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A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE

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THE RATIONAL
GOOD: A STUDY IN
THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE
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LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD.
RUSKIN HOUSE, 40 MUSEUM STREET, W.C. 1

First published in 1921

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PREFACE

THE following chapters were originally written in 1908-9, in amplification of a sketch of ethical theory contained in my *Morals in Evolution*, which had been published three years earlier. I was not, however, satisfied with the result, and put the manuscript aside for several years. It has now been almost entirely re-written. My obligations to various writers on Psychology and Ethics will be manifest, but the general theory which most nearly corresponds to the central doctrine of the work is one which I heard expounded in a paper read in New York in 1911 by a distinguished lecturer on Ethics, and have never met with again in print. Mr. J. A. Hobson kindly read the work in its original form, and made many valuable criticisms. Mr. A. W. Perris has performed the same service to the revised work, and several alterations and additions are due to his suggestions. I have also to thank him for revising the proofs.

L. T. H.

WIMBLEDON,
October, 1920.

INTRODUCTION

WHAT is right, we have often been told, is the easiest thing in the world to know and the most difficult thing to do. Unfortunately truth will not compress itself into epigram, and a facile antithesis is usually misleading. To deal plainly with himself is perhaps enough for a man in ninety-nine cases, but the hundredth, if he still deals plainly, will present a real difficulty. Moreover the ninety-nine cases are, or appear to be, so easy because the man lives and moves and acts in a society with defined standards, established relations, express or implied understandings under which he has himself grown up and to which his sense of right and wrong has adapted itself. He knows in the ordinary case what is expected of him, and he expects nothing else of himself. If these standards are assumed, private conduct becomes a matter of their application, and it is true that this is, in any ordinary case, simple enough. But suppose the social standards themselves to be called in question. By what standard shall they be judged? Here is a question which is so far from simple that the plain man recoils from it. Why question the wisdom of our ancestors, the system which has worked—not perfectly perhaps, but still has worked—and has made us what we are? Let us do our duty in that state of life to which it shall please God to call us, and be thankful that we are members of a stable community with stations provided for all respectable people to fill. Unfortunately we cannot dispose of the question in this manner. Our standards criticize themselves. We have spoken of defined and recognized rules

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which are not difficult to apply. But if we look closely into the network of current ideas of conduct we shall find not one standard but several. There are codes of law and custom, good manners and good taste, partly supplementing, partly correcting one another. In particular, behind the code of ordinary respectable society are principles higher and more austere, intolerant of much which the working standard allows. In large measure these principles are embodied in the teaching of the Churches and in that sense belong to the officially recognized tradition. The shifts and devices by which they are accommodated to the working standard form the familiar theme of the satirist, and do not concern us for the moment. Our point is merely that while it may be quite easy for a man to apply the everyday standard to his particular case, and equally easy as an intellectual exercise to apply an ideal standard, he may find in the result that what is permitted by one code is repudiated, if he takes it seriously, by the other, and his real difficulty is to answer the question: under which Lord? Now the same question at bottom confronts society as a whole. It lives on a certain tradition. It has its network of institutions, customs, and understandings. But it also contains germs and possibilities of a different life. The time is past when men in the mass simply took the established order for granted. They react upon it freely and seek avowedly to mould it to their own ideals. But again, there are more ideals than one, and between them what is to decide? The established order sits serene while the ideals wrangle over the succession. Indeed, to some of them it may apply the wit of Charles II: "They will never kill me, James, to make you king." It must be admitted that ideals may attract the fanatics, the ill-balanced, and the mischief-makers. Violence is met by violence, and the question of right and wrong becomes an issue between numbers and organization, perhaps in the last resort between the bomb and the machine gun. Morality itself is as old as mankind, but the moral ideal seems to be by comparison a recent growth. The

question has often been asked whether any tribe, however primitive, has subsisted without some form of religion, and the answer depends on what we mean by religion. But if the question be whether any tribe has existed without morality, the reply can be made more definite. Investigation has shown that the simplest and most primitive peoples known have their definite codes of custom according to which every one knows what he is to expect and what is expected of him. The code is ordinarily observed, and it suffices to cover as much as is essential in the simple relations of primitive life, to give a certain protection to person and property, and a certain regularity to sex-regulations. Generally, it has behind it a certain body of belief, sometimes of religious, more often of magical, colour. But its real strength is the force of custom itself and the underlying fear of anything that would profoundly change or destroy the social order. In this sense, then, investigation shows morality to be universal, and general considerations point to the same conclusion. For we may well ask how any number of human beings could live permanently together unless they understood one another, and how they could understand one another unless they knew what to expect and what would be expected of them under given conditions, and unless, on the whole, they had confidence that the expectations would be realized. These things can only be if men have defined obligations to which ordinarily they are loyal.

As society enlarges and develops, morality is elaborated and, on the whole, refined. The code has to deal with wider and more complex relations, and primitive custom breaks up into the law which has its definite organs of enforcement and morality in the narrower sense, which covers the finer and more personal issues. There is, as we all know, a rich variety of detail in the legal and moral codes of various times and places, yet in fundamental principle there is more agreement in the actual working codes of society than we of the "higher" civilizations like to acknowledge. For the working code, we may say

generally, is of the nature of a compromise between self and society. It takes the ordinary man just as he is with all his confused and often conflicting impulses, good and bad, social and selfish, and it puts him under certain restraints. He must not move his neighbour's landmark, but on the whole he may do what he will within his own. Life is a kind of game, in which each is expected to play for his own hand, only he must play according to rule. But some few centuries before our era there emerged a very different conception of life and duty. According to this conception life is not a game to be played by man against man, or family against family, or community against community. Life rests on a secret, profound, yet exceedingly simple once revealed, which dissipates all its difficulties, puts an end to strife and sorrow, shows us the way of light, emancipation, and peace. The secret is to put off self-hood, and merge ourselves in the life of others, of all living things, perhaps of the universe, to ask for nothing, to be ready to give everything.

"Full of hindrances is household life, a path defiled by passion, free as the air is the life of him who has renounced all worldly things." ¹

Such a man is in charity not only with all mankind, but with all created things.

"And he lets his mind pervade one quarter of the world with thoughts of love, and so the second, and so the third, and so the fourth. And thus the whole wide world, above, below, around, and everywhere, does he continue to pervade with heart of Love, far reaching, grown great, and beyond measure. Just, Vasettha, as a mighty trumpeter makes himself heard—and that without difficulty—in all the four directions, even so of all things that have shape and life, there is not one that he passes by or leaves aside, but regards them all with mind set free, and deep, full love." ²

How far this Buddhist conception is original and what elements it may have derived from earlier Brahmanic

¹ *Buddhist Suttas, Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xi. p. 187.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

teaching we need not here enquire. We may remark only on the striking analogies in the doctrine of Lao Tse: "To joy in conquest is to joy in the loss of human life." "Who-soever humbleth himself shall be exalted, and whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased." "I would return good for good, I would also return good for evil. I would likewise meet suspicion with confidence."¹ We may think also of the doctrine of equal universal benevolence upheld by the philosopher Mih against the protests of the classical moralists as evidence that wherever or whenever these conceptions originated they took root in China as well as in India. Spreading West they inspired various ethical and religious disciplines, and received one of their noblest expressions in the Christianity of the Gospels.²

Vary as it may in detail and in the cosmological ideas associated with it, the doctrine of the selfless life is one, and easily recognizable in all its expressions. Its promulgation constitutes the one really great epoch in moral evolution, and is comparable in its effect to the Copernican revolution in astronomy and the remodelling of scientific method achieved in the period from Galileo to Newton. No one who has ever entered at all into the spirit of the teaching can see life again in quite the same light. It is one of the revelations, like falling in love, or like parenthood, each of which also puts life on a different plane. Yet, with all its potency, the alleged simplicity of the doctrine was a delusion. It has not been found possible for men in the mass to live by it, and its reception as an orthodoxy has always been a disaster to the creed. I would not deny that, now and again, we catch a glimpse of it in our working life, and one or two of us may have known a woman—or even, rarer exception, a man—whose nature seems by some divine gift moulded throughout on the lines of the selfless religion. But to attract numbers, and keep them, the teachers and the

¹ *The Path of Virtue*, Tr. by Old, chaps. xxii, xxxi, and xlix.

² And let us add, for the sake of justice, in the Pauline account of charity.

Churches have striven in vain by asceticisms and brotherhoods, disciplines and charities. They could enforce the rules, but not breathe the spirit into the mass.¹ Here is the main root of that divided allegiance of which we have spoken. For all Christian communities the laws of God and of man fall asunder and the patchwork compromises are so often threadbare that we are driven to wonder whether the franker Paganism did not gain in honesty what it lost in idealism. But the real trouble lies deeper even than the difficulty of forcing too lofty a creed on imperfect mankind. The doctrine itself is only one-half of the truth, and, if the Western world has some hold of the complementary half, the means of fitting them together are still to seek. For the Eastern doctrine in itself tends to quietism and resignation, and the truth that the West has discovered—a truth originating perhaps with the Greeks, but revived with new meaning in modern times—points in the most opposite direction. For collective mankind resignation is not a duty, but a coward's plea. Its duty is not to do the will of the gods, but to refashion the world to its own will, whereto, so far as concerns material things, it is slowly finding out the

¹ The conversion of the Empire was a pyrrhic victory for Christianity. How was communism to be reconciled with property, "take no thought for the morrow" with industry and thrift, non-resistance with the law courts and, above all, with war, the prohibition of oaths with judicial procedure, and so forth? On some points the Church put up a fight, e.g. at one period it actually secured the suspension of the death penalty, and on the whole it had its way (whether for good or ill) in the law of marriage and divorce. But in the main the official churches adopted a questionable form of compromise, maintaining their principles in the letter while admitting ingenious devices for nullifying their application, and thus introducing an element of sophistry into the public ethics of the modern world which we do not find in antiquity. On the other hand there have seldom been wanting small, unorthodox bodies which have stood for the Christian ethics in their purity, and the influence of these bodies has been great and sometimes decisive. The whole subject has been discussed by Lecky, *History of European Morals*, chap. iv, and in the present writer's *Morals in Evolution* (3rd edition, p. 519).

way. Of the individual, it is true, the utmost sacrifice may be demanded, but for a cause, not as an end in itself, not to destroy individuality. On the contrary the demand is pervading and universal, for rights, scope, the means of expression, the conditions of happiness, whether for the individual, the class, the sex, the nation, or the race. For every human seed the fullness of its flower and fruit. This is a creed not of resignation, but of assertion. The danger is that becoming self-assertion, it may turn to anarchy, and that is why, if we could but find the way, it must be welded upon the old lore of the East.

In the meantime men find themselves in a new world of vast possibilities and increasing power. They are fired with new hopes, and impatient of old restraints. Often they are tempted to trust to passion rather than reason, and sometimes to rely more on force than on justice. In the welter of new elements it is not wonderful that it should be so. The world was not made in six days, nor will it be remade in six generations, and meanwhile ideals will, if we may so put it, contend with as much violence and as little scruple as persons.

But is there not, after all, a more excellent way? Is there not a method of bringing reason to bear on matters practical and social as on matters physical and mathematical? In the world of thought there is a reality to which preconceived opinion and rebellious emotion alike must bow. When experiment and calculation have spoken controversy is put to silence. Is there no corresponding reality, no analogous method in the world of practice, and of human values? There is, it may be said, this essential difference. The Reality of Science recks nothing of human wishes and emotions. But the values of human life are the objects of our wishes, and form the very tissue of our emotions. They neither subsist nor go forward like a planet in its orbit without regard to the human will, but are made and unmade by that will. They are what we would have them to be, whereas the reality which science studies is what it is, no matter what we would have it to be. Rational proof,

then, is inapplicable to human ends. Feelings and desires are not susceptible of truth and falsity, and there is nothing to be proved or disproved about them.

Such is the first and most obvious retort to the claim of Reason to govern the world of practice. But a little consideration suggests some points at which the contrast between theory and practice is overstated. Is the world of Values—to go to the central point—so completely shut off from the world of truth and reality as the retort assumes? No one would deny that given a certain End, the means employed to bring it about may be such as will “really” succeed or “really” fail. No one will deny that in this respect our judgments about action may be true or false. But what of our ends when we have gained them? Do we not find that some are “really” satisfying, and others “really” vain and illusory, and if so, must we not admit that there is a reality and an unreality in the world of our desire, and a truth and falsity in our judgments as to what is good? Lastly, if A pursues an end which is very satisfactory to him, but a crushing blow to B, is that end good as A thinks, or bad as B considers? Is there no court of appeal, nothing to determine what is just and fair between the parties? A strong and persistent impulse—if we are to appeal only to impulses—urges us to “see fair” in such a case, and that means to find something which is “really” right no matter what A and B may severally think. It looks, then, as though right and wrong may stand to the will much as true and false stand to the judgment. It would seem that they, too, claim a kind of validity which is regardless of any individual aberration. If that is so we shall not be surprised if we find something analogous to the reason which determines what is true in the processes which establish what is right.

Whether these things are so is the question to be asked in this volume. We are concerned with the function of Reason in practical life. We shall enquire whether there is a Rational, and therefore a demonstrable, standard of values to which the actions of man and the institutions

of society may be referred for judgment. If we find such a standard, which we may call the Rational Good, we shall have to ask in what sort of life inward and outward is it realized, what authority and power does it possess to dominate the actual conduct of men, and what light does it throw on the relation between human aspirations and the cosmic processes among which the life of the race is numbered. These are all questions of the first principles of Ethics and Religion. To apply such principles to the social structure, which is the great need of our time, requires a systematic study of "*axiomata media*" and a concrete enquiry into the actual working of institutions which cannot be attempted on this occasion. The connexion of wide generalities with particular facts involves the establishment of many intervening links. These facts must be left to the student of society and the student of character. But it will be found in the sequel that our principles involve, as all substantial propositions must, the general rules and directions for their application.

THE RATIONAL GOOD

CHAPTER I

THE SPRINGS OF ACTION

I. IN the world of turbid feeling and conflicting impulses wherein active life moves and has its being, Reason is a strange, an unbidden and often an unwelcome guest. A philosophic theory may explain, but seldom guides the actions of men. An ideal must usually be translated, perhaps mistranslated, into a symbol; it must be personified, perhaps mispersonified, in a leader, before it will command the devotion of the multitude. Once woven into habitual modes of feeling, once caught into the web of daily effort and strife, once entangled in all the associations of victory and defeat, satisfied ambition or glow of resentment, it may gain a power to conjure from the memories it evokes. It will seldom kindle and sustain by its inherent force and value. The effective rules of conduct are rather those which formulate what men feel than those which tell them what they ought to feel. Indeed, it was the master of thinkers who said that bare thinking sets nothing moving.

In some directions no doubt the growth of applied science has extended the sphere of reason in human affairs. Yet in the world of mind, which might seem to be her own domain, reason in these days seems sadly out of fashion. Psychology, which begins to reduce the play of mental activity to a science, has not fostered the conception of conduct as a reasoned art. On the contrary,

its tendency is to emphasize the primacy of feeling, the sway of instinct, the prevalence of the irrational in the mass movements of mankind. What is still more remarkable, philosophy itself, once the appointed guardian and advocate of reason, shares in the irrationalist tendency. We shall end by defining man as the irrational animal, and the modern philosopher as his prophet.

2. So far as psychology is concerned the emphasis on the irrational is easy to understand. When men first reflect upon their behaviour they naturally start with things of which they are fully conscious. If I am asked why I do this or that, my answer is given in terms of an End. If I cannot state the end clearly I seem to myself rather foolish, and to my neighbour, perhaps, insincere. So axiomatic does it seem that—to use the Greek phrase—everything is done for the sake of the apparent good that is to come from it. But to Psychology this mode of explanation will often seem very superficial. Going behind the ordinary consciousness, psychology is very largely concerned in distinguishing the forces operating in the twilight of semi-consciousness, if not in the dark of the unconscious, upon which our purposes depend, and, since new discoveries are very like new toys, it is not surprising if some psychologists, in their delight with the forces that they have laid bare, make of these the whole of mind, and, while elevating impulse and emotion to the highest place, regard reason and will as superficial conceptions. On this way of thinking the reasons that we give for action are merely *ex post facto* formulæ for the impulses and emotions that really prompt the act. The impulses are not based upon the reasons but the reasons on the impulses. A man may think that he loves a woman because she is beautiful, but in reality she is beautiful to him because he loves her. He says, and even believes, that he resents another's claim because it is wrong. In reality he finds it wrong because he resents it. He does this or abstains from that in conscious obedience to the will of God. In reality the effective will of God is the expression of impulses, within

himself, as modified by social traditions reposing in the last resort on cognate impulses in the minds of other men. From this last case it appears that not only does a man's personal account of his personal nature rest on his personal impulses, but social theories, traditional beliefs, ancestral customs, and new departures spring, not from the reasons given for them, but from impulses, permanent or transitory, of mankind. Thus, a completely new mode of explaining social institutions arises. When it was first discovered that many "primitive" peoples buried food and implements, perhaps horse and wife into the bargain, with a dead chieftain, the interpretation was, very naturally, that they believed the dead man to enjoy a continued existence very similar to his life on earth, and they buried with him all that he would most need in the future state. What had to be explained on this view was the genesis of the belief. That being given, the funeral practices would follow. But the psychological methods that we are considering tend to reverse the order. They suggest that certain emotions about the dead, a strange blend of fear, regret, and affection, prompted the offerings, and the theory came in afterwards as an explanation. In the Banks Islands they place a piece of banana trunk on the bosom of a dead mother. This is to deceive her ghost, which would otherwise carry off the living child. Could even the Banks Islander be so childish as to cheat himself with this reasoning if he were really moved by reasoning alone? The truth is that a powerful sentiment urges him to give the dead woman that which she most cherishes. A still more powerful sentiment bids him save the baby. Between the two he devises a compromise of make-believe, all in logical terms, but full of inconsistencies. The mother remains alive enough to desire her baby, but not intelligent enough to distinguish between the baby and a piece of wood. The compromise could deceive no one, however savage, if he had not made up his mind to be deceived. Now the cruder self-deceptions may be only possible at the lower stages, but, fundamentally, the

same relation between impulse, emotion, desire on the one side, and explicit purposes, ideals and principles upon the other, holds for all stages of development. The wicked do not at bottom fear hell, but live in a hell of fear. We do not punish criminals because punishment is just, but because we hate or fear them, and out of our hatreds and fears we weave a system of ideas in which, as though on impersonal and impartial principles, suffering is attached to wrong-doing. Our ethical and social principles are in the same case. The French philosophers announce the rights of man, as so many abstract principles founded on reason and applicable at all times and places to all mankind. In reality they formulated the resentment of the French bourgeoisie against aristocratic privilege and monarchical misrule. To the English Utilitarian democracy—which he formulated as a logical deduction from principles of ethics and psychology—meant, in fact, the supremacy of his own middle class, and Liberty meant the plenitude of opportunity for its commercial ambitions. So we might go on with the religious, ethical, or social principles that the world has known. The whole may be summed up in this way. At bottom man is moved, not by ideas or principles, but by impulses and emotions, or to put them into a compound term—since they are so closely allied—by impulse-feeling. But he is influenced not only directly but in many subtle ways by the impulse-feeling of others, and he has to give and receive an account of what he does and what they do. Hence he formulates his impulses into ends, and explains them by reasons which are mutually intelligible. This explanation has a use of its own. It serves intercommunication and mutual understanding. But in the order of causation it arises *ex post facto*. The real cause, whether of the personal act or the social custom, or the ethical principle, lies in impulse-feeling. To treat the alleged reason as the true ground is the fallacy of intellectualism.

In fact it would seem, on this view, that man is not precisely the irrational animal as suggested above. Still

less is he the rational animal of his own philosophy. We might describe him rather as the would-be rational animal. Among his other impulses he owns this curiosity among desires—the desire to explain himself to himself and others. Acting under this impulse he forms theories of “life and action,” and, taking these theories seriously, he becomes an intellectualist. In reality reason, intellect, perhaps consciousness itself, are only “epiphenomena.” They are the fly upon the wheel which in reality revolves on the hub of emotion, or rather of still deeper, perhaps purely physical, forces, which for some unintelligible reason have felt emotion as their concomitant—a useless concomitant, functionless, an effect, but not a cause, a fly upon the wheel.

3. With the ultimate questions of causation involved I cannot deal here. I must assume in general terms that the life of mind has a true meaning and function, that it is not merely an effect of bodily movements or their projection, as it were, upon another plane, but takes part in them, and through them makes itself effective in the world.¹ But if that is assumed, the question of the true relation between the unconscious and the conscious, the emotional and the rational, impulse and idea, still remains, and the question will run all through our enquiry. Clearly, it is fruitless to speak of a Logic of Practice if there can be no practical significance in logic. What may be remarked as a preliminary is that, of the examples chosen above, the reader will probably have found some much more convincing than others. Thus, to take the very first, love is proverbial for its blindness, and for its power of endowing the loved object with all lovable qualities. This is perhaps the strongest case for the theory that the emotion creates its own excuse. But even Love may, tragically, have its eyes opened. It could not be maintained that faults never appear till

¹ For a thoroughgoing defence of this view see Dr. McDougall's *Body and Mind*. In excuse for my omission here I may be allowed to refer to my *Mind in Evolution*, chap. ii, and *Development and Purpose*, Part II, chap. iv.

love is dead. It must be allowed that it is the blemish that sometimes gives it its mortal wound. Take next, resentment. If our anger seeks justification, is it not equally true that to be required to state our case has its effect upon our anger? When we lay it before another in plain language are we not forced to make some distinction between our personal sources of irritation and the offence which will be recognized as such by an impartial man, and would it be questioned that the judgment of our neighbour has its effect, if not on the emotion itself, at any rate upon its practical expression? Grant, for the sake of argument, that legal punishments originate from emotions of blinded indignation and fear. The fact remains that, as they stand, they constitute a penal code formulated in abstract terms, defining impersonally the crimes for which they are due, the procedure by which guilt is to be ascertained, and so forth. There is a long interval between the penalty so inflicted and the direct emotional expression of resentment by an injured man, and that interval is occupied by processes of deliberation, discussion, comparison, by considerations of public interest, by reflective notions of justice, responsibility and desert. It may be said that, if we take away the primitive emotion, all this legal mechanism would be as powerless as the cold gun without the powder. Maybe, but without law and morals the emotion would be as ill-directed as the powder without the gun. There are two elements in human action, and they are necessary to one another. Whether idea or impulse comes first may be difficult in a specific case to determine, but, whichever comes first, both in the end are equally essential to the developed purpose. It may well be that some sentiment¹ about the dead first prompted funeral gifts. But they could never have assumed their elaborate

¹ Whether it be fear or love. It looks as though the burning, burial or destruction of the dead man's belongings were prompted, at the lowest stage, by a kind of dread expressed, in the first degree of reflection, in the magical conception of a death infection. The kindlier feeling is perhaps later.

development—including sometimes the sacrifices of slaves, and even of the widow, at the grave—but from the positive and articulate belief in survival. Nor would this belief have arisen out of the sentiment alone if it had not been favoured by the intellectual situation. The belief in continuity is founded on a very simple logic, and, for the simpler peoples, obtained some corroboration from dreams and an easy explanation from the animistic conception of soul and body. In fact, when this conception is shattered, the practices are changed and reduced to a shadow of themselves. Often we can clearly see that it is the belief which causes practices that probe the very depths of human emotional capacity. Take the case of human sacrifice. Are we to attribute this to a direct delight in cruelty, or even negatively to a special callousness in savage peoples? There is not the smallest reason to regard agriculturists as inherently more callous than other men. On the contrary, the manners of a settled agricultural people are in general milder, if anything, than those of the herdsman and the hunter. But the overwhelming majority of cases of human sacrifice are found among agricultural peoples of the second and third stages, and the reason is simply the widespread belief, of magical origin, in the influence of a human victim upon the crops. We cannot suppose that our ancestors, in the period of religious persecutions, suddenly acquired an increment of natural cruelty which they lost again when the persecutions ceased. These appalling cruelties began when heresy arose, under the influence of the belief that heresy put all men who might be influenced by it in jeopardy of eternal suffering. When this belief began to be weakened heretics were no longer burnt. Undoubtedly the psychologist will trace many unavowed emotional elements in the work of the inquisitor. In particular he will realize that it is the inquisitor's own fear which points his zeal. In exterminating the doubter he hopes vaguely to extinguish the doubt. Nevertheless the belief is in the governing fact. The fanatic would not experience these particular fears in this marked degree

if his imagination had not painted an unjust God in the image of a Philip II. Still less would he have been able to persuade the balanced, moderate man to join with him in burning noble men and women of pure lives had not one and all been in intellectual agreement on their theory of the universe.

4. To this the reply may be that, however influential the conception of God, of the future life, of the universe and man's place in it may be, the conception itself rests on human emotions, and expresses the character of a race, an age, an epoch in civilization. Civilized people do not tolerate a Moloch. The story of Isaac embodies the memory of the abolition of human sacrifice under the influence of a dawning humanity. Plato, with all his respect for the traditional religion, has to urge a purgation of the Homeric Olympus. Christian doctrine rightly placed Charity above Faith, and, if men in general had been in their heart as in their profession Christians, they would never have acquiesced in a conception of Deity which necessitated persecution. Indeed, as manners grew milder they revolted against it. Thus, if it is conceded that theory influences practice, it will only be on the understanding that theory is itself determined by character. But this objection only allows a part of the truth. When God has become the ideal of goodness—a position only reached at an advanced stage of religious development—it would certainly seem that the character attributed to God must reflect the essential elements of perfection as conceived by man. But to frame a consistent ideal of perfection is itself as much an intellectual as a moral effort, and to reconcile perfect goodness of will with the possession of disposing power over the universe is emphatically a problem for the intelligence, and one which it could not, in fact, solve. The God of Christianity was encumbered from the first with remnants of the Old Testament tradition—which to this day are quoted as an excuse for vicarious punishment—and it was difficult to get rid of these inconsistencies without shaking the authority of tradition. What was more serious was

that—to meet purely intellectual needs—God was the creator of all things and the disposer of the eternal destinies of men. Hence all the problems of the origin of evil, of free will, desert, grace, and predestination, problems of intellectual origin that could neither be solved nor even discussed without raising acute moral questions.

To take an illustration from quite another part of our field, how great has been the influence of biological investigation on modern social theory. The conception of natural selection and the struggle for existence has been used at one time to justify competition and obstruct the growing sense of collective responsibility, at another to justify war and conquest, and silence the claims of personal liberty and international right. Clear thinking is every whit as necessary as right feeling to the discussion of the moral issues raised by such theories. It is perfectly true that they owe their ready acceptance to a favourable emotional prepossession. It is quite easy to understand why some of the modern Eugenic arguments are popular among the classes that are fortunately circumstanced and can barely obtain a hearing from the "bottom dog." But though the desires and emotions of men account for the popularity or unpopularity of social theories they do not account for the theories themselves. These arise out of the intellectual situation, just as the prevalent attitude towards them arises out of the emotional situation, and, like all theories, they have in the end to run the racket of logical and evidential tests. It would, I admit, be too much to say that a popular theory may be killed instantaneously by disproof. It dies hard, or rather undergoes a process of evanescence, fading away first from the discourse of educated and intelligent men, becoming a mark of ignorance, of simplicity, and so by stages dissolving into oblivion while quicker minds are busied in finding a substitute.

Theories, then, exert a real directive influence, and theories have their main root in the intellectual world—in the state of knowledge, the level of intellectual clarity, the mode in which men conceive the problems of life

and society. The critic of intellectualism can see the point quite clearly when the deficiencies of theory are in question. He will show how the abstraction of natural rights or of popular sovereignty justified some of the worst mistakes and excesses of the French Revolution, how ideas of Liberty and Equality overshadowed the structure of the American Constitution, how weaknesses in Bentham or in Cobden vitiated much of the work of English Liberalism. Admitting that theories may be influential for evil he does not recognize that they can be influential for good. Yet his whole criticism is an unwitting testimony to the importance of well-reasoned ideals. If defects in the theories of Rousseau or Bentham are seriously chargeable with certain bad results in practice, it follows that, if these mistakes had been corrected in good time by a better way, those ill results would have been avoided. On the whole question of the real influence of social theories—and I would associate religious ideals with them for this purpose—we ought, I would contend, to keep an open mind and look to careful historical and comparative investigation rather than to theories of human motive alone to give us the answer. The historic fortunes of ideals, what has actually determined their growth, what real influence they have exerted upon events, how far they have been merely an intellectualized version of some process that was going on, and would have gone on to the end, without them, how far they have really been effective in altering the face of society—these are questions on which, within certain limits, general psychology leaves us with an open mind. It indicates several highly interesting possibilities, and it is the fascinating, though exceeding difficult, task of sociology to determine in each case which possibility has been realized. Was the Stoic philosophy, for example, a real force in the remodelling of Roman jurisprudence, or did it merely furnish a convenient formula for changes necessitated by an expanding civilization, and the needs of a cosmopolitan empire? If the mere needs were the primary causes of change, would they have been so clearly

felt, or the lines of solution so readily discoverable without the aid of the larger principles which the philosophy furnished? How far, again, in the fourth and fifth centuries was Christianity the conqueror or the conquered? Was the world Christianized at bottom, or the Church paganized? How far, in modern times, were the theories to which we have alluded above merely a reflection of popular movements in the minds of bookish men? How far was there an interaction between theory and event, and would a more adequate theory have had practical effect in giving increased coherence to the impulses of men? These are questions to which, I think, the concrete answer must be supplied in each case by the social historian trained in psychological analysis. As we proceed we shall see, in general, something of what theory can and of what it cannot do, and for our present purpose these generalities will have to suffice.

