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ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY

Supplementary Volume XVIII.

HUME AND PRESENT DAY PROBLEMS.

THE SYMPOSIA READ AT THE JOINT SESSION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, THE SCOTS PHILOSOPHICAL CLUB, AND THE MIND ASSOCIATION AT EDINBURGH, JULY 7TH—10TH, 1939.

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PROGRAMME.

RIDAY, JULY 7th.

Annual General Meeting of the Mind Association.

At 8 p.m. Chairman: Sir W. D. Ross.

Address by Professor N. Kemp Smith.

"David Hume: 1739–1939"

SATURDAY, JULY 8th.

At 10 a.m. Chairman: Professor J. Laird.

"Self Identity."

Professor J. N. Wright, Dr. C. A. Mace.

At 8 p.m. Chairman: Professor N. Kemp Smith.

"Are there *a priori* concepts?"

Mr. D. M. Mackinnon, Mr. W. G. Maclagan, Mr. J. L. Austin.

SUNDAY, JULY 9th.

At 10 a.m. Chairman: Professor G. C. Field.

"The Moral Good as a Relation Between Persons."

Mr. J. W. Phillips, Professor A. Macbeath, Professor H. F. Hallett.

At 8 p.m. Chairman: Professor G. E. Moore.

"The Present-Day Relevance of Hume's *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*"

Professor A. E. Taylor, Professor J. Laird, Professor T. E. Jessop.

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THE INAUGURAL ADDRESS.

DAVID HUME: 1739–1939.

By PROFESSOR N. KEMP SMITH.

As the immediate occasion of our holding our meetings this year in Edinburgh is that it marks the bicentenary of the publication of Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, the subject appropriate to this opening address has been predetermined for me; and it is one upon which I welcome the opportunity of speaking.

Hume left instructions that on his tomb there should be no inscription save his name, with the dates of his birth and death, "leaving it to posterity to add the rest." Posterity, we find, has for the most part dealt very harshly with the author of the *Treatise*. Even if we consider only those of his critics who are in sympathy with the empirical type of philosophy for which he stands, and might therefore be expected to have, if anything, a prejudice in his favour, what do we find? Here, for instance, is the judgment passed upon Hume by John Stuart Mill,

> "Hume possessed powers of a very high order; but regard for truth formed no part of his character. He reasoned with surprising acuteness; but the object of his reasonings was, not to attain truth, but to show that it is unattainable. His mind too was completely enslaved by a taste for literature; not those kinds of literature which teach mankind to know the causes of their happiness and misery, that they may seek the one and avoid the other; but that literature which without regard for truth or utility, seeks only to excite emotion."*

* *Westminster Review*, 1824, vol. II, p. 346. Mill is reviewing George Brodie's *History of the British Empire*, and has Hume's *History of England* mainly in view; but his judgment is none the less in these unqualified terms.

Or take this passage from T. H. Huxley's volume on Hume in the English Men of Letters series,

> "It must be confessed that . . . Hume exhibits no small share of the craving after mere notoriety and vulgar success, as distinct from the pardonable, if not honourable, ambition for solid and enduring fame, which would have harmonized better with his philosophy. Indeed, it appears to be by no means improbable that this peculiarity of Hume's moral constitution was the cause of his gradually forsaking philosophical studies after the publication of the third part of the *Treatise* . . . and turning to those political and historical topics which were likely to yield, and did in fact yield, a much greater return of that sort of success which his soul loved."*

In the present bicentenary year a Danish scholar, Dr. Vinding Kruse, in a work on the *Treatise* and *Enquiries* published a few months ago by the Oxford University Press, would have us agree to the following statements :—

> "It is well known that in his later life Hume time after time suppressed his most radical ideas in order to be better appreciated by the public, and it is characteristic that in his autobiography he describes the 'ruling passion' of his life not as a Spinoza would have done, as the urge of philosophical cognition, but love of literary fame. And this literary ambition was not of the nature which was content with the immortality usually accorded to great thinkers by a late posterity; but, practical and concrete as he was, he craved first and foremost the admiration of his contemporaries. . . . And therefore he was consistently led to regard the judgment of the public as his supreme court, his only guide in his literary work."†

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* Op. cit., p. 11.

† *Hume's Philosphy in his Principal Work, A Treatise of Human Nature, and in his Essays.* English translation, p. 8.

I propose to challenge these judgments, which in one form or another have come to be widely accepted ; and in doing so there is hardly a single main aspect of Hume's philosophy which I shall not have to bring under review. More particularly, there is the question of the relation of the *Treatise* to the *Enquiries*, the reasons for the changes of teaching and for the omissions. Did he prove false to earlier, higher ambitions when he turned from philosophy to the writing of history ? What was the quality of the passion for literary fame to which he himself confesses ? And as leading up to these questions, what is the truth in regard to the reception actually given to the *Treatise* on its publication and throughout the period during which Hume was creatively active as a writer ?

When we look back there is almost inevitably a foreshortening of the time-perspective. We recall the controversy in regard to Hume's teaching which arose upon the publication of Reid's *Inquiry* and of Beattie's *Essay*. Wha we tend to overlook is that Reid's *Inquiry* did not appear until 1764, and Beattie's *Essay* not until six years later. In the twenty-five years which thus intervened between the *Treatise* and Reid's *Inquiry*, for all the public attention the *Treatise* received it might almost as well not have been published. And since it is this period—the period during which Hume was creatively active—that he had in mind when he wrote of the *Treatise* as having come " dead-born from the press," it is not surprising that he should have expressed himself in this manner. He had pictured himself as addressing an interested audience ; instead, as it seemed, he had only been soliloquizing to himself. The sole exception to the total silence throughout the twenty-five years was the appearance of a volume of essays by his friend, Henry Home, later Lord Kames, in which the *Treatise* is referred to in a friendly though critical manner. Hume's *Enquiries* had, of course, meantime been published. But even they met with but little response, and that almost solely in connection with his attack on miracles.

After Hume's death, it was only very slowly that the *Treatise* came to be generally recognized as a philosophical

classic and to be studied in an unprejudiced manner. It did not reach a second edition until 1817, i.e., 78 years after its first publication. In view of its continuing eclipse throughout the early decades of the 19th century there is no cause for surprise when we find that John Stuart Mill had never been sufficiently interested in Hume to look into the *Treatise* for himself, and seemingly had also never read Hume's *Dialogues*. On the other hand, the nearer we come to the present time, the greater the attention we find given to the *Treatise*. Thus though a German translation of it had been published in 1790–2, it was not until 1878 that a French translation appeared, and then only of Book I. A new German translation was completed in 1906. The first Spanish translation of the *Treatise* appeared in 1923, and the first Italian translation in 1926. And now it is true to say in these present years that there is more being written upon Hume, and especially upon the *Treatise*, than at any time in the past.

But let us go back to the years immediately sequent to 1739. The manner in which Hume reacted to his disappointment has every claim upon our respect. He took upon his own shoulders the blame for his failure, and at once —I say, at once, for we have quite conclusive evidence of this —set about enquiring what were the defects in the *Treatise* which had led to this failure. It was himself he blamed, not the public. Indeed, in so doing, he was only advancing (under the influence of the obvious failure of the *Treatise* to obtain a hearing) on the path upon which his feet were already set in the interval between the publication of the first two volumes of the *Treatise* and the third. What better evidence—evidence reinforced by the recently discovered *Abstract*—could we have of Hume's readiness to revise his own work in an impersonal, critical manner than the Appendix which he added in volume three. There he expresses dissatisfaction with his account of the doctrine which is central in Book I, his doctrine of belief, and there too he frankly confesses that on reflection he cannot but recognize that his methods of dealing with the self have proved abortive. In view of this readiness on

Hume's part to adopt an attitude of criticism towards his own teaching, and this before he knew how the *Treatise* was going to be received, we have the right to demand very special evidence to convince us that when he went further, as I think he certainly did in the omissions and changes of doctrine in the *Enquiries*, this was dictated by unworthy motives.

What are the grounds upon which the accusation is made—the accusation that Hume was unduly influenced, and that his career as a philosopher was checked, by a craving for immediate recognition, and that he made sacrifices to this end which betray a serious flaw in his character? There are two passages in his autobiography which bear on this. First, there is the passage in which he tells us that he was early seized with a passion for literature, that this passion was " the ruling passion of [his] life, and the great source of [his] enjoyments." His family had designed him for the profession of the law.

> " But I found an unsurmountable aversion to everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning ; and while they fancied I was poring over Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which I was secretly devouring."

Secondly, after saying that were he to name the period of his life which he would most choose to pass over again, he would be tempted to point to its closing years, he adds :—

> " I possess the same ardour as ever in study, and the same gaiety in company."

And then follows the account which he gives of his character.

> " To conclude historically with my own character. I am, or rather was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself, which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments) ; I was, I say, a man of mild disposition, of command of temper, of an open, social, and cheerful humour, capable of attachment, but little susceptible of emnity, and of great moderation in all my passions, even my love of literary fame, my ruling

> passion, never soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments."

You will notice that he again uses the phrase " my ruling passion," this time as referring to his " love of literary fame " : in the earlier passage when he uses the even stronger phrase " the ruling passion of my life," it is his delight in literature of which he is speaking.

Burton very rightly takes these two passages together.

> " Money was not his object, nor was temporary fame ; though, of the means of independent livelihood, and a good repute among men, he never lost sight : but his ruling object of ambition, pursued in poverty and riches, in health and sickness, in laborious obscurity and amidst the blaze of fame, was to establish a permanent name, resting on the foundation of literary achievements. . . . from his earliest years to an advanced period of his life, his mind was characterized by constant improvement, and he was every now and then reaching a point from which he looked back with regret and disapprobation at the efforts of earlier years."*

As Burton might have added, revision of his writings was a main occupation of the last fourteen years of his life—a period during which he was not engaged on any new large piece of work.

The truth I take to be this. Nothing, Hume was convinced, could be more harmful to philosophy than that it should become detached from the general life.† It should be, what those recent innovators to whom in his Introduction to the *Treatise* he refers as being his forerunners in philosophy, viz. "my Lord Bacon," "Mr. Locke, my Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutcheson, Dr. Butler," had

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* *Life of David Hume*, vol. I, pp. 18–19.

† Cf. Hume's essay entitled "Essay Writing" (1742), an essay later withdrawn, doubtless because he considered that he had expressed the view more adequately in the Section introductory to the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, " Of the different Species of Philosophy."

succeeded in making it to be, a department of literature, accessible to all intelligent readers, and in living contact with contemporary thought. It was in philosophy thus conceived, and in the kindred fields of criticism, political theory, economics, and what is so closely bound up with them, especially with morals and political theory, the study of history, that Hume found himself absorbingly interested. His admiration went out to those who laboured successfully in these fields, and his ambition—the ruling passion of his life—was to be able through his writings to prove himself not unworthy of being counted one of their number. This surely was no illegitimate ambition. And in his case it was the more plainly disinterested in that the views to which, in his pursuit of truth, he found himself committed, brought him so invariably into conflict with the favoured tendencies of the public for which he was writing. His readers—those possible readers who existed in any considerable number—were Christians in religion : Hume was not only not a Christian, he regarded religion as in the main a malign influence, and as ceasing to be so only in proportion as it limited itself to reinforcing moral sanctions, and was not as religion zealously held. In the writing of history, his independence of judgment again landed him on the unpopular side. Living in the home of the Covenant, he became more and more of a Tory, writing in defence of King Charles, and eulogizing the high-church policy of Archbishop Laud. Was this the conduct of a man who was ready to violate truth for the gaining of a merely temporary fame, or of a man who as Dr. Vinding Kruse contends had come

> " to regard the judgment of the public as his supreme court, his only guide in his literary work " ?

You will recall the passage which I quoted from Mill—the passage in which he declares that regard for truth formed no part of Hume's character. I would now ask you to observe that Mill's condemnation of Hume was not based on any accusation of deference to popular opinion but on what Mill considered to be his lack of regard for

truth, issuing in an excessive scepticism. In the Introduction to his father's *Analysis of the Human Mind* Mill contrasts Hume's sceptical teaching with what he takes to be the more positive, constructive teaching of Hartley. To Hartley, he declares, will always belong the glory of having originated the true theory of the mind ; and one of the reasons, Mill holds, why this has not been more generally recognized, is that the publication of Hartley's work

> " so nearly conincided with the reaction against the experience psychology, provoked by the hardy scepticism of Hume."*

Mill's disciple, Alexander Bain, was viewing Hume's philosophy in a similar manner when he ventured the strange pronouncement :—

> " No doubt [Hume's] Toryism was his shelter from the odium of his scepticism."†

Some among Hume's critics have recognized that an accusation of pandering to the public is not easily reconcilable with this independence of judgment ; and in meeting the objection, they have had to come out into the open, and to attack Hume on quite other grounds than any which his own confession can be used to justify. The indictment then is that Hume was so bent upon immediate success, that failing to gain a hearing by legitimate means he turned aside from his high calling, and sought it in unworthy ways. This, you will recall, is Huxley's accusation against Hume :—

> " Hume exhibits no small share of the craving after mere notoriety and vulgar success, as distinct from the pardonable, if not honourable, ambition for solid enduring fame, which would have harmonized better with his philosophy."

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* Op. cit. (1869), vol. I, pp. xi–xii.

† *John Stuart Mill* (1882), p. 34. Bain, in writing at this late date, and in the course of referring to Mill's review of Brodie's *History*, remarks—it is interesting to note—on the change in Hume's reputation as a philosophical thinker which has meantime come about " . . . and, at the present time, when Hume's metaphysical reputation is so resplendent, his moral obliquity as a historian should not be glossed over."

In fairness to Huxley, it must be added that what he has in view—and here he dissociates himself from Mill—is solely what he takes to have been Hume's desertion of philosophy, in not following up the *Treatise* by other philosophical works of the same or greater calibre, and in choosing instead for his further writing, fields in which he could hope to reap an easier harvest. Huxley elsewhere speaks of

> " that profound veracity which was," he says, " the secret of [Hume's] philosophic greatness."

It is only therefore in this more limited application that we need consider Huxley's judgment upon Hume. It raises the main question how Hume's *Treatise* stands related to the *Enquiries* ; and it is by reference to this central question that I shall order what I have to say throughout the rest of this address.

The traditional view of the relation holding between the *Treatise* and the *Enquiries*—the view to which Huxley gives voice—rests, in the main, upon a continued acceptance of that interpretation of Hume's philosophy which gained currency through the writings of Reid and Beattie ; and if this manner of regarding Hume's teaching be retained, it does indeed seem impossible to evade the conclusion that in the *Enquiries* Hume has, of set purpose, deliberately suppressed all admission of the more extreme consequences to which his teaching, if consistently developed, is bound to lead. Reid's indictment of Hume—for, surely it is an indictment and not a eulogy—is two-fold : first, that Hume's fundamental principles have been taken over in an uncritical manner from his predecessors Locke and Berkeley ; and secondly, that though Hume has had the insight to recognize—this indeed is the sole merit which Reid allows to Hume—that they do not suffice in answering any of the questions to which philosophy seeks a solution, he has yet been content to rest in the sheerly sceptical self-destroying attitude to which he has thereby been committed. Reid's *Inquiry*, in which this account of Hume's teaching is expounded in detail, was published in 1764, passed into a second edition in the following year, and reached a fourth edition

in 1785. As I have already mentioned, it was not until 1817 that the *Treatise* itself attained the honour of a second edition.

Reid's manner of interpreting the *Treatise* gained yet wider currency through Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immortality of Truth,* published in 1770. It went through eight editions in the course of the following decade, and was twice translated into German before the end of the century. More than any other work, it has determined the prevailing conception of the character and consequences of Hume's philosophical teaching. So far as Beattie's comments are argued, they are those of Reid.

> " The substance," he says, " or at least the foundation of Berkeley's argument against the existence of matter, may be found in Locke's *Essay* and in the *Principia* of Des Cartes—Mr. Hume more subtle, or less reserved, than any of his predecessors, hath gone still greater lengths in the demolition of common sense."*

From these, and other like criticisms, Beattie descended into invective.

> " Those unnatural productions, the vile effusions of a hard heart, that mistakes its own restlessness for the activity of genius, and its own captiousness for sagacity of understanding ; may, like other monsters, please for a while by their singularity, but the charm is soon over ; and the succeeding age will be astonished to hear, that their forefathers were deluded, or amused, with such fooleries."†
>
> " Away with this passion for system-building ! It is pedantry ! Away with this lust of paradoxes ! It is presumption."‡

This is the book of which Beattie's royal patron, George III, kept by him two copies for occasional reading, one at Kew, and one at Windsor.

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* *Essay*, pp. 214-5.

† *Essay*, p. 404.

‡ *Essay*, p. 423.

Reid and Beattie almost entirely ignored the *Enquiries*, which had, of course, been published many years previously. Their constant endeavour was to focus the readers' attention upon the most extreme of Hume's utterances in the *Treatise*, and to suggest that in these extreme utterances Hume's teaching found its true and appropriate expression. This, no doubt, was what finally decided Hume to preface what, as it happened, came to be the posthumous edition of his collected *Essays* with the "Advertisement" in which he disowns the *Treatise*, and requests that the *Enquiries*

> "alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles."

And he speaks of the procedure of Reid and Beattie in what for him, in published writing, was unusually strong language, as being

> "a practice very contrary to all rules of candour and fair dealing, and a strong instance of those polemical artifices, which a bigoted zeal thinks itself authorized to employ."

In forwarding the "Advertisement" to his publisher, he adds the private comment :—

> "It is a compleat Answer to Dr. Reid, and to that bigoted silly Fellow, Beattie."*

Let us consider the two points in Reid's indictment of Hume, and first his charge of a self-defeating scepticism. Hume, in all his writings, has consistently held to the view—

---

* *Letters* (Greig), vol. II, p. 301. The letter is dated Oct. 26, 1775. Cf. Kant in his *Prolegomena* (Mahaffy's translation, p. 5) : "But the perpetual hard fate of metaphysic would not allow [Hume] to be understood. We cannot without a certain sense of pain consider how utterly his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and even Priestley, missed the point of the problem. For while they were ever assuming as conceded what he doubted, and demonstrating with eagerness and often with arrogance what he never thought of disputing, they so overlooked his indication towards a better state of things that everything remained undisturbed in its old condition."

a view in which he agrees with Locke—that knowledge, to be knowledge, must be completely certain. So long as there is even the bare possibility of error, knowledge is absent. What differentiates it from all *opinion*, is that its opposite is not even conceivable. That 3 and 2 are 5, is, Hume maintains, an absolutely certain judgment. To talk of *believing* it is meaningless ; it is known. In the field of knowledge there is therefore no tribunal other or higher than reason ; there reason is sovereign. As he states in the *Treatise*, at the opening of the section *Of scepticism with regard to reason*,

> " our reason must be consider'd as a kind of cause of which truth is the natural effect."†

When Hume lays claim, as he indeed does, to the title " sceptic," he means thereby not a self-defeating scepticism, which in discrediting reason blunts the weapons that have to be relied upon in the battle with the forces of fanaticism and superstition, but a scepticism of the aristocratic, academic type—what Hume himself also entitles a " mitigated " scepticism—the scepticism which has its source in a fastidious insistence that while our standards of judgment must indeed be appropriate to the kind of problem which is being dealt with, these standards must be held to with the uttermost rigour.

This is the determining principle of his discussion of the ideas of space and time in Part II of Book I of the *Treatise*. Whatever be the defects of this portion of the *Treatise*, it illustrates more forcibly than any other Hume's conviction that reason can never be conflict with itself, and that the possibility of antinomies of reason, to use Kant's phrase, may not, therefore, be allowed.

Throughout the discussion Hume has in mind Pierre Bayle's treatment of the issues in his article on Zeno in his *Dictionary*. Bayle's contention is that there are three and only three possible views in regard to the constitution of space and time. Either they consist of mathematical points,

† Op. cit. (Selby-Bigge's edition), p. 180.

or of physical points, or they are infinitely divisible. These three, he maintains, are exhaustive of the possibilities. All three, he further maintains, can be shown to be false, because self-contradictory. What is the conclusion which Bayle then draws? He draws the sheerly sceptical conclusion that when mathematicians and philosophers decide in favour of infinite divisibility their excuse for doing so is not that they are able to show that it is free from self-contradiction, but because, as introducing the notion of something which is infinite, it allows them a convenient and plausible way of escape from their difficulties.

> "The divisibility in infinitum is an opinion embraced by Aristotle, and almost all the professors of Philosophy, in all universities for several ages. Not that they understand it, or can answer the objections it is liable to; but because having clearly apprehended the impossibility of either mathematical or physical points they found no other course but this to take. Besides this opinion [in making the appeal to a something that is infinite] affords great conveniencies; for when their distinctions are exhausted, they shelter themselves in the nature of the subject, and allege, that our understandings being limited, none ought to be surprised that they cannot resolve what relates to infinity, and that it is essential to such a continuity to be liable to such difficulties as are insurmountable by human reason."*

And their argument, as Bayle is mischievously careful to point out, can then be retorted on philosophers by the theologians. If space and time, as being infinite, be of this non-rational character, what objection can be made, on rational grounds, to any religious dogma or divinely operated miracle, in which the divine, as even more mysteriously infinite, exhibits its adorably mysterious character?

---

* *The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle.* (English translation, 2nd edition, 1738.) In note G to the article on *Zeno*.

Hume has taken Bayle's method of argument as a direct challenge to the defence of reason ; and in Part II of Book I of the *Treatise* he has given his answer to it. For this, and not his sensationalism, was here the determining influence. He agrees with Bayle that there are only the three possibilities. He further agrees with Bayle that the doctrine of sheerly mathematical points is untenable ; and of the two remaining views, he adopts the hypothesis of physical points, and proceeds to develop it in a manner which enables him, as he claims, to meet all the objections to which Bayle and others have supposed it to lie open. He then completes his argument by showing that the alleged mathematical demonstrations of infinite divisibility have no logical cogency.

Hume's own positive teaching, that space consists of physical points, is, I think we must agree, one of the least satisfactory parts of his philosophy, as he himself later seems to have come to recognize. What I wish to emphasize is that his main motive in denying space and time to be infinitely divisible, and in his consequent heterodox treatment of geometry, was his desire to vindicate for reason the right to have jurisdiction in every field of possible human knowledge, with no limitation save such as is prescribed by the absence or insufficiency of the data which it can have at its disposal in dealing with them. Many of the misunderstandings to which he laid himself open in the *Treatise* have been due to a confusion between the two very different senses in which he has employed the term " reason." In addition to reason, properly so called, there is, to use his own expression, " what is *commonly*, in a popular sense, called reason "*—a faculty supposed to be capable of determining moral distinctions and of justifying beliefs in regard to matters of fact and existence. This so-called " reason," he maintains, is merely a misnomer for instinctively determined sentiments and beliefs. Accordingly he was not departing from or qualifying his defence

* Cf. *A Dissertation of the Passions* (Green and Grose's edition), p. 161 Italics not in text.

of reason, he was further substantiating it, in proceeding to show that this so-called reason has no right to the title.

This, it is significant to observe, is likewise his teaching in his *Enquiry concerning human understanding*. Here is a passage from the *Enquiry* :—

> " The chief objection against all *abstract* reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time ; ideas, which, in common life and to a careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief objects of these sciences) afford principles, which seem full of absurdity and contradiction. No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension, with its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation."†

Hume here, as in the *Treatise*, is not approving this depreciation of reason ; he is condemning it.

Hume's treatment of geometry as being an inexact science is customarily regarded as prescribed for him by his sensationalism. This, as I have already suggested, is not really a tenable view. Hume takes a non-sensationalist view of both space and time. He has refused to adopt the easy line of treating extensity and duration as disclosed in simple impressions. [Had he done so, he would have had to allow that the impressions, however simple, are, at least in thought, divisible, and he would not therefore have been able to employ the arguments upon which he has relied in refuting the hypothesis of infinite divisibility.] Instead he has had to resort to unanalysed, make-shift phrases, describing space and time as being the two distinct " manners," the spatial and the temporal, in which unextended and unchanging impressions and ideas " *appear*," and as he has to add " appear *to the mind*."*

† *Enquiry* (Selby-Bigge's edition), p. 156.

* *Treatise* (Selby-Bigge's edition), p. 36. Italics not in text.

In another respect Hume qualifies his scepticism—namely in his doctrine of the natural beliefs—but upon this I shall not now enter.

To come to the second main assumption upon which the traditional interpretation rests—that Hume's thought is confined within the limits imposed by the Locke-Berkeley tradition. There were other influences acting upon Hume, and in respect of what is *distinctive* in Hume's teaching, they are quite as important as any that came to him by way of the writings of Locke and Berkeley. These other influences were three-fold; first, the Montaigne-Bayle tradition; secondly, the Shaftesbury-Hutcheson tradition, in certain respects reinforced and in certain respects modified by Butler; and thirdly an influence which came to him through his own independent reflections on Newton's methods of explanation in physical science. Only when these other influences are taken into account can we be in a position to appreciate the use—the new and very distinctive use—to which Hume put those principles and assumptions which he continued to share with Locke.

I shall not attempt to dwell on the Montaigne-Bayle influence. Montaigne—one of his favourite authors—influenced him in his view of animal life and in his manner of expounding his academic scepticism. Bayle's influence was similar, but also more specific and varied. It is the other two sources of influence which more directly concern us.

What was the Shaftesbury-Hutcheson tradition, and what was its influence on Hume? To answer these questions, we must bear in mind what Hume has himself told us of the interests of his early years, and of the mental crisis which came in his eighteenth year.

> "I found," he tells us, "a certain Boldness of Temper, growing in me, which was not enclin'd to submit to any Authority in these subjects [the subjects to which he is referring are philosophy, including moral philosophy and criticism, *i.e.*, the philosophy of the literary and fine arts], but led me to seek out some new Medium, by which Truth might be establisht. After

> much Study, and Reflection on this, at last, when I was 18 Years of Age, there seem'd to be open'd up to me a new Scene of Thought, which transported me beyond Measure, and made me, with an Ardor natural to young men, throw up every other Pleasure or Business to apply entirely to it."

What Reid seems constantly to have had in mind when he thought of Hume was the teaching of the first twenty pages of Book I of the *Treatise*, where Hume states his version of what Reid calls " the ideal theory "—the theory in which Hume agrees with Locke that all ideas are copies of the impressions of sensation and reflection. Everything else which Hume has to say is, Reid would seem to have held, exhaustively predetermined by these opening pages. That is not, it seems to me, a tenable view of the *Treatise*. The teaching of the opening pages—in its account of the distinction between impressions and ideas—is coloured by Hume's doctrine of belief. That doctrine, with its grounds and consequences, is not expounded until much later in Book I, and has itself, in turn, in large part been suggested by the doctrine of sympathy expounded in Books II and III. Reid never seems to have asked himself how it was that Hume's first work had come to include, in addition to a theory of knowledge, a system of morals, and as the foundation of this system of morals an elaborately worked out account of the passions.

To raise such questions is already to suggest doubts as to the correctness of the view commonly taken of what constituted Hume's primary philosophical interests. His early letters, the account which he gives of his purposes in the Introduction to the *Treatise*, and the body of teaching in the *Treatise* itself, go to show—and the subtitle of the *Treatise* is designed to emphasize this—that Hume's philosophical interests centered not in the theory of knowledge but in ethics. When Hume speaks of a " *new* Medium," when he speaks of a " *new* Scene of Thought," when he tells us that in the three following years he

> " scribbled many a Quire of Paper, in which there [was] nothing contain'd but [his] own Inventions,"

it is difficult to believe that he is referring only to the doctrines which he shares with Locke and Berkeley, or even—for reasons which I shall try to indicate—that he was referring primarily to his views on causal inference. But if so, what can "the new Scene of Thought" have been? What must the mental excitements have been, to account for what issued from them, the three Books of the *Treatise*? Hume has himself indicated the direction in which the answer is to be looked for. In his letter of March, 1734, the passage which immediately precedes the above quotation is in these terms :—

> "Having now Time and Leizure to cool my inflam'd Imaginations, I began to consider seriously, how I shou'd proceed in my Philosophical Enquiries. I found that the *moral* Philosophy transmitted to us by Antiquity labor'd under the same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural Philosophy, of being entirely Hypothetical . . . Everyone consulted his Fancy in erecting Schemes of Virtue and of Happiness, without regarding human Nature, upon which every moral Conclusion must depend. *This therefore I resolved to make my principal Study, and the Source from which I wou'd derive every Truth in Criticism* [*i.e.*, in the theory of the literary and other Arts] *as well as Morality.*"*

Could there be a clearer statement that it was in the field of morals that he had found the starting point, and the main goal, of his enquiries?

Now what is really distinctive of his teaching in this field connects him not with Locke or with Berkeley but with Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson's two volumes—his *Enquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, and his *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections*—appeared in the years just after Hume had left College and was prepared by his studies in Cicero and Seneca for this kind of reading.

What was Hutcheson's teaching? That moral and

* *Letters* (Greig), Vol. I, pp. 13-16. Italics not in text.

æsthetic judgments rest neither on reason nor on empirical evidence, but solely on feeling, as determined for us by the constitution of our human nature. The new scene of thought which so transported Hume, was, I should contend, the discovery that this view of value-judgments—to use a present-day term—likewise holds of all judgments in respect of matters of fact and existence, that not only can they never be demonstrated, but they also do not allow of being empirically established ; or, in other words, that they fall entirely outside the field of knowledge strictly so-called. They are matters not of knowledge or insight, but solely of belief; and belief, in turn, is found to have its source in the constitution of our animal and human mind.

This thesis accounts, as no other would seem to do, for the contents of Book I and for the relations in which Book I stands to Books II and III. Whatever bears directly upon this thesis is treated at length, and the more directly it bears upon it the greater the detail in which it is discussed. It is the conclusion in which his lengthy treatment of the idea of necessary connexion and of causal inference finally terminates. On the other hand, whatever is only subsidiary to the thesis is treated in the scantiest manner. Twenty pages are made to suffice for the statement of Hume's Lockean principles in the three opening sections of the *Treatise*, and seven pages, a very scanty allowance, for his statement of the relations of ideas and the knowledge which they make possible. Almost the only exception is the length at which Hume has discussed the ideas of space and time : practically the whole of Part II is devoted to their discussion. But, as I have argued, Hume considered this to be required in order that he might repel the extreme sceptical conclusions to which his thesis, if not qualified by due recognition of the independent realm of genuine knowledge, would otherwise have lain open.

Newton suggested to Hume yet another thesis, namely, the associationism, through which he hoped to be able to give a naturalistic, mechanistic account of the human constitution, which Hutcheson had regarded as divinely pre-arranged. Though this ambition never came properly

to fulfilment, it has exercised a disturbing influence on the argument of the first two books of the *Treatise*, leading Hume to credit to the account of association very much more than it does in fact achieve. The lack of harmony between the Newtonian mechanical analogies which inspire his associationism and the Hutchesonian biological standpoint, with its appeal on all critical issues, to instincts, propensities, passions and affections, treated as ultimates, is, I should argue, a chief source of the conflicts which pervade the *Treatise*. And it was, I should further argue, Hume's growing awareness of their incompatibility, and the cooling of his enthusiasm—still strong at the time of his publication of the *Abstract*—for the associationist part of his teaching, that account both for some of the chief omissions and for several of the changes in doctrine which distinguish the *Enquiries* from the *Treatise*.

These conflicts are, for instance, at a maximum in his treatment of belief. When he is proceeding on Newtonian lines belief is a quality of this and that perception, and is treated in the manner of his argument against miracles, as a question merely of the mechanical reinforcing of resembling and the cancelling out of differing perceptions, each perception counting as a separate unit, and each unit being of equal potency. Belief, thus conceived, automatically determines itself through the psychological mechanism which association provides. When, on the other hand, Hume is proceeding more on Hutchesonian lines, belief is not a quality of this or that perception ; it is an attitude of mind, and rests on a fundamental distinction between the mind in its character as observer, and the items observed and reflected upon, with an allowed possibility of revision, according as it does or does not fit into the systems of memory and history, and the system of sense-experiences experimentally extended. On the associationist view custom is king ; on the other view there is an all-important distinction between the vulgar and the wise, and the possibility through reflection and experimentation of testing and correcting the beliefs generated by custom in its merely automatic modes of action.

Allow me, now, to indicate the kind of evidence which can be cited in support of the contention that it was in connexion with ethical questions, and under Hutcheson's influence, that Hume came to formulate the more strictly logical problems dealt with in Book I of the *Treatise*, and in doing so to formulate the thesis that in all judgments of matters of fact and existence belief takes the place of knowledge, and as being belief, not knowledge, rests exclusively on feeling, as predetermined by that constitution of our human nature which is common to us with all other members of the species.

Let me cite two main pieces of evidence. Hume's doctrine of sympathy is as central in Books II and III as is his doctrine of belief in Book I. What is the account which he gives of sympathy? There is, he tells us, no single passion or emotion which can be so entitled. Sympathy, in his view, is a name for the tendency in men and animals to share in any emotion which they observe in others. This occurs, he declares, in all cases in which counter-conditions are not present to prevent its occurring. When we observe anger in others, the idea of anger (suggested to us through observation of their modes of behaviour) tends to become enlivened, and in being enlivened becomes, in effect, the actual emotion. We are then angry along with others; we suffer together with them; we sympathize. Now what is the agency by which, in Book II, Hume professes to account for this enlivening of ideas? He traces it to what is, he declares, the most vivid of the mind's impressions—the ever-present impression of the self. To quote Hume's precise words:

> "'Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves [It has perforce to be an *impression*, to be a *source* of liveliness] is always intimately present with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 'tis not possible to imagine, that anything can in this particular go beyond it. Whatever object, therefore, is related to ourselves must

> be conceived with a like vivacity of conception, according to the foregoing principles."*

This doctrine of sympathy must surely have been worked out prior to the enquiries which led him to deny that there is any discoverable impression of the self, and to speak in one passage—the passage in Book I so constantly quoted by his critics—of the self as being merely a heap or collection of perceptions, and expressly to declare that no one of the perceptions is constant and ever-present.

This is confirmed by the manner in which Hume has expounded his doctrine of belief in Book I. It is not merely that his doctrine of belief runs parallel with his doctrine of sympathy: it has been suggested by, and is modelled upon it. Belief, he teaches, is no more than an enlivened idea; and the source of the enlivening must be some impression co-present with it. But there is no impression which holds the privileged position occupied by the impression of the self in the case of sympathy. Accordingly Hume had to contend that any and every sense-impression, simply as being a sense-impression, must have this power of transfusing its native vivacity into what would otherwise continue to be merely ideas, and would not therefore be believed.

In how many inextricable difficulties Hume landed himself by this first scheme, by which, in Book I of the *Treatise*, he has attempted to account for belief! That *emotions* have an enlivening effect upon all co-present ideas, and that our awareness of the self, *if emotionally coloured*, can do so likewise, may be allowed. Sense-impressions, however—Hume's alleged instances notwithstanding—cannot be shown to have any such effect on *free* ideas. But even if this part of his teaching could have been made good, what is distinctive of belief, as differentiating it from any and every form of immediately experienced liveliness, would still have remained unaccounted for. Immediate experience is, Hume insists,

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* *Treatise* (Selby-Bigge's edition), p. 317; this passage is not singular; there are other passages of similar import in this part of the *Treatise*. Cf. pp. 329, 353.

infallible : the immediately experienced, he repeatedly affirms, is precisely what it is experienced as being. Belief, on the other hand, is fallible : it allows, as the immediately experienced does not, of being either true or illusory. To cover this essential feature, Hume's doctrine of belief therefore requires to be supplemented in a manner for which the analogy with sympathy affords no assistance, namely, through an analysis of the act of judging or asserting, with which is further involved an analysis of the proposition in so far as it is more than merely a complex, a plurality, of simple ideas. Or to state the issue under question in yet another way : Hume has attempted to work with a two-fold distinction between knowledge and belief ; what is required for the positions which he was endeavouring to establish is a threefold distinction, between knowledge, immediate experience, and belief.

A second item of evidence, showing that the teaching of Books II and III antedate the teaching of Book I, is Hume's formulation of the laws of association in Book II. There he states them as being five in number, three applying to ideas and two to impressions. We need consider only the laws which apply to ideas, for they alone recur in Book I: the laws of resemblance, contiguity, and causation. No professional psychologist has ever thought of treating the law of causality as being one of the separate and distinct laws of the association of ideas; and that Hume should have done so is surely very surprising. In Book I he has shown that we can never in any causal relation immediately experience anything save only constancy of sequence. How, then, can there be a separate mode of association, due to a specifically causal relation ? An examination of the examples which Hume gives of causation supplies the answer. They are in every instance examples which bear on the issues discussed in Books II and III, namely, blood-relationships, and social relations such as that of master and servant, owner and property. In general, he says, we may observe, that all relations of blood depend upon cause and effect : hence the manner in which father and son suggest one another. But objects, he adds, are causally related not only when one

produces the existence of the other, or when it is the cause of an action or motion of the other, but also when it has the *power* of producing such effects ; and this, he declares, is why the relation of property is a species of causation. It gives the proprietor the right to operate as he pleases upon the objects owned and to reap advantage from them ; and this is why

> " the mention of the property naturally carries our thought to the proprietor, and of the proprietor to the property."*

Now these are the *only* types of causal association which Hume mentions in Book I—instances, it will be observed, which have no direct relevance to the problems treated in Book I ; and Hume's use of them in Book I is the more puzzling, in that they cannot operate in the absence of an antecedent and reflectively obtained recognition that the human beings in question *are* related as father and son, and that the property *is* the property of the individual, the idea of whom it is declared to suggest.

The only explanation, in any degree satisfactory, of these features, is, I should contend, supplied by the view that the bulk of Books II and III is prior, both in the first thinking out of their teaching, and in the date of first composition, to the use made of association in Book I. This alone will explain not only his insistence on causation as a separate principle of association, and the types of instance employed, but also his failure to recognize that they can occur only to a consciousness reflectively aware of the relations involved. In Book II there is still no suggestion of the distinction, as drawn in Book I, between natural and philosophical relations—a distinction which created for Hume so many more difficulties than it availed to meet, for which reason, presumably, he omitted all mention of it in the *Enquiries*. Clearly, if association is to be viewed exclusively as a natural relation—and that is the implication of the argument of Book I—the alleged distinction between

* *Treatise* (Selby-Bigge's edition), p. 310.

contiguity and causation will no longer hold, and the instances cited will not be relevant.

If we approach the question of the relation of the *Enquiries* to the *Treatise* in the light of Hume's own statements, there seems to be no way of avoiding the conclusion that the more he thought over the system (as he not infrequently entitles it) expounded in the *Treatise*, the more dissatisfied he became with it. We may not picture him merely as finding that the vessel which he had constructed with such feverish energy, and with such high hopes, had sprung a leak and that unless he took precautions it was in danger of sinking beneath his feet. What he discovered was much more disconcerting than this. As he found, it was not enough of a vessel to spring aleak, still less to be able to sink. Was it not rather of the nature of a raft, with its Lockean, Newtonian and Hutchesonian planks so loosely roped together, that nothing could avail to keep them from going their several ways? The problem before him was not, therefore, one merely of minor repairs. The problem, as he found it, was rather as to what could be salvaged from the wreckage.

As I have already pointed out, no sooner had the first two volumes of the *Treatise* been published than Hume's dissatisfaction with their teaching began to make him uneasy, as shown by his Appendix to the concluding volume. But this was only a first stage in a steadily increasing feeling of *distaste*—no weaker term is applicable—which he came to feel towards the *Treatise*. In the Preface to his *Abstract* we already find him suggesting that perhaps the merits of his teaching lie not in supplying a finished system but in giving new hints which others may carry further, and in drawing attention to questions wherein no one before had suspected any difficulty. In March, 1740, he was writing in similar terms to Hutcheson :—

> " I am apt, in a cool hour, to suspect, in general, that most of my Reasonings will be more useful by furnishing Hints and in exciting People's Curiosity than as containing any Principles that will augment

> the Stock of Knowledge that might pass to future Ages. I wish I cou'd discover more fully the particulars wherein I have fail'd. I admire so much the Candour of Mr. Locke, Yourself, and a very few more, that I wou'd be extremely ambitious of imitating it, by frankly confessing my Errors. . . ."*

Eleven years later he writes to Gilbert Elliot :—

> " So vast an Undertaking, plan'd before I was one and twenty, and compos'd before twenty five, must necessarily be very defective. I have repented my Haste a hundred, and a hundred times."†

Then three years later, in 1754, he expresses himself yet more strongly—and this is the more significant as he is writing not to a friend but to an unfriendly critic.

> " That you may see I wou'd no way scruple of owning my Mistakes in Argument, I shall acknowledge (what is infinitely more material) a very great Mistake in Conduct, viz. my publishing at all the Treatise of human Nature, a Book, which pretended to innovate in all the sublimest Parts of Philosophy, and which I compos'd before I saw five and twenty. Above all, the positive Air, which prevails in that Book, and which may be imputed to the Ardor of Youth, so much displeases me, that I have not Patience to review it."‡

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* *Letters* (Greig), vol. I, p 39.

† *Letters* (Greig), vol. I, p. 158.

‡ *Letters* (Greig), vol. I, p. 187. The letter is believed by Burton and by Greig to have been addressed to John Stewart, Professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh. It opens formally " Sir." Hume's repeated statement that the *Treatise* was composed before he was twenty-five years of age is somewhat misleading ; it can refer only to the version which he brought back from France in 1737. He was making revisions as late as March, 1740, and volume III did not appear before the summer of 1740. (Cf. Jessop, *A Bibliography of David Hume* (1938), p. 12.) He was eighteen years of age when the " new scene of thought " broke upon his view ; he was in his twenty-ninth year before the mental excitements that gave rise to the *Treatise* had subsided and the third volume was out of his hands. In all he had given ten years of his life to the making of the *Treatise*.

Could Hume have obtained possession of every published copy of the *Treatise*, there can be no question that—such was his attitude to it in these later years !—he would have rejoiced to commit them to the flames.

In addition to the criticisms which he has himself passed upon the teaching of the *Treatise* we have evidence of at least one other fundamental change in his attitude to it. As I have already said, there was no part of his system upon which, at the time of the composition of Book I, and for some time after, he was more insistent and hopeful than in respect of that part of his programme which concerned his associationism. This was still how he felt at the time of writing the *Abstract*.

> " Through this whole book," he there says, speaking of the *Treatise*, " there are great pretensions to new discoveries in philosophy ; but if anything can entitle the author to so glorious a name as that of an *inventor*, 'tis the use he makes of the principle of the association of ideas, which enters into most of his philosophy . . . [The principles of association] are really *to us* the cement of the universe, and all the operations of the mind must, in a great measure, depend on them."*

But by the time of writing of his first *Enquiry*, this enthusiasm has markedly cooled. In the section on association in the *Enquiry*, in the early editions, he had illustrated it at great length by reference to the dramatic and other forms of unity in the literary arts, and to the role which the passions, in and through associative mechanisms, have played in determining them. On the omission of this illustration, the section was reduced in the later editions to three short paragraphs, in all no more than one-sixth of its original length. Significantly, too, there is no repetition of the statement made in the *Treatise* that association

> " is a kind of Attraction which in the mental world will be found to have as extensive effects as in the natural, and to show itself in an many and as various forms."

* *Abstract*, (edited by Keynes and Sraffa, 1938), pp. 31–2.

What, now, of the salvage work, as carried out in the two *Enquiries* and in the *Dissertation on the Passions?* The one Book of the *Treatise* which Hume contrived to rescue almost intact is Book III, which treats of his ethics. *The Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* is a restatement of it, almost the only fundamental change being in respect of sympathy, which is now treated as an ultimate propensity of the Mind, and is now also entitled sometimes "benevolence" and sometimes "humanity." We have Hume's own deliberately given judgment upon the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals.* In his autobiography, written in the year of his death, he describes it as being in his opinion

> "of all [his writings], historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the best."

The *Enquiry concerning human Understanding*, like the *Treatise*, opens with a statement of the principle that every simple idea must copy an impression, and that complex ideas reduce to simple ideas without remainder. But as he has still found no way of reconciling this principle with the awareness of the self, and of space and time, he maintains silence on these central issues—this silence being, I take it, due to his recognition that on these matters what he had previously said was untenable, and that he had nothing satisfactory to put in their place. The silence is complete as regards the nature of our awareness of the self. The quandary in which, as he confesses in the Appendix to the *Treatise*, he had found himself placed, still continued to baffle his every effort to escape from it. In regard to space he uses terms which seem to suggest that he was now prepared to allow that geometry is an exact science, of equal standing with arithmetic and algebra. But he still views the professed geometrical proofs of infinite divisibility as leading to palpable absurdity, and, if allowed, as tending to the discrediting of reason.

> "Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to that scepticism to which she is

> driven by these *seeming* absurdities and contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances, contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is absolutely incomprehensible ; and is perhaps, as absurd as any proposition, which can be formed."*

Otherwise Part II of Book I is represented in the first *Enquiry* only by three brief notes (one of which is omitted in the third and later editions) which show that he was still striving to hold to his view of space as consisting of physical points. But the fact that he deals with it thus briefly, and not in the main text, would seem to indicate that he was not easy in his mind regarding it. As late as 1755, we find Hume still hoping to be able to salvage this part of Book I. Indeed he then forwarded to the printer a restatement of it, under the title *Considerations previous to Geometry and Natural Philosophy*. It was only at the last moment that he was dissuaded from publishing it by his mathematical friend, Lord Stanhope. How its teaching would have differed from that of Part II and what were his grounds of dissatisfaction with it, we do not know.†

Hume successfully salvaged his treatment of causality and of causal inference as given in Part III of Book I, and in doing so made one great improvement : the two lengthy sections on liberty and necessity he transferred from Book II, placing them, where they properly belong, in immediate sequence to his discussion of the idea of necessary connexion. He also included what he had so reluctantly omitted from the *Treatise*, sections on miracles and on divine existence.

Part IV of Book I is not a little diffuse—a diffuseness due in the main to what for Hume is a quite unusual lack of clearness in the argument. In the *Enquiry* he has given a masterly restatement of it. The only main changes are the complete omission of his discussions on the immateriality of the soul and on personal identity, and his no longer attempting to account by an associative mechanism for belief in an independently existing world. That belief he now

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* *Enquiry* (Selby-Bigge's edition), pp. 157–8. Italics not in text.

† Cf. *Letters* (Greig), Vol. I, p. 223 ; Vol. II, p. 253.

treats as being, like the moral sentiments, in itself an ultimate —a natural belief which as little allows of being evaded in thought as in action.

Book II of the *Treatise* Hume revised and published separately under the title *A Dissertation on the Passions*. By general consent it is the least satisfactory of all his writings. With the transference of its sections on liberty and necessity to the first *Enquiry*, the bulk of the book consists in the elaborately worked out doctrine of an associative mechanism, a double process of association by which he had professed to account for the indirect passions, pride and humility, love and hatred, and in the corresponding explanation given of sympathy. Quite evidently, with the cooling of his enthusiasm for the associationist part of his programme, he has lost interest in these doctrines ; and the restatement he gives of them is so shortened as to leave the argument barely intelligible. The passages referring to the part played by an ever-present impression of the self are, as we should have expected, omitted. But as nothing has been introduced in their place, the force and clarity of the argument are proportionately weakened.

What is the general conclusion to which all this points ? I submit that what we ought in fairness to recognize is that Hume was his own best critic ; and that in philosophy we owe him a twofold debt : first of the *Treatise*—a work which his successors have rightly refused to take at his own later estimate. He gave ten years of his life to it. Impressed as he was with a sense of being engaged in pioneer work, and in moods of alternate exaltation and misgiving, it is written in autobiographical fashion and gains greatly in intellectual and dramatic interest in proportion as it is studied as a whole, and not merely, as has so generally been done, in a few selected sections, taken almost exclusively from Book I. And then secondly, we owe to Hume the further debt, that in the *Enquiries*, both by way of omissions and by way of modifications in his teaching, he has given us his maturer, more considered views, in regard to those parts of the *Treatise* in which, as he believed, he had come nearer to the truth than had any of his predecessors, or in which, at the

least, he had drawn attention to difficulties that called for and would repay, further study. I do not wish to suggest that we should displace the *Treatise*, as Hume would have us do, by the *Enquiries*. Hume, in his reaction against it, omitted much that we must value. An instance of this is his omission from the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* of his discussion of the causal axiom. Though his teaching in regard to it is a direct corollary from the teaching of the *Enquiry*, Kant, as we know, though he had long been well acquainted with the *Enquiry*, was unable to observe for himself the far-reaching consequences which thus follow, and came to do so only through the happy accident of Beattie's having quoted in his *Essay* the all-important *Treatise* passage. Most of the omissions are, however, of a quite other kind. They concern doctrines with which Hume had come to be profoundly dissatisfied, and which he could not, therefore—truth being still his quarry—allow himself to repeat. But he has given them up only after persistent trial of them ; and it does not follow that the sections in the *Treatise* which deal with them may not still be of value, as fruitfully exhibiting the complexities and the difficulties of the issues dealt with. The *Treatise* is a work of genius, and as such takes its place among the philosophical classics. No one questions that in respect of exposition the *Enquiries* are a great advance upon the *Treatise* ; what I would wish to have recognized is that they also testify to the quality of Hume's critical powers, and more especially to his powers of *self*-criticism.

Allow me now to return upon my beginnings, and to draw a summary conclusion. A question which I have raised but have not yet answered is whether it can justly be said that Hume deserted philosophy in turning to the writing of history. I am not sure that that is a proper way of putting the question. When I study Hume's *Letters*, and his works as a whole, including his *History of England*, I cannot help feeling that the question, if so stated, places the issue in a misleading light. When we allow for Hume's repeated assertion that his mental interests, from his earliest years, were equally divided between *belles lettres*

and philosophy, and that literature, as he tells us, was the passion of his life and the source of his chief enjoyments; when we note that he regarded the disciplines constituting philosophy as being logic, which he uses with a wide reference, criticism, ethics, and politics; when we further observe that his strongest philosophical interests were ethical, that his politics had an ethical basis, and that history, in his treatment of it, was applied politics, may we not rather be justified in reversing the question, and in asking how it came to be that in the composition of the *Treatise* he spent no less than ten years—that is, no less than a third of his life as a creative writer? (In those days, we must remember, men usually did their work earlier in life than now. Hume, like Gibbon, did no creative writing after the age of fifty.) If, as there is good reason for holding, Hume in the writing of the *Treatise* conceived himself to be laying the foundations of his work in the fields of ethics, politics and history, the question is not why he did not spend the rest of his life in the same way, but rather why, in those early years, the preparatory work came to bulk for him as prominently as it did. If, again, I am correct in maintaining that Hume thought out the teaching of the *Treatise* in the reverse order from that in which he expounds it; if when he started, it was his ethics in which he was primarily interested; and if when he was completing it, it was the problems of Book I which had come to monopolize his attention; if in the excitement of exploring this new territory, he had come to believe that in the association of ideas he had found a method of revolutionizing philosophy—an enterprise which he so soon came to recognize was less promising than he had hoped—if these considerations be kept in mind, may we not rather hold that in these years he had been temporarily deflected from the path which he had marked out for himself, and that in proceeding to write on questions of literary criticism, on political theory, economics, and history, he was returning to his earlier, more congenial programme of work? This will explain, as the other way of approach does not, why he came to be himself so severe a judge of the merits of the

Treatise, and why of its three Books it was Book III that he held to, restating it almost without modification of doctrine, and declaring it in its new version to be of all his writings incomparably the best. In conformity with its teaching, he proceeded to the treatment of political and economic problems, and in natural sequence to the application of his political theory, in the writing of his *History*. In his autobiography he tells us that the plan of writing the *History of England* was formed in 1752, on his appointment as Keeper of the Advocates Library. But in a letter* some four years prior to this date we find him saying,

> " I have long had an intention, in my riper years, of composing some History."

