UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_148894

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

THE BACKGROUND TO CURRENT AFFAIRS

THE BACKGROUND TO CURRENT AFFAIRS

BY

D. W. CROWLEY
M.A.(N.Z.), Ph.D.(Lond.)

LONDON
MACMILLAN & CO LTD
NEW YORK · ST MARTIN'S PRESS
1958

Copyright © D. W. Crowley, 1958

MACMILLAN AND COMPANY LIMITED
London Bombay Calcutta Madras Melbourne

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA LIMITED
Toronto

ST MARTIN'S PRESS INC
New York

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN

PREFACE

THIS book has been written in the belief that the most helpful approach to an understanding of current affairs is to try to study them in perspective. It is an attempt to identify and explain the main historical forces operating in the contemporary world and to clarify the assumptions behind the conflicting policies of the powers — in other words, to stand back a little from the trees in order to see something of the shape of the woods.

The main problem has been lack of space. There are a number of omissions that may seem strange to some readers. The writer can only plead that the decision about what to include and what to omit was often a difficult one. It was made largely on grounds of what seemed most important to explain; even so the main difficulty has been to keep within manageable length without making the treatment too general to justify the argument presented.

I am indebted to many persons, of whom I can name only a few, for assistance and encouragement. Professor S. G. Raybould, Director of the Department of Adult Education and Extra-Mural Studies, the University of Leeds, has as always been most helpful. I am also indebted to members of the clerical staff of the Department for assistance with typing. I owe particular gratitude to Captain E. D. Dougherty, of the Royal Army Educational Corps, for reading and commenting upon some of the chapters in typescript, and for general encouragement. I must also thank the publishers and printers for their special pains in making possible the speedy publication that a book of this kind requires. Above all, I am immensely indebted to my wife for her patience and forbearance.

D. W. C.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

PREFACE v

INTRODUCTION

I. BRITAIN AND THE POST-WAR WORLD 1

Dynamic forces in the post-war world: nationalism and internationalism — anti-colonialism — the rise of the 'super-powers': the USSR and the United States — the effect of these developments upon Britain's position — Britain's economic situation

INTERNATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

II. THE COMMONWEALTH — A FAMILY OF NATIONS 18

Evolution — present structure — points of strain — the need for greater centralisation — the difficulties

III. EMERGENT COMMONWEALTH — I. BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY 40

Principles and problems of political development — the tendency to federation — social and economic development — the pressing need for capital

IV. EMERGENT COMMONWEALTH — II. SOME LEADING BRITISH COLONIES 61

Ghana — Nigeria — Uganda — Malaya and Singapore — the West Indies — Malta

V. BLACK AND WHITE: THE RACIAL PROBLEM 77

Apartheid — Partnership — Kenya — racial policies of other powers

VI. THE UNITED NATIONS 108

Dangers of the balance-of-power system — the League of Nations and the United Nations — associated international organisations — GATT — prospects for world government

CHAPTER PAGE

VII. The World Divided — I. Communism 126

Marxism — Soviet foreign policy — the satellite system — Soviet communism since the death of Stalin

VIII. The World Divided — II. NATO 149

The West's response to Soviet policy — a reversion to the balance-of-power system — the United States and NATO — structure — Spain, Scandinavia, Yugoslavia — achievements of NATO — present problems

IX. No Man's Land — Germany 170

Partition — rearmament — the Saar — the suggestion of neutralisation — Austria — the problem of reunification — the Germans today

X. Supranationalism — The European Movement 200

The 'European movement' — early disappointment — the Schuman Plan — EDC — Britain and Europe — Euratom — the Common Market and Free Trade Area

NATIONALISM IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

XI. The New Giant in the Far East: Communist China and her Neighbours 220

The Chinese Revolution — Formosa — China and the USSR — Tibet — Japan — Korea

XII. Sub-Continent Divided: India, Pakistan, Ceylon 250

India's neutralism, Pakistan and the West — the aftermath of partition — instability in Pakistan — 'Pakhtoonistan' — the rivers — Kashmir — the enclaves — Nepal — India's development problems — Ceylon

XIII. Power-Vacuum: South East Asia 273

South East Asia and the West — the Indo-China crisis — the Geneva settlement — SEATO — the Bandung Conference — Siam — the Philippines — Indonesia — Burma — Indo-China since Geneva — the Colombo Plan

CHAPTER PAGE

XIV. THE MIDDLE EAST — I. THE ARABS AND THE WEST 295

The Arab world — Israel — the Canal Zone base — the Baghdad Pact — Nasser — the Aswan Dam — the Suez incident — the United States and the Arabs

XV. THE MIDDLE EAST — II. PERIPHERY 328

Cyprus — the Sudan — the Arabian Protectorates — Turkey — Greece — Persia — French North Africa

THE FUTURE

XVI. THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 346

Implications of the atom and hydrogen bombs — 'massive' or 'graduated' deterrence — the disarmament discussions — should nuclear weapons be discarded? — Britain and the future

INDEX 359

LIST OF MAPS

PAGE

The New Shape of Geo-Politics 155

The European Alignment 162

The Far East 236

India and her Neighbours 259

The Middle East 303

Israel's Disputed Frontiers 308

Chapter One

BRITAIN AND THE POST-WAR WORLD

In the middle of this twentieth century the world is passing through a curious, disjointed phase in its history. Moreover, when every allowance is made for the natural inclination always to regard one's own age as a time of crisis, it also seems almost certainly a crucial phase. Four revolutionary developments, completely changing the whole character of world affairs, have made themselves apparent since the end of the recent war; the reason why the new phase seems disjointed is the fact that, while three of these are closely inter-related, the fourth appears to be totally opposed to them. The four developments are these: the outmoding of nationalism as the main dynamic of the more advanced countries, resulting in a pressing need to reorganise their activities upon an international scale; the emergence of the two 'super-powers' — the United States and the Soviet Union — that now dominate the world to a degree quite unprecedented; the attainment — for good or for evil — of the ability to release nuclear power; and the emergence of nationalism among the large group of more backward countries where previously it has not been an important force.

A brief glance at these developments shows the first three to be closely inter-linked. It is the stage now reached in their technological progress that has made nationalism obsolescent in the more advanced countries. This new stage is marked partly by the harnessing of atomic power; and the obsolescence of nationalism has been demonstrated most clearly by the dominance of the two super-powers. Just as, about five hundred years ago, at the beginning of modern times, the spread of trade and, following this, the evolution of industry outmoded the petty principalities of medieval Europe and necessitated the creation of nation-states, so the development of new technological de-

vices — in both the industrial and military spheres — is demanding a further advance in political scale. Since the Western European nations, previously the most active in world affairs, are too small to take full advantage of the new inventions, they are being obliged to reorganise themselves into a single continental state. The realisation of the pressing need for this advance, which would otherwise have had to be left to the imagination, has been notably accelerated by the emergence upon the world scene of the United States and the Soviet Union: being already organised on a continental scale, both increasingly demonstrate the requirements of the new era. Only these two giants among the nations can hope to equip themselves with the full armaments of modern warfare; and their industrial advance threatens to outstrip the rest of the world.

While the newly-acquired control of atomic energy is also linked with these two developments, through its repercussions on both military and industrial techniques, it also presses the need for international organisation upon an even larger, more complete and more revolutionary scale. It has made the prospect of major war so suicidal that the case for effective world government, urgent even in 1918, has now become almost desperate.

On the other hand, the new emergence of nationalism among the technologically backward countries appears to be in direct conflict with these other three major developments. While part of the world is increasingly coming to look upon nationalism as outdated, and moving inevitably towards internationalism, the rest is only now entering upon the phase of nationalism, and insisting upon the sacredness of national sovereignty. The fact is that the two groupings of the world's peoples are out of step. Looking back from our present vantage-point, we in the West can see that nationalism was an inevitable stage of human political evolution, leading inevitably to internationalism in some form. But, while the advanced countries are preparing to move out of this stage, the backward peoples are only now moving into it.

Yet, as both groups live within the one world, the two tendencies come into contact at many points. Their most important inter-connection arises out of the clash that has developed between the two great super-powers. A clash was more or less

inevitable between two such giants standing head and shoulders above the rest of the world; in the event, their hostility towards each other has been made extremely intense by the direct conflict of their ideologies. It so happens, however, that the contest between them has now reached a stage of checkmate; and the newly emergent nations are numerous enough for their future adherence to one bloc or the other to decide the issue. Thus world affairs have increasingly become a contest between the two blocs for the goodwill of the uncommitted new nations — a contest that may well determine the course of the next phase of world history. Moreover, since their new political consciousness leads the retarded peoples to greatly envy the higher living standards of the rest of the world and demand assistance from the more advanced countries — as a right and not a charity — this contest is becoming more and more a competition in providing economic aid. It demands the utmost vision and diplomatic skill; and a great advantage will be held by those donor countries which themselves achieve the utmost industrial advance. Only countries of high productivity will be able to furnish aid on the scale necessary.

Another point at which the two out-of-phase worlds meet is on the issue of world organisation. Deeply conscious of their weakness and extremely jealous of their newly-won sovereignty, the new nations see in world government what appears to be the best means of obtaining security for themselves in a world of much stronger powers. (To state this fact is not to deny that their conception of the implications of world government — which of course demands a sacrifice of national sovereignty — is often most unrealistic.) Scrupulous respect for their sovereignty is therefore a necessary condition of winning their goodwill; and at the moment they judge this respect largely from willingness to adhere to the procedures of the United Nations Charter. As far as possible, therefore, the West must attempt to so frame its policy towards the United Nations as to reconcile the true demands of internationalism with the sensitivity of this new nationalism. It would seem that the most effective way of doing this would be to set a notable example of readiness to surrender sovereignty coupled with an active disinterested policy within the United Nations.

Since this book is written in English for British people, it will


be concerned mainly with Britain's position in this new world situation. It will consist largely of an examination of the consequences for Britain of these dramatic developments in international relations. Even at first glance it is obvious that Britain is particularly affected by both the main tendencies in the post-war world — the outmoding of old-scale nationalism and the emergence of so many new nations. In both cases the effect has been to greatly diminish her relative stature as a world power, and thus to make necessary profound changes in her traditional policies.

In the first place, Britain is the foremost among those nations which have become outmoded in scale by the emergence of the two super-powers. It is not, as one must add immediately for fear of wounding tender British sensibilities, a question of Britain having declined in strength, so much as of the world situation having altered to her disadvantage. To a large extent this has been due to the industrialisation of the Soviet Union. While both Russia and the United States have long been countries with a much larger population than Britain or any other Western European nation, Russia was until recently industrially backward, and therefore had little weight in the world, whereas the United States was isolationist, and content to allow Britain the leading part in world affairs. Now, however, Russia has emerged as a giant industrial and military power, and in so doing has forced the United States out of her isolation.

As the following diagram and statistics show, in population, industrial power and military strength Britain is obviously no longer in the front rank of world powers. Moreover both the United States and the USSR are advancing much faster industrially, so that Britain's relative inferiority is increasing. Furthermore, since the greater the industrial output of a nation, the higher the proportion of its resources that can be spared for military purposes, the burden of armaments Britain can afford to bear is even smaller relatively than these diagrams would suggest. Yet this burden has to be spread over a world-wide range of commitments much more extensive than is borne by any other comparable power. On top of this the equipment required for modern warfare has advanced to such a stage of complexity and expense that it can be afforded only by a super-power; militarily as well as industrially, therefore, the Western

European nations among which Britain is numbered have become obsolete.

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION, 1940–55



Statistics Relating to the above Diagram
(millions)

	United States	*United Kingdom*	*Soviet Union*
Population, 1955	165	52	215
Coal output, 1940 (tons)	398	224	166
Coal output, 1955	448	227	390
Coal output, 1960 (planned)			593
Steel output, 1940 (tons)	40	13	18
Steel output, 1955	106	19	45
Steel output, 1960 (planned)			68
Electric power capacity, (billion kWh), 1955	623	51	170
Electric power, 1960 (planned)			320

It surely follows, therefore, that Britain can no longer 'go it alone'. If she is to have any real weight and influence in the modern world, it can only be in association with other powers. Either she must merge her identity to an unprecedented extent in some larger group of nations — Europe and the Common-

wealth come to mind as the obvious possibilities — or ensure diplomatic support for her interests. In this latter case there can be no doubt that the main support must come from the United States. Much of this book will be occupied with the elaboration of this situation in detail.

On the other hand, the rise of nationalism in so many areas where it did not exist previously as a dynamic force has also particularly affected Britain. Moreover it is a development that must profoundly affect our policy in attempting to find diplomatic support, for our potential allies are deeply concerned with their relations with the new nations.

By historical accident, Britain more than any other nation built up for herself in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a world-wide chain of interests, on which depended a great deal of her former strength and influence. The rise of nationalism in former colonies and areas formerly content to accept British control has therefore struck deeply at her position. It is significant to reflect how small were the forces with which only twenty years ago Britain held secure her long chain of territories and bases: the fact was that she was able to do so mainly through the lack of political consciousness among the mass of the people, and with the support of local elements who welcomed her presence because of their personal trading or similar interests. All this has changed completely; and to lament or try to ignore its passing is as fruitless as to deplore the new dominance of the world by the two great super-states. The new conditions are facts that must be accepted. The awakening of the backward peoples, an inevitable development, has made it impossible for Britain to continue to secure her position by force, firstly because this would be impracticable however strong the forces employed, secondly because in fact the forces available are very limited. It has also made it impossible for minority elements to give us effective support. Moreover the interest of our allies in cultivating the friendship of the new nations also makes a policy of repression impossible diplomatically.

Though we can plead in all sincerity that it would serve the new nations best to continue in economic and military co-operation with us, and in fact we are succeeding with this plea in many cases, in many others the new nations find it psychologically very difficult to take such a mature view. So deeply

engrained is the memory of colonialism that they regard any offer of co-operation we may make with the deepest suspicion. In any case we have no alternative but to attempt to substitute a relationship of willing co-operation between equals for that of superior and inferior; and this requires a completely new outlook on our part. It also involves some irritation when the new nations refuse to take a realistic view — as they are bound to do frequently, for they are adolescents among the nations. But, since there is no cure for adolescence but to grow out of it, this irresponsibility must be borne patiently. The nations with which we are generally succeeding are mostly our former colonies; but with those countries where we imposed our influence in a less direct form the transition has so far been more difficult.

A further factor in the weakening of Britain's position as a world power has been her post-war economic difficulties. Military strength and therefore diplomatic weight depend largely upon economic strength: the greater the economic strength of a country, the greater the military forces it can maintain; and, conversely, if a nation is dependent economically upon the assistance of other nations — as Britain depended in the post-war period upon the United States — its diplomatic freedom of action is naturally restricted. It will be useful, therefore, to complete this introductory chapter with a brief examination of Britain's post-war economic position.

Britain's Economic Situation

A moment's reflection will show that the two dominant tendencies in the post-war world that have just been discussed — the trend towards internationalism and the emergence of so many new nations — were not really products of the war. Though the war greatly accelerated their development and made them the outstanding features of world affairs since 1945, they were in any case tendencies that had been developing for a very long time and were bound to reach their present importance sooner or later. In fact they represent a further stage in the natural evolution of world history. The same general comment is true concerning the economic difficulties that Britain has been experiencing.

Though this has been obscured in the past by the long lead

Britain has enjoyed, more or less by chance, over other countries in industrial development, the fact is that the British economy has always been very vulnerable. Possessing very little in the way of raw materials, apart from coal, which is now in short supply, Britain was by no means a suitable country to embark upon the course she chose of intense industrialisation. The expense of having to import raw materials adds very considerably to her costs of production. Nevertheless Britain has specialised in manufacture to the point where about half the food required by her population has to be imported in exchange for manufactured goods, making her, of all the world's major countries, the nation most dependent upon international trade. In the past her virtual monopoly in industrial skills made this a successful policy and Britain therefore enjoyed a high standard of living and became a wealthy country, wielding the power made possible by her wealth. (This was despite the fact that the distribution of that wealth among her people was by no means equitable.) Sooner or later, however, other countries were bound to copy her example and industrialise themselves, and when this occurred the effects of her natural handicaps were bound to make themselves felt. In effect it is largely this eventuality that is the source of our present difficulties. While it was immensely accelerated by the war, this development was already beginning to make itself apparent long before 1939.

The essence of our problem in Britain is the difficulty of producing and selling enough exports to pay for the imports we require. Quite a number of factors have contributed to this difficulty, most of them arising from the industrial advance of the rest of the world. One of the most important of these factors, for example, has been a pronounced change to our disadvantage in what the economists call the 'terms of trade'. The 'terms of trade' are in effect the ratio between the value of the goods we sell and the goods we buy. In the past, since we enjoyed almost a monopoly within world markets for manufactured goods, the prices we obtained for them were relatively high; whereas food and raw materials — our imports — were cheap, being in ample supply. Thus the terms of trade were previously favourable to us. For some years now, however, the spread of manufacture to other countries has been resulting in a relative decline in the price level for manufactured goods,

while the increasing pressure of demand upon raw materials and food has tended to increase their prices relatively. This trend has been especially marked since the war and its effect has been to worsen our position greatly, to the extent that we now have to sell about half as great a volume of exports again above the level of our pre-war trade to obtain the same quantity of imports. Some of the effect of this change might have been offset if we had been in a position to continue our exports of coal, our only raw material, which was an important item in our pre-war export trade. But the considerable expansion of industrial production in Britain since the war has brought about a marked increase in the demand for power, with the result that our coal supplies are now merely sufficient for our own needs. (The output of coal is about the same as before the war, though produced by a much smaller labour force.)

Another factor in the worsening of Britain's trading position has been the loss of our 'invisible exports'. This term is used by economists with reference to the earnings of shipping and insurance companies and the payments of interest on British overseas investments, which serve as a substitute for exports and were previously important items in our balance of payments. In effect this meant that foreign countries had to send us more goods as imports than we supplied to them as exports, in order to obtain the sterling with which to make the necessary payments. Before 1914 this item accounted for something like a fifth of our incoming credits. During the first World War, however, we sold many of our overseas investments to buy war supplies; in the inter-war period there was a steady, if moderate, drain upon them which alone enabled us to balance our payments; and much of those remaining were disposed of during the second World War. This means that now, in order to obtain the same quantity of imports, we have to sell a still further additional quantity of exports to compensate for the lack of these incoming payments. Most of the heritage of our 'golden age', when the London loan market furnished capital for all corners of the world, has now gone. Immediately after 1945 the shortage of shipping due to wartime losses, and the consequent decline in shipping earnings, also caused a serious gap on the credit side of our trading accounts; but our shipping tonnage is now returning to normal.

Another important factor has been the fall in the relative value of gold. The United States buys virtually all the world's gold output (and then buries most of it underground again in the vaults at Fort Knox), and a large part of the supply comes to it from South Africa, the world's largest gold producer. Before the war this trade produced about a fifth of the dollars coming into the Sterling Area funds. Since 1939, however, the United States has kept the price of gold frozen, whereas prices of other commodities have on an average risen about threefold, with the result that gold now plays a much less valuable part in Sterling Area trade. (To pleas that it should 'unfreeze' the price, the United States replies that this would have a serious inflationary effect.) After the pound was devalued in 1949, South Africa decided to conduct half her trade directly with the United States, allowing half to continue to pass through the sterling channels: thus South Africa is now only half within the Sterling Area.

One of the main causes of our embarassment, the dollar gap, which we share with many other countries, is due primarily to the remarkable recent advances in productivity in the United States. America's long lead over the rest of the world has produced an unbalance in world trade: there are so many dollar goods that the rest of the world wants, but so little that Americans want in exchange. Though war damage and the obsolescence of much of our machinery, owing to our inability to replace it during the war, have played some part in out backwardness, the war is by no means the main cause. Much more important has been the effect of the continental character of the United States, resulting in free competition over a much wider area, and thus a higher general level of efficiency, and also promoting the organisation of production on a much larger scale. Many of the new techniques now being used in the United States, including much that can be described as 'automation', will not be applicable in this country because, catering as they do for a much smaller market, the appropriate industries are not large enough to bear the immense capital cost and give full employment to the equipment. Nevertheless all the experts who have visited the United States since the war seem agreed that we could do a great deal to raise our productivity towards American levels — certainly enough to solve our immediate prob-

lems — if both workers and management in this country were able to acquire the American team spirit. All are agreed that, as a general rule — there are many exceptions — there is not nearly as much drive on the part of management in Britain as in the United States, and not nearly as much interest in productivity on the part of the workers.

Yet another factor in Britain's economic difficulties has been the tendency to inflation. To some extent this has been a world-wide post-war phenomenon; it has also been part cause, part effect of Britain's difficulties. Inflation occurs when demand expands faster than the supply of consumer goods. In addition to the increased prices in world markets for raw materials, there have been many other inflationary elements in the British economy: the need for the re-equipment of industry, for the replacement of war damage, the housing shortage, the crushing armaments burden — all diverting resources from the production of consumer goods without lessening the volume of purchasing power in circulation. The full employment policy, based upon an original deliberate expansion of credit that has since gone further than was advisable, also contributed inflationary pressure. (The volume of employment is determined largely by the amount of current investment, which is determined in turn by the volume of borrowing.) The root difficulty is that we have been trying to do too much at once with the resources — particularly the labour force — available. Shortage of labour for the work initiated has resulted in competition between employers with offers of wage increases, and has thus tended to produce an inflationary spiral.

For our overseas trading position, the dangers are twofold. Firstly, there is the likelihood of our prices rising too high to enable us to compete successfully in world markets — a position that has not been reached yet except perhaps in one or two industries, but is now threatened. Secondly, there is the effect of inflation in drawing into the easier home market goods that should, in the national interest, earn foreign currency as exports. It was this tendency that was reaching dangerous proportions in 1955–57, to be met by hire-purchase restrictions and the contraction of demand by means of a contraction of bank credit, and eventually the raising of bank-rate to the unusually high level of 7 per cent, to further discourage borrowing and

thus force a contraction of consumption and 'over-employment'. Ironically, if we devote too large a proportion of our productive resources to the modernisation of our factories and other productive equipment, we shall seriously reduce the present volume of our exports and speedily become insolvent. But if we do not devote enough to modernisation, we may do well enough at the moment, but become bankrupt and impoverished in the long run. A delicate balance must be preserved.

A cruel irony arises too from the fact that the problem of our foreign trade is really a dual problem — or rather a problem within a problem. In addition to achieving a balance in our trade with the rest of the world as a whole — i.e. achieving a general balance of payments with all countries, including our own colonies — we also, as bankers of the Sterling Area, have to ensure that there is no excessive drain of dollars from the Sterling Area gold and dollar reserves. (In international trade, gold is the equivalent of dollars.) We find difficulty in achieving both balances; and price movements that tend to solve one problem tend to worsen the other. This arises from the fact that most of our trade with the United States and the colonies is tri-lateral — i.e., the colonies (which contribute two-thirds of the dollar earnings to the Sterling Area funds) sell raw materials to the United States, Britain uses the dollars thus obtained to buy imports from the United States, and in return the colonies buy British manufactures. Thus a rise in raw material prices, such as occurred during the Korean War owing to American stock-piling, immediately eases our dollar problem. But, since our own purchases from the colonies are almost entirely food and raw materials, no sooner do we congratulate ourselves on this good fortune than we find we are rapidly approaching a balance-of-payments crisis!

The Sterling Area comprises Britain, the dependencies, the Dominions excluding Canada — with South Africa in partial membership — and some Middle East countries. If a dominion indulges in heavy spending, it may seriously deplete the Area's dollar reserves: the members therefore co-operate in restraining dollar imports, though co-operation has not always been as close as was desirable. Deficits in trade with Europe, which is conducted through the European Payments Union —

virtually a European international bank — also have to be met in gold; and in recent years Britain has had to meet a continuous series of large deficits. The difficulty of earning dollars has not been made any easier by United States tariff policy. On top of the difficulty in keeping our dollar dealings in balance, the British government has to bear in mind the necessity of meeting the repayments that periodically fall due on the dollar loan granted by the United States in 1947, after the abrupt termination of lend-lease. Despite the devaluation of 1949 and our continued efforts to increase our dollar earnings since then, we have still not been able to build up our gold and dollar reserves to a level giving us reasonable security against possible emergencies.

At present dollar purchases are artificially restrained by means of exchange control, the exchange rate of the pound sterling with the dollar being pegged at the devaluation level of 2.80, and applications for supplies of dollar currencies being subjected to Treasury decision. Before the war sterling, being the currency most readily interchangeable because of the widespread character and unmatched volume of British trade, was in great demand as an international medium of exchange — a circumstance that brought many benefits to us; but the present restrictions upon its use have cost it much of its attraction in the eyes of foreigners, with the result that it is in danger of losing its position as the leading international currency. One of the aims of our policy, therefore, is to restore the 'convertibility' of sterling, in order to regain this position. But before we can revert to 'convertibility', which would mean the lifting of exchange control so that the sterling-dollar rate would be free to find its own level, our dollar trade must be such that there will be no danger of a continued drain on our gold and dollar reserves. A marked decline in the reserves would result in a serious fall in the value of sterling, causing widespread unemployment and leading towards bankruptcy. Though 'convertibility' seemed in sight in 1955, and was widely anticipated, since then our dollar position has deteriorated, with our reserves falling considerably from their 1955 level. (Only 'partial convertibility' was in fact instituted, certain classes of foreign holders of sterling being permitted free exchange into dollars.)

What must be done to improve our precarious position?

Fundamentally the problem is that of increasing our export earnings relatively to our import expenditure. We must pay our way in foreign trade, and build up a more adequate reserve for emergencies. Though we can attempt to preserve the balance partly by keeping down our imports — by trying to foster British agriculture for example — there are definite limits to what can or should be done on these lines: for instance, though we may raise agricultural output considerably, this may well be accomplished at too great a cost in subsidies and in employment of resources that could be used more productively elsewhere. Thus it would be achieved at the expense of our standard of living.

Obviously the better policy is to increase our exports, and this can be done only by further increasing our productivity in the export trades. For this a number of measures are required, notably a speeding-up in the rate of our technological advance. This will involve heavy outlay — as much as we can manage without producing serious inflationary pressure — on capital investment, which can only be accomplished at the cost of some sacrifice in present consumption and of some caution in the provision of social services. (For example, despite the gravity of the housing shortage, we have probably been spending more than we can really afford on housing construction.) It will also involve a marked expansion in technical education, to meet the need for trained scientists and the much higher general level of scientific knowledge among workers that modern industry increasingly demands. We must also improve the efficiency of the basic industries — coal, steel, transport, chemicals — on which so much of the rest of industry depends.

A further change that seems obviously necessary is a fundamental remodelling of the whole pattern of our economy. Since other nations have now imitated us and industrialised themselves, with the result that our natural handicaps are now making themselves felt, it is obviously advisable to abandon many lines to our competitors, and concentrate upon those fields in which our superior skills and scientific abilities still keep us well in the lead. What we really sell to the world is our skill: therefore we must concentrate on those products in which the cost of the raw materials constitutes only a small part of the ultimate value of the product. To take an example, for each

£100 worth of raw cotton we import into this country, we produce about £180 worth of finished cotton fabric: i.e. we add about 80 per cent to the value of the raw material in the course of our manufacturing processes. On the other hand, for each £100 of raw material used in the motor industry, we produce about £800 worth of motor-car. In the case of jet aircraft, the figure is very much higher — something of the order of £100,000. Obviously, in our situation, obliged as we are to import all our raw materials, we should leave cotton goods to other countries — except for the highest quality fabrics, in which we still cannot be matched — and convert our resources, more especially our labour force, to the production of jet aircraft and similar highly scientific products, requiring a very high level of industrial skill. We should specialise in those products in which we can still lead the world. Further examples are heavy vehicles, electrical and industrial machinery, chemicals, electronic equipment, and shipping. (Motor-cars and radio are already becoming marginal.) It should be noted, lest this suggestion should seem too alarming, that a remarkable remodelling of our economy has in fact already taken place over the last ten years. Some industries have expanded about 70 per cent; others have remained at the same level, or have actually contracted. But the process should be proceeding much faster than it is.

It is sometimes suggested that considerable improvement in our position could be effected by investing large sums of capital in the colonies, in order to expand their production of raw materials. The argument runs that this would both improve the dollar earnings of the Sterling Area and help to improve the terms of trade in our favour, by reducing the scarcity of raw materials. Although a certain amount of benefit would probably be obtained in this way, it appears, however, that not a great deal could be expected over a short period: colonial development raises many difficult problems, and progress is bound to be slow. In general, and from the purely economic viewpoint, the most profitable avenue for investment at present, requiring as much as we can spare, is in British industry. (As will be argued in a later chapter, there is however an urgent need on political and humanitarian grounds for tremendous expenditure on colonial development.)

Where do the two main political parties stand on this issue of Britain's economic position? They are agreed on two points at least: the need for maintaining full employment — and therefore for maintaining some element of control over economic fluctuations — and the need for speeding-up the improvement of our productivity, particularly in the export industries. Where they differ is concerning the degree and methods of control. There are two types of controls: monetary and physical. Monetary controls include the manipulation of the bank rate, which affects the rate of investment and consumption, exchange control, and taxation, which also affects investment and consumption. Physical controls amount in short to the rationing and direct government allocation of materials in short supply. While the Labour Party argues that monetary controls are not enough in themselves and that, in our difficult situation, it is necessary to ensure that those industries which make the best use of materials in the national interest receive adequate supplies in preference to less essential industries, the Conservative Party contends that physical controls tend to produce stagnation. As under rationing supplies are normally based on what was required previously, the more efficient producer finds it more difficult to expand production and drive out his inefficient competitor, with the result that the advancement of the general level of efficiency is retarded. They therefore prefer the use of monetary controls alone. The Labour Party has also argued that many private firms, occupying important positions in the British economy, have not put sufficient effort into improving their productivity and expanding production, and should therefore be taken over by the state.

As they are the product of trends in the evolution of the world economy which, although they were scarcely recognised until the recent war, have been emerging steadily for many years and will take many years yet to run their full course, Britain's difficulties obviously will not be solved within a year or two. As will be argued in a later chapter, those which arise from the evolution of technology, to the point where it demands economic organisation on a greater than national scale can, be solved only by the merging of the British economy more completely with those of other countries. (In practice, this would amount to little more than the fuller specialisation which we

have already seen to be necessary.) Even so, there is no need to be discouraged: British industry still leads the world in many fields, and there is no reason why it should not continue to do so if the drive and initiative that created this lead can be recaptured. Greater real interest in productivity, on the part of both masters and men, could in fact solve all our immediate problems almost overnight.

Moreover an improvement in Britain's economic position would enable her to deal much more effectively with those other problems facing her in the modern world — problems of giving leadership to the Commonwealth, and of dealing with the new issues of emergent nationalism and internationalism — that form the material of the following chapters.

Chapter Two

THE COMMONWEALTH — A FAMILY OF NATIONS

The British Commonwealth is not merely an important group of nations: in its character and problems it also illustrates the conflict in the contemporary world between the forces of nationalism and internationalism. On the one hand, it represents a British solution, applied now for many years, to the tensions created by the emergence of new nations. On the other, the Commonwealth's main need, which has become urgent since 1945, is to strengthen itself as a group by closer co-operation among the members: since this, as will be seen, cannot be achieved in adequate measure without some sacrifice of national sovereignty by both Britain and the Dominions, it raises immediately the essential problem of internationalism. Thus anyone wishing to examine the possibility of establishing effective international government can learn a great deal from a study of the Commonwealth.

As a political institution, the Commonwealth has always been something of an enigma to foreigners. It appears to be quite illogical. Each of its members is completely self-governing and for all practical purposes independent — in fact they sometimes differ considerably in their policies — and there is no central authority; yet together they claim to form some sort of political unity. But how can there be unity where there is no central authority, no common organ of government? The only answer that can be returned to this objection is the typically British one that, in practice, however illogical it may seem, the Commonwealth does appear to function fairly satisfactorily as an association possessing an important measure of unity.

Nevertheless it hardly functions well enough. Though the present relationship produces a very valuable measure of co-operation, there can be no doubt that, especially in the changed

conditions of the post-war world, much more is greatly needed. The essential feature of the existing Commonwealth machinery, not always clearly understood even in Britain, and following naturally from the basic principle that the Dominions are completely self-governing, is that all co-operation is purely voluntary. But this arrangement, if very convenient, has serious disadvantages: it means that any co-operation achieved tends to amount to no more than a highest common factor of the separate national policies — there is no joint planning, no joint approach to problems from a Commonwealth viewpoint, in any sphere of common interest. Further, the steady growth in the number of Dominions, each bringing a new set of interests to the council table, makes the need of producing a greater measure of unity even more urgent. Thus one of the central problems of the Commonwealth today is that of whether its machinery can be improved in a way that will produce the joint action really required.

As far as Britain particularly is concerned, this problem also raises itself in a slightly different form. Failing closer unification of the Commonwealth, which seems scarcely practicable to any notable degree, is Commonwealth support worth any sacrifice of national interests? Since the Commonwealth is such a vague, intangible entity, is it worth Britain's while to seriously modify her national policies in order to obtain the support of the Dominions? How valuable is their goodwill? Is the Commonwealth worth the price of its preservation?

More even than with most similar institutions, the character of the Commonwealth is best understood by means of a study of its evolution. Moreover any proposal to modify the present voluntarism and informality of its machinery runs completely counter to its present fundamental principle and the whole course of its development. (Some difficulty in the nomenclature of the Commonwealth has arisen recently, since some of the members have become republics: it is now becoming usual to avoid the term 'Dominion' when referring to these members. Although on the whole this practice seems advisable, it is nevertheless very regrettable, as 'Dominion' was a most convenient term to distinguish the completely self-governing members from the dependencies. The alternative, 'self-governing members', besides being clumsy, is hardly satisfactory, as virtually all the

dependencies are also self-governing to some extent. For the sake of convenience, the term 'Dominion' will be used throughout this book in the old sense, as applying to either the republican or monarchical fully self-governing members, except where this can be avoided without undue awkwardness.)

The Evolution of the Commonwealth

Historically, the Commonwealth traces back to the Durham report, and to appreciate this key document one must go back even further, to the American Revolution. Even in these years when its subsequent development was being determined the problem that plagues the Commonwealth today — the conflict between the insistence of the members upon full self-government and the need to preserve some measure of unity — was clearly understood. The decisions taken were adopted in full realisation of their apparent logical contradiction. One might say that the creative force behind the Commonwealth's emergence has been the insistence of British people, wherever they might be, not merely on the right to govern themselves, but on obtaining self-government in a form that gave it reality — as opposed to concessions that might sound very well in theory but prove rather ephemeral in practice. Thus, when they had reached a certain stage of maturity, the American colonists insisted upon managing their own affairs; and since Westminster was too remote, would not be put off with the offer of some representation in the British Parliament. When their demands for full and separate self-government were met by the British Government of the day with the logical and natural objection that there could not be two separate governments within the one empire, but that one must in some way be subordinate to the other, the Americans stood firm. The result was the American Revolution.

Some fifty years later, the same situation appeared to be emerging in Canada. It was freely predicted that the Canadian colonies would follow the United States out of the empire. In the event, Lord Durham was sent to Canada to find a solution to the dilemma; his solution — the Durham Report of 1837 — is often described, very justly, as the Magna Carta of the Commonwealth.

In this famous document, Durham recommended that, para-

doxically, the way to retain the colonies within the Empire was to give them their full freedom. He argued that any attempt to restrict their independence would cause resentment, and thus lead to friction and eventually secession. Although he proposed that there should be four spheres of government over which Britain should retain control — land, external trade, foreign affairs and defence — it was well realised at the time that these four 'reservations', as they were called, could only be temporary. In effect therefore Durham was recommending that the colonies be granted complete self-government; and after some hesitation, his recommendations were put into effect.

In the following years, the same policy was adopted towards each of the other European colonies in turn, as it reached a certain stage of maturity; and at the demand of the colonists, Britain soon in each case followed up by surrendering three of the four 'reservations' — land, external trade, and defence. (As will be seen, control of foreign policy was retained until 1918.) Thus the Durham Report became the guiding principle of British policy towards the more mature colonies.

Since the adoption of the Durham Report, the direction of further evolution has always been towards greater and greater independence. The guiding principle has always been Durham's conception that freedom is the best means of preserving the traditional bonds; and evolution has continued even in recent years, and appears to be still continuing. By 1907 it had reached the point where it was thought desirable to adopt the designation 'Dominion' — to denote a status essentially different from that of a colony; nevertheless complete 'dominion status' in the modern sense of full self-government was not reached until 1919.

Until then, it was recognised that Britain had an overriding voice in foreign policy. Although the British Government kept the Dominion Prime Ministers fully informed on foreign affairs — in fact Sir Edward Grey, the Liberal Foreign Secretary, told them more of his policy in the years leading up to the 1914–18 War than he revealed to the British cabinet — the Dominions accepted this position. The fearful experience of the war, however, led them to insist upon full sovereignty in this sphere also. As always, Britain gave way. It was in fact as a result of her sponsorship, against the opposition of some other powers — who suspected the proposal as a British trick to obtain increased

representation — that the Dominions were admitted as separate nations to the Versailles Peace Conference and the League of Nations. Subsequently, within the League, though generally acting as a group, they did at times oppose each other. During the inter-war period the larger Dominions also expressed their new international status by establishing a number of embassies with various foreign states.

By 1919, therefore, the Dominions were self-governing in every respect: dominion status in the modern sense dates from that year. Nevertheless the evolution of the Commonwealth structure has continued, right up to the present day. There have been a number of important further landmarks. Among these was the definition of dominion status, for the first time, at the Imperial Conference of 1926. Though they had nothing more of substance to gain, three Dominions, Canada, South Africa and Eire, insisted for domestic political reasons upon having the position clarified. As a result the following statement, generally, known — after its main author, Lord Balfour — as the Balfour Formula, was accepted:

> 'They (i.e. the Dominions) are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to the other in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.'

Though, as will be seen, slightly outmoded, this is still generally regarded in its main elements as the accepted definition of dominion status. At the same time, it was recognised that certain practices still in operation did not correspond to this position, and in addition the legal situation required some minor adjustments. The outdated practices requiring no legal change were rectified simply by altering them, the main example being the method of appointment of Governors-General. Until 1926 they had been appointed by the monarch on the advice of the United Kingdom government; as this was held to imply a certain inferiority of status of the Dominion governments with respect to the United Kingdom, the practice was now adopted of the monarch appointing each Governor-General on the advice of the Dominion government concerned. (As a result, to meet the need to have some representatives of its own in the Dom-

inions, the United Kingdom began to send High Commissioners to the Dominion capitals: the Dominions had already for many years been sending High Commissioners to each other and to London.) Later, in 1931, the legal anomalies were also rectified by the Statute of Westminster.

The Dominions had not been unanimous in their attitude towards these developments, Australia and New Zealand having in fact fairly consistently opposed them. It was New Zealand which obtained the insertion of a clause in the Statute of Westminster providing that it should not apply to any Dominion until adopted by its parliament. Availing themselves of this provision, Australia and New Zealand did not adopt the Statute until the 1940s; and when they took this step it was purely as a matter of legal convenience, arising out of their activities in the Pacific islands in the prosecution of the war.

Recent Developments

Since the Second World War there has been still further evolution. Lord Balfour had a genius for drawing up acceptable formulae which went far enough to satisfy some of the parties concerned while leaving some matters conveniently vague in order not to alienate others, the Formula of 1926 being a good example. But what exactly did it mean? Though it had satisfied the Dominions at the time, further elaboration soon became necessary. Did 'freely associated' imply that a Dominion could leave the Commonwealth if it wished to? Could a Dominion remain neutral in war-time? During the 1930's there was a great deal of academic controversy over these questions.

In the event they were answered, in typically British fashion, not by legal argument but by practical political decisions. Eire settled the question of neutrality by declaring herself neutral in 1939 and maintaining her neutrality without interference; and eventually India was instrumental in forcing a decision on the question of secession. When Sir Stafford Cripps went to India in 1942 to discuss the demands of the Congress Party for self-government, he offered the Indians dominion status, to become effective at the end of the war. The Congress Party leaders then asked him if this implied the right to leave the Commonwealth if India desired; he replied that it did. As is always the case in such circumstances, this ruling immediately became ap-

plicable to all the other Dominions. Burma was freely permitted to leave the Commonwealth in 1947 without ever becoming a Dominion; and in 1949 Eire also took advantage of this development by seceding. (Nevertheless Britain still does not regard Eire as a foreign country: she accords Irish citizens the privileges of British citizenship.) Meanwhile further minor changes were also taking place: for example 'British' was dropped — officially at least, though a number of United Kingdom and Dominion statesmen announced that they would continue using it — from the term 'British Commonwealth'.

Finally, as the most recent major development, India came to the 1949 Commonwealth Conference declaring her intention to become a republic, but requesting nevertheless that she might remain a member of the Commonwealth. After some dissension, it was agreed that she might do so. This was made possible by the adoption of the rather illogical formula that, while the Queen is not the head of the Indian state, the President (at present Dr. Prasad) occupying this position, India recognises the Queen as the Head of the Commonwealth, as a sort of President of an international club. In 1956, by adopting a republican constitution, Pakistan followed India's example.

Though India's action in adopting the republican form of government aroused a great deal of alarm at the time, and the wisdom of allowing her to remain within the Commonwealth on these terms was questioned and has frequently been questioned since by a number of leading figures, it is probably a mistake to regard the Crown as an important link of the Commonwealth. It has served as a bond in little more than a formal, legalistic sense; and the Commonwealth has always shown little respect for legal formality. Under our modern form of government the monarchy now has little more than a psychological function. Though this function is by no means negligible, and though their adherence to constitutional monarchy is a significant mark of common culture among those members of the Commonwealth which have not become republics, it has never been an essential or even an important part of the Commonwealth structure. In any community, the constitutional structure is only one element giving cohesion, and other bonds — commercial and cultural connections, for example — are stronger ties within the Commonwealth community.

Moreover the Indian view of monarchy as an institution apparently differed fundamentally from the modern British conception. Constitutional monarchy is in any case rather a sophisticated conception: it is hardly surprising that Indians should apparently read much more into the symbol of the Crown than is now intended. (This was demonstrated at the Royal Durbars in India before 1939, when, after the removal of the throne, thousands of Indians prostrated themselves on the ground at the spot where it had stood.) In view of this attitude monarchy could hardly be comprehensible to Indians except as a mark of subordination to Britain which would be incompatible with true dominion status. This consideration is surely sufficient to over-ride any objection to India's becoming a republic. Moreover, India's request was probably, in a sense, a test of Britain's sincerity in offering her full equality; and it would therefore have been a mistake to try to press monarchy upon her.

Nevertheless it would seem that the persistent evolution of the Commonwealth towards greater and greater autonomy, that has continued right up until the present day, can hardly go much further without the Commonwealth actually falling apart. Many authorities on this subject believe it must either achieve closer unity or else move onward to disintegration.

Present Structure

There is no convenient constitutional term that can be used to describe the present structure of the Commonwealth. It cannot, for instance, be described as a federation, for the essential feature of a federal constitution is the existence of some common organ of government with power to bind all the members. The best-known example is, of course, the United States of America where, in addition to the separate state governments, each having control over a large number of fields of legislation, such as marriage laws, education, and social services, there is in addition the federal government which exercises jurisdiction over matters of common concern, such as foreign policy, defence, and foreign trade. There is no central organ of government of any kind within the Commonwealth with legislative powers corresponding to the United States Federal Government at Washington. As will be seen, the only body remotely resembling such an organ, the Commonwealth Conference, is purely con-

sultative, possessing no compulsive authority over the members. Most suggestions for imposing a greater measure of unity upon the Commonwealth amount to proposals to convert it into a federation of some kind.

Nor can the Commonwealth be described as some sort of alliance, for the essential feature of an alliance is the existence of certain clearly understood obligations, and the obligations of Commonwealth members towards each other have never been defined in any way. The Commonwealth has often in fact been called a 'family' of nations — a most appropriate term, best appreciated by comparing the Commonwealth and an alliance on the one hand, and a family and a joint stock company on the other. In a joint stock company, as in an alliance, it is necessary for the obligations and rights of the members to be clearly defined. Though the obligations of the members of a family towards each other, like the obligations of the members of the Commonwealth, are not specifically defined, this does not mean to say that they are any the less binding or intimate, or that the family is less cohesive as a unit, than is the case with a joint stock company. On the contrary, the reverse is true. In fact, if ever it becomes necessary to commit family obligations to definition, this is a fairly sure indication that the family relationship is in an unsatisfactory state — it is of course what normally occurs in separation or divorce. Similarly, the Commonwealth is a closer association than an alliance, and the informality that is the essence of the relationship is a measure of its strength and intimacy. This of course was the reason why Australia and New Zealand resisted the definition of the relationship at the Imperial Conference of 1926.

The machinery for Commonwealth co-operation is in fact very informal, consisting mainly of three elements:

1. *The Commonwealth Conferences.* These gatherings, formerly known as 'Imperial Conferences', have been held since 1887. Although normally they are conferences of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, conferences of Finance or Foreign Ministers are also occasionally held. They are most informal, and there is no agenda. To permit the freest exchange of views, the sessions are held in secret. Although for a time at the beginning of this century the conferences were held regularly at four-year intervals, a regular pattern of meeting is no longer followed. In fact

conferences have tended to become more frequent since the recent world war, because of the development of air transport. In the past, as can be well understood, it was by no means easy for a Prime Minister of a remote Dominion to absent himself from his own country for the considerable period required to travel to Britain and return: thus modern air travel has greatly facilitated the operation of the Commonwealth machinery. A good illustration of the previous difficulty is the experience of New Zealand's Prime Minister, W. F. Massey, in attending the 1919 Imperial Conference. Massey was Prime Minister of a coalition government at the time, the leader of the other main party in the coalition being Sir Joseph Ward. As Massey was extremely reluctant to leave the field to Ward during his long absence overseas, he insisted that Ward travel to Britain with him; and wherever Massey proceeded in Britain, he saw to it that Ward came with him. Towards the end of his stay, however, Massey was obliged to travel to the Continent, and on this occasion did not insist that Ward accompany him. But no sooner had Massey left British soil than Ward hurried to a port and embarked on a ship bound for New Zealand. On Massey's return, he approached the Admiralty and demanded that a destroyer be put at his disposal. This being agreed to, he made a very rapid return journey to New Zealand, reaching his capital about a week ahead of Ward!

The essential feature of the Commonwealth Conferences is that they are merely consultative, and have no legislative powers. Decisions are not imposed by the majority on the minority, and are implemented only through the voluntary action of those members agreeable to taking action. In matters where a decision is necessary in which all must participate — such as the 1949 agreement that India should remain a member though a republic — the minority has so far always given way: if they had strong objections, they would be free to secede. (The possibility arose recently of the members having to choose between Ghana's admission and South Africa's continued membership, South Africa having threatened to secede if Ghana were admitted. Fortunately, however, South Africa has withdrawn her threat, so that the decision has not required to be faced.) In other words, participation in the Conferences does not infringe the sovereignty of the members in any way.

2. *High Commissioners.* As has been seen, for many years the Dominions have maintained High Commissioners in London and exchanged them among themselves, and since 1926 Britain has sent High Commissioners to the Dominions. Though the High Commissioners are somewhat similar in function to ambassadors, they are in fact recognised as being something more than ambassadors. For instance, the High Commissioners in London have direct access to British government departments. During the war, the High Commissioners in London met every morning, an arrangement which was generally regarded as marking a notable step in the development of the Commonwealth machinery. Though many hoped that it would continue after the war, it has however lapsed.

Nevertheless even meetings of High Commissioners could never serve as a complete substitute for the Commonwealth Conferences. In the first place, no matter how closely he tries to maintain contact, a High Commissioner cannot remain sufficiently in touch with the position in his own country, nor can he, or any other representative, speak with the authority of a Prime Minister.

3. *Circulation of Information.* One of the main parts of the Commonwealth machinery, though less well known, is the constant circulation of information. By means of the Commonwealth Relations Office, acting as a sort of information bureau, a continuous flow of state papers and other documents, many of them highly confidential, is maintained among the members. In addition Ministers frequently visit other members, and close contact is kept up in various other ways. As well as smoothing the operation of the Commonwealth Conferences, the development of modern communications, especially the radio telephone, which provides a much more personal link than the cable and is thus particularly suitable for the intimate Commonwealth relationship, has also greatly facilitated the functioning of this element of the machinery. Further, and typical again of Commonwealth intimacy and informality, the practice has developed, apparently from spontaneous beginnings, of the Commonwealth ambassadors maintaining close contact with each other in those foreign capitals where there are several of them. The collation of information and views thus achieved is of considerable value to all the member nations.

It will be seen that there is nothing in all this apparatus of co-operation which detracts in any way from the autonomy of the Commonwealth members. Complete self-government of all the member nations is still the essential principle of the Commonwealth, and any suggestion of surrendering some sovereignty to a central authority would still, as in Durham's time, endanger the continuance of the present valuable, if rather intangible, unity.

Examples of Co-operation

Despite the fact that there is no joint planning organisation of any kind in the Commonwealth, a considerable measure of co-operation is achieved. Most examples fall into the category either of defence or economic policy.

1. *Defence.* Though there is no joint planning, even for defence purposes, consultation takes place, and there is a good deal of standardisation of equipment, exchange of personnel, and pooling of facilities. Australia, for instance, makes available to the United Kingdom the Woomera Range for rocket and atomic research. Bases in the Dominions, such as Trincomalee in Ceylon, and Simonstown in South Africa, are available for the use of the Royal Navy. (Britain has recently agreed to terminate her leases of both these bases, but may still make use of them: nevertheless it is clear that she would not have the use of Trincomalee in the event of a war in which Ceylon adhered to her present policy of neutrality. She is thus making new arrangements in the area, in the Maldive Islands.) In addition to bearing their share of United Nations responsibilities in Korea and Western Germany, Dominion forces have also been serving in Kenya and Malaya, where they have been assisting Britain with her colonial responsibilities.

Even in war-time, the Dominions do not give up their autonomy in defence — a point that British commanding officers have often found difficult to appreciate. Even when Dominion forces have been serving under a British army commander, the Dominion generals, being responsible for their troops to their own governments, always insist on the right to refer orders back to their own governments before accepting them. Nevertheless, in the past the Dominions have generally been very ready to assist Britain to the full extent of their powers in war-time; but

they have undoubtedly been rather negligent in bearing a fair share of the burden of peace-time Commonwealth defence. However, following the 1955 Commonwealth Conference, Australia and New Zealand are now to furnish forces to aid Britain in Malaya, as part of general plans for the security of South East Asia.

2. *Economic Policy.* Since the Dominions (excluding Canada) are the main members, apart from the United Kingdom itself, of the Sterling Area, any dollar goods they import are paid for from the United Kingdom's dollar reserves. (On the other hand, of course, their exports to dollar countries help to build up these reserves, and in fact make an important contribution to the Area's dollar earnings.) Thus, in the successive dollar crises, it has been necessary for Britain to obtain the co-operation of the Dominion governments for the conservation of her dollar funds. This co-operation, effected by means of import restrictions, has been readily provided, usually as the result of Conferences of Commonwealth Finance Ministers.

In addition, there has also been considerable co-operation among British and Dominion governments over such matters as migration and development. During the post-war period of capital shortage and controls, the resources of the London loan market have been made available for Dominion development projects, though limited usually to schemes which will improve dollar trade. The Colombo Plan, initiated by the Dominions, though now extended to include a number of non-Commonwealth countries, is a notable example of co-operation by members of the Commonwealth for fostering economic development.

The Bonds of the Commonwealth

In considering the problem of strengthening the Commonwealth or of merely preserving its existence, it is obviously advisable to examine not only its present constitutional structure, but also the unifying forces which lead the members to continue their association. Why do the members, more especially the newly emerged Asian and African members, prefer to remain in the Commonwealth, when they are free to leave if they wish? The most obvious explanation would seem to be that they must obtain some notable advantages in the defence, economic or diplomatic spheres. But closer examination shows that the

mutual interests that do exist are hardly strong enough in themselves to account completely for the Commonwealth's persistence.

Firstly, concerning the strategic interests. It is obvious that the Dominions are so widely dispersed that their strategic interests differ very considerably — a fact that was less apparent before 1939 because of Britain's global naval power. Though free from 1919 to conduct their own foreign policy, the Dominions tended in practice to follow Britain's lead fairly closely. The reason was largely their awareness that, being too sparsely populated to be capable of defending themselves, they depended for their security upon Britain's strength and influence as a great power. So long as Britain remained a front-rank world power, they naturally looked to her as their main source of security and protection. Thus they devoted a great deal of their attention to Britain's fortunes in Europe, and were always very ready to assist her to maintain her European position. Since 1945, however, Britain's relative weakness has meant that they can no longer rely upon her for their security. They have therefore been compelled to give much more heed to their own neighbourhoods, and the result has inevitably been a more independent approach to foreign policy. The best-known example of this tendency has been the ANZUS Pact. This mutual defence treaty, signed between Australia, New Zealand and the United States in 1951, resulted from the realisation on the part of these two Dominions that they could no longer look to Britain for their defence. They therefore turned to the only power that could effectively guarantee their security — the United States. (The ANZUS Pact will be examined in more detail in a later chapter.) A similar development, less widely noticed, has been the close inter-linking in defence arrangements between Canada and the United States.

Nevertheless the network of Commonwealth communications still remains of considerable importance to the Dominions, and its security is therefore a matter of some mutual concern. So too, since she is still by far the most powerful member of the group and without her they would be lonely indeed in a perilous world, is the security of the United Kingdom. The friendship of the United States cannot be a complete substitute for the family feeling of the Commonwealth.

When the economic interests of the members of the Commonwealth are considered, one finds a similar, rather complex, situation. Though the Commonwealth is still, as it has long been, the world's most active international trading area, the economic interests of Britain and the Dominions are by no means completely complementary, and are now less complementary than they were. On the one hand, while the greatest part of Britain's exports go to Commonwealth countries, she cannot maintain her prosperity without selling in other markets as well. On the other, though the greatest part of the exports of primary produce from the Dominions are marketed in Britain, they too are obliged to find further markets elsewhere in order to dispose of sufficient quantities of their products. Moreover, in order to obtain greater self-sufficiency for their economies, which in the past have been dangerously unstable through their dependence upon the export of a narrow range of products, most of the Dominions are now expanding their secondary industries. This development naturally means a reduction in the quantity of manufactured goods they buy from Britain, and is one of the factors contributing to Britain's present economic difficulties. It makes it necessary for Britain to find compensating markets elsewhere.

The emergence of this situation became particularly apparent at the Commonwealth Conference of 1932 at Ottawa; (and has become even more marked since 1955). As a result of the 'Great Depression' of that time, this Conference was called for the purpose of drawing up trade agreements by which the members of the Commonwealth could assist each other to overcome their economic difficulties. It was quickly found, however, that they could not do very much for each other. The Conference merely produced a number of bi-lateral trading agreements which on the whole were disappointing in their results, many being abandoned within a few years.

The fact that the Commonwealth is still the world's most active trading area is due not so much to natural mutual interests as to long-established connections and mutual confidence which are products of its history. Nevertheless these connections are worth maintaining and the mutual understanding they have helped to foster, as well as being a valuable business asset, makes a helpful contribution to a wider sense of com-

munity. Moreover, though both Britain and the Dominions must also look elsewhere for more profitable trading, particularly to 'hard currency' areas, if they are to make adequate progress in raising their living standards, the markets they can offer each other are still very valuable as the main staple of their export trade. They provide a sound base which should not be sacrificed completely for less secure, if more tempting, outlets. Australia and New Zealand especially have recently shown their serious concern for the future of the markets they enjoy in Britain under the tariff preferences still provided under Ottawa agreements; but it is also significant that Britain has refused the further concessions they were seeking. As a result, both are now looking for further markets elsewhere, and may have to offer reciprocal preferences to non-Commonwealth countries to obtain them.

Further, the ready access to the London loan market enjoyed by the Dominions is a notable advantage to them and an important cohesive factor in the Commonwealth. It was in fact the main consideration determining Malaya's decision to remain in the Sterling Area upon achieving independence, outweighing the strong attraction towards the dollar exerted by her tremendous volume of dollar exports. (As Malaya earns about a tenth of the dollars entering the Sterling Area pool — and, in effect, this decision means that she will continue to allow Britain to make use of them — her defection would have been a serious blow to the British economy.) Thus Britain's failure recently to generate adequate supplies of capital to satisfy Dominion requirements has in some measure endangered the maintenance of the Commonwealth.

Since these two bonds — mutual strategic and economic interests — scarcely seem strong enough in themselves to account entirely for the persistence of the Commonwealth association, are there any others that have made a notable contribution? One important influence towards cohesion, often underestimated in Britain, is the consciousness among Commonwealth peoples of their common culture, the product of a common literature and educational and other traditions and institutions, which operates strongly even among the Asian members. Even in India, Pakistan and Ceylon — and Ghana and Malaya — a large proportion of the politicians and administrators have

received their education from British text-books, and through the study of British institutions. A considerable proportion have been educated in British universities and schools. As a result, the people of the Commonwealth nations tend to think alike, and to have the same values and ideals. It seems significant, in contrast, that Afrikaner nationalism — the expression of an outlook quite alien to the rest of the Commonwealth—seems the most serious disruptive force within the Commonwealth today. In addition, in the case of the European Dominions there is also the influence of a large number of personal, still-maintained family ties.

Here too, however, one must enter a qualification that the position is changing: increasing consciousness of a national character of their own, even in the European Dominions, is tending to weaken this common heritage to some extent. This development can be observed at the moment particularly in the recent emergence of something like a national literature, with its own idiom, in Australia and New Zealand. (Until very recently, the characters in New Zealand novels tended to act and talk like Englishmen!)

Nevertheless it would seem that the common element of culture in the Commonwealth is still strong enough to be a most important force of mutual attraction — much more so than is generally appreciated. The members, particularly the Dominions, are deeply aware that they would exert much less weight in the world without their close association, and find great value in their unique mutual understanding, especially in their relationship with a power still so influential as Britain. Though they may differ in their policies, and know that they can never count upon unqualified support, they are aware that among the other members they will always obtain a sympathetic hearing for their viewpoint. It is mostly in this sense that the Commonwealth is a family of nations, and more than an alliance; and, now that Britain no longer has her former freedom of action in the world, her people should surely pay more heed to the value, limited and intangible though it may be, of such an association.

Points of Strain

Mainly, it seems, because of her different culture, as expressed in 'apartheid', South Africa appears to be growing in-

creasingly uneasy within the Commonwealth. Since — as will be seen in a later chapter — apartheid is directly opposite in principle to the British racial policy of 'partnership', and also to Britain's policy of advancing colonies such as the Gold Coast and Nigeria rapidly towards dominion status, South Africa opposes the most important recent trend in the development of the Commonwealth — the emergence of non-European Dominions — and has quarrelled with Britain over the three South African protectorates, and with India. South Africa's dispute with the United Nations over her former mandated territory of South West Africa, which she has refused to transform into a trust territory under the United Nations, and has now incorporated into her own administration, has also caused some embarassment among the Commonwealth members.

Until recently, as has been noted, South Africa was apparently intending to oppose the admission of Ghana to the Commonwealth Conferences, but, fortunately, she eventually decided not to object. Regarding the Protectorates — Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland — it has long been understood that these would eventually pass into the Union; and South Africa has demanded their incorporation on several occasions in recent years. British Governments have taken the view, however, that they cannot cede dependencies unless their inhabitants are agreeable. So far, because of the Union's racial policies, they have strongly opposed the suggestion. Yet Basutoland and Swaziland are economically dependent upon the Union, which could create serious difficulties for them.

The quarrel with India — a long-standing dispute — arises out of the presence in South Africa of 350,000 Indians, mostly descendants of labourers imported in the 1860's. Under an agreement of 1927, the Union Government promised not to discriminate against Indians in any way, while India undertook to persuade as many as possible to return to India. Only a few, however, were repatriated. Recently the quarrel has intensified. While India claims that the apartheid policy, under which the Indians are treated as a non-European group, amounts to a breach of the agreement, South Africa for her part accuses India of not fulfilling her commitment. Both Dominions have now withdrawn their High Commissioners from each other.

The South African Nationalist Party has also frequently dis-

cussed a proposal to convert the Union into a republic. Though the Nationalists repeat the same arguments that were used by India — that the monarchical institutions over-stress the British tie — preference for the republican form of government after long experience of constitutional monarchy marks a different motivation: the issue arises, of course, out of the bitter rivalry between the Afrikaners and the English-speaking element in the Union. Nationalist leaders have declared they are waiting for a large majority of public opinion to come round to favour the proposal. In any case, many Nationalists would be glad to leave the Commonwealth. Recently, however, apparently because of an increasing sense of the isolation of the Union in the world through its racial policies, the strength of this separatist element seems to have fallen.

Another notable element of strain within the Commonwealth is the serious tension in the relations between Pakistan and India. These Dominions did in fact fall into hostilities over Kashmir. The whole subject of their relations will however be discussed in detail in a later chapter.

The ANZUS Pact of 1951, between Australia, New Zealand and the United States, mentioned above, might also be considered the symbol of an element of strain within the Commonwealth. It was in fact preceded by a number of significant developments, dating back to the recent war. During the war years, the Australian Government insisted, with the emergence of the Japanese threat in the Pacific, that its forces in the Middle East be withdrawn for the defence of their own territory; shortly afterwards, it obtained the transfer of the Pacific War Council, then operating in London, to Washington. In 1944, Australia and New Zealand signed a mutual defence treaty, known as the Canberra Pact.

Though Dominion spokesmen have argued, with some justification, that the ANZUS Treaty was of benefit to Britain, since it relieved her of an embarassing obligation to assist with their defence, it is also true that it inevitably imposes a strain on the Commonwealth. When Britain and the United States differ on a point of foreign policy, Australia and New Zealand are obviously faced with a difficult conflict of loyalties. As will be seen in later chapters, when this has occurred, generally over the Far East, they have usually taken up a compromise position. It was

significant, therefore, when the grave divergence over Suez emerged in 1956, that both these Dominions gave unequivocal support, almost alone, to Britain.

Can the Machinery Be Improved?

Ever since, in the 1870's, it became obvious that the members of the Commonwealth were developing into separate nations, many leading thinkers in Britain and the Dominions have been seriously concerned with the possibility of creating some sort of constitutional machinery that would enable the Commonwealth to have a joint policy. This would obviously result in tremendous advantages. As has been seen, though a fair measure of co-operation is obtained under the present institutions, in theory at least a great deal more is possible. How much more influence the Commonwealth would have in the world, for example, if a single spokesman could declare its position on questions of foreign policy — instead of, as at present, a large number of leaders each defining the attitude of his particular country! The varied resources of the Commonwealth could also be put to much more effective use if placed under the control of a single authority. In recent years, with the further advance of de-centralisation and the relative decline of Britain as a world power, suggestions that something of this sort be attempted have been re-echoed more frequently, and with a greater sense of urgency.

All such proposals amount to converting the Commonwealth into some form of federation: they thus come up against the virtually insuperable difficulty that they require an important surrender of sovereignty on the part of the members. Their essential feature is that some joint organisation should be established with power to take decisions which would become binding upon all the members. For instance, it has sometimes been proposed that a federal parliament be established for the Commonwealth. But, supposing for argument's sake that each member be given one representative for each ten millions of population: this would give Britain five members, and India thirty-seven — would the British people be prepared to accept the decisions of a body constituted in this way? It is surely out of the question. Though it might be possible in theory to arrange representation on some other basis than that of population —

it has been suggested, for instance, that the House of Lords being converted into some sort of Commonwealth Council — no acceptable formula would overcome the difficulty that the members would have to surrender control of their own policies in vital spheres.

In the past, the Dominions have been very sensitive in their reactions to any suggestions of this sort. For instance in 1911 and 1949 they quickly rejected proposals that a permanent secretariat be established for the Commonwealth Conferences. Though at first sight this suggestion would seem quite harmless, the Dominions saw that a secretariat would be bound to make recommendations concerning policies — even the construction of an agenda implies that one question is important, while another is not — and feared that it would result in some degree of moral pressure being imposed upon them. Yet, for all the sensitivity of the Dominions on this point, British Governments would surely be equally reluctant to make any real surrender of their freedom of choice to a central organ. And unless the powers being sacrificed were of primary importance there would be no virtue in creating the central organ.

Are there any less far-reaching improvements it would be worth making to the existing machinery? An innovation that seems likely to be valuable would be the creation of more organisations, with perhaps government support, to foster co-operation in such fields as, for example, education, commerce, sport and cultural activities. These would help to preserve and develop the sense of community that is such an important element in preserving the Commonwealth. It is also desirable to preserve the trade links as far as is possible without undue economic harm, for although the sense of common outlook is an important cohesive factor, it is best reinforced by bonds of material self-interest! A more radical proposal is that made by H. V. Hodson, in his book *Twentieth Century Empire*, where he suggests that the Commonwealth might make use of what is termed, in studies of international government, the 'functional approach'. This is the device of establishing joint organisations to operate in narrowly limited fields, thus creating spheres of mutual interest which may perhaps later be extended, and will in themselves together amount to a notable sum of co-operation. Basing his argument upon experience with the Commonwealth Joint Supply Council

during the war, Hodson points to the fact that the sub-committees of this body, each dealing with a single product — such as rubber, steel or tin supplies — were able to achieve real joint planning, since governments do not normally have set policies in such limited fields. Thus the delegates did not come already committed by previous decisions, and were able to study their problems with a joint purpose. Hodson pleads, very effectively, that this device could be applied very valuably to the problem of achieving greater co-operation in peace-time.

Even so, in the vital sphere of foreign policy, it would seem that the Commonwealth must remain an undisciplined family, the members insisting upon their right to differ. The question remains, therefore: should Britain be prepared to modify her policies to any noteworthy extent to take Commonwealth views into account? Is the support of the members of such an intangible entity worth serious consideration? In the present writer's opinion, it is: with less physical power available, relatively, to protect her interests, Britain has no alternative but to look for the utmost diplomatic support. The Commonwealth members have valuable influence with many important foreign countries; and there is still enough family spirit within the Commonwealth relationship to furnish a most generous readiness to see and support another member's viewpoint.

Chapter Three

EMERGENT COMMONWEALTH — I. BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY

There are two senses in which the term 'Commonwealth' is frequently used: sometimes it is used to refer to the whole associated group of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and the British dependencies; more usually, as in the preceding chapter, it is employed as referring to the completely self-governing components of this group — the United Kingdom and the Dominions — alone. Neither of these usages is incorrect. In any case it is often argued that it is a mistake to distinguish too sharply between the Dominions and the dependencies, as both groups of countries fall under the same conception. The theory of British colonial policy is that the ultimate destiny of each colony, wherever this is practicable, is to become a completely self-governing state — that is, a Dominion. Dominions are colonies that have completed their evolution. On the one hand, since Dominion status implies the right to leave the Commonwealth if this is desired, this policy is Britain's solution to the rise of nationalism as it affects her own dependent territories — a solution amounting to readiness to surrender all sovereignty and recognise full rights of self-determination. On the other, as almost all emerging Dominions, so far at least, have decided to remain within the Commonwealth, viewing it as an international grouping facilitating a fair measure of co-operative action without infringement of national sovereignty, it also represents an answer of sorts to the problem of internationalism.

The dependencies themselves divide into three groups: the colonies (using the term in its stricter sense, though it is normally employed loosely to cover all dependencies), the protectorates, and the trust territories. The distinguishing mark of a colony is the fact that the administration has been established by the

Colonial Office and is directly controlled by it; in a protectorate the administration employed is that of a native ruler who remains on the throne and accepts British advice, generally through a Resident. In practice, since a protected ruler is normally obliged to accept the advice, and most are being pressed to establish democratic institutions, and since in most colonies the local population is also taking an active part in government, the difference is almost entirely one of form and law. One of the main differences, for example, is that legally the inhabitants of a colony are British subjects, while those of a protectorate normally are not: they are subjects of their native ruler and 'British-protected persons'. Examples of colonies are Gibraltar, Kenya and Singapore; Nyasaland, Uganda and the Malay Sultanates are protectorates. Some protectorates, such as Uganda, contain a number of rulers, each with his own administration. Some dependencies, notably in Africa, took shape originally as small colonies acquired many years ago on the coast, then were extended last century by the creation of protectorates over the adjacent hinterland. The Gold Coast and Nigeria were good examples (but both have now moved to different status) and another is the colony of Aden, with the adjoining Aden Protectorates. 'Trust Territories' is the new term that has been applied, under the United Nations, to the former German colonies that were detached from Germany after the 1914–18 War and created 'Mandates': that is, their government and development were entrusted to members of the League of Nations who were responsible to the League for their well-being, and pledged to advance them towards self-government. They are now administered under the supervision of the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations (see Chapter VI). Examples are Tanganyika, Togoland and the Cameroons.

In addition some of the Dominions also possess dependencies, most of these being Trust Territories. Thus Australia governs the eastern half of New Guinea, and New Zealand Western Samoa. Although South-West Africa was formerly a Mandated Territory governed by the Union of South Africa, since 1945 the Union has refused to convert the Mandate into a Trust, and has recently incorporated the country into her own territory.

The Principles of British Colonial Policy

As a power possessing colonies, Britain has had to face a great deal of criticism in the post-war world, particularly in the United Nations, from the Communist countries and the large 'anti-colonial bloc' of Asiatic and Latin-American states, many of them only recently released from colonial rule. As these groups comprise a large proportion of the members of UN, this criticism can be seriously embarassing. We are charged with being 'imperialists' and 'exploiters', unjustly preventing colonial peoples from managing their own affairs. Although we return the answer that our purpose is to prepare these peoples for self-government, our reply may not seem convincing, for our critics can retort that we appear to be taking a long time to achieve this end. This despite the fact that preparing primitive peoples for self-governing democracy must obviously be a long process. Moreover in many cases there are a number of complicating factors to be considered.

There are those of our critics, of course — and many liberal-minded British people would join them — who would argue that the standard of government matters less than the justice of allowing fellow human beings to control their own lives. If they make errors, at least these will be their own errors. The reply to this contention is that the British Government, from the mere fact of being in control of a colony, has acquired a responsibility for its good government and the preservation of law and order which amounts to a moral obligation to the ordinary inhabitant of that country. If it were to abdicate its powers to a government incapable of exercising them properly, so that hardship or anarchy, perhaps involving bloodshed and loss of life, resulted, it would be directly to blame for these consequences. Many have argued, for instance, that, since it was known that serious disorder would follow her departure, Britain must bear the blame for the frightful loss of life in India and Pakistan after partition — an estimated 400,000 deaths — more than were suffered by the Commonwealth forces during the whole of the Second World War. (In this particular case, it is probably true, however, that if we had not left when we did even worse disorder would have resulted sooner or later, with even greater loss of life.)

The question of how we came to acquire a particular colony is therefore irrelevant: the all-important consideration is that in fact we are now responsible for its government. Lest this should appear an evasion of an embarassing issue, it may be remarked here that in many cases — probably a majority — British governments acquired sovereignty over our present colonies reluctantly, as an irksome and expensive obligation. In many cases a native ruler, seeing the benefits of contact with civilisation and unable to preserve law and order sufficiently to permit trade to be carried on, himself requested British rule. In many instances, having created an oasis of law and order, we had to extend our control into neighbouring areas of anarchy to protect the lives and property of the subjects we had already acquired. Although there may be occasional pages in our colonial history of which we cannot be proud, on the whole our record is one that need not cause us shame. The age of colonisation was bound to come; and it evolved under British direction as humanely, on the whole, as was possible. No-one can doubt that in the long run it will be looked back upon as a most fortunate event in the development of native peoples, despite the numerous growing pains now being experienced in the course of the transition from primitive cultures to civilisation. But all this is in fact beside the point.

Since we are under a moral obligation to see that the government to which we surrender power is sufficiently competent, and since ability to govern is a skill that necessarily takes some time to acquire and requires some experience of the exercise of responsibility, it follows that we must put colonial politicians through an apprenticeship in self-government, preferably — though this seldom seems to be possible now — an extended one. In theory — there are of course wide variations of detail in practice — this is done by passing each colony through a series of stages, each imposing increased responsibilities upon the colonial leaders. This process can be compared with the ascent of a ladder, with Dominion status — complete self-government — as the topmost rung. The model forming the goal of this evolution is of course the British system of government — by means of a cabinet directly responsible to and removable by parliament. This pattern is built up piece by piece. In general conception, the stages run as follows:

(1) The foot of the ladder — the primitive form of colony where the Governor rules solely through his Executive Council, consisting of his chief officials. Colonies administered in this way are often referred to as 'Crown Colonies', though strictly speaking this term applies to all. This system is now almost unknown within the empire, the only remaining examples being dependencies (which are in fact all protectorates) composed of a collection of tribes which have not yet been asked to participate in centralised representative institutions — a step which would amount to bringing them into confederation. The three High Commission Territories in Southern Africa and the Aden Protectorates come under this heading.

(2) The first stage of advance is usually to create a Legislative Council, comprising some officials and some nominated local persons. This provides the administration with some contact with local viewpoints, and acquaints the nominees with the machinery of government. The Council debates and votes upon measures brought before it by the administration: thus the legislative element is introduced, and with it a measure of government by consent. Examples are Zanzibar and British North Borneo.

(3) Advance from this point takes the form of introducing into the Council a number of members elected by the local inhabitants, usually at first under a rather restricted franchise, and then gradually increasing the proportion of elected members and decreasing that of officials and nominees, at the same time progressively broadening the franchise. Often, in the early stages, election is indirect, voters electing members of an 'electoral college' — a body which then chooses the representatives; or representatives may be chosen by tribal or district councils. Very few Legislative Councils include no elected members at the present day, and in two-thirds of the colonies the unofficial members are in a majority. Reserve powers are of course retained by the governor to enable him to continue administration in the event of a dispute with the Council, though naturally these are scarcely needed where the Council has only a few elected members, and would be used only in grave circumstances where there was an elected majority. By these means the Council is gradually being evolved into a parliament; eventually the culminating point is reached where it becomes completely

elected. It is then generally given the title of Legislative or Colonial Assembly.

While the parliamentary side of constitutional development is thus being completed, a beginning is usually made with the administrative side, the first steps being taken to bring about the evolution of the Governor's Executive Council into a cabinet. Normally about the time that the unofficial members of the Legislative Council are increased to form a majority, a number of them are appointed to seats on the Executive Council and given the supervision of government departments. Eventually, as a large proportion of seats in the Legislative Council are made elective, the Executive Council becomes a cabinet, the leader of the majority party becoming 'Chief Minister' and appointing those of the Ministers who are not officials. The stage where some of the portfolios are still retained by the Governor is often referred to as 'diarchy', Malta having been in this position for many years. Most colonies are somewhere in the course of this third stage.

(4) The last stage but one is reached when the Legislative Council (or Assembly) is completely elected, and the leader of the party holding the majority of seats is recognised as Prime Minister, having the right to appoint the whole of his cabinet. As yet, however, the Governor may retain for a time the control of certain spheres of government, notably foreign affairs and defence, together with the right to intervene to preserve internal order, and often certain powers for safeguarding the position of the civil service. At the moment Nigeria is still at this stage; and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, though its premier attends Commonwealth Conferences, has similar status (and is thus not a dominion), since certain legislation, mainly measures affecting the position of the natives, may be 'reserved' for Colonial Office approval. When all the powers of the Governor are surrendered, his office thus being replaced by that of a Governor-General, whose function is equivalent to that of the monarch in the United Kingdom constitution, the colony finally attains dominion status. This may be regarded as the fifth stage, representing complete self-government.

Some general comments should be made on this process of 'apprenticeship in government'. Firstly, it is almost bound to produce friction, especially at the point where the colonial poli-

ticians have a majority of seats in the Legislative Council but possess no control over the executive. The kind of criticism of government policy made by political leaders who have no imminent prospect of being called upon to carry out an alternative policy of their own naturally tends to be very different from what it would be if full parliamentary government were in operation, and they were likely to be asked to form a cabinet as a result of their censure. It is one thing to criticise when out of office, quite another to implement a practical alternative policy when faced with the responsibility. This of course is just another aspect of the axiom that only the exercise of responsible powers can bring out the personal quality of responsibility. At this transitional stage, colonial politicians are necessarily placed in a more or less permanent role of opposition: they are almost bound to be unrealistic in their views.

This raises a further point: though in theory Britain should not abdicate her responsibilities until she is sure that the colonial leaders are capable of good government, how can she be sure before they have actually shown their capabilities in practice? Not until they have actually taken up the load of office and borne it for some time can we judge how effective their rule will be. Some men grow almost incredibly in stature in these circumstances; others reveal their limitations all too clearly. All are more or less bound to make mistakes at first: in theory at least the British Government must estimate how many and how serious these mistakes are likely to be before deciding whether to surrender control.

In actuality, of course, none of these considerations operates as much as it should. There has in fact been a notable gap between theory and practice in British colonial policy since the war, the product of a revolution in practice that is generally concealed in official pronouncements. The method of political advance by stages outlined above, which was operating long before 1939, is still in theory, and to some extent in external form, the method being followed today; but the whole process has been so immensely accelerated since 1945 as to transform its whole character. Stages which were previously conceived of as occupying some ten or fifteen years are now passed through in one year or two, or often omitted altogether. No sooner is a further stage conceded than negotiations begin for admission to

the next. It can no longer be seriously claimed that underlying the whole process is Britain's insistence upon retaining responsibility until she is reasonably confident that the colonial leaders are ready to assume control. In many recent cases it has been obvious that the British authorities could have no real confidence in the capabilities of those taking over power. The fact is that nationalist movements in the colonies have discovered, largely from what happened in India, that if they can create enough embarassment for Britain, she will give way. And nationalist aspirations are highly infectious: the recent emergence of Ghana to dominion status is bound to increase even further the pressure for advancement in other colonies over the next few years.

Though there is still some disagreement in Britain over this radical change in policy, there can be scarcely any doubt that, faced with a choice between, on the one hand, the use of armed troops and tear gas, the imposition of curfews and newspaper censorship, the searching of private houses and religious buildings for caches of weapons, and finally having to capitulate in any case in an atmosphere of bitterness — all against a background of international criticism and the alienation of nations whose friendship we urgently need — and, on the other, a quick concession resulting in goodwill and future co-operation, we have virtually no choice. Although it is desirable not to appear to give way to force, our consciousness of our responsibilities, which compels us to take a cautious attitude, often makes this difficult to avoid. In these circumstances statesmanship seems to consist of foreseeing the trend of developments, and anticipating and thus forestalling demands — though only by as much as is necessary.