5. One thing we can, in fact, see emerging from the considerations already reviewed. Much of the prejudice against reason is due to a misconception for which its friends are as much responsible as its enemies. By both alike reason is often taken as a thing apart. On the side of knowledge it is divorced from experience, on the side of conduct from feeling. In both cases the divorce is fatal to a true understanding. In regard to conduct the "practical Reason" is not a faculty which sits aloft, issuing impotent orders to a refractory multitude of impulses and emotions. It is not a faculty concerned with a system of abstract truths deducible, like so many mathematical formulæ, from first principles that have nothing to do with human feeling. It is rather a general expression for something which careful analysis reveals in permanent operation within the emotional field. The stupidest human being outside an idiot asylum is not guided by pure impulse alone. With greater or less clearness he realizes what he is about, he has an idea of his immediate end, he can follow the concatenation of ends and means, and he can weigh the advantages and disadvantages of one end against another. Irrational as

the average life may seem when tested by comparison with some all-embracing, self-consistent principle of conduct, it is orderly when compared with the chaos of spluttering impulses which would remain if the element of reason were once for all abstracted. If a man has no dominating purpose or creed that effectively directs his life as a whole, he has as a rule threads and filaments of purpose running through and connecting branches of his conduct. He has probably his trade or profession, his family life and affections, his hobbies, his house and possessions; each of these gives a certain order and consecutiveness to his conduct, and renders it so far purposive, continuous, and rational. The total result, it is true, may be a patchwork rather than a pattern, and the colours may not always match. One hand may undo the work of the other, and the contrasts of character presented by the same being in different relations may be a legitimate theme of satire; but it is fair to judge in the end not only by failures, but by successes, not only by things done ill, but by ill-doings avoided. There are elements of order, of restraint, of consecutive purpose in the ordinary life, and the starting point of ratiocination is the conception that these elements are the partial and imperfect incarnations of a purpose which is comprehensive, self-consistent, and complete. The threads which string together portions of human conduct are what a thinker, who was no rationalist, called organic filaments. They are shreds from the tissue of a higher organism, which it is the problem of reason to apprehend in its wholeness.

6. The view thus suggested of the place of thought in general, and of rational thought in particular, in ordinary workaday life, is filled in and justified when we turn to comparative Psychology. The further we go into questions of origin and development the less we shall be disposed to admit the abstract and absolute separation of the worlds of thought and feeling. On the contrary, the evidence goes to show that intelligence takes its rise within the sphere of impulse, and has for

its first function to define the direction of impulse, and shape it to a foreseen End. Impulse, informed by a definite idea of an End, becomes Purpose, and Purpose is at least the beginning of rationality in action. The relation between reason and impulse is fundamental to our enquiry, and as a preliminary to it let us remark here that the evolutionary view of purpose is essential to a just understanding of the controversy between the intellectualist and his opponent. For it traces impulse to deep-seated conditions of life, and finds for it far-reaching functions in which the interest of the moment is only a fleeting phase. But it may be only this interest that is formulated into a clear purpose. The significance of the act to the agent may then be only a very small part of its significance as understood by the psychologist who traces it to causes of which the agent is unaware and knows that it performs a function which the agent does not grasp. At this point the psychologist is tempted to maintain that the act is irrational unless the reasons which he sees for it are also those which the agent sees. But this is an arbitrary requirement. The truer inference is that the sphere of intelligence—we will not here say “reason”—in action varies in extent as the bearing and significance of the act is more or less clearly and fully understood. It is fallacious to attribute to every agent a full understanding of all the logical implications of all that he does. It is equally fallacious to maintain that he understands nothing on the ground that he does not understand everything.

To take a simple instance. A mother nurses her querulous baby to sleep. The plain man regards her action as purposive and intelligent. She loves the child, cannot bear to see it fret, knows how to quiet it, and does so. The ease of the child is her direct purpose, and so she herself would say. The psychologist descends upon the plain man, and the mother alike with the intellectualist fallacy. For him her action is instinctive and emotional. It is the impulsive outcome of the maternal feeling nourished through ages of selection as a means of securing

maternal care for the helpless young. It is rooted in a hereditary mechanism. The embraces and caresses by which it is effected are the instinctive, almost reflex, responses fixed by the inherited machine, and its significance is seen in the importance of maternal care to the life of the species. Of all this the mother, as mother, reckons nothing. She is thinking only of the child and its immediate comfort. She is acting, then, not from reason, but from impulse. But this account is really the intellectualist fallacy itself, turned inside out. The mother is not concerned with all the causes that have made her what she is, nor with all the effects which will flow from her actions. But those causes have made her an intelligent being with a certain area of purpose, within which she consciously adopts whatever means she finds best suited within that area. If it is an intellectualist fallacy to say that she acts from a conscious sense of the functions of motherhood, it is another form of the same fallacy—since it assumes that what is rational in action must be deduced from abstract principles, independent of impulse-feeling—to maintain that, unless she does so, she is acting by pure impulse. The simple truth in that case lies with the “plain man.” The mother acts intelligently for the purpose that she has in view, not on the theory which psychologists may frame about the origin or signification of such purposes.

We may apply a similar analysis to the rise of social institutions. History will often show that institutions which play some important part in natural life, and look as if they had been designed for that part, never were designed at all. They grew into their mature shape “from precedent to precedent,” each change being prompted, not by any general principle, but by the requirements of some particular situation. If that is so, there is, at each stage, no consciousness of the remote and comprehensive end towards which, as we see on looking back, the society is actually tending, and to impute consciousness of the end without direct evidence would be an intellectualist fallacy. But there is conscious-

ness at each stage of the immediate concrete or practical end, and to deny this would be the reverse form of the same fallacy. If it is often true that men have built better than they knew, the just analysis of the case is that, though they were not guided by a conception of the fabric as a whole, they were well aware of what they were doing as they added each brick.

7. It is not too much to say that the conception of purpose as valid and genuine in spite of limitation is vital to the analysis of reason, and to the whole interpretation of mental and social development. The lower forms of action generally serve functions which the spectator can recognize as useful to the organism or the stock, but are not determined by any idea of that utility. We cough not because we are aware that it is desirable to expel a foreign body from the windpipe, but because a crumb touches off a machinery which effects a violent expiration. Again, a dog eats, not that it may sustain life, but because it is hungry. But here, even at this low stage, the underlying impulses which do in fact tend to sustain life begin to force themselves up into consciousness. When the dog begs for a biscuit, or the cat runs after the person who is carrying a saucer, it is at least a tenable (if disputed) view that it anticipates this particular meal, is guided by its anticipation, and adopts accordingly the behaviour which on such occasions it has found to yield the required result. Thus, hunger, a feeling based on bodily structure and subservient to vital needs of the race, stimulates in consciousness the anticipation of a certain definite end. That end does not include all the implications which the biologist sees in it. It is very limited and narrow, but within its limits it directs action. Conscious purpose emerges from needs lying below the threshold, but it is none the less purpose, and conscious. Were it otherwise there would be no conscious purpose unless or until we could stand entirely apart from our hereditary nature.

But, it may be said, it is not awareness of the end that is in question, but control of the impulse. The

irrationalist will admit that, with varying degrees of clearness and comprehension, we know what we are about, but he regards this knowledge as a mere "epiphenomenon." The driving force is still impulse, and our knowledge of its direction neither adds to its energy nor subtracts from it. But if knowledge adds nothing to impulse it does materially affect its execution. Between an impulse acting blindly and the same impulse executing itself on an intelligent plan there will be a world of difference in the actual effect upon behaviour. If this is too obvious to be questioned the reply will be that intelligence may dictate the means to an end, but not the end-itself. In assigning a purpose we give a reason for the use of this or that means, but what is the reason of the purpose itself? Is there any but its foundation in feeling or impulse, which (it will be said) is no reason, but a blunt psychological fact? To deal with this objection we must decide what reason in matters of conduct means, and that is our main question. But we must remark at once that as life proceeds and intelligence expands there is a transformation not merely of the means by which impulses achieve their satisfaction, but, to all appearance, of impulses themselves. Particular impulses are fitted into a larger scheme, and what is more, are modified or even suppressed in order to fit the scheme.

Take the case of maternal love again. The animal mother has the impulse to feed and tend the young, and protect it from an apparent danger, and it is at least a tenable view that in so doing she can on occasion act with some intelligence. It is a tenable view that the hen-bird that goes to find a worm and brings it in to the peeping nestling is not merely prompted from moment to moment by a series of impulses, but by the purpose of filling the yellow beak. However this may be in the case of the bird, it is quite easy to understand that there is a stage of intelligence at which the purpose of feeding the young when hungry, may be formed without any clear conception of the good of the young as a being who is to live and grow, and whose permanent welfare

should govern every temporary service. Now the human mother certainly can and does form this wider conception. For her the temporary service becomes either a means or a constituent element in this wider end, and the wider end governs the narrower. Her impulse to gratify the child may be over-ruled by the advice of the doctor; her desire to soothe it may, if it is ill-tempered, be postponed to considerations of discipline. Her passing impulses are transformed into an abiding love; her temporary and occasional services, each with its own immediate purpose, become elements in a more permanent, more comprehensive, purpose. Her action as a whole is still based on feeling, and the feeling, if you will, is of instinctive character, but it also involves a wider consciousness, a more reflective consideration of the nature and bearing of her actions, an increased capacity of inhibiting immediate impulse, and guiding the behaviour of the moment by ideas of permanent value. Finally, if a woman, capable of all the wealth of maternal feeling, knows herself to be the victim of some fell hereditary disease, and on that ground renounces the hope of motherhood altogether, a deliberate consideration of good and evil results overcomes in her the whole prompting of instinct, and if her renunciation is still based on feeling it is a form of feeling which reflection alone makes possible.

To all this the retort will doubtless be that we are labouring the obvious and omitting the essential. No one questions (it will be said) that impulses may be controlled, but they are controlled not by reason, but by other impulses that happen to conflict with them. In the last analysis all that "reflection," or anything that we can call reasoning, does is to trace out consequences which show the bearing of one impulse on another. It thus multiplies points of contact, and therefore of possible conflict. But the conflict once joined, the victory is to the strong. The most forceful impulse prevails, and the force of an impulse is something which we may feel, but which we do not alter by reasoning about it. To test this account we must enquire further into the meaning of "impulse," the function of feeling, and the nature of control.

CHAPTER II

IMPULSE AND CONTROL

1. THE term impulse has a wider and a narrower signification. In its narrower sense it is opposed to purpose. An impulsive action, e.g. a blow or a threatening gesture made in sudden anger, has a definite direction or tendency, e.g. the injury or intimidation of the antagonist. But it does not involve thought. It does not wait for the formation of an idea of its own outcome. On the contrary, the impulsive man acts first and thinks afterwards. But though in impulsive action we do not think we seem always to feel, e.g. in our illustration we feel the hot emotion of anger, and the feeling among other things distinguishes impulsive action from the mechanical reflex. Moreover the element of feeling persists all along the line, and its changes of tone affect the impulse. Thus, if the blow gets home it is probable that the emotion cools down and no further impulse is formed. On the other hand, if the emotion remains the impulse continues. The correlation is so close that we might be tempted to identify them, but we soon discover discrepancies. Thus extreme emotion tends to paralyse impulse, while swift and effective impulse seems (to put it paradoxically) to satisfy emotion before it is fully excited. Furthermore, if the impulse does not satisfy the feeling it may be suspended or reversed. When the timid creature who cannot escape pursuit turns to bay, the flight impulse is discarded as an unfaithful servant, and fear itself elects to fight. Feeling and impulse, though doubtless rooted in the same fundamental suscep-

tibilities and requirements, are distinct branches on the stem, and do not operate on the same lines or on identical conditions. We can best understand their relations by considering the conditions of their development.

2. According to the general evolutionary theory, the structure of an organism grows up under the conditions of the struggle for existence. That is to say, organs useful not only to the individual, but to the stock in that struggle tend to be preserved, and therefore to develop, while organs that are useless or injurious tend to atrophy and disappear. What is true of physical organs will also be true of psychological functions, in as far as psychological functions determine the behaviour of any organism. Whatever in an organism tends to govern its action in relation to its environment must have its effect upon the fortunes of the organism and upon the question whether it will survive and perpetuate its stock. Thus in all the lower ranges of life survival value to the stock is the governing condition upon which the perpetuation of a mode of action depends, and this applies to the psychological just as much as to the physical basis of such action. Some hereditary modes of action seem to be purely mechanical, like the knee-jerk or the narrowing of the pupil in bright light. Others are impulsive in character, devoid of foresight, but informed with feeling and a certain awareness of the objects which excite them. Such are the reactions of anger or fear. Whether such hereditary impulses should as a class be called instincts, or whether the term should be reserved for certain subclasses need not be discussed here. Nor need we go into the difficult questions of the psychology of instinct. We must, however, note that some hereditary impulses are very definite and difficult to modify. They work with great precision as long as conditions are favourable, but have little power of adapting themselves to changes or peculiarities of the environment. Such is the character of many of the most remarkable instincts of insects.¹

¹ Innumerable illustrations may be found in the writings of Fabre and of Mr. and Mrs. Peckham (*The Habits and Instincts*

Others, on the contrary, are plastic and variable. They seem to require something to complete or define them, and they certainly admit of modification. We have now to ask how this modification arises. Far down in the animal world we find indubitable evidence of individual experience entering in as a factor. We find original impulses checked or encouraged, as the case may be, by experience of the results in which they issue, and on the analogy of our own consciousness—an analogy which for our purpose we need not criticize with any detail—we interpret this experience as consisting in a pleasurable or painful feeling—pleasurable in the case in which the impulse is encouraged, painful in the case where it is inhibited.¹ The nature of the change may be best under-

of Solitary Wasps). Here is one. The egg of *Chalicodoma* is laid in a sealed cell. When the grub hatches out it eats its way through the cell wall into the outer world. Fabre set it a problem by lining the cell wall with paper, but the grub ate through paper and wall. He then varied the problem by leaving an interval between the paper and the wall. This was too much for the larva. It ate through the paper and then stopped. It was wound up to eat once but not twice. It would, however, be a mistake to infer that all the instincts of the Hymenoptera are of this mechanical character. On many occasions they show remarkable powers of varying their behaviour to suit special circumstances. The really baffling thing about them is the intermixture of the apparently mechanical with the apparently intelligent. Yet, after all, if they could observe human behaviour they might be almost equally bewildered by the intermingling of crass inertia with originality and initiative.

¹ It is usual to speak of feelings of pleasure or pain. But it should be understood that pleasure is a character or tone common to many feelings which in other respects are quite distinct. Thus, there is a pleasure in feeling warm and also in the emotions of a great success. The feelings are very different, but agree in the tone of pleasure. If we call them feelings of pleasure that is merely a linguistic variant for pleasurable feeling. It may be doubted whether there is any feeling which could be accurately described as a feeling of pleasure and nothing else, unless it be some dream-like ecstasy in which all definiteness of content has vanished. Pain on the other hand is used ambiguously, meaning sometimes the feeling tone opposed to pleasure, sometimes certain substantive states, aches, smarts, pricks, etc. Some psychologists on this

stood from a well-known example. A newly-hatched chick will peck indiscriminately, and with an approximation to accuracy, at all manner of small objects strewn about on the ground. This pecking impulse is then apparently inherited as part of the mechanism with which the chick comes ready prepared to face the world. But at this stage the chick will peck with equal avidity at nutritious and innutritious objects. It will peck at grains of corn, for example ; it will also peck at small pieces of orange-peel. But there is a difference in the results. When it pecks at the corn it swallows with avidity ; when it pecks at the orange-peel it gives signs which we interpret as signs of displeasure, wiping the bill, for example, and rejecting the morsel ; and after a few experiences

ground object to the use of the term pain as the reverse of pleasure. They lay stress on the point that the concrete pains are not always wholly displeasurable, e.g. as counter-irritants or a relief from boredom. Personally I confess to being satisfied with an extremely moderate indulgence in this particular kind of satisfaction. In general the pleasurable or the reverse of a feeling depends not only on its character but on its degree. Sweetness is pleasant, and more and more pleasant to a point, beyond which it cloyes and rapidly becomes disgusting. There is an optimum point at which the pleasure is at its highest. This is clearly true of sensory pleasures, and it is on the whole true of emotions, though here the optimum point is much nearer to the maximum of which our feeling is capable. On the whole, however, I think the paradox holds that our moderate joys are more pleasurable than our extreme joys. How far does pain follow a similar curve ? A smart at its lowest stage is little more than a titillation and may even be momentarily agreeable, but it passes so rapidly into the opposite character that we think of smarts, as such, as pains. The slight ache of healthy fatigue is not unpleasant, but aches cannot set in in earnest without being pains. Much the same may be said of melancholy, grief, anger, fear. All these have a pleasurable or at least a bitter-sweet phase, while their further developments are painful in the extreme. It is pretty certain that both sensory and emotional pain, like pleasure, have a maximum (which defeats the ingenuity of torturers), and I incline to think that there is a point in the intensity of the feeling from which the painful character undergoes a decline. Whether emotional or sensorial pain seems to involve some reaction of consciousness on feeling, some distinctness therefore between the feeling and the residual self. Now

—a single one is sometimes enough—it learns to leave the orange-peel severely alone. So the chick undergoes a certain education, the broad effect of which is that its diffused and undefined impulse to peck is modified in a way which is very important for the future of the chick itself. It is defined so that there remains only an impulse to peck at certain things, while others are spontaneously neglected. This experience we put down on grounds which, as I say, we here assume to be sufficient, as consisting essentially in feelings pleasurable or painful. We assume, that is, that the chick finds the grain of corn pleasant, and the orange-peel bitter and disagreeable. Now, if we make this assumption, a consequence of importance follows with regard to the nature of feeling. We understand this consequence best if we ask first what is the value biologically of this new power of the chicken to learn from experience. The value lies in this, that it enlarges the possible sphere of action. Organisms, which are incapable of learning from experience, may come into the world ready equipped with a structural machinery which guides them with great precision within a certain range. Outside that range they are at a loss how to act, and, in point of fact, they perish for this reason in large numbers, and the stock only maintains itself in virtue of a very high birth-rate. But where learning from experience becomes possible the instinct itself may be more elastic. It may afford a basis for action in a larger variety of circumstances, and if it does not guide there seems to be a stage at which this distinctness is lost and the feeling is for the time all reality—"all things were transformed into the agony I wore." At this stage the feeling is more like an outer object and—paradoxically—is less felt, or more literally is of diminishing painfulness. The next stage is of course the confusion, deadening and final loss of consciousness and therefore of feeling itself.

On this view popular usage calls pains feelings which, over nearly the whole range of their intensity, have painful character. I see no reason on account of this usage to expel pain from its use in psychology as the opposite of pleasure, it being understood that in psychological nomenclature both terms signify not feelings, but tones of feeling,

the creature so precisely from the first, it enables it to be guided by its own experience of what is useful or harmful, and so to govern its behaviour as its conditions require in an extended sphere of action. But this salutary result depends on one condition. Experience of pleasure and pain can only aid in preserving the individual or the stock if the pleasurable feelings are excited by actions that are upon the whole beneficial, and painful feelings by actions which are on the whole injurious. The conclusion, then, to which our evolutionary account forces us is that, just as impulse must on the whole be beneficial, so feeling must on the whole run in channels tending to survival.

Two remarks must be subjoined here to avoid misunderstanding. Pleasure, as we know in our own case, is not always healthy, either from the point of view of the individual or society. There may be bad pleasures, and there may be pleasures which we deem good, but which have no discernible bearing on survival—e.g. the pleasures of art. The reason of this is that survival-value is not the cause of variations, but their limiting condition. It secures that the organs, their functions, and, generally, all that goes to determine the behaviour of the organism should be on the balance suited to the maintenance of the stock; but it does not render it by any means impossible that organs or modes of behaviour should arise which are indifferent or even harmful to survival, provided always that in the normal case the stock-preserving organs and functions predominate; and it will easily be seen that the more highly developed the organism, that is to say, the greater its power of mastering the conditions of its life, the greater will be its scope for indulgence in the impulses and feelings of this kind. Hence it is that man—of all evolving beings the one which has greatest control over the conditions of his life—is capable on the one hand of interests extending far beyond any questions of survival, on the other of impulses violating on the largest scale the conditions of a healthy life. We must not therefore exaggerate the rough and general correspondence between impulse and

pleasure on the one hand, and survival-value on the other ; nor, to come to the second point, must we unduly limit the conception of survival-value. That which governs the formation of primitive strata of impulse and feeling is their survival-value, not merely to the individual but to the stock. If the impulse which serves the individual survives, it is rather because through the individual it perpetuates the stock than because it serves the needs of the individual as such. Hence the evolutionary view is opposed to an egoistic account of the primitive basis of impulse and pleasure. The logical consequence to be drawn from biological principles properly understood, is that from the first both impulse and feeling are directed to acts in which others are concerned—primarily, the mate and the young, but also in animals that live together, the flock or the herd, or, in such cases as those of the social insects, the animal community. Impulse and feeling alike, then, may to this extent be from their origin altruistic or social in character.

We are led, then, to conceive of feeling as a mode of consciousness, the biological function of which is to govern impulse. We may regard it as the response of the hereditary structure, a structure which we are thus forced to conceive as having a psychical side, i.e. as something manifesting itself in consciousness, as well as a physical side, i.e. as something manifesting itself in movements. What we feel will thus be determined in the first place by the structure—the psycho-physical structure, as we may call it, to express its double nature—just as the impulse is determined by the structure, and the feeling operates, if painful, by checking the impulse, if pleasurable, by encouraging it.

3. But impulse, though governed and re-adjusted by the feeling attendant on its results, does not yet of necessity imply a conscious purpose. The chick's impulse to peck at yolk may be encouraged by its past experience. But this is not a sufficient ground for imputing to it what we know as a remembrance of that experience, or the anticipation of another experience of like character. In

ourselves, however, we are aware of such memories and anticipations, and it is here that what we can fairly call purpose emerges. In the chick's case all that we know is that experience leaves a certain effect, leaves a trace which we know to exist because we see the result in a change of behaviour, though we may know little of its nature.¹ In our case, as stated, we do know something of its nature. We know that on the ground of past experience an idea is formed of a future experience, of an experience that will be gained by a certain act, and this idea regulates the act, reinforcing or checking the impulse to perform it. When an impulse is qualified by such an idea and directed towards an end so anticipated, it becomes purposive in the true sense of the term and in its first incarnation we may call it a desire. Desire, then, so understood, will be rooted in impulse on the one side and in feeling on the other.² The two sources tend

¹ We speak of it sometimes as a habit, sometimes as a disposition. Of the precise physical change of tissue involved in the formation of such states we know nothing by direct observation, and the psychological state involved in a "disposition" is exceedingly difficult to formulate except in terms of the action or state of consciousness in which in response to the appropriate situation it issues.

² It is natural to say that the end towards which Desire is directed is the pleasure in the experience. But this does not conform with psychological analysis. What we desire is the experience itself, and our desire has a feeling-tone of its own correspondent (not necessarily identical) with the feeling-tone of the desired experience. In fact our power of representing to ourselves a past or future feeling as distinctive from the experience to which it belongs is small and perhaps nil. We can (a) judge intellectually that such a feeling did or will occur, (b) experience *now* a feeling about the past or future experience. Neither of these is the same thing as the formation of a representative image of a feeling as adequate as our representative image of, say, a figure. Hence it is that our most poignant memories are attached to details—sometimes quite trivial details—in the scene in which the emotional crisis was cast.

Oh, moment one and infinite,
The water slips o'er stock and stone;
The West is tender, hardly bright:
How grey at once is the evening grown—
One star its chrysolite.

to correspondence, partly because both alike are governed by the conditions of existence, and partly because the experience of feeling is always at work correcting the operation of impulse. At the same time, since desire is thus doubly rooted, we can never be sure that it will coincide with the pleasurable experience which is only one root of the two. They tend to coincidence, but do not necessarily reach it. Often we still feel impelled inexorably to an act from which we know that only disappointment will result. The control of experience is not strong enough to overcome original impulse, and we are forced to desire what will only give us pain. Still, as far as it goes, experience gives unity of direction to impulse, and adjusts it better to the permanent conditions of life as attested by the satisfaction felt in its accomplishment.

It will be observed that the definition of Desire as Impulse directed towards an anticipated end conflicts formally with the narrower usage, which expressly bars anticipation from Impulse. It is here that the double sense of the term impulse appears. For in Desire, and in every action directed towards an end there is precisely the same impulse-feeling that we find in impulsive action proper. The difference is merely that in experiencing the impulse the mind knows what it is about, is conscious of its direction, and foresees or looks towards its final issue. For the purposes of this discussion we shall use the term impulse of this propelling element common to all forms of action, and when we wish to speak of this element as denuded of any anticipation of the end we shall call it "bare" impulse.¹

The picture revives the emotion, not an image of the emotion. The point is well brought out by Dr. Wohlgemuth, though it is possible that his generalization is too sweeping (*Pleasure-Unpleasure*, p. 218, etc.). For our immediate purpose the result is that the driving force in desire is the tone of present feeling attached to an idea.

¹ The technical generic term for Impulse, Desire, and Will is Conation. But there does not seem to be an accepted distinctive term for the element which is common to them all.

4. Desire in its stricter sense seems to be directed to this or that particular object or event, whether it be one's dinner, or success in a competition, or a political triumph, or the possession of a piece of old china. These particulars, however, are not isolated and casual, but are found for the most part to range themselves about certain centres of durable interest. Thus a parent desires a number of different things for his child according as the circumstances and needs of his child vary from day to day, or year to year. But all the desires alike emanate from the same centre of emotional interest, and, moreover, are controlled by it, so that, e.g., a desire to gratify the child here and now is held back by consideration of some more permanent effect. The system of emotions that cluster round an object, such as another person, is now called a sentiment, and the effect of sentiment on action is that all the impulses and desires relating to the object have a certain common tendency, e.g. the good of the child. In this case the good of the child is an object of volition, and volition is thus not so much a specific impulse as a permeating tendency among a body of impulses and desires, or, if we turn it round and judge it by its aim, it is the direction of effort towards some comprehensive end, to which a mass of impulses and desires are subordinated as being that which makes their real meaning and value explicit. Thus volition introduces unity of direction into desire, just as desire introduced unity into the lower impulses.

5. Now in a normal life there are, of course, many objects which are such centres of durable interest, and there would seem accordingly to be many volitions, and a fair possibility of discord between them. But our personality is one, and it is driven to find some means of correlating them. In normal circumstances normal people can always decide, whether between volitions, desires, or impulses. This power of decision is what we ordinarily call the Will, and it seems to postulate a certain unity of our conative nature, and correlatively some supreme unifying principle, rule, or end of action, setting

out the real meaning of our life as a whole, just as any partial volition sets out the real value of the desires and impulses bearing upon its object. In reality, however, this unity¹ is achieved with a measure of success, which varies very materially with the idiosyncracies of the individual and with the social tradition which supplies the main outer guidance of his life. Where there is a genuine religion, some supreme object or governing conception of life so rich and many-sided that smaller things find their appropriate place under its shadow, the solution seems near. Where there is a definite and firmly-held morality there is at least the means of deciding on particular issues. Even a resolute egoism or the obstinate pursuit of a limited object gives some unity to life, though a gaunt and starved unity. If all such governing principles fail we have a being like Plato's "Democratic Man," who decides one thing one moment, and something contrary the next moment, and though such a being has Will, in that he does make decisions, he cannot be said to have Will in the sense of any continuous and consistent direction. It will be seen that the function of the Will is to bring unity into our volitions, as the function of volition was to unify desires.² The relation of will to

¹ I.e. the unity of consistent action and coherent plan. The basal unity of the self is the continuous identity of that which experiences all the impulses, feelings, etc., whether these lead it to harmonious or distracted and mutually incompatible lines of action.

² This terminology is open to criticism on two grounds. (a) It may be said that Volition is merely Latin for "willing," and that I am therefore contrasting willing with will. I might reply that this is pretty much what I mean to do. Our practical attitude towards one of the permanent objects of our interest is, I think, a department of our will, but it is not the whole will. Thus even in e.g. our devotion to a child we must not be like *ces pères de familles qui sont capables de tout*. Thus the contrast is, so to put it, between *a* will and *the* will, and since we cannot conveniently use the term "*a* will" in this sense I substitute "*a* volition." (b) It may be said that we *desire* success in many of these permanent objects. The felt contrast between Desire and Will is that, in Desire the end is attractive, and in will it may be either attractive or constrained. This is because Will is concerned with a Whole

general conceptions has seldom escaped attention. It has been well understood that in the cool deliberation which distinguishes voluntary action we bring impulse and desire to the bar of general rules and permanent interests. Before being led by impulse we weigh the result and put a value on the anticipated fruition, and we value it not merely by measuring the particular satisfaction which it promises against the frustration of some other impulse which it may involve, but rather by reference to some standard of admitted value and of general application. We consider its bearings on our permanent interests, or on the interests of some other person, we ask whether it conforms to law, morals, or religion, we weigh it by standards and principles that we apply to others as well as to ourselves. That is to say, the characteristic of the deliberate voluntary action which distinguishes human from animal action lies in the formation of general principles of action which tend to correlate our behaviour from moment to moment with the purposes which belong to our life as a whole and to the lives of others with whom we are associated. We are able to do what, apparently, the animal cannot do—to conceive ourselves as a persistent identity, abiding through the changing experiences of life, and correspondingly conceive of others as identities of the same kind, that is—in a word—as personalities. We are able at the same time to appreciate as general truths the rules of action which have grown up in such a community of persons to determine the character of their common life. It is accordingly in proportion to the development of such relatively comprehensive ends

of which only some fraction is for the moment in question and the interests of the whole overwhelm the attractiveness of the fraction if there happens to be a collision. Desire and Will may therefore coincide or be opposed. There is no objection to the use of the term Desire in relation to the widest objects, but they are not objects of Desire merely but of Will as well, because they are still pursued in the specific forms or particular direction in which they do not momentarily appear attractive. This holds not only of governing principles of all life but of any enduring objects. Such an object is therefore an object of volition.

and principles of action that human conduct comes to form a relatively regulated order, and social life an organized whole.

