but perhaps a trifle late, for according to Sakirman, leading exponent of the Asian-Russian co-operation plan, Phase Four of the plan for world conquest was already five years old at the time of Phillips' address, and Phase Four is the final phase of the plan!

The critical importance of Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East is known to most people in the Democracies; we can't have access to newspapers, magazines, or radios without being informed of the significance of these areas. There is, however, a fourth region of the Old World whose importance is not understood. To state that this is due to lack of publicity is not to charge negligence but merely to emphasize the fact that our knowledge of this area—southern Asia—is meager at the best.

Southern Asia is not a proper geographic term and has only an arbitrary assignment of countries. As in the case of the Middle East, the states included vary from one foreign office to the other. It certainly isn't a region where all the states are integrated into

a definite pattern of terrain, nor can it be defined as an area of common religion or racial stock. In fact, a goodly part of it falls within central Asia rather than the southern part of the great continent. Therefore, in order that there may be no misunderstanding as to the countries to which I refer in using this all-inclusive term, let's list them.

To me, southern Asia is a strategic complex that can be used for or against us. Each of the countries falls into a definite slot in a strategic plan, and, in spite of a variety of conflicting characteristics, each plays an integrated part in what could be one of the great tactical operations of World War III—Operation Lotus. Not all of the units that go to make up the strategic area, southern Asia, are states in themselves; some are merely provinces, departments, or protectorates of other states. The autonomy they exercise, however, is sufficient to consider them as separate units for strategic analysis. In terms of *strategy*, then, southern Asia consists of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bengal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, Tibet, Tsinghai, Sinkiang, Jammu, and Kashmir. To simplify locating them, these are the areas lying north or south of the Himalayas or, in some cases, in them.

This is the arena of Operation Lotus, so-called because the unending prayer, "O Jewel of the Lotus," and that branch of the Buddhist faith that employs it, play an important strategic role in the coming battle. To most people, the names of the areas involved are so unfamiliar many would search for considerable time before locating them on even a large map. To many others their significance appears too minor to mention. To the geopolitician, however, these areas appear in a most important role. There may come a day when the part they could play would be instrumental in materially shortening the war.

Geographically, the area north of the Himalayas is a soldier's nightmare composed, as it is, of towering mountains, wasteland, and uninviting desert. Politically, it is almost undeveloped with dictatorship and government by force of arms the normal rather than the unusual form. From the standpoint of industry, natural resources, or agriculture, its output fails to be important enough even to show on an economic-distribution map. In short, it has

offered no tangible inducements sufficient to warrant any colonizing nation ever spending money or time trying to occupy it.

Such progress as has been made in southern Asia—progress of the type the West associates with Occidental civilization—has been made south of the Himalayas, and even this is only a superficial veneer rather than a deep-seated cultural change. So far, after almost two hundred years of exposure, only India and Pakistan have acquired this veneer. It is only in certain areas of these states that even this may be found.

This southern tier, including India, Pakistan, and the disputed provinces, does not offer too much by way of rewards for extensive investments. It does offer a host of problems that have defied the British efforts and ability to solve. While some sparsely distributed industry does exist, the principal occupation is a tenant-farmer type of agriculture that fails to produce a sufficient food crop even to feed the teeming millions who occupy the land. Natural resources of a strategic nature are almost nil, and prospects of rapid industrial expansion are beyond consideration.

Religion plays a vital role in the entire theater. Buddhism claims about 150,000,000 adherents, living in this area and the adjoining area of the Far East. The Moslem representation is somewhat higher, 250,000,000, if we include those who live in China and southeast Asia. Added to these two major faiths is the mass of 250,000,000 Hindus, whose belief is divided into so many sects that it is difficult to catalogue them; 25,000,000 persons with a primitive animistic religion; 60,600,000 Sikhs, whose religion mingles Buddhism and Hinduism; 1,500,000 Jains; and about 200,000 Parsis. Christianity claims about 10,000,000.

To try to catalogue the languages would be a monumental task. India alone has 225 different languages along with numerous dialects. Nor is it convenient to separate the nationalities on ethnic grounds or on any other for that matter. To say that southern Asia is a complex area is an understatement of the first water. Its conqueror has not yet been born.

If all these seemingly undesirable features are present, why is this area of strategic importance and so vital to the Western world? Why should we be so concerned about whether it is Com-

munist or free? The answer to these questions can be found by considering the area by regions and as an integrated whole, starting with India.

The new state of India offers Russia about 1,200,000 square miles of territory occupied by a population of 320,000,000 persons. For the most part the people are poor, undernourished, and discontented with their lot. Centuries of religious control have never succeeded in convincing the Indian people, either through the pacifist, nonresistant Hindu creed or the Great Vehicle creed of Indian Buddhists, that the vast majority of the people should live in virtual thrall to a small minority of weathly landholders and overlords. Hunger, poverty, and lack of privilege furnish a perfect breeding ground for Communism.

A very healthy and flourishing, if small, Communist Party of veteran status among the various international junior partners of the Kremlin has followed wherever Britain attempted to "civilize" India. Primarily inspired by what appeared to be a hopeless nationalism, India's young nationalists sold themselves to Moscow as a possible escape from British rule. Now that India has achieved independence, these same nationalists find themselves as Red fanatics ready to continue to do Moscow's bidding. What's more, they are doing it well; for Communism, early Communism, in India was devoted more to the practical work in the field of human welfare than to spreading the doctrine of Lenin.

By virtue of a somewhat peculiar arrangement the general direction of the Indian Communists, as well as those of Pakistan, is vested in the Far Eastern Political Department of the Kremlin. Such an administrative structure links the Indian Communist with the forces of Mao Tse-tung rather than with those of the Middle East or Central Asia. Orders and plans for the Chinese Reds are equally applicable to India and Pakistan. Hence, a powerful Red force is mustered in southern Asia, which, if Russia is successful, provides the western arm of a gigantic pincer movement to cut off the rich southeastern Asiatic peninsula.

Just what can Russia gain by Communizing the Indian subcontinent? First, she gains control over a tremendous land mass that could be instrumental in isolating much of Asia from Western Europe. She acquires 320,000,000 people, already suppressed and

hopeless in their docility. If Russian police-state methods are employed, this population can be turned into productive manpower for her industries and troops for her army—a huge reservoir of cannon fodder. In addition to this, properly exploited India could become an industrial and agricultural center to augment Russian production.

Perhaps more important than any of these benefits are the strategic gains that would accrue to Russia. India offers an additional land mass to be crossed by any army attempting to drive into the heartland and provides a southern defense area to strengthen the natural barrier of the Himalayas. If Russia has a weakness to the south—a soft underbelly that could be penetrated to get at Soviet Turkestan—it is through India. To the Kremlin this is important, for the newly displaced Soviet industrial complex has come to rest behind the Urals in the very area where such penetration is possible. If the Democracies could successfully develop air bases and stage troops in India, they would virtually command all of east and west Asia, to say nothing of offering a potent threat to central Asia upon which Russia now depends as the center of her warmaking ability. Against such a possibility she needs India; Pakistan, with its 345,000 square miles and 80,000,000 people, among which are some of the best fighting men in the world; and the mountain fortresses of Afghanistan.

Finally, since the British have withdrawn from India the little kingdoms and provinces that guard the Himalayas and those north of the mountains who strongly resisted Russian encroachment, or over whom Red authority was more on paper and fictitious than factual, have turned to India as a political leader. Nehru is a big man to them, and his country the biggest in the area. A Communist victory in India would ensure an almost automatic surrender of thousands of square miles of territory and millions of people to Red control. To Russia, as will be seen, this is vitally important.

Between Russian interests and India's territory lies an area that we have come to call "little Tibet." Actually little Tibet is 460,000 square miles of territory peopled with from 800,000 to 6,000,000 (estimates vary) fine, very important people. Russia has been putting out feelers for Tibet for almost a century, and China has claimed a somewhat empty suzerainty over the country in spite of

her inability to make it effective. It's a land of almost impassable mountains where every third male is a Lamaist priest. It has almost no resources, and apart from furnishing a rather difficult and somewhat dubious route to India, its strategic value appears low. Why is it so highly prized? Why would Red China launch an expedition in winter of all times, in a desperate effort to seize it by force?

Tibet is the spiritual center of Buddhism. Somewhere in its mountains Gotama, the founder, Buddha himself, was born, and today from these same mountains, comes the voice of the Dalai Lama, whose spiritual control over 150,000,000 Buddhists is more temporal than any the Red Army could acquire for Moscow. Neither Russia nor China really cares two hoots about Tibet as a country. It's the control the lamas of Tibet exercise over the people of Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia, Turkestan, and other Buddhist-dominated Russian areas, as well as those not yet subjugated, that is important. And it is important!

Think what it would mean to Russia if, by pressure on the Dalai Lama, a spiritual command could go out to the vast area of central Asia, where Russian control is dubious, ordering collaboration with Moscow. At least half the horde Russia has reason to fear as hostile and capable of attacking her heartland would be neutralized, and she would have only the Moslems at her rear with whom to contend. Tibet offers nothing to Russia except the control of 150,000,000 people through the voice of the Dalai Lama!

Red China has claimed the capture of Tibet for Moscow, but such a capture is as yet purely propaganda. Chinese forces in strength have not reached Lhasa, and the regency established by China is a precarious one. Although the Dalai Lama, a youngster not yet twenty, now gives tacit co-operation, there is no peace of mind for China. At the very first opportunity he will turn, and his followers, most of whom hate both Russia and China, will once more become poor security risks for Moscow.

Intermingled with the Buddhists of the area are 250,000,000 Moslems. Not only are these found in the areas of dubious Russian control but also within the Soviet Union itself. For Russia to control this dynamic group she must control the Middle East and Pakistan. The Middle East because of Mecca, and Pakistan

because these Moslems are for the most part Turkis, not Arabs. Pakistan is the biggest non-Arab Moslem state and as such could exercise an element of influence with its coreligionists in central Asia. If Pakistan were Communist, Moslem resistance in the area would be negligible.

Now for Operation Lotus in which Russia will attempt to occupy Pakistan and India, turn the hatred of the Moslems and the Buddhists into a spirit of co-operation, and take iron-fisted control over all of Asia.

Pakistan's eastern provinces, the Bengal area, will probably be the first to be occupied. This move will be made by native Communists operating now in the neighboring state of Burma. For some time Russia has been whipping the native Bengali Communists to a fanatic pitch, and an invasion from Burma would not be too difficult, particularly since Moscow has agreed to an autonomous Bengal state. Control of Bengal would almost certainly ensure control of the politically undeveloped peoples of Sikkim, and if the Dalai Lama can be persuaded to speak, Bhutan also should fall.

On the west there are two routes by means of which Russia could invade India. Land invasion will be necessary because India is too large to handle by parachute invasion, although parachutists will be landed in the dissident northern Indian provinces as an initial move. Because of terrain difficulties both routes must run through Afghanistan. The starting place for either is in the Turkmen S.S.R., a Moslem republic of the Soviet Union. If Russian control in the Middle East is strong at the time of invasion, her task will be simplified.

The western route starts at Kushka in Turkmen S.S.R., runs due south to Herat, Afghanistan, and on down to Farah, where it turns sharply east to Girishk, and thence to Kandahar. From this point, following the caravan route to Quetta in Pakistan, the Russians could eventually pour out into India in the Rajasthan province. Karachi, capital of Pakistan, would then be a comparatively easy victim.

The eastern route utilizes the famed Khyber Pass. Starting at Termez, in Turkmen S.S.R., the column would proceed to Mazar-i-Sharif, east to Tashkurgan and Kunduz, thence south to Doshi,



The Arena of Operation Lotus.

swinging east to Charikar and Kabul, along the Kabul River. From here the route proceeds southeast to Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and Lahore, an important rail center only 270 miles northwest of Delhi, the capital of the Indian Union.

Political conditions being what they are, this maneuver should not be too difficult, in spite of the terrain. Afghanistan could not do more than offer a momentary delay to a Russian force. Assuming that this force was largely Moslem, the delay would be even less. Should Russia guarantee Afghanistan the return of her lost Pathan provinces along the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan, Afghanistan might even be persuaded to join the invaders in exchange for those 3,000,000 rebellious Pathans, whose natural and historical ties to Afghanistan have caused them to demand union with her. Such a move might conceivably bring in the Baluchis on the side of Russia because of their long-standing alliance with the Pathans.

In the event that this happened, Pakistan could offer no resistance. A tempting offer to replace her losses with Indian Punjab and other territory necessary to connect her to Bengal on the other side of the subcontinent would undoubtedly bring a Pakistan facing oblivion into line as a Russian ally against India.

Neither Pakistan nor Afghanistan has any love for the Soviet, although at one time Pakistan was favorably disposed to Russian advances. On the other hand, neither is adequately equipped to defend itself against Soviet might. While both are desperately trying to build up strength and co-operate with the Democracies, supplies are not forthcoming, and progress is slow. Should the Moslems of the Middle East go Communist, the Democracies can count these two southern Asiatic states as lost.

Once India goes Communist we can expect to lose all the Buddhist areas; for there will be no seemingly strong state for them to lean upon, even figuratively, as they do now. India is uneasy at the moment, and well she may be, for only the Dalai Lama stands between her and Buddhist support of Russia. The situation, to say the least, is most precarious and complex.

With Russia in India the Asiatic continent would be lost to the Democracies. Southeast Asia and the Indonesian Republic could not and would not hold out. It would also be only a question of time before the Democracies would lose Japan and the Philippines;

these two states could not be expected to bear the brunt of a Communist Asia as an aggressive neighbor.

