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MODERN WORLD POLITICS

by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi

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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

to

DOROTHY

PREFACE

WHY ANOTHER book on international relations when the market is already flooded with them? The answer is that the acceleration of international events has outmoded most of the present books and has created a definite need for the systematization of the floods of reports and material which the Second World War is producing. Moreover, because today the scholar gladly tends to throw off his usual objectivity and detachment in order to preserve his country's stake in the present war, there is a resultant need for an objective and detached presentation of the backgrounds of the conflict. This volume, prepared under the impact of war, can claim the distinction of reinterpreting the background of world affairs from the standpoint of the tragedies of yesterday. While the texts written prior to this war fell under the spell of the ideals of international legality and efforts in behalf of peace at any price, and while many were written in a firm conviction that the myths of isolation and appeasement were realities, this work—without challenging the worth of earlier texts at the time they were written—seeks a place among the growing number of works attempting to review world currents as realistically as possible. It does so without at the same time abandoning hope for the reconstruction of society on a basis which will allow for ideals of peace.

Too many writers on world problems, especially during our years of "neutrality," disregard the most obvious brutal aspects of power politics, unable to see that power can no more be dispensed with in dealing with certain nations than the police force can be disbanded in the maintenance of domestic order. The present work, however, claims in all modesty the distinction of including chapters dealing with military and psychological warfare, the problem of espionage and treachery, the new pseudoscience of geopolitics, international secret organizations, and

peace planning—all distinct innovations necessary to a complete understanding of international relations.

The introduction defines power—the catalytic force which permeates all politics. Part I discusses the elements on which world politics are based, which have also been called the fundamental realities of international relations. Part II discusses the methods and instruments employed in the struggle for power. Part III is devoted to the more outstanding phases of the struggle since the First World War, with special emphasis on events during the present period. Part IV describes some of the more recent trends in world politics.

Too many treatments of world politics have fallen under the spell of Marxian approaches, which have been found wanting, since the psychological, esthetic, religious, and irrational aspects of society have proved fully as important as the economic phases. Therefore economic determinism is avoided as the sole interpreter of world politics.

Likewise international organization, international law, and the League of Nations are dealt with as single aspects of a bewilderingly broad subject because they are only one way of interpreting international affairs. Taken alone, they fail to take into consideration many of the more subtle but vital aspects of nationalism—underground movements and economic forces, to mention only a few. Obviously they will not suffice to interpret world politics completely.

In all fairness to the contributing authors it should be stated that no effort has been made to exhaust any subject, the objective always having been to present in readable form the more important subjects which a student should know in order to enter upon an understanding of world politics—a multitude of complex and conflicting programs of states in their relations with one another. Not a single coauthor failed to express two things: (1) that he had taken on a much more extensive assignment than he had at first anticipated; and (2) that 6,000 words were far too few in which to cover his topic. Yet each coauthor has succeeded in furnishing an excellent perspective and beginning from which further study in the field may be carried on.

The footnotes and the bibliographies at the end of each chapter aim at providing enough references for additional reading and research.

It is inevitable, where eighteen independent minds contribute to a single volume, that there should be differences of opinion about the same event or about the same country. Some symposia are integrated so as to eliminate these differences, and as a result excellent contributions are often robbed of their style and sometimes of their actual meaning. Therefore, no particular effort has been made to delete such conflicts. If the footnotes are consulted, they will call attention to some of the more outstanding instances, and it is hoped that the differing views will act as a stimulus to further study.

Finally, it is hoped that this book with its new approach and innovations will help to clarify student thinking on world politics, and thus contribute to the winning of the war, and thereafter to the advancement of the great hopes of mankind for peace.

The editor is indebted to Clifford H. MacFadden for bringing up to date the maps reprinted from his *An Atlas of World Review* (copyright, 1940, by Thomas Y. Crowell Company).

THORSTEN V. KALIJARVI

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CHAPTER 1

WHAT IS POWER POLITICS?

The Nature of World Politics

States set as their goals national safety, welfare, and happiness, and in the effort to achieve these goals their activities necessarily extend beyond their own frontiers, affecting other states in the world. These contacts of state program are given the general name of world politics, and the programs themselves are called politics, which include everything states plan or do to promote their security,[1] national well-being, and prosperity. World politics, therefore, is an all-inclusive term covering regulated and unregulated, moral and immoral, lawful and unlawful, honest and dishonest, open and treacherous actions or relations of states.[2]

These relations are not synonymous with a Utopian world in which we should like to live. They refer to the one in which we actually do live. They recognize that the supreme law of politics is success, and that states are not bound by moral considerations, but often develop ideologies to justify acts which except for the ideologies would be immoral.[3] Two illustrations of this point were the liquidation of all opposition to Bolshevism in the early days of the Russian Revolution and the German treatment of the Jews. In spite of the condemnation of these acts in our own country and in other lands, the acts were justified in both Soviet Russia and Germany in terms of Bolshevik and National Socialist ideologies.

[1] Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics*, 3rd. ed., New York, McGraw-Hill, 1941, p. 265.

[2] See also Frank Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics*, New York, American Book, 1939, chap. 1.

[3] For an excellent discussion of this subject see Joseph S. Roucek, "Political Behavior as a Struggle for Power," in *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 6:4, July, 1941, p. 347.

World politics includes both the struggle for peace and the resort to war. For several years after the close of the First World War, students of international affairs treated world politics as if it dealt solely with the elimination of war. The system of collective security was supposed to be the practical realization of the ideals of international relations. So strong was this conviction that some authorities on international law omitted all discussion of the rules of land and sea warfare from their texts.[4] Statesmen and diplomats agreed sufficiently to draw up treaties "outlawing war as an instrument of national policy." The present war amply shows that the unqualified belief in collective security was not built upon a sound understanding of world politics, and that belief failed to take into consideration the crass realism of Nietzsche, who says in *Thus Spake Zarathustra:*

> Ye shall love peace as a means to new wars—and a short peace more than a long.
>
> Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you, "It is the good war which halloweth every cause. War and courage have done more great things than charity."
>
> "Thou shalt not rob! Thou shalt not slay!"—Such precepts were once called holy.
>
> . . . Is not all life robbing and slaying?
>
> This new table, O my brethren, put I up over you—"Become Hard!" [5]

The Nietzsche philosophy is cold and merciless. It precludes any plan looking toward universal peace. War is a reaction. Nations, individuals, arms, and human activities constitute its ingredients; craftiness and anarchy are its characteristics; peace is war's dormant state. War gives rise to the swashbuckling officer, the dueling student, the acquisitive diplomat, and the nationalistic historian. Nietzscheanism is therefore a contradiction of the idea of universal peace which visualizes a society free of war. It belittles honesty in international affairs,

[4] See, for example, J. L. Brierly, *The Law of Nations,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1930; and Edwin Dickinson, *The Law of Nations,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1929.

[5] For the application of this doctrine in the period between 1918 and 1939, see E. H. Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis,* New York, Macmillan, 1940.

order in the relations of men throughout the world, and world-wide good will. War is a necessity and not an aberration. Peace, according to this philosophy, does not give rise to a contented mankind, a prosperous world, sympathetic and wise statesmanship, mutual understanding, and objective science.

The study of world politics includes an understanding both of international organization and of resort to force, for war and peace—whether legally or politically considered—are different manifestations of the same process. One authority explains with convincing logic that peace is the state which exists, when the power relationships of states are in equilibrium, while war is the state which exists, when the power relationships are thrown out of balance.[6] This view may be open to challenge, as for example by observing that a single state like Rome may obtain preponderance of power and impose peace by virtue of that preponderance; but the important point is that the power explanation takes into consideration the whole ambit of state activities and does not confine itself to an ideological longing.

Power and Politics Defined

The key to world politics is power.[7] In looking for a definition of politics and power it is first necessary to note that they are both manifestations of the state. A state, Harold Laski observes, is a means of regulating human conduct by giving legal orders binding upon the behavior of men.[8] The basis of state action is the imperative ability to control and to preside over the welter of corporate, competing, and co-operative activities within the state's jurisdiction. In other words, the state has the power—active or potential—to penetrate and regulate all social life.[9] This power is not influence (which affects another through advice and wishes) but the ability to determine the behavior of another even against his own wishes.

[6] Schuman, *op. cit.*, p. 284.

[7] For a discussion of this subject see Roy V. Peel and Joseph S. Roucek, *Introduction to Politics,* New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1941, pp. 3–17.

[8] Harold J. Laski, *Politics,* Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1931, pp. 38–39.

[9] See Roucek, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

Bertrand Russell says that power in politics is like energy in physics in that it is the driving force that permeates the whole body politic.[10]

Charles Merriam says that human beings are controlled and directed in power situations as though driven by a "magnetic attraction or aversion." Their lives, liberties, fortunes, and actions are completely subject to "organized command and control" even though life itself may hang in the balance. It may not be possible to define or escape power, but the effects may be seen everywhere about us.[11] Lasswell says that politics is the study of influence and the influential.[12]

A careful summary of the thought of these men and of others on the subject is that the state is a means or device created by man to establish orders binding upon men's behavior, and extending into every human activity and relationship. The authority and ability to give these commands lies in the state, which is therefore the highest source of political power. Since there is no organization or power above the state, world politics can only be power relationships. When the Papacy and the Holy Roman Empire disappeared as political forces, the national monarch became supreme and acknowledged no power above himself save God. This unrestricted power came in time to be called sovereignty (*maiestas*). Sovereignty is the doctrine which states follow today.[13]

Manifestations

Power depends on force, physical, psychological, economic, or otherwise. It has been said that the essence of democratic government is debate and open argument, not physical force—

[10] Bertrand Russell, *Power, A New Social Analysis,* New York, Norton, 1938, p. 12.

[11] Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power,* New York, Whittlesey House, 1934, p. 7.

[12] Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics, Who Gets What, When, How,* New York, Whittlesey House, 1936, p. 3.

[13] See R. B. Mowatt, *International Relations,* New York, Macmillan, 1931, chap. 3 and p. 37.

persuasion rather than intimidation.[14] To Sorel, democracy was government by talkers. But such views refuse to recognize the ballot as means of expressing the force of the majority, or control exercised by legislatures over the fiscal appropriations without which no government can live; the democratic process, therefore, is only another manifestation of power.

Pareto considered politics as the struggle for power.[15] Other authorities have noted that it need not take the form of sheer violence and physical force. Any compulsion acting so as to impose relationships on society is power. Lenin and his Bolshevik brood, who refused to produce or fight, by withholding their labor wielded a power which was real and telling. So also war propaganda which arouses people and causes them to abandon cold reason, is a manifestation of power. So also are the economic pressures of labor organizations, farmers, businessmen, and influential groups in general.[16]

Any social institution which a state may choose to use for achieving its policies, must be considered as a vehicle or manifestation of power. In fact, any instrument for the communication of ideas, be it social or physical, may become the agency for the transmission of force or persuasion.[17] When the music, literature, and political ideas of Germany, for example, are used to develop "fifth columns" within another state, they are agencies of world and power politics.[18] If Lord Haw Haw succeeds in raising questions in the minds of English people, and if the doubt thus created weakens their powers and fighting strength, then the radio is an agency of power politics. The

[14] Moritz Julius Bonn, *The Crisis of European Democracy,* New Haven, Yale, 1925.

[15] See Roucek, *op. cit.,* p. 344, for an evaluation.

[16] For a description of the workings of some of these groups see S. McKee Rosen, *Political Process,* New York, Harper, 1935.

[17] See Merriam, *op. cit.,* chap. 4.

[18] For the workings within our own country of this type of power see the Reports of the Martin Dies Committee on *Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States;* Report No. 2 (Union Calendar No. 2), 76th Congress, 1st session; Report No. 1476 (Union Calendar No. 5), 76th Congress, 1st session; Report No. 1 (Union Calendar No. 1), 77th Congress, 1st session. Also see Harold Lavine and James Wechsler, *Propaganda Technique in the World War,* New Haven, Yale, 1938.

leaders of a state are also vehicles of power politics. What Churchill, Hitler, Roosevelt, or Stalin may say or do makes their personal acts the acts of the English, German, American, or Russian people, and makes these men the agencies for the expression or use of the power of their respective states.

Obviously not all relationships between states are manifestations of their power; neither need they involve power. For example, radio programs that cross international frontiers, unless they have political significance, are far removed from power. So are the sermons of a priest and visits between friends. What this chapter means to set forth is that world politics or international politics are the various aspects of the power relationships among the states of the world. And further, while international trade, spread of cultures, and growth of scientific knowledge enter into the international life of the world, only when they are related to power do such phenomena become vital to governmental programs, and only then can they be classified as a part of world politics.

It is difficult sometimes to make this distinction because the presence of power may not be suspected. When human society functions normally, the political aspect is not always apparent. For example, trade between the United States and Canada has been carried on peaceably for a long time because neither country has chosen to use its power to check it; but the tariff regulations of both parties are simple manifestations of the presence of power upon the permissive exercise of which the continuation of that trade must depend. Because states may not choose to exercise power in a particular instance does not mean that the power relationship does not exist.

This point may be summarized as follows: Power is coercive control over masses of people. Whatever coerces is power.[19] The most lucid and extreme illustration is war, which is nothing but the effort of one state to impose its will upon another by a resort to naked physical force. But one state may coerce another equally well by other methods. High discriminatory

[19] See Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 342 and 343; also, Roucek, "Sociological Aspects of the Problems of Minorities," *Social Science*, 15:4 (October, 1940), pp. 383–387.

tariffs as effective parts of the foreign policies of a state,[20] may be as coercive as though the state backed its traders with machine guns. Threats, too, may be displays of power. Hitler's threat to resort to force underlay the debacle of Munich; and by the failure of the French and British to meet that threat actual physical strength was sacrificed when the Little Entente collapsed and the French system of alliances was jettisoned.

Such instruments and procedures as financial control, subsidies, diplomacy and diplomatic recognition, alliances, military action, propaganda, and strategic activities are all manifestations of power, if they are exercised, or if their use is threatened, in pursuance of the policies of states.

Power Politics and Morality

Power and politics must not be confused with morality.[21] Thus far there have been very few moral concepts injected into world affairs. Many people translate the rules governing the morals in the local community, or their own private and subjective conceptions of justice, into their thought concerning international events. These applications are but personal opinions and false analogies; those rules and conceptions have no validity in governing the conduct of states. Until custom or specific agreements create an international code of morality that will control states in their conduct as group approval or disapproval enforce local moral codes, morality and world politics must not be confused. As a specific example of this point, it is not only criminal but also immoral for one individual to assault another. Assault is a threatened use of force with the visible means of carrying out the threat. Yet assault in this sense is one of the accepted practices of international politics. International morality is a highly desirable objective; but power, open or disguised, is the reality. Hence to expect states at their present stage of development to accept any interna-

[20] See Sir James Salter, *The Reawakening of the Orient and other Addresses*, New Haven, Yale, 1925, pp. 156–157.

[21] For two different points of view on this subject see Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 214–218, and J. S. Roucek, "Political Behavior as a Struggle for Power," *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 6:4 (July, 1941), pp. 341–351.

tional code as binding upon them is wishful thinking. If one has an idea that any such code actually exists, note that whatever the criterion, there are both good states and bad states involved in the opposed forces in the Second World War, and that, unfortunately, there is no universal agreement as to which are the good and which are the bad.

Judged from the angle of the proponents of international morality, wars are bad; and because they are bad, they should not exist. Unfortunately wars do exist, a fact which the most critical of moralists cannot deny. It is also a fact that states which are independent and free do as they wish in so far as they are strong enough. War is one of the foundations of world politics even though it may be regarded with aversion. If it is recalled that peace is a stabilization of power while war is lack or destruction of that stability, it is obvious that the same forces that make for peace also make for war, or vice versa.[22]


Sources of Power

Where does power originate? It is easy to see the military, naval, and air forces and their relationships to the policies of the state. It is not too difficult to visualize the assumption of force which lies behind diplomacy in terms of an army or a navy. Armaments are simultaneously instruments, agencies, and sources of power. Armaments being instruments of national policies, competition in armament is only another manifestation of the competition for power. As long as the League of Nations did not possess the overwhelming preponderance of power in the world, disarmament was a futile gesture.

A source of power more difficult to visualize is superstition and fear on the part of an opponent nation. The democracies' fear of war, especially at Munich, was a source of extraordinary power for Hitler.

Another source of power is the wealth and natural resources

[22] See Karl von Clausewitz, *On War,* New York, Dutton, 1914, vol. 1, pref., xiv, who said "War is nothing else than the continuation of policy with other means," that is, force. See the next chapter.



MAP 1. NETHERLAND INDIA AND ADJOINING LANDS

of a country, as well as the economic processes by which it maintains its existence.[23] The possession of tin and rubber resources in the Netherlands East Indies formerly gave Holland a greater power in the world than her navy or army could have done if matched against those of larger states.

Tremendous numbers of people, population in itself a power, enabled the Chinese to swallow their conquerors for centuries. But with only a fraction of the population of India, Great Britain for decades was able to retain political control over that country, partly because of the industrial character of British civilization.

The spirit of a people, the mass mind, also gives power. The unity of the Greeks in their 1940–1941 war against Italy gave them strength far out of proportion to the size of the army they were able to place in the field.

Alliances are a further source of power, and so are treaties among states.

The Measure of Power

It may now be seen that anything which gives a state strength gives it power. The military might, the economic resources, the size of the population, the cultural life, the social institutions, the psychology or spirit of the people, and ideologies are all familiar elements.[24] At the outbreak of the present war, when Britain and France were determined to maintain a mutilated balance of power on the continent of Europe and Germany was equally determined to secure preponderance, especially in the eastern part of Europe, every one of these elements was used in measuring the strength of one opponent against the other. Experts measured the size of the armies and predicted the outcome in terms of the military, naval, and air strengths of the combatants. They made estimates and predictions based on natural resources, industrial capacity, command of food and raw material, size of populations, loyalty of

[23] See Chapters 4 and 7. For excellent discussions of the use of resources in world politics see Paul Einzig, *Economic Warfare,* London, Macmillan, 1940.

[24] See Merriam, *op. cit.,* chap. 2, on "The Family of Power."

peoples, strength of ideals, tonnage in shipping, cultural institutions, and forms of government. After three years of fighting, it is apparent in 1942 that no single measure is adequate, but that into the fighting go all the strengths and weaknesses of combatant populations. Is this not "total war"?

States are sometimes divided into first-class and second-class, even third-class, powers. A first-class or first-rate power is one which can mobilize a powerful and impressive force to back its wishes and policies. Just exactly how much power this requires may be open to question, but there is usually little question whether a state is a first-class power or not. Before the war began in 1939, France, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Germany might have been ranked in the first class of powers. Below them were a larger group of states, such as Sweden, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Spain, which might have been rated as second-class powers because they could not marshall a force equally powerful with that of the first group. An even weaker group of states such as Cuba, Albania, Portugal, Latvia, and Estonia might have been classified as third-rate powers. There were still weaker states, for example, Andorra or San Marino. To measure states on this basis is to classify them according to fighting power exclusively.[25]

Types of Power

There are two types of power in international affairs as in domestic affairs. One is dormant, power which is idle but can be used if desired or needed; the other is active, power resorted to or threatened to be used to promote policies.

Active power can take deceptive forms at times. Prestige provides an example. Behind the League of Nations, as long as it had the support of England, France, and other states, lay the supposition that it could muster a power superior to any state or states in the world. As long as the conviction persisted that this power did exist, the League remained the great-

[25] See Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 291–299.

est single institution in the world. But it did not take long to discover that this power was more hypothetical than real. It was not dormant, for it did not exist, perhaps never had existed. Japan, Italy, and Germany challenged it. The U.S.S.R. challenged it in the case of Eastern Karelia. In each of these cases the power was found to be absent and the states that were supposed to contribute to it refused to do so. It was then discovered that the ultimate power lay in the national states.

Prestige

The reputation for possessing great power or superiority in a particular field is often as great an asset as actually having that power. Sir Walter Scott recognized how important this particular form of power may be when he said of Napoleon that he "needed the dazzling blaze of decisive victory to renew the charm of prestige . . . once attached to his name and fortune." [26] This simply meant that with the end of Napoleonic victories came a lessening in his influence and authority as a result of the impairment of his great reputation. Here again it is not a question of a state or leader using the authority in a particular way, but rather, of the prestige or reputation being employed as an influence and an authority in the conduct of a state's domestic or foreign affairs.

A few examples of prestige as a form of power follow.

The huge population of the U.S.S.R. was often mentioned during the Russo-Finnish War as one of the main reasons why Finland must eventually succumb, since imperial Russia had the reputation of using manpower prodigally in her warfare, breaking her enemies by sheer weight of numbers. In 1942, in the conflict with Germany, she is again using this advantage. A large population is a part of Russian prestige for power.

The prestige of the British navy has been a decisive factor in diplomacy and world politics ever since Nelson defeated Napoleon's fleet at the Nile. It was the prestige of that navy which backed the Monroe Doctrine at the time of its promul-

[26] See *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 11th ed., vol. 22, p. 306.

gation, and it is a prestige which the British navy has vindicated time after time in such impressive deeds as the sinking of the *Graf Spee*.

In much the same manner the German army before 1914 and since 1939 has held a reputation for exceptional fighting ability that has led to the recognition of Germany as perhaps the greatest military power, whereas Great Britain is looked upon as the greatest naval power in the world. The measures of these reputations and prestige have not been the number of ships of war or men in arms, or even the quantity of equipment alone, but rather the reputed effectiveness of the machine as a whole, so that its threatened or actual use served as an influence and authority in political affairs.[27]

Reputation or prestige of still another sort may be noted. The productive capacity of a state and its economic power will be shown, in the chapters on economic warfare and world economics, to be powerful instruments for backing up foreign policy or for use in an emergency. One of the means by which the United States attempted to bring pressure to bear on Japan to cease in her expansionist program was to denounce the trade agreement with her. This same type of prestige is encountered also in international finance. To mention the reputation and influence of Wall Street is platitudinous, and the acumen of the State Department in sending Dwight Morrow as United States ambassador to Mexico was inspired, since as a representative for Wall Street he was believed to wield an exceptional influence on the American government and thus to be able to do things which other equally able men, not however connected with Wall Street, could not do.

The prestige of the productive capacity of the United States heartened the British in their resistance to Germany, because the British people believed, when American support was promised to them, that they would eventually win the war.

One of the shrewdest aspects of Hitler's policy has been his skillful exploitation of German prestige. Prior to Munich no great fear of Germany was felt by France or Great Britain,

[27] See Schuman, *op. cit.*, chap. 7.

for they both believed that between the great British navy and the remarkable French army, short work would be made of the German fighting forces. They underestimated Germany. When Germany won, she used the threat of resorting to force on the Balkan states, particularly Rumania and Bulgaria, with the result that they succumbed to her policies without a fight. Hitler used the prestige of German arms in his diplomatic struggle in Turkey, and there can be little doubt but the prestige of German arms is a sustaining element in the fighting of Germany's small partners.

As a rule, if one power grows too great for their sense of security, other powers will join to curb it. Hence, very great prestige may be a liability and not an asset. The Crimean War was an excellent instance of the joining of several powers to curb Russia, which they had all come to fear. Germany was given the unofficial support of the world in the beginning of the Franco-Prussian War because the European states were apprehensive of the rising strength of Louis Napoleon and France. In 1914 the major powers outside the Triple Alliance went to war against Germany in part because they feared her new rising might.[28]

Prestige then is a type of power. It is also one of the techniques employed by states in the struggle to achieve power, and should be included as an integral part of Part Two of this text. Since prestige is so effective, it is not surprising that prestige and national honor, which is only another name for national reputation, are jealously guarded possessions of every state. Accordingly, wars over national honor are desperately earnest affairs and are not the silly squabbles over trivial matters which they sometimes have been called. They are a part of a nation's struggle for existence, and should be looked upon in that light.

Symbols of Power

Like prestige, symbols of government and politics are both a type and a technique of power. Symbols, as used in this

[28] See Merriam, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

volume, may be described in general as political institutions, concepts, values, and ideas which are expressed in word forms, signs, and the like, giving simplicity and concreteness to ordinarily abstract and complex political processes. To understand their international significance they must be understood in their national significance. They are best described by illustrations and may be roughly classified as:

(1) Visual symbols such as banners, streamers, buttons, pins, pennants, pictures, signs, architecture, art, or flowers. Thus the swastika stands for National Socialism and the fasces for Fascism, the hammer and sickle for Bolshevism, and wedged fingers for a United Nations victory.

(2) Sound symbols are innumerable and include such greetings as "Heil Hitler!" such slogans as "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity!", or such songs as *The Star Spangled Banner*, the *Horst Wessel* song, *There'll Always Be an England*, and the *Internationale*.

(3) There are also rituals and ceremonies, impressively illustrated by the totalitarian states in their parades and marchings, the gathering of the Bolsheviks in Red Square, and the Nuremberg *Parteitag* with all of its pageantry and ceremony.

(4) Thoughts and stories can likewise be symbols, as for instance the stories of Washington's chopping down the cherry tree, the excellent aim of Wilhelm Tell, and the "stab in the back" explanation of Germany's defeat in the First World War.

(5) To this can be added pictures and national characters such as Marianne standing for France, John Bull for England, Uncle Sam for the United States, Michel for Germany, and a bear for Russia.

(6) National holidays such as Memorial Day, Armistice Day, and the Fourth of July.[29]

A host of other illustrations such as statuary, oratory, public parks, and histories might be added; but enough has been given to show that symbolism is a strong force in creating morale. Since governments have been lost and won both in war and in peace through superior or inferior morale, symbol-

[29] See Peel and Roucek, *op. cit.*, chap. 3.

ism has come to be a technique and a power in itself. In the world of the 1940's the totalitarian powers have exploited this subject far more effectively than any of their recent predecessors. Being chiefly an appeal to the emotions, symbolism has come to be called propaganda and has as its main objective the indoctrination of the masses. The swastika and the fasces, idolatry of leaders, parade in variegated shirts, and singing unifying songs are familiar, but less so is the appeal in terms of hatred of certain foreign states. Such a complete hold has symbolism taken on the totalitarian powers that abstract ideas of the most philosophical sort are simplified into visual symbols by the propaganda ministries and other agencies whose task it is to control and direct the people.

In the field of propaganda symbols, the democracies have been slow to fight fire with fire. Reluctant to base arguments on anything but a rational foundation, they have refused to exploit man's visceral nature, which after all is the basis upon which fighting power rests. Refusing to exploit the full tide of emotionalism linked to symbolism, they have left the initiative in this matter to the totalitarian powers. Once again, as in the First World War, the democracies are rediscovering that symbolism, especially as presented in propaganda, is used by almost every power-seeking group, in political parties and in factions both open and secret. Since symbolism is so effective, the state itself must use symbolism if it is to survive. Patriotism in almost all of its manifestations is a response to the full panoply of state symbolism. The mass advertising of a Lenin, a Hitler, a Mussolini, or a Gandhi, can be successfully fought only by a similar mass advertising of a Roosevelt, a Churchill, or a Chiang Kai-shek.[30]

The success of the Allied propaganda warfare in the First World War is still one of the brilliant pages of that holocaust. It was the use of symbolism to destroy the morale of the enemy and to increase the fighting power of the Allied troops that was in a large degree responsible for final victory. Thus, like policies and power, symbolism reaches across national frontiers

[30] See Lasswell, *op. cit.*, chap. 2.

to play a significant role in international affairs, since it is a manifestation and a technique of that power on which those policies and programs rest. Symbolism has crept into the international field, as may be seen by listing only a few of the more common international—not national—symbols: the ceremony and ritual of diplomacy, treaties which are only symbolic of the agreement of two states, conferences and congresses, Marxism, and Pan-Americanism.[31]

Where Power Politics Appears

Since all politics is power, to speak of power politics is to utter a redundancy. Yet, power politics has come to have a special meaning in international affairs and embraces the resort to physical force or the threat to resort to physical force in support of national policies in world affairs.[32]

The need for resorting to such force arises more acutely in some areas than in others. Some one state has at times established its preponderance, as ancient Rome did in the Western world of her day. Her might was so great that she could maintain a stable power relationship in her world. Likewise the United States has succeeded in securing preponderance in the Western Hemisphere and for the major part of the time peace among the New World states has been uninterrupted. The existence of a state having superior power in a region of the world either makes its power a *fiat* or else makes the possible use of this power a deterrent to any action by lesser states which might—either directly or indirectly—challenge the preponderant power.

Where a preponderant power does not exist and where the common superior is lacking, as has been the case in Europe and the Far East, war frequently results because states, relying on their own inherent strength for security, are often willing to challenge the existing jurisdictions in the hope of bettering their fortunes. When there is no common superior, this type

[31] See Merriam, *op. cit.*, pp. 37 ff., 103, 105 ff., 111, 210, 267, 310 ff.

[32] See H. Arthur Steiner, *Principles and Problems of International Relations*, New York, Harper, 1940, pp. 3–6.

of action is a fair gamble. For example, the aggressiveness of the Axis states [33] came only after their leaders were certain in their own minds that the supposed power of the League of Nations and the whole system of collective security was only "supposed power" and not real. The League and its system being impotent, the Axis states needed only to take into account the strength of their adversaries as individual states or as alliances. This strength was simple to measure, since it was what Europe had experienced for thousands of years. The resurgence of a system of states equal in power and supporting policies by war and force, in contrast to the League of Nations, has therefore been called a return to power politics.

The realization of the weakness of the international machinery was the key to an open and admitted reliance on state power responsible to itself alone, in which recourse to war as a threat or as an actuality entered into the policies of states. Today, power is a primary consideration of every state in the world, both large and small. Perhaps—sometime in the distant future—sweetness and light will be the sole guides of states in their relationships with each other. Today, however, there is no escaping the reality and ubiquitousness of power and force.[34]

Obviously, peace comes only when some state or combination of states possesses preponderance of power in the area in which peace exists. Or it exists as a result of a stabilization of power relationships, so that for the duration of the peace no state or combination of states finds it advantageous to resort to force, either in threat or in fact, in order to implement its policies.[35]

Wishful Thinking

Living in a disorganized world in which war and violence rage, all parties strangely enough profess to be seeking peace

[33] See Chapter 15; also Joseph S. Roucek, *Contemporary Europe,* New York, Van Nostrand, 1941, pp. 526–535.

[34] See Frederick L. Schuman, *Design for Power,* New York, Knopf, 1941.

[35] For an interesting and challengeable discussion of this phase of the subject see Lionel Gelber, *Peace by Power,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1942.

and order. But the fallacy is that each seeks peace on his own terms. Translated into power concepts, this means that each seeks a stabilization of power in the world to his advantage, or else he seeks a preponderance of power. But the power stabilization sought is preponderance in the case of each seeker, either locally or generally; and since all states cannot be preponderant in the same area at the same time, therefore all cannot be satisfied. Paradoxical as it may seem, in the bitterest of wars all parties simultaneously may seek peace, and yet they may be determined to continue fighting.

Sometimes the desire for peace becomes so strong that defeatism sets in and a situation develops such as that which occurred in Italy and France during the First World War. Perhaps a similar situation may be encountered in the present conflict, although it is still too early to tell.

At other times the desire for peace causes men to believe that if states can be convinced by persuasive arguments, they can be induced to lay down arms. This wishful thinking must not be confused with the realities of international politics, which in the last analysis rest on force, for it is only through a successful manipulation of force that any state has ever come into existence or has ever been able to continue its existence. Again it is necessary to point out that the idealist, who visualizes the international order in terms of pacific relationships, forgets the driving urge, dormant or effective, which underlies all state existence and relations. Therefore any League of Nations, any confederation of Europe, any Anglo-Saxon union, or any other form of confederation which fails to take into account the element of power in its calculations, is indulging in wishful thinking and cannot hope to survive.

This recognition of power does not mean a Machiavellian world, nor does it mean that the extremely vital element of idealism need be thrown out of consideration. It merely says that, in building for the future, idealism is not enough to make the world a better place in which to live. If power can be directed toward peace alone, or if its manipulation and control can be so placed that war is avoided, we can escape the stu-

pendous squirrel cage of alternating periods of peace and war. Recognizing the role of power does not mean that we need to cast out the League or any hopes of international order. On the contrary, there should be cause for some comforting and realistic hope. If the League of Nations can be looked upon as a magnificent new instrument whereby man demonstrated that the control of power in the international world was not impossible, and that like all human instruments it was imperfect, thus requiring correction, neither idealism nor realism need be sacrificed. But to insist upon restoration of the League as a *sine qua non* for a new and happy world order is again wishful thinking—and will surely lead to bitter conflict in the future.

Methods of Exercising Power

The techniques of power politics range from simple suggestion or persuasion to the employment of physical force and violence. Insinuation and lies, reiterated until they become accepted, are familiar instruments in the propaganda panoply of modern states.[36] Compare the reports on the battles being fought during the present conflict, and the techniques will be apparent. Familiar also are racial ideas, emotional appeals, and symbolism, all of which enter into the directing thoughts and actions of men and states. Add to these force, intimidation, persecution, and conquest. A simple list of examples of the use of these techniques might include the outbreak of the present war (resort to war), the Italian conquest of Ethiopia (conquest), inclusion of Austria in the German Reich (racial ideas), Hitler's verbal attacks on Beneš (emotional appeal), the Soviet Union's contention that she was attacked by Finland (lie), final act of the Rio de Janeiro Conference (persuasion), the Baltic Republics' concessions to the U.S.S.R. (intimidation), and Great Britain as United States's first line of defense (insinuation).

Under international law the degrees of nakedness of power and the dependence of the state policies on that power may be

[36] See a good brief discussion in chaps. 17 and 18 of William Albig, *Public Opinion*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939.

regarded as follows. While the state is at peace power relationships as they affect her are fairly stable. The adjusting of power relationships is performed by diplomacy, which always has the assumption of force behind it. A test of force as a rule is unnecessary if the diplomat has a preponderance of power to support him, and if that preponderance of power is obvious. Strategy and diplomacy must therefore go hand in hand, and strategy takes over where diplomacy leaves off, since strategy is the control and direction of power set in operation. In diplomacy the apparent power determines the outcome of the struggle. In war the matching of force with force determines the outcome.

When the problem becomes too complicated for diplomacy to adjust, states have agreed that, with respect to certain conflicts, they will permit an arbitral or judicial tribunal to settle their power relationships. Obviously the matters submitted to this form of settlement cannot be vital challenges to the fundamental power of the state, and therefore it becomes necessary in most instances for the state to give its consent in advance to the arbitration or judicial settlement of any dispute to which it is a party. A difference involving national honor is a direct challenge to the power of the state, and states have been unwilling to admit arbitration or judicial settlement of this type of dispute, which has been called nonjusticiable.[37]

When the power relationships have not been adjusted through the methods thus far listed, the next step is to resort to a little more naked use of power, called "methods short of war." This step includes embargoes, nonintercourse, intervention, pacific blockade, self-help, and nonbelligerent assistance to adversaries. A few illustrations would be the Embargo and Nonintercourse Acts before our own war of 1812, the expedition of General Pershing into Mexico in search of General Villa, the blockade of Venezuela for the collection of debts, and the German and Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–

[37] For a brief summary of the degrees and types of self-help see Frederick A. Middlebush and Chesney Hill, *Elements of International Relations*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1940, pp. 343–348.

1939. Most of these methods are accompanied by a breach of diplomatic relations.

Finally, when all of these methods and several others for which there is neither space nor time (for example, commissions of inquiry) have failed to adjust the disturbed power relationship of two or more states, the *ultima ratio* or last appeal is the outright resort to war, which is physical combat and conflict.[38] If we look at war from this angle it is apparent that many of the so-called causes for war are not causes at all but merely manifestations of a disturbed power relationship, which cannot be settled in any other way in the judgment of one or both of the contestants than by a test of physical power. This approach may explain—but not justify—the fact that peace is not a matter of treaties, that it can come only as a result of stabilization of power relationships. As long as any state finds itself dissatisfied or unhappy with the power relationships under which it lives, it will take the first opportunity to throw off the yoke that binds it. Thus far, history has always furnished such states with a chance to revolt, and agreements which have sought to bind them have become "scraps of paper" at the first opportunity.

Power Misers

States can be divided into two classes with respect to power. One group comprises states satisfied with the power condition as it exists; these states have been described as "satisfied," "the haves," and "pacific." The other class comprises states dissatisfied with existing power relationships; such states have been called "unsatisfied," "the have nots," and "aggressive." [39]

All that has thus far been said would not be complete without mentioning that competition between states makes power

[38] For a suggestive bibliography on war as the *ultima ratio* of policy, see Grayson Kirk and Richard Poate Stebbins, *War and National Policy, A Syllabus,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942, chap. 3.

[39] See chapters on "War as a Symptom of Our Social Crisis," "World Economics," and "The Economic Struggle for Power." See also H. Arthur Steiner, *op. cit.,* pp. 409–415.

relative, and in many instances power is so equally divided that the equality leads to further competition. Since the measure of the political greatness of a state is the power which it can wield or which it is reputed to be able to wield, power becomes an objective itself. Thus the power-seeking states become aggressive, challenge the existing order, and seek to take power from those that have it. As a means of measuring and exercising power they seek raw materials, greater populations, markets, transportation facilities, territories, backward areas to be industrialized, wealth, and strategic frontiers. The Alexanders, Charlemagnes, Napoleons, and Hitlers seek power for its own sake, and once having secured a measure they seek more. These are power misers, for the more they have the more they want, and once having achieved power, they refuse to relinquish any of it. It would be comforting if it were possible to confine this observation to only a few states, but unfortunately most countries have some measure of this yearning in their make-up.

Conclusions

World politics is the power relation which grows out of the contacts of the policies of states. The term power politics, although a redundancy, means the resort to naked physical force or a threat to use such force, in order to achieve national policies. But naked physical coercion is only one of many forms of power or force. Since each state seeks power for its own sake or because the possession of power supposedly means greater security, well-being, and prosperity, world politics is a collective name for all the strivings of the states of the world. For a state to survive or to grow great in such a world does not depend upon law, morality, or pious hopes, but upon a cold-blooded, clear-eyed evaluation of the forces at play. Whether it likes this situation or not, no state, by the very fact that it is a state, can escape "playing the game." If it plays successfully, it survives; if not, it dies.

The following chapters are devoted to this struggle.

Questions

1. When did the return to power politics occur?
2. Compare the idealistic and realistic approaches to war and peace.
3. Define power politics.
4. Why is the expression power politics a redundancy?
5. Why, in terms of power, did the League of Nations fail?
6. What is the most prolific field for power politics?
7. What wishful thinking appears in peace plans today?
8. What relationship does power bear to morality?
9. What are the sources of power?
10. What are the agencies of power?
11. How does Lord Haw Haw enter the field of power?
12. What types of power politics are most frequently encountered?
13. What methods or techniques are employed in the use of power?
14. Trace the steps whereby a disturbed power relationship is adjusted under international law.
15. Who are "power misers?"
16. What is the fundamental assumption of the following chapters of this book?
17. Why is war called the *ultima ratio?*
18. How is it possible for all parties involved in a war to seek peace honestly and still remain determined to go on fighting?
19. What is the difficulty about using one's own personal ideas of justice in judging the acts of states?
20. Distinguish between dormant and active power.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Trace the experience of any great world leader, Napoleon for example, in terms of the acquisition of power.
2. What powers did the League of Nations possess? How far could it enforce its decisions?
3. Do natural barriers bear any relationship to a state's powers? If so, what relationship? Illustrate.
4. If the thesis of the chapter is accepted, how is it possible for small states to continue in existence, for example, Belgium, Switzerland, Cuba?
5. Is power a matter of reason or of something else? If wars are a disturbed power of relationship, may they grow out of irrational objectives?

6. Why and how does power beget power? Illustrate your thesis from the standpoint of history.

7. Are idealism and realism in international affairs consistent with each other in matters pertaining to a new world government? If you believe they are, demonstrate concretely by a scheme of your own.

8. Classify the states of the world by as many different methods as possible. Which of these methods do you consider as belonging to power classifications?

9. What efforts have been made in the past to establish an international order backed by power? What schemes have been proposed?

10. Trace the principal disarmament schemes proposed before the League of Nations. How would the different plans have affected the powers of such major countries as Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, the U.S.S.R., and the United States?

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PART I

FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ALL WORLD affairs, like municipal affairs, are based on certain fundamental realities. These realities are the elements out of which the struggle for power grows, and include people, land, climate, and institutions. Geography has a significant role to play in the rise, growth, and decline of states; it enters deeply into the relationships between them, especially where such things as climate, proximity to water, and composition of soil are concerned. Closely related to geographic situation are such economic factors as the industrial and agricultural resources and activities of communities, which provide livelihood and affect standards of material comfort. Economic and geographical advantages are the things for which states strive and often quarrel. There are also the forces which drive individual men to act, for instance, the struggle for existence, the quest for power, the search for desired objectives both spiritual and material, and even reputation. Out of all of these tendencies grow a multitude of dynamic forces such as nationalism, imperialism, minority ambitions, customs, and traditions: the groundwork for world politics and the struggles between states for power.

Through the ages a number of imperfect controls have developed: international organization, diplomacy, international law, and various means for settling disputes among states with a minimum amount of friction. These likewise are a part of the platform on which world politics is built.

CHAPTER 2

THE DYNAMICS OF STATE EXISTENCE

Statehood and the Family of Nations

World politics is carried on by states.[1] During early modern times it was customary to speak of the European states, when considered as a whole, as the family of Christian nations; but since the western political system has spread to all parts of the world it is now customary to speak of all states in the world, when considered collectively, as the family of nations. They constitute the international community to which all states belong or strive to belong.[2]

Under international law each member of the family of nations is supposed to possess three characteristics: (1) equality with other states, (2) independence, and (3) sovereignty in internal affairs.[3] The equality is theoretical only, as may be readily seen by comparing the tremendous Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with little Switzerland. Independence, too, is a legal term that often disregards the influence a dominant state like Japan may exercise over a dominated state like Manchukuo. And sovereignty, which is the highest political power in the state, is sometimes subordinated to foreign influence, again as in Manchukuo, which is ruled by Japan, even though theoretically the local government rules.

The analogy of the family is carried to its logical conclusion

[1] For a definition of state, see page 33. Schuman defines policies as "a state's will to power" (Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics,* 3rd ed., New York, McGraw-Hill, 1941, p. 265).

[2] This is the legalistic and fictional approach. From this standpoint, Frederick A. Middlebush and Chesney Hill, *Elements of International Relations,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1940, chap. 3, will be found to be a brief and helpful survey of this subject. For the brutal realities of state existence see chapter 1 of this volume.

[3] See George Grafton Wilson, *Handbook of International Law,* St. Paul, West Publishing Company, 1910, chaps. 1 and 2.

by some legal writers, who describe states as persons under international law. The analogy is even carried so far as to describe and discuss states' rights as though states possessed freedoms,[4] which normally characterize animate rather than corporate beings.

Admission to the family of nations is by a process called recognition. To be "recognized" requires a formal act such as the exchange of ambassadors, the signing of a treaty, the statement that recognition has been accorded, through which the recognizing state is interpreted as accepting the recognized state as an equal into the family of nations and thereby acknowledging that from the time of recognition it will have regular diplomatic relations with the new member. Termination of membership generally occurs in a much less formal manner, as for example when a state breaks into fragments as Austria-Hungary did in 1918, or when one state's territory is annexed by another state as was the case when Germany absorbed Czechoslovakia and the U.S.S.R. acquired the Baltic Republics—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.

To continue the family analogy even further, states die and new ones are born. History is peopled with memories of Carthage, Bohemia, Livonia, Scythia, Media, and many other communities which are no more. In 1918 the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy of 1914 died, but the new states of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia were born.

When a state comes into being or disappears, legal and political consequences arise from the event. These frequently cause international differences, as for example the dispute between Rumania and Hungary over the Banat or Transylvania when Austria-Hungary disappeared.[5]

Finally, the members of the family of nations are said to live in one of two states: war or peace.[6] Different rules apply to each condition. War suspends all normal peace relationships

[4] See, for example, Ellery C. Stowell, *International Law,* New York, Holt, 1931.

[5] A helpful summary of these may be found in T. J. Lawrence, *The Principles of International Law,* 7th ed., Boston, Heath, 1923, pp. 89 ff.

[6] See Chapter 1 for the relationship of war to peace; also see Chapter 9, "Psychological Aspects of Warfare."

between the belligerents. If other states do not become parties to the conflict they are generally looked upon as neutral.[7]

State Defined

The word state has meant many different things, but in this volume it refers to those political units that make up the family of nations. As such, a state is a group of people, occupying a definite territory, possessing political organization, and having a common belief that it is a state. Thus one may speak of "governments in exile" because they may move from the land over which they are supposed to rule, but it is impossible to speak of "states in exile" since the element of fixed territory is fundamental to a state and territory can hardly be conceived as in exile. For this reason the Gypsies today and the Jews before the creation of Palestine cannot be described as states in world politics because they lack the necessary fixed territory.[8]

Forms. States have been variously classified and divided according to many different systems.[9] However, for the purposes of world politics, they may be divided into simple and composite. In the first class one central government controls the affairs of state. In the second class two or more heads of the government complicate the conduct of foreign relations, as for example in Austria-Hungary during the period between 1867 and 1918 or in the Germanic Confederation from 1815 to 1871. The control of foreign affairs is generally vested in one head, but domestic politics, influenced by more than one head of the state, may affect the foreign policies as well.

States and nations distinguished;[10] *powers of a state.* Students of political science draw a distinction between a nation and a state, but for our purposes international relations deal

[7] For a brief discussion of states at war and at peace, see G. G. Wilson, *International Law,* 1935 ed., New York, Silver Burdett, especially parts 3 and 4. See also A. Lawrence Preuss, "The Concepts of Neutrality and Nonbelligerency," *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 218 (November, 1941), pp. 97–108.

[8] See the excellent chapter by Professor Roucek in Roy V. Peel and Joseph S. Roucek, *Introduction to Politics,* New York, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1941, chap. 6.

[9] *Ibid.,* chaps. 9 and 10.

[10] *Ibid.,* chap. 6.

with nations that are also called powers or sovereign states. In the popular sense all of these terms signify either a government endowed with supreme political power over a specific territory or a people possessed of such a government. Such a nation, power, or state possesses—in the eyes of international law—complete independence with the right to govern itself and to conduct its own affairs without interference from a "superior authority." [11]


This absolute power within its own borders is one of the basic and vital attributes of a state in world politics.[12] For example, a state defines what acts shall be considered as crimes within its territory, and it has the power of life and death over individuals within its jurisdiction. This absolute power to do what it deems best within its own borders is recognized by all other states; and, unless their interests are adversely affected, they may not legally interfere with anything that takes place. Thus, for example, the starvation of millions in the U.S.S.R., the exercise of controlled ballots in Italy, revolution in Cuba, and concentration camps in Germany are matters on which those countries take action for themselves.

Such distinctions are difficult for the average person to comprehend, because he cannot see why the confiscation of subsurface oil deposits by Mexico should be considered solely a domestic affair, or why confiscation of church property in Spain is not the affair of all the Catholics in the world. A state may have no legal right to interfere with another, but occasionally states do make representations to other states on behalf of their desires, or aid a cause, as the United States did in Nicaragua when election difficulties threatened to cause trouble between Great Britain and Nicaragua.

The significance of this may not be apparent at first, but some idea of its importance may be gained by remembering

[11] See Parker T. Moon, *Syllabus on International Relations,* New York, Macmillan, 1926, p. 1.

[12] This supremacy of power is generally discussed in texts on international relations under the heading of sovereignty. For a helpful discussion see Sir Arthur Salter's chapter on "National Sovereignty and World Peace" in Leonard Woolf and others, *The Modern State,* New York, Century, 1933, pp. 274–286.



MAP 2. WORLD'S GOVERNMENTS

that foreign policies are only extensions of domestic ones. As Simonds and Emeny say, a state's acts at home and abroad "will invariably be dictated by paramount concern for its domestic interests." [13] Hence no study of the foreign policies and the world politics of any state can be complete without consideration of the domestic forces out of which foreign policy grows, or which accompany it.

For example, in 1933, when the Democratic party replaced the Republican in the United States government, its chief task was to overcome the depression and improve the economic well-being of this country. One way in which it was believed that this object could be achieved was through an increase in foreign trade, and in order to expand foreign trade the Hull treaty program was inaugurated. To the idealistic exponent of world government it might seem a grand gesture on the part of this country. Actually, it was an extension of the domestic political program—to overcome an acute economic crisis—into the field of foreign affairs.

This illustration can be duplicated without end. The differences between dictatorships and democracies grow out of fundamentally conflicting domestic programs—political, economic, social, religious, and ethical. The opposed purposes are translated into conflicting foreign policies.

One of the most illuminating instances of the point under consideration was the French invasion of the Ruhr. On the surface, France, exasperated with the failure of the Germans to meet their reparations obligations, found it necessary to invoke sanctions by occupying the Ruhr. Actually, the French steel industry, particularly the Schneider interests dependent upon foreign coal, were unable to come to terms with the Krupp coal industry in Germany for the supply of coal on a mutually satisfactory basis. French steel producers, therefore, as exemplified in the Schneider group, sought the aid of their government, which in turn sought to secure the coal by "produc-

[13] Frank Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics*, New York, American Book, 1939, p. 22. This is an excellent discussion of the relationship of the two policies.

tive guarantees" in the invasion; Germany in her turn met this measure by passive resistance, refusing to supply the coal.[14]

The Contemporary World

Each state a law unto itself. It is important at this point to take into consideration some aspects of the contemporary world.

On the surface it appears that the courts of law, the police, the public opinion of the group, and the control by a supreme authority, all of which adjust conflicts between individuals within the state, are lacking in international affairs. Therefore, because there is no supernational power that can set up the machinery for an orderly existence of the members of the family of nations, states supposedly resort voluntarily to international tribunals such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, or the Council of the League of Nations. In short, each state is a law unto itself.[15]

This independence is the more highly emphasized by the fact that there is no international patriotism or allegiance comparable to the national. Therefore, when differences arise between states, the judgments of the peoples resolve themselves into the taking of sides—nearly every individual pays allegiance to the country to which he belongs and makes her cause his cause. In this Second World War, for example, there is no question as to where loyalty and patriotism lie for most Americans, Russians and other peoples of the Soviet Union, Germans, British, and Japanese.

Struggle for international co-operation and international law. The situation just described has led some authorities to speak of the world as lawless, and they point out that most states are unwilling to subject their policies to international restrictions. International law and international organization,

[14] See Chapter 13, "From the First World War to the Second World War."

[15] See Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 284–285. For a different point of view see Dewitt C. Poole, *The Conduct of Foreign Relations Under Modern Democratic Conditions*, New Haven, Yale, 1924.

as these authorities appraise them, are pious ideals or Utopian dreams, not realizable in the present state of affairs.[16]

Whether such views are right or not, no one can read the history of the Western world during the last two thousand years without realizing that titanic efforts have been made to establish a regime of law and order in world politics, or without also realizing that considerable progress has been made. Whether the law is used or not, it will be seen that this struggle has resulted in building up an international law of war and of peace to govern the world of states in their relations with each other, and it stands in the record that international administrative organs, legislative assemblies, and judicial tribunals have been established to administer that law and to resolve peacefully and in an orderly fashion the problems of world politics. Much of that machinery exists today, in 1942, in the midst of the Second World War.

Multiplication of human contacts. Improvement in the mode of travel has resulted in thousands of people visiting other countries in times of peace. Trade has multiplied in all parts of the globe. Only a few hours by plane separate the principal cities of the United States and western Europe. The radio, the motion picture, the automobile, the telephone, and the modern system of communications have antiquated ancient isolations. There are countless contacts of a relatively informal nature such as business, legal, religious, personal, social, and financial relationships; these do not exhaust the list. Culture and economics are interdependent.

These increasingly numerous contacts have (1) accelerated the growth of peace machinery and (2) simultaneously caused an increased number of international frictions. They have resulted in the extension of the modern state system to all parts of the world. European clothes are worn everywhere. The various races (see the demographic section of this chapter) are all

[16] See Simonds and Emeny, *op. cit.*, part 1. See also E. Edmunds, *The Lawless Law of Nations*, Washington, John Byrne and Company, 1925. For another point of view see Vera Micheles Dean, *The Struggle for World Order*, New York, Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1941. See also Gerhart Niemeyer, *Law Without Force*, Princeton, University Press, 1941.

organized according to modern western state models or else are subject to the modern western states.

To summarize: While a great deal of international law and peace machinery is available, it is used only when convenient or acceptable to members of the family of nations, who are supreme in the conduct of their policies. Increased contacts among people as a result of modern civilization have spread the western state system so as to include the whole world; but this spread has not thrown the weight of development on either one side or the other for international order, since the increased contacts create as many new frictions as harmonies. The total effect is merely a multiplication of international relations rather than a settlement of anything.

Fundamental Realities

Geographic and demographic.[17] Underlying all state life and activities are the fundamental realities of land, people, economics, cultural institutions, and psychological phenomena. Obviously they also underlie world politics and the life of the family of nations.

Land being covered in another chapter, people are the first fundamental reality of international relations to be discussed here. They are the most dynamic element in world politics, since without people intercourse among states could not exist.

On closer examination it will be discovered that not a single race is completely contained within the confines of any state and that political frontiers rarely coincide with the area peopled by a single race.[18] Therefore the states of the world, in most instances, will be found to hold people who are a conglomeration of racial strains. Yet the feeling of racial purity is so strong that it is a potent element in the political programs of many states. For example, the Houston-Chamberlain–Rosen-

[17] See the next chapter for a more complete discussion of the geographical factors. These realities are given by Moon, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–7.


[18] See F. H. Hankins, *The Racial Basis of Civilization,* New York, Knopf, 1926, for an excellent discussion of race.

berg–Hitler idea of Teutonic race superiority is basic to the Nazi political philosophy and to the program on which the Nazi state operates. It may seem unimportant on the surface that people who believe they understand the twentieth century, should hold such views; but out of such views the action of modern states often springs. Wars based on race may mean life and death to millions of people.

Population growth. One of the chief sources of disturbance in world politics is the rapid rate at which people are increasing and spreading over the earth. In 1740 Europe had a population estimated at 140 million. In the 1930's it had 530 million, an increase in 200 years of almost 400 million. G. H. Knibbs estimates that at the present rate of growth there will be about 16 billion people in the world in another 200 years. At present, the more thickly populated areas are to be found in the East, but at this rate the West will not be found far behind.[19] Growth in numbers leads to demands for areas into which excess population can move. The fact that Australia has only 2 people per square mile has led the Japanese to believe that in Australia they have a future outlet for their overpopulation. The 708 people per square mile in Belgium, on the other hand, are no problem because ways of living have been devised for them, and the desire for moving has not been developed. Only when, as in Japan and Italy, crowding becomes the basis for state action does it become a dynamic of state existence. For example, China's and India's teeming millions cannot be considered as dynamics at the present moment because they are not spurs to policy or action; but they may become dynamics at any time. The spread of the English people during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the building of the British Empire was the result, in part at least, of an overpopulation problem coupled with economic forces.

New states with few people to occupy great areas, as for example the United States a century ago, or Canada, New Zealand, and Australia today, have the opposite side of the prob-

[19] Walter R. Sharp and Grayson Kirk, *Contemporary International Relations*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1940, chap. 4. See Chapter 20, "War as a Symptom of Our Social Crisis," for further discussion of this point.



MAP 3. WORLD'S POPULATION DENSITY

lem to face. Inducement is offered to people to immigrate, and immigration brings with it a host of other problems, for example, selecting the proper immigrants, protecting the immigrant when he comes, settling him in the place where he will be most productive and useful, and making naturalization relatively easy.

In one instance, then, too many people cause states to act and to shape their foreign policies to ease the overpopulation problem. In the other instance, too few people also cause states to act, and to shape their policies so as to secure a larger population.[20]

Economic reality.[21] The second fundamental reality underlying world politics is economic and has to do with trade, frontiers, industry, tariffs, agriculture, possession of raw materials, and the like. The narrow economy of the mercantilist days has expanded into a broad international one today, in which cooperation, rivalry, antagonism, and conflict prevail among the states of the world. Most contacts among the people of the world are through economic forces.

Cultural realitics. The third fundamental reality in the conduct of world affairs is the intellectual, scientific, and artistic contact and exchange of information and ideas. Religion, music, art, literature, painting, science, invention, and fashion make their contributions, as witness for example the universal acceptance of the opera, Shakespeare, tractor agriculture, radio broadcasting, motion pictures, ballet dancing, and medicine. Sometimes these realities are not international, however, and are molded in terms of a single state's nationalism as peculiar to that state; witness Greek national costumes, Rumanian dances, Welsh singing, and Finnish literature.[22]

[20] For a brief discussion of the population problems of some of the major states in the middle 1930's, see Louis I. Dublin, *The Population Problem and World Depression,* New York, Foreign Policy Association Pamphlet, 1936.

[21] See Chapters 4 and 7 for a detailed discussion. An illuminating study of Europe, an economic geography, is C. E. Lyde, *The Continent of Europe,* London, Macmillan, 1924; also for economic warfare see Thomas Brockway, *Battle Without Bullets,* New York, Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1939.

[22] E. B. Reuter, *Race and Culture Contacts,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1934, ties this reality with race.

The influence of the writings of Dante, Mazzini, and D'Annunzio were not only the symbols of Italian nationalism, but they also gave it purpose and impetus. Bohemian literature was one of the great welding forces in Czech rejuvenation. Serbian national sentiment rallied about and flared up from national poetry. Mazzini observed, "Without a country we might perhaps produce some prophets of art, but no vital art. Art is the expression of the distinctive life of the nationality to which the artist belongs, of the sum total of his national heritage.[23]

Obviously national education has a most significant role, for its chief work lies in making good citizens. The attainment of this object requires the inculcation of national literature, history, music, art, and attitudes. Each state not only has its own peculiar culture, but consciously insists upon uniqueness in the cultural field. Its cultural pattern is a changing dynamic individuality which sets the state apart from the rest of the world and gives its people a feeling of solidarity and security. No modern state can safely be without it. No modern state neglects to use it as fully as it is able.

Psychological realities. The fourth and last fundamental reality in world politics is the psychological. It concerns the mind, and recognizes that mankind is only another name for all individuals. It is based on certain fundamental common tendencies, among them gregariousness, acquisitiveness, pugnacity, fear, love, hate, sex desire, and many other elements which the psychologists alone can list. Out of these elements grows the conduct of people, and since people are the state and since they produce world politics, these psychological elements cannot be disregarded in a study of the family of nations.

Thus the first indication that a national group is on the way to statehood or nationhood arises when the majority of people in the group recognize in common that they are a nationality. This sentiment is a form of group consciousness, which will be explored more fully later in this chapter.[24] It is also a form of struggle for survival often expressed in a "national will to

[23] Bernard Joseph quotes this thought in his *Nationality,* New Haven, Yale, 1929, p. 123.

[24] See "Institutions, traditions, customs, ideals," p. 49.

live," which may manifest itself in such a "race mission" as the imperialistic responsibility of the "white man's burden," or in the concept of a "race born to rule," or in the doctrine of a "manifest destiny" for one's own country. The words in quotation marks indicate how powerful is the drive of a state's consciousness, which Arnold Toynbee has called a nation's "soul."

Indeed, a nation is not a chance conglomeration of men; rather it is a homogeneous entity with faith in its continued existence and consciousness of its own peculiarity. Its ideologies and myths are reflections of its confidence in itself, its belief in its national mission, and its feeling of self-respect. These are all manifestations of a frame of mind whose actions can only be appreciated when the mind is understood as a fundamental psychological force.

Strategic factor. World politics consists of the way in which states combine these fundamental factors to further their will to power. The way in which a particular state combines these realities in relation to other states with which it has to deal and with relation to other states in general may be described as that state's strategy.[25]

Nationalism

Contemporary world politics is marked by the force of nationalism, the greatest breeder of friction in the world. It is a spiritual manifestation of the people of a state whereby their loyalty to country and their patriotism—the love of local institutions—are translated into bases for social and political action. In its dynamic sense nationalism consists of all the cultural and dynamic activities and ambitions of a state; [26] while in its static sense it is the existing state system in the world.[27]

[25] See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion. See also Simonds and Emeny, *op. cit.*, chap. 1.

[26] See Harry Elmer Barnes, *History and Social Intelligence,* New York, Knopf, 1926, p. 145.

[27] In addition to two classical treatises by C. J. H. Hayes (*Essays on Nationalism,* New York, Macmillan, 1926, and *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism,* New York, Smith, 1931), a student will find helpful Bernard Joseph, *Na-*

Nationalism manifests itself in a multitude of ways. A few current illustrations are: efforts to enforce uniformity of language within the borders of a state; intense love of custom, tradition, and the institutions of the state; and the effort to bring all people who speak the same language within the borders of the same state, as for example Italy's irredentist program.

Nationalism should be distinguished from nationality. The former is a sentiment or an emotion; the latter refers to a group of people inhabiting a definite territory and believing their members constitute a distinct cultural society. This distinction makes nationalism a fusion of patriotism and nationality. Nationalism must also be distinguished from a state, which has already been defined; a state is an established organization, nationalism is a quality of the mind.

Bases of nationalism. The bases on which this spiritual force rests are several. (1) One of them is strong group feeling, which often develops in those who inhabit the same territory, especially if they are isolated from other people, as exemplified in the Japanese. (2) Another is the solidarity which arises out of the belief that people belong to the same race. This is being exploited to its fullest in Germany; but it has numerous counterparts elsewhere. (3) Closely associated with this feeling is the bond which grows out of a common language. (4) A fourth comprises the traditions and the great events in the past history of a group, in which every member takes pride and shares glory. (5) Religion may be a binding force, a fact which may be observed in eastern Europe. (6) The temperament and the character of a people may be a base. (7) It has also been seen that great works of art, especially literature—stories and songs of the greatness of the group, plays about national heroes—and national dances may be added to the list of those things which make for national solidarity.

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tionality: Its Nature and Problems, New Haven, Yale, 1929; Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1939; H. L. Featherstone, *A Century of Nationalism,* New York, Nelson, 1939; F. Hertz, "The Nature of Nationalism," in *Social Forces,* 19 (March, 1941), pp. 409–415; Hans Kohn, "The Nature of Nationalism," in *American Political Science Review,* 33 (September, 1939), pp. 1001–1021.


Illustrations have already been given of the racial bond. Further discussion and examples are required of language, minorities, institutions, traditions, customs, religion, and ideals.

Language and race. The possession of a common language is the essence of racial kinship in the popular mind. Sometimes this view creeps into scientific controversies, as in the case of the settlement of the borders of Poland and Czechoslovakia at the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the First World War. That the assumption is often erroneous makes small difference in world politics if the belief lies at the heart of the policies and strategy of a state.

Uniformity of language does tend to make for group solidarity; diversity may create misunderstanding, although not always—witness the strong nationalism of the Swiss in spite of their many languages: French, Italian, German, and Romansch. Some strongly nationalistic states like Italy have only one language; other equally nationalistic states possess two, as for example Finland with Finnish and Swedish.

The political program of some states within whose boundaries several languages are spoken, often includes the enforcing of language uniformity on minority groups. Examples include the Russification and the Germanizing of peoples before 1914 and the present Russian attempts on the people of Turkestan and Bashkiria.

Minorities. Language difficulties may be only one manifestation of a broader problem, that of minorities and irredentas. The irredenta problem has been briefly alluded to and refers to a group of people who may belong racially and nationally to one state, but who are included within the borders of another state. The word irredenta means "unredeemed" and its use carries the implication that the mother state will rescue or redeem the people from the state in which they lie. Before the First World War some of the more familiar irredentas were Alsace-Lorraine, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and of course the prototype Italia Irredenta. Between First and Second World Wars some of the famous irredentist problems were the Saar Basin, the Rhineland, Schleswig, Upper Silesia, Teschen, Zips (Szepes,



MAP 4. LANGUAGES OF EUROPE

Spiš, Śpiz), Orava (Orawa, Árva), Sudetenland, Danzig, Memel, Eastern Galicia, Carpathian Ruthenia (Subcarpathia), Transylvania, Dobrudja, Bessarabia, and Eastern Karelia.[28] These European instances are examples which could be duplicated elsewhere in the world, as for example in South America in the Tacna-Arica area, or in Asia in Korea.

Minorities are most frequent in Europe and have disturbed the politics of that continent for a long time. It is physically impossible to draw a map of Europe that would allocate all peoples into independent states according to racial,[29] religious, national, or linguistic make-up and in so doing include all of each race within its own racial state. Therefore there have always been and there still are racial, religious, and other minorities, with national difficulties of a seemingly insurmountable nature. Thus the Pan-Serbian movement and the Macedonian movement in the Balkans before 1914 aimed at keeping alive the resentment of Serbs in Austria, and of Greeks and Bulgarians in Macedonia.

Numerous minorities, between 1918 and 1938, came into attention over the whole of the European continent. A few of these were the Swedish element in Finland; the Germans in Lithuania, principally in Memel, the Greek refugees in Macedonia driving out the Bulgarians; the Germans in the Sudeten area; the Irish in the United Kingdom; the Germans in Alsace and Lorraine, the Hungarians in Rumania, the Germans in the Tyrol, the Armenians, Georgians, Poles, Finns, Turks, Kirghiz, and others in the U.S.S.R.; the Poles in the German section of Upper Silesia, and the Germans in the Polish section.

From the standpoint of nationalism, minorities present two problems. In the first place, minorities are usually hard to assimilate and act as a challenge to the dominant state to terminate their intransigence. This challenge has led in the past, and

[28] See J. S. Roucek, *The Working of the Minority System Under The League of Nations,* Prague, Orbis, 1929. A brief, interesting, and authentic discussion in Henry C. Wolfe, *Human Dynamite,* New York, Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1939.

[29] See Peel and Roucek, *op. cit.,* pp. 158–164.

still does, to liquidation of peoples if they are small groups, and to their control by persuasion, force, or other means if they are large groups. Occasionally a minority is able to break away and establish an independent state as did the succession states of Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia after 1918. In the second place, minorities are potent causes for revolutions and for interventions by parent or claimant states in the affairs of the states wherein the minorities live.

In an effort to solve this situation, Woodrow Wilson, during the First World War of 1914–1918, championed the doctrine of the self-determination of peoples and insisted that minority groups should have the right to determine whether they wished to remain under the dominant state, or to set up a state of their own, or perhaps to join another parent state. Like so many other proposals of that period, this one was found practically impossible to put into operation. Who were to vote in Transylvania, where islands of Rumanians lived in a sea of Magyars and where islands of Hungarians lived in seas of Rumanians? The Swedish element in Finland remained true to Finland rather than to Sweden; but a small fraction of that Swedish element located on the Åland Islands asked for union with Sweden. How were the frontiers of any country to be drawn, since racial frontiers are not lines but zones in which racial strains cross and recross? [30]

Institutions, traditions, customs, ideals. The institutions of a country enter into its policies, aims, hopes, and aspirations—and therefore into its nationalism.[31] Among these institutions are national anthems, holidays, national games such as baseball or cricket, costumes, national dances, and the like. Their promotion and preservation are considered vital because fondness for the state and loyalty to it arise from them. It may not be easy at times to determine what a United States citizen means when he speaks of "American liberties and freedoms." Yet these

[30] For a discussion of some of these problems, see Carlo Sforza, *Diplomatic Europe Since the Treaty of Versailles,* New Haven, Yale, 1928.

[31] Some interesting views and materials on this subject may be found in D. L. Crawford, *Can Nations Be Neighbors?,* Boston, Stratford, 1932.

have grown into the "American way of life," which term in itself connects American traditions, customs, ideals, and institutions. It is not so important that the precise character of the institutions shall be known as it is that the people shall believe that there are such institutions.

Family, religion, business, law, and free economic opportunity are institutions for which presumably we stand, and we are aroused to indignation when Communist or Fascist countries move to abolish them. We are strongly opposed to the O.G.P.U. and to Heinrich Himmler's Gestapo as institutions, for we regard them as inimical to the institutions in which we believe, and this attitude is reflected in our relations with the states in which the objectionable institutions are found.

Closely connected with a state's institutions is the memory of the people, as they take pride in the wars of the past, in heroic exploits of great leaders, in patriotic sacrifices, in national obstacles surmounted, in legends of a by-gone time, and in the other events of their history. These memories are a vital part of the consciousness of the people that they are a state. This consciousness makes them capable of sacrifice and holds the state together in times of crisis. These institutions, memories, traditions, and ideals may be translated into such policies as United States neutrality, the German struggle for "a place in the sun," the Italian demand for the unredeemed provinces, Great Britain's sea power, and the French determination to recover Alsace and Lorraine after 1871. These items are the components of nationalism.

Religion. In some cases the racial, linguistic, and institutional bases for statehood and nationalism also include a religious component.[32] The racial boundary between the Poles and the Germans is also a religious boundary; so are the lines between the Moros and the Igorots in the Philippines, and between the Finns and the Russians. One of the complaints of the Nazis was that Catholic Poland controlled Protestant Danzig.

It would be possible to emphasize this matter too much as

[32] R. A. Goslin, *Church and State,* New York, Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1937.

one may readily see by noting the loyal Catholic element in an otherwise Protestant Switzerland, or by reflecting on the religious heterogeneity in the United States.

Thus, while religion may furnish the base for nationalism it may also transcend national frontiers and become a great international force. One need only recall some of the great religions of the world and where they are to be found in order to realize this international aspect. Many Christian creeds have spread all over the world. Hinduism is found widely over the Far East, especially in India; so are Buddhism and Brahmanism. Confucianism is to be found particularly in Ceylon, Tibet, China, and Japan; Greek Catholicism is scattered over the Balkans, Mohammedanism is influential in Africa, Asia, and the Near East.

Some of the world's greatest movements have been closely intertwined with religion, for example Pan-Islamism, the Pan-Arabic movement, and even Christianity itself.

One reason why the West attained world political supremacy may be found in the restless, dynamic character acquired by the Christian religion as it struggled for survival in ancient Rome, as it established its supremacy throughout Europe, as it fought for the recovery of the Holy Land during the Crusades, as it spread its missionaries everywhere. The Christian missionaries in the New World, Africa, Oceania, and the Far East have at once been agents of the church they represented and also powerful advance representatives of the states from which they came. An instance was the colonization of the New Hebrides Islands and the quarrel between the missionaries of France and England for its control.

Religion, then, plays an important part both in nationalism and in world politics. Hitler, Roosevelt, and Mussolini call upon God to help them in their fight upon each other. The role of the Roman Catholic Church in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939 is still a fresh memory. Mussolini used the Church to forward his program, and he could not succeed without its friendship. The struggle of the Roman Catholic Church in Mexico—the Papal Encyclical *Acerba animi* of September 29,

1931; and the expulsion of the papal legate Ruiz y Flores by the Mexican Chamber of Deputies as a "pernicious foreigner," these indicate that religion as a force in world politics is far from dead.

General points on nationalism. The feeling of nationalism has been so strong that states have now become deified. This is essentially a modern development, and has no counterpart except perhaps for the loyalty of the Greeks to their city-states in ancient times. Nationalism certainly did not exist during the Middle Ages; the great instance of loyalty sung by all the bards of that time was the Song of Roland, in which it is told that Roland laid down his life at Roncevaux in 778 to cover Charlemagne's withdrawal from Spain. But Roland laid down his life not for a Frankish state, but for Charlemagne himself to whom he owed personal loyalty. The first historical instance of nationalism appeared when the French people arose to support Philip the Fair, their king, against the demands of Pope Boniface VIII.

During the religious wars nationalism was closely associated with the rise of national churches. It was, however, not until the French Revolution that any people felt the surge of the full psychological tide of nationalism, and then it swept Napoleon and the French to a mastery of the whole continent of Europe, as it has swept Hitler and his legions to extensive conquests. Nationalism seems to make its most powerful appeal to a people who feel that they are alone against the world. Whether this belief is right or wrong is beside the point; the significant fact is that the belief acts as a stimulus to state politics.

Nationalism is a welling, dynamic force whose propagation is one of the most potent sources of international disputes. It unifies a state and causes it to seek to nationalize foreigners within its borders. It disrupts existing states and creates new ones. It shatters colonial empires and creates others in their stead. It leads to the revolt of people held in colonial and political subjection, and underlies the principle of self-determination, the struggles of minorities, and the yearnings of irredentas.

IMPERIALISM

The antithesis of nationalism is imperialism. The logical conclusion of nationalism is a separate territory for each national group with independent existence therein. Imperialism is the domination of one group over another and has existed ever since the first man enslaved the enemy he had conquered.[33] The two doctrines of nationalism and imperialism have been reconciled in practice by states demanding "living space," "expanding room," "self-sufficiency," and recognition of "manifest destiny."

Definition. In general imperialism means the control by a dominant people over a conquered or subjugated people. This definition was particularly applicable to the ancient empires of Egypt, Macedonia, Rome, and Carthage. Since the advent of the industrial revolution imperialism has come to have a more specialized meaning. It is used now to connote the exploitation by modern industrially advanced states of people industrially more backward. From this more recent standpoint there is little to choose between the British conquest of the backward Bushmen of Africa and Australia and the Japanese effort at controlling and exploiting the cultured and highly civilized Chinese. Both exploited peoples are industrially backward.

Until the beginning of the present war the chief imperialistic states were Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Russia, United States, Belgium, Holland, and Germany, although the latter had received a temporary setback in the Treaty of Versailles. Imperialism has also taken the form of dominating subject people in order to control raw materials, to secure markets in which to dispose of manufactured goods, and to find areas in which to invest savings with the prospect of an excellent return. Religion, culture, adventure, ambitions of individuals, monarchs

[33] See for example Parker T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics,* New York, Macmillan, 1927; M. J. Bonn, *The Crumbling of Empire,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1938; W. H. Dawson, *The Future of Empire,* London, Williams and Norgate, 1938; Scott Nearing, *Dollar Diplomacy,* New York, Viking, 1926; E. D. Schoonmaker, *Democracy and World Dominion,* New York, R. R. Smith, 1939.

and military leaders, and the desire to aid native peoples have also been powerful motives in imperialistic ventures.[34]

History. The beginnings of modern imperialism may be discerned when Europe awakened from her centuries-long slumber of the Middle Ages, and when men like Marco Polo and Sir John Mandeville entered upon their travels. Close on their heels came the explorers: Columbus, Diaz, Magellan, Henry Hudson, and many more. The seas and new lands were filled with swashbucklers, freebooters, pirates, Morgans, Drakes, Stuyvesants, Smiths, Oxenstiernas, who roamed over the world between the fifteenth and the middle of the eighteenth centuries (1492–1763) as monarchs sought colonies, shipping, and commerce. Then the old mercantilism collapsed, to be followed by a period of relative quiescence for almost a century (1763–1870), after which imperialism was renewed in a more extensive and penetrating manner.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century England, France, Belgium, Russia, Germany, Italy, and the United States entered into a race for colonies and territorial possessions which absorbed Africa, Oceania, and the Far East (1870–1920). Businessmen, soldiers, sailors, colonial officials, missionaries, explorers, statesmen, and adventurers carried the torch, which was kept alight by fears that some other state might secure all of the advantages, by fears that surplus populations needed some place to go, and by beliefs that a country's greatness required the possession of an empire. Natives were exploited; the Negroes of the Congo were despicably killed in vast numbers to promote the rubber trade; the island natives of the Pacific were given Mother Hubbards by modest missionaries and were decimated by tuberculosis; priests and missionaries were supported by the gunboats of their countries in the New Hebrides; and British, German and United States navies glared at each other in Samoa till a hurricane wrecked most of the vessels engaged. This scramble was imperialism, a ferment of political activity motivated by the desire for control over foreign lands, and led to instance after instance of international friction.

[34] G. Clark, *The Balance Sheets of Imperialism,* New York, Macmillan, 1936.

At the end of the First World War, another lull in the struggle for colonies occurred, but imperialist activity revived in 1931 when the Japanese moved into China and began the conquest that ended in the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo. At the present moment, in the midst of the Second World War, the futures of the empires of France, Holland, and Great Britain hang in the balance.[35]

Motives for imperialism. Imperialism is one of the great dynamic forces in international relations. It has been the cause of many modern wars both directly and indirectly. It is inherent in the Second World War and is a potential cause for future wars, as may be realized from the almost universal demand for access to sources of raw materials. While the profits of imperialism are oftentimes nonexistent or difficult to discern, and though the taxpayer bears the burden in the last analysis, imperialism, particularly from 1880 to the present day, has had far reaching effects upon both dominated and dominant people, upon the industries and commercial relations of advanced and backward peoples alike, upon the navies and armies of the world, upon domestic policies, upon the private fortunes of thousands of people,[36] and upon the political programs of states and of international organizations. The mandates of the Versailles Treaty after the First World War are now seen to have held no solution for the problem, and we are still as far from the solution as we were years ago.

What then are the motives that prompt imperialism? (1) Basic is the search for security, which characterizes states as well as individuals. Familiar in this respect are the struggles for naval bases, for strategic areas, for sources of manpower, for control of such key positions as Gibraltar, and for the acquisition of strategic railways. (2) The search for prosperity and the hope of establishing an imperial economy that will bring about material well-being for the dominant state furnish

[35] See M. E. Townsend, "The Contemporary Colonial Movement in Germany," *Political Science Quarterly,* 43 (March, 1928). See also W. C. Langsam, *In Quest of Empire,* New York, Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1939.

[36] See James F. Green, *The British Empire,* New York, Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1940, for an account of the world's greatest empire.

a strong incentive in the search for colonies. (3) There is always the thought that a place where surplus capital may be invested with the hope of easy and lucrative profit is the mark of a great state. (4) Sometimes a state is driven into the imperialistic field by economic competition in the search for raw materials and markets that it cannot obtain otherwise. (5) There is also the motive that drives modern states like Italy, which see in an empire a mark of greatness. This political and noneconomic motive was part of Mussolini's appeal for popular support in the Ethiopian conquest. (6) Finally, a very popular motive in states such as Italy and Japan is the hope of finding a place to which to send a surplus population.

Results of imperialism. With the sole exception of Japan, modern imperialism has been carried on by European states or by their former colonies. This has resulted in a European uniformity throughout the world, and the organization of the world about the European political and economic way of life. There are signs that this European domination is on the way out; but imperialism is still one of the great dynamic forces in world politics.

Conclusions

Dynamics of state existence are those forces which either create a state or enable it to live, once it has come into being. They include first of all the basic realities of land, people, economics, culture, and psychology; and secondly the forms that states take, their place in the family of nations, and their institutions. These dynamics are the stuff out of which power grows and from which policies are generated, for they define, delimit, and give direction to the needs, hopes, and strivings of states. Struggles of minorities for independence, drives for economic needs, quests for national greatness, longings for colonies and a "place in the sun," nationalization of the unassimilated foreigner, and appeals of national anthems are examples of these powerful forces out of which grow the lives, adventures, actions, greatness, and death of states.

Questions

1. What is the family of nations?
2. What is a state and what are its essential elements?
3. How extensive are a state's powers in domestic affairs? Illustrate.
4. What are the fundamental realities of international relations?
5. What powers do states possess?
6. At the present rate of increase, what would the population of the world be in about 200 years? How will this affect world politics?
7. What, besides a dense population, is necessary to make "overpopulation" dynamic?
8. What relationship exists between race and language?
9. How does religion enter world politics as a force?
10. What are some of the major religions in the world?
11. What part do national games, costumes, and dances play in world politics?
12. Define nationalism. What are its chief characteristics?
13. What is an irredenta? Why is it so called?
14. How do minorities enter international politics?
15. Distinguish between the imperialism of today and that of ancient times.
16. Of what value are past memories of states as forces in world politics?
17. What groups and what motives promoted later nineteenth-century imperialism?
18. What role did self-determination of people play after the war of 1914–1918?
19. Are there pure races in the world?
20. Define dynamics as applied to state existence.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. How did the German irredentas after 1918 affect German foreign policy?
2. Trace the rise of American nationalism and analyze its manifestations at different times.
3. What have been Mexican and United States relations relative to Roman Catholic property in Mexico and how has Mexico treated the Roman Catholic Church?
4. How was the Belgian Congo an illustration of the dynamics of state existence as exemplified in imperialism?

5. Is patriotism an essential to modern state survival? Why?

6. Select any troublesome frontiers in Europe, especially in eastern Europe, and compare the racial and political divisions.

7. How significant a political fact is religion in eastern Europe? Illustrate it by specific examples.

8. What is autonomy? Is it a solution for minority problems?

9. Why does the United States escape some of the more serious minority problems confronting Europe?

10. What are the fallacies of the doctrine of "the white man's burden" from the standpoint of dynamics of state existence? Has it any merits to commend it, if viewed from the same standpoint?

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CHAPTER 3

GEOGRAPHY AND WORLD POLITICS

THE INFLUENCE of physical environment on the political life of states has never been more apparent than during this Second World War. Geography has proved a dominant element in almost every important military operation and it has become increasingly obvious that geographical situation and state power are inextricably linked together. In western Europe the narrow English channel has again proved to be an effective water barrier against invasion, while British control of key points like Gibraltar and Suez has determined the strategy of Mediterranean warfare. The vast plains of western Russia have taught many lessons as to the relative value of different forms of land barriers. And the clash of states in the Pacific has accented the vital role that communications play in modern warfare. The popular recognition of the positive effect that geography has had on the course of this war is well evidenced by the maps that crowd the newspapers and the familiarity of the average person with such far away and esoteric places as Rangoon, Reykjavik, and Smolensk.

The influence of geography on the strategy of war, although spectacular, is no more fundamental than its effect on the peacetime life of states. For in peace, as in war, a state's geographical situation will in large part determine the role it will play in world politics. Such factors as climate, location, topography, size and shape affect not only the military power of the state but also its diplomatic influence and prestige, its attitude toward other states in the world community, the nature of its economic life, and even the energy of its citizens. Moreover, the more prominent geographical characteristics of a state change so slowly that they provide one of the few relatively

constant factors in international politics. These characteristics must be taken into account by every statesman, for policies adopted without regard to their influence are usually foreordained to failure.

So obvious and prominent are the effects of geography on the political life of states that there is a school of geographical determinists who believe that geography is the single determining influence on state power, state activity, and the life of the people in a state. These disciples of geopolitics, as this theory is called, have been particularly influential in Germany.[1] But the student should beware of accepting any such extreme point of view on this question. Although geography is undoubtedly a vital conditioning factor in the existence of states it is by no means a final determinant. Human forces quite as much as natural forces have shaped the destiny of states, and to ascribe to geography any final deterministic role is an error. But that geography has a strong influence on state policy and on some occasions may even determine it can hardly be denied.[2] It is important, therefore, that any analysis of the forces that underlie the struggle for power in world politics should include an examination of the great natural factors affecting state existence.

The Climatic Factor

Climate is probably the foremost of all the geographical factors affecting the life of states. Degrees of heat and cold, humidity, rainfall, and the prevalence of cyclonic storms, all condition the human organization of every region. There is a clear and close correlation between favorable climate and national energy, economic power, and capacity for progress and civilization.[3] And there is an equally clear and close relationship be-

[1] For a description of this science of geopolitics see Chapter 21.

[2] In this connection see Nicholas J. Spykman and Abbie A. Rollins, "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review,* 33:3 (June, 1939), pp. 391–410, and 33:4 (August, 1939), pp. 591–614.

[3] Two outstanding books which consider the relationship between climate and world power are J. Fairgrieve, *Geography and World Power,* London, University of London Press, 1915, and Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate,* New Haven, Yale, 1924.

tween unfavorable climates and underdeveloped political and social institutions.

The unfavorable climates. An extremely cold climate is not conducive to the development of state life and the cold zones of the earth near the polar regions and the summits of very high mountains never contain powerful political organizations.[4] In these regions the resource base is too limited to permit either large concentrations of population or industrial life. Most of the soil is frozen or covered with snow and ice, and even that land which is economically useful has only a limited value for grazing, agriculture, and forestry. Occasional deposits of minerals are sometimes found, as in the case of the iron ore of northern Sweden and the gold of Alaska, and sealing, whaling, and fishing may also provide important local industries. To obtain these limited resources states have often competed for cold-zone lands. But so unfavorable is the general situation of these areas that today no state exists all of whose territory rests in this colder part of the earth.

Aridity is another severe handicap to political development. On desert lands men must base their existence on the oases and often lead a nomadic existence in which the creation of strong and permanent political institutions is impossible. Arid lands support large populations only where plentiful water can be found for irrigation or where there are valuable mineral deposits. Egypt is an example of an arid state which supports a relatively large population on the basis of an agricultural economy made possible by the Nile River overflow. In an earlier period of history Egypt was a powerful state, but as men gradually spread northward toward the richer lands of temperate climate Egypt lost its comparative importance. Although today a number of states exist all of whose territory lies in arid or semiarid regions, none has developed great political power.

The hot regions of the earth support large populations, but

[4] For a useful map of "human occupance" showing the areas of unfavorable and favorable climates for the development of political activity, as well as for a good discussion of these climates, see Samuel Van Valkenburg, *Elements of Political Geography*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1939, pp. 116–125.

a warm climate seems also to limit political development. In tropical regions with no dry season the continual heat and wet, together with the handicap of tropical forest growth, discourage large population and advanced political life. On the other hand, where there is a distinct dry season that brings a break in climatic monotony, as in India and Java, dense population may combine with great economic productivity. It is significant, however, that even these regions are usually politically controlled by the more energetic and industrialized states of the temperate zone.

The favorable climates. The most favorable climates for political development are found in two zones; the tropical mountain highlands and the great temperate zones of higher latitudes.

Tropical mountains and highlands often have a climate that is cool enough to be conducive to physical activity and they are sometimes rich in agricultural and mineral resources. Many South and Central American states have rich upland districts of this character that have contributed much to the growth of political power. However, most of the upland regions of low-latitude countries are of limited area and are extremely mountainous. This combination is usually enough to hamper the development of powerful tropical highland states. An exception is Brazil, which has so much well-situated upland that it has become a prominent country.

An examination of the map of the world will show, however, that Brazil is a very notable exception, for every other important nation is located within the north or south temperate zones. By far the greatest concentrations of present-day political power lie in the large north temperate zone that includes Europe, central North America, and the Far East. It is significant that every one of the most powerful states engaged in the Second World War is found in this north temperate zone: the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan. In this zone stimulating climate and the raw materials of industry are found together as in no other part of the earth. It is interesting to note, however, that the rise of temperate-zone states to become great powers is a compara-

tively recent development. In an earlier period of history the warm-climate countries were the centers of civilization, for at that time men had not learned how to combat the rigorous winters of the north. Technological advances, however, have ceased to make moderate cold a severe handicap and have placed a premium on temperate-zone industrial resources. The gradual shift of power from the warm climates to the temperate zone has rearranged the entire pattern of state relationships.

Although science has proved that temperate climates provide the best natural environment for both physical and mental work there can be considerable variations of climate within this temperate zone. The development of national power is enhanced if there are sharp and frequent variations in temperature from day to day and from season to season. These cyclonic changes in temperature greatly affect the energy of men, the variation providing an important stimulus to mental and physical activity.[5] The amazing industrial and military power that Germany has developed in the short period since the First World War is in no small degree due to the fact that she enjoys an almost optimum climate. Germany lies entirely within the temperate zone and enjoys great cyclonic variations of temperature. This climatic situation and a very special strategic position guarantee Germany a perpetual position of influence in world politics no matter what division may be made of its territory or what form of government it may develop.[6] A similar combination of factors in most of the other temperate-zone states suggests that these countries will always be powerful and influential leaders in international political affairs.

Climate also affects the power of a state by influencing to a considerable degree its internal unity. Uniformity of climate seems to advance national unity while climatic diversity tends to discourage it. A comparison of two great empires will illus-

[5] A detailed study of the influences of cyclonic changes in temperature on various kinds of human activity as well as a description of ideal temperature conditions can be found in Ellsworth Huntington, *Civilization and Climate,* New Haven, Yale, 1924, pp. 220 ff.

[6] For a graphic description of the geographical position of Germany, see Charles Hodges, *Background of International Relations,* New York, Wiley, 1931, pp. 94–95.

trate this fact. The Roman Empire was essentially a Mediterranean empire. Not only were its lands concentrated around that sea but also, despite local variations, they were all remarkably alike in climate. The people of this empire spoke the same geographical language and faced remarkably similar problems. Almost all Mediterranean lands, for example, have winter rains and summer drought. Such a commonly experienced phenomenon promotes similarity in economic activity and social life, and in general a common understanding between those peoples who share it.

In contrast, the British Empire exhibits a remarkable diversity. British possessions are found in almost every corner of the world and in every climatic situation.[7] As a result, the problems and customs of the different parts of the empire tend to differ widely. And this explains in part why many British colonies have demanded a great degree of self-government, or, as in the case of the United States, absolute independence. The U.S.S.R. and Great Britain can also be compared in this respect. The Soviet Union covers more than one-seventh of the earth's area and there is an extraordinary diversity of language and ethnic groups. Yet climate is a strong unifying element, for despite north and south differences in temperature, by far the largest part of the country has the Eurasian continental climate characterized by cold winters and hot summers. It is a disadvantage to the Soviets, however, that although the most important sections of the country lie within the temperate zone these sections enjoy little day-to-day or seasonal variation in temperature, and thus lack the stimulus for energetic activity found in some other temperate-zone states.

The Factor of Location

World position. Location is a fundamental factor of great influence in determining the position and power of a state in world

[7] The best survey of the British Empire from the point of view of political geography, and one of the best surveys of its kind ever made, is C. B. Fawcett, *A Political Geography of the British Empire,* London, Ginn, 1933.

politics.[8] It imposes natural limitations on state activity which statesmen must always consider while formulating policy. So great is the importance of location that at a critical moment in a state's history it may even make the difference between independence and power or between conquest and oblivion. The Second World War has made the truth of this assertion obvious. Moreover, a state's position always conditions its attitude toward other states. Great Britain, closely adjacent to the continent of Europe, has long felt that it must play an active part in Europe's international political life for the sake of its own security and from the necessity of keeping up the long communications of empire. The United States, on the other hand, being separated by thousands of miles from the other great centers of political power, has chosen throughout most of its history to turn inward and to maintain an isolationist attitude toward world political problems. Had nature or accident given the United States, like Great Britain, near and powerful neighbors, such an attitude would probably have been impossible.

The influence of distance from the equator on the climate and therefore on the political life of states has already been examined. It is the middle-latitude states which have become the great powers. But that almost all these states should be in the Northern Hemisphere can only be explained by the location of the earth's great land masses and oceans. The great temperate-zone continents of Eurasia and North America both lie in the Northern Hemisphere. The Southern Hemisphere contains only the relatively small continents of Africa, South America, and Australia, and all three of these continents lie largely in the tropics. For these reasons it is probable that the Northern Hemisphere countries will always be the most powerful in the world. This probability becomes even more apparent when their position in respect to the great oceans and seas is examined.

The great oceans, in terms of political geography, are the

[8] A more extended treatment of the political influence of location on state life may be found in Van Valkenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–102.

Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific.[9] Although the Arctic and Antarctic Oceans are of large area they are of distinctly secondary political importance. The Antarctic Ocean drains no land and the cold Arctic Ocean has not yet become of any great political or economic significance in spite of the efforts of the Soviet Union to make its North Siberian coast a major traffic artery.

Of all oceans the Atlantic is by far the most important.[10] About 900,000,000 people, or 44 per cent of the world's total population, live on the shores of the Atlantic or its inland seas. Moreover, in modern times these Atlantic countries have extended their domination to many other hundreds of millions of people, making this area the great world center of empire. About three-quarters of the world's sea-going commerce is carried on Atlantic waters and most of the industrial strength of the globe is concentrated in the Atlantic drainage area. The shores of the Atlantic and particularly the north Atlantic are, therefore, the best location for state existence in the world. More than chance has determined that the capital of every great power in the world, except Japan, is located in this Atlantic area.

The shores of the Pacific Ocean rank second in point of desirability for state existence. Although 723,000,000 people, or over 35 per cent of the total population of the world, live on the shores of the Pacific, many of these are Asiatics with extremely low standards of living. The United States and Japan are the only great industrial powers in the Pacific. And the commercial relationships of the United States lie primarily across the Atlantic. However, the trade of Pacific countries has greatly improved in recent years and the importance of the Pacific area as compared with the Atlantic has increased.

The Indian Ocean area, lying between the Straits of Malacca

[9] An excellent analysis of the influence of coastline on state power may be found in Derwent Whittlesey, *The Earth and the State,* New York, Holt, 1939, pp. 56–129.

[10] For a more specific and extended treatment of the significance of world location in respect to the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans see Nicholas Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy I," *American Political Science Review,* 32:1 (February, 1938), pp. 41–43.

and the Suez Canal, ranks a poor third as compared with the Atlantic and Pacific areas. Although 400,000,000 people or almost 20 per cent of the globe's total population live on its shores, the Indian Ocean area is primarily a colonial world, in which until recently Great Britain exercised unquestioned dominance.

In the earlier discussion on climate it was shown that the centers of world power have moved toward the temperate zones. But even within these zones interesting shifts of power have taken place that have changed the comparative situation of every state wherever located. For a very long time after the establishment of the modern state system the center of world power rested in western Europe. Europe contained the world's only great concentration of peoples with an advanced technological civilization and at the same time it was the home of the great world empires. But recent historical events have entirely changed this picture. As a result of the Spanish-American War the United States became a great power; as a result of the First World War Japan also rose to highest rank. The result of these and similar developments has been a decentralization of world power that has marked the end of European world domination. Today the United States dominates the Americas, Japan the Far East, the Soviet Union central Eurasia, while the area of domination of western Europe is confined to the Eastern Atlantic lands, to Africa, and rather doubtfully to the Indian Ocean.

Such basic shifts in centers of power change the political relationship of every state towards every other, as well as every state's absolute power in world affairs. The reorientation of Latin American states toward the United States and away from Europe illustrates this point. So also does the situation of the smaller or less powerful states of the Far East, who now fear Japanese rather than European imperialism. The states which have lost the most from this decentralization of power are European. The state which has gained the most is the United States. Facing both the great oceans, with the direct access this gives to all the other great powers, the United States as far as

location is concerned is probably the best-favored state in the world.

Although major shifts in the centers of world power are accomplished only over long periods of time, changes in communications may very quickly change the locational significance of an individual state or even of an entire region.[11] Before the Suez Canal was built, Capetown at the southern tip of Africa had an exceptional commercial importance. But this importance was lost when the shorter Mediterranean and Red Sea route to the Orient was opened up. In a similar fashion, the ports of Brazil and the Argentine Republic suffered when the Panama Canal was built and the long trip around South America was no longer necessary. Until very recently many small islands in the Pacific—such as Midway, Wake, Guam, Baker, Jarvis, and Howland—went almost unnoticed in political circles. The development of the modern long-range airplane, however, has made them a primary consideration in the Pacific strategy of both the United States and Japan. The airplane, too, has done much to change the basic relationship between Great Britain and the continent of Europe. Although the English Channel is still a formidable water barrier it does not protect England against bombardment from the air, and it is possible that because of the growth of air power the Channel may no longer prove an effective barrier against invasion.

The influence of regional location. In terms of regional location, states may be classified into three groups: (1) landlocked states, (2) island states, (3) states with both sea and land frontiers.[12]

Landlocked states are ordinarily of small importance in terms of relative political power. If there are elements of strength in the position of a landlocked state it will almost inevitably push toward the sea and thus cease to fall into this category. On the other hand, if it is weak, it will usually fall prey to other states. The few landlocked states that have had a long-continued

[11] For a more complete discussion of the influence of communications on the position and power of states, see Spykman, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–50.

[12] For a penetrating analysis of the regional geography of Europe see Griffith Taylor, ***Environment and Nation,*** Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1936.

existence have almost always been protected by formidable natural boundaries, as in the case of Switzerland.

Island states are also few in number, although present island states include two great powers, Great Britain and Japan. The defense of island states is always primarily a naval problem. Great Britain and Japan are formidable naval powers because in a world of power politics they must be so. Weak island states usually fall into the hands of great powers. However, if an island state is strong enough to maintain its independence during the formative period of its existence it will usually develop sea power. And power having been established, an island position has great advantages in terms of both commerce and defense. The development of air warfare may make the defense of such states a more difficult undertaking in the future.

Most states of the world have both sea and land frontiers and thus must maintain both sea and land forces for defense. Whether military or naval power is emphasized will depend on the particular situation of each state. A coast which contains many good harbors will usually favor the development of sea power, particularly if the state has naturally strong land boundaries and if it is situated on one of the great commercial sea lanes. Conversely, a state with poor harbors but with a rich land area or powerful neighbors will tend to develop military power. If a state has both a good outlet to the sea and wide open land frontiers, as in the case of France and Germany, it will enjoy great advantages in communications but it will also have the difficult problem of both land and sea defense. States like the United States, Canada, and Russia, with two widely separated seacoasts, would be expected theoretically to have a most difficult defensive problem but actually this expectation does not always prove true in practice. Although the United States does have the problem of defending two coasts, it has compensation for this task in the absence of any strong or aggressive neighbor across a land frontier. Much more difficult is the situation of a country like France, with two seacoasts to defend as well as an extremely vulnerable land frontier.

Another regional influence on the political life of a state de-

pends on the state's locality in regard to its neighbors. Three general situations are possible; (1) a strong state between two weak neighbors, (2) a relationship of approximate equality, and (3) a weak state between two strong states.

Quite obviously the position of a strong state between two weak neighbors is the most satisfactory both for the safety of the state and for its power relationships. The best example of a state in this situation today is the United States, lying between Canada and Mexico.[13] Neither of its neighbors can threaten the domination of the United States on the North American continent and it is difficult to see how either will ever be able to do so in the future. Mexico is poor in resources, population, and locational advantages. Canada, although it has a territory rich for its limited population, also has too few resources ever to threaten the United States.

The location of a state between states of equal power is precarious, for there is always danger of joint attack. Hence most states in this situation try to strengthen themselves through alliances. Germany has long been in a middle position between France and Russia, and has always felt it necessary to seek outside support against those powers. In the same fashion the Soviet Union, lying between Germany and Japan, has also sought outside assistance.

The political situation of a weak state between two powerful states is the most difficult of all, for its security and even its existence usually depend on its value to its more powerful neighbors. A state placed in this buffer position will ordinarily follow a policy of strict neutrality and make every effort not to antagonize either neighbor. Switzerland is a state of this type and has successfully pursued such a policy for many years. Switzerland has had many special advantages, however. It is in a useful position to facilitate transport between great powers and at the same time it is protected by formidable mountain barriers. In contrast, topography has made Belgium a natural

[13] For the influence geographical situation has had in American history, see Ellen C. Semple (revised by C. F. Jones), *American History and Its Geographic Conditions*, Boston, Houghton, 1933.

passage between great powers and as a result it has been a traditional European battleground.

Boundaries. The natural boundaries of a state are always a distinctive feature of its regional position and often condition its relations with its neighbors.[14] Modern methods of warfare and communication, however, have made differences in boundaries somewhat less important than in the past, for few present-day frontiers put any unsurmountable barrier against invasion.

There are six different types of "natural" boundaries: river, seacoast, forest, marsh, desert, and mountain ranges.

Rivers have often served as frontiers and in many ways they seem ideal for this purpose, since they require no marking and they form a barrier requiring some effort to pass. Their actual value, however, can be easily exaggerated. If a navigable river forms a boundary between two states the question of commercial use of the river may cause friction between them. Moreover, river valleys tend to become economic units in themselves and thus much of the separating value of the river is lost. At the same time the very fact that the river does constitute a political border causes economic inconvenience. The frequent result is that both countries wish to control the entire river valley. This situation has long affected the Rhine region between Germany and France.

The seacoast boundary plays two roles at the same time. The sea is an avenue of approach as well as a barrier, and most maritime states feel that a sea boundary must be protected by naval power. Moreover, the defensive value of seacoast boundaries has declined as the use of military air power has increased. Nevertheless, almost all states are eager to attain seacoast boundaries, for these have many commercial advantages and make possible a large degree of military mobility.

The forest frontier has lost most of its strategic value in modern times, for to present-day weapons of war a forest offers no very formidable barrier. The fall of Singapore to the

[14] The best recent study of boundary problems is S. Whittemore Boggs, *International Boundaries,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1940. Another good discussion will be found in Nicholas J. Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy II," *The American Political Science Review,* 32:2 (April, 1939), pp. 231–236.

Japanese shows that even a dense tropical forest barrier is not completely effective. Yet the forest may still retain a certain protective value, as in the case of the Panama Canal which is considered impregnable against land attack.

Swamps make useful boundaries although they are found in relatively few frontier areas and are usually of very limited extent. Perhaps the Pripet marshes are the best example of this kind of boundary terrain. Many times they have protected central Poland from Russian invasion, while in the Second World War they greatly simplified the defensive problems of the Soviet Union.

Desert frontiers offer the advantage of difficulty of terrain and lack of water. Military advance and communication are difficult over sandy desert and the topography offers few opportunities for entrenchment in position. The value of this type of frontier has been evidenced during the Second World War by the campaigns in Libya. Neither Great Britain nor the Axis powers have been able to hold territorial gains made in the Libyan desert, with the result that neither Egypt nor Tunisia has been successfully invaded.

Mountain ranges are the most effective natural barriers of all, although they differ widely in value in accordance with the topography of the mountain region. The Pyrenees form an extremely effective barrier between France and Spain, not because they are unusually high, for that is hardly the case, but because the passes through the mountains are few in number and difficult to cross. The Alps on the French-Italian border, in contrast, offer Italy little protection from any army invading the Italian peninsula from France, for wide converging passes lead through the mountains. But although mountains may not always be perfect defense barriers they nevertheless contribute greatly to the stability of frontiers. The open border between France and Germany has shifted many times as compared to the Spanish-French boundary or the frontier between France and Italy.

Thus climate and topography greatly influence boundary relationships between states. But still another method of classify-

ing boundaries is possible. The stability or instability of a state's boundaries will depend in large part on its political maturity.[15] The boundaries of new and youthful states are usually considered fixed in the viewpoint of these states themselves. But from the viewpoint of their neighbors new state boundaries are usually very far from being fixed or accepted, since new states are usually carved out of territories once belonging to neighbors who are anxious to get them back. Czechoslovakia and other central European states are good examples of youthful countries whose territories were carved from older states and whose boundaries have proved unstable.

Adolescent [16] countries very often have an urge to expansion that creates unstable boundaries. Germany is an example of an adolescent state, its constituents only recently united, that has a tremendous urge for expansion. Even in this case, however, there is a difference in the stability as between different borders. The present German regime has not challenged the Swiss boundary and there is some evidence that in its territorial aggrandizement it intends to absorb large areas toward the East while permitting quasi-independence to western European states.

Mature states, like Switzerland and the United States, tend to have traditional and relatively stable boundaries which change very infrequently. Some very old countries, however, have very unstable boundaries. China is an excellent example, for surrounded as it is by foreign influences it lacks a single boundary that could be called really stable.

The Influence of Size and Shape

Size. No state can be powerful without sufficient size.[17] While size provides no index to the cultural attainments of a state, a small state can never hope to play a powerful role in world political affairs. However well situated a small state may be,

[15] For an interesting discussion of the influence of a state's age on its foreign policy see Samuel Van Valkenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 363–371.

[16] The term "adolescent" is common in political geography.—*Editor.*

[17] For more detailed treatments of the influence of size, see Van Valkenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–110.

it must inevitably lack the wealth and diversity of raw materials on which great industrial power depends, as well as the population to convert economic resources into military and diplomatic influence.

It must not be deduced from this fact that all large states are powerful; this is far from being the case. A state of large area may be mainly composed of useless territory or it may have other environmental limitations. A good example of a country of this kind is Australia. Although Australia has an area of 3,000,000 square miles, an area almost exactly equal to that of the United States, half of the continent is desert and on only one-eighth of the continent can white men live comfortably. There is no doubt that Australia could support many more people than its present population of 7,000,000, but it can never hope to become a great power.

An examination of the geographical situation of the greatest powers shows that each has large size combined with great resources and population. The British Empire, embracing a quarter of the world's total area, is a political colossus. Should many of the colonies, and particularly India, assert their independence, however, Great Britain might suffer a severe diminution in its world power position. Next in size to the British Empire is the Soviet Union, a rich and populous state, which enjoys the great advantage that all its territory is contiguous if not particularly compact. The United States, perhaps the most powerful state of all, is very compact, has a large area and population, and is generally considered richer than any other country in raw-material resources. Germany has the combined advantages of fairly large size and extremely advantageous location. The other great powers—Japan, France, and Italy—are all fairly large and populous and each controls a large colonial empire.

Although large size is a necessity if a state is to become powerful, in certain special cases large size has hindered the political development of states. China's enormous area and communication difficulties have made it very difficult to mold that state into a single cohesive political unit. One result of its loose

political character has been a series of successful attacks on its borders by the great powers. For many centuries its large size hampered any real unification of imperial Russia, although today the Soviet Union has succeeded in welding the peoples of the vast territory into a much closer unity than they ever experienced before.

Shape. The vulnerability of a state to attack from abroad depends in part upon its shape.[18] Compact shape is of great advantage to a state for the more compact it is the shorter will be the length of its boundary. And the shorter the boundary a state has in relation to its area the less vulnerable it is, for the less it will have to defend. The ideal shape for a state would thus be a perfect circle. While, of course, no state has this shape, some states like France, Switzerland, Hungary and Rumania are remarkably compact.

The long borders of elongated states are very vulnerable to attack. Those who believe, in 1942, that Great Britain will strike at Germany through Norway expect the British to choose this country because of its long coastline, which would be extremely difficult to defend.

Long borders may result if a section of a state is broken off from the main territorial mass. Before the Second World War Germany proper was divided from East Prussia by the Polish Corridor. The effect of this was to lengthen Germany's borders.

No matter what the shape of a state may be, its fundamental safety will partially depend on whether or not its important economic areas are within the frontier zone. The Soviet Union in 1941–1942 was greatly handicapped in its war with Germany by the fact that White Russia and the Ukraine, perhaps its two richest provinces, were directly in the path of the invader. The reorganization of much of Soviet industry in the vicinity of the Ural mountains, far to the east, reflects a desire on the part of the Soviet government to place its new industries as far as is practically possible from frontier zones.

From the point of view of protection, the location of the

[18] For a more extended treatment of the influence of shape, see Van Valkenburg, *op. cit.*, pp. 110–115.

capital of a state also has great significance; here again central location is considered highly desirable. Few states can follow the example of Philip II of Spain, who chose Madrid for his capital because of its exactly central position on the Iberian Peninsula. And some modern capitals have been remarkably vulnerable. A recent example was Prague, the capital of Czechoslovakia. Although Prague is centrally located in relation to the ancient province of Bohemia, it was in the zone near the German border of the new Czechoslovakian state. This geographical location greatly handicapped Czech statesmen in their dealings with their powerful German neighbor.

If a state's international contacts are primarily maritime, the capital is very apt to be located on or near the sea. Historical development often accounts for this location, but although the capital of a maritime state is not often centrally located this is not necessarily a disadvantage. Most maritime states are great sea powers and have strong coastal fortifications. Their capitals are thus fairly safe from attack by enemy naval forces. Moreover, few coastal capitals face directly on the open ocean. Almost all are on coastal rivers or on bays that can be easily defended from the sea. London, Tokyo, Washington, Stockholm, Oslo, Amsterdam, Lisbon, and Rio de Janeiro are all protected in this way. However, the modern bombing airplane has eliminated much of the locational advantage that such cities have enjoyed in the past.

Questions

1. Why is the study of geography necessary for an understanding of international politics?
2. Does geography alone determine the power of a state and the degree of civilization it has attained?
3. What is geopolitics?
4. Why are very cold and very hot climates unfavorable to political development?
5. If aridity is a handicap to political development, why has Egypt been so prominent in world history?
6. To what major geographical fact is Brazil a notable exception?

7. The most powerful states engaged in the Second World War are located in what temperature zone?

8. What is meant by "cyclonic" changes and how do they affect the mental and physical activity of men?

9. What great advantage did the Roman Empire enjoy as compared with the British Empire?

10. Why are Northern Hemisphere states more powerful than Southern Hemisphere states?

11. What are the three great oceans, in terms of political geography, and what is their relative importance?

12. Why is Europe no longer the center of world power?

13. Why are there not a larger number of landlocked and island states?

14. How may states be classified in terms of regional location?

15. What is the ideal physical relationship that a state may have with its neighbors?

16. Name six different types of natural boundaries and describe the relative importance of each.

17. Are the boundaries of new states more or less stable than those of older states? Why?

18. Are all large states powerful? Why or why not?

19. Why should a perfect circle be an ideal shape for a state?

20. What is the best location for a state's capital?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Review the outstanding military events of the present war to discover what role geography has played in each.

2. Make a critical analysis of present day American foreign policy to discover to what degree geographical considerations influence policy.

3. Make a survey of the life of tropical states to determine whether their highland regions have a higher pattern of political and social development than the lowlands.

4. Prepare a study of the temperate zone to discover which of its areas have the best "cyclonic" climates.

5. Make a comparison of the area of tropic and temperate zones in the Southern Hemisphere with the area of such lands in the Northern Hemisphere.

6. Examine into the effect of the airplane on the political geography of each of the great powers.

7. Make a detailed examination of the regional geography of some such area as the Mediterranean or the Caribbean.

8. Prepare a careful examination into the boundary problems and position of one great power.

9. Make a comparison between Australia and the United States to discover why these states of equal size should be so dissimilar in power and population.

10. Prepare an investigation into the influence of shape on the history of France, Russia, or China.

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CHAPTER 4

WORLD ECONOMICS

The Significance of Economics to Modern International Relations

In the struggle for power, security, or well-being, states apply and husband their wealth and material resources. These acts are in the field of world economics.[1] On the surface it would appear that what a state does in this respect concerns only itself, but a little closer scrutiny reveals that such is not the case; a few illustrations will make this point clear.

From 1914 to 1919 the agricultural production of the European countries dropped sharply in consequence of the First World War. The slaughtering of hogs in Germany fell off more than 90 per cent between 1913 and 1919; slashes in Denmark and Holland were equally severe. Meanwhile, American growers of corn and hogs had a difficult time keeping pace with demands from abroad, and by 1918 the large packing houses of the United States were shipping thirteen times as much lard [2] to Denmark as they had in 1913. During the same time wheat production trebled in Canada and expanded to unprecedented levels in the United States, in Argentina, and in Australia. Two years after the Armistice, Europe—except for the U.S.S.R.—had resumed agricultural production and returned to prewar levels. By 1928, the grain elevators and bins of most of these countries, spurred on by the competition of the Soviet Union, had huge surpluses. By 1936, German hog production was 50 per cent higher than in 1913. In the agricultural countries farmers called for relief; tariff regulations were established in

[1] See R. G. Hawtrey, *The Economic Aspects of Sovereignty*, New York, Lohgmans, 1930.

[2] See the *Björnstjerne Björnson*, the *Alfred Nobel*, and the *Kim*, Great Britain, Admiralty Division (in Prize) of the High Court of Justice, L. R. (1915), p. 215.

the effort to aid domestic growers; and in the United States the administration entered upon a systematic program of curtailing agricultural production at home, and of entering into treaties for trade abroad.

In manufacturing the situation was the same. By the end of 1916 more than half of the British manpower and productive facilities were concentrated on war industries and the peacetime exports were substantially abandoned. The same was true of France and of other manufacturing countries of Europe. Meanwhile the United States and India expanded their textile production to absorb the demands which the British mills could no longer meet.[3] Industry shifted from one country to another. Money and credit likewise were disrupted as wholesale inflation occurred in Germany after the war and as prices rose 150 per cent in the United States between 1913 and 1925. The foreign lending and trade policies of countries contradicted each other to such an extent, as will be seen in the chapter on "Economic Warfare," that no economic system could be said to exist in the world.

The dislocations of the First World War were so extensive that no one could possibly understand them, much less do anything about them. The prosperity of the 1920's was artificial and deceptive as the world lived and moved on borrowed money. Speculation rose to unprecedented dizzy heights. If it was not expanded bank loans and investments at home, it was loans abroad; here in the United States speculation in urban real estate and speculation in securities, much of it with capital from abroad, vied for first place in the quest for the will-o'-the-wisp of quick wealth. To make matters worse, there was a slowing down in demand for durable goods and a tendency for prices and wages in many fields to become rigid.

Thus in 1928, when the depression began, agricultural production was not decreased; instead, the produce was sold at such prices as it could bring. Manufacturing industry likewise did not willingly reduce its output but sold its products for what-

[3] For a repetition during this war, see *Indian Information,* 10:88 (February 15, 1942), pp. 195 ff.

ever prices they could bring. It is estimated that between 1928 and 1932 industrial production shrank by two-fifths. The depression in the United States, where bank credit was enormously expanded, was especially acute. The world was shown to be one great co-ordinated economic area, all parts subject to the same shocks. What was done in one country had repercussions in other countries.[4]

The most significant conclusions from these short illustrations are: (1) They show the mutual interdependence of the economic world, an interdependence which gives rise both to co-operation and to conflict. (2) They also demonstrate the great complexity of world economics, particularly in its relation to political power. (3) They prove, finally, that no matter what theoretical concept of the subject a student of world politics may have, he must of necessity face economic facts in his interpretation. Such items as economic motives, economic controversies, tariffs, treaties, and wars are fundamental to the understanding of his topic.

Conflicts Concerning Fundamental Principles

There are three chief theories concerning the types of economic relations states should have with each other, and these theories have a direct bearing upon the struggle for power.

(1) The *individualist* or the *free-trade* point of view has private prosperity as its fundamental goal. The individual rather than the nation is the unit about whom the order revolves; and under this theory he has the right to engage in whatever industry or activity will provide him with the largest reward. Acceptance of this theory means that the state must abandon any idea of self-sufficiency. Acting upon it, the individual is permitted to buy in the cheapest market and to sell in the dearest; this practice results logically in the abandonment of restraints on exports and imports. By emphasizing the economic interests of the individual this theory purports to pro-

[4] See Herbert Feis, *The Changing Pattern of International Economic Affairs*, New York, Harper, 1940.

mote peace by lessening international economic frictions and promoting mutual dependence.[5]

(2) The second viewpoint is the *nationalist* or *neomercantilist,* which places national security first and individual prosperity second. This theory is the harbor of autarchy and nationalism. Here the economic unit is the nation, which seeks self-sufficiency in agriculture, in industry, in raw materials, in finance, and in transportation. To that end nationals are expected to patronize the home markets and protective tariffs are used to promote this patronage. Self-sufficiency requires restraining the export of vital raw materials and manufactured goods and to that extent export controls and regulations are favored, always with an eye to the possible use of materials by potential enemies in future wars. Such a program stimulates imperialism, militarism, tariff wars, struggles for markets and raw materials, economic rivalry, and a dependence upon national power for the furtherance of national economic well-being. In general this is the economic doctrine of the totalitarian states, while most of the economic doctrine of the democracies is to be found in the individualist point of view.[6]

(3) As against the two foregoing, there is the *internationalist* point of view which has a great many variations. For example, there is business internationalism which contemplates the tremendous ramifications of such institutions as the Royal Dutch Shell Company, the Standard Oil Company, the British-American Tobacco Company, Woolworth's, the United Fruit Company, or the Ford Motor Company. Business internationalism tends to reduce the significance of national frontiers and regulations and to emphasize international co-operation. There is also world-government internationalism, for examples, the League of Nations, the I.L.O., schemes for federal union, international regulation of rivers, and the many programs listed in Chapter 6. There are also the underground internationals

[5] R. M. Campbell, "Empire Free Trade," *Economic Journal,* 39 (1929), pp. 371–378.

[6] See A. W. Jones, "The Free Market and the Future," *Fortune,* 25 (April, 1942), pp. 98 ff.

both of the Communists and the Fascists as well as the internationals of Socialists and workers. These last emphasize a particular class or group interest, setting it above both the individual and the nation.

Obviously none of the three mentioned types of internationalism includes all possible viewpoints; but the three do show the main trends of thinking which affect states in their economic relations in the world, particularly as to the emphasis and the implementation of their policies.

Some Basic Factors in World Economy

Underlying all world political economy are several fundamental factors, some of which are mentioned or discussed in other chapters: geography in Chapter 3; population in Chapter 2; politics and world organization in Chapter 3; law and legal systems in Chapter 5; imperialism and colonies in Chapter 2; and colonies in general, also in Chapter 2.

It is well to recognize at the outset that modern world economy rests on agricultural and industrial bases, although it is essentially affected by the latter. Nations build their economic orders on these two foundations and attain a particular national economy according to the interplay of resources, land, capital, and labor. World economics, like world politics, is but an extension of domestic activity to foreign fields. It consists of the total of all national economies, especially in their international manifestations. Sometimes world economics takes the form of international enterprises such as trusts and organizations for access to markets or raw materials. Sometimes it grows out of the interdependence of all nations for essential raw materials. At other times it manifests itself as world monopolies or the international control of raw materials; and again it may revolve about some particular resource problem such as petroleum. At still other times it manifests itself in co-operation or in conflict.[7]

[7] See *International Economic Relations,* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1934.

