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A WORKING PEACE SYSTEM

AN ARGUMENT FOR THE FUNCTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION

33

by

DAVID MITRANY
Ph.D., D.Sc. (London)

*Professor in the School of Economics and Politics of
the Institute for Advanced Study
Princeton, New Jersey*

• London

THE ROYAL

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

New York Toronto Bombay Melbourne Cape Town
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

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This study is published by Chatham House as representing one possible approach to the problem of post-war organization. Other views have been expressed in World Order Papers, published by the Institute in 1940. Further contributions to the study of this subject will, it is hoped, be made in studies projected by the Chatham House Reconstruction Committee,

First published, June 1943

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN AT
THE BROADWATER PRESS, WELWYN

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I. THE GENERAL PROBLEM

THIS HARDEST POLITICAL TASK

THE need for some new kind of international system was being widely canvassed before the war, as the League of Nations found itself frustrated in its attempts to prevent aggression and to organize peace. Some blamed this failure on the irresponsibility of small states; others, like Mr van Kleffens some time ago, rather on the egoism of the Great Powers. Still others imputed the League's failure more directly to weaknesses in its own constitution and machinery: the proper ingredients were there, but only inadequately. It was especially among those who held this view that the idea of a wide international federation began to be embraced as a new hope.

Federation is indeed the only alternative to a League tried so far for linking together a number of political units by democratic methods. It would mean an association much closer than was the League, and its advocacy therefore takes it for granted that the League failed because it did not go far enough. In what way would federation go farther? Federation would be a more intensive union of a less extensive group—the constitutional ties would be closer; secondly, certain activities would be more definitely and actively tied together. More definite common action is clearly the end—the formal arrangements which the federalists put in the forefront would be merely a necessary adjunct, to ensure the reliable working of the federal undertakings. And that is as it should be, for, leaving formal arguments aside, it is plain that the League failed not from overstrain but from inanition. It might have done more about sanctions, but that would not have been enough; even if the League's action for "security" had been more fearless, that would not by itself have sufficed to give vitality to an international system that was to last and grow. To achieve that end such a system must in some important respects take over and co-ordinate activities hitherto controlled by the national state, just as the state increasingly has to take over activities which until now have been carried on by local bodies; and, like the state, any new international authority could under present conditions not be merely a police authority.

We realize now that the League failed because, whatever the reasons, it could not further that process of continuous adjustment

and settlement which students of international affairs call "peaceful change." But they themselves, taking the form for the substance, all too often thought of it mainly as a matter of changing frontiers. We shall have to speak of this again, but what peaceful change should mean, what the modern world, so closely inter-related, must have for its peaceful development, is some system that would make possible automatic and continuous social action, continually adapted to changing needs and conditions, in the same sense and of the same general nature as any other system of government. Its character would be the same, for certain purposes, only the range would be new. It is in that sense that the League's work has in truth been inadequate and ineffective, as one may readily see if one reflects whether a change of frontiers now and then would really have led to a peaceful and co-operative international society.

A close federation is supposed to do just what the League proved unable to do, and in a set and solid way. But, to begin with, can we take a system which has worked well in one field and simply transplant it to another, so much wider and more complex? Federations have still been national federations; the jump from national states to international organization is infinitely more hazardous than was the jump from provincial units to national federations. None of the elements of neighbourhood, of kinship, of history, are there to serve as steps. The British Empire is bound closely by old ties of kinship and history, yet no one would suggest that there is among its parts much will for federation. Yet, apart from this matter of whether the federal idea has any great prospects, there is the more important question whether it would have any great virtues in the international sphere. If the evil of conflict and war springs from the division of the world into detached and competing political units, will it be exorcised simply by changing or reducing the lines of division? Any political reorganization into separate units must, sooner or later, produce the same effects; any international system that is to usher in a new world must produce the opposite effect of subduing political division. As far as one can see, there are only two ways of achieving that end. One would be through a world state which would wipe out political divisions forcibly; the other is the way discussed in these pages, which would rather overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated. That is the fundamental

change to which any effective international system must aspire and contribute: to make international government co-extensive with international activities. A League would be too loose to be able to do it; a number of sectional federations would, on the contrary, be too tight to be welded into something like it; therefore when the need is so great and pressing, we must have the vision to break away from traditional legalistic ideas and try some new way that might take us without violence towards that goal. The beginnings cannot be anything but experimental; a new international system will need even more than national systems a wide freedom of continuous adaptation in the light of experience. It must care as much as possible for common needs that are evident, while presuming as little as possible upon a social unity which is still only latent and unrecognized. As Mr Winant well said in a lecture at Leeds in October 1942: "We must be absolute about our principal ends (justice and equality of opportunity and freedom), relative and pragmatic about the mechanical means used to serve those ends."

The need for a pragmatic approach is all the greater because we are so clearly in a period of historical transition. When the state itself, whatever its form and constitution, is everywhere undergoing a deep social and political sea-change, it is good statesmanship not to force the new international experiments into some set established form, which may be the less relevant the more respectable it is, but to see, above all, that these experiments go with and fit into the general trend of the time.

THE TREND OF OUR TIME:
FROM "RIGHTS" TO "SERVICES"

When one examines the general shape of the tasks that are facing us one is, to begin with, led to question whether order could be brought into them by the device of formal written pacts. Why did written constitutions, Declarations of Rights, and other basic charters play such a great rôle during the nineteenth century? The task of that time was to *work out a new division of the sphere of authority, to determine new relationships between the individual and the state; these relationships were meant to be fixed and final, and they had to rest on general principles, largely of a negative character. It was natural and proper that all that should be laid down in formal rules, meant to remain untouched and permanent.

In much the same way the new nation-state was in world society what the new citizen was in municipal society; and international rules and a host of written pacts sought like the national constitutions to fix the formal relationship between the sovereign individual states and the collectivity which in this case also was expected to be fixed and final, with international law as a gradually emerging constitution for that political cosmos.

Viewed in this light, the Covenant of the League is seen to have continued that nineteenth-century tradition. It was concerned above all with fixing in a definite way the formal relationship of the member states, and in a measure also of non-members, and only in a very secondary way with initiating positive common activities and action. The great exception, security, was a vital action, but a negative one; its end was not to promote the active regular life of the peoples, but only to protect it against being disturbed. Broadly one might say that the Covenant was an attempt to universalize and codify the rules gradually evolved through political treaties and pacts, and to give them general and permanent validity. It was neither unnatural nor unreasonable to follow up that nineteenth-century trend and try to steady international relations by bringing them within the framework of a written pact, one provided with set rules for its working. But when it came to going beyond that the League could not be more or do more than what its leading members were ready to be and do, and they were ready to do but little in a positive way. It was indeed characteristic of the post-Armistice period 1918-19 that even the victors hastened to undo their common economic and other machinery, such as the Allied Shipping Control, etc., which had grown and served them well during the war. That was at a time when within each country government action and control were spreading fast, causing many a private international activity also to be cut down or cut off. In other words, the incipient common functions, as well as many old connections, were disbanded in the international sphere at the very time when a common constitution was being laid down for it. It was that divorce between life and form that doomed the League from the outset, and not any inadequacy in its written rules.

Hence it is pertinent to ask: Would another written pact, if only more elaborate and stringent, come to grips more closely with the problems of our time? Let us by way of a preliminary answer note two things. First, the lusty disregard for constitutions and pacts,

for settled rules and traditional rights, which is a striking mark of the times. In the pressure for social change no such formal ties are allowed to stand in the way, either within the several countries or between them. It is a typical revolutionary mood and attitude. If it does not always take the outward form of revolution, that is because governments themselves act as spearheads of the trend, and that not only in countries ruled by dictatorships. Those who lead in this rush for social change pride themselves indeed on their disregard for forms and formalities. The appeal which Communism, Fascism, and Nazism make to youth in particular and to the masses in general lies in no small degree in that political iconoclasm. At the turn of the nineteenth century the radical masses were demanding settled rules and rights, and Napoleon could play the trump card of constitutional nationalism against the autocratic rulers. Now the masses demand social action without regard to established "rights," and the totalitarian leaders have been playing the strong card of pragmatic socialism against constitutional democracy.

That universal pressure for social reform in the second place has utterly changed the relation of nationalism to internationalism, in a way that is promising if rightly used. In constitution-making there was a parallel between the two spheres, but nothing more, for they belonged politically to different categories. The nineteenth-century nationalism rested mainly on cultural and other differentiating factors, and the creation of the nation-state meant inevitably a breaking-up of world unity. A cosmopolitan outlook spread rapidly, but the nations at the same time balked at international organization and control, and they could justify that refusal by seemingly good principle. At present the new nationalism rests essentially on social factors; these are not only alike in the various countries, thus paradoxically creating a bond even between totalitarian groups, but often cannot make progress in isolation. At many points the life of the nation-state is overflowing back into that common world which existed before the rise of modern nationalism; at present the lines of national and international evolution are not parallel but converging, and the two spheres now belong to the same category and differ only in dimensions.

In brief, the function of the nineteenth century was to restrain the powers of authority; that led to the creation of "political man" and likewise of the "political nation," and to the definition through constitutional pacts of their relation to the wider political group.

The Covenant (and the Locarno and Kellogg Pacts) was still of that species essentially, with the characteristic predominance of rules of the "thou shalt not" kind. The function of our time is rather to develop and co-ordinate the social scope of authority, and that cannot be so defined or divided. Internationally it is no longer a question of defining relations between states but of merging them—the workaday sense of the vague talk about the need to surrender some part of sovereignty. A constitutional pact could do little more than lay down certain elementary rights and duties for the members of the new community. The community itself will acquire a living body not through a written act of faith but through active organic development. Yet there is in this no fundamental dispute as to general principles and ultimate aims. The only question is which way is the more immediately practicable and promising; whether a general framework should be provided formally in advance, on some theoretical pattern, or left to grow branch by branch from action and experience, and so find its natural bent.

II. THE PERPLEXITIES OF FEDERATION

THE DEFECTS OF CONTINENTAL AND IDEOLOGICAL UNIONS

Perhaps as good a way as any to seek an answer to that question, essential as a starting point, is to examine some of the main aspects and implications of the schemes proposed. For the past year or so it has been widely suggested that a federal scheme alone can meet our need, and a number of actual schemes have been put on paper. How effective would these federal schemes be, and where would they lead us politically? Before examining more definite aspects, however, it would be well to look in passing at one or two of the general propositions in which those schemes are often wrapped. As is the way of wrappings, they only obscure the substance of the contents, but these general propositions help to reveal the conception which lies behind the schemes and so its fitness for our needs.

One of the most persistent of these propositions is the attempt to distinguish between a "union of peoples" as against a "union of states." Federation, it is insisted, must be a union of peoples, to escape the "fundamental flaw in the League in its being made of States as members." We must refrain from indulging in the nice speculation as to what, under this conception, is the state; and of

how the state would be separated from the people and the people detached from their state. We must take the federalists on their own ground, which is that to create something good and lasting we must unite not the chief political units but the several political societies—the peoples—themselves. What peoples, one is led to ask, and how? Clearly, they must be united as whole communities—we cannot pick and choose parts of them; we must take the whole of each nation, as now organized, with its groups and sections, without discriminating between classes and parties, and so on. That means that we include not only those who believe in the union, but also those, who assuredly must exist, if only as a minority, who do not; and given the democratic process, that minority may at any time become a majority. What will happen to the union of "peoples" if some of the new majorities begin to tug at the common bonds? A union of peoples means, in effect, the union of political groups, and these and their attitude are bound to alter, or could be made to alter easily with the powerful means for stirring up popular currents which are now available. Here again there is the same harking back to the outlook and conditions of the nineteenth century, when "popular" was supposed to be all that was fair and reliable. Now that we have had some experience of what totalitarian dictators can do with popular opinion, either by usurping it or by corrupting it, we must look for some foundation that is not so easily changed by propaganda or shattered if abused by some particular group or unit.