It is doubtful if the Democracies could or would make the effort to regain the Asiatic territory lost to Russia. With the advantages she would possess, our whole attention would be occupied in Western Europe, trying to save our own skins. Our only hope would be to liberate southern Asia at the final defeat of the Soviet, whenever that might be, but the loss of this region might prolong the war another ten to twenty years while it supplied and protected a Russian state fighting from within the heartland.

How do the Democracies defend themselves and fight Operation Lotus to win? There is little to be gained by waiting for what appears to be the start of Operation Lotus; it began several years ago. The fighting must be done now on the political front, and immediate preparations made to fight the later military phase.

Politically Nehru and India must be won to the cause of the Democracies, but this is not the primary step. I doubt if there is one step that can be called the primary or most important step. Russian propaganda must be countered in India and countered rapidly in a realistic manner, it is true, but there are some measures that should be taken at the same time as this, if not before it.

Attention must be focused on securing the complete Moslem support in the Middle East so that the Democracies can enjoy the power of Islam, wherever it may exist. If the Middle East were sincerely allied to the Western powers, it would constitute a powerful influence on Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the millions of Moslems in central and southern Asia. To these people religion is blood, and blood is thicker than water.

Pakistan and Afghanistan must be aided, and really aided, in preparing to defend themselves. This calls for air power. As it now stands, Russia can already claim air superiority in the area. This superiority should be contested by local air power now not in existence and being provided at a painfully slow rate. The presence of American squadrons would help, but, better still, native squadrons would have a much more beneficial effect on the population. Pakistan should have priority, then India, and finally Afghanistan.

The two roads running through Afghanistan into Pakistan are not difficult to hold against foot troops, for mechanized movement is not feasible because of terrain and road conditions. They are extremely difficult to traverse when they are well guarded, as England learned to her sorrow. Given aircraft to hold off the bombers from the north, the Pakistani and Afghans could materially delay, if not defeat, Russian invaders. The cost to the Democracies would be high, but in the end the price would be cheap compared to the cost of prolonged war.

I have not been able to suppress a certain persistent scene that keeps recurring in my mind. It is a picture of Russian troops retreating to the heartland and preparing for years of draining, limited warfare, only to find themselves cut off from their Chinese allies by a wall of Buddhist enemies strengthened by Moslem tribesmen. With the Red Army rear exposed to raids from the south and east, the war in the heartland could be materially shortened. Occasionally, I find myself half praying that from somewhere we in the United States will produce a second Lawrence of Arabia—a Smith, Brown, or Jones of central Asia, if you like—who will do this thing; who, with the support of the Dalai Lama, will rouse the tribes of Asia to be our allies.

Perhaps we are too steeped in our ideas of conventional warfare to visualize the effect of perpetual guerrilla action on a landlocked army. Perhaps we are too enamored of general staffs, higher headquarters, and the like to be able to picture the number of Communist troops this type of fighting would require to protect an exposed rear. Perhaps we are too close to atomic bombs, supersonic planes, heavy artillery, and tanks to remember that frequently a man with a rifle or a light machine gun can strike terror and induce panic, particularly if he comes charging in on a shaggy Mongolian pony, carrying with him the bitter accumulated hatred of a hundred generations. Somehow, I can't get rid of the idea that such a maneuver would aid the Democracies.

The fight among the Buddhists of Central Asia, the Russians, and the Chinese is an old one, and it has died because of lack of outside encouragement. The Tibetans have appealed many times for arms with which to defend themselves, and each time they have been refused. Generally they directed their requests to

Britain, who, fearing the iron control of the Dalai Lama, could not bring herself to permit so formidable a fighting man to sit on the mountains overlooking her Indian treasure house. In World War I Tibet offered a thousand men to Britain to aid her in her war. They were refused because of lack of arms. Britain would take no chances. In World War II, Lieutenant Colonel Tolstoi of the American forces journeyed to Lhasa to inform the Dalai Lama of the events in the outside world and to find a substitute route for the Burma Road. Again offers of assistance were rejected by the West. In 1948 a Tibetan mission came to Washington to plead for diplomatic recognition and arms with which to defend the country against the forces of the Red Chinese then operating on the borders of Tibet. Again they were refused, and, returning to their Himalayan retreat sadder and wiser than before, they closed the gates against a West that was too busy to evaluate and understand the significance of the tribes of central Asia.

This is not alone my idea. Trullinger points out the importance of Tibet in his *Red Banners over Asia* and says quite bluntly, "It is up to the democratic countries to insure that the strongest party in Tibet is not a pro-Communist one." De Riencourt, Lowell Thomas, and Justice Douglas all try to make an unseeing West aware of the importance of this isolated area. So far they have failed, as I probably shall, but those of us who see the strategic advantages of 150,000,000 Buddhists fighting Russia and China will keep on trying until someday someone awakes with the brilliant idea that these people would be useful to the Democracies.

The Buddhists of central Asia have met and defeated Red Armies before. On the famous so-called "Long March" of the Red Chinese forces their army was almost cut in half by these tribesmen. Such famous Chinese units as the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Route Armies have been met by them and driven back in confusion. Even the much-touted Chinese invasion of 1951–52 was defeated, and no Chinese forces reached Lhasa until the Dalai Lama gave his consent; then only a token guard made the grade.

Civilized hatred can be eliminated at times by reason of rationalization, but the hatred of the semibarbaric tribesman of central Asia can be eliminated only by removing the cause. For centuries

his enemies have been the Russians and the Chinese. This hatred still exists, and only lack of rifles and bullets keeps him passive and quiet today. He lives in a Communist-controlled, controlled on paper, that is, zone such as Sinkiang or Tsinghai. With a little help and inducement he would revolt and harass the Russian frontier as he has done for centuries. This help we should employ, particularly in view of a pro-West, pro-American sentiment apparently present in the authorities who actually control him. No advantage should be passed by because it does not involve formal armies or precise war plans.

It is not yet too late to reach the powers-that-be in this area. Once India goes there will be no chance. Any action taken must be taken now. Remember, actually to beat the Russian once he is in the heartland he must be attacked on two fronts—one must be through central Asia, over the Roof of the World.

Southern Asia can be the key to ultimate victory; while its loss would not necessarily cost the West its victory over Communism, in the hands of Russia its benefits to the Kremlin would be tremendous. It would be a wonderful thing for humanity and posterity if World War III were a short war. If the Democracies lose Operation Lotus we can expect a war that could drag on for decades. To prevent this our strategy for survival must work overtime to recoup the losses we have already sustained in this area and to plan for its integration into the world fight for freedom.

Chapter 20

The Battlefield—Operation Red Dragon

Unlike any other theater of operations, the area in which Operation Red Dragon will be fought is already marked by the violence of war. Operation Red Dragon has passed from its political phase into one in which armies are locked in combat, men are dying, and the reputation of soldiers is being made and lost on a spin of the wheel. We can no longer speak of the coming battles or refer to Operation Red Dragon in a future sense; it is here, now. The fighting has begun.

It is too late to bemoan our past political mistakes; too late to plan for what we may do in the future; too late to enjoy the dubious luxury of dwelling on what might have been. Now we are faced with the reality of stopping the power-mad drive of a Yellow horde turned Red under the stimulus of thirty years of Communist propaganda and pressure. Somewhere along the line we have lost the simple "agrarian reformers" who once received so much sympathy from a carefully deluded or willfully misled American public. Somewhere along the line we have also lost the "poor, struggling patriot" who, we were told, fought only against a Fascist attempt to transform his country into a dictatorship. At last the mask is off, and we finally recognize the follower of Mao Tse-tung for what he is—a tool of the Kremlin fighting and dying to advance Moscow's control of the world.

I cannot refrain from indulging the bitter streak in my make-up by adding that some of us always recognized Mao Tse-tung for

what he is; some of us were never taken in by the glib tongue of those who had surrendered themselves to Communist propaganda or whose hyperdeveloped idealism had blinded them to the true state of affairs. We were woefully few in those days when Chiang Kai-shek was systematically transformed on paper from the leader of free China to the Oriental counterpart of Hitler; when China's present dictator was tolerated or even hailed as a liberator of the masses. Our voices didn't carry above the din of the early postwar paeans of praise for our "gallant" Soviet allies and the firm belief of the American people that a leopard can and will change its spots.

Our failure in China cannot be blamed entirely on the men who conducted our foreign affairs or on the military minds that evaluated the situation. Public pressure played a big part in their decisions; public opinion, carefully developed by crafty propagandists who remained and still remain behind the scenes, helped a lot to push us into a course of action that could only produce the results we now have. Rather than condemn those whose business it is to lead us in the maze of foreign policy, the whole American people should shoulder the blame that is rightfully theirs.

Not too many years ago those Americans who warned of the coming struggle in China were labeled as warmongers; those who advocated strong defenses against a Red tide in Korea were called crackpots; those who clamored for aid to the French in Indo-China were accused of harboring desires to crush a people struggling for relief from colonialism and imperialistic oppression. Not too many years ago I watched several "learned" professors refuse to grant a Master's Degree to a former Chinese Communist who, having fathomed for himself the depth of Mao Tse-tung's real purpose, entered the service of the Formosa government. After two years of work, his well-written thesis, based on personal experiences and observations as well as scientific research, was rejected. He dared to picture the Chinese Communists as tools of Moscow and fanatics who would overrun eastern Asia if given half a chance! Such criticism was interpreted as a lack of scholarship! But what's the use of digging up old bodies, reopening old wounds. Today Operation Red Dragon is on in earnest, and we must fight it; what is worse, we must fight it as we prepare for it—a sort of pay-as-

you-go arrangement with human lives as the currency instead of just dollars. Publications such as *Amerasia*, learned scholars whose profound knowledge came from books and ivory towers, professional do-gooders with visions of Utopia all did their work well. So—on to Operation Red Dragon, the first armed conflict of World War III!

What is Operation Red Dragon? Technically it's the second front of a two-front war in which the first front has not yet opened. It's by no means a minor front, nor is it the primary one. It occupies a most important place in Communist strategy; yet it is an operation in which Russia is prepared to risk nothing beyond arms and equipment. It is not in itself World War III but rather an advance phase that will smolder and crackle until the proper moment when it will burst into flame as part of the Red inferno. It is a warning of what the future holds in store for us, and at the same time it is the beginning of that future. All in all, it's a somewhat complex maneuver.

Operation Red Dragon, from both the Russian and the Chinese points of view, had its origin in the centuries before Communism became a factor of world importance. To the Russians it represents the chance to fulfill a long-cherished dream of Russian domination of Asia. To the Chinese it means the restoration of the iron control of the Celestial Kingdom, the fulfillment of the Manchu plan of conquest, and the subjugation of all those peoples of the East who have even a remote ethnic connection with the Chinese. Neither Russia nor China was able to further these dreams until the Bolsheviks came to power and the doctrine of slavery and dictatorship was clothed in the ideology of Lenin and Stalin. The doctrine of Communism aided by the preparation of Russian plans added to the ambitions of power-mad men produced Operation Red Dragon.

Reduced to simple terms the purpose of the operation is easy to see. On the Russian side the forces of the Kremlin hope to employ the Chinese Reds to further Russian aims in Asia without precipitating Russia herself into World War III. Red China's mission is to advance slowly in an effort to seize all southeast Asia if possible; to keep the Democracies occupied in the Far East so that we cannot concentrate all our forces in areas deemed more

important by us; and to participate actively in the process of bleeding the Democracies dry by forcing them to expend resources and human lives on a series of isolated engagements in which neither victory nor defeat is decisive. The Soviet hopes, by furthering this mission, to be able to secure and utilize the vast treasure-trove of the peninsula without expending a single Russian life and, at the same time, render the Democracies so impotent that when the final blow falls we will be unable to resist the initial onslaught of the Red Army.

Mao Tse-tung, however, has ambitions that differ not one whit from those traditionally held by all dictators since time began. His goal is to hold sway over a tremendous Chinese empire extending from the Russian border in the north to the waters of the Indian Ocean in the south. Perhaps, if we are ever able to discover what makes him tick, we'll find that he has visions of being a second Tamerlane or Genghis Khan. To do this he requires arms, money, equipment, and the military backing of a powerful non-Chinese army to hold him in power if necessary. Only Russia is disposed to furnish such support, for this single control of east Asia fits her plans.

On the surface the partnership between Moscow and Peking might appear to be the ideal answer to the problems of both camps, but there is a fly, and a very big fly, in the ointment. Both Moscow and Mao Tse-tung are laboring under the impression that each of them is using the other to further his own ends. If it were not for the fatal consequences to Western civilization, it might be interesting to see what would happen if this partnership resulted in victory for the Communists. Would Moscow be able to control Peking? It should be our fervent hope that we never have the opportunity to learn the answer, for the problem could only be resolved by our defeat.

The Communist plan for control of Asia was born at the same moment as the Bolshevik victory, and even before Lenin had completely pacified his own countrymen, he and his henchmen were working on the conquest of the Far East. As early as 1920 the Bolsheviks had established the now notorious University of the Toilers of the East at Moscow and were busily recruiting such men as Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Chu Teh. By 1921 Red

training schools for "Chinese and other Orientals" were in operation at Kharbousk and Tashkent. Special courses were offered at the Red Military Academy and Lenin University for "deserving" Orientals whom Moscow hoped to control and later use for a military conquest of Asia. Chiang Kai-shek, himself, was trained at these two schools, and many of the present Communist leaders in the Far East received their first training for Operation Red Dragon in one or more of the "Asian Peoples Universities."

