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PRINCIPIA POLITICA

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INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT

EMPIRE & COMMERCE IN INDIA

IMPERIALISM AND CIVILIZATION

AFTER THE DELUGE

A Study in Communal Psychology

Volumes I and II

THE VILLAGE IN THE JUNGLE

THE HOTEL

PRINCIPIA POLITICA

A STUDY OF COMMUNAL PSYCHOLOGY

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PREFACE

After the war of 1914–1918 I began a book which, when the first volume was published in 1931, I called *After the Deluge*. It was, as its sub-title indicated, a study of communal psychology, and I knew, when I began to write it and when I had finished Volume I, that, if I went on with it, it would be a long book of many volumes, an occupation which would last me as long as my mind or life lasted. For I wanted to investigate the relation between the social or political beliefs and desires of Europeans in the 19th and 20th centuries and their communal actions or the events of history. In particular, I was concerned to study the relation between the great world wars and the beliefs and desires regarding such concepts as democracy, liberty, equality, imperialism, and socialism. I began, rightly I think, to treat the subject chronologically, and in the first volume I dealt with the communal psychology of democracy, its general nature and its relation to the French revolution of 1789. I am a slow and ruminant writer and it took me eight years to write the second volume, which was published in the year when the second great war of the 20th century began. This second volume dealt with the development of democracy and the revolutionary psychology of democracy in the years between 1789 and 1832, and it was in the main concerned with the constitutional revolution, so eminently British, consummated in the Reform Act of 1832 and the unconstitutional revolution, so eminently French, which in 1830 substituted Louis-Philippe for Charles X. In fact this second volume brought me down chronologically to the great year of revolutions, 1848.

I had originally intended to continue in the same way chronologically in the third volume, dealing with the communal psychology of 1848 as I had with that of 1789, 1830, and 1832. But when I began to write it, I found—for reasons which I discuss in the first chapter of this book—that I required a somewhat different form and approach for the investigation of the events and ideas and ideals of the last 100 years. This book is indeed the third volume of *After the Deluge*, but it breaks the chronological form; it is partly political autobiography and is

mainly concerned with the fundamental political psychology of our era, with the contemporary form which the eternal struggle between liberty and authoritarianism has assumed today. It deals with the modern totalitarian state, the Germany of Hitler and the Russia of Stalin, its nature, its communal psychology, and its standards of value. I hope, in another volume, to deal with the modern democratic state in the same way.

A word should be said about the title. When Maynard Keynes read the first volume of *After the Deluge*, he said to me that I had chosen a bad title, that the book was really a study of the fundamental principles of political thought and action, and that I ought to have called it *Principia Politica*. I have followed his advice posthumously.

CHAPTER I

THE LAST HUNDRED YEARS

I WAS born in the year 1880, when Victoria was Queen and Mr. Gladstone Prime Minister. I am, therefore, 72 years old. For the first 24 years of my life I was subjected to a process which is called education; that is to say I proceeded from a kindergarten through the hands of a tutor and two private schools to a public school, and thence to a university. In 1904 I left the university and entered a profession, the profession of a civil servant in Ceylon. It was a political profession and I remained in the Ceylon Civil Service for about six and a half years; in 1911 I resigned. During those six and a half years I was a cog in a political machine which governed Ceylon, an island with an area of about 25,000 square miles and a population of about 4,000,000. During those six and a half years I was an almost purely political animal; for 10, 12, or 14 hours a day, and every day, I was occupied with politics, first as the assistant to the administrator of a province and later for two and a half years as the police magistrate, judge, and administrator of a district. When I escaped from the civil service and Ceylon and returned to live in England and London, I did not escape from politics; they have pursued me or I have pursued them ever since. I became a journalist and a writer of books, and most of my journalism and most of my books have been political. I have spent much of my spare time in work for a political party and for political societies. I have stood unsuccessfully for parliament and I am a member of the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal.[1]

Thus out of a life of 72 years, 24 have been spent in education

[1] Since the above was written, I have been Clerk to the Rodmell Parish Council. The Parish Assembly and Council have their roots deep in English history and the history of English democracy. Rodmell is a small village and parish with only 189 names on the Register of Electors. If I had not been Clerk, I should never have guessed the amount of work which he has to do. I doubt whether the Clerk in 1880 did a hundredth part of what I do. This confirms what I say later on.

—a process intended presumably to be preparatory, in some way, to the adult occupation of living—and 48 years in professions and occupations concerned with politics. By politics I mean the governmental framework or organization of society. In this sense the dividing line between political and non-political occupations or professions is not clearly or rigidly marked; there are border-line cases in which we may be doubtful to which class the occupation belongs, though generally the distinction is obvious and important. In so far as a man produces goods or services which are directly consumed or used by the individuals who constitute society, he is an economic or artistic or scientific animal, but not a political animal; he is a political animal only in so far as he is occupied in constructing the framework or manipulating the machinery of government or society within which the economic, artistic, or scientific man is to produce his goods or services. Thus at one end, the Member of Parliament or the member of a Rural District Council, a civil servant in the Treasury or the Board of Trade, a judge or a police magistrate, are political animals; at the other end the farmer, baker, miner, engineer, schoolmaster, doctor, engine-driver, artist, writer are economic, artistic, and scientific animals. The border-line cases only make the distinction clearer; it may, for instance, be difficult to decide whether a civil servant in Whitehall, at the Ministry of Education, or the Ministry of Health is or is not engaged in a political occupation. The truth appears to be that sometimes he is and sometimes he is not. Where he is dealing with the framework of society within which, and the governmental and administrative machinery through which, the teacher or doctor is to provide educational or medical service, his function is political; where he is dealing with the contents of a curriculum, the building of a school, or the opening of a clinic, his function is economic or scientific.

Looking back over the 72 years of my life, I feel that there is something strange in the fact that so much of it has been occupied, not with living, but with the machinery of living. But the strangeness does not end there; it is not limited to my particular experience, for it is part of a general strangeness, a new and fantastic pattern, which has appeared in human life during the last 50 or 100 years. This pattern has been determined by the encroachment of the machinery of life upon

living and the art of living. The absorption of individuals in politics, the domination of society—economics, art, science—by politics, are only particular examples of this universal pattern in the behaviour of Europeans in the 20th century.

In my father's generation very few people were occupied professionally or permanently with politics. He was himself a barrister;[1] in his class the men made their living in the law, in medicine, or in 'business'; the women had no occupation other than that of mothers and housewives. None of my parents' friends or relations were civil servants or politicians, and when I was a child, except at the time of Mr. Gladstone's Home Rule Bill, politics were rarely or never mentioned. In those days politics were something which took place in parliament; it was something carried on by a special class of persons; it entered the life of the ordinary person on very rare occasions, principally when he paid his income-tax (at 6d. in the £) or at the time of a general election. Occasionally far away beyond the lace curtains, the maids and menservants, the Sunday smell of roast beef and Yorkshire pudding, the stuffy security of middle-class life in Kensington, far, far away the working classes or socialists or foreigners behaved badly. Then a tremor passed over the surface of society even in Kensington, communicating itself to the heart of a middle-aged barrister and thence to the heart of a small boy, whose first contact with politics thus came through fear. The immediate cause of the tremor was a strike, a riot, the menacing sight of a drab procession of unemployed marching sullenly, shepherded by mounted policemen through

[1] The occupation of a barrister or solicitor is, perhaps, on the borderline. The judge's occupation is clearly political; his function is to see that the state's rules and regulations governing the lives of citizens are carried out; his office and duties are part of the framework of society and social machinery. In theory a case can be made for holding that barristers and solicitors are, like judges, 'officers of the Court' and that their function is the same as that of the judge, and therefore political. In practice their function is quite different and not connected with administration or the framework of society; it is to provide a professional service to individuals who are accused by the state of breaking a rule or regulation or who have become involved in a dispute as to property, rights, or obligations with other individuals. If this view is correct, counsel who appears for the Crown in a criminal case provides a political service, while counsel in civil cases or when appearing for the accused person in a criminal case provides a service which is mainly non-political.

a London street under the dripping canopy of a London fog; or it might be the threat of war, or far—ever so far—away war itself. Far away, ever so far away. It is necessary to repeat the words, for they were the dominant political notes in the life of the class and society into which I was born. These events which occasionally made us feel an unpleasant tremor pass across our sense of solid security were political. But they and the tremor and fear were transient, momentary, the flicker of a shadow across eternal sunshine. The rioters were punished; the strikers went back to work; the unemployed were employed or at any rate were shepherded by the mounted policemen off the London streets; the socialists were Germans; and war, if there was a war, was far away from Kensington between foreigners or against natives or savages. Politics were, thus, transient and remote, and even war, which was the supreme political evil, was the concern of 'the army'—a concept compounded in the mind of a small boy of a confusion of red coats, incompetence, derision, contempt, and patriotism; it was fought far from Kensington; it ended and its worst effect was to put an extra penny or two on the income-tax.

Anyone who can look back, as I do, to a childnood lived in the eighties and adolescence in the nineties of last century, will remember the remoteness of politics to their fathers' generation compared with their nearness, urgency, and devastating impact in the lives of all later generations. The change had already begun when I went up to Cambridge in 1899. It happened that I got to know, not only my contemporaries, but a considerable number of distinguished men surviving from previous Cambridge generations. Practically none of the older men were primarily occupied with politics. Most of them were dons or writers. There were among them lawyers and judges, clergymen, doctors, even bankers. None of them, so far as I can recall, were civil servants. There were three Members of Parliament among them—Sir Richard Jebb, S. H. Butcher, and Gerald Balfour. Jebb and Butcher were professors who in their spare time represented their university in parliament; Balfour, it is true, was a professional politician, but he belonged by birth to that small ruling class which in the 19th century had almost a prescriptive right to a seat in parliament and a post in the government. Thus out of this long line of Cambridge men who had been undergraduates at some time between, say, the years

1840 and 1890, only Gerald Balfour had devoted his life to politics, and even he can hardly be said to have treated politics very seriously.

The change, I think, must have begun in the early nineties. At least three of my immediate predecessors were in the civil service, while no fewer than five of my intimate friends at Cambridge became civil servants. It is significant that a particular kind of selection of Cambridge men between 1840 and 1890 produced no civil servants and that the same kind of selection, if applied to the years 1897 to 1904, produced six. But though it was already clear that the world of the 20th century was going to be different from the world of the 19th and that something had happened which would make the impact of politics upon our lives more direct and more violent, the generation into which I had been born was, between the years 1899 and 1904 and the ages of 18 and 24, completely unaware of this. We were not in any sense politically conscious; we had less political consciousness than every small child has had since 1919. The imperceptible social forces of politics and economics were already taking charge of our lives, shepherding us into political occupations instead of into those professions which our middle-class fathers and grandfathers had entered automatically and which they regarded unconsciously as established by God or nature to provide them with 'work' and an income. But we ourselves were not, as I said, in any kind of way aware of this. That in itself is a curious psychological and social fact. We were intelligent young men—some people thought too intelligent. We had a great deal of that mental curiosity which the Greeks regarded rightly as the first stage on the road to knowledge and even wisdom. There was no subject in heaven or upon earth which we were not eager to discuss with the indefatigable seriousness and thoroughness of youth in pursuit of truth. One result of our pursuit of truth was that none of us any longer believed in God. It was therefore impossible for us to believe, even unconsciously, that the Treasury, Inland Revenue, or Ceylon Civil Service had been established by divine dispensation for the purpose of providing us with an income of £300 rising by increments to £1,000 or £1,200. We did not set any more store upon nature than upon God. We were more sceptical than our fathers, and the attitude toward nature or 'the natural' had already, like so much else, begun

to suffer a change at the change of centuries. I was conscious already at the age of 17 of a particular difference of outlook between myself and my mother, and indeed nearly everyone of my mother's generation. They regarded certain things and certain behaviour as 'natural'; for instance, that women should behave in one way and men in another, or that a middle-class young man after a successful career at the university should go to the Bar or enter the civil service. They meant by this word 'natural' something more than 'usual' or 'conventional'. They connected it, no doubt vaguely and confusedly, with nature.

The Victorian felt that it was somehow or other by a dispensation of 'Nature' (as distinct from God) that women did not do certain things or think certain thoughts, that certain professions and institutions existed which should provide occupation and income for their sons, and possibly that those sons, dressed in black and a top-hat, paid calls on Sunday afternoon. This was part of the social psychology of a particular class in a particular age; it was part, and an important part, of the matrix which determined their political thinking. They were not themselves aware of this; they knew nothing of social or communal psychology or of the matrices in which political or other thoughts and prejudices are moulded. They would have been astonished if they had been told that their belief that it was natural that the English legal system and the Church of England should provide an occupation and income for their sons was not unconnected with what had gone on inside the heads of Grotius, Rousseau, and Darwin. Yet that was the truth. When Victorians of my mother's class thought of something as socially natural (the word often being a synonym for 'right and proper'), they meant in a vague and muddled way that nature herself had taken a hand in establishing this particular social rule or institution and that it therefore had a peculiar sanctity or inevitability. My mother's conception of a social rule being also somehow or other a law of nature was a very curious one. Her law of nature had really an honourable descent from the Roman *jus naturale*, for she would have agreed with Cicero that what was natural in this sense included 'rules of conduct which could be rationally deduced from the general conditions of human life'.

But my mother, who had, I think, never heard of Grotius and knew very little to the credit of Jean-Jacques Rousseau,

also owed unconsciously something in her view of the 'natural' to this ill-assorted pair of thinkers. When I was a boy, women and *a fortiori* ladies did not go on the top of omnibuses. This, in the view of women like my mother, was not a mere womanly convention; to go on the top of an omnibus was something which it was not natural that women should do. She probably would not have said that it was part of the law of nature that women should travel inside omnibuses, but in practice she thought of it and treated it as part of the law of nature. Grotius, it will be remembered, had established similar rules of conduct as part of natural law and, in his view, they were part of that law, and distinguishable as such, because they owed their force as law to 'the dictate of right reason'. My mother's attitude to the rule of conduct of women in relation to omnibuses was the same as Grotius's to the rules established by him in his epoch-making work, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*. Thus an eminent Dutch jurist, by writing about international law and throwing a large stone into the stagnant pool of human thought in 1625, may cause a ripple which will affect the thoughts of middle-class ladies in Kensington nearly four centuries later.

Rousseau in the 18th century had thrown stones which did the same. He was largely responsible for adding a new aura or overtone to the idea of nature and the natural which persists in many people's minds to this day and was certainly vaguely in my mother's mind. Rousseau's 'state of nature' was a sort of golden age in which uncorrupted men and women acted rightly because naturally. People of my mother's generation combined this view of nature quite happily with that of Cicero's and Grotius's. In the eighties and early nineties the laws of nature and the rules of right conduct really were still obeyed without question, but if they had been questioned and, for instance, a middle-class lady had suddenly seen one of her female friends climbing the steps to the outside of an omnibus, her horror would have been partly due to her feeling that in the golden age of 'nature' or paradise the uncorrupted female always travelled in the inside of omnibuses.[1]

[1] It is a curious fact that, when at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century these 'laws of nature' and codes of right conduct suddenly began to break down and break up and a profound revolution in social behaviour resulted, after a first shock of disapproval and horror, many of the older generation became completely reconciled

In 1859 the stagnant pool of human thought was again disturbed by two enormous splashes: Charles Darwin had thrown *The Origin of Species* and Karl Marx *The Communist Manifesto* into it. I doubt whether the ripples caused by that stone which the grim German Jew threw ever effectively reached my mother's mind, but those from Darwin's missile certainly did. Presumably the laws of nature, as conceived by the scientist, are *sub specie aeternitatis*, the most changeless things in the universe; but in the minds of ordinary people they have never been quite the same after 1859 as they were before it. We have been living during the last hundred years in the scientific age—how often we are told so and in many ways how melancholy is the reflection! By 1890 science had already penetrated even the lace curtains of Kensington and the minds of its inhabitants sitting apparently so secure behind the curtains. *The Origin of Species* and the controversy connected with it formed the principal instrument of that penetration. The scientist's law of nature is very different from Cicero's *jus naturale* or the natural law of Grotius or Rousseau, but the power of the human mind to digest and combine incompatibles, particularly in communal psychology, is enormous. When therefore the scientific ripples from *The Origin of Species* reached the bourgeois mind about 1880, it accepted the scientist's conception of a law of nature and combined it quite happily with its idea of a law of nature which it had derived from the 17th and 18th centuries. The effect can be observed in the attitude of my mother's generation to social conventions which they considered to be natural. They became something much more than social conventions, for in a vague and muddled way they appeared to have the authority of the scientist's law of nature. Nature which had determined that the apple should fall from the tree to the grass in accordance with the law of gravitation

to many things which they would have considered 'unthinkable' a few years before. In fact they often retranslated the revolution into the terms of their social philosophy. In 1920 my mother still divided social conduct into the natural and the unnatural, but what she had regarded as unnatural in 1890 had become natural in 1920. It was not she who had changed so much as her golden age or paradise. In 1920 it was established that the uncorrupted female in a state of nature smoked cigarettes and went on the top of omnibuses; in 1890 it had been established that she did not. Perhaps Rousseau was right.

had no doubt also determined that women should not ride on the outside of omnibuses in accordance with the laws of physiology, psychology, and sociology.

The reader of the preceding paragraphs may, perhaps, consider them a digression. I assure him that they are not. I make the bold claim that there will be no digressions in this book. Divarication is only possible if there is a point of departure and point of arrival with a straight path between them. That is or ought to be the case with most books, and I have myself tried to write books like that. But that is not the case with this book, and this is probably the place in it at which I should try to explain what I propose to do in it. After the war of 1914 to 1918, I wrote two volumes of a book which I called *After the Deluge*, and I have been meaning to write a third and possibly a fourth. *After the Deluge* is, as I noted in its sub-title, a 'study of communal psychology'. I mean by communal psychology the ideas, beliefs, and emotions, within the minds of individuals, regarding the community of which they form a part and regarding the relations of individuals to it and to one another; when analysed, it is found to consist of an intricate mass of traditions, customs, beliefs, passions, and ideals. As I tried to explain in Volume I, history is largely determined by communal psychology, and what we call civilization consists partly of the actual structure of society, e.g. the form of government and of other communal institutions, and partly of this communal psychology. And 'these two factors in civilization interact, as cause and effect, upon each other: the form of society into which a man is born is part cause of his communal psychology, while any change in communal psychology tends to modify the structure of society'. The record of these interactions is the record of human history and of the ebb and flow of civilization.

I began the book after the war of 1914–1918. It seemed in 1920 to be of some importance to understand the causes of that catastrophe, and I proposed to make the attempt by examining the causal relations between that historical event and the communal psychology of the period which led up to it. One remarkable and puzzling fact immediately confronted the enquirer into the causes of what people then called the great war. In it millions of men fought, killed one another, and died for (or against) three ideas: freedom, nationality, and

democracy. The statesmen who were responsible for the war and for the organization of its slaughter again and again called upon the peoples to fight and to go on fighting for freedom, for the rights of small nations, for self-determination, and to make the world safe for democracy. The peoples answered the call and the war was fought to final victory and defeat. Freedom, nationality, and democracy won the victory; the autocracies of the two Germanic emperors, the attempt to establish a Germanic hegemony in Europe, suffered defeat; the world was made safe for democracy. But exactly one hundred years before 1914 Europeans were just ending another great war which ravaged the continent for over 15 years, and the curious thing is that these ideas of freedom, nationality, and democracy which to most people appeared to be an adequate and legitimate cause for fighting the 1914 war were regarded by most people as an adequate and legitimate cause for fighting the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars of the 18th and early 19th centuries. Everyone knows that the result of the earlier war was the same as that of the later, and the battle of Waterloo not only defeated and destroyed the autocracy of Napoleon and the French attempt at establishing a European hegemony, it also made the world safe for freedom, nationality, and democracy, though, if Wellington, Castlereagh, Alexander, Metternich, and Talleyrand had been told so at the time, they would have received the information with horror and astonishment.

If there be any sense at all in human history, any intelligible relation between men's brains and hands, between communal psychology and communal action, in European history the series of events between 1789 and 1815 cannot be dissociated from the series of events between 1914 and 1918. In both periods there is the same sequence: complete disruption of the normal, peaceful life of a continent; a long and bitter war involving almost every European nation; revolutions and counter-revolutions; the fall of kings and classes; the dissolution of ancient states and the birth of new ones. And in both cases this continental convulsion, this vulgarization of battle and murder and sudden death and of most of the evils and mischiefs from which the good Christian three times a week prays the Lord to deliver him, was, in the view of nearly all who caused and suffered them, intimately connected with those three ideas: freedom, nationality, and democracy. It seemed

to me, therefore, that if we wanted to understand the causes of the deluge of 1914–1918, we must go back to 1789 and examine these ideas of freedom, democracy, and nationality, find out their meaning in the minds of men, and trace in the history of a hundred years the effect of their impact upon society and of society upon them.

That was what I had begun to do in the first two volumes of *After the Deluge*. The 19th-century ideas of freedom and democracy were shaped in the year 1789 and in the French revolution, of nationality in the later years of the revolution and in the Napoleonic wars. In the first volume I began the investigation of the communal political psychology of freedom, democracy, and nationality. I attempted first to discover the shape which these ideas took in 1789 in the minds of those who made the French revolution, and secondly to isolate democracy for observation and analysis, in order, if possible, to see what its general nature and effect have been in history since 1815. In the second volume I began my more intensive study of how these ideas operated in and were operated on by history. I carried it down to the early thirties in French and British history, the first crisis of the new Europe which had been shaped by the revolution and the Napoleonic wars and in which we lived until a young man destroyed it by firing a revolver in the Bosnian town of Serajevo. That first crisis was a revolution in France which drove out the restored Bourbons and substituted Louis-Philippe for them on the French throne, and a revolution in Britain which forced the king and aristocracy to accept the Reform Act of 1832.

In both these series of events the communal psychology of democracy, which was finally shaped by the French revolution, can be seen at work. Beliefs with regard to such things as individuality, human happiness, freedom, and equality were among the weapons which drove Charles X from France and drove the reluctant Earl Grey to place the Reform Act on the statute book of Britain. But at once, as I showed, the eternal interaction between communal psychology and social structure began to operate. These two revolutions were the beginning of the establishment in Europe of political democracy. In winning its first victories the communal psychology of democracy as it had emerged from the first French revolution, came up against a formidable obstacle, the economic structure of society.

Those who acted under the impulse of the new communal ideas were scarcely conscious of the economic obstacle, for what they wanted to do and thought they were doing was to alter the political structure of society. They did what they wanted to do, but in the process the collision with the economic social structure modified the political ideas in the communal psychology of democracy and dimly revealed the great dilemma of 19th-century democracy, the relation between political and economic equality. The actual result of the French revolution of 1830 and of the Reform Act of 1832 was the establishment of the first stage of middle-class democracy. The rule of the bourgeoisie in France and Britain had begun.

It was my intention to go on in the third volume to examine this rule of the bourgeoisie which spread from France and Britain over a considerable part of Europe and see how the adventures of the political ideas led from 1830 to the deluge of 1914. The adventures began with the second great crisis of the new Europe, the revolutionary movements of the year 1848. But before I could even begin the third volume, another deluge, even more catastrophic than the first, descended upon Europe and the world. My second volume was published early in 1939. In September 1939 Hitler invaded Poland and the second great world war of the 20th century began.

The outbreak of this second war is so intimately connected with the book's subject and object that I found it impossible not to reconsider the whole of the original scope and scheme. In one sense the result of this reconsideration was curious and to me unexpected. So far as I could see, it invalidated none of the conclusions to which I had come provisionally in the first two volumes and it emphasized the necessity for someone to investigate the causal connection between the communal psychology and historical events of our time precisely in the way which I had planned after the war of 1914–1918.

For the war of 1939 seemed to raise exactly the same questions which the war of 1914 had made me ask myself in the first volume of this book. The war of 1914 began when the Austrian government delivered an ultimatum to Serbia. That ultimatum raised the question of the rights of small states in Europe to freedom and of their inhabitants to manage their own affairs in their own way. Implicit in it was a claim by the Germanic empires to hegemony in central and south-eastern

Europe. Serbia was a national state; it was the immediate offspring of the national movement of the 19th century. The claim to hegemony was in itself a challenge to the principle of nationality as understood in the last century, the principle that individuals conscious of a common nationality had the right to form and be citizens of an independent, sovereign national state and so 'manage their own affairs in their own way'. If Serbia had accepted the Austrian ultimatum, she would—in the language of the time—have renounced something of her sovereignty and independence, for what the Austrians demanded was to interfere in the internal affairs of Serbia. The principle of nationality was, of course, also involved in another and deep-seated way with the Austrian-Serbian quarrel which was the occasion of the war. Part of the territory of Austria-Hungary was inhabited by peoples who were conscious of a common nationality with the people of Serbia. Within the Austrian Empire they were a subject people, and they wished to be citizens, not of Austria, but of Serbia. The young man who fired the shot in Serajevo which destroyed the world of the 19th century was one of them, and, in a sense, it was not he, but the principle of nationality, which fired the shot.

It is necessary to be clear about what fired that shot, for in my opinion it was, to a considerable extent, ideas in the heads of rulers and common men, ideas about nationality, hegemony, freedom, democracy, states, and governments. It is necessary, because since the war, and indeed before it, it has become fashionable with many politicians and political writers to say that one or other of these ideas 'has lost its meaning' and that therefore the statesman, in framing his 'practical policy', should ignore them and think only of realities, like power, economics, or geography. These ideas have not lost their meaning, and when people say that they have, they usually mean that they don't like them or the things for which they stand. It is, too, a muddled delusion to think that ideas are less real than power, economics, or geography or that they have been and will be less potent instruments in the making of man's history. Consider once more the shot which destroyed the 19th century.

The shot killed the Archduke Ferdinand. It was fired by a Serbian student named Princip. There is no dispute as to why Princip assassinated an Austrian archduke; he did it because he had certain ideas in his head. He was a Serbian nationalist,

a patriot engaged in a patriotic conspiracy against the Austrian government. The words hegemony, freedom, nationality, or the ideas for which those words stood, were in his head, and the ideas themselves represented realities which affected the everyday life of thousands of common people living in south-eastern Europe. Behind the word hegemony was the question whether Count Bethlen and the Austrian government should determine how those people should be governed or whether it should be left for them to determine themselves. Behind the words freedom and nationality lay the same question, posed from the other side of the frontier. Here were realities, the realities which make human history, the clash between two incompatible ideas. The realities fired the shot, which killed the Archduke, which began the war, which destroyed the 19th century. And Count Bethlen and the Austrian government were well aware of all this when they sent to the Serbian government the ultimatum, knowing that by so doing they were risking a European war. The war came, and the war was—and was recognized by those who caused it and fought it, to be—a war about hegemony, nationality, and freedom.

But the war was also a war about democracy. The ideas of freedom, equality, and individuality produced in the 18th century the ideas of political democracy and in the 19th century the movement towards political democracy which I studied and analysed in the first two volumes. It was not by chance or owing to the unscrupulous cunning of hypocritical statesmen that, whereas the shot which started the war was fired by ideas about national hegemony and national freedom, when the last shot was fired, those who had been fighting against Germany and Austria believed that it had been fired by the idea of democracy. In 1919 the common people throughout Europe—the people who had done the fighting and made the sacrifices which war demands—showed clearly that they regarded President Wilson as the interpreter of their political beliefs and desires. They knew him only as the President of a distant, non-European republic who had told them and the world, in eloquent and somewhat academic speeches, what they had been fighting for. He told them that they had been fighting to make the world safe for democracy. The enthusiasm with which they greeted him and his words—an enthusiasm which was far greater than they displayed for their own statesmen or most victorious

field-marshals and generals—showed that they agreed with him.

The sequel to victory in 1918 and the peace of 1919 has enabled interested statesmen and superficial thinkers widely to spread the belief that Wilson was the dupe of his own high-flown, academic nonsense and the common people the dupes of a dupe. His phrase about the world being made safe for democracy has naturally furnished them with a favourite and easy target. 'Democracy?' they have said every other year since 1924, 'democracy? Si monumentum requiris, circumspice.' It is, of course, true that though the democracies won the war which was to make the world safe for democracy, the winning of it appeared to have, at any rate in Europe, precisely the opposite effect. An attack, much more violent and open than any which had been known since 1789, began first from Russia and then from Italy and Germany, upon democratic and 'liberal' ideas and institutions. To most people, including probably some of the attackers, the attack proved to be astonishingly and unexpectedly successful. The forces of democracy which seemed so triumphant in 1918, both in the minds of men and in their social institutions, were suddenly smitten, not only by outside enemies, but by a kind of internal palsy, an impotence of conviction and action. The war of 1914 had ended with the destruction of the last three great autocratic monarchies of Europe, the dynastic property of the Romanovs, the Hapsburgs, and the Hohenzollerns, but by 1933 their empty thrones had been occupied, not by peoples and parliaments, but by still more autocratic dictators. Even more ominous for democracy was the fact that, besides its failure to establish itself in the autocratic empires which it had beaten in war, it continually lost its hold upon countries where it appeared to be firmly established; by 1939 anti-democratic and often militant dictators ruled over Italy, Spain, Portugal, and most of the smaller states in south-eastern Europe.

This grim sequel to the war of 1914, and the still grimmer sequel to the sequel through which we are living today, are no proof at all that Wilson talked nonsense about such things as democracy and self-determination. The belief that by hitting a man sufficiently hard over the head you can finally and completely dispose of the truth or existence of his ideas is a delusion firmly rooted in the minds of a large number of people; it is a delusion to which statesmen who are ruthless and realist

and professors who admire the ruthless and realist statesman are peculiarly allergic. Force can do a very great deal, particularly in producing evil, misery, and destruction, and as such will probably for long continue to be worshipped by the most virile and realist of civilized men; the one thing which it cannot do is to alter the falseness or the truth of an idea, the wrongness or the rightness of a standard of value. Those who insisted so loudly and confidently, and often so smugly, that Hitler and Mussolini had made academic nonsense of Wilson and his dupes were the unconscious victims of this vulgar error regarding force and truth; the ability of these mighty dictators to destroy by force democratic states and to imprison, torture, and kill those who held Wilsonian ideas about freedom, happiness, and democracy might be worthy our admiration and imitation, but it had no more relevance to the truth and validity of those ideas than the power and will of the Holy Inquisition to burn Giordano Bruno had any relevance to the truth of his beliefs and ideas.

There is an important difference in the nature of the ideas which the Church tried to destroy by burning scientific heretics and of those which Hitler and Mussolini tried to destroy by mass murder. Bruno's ideas were concerned with the nature of material reality, with the laws governing the causal relations of matter. It is either true or not true that the earth goes round the sun; it is either true or not true that the cause of an apple falling to earth can accurately be given in the Newtonian formula. No human being, no pack or herd of human beings, even when dignified with the name of Holy Church or Sovereign State, can alter or affect such truths by incantations or pronouncements or force or torture or murder. The stars and planets pursue and will pursue their courses ironically aloof, indifferent, unaffected by anything that man, state, or church may say or do. Here the incantations of the savage medicine man, the heresy hunting of the Catholic Church, the persecutions and propaganda of states belong to the same order of stupidity and complete ineffectiveness. The medicine men may sacrifice a million human victims, the Church burn a million heretics, the totalitarian states force a million scientists to perjure themselves for 'reasons of state', the effect upon the universe, its facts and its laws is the same as if a man tried to write his name on the Atlantic Ocean with a stylographic pen.

In the existing world of men, dominated by human stupidity, cruelty, and hatred and reeling under their impulse drunkenly from disaster to disaster, there is something comforting in this immaculate insensibility of facts. In this sense 'magna est veritas et praevalebit'.

Political ideas about freedom, democracy, and happiness are not quite like that, and at first sight are more vulnerable to force, states, churches, persecutors, and torturers. They are partly concerned with facts no less than are the scientist's ideas. But the man who makes a statement about politics or society rarely, if ever, is making statements only about material facts; he is dealing with the facts of human psychology and human behaviour, with the communal psychology of beliefs and desires and their effect upon society. And there is a further, and even more important difference. He is dealing with standards of value. Value and ethics are irrelevant to astronomy, and we have learnt—not without difficulty—that the question whether it is better that the sun should go round the earth or the earth round the sun is meaningless. But standards of value, woven on the warp of material and psychological facts, create the stuff and fabric of politics and history. No historian, sociologist, or social philosopher really questions this, for if he did it would be a confession that all history and sociology are nonsense; all politicians from kings and dictators to parish councillors assume it to be true, even when their acts and words seek or pretend to deny it.

It is essential to be quite clear on this point and complete clarity can only be attained by the study of a few examples. Veblen points out that very early in savage or barbarian society the distinction between industrial and non-industrial work emerges. Industrial work originates in women's work. One of the earliest divisions of labour was between men's work and women's work, and the division, owing to biological and other differences, led to the discrimination between employments of exploit, e.g. hunting and war, which were a man's work, and the necessary, everyday, uneventful employments, e.g. cooking, which were left to the women. If there was ever an idyllic age of noble savagery, in which even the seeds of anti-feminism had not yet been sown, the noble savages regarded the division as merely natural and useful and did not discriminate between the nobility and ignobility of different occupations. But Paradise,

if it ever existed, must have been short-lived. Among most primitive peoples or savages whom we know, women's work is not merely work which a man does not do, but which he must not under any consideration do, for it would harm his dignity to do it. In this way a standard of value was introduced into human society governing 'work'; to cook is an inferior occupation, to kill animals or enemies superior. The distinction and the standard of value have persisted to our own day, changing only to adapt themselves to the changes in society. With the changes which we call civilization, the killing of animals and human beings became less and less important; it became a pleasure or luxury rather than a necessity. This added to its dignity, and it was natural that among the earliest signs of civilization was the belief that useful work is inferior—particularly women's work—and useless work, particularly any kind of killing, superior. As civilization developed, its complexities and niceties led to increasing complexity and nicety in occupational standards of value. Crafts and, later, industry, including agriculture, fastened upon men as well as upon women the burden of useful, uneventful manual labour. But not upon all men; in civilized societies the threat and curse of Jehovah: 'in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground' has always had a strictly limited application. It has been applied exclusively to the males of the lower classes. Manual labour, agricultural, industrial, or domestic, has at all times and in all places been the duty of slaves, the common people, the proletariat, swains, serfs, the mob, the masses, the lower or the working classes—the name differs, but the standard of social value remains always the same. The 'upper classes'—royalty, aristocracy, and in later times gentlemen, who belonged to the middle or professional and business classes—consider occupations involving physical labour, except in play, sport, or war, degrading and leave it to be done by the lower classes or lower races. The belief or feeling that such work is ungentlemanly, undignified, demeaning, and degrading has often produced remarkable social results, such as kings who were too grand to move or, even in the 18th century, to dress themselves, and in India the hierarchy of castes in which the higher can be contaminated by the touch or shadow of the lower whose work is manual, necessary, and 'ignoble'.

Today in some places and ideologies this very ancient

standard of social value has been turned upside-down. Karl Marx, socialism, and communism have performed this remarkable feat, but the process did not begin with them or in the 19th century. There have been few eras probably in which some people did not question the accepted communal belief that brain work or idleness is 'superior' to manual labour and that the gentleman is a more valuable person than the labourer. We hear their voices rarely and usually in times of deep disturbance, when they emerge as prophets and leaders of revolution, for in ordinary quiet times, if you held that opinion, it was probably safer to keep it to yourself. The Gracchi raised the question in Rome some two thousand years ago, and paid the penalty. Six hundred years ago the challenge was made in a devastating popular couplet in more countries than one, for the English said:

> When Adam dolve and Eve span,
> Who was then the gentleman?

and the German:

> Als Adam henkte und Eva spann,
> Wer war denn da der Edelmann?

and the Dutch:

> Toen Adam spitte en Eva span,
> Waar vond men toen den edelman?

These early proletarian rebels against one of the most ancient standards of social value were negative or neutral; they said in their hearts: 'We workers are as good as you gentlemen'. The 18th century, which changed so many things, changed the words in the proletarian song and the thoughts in the proletarian head. The change came from the French revolution, from Marat and Robespierre, and the ominous voice of Babeuf. It culminated in Marxian socialism which finally turned the old standard upside down: they said now, not 'We are as good as you gentlemen', but 'We are better than you gentlemen'. The gentlemen and the middle classes were now expropriators and parasites; the 'worker' had risen to the top of the social hierarchy, ennobled by manual labour, and idleness took the place of the sin against the Holy Ghost. Vox populi was indistinguishable from vox dei.

To dogmatize about the hierarchy of causes of social events or to think that you can isolate the 'only' or 'the most important'

cause of political phenomena or actions is absurd, as I found and pointed out often in volumes one and two of *After the Deluge*. So many different 'causes' and such vast numbers of individuals, all with a tangle of different and often contradictory beliefs and desires in their heads, are concerned with producing the explosions which we call communal events that the most we can do is usually to discover some of the more important ingredients in the explosive which exploded, some of the beliefs or desires which pulled the trigger, or perhaps the impulse which finally launched the bomb. I do not believe, therefore, that it is possible to establish accurately the precise effect upon society of this change in communal beliefs with regard to the social value of manual labour. But there can be no doubt that, as a moulder of society, of men, their manners, and their manner of living, this change in the judgment of the value of 'work' has been a very powerful instrument.

How does such an instrument act? Almost certainly by action and reaction, working upon men and their institutions shuttle-wise, alternately or even simultaneously cause and effect. Let us consider for a moment the case of Adam Bede in George Eliot's novel, for he will throw a little light upon our problem. *Adam Bede* is, of course, fiction, not history or real life, but fiction and fictitious characters—if the novelist is, like George Eliot, psychologically and historically a realist—sometimes are even more useful to the observer of human ant-heaps than history or real life. The novel was written in 1859, about midway in time between the French and Russian revolutions. The period in which the action of the novel takes place is supposed to be earlier, in the 18th century, and George Eliot herself points out to the reader that things, of course, have changed since then. But socially and psychologically the book, in many respects, gives an accurate picture of the world of 1859. There were Adam Bedes in that world and there were villages, farms, farmers, squires, and clergymen not very different from those described in the novel. Adam is an artisan, a carpenter; he is essentially a man of the 'lower classes'. His attitude towards his work is characteristic of the first-class artisan. Throughout the book George Eliot insists on this attitude. Adam Bede is a noble character, as the 19th century understood nobility, and an important part of that nobility consists in his attitude towards his manual labour. He is immensely proud of

it; his pride is in doing a 'job' as well as it is possible to do it. Despite this pride, Adam would never have said: 'We are better than you gentlemen', or even: 'We are as good as you gentlemen'. He knows his place; he accepts the hierarchy of classes in the English village of his, or rather George Eliot's, time—the squire at the top, and then the parson, the gentry, the farmer, and so down to the artisan, and below the artisan the labourer. George Eliot is careful to insist upon this acceptance of social inferiority in Adam as something a little surprising in a character of such strength, quick temper, and pride. He regarded the squire, Mr. Donnithorne, and the whole squirearchy as in some sense 'his betters'—a standard of value is clearly shown in the word—and he would not have hesitated to acknowledge it. The workman's pride and independence make a curious combination with the sense of social inferiority. The tension is shown in the scene described by Adam to the schoolmaster when he made the screen for Miss Liddy, the Squire's daughter, and charged one pound thirteen for it.

Th' old Squire looked up at this, and peered in his way at the screen, and said, 'One pound thirteen for a gimcrack like that! Lydia, my dear, if you must spend money on these things, why don't you get them at Rosseter, instead of paying double price for clumsy work here? Such things are not work for a carpenter like Adam. Give him a guinea and no more.'

Miss Liddy 'began fidgeting with her purse, and turned as red as her ribbon'. But Adam made a bow and said:

'No thank you, madam; I'll make you a present o' the screen, if you please. I've charged the regular price for my work, and I know it's done well; and I know, begging his honour's pardon, that you couldn't get such a screen at Rosseter under two guineas. I'm willing to give you my work—it's been done in my own time, and nobody's got anything to do with it but me; but if I'm paid, I can't take a smaller price than I asked, because that 'ud be like saying, I'd asked more than was just. With your leave, madam, I'll bid you good-morning.'

And Adam tells the schoolmaster:

'I made my bow and went out before she'd time to say any more, for she stood with the purse in her hand, looking almost foolish. I didn't mean to be disrespectful, and I spoke as polite as I could; but I can give it to no man, if he wants to make it out as I'm trying to overreach him.'

This social psychology of Adam Bede belongs rather to the year in which the book was written, 1859, than to 1799, the year in which the scene is laid. Round about 1799 Jane Austen was writing *Sense and Sensibility* and some of her other novels. Like George Eliot she lived in and described life in a village, but in Jane Austen's village there were no Adam Bedes; there could be no Adam Bedes for they were only born some fifty years later. Miss Austen's social psychology is 18th century; in her novels the gentlemen do not do even the work considered today and in George Eliot's time 'gentlemanly'; one or two may appear to be perfunctorily in the Services or the Church, but gentlemen are not doctors, barristers, solicitors, civil servants, and of course never in trade or business. They live on their land and do a little shooting. No doubt there was manual labour and there were carpenters like Adam Bede in the world of Miss Austen and of the Dashwoods and Ferrars, but there was a chasm between the carpenter and his 'betters' which had narrowed perilously by 1859. In 1799 no Adam would have spoken to General Tilney in Northanger Abbey as the Adam of 1859 spoke to Mr. Donnithorne at the Chase.

At the beginning of the 19th century British society, and therefore its psychology, were still settled; when George Eliot wrote they were in uneasy transition from the French to the Russian revolution. The uneasiness is caused by the tension of half acceptance and half rejection of existing standards of class value and work value. All the lower classes, including the farmers and their wives, accept their inferior position and recognize the superior position of their betters; yet the inferiors are nearly all of them highly critical of their superiors, and George Eliot goes out of her way to weight the dice by making the superiors in most ways so inferior to their inferiors. No one brings this out more clearly than Mrs. Poyser in the magnificent speech when she 'has her say out' to the old Squire:

'I know there's them as is born t'own the land, and them as is born to sweat on't'—here Mrs. Poyser paused to gasp a little—'and I know it's christened folks's duty to submit to their betters as fur as flesh and blood 'ull bear it; but I'll not make a martyr o' myself and wear myself to skin and bone, and worret myself as if I was a churn wi' butter a-coming in't, for no landlord in England, not if he was King George himself.'

'I know it's christened folks's duty to submit to their betters as fur as flesh and blood 'ull bear it'—a statement of profound significance, historically and psychologically true, for in that sentence can be seen the dying flowers of 18th-century society and the seeds of 20th-century society.

The historical significance and truth can be seen in the fact, frequently insisted upon by me, that 'the people' are extraordinarily long-suffering and that to the vast majority thought is painful and distasteful. If you translate part of what Mrs. Poyser says into the language of the historian, it runs: The common people or proletariat or lower classes up to the end of the 18th century had shown themselves ready to acquiesce in an enormous amount of misgovernment, injustice, and exploitation at the hands of the upper or ruling classes. As far as flesh and blood can bear social misery, they had for centuries borne it patiently. But there is a limit to what even flesh and blood will bear. If the limit be passed, the ruled turn against the rulers, the people revolt. That is what happened in the French revolution. The accumulated misery caused by the incompetent politics and predatory economics of the monarchical and aristocratic ruling classes first induced some people to think and then induced all the people to rise in blind, passionate revolt against the rulers and the system which had ensured their power. This movement to destroy the political power of a class and an organization of society which ensured that power was the revolution. Like all revolutions, it was primarily an impulse and movement of destruction. Yet, even from the first, it showed the impress of thought induced by misery and was to some extent constructive as well as destructive. The construction was political; the attempt was made by political means to establish a society, based upon liberty and equality, which would make the happiness of the individual the primary object of government. Thus was born modern democracy. Its kernel is a judgment of values, a new standard of social values. You cannot be a democrat in the sense in which the French revolution defined a democrat unless you believe that the happiness of the individual is good because he is an individual—not because he is a king or duke or gentleman, and even if he be a labourer, dustman, Jew, or negro. And you cannot be a democrat unless you believe that liberty and equality are socially good.

The early democrats tried to apply their new standards of social value through political changes. The implications of their beliefs were for long naturally not fully understood even by themselves, and far less by the common people. Mrs. Poyser and Adam Bede had been deeply affected by the revolution and democracy, but they were unaware of it, and still less aware of those implications. They still believed that their social superiors were their betters and that it was their duty, as inferiors, to submit to their betters. They were not democrats; they were instinctively Tory; but democracy was creeping in. It set for both of them a limit to submission and it made them socially critical of their superiors. There is beginning in them a conscious claim to liberty and equality.

I was born 21 years after *Adam Bede* was written and 27 days before George Eliot died. When I was 9 or 10, I became conscious of the standards of value in regard to classes and work—about 30 years after the publication of *Adam Bede*. They had changed, but they had not changed so very much since 1859. My father was a Liberal and liberal-minded, intelligent and humane, but so far as I can remember —he died when I was 12—not, compared with even my generation, politically or socially minded. He was absorbed in his work as barrister and in his family. We lived in Kensington in a large house which contained man and wife, nine children, a governess, a nurse and undernurse, a footman, a cook with scullerymaid attached, a parlourmaid, and two if not three housemaids, a dog, a cat, several canaries, two white rats, and a fluctuating number of piebald mice. The resident household consisted therefore of 20 human beings of whom one was a governess and eight were 'servants'. In a mews round the corner lived John, the coachman, a horse, a brougham, and a victoria; John drove my father to the Temple in the morning and fetched him back in the evening and he drove my mother to shop or in summer for that remarkable ceremony 'a drive in the Park' in the afternoon. There also came to the house other people to serve our needs: a tutor, who administered education to my brother and myself, and 'the man' who cleaned the boots, that peculiarly Victorian institution, came daily; three times a week a governess taught us French and German; the Countess Reichenbach added romance to the dreary business of teaching my sister to play the piano by being a German aristocrat whose

family was said to have been banished for a political offence, presumably too much liberalism; I have a dim recollection of some of us being taught 'elocution' by Mr. Granville Barker's mother; in the winter Mr. Fuller came once a month in the evening and laboriously and for the most part unsuccessfully tried to teach us to dance; for a time once a week a carpenter came and taught my brother and me 'carpentering' at a bench erected in a small room in the basement. Two other persons who ministered to the needs of this Victorian family deserve mention. Every morning before breakfast Mr. Tomkins arrived to shave my father in his dressing-room; and every week on Friday afternoon came Mr. Davies from a neighbouring watch and clockmaker's shop to wind and regulate all the clocks in the house. Mr. Davies had the softest voice and the baldest head of anyone whom I have known, and I have never since met anyone who equalled him in the discretion and respectability of his appearance and the deference of his manner. 'Try it now, sir,' he would say as he handed my father or one of his small sons a watch which he had taken away to repair, and the soft voice, the respectful tone, the little bow marked with the utmost nicety the relation in 1890 between the tradesman and the gentleman, between the watch-mender and the watch-owner.

It will be seen that a barrister, with a wife and nine children, of whom the eldest was about 16 years old, employed round about the year 1890 19 persons. Of these 19 persons eight served the general domestic needs of the whole family, two devoted their entire attention to the infants, and seven were employed to educate the elder children. Standards of social value were implicit in this arrangement and from the earliest years my contact with human beings made me unconsciously conscious of these standards and of the class distinctions to which they attached. The house itself naturally was divided into strata to accommodate its classes. The servants worked in and lived in the extremities; in the basement they did their work and there the footman had an underground bedroom; high up at the top in an area to which we never penetrated the female servants slept. Below this area were the two nurseries and the two nurses with the nursery children; on the floor below this lived the elder children who had been promoted to the life of the schoolroom; and below this again

on the first floor and ground floor were my father and mother who required a dining-room, drawing-room and small room on the ground floor, a 'boudoir' half-way up the staircase, and a library, bedroom, bathroom, and dressing-room on the first floor.

I do not think that any of the 19 persons living in 101 Lexham Gardens in the year 1890 would have questioned the statement that those who inhabited the middle floors of the house were the superiors of those who lived in the extremities. We were the superiors of our servants and part of that superiority was due to the superiority of our work. The work of a barrister was better than that of a footman, and both the barrister and the footman accepted this standard of value unquestioningly. And the hierarchy of class within the house was minutely subdivided, the superiority or inferiority of the sub-divisions being determined mainly by a judgment of the value of the work performed by them. The tutor and governess were superior to the servants and were paid salaries instead of wages, only because teaching was taken to be superior work as compared with manual labour. The nurses claimed superiority over the other servants and the claim was resented but to some extent grudgingly admitted. The claim was, I think, based on a vague feeling that their intimate association with the superior class must make them superior and also that the work of looking after young children is nearer to teaching than to cooking a leg of mutton or making a bed. In our house the parlourmaid was regarded as definitely superior to the housemaids and even, I think, exercised some delegated authority over them, but I am not sure whether this was due to her dominating personality or whether it was customary at the time to consider waiting at table a superior occupation to the making of beds. The lowest of the domestic sub-classes was composed of scullerymaids, a nameless succession of whom seems to me in retrospect to have been continually coming and going, whose dirtiness and incompetence were a perpetual subject for censure and lamentation from the cook, whose silence, downcast eyes, and dejected attitudes acknowledge the guilt and inferiority of a depressed class or caste. In Ceylon I have seen the same hangdog look on the face of latrine coolies when in the presence of a high-caste headman who employed them.

In 1892 in my twelfth year my father died. At the time he

was making as Q.C., I believe, about £5,000 a year, and we had lived, like so many of our class a life of great security and comfort embedded in the large house full of servants. Almost my only contact with the class division of society had been through the servants and I had automatically and unconsciously accepted the order of social precedence and the standards of social value described in the last paragraph. I say 'almost my only contact', because I can remember a very early incident which gave me another contact, leaving on my mind a sinister and terrifying impression. I have already referred to it above. One winter night in the eighties on our afternoon walk with the nurse or tutor we once or twice met processions of unemployed. It must have been in 1887 in October and November during the 'disturbances' which culminated in 'Bloody Sunday' and the battle of Trafalgar Square when on a grim winter day two squadrons of Life Guards and a battalion of Foot Guards fought the unemployed led by John Burns and Cunninghame-Graham. Those long lines of marching men, drab and dingy but lowering and grim through the lowering yellow fog of the dingy, dirty, dripping London streets of November, came into my life from another, unknown world. It was a world which, even at the age of 7, I felt menaced my world. The nurses were terrified of these men and hurried us away whenever the dreary columns and the mounted police appeared in the distance. I heard in the conversation of my father and mother and their friends a note of alarm and anxiety, for the years 1886 and 1887 were to a certain extent a turning point in the social history of Britain, and the middle-classes, including the inhabitants of 101 Lexham Gardens, listening to a new note in the ancient growling and grumbling of the proletariat, felt a slight tremor in what had seemed the solid security beneath Lexham Gardens and bourgeois society. I heard the note, without understanding its meaning, in the growling murmurs of the unemployed as they shuffled through the mud of High Street, Kensington. Twenty-three years later in Ceylon, when, as Assistant Government Agent of the District of Hambantota, I stepped out on to the verandah of the Kachcheri to face a large crowd of bullock-cart drivers who were enraged by a government order forbidding the movement of cattle owing to rinderpest, I was instantly carried back to Kensington High Street and the terror of the small boy of 7, for I was listening again to the same

growling, low murmur of an angry crowd. I have never heard any noise more frightening, except the sudden silence of the engine of a flying bomb shutting off over one's head.

I do not think that my social psychology changed much, if at all, between the ages of 10 and 16. If it had been articulate, which it was not, I should have said that I was a gentleman and that there were a large number of persons, including servants and unemployed and plumbers and carpenters, who were not. Gentlemen were superior, and the others might at any moment become dangerous, if they were unemployed, and march in procession through the streets and break shop windows and riot; and then the only thing which could prevent the end of the world for the gentlemen was the police, the army, and gentlemen becoming special constables with armlets on their overcoats and white sticks in their hands. This attitude was confirmed at my private school in Brighton which provided me with education of various kinds, but no education in social history, social psychology, or the structure and problems of the society in which I was living. We were the sons of the well-to-do bourgeoisie. We mixed and would mix only with our own class. The lower classes lived in slums, and very nasty the slums and the people who lived in them were in Brighton in 1892. The boys and youths from those slums who came and sat on the Sussex flint wall of our cricket field and shouted abuse and obscenities at us or even sometimes threw rotten potatoes or stones at us, were known to us by the generic name of 'the cads'. In a dim way we assumed, I think, that society was rigidly divided into a world of gentlemen and a world of cads. This view of life was encouraged by the headmaster, a very charming, generous, foolish, stupid man. He was a Tory of the Tories and the years 1893 and 1894 were full of alarming events for a man of his mind. The reality of anarchism was brought home to him by the explosion of a bomb in Greenwich, and, though it destroyed the anarchist and not his victims, the incident was not reassuring. Socialism was regarded then as scarcely less menacing than anarchism. But in the headmaster's mind Mr. Gladstone was hardly less of a villain and a menace than socialists and bomb-throwers.

The first major political event which I can remember was the gallant and hopeless attempt of the 83-years-old Prime Minister in the summer of 1893 to settle the Irish question by

giving Ireland Home Rule. To speculate on the might-have-beens of history is usually profitless, but looking back over the last 50 years of British and European politics, it seems to me that if any judgment is certain it is this: that the rejection of Gladstone's Home Rule Bill by the House of Lords in September 1893 was one of those acts of political blindness and stupidity whose evil consequences are immense and unending. In Ireland the British were faced with that canker of 19th-century nationalism which during the last 100 years had continually broken out all over the body of European civilization and which was destined in the next 50 years to prove a major cause of its destruction. There was no earthly or heavenly reason why the Irish should not have been given the self-government which they demanded. If one is concerned with the truth of common sense and not with the romantic fictions of history, it is doubtful whether, if Ireland had been given Home Rule at any time during the last 150 years, the change would have had any great effect, either for good or ill, upon the lives of more than a few score persons on either side of the Irish Sea. I mean good or ill effect as the result of the Irish being ruled by the Irish instead of a British parliament and government. It is extremely doubtful whether the Irish would have been either better or worse governed to an extent which contributed materially to the happiness or unhappiness of any of them. Yet the fact that they were denied self-government produced in them a canker of hatred and anger and in the English a canker of anger and hatred; it was the cause of years of futile conflict which brought upon thousands of people misery, exile, poverty, wounds, or death. The positive, imponderable effects of a settlement of the Irish question in a civilized and democratic manner in 1893 might have been enormous. A turn in the great tides of history is often caused by a single event, a single creative act. There can be little doubt that, for instance, the grant of a constitution and self-government to the Transvaal in 1906 was such an act. It turned part of the current of British history away from the channels of imperialism and force into that of democracy, freedom, and cooperation. It created the commonwealth of free nations out of what had been an empire. If the British Empire had not been transformed into the Commonwealth in 1906, it could not have emerged, as it has today, from the wars of 1914 and 1939.

The grant of self-government to Ireland in 1890 would have had an even more profound and strengthening effect upon the Empire than the act of 1906. By 1914 we should have had on our western flank, not an embittered and rebellious colony, but an Irish Dominion prepared, in case of war, to stand by the side of South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Great Britain. One of the most remarkable facts in 19th-century European history has been the political blindness of the patriotic imperialist conservatives in every country, their complete inability even to learn, as the mouse or monkey, by the process of trial and error. The British Conservatives or Unionists, as they began to call themselves, as if to emphasize their folly, were pre-eminent among the reactionary parties in showing how by a deliberate policy it was possible consistently to produce politically a result exactly the opposite of what they intended. After the Napoleonic wars, the most powerful centrifugal force in European society was nationalism, the most powerful centripetal forces were those which the French revolution had loosed in the ideas of democracy, liberty, equality, and fraternity. It followed that, despite all superficial appearances, the greater the liberty in a state, the more complete self-government was accorded to nationalities, the greater the inherent strength of the state, and that vice versa the more a state relied upon 'strong government' to keep an unwilling national minority in a condition of subjection within a unitary, centralized system of government, the greater was its inherent weakness. This truth might have been discovered by rulers and statesmen through a process of deduction in the latter part of the 19th century, for, given the nature of national and nationalist psychology which by that time had established itself in a pathological form in most parts of Europe, it followed that there was no conceivable situation in which a state would not be weakened, politically, economically, and strategically, by the attempt of a section or class of one nationality to keep an unwilling section or class of another nationality in permanent subjection or inferior status within a unitary state.

It would, no doubt, be too much to expect that conservative patriots and imperialists should have learnt what was staring them in the face by a process of deduction, for to infer the particular from the general, to use *a priori* reasoning is denied to the lower animals and requires a fairly high level of

mental development. But the opposite process of induction reinforces the instinct of self-preservation over a wide area and various levels of animal life; it is implicit in the system of learning by trial and error. Even the amoeba has a rudimentary capacity for induction and owes its continued existence to it, while the dog whose mouth fills with saliva when he hears a bell ring has learnt at least to infer a general law from particular instances and has his feet on the road which leads to the inductive method of modern science. One might therefore have hoped or even expected that the 19th-century patriot and nationalist would have used the inductive method politically and have learnt from the considerable experience of nationalism. Unfortunately nothing is more remarkable than the obstinate persistence with which human beings refuse to learn by their political experience. The history of Austria-Hungary in the last half of the century proved the inherent weakness of any state in which a centralized government attempted to keep unwilling national minorities in subjection, a weakness which was proved to be fatal in the 1914 war. The patriots of all the other countries of Europe sagely shook their heads over the weakness of Austria-Hungary and rightly diagnosed its cause to be the unwillingness of its non-German subjects to be ruled by Germans. It was a 'ramshackle Empire'. A little further East there was another empire, the Ottoman Empire, even more ramshackle and weaker with subject peoples kicking even more violently against the pricks of subjection. All the patriots of all the empires, except the Turks themselves, rightly diagnosed the cause of Turkish weakness and prophesied the 'break up' of Turkey. Yet all these patriots refused to learn the lesson of these experiences, the lesson that the strength of a state is in inverse proportion to the unwilling subjection of national minorities. And so British Conservatives and Liberal Unionists were convinced that the strength of the British Empire depended upon refusing to give the Irish a parliament of their own in Dublin. And the headmaster who taught me Latin and Greek and Euclid in 1892 taught me this as my first lesson in politics.

Let us return to page 15, to what I propose to do in this book, and to the unwritten third volume of *After the Deluge*, which will now never be written in the form in which it was originally projected. In the intervening pages I have given a sketchy

outline of the political and social setting of my childhood, the class contours of the society into which I was born in the Kensington of 1880, and the first political lessons which a somewhat bewildered, but, I think, intelligent, child received from his nurses, parents, and masters between the ages of 5 and 12. In doing this I have inevitably and unintentionally plunged straight into the subject-matter of that unwritten third volume of my book. I have been speaking of the communal psychology of my nurses, parents, and teachers, and instantly it proved to be impossible to discuss them without showing how the chain of their political and social ideas contained links in the chain of ideas of George Eliot, of 1848 and 1830 and 1789, not to mention links of strange thoughts forged in the minds of Marx, Darwin, Rousseau, Grotius, and Marcus Tullius Cicero. I have been speaking of social ideas and social standards, their changes, and their effect upon events. I have noted the emergence between the times of Jane Austen and George Eliot of a new economic or class psychology and of its impact upon political psychology and political events, an impact which I saw, as a child in October 1887, translate itself into processions of unemployed and special constables and fear in High Street, Kensington. On that October day I was seeing and already dimly feeling the dilemma of 19th-century democracy which I described in its early stages in Volume II of *After the Deluge*, 'the unlucky dilemma' which confronted Greville and Hobhouse when they met in a street near Piccadilly on March 7, 1831, five days after Lord John had introduced the Reform Bill in the House of Commons.[1] 'The unlucky dilemma', as Greville himself called it, which confronted him and Hobhouse was defined by me as 'the dilemma of reconciling the economic inequality of the world in which Greville and Hobhouse were living with the demand for political equality and happiness of nascent democracy'. The small boy in High Street Kensington in 1887 was separated from them by 56 years. Between the revolution which they watched with doubt and apprehension and the disturbances which I watched intervened the abortive revolutions of 1848. In Paris 1848 was a 'proletarian' revolution, as Tocqueville noted at the time, and the terrible June Days which followed posed in blood the dilemma clearly for all Europe. It remained unsolved in 1848; once more in Paris

[1] Page 111.

in May 1871 the Commune tried to solve it by blood and force, but it remained unsolved in 1871; and there it was still unsolved before my eyes in High Street Kensington in 1887.

In the sketch of my own personal political education up to the age of 12, the economic dilemma was not the only historical or ideological ghost to rise out of the French revolution and the first two volumes of *After the Deluge*. The ideas of democracy, of liberty and equality; the social standards of value concerning work and occupation changing under the impact of new events, new ideas, and new ideals; the social status of women—all these things were clearly important elements operating on the social environment of my childhood; they were also precisely the phenomena which I was examining in my book. Lastly in my headmaster's study in the private school at Brighton I was suddenly confronted with the passions and political prejudices of the nationalist and imperialist, and at the beginning of *After the Deluge* I noted that nationality or nationalism was, with democracy and freedom, one of the dominating ideas of the 19th century, forming the matrix in which European society was moulded. The historian who wished to discover the causes of the 1914 war and its relation to the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars must investigate the nature and trace the effects of this idea of nationalism as well as those of democracy and freedom.

These facts are highly relevant for a living writer who has survived the two great wars and is trying to understand the origin and causes of these catastrophic events. I cannot accept the view, fashionable today, that history, like truth, is purely subjective, being a 'reinterpretation' of the past in terms of the prejudices and passions of each particular historian. I am the last person to underestimate the insidiousness and power of my own and, still more, other people's prejudices. But there is a certain obstinacy in facts and potentially a desire for truth in the human mind and an insatiable curiosity to know what has happened and why, and these three things interacting have produced a considerable amount of accurate knowledge of events in the past and of their causal connections. But there is an important distinction for the historian between the distant and the recent past, which becomes very clear to anyone who —as I was doing in my book—attempts to discover in the past the causes of great contemporary happenings. There is for

everyone a kind of watershed which divides history which is also experience from history which is just plain past history, and, rather strangely, the watershed is usually located some years before his birth. The remote or dead past may contain the causes of much in his own communal psychology and of many events which have profoundly affected him and his contemporaries. But it is not in any way part of his social experience; it neither colours nor is coloured by the atmosphere of his personal experience. But as he surveys the past approaching the present, there is a point at which events, which may have happened before his birth, become to some extent contemporary, part of his social experience and communal psychology. They are a part, not merely of history, but of his history.

This watershed in my case is the year 1848 or round about the middle of the 19th century. The French revolution, Napoleon, Charles X, the revolution of 1830, Louis-Philippe, Earl Grey and the Reform Bill, Jane Austen and Byron—all are absolutely in the past for me; they are in no sense a part of my experience, and it is only by a determined act of imagination that I can feel them as actual and present. The atmosphere of the Parthenon in the 5th or 4th century B.C. or of Miss Austen's Steventon in A.D. 1798 is more congenial to me than that of Mr. Arnold Bennett's five towns or of Mr. Sinclair Lewis's New York. But the world of Arnold Bennett and of Mr. Lewis is the one in which I was born and bred, in which I have lived and will die; its fibres are my roots; it is in my blood and bones, my heart and brain. Pericles, Socrates, and Jane Austen belonged to a world which is dead and different. To understand them as living beings I have to reconstruct them, to piece them together bone by bone or thought by thought, like a scientist reconstructing a dinosaur or a pterosaur. There were one or two men living on the other side of the watershed who transcended time, who, like Montaigne, are the contemporaries of all civilized men or who, like Beethoven, created a world untouchable by time or the tides of history. I should have been more at my ease among the books with Montaigne in the room in the round tower on the wall above the Dordogne than indeed I was at dinner with Arnold Bennett in Cadogan Square, hypnotized by the large ornament in the middle of the table, a basket of fruits in glass lit internally by an electric light. But

Montaigne, and perhaps one or two others, were exceptions and anomalies; in the interval of time which separated Lord Palmerston from Adam I can recognize hardly any contemporaries.

The watershed is social and political as well as personal. The Reform Act of 1832 was a turning point in our history; it was the British revolution which established the middle classes in power; it destroyed the 18th century and substituted for it the bourgeois society into which I was born and which 82 years later I was to see destroyed by the shot which Princip fired at Serajevo. But 1832 and the society which it destroyed were not part of my world; they belonged to the past of the dinosaur, the Parthenon, the Napoleonic wars, and Peterloo, and Earl Grey and Francis Place were no more my contemporaries than Pericles or Louis XVI. But the social atmosphere of 1848 was the social atmosphere of 1880, when I was born, and of 1887, when apparently I first became conscious of it. Those who made the 1832 revolution and those who had fought against it were already dead and embalmed in history in 1880. But the political protagonists of the middle of the 19th century lived on into the world in which I began to live. Lord Beaconsfield survived my birth by more than a year; when a boy at school, I saw Mr. and Mrs. Gladstone drive in an open victoria along the Brighton front; fifteen years later, as a young man, I had tea with the Empress Eugénie who had lost the French throne and fled to England ten years before I was born. This is only another way of saying that in the second quarter of the 19th century a new type of society was being built and the middle classes were engaged in establishing their rule in Britain and France, while through the last half of the century the structure of the society and middle-class rule, though already subjected to strains and stresses, remained substantially the same.

There was another very important element which helped to establish a social and intellectual watershed dividing me from the dead past of history round about the middle of the century. In the world in which I have lived for over 70 years three men have had a dominating intellectual influence: Charles Darwin, Karl Marx, and Sigmund Freud. *The Communist Manifesto* appeared in 1848 and *Das Kapital* began to be published in 1869; *The Origin of Species* was published in 1859. The influence of Freud came, of course, much later; he belongs to

the latter part of my life, to the decline and fall of bourgeois society, but even so without Darwin there would have been no Freud, without *The Origin of Species* no *Ego and the Id.* I shall have a good deal more to say about these 'influences' and the intellectual atmosphere which they created in the pages which follow. The point to notice here is the truism that the world was never the same after the publication of *The Communist Manifesto* or *The Origin of Species*; they created a social and intellectual watershed, and I was born and bred on this side of it.

These facts add a complication, which I had not foreseen, to the kind of task which I set myself in *After the Deluge.* In the first two volumes I was writing about past history on the other side of the watershed; I could view events and analyse them like a historian or scientist who has no personal concern in or private knowledge of the data which he is investigating. But after 1848 I pass the watershed and descend into history which to me is contemporary. The writing of contemporary history sets one a complicated and difficult problem; the writer is both witness and judge, he is probably plaintiff and, if he has a social conscience, defendant. As I said above, I do not accept the fashionable theory that the historian cannot provide an accurate and objective account of historical facts and that history is in the main a field in which we can harmlessly confirm our prejudices and satisfy our passions of love and hatred. Most of the relevant and important facts in human history are accurately known, and about the causes of great events there is a large body of knowledge which is reasonably certain and generally accepted. But naturally the interference of prejudice and passion is more likely to be strong and insidious when we deal with contemporary events. Even so the dangers and difficulties can be greatly exaggerated. Histories of contemporary events have been written which compare favourably for accuracy and objectivity with the work of any other historian; the first major historical work ever written—and perhaps still the greatest ever written—was written by a contemporary. It is noticeable, however, that the work of Thucydides is mainly a narrative of events, though he contrives to give a subtle and often profound interpretation of those events. There is no reason to believe that such an account cannot be accurate or the interpretation sound as well as subtle and profound. A man can write an accurate and objective account of contemporary

events, provided that he is sufficiently intelligent and has an adequate knowledge and distrust of his own prejudices.

But analysis or interpretation of events in human history is a very different thing from mere narrative. In *After the Deluge* I am trying, not to record, but to explain history, and when I come to the third volume and cross the historical and social watershed of my own life, I find myself in a dilemma. As a witness of events—and even to an infinitesimal extent an actor in them—I am myself part of the evidence; I am myself part of this period of history which I have to analyse and interpret. In order to understand what happened in 1789 or 1832, you must first find out what men did and secondly what men thought and felt, what meanings and value they attached to such things as liberty, happiness, and democracy. You can do that only by reading books and documents, for the facts and evidence are there and nowhere else. You will have gone a considerable way towards understanding and explaining the events of the French revolution if you can discover what Mirabeau, Danton, Robespierre, the peasants of the Midi, and the artisans of Paris thought and felt about liberty, equality, land, bread, and government; you will have taken some steps towards understanding the events of 1832, if you discover what Wellington, Lord John Russell, Greville, Hobhouse, Place, and the 'mob' in London and Manchester thought and felt about the House of Commons, the king, liberty, and the price of bread. There is only one way in which you can discover these things—by reading; because here you are dealing with history which is dead and buried in books. But when you cross the watershed, you are dealing with history still living in the minds of living men. I am myself a tiny fraction of the Boer war, the Dreyfus case, the wars of 1914 and 1939; what I thought or felt about the Dreyfus case and liberty, about the Versailles treaty and the Nazis is part of the historical evidence, part of the data which must be analysed in order to understand why these things happened.

That is the dilemma which confronted me on the threshold of the third volume of *After the Deluge*. In Volume II I had to look into the mind and heart of Greville in order to understand what he and his contemporaries thought about political and economic freedom and why different men acted in different ways about the Reform Bill. To do that I had to read the Greville diaries. But when I come to the Boer war or the

Parliament Act, I have to look into my own mind and heart and to remember what living people said and did in my presence at the time; for part of the data and evidence is there.

