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PHILOSOPHY

(THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY)

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PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XX. No. 75 APRIL 1945

SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN SOCIAL STUDIES[1]

PROFESSOR A. D. RITCHIE

THERE is a short answer to the question, whether scientific method can be applied to the study of the social relations of men, or, whether social sciences are possible; it is that these sciences exist and are in fact among the most ancient. Their success has perhaps been less startling than that of the physical sciences and they have perhaps been pursued with less enthusiasm. But there are reasons for this inherent in the nature of the social sciences, as I shall try to show.

It is often alleged that the reason for the recent immense advance of the physical as compared with the social sciences is that much money has been devoted to the former and very little to the latter. It is also alleged that this is because wicked capitalists desire the development of physical science to help them to get richer and wicked governments desire it to help them fight their neighbours. If capitalists and governments are wicked it should be a matter for congratulation that they choose to spend their money perverting mere dead matter to their wicked ends rather than perverting living men, as they would do, supposing the mere spending of money was enough to develop social sciences; and supposing also, that a knowledge of social sciences confers the same kind of control over human relations that knowledge of physical sciences does over relations of material objects. The question as to the wickedness or otherwise of capitalists and governments is not relevant to my present purpose and may be left unanswered. But the last two suppositions, which are very commonly made, must be repudiated.

The physical sciences have now reached a point at which, in certain matters, the technique of discovery and invention is so well understood, that the mere spending of money on hiring technically

[1] Herbert Spencer Lecture, Oxford, May 14, 1943.

trained workers and buying apparatus will produce in a fairly short time results of a kind agreeable to the desires of capitalists and governments. The social sciences have not reached this stage of technical development, and perhaps never will.

Again, a knowledge of physical sciences does confer control over certain relations of material bodies. If the engine of a car fails to start, a knowledge of certain branches of physics is of value towards getting it going. It is too easily assumed that a knowledge of psychology, for instance, confers on those who have it the kind of control over human beings that a knowledge of physics confers over internal combustion engines. It may be so in some cases, but certainly not in all. There are in general two ways of controlling other people—force and persuasion. Psychology is not much use for the first but it might be for the second. Still, do you think that Delilah would have had any greater success with Samson if she had studied psychology? What is more, if Delilah reads books on psychology, so can Samson. Sauce for the psychological goose is sauce for the psychological gander. Besides, persuasion depends upon personal knowledge of the person persuaded. It is doubtful whether science can ever teach that.

Though the results that are to be expected from pursuing the social sciences are not exactly of the same kind as those that come from the physical and other natural sciences, it is still quite proper to speak of social sciences. What makes any study scientific is that it has a definite subject matter, is systematic and comprehensive and that its aim is to discover the truth as far as possible. Scientific method in general is just taking things in order, simplifying as far as necessary and possible, endeavouring to leave out nothing that ought to go in, and distinguishing true from false. For the rest the method of science is the method of discussion and argument. However, as each separate science has its distinct subject matter, its method has to be adapted to that subject matter and special technical means developed. Thus in each science certain kinds of questions are asked and certain corresponding answers obtained. Technique and apparatus are tools for asking questions and getting answers; in the different sciences different questions and therefore different answers.

A distinction is drawn between pure and applied science or between science and technology; for the present I prefer to use the traditional terms *science* and *art* to mark the kind of difference generally intended. Thus science is concerned to discover the truth about some specific subject matter. Art is concerned with adapting means to ends, the ends being human purposes. Thus we have arts of medicine, agriculture and engineering. The peculiar modern use of the term *art* to mean the spreading of pigments on paper or canvas, I am putting aside for the moment in favour of older usage. The

successful pursuit of any art depends upon using the relevant scientific knowledge available. One can distinguish the science of arithmetic from the art of calculation, which applies arithmetical laws to human purposes; keeping accounts for instance. Thus we find some people who neglect these laws or are ignorant of them, putting money on horses and losing it, while others who understand them and use them, namely the bookies, make money out of such transactions. However, the application of arithmetic to human affairs does not constitute arithmetic a social science, since arithmetic considers only numbers and their relations. Numbers are always just numbers whether they are used for counting coins or stars or hours or sins or not used for counting anything.

The distinction between science and art is a matter of purpose more than method and is not always easy to draw because the two different purposes may be pursued together. Newton's main contribution to the *science* of optics, his discovery that white light is composite and its simple constituents are coloured, arose out of his interest in the *art* of optics, his desire to improve the telescope. The difference can be seen from the fact that his scientific conclusions were correct, while in the matter of art he made the mistake of supposing that lenses could not be made free of chromatic aberration.

As an art ministers to human purposes and these may change, the function of art may change too. Where ploughshares are abundant and swords scarce the industrial artist must find ways of converting ploughshares into swords. At another time he may have to do the opposite. Science regards each process at all times with equal interest as illustrating similar scientific laws. All facts within the purview of science are equally welcome and are just facts. But art discriminates between facts as desirable or undesirable, good or bad, right or wrong, useful or the reverse. Thus the art of engineering uses the notion of *efficiency* to distinguish a machine that is working well from one that is working badly. Because efficiency can be expressed by means of physical terms, it might be supposed to belong to the purely natural science of physics, whereas it is foreign to it. Efficiency may be defined as the useful work obtained from a machine divided by the total energy put into it. These are quantities of energy and energy is expressed in physical units, but the actual quantities stated are relative to a human purpose and would be meaningless apart from it; these are, the quantity you get out that you consider useful for your purpose and the quantity you choose to put in. Efficiency is not always measured in terms of energy, if there is some other aspect of output and intake that is more interesting. The efficiency of a sawmill may be measured in terms of its output in square feet of sawn timber and its intake in terms of man-hours of

labour. These are physical terms in a sense but in their case it is more easily seen that they are alien to a purely natural science. If science enters in, it will be a kind of social science.

There is a branch of physical theory which deals with the principles of working of heat engines and their efficiency. It is not a natural science in the sense of the impartial study of a field of independent non-human facts. It is as near as physics can get to a social science, a study of human contrivances in terms of their fulfilment of human purposes. Notions derived from human purposes can be read into the natural world and the consequences then developed scientifically. This is legitimate and necessary procedure, but has given rise to a widespread illusion, specially common among biologists, that the facts of purely natural science include or give rise to notions like efficiency, normality, adaptation, progress; and therefore that there is nothing about human purposes that is not derived from the natural world and not visible in a purely objective study of it. The truth is just the other way round. Human purpose is read into and taken up into the supposed neutral external objective world and embodied in sciences that are therefore not strictly natural but may be partly social.

A confusion is very liable to arise too between art and science. As to this, you may ask, if it is granted that art and science are not easily distinguished and may be pursued together in one and the same art, as Newton's experiments with the prism were a study of the *science* of light and intended also to apply to the *art* of making lenses; if they are so closely linked, why distinguish? The answer is, they ought to be distinguished because the purposes are different in the two cases and may clash. Thus the physician at the bedside is both studying the disease (science) and trying to cure the patient (art). In pursuing his artistic purpose he must give the patient the best treatment he knows, in pursuing his scientific purpose he may require to do something else "to see what happens."

When the University of Oxford was founded, though I am told there is no precise or detailed information as to what happened on the occasion, it is fairly safe to assume that the University possessed three faculties: Medicine, Law and Theology. Medicine and Law are both social sciences and are two I propose to examine. It may be that theology is one also, but for the present the question can be left undecided; it will be enough to consider the other two. In the Middle Ages the study of medicine was too haphazard and light-hearted an affair to be reckoned as genuine science, but in the past medicine had been studied scientifically and some residue of the tradition remained. Law on the other hand was studied as scientifically then as at any time, but it was no new science either. The scientific study of both began with the ancient Greeks who initiated all the sciences by

the simple process of realizing that distinction between art and science I have been trying to indicate. Of course the arts of medicine and law are older still; they are in fact coeval with human cililization of any sort.

Since medicine deals with human bodies directly by physical means it is closer to the physical sciences than any other social science. The science of medicine is the study of human health and disease with a view to understanding them and discovering their causes. The art of medicine is the application of this knowledge to preserving health, getting rid of disease and mitigating its evil consequences when it occurs. Health is a state of mind as well as a state of body, but medicine is a physical science so far as it deals with the body. It is not a natural science. For a natural science, as I have said, all facts are alike and are chiefly valuable as illustrating general theory. A sick man is a fact illustrating some specific disease, a healthy man illustrates a different combination of conditions and absence of disease, that is all. For natural science there is nothing to suggest one ought to be converted into the other or which into which. There is no "ought" about it. Life and death, health and disease, well-being and pain are all distinguishable, but as facts are all on the same footing. The science of arithmetic tells us that four is a square number, five a prime number and five greater than four. It does not tell us that four is a better or worse number than five. Nor can the science of arithmetic tell us why we prefer to have five pennies in our pockets instead of four, but prefer to have four blisters on our feet instead of five. The judgments that life is preferable to death and health to disease are moral judgments made in terms of human ends and do not belong to purely natural science. These judgments are so obvious that few people realize they make them or that it is possible to refrain from making them. A purely natural science of living organisms would just take note in passing of the difference between health and disease as of any other difference; a social science is preoccupied with the difference and with the causes of the change from one to the other.

Though medicine is a social science it is concerned with rather simple elementary social relations, that are easily understood and about which there is no serious difficulty or dispute. One is apt to think of health and disease in terms of the individual person or in terms of the exclusive relationship between physician and patient, though even that is a social relation. But one has only to consider infectious disease to see that it arises out of general social relations, even if they are social relations operating at a low level. Nevertheless, the general standard of health of a community depends upon how far public opinion about health is active and well-informed, upon the status and training of the medical profession and upon direct acts of

government; in short, upon the general standard of public order and of morals and intelligence.

The close relationship of medicine to the physical sciences enables it to use their technique. The advance of medicine has depended on the advance of these ancillary sciences. The main principles which should guide the physician in treating disease were understood by Hippocrates, but the application of those principles had to wait the rise of physics, chemistry and biology. Medicine is also one of the few social sciences in which the full experimental method can be used, though its use is difficult, complicated and slow, as the causal relations involved are complicated and human feelings and desires are among them. A properly devised experiment for the study of a proposed method of treatment of a disease would be roughly as follows. Take a group of at least 100 people who differ as much as possible in every other respect but all suffer the disease in question. A large number of cases is needed to swamp chance variations and to allow statistical methods to be applied. Divide these people into two groups as nearly alike as possible. One is the experimental group to whom the treatment is to be given; the other the control group to whom no treatment is given. It is essential that all the subjects should suppose they are being treated alike. If anyone thinks he is in the experimental group he will be encouraged and tend to get better. Anyone who thinks he is in the control group will be proportionately discouraged. After a sufficient time compare the rate of recovery in the two groups. Most diseases are rather mild and most people recover from them in any case. In fact everybody recovers from every disease except one, the one that kills him. Therefore treatment can at most produce more and more rapid recoveries. It will be seen that the experimental method is not easy or simple, but it can be used.

As to the art of medicine, the end or purpose is simple, fixed, and known; it is to promote health, prolong life and relieve pain. As a rule the practitioner is not in any doubt. He does not say to himself as he starts out on his rounds, "I don't think I'll visit Smith today. It is true he is very ill but he is a rascal and bullies his wife. Perhaps I'd better visit Jones. There is nothing really seriously wrong with him and he should be up and about in a day or two; but he is a very good chap and if he should take a turn for the worse his death would be a much more serious loss to the community than old Smith, who can well be spared." Fortunately for his peace of mind the medical man does not need to consider moral problems of this kind. Usually the three ends I have enumerated are harmonious; whatever promotes health also prolongs life and relieves pain. Sometimes there is a clash. In some very painful illness, the practitioner may feel obliged to mitigate pain at the risk of impeding recovery or even

hastening death. Sometimes he has to choose between safe treatment which will only partly restore health and a drastic one which may produce complete recovery but endangers the patient's life. These problems are not scientific but moral problems. The doctor's scientific knowledge provides material with which to form a judgment, namely the means available and chances of success or failure, but not the final judgment itself. He has to answer such a question as: is so much pain and prolongation of life worse or better than relief from pain and the probability of death? One doctor who believes that physical pain is the only evil and physical well-being the only good will have little difficulty in deciding, generally in favour of stopping pain. On the other hand another who believes that life on earth is a preparation for eternity will have more difficulty in deciding, as he is not just balancing pleasures against pains, and he may decide the opposite way. We can assume that the scientific information is the same for both of them, for the difference between the two decisions is not scientific, but moral.

For the arts, facts are not all alike but there are some among them that can be changed for better or worse. Theory is an intellectual tool to be used, like material tools, to change them. The difficulty in practising an art is that theory has to be applied to the particular instance with incomplete knowledge of facts, which do not point unequivocally to one theoretical conclusion; while the theory is always too simple really to cope with the complexity of the concrete situation.

Though the medical art, like any art, is concerned with the individual person and particular case rather than with groups or aggregates, its success has to be judged statistically by its effect on the whole population. It is only by statistical methods systematically used that successful treatment of A's appendicitis can be weighed against failure to deal with B's asthma. We are still only touching the fringe of public health statistics, but on the whole the attitude of the public and the medical profession is moving in the right direction.

In principle it should be possible to apply the notion of efficiency to medicine, to measure output of healthy or cured persons against intake in terms of, say, medical man-hours. Actually this is not done because health is taken as an absolute end worth any cost and not as a relative or proximate end to be balanced against cost.

One last remark about medicine. It is too often assumed that the consequences of medical science and art are necessarily beneficent. They generally are but not necessarily nor in fact always. I need not remind you that the physician turned murderer is the most dangerous murderer. Any kind of knowledge can be misused by those who want to do so. I would rather draw your attention to an unintended and unforeseen consequence of the increase of medical

knowledge during the last two hundred years, namely the large-scale and disastrous character of modern warfare, which is chiefly due to medical science, though other factors have operated also. Till towards the end of the 18th century wars had to be fought with small armies and campaigns had to be brief, partly because of purely mechanical hindrances, but chiefly because an army once collected died off quickly of epidemic disease and the larger the army the greater the death rate and the quicker it perished. The ambitions of military conquerors were once limited by ignorance of medicine, but now we have changed all that. There is no limit to the size of an army or the length of a campaign.

The second social science I would say something about is Law. Unlike the other sciences initiated by the Greeks it never had a long period of eclipse. It was the one aspect of Greek science which appealed to the Romans and in which they improved upon their teachers. Under the Roman Empire and later in the Middle Ages law always attracted many of the best intellects. It has never gone uncultivated while there was any civilized life at all. Nevertheless, its progress has been very slow and it has never been as scientific as it ought to be.

There is a popular belief that only a very clever man can be a mathematician or a physicist, while any fool can succeed at the social sciences. There could not be a greater or more disastrous fallacy. In principle the problems of mathematics and physics are simple. Newton said they were trivial, and he was in a position to judge. It is true these sciences have developed a formidable technique which is difficult to master. If the social sciences have no such elaborate technique that is their misfortune; it makes their problems harder still compared with those of physics since technique is meant for solving problems by making them easier. The rapid development of medicine in recent years is largely due to the valuable technical tools the physical sciences have provided for it. Law enjoys no such advantages, but has always had to invent its own technique. Moreover, its end or purpose is nothing like so simple, definite and fixed.

The end of law has been defined as, keeping the peace and preventing or settling disputes. This seems sufficient and sounds fairly simple, but there are certain preconditions underlying peacefulness and absence of disputes that are more complicated. The first of these is Security: security of life: security in all beneficial and harmless pursuits or avocations: security in the possession and enjoyment of the means of life so far as beneficial and harmless. But second and not less important is Justice or Equity; namely, the fair or reasonable adjustment of mutual claims and responsibilties of the individuals and associations or groups that constitute human society. Justice, as Aristotle said, is partly natural, partly conventional.

Some of the rules and some aspects of all the rules are universal and never seriously disputed except by those who are or should be in lunatic asylums. Other parts are such that there can be different alternative rules between which choice is mainly arbitrary. The important thing there is to have a rule as simple, clear and definite as possible and to stick to it.

Thus the total end of law is complex and not free of difficulty. There is plenty of opportunity for conflicting moral judgments and for doubt and dispute about them. For instance, how far does security extend and how is it to be procured? In primitive societies law does not really give security in our modern sense and does not punish. Its function is to give public approval for the vengeance a man takes for wrongs to his person or property; provided the vengeance is within reasonable limits, *e.g.* an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth. The *lex talionis*, which is an ingredient of most primitive codes, was a kind of justice and did provide some security against brutality and unlimited revenge. If A has knocked out B's tooth, B is entitled to go and knock out one of A's, but one only, not half a dozen. In civilized countries the law prohibits private vengeance and thereby gives greater security. Security of life and certain kinds of security of property have long been provided, but our notions of what constitutes the kind of security required are continually extending.

The difficulties underlying the interpretation of justice are even greater. Justice, to quote Aristotle again, is a kind of equality as between equals but proportionately or reciprocity as between unequals. The rule of equality is the simplest rule, where it can be applied. On the basis of equality one might say, "Equal pay for equal work," or "Equal pay for equal needs," or "Equal pay for everybody." All are good rules, but if one operates neither of the others can. As long as people do different kinds of work and have different needs equality of one sort produces inequality of another sort. As between unequals how does the rule of proportionality work? Robbery with violence is a worse crime than plain robbery. How much worse? If plain robbery deserves three years' imprisonment, how many years for robbery with violence? Dentistry calls for more skill than plumbing, and plumbing than road cleaning. If pay is to be proportional to skill, how much should the exponents of these three trades receive?

Questions of this sort all tend to be settled by custom and precedent. This produces a kind of equality, namely that A is treated now as B and C were in the past. But this kind of equality is not always considered satisfactory. To quote Aristotle a third time, people desire what is good and not solely to adhere to the ways of their ancestors.

The science and art of law are not easy to distinguish, but it may be worth while to try to do so, remembering that though both require understanding as well as action, in science action is for the sake of understanding, in art understanding is for the sake of action. The science of law seems to require three elements. First of all, factual historical study of human customs, habits, rules and institutions, so far as they are relevant to the ends already mentioned; keeping the peace and settling disputes. Secondly, since all human institutions subserve some purpose a judgment is required as to how far that purpose has been fulfilled and its value. This judgment on the historical record is as near as law can get to an experiment. If we find that following a change in criminal law there was an increase in one kind of crime and a decrease in another kind, we have obtained the kind of information that experiment provides. It is less decisive because the course of human history is unique; there is no control observation showing what would have happened had the law not been altered. It must be remembered that if a law is altered deliberately experimentally, in order to see what happens, that in itself alters peoples' attitude to the change and is a complicating factor. An experiment on human relations is almost a self-contradiction because the experimenting process itself is one of the relations concerned. Even in the sphere of medicine there are genuine difficulties of this kind. It will be realized at once that this kind of factual study is difficult and has perhaps never been pursued with sufficient energy.

Thirdly, there is theory, so far as it is possible. The final aim of theory would be the justification and the expression in definite formulae of the notion of a Natural or Rational Law; a universal standard in terms of which existing systems of law can be criticized; a law that is *natural* in the sense that it has to be found out and is not made by any arbitrary act of will and *rational* because it is not solely a fact of observation. In the meantime, theory consists of all those general principles and concepts that the lawyer makes use of in argument. The development of law as a science has been the clarification of these concepts and their gradual expansion to cover more adequately the complexities of the actual facts of human relations.

I have been assuming that there is a rational moral law, a really "objective" standard of justice, at least partially embodied in some existing institutions. If it were true that the notion of justice merely reflects the class bias of those who exercise authority, the assumption would be false. But then there would be no genuine science of law (or any other genuine social science) yet conceived. A science cannot be based upon a purely hypothetical state of affairs contrary to the character of all past and present societies, in which nobody

exercises authority and where everybody is free of bias. That is not to deny that bias and class prejudice create grave difficulties.

As to the art of law I need say no more than that, like medicine, while it is concerned with the individual case, the test of its success or failure is to be obtained mainly from social statistics. It is only these that can show how far there really is peace and security and whether disputes are settled justly. It certainly has been a grave defect in the science and practice of law that too little attention has been paid to this study of facts; until the 19th century really no attention at all. The success of criminal law is properly shown by the crimes that are not committed. Unfortunately, evidence of this negative sort is difficult to obtain and one has to be content to see whether crimes of a particular sort are tending to become less frequent or more frequent. Every crime committed means a bad mark against the law. A criminal convicted may go some way towards removing the bad mark, but only if we know that henceforth he is no longer a criminal. There is an old story, told against the medical profession, about the surgeon whose report on a case concluded: "The operation was completely successful. The patient died four hours later." But magistrates, judges and juries are doing the same kind of thing every day. All who are concerned with the conviction of criminals ought to consider it their special responsibility to see what happens to the criminal while serving his sentence and afterwards. When he is hanged it should be their duty to see it done. The ideal certainly is that judge, jury, public prosecutor and any others concerned should have personal first-hand knowledge of the working out of the law in actual fact.

Tests of the success of criminal law are not so difficult to apply because crime is a manifest fact. The success of civil law is very hard to discover at all. Absence of litigation is no safe guide. Men may refrain from litigation either because the law is so clear and definite that the aggrieved party has no difficulty in persuading the other party without recourse to the courts, or else because the law is so bad and uncertain or litigation so expensive that the aggrieved party prefers to suffer in silence. An increase in litigation on some subject may be due simply to a change in circumstances which raises new doubts and obscurities about claims and responsibilities; it may not indicate any failure of law.

It is possible to judge in terms of the cases actually contested in court. Here the layman seeing that the process is cumbrous, slow, uncertain and costly, generally takes a pessimistic view. The lawyer sees valuable principles consistently upheld, obtains intellectual satisfaction from the learning and dialectical acumen displayed and takes an optimistic view. Neither judgment is really soundly based. In the meanwhile in the absence of any objective test and any

properly ascertained body of fact, this aspect of law lacks full scientific development.

Social statistics and those other social facts that form the raw material of history are the necessary basis for the full development of social science. The more there is of them the better. Yet by themselves they do not constitute science. Unless they are organized with some purpose in view, as answers to explicit questions, they are no better than those snippets of information provided by some popular journals—as that 15·32 per cent of the male population of Wigan has red hair; that the consumption of tripe in Huntingdonshire per head of population is the lowest for any English county; and so on. But social facts certainly are the indispensable raw material of social science. The kind of facts I have in mind include not only regular statistics which aim at being a complete record of what happens in an area, like the information embodied in birth and death rates, but also the sampling methods that have been introduced more recently; the surveys of conditions in a single region, or connected with a single trade; the recording of the budget and general history of selected families before and after they have moved from one district to another; recording the careers of children after leaving a particular school; information obtained by the questionnaire method; even the haphazard methods of "Mass Observation" are of value. It is by the use and extension of all these methods that the raw material of social research can be obtained.

I have selected Medicine and Law as instances to show that there are genuine social sciences actually in existence, from the character of which it is possible to judge of what a social science is like and what it can be expected to accomplish. They can be used to illustrate another point: that there may be a clash of purposes as between the pursuit of the art of medicine and that of law. It is one of the fundamental rules of justice that no man shall be imprisoned for more than a short time without trial and conviction of crime according to due form of law. But when it comes to quarantine regulations justice goes by the board and in the interests of public health people who are guilty of no crime or misdemeanour may be imprisoned for considerable periods. It is a mild form of it, but still it does often amount to imprisonment. Human ends are many and diverse and may be incompatible. If there is a clash we have to decide which is to prevail and which to give way. The decision is a moral one. The conflict is a moral conflict, not a conflict between two kinds of science, which would mean two incompatible kinds of truth.

It is not my intention to try to enumerate all the social sciences, even supposing I knew how to do it; nor do I claim that the classification of sciences as natural and social is exhaustive. My intention is only to indicate by examples the kind of thing a social science is.

There is, however, just one further example from another social science, economics, which I must mention. As long ago as the 4th century B.C. it was stated quite clearly by Aristotle and argued out by the author of a short dialogue, Eryxias, that money (gold and silver in those days) is not wealth. It is only a means for facilitating exchange. Wealth consists of useful commodities. Nobody, of course, acted on this scientific knowledge. Instead the universal superstition prevailed that money is wealth. In the 18th century thinkers painfully recovered the simple but forgotten truth. Now, 200 years later, it is beginning to sink in. Governments are beginning to make tentative efforts to act upon it. Now for the first time in history there is a possibility that money may become what it ought to be, a useful tool, a labour-saving device; and not, as it has been, the capricious and cruel master of men's destinies. Everyone is concerned to some extent to practise the art of acquiring wealth, the material means of subsistence, but owing to universal ignorance of the science, it has been a highly destructive process. The defect has been primarily a confusion as to ends of action, and the mistaking of means for ends. It has been a defect in scientific knowledge, but one arising out of defect in moral insight and only to be cured by a moral revaluation, namely the realization of what is to be pursued for its own sake and what is not.

In the 19th century thinkers like Auguste Comte, Karl Marx and Herbert Spencer asked themselves whether scientific method could be applied to social relations and decided, quite correctly, that it could. But they seemed to think this was a new discovery and tried on the strength of it to initiate brand-new sciences of their own. In this they were not very successful. Further, if they thought they could produce a single comprehensive science of society they were probably mistaken. Certainly no such science has yet appeared. Instead we have a number of distinct social sciences; some very ancient, all very difficult and none in a position to produce anything very revolutionary all at once. In particular, there is uncertainty and confusion as to ends of action. There may even be complete moral blindness as an obstacle to progress. Medicine advances rapidly because its ends are simple and agreed upon, but chiefly because the physical sciences provide it with new tools. Law progresses very slowly but, if we are thinking in terms of periods of a thousand years, fairly steadily. A simple piece of economic knowledge familiar to the more intelligent ancient Greeks has taken more than 2,000 years to produce any results. That is perhaps a measure of the rate of progress to be expected.

I am reluctant to end on what may seem a pessimistic note, therefore let me remind you that during the million years or so that men have inhabited this earth, they have been civilized in any sense at

all for a brief period of six or seven thousand years. For less than half that time have they had any sort of science. On any resonable estimate of the expectation of life of the human community our rate of progress is not altogether unsatisfactory, though disappointing to those who expect the millennium to arrive in a fortnight.

MARTIN BUBER'S 'I AND THOU'

HELEN WODEHOUSE, M.A., D.Phil.

I

READING and re-reading the difficult and important small book *I and Thou*, by Professor Martin Buber, which Mr. Ronald Gregor Smith has translated with so much care and skill,[1] and trying to make it clearer to myself in words of my own, I find myself at odds on the threshold with the translator's Introduction. He is explaining the title and the general theme of the book:—

"There is, Buber shows, a radical difference between a man's attitude to other men and his attitude to things. The attitude to other men is a relation between persons, to things it is a connexion with objects. In the personal relation one subject—*I*—confronts another subject—*Thou*; in the connexion with things the subject contemplates and experiences an object. These two attitudes represent the basic twofold situation of human life, the former constituting the 'world of *Thou*,' and the latter the 'world of *It*' " (p. vi).

Mr. Gregor Smith goes on to qualify his account by noting that we often treat our fellow-man as *It*, but he does not match this by any note that the *Thou*-relation may extend to things, and he uses "persons" and "personal" as keywords for it throughout. Yet in Buber's own treatment one is struck by the fact that this restriction does not hold. With some other writers to whom Mr. Gregor Smith refers—Karl Heim and Professor MacMurray—it does hold, and their doctrines are much simpler to expound.

In attempting here some exposition of Buber's book and some commentary upon it, I am keenly aware of the difficulty of the task. As the translator truly says, the work "must be read more than once, and the total effect allowed to work on the mind. . . . For the argument is not as it were horizontal, but spiral; it mounts, and gathers within itself the aphoristic and pregnant utterances of the earlier part." I hope this may be borne in mind by any reader of this paper who has not himself read the book; otherwise the obscurities of brief selections may unjustly repel him from that reading. All references are to the English translation, published by T. and T. Clark, printed 1937, reprinted 1942.[2] Here and there within brackets I shall insert the German from *Ich und Du* (Leipzig, 1923).

[1] Only a small proportion of Buber's work has yet appeared in English. A further selection translated by Dr. Greta Hort is shortly to be published by Melbourne University Press.

[2] Pp. xii, 120 3s.

Let me begin with a series of aphoristic paragraphs presented on p. 6, whose content is reiterated in a résumé on p. 101.

"As experience (*Erfahrung*) the world belongs to the primary word (*Grundwort*) *I-It*.

The primary word *I-Thou* establishes the world of relation (*Beziehung*).

The spheres in which the world of relation arises are three.

First, our life with nature. There the relation sways in gloom, beneath the level of speech. Creatures live and move over against us, but cannot come to us, and when we address them as *Thou*, our words cling to the threshold of speech.

Second, our life with men. There the relation is open and in the form of speech. We can give and accept the *Thou*.

Third, our life with intelligible forms (*geistigen Wesenheiten*). There the relation is clouded, yet it discloses itself; it does not use speech, yet begets it. We perceive no *Thou*, but none the less we feel we are addressed and we answer—forming, thinking, acting. We speak the primary word with our being, though we cannot utter *Thou* with our lips.

But with what right do we draw what lies outside speech into relation with the world of the primary word?

In every sphere in its own way, through each process of becoming that is present to us we look out toward the fringe of the eternal *Thou*; in each we are aware of a breath from the eternal *Thou*; in each *Thou* we address the eternal *Thou*."

Difficult as this passage is, the point I referred to seems to me to stand out. Although the description of the *Thou* relation, as Buber conceives it, is going to be easiest when the relation holds between human beings, he yet is guarding against the belief that it holds only there, and is claiming for it a range so wide as to cover everything that we meet. The first illustration he works out in detail (pp. 7–8) relates not to a human being but to a tree—"no soul or dryad of the tree, but the tree itself."[1] The second illustration relates to human beings. The third (p. 9) concerns "the eternal source of art: a man is faced by a form (*Gestalt*) which desires to be made through him into a work. This form is no offspring of his soul, but is an appearance which steps up to it and demands of it the effective power."

It is true that "of the three spheres, one, our life with men, is marked out. . . . Here alone . . . are gazing and being gazed upon, knowing and being known, loving and being loved. This is the main portal" (pp. 102–3). But the side-gates exist as well. It is true also, and central in Buber's teaching, that every I-Thou relation reaches beyond its *prima facie* form; that in each Thou we have touch with the eternal Thou. But these references seem to me everywhere intended to deepen and extend our understanding of the primarily apparent; *not* to remove the reality of this. The fellow-man whom

[1] This example is treated still more fully in his *Daniel*, published ten years earlier (1913).

we love does not cease to be Thou because we meet in him with more than himself; and the same must hold where the primary meeting takes place elsewhere than with fellow-men.

The passage quoted in the last paragraph terminates as follows:—

"This is the main portal, into whose opening the two side-gates lead, and in which they are included.

'When a man is together with his wife the longing of the eternal hills blows round about them.'

The relation with man is the real simile of the relation with God; in it true address receives true response; except that in God's response everything, the universe, is made manifest as language" (p. 103).

Worlds interlock, and one is richer than the rest. But the passage as I understand it conforms to the spirit which I seem to find in the book as a whole—claiming all three worlds, of Nature, of Thought, and of Man, as potential fields for the Thou.

2

The claim is reinforced so far as Nature is concerned when the author connects his thought with the *mana* of the anthropologist. Let us take one such passage and make it a beginning for a further examination of what the I-Thou relation is.

(Pp. 19–21) "The elementary impressions and emotional stirrings that waken the spirit of the 'natural man' proceed from incidents—and from situations—that are relational in character. He is not disquieted by the moon that he sees every night, till it comes bodily to him, sleeping or waking, draws near and charms him with silent movements, fascinates him with the evil or sweetness of its touch. . . . At first he has in him only the dynamic, stirring image of the moon's effect, streaming through his body. . . . The appearances to which he ascribes the 'mystical power' are all elementary incidents that are relational in character, that is, all incidents that disturb him by stirring his body and leaving behind in him a stirring image. The moon and the dead, visiting him by night with pain or pleasure, have that power. But so, too, have the burning sun and the howling beast and the chief whose glance constrains him and the sorcerer whose singing loads him with power for the hunt. Mana is simply the effective force, that which has made the moon, up there in the heavens, into a blood-stirring *Thou*."

This is crude ore, evidently; very different from some of the high and pure examples which Buber gives elsewhere. Yet he boldly presents it as an early form of the same thing. Some quality of the universe is speaking in these situations, and the man answers. Will it help us if we examine what is said of the kind of answer? Buber's recurrent expression (first on p. 3) is: "*I-Thou* can only be spoken with the whole being." I suppose this to mean the same kind of thing as when we say "with my whole heart." The man who responds thus is not crouching in fear, nor yet yielding in spite of himself

to a fascination; he has stood, and faced, and chosen. He may have to overrule some faintness or some rebellion within him—whole-heartedness in mortals cannot be flawless—but his ruling principle is in charge; his act stands for his integrity. He has seen greatness, however strange its kind, and he has greeted it.

Let us turn next to a different illustration, where the human being takes the initiative. "The primal nature of the effort to establish relation," writes Buber, "is already to be seen in the earliest and most confined stage": in early infancy.

(Pp. 26-8) "Before anything isolated can be perceived, timid glances move out into indistinct space, towards something indefinite; and in times when there seems to be no desire for nourishment, hands sketch delicately and dimly in the empty air, apparently aimlessly seeking and reaching out to meet something indefinite. . . . These very glances will after protracted attempts settle on the red carpet-pattern and not be moved till the soul of the red has opened itself to them; and this very movement of the hands will win from a woolly Teddy-bear its precise form, apparent to the senses, and become lovingly and unforgettably aware of a complete body. . . . (This 'fancy' does not in the least involve . . . a 'giving of life to the universe': it is the instinct to make everything into *Thou*. . . .) . . . It is simply not the case that the child first perceives an object, then, as it were, puts himself in relation with it. But the effort to establish relation comes first—the hand of the child arched out so that what is over against him may nestle under it; second is the actual relation, a saying of *Thou* without words. . . . In the beginning is relation—as category of being, readiness, grasping form, mould for the soul; it is the *a priori* of relation, *the inborn Thou.*"[1]

The Thou that we meet in *mana* says to us, Can you stand and meet me? The Thou that the baby finds in his exploring has said to him, I am here!—come. But there is relation for him elsewhere which needs no approach; where love in his mother's arms is saying all round him, Here we are, my Dear. Should we not recognise the existence of such beginnings even within the animal world? Buber has depicted (pp. 97–8) an animal faced with a situation just beyond its capacity: the master looks into his cat's eyes while his own heart and mind say Thou to it, and he thinks for a moment that a response is given. "The bright *Thou* appeared and was gone. . . . The animal had sunk back out of the stammer of its glance into the disquietude where there is no speech and almost no memory." But there is no stammering, surely, when cat and kitten are saying Thou to each other.

Once more, let us take a different point in the account of baby-hood, and develop it into what it becomes for the grown human

[1] The last phrase surely is wrong. The *a priori* of *relation* cannot be a Thou; it must be an I-Thou.—It is "inborn" neither in the person nor in the thing, but in the whole situation. Cf. Grimm's No. 1 interpretation of *eingeboren*: "im Lande, im Ort geboren, indigena." (*Deutsches Wörterbuch*, III (1862), p. 185.) I owe this reference to Dr. Else Jaffé.

being. (Pp. 27–8) "The instinct to make contact . . . ever more clearly turns out to mean mutual relation, 'tenderness'. But the instinct to 'creation,' which is established later (that is, the instinct to set up things in a synthetic, or, if that is impossible, an analytic way—through pulling to pieces or tearing up) is also determined by this inborn *Thou*."—Is not this a foreshadowing not only of the work of the artist, but also of a kind of work which Buber does not explicitly speak of in connection with I-Thou—that of the scholar, the man of science, the philosopher? Professor Buber himself, writing such a book as this, must have known keenly the situation in which some feature of reality, dimly seen, stands over against us, and we have to stare and grope and wrestle to grasp it, while it seems to invite and evade at the same time. We have to achieve taking it to pieces and setting it up; to render it somehow in words and to make the words worthy of it; to translate and interpret and make it transparent to men's understanding, including our own. To the strivings of the truth-seeker and the truth-teller, the same account can be applied that Buber gives when he speaks (pp. 9–10, 14) of the artist and the forms which "step up to his soul" and lay their demands upon it:—

(P. 14) "The form becomes the work. Through the meeting that which confronts me is fulfilled, and enters the world of things. . . . It is 'embodied'; its body emerges from the flow of the spaceless, timeless present on the shore of existence."[1]

Here, then, are several examples of the dealings of *I* with *Thou*. How shall we describe them? Summoning courage or turning in tenderness or labouring in concentration, we are greeting reality and joining hands with it. At this point and at that point and all round us the universe speaks, and, so far as in us lies, we give our whole heart to the answer. Under the *It* connection we may deal from the surface of ourselves with the surface of things, but here the speaking and the answer alike come from the depths. Buber depicts the intensity of such moments, as the poet in him feels them. In man's ordinary commonplace attitude (p. 31) "he perceives things and events . . . an ordered and detached world . . . a reliable world. . . ."

(Pp. 32–3) "You cannot hold on to life without it, its reliability sustains you; but should you die in it, your grave would be in nothingness." But with I-Thou "man meets what exists and becomes as what is over against him, always simply a *single* being. . . . What exists is opened to him. . . . The world which appears to you in this way is unreliable . . .; you cannot hold it to its word. . . . It comes, and comes to bring *you* out; if it does not reach you, meet you, then it vanishes; but it comes back in another form.

[1] For a closer study of the process, see Buber, pp. 17, 41, or my p. 19.

It is not outside you, it stirs in the depth of you; if you say 'Soul of my soul' you have not said too much. But guard against wishing to remove it into your soul—for then you annihilate it. . . . Between you and it there is mutual giving. . . . You cannot make yourself understood with others concerning it, you are alone with it. But it teaches you to meet others, and to hold your ground when you meet them. Through the graciousness of its comings and the solemn sadness of its goings it leads you away to the *Thou* in which the parallel lines of relations meet. It does not help to sustain you in life, it only helps you to glimpse eternity."[1]

. . . "Guard against wishing to remove it into your soul." Whether in the ultimate touch with the Eternal or in the *prima facie* meeting with the particular Thou, the centre of gravity must fall outside ourselves. In an early work Buber coined the name *Zwischenmenschlichkeit* for the subject-matter of such studies as economics and sociology.[2] This idea of *betweenness*, in a deepened form, serves him well now. Throughout this book he wages war simultaneously against two differently defective ways of life: empty mechanical activity and sentimental egoism. The first leaves the heart out of living; the driving power of habit or the fever of ambition supplying its place. The surface of the man, or one obsessed part of him, deals with the surface of things. The second never gets beyond its private boundary. Feelings revolve on themselves and are savoured, without ever passing in action into the stream of the world's common life. But man must give himself away, Buber urges; he must lose his life if he is to save it; he must plunge into the fire of reality. The Spirit dwells in that which goes on between him and his fellows; and, as truly though less clearly, it dwells between him and Nature, and between him and the Idea which seeks his service. With all our heart and will, we must enter into relation.

"In the beginning," we quoted just now from p. 27, "is relation —as category of being, readiness, grasping form, mould for the soul." In one sense of existence the relationship does not exist until we have entered into it, but in another sense it was there already, waiting to be "realised." "Relation is mutual"[3]—*Beziehung*

[1] Cf. a letter by R. L. Nettleship (May 1889) (*Remains*, vol. I, p. 94). "I feel more and more the horrible contrast between rare moments and my average level of achievement. I know it is only a man's self that realises this: to the outsider you look much of a piece. . . . I do believe that the moments are the things that give one what is best, and that they don't really pass, however much one may fall away from them. In the greater part of life it seems as if one must consent to be wrapped round with custom; but the naked touch of reality, when it does come, is like flame through the veins, and each time it comes it leaves the blood running a little quicker."

In re-reading Nettleship's Letters (*op. cit.*), I have been surprised by the number of resemblances between his thought and Buber's, different as the tone and temperament are.

[2] See Hans Kohn, *Martin Buber, sein Werk und seine Zeit.* (1930), p. 89.

[3] P. 8 and elsewhere.

ist Gegenseitigkeit—even a tree can stand over against me as an equal, with its own rights and dignities and claims. Then the *a priori* of relationship, taking possession of us, flows into effect; into good works prepared for us to walk in. In art (p. 14), the potential form of beauty which dawned upon my soul is now to be fulfilled through my labours and to enter the world of things. In relationship with men, the love which is "responsibility of an *I* for a *Thou*" (p. 15) is to pass into the practical effectiveness of helping, healing, saving. Clearly this might happen also in the third department—our relationship with the non-human. To "care for" an animal or a plant or a house has the double meaning. But "the creature and our contemplation of it" (p. 15) suggests that the author may also have in mind an extension of his thought about art. The tree that we truly contemplate, says the sage in *Daniel*, is transplanted from the earth of space into the earth of the soul. Taken into the human mind that is quiet and sensitive and opened to receive it, revealing all its qualities and beauties for the first time in that clear air, may we not say that a tree enters on a new range of its life? and that the dance of the electrons or the first making of this planet, when a true student comes to know it, can do the same? Not only humanity everywhere, but Being everywhere is received in the I-Thou relation as an end and not merely as a means.

The existence in actuality of Beauty, and Love, and reverent Knowledge, is the latent Thou-relationship coming alive. Our entry into its reality, and that reality's entry into the life of time and space, are the two sides of the same happening: the worlds press into each other. This is life in the Spirit: spirit not shut inside us but outside and "between"; "not like the blood that circulates in you, but like the air in which you breathe" (p. 39). "Man lives in the spirit, if he is able to respond to his *Thou*. He is able to, if he enters into relation with his whole being."

NOTE.—This may be the best place to examine in passing the position with regard to "betweenness" of the other primary word, "I-It," in which "Man travels over (*befährt*) the surface of things and experiences (*erfährt*) them." (p. 5) In a single passage at the bottom of p. 5 Buber declares that in this connexion it is 'in him' and not between him and the world that the experience arises." *Die Erfahrung ist ja "in ihm" und nicht zwischen ihm und der Welt.* Therefore, "The man who experiences has no part in the world," and "The world has no part in the experience. It permits itself to be experienced, but has no concern in the matter. For it does nothing to the experience, and the experience does nothing to it."

I take the main purport of this passage to be the casualness, so to speak, of the I-It connexion as contrasted with the interpenetration and interlocking which characterise I-Thou. The sentence denying betweenness seems to me to be unnecessary for this purpose and unjustified in fact. When a man is investigating or utilising a thing as a means, this is still an affair between him and the object; a waiting potentiality coming into life. The connexion

does not go deep into either term; it is easily entered and left; but it is there. I-It is a "word of separation" (p. 23); it preserves independence and detachment between its terms; but the detachment is structural and positive; a stress holding them apart while it unites them. Rightly, on p. 43, it is said to "hold off" the I and the It from one another.

Hence, if the sentence quoted was really intended to deny betweenness, I think it was a passing mistake and should be ignored. Similarly when on pp. 43–4 Buber deals with institutions and personal feelings which slip out of touch, and points the contrast by calling the former "the province of *It*" and the latter "the province of *I*," we need to observe that each of them must be a distortion of the whole I-It. An I, noisy or tinkling, is still working inside the first province, and an It, contracted and abortive, is exploited inside the other.

In other important passages—the descriptions on pp. 47–50 for instance, with their "structure" and "machinery"—the picture is obviously one of *Zwischenmenschlichkeit.*

3

By this time it has become apparent that the Thou may be more like a world than like a separated individual thing. In the baby's meetings with strangeness and with love this is so from the beginning. And wherever the I-Thou relation comes to life, if it does not already involve a world, a world will begin to form round it. I may begin by saying Thou to a special person, but with that saying I make myself member of an organic whole, and the whole irresistibly rounds itself out. In part the first relationship dictates further relationship: "I care for this because my friend cares for it;" and in part the process is direct: "I care for this because my eyes and ears have been opened." What spoke to me first in my friend can now speak elsewhere, and I can answer it because the power of answering has been awakened in me.

Thus when Buber contrasts the poverty of "I" in the individual who stresses his separateness, with the richness of the person-in-relation, what the illustrations give us is the membership of a world:—

(Pp. 65–6) "How lovely and how fitting the sound of the lively and impressive *I* of Socrates! . . . This *I* lived continually in the relation with man which is bodied forth in dialogue. It never ceased to believe in the reality of men, and went out to meet them. So it took its stand with them in reality, and reality forsakes it no more. Its very loneliness can never be forsakenness, and if the voice of man is silent it hears the voice of the daimonion say *Thou.*

How lovely and how legitimate the sound of the full *I* of Goethe! It is the *I* of pure intercourse with nature. . . . It believes in her, and says to the rose, 'Then thou art it'—then it takes its stand with it in a single reality. So the spirit of the real remains with it when it turns back to itself, the gaze of the sun abides with the blessed eye that considers its own radiance, and the friendship of the elements accompanies the man into the stillness of dying and becoming."

Or to take a passage from which we have quoted already:—

(P. 15) "In the eyes of him who takes his stand in love, and gazes out of it, men are cut free from their entanglement. . . . Good people and evil, wise and foolish, beautiful and ugly, become successively real to him; that is, set free they step forth in their singleness, and confront him as *Thou*. . . . Love is responsibility of an *I* for a *Thou*. In this lies the likeness . . . of all who love, . . . from the blessedly protected man, whose life is rounded in that of a loved being, to him who is all his life nailed to the cross of the world, and who ventures to bring himself to the dreadful point—to love *all men*."[1]

This is the height, is it not, of St. Paul's Agapé, and we may as well import that word. Weak as we are, yet within our range and at our best every one of us has had some knowledge of what it means to be friends with Being. This may perhaps be brought home most clearly if we think of the opposite condition. We get out of bed on the wrong side, and quarrel not merely with our housemates but with dishes and chairs and tables, with tasks and pleasures that confront us, with events that come by chance, with the laws of man and the laws of Nature, with the future and the past. For us at such a time the devil is in all of them because he has possession of ourselves. But in contrast at our best we know that there is nothing, in principle, with which we might not enter into relation if we were good enough; nothing in the universe which we might not meet with some form of Agapé. We could bring all our relevant potentialities to meet the potentialities of the moment, joining with it to produce greatness. We could recognise "the deed that aims at me" (p. 53), and give it existence.

"The free man is he who wills without arbitrary self-will. . . . He listens . . . to the course of being in the world; not in order to be supported by it, but in order to bring it to reality as it desires, in its need of him, to be brought —with human spirit and deed, human life and death" (pp. 59–60).

The common question, "Can we believe that the universe is our friend?" is not a question that belongs to the sphere of religion. We enter that sphere when we take our own stand in friendship towards the universe. Thereafter there remain to be explored the fruits that can come of that spirit.

4

If I may express a complicated judgment, there seem to be some factors in this little book that tend to leave an impression which the author himself is always working to correct. Our memory pre-

[1] Karl Heim, to whom Mr. Gregor Smith refers (p. viii), conceives the I-Thou relation very differently, as essentially involving opposition and 'atemraubende Enge." The fellowship of wills does not typify his I-Thou but cancels it. (See *God Transcendent*, pp. 165–6.)

serves his novel and subtle descriptions of moments of vivid awareness—moments that are discontinuous and vanish quickly—whilst losing hold of the fact that what he is centrally trying to expound is something solid and continuous; the very strength of our life. Again, he will show the soul as it were holding its breath: "Only silence before the *Thou*—silence of *all* tongues, silent patience in the undivided word that precedes the formed and vocal response —leaves the *Thou* free, and permits man to take his stand with it in the reserve where the spirit is not manifest, but *is*. Every response binds up the *Thou* in the world of *It*" (p. 39). We remember this, but it is a chief purpose of this book to show that the momentary stillness must become an enduring stability by passing into movement: that "All revelation is summons and sending" (p. 115).

With these thoughts in mind, let us examine more closely the position of the second "primary word," the I-It, in a "related" world. What will be the standing of It, or what should be its standing, when the I has found its Thou? The first impression, here again, may be somewhat misleading, for we may carry away the idea that the It-connexion is merely a mark of our imperfection, to be regretted:—

"This is the exalted melancholy of our fate, that every *Thou* in our word must become an *It*. It does not matter how exclusively present the *Thou* was in the direct relation. As soon as the relation has been worked out or has been permeated with a means, the *Thou* becomes an object among objects" (pp. 16–17).

But when, according to his custom, Buber reiterates that passage in a different form on a subsequent page, the difference throws a further light:—

"Every response binds up the *Thou* in the world of *It*. That is the melancholy of man, and his greatness. For that is how knowledge comes about, a work is achieved, and image and symbol made, in the midst of living beings" (pp. 39–40.)

While here is a fine passage from the final pages of the book:—

(114–15) "Pure relation can only be raised to constancy in space and time by being embodied in the whole stuff of life. It cannot be preserved, but only proved true,[1] only done, only done up into life. . . . Thus the time of human life is shaped into a fulness of reality, and even though human life neither can nor ought to overcome the relation of *It*,[2] it is so penetrated with relation[3] that relation wins in it a shining streaming constancy: the moments of supreme meeting are then not flashes in darkness, but like the rising moon in a clear starlit night."

Now this passage seems to imply a very important point which the earlier metaphors (of two attitudes, or two primary words, or

[1] *Nicht bewahrt, nur bewährt.* [2] *Esverhältnis.* [3] *Beziehung.*

chrysalis-and-butterfly) may tend to disguise from us, and which for a long time I missed myself. It appears now that the I-It and the I-Thou are not incompatibles, but may exist, and should exist, together; and may exist simultaneously even with regard to the same thing.

But this will mean that the It connection in its essence need not arise, as we may have thought, from lack of insight or from disregard, or from the collapse of life into the commonplace. It is something which *ought* not to be overcome. When Spirit is at its highest and fullest the I-It will still remain.

Re-reading earlier pages with this point in mind, we find other passages which confirm it. On p. 46, for instance, "The primary word *I-It* is not of evil—as matter is not of evil." Only "If a man lets it have the mastery, the continually growing world of *It* overruns him and robs him of the reality of his own *I*, till the incubus over him and the ghost within him whisper to one another the confession of their non-salvation." Similarly on p. 48:—

> "The communal life of man can no more than man himself dispense with the world of *It*, over which the presence of the *Thou* moves like the spirit upon the face of the waters. Man's will to profit and to be powerful have their natural and proper effect so long as they are linked with, and upheld by, his will to enter into relation. . . . The impulse which is bound up with, and defined by, the being is the living stuff of communal life. . . ."

We conclude, then, that in Buber's central doctrine the I-It "word" is not deprecatory or privative, but stands for a positive connection of surfaces which may and should work side by side with relation in the depths. Its essence is a handling of the object not necessarily without its will but irrespectively of its will, in the service of something which may lie outside it. In the right and ordinary situation, this something outside it will be simply the Thou seen elsewhere. In the life of the good citizen, the "will to profit and to be powerful" (*Nutzwillen und Machtwillen*) is penetrated with and enclosed by relatedness. His profit makes a living for wife and children, or at the least is felt as the sign of his making good; earning a place in the story. His power includes his increasing skill in his work, or it brings things about which speak to him as being in themselves worthwhile. Only if we suppose the Thou to be entirely absent (I think it is impossible), then, indeed, the man's grave not only will be but already is "in nothingness".

For man's limited mind, of course, most of existent Being is neither Thou nor It—he does not meet it at all. But if a content enters his world even as It, there is the chance of its becoming Thou also. His tool, for the true craftsman, becomes his fellow and his friend. When all goes well his material speaks to him, desiring to become what he desires to make it. The housewife tends her house

—"I'm going to spend the morning," said a friend to me, "with the floor, talking to it"—and presently the floor presents its own shining gift to a room which makes part of a comely household life. Or we may have the opposite case of something which began by being Thou and goes through a stage of being predominantly It, to be known as Thou some day again. An illustration to which Buber recurs is that of analytic study. The subject of study may be a work of art (as on pp. 17, 41), or it might be the personality of a friend. At first we are bound up in relation with it, but when we become absorbed in analysis the subject becomes our means and our material, and that stage must be honestly worked through if the Thou is to return with fuller being. "Scientific and aesthetic understanding . . . are necessary to man that he may do his work with precision and plunge it in the truth of relation, which is above the understanding and gathers it up in itself."[1]

Neither *Grundwort* can ever be dispensed with. We conceive a city and build it, and we use in its building the workmen and the products of the earth, and the architect's design and the landscape in which it is to grow. Any one of these, in principle, could itself become Thou, glowing into life if only for a moment. Every one of them should be so potentially Thou that the implicit relation should exert a steady unnoticed pressure upon us, restraining us from inflicting unnecessary damage and warning us when we risk doing so. The advance of civilisation rests upon the growth of such sensitiveness within our resolution. With its increase we have learnt to perceive amongst other things that one of the worst kinds of damage is prolonged unemployment; the prevention of a potential Thou from finding completion by becoming part of It. That profound need reaches far beyond the economic system. In the service of their Thou men will seek to bind themselves; taking on some yoke which will get work done in the intervals when resolution and awareness fail. Men in relation with their supreme Thou have prayed to become It: "to be unto God what his own hand is to a man." They ask God, once for all, not to wait for their consent.

If we can be *It* as well as *Thou* for God, can God also be It for us? —not only be misrepresented under that form, but actually be so?

[1] Cf. E. M. Forster's *Goldsworthy Lowes Dickinson*, pp. 203–4, where the author speaks of Dickinson's "loyal and affectionate tribute" to J. E. McTaggart (as the latter's biographer). "He was not well satisfied with it. . . . The complexity of his own emotions may have confused him. His intense admiration for McTaggart, their war differences (which McTaggart chose to regard as mystically non-existent), and their tacit reunion after the war did not make for literary detachment. McTaggart was a remarkable figure, possibly a great man, certainly a very strange one, and, biographically speaking, such a man needs rather ruthless handling if he is to come alive. Dickinson only brought sensitiveness and piety."

Buber speaks repeatedly of "the *Thou* that by its nature cannot become *It*"; yet in accordance with *our* nature, he says (112) "we are continually making the eternal *Thou* into *It*, into some thing. . . . Not indeed out of arbitrary self-will. . . ." The truth seems to be that we have never *found* God, recognised and greeted and worshipped Him, until we have said Thou. But side by side with this (I suggest), as well as when this recognition fails, he may be *It*, and is so. As all perfections are his, so amongst them is the perfection of It. He is all the truth that we can find and explain, and all that waits to be found. He is the sunshine that falls on the unjust; the steadiness of the round world; the reliability that we need not think about. If I seek only for use and profit I shall never find God, but he will be there, he will be used, he will be profitable. He will serve me so far as I am able to be served, being blind.

5

"In each *Thou* we address the eternal *Thou*"—the saying of Thou anywhere is a finding of God. The thought fits well with the teachings of Chassidism; that movement amongst Eastern European Jews of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the sympathetic study of which has made so large a part of Dr. Buber's lifework. The glory of God, said the Chassidists, was poured out in the beginning over weak vessels that broke and could not hold it; but every fragment still retains a spark of that divinity, and the Presence of God goes into exile with these sparks, and man co-operates with it to bring them back into manifestation and into reunion with the one Light from which they came. A saint may convert a sinner, or a wife may prepare savoury food and her husband may eat it with enjoyment and thankfulness; in either case a spark has been released and its destiny fulfilled. To add our own examples: the tree and the moon and the poet's thought, the beloved household and the smoothly organised work and the great city, and the art and science that uphold and adorn them, and all the world that we know, in so far as it is rightly known, and served and worked with, and faced and greeted with the whole heart—all these blend in the Kingdom and the Power and the Glory.

In this book and in the other parts of Buber's work which I have read, I have not been able to decide whether his theology assigns a special centre of consciousness to God, as a Person apart, or whether it is enough that God should think with our minds as he can speak with our mouths, and that he should be the principle of all fatherhood and the fountain of all spirit; and that he should be (to take Buber's favourite thought) that which speaks to us anywhere, and that by which we answer: the eternal Word. I am sure that those

who use this kind of theology are not excluded from the essentials of Buber's teaching:

(107) "The bright building of community . . . is the achievement of the same power that works in the relation between man and God. This does not mean that this one relation is set beside the others; for it is the universal relation, into which all streams pour. . . . Who wishes to make division and define boundaries between sea and streams? There we find only the one flow from *I* to *Thou*, unending, the one boundless flow of the real life. Life cannot be divided between a real relation with God and an unreal relation of *I* and *It* with the world. . . . He who knows the world as something by which he is to profit knows God also in the same way. His prayer is a procedure of exoneration heard by the ear of the void. He—not the 'atheist,' who addresses the Nameless out of the night and yearning of his garret-window—is the godless man."

Cancelling all the separate spheres of pietism, the access through the temporal to the eternal must complete its rhythm in the returning movement, flowing back into earthly understanding and affection and service:—

(78–80) "He who enters on the absolute relation is concerned with nothing isolated any more. . . . To step into pure relation is . . . to see everything in the *Thou*, not to renounce the world but to establish it on its true basis. . . . To include nothing beside God but everything in Him—this is full and complete relation.

He who goes out with his whole being to meet his *Thou* and carries to it all being that is in the world, finds Him who cannot be sought. . . . Waiting, not seeking, he goes his way; hence he is composed before all things, and makes contact with them which helps them. But when he has *found*, his heart is not turned from them, though everything now meets him in the one event. He blesses every cell that sheltered him, and every cell into which he will yet turn. For this finding is not the end, but only the eternal middle, of the way."

MIND IN NATURE

HILDA D. OAKELEY, D.Litt.

In the idealistic movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, British philosophy under Hegelian influence endeavoured to demonstrate the rationality of the universe as based on logical construction. The keynote of the Hegelian dialectic, as interpreted by both F. H. Bradley and J. E. McTaggart is that the mind is there from the first. In the advance from the bare abstraction of Being to the fully concrete whole—"Before the mind there is a single conception, but the whole mind itself which does not appear, engages in the process, operates on the datum, and produces the result."[1] The idea expressed by poetry in Tennyson's "Flower in the crannied wall," which as the mind is fixed upon it reveals in an expansion to the universe the nature of God and Man, illustrates in a simple way the central philosophic conception of the British metaphysical idealists. Poetry could overlook the hard struggle of the little plant to keep its foothold against crowding competitors. Philosophy was perhaps too oblivious of this in its compelling postulate of the all pervading unity in which every difference and seeming contradiction would be reconciled.

From the opposite end of investigation and theory a few students of science were finding in nature traces of mind in some form or degree. This might seem to be a strong support of idealist or immaterialist views. It has to be considered, however, whether one and the same conception of mind is present in the two interpretations, and whether the definite particularistic methods of the scientific student, can contribute to the enthronement of Mind as the universal essence and reality of the whole of things. Their conclusions may nevertheless be allowed to have distant affinities with any theory that would render complete materialism untenable. The philosophic interest of their methods, lies in the fact that they do not bring with them to nature the postulate that mind must pervade all things, but are led or driven by the facts observed to take note of its seeming presence. The metaphysical idealists were not, so far as appears, especially interested in the creatures of nature below the human order. There are more things in nature than are dreamed of in their philosophy. There may be

[1] Bradley, (*Logic* III, I, ii) quoted by McTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Dialectic.*

more kinds of intelligence than are discovered by the most profound student of the human mind. These are not found by speculation as to what must be the structure of a universe dominated by mind. The necessary clues to animal intelligence are only reached, if at all, by the most devoted and unwearied observation. Philosophy has too much neglected this field of study. In the case of the idealist this has been mainly due to the fixed assumption, applied in all provinces, that the manifestation of mind must be universal in the principles of things, expressing a rational or logical order. Human reason, at its present stage, is no longer taken as exhibiting the culminating and final form of mental activity. Certainly the thinkers who lived in the full tide of biological evolutionary ideas, accepted the view that the human brain as we know it might evolve into forms furnishing a better basis for a higher mind. But this view did not affect their conceptions of the essential nature of mind as such. Attacks of some recent thinkers on long established and authoritative views of the nature of logic, do not seem to have much affected the strength of the citadels from which metaphysical idealism proceeds. But there is little direct conflict. The opposed theories are too remote from each other even to meet in battle. When the "Logical Analysis of Syntax" reaches the conclusion that "Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic as he wishes,"[1] opposition is paralysed by the absence of any common ground in respect to the nature of logic.

If the spirit of idealistic thinkers has been dogmatic we may find a counter-balancing dogmatism in some of the chief writings of natural science. What is the view of the empirical sciences in regard to the presence of mind in the individuals of nature? According to the eminent physiologist Professor Sherrington "In relation to the particular field of chemistry and physics, which is that of highly integrated animal lives, thinking appears as a phase of living." He adds: "It is an activity of life selectivity, and uniquely apart from the rest." But "Natural science repudiates it as something outside its ken. A radical distinction has, therefore, arisen between life and mind. The former is an affair of chemistry and physics; the latter escapes chemistry and physics."[2] He observes that whilst the standpoint of physics appears to be undergoing modifications under the influence of recent developments, the strictly materialistic view is still dominant in biology. "Science fails us if we ask for a form of energy which is mental." If the student of energy is asked concerning mind, i.e. thoughts and feelings, he will reply: "They are the outcome of the brain. The

[1] *The Logical Analysis of Syntax*, Rudolf Carnap.
[2] *Man on His Nature*, Chap. ix.

brain is matter and energy, therefore thoughts and feelings are matter and energy."[1] Sherrington examines cases of exceedingly elaborate behaviour in certain insect pests in the attempt to determine their nature and whether intelligence must be admitted. Describing the course of behaviour of the insect which produces sheep-rot, after propagating itself in many millions in the body of a snail, later devoured in the moist grass by a sheep, and of the *anopheles*-gnat, mosquito parasite, cause of malaria, he observes "If mind were at work there would be required sensing and perceiving, cognizing and judging, reason, intention and forecast of the future not to speak of recognition and choice and of the ways of the gnat and of man."[2] The nature of the mental spring which determines the creature's behaviour is unknown. That the whole performance at every stage could have been evolved by natural selection seems inconceivable. It may be held that Darwinism is incapable of demonstrating that the principle of purpose directed to an end can enter into a process, as a result of natural selection. Purpose in its essence cannot occur as a chance variation.

Sir Jagadisha Chandra Bose in his studies of "Life-Movements in Plants,"[3] "Response in the Living and the non-Living," etc., concludes that the movements of plants show vital activity going beyond physical explanation. It can no longer in his view be doubted that plants possess a well-defined nervous system. "As in the animal, it is possible to distinguish sensory or afferent and motor or efferent impulses."[4] Further, he thinks he has found the phenomena of response in the inanimate, e.g. in metals, by means of electrical experiments. Sherrington interprets Bose as presuming a kind of intelligence in plants and the inorganic. Bose himself, however, seems chiefly concerned to disprove dualism in nature, not by the explanation of the lower by the higher but by showing that there is no "breach of continuity," "no defiance of the physical laws that govern the world."[5] It is to be noted that it is not specifically mind, but life that he attributes to plants, and extends to things of the inorganic world.

If we are to class the phenomenon as something to be brought under the conception of mind, that conception would have to be much extended or modified. If we omit it there, must we not suppose life to have potentialities which are wholly mysterious to us? For many of the activities of animals are not to be described as less evolved, more primitive performances of a kind which appear in man in a more developed form, but as displaying

[1] *Man on His Nature*, Chap. ix.
[2] *Ibid.*, chap. xii.
[3] *Life Movements in Plants.* I, II, VII, VIII.
[4] *Response in the Living and the non-Living.*
[5] *Ibid.*, chap. xx.

properties and talents unknown to us. Reference has been made to certain devices of insects. Much speculation and patient observation have not solved the problem of the migrations of birds. Reading Professor J. A. Thomson's account of the "Wonder of Life," one must ask whether life has not in itself the genius of infinite variations for experiments in existence. Some of these appear in the chance variations of which Darwinism can give no explanation, most of them to disappear in the struggle for life. In man the inventive mind supplies many artificial variations. He flies, though nature denied him the means. Selection does not cut off ruthlessly as in nature the majority of these freely contrived variations, and some unfavourable to the advance to the human ideal are preserved. The animal perhaps attains its more modest ideal since life which gives no choice has allowed it no second chance. If it possesses mind, this is not the mind of man, which

> "Looks to the skies scorning the base degrees
> By which it did ascend."

According to some philosophers the human mind, although never ceasing its struggle to rise above the limits set by life, cannot separate itself from its physical basis. The late Samuel Alexander speaks of the "identity of mind with its neural basis." We are compelled to consider whether that which is in his view inseparable from so unstable a factor as a material process at a particular stage of evolution may not be indefinitely relative to that stage and that particular human species, and liable to be of a different type for beings at another stage equipped with a different neural process. "That which as experienced from the inside or enjoyed is a conscious process, is as experienced from the outside or contemplated a neural one." Alexander's discussion[1] assumes in general the omission of the free activity of thinking or mind creative in relation to other things. This omission seems to be in fact the inevitable result of the identification of mind with its neural basis.

The most acute problem which we have to face in Alexander's and some other theories of "Emergent" orders of things, is that of the emergence of conscious mind from its basis in physical being, in view of the unbridgeable gulf between the nature of these two factors in experience. This gulf is that between the properties of order and of disorder. The philosophy of emergence may be characterized as an attempt to introduce some more rational principle into the barren conception of evolution by increasing complexity, heterogeneity, etc. "Without the specific

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii, book iii, chap. i.

physiological or vital constellation there is no mind—all less complex vital processes remain purely vital—Mental process is something new, a fresh creation—which means that presence of so specific a physiological constitution as to separate it from simpler vital processes."[1]

It cannot be questioned that the vital province abounds in exquisite, and in their own domain perfect, manifestations of order. Everywhere we may see in individual perfections the principle which is termed "Holism" by General Smuts,[2] co-operation of diverse growths or stages of growth to produce a whole. But it is as if this unlimited variety and magnificent abundance of forms of life had been set to play together a cosmic game or drama, in perfect order, but for certain seeds of a fatal disorder which had crept into the assemblage. In the growth of these the possibility of a universal plan is ruined. The outstanding illustration is the limitless over-productivity of life. From this proceeds primarily the incurable scourge of conflict at the heart of the living world from the lowest to the highest forms. There result short-lived existence in innumerable species, the apparent meaninglessness of their entrance upon life, waste of life in unending struggles to retain it in a large proportion of the lower and even the higher types.

Professor J. A. Thomson in *The Wonder of Life* mentions that the number of eggs of a starfish is three hundred millions in a double series in each arm.[3] He quotes instances of "cannibalism in the cradle," struggle for existence amongst eggs." There are "nutritive chains of creatures," fashioned to live by preying on each other. Spinoza's "Conatus in suo esse perseverandi" might be treated as a noble though camouflaging text for a great part of animal life. Even in the plant-world the tormenting struggle goes on. There are plants which operate by starving or suffocating their neighbours.[4]

Thus in the organic world the exquisite order expressed in the individual forms of countless species, cannot be attributed to the whole province and principle of its constitution. On the contrary when regarded as a whole, life seems subject to a strange and violent inner contradiction, the laws of its nature producing total results wholly inconsistent with the ends which might seem to be implied in its particular expressions.

The first law and function of mind on the other hand is the implanting of the spirit and methods of order everywhere, in

[1] *Space, Time and Deity*, vol. ii. book iii, chap. i.

[2] *Holism and Evolution*. General Smuts, however, would not allow that disorder has entered in. [3] Chap. iii.

[4] From a letter to *The Times*, date not recorded. October, 1943.

knowledge and practice. The Greek thinkers with their profound insight into the principles that could lift human life out of the jungle, conceived the fundamental contrast of values to be between "form and the formless," "the limit and the unlimited." The elements of the Good as Plato concludes in the *Philebus*, are Measure, Symmetry, Beauty and Truth.

The whole course of philosophy had led up to this, from Pythagoras with the doctrine that number is the nature of things, the mathematical key to a well-regulated universe, introducing law into the otherwise confused medley of phenomena.

Does mind evolve as a result of natural selection? What evolves is the "neural basis." But this is according to Alexander identical with mind. Those who cannot subscribe to this position must nevertheless agree that in our experience the neural basis is indispensable to the activity of the individual mind. The enigma, therefore, remains—how these two, the "vital constellation" and the mental principle, can be combined in their functions and activities.

The theory of consciousness put forward by the late Professor Carveth Read brings out the paradox from a special angle. Consciousness is "the activity of that ultimate Being which phenomena express." His principal argument for this view is "the redundancy of consciousness." It is biologically useless—everything goes on as if it were not there. It cannot be explained from natural selection. Since it is nevertheless present in human and as some think in the higher animal life, this must be because it is "necessary, an activity of Being found wherever Being is manifested, rising to self-consciousness wherever animal bodies reach a certain high level of organization."[1] Read appears to assume the materialistic deterministic view of late nineteenth century science, with the corollary that consciousness is unnecessary as a principle of explanation, whilst himself holding on the grounds of self-knowledge that it must be accorded a necessary place. He agrees then to dismiss it from "appearance," but reinstates it in "reality." But it was presumably in the world of appearance that he discovered its necessity. Moreover, if we are living in a world of appearance this is because of the feebleness of our organs of consciousness and therefore of knowledge. If consciousness did not enter at all into this seeming experience there would be no means of judging whether or not it is a factor in events. The attempt to do without consciousness in the explanation of the event-process, whilst regarding it as all in all in reality, results from Read's endeavour to make sense of the materialistic position in natural science.

[1] *Metaphysics of Nature*, chap. x, and append. B; see also Contribution to *British Contemporary Philosophy*, Carveth Read.

There appear to be two main sources of these ambiguities, and of others in connection with the philosophy of consciousness. One is the fallacious conception of the relation of "Universal" to individual consciousness. The fallacy lies deep in our habits of thought, profoundly influenced by language. Strictly speaking there is no universal consciousness. All consciousness is individual and closely bound up with the unique, individual outlook. In the "Conclusion" of his book *Why the Mind Has a Body*, C. Strong observes "The most difficult question remains—How the individual consciousness comes from the Universal." But the question should rather be—How the idea of the Universal arises from the individual standpoint, or how consciousness should be conceived as anything but individual at any stage. The quality of any being's consciousness is determined by his whole particularity and history. Even in individuals of the same species, group, or family it varies, beginning with the sensitivity of the senses. All are subject to relativity. Human vision creates colours,[1] but not, as the biologist tells us, the vision of most animals. The world they see is grey, though many of them are clad for us in more gorgeous colours than we can reproduce. As we ascend in the scale the individuality of qualities increases, and culminates in man and his highest experiences of value. Certainly there are universal features in consciousness as the existence of knowledge and the experience of practical life make indubitable. Kant's consciousness in general (Bewusstsein überhaupt) belonged to his view of the forms of perception and categories of understanding. But the universal consciousness of a "Pan-psychist" such as Strong, and, though he hesitates to accept the title, Carveth Read, would appear to signify a unity of all particular conscious experiences, and is a monstrosity of metaphysical thought.

The other and allied principal source of confusion in the philosophies of consciousness concerns the true subject of all conscious experience, at the stage reached by the human mind. It seems probable that in no being below man in the order of the organic world has the subject which is never object emerged. The animals appear to possess only the object consciousness. We experience this state in dreams when we take part in series of events which seem to be arranged independently of our thought and will, and which we do not question, however unusual. Those who regard consciousness as the useless epiphenomenal accompaniment of actual processes, suppress the unique significance of the human experience, leaving the world as an arranged play of objects, or a game of chess which plays itself somehow in planned moves, without planners. The image of the unseen marionette manipu-

[1] J. S. Haldane, *Philosophy of a Biologist*. II.

lator inevitably arises. If mental events have no effect upon physical acts, how account for the acts of those who maintain this view, teach, write, labour to make it known? But without adopting any such extreme position, many seem oblivious of the presence of the subject which is never object, in all propositions concerning self-activity, knowledge, in fact a considerable part of our discourse. "I" do, think, wish, etc. The statement is objective. The "I" is part of the object. The subject from which the statement ultimately proceeds cannot be objectively known without ceasing to be the original subject.

Professor Sherington observes "The *I* can never come into the plane of objects of sensual perception. It *is* awareness." This seems to be near what I mean. But I should add to sensual perception all other forms of awareness as not capable of making an object of the subject ego. Elsewhere he says, "The *mind*[1] finds that our world resolves itself into energy and *mind*." There must then be mind behind energy and mind objective. The philosophic scientist Professor Sherrington seems to get nearer to the heart of the matter in regard to the place of mind in our experience than the scientist for whom the postulates and methods of chemistry and physics provide principles of explanation for the apparent function of consciousness. He appears also to have perceived something in the nature of mind which must escape the metaphysician who starts from the postulate that universal mind is the ultimate basis of all things. Armed with this conviction the absolute idealist must construct the system of things on the foundation of an objective logic, with the individual as a finite centre deriving his nature and function from the whole. The idea of the finite centre in the whole, makes impossible any clear conception of the true subject of the individual experience. It is the whole which feels, thinks, wills, knows through the individual. But what does the actual human individual know of the experience of Universal Mind? Not knowing this, he can on this view know nothing of his own original subject-activity. He only knows himself as object amongst other objects, finite centre of infinite mind. Dr. Johnson would no doubt say "Sir, we know we are individual, and there's an end on't." But philosophy must take a longer route.

[1] *Italics mine.*

POLITICS AND CULTURE

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PHILOSOPHY is very largely concerned with speculation upon problems of a highly abstract character, but some of the questions with which it deals have important practical aspects; and I think that social philosophy occupies—and rightly occupies—a dominant place in contemporary thought. If post-war policies are to render more secure the lives, the liberties and the happiness of mankind, they must be based upon sound principles; and it is with the intention of throwing certain of these principles into bold relief that I have ventured to choose the realm of politics and culture as the subject of these reflections.

The view has frequently been expressed that the more advanced trends in present-day political thought are inimical to some of the most valuable elements in "cultural life." This view may not be based upon any profound appreciation of the nature of political institutions and the meaning of "culture"; but whether it is profound or superficial it does seem to exert a certain influence, an influence mainly adverse to the idea of international organization. From political thinkers there comes the demand for some form of international federation, or league, or super-state with authority and power to prevent future wars and to settle international disputes on a peaceful and equitable basis. This demand comes—as the demand for the League of Nations came—primarily from idealists. And when I say idealists, I do not mean abstract visionaries out of all touch with reality. I mean men who, with a genuine interest in human welfare, have tried to learn from past developments in social history what adjustments in social organization would be most likely to remove present evils. It is not my purpose to criticize or defend this demand for international organization, but simply to draw attention to the existence of the demand and to point out at least one of the motives inspiring it. That motive is the desire of the good will to create such institutions as are necessary for its own expression in practical affairs. It has been partly responsible for the development of the present-day nation state; and we have reached a stage in human history, some people believe, when a further development of political institutions is necessary.

Now there are many who—sympathizing to some extent with this tendency of thought—fear that, from a cultural point of view, its influence must be harmful. They fear that the development of

international political institutions may have the effect of destroying the rich variety of national cultures and reducing humanity to the one dull level of uniformity.

In this paper, therefore, I propose to discuss the nature of culture, its importance in society, its relation to the state, and finally to deal with the question whether we are forced into the disagreeable situation of having to choose either a stable international order or a healthy variety of cultural life—whether we cannot, by a wise ordering of our affairs, create the one without interfering with the development of the other.

The Nature of Culture and its Importance in Society.—When we speak of a political society we are thinking in territorial terms. The "political" feature of a society refers essentially to common residence within a certain area, and to the institutions which grow up in order to regulate the behaviour of all who live within that area. But if the only bond between individuals were that of common residence, they would be a mere collection of persons and not a society in any real sense. It is difficult even to imagine any group of individuals living for any length of time in such purely spatial relationship. Certainly, political groups have always been real societies. Their members have always had some form of common life; and if common ideals, traditions and customs have not permeated the whole—if they have seriously differed according to locality, race, class or faith—living together has been something of an irksome task rather than a source of happiness.

Now a culture is both a product of and an incentive to a common life. Culture is not a technical term of philosophy, and it is used in so many different senses that its meaning is not always clear. We speak of a cultural education, of a cultured person, or of a national culture, often with the vaguest ideas in our minds as to what culture signifies. And so it will be well to define, or at least to describe, what I mean here in speaking of the cultural life of a society. Let us begin with some examples. The pyramids and other antiquities of Egypt are monuments of the culture of ancient Egypt. Greek poetry, drama, philosophy, and architecture are cultural products of ancient Greece. The Catholic faith was part of the culture of mediaeval Europe, as Islam is a cultural product of the Arabic-speaking world, and as certain forms of democratic institutions are part of the culture of Britain. To every one of these examples which I have mentioned the particular people concerned—and, of course, not only the people immediately concerned—has attached a value which is not merely utilitarian. Over and above any utility value which they may have possessed, these things have been valued for themselves. To use a distinction drawn by Aristotle, we may say that the culture of a people is what that people creates and desires

to maintain once it gives its attention, not merely to the preservation of life, but also to the development of the good life. "Good" here has not any strictly ethical significance. It refers to whatever is felt to have a value over and above its utility for some particular purpose. For example, a house is built primarily for a utilitarian purpose—as a shelter in which man may live. But it may also be an object in which we take delight because of its pleasing proportions, its harmony with the landscape, and so on. It has, then, for us a value over and above its value in use. And it is when men aim at the production of these extra values that we say they are no longer concerned wholly with the maintenance of life, but have begun to think of the good life. They have begun to develop a culture. They are in process of making out of life a rich experience rather than a mere series of events.

If the foregoing account is an approximately correct description of what is vaguely in our minds when we talk of a people's culture, we may take it that the cultural side of life has to do with a certain manner of valuing things. I shall elaborate this idea because of its importance for my subsequent argument.

In determining objects of cultural value, we must first of all set aside things which we value but which we have not produced. Fresh air, the warmth of the sun, a fertile soil—such things are without doubt valuable, but they are not part of culture. A culture is something which is the product of our "cultivation," something which we have produced, created or induced to grow up.

But not even everything created or produced by us is part of our culture. Valuable products may be divided into three important classes: (1) Those which are valued simply as instruments, or for their utility; and possibly most people would place in this class the apparatus which we use to keep ourselves and our dwellings clean. (2) Things which are valued only for themselves and have no utility, e.g. music and dancing. (3) Things which are valued both for themselves and for their utility, as e.g. science, beautifully planned roads and bridges, etc. Actually, it must always be with great hesitation that we place anything in either the first or the second class. Something which for most people may have only intrumental value, may very well be valued in a non-utilitarian fashion by particular persons. To most of us, the woodman's axe or the carpenter's tools seem to be merely articles for use. But I should think that few self-respecting carpenters and foresters take this point of view. To see his axe abused by a clumsy novice will arouse in the forester feelings which are quite disproportionate to the amount of damage which is being done to the mere usefulness of his instrument. Again, although I have given music and dancing as examples of the second class—things valued only for themselves and not for utility—dancing

is employed in physical training, and a military band can be useful to a commander for reviving the spirit of tired men. Plato, indeed, thought that both music and dancing were important educational instruments. But while it may be true that nothing can, with absolute confidence, be placed in the first or second class, it is true that, for a given person or group at a given time, the things which are valued can be divided into these three classes.