7. On the other hand the relation of Will to general principles has given rise to great difficulties by suggesting a chasm between Will and impulse-feeling. Will itself must have impulsive quality (in the general sense of the term), or how could it govern us? But what impulse is or can be inspired by general and abstract principles without reference to the concrete objects in which they are realized? The reply is that the real meaning of a principle lies in the correlation of a mass of concrete objects which it effects, and so similarly the strength or impelling force of the Will lies in the correlation of the corresponding impulses. Just as the principle expresses their meaning in general terms, so the Will expresses their common, combined, or organized force. The material, so to say, of Will is just the mass of impulse-feeling, but this mass, instead of acting as a collection of independent forces driving us hither and thither, is organized in a clearer conception of results, and more comprehensive views of life. Out of the original conational tissue which gave rise to feeling and impulse and desire, there develops, if the metaphor be allowed, a new and more precise organ of conduct. Of the original mass of impulses those elements which conflict are in part worn away, in part re-moulded so as to fit in with one another. Others are strengthened and confirmed by practice and by mutual alliance. All have assumed more concrete shape as they come into relation with experience. The total result, so far as the organization of conduct extends, is a synthesis of conational elements moving as a body under the guidance of some definite conception. To picture very imperfectly the nature of this development, let us first imagine the whole conative force of the soul dispersed in impulses and desires capable of acting each only in its own direction, under its appropriate stimulus of sense-perception or of anticipated fruition. Let us then imagine in contrast a gathering of all this energy

of feeling, of emotion, of conation, into an organized whole, moving in a determinate direction, and capable of bringing its whole force to bear at any point. This is the essential contrast between sheer impulse and fully developed will. We can conceive that such an organized psychic movement will present itself rather as the calm and ordered flow of a deep tide of vital energy than as the fireworks of emotion or the half-sensual flow of impulses. Though all these are at bottom one, as manifestations of feeling or conative energy, they differ in form and many important consequences flow from their difference. Those err who attribute to bare impulse, emotion or will severally, that which is due to the energy within us which takes all these forms. Will is not emotion, though it is of the force which, dammed back from its outlet in ordered activity, forms the emotional flood. It is not bare impulse, but embodies the active energy of impulse within it. It is a gathering of much, ideally of the whole, conational energy of our nature canalized into a deep and steady stream flowing within determinate limits in ordered activity to foreseen ends

It is then in the construction of broad ends, in which the otherwise scattered elements of our nature have their several functions, that the conational synthesis which we express by the term "will" takes its rise, and that our nature as a whole tends to acquire the permanent bent and definiteness of direction which distinguish the life of will from that of impulse and emotion. But the wholeness and unity of our nature remain ideals which are realized in very varying degree. We will, because, in the main, the forces of our nature set in a given direction, but we do not will whole-heartedly because the synthesis is incomplete. The primary impulses remain, and the vision of the wider ends is not clear enough, or not realized with adequate intensity of feeling. And it is because, in the conflict between desire and will, we are urged by massed forces of impulse guided by conceptions which, perhaps, we can only in part make articulate, that we have that sense of constraint which is so

conspicuous in the case of felt moral obligation, where there is a definite tension between the rebellious desire and the orderly community which we express as "will." In this tension there is the force of a clearly realized appealing end on the one hand, and the more massive, perhaps less intensely and definitely conscious, main current of our nature upon the other. It diminishes accordingly as the will acquires full control, though it can never vanish for the best of men as long as the tragic complexities of life set duty in opposition to ties of affection. A morality which should be as spontaneous as instinct implies not only a perfect will, but a perfect order of life.¹

Will, then, is the synthesis of impulsive or conative elements in man that responds to comprehensive ends and unifying principles, just as desire is the impulsive element that responds to narrower and more immediate ends. Though bare impulse is left far behind, the impulsive energies, pruned, refined, consolidated, remain the driving force to the end. Just as action always rests on impulse in this broad sense, so impulse turns on feeling in a similarly broad sense. The term feeling so used is to include the emotion that governs the simplest impulse. It is to include the interest, the excitement, the emotional tone which the idea of the end carries in the period of

¹ Our argument tends to the close correlating of the will with the self or the personality and to conceive its ends as those of the self as a whole. This does not imply that the will is peculiarly moved by the idea of the self, or by sentiments and emotions of self-exaltation or self-abasement. Such reflective inward-turned emotions do of course play their part. But to identify the will with the unity of the self in its conational aspect is not to make the self the object of the will. The object of the will, the principles that guide it, are those which interest the self and these are not (for the normal being) the self again. The self is not its own exclusive object, but many things—God, humanity, country, morality, another person or persons—objects such as these governing large tracts of life are true objects of, or principles guiding, Will. Though some of them may not affect life as a whole they impart a far larger measure of unity than would be achieved by mere impulse or emotion.

anticipation or effort. It is to include the gratification or disappointment which attend upon realization. It is to range from the simple impulses of sense to the most refined and complex interests of ethics, art, or religion. Throughout we may regard an end as the terminal point of a line of action upon which, as the resultant of a thousand tensions and pressures of physical heredity, of present experience, of social interactions, feeling moves. So we may conceive it as feeling crystallized into something definite and conceptual. In all cases a genuine end is something about which we feel, and there is no principle of action derivable from thought or ratiocination abstracted from feeling.

On the other hand, feeling is modifiable, and the purposes in which it expresses itself still more modifiable. Experience largely remodels impulse, or suggests new means to the same ends. Divergent ends impinge on one another, social relations not only define the possibilities of effective action for the individual, but interpenetrate and profoundly modify the whole sphere of his feeling itself. Religious and scientific beliefs give the tone to the mass of men's hopes and fears. Hence a double possibility of thorough modification. In a changed intellectual or social situation the same fundamental feelings may give rise to a very different body of purpose, while such changes, and even its own internal growth and interactions, may have far-reaching reactions upon feeling itself. In the sense understood, then, action rests on impulse-feeling, and it is useless to look for anything, call it Practical Reason, Will, or what we may, that stands outside the body of impulse-feeling and controls it. But impulse-feeling is completely transformed by a development, which taken as a whole tends to combine its centrifugal elements into an organized body, directed to comprehensive ends which are formulated in large and articulate conceptions of the significance of conduct. It is within this development, if anywhere, that we must look for the practical Reason. Our first step in the search must clearly be to form as precise a

conception as possible of what is meant by the Rational, and the next to apply our definition in the sphere of conduct.

NOTE

Since this chapter was written Dr. Wohlgemuth's able monograph *Pleasure-Unpleasure*, has appeared, advocating views of Feeling which, in some points, conflict with those taken above. While I am not here concerned with psychological analysis and do not think that the divergencies in question would sensibly affect ethical theory, I feel obliged to explain why I leave my statement standing, with a modification which I will proceed to state. The main points are two: (1) As to nomenclature, Dr. Wohlgemuth treats it as settled that pain is not the true contrast to pleasure, but is a positive sensation which may be pleasant or unpleasant feeling-tone. As to this, I am inclined to reply: It is agreed that we must distinguish between the feeling-tone of an experience and the whole experience to which the feeling-tone belongs. The traditional psychological nomenclature, as I understand, used the terms Pleasure and Pain for this purpose, viz. as names of two great (if not exhaustive) classes of feeling-tone. But popular language also uses Pain for the whole experience in certain cases, e.g. aches and burns, and not in others, e.g. foul smells. Hence there is a possible confusion which it is certainly desirable to avoid. But does not very nearly the same confusion arise about pleasure? Here it is that I would modify a sentence (p. 38, footnote). It is true, pleasures do not form so definite a class as pains in popular speech. Yet a good deal of ethical controversy has turned on the relation of pleasure and happiness, and on the whole "pleasure," in ordinary speech, suggests, if not a defined class, at any rate a range of experiences centering on the more elementary rather than the higher side of our nature. Yet to me it seems that the deepest tranquil happiness (as of assured love or firm religious faith) has a strong feeling-tone and that this feeling-tone, with all its vast difference of significance, has a point in common with that of a sensory satisfaction. Be that as it may, there is a clear distinction between pleasure as a feeling-tone and pleasure as the whole experience to which the feeling-tone belongs, and when pleasure is so used the same considerations arise as in the case of pain. For "pleasures" cloy, i.e. assume unpleasant feeling-tone just as pains sometimes stimulate, excite, titillate, i.e. assume more or less pleasurable feeling-tone. Hence, if the argument is pressed we must abandon pleasure along with pain and find some quite conventional terms, or perhaps symbols such as P and Π for the opposed feeling-tones in distinction from the experiences

which normally carry such tones. To banish pain and retain pleasure seems illogical.

The question of terms, however, runs, as such questions generally do, into one of substance. Dr. Wohlgemuth maintains (esp. pp. 211, 235) that "there are only two qualities of feeling-elements, viz. Pleasure and Unpleasure. Any differences except intensity, duration, and extensity are apparent only and are found to belong to sensations or other cognitive or (to) conative processes." (I imagine that under "extensity" Dr. Wohlgemuth intends to include localization.) It follows that the only *feeling*-element common to a burning pain and a sickening fear is their unpleasure. All the rest is sensory (or otherwise cognitive) or conational. I find it, from my own introspection or retrospection, exceedingly difficult to accept this. The two states appear to me to agree in something much fuller and richer than the very attenuated abstraction of unpleasantness. This something I should call feeling, and while in each case the feeling has the generic character of unpleasure, I should say that it also exhibited profound specific differences. If you ask me to name these differences, I admit that I find it extremely difficult to do so (apart from localization) except by reference either to the stimulus (including the general situation) or some elements of conation. But I accept the view that the feeling is neither the cognition of the stimulating object nor the conation. I suppose it to be that which stands between and connects them, and I take the difficulty of describing it apart from them as evidence of the intimacy of the union. To a point Dr. Wohlgemuth would agree in this. His rule on the subject is:

"The feeling-elements are not attributes or functions of sensations or other cognitive processes, but a separate class of conscious processes. Although generally closely dependent upon the cognitive and conative processes to which they belong, they often show a certain degree of independence and detachment."

Now I do not think that any one would deny that analysis is capable of distinguishing the element of feeling-tone from the other elements in consciousness along with it. The question is, first, whether the feeling can *exist* independently of other elements, second, whether what can so exist is pure pleasure or unpleasure denuded of other qualitative content. As to the first point Dr. Wohlgemuth adduces evidence (e.g. that the pleasure may precede the sensation). Here he has only one case (p. 184, referring to exp. Y. 24, see p. 108). What "Y" exactly says is: "First, feeling-tone of pressure sensation (seemed to be pressure downwards) which was not unpleasant. As pressure increased it became more unpleasant. As the feeling-tone became markedly unpleasant sensation of pain arose. The unpleasant feeling-tone preceded the pain sensation. I can analyse the unpleasant feeling-tone from the pressure sensation, but not from the pain-sensation."

This passage (which by the way tells strongly against the qualitative distinction between Pain and Unpleasure) does not show that unpleasant feeling-tone arises without any sensation, but only without that definite sensation called by the writer Pain. It arose in the first instance with the pressure and, in its higher degree (as my terminology would put it) became so distinctly painful as to be recognized as such.

As to pleasure outlasting sensation, every one knows that the effects of stimuli persist for a little while. The question is in what form does the feeling persist? Dr. Wohlgemuth has three instances. The first of these (W. 32, p. 26) concludes: "There were also organic sensations which seemed to be an integral part of, or helped to constitute, a mood of repose which was distinctly pleasant. Pleasure lasted for some time after removal of stimulus."

This speaks for itself. The second case from the same subject is an olfactory experiment in which, without further detail bearing on the point, the subject states, "Pleasure persisted for some time after removal." In fact, scents hang in the nostrils. In the third case, also olfactory, the subject says, "After the stimulus had been removed I had an idea of the act of smelling, and the idea had none of the olfactory quality of the original experience, but it retained the feeling-tone that had accompanied the sensation." That is, the feeling-tone is explicitly attached to the idea.

It results that the cases cited do not prove the thesis that feelings arise or persist independently of either cognitive or conative elements.

Secondly, as to what the feelings are. Several statements agree that they are distinguishable elements in consciousness, but distinguishable with difficulty. Here is a typical statement (X. 101, quoted p. 211).

"As to the quality of the feeling-tones of the sensations, I cannot compare definitely enough to perceive any qualitative difference in them. The difficulty is to distinguish the feeling-tones from the quality of the sensations on the one hand, and the quality of the motor reactions excited on the other hand. Allowing for these differences there seemed to be nothing left except differences of duration and intensity."

This will obviously be the result if we put *all* the qualitative differences into the cognitive or conative elements one or both. But if we do so all that is left for feeling is something so abstract that the subjects have difficulty in distinguishing it. They will agree that it is pleasurable or unpleasurable, because these are admittedly general (if not universal) qualities of feeling. But we are asked to think of this element distinguished so vaguely and with such difficulty as all that we mean by feeling and as capable of an independent existence. It is the combination of these propositions which appears to me so difficult. If you will allow me

to include within the scope of feeling elements that you insist on calling cognitive or conative I have no great difficulty in regarding feeling as independent, i.e. as requiring no further co-present element in consciousness to complete it. But if you insist on excluding all these you fall back on what seems to me an abstraction. The most I can admit (as in the text) is that in extreme cases the cognitive elements, that is all that is distinguishable, get merged into one ecstasy of delight or suffering, but I point out that this is the last stage before the entire loss of consciousness, and very significantly, it has been recognized as a stage in which extremes very nearly meet and pleasure and pain themselves are on the verge of becoming undistinguishable. Perhaps I should also add that, at the opposite extreme where feeling is minimal, analysis will find its pleasant or unpleasant character the easiest point to lay hold of. These extreme cases to my mind rather strengthen the position that definite pleasures are attributes of feelings of definite quality other than pure pleasureableness. The further proof, as I think, is that the intensity of feeling does not vary uniformly with its pleasantness or unpleasantness. For example, anger may be very intense but is not proportionately painful unless thwarted. All states of emotional tension are capable at a touch of turning to extremes of pleasant or unpleasant feeling, but while they are themselves very strongly felt the characters of pleasure or unpleasure are not always clearly marked in them.

The conclusions which, as at present advised, I should draw are that definite feeling is attached to cognitive or conative elements or both; that, however, its variations of intensity do not necessarily depend on their variations (in clearness, etc.) and it may persist with little or no change through considerable variations of the other element; that in consequence (though I have criticized his evidence) Dr. Wohlgemuth is right in his conclusion that feeling possesses a partial independence; that in fact feeling may so encroach on the other elements as in the extreme case to occupy the whole of consciousness; that at this limit, it would seem, even the knowledge of the feeling—certainly any power of naming or classifying it—must disappear. On the other hand, the feeling which possesses this measure of independence includes elements which Dr. Wohlgemuth calls sensory or conative; it exhibits numberless specific variations, and pleasure and unpleasure are merely two of its attributes. Pleasure and unpleasure never exist by themselves but only as characters of some feeling possessed of other characters, though in very low and perhaps in extremely high grades of feeling they are the most easily recognizable characters.

CHAPTER III

THE RATIONAL

1. WE have to ask, then, first what is meant by the Rational, by a rational procedure and a rational order? If the question is difficult, it is perhaps easier to see what is meant by the Irrational. In the first place, then, inconsistency is admittedly irrational. It is irrational in the field of thought to admit two judgments which contradict each other, in the field of action to pursue two purposes which destroy one another, or to accept and approve a principle of action condemning a purpose which at the same time we pursue. Conversely the rational, whatever else it may be, must at least be self-consistent. Next, though perhaps less obviously, the arbitrary judgment is irrational. This will be more readily admitted if for "arbitrary" we substitute "groundless." It is irrational to form a judgment without a ground, and whatever else we may say about "grounds" it is clear from the very fact that a ground is required, and may not always be found that the ground contains something which is not within the judgment that follows from it. If, then, we would avoid a groundless judgment we must be able to connect our judgment with something that goes beyond it, and this work of interconnexion is the main positive function of reason. Thirdly, it is held irrational to base a judgment on emotion or desire, or, indeed, on any "subjective" attitude, any impulse that proceeds merely from ourselves. But this condemnation must be subject to two qualifications. In the first place the judgment may be about the emotions, or may be simply an expression of the emotions, e.g. "This

is revolting," "that is enchanting." For judgments of this class the emotion itself is the only appropriate ground. Secondly, every judgment of mine as it issues from me must in a manner be held to emanate from my subjectivity, to be an expression of *my* thought working in accordance with the methods and processes of *my* mental constitution. It seems, then, that we cannot mean to condemn the subjective altogether. What we must mean is to condemn it in so far as it diverts us from the objective, and this means something that is, whether you or I happen to think so, or say so, or not. The rational, then, is that which deals with the objective order. But the objective is not unfortunately so plainly hall-marked that we distinguish it immediately and infallibly from the subjective, and if we ask how we effect the distinction the answer is, by the two former requirements of rationality. We correct error by the exposure of inconsistency. We arrive at such exposure by the interconnexion of one judgment with another. We support judgments by reference to their grounds, and then believe that we have obtained objectivity or, more briefly, truth. Truth, then, is generally the object of reason or the purpose of the rational procedure, and interconnexion subject to mutual consistency its method.

2. But now with regard to interconnexion some serious difficulties arise. First, we have said that we believe the grounded judgment to be true. But this implies that the ground is adequate, and we may well ask what is the test of adequacy. The ground itself, in fact, seems to require a ground, and this threatens to lead to an infinite regress. There must, it should seem, be some primary grounds requiring no further justification, but if so the judgments affirming them would be isolated judgments, and so far, apparently, irrational. And must we not, apart from them, admit other isolated judgments? I heard a clap. I can bring no evidence in support of my assertion, it may be, and yet the fact is that I heard it. That is of itself evidence. It is an ultimate fact, and there is no more to be said. Even if others heard it too,

and I bring their evidence in corroboration, is not the ultimate basis a distinct and ungrounded judgment, just "I heard it" from each witness? There seem, then, to be isolated judgments, *ἑσχατά*, at each end of the scale—the most general grounds, and the final particular fact.

With regard to the particular, however, a little reflection will show that the judgment which we accept as true is not so isolated as it appears, and that in fact we finally accept it only as grounded, and well grounded, on a general principle. If the question is, did a clap occur, my evidence that I heard it is good in so far, and only in so far, as I am a credible witness, and as my subjective hearing is good proof of an objective sound. In so far as I accept in general the testimony of my senses I assert what they report, so that my particular assertion has a ground in the sense that it is connected with the general body of my sensory judgments, and is, in fact, to be taken as valid in proportion as this body of judgments is to be regarded as generally accurate, and as it—the judgment in question—is a normal part of them, and is not disturbed by anything exceptional. All evidence as to "particulars" is in fact subject to tests and open to corroboration on such lines as these. Thus the sensory judgment, direct and ultimate as it is, is in its way a grounded judgment. Yet this statement in turn gives rise to a difficulty. For the ground is in this case another judgment or body of judgments of the same kind. In proof of the existence of a sensible object we may appeal from sound to sight, and from sight to touch, and from one man's sight or touch to another's, but we are always appealing from one sensory judgment to another, and if we appeal to the general credibility of sensory judgments on what would this rest, except on the credibility of numbers of particular sensory judgments? If, therefore, the intrinsic value of a sensory judgment is nil, and our confidence in it based only on its grounds, these grounds turn out to be equally of zero value, and, the sum of zeros being zero, we get no nearer to any ground of real confidence. It results that we must not deny all value

to a direct sensory judgment; if we are going to trust the system formed by such judgments we must allow each such judgment provisional value, such that when confirmed by interconnexion with other judgments of similar provisional value it becomes for us a confirmed or established judgment. This principle may be put generally. A judgment which we form under some stimulus, but not merely on the ground of some other judgment, may be called an immediate judgment. Such judgment has in reason a provisional value, and when interconnected with other immediate judgments so that if they are true it is true it becomes a rationally established judgment.

3. At what point would the process be complete so that we could take the established judgment as established once for all, beyond possibility of further question or need of further proof? Clearly it would be complete if we could connect it with some judgments of undoubted truth, which must, of course, in the end be immediate judgments. Now immediate sensory judgments, we have seen, require grounding, for no matter how clearly and forcibly their objects seem to impress themselves upon us we find by comparison that our reports of such objects are not always self-consistent, and though we may admit that there is a core of truth in every immediate sensory judgment, the questions that arise are those of distinguishing the hard core from the interpretations that gather about it, and this it is clear the immediate judgment does not always effect, since we know cases in which it is erroneous. Are there, then, immediate judgments at the other end of the scale, ultimate generalities of undoubted truth on which all other judgments may be grounded, and so established once and for all? Now there certainly appear to be judgments of a general character which are as immediate as the judgments of sense. That is to say, that, contemplating certain ideal objects, we become directly aware in them of relations or characters attaching to them. Propound to the mind the idea of a plane rectilineal figure of three sides

and explain the nature of an angle, and the mind will readily grasp that the three-sided figure must have three angles. This is correctly called intuition. In it a character of an object is discerned by a process of mental inspection, and the truth asserted may be called self-evident. But rational criticism will no more let these intuitive judgments alone than it would let sensory judgments alone. On the contrary, it will maintain that the self-evident judgment, so long as it is unconnected with others, has only provisional value, and it will accordingly go on to ask, as it did of the sensory judgment, what general credibility is to be attached to intuition. Is every immediate judgment that is formed by every mind to be taken as true, and so certainly true as to require no proof? The answer to this question must be in the negative. It is easy to produce the illusion of immediate obviousness, e.g. a non-mathematical person questioned as to the shortest way from A to B, which is due east of it, will reply as a matter of course that the route must be due east all the way, and will resist as sheer nonsense the statement that a route moving to the north (or south) is in general shorter. But with the aid of a globe, or even a common ball, it is easy to convince even the least mathematical of his error in a couple of minutes. Of course the fallacy rests on a confusion of different things—a straight line and a line drawn on the surface of a sphere. But at what point do we become certain that there are no similar elements of confusion in any truth which we affirm as a matter of intuitive apprehension? Many people would say that to them the existence of a God is a truth of this kind. Others would deny that they have any such intuition. Mathematical axioms that have passed current for centuries have been called in question, and it has been shown possible to construct consistent systems of thought on a basis which involves their negation. Self-evidence is in fact the impression which a propounded object makes upon a mind which thereupon delivers itself of a judgment as to that object, interpreting it after some fashion. This deliverance is a function not of one variable,

the object, but of two, the object and the mind, with all its peculiarities of structure and make-up, its instincts, innate methods, and history by which these methods have been modified. This make-up may be such that the deliverance is a judgment asserting the object to be what it is, have the characters which it has, stand in the relations in which it does stand, or it may be such as to diverge in some degree or at some point from such correspondence. The test can only lie in consistency with other judgments. Here, as elsewhere, interconnexion is required.

4. If this view is correct it results that the basis of certainty and truth is in the end interconnexion. Any isolated judgment, though it may of course be quite true and may be felt to be quite certain, is regarded as provisional and subject to criticism and corroboration by other judgments. At the same time each immediate judgment which impresses itself on us as true contributes its measure of support to the system in which it enters, and the strength of the system is in the mutual support or consilience of its component judgments, so that in this case the ground (by way of exception to our first statement about grounds) is really internal. True, the entire system may also be connected with other systems, but if we could arrive at a system containing all thought and all experience, it could have no ground and no proof in anything outside itself, but only in its internal character as a complete system of interconnected parts. Thus the principle that ground or proof lies outside the judgment grounded and proved applies to the relation of part to part or to whole, but the ground or proof of a whole lies equally—and in the case of the final ideal whole entirely—in the very connectedness of parts, each claiming immediate acceptance, which constitute it. In this sense the ideal of knowledge is self-evidence, not the self-evidence of an isolated truth on which the rest depend, but that of the consilience of a system of partial truths completing each other.

5. Judgments asserting facts are connected by the relations of the facts which they assert. Hence the

demand of reason for the ground of any judgment is at the next remove a demand for the ground of the fact. The ground of a fact is such that if the ground exists we believe that the fact, known as its consequent, exists. This in other words amounts to the proposition that in any case where the ground exists the consequent exists. That is to say, the relation of ground and consequent is universal. The search for grounds is thus a search for universal relations underlying or connecting the mass of facts with which thought is confronted. The activity of reason consists in the discovery of universal grounds and their application when ascertained in fresh cases. So far as we reason about a thing we treat it as having a ground which connects it with other things, and as this connection can be constantly extended by repetition of the process we arrive at the ideal of reason as an order of reality built up of a system of universals interconnecting all its parts.

6. We rejected above the view that knowledge could be made to depend on certain universal first principles requiring no ground or interconnexion with other truths, because self-evident. But what, it may be asked, of the principles of interconnexion themselves? We interconnect one judgment with another by certain methods which, when we come to analyse them, will be found to involve some principle. How do we know the truth of this principle? It would appear that we cannot prove it because proof would involve interconnection with something else, and the interconnection would itself imply the principle to be proven. The reply is that the validity of the principle rests on its being a correct analysis of the processes which we go through in reasoning so far as they are consistent with one another. In point of fact we do not always reason correctly, and the nature of our mistakes and their grounds are brought out when we analyse the method and formulate its principle. But if the principle is correctly stated it lays down a consistent method of inference, and every inference that we draw upon this method implies the principle. Thus, through

the medium of the principle all our acts of inference necessitate or support one another, and each and all require the truth of the principle, so that rational method itself forms a whole of interconnected parts.

7. The conception of reason which thus emerges is not one of a faculty possessed, prior to and apart from experience, of certain clear and indubitable universal axioms with which it confronts a tangled experience proving and explaining so much as can be brought under these axioms and leaving the rest unrationalized. It is the conception rather of a principle operative within experience the work of which is always partial and incomplete, always extending itself while at the same time pruning and sharpening its own methods. Neither proof nor explanation consist in the reference of the experienced order to something outside it, but in the exhibition of its internal coherence, i.e. the system of universal connexions in accordance with which its parts do not merely tolerate one another in mutual consistency, but require and maintain one another. The provisional and partial truths are established not merely by deduction from some special truth taken as known,¹ but, ultimately, by the simple fact that they form a whole of consilient truths. The isolated and partial fact again is not so much explained by subsumption under some self-evident law as by its part in the comprehensive system of universals which is reality. Finally, as every part-judgment has its proof in the body with which it is connected, so the proof of the body of judgments as a whole is in their standing together as a connected system, and if any part of reality become intelligible by relation to the remainder a whole field of reality becomes intelligible as constituting such a system. Of any part, however great and however articulate internally, we can, and indeed must always go on to ask about its connections with further reality. But if we envisage reality as a whole we can ask no such

¹ This of course may be the proximate step, but the truth used as a principle will find its ultimate justification in the manner denoted.

question, and here intelligibility must mean simply the internal completeness of interconnexions running through all its elements.

Reason then generically is the principle of interconnexion persistently applied. Since the whole of Reality does not fall within our experience, the work of interconnexion is never complete. Hence reason does not necessarily claim finality for its interpretations. What is rationally established is that which is incorporated in a system of consilient judgments. If the reflective judgment, "This is certain," can without contradiction be inserted into any such system, then the system is rationally held certain. But in general there is at least a possibility that further experience may throw fresh light upon established interpretations, and yet this does not prevent them from being the most reasonable interpretation within our reach. Hence the rational as such is not an established system, but a process governed by a principle, the process by which understanding deepens, error is repeatedly eliminated, and truth constantly enlarged. As operating in the sphere of assertion (including knowledge, suggestion, and belief), reason is the use of this principle as the discovery of the objective order, the result of this discovery being truth. As applied in spheres other than that of assertion we have yet to examine what it means. The principle of interconnexion carried through yields a whole in which the parts sustain and necessitate one another, or briefly an organized whole. Thus reason is an organic principle in thought, and so far as incomplete but progressive may be termed an organic impulse. So far as reality is finally intelligible to reason it must similarly be interpretable as an organic whole, so that we may speak of reason as the ultimate organic principle alike in thought and in reality. Finally, the fact that reason, even as incomplete impulse, is the endeavour towards the whole which interconnects the parts is the basis of its sovereignty over every partial impulse or isolated belief, whatever degree of immediate subjective certitude such belief may claim.

CHAPTER IV

THE GOOD

1. WE have now to apply the definition of the rational to the world of practice. The first step in this application is simple. It is easy to see that when we give a reason for some act we first connect it with its end or aim, and that, if we want a reason for this end in turn, we must connect it either with some further end, or with some broad principle of action. It is an easy inference that if there is a rational order of action our purposes must form an interconnected system. But from this point difficulties begin. Any system of action that we can propound, however consistent internally, will be discovered to collide with impulses, desires, interests of ourselves or of other people, and the question of the basis and authority of our system will at once arise. An end or principle of action once assumed, the part of reason is intelligible enough. It deduces consequences, connects means and ends, shows that such an action follows from the principle while such another is inconsistent with it. So far it seems to be just the reason of cognition applied to matters of fact, with the difference only that the facts in question are human actions and their consequences. But what is to happen if two ends, two principles, or, in general terms, two (or more) things that we consider good occur to us, and they happen to be incompatible with one another? We are forced to choose between them. Can reason have anything to do with the choice of ends or the preference of one sort of good over another? Has it anything to do with ultimate choice, or is it confined

to the cognitive apprehension of consistency or inconsistency between the several things that we may choose? Are there ends, or is there some end which must commend itself to a rational being as good, and as so good that everything incompatible with it is bad? Or is the preference of one thing over another a matter, in the last resort, of a choice with which reason has nothing to do? Is there, in short, a Rational Good, and if so, how is it to be defined?