This evidence is obviously of great value, if used with intelligence and caution, for exploring the great tides and sudden eddies in human history. I know much more about the communal psychology of my own time, of the ideas and ideals of my contemporaries, of history after 1848, than I can possibly know of history and communal psychology on the other side of the 19th-century watershed. After all, I am my own contemporary, and I can obtain a wider and more intensive knowledge of the contents of my own head than of what Danton or Earl Grey thought and felt. It would be absurd not to use that evidence when one is attempting to analyse and understand the wars of 1914 and 1939 and to trace their relation to communal psychology. That is what I propose to do in this third volume of *After the Deluge*. Inevitably this imposes upon the volume a different shape and method. It must become to some extent a political autobiography. I will explain the method which I propose to adopt and will then begin a new chapter.

The two wars which have devastated the world during my lifetime were caused by men's actions, not by an act of God or an iron law of nature. If men had acted differently, history would have been different, and by acting differently they could have avoided the wars. Millions of men believe that certain ideas and ideals, some of which have already been examined in the previous volumes, caused their actions which caused the wars. This view is apparently considered to be a delusion by a number of historians and sociologists, but it is, I think, correct. There is evidence that human history is determined by the continual interaction of events and communal psychology. Events are in part determined by what men think and feel and in part by events; what men think and feel is partly determined by events and partly by what men think and feel. To understand history, its events, and their causes is, therefore, a laborious and complicated process of unravelling a skein of tangled facts and psychology, of actions, beliefs, and desires. We are ourselves part of that ill-fated skein which has produced two wars, a peace which spawned Hitler and nazism, Mussolini and fascism, and a second peace which, even more threateningly

than the first, is darkening the earth with its iron curtains of fears and hates.

Looking back from 1948 to 1848, it seems to me that one can distinguish pretty clearly the most important threads that have become tangled during the hundred years into this fatal and gigantic Gordian knot. First there are those Siamese-twin ideas, liberty and equality, which we saw emerging from the French revolution and helping, in 1830 and 1832, to consolidate the political and economic power of the middle classes in France and England. Internally the history of every state in Europe, and of many outside it, has been since 1848 a conflict. From one point of view the conflict appears to be a mere struggle for political and economic power, in some places between a dominant capitalist bourgeoisie and an insurgent working class, e.g. France and England, in others between privileged classes, the monarchical and aristocratic relics of feudalism, and insurgent unprivileged classes, e.g. Germany and Russia. From another point of view the conflict appears to be not merely for power, but for ideas and ideals issuing from, and modifying, communal psychology. At first the ideas are purely those of democracy, the classical ideas of liberty and equality engendered in the revolution of 1789. Later, in the middle of the 19th century the conflict is complicated by Marxian socialism. It is often forgotten, both by socialists and non-socialists, that Marxian socialism, with all its original and fancy flowers, sprang from the roots of democracy. The authors of *The Communist Manifesto* were good democrats in the sense of 1789, 1830, and 1848 and they called upon the workers of the world to unite under the banner of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Even today the communist, who in a wide and deep field of hatreds reserves for what he calls bourgeois democracy a peculiarly virulent hate, maintains that the Soviet system is the only 'true' democracy and defends it as producing 'real' liberty and equality.

It is clear from this that men have believed and believe that they are struggling for democracy, liberty, and equality, that the words mean something socially important, that the words describe principles or methods of the highest value for organizing human society. And wherever one examines the great tides of history operating on the class structure of states during the last 100 years, one sees the same principles or ideas apparently

producing the conflict. Two examples may be mentioned. The feminist movement and 'emancipation' of women are based upon a demand for liberty and social equality with men; they are logically the corollary to the principles of democracy as defined in 1789. The other great movement during the latter part of the period has been the revolt of subject peoples in Africa and Asia against the imperialist rule of European powers. Here again the demand for self-government has been an explicit demand for liberty and equality in the name of democracy.

In order to understand the history of our times, it is therefore necessary to unravel these strands in our communal psychology and to estimate their effect and importance: democracy, liberty, equality, socialism, and communism. But there are two other strands, closely related to each other, those of nationalism and imperialism, which became more and more important in the 19th century and are by most people considered to have been primary causes of the two wars of the 20th century. Modern nationalism originated in the French revolution and in its early stages was intimately connected with the communal psychology of democracy, liberty, and equality. But as the years passed, the democratic nationalist found himself confronted by a second dilemma: it proved in practice as difficult to reconcile the claims and passions of nationalism with the claims of democrats to liberty and equality as to reconcile the claims to political and economic liberty and equality within the framework of a democratic state. In 1830 the nationalist was a democrat and the democrat a nationalist; by the time that I became politically conscious, democrats were inclined to regard nationalism as one of the major enemies of liberty and equality and, not perhaps without reason, as one of the most destructive mental diseases with which the human race, in its long and lunatic history, has contrived to inoculate itself.

The man who sets himself the task of trying to understand the origins of the two wars and of the nature of the peace which followed them must begin by investigating the meaning and effect of these elements in the communal psychology of our time: democracy, liberty, equality, socialism, communism, nationalism, and imperialism. That was what I began to do in the first two volumes of *After the Deluge*. In them I was necessarily dealing with past history, because these elements in our communal psychology have developed from and still

bear the impress of ideas, beliefs, and aspirations and of events in the immediate past. My method of investigation in those volumes was, therefore, mainly chronological; I tried to trace the course of events from 1789 onwards in their relation—both of cause and effect—to the communal psychology of what we may call for short democracy, socialism, and nationalism. The investigation, I ventured to hope, had left me with some idea of the communal psychology of the middle of the 19th century, and of the origin, nature, and effect of the various elements in it at that date. Now that I have crossed the watershed into my own life, I propose to pursue the same object, or perhaps phantom, but in a rather different way. I shall still pursue these ideas and ideals through events and into the minds of men, trying to observe how they acted upon or were acted upon by events. But I shall use as material, not merely recorded history, but my own life as a political animal, the contents of my mind, my own experience and observation. I shall abandon the strictly chronological method and shall examine the nature and effect of each element in relation to the period from 1848 to 1948 rather than trace their development chronologically through the events.

But the course of my investigation and even the previous pages of this book have brought to light a factor which at this point needs preliminary consideration before I resume my pursuit of liberty, equality, etc. In writing about the social psychology of my childhood and of the nature of the social ideas which Hitler and Mussolini persecuted, I came up against the difficult question of standards of social value. The more I reflect upon history, sociology, and politics, the more closely I examine the major events of my own time, the more convinced I become of the importance and effect of these standards. The philosophical historian, that is, the man who is concerned with the aetiology and even the metaphysics of history, as opposed to the mere investigator and narrator of historical events, inevitably finds himself, as I have done, considering ideals, aspirations, objects of communal psychology. All these words imply in this context judgments of good and bad in relation to human society, judgments regarding social standards of value. The essential meaning of the American Declaration of Independence and of the French Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme consists in judgments of this kind. What these makers of revolutions

assert is that certain things in human society are right or good and certain other things wrong or bad, and that they did what they did in order to abolish the evil and establish the good things. They may have been mistaken in more ways than one, e.g. either in their judgment of actual values or in their belief that their actions were determined by their judgment of values; but neither the belief nor the judgments can be summarily dismissed as unimportant or *prima facie* absurd. It is essential to investigate the nature of the relation between social standards of value and historical events, though it seems to me that the majority of historians and sociologists evade the issue. At any rate it is one of my principle objects in this book.

There are many other reasons for holding that this question is of great importance; at this point I will mention two. When I look back over the period of my life, it seems to me that I have lived through three kinds of change or revolution, each profound. The first is in my material environment. When 30 years ago I bought the house in which I am writing these sentences today, there was no gas or electric light in it, no drainage, no water supply; there was no system of communication with the nearest town four miles away; the four miles of road were like a farm cart track; no one in the neighbourhood owned a car and my only means of transport was a bicycle. It is unnecessary to describe in detail the changes which have since taken place. For me and my neighbours there has been a revolutionary change from a condition of almost primitive discomfort and inconvenience to one of considerable comfort. The second revolution has been the change from social security to extreme social instability. I was born into a society of which the foundations seemed, at least to the upper and middle classes, comfortably secure. We recognized that the individual might suffer social misfortune or even disaster—even the friend of the king might be caught cheating at cards or a statesman, by committing adultery, ruin his own career and the last hope of a civilized settlement of the relations between Ireland and Britain—but at the back of our minds we assumed that society, though occasionally the unemployed or war might send a tremor through it and us, was securely based and becoming steadily bigger and better. Our faith and optimism were not as foolish and complacent as many people think today, having the advantage of that *ex post facto* disillusionment which is such a useful

substitute for political wisdom. Since 1859 we had all believed in evolution and progress, and we had come to accept them as operating everywhere, upon man and his society as well as upon apes and earthworms. It is true that we tended to forget that the worm, when it turns, may as easily turn backwards as forwards. But the facts themselves afforded a good deal of support to the semi-Darwinian social optimism of the Victorian liberal. Few people would deny that in Britain life was more 'civilized', materially and mentally, for the mass of the population in 1889 than in 1789, and that the last 50 years had seen a steady and widening progress in prosperity, liberty, equality, education, and culture. There seemed to be no immediate danger to the foundations of the social structure which had made this 'progress' possible. Hence the not unreasonable sense of social security. Princip's shot at Sarajevo destroyed, as we now know, our society, its security, and our sense of it. Nothing is so destructive as destruction, and war, when it is on the scale of those of 1914 and 1939, is sublimated social destruction. Since 1914, when the human worm turned, his progress has been steadily and rapidly backwards. Today none of the foundations of the worm's society can seem to him, unless he is an imbecile worm, secure.[1]

[1] No doubt the foundations of Victorian society were never as stable as at the time they appeared to be. War is a symptom of weakness and disease as well as a cause, and there were inherent weaknesses in the foundations which, under the stress of war, proved fatal. Intelligent observers were aware of them and had their forebodings long before 1914. It was perhaps the Boer War which first clearly revealed some of the weaknesses and their dangers. The following entry in Mrs. Sidney Webb's diary on January 31, 1900, is illuminating: 'The last six months, and especially the last month at Plymouth, have been darkened by the nightmare of war. The horrible consciousness that we have, as a nation, shown ourselves to be unscrupulous in methods, vulgar in manners as well as inefficient, is an unpleasant background to one's personal life. . . . The Boers are, man for man, our superiors in dignity, devotion and capacity—yes, *in capacity*. That, to a ruling race, is the hardest hit of all. It may be that war was inevitable: I am inclined to think it was: but that it should come about through muddy intrigues and capitalist pressure and that we should have proved so incapable alike in statesmanship and in generalship is humiliating. I sometimes wonder whether we could take a beating and be the better for it? This would be the real test of the heart and intellect of the British race: much more so than if we succeed after a long and costly conflict. . . .

'To us public affairs seem gloomy; the middle-classes are materialistic,

The third revolution has been in social standards of value. During the first 34 years of my life certain ethical principles were almost universally accepted as applicable to society and politics. Even autocrats, dictators, aristocrats, and reactionaries paid lip-service to them. Few people in Europe would have admitted openly that they did not believe that truth, justice, humanity, even a certain measure of liberty and equality, were socially good and part of the essence of civilization, or that cruelty, injustice, and the arbitrary use of force, whether by individuals, classes, or governments, were evil and barbarous. Misery and death—even mass-murder by ruling classes of persons whom they did not like or with whose beliefs they did not agree—were regarded as uncivilized instruments of government. It was accepted that a value attached to human life, irrespective of the class or opinions of the person to whom the life belonged, and that the rule that a man should not be punished by state or government except for a breach of law and after a legal trial was not a mere matter of convenience or

and the working-class stupid, and in large sections sottish, with no interest except in racing odds, whilst the Government of the country is firmly in the hands of little cliques of landlords and great capitalists, and their hangers-on. The social enthusiasm that inspired the intellectual proletariat of ten years ago has died down and given place to a wave of scepticism about the desirability, or possibility, of any substantial change in society as we know it. There may be the beginnings of intellectual curiosity, but it is still a flicker and not a flame. And, meanwhile, the rich are rolling in wealth and every class, except the sweated worker, has more than its accustomed livelihood. Pleasure and ease are desired by all men and women: science, literature and art, even social ambition and party politics, have given way to the love of mental excitement and physical enjoyment. If we found ourselves faced with real disaster, should we as a nation have the nerve and persistency to stand up against it? That is the question that haunts me.' (*Our Partnership*, by Beatrice Webb, 1948, p. 194.)

The significance of these contemporary reflections is that they indicate considerable uneasiness about the foundations of society, and that such an attitude was not at all characteristic of the Webbs. They regarded themselves as social scientists and practical reformers, and in both capacities they were temperamentally and normally optimists. They held that there were great defects in society, in its organization and machinery of government, but they were remediable; the foundations of the building were sound, the building above them required alteration and adaptation to modern life; it would be folly to destroy the foundations and the existing building and try to erect something entirely new.

inconvenience, but an ethical principle, the foundation of justice and civilized life. The origin and effect of these beliefs will be discussed more fully later. Here it is only necessary to point out that they were held or professed by persons of every variety of religious belief or unbelief. And a comparison of the state of society in Britain and the great majority of European countries at the end of the 19th century with what it had been at the end of the 18th seemed to show that wide acceptance of these standards of value was changing the face of human society, that the social principles of conduct were in practice being applied, haltingly, no doubt, and often unwillingly or disingenuously, yet with considerable effect. No one who was not cynical or silly would have maintained that the Europe of 1900 was civilized, but the standard of its achievement in regard to truth, freedom, justice, and humanity was higher than it had ever been before. Even in my own lifetime I had seen in London an enormous advance in the application of the social standards of civilized values both to the government of the country and to the lives of its inhabitants. Walking through a London slum in 1910, observing the men and women who lived in it, and then remembering their condition in my childhood, gave one some idea of the change.

All this has changed since the war of 1914. I shall not describe here in any detail the nature of the change, for I shall be dealing with it at some length in the following chapter. But I must record that this revolution seems to me the most extensive and profound of the three which I have experienced. The revolution also seems to me horrifying and terrifying. I am aware that this is precisely one of those judgments in which one must acknowledge and allow for one's own prejudices. I have my own standards of value, and they constitute the prejudices which determine my judgments as to what is socially good or bad. I have a social prejudice in favour of truth, freedom to pursue and express it, justice, tolerance, humanity and a prejudice against the use of force or violence, against cruelty, and against the killing or arbitrary persecution of human beings. I think the third social principle of the French revolution, described by the word 'fraternity', of immense value and importance. I consider a society good in proportion as its structure and motive power is based on and encourages human friendliness and cooperation, both communal and individual; one which is

organized upon sectional hatreds and which organizes and encourages such hatreds is fundamentally evil. The third revolution which I am considering in this paragraph has consisted in the rejection of those standards which seem to me right and the acceptance and widespread application of the standards which seem to me wrong.

The previous paragraph leads me naturally to the second reason for holding that social standards of value are of great practical importance. What I said could be summarized in a single sentence: a society which accepted and practised the one scale of values would be civilized, a society which accepted and practised the other would be barbarous. The mere use of the word civilization is today often deprecated, and we are told that it is either vague or meaningless. This disinclination to use the word or to allow others to use it may perhaps be a symptom of the thing's decay or even a sign of uneasy conscience. It is not true that the word civilization is meaningless, or that it is meaningless when used by a man who knows what he means. Human societies, at different times and places, differ in respect to the kind of life, communal and individual, which they provide for or impose upon the human insects which make up the particular hive or heap. The differences may be either in the communal life, the hive or heap itself, or in the individual life, although it is dangerous to forget, as many do, that the communal life is always the sum of individual lives. There are three main kinds of difference. The first category is material; it is determined by the material standard of life of the community. Here it is a question of poverty or wealth, of food, clothing, houses, transport, all material things used or consumed, whether regarded as necessaries or luxuries; it is also a question of the distribution of material commodities within the community, for two communities may differ profoundly, though equal in material wealth, if the wealth is evenly distributed in the one and unevenly in the other.

The second category is less easy to define accurately, but is no less real and important. It is determined by the intellectual and spiritual framework of communal life and by the intellectual and spiritual standard of life of the individuals. The questions to be asked here are of this nature: are the laws and penalties harsh, cruel, irrational, or are they just and humane? To what extent are law and order maintained impartially, certainly,

and without corruption? The standards of education, the level of intelligence, the standards of communal and individual behaviour, the distribution and use of power, liberty, and leisure, the communal and individual attitude towards truth, the level of mental inertness or alertness, the quantity and quality of happiness, standards of taste—all these are important factors to be considered under this category.

The first category is determined by the difference of material products of different communities, the third by difference of spiritual or intellectual products. The most important are works of art, science, learning, philosophy, and religion. It is generally agreed that a community which produces no works of art must differ profoundly from one which produces the Parthenon, Homer, Pindar, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, and Plato, or one which produces the religion of the dancing Dervish from one which produces the religion of Buddha or Christ. It is these three categories of communal difference which determine whether a society is or is not civilized. I use the word in its ordinary, dictionary sense, which understands barbarism to be the opposite of civilization. In this sense, what determines whether a society is civilized is its material standards of life, its intellectual and spiritual standards of life, and its contributions to art, science, learning, philosophy, or religion. Theoretically, I think it is possible to argue that a community might be highly civilized which had a very low standard in the first category and produced little or nothing in the third, provided that it had the intellectual and spiritual framework and standards of life and conduct of civilization. The question is academic, however. In practice a life which is 'poor' and 'nasty', whether for communities or individuals, will also be 'brutish', as Hobbes implies in his classical description of barbarism. In practice, too, high intellectual and spiritual standards in a community produce works of art or speculative thought which bear the impress of those standards. This accounts for the common—though rather dubious—custom of judging the level of civilization by the achievements of the community in art, science, or religion, because it is so much easier to see the effect than the cause, the fruit than the root, the civilization in Plato's *Republic* or in the Sermon on the Mount than in the ordinary life of Athens or Jerusalem thousands of years ago.

But what I have just said shows the primary importance of social standards in determining the nature or civilization of a community. This in itself would justify the conclusion that the revolution in social standards which has taken place in my lifetime requires the most careful investigation by anyone who is attempting to explain the communal events in Europe during the last 50 years. I do not propose to continue the general discussion in this chapter; in the following chapters I shall investigate more closely the nature of the revolution and its relation to the events.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL STANDARDS OF VALUE

In all human action there are two factors: the act itself and its cause or motive. It is usually assumed—rightly, I think—that a motive may be the cause or part cause of an individual's act. Most people also believe that an effective motive may be ethical, that a man may do or not do something because he believes that he ought or ought not to do it. I am aware that this word 'ought' has, ever since Socrates began asking his unanswerable questions, caused infinite trouble to philosophers and that even its meaning is still in dispute. Luckily I am not writing a treatise on ethics, but a book on politics, and it is therefore unnecessary for me to concern myself with the philosophical profundities of Platonists, Aristotelians, and their successors. My concern is with beliefs and their relation to social action; in this kind of enquiry the profound and extremely important questions raised by the philosophers are largely irrelevant. I assume therefore that when a man believes that he ought or ought not to do something, he is making an ethical judgment, based upon standards of value. His belief can be analysed into a judgment (1) that some things are good and some bad, some actions right and some wrong; (2) that an action is right if it is good in itself or if it produces something which is good in itself or if it produces something which is a means to producing something good in itself; (3) that his actions should be determined in whole or in part by their effects in relation to what he considers good or bad. He believes therefore that it is possible to judge the relative goodness or badness, rightness or wrongness of things or actions, i.e. standards of value, and that these standards of value should determine action.

Standards of value have been used as the foundation for codes of individual conduct from the remotest ages, and it was inevitable that, as soon as an organized society of individuals developed and men began to think and dispute about the nature, effects, and objects of such organization, similar standards and codes were applied to society and its organization.

Hence arose social standards of value, which at any particular time are rarely, if ever, the same as the individual standards. The social standards are, of course, in the heads of individuals; they are usually the foundation of custom and law; they are an important ingredient of what I have called communal psychology.

The ten commandments which Jehovah enunciated on Mount Sinai implied certain standards of value for the individual and laid down a code of individual conduct. The bleak statement 'Thou shalt not kill' was an ethical command of tremendous import to our forefathers 3000 years ago and was appropriately accompanied by Jehovah's thunder. It proclaimed the ethical value of human life and human individuality and laid down, without reservation, that human life is a good thing and that to deprive an individual of it is an evil act. The commandments also established standards of value and rules of conduct regarding metaphysical beliefs, the attitude of children to parents, truth and falsehood, adultery, and covetousness. Long before the thunder on Mount Sinai great kings, priests, moralists, or lawgivers on the banks of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris had anticipated the Hebrews by promulgating standards of value and codes of conduct. But the standards and codes applied always to individuals. It was the Greeks who first applied ethics to society and its organization. The reason why the Hebrews and other early Asiatic peoples never developed standards of social value or even a communal psychology was that they had practically no secular organization of society. Their politics and their religion were inextricably mixed. In so far as they evolved any kind of secular government, they never got beyond the stage of dictatorship of an absolute ruler. But the great king was himself either God or the direct mouthpiece of God on earth. The laws were therefore religious, the commands of God, a divine code of individual conduct; and standards of value were established by God, not man, and appropriately inscribed upon stone. God was also represented and often interpreted by the priesthood. The priest might be the minister and sometimes the rival of the king; but the voice of the priest, like that of the king, was always the voice of God.

In such circumstances any criticism of society, its government and organization is impossible. If you really believe that God has commanded you not to commit adultery, you have to

accept the command as final, though you may perhaps contrive to evade it—you cannot argue with or about Jehovah in the thunder on Mount Sinai. And it is often even more immediately dangerous to argue with or about a dictator than a God, especially if the dictator claims to be both king and God. But the development of standards of social value are impossible where criticism of society and of government is impossible.

The Greeks were the first people to secularize thought and so secularized society and government. It was this unique and amazing feat which, more than anything else, made Greek and, therefore, European civilization possible. The Greeks, for some unknown reason, developed an intensely restless mental curiosity which had never existed before and has probably never existed again among any other people to the same extent. The nature of the religion which they gradually evolved was a tribute either to their luck or to their instinctive wisdom. It contained peculiar features unknown elsewhere in the religious history of mankind. There were elements of great beauty, profundity, and humanity in their beliefs, but also an element of fantastic and almost deliberate absurdity. You have only to compare the *Iliad*, the Greek Bible, with *Genesis* or even *Job* to see that Homer is in a different religious universe from the Hebrews'. Homer's gods have a sense of humour and are quite naturally regarded as fitting objects of his sense of humour. There was absolutely nothing humorous about Jehovah or in the religion of any of Homer's contemporaries or in any religion derived from Judaism or Christianity.

It was this religious or metaphysical attitude which, when combined with their intense curiosity, made it possible for the Greeks to liberate themselves from the spiritual prison of superstition which closed upon the human mind as soon as it took the fatal step of thinking and imagining. The Greeks became religiously and metaphysically sceptics without ever losing their belief in spiritual values. They had few illusions about the universe; they kept their feet firmly planted on the earth and it was on the earth that they found their ideals. There was nothing which they disliked more than excess; 'the mean' was in their view the basis of all civilization and they attained it in their delicate poise between materialism and idealism.

This attitude of the Greeks to religion and standards of value

is not merely a question of historical interest; it is of profound significance to us today and to the subject of this chapter. Further analysis of it is, therefore, desirable. I have said that it made it possible for them to liberate themselves from superstition. Consider Attic drama when Athenian and Greek civilization was at its zenith. It was religious drama, whether tragedy or comedy, performed at a festival and under the auspices of a major deity. Gods as well as heroes appeared upon the stage; the ancient religious stories were retold and the profoundest problems of religion and morals unravelled with the greatest freedom by the dramatist. This was not done in a book to be read by a few intellectuals, but publicly before an audience which consisted of all the male citizens who chose to attend. And they did attend; the dramatic contests rivalled the Olympic games as a public entertainment.

The works of three Greek tragedians have survived for us, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Aeschylus was born in 526 B.C. and died in 455 B.C.; Sophocles was born in 496 B.C. and died in 405 B.C.; Euripides was born in 480 B.C. and died in 406 B.C. Aristophanes, the great writer of comedies, was born about 456 B.C. and died probably about 380 B.C. Thus Sophocles was writing plays at the same time as Aeschylus, Euripides at the same time as Sophocles; and Aristophanes must have been present at the first performance of many of the tragedies of both Sophocles and Euripides. Aeschylus and Sophocles can be correctly described as religious, but even they were not religious in the sense in which the term must be applied to all believing Jews, Christians, Muhammadans, even Hindus and Buddhists. I doubt whether either of them believed in the existence of Athene or any God in the way in which a 20th-century Christian believes in the existence of God and Christ; they certainly did not accept the savagery of primitive Greek religion and its stories in the way in which 19th-century Christians accepted the savagery of the primitive Judaic stories of the Old Testament. Aeschylus was psychologically a conservative. In the great trilogy, *Agamemnon*, *Choephoroi*, and *Eumenides*, he treats one of the most famous of Greek religious stories which raises the whole problem of crime and divine punishment, of God and guilt. The original story is full of religious savagery which springs from the sense of sin and the nightmares of fear, hate, and divine vengeance which in all

ages men have used as the cruellest and crudest instruments of torture and self-torture. The plot is the curse which the Gods have laid upon the House of Pelops and the curse itself is the horrible cycle of murder and vengeance, human and divine. In the last play of the trilogy we see the ministers of divine vengeance, the Furies, Goddesses, who snore and whose eyes ooze and drip, who love the smell of blood and suck the blood of men; they are hounding down the matricide Orestes and demanding that he shall be handed over to them for punishment. We see Orestes twice in the sanctuary of a temple, first in that of Apollo at Delphi and secondly in that of Athene at Athens. The God and the Goddess appear upon the stage and protect Orestes from the Furies. Under the auspices of Athene there is a formal trial, in which the Furies are the accusers, Orestes the accused, and Apollo argues the case for Orestes. One must remember and try to realize what this meant. It meant that 2411 years ago hundreds of ordinary Athenians were sitting there in the sunshine listening to a frank and profound discussion by the Gods themselves in the most exciting form of the very basis of religious beliefs and of the moral problems of sin and punishment. No other people in human history, I repeat, have ever before or since treated their religion in this way.

Let us return to the trial of Orestes which was also the trial of the Greek religion and of the Furies. After the arguments the jury, ordinary men summoned by Athene, vote and their votes are found to be equally divided. Athene then as judge gives the casting vote for the acquittal of Orestes. But the play does not end there; it ends with a reconciliation between the Furies, the Goddesses of blood and vengeance, and Athene, the Goddess of reason, who herself has just given the casting vote against them. The Furies, who 'lived in darkness' and 'ran like hounds upon the trail of men', are induced by Athene to accept the verdict, to become in a new temple in Athens itself the 'Eumenides'—the 'kindly ones'. The popular conception of the Furies in the time of Aeschylus was, as Verrall pointed out, the horrible picture of them as they appear in the early part of the *Eumenides*, devils thirsting pitilessly for the blood of their victim, not 'kindly' or 'beneficent' Goddesses. The magnificent and still moving final scene of 'reconciliation' is Aeschylus's own contribution to the ancient story. In it he

rewrote the nightmare story of the savage mind in terms of civilization. This final scene of 'reconciliation' is, indeed, a landmark in the psychology of religion and civilization. For the first time in the history of the human race, so far as we know, a man questioned the doctrine of divine vengeance, of sin and talionic punishment. For the first time the problem of sin, crime, and punishment is solved in terms, not of blind vengeance, but of reason and pity.[1]

Aeschylus, I repeat, was temperamentally and intellectually a conservative, yet he revolutionized the religious conceptions of the Greeks and so of European civilization. He was an Athenian, with the Athenians' instinctive love of reason, light, and moderation. He could not accept the traditional story of the House of Pelops, the senseless cycle of the curse, of human sin and divine vengeance; his reason and his humanity revolted against the 'dread goddesses' with the 'terrors of their nameless mysteries'. After he had written the last scene in *Eumenides*, the relation of man to God and sin and punishment could never be quite the same.

There is another play of Aeschylus, *Prometheus*, which from this point of view is even more significant. The ancient legend which he used as plot was, for all its barbarity, remarkable as a proof of Greek imagination and clearness of vision even in primitive times. Zeus was a primitive and barbarous God who had established his rule over heaven and earth by force and fraud, ruthlessly employed against his father and the older Gods. Prometheus, who for the Greeks personified wisdom, had helped Zeus to obtain supreme power. But he was the friend of man and determined to aid mankind in the struggle against their pitiless treatment by the Gods and nature. He stole fire from heaven and gave it to man, and was, therefore worshipped 'as the giver of fire, and with fire of all the arts which made a good life possible'.[2] He thereby incurred the anger of Zeus who subjected him to appalling tortures.

The primitive legend, with its barbarous and cruel God, no

[1] In the summer of 1948, nearly 2,500 years after the conservative Aeschylus wrote the *Eumenides*, the conservative British House of Lords decided by an overwhelming majority to reject the decision of the House of Commons to abolish capital punishment. It takes more than 2,500 years finally to turn the Furies into the *Eumenides*.

[2] *Greek Tragedy*, by J. T. Sheppard, p. 63.

doubt reflected the cruelty and barbarity of the people who invented it; they invented a God in their own image and it seemed to them right and proper that he should be barbarous and cruel. Yet the legend dimly reflects, as the primitive stories of other peoples never do, the revolt of human reason against an irrational universe, of man against God. It is this revolt which the conservative Aeschylus makes the plot, the central theme of his play. And the revolt is no longer dimly felt to be of human reason against an irrational universe, of man against God; that is precisely the aspect which is insisted upon and transforms the play into the greatest cosmic drama ever written. Aeschylus leaves his audience of ordinary men in no doubt as to where their sympathy should be given; God is a cruel tyrant and Prometheus stands for reason, humanity, and all the things 'which make a good life possible'. This view is emphasized in the climax of the drama, the entrance of Io and the story of her cruel treatment by Zeus; for Prometheus was himself a God, but Io is a human victim of God.

Prometheus, like *Eumenides*, was part of a trilogy, but, unlike *Eumenides*, it was the second, not the last, of the three plays. We do not know how the trilogy ended. No doubt it ended, like the *Oresteia*, with a 'reconciliation', a kind of sublimation of the barbarous Zeus by his humane victim. Zeus, like the Furies, became 'kindly', for as religion becomes weaker the Gods always become gentler. But whatever the solution, of one thing we may be certain: after Aeschylus had written the Prometheus trilogy, Zeus and the relationship of man to God could never be quite the same.

It is impossible to read *Prometheus* without thinking of the *Book of Job*, and nothing shows more clearly the difference between the psychology of Greek and Hebrew civilization than a comparison of these two magnificent poems. *Job* is the only book in the Old Testament which contains any hint of revolt against the cruel and unjust God whom the Hebrews, like the Greeks, had created in their own image and against the appalling beliefs in sin and punishment. Like Prometheus, Job rebels against the irrationality and injustice of God's ordering of the universe. He demands that God shall justify himself to man by reason, not by power—'Surely I would speak to the Almighty and I desire to reason with God', he cries—the cry of the civilized man emerging from barbarism. The depth of his

revolt is shown by the reaction of his three friends, ordinary Hebrews, who regard any questioning of the divine order as blasphemy. The stage is, therefore, set, as by Aeschylus, for the same cosmic drama: the tortured Job, like the tortured Prometheus, confronts his torturer, God, with the only weapons which he possesses, reason and the standards of humanity and justice. There the resemblance ends. Only the superb poetry of *Job* conceals its essential weakness and silliness. Aeschylus, the Greek, a great poet and a deeply religious man, though he lived in an age which was only just beginning to struggle out of savagery, refused to allow his intellect to be fuddled either by poetry or religion. His mind is as sharp as a knife, and behind the knife is the will to truth, the mental integrity, the passionate pursuit of standards of value. So there is no slurring or muddling and fuddling of facts: the case of Prometheus against God is stated with superb simplicity and clarity. That is why, as I said, after Aeschylus had written *Prometheus*, God and his relation to man could never be quite the same as it had been before.

The author of the *Book of Job* was a great poet. As a poet, he was as great as Aeschylus or even greater, and, strangely enough there is something Aeschylean in the steely strength of his verse, the thunder of his imagery, his soaring and sweeping imagination.

ἔστιν θάλασσα, τίς δέ νιν καταβέσει;

asks the Aeschylean Clytaemnestra;

Who shut up the sea with doors, when it brake forth, as if it had issued from the womb?

asks Jehovah in the *Book of Job*. Intellectually the Hebrew is a child or savage compared with the Greek. Job is dimly in revolt against God's injustice, the traditional religious standards of value, the beliefs about sin and guilt and punishment. But his revolt is purely personal; he is outraged because God is torturing him as a sinner whereas he has committed no sin. But he sees nothing beyond the pain of his own misfortunes and ill-treatment. The cosmic problem, faced so clearly by Prometheus, by which he becomes a symbol of humanity defending right against divine might, is far beyond his understanding. Job is a child howling (in great poetry) because he is being punished for something which he has never done; Prometheus becomes humanity defending right and justice

against the cruelty of God and the ruthlessness of nature. In consequence, the 'argument' of Job is childish. His three friends said he was blasphemous, because he was really a sinner and therefore rightly punished by God. When God finally appears to justify himself, he says that the friends were wrong and Job right; but the divine justification, when it comes, is magnificent, though not a justification. Ethically it leaves things precisely where they were, for all that the Almighty can say for himself is: 'I am so powerful and you so powerless that I must be right and you wrong'. One can imagine the silence of contempt with which the tortured Prometheus would have listened to this argument if Kratos had used it on Zeus's behalf. But Job accepts it at once and the Lord instantly rewards him by giving him twice as much, in sons, daughters, cattle, and camels, as he had before and by curing his boils. That is why the *Book of Job* left God and his relation to man untouched.

Aeschylus is, in some ways, the most Greek of all Greek writers; in him for the first time we can see the mind of civilized man breaking its chains. Fifty years after his death, Aristophanes, in *The Frogs*, put him on the stage of comedy as the representative of orthodoxy against the restless 'modernity' and scepticism of Euripides. It is a curious orthodoxy and only a Greek and Athenian would have thought it orthodox. For Aeschylus sees that there are standards of value, of good and bad, of right and wrong, which apply to God no less than to man, to the divine no less than to the human, to the universe and heaven no less than to earth and hell. For Job a thing is right or wrong because Jehovah says so, Jehovah who made the behemoth and leviathan; to 'contend with the Almighty' or to 'reprove God' is to 'darken counsel by words without knowledge'. The Aeschylean Prometheus and Athene will have none of this; they demand that the Gods, Zeus himself, even the creator of Leviathan, shall accept the standards of civilization, reason, mercy, and justice It is the beginning of the secularization of religion.

The process was continued by Aeschylus's successors. The Gods of Sophocles have been considerably civilized; one cannot imagine the Furies or the Zeus of *Prometheus* in a Sophoclean play. But Sophocles was not interested, like Aeschylus, in cosmic ethics so much as in human beings. He accepted the ancient

stories and civilized them by omitting the Gods as much as possible and concentrating upon the human drama. In his *Electra* and the Oedipus plays the awkward problem of guilt, of sin and punishment, is played down as much as possible. The myth is accepted as the dramatic situation; the drama is in the psychology of particular characters subjected to such a situation. In the Aeschylean *Oresteia* the psychology of Orestes, though he is the 'hero' of the last play in the trilogy, is of no importance, because the drama is not about a man, Orestes, but about guilt and sin and punishment. The Sophoclean *Oresteia* is so little concerned with Aeschylus's problem that its hero is not Orestes, but Electra. Sophocles continued to secularize the myths and religion by saying as little as possible about the Gods.

Euripides went one stage further. Among his contemporaries he had the reputation of being a sceptic and atheist and old fashioned people considered his plays unorthodox. They certainly were. Superficially they followed tradition; they retold the myths and were, therefore, religious dramas produced at the festival of Dionysos. But again and again the story is told in such a way that the intelligent spectator is led to question the truth of the myth, its morality, or both. Euripides is much simpler and more direct superficially than either Aeschylus or Sophocles, but the directness and simplicity are almost deliberately misleading. With immense subtlety doubt is injected into the mind of the spectator, doubt about the truth of the story, the morality of the Gods, their very existence. When the crisis of the drama comes, we find ourselves saying to ourselves: 'This could never have really happened, or, if it did, the man was right and the God wrong'. Thus Euripides completes the secularization of the Gods and religion; he destroys the nightmare of guilt and sin and punishment which well up from the savagery of the unconscious mind and turn the Gods and us into savages; he appeals always to reason and to the standards of value which determine, for God and for man, the good and the bad, what is right and what is wrong. With the destruction of the human nightmare he destroys the old Gods.

The tragic drama is more often than not concerned with the subject of guilt, sin, and punishment. This is particularly true of the Greek tragedians, and it was not unnatural for them again and again to find the source of tragedy in sin. Their

dramas were religious, and religion has always been mainly preoccupied with sin, with establishing God's rules and regulations about sin and its punishment. It is improbable that God created man, but highly probable that man's sense of sin created God. Thanks to Freud, we know today a great deal more than our ancestors about the origin and effects of this sense of sin. Like all great men who break new ground in human thought, Freud was not infallible, and his doctrines, unlike those of religious religions (e.g. Christianity) or political religions (e.g. communism), are not absolute truth, but scientific hypotheses perpetually subject to revision in the light of new facts or new tests. One may doubt the truth of a good many of Freud's speculative hypotheses and of his brilliantly complicated interpretations, but there can be little or no doubt that his contribution to psychology, in his analysis of the working of the conscious and unconscious mind, is as new and important as were the contributions of Newton and Darwin to other sciences. And just as Newton's and Darwin's discoveries or hypotheses profoundly affected spheres of thought and knowledge far outside the sciences in which they were made, so Freud's discoveries regarding the unconscious are of immense significance, not merely for individual psychology, but also for religion, ethics, politics, and sociology. Of all his contributions, that which is probably the most fundamental and far-reaching concerns man's sense of sin.

I believe that this sense of sin and the way in which human beings deal with it, and therefore with the question of punishment and standards of value, are one of the keys to civilization. To be a slave to it is barbarism; to control it is civilization. To understand it is essential to an understanding of the breakdown of civilization with which I am concerned in this chapter. Nothing helps one to such an understanding more effectively than a study of how the Greeks for a time—alas, too short a time—escaped from their sense of sin and of how this affected their souls and their society.

It began necessarily and naturally with their religion and their tragedians, and Freud enables us to understand for the first time the astonishing nature of the achievement. It is not necessary for that understanding and my present purpose to go into Freud's theories in any detail. It is sufficient to note that the sense of sin is universal in human beings; in its origin

it belongs to the primitive, irrational, and subconscious part of the mind. It is intimately connected with infantile sexual instincts and desires and with the relation between the infant and its parents. That relationship is, almost from the beginning, compounded of a mixture of love and hatred, and in the strains and stresses of the contradiction between love and hate the child first becomes aware of what is 'right' and 'wrong', and so of a sense of sin. This sense of sin has two profound effects upon human psychology. First the conflict between feelings and desires on the one hand and the new conviction that they are 'wrong' on the other is dealt with by the mind suppressing that part of its content which it feels to be sinful. In other words many of the infantile feelings and tnoughts, now condemned as 'wrong', are rejected by the conscious mind, barred from the consciousness, but remain in the unconsciousness. There they may work unseen and unsuspected, often with strange and horrible effect upon human psychology, or, at favourable or unfavourable moments, they may, with devastating results, again break a way into the consciousness. The second method by which the mind deals with the instincts of love and hate, when these are subjected to ethical judgment and the sense of sin, is a process of transference. In the conscious mind the feelings of love or hate are transferred from the original object to some new object, though the conscious mind is normally unaware that any transference has taken place. Freud and his successors have shown that the transference can be and is made to almost any object, to God or bimetallism, to kings and next-door neighbours. The process has been of primary importance to the evolution of both individual and social psychology. It is by no means a simple process, for the original instincts and feelings may still remain in the unconsciousness clustered about the original object, affecting in strange and subtle ways the conscious attitude towards the new object, while many of the original irrational infantile feelings will be transferred, inappropriately, to the new object. Thus in the mind of an apparently sane and civilized man, without his being aware of it, God or his country or some abstract ideal will be substituted for his father, and the emotions which clustered about the old may be transferred to the new image, so that the original conflict and sense of sin will reappear, disguised by rationalizations, in his religion, his patriotism, or his work.

The human mind has learnt by a long experience that the truth is almost always extremely unpleasant, and it will go any length in order to avoid admitting the truth either to itself or to others. The genius of Freud consisted in his brilliant analysis of mental facts which the human mind finds peculiarly unpleasant and, by a habit of thousands of years, is armed to ignore or deny. This accounts for the uneasiness which his revelations rouse in the minds of almost everyone and the passionate hatred with which many oppose them. This makes it all the more remarkable that Aeschylus and the Greeks should so early have faced, with such courage and clarity, the savage spectres of sin hidden in the secret places of the human mind.

These spectres originate, as I have said, in the relation of the infant to its parents, and the crucial relationship, with its mixture of love and hate, is that of the son to the father. It is the famous Freudian 'Oedipus complex'. That Freud should have had to go back to the Greeks and their myths and tragedies to find a name for this relationship is itself of the highest significance. In their folk stories and still more in their religious myths primitive peoples reveal the workings of the unconscious mind, the primeval passions and beliefs which civilization gradually bars from the consciousness. The Oedipus myth is the most accurate record of the original father-son relationship made by any people, and it is one of the most notable examples of the astonishing clarity of the Greek mind, which one finds in all Greek literature, from Homer to Plato and Aristotle.

The difference between civilization and barbarism depends to a large extent upon how people deal with these primeval passions and conflicts. As I have pointed out, it is in the relations of the child to his parents and in the first conflicts of love and hate that the human mind and primitive peoples first become aware of 'right' and 'wrong' and 'sin'; it is there that, together with the sense of sin, are born the first standards of value. It was inevitable that sin and the standards of value should have been from the earliest times closely associated with religion. 'Thou shalt do this' and 'Thou shalt not do that' is the refrain of every moral code, and those who give commands always desire sanctions against the disobedient. Parents and many other people have found in God the most convenient provider of sanctions to enforce what they want other people to do or not to do, if only because, as Jehovah said to Job, you cannot argue with God.

Primitive standards of value and moral codes, and the nightmares about sin, now for the most part buried in our unconsciousness, received the sanction of primitive Gods and religions. They were embodied in religious myths such as form a large part of the Old Testament or the subject-matter of Greek drama. That is why all religions are full of fantastic delusions, crude and cruel moralities, and divine savagery. For the God of a savage is always a super-savage, and the commands of Zeus from Olympus or Jahweh from Sinai are born in the brain of a savage and bewildered Greek or Hebrew shepherd. But you cannot argue with God, whether he be a stone phallus, Zeus the cloud-gatherer, or Jahweh, and when man begins to stumble out of barbarism, by using his reason (which is another word for argument), his barbarous delusions, the brutal nightmares of sin from which he is struggling to disengage himself, confront him unchanged and unchangeable in the image and edicts of his God. Religion, which in the stone-age may have helped mankind to rise above the brutes, becomes, with its stone-age Gods, its medicine men and priests, its vested interests in sin and punishment, one of the greatest obstacles to a revaluation of standards in terms of truth and reason. It takes a very long time to civilize man, but much longer to civilize God.

In the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides we can still watch perhaps the most exciting intellectual feat ever performed by man—a people publicly civilizing their God. The plot of *Prometheus* is the civilizing of Zeus. And again and again in the other plays, the Greeks, with their amazing instinct for seeing the vital fact and their intellectual courage in pursuing it, go straight to the heart of the problem of civilization, the sense of sin, the ethics of punishment, and the impact of truth and reason upon accepted standards of right and wrong. When Oedipus, the symbol of the Great Sinner, the embodiment of the infant's sense of sin, cries out at the end of the *Oedipus Coloneus*, 'I am a man more sinned against than sinning', we feel that light at last has penetrated into the darkest recesses of the human mind. But perhaps the most remarkable example of ruthless exposure of mankind's most sacred delusions is to be found in a Greek comedy. It is again the Great Sinner, Oedipus; in *The Frogs* of Aristophanes, Aeschylus gives a ludicrous description of the 'misfortunes' of Oedipus working up to the climax of 'And then as a young man he married an old woman,

and his mother at that, and then tore his own eyes out', to which the God Dionysos adds a ridiculous political joke as an aside. We are so accustomed to accept Greek drama as merely something old and alien and queer, that we miss the extraordinary significance of these Aristophanic jokes. What other people in the world have ever subjected their religion and their sense of sin to this kind of treatment, and so purged their God and their own minds of cruelty and darkness? To find a parallel one would have to imagine the Roman Catholic Church staging a miracle play in St. Peter's in which Dante poked fun at the barbarous Catholic doctrine of sin, hell, and punishment, while the Holy Ghost made political wisecracks in the background. It is improbable that anything of the kind will happen this side of eternity; at the same time it is probable that unless and until it does, the Roman Catholic Church and Roman Catholics like the majority of Christians, Jews, Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists, will remain uncivilized.

When Aristophanes wrote *The Frogs*, the Greeks had already secularized or rationalized their religion and civilized their God. I do not mean by that to imply that the process was complete or permanent or that the Athenians and their God were fully civilized. The human mind is a feeble and fluctuating instrument, always divided against itself. Even the individual can be simultaneously a saint in one part of his mind and a sadist in another, an angel on Saturday and a devil on Sunday. Communal psychology, which is often the lowest common denominator of the contents of thousands of individual minds, is even more unstable than individual psychology. A society, civilized enough to produce a Socrates or a Christ, is barbarous enough to put them to death for being civilized. I am sure that there were plenty of Athenians who enjoyed the subtle scepticism of Euripides and roared with laughter at the ludicrous Gods and heroes in *The Frogs* and *The Birds*, and who the day after were quite capable of believing that Athene or Dionysos had been seen on the Acropolis—just as thousands of normally rational persons believed that a bevy of angels had been seen at Mons. But that does not alter the positive achievement of the Greeks. When Aristophanes died, the old Gods were dead, slain by their own poets at their own festivals. Religion had been publicly purified and rationalized. For the first time in the history of the world man had had the courage and imagination

to tell his God that standards of human value, truth, reason, justice, humanity must apply to God and the universe no less than to man.

The political effect of this religious liberation was, as might be expected, immediate and immense. Without a rationalization of religion, the secularization and taming of God, it is impossible to secularize or rationalize politics. For, as I pointed out above, under the ancient, pre-Greek dispensation, politics is always a department of religion. Standards of social value, in so far as they exist at all, are, like the code of individual behaviour, edicts of a God who was born in the nightmare of a savage. Being the 'Word of God', to question them at all would be blasphemy, and in order to make it impossible to alter or adapt them to meet the needs of man and society as they emerge from savagery, they are engraved on stone or some equally recalcitrant material. Mankind is, therefore, saddled with an all-powerful, unchanging, and savage God, created by itself, whose law determines the unalterable framework of human society. And in order to make the iron, closed circle still more unbreakable, power is concentrated in the hands of kings and priests, the representatives of God on earth and the only interpreters of his law.

Under such circumstances it is impossible to secularize or rationalize society until religion and God have been rationalized. That is why the Jews, who were not an unintelligent people, never developed even the most rudimentary conception of politics. In the whole of the Old and New Testaments there are, I think, only two specific instances of political or social thought. The first is in II *Samuel* 24, where it is established that it is a sin for a king to take a census of his people. The second is in the 23rd chapter of *St. Matthew*, where Christ is reported to have made the famous statement: 'Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's'—a statement of his which has been twisted more effectively than perhaps any other to nullify his ethical teaching.

The Greek attitude to society is entirely different. Even in Homer the secularization of society has begun. The rulers have to rely for power on something besides the word of God. A Hebrew Thersites is unthinkable, for he is the voice of secular criticism of government breaking through, the first harsh and ugly muttering of democracy. The process has gone much

further in the time of Herodotus. He has rightly been called the Father of History, for he was the first man to discover human society, to be interes ed in the communal history of human beings. The theme of his book is the clash between two different forms of society, one the militarist empire of a divine dictator ruling over his subject slaves, and the other the Greek city of free men. The secularization of society is almost complete in Herodotus; standards of value, very tenuously connected with God and religion, are implicitly and explicitly applied to it. Again and again it is implied that the society of free men is 'good' and that of slaves is 'bad', and the argument becomes dramatically explicit in conversations between the Great King and Greeks.

The achievement of Herodotus in the history of civilization is no less remarkable than that of Aeschylus. The world he lived in was divided between savagery and superstition. In the east, Asiatic barbarism was overlaid with the pomp and luxury of courts and kings; in the south in Egypt a semi-civilized society of the master-slave type had developed in which Gods, kings, and priests, with the aid of fantastic religious delusions, ruled over hordes of poor and primitive agriculturists; in the north and west society was still nomadic or tribal. For Herodotus to have written his history in that world was as remarkable as would have been the discovery of algebra by an African negro in central Africa in the first century A.D. It is not only a work of art; it is the first European work to be impregnated with the humour and humanity of civilization. At first sight it may seem to the 20th-century reader that Herodotus can believe anything. But this first impression is wrong. Herodotus and the Greeks with him are just beginning to struggle out of the savagery and superstition of the world they were born in. He has already a conception of truth, beauty, right and wrong, humanity which no one in the world anywhere at that time had or could have had except a Greek. He conceived of them objectively and applicable to God and man and to man's society. He could believe things which are absurd and which no uncivilized European of today would believe because his knowledge was so limited and his concept of scientific truth and of ethics still dim and vacillating. But he was determined to believe only what seemed to him to be true, to apply standards of truth and of value to everything, God, man, kings, cities,

governments, oracles, statutes. It was he, not Eve, who was the first human being to eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Jehovah was quite right to forbid us to eat of it. For Götterdämmerung comes inevitably as soon as man knows good and evil and applies standards of value to his God. The Greeks in the time of Herodotus were already beginning to secularize God and so he was the first man to apply standards of value to human society. That was why he was the first historian and the first civilized man.

Herodotus was so civilized that he already possessed the rarest of all civilization's flowers or, perhaps one should say, its vital essence—tolerance. Indeed, it may be said with truth that he was the first civilized man because he was the first tolerant man. His tolerance is the core of that Greek attitude towards the world and the universe which I am here dealing with. You can see it very clearly in his civilized attitude towards the barbarians and the barbarism which surrounded him. No Greek was ever more a Greek than Herodotus (just as no Frenchman has ever been more French than the most tolerant and civilized of all Frenchmen, Montaigne), yet he obviously had a great admiration for the Persians and their way of life, and he was eager to understand and sympathize with Egyptians, Libyans, and even Scythians. This sympathetic understanding, this tolerance, earned him the censure of Plutarch and many other Greeks; they accused him of loving barbarism and barbarians. The exact opposite was the truth. It was because he loved civilization—Greek civilization—that he had the open and enquiring mind, the curiosity and sympathy, which enabled him to understand what was good in the characters and lives of barbarians. The essential difference between civilization and barbarism—I am aware that I beg the question at present by using these words here—is shown by the fact that no Persian or Egyptian could conceivably have regarded the Greeks as Herodotus regarded the Persians and Egyptians. No doubt in the time of Herodotus there were some ingredients of true civilization in the Egyptian and Persian way of life, and the Greeks themselves learned some important things from Egypt. But what Herodotus had and they had not were civilized standards of value of truth, justice, humanity, and freedom, universally applicable to God and man, to the individual and society. Only if the Gods and thought are secularized, I repeat,

can these standards of value be applied universally, as Aeschylus had begun to apply them to God and Herodotus to society.

If one wants to get further light on the way in which the Greeks were developing this new attitude towards society and government, one may turn again to Sophocles, a contemporary and friend of Herodotus. The plot of the *Antigone* turns upon a conflict between the individual's judgment of right and wrong and the law. In the closing scenes of the play the problem is stated as clearly and explicitly as that of divine injustice in *Prometheus*. Kreon, who is the state, has decreed that the body of Polyneikes shall not be buried. Antigone, the sister of Polyneikes, considers it to be her duty to see that his body is buried, and every member of the audience, when the play was first produced in 441 or 442 B.C., would have agreed that it was her duty. But what should one do when, as Jebb puts it in his edition of the play, 'the duty of listening to the private conscience' conflicts with 'the duty of obeying the state's laws'? Sophocles does not burke the question, nor represent the answer as easy or obvious. When Antigone defies the law and buries her brother, the chorus of Theban elders, though in their hearts, as Antigone thinks, they sympathize with her, at first think she was wrong to break the law. But when Kreon decrees that Antigone must suffer the death penalty for her crime against the state, first Antigone herself, then Haimon, and lastly Teiresias, convince everyone, except Kreon, that he is wrong and Antigone right.

When Antigone is brought before Kreon by the guard, who accuses her of having buried the corpse, Antigone admits the charge at once, and the following dialogue takes place between her and Kreon:

KREON: Tell me—not in many words, but briefly—did you know of the edict forbidding this?

ANTIGONE: I knew it; how could I not know it? It was made public.

KREON: And yet you dared to override these laws?

ANTIGONE: Yes, for it was not Zeus who gave me the edict, and Justice who dwells with the gods of the underworld never decreed such laws for men; nor did I think that you who are mortal could issue decrees which should prevail against the unwritten and unfailing laws of God.

Here Antigone, 'not in many words, but briefly', proclaims the duty, both of the individual and the state or ruler, to obey

the unwritten laws of right and wrong. She insists that the state or government must recognize, like herself, certain standards of value, and that, if they do not do so, she is absolved from obedience. Here, perhaps for the first time, 2400 years ago, we can see emerging the clear conception of standards of social value. No Egyptian, Persian, Indian, or Scythian would have understood what Antigone was talking about.

Later in the play, when Haimon, Kreon's son, comes to him and tries to persuade him not to carry out the sentence, Kreon states the other side of the case, his own side and one which Persians and Egyptians would have understood:

> Whoever transgresses and does violence to the laws or thinks to dictate to his rulers, will get no sympathy from me. Whomever the city has placed in power, he must be obeyed in small things and great, in just things and unjust . . . There is no greater evil than disobedience. This is what ruins cities; this destroys homes; this breaks the ranks of allies and turns them to fly; but it is obedience which saves the lives of most of those who prosper.

To this Haimon replies with the characteristically Greek sentiment that reason is the greatest gift that the Gods have given to man; that public opinion in Thebes is on Antigone's side:

> The citizen is afraid to speak to your face words which you would not tolerate to hear; but I can hear these murmurings in the dark, these lamentations of the city for this girl—'Of all women', they say, 'she least of all deserves to suffer a shameful death for her most noble act'.

And when Haimon again says that the citizens are unanimous in thinking that Antigone has done no wrong, the argument proceeds:

KREON: Is the city to tell me how I am to rule?
HAIMON: See how it is you who are speaking like a youth.
KREON: Am I to rule this land by any judgment but my own?
HAIMON: That is no city which belongs to one man.
KREON: Is not the city held to belong to the ruler?
HAIMON: You would make a fine ruler of a desert—alone in your glory.
KREON: This fellow, it seems, is on the woman's side.
HAIMON: Yes, if you are a woman; for it is your interests I think of.
KREON: You scoundrel, to bandy words with your father!
HAIMON: It is because I see you going wrong by doing injustice.

Sophocles and Herodotus were contemporary with the birth and youth of Greek democracy. Sophocles was temperamentally an aristocrat, but in 450 B.C. in Athens even the aristocrat was a democrat. For democracy, as I shall attempt to show, is merely the corollary of certain social standards of value, the application of these beliefs and ideals to the everyday life of the state, the government, and the citizen. The standards, the beliefs and ideals, and with them the political framework which we call democracy, are all implicit in the *Antigone*. 'Justice', says Antigone, 'never gave such laws to men'. 'Whomever the city has placed in power,' replies Kreon, 'he must be obeyed whether his laws are just or unjust.' Here we have the conflict between the acceptor and rejector of a universal social standard of value applicable both to the city (the state or government) and to the citizen, a conflict which we have seen break out in its most virulent and disastrous form over Europe, over the whole world, in our own time. And the corollary of the conflict, the secondary conflict between dictatorship and democracy, also instantly appears. 'The ruler must be obeyed,' says Kreon, 'whether his orders be unjust or just.' And to Haimon he says: 'Am I, the ruler of this city, to rule it by any other judgment but my own?' To which Haimon gives the democratic answer: 'A city which is the property of a single man is not a city at all'; and then immediately carries us back to the standards of value by his plea that he is thinking of the interests of Kreon, the ruler, by trying to prevent him 'going wrong by doing injustice'.

Nearly 50 years after Sophocles wrote *Antigone*, there died in Athens, in unrecognized obscurity, a man who was still working at the greatest masterpiece of historical literature; he had been writing it for 20 years. Thucydides was an old man when he died in 396 B.C. His life had been a failure, for he endured years of exile, the penalty which the Athenians, in their prime, imposed upon their generals who were unsuccessful in war. This cashiered soldier belonged to a generation younger than Sophocles—he was born about 470 B.C.—but he probably was one of the audience who sat in the theatre at the first performance of *Antigone*. He belonged essentially to the age of Pericles. As a young man he saw Athenian civilization and Athenian democracy attain their fullest development; in middle age he sat in exile watching them destroyed by the most senseless and disastrous war of human history.

If any man ever had reason to be embittered against his country and fellow-countrymen, to look back with cynical disillusionment to the political ideals of freedom and democracy in which he had grown up, it was Thucydides. It is true, I think, that the bitterness of experience has left its mark on his mind and even upon his style. Yet one of the most remarkable of his qualities remains his love of truth, a kind of passionate objectivity, the quintessence of the Athenian attitude towards the world of matter or of spirit. It is this passion for truth and for justice—which is truth applied to ethics—which saved him from embitterment, cynicism, or despair. It enabled him to write in the second book of his history the famous speech of Pericles, a superb statement of Athenian patriotism and of the social ideals and social practice in Periclean Athens. To what extent Thucydides reported the actual words of Pericles is not known, but it is immaterial to my purpose, for the speech was made in 431 B.C.—only ten years after Sophocles wrote *Antigone* —and it gives an accurate description of Athenian civilization in 431 B.C., placed in the mouth of 'the statesman who, more than anyone else, had contributed to its political expression and development'. It is necessary here to recall to the reader the main points in that description and I propose to do so by quoting what I wrote about it in another book:[1]

Civilization for Pericles consists mainly in social organization and social objectives of which the most important are mental and spiritual, not material things, and social relations. . . . He begins with 'freedom'; he says that it is only right that he should first praise their ancestors, for it was due to them that the country had remained generation after generation a free country, protected by their courage against aggressions of both Greeks and barbarians. The right of a communtiy or state to be free, to claim 'national independence' or 'self-determination', to govern itself in its own way, is for Pericles a primary objective of a government and constituent of civilization. . . .

This kind of communal freedom is not a material thing nor an economic commodity, not even an economic relationship; it is a social relation and an element in social structure, for its existence or absence determines whether or not a community can manage its own affairs without interference from other similar communities. As I said, Pericles regarded it as a condition precedent of civilization.

[1] *Barbarians at the Gate*, pp. 51 ff.

. . . In his speech Pericles then went on to consider how the Athenians had used that freedom to develop their own particular type of civilization. The Athens of A.D. 431 was in his view the product of a particular form of government and of particular national customs, habits, or traditions. The Athenians, he said, had worked out for themselves their own form of government; they had refused slavishly to imitate the laws of their neighbours. It was a democracy, because their objective was the interests of the many instead of the few. The laws ensure equality and equal justice for all, and there is equality of opportunity, for the rewards in public life go, not to class, privilege, or wealth, but to merit. Complete tolerance is the rule both of public and private life. 'In everyday life we are not suspicious or angry if our neighbour follows his own bent, nor do we even give him the black looks which though they do no actual harm are unpleasant.' This freedom, equality, and tolerance are combined with an instinctive respect for law, and not only for the written laws, but the unwritten laws of humanity and civilization, particularly those which prescribe aid for the oppressed and which have no sanction other than the shame of transgression. Athenian civilization, Pericles continued, was however not concerned merely with laws, administration, and business; the community made deliberate provision for the enjoyment of leisure and for things of the mind: games and ceremonies and the beauty of the city's buildings. Nor were economics neglected, for Athens was so large and powerful that the riches of all the world flowed into her.

'Our military system', said Pericles, 'is different from that of other peoples.' Our city is open to the world; we have no laws excluding aliens; they can come here and learn and see what they like. It is true that an enemy may occasionally profit by this liberality but we rely, when it comes to war, upon our own spirit rather than the devices of material armament. It is the same principle in our education. The Spartans from their childhood are laboriously drilled to become brave; we are free to live as we please, but are no less ready to face the same dangers. We combine love of beauty with simplicity and pursue things of the intellect without becoming unmanly. We set no store on wealth except as a means to an end. We consider it essential that public men should be ordinary citizens and that every ordinary citizen should play a part in the life of the community; for we differ from other people by regarding those who take no part in public life, not as "quiet", but useless. Our method of government is government by discussion, for we believe that failure in action is not caused by discussion but by precipitate action not based on the knowledge which only discussion can give.

The strongest hearted are those who with the clearest vision of both the pleasant and unpleasant things in a situation do not shrink from facing it. Finally we have a standard of generosity peculiar to ourselves; we do good to our neighbours, not from calculations of self-interest, but from a fearless trust in freedom. That is why I claim that Athens is the school of Greece.'

That is the speech of Pericles—Thucydides, Book II—delivered, or perhaps not delivered, in Athens before the empty coffin of the unnamed warrior in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, the beginning of all our woes, nearly 2,400 years ago. It is one of the most hackneyed passages of ancient or modern literature; all its associations are wearisome and sordid: dog-eared books, stained desks, the ugly class-room smelling of boys and ink, the bored voice of the master, the slow tick of the malignant clock. I read it first under those conditions, as generations of English schoolboys have done, 50 years or more ago in a class-room in St. Paul's School in West Kensington. One would think that the only emotion it could awake in one is boredom. Yet I have never read it, I can never read it even today, without an uplifting of the heart, the same purging of the passions which one gets in Greece itself, at Sunium or Epidaurus, on Aegina or on the Acropolis. The reason is, I believe, that Pericles or Thucydides has here stated, once and for all, the creed of the civilized man and the civilized state in the language of bare beauty peculiar to the Greeks.

The centre of the creed, the centre of civilization, as Pericles sees it, is freedom. He is talking of the community of free men, and the corollary of freedom in such a community is law. 'This freedom, equality, and tolerance are combined with an instinctive respect for law, and not only for the written laws, but the unwritten laws of humanity and civilization, particularly those which prescribe aid for the oppressed and which have no sanction other than the shame of transgression.' This social belief was not discovered by Pericles or Thucydides; it seemed to the Greek of the 5th century to be the foundation of his way of life. It is the theme of a famous, key passage in Herodotus. When Xerxes, in his march on Greece, says Herodotus, reached the Hellespont, he decided to review his fleet and army. Sitting on a white marble throne upon a hill near the city of Abydos, he looked and saw the whole Hellespont covered with the ships of his fleet and the shore and plains around Abydos filled full

by his troops. When he first saw this host, Xerxes congratulated himself on his good fortune, but then he wept, because, as he said, 'there came upon me a sudden pity, thinking how short the whole life of man must be, since of this vast host none will be alive a hundred years hence'. After the review he sent for Demaratos, the ex-king of Sparta who had fled to Persia after his deposition. Xerxes asked Demaratos whether, after seeing the great numbers of his men and ships, he thought that the Greeks would fight. The Spartan asked the king whether he wanted the answer to be true or merely pleasant, and Xerxes said that he wanted the truth. Then Demaratos says that, whatever the other Greeks do and whatever the numbers against them, the Spartans will fight, for they are free men and 'will never accept your terms which would reduce Greece to slavery'. Xerxes laughs at Demaratos; it is just because the Greeks are 'free' that he cannot believe that they will fight against hopeless odds. 'If they were under the rule of one man, in our fashion, fear of him might make them fight or they might be forced by the lash to stand up to superior numbers. But free to choose, they would never do this. Why, even if the Persians were alone, they would beat the Greeks, for I have men in my body-guard who would fight three Greeks in single combat.'

The answer of Demaratos is one of Herodotus's masterpieces of dramatic significance. It begins superbly with a little touch of characteristically Greek common-sense realism. 'So far as I am concerned,' says the Spartan, 'I don't boast of being the match of either ten men or two, and if I had the choice, I wouldn't fight even with one. But if need be or under the impulse of some great cause, I would with the greatest will in the world take on any one of these people who say they are the match of three Greeks.' And then comes the final answer. 'It is the same', says Demaratos, 'with the Lacedaemonians. Man for man they are inferior to none; when they fight in a body, they are the bravest men in the world. For though they are free men, they are not completely free; they have a master—law, and they fear him far more than your subjects fear you. Whatever he commands they do; and he always commands the same thing, not to flee in battle whatever the number of the enemy, but to hold the line and either conquer or die.'

Again Demaratos in Herodotus gives me the same feeling of

exhilaration, of mental or spiritual cleansing—the purging of the passions—as Pericles in Thucydides. The reason is, I believe, that both writers give perfect expression to what I feel to be standards of supreme social value. For the perfect expression of what one recognizes as the highest ethical value produces on one the same psychological effects—excites the same kind of emotions—as the perfect expression of 'beauty' in a work of art. The ethical assumptions of Demaratos and Pericles are the same and of extreme simplicity: truth, reason, freedom, justice, humanity are good both in the individual and in the community and their opposites are bad. It follows that the 'civilized' community or the good state must be based upon and promote in the individual and in the community the expression of those values. The community must therefore be a community of free men, held together and directed, not by force and fear—the Great King or dictator with his bodyguard, police state, Gestapo, S.S. men, or Ogpu—but by their voluntary acceptance of and obedience to law, laws made by themselves and based upon reason, justice and humanity.

I am not at present concerned with whether these standards of value, and social philosophy and political practice founded upon them, are right or wrong. I state merely that they were accepted by the Greeks of the 5th century and that personally I accept them today. There were, 2500 years ago, other people who did not accept them, who believed in entirely different standards of individual and social value and who translated them into political practice. And in our own time there are still people who accept and apply this other scale of values. Demaratos may have been right and Xerxes wrong, or vice versa; today the democrat may be right and the totalitarian wrong, or vice versa; but if we are to understand the history of the last 50 years, we must understand the nature of this ethical conflict, for it lies at the root of the political conflicts which threaten to destroy us.

It may help us to understand, if we look a little more closely at the conflict as it appeared to the Greek in the 5th century. Herodotus, who is a great and subtle artist, shows us the conflict by the deftest and most dramatic touches. That men should be driven into battle by the lash and forced to be brave by fear of it seems to Xerxes both right and natural; the inhumanity of the lash, the degradation of the lashed and the lasher mean

nothing to him. Every Greek who heard Herodotus read his histories or who listened to the plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles would have instantly felt the inhumanity and degradation. It is a conflict of ethical values. Demaratos—or rather Herodotus—in the Greek way, does not emphasize the conflict, but makes it the more vivid by the subtle, dramatic contrast of his code. The Greek begins with what is on the surface an unimportant side issue, the question whether a Persian is equal to three Greeks. He answers the romantic arrogance and boastfulness of the Persian with cynical common sense. 'I am a Greek,' he says in effect, 'and I'm not going to engage in a boasting match with your Persians. I don't go about boasting that in a fight I'm a match for ten or even two Persians. To tell the truth, I would rather not fight at all. The Greek doesn't want to fight, except to defend himself or some great cause, like freedom. But if you force him to defend himself or his freedom, he's quite prepared to take on any of your boasters.'

It may seem to some that I am labouring an unimportant point in this side issue. But I am not; it is not an unimportant point. The issue is on the surface, but it has its roots deep down in social ethics. First, it should be noticed again that, in the time of Herodotus, of all the people in the world only a Greek would have spoken as Demaratos speaks. Herodotus, in his subtle unemphatic way, himself makes the point. Xerxes, he says, was not angry with what Demaratos said to him; he just laughed at it. He laughed because he could not even understand the Greek point of view, and he could not understand, because between him and the Greek there was a difference, not merely regarding the organization of society, but about the social value of force or power. To the Persian, power and force are and should be the ultimate arbiters; the use of force is good as a means and good as an end; to fight or to force your own men to fight bravely under threat of the lash are things to be proud of. 'I don't want to fight; to tell the truth, I would rather not fight at all', says the Greek. We are immediately in a different world of social standards, a world in which force is socially an evil—a necessary evil, adds Demaratos, if you force me to use force to defend myself or my civilization, but still an evil.

With this Herodotean debate between the Persian king and the Greek collaborator began a conflict over the social value of power which has continued to our own day. I shall have a good

deal to say about it later: here I want to call attention to two relevant points. The two different attitudes towards fighting—the superficial issue—are intimately connected with the two fundamental differences about freedom. If freedom be accepted as having great social value and a society of free men as superior to a society of masters and slaves, power, force, and fighting lose their social value except, as Demaratos holds, in the case in which they are the only means of defending freedom. The connection and the conflict are precisely the same in the 19th and 20th centuries A.D. as they were in the 5th century B.C. The 20th-century Hitlers and Mussolinis boast and glorify power and force like the Persians because their attitude towards freedom and its corollary, democracy, are the same. But even more significant is the attitude of the pugnacious democrat in the 19th century. At the end of that century the British had accepted the community of free men as the social ideal and democracy as the means of attaining it. It was commonly believed that they had made considerable progress towards both. But practice and theory or ideal are not often completely in step, and in 1877 a wave of nationalist pugnacity, imperialism, or, as it came to be called, jingoism, swept the country. This jingoism, condemned at the time and subsequently by the upholders of liberal democracy, took its peculiar name from a music-hall song popular with the political fire-eaters of the crisis. Its words repay careful study:

> We don't want to fight,
> But, by jingo, if we do,
> We've got the men, we've got the ships,
> We've got the money, too.