We have already said that cultural values are non-utilitarian; that is to say, the things which belong to our culture are included in the second and third classes. They are valued either solely for themselves, or else both for themselves and for their utility. But they are part of culture only in respect of their non-utilitarian value if they belong to the third class.

Now if we consider these cultural or non-utilitarian values, we shall see that they play an important part in developing the sense of social solidarity. It is precisely because they do so that any challenge—or fancied challenge—to their existence can often close the ranks of a group, party, or nation as no other appeal can. This unifying effect of the non-utilitarian values seems to be due to the fact that, by their very nature, they are able to become the objects of public enjoyment in a way in which many utilitarian values cannot. The utility value of a thing is very often limited to a small group of persons or even to a single individual. The number of persons which a house can accommodate is strictly limited; and so its possession is liable to arouse the competitive spirit and make the competitors acutely aware of their private needs, hopes and fears—of the things which separate them. But if that house has been designed by an architect of genius, its dignity and beauty are there for every mind capable of appreciating them. The value of the thing is not consumed in its enjoyment; it is a potential source of satisfaction to millions, and the number who share in this satisfaction makes no difference to the amount of enjoyment which is available to each individual. It is true that external factors may limit the extent to which people have access to these values. The proprietor of the house may desire privacy and build a high wall round his garden. The owner of a Rembrandt may keep it locked up in his strong-room. The philosophical and scientific wisdom of the ages may not be open to the person who is unable to pay for higher education. The priesthood of a particular cult, so far from being filled with a missionary spirit, may actually discourage converts. But these adventitious barriers have nothing to do with the essentially public character of the values themselves. A rich language, cherished institutions and customs, philosophy, art, science and religion—these things men can share without any diminution in the individual's portion. Nor is this all. In probably all forms of culture,

common enjoyment—or perhaps one ought to say the consciousness of common enjoyment—enhances individual enjoyment. If you enjoy singing, you probably sing more fervently in a choir than in your bath. If your tastes are artistic or scholarly, you are probably connected with some school, society or academy; and the knowledge that your cultural interest or inheritance is shared by others is—disturbing factors aside—sufficient in itself to create a glow of fellow-feeling. In any country, or for that matter in any large city, whose population is drawn from a variety of national strains, individuals will naturally be drawn into national groups to celebrate the fame of a national poet, to commemorate national festivals, or (if no more imposing object presents itself) to indulge in national food and gossip in the national tongue.

I must, however, guard against a possible misunderstanding. I have said that, while cultural values are, in their very nature, the objects of common enjoyment, utility values are not. I do not mean by this that utility values are necessarily private. Quite obviously some of them are not. Great industrial engineering schemes, systems of law, education, public health, postal services, and so on, have all public utility value. And if they have public utility value, they certainly form a most important basis for social co-operation. But to promote social co-operation is not the same thing as to promote the lively sentiment or consciousness of fellowship. When we think primarily of the utility of anything, our minds pass beyond it and concentrate on that for which it is useful. We are interested in results, and our attitude to the means and to the persons who produce these results tends to be coolly or critically objective. The more concentrated our attention on the end, the less room is there for sentiment with respect to the means. But, unless we are very unfortunate, periods of striving alternate with periods of enjoyment —enjoyment and contemplation both of the results and of the instruments by which they have been achieved. If the instruments have served us well, our minds delight in contemplating the perfection with which they have served their end, the grandness of their conception, their triumph over difficulties, even their familiar presence as an integral part of the daily round. We begin to value them directly. They serve as focal points for our sentiments. To adapt Wordsworth's famous definition of poetry, we may say that some of the greatest non-utilitarian values arise from a record of success recollected in tranquillity. The sentiment extends to include those who have been associated with us in our enterprise. We develop *esprit de corps*, the sense of fellowship with those who, we naturally assume, share our pride. It is for this reason that the cherished tradition of a college or a fighting service develops, not only loyalty to the institution, but also mutual loyalty amongst the

members. Sometimes, indeed, this loyalty can become so strong as to impair our sense of proportion with regard to questions of utility.

As such traditions promote the sense of fellowship in special groups, so the familiar national customs, rites, and institutions, within which the pattern of our daily life is woven, promote the sense of national fellowship, the sense of our common character as custodians of a common tradition. This is a fact so well recognized that "defence of the national culture" is regarded as a particularly strong plank in the platform of anyone anxious to obtain public support. Sometimes this appeal is made in sincerity, and sometimes it is not. But the frequency with which it is employed—especially when speed and strength of response are desired—shows how much stress we lay upon cultural ideals as integrating and driving forces in society.

The Policy of the State in Relation to Culture.—Having seen what is meant by the cultural aspect of a people's life, and how cultural values play an important part in creating and maintaining social solidarity, let us consider the relation of the state to the cultural life. To give, perhaps,a finer point to our question, let us look at certain political tendencies which are active in the world to-day. Hundreds of people are preoccupied by the problem of the reconstruction of the world after the war. In Europe, at least, states will have to be reconstituted and perhaps federated. Nor is it likely that Europe alone will be affected. Either within, or as an alternative to, a world organization, social and political thinkers are discussing the possibility of regional federations. On what basis would such regional schemes be founded? The very term "region," of course, implies that geographical considerations will exert a strong influence; but questions of community of culture cannot be ignored. As we have seen, any political society must be more than political. It must be a real society if the members are to work harmoniously together. If government is to succeed in its task of governing, if its authority is to be supported by effective power, there must be a network of institutions through which it can reach the wills of the people under its control; and there must be reasonably good will to make these institutions work. But this good will can be immensely strengthened if, throughout the community, there is a sense of fellowship, a sentiment of belonging together. And, as we have already seen, this sentiment seems to develop most spontaneously on the basis of common cultural ideals.

Shall we say, then, that because of the part which a common culture can play in welding the members of a society together, political government ought to select, as a fundamental aim of its policy, the maintenance and inculcation of a certain form of cultural life? When we realize how valuable, even from the purely political

point of view, a common culture can be, it seems to be an obvious inference that, when he is confronted by a loosely articulated mass of humanity which is to be welded into a real society, the statesman should adopt as the rallying-ground of their community life some specific cultural ideal.

On this question is it absolutely vital that we should do some clear and careful thinking; for if, through confusion of issues, we take the wrong line of action, the ultimate result may be the exact opposite of what we desire. The issues which we must not confuse are these: firstly, should a political government encourage, and provide ample facilities for, the development of cultural life? and, secondly, should a political government adopt, as a fundamental aim of its policy, the propagation and maintenance of a particular kind of culture? Assuming that the existence of a common culture does facilitate the work of a political government, which (if either) of these alternative lines of action ought it to take?

Let us consider in some detail the second one—the policy of attempting to organize the community life round some definite cultural ideal. This notion is a very familiar one; and so it may be instructive to look at the results of some of the attempts to embody it in practice.

In the past, there have been at least four things one or other of which statesmen have tried to make the essential bond of union in a society. The first is homogeneity of race, the second a certain type of social institution, the third a particular linguistic heritage, the fourth a particular religious cult. Whichever of these has been selected, state policy has been directed towards preserving and fostering it as a primary aim of government.

Of these four, the first—homogeneity of race—is not really a part of culture; and perhaps little need be said of it, except that to lay stress upon it in the modern world seems a suicidal policy for anyone who is trying to foster social unity. In practically all countries of the world which have had any history at all, races are so mixed that any resolute drive towards the identification of the nation with a particular racial group leads to the victimization of large minorities, and to the straining of many of those bonds of mutual affection which, *ex hypothesi*, we are trying to foster.

When, however, we turn to genuine cultural interests, the prospects seem much more hopeful. No member of society can, with the best will in the world, provide himself with a new line of ancestors. But he may, under favourable conditions, become attached to new ideals. And yet history shows that, when the state ranges its machinery in support of some definite cultural ideal, this frequently ends, not in the consolidation of the national life round this ideal, but in a political revolution.

We see this happen in connection with institutions. Take, for instance, the history of the English monarchy during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The strength of the monarchy was built up by the Tudor sovereigns; and during the reigns of the Henrys and Elizabeth concentration of power in the royal hands seemed to suit the needs of the time, and was an important factor in the development of a truly national spirit. For these and other reasons, the monarchial institution became the object of a cult, and the sovereign became endowed with almost superhuman attributes in the doctrine of the divine right of kings. But the passionate devotion to the monarchy, simply for itself and not from any clear view of its utility, produced results which were not altogether happy. Changing circumstances demanded readjustments in the machinery of government, particularly in the direction of limiting the discretionary powers of the king and increasing the authority of parliament. Such readjustments many were unwilling to make; and while many causes contributed to the bitterness of the struggle which followed, not the least of these was the fact that a large party in the country adhered to the royalists for sentimental reasons, without much thought about the utility of the things they were trying to preserve. They were prepared to maintain by force something which had acquired the dignity of tradition, and which they had come to value in itself as a part of their social culture. In their insensitiveness to changing social needs, they so helped to deepen antagonisms, that what had begun as a request for reform ended in an act of revolution.

We have said something about the idea of race and the cult of institutions; and we turn now to the question of language. When a language is common to a group, and when there is no strong incentive to change it for another, it forms a most valuable bond of union, and is a basis upon which other institutions of a common life may be built. Such community of language acquires particular significance in two different sets of circumstances; firstly, when a group has previously led a separate existence but now forms part of a larger state; and, secondly, when two or more separate states sharing a common language begin to consider questions of federation.

In the first case, the language very often becomes a precious symbol of ancient independence, and may be jealously fostered under extremely difficult conditions. Amongst European peoples two outstanding examples are the Poles and the Czechs. In the second case, community of language seems to be a natural principle of federation. Thus, when federation is discussed in connection with post-war settlement, we often hear proposals for an English-speaking Union (including the British Commonwealth and the United States of America), or for an Arabic-speaking Union (covering the greater part of the Middle East).

But while it is quite clear that community of language forms a useful basis for political arrangements, it is equally clear that this cannot be the only important consideration. Not only geographical but also economic factors must be taken into account. Great Britain, e.g., belongs geographically to Europe. When she has tried to ignore this fact, it has been forcibly brought to her attention by the march of events on the Continent. Again, when the problem of Czech independence was dealt with after the last war, geographical and economic considerations decreed that there should not be a purely Czech-speaking state. The new state was called Czechoslovakia; and, moreover, it included a considerable German-speaking minority.

Not only is it unsafe to take community of language as the sole basis of political demarcation, but even the fostering of a certain language as a fundamental aim of government is attended by grave risks to social happiness. The attempt to enforce the use of a single language throughout the state's territory may in certain circumstances be most unsound. This does not mean that such a policy is always unwise; for it will be generally admitted that a single medium of communication possesses distinct advantages. The point is that the policy may sometimes be unwise. It may rouse internecine strife when it involves the suppression of a tongue employed by a large section of the public. More rarely, it may arouse a sense of frustration by trying to preserve a tongue which there is a general tendency to abandon in favour of some other. In either case, the political government will be encouraging antagonisms, rather than promoting sentiments of fellowship, by its cultural policy, and thus defeating the end for which, *ex hypothesi*, it has put its finger in the cultural pie.

There is, finally, the case of religion. This is the particular form of cultural life which has most often influenced political policy. At the present day, there are various states which bind themselves to the support of some religious institution, the characteristic rites of which form part of public ceremony, and whose high dignitaries have, in virtue of their religious office, a place in the machinery of political government. In earlier times the state support of religion was even more vigorous. It was quite usual to enforce upon everyone conformity to the established religion, and to punish disobedience with fine, imprisonment, torture, or death. When emotions were particularly aroused, states even considered it their mission to extend the faith to other peoples and to embark on religious wars. And yet, in the end, states which adopted this policy often succeeded, not in creating greater social solidarity, but in arousing bitterness, dissension, and civil war; and in sharpening differences within the fold of the faithful itself. Governments which succeeded in imposing strict conformity frequently did so at the expense of the intellectual

and moral vitality of the people. Here, as in other branches of culture, it seems that when a powerful sentiment is shared by all the members of a community, the statesman can make use of this common sentiment for purposes of corporate action. But when the common sentiment does not exist, or when it is in process of altering its character, it would appear that for the state to champion and enforce a particular form of religion is to run a grave risk of promoting, not greater unity, but greater chaos.

If we try to relate the two principal conclusions at which we have so far arrived, it must appear as if we have been led into a most paradoxical, unsatisfactory, or even unreasonable position. In the first place, we have argued that the merely political bond is not sufficient to make a real society, and that government is impossible unless the members of the political community are bound together in a net-work of institutions which serve both to fulfil their purposes and also to keep them under orderly control. Still more, it is difficult for a government to mobilize the community for common action unless the members share common ideals and sentiments; and such common sentiments are most easily developed on the basis of common cultural values. The obvious inference from this would seem to be that a political government ought to adopt, as a fundamental aim of its policy, the creation and maintenance of a certain form of culture for the whole community over which it rules. But now we have reached the conclusion that for the state to adopt this attitude is a most dangerous thing, and that such a policy may well produce division and strife rather than social solidarity and harmonious co-operation.

I think the apparent contradiction in our conclusions can be satisfactorily resolved, not merely in theory but also in practice; but, in order to reach the solution, it will be necessary to probe a little more deeply the facts which give rise to the problem. We must try to understand why it is that the state's support of a particular form of culture is apt to lead to unexpectedly unhappy results. If I may be permitted to give first my conclusion, and then to elaborate the grounds on which I base this conclusion, I will say that the explanation is this: the things which have great cultural value very often have also great utility value or disvalue. Utility value changes with changing circumstances; and it is when serious conflicts arise between our utilitarian and our cultural valuations (which are non-utilitarian) that the state becomes involved in difficulties if it throws its weight on the side of the non-utilitarian.

I shall now explain and elaborate this idea which seems to me to be particularly important.

In an earlier part of this paper I mentioned the three classes into which we may group valuable objects: (1) those which are

valued simply for their utility; (2) those which are valued simply for themselves; (3) those which are valued for their utility and also for themselves. And I said that, since cultural values are non-utilitarian, their objects must fall into either the second or the third class. It is, however, extremely difficult to place anything without qualification in the first or the second class. There are few things which cannot have some utility for some person at some time; and many things, which are at first valued only for their utility, come to be valued also for themselves. A well-known example is that mentioned by J. S. Mill. While a person may begin to accumulate money for its utility—for what he can buy with it—he may develop a passion for the simple accumulation of money. When this happens we call him a miser. That which at first had only utility value has come to possess for him also non-utility value. So that, as we have indicated, it is seldom that one can, with absolute finality, describe anything as having only utility value, or only non-utility value.

But even if this were not the case, it is certain that most, if not all, of the things which acquire great cultural value belong to our third class. That is to say, we value them for utilitarian reasons as well as for themselves. This is a fact of the utmost significance in explaining why the state is liable to become involved in difficulties, when it tries to promote some special type of culture.

Consider, first, the problem of social institutions. The customs and institutions of a people grow up for a variety of reasons, but one of the most important is that they are thought to be the best for promoting social order and prosperity. The utility of the institutions to some class, or to society as a whole, is one of the main causes of their existence. A particular system of law or a particular form of government seems appropriate to the needs of a people, to their level of moral development, their temperament, their economic life, geographical distribution, etc. And if this form of government does, on the whole, work smoothly and give to the majority living under it reasonable opportunities for happiness, then it itself becomes an object of pride and affection. It acquires, in the common estimation, that kind of value which makes it part of the society's cultural life.

But the conditions of life may change, and change radically. The members of the society may be faced by the need of adjusting themselves to a new economic order, to developments in general standards of education, and to a different set of relations with neighbouring peoples. It may be that the traditional institutions, which have so adequately fulfilled their mission in the past, have become unsuitable to the new circumstances. In comparison with other possible forms of social organization they may, in the new age, have actual disutility. They may be a liability rather than an asset,

a hindrance rather than a help, in promoting the society's aspirations. And yet, having lost their utility value they may, for a considerable time, retain their profound sentimental hold on a large or influential section of the public as an honoured part of the traditional culture. With this divorce between utility and non-utility values, a strong tension is set up in the social consciousness: and the state is courting disaster if it identifies itself prematurely with the new tendencies or ties itself too firmly to the old.

The same is obviously true of language. Language, while to some small extent a development from the spontaneous expression of emotion, is mainly an instrument for the communication of ideals and desires so as to make them intelligible to other human beings. Languages, like social institutions, develop their form in intimate connection with ideas and needs. And so a language, originally developed to meet simple physical and mental requirements, may not be easily modified and expanded to serve new conditions—as e.g. when a community, isolated in its primitive simplicity, suddenly feels the impact of higher civilization. In such a case, there is a tendency for the old language to be displaced by a more richly developed one. Again, if close economic relations develop between a large, powerful community and a small weak one, there is a tendency for the language of the latter—irrespective of merit—to be displaced by that of the former. This is the position in the British Isles, where English has to a large extent displaced the native tongues of the Celtic parts of the population, and—despite the efforts being made to stem the tide—the process is likely to continue. Here, as in the case of traditional institutions, tension is produced by two forces pulling in opposite directions: considerations of utility drawing towards the abandonment of the old, and cultural sentiments operating in favour of its preservation.

Religion is liable to become involved in a similar struggle. We do not, perhaps, usually think of religion in connection with utility: and that is probably because the relation is rather less direct than in the cases of institutions and languages. But we see that such a relation exists when we reflect upon what is involved in religion. Religion is not theology, or philosophy, or science, or history. It is not a particular moral code. But it does always include some beliefs which have definite philosophical (and probably scientific and historical) implications: and it is always bound up with some code of behaviour. While no precise set of beliefs may be essential to all religions, or to any one religion in all its phases, yet, at any given time, a particular religion is associated with or includes some more or less determinate beliefs of a metaphysical, scientific or historical character. For example, in its early stages the whole outlook of Christianity was deeply coloured by the then prevalent belief that

this earth is the centre of the universe, and that the sun, moon and stars are relatively small bodies circling round it, created for the purpose of supplying it with warmth and light. While it can hardly be said that such conceptions were essentials of Christianity, nevertheless they formed part of the content of its original form: and to challenge such ideas, as did Copernicus and others, seemed to be to challenge the fundamentals of the faith. Similarly suspect were the physical and medical scientists when they began to explore regions of life hitherto dark and unknown. Mental abnormality was, in the old view, attributed to "possession" by strange demons or spirits: and even physical deformities were liable to interpretations of a like nature. Old women of peculiar habits or appearance were supposed to be on specially close terms with the devil, and to have received from him mysterious powers for working mischief on their neighbours.

Now such beliefs, in so far as they influence men's practice, may be not only devoid of utility but also positively harmful. False astronomical and physical theories can be barriers to our control over inanimate nature. False philosophical and psychological theories can be harmful if they incite us to the torture and execution of harmless old eccentrics. Once such theories become matters of doubt, we are drawn to a critical examination of them, not only from a desire for truth, but also from the point of view of their practical implications.

Yet so deeply have they been associated with the religious outlook of a past age, that any open investigation or denial of them has often produced violent reaction. Political authorities who felt themselves to be the guardians of the traditional religion threw their weight into the scale in favour of the older forms of belief, and against the new enlightenment—with results with which we are all familiar. Once more we have an example of the risk which the state runs of creating strife, rather than harmony, when it makes the preservation of a particular cult an essential object of its policy.

The truth seems to be that all the great cultural values are developed in connection with matters which have had, first and foremost, a utility value. If, for any reason, the utility ceases to exist or to be transformed into positive disutility, a psychological tension supervenes. On the one hand, we are drawn by old loyalties, by familiar and hallowed associations, to defend and conserve what we have inherited from the past. On the other hand, we are drawn by the imperious needs of the present to abandon the old in favour of something new. Such a state of tension cannot, however, persist indefinitely: and the general rule is for the latter tendency to prevail. The old, because of the sense of frustration and thraldom from which we cannot now dissociate it, gradually loses its hold upon our

affection. The new, appealing at first by its superior utility, gradually becomes also the centre of new non-utility values, the rallying point for a new stage in the history of our cultural life. To insist, in such circumstances, on the maintenance of the old is tantamount to the state's presenting itself with the royal gift of a white elephant.

So far we have been dealing with the question whether the state should adopt, as a fundamental aim of its policy, the propagation and maintenance of a particular kind of culture. The answer seems to be fairly clearly in the negative. Does this mean, then, that it should not concern itself with the cultural life in any fashion? Such a conclusion has been drawn; but it does not necessarily follow from the foregoing arguments. There is the alternative policy which we have mentioned earlier; namely, that the state should encourage and provide ample facilities for the development of cultural life, without being too officious in attempting to prescribe the particular form which this development is to take. If this alternative policy is a feasible one, then its adoption ought to have results which will be welcome even from the purely political point of view; for we must not forget that a developed social culture is one of the most potent factors in securing that sense of fellowship in a community upon which statesmen have to rely for full social co-operation on important occasions. The difficulty is to see just how this alternative policy is to be put into practice. I think, however, that if we consider a problem which is in many respects analagous, we shall find the key to the solution.

It is generally recognized—at least in theory—that education is concerned with the training of character as well as of intellect; that attendance at a university, e.g., should assist in developing the mental and moral qualities required in the good public servant. Students should emerge from their university training with some idea of the place which their work has in the life of the community, some general scheme of values, some broad "philosophy of life" which will give direction to their interests and healthy balance to their attitude to their fellows.

But how, exactly, is this development of character to be promoted? For the purely intellectual side of our training, for the acquisition of that specialized knowledge which is required for professional proficiency, there are the regular courses of academic instruction. But how do we provide character training? Certainly not by formal instruction courses in the matter of which students will sit regular examinations. In fact, the university cannot provide us with some ready-made robe of character in which we envelope ourselves, or some official philosophy of life which we learn by rote and are able to repeat on demand. What it can and should do is to make ample

and intelligent provision of those conditions which will stimulate the growth of character and personality.

With regard to these conditions, an essential one is that students should be encouraged, and provided with generous opportunities, to educate each other. While mainly occupied in their own specialist studies, they should, by mixing with those whose researches lie in different directions, gather some rough idea of what is going on round about them. They should have opportunities for the formation of all sorts of clubs and societies, for the success or failure of which they would themselves be responsible. Only by such means can they develop initiative, develop a sense of values, train themselves in the difficult business of honest co-operation for common ends, measure each other's ability and reliability, and learn by experience what is worth doing and what is not. It is on the multiplicity of these small, intimate associations within the larger whole that a rich moral and intellectual life is founded.

Here we have, I think, a clue to the way in which the state can most safely and effectively participate in the development of social culture. Following this clue, we can see the real value of voluntary associations, and the contribution which they are able to make to the life of the community as a whole. While concentrating on its essential functions of maintaining order, security and justice, and such secondary functions as, from time to time, it can conveniently fulfil, the state can best assist in the promotion of a healthy cultural life by giving ample opportunity for, and encouragement to, the growth of voluntary associations—for the free association of its members in small groups for the reasonable promotion of those ends in which they are interested. Such associations, quite apart from their direct value to the particular individuals concerned, have a general value for a variety of reasons.

In the first place, just because they are voluntary, and are not able to count upon the coercive power of the state for securing their ends, the members are stimulated to secure these ends by the methods proper to their nature; that is to say, by example and persuasion, and by convincing others that they have something worth while to offer. Success depends, in the long run, on the initiative and the loyalty which individuals show for the cause they have adopted, and on the extent to which they have trained themselves to place common aims before merely personal advantage.

In the second place—and this, again, is because of their voluntary nature—these associations are not likely to persist indefinitely, as useless survivals, after their value has disappeared or men have lost interest in the purposes which they were created to serve. Voluntary associations are fairly sensitive to changing needs, and the relative ease with which they can be constituted or dissolved helps to secure

that continuous adjustment of institutions to interests which is necessary for a vital cultural life.

In the third place, voluntary societies can provide a good training in the spirit of co-operation and reasonable compromise, so necessary in the life of the larger society.

It is, of course, true that to permit or encourage the growth of voluntary societies is to encourage the development of rival groups. There is the danger that loyalty to the small group may weaken loyalty to the larger society. But this danger is not so great as is sometimes supposed. Indeed, the most probable influence is in the opposite direction. Narrowness of outlook is much more pronounced in a community which discourages free association than in a community where associations abound. Here, at least, the proverb is true that there is safety in numbers. Where voluntary societies flourish, it is seldom that a person will belong to one society only. Few of us have purely one-track minds. Most of us have various interests, and the groups of persons with whom we associate will differ in membership to some extent according to the interest concerned. Of those with whom we become familiar through our scientific interests, perhaps only a small minority will belong to the group which shares our particular artistic inclinations. The individuals we meet in our religious societies will be to a certain degree different from those we meet in our science and art clubs: and our special brand of party politics will give us still other personal contacts. Thus, while the growth of voluntary associations draws men into small groups, it does not necessarily erect sharp barriers between the members of these different groups. On the contrary, when a person has a variety of group loyalties, these will tend to give him, in a variety of directions, bonds of sympathy with a wide range of other persons: and this variety of bonds will have a tendency to check any one of them from unduly limiting his social horizon.

Generally speaking, if we allow individuals a generous measure of free association for mutual encouragement in the pursuit of such aims as are not detrimental to the public interest, we shall be supplying favourable conditions for several results which most of us regard as desirable. These are, firstly, the development of character and enrichment of life in the individual himself: secondly, the development of social culture: and thirdly, the development of a complex network of relations binding individuals directly or indirectly to their fellow-citizens, facilitating united action when this is required.

And so we have, I think, discovered the answer to our question: What, in the interests of both political and cultural life, is the most satisfactory attitude for the state to adopt with respect to culture? The answer, surely, is that it is the business of the state government,

not to provide a specific form of culture which it seals with its approval and enforces by its might, but to provide the basic conditions in which a society can produce a living, dynamic culture appropriate to its character and historical circumstances. These conditions are: firstly, order and security on sound principles of justice; secondly, the production, and perhaps the actual operation, of great utility services which, at any given time, clearly serve the general good; and thirdly, facilitating, with the maximum of encouragement and the minimum of control, the formation of voluntary associations in which men and women can give free play to their minds, educate their characters, and fashion their material and mental world in a way which not only ministers to life but also, in Aristotle's phrase, conduces to the good life.

International Organization and Cultural Ideals.—We come, now, to the final problem which I suggested might appropriately fall within the scope of this paper. Supposing that existing national states become more closely united, either through regional federations, or in a world organization possessing compulsory judicial, legislative and executive powers, is this likely to have any profound effect upon natural cultures—the effect, e.g., of destroying their variety and reducing them to dull uniformity? There are many who fear that this would be the result: and they do not look forward with any pleasure to the day when those local customs, which give individuality to a people and provoke the curiosity or admiration of the foreigner, shall have disappeared.

In our reflections on this question, which is a serious one, we should (in order to keep the main issue clear) assume that any federal or international government will have a reasonably accurate view of its functions. A foolish one might attempt, as a matter of deliberate policy, to iron out national cultural differences in order to satisfy some bureaucratic passion for standardization. But we have already seen that it would be acting unwisely in taking up this attitude. Its legitimate functions will be like those of any other political government. Our question must, therefore, be put in the form: assuming that our super-state government knows its business and sticks to it, will not the very existence of greater political unification encourage the growth of uniformity and the decay of differences in cultural life?

Clearly, any effect which international institutions may have will be due to the fact that they have created bonds which hold together those who previously led independent existences. They will increase the facility with which different communities acquire contact with and knowledge of each other. We must, therefore, study the effects which increased contact and mutual knowledge generally have upon the people concerned. Judging from past experience, increased

contact does have a great influence in modifying forms of social life. This is most obvious when backward peoples come into contact with advanced civilizations, but it is also evident that old established cultures can profoundly influence each other.

Now there are few thoughtful people who would be prepared to say that such influence is wholly bad. Certainly some habits imported from without could well be dispensed with. It is surely a matter for regret that a people can be so unappreciative of its own heritage that it will throw valuable elements aside, and demand shabby substitutes merely because they are supposed to be the very latest things in sophisticated modernism. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that all importations are of this inferior type. Indeed, a people's culture is often deeply enriched through external influence. If we make a deliberate attempt to exclude this influence, the probability is that we shall soon find ourselves treasuring empty husks from which all that is worth while has disappeared. We know that the potentialities of the mind of the individual can seldom actualize themselves fully if he lives in isolation. Science, philosophy, art, and religion flourish most easily and richly when men have ample opportunity of sharing their experience and drawing upon each others' ideas. So, also, the development of our social heritage profits from our ability to draw upon the experience and creative work of other societies. Some of the most brilliant periods in the life of a people are the direct result of fresh suggestive contacts with the world beyond.

International influence on thought and life is, therefore, not to be wholly deplored. At least some such influences have been of great benefit; and the attempt to preserve or erect all barriers against them—the creation of cultural tariff walls—requires a very great deal of justification. If there are good reasons on political grounds for breaking down these barriers, and if the levelling of some of them in the past has been of service to national cultures themselves, then the onus of proof rest upon those who now wish to retain or even heighten them.

From a judicious consideration of what has been said in the last few paragraphs, we can draw a conclusion of some significance. It is this: the question from which this discussion originated is not, after all, the question of primary importance. Whether cultures are to become uniform or remain different is a secondary matter. What is really important is that cultures should be as rich as possible, and satisfy (so far as may be) our aspirations towards the good life. It is true that uniformity has no value in itself. It is equally true that difference has no value in itself. Uniformities which render co-operation easy, without reducing individuals to mere automata, are good Variety which gives scope for individual expression,

without producing confusion, is good. The value of uniformity and variety is to be judged in each instance on the merits of the case and according to some standard of value. This standard is a full and rich life for society, which means the individuals who compose the society. Whatever promotes this—whether it comes spontaneously from within or is borrowed and assimilated from without, whether its form is identical in all societies or varies from society to society—this is the thing which should be fostered.

Having adopted such a standard of value, we see that the healthy evolution of culture requires a continuous exercise of discriminating judgment. While an organism cannot live very long without drawing from its environment, it cannot live by simply incorporating whatever offers. It must select what is suitable to its nature, and what it has selected it must also transform into living tissue. So societies, drawing nutriment from outside themselves, must be discriminating in what they receive, and be able to transmute it, so far as this is necessary, in the process of assimilation. And here, as so often in discussing vital problems of social life, we are thrown back once more on the qualities of mind and character of the individual members of society. When one looks at the facts squarely and frankly, it is plain that, if social habits change, they change because a sufficient number of individuals have, wisely or foolishly, desired the change. If a society is to be wise in what it admits into or rejects from its cultural life, this must be through the mass of individuals exercising wise choice. If, therefore, we are anxious to ensure healthy development in the evolution of our social culture, the only foundation on which we can build with security is that of educating the individuals who make up society so that they will choose wisely. What form this education ought to take it is not our business here to enquire; but, plainly, it cannot be of that superficial kind which consists in stuffing the mind with quantities of so-called knowledge to be learned by rote, supplemented by tendentious propaganda. If the individual is to meet the onerous demands inevitably made upon him as a member of society, he has to be trained, not only by instructions as to what he should think, what he should like, and how he should act, but also by the development of his mind and character so that he will know how to think, how to discriminate between what he should and should not like, and what are the principles on which he ought to act.

To anyone who approaches the question of cultural development and cultural conservation in this, the only proper attitude, the existence of the widest possible political organization of which we are capable will appear not as in any sense an evil but as highly desirable. It will afford that order and security within which men can turn their attention more and more to the positive enrichment

of life. I suppose that, however comprehensively men may be organized politically, they will always tend to be attracted into smaller societies within the larger whole; and if there are world-wide institutions providing ordered security, every such smaller society can more easily draw from the vast reservoir of social experience such elements as are best suited to its particular needs.

WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY: *PROPOSITIONS AND CONSCIOUSNESS*[1]

SYDNEY E. HOOPER, M.A.

IN earlier articles I explained the fundamental entities in the Organic Philosophy, namely: actual entities or actual occasions, and eternal objects. But there is also a third type of entity called "propositions," very important for the introduction of novelty into our world, and indispensable for "consciousness" and the higher phases of experience. Before discussing Consciousness and these higher phases, it is necessary, therefore, to give an account of propositions.

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Propositions[2]

A proposition is a complex consisting of a definite actual entity or nexus of actual entities, and an eternal object standing in the relation of "potentially" qualifying the nexus as a predicate or predicative pattern. The feeling of an actual entity, entertaining a proposition as an objective datum, is called a propositional feeling. Now, a propositional feeling does not itself involve consciousness, but this much can be said: all forms of consciousness arise from the *integration* of a propositional feeling either with physical feelings or conceptual feelings. We learnt in earlier articles that "physical" feelings are the prehensions whose objective data are actual entities, and that "conceptual" feelings are prehensions whose objective data are eternal objects. A propositional feeling is a special type of integration, synthesizing a physical feeling with a conceptual feeling. The objective datum of the physical feeling can be either one actual entity or a nexus of actual entities. (If the objective datum be only one actual entity, the physical feeling will be "simple." If it be a nexus of actual entities, the physical feeling will clearly be more complex.) On the other hand, the datum of the conceptual feeling will be an eternal object. The point to grasp is that the prehension of a "proposition" involves a unique type of feeling which is a *synthesis* of (*a*) a physical feeling with (*b*) a conceptual feeling. Such a synthetic feeling is a propositional feeling.

Whitehead defines a proposition as "the 'potentiality' of an eternal object, as a determinant of definiteness, in some mode of restricted

[1] Paper read to the Jowett Society, Oxford, November 15, 1944.

[2] Cf. *Process and Reality*, pp. 342, et seq.

reference to a nexus of actual entities called the 'logical subjects'."[1] I will try and make clear what the definition means. In the genesis of a proposition, a definite nexus of actual entities informed by an eternal object, suffers attenuation of concrete physical status through a process of *abstraction*, thereby becoming mere "food for a possibility." Although the given nexus *in rerum natura* retains its definite actuality, the same nexus when it appears in a proposition, is transformed into an abstract set of mere "relata," in which condition it is only "potentially" (not *actually*) informed by an eternal object. These abstract relata are the "logical subjects" of the proposition. It will thus be seen that Propositions are neither actual entities, nor eternal objects, nor feelings. In truth a Proposition is a new kind of entity embodying a "potentiality." It may be regarded as a hybrid between pure potentialities and actualities. Whitehead picturesquely describes such entities as "the tales that might perhaps be told of particular actualities."

An illustration given by him enables us to understand the nature of propositions. Consider the Battle of Waterloo. It resulted in the defeat of Napoleon and the constitution of the actual modern world has been partly determined by the defeat. The course of history would have been different had Napoleon been victorious. Now the abstract notions expressing such hypothetical alternatives are generally relevant to the events which actually happened. This relevance is demonstrated by the mere fact that we sometimes think about the question concerning what the subsequent course of European history would have been, had Napoleon been victorious. Even though we may dismiss such alternatives from our minds as too remote to demand serious attention, the fact that we have entertained the ideas demonstrates the relevance of such an hypothetical alternative. (Who of us, in our own day, in far different circumstances, has not reflected on the question "What would have been the course of the second Great War if the Battle of Britain had not been won by the R.A.F.?") "Thus," says Whitehead, "in our actual world to-day, there is a penumbra of eternal objects, constituted by relevance to the Battle of Waterloo. Some people admit elements from this penumbral complex into effectual feeling,

[1] The following is a brief explanation of the difference between "singular," "general" and "universal" propositions. "A 'singular' proposition is the potentiality of an actual world including a definite set of actual entities in a nexus of reactions involving the hypothetical ingression of a definite set of eternal objects.

A 'general' proposition only differs from a 'singular' proposition by the generalization of 'one definite set of actual entities,' into '*any* set belonging to a certain sort of sets.' If the sort of sets includes all sets with potentiality for that nexus of reactions, the proposition is called 'universal' (cf. *P. & R.*, p. 262).

and others wholly exclude them. Some are conscious of this decision of admission or rejection; for others the ideas float into their minds as day-dreams without conscious or deliberate decision; for others, their emotional tone, of gratification or regret, of friendliness or hatred, is obviously influenced by this penumbra of alternatives without any consciousness of control."[1]

The brief explanation given above, with the illustration supplied by Whitehead himself, will serve as a first statement of the nature of a proposition; but it is not enough, and I will now elaborate a little more fully.

In the first place in a proposition the eternal object, which performs the rôle of the predicate or predicative pattern of the nexus of actual entities, is modified or attenuated in respect of its generality. How is it modified? In this way. An eternal object in its pure or intrinsic status enjoys absolute generality. Its relevance in respect of actualization does not refer to this or that actual entity, or to this or that nexus of actual entities, in the existing world, but merely to *any* actual entity or nexus. That is to say, its relevance in respect of ingression is absolutely general. In its pure or intrinsic status it can show no preference for a particular actual entity or selection of actual entities. Its rôle is exclusively to ingress into *any* actual entity or selection that may be relevant for the creative advance of the world. But in the proposition (which we have already learned is a complex consisting of a definite actual entity or nexus, and an eternal object) the eternal object has forfeited its absolute generality, since it now refers to a definite *selection* of actual entities. The actual entities involved in a proposition are called the "logical subjects"[2] of the proposition; and the eternal object, in respect to its possibilities as a determinant of nexus, is *restricted to these logical subjects*. This is the reason for its forfeiture of its pure original generality.

In a propositional feeling there is an integration of physical feelings derived from a definite selection of actual entities, with the conceptual feeling derived from an eternal object; and since the physical feeling is bound up with this determinate set of actual entities, indicated by their felt physical relationships to the subject of the propositional feeling, the eternal object is restricted in its application to this selection of actual entities. Hence in the *fusion* of the physical and conceptual feeling which constitutes a propositional feeling, the absolute generality of reference of the eternal object is eliminated. It now enjoys a *restricted* reference only, namely,

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 262.

[2] The logical subjects are in the old sense of the word "particulars". They are not *concepts* in comparison with other concepts: they are particulars in a potential pattern.

to the selected nexus of actual entities from which the physical feeling is derived. In other words, the eternal object in the proposition is a potential predicate or predicative pattern of just that selected nexus of actual entities—the "logical subjects" of the proposition. Consequently it no longer has the status of absolute generality. Thus we see that the proposition is the potentiality of an eternal object "as a determinant of definiteness, in some determinate mode of restricted reference to the logical subjects." In other words the eternal object is the "predicative pattern" of the proposition. The proposition itself may refer to the logical subjects in one or other of three different ways. They may be indicated (1) as *these* logical subjects in *this* predicative pattern, (2) as *any* of these logical subjects in *this* pattern, (3) as *some* of these logical subjects in *this* pattern. It is to be noted once more that it is the physical feeling in the complex that indicates the logical subjects, giving to each of them such definition as is necessary for its assigned status in the potential pattern.

In the second place, besides a restriction of generality in respect of the eternal object in a proposition, there is also (as we have seen) a modification of the nexus of actual entities forming its other pole. How does this take place? The answer is that their real rôle in actuality suffers abstraction: they no longer have the solid dignity of being factors in fact, except for the purpose of their physical indication. Each logical subject in the proposition becomes a bare "*it*" among actual things, with *its* assigned hypothetical relevance to the eternal object functioning as predicate. In other words the logical subjects of a proposition resign their rôle as constituents of fact and, in the language of Whitehead, are reduced to the status of "food for a possibility." This is how it occurs. Normally, actual entities are objectified with a certain distinctive richness of content. But in a proposition the richness of the objectifications is eliminated, and all that remains is the objectification of actual entities as a nexus of "its," each member of which has suffered deprivation of its unique essence. The nexus is reduced to a community of bare "*relata*," with elimination of the eternal object constituting the definiteness of that nexus. The objectification does nothing more but indicate that definiteness which logical subjects must have in order to be "hypothetical food for" the predicate of the proposition. But it should be noted that even the bare pointing to logical subjects as characterless "relata," makes it necessary that there should be an actual world constituting for them a systematic environment. Even logical subjects, to have any position at all, need an actual world, since there can be no position in pure abstraction.

We thus see that in a proposition (i) the eternal object forfeits its absolute generality denoted by the word "*any*," becoming a potential

predicate for an indicated nexus; and (ii) the actual entities or logical subjects, are deprived of their function as "factors in fact," by being reduced to so many bare "relata." In short, the proposition is the possibility of *that* predicate applying in that assigned way to *those* logical subjects. It is interesting, at this point, to compare a pure eternal object and a proposition. Both are definite potentialities *for* actuality with undetermined realization *in* actuality. But they differ in the range of their generality, "since an eternal object refers to actuality with absolute generality, whereas a proposition refers to indicated logical subjects."[1]

At this stage, it is appropriate to say a word concerning the truth and falsehood of propositions. Although in every proposition there is complete indetermination in respect of its realization in a propositional feeling, and as regards its own truth, nevertheless, since the logical subjects are in fact actual entities having definite mutual relations, the proposition is either true or false. But as Whitehead says, "its own truth, or its own falsity, is no business of a proposition. That question concerns only a *subject* entertaining a propositional feeling with that proposition for its datum." As we have seen from an earlier article on "Actual Entities," such a subject is called the "prehending subject" of the process of concrescence. And Whitehead warns us not to confuse a "prehending subject" with a "judging subject." He says "even a prehending subject is not necessarily *judging* the proposition." When the question of the truth or falsehood of propositions is a relevant issue, some element of *sheer giveness* is necessary to determine their truth or falsity. Even eternal objects cannot demonstrate what they are except in some definite given fact, and, in a proposition, it is the logical subjects that supply the element of givenness requisite for judging its truth or falsity.

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Certain Characteristics of Propositions

We may mention a number of interesting points concerning this propositional type of entity. *Firstly*, a proposition has neither the particularity of a feeling nor the reality of a nexus. It is a datum, suspended, as it were, in a restricted realm of possibility, awaiting a subject to feel it. Because its logical subjects supply it with a relevance to the actual world, a proposition functions as "a lure for feeling." It invites a subject to be its host, and promises, at least, some entertainment in return. Because a proposition is a "potentiality," like an eternal object, it is never tied to any particular subject who happens to feel it. Many subjects at the same time or at different times and places may feel it with diverse feelings. All

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 366.

that is necessary, so far as the proposition is concerned, is that it should be *relevant*, in the circumstances, to the subject who entertains it in response to its lure. *Secondly*, a proposition is not the same thing as a judgment. Propositions certainly are *judged*, but *what* is judged is not the judging. Judging is one of the higher phases of mental life which we shall deal with in a later article, but it is important not to confuse it with a proposition. Judgment feelings arise from a special sort of *integration* of propositional feelings with other feelings, and not from propositional feelings alone. *Thirdly*, the function of propositions is to stimulate mental interest, rather than to be true or false. Whitehead on this matter makes an arresting remark; "in the real world it is more important that a proposition be interesting than that it be true. The importance of truth is, that it adds to interest."[1] Do we not say "Truth is stranger than fiction"? Thus once again we see that the rôle of propositions is to be a lure for feeling, dangling before subjects who are mentally alert the novelties that await acceptance or rejection in the actual world. *Fourthly*, although propositional feelings are not in their simplest expression, *conscious* feelings, in certain integrations which have propositional feelings as components, consciousness does arise. *Fifthly*, it is to be noted that the physical feeling, which is always a component of a synthetic propositional feeling, has no unique relation to the proposition involved; nor indeed has the subject of that feeling prehending the proposition. Provided the requisite logical subjects are included in its objective datum, any subject whatsoever, with any physical feeling, can in a supervening phase of its concrescence entertain a propositional feeling with the proposition in question as its datum. As Whitehead explains: "it has only to originate a conceptual feeling with the requisite predicative pattern as its datum, and then to integrate the two feelings into the required propositional feeling."[2] But, of course, no subject can feel a proposition unless the logical subjects are in its own world. Aristotle, for example, could not have entertained the proposition "Hannibal has crossed the Alps," for the simple reason that the nexus of events constituting Hannibal and his arduous journey, had not been actualized in the lifetime of Aristotle, and, consequently, they were not in his world. This illustration brings out two points concerning propositions. Firstly, it is clear that new propositions come into being with the creative advance of the world. Although the logical subjects of the proposition " 'Hannibal' has crossed the Alps" had no existence for Aristotle, they certainly had for Fabius, some hundred years later. Secondly, it is interesting to note that the verbal statement of the proposition includes words and phrases which *symbolise* the sort of physical feelings necessary to indicate the

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 366. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 367.

logical subjects of the proposition, for instance, "Hannibal" crossing the Alps in the above example.[1]

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All actual entities have their own actual worlds, and those whose actual worlds include the logical subjects (which, we may recall, are a nexus of actual entities attenuated to a nexus of bare "relata"), are said to fall within the "locus" of the given proposition. All those actual entities enjoying the privilege of dwelling within the "locus" of any proposition, can, if desired, prehend the proposition as a phase in their own concrescence.

It is important to understand that a propositional feeling can arise only in a *late* phase of the concrescent process of the prehending subject. The reason for this is that before a propositional feeling can arise, there must have been certain earlier phases involving: "(*a*) a physical feeling whose objective datum includes the requisite logical subjects, (*b*) a physical feeling involving a certain eternal object among the forms of definiteness of its datum; and (*c*) the conceptual feeling of this eternal object necessarily derived from the physical feeling under heading (*b*)." Perhaps also there may be required a *novel* conceptual feeling (according to the category of conceptual reversion) "conforming" to the earlier conceptual feeling (*c*) but differing slightly from it and engendered by the *subjective aim* of the concrescing process. This reverted conceptual feeling we may call (*d*).[2]

Whitehead terms the physical feeling under heading (*a*) the "indicative feeling" (because it indicates the logical subjects); the physical feeling under heading (*b*) is called the "physical recognition." The physical recognition is important, because it is the physical basis of the conceptual feeling which provides the predicative pattern. The predicative pattern is *either* the eternal object which gives rise to the conceptual feeling under (*c*) *or* it is the novel eternal object giving rise to the conceptual feeling we have called (*d*). If "*c*" is the eternal objective providing the pattern, then "*d*" becomes irrelevant; but in either case the conceptual feeling whose datum is the predicative pattern is called the "predicative feeling." That is to say, the predicative feeling is the conceptual feeling of the eternal object providing the predicative pattern of the nexus.

We are now in a position to understand the genesis of a propositional feeling in one of the later phases of the concrescence of an actual entity. Its origin lies in the integration of what has been

[1] "Hannibal" in its least abstract form, stands for a society of settled actual entities with their objectifications consciously perceived by the subject. The word "Alps" is to be explained in the same way.

[2] *P. & R.*, p. 368.

called the "indicative feeling" with the "predicative feeling." Notice that in this integration the two data are synthesized, and that in the synthesis a double elimination takes place in respect of both data. On the one hand, the actual entities involved in the datum of the indicative feeling are reduced to a multiplicity of mere "relata" in which each is a bare "it." On the other hand, the eternal object constituting the real definiteness of that nexus is eliminated so far as its *absolute generality* is concerned, and transformed into a "restricted predicate," referring to "just those" logical subjects and to none other. Nevertheless, in the integration, the logical subjects are rescued from their mere multiplicity of abstract relata by being placed in the unity of a proposition, with a given predicative pattern. Thus we see that in a proposition, actualities which were first felt as sheer matter of fact, are transformed into a set of logical subjects with the potentiality of realizing an assigned predicative pattern. And so we come back to the conception of a proposition as a nexus of actual entities, attenuated by the deprivation of their primary richness of content into an abstract set of bare "relata" or "logical subjects," standing in the relation of being "potentially" qualified by an eternal object, itself reduced in rank to a "predicative pattern" with restricted generality. Propositions are not primarily for belief, but for feeling at the physical level of consciousness. As Whitehead puts it, "they constitute a source for the origination of feeling which is not tied down to mere datum."[1] Consequently we see that such experiences as "horror," "relief," "purpose" are primarily feelings involving the entertainment of propositions.

Different sorts of Propositional Feelings and How Propositions are Felt

Having attempted in the foregoing sections to make clear what propositions *are*, it is now necessary to explain how they are *felt*.

The nature of a proposition makes it completely impartial in respect of the various subjects prehending it; and it does not fully determine how it is "felt" by various subjects. That is to say, the proposition does not fully determine the *subjective form* of its prehension. Although a proposition may be an identical datum for a number of different subjects, the way in which the proposition is felt by these different subjects will vary according to differences in their histories. The different sorts of propositional feelings (i.e. how the proposition is felt) are divided by Whitehead into two main types, (*a*) "perceptive feelings," and (*b*) "imaginative feelings." The difference between these two types of feeling is founded on the comparison between the "indicative feeling," from which the logical subjects are derived, and the "physical recognition," from which the

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 263.

predicative pattern is derived. Now these physical feelings are either identical or different. If they are one and the same feeling, the derived propositional feeling is called a "perceptive feeling," because in this case "the proposition predicates of its logical subjects a character derived from the way in which they are physically felt by that prehending subject."[1] But if the physical feelings be different, the derived propositional feeling is called an "imaginative feeling." It is called "imaginative" because in the latter case, seeing that the predicate is derived from the physical feeling termed "physical recognition," "the proposition predicates of its logical subjects a character *without any guarantee of close relevance* to the logical subjects which are derived from the 'indicative feeling.' "[2] Nevertheless, Whitehead tells us, the distinction between these two types of propositional feeling is not so sharp-cut as might be supposed, because, although the two physical feelings ("indicative feeling" and "physical recognition") may exhibit a wide difference, they may be almost identical. What we can say generally is this. In proportion to the degree of diversity between the two physical feelings in question, there will be a corresponding free play of the imagination. A proposition, which is the datum of an imaginative feeling, has a predicate derived from a nexus differing in some respects from the nexus providing the logical subjects. Because of this the proposition is felt as an *imaginative* notion concerning the logical subjects, instead of perceptively. In imaginative feeling there are two *disconnected* physical feelings involved in the first stage of its genesis. In perceptive feeling the two physical feelings are identical, and the emotional pattern reflects the close connection of the predicate with the logical subjects. It may be repeated that the proposition in its own nature gives no hint as to how it should be felt. In one prehending subject, the proposition may be the datum of a perceptive feeling, in another it may be the datum of an imaginative feeling. But whether a proposition is felt perceptively or imaginatively, it can at least be said that the subjective forms of the two feelings will differ according to the differences of the *origination* of those feelings in their respective subjects.

This account should make clear what constitutes the difference between "perceptive feelings" and "imaginative feelings" in the theory of Propositions.

"Authentic" and "Unauthentic" Perceptive Feelings

It is important to bear in mind, that the predicative feeling (i.e. the feeling prehending the eternal object in the proposition) may have arisen in the prehending subject by *reversion*. That is to say,

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 370. [2] *Ibid.*

some conceptual feeling (*d*) which is a reversion from the former conceptual feeling, involving another eternal object, according to Category V, may have emerged. When this is the case, the predicate has in it some elements which really contribute to the definiteness of the nexus; but it has also some elements which *contrast* with corresponding elements in the nexus. These latter elements, says Whitehead, have been introduced into the concrescence by the subject influenced by its own "aim." Consequently, the predicate is distorted from the truth by the peculiar subjectivity of the prehending subject. A perceptive feeling of this kind is termed "unauthentic." Whitehead now invites us to consider the three *species* of perceptive feelings, which in turn shade into each other.

(I) Should the predicative pattern of a proposition be derived straight from the physical feeling called "physical recognition," so that there is no reversion introduced by the prehending subject, then the propositional perceptive feeling, by virtue of its modes of origination, is termed "authentic." It is authentic because such a feeling, "by virtue of its modes of origination, has as its datum a proposition whose predicate is in some way realized in the real nexus of logical subjects"[1]—i.e. a predicate derived from the real nexus, and not refracted by the prehending subject. But it should be noted that notwithstanding this congruence of the predicate with the real nexus in an authentic perceptive feeling, the proposition need not be *true*, "so far as concerns the way in which it implicates the logical subjects with the predicate," and for this reason. The primary physical feeling of that nexus by the prehending subject may have involved "transmutation" (that is to say, the prehending subject may have transmuted the *datum* of a "conceptual" feeling derived from its analogous physical feelings of various actual entities in its actual world, into a characteristic of the *nexus* containing those prehended actual entities among its members—Category VI). In such a case, as Whitehead puts it, "the proposition ascribes to its logical subjects the *physical* enjoyment of a nexus with the definition of its predicate; whereas that predicate may have only been enjoyed *conceptually*. Thus, what the proposition proposes as a *physical* fact in the nexus, was in truth only a mental fact."[2] And he points out that unless this position is understood, error will arise. The function of such understanding belongs to the subjective forms.

The case just stated is that of an "authentic" perceptive feeling entertaining a proposition which need not be true.

(II) "But if the primary physical feeling involves no reversion *in any stage*, then the predicate of the proposition is that eternal object which constitutes the definiteness of that nexus. In such a

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 371. [2] *Ibid.*

case the proposition is, without qualification, *true.*"[1] Such an authentic perceptive feeling is termed "direct."

Thus there are "indirect" perceptive feelings (when "reversion" is involved) and "direct" perceptive feelings. Both indirect perceptive feelings, and direct perceptive feelings are said to be different species of the "authentic" type of perceptive feelings. It is to be noted on the one hand that in the case of these "authentic" feelings, "the predicate has realization in the nexus, physically or ideally, *apart from any reference to the prehending subject.*"[2]

(III) On the other hand, "unauthentic" perceptive feelings are asserted to be derived from a "tied" imagination "in the sense that there is only one physical basis for the whole origination, namely, that physical feeling which is both the 'indicative' feeling, and the 'physical recognition.' The imagination is tied to one ultimate fact."[3] In other words, in unauthentic perceptive feelings the subject by its own process of reversion, has produced for the logical subjects "a predicate which has no immediate relevance to the nexus, either as physical fact or as conceptual functioning in the nexus."[4]

So much for the explanation of "authentic" and "unauthentic" perceptive feelings of a proposition.

Whitehead tells us that the subjective forms of propositional feelings "are dominated by valuation, rather than by consciousness." This is how he explains the matter. In a pure propositional feeling,

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 371. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 372.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 372. Note: On page 357 of *Process and Reality*, Whitehead says: "The reversion may originate in the separate actualities of the nexus, or in the final prehending subject, or there may be a double reversion involving both sources." It appears that perceptive feelings in which the reversion originates *in the prehending subject* are "unauthentic," and that the "indirect" type of perceptive feeling, even though associated with reversion of the first kind ("originating in the separate actualities of the nexus"), is still "authentic."

On pp. 379–381 of *Process and Reality* Whitehead says: "Without qualification 'direct' perceptive feeling feels its logical subjects as potentially invested with a predicate expressing an intrinsic character of the nexus which is the initial datum of the physical feeling.

With qualification, this statement is also true of an 'indirect' feeling. The qualification is that the secondary conceptual feelings *entertained in the nexus* by reason of reversion (cf. Categorical Condition V) have been transmuted so as to be felt in the subject (the final subject of the conscious perception) as if they had been physical facts in the nexus. . . .

It is important to note that even authentic physical feelings can distort the character of the nexus felt by transmuting felt concept into felt physical fact. In this way authentic perceptive feelings can introduce error into thought, and transmuted physical feelings can introduce novelty into the physical world. Such novelty may be either fortunate or disastrous. But the point is that novelty in the physical world, and error in authentic perceptive feeling, arise by conceptual functioning according to the category of reversion."

[4] *P. & R.*, p. 381.

the logical subjects, whilst preserving their indicated particularity, have lost their own real modes of objectification. This was elaborated in an earlier section. Consequently, "the subjective form lies in the twilight zone between pure physical feeling and the clear consciousness which apprehends the contrast between physical feeling and imagined possibility." The correct way of regarding a propositional feeling is as "a lure to creative emergence in the transcendent future." When it is functioning as a "lure," the propositional feeling about the logical subjects of the proposition may, in some subsequent phase, promote a "decision" which involves intensification of some physical feeling of the logical subjects in the nexus. Consequently, according to the various categorical conditions, propositions are said to "intensify, attenuate, inhibit, or transmute, without necessarily entering into clear consciousness or encountering judgment."[1]

Whitehead points out that from this function of propositions it follows that in the pursuit of truth even physical feelings must be criticized, since their evidence is not final apart from an analysis of their origination. He says "This conclusion merely confirms what is a commonplace in all scientific investigation, that we can never start from dogmatic certainty. Such certainty is always an ideal to which we approximate as the result of critical analysis. . . . There can be no immediate guarantee of the truth of a proposition by reason of the mode of origination of the propositional feeling, apart from a critical scrutiny of that mode of origination. The feeling has to be (i) perceptive, (ii) authentic, and (iii) direct. . ."[2]

The quotation just given is a fitting end to an account of Whitehead's theory of propositions, and we can now turn to consider what part they play in consciousness and the higher phases of experience.[3]

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 373. The term "decision" here means the phase which is the outcome of *valuation*, either favourable (adversion) or unfavourable (aversion). Such valuation is a type of "physical purpose" since it is the agent whereby the decision is made as to the causal efficacy of the subject of the conceptual feeling with its valuation, in its objectifications beyond itself.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 373. *N.B.*: It should be noted that the proposition which is the datum of an imaginative feeling *may* be true.

[3] Whitehead points out that there are two types of relationship between a proposition and the actual world. A proposition may be either conformal or non-conformal to the actual world, true or false. When it is conformal, the admission into feeling of the proposition "simply results in the conformation of feeling with fact. . . . The prehension of the proposition has merely abruptly emphasized one form of definiteness illustrated in fact." But when a non-conformal proposition is admitted into feeling, there occurs a synthesis of fact with the alternative potentiality of the complex predicate. When this happens a novelty emerges in the creative process, and the consequences may be fortunate or disastrous. But whether they turn out to be the one or the other, at least something new has been introduced into the world. "This novelty may promote or destroy order; it may be good or bad, but it is a new type of

Consciousness

It has been said that a propositional feeling is the feeling or prehension of a proposition. Now the subjective form of the propositional feeling will depend on circumstances. It may, or may not, involve consciousness, and it may, or may not, involve judgment. But it will at least involve the attitude of aversion or adversion, that is to say "decision." Consciousness will be present when what is called the "affirmation-negation" contrast has entered into the subjective form of the propositional feeling. That is to say, consciousness will be present in experience, when certain feelings are components in an integral feeling whose datum is the *contrast* between a nexus which *is* and a proposition which in its own nature *negates* the decision of its truth and falsehood. To understand this description of consciousness, it is necessary to elaborate the theme.

From earlier articles, we have learnt that mental activity is one of the modes of feeling belonging to all actual entities. But in the Organic Philosophy, mental activity is not a synonym for consciousness. Consciousness only arises in some actual entities and in certain conditions. What then is consciousness, and what are the conditions of its appearance? First of all, it should be noted that consciousness presupposes "experience," and not experience consciousness. Consciousness is a special element in the subjective forms of some feelings or prehensions. And because consciousness depends upon a special type of subjective form, an actual entity though conscious in respect of some parts of its experience, may be unconscious in respect of other parts. Its experience is wider than its consciousness, for this experience includes all those prehensions of other things exercising their functions as components of its being; but it may be conscious, if at all, only in respect of a few of such prehensions. It must be emphasized that the subjective aim of an actual entity is not primarily intellectual: it is the "lure for feeling," and so mental operations do not necessarily involve consciousness. Every actual entity contributes to the circumstances out of which it has arisen, novel formative elements deepening its own unique individuality. Consciousness is only the last and greatest of such elements, by which the individual, expressing its character as essentially "selective," dims and obscures the external totality from which it originates and which it embodies. In the Organic Philosophy, what Locke called the "ideas of particular things" are those other things exercising their function as felt components in the constitution of an actual entity; and the experience of the actual entity is its *complete formal constitution*, including its consciousness (should it enjoy any).

individual, and not merely a new intensity of individual feeling." Thus, propositions in their primary role "pave the way along which the world advances into novelty," and error is often the price paid for this advance.

In this connection, Whitehead remarks: "If Locke had not inherited the dualistic separation of mind and body—if he had started with the one fundamental notion of an actual entity, the complex of ideas disclosed in consciousness would have at once turned into the complex constitution of the actual entity, disclosed in its own consciousness—so far as it is conscious—fitfully, partially, or not at all."[1] In brief, the Organic Philosophy abolishes the detached mind. "Mind" is the complex of mental operation involved in the constitution of an actual entity, and consciousness only arises in one of these operations when it is characterized by a special type of subjective form.

Generally speaking, it may be said that consciousness is a certain way of feeling the contrast between the fact which is "given" and a mere "possibility." Or to put it in another way, consciousness is the way of feeling a real nexus of actual entities in contrast with imaginative feeling about it. When the origination of a conscious feeling is analysed, there are always to be found two components. On the one hand there are physical feelings derived from actual fact, and, on the other, there is conceptual feeling concerning a potentiality. It is this abstract element in the concrete situation that provokes consciousness, which is nothing else but the subjective form of a synthetic feeling integrating the physical feeling as a *factual* process with the conceptual feeling of a *potentiality*. The content of this integrated feeling is thus a contrast between either "what actuality *is*" and "might *not* be," or "what actuality is *not*," and yet "might be": between a fact and a possibility—and the subjective form of this feeling of contrast is consciousness. Consciousness is *how* the affirmation-negation contrast is felt; the contrast between the affirmation of objectified fact in the physical feeling, and the mere potentiality which is the negation of such affirmation in the propositional feeling. In the integral synthetic feeling, there are two components: (1) the basic *physical* feeling of a nexus of actual entities and (2) a *propositional* feeling of that same nexus regarded as mere "logical subjects" informed by a potential predicate. The conscious perception, which arises in a feeling integrating these two components, is the comparative feeling of *contrast* emerging from the synthesis. We thus see that a propositional feeling is a necessary constituent in a conscious experience. Indeed, all forms of consciousness arise from ways of integration of propositional feelings with other feelings, either physical or conceptual.

On this subject Whitehead makes the following arresting statement, which, like a meteor, lights up the whole path of the discussion: "The triumph of consciousness comes with the negative intuitive judgment. In this case there is a conscious feeling of what

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 73.

might be and is not. The feeling concerns the definite negative prehensions enjoyed by the subject. It is the feeling of absence, and it feels this absence as provided by the definite exclusiveness of what is really present. Thus the explicitness of negation, which is a peculiar character of consciousness, is here at its maximum."[1] We may illustrate this statement thus: consider the experience of "perceiving this tone as *not* grey." Here the "grey" has ingression in its full character as a conceptual novelty, illustrating an alternative. Whereas in the positive case "perceiving this stone as grey," the grey has ingression in its character as a *possible* novelty, but in fact *by its conformity*, emphasizing the given grey blindly felt. On the one hand, "in the perception of 'the stone as grey,' conscious feeling is in barest germ; on the other, in the perception 'the stone as *not* grey,' such feeling is in full development."[2] If we see clearly the difference in these two experiences of negative and positive perception, we shall understand Whitehead's assertion that negative perception is the "triumph of consciousness."

According to the Organic Philosophy, consciousness only arises in a late derivative phase of a process of complex integrations—a phase eliciting into feeling the full contrast between mere propositional potentiality and realized fact. In any given actual entity, it may happen that a phase of this sort is negligible in its consciousness; then in its experience there is no knowledge. On the other hand, such a phase may be essential to the complete concrescence; then there is knowledge. Consciousness primarily illuminates the higher phase of the process in which it arises, and only illuminates earlier phases derivatively in so far as they are components in the higher phase. But those elements in our mind which are consciously clear and distinct are not its basic facts. Even at its highest level, consciousness illuminates clearly and distinctly but a small focal region, and dimly the large penumbral region indicating rich and intense experience in the background. But whenever there is consciousness, it recalls, in some degree, earlier phases from the obscure and vague recesses of the unconscious, and thus, in a wide sense, can be said to enlighten experiences which precede it.

It has been said above, that those elements in our experience which have vivid consciousness are not the basic facts of mind. To bring this point home, Whitehead asks us to notice that prehensions in the mode of causal efficacy (i.e. the vague perception of "the hand of the settled past in the formation of the present," an experience "heavy with the contact of the things gone by, which lay their grip on our immediate selves") are only dimly illuminated by consciousness, because these prehensions are primitive elements in our experience. But prehensions in the mode of presentational immediacy

[1] Cf. *P. & R.*, p. 387. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 225–26.

(i.e. sights, sounds, tastes, smells, touches; the decorations of a world "gay with a thousand tints, passing and intrinsically meaningless"), are among the prehensions which we enjoy with the most vivid consciousness. These prehensions of vivid experience are, in Whitehead's view, late derivatives in the concrescence of an experient subject; whereas the vague, heavy experience of the present, conforming to the hand of the settled past, is the basic primitive mode of perception. Incidentally it may here be mentioned that in Whitehead's view the neglect of the recognition of the "law" that the late derivative elements we experience are more clearly illuminated by consciousness than the primitive elements, has been fatal to a satisfactory theory of knowledge. In fact "most of the difficulties of Philosophy are produced by this neglect. Experience has been explained in a thorough topsy-turvy fashion, the wrong end first. In particular emotional and perceptual experience has been made to follow upon Hume's impressions of sensation."[1] But, in Whitehead's view, this is sheer error. He says "the confinement of our prehension of other actual entities to the mediation of private sensations is pure myth. The converse doctrine is nearer the truth. The more primitive mode of objectification is *via* emotional tone, and only in exceptional organisms does objectification *via* sensation supervene with any effectiveness."[1] He goes on to say that we prehend other actual entities more primitively by direct mediation of *emotional* tone and only secondarily and waveringly through direct mediation of our senses. Physiologically this emotional tone depends for the most part on the condition of the viscera which "are peculiarly effective in generating sensations." It is true that the two modes of perception fuse with important effects upon our knowledge; but it is essential to recognize that experiences of causal efficacy are the basic facts of mind, and those of presentational immediacy later derivatives. The former, and not the latter, have metaphysical priority.

Summing up, it can be said that consciousness, like everything else, is ultimately indefinable. It is just itself, and must be experienced. But, also like other things, it is the emergent quality illustrated in the essence of a conjunction of circumstances. Consciousness belongs to that class of forms admitted or not admitted by the subject of an actual entity for the purpose of absorbing the objective data presented for a novel synthesis, into the subjectivity of satisfaction. Consciousness is that quality which emerges as the result of the conjunction of a fact and a supposition about that fact. It is the quality inherent in the contrast between the physical pole and the mental pole—the contrast between Actuality and Ideality. When such a contrast is a feeble factor in experience, then consciousness is present merely in germ, as a latent capacity. In proportion as the

[1] *P. & R.*, p. 226. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

contrast is well-defined and prominent, the occasion includes a developed consciousness. The portion of experience irradiated by consciousness is only a selection. That is to say—consciousness is really a certain mode of attention: it provides the extreme of selective emphasis. Concerning the relation of the spontaneity of an occasion to consciousness and art, Whitehead says—"The spontaneity of an occasion finds its chief outlets, first in the direction of consciousness, and secondly in production of ideas to pass into the area of conscious attention. Thus consciousness, spontaneity, and art are closely interconnected. But that art which arises within clear consciousness is only a specialization of the more widely distributed art within dim consciousness or within the unconscious activities of experience."[1]

This passage asserts that ultimately consciousness is to be regarded as the product of art in its lowliest form, since it results from the ingression of ideality into reality. The mingling of ideality with reality assumes the form of a contrast, with the purpose of reshaping reality into a finite select appearance. All later developments of human art are thus outgrowths of that profound function in nature which in the first place produced consciousness itself.

The "importance" of consciousness is not a necessary element in the concrete actual entity. If we are reflecting on the route of successive actual occasions constituting the life history of an enduring thing or person, "some of the earlier actual occasions may be without knowledge, and some may possess knowledge. In such a case the unknowing man has become knowing. There is nothing surprising in this conclusion; it happens daily for most of us when we sleep at night and wake in the morning."[2] Thus although every actual occasion may be said to have the capacity for knowledge, generally speaking knowledge seems to be negligible, except in regard to some actual occasions enjoying a peculiar and rich complexity of constitution.

This completes the account of Whitehead's theory of propositions and consciousness, and clears the ground for an understanding of the higher phases of experience. An exposition of these higher forms of experience will be given in a final article.

[1] *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 347.

[2] *Process and Reality*, p. 224.

NEW BOOKS

Men and Moral Principles. By L. SUSAN STEBBING. L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture No. 13. (Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. 27. Price 2s.)

It is fitting that Professor Stebbing's last published work in philosophy should be an essay in the methodology of ethics. She wrote less on ethics than on some other philosophical subjects but all who knew her well knew of her great concern with moral problems and their relation to political affairs. Though without illusions about the general irrationality of human behaviour, she believed strongly that philosophers whose business it is to think clearly should try to clarify moral issues both for themselves and for others and should, above all, resist the temptation to act blindly, to be swayed by irrational prejudice or ill-judged enthusiasm. She was ever an example in this respect, though reflection never dried in her the springs of impulsively generous action and sympathy which were freely moved both by the suffering and happiness of human beings. The tribute she pays to Hobhouse in this Lecture could, equally justly, be paid to her, that she was a philosopher whose philosophy informed her life.

Professor Stebbing's chief object in this pamphlet is to emphasize the fundamental logical difference between ethics and the natural sciences, whose investigators proceed by the method of abstracting isolable elements from concrete situations and formulating the laws of their recurrence in similar situations. The more completely such elements can be isolated, the more exactly can their laws be expressed. And no scientific study can be made of situations where no elements can be so isolated. In spite of some appearance to the contrary in the existence of moral "rules," no ethical situation, Miss Stebbing thinks, can provide such "isolates." Ethics, therefore, is not, and cannot be, a science. She observes, in passing, that this is also true of politics though she does not develop her thesis for this subject.

Ethical situations, expressed in judgments about good and evil, are complex and contain elements of different logical types. It is impossible to obtain from them generalizations to the effect that in any future situation containing similar elements my present judgment of good or evil would be valid or my present action ethically justified. I admit the general rule that "Men ought to speak the truth" and that on this occasion it is my duty to speak truly, but I cannot predict that on every future occasion, when asked for information, it would be my duty to give it, and not to prevaricate. What I, rightly, decide to be my duty will depend not only on the acknowledgment of an abstract moral rule, but also, and more importantly, on the particular combination of circumstances in which it is to be applied. These circumstances cannot be enumerated. We cannot, without talking nonsense, elaborate a moral rule more accurately as, "Speak the truth, provided that you do not betray your friends, give dangerous information to a madman, destroy another's peace of mind unnecessarily, etc., etc." The rule evaporates in such refinement. "Truth-speaking" is not, therefore, an "isolate" for which laws of when it ought or ought not to occur can be formulated.

What, then, are moral judgments about and how can ethics be studied? Obviously, what we judge are not single actions, but groups of actions or possible actions. I do not speak the truth because I promised not to betray

the partisan ambush and if I do my comrades will be killed. And communists (or gentlemen, or Christians) *don't behave like that.* What I do relates to a whole pattern or mode of acting inspired by an ideal and guided by principles of action, of habit-formation, of education, directed to producing a human being having a certain kind of personality, and exhibiting a particular set of characteristics, approved by the group. In judging ethical situations, therefore, Miss Stebbing says, "What we have to take account of is a whole mode of acting; ethical principles have significance only in so far as they are closely related to a certain set of actions which proceed from a spirit that inspires a particular way of life" (p. 18), and "Each ideal" (held by groups of men) "if it were put into practice, would promote, or at least tend to promote, the development of a certain type of man and would be inimical to the development of some other types" (p. 25). A very important part of the business of moral philosophers, therefore, is to clarify the ideals and principles upon which modes of acting are based, to compare the ideals of different groups and societies and to recommend to their own societies the principles of a way of life adapted to human nature as it is and life as it is daily lived by the majority of people, but capable also of inspiring the development of a human being having as many as possible of the good characteristics which a human being is capable of possessing (pp. 4 and 25).

Moralists and reformers must be always on their guard against fanaticism and the sort of innocence which preaches cloudy ideals and impossibly perfectionist principles formulated without reference to the persons which they are intended to direct or the conditions in which they must be practised. It is not only philosophers who fall in love with dreams and abstractions, and fail to appreciate that ideals which are to be realized on earth must be adapted to earthly conditions and that moral choice is often a choice between evils as well as between good and evil. Such are some Christian Pacifists who justify abstention on the grounds that no war need have occurred if all the combatants had been sincere Christians. In the state of world opinion in 1939, to appeal to a condition so impossible of fulfilment is meaningless and cannot assist the choice now between the two evils of war and the almost certain predominance in a few years of the Fascist ideal and way of life. Miss Stebbing gives as an example of a practical ideal that of the "good doctor" of the Hippocrates Oath. The medical code does not demand impossible saintliness from ordinary people, but its social results are, in general, good. A reasonable degree of professional efficiency is ensured and mutual trust achieved within a limited set of personal relationships. This sort of result should be our aim when choosing the principles and ideals by which to organize our wider social relationships. Moral principles must come down to men and their daily living conditions. Philosophers must help to guide this process.

This programme seems to require philosophers to be the sages and prophets of their societies; a role which many would reject. They might admit that part of a philosopher's business is to clarify accepted moral principles, expose their assumptions and show their implications. They might prefer to describe this as the analysis of moral judgments or the elucidation of ethical language. And they would agree heartily with Miss Stebbing that the wrong sort of rationality about ethical questions should be discouraged by showing how ethical statements are related to particular ethical situations in a way which makes an ethical rule so unlike a scientific law that to emphasize an analogy between them is unprofitable. But, for Miss Stebbing, these are at best the preliminaries to positive ethical philosophy and, at worst, mere trivial word juggling. Unfortunately, Miss Stebbing leaves unexplained the principle upon

which the choice between different ideals is to be determined. She gives a hint on page 25 when she suggests that our choice should be guided by "the sort of person we believe a human being is capable of becoming." This, however, is too vague to be very useful. An analogy with medical and other professional codes, too, is misleading. We know, and could describe fairly adequately, what constitutes being a good doctor, a good lawyer, a good carpenter, even a good trade unionist or a good employer. But can we, in an analogous sense, describe what it is to be a good human being? Moreover, what men are capable of becoming seems to be a scientific question. The philosopher has no qualifications for answering it. Biologists, physiologists, psychologists, historians and sociologists may be able to predict how man can develop. But he may develop bad characteristics as easily as good. Which characteristics do we want to develop, and why? Is there an ideal human personality which all should develop? Miss Stebbing seems to deny this in her final sentence where she states that "There is no good reason to suppose that *one* way of life, one clearly stated ideal, is appropriate to all stages of human development and to all sorts and conditions of societies." Yet I think she still clings, obscurely, to a final standard or absolute ideal by which the standards of different groups and societies should be judged. Yet such a standard of which no description can be given seems to introduce a purely metaphysical notion which in her concrete and practical mood she would emphatically reject. But if it is rejected (as I agree it should be), more must be said to allay the criticism that Miss Stebbing accepts an ethical equality which is contradicted by ordinary moral experience. We do not believe that it is merely preference for our own customs which makes us condemn as immoral the beliefs and practices of some societies. Her own condemnation of Fascism, for example, shows that Miss Stebbing would admit this fact. Unhappily, we shall never know how she would have resolved this puzzle.

M. MACDONALD.

Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies. Edited by R. HUNT and R. KLIBANSKY. Vol I, No. 2, Warburg Institute, London, 1942.

L. MINIO.-PALLUELLO: *The Genuine Text of Boethius' Translation of Aristotle's Categories.* [Boethius is not the author of the version usually printed as his (V). *His* version is preserved by the two MSS; V is a fresh rendering made probably in the first half of the tenth century. This is important, since the genuine text of Boethius' version enables us to reconstruct the Greek of Aristotle as it stood in the sixth century.] R. KLIBANSKY: *The Rock of Parmenides.* [A study of the way in which the misunderstanding of a phrase in Martianus Capella gave rise to the mediaeval legend of Parmenides as inventing metaphysics on a rock in Egypt.] L. LABOWSKY: *A New Version of Scotus Eriugena's Commentary on Martianus Capella.* [Notes on a MS. of this work in the Bodleian.] R. W. HUNT: *Studies in Priscian.* [Treats with texts of the mediaeval conception of the relations of grammar and logic.] C. C. J. WEBB: *Ioanais Sariesberiensis Metalogicon: Addenda et Corrigenda.* [Additional notes to the author's edition of the *Metalogicon.*] H. KANTOROWICZ: and B. SMALLEY: *An English Theologian's View of Roman Law: Pepo, Irnerius, Ralph Niger.* [The question discussed is *who* was *Pepo*? Evidence of an unpublished MS. of the *Moralia Regium* of the chronicler Ralph Niger shows that he really was a precursor of Irnerius at Bologna. Text given from a MS. at New College, Oxford.] E. H. KANTOROWICZ: *An "Autobiography" of Guido Faba.* [An entertaining study of the statements of this curious Bolognese figure about himself.] R. KLIBANSKY: *Plato's Parmenides*

in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. [The first Latin version of the work, anterior to that of Ficinus, was the one made, but never printed, by George of Trapezunt for Nicolaus of Cusa, which we can date approximately in the year 1451–2. Previously the dialogue had been only known in part from the version of the Commentary of Proclus, made in the thirteenth century by William of Moerbeke. Nicolaus thus knew the whole dialogue, but his *interpretation* of it had been already determined by his reading of Proclus, only he now came to combine the "theological" interpretation with a recognition that the method of the dialogue is dialectical. The theological interpretation itself was disputed by Politian and Pico della Mirandola.]

A. E. TAYLOR.

Psycho-Analysis and Crime. By MAJOR S. H. FOULKES, M.D. Canadian Bar Association.

This admirable little pamphlet is written for lay-men. It is introduced by Professor Burt, who explains the general nature of psycho-analytic theory, and its place in the corpus of psychological studies. Nothing could be clearer.

Major Foulkes then takes up the tale, and gives a further elaboration of Freudian theory, after which he proceeds to apply the Freudian doctrine to the problems of delinquency. The usual points are made: unconscious motives may lie at the root of the delinquent behaviour itself, unconscious resentment may be responsible for the anti-social nature of the act, and unconscious guilt, seeking the assuagement of overt punishment, may lead the delinquent to act in such a way as to provoke social retaliation. Furthermore society itself plays a part; we are all of us busily keeping the rules and restraining our baser natures, and so we are in a sense vicariously implicated when we contemplate those who allow their own baser natures more licence than we allow ours. The result is that we ourselves, as a group precipitating a certain social context, also develop a kind of socially sanctified "super ego" disguised in wig and gown, on whose relentlessness (or tolerance) we keep a watchful eye. If only, therefore, we could remove the unconscious motives which are responsible for crimes, and get more knowledge of ourselves, the tide of delinquency would ebb and social harmony would be less precarious.