2. We must first be clear as to what we mean by "good." Our words and our thoughts do not always coincide, but sincerely to think that a thing is good is to adopt towards it a certain attitude of mind which affects our actions and affects also our judgments of the actions of others. In so far as we think a thing good for ourselves here and now—as opposed to merely doing lip-service to its goodness—we are disposed to act in such a way as to secure or preserve it. Our disposition may be overborne by some strong contrary impulse. But if an end is genuinely conceived as good, it means that we have at least some feeling for it. This feeling has several consequences. It tends, though not always with success, to direct our own action towards the end in question; to make us approve and support those who act in a similar way; to render us sympathetically interested in anything that promotes it and adversely affected by anything of a contrary tendency. These and similar feelings and dispositions relative to any given end make up the practical attitude which the term "good" expresses. Observe, however, that while the judgment "this is good" expresses a disposition, it also asserts a fact. It asserts something to be the object of a favourable disposition, and if the judgment is true this relation is real. The practical attitude or disposition is not, indeed, the assertion, but it is a part of that which is asserted. There is thus a double action of the mind involved in the judgment of value, a practical attitude and an assertion of fact, and the practical attitude may be said to express itself in the assertion.

But it will be objected, I may recognize as good in some sense much that does not appeal to me. In particular I may recognize that something would be very good indeed for another person, but if I am absorbed in my own interests the knowledge leaves me cold. My attitude to this "good" is an "intellectual," not a practical attitude. Be it so. It still remains that, in recognizing that A B holds this or that to be good for him, I recognize that there is something about which he, and those who are interested in him, are feeling, to which he and they adopt a practical attitude. Similarly, in admitting something to be "good" in a conventional sense which does not in fact appeal to my feelings, I recognize it as part of that which the general fabric of custom and social opinion maintains. Thus the individual may recognize a good that does not directly appeal to him, and this possibility constitutes an essential part of the whole moral problem, yet it will remain true to say that, by the term "good" he signifies something which, in the connexion in which it is applicable, moves feeling, and through feeling disposes to action.¹

If this analysis is correct a judgment of the form "this is good" is an assertion, but something more than an assertion. Unless qualified by some saving clause that makes it "good for some one else, but not for me," "good from your point of view, but not from mine," it is the expression of a practical attitude or disposition. It is an acceptance of something propounded to the mind, an acceptance which may be expressed in the most general terms by saying that something fits in or harmonizes with a mental disposition. This harmony

¹ It is natural to say that we pursue an object because we deem it good, but as our whole account of the relation of impulse and intelligence will have shown, it is at least as true to say that we deem it good because we have the impulse to pursue it. More accurately, the idea of good is the definition of an impulse, or at least of a practical attitude. What part ideas themselves play in shaping our practical attitude is a question which runs through all our discussion. In general the relation is reciprocal. At lowest in the very act of defining we modify.

has, generically, two aspects. It turns on feeling, and it is effective in action. The two points are readily observable in the simpler cases. Consider any simple direct impulse, as the impulse of a little child to grasp and handle a bright object. The impulse effects itself in a series of efforts which may or may not culminate in the momentary seizure of the thing. Neglecting the latter case, and considering only that in which effort is so far successful as to achieve contact, we still find two strongly marked differences of result. If the bright object is, say, a candle flame, the effort is abruptly broken off and, so to say, reversed. There is a rapid withdrawal of the hand accompanied by a cry, which we interpret on the analogy of our more mature experience as an expression of pain. Whether the pain is to be regarded strictly as the cause of the withdrawal, as in ordinary language we always assume, raises a well-worn metaphysical controversy which we shall here endeavour to avoid—the question whether and in what sense a feeling as a state of consciousness can be the cause of a physical change. It will suffice for our purpose to regard the process of sharp withdrawal, crying, and other convulsive motor contractions on the one hand, and the feeling of disappointment and pain on the other, as a whole of many elements wherein the element of feeling appears, at any rate on and after a certain stage of development, to be an integral and essential factor. The whole phenomenon observed or interpreted by us on the one side in terms of feeling, on the other in terms of certain movements of limbs, appears to form a connected totality, and we emphasize the principal differences of aspect in this totality by calling it a psycho-physical process. In the psycho-physical process, then, of a baby trying to grasp a candle flame we suppose two essential characters. On the one hand there is effort broken off, frustrated in the moment of achievement. There is, that is to say, disharmony between the effort and its end. On the other hand there is pain felt in the moment of disharmony, and essential thereto. Pain

characterizes the feeling involved in disharmony, and the mental attitude concerned in the process of checking and cancelling effort.

The inverse case is now readily intelligible. If the object grasped is neither too hot, nor too sharp, nor too rough, the first contact is only the beginning of fruition. The little fingers explore the surface, and they close on it and convey it to the mouth, where, unless the process is broken off by the arbitrary intervention of a higher power, a new experience begins, which will differ again, according as the object turns out to be a sugar plum or a marble. The effort in the case now under consideration is not checked in the moment of attainment. The ball is explored all over, thrown about, and again pursued. The sugar plum is tasted, sucked, and swallowed. The series of actions which the effort sets a-going proceeds to a definite end,¹ and is encouraged so to proceed in the successive stages of attainment. There is a harmony between the effort and its result, and the feeling involved in the harmony is one of pleasant tone, culminating in satisfaction. By harmony is meant, in the last analysis, a form of mutual support. Generally speaking, it is that relation of parts in a whole in virtue of which they maintain and (if they admit of development) further one another.² Thus in the case of pleasurable emotion,

¹ Or, in the alternative, it is continued as long as the interest is maintained. As this gives way to fatigue the object ceases to stimulate effort and the effort ceases to yield pleasure. The end in such a case, though not precisely definite, has its conditions, either (1) in the nature of the thing which ceases to be interesting when examined on all sides, when we have, as common phrase testifies, "exhausted" it; or (2) in subjective fatigue, any given faculty of our own being capable of working at its best but for a limited time. In either event the pleasurable activity maintains itself till certain natural limits are reached at which it gradually or rapidly ceases to be pleasurable, and even becomes unpleasant.

² The mutual relation is essential to the meaning of harmony as used here. It is to be carefully distinguished from the mere subordination of parts to a whole (see below, chap. vi, p. 100 ff).

One of its simplest and most perfect examples is seen in those

incipient fruition furthers the effort until its achievement is complete, while the maintenance of the effort is, in turn, the condition of full fruition.

3. But neither pleasure or pain on the one hand, nor this internal harmony on the other, have an antecedent effort as their invariable and necessary condition. If the candle touched the child's hand accidentally, the withdrawal would be none the less rapid and the pain none the less sharp. If the sugar plum was put into the mouth by maternal fingers it would be sucked with no less avidity. It takes a philosophic mind to overlook facts so simple as these. Feeling does not merely supervene upon effort, but may initiate effort, and while pleasure in an experience prompts us to maintain it and carry it through to some culminating satisfaction, pain urges us to be rid of it. In the most passive states, such as enjoyment of warmth or contemplation of a beautiful efforts of art in which the beauty of parts lends beauty to the whole and at the same time derives an enhanced beauty therefrom. In

"A voice so thrilling ne'er was heard
In springtime from the cuckoo-bird
Breaking the silence of the seas
Among the furthest Hebrides,"

each line, at any rate each of the three last lines, is beautiful by itself, but much more beautiful when read with the rest, and the same thing may be said of the four lines together in relation to the whole poem. In Helen's lament over Hector the lines

"ἀλλὰ σὺ τὸν γ' ἐπέεσαι παραιφάμενος κατέρυκες
σῇ τ' ἀγανοφροσύνῃ καὶ σοῖς ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν"

stand out from the rest by a beauty of their own, but the higher values of this beauty they owe to the situation—the tribute to the habitual gentleness of the fighting chief who lies dead. These are good instances of harmony because each part gives something to and takes something from the remainder. When Abt Vog'er boasts that out of three sounds he makes "not a fourth sound but a star," the case is not quite so clear, as the separate notes are of little account in themselves, and seem to be merged in the whole.

I will not here pursue the question of the relation of beauty to harmony into its intricacies, but will remark only that at any rate in Ethics it is essential to distinguish between the harmony of elements and the subordination of one to another. This is a point to which we shall frequently have to recur.

view, we yield ourselves willingly to the experience until some distraction occurs or strain and fatigue ensue. That is, the pleasurable state tends to maintain itself as long as it is pleasurable, while from the unpleasant state we recoil.¹ The pleasurable state, that is, is internally harmonious, the painful is self-disruptive, even though conditions of the environment or of the psycho-physical organization constantly overcome the disruption and keep us on the rack.

Thus in either case the character of the state gives rise to a conation if it be only in the form of attention, tending either to maintain, modify, or annul it. If there is not defined effort in the sense of a series of actions so co-ordinated as to secure an end which was not realized when the series began, there is the conational force or stress on which effort rests. In the pleasurable experience,

¹ It may be objected that there are, e.g. melancholy moods in which we wilfully persist and are roused to active hostility by cheerful suggestions and hints of consolation. The cause of this is, sometimes, that we feel the comfort to be unreal, and its false light only serves to make our darkness more visible. Sometimes our melancholy is not very deep and, like most feelings which in general are of painful tone, a low grade sorrow has its pleasurable side—it is bitter-sweet—

“ Yet, Thyrsis, let me give my grief its hour
In the old haunt and find our tree-topped hill.”

Sometimes, on the other hand, in a profound grief we feel that there is something beyond any suffering of our own that is concerned—the payment of an emotional tribute to the lost which we would not have stayed till it is discharged in full. But apart from all this, we must distinguish between the inertia of a mood which seeks (as though it were an independent being) to conserve itself, and the maintenance of the conditions on which the mood rests. These, if we see a chance, we are ready enough to remove. Yet, even so, it will be said there are perverse people who cherish their grievances and exhibit positive annoyance at their removal. The explanation here is that the real source of trouble in such cases is much deeper. It lies in something of which the unreasonable being is himself perhaps unaware, and he catches on to this or that petty annoyance, partly as a counter-irritant, partly (as the psycho-analysts would tell us) to avert the danger of facing his real demon.

the incomplete impulse is confirmed, or the inchoate state maintained. We respond, as we may say, to a tentative experience with an affirmative.¹ We accept it and go on with it. Now this is precisely the practical attitude expressed in the judgment "This is good," and, in point of fact, pleasurable feeling quite naturally expresses itself in that form, or in some equivalent. On the face of the facts, then, we might say that the pleasure or satisfaction concerned in enhancing an effort, or prolonging and accentuating an experience is the equivalent in feeling of the assertion that the object of the effort or the content of the experience is good. Feeling is the required element which disposes to action and expresses itself in the judgment.

But in reality this simple and untroubled identification of the pleasurable and the good only holds under somewhat narrow conditions. Our first impulsive judgment² expressing the feeling immediately attending on an experience, may be corrected by a maturer judgment expressing the result of a wider experience. Thus, *prima facie*, judgment and feeling may fall apart.

But the maturer judgment also rests upon feeling, though not necessarily a feeling of the same kind. For example, we flinch from a pain and our sensory feeling

¹ The relation of desire to assertion is described by Plato (*Republic*, Bk. IV, 437, Tr. Davies and Vaughan):

"... would you not say that the mind of a man under the influence of desire always either seeks after the object of desire, or attracts to itself that which it wishes to have; or again, so far as it wills the possession of anything, it assents inwardly thereto, as though it were asked a question, longing for the accomplishment of its wish?

I should.

Again: shall we not class disinclination, unwillingness, and dislike under the head of mental rejection and repulsion, and of general terms wholly opposed to the former?

Unquestionably."

² I need not here discriminate the cases of true purposive action where the end is previously represented in idea, from those of impulse in which action is directed to an end which is not formulated. What I am saying applies to both cases alike.

approves. But immediately upon doing so we condemn our action as unmanly. This expresses a feeling of very different origin and significance, but whatever its origin and significance the points that I would insist on here are, that it is a feeling; that it expresses itself in a judgment; and that it affects behaviour, tending to correct, modify, or reverse action if it is of painful tone, and to complete and confirm action if it is of pleasurable tone. Further, the behaviour of others arouses corresponding feelings within us, and our expression of such feelings has an effect on others comparable to the effect on ourselves. If we judge an act good, if we praise or approve it sincerely, it is that it stirs some responsive feeling within us, and the effect of the expression of our approval is to maintain the action so judged, to stimulate the doer to carry it through, and to persist in conduct of the same type. If we judge it bad, the reverse tendencies ensue. Thus, the pleasurable feelings¹ expressed in

¹ A cynic might suggest here that, if it is a question of pleasure, many of us derive more satisfaction from the failings and delinquencies of neighbours than from their good deeds. The existence of this serious disharmony in our moral nature cannot be denied. If we trace it to its roots we find a certain exaltation of self in the spectacle of another's weakness and a corresponding depression in the evidence of his superiority. Hence the joy over the sinner, not because he repents but because he has occasion for repenting. But the foundation of this ugly joy is the knowledge that what he has done is hateful. It is because his act raises emotions of aversion—which are disagreeable emotions—that he has lowered himself. It may be objected that the witness who can after all take secret pleasure in this cannot feel a very whole-hearted aversion to the act. But if the act was not one to which society on the whole feels a decided aversion there would be no occasion for his unholy glee.

There is also a stern satisfaction in the repression and punishment of wrong-doing which, if not the highest attitude conceivable, is immune to the charge of cynicism. But the satisfaction here lies in the active operation against the ugly thing in which the emotion discharges itself. A bad act, then, excites feelings which tend to repress or punish it (and so repress acts of that type). This repressive tendency is indeed as effective in the malicious joy of the cynic as in the stern reprobation of the just. In every case, any pleasurable satisfaction in condemnation is pleasure experi-

judgments of approval, and the displeasurable feelings expressed in judgments of disapproval, react upon the modes of behaviour which excite them, tending to support them in the one case and correct them in the other. Good and bad, in their moral as in their sensory application, signify a harmony or disharmony between feeling and action, and in this relation the feeling of one man may, through its expression, affect the actions of another.

What is good, these cases show, must be something appealing to some one's feeling, whose feeling in particular there is nothing yet to decide. Only if two or more people use the word with a common significance there must be modes of experience (under which generic term of course observed and reported actions are included) which appeal to them in the same way, and the feeling of one person must have some bearing on, or at least some meaning for, the thought of another. To that extent the term "good," in its mere usage, seems to require some objective meaning. What the conditions

enced in repressing the cause of the emotion. Thus there is a disharmony between the bad act and the feeling that it excites, less direct than the felt unpleasantness of the act itself, but no less complete.

It must be added that, apart from the element of pleasure involved in the repressive processes, the emotions of disapproval are in reality of unpleasant character. This is easily seen when we contemplate a wrong which we are powerless to avert. The thwarted emotion then becomes acutely painful. It may be argued that this is only because it is thwarted, not because it is an intrinsically painful emotion. It must be replied that it is only painful emotions that increase in intensity with thwarting. The thwarting of a pleasurable emotion is the cancelling of or interference with its object. This does not make it more pleasurable. The thwarting of a painful emotion is rather in the maintenance of the object which excites it and the hindrance of the efforts which it makes to transform or abolish that object. It is true that the anger which can express itself adequately is barely a painful state, any more than the hunger which is not excessive and has the near prospect of a good meal to stay its cravings. There is none of the stress which is essential to serious pain. But there is a fount of painful feeling which rapidly wells up into stress if relief is

and implications of such objectivity are, we shall enquire later. We have only first to sum up what we have so far inferred as to the meaning of good. What is good appears, generically, as an element of experience which is in harmony with feeling. The experience may be what we call an impulse or action of our own, or of others, it may be a sensation or an idea, it may be the experience of some outer object, of a beautiful scene, a bright warm fire, an event of public interest. Further, since feeling too, is an element of experience, it would seem that what is good may be itself a feeling. To this point we shall return immediately. Meanwhile we insist that any act, or any object, simple or complex, near or remote, which stirs feeling, may form the content of an "experience" of the kind which we call good or bad. In judging an experience good, so far as the judgment is truly our own, and not a recognition of the judgment effectively passed by some one else, we express towards it a mode of feeling which may generically be called favourable; that is to say, it has the generic character of pleasure. This

refused. Emotions of which this is true are to be termed generically painful.

No study of particular men in particular cases, however, gets to the root of the question. The fundamental point is this. In so far as the emotion which the act of another excites is distorted, whether by self-feeling or any other cross-current, it is corrected in the normal decent man by the settled principle of the will which supports the common good as he understands it. At the back of the will lies (according to our analysis in chap. ii) the system of feeling in which our permanent happiness and unhappiness are involved. It is rather to this deeper source of feeling than to the emotions of the moment that our constant support of the common good owes its strength. The good act, that is to say, whether of self or another, is part of the system in which the happiness of the self is involved. It is at this deeper level that the stable conditions of harmony are reached. Thus the pleasurable element in approval is in accord with the permanent body of feeling and may be said to represent it in consciousness, while any unpleasurable element is out of harmony with the permanent conditions of feeling. It is from this point of view, in the last resort, that we are justified in describing approval as pleasurable, and disapproval as displeasurable.

feeling, so far as it finds expression, tends to maintain the type of experience to which it refers, to carry it on to completion, to intensify it, and to facilitate its repetition, and this it does now by its action within the mind of each person who feels it, and now by the effect of its expression—as praise or blame—on the mind and behaviour of others. This may be expressed by saying that the experience judged good is in harmony with feeling. What is judged bad similarly excites unfavourable feeling of painful tone tending to arrest and annul it. That is, it involves disharmony with feeling.

4. But we not only judge objects and efforts in terms of feeling. We also judge feelings themselves. We call “bad” not only the thing that gives the pain, but the pain itself. What does this judgment express? In the simplest cases it expresses the conations pivoted on the feeling, struggling with it or welcoming and surrendering to it, seeking to avert or procure it. Secondly, it may express a feeling about the feeling, and it may be noted that the second feeling is not always in harmony with the first. We may rejoice that we have rejoiced, but we may also be ashamed of having done so, or even in the present tense of doing so, and we may be glad that we mourn. The judgment appraising the feeling, then, is not the same thing as the feeling itself, but is the expression of conations relevant to it or of other feelings which it excites. Thus, feeling is good or bad according as it is in harmony or disharmony with conation, or with another feeling. Thus, in any case, what is good is a harmony between some element of experience and a feeling, but where the experience is conational the relation may be seen from either end. Viewed from the side of feeling the experience is held good, viewed from the side of conation, the feeling.¹

But while either term of the relation may be legitimately qualified as “good” or “bad,” it is a fallacy to treat

¹ Equally, if both terms are feelings, either may be held good as viewed from the other. If the “element of experience” is neither a feeling nor a conation, no such reciprocity applies (see below).

this character as independent of the relation in which it stands to the other term. The course of action, or, more generally, the experience which leaves feeling cold is indifferent. To put a value on it sincerely is to express a feeling about it. The feeling which stirs no conative reaction stands in no organic relation to our nature, and if such a feeling can be, it is without significance. It is the reaction upon the feeling that we express in our judgments. It would seem, then, that the judgment always "expresses" one term of the relation, but is explicitly concerned with the other. This prompts us to look for the essential good now in one term, now in the other, but not in both. On this line of thought, if we take the object of feeling as a self-contained good, we arrive at absolutist systems of ethics which tend to ignore human happiness, and if we take feelings in the same way we arrive at hedonistic systems in which acts, character, and objects of feeling generally sink to mere means. The nature of the fallacy and the true solution come into view when we recall that the judgment "This is good" is not only the expression of an attitude, but also the assertion of a fact, and the fact which it asserts is a harmony between an experience and a feeling. In describing anything as good we are at once taking up a practical attitude towards it and asserting a harmonious relation of which it is one term. The term may legitimately be called good as pertaining to this harmony, but the concrete truth involves both terms in that relation. "Good," then, is a harmony of experience and feeling in the generic senses described, and any element—feeling or other experience—that enters into this harmony is called good by right of membership.

CHAPTER V

THE RATIONAL GOOD

1. IF the good is generally a harmony of experience with feeling what is the rational good? In accordance with our general definition of the rational we shall expect the rational good in the first place to be consistent throughout. That is to say, whatever is reasonably held good must not tend to clash with anything else that is reasonably held good. Just as two rational judgments must not contradict one another, so two rational purposes must not conflict with one another, and if two kinds of experience, both apparently good, are found to conflict, it becomes necessary to seek some means of reconciling the contradiction. Of the problem thus set to the practical reason we shall speak presently. But let us observe now in the second place that negative consistency is not enough. Whether we think of the judgment "This is Good" as an assertion or as the expression of an impulse-feeling it must, to be rational, have a ground, and the ground must be universal. The end or act or feeling that is good as such must be good wherever and in whomsoever found, and that which is good under given conditions must be good wherever these conditions obtain. But further, if we have to find grounds for these universals—grounds for our grounds—we shall be pushed along the same line of criticism as before in dealing with cognition. Principles that figure as immediate and self-evident will be seen themselves to require a ground,¹ and the ground which

¹ If it has to be admitted on the theoretic side that acceptance of first principles as self-evident is dependent on our mental constitution, it is much more easily seen on the practical side that

will be found if they are valid is the fact that they sum up and generalize more specific and concrete ends so far as these are mutually consistent. Thus here, as in theory, we shall look to Interconnexion as itself the rational principle, only that here the interconnexion must involve the practical operation of purposes along with the speculative truth of judgments. For the judgments, being the expression each of a practical attitude, cannot consist with one another unless their practical results consist with one another. Thus in action as in theoretic statement the rational good forms a connected whole, in which no part is isolated but in the end every element involves every other. This postulates (1) a harmony of feeling with feeling. To be rational all the feelings expressed in judgments of the good must work together as elements in a single harmonious body of feeling. And since the good is generically a harmony of experience with feeling, it postulates for its achievement (2) a harmony of all experience¹ of all sentient beings with this body of feeling, as that which maintains this body of feeling and is maintained by it.

Thirdly, the rational good is Objective. The meaning of this requirement is most easily seen in the negative form that the judgment of the good must not depend on any peculiarity of the individual who forms it. But here a caution is required. It is true that to be rational the subjective factor must be in a sense eliminated. But even in the world of knowledge we had to be careful in limiting and defining this sense. Knowledge is and remains something "subjective" in the sense that it is enjoyed by "subjects" and is a function of their nature. What must be eliminated is any peculiarity of the subjective factor which disturbs the appreciation of objective reality. So here, the feeling expressed in any practical judgment is the feeling of a subject. What must be eliminated is any peculiarity of feeling which is incom-
feeling—which is admittedly essential to the judgment of value—is a function of the psychological structure.

¹ That is, of course, so far as it affects feeling.

patible with the universal relations involved in the rational system. The "objectivity" of the good is merely one aspect of its universality. One feeling is not to be preferred to another because it is the feeling of this man rather than that, except in so far as the preference is required on universal principles which are integral parts of the general system of harmony. Thus I am justified in caring much more for my child's happiness than for that of somebody else's child, if the parental affections are contributory elements to the rational good. But I am not justified in carrying the preference to a point at which it inflicts wrong on another, i.e. violates some rule equally necessary to the rational good. The body of feeling that has to be harmonized is the body of feeling experienced or capable of being experienced in any sentient beings whose behaviour may affect one another, and the contradictions and conflicts that arise within this world of feeling have to be reconciled, explained and resolved just as in the world of knowledge, before a rational harmony is reached. Thus the rationality of the good involves its impartial and consistent application to the world of sentient existence. That is to say, it is the function of the rational impulse in practice to embrace this world in a single system of purposes, just as it is the function of the rational in cognition to embrace the world of experience in a single system of thought. Not merely the recognition of fundamental similarity in the life of others but the practical comprehension of all living experience within a single system of purposes is the essential work of the rational in the sphere of action.

2. This system involves a double harmony, harmony of the mind with itself and harmony of the mind with the world, and in both relations the mind has to bend and be bent in order to attain its good. The nerve of the process is feeling which issues from and into impulses, controlling and controlled by, supporting and supported by activity, and the harmony of activity rests accordingly on a harmony of feeling. Now each element of activity or experience which any mind finds good has its harmony within,

sustaining, if only for the moment, and sustained by a receptive and operative feeling. But harmonious as it is within it may be inharmonious without, destroying or destroyed by other activities each equally at harmony within itself. This contrast may be repeated indefinitely on a growing scale. A great body of vital activity, including a large sphere of life and a great number of beings, may be internally harmonious, and yet hostile to another such body. Now the rational principle is that which persistently extends the harmony, enlarging the view, resolving contradictions, penetrating to deeper sources of unity. How this can be we shall enquire further at a later stage, but unless it can be there is no rational good and no right. Granting for the moment that it can be, we find that we mean by "Good" a harmony of vital experience with feeling, that what we so deem good at one moment or from one point of view, we may also deem bad at another moment, or from another point of view, that what we reasonably call good or what is really good must be a harmony of the totality of feeling with the totality of experience so far as it affects feeling. Thus the Practical Reason is the effort of the mind towards harmony within itself, and with nature. This harmony the mind does not find, but creates, or rather let us say that it finds it in dying cadences and catches of which it seeks to make a music universal.

3. But, it may be asked, is it clear that the universalism of the Practical Reason follows from our premisses? Might there not be some partial point of view from which a system answering all our rational tests could be worked out? For example there is, it may be said, a consistent egoism. I judge this to be good because it falls in with my wishes. Something inconsistent with it falls in with your wishes and is judged good by you. But what is that to me? I must admit that if something, x , is really good it is good universally and, therefore, for you as well as for me. But this is not as it stands sufficient, for I might contend that an essential element in x —essential to its goodness—is precisely that it is *mine*, a

fulfilment of my wishes. Carrying this right through life I get a consistent order of action and judgments about action, viz., that all are good which fit into a system, consistent in theory and practice, of *my* judgments, *my* actions, and *my* feelings. Thus, ideally, egoism might be internally self-consistent. On the other hand, the principle of universals—as a merely cognitive principle—will at least compel me to admit that you will form a similar system for yourself and that these systems may clash. If, then, both systems are rational, rational systems may be inconsistent, which is contrary to definition. If I hold mine alone to be rational, what is the basis of the difference which I allege between two similar systems? If I assert without ground that what I think or feel is preferable to what others think or feel, that is arbitrary and, therefore, by definition, irrational. It follows that there must be a ground for my preference, and if self-preference is itself a ground, it will justify your self-preference as well as mine, grounds being universal. Thus the principle of self-preference—whether of an individual or a group—involves inconsistencies and is by definition irrational.

4. At this point we shall be asked whether, after all, our demonstrations affect action in the smallest degree. If there is a consistent egoism regardless of other people's feelings, or, what is more real, a consistent group morality indifferent or hostile to outsiders, why should it care about any proof that its action is inconsistent with some wider good? Grant, for the sake of argument, that the rational good is what we have taken it to be. Still it may be said it will appeal only to those who happen to make a rational life their end. If a man cares for none of these things, who or what shall make him care? As to rationality, if a man adopts a certain end as his chief good and then acts so as to defeat the end, he is clearly inconsistent and absurd. So much we could probably get him to acknowledge, and all would claim to be so far rational that when they have adopted an end they wish to carry it out and regard actions which conflict

with it as mistaken. Thus, given an end, reason has a clear function to perform. But in the choice of ends or principles it is otherwise. One principle, such as that of harmony, may, indeed, be distinguished from others in that it carries order and coherence through all life, whereas other principles only carry them through partially. But how does this affect choice? It still remains open to any of us to reject the rational, and no proof, except it be by connexion with some end that we have actually chosen, will affect our will.

Thus we are brought face to face with the question of authority and obligation. We have to ask not merely whether there is a rational good and whether we have defined it correctly, but whether the rational good has a claim upon us, and an indefeasible claim, over-riding the promptings of subjective judgment. Now in the ordinary conception of morality we encounter just such a claim. The moral judgment imposes on us an obligation. It says that this is right and that is wrong, this is what you must, that what you must not do. It seems to state a fact and also to impose a command. What is the nature of the fact and what the basis of the command?

Many would deny that the moral judgment makes any direct statement of fact. True, they would say, it may take the form "This course of action is right." But what sort of a thing is rightness? It is not a quality of an action or a circumstance in the sense in which squareness is a quality of this table or swiftness of a body in motion. What the word imports is simply that the thing should be done, and the proposition is accordingly a command to do it. There are certainly facts in the background, e.g. the desire of some one that the thing should be done, and the possible consequences if it is not done. But the words themselves are really not a statement but an order, and even the facts which they imply are of the nature of desires, resolves, sentiments, bearing upon and tending to issue in action.