That concern with dogmatic forms and appearances comes out still more strongly in the basis suggested for selecting the federal members. There are only two criteria of selection: one essentially geographical, the other essentially ideological, in the broader sense of that term. A Pan-American or European federation would be of the first type, and would cut across ideological divisions; an Anglo-Saxon or a "democratic" federation would be of the second type, and would cut across natural geographical divisions. What would be the effects and implications of these alternatives?

(a) *Continental Unions.*

There has been much talk in recent years of the need for 'continental' unions. The Germans have argued for a Monroe doctrine for Europe, and the Japanese for one for Asia, while in the home of that doctrine Pan-Americanism has grown some solid roots. Americans have naturally denounced the misuse of their doctrine

by Nazi and Japanese; the Monroe doctrine was meant to protect the states of the Americas, not to subject them to the strongest among them. The factor which has been and remains the chief obstacle to Pan-Americanism, fear of domination by the major partner, Germany and Japan have regarded as the proper condition for a continental union. Such a demand is in itself almost a proof that there is no real unity in Europe or Asia, as there is none in the Western Hemisphere. Yet it is a realistic anticipation of a relationship that would be well-nigh inevitable in existing circumstances, until the factor of power shall have been tamed; and the closer the union the more inevitably would it be dominated by the more powerful member. That is a first objection to schemes for continental union.

In the second place, the Roman peace within such unions, even if tolerable to those subject to it, in no way promises to be also a contribution to world peace. One of the most constant lessons of political experience suggests that such aggregations would be flushed with a new sense of power, as they would be provided with a greater ability to use it. A few years ago, when the Pan-European idea was in fashion, its chief exponent had a fleeting moment of intuitive sincerity. The Pan-European movement, wrote Kalergi, "is not a movement for world peace but for union, similar to the movements for German and Italian union in the nineteenth century. The movements for union were inwardly also movements for peace." But outwardly? The German Empire was not satiated when it had united the congeries of small Germanic states. A full-fledged Pan-American union would at best be strongly isolationist. There is little promise of peace in the mere change from the rivalry of Powers and alliances to the rivalry of whole continents, tightly organized and capable of achieving a high degree of, if not actual, self-sufficiency. Continental unions would have a more real chance than individual states to practise the autarky that makes for division.

Further, without that promise of peace such unions could not bring with them a promise of continued social well-being. But there is in any case no assurance—and that is the third objection—that a European federation especially would bring its peoples prosperity. Schemes of this kind have been mooted more than once during the nineteenth century, but then Europe was in effect the political stage of the world. Economic relations with the rest of the world were yet modest, and so was general intercourse; communi-

cations were clumsy, the exchange of goods and ideas was limited, and Europe was, and felt, much of a unit *vis-a-vis* a vast exotic outer world. Since then powerful centres of social life have developed also in the other continents, and that has led not to segregation but to an ever greater and varied economic and social interdependence of all peoples and lands. What therefore might have amounted to* a fairly self-contained international, if European, society if those earlier plans had been adopted, in our time would mean rather the cutting up of a somewhat loose but living world system. The advocates of continental unions have often argued that a universal system would skip a stage in the political evolution of the world. "Just as the idea of national unity was a postulate of the nineteenth century," wrote Kalergi, "so is the idea of continental unity a postulate of the twentieth century." The analogy is more revealing than valid. There is a fictitious naturalness about these continental units. None of them has in fact that unity of type and purpose which drew men of one nation together, and if such unions would tie up certain strands they would tear up many more, and more promising ones. The problems which now divide the national states would almost all crop up again in any territorial realignment; their dimensions would be different, but not their evil nature. Yet if the analogy is fallacious, its use is significant. It shows that those who use it cannot break away from the conception which can see political society only as territorially closed units, aiming at being politically and economically self-contained. In so far as they have to admit that existing limits are holding up social progress—though their concern is admittedly more with military security—they can think merely of stretching that conception, but not of going beyond it or outside it.

(b) "*Ideological*" Unions.

Since the battle of the ideologies, which has played havoc with the League, a different type of federation has been urged upon us—not a geographical, but what one might call a sympathetic federation, with, as a conspicuous example, Mr Streit's first proposal for the federation of fifteen democracies. This criterion of selection would obviate the evident lack of unity of outlook of continental unions, but it assumes in the countries concerned a democratic unity which is seldom there. It would abandon to their fate democratic sections in the states excluded, while taking in in the states

included non-democratic sections which would be a weakness in, and a latent threat to, the new body politic. The French Canadians are one example of such discordant groups, and such dissident minorities, as we have said, may at times become majorities. France, which was to be one of the pillars of Mr Streit's scheme, is a somewhat different case in point. What would happen if one or more members were to go fascist and so lose their qualification for membership? And what if, at the same time, countries formerly fascist were to go democratic? Would the first be turned out and the second taken in? Federation under present conditions means a fairly close organization, political and economic; to revise the membership perhaps every few years would mean to disrupt periodically those very factors which would be the life-blood of the union. Or, if that is to be avoided and the original union kept together, either its ideological basis would have to be jettisoned or it would have to be maintained by force. That would almost turn the union into a Holy Alliance that would be led to stifle the democratic process in the house of its members in order to keep up the democratic dogma in its own constitution.

Like the idea of continental unions, such ideological exclusivism is not a new thing. The great Radicals who during the revolutionary period of the nineteenth century pleaded for the federation of Europe had one trait in common: they were all Republicans, and the one point on which they insisted was that only "free" peoples should be admitted into the federation. The Congress over which Victor Hugo presided laid down the conditions of freedom as consisting of freedom of the press and association, universal suffrage, and control over taxation—all of them matters of internal organization. The advocates of federation were really concerned with the state, not with the world, being convinced that rivalries and conflicts between nations were all the work of princes. Their ideological successors now hold the national state to be the culprit, but they still expect salvation from the mere existence of parliament and parties, and peace to flow from the scroll of free constitutions. **What** is the truth—that we cannot have international society until the peoples are free, or that the peoples cannot be free until we have an international society? It is at least arguable that national society **might** not have come into being if the component parts had been **expected** to become democratic first. In any case, we can hardly **take that stand** now, even if in the middle of the nineteenth century

it was not unreasonable. The reformers of the time were concerned with the organization of the state, in its constitutional basis; we are concerned with the organization of the world, in its active working relations. The purpose of any new international system would be to regulate the politics of its common life, not the parochial politics of its members. To try to do this would be to inject ideological issues with a vengeance into the whole system, whereas the evident need is precisely to neutralize them. It is a task of practical government, not of political baptism.

Moreover, while we must refrain from speculating on the nice question of definition, revealing though that might be, we cannot avoid it altogether, as it must form the basis for selecting the members. In pre-war Europe and America there was many a country whose written constitution was all that a democrat could wish. Would that political facade qualify for a place in a democratic union? In the second place, the reference here is generally to political democracy. What of the claim of the Left that capitalism is the mischief-maker, and that only social democracy could bring peace? If political democracies should hold that peace demands the exclusion of fascist states, the Socialists within them might claim that peace demands the social transformation of the democracies first. Both the political democrats and the social democrats would take their stand on what would be really issues of national organization, either equally valid or equally invalid for our purpose, and on that ground there is no reconciling them. Clearly, there is here a gross but fundamental confusion as to the real issue involved. The criterion of selection is made to rest on existing or professed democratic form, whereas the only test that could satisfy is that of democratic performance. And the performance that matters, in this as in the life of any other group, is that related to the purpose of the grouping and covering the extent of its mutual relationships. It does not matter to a football team that one of their slackers is otherwise a good engineer, efficient and reliable in his engineering relations; and it does not matter to a group of engineers that one of their failures is a good and efficient member of his local friendly society. The performance which matters in international affairs is that which concerns and affects the sphere of international relations. A democratic federation would not lead to peace if some of its members, while democratically governed, were in the wider sphere to break the rules of democratic conduct. Abyssinia **was** destroyed by

fascist Italy, but it was democratic Italy that laid hands on Tripoli and the Dodecanese; and a presumably democratic Poland it was that seized Vilna. Some other countries, though not democratically governed according to current definition, like Portugal, or Turkey under Kemal, may behave democratically in their international relations. Which of the two would make the better constituent of a democratic international system?

In the years immediately before the war the U.S.S.R. was more ready to uphold the League's system of security than many a democratic member, while she had no part in the work of the I.L.O. Japan, on the other hand, remained a member of the I.L.O. even after she had resigned from the League. Should they have been excluded from what they were willing to do because they were not doing everything else? This is another aspect of the same question, cases of a partial sharing in international action, which shows how difficult it must be, and even damaging, to insist on orthodoxy. In every case what matters is a readiness to co-operate for avoiding conflict and for advancing the task of common well-being. That is all one can ask and all one need ask. The very end of political organization is to make it possible that people with differing views and divergent sentiments should yet work together peacefully for common ends. Law and order have never meant a mere declaration of faith, but a line of conduct. In national society life is divided into public and private spheres; even in the public sphere the citizen may hold and speak any views as long as he does not wilfully obstruct its course, i.e. as long as he behaves democratically. That dichotomy is a fundamental trait of liberal democracy; it is totalitarian doctrine that denies the right to a difference of outlook, even in matters not of common concern. Nor is it otherwise in existing federations. There is much variation in the several parts of the United States in regard to press and censorship, the right of meeting and association, franchise qualifications, etc.; more recently the intent and spirit of the Federal labour laws have been greatly cramped by restrictive legislation in a score of states; nor would any one claim that the states of the cotton belt are governed democratically. Farther north, Quebec shows many a democratic flaw, while Alberta has, in a different direction, tried to go a way of her own. Yet in both countries federal activities are developing fast and progressively; it would indeed be true to say that it is in the widening of that common field that the democratic process is best satisfied

and expressed. What justification is there for expecting more and asking more in international society? If anything, our initial demands must be more modest there, both because international bonds are more tenuous, and because innate differences between the parts are more marked and more sensitive. Clearly, the ideological criterion of selection, in any case difficult to define, would be as invidious in operation as it is irrelevant in principle.

COMMON DEFECTS OF SECTIONAL UNIONS

While territorial or continental groupings, therefore, would lean upon an unreal unity of outlook and interest, ideological groupings would cut across certain real and natural interests. In Europe, and still more in the Western Hemisphere, they would break up, for instance, what are in effect natural units for security, and so would tend to grow the habits of a grand alliance rather than of a collective system of law and order.

Apart from such particular defects, all sectional schemes have certain defects in common. What, above all, would be their relations with outside groups, and their effect upon them? Pan-Europa, as we know, was in practice to be a separate organization, with a point directed against Russia and against the United States. A "democratic" federation would of set purpose have a point against non-democratic Powers; just as the Axis, in spite of the Anti-Comintern Pact, was led by its ideology to turn rather against the liberal democratic states. The first effect of any such sectional grouping, therefore, must be to force those left outside to join together in some counter-group. "Such seems the disposition of man," said Dr Johnson, "that whatever makes a distinction produces rivalry." Continental unions would almost have to invent extraneous danger or antagonism so as to stimulate internal unity; ideological unions would, of course, have such bogies ready made. We should be thrown back upon a balance of power between groups that would be much more formidable than those which broke the back of the European Concert in 1914, or than the Axis and counter-Axis groups of recent years.