One of the more surprising features of recent colonial development has been the apparent inability of many colonial politicians to see that the door they are kicking against is already unfastened. A good example perhaps is the statement in a Convention People's Party manifesto during the 1954 elections in the Gold Coast: 'The forthcoming general election will be the deciding factor as to whether we attain self-government now or languish further under foreign imperialist domination' — when the colony had already been experiencing virtually complete self-government for three years. While the explanation for this

sort of extravagance is probably its convenience for whipping up enthusiasm among party supporters, it is poor tribute to the realism or honesty of the party leaders. At least we have the compensation that when we do eventually fulfil our promises and go, the result is usually incredulity followed by gratitude for what we have accomplished and sincere goodwill.

The fact is, of course, that we can blame ourselves for much of the political discontent in our colonies. By educating natives in our own political literature, which stresses the advance of democratic forms of government, and by holding before them from the beginning the ideal of self-government, we ourselves have greatly stimulated their demands. Nevertheless, though other nations criticise us for this attitude, preferring to concentrate on economic and social advancement and avoiding or prohibiting any discussion of political development, it is probable — as will be seen in Chapter V — that they are being not more, but less, realistic than we are. Though we may make a wrong emphasis, even natives, being human beings, are political animals.

Indirect Rule

The above general survey is of course over-simplified: in particular it omits any reference to a number of difficult problems that often arise during the course of constitutional advance. An attempt is made to overcome some of these by the device known as 'indirect rule'.

This term was first used to describe the system built up in the 1890's by Lord Lugard, perhaps the most influential of all Britain's representatives in Africa, when as a young official in Nigeria he found himself faced with the task of imposing law and order and of fostering progress within a vast region, peopled by millions of inhabitants, with extremely limited resources. His solution, later adopted in many other quarters, notably in East Africa, was in a sense a development of the protectorate system. Instead of setting up an extensive colonial administration, he worked through the existing native authorities, supervising them to ensure efficiency and gradually, through advice, remodelling them in the shape of British democratic institutions.

There are two difficult problems which this method helps to solve. (It must be admitted that its main attraction to a hard-

pressed Colonial Office at the time of its adoption was its cheapness.) Firstly, it can be used to avoid the abrupt transition from the native culture to our highly individualistic European civilisation which, as we have recently seen in Kenya, can produce the most alarming and distressing results. In the nineteenth century, most colonisers believed that the best they could do for a native was to transform him as quickly as possible into a European. With the growth of the new science of anthropology, however, we have come to realise that native customs, misguided and cruel though they may often appear, are usually part of a moral system, and have a social purpose. To destroy them before the native has developed European attitudes to the point where they are second nature to him means that he is left without any system of morality or social cohesion. Severe personal or tribal distress, reaching often to complete moral breakdown, can be the result. It is astonishing how deeply-rooted and persistent the old tribal outlook proves to be, even after several generations of a native people have fully participated in a European society. Even the New Zealand Maoris, the most completely Europeanised of native peoples, still tend to a surprising degree to retain the traits of their former paternalistic tribal society, where there was little or no individual responsibility, to such an extent that they find it most difficult to adjust themselves to the impersonality of our highly individualistic form of civilisation. By facilitating the development of European institutions gradually from native forms — by producing, for example, the evolution of an elected Local Government authority from the tribal chieftain and his council of elders — 'indirect rule' can prolong and thus ease the transition.

Secondly, it can be used to offset the unequal development of urban and rural natives. One of the problems facing colonial governments in the process of abdicating power is the fact that in many colonies there are two types of natives: the great majority who are rural peasantry, a large proportion of them still illiterate, living probably in fairly primitive conditions and little interested in political affairs beyond their own villages; and a minority of town-dwellers, schooled if not always educated, highly articulate and vehemently political. Naturally, the demand for self-government tends to come from this latter group; but obviously they are no more representative of the colony —

and probably even less concerned with the real interests of the majority — than the British Colonial Government. It is difficult to surrender power to them with a clear conscience; but difficult in practice to refuse. By building up local government institutions to balance advance at the centre, and by giving rural peoples experience in self-government, 'indirect rule' helps to redress the weight of town and country. In addition, if the local authorities are given sufficient powers, it may, by creating a bridge between the tribe and the central government, help to solve another serious problem increasingly emerging in a number of colonies as they reach an advanced stage of development — their lack of unity. Composed as they are of groups of tribes differing in language, race and culture, many colonies will obviously experience great difficulties in developing mutual trust and consciousness of common interest. In most cases the adoption of the remedy usually suggested — a federal constitution — would be a mistake. As federation is rather an inflexible form of government and often perpetuates sectional conflicts, it should be employed only when unavoidable — for very large political units. Moreover, it requires large numbers of legislators and administrators, and in most colonies political ability is likely to be a rare asset and administrative expense a serious consideration. On the other hand the grant of extensive, though subordinate, powers to local authorities can be very helpful as a means of permitting considerable autonomy amidst general unity.

Though itself a solution to certain problems, 'indirect rule' unfortunately raises other difficulties of its own. The most notable of these is the fact that tribal authorities are often naturally conservative, and their exercise of power tends to be resented by an impatient younger generation who are probably better educated than their tribal rulers and demand faster advance towards democratic forms. In some cases, through undue enthusiasm for 'indirect rule', District Officers gave tribal authorities much greater powers than they had previously possessed in the tribal society. Tribal institutions are often more democratic in practice than they outwardly may seem, the chief being less the autocrat he appears than a spokesman who senses and expresses what is really the majority opinion among the elders. Thus some tribal leaders, through powers mistakenly

added to them, have tended to become despots: we find ourselves supporting reactionaries, and earn the resentment of the new generation. Many native authorities, on the other hand, are enlightened administrators, but resist over-hasty democratic advance for the same reason as ourselves — they feel, with a good deal of justification, that their people are not ready for it. Thus indirect rule can result in serious tension, and produce a difficult position for the colonial government obliged to act as umpire.

A notable recent tendency in discussions of the problem of adapting native cultures and institutions to the individualistic European form of civilisation has been a reversion towards the belief, assumed without question by missionaries and colonial officials in the nineteenth century before the emergence of anthropology as a science, that the change should be pressed through as rapidly as possible. Many authorities, including many administrators and a new school of anthropologists, are now coming to believe that the policy of attempting to prolong the transition — one of the reasons, as has been seen, for the widespread adoption of 'indirect rule' — has been mistaken. It is now being argued that the predominance of the family or tribe in primitive societies, centred mainly upon the communal ownership of land, and making it almost impossible for the able individual to advance himself, imposes too great a restraint upon their economic progress, and therefore should be broken down as quickly as possible; and that in any case the transitional stage is bound to be frustrating and is therefore best traversed rapidly. Though its only notable public expression so far has been in the Report of the Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa, (the 'Dow Commission'), published in 1955 — which may well prove a landmark in British colonial policy — this view has been finding increasing support in a number of quarters in recent years. The problem will be a vital one in the coming phase of colonial development.

Federation

Although it was stated above that the adoption of a federal form of government would be a mistake in many colonies, this applied of course to countries which are not large enough to support a federal constitution within their own territories. On

the other hand there has been a very marked recent tendency in the colonies towards the formation of federations among groups of countries. This has arisen from the extremely rapid pace of recent political advance. Though it has always been held in theory that the ultimate destiny of every colony was to become completely self-governing, the rapid advances of the post-war years have brought many of them face to face with the practical problem that they are simply not large enough by themselves to exercise all the functions of self-government. Full self-government requires a diplomatic service and an army, navy and air force. Though in all but the larger states these can only be rudimentary in size, many colonies now passing through the final stages of political development — the West Indian islands are a good example — are much too small even to contemplate such instruments of sovereignty even on the most laughable scale. But a group of countries would be able to support them jointly. Hence in a number of cases federation is being resorted to as a means of achieving the final advance to dominion status.

Another advantage of federation is that of greater economic viability and stability. The larger a state, the greater the total sum and variety of its resources and thus — one would normally expect — the greater the stability of its economy. Thus a federation is likely to be much more attractive to investors than a single, small colony. To a group of colonies greatly in need of capital — a notable example is the group of central African colonies which formed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland — this is a most important consideration. At the present time, of course, virtually all colonies are in urgent need of investment.

Further, where a group of contiguous colonies is passing through a vital phase of development, and especially if their economies are complementary — again Northern Rhodesia with its copper ore, Southern Rhodesia with its coal, and Nyasaland with its abundant labour supply form a good example — joint planning may bring enormous advantages. Co-operation among neighbouring states is bound to be much less effective than single-minded planning by a sole authority. In the case of central Africa, in fact, one impelling reason for federation was the virtual impossibility of obtaining agreement on hydro-electric development because of the intense rivalry between Southern

and Northern Rhodesia over their two projects — the Kariba Gorge and Kafue schemes respectively. (Eventually, after the creation of the Federation — though not without much heart-burning — it was the Kariba plan that was adopted, although the Kafue project is also to be proceeded with when the Federation can afford it. Railway development in the Federation area also demanded unitary planning and financing.)

In addition to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the West Indian Federation, other examples in the Commonwealth are the Federation of Malaya and the attempt to preserve the cohesion of Nigeria by means of a federal constitution. Further, Dr. Nkrumah has mooted a West African Federation; and it was a vague reference to a possible East African Federation that precipitated the trouble leading to the deposition of the Kabaka of Buganda. There is of course nothing new in this solution: Australia, Canada, the Union of South Africa, and now India and Pakistan, are all examples of federations within the Commonwealth. The 'integration' accepted in principle for Malta, which will be examined in another chapter, represents another device to overcome this difficulty of granting full self-government to a colony which is not large enough to exercise all its functions: in the case of Malta, there are no neighbouring colonies with which she could conveniently federate.

A similar problem that has recently risen to prominence as a result of the rapidity of political advances is the difficulty concerning colonies of strategic importance. Although the bases on many colonies are necessary for the security of the Commonwealth, and in many cases vital for the Western World, their retention by Britain naturally arouses the resentment of colonial nationalist movements. Colonial leaders demand that their continued tenure be based upon free agreement between Britain and the newly emergent states; but military authorities are reluctant to depend upon treaty rights, which may later be revoked (and always tend to be suspected as 'imperialism in disguise'), and point out that bases are of little use without the close co-operation of the local authorities in providing necessary utilities — such as water supplies, port facilities and communications. Colonies where this problem arises include Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Aden and Singapore.

There appears to be no alternative, however, to giving way to

the demands of the local political leaders: the rule applies just as much in these cases as in other colonies that it is impracticable to maintain authority over a population without the consent of its leaders. We have really no choice, therefore, but to hope that the colonial politicians concerned will develop sufficient responsibility to realise that adequate protection is an essential guarantee if their newly-won independence is to have meaning. There is no complete freedom of action for small states in the modern world — sovereignty really consists of freedom of choice between protectors. Unfortunately, many of the new leaders show little sign as yet of realising this.

Social and Economic Development

It seems, therefore, that Britain can return a very fair answer to the charges of imperialism made against her in so far as they refer to alleged frustration of political development — as far at least as colonies not containing a large European element among a native population are concerned. (The more complicated question of colonies with mixed populations will be dealt with separately in the next chapter. Moreover, it is futile to try to discuss this question merely in vague, abstract terms of justice and human rights, as so many of her critics do. She is rather more vulnerable, however, to charges of unrealism concerning some aspects of her past policies. Obviously the self-governing democracy we have professed as the aim for our colonies requires a high level of education and general culture for the colonial peoples; and this in turn requires a high level of economic development. Yet until recently, though we have done a great deal in these directions, we have not accomplished nearly as much as was desirable and possible. Nevertheless our shortcomings do not justify charges of 'exploitation': they have been due rather to mere human imperfection, in the form of lack of imagination and vision.

Fundamentally our failure to achieve more rapid development was due to the general acceptance of two principles: (1) that each colony should as a general rule balance its own revenue and expenditure; (2) that economic development should be left to private enterprise. The first of these principles meant virtually that each colonial government was expected to finance the creation of social services — education and health

services, for instance — and in addition the communications necessary for economic development, out of its own revenue: in other words the colony was being called upon to lift itself by its bootlaces. It was recognised that colonial governments must operate with very limited resources, and that the problems facing them were immense, so that grants-in-aid were readily available — and considerable sums were actually paid out — to governments which failed to achieve a balance; but they were expected to make the attempt. Undoubtedly this was unrealistic: how for instance could sufficient taxation to provide schools for his children be raised from a peasant whose income might be as little as twenty pounds a year — as is the case in many colonies? The situation obviously required a completely different approach if worth-while progress were to be made: if we were to be realistic in our professions of fostering the development of civilised standards and self-government, there could be no escape from the necessity of providing large systematic grants of money from the United Kingdom Treasury.

The second principle was equally unrealistic. The fact is that a great many of our colonies — and this is particularly true of those in Africa — offer little attraction to private investors. In many colonies the natural resources are very scanty; and in the others the profits are not likely to be such as to compensate for the risks involved. Although the failure of the 'ground-nuts scheme' brought forth a torrent of ridicule in the British popular press, and even now a lecturer has only to mention ground-nuts to raise a burst of laughter, there is no escaping the fact that there must be many more 'ground-nuts' failures — even if projects are not seriously mismanaged, as was of course true in the notorious 'ground-nuts' case — before colonial development can proceed very much further. While there have been a number of cases in which large profits have been returned by colonial enterprises, so many, on the other hand, have resulted in complete failure that it has been calculated that the overall return on private capital invested in Africa, for instance, has been less than four per cent. Other avenues for investment, in Britain and the Dominions, have been much more attractive. Thus the available capital has gone into them, rather than into the colonies.

Another important obstacle to the development of the

colonies by free enterprise has been the lack of communications. Although in some cases a private company has been able to build its own roads and bridges, railway, or even port, the tremendous expenditure required has often made an otherwise sound project — such as the mining of a rich vein of mineral ore — quite uneconomic. This despite the fact that the construction of the necessary communications would enable the development of other new production in the same area. As it is a form of investment on which there can rarely be a direct return, the development of communications is obviously a matter requiring government intervention. (The result will of course ultimately be to greatly increase the local revenue.)

Further, many authorities have argued that, because of the important political implications of their policy decisions, large-scale industrial enterprises in the colonies should in any case be under government control. There would seem to be a strong case at any rate for a proportion of the profits of successful undertakings to be devoted to the social services of the territories in which they are located, though not to such an extent as would reduce dividends to a level likely to discourage investment. Many large companies have already on their own initiative done a great deal for the social betterment of their native workers; but this is a matter that should not be left to private decision. There are also a number of instances where exclusive concessions of mining rights granted in some colonies many years ago should now be reviewed, even if this should amount in theory to the breaking of a contract.

Though many of our critics accuse us of having 'exploited' the colonies in the sense of having impoverished their people or deliberately impeded their economic advancement, there is in fact little justification for this charge. While we cannot deny having neglected to advance them as rapidly as we can now see was possible, Britain has in fact done a very great deal for the all-round betterment of her colonial peoples throughout the whole period of the last hundred or so years. The unseen labours of thousands of lonely, devoted, poorly-rewarded District Officers are one of the brightest, though rarely chronicled, phases of our national history. On the other hand, when it is asked why the British taxpayer did not contribute more to colonial development, it may well be retorted: 'Why should he'?

Britain's standard of living has owed relatively little to the colonial empire. Until very recently, it has formed neither an important market nor an important source of raw materials and food. Britain's prosperity in the past was due mainly to her advanced industrialisation and her trade with the colonies of European settlement (the present Dominions) and the American continent and Europe. Economically the colonies have not, until the last few decades, been a very valuable asset. Their main value, emerging only recently, has been in their important contribution to the Sterling Area dollar earnings. They have rather been a liability and a heavy responsibility; and our main shortcoming has been failure to appreciate the character and full extent of this responsibility. The nature of the problem of development was simply not seen as we now can see it; there was no public questioning of the assumptions on which policy was proceeding.

Post-War Development and Welfare Policy

Though we must admit the inadequacy of our previous colonial policy, the criticisms of neglect and unrealism are no longer valid, for a little-known revolution in policy has taken place during and since the recent war, involving the abandonment of the previously-accepted principle that the British Government should not take an active role in economic and social development. It has taken the form mainly of the series of measures known as the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. Although the first act passed under this title became law as long ago as 1929, this was only a very timid beginning, providing for the expenditure of the totally inadequate sum of one million pounds annually for the whole Colonial Empire. Even so the Act was only partly a colonial measure, its main motivation, arising out of the trade depression at the time, being the hope of fostering employment in Britain. Moreover it was only half-implemented, about five million pounds — about half the sum provided for — having been spent by 1939.

The true turning-point dates from 1940, the Act of that year setting aside £5,000,000 annually for economic and social development with in addition £500,000 each year for research into colonial problems. This was the first occasion on which colonial social services had been made the subject of a sys-

tematic anticipatory grant. To guide the expenditure, colonial governments were requested to draw up plans for future development; these plans were later expanded and extended; and there can be few colonies today that are not engaged in an elaborate long-term development programme. Since 1940 there has been a constant succession of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts, each providing for a further increase in the amounts granted. The current Act, passed in 1955, makes provision for the expenditure of £120,000,000 over the period 1955–60 — the figure of £20,000,000 a year being thus four times the annual grant in 1940. If precedent is any guide, it will be superseded long before 1960 by yet another measure.

A further manifestation of this new policy was the creation in 1948 of the Colonial Development Corporation, which was granted a credit of £100,000,000 at the Treasury and given the task of initiating and supervising projects for developing new production in the colonies. The Corporation does not dispense its funds in non-recoverable grants — the form of assistance provided under the Development and Welfare Acts — but uses them for investment. While not expected to earn profits on all its capital, it is directed to balance its accounts — that is, it is expected to balance losses on some investments by means of the profits on the remainder. It is typical of the difficulties of colonial development, however, that the Corporation is finding even these apparently lenient conditions most difficult to fulfil. The fact is that while an unsuccessful project is likely to result in the loss of hundreds of thousands or even millions of pounds — the loss on the ground-nuts scheme amounted to £36,000,000 — the profits earned by a successful scheme are generally measured in tens of thousands: thus it takes a large number of notable successes to balance a single failure. Yet, venturing as it does into new fields, the Corporation is bound to meet with a large number of failures.

By the end of 1954, when the Corporation had invested £27,400,000, its accumulated deficit already amounted to the alarming figure of £9,000,000. The installation of a vigorous new Director in the person of Lord Reith, however, who immediately closed down a large number of unpromising projects, has resulted in a small profit being returned in subsequent years.

An interesting result of all this Colonial Office activity has been its catalytic effect. The provision of communications in particular has opened up possibilities for many other projects. Many colonies have thus supplemented the British expenditure by raising loans on their own account, and private enterprise has also become much more active than previously. The total value of development plans is now in the region of £500,000,000. Some of the progress made has been quite spectacular. Many colonies have doubled their school population since 1945, while in some it has been trebled; and in some cases hospital accommodation has also been doubled. No fewer than six colonial universities have been created since 1945: Ibadan in Nigeria, Makere in Uganda, the University Colleges of the Gold Coast, Malaya, and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Even so, the needs of the colonies are still tremendous. For instance, though the present school population of Nigeria — about one million — represents a tremendous advance since the war, this is still a very small figure for a total population of 30,000,000. While there are limits to the rate at which capital can be absorbed, fixed by the limited supplies of raw materials and numbers of technicians available, most authorities are agreed — though there has been some dispute on the point — that these are still far from being reached, and that the most urgent need at the moment is for still more risk capital. Britain does not appear to be able to generate enough, either from government or private sources; even the Colonial Development Corporation terms seem too restrictive. Some colonies have obtained loans from the International Bank. But the Bank requires governments to guarantee interest repayments, and thus hardly meets the need for risk capital: as a rule colonial governments are not in a position to be able to shoulder this commitment.

The most likely solution would seem to be an international fund, probably associated with the United Nations, offering very lenient terms. But the creation of such a body would be dependent both upon the attitude of the United States, which would be likely to demand at least the opening-up of the preferential markets in the colonies, and British approval, which would not be easily given. The colonies would also have to compete for aid with the undeveloped newly independent nations of the Middle

East and South East Asia. Nevertheless something of the sort seems necessary if the colonies are to receive sufficient aid to progress at an acceptable speed; and if they should come to demand this aid as a right, and not merely as an act of generosity, as seems likely, a difficult political situation could result.

Chapter Four

EMERGENT COMMONWEALTH — II. SOME LEADING BRITISH COLONIES

GHANA

Though since March 1957, Ghana, formerly the Gold Coast, has been no longer a colony, but a dominion, it is probably best considered alongside the leading colonies. Its emergence to dominion status has, more than any other event, marked the revolution in British colonial policy since the recent war, and will undoubtedly intensify still further the demands other colonies are already pressing for further political advancement. Like Nigeria, which is endeavouring to follow closely behind, Ghana also forms a test case for our policy. As its inhabitants, living in their primitive tribal state only fifty years ago, have now been exercising most of the powers of self-government for some years, it provides us with some evidence on whether our abdication of power has been premature.

Before 1939, political advance was proceeding gradually, on the usual lines. The local political party, the United Gold Coast Convention, led by Dr. Danquah, was content to operate by the normal constitutional methods of agitation and propaganda. The situation was completely changed after the war with the advent of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Educated at a mission school and Achimota College, Nkrumah first became a teacher, then proceeded to Lincoln University — a negro institution — in the United States, and eventually came to London to be admitted to Gray's Inn in 1945. In 1947 he accepted an invitation to return to the Gold Coast to become secretary of the UGCC. By 1949, however, discontented with its moderation, he formed the Convention People's Party and proceeded to create the utmost embarassment for the government by means of hostile demonstrations and strikes. He was completely suc-

cessful, rapidly outstripping the UGCC for popular support and by 1951 compelling the government to give way.

The Gold Coast was pitch-forked into democracy. Elections were instituted for the whole country, no fewer than 75 members being elected out of a parliament of 84. The CPP won a resounding victory; Nkrumah, in gaol at the time for fomenting disorder, was released and appointed Chief Minister, and allowed to appoint six members of a cabinet of eight. In 1954 there was a further advance, Nkrumah forming a complete ministry from an all-elected parliament and taking the title of Prime Minister. Then in March 1957, the final advance was made to dominion status. The new name, Ghana, revives memories of an ancient kingdom, half fact, half legend, that once extended over a considerable area of West Africa: the choice is thus symbolic of an ambition to pave the way for a unified West African state.

How well has Nkrumah's ministry governed in the period, since 1951, in which it has enjoyed almost complete powers? On the whole, though there has been a number of disquieting developments, its performance has been quite creditable; Nkrumah and his leading colleagues have shown fair judgment and responsibility. Shortly after coming into office, they dropped the more extravagant parts of their programme, such as a promise of free public transport and sweeping measures of nationalisation; they succeeded in wiping out the 'swollen shoots' disease afflicting the cocoa plants — a difficult problem, as it was necessary to persuade the peasants to destroy all the affected trees; and they were quick to order an enquiry into allegations of corruption, which cleared all but some minor officials. Another mark of responsibility has been the encouragement they have given to British civil servants to remain in the Dominion, and their attempts to recruit more. Naturally there is always strong pressure within nationalist movements for administrative posts to be transferred to local people, long before there are sufficient local candidates competent to fill them: thus the new government's recognition of the need to retain British officials for some time yet, unusual among colonial political parties, amounts almost to statesmanship. Nkrumah particularly has impressed most observers with his capacity; a number of his colleagues also seem to be measuring up to their task.

On the other hand, Ghana has so far enjoyed very favourable conditions. The country has been prosperous, obtaining high prices for its cocoa, of which it produces forty per cent of world supplies, as well as considerable gold, aluminium and tin. Government is a much easier task when funds are ample; but cocoa prices are now falling, and difficulties may lie ahead. There have also been some disquieting features of Ghana politics, arising out of the dominant position of the CPP. Sooner or later opposition is bound to emerge even in the areas — by no means the whole of the country — now dominated by the CPP; but, from its present attitudes, there is considerable doubt that the CPP will permit it to organise. Already violence has been used against critics in some areas: there is a real danger of totalitarianism. Some of the present idolisation of Nkrumah — expressed for instance in the circulation of a 'CPP Creed' beginning 'He suffered under British rule; was imprisoned in Fort James prison; but was released and rose again to become Premier . . .' — which he apparently does little to discourage, leaves a nasty taste in the mouth. The fact that an M.P.'s salary, £960, represents unheard-of wealth to Africans has resulted in unseemly contests for candidacies at elections — yet it is clearly necessary that M.P.s and Ministers should enjoy salaries comparable with those of the British civil servants with whom they work. The CPP has also been strongly criticised in some quarters for the apparent callousness and haste with which it has swept aside tribal authorities to make way for democratic institutions of local government; but it should be remarked that, as was noted above, anthropologists are now beginnning to question the wisdom of the former British policy of attempting to bring about this transition in gradual stages. The CPP may well be wiser than their critics on this question.

The main problem facing the country as it passed through the final steps to dominion status — a deep-seated problem likely to arise again in the future — was the reluctance of a large element in the Northern Territories and the Ashanti Federation to pass under centralised rule. Like all West African countries, Ghana is an artificial unit, created by the historical accident of colonial rule. It consists of three strata: the coastal region, formerly the colony proper, where the natives, long in contact with European civilisation, have been detribalised for

many years and are considerably advanced socially; the territory of the Ashanti Federation, formerly a protectorate, where the tribal structure still persists (the Federation is a federation of tribes) and the population is much more backward: and the Northern Territories, also a protectorate formerly, consisting of Moslem emirates established many years ago by Semitic slave traders from across the Sahara by conquest of the native peoples — also much more backward socially and politically.

As it became apparent that Britain was about to relinquish her rule, an opposition party was formed, an alliance of the Northern People's Party, based in the Northern Territories, and the National Liberation Movement, based in the Ashanti region, which demanded that a federal constitution be established. It declared that it would offer armed resistance to centralised rule, which it regarded as domination of the country by the coastal natives. But it was obvious that federation, which would be over-elaborate for a country of five million people and would result in a harmful dispersion of effort, would be a grave mistake. The Colonial Secretary therefore announced in 1956 that he would decide the matter according to the support received by the different parties at elections held in July: these resulted in the CPP winning 71 of the 104 seats, including 27 as opposed to the Opposition's 32 in the Opposition's own areas. As it appeared from these results that the CPP had considerable support even in the inland regions, and could thus claim to be a national party, it was now announced that the country would be permitted to advance to dominion status as promised, as a unitary state.

Still, however, the Opposition persisted in their refusal to accept a unitary state. After Colonial Office mediation, therefore, plans were drawn up, and accepted by both parties, for the creation of regional assemblies in addition to the central government, with control of education, health services, communications, public works and police. They are to be provided with their own funds, the details of how these will be furnished being as yet undecided. In addition each of the regions, of which there are to be five in all, is to have a House of Chiefs with advisory powers.

The attainment of agreement on this difficult issue, which averted what appeared to be a most inflammable situation, re-

flected great credit on all concerned — the Colonial Office and the two political parties. Even so, the future will not be easy in such a heterogeneous state: it is to be hoped that the statesmanship that marked the birth of Ghana will continue to be shown by the leaders who will have to bear the burden of her government.

Recently further misgivings have been aroused by the action of the Government, in July 1957, in exiling two Opposition leaders, and in August prosecuting a British newspaper correspondent who had been strongly critical of this measure. The prosecution was unsuccessful; but the journalist's defending counsel was then prevented from re-entering the country for a further trial. Further incidents of this kind would bring immense discredit upon Ghana.

Nigeria

Close behind Ghana on the path to dominion status follows Nigeria. The two countries have passed through similar successive stages in their advance since 1945, and the situation in both is broadly similar, as they are both all-African in racial composition. In the case of Nigeria, however, there is the complication that the country, possessing a population of 30,000,000, is already a federation, and must obviously remain one. In fact the main difficulty with Nigeria is that of persuading the three Regions, which regard each other with deep enmity, to co-operate sufficiently to preserve federation and thus prevent three Dominions emerging, with endless possibilities for friction, instead of one.

A federal constitution, granting a large measure of self-government, was set up in 1951 in response to nationalist clamour, with a considerable share of authority vested in the central government. But by 1954, when further advance was due, it had become apparent that the measure of co-operation required for the successful operation of this system was more than could be obtained. The new constitution therefore gave greater autonomy to the Regions, which became almost completely self-governing, subject to certain safeguards against legislation of a type that would make the continuance and later strengthening of federation impossible. In the Federal legislature there are 9 official and nominated members and 184

elected representatives, half of these from the Northern Region, and a quarter each from the Eastern and Western Regions. Further revision was due in 1956, with the Eastern and Western Regions expecting full self-government, while the Northern Region had always preferred to advance more cautiously.

The Western Region is comparatively wealthy, with large cities and advanced tribal organisation. The main people, the Yoruba, include a community of flourishing merchants, who for many years have traded for thousands of miles along the western coast of Africa. Their political party is the Action Group, led by Mr. Awolowo. In the Eastern Region social and economic organisation had not advanced until recently to anything like the same degree. The main tribe, the Ibos, are vigorous, thrusting individualists who, newly emergent from their former primitive society, are now making their way into openings in all parts of Nigeria. Their party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, led by Dr. Azikwe, has recently not only been able to win control of the city councils of Lagos and Ibadan, the main cities of the Western Region, but also won more seats than the Action Group in the Region in the Federal elections. The NCNC alone wants unity for Nigeria, to obtain a share of the wealth of the Western Region and openings for the Ibos in the backward Northern Region. The Northern Region is completely different again: like the Northern Territories of Ghana, it consists largely of a collection of Moslem emirates, established centuries ago by slave traders. It is the main original area, and remained the model, of Lugard's 'indirect rule'. The Emirs maintain a high standard of administration and have been advancing their peoples steadily, though at nothing like the pace of the two southern Regions. Progress has been solid rather than spectacular. With good reason, the Emirs are reluctant to rush their peoples into democracy; but it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to hold to their own sober pace beside the impetuosity of the south. Naturally, the southerners resent the drag of the North upon the advance of Nigeria as a whole: federation seems necessary, yet how can federation be implemented as the pattern of advance towards dominion status while the North holds back? Moreover the Emirs now face the further difficulty that, because of their previous slow progress, they are desperately lacking in educated

men from their own Region to staff the greatly enlarged administration necessary under the accelerated advance that has been forced upon them; yet they are naturally extremely reluctant to employ the Ibos who are pressing for the posts. The dominant political party in the Region is the Northern People's Congress, virtually a vehicle of the rulers, led by the Sardauna of Sokoto (the Sardauna is the hereditary chief minister of the Sultan). Opposition parties, much more democratic in tendency, are beginning to appear. While the Northern Region has a polyglot mixture of about 40 peoples, nearly all speaking their own language — making the administrative difficulties almost overwhelming — the main races are the Hausa and Fulani.

The performance of the southern politicians so far does not seem, unfortunately, to have matched the standard of Nkrumah and the CPP in Ghana. Both Awolowo and Azikwe have made use of loopholes in the constitutional safeguards to undermine the position of the British civil servants, thus losing a large proportion at a time when their services are urgently needed. There has been heavy expenditure on spectacular but unsound schemes for abolishing illiteracy; corruption, nepotism and sheer inefficiency in administration are fairly widespread; and there has been little serious attention to what should be the main concern of the governments — economic development. An example of irresponsibility is Azikwe's insistence upon the creation of a University College of Eastern Nigeria, in addition to the present college at Ibadan (which happens to be in the Western Region), though this will involve enormous expense, and though for many years yet the output from the schools of the whole of Nigeria will not be nearly sufficient to make anything like adequate use of the facilities of Ibadan.

As was mentioned above, a conference on the next stage of advance for Nigeria, when some form of dominion status was hoped for, was expected to take place in 1956. It was delayed, however, to await the report of an enquiry into Azikwe's connection with the African Continental Bank, which was his creation and which had been saved from liquidation by the deposit of government funds. Though the findings seriously compromised Azikwe in British eyes, they did not seem to have notably lowered his credit among the Ibos, as appeared from the clear victory he was accorded in subsequent regional elections.

When it eventually met, in May and June 1957, the conference proved rather inconclusive. Although at the last moment the Northern Region unexpectedly joined with the two southern Regions in demanding an early date for complete federal self-government, the British Government refused to fix upon a date: it was agreed that the question be considered again in 1960, when it is hoped a number of difficult issues requiring previous decision will have been settled. These include the problem of whether the federation should consist of three, six or more Regions, and the allocation of revenues and financial powers, and are to be delegated to a number of commissions. Meanwhile the Eastern and Western Regions are to proceed to full regional self-government in the near future, while the Northern Region expects to follow them in 1959.

Uganda

Uganda is yet another British African dependency where constitutional progress has been complicated by localism. The country is a collection of tribes, some ranking as kingdoms, by far the largest being the Kingdom of Buganda, each of which has been in separate protectorate relations with Britain. Since the country must obviously be governed as a unit under modern conditions, in recent years the British authorities have been attempting to set up a central Legislative Council as a first step on the path to complete self-government. But this policy was gravely interrupted in November 1953 by the crisis which resulted in the deposition of the Kabaka (or King) of Buganda.

A comparatively sophisticated and highly organised state, Buganda has a long tradition of military conquest and lordship over the neighbouring tribes, of which its people are still very conscious. Always reluctant to merge their identity with Uganda as a whole, they were hesitant about sending forward the three representatives they had been allotted on the new Legislative Council, when their hesitation was turned into refusal by a vague unguarded reference by the Colonial Secretary at that time, Sir Oliver Lyttelton, at a London banquet, to the possibility of Uganda eventually forming, together with Kenya and Tanganyika, an East African Federation. This caused great alarm. So far Uganda has been an all-African territory; and any suggestion of association with the Europeans of Kenya

rouses deep misgivings among the people, especially after the imposition of federation upon the protectorates of central Africa, despite the disapproval of their native population. Moreover native leaders have viewed with pronounced suspicion the construction of the Owen Falls Dam on Lake Victoria, which is bound to result in an important development of industry in the area and thus, they fear, in the introduction of a large European element into their population, with the likely emergence of an industrial colour bar. Again, the parallel is with the copper mines of Northern Rhodesia. The Buganda leaders therefore viewed the surrender of some of their authority to a central legislative council as the first stage in the loss of their independence in a multi-racial federation.

The Governor therefore instructed the Kabaka, who is obliged to support British policy, by the terms of the Protectorate Treaty of 1902, to press his parliament, or Lukiko, to give way and send the representatives to the Council. But here a complication appeared: for many years now the Buganda government, reluctantly and under pressure from the British authorities, has been steadily reforming the Lukiko, which was originally an assembly of tribal officials dependent ultimately on the Kabaka, into an elected body. (Fear of the democratic forces that will be released by industrialisation is another reason for the suspicious attitude of the tribal authorities towards the Owen Falls Dam.) By this time the position had been reached where about half the members were elected. Protesting that he did not have sufficient authority to overcome the opposition of the Lukiko, the Kabaka, Mutesa II, refused to court unpopularity by pressing this advice: the Governor thereupon deposed him.

The result was grave distress among the people of Buganda, who attach mystic qualities to the Kabakaship, and an impossible situation. Eventually, after long interchanges and negotiations, agreement was reached on proposals drawn up by Sir Keith Hancock, as a result of which the Kabaka was permitted to return. The terms, representing a compromise, were as follows. While Buganda is to accept the principle of integration and send representatives to the central Legislative Council, the Lukiko is confirmed in a wide range of powers in local government. It is also to be developed rapidly into a completely demo-

cratic body. The question of an East African Federation is not to be discussed while native opinion remains opposed; and the remodelling of the Legislative Council was also agreed upon. Half its members are now Africans, a large proportion being elected, and three out of the five Ministers are Africans.

Apart from some strain within Buganda between the conservative and radical elements, the situation has been fairly quiet in the country since the Kabaka's return. Since the emergence of Ghana as a Dominion, however, the radicals have become more vocal, and appear to be winning support. Uganda too may soon be pressing for dominion status, and this demand will raise many problems. The repercussions of increased industrialisation have also still to be felt and faced up to. Meanwhile Uganda enjoys a modest prosperity, mainly from coffee and cotton: the government is assisting natives to set themselves up as merchants and establish processing plants, thus preserving more of the profits from the crops for the Africans.

Malaya and Singapore

These two colonies provide recent, typical examples of the common occurence of a government, coming into office under a new constitution, carefully planned after long discussions and negotiations, immediately demanding a radical further advance.

Malaya consists of nine states, each with its own sultan, in a protectorate relationship with Britain, together with the small colonies of Penang and Malacca — parts of the former Straits Settlements, which also included Singapore. Before the war a haphazard decentralised system of government operated, with only four of the sultanates, known as the Federated Malay States, linked in a loose federation. A greater measure of unification was obviously needed for post-war advance.

At first, in 1946, a Malayan Union was hastily created, giving a very subordinate role to the Sultans. But before it was completely established the strong dissatisfaction expressed by the Malays resulted in its being abolished, in 1948. The chief problem in Malaya is that of the relations between the native Malays, who form only slightly more than half of the population, and the Chinese, nearly as numerous, and some Indians. Under the Union liberal franchise terms were to have been instituted,

which would have admitted a large proportion of the Chinese to citizenship: it was discontent with this provision, together with a desire to maintain the powers of the Sultans as a further safeguard against the Chinese, that had aroused Malay opposition. Instead the Federation of Malaya was instituted, covering the Malayan Peninsula but excluding Singapore, which has been advanced separately. Under the Federation the Sultans at first retained much of their authority and a strict franchise operated, so that only 12 per cent on the electoral rolls were Chinese.

Subsequently, however, in the desire to obtain further radical advances, the two main political parties, the United Malay National Organisation and the Malayan Chinese Association, formed an alliance. In the meantime relations between the two main races notably improved: whereas previously the Chinese, who dominate the trade and minor industries of the country, had ruthlessly boycotted every attempt by Malays to establish businesses, there were now actually cases of Malay companies being formed with Chinese assistance. On the other hand, it had largely been the refusal of the Malays to recognise that the Chinese had a permanent stake in Malaya, that had resulted in the Chinese adopting a purely commercial attitude towards the country, thus widening the rift. This was expressed for instance in their refusal to admit Chinese to their schools, necessitating the creation by the Chinese of a school system of their own. Thus the improvement in relations was cumulative in effect, each party becoming much more tolerant of the other. Nevertheless the alliance is an uneasy one. Now that its main objective, the attainment of independence, has been achieved, there are signs of the old rivalry re-emerging.

The pressure of the UMNO-MCA Alliance, led by the Tenku Abdul Rahman, did in fact produce a rapid constitutional advance. Until 1955 the Federal Legislative Council contained no elected members. The constitution established in that year, after long study and discussion, provides for 98 members, 52 being elected — on single, common electoral rolls — and the remainder being mostly representatives of the Sultans and important commercial and labour interests, together with a few officials.

In 1952 Britain had declared that complete self-government would not be possible for Malaya as long as the emergency created by the Communist-Terrorists continued. During 1956,

however, Abdul Rahman successfully argued that not until self-government were granted could the emergency be ended. Though the Communists have not succeeded in mounting a nationalist movement, and are in fact only a handful in numbers, it is extremely difficult to suppress them in the jungle except by depriving them of supplies. For this purpose the co-operation of the local people is required, even when they have been gathered into villages surrounded by wire. It was necessary, therefore, to convince the people that the campaign against the Communists was being conducted by a freely elected government of the country, and not by the British authorities in defence of their own interests; and this could only be achieved by granting Malaya full self-government, even in the sphere of internal security.

Abdul Rahman was granted control of the security operations immediately: the security forces, which include 25,000 United Kingdom and Dominion troops, are now directed by a council of which the Prime Minister is Chairman and containing a majority of Malayans. In February, 1957, the terms were next announced of the new constitution, which came into force on August 31 ('Merdeka Day'), under which the Federation advanced to the status of a full member of the Commonwealth. They included a curious provision for the position of head of the state ('Yang di-Pertuan Besar') to be filled in turn, for five-year terms of office, by the Sultans in order of seniority. Thus Malaya is not a dominion in the usual sense of the term: the Queen is not the head of the Malayan state, though the Federation recognises her as the Head of the Commonwealth, in the fashion of India and Pakistan. The legislature is to comprise two houses — a fully elected House of Representatives and a Senate consisting of 22 members elected by the State legislatures and 11 nominated by the Head of State. (As, in order to enable the proposed changes in citizenship to be effected, elections are not to be held until 1959, the present Legislative Council is to operate as the lower House in the meantime.) The States are to become separate constitutional monarchies within the limits of their autonomy. The difficult question of citizenship is to be settled on liberal lines, the main provision being a requirement of five years residence out of the preceding seven in the case of those born in Malaya, eight years out of the previous twelve for

those not Malayan-born but resident in the country on Merdeka Day, and ten years in other cases. An elementary knowledge of Malay will also be necessary in the future, but will not be required of applicants in the first year. The Legislative Council subsequently passed a bill providing for the creation of a national system of education, in which instruction in Malay will be compulsory in all schools but other languages will also be taught in appropriate circumstances.

While Britain has agreed to assist the Federation financially, in its security operations, in external defence and in the training of Malayan forces, Malaya for its part has agreed to Britain maintaining in the country the forces necessary to fulfil its Commonwealth and international obligations.

In the case of Singapore, recent advance towards self-government has not been so smooth, though generally keeping pace, as that of its neighbour. A major difficulty has been that Singapore is so small in population and so dependent on British trade and the British base. For this reason Singapore politicians have wanted the island to become part of the Malayan Federation. But whereas Malaya's 6,000,000 population divides almost equally between Malays and Chinese (with also a large number of Indians), with the Malays in a slight majority, 800,000 of Singapore's million or so inhabitants are Chinese, with the result that their inclusion in Malaya would tip the balance there in favour of the Chinese. Thus the proposal is firmly rejected by the UNMO leaders.

In 1948 Singapore was granted a Legislative Council of 22 members, of whom 9 were elected. Further advances since then have brought the number to 32, including 25 elected members. The franchise qualification is liberal, the main requirement being three years continuous residence immediately prior to the election. Politics in Singapore have been turbulent. Left-wing elements are dominant, but are split into so many conflicting groups that the governments that have so far held power — both Labour Front coalitions — have been able to retain office only with the support of the official members of the Council. Extremist factions are ready to use violence, and order has been maintained only precariously.

It was the problem of internal security that delayed Singapore's further advance. When in 1956 the island's first Prime

Minister, the melodramatic David Marshall, followed Abdul Rahman to London to demand 'merdeka', though conceding that Britain must retain control of external security he asked for full self-government in all domestic matters, with the exception that Britain should have the right to intervene if internal security collapsed. The British Government, however, arguing that it must be in a position to prevent such a situation arising, insisted upon internal security being placed under the surveillance of a joint council, in which the British representatives should have a majority. Mr. Marshall thus resigned, and was succeeded by Mr. Lim Yew Hock.

When Mr. Lim in turn made the journey to London in March 1957, it was Britain that gave way on the disputed point. The concession appears to have been made possible partly as a result of Lim's firmness in handling the disorderly elements in Singapore, partly by the reduced value now placed by Britain upon the base, and therefore the lessened concern with the question of safeguarding it from the effects of local anarchy. At all events, it was agreed that the Internal Security Council should be chaired by the British High Commissioner, and should comprise three Singapore representatives, three British, and one from the Malayan Federation, who should thus have the casting vote. Singapore is therefore to have something short of dominion status, but amounting to virtually complete domestic self-government.

The West Indies

Like the rest of the dependencies, the West Indian islands have all made notable advances in self-government since 1945. As most of them have Legislative Councils of very long standing, some dating back to the sixteenth century, much of the ground recently made up has consisted of extensions of the franchise. Most now have fully or almost fully elected Councils which appoint a majority of the ministers. The main difficulty impeding further advance has been the smallness of the individual colonies, which meant that separately they were too small to carry the burdens of complete self-government.

The solution has been seen in federation which, it is hoped, will also strengthen the islands economically. This project was first suggested by the Colonial Office in 1945. A conference to

discuss the matter was held at Montego Bay in 1947, when certain difficulties appeared, due mainly to the fears of the wealthier colonies — though the term is used purely as a relative one — of the effect of being linked to the poorer islands. In particular, the wealthier islands, which at present impose restrictions, were afraid of the effects of immigration from their neighbours. A committee was set up to consider the proposal, however, and reported in 1950. A conference was then held in London in 1953 at which agreement was reached on the main principles; next a conference at Trinidad in 1955 overcame most of the difficulties still remaining, and set up three commissions to plan arrangements. One, given the task of recommending the future capital — a thorny problem — reported a first preference for Barbados, with Jamaica as second choice; but was overridden at a subsequent conference, which fixed upon Trinidad. British Guiana, whose constitution has been suspended since 1952 because of the irresponsible attitude of the leading political party, and British Honduras, the two mainland colonies, have decided against inclusion.

It now appears evident that the federation will emerge, and that it will take much the usual form. There will be a two-chamber central legislature, one chamber giving equal representation to most of the islands, the other representation according to population. The federal organs will also have the major powers. What is less evident is whether federation will do much to overcome the outstanding problem of the Indies — their chronic poverty. Despite the objective of achieving dominion status, it appears that Britain will have to give economic aid to the islands for many years yet, especially for the planned development which alone can mitigate their present lack of productive resources.

MALTA

Malta forms a particular case of a colony that has now reached the stage of desiring full self-government, but which is too small and too dependent on Britain economically to become a dominion. The island is almost entirely dependent economically on the British naval dockyard. The present Labour Party Government, led by Mr. Dom Mintoff, came into power in February 1955 on a platform advocating a solution through

'integration' — the representation of the island in the British Parliament at Westminster. It is proposed that in addition, as in the case of Northern Ireland, there should be a separate Maltese Parliament for certain local matters. Despite the general belief that this would be impracticable, the Nationalist opposition, led by Mr. Borg Olivier, favours dominion status. Though these have not been apparent for many years, the Nationalists were previously marked by pro-Italian sympathies. The position on the island is complicated by the attitude of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, which disapproves of the 'integration' proposal on the ground that in its present form it does not afford satisfactory guarantees for the Church's present very considerable privileges.

There are two motives behind the plea for 'integration': to raise the status of the Maltese to full equality with that of United Kingdom citizens, and to lift the economy of the island to the United Kingdom level. The Labour Party argue that Malta should be viewed as far as possible as a British dockyard town. They propose that the British Government should supply development aid over a transition period until comparable living-standards are attained. In October 1955 an all-party Round Table Commission investigated the proposal and recommended its acceptance, though it was not convinced that the economic aspect was completely practicable. Accepting this recommendation in principle, the British Government insisted on a plebiscite to ensure that there was majority support for the proposal on the island. When this was held in February 1956, 75 per cent of the votes cast supported integration, but only 60 per cent of the electorate had voted (compared with 82 per cent at the 1956 election), the Nationalists having instructed their followers to boycott the poll. Nevertheless the British Government declared itself satisfied with the result.

Since then, however, negotiations have lagged. There has been disagreement over the present disbursement of financial aid. Recently anxiety has also arisen in the island over the future of the base, in view of the re-casting of British defence policy.

Chapter Five

BLACK AND WHITE: THE RACIAL PROBLEM

If it is right to argue that Britain's policy concerning the concession of self-government to colonial peoples should be discussed less in terms of abstract conceptions of justice and human rights — and too often it is debated entirely in these terms — than in terms of the practical difficulties involved, then the same judgment also applies concerning the racial problem in the colonies. Here too Britain often has to face bitter criticism from left-wing sources, which can do her immense harm in view of the rise of the Afro-Asian bloc as an important element in the world balance of power; yet here again her justification of her policy is often only half understood, and makes little impact. In fact the racial problem is in many respects merely a particular aspect of the whole question of colonial relationships, though of very great importance for our adaption to the new world situation created by the emergence of nationalism among so many peoples subject until recently to Western rule.

And here again a superficial view of the present position in those of our colonies containing a mixed population of natives and European settlers, and in some cases immigrants from other territories or continents as well, gives apparent support to the charges made against us. In most of these colonies one sees a small population of settlers occupying generous allotments of fertile land and enjoying political privileges, while the vast majority of the inhabitants — the natives — are kept to a much lower political status and confined to reserves which are as a rule gravely overcrowded, with the soil impoverished through over-grazing by their cattle. At first sight, of course, this appears to be gross exploitation. Yet this is much too simple a view. Before the natives can be advanced educational and social ser-

vices must be established; but these are costly. Since the amount of taxation that can be raised from a community depends largely upon the level of its income, in order to provide them on an adequate scale the economy of the colony must be developed. Yet native agricultural methods are very backward and harmful to the soil. In most parts of Africa, for instance, the natives regard cattle as a form of currency and prefer quantity to quality, refusing to kill off their inferior beasts and thus running large herds which over-graze the pastures and reduce the better animals to the level of the worst. Moreover, there is little hope of much improvement in their practices for many years, despite all the educational work of government departments: native peasants are notoriously conservative. Thus the raising of the national income of the colony will depend for many years yet upon the European farmers, and to dispossess them of their land and parcel it out among the natives would greatly reduce productivity and deal a grave blow to the prospects of advancing the natives. It would obviously be in the worst interests of the natives themselves.

There is much more to be said on this problem of land distribution, which is of central importance in the whole question of race relations, and we shall return to it later. Our purpose in making a brief reference to it here has merely been to illustrate the general point that the racial problem is largely one of overcoming practical difficulties, and not merely a question of superficially 'equal' or 'fair' treatment.

Fundamentally the racial problem in our colonies is the problem of reconciling the advancement of the natives — social, economic and, above all, political — with the reasonable security of the European settlers. If the natives are advanced to equal political rights with the Europeans, eventually, through their much larger numbers, they will be in a position to impose policies discriminating against the Europeans. If they do so, or in any other way prove incapable of governing efficiently and wisely, they may well destroy the whole fabric of civilisation that the Europeans and European governments have built up. Should we take this risk? Can it be avoided? If the natives must be advanced, as seems unquestionable, can any device be found that will advance them at an adequate rate while minimising the very real dangers of serious clashes of interest and inter-

racial bitterness? Can the rate of advance be both adequate and acceptable to the Europeans?

The British approach to the problem, best represented by the 'Partnership' policy now emerging in the Central African Federation, is based on the belief that the risks cannot be avoided — for the only alternative, to try to hold the natives in permanent subjection, seems impracticable and bound to lead ultimately to implacable resentment and a tragic explosion — but that there is some hope of achieving a satisfactory solution. This is to be attempted by actively assisting the development of the natives and by giving full political rights, equal to those of the Europeans, to those who attain adequate standards of civilisation. Thus it may be hoped that, as they acquire a share of political power, the natives will come to see that continued co-operation with the Europeans is in their own best interests.

In both its general character and some notable details, 'Partnership' continues long-standing traditions of British native policy. For this reason, and because, as will be seen, there are signs of similar policies emerging in other British dependencies, and since it is further developed than racial policy in any other British territory, it seems justifiable to regard it as the representative British policy. Nevertheless, the recent deliberate acceptance of these traditions and their further clarification and development in the Central African Federation mark an important turning-point in our colonial history. They make the Federation a notable centre of interest as far as the racial problem is concerned — the scene of an experiment that will be crucial for future world-wide relations between Europeans and non-Europeans.

Yet, despite this clarification and development, 'Partnership' has not so far been adequately defined. In fact many critics of the Europeans in the Federation, including many liberal thinkers in Britain, suspect, largely on the previous record of the Southern Rhodesians — the main element in the Federation, who previously followed a native policy similar to that of the Union of South Africa — that it does not really signify any new departure. They view the term as merely a meaningless catchword coined in order to counter criticism, particularly the opposition in Britain to the creation of the Federation. It is true that precise definition is impossible, largely because, being

typically British, 'Partnership' is above all an empirical policy, depending very little upon fixed preconceptions and designed to be modified as experience shows necessary. Nevertheless the writer believes an important change has taken place in the thinking of leading Southern Rhodesians, and that 'Partnership' does represent a sincere new approach to the racial problem. While many of the developments on which this opinion is based might appear trivial in Britain, in the environment of Central Africa they amount almost to a revolution.

The easiest way to explain 'Partnership' is to contrast it with 'Apartheid'. This is in fact a natural approach, since Partnership emerged as a new racial policy largely through revulsion from the policy of Apartheid being pursued in South Africa. Though economic and political considerations were also of primary importance — in particular, Rhodesians have long resented the continuance of restrictions upon their sovereignty and viewed federation partly as a means of obtaining Dominion status — one of the main motivations that led to the creation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (the official title) was a sudden alarm on the part of Rhodesian leaders at the course that events were beginning to take in the Union.

This was despite the fact, as noted above, that until recently, despite the survival of some vestiges of earlier British policy, Southern Rhodesia was tending to follow in much the same direction as the Union in native affairs. Moreover it had long been assumed that eventually, through the pull of economic forces and pressure for conformity in racial matters, Southern Rhodesia would be drawn into the Union. Following the recent war, however, with the rise to power of the Nationalist Party in the Union, representing the Afrikaans-speaking element, and its prosecution, in Apartheid, of an extreme policy of racial domination, Rhodesian leaders became alarmed. Brought face to face with the consequences of pressing domination to its logical conclusions, they came round to the view, held by most British people outside the Union, that it is a misguided policy, bound sooner or later to produce lamentable and perhaps fearful results. They determined that they must be free to follow an alternative course.

Nevertheless they could hardly work out and apply a different policy unless they were in a position to withstand the magnetic

pull of the Union. The Federation proposal offered them a means of reinforcement by merging with other British territories to the north. Thus Southern Rhodesia was made part of a larger unit, capable of separate economic and political development. This was the meaning of the statement made in the House of Commons by the Colonial Secretary at that time when the Federation Bill was being debated that the Federation 'represented the British solution of the racial problem'.

Thus, with a view to understanding what appears to be meant by the term 'Partnership', let us first examine 'Apartheid'.

Apartheid

Literally, the word 'Apartheid' means 'separateness'. In general theory, the Apartheid policy is one of keeping the different races separate. But the purpose of separation — and the Nationalists make no secret of this — is European domination: many Nationalist leaders, including the present Prime Minister, Mr. Strydom, prefer the term 'baaskap', which literally means 'domination'. Confronted with the problem that, since they outnumber the Europeans by about four to one, the elevation of the natives to political equality could well imperil the whole society the Europeans have created, the Nationalists can see only one course to take — to attempt to keep the natives in permanent subjection. They plan to achieve this by separating them completely from the Europeans, claiming that only in this way can 'European civilisation' be preserved in Southern Africa.

Three streams of thought and sentiment lie behind the Apartheid policy.

(*a*) The belief that the natives are inherently inferior to Europeans — a belief supported by the teaching of the Dutch Reformed Church, which has played a prominent part in the development of the conception of Apartheid. It preaches that natives are descendents of the tribe of Ham, preordained by the Creator to be 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' for the remainder of the tribes of Israel — these of course being represented by the Europeans. Thus any attempt, based upon the mistaken idea that all human beings are equals, to raise the natives to a position of sharing authority with the Europeans is held to be both morally wrong and bound to result in the destruction of civilisation.

(*b*) The fear of European workers that competition from the natives would lower their standard of living. They feel their hold on their present employment to be very precarious in the midst of the vast reservoir of cheap native labour. This fear has increased recently — making a notable contribution to the rise of the Nationalist Party — through the growth of the 'poor white' problem. In every community one finds a proportion of persons who, through lack of ability, cannot rise far up the scale of labour, and generally comprise those who perform the more menial and distasteful work — such as the removal of refuse. In South Africa this class are 'poor whites'; but because of the need to preserve the standing of the white race, it is held that the most advanced African worker must be kept below their level, in employment status and remuneration. In effect, of course, this means that the African cannot be allowed to advance beyond unskilled labouring work. (As is obvious from the fact that some natives attend universities and take degrees, not all of them remain at this occupational level; but those who rise higher must work among their own people.)

The political importance of this particular motivation has increased markedly in recent years as the result of a large increase in the number of 'poor whites'. With the growing mechanisation of agriculture — a development which is having profound effects on South Africa, as on all agricultural countries — a much smaller force of farm workers is now needed. Thousands of workers have been losing their employment and making their way to the towns. Many of these men, who are almost all Afrikaans-speaking, have had a very limited education, little having been thought necessary in their former environment. Few possess any abilities that would qualify them for anything better than simple labouring work. Their influx into the towns has turned the balance against the English-speaking South Africans, who are largely town-dwellers, in many marginal electorates, making a notable contribution to Nationalist election victories and to the increased pressure for Apartheid.

(*c*) Another important motivating force behind the Apartheid policy has been the deep-seated revulsion of the Europeans against mixing European and native blood through intermarriage. According to the Nationalists, this would be an inevitable result of permitting the natives to mix freely with

Europeans as social equals, and would eventually bring about the submergence of European blood.

The policy, therefore, of the Nationalist Party, which has been in office in the Union since 1948, is to keep the races segregated as completely as possible: this is what is meant by 'Apartheid'. Separation is to be imposed in three spheres: social, economic, and political.

Social. This aspect of Apartheid policy is partly expressed in the maintenance and strengthening of the 'colour bar', as observed in the use of separate facilities for public transport, recreation, the post office, and so on. In many cases this is enforced by law in South Africa. One recent measure strengthening the 'colour bar' was the *Mixed Marriages Act* of 1950, prohibiting marriage between different races. The most important legislation under this heading, however, has been the *Group Areas Act*, also of 1950, under which the Union is to be divided into areas each to be occupied exclusively by people of one race. This will of course, when implemented, be a major step towards Apartheid. If Apartheid were carried out completely, as some Nationalist leaders wish, natives would be completely excluded from the towns and confined to their reserves — where, in theory, they would be free to erect towns and cities of their own. At present natives living in towns are generally understood to be there only on sufferance, for the convenience of the Europeans and only so long as they are working for Europeans. To compel them to conform to this conception the law obliges them to carry passes — in some instances as many as half a dozen are required — which have to be renewed at frequent intervals. If the native leaves his employment, his permission to remain in the district is withdrawn and he is thus forced to return to the reserve. The mere obligation to renew his passes is a considerable imposition, involving the spending of a number of days every few weeks standing in long queues. Moreover, on the ground that his residence is only temporary, the native may not acquire a freehold tenure in a town. Under the Group Areas Act, it is not proposed as yet to follow the extreme policy of excluding natives altogether from the towns, but a compromise has been adopted. Each town is to be divided into European and Native Residential Areas, with the Native Area carefully chosen so as to be away from main roads and to enable the natives to

proceed to their work without passing more than can be avoided through European areas. Native labour is to continue, but as far as possible is to be concealed from view!

Also under the heading of social segregation, probably, falls the policy of *disbanding native military units*. This step has been taken on the ground that natives should not be permitted to bear arms. A further measure of social policy has been the recent decision that the content of *native education* be different from that provided for European children, in accordance with the different status of natives. The Government has stated that it will withdraw its grants — on which they are virtually dependent — from mission schools which refuse to follow its new syllabus. In 1957 Apartheid was directed to the highest level of education by the *Separate Universities Education Bill*, still under consideration, which proposes to terminate the right now exercised by two universities — Cape Town and the Witwatersrand — to admit non-Europeans. It proposes that the education of non-Europeans at university level shall be separate, in colleges controlled by the state.

Economic. Racial discrimination in industry is operated largely through trade unionism, by means of the agreements reached between unions and employers. It has, however, received considerable support from the state. While native unions are not prohibited, they are accorded no legal recognition, and the *Industrial Conciliation Act* of 1956 prohibits the continuance of mixed unions. As there were no mixed unions of whites and natives, it applied mainly to unions of whites and 'Coloureds' or Indians, but the formation of mixed unions of any kind is prohibited for the future. The *Native Building Workers Act* of 1951 specifically limits the sphere of employment of natives in the building industry; and under the Conciliation Act the Minister of Labour was also given wide powers to reserve certain occupations for specified races. Curiously, the Nationalists still retain some of the old hostility to modern industrial society that was so marked among the Boers at the turn of the century, and pay little heed to the interests of industry, which is largely controlled by the English-speaking element. The prosecution of Apartheid is given higher priority than the demands of industrial efficiency.

Political. On the political side, Apartheid has taken the form

of the attempt by the Nationalists to remove the 'coloured' voters from the electoral roll in the Cape Colony — the main political issue in the Union in recent years. When the Union was formed by the South Africa Act of 1909, it was agreed that each province should retain its existing electoral system, and that this provision should be one of the 'entrenched clauses' of the constitution, which can be amended only by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of Parliament. At that time the system operating in Cape Colony was the long-standing British one of including all persons qualifying for the vote, Europeans, natives or Coloureds, on the same 'common' roll. (In South African terminology, quite different from the American usage, a 'coloured' person is someone of mixed blood.) In the other provinces, only Europeans could register. In 1936, by the required two-thirds majority, the native voters were removed; the recent struggle concerned the Coloureds, who still remained. In 1951, contending that the Union Parliament was now completely sovereign and no longer bound by the 1909 Act, which was passed by the British Parliament at Westminster, the Government passed the *Separate Representation Act*, removing the Coloureds, by a simple majority, and claimed that this enactment was valid. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the 1909 Act, representing a compact agreed among the South African peoples as the basis of the Union, still limited the powers of the Union Parliament, and it therefore disallowed the new measure.

The Government next took two further steps in pursuit of their objective. They enlarged the Supreme Court from five judges to eleven, the new members being chosen as likely to support the Government in the event of the bill being re-enacted or a similar conflict between Government and judiciary arising. They also completely remodelled the upper house of Parliament, the Senate, greatly increasing their representation in the process and so making sure of obtaining the two-thirds majority required. By means of these measures they have now carried their bill. These two manœuvres have greatly alarmed the English-speaking element in the Union, not so much for their effect on race relations but because they have swept away the safeguards provided by the device of the 'entrenched clauses' for the English population. Another of these clauses, for

instance, formed the safeguard for the English language; and the Nationalists have often made it clear that they intend to favour Afrikaans at the expense of English. To the Nationalist plea that the will of the majority in Parliament should not be thwarted the English element reply by pointing to the compact on which the Union is founded. (A claim made by the Nationalists that there was no compact, in the sense that the Boer leaders willingly agreed to the Union constitution, but that the 1909 Act was imposed on the Afrikaners without their consent, seems historically untrue.) They also draw attention to the fact that, through the working of the electoral system, which gives extra weight to the rural areas, the National Party, though in a majority in Parliament, does not have the support of a majority of the electors. It is also true, of course, that the remodelling of the Senate, upsetting as it does the previous distribution of power among the provinces, represents another serious breach of the 1909 compact.

In removing the Coloureds from the roll, the Nationalists argued they were not depriving them of representation. Under the *Bantu Authorities Act*, a system of tribal councils is planned, under which the natives will have considerable powers of self-government within their own areas. But the European parliament will of course have supreme authority over the country as a whole. These tribal organs will also supersede the Native Representative Council set up when the natives were removed from the roll in 1936, which had only advisory powers, proved quite ineffective, and eventually collapsed through lack of interest.

In addition to the 2,500,000 Europeans, (some 60 per cent of whom are Afrikaners), 8,000,000 Africans, and 1,000,000 Coloureds, the population of the Union includes a large element of Indians, numbering some 300,000, nearly all living in Natal. Serious race riots between natives and Indians, due largely to resentment of the dominant position the Indians have obtained for themselves in commerce, occur from time to time in Durban. The presence of the Indians, for whom separate areas are planned under the Group Areas Act, adds a troublesome complication to the already embarassingly difficult Apartheid programme.

Virtually the whole of world opinion outside the Union

disapproves of the Apartheid policy: on what grounds can it be objected to? With some justification, the Nationalists hotly reject charges that their treatment of the natives is cruel or oppressive: most Afrikaners appear to regard the natives with sincere patriarchal affection, as children who should be kept in their place but nevertheless cared for by their superiors. Though the mode of life of a large number is lamentable by any civilised standards, on the whole the South African natives enjoy much better living conditions and more generous social services than any others on the African continent, with the exception of the small proportion of urbanised natives in the Belgian Congo. (The amounts spent per head on health and education in 1951–1952 were £1 6s. 11d. and 15s. 9d. respectively, the figures for other territories being as follows: Kenya, 5s. 1d. and 4s., Nigeria, 1s. 2d. and 1s. 8d., Belgian Congo 5s. 8d. and 3s. 8d., Gold Coast 4s. 6d. and 6s. 1d. For Southern Rhodesia education expenditure was 6s. 7d. Income per head was £23 2s. for the Union natives — the figure for all races being £69 3s. — compared with £8 6s. for Southern Rhodesia, £5 9s. for Kenya and £9 6s. in the Belgian Congo.) Having voted large sums of money for the well-being of the natives, the Nationalists point with some effect to how much more they have done for their material welfare than previous governments controlled by the English-speaking element and British governments in other parts of Africa. Their record is also rather better from this aspect than that of the municipalities, which are also controlled by the English-speaking section. It is true, nevertheless, that the tyrannical treatment Apartheid involves in practice — including such irritations as the pass system — undoubtedly amounts to real cruelty and degradation.

It is difficult, however, to condemn Apartheid in completely convincing fashion on moral grounds. If the Nationalists are correct in arguing that the mass of the natives are inherently incapable of attaining European standards, it could be said, perhaps, that their paternalistic policy is morally sound. No-one knows, in fact, how much or how little the mass of Africans are capable of if given favourable opportunities. One can merely assert — the point cannot be proved — one's contrary belief that many Africans at least are probably capable of European standards, and that their present general backwardness is due

very largely to their environment. Nevertheless it does seem that the Apartheid policy ignores the patent fact that a number at least of educated Africans have proved themselves extremely intelligent and capable. Even if the vast majority prove incapable of attaining civilised levels — a highly doubtful proposition — it seems morally wrong to keep all, merely on account of their colour, in a permanently inferior status. And whatever the validity of Nationalist racial theory, the cruelties that result from the present form of its implementation are surely self-condemnatory.

A very effective criticism that can be levelled against Apartheid is that it is impracticable. It is manifestly impossible for two-and-a-half million Europeans to keep ten million Africans, in a continent of Africans, in permanent subjection. The mere policy of segregation in itself, even if it were not bound up with attempted domination, would necessarily, at some time in the future, arouse deep resentment: it is fantastically unrealistic to argue, as the Nationalists do, that the Africans will be free to develop their own civilised society — with, presumably, their own cities, railways, and other means of communications — in their own areas. Already the reserves are overcrowded and impoverished and, with the steady eviction of 'squatters' from the farms — another product of the mechanisation of agriculture — annually become worse. Progress on such lines would be intolerably slow. If he is to advance at a reasonable pace, the African can do so only within a European society. To shut him out, and thus deprive him of his only real hope of progress, is to foster resentment that will sooner or later produce a bitter explosion.

There is no alternative, in short, to giving the African the opportunity to advance, accepting the fact that eventually he may be in a position to impose his will on the European, and endeavouring to win his goodwill in the hope that, if and when the day comes, he will see that continued co-operation will be in his own best interests. Unfortunately, however, there is probably a danger point — a 'point of no return' — in the development of race relations. Once resentment has risen to a certain pitch, the damage can probably never be undone: subsequent gestures of goodwill, made with the best of intentions, are almost bound to be misinterpreted. Once this point is passed, the explosion can

hardly be averted. It seems probable that South Africa has already passed this point.

On the purely economic plane, the Apartheid policy also seems seriously mistaken. It is extremely wasteful, in at least three important respects. In the first place, the Group Areas Act will require the removal and rehousing of about a quarter of the entire population — an extremely expensive non-productive use of resources at a time when the Union needs all the resources it can employ for the development of production. Secondly, by depriving industry of its main potential source of semi-skilled labour, Apartheid will impose an immense handicap upon the economy in the advance to higher productivity. The world is now passing through a new and vital phase in the industrial revolution in which the need is no longer, as it was in the recent past, for a small force of skilled workers and a large force of unskilled labour, but for a very much larger proportion of semi-skilled workers. In fact many authorities contend that this development, by producing a new situation in which it is in the interests of both Europeans and natives that the advancement of the natives should be accelerated, has made the prospect of a harmonious solution to the racial problem very much more likely — in other parts of Africa at least. By continuing to try to confine the Africans to unskilled work, however, South Africa is turning against the tide of history and crippling her economic advance.

Thirdly, Apartheid is extremely wasteful of land. At the moment, since he cannot look forward to permanent residence in the towns, the urban African tends to leave his family behind on the reserve, keeping his home in being against the day of his return. In addition to the moral troubles this practice creates, through the long separation of the men from their women-folk, it greatly contributes to the over-crowding on the reserves. Only the permanent urbanisation of a large proportion of Africans will in fact enable them to attain an adequate standard of living. In reality, a large proportion of urban natives at present are permanent, illegal town-dwellers, carrying on a precarious existence without the required passes.

The fantastic cost of Apartheid was clearly brought home to South Africans for the first time in 1956 by the report of the Tomlinson Commission, which had been set up under the chair-

manship of a university professor to examine the economics of the policy. Basing its calculations on a rate of progress that, even in fifty years time, would still leave the number of natives in European areas equal to the number of Europeans, the Commission reported that an expenditure of £104,000,000 would be necessary over the first ten years on the development of the reserves to enable them to absorb the necessary number of natives. Though its recommendation on this point was rejected by the Government, the Commission also declared in effect that complete Apartheid would be impracticable by stating that some investment in the reserves by European private enterprise would be required. It also suggested the promotion of freehold land tenure among the natives in the reserves; but the Government also rejected this proposal, announcing that it was opposed to the supercession of tribal ownership. While denying that the costs could be accurately predicted, Government spokesmen agreed that a heavy financial sacrifice would be necessary and declared that the Union could meet the burden. Many authorities, however, believe the Commission's figures to be a considerable underestimate. The Report certainly seems to dispose of the possibility of complete Apartheid in the foreseeable future.

In other respects also the implementation of Apartheid raises serious practical difficulties, notably in the detail of its administration. For instance, to enforce the Mixed Marriages Act it has been thought necessary to require the whole population to obtain certificates establishing their membership of a particular racial group. Though this is of course an impossible matter to determine in many cases, the final decision as to the group to which an individual belongs rests with a minor official: many mistakes, causing serious hardship, are bound to be made. Moreover, since complete Apartheid would mean that Europeans would be deprived of their native domestic servants, many Nationalists are becoming uneasy at the prospect — to have to do one's own housework is an inconceivable imposition in South Africa. Nevertheless several leaders proclaim that there can be no compromise, with the result that the Party shows signs of splitting on this issue.

An alarming side-product of Apartheid is the totalitarian temper of the Nationalist Party. In addition to their interference

with the basis of the constitution, the Nationalists have often used the powers of the state to repress criticism. Passports have been withdrawn and other hindrances to freedom of movement imposed. The *Suppression of Communism Act*, passed in 1954 and providing for the punishment of alleged Communists, defines Communism so vaguely — extending to the advocacy of any change that would lead in the general direction of Communism — that any critic of Apartheid stands in grave danger of prosecution. A group of more than fifty persons, natives and Europeans, were subjected to a mass trial lasting many months under its provisions in 1957. In the 1930's, many Nationalists, conscious of the close similarity between their racial doctrines and those of the Nazis, openly showed their approval of Hitler. Nevertheless the strong tradition of independence in the judicial system (as shown, for instance, by the judges' support of the Union Act of 1909) has so far served as an important barrier against outright totalitarianism.

On the other hand, the opposition of the United Party, representing mainly the English-speaking South Africans, has been sadly ineffective. The fact is that, while many of the English-speaking element disapprove of the doctrinaire extremism of Apartheid, the great majority of European South Africans support the general principles of segregation and domination. The United Party have not dared to make any fundamental criticism, and have thus seemed to differ from the Nationalists only in degree. This policy has brought them little credit, either in the Union or the rest of the world. A stronger line is needed — such as the alternative that is being provided in the Central African Federation.

Partnership

Partnership can most readily be understood by examining Southern Rhodesian native policy under the same headings as those under which we have considered Apartheid, and comparing the two policies. It will be found that in every sphere the tendency is directly opposite. Firstly, however, it should be noted that in its general approach (as well as in one important point of detail — to be noted later) Partnership is fundamentally similar to the long-standing British Colonial Office policy on the racial problem. This is represented by a famous official pro-

nouncement of 1923, made with particular reference to Kenya, but understood as applying to all colonies where the interests of native and European populations were likely to conflict.

Until that time there had been some vacillation in Colonial Office policy in such situations, particularly in the case of Kenya. Following the construction, for strategic and political reasons, of the railway from Mombasa to Lake Victoria (for the purpose of securing our position — contested by other powers — in Uganda), the Colonial Office began, in the years before 1914, to encourage the settlement of Europeans in the Kenya Highlands, through which the railway passed, in order to obtain traffic that would help defray its cost. Though it was thought at the time that the Highlands were empty, this was a false impression arising from the lavish use of land under native farming methods and also the temporary effects of recent epidemics: it was soon found that there was in fact a considerable native population. Thus a conflict of interests arose in which the settlers, augmented after 1918 by a large influx of discharged officers who had been led to invest their gratuities in the purchase of farms, demanded that the Colonial Office, having encouraged them to emigrate, should give them strong support. For some years Colonial Secretaries veered erratically, now favouring the settlers, now the natives. Then in 1923 came the pronouncement, directed specifically to Kenya but enunciated as a general principle of British policy, that henceforth, wherever the interests of natives and European settlers appear to conflict, those of the natives would not be subordinated to those of the Europeans — a decision recognised as one of the main landmarks in Britain's history as a colonial power.

This decision was apparently reached on moral grounds, and Partnership, which is generally discussed in terms of expediency, does not seem to give the interests of the natives quite so high a priority. Under Partnership, the general principle assumed is that the interests of the Europeans and the natives are generally complementary, so that even if the Europeans are given privileges now — in education for instance — this is necessary to enable them to develop the country to the best advantage, and will ultimately be to the benefit of the natives. Further, Partnership rests on the belief that, if the Europeans demonstrate the sincerity of their sympathy for native advancement by giving

them every assistance, the natives will eventually appreciate the value of co-operation with the Europeans. Thus a harmonious mixed society will emerge. (The advocates of 'Partnership' deny that wide-spread intermarriage will occur in this mixed society: they envisage a community where the two races will live side by side, but distinct.)

In looking at Partnership in more detail, it seems convenient to alter the order of the headings under which we considered Apartheid: we shall take them in this sequence — political, economic, social.

Political. The best-known feature of Partnership is its adherence to the traditional British device, as evolved in Cape Colony before 1909 and adopted in Rhodesia under Colonial Office rule, of the *'common' electoral roll.* The principle is followed that every adult who attains a certain level of civilisation is entitled to a vote, whatever his race. Until 1951, the qualification was ability to pass a literacy test and the possession of either an income of £100 annually or property of the value of £100. In that year, because of the depreciation of money with the post-war inflation, these two amounts were raised to £240 a year and £500 respectively. Though probably justifiable, this increase has unfortunately aroused the suspicion among the natives that the wall was raised because many of them were beginning to approach it.

One point worth noting in connection with this device is the fact that, as opposed to Apartheid, it is quite undoctrinaire. It does not involve any prejudging of the question of whether or not the average African is capable of attaining European standards: it merely provides that each individual who does attain them will receive the franchise. If the majority are capable of rising to the required level, eventually they will be in a position to outvote the Europeans; but they may never qualify in sufficient numbers. Lord Malvern, the first Premier and (as Sir Godfrey Huggins) one of the main architects of the Central African Federation, has in fact expressed the opinion that only a small minority would ever qualify; many of his colleagues, however, appear to have higher expectations of the natives. In 1954 there were only 441 Africans, 570 Coloureds, and 594 Asians on the roll in Southern Rhodesia, among 40,000 European voters. In Northern Rhodesia the figures were 856 Asians and Coloureds,

3 Africans; in Nyasaland 75 Asians, no Africans or Coloureds. Voters must also be British subjects, and since these territories are protectorates and the local natives are therefore 'British Protected Persons', very few can qualify. Native leaders have been asking that 'Protected Persons' be also given the franchise, and that the property qualifications be lowered by about a half. It is common knowledge that many more non-Europeans possess the property qualifications but prefer not to register — they would rather hide the knowledge of their income from the tax collector. On the other hand, since they exclude many responsible but poorly paid natives such as school teachers, it is often argued that the present figures have been fixed at too high a level.

Economic. African trade unions were *legalised* in Southern Rhodesia for the first time in 1954. In announcing this step, the Prime Minister, Mr. Garfield Todd, explained that for the moment they would not be accorded the right to strike, but if they proved themselves sufficiently responsible, this privilege would be granted later. African unions had existed on the Copper Belt in Northern Rhodesia for some years previously.

It is in fact on the Copper Belt that the most important recent development concerning Partnership has occurred, though none of the Federation governments were directly implicated. For many years a rigid colour bar, imposed by the European mineworkers' union, has existed in the copper mines. Skilled employment has been kept as the preserve of European workers by the union's insistence upon the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. While European workers earn from £120 to £140 a month, the rates for natives range from about £27 for the highest grades to as low as £7 for the lowest grades. While a number of the Africans were capable of moving into some of the occupations held by Europeans, and the companies were eager to promote them, it was not practicable, because of the lesser reliability of African workers and the greater need of supervision, to pay them at the European rates. In 1954 therefore the companies suggested that some European occupations be 'fragmented', so that Africans could be advanced into the intermediate grades of employment thus created — for instance, instead of having a European foreman and shot-firer to each gang of labourers it was proposed to employ native foremen and a

European shot-firer to groups of five or six gangs. The European union would not agree, however, and long-drawn negotiations ensued. Eventually one of the two companies concerned compromised by signing an agreement with the union under which a handful of Africans would be accorded a moderate advance, following which no more would be advanced without the consent of the union. As this gave the union a veto over any further progress, seriously limiting the possibility of a subsequent further move, the other company regarded it as unacceptable. Eventually it was successful in obtaining an agreement without the veto clause. (This means in addition that the clause may virtually be regarded as void in the other agreement.) Though hedged about with many conditions, this concession marks a momentous step in the development of race relations in Central Africa, amounting to the driving of a wedge into a long-standing institution that was bound to arouse deep resentment among Africans in the near future.