The actual armed conflict for Communist control of China and the Far East started as early as 1925, when, upon the death of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek broke with the Communists and started on his long trek toward a unified state. By 1927 all Communists were ousted from the government, via a *coup d'état* that terminated in a massacre. From this act came the civil war that ended in 1949 in Communist control of the country. That Russia would support twenty-five years of civil war should indicate her firm resolve to control the area.

While Mao Tse-tung and his followers were busily fighting in China, Russia was occupied elsewhere in the Orient on what has become known as the "Trade Agent" penetration. Acting under the cover of Russian commercial agents, Communist organizers were sent into Saigon, Bangkok, and other southeastern Asian cities, where they served as liaison officers, contact points for local Communist movements, spies, and troublemakers. The Soviet entry into the Asiatic phase of World War II was Russia's big chance openly to take steps toward her goal. Russian "help" against Japan served no other purpose than to put Russia in a position to organize her Chinese allies for the final fight and to ensure her ultimate victory in the Far East. With the Chinese Red victory, the Soviet can now pursue the Leninist plan with the minimum difficulty and the minimum interference from the Democracies, who will not risk World War III to save Asia from the Kremlin.

Russia's organization for the Far East is a formidable one and highly centralized. The center of activity is at Peking, where Chen San U, sometimes known as Wong Ming, as ruthless and wily a Communist as lives today, holds sway over the All-Party Headquarters. From this headquarters the affairs of all the local

Communist Parties east of Iran are administered and the fight against democracy is directed. A subheadquarters for administrative purposes exists at Hong Kong and is under the general direction of Wu Yak Pen, a capable and thorough Communist administrator of long standing. Every Far East country has a carefully selected leader or corps of leaders, most of whom are graduates of one of the various special schools operated by Moscow. These, in turn, report to Peking and receive their orders from Moscow via the All-Party Headquarters. Thus, the Chinese now hold the control, under Russian orders of course, of all the Communists parties of the Far East, a thing of no mean importance as will be shown later.

China proper is under the thumb of Mao Tse-tung. Surrounding him, and perhaps watching him for Moscow, are such prominent Chinese Communists as Chou En-lai, China's Premier; Chu Teh, the war leader; Tsu Deh; Wang Jo-fei; and Liu Shao-chi. These names should become more and more familiar to all of us, for they are the prime movers behind the purely Oriental phase of Operation Red Dragon, and much will be heard of them in the future.

The Chinese Communist movement, starting in 1920, is the oldest of the Oriental parties, but it is followed closely by that of Malaya, founded only a few months after the parent movement at Peking. The Malayan Communist leaders are also of Chinese origin or extraction and are known to us by the names of Wu Tien Wang and Chang Ming Chan. So far by their tactics these two priceless revolutionaries have cost Britain £4,000,000 since 1947. What is more, their suppression does not appear likely in the immediate future.

Next, from point of seniority, is the infamous Dr. Ho Chi Minh, present leader of the Viet-Minh Communist forces in Indo-China. As a former assistant of the late notorious Russian Oriental specialist, Borodin, Ho has been active in revolutionary circles since 1920. His present party in Indo-China dates from about 1921, only a short time after his graduation from the Russian training schools. Ho, next to Mao Tse-tung, is probably the best known Asian Communist leader, having masqueraded for years as an Indo-Chinese nationalist whose one desire was to drive out the

French and establish a democratic government for Indo-China. This deception was disclosed about two years after World War II, and at present even the most confirmed die-hards are prepared to admit he is a tool of the Kremlin.

The year 1921 also marks the founding of the Japanese Communist party under the control of Nosaka, who exercised leadership over approximately 70,000 followers of Moscow. As in several other Asian areas, Nosaka worked under cover for years, battling against an extremely hostile Japanese nationalism that made his organizational tasks difficult. The fruits of the excellent training he received and gave, however, are becoming more and more apparent in present-day Japan and can constitute a source of severe embarrassment to both Japan and the West.

In 1923, the Indonesian Communist Party came into being. It now numbers about 50,000 members and is under the control of Pak Alimini, a Russian national by naturalization. Pak Alimini was a classmate of such sterling characters as Earl Browder, Thorez, and Chou En-lai when they were all serious students at dear old "Lenin U." His activities in Indonesia, despite his small party, have been materially aided by the trouble between the Dutch and Indonesians, and there is every indication that he will gain a number of converts. Much of the internal strife in Indonesia can be traced to his efforts. He is probably one of the most dangerous Communist leaders in the East.

His counterpart in the Philippines is Luis Taruc, a comparative late-comer, who controls the so-called Hukbalahaps (Huks) and other Reds in the islands. While the Philippine government has made a determined effort to suppress Communism in its territory, the Taruc forces have made some progress toward their objective and are a definite menace. Taruc has been aided by a number of "American Communists" who remained in the Philippines after World War II. His greatest strength, however, was derived from the ranks of Filipinos who joined his movement during the Japanese occupation. While some of these are presumed to have deserted, many still remain as active participants in the Communist movement.

Siam and Burma became acquainted with Communism in the late twenties and early thirties. In the former we again find leaders

of Chinese nationality or descent operating under the names of Ch'ing Hsi, Chin Chi, Wang Yu, Liu Sin, and Ku Kip. The outstanding leader is the priest Ch'ing Hsi, whose devotion to Leninism is greater than that he gives to Buddha. The Burmese leaders, Thakin Soe and Than Tun, are both natives of Burma. The Burmese problem is further complicated by several non-Communist nationalists movements and the presence of Bengali Communists who are aiding the local Kremlinites as part of the price for an autonomous Bengali Communist state, promised by Russia for the future.

This precious crew constitutes the leadership of the Communist movement in Asia and the loyal lieutenants of Moscow who will execute the Soviet orders in Operation Red Dragon. Until they and their assistants are eliminated, there will be no peace in southeast Asia.

It was not without good reason that the titular leadership of Operation Red Dragon was bestowed on the Chinese rather than on any other Oriental people. China is not only the biggest state in the Far East—she has an area of 3,400,000 square miles and a population of 450,000,000—she was also recognized as a Great Power and one of the "Big Five" during World War II. In addition, she has a permanent seat on the Security Council of the U.N. although the Formosa government now occupies this. Deeper than these reasons, however, lie those based on the character of the Chinese people themselves.

For centuries the Chinese have been the travelers and traders of the Oriental world, and they have pushed into every crack and corner of the desirable southeast Asian area. Today we find a Chinese ethnic enclave in almost every state in the disputed region. In Indo-China there are almost half a million Chinese with over 50 per cent of the population of Saigon Chinese nationals. In Malaya there are 2,400,000 of them, 43 per cent of the total population, and again the capital, Singapore, is one-half Chinese. Siam has 2,000,000, Indonesia about 30,000, and in Burma the number is estimated to be as high as 1,200,000 by some authorities.

The Chinese are clannish and never quite outgrow their allegiance to their families in China or to China itself. Abroad, they represent the small shopkeepers of the East, and their stores are

frequently the center of a town's social and commercial activities. They are also the moneylenders, bankers, marriage brokers, and keepers of hotels, resthouses, restaurants, and brothels. All in all, they offer ideal facilities for the collection of information, the dissemination of propaganda, and channels of communication on behalf of Communism. They are never absorbed by their environment and rarely ever become citizens of the state in which they live, although both Malaya and Siam are making efforts to provide citizenship. Their objective is to acquire wealth and return to China to die. This, of course, requires some subservience to the Chinese government and, today, service to Communism. While many of them are opposed to Moscow's doctrine, they are all potential agents under the proper stimulus, at least in the eyes of analysts of Oriental affairs.

What more could Russia ask! A Communist-controlled China with millions of potential or ready-made agents living in and actively engaged in the commerce and finance of the areas desired by the Kremlin. While their numbers may appear to be small, it must be remembered that it takes only a relatively small number of Communists to gain and keep control of a state. Russia herself has only 6,000,000 to dominate 208,000,000 people!

The Chinese are doing Moscow's work with efficiency and should give the Kremlin no grounds for complaint. In Malaya, for example, where there are more Chinese than Malays, the Chinese constitute the backbone of the Communist guerrilla war that is giving so much trouble to Britain. In Indo-China, Ho Chi Minh's forces contain large numbers of Chinese, and in Burma they are also active in the prolonged Communist guerrilla activities. Much of the unrest in Siam can be traced to the Chinese immigrants. It takes only a relatively few Communists to make trouble and secure the collapse of the not-too-stable governments that are characteristic of east Asia, and when the Communists are as wily as the Chinese, they can constitute a serious threat to any government. Truly, Operation Red Dragon was well placed when it was entrusted to the Chinese.

At present there are four areas of active combat in which Operation Red Dragon is at work. By contrast, two of these—Korea and Indo-China—may be classed as major actions, and the remaining

two—Malaya and Burma—as minor actions. In reality, these four constitute a single action, dedicated to the same purpose and objective and being conducted under a single general leadership. To treat them as four separate actions is to fail to recognize their integrated character; they should be countered as a common problem. Since the beginning of these actions it has been the policy of the Democracies, however, to regard them as four separate and distinct problems, to be dealt with by the countries most vitally concerned. This policy throws the burden of responsibility on the French insofar as Indo-China is concerned, the British in Malaya, and the Burmese government in Burma. Only in Korea have the Democracies joined forces to stop the Red aggression and then only with token forces.

Aggression is a political-military action that can only be effectively stopped by determined counteractions. In the present situation this counteraction involves a calculated risk that must be assumed by the Democracies if their efforts are to be crowned with success. Operation Red Dragon is now being countered on the supposition that if the Democracies offer a cohesive policy of united action on all fronts in Asia, the Soviet Union will view it as a provocation for starting World War III. So far, the Democracies have not dared to risk such a provocation; they are attempting to stop the Communist aggression in Asia as individuals and without assuming the calculated risk of Russian entry that would be found in cohesive action.

In Korea we find the basis of a United Nations command, despite the fact that it is largely American in personnel. Actual control, however, is vested in political authorities in Washington, London, and Paris, who must approve all the important military decisions of the U.N. Commander *before* they are put into action. Such a situation is not only impracticable but dangerous. Whenever the actual conduct of a military operation is controlled or limited by political considerations or subject to control by political authorities, it is bound to be an ineffectual one. There are times when the generals are more competent to act then the civil authorities. The actual conduct of operations in the field is one of these times.

The situation in Indo-China has been touched on previously,

and its implications and costs have been made clear. The assistance rendered by the Democracies in this action is largely limited to arms and equipment given by the United States. French troops must go it alone in Indo-China except for such native assistance as can be obtained. In Malaya, the British with some native forces are also fighting a long-drawn-out series of engagements without active allied support.

The over-all control of the enemy forces is in Moscow, and it represents a unified control fighting against four unco-ordinated, entirely independent, yet closely related actions. What chance would we have had in 1939–45 if each of the World War II allies had been permitted to meet the German threat as a separate entity, fighting where it saw fit to fight, attacking such targets as seemed important to it, and making such terms as it believed to be advantageous to it and it alone? Under such circumstances we probably wouldn't be worrying about World War III right now; we might still be fighting World War II.

An almost fundamental rule of the German school of geopolitics was the old one of "Divide and conquer." Simply translated, this rule advocated meeting one's enemies singly and defeating them as entities, rather than attempting to do battle against them en masse. We recognized this move on the part of Hitler, and we took steps to counter it. Why can we not apply the same level of foresight to the present situation in Operation Red Dragon?

The three interested nations, United States, France, and Britain, should unite their efforts to constitute a single front from the east coast of Korea to the Burma coast. Efforts within this line should be unified efforts made by all three rather than individual efforts. Once the native governments have recognized the combined character of the defense, they will be more inclined to join in the fight, offering more and more support. As it is, few if any native governments are going to risk possible destruction by backing a losing horse. Again it is a case of the nations under the hammer not being convinced of the sincerity of the Democracies in fighting Communism.*

* The single front concept advocated here has been prominently featured in the President's State of the Union message of February, 1953, and is reflected

Thai, for example, has a contingent in Korea while at the same time her national territory provides a haven for Communist guerrillas from Burma, Malaya, and Indo-China. She could and would put a stop to this practice if she were sure that the Democracies were going to win in the areas now being disputed. She cannot afford, however, to deny some help to men who one day may occupy the seats of the mighty in countries bordering hers. Against the combined forces of China, Malaya, Indo-China, and Burma she would be helpless, even with democratic support.

Native participation in Malaya is not what it should be. After all, the natives are reluctant to take up arms against the Communists who might one day be their masters. Who is to blame them? For decades, Britain has represented power to them; now the spectacle of seeing the symbol of power pushed around by an upstart Communist movement makes them apprehensive as to their future should Britain be defeated. The same thing is true of the Annamese in Indo-China. One can only retain power by acting in a powerful fashion. So far, this has not been done in southeast Asia.

The action in the present fighting in Korea can be termed a stalemate. For approximately a year and a half the Democracies have been indulging in so-called armistice talks, which are, in reality, propaganda forums for the Communists. Much muttering has taken place anent the subject, "What we will do to the Red Chinese when the armistice talks finally break down." To all intent and purpose, the talks have broken down. Because of the stumbling block of nonforcible repatriation of Chinese and North Korean prisoners, the cease-fire arrangements, the primary purpose of the talks, appear to be a dead issue, and the world has been treated to a variety of propaganda blasts on germ warfare, prisoners of war, and the like. Meanwhile, men of all nations are dying in combat.