To obviate that danger, those who realize it propose that sectional unions should be linked up into a wider association, probably a universal League. But the mere fact of association will not lay the danger; it will all depend on the nature of the sectional units and on

their relation to the wider body. Now, federal schemes imply a fairly close organization of joint activities and interests of member states. Security, economic and social development, all require under present conditions, whatever the unit of organization, centralized planning and control. The closer the organization of the sectional unions, the sharper will be their division from other similar unions, and the more tenuous their links with any universal body. It is useless to hope and to prescribe that relations with other groups should be liberal and co-operative. Finance, production, defence, etc., cannot be organized tightly in a sectional unit, and at the same time be open on equal terms to other units. Even so relatively mild a step as the Ottawa preferential arrangement helped to divide the British Empire from the rest of the world; while in the opposite sense the close economic ties which are growing up now between Canada and America, should they persist after the war in their present limited character, would loosen in a corresponding degree Canada's ties with the Empire. The organization of a federal group would have to be rigid, and so therefore will be its relations with other similar units. It is not possible to change the structure of such planned economy, or system of defence, continuously. Therefore the closer federal unit would in fact be the active dominant unit in political and social life, inevitably with privileges for its members and restrictions against non-members. In so far as successful it would engender a group patriotism, thus in the end reproducing in all political essentials the relationship which has existed between states and the League rather than that between a state and its local bodies, or that of a federation to its members. The centre of gravity of the new international life, that is, would again be misplaced, unless the scope and authority of the smaller units were to be correspondingly lesser than those of the wider grouping—and in that case they could not be close federations.

Between the conception of a universal league or association and that of sectional unions there is, therefore, a difference not merely of degree, but of essence. The sectional units would proceed in the old way through a definition of a limited territory, the other through the organization of certain common interests; and while the first would organize within their limits with the inevitable tendency to differentiate between members and outsiders, the second would select and organize certain activities for the opposite purpose

of integrating with regard to them the interests and actions of all.¹ That is precisely the urgent task which is facing us, and which would test the effectiveness of any new international system: to make international government co-extensive with international activities. That, as we shall see, happens to be also the only way for developing among nations an order of genuine equality, based upon a sharing of positive rights and duties, in lieu of the present legal fiction which has hampered co-operation without providing security. When the League considered the idea of regional groups, as in the Geneva Protocol, it was clearly laid down that regional pacts must be open to all who might wish to join them. Pan-Americanism has not been a barrier to a wider international system, much less a substitute for it, as was shown by the participation of many Latin-American states in the League; indeed, unless a wider system were to come into being, the reluctance of some Latin-American states to being tied to a Pan-American system might increase. The apparent affinity between such regional bodies and federal unions only serves to bring into relief the real disparity between the two conceptions. In the League the regional groups were meant to be a means for administrative devolution, in the other they would be a means for political exclusion. A state could fit naturally into the several parts of a system of international devolution, but it could not be on equal terms both a member of a sectional union and of a universal association. Close sectional unions would, in effect, represent merely a rationalized nationalism, with wider limits for the individual units, but otherwise reproducing the working characteristics of the system of national states.

III. THE FUNCTIONAL ALTERNATIVE

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Can these vital objections be met, and the needs of peace and social advance be satisfied, through some other way of associating nations for common action? The whole trend of modern govern-

¹ The idea is perfectly described in the definition of a 'region*' proposed by the U.S. National Resources Planning Board—roughly, that a region is the *locus* of a problem, its limits the limit of that problem, with a focal centre for its administration. On that definition America has some one hundred and twelve different regional systems—one for the Federal Reserve Bank, one for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and so on—for different federal purposes; some coincide with state boundaries, others do not, and their administrative centres are in different parts and cities.

ment indicates such a way. That trend is to organize government along the lines of specific ends and needs, and according to the conditions of their time and place, in lieu of the traditional organization on the basis of a set constitutional division of jurisdiction of rights and powers. In national government the definition of authority and the scope of public action are now in a continuous flux, and are determined less by constitutional norms than by practical requirements. The instances are too many and well-known to need mentioning; one might note only that while generally the trend has been towards greater centralization of services, and therefore of authority, under certain conditions the reverse has also occurred, powers and duties being handed over to regional and other authorities for the better performance of certain communal needs. The same trend is powerfully at work in the several federations, in Canada and Australia and especially in the United States, and in these cases it is all the more striking because the division of authority rests on written constitutions which are still in being and nominally valid in full. Internationally, too, while a body of law had grown slowly and insecurely through rules and conventions, some common activities were organized through *ad hoc* functional arrangements and have worked well. The rise of such specific administrative agencies and laws is the peculiar trait and indeed the foundation of modern government.

A question which might properly be asked at the outset in considering the fitness of that method for international purposes is this: Could such functions be organized internationally without a comprehensive political framework? Let it be said, first, that the functional method as such is neither incompatible with a general Constitutional framework nor precludes its coming into being. It only follows Burke's warning to the sheriffs of Bristol that "government is a practical thing" and that one should beware of elaborating constitutional forms "for the gratification of visionaries." In national states and federations the functional development is going ahead without much regard to, and sometimes in spite of, the old constitutional divisions. If in these cases the constitution is most conveniently left aside, may not the method prove workable internationally without any immediate and comprehensive constitutional framework? If, to cite Burke again, it is "always dangerous to meddle with foundations," it is doubly dangerous now. Our political problems are obscure, while the political passions of the time are

blinding. One of the misfortunes of the League experiment was that a new institution was devised on what have proved to be outdated premises. We might also recollect that of the constitutional changes introduced in Europe after the last war, fine and wise though they may have been, none has survived even a generation. How much greater will that risk of futility be in post-war Europe, when the nations will be split much worse than in 1919 within and between themselves? We know now even less about the dark historical forces which have been stirred up by the war, while in the meantime the problems of our common society have been distorted by fierce ideologies which we could not try to bring to an issue without provoking an irreconcilable dogmatic conflict. Even if action were to be to some extent handicapped without a formal political framework, the fact is that no obvious sentiment exists, and none is likely to crystallize for some years, for a common constitutional bond.

In such conditions any pre-arranged constitutional framework j[^]ould be taken wholly out of the air. We do not know what, if anything, will be in common—except a desperate craving for peace and for the conditions of a tolerable normal life. The peoples may applaud declarations of rights, but they will call for the satisfaction of needs. That demand for action could be turned into a historic opportunity. Again, we might take to heart what happened in the U.S.A. in 1932-33, and think of what chances the Roosevelt administration would have had to achieve unity, or indeed to survive, if instead of taking immediate remedial action they had begun by offering constitutional reforms—and that where a common system was already in being. A timid statesman might still have tried to walk in the old constitutional grooves. Mr Roosevelt simply stepped over them. He grasped both the need and the opportunity for centralized practical action. Unemployment, the banking collapse, flood control, and a hundred other problems had to be dealt with by national means if they were to be dealt with effectively and with lasting results.

The significant point in that emergency action was that each and every problem was tackled as a practical issue in itself. No attempt was made to relate it to a general theory or system of government. Every function was left to generate others gradually, like the functional subdivision of organic cells; and in every case the appropriate authority was left to grow and develop out of actual performance.

Yet the new functions and the new organs, taken together, have revolutionized the American political system. The federal government has become a national government, and Washington for the first time is really the capital of America. In the process many improvements in the personnel and machinery of government have come about, and many restrictive state regulations have melted away. More recently there has been heard the significant complaint that the ties between cities and their states are becoming looser, while those with the national government become ever stronger. No one has worked to bring this about, and no written act has either prescribed it or confirmed it. It has been a purely functional development at every point. A great constitutional transformation has thus taken place without any changes in the Constitution. There have been complaints, but the matter-of-course acceptance has been overwhelming. People have gladly accepted the service when they might have questioned the theory. The one attempt at direct constitutional revision, to increase and liberalize the membership of the Supreme Court, was bitterly disputed and defeated. Yet that proposal involved in effect much less of a constitutional revolution than does the experiment of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The first would not have ensured any lasting change in the working of American government, whereas the second has really introduced into the political structure of the United States a new regional dimension unknown to the Constitution.

In many of its essential aspects—the urgency of the material needs, the inadequacy of the old arrangements, the bewilderment in outlook—the situation at the end of this war will resemble that in America in 1933, though on a wider and deeper scale. And for the same reasons the path pursued by Mr Roosevelt in 1933 offers the best, perhaps the only, chance for getting a new international life going. It will be said inevitably that in the United States it was relatively easy to follow that line of action, because they were in fact one country, with an established constitution. Functional arrangements could be accepted, that is, because in many fields the federal states had grown in the habit of working together. That is no doubt true, but not the most significant point of the American experiment; for that line was followed not because the functional way was so easy but because the constitutional way would have been so difficult. Hence the lesson for unfederated parts of the world would seem to be this—if the constitutional path had to be avoided,

for the sake of effective action, even in a federation which already was a working political system, how much less promising must it be as a starting mood when it is a matter of bringing together for the first time a number of varied, and sometimes antagonistic, countries? But if the constitutional approach, by its very circumspectness, would hold up the start of a working international system, bold initiative during the period of emergency at the end of the war might set going lasting instruments and habits of a common international life. And though it may appear rather brittle, that functional approach would in fact be more solid and definite than a formal one. It need not meddle with foundations: old institutions and ways may to some extent hamper reconstruction, but reconstruction could begin by a common effort without a fight over established ways. Reconstruction may in this field also prove a surer and less costly way to revolution. As to the new ideologies, since we could not prevent them we must try to circumvent them, leaving it to the growth of new habits and interests to dilute them in time. Our aim must be to call forth to the highest possible degree the active forces and opportunities for co-operation, while touching as little as possible the latent or active points of difference and opposition.

There is one other aspect of the post-war period which has been much discussed and which has a bearing on this point, and which helps to bring out the difference in outlook between the two methods contrasted here. Much has been heard of a suggestion that when the war ends we must have first a period of convalescence, and that the task of permanent reorganization will only come after that. It is a useful suggestion, in so far as it may help to clear up certain practical problems. But it could also be misleading and even dangerous, if the distinction were taken to justify either putting off the work of international government, or differentiating between the agencies by which the new international activities are to be organized into nurses for convalescence and mentors for the new life. A clean division in time between two such periods in any case is not possible, for the period of "convalescence" will be different for different activities and ends; but, above all, except for such direct and exceptional consequences of the war as demobilization and the rebuilding of damaged areas, the needs of society will be the same at once after the war as later on. The only difference will be the practical one of a priority of needs, the kind of difference which might

be brought about by any social disturbance—an epidemic or an earthquake or an economic crisis—and the urgency of taking action. For the rest, one action and period will merge into the other, according to circumstances. Seed and implements will be as urgent for ensuring the food supply of Europe and Asia as the actual distribution of relief, and indeed more urgent if the war should end after a harvest. Again, both relief and reconstruction will depend greatly on the speedy reorganization and proper use of transport, and so on.