Raw and Basic Materials


In measuring a nation's power in terms of the economic factor it will be found that a vital part of that power lies in raw materials or substitutes for raw materials.[8] If a state is to survive in the modern period, it must be able to command these materials or have a sufficient store of them laid by to take care of its needs in case of conflict. However, the latter alternative is highly unsatisfactory in anything but the shortest of wars, because modern conflict is one of destruction of fighting equipment to the point of attrition. The aim of a warring power is to prevent the enemy from keeping up with the productive capacity of the rival state, thus overwhelming it not only with men but also with equipment. This strategy makes modern warfare very much a matter of industry and production, which in its turn makes raw materials of great significance to a state's fighting power.

Modern industry has created a colossal demand for a wide variety of raw materials; but nature has limited their supply and distributed them unevenly, thus giving rise to international rivalry and conflict.[9] Iron, coal, petroleum, phosphates, vegetable and animal products including wheat, rubber, sugar, and the like, are not evenly divided among states, and the nationalistic desire for self-sufficiency in them causes acute rivalry. This situation is discussed in Chapter 7 on "The Economic Struggle for Power" in connection with the "have" and the "have-not" nations. States, in preparing for war during times of peace, attempt to secure control over or access to as many of these raw materials as possible.

Among the most significant raw materials is petroleum, which produces gasoline for aircraft and automotive vehicles; fuel oil for heating and for ships and industrial plants; kerosene for lamps, stoves, and tractors; lubricants for the prime movers, machines, and machine tools; wax for the coating of paper; oil

[8] See *World Resources and Peace,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1941.

[9] See Herman Kranold, *International Distribution of Raw Materials,* New York, Harper, 1940.



MAP 5. WORLD PETROLEUM AND RUBBER


for cutting metals and tempering steel, and other products for countless purposes. Between 1860 and 1920 over ten billion barrels had been drawn from the earth and since that time many billions more have been extracted and refined. In times of war the demands increase. A major warring nation uses several million barrels in the course of a year of campaigning. This vital raw material is found in the United States, Mexico, the U.S.S.R., Iran, the Netherlands East Indies, Rumania, and Central and South America. For the most part, the oil resources of the world have been controlled by a few countries or by large international trusts, such as the Standard Oil Company or the Royal Dutch Shell Company subject to some control by these countries.

A second raw material is coal, the chief source of artificial heat and power, the basis for high explosives such as trinitrotoluene and picric acid, the source of coal tar, dyes, and other industrial chemicals. Modern civilization is built on coal, which is found in the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., China, Africa, and Central and South America. The Saar Basin and its disposal at the end of the First World War indicated how important this single raw material is.[10]


Still a third basic raw material is iron, which like coal is a foundation of modern industry and life. Iron is the metal which determines the character of modern warfare. This metal also is unequally distributed, the chief mines and reserves being found in the United States, Great Britain, Lorraine, the Soviet Union, Brazil, Sweden, Spain, and China. How tremendously important this raw material is may be seen in the names which have been built upon its development such as Carnegie, Stinnes, Thyssen, de Wendel, Armstrong, and Vickers.

These three most important raw materials are only the leaders of a long list of others about which similar observations can be made. They include chromium, platinum, copper, manganese, nickel, tungsten, vanadium, the nitrates, potash, phosphate, mercury, zinc, tin, antimony, aluminum, lead, sulphur,

[10] See "The Crisis in Material," *Fortune*, 24 (August, 1941), pp. 66 ff.



MAP 6. WORLD COAL AND IRON



MAP 7. UNITED STATES RAW MATERIAL DEFICIENCIES

mica, asbestos, fluorspar, graphite, and pyrite.[11] There are also strategically important vegetable and animal products such as cotton, rubber, hemp, jute, coconut oil, palm oil, peanut oil, castor oil, linseed oil, olive oil, hides, skins, lumber, to say nothing of foodstuffs, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

In general, countries seek self-sufficiency in raw materials for security in war, for economic prosperity, for nationalistic pride, or because of group pressures supported by popular motives. The effort to attain self-sufficiency takes the form of imperialistic enterprises as was indicated in Chapter 2, and it is also supported by such regulations as import duties which seek to encourage domestic production of the raw materials, export duties to prevent depletion of stocks by shipping to foreign countries, embargoes to prohibit any exportation at all, price regulations to control profit, licensing of monopolies so that exploitation may take place consistently with public policy, and nationalization to bring the monopoly completely under government control. Obviously these measures lead to frictions and stimulate war, and when the wars end they must be weighed in the peace settlements.[12]

No country in the world is self-sufficient in all basic and strategic raw materials. The United States is perhaps better situated than most other states, but it is far from self-sufficient,[13] and a number of laws have been enacted to provide for the procurement, the conservation, and the control of such materials as are needed.[14]

Markets and Trade

Another measure of the economic power of a state lies in its

[11] See C. H. Behre, "Mineral Economics and World Politics," *Geographical Review* (October, 1940), pp. 676–678.

[12] See J. B. Condliffe, *The Reconstruction of World Trade,* New York, Norton, 1940.

[13] On this point see "Trials and Errors," *Fortune,* 25 (June, 1942), pp. 204–208.

[14] For an excellent summary of the measures taken to date, as well as for a succinct and pertinent discussion as it applies to the United States, see Harrison A. Gerhardt, *Strategic and Critical Raw Materials,* West Point, U.S. Military Academy, 1942.

markets. The capitalistic system has produced an expansion of industry which cannot be satisfied with domestic markets and therefore demands an outlet for its surplus products. Modern automotive and steam transportation have made the carrying of those products abroad profitable even though they are bulky and may sell at low prices. The mechanization of agriculture has caused specialization and consequently greater interdependence of states in matters of food. Simultaneously, however, nationalism—regarding the state as an economic unit—demands the bolstering of its trade and markets by political protection. In order to secure foreign markets states have enacted special legislation, paid export bounties and drawbacks, negotiated favorable treaties, acquired colonies, sought favorable balances of trade and spheres of influence, and established restrictions on imports.

Trade among states grows out of: (1) differences in stages of economic development in the trading regions; (2) differences in their technology; and (3) differences in their environment.[15] An illustration of the first is the sale of American sewing machines to South American Indians; of the second, the sale of American automobiles to Canada; and of the third, the importation of coconut oil by the United States. In general, interchange of trade takes place between regions, the most important of which are: eastern North America, western North America, northwestern Europe, eastern Europe, the Mediterranean lands, tropical America, the Pampas, western South America, eastern Asia, India, the East Indies, and the Australia-New Zealand region. Most of these regions have easy access to each other, principally by water. Often they lie opposite each other across great bodies of water. The principal trade routes of the world therefore will be seen to run between regions, whose chief centers lie at the points where these routes converge. Such centers include London, New York, Shanghai, and Buenos Aires. These regions and centers are sometimes connected by rail where no bodies of water lie between them; thus Paris and

[15] See H. J. Tasca, *World Trading Systems,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1939.

Berlin are the chief railroad centers of the continent of Europe. Canals and rivers may also serve as connecting links and as arteries of traffic and trade.

On the surface it may not be apparent how closely these regions are tied together by trade nor how much the welfare of one region and its component states is affected by the other. Here is an illustration. If the wool clip in Australia is reduced because of a quarrel between ranchmen and shearers, the markets in England and the United States are immediately affected. The price of raw wool is enhanced; hence woolen cloth rises in value; hence in turn a suit of clothes in Philadelphia will cost more than before—and all because the shearers and the raisers of sheep in Australia could not agree. Sometimes, where a country has substantial control of a single product, it may be able to determine the world price of that product as the British did with rubber or as the Brazilians did with coffee. Under this type of control the inter-regional dependence is easier to see, but the trade ties in both situations are international in character.

In order to protect their trade and markets, countries have established tariff systems.[16] In general a tariff is a charge levied by a country upon a product in order to permit it to cross its boundaries. Tariffs are a direct negation of the free-trade policy which England advocated in the middle of the last century and followed until the end of the First World War. The United States early followed a moderate protectionist policy, which grew more and more protectionist with the passing of years. Germany also tended toward low tariffs but increased them with the passing of time, and when the treaty terms of the First World War had been jettisoned she returned to protection. Russia, early a low-tariff country, increased her tariffs until the First World War; the Soviet Union went on a very closely government-controlled trade program following the Revolution. For the most part countries the world over must today be classified as protectionist, that is they protect their markets by

[16] See Margaret S. Gordon, *Barriers to World Trade,* New York, Macmillan, 1942, chap. 1.

high tariffs. Broadly classified, tariffs are of three types: (1) they may be the enactments of a legislature; or (2) they may be established by agreement between two or more countries; or (3) they may be autonomous in which case a special tariff-making organization establishes the provisions. Sometimes states have what are called multiple schedule tariffs, that is, two or more schedules which may be resorted to as the case may require. Among these the more common are: (1) preferential tariffs which apply a lower schedule to some countries than to others: (2) maximum tariffs in which a ceiling is set, which ceiling is used against the countries most dangerous economically; (3) general and conventional tariffs, in which case the rates to be applied are agreed upon between the exporting and the applying countries. Any combination of these multiple tariffs may be encountered.

There are many arguments in favor of tariffs. Among them is the protection of the domestic market so that foreign competition may not destroy home industries. The idea, here again, is national self-sufficiency. Tariffs also aim to protect the farmer, maintain high wages for labor, promote a higher standard of living, preserve a favorable balance of trade, provide a source of revenue, and foster the economic well-being of a country. However, the key viewpoint to all these items is undoubtedly to be found in nationalism.

Arguments against tariffs urge that national self-sufficiency is not desirable; that protection for a nation's industries is bad because it makes them soft and unable to stand up under competition with industry from abroad; that protection actually increases prices to the people of a nation and especially to the farmers who must buy manufactured goods whose prices are enhanced by a high tariff; that a favorable balance of trade means nothing; and that protective tariffs are wasteful and unproductive.

These two paragraphs touch only a few aspects of the problem.[17]

Turning to another phase of the market problem, it may be

[17] See Margaret S. Gordon, *op. cit.*, chap. 15.

noted that just as states try to grow strong by acquiring territories and empires replete with raw materials, so also they deem it a source of great strength to possess an empire that will furnish them with markets in which to dispose of their manufactured goods. This subject has already received attention in connection with imperialism in Chapter 2. The desire to obtain markets has been one of the chief causes for Western and Japanese imperialism.[18] The acquisition of colonies has been accompanied by an effort to preserve their markets for the mother country; and in order to do so as effectively as possible preferential and low tariffs have been applied to them. This may be seen in Japanese programs in Formosa, Korea, and Sakhalin before the Second World War, in the United States tariff arrangements with Puerto Rico, in the French policy in Madagascar or Tunis, in the Dutch program relative to the Netherlands East Indies, to mention only a few, and above all in Great Britain's preferential treatment of the British Empire and dominions. The reverse of this picture may be found in the efforts of the industrialized states seeking preferences in backward and less industrialized countries, as for example the United States efforts in China and Latin America.

Sometimes states may adjust their tariff conflicts by mutual concessions. This is called tariff bargaining. Sometimes they cannot adjust their differences and such tariff wars as the Italo-French tariff war of 1888–1899 result. Sometimes states may arrange by treaty for preferential tariff treatment and to this end the "most-favored-nation" arrangement has been devised. This practice in general means that the nation profiting by it is entitled to the lowest tariff rate granted by the conferring state to any other state.

Tariffs, however, are not the only means by which markets are secured for nations, nor by which they may promote their trade.[19] One method is for a state to pay premiums to exporters of goods. These are called export bounties. Another way is for

[18] See William Moresco, *Colonial Questions and Peace,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1940.

[19] P. W. Bidwell and A. Upgren, "A Trade Policy for National Defense," *Foreign Affairs,* 19 (January, 1941), pp. 282–296.

the treasury to refund customs duties or to pay exporters of raw materials or producers of semi finished goods used in making products for export. These refunds and payments are called drawbacks. Obviously they lead to competition and rivalry among states. Other methods are reductions of transportation rates on goods destined for export; aids for the building of shipping; financial aid furnished to exporters; pooling for the purposes of dumping (which is the exporting of goods for sale below the normal market price); governmental assistance furnished through officers abroad, through chambers of commerce, and through the political influence of a country used to secure orders abroad.

The vast scope of this field indicates that it is prolific in international rivalries. It is one phase of nationalism and imperialism which is replete with party differences both at home and abroad, with private interests cloaked in a public garb, with national sentiment, security, and self-sufficiency. How fruitful of misunderstanding are the strivings of states for international markets and foreign trade will be shown in Chapter 7.[20]

Perhaps a little better picture of the extensive character of this type of economic activity may be gained from the following observation. The *Foreign Commerce Yearbook for 1935* contains a list of the articles exported from and imported into the United States; with two single-spaced columns to the page more than forty typewritten pages are needed to cover the items. These include such widely diversified articles as whiskey, cream, vegetables, paper, machinery, sealskins, pit props, seal oil, nuts, paving asphalt, jute bags, biscuits, bananas, fencing wire, soap, meat, glass, leather, automobiles, perfumes, cigarettes, coffee, musical instruments, motion-picture films, castor beans, gutta percha, lambskins, tractors, locomotives, fertilizers, railroad ties, rugs, whale guano, wattle bark, and electric machinery. These are only a small fraction of a very extensive list, and they cover the activities of only one country.

[20] See J. A. Krout, ed., "Economic Nationalism, Trade Barriers, and the War," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science,* 19:1 (May, 1940).

Food

Still another measure of the strength of a state lies in the adequacy of its food supply, for the perils of an inadequate supply of foodstuffs are lower standards of living, famine, and perhaps even death of a state itself.[21] The ultimate basis of human life is food, and the greater bulk of the food supply is produced by fishing, range, and tillage, which makes these occupations the most important in the world for three reasons: (1) the number of people engaged in them; (2) the total value of the output; and (3) the importance to human existence. Among the most important food products, particularly as they pertain to export and import and to international rivalries are: wheat, rye, oats, barley, corn, rice, sugar, beef, lamb and mutton, pork, fruits, cod, mackerel, herring, oysters, clams, lobsters, shrimps, salmon, and other sea foods.

Closely related to these products are the essentially nonfood products such as cotton, flax, rubber, sisal, silk, naval stores, and forest products.

The necessity for an adequate food supply has become extremely acute in modern war, in which blockade and counterblockade are effective instruments having as their object the starvation of the people against whom they are used. Oftentimes one may hear the contention that states with surplus populations have inadequate food supplies and hence are entitled to outlets for their "surplus population." This dynamic of state existence was dealt with in Chapter 2 and is typified by the Japanese demands for "outlets" for her people, or by the German complaints during the 1880's, or by Mussolini's arguments when he moved into Ethiopia.[22]

How much there is to this argument has been considered in Chapter 2 on "Dynamics of State Existence." Here it is important to observe that there is great inequality in the distribution of food resources throughout the world; they depend

[21] See Karl Brandt, "Food as a Political Weapon in Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, 19 (April, 1941), pp. 516–529.

[22] See Adolf Berle, "Food and Foreign Policy," *Bulletin* (U.S. Dept. of State), 4 (May 31, 1941), pp. 655–657.

upon climate, nature of the soil, and many other conditions. No nation can produce all types of food for itself any more than any nation possesses a completely rounded supply of all raw materials. Moreover, the export and import of foodstuffs seem not to depend upon adequacy of supply at home. The fact is that all states today, owing to modern transportation, are dependent upon each other for foodstuffs. The United States exports wheat, fruit, and dairy products, but imports coffee, olive oil, spices, nuts, and figs. Britain exports fish, beer, and ale, but imports grain, meat, and dairy products. France in normal times exports fruit, wine, and dairy products, but imports wine, cereals, and coffee. This list can be expanded to include practically every country and every item of food in the world.

In a world of power relationships, then, foodstuffs are tremendously important.[23] They occupy the first place in plans for national self-sufficiency. The programs for autarchy and self-sufficiency of the Soviet Union, Germany, France, Britain, and of practically all major countries are built about this item, which is covered by tariffs and national encouragements of all sorts—bounties, free fertilizers, free seeds, and aids to marketing. For example, Mussolini's draining of the Pontine Marshes had as its purpose the creation of extensive new food-producing areas for Italy. Walther Darré contended during 1939–1941 that Great Britain could not starve Germany by blockade because she is now self-sufficient in food. The Soviet Union solved its food problem by state and collective farms designed to produce more than the former small peasant holdings, and could thereafter turn greater energies to industrialization. Again, these are only a few items in the vast theater of world politics in food.

Transportation

Another important aspect of world economics is transportation, the means by which human beings and all their possessions may be carried from place to place at will. Transporta-

[23] See "Planning for Plenty," *Fortune*, 25 (April, 1942), pp. 61 ff.

tion embraces activities on land and sea, in the air, and under the water.

Naturally for nationalistic reasons all states, especially states on the borders of the trading regions, seek as extensive control of transportation facilities as possible. This effort has led to the development of merchant marines which have as their aim the reduction of freight charges to domestic concerns, making it possible for them to compete with foreign companies. They also have as a purpose the encouragement of export and import trade and the providing of sufficient auxiliary vessels for naval use in times of war.[24, 25]

To promote the growth of domestic shipping concerns, governments have evolved many ways of encouraging the building of merchant vessels, and, once they are built, of keeping them in operation. Some of the more familiar are direct financial assistance or subsidies for which the contributing country may demand some form of return, such as Great Britain does from the Cunard-White Star Company, which carries her mail in exchange for financial aid. The subsidy may be an outright contribution as France granted for the construction of such vessels as the *Ile de France*. Japan is noted for this type of subsidy. Some countries furnish indirect aid, for example, the common practice of restricting the coastwise trade to the local merchant marine; granting preferential railroad rates to some shipping companies or to the ports at which their vessels call, as Germany did prior to 1914; admitting foreign vessels to domestic registry; and exempting certain shipbuilding material from customs duties.[26]

The largest merchant marine in the world, however, would be of little use if it were unable to travel the high seas for one reason or another. To that end the tendency of the world has been to build up a free international system of high-seas transportation and traffic, which has been applied to many straits,

[24] William Diebold, Jr., "The Wartime Use of Shipping," *Foreign Affairs*, 19 (July, 1941), pp. 751–763.

[25] "Who Should Get the Ships?", *Fortune*, 25 (June, 1942), pp. 71 ff.

[26] See Margaret S. Gordon, *op. cit.*, part 3.

canals, and waterways such as the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Straits of Dover, and the Dardanelles. In times of peace merchant vessels are accorded the right to travel these areas without molestation, and only occasionally are expected to pay fees, the purpose of which is generally to keep the waterway in navigable and safe condition. Here two forces must be noted. The general community of nations tends to work for free and unrestricted traffic on the high seas and on the waterways of the world. On the other hand, states which possess both sides of international waterways reduce them as rapidly as possible to national control. The Kiel Canal, for example, under the Treaty of Versailles was to be an international traffic artery, but it was reduced to national control by Germany at the very first opportunity. Perhaps the most illuminating illustration of all may be found in the history of the Straits leading to the Black Sea from the Mediterranean.

Obviously rivers, ports, and railroads are the subjects of international and national interest and have a deep significance. In this regard it is often a most difficult matter to insure adequate access to the seas for landlocked states such as Paraguay or Hungary. The system of free ports or special privileges over railroads and other means of transportation has sometimes been tried, a case in point being the port of Salonika, to which Greece gave Yugoslavia access just before the Second World War began.

Of recent years a further complicating problem has appeared in air-borne traffic and trade. Long shipping, mail, and passenger lines were developed during the generation before the Second World War, in which such companies as Pan American Airways and the Deutsche Lufthansa took the lead. Agreements were reached during this period which permitted the use by commercial planes of the air over the land of foreign states for transportation purposes; and of course the air over the oceans was free to the use of any state which chose to send its planes there. Naturally, during war this type of transportation (as all others) has been drastically curtailed if not eliminated.

Communications

Of almost equal importance with transportation are communications, by which news and intelligence are transmitted. This has been accomplished of late years chiefly through the media of the telegraph, telephone, submarine cable, and radio. Communications have a great significance for business, news agencies, navies, armies, governments in general, and the average man. During the First World War, Great Britain and the Allied powers succeeded in securing control of the cables of the world, to their advantage in the matter of dissemination of news. Since the First World War the cable lines have been largely in the hands of Great Britain and the United States. Immediately at the end of the First World War there was considerable rivalry over the control of cables and the United States controversy with Japan over the island of Yap was an illustration in point.[27] However, since that time radio has come into prominence and has been so perfected that cables are no longer of primary importance. Certainly the bulk of our information from Europe comes over the ether rather than along the cable lines. But if the cables are of less importance than they once were, Chapter 9 on "Psychological Aspects of Warfare" will indicate that the rivalry they once occasioned has merely been transferred to the radio during the last few years. As yet no adequate international control of radio has been devised and states act as they decide their own national interests demand.

Intergovernmental Debts and Exchange

In normal times, before the advent of the conflict between free economies and totalitarian or controlled economies, the states of the world had evolved an extensive machinery by which they were able to finance international payments. It was thus possible for a person to travel or do business abroad without actually carrying money on his person with which to pay

[27] See O. W. Riegel, *Mobilizing for Chaos*, New Haven, Yale, 1934.

for goods. Among the more common instruments at his disposal were bills of exchange, that is, drafts upon the banks of the country in which he was doing business or traveling. As a rule the amounts of money (measured in terms of a gold standard) sent from one country to another were balanced by the amounts sent by the latter to the former. Money transfers tended to offset each other. If more money was received than was sent out, the exchange rate rose sufficiently to equalize the transfers from the debtor country to the creditor.[28]

Before the First World War an earlier silver standard had been replaced by a gold standard, with Great Britain exercising an overwhelming preponderance in the international financial world with a relatively free flow of trade and with governmental budgets maintained in balance. The First World War broke the gold standard and it was not restored until 1925 after a disastrous period of inflation had been brought to a halt.[29] Between 1925 and 1930 the payment of reparations and war debts, huge international loans, high tariffs, and altered channels of trade flow made the United States the great creditor country and Germany the great debtor country of the world. The loans staved off depression for a while, but when depression eventually did come it forced Great Britain off the gold standard; a sterling bloc developed, consisting of the British Empire except for Canada, the Scandinavian countries including Finland and Estonia, Japan, China, Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, and Paraguay.

On April 19, 1933, the United States deliberately dropped off the gold standard and the Gold Reserve Act of January 30, 1934, authorized the President to devalue the dollar between 40 and 50 per cent. On the next day the dollar was redefined at .5906 of its previous gold content. A related measure, the Silver Purchase Act, was passed in June, 1934, creating havoc in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Iran, and

[28] See Michael A. Heilperin, *International Monetary Economics,* London, Longmans, 1939.

[29] Seymour E. Harris, "Measures of Currency Overvaluation and Stabilization," in *Explorations in Economics: Notes and Essays Contributed in Honor of F. W. Taussig,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936.

China. The results were heavy deflation, loss of exports, and a general credit expansion.

The counterpart of these measures came from the totalitarian states of Germany and Italy, which set up rigid financial controls consisting of regulations governing trade, quotas, blocked marks, and price-deflation decrees.

The gold-bloc countries in early 1935 still included France, Poland, Holland, Switzerland, and Belgium; but with the continued pressure upon the franc and especially with the flow of gold to the United States, it was only a question of time as to how long the process could go on without breaking French currency. On September 26, 1936, France dropped from the gold standard and devalued the franc between 26 and 35 per cent. On the same day the United States, England, and France announced a stabilization agreement which pledged co-operation by the three powers to maintain currency stability, providing machinery for international clearance and envisaging the reduction of trade restrictions. Then in rapid succession followed the devaluation of the currencies of Switzerland, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Turkey, Latvia, and Italy.

The resultant situation prevailed until the opening of the Second World War. A relative stability was achieved, but one which momentarily might be ended by the resumption of international pressures especially from the dissatisfied totalitarian states of which the foremost was Germany. Tariffs felt a slight modification, but nothing sensational nor deeply significant. Among these were the ones covered by the French and Italian agreements, the Ottawa treaties, and the Hull reciprocity treaties. The totalitarian states achieved barter accords, which tended to eliminate most of the necessity for international currency movements. Meanwhile, gold steadily lost its significance as a world monetary standard. Today the question is unanswered as to whether the world is to return to gold as a standard when the Second World War ends.[30]

Complicating this picture were the reparations and debt payments, which are discussed in Chapter 13. The default on the

[30] See Paul Einzig, *Exchange Control,* London, Macmillan, 1934.

debts and the drying up of the reparations were accompanied by a controlled economy among the totalitarian states to the disruption of the system of international finance and exchange. That is the situation today as is made clear in Chapter 7 on "The Economic Struggle for Power." What the future will hold depends undoubtedly upon a combination of factors, not the least of which is the outcome of the Second World War and the disposition of the states of the world at the peace conference.

Foreign Investments

One means by which a state may secure political power is to invest money abroad. This it can do by exporting capital and securing in return control over the areas and the activities into which it sends the money. Such investments reached huge proportions during the twentieth century. Before 1914 over $20 billion of British, $8 billion of French, and $9 billion of German money were invested abroad. During 1914–1918, the United States not only paid back the money the Allied Powers previously had invested here, but also lent them over $11 billion. Thus, at the end of the First World War the United States held the bulk of international investments and most countries were in its debt.[31]

Ordinarily, under the system which prevailed up to 1939, money was exported in various forms: direct loans to governments and individuals, purchases of government bonds and securities, purchases of ordinary securities of private business enterprises, purchases of property in one country by citizens of another, and credits extended to foreign businesses and individuals. The motives underlying this type of capital export were many, but the chief ones were: to build up sources of raw materials in foreign countries, for example mines or rubber plantations in Malaya; to invest money in places where it would bring a greater return than investments at home; to develop branch

[31] On this question see Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., *The Problem of International Investments*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1937, a publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

offices and factories in foreign countries in order to escape tariff costs as the Ford and General Motors Companies did when building plants in Germany; to finance markets abroad in order to have such markets buy goods manufactured at home; and to send money into areas where it could earn good returns because of few taxes and governmental regulations.

It is not difficult to see that such investments lend themselves to political purposes; sometimes they are made simply to secure political control over an area. A typical and eloquent example is afforded by the German investments in the Balkans during the period before the outbreak of the Second World War. British control over the Suez Canal through the purchase of securities is equally to the point. The refusal of the French to aid the Austrian banks (as opposed to the British aid) in order to prevent the *Anschluss* through the customs union is still another example showing that investment and financial control are powerful political weapons.

Investments have a powerful influence on the thinking of people. The investor in the Philippines tends to think of the islands in a sympathetic manner, while the investor in backward areas tends to promote imperialism and by enlisting his government's support to move states to engage in international rivalry. No better illustration of this particular point can be found than the Consortium covering loans by European states to China. In this case, because they could not agree to let any single state do the financing of Chinese development, they all insisted upon a share in the loans. Thus they all shared in the development of this huge sphere of influence.

There is always a great problem in protecting foreign investments once they are made. Few if any countries have been able to resist the importunities for aid by citizens who have sent their money abroad to earn more for them. For example, Bismarck's reluctance to enter the imperialistic and colonial field was finally broken down by pleas from German colonials, and Germany embarked on the road to a place in the sun. Intervention has been a favorite weapon of investing states to protect their interests in backward states. This has given rise to a

number of questions, among them, how far does a state have a right to assist its citizens in collecting their earnings and protecting their interests abroad? The Drago Doctrine [32] says not at all; but the Drago Doctrine is not universally accepted.

Here again is a fruitful field of international rivalry, imperialism, conflict, and resort to force.

World Economics as a Basis of Power

A separate chapter is devoted to the conflicts which arise out of the crossings and meetings of the economic forces briefly described in this chapter. Commercial wars date back to the most primitive times and during modern times they have included such important conflicts as those during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when mercantilism was in full swing. These conflicts are of two sorts as a rule. One economic warfare is called "white war" and is fought during peacetime. The other is the economic warfare accompanying political belligerency.[33] The former consists of all those measures states take to establish economic self-sufficiency, to secure sources of raw material and markets without actually fighting for them. The latter accompanies fighting and has for its purpose the impairment of the economic resources of the enemy in the fields of food, fuels, critical metals, textiles, rubber, and shipping.[34]

The techniques of economic warfare are as numerous and diversified as those involved in the struggle for power, since economic strength is one of the major sources of power.[35] States may set up embargoes, nonintercourse acts, boycotts, and freezing regulations both as to credit and as to goods; assist in export competition, blockades, and intervention; resort to physical violence in order to destroy productive powers, transportation, and communication lines; establish blacklists and rationing; and supply goods to states with which they are friendly.

These are only a few of a host of illustrations and indicate

[32] Referring to Luis M. Drago (1859–1921), Argentine statesman.

[33] See L. C. Robbins, *The Economic Causes of War,* New York, Macmillan, 1940.

[34] See also "Business at War," *Fortune,* 25 (June, 1942), pp. 22 ff.

[35] See Paul Einzig, *Economic Warfare,* (New York: Macmillan, 1940).

some of the more important economic principles involved in world economics. They also show the close interrelationship between this subject and that of the struggle for power.

Questions

1. How is the world economically interrelated?
2. What is meant by the protectionist philosophy?
3. What is meant by the free-trade philosophy?
4. Describe internationalism as applied to world economics.
5. On which metal is modern civilization based?
6. What role does petroleum play in world economics?
7. Name some of the critical raw materials of the world. Why are they described as critical?
8. What are the principal trade areas in the world?
9. Why do states seek markets?
10. Why do states seek to become self-sufficient?
11. Name the arguments pro and con concerning high tariffs.
12. What are some of the more familiar means by which states attempt to promote their own trade?
13. How do high tariffs enhance prices?
14. What role does food play in the struggle for power?
15. Do states that are not self-sufficient in terms of food supply, export foodstuffs? Explain.
16. Who owned most of the cables at the end of the First World War and what significance did this ownership have in world affairs?
17. What part does radio play in world economics?
18. Are investments a form of power? Why?
19. Trace the steps by which the world went off the gold standard during the generation before the Second World War.
20. Why does economic warfare occur?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Discuss the gold standard.
2. Survey the critical raw materials and explain why they are critical.
3. Prepare a study of the barter system and its effect upon international finance and exchange.
4. Compile a tariff history of the period between 1918 and 1938.
5. Discuss international debts from 1918 to 1939.
6. Is self-sufficiency possible for a nation?

7. Compare neomercantilism with mercantilism.
8. Discuss international rivers and waterways.
9. Survey the use of substitutes and discuss their effect upon the quest for raw materials.
10. Is the ocean a highway or a barrier?

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CHAPTER 5

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY

Sources and Growth of International Law

Law and power politics. International law can be defined as those rules and principles of action which bind civilized states in their relations with one another. It is obvious, however, that in the international world of today rules of law play only a minor role. The relative position and prestige of states is determined by military strength, not by any standard of law observance or human culture. Military strength is vital to the very existence of the state. For this reason the quest for power has become the prime basis of state action. It would be strange indeed if in a world at war states should pay much attention to judicial procedure or to legal niceties.

International law, then, is clearly in a state of collapse during this Second World War. And it would be doing no service to international law to pretend, as some do, that no collapse in its authority has occurred. Only by recognizing the realities of the international situation and the role that the politics of power plays as against legal formulae is it possible to begin the building of a better international order.

Although the prospect for an immediate strengthening of international law is very unencouraging, there is hope for its development from a long-time point of view. The social convulsion that destroys many old ideas and institutions sometimes brings improved new ones. It is interesting in this connection to note that international law owes its modern development partly to international anarchy.

Although the sources of international law may be traced back to antiquity, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), a Dutch scholar and diplomat, was the first to write a complete exposition of international law in all its ramifications. Grotius states that he was

led to write his great legal masterpiece of 1625, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres* (*Three Books on the Law of War and Peace*), as a result of his observations of the unlicensed anarchy in the international life of his day.[1] Grotius declared:

> I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed, recourse being had to arms for slight reasons or no reason; and when arms were once taken up, all reverence for divine and human law was thrown away, just as if men were thenceforth authorized to commit all crimes without restraint.

If Grotius was so horrified by the barbarities of the Thirty Years' War, it is unlikely that those who observe the unrestrained violence of present-day global warfare will rest content with the present supine condition of international law. The present deep concern over world lawlessness is in itself a guarantee that a strong effort will be made to revive an effective law. Later in this chapter a description will be given of the directions this future development may take. But first it is necessary to examine the characteristic features of this international legal system in their traditional form.

The scope and function of international law. International law is sometimes called international *public* law to distinguish it from international *private* law. International private law or *conflict of laws* deals with the conflict between legal systems that results when an individual has rights or obligations under the domestic laws of different states. International private law is accordingly concerned with the rights and obligations of individuals, whereas international public law has to do with states as legal and political entities. A distinction must also be made between international law and *municipal* law. When used in reference to international law, municipal law means domestic or national law, not city law. Finally, international law must

[1] *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres* has been one of the most influential books in legal history. There were 45 Latin editions before 1748 and the number of translations since that time are almost innumerable. The above quotation was taken from Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1925, vol. 2, p. 20 of Prolegomena. This is a volume in "The Classics of International Law" series edited by James Brown Scott.

not be considered either a moral code or a system of ethics. It is rather a system of law based on practice and reason. However, the state that breaks international law acts contrary to the generally accepted standards of the community.

To understand fully the scope and content of this distinctive legal system called international law it is necessary to examine its purpose. However well or badly international law fulfills its function, it is already clear that its major aim is to provide a medium whereby controversies between states may be avoided or peacefully settled. But within this general purpose, several subdivisions of function are noticeable.

First, international law attempts to define the *rights* which each member of the community of nations can claim as against other states and the international community as a whole. The legal limits of state activity are established by international law, just as domestic law establishes the extent of the liberty and freedom of action of the individual. Since states are the subject of international law, a large section of this legal discipline is devoted to examination of the character of states, of changes in the status of states, of the nature of the territory held by states, and of the rights that each state enjoys within its own territory. The individual, as contrasted with the state, only exceptionally becomes a subject of international law, as in the case of blockade runners or pirates. In most cases where the rights of an individual are involved in an international controversy, the state represents its citizen.

Second, each state has *obligations and duties* under international law. It is obvious that if a state is granted rights under international law it must be ready to recognize and maintain the possession of these same rights by other states.

Finally, international law determines the jurisdiction of international institutions and prescribes the procedure to be followed by states in their intercourse with one another. The scope of authority of international courts is, for example, carefully defined by international law. And the whole machinery of diplomacy is also strictly regulated by its rules.

The sources and evidences of international law. International

law has four sources: (1) treaties, (2) custom, (3) reason, (4) authority.

Treaties [2] provide the most tangible and conclusive evidence of what the law may be in any particular case. States are perfectly free to conclude any treaties that seem to them advantageous so long as the interests of third parties are not adversely affected. As a result, almost all states are bound by hundreds of agreements and the resulting bulk of treaties is a fertile source of law. Most of these treaties, it is true, are simple bilateral agreements which lay down no general rule of law. However, out of a consistent recurrence of similar provisions in these bilateral treaties general principles of law are often deduced or developed. Moreover, in recent years many treaties (as will be seen in the next chapter) have had a definite legislative character. This statement has been particularly true of treaties signed by large numbers of states, for these treaties often contain provisions of such general application that they have the effect of a world law. The Treaty of Paris of 1856, which laid down rules of blockade and contraband, was a treaty of this type. More recent examples of legislative treaties are the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, or the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War of 1928 ("the Pact of Paris").

The most productive source of international law is undoubtedly custom. As the international community developed its modern character, certain practices became habitual, for states confronted by similar problems tended to respond to them in a similar way. Such customary behavior often gradually developed into obligatory rules of action. There is an obvious parallel here between the development of international law and the Anglo-Saxon system of common law (which is still the basic element in the domestic legal systems of most English-speaking countries). For common law like international law grew out of custom and usage, and like international law gradually became obligatory within its own sphere of activity.

Sometimes neither treaties nor custom offer a solution to an

[2] Compare with treatment of treaties in Chapter 6.—*Editor.*

international legal problem. In that case resort may be had to reason, or to "the general principles of law." These "general principles" are found by applying accustomed lines of legal reasoning to new situations. Cases are decided on the basis of what seems legally reasonable and just. When international controversies are settled in this way the effect is to increase the content of international law by adding new law of a positive character.

A final source of international law is authority. The consultation of legal authorities who have written about the law is a commonly used method of discovering what the law is or what it should be. No small share of the present law has been developed from this source. Another important source of law is the exercise of legal authority by national and international judicial tribunals and by courts of arbitration. Although the judges of such courts invariably consider the evidence to be found in treaties, custom, diplomatic papers, the general principles of law, and the opinions of writers, they must, of course, interpret this evidence. This interpretation may in itself redefine old principles of international law or even add new ones.

The development of international law by treaty, custom, reason, and authority has not gone on without great dispute as to what emphasis should be placed on each of these as a source of law. Three schools of thought long contended over this question. A once influential Naturalist school of thought believes there is an ideal natural law that perfectly defines the relations states should have with one another.[3] It is, Naturalists argue, the duty of the community of nations to discover as best it can what this natural justice is and then to bring the practices of nations into conformity with it. Naturalists reject the idea that law develops mainly from the actual practice of states. They think instead that true justice can only be found by an appeal to reason. Most present-day international lawyers, however, view this approach to law as purely speculative.

In direct opposition to the Naturalists is a more popular

[3] Among prominent Naturalists have been Pufendorf, Thomasius, Barbeyrac, Burlamaqui, and more recently Rutherford and Lorimer.

school of Positivists, who deny the possibility of discovering a perfect international legal system by the exercise of reason.[4] They maintain, on the contrary, that law grows out of the actual conduct of states in international life and that it must therefore be primarily based on custom and consent. In their opinion the best way to discover what is the law on a particular question is to observe the usual international practice.

Between these extremist Naturalists and Positivists there lies still a third school of thought, the one that perhaps has had the greatest influence of all in the development of modern international law. This is the eclectic or Grotian school, which follows the lead given by Grotius the great founder of modern international law.[5] Grotians believe that something of value may be found in the viewpoint of both Naturalists and Positivists. They accept the ideas that practice and custom are vitally important sources of international law and give the only practical interpretation of its principles. At the same time, however, the Grotians believe that international practice should always be made to conform as far as possible to the best standards of reason and justice. Harmful international practices, they argue, can develop through usage quite as well as good practices. It is always necessary, therefore, for states and individuals to gauge the quality of existing law by applying the tests of reason to it and changing international legal practice if this test of justice is not satisfactorily met.

The sanctions of international law. It is only too obvious that the community of nations can boast no sanctions powerful enough to compel obedience to the rules of international law in all circumstances and on all occasions. However, certain sanctions do exist, and during periods of relative world order they have sometimes proved effective.

Perhaps the most important existing sanction of international law is habit. Many rules and principles of law have been fol-

[4] Zouche and Bynkershoek were early Positivists of influence. Modern writers who have stressed the analytic method include in their number Fauchille, Fiore, Hall, Oppenheim, Borchard, and Hudson.

[5] Among the great leaders of the Grotian school have been Vattel, Phillimore, Wheaten, and Despagnet.

lowed for so many centuries that it would require great effort on the part of any state to overcome the inertia of the established procedures. In this respect states act in a manner not unlike the average citizen within the state, for most individuals obey the laws under which they live as a matter of course. A somewhat less important sanction than habit is that of expediency. It often pays a state to follow the accepted rule because its infringement might mean unwelcome retaliation. The respect that belligerent states show for the rules governing the treatment of enemy prisoners of war is a good example of this point.

Good faith is commonly listed as a sanction of international law, but its effectiveness during a period of violence and aggression is extremely doubtful. The attitude of many states seems to be that international rules and customs are to be observed only when it is expedient to observe them.

The final sanction of international law is force. States may legally protect their rights by force if they find it necessary to do so. By its nature, however, this sanction is relatively ineffective. For the law-abiding state may not be the one of greatest military power. While right may make might in a philosophical sense, Napoleon once said something about God being on the side with the heaviest artillery. The sanction of force would be fully effective only if the international community were so organized that it could compel all states to observe the law on all occasions.

Defects of international law and its future growth. While it is evident that international law has had a remarkable growth in the past three centuries it is equally obvious that the system is still shockingly defective in practice. There is, therefore, a strong tendency to re-examine the basic assumptions on which international law rests to determine their fundamental validity.

Certainly the most severe challenge to the traditional concept of international law has come from the Fascist states, the primary exponents of the methods of power politics. While these states do not reject in any outright fashion the validity of international law, they do interpret and apply it in such a way that it promotes only their individual political interests

rather than the general welfare of the community of nations as a whole. According to this totalitarian doctrine, the state must itself always make the final decision as to what the law is or is not in any particular situation. It is maintained that international law is only valid when it serves and satisfies the interest of that individual state.[6] For example, treaties are only to be observed if they embody "right law" or "natural law." And this right law or natural law is defined as anything that contributes to the welfare of the state concerned. If treaties do not contain the right law in this sense it is not necessary to observe them, the state itself always being the final judge of what is right or not right.

Such an interpretation of international law severely limits its sphere of action. In fact, in leaving to the individual state the decision as to what the law is, this interpretation tends to destroy existing law. Moreover, this conception of law is directly opposed to the attitude of democratic states. For the latter commonly conceive of international law as a system of rules which is imposed, interpreted, and enforced by an international community.

However, even among those who support the traditional democratic concept of international law as being a law above states, there is no complete agreement as to the form a new body of international law of the future should take. Some jurists and sociologists believe that since international law is at present ineffective in regulating international politics, an entirely new law is required which will be more in harmony with international realities. These commentators feel that the international community has made a mistake in trying to impose the rules of law on states from the outside. Too much emphasis, they feel, has been given to the external forms of international society such as organization, institutions, and regulations. What is most necessary is to change the institutions and activity of individual states from the inside so that they will tend to act in the most

[6] In this connection see Virginia L. Gott, "National Socialist Theory of International Law," *American Journal of International Law,* 32:4 (October, 1938), pp. 704–718, and Quincy Wright, "International Law and the Totalitarian States," *American Political Science Review,* 35:4 (August, 1941), pp. 738–743.

functionally useful way. As a matter of course—if this is done—then order and stability will come automatically to the international world because peaceful international relationships are a basic need of every properly functioning state. Leaders of states must, therefore, direct their thinking to planning toward useful ends. If this new direction is taken, the problems of international organization will be easily solved as they present themselves.[7]

Another very influential school of international lawyers believes that primary emphasis should not be placed on the individual improvement of states but rather on the strengthening of international machinery for the enforcement of law. These lawyers maintain that a major cause of the present conflict was the belief of certain states that there was no peaceful way out of their most pressing problems through existing law or through the existing institutional structure. International law should be developed in the direction of providing stronger international institutions for the making and the enforcement of law.

Those who hold this viewpoint usually oppose strongly the traditional legal concept of sovereignty.[8] According to this legal concept each state is a sovereign entity that need observe only those rules of international law to which it has given its consent. In practice, however, no state dares cut itself off completely from the international community. True sovereignty in the sense of an absolutely free choice and consent is therefore impossible.

Nevertheless, whether or not the doctrine of sovereignty is philosophically sound, it is believed that it has had an important and adverse effect on the growth of international institutions. For states still commonly insist that such institutions can only make political and economic decisions on the basis of a unanimous vote. Since unanimity is often impossible to obtain, a much-needed rule may fail to be adopted or a reform

[7] For an outstanding presentation of this point of view see Gerhart Niemeyer, *Law Without Force,* Princeton, University Press, 1941.

[8] A very useful analysis of the consequences of the doctrine of sovereignty can be found in J. W. Garner, "Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Relations," *American Political Science Review,* 19 (February, 1925), pp. 1 ff.

may be rejected—with the most unfortunate consequences in terms of international progress. A comparable situation in domestic affairs would be a constitutional requirement that all members of the Congress of the United States would have to approve all legislative measures before they could become law.

Along whatever path the future of international law may finally lie, it is certain that the law must be strengthened and implemented if states are to live in order and peace rather than in the anarchy of power politics.[9]

The Practice of Diplomacy

The growth of modern diplomacy. Diplomacy may be defined as the art of conducting relations between states by negotiation. Its most distinctive feature is that it makes provision for a continuous and unbroken contact between governments. At least in theory the purpose of this contact is to make possible an amicable adjustment of differences on the basis of compromise and mutual respect. In practice, however, diplomacy like law is today often perverted to the uses of power politics. It has become an adjunct to military policies.

The origins of diplomacy far antedate the rise of the modern state system. The states of the ancient world made sporadic use of heralds and special envoys, and even at times accorded them the same degree of inviolability and respect enjoyed by present-day negotiators. But in its modern form the art of diplomacy is of very recent development. It was not until the city states of northern Italy began to send professional diplomats permanently to established embassies during the Renaissance period that a regularized system of diplomatic representation was evolved. And it was not until the modern state system was firmly established during the seventeenth century that a diplomatic corps was considered indispensable to state existence. Even so, a classified and universally recognized system of representation was not worked out until the Congresses of

[9] See Willard Bunce Cowles, *Prospective Development of International Law in the Western Hemisphere, as Affected by the Monroe Doctrine,* Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941.

Vienna (1815) and Aix-la-Chapelle (1818). At those Congresses, diplomatic agents were clearly classified into the four following ranks, namely: (1) ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary and papal legates or nuncios; [10] (2) envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary; (3) ministers resident; (4) chargés d'affaires.[11] These distinctions of rank are still followed today but their chief importance is for ceremonial purposes. There is no essential difference in function. Each state may send whatever grade of diplomatic agent it prefers to another state, although in practice reciprocity is usual.

The diplomatic missions maintained by states in foreign countries can be divided into two classes, *embassies* and *legations*. Embassies are always headed by an *ambassador,* the highest ranking diplomatic officer, while the more numerous legations are headed by a *minister* of any one of several grades. Although they differ in rank, the functions of ambassadors and ministers are exactly the same. Each ambassador or minister is, of course, aided by a staff of officials of lesser diplomatic rank who are usually called *secretaries*. In the past it was customary for only the great powers to exchange ambassadors, but in recent decades this old practice has broken down. Today the exchange of ambassadors or ministers between two states tends to indicate the importance of the states to each other rather than the absolute importance of either in world politics. The United States, for example, exchanges ambassadors with a number of Latin American states to which important European powers send only ministers. In this way the close relationship between the states in the Western Hemisphere is given special recognition.

Also carrying the burden of foreign representation with the diplomat is the consular official; he holds, however, no diplomatic rank. Whereas the diplomat is primarily interested in preserving the political interests of his state abroad, the consul is a commercial representative whose duties only occasionally be-

[10] The United States does not receive papal legates or nuncios.

[11] The first three ranks are accredited to the head of the state to which they are sent, but the chargés d'affaires are accredited to the minister of foreign affairs.

come political. While a state maintains only one embassy or legation in each foreign state, it will usually provide consular offices in every important city. The three main grades of consular officials, in order of their rank, are consul-general, consul, and vice-consul.[12]

The foreign office. Diplomatic and consular officials carry on their duties under the direction of a department of government which is usually called a ministry of foreign affairs, but which in the case of the United States is called the Department of State. This ministry or department is invariably ranked highest among the departments of government, and although it is directed by an influential minister or secretary it always receives the particular attention of the political head of the state. All states today are vitally concerned about their foreign relationships and the foreign office is of special importance because it centralizes the political contacts of a state with the international community.

As has already been suggested, a primary function of the foreign office is to act as a liaison agent between the executive branch of the government and the corps of diplomatic and consular officials in the field. The foreign office not only directs the activities of these officials but is also charged with their recruitment and with the maintenance of high standards of efficiency and morale. A second major duty of the foreign office is to act as receiving agent for the information and advice sent by these officials stationed abroad and to correlate this information so that it can be most effectively used in formulating policy. Under most modern constitutional systems the political head of the government is responsible for the direction and formulation of foreign policy. Naturally this official leans heavily on his foreign office for expert information and advice concerning what that policy should be. All foreign offices main-

[12] The United States has established a unified Foreign Service which includes all diplomats and consuls below the rank of ambassador and minister. The Department of State publishes a pamphlet, *The American Foreign Service,* which includes the regulations governing admission to the Foreign Service and copies of sample examination questions.

tain experienced professional staffs to analyze the information received from abroad and to make recommendations as to policy. Finally, the foreign office performs many functions for the nationals of the state. It promotes the economic interests of these nationals in foreign countries, extends protection to their persons and property when they are abroad,[13] issues passports and visas, and publishes useful consular reports on foreign economic conditions.[14]

The work of diplomats and consuls. Ambassadors and other diplomatic agents act as spokesmen of their country in the state to which they are accredited.[15] They have been called international *contact men* or *middlemen,* for it is through them that the major part of the political negotiation between states is carried on. Although at times this negotiation is concerned with unimportant details, it very often involves questions of the utmost importance and treaties or other major agreements may result. Diplomats also collect political, military, economic, financial, and social data for transmission to their governments for use in the formulation of foreign policy. Another important diplomatic duty is the protection of the economic interests and the persons of fellow nationals. In theory the main function of the diplomat is always to promote, in every way possible, friendly political relationships between his own government and that to which he is accredited. And if a state feels that its policies can be best promoted by this type of contact, then that will be his true function. Often, however, the diplomat has served as an agent for the most ruthless kind of power politics and has been a center of unrest and rebellion in the state to which he was accredited.

The performance of these duties of the diplomatic agent is made easier because he is accorded certain special privileges under international law. The most important of these privi-

[13] Nearly 400,000 citizens of the United States live in foreign countries.

[14] An excellent description of the United States Department of State can be found in G. H. Stuart, *American Diplomatic and Consular Practice,* New York, Appleton-Century, 1936, chaps. 5–6.

[15] A list of the duties of the diplomatic and consular officials of the United States will be found in *The American Foreign Service,* State Department Publication No. 1483, 1940, pp. 3–5.

leges provide for the inviolability of the diplomat's person, family, suite, and residence; exemption from local civil and criminal jurisdiction; and the right to correspond with his own government entirely without interference.

The duties of consuls, while somewhat less spectacular than those of diplomats, can hardly be considered less important and are even more varied. Among the consul's most important duties are the encouragement of the commercial interests of the citizens of his state, reporting to his foreign office on trade conditions and business opportunities in his locality, and the protection of fellow-nationals. The consul must report on the observance of commercial treaties and he has heavy duties in regard to the regulating of the conduct and condition of the maritime shipping services of his state. He also acts as a recorder for his fellow citizens, performing notarial functions, certifying births, marriages, and deaths, and attesting wills. Like the diplomat, the consul is an instrument for the carrying out of the general policies of the state he represents. If his state desires friendship with the state in which the consul resides the consular office may be a center for the promotion of good will. On the other hand, it may be used as a center of unrest and disruption.

A consul is not a diplomat and the privileges granted the diplomat under international law are not extended to him. However, consuls often enjoy comparable rights through treaty arrangements. In any case a consul can demand undisturbed communication with his own state and with his fellow nationals, and he is habitually treated with the respect and courtesy due to his office.

The character of diplomatic representation. Trickery, deceit, and misrepresentation are as old as diplomacy. Back in the seventeenth century, Sir Henry Wotton, a distinguished British diplomatist, defined an ambassador as "an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country." Sir Henry's definition would still be considered accurate in many foreign offices today. For diplomacy has always been an instrument for promoting national policy. And when selfish interest is the motivation behind pol-

icy, then any means, however unsavory, that will promote this policy will be likely to find acceptance. Military power itself largely determines diplomatic influence. States that have been able to back their diplomacy with effective force have always carried weight in diplomatic negotiations even when the threat of force was heavily veiled.

Since military power and territorial expansion are the goals of many great powers, their diplomacy is conducted with those ends in view rather than with any desire for international cooperation. The ambassadors and consuls of many states since the First World War, and particularly those of totalitarian states, can perhaps best be described simply as spies. Legations and consulates are used as centers of "fifth-column" activity, the chief function of the diplomatic or consular office being to encourage internal disorganization and to "soften" a state so that its capture by negotiation or invasion may be easy. To this end a diplomat or consul may agitate among the nationals of his own state living abroad, may organize centers of disaffection among the nationals of the country to which he is sent, may pry out military and naval secrets, may corrupt sections of the press so that it will support the policies of his state, and may otherwise act as an agent of misrepresentation and destruction.

Democratic states, like dictatorial states, seek their own advantage through diplomacy, and in many cases the methods of the two types of government have not differed greatly. In general, however, there is a tendency among the democracies to believe that national interest may best be promoted by mutually advantageous relations between states. A treaty between the United States and Great Britain may, for example, be considered valuable and fortunate by either only if it contributes to the welfare of them both. Otherwise, it may be recognized that the treaty would serve as a source of dissatisfaction and dissension and would be of no real benefit to either state. Diplomacy still calls for wit, but wit is not necessarily used for outwitting someone else. When states believe their major national

interest to lie in co-operation and collaboration with other states, diplomacy provides an effective device through which such a policy can be carried out.

Just as the standard of what constitutes effective diplomacy has changed from time to time, so also does the position of the diplomat. Before the growth of the modern systems of communication diplomacy was an extremely personalized profession. Communications were so slow and travel so laborious that the diplomat abroad was often weeks or even months away from the foreign office from which he received instructions. Under these circumstances the diplomat wielded immense personal powers, for the scope and character of his activity could seldom be adequately checked. The action of a single individual often made the difference between war and peace between two states.

The development of modern systems of communications during the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries greatly changed this highly personalized character of foreign representation. The diplomat of today need do no more than pick up a telephone to get into immediate contact with his home foreign office. The telegraph and rapid mail services also add to the continuity of his contact with home officials. Under these conditions every important step the diplomat takes is governed by the instruction he receives. His contacts with the government to which he is sent are carefully regulated and his opportunity to shape events by the force of his own personality is thus greatly curtailed. This modern situation does not mean that the modern diplomat has become an automaton in the service of his government. But in the last two or three centuries the power of the average diplomat has undoubtedly declined even though the number and complexity of his duties may have increased.

Other Methods of Peaceful Settlement

Although international law and diplomacy are by far the most valuable devices for the promotion of peace and friendship in the community of nations, there are five other less im-

portant but still extremely useful methods of peaceful settlement: (1) good offices, (2) mediation, (3) conciliation, (4) commissions of inquiry, (5) arbitration, (6) judicial settlement. Some details and examples concerning these methods will be found in Chapter 6.

QUESTIONS

1. What role does international law play in the present-day world? Does it have any value in view of the Second World War now in progress?
2. What is the difference between international law and (1) international private law, (2) municipal law, (3) morals?
3. What is the purpose of international law?
4. What are the sources of international law and what is their comparative importance?
5. How do the Naturalists, the Positivists, the Grotians differ in their beliefs?
6. Does international law have powerful sanctions behind it? What sanctions does it have?
7. Is the sanction of force an effective one today? Why or why not?
8. What is meant by the doctrine of sovereignty?
9. How does the doctrine of sovereignty hamper the growth of a more effective international law?
10. Why is diplomacy to be preferred to war as a method of settling international disputes?
11. Where and when did the modern system of diplomacy originate?
12. What is the difference between an embassy and a legation, and between an ambassador and a minister?
13. What are the functions of the foreign office?
14. Is the work of the diplomat different from that of the consul? If so, what is the difference?
15. What constitutes "good" diplomacy according to modern democratic standards?
16. How has the growth of modern systems of communication changed the nature of diplomatic representation?
17. What is meant by obligations and when has it been used?
18. What are the chief purposes of good offices, mediation, and conciliation?
19. What are the defects of international law?
20. What are bilateral treaties and what has been their role in peace programs?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Investigate the international law of peace to discover how legal war is possible.
2. Appraise the arguments for and against international law as a true legal system.
3. Discuss the failure of the League of Nations effort to improve sanctions. How should a comparable future world organization be planned in order to make sanctions effective?
4. Review the history of the doctrine of sovereignty and make an analysis of present state attitudes towards it.
5. Prepare an account of how the modern system of diplomacy happened to develop at the time and place it did.
6. Compare the structure and duties of the Department of State with those of other foreign offices.
7. Discuss the relationship between the President and the Department of State.
8. Compare the duties and methods of a diplomat of the seventeenth century and a diplomat of today.
9. Prepare a history of diplomatic morality and immorality.
10. Investigate the work of the Hague Court of Arbitration and other such tribunals.

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CHAPTER 6

WORLD ORGANIZATIONS

What World Organization Is

There are world institutions of many types which regulate relations between states and between individuals of different countries.[1] In a substantial measure, both in peace and in war, the seventy-odd nations in the world are governed by these institutions, some of which were discussed in Chapter 5 under the heading of international law. Some are of ancient and honorable origin and writers have called them international government.[2] They act simultaneously as controls and escapes for power. For example, a state that belongs to the International Postal Union does not exercise a free and untrammeled hand in the conduct of its postal affairs with other member states, but follows the regulations which it has been agreed shall govern postal matters.

There are several kinds of world organizations. Those of one type enact or create the rules which are to govern states in their conduct with one another and are called *international legislative organizations*. They purport to include the more important agreement-forming bodies among states, such as conferences, congresses, leagues, and the like; but they also include states themselves who mutually draw up the majority of agreements that bind them in their conduct with one another. To this field belong all organizations that make conventional international law.[3]

Organizations of a second type are federations and alliances,

[1] See Frank M. Russell, "The Growth of the Idea of International Organization," in *Contemporary World Politics,* New York, Wiley, 1940, p. 377. For a current treatment, see Howard Robinson and others, *Toward International Organization,* New York, Harper, 1942.

[2] See, for example, Manley O. Hudson, *Progress of International Organization,* Stanford University Press, 1932, pp. 6–7, and Clyde Eagleton, *International Government,* New York, Ronald, 1932. The chief emphasis of both of these texts is legalistic.

[3] See Gerhart Niemeyer, *Law Without Force,* Princeton, University Press, 1941.

which in their various forms may be called *international federalism*. Such, for instance, are the British Commonwealth of nations and the United States of America, the Pan-American system, international unions, and the League of Nations.[4] No two of these are alike, but their common characteristic is that they are combinations of sovereign states for the purpose of carrying on some mutually desired object.

A third type are organizations whose primary function is the *settlement of international disputes*.[5] These include arbitral tribunals such as the Hague Court of Arbitration, judicial tribunals such as the Permanent Court of International Justice, the League of Nations, commissions of inquiry, mediation tribunals, and conciliation tribunals.

Organizations of a fourth type have been described as *executive organizations*. They presumably carry international laws and regulations into effect. Two illustrations of the working of international executive organizations were to be found in the international government of the Free City of Danzig and the Conference of Ambassadors. It may also be seen in the operation of sanctions.

The fifth and last type, the most numerous in international affairs, comprises *international administrative tribunals* and *bodies*, whose chief function is the routine or ministerial performance of international agreements. To this category belong the International Postal Union, the European Sugar Union, the Bank for International Settlements, the International Institute of Agriculture, the Institute for Intellectual Co-operation, and the Secretariat of the League of Nations [6] in most of its aspects.

International Legislation

Treaties. The first type of world organization in our classification was the legislative. Numerous examples of this are found in treaties.

[4] Incidentally, the League of Nations embraced practically every form of world organization in its many institutions.

[5] See Chapter 5 and later sections of this chapter.

[6] See Harold M. Vinacke, *International Organization*, New York, Crofts, 1934.

Modern states, finding the old customary regulations of international affairs slow, cumbersome, and inadequate, have sought to meet the needs of current life through treaties. These are contractual engagements between states—entered into through the regular diplomatic channels—setting up rules governing their mutual relations. How extensive this practice has become may be seen in the fact that in 1914 more than eight thousand treaties were estimated to be in force in the world.[7] By this treaty process states enter into binding agreements to do almost anything they wish; treaties cover every conceivable subject, a few examples being boundaries, alliances, hides and bones, traffic in opium, international exchange, exchange of ambassadors, intellectual co-operation, copyrights, trade-marks, industry, and the pacific settlement of international disputes. As already noted, these treaties constitute the bulk of conventional international law.

Like private contracts, treaty engagements between states are both observed and disregarded in real life. The famous disregard by Germany of the "scrap of paper" treaty to respect Belgian neutrality showed in the First World War how a treaty may be violated. On the other hand, another treaty between the United States and Prussia, drawn up at the close of the eighteenth century, was still being observed by both countries in 1917. This is an example of how some treaties are faithfully adhered to over a long period of time.

International conferences. But treaties have definite limitations,[8] especially the inability to reach a great many states at one time. To remedy this, international conferences and congresses have been devised. There are four types: (1) the peace conference which terminates wars; (2) the conference with restricted membership or agenda, in which the parties participating are limited and where the topics to be covered are restricted, as for example the St. Petersburg Conference of 1868 to deal with explosive bullets; (3) the administrative confer-

[7] See L. Oppenheim, *International Law,* 4th ed. (McNair), New York, Longmans, 1928, p. 701, note 1.

[8] See Vinacke, *op. cit.,* chap. 6.

ence, to be dealt with in the section on that topic; and, (4) the general conference on a world scale, such as the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, and the Assembly of the League of Nations.

The practical method of international conference makes it possible for representatives of two or more states to consider jointly matters of common concern.[9]

Usually one state takes the initiative in calling the conference, suggests a time and place of meeting, and outlines in general terms the agenda or program for discussion. The state that proposes the conference has the initial advantage in submitting a tentative agenda. This may or may not be accepted by the other states invited to participate. The importance of defining the scope of the conference well in advance of the meeting date lies in the fact that a large amount of preparatory work is usually necessary if the conference is to be a success. Delegates or representatives must be selected and instructed and their credentials prepared. Sometimes advisers or technical experts are chosen to accompany the delegates. If so, they must be designated in ample time to allow them to make a study of the items on the agenda.

The organization of the conference depends upon a great many factors, such as the number of states attending, the length of the sessions, the scope of the agenda and the purpose of the conference, all of which will, of course, vary considerably. In general, however, conferences are organized along more or less similar lines. A presiding officer, called the president or chairman, is selected and by common agreement is the chief delegate of the government which is host to the conference. One or more vice-presidents may be chosen to preside in the absence of the president. The secretarial work of the conference is carried on by the secretariat, composed of clerks, typists, interpreters and any others necessary to the smooth running of the conference.

The size of the conference determines very largely the num-

[9] For what is still the standard work on this subject see E. M. Satow, *Guide to Diplomatic Practise*, 3rd (Ritchie) ed., London, Longmans, 1923.

ber of committees or commissions needed. A large conference would have several committees and each state would be represented on each committee. The most important work of the conference is often done in the committees, and for that reason considerable importance is attached to the appointment of committee members. The decision or recommendation of the committee is reported to the plenary session of the conference by the *rapporteur*. It then remains for the conference as a whole to take whatever action it wishes in regard to the committee report. When the conference has completed its work and adjourned, the proposals or recommendations adopted are submitted to the various governments concerned for further action. This may include ratification by the competent authority if the proposals are in form of draft treaties or conventions.

It will thus be seen that the international conference—while an important part of the international legislative process—is not, in itself, a true legislative body. It ordinarily does not have the power to bind the states that participate in the conference without ratification by national authorities, but it does offer a channel through which negotiation is carried on. The international conference formulates principles but leaves the carrying out of these principles to administrative bureaus composed of technical experts. Recent years have witnessed an increase in the number and importance of international administrative bureaus.[10]

Some important and typical conferences have been those of the Hague in 1899 and 1907; the Peace Conference of Paris, 1919; the Conference of Brussels, 1874; the London Naval Conference, 1909; the Washington Arms Conference, 1922; the Congress of Berlin, 1878; the Congress of Westphalia, 1648; the Congress of Vienna, 1815; and the Conference of Paris, 1856.[11]

[10] For a good study of international administration, see Norman L. Hill, *International Administration,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1931.

[11] For a succinct discussion see Pitman B. Potter, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization,* 4th ed., New York, Appleton-Century, 1935, chap. 9. For a detailed discussion see E. Satow, *International Congresses,* London, Longmans, 1920.

The international labor organization. The best example of an international legislative organization is the League of Nations, which will be considered in the next section as an example of international federalism. Closely allied with that body, and a legislative institution in its own right, is the International Labor Organization, which has as its chief concern the raising of living standards all over the world.

Almost at the outset of its deliberations, the Paris Peace Conference appointed a Commission on International Labor Legislation and charged it with the responsibility of drawing up the text of an organization embracing employers, workers, and governments.[12] The Commission met for the first time on February 1, 1919, at the French Ministry of Labor, and elected Mr. Samuel Gompers, then president of the American Federation of Labor, as chairman. The plan drawn up by the Commission was later approved by the Peace Conference [13] and incorporated into the Treaty of Versailles [14] as Part XIII. As such it formed the Constitution of the I.L.O.

The I.L.O. held its first conference in Washington in the fall of 1919, upon the invitation of President Woodrow Wilson, and thereby actually came into existence several months before the League of Nations or the World Court.

The Constitution provides that the original member states of the League of Nations should be the original members of the I.L.O. but it did not necessarily follow that all members of the I.L.O. must be members of the League. As a matter of fact, Germany and Austria were admitted to membership in the I.L.O. several years before they became members of the League.[15]

[12] David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris,* 21 vols., New York, Appeal Printing Co., 1924, vol. 4, pp. 81–82. The best work on events leading up to the creation of the I.L.O. is James T. Shotwell, ed., *The Origins of the International Labor Organization,* 2 vols., New York, Columbia University Press, 1934.

[13] For a day-by-day account of the work of the Commission, see James T. Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference,* New York, Macmillan, 1937, especially pp. 199–245.

[14] And the other treaties of peace.

[15] Francis G. Wilson, *Labor in the League System,* Stanford University Press, 1934, p. 95.

It was not until 1934 that the United States became a member of the I.L.O. On August 20 of that year President Roosevelt accepted membership for the United States, having been authorized to do so by a joint resolution of Congress. Since that date the United States has been an active member of the I.L.O. and a leader in its wide field of activities.

Geneva was selected as the seat of the I.L.O. and the headquarters of the International Labor Office, comprising an international civil service of some four hundred men and women from practically every country in the world. For the most part they were experts who collected, collated, and analyzed reports from every nation. The Office has often been described as being the greatest fact-finding agency in the world in addition to serving as the secretariat for the International Labor Conference and the Governing Body. Its library comprised the finest collection of its kind in the world.[16]

The Office is under the direction of the Governing Body—the executive group—which serves as a board of management. There are thirty-two members on the Governing Body, of whom eight represent workers, eight represent employers and sixteen represent governments.

The Conference met annually in Geneva up to the outbreak of the Second World War. It was composed of four delegates from each country. Two of these represented the government officially, one represented the workers of the country and one represented the employers. The Conference considered a vast number of questions which pertained to almost every phase of human endeavor. Many of these questions, after careful consideration, were adopted by the Conference in the form of draft conventions or treaties to be submitted to the member states for ratification. Up to March, 1940, a total of 67 conventions had been adopted by the Conference in this manner. They were concerned with such vital problems as the prohibition of child

[16] For a more complete statement of the activities of the I.L.O., see William Lonsdale Tayler, "The International Labor Organization," in *Contemporary World Politics,* New York, Wiley, 1940, chap. 22.

labor, social insurance, forced labor, maritime questions, and scores of others.[17]

When the Nazi troops overran Europe, the I.L.O. sought quarters elsewhere. Under the leadership of its then director, John G. Winant, the I.L.O., with a greatly reduced staff, moved to Montreal. From this temporary headquarters it has continued to function, although on a greatly curtailed budget. It was able, however, to hold a Conference in New York City in the fall of 1941 which was attended by delegates from 33 states including the United States. One of the significant proposals adopted by that Conference set machinery in motion for the I.L.O. to take the initiative in postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation.[18]

International Federalism

The League of Nations. The second type of world organization in our classification was international federalism. The finest and most optimistic bid the world has yet made in this direction was the League of Nations, which combined almost all types of international organizations into its institutions in one way or another.[19] The League grew out of an effort to sub-

[17] This information is found in convenient form on the Chart of Ratifications published quarterly by the International Labor Office.

[18] *New York Times,* November 5, 1941. Of interest also is the Report of the Acting Director of the I.L.O., *The I.L.O. and Reconstruction* (Montreal, 1941). For further information on the activities of the I.L.O., see the *Abridged Catalogue of Publications of the International Labor Office,* Geneva, I.L.O., January, 1940; *The International Labor Organization* published as the March, 1933, number of the *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 166, Philadelphia, 1933; John G. Winant, *A Report to the Governments, Employers, and Workers of Member States of the International Labour Organization,* Montreal, I.L.O., 1941; William Menke, *What is the I.L.O?,* New York, National I.L.O. Committee, 1941; *International Conciliation,* 355 (December, 1939); *I.L.O.,* Washington, I.L.O., 1940; *Constitution of the International Labor Organization,* Washington, I.L.O., 1937; *The Twentieth Year of the International Labour Organization 1919–1939,* Geneva, Albert Kundig, 1939; *After Twenty Years, The International Labor Organization,* Washington, I.L.O., 1939; Ethel M. Johnson, *The United States in the International Labor Organization,* Washington, I.L.O., 1939; and, Ethel M. Johnson, *Labor and International Peace,* Washington, I.L.O., 1940.

[19] For a sharply contrasting view of the League of Nations see Harry E. Barnes' Chapter "From the First World War to the Second World War."—*Editor.*

stitute collective action for individual state action in matters affecting the peace of the world. The leadership in this new undertaking fell to the United States President, Woodrow Wilson, who, on January 8, 1918, delivered to the Congress of the United States his famous Fourteen Points, the fourteenth of which read:

> XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." [20]

Other statesmen had likewise been working on plans for a League of Nations. Noteworthy were those of Lord Phillimore of England, drawn up March 20, 1918; that of General Smuts of the Union of South Africa, published in December, 1918, under the title, *The League of Nations—A Practical Suggestion;* and that of Lord Robert Cecil of England, January 14, 1919.[21]

In promoting the idea of a League of Nations at the Peace Conference, however, President Wilson received little or no help from Clemenceau, who insisted above everything else upon the security of France and regarded the League as a luxury, perhaps even a danger.[22] Wilson made it plain to his intimate adviser, Colonel House, that he intended "making the League of Nations the center of the whole programme and letting everything revolve around that." [23] After several months of discussion the Covenant of the League of Nations was incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles as Part One.[24]

A long and bitter fight in the Senate of the United States resulted in a defeat for the Treaty of Versailles and with it the

[20] For an interesting account of President Wilson's ideas on the League of Nations, expressed on board the *George Washington* while enroute to France, see James T. Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference,* New York, Macmillan, 1937, pp. 75–78.

[21] For the texts of these plans, see David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant,* 2 vols., New York, Putnam, 1928, vol. 2.

[22] Charles Seymour, *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* Boston, Houghton, 1928, vol. 4, pp. 251–252.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] It is contained also in the other treaties of peace: with Austria (September 10, 1919); Hungary (June 4, 1920); and Bulgaria (Nov. 27, 1919).

Covenant of the League of Nations. This, however, did not prevent the League from starting to function on January 10, 1920, the date on which the Treaty of Versailles came into force by the deposit of Germany's ratification. The original members of the League were the signatories of the Treaty. In addition, certain neutral states were invited to accede to the Covenant and the door was left open for any fully self-governing state, dominion, or colony to be admitted to membership by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. Any state could withdraw from membership in the League after giving two years' notice of its intention to do so.[25]

In the Preamble to the Covenant the member states accept obligations not to resort to war and to maintain "a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another." [26]

The principal organs of the League were the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat, together with certain administrative commissions provided for in the Covenant.

The Assembly consisted of representatives of all the members of the League [27] and, as a general rule, met annually in September, at the seat of the League in Geneva, Switzerland. It also met at such other times as the Assembly at a previous meeting, or the Council, decided by a majority vote. In all action in the Assembly the principle of equality was respected. Representation was by states with one vote only to each state, although the delegation might be composed of not more than three principal delegates together with substitutes and technical advisers. The Covenant contains no rule regarding the selec-

[25] Covenant, Article I.

[26] The purposes enunciated in the Covenant and the way in which they worked out may be found contrasted in such works as: Cecil of Chelwood, *A Great Experiment,* London, Oxford University Press, 1941; Hans Kelsen, *Legal Technique in International Law,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1940; M. E. Burton, *The Assembly of the League of Nations,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1941; Ross S. J. Hoffman, *The Great Republic,* New York, Sheed, 1942; and Linden Mandy, *Foundations of Modern World Society,* Stanford University Press, 1941. These works should be set against *Ten Years of World Co-operation,* Geneva, Secretariat of the League of Nations, 1930, for an adequate picture.

[27] Covenant, Article III. See M. E. Burton, *The Assembly of the League of Nations,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1941.

tion of delegates, and governments were free to appoint them in whatever manner they wished.

The Assembly could deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. Other special duties of the Assembly were to control the budget, to admit new members, to elect periodically the nonpermanent members of the Council, and, with the Council, to elect the judges of the Permanent Court of International Justice.[28]

In practice, the Assembly became the general directing body of the League. It reviewed the work of the year preceding its regular meeting and outlined the plans for the ensuing year. It was presided over by a president elected by the Assembly. Six vice-presidents were elected in a similar manner. These officers, together with the chairmen of the six committees of the Assembly, formed a general committee which was responsible for the conduct of its various activities. Each state had one representative on each of the six committees. They considered legal and constitutional questions, work of the technical organizations, disarmament, the budget, social questions, and political problems. Whenever a matter came to the attention of the Assembly it was assigned to its proper committee for thorough study and investigation. It was not at all uncommon for a committee to spend several days or weeks, or even years, considering a problem with the help of its technical advisers and experts. When a decision had been reached within the committee, a full report of the discussions and conclusions was forwarded to the plenary session of the Assembly, where it was considered in detail and finally voted upon. A unanimous vote was necessary in practically all matters although a measure could be passed as a recommendation by a majority vote.

It should be noted that in voting each state had only one vote which was cast as a government ballot. This made the Assembly virtually a parliament of governments and not of people. While this was desirable in some respects it also had its shortcomings in that it enabled the governments to use the

[28] For a good discussion of the Assembly and the Council, see C. Howard-Ellis, *The Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations,* Boston, Houghton, 1928, chap. 6.

machinery of the Assembly to advance their own selfish ends, if they wished to do so, without a direct check being placed upon them by their people.[29] Representation might have been allotted on a different basis, as, for example, four delegates from each member state (two representing the government and two representing the people), much after the manner provided in the constitution of the International Labor Organization. Under such a plan of representation the League might have enjoyed public support to a greater extent.

The Council, the smaller executive body of the League, was composed of permanent and nonpermanent members. At the outset it was intended to have five permanent seats, one for each of the following: the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States. The original number of permanent members was reduced to four, owing to the failure of the United States to ratify the Treaty of Versailles.[30] Some years later, when Germany joined the League (1926), she was given the permanent seat originally intended for the United States. Nine nonpermanent members were elected to the Council, in such a manner that three were elected each year for a three-year period.

Each member state of the Council had one representative and one vote. Any member of the League not represented on the Council was invited to sit as a member during the consideration of questions especially affecting its interests.[31] Ordinarily, the Council met four times a year and usually at the seat of the League in Geneva, Switzerland. However, on other occasions the Council met more often—eleven times during 1920, for example.[32]

Like the Assembly, the Council dealt with any question coming within the interests of the League or affecting the peace of the world. Some special functions were assigned to it by the

[29] This was in part the basis for arguments of opponents of the League that it was the tool of France or of England.

[30] League of Nations, *Ten Years of World Co-operation,* Geneva, Secretariat of the League of Nations, 1930, p. 13.

[31] Covenant, Article IV.

[32] *Ten Years of World Co-operation,* p. 13.

Covenant, such as the supervision of the mandates system and the preparation of plans for the limitation of armaments. The peace treaties entrusted it with the responsibility for supervising the government of the Saar Territory and the Free City of Danzig and for the protection of minorities. The most important work of the Council, however, was its responsibility to make the work of the League effective in actual disputes which might arise among the nations. When a question of this kind was called to the attention of the Council, it conducted a thorough investigation of the dispute, often sending experts to the actual scene and finally reporting its decision to the League as a whole and through the League to the world.[33]

The Secretariat was the third part of the League machinery. This was really the international civil service of the Assembly and the Council, directed by a secretary-general, a deputy secretary-general and several undersecretaries. The total staff of the Secretariat numbered about seven hundred men and women from fifty-one different countries. They read, wrote, and spoke practically every language in the world and served as a vast clearing house of knowledge on a great variety of subjects. Among its duties, the Secretariat carried out the decisions of the Assembly and the Council. This often included extensive investigations and research as well as the drawing up of reports, memoranda, etc.

The Secretariat registered all treaties and international understandings regarding political questions and technical agreements concerning the postal system, customs, and sanitation. As early as 1930, the Secretariat had registered and published more than 2,330 treaties and agreements and the number was increasing at the rate of 300 per year. The treaties were published in the two official languages of the League, French and English. They also were published in their original text, if that was neither English nor French.[34]

The principal sections of the Secretariat were the Political

[33] See the references in note 26, p. 141, for a realistic and nontheoretical discussion. See also J. S. Roucek, "The League of Nations—What It Is Today," *Social Science,* 13 (July, 1938), pp. 208–215.

[34] *Ten Years of World Co-operation,* p. 16.

Section, the Financial and Economic Section, the Transit Section, the Section for Minorities and Administrative Commissions (the Saar and Danzig), the Mandates Section, the Disarmament Section, the Health Section, the Social Section (Opium and Protection of Children and Young People), the Section for Intellectual Co-operation and International Bureaus, the Legal Section and the Information Section.[35]

The Secretariat, including its various sections, research facilities and library was housed in a new building overlooking Lake Geneva. The generous gift of $2,000,000 by Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., helped make the League library one of the finest in the world.

Unfortunately the elaborate machinery of the League could not, of itself, keep the peace if states were determined to go to war. It depended for its success upon the collective action of the members in living up to the obligations assumed in the Covenant. Prominent among these was the obligation "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." [36] In actual practice it was found that the national interests of states conflicted and diverged too widely to make feasible such a general guarantee.

This was demonstrated all too clearly when Japan invaded Manchuria in September, 1931. The League Council, then in session, received China's protest and ordered both Japan and China to respect their treaty obligations. To give unanimity to the Council action, the United States, a nonmember, was invited to participate in the deliberations of the Council. The late Mr. Prentiss Gilbert was designated by the Department of State to sit with the Council but was instructed to be an "observer" only, except when the Kellogg Pact was under discussion.[37] In

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

[36] Covenant, Article X.

[37] Although restricted in his actions, Mr. Gilbert's presence marked a departure from the traditional policy of the United States (as, for example, in 1921 and 1922 when communications from the League addressed to the United States remained unanswered). See Ursula P. Hubbard, "The Co-operation of the United States with the League of Nations and the I.L.O.," in *International Conciliation,* New York, Carnegie Endowment, 1931, p. 675.

spite of the mandate from the Council, Japan continued her aggression in Manchuria and later in China. The League dispatched the Lytton Commission to Manchuria and after six months' investigation on the spot it issued a report condemning Japan as the aggressor. Japan refused to accept the findings of the Commission and withdrew from the League.[38]

Other instances of aggression, such as Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, and Hitler's forced *Anschluss* with Austria and his conquest of Czechoslovakia, found the members of the League too engrossed with their own problems to run the risk of war with a major power. This is in contrast to the firm stand taken by the League in the first ten years of its existence, when it actually stopped conflicts between smaller states. The successful termination of the Greco-Bulgarian dispute in 1925 by the League is an example of collective action.[39]

The main source of weakness in the League was that it was based on the assumption that the states could act in an international way contrary to their national power interests. The League in practical operation was hampered and checkmated constantly by national interests and policies.[40]

Health and health education were two fields in which the League probably met with its greatest success. Under the social section of the Covenant (Article XXIII) the members of the League assumed an obligation to help in the control and prevention of disease. Almost at the outset of its activities the League sent an Epidemics Commission to help in the fight against the western spread of the dreaded typhus, as thousands of refugees surged across the frontiers of Poland and other eastern European countries from the Soviet Union. Today, with

[38] The action of the League in this dispute is analyzed by W. W. Willoughby, *The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations,* Baltimore, Johns Hopkins, 1935. For a brief account, see R. J. Dangerfield, "The League and the Settlement of International Disputes," in *International Institutions and World Peace,* Dallas, Southern Methodist University, 1937, pp. 119–120.

[39] *Ten Years of World Co-operation,* pp. 31–34. Also, J. S. Bassett, *The League of Nations,* New York, Longmans, 1930, pp. 220–224. Also, Arthur Sweetser, "The Practical Working of the League of Nations: A Concrete Example," in *International Conciliation,* New York, Carnegie Endowment, April, 1929, pp. 199–200.

[40] For a realistic criticism of the League see Joseph S. Roucek, *op. cit.;* pp. 208–215.

the League deserted by the states and war raging across the Soviet Union, typhus is again taking its toll of human lives.

The experience of the Epidemics Commission showed the need for an international information service on epidemics. This was one of the first tasks undertaken by the Health Organization and was made possible by an annual grant from the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. This service was extended to the Far East in 1925 by the establishment of an Epidemiological Intelligence Bureau at Singapore. This important port was selected because practically all of the maritime trade between Japan and India and the Near East, Africa and Europe, passed through its waters. By means of this bureau in the Far East the League was able to keep in close touch with the Eastern countries where cholera and plague are always prevalent. In numerous other ways the health and well being of the people of the world was safeguarded by the health organization of the League.[41]

In the field of *intellectual co-operation* the League entered into an entirely new region of international activity. Through the establishment of a Committee on Intellectual Co-operation it brought together a carefully selected group of the best thinkers of the age drawn from the various intellectual disciplines. The mere fact that the League was able to present such an array of talent, representing such a variety of specialties, countries, and intellectual traditions, was, in itself, no small achievement. The influence of the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation upon the whole work of the League and especially upon the statesmen represented at Geneva was profound. Heretofore it had been believed generally that the thinker and the statesman moved in two wholly separate worlds.[42]

The weaknesses of the League grew increasingly apparent through the 1930's and it was clearly shown to be ineffectual as a peace agency in the Spanish Civil War. The *coup de grace*

[41] *Ten Years of World Co-operation,* chap. 7, "Health." Also, Edmund C. Mower, *International Government,* Boston, Heath, 1931, chap. 26.

[42] See *Ten Years of World Co-operation,* chap. 9, "Intellectual Co-operation," pp. 313 ff. The League also achieved real results in its Permanent Mandates Commission and in its work in controlling drug traffic.

came with the impact of the Nazi armies on Europe in the summer of 1940, which brought the varied activities of the League of Nations to a practical standstill. The political work ceased altogether for obvious reasons.[43] Certain nonpolitical sections such as the economic and financial organizations were invited to continue their work at Princeton, New Jersey. This invitation was extended in 1940 by Princeton University, the Institute for Advanced Study, and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research, because the technical aspects of the League's work were considered to be much too valuable to be discontinued or even curtailed by the war.[44]

In this limited capacity what is left of the world's greatest international organization carries on—at least for the duration. During April, 1942, reports from Berne, Switzerland, announced that the "League carries on with minor action." [45]

Pan American Union. Another illustration of federalism of a less effective sort is Pan-Americanism. It had its origin on December 7, 1824, when Simon Bolívar, writing from Lima, issued a call convening the Congress of Panama to discuss problems common to the American republics. The United States was invited to participate and sent two delegates. Misfortune overtook them both, however. One delegate died on the journey, while the other abandoned his efforts to reach Panama in time. Meanwhile the Congress had met in Panama, on June 22, 1826, and proposed a number of recommendations, none of which was ever adopted.[46] Success, however, lay in another direction with the planting of the first seeds of inter-American co-operation.

Some sixty-two years later the Congress of the United States, by an Act of May 24, 1888, invited the American powers to meet in Washington to consider matters affecting the peace and prosperity of the Western Hemisphere. The Conference sat from October 2, 1889, to April 19, 1890, and formed an association

[43] Contrast this with the view of Harry Elmer Barnes in Chapter 13.—*Editor.*
[44] *New York Times,* July 16, 1940.
[45] *New York Times,* April 5, 1942.
[46] Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People,* New York, Crofts, 1940, p. 196. See also Chapter 17, "United States and Latin America," section on "The Good-neighbor Policy and Pan-Americanism."

known as the International Union of American Republics. Resolutions were drawn up as the basis of organization. These were not to be considered treaties and were not binding on the various governments. Rather were they to be submitted to the several states in the form of resolutions with the understanding that when a state gave its adherence to the resolutions it would so notify the Secretary of State of the United States. In this informal manner was born an international organization of American states which has proved to be one of the most effective unions of all time.

Subsequent Pan-American Conferences have been held, usually at five-year intervals: [47] Mexico City (1901), Rio de Janeiro (1906), Buenos Aires (1910), Santiago (1923), Havana (1928), Montevideo (1933), and Lima (1938). More recent special conferences of American foreign ministers have been held at frequent intervals, culminating in the Rio de Janeiro Conference in January, 1942.[48]

Organization for the Settlement of International Disputes

The third type of world organization consists of institutions charged with the settlement of international disputes. The most important and interesting of these is the League of Nations, which has already been discussed. Some of the others follow.

Arbitration. For centuries foreign offices, their diplomatic representatives and consular agents, have been charged with keeping the peace between states. Sometimes, however, diplomacy fails. Recourse must be had to another method of settlement, if war is to be averted. Sometimes an informal procedure is adopted, such as good offices and mediation. These consist primarily of a third state or an official of a third state

[47] Indispensable to a study of the Pan-American Conferences are the works by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *The International Conferences of American States 1889–1928,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1931, and *The International Conferences of American States, First Supplement, 1933–1940,* Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 1940.

[48] See Graham Stuart, "The Rio Conference," *World Affairs Interpreter,* 13 (April, 1942), pp. 13–20.

bringing together the two disputants in an attempt to conciliate their differences. The third party who offers his good offices very often becomes the mediator of the dispute. As such he may render signal service by suggesting a solution acceptable to both parties. In so doing he acts merely in an advisory capacity. For example, President Theodore Roosevelt offered his good offices in 1905 when Japan and Russia were at war. He subsequently became the mediator and brought the conflict to a close on terms acceptable to both belligerents.

Other controversies center around a question of fact which may prove incapable of solution through the established channels of diplomacy or mediation. War may be avoided if an impartial commission can determine the true facts in a particular case. To meet such contingencies states have established commissions of inquiry. Among the first of these were the International Commissions of Inquiry set up by the First Hague Conference in 1899.[49] Although limited in power to a statement of facts in connection with the dispute, these commissions have more than proved their usefulness.

Arbitration was devised to overcome many of the shortcomings inherent in the machinery considered above. Instead of anticipating a recommendation for the settlement of a controversy, arbitration proceeds toward a compromise decision based on judicial principles. It is essentially a judicial method in which, through the application of principles of law, a compromise decision is reached. Usually a national of a state neutral to the contest acts as umpire.[50] His duties are clearly defined in the *compromis*—the agreement wherein the parties agree to submit their difference to an arbitrator, and to be clearly distinguished from "*compromise.*" This document also contains such essentials as "the scope of the question, the time and place of the trial, the procedure at the trial,—including the languages to be used, the forms of argument and counterargu-

[49] Norman L. Hill, "International Commissions of Inquiry and Conciliation," in *International Conciliation,* New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932, p. 92.

[50] Charles C. Hyde, *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States,* Boston, Little, 1922, vol. 2, p. 112.

ment to be permitted, the submission of evidence, and whatever else is necessary." [51] The *compromis* for the adjudication of a dispute is not to be confused with the arbitration treaty itself, which provides in advance for the submission of controversies that may arise between states. This treaty, which obligates the parties to accept in good faith the decision of the arbitrator, may be all-inclusive or may be restricted to include only certain classes of disputes. Its importance lies in the fact that states decide in advance to submit their future differences to arbitration—in the absence of a treaty they might not be willing to do so, especially after a dispute had arisen.

Arbitration is sometimes considered to be of comparatively recent origin. Historically, it dates back to the ancient Greeks if not to earlier times.[52] In the foreign relations of the United States, arbitration began shortly after the Union was formed. As early as 1794 the United States and England signed the Jay Treaty, which provided for the submission of many classes of disputes to arbitration. Great impetus to the cause of international arbitration came out of the famous *Alabama* claims brought by the United States against England and settled through arbitration on September 14, 1872.[53]

Multilateral agreements to arbitrate took an important step forward at the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899. The United States delegation had been instructed by Secretary of State John Hay "to propose, at an opportune moment, the plan for an International Tribunal, hereunto attached." [54] Hay had in mind a permanent court of law. This the other nations were not willing to accept. In its place, however, they agreed to organize a Permanent Court of Arbitration. Twenty-six states signed the Convention of 1899 which set it in motion. Further

[51] Pitman B. Potter, *op. cit.*, p. 225. See also Harold M. Vinacke, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

[52] Jackson H. Ralston, *International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno*, Stanford University Press, 1929, gives a good historical account of arbitral tribunals; see especially parts 3 and 4. Also, John Bassett Moore, *History and Digest of International Arbitrations*, 6 vols., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1898.

[53] Norman L. Hill, "British Arbitration Policies," in *International Conciliation*, New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1930, pp. 77–79.

[54] James Brown Scott, *The Hague Peace Conferences, American Instructions and Reports*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1916, pp. 8–9.

progress was made at the Second Hague Conference in 1907 when the Convention providing for the continuance of the Permanent Court of Arbitration was signed by forty-four states.

Strictly speaking, the Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration is neither permanent nor a court. It is in fact merely a panel of possible arbitrators who might be called upon to serve in a particular case. The panel is composed of names submitted by the signatory states, each of whom may designate four persons "of known competency in questions of international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties of arbitrator." From this list the parties to a controversy select an equal number of arbitrators—usually not more than two—to sit on the court. The persons thus selected, in turn, choose an umpire or presiding officer. Unlike a court of law, the courts of arbitration are formed only after a dispute has arisen and terminate when the award has been given.[55] The meeting place of the court is not fixed but is determined upon at the time the arbitrators are selected.[56]

The administrative work in connection with the Court of Arbitration is carried on by a council composed of the diplomatic representatives of the various nations at the Hague. From its establishment in 1899, up to 1932, eighteen cases were submitted for arbitration under its provisions.[57]

In the Western Hemisphere, numerous differences among the Central American states led to the creation of a Central American Court of Justice, December 20, 1907. The convention establishing this Court, which was signed by five states, included within its scope many questions of a highly controversial nature, in fact so controversial that some of the decisions of the Court were not carried out in good faith. Consequently, when

[55] For example, the *Casablanca* or *North Atlantic Fisheries* cases. See note 57, below, for references.

[56] J. H. Ralston, *op. cit.*, pp. 259–260.

[57] For a résumé of the views of arbitrators upon questions arising under the law of nations, see Jackson H. Ralston, *The Law and Procedure of International Tribunals,* Stanford University Press, 1926, and *Supplement* to same, 1936. Post-war treaties are found in Max Habicht, *Post-War Treaties for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1931. For the *compromis,* see George Grafton Wilson, *The Hague Arbitration Cases,* Boston, Ginn, 1915.

the Court was re-created in 1923, its powers were greatly curtailed. In this limited capacity the Court existed in name only with no cases coming before it during the next decade.[58]

The Permanent Court of International Justice. The establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice, commonly called the World Court, represented, in many respects, the fulfillment of an American hope of long standing.

It was proposed by the American delegations at the Peace Conferences of the Hague in 1899 [59] and 1907.[60] The American proposal met with a favorable response at the Second Conference in 1907, and all essential features were agreed upon with the exception of the number and method of electing the judges. This was the only point at issue when the Conference adjourned. The method of selecting the judges was referred back to the governments for further consideration.

Plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice were still being discussed at the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. But it remained for the Paris Peace Conference to take the initiative in setting the machinery of a court in motion. This was done by virtue of an article [61] in the Covenant of the League of Nations which stated that:

> The Council shall formulate and submit to the Members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

The Council lost no time in carrying out the mandate of the Covenant. At its second session held in London in February, 1920, the Council appointed a committee of internationally

[58] Clyde Eagleton, *op. cit.*, p. 329. For the text of the treaties between the states of the American Continent, see William R. Manning, *Arbitration Treaties Among the American Nations, to the Close of the Year 1910*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1924.

[59] James Brown Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–9.

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 79–80.

[61] Covenant, Article XIV.

recognized legal authorities to consider the organization of the Court, the method of appointing the judges, their number and status, the rules of procedure, and so forth.[62]

The Committee of Jurists drafted a statute or law for the Court which was approved by the Council and Assembly of the League of Nations and ratified by the member states acting independently and separately of the League. The Statute of the Court came into force in September, 1921, when the protocol had been ratified by twenty-eight states.

Originally the Court was composed of eleven judges and four deputy judges—this was later changed to fifteen judges. They were elected for a nine year term by a majority vote of the Council, and the Assembly without regard to nationality. The judges must be "persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are juris-consults of recognized competence in international law." [63] Nomination of members of the Court was to be by the national groups whose names appeared on the panel of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. No national group, however, could nominate more than two persons for each vacancy on the Court, and of these two, one at least must be of a nationality other than that of the nominating group.[64] Furthermore, those selected for membership on the Court were forbidden to "engage in any other occupation of a professional nature." These many safeguards assured the highest integrity of the Court.

The jurisdiction of the Court extends to all or any of the classes of disputes concerning: [65] (*a*) the interpretation of a treaty; (*b*) any question of international law; (*c*) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; (*d*) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.

[62] *Ten Years of World Co-operation*, pp. 125–126.

[63] Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, chap. 1, article 2.

[64] *Ibid.*, chap. 1, articles 4 and 5. For a good discussion of the method of nominating judges, see Harold M. Vinacke, *op. cit.*, pp. 251–256.

[65] *Ibid.*, chap. 2, article 36. The competence of the Court is discussed in C. C. Hyde, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 145–146.

It should be kept in mind that the Court has only voluntary jurisdiction. Like other courts, it is governed by law and must keep within certain prescribed limits of established rules and principles. But unlike ordinary courts of law, the World Court cannot force parties into court against their will. However, to make the Court more effective, the so-called "optional clause" was annexed to the Statute. This confers obligatory jurisdiction upon the Court as between those states which have accepted the clause. By 1938 the number of states which had accepted the optional clause totaled thirty-nine.[66]

The law, which the court is to use in reaching its decisions, the Statute gives as follows: [67]

1. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States.
2. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.
3. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
4. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case *ex aequo et bono,* if the parties agree thereto.

In addition to handing down judicial decisions (which require a majority of the judges present), the Court was empowered by Article XIV of the Covenant to give advisory opinions,[68] which it did in 27 cases. These are in addition to the 32 judgments [69] of the Court which have had a profound effect upon the development of the law of nations. All of these were cases of some magnitude. "Each of them," writes Judge Manley O. Hudson, "had importance for the peoples directly con-

[66] The list of states accepting the optional clause is found in Manley O. Hudson, *The World Court, 1921–1938,* Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1938, pp. 30–31.

[67] Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Article 38.

[68] Manley O. Hudson, "The Advisory Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice," in *International Conciliation,* New York, Carnegie Endowment, November, 1925.

[69] The Statute and Judgments of the Court are found in Manley O. Hudson, *World Court Reports,* 3 vols., Washington, Carnegie Endowment, vol. 1, 1934, vol. 2, 1935, vol. 3, 1938, vol. 4, covering the period from 1936 to 1941, will be published in 1942.

cerned, and some of them were significant for international relations generally. Fortunately, most of the cases were more or less removed from the surge of high politics, but in a few instances questions were presented of immediate bearing on political issues which were attracting current attention." [70]

Such is the account of the Court from the legal angle. From the political and realistic standpoints the Court suffered from the same ailments as the League. Particularly significant was the inability of the judges to act in an international capacity. Imbued, often unconsciously, with national views and predilections, they voted in terms of them. Some of the most notorious cases were those of the steamship *Wimbledon,* the Memel dispute, and the Austro-German Customs Union. In the latter case one judge, former United States Secretary of State Frank Kellogg, delivered a dissenting opinion, such strong exception did he take to the decision of the Court.

The position of the United States in relation to the World Court has been one of official indifference, inasmuch as the United States never ratified the Court Protocols, which had been agreed upon by the other states in order to secure American adherence.[71] Although strongly supported by President F. D. Roosevelt, the World Court measure was defeated by the Senate on January 29, 1935, by a slender margin. The vote stood 52 in favor and 36 against, but the necessary two-thirds majority was lacking. The absence of the United States has not prevented a number of United States citizens from serving on the Court as judges. The first thus to serve was John Bassett Moore, to be followed in turn by Charles Evans Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, and Manley O. Hudson.

The Court has been inactive since the Nazis occupied its seat, the Hague, early in the spring of 1940. Consequently, the meeting planned for May of that year could not be held. No

[70] Manley O. Hudson, "The Twentieth Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice," *American Journal of International Law* (January, 1942), p. 4.

[71] On January 27, 1926, the Senate had voted favorably on American adherence to the Court, but with five reservations which altered the effectiveness of the Court. For a discussion of these reservations, see Philip C. Jessup, *The United States and the World Court,* Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1929.

attempt has been made to assemble the judges since that time. Although payment of the judges' salaries has been suspended, none of them has resigned.[72]

International Executive Organization

Security and Sanctions. The fourth type of world organizations, the executive organizations, carry international regulations and engagements into effect and perform duties in world affairs similar to those the executive branch of a state performs in municipal matters. While the comparison is crude, the picture of this institution will be clearer, if examples are given.

The collective-security machinery contained a large proportion of executive power. The League of Nations, in the Covenant in Article XVI particularly, placed restrictions on resort to force and required the Council and the League to see that these were enforced. Thus, for example, the Council took the initiative in the Ethiopian, the Manchurian, and the Finnish cases. Its function in each instance was to enforce the terms of the Covenant. The Pact of Paris urged signatory states to come to the aid of aggrieved signatories and thus enforce the provisions of the treaties.

In other instances, provisions were made so that international groups might resort to sanctions to enforce rights. Such a sanction was undertaken by France when she occupied the Ruhr, which was use of international executive power, although France was alone in undertaking it. Sanctions were also tried in economic matters against Italy in the case of Ethiopia, and were urged upon the world by the Council of the League against Russia in her attack on Finland.

Supervision of treaties. Much machinery was set up at the end of the First World War with the purpose of carrying the peace treaties into effect. Excellent examples were the international government established in the Saar, with its subsequent plebiscite; also the international government of the Free City of Danzig. Continuation conferences at Spa, Hythe, Bo-

[72] Manley O. Hudson, *loc. cit.*, p. 7.

logna, Brussels, Cannes, and elsewhere illustrated the executive power being used to carry broad general international policy into effect.

In addition to the foregoing, there were many matters such as the protection of minorities, the administration and the control over mandates, the fixing of reparations, the establishment of the Bank for International Settlements, and the Hague Conference of 1930.

International Administrative Organizations

By far the least spectacular, yet the most extensive and perhaps even the most important of all official world organizations are the multitude of administrative organizations. As already said, their chief work consists of carrying routine matters into effect and seeing that they are carried out as intended by international conventions or agreements. A few illustrations will acquaint the student with their nature and operation.[73]

The telegraphic union. During the 1850's a number of bilateral treaties concerning telegraphic communication were concluded in Europe.[74] Although an improvement over the old system of individual state control, they left much to be desired. A greater degree of uniformity was needed, which could be achieved only through an international union or organization. With this thought in mind, representatives of twenty states met in Paris in 1865 and concluded a treaty or convention for the simplification of the international service and a reduction in the tariff rates. The organization thus created was later expanded to include most of the states of the world with the exception of the United States and a few others. One of the main requisites to becoming a member of the union could not be met by the United States because in that country only a very small fraction of the telegraph lines was under the control of the federal

[73] International organizations differ widely as to origin, scope, and degree of permanency. Five examples here illustrate their varying character: (1) of limited applicability, (2) of multilateral origin, (3) allowing member states to withdraw at will, (4) as respects United States participation, origin by virtue of a treaty not requiring Senatorial approval, (5) regional or hemisphere organization.

[74] Paul S. Reinsch, *Public International Unions,* Boston, Ginn, 1911, p. 15.

government. States, to be members of the union, had to be "in a position to insure the general acceptance of the principles and rules of the international telegraph conference on the part of the private companies within its territory." [75]

The International Commission on Cape Spartel Lighthouse. The international organization established to operate the Cape Spartel Lighthouse is somewhat different. In this instance the purpose was to operate jointly a lighthouse, clearly a subject within the competence of the federal government of the United States. The strategic position of the Cape Spartel Lighthouse in command of the Strait of Gibraltar made its continued operation and neutrality a matter of concern to all states. In order to guarantee the neutrality of the lighthouse a multilateral convention was signed on May 31, 1865, by many of the European states and also by the United States. The formal ratification of this convention creating a commission under international control was proclaimed by the United States on March 12, 1867.[76]

To the student of international affairs it is significant to note that this is the first multilateral convention, still in force, to which the United States became a party.

The International Prison Commission. International co-operation between states may be achieved on a purely voluntary basis as well as on the more formal basis provided for in a treaty or convention. An example of the informal type is found in the International Penal and Prison Commission which grew out of the International Prison Reform Congress of London, 1872. The United States was represented at this Congress and became a co-operating member of the International Prison Commission, the task of which was "to collect information on prisons and prison systems, and to publish material dealing with the administration of prisons and the laws relating to them." [77] Each co-operating state was free to withdraw from the organization at any time but few have done so. The informal structure of the Commission has not prevented it from

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[76] Laurence F. Schmeckebier, *International Organizations in which the United States Participates,* Washington, Brookings Institution, 1935, pp. 26–29.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 15.

rendering useful service in prison reform—work that would have been impossible for any one state acting by itself. Membership in 1931 totaled twenty-nine states, including the United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan.

The Universal Postal Union. Perhaps the most significant international administrative organization of the nineteenth century was the Universal Postal Union, which came as the culmination of a long series of proposals in practically every state. Lack of uniformity of rates and methods of transportation caused innumerable delays and misunderstandings in the handling of mails. Finally, the United States Government took the initiative and suggested an international postal conference to straighten out some of the difficulties which had arisen because of the existence of so many different systems. The conference, which was subsequently held in Paris in May, 1863, served to bring to light the practical steps that would have to be taken before a unified plan could be adopted. Consequently, definite action was postponed. A start toward international co-operation, however, had been made.[78]

By 1874 the states were ready for a postal treaty embracing the text of a proposal for international unification. With the signing of a convention on October 9 of that year in Berne, the General Postal Union came into existence. The convention became binding on the United States on March 8, 1875, when it received presidential approval. Unlike other treaties, postal treaties and conventions are not submitted to the Senate for consent to ratification. Thus the United States affiliated itself with an international organization in a manner quite different from that employed earlier with regard to the Lighthouse Commission and the Prison Commission. The Universal Postal Union, which has been highly successful in its specialized field of activity, claimed practically every state in the world as a member in 1931.

Economic unions. Other international organizations of interest stress the economic aspect of co-operation and include such

[78] For a brief account of the work of the Universal Postal Union, see Laurence F. Schmeckebier, *op. cit.*, pp. 31–43.

organizations as the Copyright Union, which maintains an office in Switzerland under the authority of the Government of the Confederation. The office was established by the terms of the Berne Copyright Convention of 1908. It examines all questions pertaining to copyrights and publishes reports which are sent to the thirty states comprising the Union. By the provisions of the Convention, the authors of any of the states of the Copyright Union enjoy the same rights and privileges which the respective laws grant to natives of the other states.

Patents and trade-marks are likewise protected by international agreement. The Patents and Designs Convention of 1928 grants protection to nationals of the member states holding patent rights. Forty-three states, including the United States, have subscribed to the Convention and an international bureau has been established at Berne to assist in carrying out the terms of the international agreement. In much the same manner, an international convention signed at Paris in 1883 and revised in Washington in 1911 protects the interest of a citizen as regards trade-marks and trade names in all of the other states which have acceded to the treaty.

The free movement of goods up and down international waterways is essential to the economic life of states which depend upon such waterways as a means of gaining access to the sea. An interruption of traffic might lead to reprisals and retaliatory action of a very serious nature. The International Convention of Barcelona on Freedom of Transit (1921) was designed to prevent interruption or obstruction of this kind by obligating the signatory states to grant complete freedom of transit and equality of transit conditions. The administrative work in connection with this Convention was entrusted to the League of Nations.

Within a limited scope, private unions have served a useful purpose, as is shown by the International Shipping Conference of 1921, which was called by a federation of shipowners' associations of certain European countries. Their concern, however, was exclusively with their interests as employers.

Summary. International administrative organizations may

be classified according to their purposes as follows: (1) A number deal with the international administration of territory, notable examples being the government of the Saar and Danzig, and the condominium of France and Britain over the New Hebrides. (2) Another group deals with international rights and regulations in rivers and waterways, such as the Barcelona Convention. (3) A third is the humanitarian type, such as the Opium Commission, the Prison Congress, and the International Labor Organization. (4) Financial union is exemplified by the Bank for International Settlements and the now defunct Reparations Commission. (5) There is a host of scientific organizations, such as the Geodetic Union and the Hydrographic Union. (6) And, finally there are the commercial unions such as customs unions and cable agreements.

Private and Nongovernmental Organizations

There remain to be noted a multitude of other types of private organizations, which have no direct relations with governments, but which nevertheless must be noted in a survey of this sort as exercising a considerable influence, if not possessed of actual political powers.

(1) To this group belong churches and religious bodies with their Christian Endeavor, Y.M.C.A., and missionary groups. (2) There are international organizations which are semiofficial in character or have a political tinge, to be discussed in Chapters 24 and 25. Such are the Communist International and the Nazi organizations abroad. (3) Another important group are the service organizations, Rotary, Kiwanis, Lions, and similar clubs. (4) Closely akin to these are the international chambers of commerce, for example the Latin-American Chamber of Commerce. (5) There are many press associations such as the Associated Press and the United Press. (6) Interparliamentary unions and learned societies such as the International Law Institute are still another type. (7) Business groups must not be forgotten. The United Fruit Company, the Ford Motor Company, the F. W. Woolworth Company, and the Royal Dutch

Shell Company are large international organizations. (8) The greatest of them all is the Red Cross. (9) Though seldom noticed, fraternal organizations such as the Masons and Elks are of international scope.

These are informal organizations, which are tremendously significant to international life. The scores of young men whom the Standard Oil Company sent to India and the Near East, or whom the United Fruit Company sends on various missions, are a significant element in the good and bad relations among states. The role of missionaries in China and the South Seas has been vital and lasting. These are the type of people through whom flows by far the greatest amount of intercourse between states. Therefore they have a place in any study of international organization, even though they may have been forgotten in some of our most significant works on international organization.

Conclusions

Great care should be taken to distinguish between what world organizations aim to do and what they actually do. The less spectacular organizations are the most numerous, especially the informal and the official administrative ones. The reason, perhaps, is that they are only remotely concerned with conflicting power. However, when world institutions challenge the power of national states, as did the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice, the national states have thus far won every struggle. The world has not yet reached that stage of development in which any international organization has long been entrusted either in fact or in theory with any great political power, certainly not power of the type that curbs national policies. It is on this rock that the idealistic ship, which carried League and Court enthusiasts prior to 1939, foundered.

Questions

1. Why is the study of international organizations considered to be of primary interest now?

2. Into which five classes may international organizations be divided?

3. Why was the United States not eligible to join the Telegraphic Union?

4. How did the organization of the International Prison Commission differ from that of the Universal Postal Union?

5. Distinguish between private and official organizations.

6. How does arbitration differ from mediation? From good offices?

7. Distinguish conciliation and adjudication from the terms in question 6.

8. Explain the difference between the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of International Justice.

9. Compare the method of representation in the Assembly of the League with that in the Conference of the International Labor Organization.

10. Why are treaties an important part of the international legislative process?

11. Is it true that the Assembly of the League became a parliament of governments rather than of people?

12. What nonpolitical activities did the League engage in?

13. What were some of the reasons for the decline of the League?

14. What interest did the United States show in the establishment of a World Court?

15. What experience with sanctions did the League have in the Manchurian case?

16. What kind of cases came under the jurisdiction of the World Court?

17. What is international administration? Why has it been successful?

18. Distinguish as many different types of international organizations as you can in the League.

19. Is the United States a member of the I.L.O.?

20. What kind of draft conventions or treaties are adopted by the I.L.O. Conference?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Discuss the development of international organizations during the nineteenth century.

2. Discuss the significance of the *compromis* in international arbitral proceedings.

3. Give an account of the organization and accomplishments of the First Pan-American Conference of 1889–1890.

4. Discuss the Rio de Janeiro meeting (January, 1942) of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and its effect upon Western Hemisphere solidarity.

5. How did the accomplishments of the League differ from its original purposes?

6. Discuss the Universal Postal Union as an administrative organ.

7. Discuss international congresses and conferences as legislative bodies.

8. Report on the Pan American Union, its origins, evaluation, and functions.

9. Discuss the Hague arbitration cases as studies in political compromise.

10. Study some large business enterprise, such as the Royal Dutch Shell Company, as an international organization.

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PART II

TECHNIQUES OF THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

TECHNIQUES are the skills, means, or artistry by which objectives are accomplished. In the struggle for power states use many techniques.

One of the oldest and most successful is to secure control over the symbols of power which were mentioned in Chapter 1. Into this psychological technique enter reputation, honor, social institutions, myths, and all forms of symbolic processes.

Another technique is to wage economic warfare, to employ economic programs and policies against rivals in struggles for markets, raw materials, and self-sufficiency. The story of this economic technique during the last two generations is filled with planned industrial acceleration, autarchic principles, inflation, labor controls, manipulation of foreign trade, and many similar subjects.

Still another technique employs the mind-molding forces, the press, the radio, the motion picture, and the lecture platform, all of which have been organized into efficient agencies for psychological warfare and peacetime pressures both at home and abroad.

The oldest and the most obvious technique for securing power is the resort to military force. With the evolution of war has come an indivisible combination into a single whole of conceptions of grand strategy, military organization, militarism, and the art of generalship.

The modern state in its world relations, especially in a critical time such as the Second World War, must employ all of these techniques for the furthering of its own interests. A state, large or small, must understand them if it is to survive, and must be able to employ them effectively whether on the defensive or the aggressive. These techniques are the marked deck with which states must play in the game of power politics, and upon the skill with which a state plays the game its survival depends.

CHAPTER 7

THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE FOR POWER

The Economic Causes of War

Economic resources and strength have become increasingly important for the position of a state even in peace, and even more so in modern total warfare, which relies to such a great extent on industrial machinery. But, while realizing the growing importance of the economic factor in the struggle for power, we must not forget that other forces operate in the conflict. In most cases important relationships, not easy to distinguish, exist between economic and political motives. The complexity of modern social and economic questions, the vast problems of a political character, such as exaggerated nationalism, make it necessary to examine economic causes and motives of wars within the framework of all the forces involved. For example, the economic causes of Hitler's success in Germany comprise one question; Germany's policy under the Hitler regime is an entirely different question. Economic forces are, of course, always in operation, their influence and pressure becoming more intensive in time of depression, of disorganized world markets, or of structural technological changes. But the economic struggle usually forms a part of a larger struggle, aiming at more general objectives, especially at domination of territories and nations.[1]

The period before 1914. In the liberal capitalist economies and in the old imperialisms, from the abandonment of mercantilism until 1914, the whole world was an economic unit.[2] Inter-

[1] The role of economic forces in war has been overemphasized, especially in Marxian theory which regards modern warfare as the result of the capitalist and imperialist system, with its continuous fight for an outlet for goods and capital. For references see Francis Brown, Charles Hodges, and Joseph Roucek, *Contemporary World Politics,* New York, Wiley, 1939, especially chap. 3 by John Donaldson, "Power Politics."

[2] For the contrary view see the chapter on "Democracies at War."

national division of production and labor did exist, in spite of various measures impairing its full operation. The economic struggle in time of peace was characterized by a constant rivalry for foreign markets and investment opportunities; the success of any country depended, for the most part, upon its real ability in production and trade. Governments did not participate or interfere directly in this fight for world markets. Indeed, in Great Britain even the lending of capital to foreign countries was practically unregulated and was conditioned more by commercial than by political considerations. (In France and Germany, however, the main trend of foreign policy governed the granting of foreign credits.) [3] This does not, of course, mean that Great Britain did not make an appropriate use of her financial strength for furthering general lines of British policy. But it did not generally apply to the regular financial transactions on the London market.

Although this economic struggle was extremely important for the relative strength of the various countries, on the whole it took the form of competition with government support (in one country more, in another less), in a general way, but not as a matter of vigorous general policy. Thus Germany, before 1914, achieved her position as the second greatest trading power in the world markets, not by military aid from the government, but rather by a successful trading drive, attaining even a certain kind of economic penetration in some countries. In this connection it is well to remember that Germany's colonies sup-

[3] French long-term investments in Russia increased from 7 billion francs in 1900 to 11.s billion francs in 1914, in Turkey at the same period from 2 billion francs to 3.3 billion francs, and in the Balkan States from 0.7 billion francs to 2.5 billion francs (Herbert Feis, *Europe the World's Banker*, New Haven, Yale, 1930, p. 51). Nearly 60 per cent of French foreign investment was in areas in which it might be expected to bring some political benefits to the lending country. (*The Problem of International Investment*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1937, p. 125). Loans to Turkey and the Balkans increased in an endeavor to weaken German influence in those quarters. Germany's investments in 1914 amounted in Austria-Hungary to 3 billion marks, in Turkey to 1.8 billion marks, in the Balkan countries to 1.7 billion marks (Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 74). The German investments were probably made to a great extent in an effort to increase the potential efficiency of these countries as military allies, particularly the investment in Austria-Hungary and in Turkey (*The Problem of International Investment, op. cit.*, p. 127).

plied only 1 per cent of her total imported raw materials, and that the trade with her colonies amounted to only ½ per cent of Germany's total foreign trade.

The period after 1919. The pre-1914 world economic and financial co-operation, with its smoothly operating exchange of commodities, based fundamentally on the functioning of the British system, was destroyed as a result of the First World War and no new system, organized in terms of international co-operation, took its place. The world economy entered a period of disintegration,[4] economic warfare following the military strife of the years 1914–1918. True, there was still a definite body of opinion emphasizing the importance of international trade and international division of production as the most effective means for maintaining and improving the general standard of living and employment, as well as for providing peace. This viewpoint was a leading principle of the League of Nations.[5] But the main trend of national economic policies became more and more clearly protectionist, approaching the general policy

[4] A new impetus to the protectionist tendency was given by the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, with its very high import duties affecting directly and indirectly the whole of world trade. Then came the British Import Duties Act in 1932, which imposed a general *ad valorem* duty of 10 per cent on all imports except those of empire products and those specifically exempted. Great Britain thus became definitely a protectionist country although she still had the lowest level of customs tariffs. Before the beginning of the London Conference of 1933, many countries adjusted their customs tariffs to be better prepared for the expected decision which should lower the trade barriers.

Besides discouraging and controlling imports through customs tariffs, a growing number of countries after 1931–1932 introduced all sorts of quantitative controls, ranging from import quotas to the complete regimentation of foreign trade. Such measures were established in all central and southeastern Europe and in many countries of South America, most of them debtors; even France, a creditor country, resorted to an import quota system. The area of free foreign trade, that is, of trade with no obstacle other than customs tariffs, was steadily reduced as the control of foreign trade was expanded.

[5] The World Economic Conference in Geneva, 1927, accordingly worked out a definite program of international economic co-operation based on recognized economic principles—monetary stability, international movement of capital, and so forth. But most of the resolutions were not put into operation. The agenda for the World Economic Conference of 1933 was likewise very promising; in fact, the basic problems—monetary stabilization, the readjustment of world production, the removal of exaggerated protectionism, and international debts—should have been analyzed thoroughly, and appropriate solutions found. But when it proved impossible even to stabilize the leading currencies (especially the dollar), the conference ended in complete failure. It was perhaps the last chance—the first year

of national self-sufficiency. The upshot of this protectionist trend was, in due time, out-and-out economic warfare. Governments expanded, extensively and intensively, their control over foreign trade; the arsenal of weapons for economic warfare grew proportionately. Tariff barriers shot up and were frequently altered; the system of import quotas was widely adopted; foreign-exchange restrictions were used directly to effect import reductions; barter and clearing-payment agreements militated against the basic idea of triangular trade, producing further reductions in volume of trade and at the same time shifting former channels of foreign trade. Still another disturbing element in the structure of world trade was competitive monetary devaluation.[6] All kinds of dumping and direct and indirect governmental subsidies became the order of the day. An important factor in all this disorder was that big creditor nations like the United States and France were unwilling to adjust their balance of trade to their position as creditor nations.