In his ethics, most notably in his treatment of what he calls the " artificial " virtues, that is to say, the political virtues of which justice is the type, Hume allows to reason, in its reflective, instrumental activities, an all-important role. When, however, he came to be so intent on the thesis that in the principle of the association of ideas we have a chief key to the workings of the animal and human mind, he was led for a time to underestimate the role played by reflective thinking, and to maintain the more sceptical thesis, that custom is king. With the giving up of his high hopes of revolutionizing philosophy on these lines—and in view of the disappointing after-history of associationist psychology, this change of view may be counted to the credit of Hume's good judgment--reflective reasoning again came, for Hume, into its rights. He still continued to hold that it is the non-rational factual elements in experience, instinctive and traditional, which are ultimately decisive in the fields of ethics and politics. But he was now also free to make ampler use of his distinction between the vulgar and the wise. It is, he now taught, only in the disciplined minds of the wise, not in the minds of the vulgar, that custom can be other than a dangerously unreliable guide. When customs suffer change, and fall into conflict, as they must

* *Letters* (Greig), vol. I, p. 109.

constantly do, it is through reason's mediation that we must find the means of making the adjustments to which the customs, properly understood, themselves point. And what customs and habits are to the individual, traditions are to a society. It was not by any mere prejudice, whim, or inconsistency, that Hume became a Tory in politics. In his use of the principle of utility, as in his own very distinctive type of sceptical empiricism, his kinship is more with Burke—with Burke in his earlier writings—than with Bentham. To the last Hume holds to, and makes central, the distinction between knowledge and belief. What, in his view, distinguishes thinking in politics from thinking in mathematics is that, in the absence of knowledge, we have to rely upon what at best is always only opinion. Our subjective convictions may be unqualified, but the objective assurances can never be other than precarious and incomplete.

SYMPOSIUM: SELF IDENTITY.

By Prof. J. N. WRIGHT and Dr. C. A. MACE.

I.—By J. N. WRIGHT.

WHAT particular question is Hume trying to answer in his chapter entitled Personal Identity in Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature? He himself states it in the form "What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our lives?" (253).* It will be convenient for me to state this in the form "What are the causes which induce an individual to believe in his personal or self-identity?" Throughout Hume's whole procedure there is, firstly, the stressing of the view that people do believe that they are identical throughout their life-time, and, secondly, the insistence that there must be some discoverable cause of this belief. I have used the word "cause" deliberately as it is the word which Hume himself uses in another connexion, namely, "What *causes* an individual to believe in the existence of body?" (187).

Now if we ask the question "What are the causes which induce an individual to believe in his own personal identity?" we might come across two sorts of answers; those which are evidential of the truth of the belief and those which are not. Evidential causes of, for example, my own belief that I am an identical person throughout my life-time would be either direct knowledge of the fact or valid inference from some premiss or premisses which were directly known; non-evidential causes would be lacking both in direct knowledge of the fact and in valid inference from any known premiss or premisses.

* The numbers throughout refer to the pages in Selby-Bigge's edition of Hume's Treatise.

I put the matter in this way because there are two points on which there can be no disagreement in the interpretation of Hume. The first is that he did hold that some things were known. Relations between ideas were " objects of knowledge and certainty " (70). The second is, that these are to be contrasted with beliefs. A question then arises with regard to the latter as to whether they are evidenced. Hume's whole doctrine is that they are not evidenced, in that they are not known from the nature of the perceptions themselves, that is, they are not self-evident, otherwise, of course, they would be " objects of knowledge and certainty," nor are they evidenced by valid inference from some known premiss.

If, then, they are not evidenced, what causes an individual to believe? Hume has no option but to reply that the causes must be psychological, as distinct from epistemological. Human beings *naturally* believe certain statements about the world and themselves, but apart from showing how these beliefs come to be formed and why the mind persists in holding them, no further account can be given. They are not rational beliefs, in the accepted sense of the word " rational " ; they are beliefs of which a psychological account only can be given. It would be folly for Hume to deny personal identity for the mind is so constructed that it believes in personal identity and its denial would be a form of words which neither Hume nor anyone else could believe. When, however, we look for reasons, there are no reasons properly so-called. There is merely a psychological account, and Hume endeavours to supply one, of the way in which the belief is attained and the cause of its persistence. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that Hume thought that this psychological account had any epistemological validity, that is, that anything discovered in the analytic and genetic psychological account could be used as rational data for the belief in personal identity.

This being so, Hume was bound to be sceptical in that although he held a belief because of the constitution of his own mind he could neither know it to be true nor give it

up. Hume's procedure is epistemological in that he is looking for evidence for a particular belief and assessing its value : it is also psychological in that, failing to discover evidence, he has left only the alternative of giving a psychological account of the genesis of the belief and of its constituents, and explaining its persistence.

This general interpretation of Hume follows from certain matters in regard to which there can be no dubiety of interpretation. Firstly, it cannot possibly be denied that Hume did draw the distinction between knowledge and belief. As I have already quoted, certain relations of ideas were " objects of knowledge and certainty." Secondly, it is obvious that Hume denied that the self, as identical, was known. Identity is, " apply'd in its strictest sense to constant and unchangeable objects " (14) ; as such, it is " perception rather than reasoning " (73) and, in the self we perceive " no *simplicity* in it at one time nor *identity* in different (253). Yet we possess a " propension to ascribe an identity to the successive perceptions and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence throughout our lives." (253). Hume sets himself the task of answering the question " What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive perceptions and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our lives ? " and the rest of his account presumably answers this question. In the Appendix, he is forced to his scepticism because although we *feel* that the perceptions are joined together, there are two principles which Hume " cannot render consistent " (635). These two principles are " that all our perceptions are distinct existences " and " that the mind never perceives any real connexion amongst them " (636). But these two statements are only inconsistent because by *feeling*, that is, by *belief*, the mind is one mind, whereas by *reason* no identity or connexion is discoverable between the separate perceptions. Hence Hume's scepticism results from the fact that by *feeling* or *conviction* he must assert the mind to be identical, or connected in its parts in some way, whereas,

by reason, or intuition (or whatever faculty it is which gives him knowledge), he can discover no such identity or connexion. That is why I say that he can give a psychological account of the belief, but that it has no epistemological validity. This means that Hume's scepticism results from his rationalism, or intuitionism. It is because the mind has a power of knowing, and of recognizing contradictions, making him call into question his personal convictions, that man is bound to be sceptical. His personal convictions conflict with his reason. This seems to be, in outline, Hume's position.

It is not always noticed that Hume's view of the Self is almost the only one left when we consider his views about time. Time, *per se*, is neither perceived nor perceivable in that there is neither impression nor idea through which it can be perceived. It is " nothing but the matter in which some real objects exist " (64). It can only be apprehended (if it is permissible to use that word) when there is a succession of impressions or ideas in the mind. Hume admits that it may be possible to consider the manner (*i.e.*, temporal) in which a particular set of impressions exists, apart from that particular set of impressions, but this manner must be conjoined to some other set of objects. Time, absolutely conceived, is not a possible idea. Now Hume is very careful to insist that it is impossible to apply the *manner* in which a succession of perceptions exists to anything which is not itself a succession of perceptions. Time, in short, could not have been known without a succession of different perceptions nor can it be properly applied to an unchanging perception. He admits, indeed, that we do so apply it to " stedfast objects," but he is very careful to note that we only do so by means of a " fiction " (65) and he endeavours to show how such a " fiction " or " fancy " arises. I am not sure that I understand fully this latter part of his explanation, but it is clear that this doctrine of time closes the door to one aspect of the problem of self-identity, namely that there is some persistent entity, cognizable and enduring through time, either as a part phase of the self, or as the self, enduring, that is, cognizably

the same. When we consider Hume's teaching about cognizable entities, namely that they must be impressions and ideas, alongside his views about time and consider, further, what it is possible to say about self-identity, Hume's own answer is about the only possible one left. The only thing that can remain to be determined is how an individual can come to ascribe an identity, as he has defined it, to something persisting through time when, *ex hypothesi*, there can be no such thing. Hume has left no alternative to the view that the self, being in time, must consist of a succession of perceptions.

His actual method of exposition consists, firstly, in rejecting what he considers to be false views and secondly in stating an answer to his own question, that is, in stating the answer to " what can give him so great a propension to ascribe an identity to the successive perceptions ? " In rejecting everything in the nature of metaphysics and in a rigorous pursuit of empiricism, he must throw out every thing that it not inspectable. With regard to what is inspectable, as against what might be introspectable, he has, whether we like it or no, merely impressions and images, differing in feeling, or in the manner in which they affect us, and these occur both simultaneously and in succession. Despite Hume's frequent use of the word " object " for " perceptions " and all that Mrs. Maund says to the contrary, this view does seem to me to be really Hume's. These perceptions are distinguishable from each other, therefore different from each other, and as they are different they may exist in separation from each other. Hence there can be no necessary connexion between the perceptions which go to make the self. As, in addition, there is no constancy in the perceptions themselves, nor " *simplicity* at one time nor *identity* in different," but the " successive perceptions only " (252), the identity that we ascribe to the mind is *fictitious* and is due to a feeling of the easiness of the transition of the successive perceptions. This feeling is similar to and confounded with the " action of the imagination " when it contemplates an identical object ; but as, on reflection, we see that there is no identity, we

produce a fictitious idea to support the identity. This fictitious idea is presumably the idea of self which is " always intimately present to us " (320). I cannot claim that this is an accurate summary of Hume's views, but it is sufficiently accurate for me to make some points of criticism, firstly, as to his method, and secondly, as to his conclusions. I shall also try to say something positively on the question of self-identity, although what I say on this springs as much from my dissent from views which appear to me to be patently false, or inadequate, as from satisfaction with the view I propound.

Firstly, as to method. Whatever Hume's intention in writing the Treatise was, it is clear, throughout the Treatise, that Hume is rigidly empirical in the sense that the test of what is the case is whether there is a discoverable sense-impression. Hume may not have been able on all occasions to carry out his empiricism with consistency, but it is clear that the distinction that he draws between " fictions " or " fictitious ideas " and impressions and ideas which are not fictions is generally used in such a way as to enable us to draw a distinction between mere belief and true belief, if not between mere belief and knowledge. Thus, if there had been discoverable an impression of extension, considered as such, extension would have been a fact ; if there had been discoverable a sense-impression of power, as such, power would have been a fact ; similarly, if there had been discoverable a sense-impression of self-identity, self-identity would have been a fact. Failing the impression, we must justify the belief. In justifying the belief, we must again, discover some immediate experience, *e.g.*, a feeling attached to some idea, but this feeling, insofar as it cannot be seen to be a copy of some impression cannot be used as an infallible test of what is the case. An extended red surface, or a bitter taste, are both known to be factual. These would, presumably, be expressible in true propositions, " There is an extended red surface," or " There is a bitter taste " ; whereas, there being no sense-impression of an identical self, we cannot know the truth of the proposition " There is an identical self ", however firmly we believe it. Hume

was so consistently empirical in this sense that he denied a distinction of reason, and took great pains to explain it away (25).

It is of prime importance, therefore, before considering any special question in Hume, to ask whether this rigidly empirical method is valid in the sense that it is by empirical methods, as so outlined, and by empirical methods alone, that what is the case can be known. This question was discussed by Russell in his paper " The Limits of Empiricism " (Arist. Soc. Proc., 1936–37, No. VII), but it has been known to philosophers since before Plato, as is evidenced by Plato's discussion of it in the Theaetetus, and it was revived in more recent times by Berkeley and Hume. I take it that from their constant allusion to " red patches," many present day philosophers would call themselves empiricists in Hume's sense. It becomes peculiarly important as a method in Hume's account of the Self. Hume might be mistaken on a question of empirical fact, namely when he says " that there is no impression constant and invariable " (251) ; or he might be wrong on the question of method of enquiry into the self, namely that altho' he " never can *observe* (italics mine) anything else but the perception " (252) when he looks into his mind, there is none-the-less, much more that can be known by methods other than what he calls " observation." And if Hume confines himself to his method of observation, then he is bound to miss out a good deal. Putting it in another way, the mind can know by inspection the nature of some of its own states, and this is a way of knowing namely by inspecting, but it can also know, if only it looks properly, that which knows, or that which has the perceptions, or something which is not inspectable in the same sense. The point that I want to make cannot be made without a certain amount of circumlocution, but it is ; that Hume's perceptions are ultimately sense-impressions and images and certain relations between them ; that it is the view that only these can be known which seems to me to be patently false ; and it is this view, springing from the method of looking at sensations and images only that I wish to call into question.

Suppose that, in Hume's words "we enter most intimately into ourselves" in order to see what is there. We certainly observe something immediately present. These are Hume's "perceptions": From the point of view of certain present day psychologists we discover what are called "immediate experiences." On one theory, *e.g.*, that of Stout, these are all mental, on some other theories, (*e.g.* Broad's) some are mental and some are non-mental. At present, I want to suppose that they are all mental (it really does not affect my point at all), that is, that the mind is a "theatre of perceptions," because it enables me to bring out a point that is vital on either view. It is this. There is a sense in which what is known when a pain is known, and what is known when a colour is known, or a smell or a taste or a sound, have something in common. What they have in common is precisely why some philosophers say that we experience them, and because they have this in common they are called empirical facts. We also find that most of these experiences can be correlated with sense-organs or sensory nerves, and, that consequently they are called by various names—sensations, sense-data, sensa and the like. These names, presupposing certain theories about the causes of them, tend to hide what is really fundamental, namely that the characters of pains, sounds, colours, smells and the like, are inspectable, or that the colours, sounds, pains, etc., are themselves inspectable, and that they are known. Now some philosophers, observing the similarity between pains, colours, sounds, that is, between what ordinarily are called sensed objects, and observing that these are known, make the mistake of supposing that anything to be known must be like them. Now there is clearly some similarity between pains, smells, sound, colours, etc., of such a nature that I know them. This character is shared, although differing in degree, by objects other than the objects I have just mentioned. Images have this character, and feelings. Images have it in a different degree. Hume refers to it when he says that they differ in "force and vivacity." Psychologists say that images differ also in kind, but it is

obvious that they are also similar to the impressions. They share some character, which is the one I am writing about and which Hume is referring to by the phrase " force and vivacity." An image of a sound is like a colour in precisely the sense in which a taste is like a smell, and all are like to each other. They are all inspectable. Now that character, in virtue of which entities are inspectable is the character which, for empirical philosophers, limits the mind's power of knowing, A thing, to be known, must share that character. For extreme empirical philosophers, unless an entity has that character, namely the character shared by colours, sounds, tastes, pains, etc., and feelings and images, that entity cannot be known.

This view, I suggest, is patently false, and the recognition of its falsity paves the way for examining aspects of self-identity which were closed to Hume. It allows room for acts of cognition, an aspect of the self which Hume could not discuss, and it is vital, in any discussion on the self to keep in these. There are acts of cognizing, or cognizings. There are acts of cognizing which are identical over a long period of time in one person. I shall later discuss whether this identity constitutes the identity of the self, but they are sufficiently obvious to demand discussion. It is equally obvious that acts of cognizing are not known as colours, sounds, pains, etc., are known, and as they are not so known, it means that empiricism is not the sole method of acquiring knowledge, and that phenomenonalism is not true, if we mean by empiricism that the only knowable objects are sense-data, or sensations and images, and by phenomenonalism, that reality, as it is constituted for us, and, on this view, there can be no other reality, is composed of these.

Hume was debarred from writing of acts of cognizing by his very method. The mind, being a " theatre of perceptions," could include no cognizings of any sort. The difficulty is not merely that the perceptions themselves perceive. There is no perceiving There is no perceiving because the very method forbids it. Hume is merely being consistent when he reduces belief to the liveliness of

the idea and explains liveliness in terms of the force or vivacity of the impression, because there is nothing else left for him to do. He is, on occasions, driven to use language which shows him to be *verbally* inconsistent, and the fact that he was compelled to do so ought to have led him to reconsider his view, but he remained content with pursuing his empirical hypothesis to the detriment of his verbal consistency. The following passage is the clearest example of Hume's verbal inconsistency. He writes, " We may observe that there are two relations, both of them resemblances, which contribute to our mistaking the succession of our interrupted perceptions of an identical object. The first is, the resemblance of the perceptions ; the second is the resemblance, which the act of the mind in surveying a succession of resembling objects bears to that in surveying an identical object " (p. 205). And a further explicit reference to the same point on p. 253. " That action of the imagination by which we consider the uninterrupted and invariable object, and that by which we reflect on a succession of related objects, are almost the same to the feeling, nor is there much more effort of thought required in the latter case than in the former." Hume might have defended himself from the charge of inconsistency by saying that the act was really a feeling, but he could hardly have defended his use of the word " act," not do I see how he could have reduced what is intended by the phrase " act of the mind in surveying " to a feeling without a serious loss of meaning amounting to an incorrect description of the situation which he is endeavouring to describe.

If, however, we admit an act, or acts, of cognizing, we clearly must at the same time admit that they are not entities like Hume's perceptions. They have not that character in virtue of which they are inspectable. Psychologists still, I believe, (or at any rate many of them) use the word " introspection " for the state of mind which is inspecting immediate experiences, that is, for the examining of the " felt pain " or the " seen colour " or the " heard sound." The tendency then is to assert that on intro-

spection we can only discover the " felt pain " or the " colour seen " and so on. A puzzle is then raised about the " subjective immediate experiencings." There is no need for puzzlement. Cognizings are known in thinking and they are known by thinking, and thinking, used in this sense, is merely a way of knowing. Further, it is a way of *a priori* knowing, in one sense of that unfortunate phrase. What I want to suggest is that much psychological knowledge is *a priori* in the sense that firstly, it is about entities that are not inspectable, and secondly that it is knowledge, and, as knowledge, is not gained by any form of problematic induction. Indeed, a great deal of our knowledge of psychical states must be *a priori* in this sense ; and certianly, our knowledge of cognitive states is. Is there anything intrinsically absurd in the doctrine ? The absurdity only arises if we assume, as a presupposition, the false view that inspecting, which is a form of knowing, is identical with all knowing. Knowing by inspecting is knowing a certain class of objects, ordinarily called empirical objects. Hume's " perceptions " ; knowing by thinking is knowing a certain other class of objects, and in this class is the class cognitive states.

Let us consider these cognitive states. I myself have used the phrase " acts of cognition." I do not wish to stress the word " act " as it has misleading features in its meaning when applied to cognition. Hence " cognitive state " is better. The first point that I wish to stress is the very close relation between cognition and the self. No one would ever use the word " self " as we are using it, namely synonymously with " person," and as Hume himself does, in his discussion on personal identity, unless the individual to which the word is applicable were " conscious." Now it seems to me that " to be conscious " always means " to be conscious of " and that there can be no sense of " being conscious," which is not " being conscious of." In short, that the fundamental psychical state is " cognizing " or being " aware of,." This view is not generally admitted. Psychical states are put either into two classes, namely, Cognition and Interest, this latter including feeling and

conation, or three classes, Cognition, Feeling and Conation. Moreover, it is generally held that Interest, as including feeling and conation, or, at any rate, feeling, can occur without cognition. Ward, for example and Drever, suppose that cognition is a development out of some vague feeling in which there is no discovery at all of the nature of anything, not even of the feeling. This view appears to be shared by Alexander, in his account of Enjoyment. Wisdom, too, in his Mind and Matter (p. 12) argues for the view that I am concerned to deny, when he writes that there is a fundamental sense of conscious which "implies either feels or is aware of." Stout uses the phrase "felt experience," and experiencing individuals are for him conscious individuals. But what sort of entity can a "felt experience" be if it is not a cognized experience?

There are three types of arguments that may be adduced to support the view that there are *felt* psychical states which are acognitive. The first is one which may be used in connexion with the usage of language. Thus, people talk of "feeling pleased," "feeling surprised" or "I felt dreadful," and so on. But even although we pass by the fact that people also use expressions like "this feels soft" or "this feels hard," it seems to me to be perfectly clear that when they say that they "*feel* pleased" or "*feel* miserable," they mean that they are conscious of their pleasure and their misery. It is a cognizing of their pleasure and their misery which they are stressing. Nobody in fact could even say that they "feel pleased" unless they cognized this. It might be replied that the fact that they express something obviously implies that they believe something, and that this in its turn implies cognition, but that *what* is expressed is "that a pleasure is felt," and that this expression includes nothing about cognizing. I agree that it does not explicitly, but what I should urge is that in these statements the cognizing is included in the use of the word "I," that in statements of the sort "'I' feel pleased" the word "I," in this case, stands for that which is cognizing, and that what is implicit in the assertion is that the cognising "I" is also the affected "I." But more than that,

I claim that when we consider " feeling " we also know that there is some relation between " feelings as felt " and " being conscious of them " such that " feelings as felt " entails " being conscious of " in precisely the same way as " being red " entails " being extended." " Being conscious " does not in fact imply " being aware of or feels " ; " being conscious " is an elliptical expression for " being conscious of " and we can see this when we see that expressions like " I feel pleased " entail the expression " I am conscious of feeling pleased."

Another type of argument which may be brought forward in favour of the view that there are acognitive conscious states of the Self is from a consideration of the nature of the human body. It is a matter of empirical evidence that cognitive states are dependent on the functioning of certain bodily states. It is also ordinarily held that states like feeling pleased, or angry, are also dependent on the functioning of the body, as, for example, on the secretion of glands and so on. It is then argued that in bodies in which those parts are missing which ordinarily are correlated with cognition, as for example, in those organisms in which there is no brain structure, or no central nervous system, and in which nutritive processes are known to go on, there must be some psychical states, like feelings. Now whilst it may be admitted that there is a correlation between cognitive functionings and bodily structure, and whilst it may also be admitted that states like feeling pleased or miserable, or states like emotions, may be correlated with physico-chemical changes in the body, it does not in the least follow that feelings may be felt without being cognized. It is admitted that what occurs in the body gives no clue whatever to the nature of the mind, and it seems to me merely a matter of insight into the nature of mental or states. In states like " feeling miserable," we have, at least, direct insight into the nature of that state and direct insight into the fact that I am conscious or cognizant of it, and, further, that the state " feeling miserable " entails somebody's being conscious or cognizant of it. The position is one in which we

endeavour to establish, by inductive evidence only, a conclusion which can never be verified, for an uncognized feeling can never be known, and when it is known, it becomes cognized.

The third type of argument consists in trying to get individuals to admit that there are acognitive conscious states, that is, conscious states unrelated to cognition, because, although they are not aware of them at the time, they become aware of them afterwards. In short by remembering or looking back, they can now cognize what was, at the time, not cognized. A desire for something is not known at the time, but becomes known later. Now much writing of this nature is so careless that it is impossible to know what is being asserted. It is one thing to assert that I have a feeling of dissatisfaction at one time which I am aware of. So far the feeling of dissatisfaction is felt, that is cognized. It is quite another thing to assert that later on I come to know that this dissatisfaction could have been satisfied by some particular object. This does not prove unconscious desires, or acognized feelings. On the contrary, insofar as I now recognize that my dissatisfaction could have been satisfied by some object, the nature of which I did not then know of, this state of affairs *proves* that I was conscious of my feeling of dissatisfaction, that I am now remembering it and that I now recognize it and have the further knowledge that it could, in fact, have been satisfied by the object. It seems to me that all evidence from memory involves cognition in that what *is* remembered is that I was at an earlier time cognizing. I also remember what I cognized but I certainly always remember that I cognized. I can no more remember something that I did not cognize than I can remember something that someone else cognized.

This point seems to me of importance because whereas persons may have feelings and desires, that is, whereas a person may in fact be pleased, or miserable and want objects, it seems to me that the psyche is such that altho' it could correctly be called a psyche if it merely cognized, it could not be called a psyche at all if it merely felt or had

desires, for the very obvious reasons that the two latter entail the former. Descartes, for example, in Principles LIII writes as if a Res Cogitans consisted of an entity possessing some character common to cognition and volitional states. There is, in fact, no character, as Cook Wilson insisted, common to cognizing and other states which have been called states of mind, but I still insist that all states of mind have some special relation to cognitional states, although I am not prepared, at this stage, to go further than to state that one requisite of being a mind at all is to cognize and that what have been called other states of mind, as for example, feelings and desires, entail cognizing.

It will immediately be asked what sort of character " cognising " can be ? There seem to be two alternatives, one to make it a determinable character which has special modes like believing, supposing, doubting, which are determinate modes of cognition, and the other to make it synonymous with knowing and make the states like believing supposing, doubting related because they have some special relation to knowing. Stout seems to favour the former view, as, for instance, when he writes in his Manual (p. 98) " When we wish to express the bare presence of an object to consciousness without indicating any special relation, we may speak of its presence to thought." This is a badly written sentence and vague in the extreme, but in view of the fact that Stout does not mention knowledge in his treatment of cognition, we may assume that cognition is used as a determinable of which the modes are determinate. As it is indubitable that we do know some things and as in all presentation to a mind, something must be known, it seems to me to be preferable to take view that the character which is peculiar and appropriate to minds is Knowing and that all psychical states therefore entail Knowing. If this is so it is the task of the psychologist to discover what states do entail Knowing and what differences there are amongst these states. It seems to me that this part of psychology still remains to be written or at any rate, written with any degree of plausibility, unless, as is most likely, I am ignorant of the right people to read.

If, then, a person, or self, is primarily a knowing being, can we conclude that to be one self or an identical self is to be a particular characterized by one identical character, namely "knowing" or "being conscious of"? The view is tempting, and it seems to have been held in some form or other by Kant. Kant certainly suggests in his Unity of Apperception some such view. My difficulty with Kant is, firstly in understanding whether he is talking about a particular at all, and secondly, whether he is talking of a character at all in his Pure Unity of Apperception. And whereas Kant seems to me to be right in stressing the view that the objective unity cannot be intelligible without positing a subjective unity, the latter tends to become a purely mysterious entity which he calls logical, but to which in fact, no logical category can be truly applied. What, despite Kant, does appear to be the case is that in cognizing I am truly aware of my real self as I am, namely as a particular characterized at this moment by a character. The question which I wish to discuss is whether the possession of this character, as identical throughout a period of time, namely throughout that time in which the particular persists, constitutes my person or self.*

Now on this point Hume is partly right and partly wrong. Hume seems to be right in saying that, or implying, that there is no persistent identical character; but he seems to be wrong in his view that there is no "identity at different times." There is undoubted identity of cognition over fairly long phases. Consider any conative unity in which an individual passes through the stages of dissatisfaction, trial and error, through striving towards satisfaction. Many psychologists write of a felt impulse, a felt dissatisfaction, and felt displeasures verging into felt pleasures as satisfaction accrues through successful striving. On this view, there need be no identity in one conative

* I apologise for the summary dismissal of Kant's views. The view that I tentatively propound is different from Kant's view and I did not want to be led into discussing points in Kantian exegesis. It is more than likely that I am dissenting from a view that I do not understand.

train. Now so long as we talk of conative activity in separation from cognition, we shall miss what is, in fact, the case in many conative processes, namely that in striving to attain satisfaction in some end, we have an identical act of cognition from one phase of the process to the other, and that Hume was in error on this point. Mr. Mace hints at this in the Introduction to the revised 4th Edit. of Stout's Manual of Psych., where he writes, in connexion with McDougall's account of the relation of feeling and conation, " Moreover, dependence (*i.e.*, of feeling) on conation does not involve independence of cognition. Success or failure of conation determines feeling so far as the success or failure is *Known*, and it is only defined in the phases of cognition. So far feeling is conditioned by cognition " (Introd. X). I want myself to insist that if we are going to talk of conative processes at all as conscious processes, then we must talk of cognized impulses, cognized feelings, cognized satisfactions, and that often the act of cognizing is one and the same.

But although there are uninterrupted and identical acts of cognizing in one person lasting through periods of time we cannot conclude that an identical person is one who is characterized uninterruptedly by a cognitive character, by a character which is constant in its appearance, and that the possession of this character uninterruptedly constitutes the self. The word " identity " is properly used, firstly of a universal, and secondly of a particular which is characterized by one or a set of universals which do not change over a period of time, as for example, when we talk of something remaining " identically " the same over from one moment to the next." Now in talking of the self, we are clearly not talking of a universal nor an aggregate of universals, nor can we suppose that any one character like " being conscious of," remains the same, constant in its instance, on appearance, uninterrupted over a period of time. In cases of deep sleep, or at any rate, under anæsthetics, individuals are not characterized by any character like " being conscious of." This bars the door to any view which attempts to

state that the identity of a person is the identity of a persistent exemplification of an identical character like cognizing, however true it may be that on occasions this character persists exemplified through periods of time in one person.

Certain alternatives then remain. One is, to cease talking of a person, or one person. This puts us into the predicament of Hume of wanting to deny what no one can deny. Another is, to substitute for the person, the body, so that one body is one person. This, to quote a famous philosopher, is "what no one will admit."* In the first place, it would have to be a thinking body, for dead bodies are not persons, and further, Locke seems to be right in saying that if a person in another body remembered the thoughts of Socrates, then he would in fact be Socrates. Metempsychosis, it may be urged, would on this view be not false, but meaningless and whether it be false, or no, it is not meaningless. Another is to explore the hypothesis thrown out by Hume that "Self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference" (251). Is it absurd to suppose that a person is that which becomes characterized in various ways, where we mean by "that" some ultimate particular?

It is important here to consider two points. The first is, what is involved at any moment when a person says that he is aware of himself, and the second, what is involved in remembering. On the first I shall, for the moment, be brief, and on this it is convenient to refer to Descartes. When Descartes intuited himself, it was certain that, on the one hand he was intuiting something completely individual, and for himself, *sui generis*, in that he had some completely individual relation to it which he had not to anything else, namely of being identical with it, and on the other, that which he intuited had a nature. It was substantial and characterized. It was both "I" and something expressible, in a proposition which has a subject

* *See* Kant, Second Analogy.

and predicate, and the subject of the proposition is, I think, not finally reducible to predicate terms.

Let us now turn to the second point. Let us consider a memory situation as factual.

The essence of memory situations is not acquiring beliefs about the past. These can be acquired by reading history books. The essence of a memory situation is acquiring information about *my* past. What is remembered is not any past occurrence, but the fact that I was involved in a past occurrence, and " involved " includes " being conscious of " it. The point is that the same individual is now apprehending what this individual also apprehended at another moment of time. It is not an identical character, namely " cognizing," persisting in the same particular ; it is the same particular doing the same sort of thing, namely, cognizing, or being similarly characterized, and knowing that it is similarly characterized. The important and vital factor is that I now cognize both that I was cognizing and also, partially, what I then cognized. Generally I am more interested in *what* I was cognizing, but this does not alter the fact that it would not be memory at all unless I could also know that I was cognizing. Failure to know that it was I who was cognizing would be to cast doubt on whether it was a memory situation at all and to cause me to wonder whether it was not, after all, just imagination. Reassurance that I was involved is reassurance that it is memory and not imagination.

Now Hume entirely failed to explain memory. Firstly, he seemed to suppose that the difference between memory and imagination was partly accountable by the vivacity of the ideas involved. He writes " the faculty by which we repeat our impressions in the first manner (*i.e.*, when the impression ' retains a considerable degree of its first vivacity ') is called the Memory," and this is contrasted with the imagination whereby " the perception is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserved by the mind steady and uniform for any considerable time " (9). What Hume entirely missed was that, as I suggest, memory involves the same individual cognizing

and that the vivacity of the perception has little or nothing to do with it. Next, he again is driven to use language which, on his own theory, is entirely unintelligible. "We find, by experience, that when any impression has been present with the mind, it again makes its appearance as an idea" (8). When we consider why Hume is forced to use the words "it" and "again," we are forced to the view that "it" *was* cognized and "it" *is now* cognized by the same individual. On Hume's view, an idea cognizes a previous impression, but it certainly is unintelligible to write of the impression as "again making its appearance." By hypothesis, the mind being "a theatre of perceptions," each of which has a "distinct existence," no perception could "again make its appearance."

But if Hume failed to account for memory, may we not retain in essence his theory, as some present-day philosophers do, and consider the mind as a series of events, and explain memory by reference to "dispositions"? We all do, on occasions, pay lip-service to dispositions and many psychologists and philosophers whose names command respect pay more than lip-service. I myself find the conception difficult when it is combined with the view that the the mind is a set of mental events and I very much doubt whether the view will stand close scrutiny. As I am proceeding on the assumption that there are minds as well as bodies, or at any rate, that there are minds, I am confining the discussion to psychical dispositions. And for the sake of clearness I want to take ideal instances which illustrate the general doctrine, ideal in the sense that they simplify the complexity of psychological situations. There seem to me to be two forms in which a theory of dispositions may be stated. In the first form of the theory, there are two things only, the events themselves and causal laws, or laws, which are stated as laws of tendencies. In this form of the theory, what is distinctive is that any mental event is not modified by previous events so that it would have been different if they had been different. All that we can say is that it will tend to do what all psychical events tend to do. In the second form of the theory, there are still only

events and laws of tendencies, but any event has a structure, part of which can be known to have been acquired by past events, so that each event hands on a trace to its successor. The difference between the two theories is that on the former, we should not be required to posit " traces," whereas on the latter we should. Throughout the discussion I am going to assume that there is no insuperable difficulty in using the word " event," although it is assumed that events do not occur in isolation from each other.

Let us consider the first form of the theory. Suppose that an event occurs say cognizing a brown sense-object and that it is followed by other events including a taste and a feeling of pleasure. We can, of these events, state a law of tendency to the effect that if a cognition of a similar sense-datum occurs, then an image of the taste and a thought of the pleasure will tend to occur. In short if anyone has seen and tasted chocolate and liked it the sight of chocolate will remind him of his previous pleasure. The first thing to note is that we must, on our first formulation hasten to add " in the same set." That is, stating the law generally, we must state " If a cognition X has been followed by a cognition Y, Y occurring in the same set as X then a cognition of something similar to X, if it occurs in the same set as X Y, will tend to be followed by a cognition similar to Y, this latter also being in the same set." The point is that both X and Y must be in the same set and the subsequent similar cognitions must be in the same set, otherwise the law does not hold. Actually, of course, I can only state the law on the assumption that Y is in the same set as X, because there are many mental events, adjacent and subsequent to X, and Y is selected for some other reason, namely that it is in fact in the same set.

We must now ask " What do we mean by ' in the same set ' ? " We cannot possibly answer " those events in which the law is instanced." Having independently premissed the same set, we cannot then make our criterion of the same set the laws which hold of events in that set. The laws are about the set, and we know the set independently of any laws that we discover about it. Nor can

continuity in time be made the criterion of the set. Events in other sets are also continuous with events in this set. The only thing that I can suggest is that something must be posited other than the events and the laws, and I can see no alternative except the one that the words " in the same set " stand for something ultimate, namely " that " in which the events occur, the " that " denoting a persistent particular. The remembering is then explicable by reference to the particular and the laws state the conditions under which the remembering takes place.

The second form of the theory differs from the first in that, although there are only the events succeeding each other in time and the laws of tendencies, each event or set of events is modified and has " traces " in it of previous events. The former theory is more akin to that of Hume. This latter theory differs from it in that it seems to posit something identical from one moment to the next, for it is part of the theory that although the traces are modified, they are not completely altered. Although they may change, there is reason to suppose that they are in some respects the same, and this does amount to partial identity anyhow and does not forbid complete identity in some respects.

For example when anyone says " X is frightened of lions," so long as this statement remains true, and it might remain true for a very long time, there would be some trace handed on which would have some identical constituents for as long as the statement remained true. The difference between the previous theory and this one is that if the statement " X is frightened of lions " is true, on the " trace " theory, there is also something in the event with which the statement corresponds, and is instantial, namely the " trace ", whereas on the theory as stated first, the statement " X is frightened of lions," means " If X were cognizing a lion, then he would be frightened " ; but this statement may never have an instance. The instance, on the trace theory is not, of course, " X's fearing lions now " but is better expressed by " X's fear of lions." Putting it another

way " X's fear of lions " on the second theory has a denotation, namely the trace ; on the first theory, it has no denotation.

The first point that must be stressed is that if the theory is to be intelligible at all it is vital that we should be able to distinguish the trace factor in mental events from that which is not a trace, otherwise the theory has no meaning. At first sight this looks plausible enough. I cognize a pain. Here are two mental events, the cognizing and the felt pain. Later I experience a similar pain and the doctor tells me that it may be appendicitis. The next time that I have the pain it means appendicitis, that is, the pain is judged to be one that is caused by my appendix. We seem to have a clear case of a mental event, namely cognizing a pain, acquiring a trace. It becomes different, that is, we can distinguish what it would have been like without the trace left by the previous experience. Further the previous experience may be said to cause the trace and the trace causes the difference. In this way, we can have causal relations between mental events without supposing temporal discontinuity.

Let us consider what is involved in this explanation, and as the trace is continuous, in order to get over the difficulty of causal continuity, let us consider it when it is not actually causing me to remember at all. Suppose that I lose my temper over a car that will not start on a cold morning. This leaves a trace which is taken up from one moment to another. Now suppose that the next day I am playing golf and enjoying it, are we to suppose the trace somewhere in the mental events of any one moment ? Suppose further, that I spend the next month on a cruise, am I to suppose that the trace persists and endures as part of each momentary phase of any immediate experiences ? I am not denying that it does, I merely want to draw attention to the fact that the hypothesis is very unplausible, or that, at the very least, the trace must be so very unlike the experience or its consequent effect that we cannot see how the effect is related to the trace. This, I suppose no one would deny ; but traces

are really very mysterious. Presumably they are qualitative and relational characters of the events; but the precise qualities and relations are very hard to discover. At most, the quality appears to be a feeling of familiarity; but this feeling only recurs when the actual past event is remembered. It is hard to say that it is there when the event is not being remembered.

But does the theory really account for memory at all? What we have on the theory is, firstly, the experienced or cognized event, secondly, this disappearing and leaving a trace in subsequent events, and thirdly this trace suddenly causing us to remember the original past event. There is nothing *to* which the events belong, just the events themselves appearing and disappearing with continuity of trace. But memory is still as mysterious as ever. At one moment t_1 an event occurs leaving a trace completely unlike the event at t_1, persisting until a moment t_2. The event at t_2 then becomes a memory of the events at t_1, that is, the events at t_1 become cognized again. Is not the essence of memory that the same individual cognized events at t_1 and now recognizes? The word "recognize" seems to me to become unintelligible on the theory, and on any theory which does not postulate one and the same entity recognizing. And it is important to note that the trace cannot fulfil this function of sameness, for at the first time of cognizing, it is not a trace. It becomes a trace after that and, as trace, is not the same, but different from the first event. I can but conclude that whatever truth the theory of traces may have, neither traces alone, nor mental events with traces, are adequate to account for memory. There must be one and the same entity cognizing and recognizing, something which persists although its characters change, and which is able to cognise the present and also to look into its past.

Pressure of space and time prevent me from dealing anything like adequately with this extremely difficult question and I am aware that my discussion on this matter, arising as it has done in connexion with what is partly a paper on Hume, is most unsatisfactory. May I try to state how the matter lies as shortly as possible? The theory is

that the mind is a set of events, but that at any time these events are inspectable, or knowable, and that among them we shall discover that part of the characters of the events are due to the persistence of " traces." The reason for the traces is that we discover at all times, or at many times, that there is a memory, that is, a cognizing of past events, or something from the past. On this theory, it would have to be past *events* because I certainly cognize that I was cognizing in the past, and although this is a recognizing of a fact, the fact is of the event, and I must somehow apprehend the event. Now states of mind are supposed to be caused, and the cause, or part cause, of this present cognizing is certainly past. To get round the difficulty of supposing causal discontinuity in time, a " trace " is posited.

Firstly, it seems to me that the awareness of Self, is not merely the awareness of qualitied events which are occurring at the time of the awareness, but of a particular, called " I " to which these events belong, or, alternatively, something called " I " which becomes qualitied in various ways. It may be objected that what I know is always a " fact," namely, " that so-and-so is qualitied." I am not certain what to say about this ; but I am inclined to the view that when I am aware of my own states I am aware that *I* am qualitied in a certain way, and that this means that I must know directly, the particular as well as the fact *that* it is qualitied. The fact that for purposes of psychological investigation and generalization I must confine myself to the state or qualities and relations of the states (or events), is irrelevant to the truth of the intuition in that it may very well be the case that I can discover laws about the qualities and relations which hold of these and not of the particular itself. In actual fact, to say that this is irrelevant is not entirely true, in that all the laws of the qualities and relations in *fact* only hold insofar as the qualities and relations do belong to one Self, that is, to the particular " I."

Next, although the second form of the " trace " theory looks plausible in that sometimes we seem to detect the difference due to the trace, as, for example, in experiments

in which repeated sounds occur, for in such experiments, although the stimulus remains the same, the sounds as heard change, it is much less plausible if we ask " Are we then to suppose that at this moment something would be discoverable of all the immediate experiences that I have ever had and which are rememberable ? " This may conceivably be so, but I think that we should have to admit that the disposition which bears,* for example, a severe pain is both unlike its cause, and its effect, *i.e.*, the memory of it.

But even if we grant this, does it help us to solve the problem of memory, by getting us out of a persistent particular ? When I remember, is it not the case that I remember that the same I which was cognizing is now cognizing what it cognized then ? The positing of dispositions handed on still leaves the problem of the " I," which is again now doing something, on our hands. Are we to bogle at causal discontinuity and at the same time shy at the acceptance of the persistence of something which is known at one time, and which is known as the *same* entity at another time ? Are we going to insist on insight into the nature of causation and deny insight into the persistence of a particular which I call " I " ? This, in effect, is what the theory does, despite the fact that what is crying out for explanation is why temporal continuity of mental events is not sufficient of itself, but temporal events in the same Self. It would appear reasonable, if we are going to insist on " traces " or " dispositions " to preserve causal continuity because we remember, that we should also preserve *that* which is disposed or possesses qualities which are disposed to do something under appropriate conditions. The facts seem to demand something. Let us supply it and be done with it. If we object to the word " metaphysical," let us find another word which is not so objectionable.

If this view is to be accepted, then Hume is correct in writing that " memory does not so much *produce* as *discover*

* " Bears " is certainly not the correct word to use, but I am at a loss to discover another word.

personal identity" (262); but it is not by "discovering the relation between cause and effect amongst our different perceptions" but by knowing the same particular. It is inportant to note however that it is not by memory that we discover *self*. What we discover by memory is *self-as-identical*, that is, memory is essential in order to discover the persistence of the same particular. A human being can, at any time, know both "I" and that "I" am being characterized, and that the "I" is both the subject and object of the intuition. This knowledge, however, is not of himself as identical and I do not see how the knowledge of self-as-identical could be obtained without memory. Memory, however, does not produce the identity. There seems to be no logical impossibility in supposing that we might have been individual selves, conscious momentarily either of ourselves or of objects without being endowed with the capacity to remember. We should not, in these circumstances, know ourselves as identical, but we could know that we were both subject and objection of intuition. No doubt the corpus of beliefs which we ordinarily call knowledge would not then have existed, but we should still, I contend, sometimes be in the position to know ourselves. But the fact that we acquire knowledge of ourselves as identical from one moment to another does seem to depend on memory, for the intuition of a particular, or the fact that a particular is characterized, tells us nothing of the persistence of that particular.

I conclude then, that the facts of memory demand a particular to which the mental states belong. Immediately, a question arises about the relation of the body to this particular. This topic is so vast that I can do little else here but confine my remarks to the content of the intuition of "Self," and it is convenient for me to discuss it in connexion with a theory held by my distinguished predecessor, Emeritus Professor, G. F. Stout. It is also appropriate in that Professor Stout would have been a participant in this Symposium if he could have been sure of being in this country at the present time.

I shall introduce it by a quotation from the 4th Edition

of the Manual of Psychology. On p. 19, he writes that the self " as internally perceived . . . is apprehended as united in the most intimate way with the subjective processes." He has previously told us that in internal perception we also apprehend our own body, so that we may conclude that in internal perception we apprehend ourselves as body-minds, or mind-bodies. Stout adds, p. 20, " As internally perceived the self is thus an embodied mind," essentially capable of knowing and feeling, and active in the pursuit of ends. Now it may be urged that perception is not knowledge, but, at best, belief, and that this is a psychological book and not a work on epistemology. But in this connexion Stout certainly uses the word " knowledge " and his " apprehension " is, in fact, synonymous with knowledge. We are perceiving truly when we perceive outselves as body-minds.

This passage is curiously reminiscent of a famous passage in Descartes. In the 6th Med. Descartes writes " Nature also teaches me . . . that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am so closely intermingled with it that I seem to compose one whole." Again, in the Principles, Descartes writes of the supposition that " God has united a body to a soul so closely that it was impossible to bring them together more closely, and made a single thing out of the two " (LX). This language for Descartes, is unintelligible unless he states what the relation which joins the two is. For Descartes, it is merely *de facto*, but even as *de facto* the relation is unintelligible unless we know what it is. All that we know is that they are not states of one substance.

Now Stout agrees with Descartes in holding that the mind and the body are one whole, but he disagrees with him in his view that the relationship between them is *de facto*. They are both in one thing, namely a Self, and a Self is not a mind *and* a body, but a mind-body. The self is known as having both psychical and physical characteristics. Reverting to his quotation, the organic sensations have a certain quale and are in a place ; the subjective states, that is, the cognitional states and feelings, both of

passivity and activity are known as " united in the most intimate way " with the organic sensations. The question is what he means by " united in the most intimate way." He does not mean that they are both characterizing the same portion of space. " Knowing " is not located in the head as a headache is. " Being conscious of " is not a character spread over a surface as sensed characters are. Nor does he mean that the characters of the subjective processes are characterizing the sensed characters, nor *vice-versa*, that the sensed characters are characterizing the subjective processes. They are both characterizing the same thing, namely, the Self. Neither is the relation one merely of temporal simultaneity ; nor of causal relation. Temporal simultaneity there might be, but this does not constitute the relation. What does constitute the relation is the fact that they belong to the series which he calls a Self.

Stout, however, would emphatically deny that the Self is a particular of the sort that I have argued it must be, for there are merely the particular states themselves. A Self, for Stout, is its states. I myself find this language unintelligible and the facts difficult to explain unless there is this particular. Moreover, on Stout's view, I find it impossible to state what the relation is between the psychical and physical characteristics unless I say that they are characters of the same particular, and this does not mean, for me, that there are merely the particular characters themselves in spatio-temporal relations or relations of causal dependence. Nor does it for Stout ; but I profess myself unable to understand this other relation that he needs, nor do I see how this theory differs in essentials from the other theories that I have criticized, unless he accepts something of the sort that I have named a " persistent particular." Perhaps he does accept it ; but it seems to be hesitatingly.

But there is one point on which he does seem to be right. We do seem to intuite that our own organic sensations are related in some special way to the cognitive state by means of which we are aware of them. As our organic sensations have spatial characteristics, this may be one of

the clues by means of which we relate them to our body. I suggest, myself, that all of the entities which are *experienced* in Stout's " internal perception " are such that they entail that an individual is conscious of them, and that in the case of self, I know these and also that I am conscious of them, and that there is this relation of entailment, between *what* they are, pains, pressures, and so on, and my being conscious of them. In fact, this relation of entailment is what is peculiar to internal perception, and one of the reasons why we distinguish it from external perception. What in fact we intuite is " I " characterized by a set of characters, namely those qualifying the organic sensations and being conscious of them, and that we see that the former qualities entail the latter. It would take me too far afield to enter into detail on this suggestion, but if it is true it means that Hume is wrong in his contention that " We have no perfect idea of any thing but a perception " (234) and in his further statement that the sentence " Something which may exist by itself . . . agrees to everything that can possibly be conceived " (*ibid.*).

But when all is said by way of criticism, well-directed or mis-directed, two things stand out in Hume's account of the Self. The first is that his influence on the method of empirical psychological investigation into the Self has been such that it has set the field for certain types of psychological investigation ever since; and the second, that his account of the nature of the self is one which must, at some time or other, be considered seriously by any philosopher, however much he may feel that it is mistaken, and that most philosophers, and certainly most philosophers in Great Britain at the present day, are well content when they find themselves in his company. This, in itself, is a homage to the " reasonableness " of his views and the thoroughness and persuasiveness with which he expounded them. No criticism or disagreement can outweigh the tribute paid to a philosopher whose views are, after 200 years, still considered worthy of examination, critical or otherwise.

II.—*By* C. A. Mace.

Concerning the truth of one at least, and possibly the chief, of Hume's contentions in the chapter on Personal Identity I am sufficiently convinced that I propose to say very little about it. Hume was anxious to maintain that the identity of a person at different times is an identity similar to that of a tree which remains the same tree in spite of the fact that all its parts, and all its specific properties, such as its shape, colour and size, are subject to continuous changes; so that after half a century there remain no part which is identical with any original part and no property identical with any original property.

Had Hume been content to state this proposition precisely and to elucidate the sense of identity in which this may plausibly be maintained there might by now have been few who would wish to contest his doctrine. But polemical ardour led him to say much more, and much that is doubtful. Of few things can it be more truly said than of philosophy: "The less said the sooner mended," and as it stands Hume's chapter leaves much to be repaired. It was unfortunate that Hume allowed himself to suppose that if his central contention were true then the sense of personal identity is a sort of illusion. It was also unfortunate that he did not attempt to give a more detailed account, and a more empirical account, of the nature of this self with regard to which these judgments of identity are made. In considering Hume's discussion as a whole I find it difficult to decide whether he wishes to base his distinctive negative contention concerning the self upon *a priori* principles or upon empirical observation. When he declares that we can have no idea of the self 'after the manner explained' because there is no impression from which this idea could be derived, he appears to rest his case upon a general epistemological principle; when,

on the other hand, he asserts that in self-observation he finds nothing but particular perceptions of heat or cold, light or shade, etc., he appeals to the test of empirical verification. In the present discussion I wish to reopen this latter empirical question. My impression is that Hume has been allowed by many of his critics much too easily 'to get away with' a specious but inaccurate report on what is after all a straight issue of observable fact. I propose, therefore, (somewhat experimentally), to challenge Hume's introspection; and to begin with I shall say that when *I* enter most intimately into what I call myself, what I stumble on is not a perception of light or shade, heat or cold, etc., but something which perceives light or shade, something that loves or hates, something that experiences pain or pleasure. Of course, that point is scored much too easily. It may be just a verbal point, and to score it honestly what I admit I have to do is to indicate certain empirical data in terms of which my statements may be verified or contested. And this is what I shall attempt to do.

Further, it will not, I think, be necessary to say that I am constituted in a different manner from Hume. Hume's self was, I think, as clearly presented to him as my self is to me. What prevented him from recognizing himself was in part the fact that, as Professor Wright remarks, he failed to observe himself in the right way, and in part the fact that he was misled by his *a priori* principle that it must be 'some one impression that gives rise to every real idea.'

Obviously the consistent use of this principle in the way Hume here employs it would lead us to deny the existence of all sorts of things concerning which we really have no doubt.

Challenged to point to some one impression from which my knowledge of my self is derived I must, of course, confess to being stumped; but I can reply as follows: Knowledge of the self like the knowledge of most other things is derivative from empirical data of considerable complexity. The problem is of the same *general* form as that relating

to our knowledge of external things. It is agreed that my knowledge, say, of the existence of the pen now in my hand, is not derived from one simple impression. To account for this knowledge I have first to specify a rather complex manifold of visual, tactile, and other data, and then explain how from this I can proceed to statements about a pen.

Similarly in accounting for my knowledge of my self I must first specify certain data and then explain how from this I proceed to statements about my self. But although in general form the problems are similar there is this important difference. There is fairly general agreement concerning the data from which knowledge of external objects is derived. Philosophers differ to a greater extent concerning the way in which knowledge of external objects is derived from the data. But in the case of knowledge of the self there appears to be less agreement, even among those who assert the existence of such knowledge, concerning the data from which the knowledge is derived. I propose therefore to restrict myself to this question—to inquire, that is to say, concerning the nature of the empirical data, if any, from which it is plausible to maintain that knowledge concerning oneself can be extracted.

For this purpose it will be convenient to begin with the senses, and to deal with the chief of these one by one; and I shall begin with the hypothetical construction of a purely visual world.

Normal visual experience is of a field approximately hemispherical, as if the percipient were located at the centre of a hollow ball rather less than one half of the interior of which is presented to his 'cyclopean' eye. He is also in some measure aware of the total sphere since the region beyond the periphery is more or less vividly imagined. In this connexion we may note that there is a certain danger of exaggerating the importance of the distinction between sense and imagery. A plain description of normal consciousness of the environment must include much that is not directly present to sense. We are normally conscious of our general 'surroundings,' part of

which we locate behind us. Whilst it may be true that we are not sensibly aware of what is going on behind our backs we do know that *something* is going on, and concerning the general character of that part of our surroundings we are as fully assured as we are concerning that part which is before our eyes.