Both circumstances point again to the advantage of a functional practice, and to the disadvantage, if not the impossibility, of a comprehensive formal attempt at organization. To obtain sufficient agreement for some formal general scheme would, at best, not be possible without delay; at the same time, action for relief and reconstruction will have to start within the hour after the "cease fire". The alternatives would be, if a comprehensive constitutional arrangement is desired and waited for, to put the immediate work either in the hands of temporary international agencies, or to leave it to the individual states. The one, in fact, would prepare for the other. Except in matters of relief—the distribution of food, fuel, and clothing and also medical help—*ad hoc* temporary agencies could have no adequate authority or influence; all of what one might call the society-building activities, involving probably considerable planning and reorganization within and between the several countries, would fall upon the individual states again, as in 1919, when they competed and interfered rather than co-operated with each other, to the loss of them all. Yet it is vital that international activity should be from the outset in the same hands and move in the same direction after the war as later, otherwise the chances of building up an international system would be gravely prejudiced. It is certain that one of the chief reasons for the failure of the League was that it was given a formal authority and promissory tasks for the future, while the immediate, urgent, and most welcome tasks of social reconstruction and reform were left to be attended to by national agencies; later efforts to retrieve that mistake only led to a series of barren economic conferences, as by that time the policy of each country was set hard in its own mould. It is inevitable with any scheme of formal organization that the national states should have to re-start on their own, and natural therefore that refuge should be sought in the idea of a period of convalescence while the full-

fledged scheme is worked out and adopted. But functional authorities would not need such political hospitalization, with its arbitrary and dangerous division of stages; they would merely vary, like any other agency everywhere and at any time, the emphasis of their work in accordance with the changing condition of their task, continuing to control and organize transport, for instance, after they had rebuilt it, and in the same way taking each task in hand with a plan and authority for continuing it. The simple fact is that all that re-starting of agriculture and industry and transport will either be done on some pre-arranged common programme, or it will have to be done, for it could not wait, on disjointed local plans; it will be done either by pre-established international agencies, or it will have to be done by local national agencies—and the agencies which will act in the supposed convalescence period will be those to gather authority and acceptance unto themselves.

PEACEFUL CHANGE AND STATE EQUALITY IN THE FUNCTIONAL ORDER

These are rather general considerations, concerning some of the circumstances in which the task will have to begin at the end of the war. When we come to the idea of functional organization itself, it could be argued not only that all *positive* functions could be so organized, but that they might work and develop more freely without constitutional constriction. Admittedly, that might prove less easy to justify in regard to the vital *negative* function of law and order. Defence, justice, police, etc. are all instruments of some constituted authority; an international police force, to take the more extreme case, would be an impotent anachronism without an international authority. Yet here*again it is true that *ad hoc* functional arrangements have been tried and have worked, where the wider formal things have been much talked about but not achieved. International policing has been effectively tried, under various

, both before and after the World War. At this very moment a whole series of functional defence arrangements are being worked out—between Canada, Great Britain, and the United States, between the United States and the states of Latin America—without any changes in their individual or mutual constitutional structure. It is true that these arrangements are related to a state of war; the idea of an American "infantry" they may evolve into a lasting art. But let us note especially how these



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relief the sound lines of a combination of functional and regional organization. The same basis could be applied more effectively than a general one to the judiciary aspects of law and order. The chain of arbitration agreements, the Hague courts, etc., were all in a sense functional arrangements. Perhaps it will be objected that they have not worked; but in so far as they have failed that was not because the method was unworkable, but because the conditions and ends of the pre-war political world were not attuned to the ends and ways of peaceful change.

There is a good way of testing these ideas, in their general nature, by looking at them in the light of two problems which in the traditional systems have had to remain in the realm of theory, but which, because they seem so baffling, may serve to show how solid could be the achievement of a functional order. The first is the pivotal problem of peaceful change. Whether ends justify means or not, certain it is that ends must determine means. Now the method here advocated would be valueless for certain formal changes, and it is therefore necessary to point out that the meaning and purpose of peaceful change have hitherto been greatly confused by an excessive attention to formal issues. As the claimants for revision or changes since the World War have almost all wanted changes of frontiers, so the reformers in their turn have laid the emphasis on the possible use of Art. XIX of the Covenant to that end. It was easy for more cautious students to show how difficult in fact that would be, and it would be still easier to show that changes of frontiers could not be served by the functional method.¹ But then the functional method by implication denies that there is much progress to be made through changes of frontiers.

The only sound sense of peaceful change is to do internationally what it does nationally: to make changes of frontiers unnecessary by making frontiers meaningless through the continuous development of common activities and interests across them. A change of frontier is bound to disturb the social life of the groups concerned, no matter whether it comes about peacefully or forcibly. The purpose of peaceful change can only be to prevent such disturbance; one might say indeed that the true task of peaceful change is to remove the need and the wish for changes of frontiers. The functional approach may be justifiably expected to do precisely that: it

¹ See "Territorial Revision and Article 19 of the Covenant," by G. M. Gáthorne-Hardy and D. Mitrany, *International Affairs*, Nov.-Dec., 1935.

would help the growth of such positive and constructive common work, of common habits and interests, making frontier lines meaningless by overlaying them with a natural growth of common activities and common administrative agencies. In so far as it could achieve that result it would also impress a different complexion upon the problem of security. That way alone lies the prospect of turning "defence" into "police," as in the national state; and especially of giving "security*" the sense of an undisturbed social life, to be preserved by common government, in lieu of the out-dated sense of the security of a physical territory, to be protected by tanks, and planes. There is nothing violently new or original about all that. Such a line of action could at most be described in the words applied to the work of Grotius—"an original use of conservative ingredients." Since the turn of the century, especially, international activities have been taken away increasingly from foreign offices and diplomats and placed on a functional basis; and the trend would have achieved much more if its progress had not been obstructed. In many fields arrangements between states have been settled and developed directly in conferences attended by technical experts representing their respective technical departments, without passing through the complicating network of political and diplomatic censors. As a student of this problem put it a few years ago, "the strands of modern international relations spread to every nook and cranny of the governmental machine and weave a pattern as complex as that of domestic administration."

The second problem which may serve as a touchstone is the no less distracting one of state equality. Based as it is on an intractable formal principle, it has in the past caused all efforts at common international action to flounder between the Scylla of power and the Charybdis of sovereignty. On the one side it led the big states to assert their power—as in the Concert of Europe, the Supreme Council at Paris, and the Council of the League—and on the other side the smaller states to flaunt their legal equality—as at the Hague Conferences, the League Assembly, and whenever they had an opportunity to bring things to a vote. Innumerable devices have been put forward to try to get round that dilemma. When the Covenant was under discussion the writer proposed a scheme of regional devolution coupled with a hierarchy of representation; the League tried the compromise of adding non-permanent members to the Council, and so on; but, as in the latter case, attempts

which began as a solution ended as a subterfuge. Hence, even in the League the principle of state equality was at best a fiction, and at worst the currency of diplomatic bargainings; and in general it has remained a stumbling block in every formal scheme proposed so far. It is worth noting that modern political action has also had to face the self-assertion of groups or provinces or regions—regionalism was a marked phenomenon in the inter-war period—in the face of the growing need for integrated social action. At first sight that may seem paradoxical, but it is natural enough that as the state becomes more highly organized and active, so should the parts, territorial or sectional, become more watchful over their share in the control and benefits of the common organization. That self-interested watchfulness is bound to be even keener when independent states are to be tied together in some new international formation.

The problem, broadly speaking, is to find an arrangement which would show a measurable and acceptable relation between authority and responsibility, which would exclude no participant arbitrarily from a share in authority, while bringing that share into relation, not to sheer power, but to the weight of responsibility carried by the several members. The issue is not wholly avoided in a functional organization, but it is sufficiently mitigated to be no longer destructive, as any transfer of authority would be limited in scope and degree to the purpose in hand. In the democratic countries we would object to giving the executive an all-round increase in power for all time, as a permanent constitutional change, but we are willing to give it all the power it may need for fighting a war or an epidemic, as a limited and specific constitutional increment which could be tested and recalled. In the same way the smaller states have accepted, and indeed invoked, the leadership of the big states in fighting a war or an economic crisis, and there is no reason to believe that they would not also do so in normal times for the sake of a task which all would want to see performed well. Instead of the legal fiction of equality there would thus be an evident and factual inequality, in certain spheres, springing from real differences in capacity and interest with regard to a specific function, but also limited to that function. It would neither trespass upon fundamental principles nor offend against sentiments of national dignity. Any state can, and usually does, claim in conferences, etc., formal equality with Britain and America. But Rumania is not likely to

insist on it if it were a matter of organizing shipping, or Norway if it were a matter of the production of mineral oil; nor would Britain claim it when it came to controlling river pollution and traffic on the Continent. In such cases it is not the state that would be placed in a position of general inferiority, but only a particular service, in so far as it was visibly inferior. The position of inferiority would be factual and partial, as it could be changeable. A country might rise in the performance of a function and so in the hierarchy of its control; and most countries are likely to have the satisfaction of being in the forefront in some one activity or the other, without regard to their size—like Norway in regard to shipping, Canada in the production of nickel, Rumania in that of oil, Switzerland in the organization of leisure, and so on. In any case, leadership could be accepted more readily when it rested on evident practical claims and was coupled with practical benefits. As in national affairs, the willingness to grant a measure of power for the sake of good service is likely to temper claims to authority for the sake of prestige. All students and most political spokesmen are insisting that the states must be ready to surrender some of their sovereignty, but is there any prospect that we could secure acceptance for a new view of formal sovereignty, and so of state equality? But the content and working of sovereignty could be modified by such inconspicuous and partial transfers of authority to international functional organs more effectively, just because they would leave untouched a fundamental principle which the smaller states, who are the many, cherish as the bulwark of their independence. The states on the lower Danube made such a transfer to the European Danube Commission and derived benefit from it; they objected only to its being an exceptional arrangement, with a tutelary tinge, and not an international device applied everywhere to similar problems. If the method becomes general, its political incidence also becomes equal. In other words, that most disruptive and intractable of international principles, the principle of state equality, may well be tamed by specific functional arrangements which would not steal the crown of sovereignty while they would promise something for the purse of necessity.

There would be in this, however, much more than a seemingly underhand change in status. This way could become the path for a gradual progress towards a real equality between nations. If the functional organs would take away something of the formal equality,

they would make a substantial return by each contributing something towards a practical equality. In national society also, as in federal states, the way towards social equality is being pursued by pooling resources and equalizing their use—in education and housing, in health and feeding, etc—and that is done generally without any change in constitutional doctrine or political status, though the actual performance is effecting deep changes, both in the working of government and in its personnel. Many international problems, like that of the distribution of raw materials and investments, and especially that of migration, could not be attacked satisfactorily in any other way. But in that way, through gradual and increasing functional developments, through the provision of common services according to needs, the system would make for that approximation of social conditions and outlook which, better than any constitutional device, might in time build up the solid foundation for a closer political association.

There is, finally, between states another inequality of which account will have to be taken—not in size or resources, but in political and economic structure. It is an inequality, or rather a dissimilarity which in the inter-war period has gone deeper than before, as it appears not only in the external form, but permeates the whole organization of the state; and it was this that led some advocates of federation to propose a democratic or some such basis for their schemes. We have already suggested that such a criterion would be invidious and unstable; it could in any case not be applied to the group of the United Nations, which range from democratic republics to authoritarian regimes. But if the outward form of the state offers a doubtful issue, either for union or against it, the actual organization of economic and social life presents a real problem if a variety of systems are to be linked up together in their totality. Not all the countries of a possible group have the same organization or interest, and countries with a similar interest are likely to be in various stages of development in that particular respect. There are countries with planned and others with a free economic life; there are industrial countries and agrarian countries. Even if democratic government were postulated for the members of a union, that no longer means *Urissez faire* nowadays. Government controls have everywhere penetrated into economic life, but in varying degrees, which would have to be brought to some common level if the organization is to be formal and comprehensive. Here again it is clear

that a formal and comprehensive scheme would imply so much dislocation on the one side and so much adjustment on the other that the difficulties would be almost insuperable, especially in a period of transition and reconstruction already difficult enough in itself; it could certainly not be achieved and made to operate speedily. But functional arrangements could take things as they are and, as far as one can see, could link together specific economic and other activities though in one place they may be in private hands and elsewhere under public control. The grid has done that in England and the T. V. A. in a measure in America. It is being done in many a war-time organization now. A Danubian Shipping Board would pool and handle all the shipping on the river; how the contribution from each riverain country is organized, and whether its share of profits goes to the state or to private owners, is a matter for that particular country. As a contrast, one may recollect how the U.S.S.R. could not participate in the work of the I.L.O. because the latter's constitution called for representation of "employers", in a capitalist sense; whereas if the I.L.O. had simply been empowered to deal with the reality of conditions in, let us say, mining or shipping everywhere, without constitutional prescriptions, its work and influence would have gone straight to the heart of the matter.