Thus the postwar problem of international debts, whether first in the form of German reparations and inter-Allied debts, or later as nonpolitical debts, was not satisfactorily settled throughout this period.

In a growing number of countries foreign trade was subjected to a complete control and regimentation by the government. The U.S.S.R. with the state's foreign-trade monopoly, and Germany with an extremely efficient, centralized control of foreign trade, offer the outstanding examples; but many other coun-

of the Hitler regime in Germany—to arrive at a peaceful, comprehensive settlement of the most urgent economic problems. Since then, no similar conferences have taken place; the power of the Axis began to increase and the importance of the League of Nations declined.

[6] It was not before September, 1936 (or 5 years after the pound sterling went off gold), that a tripartite monetary agreement was concluded between the United States, Great Britain, and France, joined by Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland. Its chief aim was to put an end to competitive monetary devaluation, to stabilize the exchange rates of the three leading currencies. A mechanism (exchange-equalization funds) was created that could fulfill, to a great extent, the functions performed by the London monetary market before 1914, which would provide a basis for monetary stabilization throughout the world, assuming the existence of an appropriate political atmosphere.

tries also resorted to more or less comprehensive forms of control.

This period of continuing disintegration of world trade and of the world division of production provided, of course, an ideal atmosphere for the nourishment of new imperialistic theories dealing with redistribution of world resources, theories outlining a new world economic policy. The origin of these theories is to be found in the experience of the First World War. An influential body of active politicians in Germany was convinced that her defeat was due to her lack of essential raw materials and other supplies in consequence of the effective Allied blockade. Analysis of a future total war strengthened the conviction that a major power must have the most important raw materials within its own territories. This conviction has been definitely and openly stated, so that we must assume that the Axis powers would not have changed their basic policy even if a liberal foreign-trade policy had given them the prospect of an economic expansion.[7]

The "have" and the "have-not" nations. Out of such reasoning as the above, a theory of the "have" and "have-not" nations was advanced, and it was supported by the disorganized situation of world trade. Germany, Japan, and Italy considered themselves the have-not nations. The British Empire, the United States, and the Soviet Union, controlling to a great extent the production of such vital strategic materials as oil, rubber, cotton, wool, jute, tin, nickel, and the like, most of which were entirely lacking to the Axis nations, were the have nations according to this viewpoint. This general theory, going back to Bismarck, has been buttressed by other arguments: population pressure, need for living space (*Lebensraum*), and need for free access to raw materials.

The supreme aim of the have-not nations was the establish-

[7] "The view that too great a dependence on foreign countries can in times of political and economic crisis endanger the national existence, has led, especially in Germany and Italy, after the experience of the World War, of the depression and of sanctions to a planned renunciation of the system of unlimited free trade." (*Weekly Report of the German Institute for Business Research*, Berlin, January 11, 1939, 12th year, no. 1, p. 1.

ment of a new world order with a redistribution of world resources, various parts of the world to be allocated to the have-nots. Economic motives were used, indeed almost invented, to aid in the achievement of this aim. It was obviously impossible to carry out the ideas through a huge resettlement of population, establishing a proportion between population per square mile and the resources of the area. The whole plan, therefore, logically required the formation of a few large, substantially self-sufficient economic units, with the erstwhile have-not nations exercising control over these units.[8] The Axis powers claimed that enlarged living space was necessary for their future development. Germany's new living space was to be carved out of central and southeastern Europe, including parts of the U.S.S.R.; Japan's was to be in the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere," Italy's in the Mediterranean.

The demands of the Axis, then, required the nations to permit German expansion in central and eastern Europe (Germany considered that the Munich agreement gave her a free hand in that part of Europe), Italian expansion in the Mediterranean, and Japanese expansion in the Far East. In other words, the western powers must either accept a new division of the world at the expense of the smaller nations and yield some of their own overseas territories, or accept an armed conflict.

Perhaps the most vital and most discussed of the have-not claims has been the demand for *a free access to raw materials.* The main objection to this argument is that no country was excluded from buying raw materials; especially is this seen to be true when the overproduction and depression all over the world after 1927–1928 are taken into account. There has been no scarcity of raw materials and no limitation on their purchase. Small industrial countries like Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and

[8] As long as the basic attitude of the Axis nations remained unchanged, the carrying out of this program required the replacement of the existing organization of world economy by a few big, largely self-sufficient units, since continual economic warfare was to be expected on any other basis. Needless to say, in a fully developed modern economy complete self-sufficiency is impossible—even in large countries like the United States and the U.S.S.R., dependent as they are on various vital imports despite their tremendous resources. Europe, of course, depends on imports for all tropical and subtropical products.

Switzerland have never complained about the difficulties of obtaining raw materials imported from overseas.

But the have-not nations might rightly point out that, with obstacles to foreign trade steadily increasing, they were not able to export a sufficiently large amount of goods at fair prices to obtain the necessary foreign exchange in order to buy needed raw materials and food and to provide sufficient employment. With exports declining, their standard of living was threatened. (Thus Hitler's words: "Germany must export or die.") Although it was clear that the Axis nations, especially Germany, were using their foreign exchange primarily to import strategic raw materials, the real answer on the part of the western powers would have been an economic program aiming at the expansion of world trade and the reduction of trade barriers. Only by so doing would it have been possible for them to give a definite and final answer to the complaint that competition in world markets on equal terms had been replaced by dependence of the have-nots upon the have nations.

The conflict of basic economic policies. By advancing arguments dealing with the unsatisfactory world conditions and by demonstrating a willingness to adjust their national economy and foreign trade policy to a renewed international trade, the Axis countries would certainly have been able to achieve a revision of the world trade policy. We know the democratic countries were anxious to avoid an armed conflict as long as there remained a single hope for peaceful international co-operation. In the exchange of letters with Hitler in the last critical days before the Second World War began,[9] Neville Chamberlain repeatedly emphasized Great Britain's willingness to start immediately a discussion of outstanding problems, including

[9] *British Blue Book,* London, H.M. Stationery Office, Miscellaneous no. 9, 1939, p. 126. The letter of the British Government to the Chancellor of the Reich, August 28, 1939, says at the end: "If a peaceful settlement can be obtained, the assistance of the world could confidently be anticipated for practical measures to enable the transition from war to the normal activities of peaceful trade to be safely and smoothly effected." And in June, 1939, Herr Wohltat went to London to begin unofficial negotiations with Mr. Hudson about a British loan of £1,000,000,000 to be granted to Germany, assuming co-operation in international trade was possible.

German colonial demands and financial credits. Similarly, it has been stated that during the discussion between the United States and Japan in November, 1941, the United States was prepared to carry on negotiations at any time with a view to working out a solution of Japanese demands within the framework of an extensive international co-operation; even the offer of financial assistance was said to have been included.

But the Axis nations did not want to return to the form of economic co-operation based on the division of production along international lines. As Dr. Schacht succinctly expressed it: "Germany must produce raw materials on territory under her own management and this colonial territory must form part of her monetary system." [10] She demanded to be assured of satisfying her vital needs within a political sphere of her own without depending on the world trade mechanism.

On the eve, then, of the Second World War two conflicting programs and doctrines stood opposed. The realistic Soviets in this crisis feared a simultaneous attack by Germany and Japan and distrusted Great Britain and France after the Munich Conference, to which the U.S.S.R. was not invited despite her military alliance with France and Czechoslovakia. One party, represented mainly by the western democracies, believed in the functioning of a world economy. Its members aimed at peace and economic co-operation and were prepared to remove important defects in the existing system, but they delayed until too late to make an effective change in world policy. Then, in the effort to avoid war, they weakened their position by going too far in appeasement. The other party, the Axis nations, was determined to establish big, self-sufficient economic units, aiming at domination over other nations and a privileged position for the Axis nations.[11] And toward this goal of achieving new

[10] Hjalmar Schacht, "Germany's Colonial Demands," *Foreign Affairs,* 15:2 (January, 1937), p. 233.

[11] See Schacht, *loc. cit.* In this connection it should be pointed out that in 1935 only 10 per cent of the total foreign trade of Great Britain was with the British colonies.

It would be well for the student to consult some of the following references for more detailed material: J. A. Krout, ed., "Economic Nationalism, Trade Barriers, and the War," *Proceedings, Academy of Political Science,* 19:1 (May, 1940);

power in the world their economic resources were completely mobilized, their economic strength fully employed, in preparation for an all-out struggle for power, for privileged position, and for domination.

The Economic Preparation for War

Economic war potential and effective preparedness. The economic factor, with all that it implies in a mechanized total war, is highly important in international relations and diplomacy. In the period between World Wars the mobilization of economic resources and military production was thoroughly studied; blueprints for economic mobilization were carefully prepared by many countries. But between the democratic and the totalitarian countries there has been a basic difference in attitude with regard to the form which economic preparedness should take. The plans of the democratic countries relied on their definite superiority in economic war potential and on their control of the seas. The totalitarian countries, led by Germany, conscious of their relative weakness in strategic supplies—oil, rubber, textile fibers, and metals of all kinds—concentrated their efforts on effective economic and military preparedness in time of peace, transforming the whole national economy from a welfare to an armed economy,[12] subject to comprehensive planning and control.

Germany. In Germany this policy has found its most comprehensive form called *Wehrwirtshaft* (armed economy) since 1933. The system took shape in two Four Year Plans. The first, starting in 1933, had as its objective the increase of arma-

World Resources and Peace, Berkeley, University of California, 1941; E. Stein and Jules Backman, *War Economics,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942; Paul Einzig, *Economic Warfare,* London, Macmillan, 1941; L. C. Robbins, *The Economic Causes of War,* New York, Prentice-Hall, 1940; H. W. Spiegel, *The Economics of Total War,* New York, Appleton-Century, 1942; Herbert Feis, *The Changing Pattern of International Affairs,* New York, Harper, 1940; D. T. Jack, *Studies in Economic Warfare,* New York, Chemical Publishing Co., 1941; R. G. Hawtrey, *The Economic Aspects of Sovereignty,* New York, Longmans, 1930; and Grayson Kirk and R. P. Stebbins, *War and National Policy,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942.

[12] F. Munk uses the expression "economics of force" for the German defense economy. See his book, *Economics of Force,* New York, Stewart, 1940.

ment production, the reduction of unemployment through public works. In proclaiming the second in September, 1936, Hitler declared openly: "Four years from now Germany must be entirely independent of foreign nations with regards to all materials which can in one way or another be supplied by the German genius in our chemical and machine industry and mining." And in 1938 Hitler stated: "All thoughts of a blockade against Germany may as well be buried now, for it is an entirely useless weapon." [13]

Essential to this policy was the achievement of the utmost degree of self-sufficiency in food. Agriculture was brought completely under the control of the government and fully protected against foreign imports. High prices, a government-controlled market, and other measures were used to attain this objective. The result was a high degree of success. It has been estimated that Germany produced from 83 to 87 per cent of her peacetime food requirements by 1938, although only 50 to 55 per cent of the normal fat consumption was produced domestically.

The armament industry (in the broad sense) was expanded with due regard for co-ordination and synchronization, and the whole industry made ready for conversion from peace to war production at a moment's notice. Exploitation of domestic raw materials was expanded, regardless of the cost involved. For instance, the production of low-grade iron ores, copper, and tin ores was extended with the aid of government subsidies. In the field of light metals, the production of aluminum was stepped up to 180,000 tons yearly against 33,000 tons in 1929, that of magnesium to 30,000 tons as compared with 15,000 tons in 1934.

Certain vital supplies Germany could not secure domestically, even though she had all of central and southeastern Europe in her sphere. Oil, rubber, textiles, metals like nickel, tin, tungsten, molybdenum, and some others, simply were not to be found there. In such cases, Germany's policy was to ac-

[13] H. V. Rauschenplat and Hilde Monte, *How to Conquer Hitler,* London, Harrolds, 1940, p. 26.

cumulate huge stocks.[14] The volume of stores thus accumulated was greatly underestimated by the Allies as Germany piled up enormous quantities of all kinds of armaments.

Simultaneously, as a second method of providing substitutes for materials not found or grown in her sphere, she began large-scale productions of synthetic raw materials regardless of the costs. It can be assumed that by the beginning of this war Germany was producing yearly about 2,000,000 tons of synthetic petroleum, 30,000 to 40,000 tons of synthetic rubber, besides large quantities of synthetic textile fibers replacing cotton and wool. Plastic substitutes for metals were developed on a large scale.

This whole system was buttressed by the foreign-trade policy. According to Schacht's plan, even as early as 1934 there existed a complete control over foreign trade, primarily for the purpose of increasing the import of raw materials. Exportation was encouraged and subsidized as far as was necessary to succeed on the free markets. Dumping, financed by a general contribution of German industry, became a common weapon.

In trading with many countries, especially those of central and southeastern Europe, the system of free payment in foreign trade was replaced by clearing-payment and barter agreements that served to bind these smaller countries more closely to Germany. The world depression in agricultural products produced a situation ripe for Germany's purchase of food and raw materials in large quantities from the Danubian countries suffering under the crisis. By paying prices higher than those of the world market, Germany paved the way for a trade drive. Compelling these countries by clearing agreements to take the countervalue of their exports in German goods only, Germany absorbed a steadily growing volume of their trade. Her position grew even stronger, and after the occupation of Austria in 1938 and of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939, between 50 and 60 per

[14] Between 1932 and 1939, Germany's annual imports of copper increased threefold, manganese fourfold, nickel seven times, and tungsten, chromium, molybdenum, titanium, vanadium by ten to twenty-five times (*The Engineering and Mining Journal,* December 15, 1941).

cent of the trade of Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, and even Turkey was with Germany. Conquest by foreign trade was successful.[15] Germany achieved economic domination over this part of Europe. An integral part of this whole system was, of course, a rigid control of prices and wages, based on the price-stop order of November, 1936.

The cost of this "defense" program up to the beginning of the Second World War was officially set at 90 billion marks, as against an estimated increase in national income of 133 billion marks since Hitler's rise to power. The real costs were obviously much greater.[16] Despite an increase in employment of more than 8,000,000 people, the volume of consumer goods

[15] See Antonin Basch, *The New Economic Warfare,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1941. Germany's economic offensive was not effectively counteracted by other interested big powers. The League of Nations Conference in Stresa, 1932, made the economic situation of the Danubian countries clear. The growing competition of overseas agricultural products, together with increased restrictions on imports into the industrial countries of Europe (Germany, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia), resulted in a drastic decline in world market prices for agricultural products. The flow of foreign credits was stopped in 1931, short-term credits having been withdrawn. Except for Czechoslovakia, all these countries were obliged to introduce moratoria and standstill agreements for their foreign debts. The conference in Stresa showed also that the principal creditor countries—the western countries—did not import (except Switzerland) any substantial amount of goods that would make possible for the debtor countries the transfer of funds and the supply of essential foreign raw materials. The maintaining of the fictitious parities of their currencies by debtor countries also delayed the necessary adjustments of their economies. The conference in Stresa recommended a system of preferential duties for the agricultural surpluses of the Danubian countries (for wheat, corn, barley, tobacco), but the resolutions were not put into operation.

After Germany, which with her protectionist policy in the period 1928–1931 had contributed to the gravity of the crisis, began her trade offensive, the only real answer could be to compete with her in purchasing the export surpluses of these countries. Doing so meant, of course, paying prices higher than those in the world market, as Germany did. Neither France nor Great Britain showed any great interest in proceeding along this line. Their situation, as a matter of fact, was not easy with regard to their dominions and colonies. Italy was not strong enough economically, and she had to respect the economic interests of South America; later, she was politically unwilling to oppose Germany. Czechoslovakia tried to enlarge her trade with Rumania and Yugoslavia within the framework of the Little Entente; although her efforts achieved considerable success, her consumption possibilities were too limited for competition with Germany.

Only after Munich did Great Britain and France begin to be more interested in developing trade with the Danubian countries. In the spring of 1940 the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation was founded by the British Treasury in order to check the German economic penetration into the Balkans.

[16] Check these figures with those in the ones given in chapters 13, 20, and 23.—*Editor.*

did not increase materially, and consequently the standard of living did not rise, so much was national production diverted to war use.

Japan and Italy. The policy of Japan shows a marked degree of similarity. Beginning with the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Japan attempted to increase its economic resources and economic war potential by occupying neighboring countries. After Manchuria came North China; then, in 1941, Indo-China and Thailand. In this way Japan obtained vital supplies of food, rubber, tin, coal, iron ores, cotton, and so forth.

The whole economy of Japan, including foreign trade, fell more and more under military control, and was subjected to an extensive general planning. The National General Mobilization Bill of March, 1938, provided for control and operation of all resources in order to prepare their efficient use for "national defense." In 1939 a five-year plan was adopted calling for increased production of minerals and substitute materials. Total civilian consumption decreased by perhaps 20 per cent. Japan, too, accumulated enormous stocks of all vital commodities, especially oil, metals, scrap iron, various tools and machines, imported principally from the United States, the Dutch East Indies, and South America.[17]

Fascist Italy, slower than Germany in adopting the policy of autarchy, never attained Germany's thoroughness and efficiency. But after the Abyssinian campaign the autarchy program was more extensively applied. It may suffice here to mention the *battaglio di grano* (the battle for wheat) begun in 1925, which achieved a substantial increase in wheat production, though at the cost of high prices for cereals. In the last years before the war the production of armaments, aluminum, and synthetic fibers (lanital made from casein as a substitute for wool) was increased.

Germany's "defense" economy compelled various smaller

[17] *New York Times* (December 14, 1941, p. 1, sec. 3): "Japan for more than five years has been doing everything possible to increase its stock piles of copper, zinc, lead, tin, aluminum and magnesium." And *The Economist* (September 6, 1941, p. 292): "Of all the major countries, Japan today would appear to be in relation to its economic capacity and eventual war requirements the best stocked."

countries in Europe to intensify their economic preparation for war. Elaborate policies of autarchy and production of substitutes were of course economically impossible, but Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and even Switzerland did try to establish important armament industries in strategically protected areas.[18]

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The U.S.S.R., possessed of resources that were ample to begin with, was not obliged to follow the policy of autarchy or to produce substitutes. Rather, the task was to build up large-scale industry—to speed up the development from a backward to a modern economy. Economic preparation for war and the building of armament factories should be considered in connection with the larger problem of industrialization. In 1928 the First Five Year Plan went into effect, a part of a larger Fifteen Year Plan. The first plan embodied a grandiose scheme to industrialize the Soviet Union, using all energy in the construction of capital equipment while deferring the hope for comfort and plenty for the people. The proportion between investment and consumption was determined by the government, which emphasized the need for swift construction of iron, coal, chemical, machine, and armament industries. It was expected that the Second Five Year Plan, 1933–1937, and the third, 1938–1943, would see an increase in production of consumer goods and the improvement of the standard of living. The Second Five Year Plan did indeed succeed in a greater production of consumer goods. But in the Third Five Year Plan, begun in 1938 while Germany and Japan were rushing war preparations, the Soviet Union accentuated military production.

The progress the Soviets achieved in industrial and mining

[18] Before Germany converted her whole economy to a war basis, various countries in Europe followed in their armaments measures a policy similar to that prior to 1914, concentrating on armaments production and training armies, but not preparing the whole economy for war—for example, not moving industries to protected places. The German victories and the aborted Riom trial showed how little was done even in France, always cited as the military country *par excellence.* Perhaps only the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland understood what total warfare required.

production can be illustrated by the following production figures for 1940 as compared with 1937.[19]

PRODUCTION	1940	1937	YEARS PREVIOUS
Electric power	40.1 billion kwh.	36.4	13.5 (1932)
Coal	164.7 million tons	127.1	29.1 (1913)
Oil and natural gas	34.2 million tons	30.5	21.3 (1932)
Lubricating oil	1.3 "	...	...
Steel	18.4 "	17.7	4.2 (1913)
Aluminum	80,000 tons	45,000	0 (1913)
Copper	157,000 "	97,500	31,000 (1913)
Manganese ore	2.8 million tons (1939)	2.2 (1938)	1.2 (1913)

With the possibility of a simultaneous war with Japan and Germany and the Donetz mining and industrial basin menaced, the Third Five Year Plan (1938–1943) placed special emphasis on industrial development in strategically safer areas. It was necessary to provide a second line of industry to supply a war in the West and at the same time to prepare for the eventual need for supply of an army in the Far East against Japan. Obviously, this twofold preparation imposed an increased burden on the Russian economy,[20] especially on the planned expansion of the production of consumer goods.

The relations between the totalitarian "defense" economies and democratic countries. With all these important countries converting their economies to war purposes and spending an ever-increasing amount for armaments, the disintegration of the world economy proceeded at an ever faster momentum. There

[19] See *Fortune*, 24 (July, 1941), pp. 61–64, 84–90.

[20] The third Five Year plan included the investment of 192 billion rubles and the expansion of all industrial production by 92%. Of the total capital invested, the Ukraine and White Russia received 36.2 billion rubles, central Russia 40 billion and the remaining 115.8 billion rubles went into the development of industry in the Volga region, Siberia, Central Asia, the Kuznetz Basin, and the Caucasus. Two large metallurgical plants were to be built in Siberia, together with new power plants and increased mining production. See Vassili Soukhomline, "Internal Foundations of Russian Resistance," in *Free World* (January, 1942), pp. 349–353.

has been much discussion as to whether democratic countries, too, could prepare adequately for war in peacetime. There is no reason to question this possibility. Indeed, the democratic countries have an advantage in that they would not necessarily be obliged to resort to a completely controlled economy because of their superior resources. But they would have to concentrate on productive capacity, on armaments, and on other aspects of proper military preparation. For democracies the task of preparing for total warfare in time of military peace is, of course, more difficult than for the totalitarian nations, especially if a considerable sacrifice is required. The people, overestimating their economic strength, do not in general realize the danger in time, and the government is not able to secure the necessary co-operation from the people by convincing them that their sacrifices are necessary. Democracies are slow to start and need such an emergency as that faced by the British after Dunkirk or by the United States after Pearl Harbor to obtain full co-operation and to co-ordinate the economic policy and strength with military needs.

Democratic leaders can lessen this handicap by recognizing danger in time and attempting to prepare the people militarily, politically, and psychologically.

Connected with the problem of war economies was the continuation of trade between countries with free, decentralized foreign trade and totalitarian countries with a complete regimentation—a foreign-trade monopoly to all intents and purposes. The democratic countries continued to trade with the totalitarian defense economies without changing their fundamental policy—in reality accepting the terms established by the latter.[21] In doing so, they directly aided these "defense"

[21] There has been a steadily growing difference between the foreign-trade system of democratic countries and that of totalitarian nations like Germany. In the first, foreign trade has remained within the sphere of private business activity, whereas in the second case it has become completely subjected to government control and directives. Those directives did not concern only the question as to what goods should or should not be exported or imported but went much further, following various political objectives and interfering—especially in small countries—with internal affairs in such respects as excluding certain firms from trade with Germany. It became clear that free trade could not suffice in relations with countries like Germany which centrally controlled and regimented foreign trade.

economies and the economic preparations of the totalitarians for war. To avoid doing so, the democracies would have been compelled to introduce retaliative controls, which might have sharpened the conflict in the economic field. The situation in 1939 called for a decisive move: either to organize a co-operative world economy or to enter upon a total economic conflict—and eventually a total military conflict, as Japan in 1941 clearly demonstrated.

In résumé, we must state that the have-not nations, having prepared and decided to risk war, were also economically much better prepared than the countries with ample resources. The have-nots began the war with their economies already fully geared to wartime needs.

Even the United States started full mobilization of its war economy, including conversion from peace to war production, after Pearl Harbor. But American war industry had a better position than the British had in September, 1939, for it was considerably expanded before the country entered the Second World War. This relatively better situation was due, in the first place, to large British orders (and before the French defeat, to large French orders also) of all kinds of war materials estimated at approximately $4 billion up to the beginning of 1942. Secondly, the good position was due to the increased armament program after June, 1940, and to the Lend-Lease Bill. Defense expenditures for the fiscal year ending June, 1941, amounted to $6.05 billion, surpassed the level of $1 billion monthly in August, 1941, and reached $1.85 billion in December, 1941. (The total defense expenditure in 1941 was, however, less than 15 per cent of the national income.) The Lend-Lease Bill of March 11, 1941, provided the machinery for

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Various recent cases demonstrate how difficult it is to maintain even agreements providing for the regular exchange of technical information if one partner is in a country like Germany. An American firm, say, forwards such information according to the exchange agreement, freely, without government interference or control; a firm in Germany must submit everything that is to be reported to the government, which decides—regardless of the obligation contained in the agreement—what can and what must not be exchanged. The basic difficulty of co-operation between free and totalitarian countries appears everywhere and cannot be left unmentioned.

sending goods of all kinds to the Allies: its full value could not be attained until 1942, the shipments for the year 1941 having been little more than $1 billion.[22]

War Economy

The economic impact of total war. The volume and intensity of the economic impact of total war has been generally underestimated, mainly in countries with ample resources and with well-developed industry. The situation with the United States an active belligerent demonstrates clearly the impact of the war; at least 40–50 per cent of the national income in the principal belligerent countries is or will be devoted to war purposes. There is actually no limit to the economic requirements; total war demands a complete mobilization and use of all available resources; it demands an extensive conversion from peace- to wartime production. Within the limits set only by available human and material resources, the dimension of the efforts and sacrifices which the nation must make are dictated by the intensity of the enemy's war effort. The factors of time and preparedness are of great importance; Japan and Germany achieved a marked advantage through their systematic preparation for war in time of peace.

The democratic countries were rather slow in transforming their economies for war. But every delay in this imperative conversion in the final analysis prolongs the war and increases the losses and sacrifices involved. No free (that is, wholly unmanaged) economy could ever discharge the tasks imposed by total war; it is necessary to create a comprehensive organization involving an extensive control of the whole economy. Transformation from peace to an adequate war economy can be accomplished only through a comprehensive national plan, compelling free welfare economies to adopt some measure of central organization and control.

The essential structure of war economies is the same in totalitarian and in democratic countries; certain common principles

[22] Check these figures with those in Chapters 18 and 24.—*Editor.*

are inherent in the functioning of all. The war's impact, with 50 per cent of the national income devoted to war, requires an adjustment of the total national economy and assumes such enormous proportions that a definite pattern of effects, fundamental in character, is discernible in the national economy whether it be totalitarian or democratic. Thus democratic countries, too, will limit freedom of production and consumption, will introduce vast schemes of priorities, even including labor in the latter, will control foreign trade and exchange, and will introduce all kinds of measures required in the fight against inflation.[23]

The assistance of voluntary co-operation in achieving the maximum economic efficiency is invaluable. The objection has been made that such war-economy organization will introduce totalitarian principles into democratic countries. But it must not be forgotten that whereas economic control and regimentation are a permanent part of the totalitarian regime, they are introduced in the democracies only as a wartime measure, subject to all political controls (as the British example clearly demonstrates) and they have only a temporary purpose.[24]

War demands have priority over civilian consumption. There is no economy so wealthy that it could satisfy both the military needs of total war and normal civilian consumption requirements, producing at one time enough of both "guns and butter." Therefore, civilian consumption must be reduced; the whole nation is called upon to make sacrifices, often greater than expected.

The impact of total war determines the chief objectives of the war economy: the achievement of the greatest production within the shortest time; the financing of the war without creat-

[23] The marked similarity of various measures introduced in Germany and in Great Britain confirms this statement: for example, the control of prices and rationing, the mobilization of labor and production, the anti-inflationary fiscal policy, control of the capital market, the system of priorities.

[24] See Antonin Basch, *The New Economic Warfare,* p. 62, and in the same book a general conclusion on p. 118: "A totalitarian war economy, thoroughly organized, cannot win the war if it is not backed by real economic strength; on the other hand it is equally true that a democratic economy even with the mightiest resources, cannot prevent losing the war if it remains on the welfare economy basis and is not organized quickly and efficiently."

ing an inflation; the synchronization, in time and volume, of civilian spending power with the reduced stream of goods available for civilian consumption; the establishment of a just system of distributing consumer goods to maintain the necessary morale and to prevent an uncontrolled rise of prices.

Securing war supplies. In mobilizing war production all possible speed is desirable. The existence, at the outset, of partially unused industrial plants and of idle labor is valuable in that such resources can go quickly into war production. The expansion of war-production capacity by the erection of new plants is also valuable. But a full application of industrial technique to modern warfare involves, beyond these two features, a considerable conversion of peace production to war purposes. This demand applies initially to the manufacture of durable consumer goods (automobiles, radios, typewriters, refrigerators, and so forth). But as the war proceeds, curtailment of these and other goods advances steadily. Bottlenecks appear in the lack of raw materials, of tools, and of skilled labor, or because lack of sufficient labor impedes the war efforts generally. A steadily extending system of priorities is established, the government agencies deciding which needs are to have first consideration.

Imposition of priorities not only facilitates war production as against civilian production, but also allows control authorities to differentiate between various types of war goods, weighting them according to their significance to the war effort. As the war proceeds, the total resources of the nation—labor and productive capacity—are mobilized; the government determines both the nature and volume of production. In countries with a shortage of labor, as in Great Britain or Germany, labor, including women, is being conscripted. To save labor, the production of consumer goods is concentrated in a small number of nucleus plants (for example, textile mills in England). By this arrangement a larger amount of labor is set free for war production than would be the case if production were reduced in many plants.

Because of the overwhelming importance of complicated

mechanized weapons, improved and changed during the war as new inventions appear, even the maximum output is never adequate; there is always a demand for more.

Complicated technical war machinery presents a difficult task particularly in conversion from peace to war production. A supply of appropriate tools is vital. But conversion is a permanent task during the war, for improvement is always required in various weapons—better airplanes, better guns, better submarines, and so on. The cost of maintaining war-production equipment is therefore much higher than in the First World War, and the technical requirements in tools and skilled labor are correspondingly greater.

Financing wars. The whole nature of the total war economy makes it necessary to part with traditional monetary conceptions and to think in terms of *real* economy. No major total war is lost from lack of money or because of financial factors alone. War is fought not with money but with current output of production plus accumulated stocks and supplies acquired from abroad and through conquest. But the financial organization must accomplish the complicated and vital task of providing the necessary funds (distributing purchasing power and credit to fit war needs) and must do so in the way that will least disrupt the economic balance.

The government can get these funds by taxation, by borrowing, or by direct inflation. Experience in the First World War and, even more, experience in the period between the wars, has strengthened the conviction that it is necessary to finance the war without recourse to inflationary methods in order to avoid a general increase in prices.[25] This means financing by taxation and by borrowing out of real savings. But the financial policy has not only the task of providing the necessary funds for war, but also that of diverting to the government the surplus of purchasing power over the value of goods available. In other words, the government must try to synchronize civilian pur-

[25] For our purpose, we understand inflation as a rise in the level of prices, making no distinction between a rise in prices due primarily to monetary causes (inflation in the proper sense) and a rise due to causes relating to commodities.

chasing power both in time and in volume with the value of goods available for civilian consumption.

It is obvious that the "pay as you go" principle cannot be applied to total war. Taxes are increased and new ones introduced—with special emphasis on income taxation—but there are economic as well as psychological limits to taxation. If 50 per cent of war expenditures can be covered by taxes, it is a praiseworthy achievement.

In the fiscal year 1940–1941 Germany defrayed the total expenditure of 68.2 billion marks with 30.2 billion marks (or 44 per cent) from taxation and other reserves, 38 billion marks from borrowing. In the second half of 1941, the estimated proportion was 2½ to 3 billion marks monthly from reserves, taxes, and contributions (or 41 per cent) as against 3½ to 4½ billion marks borrowed. In the first war year in Great Britain the total from taxes and reserves covered 44.1 per cent of total government expenditures; in the following six months, 40.4 per cent. In the fiscal period April 1, 1941, to March 31, 1942, total ordinary revenue covered 40.1 per cent of expenditures. The budget estimates in the United States for the fiscal year 1942–1943 indicate that revenue from taxes of all kinds will cover about 40 per cent of total expenditures.

If new government loans are to absorb surplus purchasing power, they must be paid out of real savings and must accordingly represent voluntary reduction of spending and consumption. The normal prewar rate of saving without cutting civilian expenditures will not suffice. Borrowing by means of a bank-credit expansion always involves the danger of inflation. And with civilian consumption being steadily reduced, the danger of surplus spending power grows. For these reasons there have been various proposals to introduce compulsory saving. Best known is the plan of J. M. Keynes, embodying a system of deferred payment of part of wages and salaries, the part withheld to be used as a compulsory saving and to be put at the disposal of the saver after the war.[26] This plan, undertaken in Great Britain to a limited degree in the form of a promised fu-

[26] See J. M. Keynes, *How to Pay for the War,* New York, Harcourt, 1940.

ture rebate on paid income taxes to individuals in the lower-income brackets, should help to divert surplus spending power to the government during the war and create a backlog of spending capacity for mitigating the expected postwar depression.

In a long total war, with growing shortages of goods, it is not possible to avoid a certain inflationary rise in prices or other inflationary manifestations. The problem is to avoid an uncontrolled increase in the level of prices, to provide an organization giving the government the power to exercise an efficient control.

Price and market control. The most efficient financial policy will not suffice in total war unless it is complemented by a comprehensive price and wage policy. War production generates higher wages and salaries, thus increasing the consumer demand for goods and adding this increase to the government's demand for all kinds of commodities. But, as was already stated, after the exhaustion of accumulated stocks and inventories, when a great part of the production is diverted to war purposes, the amount of goods available for civilian consumption will steadily decline. The anomalous situation arises in which the nation gets a higher nominal income, works as a whole a much greater number of hours, and yet has a smaller quantity of goods, perhaps a much smaller quantity, than is available for consumption even during a depression in peacetime.

Price control and rationing become an important part of the war-economy organization even in rich countries like the United States. Price control cannot be limited to a few important goods of which the supply is insufficient, as is the opinion of those who underestimate the impact of war or the intensity of bottlenecks, or of those who overrate the economic resources. Price control must include the most important raw materials, food and other supplies, and must take into account the interrelation between prices and the effect of possible substitution. If the price control is effective, there is no great difference, in the end, between a selective price control that must be steadily ex-

tended to include ever greater numbers of goods, and a general price-ceiling policy. But much time can be lost and much damage suffered if the introduction of price control proceeds too slowly or in too limited a field.

Any price control would be ineffective with wages, salaries, and profits growing; a national wage-stabilization policy is required simultaneously. If it is possible to achieve a wage and income stabilization without general commandeering by the government, it should be attempted by all means. Perhaps the best solution during the war is the system of linking wages with the cost-of-living index. This plan has worked with success in the majority of British industries and was introduced as a general measure into Canada in November, 1941.

The growing scarcity of various goods in spite of encouragement of production necessitates the establishing of a system of rationing consumer goods in order to secure a just distribution thereof. The food-rationing scheme in both Germany and Great Britain takes into consideration the varying food requirements of different sections of the population, allocating greater rations to those whose work is of a more strenuous nature. The economic impact of war results, on the whole, in a leveling tendency both as regards the distribution of income and as regards actual consumption; it definitely requires equal sacrifices.

The whole war economy must be comprehensive, one measure complementing another. So "control or even regimentation of prices and wages cannot succeed if the monetary and financial policy follows an inflationary course; and on the other hand, anti-inflationary monetary and financial measures cannot be fully efficient if prices and wages are permitted to go up in consequence of situations created by bottlenecks and other factors." [27]

Economy and strategy. A country's economic strength and state of preparedness influence its strategy in modern war. Countries with weaker resources but with effective preparation will seek a speedy military decision, whereas countries facing

[27] See Antonin Basch, *The New Economic Warfare,* p. 62, New York, Columbia University Press, 1941.

them as adversaries, if they have ample resources, look forward and will attempt to delay the decision in order to bring their resources to bear and achieve victory in the consequently prolonged war. Nations controlling the seas and backed by economic resources will rely on the use of the weapons of economic warfare to weaken the economic strength of the enemy. German and Japanese economic preparedness for this eventuality supplied the answer to this strategy.

The main objective of economic warfare is to prevent important supplies from reaching the enemy. The chief weapon has always been effective naval blockade. Other subsidiary weapons are the boycott of the trade with the enemy and pre-emptive purchases of important commodities in neutral markets.

But a total war will not be won by plenitude or lost by lack of supplies alone. A country with a great and well-armed military force will fight to replenish stocks, will fully exploit occupied countries, and will not hesitate to extend the conflict further and further, to parts of the world where the needed commodities can be obtained. A total war cannot be won by a blockade and by economic warfare alone. In the end military action will be decisive. The overestimation of the effectiveness of economic warfare (especially of the blockade) and the underestimating of the economic preparedness of Germany comprise one of the reasons why the Allies—Great Britain and France—were so slow in organizing an efficient war economy and in completely mobilizing war production. It was not until after Dunkirk that Great Britain really started to convert from peace to war production.

Conclusions

In total war, the nation is determined to use all economic as well as military forces for its struggle. Only a comprehensive governmental organization of the national economy can achieve this full co-ordination of forces, backed by the co-operation of the whole nation. A complete control of the national economy

by the state is the obvious result; there is no escaping it in a major total war, regardless of whether the war is fought by democratic or totalitarian countries.

And thus, by the time the Second World War ends, a more or less regimented and controlled war economy will have been established throughout the world, including even the remaining neutral countries. Everywhere government will command the economic life. No one can foresee what the postwar repercussions will be. Stocks of food and raw materials in Europe will have been almost exhausted. Productive machinery, for other than war goods, will have become depleted. In all countries government debts will have reached a hitherto unknown level. Prewar foreign trade has already been disrupted, new industries have been created and production expanded, necessitating a general readjustment. The problem of transition from war to peace production will be more difficult than after the First World War, owing to the vast proportions war production has assumed; the whole task presents an enormous problem. To supply exhausted Europe, to prevent the galloping inflation that will threaten in many countries, to keep social order, to prevent extensive unemployment, to establish monetary order, and to reopen international trade—all these problems exceed the capacity of a free welfare economy; we must expect, therefore, economic planning on a large scale, at least during the transition period. With an Allied victory, this planning could provide a new system of free international co-operation, as foreseen in the Atlantic Charter and in the master agreement between the United States and Great Britain.

And thus the main lesson the world will certainly learn will be that a total war demands the highest price an economy can pay. But perhaps the lesson, bitter though it may be, will inaugurate a powerful tendency toward a twofold goal. First, it may lead to the establishment of an efficient international organization that could check the growth of aggression at its incipient stage of economic preparation. And secondly, it may rebuild and restore a world economy in which economic competition could again replace totalitarian aggression. This goal

would require, of course, a genuine settlement of the major economic problems and the adjustment of production and market potentialities with modern industrial techniques. That no economic co-operation is possible between totalitarian and democratic regimes is now manifest.

Questions

1. Can the bankers and the armament industry be held responsible for a modern major war?
2. What have been the major weapons of economic warfare in the period between the two World Wars?
3. Were the have-not nations prevented from buying food or raw materials by a kind of private control or by government regulations?
4. Is the problem of relative overpopulation confined only to Germany and Italy, or does it apply also to other European countries?
5. How do you explain conquest by foreign trade?
6. What are the disadvantages and dangers of bilateral trade in the form of barter or clearing-payment agreements?
7. Can a developed industrial country achieve complete self-sufficiency?
8. Is the production of substitute raw materials a peacetime or a wartime measure?
9. Discuss the principal objectives of the German Four Year Plans and the Russian Five Year Plans.
10. Explain the difficulties democratic countries encounter in preparing for war in time of peace.
11. Distinguish between economic war potential and economic preparedness for war.
12. Is there any fundamental difference between the war economy organization in totalitarian and democratic countries?
13. Can production in total war satisfy both war and civilian consumption?
14. In modern war do you expect financial difficulties to hamper the war efforts?
15. In total war, can inflation be stopped? Can it be limited?
16. Are price and income control necessary to prevent an increase in prices?
17. What is the function of the priorities system?
18. What is the role of the Lend-Lease mechanism?
19. What function has economic warfare proper in the Second World War?
20. How and when can economic aggression be checked?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Survey the economic causes of the present war.
2. Discuss Germany's drive to the east and the have-not theory.
3. Discuss the reasons for the failure of the economic activities of the League of Nations.
4. Compare Germany's policy of self-sufficiency and the Soviet Union's policy of industrialization.
5. Compare the economic war potential of the leading powers.
6. Describe and analyze Great Britain's and Germany's fights against inflation in the Second World War.
7. Discuss the probable social effects of total war.
8. Study the probable effect of the Second World War on Europe's position in the world market.
9. Could war economy in the United States have operated on the basis of a free economy, or was a central control necessary? If so, how comprehensive a control was needed?
10. What will be the effects of increased governmental debts on postwar economic policy?

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CHAPTER 8

THE PRESS AND POLITICS

Interrelation Between Press and Politics

Democracies invariably declare (even if they do not always live up to their declaration) that freedom of the press is a cornerstone of political policy. Dictatorships, likewise invariably, reject the concept of a free press and by drastic laws and decrees force their newspapers to serve as open and avowed propaganda vehicles.

In democracies and dictatorships alike there is a close tie between the press, the public, and the government. The press of the democracies exhibits varying degrees of independence to political pressure; some or much of it is often at odds with the dominant political party of the country; and it may use its power to upset or force modification of political policy. In totalitarian countries, the entire press is harnessed to the chariot of the all-powerful ruling political party for the purpose of creating a public opinion which will fortify the decisions of the political party and its leadership. The interrelation between press and politics in Nazi Germany has been aptly described by Walther Funk, one of Hitler's chiefs in the Ministry of Propaganda. The German press, declared Herr Funk in 1935, "is no longer a barrel organ out of which everybody is permitted to squeeze whatever melodies he likes, but a highly sensitive and far-sounding instrument or orchestra on which and with which only those shall play who know how, and in whose hands the Fuehrer himself has placed the conductor's baton." [1]

But even in democracies, periods of crisis bring with them attempts by government to restrict the freedom of the press, if not by coercion or legislation, then by consent. It was by mutual consent, and at the request of the Hoover Administration, that our leading daily papers in the winter and spring of 1930–1931

[1] *New York Times Magazine* (July 14, 1935), p. 8.

played down the news of unemployment, bankruptcies, breadlines and riots; while at the same time they gave undue emphasis to every item of a more optimistic tone. So too, in the year 1935–1936, the British press by a "gentlemen's agreement" with the government withheld all news about the romance between the Prince of Wales (later Edward VIII) and Mrs. Wallis Warfield Simpson almost to the day of Edward's abdication, December 10, 1936.[2]

All wars (and especially the present one in which the stake is national survival) bring about sharp regulation of the press. Publications listed as definitely jeopardizing national security are refused the right to use of the mails, are suspended from publication, and their editors may be fined or jailed. Others—especially the foreign-language and special-interest press—are closely scrutinized. Censorship is established. News of military information is withheld from the public till it can be of no use to the enemy. Freedom of the press, like freedom of speech, is severely abridged—"for the duration."

Early interdependence of press and politics. Benjamin Harris of Boston started the American press on its way when he published a small four-page sheet, seven and a half by eleven and a half inches, entitled *Publick Occurrences, Both Foreign and Domestick.* The first (and only) issue saw the light of day September 25, 1690. Its announced purpose was "that the Countrey shall be furnished once a moneth (or if any Glut of Occurrences happen, oftener,) with an account of such considerable things as have arrived unto our Notice."

The royal governor of Massachusetts immediately ordered the paper suppressed. With the hearty approval of his Council he announced that no one was permitted to "set forth anything in print without license first obtained from those that are, or shall be, appointed by the Government to grant the same."

Glut or no glut, the people of Massachusetts had to wait nearly fifteen years for their next newspaper.[3]

[2] See *Editor and Publisher* (December 12, 1936), p. 56, for a discussion of the suppression of this case in Great Britain.

[3] The whole story of this episode is told in Clyde A. Duniway, *The Development of the Freedom of the Press in Massachusetts,* New York, Longmans, 1906.

That first brief episode of American journalism tells the tale of what has taken place again and again all over the world in the relationship between the press and politics. Governments everywhere were concerned with suppressing or controlling the printed reports of "such considerable things as have arrived unto our Notice."

The story of the growth of the daily press from its eighteenth-century coffee-shop origins is at the same time the story of the growth of popular government, and of the rise to paramount prominence of the hitherto unimportant force known as public opinion.[4]

Press and politics have been interlocked and interdependent since that day nearly two centuries ago when the press was born. In fact, up to a few short years ago, the measure of a nation's democracy was its press. If the press was small and heavily censored, one could predict with safety that illiteracy was high, poverty great, and popular sovereignty nonexistent or at best highly limited. If, on the other hand, the press was large and relatively free from governmental interference, one could be sure of a literate population whose government derived many (if not all) of its powers from the consent of the people.

The eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century press was almost entirely political. Newspapers were established or subsidized by political parties, factions, or persons aspiring to power and wealth through public office. Editors were hired primarily upon the basis of their party loyalty or their ability to lampoon and castigate opposing groups.

In this country, the partisan fires of Tory and Rebel press had scarcely been banked at the conclusion of the War for Independence before the Federalists and Republicans took their places. Alexander Hamilton, as spokesman for the former, helped William Coleman establish the *New York Evening Post,* and supervised the editorial policy of Noah Webster's *Minerva,* John Fenno's *Gazette of the United States,* and William Cobbett's *Porcupine's Gazette.*

[4] A good account of this development is to be found in Willard Grosvenor Bleyer, *Main Currents in the History of American Journalism,* Boston, Houghton, 1927, pp. 1–30.

In the Republican camp, under the watchful eye of Thomas Jefferson, were William Duane's *Aurora,* James Cheetham's *American Citizen,* Philip Freneau's *National Gazette,* and Samuel Smith's *National Intelligencer.*

Guarantees for a Free Press

Safeguards for the political liberties of the people became the subject of widespread concern while ratification of the proposed Constitution of the United States was being debated.

The Bill of Rights, presented as a series of Amendments to the Constitution, established the necessary safeguards. The very first of these provided that Congress should make no law abridging freedom of speech, press, or peaceful assembly, and was based upon the Declaration of Rights adopted by Virginia in 1776.

Hamilton in the *Federalist* defended the position of those who argued that there was no need to write into the Constitution of the United States any guarantee of the freedom of the press. Such a declaration he held "to be impractible," adding that the security of such freedom, "whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any Constitution respecting it, must depend altogether on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the People and of the Government." [5]

Jefferson, who led the fight for the Bill of Rights, argued that "The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left for me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." [6]

Jefferson's point of view prevailed. Yet less than seven years after that amendment and nine others had been adopted, a

[5] *The Federalist,* edited by Henry B. Dawson, New York, 1863, pp. 599–600.

[6] *Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* edited by P. L. Ford, New York, Putnam, 1895, vol. 5, pp. 359–360. Claude G. Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton: the Struggle for Democracy in America,* Boston, Houghton, 1925, presents a detailed though somewhat partial view of the issues and personalities of the time.

Federalist-dominated Congress in 1798 passed the Alien and Sedition Laws which violated the very safeguards written into the first section of the Bill of Rights.[7]

But indictments, fines, and jail sentences failed to bring about a government regulation of the press in conformity with the desires of the administration of John Adams. On the contrary, oposition to these infringements placed Jefferson and his followers in political power and sounded the death knell of the Federalist Party.

The Press and National Politics in the United States

Most large daily papers today suffer from a split personality, with business office and editorial room jockeying for leadership. Some astute publishers have known that the advertiser must, for his own self-interest, place his copy with those papers having large circulations; such men have usually rejected demands from advertisers for special favors. But others have trimmed

[7] The Alien Act provided for the removal from the United States of "such aliens born, not entitled by the Constitution and laws to the rights of citizenship, as may be dangerous to its peace and safety." A naturalization law was passed which required fourteen years' residence for citizenship. The Sedition Act, which was to expire in 1801, provided: "That if any person shall write, print, utter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, of either house of Congress of the United States, or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either or any of them, into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any law of the United States, or any act of the President of the United States, done in pursuance of any such law, or of the powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States, or to resist, oppose, or defeat any such law or act, or to aid, encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation against the United States, their people or government, then such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding two years." The joint purpose of these acts was to muzzle both native and foreign-born editors.

their editorial sails to meet prevailing winds. Despite the hue and cry about the pressure of advertisers upon the daily press, this pressure has had its chief political effect in editorial and news treatment of laws respecting the sale and advertising of commodities such as food, drugs, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages. Far more important is the fact that while these dailies are public utilities in a very real sense of the word, they are private business ventures, which must make a profit if they are to survive.[8]

The owners of the big dailies, by virtue of their position as capitalists, quite naturally uphold and support that political party or faction which, in their opinion, protects their property interests. A powerful lobby has been maintained in Washington for many years by the American Newspaper Publishers' Association as well as by individual papers and newspaper chains. Their concern, like that of all special pressure groups of business men, has been to prevent passage of legislation which they believe would hurt their economic interests rather than to secure legislation which might enhance it. It was in this spirit that many publishers opposed ratification of the Child Labor Amendment to the Constitution. It was for this reason they fought the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Wagner Act, the Wages and Hours Law, the Eastman Bus and Truck Bill, and similar legislation.

Attempts have been made in every country by powerful economic interests to use the press for influencing public opinion. Such use of the press by the great armament and munitions interests has been detailed by many investigators. In the United States, the hearings of the Senate Committee headed by Gerald

[8] Criticism of this profit motive of the press has been widespread and continuous for many years. The National Education Association Year Book (1938) declared: "Newspapers have become an integral part of big business and they are published invariably with the major motive of making money through selling advertising space. . . . The informing of the public in relevant and truthful fashion is a secondary consideration in most cases." A frank and forthright defense of the position of the press was presented by the *Wall Street Journal* (January 20, 1925): "A newspaper is a private enterprise, owing nothing whatever to the public, which grants it no franchise. It is emphatically the property of its owner who is selling a manufactured product at his own risk. . . . Editors, except where they own their own newspapers, take their policies from their employers. . . . The proprietor of the paper . . . considers his newspaper a plain business proposition. It is just that, no more and certainly no less."

Nye (1936–1939) revealed that munitions and armament manufacturers have utilized our press as one of the mediums for their carefully organized propaganda campaign.

The press in the United States has been similarly used by the public-utility groups: the railroads and the gas, water, and electric-power combines. Not infrequently, these great industrial interests have succeeded in having hundreds of newspapers, as well as both the Associated and United Press, present to the public as legitimate news articles the releases of their own high-powered propaganda experts. The report of a three-year investigation by the Federal Trade Commission (1928–1930), is replete with examples of flagrant abuse of the power of the press.[9]

In this country the public supports the press primarily for purposes other than its editorial outlook. This is strikingly illustrated by the fact that voters of the United States in 1932, 1936, and again in 1940 elected to the presidency a man opposed by a preponderant section of the nation's press. Who has not heard the oft-repeated comment: "I find out whom the paper supports or denounces and vote the other way"?

Even though the average reader pays less attention to the opinions of his newspaper on public questions, his general outlook is, nevertheless, bound to be influenced by the *general tone* of the paper. In this wider sense, then, today's great metropolitan dailies, which reach hundreds of thousands of readers, carry much greater weight in molding public opinion than did the personalized, highly opinionated press of the past with its exclusive-group appeal.

The United States Press and World News

Newspapers in the United States, according to a long-standing and popular complaint, have signally failed to keep their readers informed of world happenings, thus making possible our gullibility and ignorance of men and issues abroad.

How much space should be given to foreign news is a debatable question. But the undeniable fact is that the American press

[9] This material was summarized by Ernest Gruening in *The Public Pays*, New York, Viking, 1931, chap. 8, "Pressure and the Press," pp. 160–210.

has given more and more attention to it. A recent study by Frank Luther Mott declares: [10]

> In the decade and a half before the World War the average metropolitan paper carried from one to six columns of foreign news daily. This tripled and quadrupled during the war, and never again dropped to its former levels, and went up again as the Second World War developed.

More significant than the volume of its foreign news is the fact that the press of the United States gives a far greater and far more impartial coverage of world news than does the press of any other nation. The factors which have led to this development are:

(1) The press in the United States is relatively more affluent than that of other countries. The leading papers maintain their own staff correspondents abroad and accept heavy expenses for cable and telegraphic dispatches.

(2) The press in the United States, as a general rule, has had no special or vested interest in any foreign countries and therefore greater objectivity is maintained in its reports.[11]

(3) Foreign governments and institutions have long realized that there was less danger of distortion by the United States press than by the press of most other countries, and have therefore been more co-operative. At times, they have used the newspapers of this country as sounding boards or to float trial balloons for their own special interests.

(4) The press associations in the United States, through which news is gathered and funneled into the daily papers, are private ventures, not undercover propaganda agencies for the government or for any special political party.

(5) Foreign correspondents of United States newspapers generally look upon journalism as their chosen profession, and

[10] Frank Luther Mott, "Trends in Newspaper Content," *The Annals*, January, 1942, vol. 219, pp. 60–65.

[11] The Hearst press is a notable exception to the rule. Its Anglophobia has been the subject of numerous articles; its hostility to the Mexican governments for many years was related to Mexican restrictions on the vast land holdings of William Randolph Hearst. See Oliver Carlson, *Hearst: Lord of San Simeon*, New York, Viking, 1936, pp. 220–231.

not as a stepping stone to political office. Though they may (both from policy as well as inclination) adopt a friendly attitude toward the people and the government which they are covering, few allow themselves to become unofficial propagandists.[12]

The superiority applies to the correspondents themselves not because they are Americans (some are not), but because the American level of news gathering and reporting is comparatively high. They have space to explain. They are heirs to America's detachment. They are at least on a "subsistence level" of compensation in contrast to some of their colleagues of the foreign press. So there seem to be less venality, less serving of special interest, less credulity, less groveling before the might, and (Americans would be inclined to feel) better writing than are found among their colleagues overseas working for non-American papers.

The Press Outside the United States

It is true, often lamentably true, that the only idea most foreigners and observers get of a nation's modes of thought and standards of duty and excellence, and in short of its manners and morals, comes through reading its periodicals. To the outsider the newspaper press is the nation talking about itself. Nations are known to other nations mainly through their press." [13]

In the United States, ever since the close of the Civil War, the press has pursued a continued trend toward political independence; such has not been the case in most other countries. There, the press has remained highly politicalized. Many large daily papers have been the official organs for political parties or groups (Conservative, Liberal, Radical, Labor, Social-Democratic, Clerical, Anti-Clerical, and so forth); other newspapers have functioned as official mouthpieces for the governments. Both of these types report the news to their readers in the light of their political perspectives.

In Europe—where population is dense; where political frontiers are numerous; and where barriers of language, religion,

[12] Gilbert, Morris, "From Usually Reliable Sources," *Harpers,* (September, 1939), p. 389.

[13] Lucy Maynard Salmon, *The Newspaper and Authority,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1923, p. 416.

and custom are augmented by the accumulated fears, prejudices, and ambitions of nations, of peoples, and of classes—the continued politicalization of the daily press becomes understandable. Furthermore, the politics of the various European countries are all vitally concerned with what takes place in neighboring lands. Great Britain's traditional policy, for example, has been to maintain a balance of power between groupings of the other great nations—Germany, France, Italy, and Russia. However, since the Conservative, Liberal, and Labor parties usually take divergent positions on foreign as well as domestic policy, their respective papers do likewise. Hence it has been no uncommon thing to find these organs respectively casting a friendly, jaundiced, or openly hostile eye upon one or another of the neighboring foreign countries according to prevailing party outlook and political expediency. What has been true in Great Britain, has been equally true in the other European countries.

In the Americas, where the pressure to which Europe is subject has been ever so much slighter, the newspapers have tended toward greater objectivity in their foreign news. The one great exception to this has been related to Latin America's fear of expanding "Yankee imperialism," to which every newspaper south of the Rio Grande has devoted a great deal of space in the past half century.[14]

Economic and social stratification in Europe, with its consequent political rigidity, made much of the foreign press build its reader appeal upon class instead of mass. The description of the British press voiced by Sidney F. Wicks of the *Manchester Guardian* is equally applicable to that of most foreign lands:

> All English newspapers have an eye to a particular class or estate of the reader. This one might appeal to the aristocrat; this one to the bureaucratic; this to the bourgeoisie; this to the crank; this to the intelligent working man; this to the man on the street; and yet another may appeal to the kitchen maid, as most of our Sunday papers do."

[14] An excellent discussion of Latin America's fear of "Yankee imperialism" is to be found in Parker T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics,* Macmillan, New York, 1927.

Such journalism, by its very nature, tends to build its news reporting in line with what it conceives to be the appropriate psychological level and the prevailing attitude of the economic or social group to which it makes its appeal. It makes for a continuation of stratification instead of mobility; but this, insist its adherents, is as it should be.

Except for a few Latin American papers, the London *Times* and the Manchester *Guardian,* the foreign press, even if it wanted to give a more adequate coverage to world news, might not be able to do so for the simple reason that, as Gilbert Morris remarked in 1939, "Newspapers in Paris and other foreign places are thin, thin wraiths compared to the fat dailies of our American cities." [15]

Morris estimated that the average Paris daily had not more than twelve pages; British papers, slightly more; those of Germany, Italy, the U.S.S.R., Japan, and most other countries, considerably fewer. Students of the foreign press agree that, with rare exceptions, its volume of world news is only 10 to 20 per cent of that found in the metropolitan press of the United States.

Another characteristic of the foreign press is the concentration of the daily papers in the nation's capitals. This is due in part to the more intimate tie between the press and politics; in part to the fact that the capital is usually also the largest city in the country (London, Paris, Berlin, Tokyo, Moscow); and in part to the fact that most of the countries are relatively small, thus making national coverage quite easy from one center.

Whereas the United States in cities outside New York has more than a score of large dailies which carry national prestige and are powerful forces in their own regions, such is rarely the case in other countries.[16] There the cleavage between "metro-

[15] Morris, *loc cit.,* p. 389.

[16] Among the larger dailies in our own country may be listed the following: the *Constitution* of Atlanta, Georgia; the *Christian Science Monitor* of Boston; the *Sun* (morning and evening) of Baltimore; the *Plain Dealer* of Cleveland; the *Daily News* and the *Tribune* of Chicago; the *News* and *Free Press* of Detroit; the *Post* of Denver; the *Gazette* of Emporia; the *Times* of Indianapolis; the *Star* of Kansas City; *The Los Angeles Times;* the *Courier-Journal* of Louisville; the *Minneapolis Journal;* the *Commercial Appeal* of Memphis; the *Times-*

politan" and "provincial" press is very great, and the latter is usually quite what the name implies.

Because of the special group or class appeal of most foreign papers, the number of metropolitan dailies is much greater than in the United States. London had twenty-two dailies at the outbreak of the Second World War and Paris thirty; Berlin had almost as many until Hitler came to power in 1933. Even such small capitals as Stockholm, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, Brussels, and Budapest had from eight to fifteen daily papers.

Indicative of how the foreign press labels and classifies itself are the following quotations from the 1940 edition of the British Newspaper Press Directory:

London Daily Express: (circulation 2,500,000) Independent but strongly Imperialistic and ably supports the policy of consolidating the British Empire and of cementing British interests throughout the world.

London Daily Telegraph and Morning Post: (circulation 884,000) Independent-Conservative well-balanced—deals with politics— Won its high circulation without resorting to free gifts or insurance schemes.

London Daily Mirror: (circulation 1,700,000) Essentially a family newspaper with recognized feminine influence. A large proportion of its sales reaches upper and middle class homes.

The *Herald* is the official organ of the Labor Party. The *Times* is Nationalist and Conservative. The *News-Chronicle* is listed as Liberal and Progressive. The *Morning Advertiser* is Independent and Anti-Prohibitionist and "the recognized organ of the licensed trades."

The British press does a considerable amount of news suppression, even in times of peace. This, it explains, is done because the censored items violate either "good taste" or "tradition," or are "not in the public interest." Winston Churchill in the winter of 1936 told the House of Commons that the British press had "freedom plus responsibility." [17]

In pre-Vichy France the press, with a few notable exceptions,

Picayune of New Orleans; the *Bulletin* and the *Public Ledger* of Philadelphia; the *Oregonian,* of Portland; the *Times-Dispatch* of Richmond; the *Post Dispatch* of St. Louis; the *Sacramento Bee,* Sacramento; the *Chronicle* of San Francisco; the *Times* of Seattle; and many others.

[17] *New York Times,* October 28, 1936, p. 3.

was much more opinionated than that of Great Britain or the United States. And although the Constitution of the Republic specifically forbade press censorship, the French government frequently violated the provision protecting the press. The most effective method was to withhold news from the press, either directly at the sources or through delays in transmission.

Much of the French press sold its editorial policy to the highest bidder, and among the highest bidders were foreign governments including both Czarist Russia and the Soviet Union, and both Imperial and Nazi Germany.[18]

It was considered quite proper that the French Foreign Office as well as all other major ministries should annually spend vast sums of money for direct propaganda purposes in the French and foreign press.[19]

Powerful economic groups such as the French Steel Trust (*Comité des Forges*), the French Oil Trust, the Textile Trust, and others for many years either subsidized or owned outright many leading papers.[20]

The notorious Stavisky, whose corruption of public officials brought on a government crisis in 1934, according to Leland Stowe, had spent three million francs in two years' time to bribe the French press.[21]

The sale of French newspaper policy to the highest bidder has been traditional for at least a full century. James Gordon Bennett, in a letter to his paper, the New York *Herald,* from Paris, dated January 22, 1847, declared: "In one respect the

[18] Robert Dell, "The Corruption of the French Press," *Current History* (November, 1931), pp. 193–197.

[19] Leland Stowe, "Propaganda Over Europe," *Scribners* (August, 1934), pp. 99–101.

[20] The De Wendel family, majority stockholders in the *Comité des Forges,* together with that corporation, owned or controlled *Le Temps, Le Journal, Le Journal des Débates, Le Matin, L'Echo de Paris,* and many provincial papers. It likewise had much to say in the management of the Havas News Agency.

The Provoust Textile Trust held a controlling interest in *Paris Soir, L'Intransigeant,* and *Paris Midi.*

The *Comité des Houillères* (oil trust) also held an interest in both *Le Temps* and *Le Matin.*

The multimillionaire cosmetics king, M. François Coty, owned *L'Ami du Peuple* and *Figaro,* and Jean Hennessy, the famed cognac maker, subsidized *Le Quotidien.*

[21] Stowe, *op. cit.*

Paris press is peculiar. Its editorial columns, and all that influence, are regularly sold to the highest bidder." This sale, Bennett contended, was regulated "on the same principles, precisely, which rule the price of beef and mutton."

The German press was guaranteed freedom of expression in 1874, but the government, especially under Bismarck, kept a close eye on the newspapers and was particularly watchful of their political tone.

With the establishment of the Weimar Republic in 1919, the German people acquired *full* press freedom, and as Robert Desmond has said in his study on *The Press and World Affairs,* the German press became for a time one of the best in Continental Europe. "The papers printed a fair budget of news, in which domestic political affairs outweighed everything else." [22] Besides the many papers owned and published by the Communist, Socialist, Nazi, and other political parties, there were three powerful newspaper chains. Most powerful was that owned by the ardent German nationalist and former president of the Krupp works, Dr. Alfred Hugenberg. The Hugenberg press consisted of four daily papers in Berlin, including the powerful *Lokal-Anzeiger;* one in Hamburg, the *Hamburger Nachrichten;* and many provincial dailies, as well as nine weekly and monthly papers.

The Ullstein family published four daily papers in Berlin: the *Allgemeine Zeitung, Vossische Zeitung, Morgenpost,* and *B. Z. am Mittag.*

The Mosse publishing house owned the *Berliner Tageblatt* and many lesser papers.

The destruction or consolidation of the German press by the Nazis will be discussed later in this chapter.

The Japanese press, despite its late beginning (there was only one paper in Japan in 1862), soon became very widespread. In character it copied either the sensational American or the conservative British newspapers. Printing of political news was not permitted until 1909, and even after that date such news

[22] Robert Desmond, *The Press and World Affairs,* New York, Appleton-Century, 1937, pp. 229–242.

was carefully supervised by the governmental and military authorities, although the Japanese Constitution declares: "A subject of Japan is guaranteed freedom of speech in publication, printing, assemblage, and association within the scope of the law."

Until the coming of the European dictators, many authorities maintain, the control over the press in Japan was the most complete in the world.[23]

The first copy of every paper must be sent to the police for inspection. The police may then change or delete whatever they do not like, or suppress the issue altogether. Editors do not often overstep the boundaries set up by the authorities. But if these restrictions create a uniformity of tone in the press regarding domestic or foreign political issues, there is, on the other hand, the greatest possible latitude in matters pertaining to the private lives of even the most prominent persons (the Mikado excepted).

Although there are approximately two thousand newspapers published in Japan, four of these, owned by two groups, the Asahi and the Mainichi, carry overwhelming power and prestige. These four have a combined circulation of nearly five million copies per day. The Tokyo *Nichi-Nichi* and the Osaka *Mainichi* are owned by one group, the Tokyo *Asahi Shimbun* and the Osaka *Asahi Shimbun* by the other.

Political issues always loom large in the Latin American press. So too does political interference and censorship, particularly as to domestic and Latin American problems and issues. Despite this Argentina, Brazil, and Chile have many excellent, well-edited, informative newspapers, but the emphasis upon foreign news has been European rather than North American.[24]

The Press Associations

The bulk of the world's news is gathered, edited, and sent

[23] William Albig, *Public Opinion*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939, pp. 250–251; H. E. Wildes, "Press Freedom in Japan," *American Journal of Sociology*, 32, pp. 601–614; "Japan Number," *Fortune*, September, 1936.

[24] In Argentina, "Justo, Justice and Joust," *Time*, August 5, 1935, p. 18.

by wire or cable to the waiting newsrooms of every land by one or more of eleven major agencies.

The three great United States agencies are the Associated Press (A.P.), the United Press (U.P.), and the International News Service (I.N.S.). The two principal British agencies are Reuters and the Exchange Telegraph Agency. Havas is the French agency; Stephani, the Italian; and Domei, the Japanese. T.A.S.S. is the telegraphic agency of the Soviet Union. In Germany the dominant agency for three-quarters of a century was Wolffs Telegraphisches Büro. Following the rise to power of the Nazi party, this venerable institution was reorganized and incorporated into the new official agency of the German Government, Deutsche Nachrichten Büro (D.N.B.). Still another agency, supplying information chiefly by radio to newspapers abroad, free or at very low rates, was established by the Nazis and called Transocean News Service.

In addition to the above-mentioned agencies there are hundreds of smaller ones. Most of these, such as Tidningarnas Telegrambyrran (T.T.) of Sweden, service the press in their own country and have exchange contracts with one or another of the principal press associations. Scores of small agencies specialize in certain types of news reporting. Central News of America (C.N.A.) has concentrated on financial news and views. The Federated Press (F.P.) is a labor news service with a Communist slant. Science Service is what the name implies. So too, with the Associated Negro Press (A.N.P.) and the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (J.T.A.).

Reuters, Havas, and Wolff were among the pioneer news agencies the world over. Each was founded by the man whose name it bore. Each began as a strictly private business venture. But each in turn found itself compelled to work in close collaboration with the respective governments of Great Britain, France, and Germany. This collaboration proved profitable for the press services as well as the governments, for it gave to the news agencies that protection and assistance which made possible an almost complete monopoly of news service within the country. And to the governments it meant a degree of super-

vision and control over the kind of news that reached the press, both at home and abroad.

During the 1860's these three agencies, aided and abetted by their respective governments, waged long and costly jurisdictional battles over the question of their respective territories.

At last, in 1870, a truce was agreed upon and the world's newsfronts were divided up among them. The agreement, originally for twenty years, and later extended to 1903, provided that each be given a monopoly of newsgathering and news distribution within a prescribed area as well as a mutual exchange of all daily news reports. Reuters took over the whole of the British and Dutch Empires as well as portions of the Balkans and South America. Havas monopolized the French Empire, most of South America, Spain, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, Rumania, Serbia, and Belgium. Wolff covered the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, Russia, Scandinavia, Switzerland, and parts of the Balkans.

A few years later the Big Three agreed to let a newcomer join them: the Associated Press was given exclusive coverage in Canada, Mexico, Central America, and the United States.

The Associated Press, organized in 1893 as a co-operative enterprise, owned jointly by a large number of leading daily papers in the United States, was the outgrowth of a merger of several regional press associations.

The division of the world by these major agencies continued until 1907, when the late E. W. Scripps brought into being the United Press Association as a competitor to the A.P. Two years later it invaded the territories of the others. Not only did the United Press establish its own press bureaus in the world capitals; it also worked out news exchange deals with minor agencies, such as Hirsch Büro (Germany), Fornier Agence (France), Exchange Telegraph (Britain), Nippon Dempo Tsushin Sha (Japan), and Independent Cable Association (Australia).

Still another competitor entered the field in 1910 when the powerful Hearst newspaper chain organized the International News Service.

The scope of these press associations can be perceived when it is recognized that the A.P., U.P., and I.N.S. together employ more than a thousand persons abroad, with large staffs in every major capital of the world, in addition to an even larger staff in the United States. The Associated Press, which serviced 1,437 papers in 1940, supplied them with an average of 200,000 words per day, sent over 300,000 miles of leased wire. For the year 1939, A.P. spent $11,000,000 to gather and transmit the news of the world to its members.

The United Press, during the same period, serviced 975 United States and 300 foreign papers. It transmitted an average of 150,000 words per day over 150,000 miles of leased wire; and its cost of operation amounted to approximately $8,000,000.

The International News Service sent out approximately the same number of words per day as the U.P. to its 700 subscribers over 170,000 miles of leased wire at a yearly cost equaling that of the U.P.

Many years ago it was considered almost ethical to steal news from the press association.[25]

> We constantly stole Associated Press news from their wires. But that part is all right, because they stole as much from us as we did from them. . . . We hired several fellows who worked on the *World* to steal copies of the first edition as soon as the papers left the press room, and shoot them up to us.
>
> In addition to that, we hired a few men to act as bulletin board thieves . . . But much of the time this practice was unnecessary. We only practiced it to safeguard ourselves.

Later (1917), the A.P. charged I.N.S. stole its news and republished the news as its own. This led to a lawsuit in which the United States Supreme Court found I.N.S. guilty.

Charges have frequently been made that all three United States press associations were giving the press and the public tainted news. Upton Sinclair, for example, in his *Brass Check* (published by the author, Pasadena, California, 1920) insisted that neither journalistic, industrial, or political freedom would exist in the United States until the news monopoly, "the most

[25] C. S. Lord, *Editor and Publisher* (June 3, 1933), p. 12.

powerful and most sinister monopoly in America," has been broken. The cry of monopoly has continued against the A.P. up to the present time. But the fact remains that it does have large and aggressive competitors. That its news has at times been inaccurate and at times biased appears to be true.[26] Most investigators, however, tend to agree with the editorial in *Colliers* (June 6, 1914), which concluded that the A.P. did not deliberately change or color news to suit its own purposes.

That every United States press association has shortcomings is undoubtedly true, and that false and deliberately planted items go over the wires or cables from time to time is equally certain. But what most close students of journalism (including the author) marvel at is how relatively small that amount actually is in terms of the mass of wordage daily transmitted and the speed with which it is gathered and edited.

A more significant fact is that all large press associations outside the United States are either in whole or in part under the control and supervision of their governments and are also closely tied to the dominant financial and industrial interests of their homelands.

D.N.B., T.A.S.S., Stephani, Domei, and Transocean are completely subservient to the propaganda ministries of their respective governments. All news for domestic consumption must be funneled through them, and all or most releases for foreign consumption. But every item, whether intended for the home market or that abroad, is weighed and measured in terms of its political effect.

The other foreign press associations are willing to select and edit their dispatches with an eye to self interest or as they may be told to do by the governments. That a great deal of news is not slanted by them is certainly true. But they are constantly made aware of the fact that they are dependent upon the government for quick and uninterrupted service via cable, telegraph, telephone, and radio, all of which makes them the handy instruments of national policy.

[26] See Walter Lippman and Charles Merz, "A Test for News," *New Republic*, August 4, 1920, supplement.

Furthermore, as Ralph O. Nafziger pointed out, such great associations as Reuters, Havas, and Wolff

> . . . make little or no profit from the sale of their general news reports. Havas, which includes the government among its paying clients, reaps a harvest from its advertising business. Reuters has various business investments. Wolff made money on its speedy financial and market news service, to which bourse circles and the banks subscribed, as well as on special dispatch services for business firms.[27]

The Press under Totalitarian Government

One of the paradoxes of the Russian Revolution of 1917 was that while it proclaimed itself the harbinger of a new world order wherein all mankind would be free, one of its early acts was to suppress or destroy every newspaper and periodical which did not wholly accept and support the Bolshevik program.

The significance of this act lay in the fact that it set a new pattern in the control and manipulation of press, radio, and all organs through which news or opinion is disseminated—a pattern which Mussolini, and later Hitler, appropriated when they and their followers took control of the governments of Italy and Germany in 1922 and 1933, respectively.

The older absolutisms, such as that of Czarist Russia, had fought off the press as long as possible, and when this policy failed, they used coercion, censorship, bribery, corruption, and flattery to keep the press under their control. One of the most effective means of limiting the press had, of course, been to limit literacy to the upper classes of the population.

The Soviet government, however, promised and gave to the once illiterate masses the opportunity to learn how to read and write. But while doing so, it worked out a system whereby it became impossible for this new mass of literates (or anyone else) to read anything except what the Communist leadership approved. The entire newspaper and periodical press was put under strict control of the Russian Communists while a new set of social and political values were forcibly brought into being. The press was instructed not merely to adhere to the policies and

[27] Ralph O. Nafziger, *International News and the Press,* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1940, p. xxvi.

program of the new order, but also to advocate them actively.

All news, so the Bolsheviks contended, is molded by political ideology—either capitalist or Communist. Therefore they made sure that the "historically justified" view, namely Communism, alone was expounded.

The Soviet press became (and has continued to be) a 100 per cent co-ordinated political press, wherein every item of news, whether local, national, or international, must be considered primarily in terms of the light it put on the acts and policies of the Communist leadership.

During the early years of the Soviet regime one looked almost in vain for religious, sports, or society news in the Russian press. When mentioned at all it was to illustrate the corruption and backwardness of the leaders of Czarist Russia. Ordinary crime, scandal, sex triangles, and the like were banned from the Soviet press because, it was stated, the enlightened citizens of a socialist state were not concerned with "such putrid remnants of a bourgeois world." At other times the Communist leadership declared that sensational yellow journalism was a shrewd and cunning device used by the unscrupulous capitalists in all countries to keep the minds of the working classes so preoccupied that they would not revolt against their oppressors.

Western European Socialists were appalled at the ruthless and thorough manner in which the Bolsheviks destroyed all semblance of freedom of speech, press, and assembly in the Soviet Union. This, they said, was the very negation of Socialism. Only by freedom of the press, argued Karl Kautsky, foremost theoretician of the Socialist International, could the people of the U.S.S.R. be protected against, and in some measure ward off "those bandits and adventurers who will inevitably cling like leeches to every unlimited, uncontrolled power." [28]

Replying, the Bolsheviks declared: [29]

The Press is a weapon not of an abstract society, but of two irreconcilable, armed, and contending sides. We are destroying the Press

[28] Karl Kautsky, *Terrorism and Communism,* London, Allen, 1919, p. 188.

[29] L. Trotsky, *The Defence of Terrorism—A Reply to Karl Kautsky,* London, Allen, 1921, p. 58.

of the counter-revolution, just as we destroyed its fortified positions, its stores, its communications, and its intelligence system.

Raymond Postgate developed a novel explanation of the Bolshevik attitude in his book, *The Bolshevik Theory:* [30]

It is perhaps worth while remarking that the suppression of already existing periodicals by revolutionaries at the moment of success is not to be considered as an attack upon the liberty of the Press. In England, for example, a successful revolution would almost certainly find it necessary to suppress, let us say, *The Times, The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, The Evening News.* But this suppression would be just as defensible as any other revolutionary expropriation. Northcliffe's Press, Hulton's Press, Hearst's Press, and so on, are doomed, not because they purvey counter-revolution, distort the truth, etc., but because they are an ordinary profit-mongering capitalist enterprise. They satisfy, by capitalist methods, a human need—viz. news; that they provide adulterated goods and throw in objectionable propaganda is a side issue. The process of the concentration of capital, operating here as elsewhere, has made it impossible for anyone to enter into competition unless he is prepared to offer the same advertisement rates as Lord Northcliffe, pay the same circulation staff the same wages, keep the same editorial and business staffs, make the same initial sacrifice of capital, etc., etc. In other words newspapers have become the preserve of the very wealthy.

When the Communist International was organized in 1919, its organizational pattern, its theory and tactics, as well as its leadership was supplied by the Russian Bolsheviks. Freedom of the press was declared to be a bourgeois device, which like parliamentary government, should be taken advantage of, merely to destroy it. Meanwhile Communist publications all over the world were placed under strict political and organizational control of the respective Communist parties, which in turn were equally subordinate to the Communist International and its Bolshevik leadership.

For nearly a quarter of a century now the people of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have had to take their news and opinions from a press completely politicalized.

Fascism, too, took over the concept of monopolizing and

[30] Raymond W. Postgate, *The Bolshevik Theory*, p. 173. Used by permission of Dodd, Mead and Company, Inc.

politicalizing the press in the interests of the Black Shirts and their philosophy. Their techniques of control varied from those of the Bolsheviks, took much longer to be put into effect, and were never so rigorously imposed as those in the U.S.S.R.

The measures for regimenting the Italian press were started after the assassination of the Socialist deputy, Mateotti, in 1924. Two years later all semblance of internal opposition had vanished. Many editors disappeared, others underwent the Fascist castor-oil treatment, some were no longer permitted to practice journalism, and still others were imprisoned.

Mussolini himself drew up many of the rules governing the procedure of the Italian press. His son-in-law, Count Ciano, served for a time as Minister for Press and Propaganda. Chief newspaper mouthpiece of Mussolini for several years has been Virginio Gayda, editor of *Il Popolo d'Italia*. Daily instructions were given to the press concerning whom or what to denounce or applaud.

The following are a few of the instructions as listed in "Duce's Orders to Press Revealed by New York Anti-Fascist Editor": [31]

The newspapers should abstain from making the slightest favorable reference to foreign watering places.

The account of the Fascist accomplishments in the year XIII (of the Fascist regime) must appear with emphasis in all newspapers.

As regards England as well as France and Germany, keep an attitude of reserve. Instead, give much emphasis to our internal activities. Put into relief the inauguration of our public works and especially of our University City.

Give space to the bulletins regarding limitations and economies on the consumers' needs, putting into relief that Fascist Italy answers with self-denial and a spirit of sacrifice to the iniquitous sanctions.

Comment on the telegram which the rabbit and poultry raisers sent Il Duce.

Devote entire front page to the ceremony at the inauguration of University City. Give it much prominence. Comment on Il Duce's speech.

With its control over the domestic press assured, the Fascist government next turned its attention to the control of the news

[31] "Orders to Press Revealed by New York Anti-Fascist Editor," *Editor and Publisher* (November 30, 1935).

sent abroad from Italy. Those who were willing to pass on, as news, the handouts given them by the propaganda agencies, were given many special favors; but those who insisted upon reporting facts as they found them were confronted with obstacles, threats, and finally expulsion. From 1934 to the end of 1941, Italy expelled more than a score of foreign correspondents, including three from the Chicago *Daily News* and two from the Chicago *Tribune*.[32]

Like German and Soviet analogues, the Italian dictatorship uses its foreign legations, trade missions, and consulates to check the press of foreign countries for unfavorable news reports about or out of the homeland.

During the hectic years of the Weimar Republic, the Nazis exploited the freedom of press, speech, and assembly; but the Nazi program said: "Since the press is one of the most influential powers of the state, all newspapers infringing upon the public interests shall be prohibited." Said Hitler: "The press is an instrument . . . which the state has to secure for itself with reckless energy, in order to place the same at the service of the state and nation."

And "with reckless energy" the triumphant Nazis lost no time in taking over the press of Germany as soon as Hitler had taken over the reigns of government in February, 1933. Herr Goebbels, as head of the newly established Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, suppressed nearly two thousand papers in two years' time.[33] Thus the Nazis "unified" the German press. Nowhere was there such a strict censorship of both domestic and foreign news, both incoming and outgoing. Much, perhaps most, of the foreign press was banned from the Third Reich. Foreign correspondents were spied upon, their lodgings searched, their telephone conversations tapped and recorded, their letters opened, their visitors questioned, and of course, all their cable or telegraphic copy was carefully scanned, frequently delayed,

[32] "Nothing Personal," *Time* (March 10, 1941), p. 30; George Seldes, "The Truth about Fascist Censorship," *Harper's* (November, 1927), pp. 732–743.

[33] According to Seperling's *Zeitschriften und Zeitungs Adreszbuch*, 1938, the total number of newspapers and periodicals in Germany was: 1931—3,702; 1933—3,607; 1935—3,232; and 1937—2,671.

and sometimes not sent at all. Many were expelled outright; others were warned to leave.[34]

No sooner had the German press been co-ordinated, in line with Nazi doctrine, under the watchful eye of Herr Goebbels, than the pressure was applied to the German-language press of all other countries to make them spokesmen for Hitler's New Order. This campaign, too, was eminently successful.

Then, with appeasement the key policy of most of Germany's neighbors, the Nazis suggested that the world press cease all attacks upon the Third Reich. Dr. Otto Dietrich, Hitler's press chief, was quoted in the *New York Times* as suggesting a press peace.[35]

The story of what has happened to the press of the world since the rise of modern totalitarian government is vividly portrayed in three news articles in the *Editor and Publisher*. The first, dated April 21, 1934, is headed: "Censors Grip Most of World's Press." That of June 30, 1934, announces that 74 per cent of Europe's inhabitants are under censorship. A little more than a year later, on September 7, 1935, there is a report that only one-ninth of the world's population live in countries where formal press censorship does not prevail.

In the years following 1935 even that ninth underwent a decided shrinkage. Freedom of the press, at this writing, in 1942, is only a memory, and in many cases an unknown thing, to more than 90 per cent of the world's inhabitants.

The Press in a World at War

Cynics have frequently charged that the conflict between Spain and the United States in 1898 was fought to build the circulation of Hearst's New York *Journal* and Pulitzer's New York *World*. Certainly it is true that wars build newspaper cir-

[34] "Nazis Force Mowrer to Resign," *Editor and Publisher* (August 12, 1933), p. 14; Otto D. Tolischus, "A Muzzled Press Serves the Nazi State," *New York Times Magazine*, July 14, 1935, pp. 8–9.

[35] "How beautiful the world would be today if newspapers everywhere would not only talk peace, but also keep the peace themselves. The press could easily achieve miracles in the political lives of peoples if such a general truce were proclaimed and lived up to."—*New York Times*, March 8, 1938, p. 10.

culation. But it is also true that the press loses in a war. Counterbalancing any gain in circulation is the loss of objectivity and freedom of the press.

Editors and reporters alike, especially if their own countries are involved in the conflict, cannot help but let their emotions and patriotism color their journalism. Public opinion, too, demands that the news of enemy successes be played down and those of the home country be played up.

But over and above these factors, are the laws, rules, and orders issued by the government or the military high command. Censorship is established. Newspaper editors are informed what they may or may not publish under threat of fine, imprisonment, or suppression of their papers. Reporters are regulated. Correspondents have to submit advance copy of their articles. A thousand commonplace subjects suddenly become taboo, for fear they may "give aid and comfort to the enemy." Rumors, conjectures, wishful thinking, carefully planted bits of propaganda by enemy agents, handouts from unscrupulous politicians, or outbursts from too enthusiastic patriots—all these take on greater meaning during war. And the press, which must forever meet its daily deadlines, has to decide, often on a moment's notice, whether the item received is to be printed or rejected, be plastered over the front page with a big spread, or buried on some inner page.

Blunders and stupidities committed by the censors are a commonplace in every war. The anonymity of the censor plus his plea that the blunders were committed "in the best interest of the country" save him from public castigation, but not so the newspaper, the editor, or the correspondent.

Worst of all, perhaps, is the fact that so many persons, including journalists, are willing, even anxious, to see freedom of the press reduced to an absolute minimum in their own countries while the war itself is being fought to preserve that freedom for themselves and restore it to others.

While the public clamors for news and ever more news, the press in wartime must face the fact that many of its best men

are taken over for service in the government or with the armed forces. In addition the cables, telegraph and telephone lines, besides being under strict supervision, are more than ever crowded with a flood of messages deemed more vital to national security than the mere transmission of news. Dimouts, blackouts, and serious limitations of paper, ink, type, and essential machinery also add their burden.

Although no figures are available, it is a safe assumption that in all of Europe, Asia, and Africa the mortality rate of the press has been very high since 1939. German, Italian and Japanese war policy is predicated upon the assumption that one of the most effective ways to hold a conquered people in subjection is to destroy every essential medium of news transmission which may help to rebuild and rekindle the spirit of opposition to the conquerors. Newspapers and radio stations, as a result, when not taken over by the invading forces, have been systematically destroyed, or dismantled and shipped back to the homeland. Such has been the story in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Korea, Java, the Philippines, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece, and in the occupied parts of the U.S.S.R., France, and China. And in those countries which serve as satellites (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and others), the press has been made completely subservient to its new masters.

Of the very few Old World nations not yet drawn into the conflict as these lines are penned (Portugal, Eire, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey—and Spain, which being a dictatorship has no freedom of the press), only two still remain with a relatively free press—Sweden and Switzerland—although both have been under heavy pressure from the Nazis. The Turkish press, as well as that of Portugal, is heavily censored and government-regulated. That of Eire, in trying to maintain the neutrality which its government insists upon, is not even permitted to mention that thousands of its sons are fighting and dying as part of the British, Canadian, Australian, and United States armies.

The British government, during three years of bitter war, suppressed only one daily paper—the *Daily Worker*, official

organ of the Communist Party. This took place as a result of the sustained attacks which that paper made upon the British government and its war effort in 1939, and which was part of the official worldwide communist policy growing out of the Stalin-Hitler pact.

In the United States no daily paper had been suspended up to July 1, 1942, although a few weekly publications, notably *Social Justice,* were prohibited from using the mails.

During the First World War, President Wilson established a centralized government agency to co-ordinate the work of propaganda, publicity and censorship, known as the Committee on Public Information. Its chairman was George Creel, an experienced newspaper man. His associates on the governing board were the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.

Several agencies have been set up by President Roosevelt during the Second World War to gather, study, and present information bearing on the various phases of the war. These include the Office of Government Reports, headed by Lowell Mellett; the Office of Facts and Figures, headed by Archibald MacLeish; the Division of Information in the Office of Emergency Management; and the Foreign Information Service of the Office of the Coordinator of Information. For specific war service there has been set up the Office of Strategic Services, headed by Colonel William J. Donovan. Two months after the United States entered the war, in February, 1942, President Roosevelt named Byron Price as the official censor of the American press. And on June 13, 1942, he announced the creation of a super co-ordinating agency over most of the others listed, the Office of War Information, and appointed as director the well-known journalist and radio commentator, Elmer Davis. Approximately 30,000 governmental publications were placed directly under this new organization. However, the office of the Censor remained independent, although the President declared that both Mr. Davis and Mr. Price should "collaborate in the performance of their respective functions for the purpose of facilitating the prompt and full dissemination of all available information which will not give aid to the enemy."

Conclusion

The prevailing trend toward greater centralization of power in the hands of national governments—even in democracies—means that the press will become more, rather than less political. It means that while "freedom of the press" may still remain, it will take on a somewhat different meaning than it has had heretofore. It will mean that newspaper publishers as well as their readers must wage a never-ending battle against the encroachments of governmental bureaucracy.

As the press fights for its freedom now, and in the future, it must necessarily become more and more involved in politics.

Questions

1. What was the general attitude of government toward the press in the early eighteenth century?
2. When, in the United States, and between what groups did the first discussions on the freedom of the press occur and what were the opinions of the groups involved?
3. What was the attitude of the eighteenth-century editor toward the function and conduct of a newspaper?
4. What were the specific contributions which James Gordon Bennett made to the modern newspaper in the United States?
5. What were the factors leading to the decline of the editor's influence over his columns?
6. Compare the position of the early and modern United States press in its relationship to politics.
7. In what manner and by which groups has the press been utilized for private interests?
8. How does the coverage of foreign news by the United States press compare with that of newspapers abroad? Why?
9. What factors have helped to maintain the politicalization of the press abroad?
10. What factors have militated against politicalization of the press in the United States?
11. In what fundamental way do the press agencies of the United States differ from those of the rest of the world?
12. To what extent have the major foreign press associations been regulated? In your answer, consider the specific agencies.
13. What was the new pattern of control and manipulation of the press which the Russian Revolution established?

14. Wherein did the policy of the Soviet government differ from that of Czarist Russia?

15. How was the abandonment of the freedom of the press justified by the Soviet government?

16. Why is freedom of the press—the right of opposition—important in the life of any country?

17. What effect does rigid control of the press have on its development?

18. List some of the problems that the press is confronted with when the nation is at war.

19. What steps toward censorship have been taken by the United States?

20. What steps toward censorship have been taken by the government of Great Britain?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Survey the Tory and Rebel press during the American War for Independence.

2. Discuss the press and municipal politics—a case study of one or more local newspapers with particular reference to specific local political problems.

3. Survey the Communist (Nazi or Fascist) press in the United States (or in Latin America).

4. Compare censorship techniques employed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the U.S.S.R., Germany, France, and Italy.

5. Discuss legal safeguards for freedom of the press in countries other than the United States (or destruction of freedom of the press under dictatorship).

6. Make a study of United States war journalism, with particular reference to information, censorship, propaganda, or techniques of transmitting news.

7. Report on the rise of radio news and its effect on the position of the press.

8. Discuss the transformation of the local newspaper with specific reference to the relative importance of various types of news—a case study with samplings from given years of the amount of space (or manner of treatment) of foreign, national, state, local (economic, social or political) news.

9. Report on the conservative, liberal, independent, or radical press in the United States, or on all, with reference to emphasis and treatment of specific national or international problems or events.

10. Outline possible public safeguards against slanted news.

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CHAPTER 9

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF WARFARE

The Relation of Psychology to Power

In chapter 1 it was seen that anything which coerces is power. Such coercion may be either physical or mental. Modern states are now beginning to exploit coercion of the mind, particularly the public mind, in order to effect their policies. So significant has this particular type of force become that it has been adopted as a mode of warfare in its own right. Manipulation of group and individual minds is today one of the primary techniques in the struggle for power. It is one integral part of total war.

Psychological warfare is the exploitation, for the purpose of achieving power, of men's emotions and of the ideological frameworks of their minds. It may be undertaken by a state or by cliques within a state. Psychological warfare seeks to destroy and confuse the enemies' will to fight and at the same time to develop the will to fight at home. In the totalitarian states it proceeds within the state itself at all times, and extends into the foreign policies of the state and in their various ramifications.[1] It is an important part of their military war effort and constitutes one of the basic elements in total warfare, for total war erases all boundaries between the home front and military front, involves entire populations, exploits a nation's material, intellectual and spiritual resources,[2] whether in passive or active warfare. Democratic states are just beginning to realize the full significance of this technique in the struggle for power.[3]

[1] See Ladislas Farago and L. F. Gittler, *German Psychological Warfare,* New York, Committee for National Morale, 1941; Carroll C. Pratt, *Psychology, The Third Dimension of War,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1942.

[2] See (F. Brown, ed.), "Organizing for Total War," *Annals,* 229 (March, 1942).

[3] See Ladislas Farago, *The Axis Grand Strategy,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942, chap. 14; "Political Warfare," *Fortune,* 24 (August, 1941), pp. 100–162.

The Bases

Psychological forces of this sort are a new application to power ends of certain well-known principles.[4] These principles recognize that human beings in groups act in predictable ways,[5] and that while public opinion may be a phantom—since there are literally thousands of publics, depending upon the mode of classification—nevertheless there are certain basic elements which publics have in common. Symbolically they may be classified into static and dynamic publics according to whether they are formed about mental sets relative to such things as customs or folkways, or formed about debatable questions such as the proper course of action to be taken in a matter of foreign policy.[6] Publics may also be classified according to their (1) slogans or purposes, (2) their demands, or (3) their expectations. An example of *purpose* is "Aid America by Aiding the Allies"; of *demand,* the Oregon boundary challenge, "Fifty-four-forty or Fight!"; and of *expectation,* "winning the peace" as well as winning the war. Proper classification is the key to the correct handling of public opinion.

But psychological warfare and psychological aspects of warfare (which are two distinctly different things) involve an even deeper exploitation of human beings than mere classification. Both begin on the basis that group minds are simply aggregates of individual minds, and therefore are subject to the same forces as individual minds. To be successful, therefore, psychological warfare must deal with both individual and group minds. Furthermore, it must recognize that man has two natures. One is animal, the other is rational, and because of this latter charac-

[4] Farago, *op. cit.,* pp. 79–80, shows how important to this effort American scholars have been, especially Yerkes, McDougall, Thorndike, Terman, Allport, Yoakum, Strong, O'Connor, Ligon, Dodge, Doob, and Lasswell. See also Gorham Munson, *Twelve Decisive Battles of the Mind,* New York, Greystone Press, 1942.

[5] For a most illuminating discussion of the psychiatric bases see Harry Stack Sullivan, "Psychiatric Aspects of Morale," *American Journal of Sociology,* 47:3 November, 1941, pp. 277–301.

[6] Here see particularly William Albig, *Public Opinion,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939, chap. 1. The points are briefly summarized Peter H. Odegard, "Finding the Phantom Public," outline for the Colorado Springs Public Forums, April 27–30, 1936, mimeographed. Dr. Odegard depends upon Lasswell.

teristic the influences which may be brought to bear on his thinking processes are important as power instruments.

On the whole the animal nature predominates in man's thinking, and it is the *visceral drives* of hunger for mates, food, security, and prestige that play the fundamental parts in his life.[7] Even social institutions are the outgrowth of responses to visceral needs, so that the family, church, and other institutions may be regarded as means for solving conflicts aroused by these needs. This is man the animal. But man the thinking creature is such because he has the ability to use symbols logically and to express the relationships of cause and effect. Therefore psychological warfare can accomplish its purposes not only by creating disturbances at proper points, by challenging existing institutions at others, by threatening security at others, and by generally playing upon the visceral drives, but it can also exploit fundamental emotions and tendencies in man such as love, hate, fear, courage, pugnacity, pride and prestige, gregariousness, sex, and hunger. In doing so it exerts great pressure by dealing with a multitude of things such as race, heredity, health, physique, institutions, beliefs, occupations, and the like.[8]

Morale

The main objective of psychological warfare is to affect morale. Morale has been defined as the will to fight. It has also been called a healthy frame of mind characterized by fidelity to a cause.[9] To the civilian it is a cause known and believed in, to the soldier it is command over himself characterized by pride and confidence in himself, his cause, his comrades, and his commanders. It must be maintained in both soldier and civilian, and this may be done in part through propaganda, which increases the disposition to loyalty, sacrifice, and fight-

[7] Peter H. Odegard, "Foundations of Individual Personality," outline for the Colorado Springs Public Forums, May 4–8, 1936. See also Leonard W. Doob, *Propaganda*, New York, Holt, 1935, especially part 2.

[8] See Doob, *op. cit.*

[9] See J. A. Ulio, "Military Morale," *American Journal of Sociology*, 47:3 (November, 1941), pp. 321–330.

ing.[10] Propaganda is carried on in times of war and times of peace, although the instruments and the types resorted to may differ with war and peace.

During the First World War propaganda consisted chiefly of capturing and coloring the newspapers of the world, and in doing this Great Britain was singularly successful. However, official books, pamphlets, and other literature were also used on occasion. The chief explanation of Great Britain's success lay in part in her ability to secure control of the cables of the world. The Germans attempted to combat the success of the British program by operating a propaganda radio station at Nauen, but were not singularly successful. Toward the end of the war the German morale was in part broken through Allied propaganda spread throughout the trenches by handbills and other printed matter. When the end came, the German morale or will to fight had disintegrated.

Since then, radio and motion pictures have come into greater prominence, and it is possible now for combatants to reach across political frontiers and beyond battle areas to carry on the program of morale breaking behind the lines. This possibility is particularly significant because the civilian is again on the front line as he was in the pioneer days. But it has been discovered that propaganda has its limitations; it tends to be ineffective, for example, in the absence of military victories and when there is a general public tendency toward skepticism. In short, propaganda is a two-edged sword which may hamper governments as well as aid them. Its most serious drawback is that its hysterical poison lingers long after wars have ended and militates against a sound and sensible peace. Propaganda also has a most unhappy effect upon freedom of speech, press, and opinion because, even though truthful, in order to be effective it must possess some degree of uniformity, which can only be achieved in the long run by impinging upon the three freedoms mentioned.

[10] See George Creel, "Propaganda and Morale," *American Journal of Sociology*, 47:3 (November, 1941), pp. 340–351.

Civilian morale. The problem of civilian morale is different from that of military morale, because physical danger is the business of soldiers, whereas the civilian population is more subject to terror and lacks military discipline. Hence the civilian must not only be indoctrinated with belief that his cause is just, his country right, his victory sure, but he must also have the conviction that he is participating in a worthy mission and the feeling that he has a direct part in the war.

The means of indoctrinating him are not essentially different from those employed with the soldier. The manipulation of symbols, repetition, oversimplification, distortions, and the resort to the visceral responses are all used.

Building up national civilian morale is not the whole problem; the successful conduct of counterpropaganda is also necessary to check the enemy influence. The morale process begins in times of peace and consists in the first place of not revealing any more weakness than is absolutely necessary. In times of war it includes censorship and distribution of news, information, radio, movies, cables, and stage, and the prevention of some or all types of criticism of the government and the war efforts. The morale process must be accompanied by the checking of fifth columns, of the "sixth columns" or defeatists, and others who would obstruct the war effort.

To effect all of these objects, governments at war generally set up a single executive charged with the control of information. This may be a single officer or a board. Such a functionary is co-ordinated with both the political and military branches of the government, sometimes practically independent of any legislative relationships.[11]

[11] For some recent works on civilian morale see Delbert C. Miller, "The Measurement of National Morale," *American Sociological Review,* 6 (August, 1941), pp. 487–498; John Hardin, "A Scale for Measuring Civilian Morale," *Journal of Psychology,* 12 (July, 1941), pp. 101–110; Irving L. Child, "Morale: A Bibliographical Review," *Psychological Bulletin,* 38 (June, 1941), pp. 393–420; Joseph S. Roucek, "The Sociology of National Morale," *New Europe,* 2 (January, 1942), pp. 42–43; and Goodwin Watson, *et al., Civilian Morale,* Yearbook of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1942.

TECHNIQUES

The instruments by which opinion and mind are manipulated include any means of communicating ideas, and in wartime all of these means are subject to state control. The most common stimuli thus far used for the promotion of morale are education, training of all sorts, recreation, social groups, home defenses, slogans, posters and billboards, buttons, propagandist writings, military displays, victories on the field of battle or diplomacy, and the pronouncements of leaders. All of the symbols of prestige and power mentioned in the first chapter are to be included under this heading.

There are, however, three means of communication that stand out above all others. They are the press, the motion picture, and the radio.

The press. When he thinks of public opinion the average person thinks immediately of the press, especially of the newspapers. In Chapter 7 the extensiveness of the press ramifications was noted. It is a familiar statement that whoever controls the press controls public opinion; but the statement is not entirely correct, since there are many evidences at hand that the radio, under certain circumstances, may exercise an even greater influence on the public mind than the newspaper. A good illustration of this was the first re-election campaign of Franklin D. Roosevelt, which he won with an overwhelming majority in spite of newspaper opposition. Without ignoring such incidents, it remains a fact that the newspapers present a ticket to "the greatest show on earth," that they are a pass to the pageant of life, that they reach the great majority of reading people and shape their thoughts and actions to a very marked degree, particularly because people come to them in a receptive frame of mind. They have this influence to a greater degree in some countries than in others; but there can be little doubt about the tremendous influence of the press today.[12] What the press

[12] O. W. Riegel, "Propaganda and the Press," *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 199 (May, 1935), pp. 201–210. For the most complete and recent discussion of this phase of the subject see *The Press in the Contemporary Scene, Annals,* 219 (January, 1942).

prints or fails to print has a definite conditioning effect on public opinion concerning world affairs. It has also a vast effect upon the minds and feelings of people.[13]

The motion picture. Another fascinating vehicle of thought and emotion is the motion picture providing its escape, diversion, and insight into human affairs as it banishes care, reflections, and even consciousness. Its major themes are sex, crime, love, comedy, mystery, travel, social ideals, and history, but it also devotes considerable time to national and foreign affairs. Every one of these themes is exploited by nations in their struggle for power.[14]

According to figures from the Motion Picture Almanac for 1935–1936, there were at that time 18,000 theaters in the United States alone, over 13,000 of which were in operation. It was estimated that about 80,000,000 people attended these theaters every week, and of this number 11,000,000 were under 14 years of age. Comparable interest is found in other countries. The power of the screen is recognized in England, France, and the Continental countries. The totalitarian governments have long known the tremendous effectiveness of motion pictures and have used them for the purposes of indoctrination since the establishment of the propaganda ministries and the ministries of public enlightenment.

The radio. The radio has been called the "fourth front" in the present war,[15] which indicates the tremendous importance the various belligerents attach to it. The name of Lord Haw Haw has now become a symbol for war over the ether, which crosses international frontiers and sows doubt, sedition, and corruption in the minds of some men, courage, patriotism, and determination in the hearts of others. Such is the importance

[13] See Robert E. Park, "Morale and the News," *American Journal of Sociology,* 47:3, pp. 360–377; George L. Bird and Frederic E. Merwin, *The Newspaper and Society,* New York, Prentice-Hall, 1942, chap. 11. The press was treated specifically in chapter 8.

[14] Walter Wanger, "The Role of Movies in Morale," *American Journal of Sociology,* 47:3 (November, 1941), pp. 378–383.

[15] See Harold Graves, Jr., *War on the Short Wave,* New York, Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1941, p. 7; also Charles J. Rolo, *Radio Goes to War,* New York, Putnam, 1942.

of this vehicle of opinion and belief that the radio industry has entered upon a period of phenomenal growth as its possibilities are being deeply explored everywhere in the world. This is the vehicle *par excellence* for the spread of information and misinformation. It reaches into the home to the fireside, into the privacy of the sick room, and into the moving car on the highway. Wherever man may be, he is reached by the voice of the broadcaster, which soothes, shakes or stirs him by calculated and well-understood statements, by music, by drama, by lies and by truths.[16]

In the United States alone in 1931 there were over 600 broadcasting stations and 17,000,000 receiving sets. The motto of the British Broadcasting Company is "Nation shall speak to nation," and the figures of radio development would seem to indicate that this has come true—for good or for evil. Over long wave and short wave, from commentators, from reporters on the spot, carefully directed programs reach the great majority of people in many countries. Such influence is radio known to exert upon the thinking of people, that the German and other totalitarian governments prohibit listening to foreign stations for fear that the minds of the people will be influenced in some way not conforming with the asserted interests of the country. And as will be seen later in this chapter, radio propaganda was one of the most powerful means for the sowing of confusion, doubt, and dissension by the Germans in the French camps and among civilians and officials in the early months of this war.[17]

Since the outbreak of the Second World War the tactic strategy of Berlin's radio varied with regard to the United States. At first it avoided comment. Gradually it changed to determined efforts to discredit the press of the United States and the federal administration. The interventionists were villified, isolationists praised, the hopelessness of aid to the Allies re-

[16] See James Rowland Angell, "Radio and National Moralc," *American Journal of Sociology*, 47:3 (November, 1941), pp. 352–359; and John B. Whitton and Harwood L. Childs, *Propaganda by Short Wave*, Princeton University Press, 1942.

[17] The contact between exiled governments and their people in Nazi-occupied Europe is chiefly by radio.

peated; self-preservation and pacifism were preached, and peace proposals were constantly proclaimed. Doubt and confusion were spread abroad. Other campaigns, as will be seen in this chapter, were conducted in France and Great Britain as well as in the neighbor countries of Germany. In Latin America the program consisted of warnings against the imperialistic Yankees and of reminders of differences among the Latin Americans.

The British, who were so adept at propaganda in the First World War, were very slow and clumsy in the early stages of the Second, and it was not until the announcer's stiff-bosom shirt was hung in the basement of the British Broadcasting Company in London that there were any signs of improvement. Once under way, the British made up for lost time. Perhaps no better propaganda was devised in any country than the vivid dramatizations of the bombings of London, the general newscasts and newscasts to Italy, programs for governments in exile, the wartime "actualities" or late reports of fighting and stories from combat areas, the radio V campaign, and programs sent to the occupied countries, where British radio personalities have developed large audiences.

As for the U.S.S.R., its radio programs in all languages have been very effective, if anything, perhaps a little overdone. The Moscow programs hammered persistently on the peace line during the time before and after the Finnish war, and continued to do so until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941.

The United States has also begun to develop its radio program particularly in the direction of Latin America and Canada. Efforts have been made to create a better feeling toward this country and to broadcast radio programs where they will be most effective toward this goal. Among the most effective aspects of our radio warfare today have been the answers made to the German contentions and the countering of the false assertions made concerning our conditions and warfare by the Axis powers.

These examples by no means exhaust the list of things that are happening since radio went to war. Secret stations have

been developed and portable secret broadcasting trucks have spread their ideas among the conquered people. The Norwegians listen so regularly to the British broadcasts that it is poor form to telephone anyone during the B.B.C. programs. Jamming has been resorted to, and on occasion voices interrupt broadcasts by suitable (or rather unsuitable from the standpoint of the broadcaster) comments at strategic points. Australia has reached out to affect the rest of the world. Chungking still continues to broadcast in spite of the bombings. Japan has joined the fray. In fact, the whole world as far as is possible, has joined into the welter of conflicting voices and programs on the ether.[18]

Other vehicles. The press, screen, and radio are only the three most common vehicles. There are many others such as the athletic field, the theater, the arts, music, religion, social affairs, the pulpit and the lecture platform, to mention only a few. Indeed anything which can serve as a vehicle of thought may be used as an agency of psychological warfare. For psychological warfare embraces means whereby man's mind may be influenced and his loyalty to a cause be bolstered or undermined. It uses any channel through which ideas flow, for ideas are the heart of morale, which is fundamental to success in war. Since both civilians and military forces are involved in the present conflict, all the channels are constantly filled with ideas that aim to build or break the nation's will to fight.

Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare in the First World War. The failure of German propaganda from 1914–1918 and the success of the Allies were due to the failure of the former to set up a strong central organization, which the latter did. The information releases that went out to the world from the Allies were shrewdly calculated for effect in other countries. The Germans, however, handing these matters over to the military authorities, entrusted a most delicate and subtle weapon to a group of men who were

[18] For the most illuminating, complete, and interesting discussion of this program see Rolo, *op. cit.*, and Whitton and Childs, *op. cit.*

noted for anything but their subtlety. As the war progressed, the propaganda leaders in the Allied countries found that their messages were eagerly accepted by the people at home and abroad. Knowing that people did not like to hear of women and children being murdered or of nurses being shot, they exploited everything in this line that became available. Nurse Cavell became a heroine to the Allied people because of effective propaganda.[19] When anything, no matter how small, appeared which could be used, it was used to its fullest in exploiting people's dominant attitudes.

But most disastrous for the Germans was the fact that they had built morale upon a belief in their invincibility. A combination of circumstances and skillful propaganda shook that belief in themselves. They failed to reach Paris, after it had been promised in Berlin that they would be there by Christmas of 1914. Their expected advances occasionally became retreats, and when that occurred the military had not the wisdom nor the foresight to see the advantage of speaking of a strategic withdrawal. The Allies on the other hand had started out with strategic withdrawals and heroic retreats, but eventually they began to punch the German lines; then the strategic withdrawals ceased and the German retreats began. However, when the Germans used such terms as "strategic withdrawal" in 1917, the American press quickly ridiculed them for it. The shortcomings of the German propaganda may be well illustrated by their failure to develop much disapproval of the munitions on board the *Lusitania* or to publicize successfully the warnings given to passengers before they sailed, for it is not the correctness of the statement that counts in propaganda. It is the emotional and intellectual reaction.

Since the First World War the Germans have taken the lead in the field of psychological warfare, basing their practice and plans on the findings both of their own experts and of foreign scholars. For that reason the German system and program and the way in which they operate will be examined.[20]

[19] See Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War,* New York, Knopf, 1927, p. 32.

[20] See Farago and Gittler, *op. cit.*

The German program. General C. von Keller, writing in 1914, clearly recognized the significance of morale and urged that the Germans exploit it. The *Nachrichtenabteilung,* which had charge of this matter, however, made a sad failure of it, with the result that for the time at least the matter was dropped. British propaganda efforts were highly successful during this period and are entitled to a fair measure of credit for the final Allied victory.[21] Between the end of the First World War and 1929, propaganda and psychological warfare were in a quiescent condition. Since 1929, however, a number of examples of morale building and morale breaking have been seen in China, Spain, Ethiopia, Austria, and the Sudetenland.[22]

By 1929 the Germans had renewed their interest, and under such men as General von Voss undertook the study of psychological warfare in earnest, establishing laboratories for that purpose, supplemented by institutes and testing stations. When the Nazis came into power they seized upon psychology as one of the complements of total war to which they were ready to give their support. The most significant fact about this development was that the effort was directly correlated with the military command. In spite of the skepticism of General von Seeckt, it was carried into effect.[23] The academic psychologists carried on the research, the military psychologists applied it as they found the interests of the state demanded.

This psychological program, then, was to mobilize Germany totally from the standpoint of morale. It dealt with the problems involved in the military service: equipment, symbols, personnel, communal life, propaganda, and actual combat. It was correlated with the Nazi Party organization and program to select leaders, to mold the public spirit, to educate for the "heroic" life, and to manipulate public opinion. German psychologists were carefully selected and trained and were then carefully assigned to some branch of the service. The psychologists became a new and important part of the National So-

[21] See Will Irwin, *Propaganda and the News,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936.

[22] See section on "Morale" in this chapter; also W. E. Hocking, "The Nature of Morale," *American Journal of Sociology,* 47:3 (November, 1941), pp. 302–330.

[23] Farago and Gittler, *op. cit.,* p. 8.

cialist state both politically and militarily. They acted as advisers to the military forces and became a part of the military staff.[24] They had thus become servants of politics and consequently of power in a struggle as old as man himself.

A short article in a German military journal made clear the underlying purpose in this enterprise.[25] It stated that the fast-moving action of the *Blitzkrieg* was interspersed with long periods of inactivity during which the war of nerves was to be conducted. This nerve war should have as its purpose to confuse and divide the enemy to the point where his fighting capabilities were reduced.[26] Thus war had become a combination of political, economic, and psychological coercion, which operated both in times of actual combat and in the lulls between fighting. To the end that final victory in war should be as rapid and complete as possible, Germany was urged to arm psychologically as well as materially. In that arming she utilized all of the instruments for molding public opinion which have been mentioned, developing definite procedures for their application.

The German system in operation. The basic principle of psychological warfare is that ideas are important; and, to maintain loyalty and support, the belief in ideas must be constant and firm. This is the condition desired in one's own forces. On the other hand, the enemy must be dealt with by attacking his ideas, creating if possible an ideological upheaval in his thinking. Therefore such persons as Lord Haw Haw were given ample time in which to sow doubt and dissension in the British mind during the early part of the war in the hope of breaking British morale.[27] The ideological attack was to be applied to both fighting and civilian populations.

The reason for both kinds of psychological warfare is that

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 10 ff. See also Ladislas Farago, "Psychological Warfare," in *America Organizes to Win the War,* New York, Harcourt, 1942.

[25] Quoted in Farago as Brau, "Der strategische Überfall," *Militär Wochenblatt* (1938), 18, 1134.

[26] See the German method of procedure as outlined in *Divide and Conquer,* Washington, Office of Facts and Figures, 1942. See also Harry Stack Sullivan, *loc. cit.*

[27] See Carl J. Friedrich, "Recent Trends in Propaganda," *Proceedings* of the Third Institute of Public Affairs of the University of New Hampshire, 32:1, Durham, University of New Hampshire, 1940, pp. 23–27.

total war, calling for a complete war effort by the entire population, is deeply imbedded in a disciplined civilian population, loyal and active. If the civilians can be adversely affected, their poor morale takes expression in several different ways, but particularly in reduced production of food, of supplies, and of fighting material. Poor civilian morale also is conveyed to the fighting personnel, with a consequent deterioration of morale in the armed forces. In sum, morale must be maintained at home and in the field by the country carrying on the psychological warfare, while the enemies' morale is destroyed or weakened by following a process the reverse to that adopted at home. It is highly doubtful that under conditions so exacting any program of intimidation could keep up a country's fighting spirit.[28] For example, if Germany and the Soviet Union continue to fight, it is because fighting morales of both peoples are high by reason of ideological convictions. Break the ideologies and the structure will tumble. So will the armies.

Unfortunately the discussion character of democracies (which Professor Barker has called "discussocracy") and their willingness to listen to many sides of questions have made them specially vulnerable to this type of warfare. In attacking them Germany's technique is the most advanced to date. To ferret out the sources of weaknesses in her enemies or potential enemies, she has so-called trouble seekers, who look for trouble areas in foreign countries, for example the German Academy of Munich and the German Academic Exchange of Berlin. In addition to these there are the trouble makers, who exploit the facts found by the trouble seekers in order to cause disturbances in the foreign countries. Such is the Alliance of Foreign Germans.[29]

In working toward the ideological upheaval, rumors, illusions, suggestions, agitation, lies, animosities, and prejudices are exploited to the fullest and in any way possible: by press, screen, radio, posters, songs, gossip, lectures, visitors, students, agitators, and even officials in the government itself. One of

[28] The statement in Farago and Gittler, *op. cit.*, pp. 61 ff., that the German morale has been maintained by a program of intimidation is open to question.

[29] For lists, see Farago and Gittler, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

the surest signs of the successful working of this type of warfare before the military ever strikes is the doubt and indecision that creeps into both official and unofficial circles, a condition which characterized France in the days just prior to her downfall. In this campaign what is called "comparative national psychology" is used, employing the intellectual, spiritual, cultural, religious, and social attitudes of the country against whom the warfare is being waged. Never contradicting, but following the country's own predilections, its will to war is softened. Doubt is spread concerning the correctness of its cause, and opposition to policies is stimulated in different quarters. The Nazi method of conquest culminates the technique used in conquering the masses generally, such as a show of power, the use of fear and uncertainty. The preparation follows the few simple psychological principles outlined at the beginning of this chapter.

Psychology for combat. The Nazi social and political structure is based on the principle of what its proponents call leadership. It is logical, therefore, that Nazi psychological warfare should be similarly founded. The leader is the key to the whole system. He is carefully selected because he has will, determination, operative thinking, mental elasticity, mathematical thinking, and character. Military leadership and political leadership are akin, since the political leader must have military insight.

A system of scientific selection was early introduced by the Nazis into the German army. It is the key to the selection of the command in the army and begins with youngsters as early as the sixth to eighth year of age. The army is looked upon as the highest achievement possible, and since every young man wishes to rise as fast as possible, his efforts are directed at achieving what is desired. Officers, noncommissioned officers, and specialists are tested as to their life history, skill in expression, mental capacity, and action capacity. The conscripted men are psychologically appraised.[30] The leaders have the direction and instruction of men as their primary duties.

As for the soldier himself, he has been indoctrinated from an early age so that he will demonstrate and possess certain

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 15 ff.

mental, spiritual, and physical attributes. His philosophy of life is that there is a definite pattern in life in which two things stand above everything else: courage and a knowledge of his weapon. The techniques used for this indoctrination are many. Some of the more significant are: patriotic education, political discussion, social gatherings, weekly hours, festivities, planned recreation, and brief "front talks." Officers are trained so as to develop their personality, noncommissioned officers are trained to be unsophisticated and straightforward, private soldiers are conditioned to life in the army environment. For the latter especially, many camp problems have been discussed and solutions prepared. Among these are measures to combat depression and suicide, to deal with sex difficulties, to overcome intellectual and general eccentricities, to correct clumsiness, to overcome recluse tendencies, to temper individualism, to detect and overcome cowardice, to prevent desertion, and to deal with religious matters.[31]

This system has worked out an excellent relation between men and officers in combat. Many of the problems of actual combat have been ironed out by the simple process of indoctrination, which seems to be the first method and the sole one tried in most instances and has been extensively used. The assumption of the German military leaders is that morale is basic to victory; without it, arms cannot succeed. The training program therefore has as its purpose the development of those characteristics in men which will promote morale. In the officer it is personality and in the soldier belief and confidence. To this end equipment and symbols are emphasized. The "heroic" outlook is stressed and adapts itself to the fighting spirit. On the whole, there are a few tendencies which must be counteracted. Among these are fear, superstition, and panic, the psychological effects of protracted bombardment, of surprise, of waiting for the enemy action, of poison gas, and the impulse to individual surrender.[32]

[31] See, for a short evaluation of the soldier, R. E. Dupuy and George F. Eliot, *If War Comes,* New York, Macmillan, 1937, chap. 3; also Farago and Gittler, *op. cit.,* pp. 35 ff.