The words repay study, because of the first line. 'We don't want to fight, but . . .' They are precisely the same words as those used by Demaratos to Xerxes. The British jingo of 1877 is fundamentally different from the nazi of 1933 in his standards of value; he has accepted the Greek social values, and even at the moment when he is betraying them he pays lip-service to them.

Modern jingoism—or the word for it—was born three years before I was born, but it was still a potent force in my childhood and youth. Even the echo of the music-hall song was still from time to time heard in politics, for instance in the autumn of

1898. 'We don't want to fight, but . . .' The song links my life with those of Demaratos and Herodotus, for the words before the comma are no less important than those which come after them. I stand on their side in the conflict which began at Thermopylae and ended for the time being on the plain at Marathon and in the narrow waters around Salamis.

The conflict, I repeat, is not merely over power, but over the social value of power or force. I don't want to fight, says Demaratos, for fear, for glory, or for fighting's sake; but I will fight *for a great cause*, and freedom is a great cause. One further point should be noted before I leave this side issue in the speech of Demaratos. The conflict was not finally settled at Salamis. It has continued to appear throughout history and is still raging. It has remained the same except in one particular. The Greek view was that the only social value in force is as a defence against force. There were no pacifists in the modern sense in Greece or anywhere else when Herodotus and Thucydides lived. I do not know whether there were any pacifists in this sense before Christ made what was perhaps the most uncompromising of all his pronouncements:

> Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.

Of all Christ's teaching this command has probably had the least practical effect upon the conduct of Christians and therefore upon individual conduct and social behaviour. The Christian churches have always contrived to explain it away so that the muscular Christian may be encouraged 'to be a man', to smite his assailant on the right as well as the left cheek, and even to get his blow in first if it looks like fighting: naturally therefore in communal matters they have supported what are euphemistically called 'just wars' and legal systems based upon the primitive Semitic principle of retribution or vengeance, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Only the other day we heard the cock crow several times in the House of Lords when bishops spoke and voted for the death penalty.

It is a mistake to allow the cynicism of bishops to make one over-cynical. It is true that 'human nature', encouraged by organized religion, has ensured that Christ's uncompromising

pacifism shall have little or no direct effect upon the conduct of the individual Christian or upon the policy of the Christian church or Christian state. But it has had some effect upon theory and beliefs and communal psychology. The plain meaning of Christ's words implies an ethical judgment, a judgment on the social value of force. He took the Greek standard of value one stage further. In the Greek scale of values force and fighting were bad for three reasons: first, power or force is not a good thing in itself, though it may be used as a means to obtaining or safeguarding good things;[1] second, the use of force produces evil results; thirdly, a community in which power or force is the determining factor in the regulation of social relations cannot be a community of free men, and the good state must consist of free men. The Greek argued from these premises that the less force is used in the relations between individuals and the organization of society, the better is the citizen and the better is the city. But he maintained that in life itself we are often compelled to choose between two evils, and of two evils the wise man chooses the lesser. If the threat of force puts you or your city or 'the good life,' which includes freedom, in peril, then you must choose the lesser of two evils and defend yourself or the 'great cause' by meeting force with force. The Greek view has persisted until our own day; many would say that it has become part of the communal psychology of European civilization; it is indistinguishable from the attitude of the 19th-century liberal democrat.

Christ had a different standard of social values. You must not, he says, resist evil or resist force by force. This may mean one or both of two things. It may mean that force is such an evil thing in social relations that it should never be used or that the effects of its use are so bad that it is in fact never the lesser of two evils to use it. I think that Christ probably believed both these statements to be true and condemned the use of force

[1] I think that this was the view of the 5th-century Greek; it seems to me implicit in Herodotus's contrast between the Persian and Greek attitude to power. But the Greek, like other people, was not always consistent. It would be possible to quote many passages proving that, when he thought about his own state—his beloved 'city'—he regarded power as good in itself. It was certainly true of the Athenian when Athens was at the height of its power and its imperialism. It is easy to detect the imperial note or cloven hoof in the Thucydidean Pericles.

absolutely on both grounds.[1] The doctrine has reappeared at intervals ever since among individuals or small groups; it has sometimes been accepted, for instance by the Society of Friends, as an integral part of the Christian faith, but it is sometimes held as part of a standard of social values for which no religious sanction or origin is claimed. It has had an effect, the extent of which is not easy to estimate, upon the attitude towards power and force in the communal psychology of modern Europe. Its direct influence upon the actions of individuals or the policy of states has been small. The enormous increase in the reckless use of organized and unorganized violence has been a remarkable feature in 20th-century history, and the pacifism of pacifists, who are the chief heirs and exponents of Christ's doctrine, has proved impotent to withstand it. The only other important exponent of non-violence has been Gandhi in India. In this case the doctrine was widely accepted both by individuals and political parties and there can be no question of the good faith of Gandhi himself. But the doctrine was never translated into practice either by the Indian people or the Congress Party, and the history of India during the last 50 years is the same record of violence as that of other countries, and it is not easy to decide whether Gandhi's non-resistance movement had any important effect upon individual or communal practice. I shall probably have to deal again with this question of the value of power or force, but for the moment I must leave it. Before doing so, there is one point I must notice. The ambiguity in Christ's doctrine of non-resistance, which I referred to above, has persisted. It is usually impossible to discover whether those who believe in non-resistance do so because they believe that force is such an evil in social relations that it should never be used or because they hold that the effects of its use are so bad that it can never be the lesser of two evils. In other words, it is

[1] Luckily for churches and bishops, the Christ of the New Testament, like the Greeks and other people, is not always consistent. Many of his sayings and actions recorded are inconsistent with the doctrine quoted above; they can be used, and have been continually used by churches and bishops, to prove that he was in favour of the use of force under some conditions, and so to nullify the most characteristic teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. It would be very unfair to official Christianity to seek to deprive it of such famous texts as: 'Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword.'

usually doubtful whether pacifists reject the use of force because they hold it to be bad in itself or bad as a means, or for both reasons.

But I must return to Demaratos and his main point. He makes the pivot of Greek communal life of their standard of social values, the same as Pericles. The Greek, he says, acknowledges and obeys a master, not a man, nor fear, nor force, but the law, and the law includes, as Pericles added, not only the state's written laws, but 'the unwritten laws of humanity and civilization'. The conflict between the two social systems is here made absolutely clear. You can build a city or state upon power, the Greek admits, and hold it together by fear or force, some of the citizens being rulers or masters and the others ruled or slaves. But such a community is barbarous and the individuals in it barbarians. The best human society is one in which freedom and equality are based upon tolerance and a respect for law, upon reason and humanity. Such a society and the individuals who compose it are civilized.

The Greek view rests upon two kinds of judgment which are radically different from each other. The first is an ethical judgment, a judgment on values. It maintains that in human society happiness, freedom, humanity, tolerance, justice, reason, are good and that the best community will be composed of free, equal, humane, just, happy, and reasonable men. The second kind of judgment is practical; it is concerned with the best social means for attaining these social ends. It maintains, for instance, that the community or state must ensure the maximum possible amount of liberty to the individual citizen and treat each citizen as an individual with equal rights; that communal decisions must be made by reason and therefore through discussion; that the citizens must regulate their relations by an instinctive respect for tolerance and law whether written or unwritten. The best political organization for attaining these ends is, the Greeks held, democracy, a system in which the citizens, treated for primary political purposes as equal, decide by voting, after public discussion, what shall be the main lines of communal policy and action and in which the government which carries out the policy is elected by and is responsible to the citizens.

It is important, if possible, to distinguish in this social philosophy the judgments regarding ultimate values or ethical ends

from those regarding the practical methods of attaining the desired ends. It is not easy to do so; it never is easy to untangle this particular labyrinth in social psychology. There seems to be a bias in the human mind, as in a bowl, which turns it inevitably from the straight line into muddle. One of its favourite muddles is to confuse the means devised by it for attaining ends with the ends themselves and to transfer to the means the emotions which are only appropriate to the ends. It is a muddle which has probably caused the human race more misery and more deaths in its history than cholera, the black death, the plague, tuberculosis, and all the other major diseases added together. In Greek political philosophy democracy, for instance, is simply a means; it has no intrinsic value; it is political machinery, the only political machinery which has proved capable of producing those things of intrinsic value which make the life of the individual and of the community good. Democracy, therefore, though without intrinsic value, is socially of immense importance, and is rightly treated as such both by its adherents and its opponents, for it tends to produce the kind of communal life which is judged to be good by its adherents and bad by its opponents. But, though important, it remains machinery; whether it is used to produce those things which are communally of intrinsic value depends upon many other factors besides its own merely formal existence. Many people—and some Greeks among them—confuse political democracy with the communal life to the creation of which it is a means. The confusion comes about in two different ways. The meaning of democracy is extended from the political system to the whole way of life of which political democracy is merely a part. Democracy was used by me in this wider sense frequently in the first two volumes of this work because I was examining the social psychology of people who did in fact regard democracy in this way. The 'democratic way of life' was to them the life of the community of free and equal men who regarded happiness as of high intrinsic value, truth, reason, and tolerance as good. That is, of course, an entirely different thing from political democracy. There is no reason why the word democracy should not be used in this extended sense provided that we do not confuse it with democracy in the restricted sense. Unfortunately the bias of the mind to muddle again and again causes people to confuse the two, to

regard political democracy as the ultimate end, and to transfer to the dry bones or skeleton of political machinery the emotions appropriate only to the lives of living beings.

There is another cause for muddle which encourages the first. The conflict between Demaratos and Xerxes was concerned with ultimate social values and has persisted, as I said, throughout history. It is fought out in the political arena and so usually has concentrated upon the form and framework of government. The democrat has been forced to defend his democratic institutions against the authoritarian, and the king, aristocracy, or dictator to defend his power or privilege against the democrat. Heat of conflict always fires emotions for the object which we are having to defend, and so the democrat is led to transfer to a constitutional skeleton and to the mechanics of political forms the passion which is appropriate only to things of the highest value in human life. The political result is that the shadow is mistaken for the substance, and when people pursue shadows, they obtain nothing of any substance or value. It is not that political democracy is unimportant; it is of immense importance as the means for obtaining a communal life of high intrinsic value. But history shows that when, as has often happened, democrats, in the struggle to obtain or retain the political machinery of democracy, are led to regard that machinery as an end in itself, they begin to assume that as long as the machinery ticks over—the elections are held and the offices distributed and the speeches made—they have done everything necessary for obtaining the best possible life for the best possible community. But that is just what they have not done, as was shown by the Liberals in the early years of this century and the German social democrats after the 1914 war. The machine ticks over, and the parties and politicians which have made it an object of worship become part of it, machines themselves. A peculiar kind of political impotence or sterility descends upon them, for they no longer have any belief in or even understanding of political 'principles', which are in fact the statement of belief in ultimate social values. They lose their sense of social values.

This loss of the sense of values through the confusion of political means with social ends is, I believe, one of the commonest and most corrupting of historical phenomena. It is at the root of the fatal political doctrine or assumption that the

end justifies the means. It explains much of the almost incredible stupidity and cruelty of communal beliefs and actions, the suicidal savagery of nations, churches, parties, sects, and classes. It crops up again and again in all ages and all countries. The Greeks themselves fell a victim to it. It accounts for the notorious fact of the failure of successful wars; victory, which at the beginning was rationally regarded as the means of obtaining certain objects, gradually becomes an end in itself and the objects are forgotten. Only by confusing means with ends was it possible in the 18th century to pity the plumage and forget the dying bird. In the 20th century the world has been devastated by people whose minds have been perverted by this delusion. In Italian fascism and German nazism it was the human scum which rose to the top of the water and the leaders in both movements were almost all gangsters, perverts, or paranoiacs; but the millions of their followers, who greeted Mussolini and Hitler with howls of delight and approved or condoned their horrible regime—which combined the most savage sadism with the most senseless stupidity—were, for the most part, ordinary decent human beings—if there are such things as ordinary decent human beings. At any rate they were of the same stuff, physical and psychical, as those who in other times or places have given the same allegiance to a Buddha or a Christ. These ordinary people are gullible and muddle-headed, and, like all human beings, have within them a streak of savagery and sadism; but normally their scale of social values is nearer to that of Buddha or Christ—or perhaps it is safer to say Rousseau or John Bright—than to that of Hitler or Goebbels. That is to say, the social ends which normally they regard as the right objects of communal or governmental action are the exact opposite of those of nazism or fascism, of the Hitlers and Mussolinis. The process of turning an ordinary decent German or Italian (or Briton or Frenchman) into a sadistic savage or the worshipper of a homicidal maniac is not a simple one, but it is partly achieved by this psychological conjuring trick of transforming means into ends. The nazi and fascist leaders were adepts at the trick, which consisted in first getting ordinary men and women to believe that they had the means, if they were given the power, of attaining the ultimate social ends, a happy (prosperous), free, and industrious community (nation), and secondly, when they had been given

power, to induce their dupes to regard the regime itself and the methods adopted by it as the ultimate social end. Nine-tenths of German and Italian propaganda was directed to this object, and with complete success. The most abominable means were approved or condoned for the highest ends.

Here we already touch the contemporary revolution in standards of value, and perhaps an important cause of it. The phenomenon is not confined to fascists and nazis. It can be observed among patriotic conservatives on the right and among socialists on the left. How often has the country, the nation, the state—and finally the party—which was to be the means for establishing 'the good life' been substituted for the good life itself, becoming an excuse for or cause of every social evil! The Marxian socialist has become an adept in this kind of communal contortionism. Marx and Engels, for all their pragmatic dogmatism and rigid doctrinairism, always regarded socialism and communism as means; the ends of communal action which they accepted were those of the 19th-century democrat: happiness, liberty, equality, fraternity. Their modern disciples have turned the original doctrine inside out and upside down just as the churches have done with Christianity. The Marxian framework of socialism or communism has become for them the solitary, supreme end of society and, therefore, of human action, and, in order to establish it or to preserve it, happiness, freedom, equality, humanity, common sense, and truth must all be sacrificed. It is not only of religion that one can truthfully say 'tantum potuit suadere malorum', and the reason why patriotism or socialism can, like religion, persuade ordinary decent human beings to perpetrate the most senseless and savage abominations is the same.

I said above that we have here touched the contemporary revolution, which is the main subject of this chapter. I have approached it, I admit, slowly and circuitously, but deliberately in this manner. Indeed, though I have touched it, I do not propose even yet to grasp it. There is another preliminary point regarding social standards of value which I must deal with first. It is, I believe, of great theoretical and practical importance, for it is rarely, if ever, apprehended and is the subject and cause of muddled thinking and confused action.

I will deal first with the theory. If you examine the statements of political theorists, historians, philosophers, and statesmen,

you find that things which, according to them, are good in themselves, the ultimate ends of communal action, or socially of intrinsic value are, among others, happiness, freedom, power, discipline, equality, inequality, patriotism, glory, tolerance, ruthlessness, humanity. I have myself in this book often implied that some of these things were socially of intrinsic value or should be the ultimate ends of communal action. Such statements are, however, only accurate if they are understood as simplifications of highly complex ethical judgments. What I mean can perhaps be shown most simply by comparing individual standards of value with social standards of value. For instance, it has been held by many people that pleasure is or should be the ultimate end of individual action, that it is good in itself. (Whether these people are correct in their judgment is here irrelevant.) This gives to the individual a comparatively simple object of his actions; all he has to do is to find out what things give him pleasure and then pursue them; if he finds that beer or beauty gives him pleasure, he should pursue beer or beauty as the means to his ethical end. But the hedonist may also be a Christian—he very often is—and in that case he will hold that there are other things of intrinsic value besides pleasure, e.g. the Christian virtues of love and charity. If beer gives him pleasure, he will still rationally and rightly pursue pleasure through beer, but he will also hold that he ought to pursue the love of his fellow-men, the love of God, and truth, and what is more that he should find pleasure in them as well as in beer. But now the object of the individual's action is no longer the simple object of the simple hedonist; it is extremely complex. It is not an object like pleasure or even a number of such objects, but a series of complex psychological states which, for convenience, may be defined as a particular 'way of living'. What in this case is judged to be of intrinsic value for the individual is a way of life in which he finds pleasure not in hating but in loving his fellow-men, or in pursuing truth, or in worshipping God.

It seems to me that a great deal of ethical theorizing is vitiated by a failure to realize this fact. Philosophers dispute interminably whether pleasure or love or truth or justice are the things of ultimate value, and most of the dispute is vain and meaningless. The things which have intrinsic value are rarely, if ever, simple objects, but are complex psychological

states, usually of considerable duration. One can see this if one examines the position of beer and beauty as possible objects of value. If the hedonist is right, pleasure in drinking beer is good. But not even the most fervent hedonist or beer-drinker would say that he means by that that beer has intrinsic value; what he asserts is that beer is good as a means to that which has intrinsic value, namely the pleasure in drinking beer. But many hedonists and non-hedonists treat beauty from the point of view of value as in a completely different category from beer; they treat beauty in itself as good in itself. This, I think, is due to muddled thinking or inaccurate analysis. The pure hedonist is obviously illogical or inconsistent in making any distinction between beer and beauty as objects of value; if pleasure be the only good, beauty like beer can only be a means to good; it can have no intrinsic value. But even the non-hedonist who believes that there are many other things besides pleasure which are good in themselves is wrong in treating beauty as having any intrinsic value by itself. There may be beauty in 'this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire', or in 'twisted braids of lilies', or in the temple on the headland at Sunium, or in a picture by Piero della Francesca, or in the third movement of Beethoven's Op. 132, or in the line 'The multitudinous seas incarnadine', but there is no intrinsic value in that beauty or in the objects in which it adheres except in relation to the human mind. If there were no human mind in the universe, the beauty and the objects in which it adheres would not be valuable or even potentially valuable, and a universe in which there was no mind would contain just as much or just as little good if it were ugly as if it were beautiful.

If this be true, it follows that individual standards of value apply rarely, if ever, to simple objects; they apply to complexes, to particular relations of the mind to particular objects. There are some objects, such as truth and beauty, which are far more important than others in the production of complexes which are of intrinsic value. But they are not in themselves good nor are the states of mind appropriate to them good in themselves. It is only when the one is in a particular relation to the other that we get something of intrinsic value. Thus the beauty in the picture of Piero della Francesca and the picture itself have no intrinsic value, nor have the emotions appropriate to the

picture and the beauty in it any intrinsic value; we only get the intrinsic value when the appropriate emotions are felt for the particular beauty in the particular picture. When we say, therefore, that the picture or the beauty in it is good in itself, we ought to mean only that potentially it is part of a complex which is good in itself. And when we say that the aesthetic emotions have intrinsic value, we ought to mean only that potentially they are part of a complex which has intrinsic value. The aesthetic emotion appropriate to the good picture, if felt to a bad picture, would produce nothing of intrinsic value.

The same applies to 'truth'. There are certain attitudes of mind, including respect for or pursuit of truth, which have high intrinsic value. The psychological attitude of Socrates to truth was good in itself; the psychological attitude towards truth of the solver of cross-word puzzles has no intrinsic value at all. Yet both are pursuing truth. The contradiction is explained by the fact that truth by itself or the pursuit of truth by itself has no intrinsic value. What has intrinsic value is a highly complicated relationship between the human mind and truth. The relationship depends upon the kind of truth pursued, the motives of pursuit, and the duration of the relationship. In the case of Socrates it was his general attitude towards truth which was good in itself, his way of life and relations with other people as determined by his respect for and pursuit of truth. You can analyse this complex, which has value, into different factors and elements which are essential to the value, but it is the complex which has value, not any of the elements in isolation.

It is important to be clear as to the real relations of these elements to one another, to the complex which has value, and to value. In some respects the relation of each element in the complex to the complex and to intrinsic value is that of means to end. But I doubt whether it is strictly accurate to define it as such. If the simple hedonist is correct, he is right in regarding beer as a means to intrinsic good, i.e. pleasure. It is pleasure which is good in itself, and drinking beer produces pleasure, which is what has intrinsic value. Therefore beer and drinking, and finally drinking beer, produce the good in itself, pleasure, and are simply means to that end. In this case beer and drinking are not part of a complex which has value; it is not the complex,

'drinking beer', which is good in itself, but the pleasure which is the result of that complex. The relation of beauty and truth to the complexes having intrinsic value, which I considered above, is quite different from this. Truth and respect for or pursuit of it are not just means, as beer and drinking are in hedonism. The pursuit of truth does not produce something of intrinsic value as drinking beer produced pleasure, which is the ultimate good in hedonism; it is the complex, 'pursuit of truth', which itself has the intrinsic value. Truth is, therefore, in this relationship something more than a means to an end, it is part of a complex which is an end in itself.

In making these distinctions I am not splitting hairs or chopping logic. They are necessary for an understanding of our own judgments regarding individual and social values, and are highly relevant, as I shall show in good time, to 'practical politics'. And it is with this end in view—'practical politics'—that I must make one more general distinction. Though truth and beauty, and other things which may be essential elements in complexes of high intrinsic value, cannot be considered to be good in themselves or even as means to good, they have immense ethical and social importance. Their importance comes from their potentiality, for they are essential elements in psychological states and ways of life which have the highest intrinsic value for the individual and for society. The attitude of the individual or of the state to truth, for instance, may, therefore, be of the greatest importance in cases and relations which are themselves of no importance in regard to values, because they may create conditions, habits of thought, or ways of life which will be favourable or unfavourable to the creation of complexes of the highest intrinsic value in which truth is an essential element.

I must now turn to social standards of value or standards of social value, and I must begin by defining my terms a little more accurately. The Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount contain a code of individual conduct. They prescribe for the individual what things are for him of intrinsic value, what should be the ends of his actions, and what are the means for attaining those ends. 'Love' of one's fellow-men, says Christ, is good and hatred bad in itself; and the way to attain this attitude of mind and way of life is not to hate or retaliate against a man who deliberately injures you, but to show the

greatest meekness and good-will to him. These standards of value and this code of conduct are given to the individual as an individual irrespective of the society in which he lives, and, though it is recognized that he is a member of society, he is enjoined to pursue the ends and use the means without regard for or help from society. Jehovah in the Ten Commandments is concerned solely with the relation of the individual to God and his code of conduct as prescribed by God; Christ in the Sermon on the Mount is concerned with the individual's personal salvation, his relation to God, and the code of conduct prescribed for him by God and which he must follow in order to obtain salvation.

The way in which Herodotus and Thucydides look at the individual, his conduct, and the ends which human beings should pursue is quite different. The difference consists largely in the fact that they always regard the individual and the standards of value for human conduct from two points of the view, the individual as an individual and the individual as a member of society or community.[1] Take, for instance, Pericles's

[1] I mean by society a body of human beings in some kind of relationship, whether organized or unorganized; I mean by community either an organized society or a society the members of which regard themselves as united by particular relations. Some writers object to the use of these terms on the ground that they are vague or meaningless—wrongly, I think. Mr. J. D. Mabbott in *The State and the Citizen*, for instance, takes this view and holds that both words should be 'banished from our vocabulary'. The fact that later on in his book he himself slips into using the obnoxious words shows that they express a meaning for which some term is required. And his reasons for banning them are unconvincing. He objects to the use of the word society in the sense defined by me above on the ground that 'it is clear that the whole human race is in no sense a "society", just as all red-haired men and all sufferers from rheumatism are not societies'. But the words 'human society' mean something quite definite, namely the body of human beings related to one another as human beings, and the society of red-haired men means something quite definite, namely the body of human beings related to one another as all having red hair. Mr. Mabbott seems to be confusing the importance or triviality of the relationship with the importance or triviality of the word. The relationship of humanity in the body of all human beings makes the society of enormous extent; some people would say that the relationship was important and others would say that it was unimportant; but that does not alter the fact that it is convenient to have a word for 'a body of human beings in some kind of relationship'—and in that sense the whole human race is a 'society'. So too with the red-haired men. In this case most people would agree that the relationship

statement in Thucydides that the Athenians in their everyday life were not suspicious or annoyed if their neighbours followed their own bent, and that they did not even show disapproval if some one did not do what everyone else did, the kind of disapproval which, as Pericles remarks, though it may not do actual harm, is so unpleasant. Here Pericles is dealing, as he says, with a particular aspect of freedom, the positive freedom of the man who develops his personality in his own way and the negative freedom of the man who is not obstructed in doing this by social pressure, by public opinion insisting upon uniformity. This kind of personal freedom or originality Pericles, like the majority of Athenians, regarded as of great value, but it has two different aspects. It has a value for the individual as an individual. Most people would agree that originality, the habit of thinking and feeling for oneself, is good and that the uniformity which comes from people having their thoughts, feelings, and actions rubber-stamped by public opinion is bad. There is value here in the man himself, in his attitude of mind and way of life, quite apart from the society of which he is a member. But there is another aspect in which this freedom and originality, and the value inherent in them, are related to society, an aspect in which one can legitimately say that there is a social as well as an individual value.

The Thucydidean Pericles regards, not only the man 'who follows his own bent', but the society or community which allows and encourages him to do so as having value. Indeed the whole of his speech is a description of the kind of society which pursues ends good in themselves and which therefore itself has intrinsic value. This seems to me the only rational way in which to consider values in the life and conduct of human beings. Individual value attaches to the habit of mind and way of life of a man who thinks for himself and has the courage of his convictions; the sheeplike, human automaton

is not, never has been, and probably will never be of much importance, and therefore that no Oxford don has ever written or will write a book on the society of red-haired men, but that does not mean that all red-haired men are not a society in the sense defined or that some societies may not be important. One cannot maintain that a flea is not an animal because it is so small, or that it is meaningless to use the word animal in the sense 'organized being endowed with life, sensation, and voluntary motion', because then it would include both the flea and the elephant.

who follows the mental tail of his leader to salvation or destruction has no value, whether his end is to be saved or destroyed. But it is also rational to hold, with Pericles, that value attaches to any 'body of human beings in some kind of relationship', if in those relations the individuals have this particular attitude of mind and way of living and the body of men, by its manners, customs, organization, or laws, actively or passively, encourages the attitude of mind and way of living. The value here belongs to the body of men, the society or community, rather than to the individual, and I call such values 'social values', while the values of this kind, which are accepted or attained by a particular society at a particular time, I call social standards of value or standards of social value.

There are some individual values which have little or no connection with or dependence upon social values. My own view is that pleasure is not good in itself, but that it is a necessary ingredient of many different states of mind which are good in themselves. Thus I hold that to take pleasure in cruelty is bad, that to take pleasure in drinking beer is mildly good, and that the attitude of mind of Wordsworth to sea and mountains (in which pleasure certainly played an important part) is very good. In the last two instances the pleasure and the valuable complex of which it is an integral part are only remotely connected with social relations. Provided that beer, seas, and mountains are available, the potential beer-drinker or the potential Wordsworth can attain the desirable end in isolation from his fellow-men.

At various times and places, particularly in primitive and simple societies, a man lives his own life in comparative isolation. There is little or no organized communal life and the relations between individuals are narrow and few, being limited to the family and a small number of neighbours. In such societies nearly all values are individual. Values for a rural population are, for this reason, almost always more individual and less social than for townspeople. Yet in a secondary sense even the most isolated life may have a social value. The value in Wordsworth's thoughts, feelings, and way of life and the value in St. Simeon Stylites's (if they had any) were not immediately dependent upon or even influenced by other people and therefore by society, but I think it can reasonably be said that the value of a society which produces

Wordsworths would be different from that of a society which produces St. Simeons.

At other times and places the relations between individuals have become numerous and complicated, and we ourselves live in an age in which human life is everywhere dependent upon an infinite complication of world-wide relations, organized and unorganized. In such a society the social standards of value become enormously important, for whatever he does or whereever he goes the individual finds that he is entangled in a complicated network of social relations. It is true that in very simple and primitive societies the impact of society upon the individual is violent and incessant. His life and his standards of value are determined for him by the life and standards of the communal unit to which he belongs. But the determination is clear and comparatively simple. In tribal society, for instance, the tribesman is and feels himself to be an integrated member of his community, the tribe. The life of the individual is part of the life of the tribe and cannot be disentangled from it. Within the prescribed limits tribal custom determines rigidly both the social and the individual life, and there is little, if any, division between individual and social standards of value. And since the society is small, the relations clear and limited, the customs and laws few, definite, and accepted, there is hardly any room for conflict between the individual and society, between his standards and social standards.

As soon as one leaves the blessed simplicity of the savage for the bewildering complications of civilization the situation alters. Consider for a moment the life of the man who lived in the house in which I am now writing, in the village of Rodmell, in the latter half of the 18th century, and the impact which society must have made upon him, his life, and his standards. From one point of view he was socially a much freer man than the tribal savage. Village opinion is a powerful instrument for enforcing uniformity of life and standards everywhere and in all ages. But it is quite different from the rigid framework of tribal custom. My predecessor in this house, no doubt, accepted unconsciously much of the social psychology of his environment and his standards of value and way of life conformed, within certain limits, to those of the squire, the parson, and his fellow-villagers. But the psychological effect of this social environment upon him was that of a diffused jelly rather than of an iron

framework. There was no law of custom so meticulous and so rigid that he accepted it, not merely as part of tribal life, but as part of himself; instead of this, he was embedded in a rather indeterminate, gelatinous social atmosphere of manners, morals, and customs. If he had enough money, he could live his own life in his own way according to his own standards of value, with little interference from the law and none from his neighbours. If he were poor, the economics of poverty rather than the customs and standards of society imposed upon him conformity; but there was sufficient space and freedom for the poor man within the walls of society to allow him to revolt ineffectively if he were a Thomas Turner, and effectively if he were a Tom Paine. But though in this way he was freer socially than the savage, being subject less directly and insistently to the impact of his immediate environment, his way of life, his thought, his standards of value were already profoundly influenced by other elements in the social structure. The society to which he belonged and therefore the social relations in which he was entangled were infinitely wider and more complex than those of any savage. Those relations, distant, unknown to him, uncontrollable by him, might determine the way of his life or the method of his death, mould his communal psychology, his private thoughts, his standards of value. In Westminster speeches were made and laws passed which affected his way of life in small ways and great; in Lancashire and Yorkshire men were doing things which in another 100 years would revolutionize life in Rodmell village; in America men, by throwing chests of tea into Boston harbour, began a series of events the effects of which were immediately felt in London and Sussex and soon by the whole world; in Paris the vacillations of a stupid king and the cutting off of his head began another series of events which was soon to affect the lives of every man and woman in Europe, which changed the thoughts inside the head of my predecessor and perhaps led to his dying by a French bullet on a Spanish mountain or on the plains of Flanders.

It is commonplace to say that the relations between the individual and society have increased enormously in number and complication since they cut off the king's head in Paris. As I sit here looking out of the same window upon the same garden, trees, water-meadows, and downs which my predecessor

looked through and at in 1795, my life and my thoughts are bound by an infinite number of strands to the society of Rodmell village, to the society of the county of Sussex, of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the Commonwealth of Nations, of all the peoples, nations, and states of all the continents, and finally of the human race. The strands which bind me are not only more numerous than those which bound him, they are tighter, stronger, more complicated, and—what is important—less visible. I am entangled in society like a minute fly in a gigantic spider's web which he cannot see. I cannot struggle against it, even if I wish to do so, for I do not know where or whence the blow will fall or the sentence be pronounced which will twist my thoughts, deprive me of bread and butter, blot out my house and my garden, or confront me with a sudden and nasty death.

The relations of the tribesman to his fellow-men, to the society of which he is a member, are local, immediate, definite, and few. He knows what they are and from where they and their sanctions emanate. He belongs to a single, simple society or community which he can see with his eyes. The 18th-century Englishman had moved a long way from the savage; he was no longer a member of a single local visible society; he already felt the impact, not only of his village and country, but of Europe and America. Yet I am not sure that his social relations were not nearer to those of the tribesman than to those of our unfortunate times. The impact of communal life upon his private life was nearly always still local, immediate, visible. If society aimed a blow at him, he could see exactly where it came from—from the squire, perhaps, or the village constable. He might well live his whole life without any social relations, outside a five-mile radius from his house, exercising any important influence upon his way of living and thinking; his standards of value were those of his immediate neighbours and probably remained stable and unassailed from birth to death. There is no one in Britain or Europe, there must be few people anywhere in the world, of whose lives during the last 50 years this could be said.

This revolution in man's way of life is fully recognized in the theory and practice of politics, but the recognition is almost always limited to its effect upon social, political, or economic structure and mechanics. Very little attention has been given

to its effect upon individual and communal psychology and standards of value. Even where it is recognized, the recognition is superficial and half-hearted; nostalgia for the past, for what is dead and done with, is one of the dominating ingredients in communal psychology; that is why the dead hand shapes our history. The world's social and political disasters of the 20th century, which have been as catastrophic as any in human history, are mainly due to this kind of social nostalgia, to our refusal or inability to adjust our communal and individual lives to the conditions imposed upon us by an entirely new form of society. I can see this in my own person and the pattern of my own life. Even the world which I was born into in Kensington has vanished, as I said in the last chapter. Yet I sit looking at the garden which was a garden 300 years ago and at the little church which was a little church looking into my garden 600 years ago and at the down beyond which was a down 600,000 years ago—I sit, with my ration-book in my pocket and an identity card, pretending to myself that these are the only things which have altered in 60 or 600,000 years —there having been obviously no ration-books or identity cards when I or the garden or the church or the downs were born—trying ineffectually to live and think and feel as my parents did when the lace curtains in Kensington appeared —so deceptively—to protect them from the deluge, the unemployed, and battle, murder, and sudden death. Like the little church at the end of my garden, I am a social and political anachronism, and so are all my neighbours.

This intricate network of relationships—economic, political, social, and cultural—which has entangled human society and knit together the lives of all individuals over the earth's surface is the result of human actions. The result of a man's watching steam come out of the spout of a kettle may be the invention of the steam engine, and the result of that 50 years later the industrial slums of Lancashire, and 150 years later the dictatorship of the proletariat or of Stalin in Russia; it may also result in my having a ration-book in 1952, and in an American destroying by means of a small ball dropped from an aeroplane a Japanese city and its thousands of Japanese inhabitants. These human actions have produced new human relations, and these relations produce new actions and again new relations; that is the inescapable logic of events which moulds

history and from which we cannot escape by mumbling as social incantations the shibboleths of a world and society no longer existing. The relations are there, created by what our ancestors did or we are doing; they will exist so long as, and because, we live as we do, and they can only be destroyed by the destruction of our way of life.

These social relations—the relations of individuals in a society, whether it be the society of a village, a country, a continent, or the world—may be unorganized or organized. In the village and society of Rodmell we are bound together by a large number of different relations. Many of them are organized, being regulated by law, custom, or the rules of voluntary associations or societies. To a large extent we are an organized society, for many of our relations are regulated by the law of the land and the police, by the County Council, the Chailey Rural District Council, and the Rodmell Parish Council. As cricketers our relations are organized voluntarily in a cricket club, but as lawn-tennis players they are completely unorganized. As users of the village shop our relations are organized by the custom of first come, first served. The beginning of organization in an unorganized society can be seen in the relations of the owners of orchards to the school children. They are usually unregulated and strained when apples and pears are on the trees. One orchard-owner has, however, introduced a certain amount of voluntary regulation by going to the school and informing the children that as long as his orchard was not robbed he would regularly give them apples, and the terms of the understanding have been scrupulously observed by both parties for many years. The understanding does not apply to strawberries, and the unorganized relations over the strawberry beds have occasionally led to unfortunate results.

As soon as there is social organization, social values are created, whether the organization be compulsory or voluntary, by laws and regulations or by custom. The values primarily belong to individuals, to their psychology, their way of life, their relationships to one another and, perhaps, to society itself and to communities within society. But the organization of society affects, and may determine, men's psychology, way of life, and relations, and, in practice, it does so proportionately to the number and complication of the relations. The more

relations there are and the more complicated they are, the more organization, laws, rules, regulations, customs become necessary. The nature and quality of the individual, of his mind and way of life, in these circumstances, come to depend more and more upon the nature and quality of the social organization.

It is in the relation between the individual and social organization that social, as distinct from individual, values are created. Let us assume, for the moment, with Xerxes, Hitler, and many other people, that discipline and power have intrinsic value. Their judgment is an ethical judgment regarding values. The spectacle of the ruler controlling the hosts of disciplined men and of the ruled, the hosts of men obeying their ruler, a spectacle of power, fills them with moral enthusiasm, whether it be the great King at Abydos, looking down upon his men and ships or the Fuehrer in the Berlin Sportspalast receiving the salute of outstretched arms and the thunder of 'Heil Hitler' from his nazi hosts. What exactly do they mean by this judgment? The Xerxes and Hitlers of this world are not psychologists, and we must do their psychological analysis for them, using as evidence their own words and deeds. Their meaning is, I think, something like this: The efficient exercise of power by the few who are naturally fit to rule or lead the many, who are capable only of being ruled or led, has intrinsic value. The 'good life' for the individual, if he belong to the ruling or leading class, consists in the exercise of power over the ruled, in the direction, organization, and use of them for certain ends, and if he belong to the class of ruled or led, in discipline and obedience to the orders of his rulers. The good life for the individual within the community depends therefore upon the relations between the individuals and their organization by the community. The good community is therefore the community which organizes the relations of individuals in such a way as to encourage or compel them to live the good individual lives, i.e. to exercise power efficiently and use it for certain ends, on the one side, and, on the other side, to practise the disciplined obedience which makes this efficient exercise of power for certain ends possible. The social values are to be found in the communal organization to promote power and discipline.

But the analysis must be carried a little further. The first point to notice is that those who adopt these standards of value

(and many who do not) would say that the community itself —the nation, state, party, or even public school—is what has most intrinsic value, that the supreme ultimate end is not the individual or the individual way of life, but the community. Hitler, for instance, repeatedly said that all he did was done for 'Germany' and that his ultimate end was the creation of 'a powerful Germany'. It is possible that at moments he not only said this, but believed it. But just as Prometheus had the right (or duty) to question Zeus, or Job Jehovah, so we have the right and duty to question Hitler or Stalin, the nazi or the communist. When Gods and dictators say that this is good and that bad, they must be politely asked to say what they mean and submit their ethical principles to the bar of reason and common sense.

Hitler personified the 'Germany' which he set up as the ultimate end of his actions, an ideal object of intrinsic value, just as boys and masters in a public school personify 'the school' as an object of intrinsic value when they require that certain things should be done or not be done for its sake. These objects, which become the centre of ethical principles and standards of value, are not persons, but very complex abstractions. The words and actions of their devotees show that they have two important ingredients: one physical, a particular territory with its cities or its school building and the people who inhabit it; the other spiritual, the nature of the inhabitants, of their relations and of the lives which they live. At first sight it might appear that, in the view of the devotees, the values belong to the abstractions or personifications, to Germany or Eton; but if their words and beliefs are carefully examined, it is clear that, even though they sometimes categorically say this and probably believe it, it is not what they really mean. Let us examine the mind of Hitler.

Over and over again Hitler shows that his standards of value apply, not to 'Germany', but to Germans, to the way they live and to their relations to one another, to their government, and to other peoples. For instance, he had nothing but abuse and contempt for a democratic or socialist 'Germany', the Germany of the Weimar Republic—it was intrinsically bad, whereas the 'Germany' of national socialism was everything that is good. But the two Germanys differed from each other essentially in the way of life of their inhabitants, in their relations to one

another, to their government, and to other peoples. Hitler himself recognized that this essential difference was the basis of his standard of values by insisting that what he was aiming at and achieving was to change the way of life, private and public, of Germans. Individual values consisted in the exercise of power by himself and his leaders and in the discipline and devotion of the masses; social values consisted in organization of the community in such a way that these relations were possible and inevitable. The school boy and master take the same view of individual and social values in their school; their loyalty and devotion are given to the school because it provides the organization and framework for a particular way of life and of human relationship; if that way of life, and the psychology and traditions upon which it is based, were radically changed, the school would lose its value for them.

This confirms the conclusion of my previous analysis that the things which people judge to have most intrinsic value, the ultimate ends of human action, are complex psychological states or ways of life. It is true that men—and the Hitlers among them—believe that other things are also good in themselves, sometimes quite consistently and at other times owing to the inveterate muddle-headedness of human beings. For instance, Hitler frequently said, and often probably believed, that the supreme good was 'Germany' and the glory of 'Germany', and that for this he was prepared to sacrifice himself and any number of Germans, not to speak of Jews, Poles, Czechs, and Russians. Pericles and his Athenians regarded Athens much in the same way, an object of value to preserve which men had rightly and gloriously died at Marathon and Salamis. It is of the first importance to understand the nature and validity of these beliefs, for the political history of mankind has been enormously influenced by them, by men's habit of personifying communities—the city, the church, the nation—and by treating them or the attributes ascribed to them as supremely good or supremely evil. A school in which everything is sacrificed to 'the school'; to its traditions, glory, and *esprit de corps*, is very different in nature and effects from one in which the mind and way of life of each individual boy are regarded as of ultimate value. So too political action will be fundamentally different if men regard the glory of Germany or the happiness of Germans as the end to be aimed at.

Let us examine this conception of communal glory as an end, for its almost universal acceptance throughout the thousands of years of recorded history makes it a convenient example for analysis. The first thing to remark is that both Pericles and Hitler, whose views as to what is good differ so fundamentally in many ways, agree that communal glory—the glory of Athens or Germany—depends upon the psychology, way of life, and actions of the individuals who constitute the community. This attitude and judgment of social values I have referred to more than once before; it seems to me right and reasonable. If certain psychological states and ways of life are good and worthy of our admiration, then a community of men living that kind of life and organizing their relations so that it can and shall be lived is itself good and worthy of admiration. And it is not merely good as a means, as providing the machinery and organization which make the good individual life possible. It has, I think, itself intrinsic value. A school, a city, or a state can have a value which is not merely the sum of the values of the individual lives of those who constitute their living tissue. But here again the object which has value is extremely complex. It is part material, part conceptual and personification. To Pericles, as his words show, 'Athens' is the Athenians,' their way of life, their laws, traditions, history, customs. But it is also the city itself, its soil and sky and beauty, its streets, its market place, and temples, fitting objects for the devotion of her citizens and for the poetry of her poets. And it is also her power and her glory, which are indeed another aspect of her communal life and her material beauty. All these things are united to form the complex 'Athens' to which Pericles, I think rightly, ascribes intrinsic value. Hitler's Germany and the 'Eton' or 'Harrow' of the devoted schoolboy are, up to a point, the same kind of rational complex.

But there is a point at which the nature of the complex can change and become irrational. In my description of Pericles's Athens there is a certain amount of personification. Athens is regarded as something more than a city and the sum of its citizens. It is an entity with a history and a life of its own. But it remains for Pericles 'a personification'; it never becomes a person. The distinction is politically of vital importance. Athens, Germany, and Eton are not persons, but personifications. The Greeks, with their dislike of exaggeration and

habit of clear thinking, rarely mistake the products of their imagination for reality, and do not therefore treat personified communities as if they were real persons. In modern times this has continually been done, with disastrous effects. Hitler proclaimed Germany to be of such transcendent value that the good of Germans, and *a fortiori* of the lesser breeds of men, must be ruthlessly sacrificed to her. No one could believe such savage nonsense unless in his mind the symbol or personification has been substituted for the reality. The Russian communist does much the same with the Soviet Union and communism as Hitler did with Germany and national socialism, transferring the value in a certain communal way of life to a personification fabricated out of a community, political theories and the darker passions of the human unconscious. It is significant that the worship of these modern Molochs and the bloody sacrifices which have to be made to them cannot be obtained without a secondary personification, the personification of a real person who can then personify the original personification. To the good nazi Hitler personified both Germany and national socialism and to the good communist Lenin and Stalin personify Russia and communism. It is easier, as the history of religions shows, for the human mind to delude itself with the reality of the personification of a person than with that of the personification of an idea. And nothing makes the confusion and corruption of standards of value easier than these personified persons.

CHAPTER III

FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY

THE analysis in the last chapter has thrown light upon the general nature of standards of individual and social value and the relation of one to the other. Certain things follow of great importance both to the theory and practice of politics. Consider, for instance, the political idea and ideal of freedom. If Herodotus and Thucydides were right, the conflict between Xerxes and the Greeks was intimately connected with a conflict regarding the value of freedom. This conflict recurs again and again in European history; it is raging savagely throughout Europe today. It can be defined concisely and with some accuracy as follows: the Greeks and those who have accepted their standards and traditions judge freedom to be socially of the highest intrinsic value. It has been considered of little or no value normally, and often as positively evil, by the Xerxes and Hitlers, by communists, and usually by kings, aristocracies, and ruling classes. We have therefore freedom or liberty, as an object or ideal, opposed to the object or ideal of power, domination, and discipline. The ideal opposition, which is concerned with values, issues in a historical conflict when a Xerxes seeks by power to destroy what the Greeks regard as their freedom; when the 'people' demand, in the name of liberty, to share in or abolish the political power of a king, an oligarchy, or a plutocracy; when the liberty of the subject or 'civil liberties' are claimed against the government; when the 'right of self-determination' is claimed by a subject people; when 'democracy' resists 'authoritarianism' or a dictator's bid for 'world-empire'. In the conflict which ensues the libertarians often personify a city, a state, or a principle in the same way as the kings and dictators, so that Athens, the British Empire, or even 'democracy' usurps in their minds the place of 'freedom', becoming a kind of personal God on whose altar everything must be sacrificed, including sometimes freedom itself.

The last sentence reveals a very important fact in political psychology. The words 'usurps in their minds the place of

freedom' are a literal description of what happens, Those who have, in the practice of politics, pursued freedom or liberty and writers and historians who deal with the theory or principles of politics nearly always regard freedom as if it were a simple entity like a marble or an apple or a simple, recognizable feeling like pleasure or pain. It is a 'thing' which you may either have or not have, and it is this thing, freedom, which for the libertarian has intrinsic value. Freedom is for him good in itself, and therefore the more freedom in the world, the better the world, just as, if marbles are good, a world with 1,000,000 marbles in it would be better than a world which had only 999,999.

In this sense there is no such thing as freedom. To be free means to be able to do what you want to do or not to be compelled to do what you do not want to do. (I am aware that it is possible to quibble about what freedom *really* means *ad infinitum*, but whatever shade of meaning or muddle be given to the word, the essential meaning will be found to include this power or ability to choose to act or not to act and/or the absence of compulsion.) Freedom or compulsion, as an object of value, is therefore not a thing like a marble, a man, or margarine which can be counted, measured or weighed. It is not even a thing like a work of art—a statue or a picture, for instance—a material thing in which the artist has embodied externally the record of states of mind which have intrinsic value, and which is potentially a simple and direct stimulus of valuable states of mind in any spectator. Freedom is a psychological relationship or a condition in a complex state of mind or way of life. To argue whether freedom is good or bad is nonsense and meaningless. The value attaches to the state of mind or the way of life, and freedom is therefore an essential part or condition of complexes some of which are good, some bad, and some indifferent.

These facts explain why nine-tenths of the disputes between libertarians and authoritarians are concerned with phantoms, not realities: The authoritarian has no difficulty in producing complexes which are bad and in which freedom is an essential part of condition. Freedom to torture and murder people is, he points out, obviously bad and everyone agrees that it is right and proper for the community to prevent people acting in that way. Therefore 'freedom' is not good in itself; in fact it is

usually bad, and the more authority and discipline the better. The libertarian, accepting this phantom thing 'freedom' from his opponent as something which one can isolate as good or bad, replies that the freedom is good; it is the torture which is bad and the frame of mind of the torturer. It is only because the badness of the torture exceeds the goodness of the freedom that on balance it is better to abolish the freedom and prevent the torture. And thus the libertarian, wrongly assuming that there is this 'thing' which we call freedom and which is always of intrinsic value, is continually having to discover or invent reasons for depriving people of it, while the authoritarian, making the same assumption about the 'thing', but judging it to be bad, considers that he is absolved from having to give reasons for habitually depriving other people of it.

If we assume for a moment that Demaratos, Pericles, and the libertarians are right and Xerxes and Hitler wrong, the relation between freedom and a standard of individual and social values must be re-stated, for it is other than that which is habitually assumed. Freedom is always part of a complex which is either a state of mind, which may or may not issue in action, or a way of life or pattern of behaviour. It is a condition within the complex of the relation between the will and the act, between willing and action in the widest sense, e.g. freedom of thought is a condition of the relation between willing and thinking. The condition itself has no intrinsic value; in fact, if you try to isolate each part of the complex, even the willing and the action itself, none of them may have intrinsic value in themselves. It is the complex which has value, and the immense importance of 'freedom' is that it is a condition of complexes which are potentially of very great value. Superficially it might seem that the condition—freedom—having itself no intrinsic value, is merely good as a means, because it is a condition of things which has to be established before and in order that the thing which itself has intrinsic value can be produced. But this is not really the case. Freedom is something more than a condition precedent to the production of things which have intrinsic value; it is a condition which is an integral part of wholes or complexes having value.

This is not a mere quibble; it has, as I hope to show, great practical importance, and I must, therefore, make the distinction clear. Certain economic conditions may be a necessary

condition for the production of works of art by a particular artist. The functioning of the artist and the production of his plays or pictures are here the things which have value. The economic conditions are simply conditions which have to be established before the artist can function and the works of art can be produced. They are not part of the thing which has value, but purely means like the poet's pen or typewriter or the painter's easel and canvas. Compare this with what is called 'freedom of speech'. Freedom of speech in the widest sense is part of a complicated psychological state; it is a relation between the will and action, between what one wants to say and what one is allowed to say. It affects or may affect the artist when he takes his pen or brush and contemplates the empty page or canvas. The sense of freedom or constraint is then part of his psychology, and may be of crucial importance to it, and it is the psychology which has value. So too with the ordinary man who is not a creative artist. The psychology of the man who can think and say what he likes about religion or politics is different from that of the man who, by fear or other means, is constrained to think or at least say only what a church, a government, or gestapo imposes upon him. His general and particular states of mind and ultimately his way of life will be different. It is the sense of freedom or constraint which to a great extent constitutes the difference. 'Freedom' is an integral part of the complex, because the sense of it is an integral part of the states of mind, pattern of behaviour, or way of life. If the standards of value of the libertarian are right, it is the complex which has value, the state of mind, pattern of behaviour, and way of life of the individual who has this 'freedom' and sense of freedom, and beyond the individual the community and the communal life of such individuals.[1]

[1] In order to forestall a possible objection, I should add that in one sense freedom is merely a condition precedent to the good life and the good community as analysed above. We sometimes apply the word to the framework of communal freedom, the constitution, laws, regulations, and customs which make the psychology and behaviour of the free man and the life of a free community possible. This framework and machinery of freedom has no value except as a means to the intrinsic value in free minds and free lives. With our fatal habit of confusing means with ends, we place the value upon the machinery of living rather than on the lives of men, and even sacrifice the lives for the machinery.

We can now state with greater accuracy and clearness the essential conflict between the authoritarian and the libertarian. First as regards freedom in relation to the standard of individual values. The libertarian view is that the psychology, behaviour, and way of life of the individual who feels, thinks, and acts with a sense of freedom is generally good, and that the life of the man whose desires and inclinations are habitually thwarted and who lives under daily direction, constraint, or compulsion is bad. For the individual, therefore, freedom is not of itself good or bad, but the sense of freedom and initiative are basically of the greatest value in the individual's psychology and way of life. Here at once begins the paradox of freedom and civilized life. Man is born with instincts and his desires and inclinations are determined by his instincts. In order to be civilized, indeed in order to live at all as a member of any community, the individual has to learn, somehow or other, to thwart, control, and direct his instincts, his desires, his inclinations. In order to be free he must learn how to lose his freedom.

There are two ways in which the individual may lose his primal freedom of the instincts, from without or from within. The conflict between authority and liberty begins here over the body and mind of the new-born infant, in the nursery. The adjustment and control of instinct may be imposed from without by compulsion, by the authority of parents and nurses, or they may be learnt, not without pain, to be accepted and imposed from within. I do not believe that any adjustment of the individual to the necessities of modern communal life is possible without external compulsion of the child. But there remains a fundamental difference between the authoritarian and the libertarian solution of the problem of civilizing infants and children. The authoritarians have almost always had their way in the past. Their methods were summed up in the rule that to spare the rod was to spoil the child. Born in original sin we must be compelled to do what we do not want to do and not to do what we want to do. There is only one way in which this lesson can be taught and learnt, by the establishment of the authority of the parent and the parent's agents or substitutes and of 'discipline' in the child. Authority and discipline are most easily established by fear and by the inculcation or encouragement of the sense of sin. The child must be taught to be afraid from his earliest years to do what his parents do not

want him to do. He may, for instance, be taught not to wet his bed by being smacked or beaten if he does so. Or he may be taught that it is wrong to wet his bed and a 'sin' for him to do what his parents forbid him to do, namely to wet his bed; in that case the rod or the smacking will become unnecessary, for the internal sanction of fear of sin, of the sense of guilt, will prevent him from bed-wetting.

The authoritarian, therefore, and many modern psychologists assume that ordinary men and women can only be civilized and kept civilized by fear of some authority—a God, a parent, a nurse, or schoolmaster—or by the sense of sin or guilt. I believe this to be untrue and that there is another method by which living creatures can learn to control their instincts and adapt them to social life and what we call civilization. It consists in substituting for the sanctions of fear and sin those of love (in the widest sense) and—I hesitate to introduce such an unfashionable idea—reason. I have in the course of my life kept uncaged in my house, sharing my daily life, a large number of different animals, from the common or garden cat and dog to a leopard and a monkey. The problem of domesticating animals is the same as that of civilizing human beings; it is easier only because man is probably the most savage and cruel of all animals and because the other animals have not committed man's mistake of inventing abstract ideas and words to interpret or misinterpret them. In order that a wild animal, whether a dog or a leopard, may become a happy and congenial member of your household, you have, somehow or other, to get it to control or repress its instincts, to adapt them to social life or civilization. The approved way of attempting to do this is, as with children, by fear and, where possible, a sense of guilt, and up to a point it can be successful.

When I first began to keep animals, I adopted the usual method of civilizing them. I taught my dog to be clean in the house by beating it when it was dirty and rubbing its nose in the mess that it had made. It learnt to be clean, to be afraid of me and of doing what I did not want it to do. It also acquired a strong sense of sin. In this the psychology of the dog is very curious. It seems to have lived so long with and so close to man that it has acquired from us the capacity of feeling guilty. It does not matter how you treat a dog, he will certainly develop a sense of sin; he will show quite clearly from his behaviour

that he is not merely aware that he should not do certain things, but he feels towards his doing them an emotion which is indistinguishable from the human sense of guilt. I have never kept any other animal which behaved like this. The idea that cats cannot be civilized is a delusion. I have had cats which were highly civilized, as civilized as dogs and most human beings; they were aware that there were things which they wanted to do, but which they ought not to do, and for the most part they did not do them. If they did them, they might show fear, but never, like the dog, any sense of guilt. The same is true even of the monkey. It is in my opinion impossible to share one's daily life with a monkey and not to form the opinion that the monkey's mind is much nearer the man's than is the dog's mind or the cat's. Its mental reactions are not so immediate or direct; it has the beginnings of a speculative instead of an instinctive reaction; it 'considers' a thing or a situation in a way which is very rare in a dog or cat. I should, therefore, have expected the monkey, when subjected to civilization, rapidly to catch from man the sense of sin, for it is a very contagious disease. But in my experience, which is, however, small, this does not take place. The monkey—to judge from the two which I have kept—is, despite or perhaps because of its more human type of mind, not at all easy to civilize. It can learn, with difficulty, that in social life there are things which, against one's own wishes, one must do or not do, but it never shows the slightest sign of having acquired any feeling of 'having done wrong' when it transgresses a rule of social life.

The ordinary way of civilizing animals is, as I was saying, by means of fear, force, and a sense of sin, and that is the way in which I at first dealt with my dog and cats. For the last thirty years or more I have adopted a completely different method, and the animals trained under it have all, I think, become much more civilized than those dealt with in the ordinary way. All animals which I have known exhibit, like human beings, two contradictory impulses or instincts, one that of affection or cooperation, the other of hostility or aggression. Consider, for instance, the cat which is still, after centuries of domestication, born an essentially wild animal. If you carefully watch its psychological development, you will find that, when it first begins to stagger about as a kitten, it is primarily and potentially an affectionate animal. I have just been watching an

extremely affectionate and at the same time aggressive Siamese cat bring up a kitten. The kitten began by showing every sign of affection for its mother, and it soon transferred this to human beings and a large dog. It showed absolutely no sign of fear or of unhappiness unless it was hungry. After some weeks it began to develop a passion for 'play', which consisted of tearing wildly about the room and flinging itself upon its mother and, somewhat later, upon me in an ecstatic romp. In this romp it would seize almost anything—it's mother's ears, my fingers, or the buttons on my coat—in its mouth and chew them. It would do the same with the dog. It never bit me or the dog aggressively, it chewed us playfully and fearlessly, because we both treated it gently and never hurt it. The mother behaved very differently. She entered into the romp, but with terrifying violence. When the kitten flings itself upon its mother, it begins with a boisterous, but playful mêlée; this soon develops into a sham fight. The mother seizes her son's head or throat in her mouth, clasps him with her forepaws, and kicks him vigorously with her hind legs. Very soon she hurts him and he begins to shriek. So he gets his first experience of pain and fear. And his reaction to it and to her is completely different from his reaction to me and the dog. As soon as she lets him go, he flies from her; and when he comes back, as he very soon does, to renew the romp, he flings himself upon her with a violence which he never shows to us, and the romp becomes half play and affection and half fight and aggression.

You can train the kitten or any other animal to adapt itself to civilized life by using it's mother's methods of force and pain if it does not do what you want it to do. In 99 cases out of 100, the animal will learn in this way to adapt itself to civilization. But it will be only semi-domesticated or semi-civilized, for just below the surface of its mind, and rising to the surface at any moment, will be elements of fear, rebellion, or hostility. The other way of training animals is through their potential affection. You must never hurt them or use unnecessary force upon them. You must establish from the earliest moment the things which, for the sake of civilization (which includes your own convenience), they are never under any circumstances to do; and you must prevent them doing these things with the utmost patience and gentleness. In the vast majority of cases there is very little difficulty in doing this, provided that at the same time you do

everything in your power to encourage the animal's spontaneous affection for you. It is easy to win any animal's affection, if you feel and show affection for it and allow it complete freedom to do what it wants to do in everything except in that limited sphere of its activities which civilization and your wishes have prescribed for it.

The animal trained in this way is always, in my experience, freer, happier, and infinitely more civilized than those trained in the first way. It has accepted as its code or pattern of behaviour your code of civilization or—one might say—of values in a strictly limited sphere of which you and it are aware. In this sphere it has learnt to act naturally against its own nature. It is, if you like, afraid to break the rules, but not because it is afraid of you; it is afraid of the discomfort of your displeasure. It is as though a religious person really did believe in God and his rules, and there was at the same time a strong personal bond of affection between them.

At this point I cannot refrain from what may appear to be a digression, though I hope that some readers will eventually discern its relevance. It astonishes me that religion and philosophy, psychology and sociology have almost always ignored the existence of animals. Take first religion and metaphysics. It seems to me essential that in the metaphysics of true belief the brutes should be given an appropriate place, appropriate to the metaphysical or religious system, whatever that may be. But no religion or philosophy that I know of, except those which assume metempsychosis, have taken the trouble to put forward even the rudiments of a satisfactory explanation of the existence and psychology of animals, and by satisfactory I mean an explanation which is appropriate to the particular metaphysical or religious system. I have no explanation myself but there is no call upon me to have one, since I have no religion and no metaphysical beliefs. I can see no satisfactory explanation of my own or my neighbour's existence, of what we are doing or are supposed to be doing in this wholly inexplicable universe. I have never heard any satisfactory explanation of why the stars go flaming through space—or, indeed, of any cosmic why. Naturally, therefore, I claim to have no knowledge of the cosmic position of the flea and the elephant, the dog and the marmoset.

But the metaphysician and the religious believer stand in a

very different pair of intellectual shoes. They claim to be able to answer these cosmic enigmas; they explain the stars in their fantastic courses and the fabric and fate of human souls; they interpret for us the whys in the mind of God. And they leave the flea and the elephant, the dog and the marmoset completely out of the picture or the universe, or they give them a place in it which knocks the picture or the universe to pieces.

Take Christianity, for instance, and consider it for a moment through the eyes of a dog, which is lying at my feet before the fire snoring, and a marmoset, which is sitting on my knee, staring into space. I know them both intimately; in a number of ways I understand them and they understand me, and our mutual interpretation of our feelings, meanings, and actions is the same, except for speech on their side, as that between two human beings. Our intercourse and conversation are as intricate and intimate as they often are between two human beings of long acquaintance living in the same house. I do not believe that they have an immortal soul, but neither do I believe that I have an immortal soul. The Christian does believe that I have one; he can tell me all about it, where it came from, the nature of its sins, how it can be saved, and where it is going to. It seems to me that, if anything is certain, it is certain that, if I have an immortal soul, there is something indistinguishable from an immortal soul in my dog and my marmoset, because I see in my marmoset all the phenomena of behaviour from which, when I see it in you who are reading this page, I am told to infer that you have a soul. If the fabric of your soul be immortal, why should the Christian believe that hers is not? Actually he neither believes nor disbelieves it; he just shuts his eyes to the whole problem, ignoring her soul, thinking it apparently unimportant to enquire whence it came, the nature of its sins, how it can be saved, and where it is going to. By doing this, he allows my marmoset to make nonsense of Christianity. In the same way, she seems to me to make nonsense of all religious systems, except, as I said, the rather nonsensical systems which assume metempsychosis. Why should we assume it? In other words, the marmoset makes nonsense of the universe, and from her behaviour I sometimes suspect that she is fully aware of it.

Like the metaphysician and the religious believer, the psychologist and sociologist almost always ignore the animal world.

This is both strange and unfortunate, because the scientific psychologist, the educationist, and the theoretical and practical politician can all learn much by studying the mind and behaviour of animals and their reactions to the social life of man. This is particularly true of the problem which led me into this discussion about animals and their domestication, the primary problem which confronts human beings as members of a community, the problem of learning to do what you do not want to do and not to do what you want to do. The first step to civilization which man has to take is the civilization of his instincts, their control or repression or adaptation to communal life. The same problem confronts the puppy, the kitten, or the infant born in any house in Britain today. They must, if they are not to become a nuisance and menace to themselves and everyone else, learn somehow or other to civilize their instincts.

By trying to civilize a cat you can learn a great deal about the problem of civilizing an infant and of building a civilized society. Many people will deny this, because they hold that the psychology of a cat is so different from that of a child that it is irrelevant. This superiority complex of human beings regarding their poor relations is wrong, though there is some excuse for it. The interpreters of the minds of animals are too often divided into two extreme schools. The first anthropomorphize the beasts just as they do their God. They are sentimentalists who unscientifically and crudely translate the reactions of their dog into the terms of human psychology, endowing it indiscriminately with the highest virtues and a mind which would get a higher mark in an intelligence test than its owner seems capable of. But those who, irritated by this kind of sloppiness, go to the opposite extreme and dismiss animals as mere mechanical caricatures of imbecile human beings are no less sentimental. Their sentimentality is concentrated upon themselves, upon human beings, instead of upon the dog and the cat.

A cat cannot 'reason' as a grown man can, because, unlike the man, it has not developed the art of speech and therefore presumably cannot have general or abstract ideas. But if our inferences from human behaviour are correct, we are bound to infer from the cat's behaviour that it has instincts, sensations, feelings, emotions, will, awareness, perception, concentration upon intention, interest, contemplation. There is nothing in the behaviour of animals and human beings which would lead

one to conclude that these mental processes in animals are any more crude and mechanical than they are in men. Take the case of emotional sensibility. A cat or dog will display signs of dislike or affection towards other animals or towards human beings. But they have no appearance of being just crude, mechanical psychological reactions of attraction and repulsion. They are, in my opinion, more subtly and sensitively felt than in the case of many men and women. I knew a dog who lived with a family of nine children and whose behaviour showed so delicately a graded affection for the nine that they invented a game which he appeared to enjoy as much as they did. Two of the children would pretend to fight and the dog always went immediately to the assistance of the one who stood higher than the other in the hierarchy of his affections.

Take, again, the very important mental quality of 'awareness'. Awareness seems to me to be an essential ingredient of what we call intelligence, and the level of intelligence in ordinary human beings is lamentably low because of the lack of this ingredient. In order to perform an action x a person must have noticed a state of things y; he does x because he is aware of y. Over and over again in ordinary life efficient or intelligent action x thus depends upon the awareness or notice of a y. The level of efficient or intelligent housework, for instance, seems to me lamentably low because of the almost complete lack of this kind of awareness or notice. It is the commonest thing in the world for a person A, who does the housework for a person B, every day, year after year, to move an object x from a place y to a place z—the wrong place—because A has never noticed (1) that B every day, year after year, moves x from z to y, and (2) that B uses x for a purpose which requires it to be at y and not at z. Nearly all the dogs and cats that I have known have a more highly developed faculty of awareness than this, and their actions appear therefore to be more 'intelligent'. For instance, I have a sheepdog which sleeps in a basket by my bed. The morning routine is that I shave with an electric shaver in bed and then go to the bathroom. The moment I have shaved the dog gets up, ready to follow me into the bathroom. If I get up before I have shaved and go downstairs to open the damper in the kitchen stove, she either remains in the basket or follows me down. When I come up again, she runs on ahead, not into the bathroom, but back

into her basket in the bedroom. I am not concerned with the exact psychological interpretation of her actions, what, for instance, the nature of her awareness is and what is the exact nature of the causal connection between her actions. But I maintain that (1) she is aware of the fact that I do not go to the bathroom until the noise of the electric shaver has begun and ended; (2) that this is a fact that she has 'noticed'; (3) that her subsequent actions, as described by me, are determined by her awareness and notice of the facts and that, if she had not noticed them, her actions would be different; (4) that her actions in relation to what she is aware of are what we ordinarily call 'intelligent'. I also maintain that the awareness and notice and their relation to intelligent action in the case of the dog are indistinguishable from the awareness and notice and their relation to unintelligent action in the case of the person doing housework.

But for my purpose, which is to apply our experience of the civilizing of animals to the problem of civilizing man and human society, the comparison of the animal to the adult man is unnecessary and misleading. For the civilization of man has to begin when he is an infant, when, like the animal, he is a mere animal without speech or abstract ideas. Both in the animal and in the infant there are mental processes which do not include the faculty of speech and therefore of abstract ideas and 'reasoning' (as in adult man), but which appear to determine action and to be capable of influence, direction, or modification by the action of other human beings. The discoveries of modern psychology provide us with what may be clues to the nature of these processes. I cannot accept the elaborate system or theories of Jung, particularly regarding what he calls the collective unconscious, for much of it is based upon false analogies, unsupported assertion, and bad reasoning. But using what he owed to Freud (and so grudgingly acknowledges), he has added important things to our knowledge of the nature and history of the unconscious in man. It seems highly probable that the unconscious mental mechanism is historically prior to the conscious. Our best evidence of the nature of the unconscious—of its mechanism and contents—comes from dreams. In the twilight between his emergence from the ape into the human being—and probably for long afterwards—prehistoric man 'thought' and felt as we do in

dreams; and the content of his mind, even of his life, must often have been the same as that of our dreams and nightmares.

The mental processes of the unconscious in dreams are peculiar and, in many ways unlike those of the conscious. It is not true—as it should be, I think, if Jung's theories were sound—that there is no verbal, conceptual, or logical reasoning in the dreams or unconscious of modern man. The mental mechanism of the unconscious in our dream world is often the same as that of our consciousness when awake. We speak and are spoken to; we have general and abstract ideas; we act because we have understood the abstract or general ideas in something that has been said; we think in words and, therefore, 'reason'. But besides this, the unconscious appears to make use of another, and probably older, mental mechanism. My own experience, confirmed by many people, is that the substance of dreams is to a large extent pictorial rather than verbal or conceptual. What happens, happens in a series of visual images; when something happens to me, I see even myself in relation to the happening, and I am aware of it visually and not both visually and verbally or conceptually as in my waking life. Yet, when the mental process is entirely visual and there appears to be no verbal or conceptual awareness, there is still often a process which is indistinguishable from what in waking life we call 'reason'. That is to say we do *y* because we are aware (visually) of *x*, and if we had not been aware of *x*, we would not have done *y*. Though the awareness is purely visual and is not thought verbally or conceptually, the relation between it and the action is not instinctive. It is quite different from the instinctive reaction of running away, whether in a dream or ordinary life, because *x* suddenly frightens us. It is a rational or intelligent relation, in the ordinary sense of those terms.

It seems probable that Pithecanthropos and the first human beings 'thought' as we still often 'think' in dreams—visually, not conceptually—and that the dog, on one side, and the infant for a year or two, on the other, still do. The dog starts up when frightened by a loud noise instinctively, automatically, as a result of reflex action; but the mental process which induces him to go into my bedroom instead of into the bathroom is different; it is the same as our mental processes when we do *y* because we 'know' that the situation is *x*, and not *a*, *b*, or *c*.