The Communists do not have and never did have a sincere desire to end the Korean war. It's too fertile a propaganda instru-

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in our present foreign policy. The new administration that has taken office since this chapter was written appears to be putting into practice many of the procedures advocated by the author.

ment to toss away on humanitarian grounds. For every day Korea can be kept in a state of hostilities Moscow can shoot story after story to its satellites, describing the ridiculous picture of the world's Great Powers being held at bay by the forces of Communism. Once the war stops, this source of publicity is ended. And so is the drain on allied resources, finances, and manpower. If it weren't for Korea, the Democracies might make progress in Indo-China, Malaya, the Middle East, and Western Europe. Russia will not be so foolish as to permit hostilities to be stopped in Korea, thus allowing the Democracies to increase their strength in other vital areas. I am willing to predict that unless the Democracies assume the calculated risk and launch a decisive unified effort against the Asiatic Communists, World War III will find us still in a hassle in Korea, Indo-China, and Malaya.

The Korean terrain has been so fought over that the plan of operation is apparent to anyone who reads the newspapers. Russia occupies Dairen and Port Arthur as warm-water ports. She also occupies the Kuriles north of Japan. With Korea in Red hands she can protect her Chinese ports and offer a threat to the Democracies' position in Japan. Without Korea she and eastern Manchuria are vulnerable to attack, her Chinese ports are threatened, and she's too far from metropolitan Japan to be a threat. While even now she could make a blockade of the Yellow Sea somewhat difficult, Russia is theoretically at peace with the world, and her ships must be allowed in and out of Dairen and Port Arthur; with Korea in her possession Russia could materially strengthen her defenses against such a move by the Democracies.

To win in Korea, Red forces must take Pusan and the old perimeter of southeast Korea. The Communists must be able to deny the Democracies landing space. They must exercise control over the Korean Straits and the Sea of Japan. Once this is accomplished, Japan's usefulness to the allies must be equivalent to that of Britain if Russia controlled the English Channel. Moscow cannot profit, however, unless she can control all of Korea. A negotiated peace or armistice in Korea would merely delay the day when Moscow will again seek complete control of the "dagger aimed at the heart of Japan."

In the southeast the Communists do not possess the same

advantages as did the Japanese invaders, in spite of the contiguity of Red China to the coveted treasure chest. Where Japan was a naval power, Red China must limit herself to land or air operations, neither possessing adequate naval strength for sea invasion nor able to get the needed ships from Russia. To invade southeast Asia by land is no easy task. The principal land invasion routes are through Indo-China or over the mountains through Burma. The first offers her a very limited number of routes of approach, and the latter represents a task she is not equipped to undertake. Defense against either route is excellent, and the invasion costs would be high.

Land invasion of Burma is best accomplished from the south and east through Malaya and Thailand. This presupposes Chinese control of both of them. To obtain this easily would require a sea-borne invasion, not within China's capability. She could, however, get at Thai through Indo-China, the gateway to the southeast Asian peninsula. Once Indo-China fell, Thai, Malaya, and Burma would be likely push-overs, Thai without hostilities. With Thai in her control, Russia could move her puppet Chinese into Malaya and Burma, and the treasure chest would be hers.

Singapore, the fortress of the area, is susceptible to land attack. Should the Chinese succeed in getting into Thailand, they could strike south to Singapore by the two principal routes followed by Japan. Small invasions could also be launched from the south coast of Indo-China, main springboard of the Japanese attack in World War II. Proceeding either by sea or land or air, preferably the latter two, the Red forces would be able to besiege and probably secure the main Malayan airdrome at Kota Bahru. A second force could drive from Thai to seize Penang Island, from which Chinese air could command the approaches to the Strait of Malacca, the critical doorway to the Pacific, Indonesia, and the South China Sea.

Once Penang and Kota Bahru were in Red hands, the campaigns would be similar to those of World War II. One column would strike south through the central area of Malaya to Gemas and follow the rail line to Johore Bahru. A second column would follow the rail line to Malacca and thence along the coast to Johore Bahru. A third column coming south from Kota Bahru



The Arena of Operation Red Dragon—showing Chinese attack pattern for the conquest of southeast Asia.

would seize Kuala Trengganu, Kuala Dengun, Kuantan, Pekan, and rendezvous at Johore Bahru. From this point the three columns would attack and probably capture Singapore, just as Japan had done.

Simultaneously an attack would be launched northward from Bangkok into Burma. While this attack would cross the mountains between Thai and Burma, the Japanese were able to accomplish it, and the Chinese could probably do so also. Rangoon and Mandalay would be the principal objectives. Control of Mandalay would open the carefully built Burma Road, if it had not already been used for a Chinese attack from the north. In all probability, the Chinese initial attack on Burma would come from the Burma Road as well as from the south, thus placing a weak Burma between two fires, making resistance difficult if not impossible.

The key to these maneuvers is Indo-China, and for that reason the Red strength is being directed against that area. Since the close of World War II the fighting has been desperate as the Ho forces have attempted to gain control of the Annamese rice basket in Tonkin Province. If the Reds can get Tonkin, they can secure the surrender of all of Indo-China. Early attempts to gain control of Indo-China by precipitating revolution and the establishment of a Communist Peoples Republic having failed, the Ho forces must fight for the area. On the Chinese side of the border Mao Tse-tung has mobilized over 100,000 Chinese troops, who are only waiting for a word from Moscow before they join forces with the 100,000 already in the Viet-Minh Red army.

So far France has been able to hold on but at a terrific price. To do so eats up one-third of her national defense budget, the cream of her officer and noncommissioned officer crop, and requires between 120,000 and 140,000 troops. Should France be defeated or withdraw because of the price, all southeast Asia would fall to Moscow.

Supposing it did, what would we lose? We would have to count on the loss of India and Pakistan as natural events incident to the loss of southeast Asia. Add the total to that of China, already lost, and the results are staggering. In terms of countries we would lose seven; in terms of population, 719 millions. Resources lost would include 96 per cent of the world's rubber supply, 99 per

cent of the jute supply, 59 per cent of the tin, and 15 per cent of the manganese. In addition to this we would lose valuable oil in Indonesia, a certain loss if southeast Asia went Communist, antimony, and some coal and iron of local importance. Politically and strategically, we would lose control of the sea routes to Australia and the Indian Ocean as well. Japan and the Philippines would certainly go, and the western defenses of the United States, the outer crescent, would become a thing of memory.

Does China have the ability to make this move? She does. Her army is well-trained and well equipped with Russian weapons. Her air force, a key factor in an all-out invasion of southeast Asia, is growing rapidly and can be estimated as having 10,000 planes, 40,000 flying personnel, and 7 airborne divisions by the end of 1952 or early 1953. Militarily she definitely has the ability to overrun southeast Asia unless the Democracies can stop her. Under our present appreciation of the problem and our limitations in meeting it, countermoves by the Democracies have only a fifty-fifty chance of being successful.

Our strategy for survival in southeast Asia should include a number of basic premises that may come as distinct departures and distinct surprises to many people. Besides the single unified front concept discussed earlier we must plan and institute a blockade of the Chinese coast. In this we will have to assume the calculated risk of Russian protest, armed or otherwise, because of the Soviet control of Dairen and Port Arthur, both of which would be affected by such a move. Supplies from the outside must be kept from filtering through to be used against us.

In addition, a successful blockade would do much to re-establish the prestige of the Democracies in the Far East. Up to this point the Western powers have not acquitted themselves in a manner that ensures the all-important face-saving demanded by Oriental peoples. For some reason we have followed a course of action based solely on keeping Russia at least passive at the expense of our Far Eastern prestige. In view of the objective of Red China in the southeast Asian peninsula, a blockade might well stiffen local anti-Communist resistance and would definitely reduce the possibility of trouble in Japan, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

The time has finally arrived when the Democracies can no

longer afford to stall on the subject of the Chinese Nationalist Forces. Chiang Kai-shek has about 500,000 men on Formosa, all willing and eager to renew hostilities against their old Red enemies as soon as we are ready to employ them. Unfortunately, as yet only about 10 per cent of these troops have been equipped for combat. These forces should be armed and readied for the field for use against Mao Tse-tung, Russia, or anyone else who wishes to destroy the sovereignty or freedom of the Asian states. To refrain from employing them is not only wanton waste of fighting man power, but it imposes an additional burden on the United States. Our Seventh Fleet has been assigned the mission of standing between the Red Chinese and the Nationalists in order to keep them apart! *

Over and above these things, the war in Korea must be brought to an end as rapidly as possible, and that end must spell decisive victory for the Democracies. The same is true of the guerrilla wars in Indo-China, Malaya, and Burma. This, of course, requires recognition of the fact that these actions are planned aggressions against the freedom of the Democracies and are integral parts of the Russian plan to dominate the world. Let's not miscall them; let's have the courage to recognize them for what they are. They should be terminated decisively by an all-out effort as soon as possible.

One of the outstanding pathological political faults of this century is the fact that we have become masters of words instead of actions. In short, we talk too much. Words are wonderful things, but we rapidly reach a point where it is time to stop talking and act. So long as our strategy has a basis of words, we will be a nation facing aggression. Any strategy for survival designed to combat Operation Red Dragon, or any other for that matter, must be based on action.

* The fleet was relieved from this duty as a result of President Eisenhower's State of the Union message in February, 1953. Serious consideration is also being given by the new administration to the use of the Chinese Nationalists and to the speeding up of their training and equipping.

Chapter 21

Victory and the Atom

Since the atom has been established as a multipurpose weapon, millions of Americans have come to believe that victory for the United States and the Democracies is as inevitable as one breath following another. Just load up the big bombers, signal them to take off for the Soviet Union, and then go to lunch. By the time the dinner hour rolls around, the war will be over, and Russia will be a wilderness blanketed with radiation—the aftereffects of our atomic bombardment. How can we lose if we have the A bomb?

If you are one of these people who have so blithely assumed our victory is an inevitable sequel to an atomic raid on Russia or that nothing can happen to the United States so long as we have the A bomb, get over the idea and get over it without delay. The assumption is not only false, it's worse than false; it's faulty strategy and one that, if followed, will destroy the United States. Instead of assuming that all our troubles are over because we possess a so-called "superweapon," try to visualize the atom bomb, or any atomic weapon, for what it really is rather than as something out of the pages of the history of the future. Once you've done that, you'll get an entirely different picture of atomic warfare and what it really implies in terms of employment and survival.

Since the first A bomb fell on Hiroshima and announced the birth of the atomic era to a marveling world, we in America have enjoyed a false sense of security closely coupled with horror. Of the two, the sense of security has predominated. It is, perhaps, this

false sense of security that has led us to make a number of assumptions, equally false, and to capitalize on these assumptions, elevating them in our minds to the status of truth.

Foremost among these assumptions is the popular idea that the atomic weapon is the ultimate weapon. Many people have come to speak of the atom bomb with the same reverence and awe that might be paid to some superinvention that clearly marked the end of man's progress. Nothing is further from the truth; superweapon, perhaps; ultimate weapon, no. The fallacy in this ultimate-weapon concept is easily seen if we set down a list of basic requirements or characteristics for such a weapon. While there are probably many such lists the best one has been devised by John W. Campbell, Jr., writer, editor, and physicist, and appeared, of all places, in the science-fiction magazine he edits. It is reproduced here with slight modification.

Basically, the ultimate weapon must have the following characteristics:

1. It must absolutely wipe out all opposition.
2. It should be of such nature that no resistance to it will be possible.
3. It must be of such a nature that the opposition cannot turn it against the original wielder.
4. While annihilating all opposition, it must not harm friends.
5. It should not damage any useful or constructive forces.
6. It should be of a catalytic nature, self-propagating, such that once loosed even the destruction of the original source cannot defeat it.
7. It should render all present weapons inoperative, making both atomic weapons and conventional weapons harmless.
8. Its power should be such that no power in the universe can stand against it.
9. Its effect should not depend on surprise, so that even pre-erected specific defenses cannot defeat it.
10. It should cost very little.
11. The field where it has once been used should be permanently uninhabitable by the opposition, but freely accessible to friends.

Simple inspection of this set of characteristics clearly reveals

that nothing in our family of atomic weapons even begins to approach the requirements for an ultimate weapon, let alone fulfill them. It is more than doubtful if the field of atomic science will ever produce a truly ultimate weapon within the Campbell characteristics. Therefore, we must accept the fact that our much vaunted atomic weapons are merely means of waging war, superior in their destructive ability to the conventional weapon.

Almost as popular and widespread as the ultimate weapon fallacy is the misbegotten idea that our possession of the atomic bomb is *the thing* that prevents the Soviet Union from attacking. So long as we retain possession of the bomb and its secrets, we can prevent war; we are safe. Obviously, this is the rawest kind of foolishness. According to Major George Racey Jordan we have already given the Russians not only the secret of the atom bomb but the plans with which to build it and the fissionable material the bomb requires to be effective.

We are well aware of the fact that atomic knowledge is not exclusively the possession of American scientists. Treachery, a naïve belief in Russia's sincerity, and downright carelessness have nullified any exclusivity we might have had. We cannot deny or overlook the fact that Russia has some brilliant nuclear physicists, men like Peter Kapitza and Joffé; that she holds captive many German scientists who worked on atomic energy before the collapse of the Third Reich; and that traitors like Klaus Fuchs and Pontecorvo, who acquired their knowledge under the banners of democracy, sold out our secrets to the Soviet Union. Obviously, these Russian scientists, aided by their captives and their agents in our atomic projects, knew what to do with the information and material they received from us. Let's face it. Russia has the atom bomb, and with her record for ruthlessness she will use it when she is ready. It is not now so much the United States surpassing the enemy in atomic weapons to ensure our superiority but rather working feverishly to keep even with the Russians in their efforts to surpass us. Possession of atomic weapons by the United States does not and will not prevent World War III, by any stretch of the imagination.