But to eliminate for the present the complications that are introduced by the distinction between sense and imagery I shall ask permission to postulate a being so equipped as to be sensibly aware of the total visual sphere. This sphere would presumably be presented to a more or less spherical organism supplied with optical receptors at each of its poles and with four more equally spaced around its equator.

To eliminate further the complications that arise from the need for supporting limbs I will suppose my observer to hang in a suitably consistent and translucent medium. James Ward once played with the idea of a gannet's mind possessed of a philosopher. In principle I am asking no more when I invite you to consider the data presented to my spherical philosopher suspended in a pure, translucent and space-pervading jelly.

It is not necessary to describe the field in detail, as this has been done by many contributors to the theory of perception. There are, however, certain features of this field upon which I want to place, for my present purpose, particular emphasis. Some descriptions of the visual field have erred, I think, through oversimplification, and this may in part explain and justify the distrust evinced by Professor Wright and others with regard to those who allude so frequently to the existence of ' coloured patches.' The field is not exclusively composed of particular coloured expanses standing out against the background of a hollow sphere. The background itself is not even strictly a sphere. The blue dome of the sky, for example, differs in respects more important than colour and size from the dome of St. Paul's. It lacks surface texture and resembles more the indeterminate and unbounded void presented when the eyes are closed.*

* It has the character of what Katz has described as a ' film colour '.

In certain cases, too, as, for example, in looking at coloured transparent bodies, our sense-datas are solid, three-dimensional wholes. So, too, in virtue of sense-given relations we are immediately aware of organized wholes, as the Gestalt psychologists have sufficiently insisted. The precise phenomenological description of Gestalten is of particular importance in specifying the ways in which such 'categories' as substance and causality may be exemplified in purely visual terms. Not infrequently is it asked: Are sense-data substance? Have they causal properties? To these questions we can give no simple answers. I think it helps, however, to say that a purely visual world would exhibit *attenuated substances* and *attenuated causal processes*. This amounts to saying that if we want to use the word 'substance' and the word 'cause' in the description of purely visual experience we are forced to use these words in modified senses, and we are justified in such modifications by the principles underlying so many of the philosophical adaptations of language. Such words are used in new senses in order to draw attention to interesting similarities. Thus the Gestalt psychologists have drawn attention to the fact that one of the most common forms of visual organization is that in which we are presented with the distinction between 'figure' and 'ground.' It helps to indicate the distinction by saying that the figure is a 'thing' in a sense in which the ground is not. A well-organized visual whole standing out against its ground is an example of what I here would describe as an 'attenuated substance'. This language is intended merely to draw attention to a certain similarity between some of the immediate data of the visual field and 'substances' in the 'ordinary and proper' sense of this term.

An example of what in the same way I should describe as attenuated causality is afforded by Professor Price's discussion of 'impenetrability.'

"Some would make a great mystery of our consciousness of impenetrability or 'resistance': but only because they think it has something to do with our will, or with

our muscle or with both. But there is really no mystery at all, and neither the will nor the muscles have anything to do with the matter. A purely contemplative being having the sense of sight and an intelligence such as ours, but completely devoid of either will or muscles, could perfectly well be conscious of impenetrability just as we are." "We know that a stone wall is impenetrable," Professor Price proceeds, "because from time to time we see all sorts of things moving towards the wall . . . some falling from above, some moving horizontally from various directions; and we see them coming into contact with it. When they do so we notice that they all *change their mode of movement*; they rebound, or stop, or break into bits. Further we notice that if anything does get to the other side of the wall . . . It does so only by changing direction and going round the 'obstacle.'"

I should prefer to state the matter thus. The ordinary notion of impenetrability or resistance is derived from a variety of sense modalities, and it has in point of fact certain interesting relations to 'the will' and to the experience of muscular movement. If we restrict attention to the contributions of sight we obtain an attenuated notion of impenetrability—the notion that Professor Price describes. In this sense, of course, a brick wall is impenetrable even to a ghost, or to the moving shadow of a cloud. On encountering the obstacle the spectre disappears whilst the shadow of the cloud seems to climb over it just as we are forced to do. Transparent bodies, on the other hand, though really solid may be lacking in visual resistance.

The result of these and other detailed amendments which I think may fairly be suggested regarding the actual appearance of the world to sight is, I believe, to present a description of visual appearances which conforms much more closely to what we actually see, and one which, as I have already suggested, may seem to mitigate the doubt which many feel with regard to contemporary empiricist phenomenology.

Perception, p. 275.

But though they may seem to make more plausible the empirical account of our awareness of the external world they contribute nothing of great importance to an empirical account of the observer's awareness of himself. So far as we restrict ourselves to the experiences of " a purely contemplative being having the sense of sight and an intelligence such as our own " we can point to no segregated whole to which such a being would refer as ' I ' in the sense in which that term is most commonly employed. There would, however, be one sense in which the word could be conveniently employed. It could be used to refer to what in a quite precise sense can be called ' a point of view.' In this sense we do in fact use it. An observer commonly distinguishes between the movement of an object in his visual field and his own movement in relation to the object in question—and this distinction can be expressed in purely visual terms. ' It is moving ' expresses a partial, restricted change within the field whilst ' I am moving ' expresses a systematic change in the field as a whole. The change is most simply described as a shift in an unoccupied point of view. For knowledge concerning the occupant of the point of view we are clearly dependent for data from some source other than vision.

To specify precisely the contribution of tactual experience it is important sharply to distinguish the data of touch from the data of proprioception. By tactual experience I shall here mean awareness of the surface qualities of things contributed by the cutaneous senses, not only touch in the narrower sense of the term, but also the awareness of warmth, cold and superficial pain. I wish to exclude the awareness of qualities which are located in the body and more particularly experiences of the kinaesthetic type. But at this point it will be convenient to endow our hypothetical observer with mobile tentacle-like limbs which, being devoid of musculature, flap about in a purely passive way in accordance with the forces at play in the surrounding medium.

Under such conditions the purely visual world would be replaced by one of very much greater complexity.

The field in addition to containing patches and volumes of colour variously organized would be further diversified by 'patches' of roughness and smoothness, warmth, cold and intermittent flashes of pain.

The new data would be of very considerable importance in the transition to an awareness of a 'world of material things' since they would contain the basis for an important type of judgment of identification—judgments of the form: 'That which is red is hot,' 'The thing to which this patch of roughness belongs, is identical with that to which that patch of blue belongs.'

I can see no way, however, in which the data could contribute, under these conditions, to any awareness of the distinction between oneself and other things.

The introduction of visible limbs is a complication of some interest by reason of the frequency of their appearance in spite of change in 'the point of view.' But even if they were invariably present this would not in itself give any reason for supposing that they were a part of the observer. More importance, at first sight, attaches to their association with tactile experience and with pain.

This is not an appropriate occasion for a full discussion of the correlation of data from different senses, but there are one or two points regarding it to which I wish to refer. The identification of the space of vision with the space of touch in general is a fact requiring explanation. Whilst it is plausible to say that within any one momentary sense field some spatial relations between the items are given as immediately as the items themselves this would seem not to be the case with data from different senses. For this reason, I think it is a mistake to suggest that the seen hand, for example, appears to be identical with the felt hand on account of the principle of nearness or proximity (in the sense of the Gestalt psychologists). On the contrary, they appear to be in the same place because they appear to belong to the same thing.*

* This is instanced most obviously in the experience of touching one's face (as in shaving) in front of a mirror. The tactile datum under such conditions can quite readily be located in the mirror where the face appears

Further, granting a general correlation between the space of vision and the space of touch there is another puzzle concerning the manner in which a datum of touch can be judged to co-exist with the relevant visual datum. They are in fact not so presented. In touching the place occupied by a coloured patch the patch in question is obscured from view. The tactual datum is presented as being in the place where the colour was but is no more—It appears in fact to be *behind* a new datum which corresponds to the finger with which the place in question is coloured. To a strict phenomenalist the facts would have to be expressed as a law of sequence not as one of co-existence. Apart from an assumption to the effect that the visual surface remains the case in which a red patch is replaced by a tactual datum does not differ in principle for that in which the red patch is replaced by a green. Visual data, in other words, are not only 'impenetrable' by other visual data, they are also impenetrable by touch. Such facts, too, illustrate the extent to which our ordinary judgments rest not only upon what is sensibly given but also upon what is present in terms of what is commonly described as 'mental imagery.'

It is also evident that the qualities presented through the cutaneous senses have the same general status in the world as colours—they appear as characters of objects other than the self presented at various distances from the point of view. If our limbs were long enough they would appear as far off as the sky, and given no sensibility within the limbs themselves there would be nothing to suggest any special attachment to or connexion with the observer. This is also true with regard to cutaneous pain. The self, in other words, endowed only with the senses I have specified, is still nothing more than a point of view, though the view from the point of view has been complicated in various ways.

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to be. It is not unplausible to suppose that a purely contemplative being endowed only with sight and cutaneous sensibility who lived in front of a mirror would locate all his tactile sensations in the place of the mirror image. The principles here involved are only those implied in the facts elicited by Stratton's well-known experiment with the inverting spectacles.

In the purely visual field, the centre of the 'sphere' is hollow. If it has a core this core cannot be seen. There is a certain minimum distance from the centre at which objects can appear, and a visually *proximate* environment cannot assume the form of a boundary. As objects approach they become vague and obscure, and at closest proximity transform the whole field into a dark and undifferentiated void.

The addition of cutaneous sensibility, on the other hand, defines a limit to the core. It is true that even with uniform stimulation of the whole body we do not sensibly apprehend its shape, but we do apprehend a proximate surface. The important point, however, is that even this surface would not appear as the surface of one's self. Condillac's sentient statue embedded in a plaster mould and endowed with refined cutaneous sensibility would apprehend the surface of its encasing plaster; but it itself, if it appeared at all, would appear only as a hollow space, or as a mere point of view.

The situation alters in a fundamental way when we further complicate the picture by the addition of the data of proprioception or by what are often described as 'somatic' or 'corporeal' data. Such data alone can give any empirical basis for the assertion of the existence of an occupant at the centre of the sphere; and alone provide an intelligible basis for anything more than the highly attenuated conception of the self as a mere point of view.

In normal experience the central core around which visual and other exteroceptive data are disposed would appear to constitute the only opaque three-dimensional region which is sensibly filled, and one on which cutaneous data are sensibly spread.

These are features in virtue of which we come to be aware of the body as a material thing. There are other features in this central core in virtue of which we may come to be aware of the self as a 'mind.' I agree with Professor Wright that we are aware of 'mental acts.' Where I disagree, I think, is in the supposition that such awareness is,

in *any* important or ordinary sense, *a priori*, and in the supposition that our awareness of our mental acts constitutes an objective to empiricism. I want to suggest that the awareness of ' mental acts ' in a sense particularly important for the theory of the awareness of the self is a matter of the perception of the causal relations of somatic data.

It is important to avoid language which suggests that the self is *itself* an act, or any set or system of acts. If the self is anything it is that which acts, and if the awareness of mental acts entails an awareness of the self it may do so in the perfectly ordinary way in which the intuitive awareness of any sort of act entails an awareness of an ' agent.' A murder is ' an act ' ; and clearly I could not *perceive* the committing of a murder without perceptual awareness of the murderer. Some change in each of the two participants in the act is observed in sufficient detail for certain causal relations to be discerned between the behaviour of the one and the death of the other. Now mental acts, in a plain sense which does not differ in important respects from that in which we speak of a murder as an act, are most clearly exhibited in what we call acts of ' attention ', such as occur when we listen carefully for an expected sound or look for something which has been mislaid. In phenomenological terms what appears to happen in such a case is that a change in the auditory or visual field is brought about by some ' bodily adjustment ' experienced as a change in the somatic complex —experienced as a series of movements and tensions.

The view I wish to present for consideration is, I think, a variant of one proposed a long time ago by Professor Broad—the view that " getting sensed " may just mean " coming into such relations with the somatic sense history to form with it a general sense history ".

Professor Broad adds " On this view a sensation of a red patch would be a red sensum, so related to a *somatic* field that they form together a *general* field in a certain sense-history. A contemporary auditory sensation would consist of a noise-sensum, related in the same kind of way

to the same somatic field. The somatic field itself would consist of feelings or presentations, which are not objects of acts of sensing, but are unanalysable mental states. It will thus form the subjective factor in all true sensations. If we ask: "What is the relation which a special sensum must have to a somatic field in order to be sensed?" the answer seems to be that the sensum must stand in the relation of sensible simultaneity to some part of the somatic field, i.e., that the two must fall into a single Specious Present. For this is certainly the only known relation which binds various special sense-fields together into a single general sense-field. Of course, it may well be that something further than this is needed, but at any rate this seems to be the most noticeable feature in the relation"*

The respect in which I wish chiefly to amplify and modify this doctrine is in distinguishing quite sharply between two cases apparently covered by this description—one in which an act of the self occurs and one in which it does not; or, if the statement be preferred, in distinguishing two quite different senses in which this analysis enables us to define the word 'act'.

There are clearly two quite easily distinguished ways in which sensa may come into the required relations to somatic histories. The one case is that in which the initiative comes from the somatic core, that is the case in which some act of 'adjustment' in this core facilitates the process of coming into relation. This is an act in the ordinary sense of the word, and it is an act of the self. The other is the case in which the sensum obtrudes itself without obvious co-operation on the part of the observer. If this be an act it appears as an act on the part of the obtrusive sensum, and as an act of the observer only in the very extended sense in which mere acceptance of the unavoidable can be described as an act.

The same distinction is exhibited in the cognitive operations of memory and imagination. 'Acts' of memory and imagination admit of analogous definitions. In these the act is constituted by some somatic adjustment which

* *Scientific Thought*, p. 522.

facilitates some revival or some constructive synthesis. These somatic adjustments are certainly more obscure than those involved in attentive observation, but they do not altogether defy empirical description. The attempt to describe them constitutes one of the most interesting (but most neglected) sections of James's classical chapter on the Consciousness of Self. On empirical grounds he was led to suggest that " *the 'Self of selves', when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat.* I do not for a moment say " he continues, " that this is *all* it consists of, for I fully realize how desperately hard is introspection in this field. But I feel quite sure that these cephalic motions are the portions of my innermost activity of which I am *most distinctly aware.* If the dim portions which I cannot yet define should prove to be like unto these distinct portions in me, and I like other men, *it would follow that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked* ".*

What makes James's account of the matter unconvincing on a first reading is the use of language which suggests that the Self is " after all, only the Body " ; and the view which I wish to defend will, I have no doubt, seem equally unconvincing if it is held to carry the same implication.

I propose therefore to conclude this discussion by attempting to specify the sense in which the Self is, on my view, identical with the body and the more important sense in which I should say that it certainly is not.

In the analysis of our knowledge of material things philosophers distinguish (i) the objects that appear in relatively simple sense experiences, (ii) certain " corresponding " objects that appear in more complex perceptual experiences and (iii) other, also " corresponding ", objects apprehended at an " ideational " level—illustrated very roughly by the sensum of a penny, the common sense penny, and the penny as it might be described in a physicist's vocabulary. We are all familiar with the objections

* *Principles of Psychology*, pp. 301-302.

to the use of language which suggests that what we are concerned with here is not a penny but threepence—but the 'dangers' are so well known as in most cases not to be dangerous. We may speak similarly of the visual penny and the tactual penny without being so misguided as to offer one of each kind in payment for our morning "Times". But in the case of awareness of the self this kind of danger does in fact arise. There is a certain peculiarity about the knowledge of oneself that is apt to encourage not only the philosopher but also the plain man to count himself twice in taking a census of the universe.

It is not I think unplausible to maintain that every sensum is linked with some material object in one or other of certain ways so that from the existence of any sensum whatever the existence of *some* material object can be inferred. Accordingly, in an appropriate sense of the word "of", any sensum can be said to be a sensum of the object or objects to which it is so linked. This, of course, amounts to a denial of the existence of "entirely wild" sensa. And it may further be the case that all my somatic sensa are linked in one of these ways to that material thing which a physiologist might properly describe as my body, and it may be that the somatic sensa entailed in a description of my mental acts are appropriately linked with those physiological processes which James refers to as "cerebral adjustments, or peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat". All this, however speculative, may quite well be the case. And if it be the case I think we should be entitled to say two things:

(i) that there is a certain sense in which I am my body, viz. in a sense in which this merely amounts to saying that the data presented in the awareness of the self are linked to the body by the relations above referred to.

(ii) That the relations are such that the most direct kind of awareness of the self is *not* an awareness of the body; so that when we obtain knowledge of the body in other ways we fail to recognize

> it as identical with the self, just as cartographers in making a map of the country fail to recognize a mountain approached from two directions and so record two mountain peaks where in fact they should record only one.

How this would come about would be in part explained in the following way.

The awareness of a material thing which is obtained through a visual sensum, *v*—whatever else it may require—at least depends in part upon some other datum, say a tactile datum, *t*, which is or at some time has been so presented that we can judge that the thing to which *v* " belongs " is identical with that to which *t* " belongs ". Now one of the peculiarities of the awareness of the self obtained through awareness of our own acts is that the relevant somatic data are not presented in suitable relations to other data for such judgments to be made. We do not for example apprehend our " cerebral adjustments " both by somatic experiences and by touch or vision. Even therefore if James is right in saying that these acts *are* cerebral adjustments there is not sufficient basis for this assertion in our perceptual (or introspective) data. The conditions required for a perceptual judgment to this effect would include the occurrence of somatic experiences in conjunction with some other kind of experience analogous to the relations observed between visual and tactile data when we judge that the visual penny is identical with the penny we touch. Knowledge of the self given through the awareness of mental acts is derived from a single modality of sense, and this does not satisfy the conditions requisite for any perceptual judgment about the body.

The conditions under which we apprehend the self in our awareness of our mental acts are conditions under which we *might* have been affected by external material things. Under those conditions we should not have perceived those things as material. This is the case previously considered in the hypothesis of a sentient being endowed only with visual experience. For a being of this kind

there would be no meaning in describing the presented objects as material; and in so far as actual experience approximates to these conditions the philosophically unsophisticated are apt to describe the objects presented as belonging to a supersensuous or "spiritual" order of reality. Visual data which lack corroboration from other senses are described as spectres, spirits, phantasies or ghosts; or by the more sophisticated as existing only in the observer's mind.

Accordingly, even granting the truth of some hypothesis such as that of James regarding the relations of the data presented in the introspection of our acts to the body as presented in other ways it is less misleading to say that the self is not the body than to say that it is. These acts are sensibly presented not as cerebral adjustments but as adjustments of the self; and these adjustments are the most characteristically "mental" occurrences in our experience.

In the foregoing argument the emphasis is placed, in the main, on a point in which I think I am in agreement with Professor Wright—viz. that the nature of the awareness of the self is exhibited by an analysis of what we are aware of when we attend to our "mental acts". But perhaps Professor Wright will not welcome my support because the account I offer of this awareness is, so far as I can see, one that Hume would have in principle no reason to reject. The conception of Self which I am prepared to defend is one that Hume was not concerned to attack; but the view that he did attack is probably one that nowadays few would wish to defend.

But without specific references either to Hume or to Professor Wright I wish to press the claim for recognition of the epistemological importance as well as "the merely psychological interest" of somatic data. There is a certain tendency to suppose that whilst visual, auditory and tactile data are of philosophical importance as constituting the empirical basis of certain kinds of knowledge, organic and somatic data call for no further recognition than can be accorded by a footnote.

This assumption is natural and intelligible when what

we are concerned with is our knowledge of *external* objects, but involves a serious error if we are to give as detailed and as precise an account of the knowledge of the self as we attempt to give of external things. It also involves an error if we are seriously concerned with an analysis of the externality as well as the materiality of these things. It was with a view to indicating some of the distinctive contributions of different sources of information that I decided to approach the special subject of this symposium by a rather long discussion of the data sense by sense. Even so, I am conscious of the fact that an adequate presentation of my point, could with advantage have been considerably longer.

Another matter on which I could, and perhaps should, have dealt in greater detail is that concerning the *causal* relations involved in mental acts. To forestall some at least of the possible lines of criticism in this connexion I would say, however, that the view here expressed does not, so far as I can see, depend on any particular view concerning the analysis of causal statements. Any analysis of such statements must surely be consistent with the fact that we can know with assurance on the basis of observation that sometimes a change in sensory experience is determined by an act of attention and sometimes it is not. In the cases in which we judge it to be so determined I am content for the present to leave it an open question whether we are here using the word " determination " in the sense in which it is used in regard to purely material changes ; and I am also content to leave it open whether we are here using causal notions in a full-blooded or in what I have called an " attenuated " sense.

Perhaps I should add that in suggesting an empirical account of the awareness of the self I am not concerned with the advocacy of empiricism in general. If we find that we are empirically aware of ourselves we can take this just as an empirical fact not as an *a priori* necessity. Further, if I am correct in suggesting that the somatic " sensa " are the data from which this awareness is derived I do not think we need insist that these sensa are on all fours

with the sensa from which we derive our knowledge of external things. For one thing, there are, I think, reasons for doubting whether somatic sensa correspond to the psychologists sensations as visual data correspond to their visual sensations and auditory data to their auditory sensations. The somatic data presented in the awareness of mental acts may quite well be correlated with central neural process. Even for a thorough going empiricist the important point about an empirical datum is not that it is sensory in character but the fact that is is *empirical.*

SYMPOSIUM: ARE THERE *A PRIORI* CONCEPTS?

By MR. D. M. MACKINNON, MR. W. G. MACLAGAN AND MR. J. L. AUSTIN.

I.—*By* D. M. MACKINNON.

THE precise significance of the question under discussion is one which its form does not at first sight disclose. We are asked—Are there any *a priori* concepts?—and the form of the question suggests at first sight that the question of discussion is one of fact, and not one of analysis, and therefore not a properly philosophic question. For philosophy, we are told *ad nauseam*, is concerned not with the establishment of matters of fact, but with the clarification of meanings. The question—Are there any *a priori* concepts?—seems formally at least at first sight to resemble such questions as—Are there any mastodons? and to demand solution by comparable methods. None the less it is a philosophic problem, and one that seems to me of considerable importance, and I propose to begin our discussion by pointing out precisely why it seems to me of such considerable importance, as I think that by so doing I can best direct the attention of my fellow-symposiasts to those aspects of the question which seem to me most to require discussion.

We are all agreed, I suppose, that part of the very considerable achievement of Bishop Berkeley in regard to the solution of the philosophic problems connected with the nature of the material world is the recognition of the great importance of the part played in our consciousness of that world by our having sensations. In fact one might argue that for him the problem—What is matter?—formulated itself rather as—What is the differentia of material-object-consciousness? He sought to resolve the problem of the nature of the material world by exhibiting the peculiarities

of the particular form of cognition, which we call perception. In his thought the analysis of perception *was* the analysis of matter.

Now we need not agree with him in this reduction of the problem to terms of the analysis of a particular class of cognitive acts. But we must admit the truth of his recognition of the close connexion between the reception of sense-contents, and the notion which we have of a material world. There is a very close dependence indeed of our formation of the concept of materiality or material existence upon our reception of these data, even though the precise nature of that dependence is extremely obscure.

When we say, as I think we must say with truth, that unless we received sense-contents, we would not form the concept of materiality, what kind of a proposition are we asserting? It might be said, and I think it has been said by certain philosophers, that we are asserting some kind of an empirical psychological proposition. When we assert a connexion between our sense-awareness and our formation of this concept, the statement is historical in character. We are referring to a state of affairs that we have observed to obtain in a great number of cases, namely, the *de facto* dependence of the formation of such a concept upon our receipt of sense-impressions. The content of the concept is at present opaque to our understanding.

Our employment of it in thought is perhaps accompanied by our having a rather complicated mental image, but we must be careful not to confuse the content of this image with the content of the concept. When I say complicated image I am referring to what I think I experience myself on occasion, when I make such judgment as—A pencil is a material object. When I make that judgment, I am sometimes aware of a very blurred series of images in which I represent to myself in a highly schematic manner possible experiences of a sensuous character that I regard as obtainable. I am not saying that I always have these images when making such judgments, certainly not that I am always conscious of having them. I merely suggest that on certain occasions the complex mental event which is my judgment

includes the representation by way of image of certain obtainable experiences. I think I may go further, and suggest that if I attend carefully to my mental processes, I find it hard to discover a judgment in which I am concerned to assert that such and such is a material object in which I do not, however briefly, thus image to myself some further obtainable sense-contents. In fact one might say that part of the differentiation of such a judgment regarded as a mental event is the occurrence of just such a process of imaginative representation.

None the less those philosophers, who contend that the dependence of our formation of a concept of materiality upon our receipt of sense-contents is *de facto*, contend that, though the employment of the concept in thought is accompanied by such schematic representation, its content is not adequately accounted in terms of the possibility of such imaginative activity. They argue, it seems to me, with great plausibility, that the content of the concept of materiality, as that notion is understood by the plain man, includes far more than a mere possibility of sensuous experience. For when a plain man judges that such and such is a material object, he believes that he is asserting not merely that certain further sensuous experiences are obtainable, which stand in certain relations to those which he is at present enjoying, but that these experiences are disclosing to him a continuant that exists simultaneously as a whole, albeit *ex parte* unperceived, and that continues to exist, apart altogether from the presence of a percipient. He may admit that his own employment of this notion in thought is accompanied by acts of imaginative representation, but he declines to admit that any series of such acts exhausts the content of the concept. For by no act of such a kind can he represent to himself the unperceived persistence, or substantial unity, of that which he judges to be a material object.

Thus, it seems to me that the plain man regards the *esse est precipi* as a synthetic proposition, referring to the limits of his own representative mechanism. He can only represent to himself the notion of materiality by the help of a series of

sensuous images. But to suggest that the sentence expresses a rule for the understanding of material object sentences is to suggest something which he is very unwilling to accept.

I said above that Berkeley, and this is, I think, true of the majority of phenomenalists, sought to resolve the problem of the nature of matter by reducing it to terms of the nature of perception. Its *Esse* is *percipi*. In the useful language of Prof. Bridgman, phenomenalists are concerned to contend that matter can only be defined operationally or by reference to those cognitive acts which we employ to determine whether or not the concept is exemplified in a given situation. This is the crudest form of verification principle, in which we suggest that a concept is determined by the method we employ to decide whether or not it is exemplified.

Now the plain man is very loath to admit that in the case of matter the content of the concept is exhausted by the specification of the operations determining the conditions of its legitimate employment. On this view of the *Esse est percipi* as a rule of procedure rather than as an empirically verifiable psychological proposition, the hypothetical proposition quoted above is seen to assert not a *de facto* connexion, but rather to exhibit the content of the concept formed. Our formation of the concept is necessarily conditional on our having enjoyed certain experiences, if its content is exponible in terms of a determinate set of such experiences.

Now I have selected this example, for I think that most philosophers are agreed that materiality is in some sense an *a priori* concept, and that Berkeley is concerned very forcibly to contend that it is not. Berkeley would, I imagine, if he had our advantage of a concise verbalist language, suggest that "matter was a convenient, notational device," or somewhat. He might even have said that it was a "logical construction," being careful to avoid the metaphysical atomist pitfalls into which the uses of this notation may draw the unwary. Certainly it is obvious that the sense in which *a priori* concepts are called concepts differs from that in which empirical concepts are called concepts. Even those who believe that *a priori* concepts are genuine and not pseudo-concepts must admit this, remembering the non-perceptual

intuition which is the means of our awareness of their concrete exemplifications. But for the philosopher, who is concerned to deny that they are properly called concepts, the difference is still more important. For unless he wishes to commit himself to a self-refuting nominalism, he must concede that such notions as causality, materiality and the like are not of universals at all. He must at least as an illuminative comment allow us to say that "there is no such thing as causality," provided that the context of the comment makes clear that it is made to call attention to the difference in significance between such terms as redness and such terms as causality.

It seems to me that the problem of *a priori* concepts is the problem of the relation of the rules governing the use of such terms as redness, and those governing the use of such terms as causality. At our unsophisticated level we are inclined to believe that the use of such terms is governed by precisely similar rules, or, if you like, that causality is a universal. It was just this that Hume denied, even as Berkeley before him had denied that materiality could thus be called a universal. There were universals*—yes, but such terms as causality, materiality did not denote such. For the rules whereby we might be acquainted with their instances were impatient of formulation. No one knew what it was like to be acquainted with a cause, but the rules governing the employment of causal language could be formulated. To some the asking of such questions as—When do we use the word cause?—might suggest an historical enquiry, but for Hume at least in no other way could its sense be specified. If we can recognize that the causal language is one particular notation that has certain practical advantages, all our puzzles will disappear. We will see the origin of Stout's mythology in the elementary syntactical structure of the language. The subject—verb active—object order of so many sentences is seen to beget an anticipation of conformity in the data we employ the language to describe. With Carnap the causal problem disappears, if we reformulate the question—Are there causes?—as Are there transitive, active verbs?

* I am not sure if Berkeley would have said this.

None the less the plain man is bewildered. The admission of phenomenalism and the relegation of the whole framework of existents to the status of a notational device, albeit one practically very convenient, offends his native realism. He is ready to admit with the phenomenalist that our knowledge of a material world is dependent on our receipt of sense-impressions. But, as Berkeley saw, before he resolved the antinomy by way of his theology, he is at the same time convinced that his conceptual picture does represent the structure of that world. He is loath to relegate it to the status of notational convention as the consistent phenomenalist must. He is concerned to defend the treatment of causality and materiality as universals, and to exhibit their instances as objects of some non-sensuous intuition. His conviction is deep-rooted, and his formulation of the epistemological problem of our passage from sense-awareness to knowledge of a world of causally interacting substances is throughout conditioned by this assumption. The discipline necessary to convince him that his problem is a pseudo-problem generated by the failure to recognize that causality is not a universal is likely to be painful.

I want to ask my fellow-symposiasts to regard the question as one of the conformity of our commonsense conceptual picture of the world with the facts, and I suggest that they reflect on the dilemma : either some form of non-sensuous intuition must be admitted, or else the commonsense conceptual picture of the world must be relegated to the status of a notational device.

II.—*By* W. G. MacLagan.

I.

We are asked to consider whether there are any *a priori* concepts, not which concepts, if any, are *a priori*. The terms of our enquiry do not commit us to a sort of identification parade of concepts, which might continue indefinitely. The particular question put to us is answered if we find that in our thinking we make use of even one concept that is not empirical. Mr. Mackinnon is therefore proceeding on a perfectly fair principle when he isolates for special consideration such concepts (or pseudo-concepts) as those of materiality and causality, on the ground that if there are any non-empirical concepts at all, these are ; and he may also conceivably be right in fact in picking out just these two.

None the less, I have two complaints to bring against him. The first derives from the fact that he has not himself given a definite answer to the question whether there are genuine *a priori* concepts of materiality and causality, nor, therefore, to the more general question that is our subject. My objection is not to the absence of a decision itself : I do not expect my own contribution to provide an assured one. But unless the question can be answered in the affirmative in a particular case we ought not to limit the discussion to that case. We ought to include in our review other alleged instances of *a priori* concepts. Though a parade of concepts is not in principle required something like it seems to be in fact desirable.

My first complaint is based, then, on the fact that Mr. Mackinnon did not answer the question he raised : my second concerns his manner of raising it. Certainly he does much more than tell us that " most philosophers are agreed " as to the *a priori* nature of the concepts of materiality and causality and invite us to make up our own minds on the point. In various ways he develops the description of the problem. But even with this development the description remains elliptical and unprecise. In discussing materiality he speaks

as though the denial that we have an *a priori* concept of materiality were tantamount to an acceptance of the phenomenalist analysis of what is said in material-object-language. For anyone not a phenomenalist the concept of materiality must be *a priori*. How are we to show that there is such a concept? Apparently by maintaining that materiality is a universal whose instances are "objects of some non-sensuous intuition." But this, I think, implies the unquestioned acceptance of certain debatable points. It implies, apparently, that experience can be defined as sensing: not otherwise is it obvious that the concept of what is non-sensuously given is a non-empirical concept. It appears to imply, further, that we cannot be possessed of concepts at all unless they are concepts of universals whose instances are *somehow* given: and that is to exclude without consideration not only the hypothesis of innate ideas but also the view (which some philosophers seem to accept) that there can be knowledge of a universal in some way independently of its instances. It is not even clear to me that Mr. Mackinnon's "non-sensuous intuition" theory of the nature of the *a priori* is compatible with his own final statement of our question as being a question of "the conformity of our commonsense conceptual pictures of the world with the facts." For this suggests that we have concepts about whose validity (that is, applicability to fact) we can enquire: and no enquiry would be needed if the fact answering to the concept were intuited. It is true that whether in Mr. Mackinnon's opinion we really have such concepts is rendered doubtful again by the concluding remark that the "commonsense conceptual picture" might have to be "relegated to the status of a notational device." But I am not sure how to understand this, unless as an expression of the view—to my mind mistaken—that what we mean by certain words is never more or other than what, on reflection, we regard the facts as justifying us in saying. To me it seems clear that if we really have the "conceptual picture" it cannot be relegated to the status of a notational device. It can, of course, properly be asked whether when we use language of a certain sort we really

are giving expression to such and such a "conceptual picture." But the question whether we possess a certain concept must be quite clearly distinguished from the question whether, supposing we do, it is an empirical or an *a priori* one.

What emerges from such considerations is this. We are, of course, agreed that "*a priori*" is used as the antithesis to "empirical." But there is no use asking whether a certain concept is *a priori* or empirical unless we have first allowed that there is such a concept (any more than it is reasonable to ask whether there are *a priori* concepts if we intend to mean by *a priori* concept any concept that we only *think* we have). There is also no hope of answering the question unless we are clear, as I am not yet, as to what is meant by "experience." Further, since the *a priori* and the empirical are undoubtedly regarded as constituting an exhaustive disjunction, the question what we mean by experience cannot well be discussed in abstraction from the question, "What are all the possible ways by which we might be supposed to be possessed of our concepts?" there being, as I have already indicated, more than two possibilities. And for this reason, no less than because of uncertainty what to say about the particular cases of materiality and causality, a wider survey is required than was suggested in Mr. Mackinnon's paper.

II.

We must begin then at the beginning. To say that a concept is *a priori* is to say that it is not empirical. But what is a concept and what would be meant by saying that it was empirical? The word "concept" may, of course, be used to name the universal element in the *objects* of our consciousness, but it seems to me that those who like, more than I do, to speak of concepts mean, rather, something subjective in the sense that it is constitutive of our thought itself and not of the world on which our thought is directed. Certainly it is only in this latter sense that a concept could be an innate idea. I shall therefore understand by "concept"

an element in our knowing or thinking whose discrimination within it corresponds to the distinction of terms or, some would prefer to say, names (but not words) within the statement that expresses our thought. Now our knowing or thinking is of or about something other than itself: and we naturally suppose that as a condition of its occurrence this other, or each of its elements severally, is or has been "given," *i.e.*, present to consciousness as its object (I do not think we are entitled to read more into the word "given" than this). Looking at the matter from the side of our consciousness, we may speak of being "acquainted" with objects. Acquaintance is not itself to be called knowledge,* though apart from it there can be no knowing or thinking; and in saying this we are, of course, not even committed to holding that it can itself occur unaccompanied by the knowing or thinking that presupposes it. It seems reasonable to equate experiencing with this being acquainted: but anyhow if experience be extended to include the thinking which acquaintance conditions it is obvious that all concepts must be empirical in the sense of being constitutive of experience. If experience be limited to acquaintance, then no concept is empirical in the sense of being constitutive of experience, but we may speak of concepts as empirical in another sense—in the sense, namely, that they are concepts of that with which or with instances of which we are acquainted: and this is what I shall mean by an empirical concept. If we wished to avoid speaking of concepts we could speak instead of terms, or names, that denote objects with which we are acquainted; and we could restate our question as the question whether there are any terms that do not denote such objects.

To define the range of empirical concepts, then, is to define the scope of acquaintance. The philosophers most usually called empiricists treat acquaintance as co-extensive with sensing, where "sensing" is to be understood as covering Hume's "impressions of reflection" as well as

* On one theory of our knowledge of relations, shortly to be mentioned, it might be more proper to say "Not *all* acquaintance is itself knowledge."

the " impressions of sensation " properly so called. If we accept this view of experience are there any concepts that must be called non-empirical? I think that there are, and that they include concepts whose existence and validity even the extreme empiricist would be unwilling to deny. But the point is rendered obscure by uncertainty as to what may fairly be said to be given in sensation.

Let us consider, for example, the case of resemblance between colours. I should be inclined to say that we sense the colours but do not sense the resemblance. What we see is always a colour or colours, and resemblance between colours is not itself a colour but, as it has been called, an " object of higher order." This will seem to some so obvious as to be trivial, but I find that to others it appears manifestly false. Now it is of course perfectly natural to talk of seeing or hearing the resemblances between colours or sounds, and to speak of two sensations as being sensibly alike or sensibly different. If this were not so no one would maintain the view that these relations are sensed. It is even possible to support the view by argument. What is needed to verify the statement that one colour is like another? Just looking at them. Does it not follow that the state of affairs asserted is just seen? The answer is, however, that it does not follow. Suppose a situation such that if A then B, and if B then C. To the question " What is required if we are to have C? " it would be equally natural, even if not equally precise, to reply that we require B, or A plus B, or even just A.

It may thus be perfectly natural to say that to see two colours is all that is necessary in order to give us the knowledge that they resemble without it being on that account true that a non-sensuous acquaintance with the relation itself is not also involved. Of course, this is not actually a proof that there is such a non-sensuous acquaintance; it is purely a defensive argument. To the question whether a non-sensuous acquaintance does in fact occur I am not quite certain what to reply. I feel sure, as I do not in the case of sensing, that it does not occur independently of knowing: what is obscure is whether it can be even dis-

tinguished from the knowing, and whether, if it cannot, the knowing should itself be spoken of as acquaintance. But if, as I think, the relation is a particular and the object of conception is universal, then I suppose acquaintance with this relation ought to be distinguished from the knowledge of it, just as much as sensuous acquaintance with a particular colour ought to be distinguished from knowledge. Even if this were not the case, however, I should still deny that the relation is sensed : so that, one way or the other, the concept of the relation would have to rank as a non-empirical concept.

It may perhaps be argued from another direction that the distinction drawn between sensuous and non-sensuous acquaintance is an unreal one. It may be said that the colours themselves are not sense-given in my narrow use of the term. What underlies this objection is, I imagine, the view that an activity of thought, a comparison, is required even for the naming of a colour. The assertion " this is red," is based on a non-sensuous acquaintance just as much or as little as the assertion " this colour is like that " : in fact, the two assertions are not really of different types at all. But this is not to the point. The fact that an awareness that is not sensing is involved in naming what is sensed and is therefore a condition of any statement about it does not abolish the fact that there is also an, in itself inexpressible, sensuous awareness of what is named.

Though I have confined my discussion to the relation of resemblance between sensibles that is, of course, only one among other cases in which a word used in the expression of even our most elementary knowledge of sensible fact does not itself denote anything sense-given. But it is not necessary to collect further examples. This is ground enough for insisting on the distinction between what is sensuously given and what, if it is given at all, must be given non-sensuously, and as warning against the mistake of " transferring to the data of sense all that is implied in the language necessarily used in describing them "*. It is

* Ward *Psychological Principles*, p. 321.

a distinction of which Locke, Berkeley and Hume all seem to have been aware, even if their successors have not always been. The doubtful language they use about relations bears witness to their non-sensuous nature*, while the admission of "relations of ideas" in contrast with "matters of fact" is equally good evidence that they, no less than their terms, must be allowed to be somehow "given."

It is a matter of the usage of words whether we should continue to limit experience to sensing and the title of "empirical concept" to concepts whose objects are sensed. If we do, resemblance, as I have said, must rank as an *a priori* concept, but to myself it seems more natural so to extend the application of "empirical" as to include resemblance under that head. If, however, the application of "empirical" be extended in the manner suggested then we must conclude that a concept cannot be called *a priori*, as Mr. Mackinnon seems to hold it should be, simply on the ground that its object is "non-sensuously intuited." This is not a sufficient condition of its being *a priori* any more than (as was pointed out earlier) it can be assumed to be a necessary one. In fact, if a concept is to be called empirical so long as its object is apprehended, whether it be sensed or not, Mr. Mackinnon's description of an *a priori* concept will be not merely inadequate but positively incorrect; the only possible *a priori* concepts will be innate ideas.

But, it may be argued, we must put a qualification on the proposed extension of the meaning of "empirical" in order to keep in touch with ordinary usage, according to which sensation is undoubtedly constitutive of experience in some pre-eminent manner. Perhaps we should say that a concept is empirical only if it is a concept whose object is either given in sensation or at least one the knowledge of which has sensation as its condition. This qualification seems to me reasonable enough, but I question whether it carries any real limitation with it. Is anyone prepared to

* Gibson, however (*Locke's Theory of Knowledge*, p. 193), argues that in Locke's case it is ontological and not epistemological presuppositions that constitute the difficulty.

name an object our awareness of which is in no way conditioned by sensation? It may well be that there is more than one way in which sensation conditions the apprehension of what is not sensed, and such differences may be relevant to the meaning of the antithesis of empirical and *a priori*. But beyond this point it seems impossible to advance except by letting that antithesis fall for the time being into the background, and concentrating instead on the consideration of certain concepts frequently said to be *a priori*, with a view to discovering just how, supposing we do really possess them, we can account for that fact.

It is unfortunate that though the question set for discussion can only receive a clear answer in this way the way itself is a μακροτέρα ὁδός quite beyond my present scope. For every reason thoroughness is not to be looked for, and my answer will perforce be a combination of dogmatism and hesitation. I shall assist myself—I hope not unfairly—by taking my programme from Prof. Broad's discussion in Chapter 3 of his *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*. His classification of claimants to the status of *a priori* concepts, whether or not exhaustive, is sufficient for our purpose, and the statement of his view except in regard to Ideal Limits is so brief and in regard to Ideal Limits so provocative that I shall be able to avoid the charge of mere repetition.

As to what an *a priori* concept is I may as well say at once that I do not find Prof. Broad more helpful than Mr. Mackinnon. It is true that he expressly allows that it might be an innate idea (which could be so, he thinks, only in what he calls the " dispositional " and not the " occurrent " sense of innate and in future my use of the expression will assume this) : but he allows also that it might be the content of a non-perceptual intuition. The difficulties I feel about this are as follows. First, to be an innate idea and to be the content of a non-perceptual intuition seem to me sufficiently different for it to be questionable whether such concepts can be treated as constituting a single class under whatever label. Certainly they do not have that identity of type which would render it safe to ask, as Prof. Broad

does, about particular concepts whether they are *a priori before* we have made it plain that the term is to cover this dual possibility. Second, for reasons I have already given, unless the expression " non-perceptual intuition " is more carefully explained than it is by Prof. Broad, it might be used to cover concepts which I am sure Prof. Broad does not intend it to cover. And, finally, it is not certain that Prof. Broad is consistent with himself. He, in one place*, seems to suggest that a concept would be empirical although it (that is, I suppose, its object) is non-sensuous : and if a distinction is intended between non-sensuous and non-perceptual it is not expounded. And I also do not know what is supposed to be the difference between the perception of a causal relation which would leave the concept of causality an empirical concept†, and the non-perceptual intuition of one which would involve its being *a priori*‡.

III.

Prof. Broad considers in turn Ideal Limits, Categories and Ethical Characteristics. I shall leave Categories to the end. In the discussion of Ideal Limits the case of straightness is examined in some detail. Prof. Broad argues that the concept of straightness will be *a priori* if, but only if, two propositions are true ; first that there is a simple positive characteristic of which " straightness " is the name, and second that we cannot say that any object actually has this characteristic. ("A priori" here appears to mean the same as " innate."). Both these contentions he denies. In regard to the former he suggests that to say " x is straight " is to affirm that x is linear and deny that it is jagged or curved. Now linearity, jaggedness and curvature are all positive perceptible characteristics. Thus the idea of straightness is empirical in that it is really a compound idea all the components of which are empirical. What is Prof. Broad's

* *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*,' Vol. I, p. 44 (on our ideas of modality).

† *loc. cit.*, p. 46.

‡ *loc. cit.*, pp. 52–3.

reason for saying that when we speak of something being straight part of our meaning is in this way negative? It ought not to be (though I suspect that in fact it is) simply that, since we are never acquainted with the perfectly straight, this is what we *must* mean. For not merely does Prof. Broad only *subsequently* discuss the question whether we have such acquaintance but he inclines to the view that we do have it. But even if he had taken the view that we do not, that would not prove that straightness is not the name of a simple positive characteristic, except in conjunction with the further premiss that there cannot be innate ideas. But Prof. Broad is not using this premiss, and if he were how could he be at the same time asking, as in effect he is, whether the idea of straightness is to be regarded as an innate idea? But if these considerations are excluded, then I can find nothing but dogmatism in the assertion that jaggedness is a positive characteristic while straightness is not. To me it seems just as plausible to maintain that by jagged I mean neither straight nor curved as to maintain that by straight I mean neither curved nor jagged, the fact being that in neither case is this what I mean though in each case it follows from what I assert.

Prof. Broad allows that the analysis just criticised might be rejected, and indeed he himself holds that it does not state what we mean on *all* occasions on which we assert that x is straight. He therefore offers a second analysis as a complement, though I must consider it as a substitute. According to this second analysis we have an empirical concept of certain relations called "comparatives,"—"hotter than," "straighter than" and the like. We also have, as a piece of *a priori* knowledge, the knowledge that "straighter than," unlike "hotter than," is a comparative that has a superlative. A concept of modality is involved in this *a priori* knowledge; but while the knowledge is *a priori* the concept involved in it is "empirical though non-sensuous." Now if this is meant, as it clearly is, to obviate the need for a simple positive concept of perfect straightness, it seems to me ineffective. Even if we possess the piece of *a priori* knowledge alleged, I do not see how we could use it to

justify our predication of the characteristic of straightness in one case rather than another. It is barely conceivable that, lacking a "direct" idea of the superlative, we still might go about saying "I know there might be an instance of the superlative, though I've never come across one." But how could we ever in a particular case say "Ah, here it is!" (even though mistakenly) unless we had such a positive idea of it, *i.e.*, knew what we were looking for? But, anyhow, the *a priori* knowledge postulated seems very odd. I think that what Prof. Broad has given is a perverse account of a fact that admits of a simpler description.

The truth is that there are some words which, whether we use the positive or comparative forms of them, we know to be essentially comparative in meaning. Thus, whether we say "x is loud" or "x is louder than y" we know on reflection that we are in each case making a comparison with a standard. This is, of course, quite different from saying that x is a noise, which is only saying that x is a thing of the sort to which the comparative "louder" is applicable, and we must not be misled even where language does not clearly mark the difference: "heat," for instance, may refer either to a certain type of sensation or to a certain range of intensity in sensations of that type. Now to say that we know that a certain comparative has no superlative is really only to say that when we use a certain word, whether or not in its comparative form, we know that we are making a statement of comparison, that we are in all cases asserting a relation, never a quality. But there are other cases in which it is the comparative and not the positive form of the word that is improper: we are not dealing with degrees of anything. When we say "loud," we refer to the degree of intensity that a certain sensation possesses: but of what does "straight" indicate a degree? When we say "this is louder than that" we say what we mean; it is not improved by translation into "this is more nearly just loud." When we say "this is straighter than that" we do not say what we mean, and it is better said in the form "this is more nearly just straight." We are here

dealing not with degrees but with approximations.* Instead of suggesting that "louder than" and "straighter than" are both genuine comparatives about which we have a mysterious piece of *a priori* knowledge we should say that "straighter" is not a comparative at all and "loud" is not a positive. "Louder" has neither positive nor superlative and "straight" has no comparative. What "straight" refers to is a positive characteristic which at the same time *is* the "superlative" of a fictitious comparative. And tiresome though all this may seem it brings out the fact that Prof. Broad's second analysis of the meaning of "straight," which is meant to dispense with a positive concept of an Ideal Limit, is unintelligible except in terms that show that we have a positive concept of that limit.

Either then we are acquainted with instances of a simple positive characteristic straightness, or straightness is an innate idea. I think we must choose the former alternative. It is logically possible that a concept of which we made use in our thinking should be merely innate, so long as no proposition in which the concept-term functioned expressed knowledge. But we could not know that the characteristic named by a term was present in a particular situation unless we were somehow acquainted with that characteristic as an objective fact; and I do not see how we could know that it was absent unless we knew from other occasions what it was like for it to be present. Now, though it has been questioned whether we ever know that a line *is* straight, we certainly do sometimes know that a line is *not* straight. If the negative analysis of "straight" as meaning "neither jagged nor curved" were correct this would be easy to understand, for we certainly are acquainted with jags and curves. But I do not see how we could have even this negative knowledge if "straight" is the name of a simple positive characteristic unless we were on occasion acquainted with this characteristic as an element in particular situations.

What then is the difficulty about allowing such acquain-

* Approximations to straightness involve, I suppose, degrees of crookedness, but the two are not the same. There is no "least crooked" line, and if there were it would not be straight.

tance? Of course, we must all be doubtful whether what we say *looks* straight is straight, when what looks straight is supposed to be the edge of a physical object (it makes no difference to this whether we are phenomenalists or not). But this is not the melancholy prerogative of straightness; it is equally possible to suppose that conditions are such that what is, in fact, straight is appearing as bent or crooked. If on the other hand we are not talking about the shapes of physical objects, but about the shape of a colour on the strength of seeing which we say that there is a physical object that looks so and so, it seems absurd to maintain that this colour can look other than it is. What can be meant by saying that the edge of the colour looks straight but may not be? Must we not say that if it looks straight it is so? And then all those, including Prof. Broad, who allow that the boundary of a colour can seem straight should allow also that the concept of straightness is beyond question empirical.

But Prof. Broad in fact holds that a sensible may be other than it appears to inspection to be. I am not sure what he intends by this. I do not see what it could mean unless that, since seeing is not knowing, the edge of a colour, whose determinate linear character (which might be straightness) is of course *seen*, may yet not be *known* to be as it is. Is it the case that in all our knowledge about our sensations there is a certain crudeness, that the conceptual net is too coarse in the mesh to catch the absolutely determinate and rapidly, even if not continuously, changing; and that, correspondingly, all our words for sensible qualities refer to any member of an unspecifiable range of such qualities? This may be so, and if so then any word of absolutely determinate significance, such as "straight" is, and "jagged" and "curved" (or, for that matter, "green" and "acrid") are not, even if it names a character predicable of what is sensuously given, is not intelligible to us simply because what it names is itself sensed. Thus, if we hold to the view earlier asserted, that we must somehow be acquainted with instances of straightness, we must go on to assert an intuition of them that is not sensing, such an intuition as Plato believed in. The existence of this intuition is, of course,

also involved in our geometrical reasoning if that reasoning essentially requires a reference to what is ordinarily meant by "space." But most mathematicians deny this and I am not mathematician enough to justify my being dogmatic either way. It should, perhaps, be observed that on the view here taken it is not strictly true that sensible figure is always only an approximation to geometrical figure. That in any case would be odd: the imperfectly circular, *e.g.*, must be perfectly something else, and why then may nothing of the sort be perfectly circular? It is our *knowledge* in the one case that only approximates in precision to our *knowledge* in the other.