[32] Farago and Gittler, *op. cit.,* pp. 53 ff.

United States

The German lead in the field of psychological warfare has made the German process the example and perhaps the model. France never comprehended its significance. The small neighbor states of Germany were helpless before it. The fall of Austria is a beautiful example of that fact. Great Britain slowly awoke to the fact that psychological war was being waged, and had the good fortune of having the German bombing of her great cities react as a tonic for her sagging morale—quite the opposite of what had been expected. The people of the Soviet Union had been indoctrinated since 1917 and were relatively insusceptible to the propaganda from abroad.

It was only during 1941 that leaders in the United States came to realize the ramifications of this penetrating activity. Every crease and wrinkle in the social fabric must be explored, if our country is to succeed at it. Thus far only the beginnings have been made by straw polls of public opinion, the Princeton Institute of Public Opinion Research, the Office of Facts and Figures, the Government Press Intelligence Service, the Army Bureau of Public Relations, the Monitoring Service of the Federal Communications Commission, the Planning and Research Division of the Morale Branch of the Army, the Office of Civilian Defense, and similar agencies. The principal point about these is that they have only just appeared and will take some time to mature.[33]

Psychological Warfare in Action [34]

The terrific effectiveness of this newly developed technique may not be apparent on the face of it, but the United States government has pictured it as follows:

Pre-invasion tactics. Before Hitler attacks any country, his agents carefully sow seeds of hate and disunity, turning people against their

[33] See Edward A. Sihl, "A Note on Governmental Research on Attitudes and Morale," *American Journal of Sociology,* 47:3 (November, 1941), pp. 472–480.

[34] This complete section is composed of excerpts reproduced by the permission of the Office of Facts and Figures from its pamphlet, *Divide and Conquer, cit. supra.*

own governments, governments against their allies, class against class.

Before the invasion of Austria, young Nazi hoodlums were sent onto the streets to play schoolboy pranks on the police and make them appear ridiculous in the eyes of passersby. In the early days of the war, before France was invaded, morale was lowered by professional weepers, clothed in deep mourning and wailing loudly, who wandered into subways and onto buses in Paris spreading the false belief that French casualties were enormous. Mothers received mysterious postcards informing them that their sons, at the front, had either been killed or were deathly ill. Soldiers received anonymous notes saying that their wives and sweethearts were unfaithful and had run off with British soldiers. Palm readers and crystal gazers in the pay of Hitler gloomily predicted to their clients that in the days to come France would lie prostrate at the feet of Germany. Nazi agents combed the gossip columns of Paris newspapers for items that could be used as blackmail against prominent persons. Armed with scraps of personal dirt, they would force the victim to act as a Hitler agent, and help spread rumors to confuse and demoralize the public. Rumors of secret weapons spread like wildfire: Hitler had electrical mines, nerve gas, deadly germs that could be dropped over an entire countryside. . . .

The poison takes hold. These rumors and thousands like them gradually accomplished their purpose. Circulated day after day, worming their way into the minds of Frenchmen, Norwegians, Danes, Belgians, Austrians, Dutch, Czechs, and Poles, they created a feeling of fear and frustration, a loathing of the war, and a certainty of defeat. Having weakened the resistance of his enemies, Hitler was quick to find outlets for their discontent.

For most evil, the Jews were to blame. Business is bad? Labor is to blame. Wages are low? Capital is to blame. War is hell? The British are to blame. Everybody was to blame *except* Hitler, the common enemy who would crush them all. National unity was destroyed by setting group against group. In Belgium, Nazis told the French-speaking Walloons that King Leopold was pro-German and was preparing to sell out Belgium to the Nazis; they told the Flemish that King Leopold had a secret treaty with the Allies and was ready to declare war on Germany. "Why should Frenchmen die for Danzig?" read elegantly printed propaganda tracts mailed to Frenchmen in hand-addressed envelopes. Slowly Hitler tried to deaden the combative spirit of the French soldier and make him distrust his British ally. When the French first crossed into German territory, the Germans retired without firing a shot, leaving behind placards and posters saying that they had no quarrel with the French. When French scouting planes swooped over the German lines, the Germans stood up and waved handkerchiefs. During the first week of the war, the French

soldiers, unloading barges at Strasbourg, were suddenly blinded by German searchlights. "Do not be afraid, French Kamaraden," cried a German officer through the loudspeaker. "We just turned on the light so you could see better. We have had the same work on our side and we know how it is." Working in the glare of German lights, the French accomplished two nights' work in one. Hitler convinced the French the war could be waged without fighting. "Defense" would triumph. Bloodshed was futile, offensive military action against Germany unnecessary. One had only to sit and wait, safe and snug, behind the Maginot Line.

Often, when German guns were about to fire, loudspeakers warned the French to take cover, even announcing where the shells would land. And if the Germans were so friendly, why should one die? The Germans had an answer for that, an answer calculated to separate the French from their British alley. "Frenchmen!" cried one tract, dropped over the front, "We want nothing from you, neither your land nor your lives. You don't want to fire on us; we don't want to fire on you. Who are the only ones who want this stupid war? The English alone. The English will fight once more to the last Frenchman. P.S. This is not propaganda. This is an exposé of the facts."

The death litany. The Germans played monotonously upon the fear of death. "Frenchmen!" cried a leaflet, shaped like a coffin, "Prepare *your* coffins." Tracts shaped like leaves swirled over the front. "Next spring when the offensive comes," they read, "you will fall as the autumn leaves are falling now—and for what?" Night after night during the long winter of 1939–1940, when the armies of France and Germany were lined up facing each other, German loudspeakers blared forth their propaganda: false lists of French "prisoners" were periodically announced; French dignitaries, visiting the front with elaborate secrecy, were greeted by the German loudspeakers; several minutes after a French infantry unit arrived at the front, the Germans announced the name of every member of the unit, his home town, and the names of his officers. This so demoralized the group that it had to be instantly removed.

Hitler's war of nerves in neutral countries, such as Holland and Belgium, was designed to keep them in a constant state of terror. By means of periodic war scares—carefully planned and rehearsed—he gradually produced a set of national jitters that left these nations weakened and demoralized.

The or-else technique. Hitler's terror was often less than subtle. The night before the invasion of Norway, the German Ambassador invited many prominent Norwegians to his home and showed them "Baptism by Fire," a movie taken during the invasion of Poland. Bombed cities, raging fires, and crushed bodies were pictured in harrow-

ing detail. Later, over champagne and a midnight supper, the German Ambassador quietly observed that the Poles could have been spared this tragedy had they granted Hitler's demands. Other nations, he suggested, would do well to remember Poland's fate.

The fifth columns. "National socialism were worthless if limited to Germany alone," Hitler has said, "and if it would not seal the rule of the superior race over the entire world for at least one thousand or two thousand years." To extend national socialism, he is spending $300,000,000 each year to organize Germans abroad, and to spread German propaganda. Directing this subversive activity is the *Auslands Organization* (Germans Abroad) of the Nazi party, with headquarters in Berlin, 600 agencies in foreign countries and a membership of 4,000,000.

Invasion tactics. Hitler invades only when he feel his groundwork of treachery has been well laid. During actual invasion, the strategy of terror creates untold confusion and panic, among both civilians and soldiers. During the battle of France, German bombs and planes were equipped with screaming sirens and whistles, turning the battlefield into an inferno of sound. Obsolete planes with schoolboy pilots, as well as every outmoded training tank in the Reich, were thrown into battle in some areas to convince the French that resistance was futile against such overwhelming odds. Germans wearing French uniforms parachuted behind the lines to issue false orders, tap military lines, and misdirect traffic. Often they spread panic in the villages merely by rushing through, crying, "Get out, the Germans are coming." Seizing French wave lengths, Germans broadcast false warnings to inhabitants of villages and towns, driving entire populations onto the roads, and clogging them so heavily that French reinforcements could not reach the front.

During the most frenzied days of the *Blitzkrieg*, the mayor of Senlis, 30 miles north of Paris, received a phone call. "This is the mayor of Beauvais," said the voice. "The Germans have crossed the Oise River. Evacuate instantly." Out poured the population of Senlis, adding to the already frightful crush on the roads. Only later, when the damage had been done, was it learned that the phone call had come from a German agent. . . .

To demoralize the Poles, alcohol is distributed to peasants in exchange for grain. No classical or patriotic music is permitted. Every monument, every document, every trace of Polish culture is being destroyed. The Polish press has been entirely wiped out. Poles cannot mingle with Germans in public conveyances. There is no longer a single Polish school. Jews in Warsaw have been packed into a ghetto in the center of the city, surrounded by an 8-foot wall, topped by broken glass or barbed wire. . . .

Tactics in America. "America is permanently on the brink of revolution," Hitler has said. "It will be a simple matter for me to produce revolts and unrest in the United States, so that these gentry will have their hands full. . . ."

The United States is still intact, but Hitler hopes to destroy that unity, physically and mentally. All his tricks are now being directed against us. Our job today is one of individual awareness, in order to avoid falling into Hitler's trap. Hitler's propaganda wears a thousand false faces. It never announces itself as "Nazi." It appears where least expected, and often under the most innocent auspices, turning up as the latest funny story told during lunch. . . .

We must not fall into the trap of assuming that, since the closing of the German consulates, German propagandists have been silenced. Transocean News Service, posing as a legitimate news bureau, spread Hitler propaganda throughout North America. The German Library of Information and the German Railroads Information sent out tons of attractively printed "white books" and "news letters" of German propaganda to businessmen, clergymen, editors, and others. Using huge mailing lists, they flooded the country with pamphlets discussing the "German side." Heavier fare was dispensed by the American Fellowship Forum, which ostensibly tried to foster better German-American relations by weighty discussions, but actually presented Hitler's views in sugar-coated form to many loyal, unsuspecting Americans. Although these organizations no longer function in the United States, many of their ideas are still being spread by publications and groups, often unconsciously and without knowledge of the source.

Before Pearl Harbor. War has only intensified the barrage of propaganda. Day after day, the Axis short waves pour falsehoods into the United States. Hitler communicates with his agents here by these short-wave broadcasts. Listening to the programs, they learn the current propaganda line and immediately act upon it, spreading rumors that will leave the impression on American minds that Hitler wishes to leave. Since the war began, German short waves have shouted of barricades in the streets of Washington, of panic on the stock market, of exaggerated losses at Pearl Harbor and throughout the Pacific. German short-wave stories of losses at Pearl Harbor, for example, gave the signal for the Hitler agents to spread rumors that we had lost our fleet and that our naval officers were traitors.

Hitler short-wave broadcasts have charged that landing of American troops in Northern Ireland was timed "to coincide with Roosevelt's gradual absorption of Australia and Canada." Via short wave, Hitler tells us that "American foreign policy is dictated from Downing Street rather than from Washington, and will leave America holding the bag." To England, however, he cries, "The British Empire is dissolv-

ing like a lump of sugar into Roosevelt's teacup." Every sign of doubt and confusion is magnified a thousandfold and sent back over the air.

What Hitler wants us to believe. To destroy our national unity, create unrest in all groups of the population, and deflect us from our major purpose—the defeat of the Axis—Hitler is trying to set capital against labor, white against Negro, Catholic against Protestant, Christian against Jew. He knows that prejudice, in any form, plays his game. Controlling the sources of news in every occupied country, and often in neutral nations, he releases only such news as he wants us to read. He will try to play upon our fears, raise our hopes, confuse and bewilder us. Through statements from "authoritative sources" he will present false and misleading pictures, often leading us to believe that he is weak when he is strong, napping when he is preparing to spring.

His strategy will follow no set pattern. One line will be pursued today, another tomorrow. But always his broad aims will be the same: to separate us from our allies by arousing distrust of them; to create friction within the United States in order to divert us from our true enemy—the Axis; to paralyze our will to fight. . . .

Conclusions

Power being anything which can coerce a state or people into acting, psychological forces have been adopted by states as a new instrument of power politics, especially in time of war. The use of psychology under such circumstances has been called psychological warfare. It is a potent element in a state's fighting capacity and it may be a tremendously significant element in breaking the morale in an enemy state. Morale is generally recognized as being basic to victory, for without it the blind obedience of a Prussian soldier of Frederick the Great plus an excellent strategic plan cannot avail (other things being reasonably equal) against a splendid spirit such as that shown by the French in the Battle of Verdun during the First World War. To reach its most effective fighting peak this morale must permeate the whole state structure, civilian as well as military.

The psychological type of warfare requires much scientific training and laboratory work. It has resulted in the mobilization of the psychologists into the fighting forces of states at

war, and so important have these become that Germany has made them a part of her general military staff in addition to using them in the ordinary work for party purposes.

Democratic countries are just awakening to the significance of this powerful weapon and are realizing that they are particularly vulnerable due to the amount and importance of debate in their form of government. For that reason they are finding it more than ever necessary to curtail the freedom of expression, and in this field as in so many others to adopt for the duration of the war practices very close to those of the totalitarian states. The recent action of the Attorney General of the United States against William Pelley and Father Coughlin's *Social Justice,* indicate a recognition of the danger which may lie in agencies that spread doubt in the midst of a country which requires its total forces for the successful prosecution of war.

Questions

1. On what fundamental characteristics in man is psychological warfare based?
2. Which are the main vehicles for the spread of information and misinformation ?
3. Define psychological warfare.
4. What part does morale play in modern war? Define morale.
5. What significance has General C. von Keller for this subject?
6. Into which two classes are German psychologists divided for warfare purposes?
7. Why has psychological warfare taken such significant development during the last few years?
8. How does the German system of psychological warfare operate on the soldier? On the officer?
9. What is the fundamental idea in the operation of psychological warfare according to the German technique?
10. What is psychology for combat? What does it emphasize?
11. What are the pre-invasion tactics of Hitler?
12. When does he attack?
13. What is meant by the "or-else technique"?
14. What were the methods and avenues of propaganda during the First World War?
15. How are civilians affected by propaganda?

16. What are some techniques of propaganda?
17. How do fifth and sixth columns fit into psychological warfare?
18. How do the Germans exploit weaknesses in enemy states? Can you apply it to the United States?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Prepare an account of propaganda during the First World War.
2. Discuss the significance of cables and other means of news transmission in the control of propaganda in the First World War.
3. Where and what are sixth columns?
4. Appraise censorship as a political instrument.
5. Discuss the role of rumor in wars past and present.
6. Examine civilian defense as a builder of morale.
7. Report on the treatment of war and politics in motion pictures.
8. Analyze the broadcasts of Lord Haw Haw and discuss his role in psychological warfare.
9. Study instances of the technique of setting group against group, race against race, and class against class.
10. How is the United States organized for psychological warfare?

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CHAPTER 10

MILITARY ORGANIZATION AND INSTITUTIONS

The Philosophy of Military Organization

Military organization has been called the systematic arrangement of means for obtaining unity of effort in the accomplishment of a task or mission assigned to a military force.[1] But if one looks upon "arrangement" as simply a matter of organization charts and manuals, and of "means" as merely armed men and machines, the full implication of the term has been missed. Military organization is primarily a way of thinking and acting, and of training so to think and act. Its every feature is conditioned by the demands of physical combat, to meet which it must be supremely efficient. And, far more than military science proper, it must be designed to meet other objectives—political, economic, and social issues—quite beyond the military tasks it is expected to implement. To understand military organization, then, it must be studied from the viewpoints of both military man and civilian. Too often this balanced approach has not been followed. Too often has military organization suffered at the hands of statesmen unable to comprehend the demands made upon it by actual warfare, or at the hands of soldiers ignorant or contemptuous of civilian institutions. In this brief review let us look at both sides, commencing with the principal military considerations—the demands of physical combat.

Offensive spirit. The continuous existence of an armed enemy is the essence of war. Thus the over-all objective of any military force *in war* must be the destruction of that armed enemy. The enemy may be weakened or distracted by numerous means and wars can end in stalemate, but no true military victory can

[1] United States Army, *Tentative Field Service Regulations,* Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940, p. 2. The term "military" is used here and throughout this chapter to refer to all armed forces: land, sea, and air. The word "soldier" is equally general.

be expected until the opposing armed force is sought out and overthrown. Because of this, orthodox military doctrine insists upon the offensive. "Through offensive action a commander exercises his initiative, preserves his freedom of action, and imposes his will on the enemy." [2] While the defensive may be adopted as a temporary expedient or as a contributing factor to a larger plan, its adoption as a fixed policy can never assure success.[3]

This concept of the enemy, and the resultant need for offensive spirit, is accepted with the greatest reluctance by the average civil group. We have not space to analyze the reasons for this hesitancy, yet many should be obvious. Obvious also should be the fact that rich democratic states experience the greatest difficulty in this connection. Victims of the delusion of passive defense, they think naturally in terms of protective lines and great stationary fortresses, of substituting stone walls and earthen parapets for nerve and vision. Our American Minute Man, for example—the untrained militiaman "defending" his home and countryland by firing from behind stone walls—is no less obvious a symbol of this psychology than that offered by the Great Wall of China or the Maginot Line.[4] Useful as defense and fortified lines may be against the desultory raids of uncivilized tribes, a battle between peers will be won only by attack and by great driving arrows of movement.

Time and space. War is, after all, primarily a matter of movement, a conquest of time and space. Major General Sir Frederick Maurice has called these elements "the fundamental factors of strategy." [5] Like the offensive spirit, they are among the

[2] United States Army, *Field Service Regulations: Operations,* Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941, p. 22. Some military writers, notably B. H. Liddell Hart, are not loath to point out the values of the defensive. But it should be noted that they all refer to its adoption under specific conditions: that is, in the face of a considerably superior enemy; or when contemporary development in weapons has rendered attack too costly; or while gathering strength to assume the offensive, and so on. The offensive spirit does not demand continued attack but the continued willingness to attack.

[3] See W. F. Kernan, *Defense Will Not Win the War,* Boston, Little, 1942.

[4] Read Walter Lippmann's syndicated column "Pearl Harbor," January 27, 1942.

[5] Sir Frederick Maurice, *British Strategy,* London, Constable, 1929, p. 21.

essential considerations of military organization. War is fought in terms of speed. It may be the four miles per hour of Stonewall Jackson's fast-moving infantry or the four-hundred-mile speed of a modern airplane, but the problem is still to get somewhere before the other man, and to get there with all the striking power one can concentrate. One must never underestimate the tremendous difficulties offered by time and space. It has been estimated that for the support of an expeditionary force it is necessary to land at least 50 pounds of supplies *per man per day* after the arrival. This figure will give some picture of the transportation called for in modern warfare—the endless stream of ships and vehicles which must be kept moving constantly between front and rear. Moreover, men who are wounded or become sick must be carried back and fresh troops must be moved forward to replace them. The farther an army moves forward, the greater become the difficulties of this lengthening chain. As it moves faster the problem becomes still greater.

The distances over which modern war is fought are equally difficult to comprehend. Popular illustrations of combat show swirling masses of men and machines in close action. Yet in reality this close action is rarely experienced. Usually there is nothing to be seen save the features of the landscape, nothing to be heard save distant gunfire or the drone of planes. Emptiness is the most characteristic feature of the modern battlefield. Fighting extends over areas of such great width and depth that no visual comprehension is possible. This dispersion is even more the case at sea than it is on land; it is not uncommon for fleets to engage while out of sight of one another over the horizon. If we recall that not so long ago a force of a thousand men could still be directed by voice, or at least by drum beat, we can understand how rapidly the problem of battle control has increased in complexity. The techniques of organization must be advanced with equal rapidity if the factors of time and space are to remain even as constant—with tremendous rapidity if we are to make allies of them.

Obscurity. In appreciating the problems of time and space

we must learn not to look upon the maneuvers of real combat as moves on a chessboard. In chess the players are visible and the board is marked in a known and unchanging pattern. In warfare the positions of the players—even one's own—are seldom certain and frequently entirely unknown; and the board is ever changing, highly irregular, and three-dimensional. In mobile warfare even top commanders must be prepared to move and fight without a clear picture of the enemy situation, and smaller units "may expect to fight with practically no information of friend or foe. . . . Theirs, as Captain Liddell Hart expresses it, is the problem of how to guard and hit in the dark." [6]

This chronic obscurity and confusion is what the soldier calls the "fog of war." He must expect to wait for hours or even days without instructions or information, then to move hurriedly under late and conflicting orders to uncertain destinations, perhaps only to be given counterorders after he has arrived. He must not be paralyzed by this indecision, nor unnerved at exaggerated and misleading reports. He must be prepared for deep, unexplained silences and lost messengers. "He must learn that in war the abnormal is normal and that uncertainty is certain. In brief, his training in peace must be such as to render him psychologically fit to take the tremendous mental hurdles of war without losing his stride.[7] This training is the task of military organization.

Manpower. We arrive thus at the final consideration, man, the fundamental instrument in war. "Other instruments may change but he remains relatively constant. Unless his behavior and elemental attributes are understood, gross mistakes will be made in planning operations and in troop leading." [8] These words from the officially published doctrine of the United States Army reflect a highly distinctive feature of a military force: that its resources—its stock-in-trade—are armed men. If we

[6] The Infantry School, *Infantry in Battle,* Washington, U.S. Infantry Association, 1934, p. 16.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] United States Army, *Field Service Regulations,* Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1941, p. 18. Hereafter to be referred to only as *Field Service Regulations,* 1941.

can assume that all organizations, great and small, possess certain attributes, and that these attributes may be classified as resources, personnel, plant, and technology, we can gain a clearer picture of this unique feature. A grocery establishment, for example, has its groceries, clerks, buildings and equipment, and the knowledge of its staff concerning the grocery trade. Similarly for a law office, but its tangible resources, since it deals more in service than goods, are restricted to a few briefs and law books. An army deals also in terms of service. Like the law office, it represents a group and fights for that group. But in the courts of battle armed men replace legal briefs; they are the "resources" of an army.

In addition to armed men, a military force has its officers, who approximate what we have called above the "personnel." Obviously, it has its plant and its technology as well. If we think a moment we can see that this dealing in manpower as such is what makes military organization almost unique today. In a sense this characteristic was present in slave labor, although the analogy is far from complete. In another sense it is present in large industrial plants, but here again we cannot carry the comparison too far. The industrial worker is far more an operator of a machine than is the ordinary soldier, who is the "machine" itself. This fact gives a clue to the marked cleavage between officers and enlisted men, for it is the distinction between operators and performers. There can be no doubt, however, that this gulf is closing rapidly; the increased mechanization of warfare tends to blend the functions of the two as manpower is being gradually replaced by machine power, and the armed man assumes the responsibilities of operation.

This distinction is important to us, however, not so much for itself as for the institutions it has bred. The gulf mentioned above between officer and enlisted man is surrounded with a hundred devices of enforcement—discipline, saluting, distinction in uniform, and caste—all distasteful to the liberal mind, yet nonetheless essential where one group must be trained to perform and one to operate. This condition has led to another unique feature of military organization: the manpower of an

army is composed of men who have contracted to serve for a more or less definite period of time. While an officer may usually resign at will, an enlisted man must serve out his contract, and a violation of that contract brings serious punishment—sometimes death. This is an obligation rarely required in civil life, and one which is highly conducive of misunderstanding in civil-military relations.

It is our object here, however, simply to set down the problems. Elsewhere in this volume the human factor is outlined in terms of psychology. Yet it is necessary to point out in this connection that war makes such tremendous demands upon the mental and physical endurance of the ordinary soldier that if he is to act as an effective instrument he must be operated with the greatest skill and the highest degree of control. And war makes no less severe demands upon the officers who must perform this operation. Couple with these demands the importance of the soldier's mission to the state, and many of the seemingly anachronistic or inequitable features of military organization will appear more justified.

Conflicts with civilian institutions. We have reviewed the principal considerations imposed upon military organization by warfare. Soldiers have met them by the adoption of a series of broad doctrines and specific techniques, built, like the doctrines and techniques of medicine or teaching, around a supporting framework of professionalism. This professionalism is no less rigid and rooted in self-interest than any other form; neither is it more so. Out of it and out of the organization it supports has grown a vast array of institutions—good, bad, and indifferent, but all profoundly important to army and state alike. In examining the doctrines and techniques in the forthcoming pages we shall glance as well at the concomitant institutions. Let us first, however, outline briefly the chief "civilian" considerations with which military organization is faced, for, as we have said, the soldier cannot think solely in terms of military expediency. His plans must accord with national expediency and it is here that we find the real areas of civilian-military controversy.

First of all there is the intermittent character of all military

establishments. Arms and armed men cost money. No nation has ever maintained its military forces at full strength in peacetime. Thus every army and navy has been confronted with the necessity of rapid expansion when hostilities were threatened or begun. This necessity is peculiar to military forces; it has no counterpart in other such great organizations as the church, state, or industry. While there is little argument about the fact of expansion there is, however, a great deal about the degree and time. The soldier wants to have more men and supplies ready than the statesman feels is necessary, or more than the state can afford, and every step in military organization must be taken with this conflict of opinion in mind.

Closely akin is the conflict in the realm of planning. In peace the military planning agencies expect to be given specific directives within which they can operate. They want to know how many men they can count on each year, how much money they will receive, what tasks they may be called upon to perform, and the answers to a hundred similar questions. But no state —certainly no democratic state—can operate with such specific objectives in mind. As a result, the soldier is usually left the alternative of planning to meet every possible contingency with every conceivable condition of preparedness or unpreparedness, or to give it up as a hopeless task and trust to luck. When in addition to lack of information he becomes the butt of pacifists urging the uselessness of his work, or of diplomats stressing the dangers of friction incident to war planning, he frequently inclines toward the latter alternative.

A third area of conflict lies in matters of authority and control. Military and civilian leaders of even mediocre competence are eager to denounce interference in each other's affairs. Yet it is rare to find the two agreeing upon a clear line of demarcation. Obviously, in these days there can be no clear line. The possibilities of conflict here, particularly under popular government, are legion. National policy and military strategy seem often to pull in absolutely opposite directions, and these two considerations—plus hundreds of smaller ones—require endless thought and oftimes discouraging compromise. The strict

application of the British blockade in both World Wars was considered a military need, but the mounting resentment of neutrals and later of occupied countries had to be treated as an equally important political consideration. The answer was found in a balanced program, difficult for both soldiers and statesmen. Whether consciously sought or not, the military failure at Pearl Harbor must be considered an important political victory for the United States.[9]

We shall return soon again to this matter of divided authority, since it touches upon one of the most basic doctrines of organization. In general, it may be said that the soldier is as well aware as the statesman of the proposition that military authority must be subordinate to civil. The top military ranks agree to it as well as do the top civilian authorities. Democratic traditionalism to the contrary, the general likes to look upon himself as the servant of the state, faithfully carrying out its sternest mission. Actually "pretorianism" is extremely rare. As Vagts puts it, less elegantly, "the military [have] accepted the governments as frameworks within which their interests could be secured." [10]

The Concept of the Mission

This recognition of higher civil authority has permitted the soldier to apply the same rule throughout his entire structure of organization. He is able to concentrate upon the considerations of combat by thinking solely in terms of a mission. No aspect of military philosophy is more dominant and distinctive than this concept of the task assigned by a higher power, of action as the purpose of one's being. Running like a leitmotif through the arias and choruses of combat, the mission is the foremost doctrine of military organization.

It is this concept of the mission that lends such a cast of objectivity to the operations of military force. It frees military thought and planning from many of the moral barriers which

[9] Compare with Chapter 24.—*Editor.*

[10] Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism,* New York, Norton, 1937, p. 324. Of course, the process is far from simple. See also, in the same volume, pp. 350 ff.

hinder the layman, enabling the soldier to adopt a somewhat scientific viewpoint and to conduct his work of killing and destruction through unmoral techniques and procedures. Obviously complete detachment is relatively rare, but it is a commonplace of military morale that confidence as a fighting man and pride of organization furnish soldiers a better background for combat than hatred of an enemy or intense patriotism.

The *ultimate mission* of armed force in war, as we have said, must be the destruction of the enemy's armed forces. In the accomplishment of this many *local* or *immediate missions* will be necessary. In every case and at every level of command these tasks are assigned by a higher authority. Saying this, however, need not imply that a commander must be given inflexible orders, nor that he cannot assume large responsibility for the interpretation of his task. "A commander of a subordinate unit cannot plead absence of orders . . . as an excuse for inactivity in a situation where action on his part is essential, or where a change in the situation upon which the issued orders were based renders such orders impractical or impossible of execution. If the . . . subordinate commander is familiar with the . . . mission of the whole command, he should take appropriate action and report the situation as early as practicable." [11] Indeed, the greatness of a soldier rests in large measure on his ability to focus an indefinite mission into a sharp plan of action. And nowhere is this ability more important than in the field of national policy.

One can understand that this dominant character of the mission is the real basis of all discipline. No regulation is too harsh, no assignment too difficult, if it is deemed necessary in the accomplishment of a military end. It is not enough for the soldier to conceive of his mission as a framework for planning. It must amount to a creed. In action his unit may be well-nigh "shot to pieces" but it must carry on. Excuses do not count in war; there is but one satisfactory report: "mission accomplished."

This outlook upon combat, with its understandable logic,

[11] *Field Service Regulations*, 1941, p. 24.

exerts a profound influence upon the relationship between soldiers and civilians. The latter rarely think in terms of missions, either for themselves or for their groups. Popular governments, recognizing no authority higher than the people themselves, are in the very way of things without true missions until or unless the people are strongly stirred with the sense of a mission. Save under such conditions, many civilians find it hard to appreciate the "duty" motif, and the complex organization and strict discipline with which it is implemented. They fail to understand the passionless, unemotional attitude of the professional soldier, his apparent disregard of social values. At the same time the soldier often looks upon the civilian's existence as planless and subject to unreal, emotional swings of sentiment from adulation to hatred, with the pendulum hanging too often at the dead center of apathy. The military man, accepting his mission of preserving the established state, sees in the "reform" elements of society the basic cause of conflict. Yet it is only fair to add that many a soldier has accepted a revolutionary mission and served it ably.

If the spirit of the mission is an essential to successful military operation, it can also be a serious impediment in the higher echelons. Not only can it serve as a convenient curtain behind which to hide from moral responsibility—a danger in itself—but equally easily can it be used to hide from mental responsibility. The common army expression, "We do not make wars, we fight them," has serious overtones of irresponsibility. Admitting that no one can question the basic integrity of purpose of the American officer, Pendleton Herring has pointed out that our military-political system has conditioned him to follow, rather than lead, public opinion.[12] "The subordination of the military to the civil authorities, while understandable, and defensible in historical terms, is not conducive to the encouragement of bold policy formulation by army leaders." Only too rarely do we find officers with that caliber of political and social acumen displayed by a Lyautey or a von Seeckt. This

[12] Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1941, pp. 48 ff.

narrowness, more than any other factor, leads the civilian to criticize the "military mind." Note how this narrowness is reflected in all the areas of civil-military conflict summarized above. Herein lies one of the principal arguments for sharpening the psychological distinctions between officers of the higher command and those in the other elements of a military force.

Plans and techniques. The soldier plans the accomplishment of his combat mission according to certain broad "principles of war," based upon fundamental human traits. We have already suggested a few of these principles—*the offensive, movement, surprise, mass,* and *economy of effort*—in the foregoing pages.[13] Within the frame of these principles the soldier utilizes the myriad techniques which go to make up the methodology of combat. He calls these "military science" or "naval science," as the case may be. Here we find *strategy* and *tactics; hegemonics,* or the science of leadership, discipline, and morale; *logistics,* or the movement of men and supplies in the field; *didactics,* or the techniques of training and indoctrination; and the thousand subordinate techniques designed to suit various arms and conditions of warfare, from jungle fighting to blockade duty. Military science includes the housekeeping techniques of a military force, usually adapted from civilian life: medicine, law, chemistry, publicity, administration, procurement, and the like. It is the systematic co-ordination of all of these principles and methods with the physical resources of men and material that is the primary task of military organization.

The Concept of Unity

When a sergeant orders "right face" it would be an absurd and useless response for his squad to face to the left. "Right face" must mean the same to the commander and the men he commands. It must mean not only the same movement but the same manner and same time of execution, and it must mean that the execution be carried out by all to whom the order is

[13] There have been numerous attempts made to codify these principles. One of the best is to be found in Charles A. Willoughby, *Maneuver in War,* Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Company, 1939.

addressed. These are the essential unities: of terminology, of training and procedure, of doctrine, and of command. Their need is obvious. A unit commander has at his disposal only a certain number of hours each day in which to plan his moves. He cannot look to every detail nor personally instruct each one of his men. He must utilize all the executive techniques and delegate his authority if he expects to have time to apply himself to his main problem. He will usually find time only for the briefest of orders and he must be certain that they will be carried out without detailed instructions, in the manner he himself would have employed. Although he must leave room for individual initiative, he must be able to count on a certain standard of performance, automatically executed.

Little need be said concerning unity in the field of military technology, terminology, and administrative procedure. Interchangeable parts were first used practically in the manufacture of military muskets. Armies are noted for their routines. It is in the matter of doctrinal unity that we first discover irresolution and caprice in the ranks of the military.

Unity of doctrine implies the presence of doctrine, and there is a persistent tendency in Anglo-Saxon armies to scoff at organized ideas as impractical or dogmatic. The traditions bred in our officer corps, while strong, are more often social, in the narrow sense, than they are warlike. The military culture of our officers tends to equip them for survival in a nonmilitary society rather than to win battles for that society. Such fighting traditions as we have are, therefore, frequently the possession of separate components or branches of our armed forces rather than of the unified whole. No one would suggest lowering the traditions of the Marine Corps or the 29th Infantry, for example, but could not these traditions be made part of the doctrine of the entire combat force?

As part of the reorganization of the Prussian Army after Jena, Scharnhorst introduced the system of rotation in line and staff duties so that all the officer personnel could be infused with the same doctrine. Clausewitz later created the maxim that the indoctrinated soldier who understands principles needs

no rules. These men saw that the inspired "heroes" we Americans are prone to seek, as Spengler says, "often destroy more than they have built up—by the gap that their death makes in the flow of happening," whereas "the creation of tradition means the elimination of the incident. A tradition breeds a high average, with which the future can reckon . . . ; no Napoleon, but an incomparable officer corps." [14] Doctrinal unity has become an essential of modern war. To attain it we must bend every effort toward the elimination of the jealousies over authority and function which now exist between branches of the service, between line and staff, and between the vocal proponents of different types of warfare.

Unity of command. Equally difficult of attainment, in spite of the tremendous background of experience, is unity of command. Such unity is relatively common in lower echelons, but often in higher commands it is tragically absent. In essence it means the concentration in one person of authority over the forces in a particular theater of activity. Unity of command is truly the father of unity of effort and the godfather of cooperation—an estate devoutly to be desired, praised by all soldiers, yet confounded by them only too frequently.

Lack of a unity in command can appear in two general conditions: (1) two or more forces under individual commanders attempting to act as one, and (2) a single force under two or more commanders. Examples of the first are very obvious in the experiences of nations allied for war purposes. The British commenced the First World War by instructing Field Marshal French in 1914 "to support and co-operate with the French army against our common enemies," but added the plain reminder that "your command is an entirely independent one, and that you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any allied general." [15] Such unstable and reluctant unions, so often so costly and tragic, are open to much criticism. Yet they are quite understandable in view of the honest differences

[14] Quoted in Edwin F. Dakin, *Today and Destiny,* New York, Knopf, 1940, p. 37.

[15] Quoted in W. D. Bird, *The Direction of War,* Cambridge, University Press, 1920, p. 47.

of national policy which may arise, or the problems of language, temperament, and military training which must be overcome. Independent action may actually be found more desirable than allied operation under a single head.

But these excuses do not hold true where the forces are all from one sovereign state. An examination of military history offers a discouraging number of examples of lack of co-ordination between the land, sea, and air forces of a single nation. There are bureaus in our own War Department and branches of our Army which even today take pride in maintaining an almost independent status. Where this is done to maintain *esprit de corps* or professional doctrine it is all to the good. Where it is done selfishly to preserve a vested interest, or stupidly through failure to see the military task as a whole, it offers the most serious kind of interference to unity of command.

The second condition of a single force under two commanders does not imply so obvious a case as that of the Roman consuls Aemilius and Varro, whose alternation of authority each day led to the disaster at Cannae. The causes can be far more subtle. The command of an irresolute officer exercised through councils of war and the interference of civil authority in military operations are cases in point. Popular governments and their officials are particularly prone to try their hands at military direction, and this is by no means always unjustified. The first year or two when a democracy is at war is a frantic period for army and state alike, and there is ample opportunity for both sides to be right and wrong in this matter. We may readily agree with Stonewall Jackson's reply to the flagrant interference of the Confederate Secretary of War, but the contemporary "meddling" of the Union Committee on the Conduct of the War is less easy to criticize in view of the conditions of military inefficiency which prevailed.[16]

The presence of such political officers as accompanied the

[16] The best account of the Jackson affair is given in G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War,* American ed., New York, Longmans, 1936, pp. 150–158. For an able account of the Committee on the Conduct of the War see T. Harry Williams' article, *Journal of the American Military Institute,* 3 (Fall, 1939), pp. 139–156.

armies of republican France in the 1790's or the Soviet forces within recent years may lead to the same debility in command. Then, too, interference in military matters is not alone the prerogative of democratic officials. Moltke attempted to resign his command of the German armies during the Franco-Prussian War due to continued interference on the part of Chancellor Bismark, and there is good reason to believe that this protest has been repeated by modern German staff officers in the face of a too severe domination of military matters by Nazi officialdom. Of course, as we have mentioned above, where justified control ends and interference begins is a point difficult of determination. We can all join in condemning the military executive who is unable to respect the authority he has delegated to his subordinates; who by open and injudicious interference in their work destroys their initiative and divides all control beneath him. But when we reach the national level we must spell out the answers, letter by letter, until we have formulated a military doctrine becoming to our needs and culture.

It might be well to speak here of the reverse of this problem of interference. When we discussed the soldier's concept of his mission we mentioned that the usurpation of civilian authority by the military was extremely rare. But the influencing of this authority by soldiers—sometimes termed "interference"—is by no means uncommon. Here and there, as in Japan, it is brazenly performed, but usually the techniques are more subtle. Armies, including our own, have maintained regular lobbies and propaganda agencies.[17] Usually, in peace time, these wedges are used to pry open the door to increased funds, but now and then they may be employed to stimulate civilian thinking about military matters. Here, too, such activity cannot be labeled as entirely unjustified. Look once more at the example of Pearl Harbor. Many United States Army and Navy officers foresaw this catastrophe as a distinct possibility. Further, they saw that they were the ones who would be called to account after it happened. A very strong case can be made that these officers should have set aside their traditional aloofness from politics and pub-

[17] Herring, *op. cit.*, pp. 122 ff.

lic opinion and taken realistic steps to prod their country out of its apathy.

These dangerous areas of civilian-military conflict only prove that the civilian leader and legislator can be just as much responsible for inefficient military organization as the soldier. At one time military science was considered a necessary part of the education of every prince, but liberal governments no longer require such training of their officials. And in this specialized world of ours such education on the part of all national leaders would hardly be possible. Yet there is no reason why a distinct corps of "martial statesmen" could not be established, trained equally in military and civil affairs, and indoctrinated in the realisms of national power. We train statesmen to meet the problems of peace. Why, then, not the problems of war?

Scalar Organization

We have covered above what may be called the "doctrines" of military organization. Let us now look at the machinery wherewith these doctrines are put into operation. Paramount is the scalar chain. By *scalar* we mean what is often termed hierarchical, a series of steps or grades which the soldier calls the "chain of command." In organization the word scalar refers to the decentralization of control through the grading of duties, "not according to different functions, for this involves another principle of organization, but according to degrees of authority and corresponding responsibility." [18] Scalar chains are evident in all human groups, but it is in government, the army, the church, and the larger industries that we find them in their longest, most clearly defined states.

There is hardly a condition of warfare, hardly a principle of combat that does not demand that there be a supreme authority of leadership and co-ordination and that this authority be made unceasingly and universally effective throughout the entire structure of a military force. This distribution of authority is effected in military organization by a rigid series of ranks and

[18] James D. Mooney and Alan C. Reiley, *The Principles of Organization,* New York, Harper, 1939, p. 14.

grades. There are few if any breaks in the chain, and the flow of command is smoothed by the unities of doctrine and procedure. As perfected, this chain is a sensitive instrument, transmitting the will of the commander down to the lowest unit of the scale. But it must be remembered that the will of a poor leader can be transmitted as faithfully as that of a good one. "Men," General Summerall once wrote, "think as their leaders think, and men know unerringly how their leaders think." It is a commonplace in army thought to judge by the appearance and actions of a unit the character of its commander. A few minutes on the deck of a warship is sufficient to suggest the managerial qualities of its captain. This chain of command can be made a faithful servant, for good or for evil; it cannot replace effective leadership.

This scalar principle was applied primarily to the control of troops in battle. Here is what the soldier calls *tactical* organization. We must keep in mind that the resources of an army are manpower, and incidentally we can recall how considerably this aspect has been altered within recent years. A century or so ago a general commanding an infantry division found it divided into perhaps three brigades, each headed by a brigadier and comprising three or four regiments. Each regiment was commanded by a colonel. The chain of command, then, ran: general → three brigadiers → nine or more colonels; an order issued by the first was very soon carried out by the last nine. But there the chain really ended, for each colonel was able personally to command his own regiment. Its men and officers all took their orders from the colonel simultaneously, usually by seeing or hearing him. Thus the regiment was considered the "basic" military unit.

Today the dispersion of warfare, mentioned earlier, has extended the chain of command far down the scale, so that now even the lowest-ranking noncommissioned officer is an integral part. The squad he commands, of some ten men, has become the basic unit of infantry, because it stays within range of his personal control, usually by voice or sign. In grouping these squads into higher units considerations of flexibility, mobility,

co-operation of weapons, and economy must be met, but the basic problem remains that of control. Experience has demonstrated that when a unit is comprised of either three or four subordinate units the results are most fortunate. A glance at the way aircraft and warships are grouped will show that this rule applies generally throughout combatant forces.

Misuse of rank. The scalar principle, however, applies to more than tactics. It governs administration as well. Rank is not only the determinant of military authority, but also of pay and function. These three "rights" combine to produce a fourth: social authority and prestige. Until quite recently, in many armies, commissions were bought and sold as so much property. In others they have been sought after and granted politically in the same manner as other favors under a spoils system. A military commission carries a certain assurance of permanent income and a reasonable immunity from competition. Military professionals tend to guard this vested interest to a considerable and often dangerous degree, and particularly to guard their chances of reaching a higher grade and income. Thus we find that seniority has become almost the only criterion of advancement in time of peace and that an army must wait for the tragic failures of war to eliminate a vast accumulation of deadwood from its higher ranks.[19]

A more serious aspect of this professional entrenchment through rigid ranks lies in the use made of these ranks to control the functional or technical duties of an officer. There is little reason save understandable self-interest (certainly not unique in the military service) why an officer's pay, his authority over men, and his planning, administrative, technological, or tactical functions should all be hung on the same scalar framework. The exigencies of war go a long way in breaking down these barriers, only to show they could be avoided in peace.

It is hard for the civilian to understand, for example, why the best signal officer should not hold the most important signal

[19] Alexander Severus, "The Fetish of Military Rank," in *Military Affairs,* 5 (Fall of 1941), pp. 171–176.

job—at least within certain limits. The soldier asks in reply how is the "best" one to be selected. He points out the vast opportunities for favoritism and outside pressure in such selection, the virtue of standardization over individualism, and the fact that long service brings greater ability. To a degree he is correct, but only to a degree. Long service brings other qualities, including fatheadedness and sterility of thought. In the command elements at least (and this should include more than general officers), brains, personality, and ability must be made to count if one expects to have an effective fighting machine.[20] Selection should not rest alone on seniority. And there seems no valid reason except traditionalism for retaining most of the present designations of rank which have come down to us from the Renaissance. Pay could be gauged on seniority plus competence, and within certain broad age categories jobs could be assigned on the basis of merit and competition. Such jobs would be functional as a basis but would carry the necessary powers of command, so that the scalar control would be preserved.

Functional Organization

By *functional organization* we mean the classification and arrangement of individuals and units of men according to duties performed, in other words by specialization. This classification is a complex matter in all organization, and nowhere more so than in the military form. It may make it clearer, then, to bring out in the beginning that military functions may be classed into three great divisions: *command, combat,* and *service.* General Headquarters is a command element, the Infantry a combat element, and the Medical Corps is an element which furnishes service. At times the lines between these elements may be drawn with considerable rigidity. At other times such distinctions are purely relative, but nonetheless they will be of value in understanding functional organization.

There is nothing new about this specialization; the Roman legion had its officers who exercised high planning and com-

[20] This "ability" must not, however, be extended to "heroism," nor "personality" to the "singularity" of a Napoleon.

mand, others who led in the actual fighting, and still others who performed the varied services of the legion, from keeping accounts to constructing roads. Even in those days the cleavage between the functions of command, combat, and service was marked. Since then it has fluctuated with the demands of warfare and contemporary culture. For specialization in military duties simply parallels the increased specialization of human living. It is, in effect, a cycle, a never-ending race with co-ordination.

Today the combat soldier, who must be master of a bewildering number of weapons and techniques, is being gradually freed from the clerical and housekeeping duties that have hitherto cluttered up his day. Co-ordination in action is being facilitated by specialization in barracks. Today a few men spend all of their day peeling potatoes or typing forms so that the bulk of each unit can devote the maximum time to learning the trade of fighting. A unit commander is able to concentrate on the essential job of knowing and training his men instead of being submerged under a flood of paper work.

This same change is evident in the services, where specialization must be developed in order that other specialization can function. In our Medical Corps, for example, trained surgeons were formerly required to perform endless tasks of administration and troop-leading. They are now being relieved of this work by nonmedical administrative or tactical officers so that they can spend their time at their real medical duties. The rule applies equally well to the command elements. For years past our War Department General Staff has engulfed itself in administration, to the detriment of the planning and leadership which should have been its primary function. Today it has been "streamlined" with considerable effect.

The real importance of functional organization to the student of military force lies not in some artificial distinction between who commands, who fights, and who renders auxiliary service, but rather in the psychological implications of these elements. Within the frame of the doctrine of the army as a

whole, each element must not only play but also feel its part. Officers with high command functions should be distinguished for breadth of vision and knowledge, open-mindedness, and intellectual curiosity. They should be mentally suited to deal with civilian and political points of view. Those with combat functions should be especially imbued with physical courage and endurance, a sense of discipline, strong individual initiative, and the will to win. And those having service duties must sense the obligations of their support. They must be satisfied with rendering unrewarded co-operation. Only by each fully appreciating the part he as well as the others must play can the force as a whole understand the meaning of teamwork.

Functional classification by armament. We have reserved for the last the most significant aspect of this functional organization, that created by the advance of technology. If the principles of war are immutable the weapons of war, in kind and in number, most certainly are not. The barbaric tribesman possessed perhaps six basic forms of weapon, and throughout the Middle Ages there were but few additions to the list. Of course, wide variations developed in size and design, but not until the ages of gunpowder and modern industry do we note a perceptible increase in number. From then on the increase is rapid; now we must number our basic forms of armament by the hundreds. Each has its own characteristics, its own special utility in battle, and organization has had to be continually modified to meet these characteristics.

For centuries Vegetius' classification of the Roman military establishment into "cavalry, infantry, and marine" held generally true. Then, as these new weapons presented new problems of tactics and called for new methods of training, the old forms of organization branched out. Cavalry, for example, very early divided itself into heavy and light horse, and by Napoleon's time was classed into at least six distinct categories, based upon weapons carried and duties performed. New nonmilitary techniques brought further amplification. Engineers, signalmen, and supply services were formed into distinctive units. All the while

the traditional lines tended to become blurred. Regiments of dragoons were created to furnish cavalry soldiers who could fight on foot, regiments of mounted infantry were created to furnish foot soldiers who could move by horse. Although all the niceties of branch distinction were preserved, by the First World War the division of units by function of arms had reached down to the level of the regiment.

The task force. This specialization has continued. Today it has reached the level of the squad, almost the level of the individual. No longer do we have an infantry regiment in the old sense, with its rigid tables of organization and equipment. The modern armored units defy classification in terms of the branches of even ten years ago. Weapons originally the sole property of the field artillery are to be found today in medium and heavy tanks, in antitank, infantry, and cavalry regiments, and others besides. Obviously, this intermixing calls for tremendous efforts at co-ordination. An interesting early attempt at this can be found in the eighteenth-century "legion," which was comprised of infantry, cavalry, and artillery under a single commander. For decades we have seen this coming, and to some extent we have effected special combinations of services and arms within the framework of the division of some 15,000 to 20,000 men. But branch jealousies have prevented much further development. Recently we have read the handwriting on the wall and taken the first major steps toward a land organization which would produce what modern war demands, the *task force.* Presumably other steps will follow.

A task force—a naval conception of some age—is a unit designed in every way—in training, equipment, morale, health, supplies—to perform a specific task or mission. Note the emphasis on planning far ahead. Such a force might conceivably comprise elements of every branch of the service and yet be hardly larger than one of the old one-branch regiments. Above all it is a unified force, not simply a temporary combination of detached elements—a chemical compound rather than a mixture—under a single commander. A glance at the conquest of Crete in May, 1941, by a German task force will indicate the

possibilities of this form of organization.[21] A chiefly air-borne invasion was met by naval and ground forces without air support. The invaders employed mountain troops for their principal attack over the rough, broken terrain of Crete, armed them lavishly with automatic weapons, prepared the way for them with parachute units, blasted out the resistance ahead of them with bombers, and backed them up with tanks, engineers, artillery, and infantry brought over by sea and air. It so happened that the Germans did not command the water, hence naval cooperation was at a minimum, but it was not entirely absent. This entire Crete Task Force was commanded and its entire operation directed by an air officer—a perfectly unified command, "blended by deliberate directive, into a coordinated whole."

The Staff Principle

Under "Scalar Organization" we have discussed the methods by which command is applied throughout all levels of a military force. We have stressed the elaborate mechanism through which the decision of one man can be carried out by literally millions of other men under his authority. But how can this man, in the face of the unbelievable complexity of modern warfare and the military machine which he commands, and the tremendous need for speed, arrive at adequate decisions? How can he cope with the diversified techniques, the myriad supply factors, the baffling uncertainties? The answer lies in the principle of the *staff,* familiar in all military organization.

The staff principle is not essentially a military estate, but nowhere else has it been applied as fully as it has in the armed services. Indeed, the duties performed by a staff were common among the ancients. Yet the higher functionalized and coordinated instrument which we today call the general staff is of relatively modern origin. Functionally it is a planning and facilitating body; psychologically it is an expansion of the personality of the commander whom it serves. The principle has

[21] See Major Paul W. Thompson, "Conquest by Air," in *Infantry Journal* (December, 1941), pp. 13–23.

been expressed simply by Clausewitz: "The general staff is intended to convert the ideas of the commanding general into orders, not only conveying the former to the troops, but also working out all matters of detail, thus relieving the general from a great amount of trouble." And, it may be added, allowing him to exercise a long-range supervision, unimpeded by detail.

A staff exercises no command, it is not a part of the scalar organization. Although a staff officer may issue orders in the name of his commander, he does so simply to facilitate their transmission. His is the job of gathering information, determining one or more co-ordinated plans of action therefrom, submitting his plans to the commander, transmitting the commander's chosen plan down through the scalar organization to the troops, and supervising its execution by the troops.

The word "staff" has been used to express such a variety of institutions that there is little wonder that the civilian finds difficulty in grasping the real significance of the military form. Indeed, many soldiers fail to appreciate its position in the scheme of things. The military staff is not a council of war. Such a body, like a presidential cabinet, is only advisory *pro tem;* its members are a part of the scalar structure. Each has his own group to consider, approaching decisions from this group's viewpoint rather than that of the commander. The military staff is even less comparable to an elected or deputized council —a congress—since it has no legislative or policy-making functions of its own. The military staff is a more dynamic body that the usual civilian research group, for it deals in advice rather than simply information. The military commander and his staff are a team. Here is no grouping of leader and led, no system of checks and balances, but a scientific method of determining the best plan to accomplish a mission and the most efficient means of executing a task. Note, however, that the mission concept must be present.

Staff obligations and conflicts. We have said the commander and his staff are a team. Obviously all commanders and staffs have not lived up to the obligations of teamwork. While a staff exercises no formal command—its function being that of

adviser rather than simply informant or agent—it does exercise a very real authority of its own. This has been aptly called an "authority of *ideas*" as opposed to the scalar "authority of *man*," exercised by the line commander.[22] To many men of action, and especially to those of limited vision, the power of ideas is not always apparent. We Americans hold mere thought and ideas in heavy contempt, but the Germans, adapting for the purposes of war *all* available tools, know their value. Perhaps that explains why we have never been able to apply the staff principle to its fullest extent. Resentment by the "field soldier" of "brass hats" is an old story in all armies and has led to bitter controversy. Too visionary work on the part of staff officers may cause it. It may best be overcome by the now common practice of returning staff officers to line duty at periodic intervals, but a complete solution is neither possible nor desirable—for the staff-line antipathy is but the distinction between the elements of command and combat.

This conflict of ideas and action has another aspect, that which can exist between the staff and its commander. The latter could no more proceed without his staff than could the staff proceed without him. Its advice is not something which he asks for. He gets it whether he likes it or not. Naturally this mandatory character of staff service is not always happily received by a commander, and it is here that the role of the chief of staff can be of great importance. This officer, who must co-ordinate all staff activity, must also render this activity palatable to his commander. When there is mutual respect and balanced strength of character, this relationship will be highly effective. However, when a commander is weak, indecisive, or disinterested, he will often grow to lean too heavily on his staff and the staff will tend to assume line authority. In effect this is what has happened in the past to the national staffs of several countries. The chief of staff has become the actual commander of the army.

The reverse is equally possible. A staff serving under a supreme, powerful individualist—a man like Napoleon, impervi-

[22] Mooney and Reiley, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

ous to staff counsel—will gradually shrivel to a meaningless group of aides. Its sections may continue to engage in fact finding, but the decision-aiding function will be abandoned in the face of an officer who resents being told what he might or ought to do.

The staff principle is beyond doubt the most effective way of getting organized work done, but it demands of men more than they are often willing to give. A real staff officer must be carefully indoctrinated. He must work anonymously and strictly according to the ethics of his trade. Using infinite patience and vision he must investigate every avenue of approach to every problem with which he may be faced. He must be prepared at all times to scrap all of his work in the face of new conditions he was unable to foresee and to plan afresh. He must work critically and objectively but with his mission ever in mind. He must, above all, be loyal and co-operate, and he must never flinch at seeing his plans thrown aside or abrogated by those for whom he works. Only real training and discipline can produce such men.

Conclusions

If military organization in the United States is to meet the challenge of modern war, those responsible must think and act in terms of the starkest realism, the greatest scope, and the longest range of vision. Military organization must, we repeat, be broadened to gather *all* available tools—mental, moral, and physical—to the purposes of fighting. We cannot go into the changes possible in lower commands (many are now being experimented with), but we can suggest a few badly needed alterations on higher levels which would soon induce necessary subordinate revolutions and without which such revolutions would be (indeed *are*) without virility or vigor.

First. A supreme war staff should be established on the national level. This should be a single body—not a mass of conflicting offshoots of the preceding peacetime government, but a closely knit unit for excogitation and facilitation. It should

be a permanent organization, superior to any army, navy, or air command, and directly responsible to the chief war executive. Its advice must be of a sufficiently mandatory character to render it effective. Its overall function should be to see that policy and strategy can go hand in hand, an immense task in co-ordination.

Second. There should be created a permanent body of persons, trained equally in military and civil affairs, with which to man this staff. These persons must be considerably more than politicians or businessmen in uniform, or than professional soldiers detailed as advisers. They should be professionals specifically educated and indoctrinated to serve the state in war. Needless to say these persons must be at home as much with the economics, sociology, and politics of warfare, as with military strategy and organization; and they must be backed by a sound body of thought and writing in their field. They should be, as a general rule, young men.[23]

Third. To a limited extent such a body could be raised at once and trained in service, but some more effective method of education should be established simultaneously to bear the principal load. A "National College of War" is the answer.

Fourth. Since this staff cannot be bothered with directing a three-ring circus or smoothing over an endless stream of bureaucratic conflicts and jealousies, the military organization below must be "streamlined." All services, such as medical, procurement, and communications, of *army, navy, and air forces* could be permanently consolidated into a Service Force. While the three media of land, sea, and air may be considered as sufficiently demanding of separate techniques to warrant separate arms to cover them, these arms could be sufficiently shuffled together and consolidated to enable them to be made into a distinct *Battle Force.* In addition to these there might well be a separate *Defense Force,* to embrace such purely home-defense units as the Coast Guard, coast artillery, fixed antiaircraft, air-raid warden service, state guards, and the like. And if we can go one step further, let us advocate a unified and co-ordinated

[23] Check this conclusion with views expressed in the next chapter.—*Editor.*

Industrial Force, to include all persons employed in vital defense production.

Fifth. There must be an abandonment of the fallacious belief that the nation can and will spring to arms overnight, and of all the balderdash that goes with it. Chief among these concepts which must go is that concerning the employment of amateurs. Every person who is given even a part-time job anywhere in the war effort should be regularly paid, even if only a small fee for the hour or two served each week. It would be even better to draft persons for this work rather than to rely on volunteers who cannot be required to meet even mediocre standards. Another damaging concept is that which forces us to procure vital war supplies from civilian sources. There is little reason why all war activity which utilizes organized labor should not be conducted lock, stock, and barrel by the semimilitary Industrial Force.

If these five steps will demand a total mobilization of all citizens, then that is what we must have. But efficient war organization will not, in the final analysis, be secured by fiat. A start must be made through study and planning, and the responsibility for these lies primarily at the door of the American student of administration and government.

Questions

1. "Military organization must be supremely efficient." Does this rule apply with the same force to all organizations? Explain.
2. It has been said that the German "secret weapon" is their "manner of thinking." Do you feel that this would be reflected in German military organization? How?
3. Could an effective military force be maintained on a largely amateur basis as is, for example, a college football team? Does the fact that the football team can count on games at reasonably regular intervals play any part in your decision?
4. Can you point out in the final campaigns of the Civil War where the Union Army sought out and overthrew the Confederate forces? Do you feel the Civil War could have been brought to a close if such offensive moves had not been made?

5. Does your answer to Question 4 suggest how the Americans may have "won" the Revolutionary War?

6. Give an example illustrating the increasing specialized responsibility of enlisted men and the consequent closing of the social gap between them and their officers. Do other factors play a part in this change? Are the results always good? Explain.

7. Using any professional organization with which you are familiar —a university, a city government, a business house—pick out its scalar chain.

8. Pick out the functional organization of the organization named in your answer to question 7. Are formal "ranks" employed and do these ranks indicate simultaneously relative authority, specialization, and scale of pay? If not, upon what basis is pay and function determined?

9. Identify any group comparble to a military staff in the organization selected in Question 7. Is it a true staff?

10. Can you suggest any nonmilitary groups which operate within the frame of a strict mission?

11. In what essentials does a self-determined objective differ from an assigned mission? Need executing a mission necessarily imply a loss of individual initiative?

12. Discuss the standards of training implicit in the command of a task force of mixed arms and services. Does this suggest a gradual change of emphasis in the training of officer personnel as it increases in rank?

13. The existence or lack of existence of what factors have led civil groups from time to time to assume an offensive spirit in the true military sense?

14. In what essential did the American Minute Man differ from the American vigilante of the West? From any of the guerilla or *franc tireur* groups of other countries?

15. Select three examples illustrating co-ordination or lack of co-ordination between military strategy and foreign policy.

16. If the thousand-man regiment of the eighteenth century could be commanded personally by its colonel, what were the functions of his subordinate captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and so on?

17. Explain what the soldier means by the "principle of the offensive." By the "principle of movement."

18. Does unity of training and procedure necessarily imply a loss of individual initiative?

19. In what two ways can the principle of unity of command be violated?

20. Military influence has long been a prominent feature of Japan-

ese politics. From your knowledge of the history and government of that country, can you suggest reasons for this unique condition?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Review the history of the political governance of war.
2. Outline the development of military planning in the United States, Germany, and other countries.
3. Report on foreign and domestic experience in the control of foreign policy by military agencies.
4. Discuss the social aspects of military professionalism.
5. What are some means for securing effective national command in war?
6. Survey the problem of nonmilitary education and indoctrination for higher military commanders.
7. Review the genesis of the task force concept in military organization.
8. Discuss the staff system in modern armies.
9. Survey the trends in the development of officer–enlisted-man relationship.
10. What are the strengths and weaknesses of volunteer and amateur war service?

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CHAPTER 11

THE ART OF GENERALSHIP

Definitions

Like many other terms in the soldier's lexicon, *generalship* suffers from a wide range of denotation and a much wider range of connotation. The confusion is not limited to civilian treatment but is almost equally great in military publications. Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language defines generalship as: (1) "The office or tenure of office of a general; exercise of the functions of a general; . . . (2) Military skill in a general officer or commander. (3) Leadership, management."

Military parlance necessarily limits the range to the strictly military aspects of the term. Some confusion remains, however, in the acceptance of the dictionary's broad inclusion of the functions of all generals, regardless of rank or the nature of their duties. The greater difficulty arises from the synonymous use of the terms leadership and generalship. Until such ambiguities are eliminated, clear discussion and conclusions are out of the question.

The popular conception of generalship agrees with the comment in a recent issue of the *New York Times* that it is a general's business to "know when to attack and when to defend." That definition, however, covers only a fraction of the general's functions. To know when, he must also know the why, where, how, and whom of the case. The reasons for his decision, the direction of attack or the position on which a defense is to be based, the manner of execution of the maneuver, and the disposition of his own troops and those of the enemy are all included in the general's estimate of the situation and his decision. Generalship, in this sense, becomes the function of high command, applicable to the situation of the commander of any

substantial independent force as well as to those who are charged with determining and co-ordinating the strategy of the nation's entire fighting forces. It governs, for example, the actions of the commanders of our forces in Australia, Hawaii, Britain, and the Aleutians as well as of the actions and decisions of the Commander of the Ground Forces, with headquarters in Washington.

This concept differs sharply from Webster's broader definition,—"exercise of the functions of a general," as will be clear from a glance at the Army List today or a stroll through the corridors of the War Department buildings in Washington. Among the officers wearing the stars of a general is a very considerable and growing number of officers who are exercising purely administrative or specialist functions. Their concern with combat, if any, is incidental. Their missions are, however, vital in ensuring the proper functioning of the entire military machine, a fact duly acknowledged in the rank they hold.

A second distinction should be noted. Among the combat organizations themselves there is as wide a difference between the role of the brigade commander in a field army and that of the supreme commander of that field army as lies between the duties of a squad leader and his commander. The subordinate brigadier has comparatively little opportunity to demonstrate his qualities of generalship. That handicap necessarily disappears in the event that he finds himself charged with the execution of an independent mission.

Leadership and Generalship

Confusion likewise arises from the synonymous use of *leadership* and *generalship*. The first is obviously a basic ingredient of the second. The most brilliant desk-chair strategists, drafting the battle plans which others are to execute, may be utterly lacking in leadership and still be supremely successful in the performance of their missions. It mattered not at all whether Count Alfred von Schlieffen,[1] who as head of the German Gen-

[1] Count Schlieffen, quoted in L. Farago, *et al., The Axis Grand Strategy,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, p. 148.

eral Staff prepared the plans for the invasion of France in the First World War, had the capacity to lead a platoon into battle. Schlieffen's concern was limited to laying down the lines of sound military strategy; it called for no leadership on his part, at least not in the sense of troop leading.

In an effort to eliminate the confusion which has arisen in the usage of the term leadership, Captain John H. Burns has presented a rough classification of leadership of all types, in which he divides leaders into the following groups: "(*a*) the leader who is intellectually or artistically supreme in his field; (*b*) the business type, . . . adroit diplomat who may swerve and twist but never loses sight of his goal; (*c*) the leader of small groups (foreman type); (*d*) the mass leader; (*e*) the good administrator."

In a peacetime army, particularly the skeleton organization with which a country like the United States is familiar, the tendency, as Captain Burns points out, is to place considerable emphasis on the selection of the good-administrator type for positions of high command. There is no occasion in peacetime to rouse the spirits of the soldiery to fighting pitch and to keep them at that point.[2] Large-scale maneuvers might provide some opportunity for leadership of that type, but it must be remembered that such maneuvers were no part of the United States system of training from the Armistice of 1918 until the day when the shadow of the Second World War was drawing close to this country. As soon as our danger became apparent the War Department began to sift the officer roster in its search for men of the type which Captain Burns describes as the "mass leader." These were wanted for combat duty. Necessarily, selection was limited almost wholly to men whose prior experience had never gotten them out of the class of the small group leader. Those who had commanded more than a skeleton regiment in actual field exercises were the exception. That condition was the inevitable by-product of a military organization which distributed the peacetime army through hundreds of

[2] J. H. Burns, *Psychology and Leadership,* Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, Command and General Staff School Press, 1934.

small army posts scattered all over the country. Regular large-scale maneuvers would have served as a corrective. It was not until 1940 that appropriations were made available to establish military maneuvers as an integral feature of the training program.

Qualifications of the Commander

From the dawn of the art of writing both the soldier and the civilian have tried to produce a formula which pictures the perfect general. The earliest writers, like those of today, lived in a period of all-out war. Just as now, national survival and the *Lebensraum* theory were in almost constant conflict during the fifty centuries preceding the Christian era. The premium on expert generalship was high and it received a corresponding degree of attention from the writers.

One of the earliest definitions of the qualifications of a general is attributed by General Sir Archibald Wavell to Socrates: [3]

> The general must know how to get his men their rations and every other kind of stores needed for war. He must have imagination to originate plans, practical sense and energy to carry them through. He must be observant, untiring, shrewd; kindly and cruel; simple and crafty; a watchman and a robber; lavish and miserly; generous and stingy; rash and conservative. All these and many other qualities, natural and acquired, he must have. He should also, as a matter of course, know his tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building materials is a house.

As General Wavell notes, Socrates had early discovered that an "army travels on its stomach." First in his list of specifications is the capacity of the leader to maintain his organization fit and fully supplied. Tactics (and we must assume Socrates implied strategy as well) is included at the end "as a matter of course."

Compare that definition with the one presented by Frederick the Great in his "General Principles of War:" [4]

[3] Sir Archibald Wavell, lecture 1 of Cambridge lectures on *The Art of Generalship*, 1939.

[4] Frederick II, quoted in Thomas R. Phillips, *Roots of Strategy*, Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Company, 1940, p. 346.

A perfect commander exists only in theory. He needs too many contradictory virtues. . . . He must know how to dissemble and yet preserve the appearance of straightforwardness. He must display mildness and severity, skepticism and immutable calm. He must use his soldiers humanely and yet on occasion waste their lives; he must possess both mental and physical energy; he must be both restrained and thorough; he must know everything, forget nothing, and never underestimate the details upon which great things so often depend.

There is no striking difference between the specifications of Frederick and Socrates except that the Prussian military genius appears to ignore the factor of administrative capacity. That he did not overlook this point is apparent not only from other comments in his "General Principles" but also from his meticulous supervision of such details in his campaigns.

The Commander's Control of Operations

More likely, and particularly in the last thirty years, we find military authorities, while agreeing pretty generally as to what a general *should be,* in sharp disagreement as to what he *should do.* By that time the well-known picture of Napoleon on his white horse (or Lee on Traveller), directing every major detail of the action begun under their orders, had been blotted out by mass warfare and mechanization. The commander's immediate influence was being exercised by remote control if at all. Comfortably established in a headquarters far to the rear of the battle line, he maintained contact by wire, radio, or messenger. The movement of the battle lines came to him through the medium of colored push-pins on a map. To many modern writers that describes the appropriate role of the senior commander. To others the view has been and still remains anathema. These latter commentators see the commander in a plane circling over the heads of his troops, observing every development below him and in the aerial combat above him. Decisions are made as rapidly as the situation unfolds. Voice radio conveys orders to the subordinate commanders of the separate fighting units. The concept is ideal, provided first that the confused picture can be properly interpreted, and provided

further that the commander can be counted on to stay alive for more than a few minutes. The present war is providing the ideal laboratory for the test of these opposing theories.

Disregarding for the moment the never-ending quarrel among the military writers as to personal qualifications and technique of performance, it may be noted that general agreement [5] exists as to certain major attributes.[6] Without regard to relative priority, these may be listed under eight heads: technical capacity, mental and spiritual stability, ruggedness of physique, moral strength, daring, administrative skill, common sense and leadership. Considering them in turn, historical examples as well as the views of military commentators are of interest.

Innate Skill as Opposed to Experience

To Socrates, the technical skill in mastering the problems of strategy and tactics, that is, the planning of the campaign and the handling of troops in battle, are relatively unimportant. Without fully endorsing that stand, Wavell is inclined to agree. It is reasonable to assume that Socrates could not forget the disasters which had befallen the Athenian armies in the Peloponnesian War when faulty handling of the supply problem more than once ruined a campaign. And his memory must have been scarred by the privations which Athenians suffered in the siege of their capital. In general, military commentators,[7] including such masters of strategy as Napoleon and Frederick, agreed that this essential skill must be innate. For one congenitally unendowed with that skill no amount of training or experience in the field can develop what Napoleon describes [8] as a "clear head that estimates a situation correctly, is not easily dazzled and cannot be paralyzed by good news or bad."

[5] R. W. Phipps, *The Armies of the French Republic and Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon,* 2 vols., Oxford University Press, 1929, vol. 1, pp. 16–19, 25, 65–68, 261–446, vol. 2; Wavell, *op. cit.;* Burns, *op. cit.*

[6] Wavell, *op. cit.,* lecture 1.

[7] Phillips, *op. cit.,* p. 346; Farago, *op. cit.,* pp. 145–146.

[8] General Burnod, *Napoleon's Maxims of War,* Kansas City, Mo., Hudson Kimberley Publishing Co., 1923, maxim 73, p. 134.

In the same vein is the comment of Frederick II: "The mule that carried Prince Eugene's pack saddle through ten campaigns did not thereby become a better tactician. To the shame of humanity, many grow old and gray in otherwise honorable professions without making greater progress than that mule."

Frederick qualified [9] his condemnation with the comment that "actual experience must be considered. Only after repeated examination does the artist recognize the fundamental nature of his art." Possibly an afterthought brought to his mind the recollection of his first real battle experience at Mollwitz when blind panic had sent him galloping from the field, leaving it to his generals to win the victory. We see a similar contrast between young Arthur Wellesley, winning his spurs in India, and the same Wellesley as Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular War. Washington, too, learned from experience, as is evident from a comparison of his Long Island campaign in the summer of 1776 and the brilliant series of operations at the close of the year in which he took Trenton and ultimately compelled Cornwallis to withdraw from New Jersey. In the interim Washington had profited in knowledge, if in no other way, from the pounding his troops had taken at the hands of Howe and Cornwallis. Such lessons made up for the lack of an opportunity to follow the line of the counsel later offered by Napoleon Bonaparte to all aspiring military leaders, namely to study "again and again the campaigns of Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and Frederick."

Theoretical Peacetime Training for Future Commanders as Contrasted with Early and Continued Campaign Experience

So far as history records, the great masters of strategy who had the opportunity to put their plans into execution, in that respect differentiated from military geniuses like Count Schlieffen whose function was solely the drafting of plans which

[9] Phillips, *op. cit.*, pp. 346–357; Farago, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

others were to carry out, were in the great majority of cases close students of military history. In them, instinctive capacity was rounded out by absorbing the tricks of the trade which past masters had left on the printed page. Recognition of that fact is responsible for the staff colleges and schools of war which in the present century are an integral feature of the military establishments maintained by every country of note. In map and in terrain exercises the aspiring students, selected from among officers who have previously demonstrated superior ability, are presented with varied types of problems. The problems are designed to represent the full range of what, in the faculty's opinion, may face these future generals in modern battle. Nevertheless, as experience in every army has shown, such courses of study, no matter how earnestly pursued, may prove to be no more than "the pack saddle on Eugene's mule" for some of the students. Even some who display considerable capacity in this peacetime substitute for war training are found wanting at the hour of decision.

By contrast, the highest rung on the all-time ladder of military genius has been reached repeatedly by men who got little or no instruction except in the hard school of experience. The vagabond Mongol youth who as Genghis Khan led his conquering hordes over most of Asia acquired all his military knowledge and skill the hard way. Hannibal and Alexander the Great are often placed in the same category. The parallel, however, is not quite correct. Hannibal at the age of nine was taken to Spain by his father Hamilcar Barca to learn the art of war. Himself a lifelong soldier and one of the great leaders of ancient times, Hamilcar taught the boy so well that at the age of twenty-five he was ready to launch the campaign which for fourteen years kept most of the Italian peninsula at the mercy of the Carthaginian army. Alexander, like Hannibal, not only learned his lessons in the saddle but likewise had the benefit of tutelage from his father Philip, outstanding military leader of his time. It was not a raw youth of sixteen but a seasoned campaigner who led the Macedonian army to victory over revolting hill tribes during one of Philip's absences.

The Principles of War

However far an examination of military history may be pursued, it is clear that the outstandingly successful military leaders of the past were well versed in the cardinal principles of war.[10] Variously grouped by military writers beginning with the Chinese Sun Tzu in 505 B. C., current doctrine lists them as follows: the objective, mass, the offensive, security, surprise, movement, economy of force, simplicity, and co-operation. For the unschooled Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest, C.S.A., those principles were summed up in a rule "to git thar fustest with the mostest men." [11] At another time Forrest replied to a sorely beset subordinate's plea for help with "Fitum." [12] Instinct and experience taught the unlettered Forrest what schooling, study, and experience gave to others whose problems of strategy were more serious and fraught with greater consequence than any which this Confederate raider ever faced. In whatever manner the knowledge and skill were acquired, they summed up to the leader's capacity for digesting all the information available at the hour of decision, then using it to the utmost advantage for his troops and the utmost disadvantage for the opponent. Every step in the process, as Napoleon reminds us, must be taken with a clear head which cannot be disturbed by good news or bad. Grant, doggedly fighting it out "on this line, if it takes me all winter"; Marshal Joffre, regularly retiring at a set hour, even in the crises of action, to find in sleep the steady calm he would need for the problems of the morrow—these men typify the detachment from immediate stress which enabled them to reach clear and sound decisions.

Mental and Spiritual Robustness in the Commander

Wavell, in his Cambridge lectures (1939), places great emphasis on this quality of mental and spiritual robustness. The

[10] C. A. Willoughby, *Maneuver in War,* Harrisburg, Military Service Publishing Co., 1939, pp. 25–44.

[11] Willoughby, *op. cit.,* p. 25.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 25.

mere capacity for detachment from the shocks of the hour is not enough. The undertaker can do as well, or better, in that respect. The general's situation is comparable rather to that of a doctor forced by circumstances to perform a major operation which will tax his skill to the utmost, on a member of his family. Military leaders there have been, and are, and will be in the future, to whom the men in ranks are just so much cannon fodder. Considerations of humanity do not enter into their calculations. Compunctions about "wasting" the lives of their soldiers, as Frederick II puts it in his "General Principles," do not disturb them except as the losses in manpower affect the chances of victory.

Frederick's views became the basis of an ideological development sponsored and led not only by military writers like Clausewitz, but by the German historians, philosophers, and sociologists as well. The cannon-fodder Prussian concept has finally reached its climax in the Nazi doctrine which sees the individual only as a useful instrument of the state, reaching his highest utility in the business of battlefield slaughter. For the general who attains the callousness and ruthlessness of temperament implicit in the Nazi (and Japanese) codes there can be no particular tax on mind or spirit when the casualty reports are brought in. He endures none of the agonies that always beset a leader of Robert E. Lee's type.[13] Lee, like other soldiers of humane heart, did not hesitate to call on his men for every sacrifice. At the same time, such men can never quite suppress the constant shock inflicted on their subconscious by the sight and sound of human suffering. Emotional overbalance eventually produces breakdown in not a few, as the records of the First World War clearly show.

It is not beside the point to remark that in one modern instance an entire nation all but succumbed to the impact of heavy losses, when General Nivelle's 1917 Aisne offensive was viewed at first-hand by overenthusiastic politicians who had come to the front to witness an anticipated break-through. On the heels of their clamor over the losses came a nationwide wave

[13] Douglas S. Freeman, *Lee as a Leader,* lecture, Army War College, 1939.

of defeatism which almost brought France to its knees. The commander who cannot steel himself to such phenomena of war is out of place at the fighting front. It may be argued that the extreme Prussian—now Nazi—attitude has the merit of promoting efficiency and enhancing the odds for victory. Within limits that is true. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that such callousness expresses itself not only in victory but in wanton waste, as typified by more than a half million casualties suffered by the Germans in the fruitless effort to take Verdun in 1916. The same picture appears in Mussolini's squandering of his divisions in the 1941 campaign against Greece and in the Hitler-led final 1941 drive against Moscow. Not even the psychologist can say just how the balance must be established to ensure the commander the mental and spiritual robustness which remains far enough superior to shock to ensure full vigor in meeting his problems without at the same time blinding him to the folly of useless waste.

Physical Attributes

The physique of the successful commander must necessarily be on a par with the mental balance already indicated. Modern warfare may not demand the physical superiority which distinguished the tribal chieftain in the days of the single combat. It does, however, call for health, vigor, energy, physical courage—and in the eyes of many, for youth as well.[14] Ill health and the lack of physical reserve to rise superior to prolonged exertion and strain have doomed many a commander to failure in a crisis. Stonewall Jackson, physically exhausted by his exertions in the Valley Campaign [15] was never once able in the Seven Days' Battles of the Peninsular campaign to function with full effectiveness. Always dilatory in getting his command into action, he nullified whatever chance Lee might have had to destroy McClellan's Union Army. Day after day in that almost continuous action, Lee's chance to crush a major part of

[14] H. E. Eley, Army War College, lecture, *Leadership and Morale in War,* 1940.

[15] O. L. Spaulding, *The United States Army,* New York, Putnam, 1937, pp. 276–277.

the Union force was frustrated by Jackson's delays in getting into action. Fatigue, in short, was responsible for setting the low-water mark in Jackson's brief and brilliant career as a military commander. Napoleon's later years were marked by similar slumps. On the retreat from Moscow the Russian winter sapped his vitality quite as severely as it did the Nazi physical reserve in the 1941–1942 winter campaign in Russia. Long before Napoleon reached the Beresina his personal escape had become the dominant consideration in his mind. Lacking again were the physical and mental vigor in the hours when Napoleon was making his last desperate efforts to retrieve his fortunes at Waterloo. The Napoleon of Ulm and Jena would have attacked Wellington in the early morning. An older and wearier Napoleon waited for hours while, unknown to him, Blücher's Prussians were marching to Wellington's assistance. And at the moment when the final charges of the French gave promise of at last breaking the British squares, Blücher's van came over the skyline to strike Napoleon's flank and drive him into oblivion.

The Age Factor

General Georg Wetzell, a leading Nazi military commentator, sees the commander as one who keeps "himself and his staff constantly on the move." [16] Most of his hours are spent with the troops at the front rather than at a desk in a distant headquarters. At the spot where the main blow is to be delivered this commander must appear, in Wetzell's opinion, at the opportune moment to assume personal command. The program Wetzell contemplates would tax the strongest vitality to the utmost. That his views, expressed shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, are generally accepted in Nazi military circles is apparent from the heavy casualties among German officers of highest rank. The mechanized units have been particularly hard hit in that respect. Indeed, only by remaining with his combat elements is it possible for the com-

[16] Farago, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

mander of mechanized forces to retain any degree of personal control over operations.

The prescription would appear to call not merely for health and vigor but for youth as well. For any such argument history furnishes abundant examples. The most ardent advocates of a military youth movement in the appointment of officers to the highest commands invariably ignore the successes registered by leaders who were well past the prime of life, while emphasizing the stodginess of Frederick's all but senile veterans who went down before Napoleon's attack at Jena. By contrast the commanders of the seven German armies which all but broke the resistance of the Western Allies in the opening phase of the First World War ranged in age from 65 (von Bülow) to 78 (von Heeringen).[16a] The riposte to that statement is obvious—those oldsters failed to attain their major objective, the destruction of the French army. That failure, however, is not chargeable to lack of vigor on the part of the army commanders, but rather to the progressive emasculation of the original plan by the German High Command over a period of years. German superiority was lacking as a result at the decisive moment and place. Hindenburg, recalled from retirement, was 67 at Tannenberg, the scene of his greatest triumph. Mackensen was 66 when he succeeded in his great break-through at Gorlice. Von Moltke was 70 at Sedan. Along with Marshals Foch and Joffre, these men would have been denied active service in the army of the United States under the law which makes retirement compulsory at 64. The lower age brackets do, however, furnish their share of the great captains of history. Marlborough, Robert E. Lee, and Ludendorff were in or near their middle fifties at the time of their pre-eminence. Marlborough, however, was 61 at the time of his most admired maneuver, the forcing of the Ne Plus Ultra lines. Wellington and Grant achieved their greatest successes while in their forties. Their ages were still a far cry from those of striplings like Alexander of Macedon, Hannibal, and Charles XII.

[16a] The nominal rank given the German Crown Prince, the Crown Prince of Bavaria, and Duke Albrecht of Würtemberg as army commanders is ignored in this statement.

From the day of Prussia's ascendancy under Frederick II to the present, a period in which German commanders have repeatedly been outstanding exponents of the military art, the selections for high command have emphasized demonstrated capacity and vigor. In his *Feldherr und Feldherrntum,* Colonel Theobold von Schaefer covers the point with the following comment: [17]

> Today there is more of a call for young officers and commanders than at any time in the past. However, young officers often lack knowledge and experience, as well as the respect and confidence of their subordinates. Also young officers are bound to grow older during the interim periods of peacetime. The question then arises whether the men who have trained the army, who have contrived and worked out its plans, should be replaced by younger men when the war breaks out. One glance at any such suggestion is enough to reject it.

The point is well illustrated in our own service by the performance of General Douglas MacArthur, in his sixty-third year.

Fear and Courage

Physical courage is a quality taken for granted in a soldier.[18] In the popular mind it is too often confused with that negative characteristic, the complete absence of fear. As Marshal Foch and others have commented, the man who has had real battle experience and subsequently declared that he felt no fear is lying. It is the triumph over the instinctive recoil from brutal death or maiming in combat which marks true courage in the soldier. Lefebvre, one of Napoleon's marshals, living in comfortable retirement found himself annoyed by the repeated expressions of envy from a civilian friend. Taking him into the garden he offered him his military decorations, his house, and all his other possessions—on one condition: "Let me take ten shots at you at forty paces. If you survive you can have all this which you crave." When the friend objected, the old marshal remarked, "All right, let us have no more of this talk

[17] Farago, *op. cit.,* pp. 147–148. Copyright, 1942, by the Committee for National Morale and reprinted by permission of Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., publishers.
[18] Eley, *op. cit.;* Wavell, *op. cit.,* lecture 1.

—but remember that I had several hundred shots fired at me at that range before I got all this."

Moral Strength in the Leader

In all these leaders the military student finds a central core of moral strength which permits the individual to rise above vicissitude, disaster, or triumph to remain his own master within the sphere allotted to him. The true commander must make his own decisions and abide by them. He can never be party to a council of war,[19] where collective opinion, often a weak compromise between the divergent views of the participants, becomes the basis of action. Instead he counts on his staff to provide the information on which his decision and plan of action are based. At the proper moment the staff outlines to him all available data on the enemy's troops and dispositions as well as corresponding data on his own troops. The status of his personnel and supply is shown, along with all other details pertinent to the task in hand. A recommendation for action may be, usually is, forthcoming. The decision, however, and the general plan for its execution, are the function of the commander. Once given, even though it may run completely counter to the views of the staff, it becomes the mandate for full and loyal execution by all units within the command. The necessary orders are transmitted to all subordinate elements by the staff. Execution thereafter is practically automatic in a veteran, battle-tested organization. The German General Staff study of the Franco-Prussian War, in its description of the operations at Sedan, comments that "The execution of the battle resulted so completely from the preceding operations that not a single order from the Army Commander was necessary during the battle to insure uniformity of action." [20]

Less happy is the situation of the commander of a relatively inexperienced organization. It is not merely a matter of exercising personal supervision over all major details, but the

[19] Burnod, *op. cit.*, maxim 65, p. 122; Wavell, *op. cit.*, lecture 1; Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War*, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1862, p. 58.

[20] Farago, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

necessity of responding to every crisis, anticipated or not, with immediate decisions and prompt directives. Such a situation faced Major General J. T. Dickman, commanding the United States Third Division at the bend of the Marne when Ludendorff launched his long-heralded *Friedensturm* in July, 1918. In the early hours of the German attack, the French divisions which had covered both flanks of the Americans withdrew several miles. Dickman's men, defending in three directions, at once were isolated and in danger of being surrounded. Sure of the quality of his green troops, Dickman not only decided to hold his ground but even sent detachments from his artillery to man the 75's which had been abandoned by the French in their withdrawal. By nightfall no living German remained south of the Marne on the Third Division's front. A commander of weaker moral fiber would have withdrawn at least far enough to make his front conform with that of the French. A better known instance of a reserve of moral strength is that of Marshal Joffre. His imperturbable calm in the gravest crises gave confidence not only to those in immediate contact with him but was transmitted down to the last *poilu*. Out of that confidence was born the counteroffensive which swept back the Germans at the very hour when final victory was in the Kaiser's grasp.

Daring as Opposed to Recklessness

Daring,[21] something of the spirit of the gambler, is one aspect of the true commander's moral strength. In good troops that quality of spirit pervades the entire organization. It leads the individual like Captain Colin Kelly to gamble with his bomber and his crew in order to blast a Japanese battleship out of existence. The commander gambles for far higher stakes, risking not only his troops, but in some instances the safety of his country as well. Hannibal's fourteen-year gamble in the plains of Italy, too far prolonged, left his capital finally at the Roman's mercy. Carthage, as a result, was blotted out of existence.

[21] Burnod, *op. cit.*, maxim 18, p. 49; Wavell, *op. cit.*

The daring of the commander must, after all, be based on sound calculations. It aims to catch the enemy by surprise, striking him where he is most vulnerable and defeating him before he in turn can capitalize on the weaknesses which the attacker must incur in order to have sufficient strength at the decisive point. A perfect illustration is Lee's maneuver leading to the Battle of Chancellorsville, when he faced Hooker's entire Union Army with nothing more than a thin screen of troops, while Stonewall Jackson swept around Hooker's right flank to strike and crush it before Hooker could take proper countermeasures.[22] Napoleon's comment on this spirit of adventure in the commander is: "If the art of war consisted merely in not taking risks, glory would be at the mercy of very mediocre talents." He used to ask whether a general was "lucky." Actually, he meant "bold." As Wavell remarks: "A bold general may be lucky, but no general can be lucky unless he is bold. The general who allows himself to be bound and hampered by regulations is unlikely to win a battle."

The time, place, and conditions under which great risks are to be taken in the gamble for a smashing victory are vital elements in the decision. Instances will occur when the choice lies between a desperate gamble and the resort to passive defense which can lead only to final defeat. Faced with that alternative, Napoleon elected to take the offensive which ended on the field of Waterloo. The reverse occurred when Mustapha Kemal turned on the Greeks, openly challenging the British Empire, and finished by winning back much of what Turkey had surrendered under the Treaty of Sèvres. In both these instances an entire nation and all its resources were gambled on the chance of victory. A similar course by the high command under conditions where time and future production assure the progressive development of vastly greater fighting power is folly. The commander in such a case has under his control no more than the advance guard of the nation's ultimate fighting forces. More than that, these fighting forces are the nucleus of the ultimate national combat potential. Temporarily faced by stronger

[22] Spaulding, *op. cit.*, pp. 292–297.

enemy forces, he cannot afford to risk the great gamble of the general offensive, when a defeat may spell irretrievable disaster or, at best, a long delay in building up the strength necessary for final victory.

The decision in such cases calls for a commander of the strongest moral fiber, particularly if the spirit of the nation behind him does not take kindly to a strategy of defense. Neither McDowell nor President Lincoln could resist that spirit in 1861.[23] Bull Run was the result. Fabius Cunctator "of whom every right-minded Roman spoke with scorn," George Washington, and Nathaniel Greene in his campaign in the Carolinas, all had to endure the obloquy of their countrymen in order to hold to the one course that offered any chance of victory.

Administrative Skill

Administrative knowledge and skill—the French call it *le sens du praticable*—ranks high in the qualifications for superior command.[24] Moreover, every advance in the application of technology to warfare places a heavier burden on the commander. It may be noted that, whereas some five thousand separate items made up the equipment of a battalion in 1918, that figure has been increased by more than tenfold today. It is not to be expected that the commander will have detailed knowledge of all these items. What he must have, however, is a sound understanding of what may be expected from his organization with the equipment provided: the rate at which the command can move by day and by night under all the varied conditions of terrain, weather, and available highway facilities; the fire power which can be developed by the individual elements of his command and by the collective whole; the rate of everything his command uses under camp, bivouac, marching, and battle conditions; the means and facilities for replacing the munitions and supplies which he is constantly using. For the bare statistics he can count on his staff and his subordinates if

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 252–254; Upton, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–246.

[24] Wavell, *op. cit.*; Eley, *op. cit.*; Phillips, *op. cit.*, pp. 295, 357–362, 430–431.

they have been properly trained. It is the commander's function to translate such figures into terms of fighting power. Hitler, in a peevish moment thrusting his military commanders aside, drew up his own equation of German striking power and ordered the final 1941 drive on Moscow. Whatever *sens du praticable* he had shown before, it was lacking at that moment.

Knowledge of the powers and limitations of the forces under his immediate control is but one element in the commander's book of requirements. Mechanized war puts a steadily increasing premium on knowing what can be done with the co-operating elements of sea and air power. Lacking such understanding and facing an enemy who employs all elements of land, sea, and air power to develop a blow of maximum effectiveness, the commander may well be defeated before the first shot is fired. The Gamelin school of French strategists, blind to the destructive possibilities of modern fire power, complacently trusting in the strength of fixed defenses to ward off any offense which Germany might launch, illustrate the point. With their contempt of de Gaulle's theory of attack with mechanized forces, a theory which the Nazis promptly adopted, the Gamelins of France doomed their country from the outset.

The commander's mental burden does not begin and end on the battlefield. He cannot rest content with being merely a super technician, limited to a knowledge of his men, their training, their tools and their employment in the campaign. For the subordinate general who is to remain a subordinate, such technical knowledge may be enough. For one who aspires to high command, a sound understanding of economics, politics, economic geography, international relations, psychology—particularly as it applies to the problems of propaganda—must be secured. To that list must be added now the all-embracing subject with the newly-coined name geopolitics, covering as it does all the factors which combine to make up the combat potential, present and future, of the separate nations. So equipped, the commander is in a position to discharge his role as military adviser to the state. Without such knowledge his estimates may become guess work, his recommendations, gambles.

Relations between Civil and Military Elements

We are now brought to the always vexing point of the relations between the civil and military elements of the state.[25] Occasionally a Frederick, Napoleon, or Alexander may combine those functions within himself. The more frequent picture is one of an uneasy relationship in which neither the civil nor military element is sure of its ground and both show tendencies to invade the province of the other. Democratic theory, particularly as evidenced in United States history, looks on the military element as one concerned only with the execution of policy, never with its making. The rule applies to wartime as well as peacetime. The theoretical corollary accords to the military in time of war complete freedom in execution, unhampered by civilian political interference. General Pershing's success in the development and handling of the American Expeditionary Force is largely due, as he declares, to the absence of interference from Washington and the support given him by President Wilson.

General Georg Wetzell, writing in 1939,[26] spoke for an influential element of the German army when he expressed the following view:

> In time of war the military commander alone fulfills the will of the statesman. Therefore, since the military commander must subordinate himself to the head of the state (statesman) with regard to the dynamic and decisive policy in peace and its objectives in war, the head of the state accordingly must subordinate himself to the military commander in so far as the accomplishment of the military victory is concerned. Without this condition the policy cannot achieve its crowning success in war. In order to attain this co-ordination of the political and military aims and actions in war, it is necessary that in time of peace the head of the state approve the operations draft in principle."

Hitler's solution for the issue created by army leaders who held to Wetzell's views was to elect himself commander-in-chief

[25] Wavell, *op. cit.*, lecture 3; Farago, *op. cit.*, pp. 154–155.

[26] Farago, *op. cit.*, p. 154. Copyright, 1942, by the Committee for National Morale, and reprinted by permission of Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., publishers.

in immediate charge of military operations. How far his essay at the Napoleonic role will carry remains to be seen.

The merits of this issue cannot be debated here; what is important is the necessity on the part of the superior commander and his staff to come forward both in war and peace with clear and full recommendations in any matter touching the nation's fighting power. Such knowledge cannot be gained on the drill ground or from the training manual. To master it the soldier who aspires to high command must carry his search for knowledge through the schools which the military service makes available, and supplement that substantially by graduate study in civilian institutions. True, without such knowledge he may still aspire to high command and even attain final distinction for want of better material to fill the top rungs in the military hierarchy. If so, whatever his rank, he will not be in a position to discharge his proper function as military adviser to the head of the state.

Personal Leadership in the Commander

The elements which combine to make the art of generalship, as listed in the foregoing discussion, represent a total which few men have ever boasted. Possessing them all, a commander will still fall short of his goal unless he is by nature a leader. Civilians and soldiers alike, having given the most serious study to the development of this attribute, admit finally that unless the individual begins with a positive congenital basis for leadership, little can be hoped for from schooling. What is more to the point, no psychologist has yet come forward with a formula which clearly indicates how leadership is to be inculcated. Of necessity, the armed services have gone further than any civilian educational group in that respect. Every service school devotes at least a moderate amount of attention to leadership instruction. And in ratings given every army officer in his annual efficiency report (made out by his immediate superior) is the all-important heading "leadership." The officer whose record does not show consistently "excellent" or "superior" ratings in

that item has no hope of attaining high command in a combat unit. But even with all this emphasis, the course of instruction which will show a man how to become a great leader has yet to be brought into being.

The difficulties are many. Even a glance at the historical examples of great military leaders of the past indicates that the range of their personalities, techniques of control, and methods of dealing with their subordinates run the entire gamut from the stern, unapproachable, and occasionally the tyrannical type to the easy-going individual who makes his soldiers feel that he is one of them. (In fact, the German solution of that problem has all but effected the transition from the former to the latter type in the period which separates the Nazi commanders from the Kaiser's officers of the First World War.) In this confusion, instruction in leadership becomes largely negative, emphasizing what to avoid rather than what to do. At the same time instruction stresses the objective, leaving it to the officer to use the varied assets of his native personality in attaining the desired end.

What is clear above all is that the leader must enjoy the confidence of his men. They must feel instinctively that he will accomplish the utmost possible without unnecessary squandering of their lives. Sure in that belief, they can be launched into any attack, however hazardous, or if need be they will resist to the last in whatever sacrifice mission is assigned them. Such use of the troops, however, is quite different from the "wasting" of their lives, as Frederick callously remarks. Confidence is at the same time quite apart from popularity. Wellington was never popular with his troops. The same may be said of Frederick II, Kitchener, Ludendorff, U. S. Grant, Washington, and to a degree, of Pershing. Yet every one of them enjoyed the full confidence of the men he sent into battle. On the other hand Marlborough, Robert E. Lee, Napoleon, Benedict Arnold in the days of the glory which preceded his treason, Gustavus Adolphus, and today Rommel and Douglas MacArthur must be rated as popular with their men.

One characteristic all these men had in common. Their sol-

diers knew that they would not only be well led in battle but that everything would be done throughout the campaign to provide as promptly and fully as possible for their everyday needs. Their feeding, their shelter in camp and bivouac, and everything else pertaining to their comfort were given the commander's unremitting attention. Hardships are relatively easy to endure when the soldier knows that everything possible is being done by his superiors to mitigate them. Fortunate is the commander who can gracefully add the personal touch in his intimate contacts with his men. Lee, stopping to give a word of sympathy to a wounded soldier; Napoleon, singling out a private by name to give a word of praise for some deed of courage in action; Pershing, stopping in his review of a unit drawn up for his inspection to express his commendation of some soldier whose medal spoke of a job well done—these men established a personal contact which firmly cemented the tie between the commander and his men. On the other hand the effort to establish such contact may lead to unexpected results. Wavell relates the incident of Allenby speaking to a soldier sitting on a trench step, earnestly engaged in extracting cooties from his undershirt. "Well, picking them out, I see," remarked the general. "No, sir," replied the man without looking up, "just taking them as they come."

Whatever the formula or technique adopted by the commander, it must be real, not sham. Underneath the system must lie the feeling that these men are the leader's charges in the bloody business of life and death, victory or defeat. The sacrifices demanded of them from their first day of training to their last battle must be grounded on the concept that they will be asked wisely and to a sound end. There is no room for the cannon-fodder theory, the waste of energy and men. That theory may be good enough, when combined with a nationwide fanaticism, to bring early victories; it has never stood up to the test of prolonged vicissitude and disaster. Integrally it violates every decent human instinct, dooming itself from the outset to failure in the long run. For the long war and in preparation for the peace to follow which must bind up the wounds of

war, dependence of the leader must rest on a stronger bond, something that enduringly grips the soldier's heart and not merely his disciplined reflexes. That, at least, is the *democratic* concept of true leadership.

QUESTIONS

1. Define "generalship" in its military sense.
2. (*a*) Distinguish between "leadership" and "generalship." (*b*) Classify roughly various types of leaders, indicating which is generally found in a peacetime army; in a wartime army.
3. What difficulties does a democracy normally face in securing high-quality leadership at the outbreak of war?
4. State the advantages of exercising command in battle operations from a safe command post relatively distant from the fighting front. What are the disadvantages of this procedure?
5. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of close control of battle operations by the commander.
6. "The mule that carried Prince Eugene's pack saddle through ten campaigns did not thereby become a better tactician." What are the implications of Frederick's comment?
7. To what extent, in your opinion, does actual battle experience develop the qualities of generalship? Support your comment with historical instances.
8. What is the function of the peacetime military staff school in preparing officers for wartime high command and staff duty?
9. What is your view of the idea that "youth must be served" in the selection of officers for high command?
10. What are the major attributes desirable in a commander?
11. In your opinion, is innate genius or campaign experience the major factor in the development of a general? Why?
12. What conditioning factors played their part in the development of such striplings as Alexander and Hannibal into military geniuses?
13. What are the principles of war? Which of these are illustrated by Forrest's "Git thar fustest with the mostest men"?
14. Cite several instances to show that callousness in the wasteful employment of manpower prevented a commander from attaining his objective or seriously interfered with its attainment.
15. Does modern war demand a higher degree of physical efficiency from the soldier than warfare a hundred years ago? Two thousand years ago? Discuss.
16. What is your opinion as to the legal retirement age (64) for United States Army officers?

17. Are physical fear and physical cowardice in a military leader (of any rank) synonymous? Discuss.

18. Under what circumstances does daring leadership become culpable recklessness?

19. To what extent, and how, in your opinion, should the military leaders in a democracy resist popular clamor for a line of action deemed unsound?

20. The power of military offense and defense is rarely in balance. Which, in your opinion, has the upper hand today? Illustrate by example.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. In modern war youth is an outstandingly important consideration in the selection of officers for high command.

2. "The most important qualification of the general is a clear head that estimates situations correctly, is not easily dazzled, and cannot be paralyzed by good news or bad."—Napoleon. Appraise this.

3. "Only one opinion should be presented to the commander [by his staff] for his examination, and only one man should be authorized to present it. A commander need only listen to the advice of different men of more or less intelligence, recognizing the well-founded objections of one and the qualifications of another, to face the combination of well-meaning measures."—Frederick II. In the light of the above comment discuss the council of war as opposed to the principle of independent decisions by the commander.

4. The "principles of war" have remained essentially unchanged since first developed by Sun Tzu, 505 B. C., even though their enunciation by military authors has been considerably modified. Discuss their application to modern mechanized warfare.

5. Frederick II, in his "General Principles of War," remarks that a general "must use his soldiers humanely, and yet on occasion must waste their lives." Discuss that precept from the standpoint of: (1) military efficiency as illustrated in the current war; (2) sociological consequences, both immediate and long-range.

6. Discuss the causes and the effects on the French Army and French nation of Nivelle's failure in the 1917 Aisne offensive.

7. Contrast Stonewall Jackson's generalship in the Valley Campaign of 1862 and in the Seven Days' Battles.

8. Consider the theory, advanced by many, that an all-out American offensive in the spring of 1942 would have been sound strategy. Discuss that strategy from the standpoint of the risks involved, the ob-

jectives to be gained, the military means available, and the possible effects on the final issue.

9. Demonstrate the increasing burden placed on the commander's administrative capacity in handling the problems of logistics, supply, and communications as a result of developments in military equipment. Consider four typical armies in your discussion: Genghis Khan, Napoleon, the First World War, the Second World War.

10. Discuss the personal, as contrasted with the technical, elements of military leadership. Among others, consider the following commanders: Joshua, Alexander, Genghis Khan, the Duke of Wellington, George Washington, Robert E. Lee, U. S. Grant, G. B. McClellan, Ferdinand Foch, John J. Pershing.

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CHAPTER 12

SEA POWER IN MODERN WAR

The Purpose of Navies

Of all the elements of military strength, that which is covered by the term "sea power" has been most often misinterpreted and misevaluated. A generation ago this term had an almost magical ring. Sea power was something that determined the course of empire and history, something that was inevitably decisive in war. The frequent citation of Mahan's books by people who often did not bother to read them perpetuated a legend which was on the whole erroneous. Today, on the contrary, popular opinion has swung over to the conviction that sea power is an obsolescent force in war and in world politics. The marvelous accomplishments of military aircraft have given rise to the feeling that the airplane and the warship are inevitably competitive in their functions, and that in this competition the warship is bound to succumb.

But sea power has never meant merely warships. It has always meant the sum total of those sea-going instruments, land installations, and geographical circumstances that enable a nation *to control transportation over the seas during wartime.* The ultimate aim of almost all naval operations is ability to determine the movements of the lowly freighters or transports in which are carried nearly all the commodities and the men that move across the sea. In so far as the airplane plays an essential part in such control, it is functioning as an instrument of sea power. If in the future the transfer of men and commodities across the seas becomes unimportant in war, or if the greater part of ocean transport is carried by aircraft rather than by ships, sea power as we have known it will cease to have meaning.

As a matter of fact, several important wars in modern times have been decided against the side which controlled the seas. The two wars in which France was defeated by Germany, those of 1870–1871 and of 1940, are examples, and France came within a hair's breadth of being defeated also in 1914. A short, overwhelming campaign of one land power against its neighbor is likely to be little affected by the fact that one side has the opportunity, denied to the other, of importing commodities and manpower from overseas. In our own time we have seen Germany store up such vast quantities of materials that she remained relatively unaffected for more than two years of war by the blockade raised against her.

On the other hand, *Blitzkriegs* sometimes misfire, and when contending armies bog down in an enduring stalemate during which they continue to expend munitions, supplies, and manpower on a vast scale, the factor of sea power tends to become of steadily increasing weight in the balance of decision. All the great wars of the last century and a half—the Napoleonic Wars, the Civil War in the United States, and the First World War—were influenced decisively by the fact that one side was able to avail itself of ocean transportation and to deny that privilege to its enemy. And in the year 1942, with fighting fronts scattered over the globe and nations using their military resources on a colossal scale, the tremendous role of sea power has again been impressed upon us.

The conviction that aircraft will replace ships as the major means of transportation across the seas has been urged by some writers.[1] It would of course be foolish to say that such a change is impossible. But it should be remembered that nations at war inevitably rely for the most part upon channels of communication that have been developed during peace. There is not time to build up a whole new transportation system. The freighters that carry on the normal peacetime commerce of the world are pressed into duty as the carriers of the vital cargoes of war. Even if it were possible to build a vast fleet of great transport

[1] Loening, Grover, "Ships Over the Sea," *Foreign Affairs*, 20:3 (April, 1942), pp. 489–502.

planes in which most of the commerce of the world could be carried, that task would be too big to complete during a war, and it is doubtful whether nations would be willing to support such an expensive system during peacetime. So long, therefore, as the airplane is a far more costly means of transportation than the surface vessel, and it definitely seems fated to remain so,[2] we may confidently expect to see the major part of the world's commerce carried on in ships.

The airplane, far from diminishing the importance of shipping, has in fact added to its burdens. For even if the airplanes themselves can be flown across oceans—the smaller types for the present cannot—their fuel, ammunition, spare parts, ground crews, and the food and other commodities needed to sustain the personnel can be carried to advanced bases only in ships. This change simply reflects the general increase in the quantity and complexity of the equipment used in modern war, and the effect of this increased complexity is to make control of the sea lanes in wartime more important than ever before.

The vehicles of ocean transportation must be considered as an essential part of sea power. A navy without a merchant marine is like a locomotive without cars behind it. The lone locomotive represents power, but power without functional meaning. Lack of ocean carriers makes the sea as much a barrier as does a superior hostile fleet—more so in some cases, for a hostile fleet may frequently be evaded but the consequences of a shortage of shipping cannot be evaded. The nation that possesses a strong navy but a weak merchant marine may be able to deny the seas to the enemy, but unless it relies upon the shipping of other nations it will not be able to use the seas for its own purposes. The Second World War has been a sufficient lesson on the value of shipping in wartime, for the United Na-

[2] Even the efficient transport plane of the future which Mr. Loening visualizes in the article cited above would consume, according to his estimates, 40,000 pounds of fuel to carry a load of 40,000 pounds of cargo a distance of 4,000 miles. Thus, one pound of expensive high octane gasoline would be consumed for every pound of cargo delivered. He computes also that the aircraft needed to replace a ship on any given route would cost five or six times as much as that ship. These are the figures of a man who is decidely sympathetic to the idea of aerial transportation.

tions' shortage of shipping has limited their offensive effort in every theater of the war.

In saying that sea power is intended to control transportation —or communications, as military men prefer to call it—over the seas during wartime, we mean specifically that it fulfills the following functions:

(*a*) It protects the transfer over water of armies and air forces to those points where they may be used effectively against the enemy. Such forces are usually brought to friendly shores for operations in nearby territories; but sometimes they are landed on a hostile coast.

(*b*) It also protects the transfer of the commodities of ordinary sea-borne trade, which include all the materials necessary in the production of armaments.

(*c*) It prevents the enemy from using the sea to transport his own armed forces, which means, among other things, that sea power defends one's own territories against invasion.

(*d*) It exerts economic pressure on the enemy by preventing him from importing overseas commodities which he lacks. This is popularly called "blockade," and in a long war it is bound to be of the greatest consequence. It prevents the enemy also from exporting products, the proceeds of which might be used either to pay for goods received from adjoining neutrals or for various services (propaganda and the like) performed abroad. The navy also throws as much strain as possible upon the enemy's internal transportation system by attacking the coastwise and other shipping which normally carries a portion of the burden.[3]

The only important use of the navy which falls outside the general classification of "control of communications" occurs when warships, including aircraft carriers, are utilized to bombard land objectives. The great fire power incorporated in the guns and aircraft of a fleet can be exploited not only in cover-

[3] During peacetime a major part of the commerce between Germany and Italy is carried on by ships that pass round the Iberian Peninsula. The stoppage of this transportation by Great Britain naturally throws a severe burden on the railroads running between Germany and Italy. See R. W. B. Clarke, *Britain's Blockade,* Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 38.

ing a landing but also in co-operating with friendly armies already ashore, or simply in an independent assault upon enemy coastal installations. The British Mediterranean Fleet, for example, co-operated with General Wavell by bombarding Italian strongholds along the African coast during the British offensive of December, 1940, and during the same month it proceeded to an independent bombardment of Valona.[4] Again in July, 1942, the British fleet shelled Mersa Matruh when the Nazis had occupied it. Fleets will not be so used, however, if the risk involved threatens to impair their ability to perform their primary function. Battleships were conspicuously absent in most of the Japanese descents upon United Nations territory in the Far East—not because they were unfitted for such operations but because the Japanese had to save them for the more important function of countering the capital ships of United Nations fleets. They therefore contented themselves with the fire power of less powerful but also less valuable ships.

Navies thus have their offensive and defensive uses, which are always mutually supporting and usually undistinguishable. Denying the seas to the enemy is correctly regarded as an offensive activity, while the protection of one's own shipping is generally defensive in character, but the operation that denies the seas to the enemy incidentally defends one's own coasts against invasion, and the shipping that one strives to protect on the seas may be carrying an invasion force. Blockade is an important form of the naval offensive, though it is rarely regarded as such by the public, which is accustomed to thinking of the offensive in much more active terms. This confusion is partly due to the fact that people do not readily distinguish between tactics and strategy in warfare.

The Strategy of Naval War

The term "tactics" refers simply to fighting, to the brief interludes when opposing forces are in contact. "Strategy," on the other hand, refers to the whole basic conduct of a war, to the

[4] See Gilbert Cant, *The War at Sea,* New York, John Day, 1942, pp. 189–192.

dispositions of strength which enable a navy to fulfill the purposes for which it exists.[5] Strategy is the more inclusive concept, since a battle is simply a crisis situation in a strategic operation. Strategic considerations may sometimes demand that battle be avoided even when the enemy forces are inferior to one's own, and on the other hand they may demand that a warship seek action and fight to the finish even when hopelessly outclassed. In other words, one never fights simply for the sake of fighting but to attain certain ends.

Naval strategy is determined by its objectives, by the characteristics of the implements used, and by the attributes of the domain on which naval war is waged. Since all these differ greatly from the determinants of war on land, we must expect maritime strategy to differ materially from the strategy of land warfare, although of course a few ideas are common to both.[6] The purpose of naval operations is on the whole much more limited than that of land warfare; as a rule, navies exist chiefly to aid and sustain armies and air forces, and these latter achieve the final decision. The warship has no counterpart among the tools of land warfare for mobility and tactical and strategical independence. Finally, the sea has none of the terrestrial complexities of land. It has no roads, mountains, forests, or rivers, no centers of population or industry. It is only a flat waste to be crossed.

In war at sea there can therefore be no "fronts," no lines held by one side and besieged or attacked by the other. A body of water cannot be occupied as land areas are occupied. And yet, surprisingly enough, one finds during most great wars that certain important maritime areas have a considerable ocean traffic from which one of the two opposed sides is almost entirely excluded. In such a case, the side that enjoys the advantage is said to be in "command of the sea" in the area where that situation exists.

Command of the sea thus means simply that the effort to

[5] See A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783,* Boston, Little, 1890, p. 8.

[6] Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy,* London, Longmans, 1919, pp. 139–145.

control communications in a particular maritime area has been on the whole successful. The side enjoying command may be suffering losses from raiders of various types, but so long as those losses are not on a decisive scale the term command is applicable.[7] Where neither side can use the sea without excessive cost, or where both sides can use it even though at some peril, the sea is not commanded but in dispute. Disputed rather than commanded seas are normal in war, and the naval side of a conflict is usually aimed at establishing and maintaining command in the areas of chief importance.

It should be observed that one belligerent may command one area while its opponent commands another. In the summer of 1942, for example, the United States enjoyed command in the eastern portion of the Pacific while Japan commanded the western portion, and between the two controlled areas there was a considerable section of the ocean which was in dispute. The United Nations' program for winning the war necessarily included the wresting of command of the western Pacific from the Japanese. Similarly, Great Britain and the United States enjoyed command of the Atlantic, and upon their maintaining that command against various threats, particularly from Axis U-boats, depended the whole outcome of the war in Europe and ultimately in Asia as well.

The number of warships and aircraft available to a belligerent is inevitably limited, and the problem is one of disposing available fighting craft in such a manner as to secure and exercise command. How is this done? Obviously one cannot protect one's own shipping merely by convoying, because a fleet dispersed into numerous convoy escorts is nowhere strong. An enemy fleet, even if much weaker, could by concentrating its strength overcome any of the convoy-escorting warships it might encounter. Such a concentrated fleet would also over-

[7] See Bernard Brodie, *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy*, Princeton, University Press, 1942, chap. 4. Some writers, impressed by the heavy losses to submarines in presumably commanded seas, have expressed impatience with the doctrine of "command," which they consider old-fashioned. The fact is, however, that the exactions of the old surface raiders were at least comparable to those of the submarine today. See also Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, Princeton, Univerity Press, 1941, pp. 103 f., 329 f.

come any of the patrolling cruisers engaged in stopping its shipping, and one's efforts to control communications would end in failure.

The remedy for this situation is at once apparent. The concentrated force of the enemy must be countered by a similarly concentrated force of one's own that is capable of defeating it in battle. This idea is commonly spoken of as the "principle of concentration," and the force which is retained for this purpose is usually spoken of as the "battle fleet." The battle fleet of a navy usually contains all its battleships, but various other types of warships, including aircraft carriers, will have their part in it, and in some areas land-based aircraft will supplement the battle fleet in its work or sometimes even replace it altogether.

The object of the battle fleet is to stand prepared at all times to bring the enemy fleet to action if it puts to sea. If that fleet can be destroyed so much the better, but the mere threat of destruction will often be enough to keep the enemy at home or at least out of those seas where he can do significant damage. If his force is clearly inferior, he will be anxious to avoid action, and that anxiety may greatly limit the amount of damage he can do. In both World Wars, the British fleet based on Scapa Flow in the Orkney Islands has pretty effectively denied the German battle fleet access to the Atlantic. In the First World War, the German battle fleet made no attempt to enter the Atlantic, and the fate of the *Bismarck* in 1941 is an indication of what is likely to happen to those German battleships that seek to raid in that area.[8]

The battle fleet that threatens the enemy fleet with interception and possible destruction if he slips too far away from his base is providing a cover to the convoys and the patrolling cruisers that operate independently of it. The convoy escorts and cruisers may operate against enemy raiders of all kinds, especially submarines, and against enemy shipping, without the

[8] Paul Schubert, *Sea Power in Conflict,* New York, Coward, 1942, pp. 202–218.

constant fear of being set upon by a vastly superior force. This kind of cover is termed "general cover" to distinguish it from the "close cover" that escort warships offer to the convoys they are attending.[9]

Naturally, whether a system of general cover will really provide protection depends entirely on the degree of likelihood that interception will take place if the enemy attacks. This in turn depends on geographical circumstances. A fleet based on North America would have a difficult time keeping a large European fleet out of the Atlantic, but one based on the British Isles is able to do so with relative ease. To command a certain sea the superior fleet must thus have a base which is on the side of the sea nearest the enemy. It can readily be seen that a fleet based on Pearl Harbor can never command the western Pacific. In order to command that region it must use its superiority to wrest from the enemy bases more favorably situated. If it lacks the strength to seize such bases, it must be content with long-range raiding operations, which are hardly likely to be conclusive.

It should be observed that if the enemy fleet is so inferior as not to care to challenge it, a battle fleet may assert and maintain command of a sea without firing a shot. During the First World War, the British Grand Fleet had only one inconclusive action with the German High Seas Fleet. Because of the relative inactivity of British battleships, that type of vessel fell greatly in popular esteem. Yet upon British battle-fleet superiority depended that command of the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel which enabled the Allies to win the war. Similarly, when the Japanese were carrying out their invasions of Malaya and the East Indies, their battle fleet, which seemed superficially to have no part in the activity, was standing poised somewhere in the North Pacific ready to intervene if the United States had sent a substantial naval force to the Far East. It

[9] Captain Russell Grenfell makes a somewhat different distinction, that between "general cover" and "full cover," but the latter is roughly comparable to the close cover of convoy escorts. See his *Art of the Admiral,* London, Faber, 1937, pp. 37–38.

was the temporary inability of the United States fleet to defeat that Japanese fleet that prevented the United States from sending the forces necessary to stop the Japanese in their tracks.

The Defense of Shipping

The defense of shipping is of course an integral part of naval strategy, but owing to its importance in modern warfare it is necessary to consider it separately. Command of the sea does not exclude the likelihood that the enemy will have substantial means of inflicting damage upon one's commerce or that he will lose any opportunity to do so. It simply means that the "main body" of his naval forces is accounted for, which is important enough, but it nevertheless leaves a great many problems.