Though obviously the whole Partnership policy would have counted for little unless this breach had been opened in the industrial colour bar, neither the Federation government nor the territorial government intervened in the negotiations. If Africans are to advance, the co-operation of the European workers will be required to train them; thus it was held that it would have been useless to try to impose a new arrangement upon the workers without their consent. In these circumstances the new agreement is all the more satisfactory. The whole incident in fact provides a good illustration of the important truth that Partnership will never be successful without full concurrence and far-sightedness on the part of individual Europeans. In addition, the determination shown by the companies appears to confirm the optimistic view that, by making the advancement of Africans essential to the further development of productivity, the new phase of industrialisation will remove a great deal of the present tension from African race relations.

Social. In the field of social life, a number of measures have been adopted recently in Southern Rhodesia which, though they might seem of little moment to an outsider, appear to mark a significant change of attitude when placed within the southern African environment, especially when compared with Apartheid measures. For example, the Government has begun an

extensive programme of construction of *permanent native housing in the towns* — in direct contrast with the Union policy of permitting the natives in the towns only on temporary sufferance. At the moment the programme is being held up — and thus the Partnership policy is being endangered — by a shortage of finance, the British Government having granted only a quarter of the loan requested. An act was also passed recently, despite strong opposition, permitting the construction of *recreational facilities for natives*, such as swimming pools, cinemas, and tennis courts, *in European housing areas*, with the object of ending the necessity for domestic servants to travel long distances for recreation. The same piece of legislation also provided for the inclusion of living accommodation for both races in the new University College of Rhodesia. Though operating very rigidly through convention, the social colour bar is not established by law in Southern Rhodesia. Proposals have indeed been made to abolish it by means of legislation; but the Government has rejected these on the ground that legislation in advance of European opinion would provoke incidents that would worsen race relations, rather than improve them. Nevertheless failure to break down and abolish the colour bar quickly seems the gravest danger to the success of the whole policy of Partnership.

As a further measure of social policy, Southern Rhodesia is now *re-forming native military units* and restoring arms to native troops. They had previously been disbanded, in line with South African policy.

It is impossible to predict what will be the outcome in the Central African Federation, and difficult to be optimistic. Though it can be hoped that the Federation has not yet reached the 'point of no-return', it cannot be far from it. So far the changes that have taken place, though highly significant, have only touched the surface of the problem; though it is probably true that it would be unwise to force the pace, much deeper changes must be wrought in the very near future if the confidence of the natives is to be won. The situation is out of the control of the British Government; everything now depends upon the Southern Rhodesian citizen. Has he sincerely changed his views, or are the present concessions only window-dressing? Will he raise the voting qualifications again if about to become outnumbered? Already, because of the British decision to force the

natives of the two protectorates into the Federation against their will — a wise decision, for their opposition was an unpractical, escapist attitude, but a risky one — there is considerable leeway to be made up: confidence has already been lost and must be restored. Yet there has been a large influx of Afrikaners into the Federation since the war, forming the largest element among all the post-war immigrants, many bringing their belief in Apartheid with them. Moreover it is probable that the leadership of Lord Malvern contributed a great deal to the victories of the United Party in Southern Rhodesian and the Federal Party in federal elections. With his retirement, the opposition to the new liberal policies, undoubtedly stronger in the country than in the two parliaments, might well, within a few years, carry the day.

Some indication of more recent trends was provided in 1957 with the remodelling of the franchise systems in both the Federation and Southern Rhodesia. The changes in the federal system seem disappointing, and designed more to fob off criticism in Britain that would hinder the further advance to full self-government that the Federal Party leaders are ardently seeking than to promote the Africans to more effective political rights. They consist mainly of the enlarging of the 'ordinary' (in reality European) representation in the federal parliament from 29 to 47 seats (including the three Europeans elected to represent the Africans), and the African representation from 6 to 12 seats; the creation of a federal citizenship that includes British Protected Persons and ends the restriction of the franchise to British subjects; and the institution of a two-tier franchise system. Qualifications for the new 'A' roll have been raised much higher than those for the old common roll, to a level very few Africans can aspire to; and voters on this roll will elect the 47 'ordinary' members. Six of the 12 African representatives are to be elected, as at present, by native district councils; the 6 newly created seats will be filled by means of elections held on the 'A' and 'B' rolls combined, the main qualification for the latter being an income of £15 a month, compared with £20 for the old common roll. 'B' roll voters are never in any poll to have more than half the votes of 'A' roll voters.

Though it will admit many more Africans to the franchise immediately, and can thus superficially be described as ad-

vancing them politically, this new system will of course severely limit the powers they receive, and will also prevent them from obtaining a real share in the governing of the country for an indefinitely long period. The key to its character lies in the extremely high qualifications for the 'A' roll, and the predominant position of the 'A' roll voters. It therefore amounts in reality to a serious departure from Partnership. In making this retrograde step, the Federal Party, under Sir Roy Welensky's leadership, was apparently affected by a swing of opinion away from liberal policies revealed in by-elections.

In Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, the United Federal Party is planning a notable step forward. Nevertheless it had to be driven into a liberal policy by the threat of the Premier, Garfield Todd, to resign unless a franchise were adopted on the lines of the proposals of the Tredgold Commission of 1956. Although these were regarded as very liberal, the franchise eventually agreed upon by the United Party caucus goes considerably further. While the ordinary franchise qualification is to be maintained at its present level, a further range of voters is also to be admitted to the common roll on a special low qualification requiring no means test whatever, but merely an education up to Standard Eight — somewhere around the middle years of an English secondary school. It is also proposed, however, that entry under this special qualification will be closed when the number of special voters reaches twenty per cent of the total of ordinary voters in the colony.

Though this restriction might suggest undue caution to an English reader, it seems only reasonable in the circumstances. It is estimated that some 10,000 new voters will qualify immediately, and probably 16,000 by 1963, compared with the few hundred African votes at present. On the whole, preserving as they do the true common roll, while giving a much larger section of Africans the experience of participation in government, without restricting in any way their prospect of a larger share of power as more of them continue to qualify, as in the past, for the higher franchise, the proposals represent a considerable advance. (Their main limitation at the moment is that they make no provision for the re-opening of the special roll, once it has been closed.) In fact, so strikingly do they conflict with the new federal franchise that the United Party, though always closely

associated in the past with the Federal Party, would now appear to be obliged to make an independent entry into federal politics.

Meanwhile the African Affairs Board of the Federation Parliament declared its objection to the federal proposals, which, therefore, had to await consideration by the British Government. Despite a strong protest by the Opposition, the Government eventually, in November 1957, sanctioned the legislation.

Partnership in Other Colonies

One reason for claiming that Partnership is not merely a Rhodesian concept, but the emerging British answer to the racial problem, is the fact that similar tendencies in native policy can be observed in other colonies where similar situations are arising. *Kenya* is a noteworthy example. Here of course native policy has been greatly complicated by the emergency. Although much of the motivation of the Mau Mau movement was due to a sense of injustice over the usual focus of the native problem — the distribution of land — greatly aggravated by the destruction of the native culture and moral code through the impact of European civilisation, the emergency is not the Kenyan manifestation of the revolt that seems inevitable sooner or later in South Africa. That will be a much more fearful, more sophisticated turbulence, much more difficult to put down. But it has certainly pointed to the dangers ahead, and stimulated a more urgent approach to the racial question. On the other hand it has also made it politically impossible for the moment to introduce measures which might otherwise have been adopted by this time, thus setting back development to some extent.

The new native policy announced by the Government shows close similarities with Partnership in Southern Rhodesia. For instance, all kinds of African and Arab education are to be accelerated, including technical education, which will produce skilled tradesmen. Family homes, available for purchase, are to be built for natives in the towns; native villages are to be created in the White Highlands, from which farm workers will be able to go out to neighbouring European farms, while native tradesmen will be assisted to set themselves up in the villages. A number of light industries will be fostered. There is no doubt that these measures will be of great benefit in relieving overcrowding in the reserves and developing the urbanised life that

alone can furnish an adequate standard of living for African populations. Nevertheless, as some authorities have pointed out, they will need to be coupled with social security services and a raising of wage rates sufficient to permit personal saving: at present the main obstacle to urbanisation is the fact that the family holding in the reserve is the African's only safeguard against sickness or other misfortunes and old age. Yet Kenya's productivity at the moment is quite insufficient to bear the burden these charges would impose, especially on top of the increased expenditure on education. Once again, on closer examination the racial problem reveals itself as being not so much a matter of deciding where justice lies as of overcoming difficult practical obstacles.

On the political side, it has not yet been finally determined how the natives are to be given a share in self-government. Because of the emergency, assurances have been given to the European electors that no change will be made before 1960 in the present system of electing European and non-European representatives separately. In other words — as this declaration is generally understood — the 'common roll' system, if it is to be eventually adopted, will not be instituted before then: it was considered advisable to ensure a period of stability before initiating such a contentious change. Although elections have now been instituted for Africans — previously African representatives have always been nominated — the African voters are registered on a roll of their own and vote for their own separate candidates. A wide franchise has been instituted, and in addition the system has been adopted, following the recommendations of a Special Commissioner, Mr. W. F. Coutts, appointed to consider the matter, of granting extra votes, up to a maximum of three, to natives possessing higher qualifications — such as a superior education or eldership of a church.

So far, to safeguard the interests of the natives in accordance with her 1923 declaration, Britain has not permitted the Kenya settlers to advance very far towards self-government. But even if she maintains a considerable measure of control over the affairs of the colony for some years yet, despite the continued pressure of the Europeans for greater powers, the success of the new native policy, which it seems justifiable to describe as a form of partnership, will largely depend, as in Central Africa, upon its

acceptance by the European population. At the moment it seems rather doubtful that this will be forthcoming.

Recently, in 1954, a marked further instalment of self-government was in fact granted, as part of the creation of what was described as a 'multi-racial' system of government. The term was used in the sense that all races will share in both the legislative and executive powers. Since 1952 the Legislative Council has consisted of 54 members, comprising 8 ex-officio, 18 nominees, 21 elected members (14 Europeans, 6 Asians and one Arab) and 7 native representatives who, as seen above, have recently been chosen by election for the first time. The 1954 changes took the form mainly of the creation of a Council of Ministers, made up of six officials, two nominated members and six unofficial members, of whom three are Europeans, two Asians and one an African. In addition three Under-Secretaries were later appointed, of whom two were Africans.

This development brought about a marked division of opinion among the Europeans. On the one hand the multi-racial principal and the general trend of the Government's native policy were accepted by Michael Blundell, the most prominent figure in Kenya politics, and a group of members who accepted his leadership, but on the other an opposition arose, including most of the remaining European members of the Legislative Council, demanding permanent adherence to separate electorates and the exclusion of natives from the Highlands — apparently the Apartheid alternative. At the first subsequent elections, in September 1956, Blundell's group was in the main successful, but only at the cost of toning-down the liberalism of its policies. Thus though some at least among the Europeans, mainly it seems among the settler element, have come to accept the view, inconceivable even a few years ago, that there is no alternative to shouldering the risks of partnership, they are apparently losing ground to the less liberal section, which is reported to be strongest among the urban Europeans. The chances of racial harmony in Kenya seem to be diminishing.

Meanwhile the first African elections, held early in 1957, resulted in the defeat of the moderate candidates and a clear victory for the Kenya African Congress, led by Mr. Tom Mboya. Mboya is taking up a challenging attitude, demanding an immediate sweeping increase in the African proportion of elected

members. As there are five-and-a-half million Africans in Kenya, compared with 30,000 Europeans and 90,000 Indians, it is difficult to refute his contention that the present African share of representation is grossly disproportionate. This result of the operation of the present electoral system suggests that the Europeans may come to rue the day when they failed, from the beginning, to institute a common roll.

In *Tanganyika*, the only other British colony in Africa with a considerable European element, the problem is as yet not so urgent. Because of the uncertainty concerning the future of the territory due to its status, first as a mandate and later a trust dependency, relatively few Europeans have settled there (a large proportion of those who have done so are Italians), and there has been little friction over land — though recently, with the remarkable extension of coffee-growing among the natives, some discontent has begun to appear. Moreover, the Indian element in Tanganyika, subjects of the Aga Khan, have the reputation of constituting less of a problem, through being most co-operative in their attitude, than Indian communities elsewhere — as in Kenya and Natal. The Legislative Council has 55 members — 28 official, 27 unofficial, comprising 9 Africans, 9 Asians, and 9 Europeans. Although at the moment elections are conducted by means of separate rolls, it is officially proposed to introduce a common roll: it has been stated that this will be effected gradually, a few seats at a time, with educational qualifications for voters. Meanwhile many of the natives are attaining considerable prosperity and bettering themselves culturally through the famous Kilimanjaro Producers' Co-operative Association. This organisation, created by a European but administered largely by the natives themselves, has greatly extended coffee production and, in addition, given the natives invaluable experience of democratic administration. Its headquarters, containing a restaurant, reading and lecture rooms and other recreational facilities, is the show-piece of Tanganyika.

In the *Federation of Malaya* and also in *Singapore*, where the existence together of Chinese, Malay and Indian populations provides a different form of the racial problem, the consistency of British thinking on this subject is shown by the fact that here too common electoral rolls are in use. Here also it is felt that

separate representation on racial lines would destroy the possibility of creating the sense of community that is essential to effective democratic self-government. Though it is too soon to say that harmony has been achieved in Malaya — the much-improved tone of Malay-Chinese relations in recent years gives ground for hope, but may merely be temporary — of Singapore it can at least be said that in recent elections the alignment of the political parties has cut completely across the racial divisions. Since it was formed for the purpose of hastening the concession of full self-government, however, the alliance in the Federation between the Malayan Chinese and Malay political parties may not survive for very long after the ending of colonial rule.

In October, 1957, it was also announced that it was proposed to institute elections in *Uganda*, conducted on a common roll.

Policies of Other Powers

Additional perspective can be obtained for one's view of Partnership by comparing it with the racial policies of other powers. Each of the European colonial powers has adopted a different policy as a means of solving or avoiding the racial problem, some of them based upon analyses of the problem quite different from ours. If their diagnoses are correct, Partnership must be based on false premises. The ultimate test is probably the result achieved: does racial harmony seem a likely prospect in these other colonies?

In *Portugal's* African colonies, Angola and Mozambique, the attempt has been made to avoid the problem. Government measures compel Europeans to do their own manual work. This means there is no colour bar; but this policy is undoubtedly very wasteful of labour. Since, in addition, there has been little investment in either colony, due to Portugal's lack of capital — despite a notable increase recently corresponding to the increased investment in colonies everywhere — both are impoverished. They are sometimes referred to as 'slum corners' of Africa. There is no share in government for either natives or Europeans — a situation which is hardly surprising, since Portugal herself is a dictatorship. So far the natives seem contented; but one suspects that resentment will emerge as development proceeds at a faster rate in the neighbouring territories of other powers.

The *French*, too, have managed to avoid the erection of a colour bar. In all the French colonies, the underlying assumption of policy has always been that the goal of all development is for the natives to become Frenchmen. Thus there is no intention of holding the natives in permanent subjection. Though so far there appears to have been no sign of resistance to this conception in the Equatorial African territories, the recent revolt of the more sophisticated and civilised Algerians — a profound shock to France, since Algeria has long been regarded as her model colony — suggests that trouble may be in store in the Equatorial colonies when they attain a higher stage of development. Nevertheless the policy has been by no means a complete failure: educated Algerians, Tunisians and — to a lesser degree — Moroccans journey regularly to Vichy to take the waters like typical French bourgeoisie and look to Paris rather than Cairo as their cultural home. The revolt in North Africa has been largely political, and is not a product of any suggestion of innate inferiority due to race or colour. The moderates at least wish for no more than home rule, and prefer to retain the French connection: most of their resentment has been directed against the privileges enjoyed by the French 'colons' or European settlers and also, in the case of Algeria, against 'second-class citizenship' — the term used to emphasise the artificiality of regarding Algerians as French citizens while their standard of living is very much lower than that of the Metropolitan French. The main device for buttressing the position of the 'colons' has been that of indirect elections: the electors vote for candidates for electoral colleges, which in turn choose the actual representatives for the legislative body itself. Separate colleges of equal size have been used, despite the much greater number of the native inhabitants, for the colons and natives. In addition, as has been officially admitted, elections have been 'managed' to return candidates acceptable to the government. Devices of this invidious character could hardly be expected to maintain racial harmony. If only the French had lived up to their professions of 'cultural partnership' — which seemed to imply equality for all attaining French civilisation — the results might well have been much more satisfactory. Nevertheless, North Africa seems to show that French colonial peoples will prefer their own national character, even if strongly marked with French

borrowings, to becoming no more than an image of France.

The Equatorial colonies, of course, are much less colonies of mixed settlement than the North African dependencies. Despite the absence of a colour bar, however, there appears to be some danger of racial disharmony there owing to the French practice of employing Frenchmen for even the lowliest posts in colonial government service — down as far, in some instances, as postmen. This deprives the natives of one very important avenue of advancement. One peculiarity of French methods of colonial government, fully consistent with the tendency to view France as the complete repository of the highest wisdom and culture, is the practice of deciding questions of the relationship between Paris and the colonies without consulting the colonial peoples. An instance was the important conference at Brazzaville in 1947, which drafted the constitution of the French Union, and comprised only colonial officials.

Perhaps the most interesting native policy to contrast with Partnership is that followed by *Belgium* in the Belgian Congo. Like the Portuguese, the Belgians attempt to avoid the racial problem, though they do not deny themselves the use of native labour — on the contrary. In effect, they criticise the British approach to the whole problem of advancing Africans as placing far too much stress upon political development. We ourselves, they argue, have fostered much of the discontent that troubles us by placing before Africans the ideal of self-government — an unnecessary stimulus. They have followed the principle that the sounder course is to develop the natives economically and socially without any suggestion of political advancement and, in fact, discouraging political ambitions very severely. In the Congo, therefore, the natives have been actively encouraged to settle permanently in the towns surrounding the great state-operated mining enterprises. They have thus been rapidly detribalised and, in addition to enjoying very high standards of housing, medical services and education, have been encouraged to train for and undertake skilled occupations. At the frontier with Southern Rhodesia, for instance, African drivers and firemen take over and drive into the Congo trains that have been brought to that point by a European crew — natives are not permitted to work on the footplate in British territories. But the least sign of disaffection in a native results in his

immediate return to his village — where conditions, including a measure of compulsory labour to pay taxes, are much less pleasant than in the mining towns.

On the obverse side, this policy is complemented by rigid restrictions upon European immigration. With the object of avoiding the complications and difficulties of a 'poor white' problem, the Government requires every immigrant to be in possession of the sum of fifty thousand francs (about £360), with the result that immigration is severely restricted and, as is of course the intention, European residents are almost all employed in professional or supervisory posts. If a European becomes impoverished for any reason, he is quickly returned to Belgium. Until recently, neither Europeans nor natives enjoyed any share in the government of the Congo, which was administered bureaucratically from Brussels; but, in response to agitation, a limited measure of self-government has been granted in the post-war period. There are native mayors in some of the Congo towns.

Are the Belgians correct in their analysis; do we create unnecessary difficulties for ourselves by deliberately advancing Africans towards self-government? There have been indications recently that Belgium is not being completely successful in her policy. In 1951, for instance, there were no fewer than 3,000 cases of natives being returned to their tribes: agitation has emerged on a significant scale, despite the Government's every endeavour to repress it before discontent could spread. Meanwhile the European settlers have also become uneasy and have demanded the abolition of the restrictions upon immigration. Afraid of the future in a land where they are immensely outnumbered, they are calling for increased immigration to redress the balance.

Though supporters of the Belgian policy might argue that African discontent is an infection that has spread from across the Rhodesian border, experience of the Congo at least does not seem to disprove the British belief that all men are political animals, and must, as their standards of living and education rise, be granted an outlet for political self-expression. In other words, the British reply to Belgian criticism is that Belgian policy misreads the very nature of man. Not that all men, even in Western Europe, show an urgent desire for political rights;

but that every community throws up a politically-ambitious element who must have an outlet.

It is very true, of course, that racial policy is indivisible. Policy in one part of Africa will inevitably have repercussions in other territories, and indeed will contribute to the composite conception of European motivation and intention towards non-Europeans all over the world which has become one of the major forces in international politics. Partnership in Central Africa is bound to influence the domestic situation in South Africa, and also British colonial policy in Kenya; on the wider plane, if Britain does not make clear her disapproval of Apartheid, her relations with the new nations in the Middle East and south-east Asia, whose goodwill is so important to her interests, will inevitably deteriorate. Though neither Europeans nor natives may eventually prove big enough in stature to achieve racial harmony through Partnership, there appears to be no alternative policy worth serious consideration, from either the colonial or the diplomatic — to say nothing of the moral — aspect.

In 1958 Partnership faces a crisis at the focal point, Southern Rhodesia. With a general election approaching, the previous tension within the United Federal Party over racial policy has developed into an open breach. The fears of a large element in the Party that the Premier, Mr. Garfield Todd, was pressing on too rapidly, for the taste of the electorate, with the advancement of the natives resulted in a series of quarrels at the beginning of the year within the Cabinet and the Party. Eventually Todd was forced to resign from the Premiership and later he seceded from the Party, seven of the Party's 29 Members of Parliament following him, to form the United Rhodesia Party — reviving the name formerly used by the United Federal Party. Sir Roy Welensky, the Prime Minister of the Federation, has come out against Todd. The new Party has announced its intention of contesting every seat at the election. Whatever the result, it seems likely to be a momentous event in the development of the racial problem.

Chapter Six

THE UNITED NATIONS

Of all the numerous international organisations whose emergence has marked the rise of 'internationalism' as an important characteristic of the post-war world, the most notable is of course the United Nations. Not that the United Nations, being as it is the successor to the League of Nations, represents a completely new conception. The formation of the League in 1918, the first attempt to create machinery for world-wide international government, constitutes a notable landmark in world history, signifying the emergence of a new phase that the United Nations now re-emphasises. Already in 1918, because of the militant tendencies of modern nationalism and the terrible effects of the application of twentieth-century science to warfare, some institution of this kind seemed to have been made necessary. It seems even more urgent — desperately urgent — now.

The fundamental source of almost all the tension that arises between nations is fear, based upon insecurity. The methods previously used to obtain security have proved ineffective: thus the United Nations represents an attempt to devise a more effective method, and thus eliminate fear. Ever since the emergence of the nation-state as the typical form of political organisation, nations have generally tried to meet their need for security by means of the obvious device — the formation of alliances. But alliances produce counter-alliances, and thus lead to balance-of-power systems. Almost invariably, if country A, feeling itself in an insecure position regarding country B, forms an alliance with country C (a step which may well be taken though B is not contemplating attack on A), country B will then feel insecure. (Since the object of the alliance was to bring preponderant strength to bear against B as a deterrent, this feeling is usually justified.) It will therefore seek an alliance with, say,

country D. But A and C will now again feel insecure, and will seek a third ally: the process tends to repeat itself. Thus, throughout modern history, it has been the normal state of affairs for the European states to be divided into two antagonistic groups. The result has been to multiply tension and fears, rather than reduce them.

The irony of this situation is that each nation considers it is acting defensively; yet the precautions it takes for its security are almost invariably considered by the power against which it is acting to destroy *its* security. In fact, no nation feels completely secure until it enjoys an absolute predominance in strength over a potential enemy; yet the very possession of this strength creates an intolerable situation for the other power concerned. Moreover in international affairs a mere assurance of pacific intentions is worth very little. No responsible statesman can leave his country in a vulnerable position, relying solely on the promise of another power in a position to menace it that advantage will never be taken of this situation. The only exception is when the two states concerned share a strong mutual interest — usually a defence interest against another group of states — and possibly a long tradition of friendship. Further, the security interests of states are normally focused upon certain strategic areas, from which attacks could readily be launched against them. They therefore endeavour — by obtaining control over these themselves — to prevent a potential enemy from controlling them. But such areas are very often also convenient for launching attacks in the opposite direction, and are thus also regarded as vital to its own defence by the potential enemy. A notable example is Korea — a convenient 'springboard' for attack either from Japan into China, or from China upon Japan. Thus a position satisfying one group of powers is almost bound to be unsatisfactory for the opposing group.

Nevertheless, in the past the system worked well enough as a rule. In the first place, the opposing alliances generally settled down at approximately equal strength, thus producing a deadlock which would preserve the peace — for a time at least. Hence the term 'balance-of-power' system. Secondly, in these circumstances it was usually possible for the leaders of the two alliances to agree on some compromise — over such matters,

for instance, as strategic territories. Agreement was generally facillitated by the fact that governments were absolute, which meant that leaders were free to act largely as their own commonsense directed; and also the leaders came to know each other personally, and were often able to develop relations of mutual personal trust. Thus, though far from perfect, the 'balance-of-power' system was adequate enough.

Now, however, because of the increased horror of modern warfare, certain inherent disadvantages in its practical operation have become quite unendurable. Its primitive character is now only too clear, and intolerable. Moreover, the association of nationalism with popular government has made compromise between nations much more difficult. Foreign policies have become much more impersonal, at a time when the world has become smaller and competing interests more closely interlocked.

There are two main disadvantages of the balance-of-power system. Firstly, it creates tension, and tension greatly increases the danger of war breaking out. A balance-of-power situation generally leads to an armaments race, which further heightens the original tension; thus a highly dangerous cumulative effect develops. In a tense situation a nation is likely to be tempted into a hasty measure in the interests of its own security which may well appear to an opposing power as a provocative act of aggression. A slight miscalculation may be made, or an irresponsible action taken, and prove disastrous.

Secondly, there is the dangerous likelihood of a trivial dispute between members of opposing alliances leading almost automatically to a major war. One of the reasons for the emergence of the League of Nations after 1918 was the fact that the First World War provided a notable instance of this. Germany was allied with Austria, Russia with France; Russia regarded herself as the protector of Serbia, and Britain had an understanding with France. The murder of a petty Austrian Archduke in the Balkans resulted in Austria presenting an ultimatum to Serbia; Russia came to Serbia's assistance; Germany and France were drawn in almost immediately. So also, within a few days, was Britain, and eventually most of the world was involved. The result was the horror of 1914–18.

In the minds of those who brought it into existence at the

Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919, therefore, the League was a means of improving upon the balance-of-power system and avoiding these serious disadvantages. It was hoped, in fact, to abolish war as a means of settling disputes between nations. In place of alliances, the nations were to rely upon 'collective security' — in other words, though the term has sometimes been used with a different meaning, upon the deterrent force of an unchallengeable alliance consisting of the great majority of all the nations. It seemed obvious that the threat of collective action by such an organisation would be more than sufficient to deter any potential aggressor, and that the urgency of the common interest in preventing a recurrence of war would lead the nations to give the League real authority and power. In fact, much of the discussion concerning the League in the 1920's was based on a belief that even the threat to take collective military action would never have to be seriously used. Apart from the general horror of twentieth-century war, so recently demonstrated, appearing to make it seem most unlikely that any nation would seriously consider recourse to military action, it was thought that the threat to impose economic sanctions — another of the League devices — would be sufficient to bring an aggressor to comply with its directions.

Nevertheless the League, while fostering a great deal of international co-operation that was of very considerable value, did not fulfil its main purpose — of providing security for its members. Its failure in this respect was due partly to weaknesses in its machinery, but much more to the unwillingness of the nations, when faced with a crisis, to operate the machinery with sufficient vigour or surrender enough of their sovereignty to it. Since the United States always gave strong support to League decisions, her failure to become a member was not, as is often alleged, an important factor in its ineffectiveness. In effect, therefore, by the middle of the 1930's the nations had reverted to the balance-of-power system. There was no other choice.

The failure of the League did not, however, diminish the urgency of the need to improve upon the balance-of-power method. The Second World War re-emphasised and heightened this urgency, so that during its course the decision was taken to make a fresh attempt. The result is the United Nations.

Origins

The first hint at the project of a new world organisation was contained in the Atlantic Charter, the declaration of war aims drawn up by Churchill and Roosevelt in mid-ocean in August 1941. It included the aim of securing to all peoples security from aggression and foreign domination. In January 1942, 26 nations signed the 'Declaration of the United Nations' subscribing to the principles defined. In October of the same year the 'Big Four', at their Moscow meeting, specifically stated that their wartime co-operation would have to be continued after the peace for the purpose of securing this aim. In 1944 a start was made with the planning of the new organisation at a conference at Dumbarton Oaks, where the main outlines were drawn. The most difficult question concerned the arrangements for the 'veto', the 'Big Four' reaching agreement as to the view they should take on this subject at the Yalta Conference, in February 1945. From April to June 1945, the final form of the Charter was worked out at San Francisco in a full conference of all the prospective members. The name 'United Nations' was fixed upon, at the instance of Roosevelt, to stress the continuity from the wartime alliance. The first meeting of the General Assembly followed at London on 10th January, 1946.

Broadly speaking, the United Nations employs similar methods to those of the League in attempting to fulfil the function of preserving peace. Thus its main purpose is to provide facilities for (*a*) the peaceful settlement of disputes along lines of equity and international law, (*b*) the open hearing of the cases of both parties to a dispute before the tribunal of world opinion, (*c*) inquiry into the facts of a dispute by impartial investigation, (*d*) collective security — bringing the combined resources of all its members to bear against armed aggression, (*e*) fostering international co-operation in economic and social development and similar spheres, in order to remove potential causes of friction and to help create the 'one world' atmosphere which will make fully effective world government more feasible.

As far as the details of its machinery are concerned, however, the United Nations is intended to improve considerably over the League. In fact the Charter, the constitution of the United Nations, is best understood by comparing it with the Covenant

of the League. It is an attempt, based on our experience of the twenties and thirties, to remove some of the League's deficiencies. The stress of the Covenant was upon equality among the nations. Woodrow Wilson, its main architect, was a convinced Liberal, with a profound faith in the value of rational discussion as a means of composing differences. The Charter, on the other hand, is designed above all for practicality and efficiency for taking action, wherever action is possible. The League was founded in a spirit of idealism, which is reflected throughout the Covenant; the United Nations in a spirit of grim realism. The League failed largely because it was not close enough to the realities of international politics: it imposed obligations on the members which, when the time came, they were not really prepared to fulfil. In contrast, the United Nations Charter is deliberately intended to carry world government only so far as it can be extended at the moment. Though this might appear to be rather a cynical approach, it is undoubtedly of the utmost importance that such an organisation should be in existence, with its powers extended to the farthest limits compatible with practicality. Most governments and individuals would surely agree, in theory at least, with the hope that experience of what is practicable will lead to further advance towards the desirable.

The Security Council

This difference in stress between the United Nations and the League of Nations is marked most noticeably by the predominant position accorded by the Charter to the great powers. This is expressed in two notable features of the constitution — the pre-eminent powers granted to the Security Council, and the possession by its permanent members of the veto. The Security Council takes all the important decisions of the United Nations, which are binding upon all the members; the great powers are given permanent seats upon it; and their unanimous consent is necessary before any action can be taken. On the one hand, this promotes speed and efficiency, for the General Assembly is obviously, because of its sheer size, unsuitable for obtaining speedy action. On the other hand, it accords with the realities of power politics: no decision strongly opposed by a great power would be likely in any case to be implemented.

There are five permanent seats on the Council, held by Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Nationalist China. There are also six non-permanent seats, each non-permanent member being elected for two years, with half retiring each year. By convention, these are so chosen as to give a fair geographical distribution in the representation of the Council — that is, there is usually one member from the Far East, one from the Middle East, and so on. Similarly, one of the seats is always held by a Dominion. The Council is charged with the primary responsibility for taking action to preserve international peace and security, and has the duty of dealing immediately with any threat to peace or to a member. It functions continuously: each member must maintain a permanent representative at the seat of the United Nations in New York. In addition the Council must approve the admission of new members to the organisation, and exercises the function of trusteeship over trust territories declared to be of strategic importance.

The most important feature of the Council — certainly the feature arousing most interest and discussion — is the right of veto possessed by the permanent members. The veto does not operate on questions of procedure, and thus cannot be used to prevent a dispute being discussed. The consent of the permanent members, as well as of the majority of the Council as a whole, is however required before the Council can initiate any action. Although the wording of the Charter would suggest otherwise, it has become recognised by convention that mere abstention from voting does not amount to a veto. To exercise its right, a permanent member must actually declare its negative vote. Although the USSR has argued that its failure to approve of United Nations intervention in Korea constituted a veto — she was boycotting the Security Council at the time as a mark of her disapproval of the exclusion of Communist China — it can readily be shown that by her former actions she had herself recognised this convention.

Although the suggestion most frequently made for the improvement of the United Nations is that the veto right should be abolished or severely modified, it is difficult to see how this could be accomplished. It would require amendment of the Charter, and amendments are themselves subject to the veto.

Dissatisfaction with the veto has arisen largely because, though originally intended as a safety valve, to be used only as a last resort, it has been employed so frequently by the Soviet Union as to paralyse the whole United Nations machinery. Yet, when the Charter was being drafted, the Soviet Union made it clear that she would not become a member of the organisation unless accorded the power of veto; and her exclusion would have deprived the United Nations of most of its value. Moreover, as was argued above, the inclusion of the veto has the very real merit of bringing the United Nations into close correspondence with the realities of international politics. Its abolition would completely alter the essential character of the organisation.

It should be noted that, just as the veto power cannot be used to prevent discussion of a dispute by the Security Council, neither can it be employed to prevent the summoning of a general conference of the United Nations for the purpose of considering proposed amendments. But any amendments, in addition to being carried by a two-thirds majority of all the members, have to be approved by all the permanent members. Thus the veto could not be notably limited or abolished without Russia's consent.

Despite the serious limitations imposed on its powers by the veto device, the United Nations represents a considerable further step along the path to world government as compared with the League. Under the Covenant of the League, unanimity was required even in the Assembly in most matters: in theory at least, all members possessed the veto. In practice of course, the minority on any question generally gave way to the moral pressure of the majority. The remarkable feature of the United Nations is that, under the Charter, the smaller members have made a very considerable surrender of their sovereignty. They bind themselves to accept the decisions of the Security Council. The smaller members have been prepared to sacrifice their freedom of action in this way because they are the most ardent supporters of international organisation. The fact is, of course, that in giving up sovereignty they are surrendering something that they do not really possess in any great measure. Whatever their feelings in the matter, small powers are able to exert little control over their own destinies; they have little real freedom of action in the world. They continually face the possibility of be-

ing drawn into wars as the result of policies of other powers over which they can exercise little influence. In fact, in exchange for a sacrifice of non-existent sovereignty, they gain much greater influence within the United Nations, through obtaining a platform to make themselves heard before world opinion, than they could ever possess if no such organisation existed. In an anarchic society, it is the small people who clamour for the creation of a police force: those who are powerful enough to look after themselves generally prefer to do so. Though they strenuously opposed the grant of the veto to the great powers, when it came to the point the smaller nations preferred an organisation incorporating the veto to having no world organisation at all, these in effect being the alternatives they were being offered.

As far as the great powers are concerned, therefore, the United Nations is a voluntary, consultative organisation. The only constraint, by no means an unimportant one, to which it subjects them is the moral force of world opinion. But the smaller powers are in a very different position: to them it is virtually a world government, though without physical force to compel acceptance of its decisions. At the San Francisco Conference, the small powers again attempted to limit the predominance of the permanent members of the Security Council over them by prescribing in detail the steps to be taken by the Council in the event of a threat to the peace. But the permanent members refused to accept this restriction upon their freedom of action; and again the smaller powers had to give way. Under the League, all members were pledged automatically to impose certain measures against a nation designated as an aggressor — thus, in theory, even the great powers fettered themselves in advance. Under the United Nations all promise to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council, which is the organ possessing the main powers of decision, and to adopt peaceful means of settling their disputes. But, since they control the Council and can each nullify any of its decisions, the great powers preserve their sovereignty unimpaired.

It is partly because possession of a permanent seat in the Council gives a nation a position of such importance within the United Nations that the question of Communist China's admission to membership has attracted so much attention, for it would involve the Nationalist Government giving up its per-

manent seat to Peking. Presumably the Nationalists would then be given a seat in the General Assembly as representing Formosa. Though this would alter the present balance of the Council, by providing the communist bloc with a second veto, this would be of little significance, since the veto power relegates considerations of voting strength to secondary importance. However this is not the only point at issue: in fact the conflict of opinion on Peking's admission is to some extent based upon differing conceptions of the whole character of the United Nations. If one regards the organisation primarily as existing to facilitate the peaceful discussion and settlement of disputes, then a strong case can obviously be made out for the Peking Government's admission. Since Communist China is a country that is very likely to become involved in disputes, she should, under this conception, be present, in order to be readily available for participation in discussions. Generally speaking, this is the British viewpoint. On the other hand the Americans have tended to take the view, based upon a phrase in the Charter, that the United Nations is an organisation of 'peace-loving states', maintained to preserve world peace. They argue that Communist China has an aggressive record, and therefore cannot claim the right to admission. (The issue also involves, of course, the refusal of the United States to recognise the Peking Government as the government of China.)

Even though one accepts the British viewpoint, it is worth noting that the United Nations does not confine its powers to its own members. It makes clear its intention of taking steps to meet any aggression, even by a state which is not a member.

On the question of revising the present arrangement of the Security Council, one improvement that would probably meet with the approval of all the permanent members, and also strengthen the United Nations as an organisation, would be the admission of India to a permanent seat. Because of the sheer size of her population and also her influence among a large number of smaller nations, India is obviously a most important power in the world today. Recognition of this fact would bring the organisation closer to the realities of world power relationships — and it is important to be as realistic as possible. India seems to have a stronger claim to a permanent seat than France.

The General Assembly

The General Assembly, the other main organ of the United Nations, gives representation to all member states. It meets each September in regular session, but special meetings may be called as desired. Since the power of decision is placed in the hands of the Security Council — unlike the case of the League, where the Assembly could also discuss and pronounce upon threats to the peace quite freely — it is essentially an overseeing organ. All other organs report to it; and one of its main functions is to elect representatives to them, particularly to elect the non-permanent members of the Security Council. Except on administrative matters, it can act only by making recommendations. Nevertheless it can discuss any matters within the scope of the United Nations, except disputes under consideration by the Security Council; and it may also pronounce on these if the Council requests its opinion. Thus there is no possibility, as under the League, of action being delayed by a long debate in the Assembly, with a large number of delegates insisting upon stating their views.

In the Assembly decisions on important matters, including elections to other organs, are by two-thirds majority of the number of members voting. In September 1957, the number of member states was 81. There is no provision, as under the League, for a member to leave the organisation, though members may be expelled, this omission being deliberate.

Recently, by a process of convention, the Assembly has risen to a position of greater importance than it was accorded under the Charter. This has come about as the result of a resolution carried in 1950, generally known as the 'uniting for peace' resolution, providing that, in the event of the Security Council failing to come to a decision concerning a threat to the peace through the use of the veto by one of the permanent members, the matter could be considered by the Assembly and action taken by the members in support of any resolution carried. Arising out of the Korean War, and the realisation by the West that they had been fortunate in avoiding a Soviet veto and were not likely to enjoy such good fortune again, the resolution represented an attempt to provide a means of by-passing the veto. It was a device to obtain some degree of United Nations authority for measures

against aggression taken in a similar situation in the future.

The whole procedure was of very doubtful validity. This new provision made a radical alteration to the whole character of the United Nations: for its legal force to be unchallengeable, it should have been passed as an amendment to the Charter. Yet the procedure for amendment, which is clearly laid down, was not followed — if it had been, Russia would probably have vetoed the proposal. For some years little was heard of this new device, until it was brought into operation during the Anglo-French operation against Egypt in 1956. When Britain and France then vetoed a Security Council proposal, the issue was referred, over their protests that the Assembly had no legal competence, to the General Assembly; and a resolution condemning their action was carried by that organ.

Since one would expect the Soviet Union to be extremely wary of this mode of procedure, the incident was most interesting to observe, from the fact that the Soviet delegates did not object. In fact their actions virtually accorded recognition to the device, and it is now possible, therefore, to argue that it has become a legitimate method of taking action, by virtue of generally-recognised convention. Nevertheless, as British spokesmen declared at the time, an Assembly resolution may still be said to carry less force than a Security Council decision. Refusal to comply with a Council decision involves the breaking of a solemn pledge, and in this sense can be regarded as illegal, while there is no stated obligation or pledge that constrains a member to accept an Assembly direction.

This new procedure could not, of course, be used to initiate effective action against either of the super-powers — the United States or the Soviet Union — or in face of their strong disapproval. It therefore represents something of a reversion to the techniques of the League — to a tendency to rely upon moral rather than physical force — and introduces a dangerous element of unreality into the United Nations procedure. On the other hand, it is advisable to give moral force the utmost scope within the organisation compatible with power realities — it was lacking in this respect previously — and this new technique is of some value if used in appropriate cases, the Suez incident furnishing a fair example. The United Nations has probably gained more from its introduction than it has lost.

Other Organs

In addition to the Security Council and the General Assembly, the other primary organs of the United Nations are the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat. There is also a large number of international organisations associated more or less closely with the United Nations. Some have been directly sponsored by the United Nations; others have no direct link, but the United Nations encourages them and endeavours to maintain contact with them. The first group includes the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Development Corporation. The International Labour Office, in which employers, workers and governments from many countries meet to discuss problems of industrial relations, is also directly connected with the United Nations, since it was inherited from the League. (A stir was created in 1954 by the application of a number of Communist countries for membership, several members objecting that it was difficult to conceive of employers' organisations from communist countries. However, these countries have been permitted to take part.) Organisations having no direct link with the United Nations, though it keeps up liaison with them, include the Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunications Union, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, and many others.

The Trusteeship system of the United Nations takes the place of the Mandate system of the League. Virtually all the Trust Territories are former mandates — that is, territories detached from the defeated powers following the 1914–18 War. (In addition, the former Italian colony of Italian Somaliland has been granted to Italy under Trusteeship, and a number of Pacific islands have been designated 'Strategic Trust Territories' under the control of the United States, which is responsible for them not to the Trusteeship Council but to the Security Council.) Nations administering Trust Territories undertake to promote their 'development towards self-government or independence'.

Their administration is supervised by the Trusteeship Council, which itself is responsible to the General Assembly, and which consists of one delegate from each of the following: (1) all member states administering trust territories, (2) all great powers not thus included, (3) as many other states, elected for three years by the General Assembly, as are needed to ensure that the Council is equally comprised of states administering Trust Territories and those which are not. The Council operates largely by initiating inspections of Trust Territories, all of which have now been visited at some time, and by considering reports from the administering states. As the reports take the form of answers to a series of questions posed by the Council, this control is closer than was the case under the mandate system of the League, which left the administering power to decide what to report upon. All decisions of the Trusteeship Council are taken by simple majority.

In addition to the trusteeship system, the development of other types of colonies also comes under the purview of the United Nations. All members possessing colonies undertake to develop their colonial peoples politically, economically, socially, and educationally, and to promote self-government according to the circumstances of each territory. Several have undertaken to send annual reports to the Secretary-General on all the territories for which they are responsible.

The Economic and Social Council, though mentioned in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, was not originally conceived as a major organ of the United Nations. It was raised into this position at the San Francisco Conference, mainly on the initiative of the British Dominions. It consists of 18 members, elected by the General Assembly for three years at a time, and decisions are taken by a simple majority vote. Broadly speaking, its function is to promote the economic and social betterment of the peoples of the world. Its most important work is to supervise, encourage, promote and co-ordinate the work of the specialised international agencies engaged in this field.

Although it is probably an exaggeration to claim, as did Field Marshal Smuts at the San Francisco Conference, that 'one of the most prolific causes of war is social and economic unrest', the work of these international organisations is undoubtedly of considerable importance in paving the way for

true world government. By far the greatest obstacle to the creation of an effective world government at the present time is the refusal of the nations, especially the great powers, to invest it with any real authority — to surrender to any far-reaching extent their freedom of action. Just as the rise of nation-states was made possible when it was realised that local interests were of much less importance than national interests, so too international government will become feasible only when the peoples of the world conceive of their common interests as transcending their national interests. The development of this 'one-world' consciousness should be greatly accelerated by the work of these international agencies in the economic and social spheres. The extensive practice of international co-operation, which has already, under their leadership, reached unprecedented proportions, will help create the conception of world citizenship.

The International Court of Justice, though a major organ of the United Nations, sits not at New York but at The Hague. It consists of 15 judges, appointed from among the member nations. Although each member of the United Nations is also automatically a member of the Court, and undertakes to comply with any of its decisions to which it is a party, it was found at San Francisco that several states were not ready to accept compulsory jurisdiction. This is another indication, of course, of the unwillingness of the nations, especially the great powers, to surrender their sovereignty to an international organisation. As a result, jurisdiction is optional; members are not obliged to declare in advance whether they would be prepared to accept the decisions of the Court in disputes to which they are a party.

Nevertheless, most members of the United Nations have declared in advance that they will be prepared to submit matters concerning their interests to the Court, usually with certain specified exceptions. For instance, the United States has made such a declaration, but, following the Monroe doctrine, has excluded matters concerning the American continent.

The Secretariat is under the control of the Secretary-General, who at present is Mr. Hammarskjöld, of Sweden. He succeeded Mr. Trygve Lie, of Norway, who was widely thought to have shown insufficient impartiality between the Communist bloc and the West. In addition to organising the secretarial work of

the organisation, the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which may in his opinion threaten the maintenance of world peace.

GATT

There is one notable world organisation — strictly speaking it is not in fact an organisation, though it is usually referred to as if it were — which is not linked in any way with the United Nations: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This is an association of 35 countries, responsible among themselves for four-fifths of the world's trade, based upon this 'General Agreement', which was signed in 1947 at Geneva. No actual organisation has as yet been established, despite agreement among the nations concerned in 1948 and again in 1954 in favour of the creation of an International Trade Organisation. The 'members' merely hold conferences periodically, the main purpose of these gatherings being to negotiate tariff reductions with each other bi-laterally.

Though the signatories have undertaken to pursue the reduction of duties and other restrictions upon trade, there is no specific obligation in this connection. The main benefit of accession is the advantage derived from a pledge taken by all members not to raise duties or impose restrictions against other members. Certain exceptions are provided, applying mainly to the use of import quotas by countries experiencing a severe shortage of a particular currency and backward countries which are endeavouring to develop particular industries; but the restrictions have to be justified annually. In addition, a particular duty may be raised if an equivalent concession is granted upon some other import. Nevertheless the advantage of membership is a very real one, as has been shown by Japan's persistent efforts, successful at last in 1955, to obtain admission. GATT also serves as a convenient forum at which complaints of unfair trading practices can be raised. Three of the contracting parties — China, the Lebanon and Syria — withdrew before 1952.

If an organisation is eventually created — the present title being suggested is Organisation for Trade Co-operation — it is anticipated that it will enter into close relations with the International Monetary Fund, since this also exists largely to foster a high level of international trade.

General Considerations

One of the main criticisms levelled at the League of Nations was that it possessed no military force with which to compel obedience to its decisions. At the San Francisco Conference, it was planned to create such a body for the United Nations. Under Article 43 of the Charter it was provided that members were to furnish suitable contingents, to be kept immediately available for the Security Council's use. In particular, the Council was to hold an air force in readiness for emergency action. Each nation was to contribute according to its capacity, the precise strength of each contingent to be determined by negotiation between the nation concerned and the Security Council. Though negotiations were actually begun with a number of member nations, in every case they soon ran into difficulties, and very little progress was being made with the project before the clash between the Communist countries and the rest of the world became open about 1948.

It was also proposed to establish a military General Staff, comprising the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, to be responsible, under the Council, for the strategic direction of these forces. No international force was created, however, until the tiny special force was collected in 1956 for use during the Suez Crisis, and this is obviously very different from the instrument envisaged at San Francisco. Though this force used at Suez showed the value of such a device, as both Arabs and Jews treated it with the utmost respect as embodying the moral authority of the United Nations, the uses of a force of this kind are strictly limited, since it was able to intervene only with the consent of the two parties.

One of the projects which occupied a great deal of the time of the League was the achievement of disarmament, the high hopes of making some real advance in this direction being characteristic of the spirit of idealism in which the League spent the first period of its existence. It is equally characteristic of the United Nations that, although there has been much less optimism on this occasion and less popular attention has been devoted to the question, discussions on disarmament by a United Nations subcommittee have been proceeding, at varied pace, since 1946.

The subject is one which requires extensive treatment in a separate chapter.

Does the United Nations deserve serious support? Although, as has already been pointed out several times in this chapter — it can hardly be over-emphasized — the Security Council has little real authority at present, because the great powers are unwilling to surrender any real measure of sovereignty to it and have not taken the initiative to make as much use of it as was practicable — for example over the Palestine dispute before 1956 — it is nevertheless of very real value to all nations to have an international organisation in being which can carry international government as far as is feasible under present conditions. As UN showed over Suez, as the vehicle of world opinion it is not to be despised. It could be used more effectively if stronger leadership were more often supplied; but this depends on the members individually. Britain in particular, as a power that can no longer 'go it alone', would find it very much in her own interest to take care to supply more of this initiative. The fact that the United Nations cannot be invoked against a superpower such as the Soviet Union is no argument for not employing it whenever a practicable occasion arises: Britain especially has more to gain than lose from encouraging the rational discussion of disputes in place of the resort to force. The United Nations does furnish a valuable forum for peaceable discussion, though there is much also to be said for preliminary negotiations away from the excessive glare of its publicity.

Further progress towards world government can be made only as quickly as the conception of world citizenship emerges and impresses itself upon the peoples of the nations. As has been seen, the specialised agencies are doing valuable work to spread and deepen this conception. In addition, the invention of nuclear weapons has now provided a desperately urgent international common interest, far transcending national interests, which might be expected to supply an important stimulus towards the creation of a really effective world authority. Even this stimulus, however, seems insufficient to overcome what is the greatest obstacle at the moment to a world-wide sense of community — the division of the strongest nations into the Western and Communist blocs.

Chapter Seven

THE WORLD DIVIDED — I. COMMUNISM

As was observed at the beginning of the previous chapter, it is no new experience to find the world divided into two hostile blocs of powers, with the threat of war overshadowing the lives of many millions of people. This situation can in fact be regarded almost as the normal state of affairs; and, since it has already recurred three times since 1900 — in the years before 1914, in the later 1930's, and since 1948 onwards — seems to be as characteristic of this century so far as of any other. Moreover on each of the two previous occasions in this century — as in most similar situations in recent history — the threat did in fact eventually culminate in war. It is little to be wondered at, therefore, that at the present time the cleavage between the Communist bloc and the West is the centre of interest in world affairs, and must dominate this book. In addition, the advent of nuclear weapons, whose unprecedented destructiveness makes the prospect of major war so fearful, immensely increases the tragedy of the cleavage and the urgency of the need to resolve it peacefully.

It is of course the rift between these two blocs that has frustrated the efforts of the powers to devise a system of collective security through the United Nations. Because of the Soviet Union's refusal to co-operate with the West in making the United Nations an effective body — expressed in her frequent use of the veto, which has virtually paralysed the Security Council — the nations are unable to look to the United Nations as a means of preserving their security. Thus, inevitably, the world is back again to the balance-of-power system, with all its defects. This is in effect the meaning of the creation of NATO. Why has the Soviet Union brought this situation about? Why was the Soviet Union unwilling to give the United Nations a

reasonable trial (it might not have been effective of course even with her co-operation) when all previous experience showed the desperate common need for a collective security system? The answer is to be found, surely, in Russia's excessive distrust of the rest of the world, due largely to her Communism.

Moreover, it is surely this factor — Russia's Communism — which also greatly heightens the tension and difficulties of the present situation. In the past, as has been seen, the balance-of-power system has always been the product of fear. But mutual fears can generally be mitigated to some extent by rational discussion, and compromises found. In the present situation, however, Russia's fears, being based on a doctrinaire view of the rest of the world, are irrational, and virtually impossible to quieten by appeals to reason and realities. Previously the balance-of-power system generally preserved peace for a time because opposing statesmen were able to find sufficient common ground to see something at least of each other's point of view. But the great difficulty with Communist leaders is that the West cannot get on common ground with them: it seems impossible to persuade them to take a reasonable and realistic attitude. They are not prepared to try to see the realities, but insist upon viewing the world through the distorting mirror of communist analysis. By refusing to accept unmistakable evidence of the goodwill of the Western powers — as shown by the latter's far-going disarmament after 1945 and readiness to look for their security to the United Nations — and instead following policies which, based upon suspicion, placed the Soviet Union, as was their purpose, in a virtually impregnable position, the Communists completely destroyed the security of the Western European nations and compelled them to rearm and combine against her. Though it is arguable that Russia was bound to have been most suspicious in any case, especially with the United States in possession of the atom bomb — even if she had not been communist — her fears and suspicions were immensely deepened by her Communism. And it is her resulting doctrinaire, superficial view of the rest of the world, on top of the inherent Russian tendency to distrust, that continues to make the Soviet Union so extraordinarily difficult to deal with. It is desirable, therefore, to know something of the character of the Communist doctrines.

Because of their preference for the 'practical' approach to political questions — for examining the facts of a problem and devising a solution to fit them, without much reference to general theories concerning the nature of society — British people appear to find it difficult to appreciate the Communist way of thinking. Though our political parties represent different political philosophies, and differ because of them, they place little stress on basic doctrines, and in fact modify them from time to time in the light of further experience. As a rule they are concerned much more with their different proposals for immediately increasing the well-being of the nation. Since they all begin by examining the present situation, there is usually a fair measure of agreement among them, and their differences are largely on the detail of policy. The Communist Party, however, has a completely different approach. The Communists have an elaborate political philosophy based upon their own supposedly scientific interpretation of history, which they regard as unquestionably correct and use as the key to every problem of domestic and foreign affairs.

In other words, they are not greatly interested in the detailed facts of a particular problem: their method is to turn to what appears to be the appropriate passage in the recognised Marxist writings and deduce from it the 'correct' ready-made solution. (The Communists are forever using the term 'correct', or 'incorrect'.) Secondly, it follows from the nature of Communist doctrine that the Communists are not concerned with improving or reforming the present social order in democratic countries, but with hastening its collapse and the emergence of communism, both of which they believe in any case to be inevitable. Though in the meantime they are prepared to improve the lot of the 'proletariat' by gaining advantages for them, this must not be done in such a way as to prolong the existence of capitalism. In other words, the demands of the 'proletariat' must not be moderated in any way for the convenience of other sections of the community.

In tending — as we do — to think of the Communists as just another of the political parties, we therefore make a serious mistake. They work from completely different premises, and their objectives and purpose are quite different from those of the other parties. It is surprising how often commentators, even in reputable newspapers, fall into the error of attempting to ex-

plain Communist policies by reading into them motives which make sense in terms of our own habits of thinking: the truth is that Communist motives, though they may not appear to make sense to us, are invariably explained by Communist doctrine. In order to understand them, therefore — and to appreciate the chasm that lies between the Soviet bloc and the West — one must examine 'Dialectical Materialism' — the basis of Communist teachings.

MARXISM

Although it is obviously impossible in the space available here to go into all the ramifications of Communist theory — countless volumes have been written on the subject — this is not necessary, for all Communist doctrine derives from a few fairly simple propositions. These were propounded by Karl Marx, a German university scholar who was expelled from his own country in the middle of last century, came to London and spent many years, living in poverty, toiling in the British Museum on his main work 'Das Kapital'. (Only Lenin and Stalin have been accorded the supreme honour of being recognised as having added any essential matter to Marx's teaching, so that the body of Communist doctrine is often referred to by the Party as 'Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism' — though recently there has been a tendency to omit the last component of this term!) The essential part of Marx's argument is dialectical materialism — the key to the 'scientific' explanation of history. By the term 'dialectic' is meant the conception that history proceeds by means of a series of revolutions, each consisting of three phases — thesis, antithesis and synthesis. This conception Marx derived from the German philosopher Hegel of the early part of the century. Hegel conceived of this process as explaining the manner in which ideas were worked out by the natural operation of human thinking: a general proposition — a thesis — gives rise, on reflection, to contradictions — antithesis. By further thought, these are reconciled in a synthesis; but this immediately becomes a new thesis, and so the process repeats itself. But Marx applied the 'dialectical process' to the whole course of history. In adding the term 'materialism' he contended that the driving force of history, which produces a 'dialectical' pattern in the historical evolution of societies, is the operation of

changes in the organisation of production, due to changes in the methods of production.

At each stage in history, the means of production in use determine the way in which economic life is organised, and result in one of the social classes — that owning the means of production — being in possession of the dominant economic power. Since this is the fundamental form of power, the political organisation of each society is merely the expression of the interests of its ruling class, and gives the dominant political power to that class. In fact the whole body of ideas and values generally accepted in a society is merely a rationalisation of the interests of the ruling class, assisting the subjection of the rest of the community to its control. Historical change comes about because, inevitably, new methods of production develop, transferring economic power to a different social class. Thus a revolution takes place in which the class that has newly come into the possession of the dominant power in the economy seizes the political power from the control of its outmoded precursors, remodelling the whole society and bringing its own appropriate set of ideas and values into currency. Then the whole 'dialectical process' begins again, and repeats itself. A new period of 'thesis' — the new form of social organisation — leads to a new phase of 'antithesis' — when its mode of organising production undergoes inevitable change with the evolution of new techniques of production — resulting in a situation where the class wielding political power no longer corresponds to the class possessing the vital control over economic life. This contradiction produces revolution; and so a new 'synthesis' emerges, which automatically becomes a new 'thesis'.

This abstract analysis becomes clearer when applied to the course of modern history. Marxists usually distinguish three eras of modern history: feudalism, capitalism, and communism. Under feudalism, the mode of production is peasant agriculture; thus the ruling class is the landlord class, consisting of the feudal nobility. They are organised around the foremost among them — the king: thus the form of government is monarchy, the king generally ruling with his council of great nobles. Since the main purpose of this organisation is military security, the virtues given the highest place in this society are the military virtues — chivalry, gallantry, and so on.

After a time, however, the village handicrafts lead inevitably to the invention of machinery, thus to the factory era. Here the dominant social class is the factory owners, and the accepted virtues those which suit their interests — honesty, diligence, sobriety, industriousness. When firmly established, they in turn seize the political power, the form of political organisation suiting their interests being parliamentary democracy. (The crisis of this revolution in England — according to this analysis — was the passing of the 1832 Parliamentary Reform Bill.) Though they spread the fiction that parliamentary rule gives political equality to all, in reality their command of the press, and the permeation of all the thought of the community by their ideas, gives them complete control. In other words, as far as a communist is concerned parliamentary democracy is a system of rule by the capitalist class.

The point in history of greatest interest to the communists is of course the final revolution by which capitalism is superseded by communism. Again, this comes about through the further development of the productive processes. According to Marx, the natural tendency under the factory system is for factories to become larger and larger: thus the number of factory owners will become fewer and fewer, and the proportion of workers — the 'industrial proletariat' — larger and larger. Eventually the point will be reached at which the employers will be so weak numerically that the workers, goaded by their exploitation, will seize the factories for themselves and establish communism. (Marx also propounded a theory of economics, called the 'theory of surplus value', in which he argued that the employers deprived the workers of their fair share of the proceeds of their labour, and that thus the standard of living of the working-class would continually deteriorate. The clashes of monopolists among themselves, and rivalries between capitalists of different nations, would also hasten the collapse of capitalism by disrupting production and adding to the misery it inflicted. But a study of these refinements is hardly necessary to the understanding of dialectic materialism, which is the core of his doctrine, with the most important implications.) Since the working-class is the lowest and last of the social classes, this will be the final revolution; no other class remains to come to power. Thus 'pre-history' will end and 'history proper' — the era of working-class rule, will begin.

The attraction of this teaching is clear. Previous socialists, of whom there had been quite a number, had relied upon appealing to the sense of justice of their fellow-men to establish socialism. Marx, however, taught that socialism was inevitable — that it was bound to come as the goal of the whole course of history. Hence the complete confidence of Communists: time is on their side. This helps to explain the amazing rise of this academic theory of history, propounded by an impoverished refugee working unnoticed in the British Museum, to become one of the major forces of the modern world. Nevertheless this might never have happened had not Marx's disciple, Lenin, been at hand during the Russian Revolution of 1917, alone among the revolutionaries in knowing precisely what he wanted and in a position to divert this upheaval into the path of Communism. Another of the attractions of Communism, appealing to persons, such as are found notably among scientists and technicians, who like their conceptions clear-cut, is its neat logic and precision. By applying the principles of dialectical materialism, one can automatically produce a solution to any problem, which Communists will then regard as unchallengeable. (Hence their frequent use of 'correct'.)

A few of the refinements and implications of Communist doctrines should be noted. In the first place, the Communists use the basic principles of dialectical materialism to justify the totalitarian régimes they are now operating in Communist countries. Since all the thought of the people of capitalist countries will be dominated by capitalist conceptions, it is not possible to allow self-government for some time after the revolution and seizure of power by the workers. Not in fact until a whole generation has known no other existence than life under communism can the people be trusted to think in communist terms. Until then the Communist leaders must exercise a close dictatorship, known as 'the dictatorship of the proletariat'. Even when elections are permitted, as they were in Russia in 1936, there would be no point in permitting candidates to stand who represented parties other than the Communist Party; since communism is the only scientific and correct political philosophy, this would only amount to giving the people an opportunity to make wrong choices. Moreover, since Communism is the sole repository of the truth, persons who differ from the Communists do so funda-

mentally as a result of their own selfish class prejudice. Thus it is a mistake to imagine that Communists are insincere when they advocate single-party elections: they are perfectly sincere in believing that these represent 'government by the people'. In using such terms as 'People's Democracy', they argue along these lines: democracy is rule by the majority of the people; the workers are the great majority ('masses') of the people; the Communist Party is the party representing the interests of the working-class; therefore democracy is rule by the Communist Party. To consider this train of reasoning hypocritical is to totally misunderstand the whole character of Communism. Similarly, applying it in the opposite direction, the Communists are sincere in condemning the government of Western Germany, for example, as undemocratic, on the ground that it permits the operation of political parties representing the interests of minority social classes.

It follows also that it is useless to expect the Communists ever to permit the free circulation of democratic ideas — in our sense of the word — in their countries. Since Communism is the truth, this would be permitting the propagation of falsehood. Similarly it is wasting time to try to point out to Communists their inconsistency in condemning any limitations applied to their freedom of speech in democracies when freedom of speech is completely denied under communism — to a Communist his own teaching is the truth, which it is therefore wrong to repress, whereas other doctrines are distortions of the truth based upon the self-interest of privileged groups, which must be stamped out.

Thus the Communists are something much more than a political party in our usual sense. In many respects, in fact, Communism is more like a religion than a political movement — hence its hostility to religion (the 'opiate of the people') — and very similar to the medieval churches in its intolerance. In Communist countries, the Communist Party itself is like a priesthood, comprising those who believe with utter faith, while the bulk of the people are expected to be as the Christian layman who, although sincere in his support, cannot achieve the single-minded, unquestioning fervour required of the priest. An interesting and significant development in Communist China has been the use of periodical meetings of small groups of people to

'confess' and thus try to eradicate from their minds all unworthy thoughts — all lingering traces of bourgeois prejudice: a close parallel with religious practices.

Since dialectical materialism is the key to the understanding of all political questions, it follows that there is no purpose in debating alternative policies under Communism: when a problem arises, policy is decided by correctly applying the basic principles. Lenin and Stalin both received tremendous adulation for their skill in this type of analysis; the reports of Soviet Congresses always show Stalin summing up the contributions of other speakers, according praise for a correct interpretation and relentlessly sifting out errors — for all the world like a schoolmaster with a backward class, with all his points derived from the recognised texts. The strongest argument in Russia was always an appropriate quotation from Marx, Lenin, or Stalin. Under Stalin, in fact, Marxist principles were applied in the most remote fields. For instance the Russian biologist Lysenko, who contended that evolution proceeds not merely by automatic selection of variants — but by means of the inheritance of new characteristics acquired during the lifetime of the parent organism, was raised to a very eminent position, since his doctrine appeared to accord with dialectical materialism. This differs completely from the view accepted by orthodox biologists — that no organism can bequeath a change in its characteristics which it undergoes after birth. The application of his principles to Soviet wheat production is said to have done tremendous harm. There are indications that Stalin's successors may be less rigidly doctrinaire. It seems difficult, nevertheless, to imagine how a regime can avoid being doctrinaire when its whole basis is a theory of history.

Since the Communist Party is the sole interpreter of what are the best interests of the workers, it follows that the trade unions can exercise no independence. Though they may make known the wishes of the workers in any industry concerning the provision of facilities and similar matters, they cannot oppose the government or press views on such questions as the organisation of their work. In short they have no power of their own, but are rather instruments of the state. In all their activities they must assume that the government has the best interests of the workers at heart and is the best judge of what they require.

The greatest difficulties experienced by all Communist governments have invariably been in their relations with the peasantry. All Communist governments are continually endeavouring to 'collectivise' the peasants. There are two reasons for this policy, economic and political. It follows from the Communist view of history that the factory system is the most efficient form of production: therefore agriculture must be organised on factory lines, and the peasantry converted into wage-earners. The political motive follows from dialectical materialism: peasant agriculture belongs to the feudal era, therefore peasants are bound to think in feudal terms. They must therefore be brought under the factory system before they will begin to think along communist lines and develop communist attitudes. At various times the attempt has been made to collectivise the Russian peasants, generally through the intermediate stage of co-operative farming; but success has always been limited. The peasants, given their land through the expropriation of the landlords at the Revolution, have shown a determined resistance to surrendering their private ownership. When the first great drive for collectivisation was made in 1928–1929 — when many thousands of 'kulaks' (more prosperous peasants) were liquidated — they responded by killing off so many of their cattle that the USSR still suffers a serious shortage of livestock as a result. No Communist government is prepared to leave the peasantry in private ownership of their land; yet none has been able to do much to alter the situation. China is the latest country to make the attempt at moving towards collectivisation. (According to Communist teaching, true Communism will not exist until the whole economic life of the country is based on mechanisation. Thus even today Russia itself is said to have achieved not a communist but a 'socialist' society — a society, under the Communist definition, where no labour is privately employed. Russia, however, was recently declared to have now attained the means — e.g. complete coverage with electric power — to become truly 'communist'.)

Since the people living in a historical era will always, according to dialectical materialism, think in the terms appropriate to that era, it follows that a capitalist society cannot be transformed into a communist society, or even a socialist society, by democratic means. In any case the ruling class, the property

owners, will not give up their position until compelled by force or the threat of force. (To the objection that, since many members of the Communist Party come from the propertied classes, it seems false to argue that thought is determined by environment, the Communists reply that though occasional individuals may break through the distorted conceptions accepted around them, they are too few to offset the historical forces at work within their society. Recruits from these classes are subjected to the severest scrutiny.) Thus revolution — not necessarily involving the actual use of violence — is necessary; and the whole policy of the Party is to hasten the revolution. Hence, although a times they will co-operate with the Labour Parties — or any other parties — when they believe their policies at the moment to be leading towards this end, particularly when they support raising the demands of the workers, they whole-heartedly condemn Labour Parties for their pursuit of their objectives by democratic means. They contend that, since parliamentary democracy is an expression of capitalism, this results merely in prolonging the continuance of capitalism. Thus Labour politicians are 'traitors to the class struggle'. For this reason also the Communists will support and encourage wage demands that could not possibly be borne by industry — and will openly admit this — on the ground that the result will be to hasten the collapse of capitalism. On the other hand, in agricultural countries the policy has often been to assist the creation of a capitalist economic system. In such cases the Communists have argued that since the various historical eras succeed each other as a result of technological development, it is impossible to alter the sequence, and therefore the 'correct' policy was to speed the emergence of capitalism in order to pave the way for the subsequent era of Communism. The creation of a communist society is, however, always their ultimate objective.

The Case Against Communism

It is futile and dangerous to try to dismiss Communism, as do so many in the West, as a fantastic doctrine whose fallacies are so obvious as to scarcely need pointing out. Anyone adopting this sort of attitude immediately reveals that he knows very little about the subject: as a rule, he will be found to be conceiving Communism in terms of democratic politics, which is of

course a fundamental mistake. As is surely apparent from the intellectual calibre of many who have become convinced Communists, dialectical materialism, though ultimately fallacious, is by no means easy to refute as an explanation of historical development. Marx's writings have thrown a great deal of light upon history, and no modern historian could dispute the value of much of his analysis. In fact it is probably fair to say that Marx's conception of the historical process is about eighty per cent true, using the idea of percentage in of course an inexact and metaphorical sense. Although Communists make their great mistake in claiming one hundred per cent truth for it, it is difficult to persuade the average person of the importance of the missing twenty per cent. The immature, superficial thinker, for whom eighty per cent is near enough, is almost bound to be convinced by Communism. One of the main reasons, though certainly not the only one, why the Communist Party has not won more support in Britain is that British people have a distaste for thinking on historical lines: otherwise it would probably have won many more adherents on the merits of dialectical materialism as an exposition of history.

It is important, therefore, not to underrate Communism, and to present the case against it as clearly and soundly as possible. It is one of our weaknesses in the West that many of the arguments put forward against Communism could be refuted with ease by any practised Marxist. Many of such criticisms, in fact, merely confirm dialectical materialism by obviously reflecting the element of self-interest in the attitudes of privileged social classes. Moreover condemnation of Communism as a political system based upon adverse comparisons of living conditions in the USSR with those in western democracies, as has been commonly resorted to in the past, is likely to recoil upon our own heads: conditions in Russia were appalling before the Revolution and the Soviet régime has many remarkable achievements to its credit — in fact it seems quite possible that standards of living in Russia could rise appreciably higher than those of Western Europe in the near future. And to claim that democracy is a superior system on account of its material achievements is to give away half at least of the game to the Communists — by acquiescing in their view that man is fundamentally motivated by materialistic considerations.

Similarly, though there is more force in the contention — it is a damaging point against Communism — that the Communist countries themselves contradict the teachings of Marxism — since without exception none of them had advanced very far in their phase of capitalism before they became Communist — this by no means demolishes the case for dialectical materialism. It could still be reasonably argued that the emergence of Communism in these countries, before it has appeared among the more advanced capitalist countries where one would have expected revolutions to have occurred earlier, is due to historical accidents not covered by the theory, and that the forces described by dialectical materialism are nevertheless still the dominant forces in capitalist democracies. Similarly again, it is undoubtedly true that Marx under-estimated the ability of the small business — for example the small shopkeeper — to survive, and failed to foresee the emergence of the large managerial, technician and executive class which has partly offset the proportional increase of the 'proletariat' in modern industry, and this is also a serious indictment against his theories. But it is still possible for a Communist to contend, with some force, that these unforeseen factors necessitate amendments to the detail of his analysis which have merely not yet been worked out, but that nevertheless it is still substantially correct.

There is no fully effective answer to the Communist case short of demonstrating the inadequacy of the very basis of Communism — the theory of dialectical materialism. And this cannot be done honestly — and nothing less than the highest standards of intellectual integrity can be acceptable if our answer is to be effective — without admitting frankly at the outset that dialectical materialism is eighty per cent valid as an explanation of the forces that create history. It is a large part of the truth, but not the whole truth. But since it is not the whole truth it is a serious mistake to try to make the whole life of a nation conform rigidly to it, as the Communists do. It cannot form an adequate basis for organising the whole of social life. We can claim, in fact, that with all its shortcomings, our present form of society affords a more satisfying life to the individuals who comprise it than Communism. And further that since no one can — or ever will be able to — draw up a master blue-print for the ideal society, it is better to reform our present social organisation

gradually and piecemeal, as all our parties are trying to do, than to destroy it at one stroke in favour of a master blue-print such as Communism provides.

Any form of social organisation is based upon a conception of the nature of man — as also is any general theory of the nature of historical change. We simply do not know enough about man — and this is where the Communists make their fundamental mistake — to be able to predict the course of history, and therefore to be able to construct an ideal society. We cannot produce a 'science' of history, which is what the Communists claim Marx achieved when he wrote *Das Kapital*. The root defect of dialectical materialism is that it is based upon a conception of man as being motivated by materialistic, self-seeking individualism: while this may be eighty per cent valid, even this high degree of accuracy is not sufficient to provide an effective key to the course of history. Ironically enough, the truth of the matter is that Marx himself, in accordance with his own theories, was largely a prisoner of his own times. Materialistic individualism (largely a rationalisation of nineteenth-century capitalism) was the accepted view of the nature of man at the time when he was writing; but since then it has become outmoded. All modern thinkers are agreed that man is a much more complex creature than this would imply. Human motivation is obviously a complex mixture of self-interest, conscience, the creative impulse, the desire for recognition as a member of a group ('team spirit') and many other elements. (The existence of the creative, self-expressive impulse alone would make life in a Communist state unbearable for many people, judging from the artificiality of Communist art, in which the artist must depict life not as he sees or senses it, but as he feels he ought to see it.) All these elements have contributed to the course of history, invaliditating the Marxist interpretation.

When the facts do not correspond to Communist theory, the Communists ignore them. A good instance was Marshall Bulganin's recent reply to a question, put to him in Moscow, as to how he reconciled the fact that British expenditure under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts exceeded by far the profits being gained from the colonies by British interests with the Communist theory that colonisation is motivated solely by the purpose of exploitation. He responded: 'I cannot conceive of

one country entering the territory of another except for the purpose of "pumping-out".' Apparently he refused to credit the existence of the Development and Welfare Acts.

Our greatest difficulty in replying effectively to the Communists lies in the fact that, whereas they put forward a complete explanation of history and human behaviour, we are unable to produce an alternative explanation. We can merely retort that no complete and clear explanation is possible. To immature peoples, such a confession might appear to be an evasion: nevertheless it is the truth, and on the truth we must stand.

Similarly, to the people of backward countries where the path to essential social reform seems blocked by the existence of privileged classes, such as wealthy landowners, who appear most unlikely to consent to their own dispossession and in many cases wield a dominant share of political power, the Communist course of revolution may seem much more likely to produce the necessary changes in an acceptable time than the democratic process of peaceful change. Even in some Western European countries, notably France and Italy, the propertied classes have strenuously resisted such a peaceful social revolution as — incomprehensible as it would have been to Marx — has occurred over the last two decades in Britain. (Marx could surely never have conceived the House of Commons imposing Britain's recent rates of income tax). Since it lends some plausibility to the Marxist doctrines, this obduracy is probably an important reason — another is the fondness of the Latin peoples for clear-cut conceptions — for the notable strength of the Communist Party in these countries.

Soviet Foreign Policy

The aspect of Communism which is naturally of most interest to the West is its influence upon the foreign policies of the Communist countries, more especially that of the Soviet Union. If the West is to come to terms with the Communist world — and whatever our opinions of Communism as a system of government this seems necessary if the present, constant fear of frightful devastation is to be removed — it will be necessary to take into account the motivation of Soviet foreign policy. What are Russia's aims? She is generally accused of aiming at world

domination — at extending Communist rule until Communism dominates the globe. But if this impression, which seems to be confirmed by the remarkable expansion of Russian power into Eastern Europe since 1945, is true, what is the underlying purpose of the Soviet leaders? Though Communism has always proclaimed itself a system of government that transcends national frontiers, it seems scarcely credible that the Russian Communists have so deep a concern for the 'proletariat' of other nations as to create the present almost unendurable tension and provoke the deep hostility of the rest of the world on their behalf. If Russia's intention has been to bring them the benefits of Communism in the interests of their well-being, she has certainly shown a degree of self-sacrifice previously unknown among nation-states.

There is in fact some divergence of views among commentators concerning Russia's motivation. Some writers have argued or implied that the fact of Russia's being Communist has made little difference to her foreign policy. Pointing to her age-old tendency to expansion, in the same directions — towards the Baltic, towards the Dardanelles, the Persian Gulf and the Far East — in which she has been pressing since 1939, they contend that the Soviet policy is little more than a continuation of Russian tendencies under the Tsars. Undoubtedly, as is generally the case with any government, the Soviet leaders have been actuated by a complex mixture of motives, some of which, such as the very considerable advantages to be gained from obtaining control of the economic resources of the satellites, have little or no connection with Russia's Communism. Nevertheless most commentators would agree that the character of Communism greatly aggravates her expansionist pressure, though not for the reason that the man in the street would usually supply.

As with virtually all nation-states, fear has been the main dynamic of Soviet policy. Though her actions have appeared aggressive to the West, to the Russians they were defensive. The main effect of her Communist doctrines has been to immensely exaggerate her natural fear and suspicion of the West, thus motivating her extraordinary expansion into Eastern Europe, which is intended mainly to greatly strengthen her security.

Since the Communist fear of aggression from the 'capitalist' countries is so deep-seated, it is probably true enough that the

ultimate aim of the Soviet Union is world domination; for the Russians would not feel secure while any democracy of any military consequence remained outside their control. (The prospects for any of lesser importance would of course, by this time, be scarcely encouraging.) Nevertheless this long-term aim must scarcely seem practicable for many years yet even to the Communists themselves. It is therefore more pertinent to distinguish between Russia's long-term and short-term aims, when it becomes clear that the more immediate objective of Russia's policy has been to secure her own frontiers. The post-war expansion of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe, and the creation of the extensive system of satellites, has primarily been motivated by this purpose.

Russia has always been extremely nervous for her western frontier. Since there are no natural obstacles against invasion for some hundreds of miles inside her territory, she has reason for her fears. In particular, the Russians have always been uneasy about the vulnerability of Leningrad, their second city, which until the Second World War lay only about ten miles from the Finnish frontier — a situation bound to cause serious concern to any power. They have also always had particular fears of the possible use of the Baltic republics — Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania — as 'spring-boards' for an invasion of their territory. Thus they took care, when the opportunity presented itself, to push the frontier of Finland back many miles from its previous position, and to incorporate the three republics (which had in fact been ruled by the Czars before 1917, though their separate nationalism had never been subdued) into the Soviet Union. Similarly they brought the Eastern European states under their control in order to create a belt of buffer states and thus keep a potential enemy at a distance. Their method is well-known: under the pretext of the need for national solidarity, they pressed the creation of all-party cabinets upon these states, ensuring that Communists, despite the fact that nowhere did they obtain more than a fifth of the votes in elections, were given control over the vital offices of police and defence. Within a few months, with the shadow of the Red Army in the background, the leaders of other parties were arrested on vague or trumped-up charges of plotting against the state, and their places in the cabinets were filled by Communist nominees. Communists

would of course argue that the resulting 'People's Democracies' do in fact represent government 'by the people' — that is, by the Communist Party, which speaks and acts for the people, though they do not always recognise its voice. But the essential purpose was to safeguard the Soviet Union. In addition to the security obtained through the buffer system, control of the whole of Eastern Europe gave Russia a predominance over Western Europe that completely ruled out the possibility of an attack upon her.