All this is, of course, familiar to students of psycho-analysis as applied to the field of delinquency, and all well-informed persons rightly clamour for observation centres, psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatment of suitable cases, and, in general, for a better understanding of the psychological and sociological causes of crime. There is, however, an influential world in which these matters are unknown, and it is to be hoped that this pamphlet will reach it. It ought to be read by all magistrates, judges, probation officers and anyone else responsible for the fate of those whom the law has delivered into their hands.

For the "initiated," however, Major Foulkes raises extremely interesting questions. Let us grant that psycho-analysis can work wonders with delinquents for whose actions unconscious motives play a *preponderating* role, let us include the child, whose social adjustment is in the process of development and therefore may well go reparably wrong, and let us also throw in the "young person" who has such a difficult passage in our culture from childhood to adulthood that resentment and guilt may almost be considered the order of the day. Let us hand them all over to the psycho-analyst and let us not be put off by the pessimism of the East-Hubert report. What have we left? Perhaps we have the a-moral psychopathic personality, who seems incapable of social training altogether. If we leave him on one side as a curiosity, is

there anyone left? Is there a place for the "normal" criminal, in whose delinquency unconscious motivation plays really very little part? Surely no one who knows any criminals at all could deny such a category.

The "normal" criminal is by far the most interesting specimen because he raises the extremely puzzling question: why are we all not more criminal than we are? It looks at first sight as though it were not so much that he had something inside him, which we have not, and which must "out" in criminal behaviour, as that we have acquired a stable integration on a socially acceptable level which he has not. Psycho-analysis may be able to *remove* unconscious motives, but what can *implant* that stable integrative system which seems to rule out untoward behaviour without difficulty—it is just "unthinkable"—and enables us to endure any amount of frustration without turning a hair? It seems a little unfair to lump all these formidable issues on top of Major Foulkes's little pamphlet, and it is not done in a spirit of criticism. The point is this: granted that our knowledge of mental abnormality may well help us to "cure" many of our delinquents, we shall have to go a long way towards repairing our gross ignorance of normal functioning before we can do much for the rest. W. J. H. SPROTT.

Philosophical Essays in Honor of Edgar Arthur Singer, Jr. Edited by F. P. CLARKE and M. C. NAHM. (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press; London: H. Milford. 1942. Pp. x + 377. English price 21s. 6d. net.)

When a man has a wide variety of interests, they tend to acquire a certain unity through their meeting in his person, and there is fascination in such a biological fact even if there is something of a strain in attending with equal courtesy to so mixed a company. If, however, as in Singer's case, this variety of interests, historical, logical, aesthetic, biological and psychological, stimulates his pupils and friends, not to combine these interests, but severally to pursue only one or two of them, there is too much dispersion for a collection of their views (as in the present volume) to be very effective. In a very general way it may be said that Singer's method in philosophy, i.e. his attempt to show that logic was flexible enough to deal with most traditional antitheses, however petrified they may seem, requires to be developed in detail, which is just what most of these essays attempt to do. All the same, it is hard on the reader to have to adjust his mind to histone and sterols in one essay, *n*-voiced polyphony in another, Aristotle's *Postpraedicamenta* in a third, the difference between the calculus of propositions and the calculus of substantives in a fourth, and so on.

The book has four parts.

The first Part begins with an essay on the criteria and limits of "meaning" by A. O. Lovejoy, in which that redoubtable critic, on this occasion without very minute subdivision, has many important things to say about what Carnap thought in 1928. Next there is an essay (reprinted) by the late H. B. Smith on "Postulates of Empirical Thought," rather looser in expression than one would have expected from so careful a logician. Next H. Jaffe gives a fluent and rather thin account of the development of the experimental method from Aristarchus to Kant. He is followed by C. W. Churchman, "Towards a General Logic of Propositions," who rightly disdains to be other than severely technical. Then we have two papers on biology by Eliz. F. Flower and Miriam I. Pennypacker, the first writer being confident that the definition of life and the embittered struggle between mechanists and vitalists

in biology can be settled by an adequate logic, the second writer being not quite so confident. Lastly, in this Part there are three psychological essays (largely experimental) on "The Principle of Associative Learning" (E. R. Guthrie), "The Concept of Volition in Experimental Psychology" (F. W. Irwin), and "The Experience Theory of the Social Attitude" (M. G. Preston). The last of these make an interesting attempt to show that actual experiences are the occasions rather than the "necessary and sufficient conditions" for psychological explanations. Mr. Irwin's essay seems to me to be a very clear and a very useful piece of work.

Part II (ethical) begins with an essay on the "Definition of Criminal Mind," and tries to tell all Anglo-American lawyers that they should abandon any attempt to be other than pure behaviourists in the matter of *mens rea* in criminal law. There are then two essays by gentlemen of the cloth, one about ethics and science (W. S. Sheriff), the other about religion as the officiating clergyman in the wedding of art, science, and other patterns of culture (J. K. Shryock).

Part III deals with Aesthetics. In it Nahm's contribution—he is one of the editors—"Ateleological Theories of Aesthetic" is a delightful study of the limits of formalism in aesthetics with special reference to the Polycleitean canon, Virtruvius, Hambidge, Leonardo, and Dürer. M. G. Rigg's paper on "The Expression of Meanings and Emotions in Music" contains interesting psychological evidence about the extent to which tempo, staccato notes, etc., are usually felt to be congruent with particular emotions. J. S. Adams also writes on Music, and L. W. Flaccus on general aesthetics.

Part IV is historical. It begins with a paper addressed to expert Grecians, on Phantasia in Plotinus (G. H. Clark). Next F. P. Clarke, the other editor, compares Kant and Aquinas on the proofs of God's existence, but too briefly to be either as useful or as interesting as such a discussion might have been. The next paper is addressed to learned Aristotelians (it is reprinted). It is the late I. Husik's final attempt to substantiate his view that the work *On the Categories* is wholly Aristotle's. Then J. H. Randall, Jr., writes usefully upon the fundamental dualism in Newton's conception of method and proof in natural philosophy, and W. D. Wallis gives a short and rather labile account of Hume's contributions to social science.

Lastly, there is a bibliography of Singer's writings, including reviews.

JOHN LAIRD.

Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Translated with Notes by T. M. KNOX. Oxford, At the Clarendon Press. 1942. Pp. xvi + 382. 21s. net.

Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* reveals as in a magnifying glass a specific attitude of modern man which must be overcome if we want to arrive at a real order of human affairs. Let us call it *deificatio hominis*. Broadly speaking, what really happens in this book is that Hegel deifies nation and state. This deification proceeds, positively, by transforming the principles of the modern mind, like the *Cogito*, autonomy and self-determination, into absolute principles, and negatively, by sacrificing to these self-created idols not only the legitimate human understanding, which is derided as merely finite, but also his legitimate ethic, which is scorned as mere empty and formal "Ought," as mere *Moralitaet* which has to be absorbed by the concrete life of the state which parades under the high sounding name of *Sittlichkeit*. This book is one of the greatest tragedies ever written in purely philosophical language, for it is *the* tragedy of modern man, *our* tragedy of which, let us hope, the last act is being performed just now.

I shall have to concentrate on this, the most important aspect of this book. It should, however, be added that it seems almost impossible to study Hegel to-day without taking notice of the powerful protests against his philosophy, raised by Feuerbach (in the name of the empirical real Self), by Stahl (on behalf of Christian personality), by Kierkegaard (who affirmed the "existence" of the sinful soul), by Marx (who advocated the cause of the proletariat and the influence of the material spheres of human society), and, last but not least, by Ranke who in face of his most comprehensive knowledge of history denied that the historian possessed the knowledge of the "Concrete-Universal" which Hegel claimed and who added that, if he had it, he would partake in "Divine Science."

Hegel sacrifices ethics to the state. Whereas they should be independent of the state and the state an object of moral judgment, here they are subordinate to the state which becomes the subject of morality. *Hegel has in fact no ethics.* Even the term "ethics" disappears; it is once used as *Naturbeschreibung* of the virtues, and besides that only in historical references to Socrates, Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza. But, what is worse, he rejects ethics, in so far as they are based on the notion of "ought" and of duty. This rejection as such is unmistakable and central, repeated over and over again, here, e.g. §135, in the Logic, Phenomenology and Encyclopedia. In other words, Hegel is not content with either a finite understanding, or a finite will—he claims in his megalomania an infinite will. *Against this rejection of ethics a most emphatic protest must be made.* Titles like *The Ethics of Hegel* and *Hegel's Ethical Theory* should not mislead us. Hegelianism is an essentially ambiguous philosophy and Hegel's critique is ambiguous too; he accepts every standpoint as a stage in his dialectical movement. Every one of them is *aufgehoben*, i.e. "done away with" and "preserved." Hegel, moreover, knew exactly the meaning of ethics. His *Philosophische Propaedeutik*, written in Nürnberg (1809–11), contains even a comprehensive theory of duties and acknowledges the good as *Sollen*, which has to be realized but which may be distorted by reality. In this book the state is still subordinate to ethical ideas and has not yet incorporated in itself the whole ethical life.

There is no room here to describe the complicated process by which the substitution of the *Rechtsphilosophie* for ethics is achieved, or the corresponding replacement of Kant's practical reason by the "real mind" (1805), the "practical mind" (Nürnberg) and the "objective mind" (since Heidelberg). But it must be noted that the fragment, published by Lasson under the title *System der Sittlichkeit* bears in the manuscript the title *Rechtsphilosophie von 1800*, and that it contains the germ of the later *Rechtsphilosophie*. Here already ethics, as the theory of the moral law, are replaced by *Sittlichkeit*, as the theory of moral being; in other words, the idea that man is good if his action is in conformity with the moral law, is superseded by the idea that he is good if his will is identical with the absolute will, or if it is not he himself who acts, but the absolute mind in him. The basis of this transformation is the acceptance of Spinoza's and Schelling's pantheism, "that all things are in God," and of their absolute identity. Hegel adds the idea of the Concrete-Universal, expressed in this form, "that every particularity of action, thought or being has its essence or meaning merely in the whole:" he finds the first realization of this Concrete-Universal in the nation (*Volk*) which he deifies and its second realization in the government for which he claims the true moral life in God. Through this identification with the absolute mind the individual is supposed to gain eternal being.

The *Rechtsphilosophie* adds the deification of the state. "The state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom. . . . It is the march

of God in the world, that the state is. . . . We must consider the Idea, this actual God, by itself" (§258). There cannot be any doubt about the fact that *the sphere of ethics is subordinated to that of the state, that this subordination dethrones ethics and transforms them into metaphysics, and what is worse, that it leads in fact to an amoral attitude*, i.e. to a prevalence of amoral values over moral values. For in the last instance, power is recognized as the decisive factor in the inter-relations of states and in history.

Hegel, indeed, following Frederick and Fichte, taught the Germans the power lesson and accepted Macchiavellism as one of the elements of his theory of the state. The German reality, the *Klein-Staaterei* and the powerlessness of the German states, or the discovery that Germany is no longer a state just because she lacks power, led Hegel in 1802 to the acknowledgement of power as an essential element of the state: "The unity of State Power for the sake of defence is the essential quality of the State." He accepted Macchiavelli's theory, he praised Frederick as the regent in whom the interest of the state received its highest and universal justification. National might is accepted as moral right and war as a national ideal. This idea is triumphant. For the absolute sovereign nation state, which has assumedly absorbed morality, does in the end not recognize any other judge except world history: *Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht.* This means in plain language, that the task of ordering the totality of the human community has utterly failed, that Hegel's hybrid notion of "right" is unsuitable as a basis for a law of nations, that in the most decisive sphere the law of the jungle and brute force are to prevail, or that might triumphs over right. (Hegel's Theory of Might has found its interpreters in H. Heller and F. Meinecke.)

More important than a critique of Hegel is the lesson which we may learn from him. This lesson seems to be the following, *Nostra res agitur.* Hegel's theory of the state represents a dialectical synthesis of the preceding theories of the state, and especially of the modern theories. This synthesis reaches a ground common to the conflicting systems. Hegel accepts the principles on which the modern theories of the state are based, notably the ideas of the individual, of the nation, of the nation state, of autonomy, of self-determination and of sovereignty. He renders a great service in pursuing these notions to their utmost limit. He arrives, consequently, at the notions of an "absolute or unconditioned self-determination of the will" and of "infinite autonomy" (§135), of "the will which is infinite not merely in itself, but for itself," and of the nation state (or better of the *Volk* as state) "as the mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality" and as "the absolute power on earth" (§331), which is consequently sovereign and autonomous. This sovereignty is based on "an ungrounded (or irrational) self-determination of the will in which finality of decision is rooted" (§279). Hegel thinks (most powerfully and with utmost consequence) what the others do. In doing so he exposes the inherent weakness of the whole modern system of politics based on the notions of absolute individuality, of autonomy, of self-determination, of absolute sovereignty, and of the nation state. Hegel proves that the acceptance of these principles implies the proposition that might is right and that perpetual war must reign between these states. It is of no use to reject Hegel and to preserve the same principles. We are faced with this dilemma: either we preserve these principles of modern politics or we reject them. In the first case we choose the right of the stronger and incessant war. In the second case we choose a new system the *principles* of which cannot be developed within the scope of this review.

The great importance of this translation seems to me to be that it puts before the reader these problems in the form which they received in Hegel's

treatment. Professor Knox is certainly right in separating the text of the manual from the additions which are lecture notes. Both form indeed two different books, and the attentive reader will notice two different styles, the condensed style of the written word and the freer style of the spoken word. Hegel's lecturing was more thinking aloud and meditating than a speech addressed to others. Lasson's useful headings of the additions are unfortunately omitted. It would be most ungenerous not to acknowledge the enormous amount of work which has gone into the making of a most readable book. But the reader must realize that Hegel is almost untranslatable because of the essential ambiguity of many of his terms and because of his most arbitrary coinage of new expressions outside common usage. Under these conditions every translation must become an interpretation. Reference to the original at important points may not be out of place. This comparison will show that the translation is very felicitous in most places whereas at others room for doubt is possible; e.g. *Leitfaden* is "manual," not "guiding thread" (the logic was originally a *Leitfaden* too). In §331 "an identity between the state and its neighbour" seems to give a false reference to the word *beider*, which, I suppose, refers to "an identity of the formal and material element." The end of §13 "will is thinking reason resolving itself to finitude" would perhaps improve by substituting "limitation" or "determination" for "finitude," for the point in question is the limitation or determination of something infinite or indefinite. The reader will experience the great value of the translation if he tries to read the original and compares his own interpretation, at every step, with that of the translation. F. H. HEINEMANN.

Formalisation of Logic. By RUDOLF CARNAP. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 1943. Pp. xv + 159. Price 16s. 6d. net.)

This is a book which is likely to prove of great value in the development of Logic. Though the conclusions are in themselves highly significant and interesting, an important practical effect will be to establish confidence, from the scientific standpoint, in the methods and point of view developed in the foregoing volume, *Introduction to Semantics. Formalisation of Logic* is simply the application of these methods to a special problem.

The point of view adopted in the former volume is that Logic is part of the science of language, and the methods developed are the semantical and syntactical methods. In Semantics sentences are regarded as having reference to possible states of affairs, and there are accordingly rules of designation and rules of truth determining their outward reference. These rules are found to involve concepts of a logical character. Syntax on the other hand abstracts from all outward reference, treating sentences purely from the point of view of their relatedness to one another according to certain rules. Some of these rules too are found to possess a logical character, but since *Logic* is usually taken to involve truth relations and thereby outward reference, we do better to speak here of a *calculus*. The various forms of propositional calculus are examples. Now if all the sentences of a calculus contained in a syntactical system occur also in a semantical system, we may justly refer to the latter as an *interpretation* of the calculus, and under certain conditions a *true* interpretation. Thus although in the first place we may arrive at the conception of a calculus by abstraction from a semantical system, once having arrived at such an abstraction we begin to see how to construct a calculus by rules independent of semantical concepts, and it becomes apparent that one calculus may be capable of various possible interpretations.

This gives the setting to the problem of the formalisation of Logic, which is the problem of finding a suitable calculus for Logic. The question naturally arises whether the calculus in general use, viz. some form of the propositional calculus (conveniently referred to as "PC"), is open to any true interpretations besides the normal one which it is assumed to have. If there are other, non-normal, interpretations, the conclusion is that PC is not a *full* formalisation of Logic, i.e. that there are essential features in Logic which are not represented by PC. Prof. Carnap finds that such non-normal interpretations are possible, and his task thereafter is to supplement PC by additional conceptions and rules in order to render it an adequate calculus for Logic as usually understood.

The semantical aspect of Logic is evident according as the dependence of Logic upon semantical notions such as truth is evident. This dependence occurs most plainly in the truth-functional method of dealing with the logical constants, and the normal truth tables (NTT) are accordingly taken as the basis of propositional logic as distinct from the propositional calculus. Chapters A and B deal respectively with PC and NTT, for the purpose of putting them in the compact form required for their comparison in the subsequent chapters, the purpose of the comparison being to determine whether it is possible to interpret PC in a non-normal manner, i.e. in such a way as to conflict with the rules presupposed by NTT.

The philosophy of Logical Positivism is not in evidence in *Formalisation of Logic*. The problem itself, however, is one which at least in appearance has an important bearing upon the logical positivist thesis, for if any essential features of Logic defy formalisation one could plausibly maintain that they admit of a metaphysical explanation; since on the one hand, being essential features of Logic, they would not owe their origin to empirical fact, while on the other, being unformalised, their dependence upon the nature of language could not be demonstrated. Therefore the successful elimination of such features by Professor Carnap's method appears to be a triumph for Logical Positivism. However, the question really involved here is whether formalization itself does effectively reduce the essential logical concepts to dependence upon language. The preceding volume appears to aim, among other things, at demonstrating such dependence. But the more natural interpretation of the successful handling of Logic in terms of linguistic concepts such as "sentence" is that language proves to be a suitable empirical medium by which to verify theories of Logic, just as the field of physical observation is a suitable empirical medium for verifying theories about matter. Now there is no apparent inconsistency in thinking of the Laws of Nature as themselves transcending the medium of observation by which they are known, in fact this is the normal manner of conceiving them, Phenomenalism being neither a common nor a necessary form of explanation. Similarly, in spite of formalization in terms of linguistic concepts, it would still be natural and not evidently inconsistent to think of the Laws of Thought as themselves transcending language.

Thus the book displays little *direct* interest in this question. However, some very illuminating remarks are made on the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle in §19 (Chapter D). Here it is shown that the formalization of two semantical concepts (L-exclusive and L-disjunct) would lead to syntactical concepts (C-exclusive and C-disjunct) not in fact contained in PC. These two semantical concepts occur respectively in the two Laws, but although there are corresponding syntactical truths which look the same as these Laws, and although they *can* be interpreted to make both Laws true, this interpretation is not *necessary*. Non-normal interpretations are also

possible. This fact in regard to the supposed equivalents of the Laws of Thought has a highly paradoxical appearance, and its revelation is a tribute to Professor Carnap's investigation, though I believe the same result could be arrived at by a simpler path. We usually think that having formalized implication, we can reach the concept of exclusion by combining implication with negation. This, however, is not sufficient, because negation in the propositional calculus has not the fully determinate value that it has in ordinary logical discourse. The impossibility of thus deriving exclusion from implication could, I believe, be employed to disprove the favourite theme of the unity of affirmation and negation. In any case, the only road to complete formalization is by the introduction of new concepts.

Among these, the so-called "junctives" are of special interest. A junctive is a class of sentence which allows of two specifications, a disjunctive and a conjunctive, according as the sentences are considered in disjunction or in conjunction. This provides a basis for semantics and syntax which is symmetrical with regard to disjunction and conjunction, thereby leading to an analogous symmetrical treatment of truth and falsity. The one-sidedness in which classes of sentences were always assumed to be in conjunction, and in which truth but not falsity was represented, is eliminated.

Thus it seems necessary to introduce a calculus stronger than PC, and fully expressive of existing logic. But this is not sufficient ground for the abandonment of PC as a calculus, any more than the development of relativity physics was an argument for the abandonment of Euclidean geometry. The problem of the formalization of Logic presupposes Logic as given unalterably, and that a calculus is to be judged only from the standpoint of its formalization or failure to formalize Logic. The converse problem is that of the possibilities in the interpretation of a given calculus. Although Professor Carnap deals with three ways of interpreting PC, he gives no hint of the possibility of a complete reversal of attitude, and one is left with the impression that calculi are but the handmaids of Logic. This implied outlook is in conformity with the fact that the theory of truth-functions is basic for Logical Positivism.

The final chapter shows how solutions to the problem of full formalization may be found for functional logic. Here the concepts of universal and existential operators occur in addition to the essential concepts of propositional logic. For the most part, the methods of solution are an extension of the methods adopted for propositional logic. E. TOMS.

World Hypotheses: a Study in Evidence. By STEPHEN C. PEPPER. (University of California Press. 1942. Pp. xiii + 348. Price not stated.)

"World hypotheses" are systems of metaphysics, and it should be explained at once, for the benefit of the squeamish, that this is a book which takes metaphysics seriously. Its main subject, indeed, is a comparative study of the theories of the traditional metaphysical schools. It is only fair to point out, however, that the author approaches his subject in a most undogmatic manner and, while making a good case for the possibility of significant world hypotheses, remains to the last open to the view that they may be eventually replaced by a quite different type of knowledge. His careful discussion of evidence and corroboration should interest even those whom it fails to convince; and the whole book, closely reasoned and lucid as it is, could be read with profit by supporters and opponents of the traditional metaphysics alike. Both would find it stimulating and perhaps disturbing too.

The work falls into two main parts, the first concerned with epistemological and methodological questions of a general nature, the second offering a sketch of the four world hypotheses which the author considers "relatively adequate," and giving concrete illustration of the conclusions of the first half of the book. Although this sketch is very well done and is indispensable to the understanding of the author's point of view, it is in the first section that interest will mainly centre. Professor Pepper begins by combating both absolute scepticism and complete dogmatism about knowledge generally. The former is demolished by the usual arguments; under the latter head the author attacks, besides such an obvious Aunt Sally as infallible authority, (1) the belief in self-evident principles (including the principles of logic), and (2) the belief in indubitable facts. His attitude to both is reminiscent of that of supporters of the coherence theory: he refuses to admit that logical or any other principles are valid save so far as they cohere with the rest of our knowledge, and he denies (in coherence language) that there can be perception without judgment. The second point he illustrates by showing that what is indubitable fact for one philosopher (in this case sense-data as defined by Professor Price) is interpreted quite differently by another (in this case, Dewey); and he suggests, without pressing it at this stage, that the reason is to be found in differences in the fundamental categories accepted by different thinkers. These matters are all dealt with rather too briefly to be satisfactory (the question of logical rules and other prescriptive principles in particular is treated far too shortly, with the same weaknesses as are displayed in the coherence theory); but the result arrived at is, for Professor Pepper, of great importance. It is that knowledge does not "begin with certainties" but may "dawn like day out of a half-light of semi-knowledge and gradually grow to clarity and illumination" (p. 39). Any piece of evidence, to gain critical acceptance, must hence be corroborated. Now there are, the author argues, two main types of corroboration, multiplicative and structural. Multiplicative corroboration is achieved when a number of witnesses agree in affirming the same fact; its refinement is found in the sphere of physical science when machinery is devised enabling a question (e.g. what is the temperature of this body?) to be answered by means of a pointer reading about which there will be general agreement. Such products of critical examination are here called "data." Structural corroboration is, very roughly, the agreement of fact with fact: it is the linking of facts together by means of hypotheses, resulting in the positing of other probable facts. It is obvious that we do all make use of such hypotheses in our everyday thinking, though we should not normally be prepared to assign the same cognitive value to their products as to "refined data" in Professor Pepper's sense. Professor Pepper recognises this hesitation in choosing the name "danda" for such products.

The stage is now set for some interesting assertions. Professor Pepper argues, first, that in the present state of our knowledge both forms of corroboration should be regarded as having cognitive value. This means that he rejects the positivist thesis according to which (in his language) refined data are the only reliable form of evidence, and the only admissible hypotheses add nothing to the facts. He is willing to admit that the positivist theory might eventually be established, but regards its establishment as, at present, nothing more than a pious and not very well-founded hope. With an undogmatic advocacy of the claims of multiplicative corroboration he has no quarrel: science, however, exceeds its function if it says dogmatically that its method is the only one. Data can thus not claim to be intrinsically superior to danda. Secondly, Professor Pepper says that once structural corroboration is admitted,

it is only logical to accept the validity of world hypotheses. The argument can be put best in his own words (p. 77): "As long as there are outlying facts which might not corroborate the facts already organised by the structural hypothesis, so long will the reliability of that hypothesis be questionable. The ideal structural hypothesis, therefore, is one that all facts will corroborate, a hypothesis of unlimited scope. Such a hypothesis is a world hypothesis." In a later passage (pp. 155 ff.) the author discusses the objections to this argument offered by the Theory of Types, only to reject them on the ground that the Theory of Types, though claiming to be a purely logical doctrine, itself falls within the framework of a particular world hypothesis and cannot therefore prescribe to other world theories.

Some readers will doubtless shuffle in their chairs when they get to this point, but it will be profitable, all the same, to postpone criticism until the conception of a world hypothesis has been clarified. It is to the study of world hypotheses that the author next turns. These hypotheses, he argues, are generated as a result of an attempt to give a unified interpretation of all the facts of experience in accordance with a single clue, and such a clue is here called a "root metaphor." The idea is that we seize on some striking fact in experience—Professor Pepper would give as instances of such facts the character of an event or the phenomenon of organic unity—and attempt to understand all other facts in the light of categories drawn from it. At the basis of every genuine metaphysical system there thus lies the intuition of a root metaphor. Every such system is independent of every other one, and cannot be judged by conceptions drawn from another system. Even the conception of truth, the author argues, is not free from metaphysical bias, but varies widely in the different world hypotheses. The test of the adequacy of a world hypothesis must hence be purely internal: it must reveal its possibilities (*a*) by the extent to which it succeeds in embracing all the facts of experience, and (*b*) by the extent to which it succeeds in giving a precise interpretation of every fact and avoids a plurality of equally convincing and equally unconvincing explanations. A bad world hypothesis (Professor Pepper instances animism and mysticism as a philosophical theory) can readily be seen to fall down by these tests, i.e. to lack scope and precision. A second and equally important corollary of the root metaphor theory is that eclecticism can only introduce confusion into metaphysics. The eclectic makes use of categories drawn from different root metaphors, whose true value can only be appreciated in their proper context. It should be noted, however, that while eclecticism is confusing in theory it may yet be indispensable in practice; and in fact Professor Pepper recommends such a practical eclecticism at the end of his book.

An examination of the history of philosophy shows that men have intuited comparatively few root metaphors, and not all of these have given rise to world hypotheses of any degree of conviction. The position Professor Pepper finally takes up is that, while no world hypothesis so far formulated is free of internal defects, there are four theories which deserve to be called relatively adequate. These theories, here named (to avoid controversy) Formism, Mechanism, Contextualism and Organicism, are described and examined in the second half of the book. The reader will recognise old friends beneath these unfamiliar titles, and he cannot but admire the skill with which the author presents them (the description of Contextualism, which is roughly the metaphysics of Bergson, is particularly convincing). It would be interesting to discuss the hypotheses in detail, but space will obviously not permit.

The philosophical school whose doctrines Professor Pepper seems to follow

most nearly in his preliminary analysis is the idealist. He says himself in his preface that idealism was the first theory to attract him, and that though for a time he reacted so strongly against it as to become successively a dogmatic materialist and a pragmatist he has since found empirical grounds for its at first apparently purely verbal formulas. It is this sympathy with the idealist point of view, one suspects, which makes him refuse any sharp distinction between belief and knowledge: the theory of structural corroboration commits him, in effect, to a doctrine of degrees of truth. I have already mentioned the similarity of Professor Pepper's account of the principles of logic to that of the supporters of coherence; and the whole conception of a world hypothesis, as here expounded, has obvious idealist affinities. It is significant, for instance, that there is no mention of Kant's objections to the use of hypotheses in metaphysics, nor any consideration of the question whether concepts known to be valid in sense-experience retain their validity when, in Kantian language, we attempt to apply them to things in general. After all this it is with something of a shock that we read the main conclusions of the book: that idealism is only one of four world hypotheses with approximately equal claims on our credence, and that any theory which attempts to embrace categories derived from different root metaphors or interpret one world hypothesis in terms of another cannot be tolerated. There seems to be some radical contradiction here, and the reader is not helped by Mr. Pepper's statement (p. 84) that "anyone taking a broad and tolerant view of the cognitive situation" might be expected to share his views about knowledge, evidence and corroboration. This would imply that his preliminary analysis was free from metaphysical presuppositions; yet that it should be is scarcely plausible in view of the later development of the argument.

Despite these criticisms, I hope the book will have a wide public, since it is full of clear and intelligent argument and remarkably free from merely controversial writing; which is more than can be said of many recent pronouncements on the same subject. It is a pity there is no index.

W. H. WALSH.

The Device of Government. An Essay in Civil Polity. By JOHN LAIRD, LL.D., F.B.A. (Cambridge University Press. 1944. pp. 173. Price, 6s. net.)

The argument of this book may be baldly outlined as follows:—

At the outset the adjectives "gregarious." "social" and "political" are distinguished in order to show that, while human beings are possibly by nature gregarious, they are only partially social, and are certainly not instinctively political. Hence, political organisation, which is an arrangement of a community by which a supreme power gets obedience by maintaining a monopoly of the more serious forms of punishment, is the result of deliberate contrivance. Furthermore, although the members of political communities differ very widely in their abilities, this does not justify any hasty conclusion that, apart from children, there is any considerable class of sane persons who are incapable of all political functions. (Ch. I, "Whether Man is by Nature a Political Animal," and Ch. II, "Of Natural Slavery, Natural Kingship, and Similar Topics"). Force is of the essence of government, which is not necessarily the worse for that since there are worse ways than intimidation of securing obedience. The device of government works most smoothly when there is willing consent to the orders of the sovereign, and is most worth while when the willing consent results from informed views on the part of the subjects. (Ch. III, "Of Government Traditionally said to be by Institution," and Ch. IV, "Of Force, Will and Consent in Matters of Government.") Sovereignty is a political notion meaning "supreme ruling power." It is of the essence of the

political device that there should be a sovereign, and while sovereignty may in fact be limited or divided, there are no inherent moral limits to it, and there is no "inviolable sanctuary" into which Governments are for ever morally precluded from entering. (Ch. V, "Of Power and Sovereignty.") There are strong authoritarian arguments against democracy, particularly as regards the inability of an ordinary man to understand political issues of any considerable complexity; but by means of the distinction between administration, for which only a small proportion of the members of a political community would be qualified, and political common sense, which in suitable conditions may be widely distributed, a strong case may be made out for the advantages of democratic rule. Democratic rule may be totalitarian, but there is a general presumption in favour of freedom, and "freedom," in political contexts, is not difficult to define since it just means "absence of constraint." The weakness of totalitarian theories is shown when we ask what good purpose is served by Governments being totalitarian, and it emerges that totalitarians ignore the differences between communities, states and governments. (Ch. VI, "Of Democracy and its Rivals," Ch. VII, "Of Political Liberty, Equality and Fraternity," and Ch. VIII, "Of Totalitarian Theories of Government.") In the final chapter (Ch. IX, "Of Internationalism and Supernationalism") the author distinguishes between a league of nations and a governed union of nations, and suggests that not only is there nothing inherently absurd in the latter conception, but that such a union might possibly keep the peace among states as state governments keep peace among groups and factions. Supranational government, however, would necessarily involve the supranational use of force.

Although it is one duty of a philosophical reviewer to indicate the scope and argument of the book under review, I am afraid that the above summary is far from doing justice to Professor Laird's exposition of his themes. This book has nothing in common with the thick and solemn obscurities that so often pass in our day for political philosophy and make both teachers and students wonder why political philosophy is included in the philosophical curriculum. Without talking about the scope of the subject or discussing the methods to be employed, Professor Laird makes it quite clear by his own practice that what he is about is (*a*) the clarifying of political notions (e.g. ruling, democracy, consent, force), and (*b*) the discussion of political propositions involving judgments of better and worse, i.e. political casuistry. As an example of (*a*) the following discussion of freedom (pp. 117–18) may be quoted:—

> "In politics as elsewhere, freedom, strictly understood, is a negative conception meaning non-interference. This simple truth is sometimes obscured by a failure to draw the relevant distinctions. The question is not merely a question of interference or non-interference of the Government with its subjects; for the Government may use its powers to prevent one of its subjects from interfering with another of its subjects, and the result of such Government action may be a nett gain in freedom. When, however, it is argued that a Government has the duty of promoting as well as of protecting the positive conditions of freedom—life, health, skill and, perhaps, remunerative employment—the argument shifts its ground in a negligent way, and does not distinguish between the conditions of a *good* life and the conditions of a *free* life. It may be true that a good life is never *very* good unless it is free. All the same, the quality and the freedom of human action are not the same thing. Very high-grade action may be coerced as in a conscript army or munition factory; but action which is coerced is never free. That would be a contradiction in terms."

As an example of (*b*) I would refer to the discussion of "equality of opportunity" (pp. 128–31) which Professor Laird points out may be advocated on the not necessarily consistent grounds of efficiency and of justice, and which, when applied in early life through examinations may result in stabilising inequalities which later development no longer justifies.

This is not the place to argue over points of difference, though it is the place to mention that the book is equally free from dogmatism and from propaganda. I would mention, however, that its approach is neither historical nor sociological, and although this is quite legitimate, especially when, as in this case, it is obviously deliberate, points which an historical approach might bring out are not touched on. An interesting example is in the account of sovereignty in which Professor Laird, on the lines of Hobbes, suggests that there is no aspect of human life that can *a priori* be regarded as morally unamenable to civil government. The historical study of modern democratic ideas shows that religious ideas of individual conscience have deeply influenced liberal democracy, and may be found not only in the political writings of the Master of Balliol, but also in the views of Professor Laski (". . . that inner self in each one of us which we can never yield to anyone's keeping without ceasing to be true to our dignity as human beings." *Faith, Reason and Civilisation*, p. 35). This may be nonsensical, but I think it is an important enough view to discuss, as indeed Hobbes discussed it, although in a very hostile fashion. I notice also that Professor Laird tends to regard law as something technical (p. 73, p. 143), rather than moral. In this connection it would have been interesting if he had discussed Hobbes's remarkable description of law as "the public conscience" and the vindication that this view receives in such works as Roscoe Pound's *Law and Morals*.

It is obvious both from the manner and matter of his book that Professor Laird has set himself to make the best possible use both of Aristotle and Hobbes, with the latter predominating. The work is full of matter, presented briefly, clearly, and with wit. I do not know of any book as suitable as this is for an introduction to political philosophy, nor does it often happen that a book is at once so pointed and so candid. Not the least of its attractions is a really useful index.

H. B. ACTON.

A Modern Elementary Logic. By L. SUSAN STEBBING. (Methuen & Co., Ltd., London. 1943. Pp. viii + 214. Price 8s. 6d.)

This excellent book will fulfil a long-felt need. For students taking a first year course in Logic there has hitherto been no suitable, complete modern English text-book. There are several good text-books of a more advanced type of which one is Professor Stebbing's own earlier work, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*. Of these certain chapters are suitable for elementary students, but the process of reading disconnected chapters of a more advanced book is apt to be confusing to beginners, especially to those working without the guidance of a teacher. The present book is written to meet the needs of both solitary students and those working under tuition. It is written with all Professor Stebbing's gift for clear exposition and apt illustration, and avoids the controversial issues without which the larger book would be poorer but which tend to intimidate elementary students unacquainted with logical polemics. The usual topics of first examinations in logic are treated from a modern standpoint. Chapter vii is a particularly admirable introduction to the notions of propositional functions, variables, material implication and entailment. No examiner of elementary logic papers need now feel chary of introducing such terms, even by the back door of "Comment on *two* of the

following," among the usual collection of antiques, including the "Universe of Discourse," which Miss Stebbing mercifully consigns to a footnote. The book also includes examples with a useful key for solitary workers. Perhaps the one defect of the book is that induction and scientific method are confined to a single last chapter. As Miss Stebbing explains in her Introduction, there are several good, modern works from which a student may supplement his reading on these topics. Nevertheless, the book would have been better balanced and even more useful with a fuller discussion of these subjects conducted with Miss Stebbing's particular skill. This is especially so when it is remembered that supplementary works may not be easily accessible to students working alone, for whom the book is partly intended. It is a good book, however, and one that will not be without interest to a wider public than that of students working for elementary examinations in logic.

M. MACDONALD.

The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox. A study of the choice between traditional idealism and systematic pluralism. By HENRY ALONZO MYERS. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. London: Milford. 1944. Pp. xiv + 96. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

The "paradox" is that although Spinoza and Hegel had a number of fundamental premises in common, they arrived at opposed conclusions. Mr. Myers resolves the paradox by distinguishing between the structure of knowledge in itself and the state of knowledge at a given time. Influenced by their theological and ethical bias, he holds, Spinoza and Hegel were systematic monists, but the content of Hegel's system differs from Spinoza's because the late eighteenth century substituted interest in the sciences of growth and development for interest in mathematics.

In dealing with Hegel's debt to Spinoza, Mr. Myers overstates a good case. For instance, when he says that "the secret of Hegel is best approached through Spinoza," he surely forgets or minimises Hegel's debt to ancient Greece; when he says that Hegel "turned to Spinoza for his fundamental notion of system," he offers us no reason for writing "Spinoza" instead of "Aristotle;" and when he asserts that historians of philosophy have "made little of" Hegel's relation to Spinoza, he surely overlooks Hegel's own statement that "thought must begin by placing itself at the standpoint of Spinozism; to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all philosophy," as well as, for example, Mr. Mure's *Introduction to Hegel* (1940), p. xiv.

Mr. Myers is not merely writing an essay in the history of philosophy; he also wishes to show where metaphysical speculation has gone wrong. Spinoza puts his attributes on a level with one another, and thus paved the way for Mr. Myers' "systematic pluralism" which holds that reality is known through a number, potentially infinite, of systems of knowledge, each of which reveals the essence of reality from its own point of view. Hegel, on the other hand, instead of developing Spinoza's hint, arranged his categories hierarchically, and thus held that some of these "perspectives" were less true than others; monism was saved at the expense of a doctrine of degrees of truth and reality which Mr. Myers finds obnoxious.

This is an interesting essay, but it is slight; Mr. Myers has perhaps tried to make too many points in too short a book. In particular, his own epistemology remains obscure, for though his pluralism is made intelligible enough, we are left in the dark as to why a mere sum of differing perspectives should be called "systematic" at all.

T. M. KNOX.

NEW BOOKS

Books also received:

RUDOLF JORDAN. *We are Ancestors:* or *The Age of Responsibility.* Cape Town: Cape Times, Ltd. 1941. Pp. 220. 6s.

RUDOLF JORDAN. *Homo Sapiens Socialis* (Principles of the Philosophy of Responsibility). South Africa: Central News Agency, Ltd. 1943. Pp. 243. 12s. 6d.

OLIVER C. QUICK, D.D. *The Gospel of the New World.* With a Memoir by the Archbishop of Canterbury. London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd. 1944. Pp. xiv + 119. 6s. 6d. net.

HENRY ALONZO MYERS. *The Spinoza-Hegel Paradox* (A study of the choice between traditional idealism and systematic pluralism). Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. xiv + 96. English price, 10s. 6d. net.

The Philosophical Forum: An Annual published by The Boston University Philosophical Club. Vol. 2. Spring 1944. Pp. 44. 50 cents.

RAY LEPLEY. *The Verifiability of Value.* New York: Columbia University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. xii + 267. English price, 22s. net.

C. E. M. JOAD. *Philosophy* (The Teach Yourself Books). Published by Hodder & Stoughton for The English Universities Press, Ltd. 1944. Pp. 228. 3s. net.

W. A. SINCLAIR. *An Introduction to Philosophy.* Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. 152. 5s. net.

YERVANT H. KRIKORIAN (editor). *Naturalism and the Human Spirit.* (No. 8 of the Columbia Studies in Philosophy). New York: Morningside Heights: Columbia University Press. Pp. x + 397. $4.50.

A. E. TAYLOR. *William George de Burgh,* 1866–1943. From the *Proceedings of the British Academy,* Vol. XXIX. London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. 24. 3s. 6d. net.

H. A. HODGES, M.A., D.Phil. *Wilhelm Dilthey. An Introduction.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. 1944. Pp. x + 174. 10s. 6d. net.

I. A. RICHMOND. *Robin George Collingwood,* 1889–1943. From the *Proceedings of the British Academy,* Vol. XXIX. London: Humphrey Milford. 1944. Pp. 24. 3s. 6d. net.

HELEN WODEHOUSE, M.A., D.Phil. *One Kind of Religion.* Cambridge University Press. 1944. Pp. 208. 8s. 6d net.

MORRIS GINSBERG, M.A., D.Lit. *Moral Progress* (being the Frazer Lecture delivered within the University of Glasgow on April 18, 1944). Glasgow: Jackson Son & Co. 1944. Pp. 45. 2s. 3d. net.

R. WALZER (ed.). *Galen on Medical Experience.* First edition of the Arabic version with English translation and notes. London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. xii + 164. English price, 12s. 6d. net.

WILMON HENRY SHELDON. *Process and Polarity.* New York: Columbia University Press. London: O.U.P. 1944. Pp. xiv + 153. English price, 13s. 6d. net.

LOUISE SAXE EBY. *The Quest for Moral Law.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1944. Pp. x + 289. English price, 22s. net.

K. F. REINHARDT, Ph.D. *A Realistic Philosophy.* Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company. 1944. Pp. xii + 268. $2.75.

CORRESPONDENCE

DEAR MEMBER,

Scientists in liberated Europe need literature dealing with advances made in thought in Allied countries during the war. In particular, French scientists and philosophers require this literature as quickly as possible.

We have been asked to appeal to members of the British Institute of Philosophy to give to their French colleagues copies of PHILOSOPHY from January 1940 onwards: either complete sets or single numbers. All material sent to France would be fully used. Single copies would be microfilmed, and films and abstracts distributed; thus the greatest possible use could be made immediately of any periodicals.

Members who have sets or single copies of PHILOSOPHY to spare are asked to send them, at the earliest possible moment, to: The Association of Scientific Workers, Hanover House, 73 High Holborn, London, W.C.1.

Yours sincerely,
SYDNEY E. HOOPER,
Editor.

UNIVERSITY HALL, 14, GORDON SQUARE, LONDON, W.C.1.
March 1945

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

DEAR SIR,

Since Dr. Laing quotes me in his article on *Kant and Natural Science*, perhaps I may be allowed a brief comment.

According to Kant, it is only by experience that we can discover the cause of a given effect or the effect of a given cause; and I pointed out that *in this respect* Kant agrees with Hume. On this Dr. Laing is good enough to inform me that it is the divergence from Hume—not the agreement—that will constitute Kant's answer to Hume. He fails to indicate that I have stated—as any commentator should—*both* the divergence *and* the agreement. Kant differs from Hume in holding that we have *a priori* knowledge of the causal principle itself. As I say in the next sentence: "Our *a priori* knowledge is confined to the statement that every event must have a cause." Thus Dr. Laing totally misrepresents my position even in the passage quoted—not to mention many others.

The reason behind this misrepresentation seems to lie in a curious prejudice which vitiates his argument throughout. He maintains that in order to answer Hume Kant must show, not merely that the causal principle can be established *a priori*, but also that particular causal laws can be "deduced" from this principle and their truth "guaranteed" by it. He even attributes to Kant himself the claim that by establishing the *a priori* character of the principle of causation he has "automatically" established "the *a priori* character of empirical science"! Kant makes no claim to establish such a contradiction in terms: on the contrary he consistently repudiates it. What Kant claims is that (1) the condition of the discovery of causal laws, and indeed the condition of our experience, is the general principle of causation; and (2) that this general principle can be established *a priori* by the Critical method. Kant may or may not be successful in justifying this answer to Hume, but there is no reasonable doubt that it is an answer. Yet Dr. Laing charges Kant with confusion because he does not give a quite different answer which would manifestly be false. Heaven knows there are enough difficulties in Kant's argument without adding to them artificially. If Dr. Laing wants to know why Kant did not give the kind of answer he demands, the only reply can be that Kant had too much sense.

H. J. PATON.

14, MERTON STREET, OXFORD.
November 9, 1944.

CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF *Philosophy*

DEAR SIR,

My quotation from Professor Paton's work on Kant was limited to what I considered relevant to the issue raised. I am not aware that this constitutes a "misrepresentation." My "curious prejudice which vitiates" my argument throughout lies, I think, in interpreting Hume differently from Professor Paton. Hume's primary problem, as I indicated in the article in question, arises just within that region wherein Kant is said "to agree" with Hume, who was concerned in the first instance with the propositions that make up physical science in the generally accepted usage of the word. The problem concerning the causal principle is for Hume a derivative one, arising out of the primary one; evidently he thought that a solution to the former would help him to a solution of the latter; but he finds it necessary to turn to a consideration of the discovery of specific causes and effects. I should hesitate to accept an "answer" as an answer unless it were justified; and I still fail to see that Kant ever comes to grips with Hume's problem, especially as Professor Paton admits, if I understand him rightly, that the body of propositions making up "science" lie outside the scope of Kant's enquiry. What I was "demanding" was that he should have done so.

B. M. LAING.

THE UNIVERSITY, SHEFFIELD.

(Correspondence closed.)

INSTITUTE NOTES

We are glad to note that Professor Alfred North Whitehead has been recently awarded the O.M. in recognition of his distinguished work in Philosophy.

Members will be notified when occasional lectures are arranged.

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[*Suggested*]

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THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

MESSAGE TO READERS

During the war, the Institute has succeeded both in publishing its Journal regularly, even though reduced somewhat in size and frequency of issue; and in providing a minimum of lectures on topics of philosophy. Now that the war in Europe is over, it is desired, as soon as possible, not only to restore the Journal to its original format and number of issues, but also to arrange lectures and meetings on a gradually increasing scale. Readers of the Journal will be aware that the war has inevitably reduced the income of the Institute, whilst at the same time increasing its cost of production by approximately 75 per cent. In order, therefore, that generous services may be provided to those interested in philosophical matters, it is clearly necessary that the income of the Institute should be considerably augmented. This can only be done through an increase in membership and by donations and bequests.

The Editor desires to express his gratitude to members and readers of the Journal who have already responded to his earlier note, and hopes that their example will be widely followed.

Editor.

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FINALITY IN THEOLOGY

PROFESSOR JOHN LAIRD

THEOLOGY, or the science of God, has to be distinguished from religion which might be godless, may contain very little of science, dogma, or creed, and sometimes consists very largely of the habit, attitude, or even the mode of public or private devotion or ritual.

Therefore many would say that religion is a deeper and a greater thing than any theology however pretentious. Text-books of science have their place, we may be told, but only a menial place. Doctors are only teachers and should not be mistaken for masters. A language is too big for its grammar. So theology should attend to these analogies and abate its pretensions.

Nevertheless there are few, however devout they may be and however loyal to religious traditions, who would deny outright that their religion implies something that can be stated in the form of a belief or that belief claims to be true, invites precise formulation and is consequently examinable. Religious persons may themselves have very little appetite for much of that kind of thing and may be confident that those whose appetite for it is stronger than theirs are usually rather sickly in their spiritual condition. But they cannot deny that the thing exists, that there is a field for principles, for their formulation and for rigorous inquiry into the said formulation. In other words they admit the existence of theology, *in posse* if not *in esse*, unless they are Hinayana Buddhists or belong to some other species of devout atheists, and even then it is largely a matter of definition whether these devout atheists are extruding theology or pursuing it.

In several of the greater and more highly developed religions, particularly in those which put their reliance, in a marked degree, upon their sacred scriptures, a claim to exclusiveness, for all time if

not for all planets, is expressly or more covertly made. That is a claim to finality, not indeed in the sense that there may not be developments within the faith, but in the sense that the faith itself, being the only true way, has no competitors and will never be surmounted by a truer faith. This claim, being a claim to exclusive truth, implies a similar claim on the part of the doctors who expound the theology or science of the faith. I want to offer some comments on such theological exclusiveness in the present essay.

If anyone *knows* that his religion is final and therefore exclusive there is nothing more to be said, at any rate in his presence. The same is true if he *knows* that the finality of his theology faithfully reflects the finality of his religious vision. Even in that case, however, the man who knows may attempt to persuade others less fortunately circumstanced. If so he has to dispute with the others as Paul seems to have done with the Stoics and Epicureans at Athens before he told the Athenians from the Areopagus who their unknown God was.

In other words, there are occasions when professions of knowledge are not enough, however sincere these professions may be, and these occasions are much more searching when there is no agreed background, of sacred scripture, say, on which the would-be persuader and his hearers both rely. What is to be done when Christians accept both the Old and the New Testaments, when Jews accept only the Old, when Mohammedans accept the Koran, when Hindus accept the Vedanta and the Bhagavadgita? There is nothing for it, then, except general theological argument. The conviction, the passionate conviction of exclusiveness and finality is scarcely enough. It may suffice for religion but not for theology.

Would we not all like to ask, not "What is theology here or theology there, theology in this tradition or in that tradition?" but, quite simply, "What is theology?" Is there not something profoundly unsatisfactory if theology is never, or hardly ever, discussed, and if, instead of theology, what is discussed is always Christian theology, or the theology of Hinduism or the like? True, it might be still more accurate to speak of Christian or Hindu theologies in the plural rather than of Christian or Hindu theology in the singular. That, however, is no answer to the charge of naïve isolationism, one of the most serious charges that can be brought against anything that sets up to be a science. Is this attitude—the attitude, say, of those who habitually speak as if "all the world" were Christian when they know it isn't—even feebly defensible at the present time? And is its defence stronger in theology than elsewhere? No doubt, in view of what has happened and is still happening in this twentieth century it would be foolish to suppose that all races and peoples have come to understand one another much better than they used to do: but surely it has become very difficult indeed to remain blandly content

with any sort of ideological isolationism whether theological or of any other variety.

If this be admitted it would seem that four different attempts could be made, each sufficiently distinct to warrant separate discussion. The first would be an attempt to discover a common basis for all the major religions, to regard this common basis as the essential substance of theology, and perhaps for theologians to agree to differ on matters which leave the common basis behind. The second would be the policy of differing to agree, that is to say, an attempt to explore differences, in the hope, ultimately, of arriving at a higher synthesis. The third would be a policy of toleration, to live and let live and no more about it. The fourth would be a missionary policy, that is to say, to assert and, let us hope, to give good theological reasons for the exclusive claims of the theology of some particular religion and therefore, as decently as possible but at any rate firmly, to try to convince the rest of the world.

I shall try to offer a brief discussion of each of the four.

I

The first way seems the simplest, and, superficially at any rate, the most attractive. The major religions of the world, we are told, grew up independently, each in its own quarter of the globe, although subsequently spreading fairly widely in a vast variety of ways. Each, nevertheless, achieved a theism having marked similarities to the theism of the others, and the circumstance was duly reflected in the major theologies of each. Hence a broad common basis is not a dream: and concurrent, largely independent, testimony should have very great weight, just as in any other question of evidence. Is it not reasonable to expect such a basis to be the surest foundation of any theological superstructure likely to be stable? How could religions and theologies expect to survive if they did not pool their resources in this way? It is the way of sanity in all human affairs. Men never see eye to eye about everything. Unless they fritter their energies away in mere futilities, they unite on a broad policy among the like-minded, and mobilize accordingly.

We are learning this lesson intratheologically, the argument proceeds, so why not apply it intertheologically? Within any given faith, schisms may often have been justified in their origins; but their perpetuation is something very like a crime. In matters of doctrine the Free Churches of Europe may find it hard to remain permanently estranged from the body from which they seceded, and their disputes seem trivial when transported to Asia or to Africa. It may be harder to apply the same argument to Greek Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism, to say nothing of Abyssinian

Christians and Nestorian communities in the Far East, but the same principle, if harder to apply, may still appear to be essentially sound. When Locke and Leibniz reflected on the wrack that the wars of religion had brought about in Europe, did they not plead for a common basis of Christianity based primarily (they thought), upon the reasonableness of Christianity's essential message? It was a simple plea; but was it not also profound? Why then restrict the argument to Christian theologies? If all the major theologies have a common basis, should they not, by their union, achieve a stronger thing than even a united Christendom could ever hope for? Let theists unite like other men of good will. There is something wrong with them if they remain persistently aloof from one another, a lack of "tragic earnest" in their attack upon the world, the flesh and the devil.

The reply, I suppose, would be that there is no justifiable analogy between schisms and heresies within a theological tradition and the separation between theologies which express distinctively different religions. Many of the former differences refer to ritual or church government rather than to doctrine, and although differences of this order may be much more theological than they seem, since, for instance, they may entail consequences concerning what is or is not idolatry, they would not commonly justify more than a theological civil war from which all parties might properly agree to exclude foreign troops. Schisms, again, are often due to dissatisfaction with the practice of priests and ecclesiastics at any given time, and, once the protest has been emphatically made, cannot be rationalized into anything very considerable in the way of theological doctrine. In short, it is quite easy to maintain that while there are no adequate grounds for separation, much less for contumacious and internicine separation within, let us say, Christian theology, there are very much stronger grounds for intertheological separatism.

Obviously this reply has a certain force although some may think that the theological differences between Christian doctors—to keep to that instance—are at least as great as the differences between some of them and some theological doctors who are not Christians. The main question, however, is whether it is or is not possible to construct a common platform on which the doctors of all the major religions could sit in harmonious dignity.

A frequent complaint is that such a platform would be far too thin for the safety and comfort of any of them. The common denominator of the major religions, we may be told, is far too attenuated to give solid support for any ponderable religion; and similarly of their associated theologies. It is begging the question (the argument continues) to say or assume that on this wide scale, the points of agreement among the major religions and their satellite theologies

come anywhere near to exhausting the essentials of any one of them. The objection is just the objection to milk and water, especially to what is more watery than milky. Similarly, and with the aid of less innocent metaphors, we may be invited to remember that the corruption of the best is the worst, and to extend that principle beyond the mere decay of the best and make it include all that rivals the best by appearing but failing to express much the same thing. An out-and-out atheist, it may be said, is better than a Christian heretic, or an unattached theist with a roving commission bearing his own image and superscription. And similarly in other theologies.

Accordingly the palmary question would seem to be whether the major religions with their interpretative theologies do or do not agree upon fundamentals, and, if so, upon what fundamentals. On what precisely do they agree?

Plato, in his *Laws*, very early in the tenth book, said that there were three kinds of atheist, namely, the man who said there were no gods "as the laws would have him believe," the man who held that although there were gods they paid no heed to mankind, and the man who supposed in his foolish heart that the gods could be bribed by sacrifices and cajoled by prayers.

In a wide sense that may be taken to mean that nothing is to be accounted theism unless it is magic-free ethical monotheism. If so, a common inter-religious and inter-theological basis for the major religions might be practicable and not altogether vague. True, there are few theologies and no religions whose sacramentalism is easy to distinguish from magic, and the magics are so very various that a basis of sacramental agreement is not very promising. Still there are strong and general theological tendencies to rid theologies and religions of the incubus of magic, and a resolute effort on these lines should not be unwelcome anywhere to the most sincere friends of philosophy, religion, and theology. Similarly, and still more forcibly regarding monotheism of an ethical cast. Plato's phrase "the gods in whom the laws of his city would have him believe" suggests something parochial or at any rate regional, but if we were to say that all the major theologies are concerned with *the* God (or divine society) of the universe, the hyper-cosmic, super-celestial ground of all that doth appear, we should be approaching a common basis of theology which was essential to any theology worth the name. If, further, we were to say that *ethical* monotheism is essential to good religion and to sound theology we might reasonably be supposed to be ascribing a measure of soul as well as some firmness of body to the basis of agreement.

Such a view could defend itself fairly successfully against a good deal of criticism. "Monotheism," it is true, may not be much more than an umbrella under which the most diverse beliefs take shelter.

In that case there may be little point in proclaiming "Lo; There is just one umbrella." "God" is a very general and may be a very ambiguous name. Is he "limited" or "unlimited"? Is the pronoun appropriate? Are pantheistic conceptions of "him" conciliable with any others? Is "he" a being at all or only a Logos, or, again, a numinous aura? These and their like are very important theological questions, but they may be and they are raised *within* the theologies of several great religions. Consequently it is not immediately apparent that many-religioned agreement on such matters would be paler or more emaciated than single-religioned agreement; and even where the differences appear to be marked, complete estrangement should not follow. Jews and Mohammedans, I suppose, object to Christianity, among other grounds, on the ground that it is imperfectly monotheistic. They accuse it of tritheism. Christians deny that trinitarianism is tritheism, although, unfortunately they have elected to cloak their denial with an impossible patchwork of metaphysics. All the same, differences of this order need not be final and should not be exaggerated for polemical purposes.

Similarly of the ethical aspects of *ethical* monotheism. It is very generally agreed in many parts of the world that God is supremely good as well as supremely great, and that his goodness is not irrelevant to man's. Certainly there are acute differences of belief regarding what constitutes goodness and righteousness either in man's case or in God's, and, again, regarding the extent to which God's righteousness, largely inscrutable, is devoid of any visible resemblance to man's. On the first point, however, it is fair to say that there is a very considerable degree of ethical agreement among mankind, that several religions and theologies allow deep internal differences on matters of ethics, and that the search for a common ethical world-creed is not wholly impracticable. There is nothing absurd in comparing the views of Mencius with those of St. James, the Eastern ideal of detachment from individual personal consciousness as well as from the world with the more militant type of bliss commonly favoured in the West; and so on. So of the second point. The measure or the measurelessness of the difference between God's goodness and man's is a general theological question not peculiar to this theology or that other, and it need not raise a very formidable barrier between most of the greater religious traditions.

Plato's requirement that theists must believe that the gods "pay heed to mankind" seems to assert a providential as well as an ethical monotheism. Here a basis of common agreement might be more difficult, as also with regard to the kindred notion of a redeeming Providence or Saviour of mankind. In the East, Krishna or Ishvara would play such a part; but not Brahman. More generally, if we could say, with Bowman, that Christianity's main business is to oppose

"the drift towards the impersonal" the path of conciliation might seem to be very stony indeed. There would, however, be substance in the reply that insistence upon the "personality" of God has tended to be much more emphatic and also much more naïve in the last century or two of Protestant Christian theology than ever before, that the Logos doctrine and much else in Christianity is not conspicuously "personal," and that if Christians have succeeded among themselves, although perhaps by inadvertence, in accepting or at any rate in tolerating views of the deity which are impersonal rather than personal, and, indeed, hypertheistic rather than theistic, a wider human constituency, even if it were sharper-witted than the Christian, might have equal success.

On the other hand, if it were maintained that Christianity's solution of the riddle of existence is contained primarily in the Incarnation itself, and if the Incarnation really is *the* Incarnation, a genuine and unique historical event, not a myth or a poem however instructive, it is hard to see how there could be genuine agreement between Christians and others in a big way. The Christian contention would be that ethical monotheism, unilluminated by the actual history contained in the Gospels, is far too dim to reveal the greatest matters of theology and religion. The proposed basis of agreement would collapse because it was *not* an agreement on essentials, the prime essential being absent. To ignore the point would be even more foolish than Gibbon's absurd gibe that only an iota stood between homoousians and homoiousians.

The same would be true of any other religion or theology which from the nature of the case made exclusive claims, and was bound to put them in the forefront.

Here, for the time-being we may leave the matter, although it is bound to reappear in various forms. Theistic agreement upon ethical monotheism, let us say, would be something, but, for some religions and theologies, not nearly enough. If *such* a difference, despite other agreements, made all the difference, it is not clear that there would be a greater harmony between all theists than between some theists and some atheists. Buddhists, for instance, although they are atheists, might agree much more closely with Sankara, who was not an atheist, than Calvin or Barth would.

II

The way of divergent development in the hope of a new synthesis may seem to be more promising, at any rate if the term "synthesis" is construed rather liberally. Religions are living growths in which all the shoots and tendrils of human nature are intertwined; the same may be true of theologies though they are not usually so lush

of life. And syncretism, that feeble mimic of synthesis, has been very common indeed. Sometimes a political government deliberately imported foreign deities. That, very frequently, was the policy of the Roman republic in times of disaster. Again, there has been mingling by infiltration. Cults, notions, and ideals are apt to gain a parasite's living room, and to retain it even when attempts are made to smoke them out. There may also be a form of synthesis by mutual accommodation, as when a people nominally Christianized is encouraged to retain its old feast days tricked out with Palestinian emblems. Was not the papacy the ghost of the Holy Roman Empire? How many ingredients went to the making of Arminianism? One expects a religion to be a fusion of mixed elements, just as one expects a "race" to be.

Such religious intermingling is reflected in many theologies, and the same may occur in deliberate theological science when the synthesis is undertaken in a studied way. What could have been more important for the history of Christianity than the historical circumstance that it turned towards Greek metaphysics as early as the sub-apostolic age and ceased to be primarily evangelical or messianic? What again could have had greater historical significance than the fact that metaphysical-theological enterprise took place in the regions of the Levant, at the strategic confluence of Eastern and Western ideological forces? The Levant was a seed-plot for hybridizing, for co-reflection, for syntheology. When the day comes (and it may be approaching) when all the world is an intellectual Alexandria, what is to prevent planetary theological symbiosis?

In general the problem of genuine synthesis in philosophy or in theology is the problem of discovering the unity, if possible the necessary unity, of truths that seem to be very different if not flatly opposed. Illustrations of such an enterprise may be seen in two very striking attempts at synthetic construction, those, namely, of Aquinas and of Hegel. These attempts, as we shall see, have a somewhat different problem from the problem of synthesis of the major religions and their theologies, and the difference is instructive. There is sufficient resemblance, however, to justify investigation.

Aquinas's problem was to synthesize—to think together in a genuine integrity—two great independent systems each of which he believed to be true and indeed unchallengeable—namely, Greek science or philosophy (i.e. the rediscovered Aristotle) and Christianity —and to show that the latter completed and perfected the former not arbitrarily but in principle and without substantial modification on either side. Since there need be no general presumption that science (or philosophy) is opposed in principle either to theology or to religion, the general idea of their union presented no insuperable difficulty; and Aquinas's greatness consisted in the skill and fidelity of his

actual systematic construction. Obviously, however, there would be quite a different situation if the problem were not to combine two systems neither of which was believed to compete with the other except by accident (both being immune to serious challenge) but, instead, to combine religions and theologies which *were* competitors in the same field and whose truth could not be taken for granted, being very largely upon trial in each instance. In the second case the synthesis or co-inquiry would be likely to involve a degree and kind of re-inquiry not contemplated in the first case; and confidence in the result would be likely to be proportionately diminished.

In Hegel's ambitious and very striking philosophy of religion, the upshot was that Christianity could be shown to be the final synthesis of all that is true in religion although it was only as true as religion can be, that is to say, truer than anything else *except* the philosophy of Spirit, i.e. the philosophical self-manifestation of the Absolute. Clearly such a solution would differ in two cardinal respects from most other attempts to effect a synthesis of the major religions and their theologies. Its finding would be that Christianity was the synthesis in question, the other religions or theologies being splendid failures but no more, not that Christianity was, like the rest, something that, much transformed, awaited inclusion in a higher religion. It would also deny that a religious synthesis could in the end be genuinely adapted to theology if theology is really divine science, philosophy, or truth; for theology would always be sub-scientific and sub-philosophical. Despite these very important differences, however, Hegel's attempt should be held in constant remembrance by all who aspire after a comprehensive syntheology.

There would be room for an intelligible synthesis if each of the major religions and their theologies laid narrow or exaggerated emphasis upon complementary aspects of the truth, and there would further be a direct invitation to philosophical synthesis if there were an immanent dialectic in the quest, that is to say, if every inadequate or exaggerated theologico-religious system swung over to its own proper complement with an unmistakable *nisus*, and if this process went on and on from the barest to the fullest theologico-religious system. Nor would it greatly matter if, sometimes, there were alternative "proper" complements, provided that these alternative routes led eventually to the same haven without intolerable disorder.

Such was the process that Hegel contemplated. He even supposed that the historical order of the development of religions corresponded in time with the distinctive steps in the logic of the theological dialectic. Some of his transitions, it is true, were rather arbitrary. Thus he held that sublimity (in Judaism) swung over to Beauty (in Greek religion) and that the movement culminated in Utility (in Roman religion). Other Hegelian transitions, however, looked much

less arbitrary. We may or may not agree with what he said about the religions of Persia, Syria, and Egypt, but the type of transition that he professed to discern in their case is a good illustration of what would be a dialectical evolution if the facts were as Hegel saw them. In Zoroastrianism, Hegel said, there was an external dualism between good and evil, light and darkness, Ormuzd and Ahriman. In the "Syrian" religious cults the rift came from within, and came near to healing by first intention—for the phoenix rose from its ashes and Adonis rose from the dead. In the Egyptian religious system, according to Hegel, Osiris became the lord of all departed spirits as well as the lord of the living, and so was capable of a fuller triumph than was possible in the Syrian form of religion.

Hegel held that Christianity was the culmination of religious dialectic, only to be surmounted by what went beyond religion, because in it alone spirit was reconciled from all its distractions, worldly, fleshly, and near-spiritual. It had reached the Absolute although only in the imperfect imaginative way of a religion. He had or professed to have a clear vision of the goal and so was able or professed to be able to give a final judgment upon the success of *any* attempted synthesis. This raises the question whether, without such a standard, an attempt at dialectical syntheology could be more than groping. In short, it is hard to avoid the suspicion that theologians who aim at a vast religious synthesis must be or believe themselves to be highly superior observers and indeed supertheologians. Must they not believe themselves capable of discerning the finer essence in all the great religions and theologies? Must they not believe themselves capable of placing all such doctrines and of uniting them in a hierarchy? That might be practicable if one knew the answer in advance, not necessarily in detail but at least in general principle. It would be much more hazardous if the answer were hidden, and had to be approached with many false and fitful starts.

This, as it seems to me, is the greatest difficulty that such an ambitious synthesis in religion or philosophy has to face. It need not, however, be insuperable. Every would-be synthesizer, at any rate for a great part of his enterprise, must keep pretty close to points of doctrine which have been developed pretty fully in the major theologies. What he draws upon is religion itself in its theological bearings. If that be suspect in any considerable degree the whole attempt at synthesis is little more than an intellectual flirtation, not a serious pursuit with honourable intentions. Therefore unless the synthesizer has the effrontery to hold that all the greater theologians in all the greater traditions have fumbled and stumbled, erred and strayed in the most preposterous way, he is bound to respond to the chords that have been struck by these very theologians. Hence the necessary distinction between agreeing on a

common basis, and differing in order to discover a higher synthesis is less than it might seem.

Power which must be more than planetary if it is to be the impregnable rock and succour even of petty men. Some affinity between this power and man's spirit, that is to say, man's mind and deepest hopes and purest aspirations. Some tendency in the heart of things towards bliss and peace and redemption not unhuman although very likely much more than human. In some such ways as these, despite all their differences, the greater religions and theologies tend to combine. If the peace that passeth understanding is better understood in the patient East than in the bustling West, why should it not be so? If Islam has the firmest conception of God's power, why should the thing be impossible? If there is more of tenderness and of compassion in Christian theology than elsewhere, why, despite the savagery of certain Christian theologians, and despite so much in Christian practice, should the fact be denied or forgotten?

III

The third policy is a policy of deliberate and final isolationism in religious culture, a policy of avoiding, not all contacts—for business and geographical contacts need not matter—but all contacts of religion, and of declining to encourage such contacts in any relevant way when they cannot be avoided altogether. Muslim, Jew, and Greek Orthodox may live together and chaffer together and die together in Bosnian villages, and the Franciscans may have a stronghold just across the valley. That is irrelevant if each religious community goes its several religious way.

This policy seems better adapted to religion than to theology. None of the major religions, it may be said, has had a strong hold on men's minds unless it has had a fairly large number of adherents united in a common institution, vivified by constant interchange of ideas on the part of like-minded men and women who live by their religion (or profess to do so) and test it sedulously and continuously by life's exacting standards. A certain extension of the argument from religion to theology, however, may seem to be readily defensible. Theologies which do not have their roots in the religious experience of such communities (we are told) are very unlikely to flourish, and their flowering, if they flourish at all, is only for a day.

Take a cultural analogy—let us say, the growth of a language. There may be a case for a world-language, and particularly for a world-language not imposed by force by world-conquerors who do not like to take the trouble to learn any language except their own. Such a world-language, while it could scarcely be a synthesis of all the tongues on the globe, might very well be compounded of several

spoken languages and have minor indebtedness to a swarm of other spoken languages. A synthetic world-language of this kind might be preferable to basic English or uninflected Latin, and, in time, might become more than an instrument for commercial exchange. It might conceivably come to develop a literature.

That would be a possible cultural development, but in the case of language it is not at all a probable development. Up to a point dialects tend to coalesce with certain loss, but, on the whole, with greater gain. Beyond that point languages, as distinct from dialects, flourish best and develop a literature when they are sensitive to their own purity and are neither imitators of others nor borrowers from others. That is true even of a language like English whose origins are very mixed, and whose standards, often, have suffered from too much conscious imitation of Latin, French, and Italian models.

In the end a language is an independent growth, and its best policy would seem to be a policy of linguistic isolationism however intricate the commercial, industrial, and political world-contacts may be. Business men can afford to be bi- or multi-lingual: writers very seldom. This fact, it is true, may not be wholly unalterable. In the past it may have been due to historical causes which no longer prevail. He would be a bold man, however, who predicted that, in time, some single world-language with its world-literature will not only oust all the others but will also excel them where they are subtlest and most delicate. It is at least permissible to believe precisely the opposite. So, if the analogy held, there would be more to be hoped from religious isolationism than from religious fusion.

This analogy may have some value. Religion, like language, is part of the culture of a community. On the other hand, the analogy need not be worth very much. We are not entitled to assume that all the constituents of culture have a parallel development.

For instance, we may doubt the force of the analogy when we remember the strength that an alien religion may speedily gain. I allow that an alien language may also be predatory, but its appetite is not comparable to the voracity of a religion.

Consider the hold that the Jewish Bible obtained in a country like Scotland. The Scots may have certain resemblances to the Jews —enough, at any rate, to help a comedian with his patter. But how did it come about that an island people in a climate politely called temperate came to think, in the religious way, in terms of the hot and arid East, to thirst for springs of living water when it was itself mostly water-logged, to talk habitually of locusts, palms, and almond trees and of sojourning in a wilderness as unlike a Scottish forest as could well be imagined? One might almost conjecture that a religion is the stronger for being imported, for drawing upon imagery which is remote and mysterious and as good as other-planetary to the bulk

of the hearers. No doubt many Scottish believers thought in terms of their own environment whatever their lips might say. On the walls of Lutheran churches in some of the Hanseatic ports the participants in the scenes near Calvary are depicted in black coats and silk hats. (It is difficult to illustrate the point from the gaunt walls of a Scottish kirk.) Such grotesque congruity (or incongruity), however, does not affect the main point at issue, namely the difference between the imaginative religious background and the familiar ways of common life. It is easier, on the whole, to escape, imaginatively, into an unknown country which, despite its hidden mystery, is such a long way short of heaven as not to seem quite empty and intangible in its splendour.

Accordingly, while there may be quite good arguments for linguistic isolationism, and for various other forms of cultural isolationism, perhaps in sport, perhaps in art, perhaps in political government, it is not nearly so clear that religious isolationism has the same strong natural basis. On the whole, religions have been more successful, not less successful than other forms of human culture in their diffusiveness, even to the point of attempting to embrace the whole habitable globe. The reason is obvious. The greater religions have evolved a theology which is not merely planetary but cosmic or even hyper-cosmic. Therefore the omens for *theological* isolationism are not at all favourable, even if the arguments for *religious* isolationism were stronger than I believe them to be.

IV

It remains to consider the case in which a religion, faith, or theology claims and, after consideration persists in the claim, that it and it alone is the final truth, so having the duty of setting all others right. As regards Christianity, this was the robust attitude of Paley in his *Evidences*. "I desire," he there said "that in judging of Christianity it may be remembered that the question lies between this religion and none; for, if the Christian religion be not credible, no one with whom we have to do will support the pretensions of any other." It would be rather unusual for Christian theologians to be so very blunt and so very confident nowadays, and most unchristian theologies are less intolerant than most Christian theologies. Quite recently, however, Dr. Hensley Henson quoted the above statement of Paley's in his book *Christian Morality*, and declared that "Paley's declaration in 1794 remains without effective challenge in 1935." A great many Christian theologians quietly assume that it is so although, unlike Barth, they may be reluctant to make quite such an open declaration.

If this be the attitude there may seem to be no honest alternative

to a frankly missionary effort where other religions or theologies are concerned. These can never be treated as equals. "Let us all get together round the table" cannot be a serious suggestion. Given the claim to finality, little may seem to be left for the missionary's discretion except matters of courtesy, diplomacy, or policy. As a matter of courtesy other views should be allowed full expression, and diplomacy is just courtesy employed not for its own sake but for some other purpose. Policy also—although such a policy is dangerous —may suggest the advisability of beginning with an attempt to discover common ground and in concealing the claim to finality for a time.

The upshot of such a view, however, may seem to be simply that concession or compromise would be treachery and surrender. In a sense, therefore, there is nothing more to be said about the matter. On the other hand, the claim to finality may be based on several grounds, not all of which involve the same sort of intransigence. This aspect of the matter, although it is subordinate, should also be discussed.

Speaking of Christian morality rather than of Christian theology or religion—though this triad, in his opinion, is not dissociable— Dr. Hensley Henson, in the volume already mentioned, argues that Christian morality is "final" in comparison with all other moralities because it alone is genuinely "natural" in the sense of that word which found expression in the ancient terms of *ius naturae* and, less precisely, of *ius gentium*. In other words, he holds that Christian morality and it alone is capable of becoming the true and acceptable morality of all mankind. A typical and very candid expression of his view occurs in the following passage:

"The point on which we insist, as implied in the statement that Christian morality is natural, is the agreement between the conduct which Christianity requires and that which human civilization at its best insists upon. Christianity is in human society a moral influence which stimulates every element in it which is properly described as natural. This is the reason why Christian civilization has become the norm of modern civilization. In India, in China, in Japan there are distinctive civilizations which have flowered richly in art and literature, and still succeed in holding the allegiance of numerous communities. But all are 'cribbed, cabined, and confined' within local and racial conditions. It is inconceivable that they should win acceptance in Europe and America. Christian civilization alone has the strength, range, and elasticity which make universal adoption ultimately inevitable. Whether when so adopted it will retain its ancestral connection with Christianity may be doubtful, but about the connection there can be no question."[1]

[1] *Christian Morality*, pp. 154 f.

I should be digressing were I to try to examine this remarkable argument in detail. How can Christian morality be final if civilization at its height may lose its ancestral connection with Christianity? Does it stand to reason that the civilization of Europe and America may not have more to learn from the ancient civilization of the East than the East has from them? Is it morality or religion that have made Europe and America so very strong in the world? Has not Pundit Nehru recently made the very same claim to implicit universality for *his* religion as Dr. Henson makes here for Christianity? If Christianity has succeeded in some such way, may the reason not be that it has a greater genius for assimilation than any other religion?

What I want to point out is something that involves no digression, namely that if the superiority of some given religion or theology to all others is defended on grounds such as Dr. Henson's, the whole question is open to rational argument, and, despite Dr. Henson's approval of Paley, is wholly opposed in spirit to Paley's attitude. The question is essentially a question for general discussion. As Dr. Henson says in another passage, "a genuinely Catholic Christianity which has incorporated into its dominion the distinctive genius of the Japanese, the Chinese, the Hindu, the Arab, and the African will be vastly richer and nobler than any version of Christ's religion which the world has hitherto known. All the ethical treasures of humanity will finally find complete and permanent expression in Christian morality." The emphasis here is upon catholicity, upon universality, and upon the contribution that the "distinctive genius" of Japan, China, and Palestine make to it. What is to be expected is a mixed not an exclusively Christian ancestry, however confident the Christians may be that whatever is catholic or universal will in the end owe more to Christianity than to anything else.

There would be quite a different type of finality, and of missionary zeal based on finality, if the contention were that Christian theology is ultimately based upon a unique historical occurrence in Palestine about two millennia ago, i.e. upon the Incarnation, Atonement, and Resurrection of Christ. No doubt incarnation myths and immortality myths have been common enough in a variety of religions and theologies, and Krishna or Adonis may frequently have been accepted as historical figures. What many Christian theologians maintain, however, is that Christ's Incarnation was necessarily unique, and that the record of this unique piece of history is the ultimate warrant of all Christian theology. The Atonement was made once and for all. There will never be another God-man upon earth, and although, if other planets were inhabited, a pious conjecture might be that they too should be visited by their Redeemer, this notion of a Wandering Saviour is repugnant to most Christians.

Precisely in so far as the basis of Christian theology is unique and also historical, Christian theology must be exclusive and cannot honestly pretend to be anything else.

Thus Dr. Leonard Hodgson writes (so far as I can see inevitably from his standpoint). "To Christian faith God is known primarily in His redeeming activity in Christ. But this very fact prevents us stopping there. If God has thus willed to enter within history and within it to work our salvation, that must be for believing Christians our clue to understanding all human history and all the evolution of the universe in which human history has its place. Thus inevitably there arises *Christian philosophy*, that philosophy which is the attempt to interpret the meaning of all things in the light of God's self-revelation in Christ."[1] Again Hodgson says, "The standpoint from which we view the universe is that of men sharing in a way of life now being lived as a matter of historical fact in this actual world. We have been gathered into it by God, who has revealed Himself in a sequence of historical acts recorded in the books of the Bible and the history of the Christian Church. This sequence of events, the history of our own spiritual ancestry, through which God's revelation has come to us, must always have for us a special and unique significance. Our Christian philosophy must therefore recognize this special significance and find a reasonable way of relating this particular historical sequence to the rest of the events which go to make up the universe."[2] And yet again he writes: "Our clue to the understanding of the universe is our conviction that we are God's creatures made for a life of personal communion with Him and with one another. To use this conviction as a clue means to regard it as giving its meaning to all the content of our observation and experience."[3]

In short, the claim is that the record of Christ's life upon earth is in principle our clue to *everything*, to the origin (and eventual annihilation?) of the physical universe, to the purpose of the stars, to the high station of human souls in the scheme of things, to the centrality of spiritual things in the cosmos, to the subordination of all world-problems to the fundamental problem of redemption from sin. The question may be raised, of course, whether Jesus, in his recorded sayings ever did make such claims: whether he believed himself to be more than a Messiah and to be actually co-equal with God the Father whom he taught his disciples to address as *our* Father: whether he ever tried to be a metaphysician or a theologian. That however is not the point. The point, for those who agree with Dr. Hodgson, is that the record of Christ's life on earth and subsequent communion with his church is our only clue to theology, cosmology,

[1] *Towards a Christian Philosophy*, p. 25.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 154. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

metaphysics, and all such fundamental inquiries. There may be a question about the extent of the guidance afforded by the clue. But there is no other clue, nothing else except the bewildered guesswork of a natural reason unequal to such a task.