The inferior enemy who has lost or forfeited command in a particular sea is unable to operate his own shipping there, but he will attempt to send individual raiders of all kinds into that area—surface, submarine, and aerial—in order to deny at least in part to his opponent that which has been denied completely to himself. This form of strategy is a very old one in naval warfare and has been labeled the strategy of the *guerre de course* (war of the chase). It should be observed that even before the days of the airplane and submarine, individual raiders were able to get onto the high seas and inflict heavy damage on the adversary even when their own home ports were fairly tightly blockaded. In the War of 1812 United States ships raided British commerce while Great Britain was maintaining a blockade of United States ports,[10] and in the Civil War the *Alabama* and other Confederate vessels operated against Union commerce even while Union warships had completely surrounded the coasts of the Confederacy. In neither case were the raiders really challenging command; they were simply robbing their opponent of some of its fruits.

In modern times the airplane and especially the submarine

[10] A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812*, London, 1905, vol. 1, p. 398.

have made the exercise of command far more difficult than formerly. Depredations of German U-boats in both World Wars have been so extensive that some strategists have been driven to draw distinctions between "surface command" and "subsurface command." There is little need for such word play, for so long as one combatant's shipping continues to ply an ocean from which its enemy's shipping is totally absent, the former is in command of that sea. The enemy's U-boats are simply raiders that must be countered by methods essentially comparable to those with which other raiders are countered.

The enemy raider is out to attack not one's warships but the slow, vulnerable freighter, and that militarily unimpressive object must be ready with the aid of its escorts to repel or evade attacks from submarines, airplanes, motor torpedo boats, cruisers, and mines. The techniques adopted for the direct defense of shipping naturally depend upon the type of enemy attack that is most feared, the resources available for meeting it, and the character of the shipping defended. Protection required against submarines differs from that against surface raiders, and both may differ markedly from that most useful against aircraft. The enemy will not announce in advance how or where he intends to attack. Since resources for defense are bound to be limited, one must distribute them properly to secure the maximum effectiveness.

One type of protection to shipping is the "general cover," discussed above. It represents the most economical use of a limited number of powerful warships. To be sure, it is effective only against the enemy's surface forces, and it is therefore easy to dismiss as unimportant in an era when the major part of shipping losses are due not to surface warships but to submarines, to aircraft, and to mines. But the fact that losses to one kind of menace are low means not that it is trifling but well under control. The surface warship is potentially far more dangerous against shipping than any other type of craft. And it must not be forgotten that without the general cover of a battle fleet, general convoying and antisubmarine measures in a region like the North Atlantic would be totally impossible.

Another technique for the protection of shipping is evasive routing. During peacetime, shipping generally follows certain well-known lanes across the oceans, and raiders would only have to sit astride those lanes in order to sweep in their victims. But during wartime the routes fan out considerably and are varied from trip to trip. The immensity of the sea is thus one of the first elements in the defense of commerce.[11]

However, general cover and evasive routing are not enough. Some fighting power must be attached directly to the merchant ships. The first step in that direction is the arming of the ships themselves with five-inch or six-inch guns and smaller anti-aircraft armament. The guns make it highly dangerous for any submarine to expose itself on the surface in daylight within range. That obviously does not protect a vessel from torpedo attack, but it does force the submarines to use up their slender supply of torpedoes and to maneuver into positions much closer to the target than would be necessary if the attack were made by gunfire. Owing to the low submerged speed of a submarine, close approach for torpedo attack is not always easy.

A convoy of a dozen or more vessels, each armed with a six-inch gun, represents a considerable concentration of fire, which means that the armament is helpful against lighter surface raiders as well as submarines. The concentration of anti-aircraft armament is also useful against enemy air attack, especially if it is coupled with mobile balloon barrages. But most effective against the air menace are the fighter planes mounted on catapults. When first used by the British in the autumn of 1941, they reduced losses from enemy aircraft to 8 per cent of what they had been in the previous spring. At that time German bombers were running a close second to U-boats in the destruction of shipping, but by the end of 1941 sinkings from planes had been reduced, on the trans-Atlantic route at least, to relatively insignificant proportions.

The chief defense against attacks on shipping, however, is found in the armed escort. The best counter to the surface raider is naturally a warship of greater power, and in both

[11] Grenfell, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–50.

World Wars battleships and sometimes whole battle squadrons have occasionally been used as escorts to important convoys. The backbone of the modern antisubmarine escort is the quick, maneuverable destroyer with its depth charges and detecting apparatus. Unfortunately, up to the summer of 1942, there were in the United Nations fleets far too few destroyers and other escort vessels to implement sufficiently the defensive potentialities of the convoy system. This lack accounts for the very large losses suffered up to that time.

Convoy, which means simply the herding together of freighters in groups, chiefly for the purpose of economizing on escorts, has certain inherent drawbacks. Even when it completely eliminates losses to raiders, it very much reduces the usefulness of available shipping. Convoys must proceed at the speed of their slowest members; there are always delays in organizing the groups, and there is an alternate congestion and slackness at terminals that reduces the efficiency of unloading. It has been estimated that convoy on the trans-Atlantic route results in a reduction of shipping efficiency by at least 25 per cent, and in the coastwise shipping off the Atlantic seaboard of the United States the percentage is considerably higher. However, the only alternative to this loss is an appalling number of ship sinkings.[12]

The defense of shipping is a field of constantly shifting problems. The raiders change their locale of operations and their tactics almost from week to week, and each change demands an immediate readjustment in the tactics and strategy of defense. The nation which must protect a huge shipping in wartime can never sit back with the complacent belief that it has a menace under control, for that menace may lift its head anew in totally different form on the following day. Anchored mines are followed by magnetic mines, which are followed in turn by acoustic mines. Submarines are driven out of the narrow channels in the approaches to Great Britain, whereupon they use reconnaissance airplanes to find their prey on the broad seas. The Battle of the Atlantic and of all the seas on which shipping

[12] Sir Herbert Russell, *Sea Shepherds,* London, Murray, 1941.

must be defended is bound to endure from the first day of war to the last.

Sea-Borne Invasions

Before the Second World War the invasion of territories from the sea ("amphibious" or "combined" operations) was thought to be almost an obsolete form of war, yet we have since seen a succession of sea-borne invasions on a scale such as the world had never before witnessed. The great Japanese conquests in the Far East are the outstanding example, and the United Nations must duplicate them in the course of winning the war.

The land-based airplane has made invasion from the sea more difficult, but it has certainly not made it impossible. It is useless to talk about air forces keeping fleets out of coastal waters unless we consider both the fleets and the air forces in quantitative terms. Large defending air forces simply mean that larger fleets are necessary for attack and that those fleets must be defended with sufficient anti-aircraft armament and with considerable air power of their own.

The belligerent who controls the seas exercises a power hardly known in land warfare. He can concentrate an army in his own ports unseen. He can then transport that army to any selected point along hundreds or perhaps thousands of miles of enemy coastline, and his approach is not governed by mountains, valleys, or railroads, as on land. To confuse the enemy, landings will be made simultaneously at several places. Complete surprise is likely if the distance from the attacking base is short; if it is long, reconnaissance planes will probably sight the expedition, but that will not reveal to them the exact position of the intended landing. The Japanese failure at Midway in June, 1942, indicates not that this form of attack is likely to fail but only that the Japanese did not come in sufficient strength.

It should be noticed, however, that the success of a sea-borne invasion depends not merely on naval strength but on the land

strength available to follow it through. Such an operation is after all merely the use of a navy to initiate and supply a *land offensive*. In the summer of 1942 the prospects of an invasion of the European continent by United States and British forces depended chiefly on whether there was enough land and air power to transfer enough soldiers, arms, and supplies to the shores of France or Norway, and whether there was enough merchant shipping available not only to be able to support losses but also to establish those forces there with the necessary speed.[13]

The Constitution of Fleets

The military resources of any nation are bound to have limits, and it is incumbent upon the nation to allocate those resources wisely. They are first divided between land and sea forces and their respective air components. The United States has long since decided that rather than have a modest army and a modest navy it would do better to have a great navy and a small army. That decision was sound for many reasons, but chiefly because of the country's geographical situation and also because naval strength is much more slowly expanded than land strength.

Within the navy, however, there is the problem of dividing the available money and materials in such a way as to secure the maximum of all-weather, all-purpose fighting strength. This problem involves a balanced fleet, balanced in accordance with the soundest and yet the most advanced tactical and strategic theories of the time. Naturally, those theories cannot be tested until war comes, and the nation that has made the fewest mistakes has a tremendous advantage. Some adjustments can, however, be made during the course of the war, but one must remember that it is easy to misread the lessons of hostilities on the basis of superficial evidence and loose thinking. Close analysis of the lessons derived from actual combat is one of the most important duties of the military chieftains of a nation, and civilians would do well to remember that their own fund

[13] Brodie, *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy*, *cit. supra*, chap. 6.

of information is usually too limited to justify their exerting pressures that run counter to the considered judgment of those chieftains.

Combat weapons tend to be highly specialized. The battleship, which is simply the strongest fighting ship which it is feasible to build, is intended chiefly, perhaps solely, to fight its like among the vessels of the enemy. It has been considered in the past to be the most economical means, despite the high cost of individual units, of concentrating great fighting power. The battleship has been brought into the most undeserved disrepute, due chiefly to bias and a very superficial reading of news reports. Close analysis of events reveals clearly that the battleship has fared far better under air attack than any other kind of warship.[14] It is too often forgotten, also, that the battleship can continue to adjust itself to new conditions as it has done in the past.

The cruiser is a weapon of reconnaissance and pursuit, a means for exercising the command that battleships usually acquire. The destroyer is chiefly a torpedo and depth-charge vessel, indispensable in battle-fleet maneuvers but most useful of all as a defense against the submarine.

The aircraft carrier is the vessel in which the mobility peculiar to aircraft and that peculiar to warships are combined. Aircraft are highly mobile within the limits of their range, but their range is usually not great and their bases are not easily moved. Warships, on the other hand, are much more self-sufficient at sea and have far greater range. Thus, the carrier should be regarded not merely as a floating but as a mobile flying field. Strategically, however, it is proper to regard it as simply another warship whose chief weapons are not guns or torpedo tubes but airplanes.

The airplane has clearly revolutionized naval warfare, and has attained a position which could hardly have been anticipated as recently as a decade ago. Its marvelous accomplishments, however, both in reconnaissance and attack, have led to

[14] *Ibid.*, chap. 8.

broad generalizations and predictions that are hardly justified by the available facts. Like every other instrument of war, the airplane has its peculiar limitations, and commanders will derive a great deal more benefit from its use by recognizing those limitations than by denying them. The airplane lacks not merely the range but also the sea-keeping qualities of the warship, and it is hard to see how progress in the future can change that fact. It is far more limited by weather than is the warship, and its military load bears no comparison with that of the latter. The airplane is far more easily destroyed in battle than any other naval fighting craft. Its effectiveness against battleships depends largely on the effectiveness of the torpedo, and future battleships may be so constructed that the torpedo will have lost most of its sting. It is therefore wiser to consider the airplane as an instrument that is most useful in combination with surface ships rather than as one that is bound to drive out the warship.

Bases must be considered as an integral part of naval strength, since the military efficacy of ships and airplanes is determined largely by the position of the bases from which they operate and the facilities available at those bases. Many great campaigns both on land and sea are fought for the sake of capturing naval bases in order either to avail oneself of their use or at least to deny their use to the enemy. The technological developments in navies during the last hundred years have had the effects both of making the fleet more dependent upon its base and of limiting the number of sites that are available as fleet bases. These facts are naturally reflected not only in the conduct of wars but also in peacetime diplomacy. A United States government aware of the geographical realities of national defense would be aware not only of the value in the Pacific of such sites as Guam but above all of the key place that the British Isles play in our security—a place they hold as much by their position astride the sea lanes of the continent as by the strength and national characteristics of the British people.[15]

[15] See Forrest Davis, *The Atlantic System,* New York, Reynal, 1941.

QUESTIONS

1. Under what circumstances could sea power become an obsolete factor in war? Do we seem to be progressing in that direction at the present time?

2. Is it true that nations which have commanded the sea have invariably been victorious in war? Under what circumstances is sea power of little consequence?

3. Why is sea power more likely to be decisive in a long war than in a short one? Would it invariably be of small consequence in a *Blitzkrieg?*

4. What factors militate against the shift to the airplane as the basic means of transportation across the seas? Can you conceive how those factors might be overcome?

5. For the present, can we say that the airplane has diminished the burden upon shipping or decreased the importance of sea power in war?

6. Why is it proper to consider the merchant vessel as much a part of sea power as is the battleship?

7. In the old days the term blockade was applied only to a situation where a group of ships maintained a station just outside an enemy port. What meaning does the same term have today?

8. Distinguish between the economic and military uses of a navy.

9. It is an old axiom in naval strategy that a fleet should not be used against coastal fortifications while an enemy fleet remains in being. What is the reason for this?

10. Why is it so difficult to distinguish between the offensive and the defensive uses of a navy?

11. What is the distinction between tactics and strategy in naval warfare? Is the distinction between the two similar or different in land warfare?

12. Why should naval strategy differ materially from the strategy of land warfare?

13. What is the meaning of the expression "command of the sea"? Some writers regard it as an old-fashioned concept; do you see any reason why they should?

14. Why is the convoy system inadequate by itself for the defense of shipping?

15. What is the distinction between a battle fleet and a navy? What class of ships are particularly characteristic of the battle fleet?

16. Why would a battle fleet based on Pearl Harbor be unable to command the western Pacific? Where would a United States battle fleet be most effective in commanding the North Atlantic: Hampton Roads or Scapa Flow?

17. Several British battleships completed during the First World War never saw action against the enemy. Would you say they were useless on that account?

18. What are some of the procedures in the defense of shipping? Can you see any disadvantages in evasive routing? In convoy?

19. In what ways does sea-borne invasion differ from land invasion? Would you say that the successful German invasion of Crete by air makes sea-borne invasion less likely in the future?

20. Under what circumstances could a battleship perform functions impossible to aircraft?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Assess the influence of the invention of wireless on naval warfare.

2. Examine the consequences upon naval strategy of the great improvements in land transportation during the last hundred years.

3. Discuss the specific uses in which aircraft would be an advantageous form of ocean transport.

4. Report on consequences upon the location of naval bases of the recent developments in bomber aircraft.

5. Discuss docking problems in respect to the different categories of warships.

6. Report on naval aviation in the First World War.

7. Survey the effects of the Washington Peace Conference of 1922 on the Second World War.

8. Prepare a comparison of the U-boat campaigns of 1917 and 1942.

9. Compare the advantages and disadvantages of a two-ocean United States Navy as against a permanent alliance with Great Britain.

10. Compare the careers of the Confederate raider *Alabama* and the German raider *Admiral Graf von Spee.*

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Part III

THE GREAT REGIONS IN WORLD POLITICS

The First World War demonstrated that the world, in consequence of technological developments, could no longer be divided and maintained in great isolated regions. Significant events in one country, the war made plain, were bound to affect the life of other countries. Geographically it might be possible to speak of the great regions, but actually the boundaries were oftentimes ephemeral. The Second World War has merely verified this thesis—witness the bombing of Japanese cities by American planes and the aerial ferry system to Great Britain from North America.

This interaction being recognized, it may then be observed that European events have had the deepest significance for the present conflict because what happened in Spain, Italy, Germany, Geneva, Munich, France, and many other areas of the Continent determined the decisions in other parts of the world. Washington and Tokyo depended to a large extent upon what happened in Flanders and the Ukraine, while Latin America made its decisions with an eye to both Europe and the United States. Asia indeed gauged her actions with reference to Russia and Japan, but these two in turn were inherently tied to the decisions made in Europe. Africa's fate was entirely linked with what happened on the Continent of Europe. The accounts of the struggle for power contained in the chapters of this section are tied closely together. They show that total war applies not only to the combatant states, but that total war affects every state in the world, be it belligerent or neutral.

The following chapters also substantiate the thesis that world politics operate according to rules—but they are not necessarily rules of moral conduct.

CHAPTER 13

FROM THE FIRST WORLD WAR TO THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The Treaties after the War


THE most statesmanlike attitude toward peacemaking at the close of the First World War was the assertion of President Wilson that the only just and lasting peace would have to be a "peace without victory." But Lloyd George's policy of a "knockout blow" prevailed and President Wilson later acquiesced in this attitude.[1]

One of the great difficulties in making a statesmanlike peace is the fact that peacemaking follows the hysteria and madness of wartime and has to be carried on in an atmosphere in every way unfavorable to sanity, justice, and foresight. This statement was never more true than at the close of the First World War. The lies, hatreds, and losses of the war period embittered the victors and encouraged a policy of revenge. President Wilson was more inclined to work for a constructive peace than any other members of the Big Four at Paris, but he was no match for his colleagues in duplicity and diplomatic maneuvering. Moreover, many of his professional advisers were more afflicted with passion than equipped with sanity and due regard for the future of world relations. Toward the end of the Peace Conference President Wilson himself seemingly became more interested in the League of Nations than the peace treaty and resigned himself to the vindictive policy of his colleagues in return for the inclusion of the text of the League covenant as an integral part in the peace treaty.[2]


We do not have space for a detailed analysis of the postwar treaties. The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919.

[1] See C. H. Grattan, *Why We Fought,* New York, Vanguard Press, 1929; and Walter Millis, *Road to War,* Boston, Houghton, 1925.

[2] J. T. Shotwell, *At the Paris Peace Conference,* New York, Macmillan, 1937; G. B. Noble, *Policies and Opinions at Paris, 1919,* New York, Macmillan, 1935; and Alcide Ebray, *A Frenchman Looks at Peace,* New York, Knopf, 1927.



MAP 8A. EUROPE



MAP 8B. EUROPE

It deprived Germany of considerable territory (to which, perhaps, the recipients' titles were as valid as the loser's), such as Alsace-Lorraine and sections of East Prussia and Silesia, and provided for Allied occupation of the Rhineland. In some ways more serious were the economic items in the treaty, which compelled Germany to hand over much of the rolling stock of her railroads, great quantities of livestock and agricultural products, and large annual shipments of coal to France and Great Britain, and to pay to the Allies enormous reparations, which were finally set at $33 billion in 1921. The rich coal mines in the Saar Valley were given over to France until 1935, when a plebiscite was to be held to determine their future status. Germany was also subjected to unfavorable tariff regulations and many minor economic disabilities.[3]

Perhaps the most serious and unpardonable aspect of the Allied policy of revenge was the continuance of the blockade of Germany until June, 1919. As a result of this, it has been estimated, at least 800,000 Germans, mainly women and children, died of starvation or malnutrition after the Armistice had been signed.[4] This mortality may be compared with a total of some 80,000 British killed and injured by the German air raids, which at least had the justification of being carried on in wartime.

Many other humiliations were imposed upon Germany, but perhaps the one which rankled most was the so-called war-guilt clause (Article 231) of the Treaty of Versailles, which compelled the Germans to admit exclusive responsibility for bringing on the war, a contention which had been blasted by historical scholars even before the treaty was signed.[5]

Similarly harsh treaties were made with Germany's allies.[6]

[3] P. P. Reinhold, *The Economic, Financial and Political State of Germany since the War,* New Haven, Yale, 1928; and J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace,* New York, Harcourt, 1920.

[4] Maurice Parmelee, *Blockade and Sea Power,* New York, Crowell, 1924, chapters 11–13.

[5] Alfred von Wegerer, *A Refutation of the Versailles War Guilt Thesis,* New York, Knopf, 1930.

[6] W. C. Langsam, *The World since 1914,* New York, Macmillan, 1933, pp. 126–133; and P. S. Mowrer, *Balkanized Europe,* New York, Dutton, 1921.

The Treaty of St. Germain, signed with Austria on September 10, 1919, reduced Austria to a miniature state freeing Polish and Czechoslovak regions to help form new states but also breaking off populations loyal to Austria; this treaty likewise imposed reparations, and forbade union with Germany. The Treaty of Trianon, signed with Hungary on June 4, 1920, similarly stripped Hungary of former territory, some of which included intensely patriotic Hungarians, levied reparations, and restricted the Hungarian army. The Treaty of Neuilly, signed with Bulgaria on November 27, 1919, compelled that state to cede territory to Yugoslavia and Greece and to pay large indemnities. The Treaty of Sèvres was signed with Turkey on August 10, 1920, and reduced Turkey to a small state in Asia Minor with a little area in Europe around Constantinople and the Straits. But the Turks were able to take advantage of Entente jealousies and tore up the Treaty of Sèvres. By the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, about 800 square miles of its former territory in Europe was restored to Turkey, which agreed to demilitarize and internationalize the straits leading out of the Black Sea.

It has often been stated that the postwar treaties imposed by the Allies were no worse than those which would have been imposed on the Allies by Germany if the latter had won the war. This statement is undoubtedly true, but it does not thereby justify the harsh treaties of the Allies nor make that policy in any degree likely to succeed. Rather, the whole situation vindicates President Wilson's foresight in declaring that only a peace without victory could be a constructive peace. While it so happens that the Allies did win and that they did impose vindictive and short-sighted peace treaties and that the latter played a large role in laying the basis for the Second World War, nevertheless it would be an exaggeration to contend that the peace treaties were solely responsible for the coming of the Second World War.[7]

[7] The Treaty of Versailles may also be regarded in other aspects than its punishment of Germany. It had much to be said in its favor. For example, there were the provisions establishing the League of Nations, providing protection for minorities, and establishing new states out of nations that had been imperial prov-

Reparations and War Debts

Despite the fact that Presdent Wilson had promised that there would be no indemnities imposed upon the vanquished after the war, crushing reparations were levied upon Germany, as we have previously noted. In 1871, Germany had levied an indemnity of $1 billion upon France. This was regarded by many at the time as a harsh act. But in 1921 the Reparations Commission decided to impose reparations of $33 billion upon Germany. This staggering total was in considerable part due to the fact that it included pension payments to Entente soldiers and their relatives, a provision agreed to by President Wilson against the advice of most of his economic experts. Under the Young Plan, in 1929, the total reparations were reduced from $33 billion to $27 billion.[8]

The most serious friction growing out of the attempt to collect German reparations was the invasion of the Ruhr by France and Belgium in January, 1923. By the summer of 1922 Germany had paid somewhere between 25 and 40 billion gold marks on the reparations account, but then had to default and ask for a delay in further payments. The English were inclined to grant the German request but Poincaré insisted upon a Franco-Belgian invasion of the Ruhr and an attempt to collect reparations directly through operating the German industries and mines in this area. The Germans met the invasion by a deliberate inflation of the German currency which doomed the invasion to economic failure but at the cost of tremendous misery to the German middle class, whose investments were wiped out as a result of the inflation. The German government was incidentally benefited, however, by being able at the same time

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inces before 1914. For views on a number of these questions opposed to those of this chapter, see Chapter 20, "War as a Symptom of Our Social Crisis," and Chapter 7, "The Economic Struggle for Power."—*Editor.*

[8] H. G. Moulton, *The Reparation Plan,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1924; D. P. Myers, *The Reparation Settlement,* Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1929; and J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Wreck of Reparations,* New York, Morrow, 1933. (Compare this paragraph with Chapter 23, "Totalitarianism at War."—*Editor.*)

to wipe out most of its national debt through nominal payments in inflated currency.[9]

British and American opinion was opposed to the Ruhr venture and in 1924 a commission of experts headed by Charles G. Dawes, a Chicago banker and later vice-president of the United States, tried to straighten out the reparations tangle. The so-called Dawes Plan provided for gradually increasing annual reparations payments on a scale which Germany accepted. Early in 1929, still another international conference was called under the chairmanship of Owen D. Young to revise the revised reparations schedule. On June 7, 1929, the so-called Young Plan was signed, which slightly reduced the total reparations payments as well as the annual payments on account. By 1931 Germany had been so seriously affected by the world depression that a German financial collapse seemed imminent. So President Herbert Hoover secured a moratorium of a year on reparations payments; then the Lausanne Conference in 1932 reduced the total of future reparations payments by Germany to $714,000,000 and the Young Plan was abandoned. In the end, Germany did not even pay off the sum stipulated at Lausanne.

In this way the reparations issue came to an ignominious end. Though it had yielded the Entente a considerable sum of money, it is doubtful if this was equal to the disastrous results of the international ill-feeling and the delay in economic recovery which the reparations policy had produced.[10]

Many Germans have contended that reparations account for the economic ruin of the German Republic. This view is hardly true. The economic impact of the First World War itself upon Germany, the unwise use of loans to Germany after the war by the United States and other countries, and the unsettling

[9] H. T. Allen, *The Rhineland Occupation,* Indianapolis, Bobbs, 1927; D. J. C. Street, *Rhineland and Ruhr,* 1923; and Guy Greer, *The Ruhr-Lorraine Industrial Problem,* New York, Macmillan, 1925. (Again, compare Barnes's view on this question with the views of Roucek in Chapter 20, "War as a Symptom of Our Social Crisis," and of Basch in Chapter 7, "The Economic Struggle for Power." —*Editor.*)

[10] David Lloyd George, *The Truth about Reparations and War Debts,* New York, Doubleday, 1932.

effects of world depression after 1929, all contributed their part to the economic collapse of Germany in 1932. But Entente apologists have been equally guilty of exaggeration in their contention that reparations had no appreciable effect upon the economic decline of the German Republic.[11]

The other outstanding financial problem of postwar Europe was the war debts that were owed to the United States by various Entente countries.[12] These amounted to some $11 billion. With accrued interest they stood at about $12 billion by 1923. Despite the fact that it had been recognized at the time that these were loans and not gifts, France, Great Britain, and Italy suggested that the United States cancel all these war debts on the ground that they had really been fighting our war and protecting the United States from a possible German attack. The United States declined to accept the novel and ingenious logic of its former Allies, but it did agree to a reduction of the debts on a scale beyond any precedent in human history.

Between 1923 and 1926 a plan for debt settlement was worked out between the United States and its major debtors whereby over 80 per cent of the Italian indebtedness was canceled, over 60 per cent of the French indebtedness, and over 30 per cent of the British indebtedness. The grand average in the reduction in the Allied war debts was 51.2 per cent. Even this charity was not graciously accepted by the Allies; there was much talk about Uncle Sam's having been transformed into Uncle Shylock, language which did not increase the good will of Americans towards their former Allies.

With the sole exception of Finland, the Allied debtors did not honor their debt settlement with the United States. Beginning in December, 1932, they ceased scheduled war-debt payments to the United States. Some, like France, defaulted entirely. Others made token payments in the form of a nominal payment on the interest due. The defaulters offered as their alibi the fact that when German reparations were wiped out

[11] J. T. Shotwell, *What Germany Forgot,* New York, Macmillan, 1940.

[12] H. G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, *World War Debt Settlements,* Washington: Brookings Institution, 1926; and Dorsey Richardson, *Will They Pay?,* Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1933.

at Lausanne this cancellation carried with it, by implication, the cancellation of Allied war debts. There was neither moral nor legal foundation for this absurd contention, but the United States took no steps to collect the debts due or to impose penalties upon the defaulters. It is believed that the recognition of the futility of trying to collect war debts was what led the United States in the Second World War to adopt the policy of outright charity to Great Britain instead of once more resorting to the fiction of loans.

An argument of some validity used by the European debtors was that the high tariff system of the United States made it impossible for the debtors to pay off their debts through shipment of their goods to the United States. But this contention is in large part nullified by the fact that at no time did the debtor nations offer to make payment in full in return for a suspension of the tariff obstacles hindering the exportation of Allied goods to the United States. The offered excuse of inability to pay was, of course, nonsense—every defaulter was spending far more for armament than the scheduled annual war-debt payments. Indeed, at the very moment that Italy was complaining of inability to pay she was borrowing large sums for armament from private bankers in New York.

The League of Nations and the World Court

It was the hope of many, including President Wilson, that however bad the postwar treaties might be, they could be modified and improved by a League of Nations which would preside over world affairs after the war, promoting international justice and safeguarding world peace. A plan for such a League of Nations was drawn up during the peace conference and was made an integral part of the peace treaty. Geneva, Switzerland, was selected as the headquarters of the League and the first sessions of the League were held there in 1920.[13] Closely associated

[13] The two best general books on the League of Nations are J. S. Bassett, *The League of Nations,* New York, Longmans, 1928; and Felix Morley, *The Society of Nations,* Washington, Brookings Institution, 1932. (Compare Barnes's views of the League with those expressed in Chapter 6, "World Organizations, and in Robert Dell, *The Geneva Racket, 1920–1939,* London, Hale, 1941.—*Editor.*)

with the League was the Permanent Court of International Justice, commonly called the World Court. It was established in September, 1921, and may roughly be regarded as the judicial branch of the League.

Few sane and far-sighted commentators could fail to approve the League of Nations as an important and promising first step towards the creation of some form of international order and the germ of a force which might reduce the prospect of war. As an idea the League deserves unqualified approval. Unfortunately, the specific League that was established and the policies that it followed were so unwise and one-sided that the League was almost inevitably foredoomed to failure.

In the first place, two of the most powerful European states, Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, were excluded from the League. And despite the fact that its president had taken the lead in creating the League and putting it into the peace treaty, the United States refused to join the League. All this was a serious loss to the League as a constructive body in world politics. As affairs stood at the time, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States were the countries most likely to exert a pacific and moderating influence in world affairs and most cordial to proposals for disarmament.

Since the League was composed almost exclusively of the victors in the First World War, it was only natural that it should be much more interested in preserving the Treaty of Versailles and perpetuating the postwar settlements than in advancing the cause of international justice and world peace. Since the Versailles system was doomed to failure and collapse, the linkage of the League with this system gravely imperiled the League and ultimately hastened its extinction. Even the later admission of Germany and the U.S.S.R. came too late to effect any impressive improvement in the policy or acts of the League. Their pleas for disarmament and for equality in the treatment of nations were ignominiously voted down.

Another fatal defect of the League lay in the fact that its members refused to surrender an iota of the ideals and policies which went to make up the war system and had brought on the First World War. At home, they remained just as devoted

as before 1914 to nationalism, imperialism, to great armaments, to secret diplomacy, to tariff wars and the like. It was hardly to be expected that they would be effectively transformed into angels of sweetness and light when they assembled at Geneva. As one writer has fairly remarked, to expect this, would be as naïve as to believe that leading New York City racketeers and organized criminals could be transfigured and made into saints simply by assembling them in the Cathedral of St. John the Divine to sing the Doxology and recite the Twenty-third Psalm. An international spirit can be created only when the reforms involved have been initiated in the home capitals of the members of a League of Nations or any other international organization.[13a]

The League of Nations settled a number of minor disputes; through its International Labor Organization and other agencies it gathered much valuable information on social conditions throughout the world; and it also exerted an important educational influence not only upon visitors to Geneva but also upon students of League activities scattered throughout the world.[14]

Nevertheless, and as was to be expected, the League failed miserably in exerting the influence which had been expected of it in promoting world peace and curbing international disorder. It got nowhere in the way of bringing about substantial disarmament. It failed to curb any powerful aggressor at any time between the two World Wars. It did little or nothing to eliminate the main causes of war or to reduce their effectiveness.

The humiliating failures of the League with respect to outstanding incidents of aggression finally brought its career to an end. It failed to stop Japan in Manchuria; it refused to apply adequate sanctions against Italy in the Ethiopian invasion; it acquiesced in the shameful invasion of Spain by Germany and Italy as Franco's allies in the Spanish Civil War; and it failed to make even a feeble gesture to restrain the ag-

[13a] See Dell, *op. cit.*

[14] G. A. Johnston, *International Social Progress,* New York, Macmillan, 1924; L. A. Mead, *Law or War?,* New York, Doubleday, 1928; and Morley, *op. cit.*

gressive acts of Hitler, from the reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 to the attack upon Poland in 1939. The outbreak of the Second World War administered the *coup de grace* to the League and, as was seen in Chapter 6, what remained of its bureaus were moved mostly to Princeton, New Jersey.

The League will remain an interesting object lesson on the need for a world organization and on the policies which should be avoided by such an organization if it wishes to succeed in its mission.

French Hegemony in Europe and the Versailles System

France after 1918 was very naturally determined to maintain the supreme position she had gained in Europe as a result of the First World War and to keep Germany so encircled and suppressed that she would not be in any position to wage a war of revenge. The French remembered that they had awaited a war of revenge from 1871 to 1914 and had at last succeeded in thoroughly humiliating their former conquerer. They naturally feared that the Germans would seek to repeat the French example and took steps to render this as unlikely as possible. They relied not only upon their dominant position in the League of Nations but also negotiated a series of treaties with the nations around Germany so as to encircle the latter and render any military activity by Germany hopeless and futile.[15] On the very day that the Treaty of Versailles was signed, France signed two so-called security pacts with Great Britain and the United States, according to which these countries would come to the aid of France if attacked by Germany. The United States Senate rejected the American treaty and this rejection automatically nullified the pact with Britain.

France then turned to treaties which would enable her to build a cordon of allies around Germany. She signed a military alliance with Belgium in September, 1920, providing for mu-

[15] R. L. Buell, *Europe: a History of Ten Years,* New York, Macmillan, 1928; and N. L. Hill, *Post-War Treaties of Security and Mutual Guarantee,* New York, International Conciliation Bulletin, 1928.

tual defense in case of a German attack. A treaty was signed with Poland in February, 1921, and ratified in May, 1922, providing for mutual consultation, for the enforcing of treaties to which the countries were parties, and for military aid in the case of attack upon either country. In January, 1924, France signed a treaty with Czechoslovakia agreeing to arbitrate disputes, to protect the mutual security of both states, and to enforce the relevant peace treaties. In June, 1926, a pact was signed with Rumania, and in November, 1927, with Yugoslavia, roughly similar to the pact with the Czechs. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania had formed a Little Entente in 1920–1921, mainly to protect themselves against any effort on the part of Hungary to violate the Treaty of Trianon. Cordial relations were promoted between the Little Entente and Poland, so that by 1927 France had Germany completely encircled and isolated.

The total military resources of France and her allies at this time exceeded those of Germany by a ratio of 40 to 1. The statement seems incredible after the speedy collapse of France under the impact of Hitler's blows in 1940. The undoing of France came not only as a result of Hitler's military might but as the consequence of the duplicity and vacillation in French diplomacy in the 1930's, a subject to which we will revert later on. But, in 1927, with Germany surrounded and virtually disarmed and still out of the League of Nations, France seemed safe enough and her military dominion over Europe appeared to be assured for many years to come.

German Efforts at Rehabilitation and Conciliation

Suffering under the sting of defeat and crushed under the economic clauses of the Treaty of Versailles and the burden of reparations, the condition of Germany in 1919 was sorry indeed. But the new republic buckled down in dead earnest to meet its problems and it found a superbly able leader in its minister of reconstruction, Walther Rathenau.[16] He endeavored

[16] Walter Meakin, *The New Industrial Revolution,* New York, Brentano, 1928; and J. W. Angell, *The Recovery of Germany,* New Haven, Yale, 1929.

to step up German industrial efficiency by a process known as the rationalization of industry, namely, the elimination of waste, industrial consolidation, electrification, and the introduction of the latest and best machinery. This program enabled Germany to overcome in some degree the loss of natural resources and factories under the Versailles Treaty. An effort was made to pay reparations, and loans were secured from the United States to help in reconstruction after the war.

Austria and Germany wished to unite after the war, a rational move which would have been beneficial to all concerned, but this *Anschluss* was strictly forbidden by the Treaty of St. Germain. It took place under more ominous auspices eighteen years later, when Hitler moved into Vienna.

Far and away the most promising move to rehabilitate Germany and promote her future security was the treaty signed with the Soviet Union at Rapallo on April 16, 1922. Most of the calamities which had come to Germany in the previous generation had been the result of the Kaiser's folly in breaking away from Russia and courting Great Britain. Rathenau had the good sense to revive the wisdom of Bismarck and come to an understanding with the new state that had succeeded Imperial Russia. Had he lived, and had Soviet-German relations prospered, it is unthinkable that the sorry state of the world since 1939 could have come to pass. A German-Soviet combination could not have been successfully bullied, even by France, and the economic advantages of co-operation between them would have meant greatly increased prosperity for both countries. But Rathenau was murdered in June, 1922, and his successor Gustav Stresemann, while not abandoning the U.S.S.R., concentrated upon wooing France. This policy proved in the long run as futile and tragic as the Kaiser's courting of Great Britain had proved a quarter century earlier. It would seem no exaggeration to hold that the assassination of Rathenau was perhaps the most momentous and tragic act in the twenty years that separated the two World Wars. Republican Germany was not able to produce another leader who even faintly approxi-

mated his political stature or understood the wisdom of his policies.

Stresemann is far better known in postwar politics than Rathenau, but he was a much less able and far-sighted statesman. He believed that the rehabilitation of Germany could be best effected by seeking conciliation with France.[17] As a result of his feelers, delegates from Germany, France, England, Italy, Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia held a conference at Locarno, in Switzerland, from October 5 to 16, 1925. Austen Chamberlain in England and Aristide Briand in France were reasonably favorable towards conciliation, and seven so-called treaties or conventions were worked out which guaranteed the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and Germany and France under the Versailles Treaty and bound Germany, France, and Belgium not to attack or invade each other except in defense. These treaties also provided for the arbitration of all disputes between Germany and the other signers of the Locarno treaties, Germany agreed to demilitarize the Rhineland and France agreed not to try to annex it or to make it a protectorate. In addition to the Locarno conference, Stresemann and Briand met informally at Thoiry and still further promoted a spirit of Franco-German conciliation.

While something was saved from the Locarno engagements, the policy of conciliation was dealt a rough blow the next year when the French financial crisis led to the recall of Poincaré, whose policy toward Germany was far less amiable than Briand's. But the evacuation of the Rhineland by Allied troops, as provided for in the Young Plan, was carried out in the summer of 1930.

In large part as a result of loans from the United States, the German Republic enjoyed better times from 1925 to 1929. But even this slight prosperity was short lived.[18] The inflation of 1923–1924 had dealt a heavy blow to Germany. A considerable

[17] Rudolf Olden, *Stresemann,* New York, Dutton, 1930; G. Glasgow, *From Dawes to Locarno,* New York, Harper, 1926; and N. L. Hill, *op. cit.*

[18] Angell, *op. cit.;* and W. F. Bruck, *Social and Economic History of Germany from William II to Hitler,* Oxford University Press, 1938, chap. 3.

proportion of the loans went towards the payment of reparations, a steady drain upon German finance. The portion of the loans other than that diverted to reparations was not always wisely used by the Germans. The impact of the world-wide depression of 1929 was the final straw. Matters went from bad to worse in the German Republic and by 1932 it faced economic collapse. Its finances were in a bad state, its industries were curtailed, and some six million men were out of work. The moratorium of 1931 and the wiping out of reparations in 1932 provided slight relief. The economic desperation of Germany in the early 1930's provided a very fertile ground for propaganda by Hitler and his Nazis. By January, 1933, they had so gained in power that they were able to persuade the senile president, Marshal von Hindenburg, to install Hitler as chancellor of the German Reich, a move which had immense and momentous consequences for the future of Germany and Europe.[19]

Economic Nationalism and the Tariff System

One of President Wilson's Fourteen Points was the promise to remove all economic barriers and to establish trade equality among the nations. Had this been realized, one of the more formidable causes of the war might have been removed or mitigated. But exactly the opposite result took place.[20] The tariff system had been bad enough in Europe before the war, but the situation became far worse after the peace. The latter increased the number of separate states in Europe from eighteen to thirty and each of them proceeded to erect a tariff wall around its borders. In general, the tariff schedules were higher than they were in prewar days. This perpetuated and intensified the unfortunate tariff wars which had plagued Europe before 1914,

[19] C. B. Hoover, *Germany Enters the Third Reich,* New York, Macmillan, 1933; and Theodore Abel, *Why Hitler Came into Power,* New York, Prentice-Hall, 1938.

[20] See the admirable summary of this subject by Thomas Brockway, *Battles without Bullets,* New York: Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1939 (bibliography on p. 95); and F. H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *Great Powers in World Politics,* New York, American Book Company, 1937.

and the new problems were aggravated when free-trade Britain went over to protectionism after the war.

European public finance was also linked with international affairs and all too often tended to promote ill-feeling.[21] Most prominent examples, of course, were reparations and war debts, already discussed. But these were not the only instances. Austria and Hungary were kept in a position of economic tutelage through loans from France, and French allies like Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were held closer to their alliances with France through large French loans, though France was not their sole creditor. The refusal of the Bolshevik government in the U.S.S.R. to assume the debts of the Czarist Russian regime promoted hostility towards the Soviets, in some cases delaying the recognition of the Soviet government and encouraging those who wished to keep the U.S.S.R. out of the League of Nations.

The struggle for markets and raw materials also intensified ill-feeling in Europe.[22] Germany and Italy were convinced that they did not possess natural resources at all in proportion to their needs and to their status in the family of nations. This feeling was intensified by the loss of the German colonies at Versailles and the denial to Italy of the rewards which she had been promised under the secret wartime treaties. Germany and Italy came to regard themselves as have-not nations, unjustly oppressed by the haves.[23] This led to struggles for self-sufficiency along such lines as the attack by Mussolini upon Ethiopia and the institution of the Four Year Plans in Germany under Goering, in the effort to make Nazi Germany self-sufficient in both peace and war. This striving on the part of Germany and Italy tended to develop suspicion and hostility on the part of their

[21] J. C. Stamp, *The Financial Aftermath of War,* New York, Scribner, 1932; J. T. Madden, Marcus Nadler, and H. C. Sauvain, *America's Experience as a Creditor Nation,* New York, Prentice-Hall, 1937; and Max Winkler, *Foreign Bonds: An Autopsy,* Philadelphia, Swain, 1933.

[22] Simonds and Emeny, *op. cit.;* Kemper Simpson, *Introduction to World Economics,* New York, Harper, 1934; and Herman Kranold, *The International Distribution of Raw Materials,* New York, Harper, 1935.

[23] Compare this with the views of Basch and Roucek, Chapters 7 and 20.—*Editor.*

neighbors, which in turn inflated the sense of frustration and injustice which rankled within Germany and Italy. These economic strains and stresses and the struggles which they encouraged have correctly been called "battles without bullets."

The Disarmament Fiascos

One of the most attractive items in Allied war propaganda during the First World War and one of President Wilson's Fourteen Points was the promise to end great armaments and to bring about a period in which the nations of the world need no longer stagger under the tremendous burden of armament expenditures. The whole spirit of the postwar settlements boded evil for any such benign hope, but eager anticipations were raised when the nations of the world were invited to a conference for the limitation of armaments at Washington in the summer of 1921. The Washington Conference opened in November.[24] The main achievement of this gathering was an agreement to end expensive competition in building capital ships and to scrap certain old capital ships. An agreement was reached whereby in ten years Great Britain and the United States would be equal in capital ships and Japan would be 60 per cent as strong as either. The United States suffered most in this arrangement, since she gave up fifteen ships in comparison with seven for Japan and four for Great Britain. No agreement could be reached as to limitation of light cruisers, submarines, or aircraft, and France resolutely blocked any discussion of land disarmament. In general, aside from the value inherent in any discussion of disarmament, the conference was relatively ineffective, since many of the ships affected by limitation or scrapping were already obsolete or obsolescent. Nevertheless, to check for the time being the expensive competition in the building of capital ships was something accomplished.

Another naval disarmament conference was held at Geneva from June to August, 1927.[25] It broke up because of disagree-

[24] R. L. Buell, *The Washington Conference,* New York, Appleton, 1922.

[25] On the naval disarmament conferences, see B. H. Williams, *The United States and Disarmament,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1931.

ments between Great Britain and the United States. The latter wished to extend the five-five-three arrangement of all classes of naval craft, but Great Britain refused to consider any such limitation of its light cruisers, which it deemed essential to the defense of its vast empire and extensive commerce. Still another naval disarmament conference, held in London in 1930, likewise proved a general failure because Italy insisted upon parity with France, which the latter would not concede. The naval holiday in capital ships was, however, extended to 1936. Yet even this extension was partially nullified by the so-called "escalator clause," whereby any power was allowed to exceed its limitations if it believed that new construction by a nonsignatory power threatened its security.

A second conference on naval disarmament was held in London in 1936. Any prospect of real success in limiting naval armament was minimized by the withdrawal of Japan in the middle of January, 1936. Japan repudiated at this time the five-five-three arrangement which had condemned her to naval inferiority. The conference continued, and on March 25, 1936, Great Britain, France, and the United States signed a naval treaty that provided for the exchange of naval information, limitations on the size of some classes of warships, and the suspension of the building of heavy cruisers until 1943. The Soviet Union and Germany signed the treaty in 1937, and Italy in 1938. But this treaty effected no serious reduction in naval building, and the increasingly tense international situation led to a modification of its terms in June, 1938.

One of the most lamentable and reprehensible incidents of the naval disarmament diplomacy was the revelation that great armament concerns and shipbuilding companies had hired propagandists to lobby against disarmament at the conferences and to stir up ill-will and suspicion among the participants.[26]

The first and only general disarmament conference ever held in the world met intermittently at Geneva from February 2, 1932, to June 11, 1934. It accomplished even less than the

[26] C. A. Beard, *The Navy: Defense or Portent?*, New York, Harper, 1932, chapters 5–6.

naval conferences. It did not reduce any army nor did it scrap a single gun, tank, or airplane. The conference was disrupted at first by the clash between the French demand for security and the German demand for equality. On May 17, 1933, Hitler addressed the Reichstag and announced that Germany was willing to disarm entirely if her neighbors would do the same. Unfortunately, the disarmament conference did not call Hitler's bluff to discover whether or not he meant what he said. The conference was adjourned in June to meet again in October. But two days before its sessions were to be resumed Hitler announced that Germany was withdrawing from the League of Nations and from the disarmament conference, with the implication that she would defy the armament limitation imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. In the face of this German defiance, the conference was further adjourned until the end of May, 1934. But when it was convened no agreement could be reached and the conference finally broke up in futile fashion on June 11, 1934. The chairman of the conference, Arthur Henderson, blamed France primarily for the failure of this general disarmament conference.[27]

Far from attaining the disarmament ideals of the First World War period, the world was spending more than three times as much for armament fifteen years after Versailles as it had been spending in 1913. Germany proceeded forthwith to begin building up the great Nazi army with which she paralyzed Poland in 1939 and overcame the Low Countries and France in 1940. The one country which sincerely wished disarmament [28] was the Soviet Union, which frequently invited the League of Nations to consider forthright and sweeping disarmament.

The Vain Effort to Outlaw and Repudiate War

An outstanding item in the Allied propaganda during the First World War was the assertion that this conflict was to be a war to end all wars. Many hoped that something might be

[27] F. L. Benns, *Europe since 1914,* New York, Crofts, 1936, p. 281.

[28] Compare Barnes's view of the U.S.S.R. with Cave's in Chapter 16.—*Editor.*

done in the way of outlawing war. Great hopes were raised in October, 1924, when the assembly of the League of Nations approved the so-called Geneva Protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes. This had been put through under the leadership of Ramsay Macdonald and Edouard Herriot, both friends of world peace. It called for the arbitration of international disputes and stigmatized as an aggressor any nation which refused to arbitrate. But in the operation of British politics Macdonald lost office and his Conservative successors repudiated the Protocol.[29]

The antiwar effort persisted, however, and bore fruit in the Kellogg-Briand Pact to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. It was signed by the leading powers in August, 1928, and on July 23, 1929, was proclaimed as binding on the 64 powers which had by then signed it.

The proposal to renounce war was originally made by Briand to the United States, with the apparent aim of preventing the United States from effective interference with French policy in respect to Germany. But American friends of the outlawry of war gained the support of Senators Borah and Capper and forced the expansion of the proposed into a general renunciation pact. It might have had some beneficial results but for the reservations which later nullified it.

The text of this pact seemed a convincing repudiation of war, but the reservations and exceptions stipulated by various signatories rendered it a hollow sham from the beginning.[30] The signatories did not, it seemed, renounce all wars. Wars of self-defense, wars in defense of areas of special interest to any power, wars in execution of previous treaty obligations, and wars growing out of sanctions of the League of Nations were excepted from this renunciation by various signing powers. It is obvious that almost any conceivable type of war might be included under one or another of these forms of conflict to which the pact did not apply. Moreover, the pact did not provide

[29] D. H. Miller, *The Geneva Protocol,* New York, Macmillan, 1925.

[30] Drew Pearson and Constantine Brown, *The American Diplomatic Game,* New York, Doubleday, 1935; and J. T. Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy,* New York, Harcourt, 1929.

for the rectification of injustices, for disarmament, or for the enforcement of the treaty against any violator.

Indeed, hopes based on the Kellogg Pact were sheer illusions. As Professor Borchard and others have pointed out, it was really a war pact rather than a peace pact. By excepting from the pact the more common types of wars, it logically implied that these were good wars. In this way, the pact, for the first time in human history, put the moral approval of the world behind all the more likely forms of war.[31]

In the light of these inadequacies, it is not surprising that the Kellogg Pact was defied, quite legally and logically, by Japan and Italy, or that in the ten years following its promulgation over three million persons lost their lives in wars, the greatest number ever to be killed in any decade except that of the First World War.

The Disintegration of the Soviet Move for Collective Security

The League of Nations collapsed and the Kellogg Pact proved a failure if not a sham at the very time when Mussolini and Hitler were challenging the peace and safety of Europe. Therefore, some other system of collective security had to be substituted. It was natural that the U.S.S.R. should take the lead in this movement. The Soviet Union had been the most sincere exponent of real disarmament. She had also taken a lead in urging the League to curb aggressors. The U.S.S.R. was motivated by self-interest. It would be impossible, even under the Five Year Plans, to provide for adequate supplies of consumption goods and for higher standards of living so long as the Soviets feared attack and had to divert a large part of their productive efforts to armaments and defense industries. Moreover the Kremlin knew well enough that, along with France, the U.S.S.R. would be the most logical victim of a rearmed Germany, if the latter chose to fight. Indeed, Hitler might first attack the Soviets in order to get the resources needed for a

[31] Printed address before the Williamstown Institute of Politics, August 22, 1828.

successful conquest of France. Since France was also fearful of Germany, the Kremlin could also count upon the support of some enlightened Frenchmen in working for collective security, especially before the British Tories began to build up Hitler in the years following 1934.[32]

In 1932 the U.S.S.R. signed nonaggression pacts with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. In the following year she signed nonaggression pacts with Rumania and with the Little Entente as a whole. In June, 1934, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Rumania signed a triangular arrangement which mutually guaranteed their existing frontiers.

Considerable progress was made in a military alliance with France to guarantee mutual protection in the case of an attack by Germany. A nonaggression pact was negotiated in 1931 and signed in 1932. But the assassination of the French foreign minister, Louis Barthou, in the autumn of 1934 hampered the Soviets' alliance with France.[33] Prominent French officials like Bonnet and Laval, who were suspected of Fascist sympathies, were anti-Bolshevik, and thought that they could get protection from Germany through collaboration with Hitler more safely and more certainly than through an alliance with the Soviet Union.

The final collapse of the campaign by the U.S.S.R. for collective security came at Munich in September, 1938.[34] Leadership in the campaign had been taken by the Russian foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov. When it seemed likely that Czechoslovakia would be sacrificed by them, Litvinov assured France and Great Britain that his country would go to war together with them in defense of Czechoslovakia, but France and Great Britain would have nothing to do with him and his proposals.

[32] See Thomas Preston Peardon's account in Chapter 14, "Great Britain and the Empire," for a view differing from that here expressed by Barnes.—*Editor.*

[33] On the U.S.S.R. and world politics, see S. N. Harper, ed., *The Soviet Union and World Problems,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1935; and J. E. Davies, *Mission to Moscow,* New York, Simon and Schuster, 1942. On the disastrous nature of Barthou's assassination, see F. L. Schuman, *Europe on the Eve,* New York, Knopf, 1939, chap. 3.

[34] For contrasting views see Chapters 15, 16, and 26, especially the sections of the latter concerning the Comintern.—*Editor.*

Instead, they submitted to the humiliation of Munich and conceded to Hitler his Sudetenland demands. The French had mistakenly believed that the Soviet Union's military strength had been reduced by Stalin's purges. The British Tory leaders had been for some years tacitly encouraging Hitler's bellicose policy and rearmament progress, in the fond hope that he would attack and destroy the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the country most feared in all the world by the Tories who were then completely ascendant in the English government. The Munich betrayal was particularly ominous for the Soviet Union, since Russia was ostentatiously excluded from the negotiations. Poland also rejected the Soviet proposals of collective security and refused to permit the Red Army to enter Poland to help protect the latter against a possible German attack.

Stalin wisely decided to pursue a Soviet policy of self-interest. Addressing the All-Union Communist Party Congress in March, 1939, Stalin charged that the press of the United States, France, and Great Britain, "by creating noise over the Ukraine, are trying to arouse the fury of the Soviet Union against Germany to poison the atmosphere and provoke a conflict without any apparent cause." He bluntly notified the world that the Soviet Union would not pull chestnuts out of the fire for other countries. Litvinov was replaced as foreign minister in May, 1939, by Molotov, a loyal subordinate of Stalin. In the spring and summer of 1939 Stalin rejected the halfhearted and hypocritical advances of France and Great Britain, and on August 23, 1939, signed a nonaggression pact with Germany to give his own country time to make additional preparations to meet German attack. His wisdom was amply vindicated by the events of the summer of 1941.[35]

Building the Nazi Frankenstein

We have heard much about "appeasement" as a cause of the Second World War. Specifically it is alleged that Chamberlain

[35] Anna Louise Strong, *The Soviets Expected It*, New York, 1942. (Stalin also signed to turn the German attack westward instead of toward the U.S.S.R. See Chapter 16 for a view differing from that here expressed.—*Editor.*)

and his Tory associates appeased—made repeated concessions to—Hitler until it was too late to resist him effectively.[36] This assumption rests upon the theory that the Tories were really fearful of Hitler and thought he might make war upon Great Britain. Hence, they gave in to him, time and again, solely in order to avert and postpone the dreaded attack. Any such interpretation is obviously nonsense, in spite of its wide acceptance by many journalists and historians in our own day. The official British policy was not the "appeasement" of Hitler but secret collaboration with him.

What the British Tories, led by the so-called Cliveden Set, really feared, however unjustified their fear, was the largely imaginary threat of the Soviet Union, and what they most desired was the frustration of radicalism everywhere in Europe.[37] Through their financial hold upon France and through the aid of many French politicians who were sympathetic with Fascism, the Tory leaders in Great Britain were able to hold France in line with their policy of hostility to the U.S.S.R., even though at times certain Frenchmen showed some cordiality toward the Soviets in a proposed program of mutual defense.[38]

The Tories had plentiful assurance that they had nothing to fear in the way of an aggressive attack by Hitler on the British Empire. From the time when he wrote *Mein Kampf* to 1939, Hitler exhibited an attitude as pro-British and anti-Russian as the Kaiser's had been. His fondest dream, so he intimated, was to divide the Old World with Great Britain, Germany to dom-

[36] Prime Minister Chamberlain, on February 1, 1938, said: "What we are seeking to do is to get a general appeasement throughout Europe which will give us peace. The peace of Europe must depend upon the attitude of the four major powers—Germany, Italy, France, and ourselves. . . . If we can bring these four nations into friendly discussion and into a settlement of their differences, we shall have saved the peace of Europe for a generation." This was Chamberlain's own definition.—*Editor.*

[37] For an opposed view, see Chapter 14, "Great Britain and the Empire," by T. P. Peardon.—*Editor.*

[38] For the best accounts of the Tory support of Hitler and his aggressive tactics to 1939, see F. L. Schuman, *Europe on the Eve,* New York, Knopf, 1939, chapters 9–12; and G. T. Garratt, *What Has Happened to Europe?,* Indianapolis, Bobbs, 1940. For a competent account that accepts the appeasement thesis, see D. L. Lee, *Ten Years: Europe on Its Way to War, 1930–1940,* Boston, Houghton, 1942. (For a contradiction of the last, see T. P. Peardon, *Great Britain and the Empire,* chapter 14.—*Editor.*)

inate the European continent and Great Britain to continue ruling the far-flung Empire. As good a statement as ever made of this Nazi attitude was written by Alfred Rosenberg, with the approval of Hitler:

> Great Britain assumed the task of protecting the white man wherever he may live, scattered all over the globe, and British colonial policy remained faithful to this mission. This was Great Britain's mission in the past; it is in the best interest of all nations that she continue in the service of this mission.

At the present writing it looks as though Hitler's Germany would be brought to ruin in the same manner as was the Hohenzollern Empire, namely, by Hitler's pro-British and anti-Russian policy. The policy was still in evidence as late as Rudolf Hess's flight to Scotland in the spring of 1941, and the German attack on Russia in June of that year fitted into the same pattern.

Even as late as the spring of 1939 Great Britain still hoped for a German attack of the Soviet Union, and her negotiations with the Kremlin were weak and hypocritical. As the able British journalist, Robert Dell, wrote in *The Living Age* in the summer of 1939: [39] "It can hardly be doubted that Chamberlain never wished or intended the negotiations with Russia to succeed, and started them only in the hope that they would frighten Hitler into coming into an arrangement with England on better terms."

The Tories still dreamed of Nazi destruction of the feared Soviet power and did not wish to have to come to the rescue of a country whose destruction they wished and plotted.

This policy of bolstering the opponents of Bolshevism began in January, 1932, when Great Britain refused to stand with the United States in curbing Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Then came the Ethiopian fiasco of 1935–1936. After faint-hearted and generally unsuccessful attempts to get the League to apply sanctions against Italy, Great Britain weakly refused to fight against this second-rate Mediterranean power and stood

[39] Robert Dell, "Behind the Moscow Impasse," *The Living Age* (August, 1939), pp. 546 ff.

aside while Mussolini conquered Ethiopia. There were, of course, other, if secondary, reasons why Great Britain did not forcibly oppose Mussolini in 1935–1936. Even more obviously partisan was the Tory policy in the Spanish Civil War. Here Britain invented the hypocritical and notorious nonintervention policy, which really facilitated extensive intervention by Italy and Germany in support of the Spanish Fascists, while it prevented sympathetic countries from giving any effective aid to the Spanish Loyalists. The policy worked out well, however, for the British Tories, who had the satisfaction of seeing liberalism and radicalism crushed in Spain.

But Mussolini was bound to play only a minor role in any Tory plan to destroy the Soviet Union and social revolution in Europe. The anti-radical champion selected and groomed for this role by the British Tories was Adolf Hitler. The British saw in him their "great white hope" as the conqueror of the Soviet Union and the liberator of Europe from the specter of Bolshevism. Hence, the Tories encouraged rearmament of Germany, failed to object effectively to Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland and the annexation of Austria, and took the lead in collaborating with him in the betrayal of Czechoslovakia. But they overplayed their hand at Munich through stressing too much the fiction of the war threat and appeasement. They thereby aroused the liberal and labor elements in France and Great Britain to such a state of excitement and protest that, when the showdown came over Poland in August, 1939, the Tories feared to stand aside. The Tories were, thus, defeated in their plan at the moment of potential success and later fell into the very trap which they had set for the Bolsheviks. Instead of Hitler's spending his might against the Soviet Union in 1940, the British and French themselves were compelled to endure its impact, the former with grave injury and the latter with complete disaster. When Hitler finally did treacherously attack Russia on June 22, 1941, the British government, quite ironically, found itself in a position where it had to give military aid to Russia as the sole hope of assuring a defeat of the Nazis.

This framing of a destructive Nazi attack upon the U.S.S.R. was a somewhat reckless gamble, even in 1935–1936, for it carried with it the destruction of everything that protected the peace of Europe. The League of Nations went down to ruin, all the peace machinery was destroyed, the Soviet program for collective security was sabotaged, Europe was wide open for war, and Hitler took full advantage of the opportunity.[40] It must, of course, be emphasized that many British leaders, such as Winston Churchill and Stafford Cripps, and apparently even some of the Tories, were bitterly critical of the British encouragement of Hitler, but they had little influence on official policy.[41]

The Genesis of the Second World War

Hitler came to power in January, 1933, committed to the promise to destroy the Treaty of Versailles and to restore Germany to a position of equality and prestige among the European nations. Aided by the British Tory encouragement which we have noted above and by the treachery of Fascist-minded Frenchmen, he succeeded in making good his boast with a thoroughness and rapidity that amazed onlookers and spelled disaster for the world.[42]

In October, 1933, as we have seen, Hitler withdrew Germany

[40] While the Tory policies may have aided Hitler, there is no evidence that the idea for the attack on Russia was not Hitler's own, as well.—*Editor.*

[41] In the years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War there was a tie-up between certain government leaders in Great Britain and the Anglo-German Fellowship which sought to promote closer relations between England and Germany. After August, 1939, prominent Tories castigated Hitler for making a treaty with Russia rather than denouncing Russia for her treaty with Germany. British newspapers in August and September, 1939, and during the later Soviet expansion in the Baltic, denounced Hitler's new Russian policy. They alleged that, by his treaty of August, 1939, with Russia, he had let down the barrier to the extension of Russian power and influence in the West. Finally, the British government put rather less than any obstacles in the way of British citizens who went to fight for Finland against Russia.

[42] For good accounts of the momentous developments, see Schuman, *op. cit.*, also, by the same author, *Night over Europe,* New York, Knopf, 1941; Lee, *op. cit.;* Garratt, *op. cit.;* Walter Millis, *Why Europe Fights,* New York, Morrow, 1940; and Graham Hutton, *Survey after Munich,* Boston, Little, 1939. The best life of Hitler is Konrad Heiden, *Hitler,* New York, Knopf, 1936; and the best general account of Nazi Germany is Stephen Roberts, *The House that Hitler Built,* Boston, Little, 1938. The only reliable and objective book on the nature

from the disarmament conference and the League of Nations. In March, 1935, he repudiated the military and naval limitations imposed upon Germany by the Treaty of Versailles. In March, 1936, he not only defied the Versailles Treaty but also the Locarno Pacts by occupying the demilitarized Rhineland and proceeding to refortify it. On January 30, 1937, he openly announced to the world that Germany had completely obliterated the Treaty of Versailles, so far as it limited Germany.

Next Hitler proceeded to lay the basis for the extension of German boundaries. Italy had at first opposed his attempt to extend Nazi authority over Austria. But the formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936 removed Italian opposition to Hitler's Austrian ambitions and in March, 1938, Hitler sent Nazi troops into Austria [43] and forthwith annexed it to Germany. The next victim was to be Czechoslovakia. Great Britain collaborated, especially by sending Walter Runciman to Czechoslovakia to persuade the Czechs to accept Hitler's demands without any serious disturbance. But the Czechs resisted persuasion and it was necessary to make a show of war. We have already mentioned that France and Great Britain repudiated the proffered Soviet aid and readily sacrificed the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia to Germany according to the agreement made in Munich in September, 1939. Once this area had been ceded to Germany, the defenses of Czechoslovakia were removed and it was laid wide open to further German aggression. Alleging violations of the Munich pact and new conditions which altered his promises of the preceding autumn, Hitler proceeded to annex the remaining portions of Czechoslovakia in the middle of March, 1939, save for a small area, Ruthenia, which he turned over to Hungary.

Then, on March 21, 1939, Hitler began the maneuvers that led Europe into the Second World War. He demanded the return of Danzig to Germany and that Poland permit a German motor road to be constructed through the Polish Corridor.

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of Nazi Germany and its basic policies in English is G. F. Kneller, *The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1941.

[43] See Chapter 15, "The Continent of Europe," for an explanation.—*Editor.*

On their face these demands appeared reasonable, and Hitler warned that their rejection meant war. But Poland did reject them and on March 31, 1939, Chamberlain announced that Great Britain and France would fight in case Hitler took any steps which clearly threatened Polish independence.

To those who had penetrated the appeasement sham, the reason for the British change of policy appeared clear. Chamberlain and the so-called appeasers had represented their betrayal of Czechoslovakia as a reluctant and deplored step which they had taken solely to preserve the peace of Europe. They had overplayed their hand as regards the danger of a German attack upon England by mobilizing the fleet, digging air-raid trenches, and distributing gas masks. The populace had been so inflamed in the autumn of 1939, especially the liberal and labor elements, that Chamberlain and his associates did not dare to step down in the face of another Hitler threat.

The Nazis asserted, upon the basis of alleged Polish documents published by the Nazis, that Britain was encouraged to recommend Polish resistance to Hitler by assurances given by the United States that it would enter the Second World War as an ally of Great Britain and France.[44] Whether this is true or not, neither United States nor British assurances to Poland were necessary to make the latter country assume an attitude of stiff resistance to Hitler. Unbelievable though it may seem in the light of later events, the Poles actually thought that they could defeat Germany, or at least successfully defend themselves against the German attack, without any aid from France or Great Britain. Poland rejected the aid of the U.S.S.R., the only country which might have given her effective assistance in the crisis of 1939. The French politicians found themselves in the same difficulties as the Tory government in London in acquiescing in any further aggression by Hitler. Moreover, France had been alarmed by bellicose demands from Mussolini for French concessions to Italy in northern Africa and elsewhere.

During the summer of 1939, Europe marched straight to

[44] C. H. Grattan, *The German White Paper,* New York, Howell, 1940.

war.[45] Chamberlain tried to avert it by emphasizing the British intention to fight in behalf of Poland, but in the light of the events of the previous years Hitler did not take him too seriously and apparently believed that Great Britain would step down at the last moment.

But Hitler did fear to take the risk of war without making it fairly certain that the Red Army would not attack his rear. Great Britain and France had negotiated in half-hearted fashion with the U.S.S.R. during the spring of 1939, but the Bolsheviks distrusted them and, moreover, their demands upon the Soviet Union far exceeded any benefits which they offered to confer in return. The Soviets decided that their interests would be better served by coming to an understanding with Germany. So, on August 23, 1939, as we have seen, the U.S.S.R. signed the nonaggression pact with Germany.

Once he had arrived at an arrangement with the Soviets, Hitler moved rapidly, apparently feeling that France and Great Britain would hesitate to plunge Europe into war over Poland. The Poles remained stubborn and Hitler moved with a speed which would have made it difficult for them to concede anything to him even if they had desired to do so at the last moment. The Poles mobilized their army on August 30 and Germany invaded Poland at five o'clock on the morning of September 1. The Second World War was on. Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3. Mussolini did not enter the war until June, 1940, when French defeat was certain and the peril to England was grave. Versailles, and all the other mistakes of twenty years, German as well as French and British, had borne their natural fruit.[46]

Questions

1. Was the Treaty of Versailles a cause of the Second World War? Defend your opinion.

[45] Lee, *op. cit.;* Oliver Benson, *Through the Diplomatic Looking-Glass,* Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1939; and Alfred von Wegerer, *Origins of World War II,* New York, R. S. Smith, 1941.

[46] Jonathan Mitchell, *Goose Steps to Peace,* Boston, Little, 1931; Garratt, *op. cit.*

2. Did the postwar treaties "Balkanize" Europe? Defend your opinion.

3. Why were reparations levied on Germany?

4. Trace the stages in the reparations problem from 1919 to 1932.

5. Should the Allies have paid their war debts? Was Uncle Sam an Uncle Shylock?

6. Summarize the merits and defects of the League of Nations.

7. Why did the League fail?

8. Outline the French policy toward Germany from 1919 to 1932.

9. Was Walther Rathenau's assassination a world calamity? Defend your opinion.

10. Why did the German Republic collapse in 1932?

11. Give some of the economic causes of international ill-will between the two World Wars.

12. Account for the failure to reduce armaments between 1919 and 1936.

13. Can we fairly call the Kellogg Pact a sham? Why, or why not?

14. If the Soviet Union was especially interested in peace, disarmament, and collective security, can you explain why?

15. Explain the Soviet Union's motives, as they appear to you, in signing a nonaggression pact with Germany in August, 1939.

16. Did the British and French governments knowingly permit Hitler to become a powerful military menace? If so, what was their purpose, in your opinion? Defend your view.

17. Explain, and criticize or defend, the "appeasement thesis."

18. Since France and Great Britain decided to go to war over the Polish question, when they had not done so on behalf of Czechoslovakia, can you cite some reasons? Take into account the generally accepted view that Czechoslovakia was by far the more democratic of the two states.

19. Was Poland justified in resisting Hitler?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Discuss the personalities who represented the Big Four at the Paris Peace Conference, and their policies.

2. Prepare a history of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

3. Report on the work of the International Labor Organization.

4. Discuss the Ruhr invasion and German inflation.

5. Appraise Briand and Stresemann as conciliators.

6. Survey the propaganda against disarmament.

7. Review the history of the Kellogg Pact.

8. Appraise Maxim Litvinov as a statesman and diplomat.
9. Discuss how Hitler came into power.
10. Discuss the personages in, and tendencies of, the Cliveden Set.

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CHAPTER 14


GREAT BRITAIN AND THE EMPIRE

THROUGHOUT most of the nineteenth century Great Britain was supreme among the world powers. In industry, in commerce, and in finance she was pre-eminent. Her Empire's area grew from .5 million square miles in 1800 to 11.25 million in 1914, and its population from 20 million to 417 million. Not only did she have the largest navy, but she alone possessed the bases and coaling stations necessary for action in all parts of the world. All the other great powers were European states whom she was able to contain in their homeland by her naval might. Her intervention in Continental affairs was almost always decisive. Outside Europe the British Imperial power was the very cornerstone of existing arrangements. So long as Great Britain remained satisfied with the existing status, her naval supremacy was a shield to other empires—the Belgian, French, Portuguese and Dutch—as well as to the Monroe Doctrine and the western hemisphere. Throughout vast stretches of the earth one could speak of a Pax Britannica, a peace maintained, for better or for worse, by British might.[1]

This world position of Great Britain has been under attack for fifty years. Thus far the attackers have been beaten off, but only at increasing cost and with increasing difficulty.

The first challenge to British supremacy came when the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway (1891–1903) brought Russia into the Far East as a major competitor for empire. At about the same time, the Franco-Russian Military Convention (1894) threatened British dominance of the vital Mediterranean link between the Atlantic and the Indian Oceans, while a little later Germany's decision to build a first-class navy imperiled even the home waters.

[1] For suggestive comment see Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918–1935,* London, Macmillan, 1936, part 1.



MAP 9. THE BRITISH EMPIRE

To check these new rivals, Great Britain sought new friends. In the Far East, an alliance was formed with Japan (1902). An understanding with the United States took care of the Western Hemisphere.[2] In Europe, Italy was partially weaned from the Triple Alliance and friendly understanding was developed with France (1904) and even with Russia (1907). By virtue of these adjustments, Great Britain was able to rearrange her forces, concentrating her own strength at home and leaving the rest of the world to her new associates.

The combination of powers just described was able to send Germany down to defeat in the First World War. For a decade thereafter Great Britain enjoyed a respite, but in the era that followed it was seen that her difficulties had been increased rather than diminished.

In the first place, diplomatic developments were in large part unfavorable to Great Britain. Two of her former allies, Japan and Italy, had joined the ranks of those who wished to rearrange the world at her expense. Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were poisoned by the deep and mutual suspicion with which a socialist and a capitalist power naturally viewed each other. The connection with France remained close because it was based on a deep community of interest, but even in this there was constant disagreement over such questions as the proper treatment of Germany, the best roads to security, and disarmament. Only with the United States could it be said that understanding was deepened to the benefit of Great Britain's position in world affairs.

Along with these diplomatic shifts there were disquieting military developments. With the growth of the United States and Japanese navies, sea power ceased to be confined to Europe where it had been so easily subjected to the pressure of British supremacy. Indeed, Great Britain was unable to maintain her supremacy after 1918, but had to concede parity to the United States and a high ratio to Japan. Moreover, the airplane enabled land power to compete with sea power in all the narrow

[2] See Lionel Gelber, *The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship, a Study in World Politics, 1898–1906,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1938.


seas around Europe—especially the English Channel, the North Sea, and the Mediterranean—thereby making more difficult the task of defending the homeland and communications. The airplane, too, brought the Continent closer to the British Isles. It seemed no longer sufficient to guard the Channel ports and the Low Countries in order to assure British safety. The whole of France had become a part of Britain's bastions.

The Empire after 1918 was more difficult to govern and to organize for war and diplomacy. In its parts with population of European origin—Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Ireland—the long development of self-government culminated in the attainment of equal status with Great Britain. This equality was recognized by the Imperial Conference of 1926; an attempt to give it legal statement was made in the Statute of Westminster, 1931.[3] Henceforward, British policy must be arrived at in consultation and applied in co-operation with the Dominions, each of whom had special interests to which consideration must be given. A policy so reached must almost certainly be framed slowly and reflect a spirit of caution and compromise that will sometimes seem excessive to the impatient outsider upon whose shoulders rests none of the responsibility for decision or execution.


The extent of Dominion sovereignty was shown clearly when war came in 1939. Australia and New Zealand aligned themselves with Great Britain immediately, without separate declarations of war, on the theory that when the king goes to war he does so for all his dominions. Canada waited a full week before declaring war on her own behalf, which raises interesting questions as to the status of that country from September 3 to September 10, 1939. South Africa decided in favor of participation after a tense debate, a close majority against neutrality, and a change of government. Eire remained neutral, refusing to grant the use of her territory for naval and air bases and even protesting against the landing of American troops in

[3] On the position of the Dominions in the British Commonwealth, see A. B. Keith, *The Dominions as Sovereign States,* London, Macmillan, 1938; W. K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs,* vol. 1, *Problems of Nationality, 1918–1936,* London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1937.

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MAP 10A. AUSTRALIA



MAP 10B. AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Northern Ireland (January, 1942) on the ground that sovereignty over the whole island rightfully belonged to the government established at Dublin. It was obvious that Premier De Valera would assert his separatist claims even if by so doing he endangered the whole cause of the United Nations.[4]

This difficulty in holding the Empire together was heightened by the undoubted deterioration of Great Britain's world economic position after 1914. Many factors combined to produce this result: the loss of markets during the First World War; the development of industry and tariffs in many countries; the growth of foreign merchant marines; the expansion of the coal industry in other countries; still more, the shift from coal to oil as a fuel; the rise of financial rivals, especially the United States. Obviously England had ceased to be the workshop of the world. She must adjust herself to a world economy dominated by nationalism rather than free exchange. Moreover, some of the changes listed above have direct strategic as well as economic significance. For example, the increasing use of oil for ships and other purposes means that Great Britain must import some three billion gallons of fuel oil every year even in times of peace—"a commercial and strategic liability which pre-1914 Britain never had to face." [5]

It seems fair to sum up the effect of these changes by saying that after 1918 Great Britain was relatively less strong and less prosperous than formerly and, in addition, less able to draw with assurance upon the resources in men and materials that existed in her Empire.

Great Britain and the League

In these circumstances it seemed obvious to one school of thought that Great Britain's best course was a strong League of Nations policy. There were several reasons for this view. Great Britain had the same interest in establishing a reign of

[4] H. McD. Clokie, "The British Dominions and Neutrality," *American Political Science Review*, 34:4 (August, 1940), pp. 737–749.

[5] E. H. Carr, *Britain. A Study of Foreign Policy from the Versailles Treaty to the Outbreak of War*, London and New York, Longmans, 1939, p. 30.

law in world politics that those with many possessions always have in law and order; it was very doubtful whether she alone could protect her Empire and other interests against her new, powerful, and scattered rivals. It could further be argued that the clashes of interest between the different members of the Commonwealth would be harmonized if the foreign policies of all were made subordinate to the principles of the Covenant. In particular there would be no danger of a clash over British commitments in Europe if Great Britain never had any commitments except those League obligations that would bind the Dominions as much as the mother country.

Others, however, saw in the League not a preventive against war so much as a means of involvement in war. If League sanctions, economic or military, should ever be applied, the principal means of enforcement must be the British navy. It was difficult for persons in this second group to believe that any strong state would consent to be blockaded by the League without resorting to war in an attempt to break the iron yoke of sanctions. Thus war would come out of the effort to preserve peace. Moreover, it was often argued that no effective League of Nations was possible without the United States as a member.

The advocates of collective security, whether on grounds of national interest or for broader philosophical reasons, developed a powerful support in England for the League of Nations. On occasion, as for a short period during the Ethiopian crisis, they were able to compel the Cabinet to follow a League line. At all times, they forced statesmen to pay lip service to the League. But no British Government ever acted for long on their principles.[6] The men who controlled British foreign policy from

[6] On the "Traditionalists" and "Collectivists" in British foreign policy, see A. Wolfers, *Britain and France Between Two Wars. Conflicting Strategies of Peace Since Versailles,* New York, Harcourt, 1940. Wolfers shows that the division did not follow party lines strictly. Among those who tended to take a "League line" (for varying reasons) were not only Labourites such as Clement Attlee, Arthur Henderson, Hugh Dalton and others, but Conservatives such as Viscount Cecil and Winston Churchill (who saw in collective action a twentieth-century "Grand Alliance" against the enemies of Great Britain). The main organization of the "Collectivists," the League of Nations Union, included many Conservatives. But the dominant figures in the Conservative Party, especially in the decade after 1931 —men like Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Simon—never placed

1919 to 1939 were willing to use the League as machinery for the discussion and conciliation of disputes, but they were either too realistic or too earthbound for the bold experiment of collective security. Instead, they pursued British interests by a cautiously defensive policy, a policy of compromise and of waiting for time to exercise its sedative effect upon inflamed and disgruntled states. To hasten this expedient outcome they were even willing to make concessions, if the price was not too high. Unfortunately, they tended to make concessions too late and to the wrong people and their policy ended in disaster.

The Far East

The first threat to Great Britain's Empire in the nineteenth century had come in the Far East, from Russia; in the twentieth century it again came in the Far East, but from Japan. It had been possible to checkmate Russia by an alliance with Japan. But to check Japan was far more difficult. Fear of American opinion and pressure from the Dominion of Canada had caused the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the Washington Conference (1921–1922) and the substitution of a series of international agreements by which it was hoped peace would be preserved in the Far East. The most important of these agreements was the Nine-Power Treaty (February 6, 1922), whose signatories agreed "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China." There was also a Four-Power Treaty (December 13, 1921) by which the British Empire, the United States, Japan, and France agreed to respect the existing status in the Pacific Islands and to confer together in case of dispute arising between them or of a threat from an outside power. Any chance that these treaties would be an effective deterrent on Japan, however, was removed by the accompanying agreements to a cessation of further fortifications in the western Pacific and to a naval ratio of five-five-three in capital ships

any confidence in the League. Perhaps Lord Newton summed up their opinion when he referred to the League as a "mutual admiration society manned by well-meaning busybodies."

(Great Britain to the United States to Japan) that left Japan supreme in that area.[7]

By signing these treaties Great Britain admitted inability to defend her interests in China against Japanese expansion. Her military frontier was drawn at Singapore. What, then, should she do when Japan invaded and conquered Manchuria (1931–1932)? There was a loud outcry demanding League action. It was fairly evident, however, that the only League action that would have any effect on Japan was the application of sanctions. These were out of the question since United States cooperation was not forthcoming. Anyone who supposes that the United States gave a strong international lead in the Manchurian crisis is imagining a vain thing. United States senators boiled at the very mention of sanctions and silk workers paraded the streets in protest. In other words, even if the British Tories had wanted to "apply the Covenant" there wasn't a chance in the world that it could be done. And they did not desire to annoy the Japanese unduly with mere recrimination.

Therefore, in all the period at Geneva during which the League members were dealing with Manchuria, the British government as represented by its Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, impressed onlookers as more sedulous to avoid offending the Japanese than to uphold the Covenant. The impression was probably correct—for the Conservatives in power in Great Britain (among whom we may include the nominal Liberal, Sir John Simon) inclined to the view that Japanese expansion need not bring disaster to British interests. Japan, it was thought, would permit a continuance of European trade in her China territories. In any case, having conquered Manchuria, she would probably turn north against the Soviet Union rather than south where Great Britain's major interests lay. In that event, it should be possible to reach an agreement, as agreements had so often been reached with other imperialist powers before 1914.

This calculation was, of course, proved wrong by events. Japan turned southward, and wherever she went European en-

[7] See also Barnes on this point in preceding chapter.—*Editor.*

terprise was soon squeezed out. Soon she had cut all routes by which English business on the coast had reached into the Chinese hinterland. In 1937 the British ambassador to China was machine-gunned by Japanese aviators, with extreme disregard of the Union Jack if not with deliberation. Two years later British subjects were stripped and searched by Japanese soldiers during the blockade of the British concession at Tientsin.

British interests in the Far East were clearly brought close to disaster by such events. As early as 1934, when the Japanese established an oil monopoly in Manchukuo, this situation began to be borne in on London and some change in policy resulted thereafter. Better relations were established with China, export credits were extended to that country, and some aid was sent over the Burma Road (completed in 1938). A really vigorous policy of aid to China might have been a brake on Japan; it could hardly have led to greater catastrophe than occurred later in the Pacific. In the early twentieth century the rulers of the British Empire were willing to check imperialist Russia by an alliance with imperialist Japan. A generation later they were not willing, until they had been almost driven out of the Pacific, to try to check imperialist Japan with the aid of the resurgent Chinese people.[8]

Ethiopia

The failure to cope with Japan was less startling than the reversals of policy in the case of Italy. It became more and more apparent in the 1930's that Mussolini was aspiring to hegemony in the Mediterranean and to empire in Africa and the Near East. The Italian Navy and air force grew to threatening proportions; assiduous propaganda sought to undermine Great Britain's position throughout the Arab world, and Mussolini talked bellicosely about "mare nostrum." Since the Mediterranean had long been an English lake or, at least, a vital English lifeline, the implications of Italian ambitions were suf-

[8] For a critical summary of British relations with Japan see Irving S. Friedman, *British Relations with China, 1931–1939*, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940.

ficiently obvious. Therefore, when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in 1935, it did not seem surprising that Great Britain, in the person of Sir Samuel Hoare, then foreign secretary, took the lead in demanding that League authority be upheld. As a result, Italy was declared an aggressor, limited economic sanctions were applied against her, and London secured from a number of states (France, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia) promises of aid if attacked while upholding the decisions of Geneva. For a time, League prestige climbed to new heights. But then a reaction set in. In the first place, sanctions were left ineffective by not being extended to include oil and other key products. In the second place, great doubt was cast on British motives by the publication in December, 1935, of the Hoare-Laval plan designed to settle the crisis by giving Mussolini about two-thirds of Ethiopia. When these proposals leaked out on December 9, the effect on public opinion in England and elsewhere was prodigious. Hoare was swept from office and the Hoare-Laval plan scrapped. But the damage had been done. The League never recovered from the shock. And Mussolini soon got away with the whole of Ethiopia.[9]

It is probable that the British National Government's sudden appearance in the role of League advocate had been the result of the pressure of public opinion. In the summer of 1935 the League of Nations Union had conducted an extensive poll of popular attitudes toward collective security. This revealed that some 10 million persons favored economic sanctions against aggression and, what was still more remarkable, that as many as 6 million favored even military sanctions.[10] No government was likely to ignore so large a body of opinion on the eve of a general election. Sir Samuel Hoare discovered the Covenant.

But, once the election was over, there were at least three reasons for seeking such a deal with Mussolini as the Hoare-Laval plan envisaged. First, those who thought in imperialist

[9] See Wolfers, *op. cit.*, pp. 355–364; Vigilantes, *Inquest on Peace: An Analysis of the National Government's Foreign Policy*, London, Gollancz, 1935, chap. 5; New Fabian Research Bureau, *The Road to War*, London, Gollancz, 1937, chap. 4. See also Chapters 6 and 13.—*Editor.*

[10] See Dame Adelaide Livingston, *The Peace Ballot: The Official History*, London, Gollancz, 1935.

terms did not believe (and events have confirmed them in their disbelief) that an Italian conquest of Ethiopia would be a fundamental threat to British interests. Second, to push sanctions further might drive Mussolini to war at a time when British armaments were dangerously low. Third, it seemed foolish to quarrel with Mussolini when Hitler was the real menace who had to be stopped.

All of these reasons had probably operated to produce the Hoare-Laval pact. But this reversal of policy was disastrous. The heart went out of the collective effort and, in the summer of 1936, sanctions were abandoned. Either clear-cut support of the League or a frank acceptance of Italian imperialism would have been better than the fifty-fifty program attempted by Hoare. As it was, Mussolini was able to represent himself as a victor over Great Britain and the League, Hitler was encouraged to gamble on reoccupying the Rhineland, and both Italy and Germany were emboldened to intervene in Spain.

Nonintervention in Spain

About British policy in the Spanish Civil War there was none of the high-sounding pretension in which Sir Samuel Hoare had first indulged in the case of Ethiopia. Two ends were sought: first, localization of the conflict so as to prevent a major war; second, the protection of British interests by preventing German or Italian annexation of Spanish territory and by securing the withdrawal of foreign troops (mainly Italian) from Spanish soil at the end of hostilities.

The first of these ends was sought by establishing the fiction of "nonintervention"; that is, the major powers agreed not to aid either side in Spain. Actually, German and Italian intervention reached large proportions, but the pretense that nonintervention was being observed enabled the British and French Governments to beat off the demands of progressive and radical elements in their electorates that something be done to aid the constitutionally established regime at Madrid. Had those demands been heeded, the crisis would certainly have grown worse

and war might easily have occurred. If this analysis was correct, nonintervention did preserve peace although at the expense of Spanish freedom.[11]

To secure the second end of policy direct negotiation with Italy was resorted to. An agreement of January, 1937, provided for the "respect of each other's rights and interests" in the Mediterranean, contained a disclaimer of any desire to modify the existing status in that area and was accompanied by a note in which Italy specifically promised not to violate the integrity of Spanish territory. By a more extensive agreement, over a year later (April 16, 1938), Great Britain undertook to recognize and promote recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia, Italy to respect Spanish territorial integrity, to withdraw her soldiers from Spain at the end of the war, to refrain from anti-British propaganda, and to collaborate in maintaining the status existing in the Red Sea.

Given the ends sought, British policy in the Spanish affair can perhaps be pronounced successful. No major war developed out of the events in Spain, and when Franco had finally won his victory Italian and German forces withdrew from Spanish territory. As late as the summer of 1942, at least, Spain had not joined the war on the Axis side.

Yet there were many who felt that the policy was too narrow in its conception, too cautious in its application. When an international patrol was established to deal with repeated sinking of ships by "unknown" submarines (almost certainly Italian), the depredations soon ceased. Would a firm stand on the whole problem of Spain have put a stop to intervention and checked the increasing arrogance of the Fascist states? It was all very well to say that British interests had been protected, but the dictators received their returning soldiers in triumph and boasted as if they had won another victory over democracy and the established order. If the Loyalists had won, would not England have had a firm friend in Spain after 1939 instead of a regime whose destiny is bound up with an Axis victory? More-

[11] See the discussion of France in Chapter 15 for another view.—*Editor.*

over, Mussolini was not appeased in the end by treaties or agreements or complacent acceptance of his conquests.[12]

Britain and Germany

Long before Hitler came to power a large segment of British opinion was convinced of the necessity of revising Versailles before a stable and decent peace could be made; this opinion did not disappear after 1933. Yet along with it there developed a passionate revolt at the excesses of Nazi rule. The contrast between these attitudes was so great that a strong or consistent policy towards Nazi Germany could hardly be looked for. There was, on the one hand, a continued willingness to placate Germany by some measure of revision. A determined effort was made to avoid splitting Europe into two armed camps. Even after Germany had withdrawn from the Disarmament Conference and the League, British efforts were directed toward an arms agreement that would be satisfactory to all.[13] When Hitler denounced Locarno and remilitarized the Rhineland, London refused to join France in military measures. In June, 1935, she even contributed to treaty violation by concluding a bilateral agreement by which Germany was allowed 35 per cent of the naval tonnage of the British Commonwealth. This acquiescence in German moves was, however, mingled with protests at German methods and treaty violations, with such precautionary measures as increases in arms estimates and even with some diplomatic steps to offset Berlin's gains (Stresa Front, 1935). These contrasting measures added together to give an effect of confusion and weakness.

The Policy of Appeasement

An attempt to dissipate this impression was made when Neville Chamberlain became prime minister in May, 1937.

[12] See W. N. Medlicott, *British Foreign Policy Since Versailles,* London, Methuen, 1940, chap. 10; New Fabian Research Bureau, *op. cit.,* chap. 5; D. Graham Hutton, "British Policy towards Spain," *Foreign Affairs,* 15:4 (July, 1937), pp. 661–673; W. Horsfall Carter, "Spain and the Axis," *Foreign Affairs,* 20:1 (October, 1941), pp. 175–183.

[13] Contrast this view with that of Barnes in the preceding chapter.—*Editor.*

Chamberlain was quite inexperienced in the handling of foreign affairs, but he had decided opinions concerning them and sufficient force and pertinacity to put his opinions to the test of practice. His views may be summarized as follows: a continuance of the current indecisive policy was likely to involve Great Britain in war with Germany, Italy, or Japan, or with all three together; another war would mean universal impoverishment, social revolution, and the end of the British Empire; the League was no longer, if it ever was, capable of averting war; war might be averted by a consistent policy of conciliating the dynamic powers at least in Europe; during the process of conciliation Great Britain must re-arm so as to be prepared for the worst. In addition to this, Mr. Chamberlain sought to make clear the specific interests for which Great Britain would certainly fight. They were the defense of the integrity of France, Belgium, Portugal, Iraq, and Egypt; the protection of the territories and communications of Great Britain and the Empire; the prevention of European domination by a single power.[14]

It would perhaps be correct to say that the three announced aims of Mr. Chamberlain were consistency, clarity, and conciliation. Unfortunately he was not really clear. The most important question facing Europe at the time he assumed control of British foreign policy was Czechoslovakia. France was bound by treaty to fight beside Czechoslovakia in case of a German attack. Mr. Chamberlain did not guarantee Czechoslovakia, neither did he make it clear that he would fight for France if she lived up to her treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, and neither did he declare a disinterest in the whole Czech question. In the second place, he was not able to be consistent, for English public opinion forced him to accompany his policy of appeasing Hitler with recrimination and protest at the methods (in Austria for example) by which Hitler was gaining his ends; indeed, after the occupation of Prague, public pressure forced him to extend to ramshackle and re-

[14] Speech of March 24, 1938. Chamberlain's speeches have been published under the title of *In Search of Peace*, New York, Putnam, 1939. See Harry E. Barnes's interpretation in the preceding chapter.—*Editor.*

actionary Poland the guarantee he had refused to progressive and democratic Czechoslovakia. In the third place, Chamberlain adopted conciliation just at the moment when more concessions to Hitler would mean drastic revisions of the balance of power and bring German domination of Europe appreciably nearer. On top of all this, he executed his whole policy clumsily. He did not re-arm vigorously. He did not intervene personally in the Czech crisis until Europe had been brought to the brink of war and he then allowed Hitler to have his way in a manner that made it impossible to talk convincingly about a negotiated settlement. The steps by which the Munich "Agreement" was implemented drove this point home. Germany simply took what she wanted. The international supervisory commission provided for was a rubber stamp and the international guarantee by which the Czechoslovak rump state was to be protected never came into effect. At Munich Mr. Chamberlain became inextricably associated with what was probably the most stunning defeat ever suffered by British diplomacy.

As a result of that defeat the balance of power shifted sharply to the side of Germany. Her supremacy in central and eastern Europe was assured. The French alliance system was smashed. The strategic advantage given by the control of Bohemia was gone and along with it Czechoslovakia's munitions output and her superb army. It is very doubtful if such preparations for war as were made by Great Britain and France in the year after Munich offset these losses. Certainly they did not offset the reversal in diplomatic tactics by the Soviet Union that followed.[15]

The Turn of the Tide

So deep was the impression made by the British defeat at Munich, coming at the end of the long retreat since 1931, that men began to talk of British "abdication" as a great power.

[15] Professor R. W. Seton-Watson thinks that ". . . the basic feature of the Munich 'Settlement' was Mr. Chamberlain's acceptance of Hitler's demand for the exclusion of Russia from the European Concert and a tacit recognition that Eastern Europe lay specifically within his sphere of interest." Seton-Watson, *From Munich to Danzig*, 3rd ed., London, Methuen, 1939, p. 256. On appeasement and Munich see also Wolfers, *op. cit.*, chap. 17; Arnold J. Toynbee, "A Turning

Such pessimism, however, ignored the fact that beneath the surface the tide had already begun to turn. Even while she was yielding to the aggressors, Great Britain was preparing, although all too slowly, for the day when she would yield no more. As early as 1932 it had been announced that defense estimates would no longer be based on the assumption that there would be no war for ten years. Two years later, Prime Minister Baldwin declared that the air force would be doubled and a further increase was announced in 1935. The *Defence White Paper* of March 3, 1936, contained proposals for all-round rearmament, while the next year saw the adoption of a five-year program entailing expenditures to the tremendous (as it seemed) total of $7,500,000,000.

In the 1930's, too, the whole Empire underwent a process of reconstruction that, in the words of a penetrating writer,[16] "mastered the forces of disintegration" and turned it once again into a "living, functioning organism." Imperial consciousness grew apace. Colonial administration was improved, especially by greater attention to education and social reform. Some effort was made to solve the Indian problem by the Government of India Act of 1935. In the Commonwealth, after 1931, emphasis was shifted from the search for autonomy to a search for unity and co-operation between the Dominions and the United Kingdom in a war-filled world. Finally, relations were improved with a number of states on the fringes of the Empire—Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.

Much of this process had been successfully completed when Hitler occupied Prague in March, 1939. With that event, English opinion hardened. There were to be no more retreats in Europe at least. When Poland was invaded Great Britain went to war.[17]

Point in History," *Foreign Affairs*, 17:2 (January, 1939), pp. 305-320; Winston Churchill, *Step by Step, 1936–1939*, New York, Putnam, 1939; by the same author, *Blood, Sweat, and Tears*, New York, Putnam, 1941; Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission: Berlin, 1937–1939*, New York, Putnam, 1940.

[16] See Albert Viton, *Great Britain. An Empire in Transition*, New York, John Day, 1940, p. 229.

[17] See *Documents Concerning German-Polish Relations and the Outbreak of Hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939, Cmd 6106, Miscellaneous No. 9 (1939)*.

Great Britain and the United States

In the dismal record from Manchuria to Munich, one of the few bright spots was the steadily improving relationship with the United States. We have already seen that just at the moment when Great Britain was forced by the growth of the German navy to concentrate on maintaining naval supremacy in the North Sea, the United States had emerged as a great sea power. In their turn, United States authorities, fearful of a possible threat to Central and South America, found in British sea power "one of the principal foundations of American world security." [18] The understanding thus produced by mutuality of interests survived the stresses of the British blockade during 1914–1917. After the First World War, consideration of the United States became a primary if not the central factor in determining British policy. With a naval ratio of parity the latter could break any blockade imposed by the Royal Navy. This meant that United States co-operation or at least benevolent neutrality was necessary to wage war or apply sanctions. It meant, too, that Great Britain, with her long lines of communication, could never hope to win a war with the United States.[19] Moreover, if intervention by the United States had been necessary to defeat Germany in the First World War, still more would American action be decisive in determining the destinies of nations in the twentieth-century struggles for power. For these reasons, as well as because of the wishes of the Dominions and the strategically exposed position of Canada, it became absolutely essential to Great Britain never to lose the friendship of the United States. Fortunately the two countries tended to see eye to eye on fundamentals. In contrast to 1914, there was in 1939 no question of neutrality in thought. Nor was the connection merely sentimental. It was widely believed in the United States that American interests were closely involved in the victory of Great Britain. After the fall of France,

[18] Lionel Gelber, *op. cit.*, p. 135. Gelber points out (p. 91) that from the early part of the century, Great Britain always considered important steps in diplomacy in the light of their consequences upon the Dominions and the United States.

[19] See Carr, *op. cit.*, pp. 42–45.

even some professed isolationists manifested concern over the fate of the British Navy and the control of the eastern shores of the Atlantic. Thereafter the association of the two nations in the war effort grew increasingly close. To their understanding a seal was placed by the Atlantic Declaration (August 14, 1941), a document that seemed to mark the final resolution by these two countries to maintain jointly throughout the world their interests and their ideals.[20]

After the United States entered the war this resolution began to be implemented by the numerous joint committees for economic and military co-operation and by the close contacts between leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. It was evident, too, that this co-operation was meant to extend beyond the end of the war. Thus, Article VIII of the Atlantic Declaration implies that "pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security" there will be Anglo-American maintenance of the peace. By the agreement of February 28, 1942, it was further made clear that the two governments proposed to move jointly in the postwar world to secure the economic objectives of the Declaration—assured access to raw materials for all nations, reduced trade barriers, social security, and higher standards of living in all countries.[21]


The Problem of India

Nowhere were the difficulties of Imperial government shown more clearly than in the case of India. Here Great Britain has to reconcile a complex of conflicting interests and aspirations: British and Indian; Indian states and British India; [22] Hindu


[20] For a discussion of the Atlantic Charter see Chapter 27, "Plans for a New World Order."—*Editor.*

[21] On problems and difficulties of Anglo-American relations, see Geoffrey Crowther, "Anglo-American Pitfalls," *Foreign Affairs*, 20:1 (October, 1941), pp. 1–17; *The Round Table*, no. 125 (December, 1941), pp. 5–16; John MacCormac, *America and World Mastery*, New York, Duell, 1942.

[22] It must be remembered that only "British India" (comprising, however, nearly two-thirds of the total area and three-quarters of the total population) is directly subject to the Emperor of India (that is, the British Crown). Some six hundred princes rule the rest. They are all subordinate to the Crown, whose will prevails in the last analysis, but they enjoy varying degrees of autonomy,



MAP 11A. INDIA



MAP 11B. INDIA

and Moslem; caste Hindu and Untouchable. She has to deal with a country that is compressing centuries of history into decades. "It is agitated by a struggle between religious communities as fierce as that in seventeenth-century Europe, by a nationalist fever as acute as that of revolutionary France, by an economic class war as portentous as that of the contemporary Western world." [23] Is it any wonder that no policy hitherto proposed has proved workable?

In 1917 the British Government announced that the goal of its administration of India was self-government, but the partial provincial self-rule conferred by the Act of 1919 proved an insufficient measure to satisfy Indian Nationalism. Under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi, the application of the tactics of nonco-operation, boycott, and civil disobedience kept the country in constant tension and produced at times a condition approaching open rebellion. It was hoped that a solution had been found in the Government of India Act, 1935. By this statute a federation of all India was proposed in which the provinces would have almost complete responsibility for their own affairs while the central administration would be largely controlled by Indians. Students familiar with the normal pattern of constitutional development in the British Commonwealth were convinced that the limitations on self-government that were still left in this Act would disappear in the course of a few years, as similar reservations had done in the case of Canada and other Dominions. The Indians, however, were not satisfied, and for this reason, as well as for others, the Act was never put into full operation.

Consideration for world opinion, a widespread desire to satisfy Indian aspirations, and the expediency of winning the enthusiastic co-operation of the Asiatic peoples in the war effort made a settlement of the Indian problem increasingly urgent after 1939. It became so acute after the Japanese invaded Burma that Sir Stafford Cripps was sent as a special emissary with specific proposals as to how complete independence could

[23] Guy Wint, in Sir George Schuster and Guy Wint, *India and Democracy*, London, Macmillan, 1941, p. 232.

be attained.[24] These proposals (March 29, 1942) fell into two parts. (1) It was proposed that "immediately upon the cessation of hostilities" a constituent assembly for all India should be chosen. The representatives from British India would be selected by an electoral college made up of the combined membership of the lower houses in all the provincial legislatures unless "the leaders of Indian opinion in the principal communities" agreed upon some other mode of choice before the end of the war. Representatives of the States would apparently be chosen as their rulers decided. The British government promised to accept and implement the decisions reached by this constituent assembly subject only to (*a*) the recognition of the right of any province to refrain from accepting the new constitution and (*b*) the signing of a treaty between Great Britain and the constitution-making body. This treaty would deal with matters arising out of the transfer of power to the new Union and would contain guarantees of minority rights. By these provisions London hoped to meet the Nationalist demand for full autonomy without dishonoring her pledges to protect the interests of minority groups and areas. (2) During the continuance of the Second World War Great Britain would retain the control and direction of defense, although Indian leaders would participate in organizing the resources and manpower of the country. Moreover, an Indian would be appointed to the War Cabinet and to the Pacific Council of the United Nations. India would also send her own representative to the peace conference.

Within two weeks, this British offer had been rejected both by the Hindus and the Moslems—although, significantly, for different reasons. The All Indian Congress (composed mainly of Hindus although claiming to speak for all India) objected to the powers given the Indian princes to choose the delegates from the States, to the possibility of the nonaccession of states and provinces to the proposed Union, and to the reservation of defense for the period of the war. The Moslem League, on the other hand, was fearful that minorities within the prov-

[24] Text in the *New York Times*, March 30, 1942.

inces might be coerced into the union and demanded that the right of partitioning Moslem from Hindu India be given unequivocal recognition.

To realistic observers the whole episode, ending in the return of Sir Stafford Cripps and the withdrawal of the British offer, served to demonstrate the sincerity of British attempts to meet Indian demands, the intransigence of Indian nationalists and the extreme difficulty of the whole problem. Illiterate, politically inexperienced, deeply sundered by communal rivalries, the Indian peoples seemed to lack the basic requirements of democratic government, perhaps, even those of national unity. Above all, they lacked what Lord Bryce regarded as the great prerequisite to democracy, an "agreement on fundamentals." [25]

Nor was the continuous discontent of India exceptional among the parts of the Empire where the origin of the people was non-European. Waves of nationalist unrest swept through all these colonies after 1919, especially in Asia from Suez to Singapore. In Egypt, the grant of a qualified independence, in 1922, failed to slake nationalist passions. Not until 1936 were relations between the two countries put on a satisfactory treaty basis. In Palestine, the British undertook the impossible task of creating a national home for the Jews without prejudice to the nationalist aspirations of the Arab majority, who claimed that the territory had been promised to them as part of an independent Arab state. With the growth of Jewish immigration and enterprise, bitterness between the two peoples found vent in riots and demonstrations. After 1936 disorder was almost constant.[26]

[25] Amid the vast literature on India special attention should be given to the recent work by Sir George Schuster and Guy Wint, *op. cit.* Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's autobiography *Toward Freedom,* New York, John Day, 1941, gives a splendid picture of the Indian mind at its best. This book may well become classic.

[26] See E. Monroe, *The Mediterranean in Politics,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1938; G. T. Garratt, *Gibraltar and the Mediterranean,* New York, Coward, 1939; George Young, *Egypt,* London, Benn, 1937; N. Bentwich, *England in Palestine,* London, Kegan Paul, 1932; "Palestine: The Wider Hope," *The Round Table,* no. 114 (March, 1939), pp. 252–277; "Palestine: A Leaf Turned," *The Round Table,* no. 115 (June, 1939), pp. 457–475; "Arab Nationalism and the War," *The Round Table,* no. 124 (September, 1941), pp. 698–708.

Conclusion

Why did British statesmanship so generally fail to rise to the necessities of the period between the Peace of Versailles and the outbreak of the Second World War? In particular, why was it so sluggish in rallying to meet the challenge of Fascism after 1931?

A full answer to these questions cannot be given until we have a better perspective and far more documentation than is now available. The cautious student will hesitate before accepting the partisan and windy charges of conspiracy with Fascism, and the loose assertions of British decadence that have been tossed about so freely by some writers. It is doubtful if they are true and certainly they are not yet substantiated, in spite of Munich and Singapore.

It is likely, however, that any satisfactory answer must give weight to several factors. The number and complexity of the problems to be faced and the cost of mistakes might well produce hesitation and confusion even among skillful governors. Actually both the Parliaments and the Cabinets of the 1930's were filled with men of dismal mediocrity. Moreover, all the governments in this decade were dominated by old men who had lost or had never possessed vision and daring. This was true of the three prime ministers of the period—Ramsay Macdonald, Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain—and of such foreign secretaries as Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare, and Lord Halifax. The young and vigorous Anthony Eden was forced out of the Foreign Office in 1938 when he refused to truckle to Mussolini; while later in the same year Alfred Duff Cooper, First Lord of the Admiralty, resigned after Munich. The old men hung onto power with a grim tenacity that survived all defeats until the spring of 1940, had no conception of the real forces of our age, nor were they willing to learn either from the young or from such men of their own generation as Lloyd George and Winston Churchill.

Class interest almost certainly played some part in determining the attitudes of these Tories. They made great sacrifices to

avoid war because they believed it would lead to social upheavals unfavorable to their privileges. They were inclined to a certain sympathy with Hitler and Mussolini, whom they regarded as the saviors of western Europe from Bolshevism. Therefore, they were prepared to go to great lengths to avoid conflict with Italy, or, especially, Germany. They went so far as to endanger the security of the nation and the Empire.[27]

Their policy had, however, a logic other than that of class interest. Just as Bismarck had sought to placate France after 1871 by encouraging her expansion overseas, so might it be argued that if Hitler was allowed to go eastward (and this was the policy implicit in Munich) he would not be a menace to the west. The further he went the more complicated his problems would become. In the end he would clash with the Soviet Union. Even if he defeated the U.S.S.R. his strength would be exhausted for a long time to come. Thus the balance of power would be restored without involving Great Britain in war. If this Tory calculation was stupidly Machiavellian, so was its Soviet converse.[28] Many of those who were most horrified by "appeasement" viewed the Russo-German Pact of August, 1939, as a shrewd stroke of policy. It was the tragedy of Europe that when the Soviet Union wanted collective action against the Fascists, the British Tories preferred to seek a deal with Hitler. When Great Britain stiffened after the occupation of Prague, the Soviet Union, still conscious of the abominable treatment received in the negotiations leading up to Munich, still suspicious of Tory intentions, took its own immediate safety in hand by making a deal with the aggressor. This did not save the Soviet Union from German attack in 1941, and probably the same result would have followed a continued application of

[27] This attitude was supposed to find special favor among people who frequented Lord Astor's country estate, Cliveden. Leaders of appeasement were often referred to as the "Cliveden Set." F. L. Schuman, *International Politics,* 3rd ed., New York, McGraw-Hill, 1941, pp. 608–609, lists among those favoring a deal with Hitler: J. L. Garvin, then editor of *The Observer;* Sir Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England; Lord Beaverbrook and Lord Rothermere, owners of newspaper chains; W. R. Inge, the retired Dean of St. Paul's; and the Archbishop of Canterbury. (Compare this view with that of Barnes in the previous chapter.—*Editor.*)

[28] Again contrast with Barnes.—*Editor.*

the policy of appeasement by Great Britain at the expense of the Soviets.

Mediocre leadership, class interest and erroneous calculations of forces and trends go far to explain the hesitations and confusion of British diplomacy between the wars. Even after September 3, 1939, the same tendency to a cautious and a purely defensive policy was evident. Those were the days of the *"Sitzkrieg"* in which it was confidently believed that time was so completely on the side of Great Britain and France that it was only necessary to stave off German offensives, relying on the blockade to produce ultimate victory. Not until after Churchill succeeded Chamberlain in May, 1940, when Great Britain was brought to the very edge of destruction, was there anything approaching total organization of the nation for war purposes. Even then, as Crete and Singapore showed, there was displayed too little of the imagination and daring necessary to defeat the enemies of Great Britain and the United States in the Second World War.

The war not only drives Great Britain closer to the United States but also seems to accentuate the importance of international peace and organization to her future.

It is her headship of the Commonwealth-Empire that has enabled Great Britain to hold so important a place in world politics. Without the vast human and material resources and strategic advantages that she has been able to draw from overseas the United Kingdom would become merely a rather small country, ranking fifth among the great powers in population,[20] not very well endowed with raw materials, and in constant danger from the Continent. If Great Britain is to survive the Empire must survive in some form or other.

It is probable, however, that the Empire in turn can survive only by being absorbed in a larger and higher system. The

[20] Far below the U.S.S.R., the United States, Germany, and Japan and not much ahead of Italy or even France. She would be completely overshadowed by the 375,000,000 inhabitants of Europe west of the Soviet Union if a United States of Europe should emerge. Of course, without the Empire, including what Viton calls the "Outer Empire" and the "Financial Empire," Great Britain could not even support the 46 million inhabitants she now has.

Empire is scattered over too wide an area and is too heterogeneous in composition to be capable of defense by Great Britain, especially in the dawning era of gargantuan continental states—the Soviet Union, the United States, Germany, and perhaps China. Three developments seem of decisive importance in this connection:

(1) The Second World War is turning the Dominions into industrialized and heavily armed communities, more self-directing than ever before.

(2) One of the strongest links of the Empire—reliance on Great Britain for defense—is already broken. A country like Australia, that has seen the Japanese swoop down from the north with little effective interference from Great Britain, will have a new outlook on world politics after the present war.

(3) In so far as the Dominions, and the dependent parts of the Empire as well, seek outside associations, London has to compete more and more with other centers of attraction. This is obvious when the whole world is looking to Washington, when China confers with India, and when the prestige of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics mounts steadily.

These developments seem to strengthen the centrifugal forces that are always present in such a political structure as the British Empire. If the League of Nations was deemed indispensable to counteract them after 1919, an even stronger international organization will be necessary after the present war. Fortunately for Great Britain, this is not only her need but the need of mankind, and its satisfaction is the main political task of the present century.

Questions

1. Comment on the following as statements of the essence of British policy: (*a*) "The desire for isolation and the knowledge that it is impossible—these are the two poles between which the needle of the British compass continues to waver." (*b*) "All our greatest wars have been fought to prevent one great military power dominating Europe, and at the same time dominating the coasts of the Channel

and the ports of the Low Countries."—Sir Austen Chamberlain. (*c*) "We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe: but this country cannot and will not act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution."—Castlereagh, 1820.

2. What were the bases of British prominence in the nineteenth century? How have these been modified by later developments?

3. Has modern technology strengthened land power at the expense of sea power?

4. In what sense, if any, do you think it true to speak of the League of Nations as the "British Empire in commission"?

5. State and comment on the reasons given for British policy concerning Japanese expansion.

6. Explain the Hoare-Laval Pact.

7. Describe the aims, methods, and results of British policy in Spain.

8. What was the policy of "appeasement"? Do you think its failure was inevitable or due to the method of its application?

9. Continental statesmen sometimes spoke of an "Anglo-Saxon bloc." Did British-United States relations justify such a term?

10. Assuming that the United Nations win this Second World War, some persons believe it will be followed by the establishment of a kind of Pax Anglo-Americana. Discuss the forecast.

11. How have modern economic changes affected Great Britain's world position?

12. How did Great Britain adjust herself to the challenge of rising competitors at the end of the nineteenth century?

13. What were the principal effects of the First World War on relations between Britain and other parts of the Empire?

14. Account for the spread of colonial nationalism after 1918.

15. What were the effects of the Washington Conference Treaties on Far Eastern Politics?

16. What were the consequences of Munich?

17. Describe the responses of the various Dominions to the British declaration of war in 1939.

18. Compare Britain's position *vis à vis* Germany in 1914 and in 1940.

19. Discuss the apparent effects of the Second World War on British Commonwealth relations.

20. Compare the British Commonwealth of Nations, the League of Nations, and Federal Union as methods of international organization.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Estimate the effects of the airplane on empire and vice versa.
2. Survey Canadian and United States relations.
3. Discuss Anglo-United States co-operation in the prosecution of the Second World War.
4. Discuss the negotiations between Britain and the U.S.S.R., 1939.
5. Report on Anglo-American relations in the Far East, 1931–1939.
6. Discuss British Imperial co-operation in the Second World War.
7. British public opinion and the League of Nations, 1919–1939.
8. Survey the status and history of Great Britain in the Mediterranean.
9. Discuss the relations of Britain and Palestine.
10. Report on Great Britain's economic recovery.
11. Survey the problem of India.
12. Discuss the British Foreign Office.

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CHAPTER 15

THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE

Europe at War and Peace

The two preceding chapters have in their diverging interpretations covered much of the background necessary for an understanding of continental affairs following the outbreak of the Second World War. They make clear the French ascendancy after 1918, the British doubt and uncertainty, the Italian rise with its attendant strategic changes in the Mediterranean, the struggle of the Soviet Union for acceptance into the family of nations, the helplessness of small states, and all the accompanying circumstances. They list the failures of disarmament, of the League, of collective security, of peace treaties, and of attempts toward the adjustment of Europe's ever-burning frontiers. They are accounts of human hopes, inadequacies, and failures.

They are also accounts of struggles for power and of clashes of policies in open conflict with the idealism of the proponents of collective security, which were largely fought in three areas: (1) Europe, (2) the Mediterranean, and (3) the Near East.[1]

Such struggles are an old story for these areas. From time immemorial Europe has witnessed alternating periods of war and peace as nations have worked for mastery. During modern times such continental powers as Spain, France, and Germany have sought domination, while Great Britain has sought a balance of power. Sometimes the struggle has been carried on by diplomacy; at other times—as wars have drained the states of fighting strength—the struggle has entered into a quiescent phase; and at still other times the balance of power has pre-

[1] See R. S. Kain, *Europe, Versailles to Warsaw,* New York, H. W. Wilson, 1939; F. L. Schuman, *Design for Power,* New York, Knopf, 1942, pp. 79–235. For a correlation of all theaters at the opening of 1942, see Oliver Benson, "Hitler's Europe Under Siege," *Current History* (January, 1942), pp. 427–434.

vailed as it did during most of the nineteenth century. At such times there has been peace.

But periodically rivalries have broken out in virulent form, and there have been wars. This is written in the midst of such a period, which has spread its destruction everywhere.

To understand what this Second World War is about as far as it pertains to Europe, it is vital to know what are the major policies of the European states which govern their conduct of foreign affairs. The background for these policies, especially in their historical aspects will be found in the two preceding chapters.[2]

Great Britain. In recent times Great Britain has been motivated by fairly clear objectives. The most fundamental one since the days of Cardinal Wolsey has been the basis for them all. It is to create a balance of power on the Continent by maintaining the fighting strength so evenly that the additional weight of British arms on one side or the other would determine victory for the side on which they were thrown. Lloyd George abandoned that policy at the Paris Conference and surrendered predominance of power to France, which held it until the 1930's. Closely related to this policy were those others which called for British naval supremacy and for making it profitable for outside states to be on friendly terms with Britain. Such basic ideas called for the skillful playing of a lone political hand, and Great Britain consistently refused to join in continental diplomacy, holding aloof from the system of collective security. Still another—dangerous—principle was the assumption that Britain could take severe losses at the beginning of any war in which she might engage, but that she would "always win the last fight" and then dictate the terms of peace. A corollary of this program was, H. A. Steiner says, if possible to have other states pull her diplomatic chestnuts out of the fire.[3]

[2] See also Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics,* New York, American Book, 1937; also Steiner, *Principles and Problems of International Relations,* New York, Dial, 1940, pp. 583–761.

[3] Steiner, *op. cit.,* p. 636. For an excellent account of British foreign policy in its historical aspects see H. Temperley and L. M. Penson, *The Foundations of British Foreign Policy,* New York, Macmillan, 1939.

France. The French policy was dictated by an entirely different set of principles. Basic was the quest for security against attack, especially from Germany, and a maintenance of the *status quo* created by the Treaty of Versailles. France sought to bolster this with arbitration and pacific settlement, and by giving lip service to disarmament. Security could only come from other states and at first Great Britain was the mainstay. She was abandoned as France sought security in the League, in her alliances, and in the system of collective security. In 1938 and 1939, when Hitler menaced the peace of the world, we have seen (in Chapter 13, "From the First World War to the Second World War") that France willingly returned the leadership to Great Britain as the Little Entente was smashed at Munich and the League was shown to be ineffectual in Manchuria and Ethiopia.[4]

In the practical task of carrying these policies into effect the French were beset by many troubles. Domestically, French policy was marked by confusion, as may be seen from the failure of the Right and Blum's Left to see French interests clearly and support the Loyalist cause in Spain during the Franco revolt. There have even been accusations that a Fascist directory consisting of Pétain, Weygand, Chiappe, Doriot, and Laval were receiving direct aid from Berlin. France, then, was disunited and indecisive when the international storm clouds gathered. The first Blum cabinet fell; Chautemps fell in turn; then Blum again. The weak Daladier ministry followed, and when Bonnet and Daladier went to Munich, they did so prepared to make terms on conditions which the British deemed wise for Great Britain, correctly believing that the French leaders at home could be persuaded to yield to Nazi dictates. Furthermore, the French leaders seemed far more interested in fighting the Communists at home than they were in meeting danger from abroad. Some of their foreign policy was a reflection of this attitude, for they were ready to yield to Germany rather than to concede Soviet demands on the Baltic. The ex-

[4] See Paul Perigord, "Foreign Policies of France," the third lecture of *Foreign Policies of the Great Powers,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1939, pp. 69–115.

tent to which France was ready to yield was reflected in the Bonnet agreement to the Italian Peace Proposals—so-called—of September 1 and 2, 1939. The French wanted a secure France, but they could not agree on how to secure it.[5]

Germany. The German policy between 1919 and 1933 had been one of asking for revision, but hardly demanding it. For a part of the time at least Germany had sought reconciliation with the rest of the world. When Hitler and the Nazis took control the German policy visibly strengthened, although between 1931 and 1933 it had grown stiffer as the world uncertainty and depression grew. Hitler had always attacked the peace treaties and he continued to do so after he came into office. He promised peace to his neighbors, Austria in 1934 and Poland in 1934, but he planned to revise the terms controlling Germany as soon as he could. His purpose was to strike his opponents when they were divided, surprise them, exploit their weaknesses, spread discord among them by propaganda and fifth-column techniques, and to divide and conquer. His was a return to the policy of blood and iron with a vengeance.[6]

Looking at the platform of the Twenty-five Points and *Mein Kampf,* it is seen that the Nazi policy consisted of uniting the Germans; destroying the Versailles and the other treaties of peace; securing more space for German population and for its support; re-creating the German army; uprooting the Jews; preventing any two continental powers from coming into existence at any one time; breaking the Soviet Union; destroying France as a military power; making overtures to Great Britain and Italy; and, achieving predominance on the continent, particularly in the east.[7]

Great Britain and Italy were to be wooed. The Rome-Berlin alliance—the Axis, as Mussolini euphemistically called it—was a step in this direction, for it grew out of the settlement of the

[5] See D. W. Brogan, *France Under the Republic,* New York, Harper, 1940; C. E. Black, "Vichy at the Cross-Roads," *Current History* (January, 1942), pp. 446–449 for a brief description of present French policy.