The difference between instinctive or mechanical action and intelligent or reasoned action consist largely in the fact that the first is the result of a positive awareness, while the latter is the result of an awareness that is both positive and negative. We act intelligently or reason when we act because we know that the situation is not only *x*, but also not *a* or *b* or *c*. In ordinary life there are differences in the behaviour of human beings which lead us to infer that they are acting in the one way rather than in the other, and experience seems to show that our inferences are justified, that the differences in behaviour answer to a difference in mental process. We know, for instance, that we ourselves often hesitate to act, when we are acting intelligently, because we are considering whether the situation is *x* or *a*, *b*, or *c*, and the same kind of hesitation in similar circumstances in another person leads us to infer, apparently correctly, that the same kind of mental process is going on in him. But exactly the same kind of differences in behaviour can be observed in a cat or a dog, and we have, therefore, the same reason for inferring that they too sometimes act intelligently or rationally. The difference between the dog and the adult human being is that the dog 'reasons' in visual and oral images, as we do in dreams, whereas the man uses verbal and conceptual images as well as visual and oral.

If this view be correct, experience with the training or civilizing of animals is relevant to the problem of civilizing man. In fact, in the two alternative methods of civilizing a dog or cat, which I dealt with above, we are brought face to face with this problem in one of its simplest forms. And the problem, the paradox, of individual liberty is its kernel. Under the first method the dog or cat learns to control or adapt its instincts in accordance with the edicts of its master, to do what it does not want to do and not to do what it wants to do. The animal is not a free animal, for freedom plays no part in the process of training or in the relationship between it and the other members of the society to which it has been conditioned. The relationship is established upon the basis of authority on one side and discipline on the other. The animal learns to obey primarily from fear, and usually from fear of pain. The different effect of this process upon the dog and the cat is worth consideration. Most dogs can be trained in this manner with complete success if by success be meant the production of a living

creature which will do what it has been told to do. Nearly all dogs are naturally and spontaneously much more affectionate than other animals, including man. They are usually very sensitive psychologically, i.e. they react quickly and emotionally, not merely to the way in which they are treated, but even to the moods of men and other animals. By beating or cursing a dog you can, therefore, rapidly train it to do or not to do almost anything—hence the ancient delusion, still held by quite a number of people, at any rate in Sussex, that a dog, a woman, and a walnut tree, the more you beat them the better they be. It is true that the dog continues to love the master and the hand that beats him—it may even be true that he loves it because it beats and is the perfect masochist. The nature of his psychology and of his civilization, after training, is certainly not simple. The life of a well-trained dog is determined almost wholly by what its master wants it to do or not to do. It does or does not do these things partly from fear and partly from affection, although, as is always the case with animals and man, as time goes on, actions originally determined by fear or affection become automatic. But dogs rapidly develop another sanction of civilization, a sense of guilt. A sense of guilt consists in not merely knowing that it is wrong to do something—exactly what is meant or understood by 'wrong' is immaterial here—but in feeling that it is wrong. I say that a dog has this *feeling* of guilt, simply because, if it has done what is 'wrong' or forbidden, or sometimes even if it is merely suspected of having done so, its behaviour is the same as that from which in a human being we continually—and apparently correctly—infer that he is suffering from a sense of guilt.

The dog is the only animal which I know that seems, like the Christian, to believe in the doctrine of original sin. It does not matter how you treat him or train him, he at once develops this sense of guilt. Even if he is never beaten, he shows all the symptoms of feeling guilt, whenever he does the forbidden thing, when he 'does wrong', when he 'sins'. Everyone recognizes the difference between the cat and the dog in this respect. The cat shows that it knows what is forbidden or 'wrong', but it never shows any feeling of guilt when it does wrong. That is why many people mistakenly believe that you can civilize dogs, but that you can never really civilize cats. It is true that a sense of sin or guilt is the shortest cut to civilization, if the essence of

civilization is discipline, the habit of not doing what you want to do coupled with a sense of sin when you do. We are here at the very centre of the problem both of freedom and of civilization, and I am afraid that we shall have to remain there for several pages.

I do not deny that it is much easier to train a dog than a cat, to condition it to social life, to 'civilize' it. Like man, he is a beast of the herd; he is naturally responsive to the herd's law, highly sensitive both to a blow and to a caress or to the vague sense of being outside 'the law' which is perhaps the basis of the sense of sin. Of all living creatures, therefore, he provides the easiest material for an authoritarian system based on discipline and 'loyalty'. Superficially he appears to be also the finest material for the libertarian system. His highly developed temperament for cooperation and affection makes it the easiest thing in the world to teach him the rules, regulations, and taboos of civilization without the sanctions of force or fear. But though his temperament makes it easy for him to learn to be civilized, it makes it very difficult for him to learn to be free. It is possible with care to teach him to be free and happy within the lines drawn by the rules and restrictions of social life, but his inordinate sense of sin continually tends to induce him to make fear the sole sanction of his actions, fear of his master's displeasure, fear of doing wrong. He is happy in the devotion to his master and in gnawing a bone or chasing a hare, when he knows that his master desires or allows him to do so. But his sense of sin atrophies his sense of freedom.

Now observe the cat. The cat has absolutely no sense of sin and you cannot instil one in him. It is also extremely difficult to beat a cat or indeed hurt it in any way, because, if you try to do so, you will probably be hurt by him more than he by you. The problem of civilizing the cat has, therefore, always been a difficult problem for the authoritarian and he usually tacitly abandons it. He excuses himself either by disliking cats or dismissing them as 'wild' animals. In consequence a large number of our cats remain semi-civilized. They live their own individual, feline lives mainly outside the precincts of human society, and they enter our houses and our lives for the warmth and food provided by us. In order to secure such advantages they give the minimum obedience to the rules and restrictions of our society which experience has shown them to be necessary.

But there is another way of treating cats and it throws considerable light on the problem of social life. You cannot civilize a cat as you can a dog, but you can civilize him, provided you recognize that the civilization of a civilized cat will always be different from that of a civilized dog.

The temperament of a cat is not that of a herd animal. He 'walks by himself'. He is the individualist of the animal world, and when we take him into our houses, we are faced with the problem, not unknown in human society, of conditioning the individualist to communal society. The only way of conditioning a cat to civilization is by first encouraging its affection and secondly by establishing the limits of its freedom. I dare say that uncivilizable kittens are sometimes born into the world, but I have never come across one. All that I have known have been born potentially extremely affectionate to their mother and other cats, to human beings, indeed to nearly all living things, including dogs, but excluding mice. It is easy for anyone who deliberately takes the trouble to encourage and develop the affectionate side of the kitten's psychology. It has to be made the basis of feline civilization. He will at once show 'love' of his 'master' or teacher in particular, but also of all the living inhabitants of the house. All his instincts of aggression, which are potentially violent, are reserved for play, which consists largely of mock battles, and for mice and birds. As soon as this relationship has been established, in the second month of his life one must proceed to establish the limits of his freedom. It takes six months to civilize a cat, and it requires great patience, firmness, and affection on the part of the human being who, during that period, stands to the kitten as a God or dictator stands to many men. The necessary limits on the freedom of a free and civilized cat are neither many nor complicated. You have to teach him that there are a few things which he must do and rather more that he must not do. He must come to you when he is called and relieve nature in certain specified places. He must not jump on tables, steal food, knock flower-pots off window-sills, etc. Provided that he is given absolute freedom to do all the things which he is allowed to do, it is easy to make him understand what he is not allowed to do. But being an individualist and with no sense of sin, unlike the dog, he will at first continue to do it. Now comes the crucial struggle between society and the individualist.

The struggle, on the libertarian system, has to be determined without the use of fear or pain by society and with the minimum use of force. It is determined in my house by will, a passive but iron resistance on the part of society. If the cat continually jumps upon a table which society and civilization forbids to him, society will firmly, but gently, continue to remove him from it x times, and there is an x plus 1 time after which he will abandon the habit of jumping upon the table. x plus 1 may equal 100 in the case of a determined cat, whereas for an intelligent and affectionate puppy it may equal 2 or even 1. I have to admit that in my house the cats are never as 'well trained' or obedient to the rules of society as the dogs, but this is solely due to the fact that society there, even at the height of the struggle, has a sneaking sympathy for the libertarianism of the cat and often has not the patience to carry every struggle to its bitter end of x plus 1. There is, therefore, often a compromise between society and the cat—though never between society and the dog: society shuts its eyes to a certain amount of rule-breaking, while the cat is careful to break the rules only within very narrow limits, so that in effect a rule is eventually established determining how, when, and to what extent a rule of society may be broken.

I propose now to summarize the arguments in the previous pages and the conclusions which, I think, follow from them and can be applied to human society. The two methods of conditioning animals to the social life of human beings are fundamentally different and produce fundamentally different results. The first is authoritarian. The animal is taught to obey, and it learns to obey through fear of the consequences of disobedience. The fear is primarily of pain, but, in the case of the dog at any rate, the sanction often eventually becomes fear, of his master's displeasure, of 'doing wrong', or of a feeling of guilt. Practically all dogs can be conditioned in this way to human society without much difficulty, perhaps because they are instinctively beasts of the herd, dislike being alone, are quick to obey and to feel and fear the sense of 'doing wrong'. Cats cannot be conditioned in this way. Fear of pain will not induce them to obey orders and 'doing wrong' gives them no feeling of discomfort. The authoritarian method, therefore, which attempts to impose discipline by the sanction of fear, does not tame or train a cat; it makes it all the more wild. You can beat a dog

into the condition which Xerxes and Hitler called civilization: if you try it on the cat, you will only produce a panic-stricken or ferocious wild beast.

The other method differs from the first in two ways. The authoritarian method of training imposes upon the animal a framework of rules and regulations which it has to obey. It is free only within the narrow and defined limits prescribed for it by authority. The other method, which I call libertarian, provides for the animal a framework of freedom, limited only by the minimum possible number of rules and regulations.

The second difference is in the means employed for establishing and enforcing the social rules. Unless an animal is born socialized and civilized—and I have not yet met one—some force has to be employed to civilize it, to teach it the limits upon the framework of individual freedom. The authoritarian uses force initiated in pain and protracted in fear; he calls the product discipline. The object of force is to establish the habit of discipline, to produce an animal which will habitually and instinctively do or not do what it is commanded to do or not to do. The libertarian also employs force, but he employs it differently. He uses it passively where the authoritarian uses it actively. He does not use it in the form of pain or punishment, but as a passive obstacle, a natural barrier, to the animal's will to do what, if it is to live in society, it must learn not to do. The libertarian's object is to get the animal willingly to accept the limitations on its freedom required of it, in fact to do willingly in a few cases what it does not want to do and vice versa. Where the authoritarian tries to make the animal feel that it is wrong to do or not to do something, the libertarian tries to make him feel that it is right not to do or do something.

The first question is whether the libertarian can by his method achieve his object with animals such as the cat and the dog. I am convinced by my own experience that he can, provided that in the first few weeks of its active existence everything is done to encourage the affectionate and cooperative instincts of the animal. At the same time force is applied in a passive, but inexorable, resistance to its will within a narrow circle of action in which it is required to conform to social rules. I have never known an animal which did not respond to this treatment. He is fond of you and almost at once therefore instinctively likes doing what you want him to do. In 99 cases out of

100 you encourage him to do what *he* wants to do, but in the 100th case whenever he tries to do *x*, a hand is inexorably stretched out and he is prevented from doing *x*: His first lesson is, not that he is punished and hurt if he does *x*, as in the authoritarian regime, but that he simply cannot do *x*. He learns pretty quickly not to do *x*, and then, even more quickly, that there are other things which you will prevent him from doing or insist upon him doing. He accepts the narrow circle of these limitations upon his freedom. He acts, I should say if I were talking about a human being, as if he complied because he felt that it was right to comply, whereas the animal, trained by the authoritarian, acts as if he felt it was wrong not to comply and feared the consequence of non-compliance.

I must now leave—regretfully, I admit—the inferior animals and return to man who, however superior, remains an animal. The question is whether it is possible to condition the human animal, like the dog and the cat, to society and civilization by the libertarian method. I shall not discuss for the moment the question of values—whether the libertarian or the authoritarian society produces the better dog, cat, child, or man. I have myself no doubt that the individual and social values produced by the free society are far greater than those produced by the disciplined society, and I have not concealed and cannot conceal this 'prejudice' at any stage in the discussion. But the question of these values will have to be considered more fully later. At the moment I am concerned merely with the question whether you can get a viable society at all by either method.

The problem of domesticating or socializing the human animal differs in two important ways from that of civilizing a cat or a dog. First, the human being at an early age learns to talk and, therefore, to ask questions—a very awkward and dangerous habit, and to reason or appear to reason. Secondly the society into which the human being, cat, or dog has to be integrated is a society of human beings, not of cats or dogs. In order to integrate a cat or dog into the life of a household, all that one has to do is to get it to accept and obey certain social rules and regulations of a fairly simple nature. However civilized and closely integrated, it remains an alien and passive element in the society. It has no say in making the rules and regulations or determining the purposes of the association. But the human infant is born into a human society; he is destined

to become an active element in it; he must begin by accepting its rules and regulations, but ultimately he will have a share in determining what the rules and purposes of the association shall be.

Both these factors, which apply to the human infant and not to the puppy or kitten, make it, one has to admit, a far more complicated and difficult matter in many ways to integrate first the child, and then the adult in society, though they do also in certain ways make the task somewhat easier. The difficulties are increased by what appears to be the congenital unhappiness and inordinate savagery of the human animal. I am always amazed at the difference in the normal behaviour of babies from that of kittens and puppies. A baby, during the first year of life, appears to be moderately contented or happy when asleep or taking food; at other times it is liable, at any moment, particularly if its needs are not immediately satisfied, but often apparently for no reason other than congenital misery, to abandon itself to paroxysms of weeping, howling, or rage. Parents are usually quite unable to deal with these outbursts, trying ineffectively to stop them by food, vague noises, or slaps. I have never known kittens or puppies to behave like this. They appear to be completely happy. When they are not feeding, they curl up and go to sleep during the first four weeks of their existence, and afterwards they either sleep or play. No one would ever talk of a kitten (or a puppy) crying in the night, a puppy (or a kitten) crying for the light, and with no language but a cry; it is man—'the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals'—who starts life in this abysmal misery, with no language but a cry.

I do not know why the human animal is born with this instinct for unhappiness, whether the cause is a sense of original sin, the intimations of reason, or the reflex action of impotent ferocity. It certainly makes it much more difficult to begin to civilize an infant than a puppy, to give it its first lessons in not doing what it wants to do. And those first lessons have to be given when the infant is mentally in the condition of the puppy. It cannot speak and, therefore, neither the nature of nor reasons for the rules and regulations which it is required to observe can be 'explained' to it. The problem is at first precisely the same as with the training of animals, and parents and nurses have in practice been compelled to choose one of the alternative

methods described above. They nearly always choose the authoritarian method. The infant discovers in the cradle that scoldings and slaps are the ultimate sanctions of civilization and society, and learns through fear or pain to take the first steps in controlling its instincts. It is true that there has been a considerable change during the last 100 years in views regarding the right way to rear infants and generally to 'educate' children. Belief in the efficacy of fear and pain, and of discipline which usually means fear of pain, as the basic instruments of education, has become less strong and less general even in parents and schoolmasters. But I see no sign of any large-scale, intelligent attempt to rear infants and educate children by the methods which might make them as fit as my dogs and cats for a libertarian society.

The authoritarian method of discipline, often in a disguised, emasculated, or erratic form, is still, I think, much the most common. Again and again one still hears the mother's angry 'Don't' and sees the slap, which means that behind the first commandments of civilization, we are taught, lie fear, pain, and sin. And when the child leaves the home for the primary school, he immediately begins to be conditioned by authoritarianism. Look into any village school in the country and examine the kind of education which the village children, between the ages of 5 and 12, receive. Here the children receive their first lessons in social behaviour and civilization. Most of them are good schools as village schools go and the teachers are hard-working, kindly, conscientious people. Yet the children leave school far less fitted than any dog or cat of mine to become a civilized member of a free society. When one observes the methods of cultivating the human mind in a primary school, one is not surprised at this; the astonishing thing is that any civilization survives such methods. The school is built upon a rock called 'discipline' and discipline is built upon a rock called 'obedience', obedience to what the teacher enacts, obedience to rules and regulations. The sanction of obedience is rewards and punishments, or rather fear of punishment or ridicule, and the ultimate sanction is pain inflicted, in the 'worst cases', by blows on the hand with a ruler.

There is in these schools no cruelty or harshness of the Squeers type. The casual visitor and the school inspector would both certify them to be primary schools of a very good type—

and so I have no doubt they are. Yet negatively they do absolutely nothing to train a child to live as a responsible member of a libertarian society, while positively they inculcate a psychology which makes any kind of freedom either dangerous or impossible. The school teachers never do with the children, what I do with my dog, try to make it feel that it is in a framework of freedom limited only by a minimum of necessary rules and regulations—and necessary for the enjoyment or use of freedom. On the contrary, everything is done to make the child feel that in the school he is imprisoned in an iron framework of rules and regulations. These are imposed upon him from above and he must obey them if he is to avoid pain and suffering.

The teachers are not inhumane or unkindly; on the contrary they are almost invariably people of good-will, and no less humane than you or I. No doubt they are faced with a very difficult task of 'keeping order' in classes so big that control, except by authoritarian methods, seems to them impossible. I think that they are mistaken in this, that is is not impossible, indeed that the authoritarian method increases their own difficulties. But in any case these considerations do not alter the effect which their system has upon the psychology of the children. The whole of education is presented to them as a 'duty' imposed upon them by authority, and a 'duty' as something which you do not like to do, but are compelled to do. You are compelled to do it, because, if you do not obey, you are punished. The children's first introduction to social life, therefore, impresses upon their minds that it is wrong to do certain things (the kind of things which one is inclined to like doing) and not to do certain things (the kind of things which one is inclined to dislike doing). The idea that there are many things which one wants to do and ought to want to do and ought to do is never encouraged; on the contrary, it is, either deliberately or unconsciously, suppressed. If some unfortunate child possesses a sense of original sin, the system encourages it in him and he becomes one of the model pupils; if a more fortunate child has been born and bred without one, the system does its very best to implant one in him. The model pupil is the child who does what he is told to do, has a sense of sin and duty, and is afraid to do wrong. By the age of 12 the children have been stamped with a pattern of either cheerful obedience or sullen revolt. Any capacity for original or responsible thought

or action has been educated out of them; they have been rendered incapable of understanding or of using freedom.

I am well aware that many people will say that all this is grossly exaggerated. There are several reasons why the disastrous effects of our educational system can remain obscure to those who do not wish to see them. Some people, including some teachers and managers of schools, consciously or unconsciously, accept the authoritarian standards of value; to them discipline and its effects are good in themselves, and they want to produce the kind of human being which issues from their schools. When they say that I exaggerate the effects of the system, they really mean that I am wrong in thinking that the effects are bad. And the nature of the effects is obscured by two other factors. First there is the fundamental decency of human nature, at any rate in Britain, in the middle of the 20th century. If this core of decency, which is one of the most important ingredients of civilization, did not exist in both teachers and children and counteract the system itself, creating the kind of compromise or half-and-half which is the cushion upon which English life and thought love to settle, no one could ignore the actual effects of the system. The second factor is akin to the first. It is the fuzziness of our social thought and social conscience. We talk of democracy and freedom, but we are content with a compromise, a fuzziness, which blurs all distinctions and makes everything which is not 'extreme' acceptable. Life, society, civilization become a huge compromise into which anything can be fitted, including the primary school.

I will give some concrete examples or evidence to show what I mean and that what I have said above is not exaggeration. The first is a general observation. I have lived immediately opposite two primary schools for years. The one is Rodmell school, which is small; the other was a large school in Richmond on to the playground of which I had a view from my sitting-room. In both schools the behaviour of the children—in particular, the boys—when they pour out from the class-rooms into the playground is the same; it is that of wild animals suddenly released from captivity. The disciplinarian regards this with approval; to him it is the 'natural' behaviour of boys released from school. In my view, it is a complete condemnation of the educational system. It shows that all the hours in school are for the child hours in a cage or prison, where he has to do what he

does not want to do. The cage is one world and the playground is another, and there is no connection between them. In the one are authority and discipline and rules and regulations; in the other is 'freedom'. In the cage he is taught only to obey; he is taught nothing at all about how to use his freedom. The consequence is that the children do not know how to use their freedom in a civilized or sane manner. In the playground they are a herd of wild animals, tearing vaguely about, shrieking, yelling, and fighting indiscriminately. They are like a dog that is always chained up and becomes a wild savage if released. My dog who has his freedom inside the house as well as outside is just as pleased as the chained animal to be taken out into the garden, but he uses his freedom in a civilized and sane way compared to the chained dog or the school children.

These children spend six or seven hours a day, five days a week, in school. Presumably the object of keeping them there is to give them necessary or useful knowledge and to train them to be members of a civilized society. The complete divorce of school life from life outside the school is fatal to both objects. The acquisition of knowledge is not necessarily an unpleasant occupation; it can be one of the greatest pleasures in life. Everything is done to impress upon the child that it is a duty, inseparably connected with school and 'discipline', something which is intrinsically unpleasant and which no one would willingly do out of school. Naturally after seven years in school, the children leave it with an ineradicable aversion to anything resembling a school book, to all 'serious' reading, to the acquisition of knowledge, and to the use of the intellect. The authoritarian school system not only fails to teach a child to learn and think; it fails, as practised in our primary schools, to train him as a useful member even of the authoritarian society. The German nazis and Italian fascists very soon realized that you cannot combine the authoritarian and libertarian systems; you cannot train people to implicit obedience to authority if half of their lives are disciplined and half undisciplined. The child and the young man were therefore subjected, in youth movements and student organizations, to discipline in and out of school, in and out of the universities. This was the 'leadership' system applied to the whole of life, and it kept the rank and file too busy being organized and drilling and obeying orders and waving flags and marching in processions to learn

the difference between freedom and discipline. It at least succeeded in turning out a mass of people perfectly conditioned to obeying their leaders' orders. The British system produces a mass of people who have been neither conditioned to obey nor trained to be free. Inside the school you have to sit still and do what you are told to do; outside the school you do the opposite, you shout and yell and fight. At the school door the line is rigidly drawn, with discipline on the one side and anarchy on the other. But you cannot divide people's lives, certainly not children's lives, effectually in this way. The uncivilized anarchy from outside enters the school every morning with the children and though the experienced teacher, by a mixture of severity and cunning, can usually keep it suppressed, it remains only just below the surface, ready to break out if there is the least inattention or relaxation of control; and the teacher who is known as 'not being very good at maintaining order'—I have known more than one—is always fighting a losing battle.

Here is an instance of how the system works in practice. There was a boy whom I had known from birth. As he grew up, he was in some ways 'backward', but in others showed character, a queer humour, and distinct intelligence. He had a passion for 'making things' and for anything mechanical, and in this he showed, as he often did in conversation, real originality. He was a thoroughly happy child until he went to his primary school. He was slow at learning from books and the teacher at once decided that he was almost feeble-minded and practically hopeless. For five years he was ground in the mill of discipline and learning, and acquired with difficulty the art of reading and some arithmetic, and with ease a hatred of books and school. I doubt whether during all that time, during all the hours he was in school, he had one hour of active enjoyment; he was always being made to feel that he was either stupid or bad, and he was, therefore, either actively miserable or dully despondent. Both he and his mother looked forward eagerly to the moment when he could leave school and take a job. Yet this boy, whom the teacher treated as half-witted, was, in fact, above the average in intelligence, and, when he was out of school, would listen to and enjoy talks on the wireless far more difficult to understand than anything the teacher was trying ineffectively to din into his bored mind. It was, indeed, partly his intelligence which made him almost unteachable in

a primary school. He was very far from being a genius and his intelligence, though above the average, was not remarkable; but he had the sort of mind which tends to think for itself. That sort of mind, in a child, is inclined to be interested only in things and knowledge which it can relate to the everyday life about it, the environment which is so extraordinarily vivid and absorbing to most of us in childhood. The complete divorce of the life in school from his life outside it, the sudden transition, when the school door shut, from complete freedom to complete discipline, the task of learning things which had no apparent relation to anything which interested him—all this acted like a blow on the head to him, and he changed instantly from a bright, happy, impish little boy to a dull, stupid, unhappy one.

That what I have said is not exaggerated is shown by the boy's later history. He was caught by the new Education Act and the raising of the school-leaving age, and, much to his own disappointment, had to go on to a secondary school. There he fell into the hands of a more than usually intelligent and sympathetic master who did his best to counteract the disastrous effects of five years' education and showed the child that there were things which he could learn in school related to his life and his interests. The effect was instantaneous. The boy began to learn things, and was as bright, intelligent, and happy in school as he had been when you talked to him in the street. He is now an eager and promising apprentice. He will, no doubt, become a good workman; he will marry and, I hope, live happily ever afterwards. And so, as they will say, everything is for the best in the best possible world. But they are wrong. The child, as I said, was no genius, but, when he first went to the primary school, he had valuable things in him which might have been developed to his own good and to the good of the community. Those things have been killed or atrophied by his five years in the primary school. The secondary schoolmaster did his best, but he could not recreate what had been destroyed. If you prune a fruit tree on consistently wrong principles for its first seven years, a skilful and intelligent gardener may in time get it to grow and bear some fruit, but it will always be a stunted and deformed tree compared with what it could and should have been. The boy will become a good workman and, perhaps, a happy father of a family, but he will never be able to use his mind and hands—and enjoy using them—as he could

and should have been helped to use them, and he will never understand the meaning or the use of freedom.

There is one final point. For five years this boy was unhappy in school. His unhappiness was due partly to the system of discipline, and partly to the treatment given to his particular type of mind. A superficial visit or inspection would never have revealed his unhappiness to you, and, when I first observed the system at work, I should have said that, though the system was hopeless as a method of educating children in a free community, it did not habitually cause active unhappiness. I now know that this is not the case. There is a minority of children—and a not unimportant minority—who are frightened and miserable in school and whose life out of school is seriously affected by this fear and unhappiness. I have heard the same story too often from parents not to know that it is true. The child, before it had to go to school, was perfectly happy, though often 'rather nervous'. In school it can do nothing right; it is 'very slow' or 'backward' or 'almost feeble-minded'. Naturally it is miserable and continually comes home from school in tears. What it gets out of education is fear, dullness, depression, a habit of obedience and, in the worst cases, of bed-wetting.[1] It is what is called the school 'discipline' which is primarily responsible for this effect. The child is suddenly subjected to the impact of a strange world of rules and regulations in which instant and implicit obedience is demanded of it. The 'successful' teacher, the 'good disciplinarian', knows that he or she is sitting on a volcano, that there is only a very thin line at the school door separating the anarchy outside from the discipline within. He has lost, if he ever had it, any conception of freedom in relation to schools and children; he is aware only of anarchy on one side of the door and discipline on the other. It is true that anarchy can never be combined with discipline, though freedom may be, and, as in the teacher's mind there are only two alternatives, discipline and anarchy, he is logical in feeling that only by the greatest vigilance and 'firmness' can he maintain

[1] The perfect circle of authoritarianism is completed when, as in a case I know, the discipline of the school broke the nerve of a nervous child and gave her the habit of bed-wetting, and then the discipline of the home had to be used to eradicate the sin which the discipline of the school had created. If one of the objects of education is to inculcate or encourage a sense of sin, it was certainly, in this case, successful.

the first inside the school and keep the second outside it. He or she is probably a kindly, good-tempered man or woman, but they have to impose upon 20 or 30 wild animals this school framework of discipline and obedience, of—to them—meaningless rules and regulations. Firmness naturally means to them the rigid and often harsh exacting of instant obedience, compliance, and even understanding, and the instruments of authority are scoldings, ridicule, bullying, or punishment of transgressors.

What the system does not allow for is that transgressors do not all belong to the same class of sinners. I have observed that in primary schools the human animal between the age of 7 and 12 belongs to one of three psychological species and that the effect of the school disciplinary system is different for each. At one end there are a small number of children well known to be 'bad'. They are usually much more high-spirited and restless than the majority, and often, though not always, more quick-witted. They are continually in trouble, for they rob orchards, break windows, steal things, and are a focus of disorder in school. The school disciplinary system has little positive effect upon them. It does not break their spirit or teach them discipline; it confirms or intensifies their psychological tendencies. The firmer the teacher, the better behaved they are in school and the wilder outside it. They are influenced by their appetites at one end of the scale and by fear of punishment at the other. When they leave school, they have learnt nothing to fit them to become civilized members of a free society. They are potentially criminals, though the great majority are prevented from fulfilling their destiny by luck, social atmosphere, and the steam-roller of ordinary working-class life. Education, therefore, has usually succeeded in eradicating in them those qualities which might have been of value to themselves and to the community, while leaving unaltered the qualities which are socially dangerous.

The second species includes the majority of children, the 'ordinary' or 'average' children, who are not unusually high-spirited or low-spirited, intelligent or stupid, sensitive or insensitive. With them the disciplinary system may be said to work. They learn to obey, to adapt themselves to the framework of school rules and regulations. They learn to read and write, to add, subtract, multiply, and divide. The intelligence

tests show that they are of average intelligence. The system does not break their spirit, for they are not rebellious, and, though bored, they are not unhappy in school. If education means anything other than an elementary knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic and a habit of passive obedience to authority, they are completely uneducated. They have been taught nothing which could possibly stimulate intellectual curiosity or individual initiative, nothing which could possibly awake in them some glimmer of imagination, some suspicion of the fact that leisure and freedom may be used in a civilized manner. On the contrary the system irons out of them any such fantastic and undesirable potentialities.

The third species really consists of two different classes of children, but teachers tend to lump both together, and the effect of the disciplinary system is eventually to reduce both classes to the same level of imbecility, and so to prove the teacher to be right. In the one class are the definitely feeble-minded children. There are, I believe, not nearly so many of these in the world as teachers and many other people concerned with education think. The reason for their over-estimating the number is to be found in the nature and treatment of the second class. This consists of children whose sensitiveness or intelligence or both, are above or different from the average. They are often what the mother calls 'nervous'. Where the ordinary child is protected by insensitiveness, they are peculiarly vulnerable—to the fear of making mistakes, doing wrong, and being made to look ridiculous. The good disciplinarian, unless he is peculiarly sensitive himself and very careful, can soon reduce a child of this kind to a state of nervous imbecility in which it is so frightened of doing wrong that it can never do anything right. It can then safely be classified as feeble-minded.

Such is our system of primary education to which the vast majority of the children in Britain are subjected. It is true that a minority, who come from the middle and upper middle classes and who are sent to private schools and public schools, are treated somewhat differently. But, except in a few progressive schools, as they are ominously called, the pattern of education and its effects are not essentially different for the middle-class child. There is the same complete divorce of the life of the school from life outside the school, the same framework of school discipline, the same insistence that the acquisi-

tion of knowledge is an unpleasant duty, the same boredom. There is, however, one important difference in the educational pattern in the middle-class and the working-class school. In both the pattern is prescribed by discipline. Discipline, as understood in 20th century society, always has two faces, authority and obedience, the face of the leader and the face of the led. In the working-class school the pattern is drawn exclusively by obedience. I have watched the primary school at work very carefully and I have never been able to observe a single instance in which anything has ever been done to encourage initiative in a child. On the contrary, it is persistently discouraged; the whole emphasis is upon obedience within the school to the teacher and to the rules and regulations. Any idea either of freedom or of one day exercising authority over others is eliminated. Those who go to these schools are obviously destined by fate and the Educational Authority to be led. This is not the case in middle-class schools. There it is recognized that, even in a democracy and a free country, obedience is not enough, the led must have some leaders, the flock of sheep must have a sheepdog and a shepherd. In middle-class schools the system of delegating authority to some of the children is almost universal. Thus while all are taught to obey, some are trained to command, and the disciplinary system of the middle-class school produces the trained leader as well as the led.[1]

[1] Our educational system has changed a good deal during the last 50 years, but it is not easy to estimate the extent of change, as regards the disciplinary system. The modern progressive school has deliberately tried completely to change the system, to make the school life a framework of freedom in which the freedom is limited by a minimum of rules and regulations, to use the intelligent cooperation of the children in place of the rigid machinery of authority and obedience. There is no doubt that the pioneers of 'progressive' education have had some effect upon private and public schools, and also upon the secondary schools in which working-class children receive their education after leaving the primary school. I have no inside knowledge of private, public, or secondary schools as they exist today; my knowledge of their methods is derived from books and reports and from the evidence of the young people of different classes whom I hear describing, and sometimes criticizing, those methods. My impression is that there is more liberty and more elasticity within the disciplinary system in private and public schools than when I was a boy and that the school is no longer such a rigid bed of Procrustes in which the mind and character were lopped and twisted inexorably so that they might fit into the traditional

I said on page 122 that the experience with the training or civilizing of animals is relevant to the problem of civilizing man. Its relevance has, I think, been shown in the discussion of the primary school and the education system generally. You can truthfully say of the child word for word what I said of the dog trained by the authoritarian if you change the word animal to child and the word master to teacher:

> The child learns to control or adapt its instincts in accordance with the edicts of its teacher, to do what it does not want to do and not to do what it wants to do. The child is not a free child, for freedom plays no part in the process of training or in the relationship between it and the other members of the society to which it is conditioned. The relationship is established upon the basis of authority on one side and discipline on the other. The child learns to obey primarily from fear, and usually from fear of pain.[1]

I have spent a long time over this analysis of the conditioning of children because, from the political or sociological point of view, it is of supreme importance. In the primary school, as I said above, the child receives his first training in social life—it is there that he begins to be conditioned to society, to

pattern. But outside the progressive school the pattern itself has not been essentially changed. The school is still a world of its own, isolated from the world and life outside it. Its pattern is still determined by authority and discipline, and the child is educated in authority or obedience, never in freedom. The acquisition of knowledge and the use of the mind are still assumed to be, and therefore are, an unpleasant duty. That this is the case is shown by the fact that for nearly all intelligent boys and girls the chief characteristic of school life is boredom. When I look back to my own childhood, what I remember most vividly of the time actually spent in school are those hours and hours of desperate boredom. And the other day I listened to four people discussing after dinner their school experiences, their ages being in the forties, the thirties, and the twenties. Two of them were men and two women; their schools had been respectively one of the greatest of public schools, a Quaker public school, a girls' boarding school, and a girls' high school. All of them said the same, whether it was the young man who had only recently left school or the man who had left over 20 years ago—what remained most persistently in their school memories were those hours and hours of desperate boredom. And I see the same hopeless boredom in the eyes of the children in the primary school.

[1] The pain may be either mental or physical; in primary schools the pain which is the sanction of discipline is much more often mental than physical.

civilization or barbarism. No one who trains dogs doubts that the dog's character, his social behaviour and reactions to other living creatures, are indelibly stamped upon him by his treatment and training during the first 9 or 10 months of existence. With infinite labour and patience, you may eventually mitigate some of the effects of bad training or ill-treatment on a puppy and it is somewhat easier to corrupt a well-trained, civilized dog; but you will never succeed in eradicating the effects of his treatment in the first contacts with society. The same is true of children. The permanent pattern of their social behaviour is largely determined by the way in which they are conditioned to society in their first contacts with it, i.e. by the way in which during the first 10 or 12 years of existence, in the home and in the school, they are taught to control their instincts, to adapt them to the exigencies of social life, to regard authority and use freedom.

The school child has been conditioned, as I have said, to authority and an authoritarian society. He has learnt that his life is sharply divided into two unconnected sections. In the one he has to do unpleasant things because he is told to do so; this is his school life, his public or social life, and when he leaves school, it will continue in his work, the occupation by which he will earn his living. In the other section he is free to do as he likes, provided that he does not break the law and fall into the hands of the village policeman; this is the world of play. The interests and occupations of the two sections are completely dissociated.

CHAPTER IV

MODERN AUTHORITARIANISM: NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM

I HAVE said above that I am concerned first with the question whether the authoritarian or libertarian system can produce today a viable society, but in the last chapter facts have revealed themselves which make it very difficult to answer the question at all. The society which has developed during the last 50 years in Europe is not viable. There have not only been two catastrophic wars, but everywhere there has been political, economic, and social disintegration. That is what journalists and other people mean when they continually talk about 'the breakdown of civilization'; they mean that the human animal has developed a way of life, but not the social organization which can make the way of life possible. In such circumstances the animal must change either its way of life or its social organization. We have been attempting to make no change in either of them, and the strains and stresses which result from trying to do what is impossible inevitably cause violent, erratic, haphazard convulsions in our lives and society.

The authoritarian system has had a long trial from Xerxes to Hitler and Stalin. Indeed, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that, except for some few brief and doubtful interludes, human society has always been based upon authoritarianism, on authority and obedience. History shows that, under certain circumstances, a stable society can develop and maintain itself for a considerable time in which social relations are based upon a system of authority and discipline and in which 'freedom' is a privilege or vested interest of a small minority. The authoritarian society has proved viable only where it can be applied to a small community in which social relations are few and simple. This has proved the case with all kinds of communities, whether nations, armies, or schools. The reason is to be found in the fundamental nature of authority. Authority and obedience as regulators of social relations suffer from some inherent dangers or defects. The efficiency of the ruler depends

upon his wisdom and knowledge and upon his power to make his commands effective. The occupational disease of dictators has always been stupidity, and one of the greatest dangers to authoritarianism and the authoritarian society is the impossibility of getting rid of the stupid or incompetent dictator before he disrupts the society. But there are also other difficulties. The efficiency of even the most efficient dictator is limited by the area of circumstances in which he has to exercise control. Up to the 19th century the difficulties or slowness of communications—both transport and information—limited the number and complexity of social relations and of social organizations, and science had not yet invented the machines which have enabled men to increase, so enormously and disastrously, in every direction the size and complication of the machinery of living. All through society the scale and tempo of communal life made the authoritarian system tolerably efficient under normal circumstances. In most places the scantiness of the population made it possible for the few who commanded to be in direct contact with the many who obeyed. Towns were small, industries were small, armies were small; it was a pastoral and agricultural world. To keep it running the number of commands which had to be given and obeyed were few and simple.

Such conditions make no excessive demands upon the intelligence and efficiency of a king, dictator, commander, or ruling class. The most remarkable thing about the history of the world before the 19th century was its social stability. There were great wars and great migrations; empires rose and fell; there were great kings and world conquerors; there were continual palace revolutions in which men won or lost thrones by murdering their fathers or brothers or by more catholic killing. But these strains and stresses and the catastrophes which they caused were, like civilization, confined to a small number of people who owned the property and the power, the ruling classes. They rarely affected the fabric of society—so loose and so simple—or 'the toiling masses' who went on toiling in much the same way, unaffected by the questions of Socrates, the conquests of Alexander, the preaching of Jesus, the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian, the Council of Nicaea, the Emperor Charles I or the Emperor Charles the Bald or the Emperor Charles the Fat, King Louis XIII or King Louis XIV, Ptolemy,

Keppler, or Copernicus. The ruling classes were, indeed, continually disrupting themselves, but they had to be very stupid for a very long time before they could disrupt or even materially affect the political or economic fabric of society which included ruled and ruler. They could make the masses a little poorer or a little more miserable, but the standard of life was normally too low for misrule to make much difference. In reading history we are apt to forget that it is almost entirely the history of that thin surface on the top of society, that handful of people to whom at any time 'civilization' belonged. It seems to be a kaleidoscope of cultures and civilizations, of wars, kingdoms, and empires. But beneath that thin surface there was hardly ever any change.

There is another fact regarding the authoritarian organization of society in the world before the 19th century which is often overlooked, but is of importance. Where social relations are few and simple, populations scanty, and contact between authority and its subjects immediate and direct, the system of authority and discipline worked most smoothly if the mass of people whose function is to obey remain 'poore, nasty, and brutish'. The actions required of the ruled are simple and direct, and the less liberty and initiative they possess, the more immediate will be their response to orders. But if communities become large and social relations many and intricate so that communal action and therefore organization are necessarily complex, the contact between government and governed cannot always be immediate and direct and the orders cannot be simple and foreseen. Hence first authority has to be delegated and, if relations and organization become sufficiently complicated, the stage is at last reached at which, if the whole system is not to break down, some initiative and intelligence will be required from those whose function has hitherto been only to obey.

The enormous growth in the size and complexity of human societies in the last 150 years has produced a dilemma of authoritarianism which is apparent in every department of human life, but which usually seems to be invisible to the authoritarian. Let us begin with a simple social organism or organization like an army, in which it has nearly always been assumed that collective action must necessarily be directed by the purest form of authoritarianism. It is true that the Greeks thought that an intelligent soldier, who knew what he was

doing and why, would fight better than a herd of brainless and obedient slaves, but no one else accepted their theory or adopted their practice for 2500 years. On the contrary, it was universally assumed that it was not possible to get large bodies of men to kill and be killed in battle, unless they had been rigidly and ruthlessly trained to obey their officers, unthinkingly and automatically. In the middle of the 19th century the poet laureate, celebrating officially a militarily senseless incident in a politically senseless war, explained the system with enthusiasm and clarity:

'Forward the Light Brigade!'
Was there a man dismayed?
Not tho' the soldier knew
Someone had blundered:
Their's not to make reply,
Their's not to reason why,
Their's but to do and die:
Into the valley of Death
Rode the six hundred.

The interesting thing is that, when the author of *In Memoriam* wrote *The Charge of the Light Brigade*—at the very moment when James Clerk Maxwell was beginning his researches into electricity and magnetism and the electro-magnetic field, in the year and month in which the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception was made an article of faith, and exactly five years before Darwin published his *Origin of Species*, three highly relevant events—the conditions which for two and a half millennia had made it just possible for generals to control armies and fight battles by the methods of Xerxes had finally passed away.

The Crimean war itself, compared with those which preceded and followed it, was a long confused skirmish between two ill-equipped and badly trained battalions, commanded by incompetent brigadiers. Napoleon and Wellington were the last commanders-in-chief who fought a great war in which the size and organization of the fighting forces and the nature of the weapons employed enabled them to know and direct what was happening after a full-scale battle had been joined. By 1870 the Germans had evolved the conscript army of masses, equipment, and weapons which made immediate and direct control of armies in battle by the commander-in-chief rarely possible. In the two great wars of the 20th century it had become

completely impossible. The functions of a supreme commander were no longer those of a fighting man or the leader of fighting men or even of a commander of fighting men; his position was that of the managing director of a large-scale industry. He was as remote from his armies and men in the field as is the man who directs the Shell oil company in London from the men pumping oil in Asia Minor. War was a large-scale industry—the largest-scale industry developed by European man; it was no longer a matter of authority and discipline of great generals or great generalship. Its result was determined by science, industrial organization, and political strategy.

The military mind, partly because of and partly as a result of this ancient tradition of extreme authoritarianism, is notoriously conservative. Both sides tried to fight the 1914 war in that tradition by the methods of supreme command handed down to them from Xerxes through Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Marlborough, Napoleon and Wellington, Clausewitz, and Schlieffen. The commander-in-chief was *ex hypothesi* an omniscient dictator whose main business was to direct his troops in battle, and, as he alone knew all the facts and the strategy and tactics by which he proposed to deal with them, the business of the troops was merely to obey orders—not to reason, but to do and almost certainly die. They died in colossal numbers on all fronts. On the eastern front they died at least to some purpose, that is to say the organization, transport, and higher command of the Russians were so inferior to those of the Germans that after three years fighting in which 6,700,000 Russian soldiers had been killed or wounded out of a total of 12,000,000 mobilized, the government were unable to get the survivors to go on fighting. On the western front, where the two sides were more or less equal in numbers, equipment, industrial equipment, and military competence or incompetence, the ancient methods of warfare resulted in a battle of confused and bloody immobility which stretched from the North Sea to Switzerland and lasted for four years. All the commanders-in-chief were equally helpless. Strategy and tactics on both sides consisted in concentrating masses of men and guns from time to time at some spot in the line and then hurling the masses of men against the enemy's masses of guns in a futile attempt to 'break through'. All these attempts ended in the same way. The scale of the 'battle' was

so vast that, once it had been joined, the commander-in-chief could not possibly know what was happening—indeed as a rule no one knew what was happening—and the attempt to direct it as even Napoleon had still been able to direct a battle was ludicrous. All the commander-in-chief could do was to order his troops to go on fighting until either they or their ammunition or both were exhausted. This they did with the result that French and British commanders more than once all but broke the spirit of their armies, e.g. Nivelle on the Chemin des Dames and Haig at Passchendaele. This strategical and tactical deadlock was euphemistically called a war of attrition, and the slaughter had to go on until the Americans by the end of 1918 gave the Allies an overwhelming superiority in guns and men.

It is extremely interesting to compare the methods of 1939 with those of 1914. The war of 1914 was fought almost entirely by military men commanding armies and navies in the traditional manner. The old military traditions were not dead during the 1939 war, but the war itself was fought, won, and lost by scientists, industrialists, and civilian directors or dictators. Its strategy was planned and meticulously controlled by four civilians, Hitler, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. They treated it as a large-scale and highly scientific industry. Its main problems were those of industrial production, transport, and the application of science to the instruments and weapons of war. The vast majority of the 'troops' or 'men'—the ordinary soldiers, sailors, and airmen—bore the same relation to the trooper of the Light Brigade who was not allowed to reason why as the thinking man to an automaton. They were either technicians or highly trained men using complicated weapons or scientific instruments in situations requiring quickness of mind and initiative. The machines and weapons, their speed and range, made the 'field of battle' almost illimitable, and under such circumstances direct, detailed command, the ancient system of authority and discipline, was physically impossible. Initiative, the habit of reasoning why, was essential right up from the 'man', through the subaltern and colonel, to the general and commander-in-chief. That was why the commander-in-chief was no longer a fighting man, no longer a director of battles, but the managing director of this colossal, insane industry, the industry of war.

Hitler was the only one of the four civilian commanders-in-chief who attempted to direct the forces in battle in the old style, and almost always with disastrous effects.[1] Indeed, in the final stages, when he did this from his underground headquarters in Berlin, the impossibility of the anachronism was completely shown up: the pace and range of modern battle are such that in the end Hitler was directing army commanders to move armies which no longer existed. The difference between the methods of the civilian dictator Stalin and those of the civilian dictator Hitler are most illuminating and reveal some of the causes for the victory of the one and the defeat of the other. Stalin was 'Generalissimo' of all the Russian forces. His word was law, and, like Hitler, he was no figure-head. He decided the strategy and continually directed how the war should be fought, acting in every way as supreme commander of his armies. But, unlike Hitler, he never attempted to act like an 18th- or 19th-century commander-in-chief. He was not interested in the fighting or the battles, or even apparently, the troops. It is significant that he never once sought 'direct personal contact with his troops in the field',[2] while Hitler 'spent much of his time in his advanced field headquarters'.

[1] Since writing the above I find the view confirmed by no less an authority than General Halder, who in 1938 became Hitler's Chief of the General Staff. In 1949 General Halder wrote a short book, *Hitler als Feldherr*, published in English as *Hitler as War Lord*, in which he tries to show why Hitler failed as commander-in-chief. He maintains that the cause of his failure was in large part due to his attempting to be a commander-in-chief of the old type. In the first part of the war, he says, nazi propaganda proclaimed Hitler as the 'Greatest War Lord in History'. The phrase, he writes, 'implied a supreme ability in the prosecution of war. But very few people had any idea what the prosecution of war really means in these times. The time when wars were fought and decided by armies alone is long since gone. Then the great military leader was the genius who with the fire of his spirit, inspired his men to deeds of greatness, whose superlative generalship opened up new roads to success, disconcerting sometimes to the experts. Modern warfare has developed into a struggle of whole peoples, a struggle which is decided by the total conduct of the nation's affairs—political, economic, intellectual, and military. Certainly the part played by military leadership is important, especially in the minds of the people, whose sons stake their lives under it; but it cannot alone be decisive. Even at the end of the first world war the whole conception had passed out of the field of the serious historian and had become merely a tool of the propagandist.'

[2] *Stalin: A Political Biography*, by I. Deutscher, p. 469.

What Stalin was interested in was the large-scale industry of war and, with complete realism, he treated it according to the most efficient methods of capitalist big business. Those methods are admirably described in the following passage from Mr. Deutscher's *Stalin: A Political Biography*:

Stalin was not attracted by the physical reality of war. Nor did he rely on the effect of his physical contact with his troops. Yet there is no doubt that he was their real commander-in-chief. His leadership was by no means confined to the taking of abstract strategic decisions, at which civilian politicians may excel. The avid interest with which he studied the technical aspects of modern warfare, down to the minute details, shows him to have been anything but a dilettante. He viewed the war primarily from the angle of logistics to use the modern expression. To secure reserves of manpower and supplies of weapons, in the right quantities and proportions, to allocate them and to transport them to the right points at the right time, to amass a decisive strategic reserve and to have it ready for intervention at decisive moments—these operations made up nine-tenths of his task. . . .

In the first phase of the war the army paid a heavy price for, among other things, the loss of self-reliance which its commanding staffs had suffered as a consequence of the purges. The warning was not, however, wasted on Stalin. He had the sense to give back to his generals their freedom of movement, to encourage them to speak their mind, to embolden them to look for the solution of their problems by way of trial and error, and to relieve them of the fear of the boss's wrath, a fear which weighed so heavily on Hitler's generals. . . . Hitler's generals had a shrewder appreciation of Stalin's methods than Hitler himself when they said that the top rungs of the Russian ladder of command 'were filled by men who had proved themselves so able that they were allowed to exercise their own judgment, and could safely insist on doing things in their own way'. . . .

It is nevertheless true that, like Hitler, Stalin took the final decision on every major and many a minor military issue. How then could the two things be reconciled: Stalin's constant interference with the conduct of the war, and freedom of initiative for his subordinates? The point is that he had a peculiar manner of making his decisions, one which did not only not constrict his generals, but, on the contrary, induced them to use their own judgment. . . . He had no strategic dogmas to impose upon others. He did not approach his generals with operational blue-prints of his own. He

indicated to them his general ideas, which were based on an exceptional knowledge of all aspects of the situation, economic, political, and military. But beyond that he let his generals formulate their views and work out their plans, and on these he based his decisions. His role seems to have been that of the cool, detached, and experienced arbiter of his generals. In case of a controversy between them, he collected the opinions of those whose opinion mattered, weighed pros and cons, related local viewpoints to general considerations and eventually spoke his mind. His decisions did not therefore strike his generals on the head—they usually sanctioned ideas over which the generals themselves had been brooding. This method of leadership was not novel to Stalin. In the early twenties he came to lead the Politbureau in an analogous way, by carefully ascertaining what were the views of the majority and adopting them as his own.

This dilemma which has confronted authoritarianism when applied to military matters and war in the modern world reappears much more menacingly in the wider sphere of government and civil society. Modern authoritarianism, in its purest or most extreme form, is to be found in the totalitarian state, of which the best examples have been nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and communist Russia. It is in these states that the viability of the system must be tested. I am not at the moment concerned with the ethics of ideology or the intentions and objects of the rulers, important though they may be. I am concerned solely with the place which these systems and governments give to authority and freedom in the social organization and the question whether society, as so organized, is viable.

I am here on ground barbed-wired and mined by the passions of contemporary politics, and I must pick my way carefully. First, it is necessary, at the risk of appearing elementary and simple-minded, to make it quite clear why I classify these states and systems as authoritarian and generically related to that of the Herodotean Xerxes. The essence of the authoritarian system is to be found in the place assigned by it to authority, discipline, and freedom in communal organization. Whether in the training of a dog, the teaching of a child, the command of an army, or the ruling of a state or empire, authoritarianism differs from libertarianism because it creates an authority or government which imposes upon the individual a framework of rules and regulations which he has to obey, and the individual

is free only within the limits prescribed for him by authority, while the libertarian system creates for the individual a framework of freedom, limited for him only by the minimum possible number of rules and regulations in the making of which he himself must have a say. As is nearly always the case in the analysis of political phenomena, it is not possible to confine oneself to political or social facts and to keep standards of value completely out of the discussion, for such standards are implicit in the facts and even in political organization. So here divergent standards of social and individual value are implicit in the two systems. An authoritarian system assumes that, whether in an army, a school, or a state, there is an authority—a man, a group, or a government—which is in the possession of an important truth: it knows what is good for the individual or the community; it is therefore its duty to impose this 'good' by rule and regulation upon those subjects to its command and it is the duty of the subjects to obey. In the modern totalitarian state, the authority which is the sole possessor and judge of social truth, of what is communally good or bad, is either a party or a person whose political decisions are absolute, final, unquestionable, because he holds within the party precisely the same position of power and infallibility which the party occupies in the community. This position of political infallibility in the state is similar and has the same effects as that of the Pope's religious infallibility in the church, except that, while the Pope by excommunication can annihilate the religious sinner only spiritually, the dictator or party has the power to liquidate him both spiritually and materially.

It is here, in the organization of power and the standards of social value upon which that organization is based, that the essential nature of contemporary authoritarianism resides and it is here that the question of its viability will be decided. It is necessary to insist upon this point, because so many of its adherents and opponents confuse the nature of the governmental system and the standards of value inherent in the political organization with the political doctrines, objects, and standards of value of particular political parties, dictators, or popes. Whether the standards of value of communism or national socialism are good or bad, whether the objects of Stalin or Tito or Hitler or Mussolini are good or bad, is irrelevant to the question of the nature, ethics, and viability of

authoritarianism. The question is not whether communism or national socialism is right or whether the objects of Stalin or Hitler are good, but what effects the organization of power and government in Soviet Russia and nazi Germany has upon the community and upon the government.

The organization of power and the relation between the party or dictator and the people, because they are authoritarian, produce in the state precisely that dilemma of authoritarianism which we observed in the modern armies. The national socialist state in Germany, which, in effect, meant the nazi party and ultimately behind the party Hitler, and the Soviet state in Russia, which, in effect, means the communist party and ultimately behind the party Stalin, exacted or exacts unquestioning obedience both from the people and from the party. The sphere of obedience is determined by the claim of the party and leader to be the sole repositories of certain absolute truths regarding human affairs, and it is this claim which gives to nazism and communism, both in theory and practice, their strange resemblance to religions and churches. The content of the nazi revelation is a crude form of nationalism or racialism which developed in the 19th century, spread to most areas of the world, but met with considerable opposition because it conflicted with the standards of liberalism, humanism and international socialism and because it menaced peace and glorified war. The content of the communist revelation must appear even stranger to any detached observer of the antics of the human ant-heap, for its central 'mystery' is a highly technical and complicated economic theory as revealed in a book which is probably the most difficult to read of any ever written by Germans, Jews, or German-Jews. There is, in my opinion, a considerable amount of truth in Marx's book and in Marxian socialism, particularly in the analysis of the impact of economic and class structure upon society and history in the 19th and 20th centuries; but, as is only natural, there are in *Das Kapital* also many facts which are wrong, arguments which are bad, prophecies which have proved false, and doctrine which is irrelevant or inapplicable to the world of today. But the whole of this mental acrobatic performed in the middle of the 19th century, with its truths and falsehoods, its genius and pedantry, its prophecies, dogmas, irrelevancies, anachronisms, and absurdities, is taken by the communists and turned into

a state religion or religion of state, a blue print of the modern state and society which must be blindly accepted and followed as absolute and ultimate truth by the true believer and imposed by force without scruple or mercy upon the economic heretic or infidel.

Both national socialism and communism are based upon an intellectual content which becomes a religion of state. This is not a fortuitous resemblance; a religion of state is an essential part of contemporary authoritarianism, and it is impossible to see how a modern authoritarian regime could establish itself at all without one. The authoritarian asserts that he is in possession of an unquestionable truth of supreme importance regarding the way of life which the individual and community should lead, and if this 'way of life' is really to be followed, it must affect almost every individual and social activity. To impose a particular way of life upon individuals in contemporary society can only be achieved through the power and machinery of the state, and social relations are, as we have seen, so intricate and catholic today that a party or dictator, in control of the state and committed to use its machinery in order to make the people live in a certain way, inevitably finds it necessary to subject every department of human life to state control.

The anatomy and biology of authoritarianism and the totalitarian state are worth considering a little more closely, particularly in their relation to political ideas. Ideas play a strange part in determining the social antics of the human ant-heap, a part which very few political thinkers, whether 'idealist' or 'realist', seem to understand. The idealist, in recent years, has continually been rapped over the knuckles or derided by the realists for believing that ideas and ideals, produced by reason out of truth, can induce a community to do this rather than that. It is true that many political idealists of the last 200 years, beginning with the 18th-century philosophers and descending through Bentham and the philosophical radicals to our own liberals and socialists, have often been too optimistic in their belief that human beings can be persuaded by ideas and ideals to manage their social affairs rationally. But the realist has been much more often and more radically wrong (and inconsistent) in maintaining that reason and ideas have no effect in politics and that all that counts is power and

emotion. If this is really the case, why should the most 'realist' dictators, like Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini, and the parties which they control, who have a monopoly of power and never lose an opportunity to appeal to passion, at the same time fill their speeches and propaganda with ideology and interminable argument? No man—not even a dictator—will argue with you unless he wishes by ideas and reason to persuade you.

The truth is that in this argumentative ideology of the totalitarian dictator we are back again in the dilemma of the authoritarian. The all-powerful head of the party and state finds himself in a cleft stick; he dare not ignore reason and ideas. In a primitive and simple society, as I have remarked, it is an advantage to the ruler to have his subjects 'poore, nasty, and brutish'; the less they think, the easier to get his commands obeyed, and to keep things going his commands or laws are best kept few and simple. There is no place in his subjects' heads for ideas, reasons, or consent. They are not asked to reason why, but merely to do and die. But the modern dictator finds himself in a hopelessly complex, urbanized world in which life would be impossible if the mass of the population enjoyed the psychology of the dumb and docile peasants who filled the ranks in the army of Xerxes and who, until the 18th century, made the rule of ruling classes so easy and so lucrative. Serfs, moujiks, and villeins have to be transformed into tractor-drivers, trade-unionists, clerks who in their work and daily life must often think and act for themselves, read and write, and understand the elaborate arithmetic of insurance acts or football pools. Ever since the middle of the 19th century it has become obvious that the wealth of the wealthy and the rule of the rulers depend to a very considerable extent upon the intelligence and education of what they then called the lower classes. The ruling classes did not educate their subjects in a fit of altruism or a sudden passion for civilization; on the contrary, they tried to keep the masses poor, nasty, and brutish as long as they possibly could. But even aristocracies and ruling classes, even the middle class, have eventually to face unpleasant facts. In the last half of the 19th century, a period of fierce economic competition, they had to face the unpleasant fact that no highly industrialized country in Europe could afford to keep its workers illiterate and uneducated.

The problem for a Hitler or Stalin, for a nazi or communist

party, is to get the millions of ordinary persons to think with one part of their brain and not to think with the other. In their work and daily life they must think and act with initiative; in politics they must do what they are told to do and believe what they are told to believe. Here the authoritarian comes up against the difficulty of consent. In the modern over-populated, mechanized world of cities, no government, even though in control of the machinery of the state, could maintain itself very long without some measure of active consent and cooperation in the masses. Up to the 18th century rulers could dispense with the consent of the ruled. The social relations of the rural populations were so few, simple, and local that their co-operation with the social activities of governments was unnecessary and undesirable. Ruling classes could go on misgoverning for centuries without troubling about the consent of the governed to their particular type of misgovernment. But we live so close together, in such a network of social relations, that each individual is continually taking an active part in social activities prescribed or controlled by the government. The whole system would break down unless the vast majority of the people gave a considerable measure of consent to the system generally and the government's activities in particular.

Experience has taught all of us, including dictators, that there are broadly two effective ways of obtaining the consent of someone to our doing something or to his doing something which we want him to do. The first is through ideas and argument; we can persuade him that what we want is reasonable, right, good, expedient, or profitable to him. The other is through his emotions; by rousing certain emotions we can get a man to act or to consent to action, and in politics the emotions which have proved to be much the most effective for this purpose are love, hate, and fear.

There are certain differences in the psychological effects of ideas and emotions upon all human beings which the politician who tries to use them for his own purposes is soon forced to take into account. Generally emotions are far more powerful instruments for persuading or deceiving people than ideas. If you can get people violently to love, hate, or fear someone or something, there is practically nothing, rational or insane, which you may not induce them to do or believe. But emotions, as instruments of persuasion or deception, are soon found by

the politician to be unreliable. Their most serious defect is impermanence, and the more violent you want them to be the more impermanent you find them. No one can love, hate, or even be afraid all the time, and it is notorious that, when an emotion which we have felt deeply dies away, there is a reaction to its opposite or even to reason. After violent anger or fear or love, 'we come to our senses', as we say ourselves, and a philosopher 2,000 years ago remarked that 'post coitum omne animal triste'. The ecstasies of joy with which the people of Paris welcomed first the accession and then the death of each of their kings, to which I have referred in a previous volume,[1] are good examples of the instability of communal emotion. The politician, therefore, like the parent, the husband, or the lover, soon learns that emotion by itself is a dangerous and unstable instrument of authority. It is extraordinarily effective over a short period, but cannot be relied upon for long-term purposes, if the people who are to be influenced or subjected have the rudiments of education and intelligence.

Experience shows that much the most effective method of getting people to do what you want them to do over long periods is to combine ideas or ideals with emotion. It is not the emotion which makes the fanatic so dangerous, but the fact that he has an idea behind which all his emotions are mobilized. When ideas have emotions mobilized behind them in this way, they acquire unusual stability and persistence and have a far more powerful and persistent effect on our long-term conduct and actions than either purely intellectual beliefs or emotion undiluted by intellect. That is why churches and governments are always arguing with their subjects or victims. You cannot argue with God or with Hitler, but you will find that a God or a Hitler is always arguing with you, if not personally, then through their chosen vessels. The resemblance between the methods of interminable argumentation of the Roman Catholic Church and the Soviet government, of St. Paul, Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler, is not fortuitous. They are trying to impose upon their subjects a permanent way of life, to get them to live their day-to-day lives in accordance with the dictates of the religious or temporal authority. Each of these authorities is compelled by the pattern of human behaviour, whatever be their ultimate aims or motives, to adopt the same methods of compulsion or

[1] *After the Deluge*, Vol. I, p. 132.

persuasion. The method is to keep millions of persons quietly submissive in their day-to-day lives, but ready in moments of crisis, when the authority may require violent action or great sacrifices from the masses, blindly to obey the emotional appeal of their rulers. What keeps the people quiet and submissive between the emotional outbursts is a belief that it is right or expedient that they should live the lives arranged for them by their rulers, while the fact that the belief has been generated in and has become inextricably connected with violent emotions gives it strength and depth and makes it easier for the rulers to whip up emotion to support the idea whenever they require the people to suffer or die for the faith, the church, the state, the regime, or the party.

This explains many facts, otherwise inexplicable, in the behaviour of religious and political leaders who have had enormous effect upon human beings and history. When an inhabitant of the village of Rodmell dies, he is buried in the churchyard, and we who survive him go to the church, as has been customary for the last 500 years, to see our fellow-parishioner laid in his grave. We listen to a service read over his body and over the grave by the parson, and the words, though I have heard them more often than I care to remember, never fail to fill me with astonishment. They are taken out of the 15th chapter of the *First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians* and were written nearly 2,000 years ago. It is almost universally agreed that Saint Paul was one of the most successful religious teachers or propagandists that the world has known and that the spiritual conquests of the early Christian Church were mainly due to him and his presentation of Christ's doctrine. I claim, in all modesty, to be intellectually well above the average and my intellect was subjected to a pretty severe training at Cambridge. I took an honour's degree in the second part of the Classical Tripos in Greek philosophy and had to study, among other works, Plato's *Timaeus* and Aristotle's *De Anima*. The closeness and involution of argumentation which in both soar away fantastically into the stratosphere of metaphysics make these two books the most difficult to follow or to understand of any which I have so far read. Yet I find them easier to understand than the tortuous and tortured arguments of St. Paul which the rector reads to me and my friends over the grave of a Sussex farm worker.

St. Paul is dealing with the same subjects as Plato and Aristotle; he is trying to make us accept his argument in order to convince us that certain facts are true about the nature of man's body and soul, about corruption and incorruptibility, about heaven and earth, about God and immortality. I do not understand one half of what he says or one half of the argument, and I do not believe that anyone else, including the rector, in Rodmell Church has any clear idea of what it all means. But I do see quite clearly what St. Paul is at. He wants me and the others to live a certain kind of life, to obey his ethical directions in our long-term conduct. His method is a subtle combination of appeal to ideas and reason and of appeal to emotion. History has proved how enormously successful his method is and apparently the more difficult and unintelligible the ideas and reasoning, the more effective they are. He wants us to believe that the dead shall be raised up and that there shall be a resurrection of the body. He tries to get us to believe this by arguments—which I do not understand—about the corruption of the body in which we are born, the differences in the nature of flesh, the nature of terrestrial and celestial bodies, and the distinction between the spiritual and the natural. The end of the argument which he wants to get into our heads is that, because of all this, flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, and that, if we wish to attain immortality in heaven, we must live spiritually in the way in which he directs us to live. And then finally he bursts into poetry and clamps his ideas on our minds with emotion:

> So when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal shall have put on immortality; then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory? The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law. But thanks be to God, which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye stedfast, unmoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord.

It is worth noting that, even in the ecstasy of emotion and poetry, St. Paul cannot stop arguing with us and arguing unintelligibly. I do not believe that anyone in Rodmell Church understands what is meant by his curious statement that 'the strength of sin is the law'. Yet the argument and doctrine in

the whole passage, though unintelligible, are of immense importance to the efficacy of his wringing of our hearts. Even the complete sceptic feels the Apostle wringing his heart when he hears the words: 'O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?', and the clouds which opened for a moment to show us heaven close again when he tells us that 'the sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law'. St. Paul was a master of communal psychology. Unlike Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, he knows how to play upon us; he knows our stops; he plucks out the heart of our mystery; he sounds us from our lowest note to the tops of our compass. And the involved, incomprehensible doctrine is a vital part of his consummate technique. He plays emotionally upon our fear of death and oblivion, upon our desire for immortality for ourselves and for the dead whom we loved, of the need for comfort and reassurance which we might find in our love of a loving God. He puts these powerful, primitive, deep-seated emotions behind his doctrine of sin. If we do what he and God tell us to do, we shall get all we desire. We accept the argument all the more because we cannot understand it. We accept it because of the comfort which we get from it. And immediately the doctrine becomes of supreme importance. We fear sin, we fear to disobey St. Paul, more than death itself. It is his arguments—incomprehensible though they be—that have taken the sting out of death and robbed death in the grave itself of victory. But it is essential that the doctrine be accepted as absolute truth; for should we disbelieve it—even perhaps if we should merely question it—the bottom would fall out of our world and out of St. Paul's too.

All the great founders of world religions have practised the same methods as St. Paul, though few, if any, with his masterly virtuosity. The churches, which are built upon the life and death of their founders, develop still further the original technique of persuasion, conversion, and authority. The original doctrine of the Christ or Buddha or Muhammad becomes the dogma of a church, interpreted and enforced by the priests. We can now understand the enormous importance given to dogma and to intellectual ideas by religious bodies who ostensibly appeal to faith, not to reason, and the at first sight inexplicable fact that they have succeeded in inducing millions of ordinary people, for the last 2.000 years. to endure and

inflict the most appalling sufferings, to kill and be killed, to torture and be tortured, in defence of the minutiae of intricate arguments or statements which are usually trivial and unimportant, irrelevant, meaningless and ununderstandable, and quite often patently untrue. The church finds itself face to face in the spiritual world with the dilemma of authority which confronts the authoritarian in temporal affairs. It has somehow or other to exact from ordinary people, day by day, and hour by hour, in their ordinary lives, to impose upon them a way of life, from birth to grave, in many ways contrary to their instincts and desires. In the long run the only way to compass their obedience is to make them believe that the way of life is right or to their advantage. Instantly the church must argue and appeal to reason, and its dogmas are its argument. The church has to say: Because this dogma is true, you must live in this way, for its truth proves that it is right and advantageous for you so to live. And behind the dogma, in order to clamp it upon the mind, the church mobilizes the most powerful human emotions, fear, cupidity, love, and hatred. The two parts of the process are both essential. It is a very difficult thing to get people to act consistently in a certain way over a long period of time. Neither a belief by itself, however important, nor an emotion by itself, however powerful, will produce such action in most people; only a combination of belief and emotion will be to some extent effective.

Two interesting facts emerge from the study of the technique of churches for obtaining long-term obedience to their authority. The first concerns the dogma or argument. The argument is always partly of great simplicity and directness, and partly the exact opposite, full of subtleties, intricacies, vagueness, and confusion. The church says: Because A, B, and C are true, then X is true, and because X is true, then you will be good and happy if you live as the church tells you to live, but damned to eternal misery if you disobey her. The part of the argument from 'because X is true' is always simple, direct, and personal; in the Pauline message and the dogma of most Christian churches it runs thus: 'Because it is true that the body is corruption and the spirit incorruptible, your only hope of escaping damnation and attaining eternal happiness is to follow the way of life enjoined by Jesus Christ, and by St. Paul and the church who are the apostolic custodians and interpreters

of Christ's doctrines.' Granted here that X is true, no one could possibly fail to see, understand, and admit the conclusion and it has a tremendous personal appeal. If it be true that to live as Christ directs us will give us eternal happiness, but to live according to the flesh will bring eternal damnation, and if St. Paul and the church can tell us exactly what Christ told us to do, then even the stupidest and blindest of human beings must see that it is advisable to follow the directions of St. Paul and the church. But the proof that X is true depends on the argument that A, B, and C are true, and here the argument is always of the most fantastic intricacy and frequently of fantastic absurdity.