If this intuition of particular objects that is not a sensing takes place should the concepts of those objects be called empirical or not? They are not empirical if only concepts of what is sensuously given are empirical. On the other hand nobody denies that the intuition is conditioned by sensing. Our sensations, as Plato held, "put us in mind of" these unsensed objects. Still, the relation between the sensing and the intuition is not so close as in the case of the concept of resemblance. In that case the object of the concept is inseparable from what is sensed, so that it is logically impossible to have the intuition without the sensation: but in the present instance the sensing, or imagining, is only psychologically relevant to the intuition. It is Hume's error, here as elsewhere, to have offered this psychological accompaniment as a substitute for the intuition itself.*

As regards Ideal Limits other than these geometrical ones I need not say much. The cases that appear difficult are those where a normative concept is involved, *e.g.*, when we speak of someone as perfectly good. Now I am not certain that goodness any more than straightness admits of degrees in the way in which loudness does. If it does, then I doubt

* In the foregoing I have made the usual simplification of considering only the sense of sight. I am assuming that the same sort of account could be given in the case of touch. But that the "suggestive" power of sight is higher, so that it is more plausible to hold that the characteristics in question are seen than that they are touched, is shown by the preference we certainly have for visible over tangible εἰκόνες as aids to our geometrical thinking.

whether anything could be perfectly good; but it will not follow that we must have an *a priori* concept when we speak of things as though they were. For we might derive the meaning of "good" from observation of actual cases in which one thing is better than another and the meaning of "perfection" from approximation—series of the "crooked-straight" type. If, on the other hand, goodness does not admit of degrees a thing may yet properly be said to be perfectly good, in a sense more significant than that in which a line can be called perfectly straight, for the following reason. That on which judgment is being passed may be very complex, as a line is not, and it may consequently be good in one respect without being good in other respects. "Perfectly good" will mean only "good in all respects." If the content of this concept is obscure that will reflect either our uncertainty as to what is meant by the simple term "good" or our inability to provide an exhaustive list of the aspects which are the subject of our valuation, or both. The obscurity, so far as it is due to the latter cause, does not show that the idea is some mysterious *a priori* one, but only that it is what Prof. Broad terms a descriptive idea. And unless the concept of goodness itself is *a priori* all the elements constituting this descriptive idea will be empirical.

IV.

This brings us to the consideration of the status of normative concepts—a more satisfactory because more inclusive term than ethical. What is denoted by such words as "good," "beautiful," "right," "obligatory"? One answer is, of course, that nothing is denoted; our use of the words is purely exclamatory. Another consists in giving as the meaning of the words certain characteristics that are not normative at all. In the first case, there is obviously no *a priori* concept of goodness, because there is no concept of it whatsoever: in the second case, what concepts there are must be dubbed empirical or *a priori* as is preferred (and would normally be dubbed empirical) for

reasons that apply equally to concepts earlier discussed. A new problem is raised only if we insist that some terms are irreducibly normative in meaning. I propose to assume that this is so.* To the arguments already generally familiar I could add nothing important and there are other points to consider. What needs more consideration than it usually gets is the question of how those who suppose that we really have normative concepts think that we can have them.

They can hardly be just innate ideas or derived from inspection of a universal not recognised in its instances. For in neither of these cases could we have any gound for ascribing the characteristic in question to one thing rather than another. The position is not of the same type as that which would result if we had a purely universal intuition of causal necessity. There we could claim that constancy of conjunction could be seen to be involved in necessity, and we might hope to probabilify particular assertions of causal connection by observation of conjunction. No such inductive procedure is possible to justify our use of normative terms. It must then be based on intuition of the character as it is present in particular cases. But there is no denying the oddity of the intuition. The character is not, of course, sensed, but neither is it intuited as just coexisting with what is sensed. An act could not just be one of repayment of debt, for instance, *and* right: if we judged it right it would be *because* it was one of repayment of debt. The character is a "resultant" character. What it characterises are states of affairs, the description of which is in terms of of non-normative characters, and the ascription of the normative character logically presupposes the awareness of those other characters (as the assertion of resemblance between colours presupposes the colour-sensations) and is not, as in the case of straightness, simply psychologically conditioned by that awareness. The differences between the present case and that of resemblance are that the conditioning awareness is nothing so primitive as sensing, it is a complex state

* I do not deny, of course, that on many occasions on which an apparently normative term is used our meaning is capable of a purely naturalistic analysis. This may even be true of all uses of "beautiful."

of believing or knowing; and that what is asserted is, apparently, a quality and not a relation. Perhaps this difference should just be noted and accepted: it is impossible to assert *a priori* that nothing of the sort could occur.

But there are other difficulties. There is nothing surprising about our misascribing a character to particular situations, but we should not know what our normative terms meant unless in some cases we knew that the character it named was present. Do we ever have this knowledge? Many appear to take for granted that we have, but the answer is not so clear as one could wish. According to some moral theories, after all, we never really know that any particular act is right or that it is our duty to perform it; and though it may be claimed that we have knowledge of certain *prima facie* duties, or responsibilities, our knowing of the meaning of these terms seems to be parasitic on our knowing what we mean by "duty-strictly-so-called." It may be said that this criticism rests on a misunderstanding of the relation intended between *prima facie* duty and duty proper. Knowledge of a *prima facie* duty should perhaps be described as knowledge that an act *tends to be* a duty proper; and this may be paralleled by the knowledge, claimed by some, that one state of affairs *tends to necessitate* another. Such knowledge of tendency is, some might hold, both possible and a sufficient basis for the understanding of our terms. But even if I were clear about there being such a knowledge of tendencies the two cases are not really parallel. For in the one case the tendency *is* the causal tendency, it is itself that to which the debated term refers; and in the other case our term refers to that which the tendency is *towards*, and so long as we have mere tendencies before us we still lack an actual instance of what that term means. As regards value, Prof. Campbell has argued forcibly that "a subjectivist definition of value is valid *save only* in the single case of the value which inheres in moral virtue";* and doubtful though I am about his general thesis I also shrink from specifying an instance that would refute it. But moral virtue has to be understood as dutifulness, so

* *Mind*, July, 1935.

that we come back to the problem of our knowledge of duties. The particular difficulty already indicated in the way of admitting that we know that this or that act is our duty might, of course, be obviated by holding a subjective theory of duty *i.e.*, the view that it is our duty to do what we think right. But even if "thinking right" presents no problem I should still not be satisfied. For I do not see how any duties are possible in a deterministic universe ; and, although it may not be clear that every event is necessitated, I am certainly unable (unlike Prof. Campbell) to claim that I am directly aware of myself as acting freely in the sense of freedom that morality requires. How then can I claim to intuit the goodness of dutifulness in any particular case ? I do not think the position is hopeless ; and (since Kant may have talked sense) it is possible that a clue to the solution lies in a distinction between practical and theoretical reason, between the consciousness that is operative in conduct and the consciousness that has our conduct, as well as other things, before it as an object. The former may be so related to the latter as to legitimise assertions that are not guaranteed by anything that could properly be called *inspection* of our moral agency. I cannot develop this here.

But suppose we allowed a knowledge of the goodness of dutifulness, would that be enough ? Not unless we were prepared to concede, as (I have indicated) I am not, that nothing but dutifulness is good and nothing but undutifulness bad. For though we should have explained how we know what "good" means we should still have to explain how we come to predicate it, with whatever uncertainty, as widely as we do. Can any reason be offered for this extended application except that we dimly and, so to say, out of focus, recognise normative characters even elsewhere ? The uncertainty of our discernment will be not only an uncertainty as to whether the characters are, in fact, present, but also an uncertainty as to what precisely they themselves are. If knowledge must be clear and distinct we shall not, on this view, know the meaning of our terms. Of their meaning, no less than of their correct application, we shall have an inkling only.

But such as it is we shall have it, as in more favoured cases we have knowledge, only by attention to the particular situations that, we think, possess these characters. The recognition of the goodness of dutifulness will not stand utterly alone: it will be at most the clearest case of a type of discernment of which there are other examples. That there is nothing shadowy about our non-inferential awareness, that between sheer blindness and what Descartes would have admitted to be knowledge there is no *via media* possible, I certainly do not believe. But, of course, to speak so may be only a disguise for one's own mental laziness and confusion of thought, and to those who think that is the case I have no answer.

V.

Finally, we have to deal with concepts of categories—a vague class when one does not know the definition of "category." Not everything that has been called a category provides difficulty. Take, for example, quality: since qualities are sensed the concept of quality seems empirical enough on any view of experience. (This is, of course, quite consistent with there being a categorial *principle* that is *a priori*, to the effect that whatever exists must exist with some determinate quality). It may be said that the term "quality" can mean nothing except as the correlate of "substance"; but this is true only in the sense of "substance" according to which our particular sensations are themselves all substances; and if it is improper to say that this formal character of being a "this-such" is sensed, at the worst we must recognise it in the way in which, we have suggested, resemblance is recognised.

The case is very different when we are concerned with substance in the sense of continuant, or of causality. Though philosophers tend to speak of these as two among other instances of a class, there is every reason for regarding them as constituting a class by themselves. Here, at least, it would be widely held, we have notions whose content cannot possibly be derived from experience.

Of course, if the phenomenalists are right, this is not so ; but I am going to work with the hypothesis that they are wrong. I know no way of settling the question other than that of asking oneself in regard to any proffered analysis, " Is this all that I mean ? " and I can only record that up to the present I have had to say " No." I do not regard a " thing " as a logical construction out of sense-contents, nor a causal succession as differing from a non-causal one simply in terms of regularity. And perhaps it is worth remarking here that Hume himself was not the phenomenalist he has been claimed as being. His position as regards causality is rather clearer than his views on substance (*i.e.*, what he calls identity) and it is certain that he is not laboriously enquiring what " causality " means, if by that is intended the enquiry whether necessity is part of the meaning. That it is included in the meaning he never denies ; what he is concerned about is the nature of the belief, which neither inspection of the events called causes and effects, nor reasoning, can *justify*, that there is such a thing. It is true that, by his own principle, we cannot have an idea not derived from a corresponding impression, and it is true that the impression offered us as the archetype of the idea of necessity is not really an impression of necessity. It can be argued that in that case necessitation *cannot* be part of our meaning when we say that A causes B, but it is not a conclusion that Hume himself drew. It could also be argued that he is committed to holding that our idea of causality is an innate, though obscure, idea, the psychological conditions of our reflective consciousness of which he thought he could detect, or even that he thought it was derived from inspection of actual instances of it in one special field. There is evidence for all these interpretations ; and, even if there is no intelligible alternative, only partiality could isolate one of them as being Hume's position. Some confusions are perhaps more creditable than some sorts of clarity, but, however that may be, unambiguous authority of Hume is certainly not to be claimed for contemporary phenomenalism, much though it may have learned from him.

But to return to the main issue, what do I positively mean by "causality" and "substance" if I reject phenomenalist analyses as inadequate? To begin with, I do not think of events as causes; events happen but do not do anything (despite the suggestion of some of our language) and I think of causing as a doing of something, an agency that implies an agent. If there is a necessary connexion between events that connexion is not itself causal, but the shadow of, or, more precisely, an abstraction from causal action. Thus the notion of substance in a sense of "substance" that means more than the mere thisness of *any* "this-such," the notion in fact of what is now commonly called the continuant, is involved in the notion of causality. And the notion of causality is, reciprocally, involved in this notion of substance: for were it not that we need substance as that of which the causal properties determining the manifestation of characters are the properties, we might, I think, be content to be phenomenalists.

So we do not really have two categories, substance and cause, but a single complex category of the causal continuant; and it is just our concept of this that is the problem. The causal properties themselves, doubtless, can be supposed to belong to the continuant only in virtue of some intrinsic characters it possesses; but, unless these characters are the very qualities (or some of them) that sensation itself reveals, we know nothing of their nature. One *kind* of substance, again, can be distinguished from another only in terms of its properties, and one property from another only in terms of the manifested characters. Thus it is true that the content of the assertion "x is a rope" differs from that of the assertion "x is a snake" only in respect of characters that are either sensed or could (it is supposed) be sensed; and each assertion admits of falsification or (never complete) verification only in virtue of the predictive element in it. But the general notion of causal continuant is being used in both alike and irrespective of their truth or falsity, and *its* validity cannot be guaranteed by the specific nature of any sensation; it is either completely verifiable by an inspection that is not sensing or it is not verifiable at all.

How then do we have this notion of a causal continuant? There is not the same obvious objection in this case as in that of normative characteristics to supposing that the idea is either innate or derived from apprehension of a universal divorced from any apprehension of its instances as instances.* For, so long as the notion includes (though it is not reducible to) that of necessary connexion between events, we can account for our particular applications of the category in terms of induction based on observation of conjunctions. (That these applications would have very different justification according to which view we took does not here concern us.†) Still, both hypotheses strike me as extremely odd, if not actually unintelligible. I should certainly prefer to suppose that we acquired the notion by being aware of actual instances of the causal continuant as such; and at the present time there is quite a lot of support for the view that we have this knowledge in the special case of our own conscious behaviour. Though I think with Dr. Ewing‡ that those who hold this view ought to stress voluntary control of mental rather than of bodily processes, and though I deprecate also their emphasis on the causality aspect to the exclusion of the substance aspect of the situation, I think that there is a sense in which they are right. But the sense in which I think they are right is not, I confess, likely to satisfy them; it leaves one much nearer Hume (as I understand Hume) than they would wish to be. I believe that from the consciousness of our own agency operative in a continuum of mental process we derive a notion of substance and of its successive states as being not sheerly contingent in their succession, not a series of merely temporally or spatio-temporally related events. But the derivation is obscure, because it is in no ordinary or easy sense that we are objects to ourselves. And I do not think, in any case,

* An expression of the latter view may be quoted from Cook Wilson, *Statement and Inference*, p. 517. "We apprehend a necessity in general, *i.e.*, that the event must have some cause or other."

† In the former case they can either not be justified at all or only by a "transcendental deduction" of the category.

‡ *Idealism*, pp. 176–8.

that this consciousness reveals a *necessary* connexion of events; the consciousness in question is simply, to borrow Prof. Stout's phrase, a "felt tendency*" which constitutes *some* kind of unity of the process as being all *ours*. When, in reflection, we view the process simply as a succession of events, standing, as it were, outside it so as to contemplate it, we can then think of these events as non-contingently related, I am inclined to suppose, only by borrowing the notion of necessity from logical entailments, from the distinction between logical necessitation and mere conjunction, which we certainly do apprehend, and by asserting connexions of that sort but somehow (who knows how?) different, as holding between events. But I do not think that we ever apprehend connexions of this curious nature, and indeed I think that the two elements involved in the "concept" of them—the entailment elements and the succession element—never combine into a single concept at all. Our experience itself, anyhow, as it is lived through is not conscious of itself in these terms, any more than (as I have said earlier) it is conscious of itself as free from such a necessity. The process of our consciousness does not offer itself as object for an inspection that guarantees either of these competing interpretations of it, though in a way which I readily admit is baffling, it is the source of both. We conclude then that the notion of causal continuant may be derived from the awareness of a particular case of it as such, viz., our own selves, with the important qualifications:

(1) that it is an over-simplification to speak of this awareness as though it were the apprehension of an object in the same manner in which the knowledge of, say, relations between colours is an apprehension; and

(2) that into the nature of the real connexion in the succession, which we speak of as a necessity,

* *Studies in Philosophy and Psychology*, iv.

we have no insight, though we know well enough what is meant by "necessity" (of a non-causal type) and by "succession "separately.

Here again, however, as in the case of normative characters, I am not convinced that we derive our concept solely from one part of our experience and then extend its application to the whole. That we do apply it to the whole I do not question, but I question whether it can be a purely analogical application. We are not conscious of ourselves before we are conscious of things, and in our consciousness of things the application of the categorial concept is already involved. And if a "mere projection" of the self on to the not-self appears obstinately as an objective fact what is the evidence that it is a "mere projection"? If then we are not to allow that the categorial concept is an innate idea in terms of which we, appropriately or otherwise, "think" the facts (whatever that may mean) and at the same time are not to allow that we have knowledge of the category as constitutive of the world about which we are thinking, in detachment from recognition of its instances as such, it looks as though we must once again fall back on the claim to a dim discernment in particular cases of that for which our words stand, dim as regards its presence and its nature alike. As with normative characters, so here, the experience that might at first seem to be the sole source of our concept will really only be the palmary instance in which its content comes nearest to being clear. To hold this it is not necessary to deny that we *also* eke out our meaning by using the notion of the self analogically. On the other hand, this view does seem to overlook the fundamental difference between the "enjoyment" of our own experience and the "contemplation" of objects. Further, there is the question of its compatibility with the inductive methods that we actually employ to determine causal laws; though I am not persuaded that this difficulty is insuperable.* But I must honestly confess that I am not happy about any of these alternatives.

* cf. Broad *Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 241–5.

If, however, we elect to hold that we derive our notions of substance and agency from our consciousness of ourselves and from that alone, and that we interpret other phenomena by analogy with this, the special difficulty this would raise is not part of the problem we have been asked to consider. It would not be a question of the *a priori* or empirical nature of our *concepts* but the question of the explanation and justification (if either is possible) of a conviction that would be expressed in an *a priori* synthetic *statement.* Just as little is it relevant to our problem whether there is only one causal continuant or many or an infinite number. But a word or two is needed on the question whether we have to admit that minds and bodies are different kinds of substance, in a sense in which difference of kind means something more than it means when trees and stones are spoken of as different kinds.

A distinction between different kinds of substance can only be drawn in terms of the different nature of the qualities manifested; and to say that there are different kinds of substance in the peculiarly radical sense suggested can only mean, I think, that certain sorts of quality are incapable of characterising the same substance. I certainly do not know this to be the case. Extension is, of course, irreducibly different from consciousness, but I cannot see that the same thing might not both think and be extended. I should, however, still object to people talking of bodies thinking or minds being extended (neither of these expressions is preferable to the other) since this disguises the fact that, *e.g.*, what is extended would only be called a mind in virtue of its having the quite different characteristic of being conscious. What I have said does not show that there is *not* a substantial difference between minds and bodies; it means simply that I do not think we have any insight into such a difference, if it exists.

Because of this, I think it is a pity that Mr. Mackinnon stated his problem in terms of the concept of materiality. Of course, there is a problem of materiality, but it is in part just the problem of substance in general, and only in part the problem of whether any substance possesses the charac-

ters in terms of which matter is defined. This latter problem, of course, does not exist at all if perception is a knowing of substances so characterised. For though we still should not know whether anything exists with these characters when we are not perceiving it, yet, if perceiving is itself knowing, it and they are independent of our perception and it would surely be odd to insist that nothing is a physical object unless it exists and has the characters that belong to such an object for more than an (unspecifiable) period. But even if perceiving is a knowing of sense-data simply, or not a knowing at all, it remains true that all the characters in terms of which we should define a substance as material are sensible qualities; and though the question whether there are any bodies in a non-phenomenalistic sense (*i.e.*, whether the qualities sensed or qualities which they resemble are actually qualities of any causal continuant) could now only be settled by argument, the concept of body involved in this argument is only the general categorial concept of causal continuant together with certain concepts whose content is given in sensation. The specific problem of materiality, then, is either no problem at all or it is a problem not about the origin of a concept but about the cogency of an argument, and that is not our present concern.*

VI.

The position we have reached may now be summarily described. We may begin by recalling the statement of our programme made earlier in this paper. The description of any concept as *a priori* is made difficult by our vagueness as to what may properly be said to be given in experience. This vagueness is inseparable from the fact that, while

* No argument could as a matter of fact conclusively establish the existence of bodies. The best we could say would be that it was a hypothesis that no experience refuted and that had pragmatic value, while no other hypothesis had any pragmatic value. Of course we could conclusively *refute* the assertion that there were bodies if it were self-evident that the characters defining body were such as could not exist unperceived.

"*a priori*" and "empirical" are supposed to constitute an exhaustive disjunction, there are actually more than two ways by which we might be supposed to be possessed of concepts. What is required is that we should set out these various ways and then decide which of them are most reasonably to be called empirical, and (if we can) by which of them we actually do acquire concepts.

The possible orders of concepts that we have mentioned in the course of this paper are as follows :

(1) Concepts of the objects of sensation, such as redness or resonance.

(2) Concepts of objects not themselves sensed but intuited as particulars on the occasion of sensing, the intuition being logically inseparable from the sensation. This class admits of subdivision into—

(*a*) Cases where the intuition is dependent on sensation simply : *e.g.*, the intuition of resemblance.

(*b*) Cases where the intuition presupposes not simply sensation but an apprehension of fact that involves concepts of the resemblance order : *e.g.*, the intuition of normative characters, if it occurs at all.

If an intuition of particular instances of categorial characters takes place at all it must be of type (*a*) rather than of type (*b*) ; but, if the view of this paper is correct, it must in other respects differ importantly from an intuition of resemblance.

(3) Concepts of objects not themselves sensed but intuited as particulars on the occasion of sensing, the intuition being logically separable from but psychologically conditioned by the sensation : *e.g.*, on the view suggested in this paper, the concept of straightness.

(4) Concepts of universals intuited barely as universals and not as instantiated, although here again

sensation is the psychological condition of the intuition.

(5) Concepts whose objects are in no way intuited, but which belong to the mind's intrinsic nature, that is to say, which are, in the " dispositional " sense, innate ideas. Here, too, sensation must be the psychological condition of the transformation of the " dispositional " idea into an " occurrent " one : *i.e.*, of the realisation of the capacity to form the idea.

In all cases in which sensation has been assigned the part merely of psychological condition of our having the concept, it is, of course, logically possible to claim to have the concept independently of any such condition. But it seems to me an absurd claim : and I suppose that everyone agrees with Kant on this point at least.

Now, which of these orders of concepts should be called empirical and which *a priori*? If we attempt to conform to ordinary usage we seem forced to include in the class of the empirical more than (1) and yet not all of (2), and certainly not (3), (4) or (5). That there are concepts non-empirical in this sense of the term seems to me clear. If we are indifferent to usage, then I think it is questionable whether *any* application of the antithesis is not more misleading than helpful : it might be a good thing to drop it. But if I may be allowed to call (1) " empirical in the strict sense " and group (4) and (5) together as " *a priori* in the strict sense " on the strength of the common characteristic that in neither case is the concept derived from intuition of any particular to which it applies, then I should like to invite my successor in this discussion to show either that there are concepts *a priori* in the strict sense, which I much doubt, or that there are none not empirical in the strict sense, which I am perfectly certain is not the case. In any event, whether he accepts this invitation or not, I hope that, by indulging myself in such a roving and inconclusive survey, I have provided him with a more precise issue for his investigation. Unless this is so, I am afraid I should have to agree that we have not advanced very far.

III.—*By* J. L. Austin.

Mr. Maclagan seems to have ransacked every available cupboard for skeletons to grace our feast: I hope I shall not be thought ungrateful for his assiduity, if I decline to pick with him the particular bones which he proffers to me. My excuse is that he, like Mr. Mackinnon, has touched only perfunctorily, if at all, on certain preliminary matters which deserve discussion. Frankly, I still do not understand what the question before us *means:* and since I hold, nevertheless, no strong views as to how it should be answered, it seems best to occupy myself primarily in discussing its meaning. I only wish I could do this more helpfully. I shall, therefore, first write something about *concepts*, and then something about their *existence* and *origin:* finally, because it seems an interesting case, I shall choose to argue with Mr. Maclagan about *resemblance.*

I.

Neither Mr. Mackinnon nor Mr. Maclagan would claim, I think, to have told us carefully what they are talking about when they talk about "concepts". Both seem, however, to imply that the word "concept" could not be explained without using the word "universal" *: and this seems also the common view, though how the two are related is no doubt obscure and controversial. I propose, therefore, to make some remarks about "universals": because I do not understand what they are, so that it is most unlikely I shall understand what concepts are.

* Mr. Maclagan perhaps denies this, in order to allow for the possibility of "innate ideas": but he does not believe in these. Nor does he explain about them: his brief account of a "concept" as an "element in our knowing or thinking" will scarcely suffice for that.

People (philosophers) speak of " universals " as though these were entities which they often stumbled across, in some familiar way which needs no explanation. But they are not so. On the contrary, it is not so very long since these alleged entities were calculated into existence by a transcendental argument : and in those days, anyone bold enough to say there " were " universals kept the argument always ready, to produce if challenged. I do not know if it is upon this argument that Mr. Mackinnon and Mr. Maclagan are relying. It may be that they do claim to stumble across " universals " in some easy manner : or it may be that they rely upon some other argument which is admittedly transcendental.* But I propose to consider, not very fully, that celebrated argument which, above all, seems suited to prove the existence of " universals " in the most ordinary sense of that word : it runs as follows :

It is assumed that we do " sense " things, which are many or different.† Whether these things are " material objects " or what are commonly called " sense-data ", is not here relevant : in fact, the argument can be made to apply to the objects of any kind of " acquaintance ", even non-sensuous,—although such applications were not originally envisaged. It is assumed, further, that we make a practice of calling many different sensa by the same single name : we say " *This* is grey ", and " *That* is grey ", when the sensa denoted by " this " and by " that " are not identical. And finally it is assumed that this practice is " justifiable " or indispensable. Then we proceed to ask : How is such a practice possible ? And answer :—

(*a*) Since we use the same single *name* in each case, there must surely be some single identical thing " there " in each case : something of

* For there are in fact several : see below.

† There is a constant and harmful ambiguity here : the sensa are commonly different *both* " numerically " *and* " qualitatively " (the former, of course, always). The " universal " is alleged to be single and identical in *both* ways. Hence, from the start, that fatal confusion of the problem of " genus and species " with the problem of " universal and particular ".

which the name is the name: something, therefore, which is "common" to all sensa called by that name. Let this entity, whatever it may be, be called a "universal".

(*b*) Since it was admitted that the things we sense are many or different, it follows that this "universal", which is single and identical, is *not sensed.*

Let us consider this argument.

(1) This is a *transcendental** argument: if there were not in existence something other than sensa, we should not be able to do what we *are* able to do, (viz. name things). Let us not consider here whether, in general, such a form of argument is permissible or fruitful: but it is important to notice the following points:—

(i) The "universal" is emphatically *not* anything we stumble across. We can claim only to know *that*, not *what*, it is. "Universal" *means* that which will provide the solution to a certain problem: that *x* which is present, one and identical, in the different sensa which we call by the same name. Unfortunately, as so often happens, succeeding generations of philosophers fell naturally into the habit of supposing that they were perfectly well acquainted with these entities in their own right: they have any amount to tell us about them (partly this was due to a confusion of "universals" in our present sense with "universals" in other senses, as we shall see). For instance, we are told that they are "objects of thought": and myths are invented, about our "contemplation" of universals: and so on.

(ii) On the same grounds, it must be held that to ask a whole series of questions which have

*In Kant's sense. But it is also "transcendental" in another sense, that of proving the existence of a class of entities different in kind from sensa.

constantly been asked is nonsensical. For instance: "How is the universal related to the particulars?" "Could there be universals without instances?": and many others. For a "universal" is *defined* as something which is related to certain sensa in a certain way. We might as well worry about what is the relation between a man and his aunt, and as to whether there can be aunts without nephews (or nieces).

(iii) Here, however, a point to which I have already twice referred in anticipation, must be made: this will unfortunately be a digression. There are *other* transcendental arguments for "the existence of universals". I shall mention one: A true statement is one which corresponds with reality: the statements of the scientist are true: therefore there are realities which correspond to those statements. Sensa do not correspond to the statements of the scientist (exactly *why*, is rather too obscure to discuss here): therefore there must exist other objects, real but not sensible, which do correspond to the statements of the scientist. Let these be called "universals".

That this argument begs many questions, is evident. Are all sciences alike? Is all truth correspondence? Does no science make statements about sensa? Some, for instance, would distinguish "a priori" sciences from "empirical" sciences: and hold that the "truth" of the former is *not* correspondence, while the statements of the latter *are* about sensa. Of course, too, the assumption that the sciences are true is a large one.* But all this cannot be entered into.

* Even Plato once decided that he ought not to make it. It has been suggested to me that the argument should be formulated in terms of "having meaning" rather than of "being true". I doubt if this would be any improvement.

What it is important to notice for our purposes is, that here too the argument is *transcendental*. The "universal" is an *x*, which is to solve our problem for us: we know only that it is non-sensible, and in addition must possess certain characters, the lack of which prohibits sensa from corresponding to the statements of the scientist. But we do not stumble across these "universals": though, needless to say, philosophers soon take to talking as though they did.

Now it must be asked: What conceivable ground have we for *identifying* the "universals" of our original argument with the "universals" of this second argument? Except that both are non-sensible, nothing more is known in which they are alike. Is it not odd to suppose that *any two* distinct transcendental arguments could possibly be known each to prove the existence of the *same* kind of thing? Hence the oddity of speaking of "arguments for the existence of universals": in the first place, no two of these arguments are known to be arguments for the existence of the same thing: and in the second place, the phrase is misleading because it suggests that we know what a "universal" is quite apart from the argument for its existence—whereas in fact "universal" *means*, in each case, simply "the entity which this argument proves to exist".

As a matter of fact, we can, indirectly show that the objects "proved" to exist by the two arguments so far mentioned are *not* the same. For firstly, the variety of "universals" proved to exist in the case of the first argument is strangely greater than in the case of the second argument: the former proves a "universal" to exist corresponding to every general name, the latter only does so when the name is that of an object studied by the scientist.* But it might still be thought, that the "universals" proved to exist by the second argument do, nevertheless, form part of the class of "universals" proved to exist by the first argument: e.g. "circularity" or "straightness" could be proved to exist by either argument. Yet in fact, no

* It is to be remembered that, if we are to argue that "science" is not about sensa, very little can be recognised as "science".

clearer cases could be chosen for demonstrating that the two kinds of " universals " are distinct : for, if " circularity " is to be proved to exist by the first argument, then I must be able to say truly of certain sensa " this is circular " : whereas, the " circularity " which is to be proved to exist by the second argument must be such that it cannot be truly predicated of *any* sensa.*

The purpose of this digression is to point out that, apart altogether from questions as to whether the " arguments for the existence of universals " are good and as to whether they permit us to talk further about universals, an immeasurable confusion arises from the fact that " universal " may mean at any moment any one of a number of different things. For example, if " universal " is being used in the sense of the second argument, it is good enough sense to ask " How are universals related to particulars ? " though any answer would be difficult to find. (The answer that particulars are " approximations " to universals not only implies that the two are the *same* in kind whereas they were said to be different, but also again exposes the difference between this argument and the other ; since it would be absurd to say, of some non-scientific object like a bed, that there was no sensible bed which was *really* a bed, but all sensible beds were only more or less remote " approximations ' to beds., Again, to ask " Are there universals without instances ? " is now absurd for the

* It cannot be sense to say that sensible circles are more or less " like " the universal " circularity " : a particular can be like nothing but another particular. Nor can I agree with Mr. Maclagan that, on his account, the " sensible figure " could be an approximation to the " geometrical figure " : for what is sensed can be like nothing but something else which is sensed. But I must allow that " non-sensuous perception " " intuitive acquaintance " and so on seem to me to be contradictions in terms, attempts to have things both ways. I find confirmation of this, when Mr. Maclagan says a sensible circle might be *more* than an " approximation " to a geometrical circle : i.e., as I understand him, it would *be* a geometrical circle, although we didn't know it. Thus he is making the objects of intuition the same in kind as the objects of sense—indeed interchangeable.—I wonder if Mr. Maclagan's non-sensuous intuition is such that we can say on occasion, " *This is* a (geometrical) circle " ? For whatever reason, we do not ever, I think, speak so. Yet surely, if we are " acquainted " with geometrical circles, we ought to be able to do this.

reason that a "universal", in the sense of the second argument, is not the sort of thing which "has instances" at all (indeed, someone will certainly be found to *apply* the first argument *to* the objects "proved" to exist by the second argument).

(2) So far, we have not investigated the validity of our argument.

(i) It is to be observed, that if the argument holds in its first part (*a*), it certainly also holds in its second part (*b*). If there "are universals", then they are not sensed: the whole point of the argument is, that there must exist something of a kind quite different from sensa. Nevertheless, a fatal mistake has been made by many philosophers: they accept the *first* part of the argument ("there are universals"), which as we shall shortly see is wrong, and they *reject* the second part, which is a necessary corollary of the first. Of course, the talk is at first still to the effect that universals are "thought": but theories are soon formed as to how we "abstract universals from particulars" and then "see universals in particulars".* Undoubtedly, there are "reasons" of a kind for constructing these theories and rejecting the "separation" of universals, of which the following will be the most pleasing to self-refuting nominalists: if we accept both (*a*) and (*b*), it becomes difficult to give any account of how I come to classify together the various things called "grey"; true, if and when I am correct in classifying a certain sensum as "grey", then the universal must be "in" it: but it is not *sensed* "in" it: how then am I to decide whether it is or isn't there, or even guess it?† Hence we depart from the argument

* Do we smell universals in particulars too?

† In *this* sense of "giving an explanation of naming", the theory gives none

in its pristine form, and embark on mythologies : and by the time we have finished, we may well have reached the position of so many philosophers, and hold that what I *do* sense are " universals ", what I do *not* sense are " particulars " ;* which, considering the meanings of the words, comprises two self-contradictions.

(ii) Finally, it must be pointed out that the first part of the argument (*a*), is wrong. Indeed, it is so artless that it is difficult to state it plausibly. Clearly it depends on a suppressed premiss which there is no reason whatever to accept, namely, that words are essentially " proper names ", *unum-nomen unum nominatum.* But why, if " one identical " word is used, *must* there be " one identical " object present which it denotes ? Why should it not be the whole function of a word to denote many things ?† Why should not words be by nature " general " ?—However, it is in any case simply false that we use the *same* name for different things : " grey " and " grey " are *not* the same, they are two similar symbols (tokens), just as the things denoted by " this " and by " that " are similar things. In this matter, the " words " are in a position precisely analgous to that of the objects denoted by them.‡

But, it may be objected, by the " same single " word it was never meant that it is *numerically* identical. In what sense, then, was it meant ? If it meant " qualitatively identical ", then it is clear that the sense in which there is an identical " type " of the tokens is just like the sense

* Other theories : that the particular *is* just a cluster of universals : that the universal *is* a particular of a special sort (an image).

† Many *similar* things, on a plausible view : but other views might be held.

‡ There are ways, of course, in which they are not so analogous : for instance, that one token is of the same type as another, is determined by convention as well as by similarity.

in which the sensa share in an identical common character: hence the former cannot be taken as self-explanatory while the latter is admitted obscure. If it meant that all these tokens "have the same meaning", then we cannot *assume* that it is the business of similar tokens to "mean" something which is numerically self-identical, without begging our whole question in the manner already pointed out.

But, it will be further said, I do *sense* something identical in different sensa. How this could be I do not understand; but if it is true, it is clear that this identical something is not an entity different in kind from sensa.

I conclude that this argument does not prove "the existence of universals"; and that, if it did, nothing more could be said about them than is said in the course of the argument itself, except that they are certainly quite different from "universals" in other senses of that word, i.e. as "proved" to exist by other transcendental arguments.

In a certain sense, it perhaps is *sometimes* not harmful to talk about "universals" or "concepts"; just as it is *sometimes* convenient to talk about "propositions", and as it is very often convenient to use "material object language". To say something about "concepts" is sometimes a convenient way of saying something complicated about sensa (or even about other objects of acquaintance, if there are any), including symbols and images, and about our use of them :* though very different methods of translation will have to be employed on different occasions. But on the whole there is remarkably little to be said in favour of "universals", even as an admitted logical construction: the plain man did not use it, until he acquired the habit from philosophers, and the errors into which that habit leads are very common and numerous. For example, in addition to those already noted, the error of taking a single *word* or *term*, instead of a sentence, as that which "has meaning"; hence, given some word like

* But we must "be careful". We must not say e.g., "a universal is an image": Berkeley probably did not make this mistake, but Hume probably did: hence Hume is led, whereas Berkeley is not, into a theory about "the origin" of our ideas.

" resemblance ", we search for what *it* denotes (cp III). Or again, we confuse the view that all sentences are about sensa, with the view. that every word or term denotes a sensum. Or again, and this most concerns us, we think of the " abstracted " universal as a solid piece of property of ours, and enquire into its " origin ".

I should like, then, to learn from Mr. Mackinnon and Mr. Maclagan, " what a concept is ".

II.

In criticising Mr. Mackinnon, and elsewhere, Mr. Maclagan mentions two questions which, he says, it is important to ask and to distinguish. They are formulated in different ways, but a typical formulation is the following :

(i) *Do we* (actually) *possess* such-and-such a concept ?
(ii) *How do we come to possess* such-and-such a concept ?

I recognise that these two questions have been distinguished and asked, by philosophers of reputation : Descartes, for example, asks both questions, severally, about " the idea of God ". Nevertheless, it may be doubted whether these really are distinct and answerable types of question.

As for the first question it would have been helpful to me if Mr. Maclagan had volunteered to argue it, at least in some one case : for then I might have learned what it means, or how it may be decided.* As for the second question, it is, I think, quite clear that Mr. Maclagan, like Professor Broad, regards the distinction between " a priori " and " empirical " concepts as a matter of " the manner in which we come to acquire " them. This I notice as a preliminary, because, in the opening paragraph of his section II, he does not define " empirical " in this way. That he really does mean what I claim is shown by a

* Perhaps he does intend to argue it—though, if so, he does not clearly enough distinguish it from the second question—in the case of " the causal continuant " : but there the issue is further obscured by our " having " a concept the elements of which do not combine into a " single " concept, and the content of which is " dim ".

great many remarks throughout his paper, but more particularly by the opening paragraph of his concluding section, and by the nature of the ensuing conclusions.

The principal objection which I have to bring against both questions is the general one; that they are examples of the nonsense into which we are led through the facile use of the word "concept". A concept is treated, by Mr. Maclagan as by Professor Broad, as an *article of property*, a pretty straightforward piece of goods, which comes into my "possession", if at all, in some definite enough manner and at some definite enough moment:* whether I do possess it or not is, apparently, ascertained simply by making an inventory of the "furniture" of my mind.

Let us consider first the first question: when we ask "Do we possess the concept?" what are we asking? If we are asking about some individual, or about some group of individuals, whether *he* or *they* "possess the concept of redness", some meanings can well be attached to this expression. It might be supposed to mean, e.g., "Does he, or do they, understand the word 'red'?" But that again needs further explanation; we shall almost certainly find that it is still ambiguous, and that, at least on many interpretations, no precise answer can be given as to whether the individual does or does not "understand" the "word". Does the word "red" matter? Would it not do if he used "rouge" and understood that? Or even "green" if he meant by that what most Englishmen mean by "red"? And so on. Perhaps we should say he "possesses the concept of redness" if he has paid attention to certain features in that with which he is acquainted, to call attention to which most Englishmen would use the words "red" "redness" etc., and has adopted some symbolism to call attention to them, and has not "forgotten" either the features or the symbolism. This is still only one of the things which might be meant, and is still not precise enough: and all the difficulties arise with which we are even more familiar in the puzzles about material objects—surely he might do all you say and yet *still not* possess the concept?

* Can I "lose" a concept, as well as acquire it?

But we do not need to pursue this question. For it appears that this is anyhow not the question being asked by Mr. Maclagan as his first question. In asking "Do *we* possess etc.?" the "we" does not mean *us* as contrasted with others; it means any and everybody at once. It means, as he elsewhere puts it, "*Is there* such-and-such a concept?" And now what does *that* mean, if anything? It looks as though it had a meaning, because it seems easy to proceed from the question "Does Socrates possess, etc.?" to the question "Does *any* man possess etc.?" But although verbally like the first, the second question is really very different. Similarly, although meaning may be attached to the question, "Does *he*, or do *they*, understand this word?", it is not obvious that the question "Does *anyone* understand this word?" has a meaning at all. For, in the former of these questions, to "understand" means, speaking roughly, to use as we, or as most Englishmen, or as some other assignable persons use: or again, the features of *his* experience,* about which it is asked whether he has or has not paid attention to them, require to be indicated by referring to certain definite experiences of *other* persons. Clearly nothing of the kind is possible in the case of the second question. Yet it seems to me that its verbal similarity to the first has led people to pose it—together of course, with a belief in "concepts" as palpable objects: if they were such, the second question *would* be rather like the first. Whereas it isn't.

It seems clear, then, that to ask "whether we possess a certain concept?" is the same as to ask whether a certain word—or rather, sentences in which it occurs—has any meaning. Whether *that* is a sensible question to ask, and if so how it is to be answered, I do not know: in any case, it is likely to be ambiguous.

What is here of interest to observe is, how our question (1) is liable to become confused with (2). Since it is going to be awkward, to say the least, to prove that a certain concept simply is not, it is tempting to try another way. Instead of maintaining that it *does* not exist, we

* I use this as equivalent to "that with which he is acquainted".

maintain that it *cannot* exist. For instance, in certain cases we may hope to show that an " idea " is "self-contradictory", as Leibniz thought he could show of the " infinite number " or Berkeley* of " matter ". This particular method, however, is not suitable in some of the most crucial cases, namely those of *simple* " ideas " like that of " necessity ". So here another method is tried : we claim to show that it is *causally* impossible for anyone to possess such a concept. We construct a theory about the condition or conditions

* Since Mr. Mackinnon makes much of this, a note may be excused. Berkeley, I think, maintains exactly the same position with regard to " matter " as with regard to " universals " : these two are chosen as typical of the two most popular kinds of entities alleged to differ in kind from sensa. He expresses himself much more clearly about " matter " than about " universals", (though always suffering from a lack of technical terms). He holds (1) that the plain man's ordinary statements about " ideas " or about " material objects " are translatable into other statements which are solely about sensa (including symbols) (2) that the plain philosopher's theories about the " nature " of matter (inert, etc.) and of universals (formed by abstraction, etc.) are nonsense : partly his descriptions of these entities are self-contradictory (e.g., in the way mentioned by Mr. Maclagan at the end of his section V), partly he can be shown simply to have misunderstood the nature of a " logical construction ". In one sense " there are " both universals and material objects, in another sense there is no such thing as either : statements about each can usually be analysed, but not always, nor always without remainder.

Mr. Mackinnon seems to me to underrate the second line of attack. I do not think that Berkeley would have been by any means content simply to propound the view that matter is a " logical construction " and then to abandon the plain man still asking for more : he patiently asks " *What* more do you want ? ", and laboriously shows that either what is asked for is nonsensical or else he has granted it already. And this, if we will not be content to let plain men work out their own damnation, is perhaps all that can be done.—Nor do I think that Berkeley would say " There *are* universals " quite so handsomely as Mr. Mackinnon makes him do : he would not maintain that there *are* universals in any sense in which he would *deny* that there is matter : Berkeley says that " there are general ideas " meaning that statements like " all demonstration is about general ideas " have a meaning—but also, he says that " *abstract* general ideas " i.e., general ideas as entities of a kind different from sensa, do *not* exist. (This does not mean " general ideas are sensa "). Mr. Mackinnon gives me the impression, perhaps wrongly, that he thinks " abstract " general ideas to be a limited *class* of general ideas, which Berkeley denies to exist : but it is rather a *theory about the nature* of general ideas in general that Berkeley means to deny. (I omit the supplementary theory of " notions ").

under which alone we can " acquire " concepts : and then we claim that, in the case of certain alleged concepts, these conditions are not satisfied in the case of any man : therefore *none* possesses them, i.e. they do not exist.

Thus Hume rapidly deploys a theory that we can never come by any idea unless we have previously experienced an impression similar to it : and argues that we cannot possess an idea of power-in-objects such as we commonly think ourselves to possess, because there is no antecedent impression of it.

But this roundabout method of showing that I don't, because I can't, possess certain concepts, will not do. For how is Hume's conclusion, that we possess no ideas not derived from antecedent impressions, established? Presumably by induction. But not merely is his survey of the evidence inadequate : if he is to make an induction, he must first consider all cases where I do possess an " idea ", and discover the antecedent conditions in each case. He must, therefore, consider whether we do or do not have the idea of power-in-objects before making his induction : and he must also, and this is more important, have some means of establishing in particular cases whether we do or do not " possess " a certain idea which is quite distinct from the, as yet unformulated, theory of how we " come to " possess them. Now what is that means? In Hume's case, if the " idea " were really an *image*, then direct introspection might do, though it would then be surprising that he has to go such a roundabout way to prove we have no idea of power-in-objects : but this will scarcely do on some other theories of what concepts are. I should very much like to know what Mr. Maclagan's method is.

It is also often very hard to gather how philosophers are *claiming* to establish their theories of " how we come to acquire concepts ". Professor Broad, for instance, in the passage referred to by Mr. Maclagan, says : " It is quite certain that many, if not all, simple intuitive dispositional ideas are formed in the following way ", and then proceeds to a theory about " comparing ", " abstracting ", and so on. How is this proved? If it is known,

then I must confess myself bad at knowing. Or again, discussing the question as to whether we do or do not "have" a certain idea, in connexion with Hume's problem about the shade of blue which I have never actually sensed, Professor Broad says: "(*a*) If by an 'idea of the missing shade' you mean an image which is characterised by the missing shade, the question is purely a question for empirical psychology. (*b*) If by 'idea' you mean 'intuitive idea', the answer is in the negative". It is satisfactory to have the answer: but it would be pleasant also to learn how it is reached, and by whom.

It seems to me that it is seriously questionable whether Mr. Maclagan's second question can be kept distinct from his first question. The latter seemed to amount to the question: whether a certain word has a meaning? But now does the question about "origins" really not amount to this, that we want to know: how do words mean? Hume's theory about the "derivation of our ideas" really amounts to the theory that a word, *x*, can only have meaning provided that I can know, on at least one occasion, that "this is an *x*", where "this" denotes something *sensible*. And most other theories about this subject, are really theories of a very similar sort: Mr. Maclagan himself inclines to such a view, though he would not, of course, add that the "this" must be sensible. The "origin of a concept" is commonly admitted to be found, when an occasion is found on which I can say, with knowledge, "this is an *x*". Mr. Maclagan almost formulates the problem himself in this way in the opening of his section II. The question of "innate ideas" seems very commonly to be simply the question: whether a word can have a meaning even though I can never know "this is an *x*"?* But surely it will be very difficult

* We may distinguish several questions: Do I know the meaning of the word *x*? Do I know that there are *x*'s? Do I know that there is an *x here*? Do I know that *this* is the *x* which is here? But the theory that a word only has meaning if I can know sometimes that "this is an *x*" is so engrained in us, that we confuse these questions together: for, if it is true, I cannot answer *any* of the questions in the affirmative unless I sometimes answer the *last*, and

indeed to keep the two questions: "Has *x* a meaning?" and "How do words mean?" apart? It would appear that to ask the latter is to ask "What is meant by 'having a meaning'"?* Now, *if* either of these questions can be treated independently of the other, it seems clear that it is this latter, (which would be contrary to Mr. Maclagan's view); unless the question, whether a certain word has a meaning, is to be taken as absolutely unanalysable, and to be answered by means of some sort of direct inspection.

Nevertheless, it is certain that much discussion is devoted *seriously* to the questions of "origin" and "acquisition" and "formation" of concepts. And where this is so, I suspect that we are always told either nothing or nonsense. For instance, Kant speaks with emphasis on this subject, saying that the whole point of Hume's theories, and the whole point of his own transcendental deduction, is about the *origin* of a priori concepts: it will be remembered how the wretched Beattie is slated for not understanding this. With trepidation, I confess I do not understand it either. Beyond that the "origin" of these concepts is "in the nature of the mind itself", I cannot see that we are given any information about it. Is the Metaphysical Deduction intended to show that this "origin" lies in the forms of judgment? A strange sense of "origin". Yet even so, it seems to me that no account is given of the "origin" of our concept of "necessity".

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therefore *all* of them, in the affirmative. Even Kant, it seems to me, who has every interest in distinguishing these questions with regard to such words as "duty" and "cause," since, as against Hume's verification theory, he is claiming that the first three questions can be answered in the affirmative though the last must be answered in the negative, fails to keep them always apart: just as he fails sufficiently to distinguish the question "How are synthetic a priori propositions meaningful?" from "How are they known to be true?" *Perhaps* they cannot be distinguished.—I should say that Mr. Maclagan, in putting to me the question he does about his classes (4) and (5), is posing the really difficult question; can *x* have a meaning when I can never know that "this is an *x*"? I wish I could answer it.

* This, if true, explains why theories about the "origins" of our ideas are far from being as inductive as they apparently should be.

The fact is that words like "origin" or "source" and phrases like "how we acquire" are very vague, and may mean many things. Unless we carefully distinguish them we shall fall into confusions. For example, Descartes' division of "ideas" into innate, adventitious, and factitious, seems, if we attempt to eliminate the metaphor from the ways of acquiring property, to rest on no single *fundamentum divisionis*. I suppose that really these expressions are intended to embrace *all* conditions antecedent to our "possession" of a concept: but plainly these conditions are of very various kinds, e.g. we may be given :—

(*a*) Theories about the *agents* (spiritual or material) responsible for my possession of concepts, e.g., myself, God, material objects,

(*b*) Theories about the *operations*, which lead to the "formation" of concepts, e.g., the honest spadework of "abstraction".

(*c*) Theories about the *materials* on which those operations must be conducted, e.g., non-sensuous intuitions, sensa.

(*d*) Theories about the *sources* from which concepts are somehow drawn, e.g., the mind.

(*e*) Theories about the times or *occasions* on which concepts are acquired, e.g., at birth, before birth, on the occasion of sensing *x*.

Probably this list could be extended. I do not see that these questions are anything but confusing, if taken seriously: (*c*) and perhaps (*d*) might be interpreted to make sense. It is strange that we should continue to ask about "concepts" much the same questions about "origins" as were for so long and so fruitlessly asked about sensa.

I should like, then, to ask Mr. Mackinnon and Mr. Maclagan what they are asking when they ask about "the formation" of concepts, or about their "acquisition": and also what is meant by our "having a concept".

III.

The case of "resemblance", which Mr. Maclagan introduces as one where we are obviously not acquainted in sensation with the object of a concept, is of course a special and difficult case in many ways. Yet it seems to me true to say that I do sense resemblance, though what that means needs explanation.

(1) Mr. Maclagan asks "What is given in sensation"? —an unfortunate way of putting a very easy question, to which the answer must and can only be "Sensa". What is unfortunate is the word "given" (cp. "sense-*data*", "the data of sense"). For this suggests (*a*) That something is here "given" us *by* somebody (*b*) That sensa are called "given" in contrast with something which is rather "made" or "taken", namely, my thoughts: but it is dubious whether there is any sense in which my thoughts *are* in my own control but my sensa *not* so. (*c*) That some *proposition* is "given" to us in sensation as incorrigible, as premisses are "given" in sciences or "data" to the detective: but sensa are *dumb*, and nothing is more surely fatal than to confuse sensing with thinking.

(2) Owing to his "concept" language, Mr. Maclagan seems to try, when presented with any substantive, to find some isolable part of the sensefield which is an instance of it but not of anything else. That is, I admit, vague. Given the sentence "A resembles B", it seems that Mr. Maclagan says to himself: That means there should be three things to sense, A and B and a resemblance: now we do sense the colours, but we do not sense the resemblance. But surely, speaking carefully, we do not sense "red" and "blue" any more than "resemblance", (or "qualities" any more than "relations"): we sense something of which we might say, if we wished to talk about it, that "this is red": and so we sense something of which we might say, if we wished to talk about it, that "this is similar to that" or "that this red is similar to that red". If we insist on trying to *say* what we *sense* (which is impossible), we might try saying that "I sense A-resembling-B": and see if that helps.

(3) There are, I willingly admit, special difficulties about resemblance: but it seems to me that they are not before us—for Mr. Maclagan would, as is shown by his commendation of Locke and others,* say about other "relations", and apparently about *all* of them, precisely what he says about resemblance. "Relations are not sensed". This dogma, held by a very great number and variety of philosophers,† seems to me so odd that, like Mr. Maclagan, I find it difficult to discover arguments. If I say "this dot is to the right of that dot", is it not quaint to say that I am sensing the two dots but not sensing the to the right of? It is true that I cannot say I *do* sense the to the right of: that is not good English—but then nor is it good English to say that I do not sense it, or that I intuite it. I sense what in English is described by means of two demonstrative pronouns and an adverbial phrase. To look for an isolable entity corresponding to the latter is a bad habit encouraged by talk about "concepts". What, I wonder, does Mr. Maclagan say about verbs? If "he is batting the cat", do I sense him and the cat, and intuite relations of batting and of being batted? But perhaps this is unfair: for verbs are only used in this way in unanalysed material-object language.

(4) There are those who hold that "relations" do not have "instances" at all: but Mr. Maclagan, like Mr. Joseph, takes the less extreme view that they do have instances, but not "sensible" ones. For this he has, as he candidly admits, no arguments whatever to adduce. But the difficulty is not so much to argue for the view as

* Does Hume really not allow that *any* "relations" are sensed: for instance, "contiguity"?