[6] Malbone Graham, "Foreign Policies of Germany," in *Foreign Policies of the Great Powers,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1939, pp. 1–41.

[7] See Cesare Santoro, *Hitler Germany, as Seen by a Foreigner,* Berlin, Internationaler Verlag, 1938.

Tyrol question, when Hitler moved the potentially troublesome German populations from there in 1933. The first Italian fears of German designs in Austria were laid at rest when Hitler supported Mussolini in his Ethiopian adventure, especially in a statement dated July 11, 1936. This was followed on November 25 by the Anti-Comintern Pact, which both states signed, and on May 22, 1939, by a military alliance.

With Great Britain the Nazi policies were less successful as has been seen in the previous chapter. The wooing of Italy and Great Britain was accompanied by open hostility towards the U.S.S.R. It was therefore a startling *volte face* when the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed on August 23, 1939.

There was a marked tendency to see evidence in the German-Soviet pact that the U.S.S.R. had become more nationalistic than Bolshevik. Germany and the Soviet Union were ideal economic partners, the one supplying what the other lacked. This pact also affected the situation of Poland, Rumania, and the Baltic states. It permitted the unrestricted extension of Nazi economic and political power into the Balkans. Presumably, therefore, it marked a new departure in Nazi policy, but as we now know it was only a pact of temporary convenience for both sides, which permitted Hitler to achieve what he wished—domination over central Europe. He later reversed the pact by an attack on the U.S.S.R. in accordance with the thesis of *Mein Kampf*.

Finally, Nazi foreign policy has been marked by the utmost agility in shifting and shaking some partners whenever they have served their purpose, and paradoxically a steadfastness toward others. It consists of using all means available, and is a Machiavellian program measured only by the success attending the methods which are used.

Italy. The Italian policies were centered in the Mediterranean, and the theme was epitomized by Mussolini in his address of March 26, 1939, when he stated that geographically, historically, politically, and militarily the Mediterranean was "living space" for Italy. To implement this idea the Italian navy had been strengthened by new sea sleds, warships, and planes

to challenge the British supremacy, and to terminate any question of French opposition.[8]


The Italian program was bound to conflict with the policies of both Great Britain and France. As much as 20 per cent of the total of British supplies passed over the Mediterranean route. This route gave upon the vast oil resources of Mosul and the Near East, linked the British Isles with the Suez Canal, bordered on Palestine and Egypt, and was the key to the control of the hinterland of Iraq, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula. To hold this control, the British had possession of Gibraltar, Alexandria, and Malta. In 1936 (August 26), Great Britain had granted the Egyptians a modified freedom, but she bolstered it with a right to military control over the Suez region until 1944. Cyprus and Haifa had been constructed to offset the Italian base at Tobruk. The British were determined to retain their superiority in the Mediterranean. The Italians were equally determined to break it and substitute their own.

Efforts at bringing about an adjustment in the conflict of these policies had not been particularly successful. In 1935 and 1936, the British had permitted the Italians passage through the Suez Canal in their Ethiopian adventure, although the former were undoubtedly afraid that Italy would succeed in getting to the Suez Canal by way of Ethiopia. In retrospect this seems to have been a chief Italian ambition, and may explain why the British took special pains to eliminate the Italians from Ethiopia early in the Second World War and to restore Haile Selassie.[9]

On January 2, 1937, Italy received concessions from Great Britain in an agreement covering their special interests in the

[8] David P. Barrows, "Foreign Policies of Italy," in *Foreign Policies of the Great Powers,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1939, pp. 41–67.

[9] In 1896, when the Italian threat had not been serious, England had been perfectly willing to agree to spheres of influence in Ethiopia. The Italian defeat at Adowa, by Menelik II prevented Italy from establishing her control in accordance with the agreement. On December 13, 1906, Britain and France could again with equanimity agree to divide Ethiopia as well as to grant Italy control over Italian Eritrea and Somaliland. Even as late as 1925 Great Britain was willing to play this imperialistic game with Mussolini by a supplementary agreement. This was followed by another on April 3, 1936. See the preceding chapter for further detail.



MAP 12. MEDITERRANEAN LANDS

Mediterranean. It was part of the "appeasement" policy of the next year, for it was followed by the treaty of April 16, 1938.[10] However, it failed to meet Italian expectations. When the Italians moved into Albania on April 7 and 8, 1939, the British considered the treaty had been violated and therefore terminated in that the *status quo* of the area had been broken by Italian action.

The same conflict of interests and policies may be noted between Italy and France for the same period. Italy knew that the French manpower of her African possessions could be utilized only by the Mediterranean route. To this end France had constructed the ports of Bizerta, Oran, and Algiers, and was also interested in Syria, the Mosul oil supply, and free traffic via the Mediterranean. To some extent, in order to make these secure, France depended on the British fleet. On the eve of the war France had the further difficulty of being situated alongside Spain, recently subjugated by Franco and on friendly terms with Italy. But most seriously of all, she was challenged by Italy at every turn.

Franco-Italian misunderstandings can only be understood in their historical perspective. In 1881 France took Tunis, an act which gave rise to Italian suspicion and distrust; the alliance in the First World War never allayed this. Between 1918 and 1935 the friction between the two states was constant. Not only did it manifest itself in name calling and in border episodes over escaping anti-Fascists but it also led to inability to cooperate in the disarmament conferences of the 1920's and early 1930's. The two states reached an agreement on submarines on September 12, 1919; but at the Geneva naval conference, 1927, they refused to agree, and at the London Conference in 1930, there was flat contradiction of policies. The quarrels over Tunis had led to French efforts to nationalize the European

[10] It provided for: maintenance of the existing status in the Mediterranean; interchange of information on colonial matters; noninterference in Arabian affairs; cessation of propaganda against one another; security for British interests in Lake Tsana; exemption of the conquered Negroes in Italian Africa from military service; religious freedom in East Africa; and free access to the Suez Canal under the Constantinople Convention terms of October 29, 1888.


inhabitants, whom the Italians pointed out were mostly Italian and therefore by one line of argument, should belong to Italy along with the area.

After the Ethiopian affair, France sought an adjustment of matters as the clouds of international discord loomed darker. On January 7, 1935, France and Italy agreed that France would safeguard the rights of the Italians in Tunis; yield to Italy territory in Libya and Somaliland, and Dumeira; sell Italy 2,500 shares in the railroad between Addis Ababa and Djibouti; and make minor adjustments. Unfortunately the treaties were signed and ratified, but no exchange of ratifications took place, which led to further Italian bitterness. This gave the occasion for the now famous episode in the Italian chambers on November 30, 1938, when Farinacci called out, in a rehearsed episode in the presence of the French ambassador, François-Poncet, "Corsica! Tunis! Nice!" On March, 1939, Mussolini demanded satisfaction from France on Tunis and Djibouti and from Britain on the Suez Canal.[11]


However, there were other strings to Mussolini's bow. Like Hitler, he aimed to secure control over lands, especially the Dalmatian area and the Adriatic seaboard; to gain an empire in Africa; to compensate Italy for her late arrival in the race for empire; to "rectify" the "injustices" suffered at the Paris Peace Conference when Italy was denied the mandates in the African area that had been promised in the Treaty of London of April, 1915; and to make the Mediterranean an Italian lake.

At first Mussolini encountered several difficulties from Germany, especially over the Austrian situation. Feeling that a weak Austria was a better neighbor than a strong Germany, he checked the German moves at every opportunity until the understanding growing out of the Ethiopian conflict disposed of his objections. It will be recalled that at the time of the assassination of Dollfuss Italian troops stood ready at the Brenner Pass to move into Austria to prevent Germany, if necessary by force, from annexing Austria. However, this was all smoothed out later; the German annexation of Austria took place with

[11] See Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 54–65.



MAP 13A. NORTHERN EUROPE



MAP 13B. NORTHERN EUROPE

the consent of Italy, and Germany and Italy entered the Second World War as allies.

Lesser continental countries. As for the smaller countries of Europe, most of these cast their reliance on the system of collective security and supported the League and the peace machinery as fully as possible. Belgium and Holland depended for their independence upon their importance to Great Britain and France, for they were the buffers against German aggression which neither of these great powers would willingly yield. Belgium had been neutralized before the First World War, but that neutralization had been removed by the Treaty of Versailles at the request of Belgium herself. Neutralization or no, she could not be allowed to fall into German hands. Holland was in the same category. For a short while after 1925, it was believed that the Locarno Pacts furnished the security desired; but after the Rhineland adventure of Hitler that security was found to be nonexistent. Therefore the foreign policies of both Belgium and Holland gravitated towards the French and British.

The Scandinavians were the best examples of states who placed their faith in collective security. They had elected after the First World War to substitute it for their traditional neutrality in all of Europe's wars.[12] When the Second World War broke out, they were forced back into their traditional role of neutrality, seeking to avoid entanglement on either side; but with the exception of Sweden, they all fell prey either to Germany or to the U.S.S.R. Sweden, largely because of her protected position, escaped the buffets of both the Soviets and Germany, although in the Soviet-Finnish War she made clear her determination to support Finland. As for the Finns, their one central policy was dictated by a fear of the U.S.S.R.

The foreign policies of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, when the Second World War began, had only an academic significance. All were incorporated into the Soviet


[12] See Joseph S. Roucek, *Contemporary Europe*, New York, Van Nostrand, 1941, chapters on Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, by Thorsten V. Kalijarvi.

Union soon after the war broke out. They had attempted to organize for protective purposes, but were not particularly successful and succumbed to Soviet aggression.

Poland's problem was security against two states she feared, Germany and the U.S.S.R., and therefore she cast in her lot with France, Great Britain, and the League of Nations. At the same time she sought military alliances with Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente to build up as strong support as possible in case of attack. She was not loathe to take advantage of increasing her territory if the chance presented itself, as may be seen by her action in Vilna and the sharing in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia after Munich, when she took Teschen, Zips, and Orava, to which she had formerly laid claim. Security was the key to her foreign policy. When the League proved inadequate, Poland signed nonaggression treaties with the Soviet Union on July 28, 1932, and with Hitler on January 28, 1934. When France and the Soviets signed their treaty of May 2, 1935, Poland interpreted it as French desertion and played politics with Hitler until 1939, when she returned to the French fold.[13] Then she saw her mistake and sought a guarantee of her frontiers from France and Great Britain. Security obtained in this way caused "see-saw" policies and ended with offending both the U.S.S.R. and Germany.

As for the Balkan states, those who had fought on the side of the Allies in the First World War wished to retain the *status quo*. Rumania and Yugoslavia, together with Czechoslovakia, feared a return of the Habsburgs and found no difficulty in forming the Little Entente for mutual protection. This was killed at Munich. Even before Hitler, Italian imperialism in the Balkans was especially pronounced in Albania and Hungary, and complicated relations with Yugoslavia. With the stirring of Germany the Entente powers began to grow uneasy, while the former central powers of Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary looked with interest and perhaps expectation to a

[13] See R. L. Buell, *Poland: Key to Europe*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1940.



MAP 14. SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE


bettering of conditions for themselves. Turkey and Greece reached an understanding guaranteeing each others' frontiers against a possible war by Hitler in the Balkans.[14]

France and Italy were temporarily driven together in 1933, when Hitler took power, but that rapprochement did not last long, as Hitler mollified Mussolini and the Rome-Berlin Axis came into existence. Then came the *Anschluss,* followed by Munich. The Czech independent foreign policy terminated with the partition of Czechoslovakia. Slovakia became a German protectorate completely subject to the will of Berlin. The German economic penetration of the Balkans, which had begun years before, was followed by political penetration resulting in the policies of Rumania and Bulgaria gravitating towards Berlin when the Soviet-German Pact of August 3, 1939, was announced. The Hungarian policy, which had always been revisionist and irredentist, fell in readily with the Nazi program. Austria's policies had disappeared with the *Anschluss.* Yugoslavia was divided, but tended towards Germany—especially after Prince Paul and Minister Markovitch traveled to Berlin in March, 1937. Albania lost any policy of her own when she fell before Mussolini in 1939. It was evident that Italy and Germany were planning to divide the Balkans.


Greece alone was governed by her long-standing friendly relations with Great Britain and kept out of the Axis camp. She realized that her two major problems were Turkey and Italy. The Turkish issue to a large extent had been settled at Lausanne. The Italian problem did not break until late, and Great Britain alone could aid Greece. After the invasion of Albania, Greece became more than ever apprehensive and prepared for the time when she would have to protect herself against the Fascist forces.[15]

[14] See Joseph S. Roucek, *The Politics of the Balkans,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939.

[15] Josef Hanč, *Tornado Across Eastern Europe,* New York, Greystone, 1942; R. G. Waldeck, *Athene Palace,* New York, McBride, 1942 (is a very readable introduction to the Nazi aggressive techniques used in the Balkans); C. L. Sulzberger, "German Preparations in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs,* 20 (July 1942), pp. 663–678; Grayson Kirk, "Strategic Communications in the Middle East," *ibid.,* pp. 762–766.



MAP 15A. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY



MAP 15B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Conclusion. Thus the small countries, no matter how they may have desired to remain independent and free from international politics, could not escape. They were either the pawns for great powers or maintained a precarious existence because they were buffers between them. Their foreign policies inescapably were couched in terms of the policies of the great powers. It has been seen that the policies of France, Germany, Italy, and Great Britain were interrelated and interwoven both in conflict and in co-operation. Now it is seen that the policies of the smaller countries were also interrelated and interwoven in the same manner, until nothing could happen in one country without affecting the others. Little wonder, then, that a blackhand plot in 1914 set the world at war. Little wonder, too, that war in Poland was bound to affect all of Europe.

A prominent American commentator and student once asserted that the small states were more secure than the large. All the major states are at war today.[16] It is only a few smaller ones which still remain at peace. If the trouble will be taken to scan the previous pages of this chapter again, it will be found that the policies of neither large nor small countries can be discussed without in some way mentioning the major countries and their policies. Once again the thesis of the first chapter is borne out: that the policies of states are but manifestations of their power struggles and world politics is largely the story of the strong. Nowhere does that thesis appear more clearly than in the European theater.

The Second World War—Policies at Work

Germany, given the hegemony of Europe at Munich, sought to make it good by further expansion in eastern Europe. Great Britain, realizing too late what had been lost at Munich, attempted to rectify matters by restoring the balance on the continent with the aid of France. War was inevitable.

Polish outbreak. The clash came over Danzig and the Corridor. Hitler's demands were made on Poland in August, 1939,

[16] Walter Lippman, *The Stakes of Diplomacy,* 2nd ed., New York, Holt, 1917.


and she, backed by Great Britain and France, refused to yield. Chamberlain warned Hitler that this time the British and French governments would not agree to a second Munich, and that an attack on Poland would find them squarely behind the Poles.[17] Tension mounted, and on August 31 Nevile Henderson received Hitler's note listing sixteen points against Poland. Events rushed to a climax. Germany invaded Poland on September 1 without giving the Poles a chance to negotiate an adjustment, contending that the Poles were only delaying matters and resorting to subterfuges. The campaign was short and complete. Danzig fell into German hands on September 1, 1939, as the *Blitz* slashed from three directions at once and reduced the Polish state to impotence in less than four weeks. The Soviets and Germany agreed on September 29 to divide Poland between them, for the U.S.S.R. had moved her forces in as soon as she was sure of the German kill. Early in October the last vestige of Polish resistance had disappeared.

Anglo-French-German—First Phase, September 3, 1939, to May 18, 1940. This time France and Great Britain did not yield. On September 3 they declared war on Germany, which had anticipated their move by building the Siegfried Line to hold them in check. Being in no position to help Poland, Great Britain sent an expeditionary force to France and Belgium, where it remained immobilized through the whole of the next winter.[18]


Meanwhile Hitler, with Poland successfully conquered, launched a peace offensive seeking to end hostilities with Great Britain and France, emphasizing the uselessness of fighting now that Poland had gone under. Most of 1939 and early 1940 were spent in land reconnaissance, while the fighting at sea was more spectacular than significant as the *Royal Oak*, the *Courageous*, and the *Admiral Graf von Spee* were sunk. The German

[17] For the German approach to these problems see Dr. Oskar Ritter von Niedermayr, *Wehrpolitik*, Leipzig, Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1939. See also Chapter 13 by Barnes, "From the First World War to the Second World War," for further details.

[18] See René de Chambrun, *I Saw France Fall*, New York, Morrow, 1940. See also "Technology and War" and "Psychological Aspects of Warfare," Chapters 22 and 9 respectively.



MAP 16A. POLAND



MAP 16B. POLAND

blockade of the British Isles was unsuccessful in cutting off Great Britain from her overseas supplies, and the British program of starving out Germany made no appreciable headway.

As for France, she could not shake the idea that she was fighting another phase of the First World War, for which reason she had decided upon a role of passive defense. The French political chiefs were more interested in the Finnish-Soviet War and in holding off the U.S.S.R. and checking Communism than they were in fear of Germany or desirous of defeating her. A substantial group of the controlling people had been satisfied with Munich and with Nazi policies. The leaders could not agree; indeed, Reynaud and Daladier were still carrying on a quarrel as the Germans overran Belgium and Holland. Thus, with France divided and complacent, and with Great Britain waiting to starve Germany by a repetition of the First World War blockade, the winter of 1939–1940 heard the conflict described as a "phony war." [19]

Soviet-Finnish War. A sideshow beside the big tent of the major European conflict was the Soviet-Finnish War, one of the best illustrations of straight power politics during the whole period. Like all conflicts, it had a historical background. Between 1917 and 1921 the Finnish and other Baltic peoples became independent of the U.S.S.R. in a series of wars. Between 1921 and 1939 the Soviets attempted to immobilize these people with nonaggression treaties, which everyone signed with a prayer on his lips and his tongue in his cheek. The U.S.S.R. became a member of the League in 1934, where she remained until 1939. During September and October of that year she absorbed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania because they could not fight such an overwhelming force, since Germany, whom they had hoped might be the counterweight to the U.S.S.R. upon whom they might rely for existence, was immobilized by reason of the August nonaggression treaty.[20]

Having safely swallowed these political *hors d'oeuvres,* and not having reached the main course, the Soviet Union made her

[19] See Frederick Schuman, *Night Over Europe,* New York, Knopf, 1941. See Chapter 9, "Psychological Aspects of Warfare" for an explanation of the lull.

[20] See Hudson Strode, *Finland Forever,* New York, Harcourt, 1941.

demands on Finland, which the latter refused.[21] On November 30, 1939, the Soviets struck and the world was astounded at the Finnish resistance which dealt serious blows at the Red Army and at Soviet pride and prestige. After the League had condemned the U.S.S.R. as an aggressor on December 14, 1939, the British and French promised all kinds of aid, most of which was not forthcoming. Finland could not continue the uneven fight on promises, and in March, 1940, the massed artillery and mechanized equipment of the Soviet forces broke the Mannerheim Line and crashed Finnish resistance in the south. The Treaty of Moscow was signed on March 12 and the Finns yielded to all of the U.S.S.R. demands, but retained their army intact. They feared that the victors might take all Finland at some future date. Pehr Svinhufvud visited the Wilhelmstrasse in early March. On September 24, 1940, by an agreement with Germany, Finland permitted German troops to use Finnish territory.[22]

Occupation of Norway and Denmark. In the other Scandinavian countries both sides were striving for favors, while the Scandinavians attempted to remain neutral. On April 9, 1940, Germany, for the alleged reason that Great Britain was attempting to use the two neutrals for her purposes, completely overran Denmark and attacked Norway after diplomatic and psychological warfare had prepared the way for military forces.[23] The Danes did not resist, having known for some time that it would be futile. King Christian remained at home. However, in Norway the fighting was spasmodic and determined. King Haakon and his cabinet were forced to flee to Great Britain to join Haile Selassie in exile. The German

[21] These called for the lease of a naval base at Hangö; cession of several Finnish islands in the Baltic off Leningrad; cession of the Karelian Isthmus; stationing of Soviet forces on Finnish territory; destruction of the Mannerheim Line; and a number of lesser concessions. In return Russia offered to exchange a larger territory between the Arctic Circle and Lake Ladoga. The Finns had expected the Soviet demands for a long time, and did their best to avert a war. However, to have yielded to the Soviets' demands *in toto* would have spelled the same doom for Finland as for her southern neighbors.

[22] See *Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents,* New York, Funk, 1941.

[23] For the psychological campaign see Chapter 9, "Psychological Aspects of Warfare."

troops moved from Oslo inland and landed along the shore as the fifth columnist, Major Vidkun Quisling, a Norwegian Nazi, set up a puppet regime. The Allied counterattacks were weak and ineffectual. By the middle of June the conquest was complete and King Haakon was invited to resign on July 3, 1940, which he declined to do.[24]

Anglo-French-German War, second phase. As the spring of 1940 wore on and all danger from any possible attack from the north was eliminated by the Germans, they were poised for the main blow on the continent. Following the principles of Clausewitz and most military strategists, as well as keeping the years of indecisive costly trench warfare between 1914 and 1918 in mind, they had decided upon a war of movement.[25]

The time was propitious. The French were still having domestic difficulties, and Great Britain seemed satisfied to wait for Germany to be starved into submission while she supported Belgium and France with her forces. On May 10, 1940, the German mechanized might struck westward at Belgium, Holland, and northern France. Once again the powerfully coordinated airplane, tank, and motorized troops struck as they had in Poland. Once again their weight and momentum could not be stopped. Spies, traitors, fifth columnists, and dissension opened the way into Belgium and Holland as they had into Norway. The Nazis occupied Luxembourg on May 10, and Grand Duchess Charlotte went into exile. The Netherlands went under in five days, the Hague and Rotterdam falling by May 15; Queen Wilhelmina sailed for Great Britain to join fellow monarchs in exile. Seyss-Inquart was appointed the new Gauleiter of Holland.[26]

Belgian resistance lasted a little longer than the Dutch. The Rexists were not disappointed at seeing the Germans. On May

[24] See Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics*, 3rd ed., New York, McGraw-Hill, 1941, pp. 578–580.

[25] X, "Germany's Strategy, 1914 and 1940," *Foreign Affairs*, 19 (April, 1941), pp. 495–515.

[26] For conditions under German occupation, see *Netherlands News Digest* (April 1, 1942), published by the Netherlands Information Bureau, 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City. See also Chapter 23, "Totalitarianism at War."

19 Hitler reannexed Malmédy, Eupen, and Moresnet and incorporated them into the German Reich. After a gallant fight the Belgian army was cut to ribbons by the now well-known Nazi tactics and would have been annihilated had it not been for the action of King Leopold in surrendering on May 28.[27]

The French cabinet was reorganized on May 18, 1940, to include Henri Philippe Pétain as vice premier and J. Ybarnégaray, the vice president of the Fascist Croix de Feu. A better cabinet from the standpoint of the Germans could scarcely have been in office, what with its Anglophobes, anti-Bolsheviki, and anti-Republicans. With such a government did France meet the attack of the Nazi forces.

On June 5, with the buffer states under control, the Germans smashed across the Somme with terrific impetus. On June 11 and 12, the French government fled from Paris to Tours and Bourdeaux. Some of the government leaders were for crossing the Mediterranean and taking up a new seat there and continuing the fighting from Africa. Others were for giving up the fight. On June 11 Italy declared war on France. On June 16 the Reynaud cabinet resigned. Pétain was made premier and sued for peace through General Franco. An armistice was signed in the Compiègne Forest on June 22 with Germany. On June 24 another armistice was arranged with Italy.[28]

After the armistice between France and its enemies there was strong anxiety in Great Britain as to the eventual disposition of the French fleet. On July 3 a British naval force drew up off Oran, where several French warships lay, and ordered them sunk or surrendered; the ultimatum was rejected and the British shelled the French vessels. In consequence of this, Pétain's regime broke off relations with Great Britain.

On July 19, 1940, Hitler offered peace to the British, insisting that if the struggle continued one of the two adversaries

[27] See *Belgium, The Official Account of What Happened 1939–1940,* New York, Didier, for Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1942. See also Sir Roger Keyes, *King Leopold Vindicated,* New York, Belgian Information Center, May, 1941.

[28] One of the most succinct and satisfactory accounts of this period is to be found in chapter 12 of Schuman, *op. cit.*

must go under—the British Empire would be destroyed unless it yielded. Lord Halifax, three days later, announced his country's defiant refusal.

From the time of the armistice Pétain had prime control over French governmental actions. Pierre Laval, as vice premier, was his second in command and apparently had strong influence; his home community of Vichy was chosen as the capital of unoccupied France. The relations between France and Germany grew progressively closer. Late in October, 1940, Laval and Pétain conferred with Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Keitel to arrange closer collaboration with Germany. Laval was dismissed from the cabinet in December, 1940, to be succeeded in effect by Pierre Etienne Flandin; the latter in turn gave way in February, 1941, to Admiral Jean Darlan. All these men were generally considered anti-British, Darlan especially, and favored collaboration with the Nazis in varying degrees. The close hold that Germany had on all French governmental activities caused Great Britain to notify the Vichy government on April 7, 1941, that so long as Germany occupied France the French territory would be subject to attack. As early as July, 1940, France had been included in the British blockade of the continent, for the British feared that ships bound for French ports might be carrying supplies for German use.

Pétain and his government, from the moment of assuming power, took rapid steps toward forming an authoritarian state. On July 9, at Vichy, the Third French Republic came to its end; the National Assembly so voted, and empowered Pétain to draft a new French constitution. Seven decrees of constitutional character were issued under this authority up to January 21, 1941. In August, 1940, the Freemasons were dissolved, and again in August, 1941. In October, 1940, the Vichy government announced legislation against the Jews. In a speech in August, 1941, Pétain publicly insisted, "Authority no longer emanates from below; the only authority is that which I entrust or delegate." In line with this thought, Pétain suspended the political parties and discontinued payment of salaries to members of the parliament.

On December 1, 1941, France and Germany reached an agreement for the disposition of French colonies in north Africa. The question arose, did this include any French colonies elsewhere, and did it grant to Hitler the use of the French bases in the Mediterranean? In March, 1942, fears were expressed that the French fleet might be falling into Hitler's control and that the French bases in the Mediterranean area might already be in his possession. The British attitude toward Vichy was stiffened; there was a severe attack by the R.A.F. on Paris on March 5. During the third week of April, Vichy acknowledged it had yielded five of its ships to the Japanese who had entered the Second World War on the Axis side in December, 1941. During May the Allied forces occupied Madagascar to forestall its use by Japan to sever British lines to the Far East. Laval was brought back into the cabinet and French policy became more than ever one of collaboration with the Axis.

The Balkans. After France, the next to feel the impact of the Nazi war machine was Yugoslavia. On October 28, 1940, Mussolini invaded Greece from Albania, but ran into unexpectedly fierce resistance which forced the Italian troops into retreat. The Greeks drove the Italians into Albania in a series of remarkable fights.

Mussolini may have entered upon the venture independently of any agreement with Hitler. However, the latter could not let the Duce down, and aid against Greece would make the Italian dictator more than ever beholden to Hitler. Nazi diplomacy grew more active in the Balkans. Rumania, which had already fallen into the Nazi camp, formed a new government under General Antonescu, and Great Britain broke off diplomatic relations with her on February 9, 1941. Hungary, Slovakia, and Rumania were drawn into the Italo-German-Japanese pact. German troop movements were reported in the Balkan area, particularly when Bulgaria became a member of the Axis on March 1, 1941. The path to the borders of Albania and Greece seemed to be smoothing itself out without conflict for the Nazis.

One obstacle, however, was Yugoslavia. On February 14, 1941, its government signed a pact agreeing to become a mem-

ber of the Axis. Protests by the people ended with the government being ejected from office on March 28 and a non-Nazi rule was established. The U.S.S.R. signed a pact of friendship with Yugoslavia on April 5, two days after Rome and Berlin had broken off diplomatic relations and on the same day that Axis troops moved into Yugoslavia. The full impact of the Nazi *Blitz* hit Yugoslavia on April 9 and Belgrade was captured April 13. On April 15, a new "independent" Croat government, under A. Pavelich and S. Kvaternik, was recognized by the invaders. On April 18, Hitler announced the Serb capitulation, but prematurely; guerilla fighters formed themselves into a formidable army under General Mikhailovich and maintained relatively large-scale action against the "occupying" forces. Greek resistance was broken on April 23, when the army in Macedonia and Epirus surrendered, although the fighting continued a little beyond that date. Another *Blitz* had been won and Mussolini had been relieved.[29]

Russia and Germany. This Balkan adventure was but the prelude to more momentous events during the same summer. The world, no less than France and Great Britain, had been astounded at the Soviet-German treaty of August, 1939. In the summer of 1941 it was proved to have been merely a truce, evidently preferable to the Soviets to a treaty with France and Great Britain, which would undoubtedly have unloosed the Nazi war machine against the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1939 instead of against France in 1940.

The Soviets had encouraged the Yugoslavs in their resistance to Berlin and had promised the Turks assistance in case of attack. These signs were indicative of how lightly both Berlin and Moscow regarded the August, 1939, treaty. The U.S.S.R. had begun to have apprehensions as the Nazi war machine smashed

[29] See Nicholas Mirkovich, "Yugoslavia's Choice," *Foreign Affairs,* 20:1 (October, 1941), pp. 131–151; Joseph S. Roucek, "World War II and the Balkans," *Social Education,* 5 (March, 1941), pp. 187–189, "The Balkans: Key to World War II," *World Affairs Interpreter,* 11 (July, 1940), pp. 179–197, and "Hitler Over the Balkans," *ibid.,* 12 (July, 1941), pp. 136–152; and Robert Saint John, *From the Land of Silent People,* New York, Doubleday, 1942 (is an exciting story by an American journalist of his escape from invaded Yugoslavia through Greece and Crete to Alexandria).

the French and Allied defenses during the summer of 1940. To counteract these advantages and to strengthen the front against possible German attacks the Moscow government on June 15 and 17, 1940, had sent troops into the newly acquired areas of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which were then formally incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Red Army occupied Bessarabia and northern Bukovina on June 28, 1940. King Carol had to flee Bucharest on September 6 to make way for General Ion Antonescu and his Iron Guard, who took over protective custody of Rumania's oil wells for Germany. When Germany occupied Rumania in October, 1940, the Soviet concern was further evidenced in a visit of Molotov to Berlin, November 12 to 14, for the purpose of "clarifying" the situation.[30] As Hungary, Slovakia, and Rumania were drawn into the Axis, and eventually Bulgaria, it was manifest that Soviet influence in the Balkans had disappeared, leaving only Turkey, Yugoslavia, and embattled Greece outside the German camp. Again Molotov visited Berlin, to no avail.

The stage was set; the curtain went up on the next scene when Hitler, returning to the thesis of *Mein Kampf,* after a week of rumors of friction between Germany and the Soviets, declared war on the U.S.S.R. on June 21, 1941, proclaiming that the Finns and the Rumanians were his allies.[31] However, it was not until four days later, and then after asserting that it was because of unprovoked attacks by the Soviet forces, that the Finns proclaimed themselves at war with the U.S.S.R. Italy followed suit on June 27 and Hungary on June 30. Bulgaria later joined the camp and the Germans organized contingents of troops from other countries on the continent "to fight against Bolshevism."

Almost at the outset the British joined hands and policies with the U.S.S.R., bombing the Finnish port of Petsamo while

[30] See Bruce Hopper, "The War for Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* 20:1 (October, 1941), pp. 18–30.

[31] See Frederick Schuman, *Design for Power,* New York, Knopf, 1942, pp. 203–234; Oliver Benson, "Hitler's Russian Gamble," *Current History* (September, 1941), pp. 16–26; also, in the same periodical, pp. 26–30, Wilbur W. White, "War Overtakes Russia."

at peace with Finland, and later declaring war on Finland, Rumania, and Hungary. By June, 1942, British-Soviet co-operation extended to a mutual-assistance pact for world organization after anticipated victory.

The war becomes general. Why Germany failed to take advantage of the weakness of Great Britain after Dunkirk is a matter which postwar historians will perhaps explain, but there can be little question of why she abandoned, for the time being, the battle of Britain in order to attack the U.S.S.R. In a war of exhaustion between Germany and Great Britain, the Soviet Union alone would be the winner; and if it were not to be a war of exhaustion the chances were strong that the U.S.S.R. would join Great Britain to preserve a possible ally for a future war with Germany. The realistic politicians of the Kremlin and the Wilhelmstrasse both knew that a German victory over Great Britain could only be the prelude to an all-out attack on the Soviet Union, while a stalemate would mean a Soviet mastery of the continent. Evidently Hitler found the problem of the U.S.S.R. more pressing than that of the British.

The campaign lasted into 1942, as Hitler's prediction of an early victory failed to materialize. As the effectiveness of Soviet resistance impressed itself upon Great Britain her relations with the U.S.S.R. grew closer, and British public opinion clamored for the opening of a front in western Europe to give aid to the Red forces. Stalin stated on November 6, 1941, that the Germans had moved far into his country, but that the Soviets were still fighting. As the winter wore on this fact became more and more evident as the Red Army took the initiative from the Germans, recapturing much of the territory which had been lost in the summer of 1941. With British and United States aid in materials, particularly after the United States was brought into the war on December 7, the U.S.S.R. was the only bright star in the Allied firmament during the 1941–1942 winter.[32]

Germany, nevertheless, had not yielded a single one of such more important strategic strongholds as Orel and Smolensk dur-

[32] See "Round Two in Russia," *Fortune* (May, 1942), pp. 80–142.

ing the winter, and as spring approached it was apparent that she had used the lull for rebuilding her equipment and for gathering troops and allies. On November 25, she had secured several new members for the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was then five years old. Among them were Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Croatia, Rumania, Slovakia, and the Japan-sponsored Chinese government of Wang Ching-wei. She had already set up a new civil administration for the conquered Soviet lands of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and called it Ostland. During the latter part of April, 1942, as the Ukraine lay in spring warmth and Murmansk still toiled in the grip of late winter, reports in the army newspaper *Red Star* told of huge German concentrations of troops and materials over the 2,000-mile front, while the Soviets announced that they were preparing for the spring drive with huge masses of men and material of their own. As these activities were intensified the Soviet spokesmen, British leaders, and many Americans called for the opening of a new front in western Europe to relieve the Soviet fighters. Successful forays of the British commandos led to the belief that such a move was not beyond possibility.

Meanwhile the submarine war of attrition had continued in the Atlantic, as the British and Americans controlled the sea routes, the British Isles, Iceland, Greenland, and outlying islands. In Africa the Libyan campaign had swung first in the favor of the Italians under Marshal Graziani, then to the British under General Wavell, and then back again to the Axis under General Rommel, who did not hold his position without challenge from the British. In the Mediterranean itself, Malta and other British bases underwent heavy bombardment from the air. In December, 1941, the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon had been occupied by the Free French. These and many other scattered happenings, such as the war in the Orient and the gearing of the United States for the war, indicated an active year on all fronts.

Turkey and the Near East. In Chapter 17 the Arab lands will be considered as they relate to world affairs; but there is

one country which falls neither into the European camp nor into that of the Arab lands—Turkey. Therefore a brief note concerning that country is necessary here.

The Near East was peppered with problems from the close of the First World War. The worst of these was that of Palestine, described in Chapter 17. In general the period from 1918 to 1939 was filled with propaganda, diplomacy, and economic penetration.[33]

The key position was held by Turkey. Before the First World War and throughout its course, Turkey had belonged in the German camp. When that conflict came to an end, Turkey sought her own interests and under the lead of Kemal Ataturk had found it expedient to cultivate the friendship of the Soviet Union. But although defeated, Turkey was the master of the highway to the Near and Middle East, and therefore stood between Germany, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Her policy was to maintain cordial relations with them all as far as possible. In 1934 she bound the Balkan states in her neighborhood into a Balkan pact. In 1936 she obtained release from the treaty restrictions on the control of the Straits. On July 7, 1937, through the Saadabad Pact, she united with herself Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan for political purposes. She steadily grew in influence, and in 1938 von Papen was sent to Ankara to woo Turkey into the Axis camp. During April and May of 1938 the Turks negotiated simultaneously with Moscow and London. During 1938 and 1939, with the visits of Potemkin to Ankara and Saracoglu to Moscow, she evinced her nearness to the Russian cause. On October 19, 1939, England, Turkey, and France signed an alliance, motivated chiefly by the desire of Turkey not to become a Hitler pawn. This was followed by a series of Axis victories, but until the middle of 1942 Turkey was still master of the road to the East, avoiding involvement as far as possible, and refusing to be led by the blandishments of all sides. How long she could continue to do so was problematical.

[33] For the transformation of Turkey see H. E. Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*, University of Chicago Press, 1935.

The inability of Turkey to escape German influence may be seen in the trade agreement which was signed between the two countries at Ankara on June 18, 1941, and supplemented on October 9 by an economic pact. On November 1, President Inonu stressed the increasingly difficult Turkish position. The Russian reverses of 1941 and the successes of the winter of 1941–1942 made the Turkish dilemma even more acute. The possibility of a combination of German, Italian, and French naval forces in the Mediterranean which might cut the British line did not ease matters. British nationals had been ordered to return home from Turkey indicating that the Allies might not be too sanguine about the continuation of Turkish neutrality.

Conclusion

The continent of Europe in the period between 1918 and 1942 was troubled, first, with the postwar settlements which covered the years from 1918 to 1923, principal among which was reparations. From 1918 into the early 1930's the system of collective security was tried and elaborated, collapsing under the impact of the revived nationalisms, particularly of the have-not nations. From 1933 on, the rising might of Germany, Italy, and Japan at first was not taken seriously and then was permitted to make one inroad after the other upon the peace machinery until the world was no longer big enough for a strong League of Nations and powerful aggressor states. These inroads destroyed the predominant control of France and eliminated any chance of a British re-establishment of a balance of power.

The decline of the League of Nations revealed the ever-present and underlying struggle for power among the major states, indicating that their interests remained much the same as they had always been. This struggle for power also showed that the role of the small states was cast in the mold formed to a large extent by what the major powers did.

When the Second World War broke, revived Germany was possessed of new implements of war, which she had organized

into the most powerful striking force the world had ever seen. It cut Poland to ribbons in three weeks; overran Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Norway, and to some degree Yugoslavia; broke France in an incredibly short time; forced many minor powers to yield under threat that it would be used against them; struck at the U.S.S.R.; and brought the continent under German control in the space of less than two years. Combined with German armed forces were forces for economic and psychological warfare, thus bringing all together into a mighty combination with political power.

As in the days of the Napoleonic wars, Great Britain remained beyond the reach of the most powerful continental conqueror. As in the early years of the nineteenth century she had once sought the aid of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, now she sought the aid of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the conquered states in the struggle to restore the balance which she lost at Paris, and whose restoration she threw away at Munich.

Questions

1. What were the bases of French foreign policy before the Second World War?
2. What were the bases of British foreign policy?
3. What is meant by "chestnut diplomacy"?
4. Did France fall because of her leaders? Why, or why not?
5. Did France fall because of her type of warfare? Why, or why not?
6. What relationship exists between the European and Mediterranean war areas?
7. Explain why Germany deemed it necessary to invade Norway.
8. Did the Soviet Union expect war with Germany in 1941? Why, or why not?
9. By which steps did Great Britain insure her position in the Near East?
10. Why was there bitterness over Palestine?
11. What is meant by the statement that the Peace of Moscow between Finland and the U.S.S.R. was unfinished business?
12. What was the Anti-Comintern Pact?
13. What is Turkey's significance in the Second World War?

14. How would you explain Haile Selassie's position, in 1942, in terms of power politics?

15. How did Italy and France regard each other's naval programs?

16. How long did it take the Nazis to conquer Holland?

17. What were the objectives of German foreign policy in 1939? Where could they be found?

18. What effect did the Chamberlain warning have on Hitler in the negotiations with Poland before the outbreak of war in 1939?

19. What was the effect of the signing of the German-Soviet Pact of August 23, 1939? How did the Allies lose their opportunity?

20. Trace the major events in this chapter in which the three Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania played a part.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Prepare an account of Soviet-German relations between 1933 and 1941.

2. Prepare an account of Italo-French Mediterranean rivalry from 1881 to 1940.

3. Discuss the problem of Palestine, from the Peace Conference at Paris to 1942.

4. Appraise the new Arabian nationalism and its significance for the Near East.

5. Discuss the Monarchs and governments in exile.

6. Survey the role of small states such as Hungary, Greece, Finland, Belgium in the Second World War.

7. Discuss the leaders of France, 1938–1942: their interests, loyalty to France, and affiliations.

8. Review Scandinavian neutrality, 1939–1942.

9. Discuss the policies and political activities of any major European country during the last five years.

10. Review Balkan events, 1939–1942.

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CHAPTER 16

THE U.S.S.R. AND ASIA


Russia as a Great Power

The foreign policies of a great power are determined by the material conditions of its existence. Immediate aims vary with changing circumstances, both internally and on the part of its neighbors, to which a nation must adapt itself; but long-term objectives remain substantially the same as long as a national entity maintains its structure intact. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is no exception to this rule.[1]

Geographically, the U.S.S.R. spreads across all of northern Asia and into eastern Europe and connects two civilizations, yet seems to be not wholly a part of either. The continental position gives her a strong base upon which to build her national existence, a position which is rendered more secure by mountain and desert barriers on the south and arctic wastes on the north. On the other hand, the great distances between her western and eastern frontiers render the Soviet Union relatively vulnerable to attack, particularly from both flanks at the same time, by her dynamic and expanding neighbors. This handicap has been partially offset recently by double-tracking the Trans-Siberian railway.

The Soviet's great resources in land and raw materials, much of which remain undeveloped, assure her of comfort and security in the basic conditions of life for the future, give her relative self-sufficiency in most essentials in the event of war, and limit her motives for expansion; but, on the other hand, render her an object of attack by her less fortunate neighbors. Raw materials in the U.S.S.R., such as coal and iron, are not

[1] For an opposing viewpoint see Karl Radek's article on "Soviet Russia" in J. Cambon *et al.*, *The Foreign Policy of the Powers*, New York, Harper, 1935, p. 122.



MAP 17. U.S.S.R. AND NEIGHBORS (see also MAP 2)

as conveniently located as in the United States, however, and, hence, difficulties of transport reduce productive efficiency.

Already possessed of the largest population among the great powers, the Soviet Union is expanding at the rate of more than 3,000,000 people a year. In 1917, about 95 per cent of the people were in agriculture and doubt was expressed as to the adaptability of Russian peasants to the technical and mechanical arts required by the program of industrialization projected by Communist leaders. Recent events indicate that this point was greatly overstressed. The trend towards industrialization and urbanism in the U.S.S.R. shows that Soviet leaders have been attempting to telescope the century-long industrial revolution of western countries into the span of one generation.

Basic to an explanation of Soviet foreign policy is the almost landlocked character of the country. Both the Baltic and Black Sea outlets are controlled by other nations. In the Far East, warm water harbors once possessed by Czarist Russia have been taken over by Japan, and Vladivostok, the Soviets' principal present harbor in the Far East, permits no access to the open sea except on Japan's terms. For centuries, Russian rulers have sought unmolested exit for her commerce to one of the oceans, but without success.

Both on her western and eastern flanks, the U.S.S.R. is confronted by ambitious, dynamic have-not states with large populations and resources inadequate to care for them. Both Germany and Japan look hungrily upon the vast distances of the Soviet Union and her enormous potential resources. They pose a constant menace to her security.

From the above considerations it is clear that Russia's traditional objectives, under czars or Bolsheviks, have been (1) free access to the open sea and (2) adequate defense measures to keep secure and intact her great land and people. Thus, in pursuit of the first objective, Russia has always insisted upon free transit through the Straits to the Mediterranean and either friendship with Turkey or her elimination from Europe. The drive to the open sea has brought Russia into collision with

Great Britain because of the latter's control over the outlets from the Mediterranean and over the Persian Gulf. In the north, Germany dominates the lower Baltic and thus regulates Russian commerce into the North Sea on her own terms. Only in the Arctic Ocean has Russia been free to act, but here weather conditions limit seriously the scope of her operations.

Adequate measures for defense of her great possessions have in part depended upon the distances Russia's enemies must cover, together with adverse conditions of Russia's severe climate; but modern transportation facilities and means of communication have made her more vulnerable to attack. Hence, the Soviet Union has been forced to resort to much more complicated and extensive defense measures of a diplomatic, economic, and military character than were needed in the czars' times to make good her position. These will be brought out in the ensuing discussion.

Russia in Europe; the Near and Middle East

The swing of the political pendulum which established the Bolsheviks as the ruling elite in the Russian state has not substantially altered that country's traditional policies. The fundamental aim of any country is security, and the security of a country involves the security of its ruling class. This became apparent to the Communists almost as soon as they took power. The question was, however, how could security best be obtained and maintained.[2]

The period of revolution. The accepted Marxian doctrine at the time of the Bolshevik advent to power was that Socialism could be lastingly successful only if it could be made to prevail at least in the more advanced industrial countries by world revolution. Success of their plans in Russia made Soviet leaders glow with optimism, and it was accepted as almost axiomatic

[2] Cf. T. A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy,* New York, Macmillan, 1940, p. 129, and Henry C. Wolfe, *The Imperial Soviets,* New York, Doubleday, 1940, p. 9. For a different view see A. L. P. Dennis, *The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia,* New York, Dutton, 1924, chap. 1.

that the disillusionment and disorganization resulting from the First World War had made the world ripe for revolution. The way to maintain Socialism, and, incidentally, themselves, in power was to establish Socialism in enough countries to insure a sufficiently powerful combination to beat off any hostile attacks. Hence the thing to do was to make peace with Germany, even at considerable sacrifice, in order to permit the Communists to conduct an intensive propaganda campaign in central Europe and throughout the world. High hopes were entertained that Hungary, Bavaria, perhaps all Germany, would go Bolshevik—perhaps even all of Europe. The Third International was organized in March, 1919, to carry the brunt of the propaganda campaign. Schools for propagandists were set up and army prisoners were exhorted.[3]

The Brest-Litovsk Treaty. Events did not prove at all to the Bolsheviks' liking. The harsh terms imposed by Germany at Brest-Litovsk stunned them. Yet (though the Germans thought them mad), the Communists, persuaded by Lenin, decided to accept the German demands and quit the war in order to prepare for the coming world revolution.[4] By provisions of the treaty, the Bolsheviks gave up their Baltic states and all of Russian Poland, and agreed to the independence of the Ukraine under German supervision. They yielded at least one-third of their land, railways, manufactures, and crops, and about three-fourths of their coal and iron. Western Russia was left helplessly exposed to German attack.[5]

The Civil War and the blockade. Nor was this all of the misfortunes. The Allies, with the ostensible purpose of preventing the importation of arms through Soviet territory into Germany, sent troops to the Murmansk coast and Archangel and established a blockade of the country. According to Fischer, their real purpose was at first to re-establish an eastern front against

[3] M. T. Florinsky, *World Revolution and the U.S.S.R.*, New York, Macmillan, 1933, pp. 32–43. (See also Chapter 26, by Roucek, on international movements.—*Editor.*)

[4] Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs*, London and New York, Cape and Smith, 1930, vol. 1, pp. 67–74. (See also Barnes, Chapter 13, on this point.—*Editor.*)

[5] Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–45.

Germany. Later, when Germany began to weaken, the Allies aimed at crushing the Bolsheviks.[6]

Under pressure from British, French, and Japanese leaders, Woodrow Wilson finally consented to American participation in an Allied expedition into eastern Siberia. The object was encirclement of the Communists.[7] Because of Allied interest in Baku oil deposits, troops under General Dunsterville were sent into the Caucasus. The counterrevolution led by Denikin and Kolchak was financed by the Allies.[8]

Indecision among opponents of the Bolsheviks plus their fear that Germany would go Communist led finally to the withdrawal of the Allies from the Civil War in 1919.[9]

At the close of the war, German troops were withdrawn from the Ukraine and eastern Europe and their places were taken by Allied forces for a time, until they in turn were forced to withdraw by the Red Army.[10] The blockade and the attempt of the Bolsheviks to institute Communism in Russia produced a famine. Disputes between the Soviets and Poland over their new boundaries led to war. Poland invaded the Ukraine and took over in May, 1918. Victory over Denikin strengthened the Red Army against the Poles, but the advantage was more than offset by French military aid to the latter. Soviet need for peace led to an armistice early in 1921.[11]

The Allied Council at the Paris Peace Conference refused to recognize the Revolution or to receive Soviet delegates. To prevent the spread of Communism westward, the Allies aided counterrevolutionary movements in the Baltic states (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia), thus compelling Russia to recognize their independence in treaties signed during the year 1920. Allied recognition of the Baltic states followed.[12] By treaty with Russia also, Finland and Poland obtained recognition of their independence. In January, 1918, Rumania had seized Bessa-

[6] Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 92, 124–127.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 100–101, 116–118, 132–134.
[8] Cf. Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–79, and Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 87–89.
[9] Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 80–81.
[10] Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 180–182.
[11] Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 88–89.
[12] Fischer, *op. cit.*, pp. 253–256.

rabia from Russia and this action was approved by the Allies.[13] Thus a *cordon sanitaire* was erected against the Red menace to the capitalist countries of Europe.

Far from fulfilling Soviet expectations that they would adopt Communism and realign themselves with the U.S.S.R., the Baltic states organized the Baltic League and made common cause with the Little Entente against the Bolsheviks. Poland's war with the Soviets was brought to a close by the Treaty of Riga (March 18, 1921), but the Poles sought further security against Soviet aggression by concluding a defensive alliance with France (February 19, 1921) and with Rumania (March 3, 1921). In March, 1922, Poland joined the Baltic League. Thus the Soviet Union was encircled on the west. The anti-Soviet policies of the Allies and their satellites were driving the U.S.S.R. into the arms of Germany.[14]

Turkey and the Near East. Before taking up the conclusions of the Civil War and intervention periods, it is convenient to examine briefly the policies and relations of the Soviets in Asia.

At the close of the war, the Soviets made peace with Turkey and by the terms of the treaty of March 18, 1921, the boundary of Asiatic Turkey and Georgia was determined. Red troops drove out the English and crushed all resistance in the Caucasus. Communism was instituted by force. Foodstuffs and movable goods were seized and carried off to Russia. The Caucasian oil fields were brought under Soviet control. Georgia, Russian Armenia, and Azerbaijan were organized into the Trans-Caucasian Republic. Under the treaty, Turkey, under guidance of Mustapha Kemal, reversed her previous policy of alliance with Germany and placed herself on friendly terms with the U.S.S.R. To cement the new ties of friendship, the Soviet government canceled all previous obligations of Turkey to Russia and gave the Turks a substantial loan and favorable trade provisions.

The Bolsheviks organized a Communist Party in Turkey and strove hard to convert the nation to Communism, but on

[13] Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 166–170.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 152–160.

the whole were coldly received. Marxism proved to be at odds with Moslem religion and cultural beliefs.[15]

At the Lausanne Conference, held on December 4, 1922, to regulate commerce through the Dardanelles, Turkey failed to support Soviet demands for the closing of the Straits against warships of states hostile to Black Sea powers and the alliance with Turkey sought by the U.S.S.R. failed to materialize.[16] Soviet interests were better safeguarded at the Montreux Conference of July, 1936, in spite of British opposition, when it was finally agreed to allow warships of Black Sea powers to pass freely through the Straits but to limit the tonnage of outside naval vessels passing through the Straits to not more than 15,000 tons at a time, and limit the total tonnage of foreign warships in the Black Sea at one time to not more than 45,000 tons. In time of war, Turkey was given complete control over commerce in the Straits.[17]

The Middle East. Russian Turkestan. The Bolsheviks lost little time in extending their control over Russian Turkestan and the territory bordering on Afghanistan and the Chinese province of Sinkiang. A Red Army was sent into the country in 1917 and Soviet rule was extended over all of the territory. By decrees, control was extended over foreign affairs, railways, communications, and economic life. Red propaganda directed against rich landowners and the clergy led to a revolt in 1922, led by Enver Pasha, which the Bolsheviks quelled by military force. Communism was installed, old national boundaries were obliterated, and new regional republics set up based upon ethnic differentiations. Finally, the newly organized republics were incorporated into the U.S.S.R.[18] The main objects of Soviet leaders in this region has been to get control of the natural resources of the country, to police the trade routes, and to hold the frontiers against invasion from the south.[19]

[15] Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 216–220.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 222–228.

[17] A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1936,* London, Oxford University Press, 1937, p. 622.

[18] Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Asia,* New York, Macmillan, 1933, pp. 264–274.

[19] N. D. Harris, *Europe and the East,* New York, Houghton, 1926, pp. 166–167.

The Pan-Asiatic Conference at Baku. The Bolsheviks hoped to organize a drive against the colonies of the imperialist nations in central and east Asia and also to secure their adherence to Communist doctrines. Accordingly, Soviet leaders called a pan-Asiatic conference at Baku in September, 1920, which was attended by nearly two thousand delegates from thirty-seven Asiatic countries. Red leaders presented themselves as liberators and protectors of the oppressed peoples of the Orient. Emphasis was placed upon the declaration of 1917, giving to all races within the Soviet Union absolute equality and the right to secede. The Conference was intended to be permanent, but was not convened again. Though the movement tended to raise Russian prestige for the time being, it failed of the results expected of it.[20]

Iran. Soviet policy after the Revolution fostered an Asiatic bloc composed of Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, as an offset to British expansionist policies in central Asia and as a means of giving the Soviet Union control of the invasion routes to India through Iran and Afghanistan. Soviet leaders endeavored to win the friendship of Iran by offering to cancel all obligations of the latter to the czar's regime and open Soviet markets to Iranian goods. The withdrawal of British troops in 1921 led to an increase in Soviet influence and, after some hesitation, Iran signed a treaty of commerce with the Soviet Union in 1924 that gave the U.S.S.R. the right to intervene if Iran were used by any other power to make war on the Soviet Union.[21]


Failure of the treaty to expand trade and refusal of Iran to accept Communist ideas led the Bolsheviks to revert to other methods of coercion. In 1925, the Soviet embargoed Iranian imports into the U.S.S.R. A new Soviet-Iranian commercial treaty, however, was negotiated in 1931, which gave the Soviets a virtual monopoly over a number of types of commodities imported into Iran.[22]

In 1940, in order to forestall a possible German invasion of

[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 282–283.

[21] Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 241–246.

[22] George Dean, "The War of the Diplomats," *New Outlook*, 161 (November, 1932), pp. 21–23.



MAP 18. U.S.S.R. DEVELOPMENT

Iran and to prevent the use of that country as a base for Axis propaganda, British and Red Army troops were sent into Iran and the latter country was compelled to submit to joint Soviet-British supervision.

Afghanistan. Afghanistan was destined by fate to be a pawn in the game of imperialist politics played between Russia and the British Empire. The Russians in the czars' times looked upon this country as a gateway to the Indian Ocean, while the British used it as a buffer against Russian expansionist moves. British imperial strategists continued to fear that Soviet leaders sought control over Afghanistan as a base of operations for a possible invasion of India, or at least, for propaganda to weaken British control over India.

Soviet influence on King Amanullah led to war between Afghanistan and Great Britain in 1919, which ended in a complete victory in arms for the British. The armistice that ended the war, however, recognized Afghan independence, a move which the U.S.S.R. quickly approved by the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1921. The latter treaty not only recognized Afghan independence but bound both parties not to ally themselves with any government hostile to either. The emir was given a subsidy and a loan and technical advice to help build up the country. Undercover agents, financed by the Soviet government, carried on intrigues in Afghanistan against British rule in India. In January, 1929, a conference of Soviet agents was held at Tashkent with the apparent intent of planning intervention in Afghanistan and proclaiming a Soviet republic there. This plot was thwarted by the assassination of Amanullah and the ascension, ultimately, of British supported Nadir Khan to the throne.

'Mohammed Zahir Khan, who succeeded Nadir Khan in 1933, has been able to play off the U.S.S.R. and the British against each other so as to prevent seizure of the country by either. The Soviet Union's nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939 raised anew the speculation about the use of Afghanistan as a base for military operations against British India, but the German attack on the U.S.S.R. eliminated this threat for the time

being.[23] Later, the Molotov treaty with Great Britain of June, 1942, removed it completely.

The Civil War ends. We resume consideration of Soviet policy and development from the time of Civil War and intervention. In 1920, the outlook was more promising than it had been for the new Communist state. Trotsky, who had been appointed People's Commissar of War in March, 1918, secured military instructors to aid in the training of the Red Army. Inspired by Trotsky's impassioned speeches and strengthened by large new levies, the new military machine put down the counterrevolutionists, fought the Poles to a draw, and drove the French out of the Ukraine, restoring the latter to Soviet control.[24] A Soviet government was set up in Hungary under Bela Kun and other countries were expected soon to follow suit. The Civil War ended in a triumph for the Red forces.

The policy of trade agreements. The effects of the Civil War and the blockade as well as Bolshevik attempts to set up Communism had resulted in a disastrous collapse of both agricultural and industrial production in Russia. To escape from this depression, Soviet leaders sought trade treaties and loans with which to buy machinery abroad. As early as November 20, 1919, Chicherin, Russian foreign commissar, had stated that Soviet Russia desired peace and an opportunity to trade with foreign nations.[25] In 1920, trade treaties were made with the Baltic states and Finland. In 1921, a trade agreement between Great Britain and Russia was negotiated which was followed by similar agreements with most other European states. These treaties gave tacit if not formal recognition to the Bolshevik regime. The British, fearing further German-Soviet rapprochement, reluctantly made the agreement but exacted a promise on the part of the U.S.S.R. that she would refrain from Communist propaganda in Great Britain.

The Genoa Conference and Rapallo. In January, 1922, Lloyd George suggested an international economic conference to deal

[23] Joseph Castagné, "Soviet Imperialism in Afghanistan," *Foreign Affairs,* 13 (July, 1935), pp. 698–703.

[24] Fischer, *op. cit.,* pp. 98–99, 144–146.

[25] *Ibid.,* p. 380.

with the problem of war debts. The defeated nations were invited, the idea being, particularly, to get the U.S.S.R. to acknowledge czarist debts. Thirty-four nations, including the U.S.S.R., took part in the Genoa meeting. Chicherin, speaking for the Soviet government in October, 1921, had offered to settle the debt question in exchange for a loan from the Allies. Hence Allied hopes were high.[26]

Creditor nations at this meeting insisted upon repayment to them of the debts of the old Russian regime. The Russians offered to repay part of them if given a loan. A deadlock ensued and the Conference failed. During the Conference, Russian delegates announced the consummation of a treaty of friendship with Germany. This treaty gave recognition to Soviet Russia, and provided for resumption of diplomatic relations and economic collaboration. In addition, secret arrangements were made for military co-operation, in evasion of the Versailles Treaty, as a result of which German officers could train Russian troops and themselves gain necessary experience in field work. Thus both nations, defeated and made outcasts by the war, could recoup themselves.[27]

The New Economic Policy. Collapse of industry at home and failure of the Communist revolution to materialize abroad compelled Soviet leaders to revise their optimistic views. In March, 1921, Lenin was forced to admit that world revolution would not come soon. In the meantime, it was imperative that Socialism be firmly established in Russia in order to relieve the economic crises. A retreat was necessary, he said, and concessions must be granted to foreign capitalists for the time being.[28] Under the New Economic Policy, private markets were reopened and private initiative was restored, though under state control. As a result, trade began immediately to revive.[29] By 1927–1928, industrial and agricultural production had returned

[26] Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–26.

[27] J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, "From Brest-Litovsk to Brest-Litovsk," *Foreign Affairs,* 18 (January, 1940), pp. 201–202.

[28] Florinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–84.

[29] Lancelot Lawton, *An Economic History of Soviet Russia,* London, Macmillan, 1933, p. 309.

to its prewar level. But this was obviously not enough since Russia's pre-war industrial capacity was insufficient to guarantee adequate production for her growing population, let alone create adequate defenses against her potential enemies. In addition, agricultural production was practically entirely under private control, though most of industry had been socialized.[30]

Lenin's death, in 1924, precipitated a struggle for power among Soviet leaders which eventuated in victory for Stalin. Lenin's policies of resuming trade relations with capitalist countries and offering concessions to them to attract their capital into the Soviet Union precipitated a conflict between Trotsky and Stalin over the policies to be followed in regard to world revolution. More and more, Bolshevik leaders were becoming preoccupied with the problem of internal reconstruction, which in turn required compromise with capitalist powers.

Trotsky upheld the traditional Communist belief that Socialism could be maintained only through world revolution. He demonstrated that the capitalist economy is a world system and that no one country could hope to maintain a different system and not be compelled either to capitulate or to compromise. Stalin met this argument by showing that capitalist development was not at a uniform rate and this in itself was sufficient proof that a single country could have economic policies different from those of other countries. But he agreed that final victory would require a world revolution. Stalin's viewpoint prevailed and Trotsky (after a period of opposition activity) was compelled to go into exile.[31]

Germany now began to shift away from her stand at Rapallo and to seek rapprochement with the Allies. By committing herself to the guarantees of the Locarno Pact, Germany gave solemn pledges of her peaceful intentions and in this manner paved the way for her entry into the League of Nations in September, 1926. The U.S.S.R. could see nothing in this but a movement still further to isolate and encircle her.[32] If such were the case,

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 310–311.

[31] Cf. Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 130–137, and Florinsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 127–144.

[32] Fischer, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 599–602. (See also Barnes, Chapter 13.—*Editor.*)

it became all the more imperative that the Soviet Union should prepare for any eventualities. She attempted to do so by (1) inaugurating a policy of peace, economic co-operation, and nonaggression pacts with European powers; and (2) undertaking through the Five Year Plans a tremendous expansion of industrial production and the socialization of Soviet agriculture.

The policy of nonaggression pacts and disarmament. On April 26, 1926, Germany and the Soviet Union concluded a nonaggression pact for five years. This pact was renewed by Hitler in 1933. In August, 1928, the U.S.S.R. ratified the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of international policy but showed skepticism as to its effectiveness.[33] In February, 1929, the Soviet Union signed the Litvinov nonaggression protocol, putting the Kellogg-Briand Pact into immediate effect between itself, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Rumania; later, Turkey, Iran, and Lithuania adhered to this protocol. These commitments were confirmed by nonaggression pacts in 1932. The Japanese were offered a nonaggression pact in 1931 but refused. At the Disarmament Conference at Geneva in 1927, Litvinov proposed absolute disarmament of all powers within one year.

Soviet leaders at this time were frankly in favor of the utmost co-operation with capitalist powers and completely at one with the antirevisionist powers regarding changes in treaties through force. As Radek pointed out, foreign policy is a function of domestic policy.[34] Only complete co-operation through trade and peaceful relations would enable Soviet leaders to complete their program of internal reconstruction.

Continuing the Soviet peace drive, Molotov on November 6, 1931, stated as a policy the respect of the Soviet Union for international treaties and for the sovereign rights and independence of other nations. He absolutely ruled out any policy of military intervention in the affairs of other states.[35] Litvinov at Geneva on May 18, 1931, had offered a protocol to repre-

[33] See Chapter 13.—*Editor.*
[34] Cambon, *et al., op. cit.*, p. 120.
[35] Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

sentatives of the powers to abstain not only from wars but from all forms of economic aggression to permit peaceful co-operation and prevent fears and uncertainty.[36]

The policy of nonaggression pacts and proposals of disarmament between 1926 and 1932 resulted from Soviet fears of an Allied-German coalition against her after Locarno. Japanese intervention in Manchuria in 1931 caused the U.S.S.R. to intensify her peace drive.[37] Security was the fundamental purpose in employing these methods. According to Wolfe, Soviet leaders hoped by their peace policy to confuse and divide their enemies, lull their fears, and get them at least partly to disarm while the U.S.S.R. armed herself against the capitalist world.[38]

The Five Year Plans. Soviet leaders were forced to adopt the successive Five Year Plans as a matter of self-defense. It had become only too clear that the original design of Bolshevik leaders to guarantee the success of Socialism in Russia through world revolution could not succeed, at least in the immediate future. Attempts of extreme left-wingers to set up Communism had failed. The New Economic Policy, while partly successful in restoring production to normal, threatened to overthrow all social gains so far achieved and to restore capitalism. On the other hand, the continuing enmity of the Allies toward the U.S.S.R. was being constantly made apparent. Germany, back once again in their good graces and renewed in strength, would undoubtedly revert to her former ambitions to take the Ukraine, while to the east Japan awaited only another chance to take advantage of the weakness of the U.S.S.R.

To the realistic Soviet leaders, therefore, the question of expanding the productive powers of the nation became a matter not only of preserving Socialism but even of preserving the integrity of the nation itself. The Five Year Plans were instituted because they appeared to Stalin and his aides as the best possible way under the existing conditions to expand production rapidly up to a point where her own war potential would make

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 229–230.
[37] Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–124. (See also Chapter 13.—*Editor.*)
[38] Cf. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 65–66, and Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 266–278.

possible successful defense of the Soviet Union against her enemies.[39]

In 1928, the First Five Year Plan was inaugurated. According to Soviet claims this was completed in four years and a Second Five Year Plan was started in 1933. This was presumedly finished in 1937. The Third Five Year Plan was delayed in starting but got under way in 1939. Opinions differ as to the degree of success achieved. There is general agreement that the U.S.S.R. has taken long strides toward industrialization. In all of the plans, emphasis has been placed primarily upon the heavy industries, particularly the production of machines. Production of armaments has been a principal concern of Bolshevist leaders. Dean shows that Soviet industrial production increased from 9 billion rubles in 1928 to 73 billion in 1937. Output of railway rolling stock increased by three or four times in the same period, while in production of tractors the U.S.S.R. became self-sufficient.[40] The increasing urbanization of the Soviet Union substantiates this view. In addition, claims are now put forward that 98 per cent of Russian agriculture has been collectivized.[41]

To offset these optimistic figures, however, it is pointed out that real income per head in the Soviet Union in 1937 was only about one-third that of the average person in Great Britain. During the 1930's, about 15 per cent of the total income was devoted to heavy industry, much of which was in defense production. Nevertheless, Soviet steel production in 1940 was only about equal to that of Great Britain.[42]

Capital investments required by the program of industrialization imposed heavy hardships on the population. Throughout the entire period after 1928 there was a dearth of consumer

[39] Cf. R. J. Kerner, "Foreign Policies of Russia," in *Foreign Policies of the Great Powers*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1939, p. 155; and H. C. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 55–56.

[40] V. M. Dean, "Industry and Agriculture in the U.S.S.R.," *Foreign Policy Reports*, 14 (June 1, 1938), reprinted in N. L. Hill and H. W. Stoke, *The Background of European Governments*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1940, pp. 611–612.

[41] E. J. Russell, "The Farming Problem in Russia," *The Slavonic Review*, 16 (1937–1938), pp. 320–340. Reprinted in Hill and Stoke, *op. cit.*, p. 616.

[42] "Russian Income and Defense Expenditures," *Bulletin of International News*, 18 (August 23, 1941), pp. 1067–1070.

goods, including foodstuffs. Production of raw materials declined. Attempts to reduce the hours of labor were not successful. Labor productivity did not increase substantially—increased production was due to an increased supply of workers. Scarcity of consumer goods resulted in inflation but wages did not rise commensurably. Underconsumption decreased efficiency of labor. According to Utley, ground was actually lost between 1937 and 1940. Fears of Bolshevik leaders that the country was in imminent danger of attack compelled them to drop all pretense of holding to high labor standards and desperate attempts were made to induce workers to step up production.[43]

Under the Five Year Plans, many of the Soviet heavy industries were moved eastward. During the Second Five Year Plan, attempts were made to put nearly half of all investment of heavy industry in the region of the Urals to remove them from danger of attack from the west and to bring closer together the iron ore of the Ural region and the coal of the Kuznetsk in Siberia.[44] Estimates before the Second World War conceded that approximately one-third of Soviet industry had been moved eastward, one-third remained in the Ukraine, and one-third was located around Moscow and Leningrad.

Russian rapprochement with the Allies. The advent of Hitler to power in Germany increased the threat of German aggression against the U.S.S.R. and intensified her tendency to make common cause with the antirevisionist powers. The treaty of Rapallo was made under the influence of German businessmen and militarists who supported Germany's traditional policy of "friendship with Russia." Hitler, on the other hand, openly proclaimed as his objective the taking over of the Ukraine as a granary for Germany.[45] While this announced policy was intended partly to obtain support from the German people and from anti-Bolsheviks abroad, there seems little doubt but that

[43] Compare Freda Utley, "The Enigma of Soviet Production," *Foreign Affairs,* 19:2 (January, 1941), pp. 385–401 with M. T. Florinsky, "Stalin's New Deal for Labor," *Political Science Quarterly,* 56 (March, 1941), pp. 38–50.

[44] N. Mikhaylov, *Soviet Geography,* London, Methuen, 1935, p. 55.

[45] A. Hitler, Nuremberg speech, September, 1936; quoted in F. L. Schuman, *Europe on the Eve,* New York, Knopf, 1939, p. 241.

Hitler meant what he said. A hint of this had been contained in a statement made by Hugenberg at the London Economic Conference in 1933.[46]

The rise of Hitler in 1933 caused Soviet leaders to seek additional security against the new menace from Germany. To offset Hitler's efforts to get western support for an attack on the U.S.S.R., Stalin reversed his policy of collaboration with Germany and sought defensive alliances with France and Czechoslovakia. Encouraged by Barthou, French foreign minister, the U.S.S.R. joined the League of Nations in 1934. Barthou and Litvinov sought by means of an eastern Locarno, guaranteed by Great Britain, France, the Little Entente, and the Soviet Union, to erect a barrier against German aggression toward the east. This project was defeated by the opposition of the British Tories, Poland, and Germany.[47] The assassination of Barthou ended these ambitious attempts to stabilize the situation in the East.

Pacts of mutual assistance were signed by the U.S.S.R. with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935. These were followed by nonaggression pacts with the Baltic states and the Little Entente. Propagandist activities of the Third International, which for years had been a source of friction with the western powers, were, in form if not in fact, readjusted to collaboration with democratic governments throughout the world. Spanish Loyalists were supported in their war against the Fascist powers.[48] These moves, according to Taracouzio, were designed not only to encircle and isolate Germany but to block the policy of appeasement.[49]

While League members fumbled at an agreement to reduce their armaments, Hitler announced Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and stated that it was Germany's intention to defy the Treaty of Versailles and to rearm. Consumma-

[46] Compare Kerner, "Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia," *op. cit.*, p. 158, and Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 371–372.

[47] Cf. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 74–82, and Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–96, 129–136. (See also Barnes and Peardon, Chapters 13 and 14, on this phase.—*Editor.*)

[48] Cf. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 50, and V. M. Dean, "Russia's Role in the European Conflict," *Foreign Policy Reports,* 15 (March 1, 1940), pp. 302–306.

[49] Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

tion by the U.S.S.R. of the pact of mutual assistance with France was denounced by Hitler as evidence of an intention to encircle Germany. The pact, he maintained, was a violation of the Locarno Pact, and thus released Germany from her obligations not to fortify the Rhineland.

When, on March 7, 1936, German troops marched into the Rhineland, the Soviet Union and the Little Entente urged France strongly to take military action to prevent the German coup. The U.S.S.R. was especially favorable at this time to a preventive war to forestall Germany from successfully completing her rearmament. Both France and Great Britain were lukewarm to Soviet urgings and, as in the case of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia where the Soviets had also struggled for effective action, the Allies failed to make their promises good. It seemed clear that British statesmen were not averse to allowing Germany to regain her strength if this could be directed against the Soviet Union rather than against themselves.[50]

Refortification of the Rhineland seemed to indicate a definite decision on Germany's part to attack the U.S.S.R. The Siegfried Line was calculated to slow up or stop any attempt by France to come to the aid of her ally.[51] This view seemed to be confirmed when Hitler, after the Rhineland coup, offered twenty-five-year nonaggression treaties to France and Belgium and states bordering on Germany in the east, except the Soviet Union. In addition, this interpretation of Germany's plans fitted in snugly with the hopes and wishes of the appeasement parties in France and Great Britain.[52] Wolfe contends that the French and British feared the Soviet Union was promoting war between Germany and themselves.[53]

Violent attacks on the U.S.S.R. at the Nuremberg Party Rally in September, 1936, lulled French and British fears still further. Schuman contends that the Chamberlain government

[50] Toynbee, *op. cit.*, p. 271. (Contrast with Chapter 13; also see Chapter 14.—*Editor.*)

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 262–338. (See also Chapter 22, "Technology and War."—*Editor.*)

[52] Cf. F. L. Schuman, *Night Over Europe*, New York, Knopf, 1941, pp. 56-57, and Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

encouraged Germany to bring pressure against Czechoslovakia, persuaded France to back down on her treaty commitments to Czechoslovakia, and deliberately betrayed the Czechs into the hands of the Germans in order to open the way for the German attack on the U.S.S.R.[54] The Kremlin's offer to co-operate with the British and French in support of Czechoslovakia was rejected by London.[55]

The Agreement of Munich excluded the Soviet Union from the councils of Europe. Germany was now free to move towards the Ukraine. French and English statesmen were convinced that Germany now definitely was committed to war against the U.S.S.R. According to Schuman, disillusionment came to the Allies when Germany assigned Ruthenia to Hungary, thus, apparently precluding a German invasion of the Ukraine by way of Rumania.[56]

Apparently Germany intended to attack Poland even without a pact with the U.S.S.R. in the spring of 1939. After Munich, Poland was offered peace by Germany in exchange for Danzig and the right for Germany to freely use the Polish corridor. Why did not Poland and the Allies agree to this and thus secure the much needed delay? Apparently the failure to come to terms was due to continued uncertainty on the part of the Allies as to the direction of Germany's offensive. The appeasers would have been willing to sacrifice Poland also in exchange for a German war on the Soviet Union. But Hitler used no persuasion on the Allies to this end; instead, he dealt with Warsaw directly. The Poles resisted and the Allies finally became convinced that Germany was planning an attack in the west.[57] According to one account, the British-French promise to go to war if necessary to protect Polish integrity from German attack apparently caused the German Army high command to put pressure on Hitler for a nonaggression pact with the U.S.S.R.[58]

[54] Frederick L. Schuman, *Europe on the Eve,* New York, Knopf, 1939, chap. 9.
[55] *Ibid.,* p. 346.
[56] Frederick L. Schuman, *Night Over Europe,* New York, Knopf, 1941, pp. 115 ff.
[57] *Ibid.,* pp. 183–190.
[58] X, "Russian and Germany, Political and Military Reflections," *Foreign Affairs,* 20:2 (January, 1942), pp. 311–312.

In the game of power politics now being played, Stalin found all of his efforts to build an anti-Hitler coalition checkmated by the refusal of the Allies to co-operate. The Kremlin was fully cognizant of the purpose of the appeasers to turn Germany against the U.S.S.R., in fact, had denounced it openly after Munich.[59]

While the Soviet attempt to encircle Germany had been thwarted, the game was not wholly lost. The gloating by her enemies over disunity in the U.S.S.R. because of the bloody purges of 1936–1937 was not justified by the results, since the elimination of his opponents only served to strengthen Stalin's hands.[60] Belief by some writers that the adoption of the Constitution of 1936 and Soviet support of the League of Nations and the sanctity of treaties demonstrated a change of heart on the part of Soviet leaders proved to be only an illusion. The U.S.S.R. remained a totalitarian dictatorship playing a very realistic game of power politics.[61]

As Schuman points out, Stalin had several alternative moves at his disposal. He could try to re-establish the British-French-Soviet bloc, but this was not promising in view of the recent Allied betrayal of Czechoslovakia and the Soviets. An alliance with Hitler was also suspect in view of its uncertainty because of Hitler's unknown intentions towards the Ukraine and his consequent unreliability as an ally. The remaining alternative of partial co-operation with Hitler seemed indicated.[62]

The German-Soviet nonaggression pact. The German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939 caused Allied leaders to hasten negotiations with Moscow. Germany was already engaged in conversations with the U.S.S.R. Thus, Stalin was placed in a favorable position to exact the best possible bargain. He demanded from the Allies pacts of mutual assistance covering not only the U.S.S.R. but also the Baltic states, and a military

[59] J. Stalin, speech on March 10, 1939, at the 18th Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. See F. L. Schuman, *Night Over Europe,* New York, Knopf, 1941, pp. 216 ff. (See chapter 15.—*Editor.*)

[60] Wolfe, *op. cit.,* pp. 92–98.

[61] Cf. Schuman, *op. cit.,* p. 222, and Toynbee, *op. cit.,* pp. 375–377. (See Chapter 23, "Totalitarianism at War."—*Editor.*)

[62] Schuman, *op. cit.,* p. 225.

alliance as well. The British demurred at guaranteeing countries without their consent. Parleys dragged on, and in the meantime Hitler offered to the U.S.S.R. a nonaggression pact and an agreement to split up Poland. This was mutually advantageous because it would protect Hitler from a two-front war and enable the U.S.S.R. to extend her frontiers into Poland, and, also, give additional time in which to reach a peak of preparedness. In the meantime, Germany might exhaust herself in a war against the western powers.

By implication, the pact, concluded on August 3, 1939, prevented Hitler from realizing his dream of a German-dominated Ukraine; but as events have shown, this also proved to be only wishful thinking. Taracouzio and Wolfe doubt that Stalin had a long-term alliance in mind but Lyons, on the other hand, concludes that Stalin and Hitler were natural allies.[63]

It seems clear that the signing of the nonaggression pact with Germany was deliberately aimed at turning Hitler against the Allies. If the U.S.S.R. did not support the Allies, Germany would feel free to attack Poland because of Allied military weakness. Hence, because of British-French guarantees to Poland, war would probably ensue, Germany and the Allies would wear each other out and Europe in her weakness would be open to a Communist invasion.[64]

The Anti-Comintern Pact and the Triple Alliance. On November 25, 1936, Japan and Germany, the Soviet Union's most dangerous potential enemies, signed an agreement to suppress Communism. While this was excused by both parties as an ideological war and not a threat to the Soviet Union, its implications were clear. The tension created by this move was increased by Germany's invasion of Czechoslovakia.[65]

The Anti-Comintern Pact was consolidated into an outright alliance on September 27, 1940, in which Italy was included.

[63] Cf. Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, p. 247; E. Lyons, "Must Russia Fight Hitler?", *American Mercury*, 52 (January, 1941), pp. 24–32; and Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 248 ff. (See also Chapter 15.—*Editor.*)

[64] Cf. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 175, and Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, pp. 256 ff. (Contrast this view with that of Barnes relative to Russian motives.—*Editor.*)

[65] Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 383–389. (See also Chapter 15.—*Editor.*)

The Triple Axis, thus created, then concluded agreements with other European states under German control, including France, Spain, Hungary, Rumania, and Slovakia. These powers agreed to treat as an enemy any power intervening in the war.

The fall of France released the larger part of the German army and in the Fall of 1940 German troops were concentrated in the Balkans for a thrust into the Near East. Such a move was likely to involve the Soviet Ukraine. Hitler endeavored to still Stalin's fears in this respect by offering him a guarantee of Soviet frontiers, a share in war booty, a free hand in Iran and Afghanistan, and control of the Dardanelles. Hitler's promises, however, could hardly be taken at face value.[66]

It seems clear that the immediate reason why Hitler attacked the U.S.S.R. was because it refused to fall in with Nazi plans for a campaign to close off the eastern end of the Mediterranean and seize the oil fields of the Middle East. Viewed realistically, however, the war against Great Britain and France was the necessary prelude to the seizure of the Ukraine and the Caucasus, long desired by German statesmen hungry for land and raw materials. The U.S.S.R. was to be pushed eastward and the Ukraine was to furnish space and raw materials for German expansion.[67]

Hitler's promises could not avail to obtain Soviet consent to an eastern campaign. Though an attack by the U.S.S.R. on Germany which would at once establish a two-front war and, perhaps, encompass Hitler's defeat, the 1940–1941 Balkan campaign was carried through. And instead of making war on Hitler, Stalin preferred to consolidate his position in the Baltic states, Poland, and Bessarabia which had been seized as an aftermath of the nonaggression pact, and play a waiting game.[68]

Hitler, therefore, could not extend his lines further and attack the Allies in the Middle East with the Red Army in his

[66] V. M. Dean, "Russia and the New Order in Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, 16 (December 15, 1940), pp. 230–233.

[67] Bruce Hopper, "The War for Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, 20:1 (October, 1941), pp. 22–23. (For a different view see Chapter 15.—*Editor.*)

[68] F. L. Schuman, *op. cit.*, pp. 574–575.

rear. Hence, the Nazis attacked in June, 1941, before the fields were harvested and in sufficient time, he hoped, to crush the Soviets before the winter cold set in. Though the start had been delayed somewhat by Yugoslavia's unexpected resistance to his demands for capitulation, the German dictator expected to overwhelm the Red Army by the usual *Blitzkrieg* tactics in the approximately sixteen weeks at his disposal. By the middle of August the Germans had succeeded (they said) in defeating several Soviet armies, but were delayed on the approaches to Leningrad and Moscow by the complicated system of fixed defenses and the heroic efforts of both Red Army and civilian defenders.[69]

The United Nations. British and United States diplomats hastened to Moscow and arranged to ship military supplies to the U.S.S.R. in exchange for Stalin's pledge to support the principles of the Atlantic Charter which had been agreed to by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14, 1941. Soviet adherence to the Charter was promised at the Interallied Conference in London on September 24, 1941. This commitment was emphasized when the U.S.S.R. joined in the Declaration of the United Nations signed at Washington, D.C., on January 1, 1942. The Declaration binds all member nations to co-operate together, to employ their full resources against the Axis, and to make no separate peace or armistice.[70] Thus Russia, ostracized at Munich, was welcomed back with open arms by the democratic powers.

Soviet Policy in the Far East

Outer Mongolia. Precipitation of civil war in outer Mongolia during the First World War by White Russians led Mongol authorities to seek the aid of the Chinese. The latter sent troops into Mongolia, restored the territory to Chinese sovereignty, and set up a government under Chinese auspices. A revolt over-

[69] X, "Russia and Germany, Political and Military Reflections," *loc. cit.*, pp. 313 ff.

[70] Wickham Steed, "The Grand Alliance," *The Contemporary Review*, 116:914, pp. 68–70.

threw the Chinese regime. General von Sternberg took advantage of the situation to lead an army of White Russians into Mongolia in February, 1921, and set up a government with himself at head. In May of the same year, von Sternberg attacked the Red troops on the border and was himself defeated. Thereupon, the Bolsheviks took control, set up a Communist Party in Mongolia, and attempted to communize the country. A government favorable to the Bolsheviks was established and in November, 1921, a treaty was concluded between Mongolia and the Soviet Union making Mongolia a Soviet protectorate. The nominal sovereignty of China was recognized by the U.S.S.R.[71]

In 1924, a Mongol Soviet Republic was proclaimed. A Mongol army was organized and equipped by the U.S.S.R. Under provisions of a trade treaty, the Bolsheviks obtained a virtual monopoly over business and financial activities of Mongolia. The Chinese were gradually edged out. The Soviet share in Mongol trade increased by 1926 from about 25 per cent to nearly 60 per cent.[72]

Japanese penetration into Inner Mongolia and intrigues in Outer Mongolia against the U.S.S.R. caused the latter, in April, 1936, to threaten war if necessary to preserve Mongolia's independence. On March 12, 1936, the U.S.S.R. signed a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongols. Soviet newspapers declared that Japanese pressure on their eastern flank necessitated this and said that it was designed to block Japan's alleged objective to cut off the Soviet Far Eastern territory as far west as Lake Baikal.[73]

In a war between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, the Soviet-trained Mongolian army would probably be of material aid to the Red Army.

Sinkiang. Japanese intrigues in Inner Mongolia caused Soviet authorities to take steps to safeguard themselves against a flank attack on the U.S.S.R. through Sinkiang. A trade agree-

[71] N. D. Harris, *Europe and the East,* New York, Houghton 1926, pp. 563–571.

[72] V. Connolly, *Soviet Economic Policy in the East,* London, Oxford University Press, 1933, pp. 100–105.

[73] Toynbee *op. cit.,* pp. 933–935.

ment negotiated by the Soviets with the provincial government in the late 1920's gave them an economic hold upon the country. A Moslem revolt in the early 1930's caused Sinkiang officials to appeal to Moscow for aid instead of to Nanking. In response, Red troops were spirited over the border in civilian clothes accompanied by tanks and bombers. Defeat of the Moslems was followed by assumption of practically complete economic and political control over the province by the Soviet Union. The construction in Soviet Asia of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway, which runs parallel to the border of Sinkiang, and Soviet support of the Chinese in their war with Japan has increased Russian dominance over the province.

The Soviet government now has advisers in all of the major departments of Sinkiang's government. The Sinkiang army has Soviet-trained officers and air pilots, and is equipped with weapons of Soviet manufacture. The economic life of the province is completely under Soviet control. Aid has been extended to Sinkiang in the form of loans, technical advice, and equipment. Roads, airfields, and industries have been constructed and improvements have been made in agricultural production, health service, and schools. No attempt has been made, however, to set up a system of Communism. As in the case of Outer Mongolia, the formal sovereignty of China over Sinkiang has been recognized.[74]

The U.S.S.R. and China. China's initial reaction to the Communist revolution in Russia was one of hostility. Diplomatic relations were broken off and a defensive agreement was made with Japan in case the Reds should engage in revolutionary activities in the Far East. Chinese troops also participated in the Allied Expedition in Siberia.[75]

Soviet emissaries began to spread Communist propaganda in south China and in July, 1919, the Bolshevik government offered a treaty making substantial concessions to China in exchange for recognition. Territory seized from China by the

[74] *Bulletin of International News,* 17:2 (July to December, 1940), pp. 1478–1483.

[75] V. A. Yakhontoff, *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East,* New York, Coward, 1931, p. 132.

czar's government was to be given back, Chinese sovereignty over the Chinese Eastern Railway and over the mines and forests of Manchuria was to be restored, the Boxer indemnity was to be waived, and all concessions granted the czar's government were to be abrogated.[76]

This move put Chinese-Soviet relations on a more friendly basis, and, after prolonged negotiations, diplomatic relations were resumed in 1922. In May, 1923, a treaty was signed extending recognition to the U.S.S.R.[77]

Communist propaganda proved so successful that in January, 1924, the Kuomintang was brought completely under Red domination and the party voted an alliance with the Soviet Union to destroy capitalist imperialism in China. Soviet officers aided the Cantonese to organize and train a modern army. North China, however, was hostile to communism. Led by Chiang Kai-shek, conservative and moderate elements gradually obtained control of the party and ousted the Reds.[78]

In 1927, looting of the city of Nanking by mutinous soldiers led to bombardment by foreign warships and demands by the powers for indemnities. This caused the Kuomintang to hold a plenary session under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, in which it was voted to set up a new anti-Communist government to satisfy the foreigners.[79]

An attempt by Communists to seize control of Canton led to breaking off of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. A period of unfriendliness ensued. Chiang Kai-shek carried on war against the Chinese Reds. The Soviet embassy at Peking was raided on April 6, 1927. There was bickering over control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. In May, 1929, the Chinese, who had persistently demanded return of the railway, attempted to take over the management. Sharp exchanges led to intervention by Soviet troops and capitulation by the Chinese.[80]

Communism failed to sway the Chinese, just as it had failed

[76] Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 314–317.
[77] Yakhontoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 134–139.
[78] Prince A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 295–298.
[79] Yakhontoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 164–165.
[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 172 ff.

in other Asiatic countries, because it was totally alien to the Chinese culture. Nevertheless, by 1930 several regional governments and about thirty million people were under Communist regimes.[81]

Preoccupation of Soviet authorities with problems of internal reconstruction after 1928 led to a withdrawal from aggressive measures in China. The Japanese took advantage of this and intervened in Manchuria in 1931. Anxious to remain at peace, both because of their domestic difficulties and because their plans to fortify eastern Siberia were only in the making, the Soviets raised no great objection to this action. They even agreed to sell their holdings in the Chinese Eastern Railway to the Japanese.

It is obviously to the advantage of the U.S.S.R. to maintain a strong China in order to balance Japan's plans for expansion in the Far East. Hence the Soviet government has zealously striven to aid the Chinese in their resistance to the Japanese war of aggression. In August, 1937, the U.S.S.R. and China concluded a nonaggression pact in which they mutually pledged themselves neither to make war on each other nor to aid a third party at war with either. Both profited by the agreement, in that the Soviet Union thus prevented China from joining the Anti-Comintern alliance and China made sure that no Japanese-Soviet agreement would be made that might allow withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Soviet border for service against China.[82] Both Japan and Germany expressed hostility to this move.

Further aid to China was extended by a new trade treaty ratified on June 25, 1939. Included in this was a Soviet loan to China of $150 million for war materials. Sale to China of war materials was also protested by the Japanese, but difficulties of transportation and lack of surplus materials prevented large scale activities in this direction.[83]

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 183–184.

[82] A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Relations, 1937*, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, vol. 1, pp. 295–298.

[83] W. L. Holland and Kate Mitchell, *Problems of the Pacific, 1939*, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 88–89.

The Soviets and Japan. Period of the Revolution. Japan's real intentions towards Russia were made manifest during the period of the Revolution when the new Soviets were helpless to defend themselves in the Far East. Acting on suggestions of her military leaders, the Japanese government proposed to the Allies in 1918 an expedition to Siberia, ostensibly to rescue Czech troops who were seeking to escape out of Russia by way of Siberia. Suspicious of Japanese motives, President Wilson insisted upon a joint expedition. The Japanese had already sent warships to Vladivostok and their contingent in the expedition was far larger than those of the other Allies. In exchange for oil concessions, Japanese leaders extended their support to White Russians in Siberia in their war against the Bolsheviks. The Japanese intrenched themselves along the Trans-Siberian railway and acted as if they were there to stay. They seized Vladivostok and the Maritime Province and attempted to take over the Chinese Eastern Railway. When the Allies decided to leave Siberia, the Japanese refused to go along and continued their occupation until October, 1922. Only extreme pressure, particularly by the United States at the Washington Conference, and a popular protest at home compelled their evacuation.

It was evident that the Japanese wanted to eliminate the Soviets completely as a factor in Far Eastern affairs by separating eastern Siberia from Soviet control and erecting it as a buffer state under Japanese auspices.[84] This buffer state was intended not only to eliminate the U.S.S.R. as an economic and military factor in the Far East and thus pave the way for a greater Japanese Empire in which China could be exploited by the Japanese at their leisure, but also to prevent the spread of Bolshevism. Marxist doctrines conflicted violently with propaganda of Japanese militarists in their work on the continent, spreading "dangerous thoughts" of the most intolerable kind.[85]

In 1923, Soviet authorities, to compel Japanese recognition

[84] Dennis, *op. cit.*, pp. 281 ff.

[85] Toynbee, *Survey of International Relations, 1936,* London, Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 924 ff.

of the new regime, issued a decree annulling all concessions relating to fisheries and sealing rights and setting up new regulations discriminating against the Japanese. Further Soviet pressure finally resulted in the treaty of January 20, 1925, which gave Japanese recognition to the U.S.S.R., provided that neither party would interfere in the other's territory, and granted concessions to Japanese citizens to exploit timber and mineral resources in North Sakhalin.[86] Trade relations were resumed.

Peaceful relations from 1925–1937. Between 1925 and 1937 relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R. were fairly peaceful. The growth in strength of the Soviet Union and liberal governments in Japan aided in this development. Japan did not interfere in the Soviet intervention in China in 1929 and the Soviets remained quiescent when Japan took over Manchuria in 1931. Setting up of the Manchukuan state, however, led to continued border conflicts. Some of these were outright battles on a considerable scale. These may be considered as tests of strength. Failure of the Soviet government to insist upon its rights in the Amur River incident in June, 1937, and the withdrawal of its forces after the battle led the Japanese to infer that the U.S.S.R. was in no position for war and thus encouraged them to launch the war on China.[87]

The pitched battles at Changkufeng in 1935 and Nomonhan in 1939 which resulted adversely to the Japanese proved the superior quality of the Red Army's Far Eastern forces.[88] The Soviet Union wanted to safeguard her Far Eastern position by strengthening China in her war against Japan and, hence, found it inexpedient to continue her support of the Chinese Communists who, in the earlier period, had been at odds with the Chiang Kai-shek government. The effect of the Soviet policy was to force the Communists to ally themselves with Nanking against Japan.[89]

[86] Yakhontoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–249.

[87] A. J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Relations, 1937*, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, pp. 149–153.

[88] W. H. Chamberlin, "The Siberian War Cloud," *Asia*, 42 (January, 1942), p. 46.

[89] Toynbee, *op. cit.*, pp. 154–155.

Japan's adherence to the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 increased the tension between the two powers. Soviet leaders insisted that the pact contained secret clauses. Japan denied this and also that the pact was directed against any particular power. Rumors concerning the agreement caused the Soviet government to lower its age limits for military training. The Japanese responded by moving to create an independent air arm and to expand their air fleet.[90] The trend to war seemed evident.

Soviet defensive position in the Far East. Since 1925, the Soviet Union has remained on the defensive in the Far East contenting herself with exploiting her existing possessions. In view of the fact that the climate in eastern Siberia is difficult to endure, the soil hard to work, and raw materials not too plentiful, why should the U.S.S.R. not yield to Japan's wishes and withdraw from that section in the interests of peace? As Kerner points out, perhaps the most basic dynamic in Russia's history has been the drive of her peoples to the open sea. The search for a warm-water port on the ocean has been blocked by hostile neighbors in Europe. The Siberian coast offers the U.S.S.R. the only other outlet to the seas capable of use throughout the year.[91] Moreover, Japanese monopoly of Far Eastern markets would seriously hamper trade outlets for expanding Soviet production. It is not likely that the Soviet Union will yield to Japan.

To strengthen her Far Eastern position, the U.S.S.R. has established fixed fortifications along the border of Manchukuo, established a great naval base at Vladivostok, and created a chain of air bases from the maritime provinces to the Bering Strait. A considerable fleet of light naval vessels is maintained at Vladivostok. The movement of heavy industries to western Siberia makes possible shipment of war materials to the Far East in a much shorter time in the event of war. Moreover, the Trans-Siberian Railroad has been doubletracked and a new line has been built eastward from Taishet on Lake Baikal to

[90] *Ibid.*, pp. 145–147.
[91] Kerner, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

expedite communication. A large army has been permanently established in the Far Eastern territories, ex-soldiers encouraged to settle there by generous subsidies, and munitions industries set up on the spot.[92]

Will Japan attack the U.S.S.R.? Japanese preoccupation with the Chinese war prevented any hostile operations against the U.S.S.R. from 1937 until the Soviet Union became involved in the Second World War in June, 1941. The German-Russian nonaggression pact of 1939 obviously upset Japanese calculations. Consummation of a nonaggression pact between Japan and the Soviet Union on April 13, 1941, seemed to indicate that Japan was planning a southward move to the East Indies rather than a move against Siberia, and events have borne this out. However, written agreements are no barriers where vital interests are at stake.

Conclusion

Throughout the period under review, Soviet foreign policies have not deviated in any substantial measure from following the fundamental interests of the Soviets. As a world power with vast possessions but inadequate industrial and military power to protect and develop them, the conditions of Soviet moves vis-à-vis neighbor states were pretty much determined in advance. The policy of seeking recognition from other powers and consummating trade treaties with them was dictated by the need of the U.S.S.R. to obtain manufactured goods and machinery wherewith to meet her people's needs and strengthen her domestic industry in terms of increased output, particularly of weapons for defense. The events of the Civil War had shown all too clearly that, without exception, the great powers on her borders were ready to take advantage of Soviet weaknesses for purposes of self-aggrandizement.

The New Economic Policy and the Five Year Plans were additional steps taken by the U.S.S.R. to speed up her preparations for security against attack. The policy of disarmament

[92] Chamberlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–47.

and of nonaggression pacts sought to prevent the building up of excessive armaments by the capitalist powers and to immobilize them as respects aggressive actions against the Soviets.[93] The peace policy served the same purpose. The U.S.S.R. hoped to build a coalition of peace-loving states and thus protect herself from warlike actions of aggressor states.[94]

The Soviet policy of friendship with Germany was necessitated by the hostility of the Allies towards her during the 1920's and because the U.S.S.R. and Germany needed each other for reasons of trade.[95]

At all times, it was of course to the advantage of the Soviets to play off one combination of enemies against another. The Soviet's entry into the League and alliance with France resulted from fear of Hitler and of Germany's moves to rearm after 1933. Stalin's shift toward Germany was, as has been shown, caused by his inability to rely upon the Allies for further aid.

Opinions of authorities vary widely as to the ultimate trend of Soviet foreign policies. On the one hand, Taracouzio asserts that the U.S.S.R. has never given up her aim to install Communism throughout the world by means of revolution and military force.[96] Wolfe contends that Russia has become ultranationalistic and is following the path of imperialistic expansion.[97]

On the other hand, M. T. Florinsky feels that the U.S.S.R. by 1933 had gone the whole way toward collaboration with capitalist powers.[98] It is notable, however, that Florinsky and Toynbee were writing at the time of Russia's rapprochement with the Allies, while Taracouzio and Wolfe expressed their judgments after the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact of 1939.

[93] Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

[94] *Ibid.*, pp. 68–81.

[95] V. M. Dean, "Russia's Role in the Europe Conflict," *Foreign Policy Reports*, 15 (March 1, 1940), p. 304.

[96] Taracouzio, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

[97] Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 243, 269–270.

[98] Florinsky, *op. cit.*, p. 239. A. J. Toynbee, also, takes a similar view; see his *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, London, Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 375 ff.

K. S. Davis' argument that Stalin saved the Allies through his farsightedness seems hardly in consonance with the facts, while Wickham Steed's hopeful prediction that Soviet adherence to the "Grand Alliance" of January 1, 1942 will provide a working arrangement which will grow into a league to enforce peace must also be viewed with some skepticism.[99]

The safest conclusion seems to be that the Soviet Union will continue to work to protect and expand her own basic interests, and democratic nations must take this into account in the Second World War and in the peace afterward.

Questions

1. Compare German and Russian aims at Brest-Litovsk.
2. Give reasons for Bolshevik optimism regarding the possibility of world revolution in 1917–1918.
3. Explain the organization, methods, and aims of the Third International.
4. How was Communist propaganda received in Turkey? In Persia?
5. What was the attitude of the Turks regarding the Soviet Union's policies at Lausanne?
6. Did the Bolsheviks practice imperialism in Asia after the revolution? If so, what methods were used?
7. What conditions and events led Soviet leaders to give up the movement for world revolution?
8. What were Stalin's and Trotsky's arguments on the issue of world revolution?
9. Explain the New Economic Policy and state its implications for Communism.
10. What was the Soviet Union's objective in initiating the policy of trade agreements?
11. What was the significance of the Genoa Conference? Of the Rapallo Treaty?
12. What were the objectives of the Five Year Plans?
13. To what extent were these objectives achieved?
14. What was the effect of the Five Year Plans on Soviet foreign policy?

[99] Cf. K. S. Davis, "Have We Been Wrong About Stalin?", *Current History*, 1:1 (September, 1941), p. 11, and Wickham Steed, *op. cit.*, pp. 70–72.

15. What purposes were served by the nonaggression pacts negotiated by the U.S.S.R.?

16. For what reasons did the U.S.S.R. join the League of Nations and ally herself with France?

17. What was the Soviet stand on breaches of collective security by Japan, Italy, and Germany?

18. Why did the U.S.S.R. enter into a nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939?

19. How do Soviet and Japanese aims conflict in eastern Asia?

20. Give reasons for Japanese change of policy toward the U.S.S.R. after 1936.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Discuss the role of the Third International as an agency for Communist propaganda.

2. Outline the relation between Communist propaganda and independence movements in Asia.

3. Survey the effects of Soviet trade policies on countries of the Middle East.

4. Review German-Russian rivalry in Turkey.

5. Discuss Soviet policy regarding naval power in the Black Sea and the use of the Straits.

6. Discuss Soviet policies in the Baltic area.

7. Review Soviet-German military co-operation after Rapallo.

8. Review the Soviet collective-security policies after 1934.

9. Discuss Soviet support of the Communist movement in China.

10. Review the Soviet Union's policy regarding the Chinese Eastern railway since 1918.

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CHAPTER 17

AFRICA AND THE ARAB LANDS

Africa

In a world in which strategy looms large, the importance of Africa has been enhanced. It lies on three of the most important sea highways: the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and Indian Oceans. For long the Mediterranean was western civilization's "irrigation ditch." On its shores western man gained the cultural impetus that has sustained him to this very day. It has long been one of the busiest traffic lanes, the lifeline of empires.

On the sea routes around the African coasts the East and West have met. The Occident built a short route into the Orient by carving the Suez Canal out of the shores of Africa. In the Second World War the imperial lifelines of belligerents encircled that continent. Moving along that line, the United States bolstered the defenses of the Middle East and sought to strengthen the Soviet Union's hand.

The vast triangular coast of Africa has gained added importance in an age in which seas no longer divide. Frontiers have been obliterated by fast maritime communications. On the other hand, land frequently divides. The great desert of northern Africa is a most effective dividing line, which only yesterday it was well nigh impossible to cross.

For these reasons, Africa leads an amphibian life and has two histories. It lives at sea and also on land. One of its histories is old while the other one is new. The old is the history of Africa facing the sea, the history of a narrow fringe of land, linked to the interior only through the Nile. The younger history of Africa is that of the interior itself, the "Dark Continent." The flat contour of vast stretches of the coast, the sandbars, the desert, tropical rain and sun, rendered much of

inner Africa inaccessible to the white man until recent times.

The changing face of Africa. Africa has been precipitated into the very center of events both as a transit land and a military objective of great economic importance since Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia. The airplane and tank have revolutionized the life of all continents. Africa, too, has become a landing field for pilots. The importance of West Africa has immeasurably increased because it juts into the South Atlantic. A formerly inconspicuous African town, Dakar,[1] has thus become a strategic bridgehead of world-wide importance. The western bridgehead is on the bulge of South America, at Natal, Brazil. The distance between the two points, 1,620 nautical miles, is shorter than any line between Europe and the Americas. Fast airplanes, in the 1940's, have now brought the two worlds within five hours of flying. If a nation were to attempt an invasion of Latin America, economic or military, it would try to obtain a foothold on the African bulge.

In the spring of 1941 it became known that rails were being laid across the Sahara desert,[2] from the southern terminus of the Mediterranean railway at Colomb-Béchar in Algeria to the great bend of the Niger, beyond the desert divide. The official name of this railway was Chemin de Fer de Mediterranée-Niger, and it was being built under the auspices of the French Vichy government. No doubt could be entertained that this project was sponsored by the German Reich. The line across the Sahara was to link up central Europe with central Africa, from where an economic and possibly military invasion of Latin America could be launched.

Cherchez l'huile. Northern Africa became a theater of war shortly after Italy joined her weakness to Germany's strength in the summer of 1940. Whenever in doubt about the ulterior motive of a step, it was a serviceable axiom of old diplomacy to suggest, *Cherchez la femme,* and more often than not the woman was actually found. In the modern world of gasoline

[1] For a detailed discussion of Dakar, French West Africa, and the Atlantic islands, see Emil Lengyel, *Dakar: Outpost of Two Hemispheres,* New York, Random House, 1941.

[2] *Ibid.*

and lubricants it is more correct to say, *Cherchez l'huile.* From North Africa some of the most abundant oil wells of the Old World may be reached across a level terrain. The greatest oil-wells of the eastern hemisphere are within a radius of a few hundred miles from the point where Iraq, Iran, and Turkey meet.[3] The largest of these wells are on and near the Caspian Sea between Iran and the Soviet Union, which produces about 31,000,000 tons of crude oil in a normal year. The next largest wells are near the Persian Gulf of Iran, with an annual capacity of some 10,000,000 tons. Lastly, the Mosul district of the Iraq is responsible for an annual output of approximately 6,000,000 tons.

Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War it became clear that oil might become the bottleneck for the Axis. Because of oil, in part at least, the Third Reich launched its attack upon the Soviet Union in June, 1941, and also because of oil, primarily, the Axis struck at Egypt across Libya.

The drive was directed, of course, not merely at the oil centers but also at the solar plexus of the "world island" of Eurasia and Africa—a name dear to German theorists of geopolitics. The real "heartland" of the world island lies beyond Suez. The Axis could dominate the entire western hemisphere by acquiring a foothold in the Middle East.[4]

Oil was the motive of another warlike move on African soil, even though it did not appear on the surface at first. That move was the seizure of Madagascar in May, 1942, by the British, acting also upon the mandate of the United States and other Allies. Madagascar dominates the sea route around the Cape which was thronged with ships sailing to stock up the Soviet war chest. Had Japan been able to get there first, this lifeline of the United Nations might have been severed.

The land of the haves. Africa was bound to play an important role not merely because of its geographical location but also from intrinsic reasons. In the highly propagandized view

[3] Margret Boveri, *Minaret and Pipe-Line. Yesterday and Today in the Near East,* London, Oxford University Press, 1939.

[4] See Chapter 21.—*Editor.*


of the so-called have-not nations, it is the most typical have continent. This view is in contradiction with the more popular view that Africa is the hell-hole of creation.

Even scientific economists of the mercantilist school were spellbound by gold, considered the most solid basis of the wealth of nations. It is little wonder that Africa should be considered so rich by some, since nearly 35 per cent of all the gold supply of the world originates in the Union of South Africa alone. The very name of Kimberley, where diamonds are mined, has become a synonym of inexhaustible wealth.[5] Gold and diamonds are also mined on the Gold Coast of West Africa, and diamonds in Southern Rhodesia, both in British hands. Northern and Southern Rhodesia, between the tropical core of the continent, the Belgian Congo, and the Union of South Africa, are especially rich in minerals and metals. They have important supplies of copper and zinc, also lead and chromium, asbestos and coal. The Katanga district of the Belgian Congo is reputed to be one of the world's richest mineral-producing regions, contributing about 90 per cent of the world's supply of radium. It is also the largest diamond producer, next to South Africa. It mines high-grade uranium ore, tin, cobalt, and silver among others. Farther south, the Transvaal works rich deposits of tin and of the highly prized and expensive platinum. Mica mines are operated in the Tanganyika Territory, known before the First World War as German East Africa.


Britain's Gold Coast has also bauxite, the raw material for aluminum, and manganese, an indispensable ferro-alloy. South of the great desert belt, iron ore is mined pretty much everywhere. North of that belt, the Atlas Mountains have plenty of phosphate. Rich coal fields are worked in the south—Transvaal, Natal, and Southern Rhodesia; in the east—Tanganyika Territory and Nyasaland; in the west—British Nigeria.

But in all Africa there is hardly any oil about which the world knows. The only wells are on the coast of the Gulf of

[5] The following data are derived from *Statistical Year-Book of the League of Nations,* Geneva, 1940–1941; the article on "Africa" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 14th ed., 1929, vol. 1, pp. 292–330; the *World Almanac,* New York, *New York World-Telegram,* 1942,



MAP 19A. THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN AFRICA



MAP 19B. THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN AFRICA

Suez, and oil shale is found in South Africa as well as Nigeria. The potential hydroelectric reserves of the continent are immense. Just think of the Victoria Falls in Southern Rhodesia on the Zambezi River—350 feet high and fully a mile wide.

Grain grows in abundance in the north and south of Africa. Egypt sells some of the best cotton of the world. Africa is the largest producer of cacao and peanuts, grows large quantities of vanilla, ginger, pepper, cloves. Its wealth of vegetable oil, particularly palm oil, is inexhaustible. It could produce much more rubber than it does now. Its tropical forests are stocked with some of the most precious trees. It is rich in livestock, hence wool. It has vast uncharted wealth in medicinal products, sugar, copra, poonac, aloe, and many fibers.

The desert and the heat. Most of Africa lies within the tropics; more of it is situated in tropical regions than any other continent. The core of the land is rain-soaked jungle, steaming with suffocating heat. The impenetrable woods thin into savanna toward the north and south. The grassland levels off into the *sahel,* covered with wiry grass, thorny trees, and acacias. The desert spreads beyond the *sahel,* constantly growing at the expense of the grass. Beyond the wastes of sand and stone the land of grain spreads in the moderate climates.

Curiously, the "heat pole" of the world is far from the Equator, near the oasis of Azizia in Tripoli where 136° Fahrenheit have been recorded in the shade. A continent of extremes, Africa is both the rainiest and the driest region of the globe. On the western slope of central Africa's Cameroon Peak the average annual rainfall is 369 inches, while over vast regions of the desert no appreciable rain falls for years.

The heat breeds clouds of insects, which contaminate the land. From 80 to 90 per cent of the population of the middle Congo was destroyed by sleeping-sickness, transmitted by the tsetse fly.[6] This plague has been exterminated now in certain regions, but in other parts it still kills men. Yellow fever is also

[6] Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa,* 2 vols., New York, Macmillan, 1928, vol. 2, p. 574.

being checked, but there is still plenty of malaria. Sickness saps the energies of white men and Negroes alike.

Africa's importance as a military and economic objective is circumscribed by the degree of usefulness of the land. Only certain types of men can live under certain climes, and sometimes those types are extremely rare. Not even the ingenuity of the boldest settler can turn the jungle into farmland or grow grain on the desert sand.

Out of a total estimated African population of 157,330,000,[7] there are no more than about 3,000,000 of European origin, and 2,000,000 of them live in the Union of South Africa.[8] Africa's position in the magnetic field of power politics is largely determined by population factors. It is important to know if in this land of desert and heat the outer limits of European settlement have been reached. If that limit has been reached, Africa can continue to play no role except as a subsidiary land of a master continent—Europe. In that case, Africa would remain an ancillary economic force, serving interests outside of its own frontiers. If, on the other hand, Africa can be settled by Europeans, it could be considered a pioneer land of great opportunities.

German authors have suggested that Africa could support about 1,500,000,000 people—ten times the present population. They suggest that all it needs is proper sanitation, transportation, management, and an impelling motive.

A survey of the various regions of Africa reveals the following conditions:

On the Mediterranean coast, in the extreme north, the French possessions of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco—all of which the local Arabs call the *Maghreb*—have reached the limits of settlement. That seems to be true also of Libya, toward the east, where the Italian government tried for more than a quarter

[7] *Statistical Year-Book of the League of Nations,* 1940–1941. The figure is for December 31, 1939.

[8] J. H. Wellington, "Possibilities of Settlement in Africa," in *Limits of Land Settlement. A Report on Present-Day Possibilities,* prepared under the direction of Isaiah Bowman, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1937, p. 229.

of a century to settle nationals from the peninsula, with less than indifferent success. Egypt is a densely settled land within the limits set by the flood area of the Nile.

At the other end of the continent, in the Union of South Africa, an expansion of the limit of settlement would have to benefit primarily the natives, who have been constantly pushed around by the ruling whites.

Elsewhere in Africa, the limits are set by the tropical climate which affects the whites' health and strength. High altitudes create temperate climate over large areas in the tropic zones, and it is there that new settlement lands may be sought. The British-mandated Tanganyika Territory is a highland country. But in it water is scarce, while the deadly tsetse flies are abundant. In nearby British-controlled Kenya conditions are more favorable, and the Land Commission designated about one-fifth of the total area of quarter of a million square miles as "European highlands."[9] Even greater are the possibilities of the Belgian Congo, about 32 per cent of which belongs to the highland of the Province Orientale, on which European settlement appears to be possible.[10] The same may be said of the Portuguese colony of Angola on the west coast.[11] The mountainous regions of Ethiopia were to have become Italy's "living space." Fascist propaganda, orchestrated skillfully by Benito Mussolini, resounded with the leitmotif that the acquisition of this East African country turned the formerly have-not kingdom into a have empire. Expectations were not fulfilled and Italy reverted to its former status.

The battlefield of diplomacy. When the Second World War broke out, only about 7 per cent of all Africa was occupied by independent countries: the Union of South Africa, Egypt, and Liberia. However, this statement must be qualified. While the South African Union is a fully independent nation, it was and still is a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Egypt possessed full sovereign powers on paper, but Great Bri-

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 251.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 250.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 279.

tain had the right to maintain military establishments on her soil—a *de facto* infringement of sovereign rights. The small Liberian republic was a protégé of the United States.

Because Africa is the continent of colonies, it has long been the continent of diplomatic squabbles. There the core policies of the foreign offices of the great powers could be best observed. Diplomacy "in the raw" has long been on display in Africa. Imperialistic greed, petty jealousies, grandiose dreams, have turned Africa into a fantastic land of contradictions. While much of African history is indiscriminate grabbing, the outlines of imperial policies are clearly discernible in the rapid succession of events.

At the outbreak of the Second World War, France had the most extensive colonial possessions in Africa: 4,200,000 square miles. This figure is misleading, however, because many of these millons of square miles were desert country. The area of British-held territories covered slightly more than 3,500,000 square miles, including the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, nominally a condominium jointly held with Egypt, but not including the Union of South Africa.

The population of the British territories was 45,400,000, including the mandates, while that of the French territories amounted to about 42,700,000. Italy held just a trifle more than a million square miles, more than a third of which it was to lose in two years. Belgium had nearly a million square miles of colonies, which were governed by the exile administration in London after the invasion of the mother country in the spring of 1940. Portugal's holdings amounted to 788,000 square miles.

The British in Africa. It is said that Great Britain acquired its vast overseas empire "in a fit of absentmindedness." A glance at the map shows that in the case of Africa that is not true. It shows an "all-red" route from Cairo to the Cape of Good Hope. It shows the British entrenched along the two vital long-distance trade routes—across the Suez Canal and around the Cape. More than that, it shows that apart from certain valuable possessions of France, Great Britain holds the most strategic positions not merely in the east but also in the

west. It has Gambia, for instance, a very small wedge in the center of the West African coast, along the river of the same name, probably because it must have appeared of great importance to the British Empire builders. Great Britain owns also the best part of the vast basin of the Niger River, at the waistline of Africa in the central west.

While the "fit of absentmindedness" cannot be proved in this case, there is no getting away from the fact that Great Britain has built up this African empire merely as a second thought. It has long been interested in the Cape, which was too obviously vital to be overlooked. But it was not at first interested in the Suez Canal at all, and was not particularly interested in the interior of Africa. On the contrary, the British appeared to be anxious to keep that sultry interior sealed up.[12] Africa was long thought of only in connection with the slave trade, of which the British government sought to wash its hands. A change in the British attitude was brought about by the discovery of gold in the Rand and by the stampede into the interior of Africa.

The story of African gold is too well known to need retelling. It forced the hands of the British to push the pastoral Boers out of the way of temptation and, eventually, to take over the country. The Boers were beaten, at such a price to the victors that it amounted to a victory for the victims. Intelligent colonizers that they are, the British thereupon offered partnership to the defeated and the co-operation of the two groups has turned out to be so successful, apart from occasional hitches, that some of the leaders of the Boer resistance became venerated elder statesmen of the British Commonwealth.[13]

A royal adventurer, Leopold II, King of the Belgians, precipitated the stampede into the interior of the Dark Continent. For some time before he took the initiative, it became evident that such a stampede was inevitable. It was delayed because the

[12] Sir Harry Hamilton Johnston, *A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races,* Cambridge Historical Series, Cambridge, University Press, 1905.