THE BROAD LINES OF FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION

The problem of our generation, put very broadly, is how to weld together the common interests of all without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each. It is a parallel problem to that which faces us in national society, and which in both spheres challenges us to find an alternative to the totalitarian pattern. A measure of centralized planning and control, for both production and distribution, is no longer to be avoided, no matter what the form of the state or the doctrine of its constitution. Through all that variety of political forms there is a growing approximation in the working of government, with differences merely of degree and of detail. Liberal democracy needs a re-definition of the public and private spheres of action. But as the line of separation is always shifting, under the pressure of fresh social needs and demands, it must be left free to move with those needs and demands and cannot be fixed through any constitutional re-statement. The only possible principle of democratic confirmation is that public action should be

undertaken only where and when and in so far as the need for common action becomes evident and is accepted, for the sake of the common good. In that way controlled democracy could yet be made the golden mean whereby social needs might be satisfied as largely and justly as possible, while still leaving as wide a residue as possible for the free choice of the individual.

That is fully as true for the international sphere. It is indeed the only way to combine as well as may be international organization with national freedom. We have already suggested that not all interests are common to all, and that the common interests do not concern all countries in the same degree. A territorial union would bind together some interests which are not of common concern to the group, while it would inevitably cut asunder some interests of common concern to the group and those outside it. The only way to avoid that twice-arbitrary surgery is to proceed by means of a natural selection, binding together those interests which are common, where they are common, and to the extent to which they are common. That functional selection and organization of international relations would extend, and in a way resume, an international development which has been gathering strength since the latter part of the nineteenth century. The work of organizing international public services and activities was taken a step further by the League, in its health and drug control work, in its work for refugees, in the experiments with the transfer of minorities and the important innovations of the League loan system, and still more through the whole activity of the I.L.O. But, in addition, many activities and interests in the past had been organized internationally by private agencies—in finance and trade and production, etc., not to speak of scientific and cultural activities. In recent years some of these activities have in various countries been brought under public national control; indeed in totalitarian countries all of them. In a measure, therefore, the present situation represents a retrogression from the recent past: self-sufficiency has spread from economics to the things of the mind, and while Hying and wireless were opening up the world, many old links forged by private effort have been forcibly severed. It is unlikely that most of them could be resumed now except through public action, and if they are to operate as freely as they did in private hands, they cannot be organized otherwise than on a non-discriminating functional basis.

What would be the broad lines of such a functional organization

of international activities? The essential principle is that activities would be selected specifically and organized separately, each according to its nature, to the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment. It would allow, therefore, all freedom for practical variation in the organization of the several functions, as well as in the working of a particular function as needs and conditions alter. Let us take as an example the group of functions which fall under communications, on which the success of post-war reconstruction will depend greatly. What is the proper basis for the international organization of *railway* systems? Clearly, it must be European, or rather, *continental*, North-American, and so on, as that gives the logical administrative limit of co-ordination. A division of the continent into separate democratic and totalitarian unions would not achieve the practical end, as political division would obstruct that necessary co-ordination; while British and American participation would make the organization more cumbersome without any added profit to the function. As regards shipping, the line of effective organization which at once suggests itself is *international*, or inter-continental, but not universal. A European union could not solve the problem of co-ordination without the co-operation of America and of certain other overseas states. *Aviation* and *broadcasting*, a third example in the same group, could be organized effectively only on a *universal* scale, with perhaps subsidiary regional arrangements for more local services. Such subsidiary regional arrangements could in fact be inserted at any time and at any stage where that might prove useful for any part of a function; devolution according to need would be as easy and natural as centralization, whereas if the basis of organization were political every such change in dimension would involve an elaborate constitutional re-arrangement. Similarly, it could be left safely to be determined by practical considerations whether at the points where functions cross each other—as rail and river transport in Europe, or civil flying in Europe and America—the two activities should be merely co-ordinated or put under one control.

These are relatively simple examples. The functional co-ordination of production, trade and distribution evidently would be more complex, especially as they have been built up on a competitive basis. But the experience with international cartels, with the re-organization of the shipping, cotton and steel industries in England, not to speak of the even wider and more relevant experience with

economic co-ordination in the two world wars, they all show that the thing can be done, and that it has always been done on such functional lines. No fixed rule is needed, and no rigid pattern is desirable for the organization of these functional strata.

A certain degree of fixity would not be out of place, however, in regard to the more *negative* functions, especially those related to "law and order," but also to any others of a more formal nature, and which are likely to remain fairly static. Security, for instance, could be organized on an interlocking regional basis; and the judicial function likewise, with a hierarchy of courts, the wider acting as courts of appeal from the more local courts. Yet even in regard to security, and in addition to regional arrangements, the elasticity inherent in functional organization may prove practicable and desirable, if only in the period of transition. Anglo-American naval co-operation for the policing of the seas may prove acceptable for a time, and it would cut across physical regions; agreement on a mineral sanction would of necessity mean common action by those countries which control the main sources; and other such combinations might be found useful for any particular task in hand. That is security only for defence; security arrangements were conceived usually on a geographical basis because they were meant to prevent violence, and that would still be the task of sanctions, etc., based on some regional devolution. But in addition there is a growing functional devolution in the field of social security—in connection with health, with the drug and white slave traffic, with subversive movements, etc. In all that important field of social policing it has been found that co-ordination and co-operation with the police of other countries on functional lines, varying with each task, was both indispensable and practicable. There is no talk and no attempt in all this to encroach upon sovereignty, but only a detached functional association which works smoothly and is already accepted without question.

However that may be, in the field of more *positive* active functions—economic, social, cultural—which are varied and ever-changing in structure and purpose, any devolution must, like the main organization, follow functional lines. Land transport on the Continent would need a different organization and agencies should the railways after a time be displaced by roads; and a Channel tunnel would draw England into an arrangement in which she does

not at present belong, with a corresponding change in the governing organ.

Here we discover a cardinal virtue of the functional method—what one might call the virtue of technical self-determination. The functional *dimensions*^ as we have seen, determine themselves. In a like manner the function determines its appropriate *organs*. It also reveals through practice the nature of the action required under the given conditions, and in that way *the powers* needed by the respective authority. The function, one might say, determines the executive instrument suitable for its proper activity, and by the same process provides at need for the reform of that instrument at every stage. This would allow the widest latitude for variation between functions, and also in the dimension or organization of the same function as needs and conditions change. Not only is there in all this no need for any fixed constitutional division of authority and power, prescribed in advance, but anything beyond the most general formal rules would embarrass the working of these arrangements.

THE QUESTION OF WIDER CO-ORDINATION

The question will be asked, however, in what manner and to what degree the various functional agencies that may thus grow up would have to be linked to each other, and articulated as parts of a more comprehensive organization. It should be clear that each agency could work by itself, but that does not exclude the possibility of some of them or all being bound in some way together, if it should be found needful or useful to do so. That indeed is the test. As the whole sense of this particular method is to let activities be organized as the need for joint action arises and is accepted, it would be out of place to lay down in advance some formal plan for the co-ordination of the several functions. Co-ordination, too, would in that sense have to come about functionally. Yet certain needs and possibilities can be foreseen already now, though some are probable and others only likely, and it may help to round off the picture if we look into this aspect briefly.

1. *Within the same group* of functions probably there would have to be co-ordination either simply for technical purposes or for wider functional ends, and this would be the first stage towards a wider integration. To take again the group concerned with communications—rail, road, and air transport in Europe would need *technical* co-ordination in regard to time-tables, connections, etc.

They may need also a wider *functional* co-ordination if there is to be some distribution of passenger and freight traffic for the most economic performance—whether that is done by a superior executive agency or by some arbitral body, perhaps on the lines of the F.C.C. in America. Sea and air traffic across the Atlantic or elsewhere, though separately organized, probably would also benefit from a similar type of co-ordination. Again, various mineral controls, if they should be organized separately, would need some co-ordination; though this arbitrary grouping of "minerals" would be less to the point than the co-ordination of specific minerals and other products with possible substitutes—of crude oil with synthetic oil, of crude rubber with synthetic rubber, and so on.

2. The next degree or stage might be, if found desirable, the co-ordination of *several groups* of functional agencies. For instance, the communications agencies may not only work out some means of acting together in the distribution of orders for rolling stock, ships, etc., but they could or should work in this through any agencies that may have come into being for controlling materials and production, or through some intermediary agency as a clearing house. There is no need to prescribe any pattern in advance, or that the pattern adopted in one case should be followed in all the others.

3. The co-ordination of such working functional agencies with any *international planning* agencies would present a third stage, and one that brings out some interesting possibilities, should the ideas for an International Investment Board or an International Development Commission, as an advisory organ, come to fruition. One can see how such a Development Commission might help to guide the growth of functional agencies into the most desirable channels, and could watch their inter-relations and their repercussions. And an Investment Board could guide, for instance, the distribution of orders for ships, materials, etc., not only according to the best economic use, but also for the purpose of ironing out cyclical trends. It could use, according to its nature, its authority or its influence to make of such orders a means additional to international public works, etc., for dealing with periods or pockets of unemployment. Co-ordination of such a general kind may in some cases amount almost to arbitration of differences between functional agencies; regional boards or councils like those of the Pan-American Union might be used to adjust or arbitrate regional differences.

4. Beyond this there remains the habitual assumption, as we have already said, that international action must have some over-all *political authority* above it. Besides the fact that such a comprehensive authority is not now a practical possibility, it is the central view of the functional approach that such an authority is not essential for our greatest and real immediate needs. The several functions could be organized through the agreement, given specifically in each case, of the national governments chiefly interested, with the grant of the requisite powers and resources; whereas it is clear, to emphasize the previous point, that they could not allow such organizations simply to be prescribed by some universal authority, even if it existed. For an authority which had the title to do so would in effect be hardly less than a world government; and such a strong central organism might develop a tendency to take unto itself rather more authority than that originally allotted to it, requiring in its turn the checks and balances used in federal systems, but which would be difficult to provide in any loose way. If issues should arise in the functional system which would call either for some new departure or for the interpretation of existing arrangements, that could be done only in council by all the governments concerned. In so far as it may be desired to keep alive some general view of our problems, and perhaps a general watch over the policies of the several joint agencies, some body of a representative kind, like the League Assembly or the Governing Body of the I.L.O., could meet periodically, perhaps elected by proportional representation from the assemblies of the various states. Such an assembly, in which all the states would have a voice, could discuss and ventilate general policies, as an expression of the mind and will of public opinion; but it could not actually prescribe policy, or this might turn out to be at odds with the policy of governments. Any line of policy recommended by such an assembly would have to be pressed and secured through the policy-making machinery of the various countries themselves.