† Even by Berkeley, who jeopardised his whole theory by doing so. A pretty anthology might be compiled of the phrases found by philosophers to express their distrust and contempt for relations: "entia semi-mentalia" and what not. I suppose it goes back to Aristotle, who assumes, with the plain man, that "what is real is things", and then adds, grudgingly, "also their qualities", these being somehow inseparable from the things: but he draws the line at relations, which are really too flimsy. I doubt if there is much more behind the prejudice against relations than this: there was not in Leibniz's case, and few have hammered relations so hard as he.

to understand it at all. " The colours " I sense, I do not intuite them : I intuite " the resemblance "—or " their resemblance " ? Or " the resemblance between the two colours " ? Or what exactly ? This " intuition " is a form of acquaintance : and if we can be acquainted with relations *thus*, it seems difficult to see why we should not be acquainted with them in sensation. And there seems the absurdity that we have now separated off " the resemblance " from " the colours " : we have a sensing and simultaneously an intuiting, as we might feel a stab of jealousy while tasting porridge. Even if one is never found without the other, what has the one to do with the other ?

(5) Mr. Maclagan, recognising that there are arguments which tell against him, advances a " purely defensive " argument, based on considerations about " If A then B, if B then C ". Now in the first place there seems to be some muddle about the symbolism here. In any ordinary sense of " if . . . then ", I do not think that the premiss given above will help us at all to answer the question which is asked, viz., " What is required if we are to have C ? " For the premiss tells us about certain *sufficient* conditions for C, whereas the question is about *necessary* conditions for C. Which does Mr. Maclagan mean to talk about ?

Apparently A is to be " the sensing of the colours ", B " the intuiting of the resemblance ", and C " the knowing that the colours resemble ". Now if we interpret " if . . . then " to mean that A is a *sufficient* condition of B, and B of C, it seems impossible to suppose that the " intuiting " (alone) is a *sufficient* condition of the knowing. Surely the sensing is also necessary ? (As a matter of fact, it seems to me quite untrue that even the sensing and the intuiting would necessitate the knowing : in order to *know*, I must also *think about* the objects of acquaintance.*

* Mr. Maclagan permits himself to wonder whether the intuiting (? sensing + intuiting) can really be distinguished from the knowing. But, if it cannot, not merely does Mr. Maclagan abandon one of his original premisses, as he recognises, but also, in our present problem, " B " cannot be distinguished from " C " ; which is frustrating.

However, Mr. Maclagan is not called upon to point this out, since the plain man, against whom he is arguing, overlooks it). On the other hand, in the case of the sensing and intuiting, Mr. Maclagan must mean that the former does necessitate, i.e., is a *sufficient* condition of, the latter: for he is arguing that the plain man is able to say that "sensing is the sole necessary condition of knowing", because, though as a matter of fact the intuiting is *also* a necessary condition, the sensing does of itself necessitate the intuiting.

It seems to me, therefore, that the symbolism here is merely confusing: "if... then" cannot mean the same in the case of A and B as in the case of B and C. Moreover, I am very much in the dark as to what really are the relations between the sensing and the intuiting, the intuiting and the knowing. "Condition" and "necessitation" are words which may refer to entailment, or again to natural causation: is it in either of these senses that the sensing necessitates the intuiting, or that the intuiting is necessary to the knowing? I should doubt whether in either case "necessary" is being used in either of these familiar senses; and further, whether it is being used in the same sense in each case.

Clearly, what we are most concerned with is the sense in which the sensing necessitates the intuiting. Mr. Maclagan distinguishes the case of "resemblance" from that of "straightness", in that in the former the intuiting is "logically inseparable" from the sensing, whereas in the latter the intuiting is "psychologically conditioned" by the sensing. These *look*, from the words used, rather like "entailment" and "natural causation" respectively: but whatever may be true in the case of "straightness", I do not see, in the case of resemblance, how one event can *entail* another, so that "logically inseparable" entirely eludes me. If Mr. Maclagan says it is obscure, we may remember how obscure the "intuiting" itself is, and be content to note one more example of the high differential fertility of obscurities.

Further, Mr. Maclagan holds that other relations are

in the same case as " resemblance " : if so, then other relations between our two colours will also be intuited, and these intuitings will also be necessitated by the sensing of the " colours ". What I wonder about, is : do I, as soon as I " sense the colours ", eo ipso intuite *all* these relations (and know them ?) ? For example, suppose I do know that these two colours are similar : then I must have " sensed the colours ", for I have had the intuition of resemblance. Now if I have " sensed the colours ", I have presumably *already had* " intuitions " about which is the lighter, etc., those being inseparable from the sensing. Yet it seems clear to me I may very well know the two colours are similar and yet, if asked which is lighter, have to look back at them again. Why so, on Mr. Maclagan's theory ?

Mr. Maclagan notices, but does not attempt to defend himself against, other arguments drawn from the plain man, viz., that he says he " sees " or " hears " resemblances, and says things are " sensibly " alike or different. These facts seem to me important, and I think the plain man would quite rightly persevere in these assertions. I have heard it said that it is odd to talk of " *smelling* a resemblance": and certainly it is well to consider other senses than that of sight. But it is not odd to talk of smelling two similar smells, or two smells which are sensibly alike (though, the plain man might well ask, how could they be alike *except* sensibly ?). And if I were forced to say either " I smell the resemblance " or " I intuite it ", I know which I should choose. The plain dog would, I am sure, say it smelled resemblances : but no doubt your philosophical dog would persuade itself that it " inhaled " them.

Similar considerations hold also in the case of other " relations " : plain men say " this *tastes* sweeter than that " or " this *sounds* louder than that ".* In the case of such " relations " as these, indeed, I can scarcely conjecture what it is that Mr. Maclagan would try to persuade me I really mean. Later on, Mr. Maclagan comes to discuss

* Very plain men will say " I hear this louder than that ".

"louder" and says it is a "comparative word": I wonder whether "louder than" is a "relation" which has to be intuited? Surely, in such cases as these, it is evident that sentences containing "relation" words describe what we sense in precisely the same way as sentences containing "quality" words? For it is difficult to decide which sort of word "loud" is.

(6) I agree with Mr. Maclagan that, on his view of "resemblance", a non-sensuous acquaintance with the particular instance would occur, to which nothing similar would occur in the case of "redness". But he seems to hold that, even if I am to say "this is red", *some* non-sensuous acquaintance (or "awareness") must occur: apparently because, in order to name this colour red, I must institute a certain "comparison". I am not sure what this means. I agree that, in many cases, where I say e.g., "this is puce", I have compared the present sensum with some "pattern", perhaps a memory-image of the flea, but in any case an entity of the same kind as the sensum itself. Now this seems to me to require no non-sensuous acquaintance with anything: but I realise that Mr. Maclagan may think it does, because, when I compare the present image with the pattern, I must notice that they *resemble*. Is it, then, that he thinks an intuition *of resemblance* is needed even if I am to say "this is red"? At least this rather qualifies his original statement that "I sense the colours". However, I am not sure he does mean this: he does not state *with what* I "compare" the sensum, and perhaps he is thinking that I compare the sensum *with* something which is the object of a non-sensuous awareness, e.g., the universal "redness", (though it would be surprising to find ourselves "acquainted" with universals, Mr. Maclagan is prepared to allow the possibility for the sake of argument). I should like, then, to know what non-sensuous acquaintance Mr. Maclagan has here in mind.

SYMPOSIUM: THE MORAL GOOD AS A RELATION BETWEEN PERSONS.

By Mr. I. W. PHILLIPS, Prof. A. MACBEATH and Prof. H. F. HALLETT.

I.—By I. W. PHILLIPS.

IT will, I think, be admitted that the questions whether there is some one final standard by which human conduct is judged when it is called morally good or bad, and, if so, what that standard is, are questions which confront us all when we begin to reflect on the nature of morality. We may decide that there are other questions underlying these, such as whether these moral judgements are *genuine* judgements, and if so what is *meant* by good. But if, after consideration of these problems, we conclude that moral judgements *are* assertions about the real nature of actions, our first questions recur.

It is with these questions about the standard of judgement that I am concerned in this paper, and my argument presupposes that there are still good grounds for holding that moral judgements say something about the real nature of human actions. More particularly, my subject is that of the place, in our standard of moral judgement, of relations between persons—relations which perhaps result from, or perhaps are sustained by human action. In the hope that their significance may be discussed, I propose to state a case for regarding a certain kind of relation between persons as *the* good by reference to which conduct is morally judged. Such a good I shall call the moral good. In calling it this I do not mean to identify it with moral goodness in the sense of virtue. I understand by "moral good" simply that which is our standard when we judge action to be good or bad in the moral sense.

I shall maintain: (1) that in our moral judgements there is one kind of good—one kind of thing among the

many things which we call good—which is our standard; that therefore the moral good is not a "bonum consummatum," a good which includes all others within itself;

(2) that this moral good cannot be regarded primarily as an end for which we act, and that it differs significantly from the ordinary ends of human conduct;

(3) that this good is a certain kind of relation between persons which may be called the relation of Community, or, since this term may suggest a group rather than a relation, Sodality.

Though I cannot pretend to justify these views by three independent arguments, the statement of them as three separate theses may help to clarify the view which I would present, and may provide a plan for this paper.

I.

When we consider the chief types of theories of the moral good, we find, I believe, either a vagueness as to the nature of this good, or a clarity that is won at the cost of faithfulness to ordinary moral experience. Idealist theories leave us with a shadowy conception; Utilitarianism, in its strict form, has to misrepresent the common view of the nature of justice.

(i) In theories of the Idealist type, in both ancient and modern philosophy, the moral good is represented as in some sense a complete good. It is described more often as "the good of the self as a whole" than as "the whole good of the self," but it is thought of not as one good among others but as the total good. It is described as a certain life or activity of man, in which the various purposes of the self are achieved as fully as possible, or in which desires receive the fullest possible satisfaction. Conduct is judged to be morally good in so far as it promotes the realization of such a life or expresses the self which lives this life.

This good, however, is not spoken of as a mere totality. It is not, for example, a mere sum of satisfactions. It is essentially a system, and the distinctive mark of that life which is the moral good is integrity or coherence. Before

saying anything about the difficulty of forming a conception of an all-inclusive good, I want to consider this notion of integration, for it is the vagueness of this notion that, to my mind, makes the Idealist theory of the moral good unsatisfactory.

System may be of many kinds ; the self may be integrated or unified in many ways. Consider what " being systematic " means in ordinary life. Most of us, I suppose, set some value on tidiness, if only out of consideration for efficiency and economy of time. We like to have the things around us, and especially the things that we frequently use, in some order ; we like to keep them " in their proper places." It is not of very great importance to us, as a rule, what the precise arrangement is. Everything must have its proper place, but within limits, what is the proper place may be arbitrarily determined. We are interested, however, not only in " proper places " but also in " proper times." We decide that we must plan our day's activities and devote set periods of the day to particular tasks. In such effort after system, although again our chief concern may be for simple efficiency, we cannot simply let the day determine the proper times, as we may let the character of our room and furniture determine the proper place. Mere arrangement is not enough ; we have to decide how much time any one activity may be allowed to occupy, and so we must have some conception of the relative importance of our activities. The system is determined by some standard beyond itself. If this is true of the planning of a day's work, it is true also of the planning of life. It follows that the integration of personality implies some standard beyond itself. We do not in fact allow that any one organization is as good as any other ; our moral condemnation of some lives which exhibit a marked singleness of purpose shows this.* We cannot then accept integration as the distinctive mark of the good.

* I have in mind especially such lives as that of Plato's Tyrant (Republic, Book ix) ; but I would suggest that our final judgement on such a character as Ibsen's Brand must equally be one of moral condemnation.

For the moment I am not asking whether we can reach a conception of the good which may enable us to indicate, once and for all, the order of importance of all the interests of the self. I am only claiming that we cannot conceive the moral good simply in terms of integration, or claiming that system presupposes a standard, a distinctive good, beyond itself.

It will be said that such criticism of the Idealist conception of the moral good fails to take account of one important feature in Idealist theories, namely, the doctrine that the moral good is a common good. In this conception of the common good, it will be said, we have the standard for the integration of self-hood. Now, it must be admitted that Idealism has consistently emphasized the social character of the ideal; it has represented the life which is the good as one in which the fullest possible satisfaction of the self and others is achieved. And I would not deny that in some sense the moral good may be called common.

But, in the first place, Idealism has insisted that the common good is, again, not a mere totality of goods but a system, and the difficulty we have already noticed recurs at a new level. Possibly the best illustration of the Idealist conception is found in the life of the city-states of ancient Greece. We are told that the city-state was much more than a framework within which men occupied themselves in the pursuit of goods that were personal and private. It was a system of life which included all the interests of the city's inhabitants. The interests of men were the interests of the city; within the city the interests of its members had their place in an organized scheme. The maintenance of the city-state was thus a common good, in the sense of a good including in its system the goods which individuals sought. If this is a fair illustration of the conception, we must still, I believe, maintain that such a common good does not furnish the ground of moral judgement on conduct. It is just *one* system of goods, *one* way in which men's ends are organized, *one* arrangement that has come into being. As in our judgements on personality we hold that mere

arrangement is not enough, so in reflecting on states or cities we must hold that mere system is not enough. It is true that the demand for social justice is a demand for order; it is true also that it is commonly a demand for recognition of some interest which has been ignored. But we are not entitled to conclude from this that any system or order in which all interests have some place is a good system. Any genuine system involves some standard other than "system" itself, and the goodness of a system depends upon the nature of this standard, or, in other words, upon *the way in which* interests are organized.

In the second place, however, it is doubtful whether such a common good, in the sense of an inclusive system of goods, can be discovered in the modern world. The nation-state, in spite of the great extension of its interests and activities, is not obviously a system which includes all the interests of its members. In certain activities directed to the promotion of goods, men are brought into contact and co-operation with others belonging to *different* states. Further the complexity of human interests is so great that no state appears able to treat all its citizens' interests as its own. Yet, if we try to conceive a common good, which includes in a hierarchy all the particular goods we seek, and try to conceive this *apart from* any organized society, we can scarcely advance beyond vague notions of the well-being of humanity.

These difficulties which attend our attempts to describe a common good, conceived as a complete system of goods, suggest that it would be wiser to ask if there is not some one special good by reference to which we in fact judge the moral worth of actions. It may be that the classification of goods in a hierarchy is important, and that we must continue our attempts to construct it although a final classification is beyond our powers. Yet we must, I believe, admit that we do not know the Kingdom of Ends, and cannot conceive in detail the structure of a perfect order of human purposes. Admitting this, we must still recognize that we do judge actions by a moral standard. I suggest that there is one thing that is then present to our

minds. It is the relation between persons which the actions judged create or sustain.

Human actions are efforts to accomplish purposes. They alter things for some end. But, in most cases, they affect other people as well. In conduct we come into contact with our fellows, and with that contact a moral situation is created. It is true that many of our purposes cannot be stated without some reference to other people. It is true also that many of our activities involve collaboration with others, and that many of our purposes are shared. But it is not in these cases alone that actions are morally judged; we are perhaps most acutely aware of moral demands when we realize that a course of action which we have planned will have certain effects on others who do not share our purposes and whom we have not considered in our end. Whatever our purpose may be, and whether or not it is one which others share, our conduct may be judged by the kind of relations with others which it brings into being or maintains.

(ii) Before attempting to add anything in explanation of this view, I want to defend the conception of the moral good as a distinctive kind of good by one further argument. It may be most simply stated by reference to the Utilitarian theory of morality. I am, perhaps, somewhat arbitrarily, distinguishing this from Idealism. I call "Utilitarianism" any theory which takes the moral standard to be the good, or the greatest good, which can in any situation be promoted; I call "Idealism" a theory which takes it to be a coherent system of goods. In its first form, Utilitarianism may be said to have identified this standard with a distinctive kind of good—pleasure or happiness. (Mill's attempt to show that this, in some sense, included other goods as elements within itself does not seem to me to have been successful.) But later Utilitarianism has tended to judge actions morally by their tendency to promote goods in a less restricted sense, or by their tendency to promote the greatest good.

The question I would raise is whether such a theory can satisfactorily account for our distinction between just

and unjust actions. It is not, I think, obvious that actions are called "just" in virtue of their tendency to promote a good. Rashdall, in his "Theory of Good and Evil," recognizes that the notion of justice does present a special problem to Ideal Utilitarianism. It is a problem, I think, that he fails to answer satisfactorily. He calls the quality of human character which issues in actions tending to promote the good, Benevolence. Virtue, he holds, cannot be wholly resolved into Benevolence. It includes Justice as well. We ought not only to promote the greatest good, but also "to regard the good of one man as of equal intrinsic value with the like good of anyone else." When we show this regard in our conduct, our actions are "just." Although the principles of Benevolence and Justice do not normally conflict, we cannot assume that the promotion of maximum good is always possible if Justice is observed. Justice is shown in the distribution of good rather than in its promotion, and the right distribution may involve some sacrifice of good. We therefore appear to have in Justice a moral principle which does not reduce to a form of the general Utilitarian principle.

It might be said that equality of distribution is itself a good, to be reckoned in when we are trying to determine what will promote the maximum good. Rashdall is not content with this solution; his reason for rejecting it is that "Distribution" is too abstract a thing to be regarded as good. Instead he points out that the qualities of character which right acts express are goods which are included in the ideal end, and claims that Justice, as a quality of character, is therefore to be reckoned in when we are assessing the maximum good. But if "right acts" are defined as those which tend to produce the maximum good, and if it is not possible to say that the actions, in which Justice, as a quality of character, is expressed, have this tendency—since distribution is not to be called a good—these last actions are not obviously right, and the quality of Justice cannot be asserted to be a part of the ideal.

I cannot see that Rashdall succeeds in accounting for Justice within the limits of Ideal Utilitarianism. But I

think he is right in his recognition that, when we speak of actions as just, we are referring to some other character in these actions than a tendency to promote good. He describes this first of all, as we have seen, in terms of "distribution of goods," and certainly the notion of Distributive Justice is part of our usual idea of Justice. Yet Rashdall's own statement of the permanent essence of Justice is that it is "equality of consideration of others." This, I think, takes us beyond notions of distribution. The claim that a certain distribution of goods is just now rests upon the claim of every person to respect. Justice is thought of not as a certain distribution of goods, but as Respect for Personality wherever it is found. But this modified conception of Justice makes it still more clearly impossible for us to think of morality simply in terms of the promotion of goods, or of the maximum good; it implies a recognition of one distinctive good.

Now it is unsatisfactory to leave these principles of Utility and Justice side by side, without attempting to relate them. If there are difficulties in reducing the notion of Justice to that of promotion of goods, there is some ground for attempting to interpret morality first of all in terms of the other principle. The common belief that Justice is the basic virtue is an additional reason for making the attempt; that is, for considering the moral good as some distinctive good claiming man's respect in action. I think, however, that if the attempt is made, this good must be regarded as something more than the worth of the separate person. It is rather certain relations between persons—relations which yet imply respect for personality.

II.

Our first introduction to morality occurs, it would seem, in certain experiences of childhood, particularly the experience of being told that we ought not to do certain actions. Now, although it would be unwise to base an ethical theory solely on childish instances, those experiences reveal, in a simple form, a distinction of far-reaching

importance. When we reflect upon such simple prohibitions, we notice that some, at first sight, involve the condemnation of an *end* that we have intended to realize; others, at first sight, involve the condemnation not of an end but of *a way of behaving*, a manner of acting. The boy who is told that he ought not to steal cakes from the pantry is reproved for a total action, including the purpose. The boy who is told that he ought not to quarrel with his brother is reproved for the way in which he behaves towards his brother during some purposive activity which cannot be described in terms of quarrelling.

If we give our attention primarily to the first type of prohibition, we shall regard moral judgement as essentially judgement of purpose, and shall regard the moral good as an end, probably the chief end of man; and if we then attempt to take into account the second kind of situation, we shall have to try to show that disapproval of certain ways of acting is really disapproval of actions which hinder the realization of this end. If, on the other hand, we begin by attending to the condemnation of certain ways of acting, we shall regard the moral good rather as something to be respected in action, than as a purpose to be adopted, an end to be achieved; and when we come to take account of the fact that apparently some *purposes* are condemned, we shall seek to show either that it is really the way of acting which is judged, or that the purpose is judged bad because it is one that can be achieved only through action that is condemned on other grounds.

In the first part of this paper I have endeavoured to give reasons for rejecting the first of these interpretations of morality, though I cannot pretend to have considered every possible interpretation in terms of purpose. We cannot regard the supreme end as the integration of personality; we can form no clear conception of a common good which includes in a system the various ends that man counts as good. In speaking of some actions as just, we are applying another standard than that of tendency to promote a good. To these reasons we may add a more general one: we are aware of moral duties arising in even

casual relations with other people—relations with persons who are not considered in the purposes for which we are acting and who have no share in these purposes.

Such reasons suggest that the moral good is a good to be taken into account in conduct, or that primarily and essentially it imposes a condition which we ought to regard in action rather than sets an end which we ought to make our purpose. The examples we have considered suggest that this good consists in certain relations between persons.

The conception of the moral standard as a condition to be observed in conduct obviously resembles the conception of a moral law. But there is no need to think of this condition as a purely formal law which can be stated without any reference to a good, or to regard the rightness of actions as unrelated to goodness. The differences between ethical theories which speak of the moral standard as Law and those which speak of it as Good seem to me to have been needlessly accentuated by a failure to recognize that Law may be based on Good without being, strictly, an imperative enjoining the promotion of a certain objective end. For myself, at least, I can say that the experience of obligation is normally the recognition of a good which is not part of my objective purpose or end at the time of action ; it can be described either as the recognition of a good which demands to be taken into account, or as the recognition of an imperative that is based on a good.

But, if this is so, to fulfil moral obligation is certainly to choose one line of action for the sake of a good ; the moral good is that for which, or because of which, action is done. What difference is there between saying this and saying that the moral good is an end ? What point is there in refusing to regard it simply as an end to be promoted ? In attempting to answer these questions, I would draw attention to two features which, I believe, distinguish the moral good from what we would normally call the end for which we act.

(1) If it is a good achieved through action, the moral good is one achieved in the very act, and not a remote object of action.

(2) It is not something to be achieved by itself alone, but something created or maintained in the business of living—which is necessarily an occupation with many other ends.

In the remainder of this section of my paper, I shall attempt to explain and defend these two statements.

(1) We must recognize that in moral judgement we attribute to actions a goodness which seems intrinsic. There is truth in the assertion that the moral act is good in itself and not simply as a means to some future state of affairs. The moral good then must have this characteristic—that it is created in the act itself. The relations which are established between the agent and others have this characteristic ; among these relations then, we may expect to find the moral good. Friendship is a good of this kind ; it is created by the courteous or generous act, or sustained by an act of loyalty. It comes into being, or persists through, the action itself, and is no distant object the realization of which is promoted by the act. It appears to have that characteristic which we discern in the moral good, and actions which create it may be called intrinsically good.

The qualities of character which we call virtues, at least the simpler qualities such as Honesty, Truthfulness, Justice, Courtesy, Courage, Temperance, appear to be qualities shown in the way in which we act, rather than in our choice of ends. They are called virtues because they issue in actions which have a worth that is self-complete, or which sustain something that is good in itself, and in the very moment of action. They are not called virtues because of ends in the future that may be promoted by the actions in which they are expressed.

(2) In the simplest cases of moral action, actions expressing honesty or loyalty or truthfulness, for example, the good which is created, and by which the action is judged, is something distinct from the end or purpose of the action itself. Although honesty is good in itself, or as a relationship between human beings, it does not occur

by itself. It presupposes some purpose, such as that of buying or selling, which is not itself honesty. So, too, loyalty is demanded of us in the course of action that has some end other than being loyal, and the duty of speaking the truth arises when for some reason or other we have to make known our views. Except in pure theory, we do not speak for the sake of being truthful. Our natures are such that there are varied ends for which we must act: these are not utterly fixed and rigid, yet the general nature of our conduct is determined by them, and in the simplest cases Morality does not prescribe them but presupposes them. It is in the business of action for ends that satisfy our needs that we recognize the imperative of morality. Only rarely does a man act solely to create a certain kind of relation between him and his fellows. In seeking food and shelter, health, knowledge, beauty, he discovers the good of fellowship, and this distinctive good becomes a standard by which he judges conduct; such judgement is moral judgement. In the simplest cases the moral good presupposes an end or purpose which it cannot supply.

It may be questioned whether this interpretation of morality can cover any but the simplest instances of moral conduct. Man looks beyond the good immediately created by a particular action; he takes account of more distant results, and considers the remoter consequences of his acts. If this is so, and if he has any regard for the moral good, must it not then become an end?

I find it difficult to deny that the moral good may, in this way, be an end, but I think that if it is, it is still an end of a peculiar kind. It is not an objective end. The difficulty is similar to that which Kant encounters in his discussion of the Object of Pure Practical Reason. Earlier in the Critique of Practical Reason, he has said that "every volition must have an object, and therefore a matter," some definite end to be attained. He holds that the moral worth of action depends on how one acts. Yet, contemplating the good which is the effect of moral action, he sees that we must regard it as an end to be achieved. Admitting this, he still insists that we must distinguish

it from the particular objects which all volitions, including moral volition, must have. I think that Kant is right in maintaining the distinction between the moral good as "object of pure practical reason" and ordinary objects of pursuit, and would attempt to defend the distinction in the following way. If the moral good is found in relations of a certain kind between human beings, this good will never exist by itself. It is to be brought about in a world where men are, and must be, occupied with other purposes, with the achievement of non-moral goods. It would be a travesty of moral effort to represent it as concerned to achieve a life where no one had anything to do but love his neighbour; and yet it is in man's relations to his neighbour that the distinctively moral worth of life is found. Furthermore, the promotion of these relations which are the moral good must be indirect. Although we may say that the end of the social reformer is the establishment of better relations between man and man, we must recognize that though he may achieve this if he aims at improving the conditions on which such relations depend, or providing opportunities for their development, he will defeat his own end if he abstracts that end from the framework of man's natural purposes, and simply exhorts men to be of goodwill one to another. The moral good, even when it is in some sense an end, differs from the ordinary objects of human pursuit.

III.

At the beginning of this paper I said that my third contention would be that the distinctive moral good, which is not one of the common ends of our actions, is a certain kind of relation between persons, which may be called Sodality. In my arguments up to this point, I have to some extent anticipated this third contention, and it may be well to restate briefly the conclusions reached before adding anything to the positive account of the good.

We cannot form any clear conception of the moral good as a complete or total good. If we say that we know that

the complete good must be a system of goods, and regard coherence and integrity as its distinguishing mark, we find that coherence implies a standard beyond itself, a distinctive good which determines the plan of the coherent system.

We cannot accept the view that an action is morally good in so far as it promotes any good at all, or the maximum good. Justice, which is commonly regarded as the very basis of virtue, is typically expressed in actions which cannot be regarded as promoting goods in the ordinary sense. Does not the goodness of these actions reside in their creation and maintenance of certain human relations?

Consideration of simple moral judgements seems to show that what is counted morally good is a way of acting, rather than the promotion of an end—a way of acting that is to be described not simply as observance of a formal law, but as sustaining a distinctive kind of good.

No strict proof has been offered that in every moral judgement reference to a good in human relationships can be traced; but our simple judgements of approval of just, honest, truthful loyal actions appear to imply this. There is a strong presumption that the moral good is one distinctive kind of good—a good that is not an end in the usual sense and cannot be the sole end of action—a good that is a kind of relation between persons.

Any relation between persons which can possibly be called the moral good must be more than a physical or spatio-temporal relation. We are related in such ways to all other men, but cannot identify this relation of co-existence in one world with the moral good. By that good we must mean a relation of wills or minds, a relation which is perhaps itself an experience. In most of our actions we come into relations with others which are more than physical. We co-operate with others for common purposes; again, in acting for our own ends we affect the purposive activity of others. A relation between wills is created. At first sight, the ideal might seem to be the relation established when all co-operate for a common end, but we cannot conceive all purposes as common, We

think, then, of the ideal as the relations established when all conflict of purpose is avoided. Such relations are, in some measure, secured by every system of law, every system of rights and duties. The effect of these systems is to indicate in what ways we should behave in particular contacts with others, as tenants to landlords, as husbands to wives ; or it is to inform us of the duties of our station in a society. Professional codes extend still further our rules for behaviour, and all conduce to the maintenance of order.

Yet I find it difficult to believe that these orderly relations are the whole moral ideal. The order which laws maintain may itself be condemned on moral grounds. Our moral duties extend beyond the range of duties determined by law. And, although our relations to many of our fellows are normally governed by professional codes or customary rules, and we treat the ticket-collector as an agent fulfilling a special function and not as a personal friend, yet occasions arise when morality requires of us more than the fulfilment of the duties of our station or of the maintenance of professional standards. The relation which we count good is more than that of the absence of collision between wills. It is a relation which we see most clearly and fully in human friendship. It is not easily described in other terms. We may say that it is the kind of relation which does not put an end to itself, or which is not self-contradictory, as enmity is. For the enemy seeks to destroy his foe and so would destroy the relationship between them. But this does not define the good, and we have to admit that a calculating hatred may seek to keep its victim alive. We may note that friendship does not mean *identity* of interests or purposes, that it implies an interest in a person rather than in that which he is interested in. We may note that friendship depends upon mutual respect. But ultimately we must say man experiences such relationships and recognizes them as good. They are more than relations from which conflict of will is absent ; they are more than relations of co-operation for an end ; they are experienced unity between persons.

Now our interest in others is necessarily limited ; and friendship is an ideal which is only possible within a limited range. Yet I think that what we count the moral good is a relation between persons of this type, a relation of sodality if not strictly of friendship.

I am very conscious of at least some of the difficulties which may prevent acceptance of the view of the moral good which I have sketched. The most serious is probably the simplest of all—the difficulty of being sure that in moral judgement on action one would, without exception, regard the claim of human relations as the supreme and decisive claim. But I cannot, within the bounds of this paper, discuss the more serious difficulties, and shall attempt only to obviate some possible misapprehensions.

I do not think that any theory of the moral good supplies a clear answer to all practical questions of duty. Certainly I do not pretend that the view I have stated gives clear guidance as to how we should act when the claims of narrower and wider loyalties conflict, or again as to how we should act towards those whose purposes or whose methods are themselves destructive of the relation of community.

I do not imagine that the action of one man alone can create the relation. If it takes two to make a quarrel, it takes two to make friends. It may be said, then, that it cannot be a moral duty to bring such a relation into existence. But this surely is a difficulty only if it is maintained that the moral good is primarily an end. It seems to me clear that relations of community can be destroyed by the action of one man, and that disloyalty expressed in such action is one of the qualities we most confidently condemn. Our duty, I should hold, is to act in such a way that, as far as our action is concerned, sodality is created.

In his book " Rule and End of Morals," Professor Muirhead has spoken of his suspicion of the distinction between moral and non-moral values. To my mind, the distinction is one which must be maintained if the moral standard is to have any definiteness at all. I do not for one moment deny the importance of the problem of the relation between

natural goods and the moral good. In its theoretical aspect this is primarily a problem for the metaphysician. In its practical aspect it is the problem of so organising man's efforts to achieve his natural goods, that those relations which constitute the moral good can most easily be created. But this practical task presupposes the recognition of the distinctiveness of the moral good, and the moral philosopher must maintain that distinction.

II.—*By* A. MACBEATH.

THE thesis propounded in Mr. Phillips' paper is concerned with the nature and the interrelations of three conceptions, (1) the moral good, (2) the moral criterion—" the standard by which human conduct is judged when it is called morally good or bad," and (3) a certain kind of relation between persons which Mr. Phillips calls community. Mr. Phillips holds that these three conceptions are identical.* I propose to argue that no two of them are identical. But I find it very difficult to explain, let alone defend against possible criticism, my own view of the nature and mutual relations of these conceptions in a paper of reasonable length. Yet the only alternative to attempting this is to confine my contribution to criticism, mainly negative, of Mr. Phillips' thesis. Negative criticism of this kind is never very satisfactory. Moreover, there is a reason which makes it specially unsatisfactory on this occasion. It is this. At more than one crucial point in his paper Mr. Phillips' argument seems to proceed on the assumption that the thesis he is defending (or one similar in essentials to it) is the only alternative to the theories he is criticising. If we accepted this assumption and his criticisms of the other theories, the latter would strengthen the case for his own theory. But while I am prepared to accept, at least in principle, many though not all of his criticisms of other theories, I find myself quite unable to accept the assumption. And the most effective way of meeting his argument is to point out that there is another alternative which he has not considered and to which, as it seems to me, his criticisms do not apply. I propose, therefore, to combine with my criticisms of Mr. Phillips' thesis a brief outline of the view which I myself favour of the nature and relations of the conceptions in question. But reasons of space will compel me to present this alternative theory without the necessary refinements and much more dogmatically than I feel about it.

* In denotation, not in meaning.

The argument of Mr. Phillips' paper, he tells us, "presupposes that moral judgments say something about the real nature of human actions." If this merely meant that moral judgments are genuine judgments and not just the expression of a feeling or an attitude towards actions, I should entirely agree. But Mr. Phillips seems to mean more than this. He seems to be contrasting "the real nature of actions" not only with a subjective attitude towards actions (*e.g.*, approval or disapproval), but also with the subjective conditions of actions (*e.g.*, motives). At any rate, he holds, if I understand him aright, that when we pass moral judgments on actions, whether or not we imply anything about their subjective conditions, we are comparing them with a fixed objective standard, a state of affairs or set of conditions, conformity to which makes them morally good and lack of conformity to which makes them morally bad.

Now it seems to me that we do not use any such objective standard, but that the actions on which we pass moral judgments are the outward and visible expression of an inward and spiritual activity, and that we judge them good or bad according to the nature and intensity of this activity. This activity manifests itself in two main forms: (1) the effort to pull ourselves spiritually together and rally all the forces of our nature to enable us to resist temptation and do what we believe to be our duty; (2) the activity involved in trying to make our ideal of duty or what we ought to do more adequate. According to this view, the moral criterion has two aspects:* (1) the sincerity of our devotion to our recognized ideal as measured by the hardness of the effort which we make to realize it, and (2) the earnestness of our efforts to make our ideal as adequate as we can.

If this is so, no standard of the kind considered by Mr. Phillips can be the moral criterion. But it may be urged that no one can directly apply the criterion which I have described to any actions except his own; and that, therefore, in judging the actions of other people we have to

* I find it difficult to decide whether the second aspect can be reduced to a case of the first; and, as the question is not relevant to our present purpose, I do not propose to discuss it here.

use as our test something in the objective nature of actions which is all that we can directly observe. In a sense this is true. We say that the action of another person is morally wrong if it fails to conform to what we would regard as our duty in the circumstances. And as long as we have good grounds for believing that the individual whose action we are judging shares our ideal, we may apply this standard with some approach to justice as a negative test: we may not unreasonably condemn failure to live up to an ideal which is the individual's own. It is not nearly so satisfactory as a positive test: an action which outwardly conforms with what duty requires is not necessarily morally good. But while we often use an objective test of this kind we are never quite content with it. For in our considered moral judgments on the actions of other people we feel obliged to take account of, and make allowance for, differences of nature and nurture—for cases in which there are special obstacles, such as unusually strong innate tendencies, in the way of realizing the requirements of the ideal, and for cases in which the individual in question had little or no opportunity of making the ideal his own.* This shows that we do not regard objective achievement as the real criterion of the moral character of actions.

Moreover, I am going to argue later that, even if we accept the external manifestation of spiritual activity in action as the moral criterion, the standard proposed by Mr. Phillips will not do. Meantime I want to suggest that there is a connexion in which we do use a standard of the kind which Mr. Phillips calls the moral good, namely, when we are trying to discover what our duty is.

We seem to use the term "duty" in two different senses, as may be seen by considering such a statement as "It is my duty to do what I believe to be my duty." Even if I want to do my duty in the sense of acting from a sense of duty and know that my duty in this sense is to do what I believe to be right, I may still be in doubt whether what

* The importance of these considerations for the theory of the moral criterion has been urged and illustrated by Professor Campbell, *Scepticism and Construction*, Chap. VII, especially sects. 2-4.

I believe to be right is in fact right, *i.e.*, I may still be in doubt as to what my duty in another sense is. Now it is in trying to discover what my duty in this second sense is that I use a standard of the kind which Mr. Phillips calls the moral good. It is a standard my approach to conformity with which is a measure of the degree of my enlightenment rather than of my moral goodness.

The idea of duty arises as the result of the union in man of an animal and a rational or self-conscious nature. Self-consciousness transforms the animal impulses into desires, but it does not so transform them that they are necessarily harmonious, and over against the goods which are sought by the separate desires reason or self-consciousness provides the idea of a good which would satisfy the self as a whole. This idea or ideal presents itself to us as something which it is our duty to realize, something which has a right to prevail against the ends of the particular desires. This idea of the policy or plan of life which would satisfy the self as a whole (which may, I think, be called the moral ideal) undergoes modification and development as man becomes more enlightened and morally mature. In a particular community at a given time it takes concrete shape as a more or less definite ideal of life, and individuals make this ideal their own and refer to its demands on them as their duties, the things which they ought to do. Now it is when we try to make this concrete ideal approach more closely to what an entirely enlightened and morally good man would approve that we use as our criterion an objective standard of the kind to which Mr. Phillips refers. The standard that we then use seems to me to be the good of the self as a whole, that which would completely satisfy all the aspirations of our nature. But whatever concrete ideal of duty we have arrived at as the result of honest and earnest reflection it is our duty, in the other sense of duty, to try to realize it in particular actions

Duty in this other sense never varies. It is the demand of the recognized ideal, whatever the ideal may be. Duty in the one sense refers to degree of enlightenment, to insight into the requirements of the perfect standard. Duty in the

other sense refers to the effort of will to do the best that we know. Greek ethical theory emphasized the former, the function of moral insight and "knowledge of the good" in the moral life. Christianity emphasized the latter, the phenomena of temptation and the effort necessary to realize what we recognize to be our duty. In this matter, recent ethical theory, as distinct I think from the modern moral consciousness, is in the main Greek rather than Christian, though Professor Campbell has emphasized the other aspect. It seems to me that the two aspects are very closely connected and that an adequate theory of the moral life must neither confuse them nor neglect either of them.

Now according to the theory which I am advocating, actions which attempt to realize the recognized ideal* because it is the ideal of duty, and they alone, are morally good; and the goodness of such actions is the only intrinsic or absolute good. The duty to realize the recognized ideal, and it alone, is absolute or unconditional. If this is so, the goodness of morally good actions is not co-ordinate with other forms of good. Non-moral goods derive their value from their being elements in our ideal, the good of the self as a whole. Their goodness is not absolute, but relative to human nature. They are elements in the good for man.

Owing to the constitution of human nature there are certain things that give satisfaction to human beings. To all of these we take what has been called the pro-attitude. They are objects of interest or liking to us. To be the object of this attitude is the minimum meaning of good and is common to all forms of good.† Among such objects of interest those which have been called intrinsic non-moral goods, such as knowledge of the truth, enjoyment of beauty, friendship, health, pleasure, have a peculiar place. They are what Professor Campbell§ has called specially qualified

* For the sake of simplicity of statement I am regarding the effort to make the ideal more adequate as part of the recognized ideal.

† Cf. Ross, *Travaux du IX^e Congrès International de Philosophie* XI, p. 82; and Campbell, Mind, N.S. Vol. XLIV, No. 175, pp. 298-9.

§ *Op. cit.*, p. 281 ff.

objects of liking or interest to human nature, not in the sense that they are elements in the recognized ideal of every man but in the sense that they are necessary to satisfy major aspects or instincts of human nature, and that they are therefore necessary elements in a full human life. At a certain stage of enlightenment we recognize a duty to produce and promote them, if by so doing we are not prevented from realizing a greater good. But the duty which we recognize to produce them is what Sir W. D. Ross calls a *prima facie* duty, that is, a duty which when it clashes with other duties is not unconditionally binding.

The so-called intrinsic non-moral goods are co-ordinate elements in the good for man and commensurate* with one another. Moral goodness is on a different level or of a different kind from them and authoritative over them, not in the sense that it is stronger and will always prevail, but in the sense that our reason recognizes its right to prevail. When it is our unconditional, as distinct from our *prima facie* duty, to realize any non-moral good, it is as the embodiment of our ideal, that is, as our moral duty, and not *qua* non-moral good, that it has an unconditional claim upon us. On the other hand, if the *prima facie* duty to produce a non-moral good conflicts with a moral duty, it is morally wrong to promote the former, and therefore it cannot be our duty to do so. Non-moral goods, then, are not good absolutely but relatively to human nature.

* The commensurability of goods is a very difficult problem as the searching examination of it by Sir W. D. Ross in *The Right and the Good*, pp. 149-54, shows. There he takes the view that the different goods are comparable but not all commensurable with one another—moral good being " infinitely superior " or " of a higher order " than any other form of good, while knowledge of the truth and æsthetic enjoyment are " much better " than, but not incommensurable with, pleasure. But more recently (*Travaux du IX^e Congrès International de Philosophie* XI, p. 80), he seems to take the view that pleasure is not even comparable, let alone commensurable, with moral goodness or intellectual or æsthetic excellence, while he places these other forms of good in one class. I cannot argue the question here, but I incline rather to his earlier view, with the difference that I regard virtue as different in kind and therefore not only incommensurable but incomparable with other forms of good. If the good of pleasure is not commensurable with those of intellectual and æsthetic excellence, at least that of relief from pain seems to me to be.

If the constitution of human nature were different any non-moral good might cease to be such, but as long as the union of an animal with a rational nature remains, moral goodness will retain its absolute value: however our recognized ideal may alter, the attempt to realize it will remain unconditionally binding on us.

Now among the most important of the specially qualified objects of human interest is fellowship or friendship. It is a non-moral good, relative to human nature, the satisfaction of the social instinct. It is co-ordinate with, it has to compete against, and in certain circumstances it has to give place to other such goods (*e.g.*, knowledge of the truth, æsthetic enjoyment, the development of our faculties); and when it has a right to prevail against them, it has this right not in its own name but as the expression of the ideal, the good of the self as a whole.

Such in brief outline and stated very dogmatically is the way in which the moral criterion, the moral ideal and friendship or community appear to me to be related. And whatever objections may be urged against such a doctrine, it seems to me to be proof against all the objections (save, perhaps, one to which I shall refer later) urged by Mr. Phillips against the theories which he criticises and which he seems to regard as the only alternatives to his own. Moreover, it satisfies a condition which Mr. Phillips regards as essential to an adequate theory, for it makes moral goodness a distinctive kind of good, though not one among several co-ordinate goods.

Stated in terms of the view which I have sketched, Mr. Phillips' theory seems to treat the non-moral good of friendship or fellowship as the moral good and to regard actions which create and sustain this non-moral good, and them alone, as morally good. But there is more in his theory than this. For he has included in the content of his idea of community, in addition to the non-moral good of friendship or fellowship, a strictly moral element—respect for personality and the sort of relation between persons to which enlightened respect for personality would give rise

Mr. Phillips is impressed with the importance for morality of the effects of our actions on the lives of other people and the sort of relation with other people to which our actions give rise; and he seems to include in his idea of community the sort of relation which would exist between persons if they were both morally good and enlightened. But he finds it difficult to get a clear idea of the nature of such relations. Justice, even ideal justice or equity, will not yield the relation in question; and in the end he has to describe them as "relation between persons which imply respect for personality." This, however, still leaves obscure the nature of the relations concerned. We do not even know whether there is one kind of relation of which all the varied relations between persons who respect one another's personalities are instances. But Mr. Phillips is also anxious, he tells us, to make the moral good a specific or distinctive kind of good. And he observes that the relation of fellowship is a relation between persons and is good. In order, therefore, to make definite and precise the vague notion of the sort of relation between persons to which respect for personality would give rise he identifies it with the relation of fellowship or friendship. At any rate, he includes both sorts of relations in the content of his idea of community, and sometimes he emphasizes the one element in it, at other times the other. The result, I suggest, is genuine confusion. When he wants to make his criterion definite, a distinctive kind of good, he means by community fellowship or friendship, a relation with which we are familiar in our ordinary experience; and when he wants to prove community the *moral* criterion, he means by it the sort of relation between persons to which enlightened respect for personality would give rise.

That, at any rate, is the only interpretation which I can put on Mr. Phillips' paper; and, if it is the correct interpretation, it means that so far as community is identical with fellowship or friendship and so sufficiently definite to serve as a *criterion*, it will not do as a *moral* criterion; for fellowship may be either morally good or morally bad according to the nature of the persons who enter into the

relation and the purpose for which they enter into it. And so far as community has relevance to morality and might claim to serve as a moral criterion, it is identical not with fellowship but with relations based on respect for personality. In other words, of the two elements in Mr. Phillips' idea of community, *one* is relatively definite and *the other* relevant to the question of a moral criterion ; and it is only by a confusion between the two that community can be regarded as the moral criterion.

That when it is necessary to give definiteness to the criterion, community means fellowship or friendship appears especially from the account of the nature of community given in Section 111 of the paper, where it is described as not merely harmony or co-operation or the absence of conflict between wills but as an " experienced unity between persons " —a unity of which friendship is the clearest example. Again we are told that community is a relation " which man experiences . . . and recognizes as good," and that in pursuing his ends man enters into relation with others and " he discovers the good of fellowship, and this distinctive good becomes a standard by which he judges conduct."

That when it is necessary to prove community the moral criterion, it means the sort of relation between persons which would result from respect for personality appears most clearly in one of the two main arguments which Mr. Phillips gives in support of his thesis. This argument starts from the inability of Utilitarianism to give a satisfactory account of justice and the statement of Rashdall (which Mr. Phillips quotes with approval) that the essence of justice is equality of consideration of others ; and it continues : equality of consideration takes us beyond the notion of distribution of goods ; for equality of consideration of others implies that justice " rests upon the claim of every person to respect." Thus we arrive at the view of justice " as respect for personality wherever it is to be found." And when we try to interpret morality " in terms of " justice we find that the moral good " must be regarded as something more than the worth of the separate person. It is rather certain relations between persons—relations which yet

imply respect for personality." Such relations are what Mr. Phillips calls community.

I do not propose to discuss this argument in detail, though I may note in passing that I find it difficult to follow the step from " equality of consideration " to " respect for personality." Justice as " equality of consideration " seems to me, as I think it seemed to Rashdall in the context to which Mr. Phillips refers, to be still concerned with the distribution of goods. It is essentially a weighing of claims to a share in such a distribution. Respect on the other hand is an emotional attitude, and it is difficult to see how it is necessarily involved in " equality of consideration " any more than in " equality of distribution "—the less adequate formula which Rashdall and Mr. Phillips reject in favour of " equality of consideration." But what I want to call special attention to is the step from " respect for personality " to " community " as a sort of relation between persons. If community here means fellowship or friendship or an experienced unity between persons, we seem to have clear evidence of the confusion between the two elements in the idea of community, to which I have referred ; and if it means the sort of relation between persons based on respect for personality, the relation is so vague that it would be quite unhelpful as a criterion.

The only other interpretation of this argument that I can suggest is that the criterion or moral good that Mr. Phillips is proposing is not community as such but the sort of community which results from respect for personality. This, however, seems like an attempt to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds ; for it seems to propose both the motives (respect for personality) and the results or collateral effects (community) of actions as criteria of their moral character. In any case, on this interpretation, Mr. Phillips is giving up community as such as the test and making the test a particular sort of community. But until we know what sort of community or of relation between persons follow from respect for personality, we have made no progress towards a workable criterion.

The other main argument which Mr. Phillips advances in support of his thesis may be stated as follows : Actions which are morally good have certain characteristics, namely, (1) their goodness is created in the acts themselves and does not depend on any consequences which follow from them or on any ends to which they are the means, and (2) their goodness " is not something to be achieved by itself alone but something created or maintained in the business of living—which is necessarily an occupation with many other ends." Actions which create and sustain community have these same characteristics. Therefore, actions which create and sustain community, and they alone, are morally good.

I am concerned only with the principle of this argument and therefore I do not propose to discuss points of detail on some of which I should find myself at variance with Mr. Phillips. Subject to this proviso, I am prepared to accept the major premise, but I wish to make one comment on the minor. Mr. Phillips contends that community is something created *in* (though it is not without significance that he often says *by*) the act rather than a (remote*) consequence of it. Nevertheless his own account of community seems to me to turn it into a consequence of action. True, as he points out, it is not a remote consequence and it need not be an intended consequence. It is rather a collateral effect of pursuing other ends. But it is something created and maintained by action ; and I find it difficult to draw a clear line of distinction between " creating and maintaining " on the one hand and " producing and promoting " on the other ; and the latter is the phraseology we use of consequences.

But even if we accept both premises they will not yield the conclusion. It is a little difficult to be sure what conclusion Mr. Phillips draws. But the form in which I have stated the conclusion above is necessary to his main thesis, and in the argument regarding the first characteristic

* Why remote? A consequence is a consequence whether it is near or remote.

mentioned (see (1) above) he seems to draw it in this form. In the argument as given on p. 16, there are two steps :

(1) The moral good is created in morally good acts.
Relations with other persons established by actions have this characteristic.
Therefore, the moral good is a relation between persons.

(2) Friendship is a relation between persons established by actions and it is good.
The moral good is a relation between persons established by actions and it is good.
Therefore, friendship is the moral good.
That is, actions which create and maintain friendship are morally good.

Now the conclusion of the first step will not follow unless we alter the second premise to read " Relations with other persons established by actions, *and they alone,* have this characteristic." But the premise in this form does not seem to be true and Mr. Phillips has not attempted to show that it is. So that in the form in which it is stated the premise will not yield the conclusion, and in the form in which it would yield the conclusion, I see no reason for accepting it. Moreover, even if we grant the conclusion of the first step, the premises of the second step will not yield the main conclusion. Even if we allow that friendship is the only good relation between persons (and this is very doubtful) all we are entitled to conclude is that morally good actions will promote friendship, not that actions which create friendship are morally good.

It may be, however, that Mr. Phillips is using this argument to suggest his conclusion or to add probability to it rather than to provide a conclusive proof of it. But there is a suggestion in the argument, and indeed in the paper generally, that a view which regards the moral character of an action as something in action itself, in the sense of something created or maintained by the act, is the only alternative to one which regards the consequences of the act as the ground of its moral character. But, as I have

already indicated, there is another alternative and it seems to me to be the true one, namely, that the ground of the moral character of an act is to be found in the spiritual activity of which it is the external manifestation. And I may add one advantage, as it seems to me, of this alternative : it does not compel us either to interpret all actions in terms of the pursuit of ends or to interpret all of them in terms of ways of behaving. The spiritual activity which it regards as the moral criterion can manifest itself both in the pursuit of ends and in ways of behaving ; and the plan or policy of life which it regards as the moral ideal includes both aspects, and so makes it our duty both to pursue certain ends and to behave in certain ways. In view of the undoubted difficulties which Mr. Phillips himself discovers in the way of reducing either form of activity to terms of the other, this seems no small advantage.

So much for the main arguments advanced by Mr. Phillips in support of his thesis. They do not seem convincing. But the thesis itself might nevertheless be true. This does not, however, seem to me to be the case. I proceed, therefore, to state my main objections to regarding community as the moral criterion.

I think it will be agreed that whatever other conditions a moral criterion must satisfy, it must at any rate be applicable to all moral actions. Now I submit that the suggested criterion does not satisfy this condition. For there are moral actions which do not necessarily involve us in direct relations to other persons and to which, therefore, this criterion cannot apply. For example, actions which come under the heading of self-improvement, such as the development and proper use of our faculties, seem to be of this kind ; and yet the moral consciousness regards them, under certain circumstances, as plain moral duties. I do not really see how this can be denied ; and if it is granted, the sort of relations between persons to which actions give rise cannot be the moral criterion.

Mr. Phillips might, however, reply that even such actions indirectly bring us into relations to other persons (*e.g.*,

as pupils to teachers, as members of a family or other social group to one another) and that the nature of such relations may be used as a criterion of the moral goodness or badness of the actions concerned. But it seems to me that some of the duties to which I refer would remain even if I were alone on a desert island. If this is denied, I should contend that even if the actions which we do by way of performing such duties are morally bad, or at least imperfect, unless they are performed with proper regard to the interests of all with whom they bring us into contact, yet that they show proper regard to these interests will not by itself make them morally good. In other words, the suggested criterion provides only a negative test. It states one but not the only condition which morally good actions must fulfil. And therefore actions may conform to the criterion without being morally good.