There is a great advantage in basing the simple and direct ethical argument of a religion upon arguments which are extremely vague, confused, absurd, ununderstandable, and untrue. It is impossible to get people in large numbers to endure or inflict suffering or to die for simple and understandable truths. The question whether twice two equals four or five has never and probably could never produce heretics and the burning of heretics or inquisitions or wars or even a judicial murder. If a thing is obviously true or obviously false, and is continually proved to be true or false to all sane people in the experiences of their daily lives, it is very difficult to get any large number of people for any length of time to accept the falsehood or reject the truth as a basis of action, or to remain for any length of time emotionally excited about either. But if you can find an argument which is vague, intricate, unprovable, and almost certainly false and link it up to an argument which is almost certainly true and which has a strong personal and emotional appeal to large numbers of people, you will find it easy to get them to believe even more passionately in the false part than in the true part of the doctrine and to sacrifice themselves and everyone else in its defence. That the argument should be untrue and unprovable is an advantage to the authority which wishes to use belief in it as the basis of the masses' long-term obedience, for it makes it easier to mobilize behind the argument those passions or emotions—including, as we shall see, hatred—which are the most powerful, the most stable, and the most likely to induce people to act against their reason or interests.

This is the explanation of the otherwise inexplicable history

of Christian and Muhammadan dogma and its effects upon the minds and actions of millions of simple-minded people. The church has to provide the masses with beliefs which will ensure their obedience to its directions in their day-to-day life. The primary belief must, if it is to be effective, be simple and direct. The primary belief is ethical. The church claims to be in possession of certain truths which prove that, if the ordinary person lives his life according to certain ethical directions, he will be good and happy, and if he does not, he will be wicked and miserable. It is therefore the duty of everyone to accept this primary truth and the way of life which the church prescribes for him. If people are sufficiently miserable, primitive, or unintelligent, it is possible to get them to accept without question and indefinitely these primary beliefs and the duty of obedience to divine and ecclesiastical authority. Unfortunately the primary truth is always either untrue or incapable of proof, and the religious authority or church at times has to recognize this by admitting that ultimately salvation depends upon 'faith'. But it dare not consistently admit this. The primary truth which it calls upon the faithful to accept and on which it bases its claim to their obedience always contains an argument in it; it is not a simple direct statement, like 'grass is green', which you either believe or do not believe without proof. It is a statement that 'because X is true, your way of life should be of a certain kind and you should obey the ecclesiastical authorities', and it is implied that the ecclesiastical authorities can prove the truth of X.

As long as the faithful can be kept sufficiently 'poore, nasty, and brutish', the church is, of course, not asked for its proof of X. But if the faithful are educated and learn to think for themselves, or if the church attempts to proselytize among people of some intelligence, it will be forced to produce its proof of X. You see the process inevitably beginning in all the recorded writings of St. Paul. It is the beginning of the church's argumentation, the proliferation of dogma. There is no limit to that proliferation, for the more complicated and fantastic the dogma—A and B and C, which are supposed to prove X—the more difficult it becomes to prove that X is not proved by A and B and C. Such questions as divided the homoousians from the homoiousians regarding the substance of Father and Son in the Trinity become of supreme importance; their meaningless-

ness and insolubility are magnets for passionate rejection or acceptance, and the irrational passions which now combine with the fantastic argumentation are the most effective instruments of the ecclesiastical authority.

These passions bring me to the second interesting fact regarding the technique of churches. It concerns emotion. The acceptance of what I call the primary religious truth by the mass of people is always determined to a considerable extent by emotion. If you live in this way, says the founder of the church, you will get comfort and consolation and happiness and freedom from fear. Ordinary men and women have always lived extremely laborious and precarious lives, darkened by fear of poverty and misfortune, of battle, murder, and sudden death, of the evil deeds of evil men, governments, and churches. Most of them are vaguely conscious that they live in a hostile or indifferent universe, and the fear of death is the fear of personal annihilation. Fear is, therefore, a dominant emotion in human life and, with fear, the desire for love, comfort, and consolation. The primary truth or doctrine in a successful religion has a profound appeal, because it offers the believer a retreat from fear, a harbour of love, comfort, and consolation. The believer is invited to believe, precisely because belief will satisfy his emotional needs, and so the emotions, are mobilized behind and inextricably connected with the primary doctrine.

The founders of religions usually emphazise the theme of love, comfort, and consolation. This is particularly true of Christianity. Christ had nothing to offer to the world's ruling classes, the rich and the powerful; his message was one of hope, through love and meekness, to their poor, lowly, ignorant victims. He offered as refuge against their fears and comfort for their sufferings the hope of happiness in heaven, if they lived as he directed them to live. But the churches—all churches—know that there is another human emotion more powerful even than fear. It is hatred. If you can get people to hate something or someone, there is practically nothing which you cannot induce them to believe or to do if it offers satisfaction to their emotion. The successful church always mobilizes hatred behind its dogmas, endeavours to make it the primary engine of faith and instrument of authority. The process, repeated again and again throughout history, is simple and easy. The method is the invention of heresy and the heretic.

Nothing holds a church more firmly together or fastens the authority of the hierarchy more securely upon the faithful than hatred of the infidel and heretic. The heretic and the infidel are not merely wicked; they are also dangerous. They may legitimately, therefore, be both hated and feared. They are 'the enemy', the origin of evil, and can be blamed for most of our misfortunes. They are hated of God, and we can, by the grace of God, and with good heart, make their lives a burden to them by unburdening upon them our own sins and miseries. In this way the ruling class in the church becomes possessed of one of the mightiest psychological instruments of communal authority. In every human group, which has a sense of communal unity, there are always two opposed psychological strands which bind it together, the feeling of unity with members of the group and of difference from those who are not members. Our family, our tribe, our village, our country, our football team, our church—they are 'our side'. Those who are not on 'our side' are naturally against us, and fear and hatred of the stranger, the foreigner, the infidel, or the heretic are always very near the surface of our minds.

All churches use this fear and hatred of the stranger—the infidel and heretic—as the foundation of their particular religion, the basis of church authority. It has led to the most grotesque perversion of the religion itself both in Buddhism and Christianity. Many people have marvelled, some with sorrow and some with derision, at the extraordinary spectacle of the Christian churches perpetually inciting their followers to hate and torture and kill their enemies and yet claiming to preach the gospel of Christ who said:

> Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you.

There is nothing to marvel at in this, though the sorrow is perhaps not inappropriate. A tough old pagan Roman remarked, long before the Roman Church proved it, that *corruptio optimi pessima*. But there is more to it than that. Hatred is the most obvious solution of the dilemma of authoritarianism. You could never establish the absolute authority of the church and the unquestioning obedience of its members upon the doctrine

that you should love and do good to heretics; it seems easy to do so upon the doctrine that you should hate and persecute them. This hatred and persecution becomes inextricably attached to the dogma and argumentation, and here again there is an immense advantage in making the dogma vague, intricate, and unintelligible. It is difficult to get angry about something which is simple and true and which you know to be simple and true; it is easy to get angry about something which you do not understand. We do not burn people for believing that twice two makes five; we burn them for denying statements which we do not understand and unconsciously feel are probably untrue.

Let us now turn from the spiritual authority of the churches to the temporal authority of states and governments. Many people in recent years have remarked that certain phenomena in the development of the major totalitarian states closely resemble those habitually recurring in the evolution of religions and churches, and it is fashionable to see in nazism, fascism, and communism modern forms of religion. If one defines 'religion' in wide enough terms, it is, no doubt, possible to include under it the old-fashioned forms of religion, like Judaism and Christianity, and the complex modern political and economic fanaticisms of Germans and Russians. For purposes of definition I think that it makes for clearer thinking if the word religion is confined to ethical and metaphysical doctrines, beliefs, and systems purporting to be divinely revealed to man by a personal God. But I do not wish to quarrel or waste time over definitions; the resemblances are clear enough; the important thing is to understand their nature.

The important fact in the resemblance between, for instance, the nazi or communist regime and the Roman Catholic Church is the methods by which they establish and maintain authority over the common people. They are almost identical. There is the same emotional appeal, the same appeal to the same emotions, fear, comfort, love, and hatred. There is the same primary, simple 'truth' behind which the emotions are mobilized. There is the same proliferation of complicated, unintelligible, and untrue dogma, which is treated as the revelation of an esoteric truth and as proof of the primary 'truth'. Consider first the simpler, horrifying case of Hitler and nazism. Hitler found the German people after 1919 in a state of bewilderment and dejection. They had suffered one of those dramatic reversals

of fortune which we associate with the Greek conception of tragedy. The pride in their power as the strongest and most militarist nation of Europe had been humiliated by complete defeat in war and the imposition of a peace which nearly all of them considered unjust. There followed years of political and economic instability which brought ruin or hopeless impoverishment to hundreds of thousands. The ordinary lives of millions of ordinary Germans were thus dominated by personal insecurity and fear, secondarily by anger and national humiliation. To these people Hitler brought the message which the churches bring to unfortunates, to the despised and rejected, the injured and insulted. 'If you accept me as leader,' he said to them, 'and follow the way of life which I direct you to live, your misfortunes, poverty, humiliation, fears will vanish. Defeat will be swallowed up in victory and Germany will be once more powerful and happy. The Treaty of Versailles will lose its sting, and you with Germany will be powerful and happy. The sting of defeat is weakness, and Jews, socialists, communists, and liberals. But thank God who will give you the victory through national socialism and Adolf Hitler. Therefore be steadfast, immovable, abounding in the work of national socialism and Germany, for you will then find that your labour is not in vain.'

This was the primary, simple, easily understandable doctrine of Hitler and the nazis. It had a direct and powerful emotional appeal to the defeated Germans. Granted that Hitler's primary statement is true, no German between 1919 and 1933 could possibly fail to see, understand, and admit the conclusion—he must obey Hitler and live the life prescribed for him by national socialism. But was it true? Hitler and the nazis, like St. Paul and the Roman Catholic Church, had to face and answer this question. They answered it in the same way, by proliferous argumentation, by building up a mass of dogma purporting to 'prove' the primary, simple doctrine. This mass of dogma, like that of the Roman Catholic Church, is a farrago of trivial and often unintelligible and untrue nonsense. Where the religious authoritarian finds the subject of his dogma in cosmology, metaphysics, and ethics, fairy tales about the substance or mathematics of the Trinity or nightmares about the organization of hell and the nature and niceties of sin and punishment, the social authoritarian built his dogma on history, sociology,

and science, fairy tales of German mythology masquerading as history, the sociological dreams of an uneducated paranoiac, and the nightmares of sadistic racialism. What makes the history of nazi Germany so horrifying, what makes one, in looking back upon it, recoil with horror from the human mind and doubt whether it can ever become even semi-civilized, is the fact that in the 20th century hundreds of thousands of ordinary, educated, apparently rational human beings accepted this repulsive nonsense as truth and condoned the barbarities and cruelties for which the dogma was used as a justification.

And now let us turn from the dogma to the emotions. There you will find them, the same emotions used in the same way and for the same purposes by the nazis as by the hierarchy of the church. First fear—Hitler promised the Germans a refuge from fears; fears, not of a cold and menacing universe, the metaphysics of death and annihilation, and the agonies of a sense of sin, but of a hostile Europe, the economics of penury and unemployment, and the social humiliation of defeat. Next, he promised to satisfy all the emotions of the herd, the sense of warmth and comfort in the sheep close packed behind the wattle hurdles or the national frontiers, and its sublimation in that supreme delusion of human groups, whether they be Jew or German, Harrovians or Etonians: 'We are not as other men are: we are the Chosen People'. Mingled with these emotions of the byre, the sheepfold, the church, the regiment, or the nation is the desire to love and worship the bellwether or the leader. To this emotion, too, popes, cardinals, and Hitlers promise satisfaction. And finally hatred. As in the church, this hatred is used in a masterly way to impregnate and be impregnated by the whole hotch-potch of dogmas, thereby enormously increasing the efficacy of both as permanent instruments of authority. The objects of hate are identified by the authority with those who deny the truth of the authority's dogma—in nazi Germany with Jews, communists, socialists, liberals, and envious and vindictive foreigners. Hitler's speeches were long paeans of hatred woven upon interminable dogmatic argumentation. They were so effective because they thus gave the herd an enemy outside the herd who could be hated, not merely as deniers of the truth and of the saviour, infidels and heretics, but as malignant agents of all the herd's misfortunes. This is the long-term value of the technique of dogma

intermixed with hatred. It enables the authority to distract the herd's attention from realities to unrealities. The exact nature of the substance of the Holy Ghost or the shape of your grandmother's nose become more important than the life which you are living or the death which you are inflicting upon your next-door neighbour. You are induced to be passionately interested in the metaphysical substance of a non-existent deity or the physical and mental substance of a non-existent Aryan or non-Aryan race and so to forget to notice that what the authority tells you is not true and what it promises to you is never fulfilled. And if at any time you show signs of becoming restive in your miseries, the authority can nearly always again divert your attention from its own failures and guilt by whipping up your hatred of 'the enemy'; you forget your miseries in your enjoyment of making other people more miserable and, under the banner of the church or of Germany you go out and kill Albigenses, Jews, Poles, or Russians.

The case of nazi Germany is a simple and crude example of the technique of temporal authoritarianism. In most of its characteristics it did not differ essentially from many of the previous major outbreaks of barbarism in European history. What gives it its tragic interest is the way in which the nazis contrived to adapt the crude and ancient technique to a highly industrialized modern state and to an apparently educated and civilized people. The case of Soviet Russia and of the communist regimes which imitate the Russians is more remarkable and even more melancholy. Hitler and his associates who established the nazi regime and government belonged to the lowest depths, intellectually and morally, of modern urban society. They were of the stuff of which in normal times the corruption of the city slum breeds the criminal and the gangster, and their standards of value, private or public, came from the same environment. Power was what they wanted, power in order to gratify the most degraded instincts of the most degraded human beings. It is, therefore, not surprising that, when they obtained control of the government of Germany and so of immense power, they established the crudest and most brutal form of authoritarianism.

The origins of communism are the exact opposite to those of nazism, and the intentions, objects, and standards of value of the men who established the Soviet regime have nothing to

do with those of Hitler and his gang. Socialism and communism are part of the deepest and purest stream of European civilization, the channel of which has been dug and shaped by the great social reformers. Whatever can be said against the theories or practice of individual socialists and communists, the great socialist thinkers and leaders, from Owen and Saint-Simon to Marx, Engels, Jaurès, and Lenin, have been men of great intellectual eminence and moral integrity who, seeing the evils and contradictions in modern society and its economic and political structure, passionately desired to remove them. That is why the appeal of socialism as an object and ideal has been so powerful, not only to the subject or exploited classes of industrial society, but to many disinterested people whose social conscience refused to accept as inevitable or desirable the economic consequences of capitalism. No doubt the ideal aspect of socialism has often attracted to its banner many simple minded, rather foolish utopians, while the revolutionary aspect, which became the dogma of important sects, has been the magnet which attracted many whose motives were mainly determined by envy and hatred. But the leaders of socialist parties and their most active and influential supporters were actuated by the highest social ideals and they insisted, not without success, that these ideals should be accepted in theory and practice by the parties and movement which they led. This difference in the psychological origins of communism and national socialism or fascism, and in the objects and mental and moral calibre of their leaders and followers, makes it the more remarkable that the methods of communist governments should follow so closely those of fascist governments. The cause of the resemblance is that the communist leaders, for reasons which have nothing to do with socialism, when they attained power in Russia, chose an authoritarian type of government, and the pattern of human behaviour inevitably compels all who choose authoritarianism to follow the same fatal path in order to maintain themselves in power. Let us trace the strange path which communist governments have thus been forced to take.

The Bolshevik leaders seized power in Russia at the end of a disastrous war. Conditions were chaotic and unstable; the people ignorant, uneducated, war-weary, and often on the verge of starvation. The leaders of the Bolshevik party were intellectuals, doctrinaire socialists who had always belonged

to the extreme revolutionary wing. Their ultimate aims and objects were, I believe, of the highest, but they and the whole doctrine and dogma of Marxian socialism were unintelligible to the 'toiling' and ignorant masses of the Russian people. They seized power by an armed insurrection in a country which had no experience of either the forms or methods of libertarian government. In the first years of their rule they had to face a succession of motley enemies and opponents: first, the revolutionary parties and factions which they had overthrown; then the Germans; and finally a civil war in which Tsarist generals, aristocrats, landowners, capitalists, democrats, dissident socialists, and foreign armies invaded Russia from north, east, south, and west.

In such circumstances undiluted and ruthless authoritarianism was the only alternative for the government if it was to survive. The government survived. Slowly and at appalling cost the motley crowd of opponents was defeated and driven off Russian territory. Peace—or what the 20th century calls peace—descended upon the Soviet Union. The Bolshevik government was 'established', recognized *de facto* and eventually *de jure* by other governments. The moment came, as it comes in all revolutions, when the revolutionary government had to make its most momentous decision, to determine its own future. Here is the eternally recurring fork in the road of history where the path on the left leads to libertarianism and on the right to authoritarianism and dictatorship. The communists chose the path to authoritarianism, and both the causes and effects of that decision are worth investigating.

The social and psychological complexion and effects of authority and freedom are similar in all ages; the governmental forms or organization in which they clothe themselves are determined at any particular moment by the communal psychology and architecture of contemporary society. Thus in one age the alternative presents itself as a choice between slavery and freedom, in another between the tyrant and the free city, in another between absolute and constitutional monarchy. In the communal psychology of Europe in the 20th century authority and liberty were inextricably linked with the concepts and forms of democracy, and the political architecture of society, moulded by this psychology, was built upon and around the political party. This was not fortuitous, but the

inevitable result of the way in which people lived and the individual and communal objects of their thoughts and actions. As between authority and liberty in an organized and ordered society, the quantity and quality of liberty will depend to a very large extent upon two things: the extent to which the government is responsible and responsive to public opinion and—what is almost the corollary of this—the ability of the people to change the government. Modern democracy is the method of ensuring the responsibility and responsiveness of governments which gradually evolved or was devised by those who desired a libertarian society. Democracy is not, as so many superficial 'thinkers' say today, a 'mere word' or the invention of political theorists. It is the machinery of social relations and of government which practical men shaped to their purpose, and their purpose was to base those social relations and government upon liberty rather than autocratic authority. Any competent political theorist could construct—many have constructed—in the laboratories of their own imagination foolproof systems and machinery to ensure liberty completely different from parliamentary democracy. Parliamentary democracy was not uninfluenced by political theory and theorists, but it grew 'naturally' out of practice, not out of theory; it was shaped by men of action in their efforts to alter or adapt existing laws, institutions, and machinery to new facts and new purposes. And one of their dominant purposes was to substitute the methods of liberty for those of authority in government.

The political organ which they inevitably turned to as the instrument of their purpose was the European 'parliament' or assembly of 'representatives'. Such assemblies have a very long history and have emerged for various purposes in all sorts of different places. Their relationship can, no doubt, be traced to more primitive 'assemblies' of tribes, cities, villages, or guilds. And, indeed, if governments are to be responsive and responsible to the opinion of the governed, no matter what the sphere of their actions, it is difficult to imagine any other way of effecting this except through assemblies of the governed or of their representatives. At any rate, for the last three thousand years no other method has been invented or tried in practice.

The form of the 19th-century political assembly differed in different places, but everywhere it had a family likeness stamped upon it by a common heredity and by the scale and architecture

of European society. It was an assembly of representatives and the working of the libertarian or democratic machinery depended upon the relation between the people and their representatives and upon the relation between the representatives and the government. The machinery was designed to make the representatives directly responsive and responsible to the people by election, and the government continually responsive and responsible to the representatives because—in different ways in different countries—the government had to obtain their assent to its policy and indeed to its existence.

The political party, as we know it today, developed everywhere naturally and necessarily as an integral part of this system and machinery. If everyone thought the same about everything, there would be no parties, but if action has to be taken and people disagree about what shall be done, either in principle or in practice, then, as soon as more than two or three are gathered together, you will get groups, factions, or parties. There has never been an active and effective assembly, either in a tribe or a cricket club or a nation, in which, when opinions differed, the party and party government did not develop. This pattern of human behaviour determined that in the modern libertarian political system of the assembly of representatives the party would play a vital part in ensuring the responsibility of the government. The extremely elaborate organization of modern party systems and machines is only a particular instance of the universal intricate organization which is the characteristic and curse of our society, from football pools to local and national government.

During the last 100 years throughout Europe, from Scandinavia and Greece to Portugal and from the British Isles to Italy, wherever and whenever men attempted to substitute a libertarian for an authoritarian system, they necessarily established, in some form or another, an assembly of representatives, political parties, and a government responsible to the representatives, and therefore secondarily to a party or parties. In 1914 Russia was the last European stronghold of undiluted authoritarianism, but even there this libertarian system had made its appearance in an inchoate or embryonic form. And as soon as the Tsarist regime fell in 1917, 'democracy' emerged with its complete paraphernalia of parliamentary organs, political parties, and responsible governments.

All this is, of course, elementary, but it is necessary to have the elements rather than the fairy tales of history and politics clearly in one's mind if one wants to understand cause and effect in the history of Soviet Russia. The Bolsheviks reversed the direction which events seemed to be taking by substituting a new authoritarian for the new libertarian political organization, and it is important to understand both why and how they did so. I shall pass over the immediate causes, such as revolution and war, important though they may have been temporarily, and deal with the deeper causes which led them to make authoritarianism permanent.[1]

Marx and Engels, as I pointed out in *Barbarians at the Gate*, accepted the standards of value and the ideals of western civilization. They spoke the language of Pericles and freedom translated into 19th-century German. And, being the children of their own era, they naturally also accepted the standards of value and ideals and spoke the language of 19th-century democracy. They had an immense contempt for utopianism and particularly for utopian socialists, but they were themselves utopian socialists in the sense that their standards of social value told them what 'the good society' was like—the non-existent but ideal society which all true socialists should aim at establishing. They defined this society in the clearest possible language in the *Communist Manifesto*:

> In the place of the old *bourgeois* society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.

That is the description of a libertarian, not an authoritarian, society, and they emphasized the fact by indicating the means by which authoritarianism would be abolished and freedom assured in the communist society. The master-slave structure of society, they held, was assured by two things: the stratification in economic classes and the use of the power of the state by governments. These two instruments of authoritarianism would disappear under communism; classes would be abolished and the state would wither away, leaving the way open to a free society of free individuals.

The rightness or wrongness of Marx's prophetic view of the

[1] In a book written by me in 1939, *Barbarians at the Gate*, there is a fuller analysis of both the immediate and remote causes.

future is irrelevant to my purpose here. I can only say that as an analyst of cause and effect in the historical past and present he has had few equals, but his vision of the future, his judgment of the right means to obtain the best ends, was hopelessly mistaken and utopian. The Russian communists accepted, and still accept in theory, the ideal libertarian society of the *Communist Manifesto* and Marx's doctrine of the means by which it can be established. Their practice has turned the ideal inside out and upside down with the result that they have established one of the most rigidly authoritarian states known in history. There are several reasons which combined to determine their choice of totalitarianism.

The first cause—and a very important one—was the social psychology of the Bolsheviks who made the revolution. They belonged to the left wing of the European and Russian socialist movement. For years the movement had been divided by a Marxian doctrinal schism regarding the right way to make a revolution. On the left were the purists who held that the overthrow of capitalism could only be accomplished by violent revolution, and socialism or communism established by what was called the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the right were the revisionists who held that the Europe of 1900 was not the same as the Europe of February 1848 and of the *Communist Manifesto*, that Marxian doctrine and tactics must be revised to meet changed conditions, and that there was no law of nature which made it impossible for the transition to be accomplished, in some countries and under certain circumstances, by constitutional and democratic means.[1] This long battle between the true believers and the heretics was fought in the parties and pamphlets of European socialism with a bitterness only possible when the faithful differ over a dogmatical generalization about which neither they nor anyone else can possibly know the truth. Lenin and his Russian comrades were among the most bitter and uncompromising opponents of the revisionists. There was, therefore, in their social psychology a bias towards violence and dictatorship, both temperamental and acquired.

This temperamental and doctrinal bias towards authori-

[1] The revisionists wanted revision and differed from the left wing revolutionaries on many other points besides these tactics.

tarianism in Lenin and his lieutenants naturally showed itself immediately in a bias of the Bolshevik government against democracy and the democratic institutions which had evolved in western Europe. Three factors in the immediate historical situation or in the communal psychology of the Russian Bolshevik encouraged this tendency and caused the bias to harden into a communist dogma. The first was the support which the western democracies gave to the armies of White Russian generals who invaded Bolshevik Russia from all sides and tried to overthrow the communist government by armed force. The second was that Russia had had no experience at all of libertarian government and was almost the only country in Europe in which democratic institutions and traditions had no roots. The third was one of those absurdities which so often have a powerful effect upon the course of human history and sometimes make one think that silliness is the dominant political characteristic of mankind. The prophet Marx and his disciple Engels three-quarters of a century before had in their Book of Revelations foretold that the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of socialist society and of the millennium could only take place through the dictatorship of the proletariat. The prophecy, as prophecies go, was not a bad one and was based upon Marx's profound analysis of the strains and stresses in the society of his time. There is no doubt what he meant by it. He held, not without reason, that in the capitalist society of the 19th century political and economic power was concentrated in the hands of the middle classes. In the class struggle which had developed between them and the workers, they used the state and democratic institutions to consolidate their interests and defend them against the workers. This was a dictatorship of the middle class, of capitalists, and their political control of the state was the instrument which ensured their dictatorship. Marx held that capitalism could not be destroyed and socialism substituted for it, unless the political power of the working class was substituted for that of the middle class. This entailed revolution and the substitution of the dictatorship of the proletariat for the dictatorship of the middle classes. This Marxian prophecy is used by the Russian communist to justify something which was never in Marx's mind at all, and is, in fact, a contradiction of Marxian doctrine.

The 'dictatorship' which Marx envisaged was the control of

the state and government by a class, the working class. It was the transfer of paramount political power within society from the capitalists to the workers. It was to be a temporary stage in the process of destroying capitalism and the power of capitalists. That Marx regarded it as a libertarian rather than an authoritarian process, as widening the area of political liberty, is shown by the fact that he looked upon it as a stage in the establishment of a classless society in which individual and communal freedom would be assured by the 'withering away of the state'. The communist dictatorship, as established in Russia and in her satellite states of eastern Europe, has nothing to do with Marx's prophetical dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the dictatorship of an authoritarian government, and behind the government of a party. There has been no transfer of power from capitalists to workers; the transfer of power has been to a small number of persons at the head of the communist party, and since this small group is the central government of the country, the result has been the transfer of arbitrary power to a government which is responsible to no one but itself and can only be removed by murder or sudden death.

In the previous paragraphs I have been dealing with the question why the Russian communists, convinced believers in Marx, established a permanent authoritarian regime, which in important respects is in contradiction with the Marxian scriptures. No one need be surprised by the contradiction. It is highly probable that if any founder of a religious, political, or economic faith returned to earth incognito a century after his death, he would be horrified at the way in which the true believers had perverted his teaching, and, unless he returned in silence and at once to the place from which he came, he would be crucified, burnt, or liquidated in some more modern way as a heretic by his followers. If Marx would today get short shrift from the Cominform, Christ would certainly be excommunicated by the Vatican.

We can now go on to consider how the Soviet authoritarian regime was established. The vast complexity of a modern European society makes it impossible for the central government to function without extensive delegation of powers. The complexity also makes it necessary for it, however despotic it may be, to keep in touch with conditions and opinion over an

immense area and the many spheres of social life which it controls. This complicated pattern of European life—national and everywhere becoming more and more urbanized and industrialized—secreted the form and organs appropriate to it. Government and society were thus articulated through a hierarchy of officials from the dictator or Prime Minister to the police constable and through a hierarchy of functional and regional councils and committees from the Cabinet or Supreme Executive Council to the Parish Council, the local Trades Council, or the Conseil Municipal.[1]

[1] The enormous growth of the committee system in the last century is part of this process. People—especially those who sit upon committees—often seem to think that the perpetual creation of committees is due to the deliberate and malignant perversity of democrats or democracy. This view is superficial. The committee—the getting together of a group of persons—is the 'natural' or inevitable functional secretion of a complicated society where cooperation between a number of individuals for a specific purpose is necessary. The committee system is just as prevalent in a totalitarian, authoritarian regime as in a democracy; it appears in nazi Germany and communist Russia no less than in Britain or the United States. The House of Commons and the Congress of Soviets are committees for the management of national affairs and the Cabinet in Britain and the Council of Commissars (now called the Council of Ministers) in Russia are sub-committees of national committees, while Cabinet Committees in Britain and the State Committee of Defence in Russia are sub-committees of sub-committees of national committees. The totalitarian system, in practice, requires more committees than the democratic because the whole structure has to be duplicated in order that the communist party may dominate and control every organ of government at every level from the local soviet to the Congress of Soviets. In the higher regions of government this totalitarian duplication seems a little ridiculous to the western mind, for it produces a Tweedledum-Tweedledee political system: the communist party has to have a Politburo at the top to control the Council of Ministers, but when you get into the rarefied region of the supreme government control is not possible. The Russians have solved this problem by making all the members of the party's Politburo the same as all the members of the Council of Ministers and vice versa, i.e. by seeing that the Congress of Soviets appoints all members of the Politburo to be Vice-Premiers. The difference between the authoritarian and the libertarian committee systems is that, as we shall see below, it is used primarily in Russia to ensure that the party's control is enforced at every level and that, by rigid party discipline, the orders which come down from the dictator on top are everywhere instantly put into effect, while in a western democracy the function of the committee is to bring public opinion to bear at every level upon authority and to ensure that the government is responsive and responsible to it.

The political party, as it developed in the 19th century, is an integral part of the system, a natural functional secretion of this type of life, society, organization, and government. As soon as the idea that the government should be constitutionally responsive and responsible to the governed establishes itself, the emergence of the political party is inevitable, for political parties are merely organized groups of the governed who want the government to be of one kind rather than of another or to do one thing rather than another. The enormous growth and elaboration of party machinery was also inevitable; it is only a particular instance of the large-scale organization which the pattern of modern life, in vast populations with intricate social relations, makes necessary. The political history of Europe in the 19th century was dominated by the movement which began with the French revolution of 1789, the demand from individuals, classes, and nationalities that authority should give place to liberty. Thus, as we have remarked, the party system in one form or another became the pivot of the libertarian system of government and of its machinery, democracy. The multi-party system was an integral part of the parliamentary system, and the social 'rights', the civil and political liberties, the traditional safeguards against arbitrary, privileged, or despotic power, were woven into the fabric of government. The party was the instrument for mobilizing or canalizing the different currents of political opinion in the governed, and so of making the government ultimately responsible to majority opinion, provided that the government was responsible to and could be removed by the majority party or parties. I am not concerned at this point with the question whether the system 'worked', whether it performed the functions of libertarian government for which it was consciously or unconsciously designed; I shall deal later with the viability of the libertarian system. But the system could not work at all unless certain conditions were ensured. Complete freedom for social or political association was essential. That meant that any group of any variety or shade of opinion must have the right to form a party, for in a society in which there is difference of opinion it is only through a multiplicity of parties that the government can be made responsive to majority opinion. The corollary is freedom of opinion and freedom of speech for the group, the party, and the individual, since otherwise the government can block the

channels through which opinion effectively acts upon it and can evade responsibility to party.

The communists were compelled by their own political objects or desires to follow precisely the same course as the national socialists; when they chose authoritarianism they had to destroy the party system and substitute for it the single-party system, which inevitably leads to what is called today totalitarianism. That the social ideals and ethics of Lenin and Stalin differed from those of Hitler and Goering made, in this respect, no difference at all, for in politics it is the logic of the means adopted, not the end aimed at, which inexorably determines events. The end which the communist leaders aimed at was communism; the means which they chose was governmental dictatorship, and they, the small group on top, were to be the dictators. From that moment they became the prisoners of their own ideas; their ultimate political end, communism, was subordinated to their immediate political object, the establishment and consolidation of their own dictatorship. The logic of events which forced the constitutional history of Soviet Russia into exactly the same mould as nazi Germany is well worth study.

In every state of the modern world there is a struggle for power at the top, for control of the machinery of central government. It is a struggle partly between political groups and partly between individuals. In a libertarian society where the political machinery is designed to make the government responsive and responsible and where the machinery works—which is not the same thing—this struggle is a complicated and often a delicately balanced affair. The individuals who form the actual or potential government are forced continually to compete for the consent or approval of large numbers of people. It is here that the importance of the political party comes in. The struggle for power is on two levels; it takes place within the party and 'in the country', and in the country it takes the form of a struggle between parties. The political leaders compete, as individuals, within their own party for support and approval, for if their party is 'returned to power', their position in the hierarchy of power will be mainly determined by their position in the hierarchy of their party. In the country the struggle is different; it takes the form of a competition between parties, groups, and interests for support and approval of groups, interests, and individuals.

Where this kind of system works, as it does to quite a considerable extent in Britain, it inevitably brings into existence a complex machinery of political life based upon the competition of political parties. Each party is forced to organize itself, centrally and to the maximum extent possible locally, in order to obtain the support and approval of the largest number of people for itself, its leaders, and its programme, when the moment comes for determining who are to be 'returned to power'. It is essential to the 'system'—the democratic system which aims at providing for and encouraging the impact of opinion among those who are governed upon the actions of those who govern—that the channels of opposition should be kept open and free everywhere, from the organs of central government down to the village and the parish meeting. The impact of opinion and opposition is channelled mainly in political parties, and the responsivemess of the government to opinion can be assured only if the formation and activities of parties are completely free from government interference. That this is one of the pivotal points in a libertarian system is shown by the significant fact that in Britain, where experience of democratic libertarianism is longer and practice more successful than in most other countries of the world, the chief opposition party has been given a constitutional position and its leader in the House of Commons receives a salary from the state. What are known as civil liberties, such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press, are the inevitable corollaries of this democratic political libertarianism.

The Russian Bolsheviks, when they seized power, found already in existence the embryos of this kind of libertarian, democratic system. It had been conceived in the struggle against Tsarism and in the womb of the Tsarist Duma; it had developed rapidly during the throes of the 1917 revolution. There was the foetus of western democracy with the usual paraphernalia for making a government responsive and responsible to opinion —legislative bodies composed of elected representatives, executives responsible to the elected bodies, political parties canalizing differences of opinion in different programmes and by their competition for support and power in the country and in the machinery of government able to make the government responsive to the impact of opinion. The moment that the Bolsheviks attained power they were compelled to destroy this

system completely. Having chosen authoritarianism, the logic of facts and of their choice made it necessary for them to get rid of the machinery of political libertarianism, for the mere existence of that machinery encourages opposition to the government by making it constitutional. Naturally the Bolsheviks struck at the pivot of political freedom, the party system, the crucial point at which opinion, opposition, and government responsibility are injected into politics. By banning every party but their own, they made the Communist Party absolute and irresponsible ruler of the Russian people and the government irremovable and unalterable except through civil war or political murder.

Who or what the party and government are, under this kind of authoritarian dispensation, cannot be dogmatically defined. In Russia the organization of the Communist Party has been as authoritarian as that of the national political system. Power within the party is concentrated in the hands of a small executive and everything is so arranged as to make the impact of opinion within the party upon the executive ineffective. Indeed, the whole system is ingeniously designed to make party opinion responsive and responsible to the executive and the executive irresponsive and irresponsible to party opinion. Within the executive there has hitherto again been a concentration of effective power in the hands of a single man, first Lenin and after him Stalin. For practical purposes, therefore, party and government are not distinguishable. Formally the power of the party or the government resides in a small group of communists, in the Politburo or Council of Ministers; actually the ultimate control of power is in the hands of a single man, Stalin. The irresponsiveness to opinion and the governmental irresponsibility of a Stalin, as shown in the events of 1928 to 1932, are almost inconceivable to a person accustomed to the methods of western democracy. The policy of ruthless agricultural collectivization and industrialization was Stalin's. All over Russia intense misery and chaos resulted from the liquidation of the kulaks and the frantic industrial drive. The peasants were in revolt and popular discontent deep and widespread. Within the party the majority of the leaders were opposed to Stalin. Yet he pursued his policy, apparently uninfluenced either by party or by popular opinion. 'Only an absolute ruler.' as Mr. Deutscher says in his book *Stalin.*

'himself ruled neither by nerves nor by sentiments, could persist in this staggering enterprise in face of so many adversities. There is something almost incomprehensible in the mask of unruffled calmness which Stalin showed in those years.' This monumental position of the absolute ruler is, of course, mainly the result of his irremovability except by assassination. The government is responsive only to violence or the threat of violence, being responsible to no one. The opposition to the government by violence showed itself in the assassination of Kirov in 1934; it had been preceded by many purges and deportations; it was followed by the terrific reign of terror which culminated in the great trials and executions by which Stalin liquidated all the old Bolshevik leaders and most of his generals. This communist massacre of the opposition, actual or potential, is under a rigidly authoritarian regime logical and constitutional; exactly the same process can be observed in the nazi Night of the Long Knives in which Hitler liquidated the opposition. In both cases the liquidation was so thorough and the massacres so catholic that they left Stalin and Hitler undisputed masters of their parties and countries.

The one-party system is the pivot of the authoritarian system because it ensures the irremovability of the government, except by violence, and its irresponsiveness to opposition, except within the party or unless supported by assassination or insurrection. In practice under the modern one-party type of authoritarianism, as the history of Germany, Russia, and the Russian satellite states shows, there is an irresistible tendency to concentration of power in the hands of one or two rulers by the violent elimination of all opposition even within the party. The control of opinion and the growth of propaganda as an instrument of government are inevitable corollaries. At first it is only opinion in the strictly political and economic sense which has to be thus conditioned. But, as we have seen in the previous pages of this book and as the experience of Russia proves, in modern society social relations are so many and so intricate that there is no sphere of individual or social life which can be cut off and isolated from politics and economics. The control of opinion by the government cannot, therefore, be restricted to a clearly defined, narrow department of life labelled 'political and economic', for anything which the individual thinks or does, even in art or science, may have

'political' repercussions. The Russian government soon discovered that if people are to be made to think and do what the government wishes them to think and do, the government must control the individual's thoughts and actions in every direction.

To say this is merely to recognize the obvious fact that in the jigsaw society of our machine age the authoritarian state, by the iron law of its own nature, must, if it is to survive, become the totalitarian state. If one or two or three men, gathered together at the head of a party or government, possess the political gospel of absolute truth and the keys to economic salvation, and if it is their right and duty to use the whole power of the state to compel the rest of the population to live the way of life prescribed by the political and economic revelation, then the system under which the government commands and the subject obeys has to be rapidly extended to every sphere of the individual's life. Even in the pre-machine age the tendency of authority, when combined with fanatical belief, to become totalitarian showed itself from time to time. In Geneva, in Scotland, and for a period in 17th-century England, when the power of church and state was combined in the hands of puritanical fanatics, the government discovered that, if people were to be made to live the life which the government knew that they ought to live, then the government must prescribe exactly what the individual might or might not think or do during all his waking, if not sleeping, hours. In Calvin's Geneva:

> The clergy of the city met under Calvin's direction as the 'Congregation', a 'venerable company' that discussed and prepared legislation for the consideration of a 'Consistory'. This Consistory was in turn composed of members of the clergy and of twelve laymen or elders. State and Church were completely identified.[1] It was the obligation of the Consistory 'to keep watch on the life of everyone'. There was no Catholic confessional, but a spy system took its place. A joke or a mere gesture might bring a man under suspicion.[2] Adultery, blasphemy, witchcraft, and heresy were capital crimes.

[1] Compare the integration of Congregation and Consistory in Geneva with that of the Politburo and Council of Ministers in Soviet Russia.

[2] In *Lost Illusion*, by Freda Utley (1949), an account of life in Soviet Russia, the author tells how her husband, a Russian in government employ, came under suspicion owing to a joke, and, though he was entirely innocent of any political offence, was arrested during one of the great purges and deported to a banishment from which he has never returned.

In the years from 1542 to 1546, when Geneva had a population of 16,000, this godly government executed fifty-eight persons and banished seventy-six. People were punished for taking too much wine, whether or not they became intoxicated. The colour and quality of clothing were governed by law. Citizens were punished for using such expressions as 'by the body', ''sblood', 'zounds'. In the public inns nobody might sit up after nine o'clock except spies.[1]

The social actions of human beings organized in groups are not determined, as many historians seem to think, by chance, by divine dispensation, or by some mysterious fate; they are inexorably determined by men's beliefs and desires. In 16th-century Geneva they believed that the government, a handful of men organized in a religious Congregation and a political Consistory, and dominated by Jean Calvin, had received from God the keys to truth and the 'good life' and that it was the government's duty to use their power—the power of the state—to compel all men and women to lead the good life. In order to do what they wished to do, to enforce their standards of social value upon the community, they had to establish authority at the top and obedience below, to regulate minutely the lives of all individuals according to the prescription of Calvin's doctrine. And since they had the power, and the fanatical self-delusions which are the occupational disease of dictators, they inevitably established a police state, in which the wearing of the wrong kind of coat or a joke or expression of opinion might lead to a man's execution or deportation, and in which government spies sat in the inns listening for the heretical joke.

The men who sat in Geneva at the centre of their bloody and barbarous police state acted under the impulsion of fantastically false beliefs and the highest religious and ethical motives. They produced a society which most people today, having shed that particular type of doctrinal delusion, consider grotesque and horrible; to John Knox, who shared their beliefs and desires, it seemed to be 'the most perfect school of Christ that ever was on earth since the days of the apostles'. Four hundred years later there sat in Berlin Hitler and his gang of thugs whose standards of value and motives reached the lowest depths of human degradation. But like Calvin they determined to impose

[1] *The Pilgrimage of Western Man*, by Stringfellow Barr, p. 51.

a way of life upon the German people by authority at the top and obedience below, and, when they got the power to do so in 1933, they inevitably established the same kind of spy-ridden police state in Berlin which the Calvinists had established in Geneva. Once more the government spy sat in the inn listening for the heretical joke which would bring the Jew or the anti-nazi to the concentration camp or the execution shed.

Today in Moscow sit Stalin and his Politburo at the head of another police state. They began with the highest ethical, political, and economic motives, the elimination of poverty, ignorance, and injustice from society and the building up of an association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all. These motives, involving high standards of social value, were entangled, like Calvin's, in a mesh of dogmatic beliefs, some true, but many false and absurd, about the economic structure of society. And then upon this tangle of beliefs, desires, and standards of value they superimposed the belief in authoritarianism in its most extreme and modern form. The Marxist way of life could, they held, only be imposed upon Russia by authority at the top and obedience below. Stalin and his lieutenants had received the truth from Marx and Lenin, and it had put into their hands a divinely ordered blue-print of social life, just as Jehovah upon Mount Sinai had in the ten commandments given to his servant Moses the divine blue-print of individual conduct. It was Stalin's duty to enforce these beliefs and standards of social value upon the community. In order to do so, the Soviet government has to regulate minutely the lives of all individuals according to the prescription of Marxian doctrine. Inevitably there comes into existence yet another police state, in which at first only the economic activity of the individual has to be controlled and directed and it is, for example, a penal offence to be a capitalist or a kulak. The one-party system is established and all political or economic heresy stamped out. But gradually the state or government finds that, if economic or social heresy is to be stamped out or prevented, the sphere of direction has to be extended to all departments of a man's life and thought. The government now decides what jokes a man may or may not make, what kind of music must be written, and what facts or falsehoods the scientist may believe. To make the wrong kind of joke, to write the wrong kind of symphony, or to believe

in the facts of Mendelianism will lead to a man's physical or mental liquidation, and once more the government spy listens for the heretical joke or opinion which will bring the deviationist, unless he recants, to Siberia.

In this communist or Soviet doctrine and practice two distinct social standards of value are involved, just as they were in Calvinist Geneva and, indeed, wherever or whenever a group or party, forming a government, attempts to impose a particular way of life upon the community. The communist aim is to establish a communist society. This 'aim' is in fact a complicated series of social beliefs and desires, which involve a complicated series of judgments on social standards of value. Marx, as I have pointed out before, was mentally a grandchild of the French revolution; his standards of social value were the revolutionary liberty, equality, and fraternity modified by the liberal democracy of his time. His quarrel with liberal democracy was not over its standards of value, for he accepted them, but over the nature of society and the way in which the ideal society, based upon liberty, equality, and fraternity, could be brought into existence. The pivot of his position here was that the economic structure of society determines its political structure and its social values. Bourgeois capitalism, he argued, produces bourgeois democracy, which is incompatible with liberty, equality, and fraternity. To establish a free, equal, and fraternal society you must, therefore, first destroy the capitalist system, and substitute communism for it. But the revolutionary standards of social value, as embodied in the classical democratic tradition, were always explicit in the 'idealism' of Marxist communism. Thus liberty is promised in the withering away of the state and in the free development of each and all; equality in that eachness and allness and in the classless society; fraternity in the exhortation to the workers of the world to unite and in socialist or communist internationalism which will end war.

These standards of value, which derive from liberal democracy and from the French revolution, and before that from the most ancient and fundamental traditions of European civilization which were born in Greece, have been accepted, sometimes with strange glosses and interpretations, by Marx's successors including the Russian communists. To a twentieth century Englishman, born and bred in parliamentary demo-

cracy and the traditions of civil liberties, liberty, equality, and fraternity seem to have been abolished from Russian society, where the rigid one-party system eliminates any political opposition, where the police and arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and execution or deprivation of means of livelihood make freedom of thought or speech—let alone action—much too dangerous for the individual, not only in politics and economics, but even in the arts and sciences, and where international relations are based on a perpetual propaganda of international hatred. But there is in the human mind, in Russia as in the rest of the world, an infinite capacity for self-deception, which it practises by habitually ensuring that the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing and that one part of the brain shall ignore what the other part is thinking. This enables us happily to overcome the logical law of contradiction, to cherish all our lives beliefs which are obviously false and contradictory, untiringly to employ means which never do and never can produce the results which we aim at, and so conscientiously to commit the grossest stupidities and the most horrible crimes for the highest motives.

This intellectual accomplishment which the 20th-century European has developed to new heights of perfection is used by him as the most appropriate and efficient instrument for solving his political and economic problems. It has enabled us to live for nearly 40 years knowing that war will destroy us and our civilization, knowing what we must do if we are to prevent war, and yet spending all our energies on preparing for and waging war.[1] It enables the Russian communist, in the name of

[1] Even statesmen have sometimes become aware of this dichotomy in the political mind. Winston Churchill writes:

'The British Government and the Parliaments out of which it sprang did not believe in the approach of a great war, and were determined to prevent it; but at the same time the sinister hypothesis was continually present in their thoughts, and was repeatedly brought to the attention of Ministers by disquieting incidents and tendencies.

'During the whole of these ten years (1904-1914) this duality and discordance were the keynote of British policies; and those whose duties it was to watch over the safety of the country lived simultaneously in two different worlds of thought. There was the actual visible world with its peaceful activities and cosmopolitan aims; and there was a hypothetical world, a world "beneath the threshold", as it were, a world at one moment utterly fantastic, at the next seeming about to leap into reality—a world of

liberty, equality, and democracy, to create a society which seems to him to embody those ideals, while in practice it achieves the exact opposite. Whether this applies to the actual rulers of Soviet Russia is an open question; no man—probably not even Stalin himself—can say whether Stalin any longer believes what he says or can distinguish between what is true and false. The absolute corruption of absolute power is most absolute in the mind of the dictator; he becomes concerned solely with power and its manipulations, so that gradually he loses touch with all other realities. Propaganda which is the instrument by which dictators think to hypnotize the rest of the world into believing what is not true seems eventually to hypnotize the propagandist into believing that what he says is true. The beliefs of a Napoleon, Hitler, or Stalin, as recorded by them in books, speeches, or conversations, are so childish, absurd, and horrible that one is tempted to think that no one but a very stupid or insane man could really hold them. It is not improbable that Hitler was both stupid and insane; but insanity cannot be diagnosed in Napoleon or Stalin and the world refuses to allow us to diagnose stupidity. We are, therefore, left with the strange hypothesis that, owing to the corruption of power and the infinite capacity of the mind to deceive itself, they really believed a good deal of what they said.

Though some doubt whether the rulers of Russia believe what they say about liberty, equality, democracy, and fraternity may be natural and legitimate, it is practically certain that the vast majority of Russian communists are sincerely convinced by their government's or their own propaganda and believe that the police state in which they live is the most advanced, free, and democratic society in the world. They believe that in such capitalist countries as Britain and America the worker still has nothing but his chains, that the government is in the hands of the capitalists whose only objects are the exploitation of the workers and the destruction of communist Russia by means of the atom bomb and an imperialist war. They believe that in these capitalist countries all democracy and liberty are

monstrous shadows moving in convulsive combinations through vistas of fathomless catastrophe.'

Mr. Stringfellow Barr quotes this passage from Mr. Churchill to show what he calls the schizophrenia which prevailed in Europe before the 1914 war (*The Pilgrimage of Western Man*, p. 301).

'sham', and that only in Soviet Russia and in the communist states which move in her orbit is there 'real' freedom and 'workers' democracy'. They arrive at this comfortable conviction by the ordinary mechanism of self-delusion which passes for political and economic thought on both sides of the iron curtain. The mechanism has two interlocking cog-wheels—one may be called 'a certain amount of truth' and the other 'the corruption of words'. There is a certain amount of truth in the Russian communist position. The object of the socialist revolution was freedom and equality for the worker, his release from the exploitation inevitable in modern society where the enormous economic power of industry and finance is concentrated in the hands of a small number of private persons. This capitalist exploitation of the industrial and agricultural workers —the vast majority in every population—was and is a very real thing. It has been abolished in Russia by the elimination of capitalists and capitalism and the establishment of state socialism. It is true that a working-class child has a greater chance of equal economic opportunity in Russia than in Britain or the U.S.A., and that in some respects there is in the east an economic freedom and equality unknown in the west. This 'certain amount of truth' in the claims of communism is used by the communist as the first cog-wheel in the process of his self-deception. He sees only the measure of economic equality and the absence of capitalist exploitation assured to him and the helpless and hopeless position of workers which he believes to exist in the non-communist world. Propaganda at home and his complete ignorance of everything outside Russia ensure that he is incurably blind to anything which is inconsistent with or contradicts his beliefs, to anything outside the tiny circle of truth and falsehood which his rulers present to him. He is blind to the ruthless regimentation of worker and peasant by the state which in inhumanity and in the destruction of liberty and equality has often equalled the worst examples of capitalist exploitation;[1] he is blind to the despotic

[1] The classical example is the treatment of the kulaks, who were first encouraged and protected by the communist government on the ground that they were the most efficient peasants and then quite suddenly liquidated with the most horrible cruelty by the same government on the ground that they were capitalists. The government ordered the liquidation of the kulaks or prosperous peasants by decree in January 1930. 'Liquidation' was

suppression of any political opposition or economic 'heresy'; to the power, habitually exercised by the government and its police, to arrest, imprison, deport, or execute any individual without trial; to the power, habitually exercised by the small group of communist rulers sometimes with tragic and often with ludicrous results, to compel everyone to believe or express belief in only those political, economic, social, ethical, philosophic, artistic, and scientific facts, fictions, or doctrines which the rulers or their parasites approve.[1]

accomplished by the simple method of immediately depriving anyone to whom the rather vague term kulak might be applied of his land and property. The exact number of families and persons, thus suddenly reduced from prosperity to complete destitution, is not known. The Webbs, who try to make the best case possible for the Soviet government, mention one million families as an estimate of the number of victims (*Soviet Communism*, 2nd edition, p. 563). Sir John Maynard, a scrupulously impartial writer, says that the liquidation 'meant that persons numbering, with their families, some five millions, were to be dispossesed of their properties, and in many cases driven from their homes' (*The Russian Peasant: and other Studies*, p. 287). The decision, he says, 'can only be compared for ruthlessness with the wholesale removals of population by the ancient monarchies', and after giving some eyewitnesses' accounts of the misery inflicted, remarks that 'it is a horrifying picture'. Even the Webbs have to admit that 'the sum of human suffering involved is beyond all computation'.

[1] The reader who wishes to study the facts can do so in two well-known instances, the Lysenko case and the treatment of musical composers in 1948. In the first case Russian scientists were forced to repudiate the discoveries of Mendel and his followers, many of which are as well-established facts as any in the whole realm of science. The facts can be studied in *Soviet Genetics and World Science*, by Julian Huxley. The case of the musical composers is even more significant. In 1948 the government suddenly decided, apparently for political reasons, that composers must be compelled to produce only the kinds and style of musical composition approved by the politicians. Zhdanov, a leading member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, summoned a conference of musicians and denounced the four most distinguished Russian composers, Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Khachaturian, and Miaskovsky. After the conference the Central Committee formally issued a Decree on Music condemning these composers as adherents of 'the formalist and anti-people school' and their works as 'marked by formalist perversions, anti-democratic tendencies which are alien to the Soviet people and their artistic tastes'. The proceedings of the conference have been published. They show that the formalism for which the composers were condemned meant to the politicians music which was not propaganda. The speeches, to anyone who is not a communist and has some knowledge of music, are ludicrous. The composers themselves had

The other mechanism of political deception and self-delusion, which is in common use throughout the world and enables the Russian communist, the most regimented man in Europe and living in an old-fashioned police state, to believe that he is a free man living in the most advanced democracy, is the corruption of words. Social beliefs and political desires, communal standards of value, have to be thought about and expressed in words, many of which are abstract. Freedom or liberty, equality, fraternity, authority, exploitation are such words. To say, as many superficial or despairing thinkers now say, that these words 'mean nothing', because they are so often misused or confused, is nonsense. A cowslip does not lose its meaning because some one mistakes it for a primrose, nor does liberty lose its meaning because dictators say that it is the same thing as obedience or because a poet in love discovers that:

> Stone walls do not a prison make,
> Nor iron bars a cage.

Freedom has just as clear and definite a meaning as cowslip when we say that 'a man is free when he can use his hands, but not free when a policeman handcuffs him', or that 'a man is free when no one, including government officials, can compel him to believe or disbelieve in the existence or non-existence of genes and chromosomes which control the inheritance of certain characteristics "on Mendelian principles", but that he is not free if the government compels him to express belief or disbelief in such facts', or that 'a man is not free if the government and its police can arbitrarily and secretly arrest him, secretly convict him of an unstated offence, and then imprison, deport, or execute him'.

In all these cases freedom or liberty means something definite and important and the 'thing' to which the words apply is just as definite and important as the thing to which

publicly to repudiate everything which they knew to be true and important in their art, confess their sins, and promise to write the kind of music required of them by the government in the future. The reader who wishes to examine the evidence for himself will find it in *Musical Uproar in Moscow*, by Alexander Werth, which contains a translation of the Central Committee's Decree and a verbatim report of Zhdanov's conference, including his own speech and those of the unfortunate composers who had to perjure themselves as artists and obey the government.

the word cowslip applies. The difference between the thing 'cowslip' and the thing 'liberty' is that you can take a botanical sceptic into a field, pick a flower, and say 'There you are; this is a cowslip', whereas the thing 'liberty' is part of an individual's physical state, a condition of his mind or way of life, or a factor in political and social organization, and you, therefore, cannot take the political sceptic either to Moscow or London, pick something up off the pavement, and say to him, 'There you are; this is liberty'.

Because of this, those who like or pretend to like and believe in the existence of cowslips, but do not like liberty, are apt to say that cowslips are simple and real, but liberty 'only a complex abstraction'. But simplicity and complexity depend to a considerable extent upon the angle of observation. Bentham and Hooker tell us that *Primula Veris* or *Paigte* is: 'Stock perennial and tufted. Leaves ovate or oblong, usually about 3 inches long, of a pale green, slightly toothed and much wrinkled. Not hairy, but often covered with a minute, pale down. Flower stalks rising above the leaves, bearing an umbel of flowers. Calyx-teeth usually broad and obtuse. Corolla with a concave or cup-shaped limb.' This is the botanist's complicated and generalized definition of that 'simple thing' the cowslip, and many ordinary people who know a cowslip when they see it would not recognize the thing in the complications. But the ordinary man's cowslip is the botanist's *Primula Veris*; the thing remains the same however simply seen or intricately defined. The simplicity and complexity depend upon the angle and purpose of observation. The same is true of liberty as a physical or mental state or as a condition of living or of social organization; it can be a very simple or very complicated thing according to the angle of observation; but the thing remains a reality and the same, however simply or elaborately described. Nothing has bedevilled the theory and practice of politics more than the delusion that you can alter the nature and effects of political actions and beliefs by describing them or even define them out of existence.

There is, however, a reason for this bedevilment which appears so often in politics and so rarely in botany. The fact that liberty, equality, and other factors in a political process or situation are not objects which can be picked up, handled, and examined, but are usually complicated conditions in the

life of an individual or a community, makes natural or acquired confusion regarding their meaning and nature easy. This gives us all, and in particular the Russian communist, a most effective instrument of political self-deception. However 'free' a society may be, no individual in it can be entirely free, and few, if any, individuals in an authoritarian society, even the most rigid and ruthless, is without some shred of liberty. The question whether a particular society and its way of life are libertarian or authoritarian turns to a large extent upon its quantity and quality of liberty and authority. Further, democracy, as it developed in the 19th century, consisted of a highly complex social machinery which was invented and operated with the object of placing legal or constitutional limits upon the power and authority of governments and of ensuring for the individual, *vis-à-vis* the government, definite rights to political and civil liberties. In Soviet Russia, therefore, the individual has some freedom, and, as we have seen, he possesses, owing to the abolition of capitalism, a form of economic freedom which large numbers of people have never enjoyed in capitalist countries. In the organs of local and national government and in the election system the Bolsheviks retained the skeleton and machinery of traditional democracy, though they had taken all the democratic flesh and blood out of it by establishing the one-party system and making political opposition to the party and the government a criminal offence. The Russian communist is taught by the ceaseless propaganda of his government to concentrate his attention upon the economic liberty which communism gives him and which is denied to the rest of the world, upon the shreds and tatters of freedom which can be picked up here and there even in the most ruthless police state, and the dry bones of democratic machinery from which the government and party carefully drain away all blood and life. He is thus induced to believe that only in Russia is there 'real' liberty, that in Britain and America all liberty is 'sham', and that the right term for the authoritarian, totalitarian, police state of the U.S.S.R. is 'workers' democracy'. By this process words are corrupted and political terms lose all meaning, but political deception and self-deception are facilitated.[1]

[1] I am dealing here with the problem of authoritarianism and discussing the way in which it works in a modern police state like the U.S.S.R. I do

In politics the use of the word 'real' is almost always a symptom of deception or self-deception by corruption of words. When the conqueror made a desert and called it peace, he always called it a 'real' peace and even sometimes thought it so. So too the communist or nazi calls obedience to the party or the dictator real freedom and Hitler's concentration camps and Stalin's labour camps 'true democracy' or 'workers' democracy'. This self-deception by corruption of words is a symptom of that other common political disease to which I have had to refer before, the confusion of ends with means. What the communist aims at implies a high standard of social values, a society in which no individual can exploit another either politically or economically, a society therefore built upon liberty, equality, and fraternity, upon the free development of each and all. The Russian communist performs the mental acrobatics by which he can ignore the law of contradiction by confusing his means with his ends. His acrobatic argument is really this: to obtain the real freedom of the Marxian society absolute obedience to Stalin and the Communist Party is necessary; therefore absolute obedience to Stalin and the Communist Party is real freedom.

I have now dealt with the origins, form, and psychology of Russian communist authoritarianism. There is one other point which needs consideration: it is intimately connected with standards of social value. It is the position of ideology in the communist system and the type of authoritarianism which it produces. Communist ideology, as I have pointed out before, bears a striking resemblance to the dogma of authoritarian churches. It is the modern form of scholasticism. The ancient scholasticism was concerned with metaphysics, the nature of

not, of course, mean that this process of political self-deception is confined to Russians and communists, or to authoritarians. On the contrary, examples of it can be seen in all countries and all ages. The process by which liberals and democrats in the 19th century—and many conservatives today—convinced themselves that economic *laissez-faire* and private enterprise produce a 'free' society is an exact replica of communist self-deception, the other way round. Because the worker in Russia is no longer subject to the authoritarianism of the private employer, the communist induces himself to belief that the worker, scientist, and musician completely regimented by the government are free: because the worker and capitalist was free from government control, the liberal democrat induced himself to believe that the sweated worker in a Manchester slum was free.

the universe, the relation of man to God, the nature of spirit and matter, and ethics, the problems of good and evil, of sin and punishment. Religious ideology or dogma was either official and authoritative or heretical. It consisted of extremely subtle and elaborate interpretation of the scriptures, which were assumed to be divinely inspired and to contain absolute truth regarding metaphysics and ethics. From time to time the church issued a pronouncement, either by Papal edict or by decision of a Church Council, as to whether some particular dogma was true and authoritative or heretical. If pronounced to be true officially, all members of the church had to believe it; the heretic who refused to accept the official dogma or who continued to believe in a dogma pronounced to be heretical could be burnt by the officials or otherwise liquidated.

The dogmas of the Roman Church, which were the product of metaphysical scholasticism, consist in the main of statements which are unintelligible or, if intelligible, incapable of proof or disproof. Neither St. Athanasius nor anyone else can know whether the Trinity consists of one person or three persons or both one and three persons, or whether those persons are of the same or of not the same substance. Even if such knowledge were possible, it would be meaningless, trivial, and irrelevant to religion and the life of man. No one of intelligence now believes that the industrious moles who turned the molehill of an unintelligible creed into a mountain of scholastic unintelligibility or that the church which pronounced their unintelligible statements to be absolute truth were talking about anything which had the remotest connection with reality or any relevance to the ethical teachings of Jesus Christ. The modern scholasticism of the Russian communists deals, not with metaphysics, but with economics and politics. It consists of an extremely subtle and elaborate interpretation of the works or doctrines of Marx and Lenin. As in the Church of Rome, so in the U.S.S.R. the economic and political dogmas or ideology which result from this interpretation become either official and authoritative or heretical. They become official if pronounced to be true by Stalin or by the supreme Congress of the Russian Communist Party. If officially pronounced to be true, a dogma is treated as absolute truth; all members of the Communist Party have to believe it, and the heretic, whether a party member or not, who refuses to accept an official dogma or who

can be convicted of believing in a dogma officially pronounced to be heretical is penalized or liquidated.

This great corpus of communist dogma, which is used as a test of faith by the Communist Party and of loyalty by the Soviet government, is in its relation to political and communal psychology a very remarkable phenomenon. There is nothing like it in the history of politics. The dogma of national socialism and of the nazis in Germany was trivial and elementary compared with that of communism. In matter and volume it is comparable only to the dogma of a major religion or oecumenical church. But its matter is so complicated and so boring and its volume so immense that very few people who are not communists, and not many who are, have any real knowledge of its nature. To understand its nature and its use, two aspects of it must be considered, first its content as produced by the economic and political theoreticians or schoolmen proper, and secondly the content which the Soviet rulers use as an implement of government.

If the English reader wishes to discover the nature of communist dogma in its purest and most modern form as produced by the economic schoolman, he should read—or try to read—a book like *Marx, His Time and Ours*, by Rudolph Schlesinger, which was published in the year 1950. Dr. Schlesinger analyses the economic and sociological doctrines of Marx and examines their truth and relevance in the world today and the interpretation of them as authorized by Lenin, Stalin, and the Russian Communist Party. His knowledge of Marx and of the colossal mountain of communist scholasticism which now overlays *Das Kapital* is encyclopaedic. There is no detail in the complicated history of party politics and of communist orthodoxy and heresy which he does not know. He has himself the schoolman's mind developed to its highest capacity, so strong, so subtle, so untrammelled by facts and reality that it can understand or spin the most complicated argument until nothing is left but an interminable and unbreakable intellectual thread. If not himself actually a communist, he accepts the postulates and axioms of Marxist communism. Dr. Schlesinger, therefore, knows what he is talking about; he can speak with unrivalled authority of what Marx and Lenin said and meant and of the interpretation of their doctrines. He is, it should be added, an extremely clever man. As a result, there is nothing, at any rate in the English

language, approaching in thoroughness his exposition of Marx's teaching, the validity of his doctrine, and its relation to modern communism and to the world of today.

The content of Dr. Schlesinger's book and of the Marxist and communist dogmas which it explains is concerned with economics and politics, with the economic organization of society and its social effects, with the class structure of society and its economic and political effects, and with the control of power and its effects in modern society. The innocent and expectant reader might reasonably assume that he would find a discussion here of subjects of overwhelming importance both to society and to the individual in the contemporary world. After all, this is the major problem, we are told, in the post-war world. It divides us into two bitterly hostile hemispheres and it is confidently predicted on both sides that the right or wrong solution must mend or end our civilization. The division is already so deep that intercourse between the communist and non-communist hemispheres has been almost completely abolished and preparations are being made for a war between them which would destroy both. In the communist hemisphere the question at issue is considered to be so vital that the individual who opposes or even 'deviates' from the official dogmas is treated as a traitor or the lowest kind of criminal; in the non-communist hemisphere things have not yet reached that stage, but everywhere the communist is regarded with growing suspicion and in many places his political activities are curtailed.

The content of this tremendous and dangerous dispute is clear; it is economic and political and it is no more abstruse or complicated than dozens of questions which the ordinary man successfully grapples with in his everyday life. Should we organize the economic system of a country on communist, socialist, or capitalist lines? What is the economic and political effect of public and private ownership of industries? To what extent should the government control communal life and the individual's life? Should there be freedom of the press and of thought and speech? Should the government be made responsible and responsive to the people, and, if so, how? These are questions of profound social importance; the value of our communal life and civilization, the nature of the life which society enables the individual to live, will be determined by

the answer which history makes to them. In the communist scriptures, the works of Marx and Lenin, there is much which throws light upon these real problems. Marx was a great man and saw deeper into some of the historical processes of his time than anyone else. He was concerned with the effect of the economic organization and the class structure of society produced by it upon social and individual lives and upon our social standards of value. His analysis was so important because it provides the essential basis for understanding some of the most intractable problems of modern society which are posed in the questions asked above. Lenin, too, was a man of very remarkable powers. Though addicted to Marxian dialectic and theory, he was, far more than Marx, a practical statesman; indeed, he was a politician of ruthless genius. In his writings and speeches he is, therefore, often dealing with economic and political realities. Nevertheless the beginnings of communist scholasticism are, it must be admitted, to be found in the Marxist and Leninist scriptures. Marx's mental inheritance was unfortunate; it led him into a Hegelian and Talmudic wilderness so that he encumbers his penetrating and illuminating work with an absurd dialectic, an economic scholasticism and dogmas divorced from reality. Lenin in turn inherited the tradition from Marx and spins endless verbal webs about classes and equality, the state, materialism and empirio-criticism.

When one passes from Marx and Lenin to modern communist theory and dogma, as expounded in Dr. Schlesinger's book, one finds that one has left all connection with reality for a cloud-cuckoo-land of pseudo-economics. It has no relevance whatsoever to any of the important questions asked in the previous paragraph. I doubt whether 10 per cent of it is really intelligible to anyone, and even that 10 per cent is only the spinning of words over words. And yet, this fantastic modern scholasticism is treated with the most portentous seriousness by intelligent communists and learned persons like Dr. Schlesinger. This peculiar attitude of communists to pure sociological theory, which later hardens into pure party dogma, has an interesting historical cause. Marx himself was pre-eminently a theorist; as a practical politician and revolutionary, he was, during his lifetime, a failure. The Marxist theory claimed to be scientific, i.e. to analyse social facts as a chemist analyses physical facts so that the Marxist can establish social 'laws'

and predict social results with the same inevitability or certainty with which the chemist establishes chemical 'laws' and predicts chemical results. The Marxist analysis predicted the self-destruction of capitalism and the inevitable emergence, through revolution, of the socialist society. It has been argued that there is an inconsistency here inherent in Marxist doctrine and practice, since, if the suicide of capitalism and the triumph of socialism are inevitable, there is no sense in the elaborate and fussy pretence of socialists to interfere with and direct events. No doubt there have been communist dialecticians sufficiently muddle-headed to be vulnerable to this argument, but Marx and Lenin are not among them. Their theory was that the establishment of a communist society was ultimately certain, but that the manner and time of its establishment depended upon an understanding of the science of the social process and a conscious direction of the revolutionary process by the initiated.

It is this belief which determined the orthodox view of theory in the communist leaders. An understanding of the science of the social process as expounded by Marx and Engels was by no means an easy or simple thing, and to direct the revolution in accordance with it required a good deal of esoteric knowledge. The revolution would be made, of course, by the working classes, by the proletariat, but the proletariat, while it had the power, had neither the knowledge nor the organization necessary for the directing of the revolution. The revolution would, therefore, have to be initiated and directed from outside the working classes, by intellectuals who understood the Marxist theory and were trained in the organization and technique of the revolutionary process. This view was first clearly enunciated by Lenin during the years 1900 to 1903 and has determined the orthodox communist attitude towards theory ever since. As Mr. E. H. Carr points out in his book *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*,[1] it was during those years of the *Iskra* period that Lenin laid the foundations of party doctrine and there were two propositions to which he continually returned. One was that 'without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement'. The other was that 'social-democratic consciousness' or 'class political consciousness' was not a 'spontaneous' growth, and could come only

[1] Vol. I, p. 16.