It may be permissible to suggest that many Christians, not all of them modernists, regard such claims as excessive and embarrassing. However that may be, the implicit exclusiveness of such a view as Hodgson's is beyond question. Therefore the view must either be abandoned or be allowed to be exclusive.

One may, however, raise a final question. If these events in Palestine are our only clue to an understanding of the universe in its depths and ultimate potencies, does it follow that Christians who accept this exclusive clue should disdain all contacts with other religions and theologies, having nothing to learn from them, and having no duty towards their adherents except the duty of converting them? Those of us who are appalled at such a conclusion may be excused for attempting to mitigate its rigours.

The prospects are not too gloomy. The contention is that certain events in history do give the clue to the riddle of the world, showing that redemption from sin is the dominating fact in all temporal process, that suns and stars are insignificant in comparison with the spirit of man, and that the relations between man and God are central in all that exists. If so, the historical proof of such a theological ontology would be proof of a very special order. The events which led to the triumph at Calvary would be proof that certain metaphysical principles are not merely matter of surmise, as they would have been had there been no such events, but have to be accepted as fact. The difference is the difference between a speculative possibility, on the one hand, and undeniable actuality, on the other hand; but the content of the speculative possibility would be the same content as history revealed when the word was made flesh.

This same content, therefore, can be examined both by those who regard it only as a speculative possibility and by those who accept it as demonstrated at Calvary and thereafter. There is no sufficient reason why the latter party should refuse to discuss with the former party, or why the former party, declining to admit that it is dealing with more than a speculative possibility, should on that account alone, be debarred from collaborative intercourse with those who have been engaged for many centuries in elaborating a belief whose foundations are, to their minds, beyond all question. If Christian or any other exclusive theologies were possessed not merely of a clue, but of a complete doctrine with no place for adventures of ideas, such collaborative intercourse between rival theologians would have very feeble prospects. The books would be closed. No reasonable person, however, can suppose that the ontological and meta-

physical clues supplied by the New Testament, the Upanishads, or other sacred literature are anything like complete. They may be firm, but they permit and encourage endless although controlled adventure.

Accordingly, even under this last heading, mere missionary zeal need not be enough. And why should Christians be the only missionaries?

LIFE AND PLEASURE (I)

THE LATE H. W. B. JOSEPH

ALL men desire their own happiness: which is not to say that they desire nothing else, or regulate all their actions with a view to it. But very many men are also puzzled and perhaps distressed by the fact of unhappiness, whosever it may be. For it seems evil, and evil is a problem, whether seen in animal pain, or in human unhappiness, or in wrong-doing, or in what, though not the work of man, yet seems unjust: as, for example, that one who does his duty should perish miserably. True, we should most of us say that our own interest has nothing to do with our duty; and the Psalmist blesses him that sweareth unto his neighbour and disappointeth him not, "though it were to his own hindrance." Yet almost in the same breath he declares that such a man shall never fall, that he shall dwell in the tabernacle of the Lord, and rest upon his holy hill.[1] Clearly he thought that, unless this were so, something would be very much amiss, though even so he might have maintained that a man ought to keep the promise which he has sworn to his neighbour. It has been impressively contended by Professor Prichard that there is no sense of "advantage" in which the question whether to keep his promise is advantageous to me is relevant to the question whether I ought to keep it, not even if I identify my own advantage with what advantages society: "our conviction that we ought to do certain actions does not in fact arise from our thought that our action will conduce to the good of society which is also our own good."[2] Yet the contemplation of a world in which, though men did their duty, they were always involved in misery by doing it, would be gravely disconcerting. Kant himself could not believe such a world possible, though more almost than any other moralist he insisted that our consciousness of obligation had no connection with any thought of how discharging it bore upon our happiness, nor the obligation itself with how discharging it actually did so. Rather than admit that there could in the last resort be even a partial maladjustment between virtue and happiness, he was prepared to accept what he claimed to have shown that the speculative reason could never establish, the existence of an all-powerful and all-righteous God.

There are, no doubt, some who can find sustainment in acknowledging an evil world and defying it. "Brief and powerless is man's life," says Lord Russell; "on him and all his race the slow, sure doom

[1] Psa. xv.

[2] H. A. Prichard, *Duty and Interest*, pp. 16, 39.

falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man . . . it remains only . . ., undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power."[1] So Henley thanks "whatever gods there be" for his "unconquerable soul." And T. H. Huxley declared that, if scientific thinking revealed the unreality of moral distinctions, it was the duty of a man of science to publish the fact.

We might ask why the unreality of moral distinctions would not destroy that duty too. And if, instead of merely deriding his inconsequence, we admire Huxley for exhorting us to tell the truth and shame the devil, it is perhaps because we feel that men's obstinate dissatisfaction with evil does not proceed merely from emotion, but is itself a mark of intelligence. The problem of evil has certainly exercised thinkers who have discussed it with less emotional fervour than have those just quoted. The celebrated Abbé Bayle and the more celebrated Leibniz are among these. Man, said Bayle, is wicked and miserable; everywhere you will find prisons and hospitals; and added, in an often quoted sentence, that history is but the record of the crimes and misfortunes of mankind. Leibniz replied that this was exaggeration; there is incomparably more of good than of evil in the lives of men, just as there are incomparably more houses than prisons; although, in respect of moral good and evil, virtue and vice, we find for the most part mediocrity, and few men either very virtuous or very wicked. The chief aim of history, like that of poetry, should be to teach wisdom and virtue by examples, and the next so to exhibit vice as will produce aversion to it and lead or help us to avoid it.[2] Those who connect with the name of Leibniz the doctrine that this is the best of all possible worlds might expect a more wholehearted rejection of Bayle's allegations. But we must remember that by this doctrine he did not mean that there was no pain or moral evil in the world, but that no other world which an all-wise, all-powerful and benevolent God could have created would have contained so little. The risk of moral evil he, like many others, thought inseparable from human freedom. I am not concerned with the defence which in his *Theodicée* he offered of his general optimism, drawing upon metaphysical doctrines that he developed elsewhere. In some respects it may deserve the reproach of facile. But it would not, I think, be fair to say that he was reduced to optimism by

[1] *Philosophical Essays*, p. 20, in *A Free Man's Worship*.

[2] *Theodicée*, § 148.

inability to face disagreeable truths. Doubtless men's desire for happiness often inclines them too readily to comforting beliefs about the world in matters beyond present ascertainment, and against this tendency the Stoic protest of Lord Russell or W. L. Henley proceeds from motives that deserve respect. But to recognize a problem in evil is not the same as to dislike what evilly affects oneself. Those whom it disturbs should indeed be on their guard against over-rating arguments advanced to resolve it. To ascribe their efforts, however, merely to their desire for happiness, and what is called optimism to that readiness to accept comforting beliefs which this desire may produce, is perhaps to mistake for the object of a desire the pleasure to which one may look forward from attaining that object.

A desire, then, to find a solution to the puzzle of evil, an interest in the issue between the so-called optimistic and pessimistic interpretations of the world, is neither a form of self-interest nor of sympathetic interest in the welfare of others. It is a speculative interest in understanding the world in which we find ourselves. Whether the discussion of the problem belongs especially to that branch of speculation called ethics is difficult to say. Every ethical system must include propositions accepted on the ground that by thinking or reflection we know them to be true. That we have duties, that there really is a distinction between good and evil, are such propositions. And if the world presents problems not merely unsolved, but insoluble, if it is unintelligible, not merely not understood, we may lose trust in our intelligence; for we belong to the world. Ethical speculation therefore cannot be indifferent to the problem of evil. But for the same reason neither can any other branch of speculation; for every branch includes propositions accepted on the ground that by thinking or reflection we know them to be true. Yet the student of mathematics does not abandon his studies because the problems remain unsolved; neither should the student of ethics.

I am not proposing to offer any contribution towards its solution. But there is a school of ethics which, relying upon a view of good and evil which I believe to be false, viz. that life is good if it brings a surplus of agreeable feeling, thinks that modern science, in the theory of biological evolution, has upon this view shown that life is good; for it has shown that life-preserving activities must upon the whole be pleasant. I believe that for all that biology can show to the contrary, the continuance of life might depend on processes as painful as you please; and my purpose is to argue that no solution lies in that quarter.

The view of good and evil to which I have referred, the belief that on this view biology can show life to be good, and by implication

that it can contribute to the solution of the problem of evil, were all held by Herbert Spencer. "The good," he says, "is universally the pleasurable"; things are good and bad "which immediately produce agreeable and disagreeable sensations"; an agent is good or bad, whether inanimate like a good shop, or animate like a good teacher, "which conduces immediately or remotely to an enjoyable state." All those who do not barbarously believe that it is the duty of men "to continue living in misery for the delight of their maker" "avowedly or tacitly hold that the final justification for maintaining life, can only be the reception from it of a surplus of pleasurable over painful feeling; and that goodness or badness can be ascribed to acts which subserve or hinder life, only upon this supposition."[1] Pessimists and optimists alike agree, "both their arguments assume it to be self-evident, that life is good or bad, according as it does or does not bring a surplus of agreeable feeling. On this issue therefore "depends entirely every decision concerning the goodness or badness of conduct"; if pain predominates in life, "actions which further its continuance, either in self or others, must be reprobated"; so that "before entering on any ethical discussion" this question must be "definitely raised and answered."[2] But it can be answered by biology; the course of evolution necessarily brings about adjustments in virtue of which the preponderance of pleasure is secure. If it were not so, evolution would have been a mistake;[2] Spencer does not tell us whose. But since it is so, the Evolution Hypothesis harmonizes with the leading moral ideas which men have reached. For the most highly evolved conduct is that best adapted to further life; life is furthered by actions conducing to the welfare of the organism, hindered by those injurious to it; with the former are correlated pleasures, with the latter pains; therefore the course of evolution, which consists in the actions of organisms becoming progressively more adapted to further their life, consists also in their actions becoming progressively more adapted to produce pleasure, with less pain. And since men count that conduct good which aims to produce a surplus of agreeable feeling, the course of evolution is towards that to which a moral man would direct his actions; and a man has only to guide himself by the teachings of evolution, acting so as to co-operate with and not to thwart it, to be sure that he is doing right.[3]

I do not know what language Leibniz would have used about the postulate in which Spencer says that pessimists and optimists agree, that life is good or bad according as it does or does not bring a surplus of agreeable feeling. For thin partitions, surely, divide the bounds of these alternatives. It is like Mr. Micawber's distinction between happiness and misery: "Annual income twenty pounds,

[1] *Data of Ethics*, ch. III, § 10. [2] *Ibid.*, § 9.

[3] *Ibid.*, ch. III, § 15: cf. chs. I and II.

annual expenditure, nineteen nineteen six, result happiness. Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought six, result misery." Indeed, Mr. Micawber's position was the more reasonable of the two. He did not think that happiness was so many pence, but that it depended on the difference between pence owing and pence owned; and the greatness of the difference between happiness and misery need not be proportionate to the amount by which a debit can be converted into a credit balance. But that wherein the optimist's and the pessimist's worlds are here conceived as differing—so that on the issue "depends entirely every decision concerning the goodness and badness of conduct"—consists in, not depends upon, the ratio between the elements of good and evil, the pleasures and the pains, in them; and if the ratios are nearly the same, though the excess falls now on this side and now on that, the worlds, so far as these elements are concerned, will differ very little; yet "every decision concerning the goodness and badness of conduct" will be reversed accordingly. Surely the difference which should justify such a reversal, and decide the issue between optimism and pessimism, should be more profound; it can hardly be so purely a question of quantity of pleasure.

We may ask, too, how the computation is to be made, which is to establish a balance of pleasurable over painful feeling, or vice versa. Are we to grade pleasurable and painful feelings in respect of intensity, to set up a one-one correspondence of grades in our two tables, to count up for each intensity of either table the "feeler-hours," and say that so many "feeler-hours" of pleasure in grade x cancel that number of painful "feeler-hours" in the corresponding grade, and both must disappear from the account? Even then, it might be found, after all such cancelling, that there was an uncancelled balance of pleasurable "feeler-hours" in one grade and of painful in another. How are we now to determine what lesser number of more intensely painful "feeler-hours" cancels what greater number of less intensely pleasurable? And do not those who talk of a balance of pleasure over pain or vice versa forget that in the scales of a balance you must place things not contrary but homogeneous. If some bodies, as Aristotle thought, were naturally heavy, and tended to the centre of the world, others naturally light, and tended to the circumference, you could not weigh them against each other, and strike a balance of light over heavy or heavy over light. And supposing there were a way of determining that your life or mine was more pleasant than painful, or more painful than pleasant, what precise sense is there in the notion of integrating the results established for every several life into a single result for all who feel?

These, however, are not the questions which I wish to press. Let us assume, in spite of all the pain, sickness and sorrow that there are

in the world, that the statement that to nearly all sentient creatures their lives bring a balance of pleasure over pain is both capable of a sound interpretation and true. I maintain that, even if the facts be so, they are in no way biologically necessary.

No doubt it is largely true, though by no means universally, that "pains are correlatives of actions injurious to the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to its welfare."[1] But that "it is an inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of Evolution, that races of sentient creatures could have come into existence under no other conditions" is not true at all. This, however, is what Spencer supposes. His argument for such a highly satisfactory conclusion was first set out in the *Principles of Psychology*,[2] and is repeated in the *Data of Ethics*! It was as follows:

"If we substitute for the word Pleasure the equivalent phrase—a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there, and if we substitute for the word Pain the equivalent phrase—a feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out; we see at once that, if the states of consciousness which a creature endeavours to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions, and if the states which it endeavours to expel are the correlatives of beneficial actions, it must quickly disappear through persistence in the injurious and avoidance of the beneficial. In other words, those races of beings only can have survived, in which, on the average, agreeable or desired feelings went along with activities conducive to the maintenance of life, while disagreeable and habitually-avoided feelings went along with activities directly or indirectly destructive of life; and there must ever have been, other things equal, the most numerous and long-continued survivals among races in which these adjustments of feelings to actions were the best, tending ever to bring about perfect adjustment."

Now this argument turns upon certain highly questionable assumptions, one explicitly made, the others perhaps unnoticed. (1) It is explicitly assumed that we denote the same feelings by calling them pleasant, and by saying that we seek to bring them into consciousness and retain them there; by calling them painful, and by saying that we seek to get and keep them out of consciousness. And only on this assumption does the argument advance. For what Spencer wishes to prove is that, if in any creature pleasant states of consciousness were the correlatives of injurious actions and painful of beneficial, it must quickly disappear: not that it must do so if it sought to maintain what was injurious and avoid what was beneficial; that is obvious, unless its endeavours make no difference to what it does. The identification therefore of what it endeavours to maintain or to expel with what is pleasant or painful is vital to

[1] *Data of Ethics*, ch. VI, § 33. [2] § 124.

the argument. (2) It is assumed, perhaps without noticing that a questionable assumption is being made, that if we seek to maintain pleasure in consciousness or to get pain out, we also seek to bring in pleasure and to keep out pain. This is probably because Spencer, like a good many others, did not realize that the pleasures or pains which we may desire or fear cannot have the same relation to the actions by which they are to be obtained or avoided as those which we are feeling may have to the actions by which they are to be maintained or expelled. For those which we are feeling exist; but those which we only desire or fear do not. (3) Whereas the conclusion required is that those races of beings only can have survived in which, on the average, agreeable and disagreeable feelings have gone along respectively with activities conducive to the maintenance of life and directly or indirectly destructive of it, the statement of the conclusion speaks of "agreeable or desired," of "disagreeable and "habitually-avoided" feelings. This is only relevant on the assumption that activities which a creature finds disagreeable it will commonly be able to avoid, those which it finds agreeable it will not only desire but commonly be able to exercise. The assumption is reasonable enough if the word "activity" or "action" (for Spencer draws no distinction) is used in its ordinary sense for something in our power. But Spencer uses the words also in the biological sense in which we speak of the action of the heart or of the kidneys; and when the whirling movements of the cilia of a rotifer, whereby food is sucked in, are called actions,[1] it is quite obscure in which sense the word is meant. Action therefore includes what may be unalterable by our efforts, as inevitable as growing old; and though it is necessary to survival that such actions should be beneficial and not injurious (which means only that they should make for and not against survival), it is by no means necessary that they should be agreeable. Our efforts might not be directed towards actions necessary for survival, unless the feelings we desire, to wit agreeable feelings, were correlated with those actions; but if our efforts make no difference to our actions, that is profoundly unimportant; and in the biological sense of the word "action" they often do not. Growing pains do not prevent our growing, for a man by trying could no more stop growing than he can add a cubit to his stature. And it should be obvious that if, when speaking of the necessity for actions to be conducive to the maintenance of life and not destructive of it, we understand the word only in its biological sense, there is no reason why life should be pleasant, nor why it should not be a protracted agony, so far as the influence of pain and pleasure on actions is concerned.

It might, however, be supposed that a reason can be found in the

[1] *Data of Ethics*, ch. II, § 4. Both words, *action* and *activity*, are used in this section.

nature of the conditions which produce pain and pleasure; but this is not so. For either these conditions are physiological; and then, for all that we can understand, the conditions giving rise to pleasure might just as well give rise to pain, and vice versa; or they are psychological, and then we shall find that they do not involve the necessity for life to be preponderantly pleasant. If we consider one or two theories that have been advanced regarding the conditions of pleasure and pain, this should become clear.

One class of theory that has met with much acceptance connects pleasure with the passage to completion of some physical or psychical process, or the unhindered exercise of some physical or psychical power: pain with the thwarting of the process, or with hindrance to the exercise of the power. Plato and Aristotle put forward theories of this sort. Professor Stout in his *Analytic Psychology*, following Avenarius, connects pleasure and pain respectively with the uninterrupted and interrupted course of a process, called a "vital series," "intervening between the initial disturbance and restored stability" of neural arrangements. "What in its psychical aspect we call the direction of mental activity towards an end, is," we are told, "on the physiological side, the tendency of disturbed neural arrangements towards equilibrium. . . . In so far as the neural disturbance simply serves to initiate and support the process of recovery in modes predetermined by the nervous organization, there is concomitant pleasure. On the other hand, any kind of hitch or hindrance in the process is unpleasant. This physiological formula is primarily based on the evidence supplied by those pleasant and painful processes which are open to psychological analysis. . . . The assumption is, that where psychological analysis fails, there is a fundamental analogy in the neural process concerned."[1]

Much might be said of the inadequacy of such general formulae about the conditions of pleasure and pain. Thus it is not the same that pleasure should depend on the passage of a process to completion, and on the unhindered exercise of a power; for on the first alternative, as Hobbes put it, "there is no contentment but in proceeding"[2]; to have attained is to have passed beyond pleasure; on the second, the continuance of an activity would afford pleasure, even though the activity is not a process towards completion, and no power is being exercised more perfectly at one time than at another.[3] Again, besides the thwarting of a process towards completion, or hindering the exercise of a power, we may suppose the reversal of the process, or mere cessation of the exercise of a power.

[1] *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 287: Bk. II, xii, § 4.

[2] *Leviathan.*

[3] Aristotle adopted the second alternative, as against Plato, who had adopted the first.

Should we assume that these also are conditions of pain? Plato, who called pleasure a process of filling, πλήρωσις, called pain one of emptying, κένωσις. We may accept Aristotle's criticism, that pain and pleasure cannot *be* these processes, but at most depend on them. It will still remain to point out that obstructing a process and reversing it, obstructing or filling and emptying are not the same; and to be inactive is not to suffer hindrance in the exercise of a power.

There are two kinds of occasion where pleasure and pain arise which commend this sort of formula about their conditions; in one the conditions are apparently psychical, in the other physical. Pleasures attend the satisfaction of hunger and thirst, and pains arise after a certain point from the using up of bodily tissue; it is these which suggested the metaphor of filling and emptying. Again, pleasures attend successful effort, and pains failure to carry an effort to completion; though it is to be noted that obstruction which does not prevent success, but only provokes to heightened effort, may accentuate pleasure. In both kinds of case, we might describe the conditions of pleasure as the passage of a process to completion, or the exercise of a power; but the thwarting of a process to completion or the hindrance to the exercise of a power is a description which seems more appropriate to the psychical conditions of our pain in the second kind of case than to the physical conditions of it in the first. Further, there is this important difference between the two kinds of case, that the pleasures and pains of successful and unsuccessful effort require consciousness of the psychical conditions on which they apparently depend, but the pleasures of eating and drinking, or pains of hunger and thirst, do not require that we should know anything about their physical conditions of bodily restoration or wastage.

This difference is important for the following reason. It might be said that to feel pleasure in the consciousness of succeeding in one's efforts, pain in the consciousness that one is failing, is no mere empirical fact. Pleasure and pain are perhaps not the best words to use here; satisfaction or contentment, dissatisfaction or discontent, might be better; for the words pleasure and pain are used of sensible states with which we need by no means always be respectively satisfied or dissatisfied. But that to succeed or fail in the prosecution of a purpose should not *pro tanto* satisfy or dissatisfy may seem absurd. On the other hand, that the bodily restoration or wastage which physiologically condition the pleasures of eating and drinking on pains of hunger and thirst should not produce these feelings is in no way absurd, but merely contrary to fact.

Having noticed this important difference between the two kinds of case which commend this sort of formula about the conditions of

pleasure and pain, we may next observe that many occasions of pleasure and pain lend it no support. Among physical pleasures and pains (i.e. such are initiated by bodily changes or stimuli of which there is no need for us to be conscious; though, as Aristotle observed, the pleasures and pains themselves are never physical, being felt not by the body but by the soul),[1] besides those for which we *can* verify some bodily process of reparation or wastage, there are others whose physical conditions are not apparently a passage to completion or a thwarting of such passage. Even severance and destruction of tissue, in connection with which pain commonly arises, and which may interrupt some vital process or activity, are not themselves the conditions of the pain; for under anaesthetics, general or local, they may occur without pain. The pain depends on certain nerves which are put out of action by the anaesthetic; and it seems a violent hypothesis that when they are giving rise to pain some process in them is being hindered or thwarted. Again, if severance or destruction of tissue caused pain because it interrupted or hindered a pre-existing vital process or activity, it should also interrupt a previous pleasure; whereas generally the previous state has been more or less neutral in respect of feeling. There are certain very important rhythmic processes in the body, of pulse and breathing, which more almost than any other can be said to have each a beginning, middle and end, and so be each a distinct identifiable process of whose course one may say whether it has or has not proceeded unhindered to completion; and the interruption of these is often highly painful. But their unhindered course is not highly pleasant; any pleasure that may accompany it is barely noticed. And if we turn to pleasures and pains which, because they depend on our being first conscious of something other than themselves, we should call psychical and not physical, we by no means always find that that, or the consciousness on which they depend, is the success or unsuccess of our endeavours. We need have been making no attempt to get what it pleases us to become possessed of; gifts please, though not won as prizes. And pain is felt in losing what we have neither been struggling to keep nor perhaps ever made in the first instance any effort to acquire, e.g. one's parents. Nor need there have been any conscious desire for, as distinct from effort after, what it gives us pleasure to become possessed of; we may take pleasure in learning of an event which we had not been wanting to happen.

It might be suggested that in such cases an unconscious desire is gratified. Possibly; but desire is not a process of action which may be carried through or thwarted, for we may feel desires which we make no endeavour to gratify. May there not, however, where there is no overt action, be physiological concomitants of desire, "small

[1] *Eth. Nic.* X, iii, 6, 1173*b*, 7–11.

beginnings of motion within the body of man," as Hobbes put it,[1] and this perhaps yet more merely incipient when the desire is unconscious? If so the pleasure of successful endeavour might be regarded as arising from the continuance of these beginnings to completion; but it is hard to see how to learn of an event which we had unconsciously desired would involve any such continuance. It is doubtful also if Professor Stout's statement that "where psychological analysis fails, there is a fundamental analogy in the neural process concerned" will bear examination. "In baffled desire," it continues, "the process of return to equilibrium is in some way thwarted. In this case the neural process has a psychical counterpart which can be defined with reference to its commencement and to the end which it seeks. In the pain of tooth-ache, such psychological definition of the thwarted conation is not possible; but it remains permissible and even necessary to assume a failure to recover nervous equilibrium, owing to positive or negative conditions." Now if in baffled desire, or other cases where psychological analysis reveals a failure of conscious effort, a neural process in which there is failure to recover equilibrium were independently ascertained, we might perhaps venture to suppose that pains for which psychological analysis fails to reveal anything arise in connection with a failure to recover neural equilibrium similar to what was found corresponding with a failure of conscious effort. But first to infer the neural process from its so-called psychical counterpart in cases where psychological analysis discovers the latter, and then to infer a similar neural process in cases where it does not, seems neither permissible nor necessary, unless we say that it is necessary to the theory which is to be established; and that is to say that the theory on its physiological side has nothing to rest on except the assumption that the facts agree with it. Unfortunately the case is even worse than this. There are indeed, as we noticed, some rhythmic processes in the body, each of which might be held to constitute one "vital series"; and there are some stable conditions to which, if disturbed, the part concerned tends to return. But, if I am correctly informed, the continuous metabolisms of the body as a whole is not analysable into "vital series" of the kind required. It is these whose uninterrupted or interrupted course was to be the condition respectively of pleasure and pain. If they are not there, there is no course to be interrupted.

We may ask also what common features are referred to, when an analogy is alleged between a purposive and a neural process. Of course both take time, and any finite duration has a beginning and an end. But this does not make of the process occupying time a unity. For if so, since the duration can be divided into parts each with a beginning and an end, the parts of the process would each be

[1] *Leviathan*, ch. 6.

equally a unity. In psychological analysis we find distinct purposes holding together as unities the several parts into which the whole process of conscious life is divisible. But this cannot be done for the neural process. We may indeed as biologists reflect that the continuance of a species depends on individuals living until maturity and leaving offspring; and so we may speak of each individual life as a process completed if it continues till reproduction, and unified by that achievement, thwarted if brought earlier to an end. Even so the language of purpose is no more than metaphorical. But it is not in the completion or thwarting of that process as a whole that the neural conditions of pleasure and pain are to be looked for; and we cannot divide the whole process into parts such that biological reasons can be found for saying of every part, whether it has proceeded to completion or been thwarted. In the part there is mostly no such culmination, such as reproduction is for the whole, the reaching of which can be called the completion of the process. An argument from analogy therefore seems not only lacking; it would be unjustified if it were really used. To say that "where psychological analysis fails, there is a fundamental analogy in the neural process concerned" should mean that the neural process always exhibits a character only sometimes found in some corresponding psychical process; but the neural process seems to be inferred to be present in every case because the psychical is found to be present in only some, and we have now seen that, even if these cases be a neural process, it is really not of the same kind.

OBLIGATION AND RIGHTNESS

W. D. FALK, M.A.

BUTLER observes in the *Preface* to the *Sermons* that the subject of morals can be approached in two different ways: "One begins from enquiring into the abstract relations of things: the other from a matter of fact, namely what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to his whole nature. In the former method the conclusion is expressed thus, that vice is contrary to the nature and reason of things: in the latter, that it is a violation or breaking in upon our own nature. Thus they both lead us to the same thing, our obligations to the practice of virtue; and thus they exceedingly strengthen and enforce each other."[1] In making this observation Butler raises the problem of the nature of moral obligation, and of the criteria by which the existence of a moral obligation can be known. He does so by calling attention to the divisions of opinion which existed on this issue in his own days. Samuel Clarke, the fashionable moralist of the period, sought the roots of moral obligation in the "nature and reason of things": for an agent to know that an act is his duty is to know that it is *fitting or suitable to the circumstances in which it occurs*. Shaftesbury, on the other hand, and many of the adherents to the doctrine of Natural Law, like Grotius and Pufendorf, sought the roots of moral obligation in the nature of agents: for an agent, to know that an act is his duty is for him *to experience a special motive to do it*. Butler recognized the fundamental difference between these two approaches. His own sympathies were with the second. Man is a moral agent because he is capable of experiencing a motive for action of a special authoritative quality; he acts immorally when he disregards and violates this impulse essential to his own nature. "Your obligation to obey this law is its being the law of your own nature. That your conscience approves and attests to such a course of action is itself alone an obligation."[2] At the same time, Butler was conciliatory towards Clarke and his school. We can come to know that we have a duty in the one or the other way, either when we realize that an act would, when done, be of a certain kind, or when we realize that our nature demands it of us. "The first seems the more direct formal proof, and in some respects the least liable to cavil and dispute: the latter is in a peculiar manner adapted to

[1] Joseph Butler, *Sermons*, ed. by Gladstone, 6. [2] *Ibid.*, 71.

satisfy a fair mind: and is more easily applicable to the several particular relations and circumstances in life."[1]

Modern moralists also are aware of this distinction, but unlike Butler they do not regard both approaches as equally possible. The problem of the *Foundations of Ethics*, Sir David Ross writes, is to examine "whether what we may broadly call the objective, or what may be called the subjective view of obligation and values is the true one—whether they are rooted in the nature of things or are names expressive merely of human preferences, emotions or opinions."[2] Many modern moralists agree that this issue must be decided in favour of Clarke, this "not sufficiently regarded philosopher,"[3] and against Butler and the ancient tradition which he represents and develops. For, although Butler's views on obligation can hardly be described as "subjective" in the sense that he makes "mere preferences, emotions or opinions" constitutive of obligation, yet his doctrine must be classified as a kind of "subjective" or "attitude theory." Butler implied that an agent has a moral obligation when and because he is in some special manner prompted to act; and this amounts to saying that he is morally obliged when and because he is *in a certain state of mind* about an action open to him. What constitutes a moral obligation is a fact not *external*, but *internal* to an agent. All theories of this kind are generally repudiated to-day. It is thought that past attempts to elucidate the meaning of obligation have failed because it has been assumed that to have a duty is a state of affairs dependent on some state of the agent's mind. The modern view is the reverse. Acts are obligations, not because agents are in some manner prompted to do them, but in virtue of a characteristic which they possess whatever the agent's attitude or feelings.

I shall be concerned in this paper with the examination of this view in the form which Sir David Ross has given to it in the *Foundations*. He rejects it in its *utilitarian* form. The characteristic that constitutes the duty to do an action cannot be its *goodness*; it is its *rightness* or *fittingness in relation to a situation*. My object in this paper is to show that this view is no more acceptable than the one to which it is opposed. To say that an act is a duty is to say that an *agent* has a duty to do it; and this, I think, is to say neither that an *act* is *good* nor that it is *right* or *fitting in relation to a situation*. Hence, I shall argue, that the substitution of "rightness" or "fittingness" for "goodness" is not a substantial improvement on the utilitarian analysis of obligation, and, moreover, that the failure is due to the defects which all forms of what might be called the "external fact" analysis of obligation have in common.

[1] Joseph Butler, *Sermons*, ed. by Gladstone, 6.
[2] *Foundations of Ethics*, 327. [3] *Ibid.*, 52.

Before I examine Sir David Ross's views one initial difficulty must be noted. It is that any analysis of obligation must take account of the fact that this term is used in different contexts. We speak not only of agents "having obligations," but also of acts "being obligations" or "being obligatory," and of the thought of acts "creating obligations." Hence, no analysis of obligation is complete which, while it apparently succeeds in defining the use of the term in one context fails to give it a corresponding meaning in the others. However, Sir David Ross devotes the greater part of his analysis to only one of the contexts in which the term is used. He discusses at length what it is *to be an obligation* or *to be obligatory*, but such an important expression as *having an obligation* finds no more than passing reference. I shall, therefore, first examine his views on the *obligatoriness of actions*, and only subsequently consider what views on the *obligedness of agents* are implied by them.

Now, according to Sir David Ross, when we say an act is *obligatory* we are saying the same or "very nearly the same" as when we say it is *right*. What differences there are he regards as "not very important."[1] He speaks throughout of acts as "right or obligatory," freely substituting one term for the other in the same argument. I shall deal briefly with his analysis of rightness in what he considers the moral use of the term. When we say that an act is right we can ask: right for what? In relation to what then are acts *morally* right? Moral rightness is not rightness for the attainment of *ends*, whether they be the agent's own ends or the ends of others affected by his actions and omissions. Such rightness is merely "utilitarian suitability." Moral rightness, on the other hand, consists in some *special* fittingness or suitability of the act to the *situation* in which it occurs, that is in the capability of the act, if joined to a situation, to make it whole or complete in a manner not further definable, but analogous to the capability of one feature in a painting to contribute, together with others, to the making of an aesthetic whole. It is unnecessary for our purpose to enter further into this view, though not everybody may think it plain that there really is a special fittingness of acts to situations which is not fittingness to the ends or expectations of sentient beings in this situation. It is sufficient to note that, for Sir David Ross, moral rightness is some property belonging to *acts in relation to a situation*; and our problem is whether obligatoriness can be identified with a property of this *kind*.

In equating obligatoriness and moral rightness Sir David Ross can draw support from common speech. People do use the expressions "y is a duty" and "y is right" indiscriminately, and popular discussions are more often about what acts are right than about what acts are duties. But this is not to say that popular usage always

[1] *Foundations of Ethics*, pp. 43, 44.

identifies obligatoriness with moral rightness, and moral rightness with fittingness to situations. What people often mean by calling an act morally right is not that it is *fitting to a situation*, but simply that it is *conformable to a prior moral law or duty*. They call it *morally* right, because it is right in relation to what they *ought* to do. On this view, the moral rightness of acts depends on their prior obligatoriness, and hence cannot be identical with it; nor on this view can moral rightness be *ipso facto* identical with the fittingness of acts to situations, for, whether fitting acts are morally right, would depend on whether they are also obligatory.

I do not deny, however, that sometimes the expressions "obligatory," "morally right," and "suitable to a situation" are used synonymously. It is not uncommonly implied in conversation that the obligatoriness of an act, say of subscribing to war-loan, *consists* in its suitability to the condition of a country at war. The "obligatory" is here taken to be the same as the "suitable" or "right thing to do." There is no need to dispute the fact of this usage, but it does not follow that reflection can sanction it; that is, that the obligatoriness of acts can consistently be identified with their fittingness to situations. It may be that people who use words in this way do so merely because they have come to take it for granted that "suitability" is the sole *ground* of their duties.

But common usage apart, it is surprising that Sir David Ross should identify obligatoriness with fittingness to situations: for he also accepts Professor Prichard's view that, strictly speaking, the expression "an act is obligatory" is an illegitimate one,[1] a view which implies that "an act is obligatory" and "an act is fitting to a situation" cannot mean the same.

We are all familiar with Professor Prichard's argument. A characteristic, he says, can only be attributed to a thing that exists; and while it makes sense to attribute *rightness* to an act *when* it occurs or *if* it occurred, it is senseless to attribute *obligatoriness* to acts on these conditions. For acts could only be obligatory prior to their occurrence, and whether they in fact occur or not. It follows that obligatoriness cannot be attributed to acts at all. All that we can do is to attribute to agents the characteristic of "having an obligation."[2]

Now, Sir David Ross, as we have said, accepts this argument, but he accepts it without mentioning that it applies only to *obligatoriness* and not to *rightness*. There is in fact no difficulty in saying that an act is right or fitting when it occurs, or would be so if it did. Only obligatoriness, not rightness, cannot enter into the description of an accomplished act. Here then we have a serious objection to regarding obligatoriness and rightness as the same, or "very nearly

[1] *Foundations of Ethics*, 56. [2] *Duty and Ignorance of Fact*, pp. 26–27.

the same." If these two terms really are interchangeable and the one can be used to qualify acts, the other must allow of the same usage; but if there are logical difficulties in applying the one term to acts where there are none in applying the other it follows that the two terms have different meanings.

A closer study of the point raised by Professor Prichard will show why obligatoriness must have a different signification from rightness. The term *obligatory*, as commonly used, conceals a double meaning. According to the *Oxford Dictionary*, it means either that which "imposes" or "creates" an obligation or that which "constitutes" an obligation, or "must be done." Let us call the power of imposing obligations *obligingness*, the property of being that which must be done *obligatoriness*. It will then be plain that there are difficulties in applying either term to acts.

Language itself will not allow us to speak of "obliging acts." Plainly, an *act* cannot impose an obligation, for, before its occurrence it is not there to oblige, and, when it occurs it can oblige no longer. It does not follow, however, that *obligatory* in this sense has *no* application. *Acts*, it is true, cannot impose obligations, but the *thought* of acts if entertained by an agent can. For the thought of an act can exist whether the act of which it is the thought will ever exist or not, and we can attribute the power to "impose an obligation" to the idea or conception of an act when present to an agent's mind even if we cannot attribute it to the act itself. It follows that obligingness and rightness are different characteristics. The first qualifies only the idea of an act of an already given description, while the second enters into the description of the act itself. Both are relational characteristics, but they hold between different terms: the one between the *idea of an act* and an *agent*, the other between an *accomplished act* and its *environment*. Hence, to know that the *thought* of an act is obliging is distinct from knowing that an *act* of the kind thought of would also be right. For if we think that an act would harmonize with a situation when it was done our thinking so does not depend on whether we also think that the idea of it is obliging for agents before it is done; and even if it so happened that the thought of none but right acts were obliging, their rightness could be no more than a *ground* of the obligingness of the thought of them: it could not be *constitutive* of it. Thus no proposition about rightness or fittingness is equivalent to a proposition about obligingness; and no analysis of the meaning of the one term offers *ipso facto* a clue to the meaning of the other.

We come now to the second meaning of obligatory, that by which we describe *ought-to-be-doneness* as opposed to *obligingness*. The difficulties of attributing this characteristic to acts are similar though

not quite the same. It is evident that an *act* cannot be said to *impose* a duty, but it is perhaps less plain why we should not say that it *is* a duty. And yet Professor Prichard argues convincingly that "being a duty" cannot be the attribute of an *act,* for the act, if or when it is done, would no longer be obligatory, and, before it is done, there is no act of which obligatoriness could be predicated. Nor can we attribute obligatoriness in this sense to the thought of an act, for plainly we do not think that what ought to be done is the *thought of an act,* but an *act.* The difficulty in this case is due to the fact that the verbal likeness between "y is right" and "y is obligatory" conceals a logical difference. When we say that charitable actions are *right* we attribute to them a characteristic which belongs to them whenever they come into existence. But when we say that they are *duties* we refer to a state of affairs which preceeds their occurrence, and which concerns some relation between agents and the bringing into being of such actions. To say "y is obligatory" is not to *add* anything to the description of y *when accomplished*: it is to assert that an act of a *given* description is *what an agent is obliged to do.* Hence, though we can say "y is obligatory," this is not properly an assertion about the act y, but about the agent who has a duty to do y. The state of affairs which we describe is no different whether we say "y is what X ought to do," or "X ought to do y," and the latter expression is the correct one. In either case the subject of predication is X, who exists here and now, and it is of him that it is asserted that he ought to do y. We may of course substitute "y is what X ought to do" for "X ought to do y," but in making this substitution we reverse only the order of words, not the order between *subject* and *predicate.* We are still thinking of a state of affairs where an agent X has a duty to do an act y, and we are merely stressing the object of his duty by saying that y is what he ought to do: we are not attributing "being a duty" to a non-existing act y. In the same manner, we may for the sake of emphasis substitute "rain is what we need" for "we need rain": but in so doing we do not attribute "what we need" to a non-existing "rain." It follows that assertions about *obligatoriness* cannot be analysed simply into assertions about *rightness.* For to say that an act is right is to say that it would be of a certain kind when accomplished, while to say that it is obligatory is no more than to say obliquely that *an agent has an obligation to do it.*

We conclude, then, that the term *obligatory* is and can be used in two different ways, but that in neither of these ways is it used as synonymous with *right.* If there is *any* connection between obligation and rightness the connection must be between "*X has an obligation to do y*" and "doing y is right."

We must now examine whether we can in fact identify "X has an obligation to do y" with "doing y is right." It is evident that, for Sir David Ross, this identification must be of paramount importance. He plainly must regard these two expressions as having the same meaning, for otherwise he could not both accept Professor Prichard's views on *obligatoriness*, and continue to equate *obligatory* and *right*. But, as we shall see, it is by no means evident that "X has an obligation to do y" can be identified with "doing y is right"; and if this is what Sir David Ross wishes to maintain it is incumbent on him to show how the one expression can be translated into the other. As far as I can see, however, no explicit analysis of the rules which should govern this translation is offered anywhere in the *Foundations*. The expression "having a duty" is only mentioned casually, and it is not easy to see how it is meant to be understood. Certain inferences, however, are possible, and to them I shall now turn.

In this connection we have first to note that common speech does connect the expressions "X ought to do y" and "doing y is morally right," but also that this usage allows of more than one interpretation. We have already seen that by the *moral rightness* of an act we do often mean its *conformity to a duty* prior to it. On this view, it is true, "X ought to do y" entails "doing y is morally right," though even then the two expressions have not literally the same meaning. The first denotes that an agent has a duty to do y, the second that if he did y he would do that which fulfills his duty. The two expressions refer to two distinct states of affairs, one which actually exists, the other which would exist only in certain hypothetical circumstances. Moreover, knowledge of the one, the agent's duty, is *logically prior* to knowledge of the other, the moral rightness of his prospective acts. On the other hand, it is true, we can convey the same meaning by using the one or other expression, yet, not because both describe the same state of affairs, but because the second is so defined as to be entailed by the first.

Thus, there is some connection between "X ought to do y" and "doing y is right," but our intrepretation of this connection is very different from that which Sir David Ross must give to it. On his view, acts are morally right not because an agent had a duty to do them, but because they are suitable to his environment; and to say that he has a duty is *tantamount* to saying that some action would be suitable. But, *prima facie*, there seems no equivalence at all between saying "a charitable action would be suitable to this situation" and "X has a duty to do a charitable action." For it is obscure what exactly we predicate of the *agent* here and now when we assert that an *action* if, or when, it occurred would have a certain property.

There may, however, be a way to overcome this difficulty. Actions are done by agents, and some, like acts of promise keeping or showing gratitude, would only be suitable to the situation if *certain* agents did them, while others, like acts of charity, would be suitable to the situation *whoever* did them. Hence, when we assert that certain actions would be suitable to a situation we *ipso facto* assert that some agent or agents would act suitably if they did them. If charitable actions would be right, then, X's charitable action would be right; and this we can also express by saying "X would do right if he acted charitably," or "X is in a position such, that if he did a charitable action he would do what would be right." Here, then, we have an assertion about the present condition of an agent which is implied by an assertion about the nature of a hypothetical action; and this *might* be considered formally equivalent to the expression "X has a duty to do a charitable action."

There is nevertheless a difficulty. Sir David Ross himself points out we only say "X has a duty to do y" if doing y is not only right for the situation, but also within the power of X. Plainly, the fact that X is unable to relieve suffering would not prevent an act of relief being *right* in relation to somebody who suffered pain, but it would prevent it being an *obligation* for X: X would only be obliged to relieve the pain if he thought that doing so was also within his power. Hence, when we say that X thinks he has a duty we cannot merely mean that he thinks y would be right if it were done, or that he would do right if he did y. We must mean both this, and that he thinks he could actually do y. This, as far as I can see, is the only way in which we can try to make "X has a duty" very nearly the same as "doing y is right." We must be prepared to say that to have a duty is *to be confronted with the possibility of doing what when done would be right, or fitting to a situation.*

Our next task is to examine whether "having a duty" can in fact be interpreted in this way, but before we turn to this we must note another point. The fact is that Sir David Ross never *explicitly* identifies "having an obligation" with "being confronted with the possibility of a fitting action." He identifies "doing y is fitting" with "doing y is obligatory," and the latter with "X has a duty to do y." But he never acknowledges that in doing so he implies that "X has a duty" means "X would do what is fitting if he did y and he could do y." On the contrary, on the few occasions when he speaks of "having a duty" he interprets this expression somewhat differently. To have a duty, he says, is to be confronted with a *moral claim*, or to have an action *called for* of us. Thus, to have a *prima facie* obligation is to have a claim existing against oneself such as a claim for the restitution of property or the fulfilment of a promise; and we *create* a new obligation when we give a

promise in as much as in giving it we create a moral claim against ourselves.

I do not want to exaggerate the difference between this interpretation and the previous one. Plainly, they are related. To be confronted with a *moral* claim is, on Sir David Ross's premises, to be confronted with a claim to which an act of fulfilment would be fitting; and to be confronted with the possibility of a fitting action is, as he frequently implies, to be confronted with the possibility of an action fitting to a claim. Nevertheless, I think, there is some difference. For, on the one view, to know that we have a duty would be to know that we *could* do a fitting action, while, on the other, it would be to know that we are *called upon* to do it. Hence, on the one view, we have a duty when we are faced with a *possibility*, on the other, when we are faced with a *demand* or *necessity*. Sometimes, Sir David Ross himself seems to attach importance to this difference, as when he says that we come to recognize what is our duty "first *rather vaguely* as suitable to a situation, and then with *more urgency* as called for by the situation";[1] but at other times he treats the difference as merely a matter of language.[2] I think the difference between these two interpretations of "having a duty" is important enough to justify their separate examination. I do not consider that either is sufficiently in accord with common usage to be acceptable, but certain objections apply only to the one and not to the other. I shall now turn to this examination beginning with the first interpretation.

Of the two interpretations, I think, the defects of the first are more easily apparent. It amounts to saying that an agent knows he has a duty when and because he knows *he could suit his environment if he would*, and to accept this as an account of moral obligation is confounding common usage. When we say that X is obliged to do y, we are implying not merely that it is *open* to X to do y, but also that in some manner it is *not open to X to do anything else*. We are referring to some imperative necessity, not to a bare possibility of action. Admittedly, this necessity is not a merely physical one, for an agent can think himself obliged, and yet not do what he ought to do. Moral necessitation is certainly different from mere physical necessitation. But, whatever the nature of moral necessitation may be, the essence of moral obligation cannot be accounted for without it. To have a duty is to be faced with some present categorical demand to act, and no theory which seeks to interpret obligation in terms

[1] *Foundations of Ethics*, 170 (my italics).

[2] *Ibid.*, 315. "When we face a moral situation, what we see first is the existence of component suitabilities, or responsibilities, or claims, or prima facie obligations—whichever language we prefer."

of the fittingness of hypothetical acts to situations can account for this. The perception of *suitabilities* could only be associated with the perception of *moral obligations* if it led, in turn, to the perception of something else, that is of an imperative necessity or categorical demand *to do what would be suitable.* These two states of affairs would be distinct even if it so happened that perception of the one were always followed by perception of the other. They require separate analysis, and what connection there may be between them cannot be taken for granted. The judgement "X ought to do what is right for a situation" is *not analytic,* but *synthetic.* Anybody to whom it was pointed out that if he did y he would do what would be right or fitting and that he could do y, would still be at liberty to deny that he had a *duty* to do y, until he was further convinced of some present *imperative necessity* to do so.

We must now consider the second view of "having an obligation," implicit in the *Foundations.* It is, I think, a more plausible account of obligation as a fact external to agents than the first, for it suggests both that to be obliged consists in being confronted with some present need or necessity of acting, and that this need or necessity inheres in the situation. There can be a claim on an agent in a situation, whatever his own state of mind; and this state of affairs contains the element of *command* normally associated with obligation. Moreover, such a view finds some support in common usage. People speak of their obligations or responsibilities towards their neighbours or their office, meaning that these confront them with demands which it would be right to fulfil. Again, they speak of their financial obligations, meaning that the payment of certain sums is required of them; and of entering into obligations, meaning that they are creating new demands upon themselves. Hence, it seems plausible to say that what *constitutes a duty is the existence of an external claim.*

Now it is of the essence of this view that it implies the severance of any link between "having a duty to do y" and having, for this reason any manner of motive or incentive to do y. In order to hold it we must maintain that to think we have a duty is merely to think that an action is *externally required* of us: we are, therefore, obliged whether we are *internally constrained* to do the act in question or not. Such is the case, even if the claim which constitutes the obligation is thought to be a specifically *moral* one, or one which it would be *right* to fulfil. For, a "moral claim," on Sir David Ross's premises, is no more than a claim with a characteristic once more external to the agent, that is a claim to which an accomplished act of fulfilment would be peculiarly fitting; and it is conceivable for an agent to know that he is confronted with a claim of this kind, and yet to feel honestly indifferent, or even averse to its satisfaction.

On this view, then, to "have an obligation" is to be faced with a need or demand for action purely *external* to ourselves; and this implies we can know our duty without having, for this reason alone, *any sufficient cause for doing* the act which is our duty; for we have no sufficient cause for doing anything without the actual presence of some inward incentive or impelling motive to do it; and we are incapable of exerting ourselves in any particular direction if the thought of doing so leaves us totally unaffected, if not totally averse. Hence, to know that an act is our duty is not yet to have any sufficient cause to do it; and we could only do our duty if it so happened that our knowledge coincided with a separate impulse to do it. Sir David Ross himself notes this implication. He refers to the familiar fact that "people often know or think an act to be their duty, and yet do not do it"; and he adds that "they will do it only if in addition to knowing or thinking it to be their duty they are impelled with a certain degree of intensity towards the doing of duty";[1] that is, if apart from knowing their duty they also have a separate impulse to do it, an impulse which except for its object is like any other.

Now, I think, this view of obligation, like the previous one, fails to account for some essential features of the common meaning of the term. We commonly expect that in thinking ourselves obliged we *ipso facto* feel some constraint to do what we think we ought to do;[2] and that we cannot neglect our known duty without disregarding a prompting whose influence we had previously felt. But if the known presence of an external claim is sufficient to constitute a duty, then, we can know we are obliged to an action without, *ipso facto*, perceiving any internal need to do it; and we can neglect our known duty without even the possibility of feeling remorse. Moreover, an agent can then know himself obliged to an action, and yet know that neither he nor anybody else can reasonably *expect* him to do it; and this conflicts with the principle that *ought implies can.*

Now, Sir David Ross acknowledges this principle in another context. He agrees that, actually, in order to have a duty we must not

[1] *Foundations of Ethics*, 226–227.

[2] Hume makes this point forcibly: "If morality had naturally no influence on human passions and actions, it were in vain to take such pains to inculcate it; and nothing could be more fruitless than that multitude of rules and precepts with which all moralists abound. Philosophy is commonly divided into *speculative* and *practical*; and as morality is always comprehended under the latter division, it is supposed to influence our passions and actions and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgement of the understanding. And this is confirmed by common experience which informs us that men are often governed by their duties, and are deterred from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impelled to others by that of obligation."—A *Treatise of Human Nature*, Vol. II, 166, Everyman's Library.

only be confronted by a claim, but must also know or think that we are so confronted, for otherwise we could not be expected to satisfy it. But, if this is granted, mere knowledge of an *external* demand for y can still not constitute a *duty* to do y: for such knowledge does not, *ipso facto*, provide us with any *incentive*, and we have argued that as long as an incentive is lacking we shall be unable to act. It is true, he allows that in order to *do* our duty, as distinct from *knowing* that we have it, we must also have a separate desire to do it, but this admission is not enough. For as long as it is maintained that knowing that an act is a duty is *distinct* from feeling any kind of incentive to do it, it is also maintained that we can be obliged to actions which for lack of any incentive no one can reasonably expect us to do.

Nor, I think, could this position be amended by granting that in order to be actually or "subjectively" obliged we must both know our duty *and* desire to do it. On such a view, to know that y is a duty would be to know that y is what is claimed of us *and* that we desire y because we desire to do what is claimed of us. But this cannot be the same as to know that we are *morally obliged* to do y. To be moved to pay bills because doing so is an act of a kind which is *desired* is indistinguishable from any other state of desiring except by its object. It is to be moved *simply* by inclination, and it is not different in *this* respect from desiring to take another's purse because we desire to get his money. But it is commonly agreed that when we are moved to do what is our duty we are not simply in a state of desiring, but are moved by an impulse which carries with it some sense of imperative necessity. Hence we could only be *obliged* to pay our bills because doing so is claimed of us, if the thought of doing what is claimed of us were itself not merely accompanied by desire, but by a special sense of feeling *constrained* to do so. And if this were the case, the reason why we *ought* to pay our bills would not be in the bare fact that we know that this is claimed of us, but in the additional fact that we know it to be *inwardly demanded* of us to satisfy external claims.

I conclude that to know we are required to pay our bills or to keep our promises is not *ipso facto* to know that we are morally obliged to do so. We only have moral obligations when we know that actions are categorically demanded of us, and this demand must be internal and not merely external to ourselves: for only then would the knowledge that doing an action is a duty be identical with the knowledge of a sufficient reason for doing it. But to know that others have claims upon us is not yet to know that we are internally committed to satisfy these claims: and hence the judgement that we ought to do what is externally required of us, like the judgement that we ought to do what would be right for a

situation, is *not analytic*, but *synthetic*. The known presence of an external demand can be the ground of a duty, but it cannot of itself constitute a duty.

The conclusion that "having a duty" must be a state of being inwardly determined to action can be confirmed by another consideration. It is an implication of the "external fact" analysis of obligation that it is not essential for *judgements* about moral obligations to have an influence on him whose actions they concern, and who accepts them as true. Discussions about duty would be about no more than the existence of claims, or the characteristics of hypothetical actions; and even if we convinced another of his duty we should only convince him of the existence of a state of affairs external to himself. We should, therefore, not have necessarily affected his inward attitude or brought him one whit nearer to feeling an incentive to do what he ought to do. But in fact when we try to convince another that he ought to pay his bills, we expect our argument if accepted to effect some change of heart in him, though it may still not change his outward actions. Discussions about moral problems are commonly carried on in the belief that in proving our point, and having it assented to, we shall provide one another with motives or "exciting reasons" (Hutcheson) for doing what otherwise we should not have been ready to do. We should think it odd to receive the answer: "Yes, I know now *that* and *why* I ought to pay my bills, but I am still without any incentive for doing so, and I, therefore, have as little cause for paying them as I had before I knew I ought to."

But the fact that this answer appears odd is evidence that judgements about moral obligations bring to light some internal necessity of acting, and not merely the existence of a state of affairs external to ourselves. For only such judgements can *essentially* have an influence on people's readiness to act, while the latter have such influence if at all only *incidentally*. Thus, we make a judgement about an internal practical necessity when we say: "The thought of you paying your bills could not fail to move you if you considered the matter fully and impartially"; and we make a judgement about an external state of affairs when we say: "Paying bills is fulfilling expectations," or "to go out in the rain is to get wet." The first kind of judgement is essentially practical since we cannot verify it and accept it as true of ourselves without actually *testing* our own reactions under conditions of full and impartial consideration; and when we do so we *ipso facto* come into the very state of mind with which the judgement was concerned. To realize that, if I reflected, I should feel ready to do y is at that moment to experience a readiness to do y which I did not feel before. The second kind of

judgement is essentially theoretical and non-committal, and what practical effects it may have are no more than incidental to it. It *may* prompt me to pay my bills, but it *need* not do so. The thought of fulfilling expectations by paying bills may be such as to leave me indifferent, or I may fail to draw what practical conclusions can be drawn from it, e.g. that "since I want to fulfil expectations, and paying my bills is fulfilling expectations, I must on reflection be ready to pay my bills."

Thus, if judgements about moral obligations are by common consent practical, they cannot merely concern the existence of claims or of any other state of affairs purely external to the agent. For the judgement that "y is required of me by the situation," or that "y would be suitable to the situation" can have no more *direct* and *unequivocal* influence on my readiness to do y, than the judgement "it is raining hard" can have on my readiness to take an umbrella or to stay at home. The only judgements which directly and unequivocally exhibit new motives to actions are judgements about an agent's readiness on reflection to do one thing rather than another; and if judgements about obligations are expected to have this effect, they must be judgements of this *kind*. They must be concerned with exhibiting the presence of a special kind of motive: with reminding ourselves or others that on reflection we must be prompted categorically to do certain actions or to refrain from others.

We are now in a position to view Sir David Ross's doctrine as a whole. We must conclude that it fails in its purpose. It does not offer an acceptable account of *obligation* in terms of *rightness in relation to a situation*. We have seen that to say that an *act is obligatory* is neither the same nor very nearly the same as to say that an act is right; and, moreover, we have seen that to say that an *agent has an obligation* is different from saying either that he could do what would be right, or that he is externally required to do what would be right. We cannot but think that when we are morally obliged we are in some manner *inwardly constrained*, and not merely surrounded by the pieces of a cosmic jig-saw puzzle which we could fit together if we would, or by foreign claims made on us by God, man, or situations. Our objective situation is no doubt relevant to the knowledge of our duties for it contains their grounds. But, in order to know how we ought to meet our environment we must turn into ourselves and enquire what relation exists between the thought of those actions which the situation proffers, and our own impulses to do what we could do, or what is demanded of us. This point, I think, is overlooked not merely by Sir David Ross, but by *anybody* who seeks the essence of obligation in a characteristic that belongs not to ourselves, but to our prospective actions. The essence of having

an obligation consists in some inward condition of being determined to action; and any "external fact" analysis of obligation must fail, in my opinion, precisely because it separates the obligation to action from the internal conditions which determine to action.

I have come to the end of my critical review, but I cannot conclude without proffering some remarks about the alternative account of obligation entailed by it.

Here it is interesting to note that the belief that obligations are independent existents is in some manner fostered by the suggestiveness of language. "Having an obligation" or "being under an obligation" suggests a state of affairs existing for an agent, yet not merely in relation to him. But to "have an obligation" is not like "having money in the bank"; to be "under an obligation" is not like being "under a shower" or "in the water." If anything it is like "having an impulse," "having an obsession," or "being in trouble." For the second set of expressions we can substitute assertions about individual states of mind, like "being impelled," "being obsessed" or "being troubled," for the first we cannot. I have no doubt that "having an obligation" ranks with the second. The possibility of substituting for it the expression "being obliged" is a clear clue to this. Strictly speaking, there is nothing that can be called *an obligation*. What we think of when we use the term is *that agents are obliged to actions by the thought of them*, or *that the thought of actions obliges agents to do them*. We think not of an *entity*, but of a *relation* between agents, the thought of actions, and the doing of actions.

It is plain from the preceding argument what species of relation this must be. When we think we are *obliged*, we think of a relation of sequence in the order of events: between the idea of an action (of an act of thinking, choosing, willing, or moving any of our limbs) and consequent changes in ourselves, beginning with a change in our inward dispositions and terminating in favourable conditions in mental or bodily events which, if they corresponded to our anticipations, would be our action. *Moral obligation* is a relation of *prompting to action* between the thought of an act and an agent, or of *being prompted to action* between an agent and the thought of an act. To oblige is to affect, to be obliged is to be affected. Obligation is a species of the relation of *cause and effect* as applied to human agents and their actions.

This view will appear less bold if we recall its provenance. It was held, at least implicitly, by many adherents to the doctrine of Natural Law. An obligation, Pufendorf wrote, is "a moral operative quality, by which a man is bound to perform somewhat or to suffer somewhat." It is a "moral necessity to perform, or admit, or undergo anything," and "although there are many other things which have

an influence on the will in bending it towards one side, rather than the contrary, yet *obligation* has this peculiar force beyond them all, that whereas they only press the will with a kind of natural weight or load, on the removal of which it returns of its own accord to its former indifference, *obligation* affects the will in a *moral* way, and inspires it inwardly with such a particular sense, as compels it to pass censure itself on its own actions."[1] Again, Hume conceived of *obligatoriness* as a relation between the thought of actions and an agent's will; and he concluded that because this relation is a *causal* one it cannot be *demonstrable* that "the measures of right and wrong;" that is Samuel Clarke's "natural fitness and unfitness of things" are "universally forcible and obligatory."[2] Furthermore, Kant's ethics rest on the principle that a duty is a categorical *determination of an agent's will*: the problem of a *Critique of Practical Reason* is to discover how pure reason can become the cause of such a determination. The moral law embodies an "objective practical necessity of certain actions" and it is called a "law of freedom" rather than a "law of nature" because human agents are necessarily determined to follow the course which it prescribes only as long as their reason prevails over their uncontrolled impulses.

There is, then, some support for the kind of view on obligation which is here suggested, though I shall not deny that it has its own as yet unsolved difficulties. To be obliged is to be inwardly determined to action, but we are not morally obliged *whenever* we are inwardly determined. Being morally obliged must be distinguishable from merely being impelled, being urged, or feeling inclined. It is being inwardly determined with a special disinterestedness, imperativeness, and a necessity which is as yet other than purely physical: in a manner which allows an agent to say *here I stand, I cannot do otherwise*.

With the analysis of this *special manner* of being inwardly determined I am not here concerned. May be, Butler was right in saying that to be morally obliged is to be prompted to action by a unique principle of "conscience or reflection," or Kant that it is to be necessarily determined as the result of a free exertion of pure practical reason. Or it may be right to say, as I myself would argue, that for an agent to be morally obliged is *to be prompted in a given situation by the thought of that action which, on full reflection and when he is honest with himself, proves unalterably more impelling than the thought of any rival one.*[3] Whether any of these views is the correct one, this is not the place to enquire. All that I am concerned to emphasize is that moral obligation must be defined in terms of some such state

[1] Pufendorf, *Of the Law of Nature and Nations*, English translation, 1703, 47.
[2] *Op. cit.*, 174.
[3] *Vide* my paper on *Morals Without Faith*, Philosophy, April 1944.

of affairs. The nature of the things which we are obliged to do contains only the *grounds*, but not yet the *essence* of moral obligation. What alone can render a prospective action obligatory is that an agent is in some special manner impelled to do it, or that he thinks he would be so impelled if he reflected.

The distinction between the *essence* of moral obligation and its *grounds* has preoccupied moralists ever since Professor Prichard raised the problem more than thirty years ago,[1] but, if the preceding argument is correct, then I think it is evident that it has not yet been carried far enough. Professor Prichard observed that to say of an act that it would be *good* or have *good consequences* is not the same as to say that anybody has a *duty* to do good acts. With this I fully agree. Goodness belongs to our acts or their consequences: it is the fruit of accomplishment. But a moral obligation to do good acts belongs to ourselves before we have done anything; and it consists solely in the imperative force with which the thought of doing what is good prompts us to bring it into existence. Hence, what makes the good act a duty is not the bare fact that it would be good when done, but the fact that the thought of it is related to ourselves in a special manner; and even if it were the case that ultimately none but good acts were obligatory, their goodness would be no more than the *ground* of a separate obligation to do them. The failure to observe this point is the main defect of the classical tradition in morals.

The same argument applies to rightness or fittingness. We have advanced no step further towards distinguishing the goodness of acts from the *duty* to do them by merely distinguishing their *goodness* from their rightness. It is true that rightness, as Sir David Ross understands it, is a characteristic of acts which is wider than their goodness; and he is, therefore, entitled to say that goodness is only one of the grounds which make acts right or fitting. But we should not be saying that we *ought* to do an act merely by saying that it would be *right* any more than by saying that it would be *good*. For whether we mean by rightness the capability of an act to harmonize with situations or its suitability to the ends or nature of others or of the agent himself, its rightness like its goodness belongs to it for its properties when accomplished. And though the anticipation of these properties in thought, like that of goodness, can become the *ground* of an obligation to do right acts, the *essence* of having a duty to do them can no more consist in their rightness than in their goodness.

Hence, there is no justification for singling out any special kind of rightness as a specifically *moral* one merely because it is a pecu-

[1] *Does Moral Philosophy rest on a Mistake? Mind*, 1912.

liar property of certain acts. The only reason for which acts can be called *moral* or *immoral* is that the thought of them is the ground of a prior duty to do or to forbear to do them: as long as they are considered in their own nature alone there is no more morality or immorality in charity, faithfulness or justice, than in fraud, cruelty or treachery. And, at any rate without further evidence, there is no reason for assuming that nothing but the thought of a unique fittingness of acts to situations—if we are prepared to accept this expression as the description of anything real at all—can be the ground of a moral obligation to do them. Anybody willing to maintain this must show it to be demonstrably certain that the thought of fitting acts and no other must *cause* human agents to feel categorically impelled: the *onus probandi* rests with him.

The only acts which are *ipso facto* morally right are those whose rightness is not the *ground* of a prior duty to do them, but which are called right simply because they are the *fulfilment of a duty*. This, I have indicated, is a common, if unsophisticated, use of this term, and in fact I think it is the one most in accord with common usage. But here it is plain that morals can gain nothing from approaching the problem of obligation by way of that of moral rightness. For moral rightness in this sense denotes nothing but the conformity of an accomplished act to something *moral* prior to it, that is a duty to do it: and by investigating the rightness of a *right action* we shall receive no more information about the nature of duty, than by investigating the rightness of a *right answer* we shall receive information about the nature of truth. The primary task of moral philosophy is to analyse what it is for agents to have moral duties, and we have to conclude that the analysis of rightness in *any* sense of the term offers no more of a clue to this than that of goodness. Those in sympathy with the *deontological* approach, first fully adopted by Kant, and revived by Professor Prichard have stopped short of this last conclusion.

Nor can morals gain anything from approaching the problem of obligation by way of the study of external claims or commands. To have a duty is to be internally required or commanded, and external requirements or commands can, once more, be no more than the *grounds* of a duty to satisfy them.

Strictly speaking it is therefore incorrect to say that when we incur debts, or give promises we *create* new obligations for ourselves. What we create are demands or expectations on the part of other people concerning ourselves such as demands for repayment, or the expectation to see a promise fulfilled. But we cannot directly create moral obligations since we have no power of *causing* the thought of these demands or expectations to move us imperatively if it be not in our nature to be so moved by it. In fact, it mostly so happens

that the thought of satisfying demands of our own making is also categorically impelling. Yet, it is not the *obligation* which is of our own making, but the *demand* which is its ground; and it is therefore not tautologous to say that we are obliged to honour our own commitments.

I grant, that "I have a moral obligation" and "I am confronted with a *moral* claim" may be used with the same meaning, but this depends on what is meant by a "moral claim." It would not be used with the same meaning if by moral claim is meant a claim to which an act of fulfilment would be *peculiarly fitting*. For, whether a claim of this description is also the ground of an obligation to satisfy it, depends, as we have seen, not merely on the nature of the claim and the effects of satisfying it, but on some further relation between the thought of it and an agent. In fact, when we speak of people's *moral claims* or of *rights* which they have against others, we commonly mean no more than that they have claims which others have a duty to fulfil; and then, plainly, to have a duty and to have a moral claim against oneself is one and the same.

Hence, common usage is justified in regarding the incurring of debts or the giving of promises as the creation of moral claims against ourselves, but only because, when we create the claims, a duty to satisfy them is presupposed. Without a prior duty no external claim or demand, whether created by ourselves or not, constitutes as yet an obligation: even the commands of God could only constitute moral obligations for somebody who considered it a *law unto himself* to respect what God bids him to do. For the command of a superior is an *external* fact, while the duty to obey it can only be a fact *internal* to the recipient.

PHYSICAL AGENCIES AND THE DIVINE PERSUASION

MAUD BODKIN, M.A.

THE intention of this article is to examine the concept of the Divine persuasion as presented within the system of Dr. A. N. Whitehead. An attempt will be made to indicate the distinctive value of the concept in relation to certain relevant aspects of the religious thought of our time.

His concept of the Divine persuasion Whitehead himself relates to Plato's idea of the supreme craftsman through whose agency such order as is possible—the best necessity allows—is produced among motions relatively chaotic. "God, desiring that all things should be good . . . taking all that was visible as it came to him, not in a state of rest, but moving without order or harmony, brought it from disorderliness to order." "For indeed, the generation of this universe was a mixed result of the combination of Necessity and Reason; Reason overruled Necessity by persuading her to guide the greatest part of the things that became towards what is best" (Timaeus 29d, 47d, Cornford's translation).

The first of these statements expresses the notion, fundamental in Whitehead's system, of the creative process as the incoming of a new type of order, and of this order as at the first established within not an inert substance, but a flux, a "creativity," formless, undetermined.

The second statement asserts the manner of this incoming by means of a term that links with present moral intuition our guess at the origin of the world. The term "persuasion," applied to the operation of divine power implies that the true image of God is not the omnipotent despot, but the "still voice" that men and things may at their peril disregard. If to the significant term "persuasion," we add the thought of the pattern—Ideas, uncreated, immutable—to which, in Plato's image, the divine artificer looks, we have the ancient basis of thought which Whitehead has elaborated as a present-day theory of the divine operation within the world.

It is in *Adventures of Ideas* (Cambridge, 1933), ch. II, that we find the fullest exposition of the concept of divine persuasion in relation to physical agencies, as this creative process appears, not to the metaphysician conjecturing the world's origin, but to the historian of human progress and frustration. Whitehead illustrates from the history of the concept of human worth or dignity the dependence upon physical conditions of the realization of the persuasive idea.

Plato's vision of human worth, the potential divinity of man, could not be realized in its full bearing on human relationship in a society founded on slavery. Yet the idea energizing in men's minds had some effect in humanizing the cruel institution it could not abolish. Finding in the Christian gospel a new and powerful "special expression," the idea became a standing criticism of current practice, and was embodied, partially and gradually, in many more special notions, legal, political, ethical. To its haunting presence sceptical humanitarians of the eighteenth and democrats of the nineteenth century, fervent Methodists and Quakers, responded, preaching it each in his distinctive terms. We note, however, that the idea, so long and widely active in men's minds, became effective in the abolition of chattel-slavery only at the time when physical conditions had become favourable. Mechanical devices, discoveries of the industrial revolution, provided a changed environment for the solving of the problem involved. Thus, in this instance, there contributed to the effecting of a basic social change many different "insights and heroisms," forms of spiritual agency, together with "senseless agencies," the newly utilized powers of steam and steel.

It is clear in this example that the kinds of agency termed spiritual and physical are in their occurrence only partially distinguishable. The teachings of saints and philosophers imply operation of psychophysical forces, highly evolved brain-energies. The steam-engine and power-loom imply moments of intellectual insight, continuous functioning of ideas. The broad distinction between physical and spiritual or mental, hard to maintain in complex historic illustration, is conceived by Whitehead, when we come to the ultimate "actual entity," the present "drop of experience," as the contrast between "what the antecedent world in fact contains," the achieved "habits of nature," and whatever ideal elements, new "forms of definiteness" belong to the present moment's "decision."[1] Thus if, as illustration, we conceive methodist preacher or humanitarian philosopher at some instant of realization of his distinctive message, we can feel with him the contrast between the ideal in its divine persuasiveness and the stubborn facts against which the idea must make way—the inertia of selfish habit in his own nature and in the institutions of society.

If we accept as fundamental this antithesis of spiritual and physical—persuasive idea and stubborn fact—the question arises: within the processes of nature what efficacy can be ascribed to ideas? The positive character of Whitehead's answer to this question may stand out more clearly if we compare it with the negative view of another philosopher within whose system the same antithesis is recognized.

[1] *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 53, 84, 269. *Process and Reality*, pp. 29, 58, 62.

George Santayana, like Whitehead, accepts as fundamental Plato's distinction between unchanging ideas, forms, essences, and the flux within which these find temporary embodiment. For readers who respond to a vivid poetic treatment of metaphysical problems no less than to technical exposition, Santayana's writings supply an enrichment of Whitehead's contrast between the physical and spiritual aspects, or poles, of any actual entity.

The "actual entity" or "occasion" of Whitehead appears in Santayana's phrase as the "natural moment" in which an essence is exemplified. It is the concrete but ultimate element in the web of existence, a fact generated and dated in the flux, with derivative relations and forward reference to other natural moments past and future. In contrast with these "connexions and transmissions," its physical pole or aspect, the natural moment possesses also the distinctive function of embodying an unchanging essence. It draws down into itself in its passing something of the eternal.[1]

In many different forms of speech Santayana has celebrated the inner or spiritual life, the enjoyment and contemplation of essences. As often he has insisted on the inefficacy of essences within the temporal, material world. The "descent or incarnation of essences cannot be their own doing, since all essences are inert and non-existent." They "overarch existence," which without them could never have wakened into consciousness; yet their necessity is "moral" and "logical" only. To assign them status as final causes within the world of fact is mere rhetoric or superstition.[2]

To the reformer or philosopher, then, at the moment of his aspiration toward the ideal, Santayana can commend only stillness, resignation. Spirit attains freedom and fulfilment so far only as "happy in itself and pledged to nothing further," it ceases to "beat its wings unreconciled against natural bars."[3] Certainly the ideal I entertain may affect my life and action, but that is so far as my act of thought is a natural function, determined by those material conditions which together constitute my body. Common speech may ascribe to spirit and to ideas the efficacy properly belonging to brain function, but the philosopher probing beneath common speech can, in Santayana's view, admit, as distinct from the physical, no spiritual agency.

By Whitehead, on the contrary, the common distinction between spiritual and physical agencies is maintained, though not without critical analysis. All essences, Santayana has affirmed, are inert and non-existent. The "flash of insight"[4] to which this statement invites us is offered by Whitehead also in his repudiation of the notion of "vacuous actuality." Essences, abstracted as Santayana has ab-

[1] *The Realm of Matter* (Constable, 1930), pp. 86–9.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 194–5. *The Realm of Spirit*, p. 79.
[3] *The Realm of Spirit*, pp. 106, 107. [4] *Process and Reality*, p. 5.

stracted them from the act of apprehension, cannot, in Whitehead's view either, play any part in the process of nature. That they do play a part depends, Whitehead asserts, on their status in the nature of God.[1]

One must proceed cautiously in the attempt to relate what Whitehead says of God, as the source or ground of new types of order, to an individual's imaginative awareness of God as the inspiration of his moral life. The term we have chosen to consider, the "Divine persuasion," requires for its understanding an attempt to conceive the conscious individual encounter with the divine, in its range of variety from tenderest consolation and support to awe-inspiring challenge and condemnation, and to hold in mind, as background to this, such questions as confront the metaphysician concerning the presence of form and change in the material universe. If we take as starting-point human consciousness of divine persuasion, as Whitehead views it, we conceive first a wider range of experience than comes usually into a religious survey. A Bradlaugh or Voltaire, fighting for a social order in which sincere negation is respected, responds in his own mode to divine persuasion equally with the individual who grasps his ideal as a personal encounter and communicates it in dogmatic affirmations. But beyond instances of human spiritual adventuring, Whitehead looks to the whole process of cosmic evolution.

"To-day, so far as our observation goes," says Whitehead, the existing "aggregations of energy in the form of protons, electrons, molecules, cosmic dust, stars and planets . . . are decaying . . . wasting at a finite rate."[2] There must have been some epoch in which the dominant trend was to their formation. The purely physical laws formulated within our scientific methodology take no account of the counter-agency needed to explain the evolutionary process. Whitehead's hypothesis is that the counter-agency is to be conceived as "some lowly diffused form of the operation of Reason."[3]

Religious tradition has supplied a symbolic form for this hypothesis. God said: Let there be light: let there be water and dry earth; let the earth bring forth herb and tree. When our thought has translated this fiat of creation into the unmeasured ages of the geologist, the problem confronts us of conceiving the appearance of molecular and cellular structure as a response of the most primitive forms of existence to divine quickening. Imagery indeed fails us when, following at Whitehead's bidding[4] the analogy of our conscious

[1] *Process and Reality*, pp. 39, 54.

[2] *The Function of Reason* (Princetown, 1929), p. 19. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

[4] Cf. *Modes of Thought* (Cambridge, 1938), p. 158: "Thus we finally construe the world in terms of the type of activities disclosed in our intimate experience."

appetition, we try to conceive actual entities of an inorganic nexus, by "decision" among the possibilities offered to their mental poles, accomplishing transition from one type of inorganic society to another, or to the lowliest form of cell-life. Yet in Whitehead's theory such decisions are implied; and for some minds apprehension of this wider range of final causation helps to deepen and assure the intuition of such causation in our own moral life.

Whitehead has emphasized the necessity of grasping throughout our whole cosmology the true relation of final and efficient causes.[1] It is, however, with our own human effort that we are mainly concerned here. The persuasive agency of ideas influencing social action, through the mental pole of the high-grade occasions making up a personal life, has to be realized as limited by the "massive habits" of nature, determining these occasions through their physical pole. In Whitehead's historical instance the idea of essential human equality could not determine action when the inherited tradition and institution of slavery, in its more obvious form, dominated the flow of men's struggling thought. So at the present time, thought and effort inspired by the same ideal finds its limitation in habits and institutions that treat men as means to material production, or in other ways subordinate essential human claims to privileged ambitions.

One difficulty in the way of clear apprehension of the relations of final and efficient causation may be found in the contrasting practice of the scientist and the moral reformer, the one confining attention to efficient causes, the other thinking mainly in terms of final causation. Professor Macmurray, considering this difficulty, has proposed that the terms "motive" and "intention" should be so distinguished as to indicate the two different aspects of human behaviour.[2] The scientific psychologist, since he works by hypotheses publicly verifiable, necessarily limits his enquiries to "motivation"—the tendencies established in the organism through past experience. Both he and those who use his results should remain aware of this limitation: that he has abstracted from the intentionality present both in his own activities of research, and in those activities, in their completeness, of which he studies only the external pattern. In Whitehead's terms, actual entities are by the scientist studied only as past, public facts, objectively immortal, from which has "evaporated," "perished," that "internal existence" that belonged to them as present.[3] The moral reformer, on the other hand, deals not with the past but with present and future—with mankind in the making. He is occupied with the intention known from within, which he shares,

[1] *Process and Reality*, p. 116.
[2] *The Boundaries of Science* (Faber, 1939), ch. VI.
[3] *Process and Reality*, p. 310.

or desires to share, with his fellows in the present moment of communication, and in the future which the present will help to determine.

By way of illustration let us consider such a saying as that of Sir Richard Acland, speaking at a public meeting on Common Wealth ideals. "In the new civilization as we see it the motive of service to humanity is going to come first, and the motive of self-interest second." Compare with this the conclusions concerning motivation in a planned society of Sir Josiah Stamp, writing as a scientist and philosopher.[1]

Sir Josiah Stamp speaks of considering motives "as they at present exist," and of the need for "knowledge on a more definite and scientific basis" about such motives as the desire "to do a workmanlike and efficient piece of work," and "man's ability to sacrifice for a principle, for an institution or for a person." But the scientific basis for measuring the strength of the desire to excel, or the love that makes sacrifice possible, can consist only of happenings in the past. Observed and analysed with whatever skill and care these cannot, if we accept Whitehead's view of final causation, assure us of what will happen in that unique present when each of us, as living actual entity, encounters the Divine persuasion.