We are, then, on this view, to take the moral judgment as, in essence, a command. Let us leave for the moment

the question whether it is or is not an assertion of fact, and consider it as a command. Who, then, commands, who is commanded, and, above all, on what authority does the command repose? The first two questions were answered once for all by Kant. In the moral judgment proper it is the self which both commands and obeys. When I do a thing that is right because it is right I do it for a reason which I myself acknowledge as good, and binding me because it is good. True, another may tell me my duty, but if I obey him merely because he commands that is not in itself a moral ground of action, while if I conform because he convinces me, that again is acceptance of a principle which I now acknowledge on my own account as binding me. If this is so we begin to get an answer to our third and most important question. The principle which I accept as binding must be one that appeals to me as a decisive ground of action, that is, one that overcomes other grounds for other actions, it being just this supremacy which the term "binding" expresses.

We become aware of such supremacy through conflict with some other motive of action, and we are aware of it not only in the moral but in the prudential sphere, and indeed, as has been hinted, not only in action but in cognition. Thus I may be constrained by cogent reasoning to dismiss an opinion to which I am very strongly inclined. I am constrained by prudence to avoid a dish which I find very tempting, just as I am constrained by honesty to admit a debt which it would be very convenient to ignore. With essential differences there is also an essential point of agreement between the three cases. In one I am convinced that, however strongly appearances may suggest, say, that the fields are rising and falling, in reality it is the aeroplane that is "banking" while the fields are stationary. In another I am certain that the evils of ill health are really so great as to outweigh the momentary satisfaction of appetite, and I am certain of this and guided by my certainty, although the felt impulse of appetite may be much keener and more vivid than any representation of future ill consequences. In the last

case, though I may be just as keenly tempted by opportunities of evasion, I feel that it would be "really" bad and not good. What is common to the three cases, then, is the insistence on something "real" as opposed to something "apparent"—in the case of action on something "really" bad, though "apparently" good. This seems to bring us back after all to the view that the moral judgment does assert a fact of some kind. But again, without pursuing this question, let us try to complete our analysis of its import as a command. In the first place it propounds a principle or end or ground of action. As a general term for such grounds we have used the term "good," since we took it that everything that appears to us as a motive for action also appears, at least provisionally, as good. The moral judgment, then, propounds to me something as good, but it also claims supremacy for this "good" over any other that appeals to me—even though that other may admittedly be "really" good, so far as it goes, or would be good if it did not happen in this case to conflict with something superior to it. Further, this supremacy is claimed for the rule of action as such. The moral principle does not allege that the actual inclination to obey it is greater than the contrary inclination. But it bids us obey, no matter what our inclinations may be. Such, then, is the nature of the moral command, and the question is whether it is a reasonable command.

Observe first that there is no more difficulty in applying the test of rationality to a command than to an assertion. We can easily see that commands are unreasonable if they are in conflict with one another or if they are arbitrary, that is ungrounded. Conversely, commands are reasonable so far as they are consistent and grounded, and this, as our analysis has shown, will mean in effect in so far as they prescribe a harmonious system of ends to be pursued. Observe, secondly, that there is no difficulty in the opposition of the command to the felt inclination. Even a rule of prudence involves as much as this, the dull weight of permanent interests overcoming

the vivid inclination of which we are most intensely conscious in our feeling. Into the psychology of such struggles we need not enter for the moment. It is sufficient that they prove that, by whatever means, the inclination which is most intensely felt in consciousness may nevertheless be overcome. The more serious difficulty begins when we remember that in matters of prudence, inclination and interest after all stand on the same platform. Both appeal to the same self; nor do they necessarily suggest any qualitative distinction between the different interests of the self. The moral judgment, on the other hand, does make qualitative distinctions. It does not recognize, that is, that any amount of some other sort of good cancels the bad involved in infringing its rule, and what is more, though adopted and approved as a rule by the self for the self, it ignores the individuality of the self in its prescription, which maintains the goodness of a rule as a universal and true for all selves placed in the circumstances, whatever they be, that the rule contemplates. It is in principle indifferent to its truth whether the person whom it contemplates accepts it or not. Just as the rule of prudence holds for you whether you are inclined to accept it or not—your felt inclination making no difference to the working out of causes and effects—so the moral rule holds good independently, not only of your felt inclination, but of your most deliberate decision. It applies to you. It holds of you, but it holds independently of your will as well as your desire or your impulse. But how can anything practical hold “of” me if no impulse, no desire, no volition of mine urges me to it? We have admitted from the first that all actions rest on some element of feeling. If, then, there is no responsive feeling in me what meaning has moral obligation for me? This brings us finally face to face with the “fact” alleged by the moral judgment. For the reply must be that it has not been said that moral obligation holds “for” me in the sense that it does in the case assumed make an appeal to me. That would be a contradiction in terms. What has been said is that it holds “of” me, that is, that there

is, in fact, an obligation which in the case assumed I ignore. The analogy, again, is with the relation between reality and opinion. A danger, for instance, is equally there for the man who sees it and the man who does not see it. It concerns him though he does not know it, and the only sense in which we can take obligation to hold "of" a man who does not recognize it, is that its validity is independent of his knowledge and concerns him though he does not know it. In what sense, then, does obligation concern the man who does not appreciate it? The reply is that it concerns him as colour concerns the blind man. He misses what is really good, the goodness which stands the test of rational examination.

To the morally deficient the demonstration no more brings practical conviction than an explanation of the colour system gives sight to the blind. The moral impulses are not created by exposition but must be there before we can appeal to them. In the normal man, however, such promptings exist, and assert themselves with varying degrees of actual force against rebellious impulse. Thus the sense of moral obligation is something real. When it is asked whether moral obligation is a fact the question cannot refer to the existence of this feeling. The question is whether moral obligation is or is not something more than a feeling irregularly diffused, both as to intensity and direction among human beings, that is to say whether, if we regard it as a command, the command is reasonable, whether if we regard it as asserting a fact, the assertion is true. Now what the moral law imposes on us as a command is that we should follow a certain mode of life as superior to any other so that not only is that mode of life good, but anything that conflicts with it, however attractive in itself, is bad, and what the moral judgment asserts is the same superiority put not as a command, but as an assertion of supreme goodness. The question whether the command is valid or the assertion true is the same question differently phrased, and comes back to this: Is the moral judgment reasonable? These questions we have sought to determine by defining

rationality, and we have come accordingly to the conclusion that the belief that we owe allegiance to a wider life than our own is justified in reason. For we found that a harmony of feeling with experience extending to all beings that feel, must be reasonably held good as conforming to the definition of reason applied to practice. Hence the feelings, whether they take the form of impulse, volition, exhortation, or command, prompting to the support or development of such harmony, are reasonable. They are mutually consistent, give each other support and are of universal application. Conversely, opposed principles are reasonably held bad. If our argument is sound it follows that the attitude of will which accepts a moral obligation is a rational attitude, and the assertion implied in that acceptance a true assertion. I would add that even if our view of the rational and the good be rejected, I should doubt whether any other form could be given to the problem of moral obligation. Is the feeling rational or not? Does it rest on reality or not? All these are the same question in different forms. Possibly others may suggest other forms which would prove more convenient, but whatever the form, I suggest that the real issue is the same—the capacity of the feeling of obligation which we experience to stand the test which proves it reasonable.

The question, it will have been seen, turns on a due appreciation of the bearing of reason upon action, and it comes to a head in connexion with the “transpersonal reference” which is the main theoretical crux, as it is also the practical difficulty in morals. Some, misled by an unduly narrow view of rationality, have identified reason with prudence and conceived all altruism as based on supernatural motives. Others have identified the work of the Reason in this regard with the intellectual admission of the essential identity of human beings and the equal value of the good which all can enjoy. Others, again, have seen in the Practical Reason an authority over-riding mere impulse and impelling the emotional human subject to conform to law. On the view here taken every judgment of the good involves the existence of an impulse-feeling

directed towards it. To recognize some act or experience of another as good is, therefore, not merely an intellectual judgment, but a judgment imbued with a tone of feeling towards that act or experience. But we recognized among the mass of impulses a certain correlation which, in its simplest forms, makes for unitary control and, in its more rational form, for harmony. This tendency we can speak of as a specific impulse towards harmony, but we must note that it is an impulse among impulses, qualifying and reshaping them. In virtue of this movement our impulses become an organized body overcoming recalcitrant movements, however intensely felt, by the power of an organized mass. This organization, consistently and intelligently carried through, is the practical reason which is the mass of impulse-feeling harmonized, or in process of finding harmony.

5. But, while the Practical Reason is an impulse and its work creative, it is also the recognition of a fact and its creation is solidly based on a reality. Its effort towards a harmony of all experience for all mind would have no meaning if there were not, as matter of hard fact, a certain unity actually pervading all mind. In requiring harmony between any two impulses, the practical reason is assuming that there is a relation between the two spheres to which they belong. If, indeed, they collide in practice so that in following one we frustrate the other this relation needs no proof. But the requirement of the reason goes beyond these cases. As reason its judgments take the shape of universals and what is good or bad for it is good or bad universally, that is to say wherever precisely similar conditions are found. Fundamentally we have seen that the condition of goodness is harmony between experience and feeling within a mind, and the universality of this principle and of every judgment applying it is the assertion of a certain unity of mind wherever found. This unity has two characteristics. On the one hand it includes that fundamental similarity of character which is the basis of the universal judgment, on the other hand it includes the social solidarity which is implied in any judgment of

one man's conduct by its effect upon another. The world of Practical Reason must be of one tissue throughout, in the double sense that its character is fundamentally alike all through and that its parts, as far as intercourse extends, are all interconnected. It is this unity of which we are obscurely conscious in the sense of moral obligation. The relation of our individual self, our particular act to the whole is what we know as duty. The conformity of any act with the system required by the whole is what we know as its rightness, and since all these terms express or imply actual relations of a real part to a real whole, the moral judgment is witness to the real existence of an order which at the same time it seeks to develop and perfect.

The unity which the Practical Reason finds in existence differs from the harmony which it seeks to create in two essentials. In the first place, mere physical barriers obstruct and may completely sever intercourse, so that until these are overcome the world in which it moves is not that of all mind, but only (if the expression be allowed) of all available mind. Secondly, within the circle of minds that are in contact, i.e. the actual community, there is every degree and kind of conflict and disharmony shot through the pervading unity. The unity, however, is always real and always operative in this tangible sense, that no one part permanently escapes the consequences of that which affects the rest, and the whole is affected by the behaviour and suffering of any one part. The development which each man can achieve is conditioned in kind and degree by the development of others. Even the man who succeeds in putting himself above others must, willy-nilly, shape his own self accordingly, cherishing this and oppressing that side of his nature, a truth depicted in its extreme case by the Platonic tyrant who turns out to be the sufferer from a tyranny within his own soul—a description of which biographers of Abdul Hamid have given vivid contemporary illustration. Particular acts may not indeed bring their appropriate reward or penalty upon the doer, but in the main God is

not mocked, and through a thousand subtle interactions the choice of a line of life entails the consequences which it may seek to ignore or defeat. The unity is such that the parts do and will interact, if not harmoniously then with a greater or less degree of mutual perversion and destruction.

6. On the view here taken of the Practical Reason it is clear that not only the intellect, but the feelings, impulses and emotions of human beings that make for a harmony in life as a whole, may all be regarded as rational in character. But this does not, of course, mean that they are acquired or even trained or developed by ratiocination. They grow up originally, as all impulses grow, under the conditions of heredity as determined by natural selection. Far down in the animal state impulses appear which have reference to the welfare of others. The parental instincts, in fact the sex instinct, and, where it exists, the herd instinct, are all impulses of this class. The psychophysical organization grows up under environing conditions, physical and social, to which it adapts itself in a rough and ready way by response. These responses must, in accordance with well-known biological conditions, be on the whole such as will assist the survival of the individual and the stock. That stock will survive and increase in which the behaviour of component individuals is best adapted to the requirements of the mode of life which the stock enjoys; this adjustment of responses implies an adaptation of organization and feeling, and this organization as handed on by heredity is the basis of instinct. In so far as the life of the stock is social, that is in so far as it depends on the interaction of individuals, their mutual forbearance and mutual aid, their relations and behaviour affecting them will accordingly become subjects of instinctive feeling. The appreciation of such behaviour, at least as soon as any complexity arises, will involve intelligence, just as the appreciation of the bearing of any single act on the welfare of the individual may involve intelligence. Yet the feeling to which the act appeals when its bearings have been worked out, may be of instinctive origin.

Nor is it to be supposed that the social instincts are restricted to the human race. Many of the lower animals live under social conditions, and social, and particularly parental instincts, are verifiable far down in the scale of animal creation. Now anything that violates these instincts is directly felt as bad, and what falls in with them as good. It is possible that these judgments may be reversed on appeal, just as the instinctive withdrawal from physical pain may be overcome, and what we first feel as bad we may be driven finally to accept as good. But that is only to say that our immediate and unreflective impulse—whether we call it an immediate judgment or a spontaneous reaction of feeling—may be overborne by wider considerations. It does not affect the fact that the feelings that bind us to others and overleap the boundary of self are just as primary psychologically as those which interest us in our own future. They are rational in the sense that they are integral parts of a rational synthesis, not in the sense that they are results reached by a deductive reasoning, or by any other purely intellectual process. They do, however, take intellectual expression in judgments of value, and accordingly our primary and unreflective ideas of what is good or bad have reference to others as well as ourselves. We are not to suppose that either logically or psychologically the idea of good is first built up for ourselves alone, and then transferred by analogical inference to other people. The idea of good—and for that matter the idea of self also—is formed by the interaction of mind on mind, and the emotions and ideas which their play calls forth. The “good” is what is accepted, approved or encouraged by some one, not necessarily by self. As soon as the self clearly recognizes its goodness that is tantamount to a practical acceptance. To learn the meaning of the word is to assimilate and fit on to our own feeling ideas that are moving in the social life around us. Nor again can we logically consider the good of others as formed analogically upon the model of our own. What is in the order of reason to be held good for me, is not finally

determinable apart from the good of others whom it will affect. To suppose that I can definitely ascertain my own good and proceed to the inference that the good of every other person is like it, is unduly to simplify the moral problem. As we shall see more fully later, self-development is not as such an element in the social ideal, but only such development as contributes to the harmony of the social whole.

The reason of practice resembles the reason of theory in that it is the endeavour to establish harmony throughout its own world. But both in its nature and method it differs in accordance with the difference of its problem. Its world is the world of impulses, emotions, fixed purposes, passions, all the vital activities of men, and it is within this turbulent mass that it has to establish harmony. For this purpose it must itself be charged with all the energy of profound feeling, and its development is as much a development of feeling as of thought. The preparatory work is done by that unconscious growth which the conditions of physical and, later, of social life make possible. The later stages are carried through by an education in which the conscious appreciation of the significance of conduct and the bearings of behaviour in its complex social relations plays an increasing part. But throughout, the expansion of view and the refinement of ideals must carry feeling along with them. Without a basis in feeling the "rationality" of any unselfish action would be a word without force. Without the notion of rationality the mass of social feelings would be without cohesion, guidance or unity of aim. Here, as elsewhere, the function of the principle is interpretative. It is to make the impulse understand itself. At the same time here, as elsewhere, the interpretation deepens and strengthens the very feeling which it serves. The wider sense of meaning and purposiveness which the recognition of this rational coherence lends to the social feelings, becomes the keystone of the arch among the feelings themselves. Reasoning cannot put into men feelings that they do not possess, but by directing, co-ordinating and giving unity and

stability of aim it may most materially enhance the working energy of feelings out of which it is itself engendered.

7. The all-embracing harmony in which we found the ideal of the practical reason is in strictness incapable of complete realization. Experience is unlimited, and the mind with its capacities for feeling is always in process of "becoming" if not of growth. There is, therefore, so far as human vision can see, no limit to the work of reason, and no stage at which it will be able to rest on the achievement of final harmony. The definition of the rational good must take this limitation into account.

But once again, the case is closely analogous to that of rational thought. There, too, we saw that, experience being unlimited, the body of systematic thought is never complete, and not only is it incomplete, but for that very reason it is never final within its own sphere. It is always theoretically liable to modification by new experiences and new interpretations of experience. Thus, while it is reasonable to maintain the system established by the interconnexion of experience so far as it has gone, it is equally reasonable to hold it liable to modification by fresh experience, and it is reasonable in forming a conceptual interpretation of reality as a whole to be for ever seeking fresh experience to bring to bear on the thought-constructions already made. Putting all these points together we found that in the sphere of cognition itself—though the purpose is not to construct reality, but to interpret a reality that already exists—the reason ultimately reveals itself as a conation or an impulse. It is the impulse, not merely to interpret the experience that men have actually accumulated, but to extend the synthesis of thought to all possible experience. It is the organizing principle in thought. In strict analogy the practical reason is the organizing principle in the actions of men. It is the impulse to develop harmony, on the one hand by extending the control of mind over the conditions of its life, on the other hand by establishing unity of aim within the world of consciousness itself. The measure

of harmony so achieved at any given stage is not complete, and its rules accordingly are not necessarily final. But they are to be modified only in the interests of some fuller harmony to which such a change will demonstrably lead. What it is reasonable to hold good under any given conditions is the harmony which is as perfect and comprehensive as we can make it under these conditions, which ignores no element which we can see to be relevant and admits no conflict of which we are aware. Such a system it is reasonable to hold good, but it is also reasonable to recognize that its principles are liable to revision, the system being one which not merely admits of expansion but demands it.

This expansion, we have hinted, follows two main lines. On the one hand, there is the development of harmony within the world of feeling itself. On the other, there is the endeavour through action upon the environment to bring experience into harmony with the trend of feeling as a whole. These two movements, when all their implications are understood, may be said to involve the whole sphere of mental activity. They involve the development of mind in all rational beings, and in all their mutual relations to the point in which it can work in perfect concert with itself, and they involve the extension of its operations on every side in the organization of its life. These considerations indicate the general direction in which harmony is to be found, and it remains to follow them up into some further detail, in order to form a clearer conception of the nature of harmony, the conditions on which it depends and the life in which it is realized.

CHAPTER VI

THE REALIZED GOOD

1. To understand the structure of harmony we must begin with its constituent atoms. That is to say we must go back to the simple processes by which it is brought step by step into relation with life as a whole.

We have seen how, in any particular case of its exercise, an impulse is affected by the feelings to which it gives rise, how it is furthered by pleasure and inhibited and perhaps frustrated by pain. Now pleasure and pain have effects which do not end with the particular experience in which they arise. They modify our subsequent behaviour, the pleasurable feeling tending to strengthen any pre-existing impulse that led up to that feeling or to create a desire where none existed before. We need not for the moment enquire closely into the psychophysical mechanism involved in this process, which is subtle, complicated and difficult to analyse. We note only the empirical fact. When an impulse results in a pleasurable experience, the pleasure not only strengthens that particular impulse and carries it through to its completion, but has a permanent effect such that when a similar impulse is again suggested by the circumstances of the organism, it is stronger than before, and may continue by the same process to grow in strength till a maximum point is reached. The opposite pair of effects may be attributed to pain. Thus in the pleasurable experience a double harmony is involved. There is the harmony of impulse with feeling in any single case and the wider harmony between numerically different impulses and

feelings of the same class. The impulse in each case gives rise to the experience to which the feeling is attached, and the feeling confirms the impulse. In the case of pain there is at first sheer disharmony—the pain both arrests the individual impulse which has given rise to it, and tends to inhibit the subsequent formation of similar impulses. The effect of this inhibition, however, if carried far enough, is to suppress impulses of the type in question and so reduce conscious disharmony to a minimum.¹

These relations suppose something permanent and yet plastic which the feelings affect and by which the impulses are formed and reformed. How this permanent element which we call the self is to be conceived, what is its relation on the one hand to the body, on the other to the experiences of which we call it the subject, are metaphysical questions which we shall here as far as possible avoid. But our account, though it carries us but a very little way into the life of the self, already forces us to conceive it as something with a certain constitution or organization of its own. That, at least, is the phrase in which we can best sum up the facts. The self feels in a certain way. We cannot regard this feeling as being put into it from without. Even if we conceive it as due in part to the action of external things, e.g. the prick of a pin, still the feeling is the mode in which the self reacts to this stimulus. It is so organized as to give this response to this stimulus. The same may be said of its impulses and of the way in which its impulses are modified by its feelings, and from this modification it results that its organization is not something fixed once for all at the beginning of its experience, but is capable of development. It not only has impulses, experiences and feelings, but it tends to shape or organize them into a harmony. So far as there is a resultant harmony in our actions and experiences it is the expression of the internal harmony of our organization. So far as this internal harmony already exists the impulses that we follow lead to pleasurable ends and these different

¹ It does not, however, follow that all disharmony is overcome, see below, p. 100 ff.

ends are congruous with one another. So far as there is disharmony between act and consequence there is disharmony in the constitution of the self which the experience itself tends to annul. The harmony that we express in the judgment "This is good" even when this is the immediate and unreflective utterance of feeling, may be regarded as the harmony of an impulse or experience with the organization of the self, and in this sense we were justified in speaking of it as an acceptance. Finally, this harmony of any act or experience with the inner organization may be considered as the basis of any harmony found between it and other acts or experiences.

If life consisted in the repetition of certain sets of actions having nothing to do with one another, the matter would end here. The questions of moral practice and moral theory arise precisely because life is not so simple. The experiences that appeal to the natural man are manifold, and they are not mutually consistent. The life of impulse viewed as a whole is not one of harmony, but of chaos. The pleasure of one moment is the pain of another. Even within the animal world we find this conflict giving rise in the course of experience to a certain modification of impulses. How precisely this modification may be brought about at that stage is a question that need not concern us here. What is essential for us, is to consider the conditions of harmony in a mind capable of deliberately comparing one experience with another, and viewing them as a connected whole. Let us again suppose the simplest case. Let us suppose the mind to have to deal with two types of impulse and their attendant satisfactions, and to find that in greater or less degree they conflict, so that indulgence in the one is the destruction of the other. We are to suppose further, that the mind in question has no other interest except in these two directions, so that apart from them we can, for our purposes, say that it is not. Several alternative possibilities are presented by the case. One impulse may entirely overcome the other. Its satisfaction is held good, and indulgence in the rival impulse being an obstacle thereto, is held bad.

In fact, the impulse itself by repeated inhibition may be gradually suppressed. Of the mechanism of this process I say nothing here, and I must not be taken as implying that of any two impulses the stronger necessarily prevails. I doubt whether this is true, except in a sense which makes it quite valueless. Our object is merely to set out the alternative methods of dealing with opposed impulses. There is, then, in the case supposed, consistency in action but a certain disharmony of feeling. If the impulse is relatively superficial the disharmony may be gradually worn away, though only at the cost of some curtailment of the self. In proportion as the impulse is deeply rooted, this process ceases to be possible and we are left with an underlying disharmony in our lives.¹ Another possibility is that the two impulses are equally matched, and that the mind, having no further data to go by, is unable to make a choice. In this case, harmony appears impossible. Action must either swing inconsistently from one pole to the other, or the mind must be reduced to a kind of paralysis in which all interest and pleasure is lost. But lastly a third alternative appears in which one or both forms of impulse undergo a certain modification whereby they become consistent. One of the impulses we may suppose, to take the simplest case, is moderated in intensity or guided towards one class of objects to the exclusion of another, and so remodelled it is found not less satisfying in itself, and fully consistent with the indulgence of its former rival. In this case there is the beginning of something akin to what we call character. Conduct and experience react on raw impulse and re-fashion it. They define its object and so bring it into consistency, even into co-operation with the work of other impulses similarly re-fashioned. Each impulse is, in Aristotelian phrase, brought into the mean. In this case the result is harmonious. There is restraint but no excision. Both types of impulse and feeling subsist.

It will be seen that this solution postulates a distinction between something radical in our impulses and something

¹ See below, pp. 100, 103, etc.

relatively superficial. It assumes that an impulse which primarily expresses itself in one form may in interaction with other impulse-feelings assume a different form, in which it is fully satisfied. A leading instance would be sexual feeling which, indiscriminate in its purely animal phase, is, by a fusion of psychical influences, concentrated in an impassioned devotion to one person wherein, as long as the fusion endures, its satisfaction is complete. It is only so far as some such transformation occurs that harmony proper between originally conflicting impulses becomes possible. We cannot *a priori* assume its possibility, but that it does as a fact play a large part in life is matter of experience, and recent psychology shows the converse truth to be equally important. It shows that the radical impulse which is apparently—so to say, officially—suppressed, takes its revenge either in disturbance of the mental life or in some object or outlet foreign to its original direction, and perhaps more fatally, though more subtly, inconsistent with real harmony.

In general what we call the superficial impulse is the particular application, or else the specific development, of a generic want. To take a very trivial instance, it makes very little difference whether I satisfy my appetite with beef or with mutton, provided that either meat agrees with me. But whether I am to satisfy my hunger at all or go famished is a much more serious matter. Again, an epicure may demand delicacies. This demand lies deeper than the requirement of a particular luxury, but in the normal man is itself a relatively superficial form of the appetite for anything wholesome and well cooked. So of the contented man Calverley sings :—

“ The grouse, the duck, the early pea
By such, if there, are freely taken.
If not, they munch with equal glee
Their bit of bacon.”

Thus on a root impulse of hunger which cannot go unsatisfied, or permanently under-satisfied, without serious dislocation of our organization, there is an embroidery of

more specific desires in a decreasing order of importance. This conception may, I think, be generalized and we can then recognize the foundations of inner harmony in the satisfaction of the deepest impulses for which all the more superficial forms are rightly sacrificed. A moral psychology is required which should give us the hierarchy of impulses and show us definitely, what at present we perhaps feel rather than scientifically apprehend, which are our deepest needs and what the conditions of their mutually consistent satisfaction.

In any case harmony is possible so far as radical impulses admit of mutual adjustment in their several objects or expressions, and so far as such harmony is attainable it forms a rational system in accordance with our previous definition, and the conception of the good that accords with it is a rational conception. For by the rational as we have conceived it, we mean on the side of cognition an order of thought which forms a coherent whole out of all available elements of experience. It is to be comprehensive as well as consistent. All experience must be admitted, and no mutually incompatible renderings of experience can be tolerated. The work of building up the rational order, however, proceeds piecemeal. Bit by bit masses of experience are formed into connected groups by interpretative conceptions, and these conceptions are in turn brought into relation with one another. If they conflict, rational thought seeks a modification which will reduce them to consistency, but it aims at consistency, not by ignoring any element of experience, but by remodelling the interpretation of it, and it modifies its interpretation only so far as the needs of consistency throughout its interpretation of experience require. Applying the same conception to conduct, and in particular to that practical attitude of approval or acceptance which we speak of as the judgment of the good, we may say that the rational good must similarly form a coherent whole in which every element of apparent goodness is duly weighed, that it is irrational to include in our conception of the good, elements that conflict with each

other, and equally irrational to exclude any element except on the ground that it conflicts with some other, and that when such conflict arises, the problem is to find a synthesis in which each element is as far as possible preserved. It is, of course, possible that a conflict might be such as could only be ended by the complete extinction of one impulse. But supposing that the end could equally well be achieved by a partial modification not involving suppression, this would be the more rational course. We have, in fact, so far seen no reason for inhibiting and suppressing one kind of impulse, except in the interest of some other impulse or experience with which it conflicts, some disharmony which it causes, and to the extent which this interest requires and no further. That is to say, the primary judgment involved in our acceptance of an experience holds good, except so far as it conflicts with other elements of satisfaction of similar origin. We see, so far, no reason in suppressing any impulse merely for the sake of suppressing it. We see such reason only in the modification rendered necessary by the requirement of harmony throughout our practical attitude, i.e. throughout our ends as a whole. The judgment of the good expressed our acceptance of an experience and that we found was the same thing as saying that it harmonized with a feeling which is a part of our "organization." Now we find that such *prima facie* harmony may lead to a deeper conflict and as rational beings we seek to overcome this conflict, and seek a harmonious satisfaction for our "organization" as a whole. At this stage, then, we judge good that which fits in with this **more** comprehensive organization. All that so harmonizes is good, and nothing else. To reject anything that belongs to this whole is to lose some element of the good. An avoidable and therefore an irrational disharmony is involved in the needless suppression of an impulse which, if suitably modified, would in fact consist with those which we cherish.

It is, then, by remodelling and transforming impulse that the principle of harmony makes for many-sided

development and fullness of life. Outwardly, indeed, harmony appears most readily attainable through repression. If a refractory feeling is simply kept under it fails to disturb the orderly system of conduct. But there is here a confusion between harmony and order. The type of feeling which is merely repressed, and subsists in the mind as a permanent impulse without an outlet, is a source of permanent internal disharmony. It may be that such repression is unavoidable, but if so the dammed up current remains a permanent menace to the order of life. The truer solution is always to find the channel along which it may safely run, in other words, to train the feeling and direct it towards objects which do not clash with the other accepted purposes and rules of life. In the provision of such an outlet there is net gain, not only in the economy of internal friction which repression involves, but in the fuller life which the utilization of each fresh spring of impulse renders possible. The harmony reached through development is always more complex and is more difficult to attain than the order based on repression, but it is intrinsically good, while repression is at best a necessary evil.¹

¹ The first announcement of the Principle of Harmony as the basis alike of personal and social well-being is, I suppose, to be found in Plato (*Republic*, bk. IV, p. 443, Tr. Davies and Vaughan): "... the just man will not permit the several principles within him to do any work but their own, nor allow the distinct classes in his soul to interfere with each other, but will really set his house in order, and having gained the mastery over himself, will so regulate his character as to be on good terms with himself, and to set those three principles in tune together, as if they were verily three chords of a harmony, a higher and a lower and a middle, and whatever may lie between these; and after he has bound all these together, and reduced the many elements of his nature to a real unity, as a temperate and duly harmonized man, he will then at length proceed to do whatever he may have to do, whether it involve the acquisition of property or attention to the wants of his body, whether it be a state affair or a business transaction of his own; in all which he will believe and profess that the just and honourable course is that which preserves and assists in creating the aforesaid habit of mind, and that the genuine knowledge which presides over such conduct is wisdom; while

2. The process described may be succinctly formulated as the development of personality. By development is meant, for our purposes, progressive fulfilment. There is fulfilment in the realization of any capacity, as in the active exercise of an organ or the satisfaction of a desire. There is development in the strengthening of the organ by exercise or the reinforcement of an impulse by a

on the other hand, he will hold that an unjust action is one which tends to destroy this habit, and that the mere opinion which presides over unjust conduct, is folly." This passage, however, must be read with the earlier description of Temperance (p. 432a) as a concord between the better and the worse elements as to which of the two has the right to govern. From this it will be seen that, in spite of the identity of name and partial agreement of idea, there is a material difference between this conception and ours. Plato's harmony is essentially a subjection of the Desires and Appetites to reason—the larger part of the soul, as he himself says, to the smaller. Reason is a governing principle, and Desire has nothing to do but obey. The position of the intermediate "spirited" or emotional element is more honourable in that it is the natural ally of Reason, but it is still subject to rational direction. The view here taken is that harmony is not a subjection of any part to any other, but a process of mutual development, and that reason does not govern this process *ab extra* but is the principle of mutuality within it. (It is right to remark, however, that the negative function attributed to Desire is partly corrected by many other passages in Plato.)