A modification of the possession idea, but an equally false modification, is found in the theory that as long as the United

States produces more atom bombs than the Soviet there will be no war. This theory comes from the popular idea of quantity of arms rather than quality, and while it may be applicable to conventional armament, it's false when speaking of atomic weapons.

The effectiveness of atomic bombs depends not on the quantity of bombs on hand but the destructive ability of the bomb based on the amount of fissionable material available for use. The key to atomic capability rests on the amount of fissionable material either contestant can obtain to put into the bombs. If the United States has access to greater quantities of uranium and other suitable material than does Russia, we will have more powerful and effective bombs than the enemy. If Russian access exceeds ours, she will have the advantage.

We may ultimately discover that one of our bombs will do the same work as ten of Russia's or *vice versa.* In that case the mere fact that Russia had five hundred bombs to our sixty or seventy would still not make her more dangerous or better equipped to defeat us. Therefore, those people who feel secure, when they read some editor's estimate of an eight-hundred-bomb stock pile in the United States as opposed to a fifty-bomb stock pile in Russia, should ask themselves which one of these stock piles represents the greater power. In atomic weapons it's quality not quantity that governs their value.

The last major assumption is the one that follows the general line that victory is ensured if we use the atomic weapon against the Soviet. This is perhaps the most naïve and childish of all the assumptions and has been reiterated throughout history whenever a new weapon has been introduced into organized warfare. The same line of reasoning was applied to the use of the archer against the armored knight; the rifleman against the archer; and the dive bomber against the infantryman or defenseless city. For a brief moment during the time one side has the exclusive use of a new weapon this theory might be true, but as soon as the exclusiveness is lost, the concept becomes useless, and warfare returns to the same basic problems of strategy, production, and logistics that it occupied in an earlier weapons era.

Both sides have the atomic weapon; both sides will use it; neither side can assume victory by its use. It is a well-established principle

of war that, given time, one side will always find a way to nullify, reduce the potency of, or protect itself against, the weapons of the other. It is true that with a weapon as powerful as the A bomb the side dropping it first may have a momentary advantage, but this advantage is nullified or reduced when the other side retaliates in kind. Atomic weapon or conventional, victory still depends upon the reduction of the enemy's warmaking ability. It's still a question of how, when, and where the atomic weapon is used, not simply if it's used.

Ever since the United States first used the A bomb against Japan, we've been living in an era of "atomic hysteria" that is definitely harmful to the cause of democracy. Quite apart from the popular misconception of atomic weapons and their employment, our general reaction and attitude have had dangerous repercussions on our allies, and these repercussions could seriously impede our victory over Communism.

Europeans do not enjoy the same high regard for the A bomb that we do; our democratic allies see it in a somewhat different light. With his cities so much nearer the source of Communist might than our own towns, the average European is more prone to think in terms of reprisal. Where we in America can see only an atom bomb on the Kremlin or the Palace of the Soviets, he sees a Russian A bomb on the Tuilleries, the House of Commons, or Buckingham Palace. Our visions of endless miles of destroyed Russian industry appear to him in the shape of an equal number of miles of blasted French, British, Dutch, or Belgian factories. The unfortunate victims of the bomb, necessary war dead, are not Russian dead to him but his own. He fears our possession and use of the bomb as much as do the Russians!

One may well ask why? Surely he has no fear that we, the kind, benevolent United States, will bomb Paris or London. This terrible "ultimate weapon" will only be used against the aggressor in defense of our freedom and that of the European Democracies. Why, indeed, should the European fear the atom bomb?

The atom bomb was almost rudely dumped on an unsuspecting world. We went to bed one night, fighting a conventional war, and the next morning we awoke to the news that an atom bomb had been used against Japan. Neither the enemy nor ourselves

had any warning. In fact, it had never occurred to most of us that our governments were even thinking in terms that we associated with science fiction rather than actuality. We were almost as shocked as the enemy.

Its very birth was dramatic and, in a certain sense, glamorous. Our modern minds could not grasp for a single moment what its effects might be. It was not until months later, when pictures and statistics came to us from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, that the scope of its power of destruction began to register. Unable to visualize anything more horrible, we made it the "ultimate weapon."

For seven or eight years now we have glamorized, propagandized, dramatized, and almost deified the atomic bomb. Some people have gone so far as practically to set it upon an altar and bow down to it as the existing symbol of divine protection. We surrounded it with a wall of secrecy never before known in the United States; in fact, the atomic weapon has been so carefully guarded that no one but the enemy has been able to find out anything concrete about it. Once we robed the atom in all the trappings of glory and power we created for it, we let the rest of the world know exactly how we felt about it, just as we do with everything else in the United States that we feel is superior to a comparable article produced elsewhere. It was this combination of circumstances that did the damage.

We ourselves have produced the fear of the bomb in Europe. Because of the secrecy surrounding its origin and development; because of the veiled and vague references that appear in our press; because of the great volume of half-cracked writers who hastily read a chapter on nuclear fission and produce a scholarly-sounding article, we have come to regard it as the end product of all military progress. In short, we have given it such a build-up, characteristic of American advertising, that instead of becoming a thing of comfort to our allies it has become a thing of horror. The Russians also have an atomic bomb! In the European mind, every word of propaganda issued by us in behalf of our bomb, every bit of glamour with which we surround it, every shadow of horror or mystery with which we enshroud it is automatically transferred to the Russian bomb. All the tricks we used to impress

the Soviet of the strength and horror of our superweapon have only served to impress our allies even more.

Today, the European fears it. Like ourselves, he doesn't know whether it's round, oval, cigar-shaped, or square. He has no idea if it's big or small. Can it be carried in one's pocket, or does it require a fleet of airplanes? To us these things are not so important because we are still laboring under the false security of distance. To the average man in Paris the picture is entirely different. He knows only three things: its results are horrible, many of those launched against Russia will be stored and launched from his territory, and the Russians have it, too! We did a good job on selling America's number-one weapon—too good a job; we oversold it.

Let's be realistic and practical about it. We have the A bomb, and so does Russia; therefore our possession of it will not deter someone else who also has it from employing it. If we use it against Russia, Russia will use it against us. That's simple enough. There's only one fly in the ointment, and that's the fly that bothers John Bull, Marianne, Katrinka, and all the rest. *Russia will use it first!* We won't be the aggressor in World War III!

We're all agreed that the next war will begin by Russian action against the Democracies. Knowing Soviet tactics as we do and certain that the initial stages will be blitzkrieg aimed against troops and civilians alike, being aware of the profound importance of destroying the antagonist's warmaking power, we can't exactly see Russia starting a war by just a polite little artillery barrage against the Saar or some other Western area. Quite the contrary. We can foresee the barrage all right, but it's accompanied by vast waves of Russian aircraft zooming over Paris, London, Rome, the Hague, New York, and Washington, and each one of these planes is carrying an atom bomb!

That's what Europe fears! We dressed up the atom bomb for them, and then we told our friends they'd see its effects before Russia did, not from our planes but from Russian aircraft. That's a nice prospect for the average European. It's not difficult to understand why he fears the "ultimate weapon."

That we may recognize, at this late date, that we have been overeager in our approach to the atomic weapon is no consolation

to John Bull, Marianne, Katrinka, or even you and me. Perhaps if we spend as much time, money, and propaganda on assuring everyone that we have the secret of the defense against atomic weapons as we have in glamorizing them, we'd all feel better about the subject. At least our strategy has to devise a way of winning public confidence abroad, or we'll find ourselves so tied up in controlling and restricting agreements that our atomic weapons will be about as useful as a slingshot. After all—would you want an A-bomb dump in your town if you knew the Russians were only a few hundred miles away and had inside sources that could give them the exact location of that dump? That's Europe's fear.

An additional reason for Europe's fears may seem ridiculous to us, but it is nevertheless real to many Europeans. Thanks to Communist propaganda, neutralism, and a host of politicians who are using the situation for political gain, large segments of the population in the Western European Democracies are afraid that we, the United States, will be the aggressor and start the war! The Communists have done a much better job than we realize in convincing Europe that we are warmongers, potential aggressors, and a nation whose ambition is to dominate the world. Politicians have used this warmonger theme, greatly toned down but still effective, coupled with the theme of American imperialist ambitions, as instruments by means of which to attack existing governments in hopes that popular reaction will expel the "ins" and replace them with the propagandizing "outs." This is particularly clear in Great Britain and France.

Of course, the "outs" would probably be in close co-operation with the United States if they succeeded in gaining power, but the man in the street in Europe does not see this. All he sees is a group of political leaders attacking the United States, warning him against the government presently co-operating with us, and advocating a mass foot-dragging movement to keep the United States from plunging the world into World War III. He remembers that we are notorious for being slow starters in war, that we never really mobilize for our own defense until the war is well on its way. What happens, he asks himself, if the United States, in a moment of anger or enthusiasm for conquest, drops an A bomb

or two on Moscow and is in a state of semipreparedness when she does so? Who takes the rap until we are ready to go all out for victory and what happens to the European cities meanwhile? With the A bomb also a Russian weapon and the European city much nearer than Washington, his fertile imagination supplies an answer that strikes terror to his heart.

So, because of propaganda, both the enemy's and ours, misconception, proximity, and politics the European on whom we must depend for help and whose security we represent has come to be almost as suspicious and fearful of us as he is of the Communists. Our atomic weapons that should give him a feeling of equality with the enemy only serve to heighten this fear and increase the tension under which he lives. With the initial impetus that we, the American people, gave to the atomic hysteria added to the shrewd opportunistic tactics of both the Communists and the European politician, our strength has almost become a handicap in our efforts to aid our sister Democracies. This unfortunate turn of events will be difficult but absolutely essential to overcome and set to rights.

Viewed from the standpoint of a geopolitician, and probably from the viewpoint of all strategists, the atom bomb is merely one member of a family of weapons in our normal arsenal. We have rifles, tommy guns, light machine guns, heavy machine guns, and 50-caliber machine guns. With them are bazookas, antiaircraft guns, artillery of various sizes, flame throwers, rocket launchers, and a variety of weapons for attack and defense. All weapons may be assigned to definite families within the normal arsenal according to certain common characteristics. The same rule holds good for atomic weapons. A bombs, atomic artillery, atomic rifles, and the like have the common characteristic of utilizing atomic energy or some such thing. There's nothing mysterious or dramatic about them. They hit harder, do more damage, and produce more casualties, that's all. They constitute a perfectly normal and rational development in the progress of weapons systems, and they are merely a part of the arsenal of war the same as a bayonet, a block-buster, or a pistol. Why not accept the fact and get off this merry-go-round of super-super-ultra-ultimate stuff that has spun us into a dizzy cycle of fear?

Stop and think for a moment. Just how much do you, as the average layman, know about the construction of a bazooka, what kind of shell it fires, or what kind of a fuse it has? What do you know about the operating principle of a flame thrower or a rocket launcher or a time fuse? Are you an expert on mortar systems? Do you know how to repair a 50-caliber machine gun? For most of us the answer is negative. That doesn't worry us. We don't go to bed nights and stay awake wondering how antiaircraft fire is controlled or how big a plane it takes to carry propaganda leaflets. We simply accept these facts as something outside the scope of our activities and leave them to the specialist in the field. Why not do the same thing with the A bomb? It's the same sort of gadget in the long run, a military weapon that will be used by the military when and where indicated.

The armed forces have a rule that much of the information given to personnel is on a need-to-know basis. If a man's job requires that he know a certain thing, he is told it; if he doesn't need to know it, he isn't told. There are hundreds of things about the Democracies' war machine the average citizen not only does not need to know but which would be fatal to our chances of success if he did. A bombs and the like are among these things. Why single out one small part of this material, glamorize it, dramatize it, and make a fetish out of it? Accept it as a normal part of war and forget it. Strategy dictates we induce Europe to do the same.

Perhaps if we view these glamorous atomic weapons in a cold light, it may be easier for us to accept them as the normal rather than the fantastic. The average layman thinks only of the A bomb that, for the sake of identification, we may call the conventional A bomb. This was the general type used against Japan and is the kind that can reduce large segments of a city to a rubble heap in short order. It still constitutes the mainstay of the atomic arsenal and probably will until the H bomb is perfected. Originally the A bomb was a strategic weapon to be used against cities, industrial areas, and installations in much the same fashion as the old conventional block-buster or other giant high-explosive bomb. More recently it has acquired a tactical use, and research and natural developments now permit its use against troops.

Readers Digest, in an article extracted from *U.S. News and*

World Report for January 26, 1951, gives a most appropriate illustration of tactical uses by contrasting the fact that two B-36 bombers each dropping one A bomb could accomplish approximately the same damage over an area one and a half by four miles as was accomplished by 5,200 tons of conventional bombs dumped on Saint-Lô during World War II. The tactical uses of the new A bomb could include, besides the "carpet bombing" referred to above, attacks on enemy spearheads, destroying enemy breakthroughs, neutralizing enemy troop concentration, and the like.

Recent tests have demonstrated the possibilities of effective "baby A bombs" or "junior A bombs" for purely tactical uses on the field of battle. These smaller bombs could be carried by small planes and could produce a more limited area of destruction against enemy front-line troops attacking our positions. Their effects could be greater and more certain than the conventional artillery barrage and, in the long run, less costly in terms of cost per effective hit. World War III will probably see a wide use of this type by both sides.