The reformer is so far at one with the sociologist that he also seeks to analyse and take account of past happenings. Sir Richard Acland compares the observed behaviour of workers in Soviet Russia and in capitalist Britain, arguing from the effort and sacrifice of which Russians have shown themselves capable to a probability of similar results from socialism in Britain. Yet the attempted argument from observed results is subordinate to the intention to stimulate collective emotion and will. The confident tone of the saying quoted is not due to any force of the argument from the past. If we are studying with Stamp the mechanism of motivation as hitherto observable, we may well assent to his conclusion that "over a major part of the field" such motivation cannot successfully work a planned society,[2] yet, as members of an active group looking alike at past and future in the light of our common intention, we may dare to assert that motives of which, with divine help, we are capable shall work a planned society.

We seem at this point brought to a distinction which has, through the work of a recent writer[3] become significant for many religious thinkers: that between a relation essentially personal, the relation *I–Thou*, and the relation *I–It*, which a person has with an inanimate thing, or with another person considered as science considers him, as

[1] "Can Present Human Motives Work a Planned Society," *Philosophy*, July, 1935. [2] *Loc. cit.*, p. 312.

[3] Martin Buber in *Ich und Du*, translated by R. G. Smith, *I and Thou*, Edinburgh, 1937.

an object determined by the past.[1] When, looking to the future, I challenge my fellow man, as I challenge myself, to act in obedience to ideals which I see as binding on us both, I am speaking within the *I–Thou* relation. Within this relation is implicit the Power which Buber terms the Eternal *Thou*: in Whitehead's language, God whose primordial nature sustains the ultimate harmonies, rendering them active in human decisions. Buber has spoken of the necessary transition by which the human *Thou*, whom I address as sharing with me relation to the Divine, must also be considered as an *It*—an object determined, limited, by the past. To this transition even my thought of myself is subject. Looking to the future I assert my freedom to do what I see to be right; looking to the past I know myself as a creature with habits, dispositions strongly entrenched, hindering me from so acting. Religious teachers have recognized in the function of prayer and contemplation a means of reconciling the clash of these two modes of thought and being. It is in prayer and meditation, Dr. Denant has written,[2] that dispositions can be modified, "the channels of the soul recut." "If the intention is directed by the mind and conscience when one is poised in attention before the eternal things, then gradually the will is formed, and comes into being when the practical situation requires it." Somewhat similar though subject to yet greater difficulty and uncertainty is the collective effort to which the religious or political reformer challenges his hearers when he holds before them the great human ideals, trusting in the power of these to quicken a common will capable of the needed sacrifice and service.

The clash of the *I–Thou* and *I–It* relations—or of the modes of thought dominated respectively by final and by efficient causes—has found expression in recent discussion of the words *We* and *They* as representing different political attitudes. Advocates of change, said Sir Stafford Cripps, lament "that 'they' will never implement the promise of a new Britain or a new world. . . . 'They' is not the language of democracy or even of the class struggle. 'They' is the language of dictatorship and defeatism of the common people."[3] Truly *They*, as present in the thoughts of the baffled reformer—*They* who occupy key positions and, through the power of wealth over

[1] See especially Buber's statement (*I and Thou*, pp. 57–8) of the distinction between the limited scientific truth concerned with the "having become" (*nichts-als-geworden-seins*) and the truth, valid for spirit, of the active presence of the *Thou*, "the becoming out of solid connexion" (*das Werden aus der Verbundenheit*). In a supplement to *The Christian News-Letter* (December 29, 1943) the Archbishop of Canterbury refers to the distinction between the scientific and the more fundamental spiritual approach to reality, and declares that a choice of the spiritual approach—"a decision for society as the basic truth of human existence"—would create a new epoch in human history.

[2] In *The Life of the Church and the Order of Society* (Longmans).

[3] From Sir Stafford Cripps's rectorial address to Aberdeen University, February 1943.

press and party, manipulate public opinion—is a concept tending toward defeatism, breathing discouragement on ardent hopes. Yet dare we substitute the easy optimism of the uncritical *We*—the ardent reformer's cry, "We can do it if we will," where *we* represents the faithful few gathered at street corner or community centre, some group almost powerless in terms of the forces the sociologist must recognize? The thinker's resource must be so to grasp, as Whitehead says, the true relation to each other of final and efficient causes as to sustain individual and collective intention oriented to the future, without losing sight of the balance of forces estimated through objective study of the past. Even study of the past, as the past is viewed by the historian concerned rather with unique occasions than with abstracted regularities, brings a saving uncertainty into our prediction of failure for the small group's generous hopes. Within limits, with qualifications, history has confirmed the spiritual insight of St. Paul concerning God's choice of the weak things of this world to confound the mighty. Our wisdom in viewing both past and future is to maintain faith in the ultimate harmonies God's nature sustains, while we continue the scientific search for conditions of achievement.

One point of apparent conflict may be noted between Whitehead's account of the relations of actual entities and that given by Buber and others of the nature of personal relationship. Whitehead has emphasized the mutual independence of contemporary occasions, "within the sphere of their teleological self-creation . . . the immediate activity of self-creation is separate and private so far as contemporaries are concerned."[1] Does this saying exclude that direct meeting in which, Buber has declared, true personal life consists?

One consideration that seems relevant here is that of the continuity and integration of the high-grade occasions making up a conscious personal life. If we can recall from our own experience some moment of encounter with another's thought and intention from which was felt to spring new power, or some new way of life, such a moment must have consisted of many actual entities in Whitehead's sense. It was within the continuous and closely integrated sequence of these that the new meaning became distinct, passing from its dawn in consciousness to power and clarity. Yet the assertion that personal encounter takes place in such a sequence rather than in any single occasion does not wholly meet the difficulty. Whitehead has explicitly stated[2] and constantly implies[3] that the subordinate

[1] *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 252: see also *Modes of Thought*, p. 206.

[2] *Science and the Modern World*, ch. V, pp. 109–12.

[3] Miss Dorothy Emmet has noted that the "cell-theory" applied in the passage in *Science and the Modern World* helps to explain Whitehead's continual characterization of atomic actualities in terms intelligible in the first instance only by reference to nexus of relatively long duration. *Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism* (Macmillan, 1932), pp. 183–6.

organisms making up a whole nexus participate in the characters of the whole. The character of "teleological self-creation," which we recognize within the moment of spiritual encounter, is precisely that which Whitehead attributes in some degree to every actual entity. The fundamental question at issue is whether in this self-creation the direct presence of the *Thou* can be asserted.

The true answer to this question seems to me to have been indicated in the essay by Charles Hartshorn on Whitehead's Idea of God. "Must there not," he questions, "be a cosmic present, in spite of relativity physics, the *de facto* totality of actual entities as present in the divine immediacy. . . . Since they are all immanent in God, and he in turn immanent in them, must they not be immanent in each other?"[1]

As relevant here we may note Whitehead's suggestion that through the "peculiarly intense relationship of mutual immanence" possible to persons, with the nature—in one sense temporal in another non-temporal—of God, the personal society constituting the human soul "may be freed from its complete dependence upon the bodily organization."[2] May this imply freedom also in some degree from confinement within the separateness of the body? In another passage, referring to the mutual immanence of occasions, Whitehead has suggested: "perhaps . . . the relations of mental poles to each other are not subject to the same laws of perspective as are those of the physical poles. . . . Thus in respect to some types of appearance there may be an element of immediacy in its relations to the mental side of the contemporary world."[3] The hint given in these two passages, taken in conjunction with Whitehead's whole discussion of truth and beauty of appearance,[4] suggests that his philosophic

[1] *The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead*, edited Schilpp (North Western Univ., 1941), p. 545. [2] *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 267. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 318.

[4] Whitehead has spoken of such an appearance as the young child's direct perception of its mother's mood as having "to the contemporary real mother a truth-relation in the fullest sense of the term 'truth' " (*op. cit.*, p. 316). In such an awareness there is no falsifying abstraction of "bare sense-perception" from total experience, with consequent "veiling from the observer" of the self-enjoyment of the contemporary world (cf. *Ibid*, pp. 280–2). The perceived feelings of the mother belong to the percipient's past only in the primary sense in which all activities of the bodily nexus are in the past by which the percipient occasion is conditioned. Yet for all the immediacy of such a perceptive encounter, the relation of appearance to reality is through the physical rather than the mental pole—a matter of efficient not final causation. An example of the relation of high-grade occasions through the mental pole might be that "sacrament of expression" in which I enjoy the communicated thought of Plato, extending my apprehension of the universe through "community of intuition" with the originating thinker (cf. *Religion in the Making* (Cambridge, Re-issue, 1930), p. 118). Here there is appearance immediate "in its relation to the mental side of the contemporary world" in which the thought of Plato, though not his animal body, still lives.

outlook is compatible with a recognition, which he himself has not developed, of a unique significance in the relations of persons both one to another and to God.

If we wish to consider further this question of compatibility between Whitehead's thought and the view that unique significance belongs to personal relationship, we may find our line of inquiry indicated by Whitehead's reference to the different types of order which the divine persuasion makes efficacious within societies of entities at different epochs. The structure of our epoch, says Whitehead, "exhibits successive layers of types of order, each layer introducing some additional type of order within some limited region which shares in the more general type of order of some larger environment."[1] He refers to a percipient occasion within a particular region grasping the region as one and itself as a member. We may think of a percipient occasion within a human life grasping itself and its living nexus[2] as belonging to each of two "successive layers of types of order." Thus St. Paul, and thousands after him, have felt with mingled grief and joy their subjection to both a "natural," or animal, and a spiritual order—a "law in the members" and a participation in the Divine giving victory over that law. On man's membership of these two types of order religious thought has always focussed; and the implication has been realized that self-centred "sinful" impulses inevitably mingle with action that spiritual aspirations initiate. In Whitehead's philosophy this "sinfulness" is interpreted as the destructive resistance of a higher by a lower type of order within a being capable of recognizing higher and lower. Such recognition, our grading of types of order, has its ground ultimately in what Whitehead terms "the teleology of the universe, with its aim at intensity and variety,"[3] or "God's purpose in the creative advance," evoking "intensities," "depth of satisfaction," in actual occasions.[4]

[1] *Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 256–7.

[2] A certain difficulty appears inevitable in the use of the term *percipient occasion* or *event* for my own self-awareness. The difficulty has been emphasized by Professor Bowman in his criticism of Whitehead's system. (See his discussion of the percipient event, *A Sacramental Universe*, Princetown, 1939, pp. 117–24.) If, with Victor Lowes (in his essay "The Development of Whitehead's Philosophy," *The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead*, 1941), we venture to discount Bowman's criticism as taking account only of Whitehead's earlier work in which "the understanding of the physical level from the perspective of the metaphysical level is postponed" (*loc. cit.*, p. 87) we may still feel the awkwardness that must accompany the use of terms designed for exposition of the physical level, when we pass to consider our own life from the metaphysical level. The awkwardness is perhaps the price that must be paid for that systematic inclusiveness—the effort to achieve both coherence and adequacy—that has made Whitehead's thought relevant and stimulating within very diverse fields of interest.

[3] *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 259.

[4] *Process and Reality*, p. 147.

It is in loss of such intensities "when things are at cross purposes" that evil consists.[1]

In his sketch for a psychological physiology[2] Whitehead has indicated two main modes of characterizing human mentality: first through its relation to the body as its outcome and directive agency, second, as "a system of cogitations which have a certain irrelevance to the physical relationships of the body." Variety and intensity of experience is attained by the occasions constituting a "presiding personality . . . in the body" partly through the body's complex structure—the interweaving of its constituent societies so that an enormous variety of physical experience may be focussed at certain points. Partly the variety and intensity depend upon "canalized" mental originality. There is reaction from physical experience, determination through ideas made relevant at once through their status in the nature of God and through prior prehensions within the living personal nexus. As illustrating the nature of this system of cogitations partially irrelevant to the body's relationships, we may refer again to Whitehead's pronouncements on intercommunication through language. By that spiritual interaction he has termed the "sacrament" of communication—"expression proffered by one and received by the other"[3]—the conscious personal nexus is enriched beyond anything direct bodily relation could achieve, so that, in a sense, the human soul is "a gift from language to mankind."[4] Within communication at its highest power, when through the expressive and creative sign a subject becomes aware of a new intuition as both his own and another's, the *I–Thou* relation is realized. My individual spirit passes beyond the limits of my own vital station, the body, and learns to see body and mind from the standpoint of another *I* for whom I am *Thou*. From this realization in its countless varied forms within our experience we move toward the ultimate intuition of a *Thou*, the supreme limit of our own rationality, within whose vision all standpoints are included and brought to harmony.

"Man has spirit only in that he is addressed by God": "spirit is not in the *I* but between *I* and *Thou*." Those who accept these sayings of recent theological writers[5] would claim that in personal consciousness thus heightened, raised through the sacrament of communication to fresh range and intensity, a new type of order appears, through divine action emerging from animal life as animal life through such action emerged from the inanimate.

[1] *Religion in the Making* (Cambridge, Re-issue, 1930), p. 84, cf. also the saying that "God as conditioning the creativity with his harmony of apprehension issues into the mental creature as moral judgment." *Ibid.*, p. 105.

[2] *Process and Reality*, Part II, ch. III, §§ IX–XI.

[3] *Religion in the Making*, p. 118. [4] *Modes of Thought*, p. 57.

[5] Quoted and discussed by John Baillie, *Our Knowledge of God* (Oxford Press, 1939).

Finally, we may ask what is the value to us individually of this concept we have studied of the Divine persuasion.

Those who are able to find in the teaching of the Christian Church satisfaction both intellectually and emotionally will probably dismiss the concept as vague, speculative. To other minds, differently conditioned, these speculative propositions of Whitehead may offer, in his own phrase, a strong "lure for feeling."

Professor Macmurray, in a letter to Dr. J. H. Oldham concerning a question of religious belief, has written: "It is not possible for me, nor for many of my contemporaries, to believe *effectively* that Jesus rose from the dead in the flesh. . . . I realize that the inability is not based on evidence, but is the result of the climate of thought in which I live. But the conclusion I draw is that I must not assert the resurrection as the basis of my faith. The peril of publicly assenting to what one cannot believe effectively and practically seems to me very great."[1] If we agree with this estimate of peril in asserting what cannot be believed effectively, it becomes essential that each of us should discover amongst the images and formulae offered to his faith that which for him makes possible a belief effective because corresponding to what in the depths of his being is believed already. The doctrine of the Divine persuasion, as outlined within Whitehead's system, seems to me an expression of faith congruous with the intellectual climate in which we live, for some of us providing just that form of thought needed by our own groping sense of the Divine.

I will try to indicate some of the characters which give this doctrine special value in relation to the needs of our time.

First, as to the term "persuasion": considered apart from its context in Plato's thought and Whitehead's system, its associations might mislead. In our common speech *persuasion* readily suggests modes of subjective pressure applied with irrational urgency. As with most of the terms Whitehead bends from common use to the purposes of his theory, an effort of dissociation is needed. The term must be felt in its new context, with illustration appropriate to it. When the thinker has realized, with such vividness as his individual resources allow, the order and harmony discoverable within cosmic process, amidst disorder and frustration; when he has felt the overpowering attraction of such harmony discovered and conceived, he is in a position to speak of persuasion as Plato and Whitehead use the term. Then it may appear to him, as to Whitehead, that both "in intimate human experience and in general history" the divine immanence is best exemplified in those moments when clashing human wills modify themselves to harmony—some far-reaching idea, latent

[1] Quoted by Dr. Oldham in *The Christian News-Letter*, Supplement to No. 192, October 6, 1943.

or explicit, organizing conflicting impulses and subduing them to agreement.[1]

The doctrine which within historic Christianity presents a persistent alternative to that of God as persuasive agency, sees in him, says Whitehead, "the final coercive forces wielding the thunder. By a metaphysical sublimation of this doctrine of God as the supreme agency of compulsion, he is transformed into the one supreme reality, omnipotently disposing a wholly derivative world."[2] Omnipotence, ascribed in this sense to God, for many at the present day makes impossible effective faith in divine goodness. "If there were a God," says the humane revolutionary, Anselmo, in Hemingway's novel, *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, "never would he have permitted what I have seen with my eyes. Let them have God." Anselmo's *them* stands for the Fascist enemy, cruel and bloodthirsty in his zeal for religion and claim to orthodoxy. To the Fascist enemy, many of us feel, we could well surrender a God whom omnipotence made responsible for such things as offend sight and mind to-day. Plato's thought, accepted by Whitehead, of God as that persuasive agency through whom there is order—some degree of "aesthetic consistency"[3] in the world whose basic constituent of formless flux, "creativity," does not originate in him, meets the difficulty of those who cannot effectively believe in God as both good and omnipotent in the world we know.

This answer to the difficulty appears more adequate than any solution patterned on the myth of the Fall, attributing evil to perversity of human free will. Not human suffering and frustration only, but that of the whole animate creation appalls the contemplative spirit of our time. The self-centred destructive impulses known as sinful in ourselves, however penetrated and heightened by self-consciousness, resemble too fundamentally the predatory impulses

[1] Writing in 1931 (*Adventures of Ideas*, pp. 205–6) Whitehead used as illustration of response to the divine persuasion the welcome halt in violence effected by talks between Gandhi and the then Viceroy of India. He affirmed his belief that the religious motive thus exemplified still at the present time, though institutional forms of Christianity decay, holds "more than its old power over the minds and consciences of men." Our outlook to-day may be less hopeful. The ill odour of practices named "appeasement" has infected for many the idea of conciliation through reason. Yet the value remains of that ideal truly conceived, felt perhaps by some even more poignantly amid the terrors of violence uncontrolled.

The religious thinker seeking present-day illustration of the divine persuasion might choose from the economic field the example of the Tenessee Valley experiment, as described in Julian Huxley's *T.V.A.* (Architectural Press, 1943). Persuasion here appears as the gradual triumph over individual prejudice of a wide-ranging plan whose rationality is able to convince first the few, through skilful presentation, then the many through actual working.

[2] *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 213. [3] *Religion in the Making*, p. 86.

of animals for us to ascribe their origin to human will. From life's first dawn its intensities and harmonies have contended with conditions partly adverse to them, adverse therefore to that which Whitehead dares to recognize as "the teleology of the Universe," or "God's purpose in the creative advance."

One more character of Whitehead's concept may be briefly noted as having special relevance to our time and its problems. We live in an epoch of swift change, when much of the social structure that had enshrined, for the older among us, our best hopes and affections seems crumbling away. Christianity, thought of as an historic institution or traditional way of life, fails us. Yet amidst disaster faith may be maintained in the continuing action of the divine persuasion. "As epochs decay amid futility and frustration," Whitehead has written, "as the present becomes self-destructive of its inherited modes of importance, the Deistic influence implants in the historic process new aims at other ideals."[1] Can this thought console us for loss of forms we have learnt to venerate? I think it can, if, with Whitehead, we have faith that the new forms are manifestations of the same eternal values which we in our degree, and those great spirits throughout the course of history whose lives still minister to ours, have received from God, the source of all order and of harmony among aims that differ.

The concept of the Divine persuasion animating the whole outlook to be derived from Whitehead's philosophic writings, the thought of our common life as an adventure guided toward harmony amidst the conflict and confusion of change, serves for some of us, more adequately than any other religious image or formula, to sustain hope and insight through the dark hours of our present situation.

[1] *Modes of Thought*, p. 142.

SYMBOL AND MYTH

DR. ALEXANDER ALTMANN

THERE are two ways in which Symbol and Myth are related to each other. Firstly, a certain class of symbols represents the remnant of myths. Such figures as, e.g. the Dragon, Leviathan, etc., which we find in Biblical literature, are not used in the full sense of the underlying mythological conception, but in a metaphorical sense. They are chosen by the author because of their mythical associations, but not in their mythical meaning. A metaphor of this kind is, as H. J. D. Astley put it, "broken-down mythology."[1] There are a great many symbols both in poetry and mysticism which must be understood as the relics of mythical thought. We owe a great deal to ethnology for having thrown light on this relation. The microcosm-macrocosm symbolism, for instance, becomes more intelligible if we consider that in primitive mythology the world emerged from the body of primordial man.[2] The gifts to the dead appear in later forms of sacrificial cults as purely symbolical, but there is no doubt that originally they were intended for the real use of the dead.[3] In these and in numerous other cases the symbol has only a reduced value as compared with the original myth from which it is borrowed. It is not self-evident, but relies on the mythical conception, without, however, taking it seriously. It is "merely" a symbol, and has no truth of its own.

There is, however, another way in which Symbol and Myth are connected. J. J. Bachofen[4] defined the myth as the "exegesis of the symbol." The symbol, in this sense, is not a late by-product of the myth, but its progenitor. The myth only unfolds what is inherent in the symbol.

Both C. G. Jung and E. Cassirer have, in our own generation, attempted to give this view of the symbol and its relation to myth a new basis, each in his own way, Jung from the standpoint of his psychology, Cassirer from a Neo-Kantian viewpoint. What seems to be the common denominator of these two interpretations of myth and symbol is the fundamentally positive value which both attach to them. No doubt, they both are under the influence of that great revolution in our estimation of myth and symbol which is the

[1] Cf. H. J. D. Astley, *Biblical Anthropology*, p. 86.
[2] Cf. E. Cassirer, *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, II, pp. 115–116.
[3] Cf. Cassirer, *loc. cit.*, II, p. 198.
[4] Cf. J. J. Bachofen, *Versuch über die Gräbersymbolik der Alten*, Basle, 1859.

heritage of the Romantic School. The new interpretation of symbolical and mythical thinking was inaugurated by Herder, Schelling, and their circle; it was further developed by J. Görres, and culminated in the Swiss School of late Romanticism, of which J. J. Bachofen was the most prominent representative. It is upheld to-day by a number of thinkers who follow closely in Bachofen's footsteps, such as E. Dacqué, O. Goldberg, E. Unger and others. In the present article, we shall confine ourselves to an elucidation of the general trend of the Romantic view, and the way it is reflected in the thoughts of Jung and Cassirer.

In which way did the Romantic School attach positive value to Symbol and Myth? In the first place, it stressed the expression-character of symbolic and mythical thinking. The traditional view saw in both either a poetical metaphor for some rational idea, or, in a pragmatist sense, a useful fiction. Symbol and Myth had no truth of their own. They were given the aspect of truth by reason of an analogy to something else, be it a moral idea or some assumed historical happening. This allegorical interpretation, which goes back to the Stoics, was completely discarded by the Romantic School.[1] In the view of the Romanticists, the creation of a myth was not due to an intentional act of an inspired individual, but was the natural and unintentional activity of the collective mind. Herder was the first to emphasize the two characteristics implied in this view of symbol and myth: the unintentional (natural) and the collective. Symbol and Myth are not intended to give, in a veiled manner, information about something known otherwise, but they reveal the innermost nature of a people. They do not copy reality, but they are responses to reality. They bear testimony to the impact of the universe upon the mind of Man in the mythical age.

According to the Romantic School the myth is the expression of absolute reality. Schelling declares that the deities of mythology are but the universe intuited in the form of the particular. The ideal and real coincide in the mythological figure. This is the reason why the symbol has its place in mythology. The symbol, Schelling defines, is the synthesis of type and allegory. It combines the representation of the particular through the general (type) and the representation of the general through the particular (allegory). In the symbol both are one. The symbol is as concrete, self-evident as the image and as general and meaningful as conceptual meaning. It is, in the significant German phrase, "Sinn-bild."[2] This identity of the ideal and real amounts to the absoluteness of the mythical world. To the

[1] For an exposition and evaluation of the Romantic School, cf. A. Bäumler's Introduction to *Der Mythos von Orient u. Okzident*, ed. M. Schroeter, 1926.

[2] Cf. A. Allwohn, *Der Mythos bei Schelling*, 1927, pp. 32–33.

school of early Romanticism symbol and myth had the validity of absolute truth.

J. Görres went a step further in defining symbol and myth. Whereas Schelling and his friends saw in imagination the instrument of the mythical mind, he introduced the idea of the *unconscious* for an interpretation of mythical thinking. Görres described the kind of world in which the myths were created. Man was not yet separated from Nature and Earth. An umbilical cord still tied him, as it were, to the inner life of the universe. His mind was more or less in a state of dream, somnambulistic, unconscious. Görres speaks of the "Cosmic-demonic generations" of the primordial world. In this period, Man, himself a symbol of Nature, was thinking in symbols.[1] Thanks to his intimate union with Nature, he was able to penetrate deep into its mysteries. The myths are the result of his intuitive, unconscious insight into Nature.[2] There is one more aspect of Görres's interpretation of mythical thinking. It concerns the significance of mythology for the collective group from which it has sprung. Although the product of a distant past, the myth never loses its significance for the people which gave birth to it. It expresses in an unsurpassable manner that which lies at the bottom of the collective soul. In this sense, the whole future of a people is determined by the particular character of its mythology. The future of a nation is contained in its myths, Görres formulated in a phrase of stupendous depth. Nothing can change the fundamental structure of its outlook and character as laid down in the great and lasting symbols of its mythology.[3]

J. J. Bachofen approached the world of mythology not so much as a philosopher but rather as a historian. He refused to describe the mentality of the world in which the myths were created. In his view we were too far removed from those ages. Our psychology, he felt, was fundamentally different from theirs. He deprecated any psychological interpretation of myths such as Nietzsche would attempt. He preferred to look at the mythological period not as a psychologist, but as a historian who treated the myths as documents of the human mind and tried to understand them. He rejected the methods of literary criticism for an interpretation of myths. This method, he thought, could not be applied to ancient sources such as myths, since our psychological distance from the past made it impossible for us to judge from the level of our mentality. We were bound to mis-interpret and mis-read. The only true guide and the only criterion for the interpretation of myths was a "sense of depth, as he termed it, a certain intuitive faculty to grasp the emotional and spiritual life behind the mythical symbol. It may be a vague

[1] Cf. A. Bäumler, *loc. cit.*, pp. 101–102.

[2] See also E. Dacqué, *Urwelt, Sage und Menschheit*, 1928, pp. 20–38.

[3] Cf. A. Bäumler, *loc. cit.*, p. 103.

term, but Bachofen himself certainly possessed that "sense of depth," which enabled him to interpret symbols and myths, not as Schelling did, from the standpoint of an absolutist philosophy, but as a "historian."

Like the Romanticists, Jung stresses the intimate connection that exists between symbol and myth. Symbolic thinking is mythical thinking. It is one of the characteristics of Jung's psychology that in order to illustrate and explain certain products of individual symbolism such as occur in dreams he draws parallels from the mythical sphere. Whereas Freud tried to explain myths and other productions of racial phantasies by reference to individual psychology (cf. his *Totem and Taboo*), Jung attempts "to settle problems of individual psychology by referring to material of racial psychology."[1] In contrast to Bachofen, who felt that the discrepancy between the mentality of the past and the present ruled out any possibility of a psychological interpretation of mythology, Jung believes that the same psychological conditions which led to the creation of myths are still prevalent to-day. Jung is able to assert this possibility because, to him, the unconscious mind is not a matter of the past. It is still very active to-day, in fact, it is the decisive factor in the psychic life. Jung distinguishes between the Ego as the centre of consciousness on the one hand, and the Self as the centre of the total psychic life, including the unconscious, on the other. The sphere of the unconscious has, in turn, two layers: one of the personal unconscious, which is more or less identical with what Freud understood by the "unconscious"; it consists largely of material which had previously been conscious, but was repressed on account of its incompatibility with the demands of consciousness; the second and deeper layer is the collective unconscious. Jung describes it as the matrix of all psychic life, including consciousness, the creative ground, the source and origin of all meaning. This collective unconscious is unimpaired by the fluctuations of consciousness, the latter being only an ephemeral, epiphenomenal offspring of the collective unconscious. The structure of the collective unconscious has remained unchanged in the course of history, and it is working to-day exactly as it worked in the past.[2] Hence our right to approach the past creations of the collective unconscious psychologically.

What is, then, the primary function of the collective unconscious? Jung's answer is, like that of Bachofen, that it produces symbolic images. It expresses itself in the language of symbols. Jung calls

[1] Cf. S. Freud, *Totem and Taboo* (Translated by H. A. Brill), pp. v, xii.

[2] Cf. C. G. Jung, *Wirklichkeit der Seele*, 1934, p. 66; *Seelenprobleme der Gegenwart*, 1932, p. 396.—Our exposition of Jung is indebted to K. Kellner, *C. G. Jung's Philosophie auf der Grundlage seiner Tiefenpsychologie*, 1937.

them, in Augustine's phrase, "Archetypes." It is not any easy matter to define clearly the meaning of this term. On the one hand, Jung's "Archetypes" are identical with what Lévy-Bruhl and others understood by "représentations collectives".[1] They are "the enormous spiritual heritage of mankind reborn in the individual brain."[2] But Jung emphasizes, on the other hand, that representations as such cannot be inherited. All we can inherit is the disposition to produce certain representations. Jung calls the Archetypes, in this sense, the psychic expressions of anatomical and physiological dispositions.[3] They are obviously not of a spiritual nature, but almost entirely a function of the brain. Jung also describes the Archetype as a union of instinct and primordial image. Whether the spiritual or the biological factor has priority, Jung leaves undecided. He assigns to the image the function of guiding the instinct, but also calls the image the self-intuition of the instinct. It seems, therefore, that the emphasis lies on the biological side. Like the Romanticists, Jung sees in the symbol an expression of the unconscious mind in its original oneness with the universe. He actually assumes that certain archetypes Man shares with the animal. They are simply an expression of Life itself.[4] From this it would appear that symbolic thinking is essentially bound up with the biological function of the Psyche. No clear distinction is drawn, anyhow, between the spiritual and the biological.

Jung's conception of "Libido" points in the same direction. The term is used to denote psychic energy.[5] This means, in the last resort, biological energy as the nature of the collective unconscious. As Jung emphasizes, the problem of Life lies in the necessity of transforming energy (Sublimation). Psychic intensity or value must be continually shifted from object to object according to the necessities of life, which are ruled by the need for adaptation. To change the natural direction of the Libido is a task which the conscious will alone is unable to perform. The will only represents that quantity of psychic energy which is subject to the control of consciousness, because it is the result of a long process of domestication through culture and morality. It is, however, insufficient to change the direction of unconscious tendencies of the Libido. Here the function of the Symbol comes in. Jung formulates, "The psychological machine which transforms energy is the Symbol."[6] Again, it is only on account of its biological or energetic character that the symbol is able to transform psychic energy.

[1] Cf. C. G. Jung, *Psychology and Religion*, pp. 64, 122–123.

[2] Cf. C. G. Jung, *Seelenprobleme*, etc., p. 175.

[3] Cf. C. G. Jung, *Psychologische Typen*, 1930, p. 598.

[4] Cf. C. G. Jung, *Das Unbewusste im normalen und kranken Seelenleben*, 1926, p. 101.

[5] Cf. *Psychol. Typen*, p. 645.

[6] Cf. C. G. Jung, *Über die Energetik der Scele*, 1928, p. 76.

There is a further point which requires attention. Jung defines the myth not only as the exponent, but also as a kind of projection of the collective unconscious.[1] By projection, he understands the "transference of a subjective process to an external object."[2] A projection is possible and natural in the case of an unconscious psychic happening. What I am not consciously aware of, is indifferent to the distinction of subjective and objective. A person who is unconscious of certain complexes in his psyche is apt to project them on to some other person. We always find our weaknesses in others. Jung explains that the ultimate *raison d'être* for the possibility of projection lies in the archaic sense of identity between subject and object. Like the Romanticists, he holds that the primitive mind lives in a "mythical identity," in a "participation mystique" (Lévy-Bruhl) with the external world. This *unio mystica* comes to life again in every act of projection. Jung calls the projection of an archetypal image "Imago." Thus, for example, the collective image of the Mother is not a copy of a real, individual mother, but the archetype of the "eternal" Mother which is a category or symbol of the collective unconscious and pre-forms every possible experience of motherhood. The individual mother is but the carrier of the Mother imago, which is projected on to her, and it is possible that any person might appear in the light of the Mother symbol. So far as mythology is concerned, it is the sum total of projected images. We may define mythology as the expression of the collective unconscious by way of projected symbolic images.

What value does Jung attach to symbolic and mythical thinking? Does not the idea of projection imply that the mythical world is entirely subjective and unrelated to objective reality? Jung uses the conception of the Archetype in a manner which recalls Kant's conception of the Categories, which predetermine the nature of all possible experience and thus constitute the "objectivity" of experience. Jung, too, takes the function of the Archetype in the sense of a Category. The Archetypes, he says, are the *a priori* categories of every sort of intuition, the mental pre-condition of all activities of the unconscious. Even imagination is bound and limited by them. That may sound Kantian, but is, of course, a very much different idea. It is a return to the psychological notion of an innate structure of the mind, but has no relation to the transcendental conception of the Categories in the Kantian sense. As we have seen, the Archetypes originate from a biological source, from the processes of the psychic life.

Jung feels that despite their psychic origin the Archetypes have an objective value. The collective unconscious from which they originate is the ultimate reality. Since it combines instinct and image,

[1] Cf. *Seelenpr.*, pp. 165–166.

[2] Cf. *Psychol. Typen*, p. 657.

matter and form, it is the absolute reality. The structure of the World and the structure of the Psyche are identical. Truth is to be found in the soul. Out of its depths, God speaks to us. It is, we should say, a pantheistic and biological conception of God. The "integration of the personality" and the establishment of the Self become the meaning of Life. God and the Self are identical. Symbol and myth have objective value, because they help us to find ourselves. The romantic idea of "the future of a people contained in its myths" is echoed in Jung's conception of the Symbol as a "dynamic experience" pointing towards the future. Whereas Freud interpreted the symbols, especially dream symbols, as relics of the past, as static images and signs which reflect certain repressed tendencies, Jung understands the dream symbols as creative efforts of the psychic life to express its tendency. Every crisis produces a symbol which points the way to a new life. The symbol is not retrospective, as in the case of Freud, but pro-spective, "providential." One could say, in variation of Görres, that the future of an individual person is hidden and contained in his personal symbolism.

We tread on entirely different ground when we turn to E. Cassirer's *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, and yet there is a certain amount of agreement between Cassirer and Jung. The common ground is the Romantic tradition. It is the achievement of the idealist philosophy, Cassirer says, to have done away with the copy theory of truth. The fundamental notions of every science are not copies of a given reality, but spontaneously created symbols. Correspondence is replaced by the logical "function." Instead of the material unity of the Substance, the functional unity of the Symbol becomes the final aim of philosophy. As one sees, Cassirer uses the term Symbol in a functional sense. Here he is in basic agreement with Jung. But whereas for Jung the Archetypes are functions of the unconscious mind, for Cassirer the symbolic function is exercised by consciousness. All conscious creations of the mind are symbolical. In this sense, Symbol and Myth belong together in the same way as Language is symbolical, and Science uses symbols. H. Hertz called the conceptions of the physicist (Space, Time, Energy, Atom) "Images." Reality can never be expressed otherwise than in symbols.

Cassirer wants to extend Kant's Copernican Revolution to all spheres of mental activities. He sees in Language, Art, Myth, Religion and Science the manifestations of the Spirit, each in its own way, each as a special idiom of the same language, as a special type of the symbolic function. Each constitutes a particular aspect of reality. None can be reduced to the other, and each possesses objectivity in so far as the symbolic function which constitutes it is not arbitrary, but has a typical structure and meaning. It should be

noted that Cassirer calls the symbols created by the symbolic function "Signs." All exact thinking he says, rests on the symbolism of universal signs. Usually, the term "Sign" is employed in contradistinction to the Symbol. Edwyn Bevan[1] and Georges Dumas,[2] for instance, exclude signs from the class of the symbol proper, because they bear no analogy to their singificata. Words are classified as signs because the sound of a word has, in most cases, no analogy to the object. Cassirer includes signs amongst the symbols. Language is regarded as the creation of the symbolic function. This is possible because Cassirer drops the condition of analogy altogether and interprets the symbol in a purely idealist sense. The unity of the function guarantees the objective and symbolic character of what would otherwise be a mere system of signs without corresponding reality. In E. Husserl's *Phenomenology*, where there is no room for any functional activity, there is likewise no room for the symbol. The intuitive act immediately grasps the essence of things and values, and consequently there is no use for the symbol other than that of a mere sign and substitute.[3] To Cassirer, every sign is symbolical, if it is the product of the symbolical function.

The great difference between Cassirer and Jung lies in the discrepancy of their fundamental approach to the problem of meaning. It is the difference betwen the psychologist and the idealist. Jung's conception of meaning is psychological. He wants to explain the processes that lead to a certain mental outlook. He is concerned with the genesis of a symbol, and is satisfied that it has meaning if the dynamics of the psychic process makes it intelligible. Thus, for example, the symbol of the Hermaphrodite has meaning because every human being has bi-sexual qualities and tendencies. Or, the symbolic rites of initiation which we find amongst primitive peoples and in the mystery religions have meaning because they are methods of mental hygiene. The symbols of Dogma have meaning because the Dogma originated from visions, dreams and trances, and reflects the autonomous activity of the unconscious. In its present form, the Dogma is the result of the activities of many minds of many centuries, which purified the original symbols of all oddities arising out of individual experience. Jung feels that the symbols produced by the unconscious are the only things able to convince the critical minds of modern people, because they are rooted in actual psychic experience. The abstract idea has no power and no appeal. Again, meaning is conditioned by its psychic roots. Cassirer, on the other

[1] Cf. Edwyn Bevan, *Symbolism and Belief*, 1938, pp. 11–13.

[2] Cf. *G. Dumas, Le symbolisme dans langue*, in *Revue Philosophique de la France et de L'Etranger*, 59, CXVII, 1934, p. 8 ff.

[3] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson), §§ 36 and 43.

hand, does not analyse the psychic conditions which underlie the sphere of meaning. He takes the finished product and analyses its structure. The psychic processes in which Jung is interested may be the necessary pre-condition for reaching the level of meaning. The unconscious may have a function in this respect. But Cassirer would insist that it cannot, by itself, give meaning and purpose to intellectual activity.

It follows that mythical thinking has a different place in the estimation of Cassirer from that of Jung. Although Cassirer upholds the "objectivity" of mythical thinking, he does not put it on the same level with scientific and conceptual thought. The human mind has definitely outgrown the age of mythical thinking. Jung, on the other hand, sees in the rebirth of myth the re-union of Man with the ultimate reality of Earth and Nature. In the conflict of these two views lies a great deal of the spiritual issue which confronts humanity to-day. It is not the purpose of this paper to enter into this wider question. There is, however, one point which has a direct bearing on our subject. It concerns the relation of mythical and ethical thinking.

In following Hermann Cohen,[1] Cassirer stresses the fact that the ethical outlook of the Prophets of Israel signifies Man's triumph over mythology.[2] The mythical dream world with its collective, demonic, and magic approach to the mysteries of Life is superseded by a sense of self-conscious individuality and moral responsibility. The I-Thou relationship takes the place of the introspective dream world with its mythical symbolism.[3] Against Renan, who held that mythical thinking was entirely absent from the Semitic race, J. Goldziher endeavoured to prove that there was a mythological stage in Semitic thought as well.[4] But there can be little doubt that whatever the pre-historic mental frame of the Hebrews may have been, their decisive achievement was the turn towards the ethical thinking in terms of the I-Thou relationship. The "New Heaven" and the "New Earth" which the Prophets of Israel announced meant the end of mythical cosmogony. The mythical motifs—notably of Babylonian origin—which were employed by Biblical authors[5] are used in a metaphorical sense only (cf. above). The term "broken-down mythology" is indeed a fitting description of this kind of figure of speech. The latest standard work of Biblical exegesis, B. Jacob's great *Commentary on Genesis*, shows clearly that the mythical approach is

[1] Cf. Hermann Cohen, *Die Religion der Vernunft aus den Quellen des Judentums*, 1913.

[2] Cf. *loc. cit.*, p. 152.

[3] Cf. *loc. cit.*; see also Nathan Söderblom, *The Living God*, pp. 265 ff.; Martin Buber, *I and Thou*.

[4] Cf. I. Goldziher, *Mythology among the Hebrews* (Translated by R. Martineau, 1877).

[5] Cf. Hermann Gunkel, *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit*, 1921.

completely discarded and consciously attacked in Biblical thought. This does not mean that Judaism has remained entirely immune against mythical thinking. In fact, the whole history of the Jewish religion and of Jewish philosophical and mystical speculation represents a continuous struggle against the mythical elements from Babylonia, later from the Gnostic world, which tended to overlay its monotheistic and ethical structure.[1] On the whole, Judaism was successful in combating the mythical influences from without. The prophetic message of social and individual ethics has remained predominant in Jewish thought. Christianity bears witness to the ethical heritage of the Jewish religion from which it sprang. Our Western Civilization is based on this heritage which is being put to a new test in our generation.

[1] Cf. G. G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, 1941.

DISCUSSION: *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell*[1]

This huge book contains essays on various aspects of Mr. Russell's writings of the last 50 years by 21 different contributors, mostly domiciled in America, together with Mr. Russell's comments and explanations. We are told in the preface of Mr. Russell's great surprise that over half of the contributors had not understood him, and of his feeling that further explanations were not likely to fare any better than his books; and this makes the editor ask whether the major aim of this series of "Living Philosophers" is doomed to failure. That aim can perhaps be put in the following way. When we study the writings of great philosophers in the past, we find it difficult to be sure what they meant, and endless controversies of interpretation arise; and we should like to have had the opportunity of meeting the philosophers and getting them to settle our controversies. When we have a great philosopher alive, then, the Editor thought, we might spare later interpreters at least some of their controversies by getting him to clear up our difficulties about his meaning. Of the volumes in this series, that on Whitehead is the only other I have studied, and in that case the aim I think failed; partly because of Whitehead's health, which prevented him from replying, and partly because of the large number of contributors who wrote about their own views instead of about his. In the present book, it can at least be said that all the contributors have genuinely tried to write about Mr. Russell's views, and that Mr. Russell has made his position on some points more clear. The essays have been arranged by the Editor in order from abstract to concrete, beginning with logic and ending with history, and in his reply Mr. Russell has dealt with them essay by essay. There is a short autobiographical sketch at the beginning, a nearly (but surprisingly) complete bibliography at the end, and a very full index. Book production is admirable. I should not omit mention of the characteristic portrait and of the facsimile of the first page of Mr. Russell's MS. The only thing lacking is a roll of moving picture film with sound track: posterity deserves that.

Mr. Russell's inquiries have dealt with four main topics, of which the first three, logic, epistemology, and ontology, can be described as theoretical, while the fourth relates to social problems. There is for Mr. Russell a sharp distinction between the fourth and the first three. A person's views on ethics result from his desires and wishes, and ethical statements are neither true nor false. This does not mean that it is illegitimate to express any views on these matters. It merely involves a different technique of expression. Views on logic and epistemology and ontology Mr. Russell thinks are in a different case. Here there are at least some disputes which can be settled definitely by the production of evidence. Hence he does not regard ethical statements as falling within philosophy in the strict sense. "The only matter concerned with ethics that I can regard as properly belonging to philosophy is the argument that ethical propositions should be expressed in the optative mood, not in the indicative" (719).

I shall not attempt even to indicate the contents of the various essays,

[1] *The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell.* Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp. The Library of Living Philosophers. Volume V. (North-western University, Evanston and Chicago. 1944. Pp. xv, 815. Price 30s. net.)

but shall try instead to bring out some of the fundamental points of principle that emerge from them.

The Method of Analysis.—Mr. Weitz in his essay on "The Unity of Russell's Philosophy" chronicles the different philosophical stations through which Mr. Russell has passed in his long journey, but insists that it was always the same engine pulling the train. The main points Mr. Weitz makes are (1) that the fundamental element in Mr. Russell's philosophy is the method of analysis, and (2) that analysis has two forms. The first form of analysis is "real definition," i.e. the account of some complex situation (whose nature is independent of the language we use about it) in terms of its elements, their characteristics, and the relations between the elements. This Mr. Weitz illustrates in detail. The second form of analysis is "contextual definition," and has to do with words and phrases (especially words and phrases whose use in sentences led to difficult philosophical puzzles), and results in the substitution of a different set of words and phrases by means of which we can say all we intended to say when we used the original words, without being involved in unintended perplexities.

The Theory of Descriptions.—A classical example of this is Mr. Russell's Theory of Descriptions, dealing with phrases of the form "the so and so." This theory doesn't seem to say much or to propound anything startling, and an ordinary reader, when he comes across it, may be forgiven for wondering what there is classical about it. We can perhaps think of him as making reflections of the following kind: It has been pointed out long ago that if a person says "That cow is queer" he may be met with the reply "It *is* queer, but it is not a cow." That is to say, it has always been understood that a person could use such a form of words as "That cow is . . ." significantly even though he was wrong about its being a cow, and that this form of words could in fact be a convenient alternative to the sentence "That thing is a cow": so that the sentence "That cow is queer" could be used conveniently by a person who wanted to assert both that that thing was a cow and that it was queer. Similarly if a person says "The *Bismarck* is a menace to our convoys" he may be met with the reply "It was, but it no longer exists"; and here again it has always been understood that a person could use such a form of words as "The *Bismarck* is . . ." significantly even though he was wrong in supposing such a thing to exist, the account of this form of sentence being similar to the other, except that the word "the" makes it a little more complex: so that the sentence "The *Bismarck* is a menace to our convoys" could be used conveniently by a person who wanted to assert both that there was just one thing named *Bismarck* and that it was a menace. Now, our ordinary reader might add, Mr. Russell's Theory of Descriptions does no more than give an account of phrases of the form "the so and so" of exactly this sort: all Mr. Russell does is to tell us that when we say "The *Bismarck* is a menace," what we mean is (1) that there is a thing named *Bismarck*, (2) that there is only one such thing, and (3) that that thing is a menace: and that three sentences to that effect say it much more explicitly than our original sentence. We knew all this, our ordinary reader might reflect: what's the big idea?

Mr. Moore has devoted his whole essay to this theory, and he regards it as a great achievement on Mr. Russell's part. It is worth while to ask why this theory was regarded as important when it was put forward.

There are various reasons. The first is that Mr. Russell was developing a form of language which would be fully explicit, and using his language as the instrument for a revolutionary logic, much more powerful than the traditional logic. The second is that he was raising new questions about the conditions under which significance could be attached to words or phrases occurring in

a sentence, showing that in some cases words or phrases could be shown to have, apart from any particular sentence, the significance they had in the sentence, while in other cases this was not possible: phrases of the form "the so and so" being of this latter kind. The third is that he used his discussions about the significance of phrases to clear up one of the difficulties about how it is possible to use words referring to something which has no kind of reality whatever. Suppose you assume that in order to be used in a significant sentence a phrase such as "The *Bismarck*" must be significant when taken by itself. If the *Bismarck* no longer exists, then the phrase seems not to refer to anything and hence not to have any significance. But then no sentence in which it is a constituent could be significant. We could adopt this solution, though it would go counter to the ordinary way in which people use language: for example, we should have to say that "The *Bismarck* no longer exists" must be a meaningless collection of words. If, however, the phrase is significant even in the case where there is no actual object to which it refers, it seems as if there must "be" some non-actual object to which it refers. Mr. Bradley and those who agreed with him found no difficulty in accepting the view that whatever can be thought or referred to in any way "is" in some sense, though they did not suppose it to "be" in complete independence of the thought or reference; but Meinong developed the view that there is a realm of Being containing all such entities, and innumerable others, independently of any reference to them. Anyone who, like Mr. Russell at that stage, distinguished between the act of referring to something and the thing referred to, had either to agree with Meinong or to deny that the phrase in question was significant by itself. He did the latter, and suggested that there was no need to assume that every constituent of a significant sentence must have significance apart from its use in the sentence, drawing attention to a number of symbols (which he called "incomplete symbols") which only get significance through the way they are used in combination with other symbols.

It was thus not merely Mr. Russell's account of sentences containing phrases of the form "the so and so," but the part it played in the treatment of a variety of pressing problems, that made it important. It exemplified a method of clarifying obscure situations, by a particular technique for studying the language whose use gave rise to them; and one of its immediate effects was to sweep out from the universe a vast collection of mysterious entities, no longer indispensable. This instrument he described as a form of Occam's razor.

Beside Mr. Moore's and Mr. Weitz's discussions of this theory of descriptions, there are two interesting comments on it, one by Mr. Gödel (in his article on "Russell's Mathematical Logic") who seems to suggest that it is more "realistic" than it need be, since Mr. Russell "does not consider this whole question of the interpretation of descriptions as a matter of mere linguistic conventions, but rather as a question of right and wrong" (130), and one by Max Black ("Russell's Philosophy of Language") who contends that it is "metaphysically neutral," because what Mr. Russell offers is merely a translation of one sentence into other sentences, and because in verifying the correctness of his proposed translation there is no need to appeal to any philosophical principle, but only to social facts concerning the way language is used (243). It is discussed also by Mr. Feibleman ("Russell's Introduction to the Second Edition of *The Principles of Mathematics*") who argues (158 f) that while it does enable us to dispense with such entities as golden mountains and round squares, yet it need not be used as Mr. Russell himself seems to use it in the Introduction to the Second Edition of the *Principles of Mathematics*, as a weapon for an attack on the realism of the First Edition of that book. I have not seen this *Preface*; but if Mr. Feibleman's account of it is to be trusted, Mr.

Russell holds that the method of analysis can at any rate be a valuable weapon for undermining certain metaphysical positions, and in that sense at least is not metaphysically neutral. This, however, would not show that the theory is not neutral in Mr. Black's sense.

Mr. Moore's discussion has his usual thoroughness. and raises important questions, e.g. how far the theory has to do with sentences and how far with propositions; how far such a proposition as "The King of France is wise" is the same proposition as "At least one person is a King of France, at most one person is a king of France, and there is nobody who is a king of France and is not wise"—in other words, in what sense the proposition analysed is the same proposition as that which the theory gives as its analysis; and how far the theory can be satisfactorily described as giving a translation of one sentence into other sentences.

The Principle of Logical Constructions.—An important principle used by Mr. Russell in his role of philosophic barber is one which he worked out in conjunction with Whitehead, viz. the principle of logical constructions. Mr. Weitz suggests (65) that "Russell means by a logical construction the *substitution of a symbol* whose denotation is given in sense-experience or is continuous with and similar to something given in sense-experience for a symbol whose denotation is neither given in sense-experience nor is similar to and continuous with something given in sense-experience but is postulated as an unempirical inferred entity." He proceeds in Section IV of his essay to justify this interpretation, which he sums up (104) as follows: "This process, whereby empirical symbols replace unempirical symbols, has, it seems to me, two distinct parts: (1) to determine what are the ultimate wholly or partially empirical entities, and (2) to define, by means of logic, the symbols of science in terms of the wholly or partially empirical entities."

This is, I think, an accurate account of the principle, which Mr. Russell formulated in his article in *Contemporary British Philosophy*: "wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities."

The qualification "wherever possible" should not be neglected. For, as Mr. Russell says in his reply to Mr. Laird (699), "where a suitable construction is possible, this very fact invalidates the inference, since it shows that the supposed inferred entity is not necessary . . ."; and the qualification leaves a loophole, which is important in view of Mr. Russell's later examination of empiricism, for entities which have to be accepted although they are neither known nor replaceable by constructions out of known entities.

On this account given by Mr. Weitz, Mr. Russell makes no comment. It seems then to be included in his general statement (686) "With everything else in Mr. Weitz's essay I am in agreement."

The Principle of Acquaintance.—The principle of logical constructions is discussed by Max Black in Section C of his essay. Mr. Black suggests in a section heading (244) that this principle "relies on" Mr. Russell's other principle that "every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted," and that apart from this latter principle the former would have no plausibility whatever, however stubborn the dislike of merely postulated entities which it expressed. Mr. Russell in his reply denies this, asserting that he used the former principle before he introduced the latter, and that the former depends only on a general dislike of postulated entities.

The principle of acquaintance just quoted comes from *The Problems of Philosophy* (*Problems*, p. 91), where it is put in italics as giving "the fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions" [i.e

containing some phrase of the form "the so and so" (*Problems*, p. 82)]. A reader who turns to the *Problems* for enlightenment as to what is meant by the words "proposition," and "composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted" will find no direct guidance on the former, though he may gather (*a*) on the one hand that if some propositions contain phrases then some propositions are sentences of some kind, and (*b*) on the other hand that the kinds of thing with which we are acquainted are "things" such as sense-data (colour, shape, hardness, etc.), some things we remember, our awareness of being aware, perhaps something we call "I," and some universals (whiteness, diversity, etc.); so that the constituents of propositions must be some of these things. He will reflect that sentences can contain words standing for things like these, but not the things themselves, and he will wonder whether for "propositions" in the phrase "propositions containing descriptions" he should substitute "sentences," or whether, in the expression of the principle of acquaintance itself, instead of the phrase "constituents with which we are acquainted" he should substitute "words standing for things with which we are acquainted." In the former case he will be able to avoid taking a proposition to be a sentence, and will be able to take it as a complex of "things" such as sense-data, memories, universals, etc.; in the latter case the basic principle would run "every sentence which we can understand must be composed wholly of words standing for things with which we are acquainted."

The words used on p. 91 of the *Problems* in defence of the principle, "We must attach *some* meaning to the words we use, if we are to speak significantly and not utter mere noise; and the meaning we attach to our words must be something with which we are acquainted," would seem to suggest the desirability of this last emendation. Mr. Russell's new explanation in his reply to Mr. Black (695) also lays the stress on "understanding words," but makes this understanding dependent on having noticed features of situations. "The use of words which are not learnt through a verbal definition has to be acquired as a habit; that is to say, the child has to experience a series of similar circumstances accompanied by similar noises. To say that we can understand without acquaintance seems to me equivalent to saying that we can acquire a habit without ever being in situations such as would give rise to it." Now this passage, if taken seriously, would give the word "acquaintance" a far wider and far looser meaning than it had in the chapter in the *Problems*. "Being acquainted with S" would seem to be equivalent to "having been in situations which lead to the habit of saying 'S'." I once overheard one of my very small children saying to the other, "Daddy's in a bate, you'd better not ask him just now." Mr. Russell's explanation, without further explanation, would lead to the conclusion that she was acquainted with my being in a bate. I think Mr. Russell would have to add, if his new explanation is not to let loose a flood of nonsense masquerading as understood, that to discover what "S" means, we must analyse the situations which led to the habit of saying "S," and restrict the meaning of "S" to something in these situations with which we can be acquainted in the earlier and narrower sense. But in that case the criticism Mr. Black goes on to make is justified, that the alleged grounds for the principle merely repeat the principle itself.

Anyhow, Mr. Black rejects the principle. He seems to take it to involve the principle that any word (or symbol) we can significantly use must either itself indicate something with which we are acquainted or be definable in terms of such words; and he argues against this. His main point he does not stop to develop: "It can be demonstrated, in connexion with quite elementary examples of deductive theories, that 'auxiliary' or 'secondary' symbols can be introduced in such a way that they are not capable of *explicit* definition

in terms of the basic experiential terms of the theory. This does not render them undefined, in a wide sense of that term, since the mode of introduction of the auxiliary symbols into the system provides both for their syntactical relations with associated symbols and for inferential relations between the sentences in which they occur and the 'primary' observational sentences of the system" (250). He gives as examples terms such as "entropy" and "energy," and sees no reason why such words as "table," "I," etc., in ordinary speech should not be treated in this way. This point is made also by Mr. Nagel (348), with reference to Carnap's papers on "Testability and Meaning" in the *Journal of the Philosophy of Science* for 1936 and 1937.

The Primacy of Sense Experience.—In his interesting essay on "Russell's Philosophy of Science" Mr. Nagel discusses among other things this question of the primacy of sense-experience. Mr. Nagel can see no ground for holding either that sense-experiences are psychologically primitive or that statements directly arising out of them are our most indubitable statements. Nor can he accept Mr. Russell's principle that a belief derived from data by a process which is not logically demonstrative must be less certain than any of the data taken by themselves. Further he shows that Mr. Russell himself accepts certain "data" which involve an element of interpretation and inference; and he asks, "If our actual data involve an element of 'interpretation' and 'inference,' how in principle can we exclude physical objects as objects of knowledge on the ground that physical objects involve an element of 'inference'?" (335). The primary fault Mr. Nagel finds here is Mr. Russell's association of psychological and logical primitiveness. Mr. Nagel's discussion on these points reinforces Mr. Black's criticism of the principle of acquaintance.

Mr. Russell and Science.—Mr. Russell agrees that we all do believe that more is present than we experience when we see a table, though he can't justify this belief, and though he holds we never can be sure we do see a table. Mr. Black along with other contributors criticizes Mr. Russell for not being sure, while on the other hand Mr. Russell criticizes Mr. Reichenbach (who writes on "Bertrand Russell's Logic") for being content with something which does not claim to be "knowledge" at all. Mr. Reichenbach holds that the evidence of our present experience together with our reports of past experience is never such as to justify any claim that we know what will happen; he holds rather that our evidence justifies us in making a more or less confident bet (which he calls a "posit") on the situation. If so, Mr. Russell replies, our predictions are no better in principle than those of an astrologer. We need more than this. If a "system of posits" is to be a good "tool for predicting the future," he argues, "the future must be such as it predicts" (683). By this I take it he means that we cannot avoid committing ourselves to claiming that we know, even though we cannot be certain. Or if you like, that we must make assertions, and not merely bets. Mr. Russell adds, "I do not see any way out of a dogmatic assertion that we know the inductive principle, or some equivalent; the only alternative is to throw over almost everything that is regarded as knowledge by science and common sense."

This quotation gives one of Mr. Russell's fundamental convictions. I can bring out its significance best by reference to his reply to Mr. Weiner's paper on "Method in Russell's Work on Leibniz." Mr. Russell believes in science as firmly as Leibniz believed in God. I have never been able to see that he had good grounds for regarding Leibniz as insincere in this matter, and I can see no reason why a future historian who agrees with Mr. Reichenbach should not have similar (and equally bad) grounds for regarding Mr. Russell (in the words Mr. Russell uses about Leibniz) as "insincere towards himself as well as towards the public" (696), as having "moments of insight which he felt to be incon-

venient and therefore did not encourage" into what he believed about science. For there is no doubt I think that it is only a dogma which keeps Mr. Russell from Mr. Reichenbach's position.

Perhaps Mr. Russell is right in firmly believing much he cannot hope to prove. Einstein (290) chides him gently for "the bad intellectual conscience which shines through between the lines" of the *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*. I am not sure just what he means by this, but I conjecture that he thinks Mr. Russell is uneasy about refraining from accepting what Einstein calls "concepts." "I am convinced," says Einstein (287) in his essay on "Russell's Theory of Knowledge," "that . . . the concepts which arise in our thought and in our linguistic expressions are all—when viewed logically—the free creations of thought which cannot inductively be gained from sense-experiences," and he goes on to speak of the "gulf—logically unbridgeable—which separates the world of sensory experiences from the world of concepts and propositions."

"Concepts" are tools which simplify the ordering of sense-experiences. To say, under the influence of Hume, that "all those concepts and propositions which cannot be derived from the sensory raw material are, on account of their 'metaphysical' character, to be removed from thinking" is to give a wrong criterion for their use. The only criterion Einstein would apply is that of the successful ordering of sense-experiences through their connection with the propositions of the conceptual system, with the proviso that the system "should show as much unity and parsimony as possible."

All this is closely connected with Kant's view, though without Kant's belief that certain concepts are "necessary" for the building up of knowledge. Einstein merely puts this view and does not develop it, so that it is not clear whether he holds that there might be a variety of conceptual systems which succeeded in incorporating sense-experience with the "requisite" unity and parsimony, sufficient for all intellectual and practical purposes, as there is a variety of systems on which you can make a good map of a particular district, so that there would not be only one unique system, which could be called the true one, though all the systems would correspond with one another.

Einstein feels that the influence of Hume, while salutary, was dangerous, as leading to a false view as to what concepts are admissible in science; and his suggestion seems to be that the *Inquiry* shows signs that Mr. Russell feels that he really ought to put more trust in concepts, though he can't bring his senses to let him do so.

In his reply Mr. Russell takes up Einstein's point that the series of integers is an "independent creation of thinking," and asserts that if sense-experience did not present us with anything we could count, the series of integers would not have been invented, or at any rate not taught to schoolboys: but none of this is incompatible with what Einstein says.

Science and Epistemology.—Mr. Nagel's essay gives Mr. Russell the occasion for clarifying his position with regard to science, and for bringing out the way in which his epistemological problems arise (700 f). The following points emerge.

(i) It is common sense to believe that what physicists agree in asserting is likely to be approximately correct.

(ii) But while physicists are competent to make approximately correct assertions, they are not competent to say what precisely they are asserting. That is the business of philosophers.

(iii) For example, physicists not only make some prophecies which can be verified. From the general laws they enunciate, many consequences can be deduced, some of which cannot be verified; and this raises the question, in what sense, if at all, do they hold that the statements about unverifiable

consequences are true? Or, in Mr. Russell's language, what precisely are they asserting "in outline" as to unobservable facts?

(iv) This last question is the one we have to start with, if we assume that what physicists assert is true. One of the first points we can make is that physicists no longer suppose that "there are persistent pieces of matter, moving in three dimensional space" which exist whether they are perceived or not. The old physicists who supposed this were using the common-sense notion of a thing; but the new physicists' conception of a four-dimensional manifold of events does not require the common-sense notion of a thing.

(v) The fundamental task of physicists is to discover principles (causal laws) from which, with statements about a certain region or regions of space-time, we can infer statements about other regions of space-time. These laws are such as, for all practical purposes, (*a*) to assume continuity, (*b*) to make probable determinism, for all macroscopic phenomena, including living as well as dead matter.

(vi) In such a world, can there be any such occurrence as "perception" is supposed to be? Here the epistemological problem arises, What relation have such occurrences as "seeing the sun" to the sun?

(vii) Mr. Russell holds that "seeing the sun" is an event causally connected with other events, and he finds it difficult to see how anyone could question this. He holds also that the event described as "seeing the sun" can be correctly so described only if there is a causal connexion of a special sort between the sun and the event. For if physics and physiology are to be trusted, when the event occurs there often is this connection, and again the event can often be prevented from occurring by breaking the connection, and finally (which clinches the matter) when the event occurs without this connection we can't describe it correctly as "seeing the sun."

(viii) This does not mean that when I see the sun what I see is the sun. It is a mistake to suppose that "my seeing the sun" involves a distinction between "my seeing" on the one side and "what I see" on the other. The perceiv*ing* and the perceiv*ed* are identical: it is an event in my brain. The causally connected set of events in the sun occurred about eight minutes earlier: the silver shape I see is the later event in my brain which I call "my seeing the sun." And there is no evidence which could lead us to suppose that there is any resemblance either in colour or in shape between the two events. Physics holds that the sun has no colour. I must then either deny physics, or deny that I see the sun, or deny that I see something silver: and Mr. Russell denies the second alternative.

"*What I See is in My Brain.*"—This leads Mr. Russell to explain just what he means by saying that what he sees is in his brain; for he says, "I have not so far found any philosopher who knew what I meant by this statement" (705).

A piece of matter, we are told, is a system of events. Events have spatio-temporal position in virtue of their causal relations. Certain sets of events have spatio-temporal relations of such a sort as to make them "members" of a "point," or perhaps of a "minimal volume." A piece of matter is made up of parts or "portions" or "members"; the "portions" or "members" of a piece of matter are points or perhaps minimal volumes, and it is important not to confuse this statement with the statement that the "members" of a minimal volume are events. Events are members of points or minimal volumes; points or minimal volumes are members of pieces of matter. Events are not members or portions of pieces of matter.

This is somewhat perplexing as it stands, for it seems to be in virtue of spatio-temporal relationship that events are "members" of points or minimal volumes, and also in virtue of spatio-temporal relationship that points or

minimal volumes are "members" of a piece of matter; and it does not seem easy to distinguish the two kinds of spatio-temporal relationship. Nor does it seem easy to see why the same word "member" should be used in the case of both relationships.

The view does not become clearer, but rather more perplexing, when we consider its application to what I see. According to Mr. Russell (*a*) my seeing is identical with what I see, (*b*) physiology shows that my seeing as an event is located in my brain. It follows that what I see is located in my brain.

Personally I should deny both propositions, and for a single reason, viz., that when in the course of my ordinary activities I am said to see the things around me, what is being referred to as my seeing cannot be described as a single "event," "my having a visual percept." Nor is there literally any single event capable of being so described occurring in me. Physiology may show that there is some brain process in the absence of which I shall not see anything; it cannot show that all other bodily processes can be dispensed with. I should say that when I see the silver disc I refer to the sun, there is not only one event involved which could be said by Mr. Russell to be a member of a point or a minimal volume, but a whole series of events occurring in different parts of my body. Seeing the silver disc is just as complex as pointing to the sun.

But suppose Mr. Russell's views here be accepted. My seeing the sun becomes, on his theory, a member of a point or minimal volume which is itself a member of my brain. What I see, on his theory, is my entire visual field at the moment (or short duration). It contains tree-like, flower-like, sky-like, sun-like, etc., colours and shapes arranged in a two (or three) dimensional whole. Now this two (or three) dimensional complex, which on Mr. Russell's view is literally what I see—for only just before he told us that we see colours and shapes, not tables and suns—is apparently also on his view literally the event described as "my seeing what I see." Now there might be some plausibility in the view that my seeing as an event is located in a point or minimum volume of space-time. But I find it rather difficult to regard my visual field as located there. Further, Mr. Russell says (706) "there is one part of the physical world which we know otherwise than through physics, namely that part in which our thoughts and feelings are situated." Here again there would be some plausibility in the view that if I recognized a particular part of my brain as the part in which my seeing was taking place, that would (in some sense) justify me in saying that I knew something about that part of the brain. But I can see no ground for holding that in seeing what I see, I am getting information about this part of my brain.

Two Senses of "Verifiable."—Further points in Mr. Russell's attitude to science come out very clearly from what he says in his reply to Mr. Stace (who writes on "Russell's Neutral Monism"). Answering an accusation of fraudulence, Mr. Russell distinguishes two senses in which an entity can be said to be "verifiable." In the first sense an entity is called "verifiable" if it is experienced by someone. In this sense, Mr. Russell thinks it would be possible to construct out of verifiable materials only, everything in the world that is verifiable; i.e. I suppose, to enunciate a set of general laws of such a kind that with their help, from what people have experienced you could predict what they will experience, without needing to suppose that anything exists that nobody has experienced or ever will experience.

But he does not think anybody could seriously believe that such a world would be complete. We all do suppose much more to exist. The predictions made possible by the general laws of science are not limited to what someone actually will experience; and everybody does believe that things exist which are not "verifiable" in the first sense. The sense in which the word

"verifiable" is ordinarily used in science is wider. In this wider sense an entity is said to be "verifiable" if it is inferred in accordance with the recognized canons of scientific method; and Mr. Russell is prepared to cut out from his world anything unverifiable in this second sense, but not anything unverifiable in the first sense.

At the same time, his epistemological theory leaves him with no defence for this, except his obstinate belief in science. This of course would not be a valid reason for ceasing to believe in science; it is rather an indication of a shortcoming in the epistemological theory.

Epistemological Order.—This epistemological theory is most fully expounded in the *Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*. This book is dealt with in two papers, one by Mr. Ushenko ("Russell's Critique of Empiricism") who rightly regards it as fundamentally concerned with the points in which a strict empiricist theory fails to justify all the beliefs all of us want to hold, and as asking what is the minimum alteration we must make in empiricism if we are to justify these beliefs; and the other by Mr. Chisholm ("Russell on the Foundation of Empirical Knowledge") who equally rightly regards the notion of epistemological order as central in Mr. Russell's theory of knowledge. Both these papers Mr. Russell praises highly, and in his reply to Mr. Chisholm he develops his ideas on epistemological order, defending his view that some of our beliefs are more fundamental than others, in the sense that we accept the latter because we accept the former.

In particular, in regard to physics, he has an argument (713) to show why "percepts should be treated as epistemologically prior to 'things'," which is of great interest, and brings out clearly the nature of the task Mr. Russell has set himself.

The situation Mr. Russell proceeds to picture can be put quite generally. Let us look at it for a moment independently of his argument. If we mark off a volume of any size or shape anywhere in the universe, we can divide all events into those inside this volume and those outside. Let us now imagine a knowing being whose information is entirely derived from the events inside the volume. Then any universe whatever would be compatible with his information, provided it contained as a part the events inside the volume. (This is a modern version of Hume's difficulty about induction.) A universe which contained no events beyond those inside the volume would be compatible with his information. All human beings are in a position of this sort, even from the common-sense point of view, so far as events in the universe beyond the stratosphere are concerned. The sky *might* be the limit. Now the world of scientists and instruments and varied happenings furnishes so many laws within the volume to which they are restricted for their information, that the suggestion (for which, of course, there could be no direct proof) that there are events outside obeying the same laws, often enables very precise statements to be made about events outside; as in the case of Galileo's observations with telescopes or Newton's calculations about gravitation, or modern spectroscopic work on the elements in the stars. If the events within their volume gave them no laws at all of a kind that they could apply to events outside, either they would be unable to find any reason for supposing there were any events outside or they would have to fall back on laws they were convinced held, although they could not justify their conviction.

Let us now come back to Mr. Russell's use of the illustration. An individual human being depends for all his information about what is actually happening, Mr. Russell seems to assume, on his percepts. Now his percepts are caused by the events inside his body. Hence his body gives the limits of the events on which he has to rely for what he infers to happen outside his body. If what Mr. Russell said about the location of percepts in the brain is taken into

account, the individual is more narrowly restricted. His primary volume of events is bounded at most by the inner surface of his skull.

This illustration makes more vivid what Mr. Russell means by speaking of percepts as epistemologically prior to things. It also brings out the fundamental problems of principle which his doctrine of the epistemological priority of percepts raises for him. For the illustration is an illustration only if the laws of physics and physiology are accepted. For only then can an individual's percepts be located within his body, and more narrowly within his brain (if Mr. Russell is right). And the difficulty is that if an individual assumes as Mr. Russell does that his percepts are his fundamental source of information about what happens, he will have to admit that the only events he has experience of within his volume are his percepts, whereas the laws of physics and physiology seem to refer to events outside his volume that are not percepts. So that he can only hope to use his information about what occurs within his volume as a means of inferring events outside his volume, if he can assume that events that are not his percepts are subject to the same laws as his percepts; just as scientists can hope to use the information about what happens on the earth for inferences about what happens in the heavens only if they can assume that heavenly bodies obey the same laws as earthly ones. And to succeed fully he must show that the laws he derives from his percepts are the same as the laws of physics and physiology.

The difficulty can be put in three ways: can an individual infer events that are not his percepts from his percepts? or: Can he infer unobserved events from his observed events? or: Can he infer events where he has no brains from events in his brain? It is the same difficulty, however we put it.

The first two ways of putting the difficulty show why, as Mr. Russell says in his reply to Mr. Laird (who writes on "Certain of Russell's Views Concerning the Human Mind") he is increasingly subjectivist in his epistemology; the third way suggests why he is increasingly materialistic in his ontology.

All Mr. Russell can do at present is to hold on to the laws of physics and psychology, while sticking to his difficulty. This comes out in his reply to Mr. Boodin ("Russell's Metaphysics"). His central problem becomes, Can we find any epistemological principle which will justify our reliance on science? Our percepts may be our fundamental source of information about what happens, but there may be in addition general principles which do not depend for their justification on our percepts, which we can perhaps formulate in such a way that we are ready to believe them on their own merits, and which together with our percepts will justify science. Mr. Russell's search continues.

The illustration makes clear also, I think, why so many critics regard as the primary error the view that an individual's own percepts, considered as events within his body, are epistemologically prior to all his other information. This, I think, is the fundamental criticism of Mr. H. C. Brown, the title of whose essay "A Logician in the Field of Psychology" indicates his further conviction, that Mr. Russell's logic has been a misleading guide in epistemological and psychological inquiries. Professor Brown, whose death before his paper went to press his friends will mourn, was a man of great charm and sincerity, a sensitive and vigorous personality.

The second part of the volume is concerned with Mr. Russell's views on ethical, religious, social, political and economic, educational, and historical questions. These views are a part of his biography, but he does not regard them as a part of his philosophy. The essays, by Mr. Buchler, Mr. Brightman, Mr. Lindeman, Mr. McGill, Mr. Bode and Mr. Hook are full of interest, and the replies enable Mr. Russell to give in brief compass his opinions on a wide variety of topics. To deal with them adequately would demand another review.

L. J. RUSSELL.

NEW BOOKS

Does It Follow? By MEYRICK H. CARRÉ. (Nelson. 1944. Pp. xiv + 152. 5s. net.)

Does It follow is a short, non-technical work, chiefly consisting in material drawn from various speeches and writings, for practice in logical thinking. The author's own exposition is limited to the Introduction and Part I, which contain his account of the purpose of the book, some advice to the novice for the logical analysis of passages for criticism, and his own implied theories. Part II contains 200 easy examples, mostly only a few lines in length. Part III contains sixty more advanced examples, ranging from a few lines to a page and a half in length. Part IV contains ten much longer examples, most of which occupy about four pages. The source or the nature of the source is stated at the foot of each example.

On p. 17 the author claims that "anyone can see an error in thought if it is put simply enough." This suggests that all we require for training in criticism is practice in the analysis of particular passages, and that generalization and theory are unnecessary. He is emphatic about the importance of simplification, to the extent of distinguishing first the assertion intended, and then the bare argument put forward in support of it. However, he does not explicitly disparage theory, but on the contrary hints in the Introduction (pp. ix–x) that the eventual purpose of practice in logical criticism is to "enable us to grasp the principles of rational and cogent discussion." But on the whole he seems a little dubious as to the necessity of a theoretical exposition of his conception of "thinking."

Some sort of definition of thinking would seem to be necessary, for otherwise we are left in obscurity as to the type of error which the author wishes to exemplify and criticize. Is he speaking of errors in pure reasoning? Is he speaking of *indisputable* or *indubitable* errors, whether from faulty reasoning or from some other cause? Or does he also include "errors" which merely seem to Mr. Carré to be obviously errors? Presumably he would not intentionally include "errors" of the last type, for which no objective criteria were available. But he does seem ambiguous in his conception of thinking, and in his consequent conception of mistakes in thinking. This should put us on our guard lest any "errors" of the last-mentioned type should be included unwittingly.

Little harm would be done if it were merely a matter of refraining, at a certain stage, from further technicalities. Everyone has, at some point or other, to decide upon the expediency of entering into greater detail. But we shall see that much more is involved. In some places, for instance, the author uses terms suggesting that thinking is a matter of *arranging*, the question of proficiency being foremost. Naturally, if this were all, it would be only by a figure that we could speak at all of *errors* in thought. Strictly there could only be similarities and contrasts between different people's ways of thinking, and "criticism" would be nothing more than disagreement. We must presume that the author of a book about errors believes that errors exist and that there are, in principle, objective standards for detecting them. However, the need to be at least conscious of such objective standards (whether formulated or not) is obscured by this juxtaposition of a subjective conception of thought.

At the outset of his suggestions for analysis in Part I, Mr. Carré does well to distinguish between conclusion and argument. To criticize a passage one

must know what its author intends to claim (viz., his conclusion), and the means he employs to support his claim (viz., his argument). Already in the Introduction a further distinction had been suggested, viz., that between *premises* and argument: on p. xi appears an important description of the nature of argument, viz., "our power to perceive the relation between premise and conclusion," while on p. xiii is developed a contrast between "facts," "knowledge," "information," etc. (viz., premises) on the one hand, and "logical processes," "method," etc. (viz., argument), on the other; and while admitting the importance of the former, Mr. Carré implies that his own concern is with the latter. But he does not seem to think it necessary to distinguish argument from premises in particular examples, for he makes no mention of this distinction in developing his method in Part I. He seems quite content with the distinction between conclusion and argument. The practical result seems to be that he seriously confuses arguments with their premises. Hence, although his definition of reason on p. xi is promising, in practice he makes room for processes of thought lacking objective tests, and such cannot be pronounced unequivocally correct or erroneous.

It is in the discussion of evidence more than anywhere else that the door is thrown open for a serious lapse from objectivity. In the text evidence is treated as referring to the matter of observation, supposed present in someone's experience, and ascertainable apart from any propositions making the evidence explicit. But then the reasoning cannot be made explicit either, for reasoning begins only with specific premises, and moreover is determined by the premises *qua* propositions, and not *qua* expressing a certain kind of experience such as the observation of evidence. If we presume to pass straight from such evidence to the conclusion (viz., to the proposition for which the evidence is taken to *be* evidence) the reasoning itself cannot be disentangled from the experience of cognizing evidence. The failure to distinguish argument from premise thus involves the failure to distinguish reasoning from an unexpressed cognitive experience. Now a reasoning process possesses, in the Laws of Thought and other principles, clearly definable and objective criteria whereby errors of reasoning can be detected. But a process of cognition preceding formulation is not open to judgement, in regard to its correctness, by an objective standard, for the simple reason that it is essentially subjective. The amphibious process classed as thinking by Mr. Carré would evidently be infected with the same subjectivity. In some cases of cognitive experience, e.g. in the estimate of the number of an observable group (see examples, pp. 29–30), there appears to be community of experience and therefore a common standard (viz., by counting, in the case of estimating numbers). But in others there is no such community, and certainly in these cases there can be no presumption of objectivity, since the only ground for such a presumption is agreement and evident community of experience. Criticism, in these cases, implies a vicious circle. Unfortunately Mr. Carré shows, by his example on p. 33 and by many others, that he does not restrict himself to cases in which there is an undisputed criterion. On the contrary, the critical remarks preceding and following this example directly indicate principles of a subjective and debatable character. "The rest of our knowledge," "new," "abnormal," "supernatural," are all terms possessing a different content for different individuals. Mr. Carré himself puts a special interpretation upon them in the act of taking them to be objective. He can hardly avoid doing so, having in principle allowed cases in which a truly objective criterion is lacking. Therefore we can by no means conclude that the fallacies he alleges are real. All we can conclude from an examination of these cases is that Mr. Carré has a bias in favour of positivism. The presence

of a bias is subtly if unintentionally concealed, for the confusion admitted by his method allows an arbitrary premise (e.g. "that supernatural hypotheses are pure speculation") to acquire the prestige of a logical certainty; it therefore allows a *disagreement with someone's premises* to be mistaken for an *error in that person's reasoning.*

Now Mr. Carré professes to be concerned with errors of *reasoning*, so he is scarcely justified in searching among premises (expressions of cognition) for the type of error which he professes to detect. His only recourse is to determine whether any of the principles of reasoning have been violated (e.g. the Laws of Thought). We have seen that he fails so to limit his procedure on account of his failure to distinguish argument from premise. But neither has he distinguished between indisputable and arbitrary grounds, and so he cannot isolate even such statements as are *indisputably* erroneous. (The latter, comprising errors of cognition as well as errors of reasoning, could conceivably be classed as errors of thinking.) All we can expect of his method, therefore, is the isolation of a class of errors, including three undistinguished types, viz., errors of reasoning (indisputable), indisputable errors of cognition, and disputable "errors" of cognition. Evidently criticism can be trustworthy only if it avoids the imputation of "errors" of the third type. This seems to be the thought of all those who elect to concentrate upon errors of reasoning or thinking, and not upon errors in general. The fact that so many of these well-intentioned authors omit to make the requisite distinction is, to say the least, disquieting. Judgements formulated direct from experience constitute material (for analysis) of quite a different order from that offered by reasoning from specific premises to a conclusion.