These then are the several types and grades of co-ordination which might develop with the growth of functional activities. But there is, finally, in the political field also the problem of security, admittedly a crucial problem, for on its being solved effectively the successful working of the other activities will depend. At the same time, the general discussion of functional organization will have served to bring out the true place and proportion of security, as

something indispensable but also as something incapable by itself of achieving the peaceful growth of an international society. It is in fact a separate function like the others, not something that stands in stern isolation, overriding all the others. Looking at it in this way, as a practical function, should also make it clear that we would not achieve much if we handled it as a one-sided limited problem—at present too often summed up in "German aggression." German aggression was a particularly vicious outgrowth of a bad general system, and only a radical and general change of the system itself will provide continuous security for all. In this case, also, it would be useful to lay down some formal pledges and principles as a guiding line, but the practical organization would have to follow functional, perhaps combined with regional, lines. That is all the more necessary as we know better now how many elements besides the purely military enter into the making of "security". The various functional agencies might, in fact, play an important role in that wider aspect of security: they could both watch over and check such things as the building of strategic railways, or the accumulation of strategic stocks in metals or grains. Possibly they could even be used, very properly and effectively, as a first line of action against threatening aggression, by their withholding services from those who are causing the trouble. They could apply such preventive sanctions more effectively than if these were to wait upon the agreement and action of a number of separate governments, and they could do so as part of their established duties, and therefore with less of the political reactions caused by political action.

REPRESENTATION IN CONTROLS

One aspect that is likely to be closely examined is that of the structure of the functional controls, and here again the initial difficulty will be that we shall have to break away from attractive traditional ideas if we are to work out the issue on its merits. It is not in the nature of the method that representation on the controlling bodies should be democratic in a political sense, full and equal for all. Ideally it may seem that all functions should be organized on a world-wide scale, and that all states should have a voice in control. Yet the weight of reality is on the side of making the jurisdiction of the various agencies no wider than the most effective working limits of the function; and while it is understandable that all countries might wish to have a voice in control, that would be really to

hark back to the outlook of political sovereignty. In no functional organization so far have the parties interested had a share in control as "by right" of their separate existence—neither the various local authorities in the London Transport Board, nor the seven states concerned in the T. V. A., nor the states of the world in the B. I. S. And in any case, in the transition from power politics to a functional order we could be well satisfied if the control of the new international organs answered to some of the merits of each case, leaving it to experience and to the maturing of a new outlook to provide in time the necessary correctives. The new method would have in this regard certain very solid merits: (i) Any claim to a share in control would have to be justified by a corresponding and evident capacity for performance; (ii) by that test smaller states could also qualify and the participants in control would vary, thus avoiding an exclusive accumulation of influence by a few countries; (iii) the same test again would govern not only the fact of participation in control, but also the extent of the powers of control in each case; (iv) and the performance would be practical and measurable, with a periodical balance-sheet, more definite and more suitable for examination than the reports to the League's Mandates Commission, through which the work and the policy of each agency could be closely checked. Czechs and Swiss may possibly dislike not having a direct part in the control of an International Shipping Board, and it is true that as consumers they would run a certain risk, as with such a monopolistic Board they could not drive the bargains that are possible when shipping is run by a number of competing private undertakings. Still, in this case also they would have no direct voice in control, and would be equally powerless against a shipping cartel, whereas the organization of shipping as a recognized common service would give them a standing in court, so to speak, with a right to bring open plaint for any particular grievances and even to criticize on general grounds any failings of the service. To this might be added that from all past experience a personnel which would be largely technical and permanent is likely to develop both a professional pride and a vested interest in good performance. That is an important point, and one that helps to bring out in this case, too, how formal ideas of equality may actually stand in the way of practical achievement. For "equal representation" involves not only the presence but also the character of representation; it is not merely a matter of being

represented, but clearly of being represented by people of one's own choice and who will express one's particular interests. The demand for equal share in control is only too likely to lead to that for an equal or proportional share in personnel, and that would be to build up within the various agencies a mass of national groups rather than a detached international civil service. Yet the growth of such a service would be the best insurance against any possible abuses, just as the functional method itself, by concentrating all attention on a practical public service, is likely more than anything else to breed a new conscience in all those concerned with such international activities.

This line of action would help to develop also another factor that is needed for the good working of any such experiment, namely, an international outlook and opinion. The very fact that it would concentrate attention on practical issues and activities would give people a better chance than the habitual political arguments to judge it on its merits. And as it would be natural to vary the seat of the various agencies, placing it in each case at a convenient centre for the particular function, people in many parts of the world would have before their eyes a piece of international government in action.

It must be expected that the idea of an equal voice and the demand for it will die hard, in spite of its hollowness in all past experience, and that the ideas accepted here will appear to some as a surrender to power. Power, unfortunately, is one of the facts of international life that have to be reckoned with, but it would be a great step forward to harness it to a common task, for common ends, and in a measure under common control. In that way the less powerful and less wealthy peoples would at least get some of the reality of equality, for limitation in executive control does not imply exclusion from participation in the work and in its benefits, or indeed in the shaping of more general lines of policy. If, for instance, the main suppliers of capital might have to have a leading role in an International Investment Board, which would be an executive agency, all the countries could and should be represented on an eventual International Development Commission, which would debate and recommend in an advisory capacity the general line of economic action. That kind of inequality is inevitable when the contributions will be so unequal and while the method is still on trial, though one might hope that gradually the functional agencies would acquire a purely technical form of management, based no

more even on contributions but on the capacity of the managers for their jobs—it would be, one might say, equality in non-representation. But to insist on rearing a system from the outset on the legal principle of equality could only lead to one of two things: either any effective action would be blocked again—for how far would the Great Powers be likely to go in allowing their capital and resources and so on to be disposed of by majority decisions?—or, if they agreed among themselves, the big states would probably feel impelled to take matters into their own hands. Can any one doubt that these are the inescapable alternatives? Already amidst renewed professions about the equality of nations one hears increasingly the theme of the responsibility of the Great Powers for shaping the world to come; and with it murmurs of incipient revolt amongst the smaller states against that assumption of a "rich man's burden." Just as the elusiveness of the formal approach led those who cling to it to seek the respite of a "convalescence period," so its contradictions lead them either to try and shift responsibility for the future upon some vague European or other council, or to fall back in baffled exasperation upon the special claims and standing of the four allied Powers.¹ That is the dilemma to which the idea of formal

¹ The speech of Sir Stafford Cripps at Bristol, on April 18, 1943, is a characteristic instance of how lightly these conceptions are bandied about, even by a democrat and a distinguished jurist. After the war, he said, America, Russia, China, and the British Commonwealth will be the most powerful nations, "and upon those four, in association with the United Nations, will fall the main task . . ." The new international organization, he insisted, must have the right to give majority decisions and to enforce compliance with them. "Into this picture will fit the four Great Powers, who will in the initial years . . ." have to assume great burdens and responsibility. Is the "majority" which Sir Stafford mentioned, but did not define, to be a "democratic" majority of all the United Nations, and in that case how would the four Great Powers "fit into the picture"? Or is it a majority of the "big four" to which he would give that right to make decisions and enforce them upon the world?

The growing uneasiness of the small states was expressed recently by Mr Bagge, die Swedish Minister of Education and leader of the Conservative Party, when giving his blessing to the idea of a northern group, though admitting its difficulties: "Some quarters have loudly proclaimed that the existence of small neutral States is no longer tolerable or even imaginable. What the German 'new order' would mean we have been clearly told in detail. We know less about what the allied international organization for the preservation of peace entails. Though the Atlantic Charter greeted with joy and hopefulness, not least from the smaller peoples, we have also seen authoritative statements in the opposite sense in the British and American Press. A new Holy Alliance, blandly basing inroads on the smaller States' independence and integrity on the so-called security needs of the great Powers, and dividing Europe into spheres of interest, would be a very unwholesome atmosphere for the small States, which must take all precautions to maintain their freedom and independence" (*The Times*, May 18, 1943). In the same week the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Spaak, and the Czechoslovak Minister of State, M. Ripka, frankly and openly protested in speeches made in London against any idea that post-war plans and settlements could be decided "by a dictatorial verdict of the Great Powers, or of some of them."

equality leads inexorably: equality without government, or government without equality. But this kind of inequality would be political and therefore less controllable in its ends and in its means; hence we must have the ingenuity and detachment to devise a more satisfactory adjustment between the principle of legal equality and the needs of a working equality.

IV. THROUGH FUNCTIONAL ACTION TO INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

THE WAY OF NATURAL SELECTION

One cannot insist too much that such gradual functional developments would not create a new system, however strange they might appear in the light of our habitual search for a unified formal order. They would merely rationalize and develop what is already there. In all countries social activities, in the widest sense of the term, are organized and reorganized continually in that way. But because of the legalistic structure of the state and of our political outlook, which treat national and international society as two different worlds, social nature, so to speak, has not had a chance so far to take its course. Our social activities are cut off arbitrarily at the limit of the state and, if at all, are allowed to be linked to the same activities across the border only by means of uncertain and cramping political ligatures. What is here proposed is simply that these political amputations should cease. Whenever useful or necessary the several activities would be released to function as one unit throughout the length of their natural course. National problems would then appear, and would be treated, as what they are, the local segments of general problems. There is a lesson to be drawn from the fact that federal states even more than unitary states do of necessity develop their common life on a functional basis. In Australia, in the face of a fairly rigid constitution, as new problems come up there is ever more experimenting with extra-constitutional machinery. Because the states could not raise foreign loans in competition, nor would readily submit to federal control, they have built up a Loan Council for use by the federation as well as by the states; when several experiments with marketing schemes were invalidated on constitutional grounds other roundabout schemes had to be worked out by negotiation; and the Tariff Board

provides yet another example of the application of the functional principle. As many illustrations could be given from Canada, and many more from the United States under the New Deal. In America it would have been utterly impossible to reconstruct the federal authority through constitutional changes, but by a gradual accumulation of new functional tasks and powers the government at Washington now has come to represent a working unity which has welded the life of the country together more solidly than the Constitution ever did or could. In his *Survey of American Foreign Relations*, 1928, the late Mr Charles Howland listed this preference for specific action as one of the four fundamental American traditions; while suspicious of "entangling alliances," this was the type of international action which America had always favoured and never feared.

Such examples which show how the functional trend is making headway under federal constitutions also go to show that in the international field also such functional beginnings could grow in time into a rounded political system. There is nothing incompatible between the two conceptions: the functional arrangements might indeed be regarded as organic elements of a federalism by instalments. But such a federalism if it came would be the solid growth of a natural selection and evolution, tested and accepted by experience, and not a green-table creation, blown about and battered by all the winds of political life. A functional organization does not crack if one of the participants tries political or social experiments of his own. Nor would indeed its existence be in jeopardy, as would be that of a sectional federation, if one of the members were to secede altogether. If the seceding member or members should happen to be pivotal factors in certain activities the result might be serious, but even then only the particular function affected would be endangered, while the others could go on. Or a state could drop out of certain functions but continue in others, as Japan continued to share in the work of the I. L. O. after she resigned from the League. Some participants could drop out, that is, or some functions could be abandoned without wrecking the system as a whole. Contrariwise, a function could be resumed, or a member might return, without political upheaval. In the past, indeed, after international wars proved functional arrangements have often been resumed as a matter of course, in spite of passions roused and frontiers changed. Constitutional arrangements would inevitably be shaken in the former cases and altogether broken in the latter case.