While the H bomb is, at the time of writing, too deeply shrouded in mystery and secrecy to speculate on its effects or uses in war, by publication time we should have some idea of the importance of it. Results from tests at Eniwetok, held during the summer and fall of 1952, may be available to firm up any speculation made here. One thing must be made clear—simply exploding the H bomb does not demonstrate its usefulness as a war weapon. There are many other factors such as cost, economic utility, effects, usefulness against targets, etc., that will have to be determined before we can say we have an effective super-super-weapon.

Again, we are faced with the problem of exclusivity of possession. It is safe to assume that the Russian scientists, with the help we voluntarily and involuntarily gave them, have been able to bring Russian production and research to a level almost equal to that of our own people. We cannot, therefore, assume that if we perfect an effective H bomb Russia will be far behind us in producing one of her own. This, of course, would have a dampening effect on the triumph of our own weapon and might tend to nullify it to some extent. The H bomb's most important force as a weapon will accrue to us only if we have it exclusively.

Dr. Robert Lapp, atomic scientist, in a recent extremely well-written and factual article appearing in the *Saturday Evening Post* (October 25, 1952), has summed up the current information available for public release. Contrasting it to our 1950 edition of the A bomb, Dr. Lapp assigns the early H bomb almost twice the area of blast damage, over twice the area of heat-flash, and an area of almost one-third more dispersion of radioactive rays. Looking into the future, Dr. Lapp believes that the 1953 improved H bomb may have a blast-damage of four times that of the 1950 A bomb, a heat-flash area over four times that of the 1950 atom bomb, and an area of radioactive ray dispersion of twice that of the 1950 atomic weapon. While much of this is sheer speculation, although it is based on theory and experience, it will serve as an indication of what might be expected *if* the H bomb works at all.

Like the A bomb, the H bomb will be limited in power by the available supply of the material used to produce the explosion. The production of this is far more difficult and expensive than production of the A bomb and may slow down mass production. The one consolation appears to be that if we can produce a useful and effective H bomb before Russia, we have at our disposal the funds and production methods to outproduce her. In spite of everything there are still a number of questions that must be answered before the H bomb officially joins our arsenal. Foremost among these are two. Will the cheaper A bomb do as effective or more effective a job than the H bomb in spite of the strength of the latter? Have advances in aviation reached a point where it can be delivered, or are man's destructive weapons to be limited by his ability to produce the proper carriers? There are, of course, many more questions, but these two will have to be solved not only by us but by our enemy before the H bomb becomes an actual threat to our country or a weapon to preserve freedom and democracy.

The launching of robot planes and other guided missiles is not new, nor does it symbolize the beginning of push-button warfare. This type of weapon, equipped with atomic warheads, would do infinitely greater damage than the V-1 and V-2 rockets of World War II and would be less restricted by launching sites. They operate, however, on the same general principle, i.e., launching

from a distance at a target not visible to the users. Undoubtedly the "bugs and wrinkles" of World War II are being ironed out, and guided missiles in World War III will be more effective and more common.

Last autumn the Army announced the construction and testing of an atomic artillery piece capable of shooting an eleven-inch projectile twenty miles. Such a weapon could hammer enemy strong points, fortified positions, and concentrations. Accuracy of the new cannon is surprisingly high. According to reports, it is capable of shooting both conventional and atomic projectiles. While it does overcome some of the handicaps of former "Big Berthas," namely the ability to be transported over highways instead of railroads and the ability to be set up and readied for firing in fifteen minutes as opposed to ten or twelve hours, it is still road-bound and susceptible to air attack.

Atomic-powered submarines have already been produced and should be almost conventional by the time World War III is upon us. The use of atomic propulsion would make high-speed, fully submerged, long-distance operations a reality and would increase the effectiveness of our undersea fleet. Adaptation of an atomic engine to warships will probably develop from this experimental undersea craft.

Underwater torpedoes equipped with atomic warheads are also a distinct possibility and should make life hectic for Russian submarines and submarine bases. While the Soviet submarine fleet is probably the largest in the world, her acute shortage of appropriate home ports renders her particularly vulnerable to undersea attack by fast-moving submarines equipped with atomic torpedoes capable of doing extensive damage.

It should be apparent by now that atomic weapons are the old conventional weapon with increased striking power, destructive ability, or increased speed. They are by no means as glamorous and mysterious as popular hysteria has made them. They are subject to usage within the same general formula as the conventional type —to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy's warmaking ability with the minimum destruction. Possession of them will not prevent war, nor will their use ensure victory. They are definitely not the ultimate weapon. Their acceptance by the public

should be as a normal development in armament and a normal part of our arsenal.

Their successful employment in our strategy for survival depends upon our abilty to deglamorize them at home and abroad and to convince the European that they are as essential to his continued freedom and welfare as the conventional type. This will require an adequate propaganda campaign for our own people as well as for our allies. The old cliché about a little knowledge being a dangerous thing was never more true than in the case of the atomic weapons. Let's take them off the pedestal, remove the halo, and stop attributing to them characteristics they do not and probably never will possess. Strategy for survival must be based on common sense, not hysteria and popular misconceptions.

Chapter 22

The Communist World after the Deluge

The paradox of democracy, in its military aspects, lies in the fact that in winning a war democracy automatically plants the seeds for a succeeding war by failing to plan for the peace. This is not so much a fault of the philosophy of democracy but of the men who operate under the philosophical cover. While war is not incompatible with democracy and may be, under certain conditions, a valuable instrument of democratic policy, it is an abhorrent instrument and one democracy avoids. For this reason, we not only fail to develop a military philosophy, but we fail to plan our wars to include the final objective.

Normally a nation like the United States goes to war only as a last resort or when she is forced by direct attack to do so. In either case we, her people, are reluctant but firm in our prosecution of the conflict *up to the point where the enemy capitulates.* Beyond that point we are lost. Frankly, we never know what to do with a war when we've won it. As a result of our inability to realize that simple victory in a war settles nothing, we always fall short of achieving the ultimate objective—the solution of the problem that caused the war. We are so intent upon forcing the enemy to capitulate that no plans of a concrete nature dealing with the postwar world are ever made prior to his capitulation. As a result we are always caught politically and militarily unprepared to cope with postwar situations—not those arising five years after the

war but those arising five minutes after the last gun is fired. This is the constant weakness in our strategy.

Today's war with Russia, in either the cold or shooting phase, is not only a military war but also an ideological war. Ideas are weapons of potent force, a fact we are prone to forget in spite of the constant demonstration the enemy has given us. To win merely the military phase, destroy the warmaking potential of the Soviet Union, and bring her down in complete defeat is not sufficient. We must be prepared to win the ideological war that has already begun, will continue through the shooting phase, and exist in force long after the last Russian plane has been shot down or the last Communist gun silenced. The real objective of World War III is not so much the defeat of Russia as a nation but the defeat of the things she stands for, particularly the Communist ideology.

We said and wrote the same brave and wise words during World War II, along with many others we have subsequently come to wish had never been brought to life. In spite of it all, the first chance to demonstrate the fitness of the Democracies for the task at hand found us unprepared. The surrender of Italy caught us with a set of half-formed ideas, partly or inferiorly trained personnel, and a strong penchant for confusion. Our methods of handling this situation consisted in the feverish recruiting of every conceivable type of individual, giving him a short course, a commission, a handful of pamphlets and instructions, and launching him on the Italians with a prayer for his success. Because the heavens failed to fall and there was no active revolt in Italy, we assumed it was safe to pursue the same makeshift policy in Germany. The results are apparent.

It is not sufficient to restore the police and fire services of an occupied area, make the trains run on time, and ensure a flow of gas, electricity, and water. The presence or absence of these things is not a basic cause of war. Our services must go far deeper, be far more penetrating if we are to succeed. The primary function of occupation forces should be a direct attack on the basic causes or ideology responsible for the war with the objective of eliminating the causes or the ideology as rapidly as possible. This, of course, requires a recognition of the causes by the victor and advance

planning and preparation to attack them. Our occupation forces for World War III should be equipped at least to launch the initial attack on these problems. Victory will not be ours in World War III until Communism has been eradicated beyond return.

If any lesson of World War II should be learned and remembered, it is that associated with our various occupation forces. It is obvious from the difficulties we are now encountering in Western Germany, the resurgence of a neo-Nazi group in the former Reich, and the opposition we are receiving, that our policy of occupation left much to be desired. The same may be said for Japan and the sudden Communist-sponsored wave of anti-Americanism we are now witnessing. Should we repeat our mistakes and fail to crush completely Communism in Russia, not only our occupation but our victory will be a hollow imitation of the real thing.

Obviously the victorious Democracies must occupy certain sectors of Russia in order to promote the victory and ensure the rehabilitation of the nation. To stop at the borders of the Soviet Union would be disastrous in the long run. It is equally obvious that occupation will be a difficult task of a magnitude no combination of nations has undertaken heretofore. We cannot, therefore, permit ourselves the luxury of waiting until the Russians surrender before we plan the best way to handle the situation; a sound strategy for survival indicates that a high priority be given such a project before the actual outbreak of the shooting war. To win we must be prepared to solve the problem of Communism and the slave world before we undertake to destroy the military threats they offer to world peace.

What are the problems attendant upon a victory by the Democracies? They fall into two general classes—those local to the Soviet Union and those arising from her satellites. While there may be some overlapping, these two are not the same problem, and separate solutions must be found. In each class, however, we find the same ideological, political, and economic subdivisions, all three of which present difficulties with which we must contend.

Primarily, these problems will be handled by our Department of State as soon as the occupation troops can consolidate our territorial gains. However, there is an interim period between the

cessation of hostilities and the beginning of the State Department's control during which the military must exercise complete jurisdiction. It is this period that is the most dangerous and the one we must discuss as a part of our strategy for survival. By the time the Department of State arrives to take over, the pattern of success or failure will have been established.

The task before us is a tremendous one. In the Russians we are dealing with a people who not only have had no experience with what we call democracy but have been taught that such a system is morally and politically wrong. In addition to this, the Russians have been obsessed for centuries by a xenophobia that has become identified as a national characteristic. These two obstacles alone could easily nullify victory unless they are dealt with promptly and carefully. To liberate the captive Russian mind will require something more than the halfhearted strutting-conqueror efforts of a lieutenant from Boston or a captain from the Bronx. Mere military rank, troops, and martial display won't succeed in Russia. The people are already too familiar with these institutions. Something more will be required.

The choice of occupation officers and troops and the training they receive are the starting points of our ultimate victory. Upon them must rest the initial resentment of the Russians as well as the initial successes we hope to have. Therefore, they must be thoroughly trained in their tasks and have at least a partial command of the Russian language, knowledge of Russian culture, and an appreciation of Russian thinking and tribal mores. These things are important in winning the confidence of the people and go far toward simplifying the task of occupation and liberation.

They must be selected with great care and foresight. The dispatching of units as such would not seem wise in view of our experience in Germany; all fighting men are not qualified to serve as occupation troops. We must select our occupation forces on the basis of being salesmen of democracy rather than police of the area. One cannot sell democracy by autocratic methods, dictatorial bearing, and oppressive conduct. Firmness not tyranny should be the watchword. This selectivity must extend not only to the officers but to the enlisted personnel as well, for little is to be gained by sending one high-type, well-trained officer and thirty

enlisted men selected at random to administer a village. This is borne out by our experience in World War II.

In setting up our belated occupation units for Italy, a task in which I had considerable personal experience, we concentrated entirely on training the officer personnel while the necessary enlisted personnel was hurriedly requisitioned from a nearby replacement center. This method failed to produce the desired effects. We were unable to secure the outstanding enlisted personnel the task required or the qualified enlisted specialists the occupation mission demanded. Even the tables of organizations for these units were hastily drawn, some only a few days before our occupation units were dispatched. This produced an early confusion in responsibility and command that led to a failure to arrive at an early solution of some problems and the creation of many new ones. It should be borne in mind that the American G.I. is a gregarious creature who will have a much wider and greater contact with the former enemy population than will the officer. For this reason, he should be selected with at least the same care as the officer, and his training should be as intense.

The Democracies should be prepared to enter Russia and the satellites as liberators, rather than victors, in an effort to demonstrate that occupation is not so much a matter of payment for the Russians' political sins but rather a teaching force to train and assist them in discerning the necessity of applying democracy to the former Communist area. While I have no illusions concerning the war guilt of the average Russian and no sentimental idea that he is merely an unwitting tool of his government, it is only fair to note that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union contains only 6,000,000 members in a population of 208,000,000. On the other hand, out of 110,000,000 votes cast in the 1950 elections for the Supreme Soviet, only 300,000 were in opposition to the slate proposed by the Communist Party, the only legal party in Russia. This does not necessarily mean that these 300,000 opposed the Party; some may have only been in opposition to the candidate proposed. Normally, the Communist Party polls between 98 and 99 per cent of the vote cast. In spite of this, at least in theory, there is a much larger non-Party membership with which the Democracies could work than there were non-Nazis in Germany.

With this large group we may have a chance to sell democracy, if we approach it in the proper manner, striking while the sting of defeat is still strongly felt. In any event, selling democracy to the Russians will be no easy task.