It must be admitted that a superficial reading (at the least) of the history of the inter-war years gives the Russians good grounds for their suspicions of the 'capitalist' countries. France and Britain in particular gave active assistance to the 'White Russian' armies which invaded Russian territory in 1918–21 in the attempt to overthrow the Communist regime and were repulsed only by tremendous exertions. Britain sent in an expeditionary force from Archangel; after the Poles had first advanced into Russia, then been pushed back almost to Warsaw, France assisted Pilsudski to push the frontier back again many miles into the Ukraine, well beyond the 'Curzon line' drawn by Lord Curzon as the proper boundary between Catholic Poles and Orthodox Russians. France openly referred to the Eastern European states created at Versailles as a 'cordon sanitaire' against Russia. Russia was not admitted into the League of Nations until 1934; and the Communist Government was not recognised by Britain until 1923, by the United States until 1933. Many prominent figures in the West held the view that Hitler was of some value to Europe as a bulwark against Soviet Communism.

When the Munich conference was held in 1938, Russia was not invited to attend. Subsequently when, despite Russia's offer to join France and Britain in a guarantee, Czechoslovakia was allowed to fall to the Nazis, the Communists adopted the interpretation that any advance by Hitler to the east — towards Russia — was viewed by the democracies without concern, perhaps even with relief. (There is no doubt that military opinion in the west greatly underestimated Russia's strength, though even so she barely withstood the German onslaught when it eventually came.) In the negotiations for a Russian-British-French alliance that took place in 1938–39, Russia demanded transit rights through Poland and the Baltic countries: when

Poland in particular proved unwilling to concede these, and France and Britain failed to persuade her, the Communists drew the conclusion that they were not sufficiently concerned about guaranteeing the Soviet Union. These and many other plausible interpretations have been liberally used in Communist propaganda; and appear in fact to have had considerable influence amongst some sections of public opinion in the west.

Nevertheless they are scarcely relevant. In the closing stages of the war and afterwards, the Western leaders, fully aware that the gravest danger to future peace lay in Russia's suspicions, made every effort to convince the Soviet government of their peaceable intentions. British and American armies were held back to enable the Russians to march beyond Berlin, and into Eastern Europe. The West disarmed almost completely, despite the Soviet action in maintaining their forces at the fantastic level of 175 divisions, and showed themselves prepared to co-operate closely with Russia in the United Nations, and to rely upon it for their security. Already Russia's attitude was making progress extremely difficult at international conferences — even during the war her co-operation had in fact been very grudging — but this fact was carefully concealed, lest public criticism should antagonise her further. (This restraint was at the expense of the reputations of the western statesmen concerned, notably that of Mr. Bevin, whose difficulties have only recently been adequately appreciated.) There was ample evidence that the West was very ready to live at peace with the Soviet Union — all to no avail.

The truth seems to be that the effort was predestined to fail — though it was well-worth making and had in fact to be made — because the Communist suspicions are quite incurable. No amount of assurances would, or ever will, overcome Russia's fears. Even under the Czars, Russia was almost always pervaded by deep suspicions of the West: this tendency has been immensely heightened and fossilised under Communism. Since Communist doctrines depict parliamentary democracies as instruments of capitalist government, and capitalists as being motivated by the defence of their property interests and inevitably hostile to Communism, the Communists believe the democracies are bound to nourish aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union. Being so completely doctrinaire, they could never be persuaded

otherwise. Where the facts do not fit this theory, they will discard them. Any Soviet ambassador who reported that a democratic government had peaceful intentions towards the Soviet Union would be placing himself in a dangerous position, as he would be contradicting Marxist doctrine; in any case, this evidence would be disregarded as marking only a temporary aberration due to some quirk of the democratic leaders at the time. The view would be taken that materialistic determinism would be bound to reassert itself eventually, when the particular democracy would revert to its predicted hostility.

Incredible though this may seem, the Soviet leaders appear to sincerely believe their own invariable description of democratic leaders as 'war-mongers'. All the evidence is that they are complete prisoners of their own Marxist conceptions. For example, in their slogan, the 'fight for peace' (less heard recently, but constantly used in their campaign against German rearmament), the word 'fight' makes a curious and surely significant emphasis; they often appear to be referring to the extension of Communism as their real aim. In fact they probably do conceive of the phrase in these terms, for, following Marxist doctrine, they expect peace to be possible only when 'capitalism' has been overwhelmed. It is a mistake to try to make sense of their policies along Western lines of thinking, for their approach is utterly different. Hence the clash of interests between the two great power-blocs at the present day is much more dangerous and much more difficult to reconcile than previous contests for position between opposing alliances. There appears to be so little ground for mutual understanding and therefore compromise; and the Soviet outlook so fantastically distorts the realities.

Changes Since Stalin

Although significant changes appear to have occurred in Soviet policy since the death of Stalin, these do not seem to be fundamental. The major difference seems to be a greater flexibility, associated with the attempt of the new leaders to substitute 'collective leadership' for one-man rule. Stalin's leadership was notable for the extreme rigidity with which he kept to the Marxist texts and stifled even the most minor criticism: the new leaders seem prepared to permit discussion of minor issues. But

they are nevertheless Marxists, working from a doctrine. One is bound to suspect that so long as policy is based on a text, there is bound to emerge eventually a supreme interpreter or analyst of the sacred theory. Thus it seems likely that the present regime is only temporary, and will almost inevitably revert to dictatorship.

In foreign policy Stalin was unrelentingly hostile to the West, and would never cede the slightest advantage. Though after his death the new leaders showed themselves ready to make occasional concessions, it appears, as will be argued in more detail later, that this did not signify a more trusting attitude towards the West, but was rather a new flexibility and subtlety, designed to achieve the same major objectives by a different method. In any case, since Stalin's 'toughness' had not weakened the determination of the West, it seemed only logical to relax tension without however giving up any vital ground, in the hope that the Western alliance, held together mainly by fear of Russia, would fly apart. Stalin himself might possibly have resorted to the same tactics once, despite all his efforts, the West had rearmed Germany. In fact there are signs that the new line of policy was beginning to emerge some months before his death.

One note, however, that marked a new — but not perhaps deeply significant — development in Communist foreign policy was sounded by Kruschev in his famous denunciation of Stalin at the 1956 Communist Party Congress. Dismissing Stalin's hysterical fear of the democracies as outmoded, he explained that, while it had been justified while Russia was weak among the nations, she need no longer be afraid. The expansion of Communism since 1945, the immense development of heavy industry that had given her a tremendously increased military potential, and her achievement of parity in nuclear weapons had made her impregnable to attack. Although this contention does not contradict Marxism in any respect, since it still takes for granted the hostility (though now ineffectual) of the 'capitalist' countries, it does perhaps give grounds for hope that 'peaceful co-existence' with Russia may now be possible, on the basis of a reasonable compromise settlement.

A more fundamental change, perhaps, that was also reflected in Kruschev's speech was the greater scope that was also being conceded in the Soviet Union at about the same time to discus-

sion. Stalin's whole despotism was based on his insistence upon complete acceptance in detail of his own interpretation of Marxism, the slightest sign of deviation being suspected as treason. To maintain his dictatorship Stalin imposed a reign of terror involving the most rigid scrutiny of the thinking of his subordinates. It appears that, as one would expect, this had become utterly untolerable, particularly to the new educated classes that the Soviet system was producing. Kruschev and Bulganin have apparently thought it advisable to relax this discipline in order to dissociate themselves from this tyranny and base their régime upon a greater measure of popular support. Thus, consistently with the loudly proclaimed new system of government by committee, discussion of the detail of communist policy has been permitted. It is taken for granted, of course, that questioning of the fundamental Marxist position is inconceivable.

But where can the line be drawn? It is obviously impossible to question matters of detail for long without drifting into an examination of the basic principles of Marxism. It appears to be largely this difficulty, expressed in terms of the claims of satellite parties to have their own legitimate interpretations of Communist doctrines, that led the USSR into the Hungarian crisis. In the post-Stalin atmosphere of free discussion, the urge for self-expression led first the Poles, then the Hungarians, to make criticisms of Russian policy. The Polish initiative was acceptable — though not easily — because the Polish leaders remained convinced Communists, and were cautious. The Hungarians went too far. Discussion within the Hungarian Party spread into the streets; and when Mr. Nagy's government withdrew from the Warsaw Pact and asked for the withdrawal of Russian troops from their territory, the Soviet Union felt obliged to intervene. It did so, despite the immense loss of goodwill it was bound to suffer among the Afro-Asian countries — a serious setback to its diplomacy — in the belief that the chain of Eastern European buffer states was vital to its security. Since then it has become obvious that, though originally they benefitted the USSR economically and militarily, the satellites are now a burden in both respects, though a burden the Russian government still feels it necessary to bear.

Moreover the central dilemma of Communist rule still re-

mains unsolved: how to combine a system of government based upon a dogma with tolerable freedom of discussion and thought. In the nature of things there is no solution to this problem. It is a mistake for rulers to try to claim infallibility, for this places their executive class, even more than the mass of the people, in an unendurable situation. For this reason Communist rule is bound sooner or later to collapse.

Chapter Eight

THE WORLD DIVIDED — II. NATO

The response of the West to Russia's expansion into Eastern Europe was the creation of NATO. NATO was an utter necessity: no Western statesman could have remained unconcerned at the tremendous threat Russia had poised over Europe. Even if her intentions had appeared to be friendly — and all the evidence suggested she was dangerously hostile — no West European state could have remained unmoved at the potential threat to its security constituted by the enormous preponderance of the Russian armaments and her domination of Eastern Europe. Nevertheless the creation of NATO produced an international situation full of grave difficulties for Western diplomacy. It is these difficulties, centring mainly upon the problem of Germany, which are still the main preoccupation of the world today.

Fundamentally this is due to the fact that the creation of NATO represented a reversion on the part of the West to the perilous balance-of-power system of conducting international affairs. Twice in this century we have tried to get away from this dangerous device of seeking security in alliances, but without success. As was seen in a previous chapter, it is as if a pendulum has been swinging in world affairs. At the beginning of the century we were still operating the balance-of-power system; then after 1918 we attempted to substitute collective security, by means of the League of Nations. But the League did not succeed in this respect, so that the pendulum swung back, inevitably, towards the balance-of-power method. Again after 1945 we tried to create a system of collective security, this time in the United Nations. But again, by about 1948, world organisation had disappointed Western hopes. It had become patently clear that no nation could depend upon the United Nations to guaran-

tee its security. Thus, reluctantly, the West reverted again to the primitive system of alliance — a return to the balance-of-power method.

This of course has involved the world again in the two grave dangers of the balance-of-power system: the danger of the tension it inevitably creates, and the danger of a minor dispute between any two members of the opposing blocs leading the whole world almost automatically into a further major war. In the present situation both of these dangers centre very largely upon the German problem, which will be the subject of the next chapter. But first it will be necessary to examine NATO, the main instrument of Western policy, more closely.

Despite the fact that the policy behind its creation represents a reversion to the traditional balance-of-power method it would be a mistake to view NATO as merely another in the long series of alliances that have played so prominent a part in modern European history. To do so would be to miss a great deal of its significance. In three respects at least NATO represents a remarkable and unprecedented development in history. In the first place, it does not reproduce the usual pattern of a patch-work of European allies geographically intermingled with the members of the opposing alliance. It unites virtually the whole of Western Europe behind a single, long defence line. This results, of course, from the effect of Russia's tremendous preponderance in destroying the previous European system of a large number of approximately equal states with numerous jealousies and conflicting interests. All now share the vital common interest, which has submerged all others, of warding off the Soviet Union. Secondly, NATO includes the United States; thirdly, it imposes a remarkable degree of unity upon its members. These two features, which are inter-related to some extent, require examination in rather more detail.

The United States and NATO

The inclusion of the United States in NATO obviously marks a major revolution in world affairs. Ever since George Washington, the first President, the main tradition of American foreign policy has been isolationism, particularly towards Europe. The first principle of American foreign relations has been to keep out of European quarrels and avoid alliances with European

powers. Both in 1917 and 1941, the United States was brought into war against all its inclinations at the time — by U-boat attacks on her merchant shipping in 1917, and by Pearl Harbour in 1941. And in 1941–45 it was against the whole weight of American tradition — probably as the result of the presence in high office of two such unusually internationally-minded Americans as President Roosevelt and General Marshall — that the United States Government agreed with Britain that the European War should be finished first. How therefore can one explain the revolution in American foreign policy represented by America's acceptance, in NATO, of a twenty-year peace-time commitment in Europe?

Fundamentally, of course — though much more has to be said in explanation — the reason for the participation of the United States in NATO is the deep antipathy of Americans for communism. Though Europeans, and particularly the British people, also strongly disagree with the Communist viewpoint, their disapproval is distinctly different in tone from the impassioned hostility of Americans, derived from the complete contradiction between the American and the communist approach to questions of government. When the United States was founded in the eighteenth century, the intention was to establish a system of government as far removed as possible from the monarchial systems of Europe. Though in the meantime European countries have transformed their monarchies into democracies, the tradition of giving extensive powers to governments has continued in Europe to some extent, while in the United States the eighteenth-century tradition of reducing the powers of governments to a minimum and subjecting them to close popular control has persisted strongly — to greater degree in popular conceptions than in political practice, yet markedly even in political practice. It finds particular expression, in the United States constitution, in the written definition of the rights of citizens which the governments may not infringe, and also in the conflicts of authority between President and Congress, between Senate and House of Representatives, and between the Federal and the state governments. Though such conflicts are virtually unavoidable in a federal constitution, they were welcomed by the founders of the United States, and are still generally approved by American opinion, as devices to minimise the powers

of the authorities and thus maximise the freedoms of the individual citizen. The contrast with the communist system, where the government is all-powerful, could scarcely be more marked.

Americans are also at the opposite pole from Communists in their thinking concerning economic questions. To Americans the minimisation of state intervention in economic matters has often seemed an essential element in democracy. (Paradoxically from the European viewpoint, they have often interpreted this principle as permitting the active assistance by the state of private undertakings.) Partly this tradition derives from the persistence in American thought of the 'frontier outlook' — the attitude that the proper course for a man dissatisfied with his living is to seek new opportunities elsewhere, and not to look to the state for protection or assistance — long after the frontier, whose cheap land was its main justification, has disappeared. Partly it can be traced to the character of liberalism, at the time in the eighteenth century when it found expression in the creation of the United States, as a movement against the protection by monarchial governments of the vested interests associated with them. At all events, nothing could be more completely opposed to American conceptions than the detailed control by Communist governments of all aspects of economic life.

Moreover, Americans tend to regard their basic conceptions, on both the political and economic issues, as moral judgments on which little difference of opinion is permissible. Thus they tend to view communism as morally depraved — the instrument of a contemptible international conspiracy. (In contrast, most Europeans find it readily possible to believe that a Communist could accept Marxism out of disinterested, intellectual conviction.) But even this extreme animosity is not sufficient in itself to explain the participation of the United States in NATO, since Americans are not so hostile towards the Communist countries as to wish to destroy them, so long as they themselves are left in peace. Nor can one explain their support of NATO in terms of a more friendly and charitable concern with the dangerous situation of fellow democracies. Though it would be a serious mistake not to take into account the remarkable magnanimity the United States has displayed towards the rest of the


'free world' since 1945, it is rarely sound, of course, to try to explain the foreign policy of any state purely in terms of disinterested benevolence; and the present case is no exception. Nations do not normally extend aid or enter into alliances without some interest of their own in view. The main reason why the United States is in NATO and played a leading part in creating it is because Americans feel that the existence of NATO is very much in their own interests. Nevertheless, far from being the war-mongering power depicted in communist propaganda, the United States entered into NATO very reluctantly. All the evidence shows that it was by no means easy for the Americans to abandon their isolationism. No nation was more ready to disarm, or more eager to avoid alliances. Despite their deep antipathy to Communism, the great majority of Americans were very ready to live at peace with the Soviet Union: it was Russia's course of expansion into Europe that forced the United States unwillingly into NATO.

The Americans feel themselves menaced by Russia as they have never been menaced before by a foreign power in all their history. In fact a revolution has occurred since 1945 in the relations of the powers to each other — a revolution due to the tremendous recent advance in the means of waging war — which has overturned American thinking. Because it has had much less effect upon their strategic position, Europeans are much less conscious of this development, and have therefore generally failed to appreciate the American motivation. While they tend to imagine themselves in the front line in the event of war, with the Americans operating, as previously, from the rear, the Americans themselves consider, with some justification, that they are likely to feel the weight of a Russian attack quite as much as Europe. The development of the long-range bomber, together with the advent of nuclear weapons, has brought the United States from the rear into the front line of attack. The North Polar region is no longer an absolute barrier to military operations: long-range aircraft can now fly completely across and beyond it and return to their bases. While Europeans still tend to think of the map of the world in the rectangular shape in which it is usually seen, in Mercator's projection — a conception that was still fairly adequate until very recently, and made American non-involvement a feasible policy — Americans

are very conscious that they face the Soviet Union, and are within striking distance of the Russians, across the North Pole. In the foyer of most American theatres and cinemas today is displayed a notice giving directions to the nearest air-raid shelter in the event of sudden attack. Rather alarmist, perhaps, to European tastes; but an indication of how completely Americans have appreciated the revolution in world strategy. In fact the Americans have anticipated developments: it is only very recently, long after the notices were first displayed, that Russia has possessed aircraft of sufficient range to reach the northern United States.

Another portent of the new shape of global strategy has been the frequently reported experiments being undertaken by the United States — and the Soviet Union — in Arctic warfare, including flying aircraft off ice-floes, the construction of railway lines under the ice-cap, and so on. There is also the costly construction, in co-operation with Canada, of the three radar chains — the Macgill Fence, the Pinetree Fence, and the D.E.W. (Distant Early Warning) Line — on Canadian territory, the D.E.W. Line being on the fringe of the Arctic circle. Another effect of this revolution has been the prominent role assumed by Canada in world affairs. Lying as she does between the two potential main antagonists in a future world war, and very conscious of her exposed position, Canada has taken a very active interest in Atlantic defence.

Two consequences follow for the United States. Firstly, if she is in danger of war with the Soviet Union, despite the fact that she has no wish to be involved in such a contest, it is of great advantage to her to have allies. Even if Russia were not to consider attacking the United States for many years, the Americans would be most uneasy to see the whole of Europe, Asia and possibly Africa fall to Communism, leaving their own continent isolated in a Communist world. Thus the United States has been concerned to strengthen the defences of the democratic states and assist them erect deterrents against further Communist expansion. Secondly, although it has become possible to conduct a war across the Arctic Circle, it is neither comfortable nor convenient. It would be of very great assistance to the United States — and provide a much stronger deterrent against the Soviet Union — to be in a position to be able to launch a



THE NEW SHAPE OF GEO-POLITICS
The importance of the North Polar Region in the Post-War World
and the Western encirclement of the USSR.

retaliatory attack upon Russia from bases in Europe. (Though the Communists make much of the fact that the United States has set herself out to acquire bases thousands of miles from American territory, denouncing this policy as a clear indication of aggressive designs, it is obviously impossible in war to distinguish at all clearly between attack and defence, especially as far as acquiring strategic positions is concerned: the best defence is to be able to threaten punishing retaliation.) But the foothold in Europe must be secure, hence the concern of the United States at the danger of Russia over-running Western Europe. In addition, it is a very great advantage to the USA to be able to refuel bombers in mid-air over friendly European territory.

NATO's Close Unity

The other remarkable feature of NATO — the extremely close degree of co-operation it has imposed upon itself — is perhaps even less clearly appreciated by the man in the street. It consists largely in the fact that under NATO the member states have given over control of their defence forces to an international command organisation: this is a very drastic surrender of sovereignty, brought home most vividly to British people in 1950 when an American Admiral was given command over their Atlantic fleet. Reflection brings to mind only two instances in modern times when we have consented to a similar measure — in 1917, when Marshal Foch was appointed Supreme Commander over the Allied forces in France, and the recent war, when General Eisenhower was made SACEUR. Both occasions occurred in time of war, when the closest possible co-ordination was urgently necessary — in 1917 because of the German break-through towards Paris in the Second Battle of the Marne, and in the recent war when it was necessary to effect the very difficult operation of a landing in occupied Europe. Now we have taken the unprecedented step of going to the same length in time of peace. How can this be accounted for?

In the first place, though Europe was at peace, it was a peace recognised as 'cold war'. The situation seemed very grave, and Europe's main weakness in face of the immense strength of the Soviet Union was its disunity. The weakness of our disunity

against Hitler, when so many states held back in the hope that Germany had no designs upon them, thus enabling her to pick them off one after the other, had not been lost upon Europe. As it was Western Europe could not hope to match the man-power and resources of the Soviet bloc; but at least we could redress the balance as far as possible by banding together in a tightly-knit structure. Thus to a considerable extent the situation itself determined the form taken by NATO. Another important contributing factor, however, was American pressure. Though successive United States Governments have firmly discarded the isolationist tradition, isolationism is by no means dead even yet as a force in American politics. While the view has generally been adopted that the United States badly needs allies and foreign bases, there are still many Americans who hold that they are not necessary to her: they are confident that the United States could successfully defend itself without external support or facilities. They contend, therefore, that at the very least their Government should not expend American money in an attempt to strengthen Western Europe unless it obtains an adequate return for this expenditure. In other words, the Western European countries should not be given American dollars unless they show they are prepared to make effective use of them — by creating an effective defence organisation. Since Western Europe's outstanding weakness is its disunity — and the Americans have been even more strongly convinced of this than Europeans — there has in particular been constant American pressure for close unification of the Western effort. Naturally, this has been directed more especially at the projects for re-arming Germany and incorporating German forces in a 'European Army', as for instance when Mr. Dulles gave a strong hint of possible American withdrawal from Europe on France's rejection of EDC, speaking pointedly of a possible need for an 'agonising reappraisal' of American policy. The understanding has always been in the background, and must still strongly influence Western European policy, that the United States is in Europe only conditionally. Since three-quarters of NATO expenditure has been contributed by the United States — NATO could not in fact have existed without American support — this pressure has hardly been ineffective, though it may not have been necessary.

The Origins of NATO

It was not until about 1948 that the West became seriously alarmed at Russia's expansion into Eastern Europe. Although the Russians had been using highly questionable methods to ensure that Communists obtained power in the Eastern European countries out of all proportion to the votes they had obtained in elections, it was generally recognised that they would go to very considerable lengths to ensure that the governments of these countries were friendly towards the Soviet Union; democracy had in any case been an alien and very weak plant in most of these states; and the technique the Russians were using was not as yet widely understood. In Greece, where the Communist Party was thwarted by British action, Russia had not been able to play a direct part. (Yugoslavia had of course assisted the Greek revolutionaries; and Yugoslavia was also the exception among the satellites — a state whose Communism was a native product, and not dependent upon Russian support.)

The turning-point, though still this was not widely appreciated at the time, came in 1947 with the Soviet Union's rejection of Marshall Aid, more especially her action in prohibiting the satellite governments from attending the European conference at Paris, which several had announced their intention of attending, where arrangements were agreed upon for accepting and distributing this aid. Then, in 1948, the rift became obvious with the blockade of Berlin and the Communist *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia. Unlike the other satellites, Czechoslovakia was by no means backward in social structure or political experience, but a progressive modern democracy; and was a country reaching into the heart of Europe. The Communist seizure of power represented in this case blatant imperialism. The West at once became conscious of the Soviet Union's 175 divisions still under arms, with in addition some 80 divisions in the satellites, to meet which it could deploy a mere 10 or 12 divisions.

Previously, in 1947, Britain and France had allied by means of the Treaty of Dunkirk; but, as there had been no sense of a threat from Russia at this time, the terms of this treaty had been directed against a possible resurgence of German militarism. In 1948, when this alliance was extended by the Treaty of Brus-

sels to include Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, Germany was still considered the most likely source of danger, but the possibility of invoking the provisions against the Soviet Union was also envisaged. By the time the Treaty was ratified, however, alarm had become widespread, and it was felt that something more was needed. Discussions took place between the United States and Canada and the Brussels powers — apparently on the initiative of Britain, though Canada was also active in pressing the project — and Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal were brought in. (Portugal was already associated with the Brussels Treaty group through her 1715 Treaty with Britain.) Eventually the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington in April, 1949.

When it was suggested that Turkey and Greece also become members, there was some opposition to the proposal. The two Baltic countries in particular were reluctant to assume responsibilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Eventually, however, their consent was obtained, so that Turkey and Greece were able to accede in 1952. Meanwhile, during 1948 there had been a modification in the alignment of the two blocs of powers with the defection of Yugoslavia from the chain of Russian satellites. Yugoslavia did not, however, become a member of NATO. Since signing the Balkan Pact with Turkey and Greece (which will be examined in detail later) in 1954 she can be said to have been associated with NATO, for if either of these countries is attacked, she is obliged to come to their assistance, as also are the NATO powers. If, however, she were attacked, in theory only Greece and Turkey among NATO members would be obliged to assist her. In actuality, of course, this support would almost inevitably result in hostile action by the aggressor towards these two countries, and would thus draw in NATO. In any case the British Government declared in 1954 that Yugoslavia would receive British assistance in the event of an attack, despite Yugoslavia's having no formal commitment to aid Britain should an attack be made on the United Kingdom.

Because of her strategic position, Yugoslavia is in fact of such vital importance to NATO that the West could not stand by and see her brought back into the satellite system by force of arms. Control of Yugoslavia would give the Soviet bloc access to the Mediterranean and a link with Albania; in addition

Yugoslav co-operation is necessary to cover one of NATO's weakest points — the thin strip of Thrace that links Greece and Turkey. Only air cover from Yugoslavia, threatening the line of attack down the western shore of the Black Sea, would enable this link to be held. Since the death of Stalin, however, Tito's position has been equivocal, to say the least. Though he has been granted and has accepted liberal supplies of American aid, he is still an avowed Communist and has taken up the neutralist position, denouncing, along with Nehru, Nasser and other neutralist leaders, the whole policy of attempting to deter the Communist bloc from aggression by means of military alliances. His relations with Moscow fluctuate continually, being sometimes quite cordial, sometimes frigid. At least there seems little likelihood of his returning to the Soviet bloc.

Another country associated with NATO but not a member is Spain, which has granted naval and air bases to the United States in return for economic and military aid under a Mutual Aid agreement signed in 1954, and would thus inevitably be involved on the NATO side if a European War were to break out. At various times it has been suggested, though never, as far as is publicly known, at an official level, that Spain should be admitted to NATO. The bitter opposition of the Franco Government to communism is an argument in her favour, and there are also good military reasons for including her. Coverage of the western Mediterranean and the Channel approaches would be greatly facilitated by operation from Spain; the Spanish army, trained and re-equipped and incorporated into the Western European forces, would bring welcome reinforcements in manpower, though at present it is very weak and backward; and Spanish territory would afford a convenient regrouping area, protected by the Pyrenees, adding depth to the NATO defences. (It would not be politic, however, to stress the possibility of even a temporary withdrawal from the present NATO line.) Further, the inclusion of Spain in NATO might conduce to her giving up her demands, repeated periodically, that Britain transfer Gibraltar to her ownership. Nevertheless the proposal is never likely to receive serious consideration, as alliance with Franco, the sole remaining member of the notorious circle of pre-1939 European fascist dictators, who was closely associated with Hitler and Mussolini, would be strenuously opposed by


the left-wing Western European parties, and would thus strike a grave blow at NATO morale. Though Franco tolerates some criticism of his régime, as long as it does not take an organised form, Spain is still a fascist state, organised on the fascist corporative lines. The restoration of the monarchy, as now being planned for some unspecified future time, may be accompanied by changes towards a more acceptable form of régime. America's present agreement, which in effect closely associates Spain with NATO, seems, in the circumstances, a convenient if hardly very creditable arrangement.

Though full members of NATO, and contributing to the NATO forces, Denmark and Norway have shown some reluctance to be fully incorporated in a complete European defence system. They have insisted that no American bases be established on their soil. Vulnerable to a Soviet attack and lacking confidence in NATO's ability to protect them, they prefer not to risk provoking communist action. In addition, they tend to be torn between NATO and the desire since the war to establish close relations with their Scandinavian neighbours, marked by the creation of the consultative Nordic Council. Closer relations are naturally difficult to achieve while the other two countries, Sweden and Finland, remain outside NATO.

There are in fact four European countries which are pursuing a policy of strict neutrality, avoiding any association with either alliance: Sweden, which has a long tradition of neutrality, Austria (obliged to remain neutral by the terms of the 1955 Peace Treaty), Switzerland, and Eire. Though definitely not a Russian satellite, Finland, situated where the West could do nothing to protect her and lying open to Russian attack, may in effect be said to be associated with the Soviet bloc: she is obliged to avoid provoking Russia. Though Finland was forced in 1945 to grant a base at Porkkala to the Soviet Union — it has recently been given up and evacuated — the political parties successfully resisted Russia's attempt to obtain representation for the Communists in the Cabinet, thus, very fortunately, escaping the usual pattern of Communist *coup d'état.*

Thus, to summarise: NATO comprises Britain, the United States, Canada, France, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Western Germany (since 1954), Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey; the Communist bloc (the

alliance has been formalised since 1954 under the Warsaw Treaty, but of course was an alliance in all but name — based formally upon a series of bi-lateral treaties — from the creation



THE EUROPEAN ALIGNMENT

of the satellite system) consists of the Soviet Union, Poland, Eastern Germany (in so far as it can be regarded as a separate state), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania.

The Structure of NATO

The unprecedented unity of NATO as an international defence organisation is of course expressed in its command system and elaborate structure of central organs. Never before in peacetime, and rarely in time of war, have national forces been placed under foreign control to the degree represented in NATO. The main executive body is the North Atlantic Council, consisting of deputies of the Foreign Ministers who sit in permanent session, full meetings of the Council, attended by the Ministers themselves, being also held several times each year. There is also a Military Committee, comprising the Chiefs of Staff, who also have permanent representatives known as the Standing Group. In addition, specialised committees have been set up for such matters as standardisation of equipment and training. A valuable contribution to the work of co-ordination is made by the NATO Defence College in Paris.

The NATO forces are organised in an elaborate system of commands, which has at times caused controversy and has twice been rearranged. At the moment there are four main commands: (*a*) European, with headquarters (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe) in Paris, (*b*) Atlantic Ocean Command, (*c*) Channel Command, (*d*) Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. Each of these subdivides further, SHAPE for instance dividing into Allied Forces Northern Europe, Allied Forces Central Europe, Allied Forces Southern Europe, and Allied Forces Mediterranean, each of these commands then subdividing again into usually about four groupings of land and air forces. There is a difference between the land and sea organisation in that the naval forces are not actually in being in the various commands, the command structure merely being in readiness to take over control of the various fleets should the occasion arise. The Supreme Atlantic Commander (SACLANT, under the system of title formation from initials that has developed) has under him a Commander-in-Chief Western Atlantic, a Commander-in-Chief Eastern Atlantic, and Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic. (Allied Forces Mediterranean also consists of naval forces, in being.) The post of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) has passed in succession from General Eisenhower to General

Ridgway, General Gruenther, and now General L. Norstad.

There is no doubt that the main factor making NATO possible has been United States financial aid. Four-fifths of the money expended by NATO has been provided by the United States. Further, it has been largely the generous financial assistance provided by the United States in the post-war period that has made economic reconstruction possible without a grave lowering of standards of living that would have made it impossible for the European nations to arm themselves and would also, probably, have resulted in a large proportion of the people of some nations turning to communism. As it is, the proportion is already seriously large in both France and Italy.

The Development of NATO

How much has NATO achieved since 1949? At first sight, the results seem disappointingly small; and certainly they have gravely disappointed the original hopes. As late as March 1951 there were still only about 12 NATO divisions in Western Europe, unsuitably deployed, and less than 1000 planes, to face the 240-odd divisions and 20,000 planes of the Soviet bloc. Though at first there was talk of raising 100 NATO divisions, the figure was soon halved, and then reduced to about 30; but even this figure has come to appear well out of reach. (Although Soviet divisions are much smaller than those normal in the West — about 12,000 men as compared with about 20,000 — they have a much smaller 'tail', and therefore represent about the same fighting force.) At the moment, in fact, there are still only about 14 NATO divisions in Western Europe: the six American and four British divisions in Germany, with small contingents from other countries. The French forces have been drained away, firstly to Indo-China, now to North Africa; the hoped-for 12 German divisions have now been reduced to 6, and it will be some time before these take the field. On the other hand the present forces are much more suitably deployed and organised than those of 1949.

Nevertheless, NATO has not been ineffective. The air forces have been greatly improved, and now number about 4,000 planes, of a much more up-to-date pattern than the 1,000 of 1951. But the most important task NATO has carried out has been the creation of the so-called 'infrastructure': the network

of about 130 airfields with concrete runways, suitable for the operation of jet aircraft, supplied with pipe-lines to provide sufficient jet-engine fuel and linked by an elaborate communications system. Though this was not required in the previous war, it will be necessary in future warfare. Just recently attention has been turned to the construction of a European radar system, now well under way, air defence having been previously regarded — a curious oversight — as a national responsibility. The construction of these communications and radar systems has been greatly facilitated and cheapened by the recent development by the United States of the 'scatter' system of bombarding the ionosphere electronically and creating a reflecting layer, thus immensely increasing the range of microwave propagation. Thus NATO has in fact carried out work of immense value, though not as much has been achieved as was hoped in the sphere of manpower.

One of the reasons for the failure to produce larger ground forces has been the refusal of the European countries, with the exception of Britain, to adopt the two-year term of national service that was agreed to be necessary. The lack of sense of urgency thus demonstrated has tried the patience of the United States and been a source of anxiety to those who have believed that NATO should be more than a mere sprinkling of forces — a 'trip-wire' — to actuate the nuclear retaliation which has, of course, always served as the main Western deterrent. For reasons explained later, this anxiety has deepened as the lead of the West in atomic weapons has diminished. Nevertheless, throughout most of 1955 and the early part of 1956 there were many signs that the interest of the European members in NATO was declining even further, to a dangerous level, due largely to the impression that there was no longer the same need to fear the Soviet bloc, because of the superficially more pacific tone of Russian policy. NATO had been created in fear, and it seemed that, as fear declined — for no adequate reason — it was in danger of disintegrating.

One manifestation of this declining sense of urgency was a political crisis that arose in Iceland in March 1956, over the question of the presence of United States forces. In addition to some friction with the local population, one factor in the situation was the dispute over the control of fisheries between Iceland

and British fishermen, as a result of which imports of Icelandic fish into Britain were being boycotted. In these circumstances the Soviet Union had stepped in and begun to take a large proportion of Iceland's surplus, making it a matter of some importance to Iceland to maintain friendly relations with her. There was a change of government, and a request was made to the United States to withdraw her forces. As Iceland lies in a key strategic position across the North Atlantic sea routes, and is also valuable as a staging-point for the ferrying of fighter aircraft, in addition to being of some use as a site for radar, this development caused considerable anxiety.

Considerable discussion therefore took place of various proposals for strengthening NATO morale by, in effect, replacing the sense of fear with a stronger sense of community, a conception which in any case NATO had always been meant to stress. Though those working at the top level in NATO have in fact managed to achieve a remarkable spirit of unity, it was felt that the organisation was not sufficiently in contact with the peoples of the member countries; and there was also some feeling that the military function could hardly be exercised adequately without a joint foreign policy. It was also thought by the smaller powers that their views were not sufficiently taken account of by the larger powers on questions of foreign policy. Disputes among NATO members, particularly the dispute over Cyprus between Britain, Turkey and Greece, had also done a great deal of damage to the organisation — the 1955 joint exercises between Greece and Turkey had been cancelled — and it was thought that machinery should be created for the settlement of such problems. Suggestions put forward therefore included the creation of a NATO parliament — conferences of members of the legislatures of the member countries are already held, but infrequently — the creation of machinery for concerting foreign policies or producing a joint policy, machinery for the settlement of disputes, and a proposal that NATO as an organisation should promote the provision of aid for undeveloped countries — and thus develop a sense of more positive purpose. It was also proposed that NATO extend the co-operation of its members into the economic, social and cultural spheres. In early 1956 a three-man committee, known as the 'three wise men', was set up to study the question. It consisted of Hr. Hal-

vard Lange, of Norway, Dr. G. Martino, of Italy, and Mr. L. Pearson, of Canada.

When the Committee reported at the end of the year, they declared that they could suggest no major innovations in the structure of the organisation that would serve a useful purpose. The only alteration they proposed in the NATO machinery, which was adopted, was that the Secretary-General should be empowered to offer his good offices informally to members between whom a dispute had arisen, and could call on three permanent representatives to act as mediators or arbitrators if the parties consented. Specifically rejecting the suggestion that NATO should promote the dispensing of economic aid, they argued that it was not suitable for the purpose, and would merely duplicate the work of other organisations in this field. Otherwise they confined themselves to suggesting that members should agree to consult each other in advance concerning changes in foreign policy, and should give full consideration to the interests of other members. This was agreed to, with the exception that the United States announced that it could not promise always to consult NATO in advance in foreign policy matters. It would however do so whenever this was practicable.

There were two main reasons why the Committee's report did not contain any more radical proposals. In the first place, the European situation had changed dramatically during the months in which the Committee had been sitting, with the Hungarian uprising and its savage repression by the Soviet Union. In a moment this had revived much of the former fear of the USSR and thus, tragically, had restored NATO morale. One result was the withdrawal of Iceland's request for the evacuation of United States forces. (The fishing dispute was settled soon afterwards, though the USSR continues her extensive trade.) The need for giving NATO more of a sense of community and positive purpose had largely disappeared, and interest in the question had waned, before the Committee reported. Instead attention had turned, because of the Suez episode, which occurred simultaneously with the Hungarian development, to the problem of co-ordinating foreign policies. Secondly, nothing far-reaching was proposed because the problems are essentially the very difficult problems of international government. NATO is already an international community at

the military level, and to make it a complete community at the political level as well, capable of evolving a joint policy in foreign affairs and possibly also in some other spheres, would mean a surrender of sovereignty on the part of the members that is more than they are prepared to make. This is the same fundamental difficulty that impedes the development of the United Nations and the greater centralisation of the Commonwealth, and even in NATO, where the community of interest is so much greater, it is insuperable at the moment. As is usual in these cases, it was the largest power that showed itself most reluctant to limit its freedom of action, as occurred when the United States declared she could not undertake always to consult with other members in advance.

Though the USSR has done her reputation immense and permanent harm by her actions in Hungary, the memory will not remain sharp very long and NATO morale is almost bound to fall again, unless active measures are taken to bring the public into closer touch with the organisation. Already pressure is returning for the reduction of NATO contingents. On this occasion it has been stimulated by Britain's decision to reduce her contribution in manpower. Certainly Britain has been careful not to try to justify this step by the easy argument that the provision of atomic weapons for 'conventional' or tactical use — in direct support of ground operations — will compensate for the reduction in manpower. This is a plea that other countries could also employ, but one that is obviously untenable in view of the present sparsity of NATO forces. Instead she has pleaded economic necessity. Yet it may be difficult to persude others not to seek reductions as well. On the other hand, as she can point to the fact that her defence expenditure is much higher per head of population than any other European member, Britain can prove a special case; and the Continental reaction may continue to be, as appears the case at the moment, one of alarm at the further thinning-out of the NATO line. In this event the other members may hesitate to copy Britain's example. Meanwhile, like his precursors, General Norstad continues to press the view that even the present land forces are still quite insufficient.

Britain's new policy also poses a further question that is of particular moment to NATO. It arose partly out of the necessity of making a choice between nuclear and conventional

weapons: even the super-powers are finding that they cannot afford both on a large scale. But can nuclear weapons be safely substituted for conventional armaments? This is indeed a crucial question, especially for NATO policy; but its examination will have to be left to a later chapter.

Chapter Nine

NO MAN'S LAND — GERMANY

We have already remarked that there are two grave dangers that always result from the division of the nations into two hostile alliances: the creation of tension, which immensely increases the difficulty of maintaining the peace, and the danger that any dispute between two members of the opposing alliances is almost bound to involve all the rest, thus magnifying a local quarrel into a world war. The reason why so much of the interest in world affairs since 1945 has centred upon Germany is largely the fact that the division of that country makes it the main focus-point of both these dangers under the present balance-of-power system. Germany is the unsettled element in Europe, a tremendously valuable prize which it has been the main objective of both power blocs to obtain. Post-war European affairs have consisted largely of a struggle for Germany. Thus in the first place, Germany has been the main source of world tension. Secondly, since the division of Germany is obviously impermanent and so bitterly resented by both East and West Germans, it is the most unstable element in the European situation. A rash act on either side could lead very quickly to a struggle between the two German states, which would involve the rest of the world almost automatically in a major war. The various attempts to settle the German problem have therefore been, in effect, attempts to eliminate the grave dangers inherent in the present balance-of-power system; it is extremely regrettable that they have not succeeded.

It is obvious that any settlement will have to be the result of a compromise. The West is not prepared to see a united Germany pass under Communist control; Russia is not willing to allow a united Germany to become part of NATO. A position somewhere between these two extremes must be found if the problem is to be solved — and it is most urgent that it should be

solved if this is at all possible. So far most of the initiative towards finding an acceptable compromise appears to have come from the Russians, while the West has refused to move from its stipulated demands. There has been a growing feeling in many NATO countries that the West has been too rigid, and insufficiently ready to try to meet the Russian point of view. It will be one of the purposes of this chapter to discover whether there is justification for this feeling. Since in an alliance of democracies it is essential to have firm public support for the joint policy being pursued, this uneasiness should be the subject of some concern; and in fact it is important that the essential character of the German problem should be widely understood in the West. Because it is fundamentally a military problem, it hardly seems to be.

Origins of Partition

How, in the first place, did the division of Germany into two states come about?

When the great powers agreed, at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, on their arrangements for the treatment of Germany at the end of the war, they did not intend — or certainly the two Western powers did not — that Germany should even temporarily be partitioned. It was decided that Germany should be denazified, demilitarised and jointly administered by themselves until reconstructed as a democratic state. In order to enable each to share in this work, the country was to be split up into three occupation zones; but a single joint policy was to be followed, so that Germany would be reconstructed as a unit. The Soviet Zone was to extend from the Oder-Neisse line to the Elbe; the British Zone was to be in the north-west; and the American in the south. Later the French demanded that they be allowed to share in the occupation, and their claim was supported by Britain and the United States. Russia thereupon agreed that France also be given a Zone, provided that it were formed from the areas already allotted to the other two powers, and this was arranged, the French receiving a Zone in the south-west.

This plan, of course, implied agreement upon a joint policy, to be achieved by means of a central Control Commission. This body was to sit at Berlin which was also, though it lay within the

Soviet Zone, to be divided up into four sectors and jointly administered. At Germany's defeat, the USSR extended Poland's frontier to the Oder-Neisse line, occupying East Prussia, Pomerania and the industrial part of Silesia and expelling the German population, though it had not been finally decided that this was to be Germany's future eastern frontier. The remainder of the country was divided up for occupation purposes as had been agreed. (It is interesting to note that, though the three Western powers concluded treaties among themselves securing transit rights across the Zones, no formal guarantee was sought from the USSR, since it was thought advisable to avoid the least impression of any lack of trust.)

Unfortunately, the plan of imposing a joint policy could not be implemented. Agreement was found impossible. The main question originally upon which the powers differed was that of reparations. Because of their experience after 1918, the Western powers pleaded that the exaction of huge sums was not economically practicable, and would not agree to the tremendous amounts Russia demanded. The question came to a head at Potsdam, in July and August 1945, where the other powers very reluctantly, because of Russia's complete obduracy, agreed to take the Russian figure as a basis for subsequent discussion. Though the matter was thus still far from finalised, Russia immediately began removing equipment, particularly capital goods, from her Zone on a scale corresponding to this amount. Since Eastern Germany was normally the main source of food supplies for the country as a whole, this meant that the Western powers found themselves pouring large quantities of foodstuffs into their Zones, merely to keep the Germans alive, while the USSR was 'pumping out' from hers.

But this was by no means the only issue upon which there was hopeless disagreement. In many cases the French, who also demanded the utmost severity to be visited upon the Germans, and, resentful of their apparent decline to minor-power status, took advantage of the split to assert their independence as forcefully as possible, sided with the Russians. But there could be no doubt where the main responsibility for the breakdown lay. Conference after conference took place throughout 1946 and 1947, with virtually no agreement on any point. The West began to learn — what wartime experience had already hinted

— how difficult it was to deal with the Russians. But it was impossible to allow policy to await eventual agreement — not that this ever seemed likely: Germany was prostrate, and reconstruction had to begin immediately. Each power was obliged to make a beginning separately, and thus each devised its own policy. As far as political reconstruction was concerned, a start was made with local government, which had everywhere disintegrated; and naturally each occupying country employed the models with which it was familiar. Democratic institutions began to take shape in the Western Zones, communist institutions in the Soviet Zone.

As it soon became apparent that a joint reconstruction was urgently needed, especially in the economic sphere, the USA and Britain unified their Zones on 1st January 1947. France, still attempting to magnify her importance by holding the balance between the two sides, held out until 1948. By then she had been obliged to choose her side of the fence, and had no real choice: she merged her Zone into what now became Western Germany. In the same year a start was made with reconstructing a central government, on federal lines. As a beginning, the state or Lander parliaments were created.

By 1948 also, it had become obvious that the first step to economic recovery must be the creation of a sound currency. As the mark had become worthless, wages offered no incentive to employees to work, and shopkeepers were refusing to part with their goods except under a primitive system of barter. Nevertheless Russia, as usual, would not agree to currency reform. In June, therefore, the three Western powers proceeded by themselves to issue a new mark in the Western Zone. The effect was remarkable, the shops suddenly filling with displays of goods, and production increasing by a quarter in a single month. The result, however, was to greatly embarass the Russians, particularly in Berlin, where an uncontrollable traffic sprang up between the two sectors. In response, they blockaded the city. The breach between Russia and the West had become open. (It was also about this time that Russia's policy of securing complete control of Eastern Europe became apparent, notably with the seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.) The Western powers reacted by showing complete determination to hold on to their vulnerable outpost in Berlin, instituting the air-

lift which enabled them, by an immense effort, to maintain supplies. This was kept up until the Russians relaxed the blockade, almost a year later, in May 1949.

Shortly afterwards, in August, the process of political reconstruction was completed in the west with the election of a federal parliament for the German Federal Republic, Dr. Konrad Adenauer becoming Chancellor. In its domestic programme his party, the Christian Democrats, favours a 'centre' policy of a fair measure of economic liberty. In foreign affairs he has stood for close co-operation with the West, including the acceptance of such measures of precaution against a revival of German militarism, which naturally involve considerable sacrifices of German pride, as seem necessary to demonstrate Germany's sincerity and rehabilitate her among the nations. Two months later, in October, the German Democratic Republic, to all intents a Soviet satellite, was proclaimed in the Eastern Zone. Thus partition was complete. Two Germanies had emerged — one democratic, the other communist.

German Rearmament

It was inevitable that, following the creation of a German government, the question of rearmament would soon arise. It was also natural that the suggestion should come first of all, in 1949, from the Americans. At that time the European countries were still hardly ready to face up to the proposal. Nevertheless, as the sheer impossibility of making NATO anything like an effective defence organisation without the Germans began to become apparent, it forced itself upon them. In addition, the proposal soon became bound up with another project that came to the forefront in European affairs in the early 1950's — the attempt to federate Western Europe.

Though many sections of public opinion tried to close their eyes to the fact, it was obvious in any case that Germany would have to have her full sovereignty restored to her eventually, and could not be kept permanently disarmed. While it was readily understandable that many Western Europeans should be most uneasy, considering the part Germany had played in the last three major wars, at the thought of the Germans in arms again, such fears revealed a failure to keep their thinking apace with world developments. Europe had been transformed since 1939.

The twelve divisions that soon came to be regarded as the appropriate scale for Germany's forces — a target that before very long was to recede well beyond reach — seemed puny enough when placed beside the 175 divisions which the Soviet Union was still maintaining in the field. Germany could never again be a threat at all comparable with the threat of Russia. As it was the NATO target, at first spoken of vaguely as being in the region of about 100 divisions, was soon being halved, and even then seemed wildly optimistic. It rapidly became apparent that twelve divisions from Germany would be invaluable, if not in fact absolutely essential — in the attempt to establish even a force worthy of modest description as a 'trip-wire' against the tremendous weight of Russia and her satellites. Moreover, if war were to break out, Germany would undoubtedly be the main battlefield. She was the main forward area for which a defence scheme had to be constructed. It seemed ironical to suggest that this be attempted without a contribution of German troops. The Americans, able to take a more detached view, were naturally the first to see that German participation would be necessary to make NATO at all effective; but little American pleading was necessary before most sections of European opinion also recognised this inescapable fact.

Nevertheless, though the proposed German forces seemed negligible as a threat to Europe compared with the Communist divisions, it was advisable to couple rearmament with such safeguards as could be devised against a revival of German militarism. The proposal that first emerged as a means of achieving this end was the plan for a 'European Defence Community' brought forward in the Council of Europe by M. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, in 1951. But in addition EDC, as it was commonly called, had a further purpose. As well as making German rearmament possible in an acceptable form, it was intended to carry the European nations a further step along the path to federation.

In order to clarify this point, it is necessary to glance very briefly at the development of the 'European movement' — which will be considered in detail in the following chapter. At first, in 1949, the enthusiasts for European federation had endeavoured to obtain the creation of a European parliament, but had been frustrated, largely through the unwillingness of Britain.

As a result all that had been achieved was the setting-up of the Council of Europe which, far from being a legislative organ, eventually emerged as little more than a debating society. Rebuffed in this fashion, the 'Europeans' had turned to the 'functional approach' — to an attempt to pave the way for federation by creating as many organisations as possible, each to bring about close co-operation throughout Europe in a particular sphere. Four of these functional organisations were at first proposed and of these EDC, meant to unify Western Europe in the vital sphere of defence, was naturally seen as the most important.

Moreover EDC seemed to offer the 'Europeans' a most suitable opportunity to put into practice their favourite principle of 'supranationalism'. They had always argued that, because of the age-old and deep-seated character of the rivalries among the European nations, any organisation based on mere co-operation among governments would be quite insufficient, leaving too much room for clashes of conflicting interests. It was necessary, in their view, to establish authorities that would exercise power extending across national frontiers and over-riding governments. The essential principle of EDC, giving it its main value as a safeguard against German military resurgence, was that it was a 'supranational' army. It was not to consist merely of national armies working in close co-operation, but was to form a European army, its soldiers wearing not their own national uniforms, but a common European uniform. The national contingents were to be intermingled, so that within a division there might be a French, Dutch and a German brigade. The command was to be international, so that the units would come under the command of officers not of their own nationality. In this way not only would Europe's main weakness, her disunity, be eliminated in the military sphere, but no country, Germany of course being the example particularly in mind, would possess a national army with which to undertake a policy of aggression.

The smaller European nations, always especially conscious of the need for organisation on a larger scale, strongly favoured the project. The Scandinavian members of NATO did not wish to join; but this was not taken as a serious set-back. Opinion in Italy was divided; but it appeared that Italy would decide as

France decided. Opinion was also divided in France, where it was the French 'Europeans' — mostly MRA leaders (the equivalent of Christian Democrats) — who were the main protagonists of the project. On the left, the Communists naturally opposed it; the Socialists were divided, most of those opposing the plan doing so out of fear of a rearmed Germany; the Radicals were also divided, though a larger proportion were in support. On the right, the conservative groups and De Gaullists opposed because of unwillingness to countenance the loss of France's identity as a military power, and the resulting breach of her long military tradition. The decision really lay with the Radicals, who had a large representation in the Chamber, split up into several groups.

One of the great attractions to Frenchmen of the EDC scheme, as of the whole project of European federation, was that it could be envisaged as the absorption of the rest of Europe by France. The French had always regarded themselves as the leaders of European thought: here was a French idea becoming reality, and encompassing Europe. French orderliness, French logic, were to be imposed upon the rest of Western Europe. Again and again one meets this half-conscious conception in French speeches of the time. In particular, EDC was to represent a peaceful conquest of Germany, a pacification of German barbarism, by a Europe led by France. But this conception was valid only if Britain participated: Britain and France together would dominate Germany in EDC. If Britain had been prepared to come in, there would have been a favourable vote for EDC in the French National Assembly, and the project would have materialised. But Britain was not prepared to join. As a result, instead of Britain and France predominating over Germany, it appeared that Germany would be much the largest contributor to the European army, especially so long as French troops were tied up in overseas colonies. (A third of the French army was in Indo-China at this time, and a considerable part of the rest, soon to be increased, in North Africa.) Germany would dominate France — a very different situation. It was very largely for this reason that the National Assembly rejected EDC, and the whole project collapsed.

It was Britain therefore that was primarily responsible for the eventual failure. It is of some importance therefore, to examine

Britain's reasons for refusing to come in, and her subsequent entry into a European Army in the new form of WEU. There were several reasons. Though the explanation usually given was her enormous overseas responsibilities, which thus made it difficult for her to permanently commit a large part of her forces to the Continent, this was probably on the whole an excuse rather than a reason, as special provision was made under WEU for the withdrawal of troops to meet emergencies outside Europe. To be true, this would have been difficult under EDC if national contingents had been welded into a single army; but the scheme could probably have been modified sufficiently to meet Britain's requirements had this really been the major objection.

Other important considerations included, firstly, British reluctance to be caught up in any scheme closely associated with European federation. EDC was to come under the control of the Council of Europe, and was ultimately meant to pave the way to converting the Council into a real European parliament. As will be seen in the following chapter, Britain has consistently preferred not to become involved in this movement, though she has always favoured a very close measure of European co-operation. Similarly, the British instinct — opposite to the French, who always tend to be attracted by a novel, far-reaching idea — was to doubt the practicality of EDC. The British are always reluctant to take spectacular steps into the unknown, preferring to move down new paths as slowly and gradually as possible. Much British opinion wondered whether such a polyglot army as EDC, with its mixture of nationalities and international command — each nation with its own completely different conception of military organisation — could possibly be anything other than hopelessly inefficient.

One also suspects that another important British reason, though a difficult one to substantiate, was a lingering trace of the traditional tendency to isolationism. Britain has always been reluctant to commit herself on the Continent more than can be avoided, preferring to retain some freedom of action in her European policy. Her foreign secretaries have had a distaste for predicting the course of developments, and a preference for being free to deal with events as they arise. In this case, however, it was obvious that the unity of Western Europe and the

incorporation of German forces in its defence system was a matter of great importance to Britain. Being essentially part of Europe herself, she had expressed strong approval of EDC, and her regret that she could not join in. She had also become conscious of mounting American disapproval as France hesitated. The United States had always made it clear that she was in Europe only upon a certain condition — that the European countries showed themselves sufficiently diligent in their own defence, which now had come to mean in effect that they unify their effort and consent to the rearmament of the Germans. If the USA withdrew from Europe, this would be a grave blow to Britain, as well as to the Continental countries — a fact that she had generally been more ready to recognise than they.

When it began to appear that her refusal to participate seriously prejudiced the whole project, Sir Anthony Eden had offered the British forces then in Germany — four divisions, including an armoured division, and a tactical air force — to act in close association with EDC 'as long as they were needed' — a step that was regarded at the time as unprecedented, and a clear breach of traditional British policy. They were to stand beside the European army, but not actually to form part of it. But even this had not sufficed: it had not been a close enough commitment to satisfy the French. Thus, eventually, in August 1954, France rejected EDC, and Mr. Dulles spoke ominously of an 'agonising reappraisal' of American policy.

Western European Union. Once it became apparent that EDC was about to be rejected, there was considerable alarm in Britain; and since it was appreciated that Britain had been largely responsible, there was widespread feeling that it was up to the British Government to take action to redress the situation. The time factor, which had always been most important throughout the long discussions, had also become vital. Adenauer had carried the German people with him in accepting the unwelcome terms for Germany that EDC involved: rejection of the Treaty had seriously discredited him. There was a grave danger that he would lose popular support, and any successor would be likely to be much less co-operative with the West. Germany was steadily regaining her sovereignty and sense of independence: it was highly advisable that the arrangements for her rearmament be completed while she was still in an amenable mood. Sum-

moning a conference at London, subsequently continued in Paris, Sir Anthony Eden immediately took a vigorous initiative. The core of his proposal was that the plan for a European army be continued with, but on rather different lines. Though there should be a very high degree of integration among the components, the army should not be organised on supranational lines; and it should be directed not by the Council of Europe, but by the Brussels Treaty Council. The Brussels Treaty, the mutual defence agreement signed in 1947 by Britain, France and the Benelux countries, had served little purpose since the creation of NATO; now however, its Council, enlarged by the admission of the other nations concerned, offered a convenient alternative as a controlling body for the new European army to the Council of Europe.

Fortunately the French Prime Minister at this time was M. Pierre Mendès-France, who gave Eden strong support in this new project. Unusual among French politicians in his concern for what was practicable, as opposed to their usual rigidity in refusing to compromise their own preconceived principles — a characteristic that often infuriated his rivals and led them to brand him, most unjustly, as an unprincipled power-seeker — Mendès-France had already been responsible for bringing the EDC question to decision after months of aimless discussion. He now seized upon Eden's lead and persuaded the National Assembly, not without bitter opposition from many 'Europeans' who argued that there must be supranationalism or nothing, that Western European Union, as the new proposal was called, was the only possible solution. On the one hand he wrung concessions to the French view from the other powers in order to make the proposals acceptable to his Assembly; on the other, in intense debates, he cajoled and bludgeoned the French parties into recognising European realities, and eventually carried the day. The other nations quickly followed suit.

The Western European Union Treaty, binding upon its signatories for a fifty-year term, removed most of the objections British opinion had felt towards EDC. Nevertheless Britain's entry into close, long-term commitments represented a striking revolution in policy. The WEU army has no connexion at all with the Council of Europe: the Brussels Treaty Council, consisting of Foreign Ministers or their deputies, has been enlarged

by the admission of Germany and Italy, and a WEU Assembly has also been created, made up of parliamentary delegations, to voice public opinion in the member countries. Integration is to be effected within the WEU forces as far as is practicable. There will be no mixture of commands at lower levels; but the element of safeguard will be maintained in that national contingents, particularly the German land forces, will be so interdependent for supporting arms and services as to make it impossible for them to function effectively as independent units. Members with colonial responsibilities are not obliged to put all their forces into the European army. In addition provision is made for the withdrawal of forces to meet overseas emergencies, the application for approval to be made to SACEUR, under whose supreme command the army falls.

The connexion between WEU and NATO is largely through SACEUR — the NATO post of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. The WEU army represents the military and air contribution made to NATO in Europe by the WEU member states. As part of the London and Paris agreements, it was accepted that Germany should be admitted to membership of NATO upon ratification of the WEU Treaty, and this was duly implemented.

In addition to the provisions for integration of the WEU forces, further safeguards against a revival of German militarism were also incorporated. One of these was the stipulation that WEU forces should in the first place be deployed by SACEUR according to arrangements reached with the government concerned, and should thereafter not be moved without his approval. Further, Germany pledged herself not to attempt rectification of her frontiers by force and, more important, not to manufacture the 'ABC' weapons (atomic, bacteriological, chemical), long-range missiles, large naval vessels or strategic bombers. An agency to supervise armaments manufacture was set up, the French attempting, with a fair measure of success, to secure for it rather extensive powers.

Simultaneously with the ratification of the London and Paris agreements, the 'Bonn Treaties', negotiated in 1952 and providing for the return of full sovereignty to the West German Federal Republic, were implemented. Most of their provisions were concerned with converting the status of the NATO troops

on German soil from occupation to defence forces. The Federal Republic had already, in 1950, been made an associate member of the Council of Europe, and in 1951 admitted to full membership.

It had been hoped that Germany would furnish 12 divisions for WEU, and in fact there had been considerable discussion of means of ensuring that she did not raise more than this. (The WEU Treaty provides that the size of the members' forces may only be increased with the unanimous consent of the Council.) Since the signing of the agreements, however, the Germans have shown themselves most reluctant, because of a general repugnance for everything military and also unwillingness to shoulder the economic burden of defence, to provide anything like 12 divisions; and it has become increasingly obvious that this number will not be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. For the moment, therefore, the fears associated with German rearmament seem most unreal. As a result of Germany's failure to raise forces of her own, the NATO powers with forces in Germany have each year appealed to the Federal Government to continue paying to them a large part of the 'support costs' they received while these were occupation forces, on the ground that this would be no more than a fair contribution for Germany to make towards the sharing of NATO responsibilities. (The cost to Britain of maintaining her four divisions in Germany is £70,000,000 a year, a large part in scarce foreign currency.) So far, though a large part of her budget has been set aside for defence costs and is accumulating unspent, the Republic has provided only part of the sums suggested, and that only very reluctantly.

The Saar

One of the conditions insisted upon by a large section of French public opinion before they would consent to the rearming of Germany was a settlement of the Saar question. The Saar, a small territory on the borders of France and Germany, with a population of one million, has long been disputed between the two countries. The Saarlanders are Germans culturally, but their economy fits in rather well with that of France: Saar coal is complementary to the iron-ore of Lorraine. After 1945 control of the Saar was given to France pending a final

peace settlement. A Saar parliament was granted control over domestic affairs, but France controlled foreign relations and trade, merging the Saar economy with her own. French currency was used, a high tariff wall was erected against German imports, and the French took possession of the Saar heavy industries.

The first proposal for dealing with the Saar was the Van Naters Plan. Put forward when it was thought that EDC was about to be established, it suggested that the Saar should become 'European territory' — the site of the European federal capital, on the lines of the District of Columbia in the USA and Canberra in Australia. It should be the seat of the Council of Europe and the various European bodies it was hoped to create. But when EDC collapsed, and with it the hopes of making a European federation much of a reality for many years, this scheme lost most of its point. (The Coal and Steel Community could well have moved its headquarters to Saarbrucken; but it was reported that its officials much preferred to stay where they were — in Luxemburg.) Thus another proposal was brought forward: that the Saar be 'Europeanised', in the sense of being given a special status of complete independence guaranteed by all the Western European powers. Since France's main object was to prevent the return of the Saar to Germany, she agreed to the Saarlanders being permitted to vote on this proposal. They were to be given only the choice, however, of voting either for or against this solution, with a majority for the negative to result in continuance of the existing status — under French control. During the French régime parties favouring a return to Germany had not been permitted to operate; but it was also agreed that for three months before the plebiscite, complete political freedom should be permitted.

In this way the French intended to prevent any possibility of the Saar returning to Germany: there would be no opportunity to make this choice. In accepting these unequal conditions Adenauer had made a real sacrifice in the interest of European goodwill, in the face of the strong disapproval of important sections of German opinion. At first, while Germany was still discredited and impoverished and there were fears that German competition would cripple the many light industries established in the Saar since the war, it appeared probable that the majority

of Saarlanders would willingly accept exclusion from Germany. But as the plebiscite campaign began to gather momentum, the pro-German parties, advising a negative vote, began to win by far the most support. For a time the French, still believing that a 'no' vote would mean continuance of their control, watched this development with amusement. Before long, however, it became clear that the pro-Germans knew very well what they were doing. A large majority for the negative, as an expression of disapproval of either 'Europeanisation' or French rule, would obviously compel reconsideration of the whole question — if a large majority favoured return to Germany, it would be foolish to try to impose any other solution upon them. And so it proved. The plebiscite took place in October 1955. A clear majority for the negative — by 423,000 to 202,000 — was immediately followed by French acceptance of the fact that the Saar must be restored to Germany.

Though this result had been a blow to French prestige, it had discredited Adenauer even more. He had been prepared to let the Saarlanders go, yet by their own efforts they had won their way back to German citizenship. It had been an impressive demonstration of the power of nationalism. Following this decision, details of the economic settlement, which had always been a thorny aspect of the negotiations, with France very difficult to satisfy, were worked out. Though it was agreed that the Saar should become a Land of the German Federal Republic on 1st January 1957, the Franco-Saar customs union was not to be ended immediately, but the Saar would be economically integrated with Germany in gradual stages over a three-year period. Even after these three years, special arrangements would be made for the exchange of a high level of customs-free goods between France and the Saar for an indefinite period, in order to maintain many of the existing economic ties. The French would also continue to mine the Warndt coal-field until 1980. In addition, the French made agreement conditional upon the construction of a canal along the Moselle between Coblenz and Thionville — a project that would greatly foster the exchange of Ruhr coal and Lorraine iron-ore — the expense to be shared about equally by the French and German governments; and this was also accepted by Germany.

Thus the French had been frustrated in their attempt to de-

prive Germany of a valuable piece of territory. However the ready acceptance by the French of the implications of the plebiscite result, and the cordial atmosphere in which the negotiations were concluded (though they were difficult to the end, they had been much more frigid before 1955), were a pleasing indication of a much improved tone in Franco-German relations generally. Many observers have given much of the credit for this improvement to the contact between parliamentarians of the two countries at the Council of Europe.

German Reunification

The problem of how to rearm the Germans was of course closely linked with the main and most urgent problem of how to reunify Germany. Both the Germans and the Russians had been acutely conscious of this link. Much of the opposition to Adenauer in Germany had been based on the plea that, in accepting the rearmament of Germany in close association with the West, he had been giving insufficient attention to reunification, and in fact making it much more difficult. (His reply had been that Germany could expect no favours from the Russians as long as she was weak, and she could only be strong in alliance with the West.) And since it was the USSR's main objective to prevent the incorporation of Germany in NATO, Soviet spokesmen had played as loudly as they could upon the opposition's misgivings. Alternatively they had threatened that the rearming of the Federal Republic would make it impossible for them ever to agree to reunification, and pleaded for a further conference on the question of reunification before the West committed itself irrevocably to this step.

In reply the West, pointing especially to the difficulties that kept mounting for the whole rearmament project with each month of delay, had accused the USSR of merely attempting to frustrate the proposal and keep NATO weak. Russia had never responded favourably to conciliatory gestures before, but had only shown respect for strength; nor would she give any earnest of a sincere desire to seek agreement on the problem of reunification — the token sought being acceptance of the basic principle of free elections, this being stated as the West's minimum requirement. As a test of Russia's sincerity, it was declared, a conference would be welcomed — once German rearmament

had been accomplished. The West would then be able to 'talk from strength'. Though the USSR made the most of the widespread fear of German rearmament in their propaganda, the West was able to point out that as early as 1948 the Russians had established the Bereitschaften (alert forces) in the Eastern zone — nominally as an auxiliary of the police, but soon equipped with armoured fighting vehicles and artillery, also including naval and air units. These forces, which could hardly be intended merely for police purposes, were also officered by Russians.

Throughout the long debate on reunification that had gone on almost continuously since the decisive split in 1948, two separate but related questions had been at issue. Firstly, the domestic aspect: how, and on what basis, was a reunited German state to be achieved? Secondly, what might be called the foreign affairs or European aspect: what place could a reunited Germany occupy in the European power system? The Russians had not been able to bring Germany completely within their own system of satellites; they had made it clear they would not consent to reunification if the resulting state were to pass into NATO. Was there any compromise position that might be acceptable to both parties?

On the first issue, the West always insisted that reunification must be based upon free elections. Set up an all-German parliament or constituent assembly formed by means of elections held throughout the country, and Germany would have a single government: this has always seemed to the West the obvious and only solution. The West also insisted that the elections must be internationally supervised to ensure that voting was really free; but the USSR rebuffed this suggestion, claiming that the East German Government was capable of conducting its own elections without any 'interference'. Nevertheless the Russian rejection of the Western proposals was not based merely on objections to supervision. Since the population of Western Germany is about 48,000,000, and that of Eastern Germany only about 18,000,000, the effect of free all-German elections would obviously be to merge Eastern Germany into Western Germany and destroy East German communism — a result it was naturally difficult to envisage the USSR accepting. The Russian counter-proposals, therefore, though they varied in detail from

time to time, always took the general form of suggesting a procedure based upon equal status for the two states. For instance it was proposed at one time that they be given equal representation in a constituent assembly. Thus the USSR has apparently been attempting to avoid the dismantling of the communist state in East Germany. As the West has refused to relax its insistence upon free elections, there has been virtually no progress at any time on this aspect.

One comment might be made here: it seems rather unrealistic of Western statesmen always to accuse the Communists of hypocrisy on this point. To the West, it seems self-evident that government based upon free elections is the ideal form of government, and amounts to self-government. Therefore let the Germans form their own government based upon all-German free elections — the argument seems irrefutable. But to communists this is by no means self-evident. To them Communism is the ideal form of government, but, left to themselves, people are likely, through prejudices carried over from their former life under capitalism, to make a wrong choice. Therefore the communists see no virtue in free elections. To expect communists to accept the proposition that free elections are the ideal basis for government is to ask them to abjure communism. There is nothing hypocritical about their attitude: strange as it may seem to the rest of the world, this is what they believe. There seems to be little point, therefore, in our persistently haranging them about free elections, as if expecting them eventually to give way. They know all our arguments, but are not convinced. There can be no objection to our repeatedly demonstrating our belief in free elections, but it is unrealistic to confuse demonstration with negotiation; and in insisting upon free elections as our minimum terms for German reunification, we can hardly be said to be negotiating.

The other aspect of the problem, the question of the place a reunited Germany would occupy in the European power system, is probably even more difficult. The Soviet Union intends to prevent the whole of Germany passing into NATO; the West would obviously never consent to Germany being absorbed into the Soviet orbit. Some compromise is therefore necessary. But can there be any possible and acceptable compromise in this situation?

At first, when the West was beginning to discuss the rearmament of Western Germany, the Russians appeared to be saying that reunification might be possible if Germany were left disarmed. And soon this suggestion took the form of a proposal that Germany be neutralised. Although originally it appeared that 'neutralisation' implied disarmament, later it became apparent that Russia had come to recognise, as had the West, that the Germans could not be left totally disarmed: it was out of the question to leave a huge 'vacuum of power' in the centre of Europe. Neutralisation then began to be discussed in terms of Germany maintaining some forces of her own, preferably kept at a very low strength — merely to 'occupy the ground' and prevent it being occupied quickly, without any resistance, by any other power — but remaining unattached to either of the two great alliances. It has been this prohibition upon membership of either of the 'blocs' that has been the essential point.

On its face value, this appeared as a constructive compromise proposal. It has been the failure of the West to respond with anything more than an unqualified refusal that has led to some misgivings, and to the feeling that Western leaders have been too rigid in their approach, among some of their own following. Since the existing situation is highly dangerous, and every effort should be made to achieve a solution if this is at all possible on reasonable terms, this suggestion, and possible modifications of it, are worth examining rather closely.

Is this Russian suggestion of neutralisation really what it purports to be — a fair compromise proposal? Does it offer a fair *quid pro quo*? In bringing the suggestion forward, the Russians made a great deal of the fact that a similar solution had made possible the conclusion of the Austrian Peace Treaty in 1955. Are the two cases really comparable? At first sight there appears to be a good deal of similarity: Austria, like Germany, had been divided into four zones at the end of the war and occupied, and long negotiations had failed to result in agreement on a final settlement. Eventually, in 1955, the USSR had proposed a settlement based upon Austria taking up a position of neutrality, and the West had agreed. Why should we accept in the case of Austria what we have refused in the case of Germany? Before proceeding with Germany, let us glance at what happened in

Austria, when we shall find a number of important differences.

The Austrian Peace Treaty

There are two essential points of difference in the case of Austria as compared with Germany: Austria had not been divided into two states during the occupation, and it is not a country of outstanding strategic importance. In the first place, Austria was not treated as a defeated enemy, but as one of Hitler's conquests. She was therefore occupied only for the purpose of 'denazification'. Further, Austria had not collapsed completely, as had Germany. The allies found an acceptable government available immediately, headed by Dr. Karl Renner, the Socialist leader, and placed it in power. Thus there was no necessity to reconstruct the machinery of government: the Russians were given no opportunity to establish communism in their zone.

As there was no question arising concerning frontiers, there was no real reason why the Austrian Peace Treaty should not have been signed shortly after the end of the war. For year after year, however, the Russians withheld their signature on various pretexts, in order to use their final consent as a bargaining counter in other negotiations, notably over Germany. Eventually, in 1954, when it became apparent that, despite all their efforts, Germany was about to be rearmed, they turned from their 'cold war' policies to a 'peace offensive', taking a long series of shrewdly calculated steps designed to show how reasonable they could be. One was their agreement to a truce in Indo-China — when they were winning the war. Another was their rapprochement with Marshal Tito; another their surrender of foreign bases — at Port Arthur in China, and Porkkala in Finland.

Another was their signature at last of the Austrian Peace Treaty. They reached agreement with the Austrians without much difficulty on some outstanding questions concerning expropriated Austrian assets and put forward the suggestion of neutralisation, which was a price the West was prepared to pay to achieve a settlement. Thus the Treaty was signed, in May 1955. Immediately the Russians began to proclaim that, since neutralisation had made possible the solution of the Austrian 'problem', it was obviously the device with which to overcome the German impasse.

Partial Neutralisation

Unfortunately Germany presents a very much more difficult problem. Little reflection is needed to see that the Soviet offer is not really a fair *quid pro quo*. The man in the street seems to have appreciated this from one aspect — that of German resources. While the Russians would be giving up control of the manpower of the 18,000,000 East Germans, the West would be depriving itself of the 48,000,000 of Western Germany, and in addition the great bulk of Germany's important heavy industrial potential, virtually all of which is in the Federal Republic. But what the man in the street has generally failed to grasp is the strategic issue.

As has been seen, the main motivation of Russia's foreign policy since the end of the war has been to secure herself from the possibility of attack — by building a chain of buffer states across Eastern Europe to safeguard her frontier, and by establishing herself in a position dominating Europe. As Eastern Germany adds comparatively little to the breadth of her buffer zone, since the whole width of Poland lies behind it, and has little weight in the European balance of power, to give it up would make little difference to Russia's security system. Russia's security would be little affected. On the other hand, for the West to give up Western Germany would cripple NATO, and leave Western Europe virtually without security. In any form of warfare, the first essential for an effective defence system is depth; with modern weapons, the depth needs to be greater than ever before. If Western Germany were surrendered, a huge gap would be created in the centre of the NATO line which would completely destroy its effectiveness. There is insufficient depth in Holland and Belgium alone to maintain an effective toe-hold in northern Europe; Denmark and Norway, which already have little confidence in either the ability or the willingness of NATO to defend them, would be completely cut off from the rest of the NATO countries and would lose all interest; the USSR would gain a most valuable prize — the mouth of the Baltic — for the deployment of their tremendous fleet of ocean-going submarines. If Britain were obliged to withdraw her forces from Germany, they would be taken back across the Channel, whence it would be difficult to bring them into action

at short notice, while the loss of the American forces, which in all probability would be withdrawn right across the Atlantic, would deal a tremendous blow to European security. (Further, if ever the American troops leave Europe, it will become dangerously likely that, in the case of a major Russian threat, the United States would withhold the atomic counter-weapon rather than expose her cities to the destruction of a nuclear global war.)

Thus neutralisation is by no means what the Russians profess it to be — a fair compromise proposal. While it would make little difference to the Russian position, it would mean the virtual dismantling of NATO. The West is fully justified in rejecting it; but where the West has fallen short has been in not bringing forward an alternative suggestion for a fair compromise. In replying, as they have, that neutralisation is impracticable, because it will be impossible to restrict Germany's sovereignty in foreign policy indefinitely, and that therefore she must be free to choose for herself, the Western spokesmen have in effect been calling upon Russia to give up ground to them, without offering any recompense. This is scarcely likely to be of much effect. (Moreover, though there is some force in the contention that Germany's sovereignty cannot be restricted, nations have accepted obligations before today, and do so continually, in international interests; and Germany's future is very much a world interest. It would not be asking too much to call on the Germans to enter upon some such commitment.)

Is there no other, better-balanced compromise, which we could reasonably put before the Russians? On the basis of equal sacrifice coupled with the need to maintain defensible positions, the solution would seem to be on the lines of what has sometimes been called 'partial neutralisation'. If the West were to withdraw from the present East German frontier, but were to retain the use of sufficient German soil to give NATO a defensible foothold along the North Sea, would that not meet our essential requirements? Would it not be fair to ask the Russians to withdraw a similar distance, and accept German reunification on this basis?

Though at first arousing little attention among the general public, such a proposal has long been discussed among the powers. Just before the 'Summit' Conference at Geneva in July

1955, a preliminary meeting of the three Western leaders was held in Washington to decide upon the policy to be followed at Geneva; and at this gathering Sir Anthony Eden, prompted apparently by several leading British journals, who had all come forward with this suggestion simultaneously, proposed that 'partial neutralisation' be put before the Russians. It was reported, however, that President Eisenhower would not agree to this proposal, as Dr. Adenauer had impressed upon him that no solution involving 'neutralisation' in any form would be acceptable to the German Government. Thus 'partial neutralisation' was not accepted Western policy when the 'Summit' Conference met at Geneva.

Nevertheless, believing apparently that the suggestion was too promising to be disposed of so summarily, Sir Anthony managed to re-introduce it at Geneva — at the cost of some embarassment on the Western side. The opening exchanges, on Germany, followed much the pattern that had been expected. The Soviet delegates proposed neutralisation; the West objected that Germany's sovereignty could not be restricted — she must be free to choose her own foreign policy. There, in the meantime, the matter was allowed to rest. (In order to give the Russians a chance to expound their position, they were not pressed for the moment on the question of free elections, which the West still regarded as essential; a rejection on this point would have made further discussion seem futile.) The conference then moved on to the problem of disarmament. The great difficulty impeding disarmament is of course that of devising some system that will enable the powers to be assured that no threat is being prepared to their security, thus making it possible for them to make notable reductions in their armaments; and it was on this problem, as usual, that the discussion centred. The USSR, which had always rejected the American insistence upon a thorough-going system of international inspection as impracticable, raised again its alternative proposal — the maintenance of inspectors at 'control points', such as ports and rail junctions, where unusual movements of traffic, in preparation for an offensive, could be detected. Dismissing this as insufficient, President Eisenhower then made the spectacular suggestion of aerial inspection, together with the exchange of plans of defence installations and armaments factories. Though this aroused con-

siderable interest, the other leaders obviously had their doubts concerning its adequacy.