But it is not only in the case of actions without a direct social reference that this criterion will not serve. It has equally grave defects when applied to actions which necessarily bring us into relations to other persons. In this connexion it is necessary to distinguish between (1) those effects of our actions on the lives of other people* which were foreseen by us, and (2) those which were not foreseen. Among the latter we have to distinguish further between (*a*) those which could have been foreseen by us if we had made reasonable use of the powers we possessed at the time of the action ; (*b*) those which could have been foreseen by us if the use we had made of our powers in the past had not dulled our imagination or our sensitiveness to the claims of other people ; and (*c*) those which we could not have foreseen without powers of insight and expert knowledge which we could not be expected to possess. Now (1) are included in our purpose† or motive and therefore the

* Whether the other people in question share our purposes or are only incidentally affected does not seem to affect the issue.

† The fact to which Mr. Phillips calls attention, that they are not directly aimed at, in the sense of being our ends, does not seem to make any difference in principle.

moral character of our actions may be judged in the light of them. For (2*a*) and (2*b*) we may also be held morally responsible. But for (2*c*), however important they may be, we cannot be held morally responsible, and therefore our actions cannot be judged morally good or bad because of them. To praise or blame us for them is in effect to apply the criterion of Utilitarianism which Mr. Phillips himself has rejected. Yet Mr. Phillips seems to want to use his criterion in the case of consequences included under (2*c*) : consequences which not only were not part of our purpose but which from our defects of insight and the limitations of our knowledge could not have been foreseen. It is true that the limitations of our imagination and insight have very serious effects on our actions and that much selfishness is merely thoughtlessness ; but I suggest that the moral consciousness distinguishes sharply those effects of our actions (whether or not they are effects on the lives of other people) which fall under (2*a*) and (2*b*) from those which fall under (2*c*) ; and that therefore no criterion which, like that suggested by Mr. Phillips, would make us morally responsible for the latter is in harmony with the deliverances of the moral consciousness.

I have been speaking of the effects of our actions on the lives of other people ; but Mr. Phillips speaks mainly of the relations which our actions create or maintain with the people affected by them. But so far as I can see he is entitled to speak only of the relations which they would establish if the people affected by them were enlightened and morally good, the relations which our actions are *fitted to create* or which they would create in an ideal community. Otherwise the moral character of our actions would depend on their being understood and properly responded to by other people. Mr. Phillips notes this difficulty in the second last paragraph of his paper and tries to meet it, but so far as I can see without success. He admits that the action of one man alone will not create community, but he still contends that it is a moral duty for the individual to create it. The only ground he offers for this contention is that the action of one man can destroy

it. This, of course, is true ; but it only proves that it is our duty to create *one* of the conditions of the relation or one term *fitted* to stand in the relation, not the relation itself. In the last sentence of the paragraph Mr. Phillips himself practically admits this.

But the relations with other people which our actions would create, if other people were enlightened and morally good, will not serve as a criterion in any society which we know, and therefore the criterion which Mr. Phillips proposes is the relations with other persons which our actions *in fact* create or maintain. Such a criterion, however, would approve some actions which the moral consciousness would condemn ; *e.g.*, some actions which promote community with morally bad persons. Indeed in any society that we know " living genially with the minor vices " is often more conducive to fellowship or community than a strict regard for duty. And the criterion would also condemn some actions which are morally good, *e.g.*, the action of a man who from a keener or a more enlightened sense of duty than his fellows takes a stand alone against a whole society or group of which he is a member, and thus creates disharmony. We need not go for examples to a Jesus or a Socrates. We meet them every day in the world around us : men placed in circumstances in which merely to remain quiet would lead to harmonious relations to other people, but where this cannot be done without disloyalty to what they believe to be right.

According to this criterion the whole duty of the good man is so to act that he will create and maintain friendly relations with all with whom his actions bring him into contact. As long as he acts thus it does not matter what ends he pursues ; and a society of friends with undeveloped minds and low tastes is morally better than any other society which is less harmonious.

Moreover, the criterion in this form seems incapable of application to many actions which have a direct social reference—and not just for lack of knowledge of the relevant detail, but in principle. For the same action may involve us in relations to many persons or groups of persons ; and

occasions arise in which an action that will promote social relations with one man or group of men will create unsocial relations with others. By which set of relations are we then to judge the moral quality of our action?

But I need not pursue these difficulties. There is no doubt that if persons were perfectly good and entirely enlightened, the relations between them would be relations of community; and such community is, no doubt, the only really stable community. But we cannot therefore conclude that if persons are in a relation of community they are morally good. Nor can we say that the relations of a morally good man to those who are not morally good are relations of community; nor even, as long as men are imperfectly enlightened, that the relations of morally good men to one another are always relations of community. We cannot separate the nature of the relations between persons from the nature of the persons related, but it is the nature of the persons that determines the relations and not *vice versa*. The nature of the relation called community seems so vague that we can give it a definite meaning only by thinking of it as the relation between persons of a certain kind (*e.g.*, the relation between persons who are enlightened and morally good or the relation between partners in the same enterprise or the relation between friends) and it is very doubtful if the term has precisely the same meaning in the different uses to which we put it. In any case, we seem to know more about the conditions of moral goodness in persons than about the nature of the relations between a morally good person and other people. If, therefore, we are to give definiteness to the idea of community or to provide the conditions of stable community, we must begin with the nature of the persons who enter into the relation. For the terms may have to be transformed to make the relation possible. And surely morality is as much concerned with remaking persons as with remaking the relations between them.

No doubt it is for reasons of this kind that Mr. Phillips, as we saw, at one point describes the sort of community which he regards as the criterion by reference to the persons

who enter into the relation, persons moved by respect for personality. But we have already examined this way of escape from his difficulties and found that it either involved giving up the criterion of community altogether or left the relation of community as indefinite as before.

Even if we reject community as the moral criterion, as I think we must, Mr. Phillips is undoubtedly right in emphasizing the importance for morality of the effects of our actions on other people and the necessity, for an adequate view of the moral ideal, of getting a clear idea of the sort of relations between persons which an enlightened and mature moral consciousness would approve. Personality or the moral consciousness appears in many centres. Each has his own conception of the moral ideal and feels moral obligation to realize it in his actions. Once we have sufficient sympathetic insight to realize this, we have to take account in our ideal of the fact that other selves are embodiments of the moral consciousness. And if, as I contend, our reason recognizes the absolute value of moral goodness in our own case, this recognition must now be extended to the efforts of other selves to realize their recognized ideals. Thus with every increase in our insight into other selves as independent personalities, the effects of our actions on other people become an increasingly important moral issue and the problem of reconciling the conflicting claims of different selves becomes more urgent. Every system of justice is an attempt at formulating the principle which should govern the relations between persons. It is in this sense that, as Mr. Phillips contends, justice is the (or at least a) basic virtue. It is the minimum of virtue required in social relations. But it is not the maximum. Justice is concerned with rules governing the distribution of goods or of the conditions of happiness; but however just the rules and however impartially they are applied, they will not give us the whole duty of man. According to any system of justice, what I have a duty to do others have a right to expect from me. But in any society with which we are acquainted it may be the duty

of the morally good man to do what others have no right to expect of him, to give more or exact less than justice requires. He may consider it his duty to be not only just but generous, forgiving, bearing the burdens of others, suffering vicariously.* Thus justice will not give us the highest ideal of conduct.

Moreover, justice is concerned with rules and what we need is a principle. Now respect for personality may be put forward as the required principle, and it applies to our own personalities as well as to those of others. But we are far from having an adequate idea of the sort of relations between persons in which such a principle would find complete embodiment; and I do not think we can cut short the difficult task of trying to get such an idea by identifying it with fellowship or friendship.

This paper has already extended to undue length, but before concluding it I must consider, as briefly as I may, the criticisms which Mr. Phillips has urged against the view which regards the good of the self as a whole as the moral ideal, as far at any rate as these criticisms affect the use which I have made of this conception. I do not regard the good of the self as a whole as the moral criterion but I do regard it as the ideal in the light of our conception of which we decide what our duty is; and if some of Mr. Phillips' criticisms are well-founded I think it will not serve even the purpose which I assign to it.

Mr. Phillips insists that the good of the self as a whole is a vague conception. But is its vageness anything more than is implied in its being a formal principle? And surely the contrast between the good of the self as the unitary centre of many desires and the goods or ends of particular desires is not vague: we are all familiar with it in everyday experience. Moreover, though the good of the self as a whole is a formal principle, man has in the course of history given concreteness to it in the shape of particular policies

* If it is suggested that the ideal I have described is a religious rather than a moral ideal, I should reply that in that case there is a moral duty to be religious.

of life with their moral codes and systems of duties. These concrete embodiments of the ideal change with the growing enlightenment and moralization of man, but the final standard, in the light of which we judge moral codes and systems of duties as better or worse, is the provision which they make for the satisfaction of the self as a whole. For reasons which we have already seen, a prominent place in this ideal has to be taken by our relations with other persons. Indeed the good of the self as a whole and the life based on respect for personality may be regarded as descriptions of the same ideal from different angles.

Mr. Phillips further objects that the wholeness or coherence which is found in an integrated self is not a final test, but presupposes a standard beyond it by reference to which its goodness or badness is to be judged. We can get harmony or an integrated self in many ways and discord may be better than many such harmonies. In fact, Mr. Phillips directs against the idea of the good of the self as a whole the argument which I have urged, as it seems to me with more justice, against his conception of community, namely, that it is good or bad according to the principle on which it is founded. When this criticism is directed against wholeness or coherence in relation to the self as a whole, its edge can be turned by pointing out that the content of the self (instincts and impulses) is given ; and that coherence is not the meaning of goodness but the test we apply to a particular suggested good to discover whether or not it is really good—just as we apply the same test to a particular interpretation of a phenomenon to discover whether or not the phenomenon has been correctly interpreted. The forms of harmony which are evil are not final or stable and they reveal this by their impermanence, their incapacity to satisfy the whole self. We can say of coherence what Mr. Phillips says of community, namely, that it is not what we aim at, but a condition to which we must comply when we aim at other things.

Now what sort of harmony is final harmony, what sort of life will satisfy the whole self is a question which cannot be answered *a priori*. The answer to it has to be discovered

empirically, by experiment, in the history of the race. It may be that no system of life under finite conditions, and therefore no system of life that we can imagine, will completely satisfy the self. But what is required for the purpose which I assigned to the moral ideal is not a fixed objective standard but the most adequate idea that we can form of such a standard. And whatever its content, the form of the ideal seems to be the good of the whole self.

III.—*By* H. F. HALLETT.

I THINK that perhaps the most useful contributions that I can make, as third symposiast, to our review and discussion are (1) to draw attention in some orderly way to what appear to me to be the essential points of dispute between the first two contributors, with a view to concentrating discussion upon important issues; and (2) if I may venture so far, to indicate step by step the sort of opinions I should myself favour, and on what grounds. I do not, of course, wish unduly to limit the discussion to the topics I raise; and I hope I shall not be thought to be unduly extending it by what I have to say on my own account.

Speaking broadly, the questions that appear to me to be raised concern the three topics: (*a*) the nature of the moral standard; (*b*) the nature of the moral good; and (*c*) the nature of the relations holding between the moral standard and the moral good. It is true that the titular subject of the Symposium is the nature of the moral good, but Phillips as opener makes no attempt to exclude the further, or prior, question of the moral standard, introducing it in the opening sentence of his paper, and formally describing his subject in the second paragraph, as concerned with questions "about the standard of judgment". I need not decide whether Macbeath is justified in his assertion that according to Phillips the moral good and the moral criterion are identical in denotation: "*the* good by reference to which conduct is morally judged . . . I shall call the moral good" seems to favour the assertion, though the *caveat*: "in calling it this I do not mean to identify it with moral goodness in the sense of Virtue", must not be forgotten. With any such identification of the moral criterion with the moral good, Macbeath immediately joins issue, and interpreting Phillips's conception of the moral good as an objective end, he denies that we "use any such objective standard" in forming our judgments of moral goodness or badness. "The actions on

which we pass moral judgments are the outward and visible expression of an inward and spiritual activity, and . . . we judge them good or bad according to the nature and the intensity of this activity". The moral criterion, therefore, he holds, is related not to an objective end but to the "spiritual activity" of the agent. The question of the moral standard and its relation to the moral good thus become essential topics for our Symposium.

Before turning to a discussion of the three connected subjects that I have distinguished, there is one further matter which seems to me to be of some importance: the nature of the *method* to be adopted in reaching ethical conclusions. With the main contentions of Phillips's paper I find myself in profound sympathy, though this does not mean that Macbeath's criticisms awaken no response in my mind; indeed in the matter with which I am now concerned I fancy that Macbeath, and certainly some of his contentions, are above reproach: but I have no clue in Phillips's case to the method by which he has reached his main theses. His method has been, I suppose, empirical in form, and thus not specially impressive to my own type of mind that tends to work towards philosophical conclusions from a basis of metaphysical analysis. Agreeing as I do with Phillips's conclusions so far as they go, I do not think that I should ever have succeeded in reaching them by means of a purely empirical inquiry, and perhaps I am wrong in suggesting that he has done so.* If so, it is because he gives us no clear account, and not much hint, of the processes involved. But I am inclined to suppose his method to be empirical from the limited character of his thesis: I do not see how a thoroughgoing metaphysical analysis could have led to a conclusion so narrow and contracted, even if true, as that the moral good is "community" *simpliciter*. It is chiefly in this region of method and its extended results, that what I have to contribute to the Symposium may prove of interest and utility. I

* Cf. his statement at the end of his paper: "I do not . . . deny the importance of the problem of the relation between natural goods and the moral good. In its theoretical aspect this is primarily a problem for the metaphysician".

know, of course, that those who have closed their minds to all inquiries of a non-empirical type will find my remarks on these subjects jejune and nugatory ; and I am content that it should be so : there are other matters for them to discuss.

In a recent paper read before the Aristotelian Society,† Professor Dingle gave an account of his philosophical viewpoint, supporting it by appeal to various forms of experience, but admitting in a final section as an important but yet more or less adventitious failure that his theory gave no clue to the elucidation of the problem of ethics. I ventured to suggest at the discussion that ensued that so far from this being no more than an incidental *laches* in a philosophical theory, I could conceive no more damaging admission on the part of its author ; for it is in our moral experience that we come into genuine contact with the proper subjects of philosophical inquiry, in relation to which alone the objects of scientific and phenomenological contemplation can receive their essential *éclaircissement.* In so saying I did not mean to suggest that the mere *science* of ethics is likely to provide much clarification of the nature of the spatio-temporal world. The history of this science sufficiently illustrates its impotence, for it has made no notable advance since the time of Aristotle ; and every attempt to sever it from its parturient mother, metaphysics, has produced but a monstrous still-birth. An ethical theory that is based on empirical grounds, and is derived solely from contemplation of the processes and objects that constitute the province of human conduct viewed externally, must in the end stand condemned as having missed the essential character of practice, and the principles that govern it. For *action* is not as such an object of contemplation : it is not even an objective *process* in time ; but a possession, and non-temporal essence. It is thus that action belongs essentially to the present, which is not a moment of time but an influx of eternity. From the standpoint of time it is an influx of what is not temporal ;

† *Proc. Arist. Soc.* 1938-9, pp. 121-146.

from the standpoint of eternity it is an efflux that generates time. And time as it is generated is wholly past: not active or creating, but passive, emanated, finished. Even the future is no more than a supposed past of some imagined present, and continuous with the real past. The present itself, as has so often been noted, can be nothing in time.* Action is not temporal, but in relation with its "other" generates time; and thus ethics which is concerned with action is not primarily and essentially a matter of objective temporal process and end, but, as Macbeath rightly says, of "inward and spiritual activity". Practice, in other words, is not an empirical object but the source of all objects, and thus not of empirical derivation. I shall extend my remark on Professor Dingle's confession, therefore, by saying that no more damaging claim could be made by a moralist than that his theory is empirical in origin and significance, that it is a science concerned with ethical objects and the objective ends of conduct, or even that its conception of moral right is of a law relating solely to the forms governing our choice of such objects and ends, such as the principles of Justice, of Benevolence, of Self-love (which can relate only to an anxious conscience halting between opposed opinions, and thus necessarily condemned to partial error), or even, perhaps, that last refuge of "radical objectivism" in ethics, the principle of the universality of the maxim of the categorical imperative, respect for which is the source of a conscience, serene and inerrable it is true, but such only as a result of its complete vacuity.† The history of ethical speculation cries aloud, it seems to me, the failure of all such methods of arriving at a satisfactory moral philosophy.

* The "specious present" conceived as present is certainly "specious"; and conceived as temporal it is not present.

† Kant's moral theory is ineffectual, it seems to me, exactly in proportion to his metaphysical agnosticism. So far as relates to the *form* of morality the account is valuable because Kant's agnosticism did not extend to the form of metaphysical entities, as the doctrine of the Ideas of Reason illustrates.

I. *The Moral Standard.*

It is useless to discuss the question whether action is or is not free: action‡ and freedom mean the same thing. It is thus that freedom is the essential postulate of ethical theory, for ethics is concerned with action. Nor need we consider the question whether human beings are free: if they are not, they are not moral agents (or indeed "agents" at all), and it is with moral agency that we have to do. Now the essential thing about action, as distinct from objective process in time, is that it is an efflux of the character of the agent and not a transition from a cause in time to a sequent effect. Further, by morality we mean such action as subject to criticism or valuation; and moral action must be action in accordance with a principle. The principle is what we call the "moral standard", and our first problem concerns its nature and properties.

I shall first of all suggest that the moral standard or criterion or principle must from the very character of morality be something within the possession, or at least the knowledge, of the agent, and not some external, objective, ideal, final end that is necessarily beyond the reach, and even beyond the intellectual grasp, of the ordinary moral agent. This is essentially what is advanced by theories that emphasise the inerrability of conscience, whether they take the form of a Kantian emphasis on the formal character of the criterion and the ultimate goodness of the good will, or the form favoured by Macbeath that emphasises the principle that actions are "good or bad according to the nature and the intensity" of the "inward and spiritual activity" of which the "actions on which we pass moral judgments are the outward and visible expression".§ The trouble is that neither Kant nor Macbeath

‡ My distinction between action and temporal process, is of course, crucial.

§ Phillips will be able to speak for himself, but I should have thought that his theory of the nature of the moral good as "community" is also based upon this principle, and that Macbeath only thinks otherwise because he has failed to note the importance of Phillips's statement that "the moral good is . . . achieved in the very act", "created or maintained in the business of living". The principle that we must *possess* our standard is, I think, the main axiom that underlies and so far validates his argument.

are really willing to make the moral conscience inerrable, though they see clearly enough that if morality is to be possible for a finite agent his conscience must be a final court of appeal. Kant avoids an issue by making the criterion a purely formal one, though his critics have always agreed that this makes the principle singularly uninstructive in the ordinary business of morality. But Macbeath, doubtless with this objection in mind, gives us a more concrete principle, and as a result cannot avoid the obvious issue that "duty" will now have two senses: that which as a moral agent I must here and now perform, and that which serves as a more ultimate court of appeal for the enlightenment of conscience. "It is my duty (*i*) to do what I believe to be my duty (*ii*)" even when, in the second sense of the term, I believe wrongly. My conscience must be inerrable if I am to be a moral agent at all; on the other hand, I must be able to enlighten my conscience. Thus Macbeath, and the idealistic school generally, are really left with two standards of morality: the inerrable conscience of the actual agent, and "the good of the self as a whole" which would be dictated, or embraced, by the conscience of a perfectly enlightened agent. And the fact that this second standard is the *ideal* form of the first—if it is—will not, I think, serve as a principle of unity in the moral life sufficient to safeguard the reality of the moral experience of this or that man at this or that stage of his moral development.*

Now I do not think that this dualism can be satisfactorily resolved by denying either the first or the second account of duty: they are both essential and defensible. The first is ethically axiomatic: to deny it is to deny the actuality of finite moral experience. But the second is also inescapable, for there can be no more unsatisfactory dualism in morals than the assertion that what it is right

* Though I do not forget the pregnant remark of Bosanquet: "The great enemy of all sane idealism is the notion that the ideal belongs to the future. The ideal is what we can see in the light of the whole, and the way in which it shapes the future for us is only an incident—and never the most important incident—of our reading of past, present, and future in their unity". (*Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 136).

for a man to do need not subserve his true good. Nor do I think that the dualism is made any the more acceptable when it is allowed that though what is right for him may not subserve his immediate or actual good, it does conduce to his ideal good, or ultimate good, or good in an after-life. What is morally right for an agent must subserve his moral good *sans phrase*. This is the principle that is at work in Macbeath's second sense of the term "duty": if "the good of the self as a whole" is the genuine moral good, then it must be morally right for the agent to achieve it even when he is ignorant of its nature and of the means of achieving it. I confess I am in full agreement with this argument, and it is because I admit, nay advance, both this account of duty, and also that of duty as dictated by the inerrable conscience, that I am forced to accept a view of the moral good that in essence (on one side at least) agrees with the theory of its nature advanced by Phillips. Whether it is also in harmony with the views of Macbeath (on its other side), and if so in what sense, has still to be indicated. My contention at the moment is that this divorce of two senses of duty or moral standard, at least in the form in which it seems to be advanced by Macbeath, is a sign of bad theory. For these are the premisses that should be used for a transcendental argument concerning the true nature of moral good; and their apparent divorce in actual moral experience may be no more than an expression of human finiteness, and of its special flexible character.

Before I leave this section of my paper, and as a preparation for the next, I should like shortly to discuss another form of the objection that is raised to the principle of the essential connexion of moral right and moral good. It will have been noticed that Macbeath in a footnote, adds the minor correction to his assertion that Phillips holds that the moral good, the moral criterion, and "community" are identical: "in denotation not in meaning"; and it is, of course, plain that the identity is not one of connotation. But neither, therefore, could it rightly be asserted to be an identity of denotation. My objection, however,

involves a point of logical theory which I do not desire to introduce into the argument: I mention Macbeath's remark only to introduce anew the relation of the standard of right and the nature of good. I should find it difficult to determine which of these is absolutely prior, for the question of priority would almost certainly depend for its answer on the point of view from which their relation is regarded.† What I am contending here is that they are essentially correlative :‡ it must be morally right to create, or produce, or enjoy, or advance, what is morally good (the correct verb will depend on the character assigned to the moral good); and it cannot be morally right to destroy, negate, reject, retard, it. And this is true, I think, of the relation of *believed* right and *believed* good equally with that of *genuine* right and *genuine* good. The difficulty with which we have to deal is that it seems that it may not be true of the relation of believed right and genuine good, or that of genuine right and believed good. Yet it is believed right that ought to determine the actual will, and it is genuine good that is the sole true satisfaction of the moral agent. And this is why it seems difficult to believe that the moral standard can be, as Macbeath says, "the sincerity of our devotion to our recognised ideal . . . and the earnestness of our efforts to make (it) as adequate as we can", while the moral good is definable only as "that sort of life which will satisfy the whole self", or some other objective end, never realised, or even believed to be good, except perhaps as a vague formula. For it is believed right that ought to determine the actual will, and believed good that is understood in

† Thus from the point of view of the finite, relatively unenlightened, moral agent it is evident that the moral standard is prior. For his duty may be clear while his conception of real good remains vague and formal. Yet from the point of view of the enlightenment of conscience, as Macbeath says, it is the ideal good that is prior, since "it is a standard my approach to conformity with which is a measure of the degree of my enlightenment rather than of my moral goodness".

‡ "We mean one thing by goodness or value and another thing by the claim it lays upon us to be realised by or in our actions and to become our rule of life. But this does not exclude the possibility that the two ideas stand in an essential relation to each other as two aspects of a real situation". (J. H. Muirhead, *Rule and End in Morals*, p. 45.)

detail.* The same difficulty infects Kant's view that the standard is " the good will ", the universality of the maxim of our action, while the *summum bonum* includes also the *bonum consummatum* or "happiness proportioned to morality".† It may, of course, be said that the fact that we do not know, even in broad outline, what would satisfy the self as a whole, or even, in Kant's case, what constitutes genuine happiness,‡ need not, for the agent himself, invalidate the moral standard that he does understand and accept, since this is, for him, morally prior to the good, so that the approximation of action to it is an essential pre-requisite of *any* possible attainment of good. The argument has, I think, a certain validity in relation to Kant's moral theory, since for it the *bonum supremum* is the dutiful will itself, so that believed right and genuine good do so far remain strictly correlative, while the *bonum consummatum* may, perhaps, be regarded as in the nature of a *bonus* rather than as an essential element of *strictly*

* As I have here introduced the terms " right " and " standard of right " in addition to " good " and " standard of good " perhaps I should say (*i*) that the de-objectification of moral good will, I think, assimilate the standard of right to the standard of good, and thus bring the right and the good into direct relation with each other ; and (*ii*) that even apart from this emendation of morality no doctrine strikes me as less true to moral experience than that insinuated by Ross in his assertion that " I can act from a certain motive only if I have that motive. . . . My present duty, therefore, cannot be to act here and now from it ". (*The Right and the Good*, p. 5). The implied theory that we have no immediate control over our motives (in the sense of " an ordinary desire or the sense of obligation " (*loc. cit.*)) is morally fatal. After all, it is our constant duty to be intelligent and this alone is capable of convincing us (even " between the stirrup and the ground ") of duties that without it would not be operantly realised, and of extending and limiting the borders of the " universe of desire ". I think it *is* right, i.e. that it *is* my duty to advance the moral good *from good motives*. I do not doubt that our power to do so is limited in varying degrees, and our duty limited with it ; what I deny is that we have *no* power over our motives.

† " The distribution of happiness in exact proportion to morality (which is the worth of the person, and his worthiness to be happy) ". (*Critick of Practical Reason*, Pt. I, Bk. II, ch. 2).

‡ " The idea of happiness requires an absolute whole, a maximum of welfare in my present and all future circumstances " (while) " it is impossible that the most clearsighted and at the same time most powerful being, supposed finite, should frame to himself a definite conception of what he really wills in this ". (*Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*, sect. 2).

moral good.§ But with Macbeath's theory the argument is less easy to defend : for " the satisfaction of the self as a whole " is the genuine moral good, and no mere bonus, while the end achieved by the " sincere " and " earnest " effort of the dutiful will may not satisfy *any* part of the self,|| and certainly not the self as a whole ; for what I believe to be my duty may only be my duty because, in my state of relative unenlightenment, I *believe* it to be so. With Kant's doctrine the objection to be raised concerns rather the vacuity of the *bonum supremum* in the absence of its consummation ; with Macbeath's theory it is the absence of a satisfactory account of the relation obtaining between " the satisfaction of the self as a whole " and the immediate " good " secured by sincere and earnest effort after the " recognised ideal " and its enlightenment. For both are conceived, I think, as objective ends separated from one another by temporal processes, even when both are conceived as real ends ; the " recognised ideal " I may, in part at least, achieve today ; " the satisfaction of my whole self " is postponed to the end of an extended moral progression. This divorce results from making the good, both immediate and ultimate, both believed and genuine, an *end* towards which the agent works, and not " something achieved in the very act ", " created and maintained in the business of living ",—in a word, no object, but the life itself, the very action that he is. It is in this direction that I, and I think also Phillips, look for a mitigation of the difficulties I have emphasised. I should hold that the moral good is no ideal problematically real in the future no mere conception set up as an external measure for judicial estimation of the worth of our efforts, but the essential principle of action proper to such a being

§ I am, of course, aware that even with the italics this is not an altogether fair statement of Kant's views. Yet " there is not the least ground . . . in the moral law for a necessary connexion between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as part of it ". (*Critick of Practical Reason*, Pt. I, Bk. II, ch. 2, sect. v).

|| Since these very qualities of our will preclude the moral self-esteem of a satisfied conscience. " When ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, we are unprofitable servants : we have done that which was our duty to do ".

as man, and carried to its ideal limit; and that it is thus that it sets a standard capable of being morally effective for the enlightened agent. Further, that the *de facto* standard, which alone inerrably governs our conduct, is correlative with a good that is some part, or element, or *abstractum*, or derivative, of the real good, just because in its measure it too involves the action, the freedom, of the finite agent, as opposed to the passivity, the bondage of the tool. It is the conception of good as an objective end to be pursued, rather than as a quality of life to be possessed in the creation of values, and in community with the activity of other agents, that makes "the satisfaction of the self as a whole" inappropriate as an expression of the real good of an agent operating under the dictates of an inerrable but incompletely enlightened conscience.*

* In speaking of the "inerrability of conscience" I do not wish to suggest that this or that moral agent is necessarily well-informed as to what his conscience does inerrably require of him on this or that occasion, but (*a*) that conscience *as such* is inerrable, and (*b*) that conscience does actually operate in human experience. In spite of the difference of subject the situation is analogous to that in which we find the unanalysable elements of sense-perception: we may be sure that there is "red" in the world of sense-perception, though not that this or that object is red. The intuition of "red" is immediate and indubitable; yet "red" is nowhere isolable as sense-datum *simpliciter*, but always as qualifying some reputed object or contour. Thus any given perception of "red" is at once indubitable as to its content, but dubitable as to its attribution. So also conscience is inerrable as to its ethical authority, but errable as to its special dictates. Yet every duty makes some special demand, and that it is *never* right is as incredible as that nothing has ever been red. We can only explain our possession of these factors, or elements, of experience by allowing that they have been intuited, though not necessarily in similar, or even analogous, ways. Likewise we may say that the agent's recognition of "good" is inerrable: not that he never regards as good what is not truly so, but that as to "good" he is never mistaken, though his attribution of it is errable. Again, we cannot suppose that he never attributes it rightly, for thus an explanation of its origin would be lacking, since it cannot be intuited in isolation from something to which it is attributed. "Right" and "red" and "good" are indubitable in the actual experience of them,—"in the very act".

If now it is argued that an indubitable factor or element must have indubitable application if it is indubitably actual, I not only agree, but this is the very nerve of my inference: what is essentially the same solution is applicable in all of these cases: we must pass behind the objectivity of objects to the things in themselves that thus appear. The "red" which is extant, yet never indubitably attributed to objects, must be taken as non-objectively real as action. The "good" which is extant yet never adequately discoverable among objective ends and purposes, must, as Phillips suggests, be taken as "achieved in the very act, and not a remote object of action". So also conscience may err as to the *objects* worthy of achievement, but never of the absolute worthiness of conscientious *actions*. I am not here, be it noted,

II. *The Relations of the Moral Standard and the Moral Good.*

In the discussions of my first section it is evident that I have trespassed very seriously upon the subjects that should be discussed under the present head; and this will allow me to give a more summary account of my views and criticisms of the theories advanced in the first two papers of the Symposium. I have suggested in a footnote† that the opposition of Macbeath to that part of Phillips's thesis that concerns the formal character of the moral good is less serious than he supposes as a result of his unconscious "muting" of the emphasis on the non-objectivity of a good that is genuinely moral. It is, I think, because Phillips is considering the moral good as something "achieved in the very act" that he is able very closely to associate the standard with the good; just as it is because Macbeath is thinking of the moral good as an objective end resulting from the action, immediately or remotely, that he is compelled to dissociate the moral standard, which must be operative in the act, from that good. I do not say that Macbeath seriously holds that "the satisfaction of the self as a whole" ought to be conceived in this objective way, and not rather as real only in so far as it may be "achieved in the very act"; but I do say that it seems to me that his anxiety to divorce the operative standard from the real good is based on some such tendency. If, however, we think of each right action as contributing in

retreating to a Kantian formalism, according to which the good will alone is morally good, though that in its way is an admirable expression of the inerrability of conscience; but because *conscience dictates not mere conscientiousness, but some definite action*, the formal goodness of will is insufficient. The solution advanced by Macbeath is that we test the rightness of actions by reference to the moral good, i.e. "the good of the self as a whole"; but, as I have said, the difficulty here is that the standard is never realised in finite experience, while the inerrability of an infinite being raises no special difficulty. But if morality is applicable to finite agency, as the experience of obligation implies, it must be within the power of the finite agent to determine some action that is right absolutely; yet the test of duty (*i*) in terms of duty (*ii*) puts this beyond his power, for he has no clear idea of the *content* of the latter, while its *formal* character is inoperative. The solution offered by Phillips has the advantage of providing an applicable criterion: the moral good is possessed "in the very act", and may thus directly answer to, and verify, the rightness of our moral judgment. The ethical content of the formal principle is the action itself that is inerrably right.

† P. 148, note §.

proportion to its rightness to a good " achieved in the very act ", the correlation of the good and the standard becomes not merely possible, but inevitable. In that case resistance to temptation, and the enlightenment of our ideals, that Macbeath takes to be the moral standard, may not be so remote as might otherwise be supposed from Phillips's conception of our duty to promote " community " as opposed to isolation and self-interest. The *rapprochement* would of course depend on a further modification of Macbeath's views on the nature of " community " as " necessary to satisfy . . . (an) instinct of human nature ", an " object " of a " pro-attitude ", a formal harmony between persons, by placing the emphasis on its character as a spiritual activity congruent with relations of persons, and thus dependent upon the worth of such persons. For Phillips, as I understand him, the " relations between persons " that he calls " community " are not so much relations between embodied minds produced by their objective movements, as relations of active personal experients constituted by their co-operant spiritual activities. Such a change of emphasis would, it seems to me, convince Macbeath that the thesis of Phillips does not imply that " a society of friends with undeveloped minds and low tastes is morally better than any other society which is less harmonious." Thieves's honour and harlotry, however harmonious, are not to be compared with the pugnacious or disputatious community of a boxing club or philosophical congress, nor certainly with the co-operation of the craftsman with his material, of the *prima ballerina* with the *corps de ballet* and the orchestra, or " the marriage of true minds ". It is not mere agreement or harmony that constitutes " community ", but the realisation of potency through adequate co-operation with the complementary potency of others that supply at once a limitation and an enfranchisement. " If men were all to become even uniformly mad they might agree tolerably well with each other ", says Francis Bacon: but we should hardly say that the " community " of such a congress was superior to that even of a debating society

however unenlightened. Not agreement but co-operation constitutes "community"; and in proportion to the inwardness of the co-operation is its perfection or totality. This is a subject to which I should like to return: the point I am trying to make clear at the moment is that Phillips does not seem to me to be attempting, as Macbeath suggests, to reduce right to nonmoral or objective good, but rather to elevate moral good, too often conceived objectively, to the status of a "spiritual activity" for the finite agent only attainable through co-operation with the complementary activity of others. This heightening of spiritual activity through the enfranchisement that comes from relation with co-operant others, is what Phillips calls "community"; and rightly so, for thus the self finds itself in and through its other, and finds its other in and through itself.

I have, or so I hope, sufficiently expounded the difficulty I find with Macbeath's divorce of the moral standard from the moral good. That separation, I have suggested, is due to the objective purposive view of the good that he tends to adopt as opposed to the internal, spiritual, conception of the standard. The unexceptionable principle that "it is my duty (*i*) to do what I believe to be my duty (*ii*)" even when I believe wrongly,—that conscience is as such inerrable,—implies that the standard and the good *may* not be even indirectly or remotely related. Though doubtless the omission of a dutiful action will leave the self without one of its most important satisfactions, yet a perfectly dutiful action may be aimed at, or at least inevitably produce, a morally bad result (except for the good or satisfaction enjoyed in the form of moral self-esteem); and an immoral action may produce (or even be aimed at) morally good results. This emphasises, perhaps unduly,* the difficulty I have found in Macbeath's account: though it may be true that for a perfectly rational being there is complete harmony between moral right and moral good,

* Cf. p. 153, note ||. Perhaps if we distinguish "satisfaction" from "contentment", and derive moral self-esteem from the latter, we need not deny that a dutiful action, whatever its consequences, does satisfy the moral nature.

yet for us with our " union . . . of an animal and a rational or self-conscious nature " (or as I should say : our microcosmic or finite-infinite nature) there will always be incongruity, and often even serious disharmony. This is not in itself a special difficulty for ethical theory (it may even be its essential basis), but it becomes so if we try, as Macbeath does, to combine loyalty to the inerrable dictates of duty, with the pursuit of " the good of the self as a whole " regarded as an ideal object out of direct relation with the actual duty. It may, of course, be possible to produce reasons for *believing* in the ultimate harmony of duty and good : or to give " duty " a second sense derived from the ideal good ; but even if it were possible to establish the *necessity* of such harmony, the special difficulty I am emphasising would remain. The epithet " moral " is being used ambiguously unless the moral standard is directly and immediately related to the moral good ; unless our duty (*i*) is in essential harmony with our duty (*ii*). Now if the moral good is conceived objectively as a satisfaction belonging wholly to a problematical future, this cannot be assured ; if, on the other hand, it is conceived as a spiritual experience or activity that belongs essentially to right actions, and is promoted in some measure by every dutiful effort, and in turn sets the standard for further conduct, then the special difficulty I have raised will at least be mitigated. And this, it seems to me, is what Phillips desiderated in his account of " community " as the non-objective moral good. And though, as it will be seen, I think his conclusions stand in need of important amplification, I regard his thesis as of great importance and significance.

There is one further objection that I wish to raise to Macbeath's account of the moral good in its relation to the moral standard : Phillips's criticism of " the satisfaction of the self as a whole " is that it is " a vague conception ", and Macbeath asks : " Is its vagueness anything more than is implied in its being a formal principle ? " I do not know whether Phillips accepts this reading of his objection, but I do not see why he *should* do so. After

all, " community " itself might be called a formal principle, for it does not ostensibly include every example, or even mode, in which it finds expression in the moral life. But the main objection to the idealistic conception of the moral good is not this, it seems to me, but its lack of content when taken out of relation to " the actual business of living ". † What is meant by a " satisfaction " ? is the sort of question that comes most readily to mind ; and what is desiderated is not so much examples of satisfactions, as some attempt at relating the notion of a satisfaction to the nature of the self and its wholeness. Phillips's theory is less open to this sort of objection, precisely because in " community " he offers us a satisfaction that *is* related to the nature of a self that is finite in a world of " others " that are capable either of obstructing or facilitating its action. Now Macbeath tries to meet Phillips's charge of " vagueness ", and it is in connexion with his attempt to do so that my present difficulty arises. " The contrast between the good of the self as the unitary centre of many desires and the goods or ends of particular desires is not vague : we are all familiar with it in everyday experience ". Again : " Man has in the course of history given concreteness to (the good of the self as a whole) in the shape of particular policies of life with their moral codes and systems of duties . . . the final standard in the light of which we judge (these) as better or worse is the provision which they make for the satisfaction of the self as a whole ". It is, admittedly, unfair to take assertions like these, framed to meet one rendering of the objection of " vagueness ", as answers to a different interpretation of it, and I do not wish to do so, but merely to point out that the first statement which does make some connexion of the good with the

† The real emptiness of the formula : " the good of the self as a whole " is partly concealed by the substitution of the term " satisfaction " for " good ". The fact is that to say that the moral good is " the good of the self as a whole " is an obvious *circulus in definiendo* : it tells us not what good *is* but only its *location, distribution,* or *extent.* Phillips, on the other hand, attempts an account of the *nature* of good : it is " community ". *I* shall say that it is primarily " action " : for an *infinite* being, *pure creation* " out of nothing " ; for a *finite* being, still *creation,* but *diminished* by a given matter of " otherness ", and consequently *enhanced* by community of action with the " other ".

self and its wholeness does so in terms of desire, and is thus out of step with *moral* experience (which makes duty the source of properly moral satisfactions); while the second statement which connects satisfactions with duties, connects the good, not with the self and its wholeness, but with the self in its relation to society and social organisation. But what seems to be required is an account of the relation of "the satisfaction of the self as a whole" with the dutiful self and its inerrable conscience, and not with the self as a seat of subjective desire, nor as a member of an objective social order. In giving the moral good a recognisable content standing in recognisable relations with the self, Phillips avoids the sort of vagueness that he imputes to the idealistic account. He does not, however, explore the possibility that the explanation in terms of "satisfaction" might also be made to serve the same purpose; and, as we have seen, Macbeath does not lift a hand to help him to discover how this could be done. Yet had he done so, Phillips might have become more aware of the need of his theory for the sort of amplification suggested by Macbeath: "A moral criterion . . . must . . . be applicable to all moral actions . . . the suggested criterion does not satisfy this condition. For there are moral actions which do not necessarily involve us in direct relations to other persons. . . . For example, actions which come under the heading of self-improvement, such as the development and proper use of our faculties . . . (which are) plain moral duties". I shall argue later that when we take an adequate view of satisfactions, and no longer conceive them under the external or objective analogy of the "pint pot", we shall find that a true satisfaction is none other than an unimpeded activity, which is identical with free action, and thus with duty. To what extent free action is possible without the co-operation of other persons need not be determined in detail: it will be clear that if, with Phillips, we confine "community" to relations of *persons*, we must include also in the moral good those relations which we have with superior and inferior beings in the hierarchy of the Real. A more philosophical solution would be to

extend the notion of " community " to every kind of relation between the self and what is other than the self, distinguishing under it relations of dependence and aspiration with more perfect beings, of mutuality with our fellows and equals, and of production or use with less perfect things. In this sense we could then say that " the good of the self as a whole ", and the good of every part of the self, is achieved in community with what is other than the self, for these constitute the self's determining and enfranchising context, and thus stand directly related to the proper exercise of the activity that is our real essence. This is true of bodily actions equally with the essential " inward and spiritual activity " that we are. Here is a formal principle that both substitutes for vagueness a proper amplitude of scope, and also connects the inwardness and inerrancy of the moral conscience with the unendingness of moral endeavour, through the conception of a good that is at once congruently achieved in each act of duty, and yet subject to unending growth as the urge towards freedom is amplified and vitalised in the individual experience.

III. *The Moral Good.*

We thus reach the subject matter of the third section of my treatment : the nature of the moral good as it stands related to the inerrable conscience of the finite agent. Speaking summarily, and with no attempt at subtlety and elegance, we may say that as Kant emphasised the morality of Right, and the Utilitarians the morality of Good, so Idealism attempts to retain both Right and Good as *ideally* correlative, and the theory defended in this paper makes them essentially and inwardly correlative. Thus Kant must face the charge of empty formalism, and a failure to elaborate a credible theory of the good ; the Utilitarians of eliding the essential conception of duty ; the Idealists of providing no explanation of the double use of the term " duty " as it relates to the moral experience of an actual finite agent ; and the theory I have defended must explain the nature of the good in such a way as to

give full weight to the element of problem and effort and failure in the moral life.

The essence of the theory advanced by Phillips, that I have defended and amplified, is that the moral good is not an objective end to be pursued, but an activity to be freely enacted. It is to this conception of the good as neither a state passively enjoyed,* nor an object to be acquired, that we must look for an explanation of the essential character of morality as free or self-legislating action. It is important to notice that when Phillips speaks of moral good as "community" or "a relation between persons" he is not, apparently, thinking of relations between "embodied minds" produced by the objective processes that we are apt to call a man's "actions". He is thinking of relations constituted by the mutuality of persons as things in themselves: relations that are partly objectified as bodily movements and reactions and responses, but which are primarily "inward and spiritual", to use Macbeath's phrase. I have already commented upon Macbeath's apparently external view of "community" as signifying primarily an absence of disharmony

* One of the chief merits of Egoistic Hedonism—perhaps the only one of importance—is that it offers a good that really belongs to the agent, and is enjoyed by him. Any theory that makes a man's good something that exclusively belongs to another refutes itself. An agent's good must be something that the agent himself enjoys or possesses, though not necessarily exclusively. As Butler rightly says, the objection to the view that pleasure is the sole end of appetite or desire, and hence the essential good, is that it depends upon the "prior suitableness between the object and the passion". (*Sermon XI*, sect. 6). Thus the direct pursuit of pleasure as an object is futile, if not impossible. But if the suggestion is that this disqualifies pleasure from being accepted as the moral good (as I suspect has sometimes been supposed) I should say that this is precisely to miss the ethical point. The fact that pleasure is not an object that can be pursued, but must be enjoyed in the successful pursuit of objects, is its chief claim to moral goodness. Its disqualification arises from the dependence upon objects, and its consequent passivity in human experience—not from its subjectivity. And in so far as it involves an active relation to objects "suited to our several particular appetites, passions, and affections", (*Loc. cit.*, sect. 9) the disqualification must itself be qualified. It is in this sense that, as Spinoza held, pleasure raised to its highest perfection as *beatitudo* is itself freedom and virtue (*Eth.* V, xlii). Yet in so far as pleasure is still not in itself an action, but a quasi-objective possession, it remains rather the symptom than the essence of moral good. For this good must belong so closely to the finite agent as at once to constitute his peculiar virtue or strength, and to bring him into effective and congruous community with his complement.

among separate persons, instead of the spiritual reciprocity or mutual dependence of finite agents from which externally issue " embodied minds " and their objective relations. It seems to me that Phillips's thesis that moral good is distinguishable from natural goods in being, if an end at all, an end that is advanced or retarded in the very process of seeking the objective natural ends of common life, is peculiarly valuable : indeed that no proposition is more vitally important for ethics ; and that his modest way of advancing it does less than justice to its centrality. He first introduces it, it will be recalled, in connexion with his contention that the recognition of justice as morally good will not cohere with the view of Ideal Utilitarianism that actions are moral in proportion to their tendency to promote the greatest good. Rashdall's attempt to reconcile them by emphasising the goodness of justice itself as a quality of character to be included in " the greatest good ", he, rightly I think, rejects. For justice would thus be *one* of the goods, though perhaps *primus inter pares*, included in the sum-total : to be sacrificed, therefore, where a greater total good seems to be obtainable by means of unjust actions ;—or, if it is taken as *supereminent* among these goods, incapable of being accepted without disrupting the Utilitarianism, however Ideal it may be. Here is an " end " that is not among the ends, but governs their pursuit.

Now, as I have said, Phillips gives us no account of the metaphysical basis of the distinction thus drawn between moral and non-moral goods, and I am, therefore, left to impute it ; and thus to lay myself open to the danger of an eclipsing snub from one whom I would fain support. But I must take the risk. Prominent among the principles which would, I suppose, be admitted by most, if not all, schools of ethical thought, in some sense or other, is that which relates moral values with the nature of the agents for whom they are valid. In this sense we are nearly all addicted to " naturalism in ethics ".† What is right

† The essential difference between the theory I am defending and other ethical theories that derive morality from human nature, is that with Kant I trace the specifically ethical element to a non-objective source. In this

and good for a man is right and good for an angel or for a mouse only in so far as the angelic or mouse- nature is congruent with human nature. The verbal agreement remains ineffective, however, because there is no general consensus about the essential elements of human nature. Kant, interpreting morality as relative to human nature *qua* rational (yet also sentient), gives a rationalistic account of obligation ; his naturalistic opponents, taking it as a tissue of impulses, desires, instincts, etc., give a causal or a functional account ; the idealists, looking to self-conscious purpose as characteristic of human nature, give a teleological account. But though the principle has failed to serve as a basis of ethical reconciliation in the past, it

Spinoza is entirely at one with Kant, though his theory has often been mistaken for an " objective naturalism ". ‡ Human good reciprocates with human nature and circumstance, but not with their objective appearance. It is thus not an objective end pursued by the " embodied mind ", or even possessed by it. But this does not necessitate a retreat to a Kantian formalism, which is, in effect, only the last refuge of " radical objectivism " in ethics, being directly related to Kant's metaphysical agnosticism. Real human good, i.e. the moral good for man, is man's proper action as a thing in himself in his relations with other agents of all grades. And this is directly related to human right : it is right for the agent to perform his proper action, and not to mistake himself for his own appearance. This *is* his moral good. For an infinite being (Kant's purely rational being) this is eternal creation by which the " other " (*Natura naturata*) expresses the " self " (*Natura naturans*), and " community " is " the infinite love wherewith God loves himself ". For a finite being (Kant's partly rational and partly sentient being) creation is diminished to formation, and amplified concomitantly by action that bears relation with the limiting and enfranchising agency of its complement. Thus for finite beings right and good are apt to appear incongruent through the objectification of " self " and " other " and " good " ; but this is to confuse non-moral goods with the moral good.

‡ And that in spite of his familiar and emphatic declaration that, even with respect to objective goods, the goodness is primarily derived from the agent : " We neither strive for, wish, seek, nor desire anything because we think it to be good, but contrariwise, we judge a thing to be good because we strive for, wish, seek, or desire it ". (*Eth.* III, ix, Sch.). Even objective goodness is thus derived from the *conatus* of the agent, whether it be mental (will), psycho-physical (desire) or physical (appetite), towards objects that are conducive to his power of acting. But if this is true of the goodness of *objective* goods, it is because *essential* goodness is not objective at all, but is the proper action of the agent. Here the good and the *conatus* or action are identical : for man *as mind* this action is understanding, and his highest good is thus " the knowledge of God ", because God is the highest thing a mind can understand. But this " knowledge " is *beatitudo* or virtue. It is a peculiar vice of translators to render the Spinozistic " *ens* " as " object " ; " *objectum* " is a relatively rare term in the *Ethics*, and is mainly confined to the psychology of Part III.

must not be ignored or despised. The dependence of moral values on the nature of the agent for whom they are valid equally concerns both the character and source of moral right and also the nature of moral good. Even the rationalistic Kant was not content to elaborate a doctrine of right, based on the primacy of practical reason in human nature, but also sought to relate it to that nature in its totality through the conception of a *summum bonum*, composed of a rational good or *bonum supremum* together with a sentient good or *bonum consummatum*, with relations congruent with those of the rational and sentient elements of human nature; while the ethical naturalist, not content with an account of goods as issuing from the subordination of the individual to his physical and social environment, has attempted to derive obligation itself from the complex tissue of human conation and sentiency. Even the idealists have sought for the enlightenment of the *de facto* conscience through the conception of an ideal satisfaction of human nature as a whole, and have interpreted the actual good as a satisfaction of human nature with due regard to the governing value of its moral foundation. It is true that the reciprocation of nature and morality is "muted" by the Kantian formalism, and it has always been a reproach brought against Kant that he provides no concrete conception of human good congruent with his conception of human duty, though some have thought, with Carritt,* that he attempted to deduce concrete duties from the abstract form of duty. The ultimate moral principle is defensible only as it receives a purely formal interpretation, and is thus incapable of providing an account of moral good other than the goodness of the good will. For any further account of the specific goodness of good as a possession we are referred to "happiness" which is only connected with the good will by means of an ethical theology which is itself derived from, and only substantiated by, the outstanding disconnexion in question:—unless, indeed, we suppose the possessor of the good will finds its possession good as ministering to his moral self-esteem.†

* Cf. his *Theory of Morals*, pp. 78 *et seqq.*

† But cf. above p. 153, note || and p. 157, note *.

There is reason to believe that this set of difficulties has not been remote from Phillips's mind during the elaboration of his thesis. As he says in a private letter which I hope he will allow me to quote: "the Kantian conception of the moral principle as one which declares *how*, rather than *for what end*, we ought to act is important . . . but the Kantian account of the principle in terms of Reason or rational nature seems to miss something. In other words the command 'Respect' implies a judgment of value".

Now it seems to me that this often-emphasised imperfection in the Kantian moral philosophy is directly derived from his unsatisfactory account of human nature: I had almost said "accounts", for are we not left with a noumenal man or rational moral legislator, and a phenomenal man or sentient moral subject, that are at once the same man, and yet completely and essentially opposed men? All the sentient elements of human nature appear to belong to the phenomenal man, and the noumenal man seems to be left "high and dry" with no character other than the native urge to universalise the maxim of all actions that he takes to be under his control (though the phenomenal man who performs them is known to be subject to the laws of nature). The moral good of the noumenal man is the possession of a good will; the good of the phenomenal man is that harmony of impulse and accomplishment that we call "happiness": but what is the total good of the total man, or the real good of the real man? The former must be as incoherent as human nature itself conceived in the divided state in which Kant seems to leave it; the latter falls outside of the Kantian philosophy as a result of his overruling metaphysical agnosticism.