The present view of harmony is much closer to the Aristotelian doctrine. The *ὁρθὸς λόγος* which defines the mean is incompletely described in the *Ethics*, but the term is suggestive of a relation between the means in all cases which would at least yield consistency, which is the negative side of harmony. In his description of the *σπουδαῖος* Aristotle describes in his own fashion of half-conscious humour the life that is internally harmonious in our sense: "... the good man is of one mind with himself, and desires the same things with all his soul, and wishes for himself what both is and seems good. . . . Such a man also wishes to live with himself; for his own company is pleasant to him. The memory of his past life is sweet, and for the future he has good hopes; and such hopes are pleasant. His mind, moreover, is well stored with matter for contemplation: and he sympathizes with himself in sorrow and in joy; for at all seasons the same things give him pain and pleasure, not this thing now, and then another thing—for he is, so to speak, not apt to change his mind" (*Ethics*, ix. 4, Tr. Peters).

satisfactory experience, which makes a still further and, so to say, fuller fulfilment possible. Every development is itself a fulfilment, but is also a step to a further fulfilment, having as its goal a maximum or saturation point of fulfilment beyond which no advance is possible, but only the maintenance of that which has been achieved. By Personality is meant that constitution of the self which our account has postulated, that operative unity which, by the continual interrelation of action and experience, gives to each man's active life whatever cohesion and whatever individuality it manifests. If we think of the outer world as supplying the material of a possible life to each of us, the impress given to this material is the impress of our personality. This impress differs by shades if not by deeper contrasts from case to case. In particular the degree in which interrelation is effected varies very greatly. If it should fail altogether we should deny that personality existed and the attribute of personality is, in fact, refused to men deemed incapable of appreciating the permanent bearings of momentary impulse. If the threads of relation are broken and then spun afresh we call it a changed personality. If the interrelation is very incomplete the personality strikes us as chaotic, irrational, inconsistent in varying degrees. On the other hand, in proportion as it is complete, the personality stands out as a strongly-marked self-consistent individuality, imposing its type upon experience and moulding its fortunes to its own will. Clearly, then, while personality interrelates all partial developments, it itself admits of development, and it is in general on this central development that the others depend, since without it they may clash and destroy one another and life itself.

Now personality itself, as we know, may be incomplete and onesided. It may starve itself of one meat and glut upon another. It may unify its life by ruthless repression. There is a "development" of the miser or the ascetic. But these are not developments of the personality as a whole, but of one part to the prejudice of others. Development as a whole means development on all sides

that can in fact be reconciled, and though necessarily subject to all the limitations of human finitude—even the restricted quantum of available energy necessitating the sacrifice of one good thing for another—the ideal is clear and we can set our faces towards it if we cannot reach it. The development of personality so conceived will involve (1) a harmonization of impulse-feelings; (2) control of the conditions on which the success of every impulse depends, that is to say, of the world of experience generally, so far as it affects the individual. This constitutes the harmonious fulfilment required by the rational good, so far as this can be realized within the life of the individual. If we mean by the development of personality the establishment of the principle of harmony within us, then that is broadly the psychological condition of the rational good. If we mean by it the actual process of the full and harmonious life, then it is the good itself so far as it can be realized in one human being.

3. So far, following out the psychological conditions of synthesis, we have considered the question as though the individual stood alone in the moral world. We have, indeed, referred to an environment, but we have not assumed that that environment contained any being with claims upon the self. Yet without making any such assumption we have been able to distinguish an apparent, or, as we might say, subjective good from a permanent real or objective good, to identify the one with the pleasurable feeling based on a single susceptibility of the self, and the other with the harmony in which the whole soul is expressed. We have seen that this harmony of judgment or feeling has as its aim or, to put it otherwise, its objective expression, the harmony of experience and action as far as the control of the personality can be extended. We have, in short, been able to conceive the elements of a rational ethics within the limits of a single personality.

But, of course, this way of regarding the matter is a mere fiction, introduced for convenience, and as has been

said above, we are not to suppose that the ethics of the self are either logically or chronologically built up first and then the ethics of altruism added on. Prominent among the stimuli of the environment upon each individual are phases of the behaviour of other people, and prominent among the susceptibilities, the conations and the feelings of each are from the first those which have relation to others. Indeed there is not the slightest doubt that this altruistic reference begins psychologically long before the distinction of self and others is clearly made in consciousness. We can trace it in the organic world in instincts that arise at a level far below that in which distinctness of personality is formed. The transpersonal reference, then, is a constitutive element in the normal personality. Moreover, as has also been said, these transpersonal references—at least, so far as they make for co-operation and mutual understanding—may be collectively regarded as partial expressions and emotional renderings of the truth which is in ethics the most essential part of the rational principle itself. This is the truth that each personality is itself but a part of a whole, and its harmony an element in a wider harmony. Just as it is irrational to follow a single impulse by itself without considering its relation to other impulses, so at a higher remove the irrational in morality is the practice of taking the self out of connexion with other selves, or a group out of relation with a wider group as the whole instead of as the part. We are thus brought from the psychological to the social synthesis, and to trace its operation we may start from the individual personality and follow the same method as before. What falls in with our approval is *prima facie* good, and we remodel our first judgment only so far as the needs of harmony require. Hence the “good” of each personality—the development in which a mass of susceptibilities egoistic and altruistic were harmonized, must be remodelled so far but only so far as is required by the necessity for harmony with the effort and aim of others. The end must now be the harmonious development, not of the

individual personality as such, but of all that group with which the individual can enter into organic relation—ideally of nothing less than collective humanity.

We might express this result by saying that we apply to conduct the rational principle that similars must be treated similarly and that, as a certain development is good for me, so a similar development is good for others who are similar to me. But this mode of expression, as has been shown above, suggests, if it does not actually involve, more than one element of fallacy. To begin with, it treats the conception of goodness as formed for self on one ground and transferred to others by a piece of intellectual ratiocination. The truth is that the process is the same throughout and is essentially conative or practical rather than intellectual. The principle of the practical reason is that the action of each moment is to be fitted into the entire scheme of conduct. This is an abstract or intellectualist expression for the effort towards harmony, which is common to the whole of the moral consciousness, which pieces the personality together as well as binding man with man. This effort is never merely "cognitive," i.e. it is never confined to the recognition of something that is already there. It is the element operative always in the shaping of conduct and character. It does not begin with the building of the personality and then proceed to the building of society, for in the shaping of the personality the transpersonal reference is abundantly present. Nor, lastly, is it quite true to conceive my good as a fixed datum from which to infer that of other people. For no person's good is definitely fixed till the whole is considered. The datum at any stage is the *prima facie* good, and the conclusion at the full development of that stage is the harmony wherein the *prima facie* good is in greater or less degree modified. Self-development, as such, does not, in short, remain part of the social ideal. Rather all personal development is good as long as it is capable of harmony, and given harmony, the wider the sphere of development, the greater the good attained.

Nevertheless there is a sense in which social development may be understood as the synthesis of the development of individuals. So far as the achievement of each man is truly social, it fits in with and advances the achievement of others, and the "structure" so built up is a collective work, "a general deed of man," which grows from generation to generation. The conditions of this growth, indeed, differ markedly in the case of different social products. In the matter of organized knowledge it is comparatively easy for the more gifted individual to enter into the heritage of generous social effort. The young mathematician can soon learn much that Newton never knew. Thus, placed abreast of the best thought of the age, it is relatively easy to make an advance which will definitely carry knowledge a little further. The body of definite knowledge—eminently a social product—develops steadily by a kind of mechanical accretion. The case is much the same with the material capital of society, its roads and railways, its buildings and laboratories, and with the immaterial tradition of industrial and artistic skill. Such developments may be steady and continuous, and are rarely arrested or lost except through some social cataclysm proceeding from other causes. On the side of conduct, of ethical ideas and practice and of established social relations, the matter is somewhat more complex. The established tradition is indeed always of inestimable value, but it is hardly to be developed and improved with the same certainty. In ethics and in religion it is not possible to communicate the whole meaning of truth by teaching. Each man has to enter into it anew for himself. The social milieu is much, but it is not everything. Ideas of life have to be reincarnated in every fresh living experience, and as each individual is exposed to his own dangers and temptations, so the changing circumstances of a people provide new opportunities, open out fresh dangers, which act as social temptations and often lower the standard or weaken the principle which an earlier generation had fought hard to set up. On the ethical side, therefore, progress is less

steady. Yet the whole mass of social institutions, of philosophical, ethical and religious conceptions as well as the heritage of the imaginative world, of literature and art, must of course rank among social developments and owe their rise and progress to the action of mind on mind a million times repeated. The harmony that governs them, that determines their value and ultimately conditions their growth is centred, not in the individual personality, but in that which we call metaphorically the social mind, an expression for the resultant directive force of the complex interaction of innumerable individuals and of successive generations. The supreme development—that which embraces all that is good in all subordinate developments—is that which, bringing this central directive force from infancy to maturity, welds all partial fulfilments into a coherent scheme and moves to the harmony of experience and feeling as a whole.

Now the ordinary purposes and impulses of men lead them along the line of one subordinate development or another, but it is only the authority of the moral law that keeps these various ends from utter divergence, and it is only a completely rationalized ethics that could so direct them as to establish real harmony among them. The problems of conduct arise because the different lines of human development are not naturally harmonious, and this is why the good as we know it does not appear to consist in development alone, but involves also much repression—so much that the negative commandments often occupy the most prominent place. But here again the truer view is that repression only exists for the sake of fuller development, and we may conceive this development as the working out in a great variety of forms, and under much diversity of conditions, of a unitary principle.

In tracing the emergence of order in the consciousness of the individual we were led to conceive of the personality as a comprehensive, self-consistent impulse, organizing the subordinate impulses of the self and the world of experience with which it comes into contact, into a harmony. Now extending our view to the whole world

of living activity and feeling we have to conceive of a wider impulse similarly related to each separate personality, and thus tending to an organicity of human life and experience as a whole. The building up of isolated impulses into the Self or Person, and the union of separate individuals in a social bond may be regarded as the two great movements of synthesis, which between them bridge the whole gulf between the isolated impulse and the complete harmony of activity and feeling. It is, we have contended, a serious error to suppose that these two forms of synthesis are separate in their operation, for it is precisely the same living impulse towards organization and harmony that runs through both. But they are based on specific differences of relation within the unity, and may be briefly designated the principle of Personality and the principle of Love. The shaping of impulse under the developing influence of these principles, is, to put the matter in the most general terms, the condition of Harmony.¹

4. In this account Development figures as a means, and Harmony as the real end, and this is in a sense the true relation. But there is another side to the matter. (a) In any stage short of complete maturity harmony is as much a cause as an effect of Development. We have seen the relation at its simplest in the development of a faculty or susceptibility where feeling is in harmony with impulse. The satisfaction in each experience confirms

¹ We set out to enquire into the two departments of Harmony, that of feelings *inter se*, and that of feeling in general. Now we have found two principles of development. The temptation to pair them off, one principle for each department, is obvious, but must be resisted. We naturally incline to make Love the basis of harmony in feeling, and to see in this principle, taken separately, the ground of that submissive acceptance of the external order which becomes religious Quietism. Then again we could see pushing, self-assertive, practical Personality shouldering the task, which Love in its gentleness declines, of subduing refractory elements in human or external nature. But in fact the "conquest" of nature is more a collective than a personal achievement, while conversely, some unification of impulse-feeling has been shown to be required by Personality.

the impulse and carries it through to the end. It also deepens the hold of that type of impulse and so tends to carry it to its maximum point of strength. It is only when this maximum is reached that growth ceases. Similarly, so far as the different powers or susceptibilities of a man form a harmonious whole, it follows from the bare conception of such a whole that they tend to strengthen one another. If it is true, as the Greeks maintained, that virtue is one, it is because each virtue which, so far as it is separable, may be regarded as a development of one side of human nature, is favourable to the corresponding growth of other virtues. Courage and Temperance, as a Greek would have said, are conditions of justice, for in one sort of difficulty it needs a high spirit and contempt of danger, in another it needs moderation of passions and self-control to fulfil the demand of duty to our neighbour or to the community. In the same way the good citizen is, so to say, essentially a co-operative unit. He contributes something to the common life of society, which upon the whole tends to raise the standard of the common life and to assist in the further development of good citizenship. In each case it is equally true that what is bad tends to propagate corruption, but if the corruption goes far enough, death ensues, death of the will in the individual or of the social structure in the case of the community, and the only growth is of the cancerous type that must finally destroy the tissue in which it lives. Lastly, any purpose recognized as good is necessarily assisted and carried further by the will which so recognizes it, and if different purposes ultimately find a harmony they must similarly tend to mutual assistance and a common growth. The limit in every case is fullness of development. Wherever it is reached, wherever, for example, a structure has reached the full growth which the conditions of its existence admit, harmony has its effect, not in the further development, but in the maintenance of that structure at the point of fullest efficiency. But where the limits of growth are undefined, harmony is manifested in development, and wherever there is

repression there is *pro tanto* disharmony. Now the scope of the mind as an organizing principle in the world has no limits known to us. We may conceive a heaven in which mind, having attained its full stature, would find its good in the fruition of the perfect harmony finally achieved in an "energy of realization without process of change." But, short of this heaven, Harmony and Development continue to support and advance one another.

(b) Of the two it is Harmony, we have granted, which is the ultimate end. But if we regard Development as a means, it is partly because it is a process, incomplete and pointing beyond itself. We defined it as a progressive fulfilment. Now conversely, we can enlarge the conception of fulfilment to cover not only its ideal completeness, but any stage on the way. Fulfilment, then, becomes another name for Development in its static aspect—not as something in process, but as something which has attained a certain level. Now Fulfilment so regarded has a higher status in the good than that of a mere means. It is the *résumé* of all that mass of living experience which has been definitely brought into harmony with feeling.

Harmony of feeling and experience appears, to begin with, in the fulfilment of Conation. In the case of clear purpose this means the attainment of the end with which the purpose sets out. In the case of the lower grades of conation it means the removal of the discomfort or lack from which the conation starts. In the more passive experiences in which conation plays a secondary part, there is, where we find harmony, a touching into life of emotional susceptibility, an active realization of what was a dormant capacity. Here, too, then, something that is at first a mere potentiality is completed. A capacity of reaction finds the object appropriate to it and issues in activity. This also we may call fulfilment. Thus the good consists in the fulfilment of vital capacity, but the rational good cannot consist in the fulfilment of any and every sort of capacity, since one fulfilment may destroy another. It can consist only in such fulfilments as are in mutual consistency. These, when life is considered as

a whole, will also yield the greatest sum of fulfilment.¹ In fact, so far as our vital capacities attain or approach realization as a whole, it can only be through a scheme which is internally consistent in its practical operation. The rational good then, as the mode of life sustained by a harmony of feeling, is a harmonious fulfilment of vital capacity, or the fulfilment of vital capacity as a whole. Feeling in harmony with its object is what we call Pleasure. The body of feeling in harmony with itself and the body of its objects is what we call happiness. Viewed as feeling, then, the Rational Good is happiness, viewed as the object of this feeling it is the fulfilment of vital capacity as a consistent whole.² Viewed in both aspects together it is happiness found in such fulfilment. It is an error to regard either the feeling as a mere means to the fulfilment or the fulfilment as a mere means to the feeling. The fulfilment is the object of the feeling, not in the sense of its aim, but in the sense of that in relation to which the feeling subsists. Finally, the sense of harmony which is pleasure and happiness does not come into being first with complete fulfilment, neither does it perish with fulfilment, as some think, but is active all along the line

¹ For if anything be added it must by hypothesis cancel something that has been included. That something has been included either (1) because it harmonized with the rest of the system while the proposed addition conflicted. In that case to make the addition would not only cancel one element but the system generally. Or (2) because it was the more strongly felt, i.e. rested on a larger energy of impulse or realized a richer feeling. In that case it is in itself the fuller realization of capacity.

² It may be said that, in the fulfilment of purpose, the point is not the realization of any capacity but the attainment of an objective end. In fact neither in knowledge nor in action can the conscious mind dispense with an object, but the reason why we describe the object in terms of mind rather than the impulse or will in terms of the object is this. The thing to be achieved is that in which impulses of our own, modified by reflections of our own, take precise form and direction, and if it is good and fruitful the thing achieved meets a need of our own, and so returns into and helps to further the system of impulses and needs, of each of which in turn the same things may be said.

of conation as far as it is working with success. There is pleasure in pursuit, but if the prize is solid, that is in harmony with the permanent scheme of vital fulfilment, as in the fruition of a genuine love, there is equal pleasure in attainment and possession.

It may be asked whether we ought not to regard practical rationality still more broadly as an impulse to harmony in reality as a whole, not merely in the world of feeling. Harmony as the mutual support of parts seems in itself to have a wider application, to be realized, in fact, in every structure, even a purely material structure, which, as a whole, maintains itself. Thus the keystone of an arch keeps in place the bricks which keep it in place. The several parts of the arch maintain one another. On the other hand, there seems to be nothing "good" or "bad" about an arch, except the purely external, human, purpose which it serves. A somewhat more difficult case is an object of beauty. Here, again,¹ there is the relation of harmony, different parts necessitating one another, and it would not be so easy to say offhand that the object as a whole has no value in itself. The mutilation of Rheims Cathedral seemed something terrible, apart from any injury to feeling or loss to the artistic enjoyment of human beings. On reflection, however, I believe that we find an element of illusion in a sentiment of this kind. A visible world which there is no one to see is not, in my opinion, as it is in that of many, an expression without a meaning, because I do not believe that surfaces and colours, light and shade, depend for their existence upon the observer. Whether a beautiful world which there is no one to appreciate has a meaning is a point on which, for myself, I am more doubtful, i.e. I cannot feel sure that beauty is a character of things independent of their relation to a contemplating mind.

¹ That is to say, in developed art. The beautiful as such is in harmony with feeling, but the question here is of a harmony within the beautiful object over and above harmony with feeling. Some of the difficulties in defining the elements of beauty as consisting in a harmony in this sense have been hinted at above (chap. iv, p. 69 *note*). I cannot examine them here.

But a world in which beauty has value or is good, although there is none to value it or find the good in it, does seem to me to contain a contradiction. That is to say, I believe value and goodness to be conditioned by the life of mind. This, I think, is the consequence of our original definition. We found "good" to mean not harmony in general, but harmony with some disposition of mind, and developing this we found rational good to reside in a harmony carried consistently through the world of mind and its experience, a harmony of mind with itself and with its object. It is not, then, harmony as such, but harmony in and with Mind that is good.

Even this formula, however, seems to carry us a step beyond our original definition. If a beautiful object has no value apart from mind, is there not a sense in which it has an intrinsic value *for* mind? It is not valued as a means, but as a joy of itself. Does its goodness, then, reside only in the activity of creation or contemplation? This is surely as one-sided an abstraction as the goodness of the object apart from the mind. Goodness we found originally was in the harmony of feeling and object, and we granted the validity of the term for each element in this relation. The object, then, which of itself and not as a mere means to something else, yields satisfaction, must be deemed good, and we must extend our definition of the rational good to include along with the fulfilment of vital capacity the system of objects which such fulfilment involves, the system, we may phrase it, in which the mind finds itself at home. This system will include material objects, all that is beautiful for instance and all manifestations of structural perfection and vast ordered energy. But there will always be this distinction between material things and animate beings, that the "goodness" of a material thing involves its relation to a mind. It is good in the sense that it is an indispensable element in a whole that is good (as contrasted with a mere instrument which may be indifferently replaced with another). The mind, on the other hand, that enjoys any harmony is (to that extent) a good of itself, requiring no further

condition to complete it. But this harmony may require material objects not merely as instruments but as part of its constitution. To recognize this we should, I think, define the good as Happiness in the fulfilment of vital capacity in a world adapted to Mind.

6. In this definition Happiness means Happiness of all beings capable thereof ; fulfilment of vital capacity means fulfilment in all living beings so far as it can attain harmonious expression. It is this universal harmony of feeling and vital activity which is the good, and the end which each individual is required to serve, not his own happiness or the fulfilment of his own powers. How the good of the individual is related to this comprehensive end has been indicated in the preceding sections. In general confirmation of that analysis it may be added here that of empirical truths about happiness, few are more certain than this—that the individual must find happiness in objects beyond himself. Neither his own happiness nor the fulfilment of his own personality is an adequate statement of an end which will satisfy permanently a finite individual. Shut up in the self he is stifled and, whether it be called happiness or self-development, there is the same stuffiness in the confined atmosphere. The self must have some other person to care for, even, if it can get nothing better, some material object to pursue. It must fasten itself to the larger world by some attachment that gives a man a reason for continued existence, even if it be nothing more thrilling than that

“ Somewhat completer, he may say,
My list of Coleoptera.”

No one is wholly unhappy who finds some external interest to engage him, but neither is he very happy if his interests are such as to leave large tracts of his natural capacity unfulfilled. This fulfilment is material to the happiness of the individual, but the first condition of any fulfilment is that he should look beyond himself.

Where, then, is he to look ? According to our definition he is to look to anything great or small, personal or

impersonal, that contributes to the fullness of life upon the whole. Thus, whether he is bringing up his child or serving the State, or stubbing Thornaby waste, he is doing his part in a harmonious movement. But, it may be asked, why should the fulfilment of another personality (e.g. in the education of the child) be an end of true value when self-fulfilment is not such an end? The answer may be put in various ways, of which perhaps the simplest is that there is nothing complete without love. Though one person cannot be happy in himself, two people can be very happy in one another and as objects to one another—so happy that they may think that they need no one and no thing else. This, however, is a fallacy of exaggeration which leads to the *égoïsme à deux*. The pair need a common object that takes them beyond each other, and if the child seems to complete this trinity it is because the promise of its life points them on and on into a vista which has no closed end.¹ Even a great community that cultivates its own life in isolation and indifference to the rest of mankind is open to the charge of collective egoism and the danger of ultimate sterility.

Pursuing this line of thought we are forced to ask whether humanity itself is not subject to the same law. Can it make its own fulfilment its goal, even if we include with this the making of the world into a home of order and beauty? Would not the whole race be involved in an egoism and ultimate sterility thus shut up within itself, and must it not find something entirely outside itself to serve? If Humanity is only one incarnation of Mind this would be in our definition true. It has not

¹ Compare Ruskin's postulate of some "escape" into the Beyond as an element of the highest æsthetic effect in painting. Observe too that, in his teaching, this condition has to be reconciled with the still more essential requirement of Repose. This reconciliation of apparent opposites seems to be the problem both of life and of art. We demand objects that satisfy, and yet it seems to be a condition that they should point beyond themselves and thus not wholly satisfy—a paradox which is resolved if we have the grounded confidence that what is wholly good breeds more good and more in unending sequence. Here there is at least a hint of assuagement for the human lot of "infinite passion and the pain of finite hearts that yearn."

merely to care for the lower forms of life but to enter into relation with whatever beings have mind. But if we take Humanity as the head of the only living creation that we know, or if for Humanity we simply substitute Mind, can we assign for it any object but the self-fulfilment of our definition? We can think of the fulfilment of Mind as having value, we can think of some things other than minds as having a value conditioned by mind—a value for mind. Can we think of anything else that has value, and which could, accordingly, be an object for Mind to serve? If not we must keep to our definition, but can we then avoid the charge of a kind of egoism and ultimate sterility which has pursued us from the individual onwards? The reply, I think, is this. We saw that egoism was transformed by love when only one other person came within the orbit of interest. But we saw a narrow finitude and an ugly indifference to the fate of others involved in the exclusiveness of personal affection. These characteristics fade gradually away as the circle is enlarged. In particular in the wider life of a great community nothing comes to an end. The effects of action, good or bad, do not cease. The possibilities of development are without assignable limit. Yet still, if there is indifference to a wider world there is something lacking. Love clearly is unfulfilled, and there is a limit to the expansiveness of faculty and achievement where there is no desire to share the fruits with all who can enjoy them. These limits disappear only when we come to the whole world of mind, aware of itself as a unity bound together by love and reason. Nothing imagined as of possible value, nothing capable of happiness or misery is shut out. The distinction of self and other has vanished, because outside this "self" there is no other. The ego must find an object because it needs love, and it needs something to connect it with the world of mind. But the world of mind is based on love within, and has nothing without to connect itself with. Thus its end is the achievement and maintenance of a harmony within, while to the individual it is an object in which he may certainly share but which stretches far and wide beyond his own personality.

CHAPTER VII

APPLICATIONS

I. THE rational principle is not only an ideal but a working impulse in man and society. So far, it resembles the spiritual principle of Idealism. But it is of the first importance to make clear that it is an impulse working under cramping limitations. Idealist writers explain imperfections by the incomplete development of their principle. In truth, this is merely a negative condition. The irrational and immoral elements in life, its cruelties and injustices and Pharisaisms, have springs of which Reason, developed or undeveloped, is innocent. They go back to the man who fights for his own hand, the impulse that pursues its regardless course, the limiting physical conditions that bind man to the immediate, a menacing environment with which reason germinating slowly has to grapple as best she may. Far from dominating the actual moral code, reason, as an explicit conception, is the latest comer on the field. The working code of morals grows up, as has been shown, out of the countless interactions of man with man, the feelings which they excite, the kind of life which they make possible or impossible. Consider, for instance, the genesis of public justice. Following an impulse of resentment a man seeks to avenge an injury. He kills his man, and in turn arouses the wrath of the victim's son. The son appeals to uncle and cousin, gets help, and seeks to retaliate. Through such retaliation the manslayer and his kindred, it may be, learn a lesson in moderation. Or, perhaps, a woman connected by blood with one party and by marriage with the other intervenes

and makes peace. A settlement is achieved and becomes a precedent, and there emerges a rule regulating the occasions and the degree of vengeance, or possibly prescribing the conditions and nature of compensation for injuries. Where no such lessons are learnt, where a tribe proves itself incapable of being taught, it may disappear through internal anarchy, or become a prey to a more disciplined neighbour. The actual conditions of life are there and are sternly operative, whether men have reason enough to apprehend them or no. They must, on the whole, operate selectively, giving to those whose emotions are more nearly attuned to the actual requirements of their life-conditions, or who are best able to modify their passions and direct their actions as the conditions require, an advantage and an eventual preponderance over others. The rational mode of feeling, the emotion which in kind and degree responds to what is really good in human life, owes its original growth, not to the clear apprehension of the function which it performs, but to the bare fact that in performing that function it helps to keep society together, and to develop and expand its life. Just as organs and impulses which serve the individual tend to grow because on the whole those who possess them thrive and are fruitful and multiply, so, at a higher remove, modes of feeling, and finally ideas and thoughts which serve society have this indirect advantage over others, that in so far as they predominate the society which they inspire is more likely to prosper and expand or impose its type upon its neighbours. There are filaments of Reason, as was said at the outset, but filaments are not the matured structure. They grow because they do, in fact, correspond to fundamental conditions of life, not because the life which they create is clearly conceived. Reason comes by her own, not because men willingly and consciously accept her, but because unreason carried far enough produces miseries and disasters. Sufficiently grave departures, whether to the right hand or to the left, either produce reactions or lead to social dissolution. Against dissolute practice,

society will perhaps erect the barrier of a stringent theory, and save itself in turn from the consequences of the theory by a network of tacit understandings forming a secondary and more genuine code of conduct beside or behind that which men outwardly profess. The price of luxury is disorder, the price of undue strictness is insincerity, and both prices will be paid until men seek to found conduct on the dispassionate consideration of what is permanently in accord with the requirements of human nature under the conditions of social life.