Unexpectedly, Sir Anthony Eden then made a further suggestion: that as an experimental starting-point and a contribution to the reduction of tension a 'partially de-militarised zone' be created down the centre of Europe, between the Communist bloc and the NATO countries. The result was apparently to produce some confusion on the Western side — for obvious reasons. As a glance at the map of Europe reveals, the only part of central Europe in which NATO is in contact with the Soviet bloc is in Germany. This proposed zone, therefore, was in effect — as Eisenhower is said to have immediately protested — a revival of the suggestion for the 'partial neutralisation' of Germany which the Western powers had already considered and rejected at Washington. Rather transparently, Sir Anthony pointed out that he had not mentioned Germany and that they were no longer discussing German reunification, but had moved further down the agenda! In any case, as this proposal seems to offer the only approach to the German problem at all likely to be profitable, his stratagem, if such it was, was amply justified.

The 'summit' conference was meant only to be exploratory and thus no decisions were reached, discussion being adjourned and then taken up again in October by the Foreign Ministers. But here again little progress was made and, after a short time, the West effectively ended the talks by asking the Russians directly whether or not they would agree to basing reunification upon free elections throughout Germany. The reply being a refusal, there seemed little point in continuing the conference, which broke up almost immediately.

Following the Geneva talks, there were indications that the various powers were continuing to give thought to the problem, and that the British suggestion was beginning to find some favour. A few weeks later, the US State Department announced that they thought it had possibilities, but that they would prefer to place the neutral zone on either side of the East German-Polish border. This would surely be asking too much of the Russians! Just before their visit to Britain in April 1956, Bulganin and Kruschev also declared they had been considering the idea, and thought it worth exploration. Even more noteworthy, in view of the explanation that it had been Dr. Aden-

auer's objection which had caused the original rejection of the proposal, was the fact that when the Federal Government itself, for the first time, made a direct, separate approach to the USSR late in 1956, after re-establishing diplomatic relations, 'partial neutralisation' was the main proposal advanced for discussion. (Nevertheless the Russians proved unresponsive on this occasion.)

As the problem remains as urgent as ever—it is difficult to overstress this — and 'partial neutralisation' in some form or other, based as it is upon the present disposition of forces, appears to offer the only hope of a mutually acceptable compromise, and therefore a solution, one would hope and expect to hear it further discussed in the near future. Though at first sight it would appear to divide Germany into three parts (if the USSR were to insist upon retaining some foothold on German soil) instead of the present two, this impression is due to a misconception of the role of the German-based forces. The fact that the NATO (and possibly Communist) forces were not armies of occupation, but merely foreign troops having the use of German facilities — in the same way as the US forces use bases in Britain — having no control over the German government but merely the status of guests, would mean that their presence would not pose a serious obstacle to the creation of a single government. In fact, the proposal would greatly facilitate reunification. (Although the details would be by no means easy to work out, the conception becomes simpler when one remembers that what NATO requires above all is to maintain its 'infrastructure' on German soil.)

As this book is being prepared for the press, the important 1957 meeting of the NATO Council is being held in Paris, and once again the idea of discussing with the Communists some sort of general 'disengagement' in central Europe is being widely mooted. This follows a recent Polish suggestion that nuclear weapons be excluded from an area comprising the two Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and also a similar proposal of a mutual withdrawal made by Mr. George Kennan in the 1957 Reith Lectures, which have aroused unusual interest.

Even if the problem of a reunited Germany's future position among the powers were solved, however, agreement would still have to be reached on the other aspect — the problem of the

manner or means by which reunification can be achieved. As has been seen, at Geneva the West repeated its insistence upon free elections. Russia's response was to propose gradual reunification by a piecemeal process, by means of setting up a number of boards consisting of representatives of the two governments, each charged with the co-ordination of some particular field, such as transport or intra-German trade. It seems to the present writer that this suggestion, based, like 'partial neutralisation', upon acceptance of and development from the *status quo*, should be agreed to. The West's insistence upon free elections seems a demonstration of principles rather than a constructive policy: this compromise would seem to be as much as we can hope to salvage from the post-war situation. Possibly, later on, given further developments within the Communist world, full reunification might emerge from these functional beginnings; and in any case, without such changes it is impossible to imagine Russia surrendering East German communism. Though some commentators have suggested that in making this proposal Russia is endeavouring to obtain a foothold for Communists within an all-German government, with a view to bringing about a *coup d'état* at some time later of the kind that was used to establish Communist governments in the satellites, the situation would in fact be quite different from that which obtained in Eastern Europe. In the first place, the deciding factor in each of the previous cases was the control of the country by the Red Army. Though vigilance would be necessary, there would be no real need to fear such a manœuvre. A loose federation is quite a different constitutional structure from a coalition government in a unitary state.

One further point: Russia's proposals for the neutralisation of Germany have always been coupled with the suggestion of a general European Pact, under which mutual guarantees against aggression would be exchanged. To avoid complicating the question unnecessarily, and in the belief that the Russians could be brought to discuss the proposals separately, no reference has been made to this suggestion in the account above. As British spokesmen have indicated at various times there would be no objection on the part of the West to exchanging such guarantees, though Western statesmen would view them as only 'scraps of paper' unless backed by some real concessions, such as the

creation of a neutral zone. At times, however, the Russians have indicated that they intend such a pact as a step towards the disbanding of NATO and their own Warsaw Alliance (which of course merely formalises a very close relationship which is not really dependent upon treaties), and have also coupled the suggestion with a demand for the dismantling of foreign bases — by which they mean mainly the withdrawal of American forces from Europe. Both of these conditions would, of course, completely destroy all the West's security, and are therefore unacceptable. But, since the division of Germany must be a source of anxiety to the Russians as well as to ourselves, it may be not too much to expect from the Russians that they give up these stipulations as part of their contribution to a German settlement.

The Germans and Reunification

Increasingly, as the problem of Germany and of a general European settlement is discussed, the views of the Germans themselves must be taken into account. No longer an occupied and controlled former enemy, but an equal partner in the Western alliance, the Federal Republic is beginning to feel its feet, cast off its sense of shame, and insist more strongly on its own particular interests in any settlement. The issue is a leading one in German politics; and since the two main parties are rather evenly matched, their leaders have to pay close heed to public opinion on the question.

And, naturally enough, the Germans strongly resent the partition of their country: it is for this reason that the present position in Europe is so inflammable and unstable. The depth of German feeling causes grave difficulties for the West. Though it was the Western view that only by rearming Western Germany and incorporating her in NATO could a strong enough position be obtained for the Western bloc to enable effective bargaining to be pursued over reunification, it is also true that the division of Europe into two hostile blocs is the main obstacle to reunification, and that Germany's membership of NATO appears to make the partition line even more emphatic a boundary. In this position, Adenauer has had to face the telling criticism that his policy of whole-hearted alignment with the West tends to perpetuate partition. Though he has responded with all the usual Western arguments and also pleaded that without West-

ern support the Federal Republic, the country next in the line of further Russian expansion, could not hope to maintain her independence, he has also had to impress on the Western powers continually the importance of actively seeking to end the state of partition. His position has been particularly difficult when there is so little he has been able to point to in the way of Western initiatives towards this end. He is the unfortunate heir politically to all the inherent difficulties in the situation.

Though it has been easy for the Opposition, the Social Democrats, to criticise, they have found it less easy to suggest an alternative policy. Nevertheless it has been a constant fear of the West that the Germans might at some time sacrifice the common Western cause for the sake of their own particular interest — in other words, strike a bargain with the Russians by withdrawing from NATO in return for reunification — and this is the position the Social Democrats tend to move towards. Their policy is by no means clear — they are not quite so naïve as to expect to obtain a great deal from the Russians immediately; but their spokesmen have at times referred to German membership of NATO as a bargaining counter, and favoured more interest being shown in the Russian suggestions for a general security pact among all the European nations.

Curiously, the third main party in German politics, the Free Democrats, though poles apart from the Social Democrats on domestic policy, tends to take a somewhat similar view on foreign affairs. The Free Democrats are right-wing, representing 'big business', and many of those behind the Party cast a jealous eye at Russia's economic domination of Eastern Europe — formerly Germany's main market. They have tended to accuse Adenauer of being too stubborn in his policy towards the Russians, thus perpetuating Germany's exclusion from this important field to trade. But, again, they have few constructive suggestions to offer towards an alternative policy.

A complicating and unsettling factor in German politics has been the influence of the refugees. Since these form nearly a quarter of the total population, none of the parties can afford to ignore their views. The appointment in 1953 of one of their leading spokesmen, Dr. Oberlander, as Minister for Reunification, was the cause of some alarm in the West. When Germans speak of reunification, very often they mean not merely the rejoining

together of the present two German states, but also the restoration to Germany of all her former territories east of the Oder-Neisse line, and in eastern Europe — including East Prussia, the Sudetenland and so on. More than 90 per cent of the refugees originate from these territories: this is despite the fact that the stream from Eastern Germany has remained at the level of about 200,000 annually even through the 1950's. Though some are intermarrying with the local population where they are now living, it was significant that these marriages were frowned upon by many of their number, and are still rare among the Sudeten Germans, the most unreconciled of all the groups. The refugee organisations insist the refugees must eventually be restored to their lands and property in the territories whence they were expelled or fled; and the slowness of their resettlement in the Federal Republic has partly been due to the reluctance of the government to enter upon a vigorous resettlement programme that would imply that their hopes are vain. Until the 1957 elections, their attitude was an important force in German politics.

Though the Western powers have denied that Russia's policy in treating the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent eastern frontier has their sanction, and insist that the final decision must await the peace settlement, they did give Russia to understand at the Yalta Conference that they considered this line might prove an appropriate frontier; and it seems a suitable choice. In any case, as the land and cities are now completely occupied, any restoration would involve as great an upheaval as that of the post-war period, and seems quite impracticable. Nor, even if practicable, would it be wise. It is both extraordinary and most significant that, even after some five hundred years, the German minorities in these territories had never been assimilated with the local Slav populations. They still kept up something of the air of being the bearers of Teutonic civilisation to the backward Slavs. In fact there have been echoes of this posture in the slogans of the refugee organisations; and this is not a healthy attitude. The German minorities have always been a source of trouble in Eastern Europe; Russia has on the whole done Europe a good turn in expelling them. The dreams of the refugees have been an alarming and dangerously unrealistic element in the post-war European situation.

It was a good omen, therefore, that at the Federal German elections in September 1957, it became apparent that the refugee organisations no longer found much support for their attitude among the electors. After their first soundings of opinion, the major parties proceeded to ignore them; and the most striking feature of the results was the complete elimination of the Refugee Party from the Bundestag, where it had previously held 27 seats. Apparently the great majority of the refugees are now reconciled to resettlement in the Federal Republic. In fact, the results of the elections generally were reassuring to the West, the Christian Democrats winning an absolute majority in the House for the first time: 270 seats compared with 244 previously, to 169 (151 previously) for the Social Democrats, 41 (48) for the Free Democrats, and 17 (15) for the German Party. The voting appeared to turn largely upon domestic issues, Adenauer pointing out very effectively that the opposition parties could put forward no practicable alternative to Germany's present foreign policy. The main misgivings of the West arise from the fact that he won this convincing victory at the age of 82. His party must soon look for his successor, but it is doubtful that they will find one of comparable stature.

Chapter Ten

SUPRANATIONALISM: THE EUROPEAN MOVEMENT

Of all the movements for the creation of international institutions that have emerged since 1945, none has been more remarkable, in its aims and in the progress it has achieved, than the 'European Movement' — the movement associated with the Council of Europe. Though the 'Europeans' — as the enthusiasts who have supplied the initiative are often called — have been disappointed at the rate of advance towards their ultimate objective — a united European state — it would have seemed incredible twenty years ago that by the mid-1950's the European nations could have linked themselves together as closely as they have done in the last few years. So revolutionary has this progress been, though yet so limited in comparison with the movement's objective, that it seems to mark a new phase in world history. Yet in effect Britain has refused to admit that it has any epoch-making importance, being careful to remain only half-involved. Have British governments been making a grave mistake on this issue? Is there a danger that Britain will be left behind by the trend towards supranationalism? The answer depends on whether this new movement is only a flash in the pan, or truly an historical turning-point.

In attempting to find an answer to this question, let us first examine the forces that have brought the Council of Europe, and the new institutions connected with it, into existence. How far are they temporary, how far likely to be permanent? The main motivation has been the consciousness of Continental peoples that their nation-states are too small to make the best use of their resources for economic and military purposes in the modern world. Since the Middle Ages the trend of technological advance has always been such as to make necessary the

organisation of community life upon a larger and larger scale. We have now reached the stage where none but the very largest nations seem large enough. None of the Western European nations is large enough by itself to make adequate use of automation or atomic power, or to develop a strategic air force equipped with the most powerful atomic weapons. A continental scale is necessary. And realisation of this has been impressed upon Western Europeans by the fact that two nations organised upon this scale — the United States and the Soviet Union — already exist. Europe is already being outpaced and outmoded.

The main stimulus to the European movement has come, naturally, from the circumstance that one of these two supernations is communist. The movement has been largely a response to the threat poised over Western Europe by Soviet Russia, and interest in unification has tended to wax and wane as Russia's attitude has seemed more and less menacing. In addition, however, some 'Europeans', an important element though a minority, have been motivated by the aim of creating a 'third force' — a European state that would counter-balance the predominance of the United States in the anti-communist half of the world. Hostility to American culture and resentment of dependence upon the United States have contributed to this attitude. Nevertheless American governments have strongly supported the movement, to such an extent that American support has been an important factor in its comparative success. Even more conscious than Europeans that the disunity of Western Europe is its main weakness, very much aware that the continental character of the United States is the main source of its strength, and greatly preferring a strong Europe as their main ally, Americans have been almost embarassing in their approval. It follows that support for the movement need not be anti-American in spirit.

Another motive has been the desire to end the age-old rivalry between France and Germany by linking these two countries together within a European community. French politicians have played a leading role in the movement, partly with the intention of at last freeing France and Europe of the German menace. Frequently in fact, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, one detects in French speeches on the subject the sentiment that the success of the project, which is so eminently rational and to

which French thought has made such a notable contribution, would in a sense represent a peaceful conquest of Europe by French culture — the main element to be subdued being of course German barbarism. In addition the French have been particularly resentful of their relegation to minor-power status in the post-war world, and have therefore been particularly anxious to create a 'third force'. On the other hand, the same extreme sensitivity and pride about France's leading role in world history that has added extra bitterness to this resentment has caused misgivings among many Frenchmen, particularly on the right, at the prospect of France losing her identity by submerging herself into a united Europe.

Largely because they are so small, with no prospect of an effective separate existence in modern conditions, Belgium and Holland have also been enthusiastic for the movement. Together with Luxemburg, they were responsible for a previous development which helped to promote the idea of European unification — the formation of the Benelux Union. This was an economic and customs union, decided upon by the three exiled governments in London in 1944 while the war was still being fought. Because of divergent policies, however — Holland adopting planning for reconstruction, while Belgium preferred free enterprise — it was not fully implemented until 1953, when Holland relaxed its system of controls. Its benefits soon became apparent, and have provided a further important stimulus for the wider movement.

Origins

There is of course nothing new about the basic idea of linking the countries of Europe together into a single super-state. It has been mooted at various times since the demise of the shadowy Holy Roman Empire, which in its day had imposed a tenuous unity upon medieval Europe, but until these post-war developments it seemed no more than a toy for visionaries. After 1920 a number of societies emerged in different countries at various times to promote the project, some of them the product of the writings of the American, Clarence K. Streit, in the 1930's on 'Federal Union' — a proposal for the federation of the United States with European countries. But the idea received no serious attention until given typically vigorous advocacy in a speech

delivered by Churchill at Zurich University in September 1946. It was then widely discussed, so that the interested societies were encouraged to set up an international committee with the object of pressing the various governments to take action.

A further impetus was provided by the Marshall Plan. When Marshall offered American economic aid to Europe in 1947, he made his offer conditional upon the European countries co-operating to plan its distribution and expenditure — a gesture typical of American disapproval of European disunity and of the type of pressure employed to remedy it. On Bevin's initiative, the European countries formed OEEC (the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation) and called upon the United States to implement her offer. (It has been rumoured that Marshall had been speaking in hypothetical terms, and had not anticipated such a literal response; but in any case the United States carried out her part of the bargain very generously!) This marked an important development in European co-operative action. Even so, there appeared to be little prospect even at this point of embodying this co-operation in permanent political institutions until, suddenly, the Russian blockade of Berlin and seizure of power in Czechoslovakia aroused Western Europe to a realisation of its weakness. Interest in promoting a real measure of unity mounted overnight, and brought a dramatic advance.

In May 1948, a 'Congress of Europe', convened by the international committee, was held at The Hague and attended by a large number of leading figures from the various countries. Churchill again played a prominent part. The Congress concluded by calling upon the European governments to take action. As a result, conferences were held at which the Statute of the Council of Europe was drafted; and eventually it was signed in London on 5th May, 1949. In a surprisingly short time the movement had created what had previously seemed only an academic dream — a representative European political organ.

Already, however, the 'Europeans' had been disappointed. They had hoped to make the Council a real European parliament, controlling a European cabinet. This was to have been achieved mainly by having it elected directly by the European people, which would have meant that it could have legitimately claimed to represent European opinion, so that its decisions

would have had to be accorded considerable respect. This aim was frustrated, however, by the British Government, which insisted that each country should be free to appoint its own delegation as it chose. The method adopted in Britain, and subsequently followed by most other countries, is for Parliament to select an all-party delegation. Thus the Council cannot claim to represent the people of Europe in any very real sense and has, appropriately, been accorded very limited powers. Though it is going too far to dismiss it, as many do, as a 'mere debating society', it is not a great deal more. Similarly the Committee of Ministers, which the Europeans had hoped to make a real European Cabinet, is very much less than this: to be implemented, its decisions have to be ratified by the member governments.

The Council, which sits at Strasbourg, has three organs: the Committee of Ministers, the Consultative Assembly, and a Secretariat. The Committee consists of the Foreign Ministers of the member countries, who meet about three times a year, or their deputies, who meet monthly as a rule. As only the Committee can make decisions, it is the most important organ; but even so, as has been seen, these decisions are not binding upon the member governments. The Consultative Assembly has 132 members, appointed by the parliament of each country or by means of methods approved by it, representation ranging from 18 for France, Britain, West Germany, and Italy to 7 for Belgium, the Netherlands and Greece and 3 for Iceland and Luxemburg. (The remaining members are Denmark, Eire, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey. Since the movement is regarded as being essentially one of parliamentary democracies, Spain and Portugal, being dictatorships, are not members; nor are Switzerland, Austria, Yugoslavia, and Finland, as these countries regard membership as incompatible with their neutrality.) It has recently met three times a year, and acts by making Recommendations, requiring a two-thirds majority, or passing Resolutions, carried by simple majority. The Committee of Ministers is not however obliged to act upon these. It also, with the Committee, receives reports from the various specialised organisations which are being established in the present phase of the movement.

Is the Council of Europe of any real value? It is certainly difficult to point to anything of importance it has accomplished;

but the contacts between parliamentarians at the meetings of the Assembly have apparently borne much good fruit indirectly. They are given credit, for example, for much of the improvement in Franco-German relations in recent years, such as was demonstrated in the comparatively smooth final stages of the negotiations over the Saar. In the meantime, the Council waits for the evolution of a more closely linked European community, as is gradually being brought about by the multiplication of specialist or 'functional' organisations.

The Functional Approach

In 1950, foiled in their attempt to make the Council of Europe a real parliament, the 'Europeans' turned to the 'functional approach' towards ultimate unification, i.e. to the plan of working for unity piecemeal by setting up as many organisations as possible to carry out specialised functions. The conception behind this policy was the belief that, if a sufficient number of these organisations were established, Europe would eventually come to be acting as a unity in so many fields of activity that a final step to political unification would represent little more than recognition of an integration that had already been achieved. In any case, close association over a great part of community life would greatly help to foster the sense of common interest that is the essential requirement for political unity. As it was held that a merely federal form of organisation or mere co-operation among governments would emphasise divergence of interests more than it would promote association, the 'Europeans' determined that these institutions should be 'supranational' in character, i.e. that their organs should be given powers overriding those of the national governments — a revolutionary conception.

In the first place four such organisations were proposed — each commonly known by the name of the French Cabinet Minister who promoted it. They were the European Coal and Steel Community (Schuman Plan), the European Defence Community (Pleven Plan), a transport authority (Bonnéfous Plan), and an agricultural authority (Pflimlin Plan). Recently others have been added, the best known being the European Common Market and Euratom. All of these institutions will be examined in some detail in a moment; but firstly it will be ad-

visable to consider the general course of development of the 'functional approach'.

The first two organisations upon which great hopes were placed were the Coal and Steel Community and EDC. Despite a grave disappointment when Britain, typically, refused to participate, the Coal and Steel Community was successfully founded in July 1952. It was obvious, however, that some time would have to elapse before it could be seen whether it could function effectively and produce the benefits expected by its supporters: there were many sceptics, especially in Britain. Even greater importance was placed by the 'Europeans' on EDC. This, as will be remembered, was to be a fully supranational institution, to the extent that it was to create a European army and not merely a combination of national armies, with all troops wearing a common uniform and units so intermingled that no one national army could be withdrawn and operated separately. If the member nations could have been persuaded to surrender such a vital function as defence to a supranational body, this would have constituted a remarkable stride along the path to a fully united Europe. EDC very nearly came into being, but, as was seen in the previous chapter, was eventually rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954, because of Britain's refusal to come in. Once again Britain had been the stumbling block, and one of her main reasons had been reluctance to associate herself closely with the European movement. In other words, one of her main objections to EDC had been that it was one of the functional organisations of the movement, intended to come within the orbit of the Council of Europe.

For the moment, nothing further was done about the projected transport and agricultural authorities, though there was further discussion about them at various times. Attention shortly turned to other projects. The collapse of EDC was a severe blow to the 'Europeans': in response they soon set about finding other fields for functional organisations in order to restore the movement's lost momentum. It is this renewed initiative that has brought the movement to its present phase. Organisations now proposed include the Common Market, Euratom, and a European postal service.

This further development has brought the whole question of Britain's attitude to the movement to crisis point. Despite the

sceptics, the Coal and Steel Community has flourished. The six nations who joined it — known often as 'The Six' or 'Little Europe' or the 'Messina Powers' (after the location of the conference where this next stage of advance was planned) — are now going ahead with the Common Market and Euratom. This is despite the fact that the prospects of creating these new institutions seemed far from hopeful at one stage. In the first half of 1956, interest appeared to be waning, and many obstacles were raised, enthusiasm apparently falling off (simultaneously with the decline in NATO morale) with the seeming relaxation of the Russian threat. But the crushing of the Hungarian revolt by the USSR in November, together with accumulating evidence of the success of the Coal and Steel Community, changed the atmosphere. The Rome Treaties of February 1957, establishing both organisations simultaneously, have now been ratified.

Britain has already declined to join Euratom: can she afford to let the Common Market also proceed without her, under peril both of severe economic loss through being excluded from important European markets, and of the final antagonism of 'The Six' for throwing aside this crucial opportunity to associate herself after all with the project of a European state?

The European Coal and Steel Community

In addition to serving as one of the functional institutions whose multiplication will, it is hoped, pave the way for the European state, ECSC was meant to furnish some of the benefits of European unification in the economic field. And here, of course, the model is the United States. One of the reasons why the continental size of the United States has been partly responsible for its much greater advances in productivity compared with the European nations is the much wider area this opens to free competition. Over the whole of the United States, producers are in direct competition with each other, limited only by the transport costs of their products. The more efficient producers (using 'efficient' in the economists' sense, denoting no more than cheapness of costs of production) therefore tend to drive out the inefficient. The result is an increase in the general level of efficiency — in other words, increased productivity. Europe, on the other hand, being split into small nation-states,

does not constitute a single market, but a group of small markets, the producers in each country being generally protected from their potential rivals in others, mainly by means of tariffs. Thus the less efficient producers tend to survive, the more efficient have less scope for expansion, and the result is to restrain the advance of the average level of efficiency.

The purpose of ECSC is to create throughout the whole area of the member countries conditions of completely free competition for the coal and steel industries, similar to those existing in the United States. It is hoped, of course, that the result will be a marked increase in their overall level of efficiency; and the reason why these two industries were chosen was their fundamental importance in the economy. The reason why an institution was thought necessary was the fact that completely free competition cannot be ensured merely by the removal of tariffs. Within a country, an industry may be receiving concealed subsidies of some kind which assist it in competition — in the steel industry, for example, the rail charges for the carriage of coal or iron ore to the steel works may be artificially low. The executive organ of ECSC was therefore given power to direct governments to adjust such conditions within the member countries. Further, fully free competition requires complete freedom of movement for labour: a more efficient producer may not be able to expand, and a less efficient firm may continue in production, if the workers employed by the latter experience difficulty in transferring to the former, or are strongly reluctant to do so. Another important function of ECSC, therefore, is to facilitate such movements. It attempts to do this by issuing 'labour cards' which serve as a sort of 'labour passport', entitling a worker in these two industries to immediate employment in any of the member countries, and by building workers' housing where required — a project in which it has been greatly assisted by a generous grant from the United States (one token among many of American favour for the organisation).

With such functions to discharge, ECSC is highly suitable for organisation on supranational lines — hence the enthusiasm shown for it by the 'Europeans' and, on the other hand, the deep misgivings it aroused in Britain. Eventually it is to have six organs, one of these having not yet been founded. At the head is the executive body, the *High Authority*, consisting of nine mem-

bers, experts appointed by the member governments for 6-year terms but not responsible to their own particular government. Once in office, they are expected to consider questions not from a national but from a European view-point. The High Authority takes the decisions of the organisation, giving orders to governments. It is assisted by a *Secretariat.* There is also a *Council of Ministers,* consisting of Foreign and Economic Ministers, which exists, however, merely to facilitate the implementation of the Authority's decisions, and cannot impede or reject them. The organisation also has an *Assembly,* of 78 members, drawn as far as possible from members of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, which can make recommendations to the High Authority. It also receives an annual report from it, and by a two-thirds vote of censure can dismiss it. In addition there is a *Court of Justice,* of 7 members, which hears appeals against the legality of the High Authority's decisions. The organ planned but not yet created is a *Consultative Committee,* to comprise between 30 and 51 members representing producers, workers, consumers and distributors, which will be able to present the views of these interests.

The tie with the Council of Europe takes the form mainly of a stipulation that the High Authority and ECSC Assembly shall submit annual reports to the Committee of Ministers and Assembly of the Council. It is also intended that the provision that the members of the two Assemblies shall as far as possible be the same persons will also form a strong bond. As was mentioned above, Britain declined to join the organisation — for the good reason that the coal and steel industries are so vitally important in the British economy that she could not risk surrendering control over them. (Nevertheless insularity and native caution, and scepticism concerning the revolutionary character of the project, also seemed to play their part.) She undertook, however, to act in concert with the Community as far as possible, and maintains a permanent delegation to the High Authority.

What results has ECSC achieved? Although still far from completing its task, it has achieved considerable success in its opening phase under the enthusiastic leadership of M. Guy Monnet (who resigned in 1955 to devote his energies to the campaign for the creation of further supranational bodies). It is still too early to judge whether it will fulfil all the hopes of its founders.

There can be no doubt, however, that the European coal and steel industries have already been greatly stimulated: their output has been greatly increased, and there has been a marked general improvement in efficiency. While it is impossible to determine how much of this improvement has been due to the creation of the Community, and how much would have occurred in any case, there are indications that the spur of free competition has had a notable effect. While no mines or steelworks have so far been obliged to close down, though some high-cost Belgian mines have been threatened a number of times, remarkable new standards of efficiency have been achieved by undertakings which had previously lagged far behind the rest of their industries! Coal and ore supplies are now moving to their 'natural' markets, with a consequent notable reduction in their average cost. The apparent success attained by ECSC has undoubtedly won a great deal of support for the project of a Common Market — which in effect plans to do for all commodities what ECSC has done for coal and steel.

Euratom

The particular plea for Euratom, the European institution created to organise joint action among its member countries for the development of atomic power, rests mainly on the fact that this is a project too large in scale for any one European country to handle effectively. The main difficulty is the large variety of types of reactor requiring investigation and development to discover which are most suitable for particular needs, and the immense number of scientists this absorbs. There is also a further special consideration — the fact that the necessary supplies of enriched uranium can also be used for the manufacture of atomic weapons: it would obviously be highly advantageous to have some means, such as Euratom might well supply, of controlling their use. Euratom is to operate through a similar system of organs to that of ECSC, headed by an executive High Authority.

The main point at issue during the final stages of the discussions on Euratom was whether all fissile material should actually be owned by the organisation. Eventually it was decided that it should be — an arrangement that will give the Authority very real powers. Though it was originally intended that Euratom

should actually produce material, this now seems unlikely, largely because of a very generous offer of enriched uranium at a very cheap price by the United States. A typical gesture of American approval for European unification, this offer, significantly, was not extended also to Britain. Euratom will have the monopoly of importation and distribution of fissile material within the community, and will plan and supervise a joint approach to the development of atomic power. In addition to collecting and distributing information, all members being obliged to share any knowledge gained with the rest, it will probably itself promote research.

At the time when the Euratom project was emerging, there was a rival suggestion in the field — a proposal for a European organisation for co-operation in atomic research, under the auspices of OEEC. This was not to have any supranational powers, but was merely to promote joint effort. (Euratom will probably become a member, as if a single nation, of the OEEC scheme.) As Britain has usually favoured such institutions in preference to supranational bodies, it might have been expected that she would support this OEEC plan — despite its reduced effectiveness, compared with Euratom, for preventing the misuse of fissile materials. But she has favoured neither. Apparently, since Britain is well ahead of the Continental countries so far in atomic research, the British Government is reluctant to share out its hard-won findings with the other Western European nations. This policy, however, seems short-sighted. It seems obvious that in a few years time the OEEC group, working jointly, will overtake Britain's lead and move on past her; and they will naturally be most reluctant to admit her to their circle at that stage. The strain on her industry due to the immense number of her scientists occupied in atomic research is already handicapping Britain seriously in world trade by holding back her technological development. Further, the position is gravely aggravated by her decision to proceed with the development of the H-bomb — an undertaking extremely expensive in scientists and consumption of fissile material. Since there is no strategic interest of Britain's — as distinct from her common interests with the United States — that could not be served effectively with the atom bomb, this decision seems to have been taken purely for considerations of prestige. Britain cannot afford prestige at such

a price; and in the long run must lose rather than gain prestige by over-extending her resources.

The European Common Market

Simultaneously with Euratom, the 'Little Europe' group of nations has ventured upon the project of a European Common Market. This institution should have profound, possibly spectacular, effects on the economies of the member countries. Broadly speaking, the intention is to create completely free competition in all industries, with certain qualifications concerning agriculture, in the same way as ECSC has achieved this for coal and steel. In addition to being motivated by the desire to revive progress towards European unification, the 'Europeans' have been attracted to the project by the notable success of ECSC.

There are two ways in which free competition will be promoted: firstly the complete removal of all tariffs upon each other's products by the Common Market countries, and secondly, since this alone is held to be insufficient for the purpose, by the operation, in similar fashion to those of ECSC, of especially created organs which will attempt to eliminate artificial advantages — such as concealed subsidies — enjoyed by industries in particular countries. Theoretically the results of freeing competition over a continental area should ultimately be immensely beneficial, though a good deal of difficult readjustment will probably be necessary in the transitional stage. Instead of each country producing a wide range of commodities as at present, and protecting its own industries which operate at a higher cost than the same industries in other countries, each will tend to specialise and produce for the whole community those commodities which it produces best. The result will be a widespread reduction in prices; and in addition the wider competition should prove immensely stimulating to manufacturers to improve costs and qualities. (Economists argue that, even if one country cannot produce any commodity more cheaply than others in the group, it will still be advantageous to the others to concentrate on those products where their relative advantage is greatest, and leave some industries to the handicapped country; and they will naturally tend to do this. Thus there is no danger of any member country being left with nothing to produce.)

Another important benefit which free competition should promote is a marked increase in the scale upon which many industries will operate, which will greatly facilitate the introduction of the latest technological advances — the revolutionary electronic equipment generally summed up by the term 'automation'. Though this equipment can greatly cheapen production, being extremely complex, it is of course very costly to instal. Thus its full benefits can be obtained only when its capital costs are spread over a large output. In Europe at present many industries to which automation is applicable — the motor-car industry for instance — are not producing in sufficient quantities to adopt the new devices extensively, the main reason for this being the effect of tariffs in preventing the leading firms from obtaining a European market. Under free competition the more successful firms should be able to expand to the necessary scale. Just as technological advance made necessary the merging together of the small, locally-based economies of the middle ages, and thus contributed a major part of the stimulus to the emergence of the modern nation-state, so it now appears to have moved on a further stage, and made continental economies — and perhaps political organisation — necessary.

The abolition of tariffs among the members, to which they will pledge themselves in advance, is to take place by means of cuts averaging 10 per cent in each of ten periods, extending over 12, or possibly 15, years. Though the decision about which tariffs to reduce at any stage is to be left to the separate governments, there must be an all-round minimum reduction of 5 per cent in each period. And more stringent requirements must be met at the end of four-year stages.

Although there is to be a common set of tariffs towards the outside world (thus the Market is to be a 'Customs Union', though it will also be much more), the tariffs will be fairly low. Holland and Belgium, which are low tariff countries, were granted the best of a compromise in this point. An exception to the general objective of complete free trade within the Market will be agricultural products, where the tradition of most of the six countries has long been protectionist. At the moment they operate systems of import control through marketing boards, importation being prohibited in each case so long as the dom-

estic price of the particular commodity remains below a level prescribed by the appropriate board. Under the Common Market the boards in each country are to be instructed to give preference in their marketing to other member countries; and there are plans for eventually instituting either a common agricultural price level or common marketing boards. The degree of free competition that will result will therefore depend on the sort of level of minimum prices that will be decided upon.

A European Investment Bank is to be set up, with a capital of $1,000 million, to which all will subscribe, to assist with the necessary re-equipment when one industry is shrinking within a country, while another is expanding to take its place. It is hoped this will minimise or eliminate the hardship caused by transition. There is also to be a common fund to assist with the expense of retraining and moving workers, half the expenses in each case to be met from the fund, and half by the government of the country concerned.

The organs of the Common Market are to be (1) a permanent executive European Commission (corresponding to the High Authority of ECSC), (2) a Council of Ministers, (3) an Assembly, probably identical with the ECSC and Euratom Assemblies, (4) a Court of Justice — again to be shared with ECSC and Euratom, (5) a Secretariat, (6) a Monetary Committee. As the Council of Ministers will have the right to reject the Commission's proposals, the element of supranationalism will not be as great as in ECSC; but the Council may act only on decisions of the Commission. For the first four years the Council's decisions must be unanimous; after that they may be vetoed by a combination of a large nation (France, West Germany, or Italy) and a small nation (Holland, Belgium or Luxemburg). Two important additional powers have however been vested in the Commission: the authority to order a government to remove a subsidy or alter its taxation to eliminate an element of discrimination — a remarkable concession of sovereignty — and the power to grant a temporary dispensation to a member country concerning a tariff on some commodity, if there is severe hardship in a particular industry or region. As yet it has not been proposed to place general fiscal policies under the Commission's control, though it would be possible for a government to adopt fiscal measures that would disrupt the operation

of the common market. Though the Monetary Committee is intended to promote the co-ordination of fiscal policies, many authorities have pointed to its consultative character, which could make it quite ineffective, as a serious weakness in the project.

An issue that caused difficulties before the treaties were finalised was that of overseas territories. France was eager to have these included in the common trading area, and to obtain assurances that capital would be invested in her colonies by the other countries. Her eyes were naturally on Western Germany. While German financiers saw some attraction in the prospect, they had misgivings about the security of the proposed investments because of the political uncertainty in the French territories. Eventually it was agreed that the colonies be included in the Market, and an Overseas Investment Fund be created, for an experimental five-year term. The Fund is to amount to $581 million, with France and Germany each contributing $200 million, Belgium and Holland each $70 million, Italy $40 million, and Luxemburg $1,250,000. Of this sum French colonies will receive $311 million, Belgian $30 million, Dutch $35 million, and Italian Somaliland $5 million. The free entry accorded to produce from these colonies is expected to have an adverse effect upon exports of coffee, cocoa and bananas from British colonies to Europe, which have been considerable; but sales of other products are not likely to be seriously affected.

Though France also sought provisions for the harmonisation of social policies, since her own advanced policies impose a heavy burden on her industry, she was less successful on this issue. All she could obtain was a vague general undertaking, with specific pledges only in respect of equal payment for the sexes and equalisation of rates of overtime payment.

Though they will not operate effectively for some time, Euratom and the Common Market came into being in January 1, 1958. The Common Market especially amounts to rather a hazardous 'leap into the dark', and may lead to some hardship, for a time at least. If extensive re-equipment is necessary Europe will be faced with an immense burden of investment. But this investment is probably needed in any case; and in theory the project seems most timely. It could well be immensely beneficial; and further delay over some development of this sort

could have resulted in Europe being hopelessly outpaced by the United States in the near future, and possibly the Soviet Union some years later. If it does succeed to a marked degree, it will make a crucial contribution to the unification of Europe.

The Free Trade Area

So far Britain has consistently held aloof from the European movement. Though frequently showing her awareness of the urgent need for close co-operation with her continental neighbours — except in the case of the OEEC plan for atomic power development — she has refused to enter the supranational institutions on which the majority of Western European countries have set their hearts. She has raised particular and fairly convincing difficulties about ECSC and EDC; but in addition she has strongly preferred to delay the political integration that is the professed eventual purpose of the 'functional' organisations. The Scandinavian countries have adopted a similar attitude. Similar in outlook to the British, their leaders, like ours, have questioned how a European parliament could operate satisfactorily when the whole approach to politics of the Latin peoples differs so greatly from theirs and ours. The Latins prefer a multi-party system, while the British and Scandinavians show a marked preference for two parties only. (Germany and Holland seem to take up a mid-position.) Under the British system, Cabinet controls Parliament, reducing a back-bencher to a position of little importance; in France parliament exercises very real control over the cabinet, and a handful of back-benchers may overthrow a government, so that their views have to be seriously considered. Our two parties tend to the middle of the road; in the Latin countries the extreme parties, both of left and right — and both have a large representation — do not even approve of democratic government. In addition the Scandinavian countries have a Commonwealth-type relationship among themselves which it would be difficult for them to merge into an integrated Western Europe. One obstacle is that Norway, Denmark and Sweden would be loth to abandon Finland — whose need to exercise extreme care in her relations with the USSR would preclude her from joining.

A serious problem has been raised for these more reluctant countries, especially for Britain, with the latest stage in the de-

velopment of the European movement. Euratom and the Common Market are the next step; Britain has rejected Euratom, thus incurring some more resentment; she would prefer to avoid entanglement with the movement by staying at a distance from its functional institutions; but can she afford to remain out of the Common Market? If it comes into operation as expected, she may find herself eventually excluded from trade with the member countries. Though at present they take only one-eighth of British exports, this is by no means a negligible quantity. Moreover, since 1949 European trade has boomed, while trade with the rest of the world has not expanded as was hoped. In the years 1949–55 trade among Western European countries expanded 57 per cent, that between Britain and the Commonwealth only 37 per cent — a result apparently produced by the greater increase in productivity in manufacturing industry in this period than in agriculture (which experienced its period of rapid technological advance in the 1920's and 1930's). It is highly important to Britain to share in this expansion if possible. Further, the aim of restoring the position of sterling as an international currency, which would bring profitable financial business to this country, will not be attained unless we are active in this market, as the former attraction of sterling was dependent to a large extent upon its free circulation in ample quantities in Europe — a circulation promoted largely by our formerly extensive European trade. Yet how can we attach Britain to the Common Market without abolishing the Commonwealth preferences? Though these are now less valuable to this country than they were, to abolish them would be politically very difficult and of doubtful wisdom.

In this dilemma, the Government has proposed the creation of a 'Free Trade Area', to be formed under the auspices of OEEC, to govern the relations of other Council of Europe countries with the Common Market. Unlike a Customs Union — which, as has been seen, is the system adopted by the Common Market — this would not require the erection of a common tariff system towards the rest of the world, but merely internal abolition of tariffs among the members. It is proposed that this be done in steps corresponding with those adopted by the Common Market group. But under this scheme Britain would still be free to continue the Commonwealth preferences.

At first sight this would seem to involve a difficulty: what would prevent merchants conveying duty-free to the Continent goods previously admitted to Britain under the British preference, thus avoiding the duty normally levied by the Continental country? It has been stated, however, that a control system, based upon certification of the country of origin, could be devised to prevent this. Though it would obviously cause considerable inconvenience, the Treasury has declared it would be practicable.

Membership of the Free Trade Area would not, of course, place Britain, or any other member outside 'The Six', under the authority of the Common Market organs. Nevertheless, as it would involve her almost completely in the resulting area of free competition, it would be a bold step, particularly since Britain is so much more dependent upon foreign trade than other European countries. She would run more than her share of the risks, without the two Common Market funds to assist her readjustment (though on the other hand she would not have to contribute to them) and, whether the consequences for her were either beneficial or harmful, would probably be affected more than other member countries. Though, since so much depends upon the response of managements to the stimulus of competition, it is impossible to forecast with any exactitude, it seems probable that British consumer goods industries would contract, and capital goods industries expand. But in any case, as was seen in the opening chapter, it is precisely this reorientation of British industry that has already become necessary.

In addition to leaving herself free to maintain the Commonwealth preferences, it is Britain's hope also to preserve protection for Commonwealth and British farmers by having agriculture and foodstuffs excluded from the Free Trade arrangements. Since they are in fact retaining a considerable measure of protection for their own agriculture, it was apparently thought the Common Market countries would probably agree to this. But strong resistance has been encountered, especially from Holland, and also from some OEEC countries, especially Denmark, whose export trade consists almost entirely of agricultural products. On the other hand the self-governing Commonwealth countries have stated their approval of British participation. They believe that any policy that

strengthens Britain will ultimately benefit them; and in any case the British Government has recently shown its preference for favouring the British farmer rather than assisting them to dispose of their produce on the British market. They are therefore being obliged to find other markets, and are interested in the possibility of entry into Europe. Now that Britain has shown itself incapable of raising as much capital as they need for their development, they are also looking, probably with too much optimism, to European sources. The Commonwealth preference system seems to be on the point of breaking up.

More recent economic studies have also suggested that the inclusion of agriculture in the Area would probably have less effect upon British farming than was at first generally thought. Moreover, in view of the special Common Market provisions for agriculture, acceptable compromise arrangements could surely be negotiated. The range of produce likely to be exported from the continental countries differs considerably from that produced by British farmers, and only certain sections of the British industry are likely to contract, these being comparatively unimportant: horticulture and pig production. Nevertheless the Government continues to declare that it will not contemplate bringing agriculture into the arrangements. One is bound to suspect that its main concern is over the political importance of the British farming interest — now being subsidised at the rate of £245,000,000 a year. The present expansion of British farming is not worth this fantastic price; it is also this policy of subsidy that has deprived the dominions of their potential markets.

The main problem facing Britain over the project is really the difficulty that kept her out of ECSC: that of reconciling participation in European free trade with maintenance of the control over the economy that has been thought necessary to ensure stability and full employment. There is some doubt whether the control we can exercise will be sufficient if the ability to restrict imports from Europe is surrendered, as it seems will be necessary. The choice is thus between a prospect of accelerated economic advance and a greater measure of assurance that we can deal effectively with possible economic crises.

Chapter Eleven

THE NEW GIANT IN THE FAR EAST: COMMUNIST CHINA AND HER NEIGHBOURS

From consideration of the efforts of the Western world to devise suitable forms of international organisation — efforts motivated by a realisation that technological advance has now outmoded nationalism — we now move, ironically, to problems arising from the fact that a large part of the world has only recently arrived at the stage of emergent nationalism. The first of the new nations to be examined, China, is in many ways untypical, but for this very reason is an important example. Most of the new nations are very weak, and are occupied with the problem of how best to preserve and express their newly-found independence in the world of power politics; but China is herself one of the major powers. Nevertheless China, though large, was until recently also very weak — was in fact a geographical term rather than a state or nation — and her emergence to great power status has to a large extent taken the form which, unfortunately for the West, the new nationalist movements have generally had to take — an assertion of independence from Western control or interference. Thus the new nations regard China as, to a large extent, one of themselves, and look up to her half with admiration, half, if they are close to her, with uneasiness. Certainly China's appearance among the great powers is a revolutionary, epoch-making development.

At the end of the nineteenth century, China was the 'sick man of the Far East'. The power of the Manchus, the latest in her long succession of dynasties, was steadily decaying. The Manchu emperors had lost control of the outlying provinces; it appeared that China was about to fall apart; and the hungry, newly industrialised countries hovered about her, eager to hasten the

process and pick up the pieces. Through the chance, however, that Britain and the United States coincided in desiring to prevent the empire being partitioned, China was preserved as an entity, nominally at least. Having just acquired, in the course of the race for Africa and south-east Asia, rather more possessions than she could readily digest, Britain did not want any more territories for herself, but on the other hand did not wish to see other nations acquiring them and thus possibly excluding her from potential markets and sources of raw materials. For her part the United States was closely interested in the Chinese market, but had a strong anti-colonial tradition. It was virtually impossible politically for her to annex China for herself; but American business men were confident that, with their advantage of closer access to Asia, they could outstrip their rivals and dominate Chinese trade if only they could compete there freely. Business interests had more even than their usual influence with the State Department at this time. Hence, with strong British support, the United States pursued what was called the 'Open Door' policy in the Far East, with fair success.

Nevertheless, although Britain and the United States were able to preserve China, they did not go as far as to prevent other Western powers from obtaining, like themselves, trade concessions, grants of legal privileges for their nationals, and some control over ports, from the decrepit Chinese government. And when trouble occurred as the result of these concessions — such as the Boxer Risings — the powers took punitive measures much as if China were actually a colony. Thus the first aim of Chinese nationalists was always to abolish the foreign treaties and put China on an equal footing with the West. Further, there were two nations whom Britain and the United States could not restrain completely — Russia and Japan. Russia was moving on a course of colonisation and imperialism at this time as much as any other European power, with the difference that her expansion was being carried out across Asia. For that reason Britain and the United States could do little to prevent her acquiring interests in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, as she did increasingly round the turn of the century. As for Japan, she too was an industrial power in search of markets and raw materials, and her close proximity to China made her difficult to deal with. Since Britain was already feeling the strain upon

her resources and had little to spare for the Far East, she attempted to solve two problems at once by allying with the Japanese, making Japan her sword-bearer in this region and imposing some restraint upon her in return for valuable diplomatic support. But from time to time Japan demanded a further price for her services, in the form of consent for an annexation — causing some embarassment in Anglo-American relations in the process. Thus, after taking Formosa in 1894, she acquired Port Arthur in 1905 and gradually secured Korea between 1905 and 1910. One prominent strand in the pattern of Far Eastern history was the contest between Russia and Japan for Manchuria.

Eventually, deeply ashamed at the plight of their country, Chinese patriots began to bestir themselves. But many years were to pass before China could take her appropriate place among the powers. The beginning was made in 1910 with the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty by the Kuomintang organisation, led by its founder, Dr. Sun Yat Sen. The Republic of China was proclaimed. More even than the ruling dynasty the revolution was directed against the wealthy landlords, Sun Yat Sen blaming their feudal exploitation for most of China's weakness. At this period the Kuomintang was impelled by an idealistic reforming zeal: Sun is honoured by the present Communist Government as one of the founders of modern China. For many years, however, he was unable to establish his authority over the whole country. Many regions were in a state of anarchy except for the spasmodic control of local 'war-lords'; many of these were provincial governors appointed by the Kuomintang who had taken power into their own hands. Sun died in 1925, being succeeded by Chiang Kai-shek. Relations were friendly at this time between the Kuomintang and the Russian Communist Party, Chiang actually undergoing a course of training in Moscow. There was in fact a strong Communist element within the Kuomintang, one of its leaders being Mao Tse Tsung.

In 1928, however, when at last Chiang had brought most of China under control, the Communists broke away. Though given very little help by the USSR, they kept up rebellion against the Kuomintang until 1937. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the West's preoccupation with the depression, Japan had invaded Manchuria in 1931. In 1937, as has happened sooner or later throughout Chinese history with all invaders of the rich

northern province, she turned towards central China. The Communist forces and the Kuomintang then joined in an uneasy alliance against her. In 1941, with the bombing of Pearl Harbour, the war in China merged into the world struggle. China became one of the allied powers; and it was agreed that after the final victory Japan would be deprived of Korea, Manchuria and Formosa.

But the long struggle with the invader had brought only a temporary lull in the internal contest between Communists and Kuomintang — in fact there were numerous occasions when the truce broke down in certain areas. Meanwhile the United States furnished large quantities of military supplies. As the war progressed, both parties showed less and less interest in fighting the Japanese, preferring to wait for the Allies to dispose of Japan while they stored all the supplies they could obtain in preparation for the renewal of their own contest. Already by about 1944 there was open fighting in some districts. Eventually, after prolonged pleading to both sides to forget their differences and put out some real effort against the common enemy, the United States cut off supplies.

When, shortly afterwards, Japan surrendered, open civil war flared out almost immediately. And at the outset the Communists gained an important advantage. After hurriedly declaring war against Japan on the day of the Nagasaki bomb, the USSR occupied Manchuria at the surrender, capturing large quantities of Japanese equipment, which she undertook to hand over to the Kuomintang, as the legal Chinese government. Both Communists and Kuomintang rushed forces into Manchuria; in practically every case, however, the USSR then proceeded to delay notifying the Kuomintang of its evacuation of particular points and that the military stores awaited collection — long enough for the Communists to reach them first. This help, the main assistance the Chinese Communists received from the Russians, substantially affected the course of the civil war.

The main factor, however, in the Communists' eventual victory appears to have been their success in appealing to the peasantry. For many years the reforming zeal of the Kuomintang had been steadily declining, until now the Party was hopelessly corrupt and inefficient, and linked with reactionary elements in the country. Popular support went increasingly to

the Communists. During most of the course of the war observers gained the impression that the Communists were land reformers and nationalists rather than Communists on the Russian pattern, so that it would appear that they were deliberately placing little stress on their doctrines; but this deception, if indeed it was practised, probably had little effect on the course of the contest. In any case Mao's brand of Communism has always given a leading place to the peasant. Though brutal to the landlords, the Communists gave the great majority of the people what they wanted — land and efficient government without shadow of corruption. By 1949 they had driven the Kuomintang from the mainland into Formosa. The 'People's Republic of China' was proclaimed in Peking, and was shortly given 'de facto' recognition (which does not imply approval, but mere recognition of effective rule) by Britain and many other countries. The United States appeared to be about to follow suit, despite bitter disappointment at the collapse of the Kuomintang, when the outbreak of the Korean War made such a step politically impossible.

The foreign treaties were revoked; of the cessions to Western powers, only Hong Kong remains in foreign hands. China has allowed it to remain British because of the convenience it affords her for trade with the non-communist world. If the Communists ever changed their minds, it could not be defended: thus most foreign firms still operating there have sold the freeholds of their premises, and are occupying them on lease. Meanwhile the diminutive colony struggles with the problem of accommodating hundreds of thousands of refugees.

The fall of China to Communism came as a tremendous emotional shock to Americans. There are several reasons for this. In the first place Americans have always held the belief that China was naturally an American sphere of influence — economically and culturally if not directly politically — as evinced at the turn of the century by the 'Open Door' policy. The relationship was not merely economic. China has long been a popular field for American missionary activity; it has often been said that at some time in his life every American has put some contribution into a collecting box for the 'poor Chinese'. China's accession to Communism seemed therefore like the child biting the hand that had fed it. In fact the reaction was partly one of incredulity, heightened by a strain in American thinking, which

is so completely hostile to Communism, that makes it difficult for Americans to believe that the people of any country could, in the majority, be attracted to Communist government. They tend to prefer to believe it was imposed by treachery of some kind. The emotional blow of the Communist victory accounts for a good deal of subsequent American policy towards China.

Another factor, however, is the high priority in world strategy given to the Far East by the United States. Though the Pacific may seem an immense ocean, Americans have always felt that developments on the farther side from them closely affect their security. During the recent war there was considerable fear in Europe, with very real justification both from the traditional trend of United States foreign policy and from much American thought at the time, that the United States government would prefer to concentrate on the Pacific War first — a possibility that fortunately came to nothing owing to the presence at its head of two such European-minded leaders as Roosevelt and General Marshall. (The isolationist element in the United States tends to coincide with the 'Asia-firsters': isolationism is the view that Europe's affairs are no concern of the United States, but Asia's are always held, especially by isolationists, to concern her closely.) In contrast, from the time of the Japanese alliance of 1901 Britain's ability to deploy power in the Far East has steadily declined — in drastic measure since the Second World War. To Britain the area must now very definitely take third priority; and with her resources strained to the utmost in Europe and the Middle East, third priority cannot count for much. This difference in assessment accounts for much of the divergence in policy between Britain and the United States, at times very marked, in this region. What is probably the most notable divergence has centred upon the Kuomintang government and Formosa.

Refusing to recognise the Communist Peking régime as the government of China, the United States has continued to refer to the Kuomintang as the legitimate government (though recently, as will be seen, its actions have at times been open to a more realistic interpretation), and has declared its readiness to defend Formosa against Peking, even at the risk of world war. There are three main reasons for this policy. Firstly, the intense quasi-religious antipathy of American opinion for Communism.

(While majority opinion in Western Europe strongly disapproves of Communism, it is not pitched in the same passionate, irrational key.) Secondly, the strong belief of Americans that Chiang Kai-shek, for all his failings, is an ally against Communism whom it would be ungenerous to abandon. It is also argued that desertion of Chiang would destroy the confidence of all the opponents of communism in the area. Thirdly, Americans regard Formosa as a valuable link in their chain of defence in the Far East, stretching from the Philippines to the Aleutians and holding China in a 'line of containment', which they consider the front line in their own defence system.

The legal position regarding the ownership of the island is rather complex and disputed among the powers. At the wartime conferences at Cairo in 1943 and Potsdam in 1945 it was agreed that it should be taken from Japan and restored to China at the end of the war. In the Pacific Peace Treaty, Japan relinquished sovereignty; but this has not been formally transferred to any other government. Nevertheless, of course, Peking points to the wartime decisions, and claims that Formosa had always been part of China until its seizure by Japan in 1894.

The original population of seven millions in the island has been increased by another two millions with the arrival of the Kuomintang army of 300,000 and its followers. Normally Formosa is self-sufficient in rice; but at present Chiang's army imposes a heavy strain on its economy, which is heavily subsidised by the United States. When the Kuomintang party arrived Formosa already possessed its own government. Following a period of strained relations, however, the Kuomintang took over the real authority.

Purified, apparently, by its adversities, the Kuomintang is said to have reformed itself drastically. Corruption has gone, one is told, and its leaders now match the Communists in high-mindedness and serious purpose. As an earnest of its rebirth, the Party has carried through an extensive land-reform programme on the island, on democratic lines — with compensation for the landlords in the form of bonds. But the army is ageing. Until 1954 its morale was sustained by the myth that it was shortly about to return to the mainland and drive out the Communists; but since then this dream has obviously faded. Now Chiang and his Party appear to hold on in the belief that sooner or later

there will be a rising against the Communists, when they will intervene, with American support, and be restored. The danger in this attitude lies in the element of hope it seems to contain that hostilities will break out between the United States and Peking; hostilities can be so easily provoked. To most Western opinion it seems a criminally irresponsible urging, involving a gamble with the possibility of nuclear war!

Recently, however, the United States has retreated from this danger, without disentangling itself completely. A saving element in the situation is the two hundred miles that separate Formosa from the mainland, making it impossible for the Communists, who have only a small navy, to seriously consider attack. Nevertheless there is the complication that the Kuomintang also hold the two islands of Quemoy and Matsu, only a few miles from the Chinese coast. It is these two islands that have constituted the main source of tension recently. Quemoy covers the Chinese port of Amoy, and Matsu the port of Foochow.

When the Kuomintang came to Formosa in 1949 at the end of the Civil War, President Truman effectively neutralised the island, by instructing the United States Seventh Fleet to patrol the 200-mile Straits and prevent attacks in either direction. The position was thus stabilised. In 1952, however, this policy became a leading issue in the United States presidential election. Charging the Democratic administration with having been too passive in its measures against Communist expansion, condemning the general policy of 'containment' and calling for decisive action to 'roll back Communism', the Republicans promised that, if returned, they would 'take the wraps off Chiang' and permit him to harry the mainland. When Eisenhower came into office, he was obliged therefore to alter the instructions to the Seventh Fleet, enabling Chiang to mount a number of attacks upon the coast.

Naturally, these goaded the Peking régime into planning counter-measures. The Communists began to speak of 'liberating' Formosa, and started preparations for an assault on Quemoy and Matsu, which were of course much more vulnerable. As it seemed probable that the United States would assist in the defence of these two islands, war between China and the United States appeared likely, with the dread possibility of flaring up into world conflict. Moreover both parties took up a

most unconciliatory attitude. For their part the Communists declared Formosa to be their territory, and refused to discuss its future with anyone else. Paralysed by their reversal of the Democratic policy and by the political near-impossibility of negotiating with a government which they had always denounced as illegitimate and immoral, the Eisenhower administration could go no further than merely offering to discuss the situation with Peking in company with a Kuomintang representative. Peking of course refused.

Quemoy and Matsu were so exposed that most of the world appeared to believe it would be prudent to evacuate them; but how could evacuation be squared with 'taking the wraps off Chiang'? It would destroy forever the myth that alone sustained the Kuomintang — that its destiny lay in a triumphant return to China. Yet, inevitably, Eisenhower began to beat a gradual retreat towards the Democratic policy. Firstly it was announced that the Seventh Fleet had been instructed to assist the defence of such points as were necessary to hold for the defence of Formosa, the decision whether Quemoy and Matsu came under this category being left to the Commander-in-Chief in the Straits. Secondly, in December 1954, the administration gave Chiang for the first time a definite pledge of assistance for the defence of Formosa, in the form of a Mutual Defence Treaty of indefinite currency. But only Formosa itself and the Pescadores were specified as Kuomintang territory; and a price was exacted — in return for the Treaty Chiang promised not to attack the mainland without American consent.

Though Eisenhower was obviously withdrawing from a dangerous position, it was difficult for him to move more quickly than the speed with which American public opinion could be 're-educated'. Meanwhile the Communists were preparing communications in the neighbouring area, and setting up heavy artillery that could cover the two islands. It was anticipated they would be ready to attack by April 1955; the crucial question seemed to be whether the United States would have retreated sufficiently by then to avoid an engagement. In February, under American air and naval cover, the Kuomintang evacuated the Tachens — a small group of islands just off the mainland to the north — without, fortunately, any interference during this delicate operation. But the world remained

extremely anxious as the time of crisis approached for Quemoy and Matsu.

The United Nations now intervened, the Security Council being summoned and sending an invitation (Nationalist China dissenting) to the Peking government to attend a discussion. But in view of the refusal to admit Communist China to membership this was inviting a rebuff, which Peking duly inflicted. The Communists refused to attend unless the Nationalist delegate were unseated. They further demanded that discussion should be confined to a Soviet resolution treating the matter as a domestic concern of China and calling for prohibition of military action, by either the United States or Peking, while the Kuomintang withdrew their forces from the whole area.

As April came, it brought with it an unexpected turning-point — at the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference. Although this gathering of African and Asian countries to discuss matters of common concern (to be discussed in detail in a later chapter), attracted little attention in the West at the time, it has since been clearly seen as a major landmark in world affairs. Chou-en-Lai, the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, attended. Much of the interest of the Conference turned on the attitude of the delegates to Communism, many of the South East Asian countries especially being obviously uneasy at this time about Peking's intentions. Sensitive apparently to this feeling, Chou put himself out to win their goodwill, one of the means he adopted being to greatly moderate his Government's stand over Formosa. In the course of the Conference he suddenly announced that he would be prepared to discuss the problem with the United States.

Faced with this concession, the American State Department was also obliged to give ground — though the confused reactions of its spokesmen over the first few days showed that this was not done easily. Eventually talks between the two major powers began at Geneva, and tension declined. Nevertheless, as, even after this interval, no settlement has yet been reached, it could revive at any moment. Though no progress at all appears to have been made, apart from some small concessions by both parties regarding nationals of the other country which each has been detaining, the talks have now continued for two years (to the mystication of all observers, who have long been

wondering what further material could possibly be found for discussion). As long as they continue, however, the rest of the world will be grateful to be able to draw breath.

Opinions differ about the reason for Peking's sudden change in attitude. Some commentators have suspected Russian pressure for moderation; it is probably true that the USSR was as alarmed as the United States's allies at the danger of a major war over such an issue as Formosa. Some months later Mr. Dulles made a statement implying that the American threat of nuclear bombing had exercised an important influence; but the evidence is that the eventual conciliatory American response to Chou's concession was partly due to the sudden realisation by United States public opinion of what nuclear warfare might involve for themselves. This was so marked in fact as to seem to expose the threat as a palpable bluff. As always, motives were probably mixed. Both parties appeared suddenly to see the fearful danger of major war, and both were becoming increasingly conscious, as subsequent events have shown, of the great importance of obtaining the goodwill of the uncommitted Afro-Asian countries.

The New China

Since 1949, the Peking Government has been engaged in a programme of economic and social development as rapid and extensive as its resources and Soviet aid will permit. A Five-Year Plan was adopted in 1952 to cover the years 1953–57, involving the development of agriculture, irrigation and power, light and heavy industry, communications, education and medical services. The targets, at first over-optimistic, were revised in 1955; but even the modified aims provide for spectacular advance in many spheres. The revised objective for industrial capacity as a whole was an increase of 104·1 per cent. More detailed figures are as follows:

Industrial Production

	1952 (*actual*)	1957 (*target*)	Per cent *increase*
Coal (tons)	63,500,000	113,000,000	80
Steel (tons)	1,350,000	4,120,000	200
Cement (tons)	2,860,000	6,000,000	110
Electricity (m kWh)	7,260	15,920	120

Among the major projects are the construction of 15 power stations, 31 coal mines, and 13 large reservoirs. Cars, tractors and ships are being produced, though often they contain imported components. Except for textiles, it was largely light industry that suffered in the revision of the plan; heavy industrial development is being looked to for the expansion of agricultural productivity that will be necessary to overcome China's most desperate problem — feeding her rapidly growing 600,000,000 population. And most of this creation of heavy industry is dependent on Russian assistance, financial and technical. Particular attention is being given to opening up the resources of inland China, which is experiencing transformation. Several of the former primitive towns of the area are now thriving industrial cities.

The targets for agriculture were also ambitious:

Agricultural Production

	1952 (*actual*)	1957 (*target*)	Per cent *increase*
Grain (tons)	163,000,000	192,800,000	17·6
Cotton (tons)	1,304,000	1,635,000	25·4
Jute and Hemp (tons)	300,000	365,000	19·7
Tobacco (tons)	221,000	390,000	76·6
Sugar-cane (tons)	7,142,000	13,150,000	85·0

In January 1956 a new 12-year plan was announced for agriculture, covering the period 1956–67. This also provided for the abolition of illiteracy over the same period. Ambitious targets, generally between 70 and 180 per cent, have been set for the increased production of various products, the objective being varied according to the area. Just previously it had been announced that the spread of collectivisation of agriculture had so outpaced expectations in 1955, over 60 per cent of all peasant households being enrolled by the end of the year, that a complete revision of the collectivisation programme had been made possible. While it had been anticipated that it would take 15 years to socialise agriculture, it was now thought this could be completed by 1959 or 1960. Nevertheless, as the present 'semi-socialist' stage involves only the forming of co-operatives, where the peasants pool their resources but retain ownership of their individual holdings, while complete 'socialisation' will involve the creation of true 'collectives', where the land and equipment

will be held in common, the peasants are likely to be much less enthusiastic over the final stage. Co-operation has long been natural practice among peasants; but the pooling of their land, which so recently became their own property, will be seen as a very different proposition. (Some observers now believe that the Chinese Communists, warned by Russian experience, will go no further towards full collectivisation. Already under the present Chinese system the land is actually farmed collectively, the individual peasant merely being confirmed in a theoretical separate ownership through the issue of a document certifying the amount of land he contributed to the collective. In theory he may withdraw, and some are said to have done so.)

Though China's new leaders still display the same particular interest in the land that deceived many of those who came in contact with them during the early part of the Civil War, they are Communists none the less. Several millions of 'reactionaries' were executed during the revolution, the great majority being landlords. Land reform by any less drastic means was not considered. Though in industry many factory owners who have 'behaved well', known as the 'national bourgeoisie', have been permitted to retain control of their enterprises, this does not mark a departure from Communism. In the early 1920's Russia passed through a similar transitional phase under Lenin's 'New Economic Policy' — a temporary expedient made necessary by the disruption ensuing from an over-rapid transfer of factories from private to state ownership, before there were sufficient skilled executives to manage them. All the typical characteristics of communism — the discussion of every question in the familiar class-war terms, the condemnation of Western leaders as 'reactionary war-mongers', intensive propaganda among the adults and rigid indoctrination of the children and students — the essential apparatus of thought-control — are very marked in the New China. Though the Chinese have always been disciplined by intellectuals, it seems incredible that so ancient a culture should submit itself to this. One would have thought that the concentration of Chinese traditional social life upon the family would have worked against Communism; but undoubtedly the great majority of Chinese favour the new régime. So far even the educated have shown no distaste for their medicine.

Though the average income of the people is very low, China's

sheer size makes it possible for her to maintain very formidable armed forces — far beyond the strength of any other country in the Far East. The total strength of the regular army was about 2,250,000 in 1955, and in addition there are large trained reserves. All the services have been extensively modernised since 1949. Though the fire-power of a Chinese division compares with that of a British or American division, divisional commanders have less artillery and air support available; nevertheless the weapon strength of the new armies is very formidable, especially when their size is taken into account. The navy is far from negligible, including a large number of small craft supplied by the Soviet Union. The Air Force, by far the largest in the Far East, numbers about a thousand jet aircraft of advanced Russian types. Its main weakness is a lack of suitable airfields with the appropriate runways and equipment, but many of these are being constructed, especially in the vicinity of Formosa.

China and The Soviet Union

One of the most portentous questions arising from the new shape of the post-war world is that of the future relations of Communist China and the Soviet Union. On the surface at least, these two great Communist nations are most friendly at the moment, and together they form an immense power-bloc with tremendous potentialities. If for any reason they were to move apart, the result would be a transformation in the world balance of power. Is such a change at all likely?

A latent difference of opinion on this question has played some part in the divergence between British and American policy towards Communist China. Behind a good deal of British thought there seems to have lain a belief in the possibility of a split between the two Communist powers, and therefore a feeling that it is a mistake to show implacable hostility towards China, as this is likely to drive her even further into Russia's arms. To Americans, on the other hand, a Communist is a Communist, and there is little point in looking for small differences between different schools of communism. Communism is immoral and virtually criminal in any case, and the only attitude to adopt towards any Communist country is therefore one of unmistakable hostility. So far, to be sure, the possibility of a breach between the two countries seems to have receded; but

the situation contains so much scope for friction that it may well have been postponed rather than avoided.

In the first place, there are a number of suggestive parallels between China and the case of Yugoslavia. Chinese communism, like that of Tito in Yugoslavia, does not owe its success to the Red Army, nor is it maintained with Russian assistance. As has been seen, Mao received very little help from Stalin during the Civil War. In fact it is known that, when the question arose at the end of the Pacific War of whether the Chinese Communists should attempt to carry through a revolution or co-operate with the Kuomintang, Mao approached Stalin for advice, and was advised to co-operate. Though it has been suggested that Stalin did not desire the emergence of a Communist China to rival the USSR for the leadership of world communism, it seems more likely that he believed China was not ready for revolution, and thought the best possibility of friendly relations between Russia and China lay in a Communist-Kuomintang coalition government. Applying Marxist theory, he probably argued that China, an agricultural country, was not ready for Communist revolution: being still in the feudal era, she must first pass through the capitalist phase of industrialisation and produce a large industrial proletariat. As the Kuomintang represented this capitalist phase, the correct Marxist tactics were to co-operate with them and hurry on capitalism, to pave the way for later communism.

Whatever the explanation, Mao disregarded Stalin's advice, broke with the Kuomintang and pressed on with his revolution. And he achieved success, by basing the revolution on the peasantry. As a result a second parallel between Mao and Tito has emerged. Because of his success, Mao has achieved recognition — an extremely rare feat in Communist circles — as an authoritative initiator of new Communist doctrine. And in his version of Communism Mao accords a leading place to the peasantry in a Communist society, though Stalin always taught that the industrial workers are the only genuine Communist social class. Although such a difference in emphasis would seem petty in non-communist circles, to Communists it is a vital matter: this is in fact the very heresy over which Stalin quarreled with Tito! Thus Mao has been granted official toleration as a leading heretic!


Another, perhaps more important, potential cause of friction is the long-standing clash of interests between Russia and China along their 4,000-mile common frontier, in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang. As was noted earlier, Russia's colonial expansion across Asia reached this region in the second half of the nineteenth century, and she has been responsible for much of its development so far. A well-known instance was the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, with its main-line running down through Manchuria to Port Arthur. (There is an alternative line to Vladivostock, but the other is more valuable and important.) Being by far the richest territory in industrial raw materials in the Far East, Manchuria could be of immense assistance to Russia in her development of Siberia, obviating the long haul of materials from her central Republics. Even in more recent years, taking advantage of China's weakness and of the racial similarity of the populations on both sides of the frontier, the USSR has extended her influence in the area. She has carried out much of the development of Sinkiang and Mongolia, including the construction of communications that reach, naturally, up towards the Trans-Siberian.

Nor has she refrained from fomenting separatist tendencies among the peoples of this area, directed against the central Chinese authorities. In one case, Outer Mongolia, where such activity was carried through to its natural culmination, Russian agents assisted the revolutionary forces which eventually created a — theoretically — independent Communist state, breaking away completely from Chinese rule. Though first the Kuomintang, and later the Peking government, eventually recognised the independence of this new state, it seems highly probable that this development aroused painful heart-burnings in China.

Moreover, before handing over Manchuria to the Chinese at the end of the Pacific War — in the manner indicated earlier in this chapter — Russia stripped the province of all its industrial equipment, with the excuse that it was Japanese property!

In 1950 an agreement was signed between the two governments under which various enterprises in the outlying provinces that had been established by Russian effort and money — no fewer than 141 — were placed under joint boards of management, half Russian, half Chinese (on the model of the

Sovroms in the European satellites). The chairman of the board was to be a Chinese in each case, the general manager a Russian: the general manager having the supreme authority under



THE FAR EAST

the Russian system. A similar arrangement was operated for the Manchurian railway, and the naval base at Port Arthur was leased to Russia until 1952. (When 1952 came, Russia gave up her share of control of the railway, but at China's

request stayed on in Port Arthur, because of the Korean War.)

Obviously these arrangements were likely to lead to some friction. It was therefore an important turning-point among post-war developments when in October 1954 a further agreement was announced, under which the USSR relinquished her remaining share in the control of these enterprises. At the same time she undertook to leave Port Arthur by May 1955 (eventually, when the time came, she kept to this promise) and guaranteed economic aid for the undertakings concerned and other projects. In addition she agreed to assist China in the construction of railways to fill in the gaps between Lanchow and Alma Ata (on the Soviet Turk-Sib line) and Ulan Bator (capital of Outer Mongolia) and Tinmin. Thus inland China is being linked with the coast.

It appears that the two countries were determined to avoid a rift, and thus decided to eliminate potential causes of friction. No breach on account of clashing interests in central Asia seems likely, therefore, in the near future, though there is still ample scope for rivalry in years to come.

In the meantime, it might seem that China is too completely dependent on Russia for aid with her vital development programme to take the slightest risk of a breach. There is no other source to which she can turn. While this is probably an important element in the present situation, nevertheless such complete dependence might well in itself contain important germs of friction — the relation between borrower and lender is seldom a harmonious one. Though the exact extent of Russia's aid to China is not known, it does not appear very generous and the terms, where known, often seem rather ungenerous. China is repaying in raw materials much of the aid she receives. Visitors have reported that the Chinese seem reluctant to express more than conventional gratitude for Russian assistance. And the Chinese may well, in view of their desperate needs, resent the offers of aid held out by Russia to many other undeveloped countries. A historian would be bound to say that friction is extremely likely between two expansionist powers separated by undeveloped territories, especially with one so dependent on the other. But the need for unity for survival against the Marxist ghost of an implacably hostile world may prove a stronger force for very many years.

Tibet

The Chinese Communists had been in power in China for only a few months when they decided to establish their authority over Tibet. Legally Tibet had always been a vassal state of China, Chinese sovereignty being recognised by a convention signed by Britain and Russia in 1907. The Manchus had sent an army to Lhasa in 1910; but since their fall in 1911 Tibet had managed its affairs without interference, under the rule of the Dalai Lama.

An army of 30,000 was despatched by Mao in 1950 in an operation which displayed considerable ingenuity. Jeeps were dropped by parachute; trucks were taken to pieces and carried by hand over the more difficult sections, and then reassembled. The Tibetans could put up no resistance. Nevertheless they were treated with some caution. After first fleeing to the Indian border, the Dalai Lama was persuaded to pay a visit to Peking together with the Panchen Lama, the next most senior authority and something of a rival, to whom the Communists had paid some attention, and eventually pronounced his approval of the new régime. He retains his position, under Peking's supervision. Since 1950 the Communists have built three motor roads linking Lhasa to the rest of China, so that Tibet's centuries-old isolation has been ended.

Though much Western comment has condemned China's occupation as an act of aggression and oppression, the Communists have been able to argue that they were merely restoring Chinese authority over territory that had always been Chinese. Nevertheless there have been many reports of discontent and opposition by the Tibetans to Chinese rule. At all events, there was obviously nothing that could be done by any other power to prevent China carrying out her intentions. As will be seen in a later chapter, India, who was the power mainly concerned and who had inherited from British rule certain interests in Tibet, scarcely hid her misgivings but had no choice but to recognise the change that had been effected.

Japan

Among China's neighbours, next in importance to the Soviet Union come India and Japan. India must have a chapter to

herself; but Japan is also a country over which stands a portentous question-mark. Since the end of the war she has been feeling her way uncertainly towards a cross-roads, and the course she ultimately chooses will have an immense influence upon the future of the Far East.

Though at the side of the stage for the moment, Japan is still, and for many years yet will remain, the only great industrial power in the Far East. Opened up forcibly to Western influence by the famous action of the American Commodore Perry in 1854, Japan, displaying all the remarkable imitative faculty of her people, industrialised herself so rapidly and so thoroughly that as early as 1905 her navy was able to inflict a thorough defeat upon that of Russia in the battle of Port Arthur. This event, the first victory over a western power by an Asiatic country with modern weapons, was of course an important milestone in world history.

Though she adopted western industrial technology, Japan did not however copy western political institutions in any more than a superficial manner. Certainly, to match the prevailing fashion of liberal democracy, a parliamentary façade was erected, and the Emperor, who in any case had not exercised the real authority for several centuries, was placed in the position of a constitutional monarch. But the parliament was only a sham. Politics were permeated with corruption and the real control was in the hands of the industrial combines or Zaibatsu (the most notable being the Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups) and military authorities. Political discussion and activity were closely limited; the Minister of Defence was not accountable to the rest of the Cabinet and exercised considerable control over foreign policy. Shintoism, teaching the divinity of the Emperor, who was too sacred ever to appear in public, was an important cement helping to hold the edifice together and making possible the maintenance of a rigid national discipline.

Industrialisation, adopted despite Japan's almost complete lack of raw materials, turned her to a quest for sources of supply and markets. Moreover, the Japanese were ready to believe in their destiny as the dominant power in the East; and for most of the modern period were extraordinarily successful, never losing a major battle and steadily extending their conquests. To the Japanese war seemed to pay; their sense of destiny was con-

firmed. Thus the shattering defeat of 1945 came as a tremendous psychological shock.

The old Japan had been brought to the ground in 1945. The question was: could a new, democratic and peaceful Japan be created in its place? With immense optimism, the Americans undertook the task unhesitatingly. They had insisted upon and obtained a free hand in the occupation, General Douglas MacArthur being appointed Supreme Commander Allied Powers with the authority to overrule a merely advisory Allied Council (on which the USA, Britain, China and the USSR were represented).

American policy towards Japan may be described as passing through three stages. The first — from 1945 to 1947 — was a phase of optimism almost to the point of naivety. Free elections were held — the first the Japanese had ever experienced. A completely democratic constitution was adopted: it was written from American dictation, to such an extent that the Japanese have difficulty in understanding some of the terms used, which are attempted renderings of American conceptions for which there are no true Japanese equivalents. One important clause abjured the use of war as an instrument of policy, foreswearing the maintenance of any but defence forces. The Emperor was obliged to make public appearances. Trade unionism was fostered; and the Zaibatsu were dissolved. Women were emancipated — a striking revolution — and enfranchised. In the schools, special textbooks were introduced and the children were ceaselessly taught the virtues of democracy.

So Japan was set on the new course. It will be most interesting over the next few years to see how many of these changes endure. Though the Japanese, natural imitators as always, appeared at first to take up the new order with enthusiasm, many of the early results were probably superficial: as will be seen, some characteristics of the old régime are now beginning to reappear. Nevertheless, much of the change will probably prove permanent. Genuine interest in democratic government seems, for instance, to have been demonstrated by the high proportion voting in elections — even in recent years, nearly 80 per cent.

The second phase — 1947 to 1949 — saw considerable modification of the original policy. The United States had hoped for a short occupation; but by 1947 found that her departure would

result in a complete economic collapse. The post-war reconstruction of industry was still very far from complete. Japan had lost three-quarters of her spindles during the war; and much of her equipment was seriously obsolete. With her trade position made much more difficult by the loss of her colonies — previously her main markets and natural source of raw materials — production was running at less than half of the pre-war level, and exports were at a tenth. The United States was still finding it necessary to subsidise her at the level of $300,000,000 a year.