'from without'. The following passage from Lenin's writings of that period, quoted by Mr. Carr, shows his views most clearly:

> The history of all countries bears witness that by its own resources alone the working class is in a position to generate only a trade-union consciousness, i.e. a conviction of the necessity of coming together in unions, of carrying on a struggle with the masters, of securing from the government the promulgation of this or that law indispensable for the workers and so forth. The teaching of socialism has grown out of philosophical, historical and economic theories worked out by educated representatives of the possessing classes, of the intelligentsia. The founders of contemporary socialism, Marx and Engels, belonged themselves by their social origin to the bourgeois intelligentsia. Similarly in Russia the theoretical teaching of social-democracy has arisen altogether independently of spontaneous growth of the worker's movement, has arisen as the natural and inevitable result of the development of thought among the revolutionary-socialist intelligentsia.

The party thus became, in Lenin's view, to quote Mr. Carr, 'a repository of revolutionary theory and revolutionary consciousness, leading and guiding a spontaneous workers' "movement". But for the future of communist doctrine and party dogma, everything depended upon the nature of the theory of which the intellectual *élite* were to be the self-appointed interpreters and guardians. Unfortunately, as I have pointed out, the foundations of an economic and social cabbala are already to be found in Marx and Lenin, and the bias towards sociological and—what is much more dangerous—political nonsense already existed in the founders of communism. Take Lenin, for example. If you read his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, published in 1909, his *Imperialism*, published in 1917, and his *'Left-Wing' Communism: An Infantile Disorder*, published in 1920, two things are noticeable. There is a considerable amount of doctrinaire Marxist scholasticism in these works, and most of it is as irrelevant to facts and truth as the Athanasian creed. But, secondly, Lenin himself is not interested in the abstractions of Marxist argumentation. He is not interested in the truth or falsehood of empirio-criticism, of the theory of 'ultra-imperialism', of the doctrine that the pure Marxist should not work in a 'reactionary' trade union or enter a bourgeois

parliament. What he is really concerned with is tactics, the practice of politics, and he uses doctrine, often unscrupulously, in order to get something done. What he usually wants done is to discredit an opponent whose practical policy, often unconnected with the theoretical dispute, conflicts with Lenin's. The communist practice of destroying a political opponent by proving him to be a Marxist heretic was confirmed, if not originated, by Lenin. Even in the higher philosophy of *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* he is more concerned to discredit Mach and Bogdanov than to discover whether truth is absolute or relative. It is significant that his conclusions are two: first, that Engels and Marx were right, and second, that 'from the standpoint of life, practice ought to be the first and fundamental criterion of the theory of knowledge'.

In *Imperialism* there is an analysis, often correct and sometimes profound, of the economic and political interactions of capitalism and 'imperialism' in the world of modern states, though here what is most valuable has been borrowed from J. A. Hobson. There is also a good deal of the usual Marxist scholastic word-splitting which the acrid Marxist jargon appears to render so menacing and so convincing to the ears of the true believer; this part of Lenin's thesis, which has little meaning and no importance, for it is mainly a dispute about definitions, has been incorporated by later communists as one of the most inspired revelations in their holy writings. Just as St. Paul said the last word on marriage, so Lenin said the last word on imperialism, though that has not deterred the religious scholastic from adding hundreds of thousands of words to St. Paul's last word and the communist scholastic from adding hundreds of thousands to Lenin's. But here again Lenin, unlike Marx, is not primarily concerned with establishing the truth about politics, economics, or the 'historical process'. His purpose is to discredit an opponent, in this case Karl Kautsky, prince of reformists and, therefore, in 1917 anathema to the Bolsheviks and their leader. Lenin's real quarrel with Kautsky was, not that he defined imperialism incorrectly, but that he advocated a practical policy for socialists with which Lenin profoundly disagreed. The object of this curious book is to prove that Kautsky was a bad socialist, a bad Marxist, a reactionary, an opportunist, and a 'social-chauvinist', and therefore every good Marxist should support not the policy of the Mensheviks and

social-democrats, but the revolutionary policy of the Bolsheviks and Lenin.[1]

Finally, in '*Left-Wing*' *Communism*, we see the Lenin of 1920, no longer the revolutionary planning and plotting in exile, but the statesman and ruler. Now more than ever he is thinking of practical policy, to get certain things done which will strengthen the Soviet government and prepare the way for 'world-revolution'. The opponents of his policy he now considers to be, not only the Mensheviks, but all social-democrats and the communist extremists. His object is to discredit them, his method to affix to them labels, derived from communist scholasticism, which will attach to each some form of Marxist heresy. Thus the Mensheviks and social-democrats are convicted of the heresies of 'opportunism'[2] and 'social-chauvinism', while those simple-minded communists, who had swallowed whole the pure Marxian and Leninist doctrine of 'no truck with the bourgeoisie and the capitalists', are convicted of the infantile disease of 'Left Doctrinairism', because they carried their belief into the post-war world and, contrary to Lenin's wishes, proposed to boycott the 'bourgeois' trade unions and the 'capitalist' parliaments.

With Stalin we reach the last stage in the use of ideology and heresy by the communist leader, now head of the Soviet state and a dictator. In mental calibre he is greatly inferior to Marx and Lenin, and, while they were masters in the art of word-splitting and dialectical gymnastics, in those dry and dusty regions he flounders like a huge fish out of water. One of his earliest works, *Anarchism or Socialism*, is a pathetic attempt to explain the theory of Marxism and dialectical materialism to his fellow Georgians. It is a remarkable instance of the

[1] A few quotations will show Lenin's method, a model to later communist polemical scholastics: 'But Kautsky's definition is not only wrong and un-Marxian. It serves as a basis for a whole system of views which all along the line run counter to Marxian theory and practice . . .' (Note that a *definition* is a test of heresy!) 'Kautsky broke with Marxism by advocating what is, in the period of finance capital, a "reactionary ideal"; "peaceful democracy". . . . However one may twist Kautsky's argument, there is nothing in it but reaction and bourgeois reformism. . . . Kautsky's theoretical critique of imperialism has therefore nothing in common with Marxism and serves no purpose other than as a preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the social-chauvinists.'

[2] Was there ever a greater opportunist than the great Lenin?

naïveté of Russian communists and Soviet propaganda that an English translation of this work was published in 1950 by the government at Moscow and exported for propaganda purposes to Britain. For it is a ridiculous work, incompetent where it expounds the theory of Marx and the philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach, childish in its polemical arguments against Kropotkin and other anarchists. It was first published as a series of articles in 1906 at the moment when Stalin was just emerging, at the age of 26, from obscurity. It is interesting solely as showing his attitude, as a young man, an active worker in the underground revolutionary movement of Georgia, towards theory and ideology. He takes ideology with immense seriousness, though his handling of it is elementary and crude; he swallows Marx and Engels whole, though he cannot digest them. Indeed, they have already become for him what subsequently they have become for all good communists, the writers of the Holy Writ, the revealers of absolute truth, so that in order to prove the anarchists to be wrong it is only necessary for him to quote a sentence or two from Marx or Engels saying that they are wrong. But, though Stalin is naïvely serious about his ideology, he is, like Lenin, not primarily interested in theoretical truth or falsehood. The book was written during the great crisis for Russian socialists, the revolution of 1905. At the time the European socialist movement was, as usual, riven by the kind of disputes and factions which appear to be endemic in revolutionary movements and which certainly have done more than any capitalists to prolong the life of capitalism. The disputes and the parties engendered by them were concerned either with theory and dogma or with the tactics of revolution, and often with both. In 1906 the chief divisions were between reformists and revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks (in Russia), social-democrats and anarchists.

Two years before, Stalin, having escaped from Siberia and returned to Tiflis, joined the Bolsheviks and became a fervent disciple of Lenin. He had proved himself as a man of action, a ruthless revolutionary, and he was recognized at once by Kamenev and Lenin as Bolshevik leader in Georgia. Outside Russia the internecine conflict between anarchism and social-democracy, which began with the struggle between Bakunin and Marx for the souls of socialists in the First International, had in all the great industrialized countries of Europe ended

in overwhelming victory for the Marxists. The ideological controversies over socialism and anarchism had become a part of history, and the Second International and national socialist and labour parties paid little or no attention to the theory or practice of anarchism. But this was not the case in Georgia. There anarchism was still an active force, bidding against the social-democrats for the support of workers and intellectuals. In 1905 a group of anarchists which controlled several newspapers in Tiflis launched a violent attack upon social-democracy and the leadership of Stalin. *Anarchism or Socialism* was Stalin's counter-attack upon the anarchist leader, Cherkezishvili, and appeared in Bolshevik and trade union newspapers which were under Stalin's direction.

The interesting point is that Stalin uses his theoretical and ideological arguments, however incompetently, always as an offensive weapon. His object is to discredit Kropotkin, as the protagonist of anarchism, and Kropotkin's follower Cherkezishvili. The content of the controversies—e.g. whether Feuerbach was a pantheist and what was the intellectual relationship between him and Marx—are almost always irrelevant to Marxism, anarchism, or indeed to anything or anyone in Tiflis or anywhere else in Europe. They are mainly questions of dogma to which there is no answer; and even if there were an answer it would have no more importance to human beings than if some Marxist astronomer invented an answer to the unanswerable question: 'What is on the other side of the moon?' But that is not Stalin's view. The point for him is that Marx and Engels were always right and Kropotkin and his followers always wrong, whether on the dialectics of Hegel, the pantheism of Feuerbach, or the dictatorship of the proletariat. By quoting the Holy Writ of Marx or Engels on all these subjects he thinks to demolish Kropotkin and his Georgian followers. By thus demolishing the theory of anarchism, he hopes to attain his real object—that the workers and intellectuals of Tiflis will follow the leadership of the Bolshevik Stalin and reject the discredited anarchist Cherkezishvili.

It is extremely interesting to compare the use which Stalin made of communist dogma and ideology in later years, when he was consolidating his powers as a dictator, with his early experiment in 1906. The student of the mind of the human insect when applied to politics can learn a good deal from two

documents: (1) Stalin's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in April 1929;[1] (2) Stalin's Report at the Seventeenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1934.[2]

In the official volume of Stalin's collected writings and speeches, significantly called *Leninism*, the speech of April 1929 has the heading: *The Right Deviation in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.* The use of that sinister word 'deviation' shows that we are in the throes of the final stage of the Russian revolution in which Stalin destroyed all the old Bolshevik leaders and turned the imaginary dictatorship of the proletariat into the ruthless personal dictatorship of Joseph Stalin. There was now not only a sacred communist ideology derived from the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, but an official 'party line' based upon that ideology and, in particular, upon Lenin. I said above that Stalin's book is significantly entitled *Leninism*. Leninism was invented by Stalin and it became the most deadly weapon with which he assassinated his opponents. In 1925, in alliance with Zinoviev and Kamenev, he took the crucial step in the destruction of Trotsky, forcing him to resign from the Commissariat of War. In 1926 he turned upon Zinoviev and Kamenev and, at the end of 1927, in alliance with Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, had them expelled from the Communist Party by the Fifteenth Congress. He then turned upon Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, publicly denounced them in 1929, and had Rykov deposed from the premiership of the Soviet government, Tomsky from the leadership of the trade unions, and Bukharin from the leadership of the Communist International. In 1936 Zinoviev, Kamenev, and 14 others were tried, condemned, and executed; in 1938 Bukharin and Rykov suffered the same fate (Tomsky committed suicide before the trial).

The initial charge which Stalin brought against each of these leaders, and which led first to their fall from power and then to trial and execution, was that they had 'deviated' from what he called Leninism, but what was, in effect, only a particular policy supported at the moment by Stalin and therefore treated by him as the 'official party line'. Thus Kamenev and Zinoviev were broken and beaten as 'Left

[1] *Leninism*, Vol. II, by Joseph Stalin, pp. 184-240.

[2] *A Handbook of Marxism*, edited by Emile Burns, pp. 911-56.

Deviationists', Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky as 'Right Deviationists'. It is characteristic of the political antics of the human being that the Leninist policy from which Zinoviev and Kamenev deviated to their doom in 1926 was the policy of Bukharin, which was then supported by Stalin, and the Leninist policy from which Bukharin deviated to his doom in 1929 was the policy of Zinoviev and Kamenev which had now become Stalin's policy and the official party line.

Stalin's speech of 1929 which destroyed Bukharin is well worth examination. 1929 was a crucial year in the history of Russia and communism and in the life of Stalin. It was the year in which Stalin embarked upon his most 'ruthless' policy of agricultural collectivization and the complete liquidation of the kulaks. In his speech he attacks Bukharin for all kinds of deviations,[1] but these are really just feints or diversions, his main offensive is against Bukharin's internal policy, his opposi-

[1] The niceties of communist ideological controversies at the highest level —and the reader should remember that they may involve life or death to the controversialist—are revealed in some of Stalin's accusations against Bukharin. For instance, Stalin attacks him because he 'spoke of the necessity of fighting the Right deviation, but not a word was said about the fight against conciliation with the Right deviation. That, of course, is a great defect.' It is interesting to note that the continual use of the words 'deviation' and 'deviate' by Stalin and other heresy-hunting communists is precisely the same as its use by the earliest heresy-hunting Christians. The hunting of the Christian heretic was already an established pastime of Fathers and Saints of the church in the 3rd century. Professor J. N. D. Kelly in his *Early Christian Creeds* (p. 46) quotes a letter of St. Cyprian in which he is attacking the Novatianist heretics. He argues that it is not true that they do not 'deviate from us in the baptismal interrogation'. The explanation is that whether you are a Saint of the Catholic Church in the 3rd century or a communist mugwump in the 20th, if you pursue the same object by similar means—i.e. pursuit of power over the lives of men through holy writs, creeds, or economic dogmas of which you are the only interpreter —then the logic of facts forces you along the same road—even to the use of the same catchwords and language. The power of the rulers of the Catholic Church or of Soviet Russia rests upon a monopoly of metaphysical or economic truth. The creeds, rules, dogmas, and laws in which the church or government give the official interpretation of absolute truth have to be carried out meticulously by the subjects to the last dot of the *i* or cross of the *t*, if the rulers are to maintain power. The slightest 'deviation' from the official 'line', whether by Novatian or Bukharin, must be treated as heresy and the heretic must, if possible, be liquidated. The next stage is that, if the ruler wishes to liquidate someone, he only has to fasten a 'deviation' on him.

tion to Stalin's violent policy against the kulaks and of intensified collectivization. It is unnecessary to go into the details of the argument. The point which I am concerned with is Stalin's use of and attitude towards ideology. The extraordinary thing, to anyone used to the procedure in western democracies, is that he does not attempt to show that his policy will produce good practical results and Bukharin's bad. He appears to be completely uninterested in the economic effects of the policies upon agricultural and industrial production or upon the lives of Russians. He attacks Bukharin, not because Bukharin's policy would produce bad economic results, but because, he maintains, it conflicts with the theory of Marx and Lenin.

Bukharin had opposed the 'anti-muzhik' measures, the intensification of agricultural collectivization and complete liquidation of the kulaks, demanded by the 'Left deviationists', Kamenev and Zinoviev. He deprecated violent action against the peasants, foreseeing their violent resistance and the disastrous effects upon agricultural economy. His policy was to establish a 'network of cooperative peasant organizations' among the middle or poor peasants so that these 'cooperative nuclei' might 'grow into the system of our general state organs and in that way become links in the single chain of socialist economy'. And he maintained that the kulaks too, though they would remain 'to a certain extent alien bodies', would 'in exactly the same way, through the banks, etc., grow into the same system'.

Bukharin's argument was concerned with the economic and social effects of the two rival policies. Stalin ignores this and in his long speech attacks Bukharin solely on ideological or theoretical grounds: his object is to prove his opponents to be 'deviationists', heretics from Marxism and Leninism. He begins at once with this frontal attack:

> What is the theoretical basis for this blindness and confusion of Comrade Bukharin's group? I consider that the theoretical foundation for this blindness and confusion is Comrade Bukharin's incorrect non-Marxian approach to the question of the class struggle in our country. I have in mind Comrade Bukharin's non-Marxian theory that the kulaks will grow into socialism, the failure to understand the mechanism of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Stalin's argument is simplicity itself. Marx and Lenin had laid it down that in the class struggle against the capitalists the antagonism of class interests is irreconcilable; the kulaks are capitalists; 'Bukharin's theory of the kulaks growing into socialism is therefore a departure from the Marx-Leninist theory of the class struggle'. Therefore off with his head outside and let us get on with the liquidation of the kulaks.

The whole of Stalin's attack upon Bukharin—and it goes on for pages—is based upon 'ideology'. He attacks him, for instance, because Bukharin had said that all the peasants were poor, including even the kulaks, and that to differentiate the 'middle' from the 'poor' peasant was unrealistic, for even the 'middle' peasant 'lived a half-starved existence'. Bukharin's point was that to destroy millions of impoverished peasants after labelling them 'kulaks' and capitalists and to disrupt the whole agricultural economy in the process would have disastrous results. Stalin's answer is not that Bukharin is wrong in maintaining that Stalin's policy will disrupt the economy of Russia and have disastrous economic results, but that Bukharin's 'conception of the peasantry' is 'irreconcilable with Leninism'. And this is how he proceeds to bludgeon Bukharin with the sacred name of Lenin:

> Lenin said that the peasantry is *the last capitalist class*. . . . Why is the peasantry described as the last capitalist class? Because of the two main classes of which our society is composed, the peasantry is a class whose economy is based on private property and small commodity production. Because the peasantry, as long as it remains a peasantry, living by small commodity production, will throw up capitalists from its ranks. . . . That means that we want, not *any kind* of alliance with the peasantry, but only *such an alliance* as is based on the struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry. Thus you see that Lenin's thesis that the peasantry represents the last capitalist class . . . supplies the basis for . . . an alliance between the working class and the peasantry directed against the capitalist elements in our economy. Lenin advanced that thesis in order to show that the alliance between the working class and the peasantry can be a firm one only, provided it is based on a struggle against those very capitalist elements which the peasantry throws up from its midst.
>
> Comrade Bukharin's error consists in the fact that he does not understand and does not approve of this simple matter; he forgets

the social groupings of the countryside; he loses sight of the kulaks and the poor peasants, and all he sees is one uniform mass of middle peasants. This is undoubtedly a deviation to the Right on the part of Comrade Bukharin. . . .

There is something sinister and terrifying in Stalin's method of argumentation. It is something new in the horrible history of human politics. In the history of religion and the hunting down of heretics by their fellow-Christians, for 2,000 years we have grown accustomed to this kind of irrational perversion of reason, the use of subtle argumentation about theory and dogma, not for the establishment of truth, but as a means to power and an excuse for murder. But it is new in politics. No one before the communists succeeded in establishing a corpus of political dogma and a small political caste who enjoy a monopoly of dogmatical interpretation and who have set up a body of complicated theories, labelled by them Marxism or Leninism, which, they claim, enable them to turn a million half-starved peasants into a million 'capitalists' and 'enemies of the people' in order to justify their extermination. For the errors which they made and the evil which they did politically, before the 20th-century kings, dictators, and statesmen either offered no rational excuses or, if they condescended to argue, at least attempted to prove that the results of their actions were good. In Russia it is irrelevant that in fact, if actions are to be judged by their results, Stalin was completely wrong and Bukharin completely right. The liquidation of the kulaks was not merely an act of horrible social barbarity; it had disastrous economic results for the Russian people, precisely as Bukharin had foretold. But Stalin is not concerned with results or facts or with the sufferings of peasants, kulaks, or capitalists; he is not concerned with whether what Bukharin is saying is true, reasonable, or practical; he is concerned solely with proving that what Bukharin is saying is inconsistent with an imaginary theory of Lenin, and that he is therefore, like the kulak, worthy of liquidation.

It is unnecessary to pursue further Stalin's attack upon the 'Right deviationists' in 1929. It fills many pages, analysing many different 'errors' of Bukharin, but the method and the use of ideology and Leninism as lethal weapons are always exactly the same. It is, however, worth while to give some attention to Stalin's Report at the 17th Congress of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union five years later in 1934. Those five years between 1929 and 1934 were an interlude of comparative calm in the struggle for power between Stalin and the old Bolshevik leaders. The interlude was due to the fact that to all appearances he had already won the battle against them. Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Bukharin were all in the wilderness; Stalin had ejected them from all posts in which they could have exercised power, and he himself controlled all strategical and tactical positions within the party. In fact it was the ominous calm preceding the most violent and bloody of all the Russian communists' domestic storms. A few months after Stalin addressed the party, Sergei Kirov, Stalin's governor of Leningrad, was assassinated by a young communist who regarded himself as a follower of Zinoviev and, therefore, incriminated the Left deviationists. There followed, according to communist custom, a reign of terror in which thousands of persons were executed, imprisoned, or deported. And this in turn was followed by Stalin's final holocaust of all possible rivals to power, the great purges, trials, and executions of the years 1936, 1937, and 1938. Kamenev, Zinoviev, and the Left deviationists were executed in 1936, the generals of the Red Army in 1937, and, after the execution of Bukharin, Rykov, and Yagoda in the spring of 1938, no one was left to dispute the triumph of Leninism and Stalin.

Stalin's address to the 1934 Congress shows symptoms of a divided mind. On the surface he appears to have beaten his opponents. He begins on a note of triumph. 'The present Congress', he says, 'is taking place under the flag of the complete victory of Leninism, under the flag of the liquidation of the remnants of anti-Leninist groups. . . . The anti-Leninist-Trotskyist group has been defeated and scattered. . . . The anti-Leninist Right deviationist group has been defeated and scattered. . . . The national deviationist groups have been defeated and scattered.' And he continues:

> At this Congress there is nothing to prove and, perhaps, no one to beat. Everyone now sees that the line of the party has conquered. The policy of industrializing the country has conquered. Its results are obvious to everyone. What argument can be advanced against this fact? The policy of liquidating the kulaks and of mass collectivization has conquered. Its results are obvious to everyone. What argument can be advanced against that fact? The experience of our

country has shown that it is quite possible to build socialism in a single country taken separately. What argument can be advanced against that fact? Evidently, all these successes, and primarily the victory of the Five-Year Plan, have utterly demoralized and smashed to atoms all and sundry anti-Leninist groups. It must be admitted that the party today is as united as it never was before.

One or two things in this remarkable statement deserve notice. First the use of 'Leninism'. The policies which had 'conquered' had nothing to do with Lenin; they were Stalin's policies. But those who opposed his policies are damned collectively as 'anti-Leninist groups'. The results of political action are ignored; the only result considered is whether an anti-Leninist group has been 'defeated and scattered'. The test is still, as it was in 1929, whether an opponent's policy can be twisted into a political heresy, into a 'deviation' from an imaginary Leninist ideology. This kind of Alice in Wonderland argument is characteristic of dictatorships and police states. How much knowledge of truth and fact regarding internal conditions ever penetrates to the ordinary man in the Russian police state cannot be known to an outsider, but there must have been many in his audience who had a rough idea of the appalling results of Stalin's agricultural policy. To them and to the unfortunate victims, the hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children liquidated as kulaks to make a communist and ideological holiday, Stalin and the government offer no sane or rational excuse or justification for what they did; they completely ignore the effects of their actions in terms of human misery and happiness, destitution and prosperity. All they offer is the cold comfort of what in any other age would have been recognized as stale dogma and almost meaningless theoretical disputes.

History has made us so familiar with the incredible stupidity and ferocity of human beings in their social relations that we regard it as natural for governments to act like lunatics and savages. But there is something peculiarly horrifying in the perversion of reason in these speeches of Stalin, in the dialectical lunacy of communist practice. Hitler and Mussolini were very nasty things in human history, but so too were some of the Jewish kings, Roman emperors, and more modern rulers; so too were Jack the Ripper, Landru, and many unfortunates whom we now certify as insane. But the evil which such men

do is understandable and remediable. Chance or the social folly and supineness of ordinary men have always made it possible for some common gangster, moral pervert, or paranoiac occasionally and for a time to get himself into a position where he can control immense political or military power. The evil which such a man may do, the misery which he may inflict upon millions of individuals may be tremendous; but the whole phenomenon is in a real sense 'natural' and reasonable. The evil acts are the logical result of evil minds, the insane acts of insane thoughts, and if we entrust the rule of great cities or states to squalid criminals and dangerous lunatics, like Al Capone and Hitler, we must expect to find our lives for a time regulated by the social standards of the blackmailer, murderer, or homicidal maniac. Such men, as I said, cause incredible misery; but they are transitory and so, in an important sense, are their effects. They may destroy a civilized state, but they rarely, if ever, leave a permanent scar on the standards of civilization, for the real danger to civilization comes, not from the barbarian, but from the civilized.

That is why there is something peculiarly sinister, a new social horror, in Stalin's speeches and the practice of Russian communism. These men are not common gangsters or criminals; they are not paranoiacs or pathological sadists. They belong, of right, to the main current of European civilization. Their original social and personal objectives had as little resemblance to those of an Al Capone or Hitler as did those of Socrates or Christ, Marcus Aurelius or Justinian, Jeremy Bentham or William Ewart Gladstone. They are committed by their social tradition to the application of reason and humanity to the affairs of state and of society, which, in their view, are the affairs of the mass of ordinary men. Yet in the course of a few years they have evolved a political system as frigidly inhuman, as insanely irrational as that of the fascist or nazi. In 1934 in Russia there were millions of peasants; they formed, in fact, the majority of the population. Whether kulaks, middle peasants, or poor peasants, they formed, therefore, the majority of the mass of ordinary men. The controversy between Stalin and Bukharin concerned, not an academic question of social theory or economic ideology, but the prosperity or misery, the life or death of these millions who, in Marxist phraseology, belong to 'the toiling masses'. All this is completely ignored in

Stalin's policy, in his political actions, and in his argument with Bukharin. These millions of the 'toiling masses' are condemned, the more prosperous to death and destitution, the poorer to revolt and misery. And if you ask 'Why?', Stalin's answer is: 'Because Lenin said that the peasant is the last capitalist class'. We seem here to have reached a stage in political insanity and inhumanity in which there is no longer any real connection between what men think or say and what they do.

This travesty of human reason, this murdering of common sense, is just as apparent in the rest of Stalin's 1934 speech. There is also apparent the habitual ignorance of the dictator regarding what is happening in the world around him. Stalin ended his triumphant account of 'the complete victory of Leninism' with the words: 'It must be admitted that the Party is as united as it never has been before'. He had said the same thing to the Sixteenth Congress of the party in 1930: 'No one now denies the unquestionable fact that never has the party been so united around its Central Committee as it is today'. But in 1934, when Stalin made this statement, the disunity of the party was so profound that within a few months it broke out into a kind of civil war and reign of terror which lasted for three years. 'Unity' was only restored after Stalin had put to death all the political leaders of the first rank and most of the generals, and had liquidated by shooting or imprisonment thousands of party members.

And in the rest of his speech Stalin showed that he himself had a divided mind. He had no sooner announced 'the complete victory of Leninism' and the defeat and scattering of all deviationists than he turned round and said that this did not mean that 'all is well with the party' or that 'there will be no more deviations'. There follow pages of ideological argument the object of which is to prove that deviations to the Right, to the Left, to 'Great Russian nationalism', and to 'local nationalism' are still dangerously alive within the party. The method of argument is precisely the same as in the previous instances examined by me and I do not, therefore, propose to give more that one—but a very interesting—example. The effects of Stalin's ruthless policy of liquidating the more prosperous and efficient peasants and of rapid collectivization of farms had been so disastrous to all the peasants and to agriculture generally that he was compelled to modify and even reverse his

policy. He had, it is true, destroyed the prosperous peasants who numbered between 1 and 2 millions. The poorest peasants, who in communist ideology were treated as a single class or sub-class and were estimated to number between 5 and 8 millions, had nothing to lose but their poverty and in the main probably welcomed the 'reforms'. But the 'middle peasants' of the communist classification, who formed the large majority of the agricultural population—they were estimated to number about 16 millions or two-thirds of all the peasantry—were in revolt against collectivization. At first Stalin was 'ruthless' with them, but when at last it became clear that ruthlessness was failing, an attempt was made to conciliate them by modifying the form of collectivization. The original form adopted by him was, in accordance with the pure theory of communist ideology, the completely collectivized, equalitarian 'commune'. When he decided to reverse the policy of ruthlessness and to try to placate the middle peasants—that 'last capitalist class'—he stopped the attempt to force them into communes, and substituted the 'artel' as the unit of agricultural organization and collectivization. The difference between the commune and the artel was, as Stalin himself points out, that in the artel only the means of production were socialized, whereas in the commune both the means of production and the everyday life of every member of the commune were socialized. In fact this meant that in the artel the peasant owned poultry, livestock, a cow, grain, a garden, whereas in a commune all such property was communal.

Unfortunately there were good communists in the party who could not keep pace with Stalin's shifts of policy. They remembered that only a short time before, Bukharin and his associates had been excommunicated as Right deviationists for opposing agricultural ruthlessness and urging that the wind of collectivization should be tempered to the shorn peasants. The tempering was to take the form of accepting up to a point their passion for property and encouraging them 'to grow into socialism'. Now in 1934 Stalin was adopting the policy and supporting it with the arguments of the very men whom, a few years ago, he had 'conquered and scattered' as heretics against Leninism. But he found himself faced by a faction within the party who used against his new policy the very arguments which he had used against Bukharin. His attack upon them is remarkable.

'They are of the opinion', he says, 'that by declaring the artel to be the fundamental form of the collective farm movement, the party had removed itself from socialism, had retreated from the commune, from the higher form of the collective farm movement, to the lower form.' In a long theoretical disquisition he proves that they are ideologically heretics and sinners against Leninism. Their heresy is the heresy of 'equalitarianism'. They demand the commune instead of the artel because they demand 'equality in the sphere of requirements and personal life'. But, 'every Leninist knows, if he is a real Leninist, that equality in the sphere of requirements and personal life is a piece of reactionary petty-bourgeois stupidity worthy of a primitive sect of ascetics, but not of socialist society organized on Marxian lines'. He then quotes Marx and Engels to show that those who continued to demand full collectivization through the commune—which Stalin himself had pronounced to be Marxian, when he liquidated Bukharin for opposing it —were apostates in regard to the Marx-Engels-Lenin doctrine of equality. For 'by equality Marxism means, not equality in personal requirements and personal life, but the abolition of classes. . . . That is the Marxian conception of equality. Marxism had not recognized, nor does it recognize, any other equality.'

Here again, risking the charge of repetition, I must point out what is most fantastic in this extraordinary phenomenon. The question which Stalin was discussing involved the life and death, the poverty or prosperity, or, at the lowest, the contentment or discontent of some 16 million Russian workers. Yet he makes the only test of the rightness or wrongness of a 'policy', i.e. of political action, the question whether it conforms to or is incompatible with a dogmatical definition of the *meaning* of equality adopted by Marx nearly 100 years ago. The policy of his opponents is proved to be wrong, because it envisages a type of equality which is not covered by Marx's 'conception of equality', and the only kind of equality recognized by Marxism is the kind defined by Marx. It follows, as Stalin then points out, that if his opponents are not 'Left deviationists', they are perilously near to those heretics. It is worth while to quote his conclusion in his own words:

There cannot be any doubt that the confusion in the minds of individual members of the party concerning Marxian socialism and their infatuation with the equalitarian tendencies of agricultural

communes are as like as two peas to the petty-bourgeois views of our 'Leftist' blockheads who at one time idealized the agricultural commune to such an extent that they even tried to implant the commune in the factories where skilled and unskilled workers, each working at his trade, had to put his wages into the common fund which was then shared out equally. We know what harm these infantile equalitarian exercises of our 'Leftist' blockheads caused our industry. As you see, the remnants of the ideology of the defeated anti-party groups still display considerable tenacity. It goes without saying that if these 'Leftist' views were to triumph in the party, the party would cease to be Marxian, and the collective farm movement would finally be disorganized.

The examples which I have given above are sufficient to show clearly the attitude which the head of the communist state adopts towards ideology and the political use which he makes of it. The political and psychological interpretation of the facts is not so clear. Economic dogmas, under the generalized labels of Marxism or Leninism, have become in the hands of Stalin and his lieutenants effective instruments of power and rule. Primarily their use is within the party as instruments or weapons against rivals for power, rival policies, or dissidents regarded for some reason as dangerous. The investigator of the causes and effects of men's political actions is here confronted with several difficult questions.

The ideology itself, the highly theoretical dogmas about economics and human society, are sometimes of great interest and importance; they are sometimes trivial, nonsensical, or even meaningless. They are nearly always theories involving very complicated judgments on probabilities, ethics, and standards of value. At their worst they are the kind of belief or delusion which a reasonable man would dismiss as solemn nonsense; at their best they are the kind of generalization which a reasonable man recognizes as one among several 'principles' or objects which he must bear in mind if he is to come to a right decision with regard to some political action. Consider, for instance, the question of equality. Equality, as a 'principle' or aim in political affairs, is of high importance. A reasonable man might well make equality one of his social aims and in considering the advisability or inadvisability of any particular political action his judgment and decision would be naturally

influenced by his judgment whether this particular action would result in more or less equality. The exact nature of the equality which he wishes to produce is also relevant, for if he is not clear as to the kind of social equality which he wants, he may well find in the end that he has produced a result exactly the opposite of what he intended.

Let us apply these standards of political rationality to the particular controversy about agricultural reform between Stalin and the Right deviationists. Both sides agreed with regard to the following general objects: (1) the socialization of Russian agriculture; (2) some measure of collectivization of farms as a step towards socialization; (3) the improvement of Russian agricultural economy. The difference between the two sides and their policies was really with regard to the means of attaining these objects. Stalin's policy was (1) the immediate and complete collectivization of agriculture by forcing all the middle and poor peasants into communes, and (2) the immediate expropriation of some 1 million families of peasants vaguely defined as well-to-do or kulaks, i.e. the sudden condemnation of 5 million men, women, and children of the Russian labouring class to complete destitution or to death. The Right deviationists' policy was opposed to Stalin's in proposing: (1) gradual and modified collectivization; (2) gradual and mainly indirect pressure upon the kulaks in order to integrate them in a socialized agricultural economy.

Let us assume that a rational non-communist accepted the three general objects in which Stalin and the Right deviationists agreed. How would he have proceeded if he wished to come to a reasonable decision as to which of the two policies ought to be adopted? He would, I think, have based his decision, as we continually do in the affairs of everyday life, on an estimate of probable results with reference to the general objects, to 'principles', and to standards of social value. He would, for instance, have had to consider whether a ruthless attempt to force millions of peasants, notoriously ultra-conservative and stubborn, into collective farms would not meet with such ruthless opposition from them as, not only to prevent socialization, but to disrupt agricultural life and impair agricultural production. He would, too, weigh in the balance the results in misery and suffering which would be imposed upon 5 million persons by the liquidation of the kulaks. Here standards of

social value would complicate his decision. For he would hold that death and destitution are socially bad things when imposed on anyone, no matter what they are or what you choose to call them, and that no society or government is justified in imposing them on large numbers of its subjects unless it is impossible otherwise to prevent a worse evil or it is certain that the imposition of this enormous evil will inevitably result in a much greater good. This standard of social value is the standard of humanity which before the 20th century had come to be accepted as an integral part of European civilization.

This analysis is, no doubt, crude and elementary, but if one wants to understand the whats and whys in political action and social psychology, these are the simple things which one must consider. By ignoring them historians and political scientists seem to me too often to give a false view of history and politics and laboriously to teach us to regard the incredible stupidity and savagery with which we conduct our communal affairs as wise or inevitable. To understand communism and Soviet Russia one must examine the words and actions of the government and politicians in relation to these elementary things. If one does this, certain important things are immediately revealed.

First, let us go back to the elementary question of judging a policy or political action by the test of results. As I have pointed out more than once above, the most extraordinary thing about Stalin—who is commonly represented, both by his friends and foes, as a ruthless realist—is that he never directly defends or attacks a policy by dealing with its economic and social results. He deals, not with facts, but with dogma and theory. And even his opponents, though their case fundamentally was that Stalin's agricultural policy would have and did have disastrous economic results, never seem to make a frontal attack upon it from that point of view. It is only by implication and as a side issue that the devastating results on agricultural production are brought in by them. They accept Stalin's tests of policy and action, and the tests are dogmatical orthodoxy or heresy. They accept the insane hypothesis that the question whether the government should deliberately reduce to destitution and starvation 5 million already impoverished persons should depend upon whether these persons, defined as kulaks,

are classified, according to Marx and Lenin, as 'capitalists'.

At this point the communist would almost certainly raise an objection to my argument, an objection which I have deliberately hitherto left up the communist's sleeve. Stalin, he would say, and even the Right deviationists are in fact making results the supreme test of policy. But the result which they use as a test is the destruction of capitalism. That is and should be the supreme object of communist policy, and that is why the question whether kulaks are or are not capitalists is supremely relevant. Whether an act of government is justified depends upon whether it will result in the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of communism. That was why Stalin was right, having proved that the kulaks were capitalists, to destroy them.

This communist argument rests upon an attitude of mind and a principle of political action which have had a terrible effect upon human history. They are not confined to communists, though perhaps communists have in recent European history pursued the logic of this social insanity more ferociously and disastrously than the other 'packs and sects of great ones that ebb and flow by the moon'. I have often heard 'fellow-travellers', and persons with much less sympathy with communist theory and practice than a fellow-traveller, talk as though it were self-evident that such things as the liquidation of the kulaks, the great purges, and the imprisonment of the human mind, though 'deplorable' in themselves, can be defended or condoned if you accept the communist view that the destruction of capitalism is the end to aim at and that it cannot be attained without destroying kulaks, Trotskyists, and the human mind.

The argument rests upon an assumption which is occasionally accepted in the affairs of ordinary life, but there, if a man accepts it, we recognize that he is either insane or feeble-minded. I remember reading in a newspaper some years ago that a coal-miner took home with him some dynamite used in the mine and blew up his house with it, seriously injuring himself at the same time. Enquiry showed that his house had been infested with blackbeetles and that his intention in using the dynamite was merely to destroy them. I can see no essential difference between the policy or method of the miner with the blackbeetles and those of Stalin in 1930 with the kulaks, except

that everyone recognizes that the miner was imbecile and that Stalin is a great man and statesman.

The assumption of the miner and Stalin is not merely that the end justifies the means, though that lunatic belief is probably included in the mental processes which led to the respective actions. There is a more subtle and even more dangerous ingredient in their minds. Let us once more examine the mind of Stalin. His ultimate object of political action is quite clear; he states it again and again. It is the creation of a communist society and the destruction of capitalism. The object is clear, but it is by no means simple. On the contrary it is extremely complicated and can only be described in very general terms. It is a political object which, Stalin and all communists agree, involves a gigantic task which requires a long period of time for its accomplishment. Even after 30 years of communist rule, under the inspired leadership of Lenin and Stalin, full communism, they continually tell us, has not yet been attained, the perfect classless society has not been established, the state has not withered away, and capitalism and capitalists have not been completely eradicated.

Communism is one of those intricate and gigantic social ideals which, ever since the beginning of civilization, have from time to time captured and inflamed the imaginations of a few men, encouraged them to desperate revolts against evil, and left behind in human history a trail of glory, hope, savagery, and misery. As a rule, the higher the ideal, the more fanatic has been the idealist, and the more abominable have been the sufferings which he has inflicted upon the mass of ordinary men. The reason for this fantastic sequence of nobility and degradation, of good and evil is always the same. The vagueness, intricacy, and grandeur of the ultimate object make it seem to its worshippers so important that everything must be sacrificed to it. When the blessings and glories of heaven are there before our eyes, it would be folly and cowardice not to do everything in order to attain it, they say. You must sometimes do evil in order to produce what is good, for omelettes, they say, are not made without the breaking of eggs.

This view has been almost universally accepted, particularly by those sitting in the seats of power, in all ages of our history; in the world of today it is the major plague which we have invented for our social destruction. As a rule of conduct it is

intrinsically so unsound that, if acted upon, it must almost inevitably defeat the ultimate object and lead to great disasters. Let me first state what seems to me the only safe and rational rule of social conduct in this matter, in order to shorten the proof of the unsoundness of the view that, provided you have a grand enough social object, you are justified in causing any amount of immediate evil and suffering in order to attain it. A rational and civilized man would, in my opinion, act socially and politically, as in fact normally he does in his private life, on exactly the opposite principle. Large social ideals, like communism or democracy, liberty and social equality, are of immense importance; they are the warp upon which alone we can weave the pattern of a civilized life. Unless they are firmly in the minds of the mass of common men and of the government as a kind of compass by which they continually and almost unconsciously set their political course, progress towards a civilized society is practically impossible. But though we should believe passionately in our ultimate social objects and ideals, we should persistently examine with the coldest scepticism the immediate means proposed for attaining our purposes. Our general rule of political conduct should be: the greater and grander our social object is, the more certain it is that we are not justified in seeking to attain it by any action which will immediately produce evil and misery on a large scale. In other words, though it may be reasonable to do a little evil in order that a little (or even a large) good may come of it, it is insane to do a great evil that a great good may come of it. And the reason simply is that, though little, and sometimes great, goods often come out of little evils, great goods practically never come out of great evils—and, if they do, no human being can foresee them.

Some of the reasons for accepting this as the general rule of political conduct have already emerged in the previous discussion. For instance, these large-scale social objectives, like communism, are complex, long-term projects. They involve, no doubt, the destruction of much of the social fabric which the past has secreted. In other words, a 'revolution' is often necessary and salutary; but to bring into existence the society envisaged, say, in the *Communist Manifesto*, you must build as well as demolish. It is only in politics that people regard destruction and construction as the same thing. Destruction is

a simple matter and its immediate effects can usually be accurately foretold. You may destroy capitalism by destroying capitalists, and you can liquidate a capitalist by shooting or expropriating him and a kulak by starving him to death. But any number of shot capitalists and starved kulaks cannot be said to constitute a society in which the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all.

The historical truth which I am here trying to insist upon as an induction from experience is so elementary and simple that it is almost universally ignored, particularly by great men. The truth is that the means adopted are precisely those which cannot produce the ends desired. The infliction of large-scale social evil in the immediate present makes the attainment of large-scale social good in a remote future so improbable that sane and civilized people, if they existed, would always treat its attainment by such means as impossible. It is a simple case of the evil which we do living after us and our good intentions being interred with our and, unfortunately, other people's bones. Even the Holy Roman Church seems to have been convinced by experience that the slaughter of Albigenses and the torture and burning of heretics could not produce a Christian society or a Christian church. The means—the pain, suffering, and death of thousands—were easy enough; the object was difficult and complicated; and the evil in the means made the good in the object unattainable. In the 18th century the invention of the guillotine seemed to make the liquidation of those who opposed the revolution a simple matter. So it was, but every time the knife fell it made the creation of a society based upon liberty, equality, and fraternity more improbable. And the same is true in Russia today. The liquidation of kulaks and capitalists is easy enough, but it is not the state, it is the socialist society which withers in the sufferings of the liquidated. The police state remains; the ideals of Marx and Lenin are interred in communist resolutions.

The idea that ruthlessness is an important element in statesmanship has been popularized in our age by the three great dictators, Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin. It is one of the most ancient of all political delusions and is in fact the *reductio ad absurdum* of the delusion with which I am dealing here. It was practised ages ago by Sumerian kings and by Xerxes. It was a baneful tradition of the ancient Roman statesmanship. The

Church of Rome, Cromwell, Louis XIV, and Napoleon all spread ruin and misery around them and defeated themselves by means of it. Only in Athens, where human beings enjoyed for a brief moment a lucid interval in their chronic lunacy, was it realized that ruthlessness was the hall-mark of the barbarian and the bungler: the wise man, even if a statesman, should practise moderation, compromise, and scepticism. And the reason is that ruthlessness, the occupational disease of rulers, defeats itself.

There is a second reason why the ruthless adoption of means which involve the certainty of great evils in order ultimately to attain a great social good is disastrous. It destroys or perverts our sense of social values and therefore the foundations of civilization. The lowering of social standards of value in recent times, to which I drew attention earlier in this book, is largely due, I believe, to the modern doctrine and practice that in order to make life on earth a paradise for all it is necessary first to turn it into a hell for many. What actually happens is that, as we have seen so often in our investigation of social psychology, the means are confused with the ends and the values appropriate to the ends are unconsciously transferred to the means. It is a good thing, says the church, to save the souls of sinners and in order to save them it is unfortunately necessary to burn heretics. Soon the 'unfortunately' drops out and the burning of heretics becomes a merit, an end in itself. What was regarded at first as a social evil is now regarded as a social good, and the civilized scale of values is contaminated and destroyed.

In the revolutionary trinity of 1789 fraternity stood for something of immense importance, painfully evolved, in European standards of social value. It was destroyed by the guillotine, which, in a few years, taught the revolutionaries to accept a standard which was the exact antithesis, and still call it 'fraternity'. At first the killing of a few aristocrats was regarded as an 'unfortunate necessity' in order to 'safeguard' the revolution. But the killing of aristocrats is immediate and simple, the 'revolution' complex, vague, unsubstantial, in the far future. Soon the killing of aristocrats becomes, in the minds of innumerable revolutionaries, indistinguishable from the revolution. The stage is then reached at which to kill aristocrats and other enemies of the revolution is good in itself, and becomes the principal duty and pleasure of revolutionaries; and then

at last comes the final stage in which the killing of revolutionaries by one another in a struggle for power is regarded as the essence of the revolution and of fraternity.

The same dreary process of contamination and corruption has been pursued in Russia. Civilization cannot be built upon the communal psychology of chronic hatred, but in the theory and practice of 19th-century socialism hatred inevitably took an ominously prominent place. The *Communist Manifesto*, like the Sermon on the Mount, is an appeal to and for the under-dog, but where Christ appealed to the psychology of love, Marx and Engels appealed to that of hate. Theirs was not the religion of meekness; it was a call to battle addressed to the economic under-dogs of capitalism. 'Workers of the world,' they said, 'unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains. Unite to expropriate the expropriators!' I am not arguing that Marx and Engels were wrong; on the contrary in the main they were, I believe, fundamentally right. The socialist ownership and control of industry by the community, which involved the expropriation of the expropriators, was certainly desirable and probably inevitable. But the expropriation of an expropriator is not an end; it is not good in itself; it is a means to a social end, and, being a means which will almost certainly cause human suffering, should be used by civilized and therefore humane people with restraint and even regret. I am aware, of course, that what I am now saying will appear ridiculous and trivial to most communists and many socialists and capitalists, but I am discussing standards of social value and considerations such as these are of the essence of my subject—which is not trivial, but of the highest communal importance. The pattern of social life, and therefore of individual lives, is determined as much by the relation of communal emotions to communal values as by communal beliefs and desires.

The persistent appeal to communal hatred is one of the most remarkable features in Russian communism. We have already noticed it in the use of ideology by Soviet rulers. The theme is always an attack upon guilty men or guilty classes—capitalists, kulaks, imperialists, war-mongers, Trotskyists, or some other species of deviationist. The Russian people are subjected to an uninterrupted stream of what is now called propaganda. It is an unending stream of incitement to the hatred of wicked people who are represented as the unscrupulous enemies of

Russia and of the masses. It is these capitalists or kulaks, imperialists or Americans, and their dupes and hirelings, who deliberately prevent the workers of Russia and of the world from attaining the Marxist or communist millennium. Therefore the first duty of the good communist is to hate them and the second to liquidate them.

The Russian communist has thus followed obediently the same path as the Church of Rome and the French revolutionaries. A society based upon the hatred, persecution and burning of heretics was substituted for a society based upon Christian love and pity; a society based upon the hatred and murder of aristocrats and revolutionaries was substituted for a society based upon liberty, equality, and fraternity; and today we are watching the substitution of a society based upon the hatred and liquidation of capitalists and deviationists for one based upon freedom and socialism. The resemblance in this evolution of communal psychology and actions is not fortuitous. In each case the evolution is the result of the belief that in order to attain a great good you must do great evil; for there follows in each case the confusion of means with ends and the destruction of civilized standards of social value.

I must, at this point, again attempt to guard myself from misunderstanding and misrepresentation by repeating that I am not saying that this corruption of social values is peculiar to communism or the result of some peculiar wickedness in communists. One of the few pleasures in life which, I feel, we should habitually deny ourselves is the moral and intellectual comfort which we all derive from discovering that someone else is wicked; you should, in fact, call no man wicked until he (or, better still, you) is dead. Stupidity and what we call wickedness, which is often a kind of ethical stupidity or muddled sense of values, seem to me to be distributed with even-handed generosity among us all. All social and political sects and all national communities—in fact, I should say too, all individuals —from time to time stupidly do some immediate evil for the sake of some distant good, and, when the evil becomes only too apparent and makes the attainment of the good more and more improbable, confuse in their minds the evil means with the good end. And when the evil that we do is, as it nearly always is, someone else's suffering, we justify ourselves by discovering that the sufferer is the chief obstacle to our attaining the distant

good, and therefore an appropriate object of Christian or social hatred.

You can observe in the capitalists who hate communism precisely the same psychological and communal processes as in the communists who hate capitalism. You can also, no doubt, observe it in those believers in the traditions of democracy and humanism, among whom I count myself, who hate totalitarian dictatorships. But even in history and politics two wrongs do not make a right, and the almost universal belief that if you can only accumulate a sufficient number of wrongs they add up to a right is a vulgar error in ethical mathematics. At any rate in the world of today the do-evil-that-good-may-come-of-it communal psychology and the political results of it, which I have been examining, are more virulent and more dangerous in Russian communism than elsewhere. The reason is that it has been adopted as the main instrument of government by the rulers of a great power. It is because the ultimate object of the Russian communists is so gigantic and so remote—and, one may add, so good—that they claim the right to do evils, so immediate and so gigantic, which they believe to be necessary for the attainment of that object. And since the ruthlessness of the dictatorial government in making 'the guilty' suffer today in order that 'the good' may be happy and prosperous in some remote future is on the grand scale, everything else is on the same grand scale—the confusion of the evil means with the good end, the hatred and the persecution, the corruption of social standards of value. Democratic governments such as exist in Britain, the U.S.A., France, and many other countries of western Europe are saved by their 'weakness'—the strength of a government being reckoned in inverse proportion to the liberty allowed to its subjects—from entertaining such colossal good intentions and, therefore, from defeating them by such colossal evil means. It is, therefore, neither possible nor necessary for the governments of these countries to use communal hatreds, except in war, as instruments of government on the scale attained by the nazi and communist dictatorships.

One thing more must be said regarding the prominent place which hatred has taken in communist communal psychology. It is, I think, true that there has been an enormous increase in both the virulence and quantity of communal hatreds during my lifetime. Communist hatred, though remarkable for its

unflagging violence, is part of an almost universal phenomenon. One important cause of the phenomenon is what may be called social frustration. The world's vast troubles of the last 50 years have been largely due to the failure of individuals and national communities to make the political and economic readjustments required by the new patterns of life which those same individuals and communities were adopting. Science has enabled us to live a kind of life today inconceivable in 1880. And we are all living it. But to live it requires social relations, economic organization, and political machinery on a scale and of a kind which were also inconceivable in 1880. To adjust the social environment of 1880 to the lives we live in 1950 required profound economic and political changes. In many directions we have failed to make those changes. Our failure has been most spectacular and most disastrous in two spheres which are intimately connected: in the political framework, particularly in Europe, of sovereign independent states and in the organization and control of industry and agriculture.

If you compare the first 50 years of the 20th with the last 50 years of the 19th century, it is clear that while our fathers lived in an era of comparative calm and stability, we have entered an era of social struggle, upheaval, and terrible disasters. That the root of the trouble is in the maladjustment in the two spheres noted above, the international and the economic, is shown by the fact that the social struggles have been between economic classes and national governments, the disasters have been two world wars between sovereign states, and the third world war which threatens us will, if it comes, be concerned in some inexplicable way with economic ideology and national independence. These social struggles and wars are also connected with a social phenomenon of which the 19th century apparently had little or no experience, but of which since the second decade of the 20th century we have heard a great deal both from practical politicians and from the theorists who diagnose the causes of disease in our society, and of the decadence of our young men or our art. 'Frustration' has become one of the most well-worn words in popular journalism and one of the most useful missiles to throw at 'bureaucrats' and governments. If one were to accept the picture of the world thus drawn for us, we should have to conclude that everyone everywhere is being perpetually prevented from doing what he

wants to do by someone usually called simply 'they', and that most of our ills began with the universal 'frustration' of which we all first became conscious during the years which followed the Treaty of Versailles.

I do not think that this diagnosis or the description of the psychological condition of the ordinary man which habitually accompanies it in the popular press is accurate. It is not true that, if you consider the whole population, the individuals generally exhibit symptoms of frustration unknown to their fathers and grandfathers. The symptoms can, no doubt, be observed in the small class of the very rich and in the middle and lower middle classes whose opinions have either made or been made by the Northcliffe and Beaverbrook press. But when I look back over the social changes which have taken place in my own life, I see that, at any rate in Britain, the vast majority in their private lives are far freer, more alert, happier, and more contented today than they were 50 years ago. Nor is it true that social frustration, due to maladjustments between the lives which men live and the social machinery, are peculiar to our time. Thomas Turner, as I noted in a previous volume, was typically a socially frustrated man, and I am sure there have been more mute, inglorious Thomas Turners through the ages than there have been Miltons. Moreover the maladjustments which lead to 'frustration' are precisely those which lead to revolutions, and thwarted or successful revolutions have been common events throughout human history.

Nevertheless it is also true that a certain kind of frustration has spread more widely and penetrated deeper into our society during the last 50 years than perhaps at any other period. It is a public rather than a private frustration, due to the economic and international maladjustments which I referred to above. It is fundamentally a social frustration, which of course necessarily affects the individual lives of us all. I noted at the beginning of this book the extraordinary change which has taken place, during my lifetime, in the incidence of 'politics' upon the lives which we lead. My father and his contemporaries were mainly occupied with the problem, the pleasures and pains, of living; politics or the social machinery of life was a remote process which intruded, rarely and academically, in their thoughts and pursuits. Today we are all politicians all the time. Hundreds of thousands of people are occupied all

their days, not with life or some function of life, but with trying—often vainly—to make the social machinery of life work effectively. And even if and when we are not immediately concerned with politics, we yet find that this social machinery is perpetually intruding in our private lives which are eased, directed, or thwarted by a network of organization, government regulations, problems, and crises of which our fathers had little or no experience.

These new conditions have had a profound effect upon individual and social psychology to which little attention has been given. The ordinary man wants to live his life in his own way. By life he means, not politics or the machinery and organization of living, not even 'work', but personal activities which interest him or give him pleasure. They differ from man to man, and from woman to woman. They include the society of one's family and friends, tinkering with an old car or writing poetry or cultivating one's garden, playing cricket or watching football, reading a book or listening to music or looking at pictures, talking or the difficult, but delightful, art of doing nothing. In this the ordinary man shows a sound judgment and a civilized standard of values, which priests and other interested parties whose object it is to acquire power over the minds or bodies of ordinary men continually attempt, often unfortunately with success, to pervert. Earlier in this book (pp. 90 and following) I gave reasons for believing that the things which have ultimate or intrinsic value are particular relations of the human mind to particular objects and complex psychological states which, for convenience, may be defined as particular 'ways of living'. If this be so, the ordinary man is right in judging implicitly that the happiness which he gets from the free enjoyment of his ordinary and private process of living, from his 'way of life', is the thing which, privately, socially, and ethically, has intrinsic value. And the value is in life and living, not in the social framework or machinery of life, nor in myths, nightmares, and abstractions. It will be found in the thoughts and feelings of individuals, in their reactions to cricket or truth, to football or beauty, in their homes or among their friends, not in the state or churches or 'society' or work or sin or salvation. The Protestant capitalist with his 'gospel of work', the Catholic priest with his barbarous stories about sin and salvation and the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin, the

nazi or communist with his similar stories about national or social sin and salvation and the deification of the Fuehrer or Lenin or Stalin are all interested parties, playing the same game and hunting the same prey; their object is to lure the ordinary man into a complicated spider's web of false beliefs and values, connected with the machinery of living, into the church or the state or the party where he will be in the power of the priest or the politician.

It is in these regions of the mind and of society that the seeds of our social frustration will be found. We, ordinary men and women, want, as I said, to 'live our lives in our own way'. We are not interested in the social framework and machinery of life except as a means to living. The priest's God has receded from our lives; we have lost interest in the metaphysics of sin and salvation or the domicile of the body of the mother of God. We are not really interested in the metaphysics of economic sin and salvation, though too often the incantations and fulminations of the priests of 'communism' or 'capitalism' or of some other political dogma so bemuse us that we are lured into their power and follow them, like the Gaderene swine, into the abyss. Most of us are prepared to do our share of 'work' in order that we may earn our share of the 'daily bread' and the machinery of social life tick over smoothly so that we, the individuals, may get on with the job of living. But that is exactly what does not happen. The machinery refuses to work. The economic system 'breaks down'; our private lives are swept hither and thither, crippled or ruined, by slumps, strikes, lock-outs, currencies, laws, rules, and regulations. The international system 'breaks down'; in the uneasy intervals between wars our private lives are dominated by crisis which follows crisis, obstructed by unintelligible quarrels and obscure 'problems' which rise up out of the international witches' cauldron among peoples whom we do not know in the uttermost parts of the earth. Then comes along a world war, and the last shreds of individuality are taken from us; we are swept helplessly into the machinery of living, which has now become quite cheerfully the machinery of death; we are given a badge and a number, called up into the armed forces or the national service, directed here or there, registered and rationed, evacuated from bombed houses or included among the expectant mothers, until we are destroyed by enemy action or notified as

a casualty to our next of kin or, if fortunate enough to outlive the war, demobilized and returned to 'civilian life'.

The machinery, in fact, does not work. All the oratory of statesmen and politicians, all the pseudo-science of political scientists and economists, all the venomous intricacies of ideologists cannot hide the fact; the machinery of life is not working and it does not work because, as I said, we have refused to adjust the economic and international machinery of society to the kind of life which all over the world individuals and societies try to live. Ordinary men and women, whether living in Korea or Buenos Aires, in Berlin or London, do not understand all this, they could not explain what is happening to them; but they feel it, a continual feeling at the back of the mind of apprehension, obstruction, helplessness. For thousands of years religion and the priests of religion have taught human beings the right way to deal with this kind of situation. We look into the darkest recesses of our mind and dredge up from there the foul and irrational deposits of our primeval savagery as appropriate means of dealing with a famine or drought or the illness of our king or a slump on the stock exchange. If we are threatened with communal disaster, it is because the Gods are angry, and the Gods are angry because some one has sinned. If we are bewildered, thwarted, afraid, if we are threatened by unemployment or a strike or a slump, we must smell out the sinner who is the cause of our misfortunes. Our political saviour, the man whom we must make dictator, is the man who shouts loudest:

> By the pricking of my thumbs,
> Something wicked this way comes,

and will provide us with the victim and the scapegoat.

The enormous increase in communal hatred during the last 50 years has been due to this ancient process of dealing with communal frustration, fear, and misfortune. Our misfortunes and frustration are due to our own political stupidity, our social incompetence, our inability to readjust the social framework to the new kind of life which we are living. But bewildered and helpless, we cannot see this. It is so much simpler to assume that it is all due to the wickedness of some wicked men, and it is a duty—and so comforting—to hate the wicked and the sinners. We become in this way the easy victims of our own passions and of the seekers after power. The man who can

show us the right people to hate and persecute is the chosen leader who, if we obey him, will give us the promised land. The classical example of this process was, of course, in Hitler's Germany. But it can be observed as virulent today in Stalin's Russia, and indeed, under various forms, throughout the world. It is only the scapegoats and victims which vary; they may be capitalists or communists or Jews or Hindus or Moslems; the point is to hate them as the malignant cause of our ills.

The rulers of Russia in their persistent appeal to this passion for communal hatred are only following the most ancient pattern of behaviour of kings, priests, and others whose business it is to get large numbers of men to believe and obey them. Nothing unites a community more closely than common hatred, and if the rulers can direct the hatred on to a heretic, Jew, kulak, capitalist, or communist, they provide themselves with an explanation of all misfortunes which may fall upon their subjects and with scapegoats who will distract attention from their own shortcomings. At the same time nothing destroys more thoroughly the political intelligence or corrupts more completely the social values of a community; but from one point of view this too has its advantages, since it is probably easier, at any rate for a short run, to rule half-imbecile savages than civilized and intelligent men and women.

I have been trying, in the previous pages, to analyse social psychology as it manifests itself in the totalitarian government and the communist ideology of Soviet Russia. It seems to me to be of the highest importance to try to understand exactly how people think and feel in politics and in their reciprocal relations as rulers and ruled, for without that knowledge it is impossible to understand the causes of social events. I am not concerned at this point to propose what are called 'remedies' or to apportion praise or blame, though, since judgments upon social values form an important part of the facts which I am investigating, I cannot eliminate nor do I wish to conceal my own judgments of what is socially good or socially bad. Here, however, there is one point which I should perhaps dispose of. In dealing with the totalitarian dictatorship of Soviet communism and with its use of ideology and communal hatred as instruments of government I have not concealed the fact that they conflict with my own standards of social value. The relevance of the facts, which I have been trying to investigate

and interpret, to the question of the viability of authoritarian systems of government will be considered later, but one objection which the communist and fellow-traveller would certainly make to what I have said may be answered here. 'You completely ignore', they will say, 'the immense achievements of the communist regime in Russia. Stalin and communism have in a generation changed the most backward and poverty stricken country of Europe into the most powerful nation in the world. Russia is the only great power whose strength has been based, not upon the exploitation, but on the freedom and cooperation of workers and peasants. What that means was shown by the record of the Soviet government and the Russian people during the war. You ignore the astonishing achievements of communism and workers' democracy in industry and agriculture, in education, health, and science, and, blinded by your bourgeois psychology, prate about the sham's of freedom and happiness in a capitalist society.'

I do not deny the astonishing achievements of the Soviet government during the war or its material achievements in peace. The industrialization of Russia in a generation is undoubtedly a remarkable feat. I have already stated my belief that by the elimination of the private capitalist communism has freed the worker from a particular kind of exploitation and has, therefore, established a type of economic freedom not enjoyed elsewhere. I have no doubt that there is a good deal of truth in the claims of Russian communists and their supporters that the working classes enjoy educational and 'cultural' opportunities to a greater degree than in 'capitalist' countries. I do not underestimate the value of these things; indeed, I believe in democracy and socialism precisely because I value them, because it seems to me, you cannot build a good society except upon the basis of equal opportunities for all in the spheres of economics, education, and culture, and such equality is unattainable in the class structure imposed by 19th-century capitalism.

But I am dealing here with social values of a society as a whole, not of isolated fragments. In thus judging the value of contemporary Russia, of course, in the calculus of values due regard must be given to the material 'achievements' of the Soviet government. If one considers the kind of society which is now being produced in Russia and its satellite states, the

kind of life which the individual has to live there, and the kind of individual which that life produces, there seems to me to be only one conclusion, namely that in the last 500 years of European history there have been few periods and places in which the government has been worse, the lives which ordinary men and women were forced to live more degraded, the standards of social value more debased than they are in Russia today. I can give my reasons for this judgment and they are based upon an acceptance, not of 'bourgeois standards of value', but of the standards of value of European civilization which derive from the Greeks and have been accepted by a long line of civilized Europeans which included Marx and Engels.

First, let us take the sphere in which the Soviet government has achieved something, the standards of life of the working classes, the industrial and agricultural production, and its military strength. It is probably true that the standard of life of the ordinary man and woman in Russia has improved considerably under the communist regime and it is certainly true that the government has enormously increased the country's military strength and industrial and agricultural production. A high standard of living for the whole population and, therefore, an efficient economic system both in industry and agriculture are, in the opinion of most people, the tests today of civilization and the good society. They are, I should say, a test, in the sense that they are among the most important prerequisites of a modern civilized society in Europe. We are committed in the 20th century to the machine age, to a mechanized life based on large-scale mechanized industry and agriculture. As a way of life, it has serious drawbacks; but it has at least ensured that, if organized with sufficient skill and intelligence, the life of laborious hardship and poverty which most of the world's inhabitants have lived since Jehovah put the curse of labour upon Adam is now quite unnecessary.

There is no doubt that the Soviet government has increased industrial and agricultural productivity considerably in the last 30 years by large-scale mechanization. They have at the same time improved the standard of living of the poorer classes. But the achievement is not unique and is enormously exaggerated by communist propaganda. Capitalist societies and semi-socialist governments have frequently performed similar

and even greater miracles by the same methods in Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and in smaller and poorer countries during the 19th and 20th centuries. In the production of wealth socialism or communism, at least in their early stages, have little or no advantages over capitalism; their advantages are a more equitable distribution of wealth in the community. The communist system in Russia can take credit for more equitable distribution of wealth, not for increased productivity. And though the mass of the population are probably a good deal better off than they were under the Tsar, their standard of life is still extremely low. Communist propaganda puts the blame for this upon the war and the hostility of capitalists. But Great Britain, Belgium, Norway, and the United States all went through the war and in all these countries the standard of life of the 'toiling masses' is immeasurably higher than in Russia. The British had to endure the war for nearly two years longer than the Russians and for a year bore alone the full weight of the German and Italian forces. That we came out of the ordeal with less damage than the Russians was due in part to the fact that, under a semi-capitalist, semi-socialist democracy, our resistance was not only as tough as but more intelligent and better organized than the Russians'. Under a social-democratic government our economic and social recovery compares favourably with that of any communist, totalitarian regime. The Russians and those who relay Russian propaganda as if they were gramophone records for use in radio 'recorded' programmes ignore this and also ignore another significant fact. The Soviet government has deliberately cut off its own subjects and those of its allies from all contact with the western 'capitalist' world. The object of communist statesmanship is still world revolution, i.e. one of the major aims of Stalin's policy is to induce the peoples, now living in the west under what is called social democracy or democratic capitalism, to overturn their governments, destroy the social framework of their lives, and substitute communism and dictatorship on the Soviet model. If communism and dictatorship are producing in the east material results so superior to those of social-democracy or capitalism in the west, what is the sense of preventing western people from seeing for themselves the eastern paradise or the eastern people from seeing for themselves the western working classes with nothing to lose but their

chains? For sheer craziness human beings have never surpassed themselves in their political antics on both sides of the iron curtain during the five years following the war. Here is a land of pure delight, Moscow and its 'fellow-travellers' and its 'sympathizers' daily and hourly blare out all over the world by radio and all the other instruments of modern propaganda, here on the Moscow side of the iron curtain is a land of pure delight where omelettes grow on trees and roasted pigs come crying out, 'O eat me if you please'. But if anyone from the west wants to see the land of pure delight and the omelettes and the roasted pigs, he is refused admittance, while, if any fortunate easterner enjoying the omelettes and pigs, attempts to cross a frontier and see for himself the failure of capitalism, he is shot or sentenced to many years' imprisonment. There can be but one reason why the communist dictators pen their own toiling masses with such ruthless rigidity behind the iron curtain, a determination to insulate them from the truth.

Here we come back once more to standards of value. In all authoritarian regimes fear is endemic and the governing classes or the dictator suffer from the disease of being afraid even more persistently than the governed. If you compare the speeches of democratic statesmen, like Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee or President Roosevelt and President Truman or any French or Scandinavian premier, with those of a dictator like Hitler, Stalin, or Franco, you will find one notable difference. Fear plays little or no part in the political psychology of the democrats; they may be strong men or weak, wise or foolish, but they are not habitually afraid either of persons or events, and they are not habitually afraid of the truth. Occasionally they can be convicted of manipulating or concealing facts, but they do not make a habit of large-scale suppression and perversion of facts. One important reason why they do not do so is that the society in which they live makes it impossible for them to do so successfully. They have no monopoly either of the truth or of freedom of speech; they have no monopoly of the power to state and interpret facts. It is in this crude, but effective, way that freedom as opposed to authoritarianism actually works in our day-to-day lives. Putting it at its lowest, our rulers in a western democracy know that, if they tell a big lie, they will be found out at once, for dozens of people will get up and state the facts. Putting it a little higher, one may say that the western

statesman learns not to be habitually afraid of the truth. That is the result of freedom working upon politics and society. It may sound petty and unimpressive compared with the grandiloquent claims of dictators or even democrats for their political 'systems'. But it is in this kind of unimpressive, pedestrian way that 'systems' really act upon men's thoughts and actions. Freedom is not unimportant if it produces prime ministers and presidents who do not live in perpetual fear of truth.

Now turn to Stalin or Hitler, to the daily working of a nazi or Soviet government and its propaganda machine. In a speech of Hitler or Stalin you will find again and again sweeping statements which are fantastic perversions of the facts. The world outside Germany as it was represented by Hitler and Goebbels to the German people was a travesty of the truth; the 'capitalist' world outside Russia as it is represented by Stalin and communist propaganda to Russians simply does not exist. And this use of wholesale and large-scale lies as an instrument of policy is not confined to the reaction of a communist government to the capitalist world. When Stalin attacked Trotsky, the same suppression and perversion of facts took place to such an extent that even the history of the Russian revolution had to be rewritten to conform with the statements which are untrue. In Stalin's speeches which were the prelude to the purges and the liquidation of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and the rest there is the same procedure, and it is being repeated today in the quasi-domestic war of Russian communism upon Tito and Yugoslavia.