The three above-mentioned types of "error" actually occur undistinguished among Mr. Carré's examples, and it must be concluded that he falls short of his objective in practice as in theory. Examples of the third type are naturally determined by Mr. Carré's particular bias, i.e. they are offences against positivism. Among the first twenty (Part II), of which the author gives his own analysis in the Appendix, Nos. 2 and 13 are of this type. It is plain that, to many of a different way of thinking, neither these nor the example on p. 33, nor several of the others cited, would contain errors in thinking. Nor does there appear to be any objective means of settling the ensuing difference of opinion, since the alleged mistakes occur within individual minds prior to expression in determinate propositions. Lacking any objective test, Mr. Carré seems unconsciously to be applying the converse of his dictum that anyone can see an error in thought if it is stated simply enough, viz. he is assuming that if an error is sufficiently obvious (i.e. *to him*) it must be an error in thought.

The position in regard to examples 2 and 13 seems to be as follows. Mr. Carré is convinced *a priori* that the conclusions are certainly mistaken. To account for the mistake in the conclusion he then looks for a mistake in the "argument" (in which both premises and argument are intermixed), and discovers it in "generalisation from limited and unscientific observation." But the examples themselves assert sufficiency of observation, and if the recording is correct the conclusions evidently do follow. It is only by assuming that the recording is incorrect that Mr. Carré can maintain the observations themselves to be limited and unscientific. He claims to over-reach the *stated* evidence and to know that the *real* evidence is different. He is quarrelling with the *premises*. He is claiming to enter into the mind of the individual concerned, and to know the incorrectness of the stated premises by comparison with the actual experience meant to be recorded. If such a procedure were justified, Mr. Carré could discover errors of thought in any passage

whatsoever. But it is clear that, whether the premises are true or not, is a matter to be decided in principle by private, cognitional experience, and if one person (e.g. Mr. Carré, evidently) has no experiences of a certain kind, others are not thereby precluded from having them. Mr. Carré would hardly commit such a blunder in full consciousness. The explanation is that he rejects the premises not directly, but by first confusing them with the argument ("generalisation"), and then taking himself to be rejecting the *argument*.

It would be a mistake to suggest that more than a small proportion of Mr. Carré's examples are open to question. Most will repay analysis along the lines he suggests. All are interesting, especially the ten long ones in Part IV, which have as their subject-matter topics of moment both to popular and intellectual thought. E. TOMS.

The Moral Ideals of our Civilization. By R. A. TSANOFF. (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1942; London: G. Allen & Unwin. Pp. xix + 636. Price 30s.)

The publication of this book is something of an event. In the English-speaking countries general histories of ethics have been very rare for a very long time, and such as have appeared have usually been much too short for their theme. Mr. Tsanoff, however, deliberately and wisely casting his net widely so as to include literary, historical, sociological and economic philosophy as well as academic ethics, has contrived, within the limits of a single volume of about 300,000 words to give us almost a spacious synopsis of his immense prospect. (The proper names of 760 writers appear in the index, very few of them being the names of editors.) In some instances a writer's views are condensed into a sentence or two, but the book never degenerates into a catalogue and is the work of a practised and elegant writer with several decades of close study of ethics behind him.

My first business in this review is to express my definite conviction that Mr. Tsanoff's book should be widely and gratefully studied by all who are interested in the ideals of justice and humanity. I who am a professional teacher of ethics intend to advise beginners to consult it when they can and to censure senior students who do not study it seriously. Outside the schools the book should receive a very warm welcome from all persons of discrimination who have some intellectual curiosity about ethical ideas and ideals in the past and about the shape of moral futurity. The book has wit, taste and clarity in a satisfying, sometimes in an eminent degree. It is carefully proportioned. It has continuity without falling into the error of treating the authors it discusses as mere phases in a historical sweep. While it prefers a gentle equability of treatment, and is not very fond of in-fighting, it is seldom loose, often acute, and generally reliable. I should add that these statements are made upon the assumption that the book is of a class which deserves the criticism appropriate to work of a very high standard.

Having said this, I hope clearly, and certainly without reservations, I should not risk misunderstanding if I proceed to make certain comments, some of which are grumpy and pernickety.

The book, correctly restricting itself to the moral ideals of *our* civilization (i.e. to what Europe either originated or assimilated) begins with chapters on Greece, Christianity, Scholasticism, the Renaissance and the Reformation, these constituting Part I in 122 pages. In view of the very high standard of modern scholarly investigation into Greek ethics it is plain that there would be something like a miracle if a chapter of thirty pages on the subject were memorable, profound and an advancement of our learning. There is no such miracle on the present occasion and similar comments, I think, should be

made on the rest of Part I, including its account of mediaevalism, a subject so intensively studied in our times. Mr. Tsanoff is well acquainted with modern scholarship into these times, but does not seem to me to be a leader.

Part II, of about 200 pages deals with the period between the Reformation ant the French Revolution. Geographically it is chiefly concerned with England and France, though Holland and Hanover also enter in a big way and Spain in a small way. Ideologically there are several great patterns to be investigated: rationalism, empiricism and romanticism; nationalism and power politics; scepticism; optimism and misanthropy; materialism—to mention but some out of many. As it seems to me, Mr. Tsanoff shows very great skill in arranging his discussion in such a way as to compare and connect these patterns of thought as well as to clarify their estrangements.

The seventeenth century was so fertile in ideas about civilization, and the eighteenth so increased the fertility by its art of orderly expression that Mr. Tsanoff, allowing himself greater scope than in Part I, has still to accept the need for nicety of compression, and has to do so in a territory which has been very frequently explored in its several regions. Such difficulties, however, have stimulated instead of baulking him, and his success, in my opinion, has been marked. To be sure, much that he says may be questionable. What else is reasonably to be expected? In my opinion, for instance (no doubt equally or more questionable) he unduly neglects the general rational deontology in Hobbes's ethics, thus presenting a simpler and perhaps more consistent account of Hobbism than Hobbes himself did. Again, he seems to me to exaggerate the extent to which Hobbes's materialism influenced his politics and his ethics. Hobbes's psychology is introspective. Its derivation from the principles of motion is a piece of piety and his psycho-physics, by his own and everyone else's admission, is the mere sketch of a faint plausibility. In this matter, I think, Mr. Tsanoff should have made the same comment as he did in the case of David Hartley. Again, in the final pages of his elegant, moving and careful appreciation of Spinoza's *Ethica* Mr. Tsanoff allows himself an objective interpretation of the word "better" which requires close examination in view of what Spinoza himself said about the meaning of "good" and of "evil."

Such grouses apart, however, I have little but gratitude for the whole exposition of Part II, and have a special admiration for the account of British ethics which occupies approximately half of it. I have no reason for doubting that Mr. Tsanoff has first hand acquaintance with the works of all the 700 writers he discusses in his whole book, and many at least of the greater and lesser continental authors in these centuries have plainly been among his constant companions for many years. All the same he seems to me to have a peculiarly loving and a specially sedulous knowledge of British moral ideas in these, their greatest, centuries. I know of no author since Leslie Stephen who has treated these ideas so well and so informatively. Mr. Tsanoff has many obligations to Stephen, but that shows his good sense, and is no sort of disparagement of his considerable personal achievement in this place.

Part III, called "The nineteenth century and ours" begins with a chapter on Kant, who died in 1804 at the age of eighty but is here regarded as the inaugurator of the great era of German idealism. This era and the later German "realistic reaction" to it is discussed with wide knowledge and tender sympathy in about 100 pages, after which Latin Europe, British Liberalism, the "spreading American scene" and Russian sociology, whether Marxist or some other, come into the picture. On the whole this was the course a good historian was bound to choose even if his sympathies were less obviously Anglo-Hegelian than Mr. Tsanoff's. At the turn of the present century even

liberal British committee-men like T. H. Green were listening intently for echoes from early nineteenth century Berlin, and the same thing happened in America. On the continent of Europe, in addition to its general philosophy, most socialisms, and not the Marxist only were strongly influenced by what had happened in the German *Geist* even when they opposed it. The same is true in Europe to-day although it is not so marked in England and America as it was in the early twentieth century.

Mr. Tsanoff's chapter on American nineteenth century philosophy and its earlier origins seems to me to be admirable as well as delightful, and the interludes in his general argument which deal with British liberalism and with Benthamite and post-Benthamite utilitarianism show his customary skill. His main picture, with all its intricacy—religious, poetical, romantic, logico-philosophical, humanitarian, nationalistic, biological-evolutionary, despairing, hoping, fearing—is presented with something more than mere good craftsmanship. I think he overworks the adjective "lofty" either as redeeming what he deplores or as irradiating what he loves, but that may be my own misfortune. I am uplift-shy.

I shall mention only two minor points, the first of which seems to me to be rather revealing, the second a question of accuracy. Commenting upon Henry Sidgwick, Mr. Tsanoff says that although, in a separate essay, Sidgwick examined Green's ethics "with thoroughness and candour," it was "remarkable" that Sidgwick in his *Methods of Ethics* "failed to do justice to the claims of the Doctrine of Self-Realization." This seems to me to be a remarkable comment, and not to be helped by Mr. Tsanoff's further remark that "to have given adequate recognition to Self-Realization in his treatise would have required a radical change in his entire procedure." The point of accuracy concerns Mill's *Utilitarianism*. Mill, our author avers, "qualifies Benthamite doctrine by saying that the motive makes a difference in the morality where it makes a difference in the act" and Tsanoff complains that "this qualification reaches all the way through." Where did Mill say any such thing? What he did say, more than once, was that "the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action though much with the worth of the agent"—a totally different statement.

Mr. Tsanoff ends his book with a chapter on "Ethical Issues in Contemporary Thought." This chapter seems to me to be fair-minded and broad-knowledged. He is much more interested in moral ideals, that is to say in patterns of conduct and of aspiration than in the close analysis of moral ideas without any ulterior purpose. In that, very likely, he is right.

JOHN LAIRD.

Verifiability of Value. By RAY LEPLEY. (1944. New York: Columbia University Press; London, Humphrey Milford. Pp. xi + 267. Price in England, 22s. net.)

If one describes "values" rather generally as "goods (objects, desires, satisfactions, acts and enjoyments)" and adopts a similar attitude towards more specific types of "values," if, further, one interprets "verification," also rather generally, as "problem-solving adjustment," it will follow, pretty readily, that "values" can be "verified," that there is "interest" and purpose as well as factual description in all experimental "inquiry-creation-testing," in short, a diffuse unity in all human research and curiosity. Similarly it may readily be shown that there are senses in which sheer difference between "knowing" and "valuing," "quantity and quality," "descriptive and normative," "actual and creative," "objective and subjective" is not the whole story of experimental "inquiry-creation-testing."

Whether or not such a very generous invitation to unity is worth underlining in detail may be a question; but the approaches to a foregone conclusion are sometimes illuminating. In any case those who, like Mr. Lepley, agree broadly with Dewey have to undertake just such a task and are bound to censure Carnap as well as those others who, not being logical positivists, nevertheless believe that the attempt to blunt sharp distinctions is seldom commendable. I think myself that Mr. Lepley overdoes the "let's all get together" business, indeed that he carries the "what Something has joined" argument to indefensible extremes, as when he includes under "quality" the logical distinction between affirmative and negative, in other words when he allows himself to be cheated by a bad pun. Still those who are determined to cast their net widely must sometime expect to net pretty dry land. They aim at ubiquity, cost what may.

If this author's honest and inexhaustible patience communicates itself to his readers, such readers will have (I think) a modest, but (I am sure) an appreciable reward. JOHN LAIRD.

America's Progressive Philosophy. By W. H. SHELDON. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1942. London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. ix + 232. Price in England, 20s. net.)

This is a short book, there being only about 200 words to the page; but it covers a prodigious territory with seven-leagued strides. It is written with immense gusto.

It is the seventh set of lectures on the Mahlon Powell Foundation published for the University of Indiana. Mr. Sheldon's lectures were obviously meant to be popular, but although his capacity for inducing very abstract and very profound discussions to dash along at something fleeter than a hand gallop is very remarkable, it does not seem to me that these lectures, in all respects, are popular "in the best sense." There are too many loose statements to be condoned. Thus, to mention what is meant to be a point of cardinal importance and not a mere *obiter dictum*, the author, after giving a harrowing description of what happens to a man when he glissades down a crumbling cliff grasping vainly at projecting tussocks, declares that, then, "there is given an object pure and simple, and the *experience*-side has vanished," so that mind and object become identical. All that he is entitled to claim (if so much) is that *self*-awareness is not noticeably present.

Mr. Sheldon admits that "progressive philosophy" would be termed more accurately "process-philosophy." He seems to hold, however, that "process" really is "progressive." Even if it were, the contention that a progressive country should put its shirt upon a progressive philosophy may provoke ironical comment. Some of his compatriots, I think, may be a little shy of such claims, even if they agree that the process-philosophy was "rounded and matured" in America "alone."

Mr. Sheldon's reason for making the last statement is that Alexander and Bergson, to say nothing of other non-Americans such as Darwin and Heracleitus, are backnumbers now, the current version being Dewey's and Whitehead's with some support from Mead. Heracleitus had a philosophy of flux not of process. Darwin, Alexander and Bergson fumbled for the proper key. What, then, was the key? It appears to be the American discovery that process, instead of being either mere alteration of being or loss of being is "gain of being."

Metaphysically I submit this statement ought to mean that, granting "objective immortality" to the past at any moment, the present at any such

moment inevitably acquires a "gain of being." Certainly, by hypothesis, new beings exist which did not exist before, but surely the new beings need not "have more being," i.e. need not *exist more* (if that made sense) than the earlier beings. One might as well maintain that a newborn baby, by increasing the sum-total of humanity, was more human than any former human being. And if the thing were so it would be quite universal. At each successive moment an ageing man, whatever his losses in the way of hair, teeth, or wits, would "gain being," and so would stones and manure. There is no connection between such a metaphysical proposition and the idea that things *progress*, that is, retain their old capacities and acquire good new ones too. Nor does Mr. Sheldon attempt to prove the latter, although he often seems to be shaping towards it. His conclusion is quite tame. In all probability, he concludes, some things develop, some mark time, some deteriorate. In what sense is such a conclusion a portentous discovery?

Mr. Sheldon appears to think that process-philosophy is a great eirenicon which should put an end to philosophical wrangling and lead to universal co-operation among philosophers. Why? The specific opposite of process-philosophy, he tells us, is scholasticism, the doctrine of a fixed *scala naturae*. Process-philosophers tell the scholastics that there may be some fixities in the scale, but only some, and that, even if there happen to be some fixities, *a priori*, anything may become anything. Why should the scholastics be appeased? They seem to be expected to flourish on the meagre crumbs of comfort doled out by the admission that some of their beliefs need not be false. Moreover, if scholastics were thus appeased it would surely be a little odd if the same peaceable gesture were successful in reconciling all the other major philosophical differences, including the two which Mr. Sheldon thinks most important, idealism versus materialism, and the One versus the Many.

As I have said, Mr. Sheldon covers a prodigious territory. I have no space to touch on much of it, for instance on his contention that "action" is the test of "reality," or on his argument that, tautologies apart, all so-called synthetic implication is merely a historical route. These are threadbare topics, but there is freshness in Mr. Sheldon's approach to them. Some may doubt, however, whether Mr. Sheldon's gumption, though obviously considerable, is quite equal to his gusto.

JOHN LAIRD.

Books also received:

DOROTHY M. EMMET. *The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. 1945. Pp. xi + 238. 10s. 6d. net.

R. G. COLLINGWOOD. *The Idea of Nature*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1945. Pp. viii + 183. 15s. net.

ARNOLD S. NASH. *The University and the Modern World*. London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd. Pp. 223. 12s. 6d. net.

RT. HON. SIR HENRY SLESSER, P.C. *Order and Disorder: A Study of Mediaeval Principles*. London: Hutchinson & Co. Pp. 112. 15s.

Smithsonian Institution Annual Report for the year ended June 30, 1943. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1944. Pp. xii + 610. $2.

PRYNS HOPKINS, M.A., Ph.D. *From Gods to Dictators*. Girard, Kansas: Haldeman-Julius Publications. 1944. Pp. 168. Paper, $1; cloth 1.65.

W. J. PHYTHIAN-ADAMS, D.D. *The Way of At-one-ment* (Studies in Biblical Theology). London: S.C.M. Press, Ltd. Pp. 127. 7s. 6d. net.

NEW BOOKS

JACQUES MARITAIN. *The Dream of Descartes.* With some other Essays. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison. New York: Philosophical Library. 1945. Pp. 220. $3.

R. FORTESCUE PICARD. *Time, Number and the Atom.* London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1945. Pp. viii + 92. 8s. 6d. net.

J. B. HOBMAN (Editor). *David Eder: Memoirs of a Modern Pioneer.* London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd. 1945. Pp. 215. 8s. 6d. net.

A. L. KROEBER. *Configurations of Culture Growth.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1944. Pp. x + 772. $7.50.

WM. ERNEST HOCKING. *Science and the Idea of God* (The John Calvin McNair Lectures). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. xii + 124. $1.50. English price 9s. 6d. net.

S. K. SAKSENA. *Nature of Consciousness in Hindu Philosophy.* Benares: Nand Kishor & Bros. 1944. Pp. viii + 224. Rs. 7/8.

G. C. FIELD, M.A., D.Litt. *Pacifism and Conscientious Objection.* Cambridge University Press. 1945. Pp. viii + 124. 3s. 6d. net.

J. C. FLUGEL, B.A., D.Sc. *Man, Morals and Society.* A Psycho-Analytical Study. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd. 1945. Pp. 328. 21s. net.

(MISS) SIU-CHI HUANG. *Lu Hsiang-Shan: A Twelfth-Century Chinese Idealist Philosopher.* New Haven: Conn.: American Oriental Society. 1944. Pp. 116. No price quoted.

BENEDETTO CROCE. *Politics and Morals.* New York: Philosophical Library, Inc. 1945. Pp. 204. $3.

MARVIN FARBER. *The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1943. Pp. 586. English price 33s. 6d. (Humphrey Milford).

T. D. WELDON. *Introduction to Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason."* Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1945. Pp. viii + 206. 12s. 6d. net.

Z. JORDAN. *The Development of Mathematical Logic and of Logical Positivism in Poland between the two Wars* (in the series of booklets "Polish Science and Learning," edited by The Association of Polish University Professors and Lecturers in Great Britain). London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 48. 2s. 6d. net.

A. E. CLARK-KENNEDY, M.D., F.R.C.P. *The Art of Medicine in Relation to the Progress of Thought* (a Lecture in the History of Science Course in the University of Cambridge). Cambridge University Press. 1945. Pp. 48. 2s. net.

INSTITUTE NOTES

On Friday, June 1st, Professor H. H. Price gave a lecture to the Institute entitled "Thinking in Absence."

Members will be notified of the Annual General Meeting in due course.

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LIFE AND PLEASURE (II)

By the late H. W. B. JOSEPH

FURTHER, we come here to what for the purpose of our present argument is the most important consideration of all, viz. that if we could show that there were two kinds of neural or physiological processess, occurring respectively on all occasions of pleasure and pain, the fact would be valueless for proving that life *must* be predominantly pleasant. It is perhaps intelligible that to succeed or fail in purposive activity should bring respectively contentment and discontent rather than vice-versa; but that of two kinds of neural or physiological process, one should be accompanied by pleasure and the other by pain, is no more intelligible than if the connection were reversed. If the behaviour of any creature is affected by desires and aversions, by judgments, by feelings: if its desires and aversions or its judgments are connected with or affected by its pleasures and pains, then indeed the question with what bodily conditions its pleasures and pains are connected is part of the problem that interests the biologist—viz. what the conditions are under which the species can continue. But in that case the biologist must not claim that all the conditons of life and reproduction can be found in what happens in the body. Pleasures and pains, desires and aversions, purposes are not events that happen in the body. If they are the mere "apparence or sense" of what happens there, and alone determines survival or extinction, then what happens there to determine survival might, for all we can see, equally appear as pain or pleasure. If, however related *inter se*, they are really efficacious to promote survival or extinction, what happens in the body does not suffice for explaining these fates. Let us not deceive ourselves by calling what happens there psycho-physical; the word solves no problem but only conceals one.

What happens in the body includes not only respiration, the circulation of the blood, metabolism, sleep, but movements by which food is secured and ingested, by which enemies are attacked or repulsed, mating carried out, eggs laid in suitable places, young provided for, shelter and clothing found or made, and so forth. But it is another question why some of these happen in the body. We often ascribe it to instinct that in the lower animals these things happen as the continuance of the species required. To act instinctively is to be provoked, in virtue of some pre-existing bodily organization, by a stimulus of some definite sort to a response of some definite sort, usually to one that may be regarded as suitable to the situation in the sense that such response in such a situation has survival-value, for the individual or the species. An animal may be thrown into convulsions by a stimulus, but it would not be said to contort itself instinctively, because its convulsions have no survival-value; but if the stimulus were injurious and provoked a definite movement that removed the cause of it, as the sting of a gadfly provokes a horse to whisk away the fly with its tail, or if a stimulus provoked a movement subserving the continuance of the species, as the scent of food provokes a hungry animal to seize and devour it, then the responsive action would be called instinctive. Now plainly this connection between stimulus and response in virtue of a pre-existing organization might exist, not only without any consciousness of the conditions which make the response biologically useful, but equally whether pain or pleasure or neither accompanied it. Many such connexions in fact exist without accompaniment of either. The automatic regulation of secretion from endocrinal glands, or of the percentage of carbon dioxide in the air of the lungs, is such a connexion, though because there is no consciousness of what is happening we do not call it instinctive; and it normally proceeds without accompaniment of pleasure or of pain. That some of the so-called instinctive responses necessary to life are accompanied by pleasure is doubtless true; but that others, like the regulation of breathing, are not shows that accompaniment by pleasure is not required for their occurrence. It would only be required if the stimulus without the pleasure were insufficient to produce the response in an animal physically pre-disposed; and to allege this is to abandon a purely physiological explanation. So long as we profess that this is possibly the accompanying pleasure is an otiose accompaniment; and there might as well, for all our theory can say, be accompaniment of pain. Indeed there sometimes is. What is more necessary biologically than for the female to be delivered of its offspring? But what pains are greater in many species than the pains of parturition? This shows that, as long as a stimulus can produce the response which the continuance of the species requires, it does not

matter how agonizing are the activities involved. Some physiological activities are in fact accompanied by pleasure, and some by pain. In neither case can we see any necessary connexion. Biologically it is only needful that those subserving the continuance of life, or reproduction, should be provoked, and those harmful inhibited; provided this happens, it matters nothing whether either are pleasant, or painful, or unfelt.

Of course the argument is changed if we introduce desire and aversion, or again purpose, into our determinants of biologically needful action. It then becomes important what is pleasant and what painful. For our desires and aversions may be affected by pleasures and pain, and our purposes directed to obtain one and avoid the other. But whether it is a condition of species surviving that activities subserving the continuance of life, or reproduction, should be pleasant and those harmful painful will depend on how desire, aversion, and purpose are related to pain and pleasure. In any case we must not regard desire and aversion as merely the conscious side of physiological tendencies, if the introduction of them is to affect the issue; were they no more than that, the physiological explanation would still remain sufficient. The introduction of purpose must take us outside this. A merely physiological explanation of the bodily processes concerned in actions called purposes is inconsistent with their being really purposive. These bodily processes issue in movements of the limbs (or maybe in inhibitions of movement) which are the physical side, and the manifestation to others, of what, as we know it ourselves, we call (not in the biological sense) action. Now movements of bodies are commonly explained as the necessary results of other previous movements of bodies. If, when the bodies whose movements have to be explained are our limbs, their movements are still to be thus explained, it does not matter what pains or pleasures accompany or are expected to be avoided or secured by their movements. Neither present feelings, nor anticipations of others to come, even though they may affect our purposes, nor our purposes are movements of bodies; nor are they therefore on this view efficacious in determining our so-called purposive activities. If our purposes make our actions other than they would have been without them, a purely mechanical or dynamical explanation of all that occurs in our bodies is impossible. So long as we hold to such explanation, we may say what we please about men's dislike of pain or love of pleasure, but we shall only be entitled to credit the Evolution hypothesis with proving that life must be predominantly pleasant, if it can discover a necessary connexion between certain kinds of bodily process and certain kinds of feeling. I certainly am not favoured with this insight, and I do not believe that anyone else is.

But, it will perhaps be said, we know that our actions are some-

times determined by desire or aversion, and sometimes by purposes which are conceived under the influence of desire for, or aversion to, a remote and more comprehensive object though in the execution of them some particular desire or aversion may be ignored. We know too how much both our particular desires and aversions and our conception of those remoter and more comprehensive objects towards which our purposes come to be directed, are affected by our experiences of pleasure and pain. Let us waive the question how all this is to be reconciled with those ways of explaining movements of bodies which physiology or any other science of body employs. The relation of soul and body, of mind and matter, is unsolved; but we cannot really doubt that our actions are influenced by our desires and purposes, and our prospects of survival by our actions; nor yet that many at least of our pleasures and pains depend on what happens in our bodies. We may grant that this dependence is merely an empirical fact. Still, so long as the actions of any animals are directed towards obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain, it is a condition of the continuance of their species that what they must do in order to live and propagate should be on the whole pleasant and not painful. Biologically speaking, an animal must practise and pursue what is necessary to life and reproduction; as a fact of psychology, it practises and pursues what is pleasant; therefore what is necessary to life and reproduction must also be pleasant. This was really Spencer's argument, and it holds. It is beside the point to labour the contention that there is no intelligible contention between any particular physiological process and pleasure or pain.

But it is not beside the point, if that life must be predominantly pleasant is claimed as a *biological* theorem; the argument just recited rests also on a psychological assumption; and this assumption, or assumptions (for there are really two) may be disputed, even though the mere argumentation holds. The conclusion therefore is still in doubt.

We saw that Spencer took it as obvious that pleasant and painful feelings were the same respectively with those which we seek to bring into and retain in consciousness, or to get and keep out of it; that he thought it as clear that we seek to obtain pleasures or avoid pains which we are not feeling, as that we seek to retain pleasures or get rid of pains which we are feeling, and clear that we desire or avoid nothing but pleasant and painful feelings. That we can only desire what we think to be pleasant, and can be averse to nothing except as we think it painful, are assumptions which have often been advanced not merely as empirically true, but as necessary. "Desiring a thing," said J. S. Mill, "and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely inseparable, or rather two parts of the same phenomenon; in strictness of language,

two modes of naming the same psychological fact." The confusion underlying all this has been so often exposed, that I need only briefly indicate it. It is true that if I now desire to get anything, I feel pleasure now in the thought of getting it by and by, and expect now to feel pleasure in getting it by and by; equally, if I desire that something should happen which is not my getting anything. But what I desire to get need not be a feeling of pleasure, and what I desire should happen, if it is not my getting anything, cannot be my getting pleasure. The pleasure anticipated from satisfying a desire cannot be that the thought of which excited the desire; whatever my desire be, I anticipate pleasure from satisfying it; the thought of *that* pleasure, therefore, cannot determine my desire to be for one thing rather than for any other.

We have allowed that the connexion of pleasure, in some sense of the word, with the consciousness of succeeding in one's endeavour may be more than a mere empirical fact; so may be its connexion with learning of the happening of what one desired should happen; and therefore, with all fulfilment of desire. The confusion of this pleasure with what is desired thus explains how it comes to be thought that all desire must be for pleasure. But the exposure of the confusion explodes that supposed necessity.

There is, however, another reason than this confusion for the popularity of the belief that all desire is for pleasure, and that is the identification of pleasure and pain with good and evil, coupled with a failure to distinguish particular desires from that desire of one's good which, unlike any particular desire, seems never satisfied and so may be felt along with them all. To desire anything for oneself on the ground that it is evil is perhaps impossible; hence, if evil were pain, it would seem that we cannot desire pain. Again, so far at least as a man acts deliberately, or with consideration, it would seem that he considers how his proposed action is related to attaining what he thinks good; and hence, if good is pleasure, that in all considered action one is pursuing pleasure.

Some would deny that in acting deliberately a man need have regard to his good; he who acts, they say, from a sense of duty is not considering how his act is related to bringing any good into being: still less to his attaining any good. I do not wish to raise this issue; and since those who identify good with pleasure would be prepared to speak of a man's good as his happiness, and a man's desire for happiness differs from particular desires in the same sort of way as does his desire for his good, it will be enough for me to argue that the influence of the desire for good is not sufficient to secure that life must be preponderantly pleasant even if one's good means one's happiness. I do not myself think that the desire of happiness is the same with the desire of good; I think that the desire of good, i.e. to

make one's life as good as possible, may lead a man to do his duty at the expense of what, in any ordinary sense of the word, would be called his happiness. Others, who would say that to act from a sense of duty involves no desire of one's good, would still agree that a man may do his duty at the expense of his happiness. Either way, therefore, if from the admission that deliberate action is with a view to happiness it does not follow that life need be preponderantly pleasant, *a fortiori* it does not follow on the assumption that we can also deliberately act from a sense of duty. And I propose to argue that, though it is biologically necessary that men's activities should subserve the continuance of the species, and though it be granted that their purposes help to determine their activities, and are directed towards happiness, yet it does not follow that life must be preponderantly pleasant, nor that they need actually be happy.

It might be argued that since good or happiness is pleasure, the influence of a desire for it is the influence of a desire for pleasure. But the plausibility of identifying it with pleasure is really gone, when once it is seen that the pleasure or contentment that attends getting what one wants is not what one wants. His good or happiness is that which would completely satisfy a man, and with which therefore he would be content. But he would be content *because* he had got what he wanted, and that was not his contentment with getting it. If this is not a sufficient rejoinder, consider that those who maintain only pleasure and pain to be good and evil contradict themselves as soon as they begin to talk also about happiness. For happiness, they say, consists in as many and great pleasures as possible, with as few and light pains. But they think of it as something which a man could say he is having and enjoying. Now the pleasures whose sum it is supposed to be are successive; and even if they make a sum, they cannot be had and enjoyed as a sum. At most a man can enjoy the knowledge, how large a sum they make. The pleasure he takes in knowing this may be as intense as you please; yet it will not be the sum of those other pleasures. And why should the only knowledge in which he can take such intense pleasures be the knowledge how many other pleasures his life will have brought him?

So far then we have neither found reason for believing that all particular desires are for pleasure, nor that purposive action is always directed into that course whereby it is thought that one will on the whole get most pleasure. And even if all particular desires were for pleasure, it is impossible to show that they must be; the belief that they must merely arises from confusing what one desires with the pleasure which, because one desires it, one anticipates from getting it. If I wanted to be High Sheriff, it would give me pleasure to be pricked; if I wanted not to be, it would not. Neither therefore recognition of the part played in determining our action by desire

and aversion, nor of that played by purpose even if purposive action must be directed towards one's happiness or good, leads to the conclusion that only if predominantly pleasant can life continue.

But perhaps what establishes the conclusion is the part played in determining action not by desire and aversion but by pleasure and pain. Desire and aversion themselves are not pleasures and pains, nor is it the pleasures we desire, or the pains which we fear, that influence our conduct, for they do not as yet exist. "Nature," said Bentham, "has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. . . . They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think."[1] But he also saw now and then, though quickly forgetting the implications of it, that to govern us they must be *in esse*, not *in posse*, and that what we desire or fear is not *in esse*. So it might be false that we seek to bring nothing into consciousness but feelings of pleasure, to keep nothing out but feelings of pain, yet true that present feelings of pleasure or pain make us seek to maintain or alter the state whereto they belong. Would it then follow that life is only possible on condition of being predominantly pleasant?

The answer is that it would not. For in the first place many pleasures and pains are incidental to states which we cannot maintain or alter at will; and provided the states which we can maintain or alter were pleasant when necessary to the continuance of life and painful when injurious, the necessary states which our efforts cannot affect might safely be painful; and life predominantly painful in consequence. In the second place, what makes us as biologists attach importance to the correlation between injurious movements or contacts and pain is that we believe that pain serves as a danger-signal, leading an animal to desist from injurious movements and withdraw from injurious contacts. It might easily injure its heart by over-exertion, if pain did not lead it to stop; if cutting and scratching did not hurt, cattle would destroy themselves against barbed-wire fences. It seems less necessary that beneficial bodily movements and contacts should be pleasant in order to be maintained; (we are not now considering whether they need be so in order to be desired or sought); for unless those injuries were painful, there would be nothing to hold an animal to one sort rather than the other. A plant no doubt will not live except in suitable soil and temperature, and where unsuitable winds do not blow on it, and insect pests and browsing or nibbling animals do not come and destroy it. But plants, not being locomotive, are not constantly exposing themselves to new environments. Animals are; and not being provided in advance with bodies proof against everything with which they may be brought into contact as they move, nor capable without hurt of every mode

[1] *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ch. I, § 1.

and duration of movement, they are led by the connexion of pain with injurious movements and contacts to preserve themselves uninjured as they move. These pains determine them to desist from what is injurious.

But, granting that pain has this biological use, how much follows? Not that life must be predominantly pleasant, but that animals may be shifted by pains from the courses injurious to life into those needful for or compatible with its continuance. It is still perfectly conceivable that very few beneficial activities should be pleasant, though it would not do for them to be painful; conceivable that animals should be kept in the necessary courses by much pain felt whenever they diverge, with little or no pleasure at other times; so that life would not be predominantly pleasant.

But men at any rate do not in fact seek to maintain in consciousness only feelings of pleasure, to get rid only of feelings of pain. Felt pains do not fatally determine movements of desistence from those activities which they accompany, or directed to removing the pain's apparent causes. And in fact, only if they do not can they be biologically useful and not superfluous. For if they did fatally determine those movements, the physical conditions of the pains might as usefully do so themselves directly. The pains are of use only if they are merely something to be taken into account; and only so are they properly called danger signals. If a train could not over-run the points when the signal was against it, the red light would be unnecessary. But if it is in my power to desist from a painful activity or not according as I desire more to be rid of the pain or to go through with the activity, or according as I judge the pain or failure to complete or bring about the expected result of the activity the greater evil; or if again I know from the pain that the activity is injurious and can set the injury threatened against that failure and judge which is more detrimental to my happiness, then the pain is useful as heading me off from or informing me of a danger which neither it nor the physical cause of it fatally determines me to escape. Then, however, if the painful activity is endured because of desire, since desire need not be directed upon pleasure, there need be no pleasure beyond that of getting what was desired; while if consideration enters, whether to endure a continuance of present pain is but one of the considerations with reference to which I shall determine how to act; and, as we have seen, it is not necessary that in thus deliberating, even if my overriding regard is for my own happiness, I should conceive this happiness to consist in the largest attainable sum of pleasures with the least admixture of pains. Nor is it necessary that because my overriding regard is for my own happiness, my life should be happy.

It has been said that a man does not do what he thinks will bring

him most pleasure, but what he now feels most pleasure in thinking of doing; that he abstains from doing not what he thinks will bring him most pain, but what he now feels most pain in thinking of doing. But supposing this is so, he need by no means now feel most pleasure or pain in thinking of doing what he thinks will bring most pleasure or pain hereafter. A man suffering from toothache may think that the pain of extraction will be less than that involved in keeping the tooth, yet shrink from going to have it out. If that is because the thought of going to have it out is more painful now than the thought of leaving things as they are, plainly to be held back from a course of action by the painfulness of thinking of taking it is no way of securing that we shall best avoid pain. So with the influence of pleasure; it is notorious what pleasure a man may feel in thinking of revenge; but he may be certain that he will have to pay dearly, and seek revenge without ever expecting, let alone getting, more pleasure if he takes it than if he does not. If then the pain and pleasure that governed us in all we do were those felt in thought of acting thus or thus, their governance of us would not even necessitate our seeking to make our lives predominantly pleasant, still less our lives being so. But if their way of governing us were that we could only take such action as we thought would bring us most pleasure, from this it would follow on biological grounds that we must act in those ways whereby at the moment of acting we expected to bring most pleasure into our lives, but not whereby we should actually do this and in fact make them preponderantly pleasant. Perhaps what makes a man shrink from death is the pain felt in the thought of dying; perhaps when he shrinks from it he believes that life has chiefly pleasure in store for him; but that need be no more than illusion. The survival of the species is served by whatever keeps an individual from dying, at least until it has done all that is needed to establish the next generation. If the individual is so constituted as not to avoid death unless believing that its life will be preponderantly pleasant, then this belief is of great biological value. But it is of no biological value that the belief should be true, and no biological argument can be produced to show that it must be so. Nor is it inconceivable that the individual should not be thus constituted; in fact it would seem untrue that it is. The lower animals when moved by desire probably act without any consideration whether by doing what they desire to do they will promote their happiness. A male animal in the breeding season will fight other males for possession of the female. Appetite and pugnacity together secure that the strongest and most courageous animals get most offspring; but provided the sexual urge is strong enough to keep them fighting, there is no biological reason why they should enjoy fighting, or enjoy mating when that comes, or if they do, why the

pleasure of it should be great enough to offset—were they capable of forming a judgment—the pains of the fight. And in men there is a love of life which takes little account whether its continuance will be preponderantly pleasant. "Men convicted of the most dastardly murders," says Baron von Rintelen, in *The Dark Invader*, "have related to me how they felt when they were granted a reprieve. Some of these wretched 'lifers' were clinging from day to day to the faintest ray of hope that a day might come when they might be discharged, even though their families had dispersed, and though they had nothing to hope for outside these prison walls in a life for which they had become wholly unfitted through decades of incarceration, as they were now nothing but human rags." Suppose that while hoping for a reprieve they had fancied their life in prison would be sweet; experience must have quickly disillusioned them, but they still fancied it would be sweet outside. If after discharge, disillusioned again, they were again sentenced to death for another crime, is there any reason to think that the love of life would not renew the old illusion? That, if we think that nature devises, may be a device of nature to secure the continuance of the species; and see how little the device requires that a man should in fact have much pleasure of living.

Every way then we have found the assertion that on biological grounds pleasure and pain must go along respectively with conditions conducive to the maintenance of and destructive of life, devoid of any foundation. On certain assumptions about considered action, it will be a condition of the continuance of the species that the individual should believe his action will lead to a preponderance of pleasure. Even so, it will not be necessary that his belief should be true; nor have we found reason to think the assumptions in question true themselves. So far as action is determined by the relative strengths of particular desires, without consideration, or so far as it depends on instinct, the question whether life will be preponderantly pleasant is not raised by the agent, and has no bearing on the survival of the species. It is perfectly conceivable that the physiological processes required for the continuance of life up to, or also beyond, the time of reproduction and of the independence of offspring, should be painful, and, if you will, even agonizing. Only by assuming that the empirical conjunction of pleasure with eating, drinking, procreation and healthy exercise, or of pain with disease and wounds, is intelligibly necessary, can the assertion be established; and to assume this is to beg the question. For all that can be shown to the contrary, the condition on which alone animals could in fact live might be that they should suffer continuous agony. Men indeed might in such case prefer to die, and take steps accordingly. If so, their species would disappear. Yet it does not follow, because they

judged death better than such a life as that, that they must judge it better than any life not preponderantly pleasant. And though it may be that they determine their actions according to judgments of good and evil, the Evolution hypothesis does not require that they must. This hypothesis then has nothing to show against the possibility that animal life, man's included, should be more or less continuously painful. I am not for a moment suggesting that in fact it generally is so; very likely it is not. Whether from the consideration that though it quite conceivably might have been, in fact it is not so, any inferences are justifiable, and if so, what they are, it is beside my purpose to enquire.

ON MIND AND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF IT

PROFESSOR J. N. FINDLAY

THIS paper is an attempt to clarify our talk about minds and thoughts —our own minds and the thoughts which run through them and which we know directly, as well as the minds of other people and the thoughts with which we credit them. We do so in order to be able to characterize satisfactorily our whole performance in talking about minds and thoughts, the rules according to which such talk operates and the goals it purports to reach. We also hope to evaluate, in the light of such a characterization, a number of more elaborate ways of speaking about minds and thoughts, so as to become clear as to their advantages or disadvantages in comparison with more ordinary ways of speaking. The whole investigation is well worth undertaking, since it has long been evident that our talk about mind and thought is, to a peculiar extent, liable to become the seat of certain deep perplexities, which do not arise when we deal with unusual material on the borderlines of knowledge, but which tend, rather, to obtrude themselves in commonplace situations, and to trouble our grasp of the most obvious notions and the most evident truths. Such perplexities, broadly covered by the word "philosophical," are rendered very stubborn by their objects and their origin. For when we are dealing with things remote, strange and intricate, we have at least a firm foothold in the well-known, simple and near, and a clear set of terms to talk with; but we hardly seem to have a perch to hop to, or any intelligible language left to talk in, when the obvious itself begins to present difficulties. And it is also characteristic of most of the difficulties we are considering that in them the burning zone of perplexity seems to shift erratically from issue to issue, that each expedient adopted to meet them involves us in new problems, that men cannot ever agree as to the *best* expedient or the *least serious* difficulty, and that, in the outcome, they resemble nothing so much as a set of sleepers under inadequate coverings, some of whom prefer exposure in one place, while others prefer it in another. Our whole talk about mind and thought has, further, something nebulous about it: it moves on a high level, charged with free electricity, which cannot be satisfactorily used or measured until it has been conducted to earth. And there would, moreover, be truth in saying that our whole talk about thinking, about inner subjective activity, is, to a large extent, the product of a primitive perplexity and of a short way of dealing with it, for we readily locate

"in the mind" whatever we should like to place elsewhere, but can unfortunately find no room for.[1] Mind is, to a large extent, a place where we dismiss and bracket everything visionary, erroneous, irregular or obscure, feeling that we have rendered it quite harmless by doing so: we should not speak of mind and thinking half so often if we always judged correctly or saw straight. It is surely not remarkable that a region so used should give birth to a crop of peculiarly stubborn puzzles. But in regard to this, as in regard to all things that utterly puzzle and confuse us, there is only one thing to be done: we must become clear as to the *nature* of our difficulty and how it has arisen. It may then be that we shall find that we have been unable to solve a certain problem merely because we lack access to certain essential data or information, which beings more favoured than ourselves may possess already, or which we ourselves may come to possess in the future. In such a case we may enumerate the alternatives, perhaps assess their probability, and then divest ourselves of curiosity until the desired data present themselves. And it may also be that we shall find reason to say, as some philosophers have suggested, that there are some perplexities inherent in the knowledge-situation, from which no one who knew anything could ever free himself:[2] in such cases, if such there be, we shall be unable to do more than circumnavigate our blind-spot, assess the plausibility of various alternatives, and then abandon curiosity without the hope which buoys us in our former type of case. And it may also be, finally, that our perplexity will reveal itself as nothing but the reflection of our ways of speaking, a shadow of the hesitant, discrepant, mutable and suggestive pattern of human language, projected outward upon the landscape, with which it merges so intimately that we fail to realize that *things* only are so difficult because the ways in which we speak of them are so unsatisfactory. And such perplexities will remove themselves once we have managed to see *why* certain ways of talking lead to difficulties, and when we either use them with a clearer consciousness of their dangers, or have superseded them with ways of talking which are less confusing or which please us better.[3]

In considering our talk about mind and thought we shall, in the first instance, leave out of reckoning all diction of a technical order, which has faced philosophical perplexities and has, in consequence, become infected with question-begging implications. We shall *not*, however, leave out of account talk which mentions "experiences" and "mental states," and shall make use of these very convenient

[1] First pointed out by Hegel, I think.

[2] It will be one of the tasks of this essay to recommend this way of speaking.

[3] It will be obvious from this passage, and throughout this essay, how much I owe to Wittgenstein, Wisdom and others.

terms ourselves. For, though they are sometimes used in technical or philosophical senses, they are more frequently merely the equivalents of the "thoughts," the "feelings" and the "wishes" of ordinary diction, things that all men admit that they themselves have, which they unhesitatingly attribute to others, and which are said to be constantly "passing" or "flashing" through people's minds. The "mental states" whose verbal symbolization we shall consider are nothing recondite nor a product of analysis, but to say that anyone has them, is to say, for example, that such a person is thinking of the years he spent in North Auckland, that he feels sad that he will never again live in such a pleasant climate, that he wishes that he wasn't doomed to end his days in a chilly southern city, and so on and so on. We are dealing with such ways of talking, furthermore, as make it true that men *know* their own experiences, or at least a large number of them, that they can *tell* these experiences to others without any special training, though sometimes they may have some difficulty in *expressing* them, that they can learn to *read* or interpret the experiences of others through their conduct or their gestures, and so on indefinitely. All these must be true statements in the kind of talk we are studying, since this is how, in fact, we normally speak of thoughts, feelings and wishes, and whoever says they are *not* true is either talking absurdly or is using language in some more or less eccentric manner. We must, in the first instance, consider the "psychic game" as we actually play it, though afterwards there is nothing to prevent us from making up another game that makes it true (or not absurd) to say that men have *no* experiences, or that they never know if other men have any, or that they cannot tell at all what other men's experiences are like, that all experiences are analysable into sensory content or are the functions of an ego, or the like.

It will illuminate the way in which we talk of mind and thought if we consider, first of all, a modern way of characterizing language[1] which covers (on some rulings) everything that is of the essence of speaking and everything that distinguishes it from senseless chatter. This characterization is an achievement of some value, since it succeeds in separating very neatly all our more obviously profitable talk from talk whose profitableness is much more dubious. The characterization in question may be briefly (though misleadingly) described, if we say that it rules all statements to be both *predictive* and *social*. It lays down, we may say, that the function of statements is always to predict the future sense-experiences of the speaker (in actual or in hypothetical circumstances), and it also makes it part of

[1] I shall not attribute the characterization I am about to give to any particular person. It represents my own way of making sense of notions that have found acceptance in many quarters. I leave aside the question as to whether it is sensible to attempt to characterize language *in general*.

their essence to solicit confirmation—indefinitely extended in space and protracted in time—from the reports of other people. It rules, for instance, that if I say: "That is a blue vase over there," I am looking forward to, expecting innumerable sense-experiences, in actual future or hypothetical situations, the sort of experiences, namely, that I might describe as "the view of the vase from here," "the view of the vase from there," "the view of the vase in such and such circumstances," as well as the various sorts of experience described as the feel of the vase in such and such circumstances, the noise made by the vase from such and such places and in such and such circumstances, and so on. And it also rules that anyone making such a statement anticipates that others will confirm him point by point, that they will evince in their utterances and their actions a parallel registration of the various views of the vase, as they place themselves here or there, as well as a parallel registration of its feel, its smell, its taste, or the sound it makes in various assigned sets of circumstances. And if enough of these expectations are satisfied, including, possibly, certain more weighty ones, a man may make the statement confidently and say that it is true, whereas if too many of these expectations, or perhaps some crucial ones, are disappointed, he must reject it and declare it false, although a smaller number of disappointments may be set aside as showing only that some person or some place or some occasion is not "normal." Briefly, our characterization makes all utterances look forward to what is visible and showable, to what the great company of normal people can take in with their senses. We should, however, be making nonsense of the characterization we are giving if we made it mean that all our statements are actually *about* anyone's sense-experiences, that they tell us what these sense-experiences will be like; to characterize our speaking in *this* manner would misdescribe it grossly. Quite obviously many speakers have never heard of sense-experiences, and even those who *have* heard of them do not speak about them frequently. The notion of a sense-experience is not a primary one; it arises only after a long course of sophistication. Only when we have had experience of illusion, of stage effects, of pictures and the like, can we be trained to differentiate (and then both hesitatingly and with imperfect confidence) between the various sensible aspects of the things before us, the views and feels and smells and tastes and sounds they offer us, and the concrete things themselves. And it is then only by a further access of sophistication that we ascribe to persons—ourselves and others—who are employing their senses on the things around them, an inward registration of such fragmentary aspects. The language, moreover, by means of which we speak of sense-experiences, is secondary and derivative: we have to describe them by analogy with concrete things, or by connecting them with

the organs or other circumstances of their origin. And since there are always vastly many sense-experiences connected with any single object or quality in the environment, it is clear that such derivative talk must frequently be short of terms to deal with its material. Quite plainly, therefore, it is silly to maintain that we are always talking about sense-experiences: our talk ranges over trees and mountains, pantomimes and dynasties, protective colouration and the falling birth-rate. And when we *do* talk about sense-experiences, we do so (presumably) expecting *other* sense-experiences which will serve to confirm what we are saying, so that if we had to speak about *these* sense-experiences, we should have again to talk about another set, and then again another, and so on indefinitely: so that, if we can't talk about something without talking about the sense-experiences connected with it, we obviously can't talk about anything.[1] But, nevertheless, though this is so, there can be no objection to our saying that *when* we talk about sundry objects we are always expecting (in the sense of being "ready for") certain sets of sense-experiences, in actual or in hypothetical circumstances.[2] And it may also be profitable to say that this is *all* that makes our performance a genuinely linguistic one, and that it is *only* in so far as we are expecting such a set of sense-experiences that we are really saying anything. We may thereupon go on to identify the *meaning* of an utterance with the sense-experiences we anticipate when we utter it; there is no harm in doing this, provided only we remain clear that we are then using the word "meaning" in an unusual manner. For ordinarily we say that we are giving the meaning of a statement, occurring in a given language, when we either paraphrase it in the same language, or render it in some parallel language. Thus we say that *Der Hahn kräht* means that the cock crows, or that "The cock crows" means that the male fowl cries jubilantly, but no one would normally say that either statement means anything about anyone's sense-experiences.

As we pointed out previously, the characterization we have sketched is valuable in that it covers very comprehensively all our most obviously profitable talk in any field whatever. For language may be said to be *good* to the extent that it can be moored to data that are hard and clear, as well as to the extent that we can readily secure acknowledgement of the same or similar data from other men around us. Now in so far as language looks forward to, and terminates in sense-experiences, it is pre-eminently in this position. For most of our sense-experiences *are* hard and clear; it is in fact

[1] The dialectical objection I have put could, no doubt, be evaded in several ways. But if so, other unplausibilities would present themselves.

[2] To be ready for *A* if *B* presents itself is a common attitude in men and animals.

very largely this hardness and this clearness which makes us *say* that they are sense-experiences. And if we take the trouble to station other observers in appropriate positions, it is not hard to train them to respond to the same sensible aspects as we do, so that they readily confirm us in our judgments. We mark the essential character of the case by saying that it is possible to *show* a sensible object to another person, so that the world of sensible objects is a showable or public world. We do not half so readily speak of showing other sorts of objects to our auditors: we do not readily say that we have shown the number three to someone, or the vice of lechery, or the experience of being sad. And while we may, in various accesses of metaphysical sophistication, feel shaken in our confidence that the sensible aspects of things *are* public and ostensible, we are none the less quite positive about this in more ordinary attitudes. The way things look from various angles, the way things feel, the taste and smell and sound of things; all these, we like to say, are features open to inspection, which can be pointed out or introduced to others quite as readily as they can be noted by ourselves. And in so far as speech connects itself with *public* matters, to that extent, assuredly, will it be able to fulfil its function of communication. And there is yet another advantage in characterizing our speaking in the suggested manner, in that it rids us, ever so happily, of a host of obstinate questions, which suddenly become mere interrogative *forms* to which no definite meaning has been given. Thus we find ourselves delivered from the problem as to whether objects which *seem* red or straight or fragrant to the majority of well-constituted observers in normal situations, really *have* the sensible properties they seem to have, and we need not feel troubled if *some* observers are tempted to describe them differently. For when we call an object red or straight or fragrant, we do not look forward to anything but a set of sensible aspects, not uniform but varying with circumstances, and sometimes so typical as to tempt us to describe our object in some different and incompatible manner, and we likewise expect reports (or their equivalents) from other people, which will show that similar data and similar temptations have occurred, and have been dealt with, in *their* experience. So that we cannot reasonably ask if anything really *has* a given sensible property when everything so far has been in harmony with expectation (or quite sufficiently so) and seems likely, from every indication, to go on being so. And we also find ourselves delivered from any obligation to turn our whole ordinary world topsy-turvy, in order to find room for the many queer objects and processes postulated by modern scientists, for as long as all we say about them involves only an expectation of future sense-experiences, we can very readily accommodate them in our ordinary environment. And we shall also find our references to the

past freed from their insolubly doubtful character, once we have rules that we can only talk about things past and done with, in so far as we look forward to experiences which are still to come.[1] It would seem, in fact, that, if we characterize our speaking in the proposed manner, only those forms of utterance will cease to be linguistic performances which are in any case profoundly troubling and embarrassing. We shall have no ground, happily, for drawing distinctions between staircases which are there continuously and staircases which are only there when someone uses his senses on them. Nor shall we have any encouragement to seek eerie differences between real observers, who are really able to confirm our findings, and visionary familiars who pretend unbrokenly to be actual persons. Such very different ways of talking will not genuinely correspond to differences in any actual situation, but one will be describing ordinary things in an ordinary manner, while the other will merely be adorning and clouding a commonplace meaning with a set of baseless, if exciting, pictures.

Our concern in this paper was, however, with our talk about mind and thought: we have to see how *this* is affected by the characterization we have given. Quite obviously if our talk about mind and thought involves an expectation of what we ourselves will sensibly register in the future, and what other confirming observers will likewise sensibly register, then what we look forward to in such talk is (almost entirely) the sense-experiences that are also expected when we talk about people's *behaviour*, including, of course, in such behaviour the things that we or they might *say*. For it is clear that, whenever we attribute certain thoughts to other people, we do so expecting them to behave in a certain manner or to say certain things, if not in the circumstances as they actually are, then in some set of circumstances that we can readily imagine. Thus a man who is not revealing his thoughts as things are, might nevertheless reveal them if he were questioned, or if he were subjected to hypnotism or torture, or if he were placed in some situation of emotional stress, and so on. And in so far as our expectation is limited to future sense-experiences of our own, there is (with one exception) nothing *else* that we can expect when we say that a man is thinking certain thoughts. And if, on the other hand, we attribute certain thoughts to *ourselves*, then plainly the only sense-experiences we expect *other* people to have, either actually or in hypothetical circumstances in order that they may be able to confirm us in our statement, are the sense-experiences involved in the observation of *our* actual behaviour. For though we may say many things about our own immediate acquaintance with our own subjective activity and the

[1] Whether these references *should* be freed from their insolubly doubtful character is, of course, an arguable question.

like, we do not expect other people to confirm us in our statements in any other way than by taking note of what we do or say. All that is *public* about our own thoughts are the actions in which they express themselves, or would express themselves in favourable circumstances.

We have, however, made one exception to our above generalization that all talk about mind and thought involves the expectation of our own or someone else's behaviour: this exception is that of sense-experiences themselves. For, as we saw, there is a sense in which it is possible to show our own sense-experiences to other people, or to observe *their* sense-experiences. We do not hesitate to say that you can see the very view that I am seeing, can hear the very note that I am hearing, can smell the very odour I am smelling and so on: all you have to do is to place yourself in an appropriate position on a suitable occasion, and use your senses (which we shall suppose normal) on the things before you. But if some people refuse to talk in this manner, if they prefer to distinguish between the public aspect seen, heard, smelt, etc., and the inward registration of that aspect, and if they prefer to reserve the name "sense-experience" for the latter and to predicate "inalienable privacy" of it —they may do as they choose, since sense-experiences are an artificial notion—then the one exception to our generalization lapses, and *all* statements about anyone's mind (to the extent, of course, that they are covered by our characterization) involve only the expectation of his actual or conditional behaviour.

There can be little doubt that it is very profitable, for many purposes, to treat our statements about mind and thought as if they were adequately characterized in the manner we have outlined. For all that is firmly etched and clear, all that is readily graspable and communicable in our experiences, are the modes of action in which they show themselves. It is through modes of action that we "pin them down" for others and even for ourselves, and it was certainly through modes of action that we first were taught to talk of them. And while there are modes of speaking which suggest that there is something *arbitrary* in the association of a state of mind with the actions which "express" it, a closer study of our utterances soon disperses such suggestions, while it also shows us why they tempt us. For so much is behaviour part of what we mean by various kinds of mental states, that we should never say that someone had them unless we were prepared to credit him with at least a readiness for certain lines of action. Thus we should not say a person had a certain purpose unless we credited him with *some* tendency to do things that advanced that purpose, though what he did would vary naturally with what he thought or knew, with other purposes, with laziness or disability and the like. Likewise, we should not say a man had

judgments or discriminations unless we thought that these (if they were relevant) would have some tendency to shape his conduct or the way in which he carried out his purposes. And even in feeling and emotion we suppose the presence of a blind but forceful working to quite definite goals—to flee, to break, to cherish and the like—associated with a characteristic gamut of more or less intelligible symbolic ways of getting rid of energy. And though it is not easy to sketch in words the multitudinous symptoms which enter into the behavioural "anatomy" of this or that experience, and though no over-precise account would accurately reflect our use of language, still it is perfectly possible to make headway in enumerating the very various outward marks that would afford evidence—whether slight or weighty or conclusive—of a given mental attitude. And we are only tempted to suppose that the relation of a mental state to its "expressions" is arbitrary or contingent because, in technical parlance, it is many-many, because a given state of mind might show itself in countless different symptomatic ways as circumstances varied, and because a given action may be symptomatic of vastly many different states of mind. And we are tempted to regard behaviour as an outer mask of hidden, inner processes because any single action proves so little, because we have to supplement it with so many other tests—so seldom applicable in practice—before we can be sure of its significance. We have, as we say, to *be* with people for a period, to try them in many situations, know the codes and laws they live by, determine generally what they want and know, before a given piece of action occurring in a special setting can be interpreted aright. And an absolutely accurate reading of a transitory mental state would only, in fact, be genuinely possible if we could instantaneously switch a man, as on a revolving stage, from one situation to another, securing by such a course of magical experimentation a range of evidence never normally available. And the mask-analogy also tempts us since human beings, being high-grade social organisms, are capable of a species of behaviour foreign to lower levels, and, known as "acting" or "dissimulation": we can, with suitable motives, do what iron or grass or gadflies never systematically do, and counterfeit the traits of other types of creatures, or of creatures otherwise placed than we are. But the acts of the dissembler are only superficially counterfeit, and his mask only superficially a mask, for in reality they are perfectly appropriate expressions of a subtle intention to impose on others. And we, who have given them a more commonplace interpretation, have merely erred in our diagnosis: we have not been *stopped* by the outer shell, but have gone beyond it in the wrong direction. And even dissimulation must, by its nature and its motivation, discover itself through countless trivial signs—we can *read* falsity in the saccharine of certain smiles and voices—and

must also be capable of a crucial "break-down" in actual or imaginable circumstances. It is plain, lastly, that we can characterise language in the way we have suggested without making nonsense of a man's reports on his own thoughts, and without failing to make abundant and good use of them. For we may simply take it as a fact that a man who *has* a certain attitude and who is ready to behave in certain ways—or *was* ready a few seconds previously—is also in a position to utter things indicative of his readiness for such behaviour. The readiness for such utterances may in fact, be added on, as a sort of supplementary symptom, to the symptoms of the attitude in question. The readiness for what we call angry behaviour supplements itself, as it were, with the readiness to say, either at the same moment or a short while afterwards: "I feel (or felt) angry," and similarly with belief or pleasure or decision or any other mental attitude. And while such statements are not always linked with a readiness for the lines of action that they *normally* portend—for we may both dissimulate and misexpress our attitudes—yet our whole training in honesty and our mother-tongue has made of them most reliable indicators. The so-called introspective judgment resembles, on our characterization, the sign given by some instrument that it is or has been in a certain state, that it will presently explode, that its contents are about to boil, that it reached a maximum temperature of 80° Fahrenheit, and so on. And, granted our analogy, we can very well see why a single introspective judgment counts so much more in our interpretation of behaviour than even a very large number of other signs and symptoms. We can understand, for instance, why the isolated statement: "I don't really believe in him," uttered no doubt with an appropriate air of sincerity, will instantly outweigh a multitude of signs of credulous zeal. For all such signs are characteristic of many mental attitudes, whereas the utterance in question is characteristic of comparatively few. And if we are ever in a position to discount the possibility of dissimulation or serious misexpression, then the five simple words "I don't believe in him" are equal in weight to an indefinite number of other signs of disbelief. No wonder, then, that we say that a man can know much more about the things that go on in his own mind than anyone else can infer from his behaviour, and that we value a reliable person's statements about his own experiences much more than an accumulation of reports from outsiders. All this is quite intelligible even if we characterize our linguistic activities in the way we have suggested, and even if we say that anyone talking about mind and thought is looking forward to the same set of sense-experiences that he would expect if he were talking about behaviour.

We see, accordingly, that the general characterization of our speaking activities, in terms of expected sense-experiences and of

public confirmation, goes far towards covering what we do when we speak about mind and thought. Whenever we do so speak, we anticipate certain situations, sensuously presented, which we can show to others, the situations, namely, which are also expected when we speak of someone's actual or dispositional behaviour. And there is also a complete one-to-one correlation between any state of mind we talk of and a sufficiently long and varied sequence of behaviour. There is, we may readily assure ourselves, after some imaginative experimentation, no state of mind that would not give itself away conclusively in revelatory behaviour if the appropriate "set-up" (or series of "set-ups") could be applied to test it. And our characterization certainly covers the majority of the scientifically and practically significant features of our talk about mind and thought. The question, however, arises, whether there are not *some* features of our normal, non-philosophical talk about mind and thought which reveal themselves as extraordinary, anomalous, senseless on the characterization we are studying, and which nevertheless seem perfectly natural and understandable on some other characterization. If this can plausibly be shown, then it might become reasonable to say that the characterization we are dealing with doesn't really fit the game we are playing when we talk about mind and thought, and that an alternative characterization fits this better. And while it would no doubt still be possible to adhere to our original characterization, even if there *were* things in our language that wouldn't readily square with it, still it might prove as frivolous to do so as deliberately to describe walking as a very plain form of dancing, or to describe hotel-keeping as a very unusual form of stealing in which one gave bed and board to people who were perfectly willing to be robbed. Now it is not at all hard to show that there are indeed several features of our ordinary talk about mind and thought which don't very readily accord with the characterization we have just been sketching, but which accord better with another characterization which is at once older and much less arresting.

The first of these features consists in the obvious fact that we have the very strongest possible disposition to *deny* that anything in the realm of mind and thought is the *same* as anything in the realm of behaviour, that we are even disposed to say that they are "poles apart," are "utterly different things," and so forth. And it is further plain that, in our talk *about* our own talk on this matter, we stubbornly refuse to admit that anyone who says that anyone has a certain state of mind is saying *at all* the same thing as anyone who says that anyone is behaving in a certain manner. And even when elementary grounds of misunderstanding are removed, and a man sees that a given experience is not to be correlated with a single, fixed piece of behaviour, but with indefinitely many lines of conduct

which vary according to circumstances and the purposes of the agent, he may still firmly refuse to identify some experience he is speaking of with any such assemblage of lines of behaviour. He may even go further and proceed to characterize them differently; he may say that the mental state he is talking of is "actual in its entirety" at a given moment, and that it cannot therefore be the same as a set of lines of behaviour of which the majority only *would* exist if suitable circumstances were present. Now this refusal to identify a mental state with a set of lines of behaviour is certainly anomalous on the characterization of language given above. For in most other cases when I make two predications of the same subject, and when I anticipate exactly the same set of sense-experiences when I utter the one as when I utter the other, I do not hesitate to say, with a little persuasion, that my two predicates cover precisely the same meaning, that they are in fact the same predicate, and that I am saying the same thing when I utter the one as when I utter the other. And if my various statements and locutions only mean whatever they mean *because* I look forward to certain sets of sense-experiences, then it is hard to make out why I say that I am meaning *two* quite different things when I am only expecting *one* set of sense-experiences, and why I further go on to characterize these two things in different and incompatible terms. Of course, there is no absolute reason why, when we are expecting a given set of sense-experiences, we should not talk in two different ways, in the one case about a mental state and in the other case about certain possible lines of behaviour, and why we should not also be permitted to say that these things are quite different and have different properties. For surely it is notorious by now that there is no fixed, universally applicable grammar of the terms "same" and "different," that we have to fix their use arbitrarily for different contexts, and that we do in fact do so very differently in different cases.[1] But *what* is obscure, on the characterization we are studying, is the *whole purpose* and *value* of such an apparently senseless and anomalous distinction, which seems to do nothing but complicate and overload our diction. It is as if we instituted two scores in football, a try and a trio, which were invariably achieved in the same circumstances and consisted of the same number of points, but which were nevertheless declared by football fans to be mysteriously different in essence. But if, on the other hand, it were possible to eliminate such senseless complications, and to describe our linguistic performances in such a way that it became intelligible *why* we drew the distinction in question, then the new characterization thus arrived at would be better and

[1] I am not ignoring the fact that whether "same" and "different" *are* used in different senses itself depends on the language we are using. But in *my* language we certainly do use them in different senses.

more helpful than the one we have been studying, and would certainly deserve to supersede it.

There is also a further anomaly in our talk concerning mind and thought which should certainly make us question the adequacy of the characterization we have given. We say frequently that it is possible in certain circumstances to know "what an experience is like," and we also say that the *only* or the *best* way to know what an experience is like is to be put in some situation where we actually *have* that experience. (We have written "only or best" in the last sentence, for, while most people would say that we couldn't "have the faintest idea" of what some experience was like unless we ourselves had had it, or some similar experience, there seem to be others who think it possible that we may sometimes *imagine* what an experience is like, even if we ourselves have never had it. Thus some have maintained that, in our earliest infancy, we were somehow able to interpret gestures and facial expressions as indicative of love, hostility and so forth, before we ourselves had experienced any attitudes of the sort. And many have said that God knows what temptation feels like, though He Himself can never be tempted. But even those who say such things would probably be ready to admit that the *best* way to know what any state of mind is like is to have the state of mind in question.) And everyone would admit that a man may *know exactly* how a terrified man behaves, how a man in love behaves, and how a man in pain behaves, without knowing *in the least* what the corresponding states of mind are really like. And just as we might show a man what sort of colour puce is, or what a tumour on the brain is like, by putting him in an appropriate situation and saying: "There, that is what I mean. Now you know what sort of thing I am speaking of," just so, in order to make plain to a man what certain states of mind are really like, we also put him in an appropriate situation, which is in this case that of actually *having* the states of mind in question, and then say to him: "There, now you know what fear (or love, or pain) is really like." And we say, further, that it is possible to know *that* someone is afraid, or *that* he is in pain or in love, quite as well or even better than the man in question, but we do not regard it as at all an easy thing to know *how* he feels just as well as he does, and certainly not to know it better than he does. We readily say that a man may *know exactly* what his own states of mind are like, and many would contend that he cannot err in this respect, but we seldom or never say that an outside person knows exactly what a given person's state of mind is like, and we admit that such an outside person may fall into the gravest errors in this field. And we also talk as if the outside person's judgment was not merely fallible, but also *indirect*: we don't suggest he knows the state of mind *itself*, but say he *forms a picture* of it, a picture based

confessedly on his own experiences, and often far from accurate. And when at times we even make a showable model of some inner state or object, as of an after-image or a number-form, or of a landscape seen by someone afflicted with Daltonism, we obviously don't think this picture is the *same* as what it stands for, and we readily treat it as a very indifferent likeness. Plainly we talk as if an outside person were much less favourably placed for knowing what a state of mind is like, than the man who has that state of mind. And while we might perhaps concede, as a bare possibility, that an outside person *might* have the same immediate and inerrant knowledge of what other people's states of mind are like, as those people have themselves, still we should not regard this as anything to be ordinarily hoped for in our present life, but should rather conceive it as the prerogative of a God or of ourselves in some exalted or non-normal state.[1] But we may note, however, that while we do not, in our utterances, hold out any clear hope that we may some day be in a position to set our sympathetic picture beside the original state it represents, in order to make sure how far it tallies, we still do not talk with certain philosophers, as if the whole business of knowing what other people's states of mind are like was hopeless or impossible. We often say that we have formed a fair notion of someone's feelings, or that we have a very good idea how something seems to someone. And in the case of people we have known for long, and with whom we are sympathetic, we often say that we know exactly how they feel, and no one thinks this anything but a pardonable exaggeration. If we may summarize the situation, our whole talk on these matters seems, on the one hand, to attribute a certain deep privacy to our inward thoughts and experiences—this is *not* a figment of philosophers but has its roots in ordinary diction—but also, on the other hand, to see no great difficulty in what is practically the overcoming of such privacy. We talk as if A had access to some object to which B has no access, but as if B could form a picture of the sort of thing to which A alone has access, by contemplating a different, but like, object to which he, B, alone has access. And we also suggest that it is possible for B to come to have a very good notion of the sort of experience A is having, he may be clear as to its general character, he may, in favourable circumstances, even approximate to knowing it exactly.

Now it is evident, on the characterization we are dealing with, that these ways of speaking are painfully anomalous: we can indeed make use of them, but it is not so easy to explain *why* we use them. It is hard to see, in the first place, why we should choose to say that

[1] It will be noted that the immediate, inerrant knowledge we are considering goes beyond telepathy, if this be regarded merely as the immediate knowledge *that* people are having certain experiences.

someone who is having an experience should know what it is like, in any better manner than an outside person. For, as we saw, the sense experiences we anticipate when we speak of someone's state of mind are not at all different fron the sense-experiences we anticipate when we speak of his behaviour. Now such behaviour is a public matter, it can be shown to others as readily as the passing of a train, and it seems strange that we should say that someone ready to behave in certain ways should know more intimately what this readiness (or the experience verbally connected with it) is like, than any other person. It would, in fact, seem reasonable to maintain that *other* people, who can dispassionately watch the symptoms of some state appearing one by one, could form a better notion of the nature of that state than anyone merely *ready* to display these symptoms, and certainly *not* disposed to watch them. A man who has a state of mind may have the advantage, as we saw, in knowing *that* he has this state of mind, since he can vent his attitude in introspective judgments without first needing to pay heed to outward symptoms, but this will not involve an advantage in knowing *what this attitude is like.* And, on the characterization we are studying, it is odd that we should choose to talk in terms of picturing what can't be known directly, or of guessing at the nature of something hidden, when all that we anticipate when we use these phrases are sensuous data not differing at all from those anticipated when we speak of objects and processes admittedly public. We may say, perhaps, that our talk of privacy and indirect approaches is nothing but a metaphor and a figure, but we must then deal with the difficulty that, on the characterization we are studying, the metaphor is pointless and the figure quite unhelpful.

We are, accordingly, led to doubt whether the characterization of the linguistic game we have before us, can really be regarded as a satisfactory one, and we are also led to consider whether it would not be preferable to characterize the same activities in a different manner which leads to fewer anomalies. To illustrate the situation with a comparison, it might be possible, with some straining, to describe the actions of a group of people playing cricket by saying that they were playing a very unusual sort of croquet, in which there were only two curious, hopelessly narrow arches, and in which most of the players had decided to dispense with a mallet while two were using very queer ones. But, even if we got as far as this, we should still be faced by anomalies without number, in accounting for all of which our whole characterization would undoubtedly be strained to bursting. Whereas all these anomalies would be very simply smoothed over if we merely recognized that the game we were describing was very different from croquet, that it followed quite different rules, and if we then used the ordinary name "cricket"

to describe it. Now the case may be similar in regard to our talk about mind and thought. Here we have found it very difficult to make sense of all the things we say if we characterize our performance as nothing but an expressed expectation of future sense-experiences. Whereas if we said that someone talking about mind and thought looked forward, certainly, to sense-experiences which were also views of behaviour, but that he looked forward to them merely as *outward signs* of what he was talking about, and that if what he was talking of was *his own* he never hoped to be able to show it to anyone else, though he might very well succeed in making them take note of something *like* it, and that if, on the other hand, what he was talking about belonged to *others*, he never expected to know it directly, though he might know something that was *like* it, that would enable him to form a more or less accurate *picture* of it; such an account of our activities in speaking about mind and thought would certainly be complicated, and it would neither be novel nor subtle, but it would undoubtedly be the best and therefore the "truest" one—since there seems to be no other standard in these matters—if it led to the fewest difficulties and anomalies. And it would not, in fact, appear to be burdened by any peculiar difficulties, since it represents more or less faithfully, what we ordinarily *say* we are doing when we talk about mind and thought, and our ordinary talk on these matters does not often lead us into quandaries. It is true that philosophers sometimes tell us that we never have "good reason" to suppose that anyone else's experiences resemble our own, since direct comparison is excluded by the nature of the case. But we may point out simply that such talk is out of harmony with usage, that its introduction serves no useful purpose, and that it is both correct and customary to say we *have* good reason to infer a similarity of experience from a sufficient similarity of behaviour. *Any* similarity of conduct between two persons in a similar situation would be said to give us *some* reason to suppose that they have like experiences, a closer similarity of behaviour (seen, of course, in connection with the *whole* situation and the *whole* history of the person) would be said to give us *good* reason to believe in such a similarity, while if the outward similarity were carried further we should simply say we *knew* that such an inward similarity existed. And while we might allow philosophers to dissuade us from saying that we *know* this sort of thing, since all our judgments on these matters are reversible, still it would scarcely be a sensible proceeding to let them ruin *all* our diction in this field, when they admit that they have absolutely nothing to offer us in its place. And it would certainly be ridiculous to let ourselves be frightened by their wilful nihilism at a level where we find ourselves both using and developing a serviceable introspective language, where men are constantly drawing similar distinctions and making

use of sinilar analogies in telling others how they feel. The game of talking about people's minds must, after all, proceed in *some* manner, it must be possible to play it if one follows certain rules, and it is surely quite unwarrantable to try to break it up merely because it isn't some superior game whose rules we cannot even formulate. We can see, however, why some philosophers have imagined that we had no reason to suppose that other men's experiences were like our own: they were confounding our linguistic situation in regard to mental states with our linguistic situation in regard to shapes and colours and other sensible qualities. For we can prove two colours to be *like* if we can set them side by side and see their boundary growing hazy, and we can prove two sizes to be *like* by placing one upon the other (or both beneath some common measure) and making sure that neither sticks out anywhere. And there are similar ways of proving likenesses in the case of other sensible qualities. And just because we cannot prove the likeness of two men's experiences in *such* a manner, we feel inclined to say we have no reason to suppose them similar. Whereas the game of finding likenesses must necessarily vary according to the objects likened, and where experiences are in question there is obviously no place for either juxtaposition or superposition or any similar process. And if some people say we aren't talking *scientifically* where we can neither superpose nor juxtapose, then our talk about the mind must simply forfeit the honour of being called scientific by such persons, and it may forthwith join the ranks of countless forms of profitable talk that have been hounded from that stuffy tabernacle. We may further draw attention to all those siren voices of philosophers who say that even trees and mountains are not public objects, that you can never see the *same* tree that I see, but at best a similar one. These statements have at least the merit of showing that our talk of public objects is not so different from our talk about experiences as some have thought it; in both cases men are taught the use of certain words and phrases by being placed repeatedly in certain situations until we find them using them appropriately. Only whereas we say that we have introduced them to the *same* object in the case of trees and mountains, we only say that we have introduced them to a *like* object in the case of mental states.

We have, accordingly, pointed to a possible characterization of our talk about mind and thought which makes it *more* than the expressed anticipation of our own future sense-experiences. But we must also emphasize the fact that our two characterizations are not, after all, so very different. For on neither characterization do we suggest a possibility of taking leave of our own psychic skins (as it were) and entering anyone else's. And on both characterizations our knowledge of other people's mental states is mediated by our

knowledge of their actual or possible behaviour, and in speaking of such behaviour we do no more than look forward to our own future sense-experiences. And on both characterizations it is possible to admit that we do a sort of thing called variously "forming a picture of X's feelings," "entering imaginatively into X's state of mind," and so on, a picturing or imagining never destined to be consummated in more direct acquaintance. But on our former characterization the function of such picturing or imagining is an utter mystery: it is not at all clear what it really is, nor what we hope to gain by it. Whereas, on our latter characterization, this picturing and imagining is the pivotal feature of our references, for while behaviour may furnish us with the *occasion* for attributing certain thoughts to people, it is our inward picturing and imagining, based on our own past experiences, which furnishes us with the *material* for such attribution. And we have, moreover, another strong reason for preferring the latter characterization of our language to the former: that it accords much better with our moral sentiments and obligations. For the majority of these sentiments and obligations are concerned with other people's inward thoughts and feelings: we must abstain from doing something that will cause another person *pain*, we must not say things that will give another person *an incorrect impression*, we must not punish another person for what he *did not really mean to do*, and so on. Now if we follow our earlier characterization, and make the whole function of language, even where its subject-matter is mind and thought, the anticipation of our own sense-experiences, then most people would say (though some, no doubt, would deny it) that this *did* make a difference to their moral sentiments and obligations. For if to talk of your pain does not differ understandably from talking of your screamings and writhings, many people would deny that there was any reason why I should not proceed to hurt you if I found it amusing. And if to talk of your delusion or your inward intention does not differ understandably from talking about certain types of behaviour, then many people would be inclined to say that it is a matter of total indifference if I deceive you, or if I blame you for something you never meant to do. And the inclination to say such things is strengthened rather than weakened by adhering to the proposed characterization, and it is in fact only in so far as we insensibly slip back into our old way of talking about our talking, that our moral life recovers. And since we must beware of talk which saps morality, or which makes it easier for us to evade essential obligations, we have an additional reason, quite unconnected with considerations of linguistic propriety, for characterizing our talk about experiences in the ordinary manner.