Thus endeavours were made to obtain higher production at lower cost and to increase efficiency. But to this end it was found advisable to reverse some previous measures. Thus the activities of the trade unions were restricted, strikes being prohibited; and the Zaibatsu were permitted to reform. At the same time more positive steps were taken to modernise the economy. Much of Japanese industry is small in scale — resembling the workshop organisation of the early industrial revolution — and relations between employer and worker are often patriarchal. Though this adds greatly to costs, elderly workers are kept on after they are no longer useful; and the employer finds something to do for those who would otherwise be temporarily out of work. The occupation authorities now tried, without much success, to foster a more modern, individualistic attitude. The problem is deep-seated, with many ramifications, and will not be solved for many years.

With the Communist victory in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Japan became involved in the American attempt to construct a Far Eastern line of containment. Obviously Japan's position makes her a vital link. Since 1949, therefore, in the third phase of American policy, the United States has been trying to make Japan a bastion in the chain of defences. Yet there are grave difficulties. As was seen above, under the American-drafted constitution the Japanese pledged themselves to restrict their armed forces to the absolute minimum essential for the defence of their own shores. Strong pacifist tendencies among public opinion, and — more recently — a growth in neutralist sentiment and increasing resentment of subserviance to the United States, have made Japanese governments reluctant to comply. As early as 1950 the United States persuaded the Japanese to by-pass the constitu-

tional difficulty by creating a 'police reserve' of 75,000, equipped with mortars and machine-guns, and even some tanks and aircraft. The numbers have since been more than doubled, and in addition rudimentary defence forces have been created. Nevertheless the United States still pleads — and at times has threatened economic pressure — that the forces Japan is building up are quite inadequate to fulfil her obligations under the Treaty of Mutual Defence. The negotiations lapse and are resumed again annually.

After waiting unsuccessfully for some years for the approval of the USSR and the Kuomintang Government for the draft she had dictated, the United States decided in 1951 to proceed with the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty, which specifically permitted rearmament. All the other participants in the Pacific War signed, though not without some objections. In particular, Australia and New Zealand, fearful of the danger of a revival of Japanese militarism, made their agreement to the Treaty conditional upon a pledge by the United States to guarantee their security, thus obtaining the ANZUS Treaty, at a time when the United States had become reluctant to accept further commitments. (By the time the Treaty was signed, however, it was the Communist threat, rather than any menace from Japan, that was being envisaged as the danger against which it would operate.)

Japan's greatest problem today, extremely serious even before the Pacific War but greatly aggravated now by the loss of her empire, is her economic position. With her population of nearly ninety millions, and with only one-fifth of the soil of her four, small, mountainous islands cultivable, she must import half her foodstuffs, and thus is dependent upon exports of her manufactures. Moreover she possesses virtually no raw materials. (Her fishing industry provides an important proportion of her food supplies; but the main fisheries are off the Kuriles — under Soviet occupation — and Korea. Hence the hostility she has experienced from both the USSR and President Syngman Rhee has been a grave embarassment.)

For many years after 1945 Japan survived only through United States aid and 'off-shore procurement' purchases for the Korean War. As the latter tailed off with the ending of the Korean fighting, the situation appeared desperate; but Japan

has managed to improve her position sufficiently — though only just — to come through. Her main natural market and source of materials is of course Manchuria, particularly for coking-coal, ore and fertilisers. But the United States frowns on trade with China, and has imposed on Japan a list of prohibited 'strategic exports' much longer even than that accepted by her other allies. This prevents any worthwhile trade. (Even the shorter list pressed by the United States on other countries — much longer than that concerning trade with the Soviet Union — proved an embarassment to them; and observance was generally abandoned, despite American disapproval, early in 1957. But Japan still complies.)

There should be important markets for Japan in south-east Asia, with the development proceeding under the Colombo Plan. Though she could offer no capital assistance, but only technical aid, she was admitted to the Plan in 1954 as a 'donor' member; and much of her diplomacy is directed to developing trade with this region. Nevertheless it will be some years before much volume of trading can be built up with the south east Asian countries. In the meantime Japan looks mainly to the Commonwealth. For many years she endeavoured unsuccessfully to gain admittance to GATT, with the object of obtaining the advantage of its rules to prevent Commonwealth tariffs being raised against her goods, and of applying pressure to have them reduced. Eventually, in 1955, the Commonwealth group gave way to the clear feeling of the other members and consented to her admission. But they are still insisting upon withholding the GATT privileges until satisfactory guarantees are obtained from Japan against the use of unfair practices — such as the copying of designs by textile manufacturers. Japanese ministers plead that the pledges sought are impracticable for any government to fulfil.

In recent years, despite vehement Lancashire opposition, Britain has concluded trade agreements with Japan, admitting fixed quotas of goods into the colonies and the United Kingdom in return for the lifting of restrictions on the entry of British goods in Japan. So far, however, the volume of Japanese purchases has been disappointing, and has made re-negotiation difficult.

Another economic burden upon Japan is the huge sum she

has to find each year for reparations payments to countries occupied during the war. Though much less than the claims — agreement was reached in each case only after prolonged haggling — the indebtedness finally accepted constitutes a formidable penance, and a further heavy burden on her economy.

Japan's post-war politics have on the whole been rather disappointing to those who hoped to see stable democracy emerge. Nevertheless there is still ample room for hope of improvement. Her first Premier, Mr. Yoshida, a right-wing leader, survived for as long as eight years, 1946–54, but only by means of intricate manœvres seen in frequent changes of cabinet and details of policy. When he fell in 1954, many of his cabinet had recently been implicated in some shipbuilding scandals. His fall, which was confirmed a few months later by the victory of his successor, Hatoyama, at the 1955 elections, was due mainly to mounting resentment of this policy of close co-operation with the United States, which was regarded as subserviance. Hatoyama won the elections by promising to follow a more independent line.

Prohibited from politics himself under the American occupation because of his previous record, Hatoyama significantly chose as his foreign minister Shigemitsu, who had actually served a short sentence as a war criminal. His government was a Liberal-Democratic coalition, dependent upon an insecure collection of quarrelling cliques, including most of Yoshida's previous supporters, and falling increasingly under the control of business interests. The main expression of his greater independence of the United States took the form of determination to re-establish relations with the USSR. But when he eventually achieved this in October 1956, after long and bitter negotiations, so severe had been the terms Russia had imposed — speeding consent at the end by increased interference with Japanese fishing — that many of the government's supporters felt the price had been too high. (This put Hatoyama in the precarious position of having stronger support among the Opposition on this question than among his own followers, the Opposition, who are Socialists, approving of the settlement because of their neutralist, anti-American leanings.) On the one hand, the USSR consented to cease her opposition to Japan's entry to the United Nations, and to repatriate the several

thousands of Japanese prisoners-of-war still in her possession. On the other, though the USSR agreed to return the two islands of Habomai and Shikotan, over which feeling ran high, at the eventual signing of a peace treaty, no undertaking could be obtained concerning Kunashiri and Etoforu, over which feeling was almost equally strong. And it was felt that Hatoyama had left Japan in a disadvantageous position for further bargaining, as further pressure for these latter two islands would be likely to delay the peace treaty, and thus the regaining of Habomai and Shikotan. (Japan has despaired of regaining Sakhalin and the Kuriles — promised to the USSR at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 as the price for her entry into the Pacific War — despite a sound historical claim and a large investment in their development. Under the American Peace Treaty, in addition to surrendering Formosa, Manchuria and Korea, she gave up the Bonins and Ryukyus, which were placed under American trusteeship as strategic trust territories, nominally under the supervision of the UN Security Council.)

An old and ailing man when he came to the Premiership, Hatoyama resigned as soon as his main mission, the Russian settlement, had been completed. He had been in power long enough to demonstrate that, though a pretence of independence of the United States can be attempted by a Japanese government, it can hardly be made very convincing. Japan is still too dependent on the United States to flout American policy in any important respect. Though under pressure from commercial interests to negotiate a trade agreement with Communist China, which continually held out attractive bait, he had to refuse to permit discussions at an official level. Informal agreements, dependent for implementation upon government approval, have been reached by private Japanese delegations with Chinese representatives; but the lists drawn up have always contained a high proportion of 'prohibited strategic exports', and the Japanese government has refused to act upon them. Though there has also been pressure for an agreement to resume relations with China, Peking has so far refused to discuss the repatriation of the war prisoners she holds and demands that Japan break off relations with the Kuomintang, with the result that discussion has not advanced beyond the stage of preliminary enquiry.

When Hatoyama retired, he was succeeded bv Ishibashi, who

shortly afterwards fell ill, and was replaced by Nobusuke Kishi. Kishi, who was closely associated with pre-war and wartime government and was imprisoned for three years by the Americans, without actually being charged as a war criminal, has the reputation of being ambitious, unscrupulous and intriguing — a power-seeker without perceptible political principles or programme.

He has recently made it clear that he prefers greater reliance upon the United States to any attempt to achieve a more independent policy. Instead of increased trade with China, he is working for American financial aid to equip Japanese industry for a higher level of trade with south-east Asian countries. His sop to public opinion is an occasional scolding of the American State Department for tactlessness and lack of understanding. It will be interesting, however, to see how much success this policy will bring at the next elections, for popular feeling seems to be moving nearer the Socialist line — that Japan must free herself from subordination to the United States and alignment with the West in the cold war, and establish a more friendly relationship with her Communist neighbours. (The Communists themselves have only a handful of seats in the Japanese Diet, and seem unlikely to win more.)

In view of his record and his apparent disregard for public opinion, it seems possible Mr. Kishi may see to it that the next elections are not as free as has been the case so far in the new-model Japan. Already there has been talk in conservative circles that the leap into thorough-going democracy has been too sudden a breach with the national tradition — that Japan needs 'firmer leadership'. In the last few years, despite strenuous Socialist opposition, the right-wing governments have reversed some of the occupation reforms intended as safeguards of democracy: control of the police, which had been decentralised, has been restored to the Cabinet, as also has control of education.

Japan is slowly re-awakening, as if from a dream, and beginning to recover her individuality. It is a matter of great moment to the rest of the world, especially to Pacific countries, what form her new personality will take. At the moment it is rather embarassing that the neutralist, semi-pacifist forces should appear the most promising guardians in her domestic politics of the frail new plant of liberal democracy.

Korea

Another of Communist China's neighbours with whom she has been intimately concerned in the post-war years has been Korea. The attention this little country has attracted from the powers has been due mainly to its strategic importance. Its position, a peninsula extending from the Asian mainland in the direction of Japan, makes it a most convenient 'spring-board' for mounting an attack in either direction — either upon China, or from China upon Japan.

At the end of the war, Korea was taken from Japan and jointly occupied by the United States and the USSR, the two zones being divided at the 38th parallel. The intention was to establish an independent republic. But, as in the case of Germany, the occupying powers found it impossible to agree on the form reconstruction should take; thus the division became permanent. A democratic republic emerged in South Korea, a communist state in North Korea. In 1948 the United Nations sent a commission to the country to arrange for and supervise free elections; but it was refused admission to North Korea. As a result, elections were held only in the south, Syngman Rhee being returned as President.

The situation thus created was naturally unstable. South Korea, which contains three-quarters of the population, is predominantly agricultural, while North Korea is industrial, so that unification of these complementary economies has been urgently needed. Nevertheless in 1949 both occupying powers withdrew their forces. In June 1950, war broke out. Though the question of which party attacked the other has been much disputed, the evidence that North Korea was the aggressor seems fairly conclusive — this being in fact the finding of a UN Commission sent to investigate the matter. Further, though naturally there is no clear evidence on this point, the attack was probably instigated by the USSR. Russia seems to have believed, mistakenly, that the withdrawal of her forces by the United States meant that she did not regard Korea as being of primary importance; or in any case may have hoped to gain her ends by a rapid blow before the United States could intervene.

President Truman reacted very swiftly, however, sending in American forces from Japan immediately and appealing to the

United Nations to endorse his action. (Even so he was only just in time: South Korea was nearly over-run, and was saved only with great difficulty.) As the USSR happened to be boycotting the Security Council at this time in protest at the refusal to admit Communist China, she was not in a position to exercise her veto. Thus the step Truman had taken was approved, and the counter-measures against the Communist forces, though conducted primarily by the United States with the assistance of small contingents from the Commonwealth, Turkey and a few other countries, were recognised as a UN action.

General MacArthur was given the Supreme Command. After some hard and protracted fighting, the Communist forces were pushed back to the 38th parallel. The question then arose: should the UN forces stop at this point, or should they continue their advance into North Korea? Though the Peking Government warned the United States, through India, that they would intervene if the advance should continue, MacArthur pressed on across the parallel, with the result that large forces of Chinese 'volunteers' were brought into the battle. Their weight was at first too much for the UN Army, which was driven back, almost off the peninsula. Eventually, however, the Communists were pushed back again, by means of sea-borne landings behind their forward lines, until the position was established in the region of the 38th parallel.

Was the Chinese intervention an act of aggression? While it is impossible to return a conclusive answer to this question, it was only natural, surely, that Peking should be alarmed at the prospect of a potential enemy — the United States — establishing itself on the Chinese frontier. It is hard to imagine any strong state facing such a possibility and denying itself an opportunity to take counter-measures.

Eventually an armistice was agreed upon; since then the question of a permanent settlement has been discussed at length, with little progress. The West has continued to insist upon reunification being achieved by means of free all-Korean elections, conducted under international supervision. For many years the Communists rejected the provision for supervision; but at the Geneva Conference of May 1954 (the gathering better known for the settlement of the Indo-Chinese war), they gave ground, apparently as part of their policy at that time of

showing a more conciliatory attitude on questions in dispute with the West. They agreed to the supervision of the proposed elections provided that a suitable international commission could be formed — i.e. not a United Nations body, since UN had been a participant in the war. (Russia has always, of course, denounced the UN intervention as not being in accordance with the Charter, since her consent was not obtained to the Security Council decision.) But this was also made conditional upon the previous withdrawal of all foreign troops. This condition, however, is unacceptable to the West. While Communist forces could re-enter Korea from China in a matter of hours, it would take some appreciable time, if trouble arose, to bring back the American forces, especially since there are no longer occupation troops readily available in Japan. And it would always be easy for the Communist delegates to paralyse an international commission.

Thus Korea remains divided, with a permanent settlement as far off as ever. Meanwhile the United States has been withdrawing her forces until only a handful now remain, though the Republic of South Korea is itself very well armed. And Syngman Rhee continues to make bellicose speeches threatening the North with attack. The situation still seems dangerously unstable — the more so since the United States' withdrawal. Presumably it is fear of losing their good name among the uncommitted countries, satisfaction with the buffer they still retain in North Korea, and belief that control over South Korea is not worth the risks involved in a second attack that are holding back the Communists.

After long-continued complaints by the non-Communist members that the North Korean government was refusing inspection facilities, the International Armistice Commission broke up and disbanded in 1956. Recently, to match the re-equipment (in defiance of the armistice terms) of the North Korean forces, and in connexion with the steady withdrawal of its forces from Japan, the United States has been transferring large quantities of the latest military equipment to South Korea.

Chapter Twelve

SUB-CONTINENT DIVIDED: INDIA, PAKISTAN, CEYLON

The Far Eastern country next in importance to China is India, another of the new nations that have emerged in the post-war world. It was in fact India's rise to nationhood more than any other immediate factor that roused the ambitions of other colonial peoples, transforming their nationalist movements from cliques of rootless dreamers into political forces that could not be resisted. India is of leading importance in the modern world firstly because of its sheer size of population. Though still backward economically — despite being already much further developed, as the result of British rule, than most other Asian countries — the Indian Republic with its 370-odd millions obviously has the potentialities of a really great power; and future as well as present power-relations should be taken into account in diplomacy. Even at the present, India's immense population entitles her to particular consideration. In addition, however, and of greater importance, India is looked up to as a leader by the whole bloc of new nations — the uncommitted Afro-Asian bloc which wields so many votes in the United Nations and whose goodwill is increasingly a main prize in the diplomatic contest between Communism and the West. Upon the attitude of these countries will largely depend whether democracy or communism will dominate the world; since they so often follow India's lead, she is almost in a position to sway the balance of world affairs.

It is therefore a matter of immense concern to the rest of the world that India has so far followed a policy of neutralism. What factors have produced this policy? Are they likely, as far as one can foresee, to be permanent?

An explanation often given for this policy is India's intense desire for peace. This desire is an especially strong element in

the motivation of the Indian Government because of the crucial character of its development programme, which would be utterly and tragically disrupted by an outbreak of world war. But, though this fear may loom larger to the Indian leaders than in Western minds, it can hardly be much more prominent and urgent: world war is a fearful prospect to all countries at the present day. Thus her strong desire for peace is hardly enough in itself to explain India's policy. It is true also that most Indians — like most Asian peoples — are so preoccupied with the question of 'colonialism' that they tend to view the conflict between Communism and the West as no concern of theirs. But this is certainly not Nehru's view — and to a large extent Nehru is India in world affairs.

In fact Nehru disavows the term 'neutralism' as a description of India's policy, if interpreted as a desire to withdraw from world affairs. Arguing that the world conflict is a matter of primary concern to India, he claims that his policy is motivated by this consideration, and deliberately attempts to play a very active role in the world. Strongly disapproving of communism as a system of government, he will have no truck with the Indian Communist Party, and is as alarmed as the West at the expansion of communism. But he believes that Communist aggression has been the expression mainly of fear, and therefore contends that it is a mistake to try to counter it by means of military alliances. These will inevitably aggravate the basic fear, and tend to produce further aggression. Instead, he argues, the West should try to dispel Communist suspicions by avoiding alliances and military measures and engaging Communist governments in discussion as much as possible, setting an example of reasonableness and fairness which the Communists will be compelled to match. Consequently, to assist the preservation of peace he has himself actively promoted discussion.

As Nehru's analysis of communist motivation is basically sound, it is difficult to dispose of this line of argument convincingly: it certainly cannot be lightly dismissed. Nevertheless most Western leaders, while admitting the real and largely inevitable danger of provoking Communist fears through the adoption of military counter-measures, would contend that the danger involved in not taking precautions is even greater. And this is confirmed by experience of Russia's behaviour: the more

conciliatory the West has shown itself, the more eagerly has Russia taken every advantage offered, without the least concession in return. The fact is that, since Communist suspicions are caused by rigid obsession with the doctrine of dialectical materialism, they are incurable: they must be accepted as one of the unalterable facts of the world situation. Thus, in the ultimate analysis, Nehru seems unrealistic, although, since his contention depends primarily upon a matter of judgment and opinion, he cannot be clearly refuted.

Nevertheless, India's neutralism does not seem to be merely the product of a train of thought for which Nehru is particularly responsible. Nehru is by no means alone among Indians in tending to decry the resort to strength and physical force. This tendency is almost a tradition in India, having deep roots in many of India's religions. (A cynic can point to the fact that violence has been far from infrequent in India's history; but this is beside the point.) It has showed itself prominently at many times in the history of the Congress movement, notably in Gandhi's 'passive resistance' campaigns; and Gandhi's influence, though diminished, is still strong within Congress. (Moreover Nehru is only one of several Congress leaders in whose minds it is blended with a late-Victorian radicalism that seems an important element in the influence of their English studies. This is despite the fact that, like most such heritages, the tradition appears to have become rather outmoded upon transfer.)

Since it is based largely upon an optimistic view of the possibility of reassuring the Communists, India's neutralism is likely to alter if the world situation obviously changes, especially if India's immediate surroundings are affected. If Chinese or Russian expansion were to become more obvious in Asia, India would probably come closer, almost overnight, to the Western position. Realisation of this fact by the Communists is an important stabilising factor in the world today.

It seems curious at first sight that Pakistan, which shares so much of India's history and background and whose present development problems are so similar, should differ so completely in foreign policy. In contrast to India's neutrality, Pakistan has associated herself closely with the West. The explanation arises out of the circumstances and consequences of the division of the sub-continent. Partition left Pakistan much the weaker of the

two succession states; and India both resents the difficulties partition has imposed on her, and despises Pakistan as a political monstrosity that cannot possibly endure. Thus Pakistan lives in constant fear of India: it is for this reason she has turned to the West — not for protection against Communism, but for protection from India. An understanding of this complex of attitudes — particularly India's viewpoint — is necessary to make sense of the disputes between the two countries — disputes that have seriously distorted the policies of both towards the outside world. The questions at issue, particularly the Kashmir problem, are complicated and must be examined in some detail; but first it will be advisable to glance back to the circumstances of partition.

Partition

Britain always took the view that the partition of the subcontinent would be a grave mistake, and strove her utmost to avoid it. Over the last few years of British rule, British representatives continually pleaded with Congress and the Moslem League to agree upon some form of federation under which Hindus and Moslems could live together within a single state; it was only these protracted efforts to preserve unity that delayed the final cession of full self-government. All to no avail. Eventually it was seen that agreement would never be possible: thus Britain mapped out the frontiers between the two succession states and in 1947 left them to govern themselves.

It was known that disturbances would result; but the rioting and communal strife that followed far exceeded expectations. It is estimated that 400,000 lost their lives — a greater sacrifice of life than was suffered by the whole of the Commonwealth forces throughout the Second World War. And this was to be only the start of the troubles that have arisen from the division of British India.

Who should bear the blame for partition? Though Britain did all she could at the end to prevent it, she has often been accused of deliberately fostering antagonism between the two communities in the past as part of a 'divide and rule' policy. There may have been some slight substance in this charge a hundred years ago, in that at times Britain took advantage of the division; but even then it was never a deliberate and consistent policy. A

much more important factor has been the long-standing British policy of encouraging the aspirations of Indians for self-government, dating from the reforms following the Indian Mutiny. Britain acted as a foster-mother to Indian nationalism: circumstances, for which she was not responsible, produced two nations instead of one. The division was latent: British policy brought it into the open. Though it is arguable that more vigorous measures might have been taken to bind the Indian peoples together, it was part of the whole British attitude that they should be left as far as possible to work out their own problems for themselves.

Nevertheless Moslem nationalism did not emerge as a political force until it was created, virtually from nothing, by Jinnah. If they had accepted his first moderate demands for some autonomy for Moslems, the Congress leaders could probably have averted a serious rupture. It was when they refused that he founded the Moslem League, and built it into a force that made partition inevitable. Though on the whole one must agree with the argument always advanced by Congress that it is a mistake to try to erect a modern state on a religious foundation — that the state must be secular, tolerating all religions and binding its people together in a unity to which religious beliefs are irrelevant — and that the Moslem claims would be extremely mischievous in their effects, it was unwise in practice to try to override the contrary Moslem attitude. Eventually Congress saw the need to make some concessions; but only when it was too late. By then Jinnah had raised his demands well past the point to which Congress was prepared to go.

Thus, based as it was upon two conflicting conceptions of the state, the problem was an extremely difficult one which only unusual foresight could have solved. It is hardly surprising that no solution was achieved. Nevertheless it is profoundly regrettable: partition has done great harm to the sub-continent. It has left Pakistan a weak and vulnerable state, yet responsible for the major defence burden on both the north-west and north-east frontiers. The effective defence of both these areas requires the close co-operation of the two armies, yet there has been no willingness to co-operate. Economically partition has led to the expensive misuse of resources, at a time when both countries are straining to the utmost under vital development programmes.

It has also seriously distracted both of them politically and diplomatically.

Pakistan Since Partition

How far does the history of Pakistan since 1947 bear out India's contention that Pakistan is a futile creation that cannot be expected to endure — a political monstrosity that will never be able to establish effective democratic government? Unfortunately, much that has transpired so far appears to confirm the Indian analysis. As yet Pakistan has failed lamentably to develop cohesion. There has been a continual series of crises at both national and provincial level, with democratic government repeatedly suspended. Another measure of her ineffectiveness has been the fact that Pakistan took no fewer than eight years to draft her constitution.

She began her history facing a number of daunting handicaps. Her two halves — East and West Pakistan — are separated by a thousand miles and include a polyglot mixture of peoples — Bengalis, Sikhs, Punjabis, frontier Pathans, and many others. The country is also seriously unbalanced: though East Pakistan is smaller in area and naturally forms a single province, it has a considerably larger population than West Pakistan, which divides naturally — and until recently was divided — into five. The resulting distortion in the constitution provided ample opportunity for intrigue at the centre. Moreover, because the Moslem League was strongest in areas where Moslems were in a minority, most of the politicians were refugees, without roots in the provinces they represented. Thus politics in Karachi (which is in West Pakistan) have tended to consist largely of meaningless contests between cliques of mere power-seekers within the ranks of the Moslem League, which for a long time was the only political party. Resentment and disillusion spread, especially in East Pakistan, which urgently needed attention because of the disruption of the jute industry by partition and, with justification, felt neglected. (While East Bengal, which became East Pakistan, is the main jute-growing area, the processing factories were in West Bengal, which went to India.) Provincial governments also, one after another, lost their grip on local affairs, to the extent that the central government had to intervene. The main redeeming feature, the only piece of good fortune, has

been the country's basic economic self-sufficiency, though development is urgently needed.

Pakistan also suffered the misfortune in her first few years of losing her two outstanding leaders. Jinnah died shortly after partition; and his able lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated soon afterwards — two tragic blows to the young nation. The country has since been gravely short of first-rate leaders. Only the presence at the head of the executive of two 'strong men' in the British-trained civil servants, Ghulam Mohammed and Major-General Iskander Mirza, who have been ready to distinguish between adequate and inadequate administration and have not hesitated to intervene when the situation demanded, has been Pakistan's salvation.

From 1947 to 1956 Pakistan was governed by a Constituent Assembly whose main task was meant to be the drafting of a constitution based on Islam. Ali Khan's successor as Prime Minister was Nazimuddin, an amiable and well-intentioned but rather weak man. He was eventually dismissed by the Governor-General and replaced by Mohammed Ali, previously the Ambassador to Washington. At partition Pakistan, as the weaker of the two states, looked hopefully to Britain, who had brought her into existence, for support in her various disputes with India. But Britain, doing all she could to demonstrate to the Indians that they were now completely free to follow their own course, acted always with scrupulous impartiality. The United States, however, strongly resented India's policy of neutrality at this time and did not hesitate to show her disapproval: thus Pakistan moved towards a close attachment with her. Mohammed Ali was an important instrument of this policy, expressed mainly by Pakistan's acceptance of American military aid, which he negotiated. In return Pakistan supported the United States diplomatically, though she would not go so far as to grant the use of bases.

Later, when it appeared that no progress was being achieved with the formulation of the constitution, the Governor-General, Ghulam Mohammed, again intervened, dismissing the cabinet and dissolving and reforming the Constituent Assembly, though retaining Mohammed Ali as Premier. At the same time West Pakistan was united as a single province: thus a major source of difficulty was eliminated from the constitutional problem. (The

repeated interventions of the Governor-General have provided a fascinating study of British-pattern constitutional monarchy in operation — and some fantastic legal tangles!) The constitution was then completed and adopted, the final version being republican in form. It came into operation on 23rd March, 1956. After having succeeded Ghulam Mohammed some months previously as Governor-General, Mirza became the first President, and still exercises an active supervising role in Pakistan's politics. Since the creation of the Republic there have (to January 1958) been four further changes in the premiership. The most notable term has been that of Mr. Suhrawardy (September 1956 to October 1957). Coming to office from East Pakistan, Suhrawardy was a symbol of a recognition of the importance of the eastern province that was long overdue; and his emergence as leader of a coalition of left-wing parties also marked the end of the predominance of the Moslem League in Pakistan political life. Nevertheless in October 1957 his coalition disintegrated and, under pressure from General Mirza, he submitted his resignation.

The unification of West Pakistan does not seem to have solved the country's problems. In March 1957, President Mirza suspended the constitution of that province and took over the government, following the defeat of the ministry in the Provincial Assembly. Subsequently it was decided to revert to the division of West Pakistan into five provinces.

Pakhtoonistan

One of the problems inherited by Pakistan from Britain, and one which has been aggravated to some extent by her association with the United States, is that of controlling the North-West Frontier. She claims sovereignty over the tribesmen of the region, so often disputed between Britain and Afghanistan, up to the 'Durand Line', the boundary agreed upon between the two countries in 1892 — though this settlement did not prevent Britain experiencing ample trouble from the Pathans throughout most of the rest of her rule. Recently, however, Afghanistan has denied that the Durand Line applies to Pakistan. She now advocates the formation of a new state, called variously 'Pakhtoonistan' or 'Pathanistan' or similar names, in this region.

Varying in intensity from time to time, Afghanistan's interest

in this project was especially marked following Pakistan's acceptance of American aid. She received the support of the USSR; in return the SEATO powers at a 1956 conference issued a declaration favouring Pakistan. Soviet interest in Afghanistan, after appearing to decline when Britain left India, revived notably after the military aid treaty. Communist agents have again been active, and the USSR has furnished Afghanistan with development aid. Afghanistan takes full advantage of the interest of the powers: she is receiving aid from the United States and Western Germany in addition to that from the Soviet Union, representatives of these countries jostling each other daily on the streets of Kabul.


The Indus Dispute

There are four questions upon which Pakistan is in serious dispute with India: her departure from neutrality in foreign policy, the issue of compensation for refugees, the use of the waters of the Indus tributaries, and Kashmir. Her foreign policy has already been mentioned, and will be dealt with in more detail in subsequent chapters. The refugee question requires little explanation: each country claims compensation on behalf of the refugees it has received from the other for property they abandoned. The claims are of course extremely complicated and elaborate, and so far, after ten years, agreement has not been reached on the amounts involved.

The question of the rivers is also very complicated: in fact no layman can judge who has the better case, both parties being able to produce foreign experts who favour their view. The dispute concerns the six tributaries of the Indus, which pass through Indian territory in the Punjab before flowing into Pakistan. Under British rule, a network of irrigation canals was constructed in an area now part of Pakistan that was fed from the waters now under Indian control. Under an agreement of 1948, it was arranged that India was to use the water from the three eastern tributaries (the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej) for the extensive irrigation works she is developing for her part of the region, while Pakistan was to use the western three (the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab). India was also to allow Pakistan to continue, temporarily, to receive a share of the water from her previous sources until she had constructed 'link canals' to join up

her irrigation works with her allotted tributaries. India was to help finance the construction of these 'link canals'.

The question of financial help has now been merged into the dispute over compensation, as part of the general financial settlement between the two countries. There has also, however,



INDIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS

been continued disagreement over Pakistan's share of the waters, Pakistan claiming that India has not allowed her the agreed share and has distributed her share unfairly — supplying plenty of water at the seasons when it was not needed, and cutting off supplies when it was desperately required. The dispute rose to a head in 1954 when India insisted upon opening her Bhakra dam, one of the largest in the world, though Pakistan had not completed the link canals to the irrigation works affected. In justification of her action, India argued that Pakistan had been dilatory, and declared she was not prepared to delay the operation of the Bhakra scheme, which she had sacrificed so much to construct. As there was little else she could do in the matter, Pakistan eventually, under protest, accepted the terms

of a new temporary agreement, similar to the previous arrangement.

KASHMIR

The most difficult and most bitter dispute between the two countries is of course the quarrel over Kashmir. This former princely state, with a population of 4,000,000, of whom 3,000,000 are Moslems, was ruled at the time of partition by the Maharajah, Sir Hari Singh, a Hindu. As the Congress movement showed strong republican tendencies, the Maharajah was naturally reluctant to accede to India; on the other hand, since his rule had rested largely on the Hindu quarter of his population, he was not disposed to deliver them to Pakistan. He decided to remain independent of both nations — a decision which was approved by both India and Pakistan.

Following partition, however, thousands of Moslem refugees made their way into Kashmir. In addition to the difficulties it caused, this influx threatened to increase still further the predominance of Moslems over Hindus in the population. In order therefore to discourage further refugees, the Government deliberately instigated some persecution of the new entrants. It went much too far, however, the worst incident being the massacre of a convoy, proceeding under safe conduct, by the troops who were supposed to be giving it protection. When news of this and similar incidents reached Pakistan, thousands of tribesmen poured over the frontier into Kashmir to the aid of their fellow Moslems. Part of India's case over the dispute rests on the charge that Pakistan connived in this invasion: although this was denied at the time, Pakistan now admits that more could have been done to prevent it. For instance whole units of the Pakistan army applied for leave and were permitted to go off in a body, with their weapons!

Faced with this incursion, the Maharajah appealed to India for protection. India's reply, however, framed on the advice of Lord Mountbatten, who was still serving as Governor-General, stated that she could not assist unless Kashmir applied for accession to the Indian Republic. (Otherwise, from a legal viewpoint, intervention would have amounted to interference in the domestic affairs of another country.) The Maharajah then applied for accession, whereupon the Indian army moved into the

state with remarkable speed and began driving out the invaders.

Since she was reluctant to see India carry off a *fait accompli*, Pakistan responded by moving her army across the frontier and deploying it behind the irregulars so that, as the Indian forces advanced, the two armies came into contact. A brief 'war' resulted — largely an affair of manœvres and investments. (The opposing commanders-in-chief, both British officers, were in constant telephone communication, and had cocktails together once a week!) Shortly, however, a truce was declared; and on India's initiative it was agreed to take the matter to the United Nations.

UN appointed an armistice commission, which is still supervising the truce, and proposed a plebiscite. Both parties agreed; in addition Pakistan agreed that India had become responsible for the maintenance of law and order and should retain some troops in the state, while she herself should withdraw. But first she sought agreement on the number and disposition of the forces concerned, to ensure that they would not be in a position to influence the voting. It is on this point, in theory at least, that discussion has continued ever since, without agreement.

Nehru has undoubtedly been most equivocal over Kashmir. While never renouncing the plebiscite, and in fact often reiterating that the matter will eventually be finally determined by plebiscite, he has repeatedly appealed to the legality of the Maharajah's original application for accession — which was in fact in accordance with the legal provision at the time of partition that the decision of each of the Indian states concerning its future should be taken by its constituted government — and declared that this and subsequent resolutions of accession by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly cannot be reversed. His pleadings make sense only under the assumption that the voting will confirm the legal position by going in favour of India. In fact his whole object in the negotiations seems to have been endless delay, apparently with the object of making sure, by means of very generous treatment for Kashmir, that the result of the plebiscite, when it is held, will be a foregone conclusion.

Meanwhile, as part of this policy, India has been keeping tight control over Kashmir, and acting as if its permanent accession could be presumed. Shortly after the truce was declared,

the Maharajah's forebodings were confirmed when Kashmir was declared a republic, and he was deposed. (His present whereabouts are something of a mystery.) A step was then taken that seemed to flout the UN proposal for a plebiscite when 'elections' — on totalitarian, one-party lines — were held and a Constituent Assembly set up. The leader taking office as Prime Minister was Sheikh Abdullah, a personal friend of Nehru, long prominent in the Kashmir equivalent of the Congress Party. After some months, however, he began — as so often happens in such circumstances — to favour independence for Kashmir. He was soon arrested and imprisoned by fellow ministers, and is still in custody. The Constituent Assembly has since passed several resolutions declaring Kashmir's accession to India; India has incorporated the state in several branches of her administration; she has pressed on with a vigorous development of public works and has heavily subsidised the sale of wheat — the staple food. But Kashmir is a police state: public discussion of political matters is not permitted.

There is much to be said for India's general attitude, especially if one agrees with India's view that Pakistan is an ineffective creation which cannot endure. If one accepts, too, the Indian contention that the modern state must be secular, then it also follows that the fact that Kashmir is predominantly Moslem has no real bearing on the issue. The question of Kashmir poses again in a new context the whole question of partition. Self-determination by plebiscite is probably not the best method of deciding such questions: the assumption that the will of the people in a particular locality should determine the issue is superficial, ignoring many important considerations. But Nehru himself has so often appealed to the principle of self-determination that he seems to have been drawn into a hypocritical position over Kashmir. If he had been more frank he would probably have obtained greater support from world opinion. (Though it is often mentioned in discussions of the problem that Nehru himself is a Kashmiri, this probably has less bearing on the dispute than is often supposed, as Nehru has to restrain his followers on the issue, his view being much more moderate than that taken by the majority of Congress members.)

Though a partition of the state has been suggested, neither party will agree to this, as both want the Vale of Kashmir, the

most fertile part, in which lies Srinagar, the capital. In 1955, when Pakistan accepted American military aid, Nehru broke off negotiations, declaring that this had completely altered the situation. Though pressed by Pakistan to explain how this was so, he refused to elaborate. Further brief and frigid discussion took place in 1955; then in 1957 India incorporated the part of Kashmir under her occupation into the Indian Republic. A last-minute injunction from the Security Council not to proceed with this step was ignored. Though one can agree with India that UN decisions and directions are by no means always just and that little understanding of India's case has been shown in UN, this flouting of a Security Council resolution ill-became such a nation as India, which has so often pleaded for a high moral attitude and the renunciation of the use of force in world affairs.

Partition of Kashmir will probably be the outcome, Pakistan retaining Azad Kashmir — the portion still held by her forces behind the armistice line.

Meanwhile, as these disputes have been running their course, Pakistan's friendship with the United States has cooled. This loss of enthusiasm has been partly a product of the revolution in American foreign policy since 1954. At that time, as has been seen, the new Republican administration was impatient with India's neutralism and rather heedless of the force of nationalism in the Far East. Since then it has become increasingly more sensitive to the historical forces at work, more aware of the difficulty and complexity of the task of countering Communism, and thus more deeply impressed with the importance of winning the goodwill of the Afro-Asian bloc. As India is so prominent in this group, one expression of this change has been greater care not to offend India. In 1956 both Dulles and Eisenhower made guarded complimentary references to India, stressing her right to pursue her own line in foreign policy, such as would have been inconceivable in 1954.

One aspect of this policy has been a scaling-down of the military supplies planned for Pakistan, and an apparent relegation of Pakistan to a less important role in SEATO than had originally been intended. The United States now apparently values Pakistan's alliance less than India's goodwill. As a result, for the same reason as earlier with Britain, the Pakistanis have

become disappointed and disillusioned, and talk of neutralism is heard increasingly. While the support given by the United States for the UN resolution against India over Kashmir may briefly halt the ebbing of Pakistan's confidence, it will probably do no more, since the Security Council is most unlikely to take any action to dislodge India from the territory she has gained.

Hyderabad and the Enclaves

Kashmir had been only one of 570 princely states which at partition had to choose between accession to either India or Pakistan and independence. All but two in reality had no option: they were too small to stand alone. One of the two was Kashmir, the other Hyderabad. The position in Hyderabad was the reverse of that in Kashmir, for the Nizam was a Moslem ruling over 17 million people, of whom only two million were Moslems and most of the rest Hindus. There was also this difference, that his territory, though almost as large as the United Kingdom, was completely surrounded by India. Nevertheless he refused to join India, and declared his intention of remaining independent. India's response was a blockade; then, in September 1948, the Indian Army entered the state, which resisted for only four days. Though the Nizam's decision had been mistaken and regrettable, India's recourse to armed force was also lamentable.

In completing the shape of her territory, India has also been concerned with the enclaves — small pieces of Indian soil still under the rule of foreign countries when Britain relinquished sovereignty. The French held three small colonies — relics of their former Indian empire — Pondicherry, Mahé, and Chandernagore, and agreed fairly readily to negotiate their transference to the Indian Republic. India has since permitted these areas to retain their individuality, so that their French culture is still unmistakable. The remaining enclave is Goa, ruled by Portugal; and Portugal refuses to 'negotiate' — which of course means to surrender. In fact she claims that Goa is an integral part of Portugal, and cannot be given up — a mystical conception that makes little sense in most British ears.

Portugal is being obstinate and insensitive to the flow of history: it is an unjustifiable anomaly that a tiny part of the Indian sub-continent should remain under foreign rule. Though it is

impossible to discover the views of the Goans in the matter — since Portugal is a dictatorship at home there is naturally no freedom of expression in the colony — as large numbers have migrated to other parts of India it seems likely that they link their destiny with their neighbours. So far India has been patient: though there have been repeated threats of invasion by volunteer 'liberators', the Indian Government has restrained them. But the question has raised serious difficulties for the West. While Communist visitors have won cheap goodwill by supporting the Indian case, the Indians have looked in vain to Britain and the United States to press Portugal to take a more realistic view. But the West has declined to do so, pleading that the question is a matter between the two parties which they alone can settle — and has thus been suspected of still being colonialist at heart. Such suspicion is understandable: the rights of the case are clear enough and the West has been giving an advantage to the Communists unnecessarily.

Nepal

Among the many small neighbours which India watches with some anxiety one of the most important is Nepal. Stretching for about five hundred miles between India and Communist Tibet, Nepal serves as a buffer zone between Indian democracy and Chinese communism — but on the southern side of the Himalayas. While, as will be seen in a later chapter, India accepted the extension of Communist rule to Tibet without protest, except concerning the employment of force — there was nothing she could do to prevent it in any case — and readily agreed to give up the rights she had inherited there from the British Raj, she has shown herself decidely uneasy about the possibility of Communist control of Nepal — which appears far from unlikely. This would bring communism to her doorstep and make a decisive breach in the mountain barrier that is her main defence in the north. Nepal is an important testing-ground for 'co-existence'.

Until 1951 Nepal continued under the feudal system of government that the country had known for hundreds of years, with the king a mere figurehead, control being exercised by the hereditary power of the Rana family. The country was best known to the outside world through the redoubtable Gurkha

troops which it furnished to the British Army. (Despite left-wing objections, it still continues to do so, and also supplies the Indian Army, and also, until recently, supplied that of Pakistan. The income from these sources is one of Nepal's main sources of revenue.) In that year, however, partly stimulated by Indian interest, a revolution took place as a result of which the Ranas were eventually deprived of power. The King took up the position of a constitutional monarch overseeing a Congress Party government.

Because of quarrels among the Congress Party leaders and the attempted subversion of left-wing extremists, however, the situation remained unstable. Following a revolt by the left-wing element in 1952, quelled by army action and ending with the flight of the leader, Dr. K. I. Singh, to Tibet, and a subsequent fierce quarrel in the Congress Party, King Tribhuvana temporarily abandoned the attempt at popular government and took power into his own hands. Personal rule continued under his successor, King Mahendra, until 1956, when a Praja Parishad (Socialist) cabinet was admitted to office.

Meanwhile Dr. Singh had made his way to Peking, where he was granted the use of Peking Radio to direct propaganda back to Nepal. It is significant of India's interest in Nepal that she protested to the Chinese Government; and some respect at least on China's part for India's sensitivities also seems to be indicated by the fact that the broadcasting facilities were then withdrawn. In 1955, as a result of discussions at the Bandung Conference, China agreed to accede to Nepal's demands that Dr. Singh be returned, on condition that he be granted a free pardon. Dr. Singh then re-entered the country, and undertook not to resort to the use of violence. Shortly afterwards, however, he set up a new political party — the United Democratic Party. He then proceeded to disclaim any Communist sympathies, and to criticise the Praja government for being anti-Indian and too friendly with China!

Nepal is now engaged upon an extensive development programme, receiving financial aid from China, India and the United States. It seems significant that she has accepted the assistance of Indian technicians, but not Chinese, and that one of the main projects is the improvement of communications with India. In early 1957, however, visits were exchanged between

Katmandu and Peking, during which the two countries jointly signed the 'Panch Shila', promising 'peaceful co-existence'. Curiously, in July the Praja Government fell, through failure to obtain sufficient support among the various parties for its policy of working for closer relations with China to offset India's strong influence, and Dr. Singh became Premier, with a strongly anti-China policy. Nevertheless he was able to obtain this office only through firm backing from the King, none of the opposition parties except his own organisation being prepared to co-operate with him! Only the Praja Party had been ready to ally with his United Democrats; but he had refused their offer! In August he announced the creation of a security force on military lines and an associated special intelligence service, also warning the press to moderate its criticisms. Politics in Nepal have entered a confused phase, with a suspicious appearance of being motivated less by principle than by place-seeking. Meanwhile, to the loud indignation of the opposition parties, Dr. Singh and the King appeared to be co-operating in repeatedly postponing a long-promised general election.

In November 1957, without explanation, Dr. Singh suddenly resigned; and the King took over full control of the Government. As one of a number of rumours, it was said Singh had displeased India by rejecting Indian aid and advice.

India's Development Problems

India's leaders face appalling problems in their endeavours to develop European standards of civilisation in their immense, terribly backward country. The tasks of unifying their unique mixture of peoples, of combating complete illiteracy and superstition, of wiping out the pernicious caste system and weaning the people from the worship of the cow, which in itself hopelessly vitiates Indian agriculture — any one of these would be tremendous enough to daunt any but the most determined reformer. Behind them all lies the problem of economic development — at the moment not so much a problem of raising the desperately low standards of living of the mass of the 370 million people as of so expanding production as to maintain these standards, by matching the present growth of the population by three millions a year. The struggle is above all to meet the ever-pressing demand for more sources of employment, and thus

prevent millions from starving. It is expected there will be 510 million Indians by 1980, yet food resources are already overstrained. Mechanisation of agriculture and large-scale irrigation are necessary: these require large-scale industrialisation, which will help provide employment. Moreover this tremendous struggle is taking place in conscious competition with Communist China. India is trying to achieve by democratic processes what China is attempting by the more ruthless methods of Communism. The outcome of the race will be viewed as highly significant by the millions of people in the undeveloped parts of the world who have not yet made a definite choice between the two systems. It will thus be immensely important for the future security of the West.

India is now engaged upon her Second Five-Year Plan, covering 1956 to 1961. Her First Plan, 1951–55, was a success, enabling her to balance her trade and averting a serious decline in standards of living. But it succeeded despite grave misgivings on the part of most observers. To help finance the Plan, India indulged in a fateful gamble, involving a serious risk of calamitous inflation, by doubling her note circulation. The gamble succeeded, largely because of a series of good harvests and because a great deal of reserve capacity existed in the economy: at the outset many factories were producing at only half their potential output. Thus the increase in the volume of goods in circulation matched the expansion of the currency.

Under the Second Five-Year Plan, India is repeating this gamble. She aims at increasing her national income by no less than a quarter during its currency — a most ambitious target, as is seen by comparing it with the increase of 15 per cent in the national product of United States between 1950 and 1955 — recognised as a remarkable expansion, even for the most highly industrialised economy in the world. To finance this development it is estimated £4,725,000,000 will be needed — a colossal sum. To bridge the gap between this figure and its present revenue, the Government plans to raise £750,000,000 from extra taxes and internal loans, to double again its note circulation — at present about £1,000,000,000 — and raise about £675,000,000 from external sources. At any time, because of its effect in diverting productive resources to the creation of capital instead of consumer goods, a development programme is bound

to produce inflationary pressure; but a programme financed in this fashion, without further slack in the economy to take up and with bad harvests always possible, seems a desperate tempting of fate.

Sacrifices are being called for, and Congress hopes to obtain them voluntarily by democratic methods — while the Chinese Government can dictate to its people. The wealthy classes in India are now by far the most heavily taxed people in the world. So far Nehru has obtained a remarkable response from the Indians; but is he mistaking for democratic consent, as many observers believe, what is really personal veneration? If he should disappear from the leadership, or if the burden should become too heavy, or if for other reasons his influence should lessen or disappear, what is likely to result? At the moment communism is hardly an important force in India, excepting in one or two states; yet the English-educated element who control Congress at present is small amidst the Indian masses, and an economic upset could conceivably win the Communist Party an overwhelming following almost overnight in such an immature electorate.

A more likely or more immediate danger, however, would be a reversion to Gandhi's teachings. Gandhi's death in 1948 must have brought profound relief to Nehru and his group of forward-looking leaders of Congress, for Gandhi's conception that the salvation of India could be found only in the rejection of the Western industrial civilisation and a return to peasant handicrafts threatened a disastrous split in the party and the end of all their hopes of a strong India. But Gandhi's influence lives on in Congress, vital enough still to become the dominant force if Nehru's policies lose their popularity. Such a development would be quite as disastrous as — and in fact would very probably form a prelude to — a swing to communism.

Moreover the decision of Congress that the massive development programme necessitates active participation by the state in industrial production, while at the same time existing private industries are to be left unmolested and assisted to expand — a mixture of socialism and capitalism — though it seems the only possible course in the circumstances, was not reached without some bitter opposition on the part of the wealthy Hindus, who tend to be conservative. And the whole struggle for develop-

ment is inextricably bound up with the struggle against caste, the sacred cattle, widow-burnings, and all the deadweight of superstition, vested interest and corruption. The next few years will be a most momentous period for India — to be watched with deep anxiety by the Western world. Already, in 1957, the targets of the Plan have had to be modified.

It was mentioned briefly above that India is counting upon the huge sum of £675,000,000 from external sources, mostly in foreign aid: obviously this will be vital to her success. How she hopes to obtain this aid will be discussed in the next chapter.

Ceylon

The third member of the Commonwealth in this area, Ceylon, is much smaller in size and population, having only eight million people. But the tangled mixture of her races, comprising Sinhalese, Ceylon Tamils, Indian Tamils, Burghers (descendants of the Dutch settlers), and Moors, makes her future policies difficult to predict. After a long experience of partial self-government, similar to that of India, Ceylon was granted dominion status in February 1948. The Government at that time was formed from the United National Party, led by the able and respected D. S. Senanayake, which had already been in power for 17 years. Senanayake was killed in a riding accident, however, in 1952. In 1953 Sir John Kotelawala became Premier. Though he followed a neutralist policy, declining to join SEATO in 1954 — partly, it would seem, for fear of antagonising India, partly because of strong sentiments among his own countrymen — Kotelawala was friendly in attitude to Britain. He greatly embarassed India by his outspoken condemnation of Chinese Communism at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

In 1956, however, when an election was precipitated over a UNP proposal to make Sinhalese the sole official language, thus reversing the long-standing previous policy of giving Tamil equal recognition, the UNP was very thoroughly defeated by the People's United Front (MEP), a combination of left-wing groups. Curiously the MEP also favoured legislation making Sinhalese the only official language and carried this on coming into office, despite serious rioting by Tamils. The election results came as a surprise even in Ceylon. They appear to have

been due to a natural swing against the UNP after its long tenure of power, irritation at Kotelawala's notorious conceit, and a strengthening of opinion, as in most parts of the East, in favour of neutralism. Thus they may not represent a permanent swing to the left. More recently, in response to further rioting, the Government has suspended the language legislation; but by-elections still return candidates who press for its implementation.

The new Prime Minister, Bandaranaike, has announced his intentions of ultimately making Ceylon a republic, while remaining within the Commonwealth, and of establishing beyond doubt the policy of neutralism. As one step to this end he requested at his accession that Britain give up her tenure of her two bases on the island, the naval base at Trincomalee and the RAF base at Katunake; and at a Commonwealth Conference shortly afterwards Britain agreed to return these to Ceylon within the next two years, though Ceylon will permit her to make use of them. (Britain then announced her intention to reactivate a former wartime staging post for aircraft in the Maldive Islands, a sparsely inhabited archipelago about 400 miles south-west of Ceylon.) The MEP also proposes to nationalise some industries, notably the transport industry. There is some discontent in Ceylon at the amount of British capital invested in the island, though it is realised it would be dangerous to interfere with this too drastically. The new government also owes some of its support to Buddhist influence, the Buddhist monks opposing the UNP on the ground that it includes too many Christians.

Ceylon's proximity to India has caused some strain between the two countries. Since the 'Ceylonese' showed reluctance in the past to do the labouring work in the tea plantations, some 850,000 Indians have come there at various times; though many have lived in the islands for many years, their presence is now resented and, because of some unemployment, their jobs are coveted. There is also resentment at the advent of many Indian shopkeepers, and at the willingness of the Indians to work for a very low wage. As a result, in legislation passed in 1949 Ceylon denied the franchise to all but a small proportion of the Indians. Since then India has agreed to assist the return of those Indians who have had only a short residence, while Ceylon has extended

citizenship to a wider category. Nevertheless she has not been as generous as India wished, so that a large proportion remain with no recognised citizenship of either country; and India also accuses Ceylon, apparently with justification, of employing underhand methods to make it difficult for even those Indians who qualify to obtain the franchise.

The experience of similar situations in history suggests that India, a giant amidst a circle of weak neighbours, is almost bound sooner or later to set herself upon a course of imperialism. In the case of Ceylon she seems so far to have shown patience and forbearance; with Pakistan she has been somewhat less patient. Much of her present restraint is probably due to Nehru, who has repeatedly acted as a moderating influence upon Congress. When Nehru goes, it would not be surprising if this moderation were to end.

Chapter Thirteen

POWER-VACUUM: SOUTH EAST ASIA

The members of the uncommitted 'Afro-Asian' group of nations which is playing an increasingly important role in world affairs are located mainly in two regions — the Middle East and South East Asia. India, Pakistan and Ceylon are best regarded as part of South East Asia — which will form the subject of this chapter — the rest of this region comprising the various countries occupying the long peninsula and chain of islands stretching south from China towards Australia. As it appears dangerously vulnerable to communist expansion, this area is most important in world affairs and the subject of much anxiety on the part of the West. Though the Western powers have very few territories of their own in South East Asia to defend, it would obviously be a grave setback to their position — a serious alteration against them of the world balance of power — if it were to fall to communism. They have been devoting considerable effort to measures to prevent this happening.

The situation is however a most difficult one for the West. Until very recently practically all of the South East Asian countries were colonies of Western powers. Their emergence as independent nations has been one of the main manifestations of the rise of nationalism as the vital, historical force outside Europe in the post-war world. As the first objective of their nationalist movements was of course to end colonial rule, their governments and peoples are intensely suspicious of the West, tending to view any suggestions of alliance as attempts to regain some disguised form of influence. Exploiting this sensitivity to the utmost, the Communists have posed as allies of the nationalists against colonialism and in many cases have successfully associated themselves with the nationalist movements. Thus, though more than a little uneasy at their exposed position

beside such a giant neighbour as Communist China, most of these countries have given little heed to Western warnings of the need to take defence precautions and have rejected offers of help for this purpose. They tend to regard the West as posing even a greater threat to their independence than China or Communism.

The contest between the Communist bloc and the West over the area has largely taken the form of a struggle to win the confidence and goodwill of the South East Asian countries. While the West has been trying to persuade them to become members of SEATO — its defence organisation for the region — and thus accept assistance in safeguarding themselves against possible aggression, the Communists have been striving, by propaganda and diplomatic means, to frustrate these overtures. Meanwhile India has been contending that, since they create tension and fears which themselves breed agression, military alliances are more dangerous then helpful in the attempt to obtain peace and security. The adhesion of most of these countries to India's viewpoint over the last few years has represented a measure both of her influence and of communist success.

This trend towards neutralism has occurred despite the fact, obvious from a glance at the situation, that the new China constitutes an immense potential danger to the independence of the small South East Asian nations. Even if there were no ideological factor to be considered, the mere proximity of one powerful state to a number of weak states would create a most unstable situation: a historian would be bound to expect China to expand sooner or later into the vacuum of power. When in addition China's immense population, imposing an unbearable weight upon her resources, is taken into account, pressure for expansion can only be expected. Moreover most South East Asian countries already contain a large Chinese element in their populations: Indo-China has one million out of 29 million, Malaya $2\frac{1}{3}$ million out of $5\frac{1}{2}$, Indonesia 2 million out of 80 million, Siam $2\frac{1}{2}$ million out of $17\frac{1}{2}$, and the Philippines and Burma each about 250,000 out of populations of 20 and 19 millions respectively. These Chinese communities form a potential fifth column and a likely source of friction with China, the more so since Chinese governments have always been particularly insistent that Chinese cannot change their nationality, but always

remain subject to the sovereignty of their homeland. (This peculiarity is sometimes explained as a product of the immense importance attached to the family in Chinese life — one can never escape one's family relationships — sometimes as a reaction to the insistence upon extra-territorial rights for their nationals by the Western powers when China was under their domination, which impressed the Chinese with the importance of nationality.) It is always an embarassment to a government to have part of the population in its territory regarding themselves as subject to another authority, especially when that authority is the government of a very powerful neighbour. Finally, the fact that the government of China is communist means that it is likely to be afflicted with all the unsettling, suspicious tendencies inevitably associated with communism.

Further, all the countries of South East Asia are engaged in a desperate struggle to improve their standards of living from their present appallingly low levels. This will require extensive social reform, and in many cases the loss of privilege by propertied classes. At the moment most are attempting progress by democratic means; but these are bound to be slow and unsure. To the north, China is using methods that seem surer and swifter, and the eyes of many Asian peoples are watching her example. They will pay even closer attention if democratic methods fail.

Indo-China

An important factor in the sudden rise of nationalism as a vital force in Asia in the post-war years was the series of defeats inflicted upon Europeans by the Japanese. Looking back before 1941, it is astonishing to realise the immensity of the populations that were controlled by a handful of European administrators and troops. Partly this was possible because in most colonies the propertied classes found it to their benefit to cooperate with the colonial power, while the strength of nationalist sentiment now makes this impossible for them; partly it was due to the enormous prestige enjoyed by the Europeans. This prestige vanished, for ever, in the Japanese victories. (Even the subsequent defeat of Japan has not been credited, by many of the common people, to the West: the communists have spread the story, to some effect, that the sudden departure of the Japanese

forces from the conquered territories was due to Soviet victories in the north!) In addition the experience of Japanese occupation acted as a powerful stimulus to nationalism. When they first came, the Japanese set up governments of the local peoples under their slogan 'Asia for the Asians' in place of the colonial régimes, thus kindling the idea of nationalism; but of much more influence was the subsequent discovery that these were only façades behind which lay Japanese domination. Resistance movements, which later became the core of nationalist movements, developed in most occupied countries.

One country providing a good model for the experience and reactions of South East Asia as a whole and a typical case-study of the pattern of forces at work in the area — in addition to being the focus of their conflict in recent years and a country of key strategic importance — is Indo-China. Formerly under French rule, Indo-China comprises three countries, Viet Nam (which itself is a union of the former Cochin China, Tongking and Annam), Laos, and Cambodia. It is Viet Nam, however, — the largest of the three — which has been the main centre of interest.

One of the anti-Japanese wartime resistance movements was that formed in Indo-China in 1941 by Ho Chi Minh, called the Viet Minh. A Communist veteran who had made his way to Moscow in the 1920's by way of studies in Paris, Ho had been sentenced to death by the French as long ago as 1930 for seditious agitation. Escaping to China, he returned to Viet Nam when he saw his opportunity during the war. Though always firmly under his leadership, the Viet Minh could not be described with any certainty as a Communist organisation until its eventual success. As also seems to have been the case with Mao in China, Ho seems to have deliberately disguised his movement for many years; at all events it obtained the support of other nationalist bodies which were not communist.

When the Japanese departed, his was the only organised authority in the country; and when the French attempted to return he negotiated with them for recognition of his Democratic Republic, which he had established in the north. Though at first there were difficulties through his attempt to obtain some authority beyond the area he actually held, eventually a settlement was reached at a conference in Paris, granting him a large

measure of local autonomy. Before the settlement could be completely implemented, however, the arrangements broke down through intrigues of local French officials who disregarded the instructions of their own government — a recurring pattern in French colonial history — and in December 1946 civil war broke out.

At first Ho made little headway, and had to be content with guerilla activity; but the French could not suppress him, and gradually he began to make ground. (Neither the USSR nor the Chinese Communists paid him much attention until about 1949, apparently having little faith in his prospects.) By 1949, however, the Viet Minh had become a serious enough problem for the French to try to divert some of its nationalist support. As a counter-blast to Ho's propaganda against colonial rule, they restored Bao Dai, the head of the ruling house of Annam, as Emperor — a post he had held previously under the Japanese. But this manœuvre did not succeed. Bao Dai, an unenergetic, pleasure-loving figure who spent most of his time on the Riviera, inspired little loyalty; nor did the French win any popular favour in the ensuing long-drawn negotiations with his government concerning its appropriate status. The French have never been able to accept the concept of dominion status, implying as it does the right of secession, but always seem compelled to hedge any offer of autonomy with vague reservations retaining ultimate authority for the French Union, which inevitably arouse suspicions about their sincerity. Time after time they were obliged to make further concessions in the attempt to satisfy Bao Dai, until eventually they were offering his government much greater freedom of action than Ho had been prepared to accept in 1946. But their concessions were always too equivocal, too reluctant and too late. Even at the very end agreement had not been reached on this question.

Meanwhile the war continued, crippling France with its demands of men and resources. The Viet Minh continued to consolidate their hold on the north and began to take the initiative, while the Viet Nam forces and people showed little zest for supporting the French and their puppet. By early 1954, when the Viet Minh captured the key fortress of Dien Bien Phu, it became obvious that the French were about to be driven out of the country. Since the fall of Indo-China would threaten Burma,

Siam and Malaya, the whole of the West became alarmed. As a conference was due to be held at Geneva, mainly to discuss a settlement for Korea, it was decided also to raise the question posed by this turn of events in Indo-China and seek an armistice.

The Geneva Conference, 1954

The differing attitudes of the Western powers to the crisis and the conference were most illuminating. Weary from the long, frustrating struggle, France wanted to escape from Indo-China — gracefully if possible, but in any case to escape. Making a typical gesture, the French Premier, Mendès-France, fixed a time-limit after which he would resign if an armistice had not been signed. As usual, the United States was most belligerent in its reactions. Shortly before the fall of Dien Bien Phu, Dulles was hinting at the use of atomic weapons; but it was soon made apparent that no other country was prepared to support him in this threat. Condemning the proposal of a parley with the Viet Minh at Geneva, he argued that Communists could never be trusted to abide by any agreement, and that their only object in negotiating was to gain time in order to win more ground while the West still hesitated. Instead, he declared, the West must set up a defence organisation for South East Asia — an organisation with determination and with real military strength ('with teeth') — and that this must be set on foot immediately. Though agreeing that such a step might eventually be necessary, Britain contended that the Communists should first be given a chance to show themselves reasonable, and that it would be unwise to come to the conference table 'with a gun behind one's back'. In other words, she insisted upon discussing the matter at the conference first, before beginning talks for the planning of a military alliance. Australia and New Zealand, America's partners in ANZUS, took up a mid-position: pointing out that it would take some time to work out the form of the military organisation, so that it could not possibly be established before the Geneva talks were over, they suggested that both policies be pursued simultaneously.

As it happened, a settlement was achieved at Geneva before it was possible for the conference summoned to create a military alliance to meet. In view of the preceding discussion, the American State Department found itself in a difficult position

at the Geneva meeting. It had disapproved of the parley; there was still talk in the United States of 'appeasement' and 'another Munich'; it was still out of the question at this time for an American envoy to shake hands with a representative of Communist China or Viet Minh — both of which, of course, had been invited. The State Department therefore behaved with great caution: except for one or two days, only junior representatives were present, and they merely hovered on the fringe of the discussions, rarely taking direct part. When the settlement was eventually agreed upon, the United States did not sign it with the other powers, but issued a unilateral declaration defining its own attitude.

As the Communists were clearly winning the war, and appeared to have everything to gain by continuing the fighting, there was general surprise in the West when they agreed to a truce. Various explanations for their moderation were suggested; the true reason was probably a combination of those put forward. In the first place it now appears, in retrospect, that this Geneva Conference was the first step in the Communist 'peace offensive' of 1954–56 — the policy, aimed probably at winning concessions on the vital issue of Germany, of parading reasonableness and moderation. (After Geneva came the Austrian settlement, the attempted reconciliation of Yugoslavia, the return of Porkkala and Port Arthur, the more flexible attitude on disarmament, and so on.) Secondly, the settlement tended to isolate and discredit the United States. Thirdly, under the terms agreed the Viet Minh probably felt they had every chance of eventually gaining the whole of Indo-China by peaceable means — a method that would be immensely preferable diplomatically to military victory. Finally, one reason why a settlement was reached at Geneva was that the West accepted terms which it had always refused in similar situations elsewhere. It agreed to the reunification of the country being carried out by means of elections, without obtaining adequate guarantees that these elections would be completely free in the communist-held part of the country.

The main terms of the settlement were as follows. Concerning Viet Nam: the Viet Minh government was in the meantime to have control of the area north of the 17th parallel, the Viet Nam government to the south. It was agreed that discussions should

begin in July 1955 (in a year's time) to arrange for the holding of elections throughout the country in July 1956, for the purpose of establishing a single government. These were to be supervised by an international Control Commission, on which India, Poland and Canada were to be represented, which was to operate by majority vote. (But no assurances were obtained that the Commission would have adequate powers to fulfil its purpose effectively.) Concerning the two smaller states, Laos and Cambodia, in whose government Viet Minh had also demanded recognition, though there had been little fighting in either, and Viet Minh had clearly been intruders, without local support, it was agreed that all Viet Minh and French Union forces should withdraw. Pathet Lao, an armed movement separate from the Viet Minh but 'fellow-travelling', was to be given some recognition in local government in northern Laos, under the authority of the central government.

Further, no foreign troops were to be admitted to Indo-China — French Union forces were not, of course, to be regarded as foreign — and none of the four governments was to become a member of any military alliance. The unilateral declaration issued by the United States was to the effect that, though she was not prepared to sign the treaty, she would take no action by means of force to overturn it, and would view any breach with grave concern.

SEATO

Shortly after the Geneva settlement the conference to frame a military organisation for the area gathered at Manila. Eventually a pact entitled the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty was signed, creating the organisation popularly known as SEATO. The signatories agreed (1) in the case of armed attack on the treaty area, to 'act in accordance with their constitutional processes' — the same rather vague wording, necessitated by the constitutional position in the United States, where the consent of the Senate is necessary to a declaration of war, as in NATO. (Nevertheless the United States gave firm assurances that the obligation would be regarded as completely binding.) (2) in the case of any other threat — apparently it is subversion or menacing preparations that are meant — to consult regarding appropriate counter-measures. (3) it was agreed

to set up a joint planning organisation, this being effected at a conference in Bangkok in February 1955. Though, under the Geneva terms, South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia could not become members, their territories were included in the treaty area. It reaches to 21½ degrees north — a line delicately drawn to include Indo-China but exclude Hong Kong and Formosa.

The signatories were the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Siam and Pakistan. Pakistan's signature was rather unexpected, and at her request the aggression against which the Treaty was to become operative was not specified in the wording as communist aggression, as the United States had intended. This request, of course, underlined the fact that in becoming a member of the organisation she was taking precautions not so much against possible communist attack as against attack by India. However the United States added a unilateral rider to the Treaty to the effect that, as far as it was concerned, 'armed attack' would be interpreted as referring only to communist action. A 'Pacific Charter', which stressed the need for co-operation to develop the area and raise standards of living, was also appended. Although it was hoped that this portended more vigorous support by the United States for the Colombo Plan, and there was some discussion of this question in the State Department for some months afterwards, no perceptible change resulted, except for the extremely generous American aid to South Viet Nam.

One interesting aspect of SEATO is that it represents the assumption by the United States of much wider commitments than she was prepared to accept when the ANZUS pact was signed. In fact this is another instance of the United States being gradually and reluctantly drawn into increasing commitments all over the world. Typical also has been her reluctance, even under SEATO, to place any considerable body of forces in the area, which caused some alarm among the signatories, especially the Philippines. The United States has generally preferred to assist other governments to defend themselves rather than help them directly by the provision of American forces; but the South East Asian countries are obviously incapable of raising adequate forces for anything more than a delaying action. (Moreover, the lack of any 'conventional' forces in the area raises the problem — to be examined in detail in another chap-

ter — that if aggression occurs, the United States may be faced with the choice of fulfilling her obligations by means of strategic nuclear bombing or of standing by and watching the aggression succeed — a difficult decision.) In fact, when it came to the point, despite the attitudes taken up before Geneva, Britain and the two Pacific Dominions showed themselves more ready to give SEATO 'teeth' than the United States. Britain has built up a small reserve in Malaya, to which Australia and New Zealand have contributed token contingents, consisting of an infantry battalion, four RAAF squadrons and two frigates from Australia, and two RNZAF squadrons and two frigates from New Zealand. This provision has been made under the ANZAM agreement, representing the Commonwealth arrangement for the defence of South East Asia. (In addition New Zealand has also, with British approval, transferred her understood Commonwealth defence commitment to this area, where previously it was the Middle East — this change having been recognised with regard to Australia since the war.)

Nevertheless if SEATO is ever to come into action — for the moment it seems that military operations in the area are unlikely — its main strength will have to come from United States forces. Though the SEATO Council meets regularly, and the Military Planning Committee is continually engaged in joint planning and has conducted joint exercises, SEATO does not possess anything like the standing forces of NATO, and was never expected to develop them. Curiously, the ANZUS signatories continue to meet separately; but the two Dominions at any rate have no further forces worth considering that they can deploy. Thus the effectiveness of SEATO depends very largely upon the attitude of the United States to the commitments it imposes on her.

The Bandung Conference

When the Manila Conference closed, it was hoped that it would prove only a beginning, and that other South East Asian countries would become members of SEATO. In particular, there were hopes that Burma might join. Since 1954, however, the trend has been away from alliance with the West: the West has had the worse of the diplomatic contest. The uneasiness prevalent among South East Asian countries concerning China's

intentions has generally receded, and the trend towards taking up confirmed positions of neutralism has strengthened. An important turning-point in these developments was the Bandung Conference of April 1955.

It was typical of the frequent ineptitude of the West at sensing the feelings of Asians that the so-called Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, summoned by the 'Colombo group' of powers (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, who for some time had been holding regular meetings among themselves to discuss matters of common interest) and attended by almost every independent nation in Asia and Africa except Israel, was almost ignored by the Western press. Most of the journals which did notice it poked mild fun at the gathering, asking whatever could be the interests which such an oddly-assorted collection of countries, from such widely separated corners of the earth, could possibly have in common. (At the New Year of 1956, however, looking back over the previous twelve months, the *Observer* selected it as the most important event in world affairs during the year.) The important fact that the West generally failed to appreciate was that — as the mere summoning of the Conference demonstrated — they did feel they had a great deal in common — as small, economically backward nations which had only recently freed themselves from Western control.

Unfortunately, considerable damage was done to the Western interests at Bandung, as Communist China was invited and sent her foreign minister, Chou-en-Lai, who was able to take advantage of the situation. It was significant, in the first place that China had been considered one of the 'Afro-Asians'; and Chou put himself out to be affable, moderate and reasonable. He was able to score a notable success in dispelling the fears of the South East Asian countries. In particular, two of his gestures made a very favourable impression: firstly, his adoption of a much more conciliatory attitude over Formosa — as observed in the previous chapter; secondly, a declaration that he was prepared to enter into negotiations with Indonesia concerning the nationality of long-established Chinese residents in that country. Both of these strokes represented a sudden and radical alteration in Chinese policy. After the Conference, moreover, he followed up these pronouncements by actually entering into talks with the United States, and agreeing to relinquish Chinese

claims to sovereignty over a large proportion of the Chinese in Indonesia. (More recently, he has advised Chinese long-resident in Malaya to take up Malayan citizenship.)

These developments appeared amply to vindicate Nehru's neutralist policy. On the other hand, two of the SEATO powers at the Conference, Pakistan and Siam, and in addition the representative of Ceylon, Sir John Kotelawala, did the Western cause a disservice by indulging in abusive and intemperate attacks on China in very general terms. These were quite discordant with the atmosphere Chou had created: there was a case to be put against the Peking government, but this was not the way to present it.

Following Bandung, there has been evidence from many quarters of a strengthening in neutralist sentiment, so that the prospect of further accessions to SEATO has receded. The generally recognised mark of definite adhesion to the 'neutralist bloc' is signature of the Five Principles of Co-existence, or Panch Shila. The five points listed in this document, normally signed bi-laterally between pairs of countries, are (1) recognition of national sovereignty, (2) non-violence, (3) equality, (4) non-interference in each other's affairs, (5) peaceful co-existence. It was originally drawn up and signed by India and Peking following China's subjugation of Tibet, when India agreed to surrender her interests there. Recently Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos and Nepal have signed Panch Shila pacts with China, and among themselves and India in various combinations. The 'defection' of Cambodia and Laos in particular represents a set-back for SEATO. (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yugoslavia are among other countries that have concluded Panch Shila pacts.) In addition there have been signs of a growth of neutralist feeling in Ceylon, Pakistan and Japan — as already noticed — and even some ominous murmuring from the Philippines.

Partly this trend away from the conceptions represented by SEATO has been due to an apparent lessening of the military threat from China. China holds the initiative, and for the moment seems reluctant to engage in adventures: her domestic problems are probably grave enough to make her wish to avoid external distractions for some time. From the original military phase, the contest between communism and the West for the goodwill of the uncommitted countries, which passed into a

diplomatic phase at Geneva, Manila and Bandung, now seems to have moved into a third phase — one of economic development and competition in offering economic aid. This aspect will be taken up later in this chapter: firstly, however, we shall briefly survey the rest of the South East Asian countries that have so far not been examined individually.

SIAM

Since 'anti-colonialism' bulks larger in Asian minds than fear of Communism, it is natural that those countries with more pleasant memories of colonial rule and the manner of its ending, which thus have less reason to be rabidly 'anti-colonial', tend to be those which show themselves more ready to see the Western point of view. Though this guiding rule does not produce an accurate analysis in every case, it works out correctly enough for most of the new nations. Of the countries already considered, for example, Pakistan, who owes her freedom and in fact her existence to Britain, has at least joined SEATO, though her motives are rather different from those of the other members. Though she has lately moved towards neutralism, Ceylon at first showed herself well disposed towards Britain: as has been seen, Kotelawala put the Western viewpoint at Bandung. It was generally believed that his main reason for not going so far as to enter SEATO was fear of India's hostility. Though his successor, Bandaranaike, has moved more definitely into the ranks of the neutrals, it is possible, as has been seen, that Ceylon is merely passing through a temporary phase. Certainly pro-Western sentiment seems stronger in the island than in most of the other declared neutrals. In the case of India, though she was freely accorded her independence, this was only after a very prolonged and bitter struggle. Moreover, as was seen in the previous chapter, the origins of India's neutralism lie in a whole complex of causes.

Siam has had the experience, unique among South East Asian countries, of never having been a colony. In her case, which is thus an extreme one, the rule works out very well. In addition to her position as a buffer between previous French and British spheres of influence, Siam probably owes her history of independence to a traditional habit of offering no resistance to outside pressures, so that there was no need to exert sovereignty over her. At all events, anti-colonialism strikes no chords

in this politically backward country. The peasantry are fairly prosperous by Asian standards — though there has been considerable distress recently, especially in the north, due to the fall in rice prices — and as yet take no interest in politics. The present government, led until September 1957 by Marshal Pibul Songgram, came into power in 1947 as the result of a military coup, displacing a left-wing régime that had gained power previously by the same method. In 1951 Pibul abolished the existing fully-elected parliament, reverting to the pre-war system under which half the members are elected, the other half being nominated by the government. Pibul thus instituted a virtual dictatorship; but over the last year of his premiership increased the amount of criticism permitted. His government was praised in many quarters for providing firm and reasonably efficient rule for a country that is not yet ready for democracy. Discontent with autocracy has been spreading in Siam, however, and it is time some advance were made in the direction of democratic government.

Siam is acutely conscious of the latent threat of China, particularly because of the repeated Chinese advocacy for a 'Free Thai State'. The Thais are a racial group occupying northern Siam (the alternative name for Siam is of course Thailand), part of Burma, Laos, and the adjacent southern province of Yunnan in China. Since it is impossible to police the frontiers and the different groups of Thais are almost indistinguishable in language or appearance, the problem of guarding against infiltration causes the Government some concern. The fact that Siam is the world's leading rice-exporting country also seems likely to attract Chinese interest. The government has accepted generous American aid and consistently given strong support to American policies.

In September 1957, owing to a quarrel within the ruling military clique, Pibul fell from power. He was succeeded by one of his colleagues, Marshal Sarit. The change does not seem likely to affect Siam's foreign policy, though it is probable that the cautious advance towards democracy may be halted.

The Philippines

As an American colony since annexation from Spain in 1899, the Philippines were always an embarrassment to the United

States, since the American tradition was so strongly opposed to the possession of colonies. In 1936 they were promised their independence in ten years time — under an act whose passage through Congress was notably aided by business interests seeking tariff protection against Philippine products — and in 1946 this promise was kept, and the Philippine Republic created. A Mutual Defence Treaty concluded at the time gave guarantees of American military aid in return for bases on the islands. (At first the United States retained the ownership of the land involved; but recent agitation has resulted in the freeholds being surrendered in exchange for leases.)

In the first few years of its existence, the new Republic suffered from corrupt and ineffective government. In addition, grave trouble was caused by the activities of communist guerrillas known as the Hukbalahaps, who could not be put down. As usual — a familiar story in Asia — they received a good deal of passive support from the peasantry, who are heavily exploited under a feudal system of land tenure. After 1953, however, a new President, Magsaysay, proved himself extremely vigorous, efficient, and far-sighted, combining repression with sincere attention to the tenants' grievances. Since his accession to office, the guerrillas have been almost completely suppressed. Unfortunately, in March 1957, he was killed in an aircraft accident; and it remains to be seen whether his successors will match his reforming zeal. The Vice-President who took his place was C. P. Garcia.

Indonesia

Among the other countries of South East Asia which have declined to enter SEATO, the next most vehement to India in her opposition to military alliances is Indonesia. Indonesia is a clear example of a country with unhappy memories of colonial rule. It became an independent republic in 1949 only after a long and bitter civil war, brought about by the obstinate determination of the Dutch to restore their rule after the Japanese occupation. Here too the nationalist movement had gained strength against the Japanese, though it had existed long before the war, despite every effort on the part of the Dutch to suppress it. When eventually the Dutch gave way in 1949, it was largely because of American, British and Australian pressure. Anti-

colonial sentiment is very strong in Indonesia, and so is communism. The Communist Party has always been one of the four parties dividing most of the seats in parliament almost equally and thus has been able to exert considerable pressure upon governments. (In 1957 the government accepted a loan of $100,000,000 from the Soviet Union.) The country being mainly Moslem, the other three parties represent different Moslem groups.

Another legacy of the Dutch — though it also seems significant that this should be encountered again in yet another Moslem country — is political ineffectiveness. Indonesia would be a most difficult country to govern in any case, with its huge population of eighty millions spread over a chain of islands of varying size, extending over a distance equal to that from London to Cairo. There are scores of races and dialects, and particularism is most marked. But on top of this problem is the difficulty arising from the fact that the Dutch gave the Indonesians no training whatsoever in government — no share even in local administration. Any notion of sharing in government was strongly discouraged. As a result, the country is now desperately short of capable administrators. Life in Indonesia today is almost completely anarchic: government departments are out of touch with their outlying offices; the police are quite incapable of preventing houses being burgled as often as once or twice a day! (There is no point in possessing anything of value that is movable in Indonesia!) Governments have been most unstable. The chiefs of the services have frequently ignored the central authorities; recently several commanders on various islands have taken all power into their own hands and set up military régimes. Throughout 1957 the President, Dr. Sukarno, was endeavouring ineffectively to restore some sort of order but by early 1958 open civil war was in progress.