Politically the method would have the strength which comes from free growth. No country need be forced to come in, and no country would be forced to stay out. Countries would come in for those functional activities in which they would be entitled to participate by the weight of their interests and resources, but all countries would benefit from the performance of a general service, even if they had no part in its control. On the other hand, no one would share in power who did not share in responsibility. This good democratic postulate could be reinforced by democratic representation; the functional structure could be made a union of peoples, not of states, but of the people directly concerned in any specific function, by giving them functional representation somewhat on the lines of the governing organs of the I. L. O.

The future lies clearly with a more liberal and systematic development on these lines. Not all activities can, or need be, so organized. But in all essential activities we could advance from our present position effectively and without delay if we would but put out of our minds the old political argument between political centralism and political devolution, which were the concomitants of the passive Liberal state, and follow a line more closely fitting the actual progress of our communal life. Instead of breaking up government mechanically into a pyramid of subordinate territorial areas, we need for our new ends rather to dissect its tasks and relevant authorities on lines that correspond to and fit those tasks. Instead of keeping up the old and barren attempt to establish a formal and fixed division of sovereignty and power, a division which changing conditions continually puts out of joint, we could with a little insight and boldness distribute power in accordance with the practical requirements of every function and object. Instead, that is, of asking *by whom* should sovereignty and power be exercised, we should rather ask *upon what* objects they should be exercised; or, to put it in other words, the real question is not "who are the rightful authorities," but rather "what are the rightful ends—and what the proper means for them?" Authority would derive from the performance of a common task and would be conditioned by it, and not from the possession of a separate "rights' Once we accept the idea of the functional organization of government those instances will become self-evident in which the regional or world-wide extension of the service and of the attendant power would be demanded by the obvious needs of the case, and could not be refused on grounds

of existing political separation without doing evident violence to the needs of the governed and to the very meaning of government. Such spontaneous growths as those to which we have briefly referred prove that there are certain branches of public affairs not local or national, but affecting the whole part of the world over which they stretch. They are, so to speak, not *areas* but *strata* of government, varying like geographical strata in their expanse; and they cannot be effectively dealt with except as such, both in the interest of the performance and of the people whom it concerns, and not least in the interest of the peaceful flow of international relations.

SOME WAR-TIME EXPERIENCES

The needs of the war have brought about some actual experiments on the lines discussed, and these experiments have worked well in practice. A whole series of joint agencies has grown up, greatly varying in structure and purpose, and that very variety shows how necessary it was found to build the organization round the job. None of these agencies was conceived in advance, but each was set up in answer to a proved need; no form was prescribed in advance, to conform to some habitual pattern, but each task was given an appropriate organization, and the organization was allowed to adapt and reform itself in the light of experience. The same pragmatic approach was allowed to rule the measures for the co-ordination of various activities and agencies. Finally, and most striking of all, though in some cases, especially between America and Canada, the arrangements went very far indeed, affecting each country's domestic policy, it was never attempted or suggested that they should be put upon a political-constitutional basis. Everybody knew indeed that these functional arrangements would have been difficult to bring about if they had implied, as a necessity, such constitutional adjustments. Almost everything that has been done illustrates both sides of that political aspect—how the specific functional activities were set in motion and worked effectively without political attachments, and how, in some cases at any rate, the dislike of political attachments actually hindered the growth of joint practical activities.

A number of international agencies existed already before the war. There was, for example, the International Union of Railways and the International Railway Congress, the League of Nations⁹ International Transit Committee, and the International Transport

Office of the Berne Convention; the postal services had the Postal Union and the Union TiWgraphique Universelle, to which might be added the Union Internationale de Radio-Diffusion. There was a World Power conference and a Standards Committee; and also a Latin monetary union, though this had broken down under the stress of inflation during the first world war. Most of these were, however, only embryonic functional agencies, for the periodical co-ordination of separate national services and policies. The agencies which have grown up during the present war go much further and are possessed of delegated executive power. It would be out of place to attempt to give here a list of these various executive bodies, but they illustrate almost every type, both in the scope of their activities and in the range of their jurisdiction. As regards participation, they vary from many two-sided arrangements between Great Britain and America, and Canada and America, to those in which several of the United Nations are included, always on the basis of their special interest in the particular function. Limitation in formal participation does not, of course, imply limitation in service; the Anglo-American Raw Materials Board, for instance, was instructed from the outset to collaborate also with the other United Nations for the most effective use of their joint resources. "As a result of the Board's activities," says the official report on the first year of operation, "world traffic in raw materials among the United Nations now flows in orderly fashion. The Board provides a meeting-ground where all can go and get a decision—a decision that will be accepted and implemented." A somewhat different basis of representation was adopted when the action contemplated was meant to embrace a definite region: the Middle East Supply Centre and the economic work of the Pan-American Union illustrate such regional action, though they differ greatly from one another. In neither case was regional co-ordination exclusive in character; whatever measures were taken there to further regional development in no way precluded their being linked up also with wider international action in the same fields.

One indirect result of the establishment of the Raw Materials Board well illustrates how functional action generates in a natural way whatever machinery it needs. For the international work which is its proper function the Board has to keep in regular contact with a number of departments, and this has led to a measure of national co-ordination which does not otherwise exist in the res-

pective countries. The Board has set up to that end an Advisory Operating Committee, on which are represented, from the U.S.A., the State Department, the War Production Board, the Department of Commerce and the Board of Economic Warfare; and from the United Kingdom, the Foreign Office, the Ministry of Production, the Ministry of Supply, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare. International co-ordination had thus brought out the need for national co-ordination in the particular field, and also produced the necessary machinery.

The same adaptable variety is to be found in the activity of the several agencies. Some of them, as their names imply, are concerned with a single product or service; others, like the Raw Materials Board, control a number of products. Again, there is the American-Canadian agreement of April, 1942, under which the two countries have adopted a mutual division of labour for certain farm products, and also facilities for the better mutual use of agricultural machinery and seasonal labour; and that without any changes in the structure of their tariffs. To these might be added the joint American-Canadian economic committee which is studying post-war collaboration in the region tapped by the new Alaska Highway— itself built as a joint enterprise; it has been suggested that for economic purposes, and possibly in the matter of administration, the development of that area of about one million square miles should go as a joint undertaking of the two countries, without regard to national boundary lines. The various proposals for a Danubian T.V.A. imply a similar idea in which, however, a larger number of countries would be involved.

A typical instance of the free growth of which such specific agencies are capable is offered by the Middle East Supply Centre, both in the matter of its work and of its organization. Set up at first to deal with war supplies, the Centre was led gradually to include civilian supplies in its operations. It was first charged with dealing with agriculture and transport, but it later added industrial development within its scope; its jurisdiction covered at first the countries round the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, but later it was extended to include Irak and Persia; and while at first it was organized as a British agency, it became a joint British-American agency after the arrival of American forces. It has only advisory authority in relation to the independent states of the region, but its control of all shipping provides a strong lever for its policy. One might add

that the Centre has concerned itself with study and planning as well as with many-sided immediate actions. These repeated adaptations would have been difficult if the Centre had been set up on some formal constitutional basis, on the strength of a treaty or pact.

It is true that the arrangement was also made easier by its being made as a war measure on the war authority of England and America. For any long-term purposes the countries of the Middle East would have to be given a more real share in control than they now have. And in this respect the same case also illustrates the other side of the political aspect. It would seem that the idea of a joint agricultural programme has been held up because the countries of the Middle East feared that it was really a step in some design to tie them together into a political federation, which they do not want. The same fear of political intentions under cover of economic co-operation has undoubtedly slowed down the otherwise great possibilities of Pan-American regional developments. Where there are no such fears the functional arrangements have grown freely in spite of different political ties. Functional links between Canada and America, and even between England and America, have grown faster and closer than within the British Empire. The Empire has only a loose co-ordinating body, the Commonwealth Supply Council, and it is significant, if somewhat curious, that Canada is not represented on it.

The general trend of these war experiments has been summarized by an American scholar as follows: "The lines between domestic and international activity are blurred, and national administrative agencies of the Powers concerned sometimes engage in domestic business, and at other times extend their functions into the international sphere. The result is a conglomeration of international boards and domestic staffs, whose duties intermingle. Administrative officers of national units deal directly with their opposite numbers in other states without benefit of diplomatic intermediaries, and simultaneously perform both national and international tasks. So far no attempt has been made to establish a super-state."¹

The contrast is supplied by the two attempts to start organizing Eastern Europe on federal lines. The first steps for Polish-Czechoslovak and for Greek-Yugoslav union, taken by the respective governments under friendly pressure from well-intentioned but ill—

¹J. Payson Wild, junr., *Machinery of Collaboration between the United Nations*. Foreign Policy Association Report, July 1, 1942.

advised Western allies, have proved worse than abortive; they have come to nothing, and have hardened the feeling that nothing can be done in that region. Another negative example, in a secondary field, was the attempt of the British Trade Union Congress to build up closer relations with American labour. Because only one trade union group in each country can be affiliated with the International Federation of Trade Unions, the T.U.C. proceeded constitutionally and attempted to work through the American Federation of Labour alone; that inevitably got it into difficulties with the other American group, the new and more influential Congress of Industrial Organizations. In the end, not only did the English move fail, it also added a further element of dissension between the two rival American groups. But if the T.U.C., in the face of that division, had made its approach on a functional tack—from miners to miners, from engineers to engineers, and so on—it might have been able to work round the constitutional obstacle and to build up a solid, if more gradual, connection with the whole of American labour.¹

THE TASKS AHEAD

In a statement given out with the first annual Report of the Combined Raw Materials Board, Mr Batt, its American member, pointed out that serious as is the raw materials problem during the war, it could become greater in the post-war period. At present there were only a limited number of purchasers and a limited shipping capacity to carry what was available, but after the war there is likely to be a scramble by all the nations to lay hands on supplies. "Experience after the first world war," said Mr Batt, "has shown that such a scramble can result in complete demoralization of supply, price and other factors in peace-time economy. It is impossible to see how such a situation can be met unless there is some form of combined machinery." The dangers which might threaten international reconstruction in this respect are two-fold: first, the kind of competition of which Mr Batt spoke, and, second, the adoption

¹ One is tempted to apply these lessons to another type of case, that of India, though this is, of course, mere speculation. The attempt to work towards Indian independence along constitutional federal lines has actually deepened and hardened the division between Moslems and Hindus. But it is at least arguable that if the Indian demand for self-government had been met through a series of functional transfers of authority, covering in each case the whole country, that approach might have given India, with growing autonomy, also a growing unity, while it would have touched as little as possible the intractable religious-political issue.

everywhere of national economic plans without any corresponding international adjustments. In February 1943, for instance, the Royal Agricultural Society of England recommended the setting-up after the war of a statutory body, on the lines of the Forestry Commission, to deal with food production and control in all their aspects. Such a national functional body could do a great deal of good, but unless it were linked to some international programme and organization the very desire to bring in this field order at home may lead to disorder abroad; and then all the fine social ideas for ensuring "freedom from want" may be mangled in the ruthless maw of international competition. These twin dangers, closely connected, have been starkly illuminated by recent discussions in England and in America on the future of civil aviation. Private interests have not unnaturally felt that they must stake out their claims in good time, and they have been using the customary arguments of national interest and safety and honour.¹ The problem of international aviation is indeed especially dangerous just because of the fears which it might harbour, or which it might serve to rouse. It touches, as the *Manchester Guardian* wrote (March 13), "all the sensitive spots" of the post-war situation, "and is one of the most far-reaching of all the tests of our capacity for co-operation." To which *The Times* (February 6) added the crucial point that—both because air transport is bound to be in a large measure international transport, and because past experience has shown that issues of civil aviation cannot be well separated from issues of military aviation which vitally affect international security—little progress can be made towards solving the problems of air transport "in any one country

¹ Mr A. N. Kemp, President of American Airlines, Inc.: "Our air efforts must not relax with victory. Immediate development and expansion of America's aviation is necessary to protect our nation at the peace conference. Then, either we will be dominant in the air—or we will be dominated in the post-war air world." (*Daily Telegraph*, February 11.) Mr Theodore Instone: "Unless Britain, with the British Commonwealth, has parity in the air with any other nation she will cease to be a great power." (*Daily Telegraph*, March 4.) Mr Walter Runciman: "We must see that there is an area in Europe quite as free as the United States, and without rival aircraft factories competing with one another. You have got to get them to use the best aircraft produced in the entire Continent... if you are not going to have the Americans overrunning the whole of the European routes." (*The Times*, March 10.) The Joint Air Transport Committee (representing the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, the Federation of British Industries and the London Chamber of Commerce): "Freedom of the Air" is an issue that "vitally affects the future greatness of Britain and the Empire. It is certainly not a nostrum to be included without thought among the freedoms for which we fight." (*The Times*, March 11.)

pending a settlement of the major issue of international organization throughout the world."