It will, however, be worth our while, before we accept it finally, to see how far the characterization we have proposed affects the

treatment of philosophical problems. For it is one of the great merits of the characterization we were previously considering that it threw immense light on the nature of philosophical difficulties, and that it opened up entirely new techniques for dealing with them. Briefly, it separated the traditional problems of philosophy into two clear-cut classes: there were, in the first place, questions which were basically of the same sort as the questions raised in science and everyday life, questions which looked forward to appropriate sense-experiences for their settlement; and there were then left over, in the second place, questions which *no* set of sense-experiences could conceivably decide, and which would make *no* difference to anyone's experience, however they were answered. The question as to the finitude or the infinity of the spatial universe may perhaps be given as an instance of the former type of question, whereas the question as to whether relations exist *between* or *in* their terms might be given as an instance of the latter. And it has then been suggested that we should regard *all* questions of the latter type as basically linguistic (though the questioner will not necessarily say this): they arise because our way of speaking confuses us or dissatisfies us, because it suggests absurdities or falsehoods, or because it fails to take account of some resemblance or relation that has suddenly claimed our notice. And our difficulties vanish when we clearly understand their basically linguistic character, when we see *why* certain ways of speaking have dissatisfied us, and when we have either altered them to suit our needs, or have gone on using them with a clearer consciousness of their inadequacies. Thus in our problem about relations our difficulty may be classed as basically linguistic since there is certainly no set of sense-experiences more in favour of one theory than the other. And as long as we stick to sense-experiences, we have absolutely no difficulty in understanding how things manage to be related, how books, for instance, lie on tables or skyscrapers are taller than steeples. It is only when we start tearing relational *words* from their contexts and staring at them, that we suddenly begin to wonder what sort of entities they stand for, and are then led to picture these entities as bridges between things, or pointers within things, or searchlights radiating from things, and so on. And all these are pictures which produce no greater clarity, and which may suggest many unanswerable questions. But such perplexities vanish when we truly apprehend the grammar of relational terms, how they actually function in linguistic operations; we are then free to talk of relations as we like, and no way of talking need ever worry us. Now, on the characterization of language that we first considered, not only are all problems about abstract categories—relations, causes, predicates and the like—to be relegated to the basically linguistic class, but also many philosophical problems about mind

and matter, their "real existence" and their "real qualities." For all these are admittedly questions whose solution cannot be hoped for as the outcome of any future set of sense-experiences. And we must account for such questions by saying that they only trouble us because we push our use of language beyond significant limits, because we talk confusedly as if we might have sense-experiences that we plainly couldn't have, as if we might one morning catch our staircase stripped of secondary qualities, or see the souls of others and their secret thoughts. And we only ask such questions (we shall have to say) because they superficially resemble questions that have genuine answers, questions about the real or ideal nature of the Loch Ness monster, for example, or the waterways on Mars. But, on the characterization of language *we* have sought to recommend, it will not be possible for us to treat this class of questions as basically linguistic merely because we cannot settle them by any set of sense-experiences. For, on our characterization, we can talk of things that cannot ever be sensuously or otherwise presented in our experience, though something *like* them may be. And so it will be a substantial, and by no means merely a linguistic, issue if we ask whether other people really *have* the inner states we think they have, or whether they are merely soulless mechanisms, which behave as *if* they had them. And there might likewise be substantial though not soluble questions about the real being and the real qualities of material substances, although we have not shown this in the present article. There are, in fact, on the characterization we have recommended, a class of questions neither basically linguistic nor capable of solution by the outcome of our sense-experiences: we may, perhaps, refer to them as "questions insoluble by virtue of the nature of the knowledge-situation." Now, on some views, the mere fact that our characterization entailed such questions, would be a weighty reason for rejecting it. But we prefer to argue that it satisfies a deep linguistic instinct in us to distinguish firmly between questions about abstract categories and questions about mind and matter and their real being and qualities. We have the strongest tendency to say that they are very different kinds of questions, and while we feel quite grateful to someone who can show the *former* type of question to be basically linguistic, we feel, not gratitude, but only outrage, if someone tries to do this in the *latter* type of case. And the whole slightly contemptuous shading of our use of the term "scholastic" bears witness to our deep feeling that those who quarrel about substantial forms are not really quarreling about substantial issues, whereas we have no similar feeling about the mind-and-matter problems of the post-Cartesian epoch. And there can be little doubt, furthermore, that differences in regard to these issues have gone together with important differences in the general attitudes of men and groups, and that they

have exercised an invigorating or depressing influence both on our scientific and on our practical activities. So that it is not profitable, nor in harmony with our verbal instincts, to say that these problems are basically linguistic. And some, dominated by aesthetic and religious interests, would doubtless find it preferable to have permanent mysteries somewhere, rather than to feel that ours is a world where everything can be found out. And we may note, further, that though we cannot speak of *solving* any of the mind-and-matter group of problems, we may nevertheless say, quite properly, that we have *reason* to entertain this or that opinion in regard to them. Thus if the world we live in were as filled with providential marvels as some have thought it, we should certainly have *some* reason for believing in its basically spiritual character. And we might similarly argue that the many weird findings of physicists in the present century have made a robust faith in matter much more difficult, and have given us *some* additional ground for taking refuge in idealistic theories. We have therefore no good reason for abandoning our characterization merely because it yields us some insoluble problems.

We have not, however, recommended a characterization of language merely for its own sake, but as a prelude to the treatment of certain basic problems in the philosophy of mind. For, once we have made plain how we propose to talk about mind and thought, we may then go on to deal with a number of issues which confront us in this field. There, too, we may find our problems sorting themselves into various groups. Some, it may be, will prove to be basically empirical, awaiting nothing but appropriate observations for their settlement. Some, on the other hand, may prove basically linguistic, being really rather questions as to the least confusing and most profitable way of talking than the factual questions that they seem to be. And some of our questions, finally, may be substantial questions which are nevertheless insoluble owing to the nature of the knowledge-situation. And in regard to these we may discover *some* reason for embracing one opinion or another. But all these topics must be left over for another article.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

PROFESSOR H. F. HALLETT

Prima facie knowledge is an ineradicable monster. Conceived as a relation of a mind to objects extrinsic to it, it is chimerical: for knowledge, as such, is of the *real*, i.e. of things as they are *in se*; but the *prima facie* form of knowledge precludes this. Its object is a thing apprehended *ab extra*, i.e. as referred to a subject to which it is extrinsic. To seek to escape this *impasse* either by making the object intrinsic to the subject, or the subject a function of the object, is to reject the *prima facie* character of knowledge as a relation of compresent terms. The incoherence of *prima facie* knowledge is that its object must be *both* extrinsic and intrinsic to mind—extrinsic as independently real, intrinsic as known—yet can be *neither*: not extrinsic since thus its *inseitas* is occulted, not intrinsic since thus truth is mere appearance. And this *chimaera* becomes a monster because knowledge is also ineradicable. We cannot know that knowledge is impossible; and, though we may be in doubt about its extancy, that very doubt is epistemic in form. It is our acceptance of the demands of knowledge that lies at the basis of our doubt; and this applies not only to legitimate doubt about the extancy of knowledge, but also to chimerical doubt about its possibility. Doubt is an inchoation of knowledge, which is thus ineradicable.

What, then, are the characters of *prima facie* knowledge?

(1) It is a *relation* subsisting between a mind and a thing extrinsic to it: as we say, a relation of subject and object, of a knowing mind and a known thing. But this relation is *asymmetrical*—for knowledge belongs to the mind as an "affection" of the subject with respect to the object or known thing. The thing *known* must be unaffected by the epistemic action of the subject. Thus:

(2) *Prima facie* knowledge is *mental*: it partly constitutes the nature of the mind that is epistemically "affected" by what is extrinsic to itself.

But the asymmetricality of the relation may also be viewed from the standpoint of the thing known: in Cartesian terms, knowledge is a relation of the "formal or subjective essence" of a thing and the "objective essence" or idea of it in the knowing mind. Here the action belongs rather to the thing, which *manifests* itself to the mind by means of a given "presentation". Its knowability is its ability to manifest itself to mind. Thus:

(3) *Prima facie* knowledge is the *manifestation* of what is *independently existent.*

This ineradicable monster, therefore, is at once a *relation* of two terms, a constituent of the *nature* of one of them, and a *vehicle* to it of the nature of the other. And *prima facie* knowledge can tolerate the suppression of none of these characters in the attempt to naturalize its monstrosity. The candid philosopher must squarely face its *prima facie* incoherence, and not seek an escape by the ways of scepticism, idealism, realism, or positivistic phenomenalism. For the sceptic argues on grounds intrinsic to that which he decries: he *knows* that knowledge is impossible. The idealist, emphasizing the mentally constituent character, and muting the others, must make of the distinction of knowledge and illusion a matter of degree rather than of kind—for both are "ideal contents" capable of no more than *ideal* "reference to Reality". The realist, emphasizing the existential transcendence of the object, and muting the others, is involved in difficulties about the manner in which this transcendence is conveyed to the knowing mind, which no more goes out of itself, or ceases to be mind, in knowledge than it does in illusion. The positivistic phenomenalist burkes the issue and swallows the monster incontinent.

But, it may be said—and if it has not often been said, it is commonly assumed—that since, in the end, the possibility of knowledge must be accepted, we might as well simply accept the "fact", and recognize that knowledge is a *unique relation* actually possessing these monstrous characters. Even so shrewd a philosopher as my teacher, Pringle-Pattison, described "dissatisfaction with the form of knowledge" as itself "chimerical"[1]—though, it is true, he was thinking of the *results* of that dissatisfaction in Bradley's attempted *reduction* of the duality of the cognitive relation to the identity of a sort of "sentience" in the Absolute, and not dissatisfaction with the form of *prima facie* knowledge. Dissatisfaction with the *prima facie* characters of knowledge need not be chimerical because the idealist is willing to neglect the idealistically inconvenient existential transcendence of the object, any more than because the realist is ready to slur over the essential mentality of knowledge (i.e. of the *relation* of subject and object, and thus also of the *terms* related). For the acceptance of either way must make of knowledge a *chimaera*. Futile methods of escape do not prove that escape is impossible; and there remains the possibility that *prima facie* knowledge *is* a monster the characters of which are subject to correction by the derelativization of the relativity of the human predicament; so that in knowledge *as such* these *prima facie* characters are reconciled. In short, *prima facie* human knowledge may be no more than pseudo-cognizance, and its monstrosity the measure of its *pseuditas*. Dissatisfaction with a *chimaera* can hardly be chimerical; but satisfaction with a recognized

[1] *Man's Place in the Cosmos*, p. 122.

monster is monstrous, however easy and natural it may be for the human monster to regard his monstrosity with humanistic complacency. What philosophical humanists have to learn is that the analysis and clarification of *prima facie* human nature and objects can only be truly enlightening in so far as they succeed in making the corrections demanded by the human predicament. Man is a part of that within which he labours, and which he seeks to understand; but he can understand it, and labour effectively in it, in so far as he is no *mere* part or section of it, but its microcosm.

So long as man conceives himself as an extrinsic and ontologically independent spectator of the real, his ideas of the nature of that real in which he is unwittingly involved must remain corrigible, and his objects infected with *pseuditas*. If it is denied that he is capable of elaborating any such "general metaphysical theory of relativity", of allowing for his ontological predicament, the denial involves his incapacity to naturalize the monstrosity of his *prima facie* knowledge, and of his nature, and of his objects, however precise may be his analysis of these and their factors, however far-reaching and coherent may be his constructions founded on these bases. Unless man can understand his human predicament, and in so doing formally transcend it, his conception of himself, and of the world, must remain the monsters of their *prima facie* extancy, which analysis and construction cannot naturalize, but only discredit as chimerical. This is the proper de-anthropomorphicatory work of philosophy in every sphere: its essence is metaphysical transcendence.

My purpose in this article is to explore the incidence of this essential philosophical method in respect of knowledge. The estimation of *prima facie* knowledge as "monstrous" is epistemic, and implies that we are capable of formally transcending it. Nothing is monstrous in itself but only in comparison with its norm. A lamb with six legs is a monster only in so far as the *normal* lamb is quadrupedal. *Prima facie* knowledge possesses characters disharmonious with the demands of knowledge as such: it diverges from the *norm* that knowledge itself dictates. It is self-condemned, for it is evidently epistemic—it is not ignorance—but imperfectly epistemic. But the self-condemned is thereby self-transcending; and it is our first business to exhibit the self-transcendence of *prima facie* knowledge.

It is to sense-perception, and particularly visual perception, that we must look for the characteristic example of *prima facie* cognizance. We picture this as the relation of a perceiving organ to a perceived object spatially external to itself. Here is the perceiver with the organ; over there is the object. In vision, e.g. the visually percipient mind is conceived as being, like the eye, in the head; the thing seen is outside of the head and at a distance from it. To a perilous extent this visual analogy governs our thought about the relations of subject

and object in knowledge. I will go further and say that it needs more care than we are accustomed to exercise not to think of subject and object as *two objects* on the analogy of the eye and the thing seen as they appear for *another* seer. In any actual perception, however, taken in itself, the psycho-physical percipient is not an object compresent with its *perceptum*; the only objects in visual perception are those seen; even the eye is no object of sight compresent with the objects seen—the eye does not see itself, nor does the visual percipient see his own eye. In perception we have objects perceived, and not these compresent with, and at a distance from, another thing, whether a mental subject or the physical organ of a subject. It does not follow, however, that the perceived objects are, as Berkeley says, "in the eye, or rather, in the mind"—for this is, once more, first to think of the subject or its organ as one of the objects, and then to place the visual objects in it: a curious farrago of inconsequences. This oscillation between two points of view—that of the percipient himself, and that of another percipient—is characteristic not only of uncritical common sense but also, it is to be feared, of more sophisticated thought: we try to think of the perception that we experience as an objective relation of two objects, one mental or psycho-physical and the other physical; and it is upon this plan that we are apt to represent to ourselves the knowledge that we have even of other *minds*, which plainly we do not "perceive". We think of the knowing mind and the mind that it knows as two psychical objects standing in the cognitive relation. We thus make for ourselves the very tough—or, as I should say, insoluble—problem as to *how* we know other minds without perceiving them.

In primary perception, taken in itself, in the very act, it is possible to discover only one objective term, viz. the *perceptum*. But this, of course, is perceived, and we are apt to think of the perceiving as resident in another term, the mental or psycho-physical subject, and to regard this as another object perceptible but for the accident that it is awkwardly placed, or busy about something else. We think of our own perception as it might be for *another* percipient viewing it *ab extra* as the compresence of two things.

But the fact that the eye does not see itself, and the fact that the seeing mind cannot be perceived at all, are not mere accidents easily made good by the use of a mirror or appeal to common experience, or again, by the assignment of a different objective character to mind —a ghostly objectivity. These facts are essential in the elucidation of sense-perception. The common supposition that perception is an objective relation of two objective terms, a mental or psycho-physical thing and a physical thing, is fallacious. Nor can it be corrected, but only rendered more sophistical, by the theory that though only the *perceptum* is objectively present in perception, yet this is by nature

duplex or neutral—being, or becoming, both the objective constituent of the percipient mind, and also an object external to him. The two terms of the cognitive relation cannot be conjured out of the one, and cognition interpreted as the *formal* identity but *material* diversity of two "objects": a mental presentation and a physical thing. Such an attempt must break down, either by an idealistic insistence on the ideality of the physical object (as in Berkeley), or by a realistic insistence on the objectivity of mind (as in Alexander). And in either case the distinction of knowledge and fantasy is reduced to one of mere degree—either of coherence or of abstraction.

At least it *ought* to be so reduced; but, of course, no idealist and no realist is faithful in the attempt to interpret knowledge as a mere relation of two objective things. For Berkeley, perceiving is an *action* of the mind, and the *perceptum* is real as related to Divine action. For Bradley, the real is not "floating" but "referred" ideal content; though the action of referring or judging, being the action of the subject, cannot reach an object that is other than ideal. Alexander, again, identifies cognition with compresence of mind and thing, but only by stressing the special character of mind as cognitive, i.e. active as well as objective—a combination of characters that is admitted rather than explained. Neither Bradley nor Alexander follow Berkeley in assigning any active part in knowledge from the side of the known: for the one the real is ideal—a passively judg*ed*; for the other it is the cognitively passive object of contemplation. But how can we *know* a thing, i.e. apprehend its *reality*, its *inseitas*, if in our knowledge it does nothing? My thesis is that if knowledge is a relation it is a relation not of objects but of agents, and it is thus that it is *unique*.

It will be objected, perhaps, that even if we grant that knowing is an action, in perception at least it *has* an object extrinsic to it: it is the action of perceiving a *perceptum*; so that here, it would seem, cognition is a relation, not of agents, but of an agent and an object. I reply: the question is whether this is characteristic of perception *as knowledge*, or is its characteristic *defect* as *prima facie*. Is perception a *normal* species of knowledge, or only a species of pseudo-cognizance? And further, is it indeed true that even perception *as cognitive* is such a relation *simpliciter*, or does it essentially involve something more?

Let us next go to work systematically; it has been usual broadly to distinguish in human cognizance two main species, variously denominated "perception" and "conception", knowledge of "matters of fact" and of "relations of ideas", *a posteriori* and *a priori* cognition, etc.,[1] though this has not necessarily meant their total separation,

[1] I am only emphasizing a broad contrast, not suggesting that these are precisely equivalent distinctions.

either in *mera experientia* or in more developed types of cognizance.[1] A distinction that does not involve a separation is the product of abstraction, or *conceptual* separation; and it is thus that perceptually "empty" conceptual forms (such as multi-dimensional geometries), and conceptually "blind" spatio-temporal sensuous contents, may be distinct objects of human cognizance, though they are not empirically authentic. Let us consider the objectivity of these diverse species of object: perceptual (presentational or categorial) and conceptual (pure or applied). The point at issue is the ground of their *reality* as objects of *knowledge*: for knowledge is *of the real.*

(1) *The Object of Perceptual Cognizance.*

The object of perception is not a "hard" given, but is of various degrees of givenness and intelligibility. A primitive mind may "see" what is to us an eclipse of the moon as its absorption by a dragon. The naïve observer actually "sees" only the changing contour of the yellow disc; the astronomer "sees" the shadow of the earth passing over the mountainous surface of the moon. I will here distinguish only two broad stages in the development of perception, which I will call "presentational" and "categorial", without narrowly examining their empirical extancy.

(*a*) *The Object of Presentational Perception.*

Here we may distinguish three factors of objectivity: (i) a certain sense-*content*; (ii) its spatio-temporal *form*; (iii) its *extrinsicness.* Opinions have differed widely about the relations of these factors: Berkeley was inclined to derive the second from the action of the self, and to attribute the third to the divine source of the first. Hume sought to make the second a function of the first, and either to deny the third or non-rationally to accept it as beyond the scope of human reason. For Kant, again, the first and second are inseparable, though the first is attributed to an imperceptible thing-in-itself and the second to the percipient self (or its specificity); the third, which Kant strongly asserts (for he is no subjectivist) is a function of the work of categorial thought, and would thus be absent from strictly presentational perception. The presentational object, as such, is not extrinsic; the authentic empirical object is; though the conditions of its apprehension render it phenomenal.

I find myself in partial sympathy with all these divergent views: I think that Berkeley was in principle right in his attribution of space

[1] "Neither of these faculties has a preference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object would be given us, and without the understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions blind. . . . Knowledge can only arise from the united operation of both. . . . (Nevertheless) we have great reason carefully to . . . distinguish them" (Kant, *Critick of Pure Reason*, II, Introd. I).

and time to the action of the self in its reception of sense-content; e.g. that the distance of an object is an objectification of the action that must be undertaken in order to receive the sense-content. I think that Hume was right in making the empirical spatio-temporal form a function of the sense-contents as actually received. And I think that Kant was right in denying the independent objectivity of either the sense-content or the spatio-temporal form: in attributing the former to the action of the thing-in-itself on the self, and the latter to the responsive action of the self; and finally, in connecting our *grounded* attribution of the extrinsicness of the developed perceptual object with the activity of categorial thought. I think, however, that our naïve acceptance of the presentational object as extrinsic is independent of categorial thought, and has a humbler and less satisfactory source in the psycho-physical constitution of the percipient as it is embedded in the constitution of his world.

Everyone remembers Boswell's story of Dr. Johnson's "refutation" of Berkeley, though I fancy that few have consulted Boswell's own account so as to recognize the essential point of the argument. "After we came out of (Colchester) church we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot *with mighty force* against a large stone, *till he rebounded from it*, 'I refute it *thus*.' "[1] I do not, of course, regard the argument as complete and conclusive,[2] but is it not clear as the midday sun that he was not guilty of the naïve fallacy uniformly attributed to him of arguing that because he felt certain sensations the stone must be independently material? He was as capable as another of realizing that his sensations and feelings had never been denied by Berkeley, and were no premisses for such a conclusion. His argument is that the stone is more than idea because it *kicks back* when kicked. The sensible qualities are only the presentational accompaniments of the experienced *reaction*, not the ground of our attribution of extrinsic authenticity to the object.

In presentational perception, then, there is apprehension of a physically *reactive* other characterized as *sense-content* in a *spatio-temporal form*. Reflection may suggest that the sense-content is posited by the other as related to the psycho-physical self, and the

[1] *The Life of Dr. Johnson*, sub 1763. (Some of the italics are mine.) Cf. this account, e.g. with the emasculated version of W. A. Sinclair in his recent *Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 62.

[2] In particular it can prove no more than that the stone is as independently real as Dr. Johnson's body. It thus raises a different sort of problem: is the *esse* of "kicking" *percipi*?

spatio-temporal form by the psycho-physical self in respect of the other. If so, the whole situation is expounded as a complex of *actions* rather than as a relation of a mental action with a passive object. That such a situation is confused in a high degree is, of course, admitted—indeed, contended: in particular, the emergence of objective content from a relation of actions requires elucidation which is not easily forthcoming. But to take this as merely "given" is no alleviation; for knowledge is *understanding*, and not passive receptivity, and in so far as presentational cognizance is of a "given" it is indistinguishable from fantasy. What is "given" in knowledge, as given, is an epistemic privation: it can be given only as *problem* capable only of speculative solution. Only problems arising from sophistication can be solved by mere analysis.

(*b*) *The Object of Categorial Perception.*

In developed perception we pass beyond the range of the naïve Johnsonian refutation of subjective idealism (for it hardly touched the essential activism of Berkeley). For presentational perception the *perceptum* is a passive spatio-temporal *sensum* discovered as associated with a power of reacting to certain of the actions of the psycho-physical self: for categorial perception it is an objective entity embodying its own modes of objective constitution and behaviour. It possesses not merely determinate spatio-temporal form but also *categorial form*. Presentations are now the matter which categorial perception apprehends under the forms of the understanding; and as so conformed they are apprehended as things embodying characters and modes of behaviour rather than mere presentations *plus* an associated reaction.

By what magic, then, do passive presentations develop into epistemically independent things? Their mere subjection to the categories of the understanding, conceived as of mental origin, can hardly be supposed to make of them independent existents, but contrariwise, must render them more fully subject to the mind, and thus more abjectly passive. Their apparent possession of their own proper modes of behaviour would seem to be more than subjection to the requirements of the understanding. They appear *as if* independent, but no ground seems to be forthcoming to convince us that this is not the mere reflection of our own mental action in so constituting them. They are still categorially formed "objective contents" whose reality is in question. Thus, we must ask more narrowly: what is the source of this appearance of epistemically independent entity? Why do these objective contents, these categorialized spatio-temporal *sensa*, appear as entities independent of cognizing mind? For it is not sufficient to accept the "fact", especially when the analysis of the fact seems clearly to make of it mere appearance. In short, we

are still faced by the problem of "knowledge": how what is intrinsic to cognitively active mind can be extrinsic to it as *cognitum*.

With presentational perception the escape was made by the admittedly unsatisfactory appeal to associated experiences of reaction on the part of the presentation to the action of the psycho-physical self: the presentation is real because we cannot put our fist through it without damage to fist or presentation. With categorial perception, however, this would appear to be unnecessary, because the perception itself reveals the object as independent. As categorial in constitution it is intrinsically independent, at least in appearance. Yet the categorial form is no more than a form of objectivity. The categories are ideal—are imposed on the presentational content by the mind, and not real modes of action in a thing independent of the mind. Only if they can be attributed to, or derived from, real action in the *cognitum* can their mental imposition validly authenticate the independent existence of the object. Only on the supposition that we can apprehend the active reality of things, can we assign to the categorialized objective content of developed perception a genuine *appearance* as existentially independent of cognizing mind.

Now we cannot do this by way of object, either as categorial form or as presentation: action makes no objective appearance—it is the *inseitas* of the agent, and not his appearance *ab extra*. Objective behaviour or relative motion is not action *in se*. But this is no sufficient ground for metaphysical scepticism, save on the assumption that knowledge is essentially of objects—which is the very matter under discussion. On the contrary, it is a ground for questioning this assumption—especially as knowledge is *of the real*, and the reality of a thing is what it is *in se*, and not what it appears to be *ab extra*. Knowledge of a thing is of its *inseitas*, i.e. of its agency; and the fact that agency is no object is no ground for a denial of the possibility of knowledge in the sphere of categorial perception. We know that its objects are authentic because, and in so far as, we find our psycho-physical selves in co-operation, or in conflict, with their physical action. There is active *community* between the psycho-physical perceiver and the *perceptum* (for even conflict is based upon underlying co-operation); and it is this non-objective community of agents that makes of categorial perception a form of knowledge, and no mere presentation.

This was, indeed, the vital root of the Johnsonian "refutation" of Berkeley: what disabled it was' that it made the reaction of the stone an *addition* to the presented content, whereas the content is through and through objectively conformed to it. Space and time are objective expressions of active co-operation and obstruction; and in categorial perception the categorialized objective content is conformed to the community of action in self and other. The cate-

gorial forms are expressions of the active community of knower and known. Community of action lies *perdu* in the forms of space, time, and the categories, as their very life; and it is by virtue of this *essential* knowledge of agency that the objects of categorial perception are apprehended as *real appearances*, and no mere objective contents.

(2) *The Object of Conceptual Cognizance.*

The peculiarity of purely conceptual knowledge is that it is concerned with an object not as such "given in experience". Though it is applicable to properly selected "matters of fact", its object is not itself an extant entity. "The triangle" is not *a* triangle; nor is "man" *a* man. The objective content of the *conceptum* may be primarily an abstraction from perceptual objects, though secondarily it may be a construct from such abstractions to which no perceptual object conforms. But whatever may be its source, in conceptual knowledge the objective content is posited, or, as we say, "defined".

But it is not thereby deprived of reality—for if it were we could not legitimately speak of conceptual *knowledge*: this would be mere fantasy. Nevertheless, *concepta* are not real in the sense in which *percepta* are so conceived: they are not physically reactive or extant in the categorial system of nature. In what, then, does the reality of the object of conceptual knowledge consist? I reply, essentially in this: that it has "a will of its own"—we cannot do as we like with it: it dictates its own properties. The novelist can make his fictions do as he likes (though within limits if he is to retain some measure of realism and credibility); but having posited "the triangle" Euclid was at its mercy, for its properties follow not from his will but from the self-determining essence posited. Doubtless, in positing "the triangle", i.e. defining it within the framework of the axioms and postulates, he also by implication posited all its properties; but not by an act of his own will or choice. He did so by reason of the necessarily determinate "will" of that which he posited; and we are all in the same position with respect to the *conceptum.*

Conception, then, is knowledge because its object *acts* independently of the conceiver's conceiving action: the conceiver is compelled to accommodate his intellectual action to the requirements of the *conceptum.* The same is in principle true of forms of conceptual cognizance concerned not merely with spatial conformation but also temporal and categorial character. Though space, time, and the categories as formally objectified in perceptual and conceptual objects are expressions of the action of the psycho-physical self as "affected" by the action of the physical other, it is the action of the other that determines their precise modalities as so objectified. Similarly, though in perception the "matter of sense" is an expression

of the action of the physical other as "affecting" the action of the psycho-physical self, it is the aptness of the action of the physical self to that of the other that determines its precise character. With conception, "matter of sense" is neglected; though when we seek to interpret conception as a relation of a mental action to an extrinsic object we are bound to give it formal entry as empty or occult quality. In conception, as such, we give ourselves over entirely to the intrinsic action of the *conceptum*. There is, in fact, no extrinsic "object", but a formal "agent". "The triangle" is not *a* triangle, but, if I may so say, "triangulation".[1]

I have not so far distinguished pure conceptual knowledge from *applied* conception, partly because science aims at an ideal of pure conception, and partly because actual scientific knowledge is of various kinds according as it is concerned with various orders of perceptual entity. Science represents the effort to pass from perception to conception, and as it does so it more or less excludes presentational content from its analysis. It must also be remembered that empirical science clings to its perceptual *terminus a quo* in a manner in which mathematics does not. It is thus presented with the problem of what exactly distinguishes *applied* from *pure* mathematics which is its formal ideal. Ideal science would seem to transcend the empirical. Broad's suggestion of an "occult quality" somehow corresponding with tactual *sensum* indicates his realization of this problem, but can hardly be said to resolve it: is not the tactual *sensum* sufficiently occult?

It has often been said that "reality" is no *predicate*: a conceived hundred dollars, says Kant,[2] has the same predicates as the real hundred dollars in my pocket; it cannot be precipitated into being by the addition of a further character. But neither is it an "occult quality" attributed to an objective determinate form as the implication of its epistemically independent "givenness". Nor can we make of it a sort of *formal* predicate or objective counterpart of a mental act of "reference" or "projicience". It is nothing objective, either empirical or occult quality, or formal product of judgment. What, then, is "reality"? I reply, it is intrinsic *action*: that is real which acts, and action, as such, is no object of contemplation. You will, perhaps, object: if reality is action, and thus no object of contemplation, how does it come about that we contemplate objects at all? And if this is illusion, what in the name of truth is "knowledge"?

The aetiology of objectivity is a subject too complex and difficult for me even to attempt to deal with it here. I shall assay that problem elsewhere, and perhaps with but indifferent success. But as to know-

[1] It is thus that its "functional" definition is more purely conceptual than the Euclidean, which is, in part at least, formally perceptual.

[2] *Critick of Pure Reason*, Pt. II, ii, Bk. II, iii, § iv.

ledge, *prima facie* and essential, there are some things that can, and must, be said.

(*a*) Prima facie *knowledge.*

Even here, where knowledge takes the form of contemplation of objects, we have seen that in so far as it is authentic the "object" is no mere "objective content" constituted of sense-material in spatio-temporal and categorial form, but this realized as appearing agent, i.e. as objective expression of *action.* The pertinacious attempt of phenomenologists to exclude action from the real is not merely futile, but destructive of the very essence of knowledge. That this is not generally understood is due to the preconception that if action is admitted it must be in some objective form, as presentation or entity: some "force", "effort", or "energy" with its own peculiar objective form that can be contemplated. It is excluded from the picture very much as Hume excluded the "self", because he could not discover it among the passing "perceptions". The denial is thus a flagrant *petitio principii,* for this preconception is precisely what is being denied. The result is that in *prima facie* knowledge the very thing that makes it "knowledge" is excluded because it cannot be contemplated; for what makes it contemplation, viz. the objective content presented, is extraneous to, and by no means the intrinsic *inseitas* of, the *cognitum.* It is for this reason that I have sometimes said that mere *data* are mere *ablata*: "blind spots" in the field of cognition; and that actual *data* are always *problemata*—objects of knowledge the nature of which is not wholly intrinsic, whose objective content is incapable of certifying truth because their action is extrinsic to their objectivity. This defect is partly overcome in conceptual knowledge, where the defined *conceptum* dictates its own properties—but still *only* partly in so far as the original *conceptum* is a given (or taken), and not dictated by some primordial *causa sui.*

(*b*) *Essential Knowledge.*

It follows that essential knowledge, as such, is a relation of the action of a mental agent and the action of an agent in some sense other: either a physical agent, or another mental agent, or even the knowing agent itself under reflection. The action of the other is not contemplated as objective content—indeed, all such content must be set aside as a privation of essential knowledge, and thus as problem. A world fully known, i.e. understood, would contain no mere *data,* but would be *"transparently"*[1] *intelligible,* flowing without spot of blindness from the primordial self-active nature of a perfectly intelligible *causa sui. Prima facie* knowledge is a privation of this

[1] The inverted commas indicate my realization that "transparency" is an objective character.

"transparency", and its contemplated objects, in so far as they are *data*, are defects masquerading as contents; and in so far as they are categorial, are agents masquerading as objective things. That they are *able* to do so is due to what in them is not mere *datum*, viz. intrinsic action; and this must be known if they are to be in any sense *cognita*, i.e. real, and not mere fantasy. And *mere* fantasy is nothing (the essential truth that underlies Locke's *dictum* that all knowledge is from experience).

What, then, is the nature of this essential cognitive relation of agents? Generically speaking, it may be described as *community*, but its special nature varies with the status and nature of the agents. The knowing agent is, of course, always *mental*, for mind is by definition cognizant. But the *cognitum* may be either *physical* or *mental*, and either *self* or *other*; and the special character of the community that is essential knowledge varies accordingly.

(i) *Knowledge of the Physical Self.*

It is a curious common-sense delusion (apparently shared by many scientists) that our knowledge of our own bodies is similar to our knowledge of other bodies. In fact, however, we know them, not as external objects of perception, but as the physical actions that we *animate*. In any act of vision, e.g. the organ of vision is not itself seen as visual *datum* or object; it is a visual object only for some *other* percipient. And, in general, the operant body is no object to the mind that animates it. The agelong failure to understand this arises from the fact that the physical agents of perception are so differentiated as to appear as localized organs, so that, e.g. we *see* other parts of the body, *feel* the eye, and so on, and are thus prepared to regard the absence of the eye from vision, of the touching hand from tactual perception, etc., as mere accidents easily made good. But, as I have said, this is no accident, but essential to the perceptual predicament. The body is no extrinsic object in which the mind lives "as a sailor in a ship". The mind animates the body, and its animation of it is its knowledge of it. There is *community* of mental and physical agency which from the point of view of body is animation, and from the point of view of mind incarnation or embodiment. The naïve error of uncritical common sense and science is to read the cognitive relation of mind and body as an objective relation of two objects—whence arise many of the insoluble, because illusory, problems of psycho-physics. "Ne'er canst thou see the seer of seeing": and it is equally true that the organ of sight is invisible, and in general the organ of perception imperceptible in the psycho-physical act of percipience.

(ii) *Knowledge of the Physical Other.*

Unlike the physical self, the physical other makes objective appear-

ance, and it is commonly supposed that this appearance *ab extra* is itself the essential nature of the *cognitum in se*; or, at least, that by correction that leaves the objectivity untouched the essential nature of the physical other may be estimated from its *prima facie* appearance. Locke's attempt to reconcile himself to this absurdity by postulating a material substance as extrinsic support of perceptual appearances was rightly discredited by Berkeley in so far as this substance was conceived as an unpresented, and even unpresentable, *object* (though Locke toyed with the notion that other, more apt, minds might even "perceive" the matter that supports the perceptual objective contents—not clearly realizing that, for such a percipient, material substance would itself be the quality of some more occult substance). In place of this substance, Berkeley posited Divine *action* as the source of perceptual appearances. In this he was, I think, in principle right; but not in assuming that that action is essentially *mental* or immediately *divine*. Just as the physical reality of an eye is not attributable to the mental action either of the mind that animates it or immediately to the mind that creates it, but to its own physical action, so the physical reality of any *perceptum* is not attributable to cognitive action in itself, or in God, but to the essence *in se* that it is. This is in agreement with the principle that a *cognitum*, as distinct from a fantasy, is no mere objective content, but this *known as real*, i.e. as "possessing a will of its own". It is its intrinsic action that is its reality, It is *known*, therefore, as active, and only in so far as that action is the source of the objective content can the apprehension of this rightly or, indeed, in any sense, be called cognition. Apart from this derivation the objective content is mere *datum*, i.e. cognitive *ablatum*, and in actuality, as confusing objectivity and agency, *problematum*.

This, indeed, is what everyone knows in actual experience, as distinct from abstract epistemological analysis under the tyranny of a "radical objectivism" derived from the too ready acceptance of the contemplative emphasis of *prima facie* knowledge as normal or essential. The things that, apart from our own bodies, we know best, and most profoundly, are those whose relation to the mind most nearly approximates to that of the body: the things that co-operate with the psycho-physical self as responsive agents, as physiological correlates, apparatus, instruments, tools, materials of craftsmanship, and the like; and the things that we know most superficially are those which are mere reactive obstructions, or buffers limiting our physical action. Our knowledge of the physical other is essentially the active *community* of that other with the animated physical self. Where this is lacking there is no knowledge of even the most superficial character. The extra-mentality of Johnson's stone was sufficiently authenticated by its *reaction*, but he was even more certain of the reality of "his

Tetty". Where community of action in self and other is most complete knowledge of the other is most certain and perfect, and most akin to love.

(iii) *Knowledge of the Mental Self.*

"*Sum cogitans*": in the very action of thinking, i.e. mentally acting—conceiving, perceiving, doubting, willing, desiring, etc., I am real "beyond a peradventure". This does not, of course, make of me an *object* extrinsic to myself. Here we have the immediate, essential, intrinsic, self-knowledge of a mental agent as mentally active. We "enjoy", as Alexander says, our own conscious action. Unfortunately, however, the uncritical "radical objectivism" of the naïve commonsense and scientific consciousness seduced Alexander into the false supposition that since among the actions that we "enjoy" is that of contemplating objects, what we enjoy is, after all, a sort of object: to wit, a *mental* object with spatio-temporal characteristics, compresent in Space-Time with physical things, though possessing the special character of contemplating them.

Knowledge is thus for him the mere *compresence* of mind and thing, and is *cognitive* only by reason of the special nature of mind as essentially contemplative. Thus "enjoyment" that began its philosophical career so promisingly, is involved in the disaster of being represented as *the contemplation of contemplation*—the ambiguity of the abstract substantive more or less effectively concealing the fallacy that springs from Alexander's inveterate "radical objectivism". We "enjoy" (among other actions) contemplat*ing*; and this is a knowledge which has no object extrinsic to itself which we enjoy. We do not contemplate contemplating *ab extra*—the mind does not "enjoy" itself as object, but as action: it *is* self-conscious action, even when it is also the action of contemplating a physical other. Here knowledge is community in the sense of reflective self-identity: we cannot in any sense know, without *knowing* that we are know*ing*—though it is true that in *mera experientia* conceived as merely presentational we seem to be able to do so. But *mere* presentation is not even contemplation.

(iv) *Knowledge of the Mental Other.*

The mind's knowledge of other minds has usually been considered to be more difficult to explain than its knowledge of itself, or of its body, or of other bodies, because, as such, minds make no objective appearance by which otherness may be mediated. The knowledge which we have of our own minds suffers, not from this, but from the contrary disablement of being too immediate easily to fall under the *prima facie* interpretation of knowledge as a relation of a subject to an object. But if, as I have argued, knowledge as such is not thus

rightly conceived, but rather as community of action, it would seem that knowledge of other minds should be somewhat more easily understood than knowledge of bodies—for their actions are of the same kind as those of the mental self, whereas the actions of bodies are physical. Still, it will be said, the evidence of direct community of minds without the interposition of bodily interaction (what is called "telepathy") is both rare and highly dubious, and thus wholly insufficient to reconcile us to the theory of its universality.

It may easily be allowed that in *prima facie* experience, where knowledge is taken as the apprehension of objects, this is true enough. It is, in a sense, *analytically* true, for this is just what we *mean* by "*prima facie* experience". Even here, however, the same principle holds as with our knowledge of other bodies: it is not the objective content presented that is the true *cognitum*, but the action by which it is *real*. And this is never presented as object. The difference, therefore, between knowledge of other minds and knowledge of other bodies is that bodies as known in *prima facie* experience are agents that make objective appearance, whereas minds as known are agents that do not appear as extrinsic objects or qualitied spatio-temporal contents. I must not spend time in seeking the source of this difference: suffice it to say that it reciprocates with the epistemological system of reference—knowledge being essentially mental, and the physical *cognitum* thus more profoundly other to mind than the mental *cognitum*.

The special difficulty about our knowledge of other minds is thus only the obverse of our illegitimate assumption that knowledge is of objective contents. If, on the contrary, knowledge is essentially community of action in which at least one of the agents is mental, the appearance or non-appearance of spatio-temporal content is epistemically unimportant: it concerns only the generic nature of the *cognitum*. Direct community of mental actions in different agents is, in fact, far more widespread than the dubious evidence for telepathy would suggest—though, very naturally, it concerns modes of thinking and percipience rather than particular mental events. There is, e.g. our direct intuition of the identity of the objective worlds that appear for each of us; for this is certainly not the result of inferences, sophistical or conclusive, but a direct expression of active psychophysical community. It even goes so far as to satisfy us in common life (though perhaps illegitimately) that the *sensa* of different men are identical in content: e.g. that the content that I call "red" is the same as that which you call by the same name, and that we thus have more than the name in common. Yet for this, on objectivistic principles, there is no evidence whatever: what I call "red", for all we know, may be what you call "the sound of a trumpet", or some content that lies beyond my conception. On the other hand, com-

munity of spatio-temporal and categorial form in our objective worlds has never been doubted. For here "demonstrations are the eyes of the mind", and are indubitably common. Furthermore, the "objectivity" (as it is called) of conceptual experience—that it is capable of being shared by distinct individual minds (and why else do we dispute?)—tells the same story. "The triangle" about which Euclid reasons is the same *conceptum* as "the triangle" that his understanding reader conceives (however he may *image* it), in whatever language he defines it (for expression is posterior to the expressed). If the efforts were not so earnest, and the results so disappointing, it would be amusing to take note of the antics of the common-sense and scientific mind trying to see what its self-imposed blinkers cannot but conceal—looking for the source of our knowledge of other minds among the objective contents that are but the partial occultations of our knowledge of other physical agents—when, in fact, our knowledge of these physical agents as common *cognita* already presupposes the effective community of the knowing minds. The spectacle of Hume looking for the self among its objects is not more odd; and if it seems otherwise it is because we are still thinking of the percipient body as an object of the percipience that animates it, and not truly as agent.[1]

[1] It is perhaps noteworthy that even Hume was compelled to seek the "reality" of "impressions" in their "force and liveliness"—the nearest approach to *action* available to "radical objectivism."

ON KNOWING ONE ANOTHER

JOSHUA C. GREGORY

A YOUNG boy found one of Beck's best stereoscopes, but he did not understand its use. When he looked through the two eye-pieces at the two adjacent duplicates (nearly) of each picture on each card he got a single flat picture, and he expected nothing more. Then the moment of revelation came. As he fumbled the focus onto a flat picture of Hamlet, the grave-diggers and Hamlet himself bulged out, the skull on Hamlet's palm looked like a museum piece, and the grave yawned like a real pit. The stereoscopic world of the Beck instrument had been suddenly established in the boy's experience.

The real perceptual world, where swallows fly and daisies grow, is not frozen like its stereoscopic mimic, where men look like waxworks and waters look like glass. It is not as suddenly established in experience as its stereoscopic counterfeit, but cumulative experience does establish it in each human being.

This established perceptual world, cumulatively wrought, or organized, out of experiences into experience, includes what Walter de la Mare once disrespectfully called "dressed-up mammalia." Experience grows rather than constructs this established perceptual world, with its crowd of human beings, in each human mind, though the artificer analogy is often convenient. Neither the world of material things nor of plants nor of animals nor of men is explicitly *reasoned* into existence. The experient does not deliberately infer the existence of other people to explain experiences otherwise perplexing. He accepts their existance because his cumulative experience establishes it in him, together with his whole perceptual world.

Then this great company of "fellow humans" who "possess souls, not always conspicuous, and minds, not invariably attractive, and tongues, at times tedious," troubles philosophers and perplexes logicians. They are troubled because "merely inferred friends" seem to be such logical travesties of real ones, and yet, since their bodies are directly accessible to eye, finger, or ear, while their "souls" or "minds" are not directly known, their most significant part does seem to be inferred. When Jack and Jill link arms and look at the full silver moon, Jack has his seeing, Jill has hers, and neither experiences the seeing of the other. If Jill thinks of "Diana's foresters . . . minions of the moon," Jack knows nothing of it unless Jill tells him, and even then he only thinks his own thinking and infers, however unwitting his inference, the thinking of Jill. This principle

runs through all Jack's experience of Jill, or hers of him. Each is certain of the other's seeing, but each has a private seeing which is not public to the other, though the moon itself seems public enough to be seen by anyone. The worried philosopher or logician notes Jack's power to feel his own pain when he is pricked, his inability to feel Jill's pain when a pin pricks her, his analogous powers and inabilities throughout countless experiences, and his absolute confidence in Jill's likeness to himself as a human being in spite of his inabilities. The logical plight of the firm believer in the existence of other people like himself has received a special terminological description. He can *introspect* his own experiences, he cannot *extrospect* those of others, yet he believes as firmly in what he cannot extrospect as in what he can introspect. Jack cannot know Jill's feelings or thoughts directly as he does realize directly the tuck of her arm in his. He seems to infer the most important part of her, she of him, and any two persons seem to be in the same logical plight. If the existence of other people fundamentally like one's self is thus inferred, then it seems certain and is actually only probable, which is logically distressing even if the probability is high. The logical plight does not trouble common sense because ordinary experience is blind to the fact that it does infer much of its friends. The insistent logician who exposes the inferences must, however, be humoured, and the philosopher's demand for justification of the inveterate belief in the existence of other people must be heeded and, if possible, met.

The logical discomfort goes if the alleged inference is falsely presumed. One man can see another jump, or he can hold the other's hand or hear him speak. If a human being does, in fact, detect another's pain or thought or purpose or any other apparently non-extrospectible item as directly as he can watch jumps or feel hands or hear words, he does not infer the minds of his fellows any more than he infers their bodies. We might, conceivably, know one another in this direct way without being aware of the fact. Immediate intuitions of apparently non-extrospectible items might be diffused imperceptibly through our experiences of one another, or such intuitions might be numerous enough to assure belief in one another's existence. Philosophers have tried to remove the logical discomfort by diagnosing various forms of such intuitive insights in our experience of one another. Telepathy is a tempting model for these presumed intuitions. The removal of any intrinsic difficulties in such telepathically conceived intuitions or in any other forms of presumed insights does not, however, remove the logical discomfort. Since we seem not to have the alleged direct intuitive knowledge, it is, in any case, presumed. If we have to infer that we do not infer our friends, then the logical discomfort and the fundamental problem remain.

Our knowledge of one another has been traditionally assessed as analogical. This dispensed with the intuitional attempt to infer away the distressing inferences. The discard still seems to be enjoined on any attempt either to justify our firm belief in the existence of many human beings, or, at least, to take the sting out of any logical discomfort over inferred friends.

An insurance agent in his office greets his client, Mr. Smith, and arranges an insurance policy for him. The sense of man's mortality suffuses either mind without any conscious explicit realization of the logician's pet proposition, "All men are mortal." The agent could think in the sense of this proposition if he had never glanced at a primer of logic or consciously formulated the statement. He also accepts his client as a man in the same automatic unconscious way. The prospective death of the client will probably be consciously entertained at some point, or points, of the interview, but not as an explicitly logical deduction. The agent's organized past experience and his experience of the moment blend, or grow together, into a diffused, virtually unconscious, sense of Smith's mortality. The presumed future death of Smith is in effect an inference, for he is not yet dead, and his death cannot be directly known. The inference does not trouble the agent—John Smith *will* die.

The analytical scheme of logic embodies the diffused sense of human mortality in the explicit proposition, "all men are mortal," the automatic acceptance of John Smith's humanity in "John Smith is a man," and the virtual inference of his mortality in "John Smith will die." The syllogism composed by the three propositions has been accused of a *petitio principii*, of assuming "John Smith will die" to be an inference, though it is actually included in the major premiss, "all men are mortal." Logical analysis might conceal the inference actually made by the thinking mind. There might be no inference if "all man are mortal" is an *inventory*, for John Smith would be included in it. The insurance agent's sense of human mortality cannot possibly include the full list of human deaths, and is not an inventory.

Modern logic usually handles the major premiss as "If X is a man, X is mortal." This merely connects being a man with being mortal, specifies no particular man and, since it is not an inventory, does not misrepresent the agent's inference about Smith as an item picked from a list. The logical validity of the syllogistic deduction is absolute, for John Smith must be mortal *if* every man is mortal and *if* he is a man. Such logical validity is easily obtained: "If X is a man, X has red hair," in conjunction with "John Smith is a man," validly gives Smith red hair. The logician's pet syllogism about man and mortality is both logically valid and empirically acceptable because men *are* mortal, though only some are red-

haired. This is, presumably, why it is a pet syllogism, for relatively few empirical statements have the absolutely convincing universality of "*all* men are mortal." To demand a logically valid proof for the existence of other people is to cry for the moon. Even the convincing "all men are mortal" cannot meet this demand.

The logical assessment of the belief in other people, as of the belief in their mortality, may be an inadequate analysis of the actual experiencing situation. It may, however, be possible to assess the situation effectively enough to alleviate, if not to remove, any logical distress over "merely inferred friends" and their logical status as probabilities. Their logical status will probably have to be one of probability if it cannot be one of logically valid deduction. If logical validity is so often secured by restricting empirical warrant, widely organized empirical certainties, such as the mortality or existence of men, may exclude logical validities.

Anaximenes saw the air waft a thin well-spread leaf, and conceived the broad earth as a table, or lamina, resting on the air. His successors, with more analogical success, saw shadows cast on earth, and explained the lunar eclipse as a shadow cast by the earth on the moon. Maine calls analogy "the most valuable of instruments in the maturity of jurisprudence" and "the most dangerous of snares in its infancy." Carveth Read notes the seduction of primitive minds into error by analogies. The floating leaf seems to us to have seduced Anaximenes very easily into presuming a lamina-like air-borne earth. The wildness of many early analogies seems to have seduced Carveth Read himself into accusing "analogical thought" of being "imaginative only," and into confining it to "metaphors and similes." Maine, more soberly, recognises the value of analogy for experienced and circumspect thought. Early analogies were, on occasion, helpful: shadows on earth led early astronomy to shadows genuinely cast on the eclipsed moon. In all domains the analogy either leads or misleads, and as thought matures it applies circumspect checks to analogical suggestions.

Analogy, indeed, is a staff, perhaps *the* staff, of the mind. Read notes how prone men are to rely on analogical reasoning. Descartes puts this proneness well into the mind: a noticed similarity between two things incites presumptions of unnoticed similarities. Sydney Smith puts the analogical inveteracy deeply in: we can hardly help likening anything we see to something previously seen or conceived. The inveterate habit of comparison manifests in the vogue of the metaphor, which illustrates, and of the analogy, which convicts—as Coleridge contrasts the two. In "Moby-Dick" a harpoon, which had pierced an escaped whale near the tail and was found in the hump years after when the animal was finally killed, is compared to a restless needle moving in the body of a man. This metaphor

has a bit of analogy in it, for one can *argue* from the behaviour of the needle to the travel of the harpoon. This, like Paley's familiar comparison of a contrived universe to a constructed watch, recognisably marks the inveterately analogical habit which lies so deep in mental working. A historical survey of human thought and an analysis of human thinking reveal analogies, even misleading analogies, as the stepping-stones of the mind.

If analogy is the route of discovery, as Lotze suggests, this logical form conforms more closely than other such forms to the actual process of the mind. The insurance agent's actual thinking is probably much more like an analogy than a syllogism. If the analogy is not a ground of proof, as Lotze also says, the logician naturally enough gives it the cold shoulder, which he seems to be doing. Probably no logical form, which is necessarily abstract and analytical, can adequately render the full synthetic concreteness of mental process, but the analogy seems to come closest to it of all logical forms. The analogical assessment of the belief in the existence of other people does, in one respect at least, come nearest to its actual establishment in the mind.

A human being experiences his own experiences, he does not experience the experiences of others. If the experiencer credits other people with pains, pleasures, sensations, perceptions of objects or any other non-extrospectible items, and if he does not detect these credited experiences directly in their accredited owners, as he detects them directly in himself, or as he detects the perceptible behaviour of others directly, he must analogically extend his own introspectible experiences to other people. Analogy, as Hume says, transfers experiences in past instances to resembling objects. The believer in other people credits their bodies and behaviour with, for them, introspectible experiences similar to those connected with his own behaving body. Like bodies and similar behaviour suggest comparable introspectible experiences. This analogical reference, whatever the difficulties in detail, must occur if the introspectible experiences of others cannot be directly or intuitively detected. These private introspectible experiences are clearly inferred, remain inferred, and their logical status is one of inference and associated probability.

When the Pythagoreans correlated musical notes, string-lengths and numbers, they extended these relations analogically to the harmony of the spheres. The push of the inveterately analogical habit is evident in such precipitate analogical extensions. Maine notes early interdictions on some food, for sanitary reasons, extensions of the prohibition to all food resembling it, and, on occasion, fanciful attribution of resemblance. The history of thought is full of free analogical extensions. History also reveals a constant route

of the human mind through discarded or corrected and re-corrected analogies. The same push and the same correction of extravagances are evident in the analogical extension of privately introspectible experiences. The stars and planets are created gods in the *Timaeus*; the Athenian Stranger in Plato's *Laws* claims divinity for the sun, moon and stars; for Aristotle the stars are divinely intelligent, and the divinity of the celestial bodies, as gods or godlike, persisted from Babylonian or Egyptian lore through the Greco-Roman tradition far into the Christian era. This acme of personifying objects very physically unlike men discloses the power of the push behind the analogical extension of privately introspectible experiences. The early Greek mind constantly mingled the purposive into the causal, for the human mind inveterately reads its own characteristics into phenomena. Humanized animals have received the anthropomorphic attribution more plausibly than stars. The fable still appeals, though the animal actor who behaves like a man is now discredited as a fact. Personification, which has pervaded poetry, rhetoric and speech, still flourishes. Science has even been accused of clinging to a personified nature. Personificatory speech does attest the analogical habit of projecting human qualities very freely, though the accusation of actual belief in a personified nature is rash. The free analogical extension of privately introspectible qualities has been severely corrected and largely, at least, confined to human beings. The dog is credited with a modest share of human experiences, but no animal is now seriously regarded as a differently shaped or embodied human being. The belief in other people is the final and impregnable stronghold of the personificatory habit. Men obviously do project their private experiences, and this projection, which secures the firm belief in other people, has manifested the usual extravagances of all vigorously prompted analogical extensions, and many personifications still please where they do not convince.

The child is usually said to recognize other people before it recognizes its own self. This would be strange if it deliberately argued from its own sensations or other introspectible experiences to their existence in others. We believe in the experiences of others because we have them ourselves, but not because we explicitly argue by analogy. Things happen *as if* we do analogically argue from the experiences connected with our own behaving bodies to similar experiences similarly connected with similarly behaving bodies. This is more the abstract logic of it than the actual occurrence. Our own experiences are involved in a complex organization of experience that results in the realisation of ourselves and others. The child's experiences can enable it to realize other people without realizing its own self. Its knowledge either of others or itself, in any case, is defective at first and ripens with the years.

Since the external world steadily enforces itself on consciousness (and on the organized unconscious mind) from the first, other people, as bits of it, naturally do so also. Solipsism is a sophisticated version of experience, introduced after the primary preoccupation with the external world, and thriving, when it does thrive, on the enigmas in the establishment of the perceptual world in experience. The growth of experience is fundamentally enigmatical, though it obviously does establish in us the consciousness of the perceptual world with its other people. The child's notion of other people probably begins with specially responsive bits of external reality, and until its experience has sufficiently matured it is natural enough for it to appreciate other people rather than itself. It is not necessary to settle here whether the child realizes other people as *selves* before it realizes its own self. The analogy, my behaving body is connected with certain experiences, therefore similarly behaving bodies are connected with similar experiences, comes close to the actual fact that the experiencer does believe in others *because* of his own experiences, but inferences drawn from the presumption that he does thus argue analogically, at least in an explicit way, may err, and err greatly.

The analogical extension is equivalent to supposing other people to behave *as if* they have introspectible experiences similar to those of any individual experient. Other people must behave as the hypothesis that they actually are other people requires, even if direct, or extrospectible, knowledge of their relevant experiences does occur. The others, of course, are no more deliberately argued into existence by the *as if*, or hypothetical, method than by the more purely analogical. In both cases organized experience establishes the belief and a logical analysis assesses it. The logical distress over inferred friends may be eased if they continuously behave like the other people they are supposed to be. The other people then become logically a hypothesis, and empirically an assurance because they so continuously and diversely verify the hypothesis by their behaviour.

Grass is green, thorns pierce, and ice chills: these and innumerable other perceptual assents verify for each human being the existence of others like himself. Colour-blindness disturbs the sense of similarity among men without maiming it. The vagaries of para-ethoxy-phenyl-thio-carbamide, which is bitter in some mouths and tasteless in others, also disturbs and does not destroy the sense. The confidence in verificatory perceptual assents can be more seriously shaken, for it is notoriously impossible to demonstrate that any two people have exactly similar sensory experiences. If A and B have interchanged experiences of red and green, the colour of a boiled lobster being for B what the colour of the grass is for A, and the colour of

the boiled lobster being for A what the colour of the grass is for B, then B will consistently call a boiled lobster or a ripe tomato or the sun's disc in a wintry sky "red," though his actual sensory experience will be called "green" by A. If a skilled demon deftly interchanges the sensations of A and B as they look at a boiled lobster the crustacean will seem to each to change. This might be true, *mutatis mutandis*, for all sensory or perceptual experiences. Since no demon has the needed experimental finesse, the common assents cannot be directly tested. Though we must begin, as Eddington begins, with the impossibility of comparing A's "sensation of the taste of mutton" with B's, we end, as Eddington seems to end, with substantially the same visual experience for A and B of the seven stars in the Plough. The substantial sameness of the perceptual world for each person, manifested in universal assents, is a presupposition of common sense and an explicit postulate of logically assessed science. Experience contains too many perceptual assents, and happens too consistently *as if* many similar human beings have similar perceptual experiences, for the postulate to be more than momentarily doubted. Hermann Melville compares the bottom of a whale-boat to critical ice which supports a considerable distributed weight and soon breaks as the weight is concentrated. One perceptual assent cannot stand the verificatory strain; innumerable perceptual assents do stand it. Perceptual assents involve other persons in the whole reality of the perceptual world.

When two farmers discuss a pig they do not appraise its fleece as if it were a sheep. Each human being normally treats anything as being what it is, and not as what it is not, though he may lapse unwittingly on occasions. He recognizes his own practice and the habit of his fellows when the logician states it in the Law of Identity, as it is traditionally called.

If "every man over forty is a scoundrel," as Bernard Shaw says, then the author of the aphorism is a scoundrel because he is over forty. The deduction is logically valid, however fervent the hope that it is empirically false. Such logical assents cannot be shaken like perceptual assents, and are essential for coherent thinking. If Bernard Shaw is not a knave, he disproves his own aphorism because the knavery deducible from it is incompatible with fact. If his knavery, or the knavery of any one over forty, were not so logically deducible, the proposition could not be checked because men over forty would be or not be scoundrels quite irrelevantly to its truth. Such logical validities as the Shaw syllogism are virtually acknowledged and followed by all normal human beings. Abnormal humans do so too, for the madman often argues logically enough from eccentric premisses to their necessarily absurd, though logically valid, conclusions.

When the logician analyses out such logical validities they are confidently acknowledged. They are implicitly acknowledged during intercourse, and logical assents constantly verify for each human being the existence of others who think as if in this respect they are like himself, for his fellows would puzzle him if their logic were perverse, and, indeed, much coherent intercourse would be impossible if either the Law of Identity or the Shaw syllogism were not accepted. The experient, of course, does not deliberately argue that logical assents verify the existence of others, or even realize that they do so, but he does partly believe in their existence because the logical assents help to establish the belief.

The alchemical writer Zosimos warned the operator, "on opening the cover," not to put his "nose too close to the mouth of the jar." Disobedient operators would subsequently agree that there had been a disgusting smell. There have been many *mnemic assents* since over disgusting smells from sulphuretted hydrogen. Shared memories flood intercourse and convince each of many similar others. Mnemic assents, like perceptual and logical assents, establish the belief in other people, are not argued from explicitly, and also involve the belief in the reality of the whole perceptual world. The three assents happen as if many essentially similar human beings exist, and they happen so often, so continuously and so regularly that they establish an inveterate belief in other people. If the logical analysis of the belief into a verified hypothesis remembers the enormous scope of the verification it resolves "merely inferred friends" into merely logical bogys.

The three assents, either as establishers or verifiers, do not require or imply a set of duplicate humans. When two former schoolfellows meet again after many years their many unshared memories do not make their shared recollections dim or dubious. Any two people, of course, have a common mnemic ground in countless common experiences—in the bite of the east wind, for example, or in the twinkle of a star. Their realization, normally unreflective or implicit, of a common mnemic organization confirms in each, as experience constantly confirms, the existence of others like himself. Mnemic diversities need not, and do not, weaken the establishing powers of mnemic assents. They actually help each person to realize in others a mnemic organization essentially similar to his own. No two people have precisely the same set of recollections, but, however different the sets may be, each of the rememberers knows that the other remembers as he himself might have remembered if he had lived the other's life. Other people manifest themselves to any individual as if they have mnemic organizations similar to his own. This manifestation establishes, or helps to establish, in him a belief in the existence of others like himself. It establishes the belief: he

does not argue or deliberately infer or even recognise explicitly the existence of mnemic organization.

In a recurrent dream a skeleton clutched a patient of Dr. Gregory by the throat. Any dreamer recognizes his own dreaming, though not his own dreams, in the dramatically dreaming patient. Diverse experiences can help to establish the belief in similar others through the common experience involved. The dreamer, as Heracleitos noted, lives in his own private world, and his fellow can usually no more detect experiences in him than in a waxwork. The privacy of all individual experiences is evident in the dream because the usual manifestations, by which Jack, for example, learns much about his Jill, are absent. This privacy often obscures for one man the judgments or sensations or opinions or feelings or purposes of another, and may keep them as secret as any dream. Peter's belief in the existence of other people need not waver because he often does not know, or only precariously infers, what they think or feel, for he can place them in the same difficulty, and this very common predicament makes all men kin. The dream is a reminder that even a very wholesale ignorance about other people is compatible with a sufficiently verifying knowledge about them. The patient could *tell* his dream to Dr. Gregory: the dream also points to the supreme importance of responses and communications in establishing the belief in other people, for the dreamer keeps his secret because sleep quenches his responses.

If the approaching strangers are men, the solitary Robinson Crusoe realizes, they will respond to him in some human way. Human responses vary from kisses to blows, but each responsive human being recognizes his own gamut of responses in responsive others. In particular, as he speaks or is spoken to he discovers speakers who speak as he might speak if someone speaks to him. In gesture, speech or writing others communicate with him as if they are communicators like himself, or are communicated with as he so often is. They use words, in spite of obscurities and ambiguities, as if these words have the meaning for them that they have for him. Through all variations or misunderstandings these others respond, speak or write as if they have, for example, a general notion of "dog," or ideas concerning justice, money, democracy, fascism, and the like, just as he has. He can understand that if they are men like himself they will be mistaken at times or muddled at others. If these others are like himself each of them will believe in the other others, and they act, respond, speak and write as if they do.

The lion is presumably not troubled by the problem of merely inferred lions. His acceptance of other lions probably does not grow into the explicit recognition that there are other lions like himself.

In so far as he does virtually infer their joy in the chase or anger in the fight, if he does so virtually infer them, he presumably has no realization of his own inferring or of such a thing as inference. He may also rejoice in the chase, delight in the kill, enjoy the meal and feel fierce in the fight without knowing that he has joy, satisfaction or fierceness. Since we have no direct or intuitive knowledge of the lion's potentially introspectible experiences we are compelled to infer how much or how little he resembles ourselves. If our fellows were no more responsive to us than lions we should be confined to similar and precarious inferences about them.

Language, preeminently among all responses and communications, leaves the lion for us much of a psychological enigma, or much of a precarious inference, and brings our fellow humans well within our own psychology. Our anthropomorphic tendency to project too much of ourselves into any animals is discouraged when speech does not connect us with them as it connects us with our fellows. Language does not merely manifest a convincing likeness between ourselves and others because we speak or write, and so do they. It discloses an enormous range of manifestation in which others respond as if they have experiences essentially like our own. Through it our perceptual, logical and mnemic assents extend vastly in extent and diversity. The contrast between saint and sinner, or between genius and fool, does not destroy and usually does not even weaken the recognition that others manifest to us as if they see colours, hope, fear, hear sounds, feel, judge, infer, conceive and experience in countless ways as we do.

The wholesale verification of a hypothesis, continuously, extensively and multifariously throughout experience, seems to be the best attainable logical justification of our assured beliefs in the existence of other people who are essentially like ourselves. Experience establishes the belief peremptorily in us for logic to assess. The analogical assessment comes close to the actual establishment at one point—we believe in the experiences of others, though they are as inaccessible to us as the lion's, because we have experiences ourselves. The process can then be logically assessed, and the belief justified, as an overwhelmingly verified hypothesis. The presumed others manifest too convincingly as if they do have experiences like our own for belief not to swallow up presumption.

The behaving bodies play their important part. As responsive bits of the perceptual world they help to establish the great belief; with their correlated introspectible experiences they provide the analogical assessment. The verificatory manifestations depend greatly on them—language, to take one highly important item, is on one side largely highly elaborated and refined gesture. Through them, also, it is probable, the experiences which most essentially

constitute the others share in the inescapable reality of the perceptual or material world.

The logical status of the others in whom every human so assuredly believes must be assessed as inference. The disturbing notion of probability, which experience so constantly connects with inferring, is at least alleviated, if not removed, by assessing the great belief as an overwhelmingly verified hypothesis. The others guarantee themselves effectively by manifesting so continuously, extensively and multifariously as if they are what they are supposed to be. Their guarantee establishes the belief, however uneasy it makes the logician.

NEW BOOKS

The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Edited by PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP. (Library of Living Philosophers: Vol. IV.) Northwestern University: Evanston and Chicago: 1942. Pp. xvi + 717. (In Great Britain: Cambridge University Press. 30s.)

Professor Schilpp and the sponsors of the series deserve high praise for their courage in including a volume devoted to G. E. Moore in their "Library of Living Philosophers." For Moore is a philosopher's philosopher: his writings, regrettably few in number, have been addressed almost entirely to a philosophical public, and the absence in them of any *Weltanschauung* has prevented their being as widely known as the writings of some other philosophers—Dewey, Santayana, Whitehead, Russell, Croce—who are appearing in the series. But Moore, by his teaching at Cambridge throughout twenty-eight years, by his participation in philosophical conferences and by his Editorship of *Mind*, as well as by his philosophically famous *Principia Ethica* and "The Refutation of Idealism" (both published in 1903), has exerted as important an influence on philosophical thought in Great Britain and America as any other contemporary philosopher (in this volume Murphy speaks of one of his papers as "one of the few really decisive contributions to philosophical enlightenment which this century has given us"); and a series without Moore would have seemed to his professional colleagues to have lacked proportion. Moreover, it is one of the main purposes of this series to enable the philosopher in question to reply to criticisms of his work, and Moore's most careful and detailed "Reply to My Critics" (pp. 533–677) fulfils this purpose better than several other "Replies" in the series—besides being the most substantial new piece of writing published by Moore since 1912. Partly because most of Moore's critics have written in Moore's language, but chiefly because he has attempted to deal sympathetically and in detail with their arguments and has never minded admitting that he himself had reasoned invalidly or had changed his mind, his reply, and the essays to which it is a reply, seem to me one of the most successful attempts at conducting philosophical discussion in print with which I am acquainted.

But, alas, it will not satisfy those who expect philosophers to give definitive answers to fundamental questions. Moore has been concerned for the last forty years with two fundamental questions—as to whether goodness is objective, and as to whether we directly apprehend material objects; and on both these questions Moore now confesses that he cannot decide one way or the other. On the former question, Moore writes (he is discussing, in connection with Stevenson's essay, the view that ethical statements have only an emotive meaning and so do not really express propositions at all): "I certainly have some inclination to think that it [the 'emotive' view] *is* true, and that therefore my own former view [that ethical statements express propositions about an objective quality goodness] is false. . . . I have some inclination to think that in *any* 'typically ethical' sense in which a man might assert that Brutus' action [in stabbing Caesar] was right, he would be asserting nothing whatever which could conceivably be true or false, except, perhaps, that Brutus' action occurred—no more than if he had said, 'Please, shut the door.' I certainly have *some* inclination to think all this, and that therefore not merely the con-

tradictory, but the contrary, of my former view is true. But then, on the other hand, I also still have *some* inclination to think that my former view *is* true. And, if you ask me to which of these incompatible views I have the *stronger* inclination, I can only answer that I simply do not know whether I am any more strongly inclined to take the one than to take the other.—I think this is at least an honest statement of my present attitude" (pp. 544–545). And on the latter question he writes: "In that early paper ['The Refutation of Idealism'] I really was asserting that the *sensible* quality 'blue' . . . *could* exist without being perceived: that there was no contradiction in supposing it to do so. Mr. Ducasse's view is that it *cannot*: that there *is* a contradiction in supposing it to do so. And on *this* issue I am now very much inclined to think that Mr. Ducasse is right and that I in that paper was wrong; my reason being that I am inclined to think that it is as impossible that anything which has the sensible quality 'blue,' and, more generally, *anything whatever which is directly apprehended*, any *sense-datum*, that is, should exist unperceived, as it is that a headache should exist unfelt. If this is so, it would follow at once, that *no* sense-datum can be identical with any physical surface, which is the same thing as to say that no physical surface can be directly apprehended: that it is a contradiction to say that any is. Now at the end of the last section I said that I was strongly inclined to agree with Mr. Bouwsma, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Marhenke that physical surfaces *are* directly apprehended. I am, therefore, now saying that I am strongly inclined to take a view incompatible with that which I then said I was strongly inclined to take. And this is the truth. I am strongly inclined to take both of these incompatible views. I am completely puzzled about the matter, and only wish I could see any way of settling it" (pp. 658–659).

I have quoted these two passages at length to show not only Moore's present position but also the method and tone of his "Reply to My Critics." Moore frequently disputes the reasons given by an essayist for disagreeing with him, but he usually admits that nevertheless his critic's rival view may be right. And sometimes he suggests a modification of it which is less open to objection. Creative criticism of other philosophers' views has always been Moore's method. As he confesses in the Autobiography prefixed to this volume, his "main stimulus to philosophise" has always been "things which other philosophers have said," the problems suggested to him in this way "being mainly of two sorts, namely, first, the problem of trying to get really clear as to what on earth a given philosopher *meant* by something which he said, and, secondly, the problem of discovering what really satisfactory reasons there are for supposing that what he meant was true, or, alternatively, was false" (p. 14). Nevertheless, it would be wrong to dismiss Moore as being merely a derivative thinker: Moore's principal reason for not accepting the view of another philosopher is often that he has ignored an alternative possible view which Moore goes on to suggest or examine. That Moore in many cases is unable to decide between the merits of the rival views in no way diminishes the creative philosophical ability shown in thinking of some of them.

It must be admitted that a devoted admirer of Moore like myself is sometimes disappointed at Moore's stopping his discussion at the point where he does, when he appears to be just about to embark on something very exciting where his own methods would be most profitable. I will mention two cases of this in his "Reply" in this volume.

In discussing whether or not a sense-datum is identical with part of the surface of a physical object, Moore writes as follows (pp. 636–637): "I am now seeing part of the surface of my hand; and I do now not only feel sure but know, with regard to this object I am seeing which *is* part of the surface of

my hand, *that* it is part of the surface of my hand. And also I do *now*, at the very same time, feel some doubt as to whether a certain object, which I am *directly seeing* [i.e. a 'sense-datum' in Moore's sense], is identical with the object which I am seeing which is part of the surface of my hand. But to say that I feel doubt as to this, is to say that it is *possible* that it *is* identical. And, *if* it is identical, then . . ., so far as I can see, I don't *know* that I'm not . . . both feeling sure of and doubting the very same proposition at the same time." This paradox seems to Moore "perhaps the most fundamental puzzle about the relation of sense-data to physical objects." And at that he stops. But surely what Moore knows is that what he is *seeing* is part of the surface of his hand; what he doubts is whether what he is *directly seeing* is part of the surface of his hand. The fact that it is possible that what he is seeing he is also directly seeing does not make these two propositions identical any more than the fact that it is possible that the Professor of Imperial History is the tallest Professor in Cambridge makes the two propositions "I met the Professor of Imperial History yesterday" and "I met the tallest Professor in Cambridge yesterday" identical. In his "Defence of Common Sense" Moore has been at great pains to make clear the essential distinction between such a common-sense proposition as "I am now seeing part of the surface of my hand," which it is merely foolish to doubt, and the proposition of philosophical analysis asserting the doctrine of direct (sometimes called naïve) realism—that what I am *directly seeing* is part of the surface of my hand; and that the considerations relevant to the truth of the former are entirely different from those relevant to the truth of the latter. It is surprising that this distinction (which Murphy rightly calls his "major contribution" to the discussion of naïve realism) is completely ignored here. I must also confess to disappointment that Moore elucidates his notion of "sense-datum" by reference to its analogy with an after-image instead of by reference to the fact that it is the sort of object about which I can have direct and incorrigible knowledge in sense-perception.

Another place where Moore stops just when we should wish him to continue is in his section on "Analysis" (pp. 660–667). In reply to Langford, Moore explains that for him it is a *concept*, not the *verbal expression* of it, that is to be analysed; but gives as one of the necessary conditions for "giving an analysis" in his sense that "any expression which expresses the *analysandum* must be synonymous with any expression which expresses the *analysans*" (p. 663). To take Moore's example, if male sibling is given as an analysis of brother, the expression "male sibling" must be synonymous with the expression "brother." But then in the last sentence of this section he says: "It is obvious . . . that, in a sense, the expression '*x* is a brother' is *not* synonymous with, has *not* the same meaning as '*x* is a male sibling,' since if you were to translate the French word *frère* by the expression 'male sibling,' your translation would be *incorrect*, whereas if you were to translate it by 'brother,' it would not." And he leaves it at that. Surely we have a right to ask here for some discussion of the different meanings of "synonymous"—which might also throw some light upon the puzzle to which Moore can give no clear solution, as to the way in which analysis is concerned with the verbal expressions by which the concepts analysed are expressed. It was Moore before the logical positivists who taught me and my contemporaries the importance for philosophy of considering the sentences in which philosophical propositions are expressed: whereas the logical positivists have developed their "linguisticizing" to cover all philosophy, a doctrine which, though most questionable in its extreme form, is obviously most suggestive and important, Moore seems to have been unable to advance beyond his most promising beginning.

I have devoted so much space to trying to convey the flavour of Moore's

contribution that I can only comment very summarily upon his nineteen commentators. Two, and only two, of them—Richard McKeon and V. J. McGill—seem to me to have written quite unprofitably. McKeon complains that "the center of Mr. Moore's world is not things, but beliefs. . . . The world about which Mr. Moore writes is a world of things; the world in which Mr. Moore writes is a world of propositions and perceptions" (pp. 473–474); but he throws no light upon how he expects Moore to think except by considering propositions nor to think about the problem of the external world except by considering perceptions. McGill regrets that "Moore's method is, in a number of respects, ill suited to deal with . . . questions of practical import which, as the world advances to new crises, are increasingly felt to be the urgent task of philosophy" (p. 514)—as if Moore ever conceived his purpose in philosophizing to be the same as that of Marx!

Six of the contributors concern themselves with Moore's ethics. C. D. Broad, besides critically discussing Moore's distinction between "natural" and "non-natural" characteristics, refutes the proof (in *Principia Ethica*) that ethical egoism is self-contradictory. Moore does not agree with Broad's argument; but I think that Broad and not Moore is right on the logical point at issue. Abraham Edel valiantly attempts to "formalize" Moore's ethical system by making explicit the "postulates" involved: it is not surprising that Moore finds himself completely puzzled by a line of approach so dissimilar to his own. A. Campbell Garnett discusses freedom of choice (with reference to Moore's *Ethics*): his positive suggestions for solving the free-will problem are not convincing. H. J. Paton argues, equally unconvincingly, that goodness is essentially related to the existence of a "rational will." Charles L. Stevenson, in an exceedingly able essay, defends an analysis of ethical notions in terms of "approval" and, in particular, criticizes one of the strongest arguments used against a subjective theory of ethics (that, on such a theory, ethical disagreement is impossible). His essay has compelled Moore to admit (in the passage I quoted earlier) that some form of a subjective theory may be right. William K. Frankena's defence of the primacy in ethics of the concept of "obligation" has provoked Moore to a most elaborate discussion of the relation between it and goodness, in which he disavows his earlier opinion that the former can be defined in terms of the latter, but asserts instead a set of equivalences connecting them.

Several contributors treat of Moore's views on sense-perception. C. J. Ducasse ingeniously attempts to refute the argument of "The Refutation of Idealism" by distinguishing between "objective accusatives" and "cognate accusatives," and by maintaining that an object of sensation is a cognate accusative which exists only in the presence of the activity of sensing. O. K. Bouwsma, in one of the best essays in the volume, examines critically Moore's directions for enabling sense-data to be picked out, and concludes that the sense-datum concerned can only be distinguished from part of the surface of my hand if it is conceived as analogous to a rubber glove or to an "epi-epidermis." C. A. Mace also criticizes Moore's sense-data, but seems to be under the impression that Moore in discussing perception is trying to solve a problem in genetic psychology! Paul Marhenke defends direct realism against Moore's objections by an argument which attempts to show that the spatial properties, both of physical objects and of sense-data, are "extrinsic" and not "intrinsic."

Norman Malcolm, Morris Lazerowitz, Alice Ambrose and John Wisdom all discuss, in one way or another, Moore's most characteristic method of argument: A certain philosophical doctrine (e.g. that no material bodies exist) entails that a certain common-sense proposition (e.g. that this table

does not exist) is false. But the common-sense proposition is certainly true; therefore the philosophical doctrine is certainly false. Malcolm's essay is an excellent appreciation and analysis of Moore's "style of refutation," concluding with two criticisms of it (p. 367)—that it "fails to bring out the linguistic, non-empirical nature" of the philosophical doctrine (a point made also by Lazerowitz), and that "even if Moore does succeed in making the philosopher feel refuted, he does not succeed in curing the philosophical puzzlement which caused the philosopher to make the paradox which needs to be refuted." Wisdom's essay is an attempt to advance further than Moore does in curing philosophical puzzlement: it is the most constructive and suggestive but (perhaps because of this) much the most difficult work in the volume; and it is impossible for me to say anything profitable about it in a short compass.

Of the remaining contributors Arthur E. Murphy has written a very interesting appreciation of Moore's distinction between knowing a common-sense proposition and knowing what is its correct analysis; C. H. Langford's essay on "Moore's Notion of Analysis" has (as he wished) induced Moore to state more explicitly his own position; and the late L. Susan Stebbing has contributed a characteristic short essay on "Moore's Influence."