[13] For a life of one of these statesmen, see Sarah Gertrude Millin, *General Smuts,* 2 vols., Boston, Little, 1936. For a history of South Africa, see Alan Frederick Hattersley, *South Africa, 1652–1933,* London, Butterworth, 1933.

powers were afraid of getting something started they would not be able to control. They were afraid that a great conflagration might be started in the infernal heat of Africa.

The stampede was bound to occur because of some elementary laws of politics and economics. The modern national states could not help being dynamic. Nearly all the other parts of the globe were explored, and their possibilities canvassed. Africa was the "marginal" land upon which nations drew after a certain point of expansion had been reached.

Besides, the great powers were becoming heavily industrialized, and raw materials, markets, precious metals became their principal preoccupations. The home frontiers of industrial production were being approached. The new frontiers were to be removed overseas. The white man was perfectly willing to assume the black man's burden if the black man was to carry the weight while the white man took the bows and lined his pockets.

King Leopold was the logical person to initiate the enterprise. His country was one of the smallest in Europe, perennially neutral according to international covenants, and not of sufficient importance in those days to arouse jealousy. The king called a conference of the African International Association in September, 1876, to deliberate on the best methods of African exploration and civilization. The member nations attending the conference were to concert their efforts to distribute the benefits among themselves without cutting one another's throats. They succeeded in preventing clashes among themselves, but they inaugurated an era of native exploitation which will forever remain a stain on man's vaunted civilization.

The restraints were now released, and the limit was measured by capacity to take. The King of the Belgians was off to the best start. He took the basin of the Congo River, a rich territory. His idea of civilization was to rob the natives in the most brazen way. In a spirit of high moral indignation he set out to eradicate the Arabs' slave trade, then reduced all the natives to slave status by confining them to their villages and making them work themselves to death for him.

The British felt under moral obligation not to let any other nation get ahead of them. They were the largest colonial power elsewhere and they had to be the largest colonial power in Africa. The fear of other nations' getting hold of new land of great wealth obsessed them. Soon their agents were all over the tropical country, making native kings sign away their birthrights for bottles of gin. There was no way of stopping. New lands had to be obtained, then new strategic areas to render them secure, then still further security areas—the *perpetuum mobile* in diplomacy.

At the rate events were moving in the interior of Africa, soon there would have been no more black men there, perhaps no more white men either. The powers then decided to remedy the abuses and the result was the General Act of Berlin, signed on February 25, 1885. This was the Magna Charta of colonial administration. It inaugurated the trade policy of open door in what was described as "the conventional basin of the Congo" —larger than the Congo Free State of Leopold II. Navigation on the Congo and Niger was to be free. In order to prevent nations from annexing vast tracts of land on paper, the General Act provided that an occupation must be effective in order to be valid. The other signatories must be notified of the annexation beforehand. This wise provision was to prevent the agents of competitive powers working in the same field.

The General Act brought some order into the chaos. Great Britain was thereafter ahead of the pack. Ten years before, Disraeli had purchased a controlling minority of the stock of the Suez Canal Company, a total of 177,000 out of 400,000 shares. The British were thenceforth in a dominating position along the great east and west seaway. New acquisitions in the hinterland now came under the heading of security for the Canal.

Great Britain had to control Egypt if it was to control Suez. This was done indirectly at first. Egypt was declared a protectorate of Great Britain when the First World War broke out.

Having learned to be elastic in order to rule, the British yielded to Egyptian pressure four years after the war and gave the country on the Nile its independence, but with many strings

attached. The pressure increased, and finally the visible strings were removed in the Treaty of Alliance, signed at London on August 26, 1936, which recognized Egypt as a fully sovereign power. But the Treaty gave the British the right to retain a force of 10,000 men and 400 planes on the Red Sea coast of Egypt for twenty years, also to use Alexandria and Port Said as naval bases, and to move their troops across the country in case of war.

The African Empire of France. It would be difficult to find the real reason why France had to become the second largest colonial power. To begin with, it had few mass-production industries, hence needed few colonial raw materials. As to markets, the black belles of the jungles had little flair for the sophistication of Paris fashion. The French *rentier* could equally well lose his hard-earned money in other investment "opportunities."

France, it is true, needed the colonies to replenish its dwindling reservoir of manpower. Its mortality rate was higher than its birth rate—its population was stationary, sometimes even declining. But the acquisition of colonies for the sake of black soldiers was an afterthought.[14]

The original idea behind the colonial policy of the Third French Republic was prestige. Paradoxically, this policy was fostered by that most Prussian of all Prussians, Chancellor Bismarck. He wanted to turn French thoughts away from revenge, to salve the wounds France received at Sedan. He also wanted to create friction between the French and Italian neighbors, since he was obsessed with "the nightmare of coalitions," constantly fearing that the two Latin countries would pursue a common policy. He knew that Italy also wanted to have Tunisia, and so encouraged France to take it.

While the British possessions in Africa were growing vertically, from Cairo to the Cape, the French colonies were growing horizontally, from sea to sea, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. Clearly the two lines would cross, and there the great explosion might occur. The line was crossed in 1898, when

[14] For a discussion of French colonial policies, see Lengyel, *op. cit.*

Captain Marchand of the French army led his 120 troops into the mud town of Fashoda and there hoisted the French flag. But Kitchener, of Khartoum fame, was also on the way to this Sudanese place. Two powerful empires clashed there in the persons of a handful of malaria-bitten troops. Word about the incident was flashed to Paris and London, and outside spectators were getting ready for the battle of the century. But Paris and London agreed to compose their differences. The French flag was hauled down, the Union Jack was hoisted. The conflict between the two countries was removed. The British Empire was to grow vertically, while France was to turn toward the west. There it acquired Morocco in 1911.

Thus it was that under the Third Republic France built up the second largest colonial empire of the world. In many ways it was the best ruled of all such empires. The French did not draw the color line, or drew it lightly. Perhaps they were so liberal in that respect because they needed the natives as soldiers. The black men of the country around Dakar in French West Africa, the Senegalese, were reported to be among the best soldiers of France in the First World War. In that war over 545,000 African native troops were employed by France.[15]

The French imparted their native artistic sense to much of the North African colonial empire. Some of the European sections they built represent inspired adaptations of local color to the spirit of France. They improved the hygienic condition of the natives, introduced them to the high ideals of the French Republic through enlightened schools, built roads and railways, enabled the common people to improve their living standards. The genius of liberal France was fully revealed in its colonial administration. The contrast of colonial government was best exemplified in Morocco, where Spain also has a section. While the Spanish part was in the throes of constant trouble, the French part enjoyed the benefits of peace.

After the lightning defeat of France in 1940, some hoped that the republic would take a stand in the African colonies. Whatever hopes may have been entertained at first were soon

[15] S. P. Davies, *Reservoirs of Man Power*, p. 158.

to be doomed. The "proconsul" of French Africa, General Maxime Weygand, was relieved of his duties. The discriminatory laws of the Third Reich were introduced against the Jews. A large part of the native population of French North Africa are Arabs, who are Semites, and in many instances have maintained greater racial purity than the cosmopolitan Jews there and elsewhere in France. The French army was beaten; more serious still, the spirit was altered that had made the French so signally successful in the colonial world. "Race" is a dangerous word in Africa and the French Vichy government injected it into the consciousness of millions.

Germany's place in Africa's sun. Before the First World War the German Empire had more than a million square miles of possessions in Africa: German East Africa, German South-West Africa, Cameroon, and Togoland.[16] In German South-West Africa the natives called the Germans the "twenty-five people," because they applied twenty-five lashes to the black folks' backs at the least provocation. Germany's total trade with its colonies, as is pointed out in Chapter 28 on "Peace Planning," amounted to less than 1 per cent of its foreign trade. German colonial settlement in Africa was also negligible.

Bismarck set his face against the colonial-minded Germans because he believed that his country's energies should be employed in the service of unification. He also believed that only rich countries could afford to indulge in the luxury of overseas colonization. He lived to see the day when he was deflected from his original course. The "myth" of colonies was too attractive to be ignored. The psychological impossibility of keeping out of a stampede also dawned on him. German industrialists clamored for the raw materials and markets which they believed only colonies could give. National pride demanded a new outlet for dynamic energies.

From a business point of view the German colonies were failures, partly because the Germans arrived too late; the best had

[16] For a discussion of this, see Percy Evans Lewin, *The Germans and Africa*, London, Cassell, 1939.

been taken before them. Nevertheless, the imperial German government worked unceasingly on building up an even larger overseas country. Morocco attracted Berlin's attention at the turn of the century. That country's position at a strategic point of the Mediterranean and Atlantic would have helped Germany in improving its economic and military situation. From there the rich Latin American markets are easily reached.

Thwarted in Morocco, the Germans fell back upon the idea of *Mittel-Afrika,* encompassing all central Africa from coast to coast, including the Belgian Congo and the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique in the east and Angola in the west. Presumably, such a colonial empire would have furnished a parallel to *Mittel-Europa,* which the Reich was to erect in the center of Europe. Twice before the First World War, Germany made arrangements to extend its "sphere of influence"—the first stage of annexation—to Portuguese Angola and Mozambique. These arrangements were made, naturally, not with Portugal, but with Great Britain, which had pledged itself in the Treaty of Whitehall of 1661 to defend these colonies against aggressors. The second agreement was on the point of being consummated when the First World War broke out.

When it was over, Germany had no colonies. Its former African possessions went to the victors: Great Britain, France, Union of South Africa, Belgium. A small slice of land went also to Portugal.

In his early propaganda, Adolf Hitler paid little attention to the colonial issue. He seemed to agree with his predecessor Bismarck that colonies were poor investments. But he changed his opinion and gave his followers full permisison to launch vociferous campaigns for the return of German colonies. Their possession was to help the Reich in gaining self-sufficiency in markets and raw materials.

Italy's miles of sand. "Me too!" may be writ large on the tombstone of colonial ambitions. "Me too" must have been the only reason for Italy going to war against the Ottoman Empire in 1911 for the possession of Tripoli, across from Sicily. Fully

twenty-five years were required to pacify that African possession. It has a population of less than 900,000 on an area of 679,358 square miles. It has cost very large amounts to force the sand to yield some fruit. As a source of raw materials Tripoli and Cyrenaica, renamed Libya, have been an unmitigated failure. As a place of settlement, *Libia Italiana* has been no less a failure. But, presumably, it has increased Italy's prestige.

As a condition of its joining the Allies in the First World War, Italy stipulated in the Treaty of London, signed on April 26, 1916: "In the event of France and Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favor of questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya, and the neighboring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain."

When the war was over, Italy found itself out in the cold, not under the scorching African sun. Unlike the other principal belligerents, it received no mandates. Evidently, its contribution to the war effort was not deemed sufficient to deserve such a reward. It obtained the rectification of some of its frontiers, netting it, in the words of Signor Mussolini, "many square miles of sand."

The last major African independent country—Ethiopia—was too great a temptation to a regime which fostered the spirit of war, and called itself "dynamic" in an effort to conceal its weakness. In December, 1934, the dictator's legions invaded Ethiopia. On May 9, 1936, the King of Italy was proclaimed Emperor of Ethiopia; a few days later the newly acquired territory, as well as Italian Somaliland and Eritrea, were united into Italian East Africa, under the rule of the king-emperor's governor-general–viceroy.[17]

In May, 1941, Emperor Haile Selassie was back on his throne in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. Italian East

[17] For details, see Fernando Quaranta, *Ethiopia, An Empire in the Making*, London, King, 1939.

Africa was no more. This humiliating incident must have been partly responsible for the remarkable loss of prestige Signor Mussolini suffered.

Italy's Libya was the theater of war between the British and the Italian and German Axis partners from 1940 onward. Not only was this battlefield the shortest route to the Suez Canal, but it offered vast opportunities for the invasion of the continent by the Allies.

North Africa in the Vortex. The new front in North Africa was opened up soon after Italy had entered the Second World War. On September 14, 1940, Fascist troops under the command of Marshal Rodolfo Graziani invaded Egypt. While the British, defending the Egyptian frontier, were not taken entirely unawares, neither were they fully prepared, and the initial successes went to the Italians. However, before the year was over, the British Imperial troops of Sir Archibald Wavell, British Middle East commander, took the initiative, pushed the Italians out of Egypt, chased them along the coast of Cyrenaica, and seized the key port of Benghazi on the Gulf of Sidra.

In January, 1941, came reports of the concentration of large units of the German air force in the south of Italy. Soon Nazi troops were on their way across the Mediterranean to Libya. So successfully were these operations effected that the British were unaware of their full extent. It was suspected that Axis troops were transported across the narrows of the Mediterranean, from the southwestern tip of Sicily to Tunis, Vichy-French controlled, and sent into the desert theater from there.

The name of the German Afrika-Korps was first heard in April, 1941, and from then on the show was that of its brilliant commander Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. The Axis (and that meant virtually the Nazis) now took the offensive, bypassed the fortified town of Tobruk, swept toward the Egyptian frontier, which it quickly crossed, and reached western Egypt's strategical Halfaya Pass before the end of May. The summer heat forced the belligerents to settle down to a stationary war.

Meanwhile the United States had sent much Lend-Lease material to the Middle East command. The British launched their

offensive as soon as weather permitted, shortly after the middle of November, 1941, advanced westward swiftly, relieved Tobruk, stormed down the coast under the protection of the Royal Navy, struck out into the desert to reach the highway along the Gulf of Sidra, recaptured Benghazi in a lightning thrust, and reached Agedabia. The Free French forces undertook a *tour de force* at the same time by crossing the wildest desert country from French Equatorial Africa to southern Libya, seized several Italian outposts, and forced the enemy to divert some of its forces to the south.

Now the Axis attacked, and before February, 1942, was over, it cleared the Imperials out of Benghazi, forced them to retreat along the coast and on the interior highway and to dig themselves in on the line of El Gazala-Tmimi-Mekili. A Nazi drive broke this line in June. In their best *Blitzkrieg* style they pushed into Egypt to within eighty miles of Alexandria, the most important naval base in the eastern Mediterranean and advanced outpost of Suez. British imperial troops struck back in the middle of July, 1942.

The North African campaign was followed by the Arab world with great interest. It was clear that its sympathies were always with the winner. The Libyan campaign was as important in its repercussions as in its immediate results.

The Libyan campaign demonstrated that both the British and the Germans were operating on a narrow margin; a small superiority on either side resulted in great dislocations of the front. It also demonstrated the fact that, temporarily at least, the Mediterranean was no longer a British lake, nor was it Italy's *mare nostrum*. The weakness of the Italians and their hopeless dependence upon the Germans were demonstrated beyond a doubt.

The Italians had launched this campaign in the tragic post-Dunkirk months. An easy victory Egypt would have given Italy a standing as a real Axis partner and not merely a deadweight. It would have placed Italians in the vanguard of the great push across Suez and toward the oil regions. The *fata morgana* of Empire, which the Italians had been chasing so

long, might have become miraculous reality, and Mussolini might have extricated himself from an impossible domestic situation which was hurrying his regime to doom.

The record indicates that the British did not consider the Libyan theater an important front at first. In the early days of the Libyan campaign the British believed that the way to detach the Italians from the Germans was by treating them kindly. In what way Mussolini could have helped Great Britain did not seem to have been considered. The British government was also apprehensive about the effect of the complete collapse of Italy on its relations with Vichy-France. It was feared that in case of such a victory the Germans would have forced Vichy to assume a position of active belligerency toward the British.

As the war progressed, it became clear that Libya would play an ever more important role.

Africa and contemporary history. In the course of the war it became evident that Africa was becoming more and more involved in the war. The Spanish government took matters in hand on June, 1940, by occupying the international zone of Tangier on the Strait of Gibraltar in order "to protect its neutrality." This was the usual diplomatic pretext, of course, and it was soon discarded. On November 4, 1940, the Spanish military took over the zone's government and this time there was no talk about neutrality. However, the British government exerted strong pressure on the Spanish government, which bound itself by the agreement of February 26, 1941, not to fortify the former international zone. How long this agreement would be in force it was impossible to foresee at that time.

As the war progressed, aircraft landing places in Africa and the waters around it became more important for the United Nations. The United States inaugurated a regular ferry service across the narrows of the South Atlantic. First landing in Africa was at Bathurst in Gambia. From there American planes continued their trip to the Middle East Command in Egypt and to the Union of South Africa.

Since the Mediterranean was unsafe for regular shipping,

most of the Lend-Lease material for the Middle East and the Soviet Union, also service and other troops, were sent around the southern tip of Africa.

In the first days of May, 1942, British forces seized Madagascar, until then ruled by the Vichy government of France. This step was taken in order to forestall possible Japanese occupation and assure the uninterrupted flow of goods through the Indian Ocean.

While war thus flared up at various points of Africa, it became clear that it would also be an important issue in the peace settlement and in the arrangement of the new order which the United Nations expected to arrange after victory was assured.[18]

The Arab Lands

From Morocco, on the Atlantic Coast, to Iran, on the Persian Gulf, the Arabs' lands extend across the top of Africa. Most of the Arabs are of Mohammed's race, but not all Mohammedans are Arabs. There are only some 13,000,000 "pure" Arabs.[19] Their habitat is bounded by the Mediterranean, the Red and Arabian Seas, the Persian Gulf. It is the land of the great desert of Asia Minor, *Arabia Deserta,* of Mesopotamia, now called Iraq, of Syria and Palestine.

The ancestry of the Arabs living to the west is mixed. They have intermarried with native Egyptians in the land of the Nile, with Negroid tribes in the Sudan, and with Berbers on the Barbary Coast. Their language and culture are Arabic, but their racial strain is blended. Between the Atlantic and the Persian Gulf there live altogether some 40,000,000 Arabs.

A mere glance at the map shows that the Arab lands of the eastern Mediterranean are global traffic junctions. In times of peace, half a dozen transcontinental air transport lines converged in Baghdad, the Iraq capital. Planes took off from there for the Indies, the South China Sea area and Australia. Planes

[18] For a discussion of peace planning and the colonial problem, see Chapter 28 on "Peace Planning."

[19] Boveri, *op. cit.,* p. 391.

took off from there, too, for Egypt, Italy and points west.

Oil is one of the greatest attractions of the Near East and its peripheries, as we have already seen.[20] Moreover, the waters surrounding the Arab desert became the great travel lanes of the United Nations, especially after the Mediterranean had been cut off. The British Middle East Command was supplied with men and material via the Red Sea. American lend-lease material was shipped to the Soviet Union by way of Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf.

The Pan-Arab Movement. The Arabs ruled a vast territory at the height of their power in the early Middle Ages. In those days their domain extended from the Pyrenees to India, comprising the entire southern littoral of the Mediterranean, most of the Near and Middle East. It was the Arabs that carried scientific research to the greatest heights when darkness enwrapped Christian Europe. Of them it could be truly said that they astounded the benighted West.


As quickly as they had climbed the pinnacles of fame, the Arabs fell from their high estate, as if they had exhausted their energy in one spurt of dynamic achievement. In Europe they were ousted by Spain, which had found unexpected strength in unity. In Africa and Asia they fell under the heels of the Turks, followers of the same religion, but of different blood. In a few centuries even the recollection of Arab greatness was dim. By the beginning of the nineteenth century the Arabs were nowhere a fully sovereign people.

In the middle of the nineteenth century a new Arab national movement began in Syria. The stimulus was provided by a modest literary society in Beirut.[21] The movement took its time in gathering momentum. The ruling Ottoman Empire was all eyes for just such movements and its hand was heavy on Arab patriots.

Long years elapsed before the Pan-Arab movement got under way, and the catalytic agent was the First World War. The

[20] Cf. pp. 485-486.

[21] George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening. The Story of the Arab National Movement,* Philadephia, Lippincott, 1939, p. 13.



MAP 20. THE NEAR EAST

Allied powers were fighting Turkey, and the Arabs hated their masters, the Turks. Great Britain observed the adage that in diplomacy the enemies of your enemies are your friends. The "revolt in the desert" was the Arabs' bid for freedom.[22] The nominal leader of the revolt was Sharif Husain, guardian of the Holy Places.[23] He understood the British to promise a united Arabia, of which he would be the king. But the British government itself did not wish to see the fruits of victory, at the termination of the war, collected by alien hands. The French had also claims on this region of the Near East, to which they were attached by sentiment and history. Pan-Arabia did not become a reality.

Had the British deceived Sharif Husain and the Arabs? The answer to this question can be neither a categorical "yes" nor a categorical "no." London's pledges to the Arabs were ambiguous. Furthermore, their execution was obviously predicated upon the fulfillment by the Arabs of certain obligations, such as the display of sufficient strength to command observance of those pledges.

Sharif Husain was a vain old man, and he could only think in terms of himself. He was not even hypocritical enough to qualify as a diplomat. He had several sons of varying shades of astuteness. They could hardly agree among themselves and even less could they unite the Arabs on a common platform. The English could not be expected to create Arab unity. Although the majority of the Arabs are Mohammedans, there is no religious unity even among the followers of Islam. They have sectarian differences that are real dividing lines. The Sunnites believe that the Prophet's successor was his father-in-law, while the Shiites swear that his real successor was his son-in-law. Over this difference Mohammedans have been killing one another for centuries.

Then again the inhabitants of the coastal towns of Syria are

[22] For details of the revolt, see Emil Lengyel, *Turkey*, New York, Random House, 1941, pp. 317–356.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 328.

ages ahead of the tribesmen of the desert. The Arab graduates of the great English and American universities have very little in common with the illiterate dwellers of desert tents. The rich *effendi* of Jaffa has little more in common with the hungry Bedouin of the Nejd than a Wall Street banker has with a Negro sharecropper. The mountaineers of the Djebel-Druse do not live in the same world as the inhabitants of the torrid Hejaz on the Red Sea. The puritanical Wahabis of the peninsula loathe the Mohammedan "infidels" who use tobacco and perhaps even drink.

The victorious Allied powers took advantage of Arab disunity in creating a complicated patchwork of native dependencies. They tried to reconcile highly irreconcilable interests and maintain a balance of power satisfying to the British without antagonizing the ruling Arabs and the French.

They placed the land of the two rivers, Mesopotamia of old, renamed Iraq, under the tutelage of Great Britain as a mandate. Adjacent Syria, on the Mediterranean, was turned over to France as a mandate. The French further broke up the land entrusted to them by setting up several autonomous states. Their object was to foster conflicts among the natives, according to the classical formula of divide and rule.

The Holy Land of Palestine was also set up as a mandate under the British. It was to be a Jewish National Home, in accordance with the "Balfour Declaration" of November 2, 1917, in which the British government pledged itself to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, without affecting the rights of the existing non-Jewish communities. Neighboring Trans-Jordania was set up as an Arab state within the mandate, yet separate from Palestine. The independent Arab states of the desert retained their nature-protected status.

Revolts in the desert. The Arabs had been too weak to enforce their will, but they were sufficiently strong to give expression to their discontent. The most articulate part of the Arab world, Syria, became a boiling caldron. For about eight years

after the end of the First World War a state of latent revolt continued. The French mandatory power was signally unsuccessful in finding the right type of government officials.

It was only in 1926 that Paris was finally forced to make up its mind to employ diplomacy instead of the jail. Negotiations were initiated with the natives, which dragged on for years. At long last, fully ten years later, an agreement was reached. The mandatory regime was to end and Syria was to gain its independence, subject to certain limitations in the interest of national defense. The new regime was to go into effect in 1939. But war intervened and Syria was to have another fate.

For years after the Allied victory Iraq, too, lived in a state of latent civil war which occasionally flared into open hostility.[24] The lawless Kurdish minority in the mountainous north aggravated matters greatly. Luckily, the British had a group of really first class officials at this important post, and they reached an agreement with the Iraqi; the mandate was terminated in 1936, and Iraq took its place among the self-governing nations. Because of its strategic position, however, and because of the proximity of British lifelines, England retained certain rights in the kingdom. The two countries pledged themselves to perpetual alliance.

The problem of Palestine was not solved by the mandate.[25] Soon it became the very center of the bitter controversy which threatened to engulf the entire Arab world. Revolts flared up in the Holy Land in the late 1920's and early 1930's, and the rule of the iron hand was needed. The Jews were represented by Arab extremists as the agents of British imperialism. Jewish immigration was depicted as danger to the entire Arabic world. The conflict stirred up another revolt in the desert, this time against the British. Important government papers dealt with the problem and a royal commission investigated the entire complex of questions involved. It recommended that the tiny

[24] For further details about Iraq, see Philip Willard Ireland, *Iraq; A Study in Political Development*, London, Cape, 1937.

[25] For further details about Palestine, see Jacob de Haas, *History of Palestine; The Last Two Thousand Years*, New York, Macmillan, 1934.

land should be broken into three parts, in which the Arabs, Jews, and English, respectively, would be paramount. The revolt in the Holy Land assumed civil-war proportions when the worldwide struggle flared up.

Only one Arab of stature was produced by the twentieth century. He is the ruler of Saudi Arabia, the core of the desert peninsula: King Abdul-Aziz ibn Abdul-Rahman al Faisal al Saud, better known, briefly, as Ibn Saud. He is the leader of the fanatical Wahabi sect of puritans.[26] After wrestling for years with disturbing neighbors he consolidated his power in the desert country of the Nejd. Then he marched against Husain, the Sharif of Mecca, defeated him in a short war, and replaced him as the ruler of Hejaz, in which are situated Mecca and Medina, the holy cities of Islam. Through this victory Ibn Saud became a force in the Islamic world, since he held the greatest shrines of his creed and also because his dominion was no longer landlocked but reached the Red Sea. Farther south he extended his rule along this waterway down to the country of Yemen.

He proved to be a ruthless ruler and a wise one withal. He created order in the lawless desert where the law had been the fist. He did not permit pious pilgrims to be fleeced by his subjects. He placed the royal treasury upon a budgetary basis and built up a strong armed force. The English came to respect the desert king and gave him a subvention.

The ruler of Hejaz and the Nejd played his cards with the utmost care. He said little and spoke after meditation. The few foreigners who ever beheld him thought highly of his strength. Would he be the father of Arab unity? The answer has not been given, may not be given at all. Allah has imparted deep wisdom to Ibn Saud, it seems. He appears to wish to see the impenetrable desert between himself and the West.

The vultures of the desert. Great nations descended on the Arab world like vultures. The desert land is poor, except for its oil, but it has the greatest treasure power politics covets: strate-

[26] For further details about Saudi Arabia, see Ladislas Farago, *The Riddle of Arabia,* London, Hale, 1939.

gic location. Great Britain had a head start over all the other countries. The Suez Canal is near, and of prime importance to the British Commonwealth. Beyond the Persian Gulf lies India, which long stood for English strength. To the north lies Turkey, and Great Britain has never been indifferent to its Dardanelles.

London's Downing Street knew full well that in the Arab world the old adage that nothing succeeds like success must be changed: "Nothing succeeds like money." It also knew that in the Near East a little money goes a long, long way. London's Arab Office has a long list of dignitaries on its payroll. The British also know that in the East honor ranks next to gold as a great worldly treasure. Arab dignitaries visiting the British capital receive their full share of honor; they also get it from British officials in the field. In this part of the world the name of England is interchangeable with the word for strength. The magic of Great Britain's name has not been affected even by its failure to fulfill the alleged pledge to help create a united Arabia.

The rich Arab landowners can get along with Great Britain very well. It is British policy to interfere little with the internal affairs of dependencies. In the case of the Arab lands, that meant the strengthening of the existing domestic status. Movements for change have encountered the resistance of the landowners and English neutrality. The landowners welcomed British support, since they feared the changes that swept the Near East as a result of the Turkish revolution, which caught the imagination of millions.

The Soviet Union also had a few pawns on the Arab chessboard. Moscow had attempted to convert the West, but was beaten back with great losses. Its strategists found that the resistance in the East was less, and concentrated their attacks on those weak spots. It was in 1935 that the Moscow Comintern launched its major offensive on the Arab salient, calling upon the natives to form a popular front against "imperialism." In doing so, the Comintern exploited the fact that the Allies had failed to establish United Arabia or give it freedom.

The Communist attempt was not very successful. The articulate Arabs were impregnated with the anti-Bolshevist mentality of the West and the inarticulate Arabs did not know what Moscow was talking about.

The Fascist powers also got into the fray. Mussolini, casting about for worlds to conquer, discovered that Islam lacked a "protector." When he paid a visit to Libya in 1937 he proclaimed himself the Protector of Islam. The reaction of the Mohammedan world to this move made it clear that he had blundered. The answer came promptly from the lips of the learned men of Al Koran: "Islam's protector can be only a man of the Islamic faith, and a true believer at that."

The Near East knew that the oppression of the natives was nowhere greater than in Libya. It also knew that the Italian settlers were to oust the indigenous inhabitants. But Mussolini insisted on saving the Arabs at least, even if he could not save all Mohammedans. His voluble radio station at Bari flooded the Arab lands with violent propaganda. It was directed against Great Britain, toward which Mussolini developed an outright phobia. He could not forget that the British had objected to the rape of Ethiopia. Thus the Italian dictator started his attack against Great Britain several years before his armed forces actually entered the war.

Japan also entered the lists in the Near East. In retrospect, this Japanese move appears to have been part of a long-range policy. It was in Istanbul that the Mikado's diplomatic representatives to Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, and Syria held a conference on Near East Affairs in 1938.[27] Simultaneously, the Japanese were making great strides in the economic penetration of the Near East. The Turkish government issued a note of protest to the Japanese government on the subject of the conference.

So much solicitude on the part of the great powers had a disquieting effect upon the Near East. In the years before the outbreak of the Second World War a veritable pactomania seized the chancelleries of the world. They evidently foresaw what was going to happen and tried to save their faces by signing a

[27] Boyeri, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

large number of pacts. The countries of the Near East reached the conclusion that they would be strong if they combined their weakness, and so they signed a pact. At the end of June, 1937, Turkey's foreign minister visited Baghdad and Teheran. Near Iran's capital, in a little mountain castle, he and the representatives of Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan signed the pact of Saadabad: "The High Contracting Parties agree to follow a policy of absolute abstention from interference with the internal affairs of others. . . . The High Contracting Parties agree to mutual consultation in all cases of international conflicts with a bearing on their common interests." [28]

During the Second World War. It was through propaganda that Germany first entered the war in the Near East. When the Third Reich attacked the Soviet Union in June, 1941, it intensified also the propaganda campaign in the East. While the Nazi forces were trying to force open the Soviets' front-door in the West, its spy forces were working at their back-door in the Near East. Their plan was to stir up the Arabs against the British in a Second World War version of the revolt in the desert.

Early in the spring of 1941 a change of government occurred in Iraq. The new Premier, Rashid Ali Beg Gailani, professed at first to observe his country's obligations to Great Britain. Soon it became only too obvious that he was a man of the Axis and that he was cast for the role of Quisling in the Arab world. No sooner did he feel his strength than he removed his mask and appeared as the enemy of Great Britain. A war broke out. British Indian forces were rushed to Iraq. The conflict was of short duration. The premier was beaten decisively. He slipped out of the country into the neighboring Iran and from there managed to escape to Germany, where he began to carry on pro-Axis propaganda, calling upon all Arabs to revolt.

The war was still on when the British found that the Germans were sending air-borne help to Gailani and that this help reached him via the adjacent French mandate of Syria, then under the rule of Vichy appointees. After some inconclusive

[28] Lengyel, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

diplomatic maneuvering, British and Free French forces penetrated into Syria and forced Vichy to sue for peace. This war lasted only five weeks.

The joint British-Free French forces occupied Syria. In September, 1941, this mandate was proclaimed a republic. At the same time it signed an agreement with London safeguarding Allied interests at this important point of the Near East.

No sooner was the Syrian campaign over than the British had to turn their face toward Iran. Many Axis refugees from Iraq and Syria had found shelter there, evidently trying to continue with their work. The ruler of Iran, Riza Shah Pahlevi, was governing with an iron hand, building up a modernized country. Under British and Soviet pressure he promised to cooperate with these two countries. But he had few friends and the Allies deemed him too astute to be trusted. They may have deemed him too strong, since the time came for them to take over the country in an effort to seal up all approaches to Axis propaganda and to insure an uninterrupted flow of supplies to the Soviets. They forced him to relinquish his throne in favor of his son, Mohammed Riza Pahlevi, whom they cast for a role as acquiescent sovereign.

The British and Soviets now occupied the strategically most vital parts of the country. Iran was of great importance because of its newly constructed north-to-south railway, across which much of the Lend-Lease material of the United States must be delivered to the Soviets. Meanwhile, American and British technicians were improving the harbor facilities of Iran, the rolling stock and operation of the cross-country railway.

Almost at the same time, "the land of rocks and stones and sanguinary feuds," as adjacent Afghanistan is known, also saw the extension of Anglo-Soviet control. When the Japanese forces were poised on the approaches to India, Afghanistan grew in importance as the mountain bulwark of the United Nations against the Axis countries.

In the third year of the war, Nazi propaganda played upon the ignorance of the desert Arabs by describing Hitler as the descendant of Mohammed the Prophet. But the Arabs knew

that they would not be better off under German rule than under British. They also knew that they were no less Semites than the Jews, against whom Hitler was carrying on a war of destruction. Palestine remained comparatively quiet.

Palestinian Jewry offered to set up a Jewish Army within the framework of the Allied command. The Jews of Palestine felt that because of their great stake in the outcome of the war and the shortage of men in Africa they should be allowed to contribute all they had to the common cause. The British government acceded to this request only to the extent of forming Palestinian units in which Jews and Arabs were to serve. In effect, the vast majority of the troops in these units consisted of Jewish combatants. The British appeared to be concerned about the repercussions of a Jewish Army on the Arab lands. The Jews, on their part, resented the treatment accorded to them by London, which appeared to be anxious to camouflage them from public view.

The third anniversary of the outbreak of the war found the signs increasing that the conflict might be resolved by a head-on clash in the Near East. As the Japanese forces kept on moving westward, the climax seemed to be approaching. In the heart of the Near East, the destructive forces inherent in the modern war were unloosed, and grave fears were expressed lest the Biblical cradle of man should also become the grave of man.

The Current Conflict

As was seen in Chapter 15, the Mediterranean area is one of the great theaters in the present conflict since it holds the key to the "heartland" and because of its economic importance. Both Africa and the Arab lands (and for this purpose Turkey should be included) are vital parts of the Mediterranean land area. The diplomatic game previously described has been supported by fighting, and in that fighting Libya has been the most spectacular theater.

Finally, as will be seen in the next chapter, the Mediterranean is only one of several theaters of war, but directly con-

nected with the European. No view of the European conflict can be considered either correct or complete if it ignores either Africa or the Near East. They constitute one huge sphere of power interests and struggles. The strategy and the tactics in Africa depend upon the situation on the European continent, while the latter depends for its settlements and relations upon the disposition of the Mediterranean Sea, which of course is vitally affected by both Africa and the Near East.

Questions

1. Analyze the significance of Africa from the point of view of world politics.
2. Discuss the reasons for the importance of Dakar to the defense of the western hemisphere.
3. What is the importance of Africa from an economic point of view?
4. What are the limits of land settlement in Africa? Discuss the quality of soil, climate, sanitation.
5. What does the author mean when he describes Africa as "the battlefield of diplomacy?"
6. Describe Great Britain's interests in Africa. Enumerate the British colonies, mandates, protectorates, other dependencies. Discuss the status of the Union of South Africa.
7. Discuss the General Act of Berlin about the conventional basin of the Congo.
8. Granting that the French Third Republic was a rich country, why did it need colonies? Discuss the economic, political, and military motives.
9. Discuss Bismarck's policy toward colonies. Why did Germany want "a place in the sun" of Africa? What benefits did the German Empire derive from these possessions?
10. What was Italy's African policy in the past?
11. As the Second World War progressed, did Africa's strategical importance increase or decrease? Explain and defend your answer.
12. Describe the lands of "pure" Arab settlement. What are the lands of mixed Arab settlement?
13. Give a historical retrospect of the Pan-Arab movement.
14. Discuss the "revolt in the desert."
15. Explain the differences of interest among the various Arab groups.

16. Describe the political picture of the Arab world after the First World War.

17. Discuss the policies of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., Italy, and Germany in the Near East.

18. Discuss the causes of the short-lived wars of 1941 in Iraq and Syria.

19. What was the importance of Iran for the United Nations in the third year of the Second World War?

20. Analyze the importance of the Near East from military and economic points of view.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Discuss prehistoric culture sites in the interior of Africa.

2. Analyze for elements of irrationality the African policy of the great powers.

3. Review the projects for the building a trans-Saharan Railway.

4. Examine the reasons for the change in Bismarck's colonial policy.

5. Discuss the possibilities of extending the limits of land settlement in Africa.

6. Examine the question of the hygiene of natives and white settlers in tropical Africa.

7. Survey the problem of the color line in the Union of South Africa.

8. Enumerate and analyze the failure of the Arabs to meet on a common ground.

9. Discuss the Suez Canal as a highway of international trade.

10. Discuss the Trans-Iranian Railway as a strategic route of supplies in the Second World War.

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CHAPTER 18

THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA

The United States before 1918

The traditional American foreign policies prior to the First World War consisted of the following: [1]

First, the avoidance of entangling alliances. This was adopted during the first decade of independence, when with a whole continent to settle and hostile natives to overcome, the new American government decided after a century and a half of embroilment in European conflicts to concentrate on domestic affairs and to avoid being drawn into European politics.

Second, neutrality was a corollary of the first. The United States government insisted that when other states were at war, it should remain aloof from the conflict and maintain friendly relations with all belligerents.

Third, freedom of the seas. This policy meant that except when carrying contraband, or except when found in actual battle areas, United States ships had the right to carry goods anywhere in the world as long as the nation was not at war.

Fourth, the Monroe Doctrine. President Monroe in his message to the Congress of the United States in December, 1823, announced that the New World was no longer open to colonization by European powers, and that the United States would not interfere in purely European affairs.[2] He feared that European politics would reach the New World in Spain's effort to recover her lost colonies and Russia's quest for more territory.

Fifth, the Manifest Destiny: the determination to expand on the North American continent, but to refrain from participa-

[1] See John Bassett Moore, *The Principles of American Diplomacy,* New York and London, Harper, 1918. See also Allan Nevins, *America in World Affairs,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1942.

[2] An historical background will be found for all of these principles in Carl Russell Fish, *American Diplomacy,* New York, Holt, 1923.

tion in the partitions of Africa and Asia, which had sometimes been defined as imperialism. Until 1898, this restraint was also observed in the case of the Pacific Islands.


Sixth, the Open Door Policy. Announced at the turn of the present century by John Hay, this demanded opportunity for American citizens equal with that of citizens of other countries in areas of the world (particularly China) that were being opened for economic exploitation by the imperialist western powers.

Seventh, international law, conciliation, arbitration of boundaries, and pacific settlement. This began with the provision for arbitration of boundary disputes with Great Britain in the Treaty of 1783, and in its various refinements aimed at eliminating war by pacific settlement of any international dispute to which the United States might be a party.[3]

From 1914 to 1918. During the early months of the First World War the United States was caught between two powerful belligerents as she had been caught once before during the Napoleonic wars. This situation ended in 1917 in declaration of war on Germany. The United States was forced out of isolation and participated in what had begun purely as a European war. The principle of freedom of the seas grew increasingly difficult to defend, neutrality was not respected by the belligerents, and every cornerstone of United States policy was challenged.

During the war the United States became a potent force in international affairs. The League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice were the results of American initiative and drive. The United States was transformed from a debtor state to the world's greatest creditor. Her industries grew tremendously, resulting in a demand for "open door" opportunities for United States business abroad while setting up high protective tariffs at home. The American people increased

[3] Another helpful discussion of these policies will be found in George H. Blakeslee, *The Foreign Policy of the United States,* New York, Abingdon Press, 1925. See also Dexter Perkins, "Fundamental Principles of American Foreign Policy," *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 218 (November, 1941), pp. 9–19; also Edward Mead Earle, "American Security—Its Changing Conditions," *loc. cit.,* pp. 186–193.



MAP 21. THE UNITED STATES EMPIRE

their consumption of tropical products; problems of immigration mounted; improved communications and transportation facilities tended to destroy cultural and economic isolation; and closer contacts appeared between the English speaking peoples. These were only a few of the forces which militated for changes in American foreign policy.

The United States from 1918 to 1933

From 1918 to 1925. At the end of the First World War the disillusionment of the United States with the peace negotiations caused her to reject the treaties of peace, the League of Nations, and subsequently the Permanent Court of International Justice. Separate treaties were drawn up with the defeated powers, accompanied by a reaction in this country towards isolation.[4]

The lead in these matters was taken by such "irreconcilable" senators as Hiram Johnson and William Borah. President Warren Gamaliel Harding called the Washington Arms Conference partly as a substitute for the League of Nations, partly to furnish a convenient exit for Great Britain from the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and partly to correct if possible the disturbed condition in the Orient.[5] Closely worked into this pattern was the problem of European land disarmament, in which the United States refused to take a part.

In no matter was the reaction to isolation more clearly demonstrated than in the attitude towards reparations and war debts. The United States refused to cancel the war debts and insisted that they should be considered apart from reparations,

[4] For an excellent account of the American position in these matters see chap. 34 of Samuel Flagg Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States,* New York, Holt, 1936.

[5] Very helpful is chap. 29 of J. H. Latané and David Wainhouse, *A History of American Foreign Policy,* 2nd rev., New York, Odyssey, 1940. For the postwar disillusionment, see C. A. Berdahl, "Myths about the Peace Treaties of 1919–20," *American Scholar,* 11 (Summer, 1942), pp. 261–274; Philip E. Mosely, "The United States and the Balance of Power," *ibid.,* pp. 97–122; and Herbert W. Briggs, "The United States and Post-war International Organization," *ibid.,* pp. 123–150. See also Whitney Hart Shepardson, *The Interests of the United States as a World Power,* Claremont, Calif., Claremont College, 1942 (useful lectures).

because the latter were regarded as a purely European question. The final arrangements for debt settlements have been discussed in Chapter 13. Ironically, even here the United States was not consistent, because, while refusing responsibilities related to reparations, it sent unofficial observers to participate in reparations discussions, and while renouncing any share in them, nevertheless insisted that Germany pay out of the reparations for the expense of the United States Army of Occupation. An official United States representative was sent to the London Conference in 1924 and it was Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes who suggested the method for the final adjustment of reparations.[6]

From 1925 to 1933. During the period from 1925 to 1933 the first subject of importance was collective security. In promulgating collective security, defending the sanctity of treaties, and promoting the amicable settlement of international disputes, the most significant role of the United States was as advocate of the Briand-inspired Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928, which aimed at outlawing war as an instrument of national policy.[7] At the abortive Geneva Conference in 1927, President Calvin Coolidge attempted to extend the provisions of naval disarmament to other categories of ships than those included in the Washington Arms agreements. But little came of these negotiations and in the London Conference of 1930 the United States and Great Britain agreed upon naval parity, but not upon any reduction.

Later the United States was forced indirectly into world politics and into the reparations problem when the economic crises of 1931 became acute. President Hoover was responsible for the moratorium of 1932 under which all international debt and reparations payments were suspended for a year in order to permit the restoration of financial stability.

Meanwhile, the interest of the United States in the pacific settlement of international disputes, the sanctity of interna-

[6] *Ibid.*, chap. 34.

[7] For a pithy discussion see Walter R. Sharp and Grayson Kirk, *Contemporary International Politics*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1940, pp. 555–560.

tional treaties, and the opposition to aggression were again revealed in the support given by it to the League of Nations Council in the Manchurian crisis of 1931. Here, unfortunately, we were neither willing to use the force necessary to stop the Japanese aggression, nor to withdraw from China and the Orient. The result was merely a protest and a refusal by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State, to recognize the validity of the Japanese conquest of Manchuria. Japan took these as tacit acceptance of her aggressiveness, if not approval.

New Deal Foreign Relations—1933–1942

The foreign policies from 1920 to 1932 were marked by fine lip service to international law, pacific settlement, the League of Nations, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and idealistic objectives running contrary to the cornerstones enumerated in the first paragraph of this chapter.[8] These attitudes were taken because the people at large desired them. Realistically, the government had reverted to most of the traditional policies, turned down the League and the World Court, and remained aloof from European and world politics as far as was possible.

The New Deal at first continued the foreign program of its Republican predecessor except for efforts to stimulate trade by entering into agreements with other countries. Beyond the recognition of the U.S.S.R. it is hard to distinguish between the early foreign policies of Mr. Hull and those of Mr. Hughes or Mr. Kellogg. The good-neighbor policy was an effort by the Democratic administration to establish closer and more friendly relations with the nation's southern neighbors,[9] but in the Pacific region the denunciation of the Washington Arms Treaty by Japan led to a renewal of armaments building, forcing the United States, in that area at least, to abandon idealism for realism. When Italy marched into Ethiopia, the Democratic po-

[8] For a most dynamic and realistic approach to the problem see N. J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics,* New York, Harcourt, 1942.

[9] See Delia Goetz and Varian Fry, *The Good Neighbors,* New York, Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1939.

sition differed little from that of the Republicans in the Manchurian affair.

In one important respect the Democratic policies did differ from their Republican predecessors and that was in the attitude towards Europe. The Republicans had not had any problems concerning National Socialism. As the Hitler menace grew more and more apparent, the United States, while professing a policy of peace and amicable adjustment of international disputes, found herself obliged to line up with the *status quo* powers, Great Britain and France. When President Roosevelt intervened in the Czech crisis, before Munich, presumably doing so without taking sides, it was to ask Mussolini to urge moderation upon Hitler. Roosevelt, in April, 1939, asked Hitler to promise non-aggression against the smaller powers of Europe,[10] which the latter turned aside in an ironic speech.

Latin America and Pan-Americanism

South and Central America before the First World War. While the United States was experiencing these changes in its policies, the neighbors to the south were also having their problems. Looking back in history it will be found that the South and Central Americas had experienced difficulties with European powers, as for example when France sought control over Mexico during the Civil War in the United States, and again when several European powers blockaded Venezuela to collect the debts she owed them. As may be seen in the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute during the administration of President Cleveland, the United States did not hesitate to invoke the Monroe Doctrine to ward off such European interference.[11]


Little attention was paid in United States policies to the reactions of the South and Central American people, with the consequence that they looked to Europe rather than to the north for their contacts abroad. Matters were not improved by the Mexican War, the Spanish-American War, the Platt Amend-

[10] See Latané and Wainhouse, *op. cit.*, pp. 846–995.

[11] J. H. Latané, *United States and Latin America*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1921.



MAP 22A. THE AMERICAS



MAP 22B. THE AMERICAS

ment, and the way in which we acquired control of the Panama Canal Zone. Uncomplimentary things were said on all sides, and when the United States assumed responsibility for the finances of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, when dollar diplomacy was at its fullest, and when the United States intervened in Nicaragua in 1925, its southern neighbors felt more than ever that its real objective was to make the southern continent a sphere of influence.


This feeling was used as the basis for German approaches to South and Central America during the First World War, notably as in the Zimmerman message to the German ambassador in Mexico City, in which he suggested an alliance between Germany and Mexico against the United States.[12]

South and Central America following the First World War. Many South and Central American states joined the League, undoubtedly in the hope that it might become a combination strong enough to assist them in their affairs with the United States. Northern money had flowed into the area during the war and had had no small part to play in closer co-operation among all of the states of the Western Hemisphere; but after 1918 that influence and closer relationship were lost in the greater reaches of European markets and world politics.

It must also be remembered that the South and Central American states depended to a very large extent upon Europe as a market for their raw materials, importing from them in turn the bulk of the manufactured goods needed. This balance changed in favor of the United States between 1914 and 1918. Then followed a period in which the British and Germans fought to regain their lost trade positions. They were so successful that German gains between 1933 and 1938 were spectacular in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Ecuador.[13] The other side of the picture was equally significant, for (with the exception of coffee, sugar, bananas, and cacao) Europe took the bulk of Latin America's chief agricul-

[12] Goetz and Fry, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

[13] Joan Raushenbush, *Look at Latin America*, New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1940, p. 42.



MAP 23. CARIBBEAN LANDS

tural exports. The trend of trade was definitely away from the United States toward Europe, and particularly towards the Axis countries. Thus once again the gulf between the United States and her southern neighbors appeared to be widening.

The Good Neighbor Policy and Pan-Americanism. The Good Neighbor Policy was an effort to break this trend and to establish a more co-operative and closer union of all the Americas to their mutual interests.[14] As it developed it became an effort towards uniting the American states. In this it had a significant background. Simón Bolívar's conference at Panama in 1826 may have ended in failure, but Secretary of State James Blaine's conference in Washington in 1889 was more successful and ended with the establishment of the Bureau of American Republics. Later the Bureau of American Republics was converted into the Pan American Union, whose duty it was to act as a clearing house for economic and cultural matters among the American states.[15]

In spite of these conferences, the Good Neighbor Policy had a difficult time, owing to a long series of unfortunate events and acts to which the United States had been a party. These acts had convinced the South Americans that we were intent upon exploiting them and conquering their lands. On several occasions thoughtless officials like Secretary of State Philander Knox, with the best of intentions, had blunderingly destroyed confidence in their country's actions. Moreover, many citizens of the United States, by their overbearing or heedless acts, had given the South and Central Americans ample justification for distrusting them. And finally, instances of intervention by the United States tended to support their fear, that Uncle Sam, the Colossus of the North, would some day crush them with his weight.[16]

[14] See in Chapter 6 the section on Pan-Americanism; also see Latané and Wainhouse, chap. 36.

[15] Bemis, *op. cit.*, chap. 39.

[16] See, for two examples in Cuba and Panama, Bemis, *op. cit.*, chap. 28. For the unfortunate aspects of our present program see "The Wooing of Brazil," in *Fortune*, 24 (August, 1941), pp. 97–116.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in spite of the machinery of Pan-Americanism and in spite of a jump of a billion dollars in trade with South and Central America between 1913 and 1917, the relations of the United States and her southern neighbors did not visibly improve. During the Coolidge and Hoover administrations a new direction was given to the foreign policy of the United States when Dwight Morrow was sent as ambassador to Mexico. In 1930 the State Department announced the repudiation of the so-called [Theodore] Roosevelt corollary of the Monroe Doctrine under which armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the South and Central American states had taken place. In 1933, at the Pan American Conference at Montevideo, Secretary Hull was able to dispel some of the Latin American distrust of the United States. The Platt Amendment was abrogated the next year, and in 1936 a conference met at Buenos Aires which provided for consultation among the American states in case any American state were subjected to foreign intervention, thus making the Monroe Doctrine inter-American. At the Lima Conference, which met in December, 1938, the inter-American feeling was sufficiently improved to permit the republics to affirm their continental solidarity.[17]

Soon after the present war broke, another Pan American Conference was held, this time at Panama, between September 3 and October 3, 1939. The most noteworthy achievements of this conference were a joint declaration of neutrality, a neutrality commission to arrange for its effectuation, and the establishment of a neutrality zone 300 miles from the shores of the Americas south of Canada. However, none of the belligerents recognized the 300-mile zone, and the *Graf Spee* battle took place only a few miles off the Uruguayan shore. The Neutrality Commission sitting at Rio was given the task of working out the method of enforcing the 300-mile zone, but before 1940 had come to an end the matter had been pushed into the background. The Conference at Havana in July, 1940,

[17] See Ernesto Galarza, "The Problems of the Americas," *Frontiers of Democracy* (December 15, 1941), pp. 87–92.

proclaimed that the members of that conference were determined not to permit European-owned possessions in the Western Hemisphere to fall into the hands of unfriendly powers.

The Japanese attack on the United States on December 7, 1941, was immediately followed by declarations of war on Japan by Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.[18] The governing board of the Pan American Union proposed a conference to be held at Rio de Janeiro of representatives of all of the American republics for consultation on hemispheric defense. This conference took place on January 15 and it was reported that while Argentina and Chile were reluctant to fall in line, the other republics of the Americas entered into plans for hemispheric defense both militarily and economically. Under Secretary of State Welles reported the utmost satisfaction at the outcome.

Inter-American disputes, 1918–1938. In the period between the two World Wars Latin America experienced several disputes. One of the oldest was the Tacna-Arica Boundary Disputes in which Chile, Bolivia, and Peru were involved, which had grown out of the Treaty of Ancon of 1883. The United States acted as an arbiter and administrator of a plebiscite in 1921; but the results were unsatisfactory and the United States was asked to arbitrate the matter in 1922. After several disagreements a treaty was drawn up in 1929 which divided the territory between Chile and Peru.

The most serious of all disputes occurred over the Chaco Boreal wedge between Bolivia and Paraguay, which resulted in a protracted war between the two states. The dispute ran back into the eighteenth century and flared up in 1928. By 1935 the hostilities had been brought to a conclusion.

Still another frontier dispute was the one between Peru and Colombia over the Leticia area. It began in 1922 and was ended twelve years later by an agreement between the contending parties, dated May 24, 1934.

Meanwhile the United States intervened in Nicaragua in

[18] *The New York Times* and *Christian Science Monitor*, December 7, 8, 9, 1941.

1926; but refrained from doing so in Cuba in 1933, withdrew from Haiti in 1934, and avoided intervention in Mexico under conditions similar to those wherein she had previously intervened.[19]

The New World and Europe

The battle for intervention in the United States. That the realities of power politics after the First World War did not coincide with international idealism in the postwar period was especially impressed upon statesmen in the period from 1935 to 1941, when the activities of the communists were augmented by those of the Nazis and the Fascists. Having failed to stop the aggressor states, Franklin D. Roosevelt grew more and more firm in his addresses, speaking of the necessity for quarantining aggressor states, but the American people were divided on the course their country's foreign policy should take.

During the Second World War, before Pearl Harbor, the interventionists were carrying on a vigorous fight against the isolationists and the supporters of the traditional foreign policies. As the war progressed, public sentiment gradually turned toward Great Britain and the Allied cause. It was a natural alliance of the two greatest capitalist democracies against the new totalitarianisms. The main problem for all Americans, isolationists and interventionists alike, was one of security for their country, but they could not agree on the way in which to achieve it. The isolationists believed that by holding aloof from Europe's wars the United States would avoid involvement; but the interventionists argued there was no escaping involvement, and support should be given immediately to the side where American interests lay, namely the British. These conflicting beliefs generated much heat and ill feeling.

Legislating neutrality. As far back as 1935 Congress had attempted to keep out of war by legislating neutrality, which forbade American citizens to sell arms or to lend money to

[19] See M. M. Gathorne-Hardy, *A Short History of International Affairs, 1920 to 1938*, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, chap. 13.

belligerents except at their own risk.[20] This rule was followed during the Italian conquest of Ethiopia, and also in the Spanish Civil War under presidential proclamation of August 15, 1936. The United States thereby abandoned the position which Woodrow Wilson had assumed in the correspondence over the *Lusitania*. When war broke out again in 1939, the Neutrality Act, as amended in 1937, was applied. President Roosevelt failed to convince his isolationist Congress that neutrality regulations needed change; but on November 4, 1939, he signed a joint resolution of Congress, which permitted belligerents to come to the United States and purchase what they wished, if they carried the purchases away in their own ships. This act was an abandonment of the freedom of the seas policy, for which the United States had fought the wars of 1812 and 1917. Neutrals and belligerents alike attempted to partition the oceans into zones in which they were to have exclusive control, as for example the attempted 300-mile zone by which the American Republics at Panama tried to exclude belligerents from certain areas of the high seas. The neutral zone was not enforceable, as was evident when the German pocket battleship *Graf Spee* was disabled by the British cruisers *Ajax, Achilles,* and *Exeter* on December 13, 1939, a few miles off the South American coast. She put into Montevideo and the British refused to abstain from further action against her within the proposed 300-mile neutral zone.

Objection to conquest: efforts to stop Hitler. The direction of United States foreign policy now became clearer. On June 10, 1940, after Mussolini had entered the war on the side of Hitler, President Roosevelt in a speech at Charlottesville condemned the Italian dictator for giving his neighbor, France, a "stab in the back" [21] United States foreign policy was now a "stop Hitler" program. The president pledged all possible aid to the Allies. On August 18, 1940, in the Ogdensburg Agreement (Ogdensburg, New York), Prime Minister Mackenzie

[20] See W. H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs, *United States in World Affairs, 1936, 1937,* New York, Harper, 1937 and 1938; 1937, pp. 129–153; 1938, chap. 3.

[21] *Christian Science Monitor,* June 11, 1940.

King of Canada and President Roosevelt set up a "permanent Joint Board of Defense" to deal with all matters involving defense of the United States and Canada relating "to sea, land and air problems including personnel and material."

Another step along the same path was taken on September 3, 1940, when President Roosevelt announced that on the previous day Lord Lothian and Secretary Hull had signed an agreement whereby, in exchange for fifty over-age First World War destroyers, the United States had acquired ninety-nine-year leases for naval and air bases on Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana. Later, on March 27, 1941, President Roosevelt formally transmitted this agreement with a message to Congress. A sentence from that message reads, "These bases are for American defense against attack and their construction is consistent with such defense. International developments since my message to the Congress of September third last have emphasized the value to the Western Hemisphere of these outposts of security." He further contended that these were consistent with our peace efforts. A number of other agreements governing vessels on the Great Lakes, the Lakes-St. Lawrence Waterway project, power projects for Niagara Falls, and post offices in the leased areas rounded out these relationships.[22]

The increasing responsibilities were having a deep effect upon the domestic program of the United States. Neutrality proclamations were coming from the executive as a matter of course as each new state became involved in the war. The Council of National Defense found its way into the Code Laws of the United States; a priorities board was created; the Office of Production Management was established; compulsory military service was inaugurated under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, and registration under that act took place in November, 1940; strategic and critical materials were being collected; and slowly the national economy and policy lumbered into war gear. Many foreign vessels, particularly those of Germany, Italy, and the occupied countries, were seized to

[22] *Ibid., op. cit.*, pp. 169–203.

prevent sabotage and for use by the American Government.[23]

The next step occurred when President Roosevelt, in order to implement his determination to make this country the arsenal of democracy asked Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act, permitting the government to "sell, transfer title, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of" defense materials for the government of any country which the president deemed it in the interest of the United States to aid. After long debate the bill was passed and became law with the signature of the president on March 11, 1941. The interests of the United States had driven her step by step from "legislated" neutrality to participation in the war under the euphonious term nonbelligerency, created by Hitler and Mussolini,[24] Congress next appropriated $2,000,000,000 to provide the materials. The stage for these acts had already been set in the President's speech at Dayton, Ohio, on October 12, 1940 in which he announced that the United States was determined to aid the "free peoples" in their fight against the dictator countries of Europe.

The Lend-Lease Act was further implemented by the "Hyde Park Declaration" of April 20, 1941 and the statement of Prime Minister Mackenzie King before the Canadian House of Commons on April 28, 1941.[25] In the latter the United States Lend-Lease Act (of March, 1941) was praised "as one of the milestones of freedom, pointing the way to ultimate and certain victory." Obviously President Roosevelt was becoming convinced that the only way to meet power was with power.

The Axis reply was the sinking of the *Robin Moor* on June 9, 1941, to which President Roosevelt in turn replied by removing the last restrictions of the Neutrality Act on October 22, 1941.

[23] See, for example, the *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor* for March 30, 31, and April 1, 1941.

[24] See Lawrence Preuss, "The Concepts of Neutrality and Nonbelligerency," *supra.*

[25] S. S. Jones and Denys P. Myers, *Documents of American Foreign Relations, 1940–1941,* Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1931, pp. 160–169.

An interesting corollary was added to the Monroe Doctrine about this time. The German invasion of Denmark on April 9, 1940, had raised the question of the status of Iceland and Greenland. Great Britain had occupied Iceland, and now at the suggestion of King Christian X of Denmark, "the United States expressed its willingness to assure that the needs of the population of Greenland would be taken care of." [26] During the summer of 1940 German actions off the coast of Greenland aroused American apprehension, and through that year and part of 1941 the United States tried to arrange for an understanding which would prevent the use of that area for war purposes. As a result of several considerations, not the least being the request of the Greenland Provincial Councils of May 3, 1940, Secretary of State Hull and the Danish Envoy, Henrik Kauffmann, signed a treaty at Washington for the American defense of Greenland, on April 9, 1941. The Danish Government promptly repudiated the agreement and ordered Minister Kauffmann home; but Secretary of State Hull noted, under date of April 14, that the United States continued to recognize Kauffmann "as the duly authorized Minister of Denmark in Washington." [27]

Meanwhile Latin America grew more and more apprehensive over Axis machinations. Anti-Nazi events and activities took place in Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. An Argentine Congressional Commission reported, on September 6, 1941, that there were 500,000 Nazi Storm Troopers in South America.[28] This was disturbing news north of the Rio Grande. The inability of Latin America to protect itself was not encouraging. As against a naval tonnage of 1,427,000 for the United States, Latin America had only 263,000, most of which was over-age and chiefly held by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. The air forces were equally limited, Argentina having some 275 planes.[29] The story was the same in industrial matters.

[26] Jones and Myers, *op. cit.*, pp. 228–229.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 239.
[28] *Current History*, 1:3 (November, 1941), p. 287.
[29] See Raushenbush, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–54.

These were only some of the principal developments as the Western Hemisphere tried to adjust its relations with a war-torn Europe.

The New World and the Orient

Looking towards Asia and the Pacific, the scene was equally dark and forbidding. One of the straws in the wind was the Japanese penetration into South America. Prior to Pearl Harbor considerable concern was felt by the United States over the Japanese colonization both in Brazil and Peru. It was promoted by local groups seeking cheap and efficient labor. The Japanese small farmers had been successful in Peru, but serious anti-Japanese riots broke out in the spring of 1940. All South and Central America became apprehensive about the Japanese problem. Meanwhile Japan did not slacken the drive to complete her trade program in Latin America.[30]

The policies of Japan and the United States were becoming steadily more incompatible with one another. The trouble was in a measure historical and involved China and the rest of the Far East as well as Japan.

Chinese-United States relations. Relations between China and the United States had been very friendly after the Boxer Rebellion. They suffered a little after the First World War, but were restored to cordiality by the 1930's. China had become a republic in 1911. During the First World War she just missed being subjugated by Japan. When that war came to an end, China attempted to extricate herself from foreign control; but before she could achieve success, she became a country divided as Communists and Nationalists fought for control. The efforts of the United States at the Washington Arms Conference to have the extraterritoriality clauses removed were unsuccessful. Later, when Japan invaded Manchuria and set up the puppet state of Manchukuo, the United States took strenuous steps to demonstrate her disapproval. When Japan invaded China in 1937, the United States again

[30] See John I. B. McCulloch, *Challenge to the Americas,* New York, Foreign Policy Association, 1940, pp. 31–32.

supported China, and with the progress of that war the American aid steadily increased. Loans and credits were extended to the Chinese government and supplies were eventually furnished under the Lend-Lease Act.[31]

Japanese-United States relations. American relations with Japan have not been as cordial. On July 8, 1853, Commodore Perry with a little squadron of American warships sailed into Yokohama Bay and opened Japanese ports for American trade. The story of how Japan learned the lesson of the West is told in Chapter 19. Through the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, the First World War of 1914, the Manchurian invasion and the China Incident of 1937, Japan grew to be the strongest power in the Far East. In the Russo-Japanese War Theodore Roosevelt acted as the mediator bringing the conflict to a close. During the First World War, when Japan forced the "Twenty-One Demands" on China, the United States protested vigorously on the basis of the Open Door Policy. In 1908 and later, the United States and Japan entered into the so-called "gentlemen's agreements," which placed Japan on her honor to exclude her nationals from the United States. During the Paris peace negotiations Japan felt snubbed by the western powers, and during the naval disarmament conferences of 1922 and afterwards, she agreed to the terms only for reasons of policy.[32]

From 1922 to 1934. The Washington Arms Conference of 1922 [33] ended in agreements to limit capital naval tonnage, to refrain from fortifying several Pacific strategic points, to settle Pacific disputes without resort to war, and to recognize a virtual Japanese Monroe Doctrine over Asia. Japan and the United States were both signatory parties. This set of agreements ended the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and was presumed to be a check on aggression in the Pacific region. Be-

[31] For measures, and messages concerning these measures, see Jones and Myers, *op. cit.*, pp. 241–252, 268–274. See also Chapter 19.

[32] The background will be found in A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States,* New York, Harcourt, 1938. See also Chapter 19. See also T. A. Bisson, *American Policy in the Far East, 1931–1941,* rev. ed., New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1942.

[33] See Barnes, Chapter 13, for another interpretation.

tween the meetings of the Washington Arms Conference in 1922 and the denunciation by Japan of the naval disarmament clauses of that Conference in 1934, the main outline of Japanese policies were clearly stated by Premier Tanaka in his Memorial of 1927. It was Japanese domination over the world, and in order to achieve this it would be necessary first to conquer China, and in order to conquer China it would be necessary to conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In their turn the Soviet Union and the United States would also be conquered.[34] This plan of conquest contemplated a complete control of the Orient and the Pacific.

T. A. Bisson finds the economic motive strong,[35] but there is some question as to how much validity should be given to this thesis.[36] The argument runs something as follows. Agricultural Japan was becoming industrialized, her population was growing rapidly, and her trade was booming. Meanwhile she lacked the raw materials and the markets to continue the growth of that boom, and if it were to continue, it could only be at the expense of other powers already located in Asia.

Since 1934. The fact was that Japan was expansionist, imperialist, and determined to establish hegemony in the Far East by driving out all other major powers. In 1934 she denounced the Washington Arms Agreement, and followed this with a denunciation of the Fur Seal Convention and other agreements by which she felt subjected to the control of the West. And in all of these denounced treaties the United States had a substantial interest.

In the conduct of the war against China after 1937, it was the United States who, with Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., kept supplies moving to China so that she was able to continue fighting. In 1937 Americans and British were killed in the fighting about Shanghai; on December 13, 1937, the

[34] See H. B. Morse and H. F. MacNair, *Far Eastern International Relations*, Boston, Houghton, 1931, pp. 661, 740, 750, 771.

[35] See T. A. Bisson, *Shadow Over Asia*, New York, Foreign Policy Headline Book, 1941, especially chapters 12 and 13.

[36] See Roucek's discussion in this text, Chapter 20. See also Basch's view, Chapter 7.

American gunboat *Panay* was bombed and sunk; and during 1938 other serious incidents showed the Japanese and American relations to be deteriorating. On July 26, 1939, the United States denounced her treaty of commerce with Japan, and on October 19 of the same year Ambassador Joseph Grew told the American-Japan Society in Tokyo that the United States resented the Japanese acts in China. Another American loan to China was announced on September 25, 1940, while the Burma Road, which had been closed by the British at Japan's request, was reopened on October 17. On July 30, 1941, the United States protested the Japanese bombing of the American gunboat *Tutuila* at Chungking and an apology was given on July 31. Meanwhile the Japanese acts of aggression carried her to the borders of French Indo-China, into Thailand, and to the islands bordering China, and placed her in strategically favorable positions for attacking Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines.[37]

Japan sympathized with the Axis, entered into the Anti-Comintern Pact, and revealed her real position in the pact of Berlin of September 27, 1940, which recognized the "leadership of German and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe," and the "leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia." Since the U.S.S.R. still had normal diplomatic relations with all parties to the agreement, care was taken to assure her that "the terms do not affect the political status between the three contracting parties and Soviet Russia."[38] From time to time Hitler and other Axis leaders had hinted at a similar role of "leadership" for the United States in the western world. The September 27 agreement left no place for a British balance of power on the continent of Europe, and no place for Western powers in the Far East. Germany and Italy were engaged in a life and death struggle to achieve their objective. Japan was killing Chinese by the thousands, but her real opponents were Great Britain, United States, and the Netherlands.

[37] Eugene Staley, "Let Japan Choose," *Foreign Affairs,* 20:1 (October, 1941), pp. 61–73.

[38] Jones and Myers, *op. cit.,* pp. 278–281.

Pearl Harbor—December 7, 1941

In rapid succession the Japanese government set up the puppet government of Wang Ching-wei, drew up a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union, "mediated" between French Indo-China and Thailand, March 11, 1941, and shifted her military forces in China. Most of these acts were in direct conflict with the Open Door Policy of the United States. They were the prelude of more momentous things to come, in which all American states were to be concerned.

During the late fall of 1941 matters had become so difficult that Japan sent a special envoy to Washington for the purpose of negotiating a settlement—the same Saburo Kurusu, who had signed the Tripartite Pact on September 27 in Berlin. Kurusu arrived on November 15, called on President Roosevelt on November 17. On November 22 Secretary of State Hull conferred with the British, Dutch, and Chinese ministers. The discussions made it clear that the two countries' programs were hopelessly in conflict with each other. Exploring the possibilities of a settlement, the United States on November 26, 1941, proposed: (1) the two countries enter into a mutual nonaggression pact; (2) the interested powers be urged to respect the integrity of Indo-China; (3) only the National Government of China be recognized by both states; (4) extraterritoriality be abandoned; (5) a trade agreement be negotiated; (6) all freezing restrictions on money be removed; (7) other governments be urged to adhere to these terms as well. Japan's reply was characterized by Secretary of State Hull, as "crowded . . . with infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them." Japan's point was that the United States represented the views of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and Chungking, the Japanese note remarking that all of these countries, including the United States, "were as one in ignoring Japan's position." Adding that this ended co-operation and therefore peace in the Pacific, the Japanese note stated,


"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby that in view of the attitude of the American government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiation." A last effort at peace was a message sent directly by President Roosevelt to Emperor Hirohito on December 6.[39]

The negotiations had been a mask for preparation for conflict. The mask fell away and the true face was revealed at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. Japan, as in the Russo-Japanese War, struck first and declared war afterwards, basing the declaration on the alleged British and American "inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient." To the Americans and the British the picture was quite the reverse: the Japanese struck "treacherously" because of "insane ambition and insatiable appetite" to dominate the Orient. The Japanese declaration of war on the United States was accompanied by one against Great Britain. Both returned the declaration on December 8. The British Dominions and the South and Central American States already mentioned declared war upon Japan. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Paraguay froze Axis funds located in those states, stating that in their relations with the United States they would deal with her as nonbelligerent. Colombia and Venezuela broke off diplomatic relations with the Axis, and the rest of Latin America was friendly towards the United States. Most of the governments in exile joined in the war upon Japan. The Conference at Rio de Janeiro followed on January 15.[40] Italy and Germany declared war on United States on December 11, and they were immediately joined by Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania.


War spread over the whole Orient and the Pacific: Guam, Wake, Midway, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, Hongkong, Singapore, Rangoon, Burma, and Australia. The U.S.S.R. did not declare war on Japan, but proclaimed

[39] See the *New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor* for November 15, 16, 18, 23, 27, and December 7 and 8, 1942.

[40] For an excellent brief summary see Graham Stuart, "The Rio Conference," *World Affairs Interpreter*, 13 (April, 1942), pp. 13–20.



MAP 24A. THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS



MAP 24B. THE MID-PACIFIC ISLANDS

her sympathy with the United States in general terms. On December 22, Winston Churchill visited the United States and plans were entered into for the unification of forces and command in the Far East. On January 1, 1942, twenty-six states, who subscribed to the Atlantic Charter drawn by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill on August 14, 1941, agreed to contribute all of their resources against the members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents, and also engaged not to make a separate peace with the enemy. On January 3 the unified command in the southwest Pacific was announced as: General Sir Archibald P. Wavell as "supreme commander" and Admiral Thomas C. Hart in charge of all naval forces.[41] Allied forces were united.

Global Strategy

Thus for the first time in history a real world war existed with its strategy a global one.[42] In his fireside chat of February 23, 1942, President Roosevelt stressed the interrelationship of all campaigns and the necessity for sending American forces into every area in the world.[43] This was clear. The battle of the Atlantic was being fought to supply Great Britain in her fight against Germany, who in her turn was fighting the U.S.S.R. in the eastern part of Europe. The Soviet advances made apparent the withdrawal of German materials and men to the Mediterranean, over which the Axis and the Allies were fighting for control, particularly in the northern part of Africa. The Mediterranean Battle had as its objective the British maintenance of the "life-line" of empire and the barrier against Axis southward expansion. For the Axis the objective was to divide the British Empire and conquer it piece by piece. To the east, the entrance of Japan into the war added a new Axis partner, whose purpose was to take control of the southwestern Pacific and thus divide the Allied

[41] Subsequent developments will be found in Chapter 23.

[42] Here see Samuel H. Cuff, *The Face of the War,* New York, Massner, 1942.

[43] The *Christian Science Monitor* and the *New York Times,* February 24, 1942; also T. A. Bisson, V. M. Dean, A. R. Elliott, L. E. Frechtling, and J. C. de Wilde, *The United States at War, Foreign Policy Reports* (January 1, 1942).

forces and bring a gigantic pincers to bear on India and other parts of the British Empire. Meanwhile part of Japan's task was to break the control of the United States throughout the Pacific, and if possible prevent her from re-enforcing China and the other Allies.[44]

In this vast pitting of power against power, the United States took a leading part. She announced that she would furnish the equipment, munitions, and men to fight further, particularly in the Far East. Germany began sinking shipping off the Atlantic coast with the thought of dividing the American fleet as far as possible. At home, in order to correlate the fighting capacities, a host of new legislation providing unprecedented sums was enacted. Lend-Lease aid was given not only to the British Empire, but to thirty-two countries in all. This was playing power politics on a grand scale. History had never seen anything like it. Early in December aid was given to Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay. On December 15, President Roosevelt extended this aid to all countries fighting the Axis. By November 13 over $10 billion worth of goods had been allocated, and a third sum was asked for in the Third Supplemental National Defense Act, 1942, bringing the total Lend-Lease to $15.6 billion.

A national Defense Emergency Appropriation Act and the Navy Enlistment Extension Act were quickly passed, adding another $550,000,000 for defense expenditures and extending the term of service for enlisted navy personnel to such time as the "Secretary of the Navy . . . may deem necessary." The Selective Service Act of 1942 amended that of 1940 by providing for the registration of all men from 18 to 64 years of age; and men between the ages of 20 and 44 inclusive were made liable to service in the land or naval forces of the United States. The latter were registered in February, 1942. President Roosevelt took advantage of the First War Powers Act of 1942 to set the country on a war footing by providing

[44] Eliot Janeway, "The World Is Round," *Common Sense*, February, 1942, pp. 44–47.

for censorship, speeding of production, controlling of aliens, and organizing the administration of the government for the efficient carrying out of the war.

On January 6, 1942 in his address to the new Seventy-seventh Congress, the president announced the objectives of the production programs of the United States for the coming year in part as: 60,000 planes, to be increased in 1943 to 125,000; 45,000 tanks, to be increased in 1943 to 75,000; 20,000 anti-aircraft guns, to be increased in 1943 to 35,000; and 8,000,000 tons of shipping, to be increased in 1943 to 10,000,000.[45] His budget message on the following day called for an expenditure of $30.5 billion by June, 1942, and $58.9 billion for the next fiscal year.[46] These figures, which exceed the comprehension of the average person, represent an unprecedented effort for any country in the history of the world. The United States was throwing her full human and productive weight into the great struggle for national survival.

Conclusions

In the period between the two World Wars the United States discovered that in many respects the fundamentals of foreign policy which she had followed for over a century were no longer adequate to secure her safety and well-being. The expansion of industry, growth of population, technological changes, and other conditions challenged isolation, neutrality, freedom of the seas, the Monroe Doctrine, and pacific settlement of international disputes. The reaction to isolation and the effort to legislate neutrality were not answers to the needs of the United States, and as the Second World War progressed after 1939 it became clearer that American interests had to be protected in two ways: (1) by giving aid to the enemies of the Axis, and (2) by establishing support among the nations in North and South America. The United States was no

[45] *New York Times* and *Christian Science Monitor,* January 7, 1942.
[46] *Ibid.,* January 8, 1942.

longer isolated, for she intervened not only in South and Central America, but also in the war of Japan against China, and in the European Conflict. Her soldiers were sent to Iceland, the Monroe Doctrine was expanded to cover Greenland, and Lend-Lease aid was sent to the states attacked by the aggressor powers. This policy has not been seriously challenged in North or South America.

The people of the United States sincerely and conscientiously sought an ideal world, but the United States government could not escape the realities of power politics, or the assumption of a role of global proportions in the war against the forces challenging its institutions and security.[47]

Questions

1. What are the cornerstones of United States foreign policy?
2. What has happened to them during the decade 1932–1942?
3. What did the Neutrality Act of 1937 and the 300-mile neutral zone, decided upon at Rio de Janeiro, do to the doctrine of the freedom of the seas?
4. Towards which states has Latin America been in the habit of looking in the past?
5. What is the Good Neighbor Policy? By whom was it inaugurated?
6. Why has the United States achieved leadership in the New World?
7. What is Pan-Americanism? Who was its father?
8. What difficulty did the interventionists and the isolationists have during the early months of the Second World War in the United States?
9. What was the significance of the "Hyde Park Declaration"?
10. What use of the Monroe Doctrine did the United States make in the cases of Greenland and the Dutch and French possessions in the Western Hemisphere?
11. What was the significance of the *Admiral Graf von Spee* destruction to the nations of the New World?
12. What was the effect of the Tripartite Pact on Japan?
13. What significance had Pearl Harbor for the United States?

[47] See R. L. Buell, *Relations with Britain*, no. 1 of a series of reports to *Fortune* on *The United States in a New World* (May, 1942); also John MacCormac, *America and World Mastery*, New York, Duell, 1942.

14. What did the Latin American states do upon the Axis declaration of war on the United States?

15. What was the Lease-Lend Bill?

16. Was Great Britain prepared for a war in the Far East?

17. Correlate the strategies of the Second World War in terms of their global aspect.

18. Why did Japan reject the United States suggestions for a settlement of difficulties on November 6, 1941? What did Secretary of State Hull say about the Japanese reply?

19. Trace step by step, from material contained in this chapter, how the United States moved from disarmed peace to participate in power politics.

20. Describe the role of the United States in the Second World War.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. What was the original Monroe Doctrine? Trace its corollaries as they have evolved. Why and how is it now considered to be a continental policy?

2. Trace the experience of the United States with peace machinery after 1918. Why did we adopt the attitude we did with respect to the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice?

3. What significance did the Washington Arms Conference treaties and agreements have on the relations of the great powers in the Far East and the Pacific between 1922 and 1941?

4. Why were the relations between the United States and the South and Central American states not better than they were in 1925? Trace the course of the Good Neighbor Policy from 1933 to 1942.

5. What has been the history of the Open Door Policy in China since its inception with John Hay?

6. How are military might and productive power, especially industrial power, correlated for the purpose of power politics? Use the United States as an illustration.

7. Trace the Nazi and anti-Nazi activities in South and Central America during the period between 1925 and 1941.

8. How did the United States develop her fighting powers through legislative act and government activity before Pearl Harbor?

9. What effect did the two-front war have on the American Navy and its effectiveness?

10. Trace the evolution of alliances and their causes in the Second World War.

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CHAPTER 19

JAPAN AND CHINA

THE Far East of our century presents a maelstrom of national policies generated by the inexorable progression of conflicting national interests pursued to the point of war. While Chinese and Japanese policies would seem to be predominant, one cannot rank far below them those of Great Britain, the United States, Russia (both imperial and Soviet), France, the Netherlands, and Germany. An examination of these policies discloses that the fundamental issue is the expulsion of the western powers from the Orient, with China, Japan, India, and even the United States (the "free" Philippines) ranged on one side, and the empires of Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands on the other. Western imperialism, then, is one opponent, and the other is the renascent nationalism of China, Japan, and India.

A secondary and immensely complicating issue is disclosed in the policy of Japan, which is to drive all foreigners from the Orient and to dominate it herself. The secondary issue appears to be the main one, since the lines of actual warfare disclose Japan against China, India, and the western empires in the East.

The dual nature of the oriental problem has nothing within it, however, which deviates from the standard pattern [1] of the behavior of nations bent on the maintenance or aggrandizement of national power and circumscribed by certain geographic and human factors. What these geographic and human factors are in the case of the *chief* antagonists in the oriental struggle shall now be examined.

[1] For explanation of this standard pattern refer to the first section of this book, entitled "Fundamentals of International Relations."

JAPAN


The Land.[2] Of the 4,000 volcanic islands which have been the home of the Japanese from ancient times, only four—Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu—are of sufficient size to support a large population. Until the modern era, the Japanese were concentrated on these four islands. They are extremely mountainous, forcing the population to reside in crowded valleys and along the seacoasts, and to subsist on a tillable area amounting to about 15 per cent of the total.[3] However, the warm currents of the Pacific Ocean do bring an abundance of sea food to the area and temper the climate of the eastern coasts. On the western side Japan receives the brunt of the Siberian winter, which renders those areas desolate for a large portion of the year. There are many rivers and lakes which in past years presented recurring hardships with each spring thaw, but which, harnessed in our day, are important as sources of hydroelectric power and therefore are a major indusitial resource. An additional source of power for modern industry is found in coal deposits almost plentiful enough to make Japan self-sufficient; in the old economy coal was unimportant. This, then, is the geographic area which conditioned the man of modern Japan.

The people.[4] The location of the Japanese islands, near the Asiatic mainland, especially the closeness of Kyushu and Korea, made easy the influx of Asiatic races and culture. From the south, Malayan influences entered by way of Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands. But these streams entered at a very early time, mixed with native elements, and hardened into a very distinct and separate race.


[2] The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, *The Japan Year Book, 1937,* Tokyo, Kenkyusha Press, 1937, p. 14.

[3] Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau, *Japanese Trade and Industry,* London, Macmillan, 1936, p. 54, shows the total area of Japan as of 1936 to be 677,263 square kilometers—of which 16 per cent can be cultivated. The four main islands mentioned above possess a total area of only 380,158 square kilometers.

[4] Refer to Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The Development of Japan,* New York, Macmillan, 1938.



MAP 25A. JAPAN



MAP 25B. JAPAN

The isolation of island life denied these people frequent contact with other nations. In addition, the topography of the islands forced the people to live together in compact groups. The lack of sufficient land for cultivation drove them to the sea. It also made for intense family and community co-operation in utilizing every resource to the utmost. Frequent disasters created a resistance to the shock of misfortune and a will to rebuild because the alternative was obliteration.

The final product of these factors was an extremely homogeneous, disciplined people, inured to hardship, and accustomed to poverty—a people whose livelihood demanded patience, the utmost utilization of everything within their grasp, and great co-operative effort.

The political history of Japan follows a pattern established by these traits and circumstances. When the earliest immigrants from the Asiatic mainland and from the southern islands landed in Japan,[5] they had to fight to preserve their existence against the native tribes which apparently were not as advanced as the invaders, and were of a warlike and barbaric character.[6] In order to spread further over the islands, the immigrants had to wage constant war in order to drive back the natives.[7] Thus, from the beginning, militarism was important as a factor in maintaining existence. But to be most effective, militarism must function under a single head; thus it is probable that some leader, stronger than the rest, established his power over several tribes or communities of the settlers, and led them not only against the aborigines, but also against other communities of settlers in order to consolidate his power.

The leader was assisted to power by religion as well as by arms. Around him clung the indigenous and primitive religious beliefs of those early times, such as the divine origin of his person and the deification of forces of nature and spirits of ances-

[5] Takao Tsuchiya, "An Economic History of Japan," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan,* ser. 2, 15 (December, 1937), pp. 3–6.

[6] Latourette, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

[7] The stage which this struggle has reached today can be observed with the Japanese established in all their islands and the Ainu, the modern descendants of the original inhabitants, inhabiting part of the northern island of Hokkaido—subsisting by fishing, some farming, and wood carving.

tors. This religion was, in a later day, given additional form and substance under the name of Shinto. The association of the leader, become emperor, with divinity and with the origins of the nation has been a convenient tool for usurpers. Many times during the feudal period military leaders, while seeming to give additional power and prestige to the emperor, really divorced "church and state," leaving the emperor to the performance of ritual as the chief priest of Shinto, while they wielded in his name the actual civil and military authority. The emphasis on Shinto in our own day is merely a revival of this ancient technique, serving not only to remove the emperor further from actual power but also to appeal to the nationalism and religious fervor of the people in order to gain support for modern policies.

In the seventh century of the Christian era, a governmental reform centralized political power and federalized the whole administrative system, introduced conscription, and separated the military and civil authorities with the civil at first predominant. From that time on, actual power ceased to be held by the emperor and, soon, even by his civil ministers, but resided rather in a series of military dictatorships established one after another from 1192 to 1868. Each of these dictatorships was hereditary so that there were, in fact, two royal houses. This pattern of dual government, lasting for such a long period, became the established pattern for Japanese politics. Therefore, the return to this pattern in our day (the gradual sublimation of the Diet and the access to power of various councils of military officials) is not strange nor unusual to the Japanese.

Militarism was further imposed upon the life of the nation by the development of feudalism during the period 1192 to 1868. Moreover, in 1639, under the last military dictatorship, the Tokugawa, all contact with the outside world was cut off in order to preserve the power of the dictator's government. Relations were not re-established until 1853. This long period of isolation under concentrated military rule within a feudal system, reaching far into a century which, in the West, saw the great advance of democracy and industrialism, is the most re-

cent historical factor of prime significance. Because of it Japan's people developed a deep-seated introspection (remember also the island position and the crowding into the valleys), were handicapped by a time lag of nearly a century in industrial development, were defenseless and at the mercies of the western empires when the country was opened, and, in order to preserve national integrity and revive a decayed economy, had to assimilate the new economic system and establish a new type of government in an extremely short period.

The adoption of western culture, beginning about 1860, has made Japan appear to the western world as a modern nation with, it was assumed, a modern respect for liberty, personal government, and advanced social ideals. In these outward forms we have been deceived. We have failed to understand that a society, turned completely inward to feed upon its own culture for more than two centuries without the leavening contacts of other peoples, feeding upon a culture feudal and militaristic, cannot in the space of two generations forget that experience—especially when a thousand years of militarism stand behind it—and adopt a social idealism which it has taken the western peoples themselves nearly two thousand years to achieve.

The concept of militarism in government persisted into the modern period, even with the adoption of the constitution in 1889. It was characteristic that it established the form but not the substance of constitutional monarchy. Ostensibly there is an emperor who "reigns but does not rule," a Diet of two houses, and a cabinet and prime minister supposed to be chosen by the dominant political party. In reality, the constitution preserves the power of the emperor since it vests all sovereignty in him and none in the Diet as representing the people. The emperor can veto Diet measures, can end Diet discussions with a hint of displeasure (because of the individual representative's personal regard for the emperor), can rule by decree when the Diet is not in session. Most important of all, he is supreme commander of the army and navy, the Diet having no authority over military affairs. The army and navy have direct access to the emperor partly because of his being supreme commander and

partly because the army and navy ministers, as cabinet members, are individually responsible to the emperor as well as collectively, through the prime minister. This access to the emperor was still further facilitated by the establishment in the palace itself of Imperial Headquarters. Even in more normal times, however, the services can control the civil political influences in the cabinet, since the withholding of names for the army and navy ministerial posts prevents a prime minister, disliked by the military, from forming a cabinet. Again, when the prime minister falls into disfavor with the military, the resignation of the service ministers compels the prime minister and the remaining members of the cabinet to resign.[8]

The control by the military was further strengthened in 1938 by the passage of the Electric Power State Control Acts and the National Mobilization Law.[9] These acts gave the government full direct control over the economic life of Japan, needing only an imperial order to make it operate in any direction (remember the closeness of military headquarters to the emperor). The political parties were dissolved in 1940 and a single organization called the Imperial Rule Assistance Association substituted. This, like the many secret organizations such as the famous Black Dragon Society, is a superpatriotic organization solidly militaristic in character and pledged not only to uphold Japanese expansion abroad but also to wipe out elements at home which retain any beliefs or faith in liberalism. Were the Diet itself not provided for in the Constitution, an "immutable" document, it is probable that it would long since have been discarded. It is today merely a monument to a more liberal era. It must be stressed, however, that the return to militarism was not accomplished without resistance from the political parties. They fought well for the retention of such power as they possessed, but the tide of history was against them.

This, then, is the preparation of the Japanese for their part in the struggle for the Orient in the twentieth century.

[8] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *China and Japan,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1941, p. 20.

[9] *Ibid.,* p. 26.

China

The land. On the west, northwest, and north, the frontiers of China are vast mountain ranges. Rising in these mountains and flowing toward the east and the Pacific, which bounds the southeast and east, are the two great rivers, the Yellow and the Yangtze,[10] the combined valleys of which form the great central plain and produce a rich soil. There are other large rivers, which have been connected by canals to form a splendid transportation system. The climate is temperate—verging on the tropical in the south. In addition to these blessings, industrial raw materials, especially minerals,[11] are widely distributed throughout the provinces, not only assisting in the development of the early economic stages but also giving China great actual and potential power in the modern industrial era.

The people. The people who inhabit this area probably were nomadic tribesmen in the mountain fastnesses of the west and north, infiltrating into the great central plains and settling into fixed agricultural communities, chiefly at first in the north central area. From time to time, new groups of immigrants arrived—always moving towards the great fertile river valleys and plains, always being absorbed in the general culture, and the blood streams intermingling to produce the race of today.

Early in the political life of the nation, the whole area became divided into eighteen provinces as local rulers became strong and extended their power. By 2000 B. C., according to traditional sources, one of these managed to extend his rule over nine provinces and to establish the Hsia Dynasty.[12] From that time down to the twentieth century, through some eleven dynasties, the political life of China has followed a pattern of

[10] The Yellow River, rising in Tibet and emptying into the Pacific, is 2,000 miles long. The Yangtze rises in the same general area and flows for 3,200 miles to the Pacific.

[11] *China, A Commercial and Industrial Handbook,* Washington, D.C., United States Department of Commerce, 1926. Pages 3–15 of this volume give a concise résumé of the geographic facts of each province.

[12] Authorities differ on the real existence of the Hsia Dynasty. Some, as, for example, Kenneth Scott Latourette (*The Development of China:* Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1917), find themselves "on firmer ground" with the Chou Dynasty, 1122 B. C.

dynastic rise, majesty, decline, overthrow, and confusion. It was the great misfortune of modern China that western and Japanese imperialism caught her in the period of decline of her last dynasty, the Manchu (Ta-Tsing), and that both imperialisms contributed to the succeeding stages of overthrow and confusion for their own gain.


The two philosophers, Confucius and Mencius, helped in the formation of sound government: Confucius,[13] by advancing the ideal of the statesman-scholar; Mencius, by stressing the place of the people in the nation above that of the emperor, whose duty it was to advance their welfare. Militarism did not develop as a potent force because of the natural defenses of the area, the semiindigenous origins of the people, the teachings of the great philosophers, and the lack of feudalism. Then, too, most of these rulers sensed the importance of aiding commerce, a thing easily done with the waterways and good soil at hand.

Throughout the centuries of continuous national existence under the conditions just described, it was inevitable that the Chinese should come to regard their culture as superior to that of the rest of mankind, and to develop a complacency which prevented them from seeing clearly the fact that what had, in truth, been for so many centuries an inferior fringe of nations had, by the nineteenth century, reached a level of cultural and economic development well able to challenge the superiority of the Chinese. Persistence in ignoring the fact of external progress, coupled with the internal deterioration attendant upon the decline of the last dynasty, created sufficient weakness to tempt first the expanding western empires, then the already awakened Japanese.


In 1911 the Manchu dynasty fell before a revolutionary force that was generated in the Canton region, in the 1890's, by dissatisfaction with foreign economic penetration, Manchu weakness and reaction, and the urge to create in China a democratic government on the western model.[14] Sun Yat-sen was the leader,

[13] Latourette, *op. cit.*, pp. 23–26.

[14] Read again the paragraph above, beginning, "The two philosophers, Confucius and Mencius. . . ."



MAP 26A. CHINA



MAP 26B. CHINA

and his party the Kuomintang. It is founded on the three principles of nationality, people's sovereignty, and people's livelihood. Backed by his own military, Dr. Sun established the first national government in Nanking in 1912, but was unable to retain power because of the weakness of organization of the Kuomintang and its limited influence among the masses. In addition, Yuan Shih-kai, a former minister of the Manchus, who had been designated as a kind of receiver of the state upon their departure, held the remnants of the former governmental organization in the conservative north as well as considerable military support. To preserve unity Dr. Sun resigned. Yuan Shih-kai ruled until his death in 1916.

With the failure of the first attempt at national government and the death of Yuan Shih-kai, the country was left without a national government and, following its historic pattern, war lords established themselves in the various provinces. The Peking government was dominated by a succession of these war lords in turn, while in the south, at Canton, the Kuomintang maintained its government and continued its political development. This consisted chiefly of the adoption of a plan designed for the gradual political maturing of the Chinese nation and adjusted to the realities of the whole Chinese political situation. Its essential points were: (1) military government and campaigns to overcome the war lords, (2) political tutelage of the whole nation in the principles of democracy, and (3) introduction of complete democratic government. To aid in the formation of these policies, a Soviet delegation headed by Michael Borodin went to Canton in 1923. Borodin not only helped Dr. Sun to prepare for the advent of national government, but also established Communism which spread in the agrarian districts of the southwest. The year 1925 was tragically marked by the death of Sun Yat-sen.

In 1926 the Kuomintang launched the first step in their policy by advancing northward under Chiang Kai-shek until, by 1927, they had taken Nanking and established a new national government. Then the second step was instituted—that of strengthening Kuomintang power and educating the people on

political democracy. This meant casting out such dissidents as the Communists, which Chiang proceeded to do and thereby provoked a civil war which lasted until 1936, when, having been kidnaped by Chang Hsueh-liang's soldiers, Chiang brought about, by the influence of his sincerity of purpose and with the threat of Japanese invasion in the background, a united front with the Communists in 1937, pledging adherence to the three principles of Sun Yat-sen.

A strong opposing faction followed Chang Tso-lin, war lord of Manchuria. He controlled north China from 1924 to 1928. Consequently, the Kuomintang had to subdue the north before it could claim complete rule. An expedition was launched and many of Chang's allies deserted to the nationalist cause. In 1928 Chang, retreating into Manchuria, was killed. His son, Chang Hsueh-liang, joined the nationalists and hoisted the Kuomintang flag over Manchuria. Thus the power of the nationalist government and the Kuomintang was made to extend throughout most of China. As such it clashed directly with Japan's expansionist plans. These plans were more and more threatened by the growth of nationalism in China engendered by the second step of the Kuomintang program and the capitulation of more and more of the remaining dissident elements to the Nanking government, until by 1937, China seemed to be reaching a point in national unity which could effectively curb any attempts by other powers to carry further the old game of "getting spheres of influence in China."

The Expanding Western Empires

Industrialism is an ever-expanding force. Those nations which embrace it soon find themselves forced to seek new sources of raw materials and new markets for the finished goods if the gains acquired by it are to be maintained and increased. The West found itself in this situation by the 1830's. At that time China was in a period of decline and, having all the economic requisites, presented an ideal sphere for expansion. Accordingly, from 1842 to 1860, the British acquired Hongkong,

control over the Chinese customs, and forced open several ports for commerce. The United States and France obtained treaties for trade, those of the former containing provisions for extraterritoriality. In the next decade, France obtained Cochin China (and extended her control to Annam and Tongking in 1885), while Russia got territory bordering on Manchuria and Korea.

In 1894 the first conflict with Japan occurred, in which China was defeated and Japan's demands acceded to, leaving Korea independent and subject to Japanese influence. It also revealed the extreme weakness of China and encouraged more foreign encroachments. Germany acquired domination in Shantung province; Great Britain, the right to develop the Yangtze valley; and Russia, the right to develop the province of Manchuria. In 1899, John Hay, for the United States, attempted to end the grab for spheres of influence by proposing the doctrine of the "Open Door" or equal opportunities for all nations for trade with China. In a time of extreme opportunism, the doctrine was ineffective.

In 1904, Russia and Japan fought over the exclusive right to develop Manchuria. The result left Chinese sovereignty intact but awakened her at last to the dangers of her position. These were emphasized in 1910 when Japan formally annexed Korea, ending both Korean claims to independence and Chinese claims of suzerainty. The Manchu government began a thorough reform, but it was too late. South China, already regenerated under Sun Yat-sen, drove out the Manchus and served notice to the outside world that the day of unresisted spoliation of China was at an end.

Awakened Japan

China did not take the intrusion of the western nations seriously until the failure of the Boxer Rebellion (1900) to dislodge the foreigners. Japan, by 1860,[15] not only had taken the intrusion of the West seriously, but also had taken steps to

[15] Commodore Mathew Perry's first visit to Japan was in 1853. Our first *commercial* treaty was negotiated by Townsend Harris in 1858. In 1860, the first Japanese mission was sent to the United States.

adjust herself to it. This gave Japan a *forty-year time advantage* [16] over China for the adoption of western industrial methods, political techniques, and military organization.


For the severely circumscribed Japan, the industrial system of the West seemed the answer to her economic riddle of large population, tiny land mass, and lack of resources. Great Britain's success in the face of similar disadvantages was clear proof of its effectiveness. Therefore, industrialism was introduced with all possible speed. But such an economic policy demanded territorial expansion to bring more of the basic raw materials of industry within Japan's own sphere, and to give her control of markets in which competition with the West could be equalized or reduced. Then, too, the expansion of the influence of the western empires in the Orient indicated the need for a strong army and navy to guard the islands and to assist in the expansion which, sooner or later, industrialism clearly would necessitate. Out of these considerations, then, emerged two basic tenets of policy: (1) *territorial expansion as a part of the industrial development,* and (2) *protection of the islands and any acquired areas on the continent against western imperialism.* These policies, embraced by a nation of such militaristic background, could be expressed in only one line of action—war.

In response to the needs of defense, the Ryukyu Islands were acquired in 1876,[17] and Formosa in 1894.[18] These two island groups to the south and southwest provided bastions against any further advance of the western powers from the south. Formosa helped the industrial policy along by providing an


[16] In this time lag we have an excellent demonstration of the effect of geography on national policy. The vastness of size, natural barriers, and basic wealth of good soil and great resources, plus the innate assurance derived from forty centuries of continuous cultural development, dominated Chinese thought as factors of strength. These are factors of strength *in the long run,* but for the immediate situation at the turn of the century they had not been converted into military and political strength. A similar confusion of natural basic strength for military strength could be noted in the United States and Great Britain up to 1940.

[17] Latourette, *op. cit.,* pp. 150–151.

[18] In 1874, Japan seized and occupied southern Formosa under protest from China. Complete possession was disputed between the two powers until the settlement of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, when Formosa was formally given to Japan.



MAP 27A. THE JAPANESE EMPIRE



MAP 27B. THE JAPANESE EMPIRE

additional source of food and general trade, and some room for population expansion.

It was inevitable that Korea, being the closest point of the continent to Japan, should serve as the first step in her expansionist policy. Furthermore, Russian influence in that area had been growing. In 1895, China and Japan came to blows over an issue that had rankled for more than ten years—the question of Korean sovereignty. China claimed Korea as a subject state. Japan maintained that Korea was independent. China misread Japan's strength and sent in large numbers of troops to support her contention, and a war followed in which China was severely defeated. The real importance of the war was to tell the world that Japan had become a major power in the Far East. But a second factor of importance must be noted. In the peace settlement [19] the Liaotung Peninsula was ceded to Japan. Germany, France, and Russia, seeing in this cession of territory to Japan a threat to their own expansionist policies, demanded that it be given back to China. Japan complied, receiving an additional indemnity as compensation. To the Japanese mind, an additional reason for the ultimate defeat of western powers in the Orient was thereby given—*revenge*. As far as Korea was concerned, she was declared independent, thereby opening the way for further Japanese pressure which was translated, in 1905, into a real sphere of interest,[20] and in 1910, outright annexation.

The area on the continent beyond Korea was Manchuria. Russia had led in the intrigue which forced Japan to give back the Liaotung Peninsula to China. In addition, Russia was rapidly strengthening her hold on Manchuria.[21] It became evident, then, that a Russian defeat was necessary to stop that advance

[19] Other awards were: Formosa and the Pescadores, a large indemnity, and the opening of the Yangtze River and additional treaty ports for trade with the world.

[20] Japan, by treaty with Korea, assumed control of her foreign affairs and sent a resident-general there to supervise the department.

[21] In 1895, Russia got permission to build the Trans-Siberian railroad across Northern Manchuria and, in 1898, to extend the line southward to Port Arthur on the Liaotung Peninsula, receiving also leases on Port Arthur and Dalny. Russia then began actively to exploit the area. See Chapter 16.

and to insure the area as a sphere of influence for Japan. Negotiations to neutralize Russian influence were tried but failed. It became apparent that conflict was inevitable and, as a consequence, two factors of later import developed: one, a great strengthening of the army and navy which gave their leaders much power in government; two, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance —a deal in which Japan recognized the special interests of Great Britain in China and Great Britain recognized those of Japan in China and Korea. Such an agreement gave an aura of sanctity to Japan's expansionist policy but, more to the point, left Russia isolated in a possible war. In 1904, the expected war broke out, lasted for a year, and ended in the dramatic Japanese naval victory of Tsushima and complete disaster for Russian policy in Manchuria. For Japan such a victory meant that she, a small island nation, had defeated *two of the greatest continental powers in the world* within a ten-year period. It strengthened the faith of the government in the effectiveness of an expansionist policy supported by the military, and likewise strengthened the hold of the military on government policy.

However, the third and hidden motive in the policy of Japan —revenge—was aggravated by the meager actual gains of the war. In the peace settlement sponsored by the *United States,* the principal gain was the acquisition of the Russian leases on Port Arthur and Dalny, and the South Manchurian railway and mining rights,[22] whereas Japan felt that greater rights for exploitation of Manchuria were her just deserts for such a decisive victory, although she was content for a time to recognize Chinese sovereignty over the area.

Another consequence of the war, significant to later developments in the basic East-versus-West struggle, was the fact that for the first time an eastern nation had defeated a western nation, and had helped its own imperialistic aims in the Orient. Japan had demonstrated that the European was not invincible —that freedom from western imperialism was a possibility.

[22] For other details of settlement, see: "Traité de Paix entre le Japon et la Russie, 1905," *The Japan Year Book, 1937,* Tokyo, Kenkyusha Press, 1937, p. 1156.

Accordingly, she became the leader of a new oriental nationalism. Chinese and Indians went to Japan to attend her universities and to study her political and economic organization. There, leaders [23] of reform movements found refuge and encouragement. The influence of Japan, through her universities, on the rest of Asia has been considerable. Hers was the first modern educational system to be established in the Orient. In addition, the cost to the oriental student had been adjusted to the oriental pocket. This influence continued until the 1937 Sino-Japanese War, though in an ever-lessening degree as Japanese policies aroused more suspicion.

The First World War period (1914–1918) brought fresh disasters for China. In 1914–1915, the western powers were engaged in warring among themselves, while China was intent upon the establishment of her new republican government. To Japan the time seemed propitious for a further extension of power on the mainland. Accordingly, as one of the Allies,[24] she captured Tsingtao and the German possessions in Shantung, then followed this action with the famous "Twenty-one Demands." In these Demands, China was asked to give additional advantages to Japan in Shantung, Manchuria, and central China, and to rely on Japan alone for financial, military, and political aid and advice. Policing in some areas was to be done jointly by the two governments. Munitions were to be bought in Japan. Japanese experts were to be consulted in all phases of Chinese development. Because of her weaknesses at that time, China was forced to accept most of the Demands, although many of them were canceled under European pressure following the war. The effect of the Demands, however, was that Japan was established as the *dominant* influence in China. Then, in 1917, the Lansing-Ishii agreement between Japan and the United States was signed, by which the United States recognized that Japan (by virtue of her "territorial propinquity")

[23] From 1895 to 1905, Sun Yat-sen was frequently a refugee scholar and editor in Japan. For example, in 1905, he established his *Min Pao,* revolutionary magazine, in Tokyo. For detailed information, see: Leonard S. Hsü, *Sun Yat-sen,* Los Angeles, University of Southern California Press, 1933, pp. 3–16.

[24] By virtue of her obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

had special interests in China. The collapse of Russia in 1917 caused Japan to seek additional agreements for extension of railroads and other enterprises in Manchuria, Mongolia, and Shantung. Japanese loans were made under which large amounts of Chinese public assets were pledged as security. Lastly, in the peace settlement at Versailles, Japan was confirmed in her possession of Shantung.[25] The result of these many developments was to arouse the Chinese to a degree of hatred for Japan that was sufficiently intense to carry over the succeeding years, gathering momentum with fresh incidents, until it became a weapon to be used against the Japanese in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek in 1937.

In another direction, Japan's relations were reaching the breaking point. The United States had begun to appear as an increasingly strong power in the Orient, affecting Japan's policies in many directions. In 1898, the Philippines were acquired by the United States. This placed a strong western power near Formosa. In 1899, John Hay formulated the Open Door policy, which subsequently acted as a brake on many of Japan's ambitions with regard to China. In 1905, the Russo-Japanese Treaty was sponsored by the United States, in which Japan felt she had not been awarded her just deserts. In 1907, legislation [26] was passed by the American Congress aimed at Japanese exclusion, and again by various states [27] in 1913 and 1917, wounding Japanese pride. The Lansing-Ishii agreement in 1917 allayed feeling for a time.

In 1918–1920, the United States and Japan suffered strained relations over the Allied expedition to Siberia. Japan was incensed at the American objection to the terms of the peace treaty giving Japan former German possessions [28] in China and islands in the Pacific.[29] In addition, Chinese-American

[25] The League gave Japan the former German island groups of the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls as a mandate—later fortified contrary to mandate terms, and used against the United Nations in 1942.

[26] Latourette, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 204, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

[28] Shantung—thus flouting the Open Door policy.

[29] Mariana, Marshall, and Caroline Island groups—threatening free access to the Philippines.

trade had been expanding while Japanese products were under boycott in China.

The accumulation of issues between Japan and the United States, China, and the other western powers in the Orient could best be allayed by a general conference. Accordingly, the Washington Nine-Power Conference [30] of 1921–1922 was called. The results were a reaffirmation of the Open Door doctrine and of respect for the territorial integrity of China. Japan and China settled their differences over Shantung. The United States, the British Empire, Japan, and France agreed to confer on any points of friction arising in the future over their interests in the Orient,[31] naval armaments were limited,[32] and island fortifications were forbidden. The main issue, however, the withdrawal of foreign influence from China, was left untouched.[33]

The failure of the conference to ameliorate the real problem of China created there an upsurge of nationalism, already high with the reactions to Japan's Twenty-one Demands.

In Manchuria in 1928, as we have seen, Chang Tso-lin was the established ruler. So long as he existed Manchuria was Chinese. Moreover, he had, by duplicating the road and port system,[34] thwarted Japan's full development of the South Manchurian Railway. Also, by 1928, the Kuomintang was making too rapid progress in the establishment of a united China. The death of Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and the adherence of his son Chang Hsueh-liang to the Kuomintang, making Manchuria a *de facto* part of the Chinese state, was too much for the Japanese war party. The liberal Japanese government under Baron Shidehara—which for a brief period after 1921 had acquired influence in Japanese internal affairs—was discredited, and

[30] Great Britain, France, the United States, Japan, China, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Portugal. (See Chapters 13 and 17.—*Editor.*)

[31] This was the Four Power Treaty.

[32] These limitations were extended by the London Naval Conference of 1930 but ceased in 1936.

[33] Nathaniel Peffer, *Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East,* New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 19.

[34] Roy H. Akagi, *Japan's Foreign Relations,* Tokyo, Hokuseido Press, 1936, p. 416. Also: Royal Institute of International Affairs, *op. cit.,* p. 43.

preparations were begun for a return to a more aggressive policy. This was expressed in the Mukden Incident of September, 1931, which resulted in Japan's taking complete control of Manchuria. China took the case to the League of Nations, which found Japan guilty.[35] Japan's reply was to withdraw from the League (March, 1933).

The conquest of Manchuria flouted the Nine Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris which Japan had signed. The United States felt constrained to make a declaration, since she not only had sponsored the Nine Power Treaty and had been a signer of the Pact of Paris, but also had many separate treaty rights in the area; in addition, her well-understood Open Door policy had been challenged. Secretary of State Stimson stated the position of the United States. In what came to be called the Stimson Doctrine, it was held that treaty rights would be maintained and that no territorial change resulting from an act of aggression would be recognized. Such a declaration meant that if Japan continued her aggression and the United States *really* should insist on its rights, war would be unavoidable or the United States would lose prestige. In the following years Japan did continue her aggression and the United States contented herself with notes of protest, thereby creating an impression in the Japanese mind that passivity meant acquiescence and that the United States did not consider her interests in the Orient sufficiently valuable to be protected by force. It is probable, therefore, that the policy encouraged, rather than retarded, Japan's program of expansion.

From 1933 to 1935 Japan continued aggression in the provinces of Jehol, Chahar and Hopei.[36] In 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany was signed which, in 1937, was extended to include Italy. Behind these events, from 1931 to 1937, a steady increase in the power of the military in the Tokyo government was visible. World depression, fear of the U.S.S.R., growing Chinese unity, the lax attitude of the United States, and British and French appeasement of the Axis as

[35] *Report of the Commission of Enquiry*, Geneva, League of Nations, 1932. This is the famous Lytton Report. (See Chapters 6 and 13.—*Editor.*)

[36] Latourette, *op. cit.*, pp. 222–224. (See Chapters 15 and 16.—*Editor.*)

manifested in the Spanish Civil War and in Ethiopia, were some of the forces generating this power. Clearly, 1937 was propitious for the next great step—the attack on China proper.

In the first year of the war Japan obtained the principal rivers, railways, and ports of north and central China and along the coast reaching southward to Fukien province. Chinese resistance hardened in the interior and there began the stalemate that continued until 1941, during which period Japan established puppet governments in Peking and Nanking and a new banking system. With these tools she hoped gradually to win the Chinese, through their adherence to one or the other of these regimes, and to weaken the Kuomintang by attacking its economic strength.

In 1939 everything seemed propitious for the Japanese cause. The Anti-Comintern Pact appeared a tower of strength; it opposed the U.S.S.R., China, Great Britain, France, and the United States. The Soviet Union was helping China, the British and French were bowing to Germany and Italy at Munich, and Great Britain was enduring additional humiliation at Japan's own hands in Tientsin. Actual fighting was going on against the U.S.S.R. in the Amur River region, but Japan was claiming great victories (as also were the Soviets).[37] The United States was proclaiming neutrality. Suddenly the Soviet-German pact was announced and dark days followed. Was the U.S.S.R., chief aid of China, now a member of the Axis camp? Was the U.S.S.R., opponent in actual war along the Amur, now discovered to be a friend? Was Communism, the archfiend of the Japanese press and chief bugaboo for the masses, now to be locked in the closet? The pact clearly showed Japan the character of her chief partner, and ended any genuine co-operation with Germany or reliance on agreements with her. However, she did sign a truce with the U.S.S.R. to end actual fighting, and a nonaggression treaty later. Also, she repaired her British and United States relations and began a policy of caution and watchfulness.

[37] See Chapter 16. Also see "Japan-in-China," *Fortune*, September, 1941.—*Editor.*

For China the Soviet-German Pact at first seemed to threaten an end to the aid from the U.S.S.R., and the Kuomintang was, in particular, apprehensive of the possibility of the Japanese-sponsored Wang Ching-wei government in Nanking becoming the medium for peace negotiations. However, United States and Soviet support still continued for Chiang Kai-shek.

The *Blitzkrieg* of 1940 ended much uncertainty, and established the new line of Japanese policy—aggression on the German pattern.[38] The defeat of France and the Netherlands, together with the defensive position of Great Britain and the neutrality of the United States, indicated that the time had come for the move southward. A full blockade was extended along the China coast, a better understanding was secured with the U.S.S.R. to protect the flank along Japan's west coast, Korea, and Manchukuo, and a new Tripartite Treaty with Germany and Italy cemented closer relations among the cronies. Several issues with Great Britain were settled when the British withdrew their troops from Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai and turned over the Chinese customs control to Japan. Japanese troops entered French Indo-China and a trade agreement was signed under which Japan replaced France as chief beneficiary of the wealth of the area. Trade negotiations for more products from the Netherlands East Indies were opened, and some concessions obtained.

The great obstacle to real success toward the south lay in the United States' retention of interests in the Philippines and in the threat of the United States Navy in the Pacific. The abrogation of trade relations between Japan and the United States, the embargo of sales of essential war materials to Japan, the growing boycott against Japanese goods, the rising sympathy for China and dislike of Japanese policies on the part of the general public in the United States, all indicated a stiffening of the American attitude that might be reflected in direct opposition to any further move by Japan. The attack by Germany on the U.S.S.R. in the summer of 1941 served not only to destroy a connection (Soviet pact with Germany) obnoxious

[38] See H. J. Timperley, *Japan a World Problem,* New York, John Day, 1942.

to Japan but also to assure such a diversion of Soviet energies to the European front as to give Japan a *de facto* guarantee of safety on her western flank that the tenuous Soviet-German pact had only partly afforded. With Great Britain hard-pressed in Europe, with France defeated and the Netherlands occupied, with the Soviets and Germany locked in titanic struggle, the ways were cleared for launching the next great stroke of policy —attack on the United States.

In December, 1941, the attack came and then followed the rapid conquest of Thailand (French Indo-China had already been occupied), British Malaya and Singapore, Hongkong, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, culminating in the attack on Burma and penetration to the oil fields. By April, 1942, air attacks were being made simultaneously on northeast India and Australia, causing confusion and doubts as to the next Japanese objective.[39]

Truly, Japan's Axis connection had paid handsomely. Germany "softened up" the enemy and got small, depleted European areas which had been misconstrued as control of rich empires. Japan waited until the auspicious moment and really got the rich empires themselves. To the moment of this writing, *all* the fruits of war since 1931 have been Japan's. And for the western nations the whole structure of treaty ports, spheres of influence, colonies, and dominions erected by them in the Far East, a structure which for a hundred years had appeared as an impregnable bastion of western wealth and power, had crumbled and, with it, control of the bases of western industrialism for which the structure had first been raised.

The Issues Joined

The main issue—the expulsion of the western empires from the Orient—has not been solved by their defeats at the hands of Japan. For China, the Philippines, the Malayan countries, and the Indies, the substitution of Japanese rule for Dutch or American, French or British, is not an acceptable answer. The

[39] See Chapter 18.—*Editor.*

only answer is freedom from all imperialisms. But this implies complete abrogation of foreign interests in the Orient. It is difficult to believe that, should the *combined* western and oriental nations succeed in defeating Japan, these former masters would withdraw entirely all claims to their former spheres of interest or imperial possessions. But if they realize that retention of control not only will provoke future unrest in the areas involved, but also will give cause for a future Japanese or Chinese or Indian expedition against them, this much shall have been gained in solving this basic issue. Other forces must be recognized: India's reawakened national consciousness, China's war-enforced unity, the Soviet Union's rejuvenated spirit and determined foreign policies, and the progress already made in the Philippines prior to invasion. Australia, with its Pacific location and its Atlantic ethnology, stands as a future arbiter for the East and the West, just as today it has so significantly become the United Nations' headquarters for the war effort in Asia. In contrast with these new forces in the Orient, western imperialism and Japanese militarism are outmoded and archaic. The former has already been ousted, the second is momentarily triumphant.

There are dangers, too, in the possible new power units in Asia. Continued dissension among religious groups and retention of power by the Indian princes could effectively delay Indian attainment of complete freedom. Continued Soviet support of the Communist Party in China, a group now united with the Kuomintang for defense, could, in the postwar era, prevent complete development of Chinese sovereign political and economic power. The Philippines' economic system, so vulnerable in the past because of dependence on the United States, might under a condition of complete freedom prevent that attainment of sufficiently distributed goods and services so necessary to support the democratic political system already established in 1941. Political immaturity of the native populations of Malaya and the Indies, in addition to their geographic disunity, could again subject them to outside powers.

Some hope is seen when we examine the secondary issue of

Japan's invasion. The drawing of East and West together in a common effort to defeat Japan will do much to instill mutual respect and a new and better understanding, each for the other. If Japan's attempt at conquest does succeed in arousing the oriental peoples to their own responsibilities, and if in that awareness they are able to find a new national dignity and strength, then Japan's war shall not have been in vain—for her adversaries.

QUESTIONS

1. State the two issues in the struggle in the Orient; indicate which one is fundamental, and which one is secondary.
2. Define the interests in the Orient of each of the western powers involved; of Japan.
3. Describe the geographic background of the Japanese. What would such a background portend in an industrial age?
4. What were the conditions of life in the very early days of Japan's history?
5. What kind of political life evolved from 1000 to 1860, and what were its essential characteristics?
6. Why did Japan so rapidly adopt the civilization of the West? Why was she able to do this?
7. What was the geographic background of the Chinese?
8. How did her geographic background condition China's (1) economic system, (2) political life, (3) spiritual character?
9. How did China's geographic and social background prepare her for the coming of the western nations?
10. Compare the speed with which China and Japan embraced western ideas. Is this time lag significant?
11. How long did it take China to win a strong central government in the modern era?
12. What was Russia's policy from approximately 1880 to 1917? What were the consequences?
13. What was China's position in 1930 as to territorial size and strength of government?
14. List *all* the reasons for Japan's establishment of Manchukuo.
15. What was the Far Eastern policy of the United States from 1899 to 1941?
16. What attempt at settlement of oriental issues was made in 1921, and what success was achieved?
17. From 1934 to 1941, how did the United States carry out its Far Eastern policy?