In the actual formation of the working code the whole range of human emotions, good, bad and indifferent, play their part. Not only all that makes us citizens, but all that makes us men and all that makes us animals has its share. Take the case of the complex customs and ideas that in every society cluster round the relations of the sexes. The function of these customs is to maintain the family life at its best, and to serve the development of affections and emotions that are most vital to the happiness of men and women. But what part has any clear conception of such a function played in the actual determination of custom, or law, or sexual morality? The actual family morals, that is to say the whole assemblage of law, custom and social feeling regulating the relations of the sexes and the procreation and rearing of children in any society, is a complex whole derivable from a medley of forces, psychological and social, which it would be exceedingly difficult to analyse in full and which, moreover, interact with one another in ways which are never quite the same in any two cases. There is, first, the mass of feeling that clusters round the sex relationship. There is conjugal and family affection, and running across it the yellow streak of mere animal jealousy. Perhaps underlying jealousy itself and almost certainly contributing to the respect for virginity and disgust at the unchaste, is the impulse, half physical in origin, to isolation, the readily awakened feeling of repugnance to contact, the antithesis to the sexual passion. On such primitive material of emotional tendency operate

now the self-assertion of the male, leading him to appropriate whom he can and guard his own, now the fear of ridicule and contempt if he fails to hold his claim, now a more ethical sense of compunction, of justice and of responsibility. Elements of emotion such as these, complex as they are, are only a few among the factors that go to form the morals of the family. Side by side with them and interacting with them in subtle ways, we must place the social relations of the family, the form of property, the prevailing state of industry, and the religious ideas acknowledged in the society. Where kinship, for example, is the basis of mutual protection, the family will tend to hold together and build up large aggregates of kinsfolk and neighbours, prepared to stand solidly together in the blood feud. The joint possession of flocks and herds, or possibly of agricultural land, may find for each member the means of sustenance and of useful occupation under the patriarchal guidance of the oldest male of the kin, and the common worship of the ancestor and the performance of the due funeral rites to the dead may strengthen the bond and deepen the sense of permanent family unity by all the sanctity of religion. At another stage of development all these forces may have shifted. The function of protection may have been assumed by the King or the State, industry may no longer be confined to pastoral or agricultural pursuits, the worship of ancestors may be condemned by religion, and offerings to the dead have lost their significance. The family has become perhaps a mobile and far smaller unit. It is reduced to parents and their children, and it may be that children scarcely remain under the parental roof till they are grown up, while comparative facility of divorce impairs the stability of the conjugal relation itself. It is well in such a case, where the functions of the family have largely changed, if there is sufficiently clear understanding of its permanent function and value to supply the place of a religious code dating from an earlier sociological stratum.

It is not, however, our business here to discuss the ethics of family life, but merely to suggest by the very

slightest analysis of one example the contrast between the rational determination of a custom by the function which it serves, and the actual conditions of its growth, as dependent on a confused mass of feelings and ideas played upon by social forces and religious doctrines, and shaped by traditions which may or may not have outlived their usefulness.

What has been said of the family applies with equal force to any part of the social structure and even to current morality as a system of judgments. Moralists have concentrated their interest on one fundamental question about moral psychology. Has it at its core conscience or self-love, reason or passion, altruism or egoism? It is true that any ethical enquiry would start from this question and take us back to it again, but there is a circuit embracing questions more psychological than philosophical which are of extreme interest in themselves and of great importance when we begin to apply philosophical conceptions to working life. Having made our view of the core, it is hoped, sufficiently plain we may well consider the husks which are to be stripped off. Now, if we look at the actual impulses underlying the moral judgments that men commonly pronounce and the behaviour in which these issue, we have to recognize in them a good deal that is neither very rational nor even social. In the very essence of moral censorship there is an anti-social element, a pursuit of the sinner, an exaltation of self, something at times of the hunting instinct, something of "herd" psychology. The contemplation of exalted virtue may give pleasure, but it is to be feared that it is a less exciting pleasure and one less consciously felt than that which the audacious or even the despicable criminal daily affords to the readers of countless newspapers. "What's one man's news," said Mr. Dooley, "is another man's misfortunes," and in particular he might have added his moral misadventures. The reasons for this interest are complex. On the one hand there is a kind of self-exaltation in "damning sins we have no mind to." Secretly we are rather depressed by the heroic and the

saint-like because it makes our own life seem petty and faintly makes a claim on us which our inertia resists. The gentleman of easy virtue restores our credit with ourselves. Anyway we are better than he is—and will prove it by the stones we cast at him. But it is a mistake to suppose that we do not also damn the “sins we are inclined to.” On the contrary we must damn them to preserve ourselves from them, to say nothing of our credit with the rest of the world. The “repressed” criminal impulses express themselves freely in the discussion and even in the reprobation of crime. In particular, the omnipresent “repressions” of sex take their revenge in an extremely vigilant censorship of other people. In this widespread popular diversion with all its moods of censure from the sniggering to the thunderous, it is the repressed passion itself that is active, rejoicing in the license given it for once by the moral consciousness. The virtuous will not sin, but they will dissect the sin of others with an insight and particularity made possible only by the potential sin in themselves. In brief, though the moral consciousness has a core of reason, it is deeply embedded in husks growing out of all mutual antagonisms of man and out of repressed impulses twisted into strange shapes. Religious and ethical teachers have seen this part of the truth with great perspicacity. They have been perfectly aware that the function of censorship and punishment is not to satisfy the judge or critic, but to protect society and convert the offender. There is little to add to the Platonic maxim that if justice is good it cannot be its office to inflict real evil. The Christian teaching on this point is perfectly plain. Yet it is still uphill work to plead for the treatment of wrong-doing in the spirit of the doctor rather than the executioner, still more to convince the world that restored self-respect and renewed hope are better medicines than continued self-abasement, pain and fear.¹

¹ The above analysis is the explanation of the moral disharmonies referred to above (chap. iv, p. 73). It does not alter the fact that disapproval is essentially displeasurable, but shows that the basis of approval and disapproval in the working moral code is not wholly rational.

2. The moral consciousness, as we know it, is a complex result of many imperfectly congruous elements. From the sifting process of criticism there emerges the rational order, at once the simplest and the most comprehensive of all schemes of life. Considered as a whole, it is a system of vast complexity, embracing the infinite range of human activity and every possibility of human development. No mind could be complex enough, or subtle enough, to trace out all its possibilities of application. At the same time, the direct relations of man to man, which, endlessly repeated and interwoven, build up the life of the whole, require for their just appreciation mere simplicity, singleness of aim and the sympathetic understanding of things that flows from a warm heart. A few very simple and direct qualities—perhaps in the end they reduce to the marriage of courage and tenderness—are the elements of which the whole tissue is woven, and where these elements are seen in their pure state there *in potentia* exists the whole scheme of a rational life. Upon the whole there is more of them in human nature than can express itself in human life, and the problem of the practical reason is not merely to educate individuals, but still more to shape institutions so that they may form channels within which these qualities may freely run, and where their force may be used to build up social ends.

The question may fairly be asked, what thread does the principle of Harmony put into our hands to guide us through the maze as it exists here and now? Does it yield a complete system of life which he who wills can live, or does its realization involve the conversion of society? If so, does it indicate the orientation which a better society would assume?

The questions raised must form the subject of an independent enquiry. We are concerned with first principles. But there are certain general problems of method which are in place here, and certain difficulties of principle turning upon them which should be met.

3. The general lines of method follow directly from the principle itself. Every experience involving impulse or

feeling, if internally harmonious, is reasonably held good unless it is incompatible with another such experience of equally strong claims. Where such incompatibility is found, modification is necessary, to the point, but only to the point at which conflict disappears. Thus, to put it very crudely, the function of our principle is to "see fair" between the different impulses and instincts of mankind. If anything appears good it either can or cannot be worked into the general scheme of human requirements. If it can be so adjusted all is well. If not there must be such re-adjustment as yields consistency of aim. It is a practical rather than a speculative problem, a problem, it may be said, of organization. But the organization in question is very different from the mechanical contrivances which the term usually suggests. Thus, to take one example, ingenious writers will show us how much better the business of life might be conducted, and how much more efficiently the rearing of children might be carried out, if separate households were abolished and the State became the universal parent. To such enthusiasts for social mechanism it is a small matter to cut the profoundest and most universal of all sources of human emotion, and they would not hesitate to claim its rationality as the justification of their method. The Practical Reason, as here understood, is the antithesis of any such mechanism. For it the extinction of the family life and its emotions would be a "repression" of the most deadly kind, and the simplification of the State which it would involve would be like the simplification of a picture by scraping off the paint. Its method is the adjustment of the family life to the community—an adjustment which may or may not require far-reaching changes, but would have the aim not of flattening down divergencies and centres of possible opposition, but of finding methods of co-operation and thus in the end of even fuller expression. All toleration of differences sets a problem to the social intelligence, but it is the only problem worth its solving.

Since all difference is potential antagonism, these

considerations may help to turn the edge of an objection which many feel to the formula of harmony as a principle. Is not strife, they ask, necessary to life, and in particular to development? Our faculties are called out to their last reserves only by a contest in some shape or form. A pleasant, humdrum life might, perhaps, be founded on pure co-operation, but if development is part of the ideal, it is contradictory to talk of abolishing that which develops men to the utmost. Yet, if strife in turn is carried to its utmost limit, it means mutual extinction, or in the alternative, a subjection of one party so complete that strife ends. Strife, then, if it plays a part in development, must be conditioned by the requirements of development, and we have then to ask whether it is strife within and between the parts of the whole which is developing, or strife between the whole and external enemies which is deemed necessary. If the latter the object of our strife is victory complete enough to end strife. If the former, then it must be said that the development of a whole requires that the parts in their growth do not destroy but maintain and further one another. But this is the principle of harmony again, and we reach the paradoxical conclusion that the moral condition of strife is the service of harmony. But, after all, is not the apparent paradox a familiar truth? A game is a contest, and a good one, if we keep to the rules and play in a "sporting" spirit, a bad one as soon as the spirit of strife runs away. The principle holds through life. To match oneself, one's side, one's party, one's country against another is a deep-seated impulse which supplies a wonderful stimulus to endeavour. But all depends on the rules of the game. If they are good rules they are founded on an underlying spirit of common service to broad ends of humanity. As the game develops the element of competition proper fades into the background. What remains is rather the sight of what another does or has done as a standing evidence to us of what we ought to be able to do ourselves. It is the standard rather than the individual that we want to beat. Competition is thus an imperfect

incarnation of the enthusiasm for progress. The truth to which it bears witness is the vitality of independent centres. The spirit of man does not develop equably from a single centre, but wells up with irregular profusion in thousands of distinct individuals, groups and interests. Each centre pursues its own life and fights for its own hand. The anarchy may be ended by the steam roller, but such is not the method of permanent progress. Progress lies in convincing the separate centres that within and below their differences there is something common by the service of which they can best express themselves.

4. But are all forms of life at bottom capable of harmony? What ground is there for any such assumption? Yet, if we do not make the assumption, how can we go forward? It may be replied in general terms that the rational impulse is to carry harmony as far as is found possible and constantly to explore the possibility of carrying it still further. With regard to impulses we have admitted the possibility that there may be those with which it is impossible to make terms, which are in ordinary phrase radically bad and of the nature of original sin. Such impulses, if they exist, have merely to be held in check like any untoward force in external nature. But the possibility of such a situation suggests a dilemma. It implies not merely a division, but an irreconcilable division in human nature. Is such a division compatible with the scheme of the Practical Reason? If not, must we take that scheme to postulate that the whole body of human impulse is finally amenable to laws of consistency, and is this postulate warranted either by experience or by any true axiom? If yes, what is to hinder us from supposing that not one impulse alone, but many, might prove incompatible with a rational scheme of life? Why should not the rebellious ones even turn out to form a scheme of their own, establishing, so to say, a *Sonderbund* in human nature, and if they did so, what would decide between them and the orthodox constitution? Would it be force, that is the abandonment of rationality? Or would it be a question of the majority against the minority,

a balance that might be precarious and in any case abandons the pretension to harmony?

The answer to these doubts lies in close attention to the requirements of a rational scheme. Such a scheme must be carried through life as a whole. Even if incompletely understood—as we must admit any rational scheme to be—it must be something which will work, i.e. by which we can actually live in self-consistency, not in patches, but in the whole of our conduct. Such a scheme must deal with refractory impulses, just as the scheme of knowledge deals with exceptions and obscurities. Our knowledge seeks to explain “recalcitrant” facts, and if it cannot explain them but still rejects them, has reasons to give for the rejection, which thus, in a manner, does fit them into its general plan. Similarly the practical reason does not merely negate the obstinate impulse, but shows why it is impossible. Now the impulse on its side, so far as it is isolated, has no claim to rational support, nor would its alliance with any other impulse give it such a claim—nor even with any number of impulses—unless out of them could be evolved a rival, equally consistent scheme, professing to cover life as a whole. We should then have two schemes, both apparently rational but mutually incompatible, just as in science we may have two hypotheses both consistent with a great body of ascertained fact, but irreconcilable with one another. Now in science we should say without hesitation that such a position may indeed arise at a certain incomplete stage of our knowledge, but it cannot represent the objective truth. The truth must be single and consistent throughout, so that one or other or both of the hypotheses must be remodelled before the truth can be known. Similarly, in practice the principle upon which reason works is that of a practical consistency which cannot be broken at any point. Just as a single impulse requires to be harmonized with others, so does a body of impulses or a system of conduct dealing with any part or aspect of life require to be harmonized with the rest of life, and there cannot be two incompatible

ways of dealing with the same situation which are both in the end equally rational. So far, then, we conclude (a) that the existence of one or more disconnected recalcitrant impulses raises no theoretical (though much practical) difficulty; (b) that there cannot be two incompatible systems dealing rationally with life as a whole.

5. On the other hand—and here we come to a question of real importance, practical as well as theoretical—it may quite well happen that at a given stage of development alternative systems present themselves to us as equally rational. It is true that as matter of history the contrast has more often been between a system resting on authority, tradition, or the bare fact that it does actually work, and a system derived from reasoned principles. In such an event the partisans of principle seem to be on the side of reason, but unfortunately the historian will not always find in their favour, and the reason of that will be that authority or tradition had on its side elements of experience incorporated, perhaps unreflectingly and inarticulately, in its scheme, but nevertheless incorporated so that the scheme actually worked, while the principles, however consistent internally, ignored these elements, rested on too narrow a basis and so made shipwreck. It is easily seen that such shipwreck is no condemnation of rationalism as defined here, but, unfortunately, since our lights are admittedly imperfect, the difficulty is to know when we have attained a vision broad and clear enough to guide us unerringly. Rationalism threatens to remain an ideal to be reached at some remote time, but of no use as long as man remains imperfect, that is to say, during the time when it is really wanted.

We can escape from this dilemma if *some* principles of rational living are so far certain that we may take them as guides to all life, even though we confessedly do not know the whole meaning of the scheme of life. This, again, is our procedure in knowledge. We do not possess all truth but we proceed confidently upon certain principles, assured that though only a part of the truth,

they are more than partially true. The moral consciousness has generally supposed itself to be in possession of such principles, sometimes, perhaps, prematurely. There are, however, three rules of method deducible from the general conception of a rational order, which I think go a long way to meet our difficulty, both theoretic and practical, and I shall content myself with these.

6. The first of these rules is that any system which we can accept as a step towards the rational order must be a system which will "work" under the conditions in which we live. By "work" I mean maintain itself. A system works if men living under it so far serve one another, providing for personal and common needs, that the community is actually maintained. It may be said that a community may be so bad that it is better broken up. It needs to be "hatched over again, and hatched different." Even so, the new community to be put in its place must, at lowest, be one that will work, and it is for the revolutionist to show that he can so reconstruct society from its constituent atoms as to make a better business of it than it has made of itself.¹ Ideal principles which merely destroy are not right for those whom they destroy, even though they might, in fact, "work" with people who should fully understand them, i.e. see them in relation to other principles equally necessary to the operation of a rational order as a whole. Thus our first principle is the truth underlying philosophic Conservatism. What is good for us must "work," if not literally here and now, at least in such continuity

¹ Of course we are not to require the impossible of the revolutionist. The operation of social institutions cannot be mathematically demonstrated *a priori* and the only final test is the experiment itself. What is intended is that the revolutionist must address his arguments to the problem of practical possibility as well as to that of abstract desirability and must give solid grounds for the faith that is in him. As to the margin of doubt that remains in all human forecasts he is entitled to say with a great Liberal, of temper far from revolutionary, "Our hopes are as good as your fears."

with what we are here and now that we can fit ourselves into it without any destruction.

7. The second rule is that of philosophic Liberalism, and it is simply an application of the rule that we have worked upon all through the discussion. A vital impulse we have seen can only be restrained legitimately on the ground of incompatibility with the consistent operation of life as a whole. Now, in the institutions of any society which works, there are generally a great many repressed impulses and impoverished personalities. In any such case if a means of liberation is suggested, tending to show that the system would still "work" with the new element set free, the burden of proof is with the adherent of the established fact. Life gains in fullness and harmony by each liberation, and it is on this line that the advance towards a rational order moves. Here it is those who refuse movement that must produce their reasons. Provided that it will work, the system which gives larger scope to faculty is preferable to the system which gives less scope.

8. The third rule is, I think, the principle underlying philosophic socialism. We refused to admit that social obligation could be founded on an intellectual apprehension of the "principle of similars." But this is not to deny the value of the principle as a sign-post. As the social order actually evolves it is very apt to assume a very desirable shape for some persons, some classes, some races, and a much less desirable one for others. From the point of view of general harmony it is a patchwork, good in parts, and this very goodness held together by the badness of the other parts. Against this patchwork the principle of similars is a protest. According to this principle what is good for A is good for B, unless essential differences between the two can be produced. If, say, nationality has its rights in Central Europe, has it similar rights in Ireland, and, if not, why not? If Ireland has its Ulster so have Bohemia and Roumania. Either treat these cases on the same broad principle or produce reasons, applicable as general truths, for the difference. If private

property is an excellent institution as an essential instrument of personality, what is the position of classes which possess no private property, or none such as will serve the essential function? What is the duty of the more fortunate in their regard? A good must be shared. In anything that by its nature can only be the privilege of a few, still more in any gain which by its nature is another's loss, there is a radical disharmony.

9. These very simple principles contain, I think, the germ of rational reconstruction. I do not here propose to trace them further, but I would point out two opposed dangers against which, as I think, the principle of harmony is a shield. The first of these is the fanaticism of abstract right, the fanaticism which sees one wrong and sees it so big that it overshadows all the world, or that grasps one right and would wreck society to vindicate it. For the principle of harmony there is no absolute right short of the entire system of human well-being, no absolute duty except to serve that system to the best of our understanding. This is not to say that either "rights" or "duties" are mere instruments of no intrinsic value. On the contrary, they are constitutive parts of this comprehending harmony. Each defines the actual lines of harmonious co-operation within a certain sector of life. Unfortunately, as the experience of life teaches us, these sectors are ragged at the edges, and in the marginal cases to draw the line with absolute certainty and precision between them is not within the compass of anything short of omniscience. What we have to do is to take the claims and counter-claims and find the workable system which will most fully meet them both, or rather meet such elements in both as we are compelled to hold valid. I spoke above of the rights of nationality, but I should be the last to contend that any such rights may be legitimately pressed without regard, for example, to the effect on other nationalities. What the principle of harmony will tell us is that a national claim, if deep and generic, will, if not satisfied, contain seeds of disharmony which repression will not kill. A right, that is to say

is a claim founded on some real condition of harmony. If we find that we cannot admit it without violating some other right, either our case is very unfortunate or our practical intelligence is at fault. In either alternative the disharmony will remain and will do its work.

Opposed to the fanaticism of abstract right stands the worship of the Institution, the established order, the State, the Church. What is established is a structure to which generations of effort, it may be, have contributed, which, if not pure reason, incorporates many efforts of reason, more, it may be said, than any individual with his narrow experience could bring together. These massive structures of human making, then, seem to acquire a value of their own which puts them above the life of individuals. But as soon as their sanctity puts forward this claim it over-reaches itself. On the principle of harmony the test of the value of each structure is that it operates continuously in directing the lives of men. What we seek to build up is something much greater than any individual, but not something in which the individual is lost. The relation of harmony gives us the precise clue that we require. The massive achievement of the whole must be gained, not at the expense of the part, but through the development of each summing up in the development of all. No doubt there are occasions when sacrifice is demanded, since there are numerous untoward contingencies in all relations of life. But the good of the whole cannot rest on the continuous sacrifice of the parts. That is the condemnation of the state system which rests on the perpetual requirement of military servitude, or of the industrial system, which turns out an increase of total wealth at the expense of a class of operatives degraded to the status of machines.

To sum up, the principle of harmony has to be applied to a social structure which has grown up through the interaction of many forces in which the rational impulse is only one element. The result is a patchwork of harmonious and inharmonious elements. The method of the practical reason is to found itself upon the elements of

harmony that have established themselves and to generalize them. But in so doing it must not be guided by a single aspect of the problem to the exclusion of its bearing upon the social structure as a whole. Nor, conversely, may it conceive a whole as possessing a value without respect to its human parts. Its reforms must "work" and in working must be such as to liberate faculty, facilitate co-operation and extend the sphere of fulfilment.

CHAPTER VIII

IMPLICATIONS

THE theory of harmony stands in close relation on the one side to the Utilitarian principle as developed by J. S. Mill, and on the other hand to the form taken by Ethical Idealism in the hands of T. H. Green. It will help to a more concrete appreciation of the present theory to examine its points of similarity and contrast with both these famous doctrines.

1. The broad correspondence of the theory of harmony with that of Utility is readily apparent. The harmony of experience with feeling is expressed in consciousness in the form of pleasure or happiness. We speak of pleasure in ordinary usage when we are thinking of some passing, temporary experience, some appeal to eye or ear, some sensory or emotional excitement. We speak of happiness when we are thinking rather of the state of the whole man, and of the good or evil fortune, the successes or failures, that colour a life and affect a career. The popular usage corresponds to a real distinction which is, perhaps, easier to draw in thought than to apply in any actual case. Pleasure and pain, we may say, as they deepen and broaden their roots in our personality, pass gradually into elements contributing to our permanent happiness or misery. But, notwithstanding all difficulties of demarcation, there is for thought a clear distinction between the personality, which is a principle of synthesis, and the successive impulses and experiences which are the raw materials of the synthesis. To the first belong the mode of action that we have called will, and the mode of feeling

that we call happiness. To the second, the mode of conation that we call Desire and the modes of feeling that we call pleasure and pain. We should, therefore, diverge from Mill in his definition of happiness as a sum of pleasures. Happiness and pleasure are states of mind possessing the same feeling-tone. We may, if we like, take the term pleasure as generic and say that happiness is a mode of consciousness dependent on the relatively stable character and position of the personality as a whole, and endowed with pleasurable feeling-tone. But we shall not resolve happiness into a series of pleasurable states.

Still less shall we accept the analysis which traces all action ultimately to desire and all desire to an anticipation of pleasure. Psychologically, the foundation of action is impulse in which no anticipation of an end is a necessary element, and impulse is modified but not eradicated by experiences of pleasure and pain. Further, though this experience does tend to a coincidence between desire and pleasure, there is, and would remain, even if this coincidence were far more perfect than it normally becomes, a serious ambiguity in the theory that pleasure is necessarily the object of desire. So far as the coincidence extends, and we may admit that this covers the normal life of desire in the ordinary sane person, the object of desire is the experience, the action, the possession that gives pleasure, but it is not normally the psychical experience of pleasure which the object will give. Psychologically, Butler is right as against the Hedonist when he declares that desire determines upon its object. In other words, desire is, or tends to be, desire for the pleasant, not for pleasure. The distinction is not purely verbal, for it cuts the source of the egoistic tendency in Hedonism. The object that is pleasant to me, that fills me with delight to contemplate, may itself be nothing of me. It may be my child's delight in a Christmas festivity, it may be the happiness of another man with his child. It is only if analysis proceeds to the discovery that such sights are desired as sources of refined pleasure to the man who

seeks to bring them about, that an element of egoism is imported. If I necessarily desire my own pleasure, then it would seem that, however refined, however altruistic the sources of my pleasure, the action that I take to secure it must always, under one aspect, remain egoistic. If, on the other hand, all that can be said is that what I desire is also as a rule pleasant to me to realize, no such implication remains, and the question whether my aims will be selfish or unselfish is left entirely open by the analysis of desire.

With regard to the sources of pleasure Mill himself diverged from the older Utilitarians by introducing a distinction of Quality, and admitting one kind of pleasure to be intrinsically superior to another. The distinction, while true to experience, is fatal to the maintenance of simple pleasurable as the standard of action, and raises the question what sort of experience it is that will yield pleasure of the most desirable quality. To this, on our theory, we should reply that it is the harmonious fulfilment of human powers. The end, as thus conceived, does not separate happiness from the kind of life in which it is sought, but treats them as two elements in the same whole, as the experience and the feeling-tone which qualifies the experience. The rational object of human action is a type of life, not merely a type of feeling.

Closely connected with the analysis of desire is that of Obligation. Mill held to the sense of Moral Obligation as a real psychological force, but whether it had a rational justification was not so easy for him, on his principles, to determine. The sense of obligation he held to be built up by educative processes and the laws of Association on the basis of a substratum of sympathy or Social feeling which he took to be natural. Given sufficient strength in these feelings and forces, there is at any rate no contradiction involved in the supposition that the altruistic action which Mill wishes to explain might become more pleasurable and the violation of its rules a source of greater pain to a man than any selfish consideration. Social and "unselfish" action becomes psychologically

possible on Mill's view, but whether it becomes rationally imperative is another question. On Mill's account all action is at bottom founded on intensity of desire. The stronger desire, and that is for Mill the most intensely realized anticipation of pleasure, must prevail. If a man already finds his greatest pleasure in promoting the general happiness no question of obligation arises. But if he feels nothing of the kind, or if he halts between two decisions, in what sense can we tell him that he "ought" to decide for one course rather than the other. In any sense in which it is to express a generic motive for his action the "ought" should represent some balance of pleasure which will accrue to him. But can we really promise him any such balance and is that seriously what we mean? What we mean when we assert an obligation is that there exists a ground for the course of action recommended which we, the speakers, recognize as a good ground, and as good irrespective of the particular desires or inclinations of the individual whom we are addressing. We believe the end we urge to be intrinsically or objectively excellent, and we press its claim on others, not primarily for the pleasure which it will give them to advance it, but because of its intrinsic goodness. This is to imply that the end is not merely something which we desire but something which we believe to be rationally demonstrable as the Good.

To resume, the conception of harmony so far coincides with the Utilitarian doctrine as to include the general happiness as an integral element, but differs from it in making the form of life in which happiness is found equally essential.¹ The feeling of harmony is pleasurable, and in its deeper and wider developments becomes happiness.

¹ The distinction is more important for the theory of obligation than for any applications to the social standard. For if the general happiness be the sole end, yet the means must be sought in a certain kind of life and this life must be socially harmonious and must rest for its satisfactions on the control of life conditions by intelligence. Thus, what we have conceived as the content of happiness figures in a reasoned Utilitarianism as the means to happiness.

But pleasurable feeling in abstraction from the experience which yields it is not the basis or standard of action. Action is not determined solely by desire, nor desire by anticipation of pleasurable feeling, but a rational appreciation of an intrinsically good life plays its part, and this life is not only the basis of happiness but has its own distinctive character as a harmonious development of human activities.

2. Ethical Idealism, in the shape given to it by T. H. Green, was deeply opposed to Utilitarianism, in its metaphysical presuppositions, but much less alien to it, as Green recognized, in its practical and humanitarian spirit. To the conception of developmental harmony it is still more closely akin. Green conceives the ethical order as arising from the spiritual principle in man seeking to realize itself in a Common Good. The several elements in this conception, if pressed and defined, yield point by point the principle of harmony in development. The self-realization which is held out as the goal for each personality cannot be, and is not, of course, intended as, any sort of realization of any sort of self. The miser may "realize" his avarice or the vindictive man his vengeance, but the more the self realizes capacities of this kind the worse it becomes. Self-realization must mean (a) not any kind of experience in which some psychical capacity is fulfilled, but an orderly development of an organic whole, and (b) this development, if it is to form part of a "common" good, must be conditioned by the equally desirable development of other human beings. But this is precisely the conception of the good as the harmonious development of the life of the race as a whole. Apart from the conception of harmony there is no criterion to decide between the kind of development that would be good and the kind that would be bad.

So far the present account appears only as a further definition of Green's principle. Certain important points of divergence, however, must be noticed. In the first place, Green insists on treating the element of pleasure in the good rather as a secondary consequence than as

an integral and essential element. In this he has as much over-estimated the part of impulse as the empirical school over-stated the part of experienced feeling. If the argument of previous pages is sound, feeling holds the reins, though impulse is often a refractory steed, and the more rational we become, the clearer is the coincidence between the lines of life which we seek to lay down and those in which, if not actual happiness, at least real peace and inward satisfaction are found. This view has been combated generally because it was supposed to be his own enjoyment or satisfaction which was being recommended as the object to the individual. But for this limitation there is on rational principles no warrant. What is intended is simply that the harmony of experience with feeling which is the basis of happiness, is an essential element in the harmony of experience with experience, which is the basis of organic development. The good is nothing if it does not appeal to feeling, just as feeling is nothing if there is no object to excite it.

3. A second point to be noted is that the term self-realization often seems to suggest too optimistic a solution of fundamental ethical difficulties.