It would be easy, of course, to avoid these difficulties by rejecting Kant's analysis of moral experience; but I believe that all the present symposiasts would regard that as the rejection of the finest contribution to moral philosophy that twenty-two centuries of human thought have produced. That way is not open to *us*. And no one, I think, is likely to be willing to contract the moral good to the mere

possession of a good will (with or without self-esteem). Phillips, as I understand him, desires to avoid the scandalous gulf between the moral right and the moral good by means of a distinction between the latter and all the non-moral or natural goods that constitute the objective ends of human action. The moral good, he thinks, is not an end that we pursue but an " end "* that is achieved in the course of our pursuit of those objective ends in accordance with moral principle. In seeking private advantage in accordance with justice, or enjoying pleasure in accordance with benevolence, we promote amity ; in cultivating our natural aptitudes in accordance with cool self-love we promote creativity :† and the moral good is not the advantage, the pleasure, the aptitude, but the amity and the creativity, which depend on the rightness of our actions, however the objective ends may be divorced from it. If now it is thought that this distinction only transfers problems relating to moral good from one set of objects to another, the reply must be that this is to misinterpret the very point of the theory advanced, viz. that amity and creativity are not objects contemplated and pursued, but actions possessed, enjoyed, or, more precisely, enacted, when we rightly pursue objective ends. Thus though we may be in doubt whether to pursue advantage, pleasure,

* The distinction of objective ends and real " ends " is not new in the history of moral philosophy. The third formulation of the categorical imperative requires us to treat human beings always as ends (i.e. as things in themselves, even when they are others) and never as means (i.e. as objects, even when it is the self), though, as we know, moral action has no relation to the pursuit of ends (i.e. objective ends). Aristotle also is well within sight of it in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1094A, 1-5, 16-18) ; and if I am right in my elucidation, it is the key to the moral philosophy of Spinoza. It was first of all brought clearly to my own notice by my Edinburgh teacher, Mr. Henry Barker, in his lectures on Aristotle's ethics.

† This example might not be admitted by Phillips : it indicates the need that I shall suggest for amplification in his thesis, going beyond the admissions (indicated at the end of his paper) that moral conduct cannot, *prima facie*, be confined to the development of " community " among the well-disposed, but must in the end be defined with an eye to the indifferent and malevolent. I agree with Macbeath that this side of the theory needs development ; but also, again with Macbeath, that morality as such extends beyond *social* morality. My example from self-cultivation refers to this extension of the theory. I do not deny that with suitable definition the term " community " might be made to cover these amplifications, but it would need to include more than amity and to refer to non-human " others ".

or self-cultivation when they are competitive, the same doubt does not affect our attainment of moral good, for the right pursuit of any of these ends promotes it. It is only when we think of amity and creativity as objective ends of contemplation and pursuit that we regard them as competitive: in themselves they are co-operant modes of that active being that we possess, or are, as moral agents, and which alone constitutes the moral good.‡

IV. *Metaphysical Deduction.*

It is not my business as third symposiast to introduce radically new matter into the discussion, but I ought, I think, as briefly as possible to indicate the principles and foundation upon which my treatment of the papers of Phillips and Macbeath is based. This will involve me in some metaphysical theory, but I will continue to relegate as many details as possible to footnotes where they can be neglected by the tired or unsympathetic reader.

The distinction drawn by Phillips between the moral good and goods that are non-moral is, in my view, connected with Kant's distinction of things in themselves and objective phenomena, or, as I should express it, between things in their active being and the external, determined, appearances of things.§ An agent as he is in himself is to be distinguished

‡ I do not suggest that doubt will cease to infect our choice of objective ends, but only that the doubt ceases to provide a disabling ethical problem.

§ Spinoza's distinction between what is *in se* and what is *in alio*, first of all applied to the contrast of substance and its modes, is essentially the same. But, as becomes clear in the further development of the conception of a mode, and especially in his distinction of those modes that are infinite and eternal from those that are finite, the distinction is susceptible of two important interpretations, both essential to his system, according as the *aliud* is taken as (*i*) the *source* of the mode, as with the infinite and eternal modes, or (*ii*) its *complement*, as with the finite mode. In the former sense, *Natura naturans* is the *aliud* of *Natura naturata*; in the latter sense, the environment of the finite mode is its *aliud*. Further, while only the former sense applies to the infinite and eternal modes (which have no environment), both senses have legitimate application to the finite mode. This is especially worked out (in accordance with the emphasis of the *Ethics* on the application of ethical and metaphysical principles to human life) with reference to man, who is at once dependent on *Deus sive Natura*, and also faced by an environment with which he must make terms. *Qua in Deo* he is effectively *in se*, for *Natura* is the self's *aliud* only as its creative source, and not as its complement. Yet man's finiteness entails his partial dependence on his complementary *aliud* (which also derives from *Natura*). Thus, Spinoza argues, " part " of human

from the objective appearance that he presents for an external observer, or even for himself when he apprehends

nature is eternal (though it is a derived eternity), and " part " temporal and transitory. The special sense in which the finite mode is derived from *Deus sive Natura* involves the division and ambiguity of its nature ; and it is from this that the moral situation develops. The same ambiguity and division also exhibits itself epistemologically in the co-presence of the second and third kinds of knowledge with *imaginatio* which maintains its content in face of intellectual emendation (*Eth.* II, xxxv, Sch.). Perhaps wrongly, but certainly excusably, Spinoza identifies the eternal part of man with a part of his *mind*, and asserts that this part " remains " when the body is dead (*Eth.* V, xxiii). Corresponding on the mental side to this mortal body are the perceptions and memories that constitute the temporal mind of man. This dies with the body. The essence of Spinoza's contention, which seems to me correct, is that the finite mode that appears temporally as a psychophysical object, or embodied mind, is not the full and essential reality of that mode : something of it is eternal, i.e. *in se*, because *in Deo*,—a proposition that evidently corresponds with Descartes's *cogito ergo sum* as it is qualified by his insistence on the priority of the idea of God. A man is no mere object belonging to a determined system of objects—at the basis of that appearance *in alio* is a finite reality *in se* that is in part its eternal source, and that is active or free in the measure of its self-dependence. Man's dependence on *Deus sive Natura* is dependence, not on an object or objective system, but on a creative source or *nisus formativus*, a " well springing up into eternal life ", and the very root and essence of freedom. And this is the answer to those who hold, with de Burgh (*Philosophy*, XI, p. 286), that " moral experience is inexplicable on the basis of Spinoza's metaphysics ". Doubtless, Spinoza's theory of modes regarded *in alio* is a " thoroughgoing determinism " (as also is Kant's account of objects), though it is certainly not mechanistic (as with Kant) ; but the essence of his metaphysics is the transcendence of this system in the Real, both infinite and, at least in some cases, finite (as it is also with Kant,—though it has not been customary to say that moral experience is inexplicable on the basis of *Kant's* metaphysics). " If deliverance be possible ", says de Burgh, " it can only be by driving a breach through the nexus of determinism " ; I reply : But that is the essence of the metaphysics of Spinoza, and *not to have understood it is to have understood nothing*. And the most important contention of his moral philosophy is that man is free in so far as he *acts*, aware of his essential freedom as an *ens in se* (i.e. *in Deo*), and is in bondage in so far as he suffers, regarding himself as an *ens in alio* ; || and when Guzzo (*Il pensiero di B. Spinoza*, pp. 290-1) so " acutely " traces the exact point at which Spinoza " severed the deterministic chain " by introducing a " seemingly innocent *potest* " (*Eth.* III, xliii), we can only wonder that his acuity did not suffice to reveal to the learned Italian expositor that the breach in the chain, so far from being a breach in the theory, was an expression of its central point. For Spinoza's moral doctrine is a " naturalism " only in so far as human nature is taken as it essentially is for *scientia intuitiva*, and not merely as it appears in time for *imaginatio* ; and such a naturalism is identical with the theory I have defended against objective naturalism. It derives the authority of the right, and the character of the good, from the same source : the active nature of the agent that transcends his objective, determined, appearance as a part of the system of objective nature, and the satisfactions that belong to it. To mistake such a theory for mechanism is an error which, however natural for a tiro, is blamable in a trained philosopher, and in either case fatal.

|| But, continues de Burgh (*loc. cit.*), " the issue is how man can ever rise, conformably to Spinoza's system, from a lower plane of knowledge to a

his nature externally. In his essential nature he is no determined object but a free agent, though because he is

higher ". It is hard not to think that the difficulty here is primarily sophistic rather than Spinozistic. Does de Burgh really think that for Spinoza the " emendation of the intellect " is a causal process completely determined by the experiences the man may have chanced upon ? Does he not recognise that the " passage " from *imaginatio* to *ratio* and *scientia intuitiva* is no mere amassing of information or data, but a new way of intellectual life ? ¶ If however the difficulty that is felt is that improvement in knowledge takes time, and cannot therefore be immediately available at the arbitrary fiat of the agent, the reply is that this is explicitly stated by Spinoza. He even says that after the improvement has occurred the agent may, under the persistent allurement of *imaginatio*, " forget " and be unable to retrieve his enlightenment at the crucial moment. He recommends methods of self-cultivation to overcome this practical difficulty (*Eth.* V, x, Sch.). But this, surely, is common ground : a man cannot freely do something that never entered his head, or that he has forgotten. But to say that man is not free because his intelligence is limited, or his memory defective, is a grotesque exaggeration of human bondage. But the real point of the " emendation of the intellect " is, as I have said, not an advance to a more complicated mass of information, not an extended appeal to empirical data, but a self-revealing change of view from the objects to the agents, which is not reserved to the " wise and understanding ", but is already possessed by every man who is aware of himself as a free agent, and of his " other " as the world of his freedom. Cultivation of the intellect as it is directed towards objects often obscures this direct apprehension, so that we seriously wonder e.g. how we know other minds, or doubt the freedom that is in fact the simplest and nearest thing in our experience. The " passage " to *scientia intuitiva* means the reversal of this tendency to concentrate exclusively upon the contemplation of objects. It is an advance to a higher plane of knowledge only in the sense that it brings us back to reality, to action, in the self and in the " other ", and away from the passive, serial, determined, objective appearances. It is not a process determined by causes, or even by " linear inferences ", but a rebirth, a return to the self as an *ens in se*, no longer in bondage to a context of objects, but free in the measure of its finiteness, i.e. in the measure of its ability to find in its limiting " other " the real opening to a fuller action. Objective man as a section of objective nature is not free ; but the real man as a microcosm of *Natura* is free in the measure of his microcosmicity, i.e. his activity. Nor have we here two men, but one ; for this eternal action with its fecund limitations generates the system of objects in a time that, because it is generated, is wholly past, and issues from a present that is not temporal but eternal. This eternal active present is what we experience, and with it freedom ; time we remember, and our freedom then seems overwhelmed by that totality of freedom whose temporal appearance we call nature. But that is appearance and not experience, *imaginatio* and not *scientia intuitiva*, the *done* and not the *doing*. To parody Bacon : we must enter the kingdom of morality, like the kingdom of grace, *sub persona infantis*.

¶ In one sense, as I have noted (p. 168, note §), the " emendation " is never complete : the object of *imaginatio* does not disappear when we recognise its illusoriness (*Eth.* II, xxxv, Sch.). The emendation is " intellectual "—but not therefore less effective, either epistemologically or morally. Recognised illusions do not illude ; *alia* recognised as *in Deo* do not obstruct, but become the essential field of finite freedom. Only the bad potter, or the unfortunate one who is restricted to unsuitable, intractable matter, finds the clay resistant ; only the naïve realist resents the dubiety of the given,

finite his action bears relation to other agents that thus appear objectively in his experience, and constitute his external spatio-temporal world of qualitied things. Space-time itself is the appearance of action : its spatio-temporality, of the agent's own action ; its limiting contours, of the actions of his " others ".* Now the ethical situation is set by this unique relationship of a real self or agent with his own spatio-temporal appearances as embodied mind, and to the spatio-temporal objects constituting its environment and manifesting other real selves or agents. In its rudimentary stages morality is chiefly concerned with the objective appearances of agents, that is, with things regarded as means to the achievement of objective ends : though on the side of the self the moral appeal is never divorced from some degree of realisation of its status as an *ens in se* and the real source of the actions standing under moral valuation. And this, as I think Phillips rightly suggests, in all well-conceived moral education becomes more and more central, and ways of behaving in relation to the behaviour of other agents take precedence of the realisation of objective ends. For this development concerns not only the appreciation of the possibility of free action on the part of the self in relation to " others " conceived as objects standing in objective relations with the embodied mind : it also involves a more discerning apprehension of those " others " as no mere animated contours of space-time, but as *agents*, in their measure constituted, as is the self, by inner real actions. It involves this, and a congruent relation of the acting self with its acting " others ". Morality, as a way of behaving, thus involves relations of the moral agent with his moral context of persons, animals, and things, as they are in themselves, i.e. as *agents*, not objects. Morality is therefore a movement from objectivity to reality, from things in process to agents in action, from external adjustment or disharmony to internal action or resistance, from the acquisition or rejection of objects

* For a somewhat fuller account of this metaphysical basis, I must refer the interested reader to the article " On Things in Themselves " in *Philosophy*, XIV, pp. 155-179.

to the possession of, or resistance to, action, from adjustment or inconcinnity to virtue or impotence. The true moral good of a finite agent is not something that he can acquire and attach to himself as an object: it is his own proper action as a thing in himself standing in relation with his limiting and reciprocating context of "others", that are themselves agents and not objects. And this, I take it, is the point of the third formulation of the categorical imperative: "So act as to treat humanity . . . in every case as an end, and never as means only"; we must treat the "other" as a thing in itself, and not merely as an object or phenomenon. Kant, it is true, limits the obligation to human, or at least rational, beings: and this is connected, perhaps, with his general metaphysical agnosticism, which is only modified by the necessity of discovering moral principles applicable to human relations. But there seems to me to be no other basis for the limitation; and, indeed, there is every reason to broaden the scope of morality to include relations with "others" of every class, from the *ens perfectissimum* down to the least of beings flickering on the limits of non-being: though, doubtless, our relations with other men inevitably occupy a very large and important part of our interests. *Homini nihil homine utilius.*

The moral good, then, is the action of the agent as an *ens in se.* If the agent is *infinite*, its action is perfectly free and related to its "other" only as creator to created. This is the good of *Deus sive Natura naturans*: its "other" is *Natura naturata*, and its action is creation "out of nothing". Here the moral right, the moral good, and the objective good are identical, and distinguished only for an objectifying intellect. If, on the other hand, the agent is *finite*, he will stand related to an "other" that he has not produced but which is given, and in relation to which he must work out his derived freedom. This "other" will be roughly divisible into (*i*) agents superior to him in perfection, on which he depends; (*ii*) agents of his own kind, to which he stands in relations of mutuality: and (*iii*) agents inferior to him, which nevertheless he may

put to good use. His action with respect to each of these types of "other" will depend on these relations, and will be right action when it is appropriate to them. The moral good will be the action itself as it is properly adjusted to its "other" as that "other" is in itself: that is, the agent's moral good is his own action, or strength, or virtue, as it achieves the degree of freedom proper to its finite nature in its relation with its complement. But here, though the moral right and the moral good are essentially related, the objective goods or ends sought after by the finite agent may not be in harmony with the dictates of his inerrable conscience: for they may be sought as objects, as means to the advantage of the agent, or his associates, in their objective appearance as embodied minds, and not as they are in their active being as "others" capable of entering into appropriate relations of community or dependence. Morality requires appropriate relation with the "other", whether it be divine, or human, or animal, or material. And by "appropriate" I mean suited to its real character as an *agent* and not as an object. Appropriate relation arises from the realisation that the "other" has an activity of its own, and is not a mere passive material for our exploitation. It is this attitude to his "material" that makes the good shoemaker, the good artist, the good cook, the good golfer: "sympathy", we are apt to call it in common life, with his tools, his medium, his raw material. We can use the "other" as means only in so far as we are willing to admit that it is, in itself, in its measure, an end. Much more, then, in our relations with our equals is it proper to treat them "as ends, and never as means only". Indeed, since here the appropriate relation is normally one of mutuality, we must be prepared sometimes to subordinate our physical and psychical powers in due measure to the ends of our associates. Only so can our real agency be made free. Again, in our relations with agents more perfect than man, the same principles will apply, though with an added emphasis on the propriety of subordinating our objective powers and ends as means

to more lofty purposes and satisfactions.* But here the difficulty we meet in grasping such ends, and in gaining assurance of the identity of the more perfect agents, " puzzles the will ".

It appears, then, that the main problem of the finite moral life is how to achieve " community " with the given " other " so as to secure, in lieu of the abstract† spontaneity that it curbs, the concrete freedom that it offers. The solution of the problem thus generalised will depend as much on the nature of the " other " as on that of the self: you " cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear ", or a Mercury of quicksilver, or a friend out of an inveterate bully, or a God of the State. Thus the Kantian injunction to " treat humanity in every instance as an end, and never as means only " can apply, after all, only in so far as men are " rational beings ", i.e. free agents, things in themselves, but not in so far as they are objects belonging to a system of nature that is, at least in some measure, heteronomous. Here ends and means must be arranged according to the requirements of mutuality. It would thus be truer to say that the *ens perfectissimum* alone ought always to be treated as a thing in itself and *never* as an object, as end and *never* as means; while man, who combines a rational and a sentient nature, i.e. is a thing in himself appearing as an object, should be treated as both end and means: as end, in so far as he is an agent; as means, in so far as he is an object.‡ We may use a man's body, as he uses it himself, as porter or caddie; we may even use his mind,

* " But I need, now as then,
Thee, God, who mouldest men!
And since not even while the whirl was worst,
Did I,—to the wheel of life,
With shapes and colours rife,
Bound dizzily,—mistake my end, to slake Thy thirst:
So take and use Thy work . . . "
(Rabbi ben Ezra).

† " Abstract " because the agent, as finite, falls short of the spontaneity that is creation " out of nothing ".

‡ Kant's phrase is: " as ends, and never as means *only* ". It is only the *ens imperfectissimum* that should be treated as means only and never as end, as object and not as agent: for this is its true nature as the ideal limit of unideality.

as we use the expert or the teacher; but we may not use his will (or even his impulses) for our own ends. And even when we use some part of him as a means, we can only do so effectively in so far as we enter into the *agency* of that part, and treat it as an end and not as a means† —we must use it "sympathetically" as we say. So that the distinction of end and means, like that of form and matter to which it is related, is relative and not absolute; and *morality, in the end, is the discovery of the appropriate hierarchical "community" of the hierarchical self with its hierarchical "other"*. Morality is dissipated when either the self or its "other" fails to recognise the moral good: for thus the relation is transformed to one of discrepance or even opposition. It is equally, or even more fatally, impaired where both self and "other" remain unenlightened: for then a lower "community" may blind both to the illusoriness of their satisfaction.‡ For there is a "community" that is mutilated by objectivity, and a satisfaction that is temporal and therefore transitory. This is that *summum periculum* of which Spinoza speaks as a "mortal disease" for which we must seek a remedy with all our strength;§ it is, indeed, the essence of vice: to be satisfied with what is by nature unsatisfying; to rest in a "community" that is infected with transiency; to treat the self and its "other" as means and not as ends—as objects and not as agents; or *per contra*, to treat as agents, things mutilated by objectivity—as ends, what for the agent should be no more than means, though they may be ends for some inferior being in the hierarchical Real.

It is with moral good, however, and not with vice, that we are now concerned, and my point is that because it involves both self and its "other" it must be related not only with

† This corresponds with the principle that everything in the object except its spatio-temporality is agency. Space-time is the pure object (= O); and even this is an emanation of the finite agency of the self. Cf. p. 171, note *.

‡ "The mind is engrossed by (sensual indulgence) to such a degree as to rest in it as in some good, and is thereby entirely prevented from thinking of anything else, but, after it has been satisfied, there follows a very great melancholy, which, if it does not check the action of the mind, nevertheless disturbs and blunts it". (B. d. S., *De Intell. Emend.*, sect. 4).

§ *De Intell. Emend.*, sect. 7.

" community " in the sense of amity and affection towards the well-disposed " other ", but also in the sense of toleration of the discrepant " other ", and opposition to the malevolent. Yet even when we oppose the will of the " other ", and his impulses, or " let him go his own gait ", we must do so in accordance with the principle that he must be treated " as an end, and not as a means only " : by open war, or generous toleration, and not by wile or indifference ; that is, by active relation or " community ". Not to do so is *also* the surest way of arousing his resentment. And it is in this sense that I have suggested that all these relations might be summed up under the general name of " community " ; though doubtless the action that is friendship or love is stronger, richer, more virtuous, than that which takes the form of the control of malice, observant toleration of the discrepant, or even heroic opposition to tyranny. Nevertheless these lesser actions are part of the moral good for such an agent as man. Though, as Bradley says, " we begin by trying to alter the faults of those about us, we go on to make the best of them, and perhaps end by loving them ",‖ yet the transition from correction to toleration, and from toleration to affection, does not precede but *occupies* the moral life, and the free man can enjoy his own proper good in so far as he is " strong against fortune, magnanimous against injustice, bold in face of poverty, disease, and persecution ".¶

I have just spoken of friendship and love, of heroic antagonism and generous toleration, as diverse forms of the " community " that defines the moral good of a finite agent coming to terms with his " other " : let me, in conclusion, attempt very briefly to correlate these variants with the typical circumstances in relation with which their claims to rightness might be made good. I said that an infinite agent is wholly occupied with pure creation : but I do not think that creative action is confined to the infinite, but that in his measure each finite agent, as an agent, is engaged in creative action, though he is compelled

‖ *Aphorisms*, 47.

¶ G. Bruno, *De gl' heroici furori*, II, i, iv. (181).

by his context of " otherness " to work through a material with which he must achieve " community " if his action is to be really productive. The " other " is the self's " opening ", at once limiting and enfranchising it, at once its negation and its determination. And this creativity, whatever may be the material with which it works, seems to me the essential moral good of the finite agent, just as it is the sole good of an infinite agent creating things " out of nothing ". This good is not other than the diverse goods I have spoken of as falling under the general head of " community " : for it permeates them all as the essential effort of which they are the variants when creativity is diminished by a material that is not always congenial. For the material may be either responsive, or indifferent, or refractory : it may even be actively conjugate on the one hand, or irreconcilable on the other ; and to each of these types there must correspond an appropriate form of " community " or active relation. In relation to the conjugate " other ", the moral good of the agent is that mutual possession of self and " other " that at all levels we call " love " ;* in relation to the responsive " other ", it is friendship, concinnity, or virtuosity, according to the level of the " other " ; in relation to the indifferent or insouciant, it is invitation or experiment ; in relation to the refractory, observant toleration ; and in relation to the irreconcilable, opposition, rising in its more disinterested

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* " Was this the face that launched a thousand ships
And burnt the topless towers of Ilium ?
Sweet Helen, make me immortal with a kiss.
Her lips suck forth my soul : see where it flies !
Come, Helen, come ; give me my soul again.
Here will I dwell, for heaven is in these lips,
And all is dross that is not Helena ".

(Marlowe, *Doctor Faustus*).

We must have resort to poetry in the verbal expression of " community ", for thus only do we intellectually create, and relate ourselves to, *agents* and not objects. This is the essence of " beauty " in art : " It is by our ability to call souls out of the abyss that time judges us ", says George Moore, speaking of the poet and the novelist ; the so-called " emotive content ", as logical positivists have obscurely recognised, is, or at least may be, the expression of metaphysical reality.

forms to heroic passion.† For he who realises his essential transcendence as an eternal agent, is no longer under the influence of those fears and desires that relate solely to objects and their beneficial or destructive effects upon the embodied mind that, in objective perception, he appears to be. Such an agent can be truly disinterested: "content in the midst of torment, tormented in the midst of content",‡ he will "think of death least of all things".§ "Difficulty", says Bruno in a well-known flight of intellectual passion, "is ordained to check poltroons. Things ordinary and easy are for the vulgar. But rare, heroic, divine men pass along the way of difficulty, that necessity may be constrained to yield them the palm of immortality".||

† "The soul must reach the point when it no longer regards but despises fatigue, and the more . . . the struggle of vicious enemies rages, the more it must aspire and rise, and pass with a single breath if it may be, over this mountain of difficulty. Here there is no need for other arms or shield than the grandeur of an unconquerable mind, the endurance of a spirit that maintains the serenity of its life". (G. Bruno, *loc. cit.* (179)).

‡ *Loc. cit.* (171).

§ B. d. S., *Eth.* IV., lxvii.

|| *La Cena de la Ceneri*, II. (32).

SYMPOSIUM: THE PRESENT-DAY RELEVANCE OF HUME'S DIALOGUES CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION.

By PROF. A. E. TAYLOR, PROF. J. LAIRD, AND PROF. T. E. JESSOP.

I.—*By* A. E. TAYLOR.

MY contribution to our discussion will have to consist chiefly in playing the useful but ungracious part of the *advocatus diaboli*, since repeated study of Hume's Dialogues leaves me convinced that their permanent worth is commonly over-estimated. With all their incidental flashes of insight, I find them, like everything Hume wrote on philosophy after the youthful Treatise, wanting in high seriousness and logical coherency. I fear we might say of the Hume of the *Inquiries* and *Dialogues* what Housman wrote of Richard Bentley, that his wish to discover truth was not equal to his capacity for discovering it. In the *Dialogues* this is sufficiently indicated by one ominous fact: the argument turns avowedly on the postulate of the omnipresence of *causal* order in nature, though the writer must have been aware that on his own principles he had no right whatever to make any such postulate.

Philo the sceptic and Cleanthes the "experimental" theist are agreed on the principle that *like causes prove like* effects and that conversely likeness in the effect, if close enough, will prove likeness in the cause. But Hume must have known that he had himself professedly shown that there can be no rational inference from cause to effect, or from effect to cause.

A criticism of *religious* convictions by Hume could not well have been other than superficial for a deeper reason. Criticism is always superficial unless it is inspired by sympathetic insight and an adequate sense of the significance of the issues at stake. No one will ever criticize religion or

the theology in which it tries to give systematic form to its convictions, unless he feels that it matters vitally to him and to all of us whether the affirmations of religion are true or false. The critic may hate religion as Shelley did in his *Queen Mab* days, but at least he must care enough about it to hate it. And it is so manifest that when Hume sat down to discuss the issue described by himself as that between theism and atheism, he did not " care " in any vital sense. At best he has only a languid speculative interest in the whole problem ; to him it is no more than a question about the possibility of identifying the " cause of order " in nature ; it makes no difference to the real and important concerns of life in what sense we answer the question, or whether we put it boldly on one side as an insoluble riddle. Only a profound indifferentism, which would have been as repugnant to Shelley as to Pascal, could sit down contentedly with Hume's conclusion that the disagreement between theist and atheist is no more than an empty verbal wrangle about the relative importance of the substantive and the adjective in a formula in which both parties at bottom concur. Hume's proposed eirenicon is in spirit suspiciously like the popular agnosticism of the self-educated of sixty years ago as summed up by Archbishop Magee : " We know nothing whatever about it, don't you know ; let's split a B and S." When Kant subsequently worked much of the material supplied by Hume into his own criticism of theology, he raised the discussion to a higher level. But he could only do so because he looked to philosophy for the decision and in answer to two questions of vital importance on which philosophy as understood by Hume has nothing to say : *what ought I to do and what may I hope for* ?

It does not surprise me, therefore, that Hume's Dialogues can be seen to suffer from very grave deficiencies. None of the interlocutors is a satisfactory representative of the cause his creator apparently wishes him to uphold ; for lack of proper initial determination of the problem, none of them knows clearly what he could be at ; all of them are ready not only to contradict themselves but to indulge freely in patent fallacies of *petitio principii* and *ignoratio*

elenchi. This would have been dramatically right if Hume's purpose had been merely to expose the rambling and inconclusive fashion in which such a topic as " natural religion " was apt to be discussed by the average gentleman of the eighteenth century, but the pains he was at to ensure posthumous publication seem to show that he designed more than this—apparently he held that he was making a material contribution to the criticism of the claims of theism on our acceptance. If so, the value of his work manifestly does depend very much on the clarity with which the issue is defined, the fidelity with which the speakers abide by that issue and the soundness of their logic. Comment on these points is thus in place.

Now the issue under discussion has *apparently* been defined precisely enough in the opening paragraph of Pt. II by Demea with the express assent of Philo. It is admitted as certain that there is a " God " that is, in the words of Philo—an " original cause of the universe " ; we have only to ask whether we know what that cause is, and more particularly whether, as Cleanthes asserts, it can be shown to be a supreme designing mind. It is then taken as conceded, even by Philo the champion of scepticism, that " this universe " is known to be, as a whole, an effect of something other than itself. (If Philo is meant as a representative of Hume's philosophical scepticism, we have, of course, no right to concede that " this universe " or anything else *has* such a cause, as Hume must have known.) Once laid down, this initial hypothesis itself cannot properly be called in question while we are still debating the further issue whether, given the existence of such a cause we can determine its nature, and Hume (or, at any rate, Philo) seems to have no suspicion that this elementary rule of logical procedure has been violated, for at the end of the whole conversation we find him propounding a certain thesis about " the cause of the universe " as the outcome of the debate. Yet Philo himself has in the meanwhile changed the whole issue by attempting to argue that the "material universe " needs no " cause " at all, but may be self-existent. And neither Demea nor Cleanthes seems alive to the way in which their interlocutor is playing fast and loose with the problem.

In point of fact, the apparent precision with which the original issue was determined is illusory ; neither " cause " nor " universe " has been defined, and both terms are allowed to shift their meaning in the course of the conversation. As to the second of them Philo is the great offender. When he wishes to go back on his own initial position and to suggest that the " universe " needs no cause, his reasoning is founded on the ambiguous and dubious assertion that the " universe " is a *singular event*, not a *species*. He apparently means that the whole " universe " is one thing and an unique thing, not a member of the class of " universes," and then to argue that casual connexion is only discernable where one can compare " like circumstances," *i.e.*, members of a class. To say nothing of the dubiousness of one of the premises of this reasoning (the proposition that the " universe " is in any relevant sense a single thing), the argument is an *ignoratio elenchi* : all that it could prove at most is that we are not in a position to discover the cause of the " universe", not that it has none but is " itself " the necessary being (the conclusion Philo is professing to prove here). But I will let that pass, merely remarking that to make Philo's statement that " the universe " is a singular event intelligible, we must take the term to stand for a totality of some kind, whether the aggregate of all existents, or as seems rather to be meant, the aggregate of all bodies. But when we read Pt. VI we find that Philo has now forgotten the importance of this proposition to him. To damage the appeal of Cleanthes to wise design in the structure of the universe, Philo now insists that before we draw such a conclusion we must compare *this* " universe " with the whole range of other possible or even real " universes." The word seems now to have taken on the restricted sense of solar (or perhaps stellar) system ; in any case it has come to stand for a " species."

There is an equal ambiguity in the use of the term " cause." It is never clear, all through the argument, what the speakers mean by a *cause* of the universe ; do they mean an originative source of its *whole reality*, or only, as much of their language would suggest, a source of the *order* in nature ?

When Cleanthes offers us a proof of the existence of God and Philo undertakes to refute it, what is meant by " God," a *Creator* or only an " architect of the universe " ? The distinction was as well-known in Hume's day, and many centuries before Hume, as it is today, and it will make a great difference to your religion whether you mean the one or the other, but which Cleanthes and Philo suppose themselves to mean is perhaps undiscoverable. Hume, or his personages, are discussing the question whether we can know what the cause of the universe is without knowing what they mean either by the " universe " or by a cause of it ; and this hardly augurs well for their chances of reaching results of permanent value.

The logic of Cleanthes is no better than that of Philo, but since Cleanthes has received full measure for his faults and perhaps a little more, from Professor Kemp Smith, I will mention only two instances of this. Since he rests the whole case on what he calls the " experimental " argument from design in nature, he ought at least to state this argument very carefully in a way that will not expose it to unfair and captious criticism. When he has said (Pt. V) of the order of nature that it is " the image of mind reflected from innumerable objects " he has said just what the " teleological proof " requires him to say, neither more nor less, and if he had gone no further, most of the rhetoric with which Philo retorts on him would have been irrelevant. He wantonly plays into Philo's hand and gives his own case away by the quite gratuitous addition that by *mind* he means " a mind like the human and the liker the better." He does not see that all the " likeness " required by the design argument is simply likeness in the character distinctive of mentality as such, without which it could not be what it is, meaningful and, in Paley's phrase, " prospective " activity. But for his gratuitous further concessions Philo would be precluded from advancing the objection (Pt. VII) that he is judging of the origin of the whole by " the operation of one very small part of nature, to wit man, upon another very small part, to wit the inanimate matter lying within his reach."

So again even we who have not Demea's confidence in the "simple and sublime" argument *a priori*, should at least be able to see that Cleanthes' supposed refutation of it is a mere *petitio principii*. "Whatever we conceive as existent we can also conceive as non-existent," says Cleanthes, and this is one of the premises of his syllogism. As though it had not always been the point of the champions of the "proof *a priori*" that there *is* something which we can conceive to exist, but cannot conceive not to exist. It is the business of Cleanthes as the advocate of "experimental" theism, either to satisfy us that this proposition is self-evident or to disprove it; he is not at liberty to use the contradictory of it as part of its own proof.

It has been suggested that Cleanthes is Hume's *nom de theâtre* for Butler, but Hume must have read the Analogy to little purpose if he really thought it likely either that a man of Butler's precision of thought would commit this *petitio principii* or have had no clearer ideas about the nature of analogical reasoning than those which Cleanthes must be made to hold in order to give Philo his opening.

It is characteristic of Cleanthes that, for all his confidence in the teleological argument for the existence of Deity, his conception of "prospective contrivance" is unduly external; to him it is visible apparently only in the form of manufacture; his Deity is no more than an exceptionally skilful artisan piecing together materials to compose a machine for the execution of a determinate piece of work. There is a profounder "prospective contrivance" than this in any example of a rightly proportioned work of art or a well-lived life, but of this Cleanthes seems wholly unconscious. There is here no adequate presentment of the teleological reading of nature as understood by Butler, or even by Paley, who, with all his short-comings has a much richer fund of shrewd and balanced sense than is commonly allowed by detractors who have probably never read his works.

Nor is Philo, I think (though I say it with all deference to Professor Kemp Smith), a very worthy spokesman of scepticism. There is a kind of scepticism which we can

hardly prize too highly, the searching critical scepticism which will permit no assumption in philosophy to pass until it has made its claims good under the severest scrutiny of unsleeping intelligence. But such scepticism is methodical and in principle uncompromisingly rational; its very foundation is confidence in the rationality of things. It is precisely because the sceptic of this type is so assured that any account of things which represents them as they really are must be wholly reasonable, that he is always anxious to probe every assertion submitted to him to its depths, and assure himself that it does not conceal some unsuspected irrationality before he will accept it. This is not the scepticism of Philo. His is what Pamphilus justly describes as a " careless " scepticism ; Cleanthes hardly goes too far when he speaks of it as " rambling." His business is not to bring his opponent's " experimental " theology to the test of confrontation with assured principles of reason, but merely to throw out a succession of objections which are, or can be temporarily made to look, plausible without much concern for their compatibility with one another. He tells us, for example (Pt. VII), that the world " plainly resembles more an animal or a vegetable than it does a watch or a knitting-loom," so that, if we are to trust to analogical reasoning, we ought to ascribe its formation to unintelligent " generation " rather than to conscious design. The point is a capital one in his reasoning and is treated as such, *e.g.*, by Professor Kemp Smith. Yet the same speaker subsequently tells us (Pt. X) that he " believes " all the objections to the argument from design, of which he has made so much, are " mere cavils and sophisms," and that " a purpose, an intention, a design, strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker ; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems, as at all times to reject it." " Supposing there were a God," he concludes, " were it possible for him to give stronger proofs of his existence, than what appear on the whole face of nature ? " The scepticism which can so lightheartedly contradict itself can hardly be very formidable to the believer ; the theist himself, in the interests of his doctrine must be anxious to see the case for

the opposition conducted by an advocate who has some regard for principles, and is not, like Philo, a mere " talker for victory."

Demea, again, suffers from a profound and hopeless confusion of mind. He is introduced as the champion of " orthodoxy," but his orthodoxy would certainly be dangerously like gross heresy by the standards of any known Christian community. As a professed enthusiast for the " simple and sublime " argument *a priori* (which, by the way, he states in a way which confuses the " ontological " with the " cosmological " argument), he should be a strict rationalist in his theology, and the impression that he means to be one is confirmed by our discovery that the only access to knowledge of God he will recognize is that of the " way of revotion," refusal to assert of the " supreme being " any predicate which has an intelligible and determinate meaning. According to him, the character of the " supreme being " is simply utterly unknowable ; any attempt to say anything significant about God is " anthropomorphism." He is, in fact, doing exactly what Bradley accused Herbert Spencer of doing, professing to worship something as God simply because no one can say " what the devil it can be." He, too, reaches his position by a glaring *petitio principii*, the verbal substitution of the phrase " *adorable* mysteriousness " for complete unknowability, though no one is permitted to utter the pertinent rejoinder that of that which is by hypothesis completely unknowable we cannot tell whether it is adorable or the reverse. It should not be necessary to add that, however reached, the thesis that God is simply an insoluble enigma is not, and never has been, Christian " orthodoxy." It is only made to look orthodox by confusing the familiar and highly orthodox proposition that God cannot be *comprehended* by the human intellect with the wholly different assertion that God is completely inapprehensible. Demea has been supposed to be intended as a representative of the theology of Clarke, but whatever may be the defects of Clarke's famous Boyle lectures, they are, at least, no exposition of this purely " negative " theology. If Hume really meant Demea to stand for Clarke, we could

only conclude that he is criticizing what he can never have read with intelligent attention. Professor Kemp Smith has said much that is very true about Cleanthes as an *esprit borné*. He does not know where to look for the positive evidence for his " experimental " theism, or even how to make the best use of such evidence as he does produce. But, as against the pseudo-rationalism of Demea, Cleanthes is wholly right in insisting that a natural theology which confines itself to the " way of revotion " will lead nowhere.

I cannot then regard Hume's *Dialogues* as covering more than a fragment of the ground which would have to be traversed by a really thorough-going sceptical " critique of all speculative theology." They constitute at best, as I think Professor Kemp Smith would allow, an assault on one out of several converging lines of theistic reasoning, the " argument from design," and the argument from design, taken by itself, as I shall not only admit but contend, does not suffice to justify what a worshipper of God means by belief in God. The question is whether it contributes anything at all to the case for a theism which, taken alone, it is insufficient to establish. If we accept the destructive criticism of Philo, we shall have to concede either (1) that it contributes nothing at all to the case, or (2) alternatively, that even granting that it does yield some faint possibility that the " order of the universe " is due to the " prospective contrivance " of an intelligence or intelligences, it does nothing to show that this intelligence (or intelligences) has (or have) the moral characteristics which would make it (or them) deserving of our love, trust, or devotion. I want to urge on the contrary that as regards (1) the evidence is immensely stronger than Hume was willing to allow, and as regards (2) that his own reasoning in the contrary sense is vitiated all through by a single glaring false assumption characteristic of his century.

As to (1) we need, in our discussion of the cause of " order in the universe," in the first place to distinguish two senses of " order " which are all through confused by Hume's disputants, though they are really quite distinct, " causal order " (to use the terminology of Professor Stout)

and "teleological order," organic structure such that—in the language of Kant—the part, in its structure and working, can only be understood by reference to the whole of which it is a part. As Kant rightly maintained, order in both senses is characteristic of the living and organic, but it might be doubted at first sight whether teleological order is to be found in inanimate nature. Philo's attempts to account for the presence of teleological order in the organic realm without presupposing the all-pervading presence of "prospective contrivance," and of mind, are pretty clearly the weakest part of his case, but there might be more to be said, at least at first sight, for his view that there are no traces of it in the inanimate environment of organisms and so no evidence for an originative mind as the source of the universe. We might then, perhaps, if we, like Philo, are willing to make our appeal to that *asylum ignorantiae* the "unknown possibilities of nature," suppose that prospectively contriving mind has somehow itself come into being in the *cursas ordinarius* of an order of nature which is merely causal; where mind has made its appearance and is operative there will subsequently be teleological order, as far as the action of mind is effective, but the sphere of these operations is, as Philo has said, narrowly restricted.

This is, I suppose, the view commonly adopted in his every-day thinking by the average naturalistic man of science, when he allows himself to forget the metaphysical epiphenomenalism which is his theoretical creed. But there is one objection to it which is, to my own mind fatal, and has been stated so fully and forcibly by Professor Stout in his *Mind and Matter* that it will be enough for me here simply to mention it without repeating Professor Stout's arguments against it. The supposed production of mind in an originally mindless universe would involve causality of an unique kind, wholly unparalleled elsewhere in the causal order of the physical world. It would not be, like the causal processes which we follow up in our study of physical nature, a reformation and continuation of antecedent conditions controlled by the maintenance of a fundamental physical constant or constants (such as energy or mass); it would, as

Professor Stout has said, be quite literally creation of mind out of mothing, and creation without a creator. But creation *ex nihilo*, even with a creator, is not a process of the natural order at all, and the conception of it lies outside the range of science. A philosopher who is also a Christian or Jew or Moslem may believe in the reality of the fact, but he believes in it as a mystery which cannot be made intelligible to the human mind. It would be the death of science to reckon with it as something of which the *modus operandi* is understood, one process among others going to make up the causal order which he sets himself to follow out and of which he hopes to formulate the law. Hence, every philosopher who has ever seriously envisaged the question has, I believe, come to the conclusion that there is no reason to believe that mind has ever come into being as a result of the causal process in inanimate nature, and every reason to believe that it has not, but must be reckoned with as present and operative throughout the whole course of nature, including the enormous stretch of astronomical time which we are taught by science to look on as preceding the appearance of organisms in any part of the universe of which we have any knowledge.

Incidentally, we may remark that this consideration disposes at once of an argument of which Philo makes some parade. We repeatedly see intelligence caused by generation, he says, whenever an animal begets its like, but we never see generation caused by intelligence (or design). This is, of course, formally the familiar fallacy of the "unexplored remainder." Philo singles out the most strikingly obvious antecedent to the appearance of the new organism, the copulation of the parent organisms, and treats it as by itself the complete cause or condition of the event, forgetting that this is no more than a convenient abstractive device, and that the full causal explanation of the event is impossible without taking into account the whole background of the universe. He talks as a man might talk if he supposed the dropping of the match into the powder-barrel to be the complete cause of the ensuing explosion. If there is good reason to regard the presence and operation of mind as

all-pervasive throughout the frame of things, his statement that we constantly see intelligence produced from generation will no longer be true in the sense in which it requires to be true for the purpose of his reasoning. All-pervasive intelligence will be there as part of the unexplored background of every natural event, and he has no right to assume that it has been idle and inoperative. All that he has proved is merely that the particular embodied intelligences of the parents (who may, indeed, have been drunk at the time) were not concerned in the production of the result—a proposition which Cleanthes himself would be under no need to deny.

Further—it is not in the least a novel or original remark on my part—we may pertinently ask how it is that if the causal order in the universe at large is due to some cause foreign to intelligence, we ever come to discover that order and to discover it the more fully as intelligence develops. The mere existence of a causal order in virtue of which the character of present events determines how they shall be continued would not of itself afford any guarantee that this order should be ascertainable to us. It is easy to think of comparatively small differences in the detailed constitution of our environment which would have made the discovery of causal laws in nature at large impossible to us. Yet they have already been largely discovered and it is at least a working faith without which the pursuit of science would soon die out from mankind that the more resolutely we set ourselves to discover them, the more successful we shall be. The more completely we realize our apparently unfavourable position as denizens of a small satellite of an insignificant star lost among the many other millions of stars in the universe, the more marvellous must our success in penetrating the secrets of nature appear to ourselves, so long as we think of ourselves naturalistically. If the fact impressed Hume's contemporaries less than it impresses us, they have the sound excuse that they could hardly have anticipated the successes we have witnessed, since in their day nothing was known of sub-molecular physics, chemistry was in its infancy, and astronomy had nothing certain to

teach of anything beyond the limits of a not yet fully explored solar system. From the point of view of our fuller knowledge, how are we to explain our knowledge of nature ; how are we to account for the adaptation of the gigantic natural order around us to our faculty of thought, except, indeed, on the Platonic assumption that there is an intelligence embedded in the whole structure of nature to which man is responsive ? If the causal order is itself the product of intelligence, we can understand why it should disclose itself progressively to our intelligence as our intelligence develops ; if it is independent of intelligence, the whole success of science would seem to be due to a pre-established harmony which is a wholly unintelligible mystery without why or wherefore. The full force of the " argument from design " will never be appreciated so long as we are content to reduce it to the contention that since a watch has a watch-maker a universe must have a universe-maker. The real and irresistible argument is rather that our success in increasing understanding of the pattern of things is itself the evidence that the pattern is due to omnipresent all-pervading intelligence as its source. The enormous extension of our scientific knowledge of physical reality since the days of Hume has not weakened the force of the argument ; it has made it immeasurably stronger.

To turn to the consideration of teleological order in particular, the type of order which is specially contemplated in the argument from design as commonly stated. We may describe the general character of teleological order well enough by Paley's phrase, which I have already used more than once," prospective contrivance." Still better we may speak of it with Kant as the type of order found in any complex such that the structure and behaviour of the parts is only intelligible by reference to the whole or which they are parts. Cleanthes is, of course, wrong in reasoning so often, as he does, as though the one typical example of such teleological order were a machine constructed to execute a determinate piece of work. Nothing is less machine-like than a finely wrought poem or other work of art, or a worthily and wisely lived life. The full significance and

justification of the phrasing and rhythm of the individual lines of the poem, or the arrangement of its stanzas, is only to be found in the total effect of the whole upon the duly sensitive and intelligent hearer. The significance and justification of a man's conduct during a given episode of his life is unintelligible apart from the context of that episode in just this whole life of devotion to just these ideals. Hence a peculiarity of rhythm or phrasing which would be a blemish in a poem aiming at a different total effect may be a conspicuous beauty in the poem before me, because it contributes to the particular effect the whole is intended to produce ; an act which in a different setting would be a fault may actually be virtuous where it is called for by the demands of devotion, in some special setting, to a worthy ideal. The purpose of a poem—unless it is deliberately didactic, and, in fact, propagandist, and so artistically bad—or the ruling purpose of a whole life worthily lived cannot be set forth in any single unambiguous formula like that which describes the effect for whch a machine has been designed. Any formula which will fittingly describe the purpose of either (*e.g.*, that the purpose of the poem is " to hold the mirror up to nature," or to recall emotion to our contemplation in tranquillity, or the purpose of the life to " glorify God " or to serve mankind) must necessarily have an indetermination in it which is a reflection of the freedom characteristic alike of great art and of noble living. But the poem or the life are none the less through and through expressions of purpose ; to be aimless would be ruinous to either. Indeed, both are truly more adequate examples of purposive activity than the construction of watches, houses and ships. For the good poem and the good life are embodiments of purposive activities which are worth pursuing simply on their own account, for their inherent goodness, whereas the making of watches, houses and ships is only worth while because of the inconveniences to which we should be put if we could not measure the lapse of time, shelter our bodies against the cold, or communicate with one another across the seas.

Understanding teleology in this sense, then, it is of

course obvious and is not denied by any of the speakers in Hume that teleological order does exist in nature; the organisms of vegetables and plants are undeniable examples of wholes whose parts can only be understood in the light of an idea of the whole. The whole is admittedly no mere resultant of the juxtaposition of the parts; they are and are what they are in virtue of their being one and all alike parts of the whole, instrumental to its life or functioning as a unitary whole. The issues at stake are whether unity of this kind extends throughout the universe or is confined to a "small part" of it, the realms of the organisms with which we on our planet are acquainted, and whether, if it is pervasive of the universe, the fact is sufficient evidence of the presence of controlling mind in nature at large. Philo's attempts to argue for a negative conclusion on both points are, as it seems to me, failures, partly for reasons no contemporary of Hume could have foreseen, partly for reasons which Hume ought to have been able to see.

In the first place, it is indispensable to Philo's case that we should concede that teleological order is not, like causal order in general, universal; it is confined to a "small part" of the universe and it must be legitimate to conceive the possibility at least that it has risen there as a consequence of mere causal order. We should be able to see, as an eighteenth century philosopher excusably might not, what the paradox of the position is. It is that the whole process of the "evolution" of organic form has a definite direction towards the future. The adaptations which disclose themselves in the history of the development of the individual are what Paley calls them, "prospective contrivances," adaptations not simply to the present situation of the moment but to what will be the future situation of the developing organism. And in the one case where we are able to write the history of the evolution of species, there, too, we seem to have direction of the same kind. The history of evolution on our planet has been steadily towards the development of a type which is not merely adapted to its actual environment but has displayed a steadily advancing power of self-adaptation in advance to an indefinite

range of variability in its environment. Our own species does not " survive " like some deep sea organism by finding a relatively unchanging environment and shedding all endowments which are superfluous in such a *habitat*, but by making itself at home wherever it may go. If less intelligent species have to adapt themselves to the environment in which they find themselves or be eliminated, man's way is to adapt his environment to his own ideals of what he finds satisfactory. Now the causal laws of physical nature are one and all non-prospective, they are without this forward-pointing reference. Indeed one of them, and the one which figures most prominently in the writings of recent writers on physics, the principle of Carnot at least seems to run directly counter to this trend of organic evolution. As James Ward has said, it is *catabolic* whereas the advance of life and organization is *anabolic*, so that it is not surprising to find Philo twice over by implication denying what seems now to be regarded as the chief corner-stone of physics, the principle of the degeneration of energy.

Merely as a form of words the objections of Philo sound well enough. Why, he argues, may not the " material universe " fall into order of itself, or why may not the order in it be due to some unknown character of its own ? And if you once with the Theist assume that the order in the material world is due to controlling intelligence, must you not by parity of reasoning, assume a similar cause, extrinsic to itself, for the " ideal order " the Theist has asserted to be characteristic of the divine mind ? If an extrinsic cause is wanted for the one, it must be equally wanted for the other. But the reasoning is only superficially specious, and falls to pieces the moment one realizes that the " order " to be accounted for is not merely causal, but, in the case of the organic part of the " material universe " teleological also. If the suggestion that the order in the " material world " may be due to some unknown character of the material as such is to have any relevant meaning, its sense must be that teleological order, " prospective " adaptation can be explained by reference to the causal laws of the physical sciences, and that possibility is excluded by the

considerations on which we have been dwelling. Nor is the criticism that order in the " mental " world is in the same case really sound. The retort could only be made by a believer in the now exploded psychology which reduces mental life to a mere juxtaposition of " impressions and ideas," and the author of the *Treatise on Human Nature* must have been aware that his own *magnum opus* was the *reductio ad absurdum* of this associationist empiricism. The important point is that teleological order in the " material world " does demand some extrinsic cause as its explanation precisely because the " material world " means the whole world in so far as it is explicable solely by the laws of physical science, and the laws of physical science, as we have just said, contain nothing which could furnish the required explanation. That the operations of intelligence should exhibit teleological order, on the contrary, requires no similar appeal to an extrinsic cause, precisely because it is *prospective* forward-looking interest which is the distinctive kind of unity characteristic of mental activity ; unity of conative interest is characteristic of intelligence as such as extension, for example, is of body. It is of the nature of mind that the phases of a mental process should be held together by unity of forward-looking interest, as it is of the nature of bodies that their unity should be spatial, *i.e.*, that the unity in virtue of which we speak of a body as *one* body should lie in the fact that the extensions of its parts are the constituents of the extension of the whole body.

It might, I know, be objected that these considerations only show that wherever there is mind there will also be teleological order ; they do not of themselves warrant the conclusion which Cleanthes wants to draw, that wherever there is teleological order there is the presence of mind. But let us reflect again. In the case of body (using the word body here in the strictly geometrical sense) it is not merely that the volumes of the parts of a body are parts of the volume of the whole body. We may add that the volumes of the parts, and their spatial relations to one another, completely constitute the volume of the whole. Take away the volumes of the parts and their locations

relative to each other, and the whole has vanished ; there is nothing left. Similarly in the case of a mind ; suppress its various phases, each of which has its own characteristic unity of teleological interest, and suppress also the thread of continuous teleological unity of interest which links them together, and there is nothing whatever left. Hence, if we can say that there is teleological unity pervading the universe as a whole, the cause of that order, in the sense of the principle which makes the universe the kind of unity it is, is not merely " remotely analogous " to the principle which gives unity to our conscious life and which we call a " mind " ; it is identical with it in the distinctive character which makes mental life what it is. And to say so much is not to fall into the " anthropomorphite heresy " of which Philo and Demea join in accusing Cleanthes. There is teleological order wherever we are warranted in asserting the presence of an individual mind, however humble, but minds differ immensely in the degree of teleological unity which they reveal. The mental life of any man, however ordinary, has a unity of far-reaching " prospective " adaptation about it which we are not warranted in ascribing to that of a cat or a dog ; their lives are, by comparison, what Aristotle calls bad plays without any central unity of idea, " episodic," and the same thing is, I presume, still truer of the mental life of creatures lower in the organic scale than cats and dogs. And there may equally well be any number of types of mental life by comparison with which the life of the wisest philosopher or statesman known to human history would be " episodic." The " argument from design," rightly stated, thus does not presuppose any presumptuous ascription to the mind it infers as the source of cosmical teleological order of defects or limitations imposed on the minds embodied in human organisms by this embodiment.