When the Dutch gave up Indonesia, they retained West New Guinea as the last of their East Indian possessions. Though the primitive natives of this colony have no affinity whatsoever with Indonesians, the Indonesian Republic has repeatedly asserted a claim to its ownership, and refuses to accept the retention of its sovereignty by the Dutch. (The country is often referred to as 'West Irian'.) It seems significant that, though Australia contributed pressure to persuade the Dutch to give up

Indonesia, the Australian Government, which rules the eastern half of the island as a dependency, strongly opposes this Indonesian claim. Australia has become increasingly conscious that all that lies between her and the Asian mainland is this new Republic that seems no stronger than a pack of cards.

Burma

Burma is the one example so far of a former British colony which, when granted self-government, opted to leave the Commonwealth. This step was taken in 1948. Instigated mainly by unimaginative handling by the British Government and colonial authorities of Burmese requests for a promise of eventual independence during the early years of the war, it now seems to be recognised by the Burmese themselves as premature. Burma's attitude to the Commonwealth is very much that of India. If they had anticipated that India would be permitted to remain within the Commonwealth as a republic, the Burmese would probably also have been content to remain, on the same footing.

Since independence Burma has experienced a most troubled history. She suffered a grave blow just before the transfer of power was effected, when a gang of armed men forced their way into a cabinet meeting and assassinated the Premier and six of his cabinet. The government has been contending with two separate groups of communist guerrillas — the White Flag and Red Flag Parties — with separatist rebels from the Karens and Mons — hill peoples of the centre and south with autonomous ambitions — and about 10,000 Kuomintang refugees from China, who live off the countryside by depredations upon the peasantry and levying a toll on the illegal opium traffic from the border regions. The refugees frequently co-operate with the rebels; and also imperil Burma's relations with the Peking government. (An agreement was reached with Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and Siam in 1952 for the evacuation of 2,000 men and their families to Siam; but about 10,000 are said to remain.)

By 1949 Burma's chances of surviving looked very remote. The writ of the government extended barely beyond the suburbs of Rangoon. Since then, however, the situation has greatly improved, until the government now claims to have 90 per cent of the country under control. Its success has been due firstly to the

failure of the rebel groups to combine — so that it has been possible to deal with them one by one — and secondly to the support gained by the government from the peasantry. In 1947 most of the land was in the hands of Indian 'chettiars' or moneylenders and all industry was under foreign ownership. The governing party, the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, is unambiguously socialist; and its policy of steadily nationalising all industry and regaining ownership of the land for the peasants has given it wide popular support and unchallenged majorities in parliament. The economy is fundamentally sound: although a great deal of expensive development is needed, the prospects are now bright.

In her precarious position against China's southern border, menaced by the 'Free Thai State' project, Burma clings to the hope of maintaining friendly relations with Peking. In early 1957 she gave way, with only subdued protests, to Peking's demand for revision of parts of the frontier. U Nu, the religious-minded poet who has been Premier for most of the Union's existence, is a devout Buddhist, as are most of the people, and Buddhism predisposes Burma to pacificism and neutralism. In addition, however, the Burmese know that Chinese aggression against them would greatly alarm India. Their uneasy optimism also rests, therefore, largely on the belief that Peking will leave them unmolested for fear of antagonising Delhi — a further indication of India's importance in the post-war world.

Indo-China Since Geneva

Since the Geneva settlement in 1954, the situation in South Viet Nam has been completely changed. The main alteration has been the substitution of American for French influence, accompanied by the emergence of effective government. At the armistice an American nominee, Ngo Dinh Diem, a member of the Catholic faction chosen for his uncompromising opposition to communism, became Premier. Keeping up an attitude of bitter hostility to the Viet Minh government, he refused French suggestions to accept its offers of co-operation in certain economic fields, such as the distribution of electric power — suggestions apparently motivated partly by the desire to preserve French economic interests in the North. Subsequently he had Bao Dai deposed from the office of Emperor by plebiscite and

himself became President under a republican form of government.

Though at first the situation was anarchic, with the private armies of various religious or pseudo-religious sects still in being and challenging the government's sovereignty, Diem has gradually enforced his authority and is now in complete control. Though by no means democratic, his government appears to rest on popular consent. He has had the assistance of extremely generous American financial aid — the United States policy of buying loyalty, much criticised, seems to have succeeded so far in this case. He is also pressing on, though cautiously for fear of arousing too much opposition from the landlord class, with the social reform that, more perhaps than any other factor, seems likely to decide the issue between communism and democracy in the backward countries — the redistribution of the land.

As was seen earlier, under the Geneva agreement it was provided that in July 1955 the government of South Viet Nam should meet with the government of North Viet Nam to begin discussing arrangements for elections for the whole country, to be held in July 1956. When July of 1955 came, however, Diem refused to enter the proposed discussions. And as July 1956 approached it became obvious that the elections would not take place at the time appointed. As if to emphasise the fact, Diem held elections in South Viet Nam shortly before. He justified his attitude by pointing out that no guarantees had been provided that full freedom of choice would be permitted in the North, and also reminded the world that neither he nor Bao Dai's government had signed the Geneva Treaty. The United States, which had also, as will be remembered, declined to sign the Treaty, gave him full support.

This placed the Western signatories in a difficult position: the Viet Minh had ceased fighting, when winning the war, in return for their promise that an election would take place over the whole country. It could be argued that Ho would be morally justified in resuming hostilities. Yet what could the Western powers do to persuade Diem to abide by the stipulations of the agreement? At first the Communist countries demanded a reassembling of the Geneva signatories to consider what action should be taken in the new situation; eventually, however, they acceded to a British plea that nothing be done in the meantime,

while further developments be observed. So the situation rests — it can hardly be said to be satisfactory.

Meanwhile Diem's development of South Viet Nam is being matched by Ho Chi Minh's efforts to develop the North. He is receiving financial and technical aid from China; visitors have reported, however, that the Viet Minh are as slow to enthuse over Chinese help as the Chinese to enthuse over the assistance they receive from the USSR.

The Colombo Plan

The contest between communism and the West for the goodwill of the South East Asian peoples is now being engaged on the field of economic aid. In the course of various tours of the area, Soviet emissaries have made widely reported speeches, expressing profound sympathy with the South East Asian countries in their urgent development problems, pointing to the similarity of their own experience in industrialising the USSR, and offering all assistance. So far rather more has been heard of offers than of assistance actually granted; though Russia appears to gain immense propaganda value from these gestures, she shows no sign as yet of providing more than the merest fraction of the Western aid made available to the area. She is, however, erecting a steel works in India — alongside works being constructed by Britain and Western Germany — and charging a lower rate of interest than the West. She also supplied a large quantity of cement to Burma in 1956 — though it is said to have been unloaded on to the wharf at Rangoon in the monsoon in flimsy bags, before arrangements could be made to remove it!

The main instrument of Western aid in this contest is the Colombo Plan. Though originally a Commonwealth project, decided upon at a Commonwealth Conference in Colombo in 1950, the Plan has been expanded to include many countries from outside the Commonwealth. There are now 17 member countries: Australia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Siam, South Viet Nam, the United Kingdom and the United States. Some are donor members, some recipients; some act in both capacities — for example India. All the democratic countries of the area are members, and the British colonies

in the region are also included, their development being financed by the United Kingdom colonial development agencies. Though at first intended to run until 1957, the Plan has now been extended until 1961. The cost of the development schemes projected now amounts to nearly £2,000,000,000, some four-fifths of this figure representing India's planning.

The term 'Plan' is rather a misnomer — in fact one has to read between the lines in many of the Plan pronouncements. There is no single plan, nor any central organisation. All that happens under the Plan is that the members meet annually to collate their various plans, report progress, and add up the figures. Much of the development is self-financed by the country concerned, and there is no organisation or organ to arrange or allot finance or technical aid, all arrangements being made bilaterally between donor and recipient countries. The only purpose served by viewing all the various projects as components of a single 'Plan' is to provide publicity and a stimulus.

The main difficulty facing the Plan countries is that of obtaining sufficient money. Though Canada, Australia and New Zealand were prominent in initiating the Plan, they have only small, though prosperous, populations, and therefore cannot provide much help; Britain, already straining her resources to the utmost and putting as much as she can spare into the development of her own colonies, can offer very little. She has, however, despite her balance-of-payments difficulties, released a large part of her frozen sterling balances for Plan countries (payments for wartime imports which were credited to the countries concerned in London until such time as they could be met), and requested the International Bank to apply her deposits to the International Monetary Fund as loans within the Plan.

Undoubtedly, though this has never been openly stated, the members of the Plan have been looking to the United States to supply the bulk of the amounts needed; yet, though it has furnished by far the largest amount of assistance, the United States has not made the vigorous entry into the Plan that has been hoped for. (Part of the American contribution has come from government sources; but a large part has been provided by private organisations, particularly the Ford and Rockfeller Foundations.) At various times, such as after the Geneva Con-

ference, United States Government circles have discussed more definite action; but none has resulted. One reason for this disappointment of hopes has been the American practice of supervising the expenditure of grants — which Asian countries tend to suspect as the imposition of 'strings', though it is merely a precaution to see that monies are not being wasted. More important, however, is the fact that the United States has been waiting to be definitely asked for massive assistance, while the Asian countries are generally unwilling to ask.

The reason for this reluctance is their concern over possible loss of 'face'. They resent being placed in a donor-recipient relationship; instead they would prefer the money to come from an international agency. Thus the Asian countries together with the new nations of the Middle East have constantly been pressing at the United Nations for the creation of the projected SUNFED (Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development). As the only Western country which could make this project at all comparable in execution to the scale of action required is of course the United States, everything has depended on her attitude. But so far she has not approved. Until 1955 she was able by her influence to keep the proposal off the agenda for the General Assembly; but at the Assembly of that year the Afro-Asian bloc refused to be restrained, and carried a resolution calling for the creation of SUNFED. Nothing will or can be done, however, until the United States decides to act in the matter. In the meantime, other Western countries such as Britain incur some criticism from the Afro-Asian bloc for their reluctance to press her. (The British Labour Party supports SUNFED.) And Russia continues to reap goodwill — in the eyes at least of the Asian public — by means of gestures.

Even although the situation is so delicate for them, the Western powers should surely, in the common interest, press the United States to take some action upon SUNFED. Surely the best tactics, in the present phase of the contest for South East Asia, would be for the Western members of the United Nations to proceed with SUNFED and challenge Russia, if she wishes to demonstrate her willingness to aid the backward countries, to match their contribution.

Chapter Fourteen

THE MIDDLE EAST — I: THE ARABS AND THE WEST

Next to Europe, the Middle East, a traditional goal o Russian expansion, is the area most vitally important to the West (though, as is hardly surprising considering its position on another land mass, the United States has been slow to recognise this fact.) Yet it is an area most difficult for the Western powers to deal with. As they have no territory of their own in this region — apart from Cyprus, which is of limited value strategically — the Western powers are dependent upon the goodwill of the Middle East peoples, comprising mainly the Arabs. Being pathetically backward and inefficient, the Arab states could put up no real resistance to aggression by themselves and would therefore, in their own interests, be well advised to accept Western offers of co-operation with them for the defence of the area. Yet, with the single exception of Iraq, they have not been prepared to co-operate. One major obstacle has been the upsurge of nationalism in this region, which has made the Arabs morbidly suspicious of Western connections; another the intractable problem of Israel. No satisfactory Middle East policy will be possible for the West until the problem of Israel's future is permanently settled; but even then the extremely difficult problem of achieving satisfactory relations with Arab nationalism will still have to be dealt with.

The Middle East is vitally important to the West in global strategy for a number of reasons. In the first place it is the heart of the world's largest land mass — the gateway from Asia into Africa. An advance through the Middle East would by-pass NATO and Europe. Secondly, it is most important in world communications. Though we were able to win the last war without the use for much of its duration of the Suez Canal, the longer voyages that were thus made necessary imposed a tre-

mendous strain upon our shipping resources — almost too great a strain. It was not until we had cleared the Mediterranean, thus obtaining the equivalent of a million extra tons of shipping a year, that we were in a position to be able to mount the necessary attack on Europe. Even although air communications have now become very important, markedly more so even since 1945, and although the range of aircraft is continually increasing, it is still difficult to fly between Europe and Asia without touching down somewhere in the Middle East: thus control of the area is still very valuable even when it is air transport that is considered.

Thirdly, and of greater importance still, is the factor of oil. Access to oil supplies is absolutely essential in modern warfare, both for use in military equipment and for the economy; and the Middle East is estimated to contain about 42 per cent of the world's known oil reserves. (34 per cent are in the United States, 10 per cent in the Caribbean, and some 9 per cent in the Soviet Union; only 1/5 of the world's supplies are being obtained from the Middle East as yet, but the American reserves are being consumed very rapidly, and it is thought that Soviet supplies are likely to be outpaced in the near future by Russia's own demand.) Even if it were difficult for Russia herself to make much use of Middle East oil in wartime — the problem of transporting it over the mountains south of the Caspian Sea would be very formidable, though perhaps not insuperable — it would be a master-stroke on her part if she could deprive the West of it. (This analysis assumes, of course, a long-drawn major war, which may seem unlikely but has to be considered: in any case Russian control of Middle East oil, if obtained without a major war occurring, would give the Soviet Union a stranglehold on the European economy.)

The Arab World

From 1945 to about 1954, British efforts to make the Middle East secure took the form of attempts to persuade the Arabs to convert the Arab League, with Western co-operation, into a Middle East defence organisation. Since 1954 a different approach, based on the Baghdad Pact, has been adopted; but the effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact policy also depends to a large extent upon obtaining the support of some at least of the

Arab countries. Nevertheless the change of policy was due partly to the difficulty experienced in trying to establish satisfactory relations with the Arab states, and this difficulty remains very formidable.

The Arab League, founded in 1945 for co-operation against the Jews, was welcomed by Britain at the time as a first step towards security arrangements for the area. It consists of Egypt, whose twenty million inhabitants make her the leading member, Iraq (5,000,000), Saudi Arabia (6,000,000), Syria (3,000,000), Lebanon (1,000,000), Jordan (1,000,000), the Yemen (4,500,000), and Libya (1,000,000), which joined in 1953. The Sudan (9,000,000) also joined in January 1956.

The Arab states are weak and vulnerable, and difficult to obtain satisfactory co-operation with, for a large number of reasons. Space will permit only a tabulation of these, without any extensive discussion, though some will be elaborated and clarified in the sections that follow.

In the first place, the Arab countries are desperately poor. Their economies are extremely primitive, the bulk of the population being occupied with subsistence agriculture, and the soil is very arid, only 5 per cent of the area being cultivable. Standards of living are thus almost unbelievably low for the mass of the people; illiteracy is widespread; social services generally very backward. There is very little in the way of natural resources — apart from oil, which of course has been found in only some of the states. Yet of these countries all except the two — Saudi Arabia and the Yemen — which are still feudal in their system of government, are endeavouring to operate fully democratic parliamentary constitutions. In the circumstances parliamentary institutions can be no more than a façade; and the result is extreme political instability, inefficiency and corruption. Voting is by universal suffrage, yet the peasantry forming the bulk of the population are in the grip of the small, often extremely wealthy, landowning class. In most countries the peasant often receives as little as a seventh of his own crop, the rest going to the landlord and the moneylender — in some cases the proportion falls to as low as 1/14 or 1/21. (The traditional system of division is in sevenths or parts of a seventh.) As there is little industry, there is virtually no middle class; yet Western experience seems to show that the successful operation

of democracy requires a strong and active middle class element in the community. Politics are controlled by the landlords. There are no real party systems, but merely contests for power among rival cliques of the wealthy, resulting in rapid changes of governments, usually taking the form of the regrouping of cliques in unstable 'coalitions'. If excluded too long from a share of office, the 'outs' tend to call in the mob of the capital to riot and bring down a government. Thus the premium is upon extremism — usually xenophobia — appeals to mob sentiment, and red herrings to distract attention from real issues — notably that of social reform.

Having no roots in the economy and frustrated by their political impotence, the small middle classes now emerging (perhaps better described as the educated class) also tend naturally to take up extremist views. Prominent among them are the army officers. Even when their fundamental leanings are democratic, they tend to look first towards totalitarianism. Since the urgent need of their countries is so obviously social reform, the main requirements being redistribution of the land and curtailment of the privileges of the wealthy classes, and yet the prospect of obtaining reforms from parliaments controlled by landlords seems so extremely remote, they generally think in terms of first abolishing parliamentary institutions. The required measures could then be carried through under dictatorial rule, and democracy restored on the resulting more suitable foundations. Though this process is obviously most risky, as has been revealed in both Syria and Egypt, where it has now been attempted, it does seem the only practicable route to stability.

Another element in the situation is the strength of Islam, all of the Arab countries being predominantly Moslem. The Moslem religion is both an extremist, strongly anti-Western, and a reactionary force. The Moslem Brotherhood, its main political instrument, opposes not only the West but any imitation of the West, and does not hesitate to use assassination to effect its purposes. Its demands for a large share in the control of the state are not compatible with any sort of progress. Though it has often been argued that the hold of Islam will at least help to preserve the area from the danger of communist revolution, which would seem very real in view of the immense gap between the classes, it now appears that, despite the antipathy in

theory between Moslem and communist conceptions, it is hardly as sure a safeguard as has been thought. The Soviet Union has recently been encouraging large parties from the many millions of Moslems living within her own frontiers to go on the pilgrimages to Mecca, where doubtless they point out to the Arabs that their faith continues to flourish under communist rule. Similarly Russia keeps up large staffs, consisting almost entirely of Moslems, in her embassies in the Arab countries, which adopt the practice, not followed by their Western counterparts, of living amongst the Arabs and worshipping with them in the mosques. Though — as one would expect from the character of their governments — the Communist Party is outlawed in almost all Arab countries, the closer relationship recently formed with the Communist bloc, and the influx of communist technicians, must also lead to the increasing spread of communist ideas. The main hindrance to the spread of Communism at the moment is probably the almost complete absence of political consciousness among the bulk of the people. Ironically, it is as standards of living rise and literacy spreads that communist teaching, with its natural appeal for the politically immature, will be almost bound to increase in influence — unless the West can take effective counter-measures.

The main historical force in the area — and of course the main obstacle to better relations with the West — is Arab nationalism. Yet another of the main reasons why Britain's attempts to obtain the co-operation of the Arabs have been unsuccessful is the deep disunity among the Arab states. Split by a complex pattern of rivalries and traditional hatreds, they are notoriously incapable of co-operating among themselves: the only force holding the Arab League together is their common hatred of Israel. The sentiment in favour of the creation of a single Arab nation is strongest among the educated and, with some reason, they blame the present division of the Arab world upon the West. It was the Western powers who drew most of the present frontiers, creating a set of vested interests against unification. Their purposes were their own; thus a further item is added to the sum of resentment of Western interference. Nevertheless division is by no means due entirely to Western actions. Some of the rivalries are partly dynastic, dating back to age-old feuds in the desert, some partly religious. Though one would naturally

imagine Islam to be a unifying force, the deep cleavages between the sects and the bitterness of feeling about them make it almost equally divisive. The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia in particular are a puritanical branch of Islam who regard the rest of the Arabs as renegades from the true faith.

Yet a further factor of weakness in the Arab world is the presence of a number of minorities, which have often proved difficult to control. They include Armenians, in Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon and Egypt, and Assyrians, in Iraq, Syria and also Turkey. Probably the most intractable are the Kurds, in Iraq and Syria, also Persia and Turkey. As the bulk of the Kurdish people live in the USSR, where they enjoy a measure of autonomy, the Kurds in Middle East countries are looked upon with some suspicion as potential fifth columnists.

Many of the factors mentioned will be seen more clearly when the history of the Arab world since 1918 is considered.

Recent History

Until 1918, all the Arab countries were still, nominally at least, part of the Turkish Empire, though the degree of Turkish control varied considerably. Though she had long been in effect a British protectorate, even Egypt was nominally subject to and paid tribute annually to Turkey. (A protectorate was formally declared in 1914.) Already, however, when the First World War broke out the seeds of nationalism were alive: some of the Arab leaders had been plotting revolt for some time. In return for their assistance against the Turks — mainly the support given to agents such as T. E. Lawrence — Britain promised to aid them in obtaining their independence. This undertaking was expressed in documents known as the MacMahon Letters, which were later the subject of a great deal of dispute. (When read closely, they are seen to exclude certain areas from the territory promised to the Arabs; but the pledge is certainly given in rather ambiguous form.)

Since the French were our allies, they were informed of these arrangements: in response, on the ground of a long tradition of association with the area, notably as protecting power to the Lebanese Christian communities, they demanded that they should also have a sphere of influence. A promise of this, together with an undertaking that Russia should also receive cer-

tain accessions of territory, was made in a secret agreement among Britain, France and Russia known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement — a copy of which was discovered by the Communists among the Russian archives at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, and published to the world. At about the same time yet a further complication was introduced by the Balfour Declaration of 1917. During the First, as again later during the Second World War, Britain was badly in need of dollar aid. Because of the influence in this connection of the Jewish community in the United States, it was thought advisable to make this Declaration, promising British support for the project, just rising into prominence at this time, for a Jewish 'National Home' in Palestine. Although a study of the various documents reveals that, by means of various qualifications, Britain had succeeded in avoiding contradictions in these different promises, it was natural that the Arabs should accuse her of trickery.


Britain's main ally during the war was the Emir Faisal, of the Hashemite dynasty, rulers of the kingdom of the Hejaz, consisting of that part of Arabia containing the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. He expected to become King of the Turkish province of Syria, comprising what is now Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Palestine, and at the end of the fighting established his court in Damascus. But in the Peace Settlement the province was split up, France being awarded a greatly reduced Syria and the Lebanon under mandate, and Britain the remainder. The French paid no heed to Faisal's pretensions, but quickly expelled him. Faisal thereupon began to gather an army to return to his capital in force, and his brother, the Emir Abdullah, hastened to assist him.

In order to avoid a serious conflict, Britain now offered Faisal the throne of Iraq, which he accepted. Abdullah, however, was not satisfied at this turn of events. Britain next, therefore, offered to form an Emirate of Transjordan for him in the desert between Palestine and Iraq, and Abdullah agreed to become its ruler. Nevertheless the court of Iraq has never renounced the project of forming a 'Greater Syria' and from time to time proceeds to revive it: hence Syria always views Iraq with deep suspicion. In fact Syrian leaders often bring out their own design for the 'Greater Syria', with their own country in

the creative role. Moreover, though relations between the two Hashemite states have normally been friendly, the court of Jordan used to react uneasily to Iraq's design, and on a number of occasions discussed a 'Greater Syria' project of its own!

In the early 1920's another long-standing rivalry in the area was brought to a climax when the Saudis, under Ibn Saud, who had long been bitter enemies of the Hashemites in the Arabian desert, finally drove the head of the dynasty, Hussein, father of Faisal and Abdullah, from his Kingdom of the Hejaz, and thus established the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, extending over most of the Peninsula. Little love has been lost since then between Saudi Arabia and the two Hashemite states. Since both are normally on hostile terms with Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia tend to ally against her; and since Iraq disputes Egypt's pretensions to lead the Arab League, and preserves friendly relations with the West, despite Egypt's strong disapproval, Egypt tends to become a third party in the anti-Hashemite alignment. (Yet both Syria and Saudi Arabia also view Egypt's claims to Arab leadership with considerable suspicion; the latter particularly advances claims of her own — as the 'purest' Arab state, racially and religiously.)

Though the West did its best to explain that the mandate system was not really disguised colonialism but a method of assisting territories towards eventual self-government, it had little success and the Arabs bitterly resented the imposition of the mandates. France had to quell repeated large-scale rebellions in Syria, shelling Damascus on one occasion in 1925 and reducing part of the city to ruins. Britain also faced continual disaffection in Iraq; to reduce expense, she endeavoured to police the country from the air. Eventually, despairing of establishing a satisfactory relationship, she ended the Mandate in 1930, successfully sponsoring Iraq's admission to the League of Nations as an independent state. At her departure she obtained a treaty giving her the right to garrison the two airfields of Habbaniya and Shaiba and make use of other facilities in the event of war in the region — concessions that were of course resented by nationalist opinion. Transjordan, a tiny country with virtually no resources, entirely dependent upon British subsidies, remained fairly quiet. There was trouble, however, in Palestine. There had been considerable opposition to the man-



THE MIDDLE EAST

date system, especially in the United States, and American consent had been won partly by the insertion of a clause in the Palestine mandate agreement stipulating the furtherance of the Jewish National Home project. Jewish immigration began to arouse Arab resentment, though this was not to become very marked until the 1930's.

Though the British protectorate over Egypt was formally ended in 1922, Britain insisted upon retaining control of the Canal Zone base. Repeated attempts to regularise the presence of her troops by means of a treaty were not successful until 1936: Italy's conquest of Abyssinia in that year awoke Egypt to the advantage of having a strong protector, so that she agreed to the terms demanded by Britain, granting a twenty-year lease in return for an assurance that the number of men in the base would be kept below 10,000 in peacetime. Thus, when world war broke out in 1939, the Arab states were still nursing memories of recent Western interference with their affairs.

Nevertheless, under the pressure of wartime necessity, more was to come. Three Middle East countries, two of them Arab states, were subjected to military intervention. Long before 1939, Iraq had been a target of German intrigue, and in 1941 a pro-German army revolt broke out. British troops moved in, swiftly crushed the rising, and stayed on. German agents were also active in Persia, which became important as the main supply route between the West and Russia. When the Shah refused to take action against them, Britain, Russia and the United States occupied the country and deposed him in favour of his son, the present Shah. Just before the battle of Alamein, King Farouk of Egypt was faced with a demand for control of the Cabinet by the Wafdist Party, who had majority support in the Chamber but whom he strongly disliked. When he attempted to exclude them from office, as was possible constitutionally though difficult, Britain threw a ring of armoured cars round his palace and forced him to choose between accepting the Wafdists and abdication — not because of any liking for the Wafdists, but because the rule of a popular government would help to preserve peace and order in the rear of the Eighth Army. Though Farouk was soon to become disliked this did not prevent this intervention being deeply resented by the Egyptians and added to the long list of British interferences.

After the war, Transjordan, as rickety as ever, was released from the Mandate, though of course remaining dependent upon British support. In return for her payment of the Arab Legion, amounting to £7,500,000 annually — paid directly to General Glubb, its British Commander, and not through the Jordan government — Britain retained the two bases of Amman and Mafraq. When the French attempted to restore their rule over Syria and the Lebanon, which had been under the control of Vichy authorities at the fall of France, and had therefore been occupied by Britain, serious rioting broke out. The French responded with severe measures of repression but were unable to pacify the two countries. Britain and the United States then pressed France to surrender the mandates, and she resentfully complied. Throughout the Middle East, nationalism flared up more ardently than ever before.

The Arab States

Before proceeding further with the narrative, it will be helpful to insert at this point thumbnail sketches of the Arab States. (Since she is considered in some detail throughout the general treatment, Egypt will be omitted.)

Iraq, now ruled by the young King Faisal II, is the most promising of the Arab states economically, though socially still very backward. Because of the Euphrates, it has ample fertile land and in fact is under-populated. In addition 70 per cent of the revenue from the rich oilfields, exploited by the Iraq Petroleum Company (which is British-operated, though owned in quarter shares by British, French, Dutch and American companies) is being devoted to development. Already the Iraqi army, trained and equipped by Britain and the United States, is equal in strength, and probably superior in efficiency, to that of Egypt. It has four divisions with a good deal of armour. Iraq is the main opponent to Egypt's leadership of the Arab League; but is notorious for the instability of its governments.

Since the Palestine War, when it increased its territory and population by about half, the former Transjordan has become Jordan, ruled by the 21-year old King Hussein. Jordan's governments are also notorious for their instability, in addition to their easy-going inefficiency. To its other pressing troubles Jordan has now added the problem of a deep division between its

peoples, the Palestinian Arabs being much more sophisticated and politically conscious than those of the former Transjordan. They have little patience with the lethargy of their new fellow citizens.

Syria is a very primitive country, with arid soil, a backward peasantry and few competent administrators. It is the home of extremism among the Arabs — the headquarters of both the Moslem Brotherhood and the Communist Party, though the latter is still small. In 1949, after a period of incompetent government, army officers overturned the democratic constitution and attempted to provide the strong rule that seems necessary for progress; but they have since split into cliques among themselves, and ineffectiveness and instability continue. Syria's relations with the rest of the world at any moment are largely dependent on which of the cliques happens to be in control. Some of the officers who have exercised power recently have alarming tendencies towards 'fellow-travelling' with the Communists. Syria's little neighbour, the Lebanon, is much more civilised — in its towns at least. Tripoli and Beirut retain much of the flavour of French culture; but the gap between towns and countryside is immense. The Lebanon is too small to do more than sit on the fence in disputes among the other Arab states and in addition has also been most unstable politically, being subject to frequent revolutions.

As for Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, these two states scarcely seem to belong to the twentieth century, despite the fact that the former possesses an extremely rich oil-field. This is an American preserve, the operating company being ARAMCO (Arabian-American Oil Company). Though the United States also leases the important strategic air base at Dahran, the Americans have endeavoured, until recently, not to become involved in Saudi Arabian politics. Despite the immense royalties from Aramco, and also the lucrative revenue from the annual pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina, the Saudi government is generally in debt. It is feudal in form, and at least two-thirds of the wealth pouring into its Treasury is spent on luxuries for the extremely numerous royal family. (King Ibn Saud, who died in 1954, had more than a hundred sons.) The present ruler is Saud Ibn Aziz. The tribes roam the desert much as they have always done; so narrow is their devotion to Islam that no Christian may enter the capital, Riyadh. Slavery is fairly common.


In many respects the Yemen is similar, though a prosperous little country, with closely terraced fields and a good production of hides, timber and coffee. Slavery is well known; the army, raised by janissary methods, is equipped largely with muzzle-loading muskets and long, curved knives, though recently tanks and piston-engined aircraft have been obtained from the Soviet Union. The rule of the Imams is entirely despotic, and has been marked, even recently, by many assassinations. Only in the last year or two have foreigners been permitted to enter the country — and then only a handful. Yet, standing at the foot of the Red Sea, the Yemen has considerable strategic importance. (Its position also makes it important for locust control, which must be conducted internationally to be effective.)

The other member of the Arab League is Libya — a second Jordan. When it was suggested at the end of the war that this former Italian colony be made a Trust Territory, the Soviet Union advanced a claim for the trusteeship, whereupon Britain and the United States hurriedly erected the country into an independent state. Having virtually no resources or competent administrators (though a modern democratic constitution), it is entirely dependent on the subsidies they pay to the government in return for the use of bases. It is here, at Wheelus Field, that the United States maintains the headquarters of its 17th Strategic Air Force, covering the whole area from Spain to Pakistan. (Until 1955 it was at Rabat in Morocco.) Its population is largely nomadic: there is very little sense of unity among the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and the Fezzan, or of common loyalty to King Idris, the head of the Senussi tribe. Yet even in Libya Arab nationalism is stirring: during the Suez crisis in 1956, the Government made it clear that it would not countenance the use of the bases against Egypt.

The Problem of Israel

Throughout the 1930's, as Hitler rose to power in Germany, and thousands of Jewish refugees from his persecution sought entry to their 'promised land', the problem of setting-up the Jewish 'National Home' in Palestine became increasingly difficult. Since it did not make clear whether the intention was to establish a nation-state, the Zionist choice of the term 'National Home' was equivocal. Britain tried to avoid the issue by work-

ing for a state comprising both Jews and Arabs, in which both races would share control; but it soon became apparent that the problem would not be settled easily. While the Jews were pre-



ISRAEL'S DISPUTED FRONTIERS

pared to accept this solution as long as they were in the majority, the Arabs were agreeable only if they were kept in a minority. The issue thus became one of how many more Jews should be permitted to enter Palestine; and rioting by both parties be-

came increasingly serious. In 1939, when there were 600,000 Jews in the country, to about a million Arabs, Britain published a White Paper announcing her intention to limit immigration to a further, final quota of 75,000 Jews. Then the World War began, and the problem was laid aside.

In 1945, it revived immediately and the situation rapidly reached the point of crisis. When Britain attempted to adhere to the 1939 policy, the Jews resorted to the smuggling of immigrants. Nevertheless British efforts to bring the two parties to an agreed solution and avoid partition were apparently within reach of success when an election statement by President Truman, urging the raising of the quota, stiffened the Jewish attitude and nullified the discussions. Piqued at this interference and refusing to impose any solution not based on agreement, Britain returned the trusteeship to the United Nations. Throughout 1947 UN debated the problem, appointing a Commission which in December produced a plan of partition. Britain now announced that she would leave Palestine on 5th May, 1948. Despite repeated debates in the intervening months, UN had not decided how partition was to be implemented when the appointed date came, and the British troops departed. Only a handful of UN officials were present. The Jews immediately proclaimed the existence of the state of Israel; the Arabs, who had been assembling an 'Army of Liberation' and promising to sweep the Jews into the sea, marched across the frontiers. (When the United States, supported by the Soviet Union, proposed that the provisions of the United Nations Charter for an outbreak of war be invoked, Britain — rather unrealistically — vetoed this suggestion on the ground that it implied recognition of Israel as a state. She did, however, support a resolution ordering a cease-fire.)

On paper, with 40,000,000 Arabs facing fewer than a million Jews, in a tiny state that had been given no time in which to organise itself, it appeared that the Arabs would undoubtedly carry out their threat. Yet it was the Arabs who suffered defeat. Twice the fighting was halted for negotiations under UN mediation; twice it broke out again, at first sporadically, then full-scale. When it was finally halted in 1949, under a collection of separate armistice agreements — no general truce covering all the Arab states was found possible — the Jews had considerably

extended their frontiers beyond those planned for them by UN in 1947. The main reason for the poor showing of the Arabs, apart from the extreme inefficiency of their armies, had been their complete inability to co-operate. For example, Abdullah lost all interest in the war once he had succeeded, in the first phase, in annexing that part of Palestine facing his territory across the Jordan. He refused to re-engage and relieve the pressure upon the Egyptians when, in the second phase, they were being driven south towards the Gaza Strip. Syria was no more helpful; none of the other Arab countries contributed much to the campaign.

Since 1949 the area has been in an inflammable state of semi-peace. Nuisance raids across the frontiers by Arabs have been matched by organised reprisals by the Jews. Both parties keep up a rigid trade embargo, thus causing serious injury to each other. It has not been possible to reach a permanent settlement; yet until a settlement is obtained the situation will remain highly dangerous, and no satisfactory security arrangements for the Middle East will be possible. So far the West has been following a temporising policy, attempting to keep the peace in the hope that the two parties will see reason and come to terms. This policy has been given expression in the Tripartite Declaration of 1951, in which Britain, France and the United States announced that they would control arms deliveries to the two parties so that neither could become notably stronger than the other and that, in the event of an attack by either party, they would take action in support of the other. This policy has, however, clearly failed. Neither Arabs or Jews have been confident that the promise of protection — which in fact has always been expressed in rather vague and noncommittal terms — would ever be implemented; and, far from the gradual reduction of tension that was hoped for, suspicion and hostility have continued and in fact have tended to increase. Which party has been mainly responsible for the failure to achieve a settlement?

There are three main issues on which agreement must be reached: the frontiers of Israel, the Arab refugees, and the development of the Jordan Valley. Concerning frontiers, the Arabs demand that the Jews withdraw to the UN partition line of 1947. Pointing out that the Arabs refused to accept this line

when it was drawn, and that even now her people have barely enough land in which to maintain an existence, Israel declines. Nevertheless she is prepared to negotiate minor revisions of the present frontiers, which are obviously misplaced at many points. The Arabs also demand access between Jordan and Egypt — the curious arrangement of frontiers under the 1947 UN Plan was meant to provide this — which the Jews are prepared to grant in the form of transit rights over certain roads across the Negev. Jerusalem poses a difficult problem: at present it is divided between Israel and Jordan. The UN Plan proposed its internationalisation, but Jordan recently set up its parliament in the city, as an earnest that its portion would not be given up. (Jerusalem is a Holy City to both Jews and Moslems.)

Though the attitude of the Arabs on the issue of frontiers seems to imply readiness to reach a settlement, this is contradicted by repeated pronouncements by Arab leaders that there can be no solution to the whole complex of problems short of the destruction of Israel as a state. This view also seems to be implicit in their attitude over the refugees. There are some 900,000 of these — about 500,000 in Jordan, 100,000 in the Lebanon, 80,000 in Syria, and 200,000 in the Gaza Strip. At the moment they are being supported by the special UN organisation known as UNWRA, which has repeatedly offered to finance their permanent re-settlement in Arab lands. But this would require co-operation among the Arab countries — Iraq especially could absorb a large number — which is not forthcoming; and in any case the Arabs reject any proposal that does not restore the refugees to their original holdings in Israel. This attitude is of course quite unreasonable. In reply, the Jews point out that it would make their internal security problem almost impossible, that they are already desperately over-crowded, and that they themselves have 350,000 refugees of their own from Arab countries. (There are also about 600,000 Arabs still living in Israel.)

Bound up with the refugee problem is the issue of compensation. Arab claims are colossal: Israel points out that the Arab blockade greatly reduces her capacity to pay. Recently, under United States pressure, though also from a desire to make a conciliatory gesture, out of 6,000 Arab accounts in Israeli banks totalling $5,000,000 Israel released $3,000,000 of smaller accounts.

The other issue between the parties, that of the development of the Jordan Valley, has arisen largely out of an American initiative. On behalf of UN, TVA engineers have drawn up a project for the development of this area by means of two dams, with the object of providing fertile land that would facilitate the resettlement of the refugees and also lessen the pressure within Israel for expansion — the main reason advanced by the Arabs for their refusal to countenance her continued existence. Though the plans provide for Syria, the Lebanon and Jordan receiving two-thirds of the supplies of water made available, they refuse to take part in any scheme involving co-operation with or any benefit to Israel.

There can be no doubt, therefore, that it is the Arabs who are obstructing a permanent peace settlement. Behind their statements on the various issues lies the determination that there will be no peace until Israel ceases to exist. In fact no politician in an Arab country could agree to a settlement with Israel in the present temper of Arab feeling, for this would amount to committing political suicide. Nevertheless this is a reprehensible and unrealistic attitude. Though many people in the West would agree that the Arabs were done a grave wrong, for which the West is largely responsible, by the creation of Israel, the deed has been done, and it is impossible to put back the clock, as the Arabs demand. It follows that there can be no solution that does not involve imposing a settlement upon the Arabs against their will. There is no possibility of agreement between the parties themselves, and the West must face up to this fact, as so far it has refused to do.

Meanwhile the problem paralyses Middle East policy. We cannot persuade the Arab countries that Russia poses a threat to them so long as they are completely obsessed with the presence of Israel; nor can we strengthen their forces appreciably, to give the area security against Russia, so long as any equipment we provide is likely to be used against the Jews. Moreover, any protection we afford the Jews loses us the Arab goodwill upon which our plans for the strengthening of the area depend. Nevertheless only a decisive intervention between Arabs and Jews — a clear demonstration of our determination that Israel is to continue to exist — will bring the Arabs to a more realistic view.

Israel Today

The nation of Israel that has emerged from all these tribulations and so far endured is an extraordinary mixture of what appear to be incompatible elements. Its people divide in origins almost equally between East and West, the Asians being in a slight majority. Some of the most progressive social experiments ever attempted are being undertaken in a population including many extreme sects which attempt to recreate the pattern of life under Abraham. On the one hand are the Kibbutzin, or communal villages, where everything — including in some cases even the children — is held in common; on the other the prohibition of dissection, which for many years seriously impeded the work of the medical schools, and attempts on the part of the sects to have all public transport closed down on the Sabbath. Under an electoral system based on proportional representation, a large number of parties is represented in the Israel parliament; and in the 1956 election there was a notable trend away from the centre parties towards both extremes, marking the deep division in the country and making it difficult to form a stable coalition government. Yet this contradiction of a nation has shown the utmost cohesion and remarkable morale in the face of hardship and nerve-wracking peril.

The economic situation alone would be enough to dishearten any but the most courageous community. The cost of the development that has been necessary to erect a modern state upon the Palestine desert has been enormous, so that the burden of interest payments is fantastic for a million people. Yet it is intended to settle another two million immigrants in the next ten years, involving tremendous further expense. (It was planned to invest $1,710,000,000 between 1950 and 1960, of which $420,000,000 was to come from German reparations for the persecutions of the Nazis.) The balance of trade is gravely unfavourable; yet Israel must keep armed to the teeth and is severely handicapped economically by the boycott of the Arab countries, which form her natural market. Completely dependent on external aid, much of it being privately subscribed by the United States Jewish communities, she will not be able to stand on her own for many years yet. (Not all Israelis have been able to endure the struggle — some 50,000 having left the country in recent years.)

Evacuation of the Suez Base

After the Palestine War, Britain continued her efforts to create a defence organisation for the Middle East, with no more success. A specific invitation to the Arab League in 1952 to form the core of a Middle East Defence Organisation was rejected. For a time, nevertheless, Britain still persisted with this policy. One of the main obstacles to the better relations with the Arab countries she was seeking was resentment over Britain's continued occupation of the base in the Suez Canal Zone. As the Treaty of 1936 legalising Britain's tenure was in any case due to expire in 1956, discussions about future arrangements had been proceeding sporadically since 1946. Egypt's determination to rid her soil of British troops had been confirmed — it would be an exaggeration to say it had been hardened, as she had been resolute in her determination previously — by Britain's retreat from the Abadan oil refinery in Persia in 1951 (to be considered in the following chapter). Nevertheless agreement concerning the base might have been possible but for the question of the Sudan (also to be considered in the next chapter), which was always coupled with the Base issue. An agreement, on lines similar to those of the eventual treaty, was actually pencilled by the two governments in 1946, but was not confirmed through failure to agree over the Sudan. In 1947 Egypt took the question of the base to the United Nations, to be sadly disappointed, finding the powers unwilling to censure Britain. In 1951 she abrogated the Treaty unilaterally. The Government then encouraged the population to make the British occupation difficult by means of disturbances and outrages. Building up the garrison to the fantastic figure of 80,000 men, Britain stood firm. But she was obliged to take many steps, such as the capture of the police station at Ismailia, defended to the last by a force of Egyptian police, which had been a centre of harassing activity, that gravely embarassed her before world opinion.

When in 1952 the Army junta headed by General Neguib and Colonel Nasser overthrew the monarchy and established dictatorial government, it was hoped they would take a more realistic view of the importance of the base and of the provisions necessary for the maintenance of its £20,000,000 worth of equipment, and thus agree to reasonable terms. Eventually,

by October 1954, agreement was reached through concessions by both parties. On the point of maintenance, on which Britain argued that a contingent of her troops would be necessary, Egypt insisted that no one wearing uniform should remain in the Zone; and Britain ultimately gave way. On the question of the circumstances in which the base could be re-occupied, it was agreed that it could be reactivated if any of an agreed list of Middle East countries were attacked; but Britain insisted upon including Turkey, which Egypt wanted to omit. It was Egypt which gave way on this issue. Ultimately, therefore, the terms were as follows.

(1) British forces were to be completely evacuated from the Zone within twenty months. (The evacuation was eventually completed in considerably less than this time.) (2) Egypt was to be responsible for the security of the Base in time of peace and (3) was to maintain the utilities serving the Zone. (4) The Base equipment was to be maintained under contract by civilian firms, supervised by British officers stationed in Cairo. They might employ up to 1,200 men, and a third of the labour force was to be recruited in Egypt. (5) Britain might re-enter the Base in the event of an attack upon any member of the Arab League or Turkey; (6) in the case of a threat to the peace of the area, Britain and Egypt were to consult. (7) Equipment might be moved into or out of the Base, but the level of stores might not be increased without Egypt's consent. (8) The RAF might fly into the Zone if previous notification were given. (9) The Treaty was to be reviewed in seven years.

Why did Britain agree to give up the Base, previously regarded as an essential part of her global system of security arrangements? In the debate upon the agreement in the Commons, several reasons were given. It was explained that the development of atomic weapons had made the Base both vulnerable, because of its concentration, and less valuable than before, since it was rather remote from the areas — up on Turkey's eastern flank — that had become of key importance through the consequent revolution in the tactical situation. (This point will be elaborated shortly.) Nevertheless, though of diminished value, the Base would obviously have been well worth retaining, if retention had been possible. There was the further important factor that the friendly relations with the Arab League that

were essential to a satisfactory policy in the area seemed unattainable so long as the quarrel over the Base persisted; moreover the measures we were forced to take to safeguard our troops from the interference of the Egyptian population raised a great deal of hostile feeling against us in many parts of the world. But the most important factor by far was the ruinous strain upon our finances and resources of manpower of having to maintain 80,000 men in the Base. As was explained in the House, the possibility of holding a smaller area with a reduced force had been closely studied by the military authorities; but they had reached the conclusion that any area appreciably smaller would not be worth holding. If we wished to remain we must hold the whole zone, and for this purpose, if Egypt remained hostile, every man of the 80,000 would be necessary, to safeguard the utilities and lines of supply. The Base was not worth anything like this price.

The moral to be drawn from the experience, therefore, was a confirmation of the absolute need of basing policy upon the goodwill of the local population. A base amidst a hostile people, where as many men were necessary to safeguard the base facilities as would be available as a tactical reserve, was militarily not worth having.

The Baghdad Pact

Though the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement for the evacuation of the Suez Base represented a further step in Britain's policy of attempting to improve her relations with the Arab League, already by the time it was signed a new policy was emerging which was partly an attempt to by-pass the League. This was the conception of a 'Northern Tier' alliance, originally an American idea, but increasingly favoured by Britain also. The intention was to set up a defence organisation further to the north than the Arab League; a start was made in April 1954, with the signing of a Treaty between Turkey and Pakistan, prompted by the United States. As these two countries, separated by more than a thousand miles, could obviously do little to assist each other or cover the Middle East, it was clear that this was only a beginning. It was openly said that the attempt would be made to draw in some at least of their neighbours to close the gap.

There were two reasons for this policy, the first a military consideration. One of the revolutionary effects of atomic weapons

on warfare has been to make lines of communications much more vulnerable than previously — a development that has greatly altered the Middle East situation. All the lines of attack from Russia towards the Middle East pass over very difficult ground — round the two ends of the Caucasus, or fringing the desert to the east of the Caspian, and thence across the very rugged Kurdish plateau in north Persia — much of the distance without rail facilities, and with such railways as do exist having a very large number of tunnels and viaducts. The tactical use of atomic bombs could readily disrupt these communications and thus make it extremely difficult for the Soviet Union to launch a large-scale attack through the area. The defence of the region is therefore quite practicable — much more so than previously — but requires bases for light and medium bombers within striking distance, and sizeable forces on the ground just beyond the plateau, to force an invader to advance in strength. Hence military opinion has held that an organisation was necessary based upon this area, in contrast with the Arab League, which of course focuses upon the Suez Canal.

Secondly, the Northern Tier conception was partly a product of Western exasperation with the Arabs. Since every effort to obtain their co-operation had failed, it was thought advisable to make a fresh start upon a different basis. Nevertheless the Arabs could not be disregarded completely. It was clear that the Northern Tier could hardly be effective without the support of some at least of the Arab countries: it would need underpinning, and access would be required from the Mediterranean to the vital area. The old and new policies thus overlapped to some extent, for the goodwill of some at least of the Arabs would be necessary. But, failing the co-operation of the Arab League as a whole, which was inconceivable, a start had to be made somewhere. Progress with the Northern Tier therefore meant, temporarily at least, splitting the Arab League.

It was thus an important turning-point in Middle East affairs that came in April 1955, with the accession of Iraq to the Northern Tier project, through a mutual defence treaty signed with Turkey at Baghdad. (Since then the organisation has been commonly known as the Baghdad Pact, the situation being complicated by the fact that Iraq did not join the Turkey-Pakistan Treaty: instead Pakistan acceded shortly afterwards to the new

Baghdad Treaty.) Long recognised as Egypt's main rival for leadership of the Arabs, and with a tradition of more friendly relations with the West than Egypt favoured, Iraq had already, before the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, been accepting military supplies from the United States, despite Egypt's strong disapproval. Though it was known that her accession would arouse bitter resentment in Egypt, it was hoped that Egypt would soon recover and take a more realistic view, and realise the value of the Pact for the defence of the area. In fact it was intended to persuade other Arab countries to join with Iraq, and there were hopes that eventually even Egypt would come in. Unfortunately, Egypt's reaction was even more violent and much more damaging than had been expected; and its results have been far-reaching.

When Iraq signed the Pact, she requested Britain and the United States also to join. Britain did so; the United States — curiously to British eyes, since she had originated the project, but quite consistently with her usual trend of policy — declined. Though it was openly stated that eventually it was hoped to include Afghanistan and Persia, the unfriendly relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan made Afghanistan's adhesion obviously most unlikely in the meantime, while it was thought that Persia, a very weak and vulnerable state, scarcely capable of preserving order within its own frontiers, would first have to be strengthened. Nevertheless, to the general surprise, Persia became a member a few months later, in October. She is probably a greater liability to the organisation than an asset.

Simultaneously with her accession, Britain removed a long-standing source of grievance in Iraq by revising the 1930 Treaty and giving up the Habbaniya and Shaiba airfields. A previous attempt in 1947, when an agreement on very similar lines had been pencilled by the two governments, had broken down as the result of rioting that had occurred in Baghdad as soon as its terms became known. The extremists had held that it did not go far enough; and the Iraqi Government, led at the time by Nuri es-Said, who was again the Premier in 1955, had withdrawn its signature. Under the present arrangements, Iraq has taken over the airfields, but the RAF may still use them and maintain technicians there, though no garrison forces. In addition Britain is to assist in the development and training of the Iraq Air

Force, and is to have the use of facilities within the country to help defend Iraq in the event of war.

Following Egypt's success, and now Iraq's, in establishing conditions of equal status with Britain, Jordan now put in a request for the annual subsidy for the Arab Legion to be paid directly to the Jordan Government. For once, however, Britain stood firm and refused.

As befits an organisation which so far has had little to do beyond joint planning, the machinery of the Pact is fairly simple. A Council of Foreign Ministers meets at intervals, while most of the detailed work is carried out by two committees, a Military Committee and an Economic Committee, which meet frequently. Though much was said at the outset about making the Pact an important instrument for the distribution of economic aid in the area, so far it appears to have made little difference in this respect. Despite her refusal to become a member, the United States showed herself very willing to take part in this side of the organisation's activities, and sends a representative to the Economic Committee. But so far all the discussion of a vigorous programme of Western economic aid as a second means of preserving the area from communism, very prominent when the Pact was signed, appears to have borne little fruit. Most of the work actually done has consisted of development of the communications between the member countries — an improvement that was urgently required for military purposes.

The emphasis upon economic aid was partly at least aimed at attracting other Arab states into the alliance. (The terms of the Pact hold out an open invitation to the Arab countries, providing that, while any other state may be admitted with the consent of the members, Arab countries may accede automatically. Association of the offer of aid with the Pact, however, raised the difficulty that aid of this kind could hardly be said to be 'without strings' — though it was agreed that non-members might also be recipients.) But in any case, with the support of Saudi Arabia, Egypt immediately began a campaign to ostracise Iraq among the Arabs and prevent any other Arab countries from joining. There has thus been a tug-of-war — in effect between Britain and Egypt — in which Egypt has been successful.

The bitterness of Egypt's resentment of the Baghdad Pact was due mainly to the fact that it split the Arab League and

thus challenged Egypt's leadership of the Arab world — a role which she had been assuming even more openly than before since the accession to power of Colonel Nasser. Nasser's counter-stroke — apparently quite unexpected by the Western governments — was the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia, in September 1955. The Arab countries had deeply resented the restraint imposed upon them by the West through the restriction of arms deliveries under the Tripartite Declaration: by freeing himself from Western control by means of this sudden coup Nasser immediately gained immense prestige in Arab eyes. In May and June he had tried to form a counter-alliance against Iraq consisting of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, but had not been successful, Syria at first expressing willingness, then backing down under remonstrances from Turkey. Now, at a second attempt, the alliance was readily formed.

Nasser had become the spokesman of Arab nationalism. The strength of his hold was further revealed in December, when an attempt was made to bring Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. General Templer had actually gone to Amman to discuss accession with the Jordan Government; but hostile demonstrations occurred, encouraged by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which quickly killed the proposal. Though the Amman mob had been spurred on by a liberal distribution of gold, and also by communist agents, the agitation also bore witness to the rising tide of nationalism, now headed by Nasser. Further evidence was given later in the month when King Hussein dismissed General Glubb, the commander of the Arab Legion. Though Hussein himself favoured the traditional British connection, it made him so unpopular and his position had become so precarious that he had been obliged to demonstrate his sympathy with the nationalist cause. Jordan was lost to Britain: it was only a matter of time when the Anglo-Jordan Treaty would be ended, the British bases at Amman and Mafraq be given up, and the subsidy be replaced by the offers held out by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. These steps were in fact taken in March 1957, after Britain had lost further prestige in the Arab world.

Nasser's counter-stroke had gravely embarassed the West. In addition to preventing the further development of the Baghdad Pact into a more effective military organisation, as was urgently needed, it had resulted in Russia 'leapfrogging' the Pact, by

obtaining a footing in the Arab countries from which it was meant to exclude her. (Though Nasser has no liking for communism, and is making use of the Communists in the belief that he can hold them at arm's length, the many contacts he has now given the communist bloc in the Arab world are naturally a cause of serious concern to the West.) Moreover, by opening up a new source of arms supplies he had gravely endangered Israel, and thus heightened the already most serious tension over the Palestine question — especially since the Arabs made no secret of their intention to destroy Israel. A counter-measure from the West could almost be expected.

Nasser and the Aswan Dam

This counter-measure came, or at least appeared to, in the form of the withdrawal by the West of previous offers of financial assistance to Egypt for the construction of the projected Aswan High Dam. This project is of great importance to Nasser: his whole régime may depend very largely upon its success.

When Nasser's group of officers carried through their revolution in 1952, deposing Farouk and suspending parliamentary government, they were attempting to cleanse the stables of Egyptian politics. They had been particularly incensed by scandals in the supply of equipment to the army during the Palestine War — which had resulted in much of its ammunition being found faulty upon use. Following the example of Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, they intended to carry out the social reform that Egypt so urgently needed but could not expect from her corrupt parliament, then, having established a sounder basis for democracy, to restore parliamentary institutions. It is a tribute to their single-mindedness that, in a country so riddled with intrigue as Egypt, they kept their plot secret for five years before taking action.

Since 1952 their régime has survived a number of crises. At first the 'Junta' of leaders did not expect to have to take up the task of government themselves; but when they found no one with a constructive policy, they were obliged to do so. Within a few months their progressive ideas brought them up against the bigoted, reactionary Moslem Brotherhood. Resorting to its usual device, it attempted to assassinate General Neguib, then at the head of the Junta. It was therefore outlawed; and an anxious time for the Junta followed, until it became clear that they en-

joyed more support than the powerful Brotherhood. Next Neguib, who had been called into their counsels by the group just before the revolution, chosen as a suitable figurehead because of his popularity, began to have qualms about the continued suspension of democracy: he lacked the strength of purpose of Nasser and his colleagues and their conviction in their plan. They deposed him and put him under house arrest, Nasser taking his place. Once again, because of Neguib's immense popular favour, the régime appeared to hang in the balance; but once again it survived.

It has in fact made considerable progress with social reform, including the basic reform — the redistribution of the land. At the revolution 65 per cent of Egypt's land was in the hands of 6 per cent of the population. Now holdings are being limited to 200 acres for an individual, or 300 for a family. Fair compensation, amounting to ten times the rental value, is being paid for the land acquired; and it is planned to redistribute 700,000 acres to 150,000 families over a five-year period. In addition medical graduates and other professional men are being obliged to go out into the rural areas for a period upon qualification, so that the benefits of Western learning are being made available where they are most urgently needed. A new spirit of hope and purpose has been born in Egypt.

But the difficulties facing the Junta are tremendous. Even the land redistribution programme will not begin to meet the problem of the desperate overcrowding of population: there is not nearly enough land to go round. Agriculture will never provide the mass of Egyptians with a decent living. Only industrialisation could do this, yet the country has practically nothing in the way of resources. It will be almost impossible for the Junta to live up to their promises — and now the former scapegoat for all of Egypt's ills, Britain, is no longer available.

Hence the central importance to Nasser of his project for the High Dam at Aswan. The essence of the problem of utilising the Nile is that of storing the seasonal flood water for use over the whole of the year, preventing its loss by escape into the Mediterranean. As planned, the Dam is to be 365 feet in height, and three miles long, forming a lake 750 square miles in area. It would enable 1,300,000 acres of land to be irrigated for the first time — a sizeable addition to Egypt's fertile soil — and greatly

improve the irrigation of much more. The power produced, 750,000 kilowatts, would add half as much again to the country's present supplies. It is estimated that construction would take 12 to 16 years, and the estimated cost is $1,300,000,000. (The Sudanese object to the flooding of the land and homes of several thousand of their population that would ensue and claim that better sites for the dam, where there would be much less loss from evaporation, are possible: the Nile requires studying as a whole for its best utilisation, and the Aswan project could probably be bettered.)

The greatest difficulty concerning the dam is of course its cost. After discussions with the West about a proposed loan had appeared to be making little progress during most of 1955, it was announced in October, shortly after Nasser's arms purchase from Czechoslovakia, that the Soviet Union had offered $200,000,000, at the low interest rate of 2 per cent. On December 17, a joint offer of $200,000,000 by the World Bank (which is of course under United States direction), $56,000,000 by the United States and $14,000,000 by Britain was announced, this aid to be available for the early stages, with sympathetic consideration promised for the later stages of construction. This gesture naturally gave the impression of some haste by the West to forestall the Russians. (There is some doubt as to whether the Russian offer was ever actually made.)

Then, on 19th July, 1956, the offer was withdrawn. The reason was given that, after studying her financial position, the Western authorities had reached the conclusion that Egypt would not be able to meet the interest charges and repayments on the loan, having already pledged her cotton crop, her main source of exchange, for many years ahead, in payment for the arms she was receiving from communist countries. Though this seemed an adequate explanation, the manner in which the blow had been delivered appeared tactless, to say the least. There could hardly have been any important relevant information coming to light in the middle of 1956 that would not have been available in the previous December, when the firm offer had been made. (Nasser, it will be remembered, had begun his purchases of arms in September, some months before the firm offer.) Nasser — and the rest of the world — interpreted the action as a rebuff.

The Suez Canal

Once again Nasser had a strong card to play, and proceeded to table it: on July 26 he nationalised the Suez Canal Company. He announced that he would compensate the shareholders fully, paying them the last closing prices of the previous day on the Paris Bourse, (nevertheless the shareholders have had little faith in the prospect) and that he would use the $100,000,000 annual revenue from the Canal to build the dam.

The events that followed are too close, and too vivid in the memory, to require recapitulation in detail: only a few comments need be made. Firstly, concerning the previous operation of the Canal: nationalist feeling against the Company had been mounting in Egypt for many years before 1956. In response the royalties paid to Egypt had recently been increased, and the number of Egyptian directors on the board increased from 4 out of 32 to 12 out of 40. In addition an undertaking had been given to employ more Egyptians, especially in higher posts. The concession was due to expire in 1968.

Under the Convention of 1888 governing the use of the Canal, it is provided that it must be open to all vessels in peace and war, except those of nations with which Egypt herself is at war at any time. Though the British Government challenged the legality of nationalising what was an international company, it was doubtful whether much support could have been obtained for this view. It also contended that nationalisation had altered the circumstances existing when the Convention had been signed, which were implicitly part of the Convention, so that in effect it had been nullified. For some months Britain appeared to be, and is generally thought to have been, considering military action. But, long before military measures were actually precipitated by Israel's attack upon Egypt, this design seems to have been put aside and, instead, efforts were being made to settle the issue by diplomatic means, in particular through the Suez Canal User's Association, formed for the purpose. Britain was demanding some form of international control and operation of the Canal, a proposal that was of course unacceptable to Nasser, but appeared unable to obtain support from more than a handful of countries, the United States in particular being unwilling to back British insistence upon such a thorough-

going measure. (Dulles was always prepared to support Britain in negotiations based on the proposal, but was ready to concede ground to achieve a compromise settlement; the British Government appeared not to contemplate compromise.) It appeared likely that, if the matter were left to diplomacy, a settlement would have to be reached on the lines of the Indian proposal — Egyptian operation with an international council available to hear appeals or complaints from user nations.

Next, however, in November 1956, came Israel's attack and the Anglo-French intervention. Israel had naturally been growing increasingly nervous as communist supplies of arms were delivered to the Arab countries; but she probably chose this moment to attack — whether or not there was any degree of collusion — in the knowledge that Egypt was in bad odour with France and Britain — two of the signatories of the Tripartite Declaration, which in normal circumstances bound them to take action against an act of aggression. When in the event the intervention was launched, the British Government appeared surprised at the hostility of the American reaction. (This despite the fact that they deliberately concealed their intentions from the American Government.) Though the Arabs believe otherwise, it was apparently United States pressure, backed by indications that appeals for aid over the dollar crisis that would obviously follow would not be sympathetically received unless there were rapid compliance, and not the Russian threat of action, that brought Britain and France to withdraw. In addition to the strongly anti-imperialist sentiment of the American people — and the intervention, an attempt to impose our will by force on a weaker power, looked unfortunately like imperialism — the United States Government was probably motivated by fear of losing the goodwill of the uncommitted Afro-Asian group of nations. It may well have been taking the view that to lose the friendly regard of this large group of countries was a graver prospect to the West than the endangering of the Suez passage. In other words, Britain and France had dealt a serious blow to a vital American interest.

Since Russia has achieved closer relations with the Arab countries, fear has at times been expressed that revival of warfare between the Arabs and the Jews would create grave danger of a major war between the Communist world and the West. But

this seems most unlikely. Though there is always a possibility of a minor war spreading through unexpected developments, the Russians obviously would not engage in a major, nuclear war for the sake of the Arabs. Their interest in the Middle East is to foment as many difficulties as possible for the West, and prevent us from obtaining bases.

American Policy After Suez

Since the Suez episode, it appears that the United States has been, to some extent, moving into the gap in Middle East security arrangements left by the demise of British influence. Not that the gap seems now to be as wide as was at first feared: the Baghdad Pact meetings have been resumed, with British participation fully accepted. But, although she has not accepted the full mutual defence obligations of the Pact, the United States has become a member of the Military as well as the Economic Committee; and her failure to accept the full commitments is largely compensated for by the 'Eisenhower doctrine', initiating a more active role in Middle East defence. Made on 5th January, 1957, in the form of a Presidential appeal for Congress authority, subsequently granted, this pronouncement amounted to an undertaking to furnish economic and military aid to nations or groups of nations in the area desiring it for the purpose of maintaining their independence, and to a pledge that United States military action would be taken in support of any nation requesting it when subjected to armed attack, in accordance with the UN Charter and 'subject to the over-riding authority of the UN Security Council'. Vigorous action was actually taken by the United States in April, in response to an army plot against King Hussein of Jordan, which was successfully countered, when the United States Sixth Fleet was despatched to the eastern Mediterranean. The American Government began paying the subsidies to Jordan, promised but not delivered by Egypt and Syria. The United States also endeavoured to establish friendly relations with King Saud, though so far no results are apparent, except that she has obtained a renewal for five years of the lease of the important air base at Dahran, in return for military aid in equipment and training. In fact by September 1957 Saud was endeavouring to patch up the Arab League, a policy which hardly seemed to represent friendship to the West.

Though it must be welcomed as representing a new realisation by the United States of the strategic importance of the Middle East, this new declaration by no means solves all the problems of Middle East policy. It does nothing to settle the Palestine dispute, though no satisfactory Middle East policy will be possible until this quarrel has been ended. A more fundamental criticism is that the new 'doctrine' attempts to avoid the issue of bases. Though President Eisenhower rightly placed most emphasis in his policy speech upon economic aid, giving second place to the military aspects, the question cannot be avoided. The Arab states will be incapable of defending themselves effectively for many years yet; and defence preparations need to be made well in advance, and demand Western bases. The construction of bases appeared to be the next logical step in the Baghdad Pact policy, and still seems implied. Though it is extremely difficult to combine the possession of bases with the maintenance of good relations with Arab nationalism, this is the essential problem that Britain has always been facing, and that the United States must now also face. Middle East responsibilities cannot be met with involvement in Arab politics, which the United States has always tried to avoid. While the United States appears to be thinking partly at least in terms of meeting possible commitments largely through the use of her self-supporting naval forces, it seems inconceivable that satisfactory defence action could be taken without the use of large forces on the ground with a full range of heavy equipment.

In another respect also the United States appears to be following a British error — of giving the appearance at least, if no more, of bolstering-up unrepresentative, unprogressive régimes. If the West wishes to stabilise the Middle East, it must exercise a more positive influence for the uplifting of the Arab peasantry. But how this can be exerted is far from easy to suggest. Meanwhile this problem has become more urgent with the emergence in 1958 of the United Arab Republic, uniting Egypt and Syria (with which the Yemen is also loosely associated), representing an important extension of Nasser's radical brand of Arab nationalism, on the one hand, and, in response, the federation of the two uneasy Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan on the other.

Chapter Fifteen

THE MIDDLE EAST — II: PERIPHERY.

Cyprus

On the fringe of the Middle East, close enough to be the scene of further difficulties for Britain with the force of nationalism arising out of her attempts to retain some footing in the Middle East area, lies the island of Cyprus. It is the last remaining territory in or near the Eastern Mediterranean where Britain retains sovereignty. For that reason, when Britain was obliged to end her occupation of the Suez Canal Zone, she chose Cyprus as the site for her new Middle East base. Believing that their difficulties in coping with the hostility of the Egyptian population had been greatly increased by the refusal of the Egyptian police to co-operate with them, the military authorities hoped that, should similar disaffection arise in Cyprus, they would be able to deal with it more easily since the police would be under British control. Nevertheless the move to Cyprus, producing a flaring-up of the 'Enosis' agitation, brought Britain again into a very difficult situation.

Since nationalism is fundamentally a feeling, for which there may be no very logical foundation, of belonging to a group of people conceived of as a nation, the Enosis movement — the demand of the 400,000 Greek-speaking Cypriots among the island's population of half a million for incorporation with Greece — is really a nationalist movement. Though it has often been pointed out that Cyprus has never, throughout its long history of rule by various peoples, been linked with Greece, this fact is irrelevant. (The island was originally settled by the same wave of migrants from the north that established the Greek city-states.) The Greek Cypriots speak Greek, they are educated in Greek and sit the Greek school examinations, they proceed to the University of Athens and Greek teacher-training colleges, they are members of the Cypriot branch of the Orthodox

Church — above all they feel they are Greeks, and this ultimately determines the matter.

There is nothing new about the Enosis agitation. When the first British High Commissioner arrived to assume sovereignty in 1878, on Britain being given a lease of Cyprus from Turkey, which had held the island since 1560, in return for an undertaking to protect Turkey from Russian aggression, he was met at the harbour by a delegation from the Church, asking for Enosis. (The custom, strange to British eyes, of the Archbishop of the Cypriot Church acting as the Ethnarch, or main spokesman of the people in political matters, derives from the long-standing practice introduced by the Turks into all their territories.) But there was little real interest in the proposal at the time, or for many years afterwards. Though constantly repeated, it was never taken at all seriously. A golden opportunity to alter the whole caste of Cypriot thought was lost in 1881, when, on grounds of economy, the Colonial Secretary rejected the suggestion of the High Commissioner that a system of English schools be established. This decision was typical of British rule: the administration we gave the island was always honest and fair, but unimaginative.

When Britain went to war with Turkey in 1914, she annexed the island. After being offered to Greece in 1915 as a bribe to enter the war, it was made a Crown Colony in 1925, and a Legislative Council was established. In 1931, after some rioting, arising out of an Enosis demonstration, which resulted in the burning of Government House, the constitution was suspended. Nevertheless even at this time Enosis was not supported with much enthusiasm. The burning was unpremeditated, the accidental result of a moment of excitement, and the government's response over-hasty. Nevertheless the suspension continued until the Second World War.

Following the War, a fresh start was attempted, Britain making the generous offer in 1948 of a Legislative Council containing only four nominees among 26 members. Foolishly, however, because of unrealistic objections to the retention of the usual reserve powers by the Governor — anyone with experience of colonial constitutions knows that these mean very little in practice — the Cypriot leaders rejected this offer. Nevertheless it was left open for their acceptance at any time, until 1954: it was the

withdrawal of this offer and the substitution of an offer of a much more restricted constitution in that year, proposing a Council with a minority of elected members, that precipitated the crisis.

This change of policy, deeply resented by the Cypriots as an attempt to put them back many rungs down the ladder of colonial advancement, resulted from the decision to make Cyprus the Middle East Base. Alarmed at their experience in Egypt, the military authorities wanted to make sure of their position in Cyprus by retaining a large measure of sovereignty in British hands. It was a mistaken, unrealistic decision. Even more mistaken was the subsequent statement by Sir Anthony Eden, in response to Cypriot protests, that the issue was closed and that Cyprus was British property with which we would do what we pleased. It is no longer possible to speak in terms of having property rights over human beings. A stronger argument was the plea that the use of Cyprus was necessary if Britain were to fulfil her many obligations in the area. But, since all the interests thus safeguarded could be said to be NATO interests as much as British, this hardly disposed of the suggestion put forward in many liberal circles at the time, that the base be made a NATO responsibility, with a large measure of internal self-government under some form of condominion — possibly a council on which Britain, Greece and Turkey were represented. As it would have given the Cypriots most of what they really wanted — the sense of some sort of association, even if rather remote, with Greece — this appeared the best, if an imperfect solution — perfection in the sense of the complete satisfaction of all parties being unattainable in such situations. Even such a concession would not have been necessary but for the original mistaken handling of the problem. The essence of the original error had been in the high-handedness of British policy — in the way it assumed that the feelings of the Cypriots could first be flouted and then repressed. If base facilities were wanted, there was no alternative to winning the co-operation and goodwill of the local people.

The other main obstacle to concessions, beside the fears for the security of the base, was the attitude of the Turkish-speaking fifth of the population, descendants of Turkish administrators of before 1878. They have strong objections, in which they are

supported by the Turkish Government, to coming under the rule of the Greek-speaking majority. Moreover Turkey announced that for defence reasons she could not contemplate the island, which covers most of her southern ports, passing under the sovereignty of any other power but Britain. In fact Turkish spokesmen threatened annexation of the island, if any change of sovereignty took place. Though this obduracy made the situation most difficult for Britain, it would seem that the Turks should have been made to face up to the realities of nationalism. In any case the condominion proposal should have met their objections.

For many weeks the Greek Government, which had always been very friendly in disposition towards Britain, hesitated to pronounce on the issue. Eventually, however, the mounting tide of public opinion, and in addition some tactless references in British speeches to the instability and alleged weakness of Greek governments, brought it to support Enosis. Thus deep ill-feeling arose between the two nations on NATO's eastern flank, to the point where the joint naval manœuvres planned for 1955 had to be cancelled.

Meanwhile, on the island itself the situation developed on lines that could readily have been predicted. Demonstrations occurred, which the Government attempted to suppress; rioting followed, and resulted in arrests. Those arrested became martyrs; from demonstrations and then stone-throwing the rioting progressed to bomb-throwing and shooting. As repressive measures became heavier, so the violence increased. Though the Government treated the resort to violence as criminal, the supporters of Enosis were bound to regard it as the prosecution of a holy crusade. It was a tragic clash of conceptions. (Moreover, our implied insistence that the Cypriots should limit themselves to constitutional methods surely overlooked the fact that we had not met their original peaceful protests in a reasonable spirit: what other course than demonstration remained open to them? On the other hand, the type of activity resorted to was frequently despicable.) While the actual terrorists were only a handful of the population, the great majority of the Greeks remained steady if passive supporters of Enosis. Even the mere handful of terrorists proved extremely difficult to deal with, despite the use of some 35,000 troops.

Inevitably the Government was forced to give ground. The issue, previously declared to be closed, was re-opened. Discussions were held with Archbishop Makarios, a stubborn and not unskilful negotiator, in which concessions were offered, including recognition of the principle of self-determination, which would probably have been unnecessary earlier. Even so Britain's refusal to go very far towards pardoning the resort to violence and to specify the allocation of representation in the constitution she offered did not go far enough to satisfy Makarios. And on some of the points at least he appeared to have a strong case. For instance, when he asked how many seats the Greeks were to receive in the Legislative Council, Britain replied that this was a detail that must be left until later; but surely it was the crux of the matter. The discussions broke down; Makarios was arrested and deported. In resorting to this step the Government apparently counted upon a less obdurate spokesmen of the Greeks coming forward, but this hope was disappointed. No other spokesman emerged. The stalemate continued.

Meanwhile the Suez incident had thrown interesting further light upon the whole dispute. One of the main reasons for what seemed the excessive time taken to deliver the Anglo-French attack upon Suez, which perplexed public opinion in Britain, was the fact that it had to be mounted not from Cyprus, but from Malta. This emphasised the point that many military observers had long been making: that Cyprus is not a convenient site for a Middle East base. Though satisfactory for the operation of strategic bombers, it is not suitable, either for the navy or the army, for conducting even minor operations. It has only two ports, Famagusta and Limasol, each of very limited capacity; and although in modern warfare troops could be quickly transported from the island by air, it is not possible to fly off the heavy equipment necessary for any serious action. Though fighter cover for the Suez action was provided from Cyprus, the distance that had to be flown made it rather ineffective. The military authorities have in fact always made it clear that Cyprus could never serve as a Middle East base in the sense in which the term was applied to the Suez Canal Zone, preferring to speak of a 'nerve centre' — a headquarters from which operations from other bases in the area, with land access to danger areas, could be directed. Thus even a settlement of the Cyprus

dispute will not solve the main problem of Middle East defence: the preparation of suitable bases.

It was in December 1956, during the Suez crisis, that the report of Lord Radcliffe, who had been commissioned some four months before to make a study of the constitutional question, was published. He recommended that the Legislative Council should comprise 36 members, of whom 6 should be nominated (but not officials), 24 Greek-speaking representatives and 6 Turkish. It should have full control over domestic affairs with the exception of internal security, with the Governor retaining defence, external affairs and internal security. He proposed a joint council for liason between the two parts of the diarchy. Guarantees for the Turkish element, covering religion, education, charitable institutions and language, should be written into the constitutions and there should be a Turkish Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs. In addition he suggested that the Legislative Council should have no power to pass legislation affecting Turkish domestic matters without the consent of two-thirds of the Turkish members. A special Tribunal of Guarantees should be instituted to hear complaints on racial matters, with appeals on questions of law, however, to be dealt with by the Supreme Court.

In announcing the Government's acceptance of the Report, Mr. Lennox-Boyd also suggested the possibility of partition of the island. As this would involve many difficulties, it seemed an unwise initiative. While both the Greek and Turkish Governments rejected the Report, Turkey seized upon this proposal for partition as an acceptable alternative to continuance of the *status quo*.

In February 1957, after debating opposing resolutions by Britain and Greece, the United Nations General Assembly adopted unanimously an Indian resolution calling for a 'peaceful, democratic and just solution'. In March NATO offered mediation. This was accepted in principle by Britain and Turkey, but rejected by Greece, who declared that negotiations should be conducted between Britain and the Cypriots.

At the end of March, following his compliance with a British condition that he should issue an appeal to Eoka to cease violence, Archbishop Makarios was released from the Seychelles. He had been in detention for 13 months. Permitted to

proceed anywhere except to Cyprus, he made his way to Greece. The emergency regulations were then relaxed. He then offered to enter into bi-lateral negotiations with the British Government, which insisted, however, that other parties must also be represented. As Greece refused to take part, declaring that discussions must be held with Makarios alone, the position remained one of deadlock.

In September, a British Government spokesman announced that Britain was now willing for the island to become a NATO base — a concession that would have been very helpful at the outset of the dispute.

The Sudan

As was noticed in the previous chapter, one of the main problems to be settled before agreement between Britain and Egypt over the Canal Zone Base would become possible was the question of the Sudan. Britain always insisted that the two issues were bound together; and as early as 1947 failure to agree over the Sudan had nullified a draft agreement over the Base. Since Kitchener's re-conquest of the Sudan for Egypt in 1899, it had been governed, in theory, under Anglo-Egyptian condominion, though in practice Egypt had played little part in its administration for many years. (There had been disputes between the two countries about the terms of service of Egyptian officials, and the quality of those seeking posts.) Egypt's persistent demand that the Sudan did or should form part of her territory, based on historical, cultural, strategic and economic claims, was met by British insistence that the Sudanese should decide their future for themselves. (By arranging with the Uganda Government that the Owen Falls Dam at the source of the White Nile should be constructed a metre higher than had been first planned, for her own convenience, and contributing the cost of this extra work, Egypt had herself recognised that control of the Nile — the main ground of her claim to the Sudan — must begin further south. Since it contains the source of the Blue Nile, Ethiopia must also be involved: control should in fact be attempted through joint planning by all the states in the region.) At the abrogation in 1951 of the 1936 Treaty concerning the Base, Farouk proclaimed himself King of the Sudan.

Nevertheless, after his fall, the Junta took a more conciliatory view. Shortly after the revolution, in February 1953, the new government reached agreement with Britain that the Sudanese should decide their own destiny. It was provided that a parliament should be established and the civil service 'sudanised' over a short period, after which the country should take its decision. Despite a provision that neither of the interested powers should attempt to influence the Sudanese, Egypt flagrantly did her best to see that the decision went in her favour. She devoted a great deal of money and propaganda effort to the parliamentary elections; and the pro-Egyptian party, the National Unionists, led by al-Azhari, were successful and formed a cabinet. At first political rivalries were determined largely by the religious division in the country between the Umma Party, consisting mainly of the Mahdists — followers of Abd ur-Rahman al-Mahdi, the posthumous son of the Mahdi subdued by Kitchener — who were bitter antagonists of the more orthodox sect of Moslems, the Khatmiya sect. The Umma were generally pro-British, while the Khatmiya party sided with the National Unionists. But more recently al Azhari has succeeded in forming an all-party government.