Our brand of democracy will be a new experience for the Russians, and it will be better learned if the teaching comes from their conationalists. We should start now to recruit a corps of non-Communist Russians, presently outside the Communist sphere, and train them in the ways of democracy. These in turn should be assigned to the occupation force for service in Russia as political representatives, minor officials, and in whatever capacity their services can be employed. The conquest of Russia will be difficult enough; the liberation could be even more so. Sending in non-Communist Russians to govern and assist could be a stroke of brilliance that might reduce the magnitude of the task. If it did nothing else, it would at least partially remove the obstacle of xenophobia that we are certain to encounter.

The Communist leaders came to power and held it by the efficient use of carefully designed propaganda. This has been effective in the satellites as well as Russia and must be counteracted. Having been conditioned for the last three decades to propaganda treatment, the Russians will probably react much better to it than to new methods. Should we be smart enough to adopt the tactics of this propaganda market—convince people to receive propaganda about democracy—we might be able to crush the doctrine of Communism in Russia before it is entirely liquidated in our own country.

To perform such a difficult task would require a corps of well-trained propagandists and psychological-warfare specialists who have been thoroughly schooled in Communist propaganda methods. This corps should be trained now, not after Moscow has fallen, and its training should be based on the result of careful research into Russian attitudes and thinking as well as Russian reactions. It must be scientifically done and is a task for scientists, not military men. This psychological corps must be ready to enter with the troops, not replace them in six months. The campaign for the liberation of the Russian mind must have its D-day at the moment the shooting war stops.

A thoroughly developed plan must be devised for sending Russian-speaking teachers into the U.S.S.R. as early as possible so that we may secure the minds of the young before the passage of time weakens the psychological impact of defeat. Preferably these teachers should be non-Communist Russians or Russian-speaking Britons, Frenchmen, or Americans. We should studiously avoid sending Poles, Czechs, Germans, or representatives of other nationalities that have resided under the Russian heel. There are two well-founded reasons for this avoidance. First, there must be no opportunity for the former slave to exercise a tyrannical hand over the defeated master; this would tend to alienate the people we are trying to reclaim and rehabilitate. To supply teachers from the former satellites would be to start off with two strikes on our attempts. Secondly, there must be no opportunity for the Russian pupil to find a basis for contempt. Rather, he must always be impressed. The sending of satellite nationals might excite this contempt because of the feeling of superiority with which the average Russian has been inculcated by the Kremlin. He will jump through the hoop for his master, but he would be contemptuous of those he formerly enslaved and who were liberated by the Democracies.

Religion, of course, must be restored to a country in which religion has been a thing to scorn and despise. Some clergymen to whom I have talked are prone to visualize this restoration as a sort of spiritual field day in which the various creeds will scramble madly for converts and domination. This must not be allowed to happen. The restoration of religion must be dignified and surrounded by a spirtual aura that will attract not repulse the Russian. This is no task for a well-meaning missionary whose faith is not grounded in Russian tradition but rather for a highly trained specialist in the Greek Orthodox Creed whose religious zeal is tempered by his thorough understanding of the nature of the problem. It will not be sufficient simply to preach; he must teach, counsel, and present a spiritual rallying point for a defeated people. To overcome the Communist influence inbred into the Russian may be harder in this field than in any other.

The establishment of religion, instruction in democracy, free education, careful propaganda, and expert occupation authorities may go far toward eliminating the ideology of Communism, whose

death is our objective in World War III. We shall, of course, be faced with food shortages, economic rehabilitation, reconstruction of bombed areas and industries, but none of these problems will be as difficult to solve as the elimination of the ideology. While the great mass of the people will be subjected to occupation efforts along the liberation front, our most persistent antagonists will be the guerrilla bands of die-hard Communists that will grow up around the Red leaders we do not succeed in capturing at the time of final surrender. What is to be our attitude and our treatment of this group?

Russia is a vast area, offering innumerable hiding places, and the task of mopping up guerrillas could be as prolonged and almost as costly as the war itself. Therefore, our actions against them must be thorough and ruthless. For more than thirty years the Russian has thrived on regimentation, on police-state methods and inflexible discipline. If the bonds are released too suddenly the reaction to freedom is likely to produce prolonged disorder. Our occupation forces, while bent on a liberating mission toward most of the Russians, must be firm and decisive in handling the guerrilla problem as an object lesson to the masses of the people. We must demonstrate that while democracy means freedom it will not tolerate armed efforts to overthrow it. Guerrillas must be hunted down and crushed as rapidly as possible. While the Democracies will never accept such methods, it might be better for the world in the long run, if guerrillas were executed where they are found. Our intensity diminishes with victory, and by the time the war ends we'll be ready for much softer methods. This natural reluctance to take vigorous action will prolong the guerrilla movement for considerable time. Eventually we will wipe it out, but our methods may be misunderstood, thus weakening our whole liberation program.

A clear distinction must be made between guerrilla resistance in occupied Russia and the action taken by the remnants of the Soviet forces and population that have retreated into the heartland. In respect to this group the war must continue until they are pacified, starved out, or surrender because of internal disturbance. The duration of this limited war will be conditioned by the size of the resistant group, the extent of the damage inflicted

by the Democracies on the heartland warmaking ability, and the degree of vigor with which the Democracies pursue the action. To all intents and purposes, however, this final action will be a police action rather than one that requires the imposition of a full wartime economic structure on the free world.

It is to be hoped that we do not repeat our error of World War II and present the Russian people with a second Nuremberg trial. The Russian is a mystic, and given any excuse at all, he will elevate his convicted leaders to a martyr's crown. In our handling of the Party leaders we must keep our eyes on the ultimate objective—the elimination of Communism—and think less of the torturous legal procedures of democracy. Our action must be vigorous and direct. Soviet leaders must be court-martialed before the military courts of whatever army captures them, if they are captured alive. Once convicted by military courts, they should be immediately executed without all the fanfare and folderol of Nuremberg. There must be no public international spectacle for the Russians to look back upon.

I seriously doubt if any German learned to respect the workings of democracy as demonstrated by the military trials at Nuremberg. Even less would this be true in Russia. What we would rightly consider to be only a fair trial the Russian would be bound to regard as a sign of indecision, blundering, and weakness. In the final analysis it is the Russian who must be impressed, not our legal system that must be satisfied. At the risk of horrifying and offending many gentle people I might add that it probably would be better for all of us if we were to shoot summarily the Red leaders where we find them rather than go through the fiction of any kind of trial. Sometimes the future of the world must take precedence over our interpretation of legality and constitutional procedure. In short, democracy may be best served by immediate elimination of the Communist leaders rather than by a long-drawn-out legal farce.

What do we do about the satellites? This is perhaps an even more perplexing question, for here we encounter an emotional as well as a political problem. At the present time there are at least four factions of Poles, two of Czechoslovakians, several Hungarian, and the good Lord alone knows how many Rumanian and

other Balkan factions existing in United States and Europe, all ready to take over their native lands as soon as the Russians have been driven out. To permit these varied groups to attempt to settle their difficulties while actually in the process of governing the defeated satellites would be the rankest kind of folly. Instead of restoring peace and liberty to eastern Europe we would be simply sowing the seeds of a dozen revolutions and disorders.

Unless each of the "Free Satellite" movements can achieve a united front and present a co-ordinated effort and sensible program, prior to the outbreak of the shooting war, they should be ignored. One of the reasons for Communist advances in eastern Europe was the inability of these warring exiled factions to come up with a united front at the end of the last war. Internal politics, factional advancement, and individual power became more important to these people than a temporary cessation of political hostilities in the interests of their countries. This mistake must not be repeated after World War III.

Personal experiences with various underground movements during the last war and personal contacts with members of refugee governments during and since World War II have done much to lead me to believe that our only hope for successfully restoring the satellite states to their former democratic standing will be by occupation tactics. The problem should be less difficult and less prolonged than in dealing with the Russians. The peoples in the satellites can still remember pre-Communist life and government. They have not been exposed to the evil radiations of Communism for as long a period as their Russian associates. With the restoration of law and order within the state and the presence of an international force to hunt down the native Communists, the people of these countries should be able to push forward their own naturally selected leaders in a comparatively short time.

Occupation in the satellites should end as soon as the people have demonstrated a capacity for self-government free from the Communist taint. This has to be a movement that originates within the country rather than one preached by a former leader who spent his years in exile. It must be remembered that many of the exiled leaders are men who were unable to cope with national problems after World War II and involuntarily or unwit-

tingly permitted the Communists to penetrate. To many people in the satellites these men represent failure, and their restoration to power would not be accepted with popular support or confidence. Leadership in the liberated satellites must come from within, be spontaneous, and be by men whose names may be presently unknown to us. Until it does, these countries must be occupied and governed by commissioners from the Democracies.

I do not profess that the moves suggested in this chapter are anything more than suggestions or personal opinions, despite the fact that they have grown out of study and experience in World War II. Nor am I ready to predict that unless they are followed disaster will occur. What interests me more is that we recognize the obligations and burdens victory will impose upon us and that we take immediate steps to prepare our plans for coping with the responsibilities that go with victory. In World War III we must not only win the war, we must win the peace that theoretically will follow war. I say theoretically because unless we do have a concrete, thoroughly developed plan and the trained personnel to administer it there will be no peace for any of us—victor or vanquished.

The spoils of war in World War III are not tangible things like territory, treasures, or reparations. In this war they are men's minds and souls. To win we must not only defeat the fighting hordes of Communism, we must destroy the doctrine itself. This destruction cannot be a halfhearted thing; it must be completely and thoroughly planned for before war begins. Should we be tempted to regard it as a matter that can be treated as an expedient of the moment, our fighting, our suffering, and our sacrifices will be in vain. We will be engulfed by a greater defeat in the midst of victory.

To devise such a program is no task for writers, professors, or soldiers alone but for a carefully picked group that can devote full time and the richness of experience to preparing a plan that will ensure our winning the peace. Such a group must start now, for the time will never be sufficient for the preparation of a foolproof plan. Peculiar as it may sound, we might stand a better chance of winning the war if we spent a little less time planning how we were going to fight it and considerably more time in

planning what we were going to do to win it after it was over. Our strategy for survival demands that such plans be made in the interest of the welfare of future generations and the whole people. To hold back at this time, to relegate this task to a secondary level, to regard it as a matter of expediency, is to betray the world of today and posterity. For this there can be no excuse. We missed the boat with World War I; we muffed our chance in World War II. We cannot afford to repeat our mistakes in World War III.

Chapter 23

The Ultimate Weapon

There are forces in this world so potent, so devastating, possessing so many possibilities and ramifications, that no man should set about to release them; for, once released, they are beyond control of any man. Such a force is the ultimate weapon—irresistible, terrifying, immeasurable, uncontrollable, and eternal. Difficult, at times almost impossible, to bring into action, but once committed, equally impossible to stop. Yet, by its own peculiarities it may veer from its main purpose and go off on a new tack, like a puppy chasing leaves in October. It is capable of rising to great heights, heights beyond the wildest dreams of any man, but equally capable of sinking to depths of degradation and destruction beyond comprehension. Sometimes it produces results of such infinite beauty as to defy understanding while in the very next moment its manifestations cause such horror and revulsion that those they touch never recover from the effect. The most potent force in the world, the ultimate weapon, and yet, the weakest of which any man could conceive. No man could create it; it is truly a work of the Almighty. The ultimate weapon—the human mind!

To write this chapter one should be more than a mere geopolitician; one should be, in addition, a philosopher, a moralist, a psychologist, a clergyman, and have all the accumulated knowledge of the ages at his finger tips. Yet the consideration of the employment of the ultimate weapon in global affairs is a geo-

politician's problem, for it represents both his strength and his weakness. Properly used, it can constitute a weapon of such power that it obviates the need for guns, A bombs, or war itself; improperly used, it can tear down all of its own defenses and nullify the efforts of those who would defend and preserve it. To make matters worse, it is an imponderable for it is solely at the command of the one factor the geopolitician cannot measure, cannot count upon—the individual. Truly, it is the element that controls the balance of power in any geopolitical plan, the deciding factor in any strategy for survival, and the most capricious of any instrument employed in man's preservation of himself. With this dubious support before him, the geopolitician, the strategist, and the planner must prepare his program for survival, prayerful that those whose future he is trying to preserve may not be more dangerous to his success than the enemy. Who plays with the ultimate weapon tempts destiny and tosses his future on the laps of the gods of chance. Nevertheless, on such a weapon hangs the ultimate future of the United States and the entire system of democracy and democratic action.

The employment of the ultimate weapon is mandatory today as it never has been in the course of our previous history. If we are defeated, it will be because our people had no taste or desire for victory and were content to capitulate rather than to struggle. If we are victorious, it will be because of our wholehearted support and firm resolve to make the principles of democracy triumphant. In that respect the most formidable weapon in our entire arsenal is the mind of the individual American and the manner in which he applies it to the problem of survival on our own terms.

The enemy, too, possesses a form of the ultimate weapon, just as he does the atomic bomb, planes, and other instruments of war. However, ours is superior at the moment to anything he has yet produced, and we have every potentiality of keeping ahead of him in this mental and moral armament race. We cannot assume the quality of the ultimate weapon possessed by our allies, for they have been at closer grips with the enemy's onslaughts than have we. In addition, theirs is a weapon predicated on a somewhat different appreciation of democracy and civilization than is ours. We can only hope that the example we must set in our employ-

ment of the human mind will be one in which they will find a source of strength and guidance that will stimulate emulation on their part.