This fear of the truth, which is endemic in all authoritarian societies, beginning at the top in the dictator and seeping down through all classes, is a kind of malignant virus which corrupts and degrades all social standards. It kills freedom because the governing classes dare not allow the governed to know the truth, and the more freedom of thought and speech in a community the greater chance there is that the truth will out. This corrupts the social and professional standards of the governing classes. In Russia the Soviet official, from Molotov down to the typist in a government office or a teacher in a village school, has meticulously to follow the party line. Their careers, their liberty, and their lives depend upon slavishly repeating in public the official propaganda, the fantastic misrepresentation of facts which the communist government has

decided that the masses must believe. It is possible that the more stupid officials—it must be presumed that even under communism some officials are stupid—believe what they say; their political psychology is probably similar to the genuine, parrotlike stupidity of many British communists and fellow-travellers who for many years have been asking the same questions and making the same speeches at Labour meetings. But intelligent Russians of the governing classes and the bureaucracy must know that nine-tenths of what they are compelled to say is untrue, and grotesquely untrue. They say it because their lives and livelihood depend upon their saying it, and because they live in perpetual fear of spies and informers, of being accused of treason or deviation, of trials and purges. In the political and administrative classes such an attitude of mind destroys all social standards of value, but the depths of degradation to which it leads can be seen most clearly in the scientific and artistic governing classes which are maintained by the Soviet government. The degradation of professional standards has never gone further than in the Russian geneticists, forced to repudiate for Lysenko the Mendelian facts which they know to be true, or in the musical composers forced by Zhdanov to humiliate themselves, talk nonsense, and compose bad music.[1]

[1] The claustromania of the Soviet government, a characteristic of all modern authoritarian police states, and the fanaticism of the communist and the anti-communist make all statements of fact about what is happening in Russia suspect. Detailed accounts of conditions in that country have been given in such books as *Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession*, by F. Beck and W. Godin; *The Inhuman Land*, by J. Czapski; *It Happens in Russia*, by V. Petrov; *Leap to Freedom*, by Oksana Kasenkina; and *Why I Escaped*, by Peter Pirogov. The writers are not impartial observers and allowance must be made for the bias inherent in their revolt or revulsion against what they saw and suffered. I do not believe that things are quite so uniformly black as they appear in these pictures. But when due allowance has been made for this, there remains a residue of evidence which can safely be accepted. It shows the corruption of the governing classes which I have described above, the way in which, in the upper ranks, all standards are degraded by the fear of truth and in the lower administrative officials by the soul-destroying terror of the informer. In western democracies the moral and social standards of similar classes and persons are vulnerable to other evil influences, such as the pressure of the economic system and of economic 'interests', a vulgar, ignorant, and irresponsible press, and all the occupational diseases of politicians and bureaucrats. I do not underestimate the disastrous effects of these influences upon the social standards in our

It may be said—and certainly the good communist should say—that a community is not to be judged by its upper or governing classes, but by the masses. I do not myself believe that any kind of civilized life for the masses will be found in a society in which those who govern and those who educate them rely upon, maintaining their power by habitual suppression and distortion of the truth and are themselves alternately the villains and victims of political terror. But if we are to judge civilization by the lives of ordinary men and women, then it is amazing that communists and their sympathizers should ask us to approve of what the Soviet government is making of the Russian people. It shows how the lowest social standards of 19th-century capitalism have persisted and warped the social aims and conscience of socialists. The small communist ruling class has cut off the Russian people completely, not only from the rest of the world, but from every means or opportunity of ascertaining the truth or of independent thought. The government control of the press, books, and radio ensures that even the intellectual classes and the enormous body of subordinate officials are prevented from knowing the true facts about what happens either abroad or at home. What they are told is in most cases a grotesque misrepresentation of the truth, and their minds are flattened out under the irresistible weight of government propaganda, conditioned to believe and to think

capitalist or semi-capitalist democracies; the communal psychology of a British or American politician, civil servant, or primary school teacher is not a subject for complacent contemplation. But if one compares it with that of their Russian opposite numbers, the psychology of the west belongs to a sane and civilized society while that of the east is childish and brutal. Mr. Bevin may not have stood very high in the list of British Foreign Secretaries, but it is inconceivable that he could have talked the nonsense which Mr. Molotov or Mr. Vishinsky pour out at international conferences. The excuse or explanation usually made for these Russian statesmen is that what they say is intended as propaganda for their own people and for potential communists and fellow-travellers elsewhere. But even if, as is highly probable, Mr. Molotov is too intelligent to believe what he says, this carries the evil only one step backwards. A society which breeds and educates the masses to believe this kind of propaganda is uncivilized.

The evidence for the corruption of scientists and artists is more direct. Some of it will be found in two books, already referred to by me: *Soviet Genetics and World Science*, by Julian Huxley, and *Musical Uproar in Moscow*, by Alexander Werth (see pp. 190-191).

only what the government intends that they shall believe and think. That this is so is proved both by what the government says in its propaganda and by the fantastic ignorance of truth displayed by Russian writers and other intellectuals in books or on the rare occasions such as international conferences when they are allowed to meet foreigners. The intellectual, no doubt, has many faults peculiar to his occupation, but his occupation and his training do require him to use his mind to some extent, and the record of history shows that even the most ruthless churches and police states, by inquisitions, indexes, laws, and persecutions, have rarely succeeded in keeping all the intellectuals all the time ignorant of all truth. The same thing, one may be sure, is happening again in Russia and the other police states on the east of the iron curtain; there must be many intelligent men there, as there were in Hitler's Germany, who do not believe what the government says and compels them to say. They include the scientists and composers who toe the party line drawn for them by a Lysenko or a Zhdanov, but there are probably also a good many political officials, administrators and civil servants, below the rank of Molotov or Gromyko, who know or guess that what they have to say about the world outside Russia is false. I do not pretend to pass judgment on the ethics of the individual in this vast *trahison des clercs*; no intellectual who has had the luck to live his life in a non-communist or non-nazi society and has, therefore, never been forced to make a choice between truth and death or starvation has the right to cast the first or the second stone at his unfortunate brothers in Moscow or Berlin. But he has every right to condemn the intellectual and social standards of a society which habitually subjects the individual to such cruel degradation.

The betrayal of the intellectual standards of truth by the intellectual is a fascinating study, though it is really only a subdivision of the larger subject, the betrayal of the standards of civilization by the civilized. Some time ago *Le Trahison des clercs*, by J. Benda, set a fashion and a large number of works have been written to show how many intellectuals in the last 50 years have been corrupted by the rewards and punishments of capitalist and nationalist societies and have betrayed the standards of truth and civilization of which they should have been the chief guardians. There is a considerable amount of

truth in all this. There is much which is indefensible in the social standards and communal psychology of capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism, and no one who has had experience in journalism, publishing, and politics will underestimate the powerful effect of economic pressures, the social atmosphere, and more subtle temptations upon our intellectual integrity. Nevertheless, the record of intellectuals who, at their peril, have openly defended truth and civilization against the barbarism and obscurantism of the non-communist world compares very favourably with that of communist intellectuals. In order to be fair to the Russian intelligentsia, two things must be noted. First, the Soviet rulers are so determined that the outside world shall not know what really goes on behind their iron curtain that they have succeeded, for the first time in many centuries, in really isolating the inhabitants of a great European state. It is, therefore, possible that some Russian intellectuals of whom we have never heard have openly defended the standards of truth and humanity against their government and paid the penalty. Secondly, the communist government, like the nazis and all modern totalitarian regimes, is much more savage and ruthless to its own people than any western democracy since the French revolution established some communal standards of civilization. Moreover the power which the modern organization of a great state places in the hands of a ruling class enables them to suppress opposition and to destroy an opponent with a rapidity and efficiency unattainable by older despotisms. The writer, journalist, painter, or composer who, in Britain or France, during the last 100 years refused to accept the standards of commercialized art or journalism or opposed the official policy of powerful interests or parties knew that he would have to forgo many succulent plums with which 'the powers that be' or 'society' rewarded his more respectable and amenable colleagues; he might even find that it was a hard struggle to earn a living if one upheld one's convictions. But Marx, Darwin, Lenin, Cézanne, Bernard Shaw, and many less distinguished innovators or rebels lived quite safely in Britain, France, or Switzerland and were allowed to preach and practise non-conformity; they were in no danger of liquidation or Siberian banishment. A Marx, Darwin, or Shaw in Soviet Russia today would not only be silenced, but, if he tried to speak, would either be executed or suffer some other sort of

savage liquidation. It is, therefore, true that the intellectual who refused to deny the truth or to support the absurdities and barbarism of the communist regime in Russia would have far more to lose and much less to gain than one who told the truth and attacked the absurdities and barbarism in a capitalist democracy.

However, when every allowance has been made for the communist intellectual, he cuts a very poor figure in the long history of those faced with the dangerous duty of defending truth against authority. It would be unfair to expect to find a Socrates in Soviet Russia. But about 400 years ago the Holy Office of the Roman Church and the Inquisition were practising the persecution of truth by methods almost identical with those of the Politburo today in Moscow. The fate which any intelligent and honest man knew awaited him if he did not repeat the absurd dogmas of the church or if he maintained a truth which the church considered inconvenient or inexpedient was precisely the same as the communist scientist, writer, or composer has to fear if he does not repeat the nonsense prescribed by the Soviet authority. When Giordano Bruno was accused of heresy in the 16th century, a secret preliminary enquiry was held by the Inquisitor who was explicitly forbidden to reveal to the accused the names of his accusers. The accused was then arrested and imprisoned. 'Then came the interrogation of the accused, secret also; it might be before the full court or in prison; it might be frequently repeated and also without communication of the names of the witnesses against him. There were elaborate rules, founded on long experience and a profound knowledge of mental pathology and of the weakness of human nature, for breaking down every form of constancy and for working upon every motive; threats, promises, flattery, suggestions of confessions by accomplices, every artifice, and if need be, torture, were freely used.'[1] Bruno and many less dis-

[1] *Historical Trials*, by Sir John Macdonell, p. 75; the information regarding procedure is derived from *Historia Inquisitionis*, by P. van Limborch. The book from which I quote consists of lectures given by Sir John Macdonnell as Professor of Law in the years 1911-1913, some time before the nazis and communists reintroduced this kind of judicial system into Europe. It is worth quoting Sir John's comment in the procedure: 'Reading the advice given and precepts enunciated by Eymeric in his *Directorium Inquisitorium*, one sees how crude and unscientific are the tricks and devices of

tinguished victims were subjected to the same process of judicial murder and looked forward to as horrible an execution as any of their unfortunate successors in Russia.[1] But Bruno and many others accepted a horrible death rather than deny what they knew to be the truth, and surely one hears the voice of civilization accusing barbarism in the words said to have been addressed by Bruno to his judges when they pronounced sentence on him: 'Perhaps you, my judges, pronounce this sentence against me with greater fear than I receive it'. No such voice appears ever to be heard at all in communist Russia.

This complete silence of everybody and everything before the voice of authority, no matter how untrue, inhuman, or imbecile what the voice says, is what makes the social standards of value in communist Russia so horrifying. It is something new in the history of mankind, as Mr. Isaiah Berlin pointed out in an article on 'Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century'.[2] Up to our time, Mr. Berlin remarks, 'even the censors of opinion and the enemies of the truth felt compelled to pay formal homage to the vital importance of obtaining true answers to the great problems by the best available means. If their practice belied this, at least there was something to be belied: traitors and heretics often keep alive the memory—and the authority—of the beliefs which they are intent on betraying.' And secondly, 'in the past such attempts to becloud the nature of the issues were associated specifically with the avowed enemies of reason

modern cross-examinations as compared with those in use in this tribunal. . . . I doubt whether more intelligence has ever been put at the service of law than in devising and working the machinery of this system, which did untold evil. . . . I sum up the features of the system in saying that there were no pleadings in public, no production or confrontation of witnesses, no cross-examination of them, no right to be represented by an advocate, or even to call witnesses, and that the court was at liberty to disregard all forms and proceed summarily. Certain parts of the proceedings may remind you of modern theories of penal reform. But the substance of the system recalls the delation by informers under Tiberius and Nero, which Tacitus pictures, a system which put every man's life and fortune at the mercy of secret enemies or envious busy bodies.'

[1] In fact it was probably worse. 'The accused might be delivered over to the civil power, to be dealt with "without effusion of blood", the correct and polite description of being burnt.' Niceties in the practice of savagery in the 16th and 20th centuries are a question of taste.'

[2] *Foreign Affairs*, April 1950, p. 38.

and individual freedom'.[1] Today the Soviet government claims to be the most 'progressive' in the world; its supporters within and without are reckoned to be revolutionaries and on the extreme 'Left'. From the day when the Holy Office burnt Bruno until the day when Lenin arrived in his 'sealed train' in Russia, the 'progressive', the revolutionary, the 'Left', whatever their crimes and follies might be, at least stood for reason and truth against irrational and obscurantist authority. Again and again, at their peril and often triumphantly, they raised the voice of truth against the voice of authority. Now in Russia the voice of authority, because it is authority, is accepted as the voice of truth. However irrational and uncivilized the words of authority may be, the greatest crime of the 'progressive' is to question authority, and blind obedience to dogmas, codes, slogans, and rules handed down from above is preached and practised as the primary social duty. In this deification of authority a standard of social value has been established which has not been accepted by intelligent men in Europe since the deification of the Roman emperors.

In the modern world the 'progressive' has become the 'reactionary' and the 'Left' has changed places with the 'Right'. Nothing could show more clearly the complete disruption of our former social and intellectual values. Russian communists and their supporters in other countries have their defence for this deification of authority. It is part, they maintain, of the new ethic of a completely new society. The new society is proletarian, whereas the old society was bourgeois, and it is natural and inevitable that the new proletarian society which is superior to the bourgeois should evolve new, proletarian, superior intellectual and social standards. That I cannot see the merits in communism and the beauties of proletarian

[1] I should perhaps point out that Mr. Berlin is not in this passage referring solely or specifically to Soviet Russia. He is dealing with two great differences in authoritarianism and irrationalism and in the attitude of people to the tyranny and obscurantism of authority which 'separate the political characteristics of our age from their origins in the past'. He considers that the new phenomenon can be observed, at any rate in men's minds, almost everywhere. I agree with him. But it is only under the complete authoritarianism of a great totalitarian state, like nazi Germany or communist Russia, that you can see the phenomenon and its results in their purest form.

standards is due to the fact that I apply to them the standards of the old, discredited, out-of-date bourgeois society. This communist defence is itself a complete proof of the accusation against which the communist thinks that he is defending himself. No sensible man denies that beliefs and standards of value are affected by the society in which we are born and bred. My main object in this book has been to analyse the social psychology of the last 150 years, to discover the most important factors which have led to our thinking what we think and desiring what we desire, to examine in what ways those beliefs and desires have determined the communal actions which we call history. In the very first pages of the first volume of *After the Deluge* I pointed out that what we call a 'civilization' can 'best be described as the mould or matrix in which at any particular time or place a human community imposes upon individual lives an imprint and form'. I described the process in these words:

> It embraces the existing framework of an organized society; the state and government, the laws and customs; the old gods and the new gods who will be found sitting in temples or upon thrones or even in Stock Exchanges; all the priests of all the gods who may be dead, dying, or living; the economic framework and organization; a few books, a few pictures, and the music of a tom-tom or a brass band. But it also consists, I think, of something else; it embraces that mass of communal traditions, beliefs, aims, ideals which were referred to in the last chapter. It is through this network of communal beliefs and desires that the individual, in any particular time and place, receives some of the most characteristic and indelible marks of a temporal and local civilization, and thus the community itself maintains in the mass of individuals that cohesion and stability without which there could hardly be a 'civilized society'.

The matrix in which the minds of people born during the latter part of the 19th or the early part of the 20th centuries was moulded may be described with some accuracy as the matrix of a capitalist and bourgeois civilization, provided that we make the reservations required by facts and truth. The dominant class in that period was the bourgeoisie, the economic organization was capitalistic. But the old Gods were not all in the Stock Exchange nor were their religions and priests all economic. The dying Gods who still mumbled their incantations in St. Peter's at Rome and many other churches, the

'pale Galilean' who had conquered in A.D. 364, even the dead Gods of Olympus and the savage old Jehovah on Mount Sinai still had some say. The man who runs out into the market-place crying, 'God is dead', is nearly always—and often unfortunately—mistaken and premature. The more verbose communist who runs into the market-place crying: 'All the Gods are dead except the proletarian God of Economics and his prophet Marx', are even more mistaken. It is true that the minds of all of us, including that of the prophet Marx and his communist disciple, have been rigorously conditioned by the 19th-century economic system and the communal psychology of its bourgeois controllers. Anyone, with a smattering of knowledge and a little ingenuity, can trace the effects in many of our beliefs, prejudices, desires and standards of value, religion, art, and science. But the communist dogma that our beliefs and desires are determined solely by economics and the class structure of society is one of the most ludicrous (and, it should be observed, non-economic) superstitions that has ever invaded the mind of rational men.

The mind of the man born into the capitalist, bourgeois society of the Europe of our day had to face, ignore, reject, accept, or reconcile a large number of elements in communal and in his personal psychology which had nothing to do with economics, capitalism, or the bourgeoisie. Some of them were mutually inconsistent and many of them were inconsistent with his economic and class prejudices. Their origins were many and mixed. Some, which I have examined already in this chapter, were of immense, but concealed, potency, springing from the obscure, animal chambers of our minds; antediluvian, they were born thousands of years ago in caves and cavemen, but still appear under strange disguises in 20th-century economic men, including both capitalists and communists. There were the curious beliefs and desires connected with man's place, not in capitalist England or Tsarist Russia, but in the universe; here beliefs and actions might still answer to the unexpected impact of the dead and dying professional Gods and their priests, their cosmogonies, and commands, from Jehovah and Moses to the Christian Trinity, St. Paul, the Pope in Rome, and Archbishop in Canterbury. Then there was the intricate pattern of beliefs and personal or social standards of value whose origins we have traced to ancient Greece with its dominating

concept of τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν (the good and the beautiful), concepts which may not be prototypes laid up in heaven as Platonic ideas, but at least are untouched and untainted by the economic dogmas of our childish ideologies. These are the concepts of freedom, justice, humanity, of a civilized communal life, and of arts and culture which in every age but our own have been accepted as the standards of civilization even by those who misused them for their own purposes of power and profit. Last, there was the concept of truth and the ultimate obligation to pursue and accept and proclaim it; an idea and ideal which also had its origin in Greece and which finally produced our scientific age; and it looks as if in our scientific age it will be betrayed and destroyed by our ideological scientists.

It is by these standards of civilization and by this concept and obligation of truth that I claim to judge communist society. They are neither capitalist nor communist, neither bourgeois nor proletarian. Their power and sanction come from no authority or state; rather it is they which give authority to authority. It is only by subjecting ourselves and our own minds, our prejudices, dogmas, parties, states, societies (whether bourgeois or proletarian), even our God, ruthlessly to the inquisition of these standards, to the ordeal by truth, that we can maintain the foundations of civilized life. It has been the saving grace of past ages, from the days when the Greek demanded that God himself must be judged by these standards of civilization to the days of the great capitalist bourgeois state, that, however prejudiced, stupid, and savage human beings showed themselves in practice, however uncivilized their rulers and society, there were always men who proclaimed and defended the authority of these standards against authority. They defended them even against the savageries and prejudices of their own minds, and thus, by the power of truth, often compelled the priests and kings and a long line of ruling classes to acknowledge their authority, though they violated them in their every act.

It is by denying these standards that the communists, like all totalitarian ideologists, destroy their own defence. By appealing to 'proletarian' standards of justice, humanity, art, science, and truth, as established by a party or a state, they deliberately join the camp of the enemies of civilization, the

worshippers of authority and mumbo-jumbo, the medicine-men and shamans, the Great Kings and all the little kings that have followed them, the High Priests and all the little Popes who have followed them, the Napoleons, Kaisers, and Hitlers, and all the yes-men of Authority from Balaam and his ass in the plains of Moab to the Balaams and asses of our day who slavishly bless or curse capitalism or communism merely because someone somewhere 'in authority' has told them to do so. What is true or false, just or unjust, cruel or humane cannot be altered by classes or nations, kings or commissars, communists or capitalists. There is no such thing as a proletarian truth in 1951, just as there was no such thing as a bourgeois truth in 1851 in Victorian England. There is only truth which remains the same at all times and in all places. Although it is true that X is Y, some unfortunate man may deny it either because he looks at X and Y through the distorting prism of capitalist, communist, or some other prejudice, or because he has not yet emerged from the primeval intellectual slime in which men believe that a God or a king, a priest or a commissar can determine that X is not Y. In the Victorian bourgeoisie these elementary facts were denied openly only by the most stupid or the most reactionary, and surreptitiously and shamefacedly by vested interests and the jackals who are always attracted to vested interests. Innumerable ordinary men and women fought and suffered in order to discover and proclaim the truth in the teeth of their own prejudices and in defiance of authority and vested interests. Nothing is more ominous in totalitarian authoritarianism than the rejection of this objective standard of truth and the apotheosis of prejudice and authority.

Large numbers of people accept, at least in theory, the elementary facts stated above with regard to the objectivity of truth. Even the Roman Catholic Church has had to hedge from its original position that because God and the Pope somewhat rashly committed themselves to the statement that the sun goes round the earth, it is not true that the earth goes round the sun.[1] Many people, however, who would agree that

[1] The authoritarian is always liable to run into difficulties if he undertakes to determine by authority the truth about the physical universe, particularly if he loses the power to prove his statements by burning, hanging, or imprisoning heretics. The history of the Roman Catholic Church and its uncomfortable position towards the facts of science during

there is an objective standard of truth, even though in any particular case it may be difficult to establish what is or is not true, and that it is our duty to pursue the truth in the teeth of our own prejudices and in defiance of state, church, party, or any other authority, do not believe that there is also an objective standard of individual and social ethics. In this they are, I believe, wrong. The question must be posed in its simplest, most elementary form: Are there ends of individual and social action which are good or bad, their value being independent of our own social prejudices or of the edicts of any temporal authority, such as a state, a party, or a church?[1] The question can be resolved into other questions of the greatest importance: When we say that murder is 'wrong', are we merely saying that we dislike murder or have a social prejudice against it, or do we mean to predicate of murder a quality 'wrongness' or 'badness' which is as objective as 'trueness' or 'falseness'? Or again when we make a judgment, as we frequently do, that one way of life is good and another bad, or that one form of society is better than another, do we mean that we are applying purely subjective standards of value imposed upon our minds by the psychology of our class, nation, or age or do we imply that there are standards of value independent of class, nation, or era?

I believe that in making such judgments we do mean that there are such objective standards of value just as there is

the last 100 years are well worth studying. The Jesuits have tried to extricate it from the condemnation of Galileo by explaining that he was condemned, not for teaching the truth, but 'because he persisted in teaching as a *fact* something that should have been taught only as a *theory*'. Another method of extrication adopted by the hierarchy is to maintain two levels of truth, one for the more intelligent and educated Roman Catholics and another for the masses. Thus in America, although the pope as late as 1909 'directed all Catholics to regard the creation narrative and the story of Adam's fall as historical', educated Catholics and Catholic scientists are allowed to believe in a modified version of the facts regarding evolution, while the Catholic masses are still told that 'no system even of mitigated evolution has been scientifically proved'. These quotations are taken from *Freedom and Catholic Power*, by Paul Blanshard. The reader who wishes to study the evidence for the statements and the whole attitude of the church to science and truth will find it in this well-documented book.

[1] For the moment I exclude the edicts of a God, but will consider this special case later.

an objective standard of truth. But certain distinctions must be made. We may *mean* that, i.e. we may assume that, we are making a judgment with regard to an objective standard, but we may be mistaken; the question whether we are mistaken in our assumption I shall discuss in a moment. Here I am concerned with what in fact we mean. I think that, when we say that some thing is 'right' or 'wrong', 'good' or 'bad', we do habitually mean and assume that we are making a judgment about an objective standard as we are when we make a judgment that some thing is 'true' or 'false'. When we say that X is true or Y good, we mean in both cases that we are asserting something about X and Y which cannot be determined by anything in our own or anyone else's mind or by any edict of authority. We mean that, if it is true that the earth goes round the sun, the earth does go round the sun independently of what anyone has said or thought or desired or commanded from the beginning to the end of time, and we mean that if freedom is good and slavery bad, the life of freedom is good and that of slavery bad independently of what anyone has said or thought or desired or commanded from the beginning to the end of time.

That this is what everyone thinks he means by an ethical judgment is proved by those who deny it. Take the extreme case of the religious man or the communist who maintains that what is 'right' or 'wrong', 'good' or 'bad', is determined solely by the authority of a God or an authorized interpreter of Marx-Leninism. Such people, however, habitually show that they do not regard as simply meaningless the question: 'Is an action prescribed by God (or Stalin) as right really right or an end prescribed by God (or Stalin) as good really good?' On the contrary the prophets and preachers of all religions have spent most of their time and energy, not in proving that their God has prescribed X or Y—the only relevant question if the validity of X or Y depends upon the God's authority—but in trying to convince people that the message of their God is ethically superior to that of all other Gods. If love is good in itself and hatred bad in itself merely because God has so ordained, there would be no sense in saying that Christ's injunction to love your enemies is ethically superior to the injunction to love your friends and hate your enemies. The fact that the statement is not meaningless proves that the

standards of value are assumed to exist independently of divine authority.

The communist is in the same position as the theologian, the prophet, and preacher. At one moment he professes to be an authoritarian and materialist through and through; under that dispensation he will maintain that the standards of ethical and social value of a John Stuart Mill or of a President Wilson are prejudices and trickeries imposed upon the bourgeois mind by an economic system and the capitalist ruling classes, while what is individually or socially good or bad for a communist is determined by an economic system, an economic theory, and the interpreters and prophets of economic truth Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. The communist is more muddled and incoherent, when he talks about values, than even an Anglican parson struggling to justify the edicts of Jehovah as applicable to the world of 1951 or of a Roman Catholic priest juggling with the fantastic pronouncements of an infallible Pope. But, in so far as it is possible to make any sense of the communist theory of ethics and values, the above is not, I think, an unfair statement of it. If the theory were true and the communist really meant what he said, there would be no sense, no meaning, in asking whether the values of capitalism were better or worse than those of communism. But that is what Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and their communist disciples habitually do. And they answer the question loudly and dogmatically: a capitalist society is bad, whereas a communist society is good, when judged by objective standards of value. For instance, when Marx and Engels write in the *Communist Manifesto*, 'In bourgeois society, living labour is but a means to increase accumulated labour. In communist society, accumulated labour is but a means to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer', the verbs used in the second sentence show that they are appealing to standards of value which they assume to be valid in themselves, unaffected by personal likes or dislikes, by economics or class structure, or by the edicts of authority. There is no sense in what they say, unless they mean—what in fact they say—namely that a capitalist society is bad as a means because it leads to something which socially is bad in itself, the mere accumulation of labour without any reference to the conditions of life of the human labourer, whereas communist society is good as a means because it leads to something which

is good in itself, the widening, enriching, and promotion of the existence of the human labourer.

There remains the question whether we are not all mistaken, Plato and Christ no less than Marx and Mill, in assuming that there is an objective standard of values. The question has been a source of much muddled thinking and is, I believe, of little real importance. Let me try first to avoid some of the muddles. It is often assumed that because you cannot prove that X is good, although you believe it to be good, 'good' can have no objective meaning, and that when you say that X is good, all you are stating is that you have a certain feeling about X. This is nonsense. The ability to prove that X is Y is completely irrelevant to the objective or subjective nature of Y. You may believe a thing to be true and you and everyone else in the universe may be unable to prove it to be true, but it will be true or false independently of your belief or of the ability to prove or disprove it. There was a time when the vast majority of living men believed that the sun went round the earth, whereas one or two people believed, without being able to prove it, that the earth went round the sun; these facts did not affect the truth that the earth did go round the sun. So with 'good' and 'bad'; the fact that the belief that the man who loves his enemy is a good man and the man who murders his friend is a bad man cannot be proved is irrelevant to the truth of the belief or to the objective nature of 'good' and 'bad'. The belief may be wrong and the idea of 'good' and 'bad' may have no objective validity, but not because the belief cannot be proved.

There is another common and more subtle confusion about values which has considerable effect upon men's political thought and actions. The communist correctly points out that in a capitalist society the individual's judgment of social values is determined or affected by the class and economic structure of the society in which he is born and lives his life. He then goes on incorrectly to argue or assume that, because this is so, there are no objective standards of value, that when the middle class liberal says that freedom is good, all he means is that he thinks that freedom promotes the economic interests of the bourgeoisie. Thus all judgments on social values are 'social prejudices'. The mistake of the communist here is to think that, when someone makes a judgment that X is Y, the psychological

origin of the judgment or the particular reason which caused a particular person to make this particular judgment at a particular time is relevant to the nature of Y, e.g. to the question whether it is an objective or subjective attribute. These things are relevant to the correctness or incorrectness of the particular judgment, they tell us nothing about the general nature of that kind of judgment. For instance, our judgments regarding what is true or false are often determined psychologically or socially in exactly the same way as our judgments regarding what is good or bad. We believe what we want to believe or what our nurses, parents, schoolmasters told us to believe. This frequently causes us to make incorrect judgments, but it does not mean that truth is a class prejudice or 'subjective'. The same applies to judgments of value; our prejudices may cause us to judge that X is good and that may lead to our making an incorrect judgment, but it does not follow that 'goodness' is subjective or a prejudice. The fact that our judgments about the truth can so easily be affected or distorted in this way is commonly recognized as a very good reason for being on our guard against allowing prejudices to influence our judgments, but no reason for doubting that some things are true and some false. The same ought to apply to our judgments of values, and it is a strange fact that communists and a good many other persons do the exact opposite, using the fact that such judgments are peculiarly vulnerable to prejudice as an excuse for a complete surrender to prejudice.

So far I have been dealing only with the negative side of the problem, the reasons commonly put forward for not believing in the objective validity of individual and social standards of value. I now have to face the positive side, the question whether there are any positive reasons for believing this. It must be admitted that the positive reasons which have been put forward are few and not very convincing. One argument is based upon universality. It is true that the majority of the judgments of value of a Socrates or Christ, a Buddha or a Confucius are accepted by the vast majority of the human race who have reached a certain level of civilization, as we call it. Whatever may have been the horrible story of men's practice, there has been a remarkable agreement, in many different periods and places, upon what ought to be the ends of individual and social action. Even people who, like Hitler, by their acts

or, like the communist, by his dogmas repudiate the ends, over and over again contradict themselves by appealing to the very standards which they have rejected. If the Russian communist really followed the dreary trail of his own dogmas, he would deny that freedom, for instance, was objectively good; in fact, like Marx himself, he shows that he believes that it is, for he argues that communism is superior to capitalism because communist freedom is 'real' freedom and capitalist freedom is a sham.

Unfortunately the universality of a belief is theoretically not a test of its validity. The fact that nearly everyone believes that X is green is not a proof that X is green and the fact that nearly everyone believes that X is good is not a proof that X is good. It is possible to produce other evidence besides the belief which tends to support the belief that X is green, though in the argument based upon this evidence there will always be some assumptions not capable of proof. It is also usually possible to produce some evidence other than belief tending to support the belief that something commonly regarded as good is good, though the evidence is usually more scanty and less convincing for a judgment on values than for one on some chemical, astronomical, or physical phenomenon.

For the practical purposes of living and of life, I doubt whether the ultimate basis of our beliefs regarding either the physical universe or values has much importance. I do not believe that there is any belief that anyone holds about anything, of which the rational man can say: 'It is absolutely certain that this is true or that this is false'. However deplorable this may be for 'the metaphysics of true belief', it has, I think, little or no relevance to the difficult, but necessary, art of living. I, and nearly everyone else, believe that tables and chairs have objective existence, though there have been metaphysicians who have denied it and it is not absolutely certain that they were wrong; but everyone, including the metaphysicians, recognize that it is reasonable that we should all act on the belief or assumption that tables and chairs have an objective, material existence. Politics is concerned with the art of social living. The art consists in the conscious selection of social actions for attaining social ends. The science of politics is therefore largely concerned with judgments of value, with what I have called the standards of social value. What we call civilization consists,

to quite a considerable extent, in the breeding and education of individuals whose beliefs and actions are rational[1] and determined by certain standards of value and in the organization of society in accordance with those standards of rationality, truth, and value. Civilization itself provides the reason why we should think and act, individually and communally, in accordance with its standards of truth and values. This is, I believe, a very important political principle which has been overlooked by political thinkers. Slowly and painfully during the last two or three thousand years human beings have acquired a considerable amount of knowledge about themselves and their environment; this knowledge, the acceptance of these 'truths' as true, is an integral part of what we call civilization. For instance, nearly everyone (though not everyone, perhaps) in the world today believes that the earth goes round the sun, that a doctor and not a king is the most likely person to cure you of scrofula, that it is not necessary to kill a strong man and eat his heart in order to be strong yourself, that to burn people alive is not the most effective way of convincing them of the truth. Civilization has accumulated a considerable amount of evidence to support these beliefs and we most of us accept them and act upon them in our daily life. This has a profound effect upon our individual and our communal lives, for a society which believes that burning heretics is a rational method of establishing truth is quite different from one which has abandoned the belief and practice. Yet none of these beliefs is absolutely certainly true and many of us, though we habitually accept and act upon them, would be hard put to it to give the reasons for accepting them. They are, however, sufficiently certain to form part of the corpus of knowledge of civilization, and everyone would agree that a civilized individual or community would be irrational not to accept them as true in relation to the actual life of the individual and the community.

The corpus of standards of value, developed by civilized men, seems to me to be in the same relation to actual life as the corpus of knowledge. Experience has gradually led to agreement among the great majority of men that certain states of mind and ways of living are good and others bad, and that societies which encourage the one are good and those which

[1] The degree of rationality entitling anyone to the dignity of civilization may be a matter of dispute.

encourage the other bad. Consider, for instance, the crucial, but elementary, question of happiness. I think that nearly everyone, when not yielding to the prejudices of religious or ideological dogmas or to the guilty feeling that he must justify his own happiness in other people's unhappiness, believes that pleasure and happiness are good and pain and unhappiness bad in states of mind, ways of life, and societies, in the sense explained on pages 91 to 94. He therefore considers it rational to make his own and other people's happiness an end in his individual life and in politics an important element in the standards of social value. How deeply and universally human beings are penetrated by this belief that happiness[1] is good in itself is shown by certain strange facts. The belief itself conflicts with the instincts of sadism and masochism which are more powerful and persistent ingredients of the human soul than most of us care to admit. The desire to make oneself or, still more often, other people miserable is continually operating with great and grim effect in the lives of individuals and the ordering of society. It is in conflict, as I said, with the belief that happiness is good and unhappiness bad. The conflict of a desire with a belief is by no means uncommon in human psychology, and ever since Ovid wrote the famous tag, 'Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor', we have been inventing the most ingenious and unsuccessful methods of evading the difficulty.

If the belief is a true belief about some important fact in our physical environment, we are usually compelled to modify or abandon a conflicting desire. The child or the man after a time gives up crying for the moon, though you will find in lunatic asylums, and even outside them, some people who have never succeeded in making the painful surrender of a desire to a belief. Where the effect of not acting on the belief or of gratifying the desire at the expense of the belief is not immediately unpleasant to ourselves—and particularly where the unpleasant effect involves other people rather than ourselves —we invent the most ingenious excuses for satisfying our desire

[1] For the sake of brevity, I use the word unqualified, but it must be understood as being subject to the qualifications dealt with on pages 91 to 94. That the end is not just 'happiness', but a complex state of mind or way of life in which happiness is an essential element does not affect the argument.

and plausible reasons for the delusion that the desire is consistent with the belief. This is peculiarly easy where the beliefs are concerned with ethical or social values, because the facts are usually very complicated and the effect of a particular action is often not immediately apparent or easily isolated. If the belief is very firmly and widely held, the compulsion to rationalize desires inconsistent with it can be traced in the fantastic moral and legal edifices erected by mankind to justify their ferocious irrationality. There is ample evidence of this kind to show that in the mind of civilized men no belief is more firmly accepted as rational than the belief that happiness is an important individual and social end.

Religion and politics have always provided us with the most effective outlets for unrestrained masochism and sadism. Religion has exploited most successfully the almost universal sense of guilt. The old Gods were, like their creators, cruel and savage, and so enabled their creators to practise their savagery and cruelty on other people, because of their sins, under divine authority. As men became more civilized, the belief that happiness is good and cruelty bad grew stronger, and Gods, as we have seen, were gradually and partially civilized. Human sacrifice and the grosser forms of masochism and sadism were abandoned. But the idea of sin was and still is retained as an excuse for making people miserable. It enabled the more masochistic to mortify themselves, with a good grace, by penance and self-torture and later to renounce 'worldly' happiness in the religious orders. But it has naturally been used more often for purposes of sadism, since the majority of people enjoy other people's misery a good deal more than their own. The practice of persecuting and torturing heretics dies hard. Numerous religious sects have contrived to establish a way of life in which practically all pleasure was considered sinful and it was the function of the church to see that the ordinary individual was, as far as possible, unhappy. Muhammadanism is not entirely sadistic and the Buddhism of the ordinary man, at any rate as I saw it in Ceylon, is almost a cheerful and humane religion. But it is impossible to attend a service of any Christian church or sect without feeling the overwhelming atmosphere of masochistic and sadistic gloom, the insistence upon guilt and sin and death and sorrow, blood and crucifixion, the vanity of pleasure, except it be the pleasure of punishment.

Nevertheless, the extraordinary thing is that, despite this record, no religion or church has ever dared openly to deny the truth of the profound conviction of human beings that happiness is good. The psychological trick or sleight of hand by which popes and priests of all religions and denominations have ensured that the vast majority of human beings shall live and die in the greatest unhappiness, while maintaining that their sole object is to ensure the 'real' happiness of their dupes and victims, is simple and almost universal. In its simplest form the trick consists in post-dating the happiness to a life after death where no one can know whether the priestly cheque on happiness will be met or dishonoured. Calvin and others could thus induce generations of 'rational' men to believe that practically all worldly pleasures are bad, because the sinful human being, by renouncing the bad and temporary happiness of their earthly lives, will win for themselves after death the good, real, and everlasting happiness of heaven. At the opposite end of the denominational scale the Roman Catholic priest, though rather more tolerant of the ordinary pleasures of the ordinary man, preaches the same doctrine. The sins of believers and the wickedness of heretics and unbelievers require the crucifixion and torture of God himself and the infliction of appalling pain and suffering upon millions of men. The ideal of goodness in this life is the fanatical masochist, the professional flagellant, the saint whose hallmark of sainthood appears on the palm of his hand, the revolting stigma of the nail which nails him to the cross. The ideal woman is a bundle of black cloth, shut away from the world in special houses and dedicated to a life of prayer, lamentation, self-accusation, and chastity. Yet these fantastic nightmares of misery are sold to the credulous on precisely the same prescription used by Moloch in Palestine, by Agamemnon sacrificing Iphigenia at Aulis, or by Calvin spreading misery through Geneva. The ultimate object of all this unhappiness is happiness, the happiness of 'the good', by which is meant those who believe and obey the priests and receive from them the Last Sacrament at the moment of death. The misery every one can see; the happiness is taken on trust, for the good are to enjoy it only after they are dead. And the supreme reward of the 'good' sadist is assured to him in the contemplation of hell; for, on the authority of God and his priests, he has the satisfaction of believing that

the 'wicked' will justly suffer eternal unhappiness or even eternal torture because they were not born or did not die in the right way or did not live according to those rules and regulations of the church which alone will give you, when you are dead, eternal happiness.

Of all the crazy nightmares which the human mind has been induced to believe none have been crazier than these religious doctrines about happiness and unhappiness, accepted by millions of men and women with the passionate conviction which we seem to reserve for our most lunatic fantasies, incapable of any rational proof or disproof. It is therefore highly significant, for an understanding of individual and communal psychology and human standards of value, that even in this world of cruel and gloomy fantasy, created by the demons of guilt, sin, and punishment, the mind has habitually clung to the conviction that happiness is good and unhappiness bad, and that even Gods and churches have had to conform to this conviction.

It is even more significant that the record of politics in this matter of happiness is very much the same as that of religion. Whether religion and churches or governments and states have caused more human misery in the last 3,000 years of our history is a difficult question, the correct answer probably being: 'Six of one and half a dozen of the other'. In most periods of that history the attitude of governments to their subjects has been very much the same as that of churches to their members. This was natural because governments have nearly always used religion as a useful instrument of rule and a justification for making their subjects miserable, and, when they have not themselves been dominated by a church, have had a tame or 'established' church ready to provide spiritual sanction for their rule or misrule. In primitive societies the ecclesiastical doctrine of sin and punishment is taken over by the civil authority and reappears as crime and punishment, the new form being practically indistinguishable from the old. Just as in the church sin has always been the most powerful instrument for ensuring the obedience of the common people to the priests, so in the state the power of the ruling class or caste has been maintained, to a large extent, by the institution of crime and criminal law. Until the 19th century practically all governments had treated the ordinary man as if he were a

habitual criminal; indeed, one might say there was a doctrine of original crime to match the doctrine of original sin.[1] The rulers, by what we would now call their civil administration, were mainly concerned in maintaining their own power and promoting their own material interests. The methods adopted by them for these ends—war, taxation, land and property laws and customs—were almost invariably effective in promoting the misery of their subjects and in keeping them poor, diseased, and ignorant. In these conditions the people, populace, or mob were regarded by the upper classes as a human species different from their own, always savage and potentially dangerous.[2] The proper instrument for their repression, for keeping them in their place, and preventing serious outbreaks of their inherent criminality was the criminal law. The savagery of the law, of its administration, and of judges, down to the 19th century and even beyond it, has only been equalled by the savagery of religious doctrines regarding sin and punishment

[1] Here again, it must be pointed out, the Greeks and particularly the Athenians were exceptional. The attitude of the ruler to the ruled in the speech of the Thucydidean Pericles is unique. He seems to be unaware of the problem of crime and the enforcement of law; happiness is assumed as the object of government, and it is taken for granted that ordinary people will cooperate freely for that end, cheerfully obeying both 'the written and the unwritten laws'. It is significant that criminal law is the only department of social science in which Europe owes nothing to the Greeks. Criminal law has its origins in Rome.

[2] The famous description by La Bruyère of the French peasants, which I quoted in Vol. I of *After the Deluge*, p. 269, shows that this was still true during one of the most brilliant periods of French history. The 'animaux farouches' which he saw in the fields were 'des mâles et des femelles, répandus par la campagne, noirs, livides, et tout brûlés de soleil, attachés à la terre qu'ils fouillent et qu'ils remuent avec une opiniâtreté invincible'; yet, as he sarcastically notes, they had 'une voix articulée' and, when they stood on their hind legs, human faces; 'en effet ils sont des hommes'. The attitude of the upper classes in England as late as 1820 may be seen in this extract from *The Journal of Mrs. Arbuthnot* for December 7, p. 58: '. . . we went to Drayton where we found the Duke of Dorset in a fury with his tenants and people who, to the number of nearly 20, had had a dinner to celebrate the *Queen's triumph*. They had had all sorts of ridiculous toasts, among others, "May Tyranny waste away like dew in the sun". He has turned off their farms and dismissed as labourers all those who were at the dinner, a vigorous measure which, if generally adopted, wd be a better check to radicalism than anything else in the world.'

and of their interpretation and enforcement by priests. Few things in human history are more disgusting than the long record of torture, branding, mutilation, flogging, burning, hanging, drawing, quartering, shooting, electrocuting, imprisoning, to which millions of men have been condemned, for the highest if not sometimes sadistic motives, in the sacred name of law and order, by men called judges to whom society habitually accords the greatest honours. The amount and acuteness of unhappiness inflicted upon the human race by law and prisons has probably exceeded that caused by any other human institution, not excepting war, disease, famine, or religion.

Before fascist and communist governments reintroduced on a large scale some of the most ruthless and vindictive among the primeval practices connected with crime and punishment, in so-called civilized countries it looked as if the slow growth of civilized and rational standards of social value had finally freed large portions of the earth from the most cruel and senseless methods of inflicting misery on harmless people by legal process. One of the most important causes of this change in communal psychology, which produced reform of the criminal code and law in so many countries, was the fact that gradually large numbers of persons were convinced of the truth which a small number of persons had preached for many centuries—namely, that the severity of the penal code and the vindictiveness of punishments did not produce a law-abiding population. If you flog a man or send him to jail for two years for stealing a shilling, you do not, in fact, make him or his neighbours honest, and the security of life and property for the respectable and the well-to-do is not obtained by the hanging of poor 'criminals'. In the last 30 years, however, there has been a great change, particularly in totalitarian countries, back to the old communal psychology in relation to crime and punishment. It is accepted that the government rightly treats whole classes of its subjects as natural criminals, and that it is its duty to inflict punishment in the shape of death or mass misery upon them.[1] The result is that, although the sum of human misery

[1] They may be Jews or communists in one place or kulaks and nazis in another, but they are always treated as unreclaimable criminals. The nazis held that you, therefore, could not do anything with a Jew and Hitler proceeded to the logical decision—exterminate them. Stalin's attitude to

inflicted by politics and governments had been greatly reduced during the last 100 years, particularly in democratic countries, by the effect of humanitarianism on penal codes, police, and prisons, the decrease has been counterbalanced—perhaps more than counterbalanced—by the mass misery inflicted upon economic, racial, and other classes, ideologically condemned as criminal, by political parties or governments in totalitarian regimes.

We are so accustomed to misgovernment and the unhappiness which governments and politics have always caused millions of ordinary men and women to suffer in their private lives that we unconsciously accept the fact as inevitable or even as 'natural' or 'right and proper'. This toleration of or callousness to mass misery is one of the most persistent and profound characteristics of political psychology. It can be observed throughout history in the ruthless economic exploitation of class by class, nation by nation, or race by race; in the savage persecution of sect by sect, sometimes for religious and sometimes for ideological reasons; and, above all, in the institution of war as an instrument of national policy. It is so irrational that it is almost impossible to get oneself or anyone else to consider its operation and effects objectively. When I have the toothache or when my friend loses his job and his means of earning a living in a slump or when a bomb destroys my neighbour's house and his two-year-old child, I have some understanding of the suffering involved, of cause and effect in terms of an individual's unhappiness. But it is almost impossible to apply the same standard of rational appreciation and judgment to the suffering inflicted, often deliberately and senselessly, upon millions of individuals in the following cases: slavery; serfdom and the exploitation of peasants and agricultural labourers by landowning classes; the treatment of industrial workers, men, women, and children, in the first century of the industrial revolution; the crusade against the Albigenses in the 13th and the Thirty Years War in the 17th century; the extermination of millions of Jews by Hitler and the liquidation of millions of Russian peasants by Stalin in the 20th century; the suffering now being inflicted in the year 1951

the kulaks, quoted above, is the same and he rejected as a heresy the idea that you could find a place for a reformed kulak in the communist society: the only thing to do with them was to liquidate them.

by the governments of Russia, the United States, China, and Britain upon millions of ignorant men, women, and children in Korea.

What these cases meant to individuals in terms of human misery it is impossible, as I have said, for the mind to imagine. It was caused, not by God or nature or fate, but by the communal beliefs and desires of men, i.e. by politics. In nearly every case the suffering inflicted was unnecessary and useless, in the sense that the actions taken politically or socially, which produced mass misery, did not produce the results, other than the misery, intended by the ruling classes. Their beliefs were almost always proved to be false and their desires unattainable by the measures through which they hoped to attain them. It took thousands of years for human beings to learn that the rich become richer if manual workers are 'free' rather than slaves or serfs, and that the prosperity of employers is not proportionate to the poverty and ignorance of the employed. None of the political or social results intended by those responsible for slaughtering the Albigenses or devastating Germany in the Thirty Years War were attained. The ruin of vast numbers of Russian peasants by Stalin had the opposite effect upon the economy to what he intended and within a few years —in politics the dead bury their dead—he had to reverse his policy. It is true that Hitler succeeded in killing with greater cruelty more Jews than Stalin managed in the case of the kulaks, but the only other things attained by him were the killing of millions of Germans and other Christians, the ruin of Germany, and his own suicide in an underground cellar. The Russian, American, British, and Chinese governments have repeatedly stated their objects in slaughtering large numbers of Koreans, Americans, Chinese, British, Turks, etc., in devastating Korea and destroying its towns and villages, in driving hundreds of thousands of ignorant and helpless men, women, and children, starving and shelterless, backwards and forwards through snow and rain over the desolate mountains of Korea. Those objects are to preserve the liberty and independence of the Koreans, to resist aggression, to destroy American capitalist imperialism, and/or to destroy communism. It already seems improbable that any of these objects will be attained.

Here in politics we see the same phenomenon as we observed in religion. Governments, like churches, create unhappiness,

not inadvertently or temporarily for a few persons, but deliberately and on a colossal scale.[1] The most important causes of this strange phenomenon and of the fact that the vast majority of their victims have usually[2] tolerated or even approved of their government's actions are three, and we have already observed them continually acting in political history. The first is political stupidity, which is often the obstinate inability, persisting for centuries, to see that some law or political action produces a result which is the exact opposite of that intended. The savagery of the penal law was a good example of this. The second is the disastrous delusion, common among ruling classes, to which I have had to refer frequently, that the intention to produce a great good in the distant future justifies a government in immediately producing a great evil. For instance, the governing classes would often have admitted that their penal codes or wars produced great misery, but they would have defended themselves by saying that the evil was 'necessary' in order to achieve prosperity, glory, or some great national advantage. Thirdly there is the incorrigible sense of sin, which permeates all legal systems and particularly penal codes. Governments, as I said, tend to regard all ordinary persons as natural criminals. They can be made to be good or deterred from doing evil only by making them unhappy or by the threat of misery in the form of 'punishment'. It is the ecclesiastical doctrine of sin transferred to politics—the religious doctrine being that you can make men good or deter them from evil by

[1] The effects of the Thirty Years War on Germans or of the industrial revolution on British workers, in terms of human suffering, continued for years after the war had ended and the revolution had been completed. It is probable that 100 years after Hitler died in his cellar he will still be causing great misery to millions of the earth's inhabitants.

[2] Not always. As I pointed out in the first volume of *After the Deluge*, p. 22: 'history seems to show that mass misery, if it exceeds a certain duration in time or intensity of suffering, has an effect upon men's minds'. It makes them think about 'the communal causes of their suffering'—and nothing is more dangerous to governments than that their subjects should begin to think. See, too, p. 65 of *After the Deluge*, Vol. I. It should, perhaps, be noted that intense communal misery, if protracted, can also produce the opposite effect—a kind of communal apathy and resigned despair which make any thought or revolt against misgovernment impossible. Peasant populations, where landlords, soil, and climate keep them permanently on the verge of starvation, seem often to sink into this condition.

punishment or the threat of punishment and that the good man is the man who denies himself or is denied happiness. These inveterate delusions acquire a great deal of their force and persistence because they provide an outlet for our sadistic and masochistic impulses.

This being the case, it is surely very remarkable that, although politics have always been one of the major causes of mass misery, no government has ever ventured to deny that happiness is good and should be one of the chief ends of political action. Even Hitler said, and probably believed, that his main and ultimate object of government was always the happiness of the German people. The 'true' happiness of the German people, of course, and it was only Hitler who knew what the 'true' happiness of the German people was or should be. The misery inflicted upon selected classes and races was justified by him on exactly the same grounds as churches have justified the torture, burning, and persecution of heretics and infidels. These people are wicked, irredeemable sinners or criminals; their suffering is necessary if the rest of the population is to be 'good' and happy. Besides, every 'good' man enjoys seeing the 'wicked' suffer. So, too, Stalin always maintained, and probably believed, that his only object was the happiness of the Russian people, the sole difference being that, whereas in Germany it is the Jews who are wicked and the happiness of the German people requires the mass misery of Jews, in Russia wickedness is found to reside in peasants who are not completely impoverished and the happiness of the Russian people requires that they should be ruined and exterminated.

When in this way one analyses the beliefs and desires which underlie political thought and action, the spectacle is so brutally irrational that one's first inclination is to throw away one's pen or put the lid permanently on one's typewriter. What use is there in trying to explain in terms of sense and reason politics, if they are merely the senseless antics of a savage beast? Yet despair of this kind, if natural, is not, I think, necessary. It is better—it may even be more useful—to know how Hitler and Stalin and most of us think and act politically than to continue to share their delusion that they are behaving rationally. It may possibly help us to think and act more rationally or even to find here and there a minute ray of hope

in human history. It seems to me that there is a tiny ray of hope even in the facts which I have just been studying.

It will be remembered that I have been led to this depressing contemplation of the mind and acts of Hitler and Stalin from the consideration, which began on p. 255, of the relation between our standards of social value, our beliefs that x, y, or z should be an ultimate end of social action, and actual life. The observer of human behaviour in communities is compelled at some point to investigate the nature of our beliefs about social ends and values. What is the foundation, for instance, for the belief that happiness is good in itself and therefore that governments should make the happiness of people an ultimate end of political action? I pointed out that this kind of belief is not one which can be proved to be certainly true, but that nearly everyone, when thinking or acting rationally, treats happiness as good and unhappiness as bad. If this be so, in actual life and in practical politics, the absence of theoretical or philosophical proof of the belief is unimportant. What matters in actual life is how profoundly and how widely the belief is held. For if people believe that the pursuit of social happiness is rational, the fact that they cannot prove the belief to be true will not affect their actions, any more than the fact that you cannot prove that your table and chair exist will affect your actions in sitting down at the table to eat your dinner.

Here Hitler and Stalin appear as very important witnesses. For both of these rulers, although they deliberately caused unhappiness and mass misery on a colossal scale, are forced by their own profoundest beliefs, which they share with the rest of the world, to maintain, as rational human beings, that their ultimate aim is happiness. It is not any doubt whether communal happiness is good and should be a principal end of communal action which causes men and governments deliberately and irrationally to cause communal misery. The usual causes of these savage and deplorable political acts—ranging from the colossal cruelties of a Hitler or Stalin to the comparatively petty, but no less senseless, cruelty of the law and punishment administered by more civilized governments, e.g. in Britain, France, and America—are psychological, and have been revealed in the previous discussion. The common human error of confusing means with ends; the stupidity of the human mind in continually choosing means which make it impossible

to attain our ends; the terrible political delusion that, if the end we aim at is big enough and good enough, it is justifiable or even necessary, to choose means which create immediate and large-scale evil; the difficulty which the human mind experiences in controlling desires, particularly our sadistic desires, when they conflict with our beliefs—these are the reasons why we are presented with the fantastic spectacle of the Hitlers, Stalins, and many smaller people insanely pursuing the happiness of mankind by making men miserable—or corpses.

I have been considering happiness, it will be remembered, only as one item in the corpus of social values. The conclusion which I have arrived at with regard to happiness applies also, I think, to other items in the corpus. The vast majority of civilized human beings regard humanity, justice, freedom as politically good; they believe that they should be made the ultimate ends of communal action, no less than happiness. There is perhaps not quite the same unanimity of belief with regard to them as there is with regard to happiness, and most people have a less clear cut and immediate understanding of what they and others mean by humanity or justice than what is to be understood by happiness. But our attitude to all these items in our credo of social values is substantially the same. When we think of 'civilization', we regard happiness, freedom, humanity, and justice as essential ingredients of the 'civilized' way of life and therefore imposed upon governments as ultimate ends of political action. That is why there is a kind of circular reasoning in the beliefs of civilized people with regard to civilization and why, as I pointed out on p. 255, civilization itself provides the reason why we should think and act, individually and communally, in accordance with its standards of truth and values. When we talk of 'civilization', a 'civilized' society or individual, we imply a judgment of values; we are right to use the word in that sense, and it is not true that, as many writers say, the word is so vague that it should not be used at all. A civilized society is one which provides a way of life which conforms to certain standards of social value almost universally recognized. The circular motion in the argument or reasoning is due to the fact that civilization is both caused by and causes the gradual evolution of a population which accepts those values. Happiness, freedom, justice, humanity

are among the most important ingredients of a civilized way of life to which practically everyone now attaches social value. And the judgment that these ingredients are good is so firmly planted in the minds of 20th-century men that, as with happiness, so with freedom, say, or justice, rulers or governments which in fact are destroying freedom or doing injustice on a vast scale, are forced by the profundity and universality of these ethical beliefs to pretend or even to believe that the slavery or injustice which they are inflicting is 'real' freedom or 'real' justice.

Thus there has developed an ethical corpus of values which stands in a similar relation to individual and social life as the corpus of contemporary knowledge. Each is reciprocally both cause and effect of the stage in civilization which at any particular moment a particular community has reached. Neither has the validity of absolute certainty or absolute truth, and it is highly probable that if we attempt to prove to a complete sceptic that freedom is good and should be treated as a social end by governments or that all the phenomena of the material world are subject to the laws of cause and effect, we shall reach a stage in the dispute in which each is relying on a belief which he cannot prove logically or scientifically. Yet the sceptic, like Hitler and Stalin, when he is off his guard or not influenced by some ulterior motive, will implicitly admit the validity of these 'civilized' values.[1]

[1] I do not wish unnecessarily to prolong an already lengthy argument. Otherwise I could produce a good deal of evidence from professional philosophers to support that of the rulers and governments. I will, therefore, here merely draw attention to one fact. Philosophers, from Plato and Aristotle to Hume, Mill, and Professor G. E. Moore, have disagreed profoundly with regard to the meaning, origin, nature, and validity of our ethical beliefs or judgments. Yet despite this wide disagreement, they hardly ever disagree about what is good or has value. Even those who maintain that there is only one thing which is good, e.g. pleasure, find the most extraordinary and complicated reasons for also believing in what I have called the corpus of values and for proving—often at the expense of consistency or logic—that, for instance, happiness, freedom, justice, truth, or humanity have value. Hume is, perhaps, the most significant example. Hume liked to think of himself as a peculiarly 'tough' philosopher, the complete, logical, materialist sceptic. In ethics he set out to show that nearly everyone had been wrong about the nature and origin of the 'moral sentiment'. They had been particularly wrong about the moral sentiment

It seems to me that there is some slight ray of hope or consolation in this. The horrible and insensate communal behaviour of mankind is not due to our not knowing what is good or to doubt as to the ultimate social values. It is due to

in relation to the social value of justice. According to Hume, when we say that an action is virtuous, we mean merely that when we think of it, we feel moral approval, and moral approval is only the feeling of pleasure which we get when we think of the action 'considered in general, without reference to our particular interest'. This, at first sight, would seem to offer no basis for our corpus of social values, for if this peculiar and personal sentiment of approval is all we mean when we use the words 'good' or 'ought', there seems to be little prospect of finding any reason why the happiness of other people, freedom, or justice should be the ultimate ends of government. And yet, by some remarkable mental somersaults, that is precisely what Hume contrives to do. However much he differs from Platonists, Aristotelians, idealists, or the social contract school on the meaning and nature of our judgments of moral or social values, there is little or no disagreement between him and them as to what is or is not morally or socially good or bad. By the ingenious insinuation of terms like utility, moral beauty, and sympathy, he proves to his and our satisfaction the validity of all the moral obligations and social values established by 'civilization', even of the happiness of other people and of 'the inflexible observance of the rules of justice'. This seems to me of great significance. I do not say that it proves the validity of our judgments of value; but I do maintain that the philosophers, like the kings and dictators, show that it is not doubt or disagreement about what is socially good or bad which causes rulers or governments to do what is evil according to the canons of social value established by civilization.

I should like to draw attention here to a very interesting contribution to the philosophy and psychology of social values in a book recently published, *Psychoanalysis and Politics*, by R. E. Money-Kyrle. The author is a practising psychoanalyst, and he brings forward evidence from his science that what he calls the humanist character and the humanist morality—in other words, the corpus of social values and the belief in them which has developed as 'civilized'—have their roots in the rational operations of the human mind. It follows that 'so far as people are normal, in the sense of being integrated, and therefore rational, they are also humanistic' (p. 68). His final conclusions are also worth quoting: (1) that 'a humanist character and a humanist morality are attributes of a kind of wisdom which consists of insight into ourselves and others'; (2) that 'humanism and wisdom thrive most easily in the kind of state that seeks to provide welfare without curtailing freedom'; (3) that 'the main impediment to the achievement of such a state is the political influence of unconscious motives, and that this can only be lessened by becoming conscious of them'. Mr. Money-Kyrle's facts and arguments seem to me to provide new evidence for the view taken by me of communal psychology in its relation to social values.

our political stupidity, our muddle-headedness with regard to means and ends, our habit of yielding to desires which contradict our beliefs, and finally to our imbecility in listening to political quacks, charlatans, dogmatists, strong men, and fanatics, and allowing them to gain a monopoly of political and military power. It follows that the misery and suffering caused by politics, which have enormously increased throughout the world in recent years, would be greatly decreased by the injection of a moderate amount of reason into our communal thought and action. Civilization, as I have tried to show, is a way of life determined by and conforming to certain standards of social value, among which some of the most important are freedom, happiness, justice, and humanity. This way of life is incompatible with authoritarianism, because the social values of authoritarian society are the opposite of those of civilization. Further, civilization and its values are intimately connected with reason; authoritarianism and its values rely for their power and appeal on the irrational. That is why dictators, kings, oligarchies, and churches have always spent so much time and energy on suppressing the still, small, but powerful, voice of truth and reason, and on keeping their subjects irrational. If we applied as much reason and as little emotional superstition to our politics as we do to our wireless sets, the world would instantly become a much more civilized and safe place to live in, and the regimes of a Hitler or Stalin, like those of cannibals and head-hunters, would fade into the nightmares of a vanished barbarism. Looking out upon Europe today, no one can feel very optimistic that such a change, not of heart, but of brain, will come to its wretched and bewildered inhabitants. And yet, I repeat, there is here a small and solitary ray of hope. In the past human beings have occasionally learnt to apply their reason to politics and to develop a civilization out of a barbarism. There is still a chance that they may do so again, before they destroy themselves by the latest form of atomic barbarism.

CHAPTER V

IS AUTHORITARIANISM NECESSARY OR VIABLE?

THESE last paragraphs lead me directly to the last question which I have to discuss regarding the relation between authoritarianism and standards of social value. It has been maintained again and again by all kinds of different people that both private and public morality depends upon religion and authority, and that the acceptance and implementation of standards of value inevitably disappear where rationalism and scepticism have destroyed religious faith, belief in God, and respect for authority and tradition. According to this theory, we are frequently told that the alleged decline in private morality during the 20th century and the breakdown in European civilization, which few would deny, are the immediate result of 19th-century rationalism, scepticism, and scientific 'materialism', for by destroying faith and all respect for authority they have undermined the bases of civilization. Those whose inclinations are towards some kind of political authoritarianism often include democracy with rationalism and materialism among the chief causes of social corrosion.

The question thus raised is of great theoretical interest and considerable practical importance. But if the argument, as it is commonly presented, is examined closely, it will be found to contain some confusions which must be straightened out before we begin to face the facts. The theory is based on two or three hypotheses which are quite distinct and must be considered separately. One is that ethical beliefs and acceptance of standards of value depend upon the belief that what is good or bad, and therefore the corpus of social values, have been established by a 'higher authority', i.e. by a God, and that therefore without religious faith there can be no stable private or public morality.[1] Civilization, as defined by me, cannot,

[1] The hypotheses are usually stated categorically as facts without any evidence. For instance, George Santayana, in his recent book *Dominations and Powers* (1951, p. 155), writes: 'Not only does the decay of religious faith let loose all sorts of moral licence, but the inevitable' [note the unproved

therefore, survive unless the community is permeated by a belief in God and acceptance of a moral code established for man by God. The second hypothesis, which is quite different, maintains, not that people will not believe in morality and standards of value unless they also believe them to be of divine origin, but that they will not act on those beliefs unless they are interpreted and enforced by a mundane authority, a church or state, acting communally on behalf of the divine. There is a third hypothesis, again completely different, but often somehow or other confused with the others, that people will not believe in or act on moral standards unless they are laid down for them and enforced by authority and that therefore authoritarian government is necessary if moral chaos or anarchy is to be avoided.

I propose to examine the first hypothesis first. Its lineage is of great antiquity and it has been accepted, in one form or another, by all kinds of different people, including even some of the greatest sceptics who were famous for undermining religious beliefs. Voltaire, for instance, was terrified by the prospect of the lower classes losing their belief in God and thought that scepticism could be safely allowed only to the upper classes. Many other unbelievers have agreed with him that, although the ruling classes and property owners can get on quite well without a God, it is necessary to invent one for the common people, if ethics, social stability, and civilization are to be preserved. There is no evidence for the truth of this hypo-

assumption in this adjective] 'rebellion of the passions, noble as well as base, against any external control, is often the secret cause of infidelity; because people wish to do as they like with a good conscience'. Later he tells us that 'it would undermine Jewish morality to doubt that the Ten Commandments were written by the finger of God', for 'everyone would . . . commit adultery when tempted if not deterred by prudence or by some contrary private allegiance'. The last six, question begging words, which make nonsense of what he has just said, show the muddle and mist in the minds of those who make these sweeping, unproved generalizations about religion and morality. Mr. Santayana does not consider the crucial question whether the 'contrary private allegiance', e.g. the belief that adultery is wrong, may not have written 'Thou shalt not commit adultery' into the Ten Commandments; if it did, and there is considerable evidence that it did, then decay in the religious faith that the Commandment was written by the finger of God will not let loose any sort of moral licence and no one will commit adultery merely because he has ceased to believe in the historical truth of an Old Testament myth.

thesis; in fact, all the evidence is against it. If one approaches the problem inductively, it is impossible to find in history any correlation or causal connection between religious belief or belief in God and belief in the ethics and social values of civilization. In some periods and places peoples have been profoundly religious and have had a profound sense of ethical and social values, the values being sometimes civilized and sometimes barbarous. In such cases the belief in God is certainly closely connected with belief in the particular corpus of individual and social values. Examples can be studied in the theocratical society of the Hebrews, the communities of primitive Christians, many Muhammadan countries, mediaeval Europe, and some modern Roman Catholic communities. In other times and places, the opposite has happened. There has never been a more sceptical or rationalist age than that of classical Greece, but no people have ever had a firmer or more profound belief in the ethical and social values of civilization than the Greeks of the Periclean age. Indeed, the Greek ethics were rooted in their scepticism and rationalism, just as the Hebrew ethic was rooted in their religion. The second half of the 19th century in England is another period in which an outburst of religious scepticism was accompanied by a remarkable growth of belief in moral and social values.

That this should be the case is not surprising in view of what emerged from my previous discussion of social values and communal psychology; it could be deduced from the nature of ethical beliefs. The nature of any particular ethical belief is not determined by its origin nor is its validity determined by 'authority'. We do not believe that *x* is good, because we believe that God has said that *x* is good; on the contrary, we usually believe that God has said that *x* is good, because we believe that *x* is good. Having invented God and foisted upon him our ethical belief, it is true that our religious belief reinforces the strength of our ethical belief and has again and again provided us with an excuse for persecuting those who reject our ethics and our God. That is why, as we saw from another angle, it takes much longer to civilize a God than man. All Gods are, like Jehovah, 'jealous' Gods and do not easily relinquish what has been given to them, including their ethics. They also become in time a vested interest of priests and ruling classes, who use God and his commandments as an instrument

of political power. These people rightly recognize the danger in allowing any change in an omnipotent and eternal deity, since their own power has always in part rested on their claim to interpret and enforce the divine and immutable ordinances. The Ten Commandments are indeed written by God himself on two tables of stone.

Jehovah wrote, but he wrote at the dictation of Moses. It is not the Gods, but the prophets, heretics, and unbelievers, who have changed and civilized religions and their standards of value. When men believed that it was a good thing to kill and eat human beings the Gods prescribed cannibalism; when men reached a stage in civilization where the killing and eating of human beings became abhorrent to them, the Gods forbade cannibalism. The first anti-cannibalists were almost certainly killed and eaten with the approval of God and his priests. It was men like Aeschylus and Socrates who changed the ethics of Greek religion and civilized the Greek Gods; they did not believe that truth and justice were good because Zeus had said so—Zeus had said in fact the opposite—on the contrary, it was because they believed so fervently that these things were good that they—Socrates at the cost of his life—compelled Zeus and all the other Gods to change their ways and their ethics. Two thousand years ago there was in the Middle East and even in the European territories of the Roman republic a vague, but widespread, revolt against the crudity and barbarism of traditional ethics and the established religions. It culminated in Christ's attack upon the Jewish Church and his revolutionary code of moral and social values. And he made it quite clear that he was attacking, not only the Jewish Church, but the old God. 'Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth: But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. . . . Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven. . . .' But it was Jehovah, whom Christ was to change into 'your Father which is in heaven', Jehovah himself who had said: 'An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth'. Christ's new ethical values, which

are the values of civilized men, commended themselves to so many people in the next few centuries that both the Jewish and Christian Gods had to adopt them, and even the churches embodied them in their creeds, though during the next two thousand years they contrived to prevent their being put into practice. So recalcitrant is every God to change and to civilization that the acceptance of a civilized and humane ethic by Jehovah has for 20 centuries been extremely superficial. However it is probably better that a God should be civilized on the surface than not civilized at all.