It is true enough that if the argument is to have any force we must be able to assert the presence of teleological order throughout nature universally, not merely in one small part of nature " to wit," the part of our human environment on this planet which we can consciously mould

to our own ends. But it seems plain that we have the right to make the assertion. For (1) the fact of " prospective contrivance," or in other words, of the existence of wholes such that their parts can only be understood by reference to the " idea of the whole " is patent ; every living organism, however simple, is an instance in point ; and Philo's attempt to evade the implications of the fact by suggesting that even supposing the universe to be originally devoid of any principle of " order," it must, after a sufficient antecedent amount of randomness, settle down into some sort of order which will thereafter be self-sustaining is manifestly a subterfuge. Even if " order " be taken here to mean *causal* order and nothing more specific, there is no reason why randomness should ever give rise to anything but randomness, why, for example, an epoch in which events followed on one another purely at random should be inevitably succeeded by one in which there is a routine marked by such principles as the conservation of energy or of mass. The empirical illustrations adduced of supposedly disorderly processes which result in the establishment of subsequent " order " only seem to be telling because in our thought of them we already unwittingly presuppose causal order as self-existing in the epoch of " randomness." If, for example, we find it natural that pebbles lying on the same beach, which were originally of every kind of shape, should in course of time be rounded by the waves into much the same standard shape and size, we only find this natural because we are all along presupposing both that there is regularity in the recurrence and impact of the waves and that exposure to the same environmental conditions will have corresponding consequences in the case of different pebbles ; that is, we are presupposing that there has been causal order throughout the supposed period of " randomness." And if what Philo means is that " order " which is only causal order must somehow, of itself, give rise to order which is not only causal but teleological, his assumption, as we have already seen, is simply incredible. It is equivalent to the assumption that, to borrow an illustration from James Ward, printer's " pie " would only have to be shuffled often enough to end

by producing the text of *Hamlet*. And it is an obvious criticism of such an assumption that the supposed result will not have even the faintest mathematical probability unless the number of letters, etc., contained in the "pie" is finite and the number of the repetitions of each letter and stop has been in itself deliberately controlled with a view to making this particular shuffle possible. Kant then seems to me to be entirely right in the *Critique of Judgment* when he insisted that the principle of teleological order is indispensable in all the sciences which deal with organic life. Where he does seem unreasonable is in his further characteristic contention that the principle though indispensable, is "only heuristic," an invaluable clue to discovery, but nothing more. For we may rationally ask how any principle can be so valuable a clue in the discovery of a truth unless it itself is at least a very close approximation to the truth, and how it can be *indispensable* for discovery unless it is, in fact, actually true.

Presuming, then, that teleological order is a genuine characteristic of the organic realm, we have to assume that we cannot logically stop short here, especially when we bear in mind the insuperable objections already pointed out to the conception that mind, which is in its very nature teleological, can be a product or "emergent" resultant of anything which is not itself mind. We have to remember what the relation of mind embodied in the organisms we know to its "environment" really is. The environment of organisms is something more than a background against which they are set off, or a stage on which they make their appearance. It is also the physical and chemical stuff of which they are in the end made and continue to make themselves, as long as they remain in being; their life is an uninterrupted process of give-and-take between themselves and the "environment," and it must therefore be of a kind such that this give-and-take intercourse is possible. The appearance of organic life on our planet may be, measured in terms of astronomical time, quite a recent thing, but that it should have appeared at all presupposes that there has been from the first a preadaptation of our

planet to the coming " emergence " not only of organic life in general, but of our human life with all its wealth of scientific, æsthetic, moral, religious content. And the preadaptation cannot be confined to our planet, since it again is not set against the rest of corporal nature as against a mere neutral background. The preadaptation, if real at all, must involve the whole history of the formation of our sun and its satellites, of the galaxy, and, in the end, of the whole " physical Universe." " Prospective contrivance " if real at all, cannot be what Philo represents it as being, a peculiarity of a very restricted region of the " world " ; unless we are to take refuge in the self-contradictory concept of an inexplicable pre-established harmony which no one ever has established, it must be co-extensive with the whole range of being. Only an inarticulate apprehension of this exigence of reason will suffice to justify the respect with which Kant says we ought always to speak of the argument from design, a respect which it would certainly not deserve if it were really obnoxious to the strictures which the *Critique of Pure Reason* takes over from Philo.

There is, however, one point on which Kant and Philo are clearly not to be answered. The argument from design, I contend, properly understood, is valid as an argument for the operative presence of prospective contrivance, and therefore of mind, everywhere in the history of the universe. But it is not sufficient, by itself, to warrant us in affirming the existence of what Kant means by God. It is at least doubtful whether it would suffice to establish the unity of the mind it enables us to descry behind the order of the universe, its omniscience, or its sovereign control of nature. And it certainly does not justify us in ascribing to that mind the moral character without which a good man cannot find it an object of unqualified worship and trust. So far as our argument has taken us, the order of nature might be due to the " prospective contrivance " of a plurality of minds, and possibly of minds at cross-purposes with one another. Or if it is in the end due to a single mind, that mind might be one of limited intelligence, or might be coping very imperfectly with a " matter "

refractory to its own ends. Or its ends might be merely those of the inhuman and non-moral super-mathematician imagined by Sir James Jeans, and one cannot worship mere mathematical ingenuity.

The really vital thing, as it seems to me, that calls for being said on all these points except the last, has been said not by Hume but by Kant in the *Critique of Judgment*, though Philo may perhaps be said to be dimly fumbling after it. What we really need to be satisfied of is not simply the patent fact that there is teleology in nature, that one part or one process in nature stands to another as end to means, but that nature as a whole system has an end other than its own existence. And, as Kant said, if we are looking for something which can without absurdity be thought of as the end for which nature as a whole exists, and apart from which nature is not rationally intelligible, we can find such an end only in the life of intelligent and moral personality. *If* this is an absolute end to which the existence of nature is a means, then, no doubt, from the unity of purpose bestowed on nature by its thorough-going subordination to this end, we can reasonably infer the unity of the mind which discloses itself in nature ; if we cannot assert this unity of *Endzweck*, we shall have to agree with Kant that the " polytheists " of the ancient world were interpreting the evidence of nature more faithfully by their belief in a multitude of " departmental " gods with conflicting aims and purposes. And the mere appeal to the empirical evidence of teleology in nature will not of itself enable us to decide the issue of theism as against polydemonism. If the argument is to conclude not merely to the effective presence of mind throughout nature but to the existence of God, the " teleological proof " will have to be integrated with the " moral proof," the only one regarded by Kant himself as in principle sound.

Or rather what will have to be integrated with the " teleological proof " as commonly understood is the " moral proof," not in the round-about and half-hearted form in which Kant actually presents it, but in the directer and more cogent form in which he might have presented

it had he done full justice to the central thought of his own doctrine of practical reason. The central thought of Kant's doctrine of the practical reason is that if the structure of the universe is rational at all, it must be so in a double sense, since it is one and the same reason which is both speculative and practical. An intelligible world must be a unity not merely in the sense that there is the thorough-going causal intercommunication between all its constituent parts which renders all transactions between these parts capable of unending reduction to natural law; it must also be intelligible in the further sense that the apparent conflict of purposes which runs through the life-histories of persons is unified by the all-pervading presence of a single uniform purpose disclosed to us in the moral law. The supreme principle upon which a rational moral law rests must therefore have the same status and validity as that supreme scientific principle which we may conveniently, though loosely, speak of in customary fashion as the "uniformity of nature." The moral law of unconditional obligation must have the same validity as the most universal laws—whatever they may prove to be—of natural science. To doubt this would be to doubt the rationality of the whole system of the universe.

Now the very existence of any unconditional moral obligation is, if Kant's critical analysis of morality is sound in principle, bound up with the recognition of rational personality itself as the one thing of absolute and unconditional worth, the self-justifying end which pervades and unifies all our moral endeavour. To substitute any other end for this in our scheme of ethics is to deny that the moral law expresses a true exigency of reason, and to reduce it to a mere device for effecting results which it is a mere accident of our particular position as animals with a specific physique and environment that we happen to desire. We must, in fact, choose between pronouncing all morality to be in the end something unreasonable, and in the literal sense of the word, chimerical, and venturing on the affirmation that the production and development of moral personality is itself the unifying purpose which runs through the whole course

of nature, and pervades it as a principle which is no mere unrealized ideal but is actually attained. If we venture on this affirmation, then, as it seems to me, the foundations of theism are secured, as I think has been sufficiently shown in detail in Sorley's well-known volume *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, where the central thought of Kant is exhibited independently of Kant's own unfortunate *détour* which gives the misleading impression that God is being brought into the critical philosophy merely to provide virtue with a posthumous *pourboire* (Kant's real point is not that the existence of God makes the practice of virtue *worth while* but that it makes absolute obligation rational).

Here, in the conception of moral personality not merely as an end to which certain processes in nature are in fact instrumental but as *the* end which gives nature its unity, we have, I contend, a true reason for thinking of mind not merely as somehow present everywhere in nature but as in supreme and unitary control of the whole process of nature. And if we think out all that is implied in this supreme and absolute control, we shall, I am sure, not be satisfied until we have replaced Cleanthes conception of an "artificer" by that of a creator from whom nature derives not merely its "order" but its whole existence. The reasoning, it may be allowed, is not formal demonstration, but is only not demonstrative because it goes deeper than all demonstration. All demonstration is, as we know, *ex praeconcessis et praecognitis* and therefore presupposes faith in reason itself, since without such faith there can be neither *praeconcessa* nor *praecognita*. You cannot demonstrate the reality of indefeasible obligation any more than you can demonstrate the "uniformity of nature" to any one who seriously doubts about either, but in both cases the doubt, if it is more than a mere pretence, is a strictly unreasonable doubt of reason itself.

What I have already said contains in substance the criticism I shall pass upon that part of Hume's reasoning to which he himself appears to attach most weight, his attempt to prove that even the "remote analogy" he admits to subsist between the "cause of order" in the

universe and the human mind breaks down when we try to attribute moral character to that cause. I need not recapitulate the arguments of Philo in any detail; they are common-places of the pessimists of all ages, and can in substance be condensed into a single sentence. He contents himself with the contention that pain, struggle, and error are uncomfortable conditions and could therefore never have been introduced into nature by a benevolent "author." That is, he baldly assumes that if nature has a moral purpose at all, that purpose can only be the Hedonistic one of providing as much enjoyment for everyone and everything as possible. That the assumption could be made and be allowed to pass unchallenged by Cleanthes—one could hardly look for serious criticism to a *Schwachkopf* like Demea—is characteristic of the superficiality with which both Hume and most of his contemporaries habitually treated the moral problem. Kant said the last word on this Hedonistic psychology when he remarked that such a purpose would be wholly unworthy of any God whom we can really reverence, and that we shall be thinking more worthily of our Creator if we suppose his purpose to have been to make us capable of rendering ourselves deserving of "happiness" by our own free activity.

Why there should be all the pain and hardship that there is in the world we shall, of course, never know while we are still "in the world," but if the purpose subserved by "nature" is the education of beings with the seeds of reason in them into freedom of thought and action, there must be hardships and struggles if the lesson is to be learned. Men will not become profound thinkers, when there are no puzzles and difficulties to call out the strenuous exercise of thinking, nor will they become free moral agents capable of steadily following right "in scorn of consequence," because it is right, where there are no "consequences" to be wrestled with. In the sort of Paradise of the indolent which Philo thinks (or pretends to think) a really good Creator would have constructed there would be no moral heroism (and perhaps Hume who professes to believe that true "virtue" summons us only to a life of "frolic and

gaiety" would not much have deplored its absence), but there would equally be no Humes or Newtons, for there would be no occasion to think at all. One may even doubt whether Philo's imaginary Hedonists' Paradise would even attain its own, not very exalted, proposed end. In a land of lotus-eaters one could expect to find a general weariness of the round of cheaply-won satisfactions, or, at least, if the inhabitants escaped boredom, it would only be because they were "doped" into continuous insensibility. There is a pathetic point in the old anecdote of the over-driven domestic drudge whose relations wrote on her tombstone "She's gone to do nothing for ever and ever," but though "doing nothing" might be a welcome temporary relief from eternally doing under another's orders things not worth doing, an eternity of indolence is not what any of us would deliberately choose as the crown of human felicity. *That* is not "the" rest which remaineth to the people of God."

I am only too sensible that if I ever had any character as a "thinker" to lose—and I do not suppose I ever had much—I have probably ruined it beyond redemption by these remarks. Empiricism seems for the moment to be in the ascendant again, and I have made it abundantly clear that the only work of Hume which makes any deep impression on me is the *Treatise*, in which Hume has once for all exposed the bankruptcy of empirical philosophy. I have ventured to commend the sound commonsense of the almost universally discredited Paley. And I must end by saying what will probably discredit me more still. For all the misplaced jauntiness of Cleanthes and all the limitations of his imagination, I concur with Pamphilus in thinking that his "principles" are nearer to the truth than those of Philo, if, indeed, Philo can be said to have any principles. Nature is, to be sure, not a gigantic "knitting-loom," but, when all is said, nature is more like a knitting-loom than it is like an animal or a vegetable. And a *rational* philosophy which is not simply blind to the "practical" use of reason can hardly deny that nature is like the knitting-loom in a point of fundamental importance: both are structures

which have a significance relative to something beyond themselves ; both are instrumental to something. Hence, if I can accept the judgment of Professor Kemp-Smith that Hume's *Dialogues* have made it impossible for the argument from design to be successfully defended by the kind of reasoning put into the mouth of Cleanthes, I can only do so on condition that I am allowed to add a further remark : they have also made it impossible to attack the argument by the sort of reasoning used against it by Philo. This, in fact, seems also to have been the opinion of Kant.

II.—*By* J. LAIRD.

BY arrangement, I am writing this paper without having seen Mr. Taylor's, and shall address myself to a part only of the theme we have to discuss to-night. The situation both of philosophy and of theology at the present time, as it seems to me, is complicated, confusing and often confused ; and the subject we have to discuss, the relevance of Hume's *Dialogues* to this contemporary situation, can scarcely escape the taint of perplexity. Whether all, or most, of Hume's arguments are " dated " and time-blown, whether he himself by his very success contributed largely to their antiquation, whether they are forgotten to-day rather than refuted or superseded, are questions of more than merely historical importance ; but I shall not pay equal attention to each of them. Instead I shall, almost always, ask you to consider what Hume's principal contentions were and their perennial importance for philosophical theology in the Western (and therefore largely in the Christian) tradition.

A preliminary question of exegesis cannot be wholly avoided, but I should like to be very brief about it. It is often asked whether Hume *was* Philo or whether he *was* Cleanthes. That seems to me to be a misleading question. Some dialogue-writers have used such a plan. Berkeley *was* Philonous. Descartes in his unfinished " Recherche de la vérité " *was* Eudoxe. Hobbes *was* " B " in the *Decameron Physiologicum* ; but the Ciceronian type of dialogue that Hume chose does not permit such canons of interpretation. Each collocutor develops his point of view in successive short speeches and the author has failed if the voice of any one of them is definitely his own. No doubt Hume, despite all his " artfulness," might have failed in this particular. There is not very much that is dramatic in the *Dialogues*, but Hume may have tried to import a dramatic quality by deliberately dramatizing himself and some of his friends. In so far as he did so, *he* was Philo and Elliot was Cleanthes. Dr. Blair or some other common friend may have imparted some vestiges

of vitality to the marionette Demea compounded of Pascal and of Samuel Clarke. In the main, however, I do not think that Hume failed often or signally in this way. There is much more gusto, it is true, in what Philo says than in what Cleanthes says, but the nature of the case explains most of that. In substance, Cleanthes had just one big thing to say, and Philo had a lot to say ; but volubility is not the same thing as importance. Demea is " managed " and eventually dismissed. If he had a better case than Hume and the all-too-cool eighteenth century supposed, that defect in the philosophy of the *Dialogues* persists and may " date " them in a sense that is unfavourable. But although Hume was not Demea he may well have been very often Cleanthine ; and I think he was.

If (wrongly, as I suppose) we concluded that Hume *was* Philo we should have another exegetical problem on our hands, namely, the question where, in the end, Philo stood ; for it is plain at the finish that Philo, ostensibly at least, was prepared to enter into some sort of concordat with Cleanthes. It may be suggested, it is true, that Philo's concessions are so slight that only the dull could be deceived, so slight indeed as to damage the artfulness of their irony. Of that I shall say that the inference does not seem to me to be constraining. Again, it may be suggested that enigma, aporia, a huge question mark, is all that is left. Of that I shall say that I do not think it is *all*, although it seems to me to be quite certainly a part of what is meant to be conveyed.

This being premised, let me turn to what I take to be the primary theme of these *Dialogues*.

They are in the main between Cleanthes and Philo. Demea, in principle, does not count. They are chiefly concerned with *deism* (in the sense of that term in which it is contrasted with a moral or fatherly theism) and specifically with the deistic Argument from Design. In other words, one plain inference from them is that the argument to God's *providence*, and to all that, in an ethical way, should affect " human action or forbearance " is admitted, either silently or expressly, to be very weak. More specifically still, the substance of them has to do with the resources of experi-

mental deism, that is to say, with the resources of what Hume in the *Treatise* called "the experimental method" and applied in the *Dialogues* to natural theology. Philo and Cleanthes, being men of sense, agree that the inductive-analogical method is the only one that can be used with any success at all in any enquiry into causes, whether about the birth of a midge or about the birth of a world. They differ about the resources of this experimental method with regard to deism.

For them the pulse of the affair is whether or not *positivism* is the last word in inductive-analogical argument. I say "positivism" not "scepticism," for Cleanthes persistently affirms, and Philo is always prepared to admit, that scepticism readily turns into extravagance. (Its extravagance, according to Philo, may sometimes be salutary and, in certain senses, is not always refutable, but he allows that it should not weigh with sensible people.) In other words, Philo and Cleanthes are agreed that the experimental method is capable of yielding sound (although not, in all senses, metaphysically invincible) information about natural causes. To that extent they are both good experimental positivists. They differ because Cleanthes asserts from the first, and throughout, that the experimental argument to a Designer of Nature "flows in upon him with a force like that of sensation." Philo while prepared in the end to accept (or at any rate not incontinently to deny) a mitigated form of the Cleanthine thesis, is anxious, for the most part, to contend quite seriously (that is, without more sceptical extravagance than befits his temperament) that the arguments in favour of stopping at positivism are very strong indeed. It is these arguments, I believe, that were so disturbing to mild and comfortable deists like Adam Smith.

If I am right in this interpretation, I can reasonably claim that an argument similar to the main argument of the *Dialogues* is just what should have been expected from Hume's pen. From youth up, as we know, he was sedulously occupied, indeed pre-occupied, with theological argument. Again, the principal aim of his "experimental" philosophy was to justify *sensitive* as opposed to

rationalistic belief in causes, and so to provide an adequate basis for the sciences, and, more especially, for the more "human" among the sciences. Judged by rationalistic canons (he maintained), *no* causes could be established. There the sceptic could always triumph; but there was a "sensitive" belief for men of sense, a kind of horse-sense that was not simple mulishness. I do not say that Hume succeeded in this justification, that he could effectively distinguish between prejudiced and sensible expectations, between unmetaphysical "science" and stubborn fantasy, between logical and illogical "alogic." But he set out to do that very thing. His solution was that beliefs that flowed in upon us with the force of a sensation were as good as sensation itself. They "peopled the world" for us, and were all that should properly be meant by reality. Such beliefs were not mere prejudices, any more than the testimony of the senses themselves was a prejudice, and there was a genuine and very important question whether beliefs of this order had to be banished from theology and restricted to physical and moral science. The upshot of the *Dialogues* I take to be that the massive, impressionistic argument for deism is strong and even, perhaps, invincible, but that this totalitarian experimentalism is profoundly different from the positive paths of the sciences. Both are "experimental" (or at least "sensitive" and experiential), but experimental deism cannot be positivistic, and is seriously at fault if it applies positivistic canons without recognizing the essential difference between sensitive belief that is positivistic and sensitive belief that is impressionistic-totalitarian.

I shall now attempt to support this interpretation of Hume's argument by offering an epitome of its main features in an artlessly pemmicanized dialogue. (The pages refer to Mr. Kemp Smith's edition of the *Dialogues*.)

Philo: I cannot persistently retain the Pyrrhonian attitude in economics, criticism or other such sciences, but I may legitimately be a Pyrrhonist "beyond human affairs and the properties of the surrounding bodies" (166).

Cleanthes: An eclectic philosophy is an absurdity. A

good experimentalist has to accept natural theology along with the other sciences.

Philo : " Our ideas reach no further than our experience : We have no experience of divine attributes and operations : I need not conclude my syllogism " (176).

Cleanthes : The argument *a posteriori* shows that the universe is a well-contrived machine whose Author " must be somewhat similar to the mind of man " (177).

Philo : The voice of experience is feeble here. Theistic analogy must at the best be vague. Indeed divine " contrivance " is more dissimilar than similar to human (178). How can the order *in* Nature argue the order *of* Nature ? Thought is one spring of order, but there are others, such as growth [Here Philo is vehement and at least half in earnest.] In a large sense of the words, we have experience of the birth of a planet, but not of the birth of the universe. " Cite your experience and deliver your theory " (187).

Cleanthes : When I survey the universe " the idea of a contriver *immediately* flows in upon me *with a force like that of sensation.*" Any objection is an affront to sensitive belief, and is only extravagant Pyrrhonism (191).

Philo [" a little embarrassed and confounded " (192)] : Order must *somewhere* be ultimate, either in the world or in God. Why not stop with the world ? How avoid an infinite regress ? Why, if the physical world requires an ordering principle, should the mental world *not* require one also ?

Cleanthes : But I *do* stop. Mind, as a principle of order, *does* satisfy me. Nothing else does. " I have found a Deity " (202).

Philo : You have now to argue for " a mind like the human " and indeed " the liker the better." You ought to become " a perfect anthropomorphite " (208), and must certainly banish infinity and perfection from your conception of deity.

Cleanthes : Now you are becoming extravagant ; but all your whimsical exaggerations are variants upon the theme of design. So you are really on my side.

Philo : Let me continue the experimental argument. In

all our experience, is it not the truth that mental order depends upon bodily order and not contrariwise?

Cleanthes [hesitating]: Your new principle would involve the eternity of the world.

Philo: Why not? If I were a materialist (which I am not), what would prevent me from maintaining that there is "an eternal inherent principle of order to the world"? (215). More generally: It seems to me that the universe has a certain analogy to a growing vegetable *and* to a mind-product *and* to an orderly collocation of matter. "In this little corner of the world alone there are four principles, *reason*, *instinct*, *generation*, *vegetation*, which are similar to each other, and are the causes of similar effects. . . . Any one of these four principles above mentioned (and a hundred others which lie open to our conjecture) may afford us a theory by which to judge of the origin of the world, and it is palpable and egregious partiality to confine our view entirely to that principle, by which our own minds operate. . . . Were this principle more intelligible on that account, such a partiality might be somewhat excusable: But reason, in its internal fabric and structure, is really as little known to us as instinct or vegetation; and perhaps even that vague undeterminate word, nature, to which the vulgar refer everything, is not at bottom more inexplicable. The effects of these principles are all known to us from experience: But the principles themselves, and their manner of operation, are totally unknown" (220).

Cleanthes: Another instance of your Pyrrhonian fertility.

Philo: Not at all. Such conjectures are "entirely owing to the nature of the subject" (224). I must repeat, Cleanthes, that you are turning the lesson of experience upside down. In experience, "ideas are copied from real objects: you reverse this order and give thought the precedence" (229).

[That, I submit, is the substance of the main argument regarding experimental *deism*. The discussion passes next to providential *theism*, and there Philo is very confident, the reader being plainly expected to agree. In this respect the anti-theist is said to have an easy task. The presumption of

experience is for him and not against him ; but according to Philo the presumption, of experimental *deism* was and *remains* in favour of *deism.* " The beauty and fitness of final causes strike us with such irresistible force that all objections appear (what I believe they really are) mere cavils and sophisms " (248). In other words, Philo, on p. 248, is disposed to accept Cleanthes's cardinal affirmation on p. 191.

As it seems to me the concluding Part XII is not dissimilar.]

Philo : " A purpose, an intention, a design, strikes everywhere the most careless, the most stupid thinker ; and no man can be so hardened in absurd systems as at all times to reject it " (264).

Cleanthes : That is my conviction too. It must " immediately strike all unprejudiced apprehensions " (267).

Philo : " Yes. With an important reservation, these are my unfeigned sentiments " (271). The reservation is that in all these matters the dissimilarities are not less noteworthy than the similarities. Consequently the analogy to *mental* contrivance, although genuine, must be rather slight, even if it be a little stronger than the analogy to primordial vegetation. It is therefore irrelevant to the more personal and moral attributes of the theist's God, to " human action or forbearance." I contend for a " plain philosophical assent " to a principle that cannot be further defined, namely, that " the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to human intelligence " (282), that is to say, specifically to human *intelligence*, but not to human *morality.*

Despite its brevity, I believe that the above summary liquidates the main argument in Hume's *Dialogues* with something approaching accuracy. If so the moral, I think, is as follows : Let it be agreed that experimental evidence can alone be decisive regarding all questions of origin and of matter-of-fact. Let it be agreed that experimentally grounded belief is sensitive, not rationalistic. Let it be agreed, further (reluctantly in certain quarters) that the moral and beneficent claims of theism outrun all conceivable

experimental evidence. The question still remains whether positivism in the sciences and in common life marks the limit of justifiable experimental enquiry, or whether there may still be room for a convincing sensitive belief in deism. The inference I should draw from Hume's *Dialogues* is that positivism does not exhaust the resources of sensitive belief with regard to these questions of origin, indeed that the experimental deist may well have a better case than the agnostic experimental positivist. The vulgar deist's defect is a lack of adequate patience. He does not see that the detection of Nature's design (if it can be detected) cannot expect to be facilitated by the positivistic methods of the sciences and of workaday experience. The primary aim of these methods is to circumscribe the relevant analogies, to sharpen them until they become more and more pointed. Experimental deism has to choose a different method. It has to be impressionistic—totalitarian. Such a method is legitimate for an experimental philosopher, but it is a different method from the method of simple positivism. Consequently the experimental deist's hypothesis, when compared with an experimental positivistic hypothesis, must seem to be, and superficially at least must really be, very vague and very general—" a plain philosophical assent " to God's reality and to what may seem the tepid conclusion that the divine attributes, whatever they may be, are mind-like and (probably) rather more mind-like than vegetation-like or matter-like.

If the above, or something very like it, is the central part of Hume's argument in the *Dialogues*, it should be allowed, I think, that an attempt to indicate some of the principal ways in which these contentions are likely to have persistent importance in theology is a suitable introduction to a part at least of the large question we are discussing this evening. I now propose to make the attempt.

(1) The problem of the limits of positivism in theological or other enquiries commonly called metaphysical is still very much with us, and can hardly be negligible unless all that we are accustomed to call " philosophy " is a dream or a superstition.

The particular form in which this problem presented itself to Hume has certain special features. Philo and Cleanthes were both of them sensory phenomenalists, but they both accepted a very important extension to mere sense evidence. The extension was that sense-born and sense-borne beliefs that had the force of sensation were to count as perfectly good " realities," and in particular that a certain kind of association, viz., the causal, had such force. (I shall not here enquire what this " force " precisely was. It was not mere intensity ; but Hume's *Treatise* and his first *Enquiry*, not his *Dialogues*, supply his answer to that very pertinent question.)

The problem itself, however, is much more general. It is raised by anyone who asserts that terms like " the world," " the universe," " the *omnitudo realitatis*," describe nothing positive or verifiable—whether the " verification " is " strong " and in terms of actual private sensa, or much " weaker " but still generated by private sensa, or confined to protocol-propositions in " physical " language which are supposed or stipulated to be authenticated by actual sense-experience. It would also be raised by every Kantian who maintained that causal laws describe the necessitation of one sense datum by another sense datum. For all such philosophers would say that the " world " or the " universe " or the *omnitudo realitatis* was not " something " but, instead, a name for " any so and so."

One of the things that seem to me to be of quite peculiar interest in these *Dialogues* is the way in which Hume dealt with this question. He did not attempt to settle it in advance but argued it *pro* and *con* within the ambit of his " experimental " philosophy. In the end he allowed that positivism need not (and probably should not) have the last word ; but he insisted upon the importance of the distinction between positivistic and non-positivistic sensitive belief.

(2) It is sometimes said that one of the plainest (as well as one of the most provocative) things that Hume says in the *Dialogues* is that vulgar naturalism is just as sound a philosophy as either vulgar or sophisticated deism. I have called attention to this question, unobtrusively, in my pemmi-

canized dialogue, by making a longer quotation from Hume's text at this point than at any other.

I do not think that Hume asserts "naturalism." In the context, Cleanthes smiles indulgently at Philo's naturalistic "whimsies." Philo protests that he is serious and not merely extravagant. There is a genuine, if slight, basis in Nature (he says) for Eastern (or vegetative) accounts of world-origins and also for Epicurean (or Democritean-atomistic-materialistic) accounts of them. The conclusion of the matter, however, seems plainly to be that the Westerns are right in holding that if Nature be the great mother of the world she must be an intelligent dame.

Hume's dish, it is true, is seasoned with agnosticism. Reason, mind, vegetation and other alleged primary principles are said to be *secret* causes whose effects are visible although their essence is unknown (and probably unknowable). Such statements indicate a hankering after the flesh-pots of rationalism; but they are characteristic of Hume in all his books. Therefore we cannot say, as we might like to say, that the point for a good Humian is immaterial and even meaningless, since, for a good phenomenalist, there should be nothing *behind* what things really look like, no "secret" causes *behind* manifest causal sequences. As firm sensations *are*, so they appear; as firm causal expectations *are*, so they appear. They show forth *all* that they are. These illicit rationalistic cravings must therefore be admitted to be syndromes of Hume's general condition. Nevertheless a commentator should also point out that Hume in the end seems to admit *ex ore Philonis* that Design is a *better* analogue than Vegetation or than Atomism, even granting that mind, in our experience, is dependent upon matter and not the other way round.

(3) Hume's argument in the *Dialogues*, as might have been expected from the climate of opinion in his time and country, was chiefly concerned with the Argument from Design (or, more strictly, with the Argument to a Designer), and Cleanthes's deism is always so interpreted.

In this form, deism has certain obvious weaknesses, although these may have been less apparent to the eighteenth

century and to Britain than they are to us, even in Britain, to-day. The assumption of deism in this form is that there could not be an intelligible pattern of order in the world unless the order had been *put* there—a proposition that scarcely seems likely to convince an unprejudiced reasoner.

Here Philo's reasoning is, as he protests, not simply Pyrrhonian but essentially serious. *Ex hypothesi*, he says in effect, the argument is that order requires an *orderly* ordering cause. There is therefore an infinite regress, or else an arbitrary stoppage. Why stop with mind? Why not stop before mind?

It seems likely that a wary deist would nowadays amend the argument and try to establish the inevitable presence and the inevitable power of an intelligible pattern, akin to intelligence, in the universe without also maintaining that some intelligent being must have *put* the pattern there. This might lead to τὸ θεῖον rather than to ὁ θεός; but the gain might be greater than the loss.

That is not what happens in these *Dialogues*. Cleanthes has little interest in the dialectical aspects of his position. The massive impression on which he relies is an impression of Design. It is not dialectics but experience that tells him to stop there and prevents him from stopping anywhere else. The inference that God, on this hypothesis, would really be *finite* "strikes him with no horror" (209). He has found "a sufficient principle for religion" (*ibid.*). Philo maintains that the analogy of a Designer is only "remote," but still, in his aloof way, professes, on the whole, to be in agreement.

(4) It may be thought that experimental *deism* is inherently a weaker theory than a warmer experimental *theism*, and so that Philo's repudiation of all that affects human action or forbearance is really his way of professing agnosticism. If the analogy to mind is taken seriously, it may be said, what would be the point of producing an orderly world unless goodness or love or some other such property were a part of the divine wisdom? The God of deism would show forth his cleverness and nothing more.

Cleverness *per se*, even in mankind, is a feeble and even a despicable property. It is mere skill, exerted for no solid purpose.

That may be a fair criticism of deism, but it would be unhistorical, I think, to hold that the restriction of theism to mere deism is just a polite and ironical way of dismissing natural theology. Even to-day we should not say so to those who believe in a God who is only a supremely competent mathematician. It is still less reasonable to say so of eighteenth-century deism.

What Hume and his contemporaries had principally in mind was an essentially *cosmological* theology. Is there anything unreasonable in attempting, very sedulously, to purge cosmology and cosmogony of anthropomorphic implications? In Christian theology has there not always been a violent paradox in the doctrine of a cosmic Christ, and in the Incarnation so interpreted? In so far as modern theologians think of "God" as a nation, or Church, or spiritual community, or as an abiding influence of sacramental culture, are they not, in effect, thinking *acosmologically*, and asserting only the presence and influence of a spiritual *enclave* within the cosmos?

I suppose some modern theologians would say that the experimental (or experiential) argument for theism is not what Hume implied that it was, but is an affair of "religious experience" in a sense that is nowhere nearly exhausted by the orderly pattern of natural laws to which Hume restricted his serious argument. The cosmologically minded among such theologians might discern the centre and finer essence of this religious experience in a sentiment or emotion or instinct of devout reverence for Nature and her ways. Some of the others would discern the presence of a helpful and loving Friend, and might call him a Cosmic Friend. Neither Philo nor Cleanthes make any such discovery in their experience. They may have been blind, but theology on this matter (to say the least) still speaks with a divided voice.

III.—By T. E. Jessop.

That philosophical theology has allowed the argument from design to slip into the background is sometimes attributed to the force of Hume's criticism of it in the *Dialogues*. This I cannot believe. If we were obliged to make any one thinker responsible for the neglect, that thinker would have to be Kant, who has probably been more studied, and certainly more respected, than Hume by the theologians of the last fifty years or so, and who put something positive in the place of what he rejected. But the shift of theological interest concerning the proofs of the existence of God is not to be referred to any single man. In this country, at least, philosophical theologians began to shelve the argument from design in its simple traditional form, when, on the one hand, the impressive development of natural science in the second half of last century antiquated its mode of statement, and when, on the other hand, the influx of idealism from Germany in the same period changed the intellectual climate. Biology and the newer physics have complicated considerably our mode of laying out the cosmological facts, and Kant and Hegel and their various disciples have exercised a more general influence by revealing new tasks and ways of thinking. We now have before us a wider range of philosophical possibilities and probabilities than Hume had. This gives us in the rough an answer to the question of the symposium : Hume's *Dialogues*, having the eighteenth century written all over them, are not livingly relevant to an age that has been taught by science and philosophy alike to view the theological problem more vastly and to think about it in ways that Hume did not foresee.

I shall be expected, before amplifying this answer, to say how I interpret Hume's ambiguous work. I can do so best by discounting its dialogue-form. This form is justified when, liveliness apart, the pros and cons of an issue are to be set over against each other in full force. Hume, however,

has weighted the cons with obvious onesidedness. Cleanthes is a puppet, a hybrid, half-Hume—not a thinker of the day, but an embodiment of orthodox religious feeling made to argue on Humean principles. The agreement of Cleanthes and Philo on data, methods and criteria is too close. The resultant unreality of the former shows itself in the disparity between his being portrayed with real respect as a man of brains and learning, and his being manœuvred into embarrassment with a facility which such a man would have resisted. There is a similar disparity in the characterization of Demea : although he is clearly intended as the pious simpleton of the piece, an Aunt Sally set up to be shied at, he betrays at times an intelligent familiarity with the abstruser parts of philosophy. Finally, Philo, too, is an amalgam : after destroying the dialogue with long speeches, he exhibits at the end a sudden and unexplained change of front. Whatever subtlety of argument there may be in the *Dialogues*, I can find little subtlety of artistry in it. After keeping the manuscript by him for more than twenty years, and, as Professor Kemp Smith has shown, revising it at least twice, Hume could do no better because, with all his fertility of imagination, he lacked that versatility of sympathy, that spontaneous capacity for getting inside the skins of others, which is the source of dramatic plausibility. His dialogue, in short, is without dialectic, without the clash of well-weighted opposites that lifts an argument to a higher plane.

It is Philo's abrupt and unargued admission, at the close of the *Dialogues*, of much that he has been all along rejecting that has been felt to be the primary problem for the expositor. Since, however, that problem is whether or no Philo's concluding remarks represent a sincere confession of Hume's, or merely a piece of dissimulation ironic or prudent, the interest involved is biographical. The only way in which, so far as I can see, it can be brought within the sphere of Hume's philosophy is to urge that in the conclusion he is but re-affirming as an inwardly determined and inexpugnable conviction—as, to use the language of the *Treatise*, a " natural belief "—what has been pretentiously paraded

as an achievement of reasoned inference ; but it seems to me that both the *Treatise* and the first *Enquiry* are unsympathetic to the extension of " natural belief " to matters of religion. The conclusion being disconnected from the argued content of the *Dialogues*, I shall ignore it.

The argument, stated broadly, is as follows. The existence of God is initially taken for granted, on the ground that " God " is the name for the cause of the universe, whatever character the cause may eventually be found to have. This non-religious use, with which the argument ends as well as begins, of an essentially religious term, shows how little the empiricist Hume had religion in the empirical sense in mind. The real problem turns out to be whether from the known nature of the universe anything can be inferred about its cause. Cleanthes argues that in virtue of its order the universe resembles—differing only in being on a grander scale—the contrivances of human skill, and may, therefore, be regarded by analogy as also the product of a designing mind. Philo, after observing that, unlike the matter of scientific causal investigations, the effect is singular and the alleged cause unexperienceable, attacks the analogy. Intelligence, he insists, is only one of several known causes or order, and is too small a part of the world to be elevated as the principle of the whole. Moreover, the similarity between nature and artefacts is very slight, barely warranting the supposition of a remote similarity in their causes, so remote that we may attribute intelligence to the cosmic cause in nothing more than a Pickwickian sense ; and even so, we have no analogical warrant for supposing this cause to be infinite, perfect, or even unitary. As for the ascription of moral characteristics, the blatant fact of evil definitively precludes any inference to justice or benevolence in the cause or causes : " it is an absurdity to believe that the deity has human passions " (p. 280, Kemp Smith's edition). At most we may conjecture, if we must conjecture at all, a plurality of factors possessing something very vaguely like our intelligence, although in this speculative sphere any hypothesis is but little better than any other. To Cleanthes' objection that so agnostic a conclusion takes away all the

powerful religious motives to good living, Philo retorts with an account of the disastrous effects of religion (implicitly identified with the narrowest Calvinism) on morals—it supplies lofty excuses for self-deceit and intolerance, appeals chiefly to our fears, and depresses us with the prospect of a hereafter determined in its quality by an arbitrary and therefore immoral election. The reduction of the cause or causes of the universe to a formal concept, to which in our non-sceptical moods a faint analogy with intelligence may be added, is, according to Philo, the only ground of a pure religion, for, being an object of mere cognition, it can have no practical bearing on human life, except to purge it of speculation, dogmatism, and devotion. As a high precedent for this conclusion, he quotes the words, and travesties the sense, of Seneca, " To know God is to worship Him " (p. 280), although on his own showing there is scarcely anything to know and nothing at all to worship (cp. pp. 216, 235).

What makes the argumentation, of Cleanthes equally with that of Philo, unstimulating from our present point of view is the drastic limitation of its reference and method.

In respect of reference, Hume sets forth the data of the problem with neither precision nor fullness. He brings before us an effect, the universe, and invites us to consider the question of its cause ; yet the effect, the *raison d'être* of the discussion, is characterized in the vaguest possible manner. The term " universe " or " order of the universe " as he uses it is too misty to stand as the starting-point of anything except the process of clarifying it. The order of the universe is not a simple order, so that if any general problem about it is to be decently set, its various strands need to be analyzed and defined. The nearest Hume comes to this is a mention of what he calls the orders of reason, instinct, generation and vegetation (pp. 219 f.), but they are left in their popular, unanalyzed senses. A popular cosmological picture is not enough to set going, or at any rate to keep going, a discussion that pretends to be philosophical. Whether or no Hume was justified, by the example of those whom he felt to be his living opponents,

in allowing the problem to be left so vague, is irrelevant to our symposium ; what is relevant is that in our day the problem would not be regarded as a treatable problem until it had been set in much more definite terms. With our present wealth of scientific knowledge, to achieve this is itself a prior problem. For their recognition of it we are indebted—whatever we may think of their several solutions —in this country to such men as Bosanquet, Lloyd Morgan, Alexander, Russell and Whitehead.

The limitation of method in the argumentation of the *Dialogues* is equally striking. Hume makes both his chief characters assume that there can be no *a priori* inference to a reality ; and also—another indication that Cleanthes is *pro tanto* Humean—that the only possible *a posteriori* inference to a reality is through the causal relation. In short, it is ruled from the start that at best there could be but a single argument to God—from the universe regarded as an effect.

The first of these assumptions is probably still widely held, but it is high time to challenge it yet again. Hume's conception of the *a priori* is very imperfect, and when it is corrected the question of an *a priori* proof of God, or rather of a proof in which *a priori* elements play an important part, appears in a different aspect. By *a priori* inference Hume meant eliciting the logical relations of ideas. Underlying his denial that such inference has any bearing on reality is his contention that all ideas are of the same sort, namely, copies of impressions. This view of the relation of ideas to impressions is obviously much too simple. Some of our ideas operate not as copies of impressions, or even as surrogates of any sort (*e.g.*, as symbolic equivalents), but as formative and regulative functions of the thinking process, providing indispensable systems of meaning or reference both for other ideas and for all impressions, and entering intimately into the apprehended content of these. In epistemological terms, this means that even the most empirically-laden thinking owes its thinking character to the presence in it of something more than impressions and their copies ; in metaphysical terms, it means that reality is characterized as much by the demands or impositions of

thought as by the contingent intimations of sense. Now if this be granted, Hume's distinction of relations of impressions and relations of ideas is not an adequate ground for distinguishing thinking that has a bearing on reality and thinking that has not. Of course, we cannot infer from a category a particular existent corresponding to it, no more than we can infer an existent sovereign from the idea of one—though for different reasons, in the former case because the inference would be impossible (a categorical content not being realizable as a particular existent), whereas in the latter case the inference would be possible but unjustified, as lacking empirical evidence where such evidence is demanded. But what we *can* infer from a categorical idea is that reality has a certain structure or character, unless we accept a Kantian doctrine of the categories, which most idealists and all realists reject. If, then, Hume's principle that there can be no inference from ideas to reality be thus corrected, it becomes conceivable that a partly *a priori* proof of God may be worked out, or at least worked towards. It would probably be too daring to claim that the idea of God is itself a category, but it is possible that the general structure of the universe as defined by the categories—of which we still lack a satisfactory systematization, or even list—may supply an *a priori* basis more favourable to a theological metaphysic than to any other kind.

The second assumption ties down any possible inference to God to the one Ariadne-thread of causality. God being an alleged fact, and causality being the only relation that enables us to pass inferentially from fact to fact, it follows that His existence can only be established, if at all, by showing that it is required to account for the causation of given fact. This view bristles with difficulties. In particular, it is very much open to question whether "fact" (or "existent") is the right category for God: avoiding "value," which is almost as inadequate, I would prefer to say that He is an alleged *real*. Further, Hume's notion of causal inference as the passing from one impression to another (or to its corresponding idea) under the compulsion

of a custom-bred expectation, makes nonsense of the very supposition of a non-given or a unique cause. All that I want to urge, however, is that that notion, however interpreted (and Hume often, if only implicitly, gives it a fuller meaning), is too narrow to stand as the only bridge from anywhere to reality. Hume thought incorrigibly in terms of this one category of causality—an indication of his resolve to keep to the plane of natural science. In his recently discovered abstract of the *Treatise*, he devotes more space to causality than to any other subject; and in the *Treatise* itself he reveals his obsession by explaining the idea of causality through reference to a causal psychological mechanism metaphysically conceived at the stage when the meaning and justification of the idea itself are being explicitly questioned. It may be added that, apart from occasional confusion, he means by causality nothing but efficient causality, although Aristotle was still available to suggest that "cause" might be an omnibus name. I am not blaming Hume for this narrowness, but simply pointing to the narrowness as a reason why his *Dialogues* have ceased to be helpful, even by way of provocation, on the issue with which they deal. Even the natural sciences have found thinking in terms of causality to be only one of a number of ways of reaching from fact to what reason demands for the completion of fact, and philosophy can submit even less to Hume's imposition of a single way. Neither the order of discovery nor the order of proof follows always this one way. Surely one of the most interesting and philosophically challenging points which the thought of the last hundred years has brought to light is the great versatility of the reasoning process. The resourcefulness of the procedure of recent research in all fields is as striking as its formulated results. It is this aspect of the discoveries first-hand investigation is making that has thrown such reflective disciplines as logic, theory of method, and epistemology into the melting-pot.

The limitation of reference and method in the *Dialogues* comes out most starkly in the treatment of man. He comes into the universe of Cleanthes and Philo in three

ways only—as an animal, as an artificer, and as a subject of pain. It is by omitting some of man's most distinctive features from the facts which on the one hand are set for explanation, and on the other hand are to provide the material for the explanation, that the discussion is kept on an easy plane. Man being regarded as just another class of things and his activities as just another set of events, he raises no special problem ; as with other things and events, we need only ask after his cause. Now a thing or event merely *has* causes ; it does not *know* them. That man knows is a striking *prima facie* difference which has to be noted, whatever we are eventually to make of it.* Hume does not note it. Nevertheless, it is a presupposition of the *Dialogues*. The discussion has no point if it is supposed that Cleanthes and Philo are just things undergoing changes, " little agitations of the brain," as Philo says, in an unguarded moment (p. 183). It is assumed that what they think of the world is knowledge of the world. Hume does not treat their agreement about the cosmological facts as a qualitative similarity of two sets of mental events, but as a statement of truth, and in so doing he is implicitly crediting human nature with an astonishing capacity which he does not put into his account of human nature. To put the point more directly, Hume omits from his picture of the world his own ability, as a man in it, to draw that picture and to declare what can and what cannot be reasonably inferred from it.

That omission is the very one that no philosopher can be allowed to make. It is forbidden by the grammar of philosophizing. For—to make a venturesome pronouncement—one specific principle of metaphysical method is that a philosopher's description of the facts to be accounted for must include his own philosophizing ; and one specific

* His knowing is, of course, bound up with other modes of experiencing which also deserve to be noted, and which have been regarded as more relevant than knowing to the theological issue. Cp. Martineau, following Butler and Kant: " The character of God . . . we learn not from the tides, the strata or the stars, but from the intimations of conscience, and the distribution of authority in the hierarchy of our impulses." *Essays, Reviews and Addresses*, vol. 8, p. 180.

principle of metaphysical evidence is that his theoretical completion or explanation of the facts must be consistent with the claim of his own philosophizing to be true. The later principle, after all, is only a particular, though a particularly searching, application of the law of non-contradiction. In other words, the philosopher is precluded by the comprehensiveness of his problem from treating himself as a spectator, falling outside the universe : the All can only be known from within, so that the knowing as well as the knowableness is an integral part of it. The spectator-attitude is, indeed, the device with which we sustain science, but it is the vice with which we ruin philosophy. Hume never escaped from it. The *Treatise*, as usually interpreted, is incoherent because the account he there gives of the cognitive limitations of human nature could only be true if Hume himself were free from them—and then it would not be an account of Humean nature. In the *Dialogues* also he keeps out of his universe—and not by simple omission, but by excluding in principle—his own assumed ability to talk rightly about it. This ability is one of the most remarkable things in it. By leaving it out, Hume clipped his own wings : he was perfectly right in inferring that a world with nothing so remarkable on its surface is not likely to have anything so remarkable in its depths. Throughout, however, he was pre-supposing that ability in himself. The deepest of all metaphysical contradictions is to imply both that we know anything at all about the world and that our knowing falls outside of it, and is therefore in no way significant of its nature.

The exposure of this contradiction is what I take to be the primary insight, and the permanent contribution to philosophy, of idealism. The demand for its removal is one of the *a priori* demands I spoke of earlier. What its removal would bring us to positively will doubtless long remain a matter of controversy. Still, it is a gain to have the general metaphysical problem clearly set. This problem, stated in accordance with the idealist demand, is how to conceive the universe in a way that makes the ability of a " small part " of it to know a considerable part of it cease to appear

anomalous. The universe is that order of orders in which knowing shall be seen not as a miracle, but comfortably related to the rest. Now it seems to me that the more we insist, as the Hume of the *Dialogues* does, on the priority of the kind of stuff and order revealed by the natural sciences, the more anomalous does the cosmological status of knowing beings become. This is a serious difficulty, and the only way in which, so far as I can see, we can get ready to resolve it in any detail is to give up the scientific pre-conception of a world with man's thinking as the only spiritual element in it. It is at this point I would say, and not in the assumption of design in the material order, that the question of analogy becomes critical ; for I doubt whether the material order can be cogently exhibited as a designed order unless we have reached by some other route a principle to which designing power can be reasonably attributed. One such route, I am suggested, is the study of the cosmological implication of the ability of one type of existent to be related, or to relate itself, to the rest in the peculiar mode of knowing.

Whether, in our attempt to remove the loneliness of human thinking, to reach a view in which the truth about the world may be seen as a natural constituent of the world, we are right in postulating a cosmic spirit, is too difficult a question to enter into here. I am only concerned to defend such a step against a charge which Hume brings against it. One recurrent contention of the *Dialogues* is that any anthropomorphism in metaphysics is wrong—hence there can be no theology. The conclusion certainly follows from the premiss. In any argument to God in which this term retains the core of meaning it has had for the religious experience and theology of the West, some analogy with the human mind is present. To purge the notion of God wholly of anthropomorphism would be to destroy it. Through the long self-criticism which theology, no less than philosophy, has undergone, the analogy has, of course, been drastically refined ; but what Hume rules out is the possibility of even a critical anthropomorphism. He gives two reasons : firstly, that human intelligence is " so minute,

so weak, so bounded a principle " that it cannot be taken as a clue to the vast and varied universe (p. 183) ; secondly, that so to take it would be " a palpable and egregious partiality " in our own favour (p. 220). The first reason is ingenuous, since it makes size, extent of distribution and degree of capacity the measure of cosmic significance. Of these three features, only the last deserves a word. It is true that human thinking is bounded, but even in Hume's day, if we are to accept what he himself assumes to be *known*, its boundaries were drawn generously, and since then they have been considerably extended. By dwelling on the limitations of knowing, Hume, along with Locke, has given us a tradition which makes it hard for us to realize that what makes knowing a problem is not its limitations, but its being knowing at all. This problem is sharpened not only by the advance as such of knowledge, but also by the *content* of our widened and more evidenced knowledge, by the fact that what we increasingly know makes us appear increasingly insignificant. The more we learn about the world and the mechanisms of the mind, the harder it becomes to see how such mechanisms in such a world can know anything whatever. We are busy disproving our title to prove or disprove anything. This is the paradox, the contradiction, which philosophy has to try to remove, and the supposition that the universe is not simply what our large positive knowledge shows it to be, but must have in it something to which the spiritual functioning of the human mind can be affiliated, is one attempt to remove it. To Hume's second reason—that all anthropomorphism rests on conceit—we may, therefore, reply that when, from the starting-point I have indicated, we make an analogical transition from the human spirit to a cosmic one, we do so (whether rightly or wrongly) under the impulsion not of conceit, but of a thoroughly theoretical difficulty. The only conceit is that our knowing *is* knowing, and if we abandon that we abandon all discussion.

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