The superiority of the American ultimate weapon lies in the philosophy of government and of life that our country has pursued since long before the American Revolution. With us, freedom of thought and action is not so much a matter of something the government has given us by an act of the legislature but a quality with which we were born and a God-given right that is ours to possess by virtue of being Americans. This right we will not surrender to any political organization, be it government or party, and we will resist to the bitter end any efforts to deprive us of it. At the same time, we cannot abuse it; we dare not neglect it; we must keep it vital and effective.

The ultimate weapon, to be truly effective, cannot be employed at the dictates of any government, nor can it be organized for use along given lines by governmental action. It will not effectively serve a totalitarian system or any system in which the thinking processes and the moral resistance of the people depend solely upon the will of a dictator. The use of the ultimate weapon must be a spontaneous action on the part of each and every individual and must be organized into a mass weapon of forceful proportions by our free wills and voluntary contributions to the common cause.

It is not the government of the United States that must make our moral attitude on Comunism crystal clear but the American people themselves. In a democracy the attitude of the government is, in the final analysis, a reflection of what the great mass of individuals, thinking and unthinking, want or will tolerate. In spite of political machines, secret negotiations, and governmental efforts to control our lives, no democratic government will fly in the face of the people and consistently and willfully refuse to pursue the policies demanded and expected by them. The responsibilities for the policies we pursue rests with each and every American. Should we, the American people, make clear that we find Communism and all its works, minions, and disguises to be abhorrent to us and announce our firm determination to work for its elimination from our world, our government would back such attitude with the policies necessary to fulfill our desires.

This the Communists have not learned and probably never will. Man's actions can be regulated and regimented, his life can be influenced by certain governmental patterns, and the manner in which he earns his daily bread can be dictated, but his thoughts cannot be effectively controlled and still represent a potent force for the progress of the nation. Once man succumbs to thought control and permits his leaders to dictate his thinking, they become his masters, and he becomes a robot or a political zombie. From this point on, his control and employment of the ultimate weapon is only as effective as the control employed by the dictator over his own mind. To this extent the force of the minds of the people is reduced in potency to the level of one mind, subject to the vagaries and imperfections of the mental processes and mental outlook of the dictator. Such a controlled national mind is no match for the collective use of the ultimate weapon forged by a free people who have the courage and determination to fight against the thought control of the enemy.

There are a variety of ways in which the ultimate weapon may be used to good effect by the American people. First and foremost we are faced with the campaign directed against us on our own shores. We are being besieged almost hourly by forces that have as their objective the penetration of the American mind in order to develop a false sense of toleration of the attempts by Communism to assume mastery of our country. These forces would have us adopt an improper understanding of those provisions of our constitution that have to do with freedom of speech, assembly, and the right to refuse to testify because of possible self-incrimination. They are, in effect, attempting to build up a legal wall behind the constitution in order that, shielded from view by the power of this document, they may use its protection to encompass its destruction.

We have been asked to subscribe to, and in many instances do subscribe to, a false interpretation of the so-called right of academic freedom, whereby Communist agents and sympathizers may use this right to corrupt our youth and lay plans for their future enslavement. We are asked to accept some specious reasoning and bizarre interpretations of the meaning of freedom of action and liberty itself in order that agents of the Kremlin may penetrate

our labor unions, our government, and every facet of our national life, under our protection. We are asked to espouse causes and fronts that have at their basis the poison and purpose of destroying us and the things for which we stand.

The first use of the ultimate weapon must be in our own land and for the benefit of our own people. It must be employed against the insidious onslaughts of propaganda, near treason, and thoughtless indifference. Unless we can master these difficulties at home, we cannot hope to win abroad, where the arena is wider, the participants more diversified mentally, and the stakes more obscure. In short, goal number one for the ultimate weapon is to erect a defense strong enough to keep the American people from voluntarily surrendering to thought control.

Our second mission is the production of a united front in America that will manifest itself in a firm coherent policy toward Communism and the aggressive actions of the Soviet Union. Once this is obtained at home, we will stimulate a stiffening of attitude in our allies abroad, a rebirth of courage and determination, a renewed faith in democracy, and a will to resist the encroachment of evil. So long as we remain hesitant, confused, vacillating, and indecisive, we can convey only a sense of our own indecision, weakness, and moral jitters to our associates in this crusade.

At the present time the people of the United States are floundering in a sea of doubt, reluctance to accept reality, and a downright fear of the future. This has been communicated to Europe, where it has been magnified until it has become the dominating factor in the European outlook. Such a condition produces neutralism, appeasement, delays, or limited participation, all of which could contribute materially to the defeat of democracy. What must be produced is hope, faith, courage, and the complete elimination of fear for the future of democracy and mankind. Somewhere I once wrote, "Man does not fear the unknown but the half-known." This is still valid and still a potent force in preparing for World War III. The ultimate weapon of the United States must be used to destroy fear and doubt at home so that these evils can be destroyed abroad.

Soviet strategy of the moment is based on the effective employ-

ment of the Russian imitation of the ultimate weapon to promote a long-range, long-term "Hate America" campaign. This is not limited to hatred of our government, its official actions, and our political ideology. Quite to the contrary, this is the implanting and stimulation of hatred for the individual American. Behind the Iron Curtain this indoctrination produces hatred and suspicion of the West in general and America in particular. This is a factor we will have to counter in our final victory, for it places the United States in the position of being the permanent enemy. This we cannot permit, for the belief in democracy that we cherish makes it mandatory that we liberate the captive mind behind the Iron Curtain and allow it to form its own beliefs concerning our way of life.

Outside the Iron Curtain this "Hate America" campaign has different manifestations that can, in short-range planning, have disastrous effects. It is this campaign that is gradually forcing the European to regard us as "Uncle Shylock," an imperialistic power, greedy for world domination, and ready to sacrifice the youth of our allies for our own advancement. It is this campaign that makes Europe question not only our motives but our ability to lead the free world toward real freedom and progress and to restore to the whole world the peace and security we so desperately seek.

A military build-up is not sufficient reply to this threat. We must have an awakening of political resistance, a moral rearmament, and a true demonstration of our sincerity. This requires the use of the ultimate weapon not against but in behalf of our allies. We must have a well-directed, effective propaganda campaign beamed toward the satellites to convince them that they have no cause for hatred against us but should regard us as the one hope of liberation they possess. This requires the use of the ultimate weapon in its finest form. Failure to do these things may create a permanent stalemate in which the captive population behind the Iron Curtain will settle down to complete ignorance and hate toward the rest of the world; Europe will vacillate from side to side until, weakened by its own futile efforts and beset with doubts, it capitulates; and the United States will struggle helplessly to free itself from the silken but unbreakable web of hatred that surrounds it.

The ultimate weapon must be used to convince both ourselves and the rest of the free world that we cannot win either the cold or hot phase of a global war until we are prepared to face the reality that such a war exists. So long as we are content to flounder, to equivocate, to wonder, and to ignore reality, we will never employ the ultimate weapon against our enemies. Nor will we induce our allies to be effective in their use of it. This realization and acceptance is not a task for the military or the political branches of the government; it is a task for the individual, and unless he can accomplish it, we face destruction and loss of all we cherish.

However, having once accepted the reality of the situation with which we are confronted, we will proceed to build mentally and physically for victory rather than tacitly to accept the threatened state of stalemate toward which we are rapidly heading. The inhibitions that have restricted us in the past will be allowed to remain in the past, and we can go forward with a consistency of word and deed that is unfettered by our unsuccessful attempts to find a common ground between democracy and Communism. We will then have the courage to place our practical resistance to the Soviet Union on a par with the verbal attacks that have characterized our actions since World War II.

Having once embarked on such a course of action, we may be amazed to discover that we have stripped the Kremlin of the advantages we have accorded to it and reduced the international crisis to a fight in which both opponents are fighting with both hands. So long as the American people persist in believing that we must step softly for fear of offending Russia, we shall be fighting with our hands tied behind our backs. Only those who prefer defeat to victory are content to enter an arena armed only with the power of words, a knowledge of *la politesse*, and a firm resolve to offer no offense.

We must employ the ultimate weapon to rid ourselves of the illusion that somewhere, somehow, there is some way in which we can appease or buy off the Red menace and still preserve our freedom, integrity, and honor. We must convince ourselves of something religion has tried to do for centuries—there is no compromise between good and evil. Such a compromise, or attempted

compromise, is not only morally untenable and intolerable, it is basically opposed to and destructive to the democracy we so earnestly profess to support. To appeal to Moscow to call off its dogs and pursue a live-and-let-live policy, in view of what we have already witnessed since the close of World War II, and in view of what we know of her objectives, is to open the door to constant aggression on her part. There is no appeasement for aggression, only destruction and abject surrender.

Hegel, the German philosopher, once wrote, "Peoples and governments never have learned anything from history or acted upon principles deduced from it." To a great extent, this is true, particularly where recent history is concerned. We and our allies tried the appeasement policy, the buying-off program, with Hitler and succeeded in accomplishing nothing except a possible prolongation of the war when it finally came. Since World War II, we have watched all the actions of Moscow and the progress it has made while we desperately sought for a *modus vivendi* whereby we could preserve peace and the balance of international freedom. We have been witnesses to the now familiar pattern of the forceful kidnaping of 600,000,000 people and their disappearance behind the Iron Curtain. Each time it happens we are more amazed than before. As each country disappears into the Communist structure, we bemoan its loss. Beyond that, we do nothing. We never seem to learn the meaning of the pattern history has so carefully disclosed to us. We failed in appeasement with Hitler, we have failed with Russia since World War II, but we are still clinging to the illusion that someday we will succeed. Clearly such folly calls for our employment of the ultimate weapon to blast this illusion before it destroys our country along with the others.

The war against Communism is a war in which ideas and thoughts are as potent as bullets and tanks. Men's thoughts, their reactions to them, and the thoughts they receive from others are valuable ammunition in this war. Unless these are properly employed, we cannot win, no matter how carefully we have devised our strategy for survival. To combat a "thought offensive" we must erect a "thought defense." Material defenses against aggression are not adequate for this task. When we are faced with a

titanic struggle for men's souls and minds, quantity of resistance is no substitute for quality; indifference is no excuse for inaction, and ignorance no excuse for defeat. One can only fight against false ideas by a constant reiteration of the truth and by a constant watchfulness against penetration.

This is the basis upon which the ultimate weapon must be brought to bear. It must be used on us, here at home, on our allies abroad, and on our enemies. But we, you and I, are the only ones who can successfully use it, and the initiative must come from within. It must be a constant thing, not something we turn on or off as the spirit moves us, or something we employ when we are bored with our surroundings. Part-time defense is no defense in a "thought war"; part-time attack is worse than useless; it is poor strategy.

The Democracies have every advantage, every potentiality for victory. We have the needed trained manpower, both civil and military, for devising our irresistible strategy for survival. We have the necessary sources of troops. Our natural resources and our warmaking abilities are superior to anything the enemy has to offer. If, to this, we can add the certain knowledge that our cause is right and our will is strong, we can ensure victory. It is only a question of adding the ultimate weapon to the physical advantages we possess to eradicate the ideology of Communism from the face of the earth. The decision for this rests in your hands or, rather, in your mind.

It is granted that this poses a variety of problems. We must, for example, adjust our thinking away from terms of Communist intentions and toward those of Communist capabilities. Our thinking must not be, does Russia intend to start a war, but is she capable of it! We must force ourselves to evaluate her not in terms of what she intends to do but what she is capable of doing. Then, we must act accordingly in order to defend ourselves; even anticipate her and take the effective counterstep before Moscow can commit an overt act.

This is not easy for a nation that has always placed peace above expansion and for a people that regard military force and violence as a policy to be followed only in extremes. It will require a major reorientation of our thinking and, perhaps, even of our

daily lives. We are not warmongers; we are not warriors of either the mental or physical variety. We abhor war, destruction, and violence. We will drive all our facilities to the utmost to find a peaceful settlement of any international dispute. We are, perhaps, the greatest exponent of turning the other cheek of any nation in the world. But how far can we go? How much can we give in? To what extent can we afford to jeopardize our future? The weakness in our strategy for survival is in the American people themselves. When will they make the decision to use the ultimate weapon?

There is one last word of warning that should be given and one that should be heeded not only by Americans but by every nation and all people. The human mind is an inflexible master under certain circumstances. Once it is bent toward power and conquest, it can destroy far more than it can ever build, if it is permitted to get out of hand. Against this we must guard and guard carefully, for our intentions are pure and they must remain so. Our objective must be the elimination of Communism not the forceful imposition of democracy. We are democracy's salesmen not her oppressors. Our goal is the liberation of the enslaved Communist captives not their re-enslavement by us. To this end we must remember the innate goodness of democracy. We must be firm, forceful, and determined, and we must win to survive, but we must do these things, as Americans, without losing our national soul by our actions. The United States must remain as she has always been—a democracy and good.

It is, perhaps, fortunate that Alexis de Tocqueville found the enigma of America in his travels here, just as he foresaw the ultimate battle between Russia and the United States. There is no more fitting way to emphasize the ultimate charge that destiny has placed on our strategy for survival than to repeat an observation of undetermined origin, sometimes attributed to him.

"I sought for the greatness and genius of America in her commodious harbours and her ample rivers, and it was not there; in the fertile fields and boundless prairies, and it was not there; in her rich mines and her vast world commerce, and it was not there. Not until I went into the churches of America, and heard her pulpits aflame with righteousness, did I understand the secret of

her genius and power. America is great because she is good, and if America ever ceases to be good, America will cease to be great."

This, then, is our charge. Within this framework of goodness, for the peace and security of the world, posterity, and ourselves, we must unleash the ultimate weapon and incorporate it into our *Strategy for Survival.*

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