The task that is facing us is how to build up the reality of a common interest in peace. But with a revolutionary element injected into war that demands also a new sense of peace. Not a peace that would keep the nations quietly apart, but a peace that would bring them actively together; not the old static and strategic view of peace, but a social view of it. As General Smuts said in a recent speech: "this is the social century." Or one might say that we must put our faith not in a protected peace but in a working peace; it would indeed be nothing more nor less than the idea and aspiration of social security taken in its widest range. The number of problems which take on a world character is growing apace, partly because we have a better understanding of them—and know that with economics, as with epidemics and drugs, the evil must be attacked at the source and therefore through international action—but also because of their technical peculiarities. Such is the nature of all the wonderful technical inventions that each harbours within it as much a threat as a promise. That was so with the steamship and still more with the submarine; and while flying and wireless bring comforts, they also bring fears—one threatens to interfere with the domestic safety of every people, and the other with its domestic sentiments and peace of mind. And airplanes and broadcasts cannot simply be denied access by a sovereign authority as was possible with ships and trains and telegraph; they drop upon us from the skies. Hence these contacts which crowd upon us from all directions can be as much a source of conflict as of co-operation; they must be built up in friendship for common use, or they will grow foul around us in suspicion and competition.

Empire and League having failed to find a way to an active international unity, because outstripped in different ways by the growth of social life, some reformers would now try federation; yet the very number and variety of the schemes proposed, limited territorially or ideologically, show that a scheme that might bring all peoples together cannot *even* be thought of. Federation, like other political formations, carries a Janus head which frowns division on one side in the very act of smiling union on the other. The idea which would look upon the United Nations as the grouping of the future is more spacious but less solid; it would break up the world upon no sounder basis than the chance alliance of war, and such a

miscellaneous grouping on the basis of political equality would hardly suit the needs of executive action in the great tasks ahead. The growth of new administrative devices, and especially of planned public action, must be followed up also in the international sphere if the latter is to be more than a shadow. The organization of all social activities on an universal scale and on such lines is not yet practicable. Federal schemes, though they take account of the new factor, are logical only on a limited scale, at the expense of general unity. There remains the functional method. It is by no means free of difficulties, but these are on the whole mechanical difficulties which one could hope to overcome, and not political difficulties that spring from the very act of creation of the new organization.

Moreover, if a closer union was not found necessary, and probably would not have been accepted, even in the dire straits of war, what reason is there to think that it will be more acceptable when the victorious countries would be standing on their own feet again? But it is worth noting, on the other hand, that in times of stress the nations always adopt certain types of government, the shape and working of which are dictated by the task and by the conditions in which it is performed. Already in the last war the two groups of belligerents, though they had no intercourse with one another and varied greatly in political structure and outlook, were found afterwards to have used strikingly similar administrative devices to deal with the unforeseen problems of the new war of resources. That is largely true in this war also, and the conclusion can only be that in such emergencies government has to be allowed to take a natural course, both in the several countries and in any joint action between them, whereas in normal times, when we face no great risk, we tend to force it into shapes set by dogma and tradition.

As long as these hardy imponderables have such a hold on our political outlook, there is no prospect that under a democratic order we could induce the individual states to accept a permanent limitation of their economic sovereignty by an international authority, operating over the whole field;-and that is the less likely, as we said at the beginning, at a time when the individual nations are themselves planning anew their own use of it. But while that sifting process is still going on the nations may well be found willing, as part of their new plans, to transfer part of that sovereignty to international executive agencies entrusted with specific and

carefully defined activities; they may accept even general advice and guidance when they would reject any general command. It is not without significance that of the League of Nations only the functional services have survived, including the I.L.O., and that they are readily assumed to be capable still of playing an active part in any future international scheme. Pivotal countries like the United States and the U.S.S.R. could become vital links in a functional network when they could not all be made parts of any formal political scheme. Nor does it seem possible in any other way to combine national autonomy with universality; national agencies would not be displaced, but might indeed derive fresh life and scope from wide functional co-ordination with the outside world. At the same time, action through functional agencies would minimize the intrusion of power politics in the guise of foreign help, or the wasteful use of international help by national agencies. Finally, alone in this way could we hope to prevent the damage done to international relations in every so-called peace settlement by continuing the division into enemies and friends after the conflict. Even if at the end of the war certain disabilities are to be imposed upon our present opponents in the political and military spheres, we could for the rest let them share in those activities which in our interest as much as in theirs need to be organized in common from the outset. That would help all Europe better than reparations, while through such detached co-operation for specific practical ends the peoples whom we now fight would also best be "re-educated" into a new sense of common values. We could do all that without doing violence to our feelings, but also without damaging the world's new life.

There is hope in this also for the growth of what is now well called social security. Every new activity would bring its contribution to the achievement of freedom from want and fear; and in opening up wide these channels of social action we would also broaden the area of free choice for the common man. Indeed, it is a question whether this might not be the real way to ensure also his other more personal freedoms. The issue goes rather beyond the scope of these pages, but We know from experience that Minorities Treaties and Declaration* of the Rights of Man, good as it is to have them as assertions of principle, are of little use as instruments of government. They cannot really be enforced by international action. International action could have some influence on the texts of written constitutions BUt cannot watch the nature and working

of administrative law—and administrative laws and agencies are now increasingly the means of government action and, it will be found, also the means by which minorities of whatever kind can now be discriminated against in a less blatant way. For that very reason the growth of international functional agencies should prove a more effective antidote; they could protect the freedom of individuals and minorities in various active sectors of their social life, either directly if in their employment or through administrative agreements with national agencies—as sailors, for instance, through an international shipping agency, and in general as workers or migrants or listeners-in. Here again the simple arithmetic of such specific actions may in the end build more solidly than the vast philosophy of general Declarations.

EPILOGUE

Peace will not be secured if we organize the world by what divides it. But in the measure in which such peace-building activities develop and succeed one might hope that the mere prevention of conflict, crucial as that may be, would in time fall to a subordinate place in the scheme of international things, while we would turn to what are the real tasks of our common society—the conquest of poverty and of disease and of ignorance. The stays of political federation were needed when life was more local and active ties still loose. But now our social interdependence is all-pervasive and all-embracing, and if it be so organized the political side will also grow as part of it. The elements of a functional system could begin to work without a general political authority, but a political authority without active social functions would remain an empty temple. Society will develop by our living it, not by policing it. Nor would any political agreement survive long under economic competition, but economic unification would build up the foundation for political agreement, even if it did not make it superfluous. In any case, as things are the political way is too ambitious. We cannot start from an ideal plane, but must be prepared to make many attempts, from many points, and build things and mend things as we go along. The essential thing is that we should be going together, in the same direction, and that we get into step now. Action at the end of the war will fix the pattern of international relations for many years to come, and in the conditions that will prevail then it is less than likely that we could hold a peace conference of the habitual kind.

Frontiers must be settled, and there may be some changes; as no change can satisfy both sides, all one could hope is that frontiers will appear less important and more acceptable as we organize common action across them. But for this to be possible frontiers must be fixed in advance or at least in the actual armistice, or there will be conflict; and if plans for common action are not prepared in advance, there will be chaos—the chaos of many competing and conflicting local actions. Could a returning Czech or Greek or Polish government tell its people to be patient and wait till a distant conclave works out plans for reconstruction?

Co-operation for the common good is the task, both for the sake of peace and of a better life, and for that it is essential that certain interests and activities should be taken out of the mood of competition and worked together. But it is not essential to make that co-operation fast to a territorial authority, and indeed it would be senseless to do so when the number of those activities is limited, while their range is the world. "Economic areas do not always run with political areas," wrote the *New York Times* (February 26th) in commenting on the Alaska Highway scheme, and such cross-country co-operation would simply make frontiers less important. "Apply this principle to certain European areas and the possibilities are dazzling." If it be said that all that may be possible in war but hardly in peace, that can only mean that practically the thing is possible but that we doubt whether in normal times there would be the political will to do it. Now, apart from everything else, the functional method stands out as a solid touchstone in that respect. Promissory Covenants and Charters may remain a headstone to unfulfilled good intentions, but the functional way is action itself, and therefore an inescapable test of where we stand and how far we are willing to go in building up a new international society. It is not a promise to act in a crisis, but itself the action that will avoid the crisis. Every activity organized in that way would be a layer of peaceful life; and a sufficient addition to them would create increasingly deep and wide strata of peace—not the stand-offish peace of an alliance, but one that would suffuse the world with a fertile mingling of common endeavour and achievement.

This is not an argument against any ideal of formal union, if that should prove the ultimate goal. It is, above all, a plea for the creation now of the elements of an active international society. Amidst the tragedy of war there is also the promise of a broader outlook, of a

much deeper understanding of the issue than in 1918. It is because the peoples are ready for action that they cannot wait. We have no means and *no* standing to work out some new constitution and try to impose it in due course upon the world. But we do have the standing and the means to prepare for immediate practical action. We do not know what will be the sentiments of the peoples of Europe and of other continents at the end of the war, but we do know what their needs will be. *Any* political scheme would start a disputation; *any* working arrangement would raise a hope and make for confidence and patience. The functional way may seem a spiritless solution—and so it is, in the sense that it detaches from the spirit the things which are of the body. No advantage has accrued to any one when economic and other social activities are wedded to fascist or communist or other political ideologies; their progeny has always been confusion and conflict. Let these things appear quite starkly for what they are, practical household tasks, and it will be more difficult to make them into the household idols of "national interest" and "national honour." The ideological movements of our time because of their indiscriminate zeal have sometimes been compared to religious movements. They may be that, but at their core was not a promise of life hereafter. The things which are truly of the spirit—and therefore personal to the individual and to the nation—will not be less winged for being freed in their turn from that worldly ballast. Hence the argument that opposes democracy to totalitarianism does not call the real issue. It is much too simple. Society is everywhere in travail because it is everywhere in transition. Its problem after a century of *laissez faire* philosophy is to re-sift in the light of new economic possibilities and of new social aspirations what is private from what has to be public, and in the latter sphere what is local and national from what is wider. And for that task of broad social refinement a more discriminatory instrument is needed than the old dogmatic sieve. In the words of a statement by the American National Policy Committee, "part of the daring required is the daring to find new forms and to adopt them. We are lost if we dogmatically assume that the procedures of the past constitute the only true expression of democracy."