If, indeed, the social harmony were perfect, we might lay down that the good of the whole would be the synthesis of the good of each member. For the full development of every personality is conditionally good—conditionally, that is, on its capability of harmonization with the development of others. All that in each individual might be so harmonized, we include in the term "social personality" and the failure of any social personality to achieve its full development is a net loss. Thus the most perfect social harmony must provide the fullest development for each social personality, and that is the good for each. But a social harmony which is only emerging very gradually from the condition of moral chaos and has to work itself out under the conditions of a non-moral nature never, in fact, presents so complete a consistency. The actual needs of the social order at any given time may thus involve the curtailment of developments for which

a higher harmony might readily find place. The service of society may require the entire sacrifice of happiness or life on the part of an individual. To say that the individual so sacrificed realizes his own highest good in sacrificing himself is at best a half truth. Taken alone, it is highly misleading. The individual sacrificed does not achieve that internally harmonious development in which his happiness consists, and which, under conditions of true harmony, would constitute his personal share in the common good. A society which should uniformly impose such sacrifice on all its members would not be making for that development of human powers in which we have found the rational good. Hence, such a sacrifice can only be a means and not an end, not a good in itself.¹ That the sacrifice should be made is the best thing for society under the circumstances if it is positively required to maintain or improve the existing social order. And if it is the best thing for society, it is also the best, i.e. the least bad, thing *under the circumstances* for the individual. It is his duty, and the worst thing he can do is to shirk his duty. It is also, as regards feeling, the way, not, indeed, of Happiness, but of Peace, i.e. of a sense of Unity with mankind and with the general end and aim of life. But it is not the good for the individual in the sense of that which it is generally desirable that the individual should attain. It is rather that good of which unfortunate circumstances alone admit.

It may be asked how, if we admit real self-sacrifice, we can justify it rationally to the individual. But the question involves a misconception. The rational good is not the good for the individual as an independent unit, it is the good of the whole of which he forms a part. The

¹ What is good in itself is the sense of one-ness with others and the desire to serve—whether it take the form of Love or Sense of Duty—which make men ready for self-sacrifice. That there might be some elements of sacrifice beyond the obvious necessity for self-control in the ideal order is conceivable, but they would be discords tuned to constitute a higher harmony. The absolute destruction of life, the permanent blighting of happiness or eradication of faculty can be necessary only where harmony is imperfect.

governing principle to which the analysis of the good and the reasonable led us was that it is reasonable so to act as to further the good of the whole. That good if perfected would not involve such utter sacrifice of individuals as is here contemplated. On the contrary it would be a harmony in which the lot falling to each individual would be unambiguously good for him. Yet in the effort to establish such harmony in a discordant world sacrifice is often necessary.¹ The obligation which, then, lies upon the individual to sacrifice himself is founded on his relation to the whole. Psychologically its condition is that the conational synthesis constituting the main bent of his personality is governed in the last resort by his conception of the whole or of certain principles which fashion the life of the whole. The obligation is rationally justified, that is to say, it is real or true in the sense in which any moral judgment can be real or true, as contributing to the rational good. It is psychologically effective in so far as the practical attitude of the individual is adjusted to that true good. Thus, even if we insist that in self-sacrifice the individual is choosing the least bad, and, therefore, the relatively good, for himself, that is not the rational motive. The rational motive is that his action furthers the general good. If we pass from the question of motive as it presents itself to the agent to that of actual gain or loss, as it may be judged by a by-stander, we may say that what a man loses in self-sacrifice is his own personality—the development of his own life with its attendant happiness—and what he gains is the harmony of entire identification with the wider life

¹ It need hardly be said that morally there is a deep distinction between voluntary sacrifice and one imposed by the community on the individual. In the former there is at least a partial reconciliation, the individual gaining the immense relief of a harmony underlying the disharmony. In the latter there is no such compensation. It can be justified only as a less evil than social disorder or the frustration of common effort. It is clear, however, that a social order which imposes real loss of well-being on any of its members is far more gravely imperfect than one which can repose on voluntary self-sacrifice at need.

with its attendant sense of peace. This is "his" good in the sense that it is that which hard circumstances apportion to him—"his" good judged from the objective standpoint. It is not his good either (a) in the sense of that which an ideal harmony would apportion to him, or (b) in the sense of that which he would choose if he considered the matter from his own point of view. If, then, we are asked whether in self-sacrifice the individual does or does not abandon his good, we must affirm or deny it, according to the sense in which the words are taken. The essential points are (1) that he sacrifices the good of self, so far as it is conceived in antithesis to the good of the whole; (2) that the reason for this sacrifice is not that it is a truer good for the individual, but that it is for the good of the whole; (3) that the necessity of such sacrifice rests on existing disharmonies, that is to say, is bad. The realization of the common good cannot, therefore, be regarded in an optimistic spirit as a simple sum of self-realizations.

4. We cannot face the facts of self-sacrifice without raising once more the question of the effectual force of the motives which attract us to the rational system. The part must accommodate itself to the whole or must be sacrificed. Will it consent? Let us put the difficulty first in the form of an objection which may be urged against all Rationalism, and which, though perhaps more often felt than plainly expressed, is the greatest stumbling-block in its path. It is based on what may be called an apparent discontinuity of values. To men possessed by some enthusiasm, some religion, some passion, the whole world seems cheap as the price of their heart's desire. Such an enthusiasm, it may be said, though justly condemned if the object is unworthy, is yet the sole basis of the higher life of man. Take it out of humanity and life collapses like a pricked bladder, or, to take a more appropriate metaphor, ceases to move like a mechanism from which the mainspring is gone. What, then, is to be the attitude of the rationalist to enthusiasm and passion? Is he to accept it as necessary to all movement? If so, what becomes of his accurate adjustment of values in

presence of a force which over-rides all considerations but those of its own imperious will? Is he to reject it as a disturbing factor? If so, where is he to look for the onward impulse in humanity?

To state the case in somewhat broader and more general terms. Must we not recognize that there is in the normal course of human development a phase analogous to what, in certain forms of religious experience, is called conversion? In response sometimes to a personal passion, sometimes to a social movement or a religious influence, the outlook on life is immeasurably deepened and widened. The whole sense of values undergoes a change. The petty cares and small daily pleasures become so much dross. What is real, what counts, is the interest of a deeper, more spiritual life, no fragment of which would be bartered for all the world outside. But these last words suggest that we are here abandoning the conception of life as a whole, for the sake of some one thing that is worth all others. It may be the fulfilment of a perfect love:—

I am named and known by that moment's feat,
There took my station and degree,
So grew my own small life complete
As Nature obtained her best of me,
One born to love you, Sweet.

It may be the sense of union with God. It may be the achievement of self-conquest and the deliberate and final absorption of self in the cares of Humanity. In each case, the change seems to constitute a division, a deep cleavage between the world of real values and the outer husk of things which are superficially important. Can such a fissure be justified in reason, and, if so, can practical life form a coherent whole? Or is it contrary to reason, and, if so, must we not admit henceforward that the highest development of the ethical spirit is away from reason and not towards it?

The reply that may be made is that it is precisely here where the difficulty seems greatest that the claim of reason, rightly understood, is most securely based. For

what, after all, is the test of this deeper reality? What but that it justifies itself in experience taken as a whole? The object of our worship may be a false god or a true; our love may be deep-rooted in the realities of two natures, or it may be the froth of physical fascination; our social enthusiasm may be grounded in a real relation of our microscopic selves to the vast life of humanity, or in sentimentality and verbiage. What test is there but in the living? If love is the glamour of a moment, he who gives the world for it makes a bad bargain. If it is a premonition of all that a woman can be to a man and all that she can make of him, if this life-long experience could be focussed clearly in the prevision of a golden hour, it would, in terms of cold logic, more than justify the feeling of that hour. The time of romance may be that of tragic self-deception, but it is as often that of the truer insight, imperfectly sustained in less inspired moments. Between truth and falsity the test comes in the world of prose. There is a deeper plane of being than that of our everyday experience, but the relation between them is not that of two separate orders of reality, but of underlying forces to the play of their effects. The relation is equally misunderstood by every form of idealism, supernaturalism, Romanticism, asceticism, which disregards the trivial round, and by the Naturalism which recognizes no spring of deeper forces below the surface. To recognize a deeper order of reality is only the beginning of wisdom. To see that our dim and emotional apprehension of its nature must be brought to the test of hard fact, and that ultimately this test involves the consilience of inferences drawn from the entire realm of experience is a further step, which restores unity to our world while providing a means to distinguish truth from illusion. It is because the deepest truths are illustrated in the whole texture of experience that, particularly in ethics, those who have most thoroughly mastered the profoundest principles can express them in the most elementary teaching and illustrate them with the simplicity of childhood.

But it may be urged, admitting all that can be said of the reasonableness of regarding life as a whole, what of the actual motive forces. What is there to control passion? We have contended above that reason may compel us to face a real and uncompensated self-sacrifice. We are contending now that it will compel us to review our deepest impulse in the light of life in its completeness. Reason, the reply will be, may say what she likes but has no such power. The objection has come to the surface at more than one point and we have staved it off by explaining that for us the practical Reason is not a faculty enthroned on the judgment seat above impulse, but is the synthesis of impulse itself, made aware of its goal. But when we come up against the deepest things in life we cannot be content with abstractions but are forced to ask, what goal? The individual must be anchored on something outside himself, something greater and more stable if he is to stand against these triple waves. What allegiance, then, does Reason offer him as the core or foundation of that synthesis of emotional interest which is to keep his life steadily pointed in one direction? The community, it may be suggested, offers the required anchorage. Men will, in fact, offer their lives and their all for its advancement. But the life of any existent community will not satisfy all the requirements of the case. The moral whole is not the same thing as the social. Every society of any significance is in greater or less degree organized, but moral relations arise between any two persons that come into contact however temporary and slight. Moreover, the moral order to which we owe allegiance is at once wider and more fundamental than any form of social organization, and is the standard by which we judge such organizations, not a rule which we submit to their requirements for criticism. Yet it is eminently social and prescribes social co-operation wherever this is physically possible, that is, so far as human beings come into contact with one another. Can we say, then, that the whole which it postulates is Humanity, or, conceivably, the entire sentient creation? If we do, we are in some

danger, as has been hinted above, of confusing actualities and ideals. It is the ideal of Harmony that humanity should become one co-operative whole, but for long ages humanity subsisted in scattered groups, many not even knowing of one another's existence, and even now it is split up into groups sundered by bitter and largely irrational animosities. We have noticed two forms or kinds of unity involved in the moral judgment. One is the unity of the universal, which recognizes a fundamental similarity of character in all human beings, and the universal applicability of the fundamental rules of right and duty to all who come into contact. The other is the unity of co-operation between all who have, in fact, come into contact. The first of these principles is clearly the basis of the second, and the unity inherent in the moral order is a principle of development working itself out in a fuller and more extended social co-operation. By the completion of this process Humanity would form an actual unity; but of the present and still more of the past we can only say that its unity is potential, i.e. that conditions exist out of which it may arise and among them a germinal principle which makes for its development. This principle of concord is the moral order itself.

At this point it will be said, men will not recognize allegiance to anything so abstract and impalpable as the moral order. Propound this to them nakedly and they will revolt. They need something concrete and living. In short, they need a Person, and if neither the community nor Humanity is a person, and still more if Humanity is but an unrealized ideal, they need a God. A personal God is the incarnation of the unity which the moral judgment requires, and without one the moral order falls to pieces like an arch without a keystone. The argument recalls that of Kant, in which God and immortality were called in by the moral consciousness to redress the balance of this life and equate performance with result, virtue with happiness. In the Kantian form it involved a two-fold error of logic, contradicting the principle of duty for duty's sake without question of consequences, and most

insecurely balancing a theory of the actual constitution and government of the universe on the requirements of humankind.

It is important to dwell on both of these errors, because they touch on the fundamentals of the relation between morals and religion. The first raises the question of a moral sanction. Is moral obligation enforced or backed by anything of the nature of reward or penalty? If not, can we hold to our position that obligation is a fact, whether we recognize it or not? If yes, can we say that the obligation is genuinely moral and not prudential? The reply to both questions is that moral obligation consists in the real goodness of the moral order and the real badness of violating it. Any consideration lying outside this order, as, e.g., a penalty attached by law, is not of a moral kind, and the act which it induces a man to perform is not a moral act. To rest moral obligation, then, on prudential or, generally, on external considerations is to annihilate it, as all clear-headed thinkers have realized. On the other hand, precisely because the moral order is a coherent whole no violation of it stands alone. It is in vain that we seek to cheat ourselves. There are some duties which we like and others which we would gladly shirk, just as there are some people to whom we wish to do justice and others to whom we do not wish to do justice. Now what the rationality of the moral order tells us is, to put it bluntly, that we cannot both eat our cake and have it. Not only does one false step lead to another and one failing threaten to develop into general weakness, but even the half-unconscious wrong operates as a centre of disturbance and disharmony. Psychological analysis in its more recent form very strongly suggests that that familiar figure, the man of smug respectability, conscious of rectitude, is below the level of his consciousness a very different being. All the suppressed disharmonies of his nature are there operative, maintaining a smouldering disaffection that breaks out sometimes into flashes of disturbing emotion of which the origin is obscure to the sufferer himself, sometimes into physical disease. The

fundamental source of these disharmonies is the failure of adequate and mutually consistent expression for the radical and insuppressible impulses. Such consistency could only be attained in completeness in a perfect order both within and without, that is to say in a full and final adjustment of the individual to his society, or rather, let us say, to the universe. Such adjustment is, therefore, not entirely within the power of the individual. But there is one great source of disharmony which he can avoid, namely, insincerity. Insincerity means the nominal and external acceptance of a principle or a discipline, such, e.g., as Christianity and its adaptation by various shifts and devices to normal conduct. These shifts do not touch the real disharmony, which continues operative below the threshold of consciousness, always thrust down by the aid of some plausible phrase, but only to pursue its machinations with the greater secrecy. It is here that logic—and not only the deeper logic of ideas but even the logic of words—plays an effective part in personal morals. People seldom rebel quite openly and avowedly to themselves against a principle which they accept. What they do is to get hold of an exegesis accommodating principle to desire and custom, which makes for consciousness a sufficient reconciliation. All the time they know that the reconciliation is hollow, and when a better logic exposes the sophistication they are forced to reopen the whole question. Psycho-analysis tells us that the first step towards re-establishing harmony is to bring the hidden discrepancies to light, and that is the service which a sound ethical logic performs for the individual.

Now to hold that men are happy in proportion to their fidelity to the moral law as they understand it would be a very undue optimism. The psalmist who, having been young, now was old, and yet never saw the righteous forsaken nor his seed begging their bread, was playing just one of those tricks with his own judgment by which principles are adapted to facts. We cannot have it both ways, insisting, on the one side, on the reality of self-sacrifice and the supremacy of duty over every selfish

consideration, and on the other hand, comforting ourselves with the assurance that the good God will make it all up to the sufferers and wipe away all tears from their eyes. We cannot consistently strike a noble attitude proclaiming virtue its own reward, and the next moment begin surreptitiously re-introducing extraneous rewards for virtue. What we can justly say is that virtue is its own reward *valeat quantum*, while the penalties in which it involves its adherent—up to, it may be, social ostracism and death—are equally real. The “reward” consists in this, that the moral order is a connected system which is the basis of an inward as well as an external harmony. This inner harmony is a condition of our own happiness and we cannot, as we are often tempted to think, violate it when we choose and yet preserve it. It is just to this extent that moral obligation carries a genuine and completely moral sanction. At the same time it must be remarked that the efficacy of this sanction depends on the close adaptation of the accepted moral code to the real conditions of harmony. If this adaptation were exact, if, that is, the traditional morality of any community were perfectly rational, it would express a perfect harmony within each of us in congruity with a no less perfect harmony in relation to our community. Actual morality is far from this, and sometimes the rebel against such morality gets nearer to the true conditions of harmony, yet at the cost of sharp divergencies between himself and his fellows. If such a rebel is able to formulate the higher or wider principle he does not feel this discrepancy so much. He is consciously the servant of God, or the ideal, or humanity and his differences with his neighbours fall into their place in his mind as one of the crosses that he has to bear. The rebel of a lower order, moved primarily by his own passions, is in less favourable case. Yet of him, too, we often feel that he is actuated by what we call human nature, i.e. by legitimate impulse-feelings for which society gives no adequate scope. In the moral account between this man and his community, it is not easy to say offhand where the balance of debit and credit lies.

The inner harmony, then, which alone is "virtue's reward," in the genuine sense is partially, but not wholly, within the power of the individual. But such as it is, it is an indispensable condition of happiness and cannot be violated without either a painful process of restoration or a progressive deterioration avowed or otherwise. On the other hand it is only one condition of happiness. It is all very well for the philosopher in his study or the preacher in his pulpit to rise superior to the "external goods." Many of these may be dross, but what of wife and child, the safety and honour of our country, the success or failure of our cause? When Epictetus tells us that these have nothing to do with our good, we can only reply that the man who wraps himself in his own virtue will find it threadbare. If we are to weigh the respective chances of happiness for the good man and the bad, we must put against the internal harmony of the one the insensitiveness of the other which protects him from a thousand sorrows to which a ready sympathy and a warm imagination expose us. It is not because these qualities bring felt happiness to their owner, but because of their permanent value to the world that we hold them extremely admirable. If we could make the world no better than it is, it would be best to grow a hard outer shell as some do and retire within it.

5. It results that, though the moral sanction is quite real and very serious in its own sphere, no consideration of our personal happiness can be the final basis of obligation. That basis is the goodness of the universal harmony and the badness of everything that conflicts with it. This brings us to the second question whether men can, in fact, feel an allegiance to an abstraction—as this ideal will be considered—or must personify it in a God before they can own a duty which will stand up to interest and passion. Unfortunately we cannot create a God out of our own needs, and it is not our business to create the illusion of one. As to the appeal of the rational good, no one supposes that a philosophic formula, be it universal harmony or anything else, excites the imagination or

stimulates devotion. The purpose of these formulas is merely to express the coherence or common tendency of all the higher impulses and nobler objects of endeavour. Each of these has a great and real hold on our allegiance, and they are fortified if and in so far as they are seen to be not opposed, but mutually consistent and even mutually necessary. The abstract terms in which their relationship may be formulated are not supposed to excite profound emotions. What they are supposed to do is to provide a basis on which such emotions already in being and operating in their several ways may be enabled to substitute co-operation for conflict. A man loves his country and loves truth. Many people seem to find great difficulty on occasion in reconciling these emotions, or, rather, they reconcile them without admitting the difficulty by the method described above of degrading the love of truth to the position of a subconscious rebel. This is weakening to both emotions which, when reconciled, become steadier and obtain a firmer hold on us. When patriotism itself makes us face the truth and tell the truth, perhaps, to an excited and incredulous mob, it has certainly strengthened its hold on us to the point at which we become indifferent to the inevitable cry of Traitor. So is it, also, with other emotions and elements of impulse-feeling. No formula creates them, but the more we find for them a line of harmonious activity the greater their vital energy and the stronger their hold upon us. The goodness of the life which our formula expresses, and the hold that it has on us, do not lie in the formula, but in all the energy of passion acting in a unison which the formula expresses. The life so governed is not any the less good, does not command our allegiance any the less, because the words in which we seek to express it have all the coldness of exactitude.

Moral exhortation in its place is a good thing. Cool enquiry into truth is also a good thing. The mixture of the two is a bad thing, indeed, sometimes a rather nauseous compound, and the case is not altered though the truth that we are enquiring into is the truth about

morals. Our business here is to enquire into the content and the rationality of moral judgments, and we must try to keep as closely as possible to the facts, with the least disturbance from the emotional atmosphere in which facts of this particular order are steeped. Now we have conceived the moral judgment as laying down something that can be regarded as a fact, and the body of moral judgments accordingly as stating or implying a certain body of truth. Further, if we are right in regarding the moral system as rationally justified, the assertions or implications of fact that it contains must be valid, that is to say that what it asserts is real. What, then, precisely does it assert, or imply, as to the existence of Deity? This will partly depend on what is meant by Deity. The moral system directly or indirectly asserts, we have seen, a tie which is universal and independent of any particular social organization between all rational, perhaps all conscious beings, that come into relation with one another. As a consequence, it asserts a more concrete unity between those who stand in permanent relations to one another. It is essentially concerned with the conditions of harmony and disharmony among such persons, and thus involves a unity of a kind that we may fitly call spiritual in their lives. The lives and actions of separate minds, though seemingly locked up in separate bodies are, in fact, inter-related just as two magnets, though separate bodies, are interrelated by definite attractions and repulsions. We are free to call this a spiritual union, but are we free to call it God? If so, to which of the many social unions shall we apply the term? Hegel seems to have thought quite deliberately, and rhetoric apart, that the State might be so regarded, but the Olympus so constituted has not proved a very happy one. On our principles it is clear that if we are to find God in this line of search at all it will be not in any minor or more partial association, but in all Humanity. But as to this we must remark: (1) Humanity, if a spiritual unity, is not a Person. Personality and sociality may, perhaps, both be regarded as spiritual principles of unity, but they are not the same

principles. They are species of a genus, but quite distinct species. (2) Humanity is a growing rather than a matured unity. There is the basis of this unity in the moral order and its partial realization in social life. We are, in fact, dealing here with something in change and growth, something of which the future is even clouded and uncertain. (3) Humanity is confined to an inconsiderable member of one solar system. The moral unity of which the growth of Humanity is itself the outcome appears to claim a more universal application, provided there be any beings to apply it to in other worlds and any means of intercourse. It is a poetical license to say that duty preserves the stars from wrong, but not to maintain that duty would apply to any rational beings that may exist on the surface of a star. Whether such beings exist we have no direct means of knowing, but it is hardly to be supposed that the strange and rich development of mind is peculiar to one little fragment of a single solar system. The universe, so far as we know it, is of one tissue throughout, and it is reasonable to suppose that any principle of universal applicability is also one of general application. In any case the reality which the moral order implies is a spiritual principle, which, from its most salient feature, we may call briefly the principle of Love, actively operative in correlating and so determining the activities of all conscious beings in proportion to the grade of their development, and by its operation building up communities of extending scope, culminating in an incipient union of human-kind.

6. It is here that the real importance of ethical theory to cosmic philosophy is seen. We said above that if ethical theory is valid its implications of fact must be taken as true. Therefore, certain realities can be inferred from ethics. But it should not need to be said that the moment ethics makes this claim it lays itself open to the possibility of contradiction by other investigations. Thus, if, e.g., Ethics postulated immortality, and any other branch of science could be held to disprove immortality, one or the other must be unsound. There would then be

a conflict wherein we should not know what to believe, but must seek to resolve it, as we do when two physical sciences come into conflict, by further investigation. Thus Ethics can no more dogmatize about reality as a whole than can any special science. It can only propound a view which, if it is to be finally substantiated, must be proved consistent with views derived from other methods of investigation. Now what ethical theory establishes according to the argument here pursued is (a) that the Good is a Harmony and (b) that while Harmony is an unrealized ideal, the ties that make for Harmony are real and operative. Of these principles the second is an assertion of fact which accordingly challenges criticism from the sciences which deal with matters of fact. In the view briefly referred to below (and explained in the writer's *Development and Purpose*) the ethical claim is substantiated upon a critical examination of Development. But conversely, the ethical analysis which identifies the good with harmony is of the first importance to the theory of Development. For in this theory development rests upon a principle making for harmony in a world of discord. On the view here taken, that is the same as a principle making for the Good, or, in other words, a teleological principle. Ethical theory thus sets out the conditions of a teleological view of reality, defines the nature of the end, specifies the resistance to be overcome, and indicates—what the theory of development confirms—that the teleological factor is only one part of the explanation of the world-process.

In regard to such a principle, two questions arise which cannot be answered by the practical reason alone. The first is as to its scope and power, the second as to its concrete embodiment or real being. The first question can only find its answer in a general theory of the nature of reality, as to which I must here confine myself to stating succinctly the view arrived at by an argument from elsewhere. On this view Reality is an interconnected system which develops in time, the principle of rational harmony or Love being the permanent underlying ground of develop-

ment. This principle is not the ground of Reality, but only of the development which takes place in Reality, subduing as it advances the equally real and significant element of disharmony. The scope of the principle is, therefore, accurately expressed in the formula "universally applicable" rather than "universal in operation." But there should be this rider that the principle, being a principle of development, is a creative force always at work in extending its own field of application. Briefly, if this view is correct the principle will ultimately dominate the universe.

What, then, is the nature of its embodiment or concrete realization? In its completeness it is clearly not personal in the simple and straightforward sense. On the contrary, it includes unnumbered personalities. We may suppose it to transcend personality as the purest love does in depth as well as in extent, and may, therefore, justly name it super-personal. But what of its incompleteness? How does it exist now, and in what form has it maintained itself in the dark ages of chaos? We must beware of too facile an argument. Gravity is a universal principle, in that all that is material gravitates. But we do not suppose a God of weight, or that there exists somewhere concretely embodied a Principle of gravitation, from which the tendencies of separate bodies towards one another emanate as though by an efflux. We are not to infer directly from a potency of love in the universe to a God of Love from whom it flows. What we may more justly argue is that once regarding Reality as a whole, we must look for the principles of its explanation within. It must explain itself as it cannot be explained by anything external. From this, if it is a process of development, it will follow that its maturity or completeness cannot be regarded as an external or casual result of its initial condition. The whole is the entire process, and any one phase, including the beginning and the end, is only a part of this process, determining, but also determined by the remainder. A process thus determining and determined by its own outcome is of the nature of Effort, and the

world-development must therefore fall under this category. What we call Time is the common measure of the series of changes interfused with this effort, and what we call Eternity is neither the indefinite prolongation of Time nor the negation of Time, but the co-presence of past and future in a Reality of which all process is but one facet. It is an error of the religious mind to identify Reality as a whole with God—a very natural error, a kind of pious exaggeration which seeks to claim plenitude of Being and Power together with plenitude of goodness for the object of its adoration. Nevertheless, it is an error from which logical and moral contradictions arise. Reality is only good in so far as goodness prevails in it, and goodness prevails only through the fruition of the impulse to harmony accomplished in the Time process by the subdual of the particularism which is equally real. This Effort is the creator of gods and men, of beautiful fictions and of what is noble in fact, of law and morals, of science and art, perhaps of what is beautiful in nature, certainly of the significance of that beauty to us. Its operation is intelligent and purposive and all-embracing. An effort involving, even one evolving into, purpose implies Mind, and Mind that makes for harmony must have some unity throughout, however rudimentary its achievement. Hence if the world-process is directed towards harmony we legitimately infer a Mind at its centre, but the form of unity which such a Mind possesses is less easily determined. It is possible that personality on the one hand and the social union of personalities on the other are rather its creations than adequate expressions of its substantive essence.

7. This view, true or false, rests admittedly not on ethical reasoning alone. We are, therefore, bound to consider the effect on morals if we suppose it false. In point of fact by those who take a different view of ultimate reality, the final value of human effort is sometimes questioned. It is urged that the attempt to make human life happier or better is futile if not self-defeating; that the law of evolution involves struggle and not harmony,

the sacrifice of the weak to the strong, rather than the chivalry or justice by which the strong lose the fruits of their strength; finally, that evolution itself is but a stage in the world-process to be succeeded by dissolution and the subsequent cooling of the earth and extinction of the sun itself. On the last point it may be replied that, if our views of the future of the solar system were as certain as they are in fact speculative, they might indeed affect our estimate of the relative value of different forms of human effort, but they would not destroy the basis of rational action. If we find ourselves in a sinking ship we do not spend our last minutes, say, in studying the language of the country to which we are bound. This particular object has lost its value. But it remains worth while to maintain order, cheerfulness and courage and, in a word, to die like men. Similarly, if a geological cataclysm were anticipated, not within a million years, but within fifty, it would render nugatory all effort that could only bear fruit in the far future. Like any other condition of the environment it would limit the possibilities of action and affect the direction of effort, but it would not impair the reasonableness of making life as good a thing as it could be made for the years remaining to the human race. The theory of harmony as such does not depend on an optimistic view of the world-process. With the conception of Development here deduced from that of Harmony, however, the case is different. If there is a term fixed by unalterable conditions to human development, it is clearly futile to make preparations to cultivate forms of social faculty which could only have their fruition outside those limits. If we believe the whole course of human evolution to be without significance for the Real Order, if it is a process with a set term of beginning, maturity and decay, like the life powers of the individual, our whole conception of relative values must be gravely affected. We shall place a lower estimate on all that makes for the control of natural conditions by the human mind, and a higher one on all that leads to resignation and submission. The harmony that we shall seek will be that

of the Buddhist, founded on the impermanence of things, rather than that of the Greek, founded on the intrinsic value, the promise and the hopefulness of life. What has here been said of development is coloured, it must be admitted, by the latter view, and the justification of this view cannot be sought within ethics alone. If we cannot infer the existence of God and immortality from the moral requirement that the virtuous should be rewarded, neither can we assert that human progress is boundless because its transitoriness would make our ethical system incomplete.

It does not follow that ethical analysis has no light to throw on the final meaning of experience, that is to say, on the ultimate structure of Reality and the place of the human mind therein. This light, however, as has been shown, is to be appreciated only by taking the ethical consciousness in relation to the general theory of evolution. To what has been already said on this point I will venture to add one thing which may be affirmed with confidence. The conception of a "law" of progress involving essential ethical disharmonies may be set down as a misinterpretation of the truth. The evolution of new types through a cruel and anarchic struggle in which the majority of individuals perish prematurely in each generation is a process which occurs throughout the organic world, but can in no genuine sense be called a permanent condition of progress. On the contrary, in proportion as higher types come into being they emancipate themselves in greater and greater degree from the struggle, substituting in ever larger measure the principle of co-operation and the deliberate organization of life. The ethical principle of harmony here laid down, far from being antagonistic to this movement, is merely an expression for the goal to which it tends. It is the principle of true progress in evolution become conscious and operating with full sense of its own meaning and aim in the higher organization of life. There is no abysmal conflict between ethics and evolution. The flower of the evolutionary process is the ethical spirit. The rational harmony contemplated

here means neither more nor less than the more perfect adjustment and co-ordination of the permanent forces that make for betterment in the movement in the world, and which, slowly gathering vitality as civilization advances, now mainly require a fuller and more adequate expression to secure to them the ultimate control of the movement of social life.

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