The 37-page Autobiography is fascinating reading to one who knows Moore, but it will yield little fruit to a student researching into "the psychology of philosophers." The volume also contains two good recent photographs (I would have preferred one to have been of a Moore ten years younger), and a most useful complete bibliography. The Editor, in his Preface, has gone astray as to the relation between Trinity College and the University of Cambridge: Moore was Professor of Philosophy (and, since his retirement in 1939, is Emeritus Professor of Philosophy) in the University, and was and is a Fellow of Trinity. My only other criticism of the Editor is that nowhere are Moore's Christian names stated: for the convenience at least of librarians and bibliographers he ought somewhere to have been called George Edward Moore.

R. B. BRAITHWAITE.

The Idea of Nature. By R. G. COLLINGWOOD. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1945.)

This delightful and stimulating book has been prepared for publication by Prof. T. M. Knox from the late Prof. Collingwood's lecture-notes. It describes, criticizes, and inter-relates the philosophies of Nature from Thales to Whitehead, Jeans, and Eddington. The greater part of the history—everything, indeed, except what relates to the latest period—is treated with learning, originality, and brilliance. Unfortunately, modern theoretical physics, especially since the rise of the relativity and quantum theories, is difficult to understand, and it must be said frankly that Prof. Collingwood failed to understand it. The present writer, who is a mathematician, feels that it is somewhat ungracious to draw attention to the defects of a book which he has read with so much enjoyment and edification; but the philosophers who read this review will be able to appreciate for themselves the excellence of the main body of the work, and they may perhaps find it useful to have a note of some of the errors in its concluding chapters.

(P. 144) "An attempt was made to think of gross matter as composed of local disturbances or nucleations in the ether, but this contradicted the fundamental notion of the ether as essentially homogeneous and stationary." This presumably refers to such constructions as the vortex-sponge model of Lord Kelvin, and Larmor's picture of the electron as a centre of rotational

strain. These were not incompatible with the description of the ether as homogeneous and stationary, in the sense in which these words were applied to it.

(P. 145) "The corpuscular theory of matter, from the physicist's point of view, required the assumption that all atoms had the same mass, for the theory regarded the atom or primordial particle of matter essentially as a unit of mass." It is difficult to imagine where Collingwood got this idea from.

(P. 146) "A single physical unit, the electron." The electron is not the only elementary particle; there are the proton and the positron, and most physicists regard the neutron and the meson also as elementary.

(P. 146) "At an instant there is no difference between a body in motion and a body at rest." This is akin to Zeno's paradox of the arrow: the solution is seen by considering that an "instant" is not a primitive concept derived directly from experience, but is constructed in a rather elaborate and artificial way from the "durations" which are what we actually experience, and in which there is a definite distinction between motion and rest.

(Pp. 150–151) The explanation which Collingwood puts forward to account for the fact that electrons and protons behave sometimes like particles and sometimes like waves, misses the point altogether. The difficulty was that waves *spread*, their energy thus becoming in course of time distributed thinly over large regions of space, whereas particles do not spread, but retain their energy as an individual and concentrated possession. The difficulty is now satisfactorily explained, but not in the way that Collingwood suggests.

(Pp. 151-152) "Modern physical theory regards matter as possessing its own characteristics, whether chemical or physical, only because it moves: time is therefore a factor in its very being, and that being is fundamentally motion. All bodies are in motion all the time." There is no foundation for this statement, statical systems being as much in evidence to-day as they ever were.

(P. 153) "At every point of space there are infinite forces impinging from every side upon every piece of matter situated there; and consequently, since these forces will cancel out, none of them will act on that piece of matter at all." Why should they cancel out?

(P. 154) "An expanding universe, or even a finite universe not expanding, implies space around it." It does not; a finite non-Euclidean universe is not like a finite part of a Euclidean universe; there is nothing outside it, for the simple reason that it has no outside: it is itself the whole of space.

It is refreshing to turn from the last thirty pages, where the author flounders from one mistake to another, to the charming earlier chapters, where with secure scholarship and penetrating insight he ranges over the Greek and renaissance philosophies of Nature. With the late seventeenth century, the analysis begins to be less valuable; Newton in particular is not properly appreciated.

He is not always consistent with himself, as when in one place (p. 165) he refers to *Principia Mathematica* as "a vast treatise on the logic of mathematics which laid the foundation of modern logical analysis," while in his *Autobiography* (published in 1939, the very year in which the manuscript of these lectures was revised) he calls it a "typographical jargon," the "frightful offspring of propositional logic out of illiteracy."

One may demur to his final conclusion, that "natural science as a form of thought exists and always has existed in a context of history, and depends on historical thought for its existence"; but whatever may be thought of this and other elements in the book, everyone who has read it will want to read it again.

EDMUND WHITTAKER.

PHILOSOPHY

Can Reason be Practical? By H. J. PATON. (Annual Philosophical Lecture Henriette Hertz Trust, British Academy. 1943. Humphrey Milford. Pp. 43. Price 4s. net.)

There can be no reasoning without assent to a principle of reasoning. Such assent is pure reason. Inference is reasoning. Intuition is pure reason.

The question and the problem, whether something is the case, are theoretical. The answer is a statement. The solution is a judgement. The question and the problem, whether to do something, are practical. The answer is a command. The solution is a volition. Judgement is only one of two species of assent and dissent. The other is volition.

Inference and intuition are species of judgement. Inference is theoretical reasoning. Intuition is pure theoretical reason. Pure reason can be practical if and only if reasoning can be practical, if and only if volition as distinguished from judgement can be reasoned.

It can.

Aware that Hume denies what I affirm, I am not aware that anyone else has ever asked the question thus interpreted. Not Aristotle in his doctrine that syllogism can be practical. Not Kant in his doctrine that the will is nothing but practical reason.

How does Professor Paton interpret the question?

"Intelligence is sometimes equated with reason, but at the present stage we had better regard it as a wider power, of which reason, in the narrow sense, is only a particular manifestation" (pp. 5–6). Again, "it may be wise at the present stage to regard reason as the power of intelligence so far as this power is concerned with the apprehension of necessity" (p. 8. cf. pp. 20–22). This leaves us to wonder, perhaps whether reason exhausts intelligence, certainly not whether intelligence exhausts reason. There might be practical intelligence without practical reason. There could not be practical reason without practical intelligence. Yet "the claims of reason to be practical" are "its claims to manifest itself, not merely in theories, but in volitions and actions" (p. 5).

We speak of intelligent, also of judicious, action and volition. And, while in my sense of "practical" the expression "practical judgement" would be self-contradictory, there are other senses in which it would be neither self-contradictory nor even arresting. Judgement can be about action and can influence action. On either or both counts judgement might be called "practical." If, however, "practical" is to mean "about action," then "theoretical" ought to mean "about judgement." Not even philosophy, much less judgement, is exhaustively divisible into theoretical and practical. Judgement may be chemical, botanical, and so on. Nor with the meaning "influencing action" ought "practical" to be simply opposed to any but the negative adjective "not practical."

For Professor Paton, as for Kant, the will is a faculty of conscious conformity to law. "All things in the world are governed by law." Man "also *acts* in accordance with his *concept* of rules or laws. It is in this that he shows practical intelligence or a rational will. It is by this that his conduct ceases to be animal behaviour and becomes human action" (p. 10). Here, besides action, is judgement, including ethical judgement, about action. Where is volition? Simply because you, besides proceeding in accordance with laws, have concepts of these laws, you might be said to proceed in accordance with your concepts. No doubt Professor Paton, no doubt Kant, means more than this. "To avoid the possibility of misunderstanding it should be noted that man does not show intelligence merely in *recognizing* that his action falls under a rule or is one of a kind. . . . What I am maintaining is that man

wills his action as falling under a rule, and that this is the characteristic of all intelligent willing, and indeed of willing as such" (pp. 11–12, cf. pp. 21–22). But does Professor Paton, and does Kant by his *Ableitung* of actions from laws, mean more than that human action, instead of being merely accompanied, is produced by judgement?

"If we are to understand human action, we must avoid the common mistake of making too sharp a separation between cognition and volition and of supposing that intelligence is present only in cognition. Man is not divided into separate faculties, and it is one and the same man who knows and wills" (p. 12, cf. p. 21). That it is one and the same man who knows and wills we can be hardly too often reminded. But does the reminder not serve rather to qualify, than simply to support, the claim that intelligence is present not only in cognition but also in volition? With the concession that intelligence is present only in cognition the claim that intelligence is present also in volition is reconciled by the plea that cognition is present in volition. Volition is the causation of action by cognition. Practical by its inclusion of action, volition is intelligent by its inclusion of cognition.

Take care of volition, and action will take care of itself. Now, if we are to understand volition, the mistake we must avoid is that of insufficiently distinguishing volition, whether from cognition or from action or from causation of action by cognition. The will is to practical law, not what nature is to laws of nature, but what the intellect is to theoretical law. Laws of nature are not practical but theoretical, and what the will is to practical law not nature but the natural scientist is to laws of nature.

It is because action has been put in the place of volition that to Professor Paton "the idea of 'ought' in the practical sphere seems to have a place similar to that belonging to the idea of 'must' in the theoretical sphere" (p. 16). To me the place of "ought" in the practical sphere seems similar to the place not of "must," but of "ought," in the theoretical sphere; and the place of "must" in the theoretical sphere seems similar to the place not of "ought," but of "must," in the practical sphere. Upholding the objection that " 'must' properly indicates necessity, although it is sometimes used inappropriately in place of 'ought' " (p. 15), I would add that "ought" is sometimes used in place of "must." Intent on avoiding the former impropriety, those fall into the latter who say "If I *ought* to do this, it is always open to me not to do this; but if, for example, heated wax *must* melt, it is not possible for the wax to do anything other than melt" (p. 15). Daring to prefer "I *must* do this," how shall we meet the objection that "it is merely misleading to represent two utterly different things as two species of a common genus called 'necessity' " (pp. 15–16)?

By insisting that they are extremely rather than altogether different. Let them be as different as black and white, two species of a common genus called "tint." Let them be as different as heaven and hell, two species of a common genus called "environment." What is practically necessary is not *that I do this* but *my doing this*. What is theoretically necessary is not *the melting of heated wax* but *that heated wax melts*. Only facts are theoretically, only actions are practically, necessary. But the distinction between theoretical and practical necessity is derivable from that between theoretical and practical obligation. Only judgements are theoretically, only volitions are practically, obligatory. And, while those facts are necessary to judge which the case, those actions are necessary to decide to do which, is obligatory. If it is open to me not to decide as I ought and even to decide as I ought not, it is also open to me not to judge as I ought and even to judge as I ought not.

Opening his lecture by remarking that "we live to-day in an age of unreason," by showing "how widespread is the present depreciation of reason among philosophers," by deploring that "so many of the ablest among modern philosophers have regarded the appeal to reason as an exploded superstition," Professor Paton is giving a familiar answer to a familiar question. Nor, though his answer is no longer fashionable, is his the voice of one crying in the wilderness. Among "believers in what I call intellectual or rational intuition in the sphere of ethics" (p. 26), among those who "uphold the view that reason—considered as an intellectual intuition of the absolute and unconditioned—may be practical in the sense of influencing or determining action" (p. 25), are Professor G. E. Moore and the Provost of Oriel.

Professor Moore has a pluralistic theory of value. The Provost has a pluralistic theory of obligation (Broad, *Five Types of Ethical Theory*, pp. 280–1). What Professor Paton is "trying to get at, if possible, is a single universal principle on which the absolute and unconditioned good may be based, a single and universal principle which may lie behind our judgements about certain kinds of action and also about individual actions" (p. 29).

With what relevance? Is he simply giving good measure? Is he, having answered the question whether reason can be practical, simply turning to the further question what practical reason tells us? Not simply. "Doubts of a weightier kind may be raised about the justification for attributing to these authors the belief that intellectual intuition is concerned with the absolute and unconditioned" (p. 26). But "it is neither unnatural nor inconvenient to use the word 'reason' for the power of intelligence so far as intelligence is concerned with the absolute and unconditioned" (p. 21). Conceding the claims of intelligence, can pluralism concede the claims of reason, to be practical?

Of "two main arguments against the view that there is only one ultimate principle of rightness" (p. 29), the first is not so much an argument against monism as the dismissal of an argument against pluralism. The Provost is quoted as claiming only that "in principle there is no reason to anticipate that every act that is our duty is so for one and the same reason" (p. 30). Promise-keeping, reparation, generosity may be species of a genus and may be duties only because this genus is a duty. The Provost thinks there is no such genus. But he is here denying not that there may be, but only that there must. Professor Paton thinks there is. But he is here affirming not that there must be, but only that there may.

But there *is* reason to anticipate that every act that is our duty is so for one and the same reason. Promise-keeping might be the omission of that of which reparation would be the commission. To such conflict, moreover, no moralist is more alive than the Provost, and no pluralist has handled it so adroitly. Instead of duty for different reasons, *prima facie* duty for different reasons. Pluralism at its best, is this good enough?

Not for Professor Paton. "According to the Provost what we know by reason is only a *prima facie* or conditional duty" (p. 27). But to be a *prima facie* duty is much more than to be *under some though not all conditions* a duty. So much might be said of a punch on the nose. Instead, moreover, of letting deontology borrow from a seemingly solvent utilitarianism, Professor Paton makes utilitarianism borrow from a seemingly bankrupt deontology. In the teeth of the principle of organic unity, he proposes "to assume that there is a close parallel between goodness and rightness, and that the goodness or rightness of a thing or act may vary with the context of the thing or act" (p. 28). Is there not a close parallel between *goodness*

and, not *rightness*, but *prima facie rightness?* Again between not *goodness*, but *goodness on the whole* (not barely *as a whole, Principia Ethica*, pp. 214–5) and *rightness?* Professor Paton himself allows that for Professor Moore "the 'intrinsic' goodness of things . . . is absolute and unconditioned in the fullest sense" (p. 28). For the Provost need *prima facie* duty be anything less?

Instead of duty for different reasons, *prima facie* duty for different reasons. But here is a gap. Duty for only one or for no reason? Insisting that conflict of *prima facie* duties would be not the exception but the rule, Professor Paton powerfully argues that pluralism can stop the gap with nothing better than "groundless opinion" (pp. 32–3).

To the second of the "two main arguments" the sound reply is that indefinability of rightness is incompatible, if with monism, then also with pluralism. But with both or with neither? Professor Paton "finds it difficult to understand how we can be justified in asserting a necessary synthetic connexion between two concepts one of which is a pure concept of which we can give no account whatever" (p. 32, cf. pp. 30–1). What I find difficult to understand is the contention that "to formulate the principle of rightness would be to define it" (p. 30). No doubt a definition may be mistaken for a principle.

Mistaking a definition for a principle, you may mistake pluralism for monism. Now the monism of Professor Paton is the monism of Kant. "If we ask ourselves what principle could possibly be sought and obeyed by a reason entirely independent of desire, the answer must surely be the answer of Immanuel Kant—that it is the principle or Idea of law as such" (p. 34).

Do your duty is Kant's one and only moral law at its worst. At its best I think it is: *Adopt only such maxims* (hypothetical imperatives) *as would, though universally adopted, be susceptible of fruitful execution.* Professor Paton's "brief sketch of Kant's ultimate principles . . . is intended only to suggest that when properly understood they have a much greater plausibility in theory, and a much greater value as guides to action, than is commonly admitted" (p. 40). When properly understood—Kant's one and only moral law is a selective principle. That is why it tells those nothing who expect to be told everything. Reminding us "that for Kant, and in reality, no man is merely rational" (p. 39), Professor Paton luminously insists that "so far from attempting to deduce particular duties from our principle, we must begin with volitions suggested to us by desire, with arbitrarily chosen ends and with subjective maxims; and we must use our principle as a method of selection from among them" (p. 37).

Preoccupied with my own interpretation of the question whether reason can be practical, I am likely, if to see a little of what others may miss, also to miss a lot of what others may see. Many who study Professor Paton's lecture will not read my review. I hope that all who read the review will study the lecture.

REGINALD JACKSON.

A Contribution to the Theory of the Living Organism. By W. E. AGAR, F.R.S. (Melbourne University Press in association with Oxford University Press. 1943. Pp. 207. Price 12s. 6d.)

Biology is in the peculiar position that the scientists who pursue it are themselves included in its subject matter. Consequently they can not only study organisms in the same way that geologists study rocks, but they enjoy an additional source of information from the fact that they *are* organisms. But so far is this fact from being regarded as an advantage and a matter for congratulation that the whole trend of the development of the science has

been, and still is, in the direction of ignoring it, and strenuous efforts are made to avoid the use of information derived from the fact that biologists are themselves organisms.

The aim of Professor Agar's book is to reverse this trend. He wishes to make use of this additional source of information and to apply concepts derived from it not only to the interpretation of animal behaviour but even to such processes as animal development.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first three are devoted to expounding the main thesis in detail, the thesis namely, "that all living organisms are subjects; that all but the simplest organisms (and possibly even these also) are organizations or nexus of subjects; that the characteristic activity of a subject is the act of perception; and that perception is the establishment by the subject of its causal relation with its external world" (p. 7). In developing this theme the author makes use of the organic philosophy contained in Whitehead's three later works: *Science and the Modern World*, *Process and Reality* and *Adventures of Ideas*. No reference is made to Whitehead's three earlier works, devoted to the philosophy of nature, which are perhaps more important for natural science and contain much that is of interest to biology. In Chapter II, which deals with the unity of the organism, the author seems to lay much stress on the synthesis of an organism out of its parts. He states that the source of the unity of a complex organism "lies in a property of its parts, which at present may merely be stated as the potentiality of entering into relations with other parts to form a whole" (p. 36). This seems to say no more than that the parts form a unity because they have a potentiality to do so. We should expect a student of Whitehead to seek for an explanation of this unity in an *interdependence* of the parts. The transplantation and other experiments quoted by the author do not show that the parts are independent of each other, only that they are not dependent in all cases on the *particular* parts they happen to be in physiological relation with as a consequence of normal development.

The remaining three chapters of the book are devoted to applying the main thesis to animal behaviour, embryonic development and evolution. In these chapters (especially the first two) the author offers many new examples of the kind of data which seem to resist an explanation in purely physical terms and to invite one in the language of psychology. The author is aware that: "The propriety of introducing their subjective experience into the interpretation of the activities of all living organisms is of course denied by many biologists" (p. 9). In another place he says: "To ascribe perception, and therefore final causation and purpose, not only to all independent living organisms but also to embryonic and tissue cells, is to lay oneself open to the charge of confusing science with philosophy" (p. 21). He discusses some of the objections that have been raised against the kind of procedure he urges, and some are not difficult to dispose of. But are these the important ones? Professor Agar devotes little space to the critical question of how such psychological hypotheses are to be tested. In human beings, where communication by language is possible, the testing of such hypotheses is difficult enough, but in the lower animals it seems hopeless. Moreover, there is the further question of whether psychological theories have, or can have, the kind of logical structure which renders them capable of that continuous development and detailed application over widening fields which is characteristic of physical theories. In this connexion Professor Agar certainly makes very modest claims for his point of view. He says: "It must be admitted at the outset that any attempt to interpret the process of embryonic development as a long train of instinctive action—or rather, of many trains of instinctive actions by relatively inde-

pendent agents, the self-differentiating parts—cannot be applied in detail. . . . Any attempt at detailed application would soon land us in unprofitable speculation" (p. 135). But according to Whitehead there are "two gauges through which every theory must pass." In addition to the broad gauge "which tests its consonance with the general character of our direct experience" there is the narrow gauge where only one question is asked: "Has the doctrine a precise application to a variety of particular circumstances so as to determine the exact phenomena which should then be observed?" He adds: "In the comparative absence of these applications, beauty, generality, or even truth, will not save a doctrine from neglect in scientific thought. With them, it will be absorbed" (*Principle of Relativity*, pp. 3-4). The last chapter, dealing with evolution, is on orthodox selectionist lines, and contains some interesting comments on theories of the Larmarckian type.

Whether this attempt to widen the base of biological theory is destined to share the fate of previous ones of a similar kind or not, one cannot but admire the author's courage in taking an unorthodox line, the evident sincerity of his approach to his task and the clarity with which he treats these very obscure topics. It is always important to remind biologists of the limitations of their "current modes of abstraction" and to confront them with the data which do not fit comfortably into the prevailing theories. The philosophical reader who is interested in biology will find much of value in this book, both in the new experimental results described and in the methodological problems it raises.

J. H. WOODGER.

The Destiny of Western Man. By W. T. STACE. (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1942, Pp. xi + 322. Price $3.00.)

Professor Stace, having wrestled during the past few years with the problem of knowledge, with the nature of the world, and with the principles of morality here turns his attention to the conflict between totalitarian and democratic social orders. His aim is to show on grounds which must be admitted by both sides that the democrat is not merely advocating his own preferences. Similarly, he seeks to show that the totalitarian, if he could for a moment be clear-headed and honest, would have to admit that his whole position is rationally indefensible and, in the long run, one which would fail to satisfy even himself. These aims are not very clearly expressed by the rather pretentious and misleading title under which the work is published. Nevertheless, they are important, and Professor Stace always writes well enough to make his pursuit of them interesting.

Since politics is rooted in ethics, Professor Stace begins his argument with an examination of the notion of goodness itself. "We have to dig," he observes, "down to the roots of the tree of good and evil" (page ix). These roots he finds in human nature. "There are," he argues, "two theories of the origin and nature of morals. . . . The first is the theory of morality as imposed. The second is the theory of morality as immanent" (page 19). Professor Stace's task, a difficult one on any count, is rendered doubly ambitious by his derivation of ethics from empirical psychology only—in other words by his determination to reach an unequivocal judgment about *what ought to be* from a bare description of *what is*.

The good life, on Professor Stace's analysis, is the happy and satisfactory life. To be satisfactory, a life must satisfy human nature as a whole and not merely in part. Human nature for Professor Stace is constituted by the *psychological primacy of reason* (as distinguished from the *epistemic primacy*

of reason which he rejects) over will and desire, and by sympathy. From this he concludes that a life or a society which violates man's integral human nature as at once rational and sympathetic, cannot in the long run be satisfactory.

Sympathy is essential to human nature since without it society would fall asunder into so many mere individuals, and we should thereby be deprived of the happiness which comes from service of and community with others. Reason, therefore, is not hostile to sympathy or even indifferent to it. Reason requires sympathy as its ally in securing the happy and satisfactory life.

In an interesting chapter, Professor Stace gives an account, on humanistic principles, of the infinite value of the individual. This may be derived, he claims, "both from the Christian principle of the primacy of sympathy and the Greek principle of the primacy of reason" (page 141). Man's value to himself is infinite because "this end, the satisfaction of himself, exceeds beyond measure all finite values" (page 133), or, "by infinite value is meant the value which every man, even the purely selfish natural man attributes to himself" (*ibid.*). The extension of this infinite valuation from oneself to others is achieved by the means of sympathy.

This, in bald outline, is Professor Stace's ethics. It seems to me to evade all the really difficult problems and to appear plausible—for the most part—by over simplification. The argument appears to turn on what is meant by satisfactory in this context. He writes: "I mean by a satisfactory life, one which the liver himself intuitively feels to be satisfactory. Whatever may be the proper philosophical analysis of the notion of goodness or satisfactoriness, men do, in actual fact, know whether their lives are satisfactory or not" (page 65).

But what, it may be objected, could we say to a man who does not agree with us as to what sort of life is satisfactory? If his intuitive feeling is unlike my own intuitive feeling, how can we arrive at any rational judgment or impersonal valuation concerning our two sorts of lives? If a man likes to torture other people, on what ground, except our own dislike of torture, can we challenge him? Professor Stace might reply that even the torturer at some time or other would require the sympathy of someone, and were he to do so, his attitude then would morally refute his attitude to his present victim. Does this reply give Professor Stace that rational justification of the humane way of life which he requires? Furthermore, one is entitled to wonder whether Professor Stace wishes "intuition" as to the satisfactory life to be taken seriously, and if so, how he hopes to escape from ethical intuitionism—a form of moral philosophy to which he otherwise appears hostile.

It might also be objected that Professor Stace nowhere establishes any *essential* link between reason and sympathy. He merely shows that they are compatible. A Nazi might admit that he sympathizes selectively but might frankly reject (as indeed he does) a quite general human sympathy. And how could Mr. Stace convince him that he ought to do otherwise?

The concluding half of his book Professor Stace devotes to what he calls ultimate questions. He considers the relation between the state and the individual, analyses the concept of organism applied to society or to social relations, and concludes that the state cannot be anything except a means to the ends of individuals. In a chapter "Plato or Schopenhauer" Professor Stace refutes the view that reason is nothing but an instrument of the will. He rightly shows how greatly reason determines and modifies our ends. Finally, in the chapter "Nietzsche or Christ" he shows how defective, whether as psychology or as ethics, is Nietzsche's account of human nature.

The political conclusions and social aims of this book—which was de-

servedly awarded a $2,500 prize—appear to me more likely to gain the sympathetic agreement of good democrats than either the moral theory as such or the arguments by which the conclusions are attained. A confirmed Nazi, however, would probably remain unembarrassed by either.

R. E. STEDMAN.

Process and Polarity. Woodbridge Lectures delivered at Columbia University, by WILMON HENRY SHELDON. (New York: Columbia University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1944. Pp. xvi + 153. Price, 13s. 6d.)

These lectures, the first of a series in memory of Dean Frederick Woodbridge, make stimulating reading. Professor Sheldon protests against what he holds to be the sterility of contemporary philosophy. At a time of crisis in human affairs it has little to offer. Instead of providing a metaphysic, "a plan of action with respect to the universe at large" (p. 116), so that men might have guidance in choosing their path, those who practise philosophy spend all their time reflecting upon remote epistemological problems and attempting highly technical analyses of the meaning of words. "They are content to treat philosophy as more-or-less of a pleasant game" (p. xi). Mr. Sheldon takes his own philosophy very seriously indeed. He does not say that it is a panacea for our present ills, but he does go so far as to hold that it is the "necessary condition of any panacea that may be forthcoming" (p. xii).

Professor Sheldon protests also against the attitude of the philosophical giants of the past. They cannot be accused of a lack of seriousness, but they did fail to perceive the truth in systems other than their own. In their anxiety to press forward the claims of their own metaphysic they rejected all other metaphysics, and so missed much of the truth. For we shall find the truth, in Professor Sheldon's opinion, if we understand how the various metaphysical systems which have had sufficient vitality to survive to our own day *together* express it. Their opposition is really a polarity within one system. The necessary condition of any panacea of human ills consists in understanding "the polarity of the perennial types of metaphysical system" (p. xii). Polarity is regarded by the author as the most significant characteristic not merely of human thinking, but of nature and of the universe. He sets it down as the fundamental metaphysical notion in place of such other notions as the composite or the organic. He defines it as "a relation between two opposites, each of partly independent status, asymmetrical and productive because of their co-operation, and also just because each has already a being, power and efficiency of its own which enables it to contribute something in the co-operation" (p. 108).

We may consider the polarity of the surviving types of metaphysics. The oldest type of metaphysic, according to Professor Sheldon, is the idealist, the fruit of man's aspiration and of his refusal to be bound by the material and by the body. Professor Sheldon uses the term *idealism* in a wide sense and has in mind apparently spiritual realism rather than epistemological idealism. Within it he includes some of the metaphysical systems of the East as well as idealisms of the West from Plato onwards. It has two forms, the monistic and the pluralist. Its opposite is materialism, which affirms the ultimate reality of matter and protests against the identification of being with thought. Materialism has its feet upon the earth; it views the real as a fixed, mechanistic structure amenable to law. The third type, scholasticism, is a synthesis of idealism and materialism. Its theism implies the supremacy of spirit and yet its stress on law, order and causality keeps it as firmly

grounded as any materialism, and at the same time provides it at least with a show of speculative certainty. It stands above the mind-body dispute around which idealism and materialism turn, and in this respect is similar to the fourth metaphysical type which Sheldon mentions, namely, the process-philosophy. The latter is the name given to the relativist evolutionary metaphysic which rests on modern science, and which is the opposite of scholasticism, having none of its absolutism and finality, but permitting change and the emergence of the genuinely novel. These four Professor Sheldon takes to be the main surviving types of metaphysic. There are also "dwarf" types, such as empiricism and pragmatism, which can be fitted into the main scheme. Cutting completely across it are the "irrational" philosophies, mysticism and scepticism, but *ex hypothesi* such philosophies cannot provide us with the *rational* plan of the universe for which we seek.

A critic might object to the sketchiness and superficiality of the author's exposition of these systems (and indeed the whole book suffers in this way), but the author disarms such criticism at the beginning by affirming that, close, detailed, precise thinking is not his aim. He had taken a broad canvas, and is dealing in broad outlines. It is in respect to the general outline, therefore, rather than the detail, that he is to be criticized. Before attempting such a criticism we must see how he develops his main theme.

Behind these four main types of metaphysic lie the perennial philosophical disputes, (*a*) mind-body, (*b*) one-many, (*c*) order-process. Professor Sheldon thinks we can solve all three disputes if we regard them as involving not sheer but polar opposition. Mind and body are opposites which are also complementary. "Mind . . . in its contemplative phase, entertains wholes which determine their parts or elements; body is a whole whose traits are determined by their parts" (p. 111). They are independents which yet co-operate. The One and the Many he considers in terms of individual self and society, and finds in it the same need for a recognition of independence in co-operation. Lastly, he considers the world of nature, first the inorganic and then the organic, and shows how the old mechanistic theories of a stable, fixed world have failed, how probability has ousted certainty in science, and relativism has ousted absolutism, and how if we take this view we can see that order and process are relative to each other. The order is not that pertaining to fixed structure, for irreversible changes occur and the truly novel emerges. Reality is not a closed circle, but a growing curve or a spiral. This is true also of that part of reality which is man. He also is in process; and the principle of the process is the polarity of the different parts of his nature. In man, as in his world, there is both balance and aspiration, and what happens to him and to his world is understood in terms of the polar opposition between them.

From all this Professor Sheldon draws the following conclusion. "The main attested values for man, so far as at present known, seem to be: a fairly stable order or state (monistic idealism and scholasticism here), individual personality with its private phases, person, family and property (pluralist idealism and scholasticism here), physical health and strength (materialism and scholasticism here), and, finally, levels of being (scholasticism here). These so far as we can see ought to be conserved. . . . Any plan that submerges one of them is wrong. This at once condemns extreme socialism, communism, anarchy, ascecticism . . . class rule" (p. 146).

Thus the panacea of which we are in search turns out at the end (a little surprisingly) to be simply American democracy. If we wish to save ourselves from our present unhappiness we must all adopt the liberal, humane, moderate standards of the good democrat. And no doubt there is much that can be

said in favour of this view. At the same time one notices with a little uneasiness that whilst the door has, as it were, been firmly bolted against all subversive and extreme tendencies, the window has been left open. The author has used the magic phrases "irreversible change" and "process". How would he meet the communist who holds that communism is the next step forward, the next inevitable emergence as the consequence of the strife between contemporary polar opposites? And how would he answer him when he argues further that the new communist emergence will involve not the destruction of order but rather the creation of a better, an improved order, in which, for instance, greater justice will be done to individual personality than is done at present? I feel he would find it difficult to answer on his present position.

Professor Sheldon's sympathies are with what he calls the process philosophy and he accepts its denial of absolute standards. By what standards does he himself then make his final judgments? The mush of contemporary relativism does not permit its adherents to speak either of what is true or of what is good significantly. We have been warned not to ask epistemological questions. Yet one is sorely tempted to ask Professor Sheldon what he means by *truth*? Is a system truer because it is a later emergence of human thought? This is the suggestion of much of this work. But this is not the only view of truth which it contains. On p. 59 a true map is a useful one, enabling us to adjust ourselves to our environment. On p. 62 the true is that which involves no inner contradiction. On p. 74 to ask whether a thing is true is to ask whether it corresponds to the facts. Obviously, it is no good asking which of the types of metaphysics is the most true, for the term *true* has become so vague that it really has very little significance. It is so also with the term *good*. And since it is so how can we judge between democratic and communist values? Or how can we assume that "process" is "progress", that the new emergent is an improvement on the old? One is reminded of the epigram: "We are making progress, said the Gadarene swine."

I might mention a further point of interest. Professor Sheldon, in an illuminating passage, holds that the substance philosophy is not so much a metaphysic as a description, and he "thinks that the natural scientist no more explains nature's ways than does the substantialist" (p. 121). I wonder whether the same thing might not also be said of the process philosophy. Does it at all explain? Does it not describe merely? In other words, *is* it a metaphysic? At one point in his study Professor Sheldon himself seems to suggest a negative answer to this latter question. Final explanations are still to come in some later work. "The present work is concerned only with the world of creatures. Evidence showing that there is no conflict between the notion of an . . . eternal Creator and the notion of an imperfect growing world of creatures, we hope to give elsewhere. And be it remarked in passing, that the relation between God and the world is not here conceived as one of polarity" (p. 135). The present work, then, does not *explain*. (Is that why it does not give the standards we need?) It is not a metaphysic but a very general scientific description. Until we see Professor Sheldon's metaphysic we cannot rightly judge as to whether *Process and Polarity* provides "the necessary condition of a panacea" which it claims to do.

R. I. AARON.

Robin George Collingwood, 1889–1943. Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXIX. 1944. Pp. 24. Price 3s. 6d. net.

It is significant of the brilliance and range of Professor Collingwood's intellectual gifts that it should have been found appropriate for three of his

friends to contribute to this memoir. Mr. R. B. McCallum has given the admirable narrative of his life; Professor T. M. Knox has commented on his philosophical writings; and Mr. I. A. Richmond has written on his work as an archaeologist. In addition there are bibliographies of Professor Collingwood's writings. The impression the accounts leave with us cannot perhaps be better expressed than in words of Mr. McCallum: "To men of learning in general he remains as an example of nearly all the virtues and qualities of a great scholar, of intellectual courage, lucidity of thought, clarity and grace of exposition, thorough mastery of all the relevant data in his particular field, enlightened and liberalized by a wide general knowledge in art, letters, history and science, which few in his age can hope to equal." As Mr. Richmond reminds us, overstrain and ill health told on Collingwood markedly after 1932, and for many it must be a matter for very real regret that he died leaving important tasks unfinished. The speculative thought of our age would have been enriched had he been able to complete the work on *The Principles of History* which he began, and Archaeology by the completion of his *Corpus of Latin Inscriptions in Britain*, each inscription of which was to be illustrated by his own "sensitive and meticulous pen." Mr. Richmond writes that none but Collingwood possessed the genius for this task, and adds that the work will be completed and published under the editorship of Mr. R. P. Wright.

Archaeology and Philosophy are divergent studies for most of us, but it appears that they came together in the mind of Collingwood. Mr. Richmond remarks on Collingwood's exceptional power of analysis, a power we again find most fruitfully employed in his speculative inquiries. He complains of Collingwood's tendency to "drive the evidence hard," and to build conclusions that go beyond the evidence; and he traces this dangerous tendency to Collingwood's belief that to "pose a problem permitted its answer to be predicted." But may this alleged failing not illustrate how the experience acquired by Collingwood in his archaeological studies contributed in his mind to the development of speculative conceptions, to that, for example, of imagination and its relation to impressions and ideas explained in the *Principles of Art*, and to the "Logic of question and answer" which is so fundamental to his metaphysics? Truth or falsity for Collingwood is always truth or falsity of statement, and a statement is intelligent and intelligible only as an answer to a question.

Collingwood described his life work as an attempt to bring about a *rapprochement* between philosophy and history, and it is the changing view of this relationship that governs the development of his philosophic thought. Mr. McCullum points out how this insistence on the importance of historical ideas in philosophy placed a gulf between Collingwood and many of his philosophical colleagues at Oxford who regarded philosophy as a more self-contained activity. His interest in the philosophy of religion and in the fundamental problems of the Christian faith, would tend to widen this gulf. Professor Knox has shown clearly the development of Collingwood's thought on the relation between History and Philosophy, and has pointed out how Collingwood intended to expound in detail his theory of History, as well as to clear up problems of method, and to show how what has hitherto been regarded as philosophy and history might be synthesized in a new study transcending and incorporating both. He considers it a pity that Collingwood was diverted from completing his work on History into writing *The New Leviathan*, which he regards as less original than its predecessors. This may be the case, but many will feel with Mr. McCallum that "the final judgment on this book has not been passed, and that when young men return from the war to think deeply of the perplexities of political problems they . . . will

have to admit that at least one of their elders has done his best to lead them to the inmost penetralia of political obligation."

A comparison between Collingwood and de Burgh may be of interest. In personality they differed strikingly from each other, but for both philosophy included inquiry into the meaning of art, religion, science, and history as forms of mental experience, and the relation between these was defined by endeavouring to determine the place of each in a 'scale' or 'hierarchy' of philosophical forms. But whereas for de Burgh the consummation of the hierarchy is religion, for Collingwood it is philosophy, and consequently there are important differences in the interpretations of these related forms of experience.

G. H. LANGLEY.

William George de Burgh, 1866–1943. By A. E. TAYLOR. Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XXIX. (London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. 24. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

In his opening paragraph Professor Taylor pleads his unfitness for his task, but friends of Professor de Burgh will agree that he has conveyed a very true impression of his personality, and of the relation between his life and work. He shows that it was by no accident that de Burgh eventually found his life work at Reading, where his entire energy was devoted to the "making of a University College into a University—an independent centre of an education in *living well*." This recognition of his vocation meant that he was committed to throwing all his energies into two tasks: that of planning and building for the future University of Reading, and that of making the teaching of philosophy there as rich and vital an inspiration in the lives of successive generations of students as a man may. Professor Taylor adds: "It is a striking testimony to de Burgh's 'dynamic' quality that, by the general admission of colleagues and pupils, he made a very real success of both."

Passing to de Burgh's contribution to the thought of his age, Professor Taylor rightly draws attention to his early work, *The Legacy of the Ancient World*, in which de Burgh endeavoured to show how Hebrew religion, Greek philosophy and science, and Roman law and genius for administration, came together in the course of European history, how they have by repercussion modified one another, and just what each of them has contributed to the general outlook of the Christianized European on the life of the world. Of this work the late Professor Burnet remarked when it was published in 1924: "It is exactly the book I have wanted to see written for many years." Before his death de Burgh revised the text of the Legacy, and added several most valuable appendices giving his views on certain important speculative problems that arose for him out of the historical survey, and we look forward to the publication of the new edition. In the opinion of Professor Taylor, de Burgh's second book, *Towards a Religious Philosophy* (1937) makes his philosophical position most clear. After indicating the central character of this, Professor Taylor writes: "I do not suppose that all his readers will share what I confess is my own conviction, that his beliefs are essentially sound, but I am at least sure that even the least satisfied of them will have gained from his pages an invaluable intellectual and moral discipline." For de Burgh a religious philosophy recognizes the specific experience of the religious life, and the theologies which arise from self-conscious reflection on these experiences, as an integral part of the empirical *data* for its metaphysical construction. He points out that it is characteristic of religion that it recognizes *revelation* as an independent source of knowledge, side by side with the experimental exploration of the manifold

of sense, the demands of the moral conscience, and the intuitions of the creative artist. Revealed religion is an independent source of momentous knowledge, which cannot come to us in any other way. But while making this claim de Burgh repeatedly insists that the contents of spiritual revelation must be capable of being harmonized, first, among themselves, and secondly, with the rest of our knowledge. "In all genuine religion there is faith in the sense that the believer begins by accepting as true something which he could not have arrived at for himself from premises derived from pre-existing secular knowledge. But if faith is belief in what is true, it must in the end be possible to see that religious truth is in harmony, not in conflict, with what we can find out for ourselves." The point which de Burgh makes with special clarity is that the whole position is bound up with the admission that truth in the widest sense of the word is not confined to logical propositional form; there is a wider sense of the word in which we can speak of truth, not only of religious insight, but of sense perception, or of moral divination, or of aesthetic intuition. This theme is developed much more fully in the uncompleted manuscript (*The Life of Reason*) to which Professor Taylor refers, and in which de Burgh put down what he had learned from his long experience as a teacher and as a thinker. With Professor Taylor I hope it will soon be possible to publish this work. Of de Burgh's Gifford Lectures (*From Morality to Religion*, 1938), Professor Taylor writes: "The fundamental thought is that while morality and religion are concerned with the regulation of human practice, in morality practice is regulated simply with a view to better practice, in religion it is regulated with a further view to an end which lies beyond practice, in *theoria*." "In mere morality the end to be attained by doing right or doing good is simply the fuller doing of it; in religion the end is the *knowledge* of God, and religion is ultimately so intimately connected with the regulation of action because the right doing is in itself an indispensable means to the vision." This duality of aspects, according as practice is considered for its own sake or for the sake of *theoria*, according to de Burgh gives rise within morality itself to the contrast between two divergent types of conduct and of ethical theory, neither of which can be reduced to the other. There is the type in which the central thought is the imperative obligatoriness of duty; and that according to which all responsible action is action *sub ratione boni*; and in much of the work de Burgh is concerned with defending the exclusiveness of these types. Although unable to satisfy himself that they are as divergent as de Burgh maintains (and in this I agree with Professor Taylor), he points out that any defender of the Greek and Scholastic tradition from which de Burgh has departed, must be prepared to weigh de Burgh's objections very seriously, and to find an answer to them.

All who knew Professor de Burgh will be grateful to Professor Taylor for this appreciation of a teacher and thinker, "The motive spring of whose whole character was an ardent reaching forth by desire for 'the things above,' and for that very reason was a man greatly beloved."

G. H. LANGLEY.

One Kind of Religion. By HELEN WODEHOUSE, M.A., D.Phil. (Cambridge University Press. 1944. Pp. 208. Price, 8s. 6d. net.)

In this book, whose value is out of all proportion to its small size, Dr. Wodehouse has restated an interpretation of religion in terms of the great school of British Idealism, of which the most distinguished expression in the last generation was Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures on "The Principle of Individuality and Value," and its sequel (1911–12). It is indeed much more a

revival than a restatement, for Dr. Wodehouse has put much fine thinking of her own into this very living book: but I think she would rather be regarded as offering a contemporary re-presentation of old and well accredited ways of thought than as developing an original approach of her own, for she emphasizes throughout that a long and august tradition both of speculation and religious experience supports, or at least tallies with, her findings.

The book is directed in the main to correct "a contemporary emphasis in theological thinking" which lays (in the author's opinion) undue stress upon the historical character of Christianity and presents Theism in too narrowly "personal" terms. She is, however, not so much arguing against such an interpretation as pleading that even those who cannot accept it may claim to know a religion which inspires and sustains, and which finds no unnatural expression in Christian language. She has much more sympathy for the Christian theist than for the materialist or naturalist for whom religion is to be explained away in anthropological or psychological terms as fundamentally an illusory experience. It is not within the scope of her purpose to contravert such a position explicitly (it has perhaps been done often enough)—but within the limits of its argument this short book is concerned with most of the central problems of religious philosophy, the objectivity of religious experience, the category of Personality as applied to God, Divine Omnipresence, Grace and Redemption, the nature of Prayer, and the significance of Incarnation. On every one of them Dr. Wodehouse has much that is wise to say, and says it with a freshness and sensitivity of expression that make her pages quite exceptionally stimulating.

I do not think, for instance, that there can be anywhere an exposition, so persuasive in so short a compass, of the meaning of the "concrete universal," which logicians of a very different school profess to find so unintelligible. It is, of course, a vital contention for this type of objective Idealism that Goodness must be just such a concrete reality, indeed the supreme example, a "universal" embodying itself integratingly in all that has value. "God" is indeed described by Dr. Wodehouse as "the concrete universal of all that is good," and because goodness is to be found, in all its innumerable forms and manifestations, pervading and penetrating all the reaches of experience, "God" thus conceived cannot but be acknowledged as a Power by which man's fragmentary glimpses of and efforts towards goodness are sustained, upheld and reinforced. The experiences of worship and personal redemption are real in essence on this interpretation, and there is no need for "God" as a distinct unitary Being standing in a "personal" or quasi-personal relation to the human individual, though Dr. Wodehouse does not deny that for those who find themselves unable to reject such a theism the symphony of religion may be or should be even richer in meaning.

I do not think that any fair-minded Theist would question in the main the legitimacy of this argument, nor the aptness of the evidence that supports it. He would, however, probably be unwilling to accept Dr. Wodehouse's appraisement of the category of Personality, the central issue upon which everything else depends. Admittedly Personality is not an *adequate* category in terms of which to interpret deity; it is not a terminal but a directional concept. Still, it is to the theist, an issue of primary importance whether the category is transcended or superseded in the sense in which, for instance, Life in an animal is transcended and superseded by Mind in man, or in the sense in which the individual man is transcended and superseded (only perhaps he is not truly) by the corporate integration of the community. To the Theist it does make an immense difference that the cosmic orchestra is thought of as having not only a "Leader," in the sense of one of the chief players within

it, but also a Conductor who is also the composer of the music. It is really a related criticism that suggests that perhaps a little less than justice is here done to that obstinate quality of reciprocity and mutual confrontation that characterizes both the experience of ethical transaction and that of religious communion, especially of the less mystical types.

An Anglican reviewer of this book dismissed it rather cavalierly on the ground that this kind of religion will not help souls in tribulation. A foolish attitude, as though the author's purpose was not exposition and interpretation, not homily and edification. You might as well complain that a work on railway economics does not enlighten the stranded traveller as to how to get from Hastings to Heckmondwike. But in point of fact few books on religion are written with more warmth of feeling and delicacy of sympathy, and I only omit quotation because the choice between so many marked passages and lines is too invidious. And for some of the less familiar of Dr. Wodehouse's own quotations from other writers, those readers will be especially grateful who refuse to admit any ground for the ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy.

J. W HARVEY.

Philosophical Commentaries; generally called the Commonplace Book: George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne. An *editio diplomatica transcribed and edited with introduction and notes.* By A. A. LUCE, M.C., D.D., Litt.D. (London: T. Nelson & Sons. 1944. Pp. xlii + 485. Price 3½ guineas.)

Dr. Luce is our foremost Berkeleian, one of the few who is convinced of the truth of Berkeley's philosophy without any major reservations, the best of the many who have so appreciably raised the standard of Berkeley scholarship, and even of Berkeley philology in the present century.

In this second respect the present book vastly increases the great debt we already owe him. The two notebooks bound in one (in the British Museum) which Fraser called Berkeley's *Commonplace Book* are indispensable for all who are minded to make a really sedulous study of Berkeley, but are accessible, in print, only in forms too imprecise for this purpose. Fraser's transcription was pioneer work, and the later edition published separately by G. A. Johnston contains far too many mistakes as Aaron and Luce himself proved when Johnston's book came out, Aaron in *Mind*, October 1931 and April 1932, Luce in *Hermathena*, 1932. (The translations of Hecht and others are obviously not a substitute.) It was best to attempt to produce a *perfect* editio diplomatica with each page correctly transcribed, *verso* as well as *recto*, complete with erasures, marginal signs and all else. And promptness was desirable since the manuscript shows signs of deterioration.

A glance at the page of Berkeley's manuscript whose replica is the frontispiece to the present book shows sufficiently that it wasn't easy to make a flawless transcription; and no reviewer can pronounce the transcription flawless without himself comparing it with the original, item by item. I have not myself seen the original, but am confident that Dr. Luce's work has been done once and for all. Since the method involves the transcription of Berkeley's slips of the pen, irregular spellings, etc., and since Dr. Luce, very properly, does not profess to call attention to all of these in his notes, it is impossible in all instances to say whether what looks like a misprint really is one. It looks to me as if "sould" for "should" in item 206 was a misprint, and, more importantly, "they" for "the" in item 616. But it needn't be so.

So we have the *textus receptus* at last, and the importance of the contents is allowed everywhere. The edition is limited to four hundred numbered copies

and is expensive, but no good academic philosophical library can afford to be without it. Hence four hundred copies is rather a small edition, and, if there is no further printing, private owners have the duty of either presenting or bequeathing their copies for the more general good.

Dr. Luce provides about 150 pages of notes on the entries. These of necessity cover a wide range, including, e.g. the physics, optics, and mathematics of Berkeley's time. Here Dr. Luce, remarkable as the range and accuracy of his own knowledge of such matters is, had the good sense, *ex abundantia cautelae*, to consult various of his colleagues in Trinity College, Dublin (as well as some others) on special points. The notes therefore are a triumph for Trinity College, Dublin, as well as for Dr. Luce personally. In range, precision and economy of expression and of convenience in cross-reference it would be very difficult indeed to better them. The matter-of-fact in them is quite fascinating, though, of course, not very well adapted to general reading. Some of them may be a little too kind to Berkeley, but that is scarcely a defect when the purpose is expository.

The chief points in Dr. Luce's introduction may be set forth briefly as follows. Dr. Luce proves (what Lorenz was the first to suggest) that the two notebooks in the British Museum have been bound in the wrong order. After careful argument, much of it strong, he assigns June or July 1707 to August or September 1708 as the date of composition. He further argues that "our document" was not the preliminary to composition but intermediate, dealing with what had already been largely committed to paper. It was, he thinks 'a critical commentary upon his own early work on immaterialism now lost—a work which began with a study of time, included a study of vision and rested the case against matter in the main upon the argument that the sensible as secondary qualities were "in the mind".' This he holds to be very probable conjecture, though not a proven certainty. So far as I can see, the most that could be proved in this way would be that Berkeley in 1707–1708 had planned the main divisions and subdivisions of a book-or-books-to-be and had written or drafted some of these, i.e. had done more than merely sketch them. It is clear, of course, that some of the entries, e.g. 491, 513 and 543, *were* admonitions for future insertion; but that is quite consistent with Dr. Luce's hypothesis.

The hypothesis itself is part of a general view not seriously disputable after Dr. Luce's labours, that Berkeley so far from having been a rather callow youngster in a hurry when he published the *Principles* was in fact a scholar of very high attainments who had put his philosophy to very severe and very painstaking tests, and, young as he was, had subjected himself in a wholly unusual degree to the very exacting discipline which his project demanded. His was ripe work though he produced the most famous part of it early.

Hence also the new title *Philosophical Commentaries*. Fraser's name for the notebooks, viz. Berkeley's *Commonplace Book* is misleading either in the modern sense of scrapbook or in the traditional sense of rhetorical commonplaces, i.e. general headings for the orderly treatment of any subject On the other hand Luce's title of "commentaries" suggesting as it does explanations and afterthoughts upon a finished composition seems itself to be dubiously accurate, even if Luce's hypothesis be granted him without reservation. Many of the entries are only jottings, and some of them, as Luce vigorously affirms, express views, e.g. about selfhood and about knowledge being confined to ideas which Berkeley argued himself out of. The neutral word "Notebooks," tame as it is, might be more accurate than "Commentaries."

JOHN LAIRD.

PHILOSOPHY

Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford. By DR. D. A. CALLUS, O.P. From the Proceedings of the British Academy, (London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. 55. Price 7s. net.)

It has often been said that Oxford, which was so prominent in Aristotelian studies in the fourteenth century, played an unimportant part in thirteenth-century Aristotelian learning. Dr. Callus's prolonged and careful study of numerous manuscripts at Oxford and elsewhere has led him to a different opinion; and in this paper he brings together far more information about the early study of Aristotle in England, and particularly at Oxford, than any earlier writer has done. His main conclusions are that Aristotelianism was introduced to Oxford between 1206 and 1209, i.e. almost at the same time that it reached Paris, that by the middle of the thirteenth century the study of Aristotle at Oxford had covered in range the whole *corpus Aristotelicum vetustius*, and its technique had reached a high degree of perfection, and that while the influence of Aristotle was widest and deepest in the Faculty of Arts, it also (in spite of strong opposition) made itself felt in the Faculty of Theology, among the secular as well as among the Dominican and Franciscan masters.

Dr. Callus distinguishes clearly three stages in the history of Aristotelian studies in the thirteenth century. In the first, which lasted till about 1240, the method followed was that of writing treatises after the manner of Avicenna, in which paraphrase of Aristotle's works was blended with the writer's own reflections. Typical examples of this method are the treatises of Dominic Gundissalinus and of John Blund on the Soul. In the second period, which lasted till about 1275, the treatise was gradually succeeded by the gloss or commentary, *expositio per modum commenti*, with its new technique, borrowed mainly from Averroes, and with an elaborate system of division and analysis of the text commented upon. In the third period, the divisions and analysis of the text were gradually reduced to a bare minimum, until they gave way almost entirely to the *Quaestiones* on the *litera* (*expositio per modum quaestionis*), discussions on problems arising out of the text, or connected in any way with it. Furthermore, in the second half of the century a fourth type of work began to appear, the *Abbreviationes*, *Extracta*, or *Summae* which were intended as elementary introductions to Aristotelian doctrine.

Dr. Callus's paper gives us interesting characterizations of the works of a number of comparatively little-known writers, such as John Blund, Adam of Buckfield, and Simon of Faversham; it contains many useful discussions of the authorship or date of anonymous works; and in general it adds very greatly to our knowledge of this period in the transmission of Aristotle's thought to the west and of its modification in the process.

W. D. Ross.

Greek Foundations of Traditional Logic. By ERNST KAPP. (Columbia University Press. 1942. Pp. vii + 95. Price $1.50.)

The five chapters of this book are the published form of five lectures given by Professor Kapp to the Departments of Philosophy and of Greek and Latin of Columbia University. In the first the author describes the social context in which logic originated and the function it was invented to fulfil by Aristotle. But "traditional logic" is, in certain respects, very different from the subject conceived by the founders of logic. In the four remaining lectures, therefore, Professor Kapp compares the chief doctrines of traditional logic with their Greek originals. He shows that the differences are mainly due to a different

conception of the nature and function of logic. The clarification of these distinctions is important. For, because of their different attitude to the subject, many of the puzzles that worried later logicians did not even occur to the Greeks. Later writers have sometimes found it almost miraculous that Aristotle never confused logic with grammar and psychology as have many of his successors. But, grammar had long been part of the Greek school curriculum, while, as Aristotle so often proudly asserts, Logic was an entirely new subject. Nor was it invented to describe the introspections of an individual thinker. So its founder was never tempted to treat the principles of logic as psychological laws. Nor were they merely abstract formulae or symbolic conventions. They were the rules, elicited in the course of debate with an opponent, of avoiding self-contradiction and inducing that opponent to contradict himself. In the *Topics* (which Professor Kapp shows to be earlier than the *Analytics*) the syllogistic game is presented as a mental gymnastic for sharpening the wits by a peculiar kind of conversation. For, as its name *logos* indicates, "logic was originally conceived as a science of what happens, not when we are thinking for ourselves, but when we are talking and trying to convince one another" (p. 19). Syllogistic rules were not, therefore, obtained by induction from empirical observation of how people naturally argue, like the connection of longevity with absence of bile. The subject did not spontaneously think, but he was forced by question and answer to think, according to certain patterns. Though the process was allied to that by which he ordinarily reached conclusions, he would not normally so think, any more than he would "naturally" play chess without being taught. Thus, the very artificiality of the procedure must have helped to make clear its formal character. From the later discussions of the perfect syllogism and demonstration in the *Analytics* it is clear that Aristotle has become interested in the general character of these structures for its own sake and is a formal logician as well as a teacher of the technique of scoring in debate.

It is interesting to find that its founders did not ask "What is Logic?" or "What is logic about; is it about facts, ideas, symbols, etc.?," but, rather, "How is this game of argument played and what are its rules?" No doubt many later muddles of traditional logic might have been avoided if this orginal approach and practice had been remembered. But there is still uneasiness. If logic is a game, it is a more important game than chess, but why? The original springs are refreshing but not even they quite quench our thirst.

On induction Professor Kapp is brief. He shows that Aristotle recognized problematic induction as well as the intuiting of undemonstrable principles from their instances which is now called intuitive induction (p. 78). The contemporary state of scientific knowledge probably prevented the development of this subject, even by a logical genius.

This is a work of scholarly importance, but it is also excellent and lively reading. It can be recommended to all who are interested in the foundations of our culture.

M. MACDONALD.

Philosophy. By C. E. M. JOAD. (Published by Hodder & Stoughton, Ltd., for The English Universities Press, Ltd. 1944. Pp. vi and 228. Price 3s. net.)

Professor Joad's latest book is small, but it is tightly packed with philosophical meat. Written with accustomed clarity, conciseness and occasional flashes of dry and defiant satire, it gives us Professor Joad at his best. To summarize the *philosophia perennis*, give a clear and readable account of

the main philosophical problems, draw an attractive picture of the Greek spirit, and state the pros and cons of modern scientific materialism, all in little over 225 pages, is no small feat.

Professor Joad admits early in the book that his own preferences have led him to concentrate upon certain aspects of philosophy only and to leave others untouched. Thus, there is only very partial treatment of Kant and practically none of Hegel. Nor, except for a passing reference to Whitehead, is there any mention of living philosophers.

Beginning with an admission of the difficulty of the study and some advice to the student, Professor Joad proceeds to summarize the subject-matter. The problems of perception, the opposition between the realist and idealist viewpoints, ethics, and the modern denial of ethics, politics and the transition from philosophy to religion, are dealt with. But it is in the chapter on Plato that we have Professor Joad at his most persuasive. His love of the Platonic philosophy shines through his somewhat bald and factual style, so that we get a glimpse of Plato the poet, the author of the parable of the Cave and the myth of Er, the supreme devotee of that life of the spirit for which *τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθά*, things beautiful and good—what modern thought inadequately expresses by the term "value"—are the ultimate ends of human desire. For Professor Joad also they are ultimate ends and he deals faithfully, in his chapter on ethics, with the doctrine that man's moral convictions have no more status than a "complex" or an "inhibition," being merely rationalizations of unconscious aversions or desires. How, asks Professor Joad, if that is the case, did the idea of morality arise? How have the exponents of a naturalistic ethic got hold of a moral standard by which to say "This is non-moral"? The whole of an organism is not contained in its roots. The end to which it is developing is also part of its being, and if we want to understand it, we must take it at its most highly developed and organized stage. There is more in the oak than in the acorn, more in the fully-developed human body than in the embryo.

The central theme of the book is the supremacy of value. For man, the end and meaning of the universe is truth, goodness and beauty. Man's capacity for these is his *esse*, that which distinguishes him from the other animals. Happiness is also an end, but Professor Joad, rejecting Hedonism, gives it an inferior status to the other three. Values are not subjective in the sense of being the creation of our own minds. They exist independently of our apprehension of them because they are the expression of "a mind other than our own, which knows and enjoys these values." This points to the existence of God, the Creator of the material universe and of a spiritual order, the source of the values for which men live. And when in the last chapter Professor Joad writes of values as "taking the initiative in establishing relations with us," he seems to have moved definitely away from Aristotle's conception of an unmoved Mover of all things and to be enunciating, in carefully non-committal language, the Christian doctrine of God.

In his chapter on politics, Professor Joad examines the rightful ends of political action and those which states do in fact pursue. Here he is at his most pungent, and this chapter may be heartily recommended to the smug missionary, whether in the political or ecclesiastical sphere. It also contains a telling statement of the ease for individual freedom to follow the good life in all its diversity, as it exists for greatly diverse personalities. Professor Joad admits the difficulties which result from the practical application of this principle. It is an essentially Christian principle, deeply rooted in Catholic theology, with its insistence upon human free-will and moral responsibility, and it has been given political expression only in the Liberal State, a fact

to which Catholic thinkers appear remarkably blind. (The last is the reviewer's comment, not a statement of Professor Joad's.)

The true function of the state is so to order the common life that the individual may direct his energies to the contemplation of truth, goodness and beauty, and to giving these expression in all forms of activity, such as art, science and personal conduct. Few will cavil at this contention. It might, however, be suggested that in even the most perfect society conceivable, where each citizen is secured from the cradle to the grave from poverty and ill-health, the things for which Professor Joad and most thinking people of goodwill contend are likely to be the preoccupation only of a few. What, then, is the good life for the many? We know the answer Plato gave. *οἱ πολλοί* must labour at *τέχνη*, the things which are means and not ends, in order that *οἱ ἄριστοι* may give themselves to the contemplation of the eternal values which the many are incapable of appreciating. This is the deeply cherished, semi-conscious conviction of aristocracy in every age and any genuine acquaintance with the strata of modern society forces the query upon the most ardent democrat who retains any standards of thought and conduct: "What if it were after all true, and the masses, content to be drugged by cinema and jazz, dismissing intellectual activity as 'highbrow' and moral effort as 'pie,' are incapable of appreciating the things of eternal worth?" I will not attempt to answer the question, only to suggest that if philosophers were periodically to leave their academic shades, as Plato's Guardians abandoned the contemplative life in order to revisit their comrades chained in the Cave, and to mingle with the masses in factory, office and field, they might gain a deeper insight into the difficulties which beset the practical application of the principles for which they rightly contend. I. M. HUBBARD.

An Introduction to Philosophy. By W. A. SINCLAIR. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1944. Pp. 152. Price 5s. net.)

In this small book of 151 pages, Dr. Sinclair sets out to provide a practical exercise in philosophical thinking for the ordinary reader and at the same time to state his own theory of perception and knowledge. His chief aim is to make the reader question the common assumptions about perception and thought and, having jolted him out of his unthinking complacency, to lead him by further reading down the path of philosophical enquiry.

The book is devoted mainly to an examination of the representationist theory of perception in Descartes and Locke and to a statement of Dr. Sinclair's own alternative to this theory. His grounds for rejecting it are a little unexpected, for they appear to be no more than a conviction that Berkeley cannot possibly be right. Berkeley's conclusions are, he holds, inescapable, given the assumptions of Descartes and Locke. He does not put forward any reasoned argument to prove Berkeley wrong, apparently regarding this as self-evident. He rejects the "three-term" theory of perception—the assumption of a knowing mind, an object to be known and ideas or sensibilia carrying on an ill-defined existence between the two—and, as a substitute puts forward what might be termed a "selectivist" theory of perception. According to this, our sense organs select from the multiplicity of etheric waves by which they are continuously bombarded and the differences in the perception of individuals are due to differences in individual sense organs. Thus, the organs of men and some organs of some animals are attuned to a different wave-length and therefore make a different selection. Dogs can hear sounds that we cannot. But the waves are always "there," whether or not they are registered by any sense-organs, just as Broadcasting House is always "there," whether or not we switch on our radios.

So much may, so far as the reviewer knows, be accepted as scientific fact. But does it really affect the point at issue? Dr. Sinclair contends that we do really know reality at first hand and that the secondary qualities, to which we in part owe the richness and complexity of our experience, are not the illusions that Locke held them to be. But is this compatible with a definition of reality as a succession of waves? Waves in what? Waves of what? Surely a good deal of translation has to be done by the senses or the mind or both before these waves can be turned into our perceptions of an aeroplane, a Bach chorale or a bowl of Christmas roses. And is Dr. Sinclair's position after all so very different from Berkeley's? Berkeley also held that we know reality at first hand, that our perceptions are the result of direct contact between ourselves and reality. But because he gave reality the name of God, this fact has been overlooked and he has been called a subjective idealist.

Against the "correspondence" theory of truth, Dr. Sinclair puts forward a "coherence" theory, reminiscent of Bradley's doctrine of reality. Bradley held that a system of thought has reality in so far as it is comprehensive and internally harmonious, that is, in so far as it explains a multiplicity of facts without self-contradiction. In much the same way, it would seem, Dr. Sinclair contends that that theory or system of thought is true which is simple and harmonious and at the same time takes account of all the relevant facts, and also—here Dr. Sinclair seems to be enunciating pragmatism—has useful results for practical living.

With regard to the mental processes involved in what we call acquiring knowledge, Dr. Sinclair holds, and here no one is likely to disagree with him, that just as the senses select the waves they register, so the mind selects and groups its facts according to its needs. All our knowledge is the result of this process. A scientist selects and groups the facts that are relative to the problems on which he is engaged. He is liable, as is everyone else, to ignore even some of the facts which are relevant, if he doesn't like them, because they militate against some conclusion he desires. Dr. Sinclair does not mention that we are also liable to ignore the facts we do like and to over-emphasize those we don't in our anxiety lest our judgment be clouded by personal desires.

Dr. Sinclair suggests that knowledge of our own unconscious mental processes is needed in the search for truth and appears to look to the psycho-analysts to supply this. But psycho-analysts deal, not so much with facts as with interpretations of facts, and it is precisely in interpretation that errors in selecting and grouping are most likely to arise. We interpret according to our assumptions and everybody does not accept the assumptions of 19th century scientific materialism on which psycho-analysts base their theories, and would therefore, in matters concerning the deeps of the human soul, unhesitatingly dismiss the estimable followers of Professor Freud as blind leaders of the blind. Again, if we accept the coherence theory, truth is subjective, not objective, and the roots and origins of our beliefs are irrelevant so long as the beliefs themselves are simple, comprehensive and convenient for practical life.

Although many readers will disagree with Dr. Sinclair upon many points, this is a most valuable book and wholly successful in its aim of arousing thought and stimulating enquiry. The digressions, of which there are several, are admirable. Dr. Sinclair's remarks upon literary craftsmanship would, I imagine, be acceptable to any capable and experienced writer. His list of books recommended to the student for further study is comprehensive, although some will wish that he had included Aristotle's *Ethics* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*." It is noteworthy that he rejects the "philosophia

perennis"—"wrong-headed" is his word for it. His presentation of the various aspects of philosophy, his estimate of their value and his rejection of all narrow, partial, or prejudiced views on religion, theology and psychology show a breadth of outlook and a finely balanced judgment. Altogether, this book should succeed admirably in an admirable object—to make people think philosophically and to set them on the path that leads to an ever-deepening knowledge of truth. I. M. HUBBARD.

Books also received:

R. HACKFORTH. *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* (A Translation of the *Philebus* with Introduction and Commentary). Cambridge University Press. 1945. Pp. viii + 144. 10s. 6d. net.

CHARLES L. STEVENSON. *Ethics and Language*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. xii + 338. English price, 26s. 6d. net.

LEONARDO OLSCHKI. *Machiavelli the Scientist*. Berkeley, California: The Gillick Press. 1945. Pp. 58. No price quoted.

THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT SAMUEL, P.C., G.C.B., G.B.E. *Memoirs*. London: The Cresset Press. 1945. Pp. viii + 304. 15s.

WM. EBENSTEIN. *The Pure Theory of Law*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press. 1945. Pp. xii + 210. $2.50.

HELENE WEISS. *Kausalitat und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles*. Basel: Verlag Haus zum Falken. 1942. Pp. 196. Price, 10 frs. Swiss.

SIR JAMES JEANS, O.M., F.R.S. *The Astronomical Horizon* (The Philip Maurice Deneke Lecture, 1944). Oxford University Press. Pp. 24. 2s. 6d. net.

R. I. AARON. *Our Knowledge of Universals* (Annual Philosophical Lecture, Henriette Hertz Trust, Brit. Academy, 1945) (*Proceedings of the British Academy*, Vol. XXXI). London: Humphrey Milford. Pp. 28. 2s. 6d. net.

RUPERT C. LODGE. *Philosophy of Business*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1945. Pp. xiv + 432. English price, 30s.

WILLIAM F. QUILLIAN, JR. *The Moral Theory of Evolutionary Naturalism*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. xiv + 154. English price, 20s. net.

VERNON J. BOURKE. *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom*. Milwaukee, Wis.: The Bruce Publishing Company. 1945. Pp. xii + 324. $3.

A. PHILIP MCMAHON. *Preface to an American Philosophy of Art*. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press. Agent: Cambridge University Press, London. 1945. Pp. vi + 194. English price, 15s.

C. C. J. WEBB, M.A., D.Litt., Hon. LL.D., Hon. D.Theol., Hon. D.D. *Religious Experience* (A Public Lecture delivered in the Hall of Oriel College on Friday, May 19, 1944). With a Foreword by L. W. Grensted, D.D. Printed, together with a Bibliography of his Published Writings, and presented to him by some of his Friends and Pupils on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday, June 25, 1945. London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1945. Pp. 70. 7s. 6d. net.

ZERA S. FINK. *The Classical Republicans* (An Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought in Seventeenth Century England). Northwestern University Studies in the Humanities, Number Nine. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University. 1945. Pp. xi + 225. $4.

A. D. LINDSAY. *The Good and the Clever*. Founders' Memorial Lecture, Girton College, 1945. Cambridge University Press. 1945. Pp. 28. 1s. 6d. net.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Dear Sir,

In his article on *Finality in Theology* Professor Laird quotes some passages from one of my books in which I maintain that for a believing Christian his faith gives him the clue to the understanding of everything in heaven and earth. He then expounds these passages as though they were meant to assert a claim to a type of exclusiveness which I have never held, which indeed I have spent a good deal of time trying to persuade certain of my fellow Christians to abandon.

It may be that I have laid myself open to this misunderstanding by my own failure to express myself clearly. I deliberately used the word "clue" because a clue needs interpretation if its implications are to be grasped and understood, and it is my belief that the implications of the revelation of God in Christ are to be grasped by just such collaborative intercourse between theology and philosophy as Professor Laird advocates at the end of his article.

If you have the space, I should like your readers to have the following passages to take together with those quoted by Professor Laird in your July issue. They come from p. 34 of my *Doctrine of the Trinity*.

"The only possible conclusion to be drawn from the actual revelation which God has given is that while for His own good purposes He enables some people and not others to grasp that revelation, what He demands of all men as the condition of their justification is the sincerity which is true to what it honestly believes and will not pretend to believe what it does not."

"The actual result of God's refusal to make His revelation so clear and self-evident that no one can fail to grasp it is that our minds are kept on the stretch, our wits sharpened, our tastes trained, our characters strengthened. No one, for example, can study the history of Christian doctrine without discovering how greatly our insight into its significance has grown through the interchange of thought between theology and philosophy, between Christian and pagan, between orthodox and heretic. . . . The reason why a particular revelation is given to one man and not to another is that the interplay of their differing minds is for the mutual benefit of both, and it is this mutual benefit that of His love for both God wills with impartial justice to bestow upon them."

Yours faithfully,

Leonard Hodgson.

Christ Church, Oxford.
August 29, 1945.

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

Dear Sir,

When I read Mr. Toms' admirable notice of my text-book *Does It Follow?* I concluded that the little thing was even more popular than I had imagined it to be. On a second reading I found the notice instructive in a way that Mr. Toms did not, I think, intend; and since there will be hundreds of readers of Philosophy eager to read this important work I am bound to point out how his interpretation differs from mine. He says that I am dubious of theoretical exposition. In a handbook chiefly intended for subscribers to the *Daily Babblegraph* and for listeners to the election addresses of the Hon. Samuel Slumkey it was not necessary to define the Forms of Thought. But his principal complaint is that I allow errors that lack objective test. For (*a*) I suppose that observation precedes reasoning, and therefore I admit a subjective criterion. But I plainly suggest, in all that I say about selection and analysis that observation includes judgment. And (*b*) I refer to subjective and debatable principles as tests of objectivity. In the sentence to which the critic refers I am discussing hypotheses such as that the weather can be altered by spiritual electricity, and I remark tritely that hypotheses that introduce unknown forms of agency are superfluous. Upon this Mr. Toms saddles me with a premise of his own invention "that supernatural hypotheses are pure speculation" ignoring half my sentence "If results can be accounted for in other ways." This precaution no more

makes me a positivist than a prelapsarian. He proceeds to show that two examples given in Part II presume sheer imputation on my part. A correspondent in one of the magic journals surmises that some letters are more lucky than others on the ground that he has noticed that football teams beginning with B are seldom beaten. Mr. Toms tells me that to those of a different way of thinking this would not contain error, that it asserts sufficiency of observation, and that I am making a horrible blunder in saying that the observation is unscientific. But when people in the *Monthly Diviner* and elsewhere suppose connections of this sort, between initial letters and victories in the League, we are entitled to suspect errors of very simple enumeration, and can fairly think that the record is insufficient. Examples of this type, in fact, raise interesting discussions about sufficiency of evidence.

Yours faithfully,

MEYRICK H. CARRÉ.

• 26, VICARS' CLOSE, WELLS.

INSTITUTE NOTES

At the Annual Meeting of the Institute, held on July 17th, the President, Viscount Samuel, gave a short address, of which the following, with some omissions and expansions, is a report.

THE INSTITUTE IN THE WAR PERIOD

During the six years of war the national life has suffered in a multitude of ways: there have been many restrictions, many discomforts, many deficiencies. The physical blackout has been strict; but happily there has been in Britain no blackout of culture. Institutions, for example, such as our own, although their activities have been reduced, have not been obliged to suspend them altogether.

The mental life of the nation has, indeed, suffered a real injury through the excessive restrictions imposed upon the supply of paper for books; continuous protests, from the most authoritative quarters, were of little avail. On the other hand, there was much appreciation of the action of the Government in making available a substantial sum of money, entrusted to the British Academy for distribution, to help to keep alive the Journals and other publications of Learned Societies, which otherwise might have fallen victims to the combined effects of falling memberships and rising costs.

By grants from this source our Journal, PHILOSOPHY, has been helped to continue publication. Though reduced in size, and appearing only three times a year instead of quarterly, I think you will agree that in quality it has maintained its standard. For that we have to thank, as always, the discrimination, energy and care of its editor, Mr. Hooper.

The Institute has arranged lectures from time to time, in spite of the great difficulties and damages that often hindered the holding of any kind of meeting in London during the war years. For next autumn and winter a full programme has been prepared. As with similar societies, we have suffered a serious fall in membership—from 1,400 to less than 1,100. It is of vital importance that that loss should be made good, and we must appeal to all our present members to play the part of recruiting officers. Next year will be the twenty-first since the establishment of the Institute, and it is intended to celebrate the anniversary by a special campaign to strengthen its membership, and thereby to enlarge its influence and promote more fully the purposes of the Founders.

During the year British Philosophy has been honoured by the conferment of the Order of Merit upon Professor A. N. Whitehead, by general recognition the most eminent living philosopher in the English-speaking world, and a worthy successor in the ranks of the Order to F. H. Bradley and Samuel Alexander.

We miss from this meeting with much sorrow one of our most regular and devoted attendants—the late Dr. Garvie; and another of our members, Professor Susan Stebbing, for many years active on the Executive Committee. Sir Arthur Eddington and Professor de Burgh are other leading figures whose deaths we record with deep regret.

A WAR OF IDEAS

In the early months of the war—which now seem so far away—the Institute organized a series of eight Addresses, delivered in the Hall of the Royal Empire

Society, under the title "The Deeper Causes of the War, and Its Issues." Delivered by some of our best-known members they attracted large audiences; and, published as a book, they may have helped to give guidance to public opinion in realizing how vital were the issues at stake in the colossal struggle that was then opening.

Of the innumerable wars that have blotted with blood the annals of human history, some have been dynastic; others have been merely struggles for enlarged frontiers, colonies or trade. The principle expressed by Voltaire was accepted as the normal view—"Such is the condition of human affairs that to wish for the greatness of one's own country is to wish for the harm of its neighbours." But some have been essentially Wars of Ideas. The Crusades: the religious wars that followed the Reformation; the American and other Wars of Independence, and those that arose from the French Revolution, were clearly in that category. Marxism also might easily have resulted in international, as well as civil conflicts. The Trotsky policy in Russia, and the participation of Italian and German forces, and of an International Communist Brigade, in the Spanish Civil War, might have proved to be precursors. Unquestionably the European and world cataclysm through which we have just passed was in essence a War of Ideas—the outcome of Fascist and Nazi philosophy. We might have said with Burke, "It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war."

If those principles had taken hold in this country, in the British Dominions and in the United States, they would surely have triumphed. That they did not do so is because other, and opposite, ideas were already deeply rooted, through their political and religious histories, among the English-speaking peoples. From the practice of liberty had been evolved the theory of democracy. Knowledge and study of the Bible had implanted an ethical system which inculcated and sustained justice, mercy, goodwill and national righteousness. It left no room for the opposite doctrine that became dominant in Germany, Italy and Japan.

THE MORAL

The main conflict is over, and the moment has come when we may try to discern the lessons.

The first—plain to the eyes of all men in the fate of the three States which had embraced aggressive militarism—confirms, more strikingly perhaps than any previous experience, the truth of the conclusion which Arnold Toynbee drew from his great survey of all the civilizations in all the ages—"Militarism is suicidal." It has been said that "he who makes many afraid of him has himself many to fear." The conqueror of one day, if he is a conqueror and nothing more, is sure to be the conquered of the next.

Second: the outcome being what it has been, the war gives no reinforcement to pessimism. The very occurrence of two world wars, causing suffering and destruction beyond all measure, together with the many failures of statesmanship during the period between them, might indeed well have justified the gloomiest views on the present position and future prospects of mankind if the war had ended in a victory for Nazism. But since the opposite has happened the conclusion to be drawn is the opposite. The nations forming the vast majority of the human race rose in resistance. They banded themselves together in an alliance, which remained absolutely solid under the heaviest blows and through the gravest perils. They showed that, even in warfare, democracies can beat dictatorships. At the cost of immense sacrifices, their armies, navies and air-forces, established an absolute supremacy. And at the end they have instantly set themselves to create a lasting organization that shall

endeavour to prevent the recurrence of such catastrophes. These things are indeed a striking vindication of the virtue that resides in the spirit of Man.

Third: the experience has taught us the enormous power of political and ethical ideas. And it has brought home to us the need to be on our guard against wrong ones. We cannot accept the authority of intellectuals at its face value. Herder, Fichte, Treitschke, Gobineau, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Nietzsche, Spengler, were also among the intellectuals. Hence the responsibility of the merchants of ideas, that is the philosophers, to test and to choose, and to bring to the market-place only the sound ones. So the conclusion, for us here in Great Britain, is that one task that lies ready to our hand, and one duty by no means unimportant, is to maintain the numbers and the strength, the activities and the influence, of our own Institute of Philosophy.

OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE

The British Institute of Philosophy exists to bring leading exponents of various branches of Philosophy into direct contact with the general public, with the purpose of satisfying a need felt by many men and women in every walk of life for greater clearness and comprehensiveness of vision in human affairs.

With this broad educational purpose in view, the Institute—

(1) Provides at suitable times in the day and evening courses of lectures by leading exponents in the more important subjects coming within the scope of Philosophy. All branches of Philosophy are represented —Ethics and Social Philosophy, the Philosophy of Law and of the Sciences, of the Fine Arts and of Religion, as well as Logic and Metaphysics and Psychology.
These lectures are free to members.

(2) Issues a quarterly philosophical journal (free to members).

(3) Proposes to form a philosophical Library.

(4) Gives guidance and assistance to individuals in their philosophical reading.

(5) Encourages research in Philosophy.

There are Local Centres of the Institute at Bangor, Cardiff, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Durham, and Sheffield.

Further information and forms of application for membership may be had on application to the Director of Studies at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1.

[Suggested]

FORM OF BEQUEST

I bequeath to THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY the sum of ..... free of duty, to be applied to the purposes of that Institute, and I declare that the receipt of the Honorary Secretary, or other proper officer for the time being of that Institute, shall be sufficient discharge for the same.