The way was paved for this coalition by a change in attitude on the part of the National Unionists. As so often happens in such circumstances, once in power the Party began to change its mind about accession to Egypt. Egypt had rather overplayed her support in the election; and there were fears that she meant to subordinate the Sudanese economy to her own development. Eventually the Government declared the Sudan an independent republic on 1st January, 1956, both Britain and Egypt granting their recognition.

The great difficulty facing the Sudan Government is to win the trust of the southerners. The population of the south, who are negroes and very backward, have nothing in common with the semitic, Moslem, more sophisticated northerners, who are racially and culturally similar to the Egyptians. The southerners resented the arrival of northern officials in their territories to replace the departing British, to such an extent that their suspicion and resentment led, in August 1955, to extremely grave rioting, mutiny and bloodshed. Since then the Government, conscious that the rest of the world is watching its performance

in this difficult situation, has been doing its utmost to win the trust of this primitive element. Making a beginning, far-sightedly, with exemplary moderation in its suppression of the rebellion, it appears to be meeting with a fair measure of success.

The Arabian Protectorates

Around the fringes of the Arabian Peninsula lie a number of Sheikhdoms, several being important oil-producing areas, which would by now almost undoubtedly have been absorbed by Saudi Arabia, in the process of the unification by the Saudis of the desert tribes, or in the south, by the Yemen, but for British protection. Though most of these tiny states are very backward, the force of Arab nationalism is beginning to stir among their people; and, in addition, in those where wealth from oil is speeding development, discontent is emerging against their feudal rule. Inevitably, this discontent also turns against the protecting power. Further threats from this quarter to British influence in the Middle East are therefore only to be expected.

Kuwait, at the head of the Persian Gulf, is the most socially advanced of these principalities, because of its enormous output of oil. In recent years its production has exceeded even that of Saudi Arabia, the annual payments of royalties to the government rising from $12,000,000 in 1950 to $139,000,000 in 1952 — a remarkable revenue for a state of about 200,000 subjects. Fantastic development has taken place, hospitals, for instance, being equipped in a fashion lavish by European standards. A pipeline for fresh water is now being planned, supplies having at present — as has in fact been the case for centuries — to be brought fifty miles by boat. Yet even this expenditure is not silencing resentment of autocratic rule, or discontent at the large sums still distributed among the ruling family, especially on the part of the children of rich Kuwaitis on their return from education overseas.

Bahrain presents rather a similar picture, though its wealth is not so fantastic. Its royalties in 1952 were about six million dollars, for a population of 100,000. An island with a fine harbour, it has long been a British naval base, and now also possesses a fine airfield, used both commercially and by the RAF. There is

also an oil refinery, which takes part of Saudi Arabia's output. Social development is well advanced, having in fact made much headway even before the war; and here too the seeds of discontent are beginning to grow. In Qatar, the third oil-producing sheikhdom, conditions are still very primitive and backward, though the oil revenue is more than that of Bahrain, for a population of only some 25,000. Yet already there have been several strikes against the oil company — a mark of the emergence of some sophistication.

South of Qatar extends the Trucial Coast, a collection of petty sheikhdoms, with indeterminate frontiers to Saudi Arabia. The future of these tiny states will be determined largely by the success or failure of the oil companies in finding oil in this region: so far none has been discovered. One of them, Abu Dhabi, received British support in the complicated dispute with Saudi Arabia in 1952–53 and again in 1955 over the possession of Buraimi Oasis, the rival claims being brought forward when it was thought that the area had oil-bearing potentialities. Less interest has been taken recently since it has appeared that none is likely to be found.

Further south is the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, distinguished only by being larger. In mid-1957 it attracted attention through the rebellion against the Sultan of the former Imam, Ghalib bin Ali, which was suppressed with British aid under the terms of the treaty of protection.

Along the south of the peninsula lies the colony of Aden and the Aden Protectorates. Aden, a bunkering port for coal and oil, with an important refinery completed in 1954, handles as much sea-traffic as Liverpool, and in addition has a busy air-port. It was granted a Legislative Council in 1947, to which elected members were admitted in 1949. Already these form a group demanding further rapid advance towards complete self-government — an ominous portent. The Protectorates, which attract British interest as the hinterland of Aden and are divided into the Eastern and Western Protectorates, are a collection of tribes as remote from the advance of civilisation as almost any other peoples in the world. In recent years, in order to strengthen the area and assist development, Britain has been endeavouring, with little success, to persuade the rulers to join together in a federation. Many have little control over their own subjects,

however, and some are by no means constant in their acceptance of British protection. The proposals aroused suspicions and jealousies among some of the rulers, and alarm among many of their turbulent subjects who do not welcome the prospect of law and order. Thus a difficult situation has developed. This gives ample scope for the intrigues of the Yemen, which lays claim to the whole of the area and has never consented to any demarkation of the inland frontier. Attempts to police the Protectorates from the air naturally tend to arouse misgivings in Britain.

Turkey

The strongest, most stable, and most efficient country in the Middle East today is Turkey. It is little wonder, therefore, that there is a notable tendency among the better educated element in the Arab states, especially the army officers, frustrated as they are by the ineffectiveness of their own democratic systems of government, to look to Turkey as the example of how to modernise and achieve efficiency and strength. As has been seen, the army revolution in Egypt was an attempt to put aside the political parties for a time and, under strong leadership, reconstruct Egyptian society until it formed a more suitable foundation for effective democratic government. A similar process has been attempted in Syria and also, as will be seen, is being aimed at in Persia. Leaders in these countries can point to Turkey as an instance where a dictatorship, having set the nation upon a sound course, voluntarily abdicated its powers, as it had promised, and restored democracy.

The westernisation of Turkey was the work of Kemal Ataturk following the World War of 1914–18. After rallying the Turks in remarkable fashion to resist the indignities the Allies were attempting to impose on them in defeat, Kemal in 1923 abolished the Sultanate and proceeded to modernise the country, ruthlessly crushing all opposition. His main opponents were the Moslem authorities. Despite their scandalised objections, he secularised the state, depriving them of all political power, and insisted upon the secularisation of education, the abolition of the fez (a tremendous blow to Islam), the adoption of the latin script (the arabic characters being sacred to Moslems), and the westernisation of marriage. Women were un-

veiled, monogamy instituted, civil marriage made compulsory, divorce established, and women given the suffrage.

Kemal always declared that he intended eventually to establish democracy. Turkey was still a dictatorship, however, under the control of his Republican People's Party, at his death in 1938. Thus it was left to his successor, Inonu, to institute free elections in 1946. On this first occasion the Republican Party obtained a majority and remained in office; but at the following elections, in 1950, and again in 1954, the opposition, the Democrats, led by Adnan Menderes, won sweeping victories. Though the Democrats have allowed greater freedom for the observance of religious customs — a welcome step, for religious feeling is still strong, especially in the rural areas — secularism has become accepted and there is no prospect of a reactionary restoration of Moslem political influence. And despite some features causing misgivings among Western observers, notably the continued turbulence of Turkish politics and restrictions recently imposed by the government upon the freedom of the press — justifiable, perhaps, in view of the grave irresponsibility of much of their criticism — and also, more seriously, the recent exertion of government pressure upon the judiciary, democracy seems strongly enough established to be expected to endure.

Not that the modernisation, or secularisation, of Turkey is by any means complete. Four-fifths of the population is rural, and in the villages many of the reforms have obviously gone no further than skin-deep. In most villages, for instance, though their original marriages were legalised, as required, many of the villagers have changed partners since, though they have not bothered about divorce!

Similarly, though the Republicans set themselves out to industrialise Turkey, the industries established are still small and backward, operating at high cost. Development is proceeding more rapidly under the Democrats, who have reversed the Republican emphasis on state control, and paid less attention to considerations of prestige. In the realisation that the country's living standards, still very low by comparison with Western Europe, must depend upon agriculture for many years to come, they have also devoted more interest and effort to agricultural development, with heartening results. Whereas Turkey had

2,000 tractors in 1948, she was operating 35,000 by 1953, and over this period achieved a greater proportional increase in agricultural production than any other country. Her main economic weakness, the lack of adequate communications, which are very expensive to construct over her vast, rugged plateau, is also being attended to. But as yet Turkey's economy is still frail, and her national income quite insufficient to support her heavy armaments burden. Her balance of trade is precarious. She is receiving generous economic and military aid from the United States.

Greatly alarmed by the immensely increased power of Russia, the traditional menace to her security, Turkey is demonstrating her complete determination to present the utmost resistance to any aggression. At the close of the recent war, Russia showed her continuing interest in Turkey by demanding further concessions concerning the Dardanelles: already under the Montreux Convention of 1936 she had been granted the right to pass warships through the strait — denied to other countries except at Turkey's invitation — but in 1945 she also asked for bases in the area. She was rebuffed.

Turkey maintains an army of about 400,000 men, the largest in the Middle East, and, as was seen in Korea, a most efficient fighting force. In addition to her position in NATO at the end of the long European defence line, her role in the Baghdad Pact and her stabilising effect in the Middle East area make her extremely important to the West.

Greece

As was mentioned during our consideration of NATO, Turkey's neighbour on the European side, Greece, shares with her a highly important defence interest. As the narrowness of Thrace, the strip of land where they link, makes it extremely vulnerable to a thrust down the western bank of the Black Sea, their Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia, signed in 1954, was valuable to them for the help Yugoslavia could provide for the defence of this point of weakness, since she can cover the approach route from the air. Unfortunately, however, Yugoslavia's interest in the Pact has waned with the decline in Russia's hostility towards her; and Greece's recent quarrel with Turkey over Cyprus has ap-

parently completed its demise. One of its provisions was for the creation of a Balkan Assembly of parliamentary representatives from the three countries; but nothing further has been heard of this proposal for some time.

Greece's chronic poverty, due to backwardness and over-population, is a potential threat to the stability of this region, and a problem beyond short-term solution. Though the United States has been providing generous aid since 1947, when she took over from Britain the responsibility of assisting Greece and Turkey to maintain their security, more than aid is needed. As is usual in such cases, poverty and social backwardness are associated with political instability. Politics in Greece turn largely upon personalities; and the Rally Government of Field Marshal Papagos, which won a decisive victory at the 1952 elections and held office until his death in 1956, was the first since the war to remain in power for more than two years. By careful management Papagos improved the country's economic position considerably. Nevertheless he did not greatly ease the problem for his successors.

Since the suppression with British help of their serious 1946 insurrection, the Communists do not appear to have been a menace. It is reported that they have not been able to maintain an underground organisation. But the extremes of wealth are not diminishing and, as in the Arab countries, the rootless educated classes may well turn communist in the future. Greece should therefore be the subject of close interest to the West, and a source of some anxiety.

Persia

Yet another state in the Middle East area urgently in need of social reform, yet, ironically, hardly likely to obtain it from its present advanced parliamentary system of government, is Persia. Persia is also a country in which the Soviet Union is greatly interested, yet is so weak and backward that the government is barely able to control its own territory, let alone repel a strong invader. Moreover the Kurds of the north, the most unruly element, have several times showed themselves partial to Russian influence. Though outlawed since 1954, the Tudeh or Communist Party has considerable underground strength. And

Persia is also the country through which lie Russia's natural lines of advance into the Middle East.

Russia's interest in Persia was shown in 1946, when she refused to withdraw from the wartime joint occupation at the end of the agreed six months from the cessation of fighting. It was generally thought at the time that her main objective was a share in Persian oil, one of her demands being for a concession in the north. But she also sought the admission of Tudeh ministers to the cabinet: subsequent experience of her techniques in eastern Europe suggests that this was meant as the first move towards acquiring Persia as a satellite. When Persia pencilled an oil concession and appointed two Tudeh leaders to cabinet office, the Russians withdrew. The Majlis (Persian Parliament) then refused, however, to ratify the concession, and the ministers were dismissed. It was probably a narrow escape.

Though Riza Khan, the vigorous cavalry officer who became Shah in 1923, had attempted to develop industries as part of his ambitious plans for Persia, little progress had been made by the time of his deposition by the Allies in 1942. Two-thirds of the 15,000,000 Persians depend on agriculture, one-fifth being semi-nomadic. Only 30 per cent of the land is owned by the peasants; and as a rule tenants receive only 15 per cent of their produce. Redistribution of the land is urgently needed. Yet the advanced model of parliament, elected by universal suffrage, instituted by the present Shah, Mohammed Riza, on his accession at his father's fall, is naturally dominated by the 'thousand families', as they are called, of wealthy landowners. The Shah himself favours radical reform. But he can scarcely risk alienating the landowning element completely, for fear of launching revolution. The only other elements in the country with any political strength are the communists and the nationalist religious fanatics.

Social discontent coupled with nationalist fanaticism lay behind the dispute over the Abadan oil refinery. In 1949, in quest of a loan for development, the Shah visited the United States: but because of the collapse of the Kuomintang at about this time, which put foreign loans in bad odour with Americans, he was granted a mere $25,000,000. On his return, an agitation began for the money required to be found through an increase in the royalties paid by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (in

which the British Government held a large interest), which was paying only about 14 per cent compared with the half-share of profits that had become customary in recent agreements between the American companies and the Arabian governments. A compromise offer by AIOC was rejected. The moderate Premier in office at the time, Razmara, a nominee of the Shah, was then assassinated by the Moslem Brotherhood; and by fomenting mob agitation the Brotherhood compelled the Shah to appoint Moussadeq. Moussadeq proceeded to nationalise the industry.

The Persians soon found, however, that possession of the industry was not enough: they were unable to market the oil. Meanwhile production from other Middle East countries expanded to fill the gap, so that it appeared they had done themselves permanent injury. Severe economic effects were soon felt; and the resulting disillusion brought about the fall of Moussadeq, who was replaced by the moderate Zahedi. With the aid of United States mediation, a settlement was then reached under which, though Persia remains the owner, the industry is operated by a 'consortium' for which AIOC provides 40 per cent of the capital, five United States companies also 40 per cent, Royal Dutch 14 per cent, and a French company 6 per cent. From her half-share of the trading profits, Persia is to pay AIOC £25,000,000 in compensation over ten years, and the other countries are also to pay AIOC a total of £214,000,000.

It was also agreed that Persians would be increasingly trained and employed in the higher positions in the industry, and that the nationalised company, the National Iranian Oil Company, would in the meantime be responsible for the provision of housing, transport, water and other utilities. Production is steadily returning to the former level. There are now only about 100 Europeans at Abadan, comprising a mixture of nationalities — compared with about 2,500 before nationalisation. The moral of the incident seems to be that, if trouble over oil concessions is to be avoided, the companies must have the foresight — inconvenient though this may seem from the short-term view — to train local men and incorporate them into the higher local management.

Since the settlement the Shah has obtained generous development grants from the United States. Persia is a country, however, where sums of money have a habit of diminishing without

much visible result being produced: American Congressmen have recently expressed some concern about what is happening to the dollars Persia is absorbing. Meanwhile the Shah is taking new initiatives into the attempt to solve the country's social problems. In 1949 he attempted to restrict the franchise to the literate; but the 'thousand', sensing the threat to their control, defeated the proposal in the Majlis. He has given away most of the royal estates to the peasants. Since the Abadan settlement, he has replaced Zahedi by Hussein Ala, formerly the Court Minister, as Premier, and cabinet meetings are now held in the royal palace. Persia's entry into the Baghdad Pact, which was unexpected, since it was assumed she would first need strengthening, is apparently another move in his attempt to exert a greater influence upon Persian politics. He has a difficult task before him, however, and for the moment Persia's weakness must make her more of a liability than an asset to the Baghdad Pact countries.

Moreover, Persia has two treaties with Russia which could be used to lend some justification to an intervention. While a treaty of 1921 gives Russia the formal right to intervene in Persia if she should become a member of an alliance hostile to Russia, a second treaty of 1927 makes a similar provision if foreign forces should be stationed on Persian soil. But legalistic considerations are probably of little importance compared with Persia's vulnerability. One suspects it is only fear of the possibility of atomic war that has prevented the Soviet Union from being provoked by Persia's direct association with the West into armed invasion. Increased subversive activity can certainly be expected among the Kurds of the northern plateau. Persia seems one of the world's most likely trouble centres.

French North Africa

Also on the fringe of the Middle East and the scene of another desperate struggle between a Western power and the force of nationalism is French North Africa, comprising the protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco and the colony of Algeria. In each of these countries the nationalist movement divides into a moderate wing which, while demanding home rule, looks to Paris as its cultural capital and its source of development aid, and an extremist wing which looks to Cairo. In each too lives a large community of French settlers, or 'colons', who are fearful

for their security if French control is given up. The strength of the 'colon' lobby at the French National Assembly has been an important factor in the situation. Time after time a French government has moved towards the inevitable liberal settlement with one or other of the nationalist movements, only to draw back when threatened with defeat in the Assembly. Meanwhile the hopeless struggle has helped to cripple France economically and drawn the largest part of her army out of the NATO line.

The French have been contending with revolt in the two protectorates since shortly after 1945. The turning-point in Tunisia was the dramatic flight of Mendès-France to Tunis in July 1954 to make a clear offer of home rule. Nevertheless it was on the details of the resulting settlement that he was defeated and lost office in the following February—though the National Assembly later adopted his proposals virtually unchanged. They included provisions written into the constitution that are meant to safeguard the 'colons'. Thus Tunisia achieved home rule under the government of the moderate M. Bourguiba.

In Morocco a previous French government had attempted to deal with the situation by deposing the Sultan, Mohammed ben Youssef, who had been in touch with the nationalists. This step had been taken in 1953; by the end of 1955, however, the position had deteriorated to such a degree that the French were obliged to bring him back and negotiate a settlement similar to that with Tunisia. This reversal of policy had partly resulted from alarm at the spread of disaffection to Algeria, marked by a sudden outburst of terrorism on October 31, 1954. As Algeria had always been regarded by the French as their model colony, viewed in fact as having become part of France and the leading example of their colonial policy of 'integration', this came as a woeful shock to French pride.

Since then the weary pattern has been traced out yet again in Algeria. Despite the use of nearly half a million troops, repression has never seemed possible; yet the concessions the French have been prepared to offer have fallen far short of the home rule demanded by the Algerians. Meanwhile the continuance of the struggle has endangered the settlement in the neighbouring protectorates. And the French refusal to meet the terms of the moderates tends to turn the temper of the nationalist movements towards their extremist, Cairo-centred wings.

Chapter Sixteen

THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Though it has impinged on many of the issues we have discussed in the preceding chapters, one major question — probably the most portentous issue facing the world today — still remains for separate examination on its own account: the tremendous problem raised by the invention of nuclear weapons. Closely related to it is another problem also still requiring discussion: the problem of disarmament.

The essence of the issue posed by nuclear weapons is easily enough stated, though so startling as to be difficult to apprehend realistically. In brief, the new weapons have revolutionised warfare in a manner completely different from all previous developments in military techniques, however far-reaching these may have seemed in their time. While previously it has always been possible to conceive of a victor and a loser in a war even though the victor nation might have suffered grave devastation, with the advent of nuclear weapons participation in major war appears to have become almost certainly suicidal for any nation.

The appallingly destructive powers of the new weapons are too well known to need elaboration here. The powers of the atom bomb, the products of a fission process, have since the war been greatly surpassed, though already fearful enough, by the later fusion device, the hydrogen bomb. The strategic situation has varied since 1945 with changes in the relative strengths of the West and the Communist bloc with regard to their possession of these two devices and the means of delivering them. For some years after 1945 the United States alone possessed the atom bomb in large quantities; and by the time the USSR had begun manufacture the United States had developed the hydrogen bomb, which maintained it in a position of some advantage.

Even since the USSR has produced its first hydrogen bomb, and developed a form of the weapon which could be dropped from an aircraft — a further important step that in itself required the solving of some extremely difficult technical problems — the United States has still held a marked superiority until recently in the means of delivering the weapons. Both in their range and in the number she possessed, her most advanced bombers clearly, until the last year or two, outmatched their nearest counterparts in the USSR. From their bases in many parts of the world and with the advantage of being able to refuel over friendly territory in Europe, they have been able to menace every part of the Soviet Union, while the Soviet bombers did not have sufficient range to reach the United States. Until recently, therefore, the United States has been able to use the threat of nuclear bombing as a deterrent against which the USSR had no effective reply.

During the past year or so, however, the USSR has constructed a considerable fleet of bombers with a much larger range, and has thus greatly reduced the disadvantage. Though its new bombers still cannot penetrate to the southern United States — and the United States Government is still endeavouring to maintain something of a lead by extending its bases and increasing the number of its aircraft and its stock-pile of bombs — they can now cover the northern half. The position is therefore now one of virtual parity, in that both countries would be able to inflict the most fearful damage upon each other in the event of a major war. Nor can any form of defence be devised that would prevent this: even the most advanced and elaborate air-defence systems, apart from being prohibitively expensive, (the cost of a single anti-aircraft missile is about £30,000) are known to be incapable of keeping out more than about four-fifths at the most of an attacking force. And even a small proportion of attacking aircraft reaching their target would be sufficient to inflict enough devastation to virtually annihilate the opposing country. Nor could one country hope to destroy the other so completely by a sudden attack as to prevent almost complete destruction being wreaked upon itself.

Further, the analysis that atomic war would be suicidal is rapidly becoming even more conclusive with the development of inter-continental missiles, now reaching an advanced stage.

The launching of the Soviet satellite in September 1957 demonstrated in fact that the U.S.S.R. had gained a lead in this field, being now capable of delivering a nuclear missile on any target in the United States. Nevertheless, since even a surprise attack could not prevent devastating retaliation, the position remains one of virtual parity. Moreover, in addition to the destruction of the explosions the effects of the spread of radio-active materials must be taken into account. Even if this were not sufficient, after a major war, to destroy all life on the earth, as some scientists believe is possible, the effect on the countries engaged in the warfare would surely be to virtually complete their total destruction.

In short, a major war fought with nuclear weapons would seem likely to totally destroy civilisation over a great part, if not the whole, of the earth. Neither group of combatants could hope to survive in any worth-while state of existence.

It is not an exaggeration, therefore, to say that the development of nuclear weapons has raised the gravest problems mankind has ever been called upon to face. At first sight, the sheer appalling horror of the consequences of their use would seem to rule out the possibility of further recourse to war. Unfortunately, a closer view reveals that the situation is not so simple.

In the first place, since resort to the use of nuclear weapons seems inevitably suicidal, they do not solve the problem of preventing minor wars, but in fact complicate it greatly. A power in a favourable position to win a minor war by the use of 'conventional' weapons (i.e. other than nuclear weapons — though this distinction must be qualified, as will be explained shortly), may commence a war of this kind in the belief that, rather than bringing virtually complete destruction upon its own territory, a potential major enemy, able to retaliate effectively only by means of nuclear weapons, will not intervene.

The alternative would be for the enemy power to intervene only with conventional weapons, and take the utmost care to limit the fighting to these — as actually happened in the case of Korea. But to remain prepared for this possibility means maintaining both conventional and nuclear armaments; and both types are so extremely costly that the cost is virtually prohibitive, even for the two super-powers, the United States and the USSR. Certainly it is much greater than any smaller nation

could even consider. In her 1957 Defence White Paper, Britain has in effect already announced her choice, stating her intention to depend almost entirely upon atomic weapons. (In addition, she is to develop small, highly mobile forces for 'police' action; but these will have little relation to the main defence function.) Even the two super-powers are finding the burden of both types together more than they are prepared to bear, both having recently reduced their conventional forces very considerably. The United States at least — the USSR still has tremendous conventional forces — appears to be moving towards the position where it will have no means of opposing any sort of aggression except by the use of nuclear weapons. It will then in effect have become paralysed as far as the prevention or winning of lesser wars is concerned.

It is in fact the declared policy of the West to oppose aggression in any part of the world and on any scale by means of atomic weapons. But that the official pronouncements are patently unreal is shown, as has been mentioned, by the Korean War, and also by the Indo-Chinese and Formosan crises. It was clear in all these cases that the West was not prepared to resort to nuclear arms. It is in fact obvious enough that the Western powers would not plunge themselves into a major war, with the virtual certainty of bringing fatal destruction upon themselves, for the sake of maintaining a minor ally within their orbit. Would they be prepared to do so even in the case of a minor aggression in an area — in central Europe, for example — where they have vital interests? If not, they may soon have no choice but to stand aside and allow the Communist bloc to make a succession of minor gains.

As an escape from this dilemma, some commentators have been suggesting that a policy of 'graduated deterrence' be adopted. (Prominent among them has been the American authority, Henry A. Kissinger, whose book, 'Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy', attracted considerable attention in 1957.) By this is meant a policy of warning the Communists that any aggression will be met by force merely sufficient to repel it. In other words, an attack with conventional forces would be met by conventional forces unless it were on such a scale, amounting in fact to something approaching a major aggression, as could not be dealt with by the West by conventional means. In this

case atomic weapons would be brought into use. It is argued, rather cogently, that such a declaration would both prevent minor aggressions and also, if by mischance a minor war did break out, help prevent it developing into a major conflict through some hasty misjudgment of the West's intentions.

The proposal has however met with some objections. The most important, perhaps, arises from the fact that atomic weapons are now planned for regular use with conventional forces. Artillery units are now equipped with atomic shells, and bombing aircraft employed in support of land actions are intended to use atomic bombs. Is it possible any longer to distinguish with sufficient clarity between atomic and conventional armaments? To this objection the advocates of graduated deterrence reply that a working distinction could be drawn by defining the 'tactical' as opposed to the 'strategic' use of atomic devices, corresponding to their employment in support of ground forces or as part of an 'all-out' major strike respectively. Whereas 'strategic' targets would of course include bomber bases and centres of government and industry, 'tactical' targets, such as ground-support airfields and road and rail junctions, would be limited, by definition, to an area within, say, two or three hundred miles of the ground where land-fighting was taking place. In reply to the contention that the potential enemy might not agree to such a definition, they argue that it would merely be necessary to announce it: such is the fear of major war on all sides that the enemy would take scrupulous care to observe the distinction in their own operations.

In theory the arguments for graduated deterrence seem sound; but in practice they imply the maintenance of both nuclear armaments and large-scale conventional forces, and the cost of such a policy is being increasingly recognised as prohibitive. Even since the Korean War the cost of building up stocks of atomic weapons and large fleets of high performance aircraft has mounted so markedly as to alter the whole problem of national defence and make large economies absolutely necessary for any but the super-powers. As has been seen, only the United States can contemplate bearing the dual burden if her population would be willing to do so; but the United States Government, by continually reducing its conventional forces, is moving steadily towards a position of relying solely upon the

atomic deterrent. There seem to be few Americans, however, who realise the danger this course involves of paralysing the West in the event of minor aggressions.

As far as British policy is concerned, though the small highly mobile army pictured in the 1957 Defence White Paper, supported by tactical use of nuclear weapons, would appear to be of some value in the event of minor wars, even with the great increase in fire-power through these new devices, this force would surely serve as no more than a token of resistance against the armies the Communist bloc could rapidly deploy for a campaign such as that in Korea. And this merely illustrates the point that the decision between graduated and nuclear deterrence really lies in American hands. The critical decision posed for Britain, which was taken some years ago now, was whether she should also manufacture atomic weapons in addition to the United States and, if so, of what kind. While the question of whether she was wise in deciding to equip herself with the atom bomb and a strategic air force for its delivery can be debated at length, her decision to proceed with the hydrogen bomb in addition seems undoubtedly mistaken. The project has been immensely expensive in scientific skill and industrial resources that were desperately needed in industry. It seems true that, in the event of a major war, there could well be targets of importance to Britain that the United States might ignore in the vital early stages, and Britain should therefore, perhaps, have her own strategic force to strike at them, and possession of this ability would give her important diplomatic advantages. But it seems inconceivable that these targets could not be dealt with almost as effectively by the atom bomb as by the hydrogen bomb. The choice to make the latter was thus misguided, and can be explained only as being motivated by foolish considerations of prestige. (In fact, if the possibility of such strategic targets vital to Britain has to be considered, they would surely be of European and not merely British importance, and should therefore have been catered for by means of a European strategic air force. And overstraining our resources seems the surest way to seriously diminish our prestige.)

In any case, discussion of graduated deterrence is really beside the point: there is a much more fundamental criticism of the whole policy of atomic defence to be made. The question of

minor wars apart, the whole conception of dependence upon nuclear weapons — upon devices whose use would be suicidal — obviously needs complete re-examination. The theory of the policy, as it has often been stated, is that now that major war has become suicidal, neither side will ever contemplate aggression, and thus peace will be assured. As theory this seems logical enough; but in practice it involves running a number of fearful risks. And if the risks should eventuate we should find ourselves in — to say the very least — a grotesque situation.

The fantastic destructive powers of the weapons themselves immensely increase the element of danger, because of the extremely short space of time within which the decision whether or not to use them would have to be taken. The advantage to be gained from a few hours lead would be enormous: even now, the opposing air forces watch each other minutely with deadly suspicion, ready to retaliate at the first warning of an attack, and eager to anticipate. If all goes according to the theory, major war will never occur; but a slight mistake or misunderstanding could be utterly disastrous, perhaps for the whole of civilisation. An irresponsible act by some group of fanatics in a vital area — on the border between the two Germanies, for instance; a miscalculation as to what would be regarded by the other side as a minor aggression; or some hasty, ill-advised step in the course of a minor war — any such unforeseen and uncontrollable incident could lead within an hour or two to a fatal conflict.

Is this frightful risk worth running; or would it not be infinitely wiser, in these unprecedented circumstances, to abandon nuclear weapons altogether? To be true, this would mean restoring the situation where the Soviet bloc had an enormous preponderance in conventional forces; but surely, even so, this would be the wiser decision. After all, would the West be making a right and a sensible choice, if it came to the point, in preferring suicide, and possibly the destruction of all life on this planet, to Communist domination? This is surely what the policy of nuclear deterrence implies, if we mean what we say. If we do not, then we are bluffing and, besides being extremely perilous, a policy of bluff must eventually be futile. Though fearful enough to contemplate, even Communist domination is surely preferable to racial suicide. Based as it is on superficial doctrines, Communist rule cannot last for ever; but even if this

were likely, the common-sense decision would surely be to survive.

Disarmament

These considerations are part at least of the background against which discussions have been taking place since the end of the war, mostly in a sub-committee set up by the United Nations for the purpose, to obtain agreement on a plan that will bring about general disarmament. Realisation of the fearfulness of atomic weapons gives these discussions much of their sense of urgency, though this does not always seem as marked as might be expected.

Though the detailed suggestions put forward by the parties have multiplied confusingly from year to year, the general attitudes of both sides have remained much the same throughout. For some years, while the USSR was behind the West in the development of atomic weapons, little progress was made because of her continued insistence that the first step must be their abolition. As this would have left her in a position of complete superiority in conventional forces, it was unacceptable to the West. Since her own acquisition of the atomic and hydrogen bombs, however, which radically altered the whole situation, the Soviet Union has given up this insistence and consented in principle to a start being made with the reduction of conventional forces. She still demands, however, that atomic weapons be abolished in the course of the proposed reduction programme; and the West has agreed in principle that the production of atomic weapons should cease, and existing stocks be steadily converted to peaceful uses. (The West has not specifically agreed to the destruction of all stocks within the period of reduction, as is proposed by the USSR, nor to participating in signing a joint pledge against their use that the USSR is also proposing — presumably on the grounds usually advanced by the West that such pledges are valueless.)

Since shortly before the Geneva Conference of 1955, in fact, it has been agreed between the two sides that conventional forces be reduced to a level of between one million and a million and a half men for the United States, USSR and China, and 650,000 each for Britain and France. This reduction is to be effected in two stages, each occupying about a year (there has

been some disagreement about the rigidity and timing of this arrangement) and in the course of the second stage atomic weapons are to be abolished.

The implementing of this agreement has, however, always been conditional upon finding an acceptable solution to what is always the main obstacle to progress on disarmament — the difficulty of devising an adequate system of inspection or controls to ensure that no party is violating the terms or preparing to attack some other party. Since secret possession of nuclear weapons would give a transgressor such a tremendous advantage, this problem has of course been made much more crucial by their invention. So far no agreement has been found possible on this issue. (It is interesting to note that, despite this, Britain's new defence policy will in fact reduce her conventional forces to below the prescribed maximum, while both the United States and the USSR have also been making large reductions. On the other hand Britain's new policy, and also it appears that of the United States, implies the continued use of atomic weapons.)

Until the Geneva Conference the West was insisting that the only acceptable safeguard would be a complete system of international inspection of military installations and armaments factories, by means of an agency vested with very extensive powers. In reply the USSR has repeatedly declared this to be impracticable, though on occasions its spokesmen have referred to some sort of inspecting organ, apparently with less far-reaching powers, under the direction of the United Nations Security Council. Since they suspect that the object of this arrangement would be to enable Russia to hamper real inspection by the use of her veto, the Western powers have looked at it with disfavour. The usual Soviet counter-suggestion to the Western proposal is for a system of inspection units located at 'control points' — rail and road junctions, harbours, airports and so on — where it would be possible to observe and give warning if preparations were being made for aggressive action. (Presumably these units would be under the control of the proposed United Nations agency.) In turn the West has pronounced this inadequate. Although the Western powers have not yet specifically given up the demand for complete inspection, at Geneva President Eisenhower brought forward another suggestion — mutual concession of the right of aerial inspection coupled with the ex-

change of blue-prints of military installations and armament factories. His Government is still pressing this proposal, though it aroused some scepticism at the time. It was also, as has been seen, at Geneva that Sir Anthony Eden suggested mutual rights of inspection in an area in central Europe where a 'thinning-out' of forces would take place — a proposal that emphasises the close connection between the disarmament problem and the German impasse. It was put forward, however, merely as a practicable first step which would help to reduce tension and possibly lead to the devising of more adequate safeguards.

Since the Geneva meeting, discussion has continued around these suggestions, complicated by further proposals concerning the notification, limitation and eventual cessation of atomic test explosions. It has also been marked, as always, by continued Soviet insistence — though it is not clear how far this must be regarded as a necessary pre-condition — that overseas bases on foreign territories should also be given up. The main further development has been Soviet acceptance in principle of the proposal for aerial inspection, though Soviet spokesmen continue to describe it as a side-issue. Considerable discussion has thus been devoted to the areas to be covered by this arrangement. While the United States proposals for Europe include Scandinavia and a small strip of the USSR but go no further south than the Adriatic coast and also exclude western France, the Soviet plan excludes all but the fringe of Scandinavia and a tiny segment of Soviet territory, but reaches into England as far as Greenwich and includes most of France and Italy and the Balkans to the southern frontier of Albania. In the Pacific area, while the USA proposes to include Alaska and an equivalent area of Siberia, the USSR wishes to include the whole of the United States west of the Great Lakes and offers an equivalent area of its eastern territories. The United States has also recently accepted in principle the Soviet proposal for 'control points'; but the West still appears to be insisting in addition upon a complete system of international inspection more far-reaching than the USSR seems likely to accept.

In August 1957 the West drew up a 'working paper' which appeared to be a sincere attempt to state their proposals comprehensively and meet Russian objections. In particular, they accepted the Soviet proposal for control points, and the placing

of the suggested International Control Organisation under the aegis of the UN Security Council, with each member of the executive organ to have the right of veto. It was proposed to submit this paper to an enlarged Commission representing 26 nations. The Russians, however, rejected it out of hand as 'useless' and withdrew from the Commission. Thus, for the moment, the work of the Commission has lapsed.

Nevertheless, if 'massive retaliation' would in fact be suicidal as a means of defence, it seems advisable that, whether or not the Russians are willing to negotiate further, the West should seriously consider the unilateral abolition of their atomic weapons.

Britain and the Future

In the course of the preceding chapters, we have surveyed, region by region, the main problems of world affairs at the present day. It will be for the reader to decide whether we have established in detail the general thesis with which we set out: that the effects upon Britain's position of the revolutionary changes in the world situation since 1939 compel a radical alteration in her traditional foreign and colonial policies — an alteration in the direction of more serious attention to our alliances, and closer association with the various movements towards international organisation, and also towards a marked acceleration in the social, economic and political advancement of our dependencies. For this latter purpose the help of world organisations will be necessary — which means in effect that we must press the United States to give liberal support to suitable new organisations.

What role can we accord Britain in the new phase of world affairs? Britain's new role, the present writer would suggest, can be a unique and distinguished one, leaving no room for feelings of injured pride. Though it can be much more effectively carried out if our economy is strengthened, it is a role of influence rather than power.

As has been repeatedly recognised since 1945 in the consideration given our views and wishes by the United States — consideration much greater than that accorded to any other ally and out of all proportion to our power resources — Britain is a most valuable asset to the West. This is largely because of

her immense contribution in the past to the extension of western civilisation throughout the world. Through the long chain of Commonwealth countries and their thousand-and-one links with their neighbours, British thought and political maturity, and standards of government and fair dealing — and even the quality of British material achievements — have had a tremendous influence, only half-appreciated in this country, and have won the British people enormous respect.

Though so many British people appear to find it unpalatable that Britain's contribution to the course of world affairs must now be made through influence rather than military strength, respect for this island is still so profound and wide-spread that this influence can still be a major force in the world, on the Western side. One indication of the persistent trust accorded us is the fact that already the Suez adventure seems to have been dismissed as merely a temporary aberration. The continuance of this trust and influence is dependent mainly upon the maintenance by British governments of our traditional standards of realism, common-sense, integrity and tolerance.

INDEX

Abadan, 314, 342–3
Abdullah, Emir (King), 301–2, 310
Abdullah, Sheikh, 262
Abdul Rahman, Tenku, 71–2
Abd ur-Rahman al-Mahdi, 335
Abu Dhabi, 337
Abyssinia (*see* Ethiopia)
Achimota College, 61
Aden, 41, 53, 337
Aden Protectorates, 41, 44, 337–8, 303 (map)
Adenauer, Dr. K., 174, 179, 183–4, 185, 192–4, 196–9
Afghanistan, 257–8, 318
African Continental Bank, 67
African native farming methods, 78
Afro-Asian Conference (*see* Bandung Conference)
Afro-Asian countries, 1, 2–3, 250, 273; and the racial problem, 77; and repression of Hungary, 147, Bandung Conference, 229, 230; and the United States, 263, 294; SUNFED proposal, 294
Aga Khan, The, 102
Alamein Battle, 304
Al Azhari, 335
Albania, 159, 162
Aleutian Islands, 226
Algeria, 104, 344–5
Amman base, 305, 320
Amoy, 227
Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, 1954, 315–316
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1936, 304, 314, 334
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 342–3
Anglo-Iraq Agreement, 318–19
Angola, 103
Annam, 276, 277
Anti-aircraft defence, 347
ANZAM agreement, 282
ANZUS Pact, 31, 36, 242, 278, 281, 282
'Apartheid', 80–91, 93; motivation, 81–83; social aspects, 83–4, 88, 90; economic aspect, 84, 89–90; political aspect, 84–6; in education, 84; Group Areas Act, 83–4, 89; removal of 'coloured' voters from common roll, 84–6; South Africa Act amended, 85–6; native living conditions, 87; Tomlinson Report, 89–90; Nationalist Party attitudes, 90–1; United Party view, 91; Suppression of Communism Act, 91; and the Commonwealth, 35
Arab countries, backwardness, 297–9; hostility to West, 289–300; recent history, 300–7; and Israel, 304, 307–312; Arab nationalism, 300, 305, 309–320, 327; and UN, 124–5
Arab Federation, 327
Arab League, 296–7, 299, 302, 305; and Palestine War, 307–12; and the Baghdad Pact, 314, 315, 316, 321, 326
Arab Legion, 305, 319
Arab refugees, 306, 311
ARAMCO, 306
Arctic, strategic importance, 153–6
Armenians, 300
Ashanti Federation, 63–4
'Asia-Firsters', 225
Assyrians, 300
Aswan Dam, 321–3
Atlantic Charter, 112
Atomic power, 201, 210–12
Australia, 23, 34, 242; and Statute of Westminster, 23; and Britain, 29, 33, 36; and Middle East, 36; and the United States, 31, 36, 242, 278; and Indo-China, 278; and south east Asia, 30, 281–2, 292–3; and Indonesia, 287–9; and New Guinea, 41
Austria, 161, 188–9, 204, 279
Automation, 201, 213
Awolowo, Mr., 66
Azad Kashmir, 263
Azikwe, Dr., 66–8

Baghdad Pact, 296, 316–20, 326–7, 340, 344
Bahrein, 336–7, 303 (map)
'Balance-of-power' system, 108–10, 126–127, 149, 170
Balfour Declaration, 1917, 301
Balfour Formula, 1926, 22, 23
Balkan Pact, 159–60, 166, 340–1
Bandaranaike, Mr. S., 270, 285
Bandung Conference, 1955, 229, 266, 270, 282–5
Bangkok Conference, 1955, 281
Bao Dai, 277, 290, 291
Barbados, 75
Basutoland, 35
Bechuanaland, 35
Belgian colonial policy, 106; racial policy, 105–7
Belgian Congo, 105–7, 215; native living standards, 87
Belgium, 159, 161, 176, 180, 190; and the European movement, 202, 204, 210, 213, 214, 215
Benelux Union, 202
Bengal, 255–6
Berlin, 144, 158, 171–2, 173–4, 203
Bevin, Mr. E., 144, 203
Bhakra Dam, 259
Blundell, Mr. Michael, 101
Bonin Islands, 245
Bonnéfous Plan, 205
Bonn Treaties, 181–2
Bourguiba, M., 345
Boxer Risings, 221
Brazzaville Conference, 1947, 105
Britain, parliamentary system, 216; approach to politics, 128; economic situation, 7–17, 32, 356; industrial production, 5; agricultural subsidies, 219; Sterling Area, 10, 12–15, 30, 32, 217; 1957 Defence White Paper, 349, 351; and rise of nationalism, 6–7, 328; and nuclear defence, 349, 351, 354; and disarmament, 353–6; and UN, 119, 125, 144; and NATO, 156, 158–159, 164, 165–6, 168–9; and the European Movement, 175–6, 200, 206–7, 216–17; and EDC, 177–80; and ECSC, 209; and Euratom, 211–212; and the Common Market, 216–219; and WEU, 179–80; and the Council of Europe, 204; and the future, 356–7; and the Commonwealth, 19, 29, 34, 38–9; and ANZUS Pact, 36–7; and Ceylon, 270–1; and Chinese Empire, 221–2, 238; and Communist China, 224–5, 233; and Cyprus, 328–34; and Greece, 341; and Germany 171–3, 177–80, 190–191, 192–3; and Iceland, 166; and India, 256, 265, 292; and Indo-China, 278, 291–2; and Indonesia, 287; and Israel, 301, 304, 307–10; and Japan, 222, 225, 243; and the Middle East, 296–7, 300–5, 307, 314–27, 334–8; and Pakistan, 256; and South African Protectorates, 35; and south east Asia, 30, 281–2, 292–294; and Spain, 160; and Tibet, 238; and (Tsarist) Russia, 238; and Turkey, 341; and the United States, 12–13, 211, 221, 233, 278, 308, 356; and USSR, 143, 144; and West Germany, 182; and Yugoslavia, 159
British colonial policy, 42–79, 293; criticism of, 42, 48, 54, 56, 77, 139–140; history of expansion, 43; political development, 43–54; Legislative Council system, 44–6; recent revolution in, 46–8; strategic bases, 53, and anthropology, 49–51; social and economic development, 54–60; colonial universities, 59; investment, 15; proposed UN development agency, 59–60 (*see also* various colonies)
British colonial policy, racial policy, 77–81, 1923 pronouncement, 91–2, 93; in Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 80–1, 96–9; in Kenya, 99–102; in other colonies, 102–3.
British Guiana, 75
British Honduras, 75
Brussels Treaty, 158–9, 180
Buddhism, in Burma, 290; in Ceylon, 270
Buganda, Kabaka of, 53, 68–70
Bulganin, Marshal, 139–40, 147, 193
Bulgaria, 162
Buraimi Oasis, 337
Burghers, 270
Burma, 24, 274, 277, 282, 284, 286, 289–290, 292

Cairo Conference, 1943, 226

Cambodia, 276, 280, 281, 284, 292
Cameroons, 41
Canada, 20, 22, 163, 280, 292–3; and NATO, 154, 159, 163, 167, and the United States, 31
Canberra Pact, 36
Caribbean, 296
Central African Federation (*see* Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of)
Ceylon, 33–4, 270–2, 273, 284, 292; and Britain, 29
Chandernagore, 264
Chiang Kai-Shek, 222, 226–8, 289
China, 220–38; under Manchus, 220–2, 275; Kuomintang rule, 222–4; Communist rule, 224–38
China (Communist), 133–4, 224–33, 241, 353; exclusion from UN, 114, 116–17; economic development, 230–233; armed forces, 233; attitude to nationality, 274–5, 283–4; and Ceylon, 270; and Formosa, 226–30; and India, 252, 266–7, 268, 290, and Indo-China, 277, 279; and Japan, 241, 243, 245, and Korea, 109, 247–249; and Nepal, 266–7; and south east Asia, 274–5, 282–5; and Tibet, 238; and the United States, 283–4, and the USSR, 233–8; and Viet Minh, 292
China (Nationalist), 114, 123 (*see also* Kuomintang)
Chinese, in Indonesia, 283–4, in Malaya, 70–4, 284, in Singapore, 73–4; in south east Asia, 274–5
Chinese Communists (before 1949), 222–4
Chou-en-Lai, 229, 283–4
Churchill, (Sir) Winston, 112, 203
Cochin China, 276
'Co-existence', 265, 267, 284 (*see also* 'Panch Shila')
Colombo Plan, 243, 281, 292–4
'Colombo Powers', 283
'Colonialism', resentment of, 251, 273–274, 285, 288
Common Market (*see* European Common Market)
Commonwealth, 18–39, 168, 357; evolution, 20–5, present structure, 25–30; Conferences, 26–7, 37; strategic interests, 31; economic ties, 32–3; common culture, 33–4; strains, 34–7; proposals for strengthening, 37–9; British policy towards, 19, 34, 39; and British monarchy, 24; High Commissioners, 28; trade, 217–19; defence co-operation, 29–30; bases, 29; economic co-operation, 30; migration, 30; and decline of British naval power, 31; and South Africa, 35–6; and Suez crisis, 37; position of Rhodesia Federation, 45; and the Common Market, 215, 217–19; seat on Security Council, 114; and Burma, 289; and Japan, 243; and Korea, 248; and south east Asia, 282
Commonwealth Conferences — 1911, 38; 1926, 22, 1932, 32, 1949, 24, 38; 1950, 292; 1955, 30; 1956, 270
Commonwealth Joint Supply Council, 38–9
Commonwealth Relations Office, 28
Communism, 127–48, 273–5, 352, theory of, 129–34; and agriculture, 135–6, 231–2 (in China), refutation, 136–40; and foreign policy, 140–5; since Stalin, 145–8, antipathy of United States, 151–2; in China, 224–232, in Greece, 341, in Hungary, 147; in India, 251, 269; in Indo-China, 276–7; in Indonesia, 288; in Japan, 246; in Middle East, 299; in Persia, 341–2, in Poland, 147; in USSR, 132, 134, 135, 140–8; in Western Europe, 140, 164
Communist bloc, 250–3, 352; and Goa, 265; and nuclear defence, 346
Communist China (*see* China, Communist)
Communist Party (USSR) 20th Congress, 1956, 146
Council of Europe, 175–6, 178, 180, 182, 183, 200, 206, 209; constitution, 203–5 (*see also* European movement)
Coutts, Mr. W. F., 100
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 23
Curzon, Lord (Curzon Line), 143
Cyprus, 53, 66, 166, 295, 328–34
Cyrenaica, 307
Czechoslovakia, 162; Munich Conference, 143; Soviet seizure of, 158, 173, 203; 'Rapacki Plan', 194; and Egypt, 320, 323

Dahran base, 303 (map), 306, 326
Dalai Lama, 238
Danquah, Dr. D., 61
Dardanelles, 340
De Gaullists, 177
Denmark, and NATO, 159, 161, 176, 190; and the European movement, 204, 216, 218
D.E.W. Line, 154
Dialectical Materialism, 129–32 (*see also* Communism)
'Diarchy', 45
Diem, Ngo Dinh, 290, 292
Dien Bien Phu, 277, 278
Disarmament, 192–3, 353–6
'Disengagement' proposals, 191–4
Dollar gap, 10, 12–15
Dominions (*see* Commonwealth)
Dow Commission, 51
Dulles, Mr. J. F., 157, 179, 230, 263, 278, 325
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 1944, 112, 121
Dunkirk, Treaty of, 158
Durand Line, 257
Durham Report, 20–1

East Africa, 'Indirect rule' in, 48; proposed federation, 53, 68–70; Royal Commission on Land and Population in, 51
East Prussia, 172, 198
Eastern Europe, 141–8
Economic aid, 285, 356; to Greece, 341; to India, 270; to Middle East, 319, 326–7; to Nepal, 266; to south east Asia, 292–4; to South Viet Nam, 291; to Persia, 342, 343–4; to Turkey, 340
Eden, (Sir) Anthony, 179–80, 192–3, 330, 355
EDC (*see* European Defence Community)
Egypt, 300, 304, 310, and the Arab League, 297, 302; neutralism, 284; Nasser regime, 298, 320–3, 338; 1954 agreement with Britain, 314–16, 328; and Sudan, 334–6; Suez crisis, 119, 124–5, 324–6; and French North Africa, 104, 344–5
Eire, 161, 204; and the Commonwealth, 22, 23, 24
Eisenhower, President (General) D. D., 156, 163, 192–3, 227–8, 263, 326–7, 354
'Eisenhower Doctrine', 326–7
Enosis (*see* Cyprus)
Eoka, 333
Estonia, 142
Ethiopia, 304, 334
Etoforu, 245
Euratom, 205, 206–7, 210–12, 214, 215; British attitude, 211–12
European agricultural authority, proposed, 205
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 183, 205–10, 212, 216; constitution, 208–9, 214; and Britain, 206, 209
European Commission, 214
European Common Market, 205, 206–7, 212–19; constitution, 214–15; and Britain, 216–19
European Defence Community (EDC), 157, 175–80, 183, 205, 206; and Britain, 177–9
European Free Trade Area, 216–19
European Investment Bank, 214
'European Movement' (for unification of W. Europe), 174–6, 178, 180, 200–219, motivation, 200–2; origins, 202–204; development, 205–16
European Pact, proposed, 195–6, 197
European Payments Union (EPU), 12–13
European Postal Service, 206
European transport authority, proposed, 205
Europe, Congress of, 1948, 203
Europe, Council of (*see* Council of Europe and 'European Movement')

Faisal I, King, 301–2
Faisal II, King, 305
Farouk, King, 304, 321, 334
'Federal Union' proposal, 202
Fezzan, 307
Finland, 161, 204
Foch, Marshal, 156
Foochow, 227
Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), 120
Ford Foundation, 293
Formosa, 222, 223, 225–30, 233, 245, 281, 349

'Free Thai State', 286, 290
Free Trade Area (*see* European Free Trade Area)
France, 140, 164, 216, 353, 355; and NATO, 164, and EDC, 157, 206; and the European Movement, 201–2, 214, 215, and Suez crisis, 324–6, and Indo-China, 276–8, 290; and Israel, 310; and the German problem, 171–185; and W. Germany, 205; and the Middle East, 300–2, 305; and North Africa, 344–5; and UN, 119, 144; and USSR, 143
Franco, General, 160–1
French colonial policy, 345; French Union, 105, racial policy, 104–5
French colonies, and the Common Market, 215
French Equatorial Africa, 105
French Morocco, 104, 344–5
French North Africa, 104, 164, 177, 344–5
French Union, 105
Fulani, 67

Gandhi, Mahatma, 252, 269
Garcia, President, C. P., 287
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 123, 243
Geneva Conference, 1954, 248–9, 278–280, 291
Geneva ('Summit') Conference, 1955, 191–3, 354–5.
German Democratic Republic (*see* Germany, East)
German Federal Republic (*see* Germany, West)
German problem, 170–99, 279, 352, 355; partition, 171–4; reparations, 172; currency reform, 173–4; reunification discussions, 185–99; proposed neutralisation, 190–6; attitude of Germans, 196–9; eastern provinces, 197–9; fear of resurgence, 158–9
Germany, East, 162, 172–4, 190, 186, 352
Germany, West, 161, 172–99, 292, 352; rearmament; 157, 174–82; and the German problem, 196–9; refugees, 197–9; politics, 174, 196–9; and NATO, 164, 182, 196–7; and European movement, 201, 204, 214, 215, 216; and Council of Europe, 182; and EDC, 174, 179; and WEU, 181–2; and Britain ('support costs'), 182; and France, 182–5; and the Saar, 182–5, and Afghanistan, 258; and Israel, 313
Ghalib bin Ali, 337
Ghana (Gold Coast), 61–5, 33–4, 47, 70; living standards, 87; and South Africa, 27 (*see also* Gold Coast)
Ghulam Mohammed, 256
Gibraltar, 41, 53, 160
Glubb, General J., 305, 320
Goa, 264–5
Gold Coast (Ghana), 61–5, 41, 47–8, 59
Governors-General, 22, 45
'Graduated deterrence', 348–51
Greece, 158, 159–60, 161, 166, 204, 340–341; and Cyprus, 328–34
Grey, Sir Edward, 21
Gruenther, General, 164
Gurkhas, 265–6

Habbaniya airfield, 302, 318
Habomai, 245
Hammarskjold, Dr. D , 122
Hashemites, 301–2, 327
Hatoyama, Mr. I., 244–5
Hausa, 67
Hegel, 129
Hejaz, 301, 302
High Commissioners, Commonwealth, 28
Hitler, 143
Ho Chi Minh, 276–7, 291–2
Hodson, Mr. H. V., 38–9
Holland (*see* Netherlands)
Holy Roman Empire, 202
Hong Kong, 224, 281
Huggins, Sir Godfrey (*see* Malvern, Lord)
Hukbalahaps, 287
Hungary, 147, 162, 167, 168, 207
Hussein, King (of Hejaz), 302
Hussein, King (of Jordan), 305, 320, 326
Hyderabad, 264

Ibadan, University College of, 59, 67
Ibn Saud, King, 302, 306
Ibos, 66–8
Iceland, 159, 161, 165–6, 167, 204
Idris, King, 307

India, 250–5, 258–72, 273, 274, 280–1; and the Commonwealth, 23, 24–5, 33–4, 36; partition, 42, 253–5; and spread of nationalism, 47, 'neutralism', 251–2, 285; Indus dispute, 258–60; Kashmir, 260–4; Hyderabad, 264; princely states, 264; the enclaves, 264–5; Five Year Plan, 267–70; and Colombo Plan, 292–4; and UN, 117, 262–4; and Suez crisis, 325; and Ceylon, 270–2; and Communist China, 265–7, 268, 284, 290; and Cyprus, 333; and Korea, 248; and Nepal, 265–7; and Tibet, 238; and South Africa, 35
Indian Mutiny, 254
Indians, in Ceylon, 270–1; in Kenya, 101; in Malaya, 70, 102; in South Africa, 35, 86; in Tanganyika, 102
Indus dispute, 258–60
'Indirect rule', 48–51
Indo-China, 164, 177, 189, 248, 274, 275–80, 349
Indonesia, 274, 283, 284, 287–9, 292
Inonu, M., 339
Inter-continental missiles, 347
International Bank (for Reconstruction and Development), 59, 293, 323
International Civil Aviation Organisation, 120
International Court of Justice, 120, 122
International Development Corporation, 120
International Labour Office, (ILO), 120
International Monetary Fund, 120, 123, 293
International Telecommunications Union, 120
International Trade Organisation, proposed, 123
Iran (*see* Persia)
Iraq, 295, 300, 301–4, 305, 311, 317–320, 327
Iraq Petroleum Company, 305
Ishibashi, Mr. T., 245–6
Israel, 307–13, 283, 295, 297, 299, 309 (map), 327; Balfour Declaration, 301; and Suez Crisis, 124, 125, 321, 325
Italian Somaliland, 120, 215
Italy, 120, 159, 161, 167, 304; and EDC, 176–7; and WEU, 181; and the European Movement, 176–7, 204, 215, 216; communism in, 140, 164

Jamaica, 75
Japan, 238–46, 284; before 1945, 238–240; occupation, 240–2; economic problems, 242–4; politics, 244–6, Peace Treaty, 226, 242, 245; rearmament, 241–2; Pacific War, 275–276, 287; and (pre-Communist) China, 221–3, 226, and GATT, 123, 243; and Colombo Plan, 243; and Australia and New Zealand, 242; and Britain, 243; and Communist China, 241, 243, 245; and Korea, 109, 247; settlement with USSR, 244–5
Jersualem, 311
Jews (*see* Israel)
Jinnah, M., 254, 256
Jordan, 297, 305–6, 319, 320, 326, 327; and Syria, 301–2; and Israel, 310, 311, 312
Jordan Valley scheme, 312
Jugoslavia (*see* Yugoslavia)

Kabaka of Buganda (*see* Buganda, Kabaka of)
Kafue hydro-electric scheme, 53
Karens, 289
Kariba Gorge hydro-electric scheme, 53
Kashmir, 253, 260–4
Katunake base, 270
Kemal Ataturk, 321, 338–9
Kennan, Mr. G., 194
Kenya, 41; settlement, 92; native policy pronouncement, 1923, 92, 100; Mau Mau, 49, 99; constitution, 100–2; political situation, 101–2, native policy, 99–102; native living standards, 87; Commonwealth forces in, 29; proposed East African Federation, 68
Khatmiya sect, 335
Kibbutzin, 313
Kilimanjaro Producers' Co-operative Association, 102
Kishi, Mr. N., 246
Kissinger, Mr. H. A., 349
Kitchener, Lord, 334, 335
Korea, 109, 222, 223, 242, 245; war, 29, 224, 237, 241, 242, 247–9, 278, 340, 350; and defence policy, 348, 349, 351; economic effects, 12

Korea, North, 247–9
Korea, South, 242, 247–9
Kotelawala, Sir John, 270–1, 284, 285
Kruschev, M. N., 193; denunciation of Stalin, 146–7
Kunashiri, 245
Kuomintang, 222–30, 234–5, 242, 245, 342; refugees in Burma, 289
Kurds, 300, 341, 344
Kuriles, 242, 245
Kuwait, 336, 303 (map)

Land and Population in East Africa, Royal Commission on, 51
Land ownership, need for reform of, in Middle East, 297, 322–3, in Persia, 342; in south east Asia, 287, 290, 291
Lange, Mr. H., 166–7
Laos, 276, 280, 281, 284, 286, 292
Latvia, 142
Lawrence, T. E., 300
League of Nations, 120; need for, 108, 110–11; failure, 111, 113, 149; constitution, 113, 115, 116, 118, 119; mandate system, 41, 120, 301–5; and United States, 111; admission of USSR, 143; and Dominions, 22
Lebanon, 297, 300, 305, 306, 311, 312, and GATT, 123
Lenin, V. I., 129, 134, 232
Lennox-Boyd, Mr. A., 333
Liaquat Ali Khan, 256
Libya, 307
Lie, M. Trygve, 122
Lim Yew Hock, 74
'Little Europe' (France, W. Germany, Italy, Benelux countires), 207
Lithuania, 142
London loan market, importance for Commonwealth, 33
Lugard, Lord, 48
Lukiko, 69
Luxemburg, 159, 161, 176, 180, 183; and the European Movement, 202, 204, 214, 215
Lysenko, 134
Lyttelton, Sir Oliver, 68

MacArthur, General D., 240, 248
MacGill Fence, 154
MacMahon Letters, 300
Mafraq base, 305, 320
Magsaysay, President R., 287
Mahdists, 335
Mahé, 264
Mahendra, King, 266–7
Majlis, 342, 344
Makarios, Archbishop, 332–4
Malacca, 70
Malaya, 33–4, 53, 59, 274, 278, 284; Malayan Union, 70, Federated Malay States, 70; Federation of, 70–73, 74; emergency, 71–3; defence agreement, 73, electoral system, 102–103; Commonwealth forces in, 29, 30; Chinese in, 71–4, 102–3; and SEATO, 282; and Sterling Area, 33; Sultanates, 31
Maldive Islands, 29, 270
Malta, 45, 53, 332; 'integration' proposals, 75–6
Malvern, Lord (Sir Godfrey Huggins), 93
Manchu Emperors, 220, 238
Manchuria, 221, 222, 223, 235–7, 243, 245
Mandate system, 41, 120–1
Manila Conference, 1954 (*see* SEATO)
Mao Tse Tsung, 222, 224, 234, 238, 276
Marne, Second Battle of, 156
Marshall Aid, 158, 203
Marshall, Mr David, 74
Marshall, General G., 151, 203, 225
Martino, Dr. G., 167
Marx, Karl, 129, 139, 140
Marxism (*see* Communism)
Massey, Mr. W. F., 27
Matsu, 227–9
Mboya, Mr. Tom, 101
Menderes, Mr. A., 339
Mendès-France, M. Pierre, 180, 278, 345
'Messina Powers' (France, W. Germany, Italy, Benelux countries), 207
Middle East, importance of, 295–6; oil, 296, 305, 306, 336–8, 343; attack routes, 303 (map), 317
Middle East Defence Organisation, proposed, 314
Mintoff, Mr. D., 75–6
Mirza, Maj.-Gen. I., 256
Mitsubishi combine, 239
Mitsui combine, 239
Mohammed ben Youssef, Sultan, 345
Mohammed Riza, Shah, 304, 342–4

Mongolia, 221, 235–7
Monnet, M. Guy, 209
Mons, 289
Montego Bay Conference, 75
Montreux Convention, 340
Morocco, 307, 344–5
Moscow Conference, 1942, 112
Moselle canal, 184
Moslem Brotherhood, 321–2, 343
Moslem League, 253–7
Moslems, in Middle East, 298–300, 321–2; in USSR, 299; in Turkey, 338–9; in Sudan, 335; in Indonesia, 288; in West Africa, 64, 66 (*see also* Pakistan)
Mountbatten, Lord, 260
Moussadeq, Dr., 343
Mozambique, 103
Muscat and Oman, 337, 303 (map)
Munich Conference, 1938, 143
Mutesa II (*see* Buganda, Kabaka of)

Nagy, Mr. I., 147
Namirembe proposals, 69–70
Nasser, Lt.-Col. A., 160, 314, 320–3, 324, 327, 335
Nationalism, 1–7, 18, 40, 110, 220, 273–274, 276; in Middle East, 295, 300, 305, 320–1, 327, 328, 336; in North Africa, 344–5
Nationalist China (*see* China, Nationalist)
NATO, 149–69, 207, 295, 340, 345; need for, 149–50; US participation, 150–6, 280, close unity, 156–7, origins, 158–9; membership, 159–62; organisation, 163–4, development, 164–9; and the German problem, 170–1, 174–6, 179–82, 185–98; and West Germany (support costs), 182; and Cyprus, 330–34
Nazimuddin, Mr. K., 256
Neguib, General, 314, 321–2
Nehru, Pandit J., 160, 251–2, 261–3, 269, 272
Nepal, 265–7, 284, 292
Neutralism, 160; Yugoslavia, 160, 284; other European countries, 161; Egypt, 160, 284; India, 251–2, 160, 284; in Pakistan, 264; in Ceylon, 271; in south east Asia, 283–4; Saudi Arabia, 284
Netherlands, 159, 161, 176, 180, 190; and the European Movement, 202, 204, 213, 214, 215, 218; and Indonesia, 287–9
New Guinea (East), 41
New Guinea (West or Dutch), (Irian), 288–9
New Zealand, 242, and the Commonwealth, 23, 27, 31, 34, 36; trade with Britain, 33; Maoris, 49; forces in Malaya, 30, 282, and Western Samoa, 41; and the United States, 31, 36, and Indo-China, 278; and south east Asia, 281–2, 292–3
Nigeria, 41–5, 48, 53, 59, 65–8; living standards, 87
Nile, 321–3, 334–5
Nkrumah, Dr. K., 53, 61–5
Nordic Council, 161
Norstad, General L., 164, 168
North Africa, (French), 164, 177, 344–5
North Borneo, (British), 44
Northern Rhodesia, 52; industrial colour bar, 69, 94–5
'Northern Tier' Alliance, 316–17
Norway, 159, 161, 167, 176, 190, 204; and the European Movement, 204, 216
Nuclear weapons, 1, 2, 126–7, 168–9, 191, 201, 344, development and implications, 346–56; and world government, 108, 125; and NATO, 165, manufacture forbidden to Germany, 181; Euratom safeguards, 210–11; and Formosa crisis, 230, and Indo-China crisis, 278; and SEATO, 281–282; and Middle East strategy, 316–317; proposed abolition, 352–6; and disarmament, 353–6; radioactivity from, 348
Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 349
Nuri es-Said, 318
Nyasaland, 41, 45, 52

Oberlander, Dr., 197
Oder-Neisse line, 171, 172, 198
OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation), 203, 207; atomic research project, 211
'Off-shore islands', 227
Oil, 305, 306, 336–8, 342–3; world reserves, 296

Olivier, Dr. Borg, 76
Oman, 337, 303 (map)
'Open Door' policy, 221, 224
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (*see* OEEC)
Organisation for Trade Co-operation, proposed, 123
Ottawa Conference, 1932, 32
Outer Mongolia, 235–7 (*see also* Mongolia)
Owen Falls Dam, 69, 334

'Pacific Charter', 281
Pacific War Council, 36
Pakhtoonistan (Pathanistan), 257–8
Pakistan, 252–64, 273, 292, 307; origins, 253–5, politics, 255–7, foreign policy, 252–3, 284, 285; and the Commonwealth, 24, 33–4, 36; Indus dispute, 258–60; Kashmir, 260–4, and Afghanistan, 257–8, and Baghdad Pact, 316–18; and SEATO, 281, 284, 285, and Britain, 256; and the United States, 256, 263–4, 281; and the USSR, 258
Palestine, 301, 302–4, 307–9 (*see also* Israel)
'Panch Shila', 267, 284
Panchen Lama, 238
Papagos, Field Marshal, 341
'Partnership', 79–81, 91–103, 107; definition, 92–3; Colonial Office 1923 pronouncement, 91–2, political aspect, common roll, 93–4, economic aspect, 94–5, 105; in trade unionism, 94; breach in colour bar on Copper Belt, 94–5; social aspects, 95–6; Rhodesia University College, 96; attitude of electorate, 96–7; new electoral systems — in Federation, 97–8, in S. Rhodesia, 98; 'Partnership' in Kenya, 99–102; in Tanganyika, 102; in Malaya and Singapore, 102–3; in Uganda, 103; compared with policies of other powers, 103–7; importance for world situation, 77, 107
Pathanistan (Pakhtoonistan), 257–8
Pathet Lao, 280
Pearl Harbour, 151, 223
Pearson, Mr. L., 167
Penang, 70
Perry, Commodore, 239
Persia, 300, 317, 338, 341–4; wartime occupation, 304, 342; Abadan, 314, 342–3; and Baghdad Pact, 317, 318, 344
Pescadores, 228
Pflimlin Plan, 205
Philippines (Philippine Republic), 226, 274, 281, 284, 286–7, 292
Pibul Songgram, Marshal, 286
Pilsudski, Marshal, 143
Pinetree Fence, 154
Pleven Plan (*see* EDC)
Poland, 172, 194, 280; and USSR, 143–144, 147
Pomerania, 172
Pondicherry, 264
Porkkala base, 161, 189, 279
Port Arthur, 198, 222, 235–7, 239, 279
Portugal, 159, 161, 204; racial policy in colonies, 103; and India, 264–5
Potsdam Conference, 1945, 172, 226, 245
Prasad, Dr., 24
Protectorate, definition, 40–1

Qatar, 337, 303 (map)
Quemoy, 227–9

Racial problem (*see* 'Apartheid' and 'Partnership')
Radcliffe, Lord, 333
Ranas, 265–7
'Rapacki Plan', 194
Razmara, 343
Reith, Lord, 58
Reith Lectures, 1957, 194
Renner, Dr. K., 189
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of, 52–3, 59; 'Partnership' in, 79–81, 91–99, 107, motives for federation, 80–1; status, 45 (*see also* 'Partnership')
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, University College of, 96
Rice, 286
Ridgway, General, 164
Riza Khan, Shah, 304, 342
Rockfeller Foundation, 293
Rome Treaties, 1957, 207
Roosevelt, President F. D., 112, 151, 225
Rumania, 162
Russia (Tsarist) and China, 221, 235; and Tibet, 238
Ryukyu Islands, 245

Saar, 182–5, 205
SACEUR, 163, 181
SACLANT, 163
Sakhalin, 245
Samoa (Western), 41
San Francisco Conference, 1945, 112, 116, 121, 122, 124
Sardauna of Sokoto, 67–8
Sarit, Marshal, 286
Satellite, space, 348
Saud, King Ibn, 302, 306
Saud Ibn Aziz, King, 306, 326
Saudi Arabia, 284, 297, 306, 336, 337; Wahhabi sect, 300, and Hashemites, 302, 319, 320, since Suez crisis, 326
'Scatter' system for radio propagation, 165
Schuman, M. Robert, 175
Schuman Plan (*see* EDSC)
SEACDT (*see* SEATO)
SEATO (SEACDT), 258, 263, 270, 278, 280–2, 284, 285, 287
Senanayake, Mr. D. S., 270
Senussi, 307
Serbia, 110
Shaiba airfield, 302, 318
Shigemitsu, Mr., 244
Shikotan, 245
Siam, 274, 278, 281, 284, 285–6, 289, 292
Silesia, 172
Simonstown base, 29
Singapore, 41, 53, 73–4, 102–3
Singh, Sir Hari, 260
Singh, Dr. K. I., 266–7
Sinhalese, 270
Sinkiang, 221, 235–7
Six, The (France, W. Germany, Italy, Benelux countries), 207
Smuts, Field Marshal J. C., 121
Somaliland, Italian, 120, 215
South Africa, Afrikaner-British rivalry, 36, 84, 85–6; and the Commonwealth, 22, 27, 29, 34–5, 36; and the British Protectorates, 35; and South West Africa, 35, 41; and India, 35, 86; gold export, 10 (*see also* 'Apartheid')
South African Protectorates, 35, 44
South West Africa, 35, 41
Southern Rhodesia, 52; 'Partnership in', 79–81, 91–9, 107; native living standards, 87; new franchise proposals, 98
Spain, 160–1, 204, 307
Stalin, J., 129, 134, 145–7, 234
Statute of Westminster, 1931, 23
Sterling Area, 10, 12–15, 30, 32, 33, 217
Straits Settlements, 70
Streit, Mr. Clarence K., 202
Sudan, 297, 314, 323, 334–6
Sudetenland, 198
Suez Crisis, 119, 124–5, 308, 324–5, 357
Suhrawardy, Mr. H. S., 257
Sukarno, Dr., 288
Suez base, 304, 314–16, 328, 332, 334
Suez Canal, 295, 317, 324
Suez Crisis, 167, 324–6, 332; and UN, 119, 124–5
'Summit' Conference, 1955, 191–3
Sun Yat Sen, Dr., 222
SUNFED proposal, 294
'Supranationalism', 176, 205, 206, 208–209, 211
Swaziland, 35
Sweden, 161; and the European Movement, 204, 216
Switzerland, 161, 204
Sykes-Picot Agreement, 301
Syngman Rhee, President, 242, 247, 249
Syria, 297, 298, 305, 306, 338; minorities, 300; and Iraq, 301, 302; and Israel, 310, 312, refugees in, 311; since Suez crisis, 320, 326, 327; and GATT, 123; 'Greater Syria' projects, 301–2

Tachen Islands, 228
Tamils, 270
Tanganyika, 41, 68, 102
Templer, General, 320
Thailand (*see* Siam)
Thais, 286, 290
'Third Force', 201–2
Thrace, 160, 340
Tibet, 238, 265, 266
Tito, Marshal, 160, 189, 234
Todd, Mr. R. S. Garfield, 94, 98, 107
Togoland, 41
Tomlinson, Professor T. R., 89–90
Tongking, 276
Transjordan, 301–2, 305
Tredgold Commission, 98
Tribhuvana, King, 266
Trincomalee, 29, 270
Trinidad, 75
Tripartite Declaration, 1951, 310, 320, 325

Tripolitania, 307
Trucial Coast (Trucial Oman), 337, 303 (map)
Truman, President H., 227, 247–8, 308
Trust Territories, 41, 120–1
Tudeh Party, 341–2
Tunisia, 104, 344–5
Turkey, 300, 315, 338–40; and NATO, 159, 161, 166, and Balkan Pact, 159–160, 340; and Council of Europe, 204; and Baghdad Pact, 316–17, 320; and Cyprus, 329–34, 341; and Korea, 248, and the United States, 316, 340
Twentieth Century Empire, 38–9

U Nu, 290
Uganda, 41, 53, 59, 68–70, 92, 334; electoral system, 103; Kabaka of Buganda dispute, 68–70
Umma Party, 335
UNESCO, 120
United Arab Republic, 327
United Nations, The, 108–25, 126–7, 144, 149–50, 168, 250; need for, 108–111; origins, 112–13; the veto, 112, 113–16, 118; Security Council, 113–117; General Assembly, 112, 113, 118–119; and Korean War, 29, 114, 247–249; amendment procedure, 115; membership, 118; and Communist China, 114, 116–17, 229; and smaller powers, 3, 115–16; 'uniting for peace' procedure, 118–19; Trusteeship system, 35, 41, 120–1; Strategic Trust Territories, 245, Economic and Social Council, 120–2; International Court of Justice, 120, 122; Secretariat, 120, 122–3; associated organisations, 120; provision of international force, UNEF, 124; and disarmament, 124–125, 353–6; and colonies, 59–60, 120, 121, 294; SUNFED proposal, 294; and Cyprus, 333, and 'Eisenhower Doctrine', 326; and Formosa, 229; and Israel, 308–12; and Kashmir, 261–4; admission of Japan, 244; and Suez Base, 314; and Suez Crisis, 119, 124–5
United States, system of government, 151–2; American Revolution, 20; antipathy to communism, 225–6; 233; isolationism, 150–1, 157; and the strategic revolution, 153–6; industrial production, 5, 207, 268; and world gold price, 10: strategic air force, 347, 307; and nuclear defence, 346, 356; and economic aid, 266, 291, 294, 319, 326, 340, 341, 342, 343–4, 356; and Colombo Plan, 294; and SUNFED proposal 294; and colonial development, 59–60; Democratic and Republican foreign policies, 227, 228; ANZUS Pact, 31, 36; and the Baghdad Pact, 316, 318, 319, 326, and Afghanistan, 258; and Britain, 12–13, 211, 221, 233, 278, 356, and Canada, 31; and Communist China, 117–18, 223–30, 233, 241, 243, 245, 283–4; and Chinese Empire, 221–222; and the European Movement, 201, 203, 211; and ECSC, 207, 208; and EDC, 157, 174, 179; and Euratom, 211; and the German problem, 171–175, 179, 191–3; and Greece, 341; and India, 256, 263–4, 265; and Indo-China, 278–82; and Israel, 308–310, 304, 313; and Japan, 239–43, 245; and Jordan, 326, and Korea, 247–9; and the Kuomintang, 223–4, 225–30; and League of Nations, 111; and the Middle East, 295, 304, 306, 307, 316, 318, 319, 323, 324–7; and NATO, 150–9, 164–8; and Nepal, 266; and Pakistan, 256, 257, 263–4; and Persia, 342–4; and south east Asia, SEATO, 286–7, 289, 290–4; and Turkey, 340, and United Nations, 119, 122, 144, and USSR, 127, 143, 144
Universal Postal Union, 120
UNWRA, 311
USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), 126–48, 201, 207, 216; agriculture, 135–6, industrial production, 5, armed forces, 158, 164, 175; strategic air force, 347; submarines, 190; foreign policy, 140–8, 251–2; and nuclear defence, 346–9, 353; and disarmament, 353–6; and United Nations, 119, 125, 126, 144; and the veto, 115, 118; living standards, 137; 'White Russian' invasions, 143; and Europe before 1939, 143–4; since Stalin, 145–8, and Eastern Europe, 158, 162, 173, 190; and Hungary,

147; and Poland, 143–4, 147; and Scandinavia, 161; and NATO, 165, 168; and the Middle East, 295, 296, 299, 300, 301, 304, 307, 312, 325–6; and the Baghdad Pact, 320–1; and Afghanistan, 258; and Afro-Asian countries, 294: and Burma, 292; and Egypt, 323; and the German problem, 170–99; and Indo China, 277; and Indonesia, 288, and Israel, 308, and Korean War, 114, 247–8; and Persia, 304, 341–2, 344; and south east Asia, 292; and Turkey, 340; and United States, 151–6, 158, and Yugoslavia, 159–60, 340

Van Naters Plan, 183
Versailles Peace Conference, 1919, 111, 143
Viet Minh, 276–8, 290–2
Viet Nam (*see* Indo-China)

Wahhabis, 300
Ward, Sir Joseph, 27
Warndt coal-field, 184
Warsaw Pact, 162
Washington, George, 150
Welensky, Sir Roy, 98, 107
West Africa, proposed federation, 53, 62
West Germany (*see* Germany, West)
West Indies, 52, 74–5
West Irian, 288
Western bloc, 250–3, 265, 270, 273–4, 356–7; and Germany, 170–1, 185–9, 190–6, and nuclear defence, 346, 349; and disarmament, 353–6; and the Middle East, 302–5, 312, 327; and south east Asia, 282–5
WEU (Western European Union), 178–182
Wheelus Field, 307
Wilson, President Woodrow, 113
World Health Organisation (WHO), 120
Woomera Rocket Range, 29
World War I, origins, 110

Yalta Conference, 1945, 112, 171, 198
Yang di-Pertuan Besar, 72
Yemen, 297, 307, 327, 336, 338
Yoruba, 66
Yoshida, Mr. S., 244
Yugoslavia, 158; breach with USSR, 234, 279; neutrality, 204, 284; and Balkan Pact, 159–60, 340
Yunnan, 286

Zahedi, General, 343, 344
Zaibatsu, 239, 241
Zanzibar, 44
Zionist movement, 307–8 (*see also* Israel)

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO. LTD
THE UNIVERSITY PRESS, GLASGOW