I will give only one more example of the way in which man imposes his ethical beliefs upon his God and his religion—not vice versa. It is a very curious and interesting example. One of the most ancient of all human beliefs has been in a kind of ethical magic which enables a man to acquire strength or virtue by ceremonial eating of some particular animal, a fellow-man, or a God. This extraordinary delusion was at one time almost universal and died hard. Eventually the belief that one could and must acquire virtues by eating animals or human beings disappeared from the minds of civilized people, and Gods and priests who had previously ordained the practice as a divine commandment now prescribed the opposite. The practice of eating one's God proved even more stubborn, possibly because it was more intimately connected with the vested interests of the deity and his religion, priests, and church. The belief that by sprinkling water over the human body or by consuming the body of God in some form or other you can attain righteousness and a remission of sins, whereas omission of such ceremonies constitutes deadly sin and entails appalling punishment, has persisted among sections of otherwise civilized peoples down to the present day. But knowledge, science, reason, and civilization have seriously undermined the belief in this kind of magic and it is probably not an exaggeration to say that a considerable majority of people in so-called civilized countries no longer really believe in it. Their ethical beliefs have changed; they no longer believe that the sprinkling of water on an infant's body can affect the ethical condition of its soul, that bread and wine are in fact the body and blood of God, or that their sins can be affected by eating the body of God in the form of wafers and drinking his blood in the form of wine.

It is illuminating to observe how this dilemma which, under the impact of civilization, has arisen in the ethical beliefs of rational men has been resolved. The primitive beliefs have always been a fundamental tenet in the moral and metaphysical teaching of many existing religions and churches. Bound up with the whole doctrine of sin and salvation, the Gods and priests are committed to these beliefs and cannot repudiate them without bringing down the entire edifice of religious morality which has been built upon them. Yet a majority, or at any rate a very large majority, of their congregations have lost their faith in these doctrines, because they have acquired a new—dare I say, a higher?—morality and sense of values, inconsistent with the primitive, thaumaturgical beliefs. Indeed, many of them regard the ancient ethic and practices with disgust of the kind which every one in England would feel today if he were asked to eat a strong man in order to gain strength himself.

The situation has been met by individuals and churches in the three different ways in which we habitually deal with dilemmas, by cutting the Gordian knot, by compromise, or by doing nothing. A very large number of people have cut the knot, by abandoning the old beliefs and the Gods and churches which still cling to them. This section includes not only atheists, agnostics, and deists, but also many who would still describe themselves as Christians, but whose connection with a Christian church is confined to burial, and possibly baptism and marriage. These people are examples of those who repudiate religion and a God because their own ethical values are inconsistent with those of religion and God. But in Protestant countries some of the churches have themselves cut the knot. Under the impact of civilization and reason, several non-conformist churches have in fact entirely abandoned the old ethical beliefs in baptism and communion and in the magic of sin and salvation. In order to civilize God they have all but abolished him.

In most countries, however, Protestant churches and a vast number of their adherents have met the dilemma by compromise. The Anglican Church is a shining example. Compromise is affected through the blessed word symbolism. Officially the ethical doctrine of the church remains exactly what it was in the days when men still believed in the magical efficacy of holy water and eating the body of God for removing sin and

ensuring life everlasting. Those whose minds and morality are still in that state can therefore remain within the fold, and, perhaps, call themselves Anglo-Catholics. But the many people whose moral sense and reason cannot stomach these doctrines are catered for by the doctrine that all these ceremonies are symbolic. The wafer is not in fact Christ's actual body nor the wine his blood; the eating of the one and the drinking of the other is merely a symbolic commemoration of his sacrifice and of the fact that only by living in communion with his teaching is it possible to live a good life. Similarly baptism is regarded no longer as having an ethical effect upon the soul of the infant or upon its fate; it is merely a ceremony symbolizing his provisional acceptance as a member of the Anglican Church and of respectable society. I think that this is a pretty accurate description of the moral and religious beliefs of nine out of ten of the professing Christians whom I know and of two out of three of the clergymen of the Church of England whose views and preachings I have been able to observe. All these people are examples of men and women whose religion has not determined or maintained their moral beliefs, but whose moral beliefs have determined their religious beliefs. They have forced their God, their religion, and their church to compromise, and so have civilized them.

There remains the third method of dealing with the dilemma —to do nothing. The most remarkable example of its use has probably been by the Roman Catholic Church. Both the power and the weakness of this organization has for many centuries been its inability to change its doctrines. The rigidity of its teaching has been due historically to its organization and to its claims. Its organization is very ancient; it is one of the most authoritarian hierarchies that the world has known; it claims to be the sole repository of absolute truth, for it alone has been entrusted by an omnipotent and changeless deity with the knowledge and interpretation of his will. The church can, therefore, and does, from time to time make pronouncements on religion, morals, metaphysics, politics, or science, the truth of which cannot—for the Catholic—be questioned. The result is that Catholic doctrine has incorporated nearly all the major fantasies and delusions which have had a wide appeal to the irrational in human beings during the last 2,000 years. Here its conservatism has been its strength, for it is, as we have seen,

usually far easier to appeal socially to men's irrational hopes and fears than to truth and reason, and the hierarchy preserves its hold over ignorant, perplexed, or unhappy people by fostering the old fantasies of sin and salvation and by promises of eternal life and happiness. But here too is the church's weakness. The mind of man does not remain unchanged during 2,000 years. As we have seen, a certain amount of truth has penetrated it; reason has slowly altered many of our fundamental beliefs; reason and civilization have ousted many ethical barbarisms and created new standards of individual and social values. But the Catholic Church, unlike most of the others, cannot move with the times, abandon its false beliefs, or modify its barbarous ethics. It is the voice of absolute truth and absolute truth cannot compromise.

As regards the Communion, therefore, the Catholic Church can do nothing to solve the dilemma. It has to stand where it stood and pretend that the dilemma does not exist. Officially it still maintains that the wafer is the body of Christ when it is eaten by the communicant. The attitude of the hierarchy is clearly shown in the following quotation from a recent book in which a highly intelligent Jesuit priest states 'what he conceives to be the nature and function of the Church to which he belongs' and attempts with considerable skill to make its doctrines palatable to the non-Catholics:

> What then does the doctrine 'of the Holy Eucharist' involve? Believing as he does that Christ is the Incarnate God, the Catholic is prepared to accept at their face value the otherwise incredible words: 'This is my body'. That the words were uttered by Truth itself is a part of his faith; that faith enables him to accept their plain sense. All the objections of students of Comparative Religion do not, of course, in any way invalidate that meaning. The Catholic is not deficient in common sense and if he finds in pre-Christian rites hints of a god slain and eaten, it is entirely natural to him to suppose that we have here evidence of a deep-seated desire on the part of human nature to come into the closest possible relationship with the object of religious worship. It is entirely in keeping, then, that that desire should have been so remarkably satisfied. What the student of Comparative Religion has rarely the time to study is the profound theological implications of the Catholic doctrine.[1]

[1] *Roman Catholicism*, by Thomas Corbishley, S.J. (1950), p. 44. Despite the author's cleverness, there are several things which unconsciously reveal

Officially, then, and when addressing Catholics, the Roman Catholic Church still maintains that the bread and wine of the Holy Eucharist are, by a recurring miracle, the actual body and blood of God, and that the moral well-being and future life of the individual depend upon the regular, ceremonial eating of God in this form. To non-Catholics, as Father Corbishley shows, the leaders of the church say the same thing, in guarded and slightly apologetic language. What exactly the attitude of the millions of ordinary men and women who still call themselves Catholics is to this doctrine must be a matter of modest conjecture, particularly for a non-Catholic. My own conjecture, which is not worth much, based to some extent upon personal acquaintance with members of the church and partly upon the evidence of books, is this. There are a considerable number of educated and intelligent persons, at any rate in this country, the United States, and France, who are still nominally Catholics and would be claimed as Catholics statistically by the hierarchy, but who in fact do not accept many of the essential doctrines or perform the essential ceremonies of the church. These people, while perhaps unwilling publicly to repudiate Father Corbishley's interpretation of the Holy Eucharist, in private repudiate or ignore it. Secondly, there is a still larger number of Catholics who do what all of us do when we cease to accept a belief which is bound up with a whole cluster of other beliefs and habits which it would be

his mind. Note the impressive, but practically meaningless, statement: 'the words were uttered by Truth itself'. What is 'Truth itself'? Truth, even with a capital T, does not itself utter words. All that Father Corbishley is saying is that he who uttered the words was speaking and habitually spoke the truth. Note on the other hand the derogatory or minimizing implication in the word 'hints'. There are a good deal more than 'hints' of God-eating in pre-Christian rites; God-slaying and eating was a common practice among human beings for thousands of years. But Father Corbishley unconsciously wishes to play down any resemblance between such rites and the Holy Eucharist. Note, too, the beautiful *non sequitur*, so common in religious disputation, of the last three sentences. There is a deep-seated desire of human beings to get into close relation with God. Savages or primitive man thought to satisfy that desire by eating God. Therefore it is 'in keeping' (with what? Truth or truth or religion or Catholic doctrine?) that this desire should be satisfied by the Holy Eucharist. The argument is based on the obvious fallacy that the universe must provide satisfaction for every deep-seated desire of human beings and that a belief implied by a deep-seated desire must be true.

painful for us to abandon. We divide our minds into compartments isolated from one another so that we can comfortably accommodate two or more contradictory beliefs. In this case, disbelief in the moral efficacy of God-eating is in one compartment of the mind. In the other compartment is a mechanical and sometimes symbolical acceptance of the doctrine and ceremony of the Holy Eucharist. Lastly, there are a few intelligent persons and a vast number of ignorant men and women who, for different reasons and in very different ways, accept the doctrine in its ancient and official form.

The relation between religious beliefs and moral beliefs is also illuminated by the different attitude of Catholics and other Christian churches and sects towards baptism. The belief in the magical effect of the sprinkling of water upon infants or adults is not confined to Christians. But fairly early in the history of the Christian churches the doctrine that the ceremonial baptism of infants was essential to ensure the moral condition of their immortal souls in this world and their happiness in the next was widely adopted. It became a fundamental doctrine of the Catholic Church. It has always been complicated and bedevilled by an unfortunate uncertainty, which has caused a great deal of ecclesiastical dispute, not to speak of heresies. At what point in the physical process of producing infants does the immortal soul, which requires corporeal sprinkling of water for its moral salvation, appear? Clearly this question is of crucial importance if the well-being and future of an immortal soul depends upon baptism before death. Unfortunately neither God nor St. Paul nor the scriptures have made any pronouncement, and it was left to the church to solve the problem. The early official doctrine, established by St. Augustine and Aquinas, was that 'the male embryo acquired an immortal soul about forty days after conception, and the female about eighty days'.[1] For reasons unknown to me, the Catholic Church, after holding this view for several centuries, gradually abandoned it, and by 1854 when the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary was promulgated, most Catholic theologians held that 'the soul starts as soon as the male sperm and ovum unite'.

Since the time of St. Augustine there has been some change

[1] *Freedom and Catholic Power*, by Paul Blanshard (1951), p. 104. I am indebted to this book for the facts which follow.

in the ethics and sense of moral values among most Europeans. The idea that the immortal soul of a new-born infant or of a foetus can have its moral state and future after death affected by the sprinkling or non-sprinkling of water is to vast numbers of people repulsive and ridiculous. Most Protestants and Protestant churches made their religion conform to their ethics rather than their ethics to their religion, and baptism like the Communion became for them mainly symbolic. The reader of *Tristram Shandy* may see how ridiculous, if not repulsive, the Catholic doctrine regarding the baptism of embryos appeared 200 years ago to Laurence Sterne, a clergyman of the Church of England.[1] But here again the Catholic Church cannot change its beliefs, however repulsive or ridiculous they may be. The official instructions to Catholic nurses and doctors regarding the baptism of embryos today are almost indistinguishable from the 'Romish ritual' ridiculed by Sterne. Thus a Jesuit writer, Father William S. Bowdern, in *The Catholic Nurse and Dying*, writes:

> Human life, and therefore the soul, is present at the first moment of conception. For this reason an embyro, even in very early miscarriage, has an immortal soul. If the embryo can be recognized, take it in your fingers, break the membranes, and dip it under water and lift it out again while you pronounce the words of baptism. In case you cannot recognize the embryo at all, pour water on the blood clot in miscarriage, and pronounce the words of Baptism.[2]

In the previous pages I have been dealing with the relation between authority, religious or political, and the acceptance of ethical beliefs and standards of social value. To sum up, the evidence points to the following conclusions. Belief in ethical

[1] 'The Romish Rituals direct the baptizing of the child, in cases of danger, *before* it is born;—but upon this proviso, That some part or other of the child's body be seen by the baptizer:—But the Doctors of the *Sorbonne*, by a deliberation held amongst them, *April* 10, 1733, have enlarged the powers of the midwives, by determining, that though no part of the child's body should appear,—that baptism shall, nevertheless, be administered to it by injection,—*par le moyen d'un petite canulle*,—Anglice *a squirt*' (*Tristram Shandy*, Vol. I, ch. 20). There follows the *Mémoire présenté à Messieurs les Docteurs de Sorbonne* and Mr. Tristram Shandy's suggestion 'whether, after the ceremony of marriage, and before that of consummation, the baptizing of all HOMUNCULI at once, slap-dash, by *injection*, would not be a shorter and safer cut still'.

[2] Blanshard, p. 105.

commandments and in standards of value can be reinforced or for a time imposed upon large numbers of people if they can be induced to believe that they have been ordained by God or by a church or state interpreting or enforcing the divine commandments. But it is not true that such beliefs cannot be strongly or widely held unless they are based upon religious or secular authority. On the contrary, in many cases and particularly with the ethics and standards of civilization, the exact opposite is true. Again and again the ethics and standards of civilization have established themselves as a revolt against the ethics and standards of religious and secular authority. In such cases, authority, instead of imposing the belief, is compelled, if it is to survive, to accept the belief. Ethically the Gods have been continually remade in man's image.

This brings me to another, and I hope the last, ethical trench in which the authoritarians are accustomed to defend themselves. The argument is, not that men will not accept ethical beliefs without divine authority, but that they will not act on them unless compelled or induced by authority. For the theory and practice of politics this is one of the most important of all questions. The statement, in the extreme form given above, is often accepted, explicitly or implicitly, by the religious and politically by authoritarians, many conservative, and not a few sceptical liberals. It is certainly not true. Most people must have known sceptics, agnostics, and atheists who were far above the average in the strength of their ethical beliefs and in practising what they preached. History teaches the same lesson with regard to politics. I have shown in the previous pages that belief in social standards of value has often been strongly and fairly widely held, without the sanction of religious or political authority; in ancient Greece and in many other times and places where the psychology and institutions of what we call democracy have developed there have always been a considerable number of people who have consistently acted upon their political beliefs, with damage and danger to themselves, in the teeth of all religious and social authority. Indeed, had this not been the case, there would never have been either democrats or democracy.

The political theory as to the necessity for authority to ensure that men shall act in accordance with their ethical beliefs is, however, frequently held in a somewhat modified

form. It is really another version of Voltaire's theory that social chaos would result if the lower classes lost their belief in God. 'Ordinary people' or 'the masses', it is maintained, though they may accept standards of social value, will not consistently act upon them unless impelled or compelled by authority. This authority must be political and probably also of a religious nature. The whole of history proves, it is argued, that whenever religious beliefs weaken and the masses acquire the habit of questioning the wisdom or even the authority of authority, then the social cement which keeps the community together disintegrates; every individual pursues his own inclinations and interests and acts without regard to social standards of value. The result is the kind of social chaos which the rationalist 'democracy' of the 19th century spread throughout the world.

If this view be correct, it inevitably follows that no stable democratic organization of society is possible, for one essential element in democracy is the right or even duty of 'the masses' politically to think for themselves and to examine the credentials of authority—and this, we are told, inevitably leads to social chaos owing to the breakdown of all standards of social value. Here we are once more back to the eternal dispute which began on the Hellespont between Xerxes and Demaratos. There is, of course, a certain truth in the view of Xerxes, Hitler, and Stalin and of those who lean towards authoritarianism without going all the way with the Great Kings and those great dictators who have inherited their thrones and theories. In all human societies of which the purpose is a common way of life, and in all organizations in which there is a more restricted common purpose, there must be somewhere a principle and centre of effective authority. In history, as we observe it, the communal psychology of the human insect has so far been such that, if the society is to hold together or a common purpose is to be pursued and attained, there must be a social centre or nucleus where resides the power to declare authoritatively what is socially good or bad, right or wrong, and to enforce the standards and purposes in the practice of communal living. It is also true that on a superficial view, if you want to get communal action for a common purpose from a large number of heterogeneous persons, it will be easier to do so if you can get them blindly to accept the edicts of authority as absolutely binding—in other words, if they do not reason why, but are

content to do or die on the orders of a God, a king, a dictator, or even a voice from the loud-speaker.

There is, as I say, some truth in this argument and the democrat cannot ignore it. It is relevant to the much larger question of the general viability of democracy, the difficult question of combining freedom and intelligent initiative with authority in the vast agglomerations of a modern state. This larger question I shall have to consider at length later. Here I am concerned with a more limited question, whether without authoritarianism it is possible to ensure obedience to moral and social standards of value in a modern nation or whether freedom and reason, if no longer confined to a small privileged class, lead to social chaos. The evidence for the truth of this statement must be either historical or psychological, but there is no evidence in history or in psychology for its truth.

I will take psychology first. I have already shown that there is no reason at all to believe that the moral and social standards of value and practice of an individual who is a sceptic and uses his reason and questions the authority of all authorities are in any way inferior to those of an individual who blindly accepts his morality and standards of social value as the commands of a religious or secular authority. There is no evidence from psychology to show that what is true of the individual or of a few individuals is untrue of a large number of persons congregated as 'the masses'. The ethical behaviour of crowds and masses is often—though by no means always—lower than that of individuals, e.g. the standards of communal behaviour are usually lower than those generally maintained in the relations between individuals. Many people will gladly swindle the state or a corporation who would be horrified at the idea of swindling their next-door neighbour. But there is no psychological evidence of any connection between this lowering of standards and their relation to authority. I have never observed that the communal psychology and behaviour of the common people, in relation to social standards, is lower in those who are sceptical and irreligious from those who are religious. On the contrary, I should say that they are usually—though again not always—higher in those who tend to think for themselves and question the ethical credentials of authority than in those who accept unquestioningly their standards from some authority.

I do not think that it is unfair to suggest that there is usually

something else in the minds of those who accept the Voltairean theory that the masses, if they lose their belief in God or acquire the habit of intelligently examining the credentials of religious or secular authority, will, unlike the upper or ruling classes, lose their ethical and social standards of conduct. The interpretation of the word of God and of good and bad and right and wrong in society has almost always been reserved as a mysterious monopoly of the ruling classes in church or state. And almost always God, ethics, and law have agreed that the power of the powerful, the privileges of the privileged, and the property of the property owners must be preserved intact. The fear of the upper classes has been, not that the lower classes, if they think, will lose their morality and social standards, but that they may begin to question this particular interpretation of them by those in power. The fear is justified, for as soon as the masses ask for the credentials of authority, they raise very awkward questions about power and privilege. To the upper classes this naturally seems to be social chaos—to question the authority of authority appears from above always to be blasphemy or high treason and the expropriated expropriator has always been convinced that 'the country is going to the dogs'. But from below things look quite different. What those in power regard as the breakdown of all standards and as social chaos may well be the birth of a new society with higher standards of value.

This leads me to another psychological aspect of the question which seems to me of the greatest significance. The main conclusion to which, I maintain, the long enquiry of this book has, so far, led us is that civilization is a way of life, which can be defined, and which is dependent upon a psychology which can be defined. I need not repeat in detail the characteristics of this civilized society; they are based upon the acceptance of certain standards of social value. The value of individual freedom and initiative; of humanity; of cooperation for social ends; of justice and social equality; of truth and reason. It is essential to civilization that there should be a communal centre of authority and in the individual the correlative centre of discipline and obedience. But the determining difference between authoritarianism and civilization resides here, in the individual and communal psychology of obedience. In the authoritarian society the individual obeys because authority

commands and the ordinary man is forbidden to use his reason in large areas of life, society, or the universe. In the civilized community the ordinary man obeys authority as a creation or part of himself, the instrument of a common social purpose and of his own standards of value. Part of the common purpose is freedom and tolerance, and government is therefore government by discussion, not by edict of God or man. And obedience is not obedience to the voice of God or king or loud-speaker, but to the law and order, made by ordinary men in parliament or otherwise assembled, 'and not only to the written laws, but the unwritten laws of humanity and civilization, particularly those which prescribe aid for the oppressed and which have no sanction other than the shame of transgression'.

If, as I do, one accepts the values of civilization, one can dismiss summarily the argument of the authoritarian that the acceptance from authority, divine and secular, of codes of individual and social conduct without question or reason by the common people is necessary in order to preserve morality, order, and society. The values in an authoritarian society are fundamentally wrong and the longer it exists the more corrupt they become. The ruling class, even if its original objects and intentions were good and civilized, as in Russia, is soon compelled, by its own psychology and the logic of events, to adopt the ethics and machinery of a police state. For itself the one standard of social value which it recognizes is power and for the rest of the population obedience. Where the society is based upon this kind of relation between authority and obedience, the chief danger to its stability is in truth, knowledge, and reason. That kind of authority can only be maintained and that kind of obedience ensured by keeping the masses ignorant and irrational, political puppets whose social antics their rulers direct by pulling the various strings of worship, hatred, and fear.

From the point of view of civilization, therefore, it is not true that authoritarianism is necessary to ensure the acceptance and practice of ethical and social codes. On the contrary by its nature it destroys the values of civilization and the only hope for the human race is not in the preservation, but in the complete destruction of its ethics and standards of social values and in their supersession by those of civilization. Whether human beings are capable or incapable of developing a really civilized society, neither I nor anyone else today can know. But one

thing is at least certain. The standards of civilization cannot be established on the deception and ignorance of the masses or upon their credulous passions. The good life, as the Greeks called it, whether of the individual or of the community requires ever more and more reason and rationality, a profound belief in its values tempered by the profoundest scepticism.

So much for psychology; let us now take a look at history. I can see no evidence in history that society and ethical and social standards are more stable under authoritarianism than under democracy. On the contrary, such evidence as there is —and there is not very much, simply because before the 19th-century society had almost always everywhere been organized on an authoritarian basis—points to the opposite. The idea that churches and governments have been able to impose codes of ethics upon the common people by authority and have thereby been able to establish societies in which rulers and ruled lived securely, peacefully, and morally is a fantastic myth created by ruling classes and professional historians. One can understand why kings, priests, dictators, and oligarchies should wish us to believe this, but why should historians and political scientists support them? For one of the most remarkable facts in human history has been the persistent instability of governments, the sense of social insecurity above and of sullen discontent below, the savage outbreaks against and their savage repression by authority, the low standard of social values and conduct imposed by authority upon the multitude and the even more degraded social morality observed by the ruling classes themselves. Finally there seems to be an ethical Gresham Law by which in great authoritarian churches, like that of Rome, and in authoritarian states which profess to impose a high code of ethics upon their subjects, the ethically bad inevitably drives out of circulation the ethically good, so that, for instance, a church or government which begins by professing to apply to society the simple and austere and humane ethics of Christ ends by preaching and practising the opposite. The more ruthless the government in its imposition of authority and the more blindly ignorant the masses in their acceptance of ruling classes' ethic, the more unstable is society and the more savage the outbreaks, revolts, and repressions.

It is unnecessary to give particular instances in proof of these statements; it is only necessary to think of the bloody history

of Europe which for 2,000 years has always been on and often over the brink of 'social chaos'. But if anyone considers my statements exaggerated, I would ask him to reflect upon the record of the Great Kings of antiquity, the chain of peasant revolts that has graced the history of our Christian governments and society, the authoritarian suppression of heresies and the wars of religion, the reigns of Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Louis XVI in France, the social stability of Russia under the Romanovs and of Germany under the Hohenzollerns and Hitler. There is at least clear evidence in this historical record that again and again social chaos has resulted from a powerful government or church attempting to impose upon the masses, often with divine sanction, a code of private and social conduct and claiming unquestioning obedience to its commands. There is also plenty of evidence that the morals of the masses, private and public, in these authoritarian societies have been abominable.

The claim that authoritarian governments produce social stability and decent standards of morality and social values in their subjects is disproved by history. Whether things have been much better in non-authoritarian societies is more difficult to decide. The difficulty is the paucity of evidence, for, as I said above, there have been very few human societies which have experimented with freedom. The Greeks did so a long time ago, and in the last 100 years or so non-authoritarian governments and societies, not perhaps of the purest kind, have been established in Britain and parts of the British Commonwealth, and in the United States, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, and France. The record is too short and scanty for any confident conclusion to be based upon it. All that one can say with certainty is that the stability and social standards of these countries have not been inferior to those of countries which have enjoyed the authoritarian system. Indeed, I should say with some hesitation—for I know that I am biased—that the evidence here is slightly more favourable to democracy than to authoritarianism. The social standards of value in the life of ancient Greece were immeasurably higher than in any of the contemporary autocracies and theocracies. No people have ever or will ever embody their ethics and ideals, private and public, completely in their way of life, but the Greeks came nearer to practising what they preached than most communities of men.

The ideas of freedom and reason permeated their political thought and all their social ideals and they came nearer to live the life of free and rational men than perhaps any other race or nation or people in history. As regards political and social stability, it is usually assumed that the Greeks were so enamoured of liberty that they never succeeded in establishing a stable framework of government. This is a delusion due partly to our educational concentration upon a short period of Greek (and almost exclusively Athenian) history. The Greeks, like all human beings who have so far appeared upon the stage of history, have written their own tragedy which proceeds through political savagery and social stupidity to death and disaster. No one can pretend that there has ever been a stable form of society and government among the rocks and flowers and islands of the Aegean, the loveliest of all European countries. But the political record there does not compare unfavourably with that of any other place or people.

The outlines of the Greek society of free men have already been drawn in the *Odyssey*. The mind and character of Eumaeus, for instance, are remarkable fingerposts on the road towards civilization. Eumaeus is a slave and a swineherd. You can hear in the turn of his sentences and the run of his thought the voice of the unlettered countryman as it was 2,500 years ago and still is in many places today. Yet you can also hear in his voice and in his attitude to Odysseus the accents of liberty and civilization, of the way of life of free men as described by Pericles 400 years later. The two dates are significant. In 800 B.C. the Greek social standards of value were embryonically in existence. In 430 B.C. they had fully developed and created in the Aegean a specific political framework and way of life. One hundred years later, after the Peloponnesian war had done irreparable damage to Greek, and particularly to Athenian, society, the Athenians and Thebans were defeated at Chaeronea by Philip of Macedon, and the Macedonian hegemony of Greece began. There followed Alexander, the greatest of the ancient war-lords and world conquerors, but it is significant that, though his empire soon fell to pieces, his permanent contribution to history was his hellenization of the east. The great days of Athens, Sparta, and Thebes were over, but the Greek language, culture, and way of life persisted and conquered the alien peoples of Asia and Africa. Nearly 200 years

later, in 146 B.C., Greeks fought and lost their last battle at Leucopetra against an enemy from the west, the Romans, and Greece became a Roman province.

From the days when a Greek or Greeks were composing the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to the day when a Roman general destroyed Corinth was a period of about 600 years. No one would pretend that Greece enjoyed political or social stability during that period. But what we are concerned with is not absolute, but relative, stability, the claim of the authoritarian that only authority can keep human society together for any length of time and that freedom and reason lead inevitably to social disintegration. The claim receives no support from these 600 years of Greek history. The political institutions, social standards, culture, and way of life were a good deal more stable in Greece than in any other part of the contemporary world where the principles and practice of political authoritarianism were universally operating. The records of Medes and Persians or Hittites and Hebrews between 800 B.C. and 150 B.C. show far less social stability than that of Athens or Sparta. And if one can compare antiquity with modernity, I can see much less stability emanating from authority in the 600 years of German history which began with Günther of Schwarzburg, king of Germany, and his rival the Black Death, and ended with the death of Hitler in his underground hole, than that which emanated from liberty in Greece between Homer and Lucian. Moreover I cannot see a vestige of a sign of anything that the Persians or Hittites or Hebrews or Germans have contributed to the political fabric of human society, except the knowledge, discovered by Xerxes, Hitler, and many other rulers, that there are few things which you cannot get a man to do by flogging and torturing him. On the other hand, the Greek political theory and practice, their standards of social values, their way of life have had a persistent and profound effect upon Europe and through Europe upon life in all the other continents. Of the great monarchies, autocracies, and dictatorships, from Cambyses to Hitler (and I would add Stalin) it is useless to 'ask this week, my lord, where they have gone nor yet this year, except with this as an overword: "But where are the snows of yesteryear?"' They have left no record upon history or upon our history but the tale of the misery inflicted by them upon millions, and perhaps two vast trunkless legs of stone

standing in a desert. But whenever what we call civilization has managed for a short time to tame the social savagery and enlighten the social stupidity of men, whether in Rome or at the Renaissance or again in the 18th and 19th centuries, it has been to Greek political ideas and institutions and to Greek social standards of value that the world always deliberately returned. The power and persistence of these ideas comes from the place which the Greeks gave to freedom and reason in society.

In modern times the only large-scale experiments in libertarian society have been those which have had their origin in the democratic movement of the 18th century. Their ultimate fate is still in the balance. It follows that the question, in an absolute form—which I shall have to consider in my next volume—whether a really democratic society can be made viable in the modern world, cannot be answered simply or categorically. But that, I repeat, is not the question with which at this point we are concerned. We are concerned now with the argument that democracy has failed to provide and cannot provide the ethical and social stability which has been maintained by authoritarianism. To that argument the evidence of history gives a simple and categoric answer. It is not true that in Europe and America, since say 1789, authoritarian government, whether of kings, classes, parties, dictators, or even popes, have given more social stability than democracies. On the contrary, such stability as this troubled period has known—and the trouble, as I have shown, has been the inevitable result of an economic and social revolution, the transition from a simple to a highly complex way of life—has been found in democracies.

The countries which have experimented with democracy since 1789, which have made a serious attempt to base their political and social system upon freedom and reason rather than upon authority, are Britain and the British Commonwealth, the United States of America, France, the Scandinavian countries, Holland, and Belgium. In that time they developed a political system and a way of life, different in certain respects in each, and yet with common characteristics which were not to be found in countries like Germany, Russia, Spain, and Italy, where democracy never established itself and the population often acquiesced in the most extreme form of authoritarianism.

The common characteristics of, say, the Englishman, the Swede, and the Frenchman, in which they differed from the Russian, German, and Italian, were their attitude towards the government and those in authority, the responsibility of government to people, the rule of law as between the individual and the government, freedom of speech and opinion. I do not think that any observant person in contact with these countries or their nationals during the last 50 years would deny that there was a difference in the communal psychology and way of life as between the first and the second group of states, and that the difference was due primarily to the ideas, institutions, and standards of value which I have been examining in this book, to the position and value assigned to freedom and reason in the political and social structure.

If, then, it is true that social stability depends upon authority and that any extension of freedom and rationalism to the masses must produce moral and social chaos, the social stability of the first group should have been markedly less than that of the second. Moreover where, as in Germany and Italy, there were political vacillations between democracy and authoritarianism, one ought to find evidence of greater stability in the periods of authority than in those of comparative freedom and rationalism. The evidence is, however, all the other way. An Englishman, looking at the history of his country, is, of course, biased. But I do not think it is really the bias of patriotism which has led to my opinion that in no country in the world has freedom and reason been built into the fabric of politics and society during the last 200 years as deeply or as widely as in Britain. At any rate, the opinion has also been very widely held by foreigners all through the period from Voltaire down to our own day. If the authoritarian thesis were true, Britain would have enjoyed 200 years of social degeneration, disorder, and decline, and the Empire or Commonwealth would long since have disintegrated. Indeed, autocrats and dictators have been continually either prophesying that this would happen or assuming, most unwisely, that it had happened. For once again, the opposite is the truth. No country in the world has shown such remarkable political and social stability and such respect for social values combined with an ability to adjust itself to the economic and international cataclysms of two centuries.

The history of the United States, Holland, Belgium, and the Scandinavians proves the same thing. No authoritarian state has shown anything like the same political and social stability as these highly differentiated communities. There remains France, which is pre-eminently, by its history and the communal complexion of its people, a libertarian country, but which has three times vacillated into authoritarianism since its great revolution. France is, in fact, always put forward as the horrible example, the warning of what liberty, democracy, rationalism, and scepticism produce in human society. It is true that the history of France since 1789 has been, in some important respects, markedly different from that of the other democracies considered above. The French have indulged in more violent social and political upheavals than the Anglo-Saxons, Scandinavians, Dutch, or Belgians. Under Napoleon I and from 1815 to 1830 and from 1849 to 1870 they had governments which were mainly or entirely authoritarian, and there were violent revolutions in 1830, 1848, and 1871. Thus for one-third of the 150 years between the great revolution and Hitler's war, the French had authoritarian regimes under emperors, kings, or dictators, while for two-thirds they had a constitutional monarchy or a republican, democratic system of government. But during the long period of 70 years covered by the Third Republic, during which they adopted a parliamentary system typical of democracy and libertarianism in the 19th century, the system seemed to many foreigners, and to some Frenchmen, to work, or not to work, in a way peculiar to France. The chief objection to it was that it rarely, if ever, provided the country with a stable government.

It cannot be denied that in the history of these 150 years there is evidence of considerable political and social instability. But there is no evidence that this was due to the extension of liberty and the weakening of authority. On the contrary the symptoms of disequilibrium and insecurity were more serious, and proved more quickly fatal, whenever authority curtailed liberty than when democracy ousted authority. French history is, indeed, extraordinarily interesting in the light which it throws upon the steadying and disintegrating elements in communal psychology under a democracy or a dictatorship. On the surface a dictatorship, once established, has the appearance of impregnable calm and security. The surface is more

often than not delusive. Discussion is suppressed or carefully rationed and regulated; any opposition which seems to the government potentially dangerous is liquidated, put under lock and key, or driven underground. The government cannot be removed except by an act of God, an accident, a violent revolution, or assassination. In ordinary life, so long as the dictator controls the police and armed forces, the possibility of God or his opponents removing him always seems remote both to himself and to the outside world. This gives his government an air of much greater strength and security than that of a ruler who may be voted out of office at any moment. Nothing disturbs this outward calm except an occasional attempt at assassination of someone in or near the government, or a 'purge', on the communist model, either in the official hierarchy surrounding the real dictator or of a potential opposition. And this government, which is apparently irremovable, at the same time gives to its admirers spectacular displays of its power instantly—without any of the fuss and fumbling of democracy—to remove great social evils, e.g. the achievement of Mussolini in making the train service in Italy comparatively punctual and stopping the abominable hooting of horns by motorists in Rome was widely accepted as evidence in the heyday of fascism that his government was strong and stable and that there was a good deal to say for dictatorship.

All these things can be observed operating upon authoritarian regimes in France during the 19th century. Seekers after social stability will find no evidence in the career of Napoleon that it is the gift of authority rather than liberty. Napoleon, like Hitler, was an anachronism in European history. He belonged to the primitive species of world conqueror. The stability of his authoritarian rule can be measured by the fact that it lasted 16 years and that during the whole of that time he never gave his happy subjects any respite from war. They fought up and down Europe from the Atlantic to Moscow, and, if that produced security at home, it produced chaos everywhere else. When at last it was over and the great man lodged in St. Helena, he did not leave behind him two vast and trunkless legs of stone standing in a desert, but really not much more—a number of statues of himself, the Code Napoléon and a centralized administrative system, a memory of insane romanticism and glory which during the next 50 years was to produce more

social chaos in France and Europe than the most anarchic and revolutionary democrats. Nothing besides remains. There followed the regime of the two Bourbons. It lasted 15 years and was a bastard authoritarianism. I studied its history in considerable detail in Chapter V of the second volume of *After the Deluge*. The Restoration, as I wrote then, 'was something much more than the restoration of a Bourbon to the throne of France; it was an attempt to recreate in France the whole framework of society which is known as the *ancien régime*'. It was an attempt not merely to restore a king, but a whole system of political and social ideas, the system of authority. The party which made the attempt were the Ultra-Royalists and, in order to succeed, they had to destroy the ideas and system of liberty and democracy which were the legacy of the revolution. The result was a struggle in which both sides, as so often happens in France, were fully and articulately conscious of what they were fighting for. The fundamental beliefs and values of authoritarianism have never been stated more clearly than by the authoritarians of the Restoration, e.g. Maistre and Bonald. As I pointed out in the second volume, they 'denied not only the ethical beauty, but the political practicability of freedom and equality'. They 'denied the possibility of a society of free and equal citizens'. They maintained that:

> The majesty of kingship, the pride of aristocracy, the authority of strong government, the command of a ruling class, the loyalty of the masses, the deference of common people, the obedience of subjects, and the discipline of the ruled constitute for the authoritarian a better and a nobler spectacle than a society of free men and equals.[1]

While Louis XVIII lived, the struggle between the Ultra-Royalists and the upholders of liberty was undecided, but under Charles X the authoritarians gained control. They proved incapable of giving France political or social stability and they disappeared in the revolution of 1830. In the political history of France there has never been a more ignoble spectacle than that of the authoritarian governments during the six years of Charles X's reign. Nothing worked in the machinery of government and the country was always on the verge of social chaos. It proved the impossibility, not of a society of free and equal citizens, but of a return in France to the authoritarian system of the 18th century.

The authoritarian government of Louis Napoleon was superficially of a different kind. It was one of the first, if not the first, dictatorships of the modern type which has developed to such elaborate perfection in the hands of Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin. These dictators make no attempt to return to any *ancien régime*; indeed they accept and misuse the ideas of liberty and equality which destroyed the *ancien régime*. They pose as the heirs of the revolution and acquire the inheritance by murdering the heirs. Hitler called himself a socialist (with the ominous prefix 'nationalist', it is true) and Stalin calls himself a democrat, and the one destroyed socialism and the other democracy. Louis Napoleon invented the trick of using the machinery of democracy to destroy it—the process consisted in first seizing power by a *coup d'état*, then annulling the constitution and crushing resistance by armed force, and finally arranging by a plebiscite that the 'people' should confirm him in power by millions of votes. There was thus established a completely authoritarian regime, on the surface, vulgar, tawdry, and garish, continually appealing to the 'people' through their emotions of fear and hatred, patriotism and 'glory', at the core insecure, ignorant, and incompetent. Napoleon III suffered from the occupational disease of all dictators since 1789 in an extreme form—extreme, because he had to show himself the heir of the Napoleonic tradition—the malignant growth of power and authority in the tissues of government and of a community whose communal psychology was still largely determined by the revolutionary ideas of liberty and democracy. In such a situation authority, instead of being a stabilizing, is a disintegrating factor. The sole basis of Napoleon's government, as of all such regimes, was power and force, and, being basically insecure, it could not tolerate any open opposition. To think that in the 19th and 20th centuries in a country like France the government can abolish political opposition is a political delusion. All the government can do is what Napoleon III, and after him Mussolini and Hitler, did,[1] drive opposition underground[2] and out of the press by increasing the pressure of internal power, and then using power and force, or the threat

[1] One may add Stalin.

[2] Modern dictatorships, which are much more ruthless than those of the last century, do this actually as well as metaphorically by murdering and burying large numbers of active or potential opponents.

of force, externally and on foreign adventures in order to appeal to emotions of patriotism and fear and glory and to distract the attention of their subjects from misrule at home to the glories and dangers of war abroad. Modern authoritarian governments have invariably tried to make themselves secure by the threat of war, and finally destroyed themselves in war. Charles X made a characteristically feeble, half-hearted, and unsuccessful attempt in Algiers to inaugurate the performance, but was driven from power before he could involve his country in war; it was Louis Napoleon who was the first to complete the pattern of this path to defeat and destruction. It is a curious form of political 'stability'.

The Third Empire lasted 21 years. The Third Republic lasted 70 years, and after the catastrophe of Hitler's war France is still governed by the essentially libertarian, democratic system which worked from 1870 to 1940. And no one who has known France and her people for 56 years, as I have, can doubt that all through that period, with its violent oscillations of fate and fortune, the great majority of Frenchmen have retained the communal psychology of free men. It is a political and social psychology, creating a way of life, which has never fully developed or securely established itself among the neighbours of France, the Germans and the Italians. So that a traveller, sensitive to the shades of meaning in men's words and actions, when he crosses a frontier from Germany or Italy into France, is instantly aware, even from a casual conversation with the man who sells him petrol or the woman who sells him bread, that he has entered a country in which the civilization of free, sceptical, and rational men and women has older and deeper roots than in Berlin and Munich, Rome and Florence.[1]

[1] I feel that I must guard myself from being misunderstood. I do not mean by the above sentence that the Germans and Italians are naturally or racially or ethically different from and inferior to Frenchmen. The unworked fabric of human nature seems to me to be much the same wherever I have come across it, whether in the valley of the Dordogne or in the streets of Munich, in a field below the shadow of Volterra or in a jungle village of Ceylon, but the mind of each of us, of the infant French or Italian peasant, the little German or Sinhalese, is stamped, from its first year, from the matrix of his environment, the history of his village, town, and country, the communal psychology of his parents and neighbours. No doubt there is within him, as in the seed of a campion or a colchicum, something —chromosomes or whatever our scientists may call them—which will

And it is this communal psychology of liberty and reason which, more than anything else, has given to republican France far more social stability than authority gave to her under the Third Empire or to Germans and Italians under authoritarian governments from the Hohenzollerns to Hitler and from Ferdinand of Naples to Mussolini.

There is, however, a peculiar form of political, rather than social, instability which was always notable in republican France and is a stock argument of many people, particularly Anglo-Saxons, but also Frenchmen themselves who are critical of or hostile to democracy. Compared with governments in Britain and the United States, and of course *a fortiori* with authoritarian governments, those in France have always been weak and extraordinarily short-lived. This, I suggest, is partly due to the French electoral and constitutional system, which seems to be deliberately contrived to produce governments which have to rely on small or no parliamentary majorities. But it is also due to a form of instability which is inherent in the democratic way of life. In the world of today authoritarian and libertarian systems, as factors of social stability and disintegration, produce effects which are the exact opposite of those alleged by the opponents of democracy. On the surface of society the totalitarian dictatorship appears remarkably stable; underneath it has no secure foundations. It establishes political at the expense of social stability, for it ensures a 'strong' government politically by making it irresponsive and irremovable, and therefore has to suppress or to mechanize all currents of social opinion. This is possible provided that the level of intelligence in its subjects can be kept sufficiently low, and all the modern dictators, Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin, have tried to keep their subjects, as far as possible, socially ignorant and imbecile. No one can pretend that our social intelligence in democracies is high, but the ordinary man in

determine the limits within which he can develop—the colour of his petals or his eyes, the shape of his leaves or nose, the maximum potential height as measured by a footrule or the maximum potential brain power as measured by an intelligence test. But just as the conditions of soil, sun, and shade will warp and twist the flower or cause it to flower freely, so the psychological and social environment will determine, to a large extent, whether the infant grows up with the mind and way of life of the Persian soldier or of a free man.

Britain or the United States has at least a glimmer of knowledge and understanding of the world which surrounds him. He is, no doubt, beset on all sides by persons who tell him lies and talk nonsense for all sorts of purposes, including propaganda which is the modern term for tendentious lies and profitable nonsense; but he does hear the truth as well as the lies, and the advantage which truth has over lies, where there is freedom of speech, is that sooner or later—unfortunately often later—the ruthless logic of facts shows that the truth is true. Unlike the inhabitant of Berlin in 1938 or of Moscow in 1952, the ordinary Londoner, Parisian, or New Yorker has never lived in a completely unreal world of political lies and ideological nightmares prefabricated for him by his government. The great difficulty for the modern dictatorship is that, whereas communal intelligence is advantageous in a democracy, it is fatal to a dictator, and at the same time it is impossible for the dictator to keep his subjects sufficiently stupid to ensure his own safety. Technically modern life requires a degree of intelligence and initiative in so many occupations which is incompatible with the degree of political ignorance and stupidity required by a nazi, fascist, or communist regime. Hence beneath the political stability there is always profound social instability. The effects of this can be seen in the social stability of France under defeat in 1940 compared with the complete social disintegration of Germany under defeat in 1945.

This social stability in France is directly connected with the political instability of governments. The connection is the essence and justification of democracy and political liberty. The thing is so simple and so eminently consonant with common sense that it has no place in political thought or theory. If you clamp an immovable government upon the complex, fluid, sensitive society of a vast modern state, you produce a political system in which the government is insensitive to and usually ignorant of those currents and movements in communal life which, in the long run, can be ignored or suppressed only at the cost of social disruption. It is precisely because the French government is so sensitive and responsive to such movements that it produces social coherence at the cost of its own stability. The stability of the authoritarian regime is that of a boiler without a safety valve.

I have now completed my investigation of the nature of the

modern authoritarian state and its relation to standards of value. There remains the question of its viability. In fact the answer to this question has already emerged from the previous pages. All forms of human organization and government tend to persist long after they become inefficient and impracticable, for, as was pointed out in the first volume of *After the Deluge*, it is nearly always the dead hand of history, the dead beliefs and desires of dead men, which hold us prisoners. A social contrivance or phenomenon, like slavery, monarchy, or nationalism, is not abandoned nor does it wither away because it has become an unworkable anachronism; on the contrary it is carefully preserved by those who have a vested interest in dead hands and dead ideas and is given by patriotism or religion an emotional sanction which makes it highly dangerous for anyone to talk common sense about it. It probably goes on producing poverty, misery, cruelty, death, revolutions, and wars for many centuries, but it continues to exist, bolstered up by the perorations of politicians, the prayers of priests, and the arguments of professors of political science.

The principle of authority applied to modern society through the dictatorship of a party or person in the fascist or communist state is an anachronism of this kind. History, in the shape of Hitler and Mussolini, showed us that it does not work, that, beneath the façade of strong and stable government, the rulers are ignorant, violent, and afraid; the ruled cowed, ignorant, and afraid, or hysterical with fear and hatred and bacchanalian 'loyalty'; the result deep down in society is a dangerous disequilibrium leading to internal violence and external wars. But, though it does not and cannot 'work', it continues and will probably long continue to exist, producing with monotonous precision those effects which it is supposed to prevent: social insecurity, economic hardships, mass misery, international anarchy, and finally that inevitable final act by which bad governments try to cut the Gordian knot of their own tying, war.

I propose to recapitulate, as briefly as possible, the most important causes of failure, inherent in the nature of contemporary authoritarianism, since, as I said, they have already emerged in the previous discussion. All the causes will be found to originate in the fact that the nature of modern society, i.e. of the lives which we actually live, is incompatible with the principle of authority, i.e. of the concentration of absolute

power in the hands of a few men. Modern democracy, which involves a relation between government and governed based upon responsibility and liberty, was not a 'system' invented by professors of political science or even by professors of revolution. It was a form of government which developed necessarily and naturally to deal with the conditions created in European countries by the industrial and scientific revolutions and the enormous increase in population. These new conditions, the new way of life, demanded at least two important innovations in the relation between the government and the governed.

The first innovation concerns primarily the governed. I have had to refer to it continually in the preceding pages. In the complicated, industrialized, mechanized life of the 19th and 20th centuries the ordinary man, in practice, has to take part in 'government'. The peasant and the artisan of the 17th and 18th centuries could live his life, uneducated and illiterate, without understanding anything outside the radius of his own village or town, and without ever taking any decision involving communal relations or 'government'. Today such a state of affairs is literally impossible. If a dictator today waved a wand and instantly reduced all his industrial and agricultural workers to the psychological, cultural, and social condition of their ancestors in 1750, the economic and political structure of society would immediately collapse. The dictator cannot and dare not wave such a wand, but he is faced by an insoluble dilemma. He has to educate his millions of workers; he has to make them sufficiently intelligent to do their job and to play their part in the intricate organization—the government—of that section of society to which he allots them; he requires of them a high measure of initiative and independence in their factory, collective farm, and trade union. But he also has something far more difficult to deal with than his 'toiling masses'. Before the 19th century an authoritarian government was happy in having to deal only with the 'masses', mostly ignorant and uneducated agricultural workers. Today even the most absolute dictator, who has liquidated capitalist and kulak and, in theory, all the bourgeois paraphernalia of capitalist society, has on his back a vast middle class, even if he calls them by some other, more euphemistic name. They are his government officials, planners, bureaucrats, managers, teachers, party officials, police, scientists, broadcasters, propa-

gandists. If these millions of men and women are to do their work properly, they must have a very high standard of education, intelligence, knowledge, energy, and initiative.

Our experience of the modern large-scale, single-party dictatorship has been short, and limited to the Russian communist and the German nazi varieties. Hitler managed to survive for six years of peace, or rather of a twilight between peace and war. The full-blown Stalinite regime in Russia has been in existence for about 25 years; six of those years were years of the great war, and the remaining 19 were neither placid nor peaceful within the iron regime or in its relations with those who lived on the other side of its iron curtain. But even these short periods of chaos[1] are enough to show us how the logic of facts compels the dictator, whether Hitler or Stalin, and the one-party machine, whether national-socialist or communist, to follow the same path in their hopeless efforts to extricate themselves from the dilemma. They have to educate their subjects, to give them the considerable and varied knowledge without which no one can perform his economic functions in the mechanized, statistically and scientifically controlled lives which we all live. The nazis and communists are fervent educationists and proud of their schools and colleges. The education is technical, scientific, and functional, and is, no doubt, often excellent. It gives the individual the knowledge, skill, and intelligence to enable him or her to perform the functions assigned to him or her by the government and party. In Russia the industrial or agricultural worker receives an education which makes him capable of becoming an efficient and intelligent unit in a modern factory or the highly organized agriculture of a collective farm. That education is necessarily of a much higher standard than their fathers, as 'toiling masses', received under the Tsars. What is in effect, though not in name, the middle class, receive an education admirably adapted to enable them to play their parts in the state and party bureaucracy or as planners, managers, technicians, scientists, police, and soldiers. While communist claims and boasts regarding scientific discoveries and economic and cultural achievements

[1] The chaos—the wars, liquidations, persecutions, *pogroms*, purges—is not fortuitous; it is a result and symptom of the incompatibility of the authoritarian government with the lives which people are actually living, with European society in the 20th century.

of Russians under the Soviet regime are often ridiculous, there is no reason to doubt that the regime is producing men and women, intelligent and highly trained, who, like Americans or British, can organize an industry or an army with ruthless efficiency or produce a bomb powerful enough to devastate a city.

Unfortunately for authoritarianism, it is practically impossible to isolate or sterilize intelligence and knowledge. Men who are clever enough to destroy a whole city, or to make motor cars and aeroplanes and wireless sets or to organize a large factory or to make a Five Year Plan will sooner or later begin to think about other things than atom bombs, the parts of machines, the output of a factory, or figures on a sheet of paper. Among those other things which they will begin to think about is politics, and politically nothing, as I have several times had to insist, is more dangerous than thought. Democracy, a highly dangerous political explosive, is the natural and inevitable result of ordinary persons acquiring sufficient knowledge and intelligence to think about politics. It is not chance, but the logic of events which has made modern democracy contemporary and concomitant with the progress of the industrial and scientific revolution and with the education of the masses. Throughout history, from the time of Athens to that of the French revolution, whenever events have given to the common people the active minds and intellectual initiative usually reserved for a ruling caste, the common people have begun to claim some control over their rulers and governments. Democracy is not, as we are often now told, a 'mere word'; it has not 'lost its meaning'; it is a natural secretion of any society in which men acquire the ability to think for themselves.

The Soviet government, like all dictatorships, cannot afford to allow the common people to think politically, for that would lead to democracy and the end of dictatorship. That is why it has had to establish the police state in Russia. The police state tries to prevent political thought in two ways. The first is the iron curtain, which is designed to prevent the intelligent Russian from having any contact with or knowledge of conditions outside Russia where there is political or intellectual freedom. The second is designed to give the government, the communist party or the police, control of the people's political thought while leaving them sufficient intelligence to be functionally

efficient in the vocation to which the state has called them. But since it is not possible, either for God and a church or for a dictator and a state, to isolate thought in functional departments, the Soviet government, as we have seen, has been compelled, like the Roman Catholic hierarchy, to extend its control to all departments of human thought. The result is naturally fantastic and absurd. Government or party officials, with no knowledge of science or music, dictate to scientists or musical composers what scientific theories must be believed and taught or what kind of music is to be composed. The facts of past history and the actual events which form the stream of contemporary life, whether in Russia itself or in the world outside it, are either suppressed or distorted in order to conform with a corpus of absurd economic and metaphysical dogma, called Marx-Leninism, or merely to ensure the absolute dictatorship of the small ruling clique at the head of the party and state.

The strains and stresses due to ignorance and stupidity which the different types of human society and government are capable of bearing without collapse are very great. They are, of course, enormous in all contemporary libertarian countries. Political prophecies are notoriously precarious. But I do not believe that the organized ignorance and artificial insemination of stupidity on the scale practised by the communist regime in Russia and other totalitarian dictatorships can continue very long without producing social disintegration or explosion. The complete physical and intellectual segregation of large populations from the rest of the world is so difficult under modern conditions and requires therefore such ruthless and persistent control of the lives and brains of the people by the government that it can hardly be made a permanent feature of communist society. Yet the authoritarian government dare not relax its control; it dare not allow its subjects to know the truth about the world on the other side of the iron curtain. It has, therefore, not only to get all its subjects all the time to believe in absurd fairy tales and nightmares about the world they live in, but in international relations it has somehow or other to put the clock of history back to the Middle Ages while keeping it absolutely up to date within its own frontiers. I doubt whether even dictators can for very long juggle so delicately and dangerously with time and truth. But the same dilemma confronts the dictatorship internally. The problem, as we saw above, is to

breed and train herds or flocks of men and women so intelligent that they can perform their complicated and difficult jobs efficiently and so ignorant and stupid that they will believe any nonsense told them by the government. I do not believe that even dictators can for very long juggle so delicately and dangerously with the truth and men's minds. One of two things will happen. The dictator will either make his subjects so stupid, so ignorant of facts, so frightened of thinking for themselves that they will no longer be capable of performing their jobs efficiently, or they will remain sufficiently intelligent to endanger the stability of the regime.

The stupefaction of the people, particularly of the younger generation, went dangerously far even in the short existence of the Hitlerian dictatorship. A study of the press and radio in the lands of liberty on either side of the Atlantic cannot leave an Englishman or American complacently satisfied with the level of general intelligence, but the picture of the world presented to the people at least bears some resemblance to reality. The indoctrinated ignorance and stupidity of the young German were absolutely staggering. It is not possible for people whose minds are in this condition, whose minds have been forced by the government backwards into the social psychology of men of the stone age or of dancing dervishes, to cope intelligently with the complicated problems and relations of 20th-century society, which is not a village or even a national society, but is the world. That the Germans tolerated Hitler's megalomaniac savagery, that starting with every conceivable military advantage they have yet suffered the most devastating military defeat in history, that they allowed Hitler to reduce Germany to complete chaos, material and social—these bleak facts are a proof of the statement made in the last sentence.

The same process of stupefaction is taking place in Russia, though the content of communist ignorance and stupidity differs from that of the nazis. When scientists, historians, economists, artists, and every kind of expert and technician are forced by the government to talk what they know to be scientific or aesthetic nonsense, and ultimately to act upon what they know to be scientifically or aesthetically false, the upper levels of the social hierarchy must become dangerously incompetent. And here we reach the second insoluble dilemma of 20th-century authoritarianism and the second innovation.

demanded by our modern way of life, in the relations between the government and the governed. This second innovation concerns primarily, not the governed, but the government. The relations which have to be organized in a great industrialized modern state are much too many and too complicated for efficient government of the old-fashioned, centralized, authoritarian type. The democratization of the government, as distinct from that of the governed, developed naturally to meet this need. The agricultural populations of Europe in the 17th century could live the kind of life which most human beings had lived since Cain killed Abel, taking no part in 'government' and subject to the local dictatorship of the landowner and sporadically to a tax or ukase emanating from the far distant dictatorship in Paris or Vienna. But that kind of social and political system is impossible in the industrialized Britain which developed in the 19th century, in the Germany of 1933, or in the Russia which the Bolsheviks determined to industrialize and mechanize on a vast scale by means of a few five-year plans. Power, the right to make decisions, initiative have to be delegated throughout the community, in every department of life, right down to the 'hand' in the factory and even the common soldier whose duty hitherto had been simply to obey orders. Life on that level of complication is impossible unless at every stage in the social or communal process there is an active partnership between the government and the governed. Each must be responsive and responsible to each.

Totalitarian dictatorships of the German and Russian type ignore these facts with disastrous effects upon the dictators as well as upon their subjects. The rulers become the prisoners and dupes of their own absolute power. Neither Hitler nor Stalin could afford to allow the truth to enter Germany or Russia from the world outside. But in segregating their people from the facts they inevitably also segregate themselves. And within his own dominions the dictator is gradually subjected to an even more deadly insulation from truth. There is ample evidence to show how dangerous and how useless it was for any individual to bring unpalatable facts to the notice of Hitler and Stalin. In the end they are surrounded by yes-men and a dream world of wishful thinking. That alone explains the fantastic end of Hitler, the conqueror of Europe, in an underground cellar in burning Berlin, surrounded by his court now

reduced to Eva Braun, Goebbels, Bormann, Dr. Stumpfegger, his cook, and a few other courtiers and secretaries; and issuing orders to armies which were no longer in existence.

There is evidence of the same kind of obstinate, megalomaniac ignorance in the Russian dictatorship, producing, not unnaturally, the same kind of large-scale catastrophes. No head of a government in a democratic state—even where the democracy is of the dimmest kind—could possibly reduce his country to the chaos and misery achieved by Stalin in 1930 by the destruction of the kulaks and the megalomaniac insanity[1] of mechanization and collectivization and industrialization and all the other catchwords which in communist propaganda seem to be regarded as adequate substitutes for political or economic common sense. He could not do so because he, first, could not be as ignorant of the facts as Stalin proved himself to be, and secondly, he would be driven from office as soon as the horrible results of his policy began to appear and before it was too late to reverse it.

Another extraordinary example of the dictator's complete ignorance of what is happening in his immediate surroundings has already been referred to on p. 213. At the 1934 Congress Stalin informed his people and the world that the communist party was 'as united as it never has been before'. That he believed this to be the case is proved by tentative measures of a liberal complexion and a relaxation of the terror which he introduced in 1934.[2] The assassination of Kirov on December 1 of that year convinced Stalin that he had completely misunderstood the situation and that the party was more disunited than it had ever been before. In a dictatorship a 'disunited' party is treated as a large-scale insurrection would be in a democratic country. For the next few years there was, in effect, civil war in Russia, all actual or potential opponents of Stalin being eliminated by purges, trials, and executions. Nearly all the prominent leaders of the communist party, of the army,

[1] One of the best accounts of this phase in Stalin's rule is to be found in *Stalin: A Political Biography*, by I. Deutscher, pp. 324-35.

[2] There was, it is true, a vacillation between intensified repression and liberalization, but, as the months passed, the liberal measures increased, e.g. the powers of the political police were limited and the opposition leaders were allowed to speak in public and write for the press. See Deutscher: *Stalin*, p. 354.

and of the bureaucracy, and thousands of obscure persons were liquidated. The remarkable thing about this holocaust is that though it happened nearly 20 years ago and though the reports of the trials have been published and a vast number of books have been written on the subject, it is still impossible to understand what it was all about. All that one can say with certainty is that: (1) there was a considerable amount of opposition within the communist party to some parts of Stalin's policy; (2) the crimes for which hundreds of communists, including the leaders, were tried and executed, and to which they confessed, had never been committed by them; (3) thousands of ordinary men and women who were completely innocent of any kind of opposition to or even criticism of the government were arrested and imprisoned or deported to Siberia.

I have often had to remark that in the practice and theory of politics, the plain facts and common sense are often denied or ignored in order that we may pursue some fantastic nightmare or chimera. Here is an example in the way in which not merely all communists and fellow-travellers, but many other people ignore the real cause and meaning of the horrible and imbecile events which preceded and followed Kirov's murder. In any country which had a responsible government and the machinery of democracy the situation would have been met by an election and the government would have won or lost the election. Even if some maniac had shot a prime minister, a president, or some other high official, for such things happen even in democracies, the matter would be settled by the trial of the assassin and a few accomplices; no one would conceive that it was necessary to settle it by civil war and a general massacre of politicians, civil servants, military men, scientists, and keepers in the Zoo. But it is the inevitable results of dictatorships, whether in 2000 B.C. or in A.D. 2000, whether in Babylon and Nineveh or in Berlin and Moscow, that opposition to the government involves battle, murder, and sudden death, while the government meets opposition with massacre. The simple and unpleasant fact is that, if you establish a totalitarian dictator with no means or machinery for opposition and not even the machinery of succession, you will get palace revolutions, murders, attempted assassinations, Nights of Long Knives, purges, massacres, and civil wars.

This system of governing men and cities and empires, the

'Off with their heads!' system of the queen in Alice's *Adventures in Wonderland*, is of immense antiquity. It worked in a kind of way all over the world in most places for thousands of years. It was always a barbarous and inefficient system of government, but the communal relations of the small and scattered populations were so few and simple that the actual lives of people were not much affected by the ignorance, stupidity, fear, and bloodthirstiness of kings and dictators. When there was opposition to Tiglath-Pileser or to a Roman emperor or an emperor of the Holy Roman Empire or to a French king or a Russian tsar, the matter was settled in a small circle in and around the court and palace. A few heads were off or a few men were banished, imprisoned, or lost their jobs; a queen or mistress gained or lost in favour; if the emperor or king won, a son or brother sometimes died or vice versa; there was perhaps a change of dynasty or Lord High Chamberlain or royal concubine. And then things went on much the same as they had in the previous 500 years and most of the governed were unaware that anything had happened at all.

Ever since the 18th century this type of government has become more and more inefficient and intolerable. The reason is that, as I have shown, what the government does now affects the actual lives of every man, woman, and child in the country indeed, it is worse than that, for what the government in Moscow or in Washington does will perhaps bring prosperity or ruin to large numbers of people all over the world. When the government is a Hitler or a Stalin, an ignorant and irresponsible and unremovable individual, or when it is an ignorant and irresponsible clique controlling a party, a police force, and an army, it inevitably produces large-scale catastrophe, for it creates conditions in which the partnership between government and governed, which is absolutely essential in the complicated relations of modern communal life, is impossible. That is the fundamental reason why the kind of dictatorship which we have seen in Germany and Italy and now see in Russia and her communist satellites is not a viable form of government in an industrialized state of 1950. It creates a framework of government in which the network of social relations which are determined—not by theories or ideologies or by governments, but by the way in which we live—become impossible.

In this book and in the two volumes of *After the Deluge*, previously published, I have been examining a historical process—the way in which human beings in the last 200 years have been trying, with very poor success, to adjust their political institutions to entirely new ways of living, to an entirely new society, that has grown inevitably out of the industrial and scientific revolution. The failure to make the necessary adjustments has produced a series of social catastrophes culminating in the social chaos which has spread from Europe to the whole world since 1914. This failure has shown itself mainly in two great areas of life, the economic and the international, for the political organization of our national states is incapable of dealing efficiently with the economic relations of its citizens or with international relations, both of which are determined for us and for it by the lives which we live.

The enormous, intricate network of relations, economic and social, within states and between states, created by the way we live, requires an enormous, intricate network of government, national and international. The facts examined in the previous pages show that the ancient authoritarian theories and practices of government have become anachronisms; the arts of living and of governing have become so complicated and so delicately poised in the 20th century that unless we learn to govern ourselves, the world becomes either chaos or a prison. Only in a few countries have people begun to learn the art of governing themselves and even there only parochially and embryonically. The democratic system of government and way of life which developed in some states of Europe and America during the last 100 years were the beginning of a natural process of social growth, the adaptation of ancient forms and methods of government to new conditions of life. But the adaptation was much too slow and too limited to keep pace with the hurricane of change in man's way of living that swept over the whole world. The vested interest in power, dead ideas, and 'capitalism' prevented the growth of political and economic democracy in most countries, and even in the most 'advanced' states delayed it until it was almost too late. Until after the 1914 war, until in fact it was already too late, there was not even the beginning of international government; the infinitely complex and infinitely dangerous relations between states or nations and the millions of men embedded in them were regulated—

in so far as there was any regulation—by a system which had hardly altered since Tiglath-Pileser. Internationally the system was the apotheosis of authoritarianism and dictatorship, for the social unit in international society was the sovereign state, and international relations were regulated by the clash of power embodied in these absolute dictators and by the clash of will embodied in their governments.

The future of authoritarianism, national and international, can be predicted with considerable accuracy, or rather perhaps one should say that the alternatives before it can be stated accurately. History shows us quite clearly what happens when men persist in retaining forms of organization and government which are anachronisms and which are incompatible with the beliefs and desires in their own heads and with the kind of lives they insist upon living. One of three things will happen: the ancient form of government will be abandoned or so modified as to make the new ways of life possible, or the new ways of life will be abandoned or modified to allow the anachronism to continue, or, thirdly, if neither of these things happen, the strains and stresses will eventually produce the social explosion or disruption which we call war or revolution.

No one can say which of these well-worn roads of history modern authoritarianism and totalitarianism will follow. The record of Hitlerism and Stalinism is too short to provide data for probable conjecture. All that one can say is that Hitler followed the second and third roads and that Stalin has so far followed the second, and threatens the third, but there is no sign of his contemplating the first. It is in fact extremely difficult for a dictator to modify his regime in the direction of liberty and democracy without destroying himself and producing a social explosion. The dilemma of communism, as of all authoritarian regimes in the world of today, is that it is incompatible with modern life and therefore in the struggle for its own existence it is forced by the logic of events to destroy modern life by the power of the police state. The iron curtain, the physical isolation and mental insulation of the Russian from the rest of the world, are necessary stages in this fantastic attempt to destroy the cosmopolitanism and interrelationship which are distinguishing features of this modern life. It is therefore extremely improbable that the living dictator will modify his regime in the direction of liberty, but even dictators

die, and one of the crudities of authoritarianism is to be found in the fact that it provides no regular and peaceful method of substituting a living for a dead dictator. When the dictator dies, there is a primitive and personal struggle for power which, as likely as not, will be settled by the primitive method of murder. That, however, is the moment of political confusion when just possibly an authoritarian regime might be democratized and civilized without a large-scale catastrophe, if power fell into the hands of persons with some bias towards political liberty.

I do not think that there is much chance of the communist dictatorships, as we know them, changing in this way, and I think it extremely improbable that they can permanently cut off and isolate their subjects from the rest of the world. It therefore seems probable that the period of social disequilibrium will continue, and that eventually the strains and stresses will produce a social explosion or disruption. What form the cataclysm will take no one can predict with certainty, but it is much more likely to be international than national. A successful libertarian revolution in times of peace against a dictatorship, controlling police and armed forces, having a monopoly of modern weapons and instruments of destruction, communications, and propaganda, is practically impossible. Internal upheavals are in the nature of palace revolutions, struggles for power between rival kings, emperors, or gangsters. The pattern is the same whether in Egypt 3,500 years ago, in Assyria 2,700 years ago, in Persia 2,415 years ago, in Rome 1,882 years ago, in St. Petersburg 151 years ago, in Belgrade 49 years ago, or today in Berlin, Moscow, or Chicago. The ease with which Hitler disposed of Roehm and his real and imaginary associates and with which Stalin destroyed hundreds of real and imaginary opponents seems to suggest that in the struggle for power behind the scenes the modern dictator is in a stronger position than his predecessors provided that he is prepared to kill quickly and indiscriminately. But in any case in this kind of struggle, whether the dictator kills or is killed, makes little or no difference, for the dictatorship remains and it makes small odds whether the power is exercised by a Hitler or a Roehm, by X or by Y.

The disruption of a dictatorship from within is, therefore, improbable, and, if the dictator could really isolate his subjects from the rest of the world, there is no reason why they should

not be kept indefinitely in a condition of political ignorance and social stupidity which would enable them to be handed on intact from dictator to dictator. But the logic of facts, the actual lives which the dictator and his subjects live, make that isolation impossible, and it is from outside and from the relations with the outside world that the danger of explosion is greatest. War—the great international explosion—has historically always been the last resource of government wherever rulers deny their subjects political liberty and the power of changing the government without violence. The cult of hatred and xenophobia is the cheapest and surest method of obtaining from the masses the ignorant and savage patriotism which puts the blame for every political folly or social misfortune upon the foreigner. This cult of international hatred has never been developed with such deliberation and intensity as in Hitler's Germany and by the communist regimes of eastern Europe. It was used by Hitler deliberately as a preparation for war. But even if a dictator does not, as Hitler did, want war, his use of hatred as an instrument of government makes it highly probable that he will eventually land his country and his government in war, whether he wants it or not. The probability is increased because of one factor in the situation which dictators and most other people ignore, but which is of immense importance. The strains and stresses in the world today are, as I have pointed out before, largely due to the fact that the lives we lead create innumerable economic, political, and social relations which are not parochial or national, but international, and that we have failed to create the machinery of international organization and government without which these relations cannot be properly or peacefully ordered. The totalitarian dictatorship, compelled by its internal policies to try to prevent all contact with the outside world, makes the international system a political monstrosity and enormously increases the strains and stresses. A government, pursuing this kind of policy, is in a state of latent or dormant war with the rest of the world. This twilight between real peace and real war is what we are passing through at the present moment, and we call it a cold war. It is, however, extremely improbable that the world can live very long in a state of latent war, and that makes it all the more likely that a dictatorship in the future, as so often in the past, will fulfil itself in what we now know as a world war. This is the

way that dictatorships and the world end, with a whimper but also with a bang.

For these reasons it seems to me that the totalitarian dictatorship is not a viable form of government for the 20th century. It remains for me to consider in a further volume the viability of democracy, whether a society based on freedom is possible in this century, and if so, what must be its political and economic organization.

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