18. Why did not the European powers protest more vigorously against Japan's policies?

19. What were the *complete* circumstances which induced Japan to strike against China in 1937, and against the western empires in 1941?

20. What new factors enter the conflict in 1941, and what do they suggest as to a future solution?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Compare the attitude of the Japanese and of the Chinese towards militarism, and analyze the reasons for each.

2. Analyze the reasons for the early establishment of a central government in China.

3. Trace Russian expansion in the Orient from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries.

4. Analyze the political struggles behind railroad development in Manchuria from 1880 to 1940.

5. Trace the development of the Open Door policy from 1899 to 1941.

6. Define the exact interests of Germany, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan in China in 1930.

7. Analyze the influence of the Communists in China from 1920 to 1940. (A reading of *Red Star over China,* by Edgar Snow, is suggested.)

8. Chart the development of parliamentary government in Japan from 1889 to the present.

9. Trace the effect of the limitation of naval armaments on the relative naval strength of Japan, the United States, and Great Britain in 1940.

10. Chart the development of the independence movement in India.

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PART IV

RECENT TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

NEW instruments of warfare produced by a changing and expanding technology are being tested out and used in the struggle for power. The conflicting ideologies of democracies and totalitarian states are manifest in their conduct of war, which have given rise to fifth columns, international secret movements, secret organizations, and many other forms of organized treachery. To justify states in their conduct of war, and to rationalize their objectives, no matter how reasonable or unreasonable, a new "science" of geopolitics has been evolved.

The return to war by the world, after the peace hopes following the First World War, is indicative of a social crisis resulting from oversimplification of political issues, wishful thinking, and the fallacies of the postwar period. As the Second World War progresses it becomes increasingly evident that the old peace machinery is outmoded and that there is need for something based upon realistic concepts. If the objective of the world is peace—and we take it to be such—then the current plans for a new world order, of which there are many, must take into consideration the bases on which alone lasting peace can be built. The era of collective security and the League of Nations was one of vision, idealism, and experiment. The generation which follows this war must profit by the mistakes of the generation after the First World War, for that is the only way in which progress can be made. Such a new order can only come about if it is built upon the concept of power as the underlying force in world affairs.

CHAPTER 20

WAR AS A SYMPTOM OF OUR SOCIAL CRISIS [1]

Desperate Search for War Causes

What are the main causes of the Second World War? Why, in spite of all the earnest prayers of millions of people for peace, have we drifted into another series of declared and undeclared wars?

The search for some reasonable answers is, and will be, one of the chief preoccupations of mankind. But in his desperate search for somebody or something on which to pin the blame for starting the wars, man has wasted a great deal of effort in proving his theories concerning the causation of such conflicts. Each of these theories has some merit, but each has failed by its very simplicity to provide a scientific explanation of that extremely complex phenomenon.[2]

Too Much Wishful Thinking

From the sociological point of view, there is one basic reason why the average observer has been unable to comprehend war, as a cause and an effect, in its complex aspects.

Much of our social thinking, in spite of our advance in empiric knowledge, is still obscured by all kinds of myths based on wishful thinking. It is generally acknowledged that the highest goal of the social sciences is to describe the social world as it is, rather than as it ought to be. Fundamentally, no cure can be lasting under false pretenses. If you go to a physician, who diagnoses your ailment as a kind of tuberculosis, the starting point of the cure depends on his analysis of the tubercular con-

[1] The core of this chapter is reprinted by permission of the editor from Joseph S. Roucek, "War and Our Culture Pattern," *Sociology and Social Research,* 25 (March–April, 1941), pp. 303–312.

[2] Cf. Willard Waller, "War in the Twentieth Century," in W. Waller, ed., *War in the Twentieth Century,* New York, Dryden, 1939, pp. 3–21.

dition as it is—and only then can steps be taken to make your condition as it ought to be. But since it is always easier to view the troublesome world around us as it ought to be, wishful thinking has always had the upper hand over the scientists' attempts to describe the social reality as it actually exists.

Wishful thinking is an inseparable part of man's psychological heritage. But, when there is too much of it, especially of the kind which refuses to see the world of reality, "it removes no difficulties and solves no problems; it only puts off the final reckoning to a later date with heavy compound interest." [3] In fact, wishful thinking, from one point of view, can be accused of having become one of the causes of the Second World War.

When the First World War ended, suffering humanity pinned its hopes for the reconstruction of the world on permanent foundations of peace.[4] The war had been fought to end war, and mankind placed its faith in that phrase. The new order, symbolized by that magic word democracy, was to justify the agony of the four years of misery and fighting.

But the war spirit in Europe and Asia did not die after 1918. In Germany and Italy two corporals began to seek a solution of mankind's difficulties in violence, sadism, and terror. Concurrently, the glittering phrases of constitutionalism and parliamentarianism soon proved illusory in the early breakdown of democratic machinery in Poland, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia, later in Germany and elsewhere. Economic nationalism was revived in all states in spite of the proclamations of the internationalists and the League of Nations, proving its unsound basis. Up to 1930 the world had planned on peace and security in spite of the numerous danger signs cropping up constantly on the national and international scene, which showed that peace was not as secure as it appeared on the surface.

These undercurrents came to a head on September 19, 1931, at ten o'clock at night, with a sudden "explosion" along the

[3] William Henry Chamberlin, "The Malady of Wishful Thinking," *Harpers*, 182 (May, 1941), pp. 561–568.

[4] Joseph S. Roucek, ed., *Contemporary Europe*, New York, Van Nostrand, 1941, chap. 1.

tracks of the South Manchuria Railway, well inside Chinese territory, when "shots" were fired at Japanese soldiers who were "innocently" marching down the tracks. (Thus, at any rate, Tokyo later claimed.) That same night 600 Japanese troops massed to storm the adjacent Peitaying barracks of China's Northeastern Army. By dawn the barracks had been burned, more than 300 of the defenders had been killed, and 9,000 or 10,000 others put to flight. It was the end of summer in the fourth year of Showa, reign of "Radiant Peace." From the embers of the Peitaying barracks came the sparks of the Second World War.[5] They spread to Addis Ababa, to Barcelona and Madrid, set ablaze books in Berlin, workers' apartments in Vienna, churches in Prague, slums in Warsaw, and shops in Rotterdam; and reached London, Belgrade, Oslo, Odessa, Beirut, Manila, and Pearl Harbor.

Back of the long, incredible tale of the folly, blindness, and madness of these years lay the desperate desire for peace of the western democracies and the United States, and the hope that peace could be safeguarded by signing covenants, treaties, and international guarantees. We in the United States had proved to ourselves—and thus assumed that we had proved to others—the uselessness of war, and we believed that the experiences of 1914–1918 had demonstrated that all nations had identical interests in peace, and finally that any nation which desired to disturb peace was both irrational and immoral.[6] The result was tragic—as demonstrated by the diplomatic and military history of the disastrous quarter century from Versailles to Pearl Harbor—a record of free nations weak and timid, of evasion that did not evade, of "appeasolationism" that neither appeased nor isolated. This can only be understood in terms of the desire in the democracies for "peace at any price"—a story of blood, bungling, and violence.

[5] Frederick L. Schuman, *Design for Power,* New York, Knopf, is a scorching indictment of the democratic weaknesses leading to the Second World War. See also: Dwight E. Lee, *Ten Years,* Boston, Houghton, 1942.

[6] Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939,* New York, Macmillan, 1940, is a brilliant analysis of how the intense desire for peace did not square with the realities of international politics of the years between World Wars.

This wishful thinking even provided word-weapons for the aggressor's psychological warfare. For example, instead of speaking of neutrality, embargoes, and intervention, they had other terms. They called battles "pacification operations." The aggressors, in order to satisfy the peace desires of the democracies, created fictions which were not merely ornaments of policy but fundamental bases of policy—fictions which embrace a whole phase of international relations. A few illustrations were the "independence" of Manchukuo; Soviet "democracy"; the United States "neutrality" which was most unneutral; the "attacks" always being made on Germany by the state she intended to attack; and the fiction of the Hitler-Stalin "friendship" during the German-Soviet Pact of 1939–1941.[7]

The Case of Oversimplification

Closely allied with wishful thinking is a second major difficulty: namely, the tendency of the average student and scholar to seek one single, simple, all-embracing explanation or "cause" for all social phenomena. In that respect there is little difference between the blasé historic approach of Spengler and the way in which a simple farmer blames the sickness of his cow on God's will. When it comes to world politics, we periodically make great efforts to solve the problem of war by blaming such simple causes as Hitlerism, or by granting more *Lebensraum* to have-not nations, or by defining aggression. But this does not conform with realities, for an analysis of war as a social phenomenon explodes all simple explanations and indicates the extreme complexity of its causation. It is difficult to define war because the meaning of war and its nature are constantly chang-

[7] The whole problem of "wishful thinking" in the United States is interrelated with the exploded fiction of "geographical isolation" and the theory of "the Wave of the Future." For the latter theory see the book by that same title written by Anne Morrow Lindbergh (New York, 1941, Harcourt). For excellent arguments against "The Wave of the Future" see: R. H. Markham, *The Wave of the Past,* Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1941; Frank Altschul, *Let No Wave Engulf Us,* New York, Duell, 1941; Edward Mead Earle, *Against this Torrent,* Princeton, University Press, 1941.

ing.[8] The same wars appear differently when they are viewed from the standpoints of religion, legalism, philosophy, science, Socialism, Fascism and Nazism and Communism. Each viewpoint also provides its particular causes of war.

War of Ideologies

Sociologically speaking, war is a social conflict,[9] fought in modern times in the name of political beliefs dear to the belligerents. Such wars, the kind we are fighting today,[10] we call "ideological" wars. Ideologies are political and military weapons *par excellence,* and hence important devices for the achievement of world power.[11] They are also one of the most potent causes of the Second World War, which can be understood only by seeing the importance of totalitarian thought in its relationship to the world crisis.

Disintegration of Europe's Pillars of Civilization

Today, Europe and western civilization are being transformed as the ideological pillars upon which western culture is based are weakened. Liberalism, democracy, rationalism, Christianity, constitutionalism—which we in the democracies are defending—are being proclaimed as heresies by totalitarian aggressors the world over. The consequent chaos grows out of two main trends: one favoring the retention of existing institutions, the other experimenting with new realities and hoping to profit by the wreckage of old ideological structures. It is a

[8] Grayson Kirk and Richard P. Stebbins, eds., *War and National Policy, A Syllabus,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942; chap. 3, "War in Statecraft and in History," pp. 12–16; chap. 4, "The Meaning of War: Definitions and Concepts," pp. 17–21.

[9] Hans Speier, "The Social Types of War," *American Journal of Sociology,* 46 (January, 1941), pp. 445–454.

[10] Melvin Rader, *No Compromise,* New York, Macmillan, 1939, is a good introduction to the philosophical aspects of the struggle between democracy and Fascism and Nazism.

[11] Cf. Joseph S. Roucek. "Political Behavior as a Struggle for Power," *Journal of Social Philosophy,* 6 (July, 1941), pp. 341–351.

fight between the belief that the milk and honey of this earth belong to a "superior" race (or a few races) in a "new order" and the belief that they belong to the champions of the existing order as trustees for all. It is a conflict between totalitarian disregard for all human values and democratic humanitarianism, between an insistence upon force and persuasion as a ruling principle; and between an aggressive nationalism and an enlightened, at least moderately enlightened, internationalism.[12]

This conflict has been injected into internal state politics. Politics is a state's capacity synthetically to equalize and adjust in useful compromises, all forms of social activity. Since human life is constantly undergoing crises, politics is also in a critical stage. The resulting social uncertainties produce regimes which are anything but peaceful. Some regimes consider themselves fundamentally to be eternally at war.

Tacitus has the British chieftains say of the Romans, in the popular version, "They make a desert and they call it peace." The chief contribution of Hitler's and Mussolini's brood to our series of crises is the autocratic state which uses all the features of militaristic warfare for its existence; their main contribution to political theory is the idea of progress through internal and international wars. The case goes far beyond the externals of military organization and drill, banners, uniforms, parades, salutes, leaders, war cries, challenges, and defiances. Theirs is a system of permanent mobilization. It is life on a war footing.

When war breaks out, the democratic people usually announce that politics are adjourned and the party system is suspended for the duration of the crisis; but modern dictatorships have discarded the party system altogether. In the stress of war, democracies abdicate basic liberties, but dictatorships destroy them as a basic principle. In wartime, democracies acquiesce in what is virtually a suspension of the reign of law, and national interest becomes the sole criterion of official conduct as long as the enemy is at the gate. In dictatorships, national interest is interpreted by the leader as the sole criterion

[12] Sir Herbert Samuel, "Wars of Ideas," *International Conciliation,* 330 (May, 1937), pp. 473–486.

at all times. He rules by decree. In peace, democracies balance their budgets, or try to; in war they spend whatever is called for. The budget of the dictatorial state is on an eternal war footing; privation at all times becomes heroic, as it does only in wartime with free peoples.

It is not by accident that the dictatorships use a militarist vocabulary to describe actions which in free countries are regarded as peace activities. Democracies stimulate wheat growing by bounties and tariffs, but dictatorships fight the "battle of the wheat." Democracies build tractor factories, but dictatorships "hurl their shock brigades into the trenches on the tractor front." The dictator state is always on its toes against the enemy within and without. Such a state is always fighting a civil war.

"Progress" in Terms of Dictators' Mentality

Dictatorships today, therefore, are on a permanent war footing concerned with internal and international foes. Such armed camps, superficially at least, have the singleness of purpose, the swift efficiency, and the crisp discipline of the military method geared to the aims of the dictators. The troops and supporters of modern dictatorships may wear shirts of different colors, but their weapons are drawn from the same armory, their doctrines are variations on the same theme, and they go forth to battle singing the same tune with slightly different words. Their weapons are the coercive, warlike direction of the life and labor of mankind. Their doctrine presupposes that disorder and misery can be overcome by more and more warlike measures. Their promise is that through the war power of the state men can be made happy. In the name of progress, totalitarian states preach that government with its instruments of war must, by telling the people how they shall live, direct the course of civilization and fix the shape of things to come. This is the foundation which all prevailing totalitarian dogmas presuppose. Despotism is no novelty in human affairs, but rarely, if ever, during the last twenty-five hundred years has any western gov-

ernment claimed for itself a war jurisdiction over men's lives comparable with that which is officially attempted in the totalitarian states. Yet it is the governmental coercion that is creating the very chaos it purports to conquer.[13] The consequence of collectivism had to be regimentation, censorship, despotism, and impoverishment, all tending to militarism, and finally war.

This militarism of social processes resembling a state of siege is a cause as well as a result of our social disorganization, inherent in the striving of contemporary authoritarian systems to achieve internal stability. These contradictions and paradoxes indicate that war is not only an outgrowth of the ever accelerating changes in our social institutions and therefore the result of social causes, but also the result of man's irrationality. Modern man is frequently a genius in dealing with the physical and external world, but often a driveling idiot when dealing with himself and his relations with his fellows.

Disruption of Social Equilibrium

Our war crisis can also be traced to the disruption of our social equilibrium. Man has lost a certain balance of material and spiritual values, which includes a sense of obligation to something not himself. Every culture must have its ultimate aim in spiritual values. Up to the recent present ours have been found in superindividualism, supernationalism, and humanitarianism, which tended to check the antisocial tendencies of our times. The nineteenth-century theorists of violence, however, such as Nietzsche and Georges Sorel, created among their followers a hostility towards everything which, for 2,000 years, had been the human ideal. In these doctrines of violence, common to the extremists of right and left, the present war of violence germinated in fertile ground. Related to violence is the common assumption that man is sovereign in spiritual values and refuses to accept a supernatural or divine ideology of life.

[13] Cf. Walter Lippmann, *The Good Society*, Boston, Little, 1937.

Hence he tolerates no rules in his tribal warfare on others, and the system of warfare has, in fact, become an end in itself.

Warfare as Extremism of Political Processes

If we approach this trend from the standpoints of the growth of state power and the accelerated advance in military might, then the desperate struggle for the control of power domestically and internationally becomes inevitable. It is under such conditions that politics and warfare have been assigned the supreme rank, the value of all values. Instead of power as an instrument for the attainment of human values, however vague they may be, human values have now become an instrument for the attainment of power. By reason of the rendering of all human values subservient to the supreme end of power, all human institutions have become subordinated to the politics of warfare. The state and politics have become our modern god.

Economic Determinism as a Cause of Wars

Popular dogmas of the years since the First World War, such as the need for *Lebensraum,* lack of raw materials, population pressure, high tariffs, lack of gold, and staggering war reparations, have held a compelling importance for dictator nations. These half-truths have touched a responsive note in the mind of the average fair-minded American and Britisher. This sympathetic attitude was widely held in the democracies until the very outbreak of the war in 1939 and was of inestimable benefit to Hitler and his satellites. This attitude must be regarded as one of the most important causes contributing to the Second World War.

Of all the economic problems arising from the maelstrom of 1914–1918, the question of reparations has been the most misunderstood. Had Germany been held to the original schedule of payments, the economic necessity for casting asunder the bonds of the Versailles Treaty might have been overwhelming, but the amount of reparations actually paid by Germany is seldom

noted. The fact remains that Germany paid, from the Armistice until the Hoover moratorium (which marked the end of the reparation payments) between $6 and $7 billion.[14] During the same period, however, Germany borrowed over $10 billion from foreign states—over half of which came from the United States, with Great Britain a close second. Furthermore, these loans were not repaid. It is obvious that not only did the First World War cost the Allies more than the Germans in actual cash and devastation of property, but the reparations paid by the German government until 1931 were actually paid out of Allied funds.[15] But many people took up Hitler's arguments as to reparations "injustice."

Now turn from the fiction of the reparations burden to that of the need for *Lebensraum*. Much has been said by Germans as to the intense population pressure upon their country in contrast to the vast spaces of the earth occupied by "inferior" races. Several fallacies underlie the distinction between have and have-not nations. One is the assumption that the territories of an empire can be exploited for the exclusive benefit of the mother country and that the mother country gives nothing in return. Imperial Spain was ruined by that policy. Another fallacy is that abundant natural resources are necessary to prosperity and happiness. What about Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden—to name only the countries having no colonial possessions? Who has heard them crying out for *Lebensraum*, or demanding special economic concessions, or engaging in warfare? [16] From another point of view, the following enlightening statistics (all for 1939) show that of all the European states the greatest human concentration was found in the little principality of Monaco, with a population of some 24,000 people

[14] E. O. Guerrant, "Economic Determinism and German Expansion," *World Affairs Interpreter*, 12 (January, 1942), pp. 415–429; Joseph S. Roucek, "American Public Opinion and Mythical German Claims," *New Europe*, 2:7 (June, 1942), pp. 202–203; and, "American Public Opinion in the Appeasement Period," *ibid.*, 2:8 (July, 1942), pp. 224–228. (See Chapter 13 for Barnes's differing view. —*Editor.*)

[15] James T. Shotwell, *What Germany Forgot*, New York, Macmillan, 1940. (The student is cautioned that there is no universal agreement on the reparations figures, especially as they relate to German payments.—*Editor.*)

[16] For further elucidation see Chapters 7 and 13.—*Editor.*

in an area of only 370 acres. Among the more "regular-sized" nations, Belgium had more than 708 inhabitants to each square mile of territory. The Netherlands counted some 680, while the estimate for Great Britain is nearly 480 persons per square mile. In comparison with these figures, German and Italian populations—in numerical terms at least—were less crowded. Germany, including the many acquisitions in 1939, was credited with roughly 340 inhabitants to the square mile, Italy with 359.[17]

Other arguments hardly fare better under close scrutiny. For example, Japan argues that she is driven to despair by lack of food and raw materials within her own frontiers. In spite of this, since the Restoration, she has been able to double her population, elevate her standard of living, and build up a modern industry.[18] She has sufficient food within her own frontiers and she has never been denied the opportunity to buy raw materials. For instance, although Japan possesses no cotton, she was able by peaceful competition to take away Great Britain's former position as the world's leading exporter of textiles. And she accomplished this feat with cotton purchased not only in the United States but also in the British possession of India.

The willingness of the democracies to concede the ideological validity of the arguments of the have-not nations, was another cause of the Second World War. Once they conceded that the haves were under moral or political obligation to share possessions with the have-nots, there could be no end to have-not demands for a redistribution of resources under threat of war.

Volumes have been written concerning the influence of the distribution of raw materials on world conflict; [19] and the importance of raw materials in the industrial world today is not

[17] Incidentally, the absorption of Bohemia-Moravia by the German Reich in 1939 increased rather than reduced German population density. For these former Czechoslovak provinces were by far the most settled regions of that country, with an average of over 357 people for each square mile. (On these matters see also Chapter 2.—*Editor.*)

[18] Hugh Byas, *The Japanese Enemy,* New York, Knopf, 1942.

[19] Brooks Emeny, "The Distribution and Control of Natural Resources, and America's World Position," *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 218 (November, 1941), pp. 58–65; Frank H. Simonds and Robert Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics,* New York, American Book, 1935.

open to dispute. However, the question is one of emphasis. The common conception is that Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., the United States, and certain other nations possess vast quantities of raw materials all out of proportion to their needs, and deny access to the have-not nations.[20] But no nation possesses all the raw materials necessary for a completely isolated existence. The important consideration is that the materials necessary for the greatest productive capacity of a nation must be easily produced and the market must be unhampered by artificial barriers. Thus postwar Germany lacked such materials as copper, iron, lead, graphite, mica, and bauxite, yet none of these raw materials were subjected to the slightest export restrictions by the producing nations.[21] In fact, where did Germany acquire all the needed materials, including iron ore and rubber, for her efficient war machine which has conquered Europe? The United States is almost completely lacking in antimony, chromite, manganese, nickel, tin, asbestos, bauxite, nitrates, platinum, potash, and other raw materials.

Economic determinism as a justification for German warlike moves can be discounted. But it was a powerful, attractive ideology which helped to make the present war possible.

Hope at the End of a Rainbow?

If we summarize the most important causes of modern war, it is evident that we are in the midst of an ideological upheaval of unprecedented magnitude. "Its common root," stated Rudolf Hess, at the 1937 Party Congress at Nuremberg, "is the universal yearning for a New Order, replacing the old order which has outlived its usefulness." [22] This ideological argument is related to a time when war itself is going through its own social and technological revolution—a process which started in the First World War and marked the final break with all traditional

[20] This is a point emphasized by the geopoliticians headed by Haushofer. See Chapter 21, "The New Pseudoscience of Geopolitics."

[21] Guerrant, *op. cit.*, p. 422.

[22] Ladislas Farago, *German Psychological Warfare,* New York, Committee for National Morale, 1941, p. 45.

conceptions and techniques of warfare, ushering in a new era of "revolutionary wars." This basic transformation has three factors. First, new military weapons have been invented and perfected that are replacing flesh and blood with steel and oil. Second, the civilian population have become active and passive participants as a result of the broadening of the sphere of military action. Third, war aims have been changed to include the settlement of ideological accounts in addition to material demands and the solution of supreme leadership among the nations.[23] All these changes have led to what is known as total war.

It is evident, then, that humanity is now faced with two alternatives—the final victory, in the long run, of totalitarianism or democracy. No state organized on a peace basis—that is, for the fullest and most effective exercise of civilization—can compete with a state organized for efficiency in war. Nazi victory can be final only if Hitler's nation-state, one and alone, assumes full control of the whole world. The possibility of a complete victory for one state, however, does exist. But the effort toward it has brought, as a tragic conclusion, war that will stay with us for a long time; for totalitarianism, as long as it exists in one form or the other, can never be a source of stability but only of age-long periodic world wars.

War and the School

The situation of the world on the eve of Pearl Harbor could not be more perfectly epitomized than by a very old saying: "They have seduced my people, saying peace; and there was no peace!"

One of the blessings of a dark moment is the breaking down into active meaning of so many of the terms with which we have been playing—democracy, patriotism, dictatorship, and totalitarianism. Today we are in a total war—and we in the United States are just beginning to realize what this means in the mobilization of all resources, all strength, all techniques.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 45. (See Chapters 9 and 21.—*Editor.*)

This the Axis began years ago when they determined upon war —and we are slowly learning the lesson.

Total war for the United States has to mean a great deal. Total war must engage every loyalty, every tradition, every faculty of self-criticism—or it will not be total, and hence unsuccessful.

In this kind of warfare, the function of the school is clear. It must do everything possible to help to win the war—and to win the peace. It must work indefatigably toward the understanding of the realities of human life, and the conditions under which human life may be led richly, co-operatively. It "will stand, unabashed, for the principle that the rules of civilization, wrought out on Sinai and the Areopagus, by Jesus and Socrates, by the Stoics and the Epicureans, are prior to the bomber and poison gas and will survive beyond them." [24]

But even more important than the winning of the peace is the immediate necessity of winning this war. A proper and necessary business of education, both public and private, in the United States is to imbue young citizens with intelligent devotion to their country's basic principles and ideals. If the citizen-soldier may be expected to die for the ideals and principles of the United States, may we not expect the citizen-teacher to support and promote them? The teacher in our country must not be—as he was only a few years ago—afraid to indoctrinate for our democracy.[25]

Democracy has an ideology of its own. Indoctrination should not be in terms of partisan platforms, but in such commonly accepted persistent basic principles of American democracy as: Democracy fundamentally respects the authority of truth rather than of autocratic leaders or classes; it accepts compromise in the provisional adjustments of controversies to secure pragmatic ends; it believes in human equality as opposed to the fixed differentiations of hereditary classes, and it keeps open the avenues of progress for each citizen; it places the rights and

[24] Alvin Johnson, "War and the Scholar," *Social Research*, 9 (February, 1942), pp. 1–3.

[25] Benjamin F. Pittenger, *Indoctrination for American Democracy*, New York, Macmillan, 1941.

responsibilities of individuals above those of any institution, including the state, in times of peace; it aids individuals by provision for general welfare; it accepts the principles of popular sovereignty and civil liberty; it establishes the expansion and maintenance of human happiness as the criterion for judging the efficiency of social processes and institutions.

By retaining the fundamental principles of our democracy and by winning the peace we may look forward to some safe period of civilization when men will be able to reduce the violent processes of conflicts to the more civilized methods of competition; when they will desist from insisting on clearing away the ruins of old systems too rapidly; when they will painfully set about reconstructing the institutions which they destroyed; and when they will realize that peace must, in the first place, be a general peace, a peace which will pertain to all departments of social life, international as well as national.

Questions

1. Why does mankind search for the causes of warfare?
2. What is "wishful thinking?"
3. What are the destructive aspects of "wishful thinking" in relation to the causes of war?
4. What were the explosive causes of warfare in the post-war European history?
5. What was the relation of "wishful thinking" to the diplomatic and military history of the disastrous quarter of a century from Versailles to Pearl Harbor?
6. What are the principles of "The Wave of the Future"?
7. Why is it so difficult to define a war?
8. What do we mean by the "war of ideologies?"
9. What are the main pillars of Europe's civilization?
10. Outline the anarchistic principles of the totalitarian way of life.
11. Politics—in the old sense—means what?
12. What does politics mean in the totalitarian state?
13. What is "progress" in terms of dictators' mentality?
14. Why does governmental coercion produce a chaos?
15. Relate our war problems to the disruption of social equilibrium.

16. What is the relation of the reparations to the Second World War?
17. Outline the unacceptable arguments for *Lebensraum.*
18. What were the arguments for the reapportionment of world's goods designed for?
19. What does the totalitarian war mean for our democratic efforts?
20. Outline the tasks of the school in the war efforts during the Second World War and in the postwar plans.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Relate "wishful thinking" to the empiric search for "causes."
2. Outline Comte's theory pertaining to the characteristics of the transitions of social order.
3. Analyze the concepts of "anarchy" and "crisis" from the sociological standpoint.
4. Trace the changing concepts of the Versailles Treaty and reparations as the causes of all the evil since 1918.
5. Outline the causes of the First World War.
6. Trace the number of declared and undeclared wars since 1918.
7. Outline the basic concepts of liberalism, democracy, free trade, and rationalism.
8. Trace the theories of Nietzsche and Georges Sorel in relationship to war.
9. Summarize the recent proposals for abolition of wars.
10. Relate the complex causes of wars to the utilization of techniques of "appeasement" and force by democracies in recent years.

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CHAPTER 21

THE NEW PSEUDOSCIENCE OF GEOPOLITICS

THE basic struggle for power among states has assumed varied ideological cloaks to justify wars. Wars in the name of religion, racialism, and nationalism are only too familiar to all of us. But "while nature has always played in the waging of war and causing of war, never until the twentieth century has its role in both aspects been so weighty." [1] This change is due to Adolf Hitler's ultimate war aims, drafted in detail for him by German *Geopolitiker* headed by Professor Major General Karl E. Nikolas Haushofer, until quite recently nearly unknown to the United States. These circles have introduced a new rationalization for war in their *Geopolitik,* the doctrine which has its major premise the geographic manifest destiny of the German nation, a concept of geography meant to give technical methods for achieving future German world domination. For, despite some wild statements about the alleged influence of the Munich Geopolitical Institute on German foreign policy during the last two generations,[2] Haushofer and his school have succeeded to a truly remarkable degree in penetrating to the inner nerve of Hitler's policy, providing the logic behind its moves, its subterfuges, and its devices.

This pseudoscience of geographical determinism has become the ideological justification of the Nazi worldwide revolutionary aims, as Marxism, the pseudoscience of economic determinism, became the ideological justification for the Russian revolution. Geopolitics is an ideological justification of Germany's age-old penchant for imperialism, for aggressive territorial expansion.

[1] Derwent Whittlesey, "The Role of Geography in Twentieth-Century War," p. 87, in Jesse D. Clarkson and Thomas C. Cochran, *War as a Social Institution,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1941.

[2] Cf. Herbert Rosinski's review of Pierre van Passen's *The Time Is Now!,* New York, Dial, 1941, in the *Nation,* 152 (June 28, 1941), p. 756. (The terms will be anglicized in the following pages as geopolitics, geopolitical, etc.—*Editor.*)

Haushofer coined the term geopolitics to describe Germany's national policies based on the geographical need for *Lebensraum,* and "supplied the scientific basis for this foreign policy." [3]

The Roots of Geopolitics

The father of geopolitics strangely enough, is the recognized and respected science of political geography which "provides a geographical interpretation of international relations." [4] Without delving, however, into the whole field of political geography,[5] it is sufficient to state that the First World War drew increased attention to the geographical problems of states. In Germany, the state that lost, this attention led to the development of geopolitics as a nationally oriented "science" of political geography with philosophical and moral implications (although Haushofer and his followers insist that geopolitics is an empirical science).[6] The chief difference between political geography and geopolitics is, the geopoliticians claim, that the approach to the former is *static* and to the latter *dynamic.* While political geography *describes* the boundary, geopolitics *evaluates* it in the light of the *requirements* of the state. While political geography examines spatial *conditions,* geopolitics examines spatial *requirements.*[7] These differences will be more readily understood by examining the thinkers who have influenced Haushofer—Ratzel, Kjellén, and Sir Halford Mackinder.

Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) developed a general theory of the effectiveness of geographic factors in the life and development of the states, likening it to an organism whose growth is

[3] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf,* New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1939, pp. 937–940, 950–953.

[4] Samuel Van Valkenburg, *Elements of Political Geography,* New York, Prentice-Hall, 1939, p. vii.

[5] Cf. Franklin Thomas, "The Role of Anthropogeography in Contemporary Social Theory," chap. 7, pp. 143–211, in Harry E. Barnes and Howard and F. Becker, editors, *Contemporary Social Theory,* New York, Appleton-Century, 1940, for the latest survey of this whole field.

[6] Karl Haushofer and others, *Bausteine zur Geopolitik,* Berlin-Grunewald, Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1928, p. 27.

[7] Robet H. Lochner, *"Geopolitik": Its Nature and Aims,* University of Chicago, M. A. thesis, 1941, is the best available scholarly survey of this field in English.

a struggle for existence, which is space. He maintained "that every people has to be educated from smaller to larger space conceptions; and that the process has to be repeated again and again to prevent people from sinking back into old small space conceptions." [8] Haushofer accepted Ratzel's doctrine of "the state as an organism" as the ostensible organic law. Ratzel's principle of education for large space conceptions has been especially embodied by Haushofer in his pseudoscience of *Geokartographie,* taken up in a later section.

The next exponent of geopolitical doctrine was a Swedish university professor, Rudolf Kjellén [9] (1864–1922), who studied the influence of natural environment (including the psychological, ethnological, political and social as well as geographical aspects) on man. He was decidedly pan-German, particularly in his belief that Germany's "living space" should contain not only central Europe and eastern Europe but also Scandinavia, Asia Minor, and Mesopotamia as well.

Kjellén conceived states not as legal bodies but as powers. In their roles as powers, the states are entities which have to be thought of geographically. Admitting that he is a disciple of Ratzel, Kjellén, however, modified Ratzel's theories. For Ratzel, political geography is the study of "the influence of natural environment on man." The latter problem belongs to "the sciences concerned with man, to psychology, ethnography, or to the political and social sciences." Kjellén borrowed Ratzel's "laws of growth" and gave to the new "science" a new name: *Geopolitik.* Geopolitics, states Kjellén, "is the theory of the state as a geographic organism or phenomenon in space, i. e., as land, territory, area, or, most pregnantly, as country (*Reich*)." Thus the "science" of geopolitics was born.

Kjellén's theories gained ground almost as rapidly in Germany and Austria as in his native country Sweden. In 1917 the

[8] For more detailed treatment of Ratzel, see Carl Sauer, "Friedrich Ratzel," *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences,* vol. 13, pp. 120–121, which discusses his chief works *Politische Geographie,* Munich, R. Oldenburg, 1897, and *Anthrogeographie,* Stuttgart, J. Engelhorn, 1909.

[9] See Edward Termanius, "Geopolitics and Political Geography," *Baltic and Scandinavian Countries,* 4 (May, 1838), pp. 165–178, which lists the works of Kjellén and outlines Kjellén's *System of Politics.*

State as Organism and *Sweden,* appeared in German translation, and in 1920 the *System of Politics.* Kjellén, in fact, met Haushofer, and the two collaborated up to Kjellén's death in 1922. Kjellén's *The Great Powers* is the acknowledged Bible of German geopoliticians. Carefully revised and enlarged by Haushofer and others, it has run to numerous editions. Haushofer, furthermore, with his "encyclopaedic knowledge, bold eclectism, and flair for publicity" (*Life,* November 20, 1939), developed and elaborated the concept of *Lebensraum* far beyond Kjellén's theory.

Sir Halford Mackinder, whose theories saw world politics as a struggle between oceanic and continental people, claimed that any country which wanted to dominate the world had to obtain control of the "world island" or "heartland." [10] This area covered the territory extending from the Volga to the Yangtze and from the Himalayas to the Arctic Ocean. This "heartland" could be powerful because it would be invulnerable from the seapower of the surrounding oceans. Mackinder later expanded his ideas in *Democratic Ideals and Realities* (New York, Henry Holt, 1919), published while the Peace Conference met at Versailles. He propounded that the new world order was not to be founded upon democratic sentimentalities, but upon the hard geographical and geopolitical "facts" underlying history. These facts emphasized the vital necessity of preventing Germany and the U.S.S.R. from joining forces, since these two powers, by dominating the "heartland" could not only dominate the Old World but the whole world. Thus Germany and Russia lost the war because they had been fighting on opposite sides; yet by that common loss they might well

[10] Sir Halford Mackinder, "The Geographic Pivot of History," *The Geographic Journal,* 33 (1904), pp. 434–437—a lecture read to the Royal Geographical Society, London, followed by discussions thereon. Mackinder developed his thesis further in *Democratic Ideals and Realities,* New York, Henry Holt, 1919. It is to be noted that Mackinder's and Haushofer's theories of the "world island" of Eurasia had been Homer Lea's *The Valor of Ignorance* (1909) before being Mackinder's or Haushofer's. Lea's *The Day of the Saxon* and *The Valor of Ignorance,* republished in 1942 (New York, Harper) warned Great Britain that a navy would never be enough; it takes land power to defeat a land power. Furthermore, peace, as Lea reminds us across the decades, is never to be had for the asking.

learn their lesson and unite. Haushofer recommended Mackinder's idea in one of the first issues of the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* and adopted his theory as a line for German world political goals, conceiving the "heartland" as a strategic area (Eurasia) containing all advantages indispensable for a Germany at war against any great power or combination of powers. In the jubilee edition of the *Zeitschrift für Politik* (August–September, 1939), in honor of Haushofer's seventieth birthday, Mackinder's map, which accompanied his article on the geographical pivot of history, is conspicuously reproduced and appreciation is expressed to the British scholar for his valuable teachings. In the same edition it is also asserted that the term *Lebensraum* has duly entered the vocabulary of diplomacy, although at times used in a distorted form.[11]

Other Germanic Ideological Influences

Certain concepts of geopolitics can be traced to such German sociological concepts as the organic nature of the state, the militaristic tradition, the economic tradition, and *Lebensraum*, all of which geopoliticians have capitalized on by incorporating in their doctrines.

The organic concept of the state,[12] in Germany, is almost a national tradition. Such eighteenth-century philosophers as Schelling and Hegel regarded the state as a natural organism, whereas those in the nineteenth century considered it a psychic, biological entity. Ratzel, Kjellén, and the geopoliticians drew from it one of their basic laws, namely the compulsive necessity for the state to grow.

[11] Jessup has recently classified it with such other slogans of diplomacy as "manifest destiny" and "the white man's burden"—P. C. Jessup, "The Reality of International Law," *Foreign Affairs*, 18 (January, 1940), p. 246. German geopoliticians also highly recommend, as an excellent introduction to *Geopolitik*, J. Fairgrieve's *Geography and World Power*, New York, Dutton, 1921, translated into German in 1925 by Martha Haushofer, the wife of Karl Haushofer. This study, first published in 1915, is apparently independent of Kjellén and seems to have attracted the notice of German geopoliticians rather late. It is a very sketchy history of the world on a geographical basis but bears the stamp of modern geopolitical ideas; these are especially obvious in the maps.

[12] Frances W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1910.

The militaristic tradition is of long standing in Germany.[13] The implications of the Germanic idea of Valhalla, "a warrior paradise of bloody war . . . , where even the beautiful ladies—the Valkyrie of Wagner's operas—swing no mean battleaxe," [14] have found their various expressions in the philosophies of Treitschke, Houston Chamberlain, Nietzsche, Hegel, Clausewitz, Rosenberg, and others. These have been utilized by the geopoliticians, as their preoccupation with military strategy demonstrates.

The concept of *Lebensraum* has been in the German language for a very long time, but it has been popularized by the Nazis. Hence the economic traditions of German neomercantilism are also intertwined with the reasoning of the geopoliticians. The idea was foreshadowed by Father Jahn during the French Revolution,[15] by Fichte, and in Grimm's epoch-making book *Volk ohne Raum (People without Room)*, a pan-German classic since 1926. The term *Lebensraum* seems to have originated with Moeller van den Bruck.[16] Literally translated, *Lebensraum* means living space, but in Germany the concept includes all that which is necessary for guaranteeing the life and development of the German people—physically, politically, and economically. It embraces prestige, historical, and geographical considerations. As such the concept is but another variant of the slogans advanced by German thinkers advocating territorial expansion, such as *Drang nach Osten* (Push to the East) or *Mitteleuropa* (Central Europe).

Haushofer: Father of German Geopolitics

The instigator of geopolitics in Germany, Major General Karl E. Nikolas Haushofer, is a distinguished doctor of geogra-

[13] Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics*, New York, Knopf, 1941, pp. 204, 294, and *passim;* Albert T. Lauterbach, "Roots and Implications of the German Idea of Military Society," *Military Affairs*, 5 (Spring, 1941), pp. 1–20.

[14] Viereck, *op. cit.*, pp. 294–295.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[16] Moeller van den Bruck, *Germany's Third Empire*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1934; Gerhard Krebs, "Moeller van den Bruck: Inventor of the 'Third Reich,'" *American Political Science Review*, 35 (December, 1941), pp. 1085–1106; Charles Kruszewski, "Germany's *Lebensraum*," *loc. cit.*, 34 (October, 1940), pp. 964–975.

phy, geology, and history in civilian life, who served at the front as a brigade commander in the First World War. Haushofer's family contained such illustrious men as a well-known painter, the founder of Athenian Botanical Gardens, and a father who was a professor of political economy. Born in 1869, Haushofer planned to follow his father's career, but during his compulsory military service period he grew to like the military life, and accordingly entered a military college where he was graduated with highest commendation. Thence he was ordered to the War Academy, where he was declared eligible for the general staff,[17] and where he taught until 1909, later to be chosen as artillery instructor to the Japanese Army.[18] This assignment allowed him to travel widely throughout the Far East, giving him both an interest in that region and the political theory to accompany it. His scientific preparation enabled him to make many careful observations of the geography of the Far Eastern countries. At the same time he studied the German geographer Richthofen's publications on defense and military policy, drawing his own conclusions of the great role the Far Eastern powers might play. He began to formulate, nebulously it is true, a plan for a new German order, basing it on the hypothesis that whoever made an alliance with Russia and Japan might rule the world. Noting the relaxation of the British Empire's grip and Japan's greatly increased will to dominate, he recommended to the German general staff that Germany should acquire bases in the Pacific. But Berlin called him a visionary.[19]

During the First World War Haushofer held the rank of brigadier general. After the war, he began a career as professor of geography at the University of Munich. Contemplating in

[17] "Persons and Personages: Author of *Lebensraum*," *Living Age*, 359:4,492 (January, 1941), pp. 434–438, summarized from *Weltwoche* (Zurich Independent Weekly).

[18] In reality he was sent to study the rapidly expanding Japanese Imperial Army. There he became so fascinated by the East that the study of Asiatic culture heads his list of favorite habits, which include drawing and painting. He added the Japanese language to his linguistic store—Chinese, Korean, Russian, English, and French. Cf., "Germany's Brain Truster Produces Nazi War Aims," *Life*, 7 (November 20, 1939), pp. 62 ff.

[19] Frederic Sondern, Jr., "Hitler's Scientists," *Current History*, 53 (June, 1941), p. 11.

one of his books [20] the terrible fate of Germany in consequence of the First World War, through which she lost more than three centuries in spatial development, he raised in his mind the question as to where lay the mistakes of the prewar guardians of the German *Lebensraum*. Geopolitics became a projection of the drive which he so strongly felt; [21] its theoretical principles correlated closely to his German outlook and rationalization on world politics in general. Both Haushofer and the German people were ripe for the seed which the erudite and extraordinarily versatile professor was to sow in German soil.

In 1924 Haushofer started a seminar and, together with his followers, the monthly *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* (Berlin, later Heidelberg). A series of geopolitical studies were soon published by its editors (E. Obst, H. Lautensach, O. Maull, A. Grabowsky, R. Hennig, and others).

Haushofer, Hess, and Hitler

Haushofer was considered at first somewhat visionary even by his followers. One of the exceptions, however, was Rudolf Hess, a personal friend of his and his aide-de-camp during the First World War.

Hess was born April 26, 1896, in Alexandria, Egypt. He served his commercial apprenticeship first in Hamburg, then in French Switzerland. In 1914 he joined the German army as a volunteer and was wounded twice. Peace came when he was just twenty-two. He went to Munich and happened to hear Hitler speak in the tiny Sternecker beer tavern, later revered by the Nazis as one of the birthplaces of their movement. "Hess became Hitler's mirror and sloganeer." [22] When Hitler's beer-celler *Putsch* failed in 1923, Hitler and Hess were incarcerated in the comfortable house of detention at Landsberg on the

[20] Karl Haushofer, *Grenzen in ihrer geographischen und politischen Bedeutung*, Berlin, Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1927, p. 242.

[21] Cf. A. Whitney Griswold, "Paving the Way for Hitler," *Atlantic Monthly*, 157 (March, 1941), pp. 314–321.

[22] Konrad Heiden, "Hitler's Better Half," *Foreign Affairs*, 20:1 (October, 1941), pp. 73–86.

Lech, and there, after each day's breakfast and morning walk in the garden, he typed *Mein Kampf* for Hitler, wording and vocalizing his leader's very general ideas.

Haushofer, whose student Hess was, visited his follower in the prison, and Haushofer and Hitler came to know each other.[23] Afterwards Haushofer's Wednesday afternoon visits with Hitler and Hess produced lengthy discussions on problems of world policy—and there is every reason to believe that chapter 14 of *Mein Kampf* is the result of Haushofer's inspiration.

When Hitler and Hess were released, late in 1924, Hess entered the service of his teacher Haushofer as an assistant. In 1925 Haushofer founded the Germany Academy, officially titled the Institute for Research in Germanism, whose task was to cultivate the intellectual relations between the *Vaterland* and German minorities abroad—a sort of Teutonic International of German splinter groups the world over. When Hitler re-established his party in 1925, Hess became his private secretary.

Upon Hitler's accession to power Haushofer was appointed to the Presidency of the German Academy at Munich, and his sons and his Jewish wife were decreed Aryans. A research organization called the *Laboratorium für Weltpolitik* (Laboratory for World Politics) was established in Munich and subsidized liberally, since Haushofer had persuaded Hitler that if Germany was to rise again its government would have to know the strength and weaknesses of its enemies to the most minute details. Haushofer's Wednesday visits to Hitler subsequently became a Nazi tradition; at least once a week, Hitler when possible, consulted his mentor on foreign policy—until the spring of 1941 when, according to recent reports, Hess, Haushofer, and Banse strongly advised against an attack on the Soviet Union. The activities of this laboratory were published by the periodical *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik,* which became the

[23] Hess wrote, under Haushofer, a study of Japan—*Japan and Espionage,* a 40,000-word thesis which may be regarded as the fundamental discussion for the Nazi intelligence service. Cf. Curt Riess, *Total Espionage,* New York, Putnam, Sons, 1941.

outstanding German publication on foreign affairs. Its maps are issued under Haushofer's special supervision.

This Geopolitical Institute now contains over 1,000 scientists, technicians, and spies whose charts, maps, statistics, information, and plans have dictated Hitler's moves. These experts—economists, strategists, psychologists, anthropologists, physicists, historians, and geographers—study and analyze the reports from the espionage services and incorporate their services into Haushofer's comprehensive *Strategic Index,* a geopolitical file of the world. Haushofer receives his reports from five different sources, namely: (1) the German diplomatic service (general information); (2) the Foreign Institute of Germans Abroad, in Stuttgart (detailed espionage); (3) Section UA-1, the Gestapo Foreign Division (difficult espionage jobs); (4) Dr. Goebbels' agents, located in German Tourist Agencies and Steamship Lines (analyze foreign press to see the most effective kind of propaganda); and (5) geopolitical specialists (for expert information). These make it possible for the *Strategic Index* to tabulate every phase of nation's life: its military, economic, and psychological strength; its political, social, and religious thinking; its geography, topography, and weather conditions.

When a country is completely charted, Haushofer sends an abstract of this analysis to Hitler with his recommendations—where Himmler can apply espionage and sabotage, Goebbels disruptive propaganda, and Ribbentrop diplomatic pressure and cash inducements.

Studies by the experts and observers are published in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik,* which recently has been stressing that the battle of Europe is but one phase of the battle to dominate the world. This thesis has been ground into every German general staff officer by all the books and pamphlets coming from the Geopolitical Institute—which he must read and digest. The numerous factual articles and maps in the *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* concern all countries and regions of the world. Albrecht Haushofer, the son of Karl Haushofer, generally discusses in a monthly article the geopolitical status and significance of the

region of the Atlantic. The father, in a monthly editorial, reviews the vast amount of political literature on the Indo-Pacific sphere issued in all parts of the world, with special emphasis on problems concerning the U.S.S.R., Japan, China, and India. Special issues on the geopolitical importance of the radio have been issued since 1937.

Haushofer's definition of geopolitics is: "the science of political forms of life in their regional relationships, both as affected by natural conditions and in terms of their historical development." The aim of geopolitics is to provide the armature for political action and guidance in political life.

Haushofer's Doctrine

This definition, a strange mixture of geography, political science, biology, and strategy, is built on the thesis that each geographic area must be utilized by a race having definite qualities, both these qualities and the essentials of the area itself being more or less invariable. The superior races only fulfill natural requirements by occupying those areas suitable for them, even if this involves the displacement or extermination of other races. From this assumption stem his corollaries: (1) To the Germans rightfully belongs the leadership of the world, an assumption supported by additional ideological props. (2) All human life is simply a struggle between nations for territory. (3) All life is a brutal, lawless struggle for existence, and internationally every nation must cede to the stronger, otherwise it delays the "wave of the future," the rule of a racially pure nation, Germany. (4) The major force in German international policy is the inherent biological urge to territorial expansion prompted by "excessive pressure of population," since there is a "danger of suffocation in Europe proper." [24] Germany cannot tolerate "the danger of suffocation through insufficiency of space." (5) Other great nations—Great Britain and France—are dying because of their declining birth rates. They lack what Germany

[24] Hermann Rauschning, *The Revolution of Nihilism*, New York Alliance, 1939, p. 188. This work, though rambling, is the best available survey in English of Haushofer's theories.

has—not only the will to live but also the will to power. (6) This results in a dynamic worldwide policy, forcing the "exhausted nations" to forfeit the excess territory to the "biological" needs of Germany. (7) Great Britain has lost the "flair to rule" and France is a "dying nation." Germany is ready to "liberate" them.

Since the tendency to regionalism ("large-area amalgamations") is blocked by the small states, it is Germany's duty to "free" them, since "small-area formations are forms of dissolution and evaporation." The small states have no other choice but to become voluntary protectorates of the resolute dynamic powers. Least of all can the small states with vast colonial possessions expect to hold their possessions while Germany is left to suffocate. Such states cannot defend their colonies by force and still less by moral arguments. The reasoning which applies to the problem of colonial territory applies with still greater force to the territory of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet Union is not only the natural enemy of Nazism but, even more, a great territorial formation which must be broken up for the natural needs of Germany.

Germany's task extends, therefore, both to the colonial territories and the great Eurasian hinterland—and hence is worldwide, including the great American spaces without a political, social, racial and economic equilibrium. Germany is the leading "renovating power" of the world, forced to fight the "resisting" powers which are weak and inactive but hold obnoxiously onto possessions to which they have no right. Hence the renovating powers became "restorers of natural right," and are unjustly denounced as breakers of the peace. Those states willing to accept Germany's leadership will regain health from contact with the new dynamism; otherwise their fate is extinction and the loss of their possessions. Only the Nazi ruling element is capable of "liberating" the world from the "unnatural" and "false" doctrines of "humanitarian folly," "self-determination," and "tolerance." This liberation will be accomplished through Germany's tenacious will to live and to rule, her racial purity, her enormous elasticity in international decisions, her un-

doubted enthusiasm for this worldwide mission, her inventiveness in destruction, her strength of nerves, her gift of divination, her impulsiveness, her power for immediate, continuous action, her clever fifth-column and propaganda machine, her constant offensive—all aiming at the global revolution, a "new rejuvenation of the world," in Burckhardt's words. Then, at the end of the geopolitician's rainbow, will come the results of a "peace policy of justice," which will make Germany "mistress of the globe," and provide "a peace not hanging on the palm fronds of lachrymose pacifist womenfolk, but established by the victorious sword of a master race that takes over the world in the service of a higher civilization." [25]

Economically, the geopolitician objects to the liberal system of international trade because, as he contends, the latter conceives human affairs only in economic terms and thus presents a distorted view of reality,[26] and because international division of labor makes states dependent upon one another. To replace this liberal system, geopoliticians propound an economic system based on autarchy and large-space economy, especially *Raumordnung* (regional planning) and a planned economy. Now that the earth is distributed and the forces of expansion are weakening, a phase of consolidation has started, and with it comes the recognition that the growth of a people requires a careful economy with the available space. Thus, "*Raumordnung* is the reconstruction of the *Lebensraum* of the nation according to the necessities of people and state." [27] Economics, in short, must be subordinated to politics.

The territory or *Lebensraum* occupied by Germany should, according to the geopoliticians, furnish Germany a living. If it cannot do so, then neighboring peoples should mutually adapt their economies so that they will supplement one another and enable all to earn a living. This economy based on a large area is called *Grossraumwirtschaft*. Geopolitics furnishes a conven-

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 184.

[26] Hans Kretschmar, "Zur Problematik der Politischen Wirtschaftsführung und Raumordnung," *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 18 (1937), p. 255.

[27] Friedrich Buelow, "Raumordnung, Raumforschung und Wirtschaftswissenschaft," *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 47 (1938), p. 300.

ient theoretical justification for Germany's co-ordination of the economies of southwestern Europe (or the entire world) with hers. The size of "the great economic area" is determined only by the practical exigencies of the moment. Economic co-operation with Germany means, therefore, eventual German political control.

Thus it is evident that the actual political aim of National Socialism is a domination designed to encompass the whole world. Thus greater Germany would tolerate the existence of non-Germanic nations only if they adjust themselves to the political forms and needs of the National Socialist type of domination. These concepts are, in brief, the broad lines of the colossal foreign policy of Nazi Germany.

Ocean supremacy. German geopoliticians are also interested in revising the principles expounded by the great American naval strategist, Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. From 1890 until his death in 1914, Admiral Mahan produced a flow of books and articles defining the principles of sea power and urging the United States to embrace those principles in co-operation with Great Britain, with special emphasis on our position in Asia and the Pacific.[28] Thus Mahan became the prophet of manifest destiny, playing the same role in relation to Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Albert J. Beveridge and John Hay that the fabulous General Haushofer and the German geopolitical school are playing today in relation to the Nazis. Indeed, looked at from the strategic point of view, the present war is a contest between Mahan's theories of sea power and Haushofer's theories of land power. According to Mahan, the nation that controls the seas will control the world; according to Haushofer, the nation that controls the solid land mass of Eurasia will control the world.

Realizing that Germany could never be able to attain naval

[28] Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Seapower on History 1660–1783,* Boston, Little, 1890; *The Influence of Seapower on the French Revolution and Empire,* Boston, Little, 1892. See also Herbert Rosinski, "Mahan and the Present War," *Brassey's Naval Annual* (1941), pp. 191–209; Allan Westcott, ed., *Mahan on Naval Warfare, Selections from the Writings of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan,* Boston, Little, 1942.

parity with the American-British sea power, geopolitical planners decided to surround the oceans with German and allied land forces and dominate the enemy navies with the German army. These objectives underlie the "battle of the Atlantic" and the "battle of the Pacific." The formula to be followed is the "march around the oceans" from which the shipping lanes of the world are dominated, thus enabling the German army to be pitted against the British navy without invading the British Isles. In fact, Haushofer's group never tires of variations on the theme of the "doomed" British Empire. They insist that Great Britain has lost the "flair to rule," as witness the placing of the Dominions on a basis of equality in 1926—"a most conspicuous surrender of power." Great Britain is no longer able to defend her rule by arms. The time has come to admit younger elements to world rule—meaning, of course, Germany as the leading "renovating" power, ready to take upon her own shoulders the "white man's burden" which has grown too heavy for tired British shoulders.

Geopolitics in Relation to Other Sciences

Geopolitics, in its determination to prove itself the synthesizer of all other sciences, has encouraged such bedfellows as military geopolitics, law geopolitics, economic geopolitics, and medical geopolitics.[29]

Geopolitics of war. Haushofer's own book, *Wehrgeopolitik* (*Geopolitics of War*) has stimulated a considerable literature on military geography, which analyzes the strategic importance of Iceland, Greenland, and Arctic approaches to the North American continent, the vulnerability of the Panama Canal to air attack, the problems of warfare in the arctic zone, and the advantages that United States air strategy derives from "space deepness."

Haushofer's most important prophet in this field is Ewald Banse, who has proposed since the early 1930's to make *Wehrwissenschaft* (preparedness science) the focus of all scientific

[29] Cf. Robert Strausz-Hupé, "Geopolitics," *Fortune*, 24 (November, 1941), pp. 110 ff., expanded in his *Geopolitics*, New York, Putnam, 1942.

work. This new science is "the systematic application of every branch of human thought and human endeavor to the end of increasing the preparedness strength of our people." Banse's formula expressed in his *Raum und Volk im Weltkriege* (translated as *Germany Prepares for War,* New York, Harcourt, 1934) has become the backbone of Germany's "strategy of terror": direct your propaganda at the weakest spots in the enemy's social and political organism; seek out the discontented minorities, the ambitious and corrupt leaders, the hoodlums, and the fanatics; exacerbate their grievances, fan their passions, appeal to their greed. Banse, in fact, forecast accurately the present technique of German psychological warfare on both the military and civilian fronts. He maintains that geography (space) and psychology (people) are more important in modern warfare than traditional military science. The Nazis considered the publication of the translation of the book untimely and withdrew it from sale with the explanation that it was "merely the senseless babbling of an irresponsible armchair strategist." Banse, nevertheless, was appointed to the important position of professor of military sciences at the Brunswick Institute of Technology, where many German air force pilots receive their technical training.

Law geopolitics. The *Lebensraum* principle has been made the basis of the new "German international law." Existing international law, German lawyers claim, has been inspired by British and French policy.[30] *Grossraumwirtschaft* (co-ordinated regional economy), "the right to space and soil," is superseding the outmoded concepts of "legalism"—so claim Hans Keller [31] and Carl Schmitt.[32]

[30] For the respective literature, cf.: Charles Kruszewski, "Germany's *Lebensraum,*" *American Political Science Review,* 34 (October, 1940), pp. 964–975; Lawrence Preuss, "National Socialist Conceptions of International Law," *loc. cit.,* 29 (August, 1935), pp. 594–609; Virginia L. Gott, "The National Socialist Theory of International Law," *American Journal of International Law* (October, 1938), pp. 704–718.

[31] Hans K. E. K. Keller, *Deutsch-Europa: Vierteljahrschrift fur die Ernwernung Europas aus dem Reichsgedanken,* Munich, C. Herbert, 1932.

[32] Carl Schmitt, *Nationalsozialismus und Volkerrecht,* Berlin, Junker und Dunnhapt, 1934; *Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung,* Berlin: Deutscher Kearts-verlag, 1939.

Economic geopolitics. The motto "guns instead of butter" describes graphically the German policy of national defense economy—*Wehrwirtschaft*—wherein all other purposes are subordinated to the ultimate goal of creating and keeping an impregnable military system engaged in "total war." [33] This policy has meant the operation in terms of *Realwirtschaft* (real economy)—the unconditional priority of all processes important for national defense regardless of costs and sacrifices. The function of *Wehrwirtschaft* is to relate economics to political and military expansion and to render any possible blockade ineffectual.[34]

Medical geopolitics. One of the least known branches of geopolitics is *Geomedizen,* which has led physicians, following the geopolitical framework, to produce valuable studies on how to preserve the health of soldiers on desert and arctic fronts. They have also presented important observations on medical aspects of warfare in such regions. More recently the resettlement policy of the Nazis has required these authorities to concentrate on the national health problems arising from such transfers.[35]

Geokartographie. Maps have become, in the hands of the geopoliticians, a dynamic symbolism intended to inculcate their people with "space consciousness." Haushofer and his staff have found this necessary [36] in order to be sure of approval for the Nazi expansionist policy. The pseudoscience of *Geokartographie* has thereupon arisen to indoctrinate a feeling of *Lebensraum und Weltanschauung.* These maps are suggestive and propagandistic,[37] employing a unique system of signatures and legends that portray dynamic action. Through arrows for ex-

[33] Cf. W. Spiegel, "*Wehwirtschaft:* Economics of the Military State," *American Economic Review,* 30 (December, 1940), pp. 713–723.

[34] Cf. Antonin Basch, *The New Economic Warfare,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1941, pp. 8–42.

[35] Robert Strauz-Hupe, *loc. cit.,* pp. 118 ff.

[36] Karl Haushofer, "Die Suggestive Karte," *Bausteine zur Geopolitik,* Berlin, B. G. Teubner, 1928, pp. 342–348.

[37] H. W. Weigert, "Maps are Weapons," *Survey Graphic,* 30 (October, 1941), pp. 528–530, points out that the geopoliticians frankly admit that the new map must be "violent" and should "force" the reader to become enamored of the subject.

ample, action is portrayed, arrows pointed inward or outward implying aggression, fan-shaped arrows showing divergence of an attack. Naturally, under the Nazis, maps portray what they wish the German people to believe, and not what has actually occurred. The best example of this technique has been published in the United States by the German Library of Information: *The War in Maps 1939/40,* edited by Giselher Wirsing in collaboration with Albrecht Haushofer, and others (New York: German Library of Information, 1941). By means of thirty brilliantly colored maps, this German propaganda publication tries to prove some such assumptions as:

Politics and policies are largely dictated by geography. . . . The editor calls his book an *Atlas of Victory,* because it portrays the practical expulsion of Great Britain from the European continent, where she is an unwanted intruder (*raumfremd*). . . . In the present volume our main purpose has been to show once more, and comprehensively, why a German victory was inevitable from the beginning, and how the Führer created the political bases upon which each of the great military undertakings was completed with well-nigh mathematical precision. . . . America, while insisting that her own continent be respected under the Monroe Doctrine, does not take a similarly clear stand on the European war. That there is only one power that violates the Monroe Doctrine, and the Safety Zone of the American Continent, is clearly shown by a map of America, which refutes, at the same time, the absurd statement that the Western Hemisphere is in imminent danger of a German invasion. . . . We see the crazy-patch Britain has made of India. . . . The last map in this series, revealing England as an alien and an intruder (*raumfremd*) in the Mediterranean basin, concludes the demonstration of the fact that the intrusion of British power into areas where it does not belong is of necessity a disturbing element. . . . Doubt of Germany's final victory is no longer possible. . . . These maps further explain how and why the British method of world subjection has outlived its day. The English world empire was not at the outset, and never grew into, an organic entity. The principle of establishing bases and zones of influence in all parts of the world has been in increasing conflict with the more recent principle of great geographic units (*Raumeinheiten*).

To leaf through this series of maps is to be convinced of the revolutionary character of the present war. The old world is dying: a new world is being born. It is the greatest evolutionary change the world has witnessed in many centuries. . . . The new Europe that is now

in the making will stand in the sign, will emerge under the symbol of a great political and social idea, that idea which made possible the victories of 1939 and 1940.

Another greatly employed device of the Nazi propagandists is the "combination map" which compares two different maps. One example [38] is the German distribution of maps after their conquest of Poland comparing her strategic and economic position in the Second World War with that in the First. Such maps also portray political ideas, such as "A Study in Empires" which attempts to prove by implication that Britain is the aggressor nation in the Second World War.

Thus it is evident that *Geokartographie* is not interested in accuracy or a true geographical representation but merely in developing attitudes favorable to the cause of Nazism.

Geopolitics and the Radio

There is no aspect of human activity forgotten by the German geopoliticians. Thus even the tactics of radio warfare, treated elsewhere in this volume, have received the attention of the Nazis. In short, the Axis radio offensive is founded on Nazi geopolitics, on the close scientific study of each regional audience of the earth, its interests and susceptibilities. Berlin's propaganda is planned according to the research of Haushofer's Geopolitical Institute on the economics, politics, history, and geographic ambitions of virtually every state, every people, every racial or religious minority in the world. These factual backgrounds are then utilized to show each nation, and groups within that nation—United States cotton growers, Argentine ranchers, Arab nationalists, Swedish industrialists—the advantage of supporting the Nazi case.[39] Carefully prepared short-wave programs are beamed from the antennae of Zeesen to bewilder, corrupt, and terrorize each target. The general pattern,

[38] See Hans Speier, "Magic Geography," *Social Research,* 7 (September, 1941), p. 319, which draws its illustrations from *Facts in Review* (February 5, 1940) as a good example of this technique.

[39] Charles J. Rolo, *Radio Goes To War,* New York, Putnam, 1942, p. 276

as ever, is the search by the Axis radio for the chinks between friendly peoples, insinuating between them its calculated lies, its bacilli of rumor.

Geopolitics in Other Countries

Geopolitics as a science has not found many adherents among the scientists of other countries,[40] who for the most part realize that "although geopolitics synthesized admirably new research, only geographical laws which were in accord with German ambitions of expansion were incorporated." [41]

South America. The Ibero-American Institute at Berlin has sent out extensive material to South America both in German and Spanish, chiefly, it is thought, to indoctrinate our southern neighbors in the *Volkstumfaktor:* [42] the proposition that wherever German-speaking people live constitutes German soil and is under the sovereignty of the German state.

Italy. The Italians, by 1939, realized the utility of a geopolitical smokescreen to justify extension of Italian "living space" in North Africa. At that time Rome inaugurated an Italian geopolitics which published articles by Haushofer and members of his institute. However, eminent native Italian geographers, such as Giuseppe Battai, Minister of Education, Luigi Villari [43] and Francesco Coppola [44] also contribute.

Japan. The Japanese had envisaged a "new order" in East Asia long before Hitler had conceived of it in Europe, as several books [45] appearing in the twenties reveal. However, despite

[40] Robert Strausz-Hupe, *loc. cit.*, pp. 116–119, gives a very brief sketch of contemporary geopolitical movements in other countries, which more scholarly sources have not as yet examined.

[41] Jaques Ancel, *Geopolitique,* Paris, Librarie Delagrave, 1936, p. 5.

[42] This principle was incorporated in an extraordinary map edited by Dr. Lange, *Kleine sprockenkarts von Mittel Europa,* Berlin, La Maison Reimes, 1933, which portrays the German people in territory from Slesvig to Trento, Lorraine to Memel, with a lighter shading for the Scandinavian or Balkan countries. The legend carries "L'Allemagne est en Europe longtemps plus repandue."

[43] Luigi Villari, *The Expansion of Italy,* London, Faber, 1930.

[44] Francesco Coppola, *L'idee imperiale della Nazione Italiana,* Rome, Politics, 1926.

[45] F. F. Millard, *Japan and the "Irresponsible Expansion" Doctrine,* Shanghai, *Weekly Review,* 1931.

the adequacy of her own spokesman [46] justifying a policy of expansion, she too in her press plagiarizes the terminology and ideas of Haushofer. Thus it is seen how the earth-based claims propounded by the Germans are not confined to German writers but may be found in chauvinistic work appearing in every country,[47] specifically the totalitarian states of Italy and Japan.

Anglo-Saxon countries. The Anglo-Saxon geographers have been recently aroused to the importance of geopolitics by the German effort—although Isaiah Bowman's *The New World* (Yonkers, World Book, 1928) bears no imprint of the pseudoscientific approach of the German geopoliticians and is really a scholarly and worthy interpretation of the political world. Recently Samuel van Valkenburg took up the "geopolitical" approach in his *Elements of Political Geography* (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1939), not succeeding very well, however, since Haushofer's approach must be understood in terms of Germany's imperialism and cannot be successfully applied through this American interpretation. But the geopolitical approach is being popularized. Bruce Hopper, for instance, states: [48]

> The key to an understanding of the present titanic struggle must be sought in the forces of history which have perpetuated a disequilibrium in the No Man's Land of Eastern Europe . . . where Western and Eastern influences in European history have remained locked in stalemate.

Derwent Whittlesey has attempted to describe the "areas of differentiation of the world's principal states and legal codes, insofar as these political phenomena are formally established and their character clear." [49]

[46] V. Reinstein, *Machiavelli of Nippon: Japan's Plan of World Conquest,* New York, The Wandering Eye, Inc., 1932; Tatsuo Kawai, *The Goal of Japanese Expansion,* Tokyo, Hokkuseido Press, 1938; H. H. Douglas, "Japan's Expansion," *China Today,* 6 (1940), pp. 15–26; Walter Pitkin, *The Political and Economic Expansion of Japan,* New York, Institute of International Education, 1921.

[47] Derwent Whittlesey, *The Earth and the State,* New York, Holt, 1939, p. 591.

[48] Bruce Hopper, "The War for Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* 20:1 (October, 1941), p. 18.

[49] Whittlesey, *op. cit.* For the most recent and powerful work in English on this subject see Nicholas Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics,* New York, Harcourt, 1942. See H. W. Weigert, "Haushofer and the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs,* 20 (July, 1942), pp. 732–742, and particularly p. 734 for clever criticism of Spykman's work.

Nicholas Spykman and A. Rollins recognize what German geopoliticians claim, that "the state, despite all organizations to curb it, is, in international relations, primarily a military organization. Of its aims in the struggle for power, the geographic objective has been the oldest aim." [50] Boundaries are "geographic expressions of the existing balances of forces," and frontiers "a political creation of man." In a previous article, Spykman defines aspects of geography in terms of military potentials for resistance or attack, among which are the size and location of states and their regional, landlocked, or island characters.[51]

A curious similarity exists between the ideas propounded by Haushofer and American philosopher James Burnham.[52] Burnham stresses large contiguous areas as the units of "continental" political systems of the future. Modern technology has made the national state, colonial empires, and free world trade anachronisms, declares Burnham—voicing, perhaps unconsciously, Haushofer's convictions.

Conclusions

The understanding of the pseudoscience of geopolitics enables us to understand some of the chief principles of the foreign policy of the Third Reich. But it must be remembered that Hitler's politics cannot be explained simply by interpreting the theory of one of the ideological schools which form the basis for his policy of conquest. The real purpose of the Nazi rule is, and will remain, the struggle for power. Geopolitics, as All Hitler's ideas, is not other than a pretext convenient in a Machia-

[50] Nicholas Spykman and Abbie Rollins, "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review,* 33 (June, 1939), pp. 391-614.

[51] Nicholas Spykman, "Geography and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review,* 35 (February, 1938), pp. 28–50; (April, 1938), pp. 213–236. Geopolitical ideas may be also found in Frederick Jackson Turner's works: *Rise of the New West,* New York, Harper, 1906; *The Frontier in American History,* New York, Holt, 1920, and *The Significance of Sections in American History,* New York, Holt, 1932. For criticisms of George T. Renner's effort at a geopolitical map of the postwar world in *Colliers,* see *Time,* 40 (July 13, 1942), pp. 42–44.

[52] James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution,* New York, John Day, 1941.

vellian game, a doctrine of geography as the technical method for achieving future German world domination.

As Nazi Germany's instrument of imperialism, justifying the need for a certain territory for Germany, *Geopolitik* is but a continuation and an extension of the German Kaiser's dream of *Drang nach Osten*. The Berlin-to-Bagdad Railroad (really from Constantinople to the mouth of the Persian Gulf), which Germans began working on in 1888, and left four-sevenths completed in 1914, was intended to make the Kaiser's dream come true.[53] It was to bind together a German system of economic and political alliances, putting a broad path southeast across Europe and Asia Minor, dominated by the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish empires. Such a railway would have given Germany an outlet on the Persian Gulf close to India. If achieved, it might have helped eventually to break Great Britain's power in Asia, to erect a German empire based on the "Transversal Eurasian Axis" from Hamburg via Prague, Budapest, Constantinople, and Alexandretta, to Basra on the Persian Gulf—nothing less than the shortest land route between the Atlantic Ocean (North Sea) and the Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf).[54] A hegemony over this gateway to the Orient meant for the Kaiser that Great Britain and France would become second-rate powers and Germany the greatest empire on the globe. Intellectual class was lent the Kaiser's *Drang nach Osten* dream by geopoliticians Paul Rohrbach [55] and Frederich Naumann.[56] Naumann, following Paul Anton de Lagarde's concept

[53] E. M. Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway*, New York, Macmillan, 1923, is the best study of the Bagdad railway project. See also J. B. Wolf, *The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad*, Columbia, University of Missouri, 1936; P. W. Ireland, "Berlin to Bagdad up to Date," *Foreign Affairs*, 19:3 (April, 1941), pp. 665–670.

[54] Emanuel Moravec, *The Military Importance of Czechoslovakia in Europe*, Prague, Orbis, 1938, was a clever presentation of this theory which, however, received attention in the West only just before Munich.

[55] Paul Rohrbach, *Der Deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912, trans. as *German World Politics* by E. von Mach, 1915), provided ethical arguments for German imperialism.

[56] Frederich Naumann, *Mitteleuropa* (Berlin, 1915, trans. by C. M. Meredith, London, 1915) became quite well-known in the Anglo-Saxon countries in the First World War.

of *Mitteleuropa,* preached an economic and political union of central and Balkan Europe administered by efficient German technicians in a vast German dominated empire. Rohrbach contended that the British Empire could be attacked and mortally wounded in the Near East. That sounded good to the Kaiser; it has also sounded good to Herr Hitler, whose ideas are formulated by Haushofer, a contemporary and fellow ideologist of Rohrbach and Naumann. The Kaiser almost got what he wanted. In 1942, his successor, Adolf Hitler, has made much the same dream his own and is now trying to make it come true.[57]

Questions

1. What is the relation of geography to the Second World War?
2. What is the chief difference between political geography and geopolitics?
3. What are the basic ideas of Ratzel, Kjellén, and Sir Halford Mackinder?
4. Describe the ideas of these three thinkers as assimilated to Haushofer's purposes.
5. What is the "organismic" concept of the state?
6. What are the implications involved in the concept of *Lebensraum?*
7. What are the limits of Germany's concept of *Lebensraum?*
8. What is the place of non-Germanic nations in the "New Order"?
9. Describe the career of General Haushofer.
10. Analyze Haushofer's definition of *Geopolitik.*
11. What were the relations between Haushofer, Hess, and Hitler?
12. Describe the operation of the Geopolitical Institute.
13. Describe the economic aspects of the claims of German Geopoliticians.
14. What is the relation of the theories of Admiral Mahan to Haushofer's theories?
15. Relate Geopolitics to military geopolitics, law geopolitics, economic geopolitics, and medical geopolitics.
16. Outline Banse's basic theories of psychological warfare.

[57] According to Richard F. Crandell, "Hitler Brain Trust Missing Since War on Russia," New York *Herald Tribune* (February 1, 1942), the debacle of the German campaign in the U.S.S.R. in the winter of 1941–1942 gives strong support to the theory that in June, 1941, Haushofer disappeared or was confined to his home because of his outspoken advice against an attack on the Soviet Union.

17. What have maps become in the hands of the geopoliticians?
18. Relate geopolitics to the radio.
19. Outline the utilization of geopolitics in other countries.
20. What are the main weaknesses of the pseudoscience of geopolitics?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Compare the ideological basis of economic determinism and geographic determinism.
2. Discuss the influence of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan on the international naval policies.
3. Survey the use of geopolitical maps as a weapon in influencing public opinion.
4. Prepare a study of Karl Haushofer as the founder of *Geopolitik,* as revealed by his life and works.
5. Show the interrelationships between the geopoliticians and the advocates of total war.
6. Outline the concepts involved in the following terms: *Lebensraum, Grossraumwirtschaft, Weltanschauung, Wehrwissenschaft.*
7. Describe the techniques used by German educators to indoctrinate their youth with "space consciousness" through maps.
8. Describe the development of geopolitics in Italy, Japan, and America.
9. Evaluate geopolitics as a "science" and explain your approach.
10. Outline the career of Ewald Banse and his influence on Hitler's foreign policy.

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CHAPTER 22

TECHNOLOGY AND WAR

TECHNOLOGY is the study or science of the industrial arts; examples are such subjects as metallurgy, textiles, and handicrafts. It is closely intertwined with the conduct of war, on which its developments have left their marks. The basic principles of the conduct of war have been covered in Chapters 10 and 11, and those principles apply to modern war as they did to war in the days of Xenophon. But even though the principles of war may be the same as in the past, the character of modern wars is vastly different from that in ancient times—chiefly owing to developments in the industrial arts.[1] Thus, for example, many improvements in methods of building and architecture have made revolutionary changes in fortifications. Also, progress in metallurgy has exchanged bronze, iron, steel, and alloyed weapons successively for wood, stone, and bone implements. The bow and javelin have been replaced by the accurate long-range rifle, and shield and armor by the tank. Textiles, too, have undergone changes. These and many other technological improvements have led to different types of combat.

ARMIES BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

As will be seen later in this chapter, the most significant changes in warfare that have grown out of technological advances since man first resorted to weapons have come from the industrial revolution and the application of steam and internal-combustion engines to fighting instruments.[2] Therefore, until the end of the eighteenth century, although Leonardo da Vinci and Francis Bacon may have anticipated modern air-

[1] Jomini said, "Weapons affect the practice, not the principles, of war."

[2] The outlines of this development may be found in William A. Mitchell, *Outlines of the World's Military History,* Washington, National Service Publishing Company, 1931.

planes and rapid-fire guns, the chief technological developments in warfare consisted first of variations on the same types of weapon—that is, the bow, javelin, shield, armor, and siege weapons and second of the use of gunpowder, which appeared in Europe in the fourteenth century.[3]

Egypt and Greece. At the opening of historical times the armies of Egypt under Sesastris used iron and metal weapons; their personnel consisted to a large extent of archers, spearmen, and charioteers.[4] The ancient Orient followed these same lines, except that in flat country it was possible to develop cavalry. The elements of courage and individual physical strength were emphasized, while the technology of weapons aimed at further strengthening small armies of well-trained men. Sparta instituted regular training for her armies, and fighting became the occupation for citizens. Mercenary fighters were to be found among the Greeks. Alexander the Great evolved infantry militia, and his Persian soldiers are reported to have developed (though they did not originate) the use of missile weapons such as slings in a very effective manner.[5]

Carthage and Rome. The records of Carthage left by Polybius and other historians tell of little advance over even the early Greek equipment and instruments of warfare. Cavalry and elephants are mentioned in its annals, but again, as far as the conduct of war was concerned, they were but modifications of past experiences. Rome, however, succeeded in developing a relatively advanced technological civilization and as a consequence her soldiers were better equipped than their predecessors. One reads of the deadly short sword or *gladius,* of shields of wood or skin stretched over metal frames, of leather helmets, javelins, war machines (already anticipated by the Greeks) including catapults, ballistae, onagers, siege towers, and bridges. During the empire period arrows, slings, long spears, and round

[3] For the technological evolution see W. T. Sedgwick and H. W. Tyler, *A Short History of Science,* New York, Macmillan, 1919.

[4] For an excellent historical account see James R. Newman, *Tools of War,* Garden City, Doubleday, 1942, pp. 10–15.

[5] Mitchell, *op. cit.* chap. 2. Also O. L. Spaulding, H. Nickerson, and I. W. Wright, *Warfare,* Washington, Infantry Journal, Inc., 1937, pp. 1–101.

shields for mounted men were used. The famous military roads were constructed.[6]

The middle period. After Rome, the Dark Ages and the Middle Ages saw the evolution of heavy armor, lances, shields, long two-edged swords, the short sword or dagger, the longbow, the crossbow, pikes, and siege machines. Industry being in the handicraft stage, it was not possible to manufacture any more advanced type of weapon. Thus warfare was largely a personal hand-to-hand engagement.[7]

Transition and modern times. A transition took place between 1290 and 1490, during which time gunpowder was introduced and cannon superseded onagers, catapults, ballistae, and trebuchets. By the sixteenth century gunpowder had even been adopted for fighting purposes by the mercenary cavalry, the *Reiters,* who were equipped with pistols to shoot down pikemen. During this period pikes, halberds, and shot entered the fighting, indicating that except for the gunpowder no tremendous advance had been made. Such was the equipment with which Europe entered the Thirty Years' War. Engineering seems to have improved, cannon had become common, and changes in fortifications had taken place in order to meet and use cannon fire. By the seventeenth century fire power had become an important weapon and Frederick the Great, who at first paid little attention to artillery, ultimately realized its value and improved it by developing twelve-pounders and howitzers. It was also at approximately this time that the bayonet made its appearance as one of the most fundamental instruments of fighting.[8]

These were some of the highlights in the influence of technological developments on the fighting equipment of armies. Each step in advance tended to make more destructive fighting instruments, and ways were soon devised to meet the destructiveness of the weapons as they appeared.[9]

[6] See Mitchell, *op. cit.,* chapters 3–5.

[7] See Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism,* New York, Norton, 1937, chap. 1.

[8] *Ibid.,* chapters 2, 3, 4; also, *The International Military Digest Annual, 1916,* New York, Cumulative Digest, Inc., 1917, pp. 78–79.

[9] For an excellent brief account see the *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 11th ed., New York, Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, 1910, vol. 2, article "Armies," pp. 592–625.

Navies before the Industrial Revolution

Athens. Turning to war on the seas and the effect of technology there, we find that the first important improvement came when the primitive Vikings and some of the Greeks realized that long, swift ships—because of their speed—were better suited for fighting purposes than the round, bulky boats of burden. All vessels were constructed of wood. The Athenians, who among the ancient Europeans developed the earliest navy, depended at first upon the ships of private citizens; but these soon proved insufficient, and Athens therefore built her own fleet. The Athenians used both sails and oars, one hundred of their triremes requiring a complement of 20,000 rowers. The tactics consisted of ramming followed by hand-to-hand fighting similar to that on land but translated to ships. Not until the sixteenth century, when broadsides were developed, was there any significant change in the western navies as compared with the organization of the Athenians. In the fourteenth century the ramming tactics were accompanied by shooting; but even this did not represent any fundamental change in naval warfare.

From Rome to the industrial revolution. Rome organized her navy for order and war in the same manner as Athens had. Byzantium also developed an imperial fleet, which was still wooden, and still organized on the same basis as the ancient fleets. The French used criminals and slaves to row naval ships in the fourteenth century, and the Spanish galleys of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries carried soldiers who would only fire muskets in actual combat and refused to man either the ship or her guns. In the early seventeen hundreds Spain reorganized her navy on the French pattern, and in the eighteenth century she equipped her vessels with cannon. The accounts of the British and Dutch navies during the same period reveal no essential differences as far as the influence of technology is to be noted.

Sailing ships were equipped with guns about the fifteenth century, and as the ships were improved, maneuverability was emphasized. But here, as in the case of land warfare, it was not until the advent of steam and the internal-combustion engine

that drastic changes and developments of a revolutionary character occurred. Then it was that sea power [10] came of age, for the machine age came belatedly to the navies of the great powers. It is difficult to assess the effect of specific inventions on the conduct of naval warfare and hence its influence on world politics; but the influence of the combination of many inventions in the field of naval warfare has been far-reaching and makes the present navies as different from those of a century and a half ago as a tank is different from a chariot in land warfare.

From the Industrial Revolution to 1914

Warfare of Napoleonic times. Since the present war and its destructive equipment are deeply rooted in the last century with its developments from the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century, a closer examination of the principal influences of technology on war are to be noted.[11]

Only a few indications of what was to come in the succeeding century were visible in the Napoleonic wars. During previous centuries, though about 130,000 men were involved at Cannae, about 100,000 at Hastings, and similar numbers in other major battles, most wars were fought with armies that did not number as many as 20,000 men. The methods of raising such armies were poor, for the typical state was neither able to draft large numbers of men nor to supply them if they had been drafted. Mercenary armies were therefore common, until the close of the eighteenth century and the emergence of the larger draft armies of nations or states.[12]

Napoleonic warfare was characterized by the impact of great masses of men moved afoot as rapidly as men could move, and supplied as best they could be supplied both off the country in which the campaigns were waged and by contract with food and munition contractors of the warring state itself.

The equipment of the soldiers included the flintlock musket

[10] For a brief and terse account see the *Encyclopaedia Britannica, cit. supra,* vol. 19, article, "Navy and Navies," pp. 299–317.

[11] See Vagts, *op. cit.,* chapters 4, 5, and 6.

[12] *Ibid.,* part 2.

of the type common in the Americas in colonial times and similar in design to the "Brown Bess" musket so long used in the British armies. Muskets of this type were in use in warfare with but relatively little change for more than a century. "Brown Bess" was a reasonably formidable looking weapon with a barrel about four feet long and resembled, except for its flintlock, the Union Army musket of the Civil War.[13]

The cannon at first were all muzzle-loading cast pieces using spherical shot and a crude prototype of the spherical shell. The technology of the casting of metals was still extremely simple, although by the end of the eighteenth century cast bells and cast cannon particularly were being made in huge sizes—some of the cannon weighing nearly one hundred tons. Little was understood, however, of the metallurgy of iron, and there was no steel available for the making of guns. Cannon almost invariably failed, therefore, by bursting and killing a goodly number of their crew.

One important development in the making of cannon had its beginning with the invention in 1775 of the modern boring machine. The patent on this engine lathe was secured by one John Wilkinson in London in 1775. Before the end of the century John Wilkinson was boring cannon for Napoleon's armies, four at a time, on some of his special machines. Toussard, ordnance officer under General Washington, brought this art to America from France, and wrote a treatise on the manufacturing of ordnance in which he employed Wilkinson's new boring machine driven by steam engine, boring cannon to dimensions much more accurate than could possibly have been achieved by casting alone. Cannon of the later Napoleonic era, therefore, were very apt to have machine-bored interiors.

Accuracy of rifle fire. The American Revolution and the War of 1812 witnessed the advent of a new idea—accurate rifle fire. The concept of the rifle dates back approximately to the year 1500. Subsequent developments had demonstrated that spiral grooves in the bore of a hand gun resulted in much greater

[13] For interesting information about the origin of the musket see Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 254–255. Also Newman, *op. cit.*, pp. 36 ff.

accuracy of fire—even with a spherical lead bullet—than could possibly be achieved with an ungrooved musket. The process of manufacturing a rifle was comparatively costly at first, but gunmakers everywhere in British colonial America had learned the art of making the light long-barreled American type of rifle at a reasonable cost long before the Revolutionary War. Indeed, so accurate were these rifles that at ranges of even two hundred yards twenty out of twenty-five shots aimed at the chest of a man might be expected to strike him somewhere. The ball was the size of a modern marble, and its power to shock, tear, and crush was considerable.

The British soldier, however, was armed only with the "Brown Bess" musket, which he could load in about ten seconds as against thirty seconds required for the loading of the American rifle, and he had to be literally so close to his target that he could see the whites of the man's eyes. A record of accuracy of fire on the part of the British in the battle of Waterloo is the firing of some 450 rounds from the "Brown Bess" muskets for each Frenchman hit. We know again of the telling effect of the American rifle in the hands of Andrew Jackson's soldiers at New Orleans in the War of 1812. British officers knew that there was little to fear from musketry much beyond fifty yards and as a consequence their close ranks were under murderous fire from Jackson's soldiers behind parapets as soon as they came within two hundred yards and even at greater range; the ranks of the British soldiers were sadly thinned and their advance was finally stopped. It is understood that the Duke of Wellington opposed the introduction of the rifle in the British army to the end of his life, that is, until about the time of the Crimean War in 1854.

Organization of services. While the armies of most great states show the necessity for organization into various specialized services, particularly as to subdivisions of combat arms, a great deal of this seems to have been lost after the revolution in artillery from mechanical to chemical in the thirteenth century. It was not until about 1775 that a real organization of artillery into batteries and regiments was effected under the French General Gribeauval. The high specialization of the various com-

bat arms in the Napoleonic armies was developed from 1790 to 1815. Vastly more progress in warfare has been made in every respect in little more than a century than was made in the two thousand years before. For all of the centuries before 1800 warfare had been but a crudely developed art. Since that time it has become a very highly developed science.[11]

Fuel-Power Developments in Warfare and Equipment

Nearly all of the developments in the equipment and the art and science of warfare since 1775 may be regarded as products of the discovery that useful power could be taken from fuels—coal, oil, and gas—by steam and internal-combustion engines. This created the so-called fuel-power epoch in the evolutionary career of men. The rapidity with which the ever-improving double-acting Watt and Bolton steam engines were put to use for driving machines in factories, carriages on roads and then rails, steamboats on rivers and oceans, makes it evident that there had been a lively appreciation of the scarcity of power from animals, water, and wind in the centuries prior to the development of fuel-power engines. At the end of the eighteenth century there was a scarcity of everything owing to the fact that available power from animal and human bodies, water and air, could not accomplish all of the work necessary. People therefore turned eagerly to the new source of power. As one compares the bulky atmospheric engines available at the end of the eighteenth century for the pumping of water out of mines with the efficient and tremendous power plants available now for producing electrical energy, he appreciates what a drastic change has taken place.

Mass production. The ideas of Eli Whitney, famous for the invention of the cotton gin, stand out as of the greatest importance in changing the character of war during the nineteenth century. In 1802 he turned to the manufacture of firearms, and secured a contract from the United States Congress for the making of ten thousand muskets. Up to this time the "Brown

[11] Newman, *op. cit.*, chap. 3.

Bess" muskets and Colonial American rifles had been made in such a fashion that each individual hammer had to be fitted to the musket on which it belonged and would only fit on another by chance. If a spring broke, it was necessary to have some expert craftsman fit in another. This required filing and perhaps reshaping; and since the process of manufacture was slow the problem of maintenance of equipment during wartime was very difficult. Whitney agreed with Congress to make ten thousand muskets by such a method that any one hammer in the ten thousand would fit equally well on any musket. He would furthermore supply additional parts, so that if a spring were broken one could merely be taken out of stock and fitted into the musket without any filing or reshaping.

Whitney spent nearly two years developing what we now know as machine tools, that is, special machines which would perform just one specialized process in the making of a hammer, spring, screw, guard, stock, or ramrod. Examination of some of these machines which are still available indicate that he appreciated rather fully the essential principles of our modern mass-production procedures and methods. He took so long in his "tooling up" process that Congressmen began to think that he had already failed. He took ten muskets to Washington, had his mechanic take them all apart, and then scrambled the parts thoroughly. The mechanic thereupon reassembled the parts into ten muskets. The Congressmen tested them and found, as Whitney had guaranteed, that they functioned satisfactorily. He had demonstrated the modern principle of mass production, namely, producing all parts so nearly alike that without any special selection, fitting, or reforming, they could be assembled into a satisfactory finished article. These "production made" muskets were used in the War of 1812. From the beginning of the century, therefore, it may be said that the principles and the advantages of modern production methods were appreciated and employed in the making of small arms for the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War.[15]

[15] Grayson Kirk and Richard Poate Stebbins, *War and National Policy*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942, chap. 18.

The percussion cap. From the seventeenth century to 1815 all muskets and rifles were fired by a flintlock. The qualities of fulminate of mercury were known, but were used only by entertainers at fairs and similar functions. In 1815 a Mr. Shaw of Philadelphia invented a steel cup filled with some fulminate of mercury which he used on a musket fitted with a projecting tube. The end of the hammer was cup-shaped so that as it dropped it covered the percussion cap and prevented the explosion from scattering fragments into the eyes of the user.[16] A year later this inventor substituted copper cups for the steel, and the end of the flintlock had arrived. In England, it was not until the completion of exhaustive trials in 1834 that the percussion lock was recognized as so superior to the flintlock that it would be fatal to continue to use the old-style lock on military firearms. Even so, official approval was not given until 1839 for the modification of the "Brown Bess" flintlock musket by replacing the flintlock with the cup-shaped hammer and a nipple in the end of the tube to take the percussion cap. The Austrian army was supplied with percussion muskets in 1840. In 1842, a new-model percussion musket with a back sight for 150 yards was issued in the British army. This modified and very inefficient "Brown Bess" musket was not replaced by the muzzle-loading Enfield rifle until the Crimean War in 1855. All muskets in use in the United States Army in the Mexican War of 1846–1848 were of the percussion type because the percussion principle had received widespread and very quick recognition in the country which had made such extensive use of the muzzle-loading rifle.

The Rodman cannon. We have already mentioned that at the end of the eighteenth century the boring of the inside of cannon became general as the result of the development of Wilkinson's boring machine. Greater fire power could be achieved as compared with unbored cannon owing to the more perfect fit of the load in the bored gun. However, guns still burst all too often and only a relatively few rounds could be fired from them; it was impossible to predict their life in terms of rounds. In 1835, Professor Treadwell of Yale revealed in a paper before a meet-

[16] See Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

ing of physicists that a tube stressed by internal pressure would necessarily begin to rupture from the inside. The common thought up to that time apparently had been that the rupture would begin on the outside, and the tendency therefore was to increase the size of cannon in the hope that the danger of bursting would thereby be reduced.

Until that time practically all cannon had been cast with a clay core and in a mold, a process which would cause cracks to develop owing to shrinkage as the metal froze from the outside toward the bore. In 1840 Captain T. V. Rodman (later General Rodman) of the United States Ordnance Department developed the process of casting cannon which became known by his name. In this process the cannon was cast around a hollow core through which water could be circulated. The outside of the metal core was covered with clay, but the metal froze against the core first and as it continued to freeze toward the outside the tendency was for the exterior metal to shrink upon and compress the interior so that not only were there no cracks in the interior to begin the failure while firing, but the interior was moreover under the ideal condition of compression necessary in any cannon today. There was still no material but iron for the making of cannon and no process but casting. So efficient did Rodman's guns prove, however, that the principle spread around the world and so long as cast guns were made and used thereafter they were made on this principle.[17]

Molded powder. The only powder available from the thirteenth century to the latter part of the nineteenth century was that known as black powder, made from sulphur, charcoal, and saltpeter. Considerable progress had been made in the combining and the manufacturing of this powder into grains of graduated sizes, polished to prevent deterioration; but very little progress had been made in controlling the rate of burning. Black powder burns too rapidly and it certainly was not the ideal type of powder to be used with cast cannon. General Rodman molded this powder into large grains or pellets of various sizes, to the end that more uniform and predictable rates of burning and

[17] Newman, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–92.

consequent pressures could be attained. This development permitted increased accuracy and longer ranges.[18]

Steel for the tools of war. The poor records of the British and their allied armies in the Crimean War promoted research of every kind. The siege of Sevastopol was a dismal affair. At the end of the war the British War Office advertised requests for an acceptable breechblock for a breech-loading cannon, for exact knowledge of how rifles and cannon should be rifled for the use of cylindrical shot, and for some material that would be superior to cast iron for the making of cannon.

In the progress of his researches, one Henry Bessemer, an ironfounder, observed the peculiar behavior of iron from a blast furnace that had burst while in operation. The metal, instead of cooling, gave off showers of sparks indicating that it was burning. This accident and observation led to the development of Bessemer's converter, into which air was forced under pressure and any desired percentage of carbon was burned out of molten iron. An unlimited supply of steel was then available.

Electrical telegraph. Professor Morse patented his electrical telegraph in 1838, and in 1844 the first messages were sent from Washington to Baltimore through the use of a system of relays inserted in a single wire. The earth was used as the return wire. The first use of this electrical telegraph in warfare, so far as one can learn, was in the Civil War in the United States, single wires being strung rapidly in the field and pocket sending and receiving instruments used by the operators of the Signal Corps. This method of communication between the headquarters and a more or less stable or even a moving front was the forerunner of the vast network of wires found on the front everywhere in the First World War.[19]

Railway transportation. The first use of the railway for transportation and warfare was in the Civil War. This war, in fact, saw the first application of many of the products of the fuel-power epoch. In Henry Douglas' book *I Rode With Stonewall*

[18] *International Military Digest Annual, cit. supra,* p. 501; also Newman, *op. cit.,* pp. 35, 54, 72–78.

[19] Mitchell, *op. cit.,* pp. 463–464.

one finds that the railway lines up and down the Shenandoah Valley and along the Potomac River from Harper's Ferry toward Washington were constantly being torn up and relaid by the opposed forces. Railway lines were important and were used for the transportation of war supplies and troops constantly.[20]

High explosives and magazine rifles. The middle and latter half of the century were marked by the invention or discovery of guncotton in 1846, the development of the Smith and Wesson magazine rifle in 1854, and the debut of Ericsson's turret ironclad *Monitor* in 1862, which made obsolete on the day of the battle with the *Merrimac* all of the wooden fighting ships in the world. The Whitehead torpedo was invented in 1866. Bell's fundamental telephone patent was issued in 1876. The high explosives bellite and melinite were discovered in 1885, and smokeless powder was made from guncotton in 1889. The Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifle was patented in 1890 and was employed by the United States soldiers in the Spanish-American War in 1898. This apparently was the first use in warfare of a magazine rifle.[21] The high explosive indurite was made in 1892.

Armor and armor-piercing shell. The rapid development of large rolling mills, the development of nickel alloy steel, and the discovery of the explosive qualities of picric acid (known as melinite) served as the basis for the development of Krupp's cemented armor for battleships and of the armor-piercing high-explosive shell with nickel steel points. The combination initiated the long, costly, and laborious development of capital ships into floating fortresses. Such ships saw their first real tryout in the Spanish-American War of 1897, when the various nations were just beginning the great naval race that culminated in the battle of Jutland.[22]

Machine gun. The modern machine gun, though anticipated by Leonardo da Vinci, had its first practical beginning in the Gatling gun of the Civil War and was perfected as a modern machine gun by the inventors Maxim and Hotchkiss before the

[20] *International Military Digest Annual, cit. supra,* pp. 151–152; 511–516.
[21] *Ibid.,* pp. 293–295.
[22] See Bernard Brodie, *Sea Power in the Machine Age,* Princeton University Press, 1941, chap. 12.

end of the century. By 1895 the machine gun had been adopted for the German army. It had a limited tryout in the Boer war.[23]

Breech-loading steel cannon. The call from the British War Office in 1856 for a practical breech mechanism for steel cannon resulted in the development by the Armstrong Company of a workable breechblock. The availability of great quantities of steel in consequence of improved metallurgical knowledge, and the step-up in the size and quality of machine tools of all kinds, made large steel cannon of the built-up type available within the next several decades. By the end of the century the famous Buffington-Crozier disappearing seacoast gun had been perfected and was being placed in most American seacoast fortifications. All naval guns were of steel and of built-up construction capable of sustaining the high pressures necessary to give projectiles great velocities and corresponding ranges.[24]

Wireless communication, internal-combustion engine, airplane, automobile. As if all of the previous spectacular discoveries, inventions and developments of the century were not sufficient to overturn and completely change the character of warfare, we see at the turn of the century three new combined inventions and discoveries. The first (about 1880) was the internal-combustion engine, using a fuel mixed with air to form a combustible mixture fired within a closed cylinder. The second (1896) was the wireless communication system, the wireless or radio telegraph. The third, the airplane, was a development from the first: an internal-combustion engine was mounted on wings and drove them through the air (1903). Internal-combustion engines were promptly put to use for commercial purposes and shortly thereafter were placed on four-wheel carriages to haul both passengers and cargo. By 1910 the airplane was beginning to show certain distinctive designs, known largely by the names of the developers; and while there was as yet no comprehension of its possibilities as a transport, bomber, or fighter, it was clear that a marvelous new reconnaissance instrument had been produced.[25]

[23] Newman, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–59.
[24] Newman, *op. cit.*, pp. 148–217.
[25] *The International Military Digest, Annual, cit. supra.*, pp. 149–157.

Submarine and superdreadnought. Submersibles have a military history dating at least to the American Revolutionary War. They were used in the Civil War. About 1894 Simon Lake perfected the even keel submarine, and submarines received earnest attention from the world's navies thereafter, especially from the famous Admiral Tirpitz in Germany. By 1910 the submarine was a very practical warship with an ever-increasing cruising radius, using the Whitehead torpedo (invented in 1866). In 1911 the British Admiralty cut loose from all previous traditions in the matter of battleship design and stepped up the major armament to fifteen inches. This was a gamble in the matter of design, but obviously necessary as a counter to the superior character of many of the German ships then being developed under Admiral Tirpitz. From that time battleships took on an entirely new aspect. They no longer resembled any conventional ship of the previous century.[26]

Review of advances. Summing up all of these discoveries, inventions, and developments of a period of 125 years, which were to change the character of warfare, we find the following formidable list beginning in about 1775. They are, somewhat in the order of their appearance: establishment of the principle of accuracy in rifle fire, organization of artillery under General Gribeauval, invention of the engine lathe by Wilkinson and from this the perfection of the steam engine and multiple cannon-boring machines, the use of steam engines for power in factories, the emergence of the superstate to supply mass armies as under Napoleon, development of the railway and the steamship, Whitney's development of mass production, the percussion cap for muskets, the breech-loading musket, the Blanchard turning lathe for gun stocks, the electric telegraph, the Rodman cannon, the Rodman molded powder, Bessemer steel in 1855, vulcanizing of rubber in 1839, discovery of the cause of failure of cast cannon, Armstrong's built-up steel cannon, the Sharps breech-loading army rifle of the Civil War, the turret ironclad *Monitor,* steel ships, hydraulic recoil mechanism for cannon,

[26] *Ibid.,* p. 154.

Bell's telephone, high explosives (bellite and picric acid or melinite) for armor-piercing high explosive shells, nickel alloy steel for armor plate, cordite smokeless powder, the Krag-Jorgensen magazine rifle in the Spanish-American War, cemented Krupp armor plate, the Buffington-Crozier disappearing sea-coast gun, wireless communication, the internal-combustion engine, the airplane, the superdreadnought battleship, the modern submarine, the high explosive trinitrotoluene (TNT), passenger automobile and truck.

Warfare in a Scientific Age

The Schlieffen Plan. In the First World War the plan for the land phase of the German conquest bore the name of the chief of staff, Count von Schlieffen, under whom it had been drafted before 1904. It was to be a campaign of mass armies using all of the equipment developed in the previous century and waged with such terrifying speed that the victims could not prepare. Many railways had been built westward to the Belgian border and to eastern France so that the maximum number of troops could be transported in a minimum of time. The rapid transportation of troops westward over the railways astounded everyone and caught France off guard. The appearance of specialized heavy artillery to destroy every obstacle in the path of the invading army showed that the Germans had been at this job a long time. The heavy 17-inch or 42-centimeter mortars (the "Big Berthas") used to demolish the fortifications around Liége had been completed in 1908. These were designed and built for this specific purpose. The vast invading armies, with all of their equipment and supply trains, proceeded with magnificent precision. The right-wing army of General von Kluck, numbering some 250,000 men, was two weeks in passing through and around the Belgian city of Brussels. Every conceivable variety of transportation for food, ammunition, and spare equipment made up this great train. It included horse transportation, steam tractors for hauling heavy artillery, automobile transportation for staff, hospital service, and all messenger service. Behind the armies

came vast numbers of civilians to take over the administration of occupied cities.[27]

Impact of equipment. From the first of August, 1914, the vast German army began to make contact with portions of the French army on the eastern frontier, then in the north, and with the British Expeditionary Force in Belgium. From then on the accumulation of technical improvements of the previous century was used in the greatest war of the Scientific Age. Rapid-firing field guns and machine guns literally stopped both armies in their tracks. The rapid-firing field gun was highly accurate and could be fired as rapidly as twenty times a minute, and shrapnel fired from these guns was so deadly that no field commander knew what to do. That the armies would dig in was well-nigh certain. The heavy siege artillery used at Liége reduced supposedly indestructible steel-turret and masonry fortifications within a few days. These mortars fired 1,700-pound shells containing 560 pounds of high explosive, at elevations as great as 65°, and the shells ascending to a great height, descended with great accuracy and irresistible force on their target.

The airplane appeared as a telling factor within a month of the beginning of the war. On September 3, 1914, a French observer, cruising to the north of Paris in one of the ridiculous appearing open planes, discovered that the right wing of the German Army was turning to the southeast and was going to pass Paris rather than go to the west of it and envelop the city. It may not be unreasonable to conclude that this one instrument alone of the Scientific Age, crude as that instrument was at the time, overturned the long-prepared and really magnificent Schlieffen Plan and all of the detailed preparations of the great German Army shaped so laboriously through so many years by one of the finest military general staffs in the world. It does not seem unreasonable to conclude that within thirty days of setting their great plan into motion the Germans lost the war on September 3, although it took four years for all of the combatants to fight themselves to exhaustion and sign an armistice agreement.

[27] Mitchell, *op. cit.*, chap. 17.

The effect of a few devices of the Scientific Age was to produce a stalemate in the mud with men living in trenches for four long years. The existence of the long trench line resulted in a mad race to construct the heaviest type of field siege artillery. Warfare became a siege on a line 500 miles long between two impassable flanks, the Swis Alps and the North Sea. For four long years, then, one new invention after another was thrown into the warfare on both sides, always in the hope that the stalemate would be broken and the war could be brought into the field and decided on the basis of maneuver, surprise, and disconcertion.

Tank. The deadly character of the machine gun was probably responsible directly for armored self-propelled artillery in the form we now call the tank. Some form of armored fortification capable of propelling itself was necessary. The idea is supposed to have been advanced by a young artillery officer to Mr. Winston Churchill, who, together with Lord Fisher, had been responsible in 1911 for gambling on the superdreadnoughts of the *Queen Elizabeth* class. The tank itself, when it appeared on the field in small and medium sizes, failed to decide anything because no field commander knew how to co-ordinate its use with the warfare of position. To the very end of the war many German commanders would not accept the tank. The brilliant strategist General Ludendorff would not permit their construction in any great number in the German Army. As a consequence, almost the only tanks the Germans used were the huge fortress-like types which were too unwieldly to be of any service, together with captured French and British tanks. German soldiers and commanders became obsessed with the fear of tank attacks from the Allies and built the most formidable of tank barriers. One of these was a two-inch steel cable buried in great concrete posts and stretching for miles in both directions on either side of the main road north of Verdun.[28]

Motor transport. The horse, for the time being at least, had finished his part as the chief power for transportation in war-

[28] See Paul C. Raborg, *Mechanized Might*, New York, Whittlesey House, 1942, chapters 1–4.

fare no matter how willing he might be. Motor transportation, crude as it was, developed rapidly until the armies had every conceivable form of tractor, truck, and transport vehicle. The British used steam lorries on their own front, finding it easier to provide a supply of coal for the steam engine than gasoline for internal-combustion engines. The Germans used a great many steam tractors of the largest sizes on their fronts for moving artillery. Solid and pneumatic rubber tires were put on artillery and transport vehicles of every character, in consequence of the discovery of vulcanizing rubber nearly seventy-five years before.[29]

Medical. The application of science in the field of medicine in this First World War was spectacular indeed. There was definite knowledge by this time of the sources of disease and methods of counteracting infection that was to produce a record, at least in the United States Army, beyond any previous expectations. All men had been inoculated against smallpox and typhoid fever, and immediately on being wounded were inoculated against tetanus. The soldiers' clothing was cleaned in high-pressure steam to kill disease-bearing vermin, and the ravages of the venereal diseases of all kinds were reduced to a minimum.

Bombing and fighting airplanes. It was hardly to be predicted that the rickety open reconnaissance plane would become so formidable a transportation device. When compared with the balloon (used first in warfare in the American Civil War), it was well-nigh a miracle. At no time in the future would it be an easy matter to move vast armies in secret. But that aircraft would become a new and deadly form of artillery was hardly expected. It developed in the First World War until it promised a destructive capacity so great that perhaps none would know how to solve the problem. By 1918 the city of Paris was being bombed several times a week by large squadrons of planes, Gothas each manned by crews of seven and carrying numerous bombs weighing 660 pounds each.

The earliest fighting from airplanes was ridiculous indeed. No study had been made of the possibility of these devices for fight-

[29] *Ibid.*

ing purposes before the war, and in the autumn of 1914 the best that the aviators could do was to throw bundles of chain at each other in the hope of entangling propellers. Since there had been no plan for the use of this device for fighting purposes there was of course no counter-artillery. So when a German airman flew low over the Place de le Concorde in the autumn of 1914, it was not surprising to find from the records that he was fired upon by a municipal policeman using his ordinary pistol. By 1917 planes had been specialized as reconnaissance, combat, and bombing planes and fighting from the combat planes had become an awesome art. Such extraordinary pilots as Baron Richthofen of Germany, the Frenchman Fonck, and the American Rickenbacher had become known and are still known for their extraordinary exploits.[30]

Gas warfare. In the spring of 1915 a regiment of Canadian soldiers posted in a low region to the north and east of the Belgian city of Ypres were strangled and most of them killed by dense clouds of chlorine gas which drifted down on them from the German line. This attack set off a wild orgy of competition as to who could devise and use the most deadly gas and in the greatest quantity. Asphyxiants, lachrymators, vesicants, appeared—in gases, vapors, and smokes. Crude gas masks were hastily devised and by the end of the war these were a regulation part of every man's equipment. By 1918 cloud gas was generally obsolete and gas shells as large as eight-inch caliber were used for laying down gas into both lines. One of the vesicants, the famous mustard gas, blistered the skin and attacked the lungs, eyes, nose and any moist parts of the body; its effects almost defied treatment. It is an interesting fact, however, that men refused to become as concerned about the effects of gas as about other forms of warfare. They were careless in the use of their gas masks and it became doubtful at the end of the war whether either side was gaining by the use of this new and horrible material. Its use had been established, however, and civilian populations were to become much more concerned about it than the soldiers themselves.

[30] Newman, *op. cit.*, chap. 7.

Sea warfare. The submarine ships so laboriously developed under Admiral Tirpitz in the German Navy were to prove one of the most formidable instruments of naval warfare. To the end of the war there was no answer to them. Listening devices were provided for use on all sorts of ships, and particularly for the special ship assigned to hunt these submarines, namely, the destroyer. All destroyers were provided with special apparatus for throwing overboard huge cans of high explosive known as depth bombs. Submarines took a fearful toll of Allied shipping and only the adoption of the convoy system enabled Great Britain and France to hold out. In this system the destroyers protected great convoys of supply ships making it prohibitively dangerous for the submarines to attack. But we need to emphasize that at the end of the First World War the problem of the submarine had not been solved.[31]

Conclusion. The First World War brought into use a kaleidoscopic succession of fairly well developed weapons such as the machine gun, the rapid-firing field gun, and heavy siege artillery; also procedures and equipment hastily improvised from new inventions, including the airplane, the tank, gas warfare, anti-aircraft artillery, the hand grenade, the gas mask, motor transport, together with well-developed naval devices such as the heavy battleship, the high-speed cruiser, the destroyer, the submarine, mine-field barriers, submarine chasers, depth bombs, and supersensitive subsurface listening devices. Anti-aircraft defense developed supersensitive listening devices; the airplane itself was developed into reconnaissance, combat, and bombing types; special artillery was developed to serve against the airplane, and the air-raid shelter appeared for the first time in warfare.

New Instruments

At the beginning of the First World War, people all over the world were still thinking of warfare in terms of muskets, cast muzzle-loading cannon, horse transportation, secret troop move-

[31] See Brodie, *op. cit.*

ments, horse cavalry, and the securing of information by spies and secret agents.

New warfare. By the end of the First World War, that is, after a period of four years, people thought of warfare in terms of breech-loading magazine rifles, rapid-firing machine guns, rapid-firing steel cannon, specialized motor transportation, the reduced possibility of secret movement of troops, specialized airplanes, the new form of mobile fortified artillery called tanks, steel warships highly specialized for the performance of special duties, the deadly character of submarines, the antisubmarine warship known as the destroyer, the wide variety of high explosives, the bombing of such cities as Paris and London, the use of the great airships known as Zeppelins, the necessity for air-raid shelters in great cities, the wide variety of toxic gases used in gas warfare, the necessity for gas masks, the widespread use of radio telegraphy, and so many more new devices and principles that there is not space to enumerate them.[32]

Crystallization of First World War weapons. At the end of the First World War the general staffs of all armies appointed groups of experienced officers to survey the practices, weapons, and methods in their own particular division of activity, to determine what the lessons of the First World War meant, and to recommend special developments in their line of activity and equipment for the future. Among the recommendations for weapons were those concerning automatic and semiautomatic rifles, automatic cannon, new varieties of tanks and mobile land artillery, many new varieties of reconnaissance, combat, and bombing aircraft, many specialized forms of transportation and traction devices, vastly improved anti-aircraft artillery, increased range for all types of artillery, and the provision for rapid transportation for every device used in the army and for army personnel.[33]

Three new forms of artillery had appeared and needed to be

[32] See Paul W. Thompson, *Modern Battle,* Washington, Infantry Journal, Inc., 1942.

[33] C. B. Falls, *The Nature of Modern Warfare,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1941.

recognized as such. One was the submarine, for which no answer has been found. France and Great Britain had been almost defeated by the use of this one weapon alone in the First World War. A second was the mobile armored land artillery, the tank. The third was the new and terrifying bomber, the airplane that had appeared in 1914 as merely a reconnaissance instrument. The airplane was artillery in the deadliest known form, a self-observing type and the only self-observing type. With this new type of artillery tremendous weights of high explosives could be transported to great distances, dropped on an objective in full view. Aerial artillery never blocked the roads for its land army, could be called for quickly in an emergency, could arrive quickly and perform its mission within a very short time, and then retire to its distant base.[34]

The Second World War

From World War to World War. Looking at this problem from another standpoint, it may be noted that the period between 1918 and 1939 was one in which the new instruments already mentioned were improved and tested. The nineteenth century had seen the development of the breech-loading cannon, of accurate fire and volume of fire power, and of the repeating system. This new period saw the advent of a highly mechanized and motorized warfare. During the First World War fire power had been the test of effective instruments of warfare; but now a drastically different technique had been devised.[35] Instead of heavy cannon placed mile upon mile beside each other, the new warfare called for bombing planes followed by parachute troops, tanks, and in their turn followed by more planes and artillery, then lighter mechanized and motorized troops. When the attack of such a force succeeds, infantry and artillery follow the motorized units to invest and hold the captured area.[36]

[34] See British Air Ministry publication, *The Air Offensive Against Germany,* London, 1941, for a graphic description of the use of the plane in this manner.

[35] See S. L. A. Marshall, *Blitzkrieg,* New York, Morrow, 1942.

[36] For the way in which these instruments were tried out in Spain, see R. Ernest Dupuy and George Fielding Eliot, *If War Comes,* New York, Macmillan, 1937; also see H. A. Sargeaunt and G. West, *Grand Strategy,* New York, Crowell, 1941.

During this time steel and concrete fortifications were perfected and tried out, but by far the most important element in this period was the introduction of motorization.[37] Mechanization and motorization were accompanied by adaptations of existing weapons to modern form of warfare, notably antitank guns, anti-aircraft artillery, land mines, and such anti-tank grenades as Molotov cocktails. As in all previous wars new instruments tended to develop their own tools and counter instruments.

Light arms. During the Second World War light arms were soon developed further than at any previous time. While the bayonet still figures in a soldier's equipment, it tends to become of less and less use; it is impossible to bayonet a tank. Both light and heavy machine guns are used, while infantry depends more and more on semiautomatic rifles, light mortars, automatic rifles, and submachine guns. Further equipment consists of newer types of hand grenades, flame throwers, and trench mortars. The range and effectiveness of the infantryman's destructive power has expanded tremendously.[38]

Artillery. In the field of artillery, comparatively little has happened since the First World War aside from the revolutionary motorization. Some of the newer developments are the various small-caliber cannon. The Germans, who lost their armaments after Versailles, began without any equipment to be retained or salvaged and have developed light all-purpose artillery, highly mobile and flexible in use. Such weapons may forecast the end of the huge guns of the First World War era.[39]

Fortification. Two great lines of steel and concrete fortifications in the west were the Maginot and the Siegfried Lines. From Belfort to Liége, seven stories deep, the French fortifications stretched as though someone had buried a row of hundreds of battleships with their heavy guns and turrets alone sticking out of the ground. Communications, workshops, hospitals, living quarters, theaters, transportation lines, and all the necessary storage space were built into these elaborate defenses. The

[37] See Raborg, *op. cit.;* also T. H. Wintringham, *New Ways of War,* New York, Penquin Books, 1940.

[38] See Newman, *op. cit.,* chap. 2.

[39] *Ibid.,* chap. 3.

German line, only three stories deep, depended on depth of successive zones. These were equipped with both heavy and light artillery. However, since such lines have now been shown to be ineffective unless supported by an alert, well-organized army, mobile and prompt in counterattack, their huge guns have little practical use. The fixed artillery posts on the coast of France and at Dover, England, which occasionally exchange salvos, have a very doubtful value.[40]

Mechanized might. Tanks, like prehistoric reptiles, have taken on a bewildering variety of shapes, forms, and sizes. The heavy tank is a battleship on land, which weighs on the order of sixty tons. Tanks come in all sizes, weights, and designs and are used for an incredible number of purposes as may be seen by noting that there are jumping tanks, bridge-laying tanks, and even radio-controlled tanks. The cost of a tank, in dollars, goes into five figures, and will rise as tanks are improved. Thus a tank unit is a costly part of the fighting forces of a state.

Tanks, including light tanks for mopping up, form only part of a mechanized division, which consists of many different types of machines, including airplanes, motorcycles, truck-borne artillery, antitank guns, mortars, kitchens, ice trucks, radio and signal cars, and six-wheeled heavy troop carriers such as the British Lanchester and the Italian Pavesi.

Counter instruments and protective devices against tanks include tank obstacles, Molotov cocktails, land mines, air bombs, rifle grenades, and antitank guns, for example the Bren.[41]

Sea power. Naval and air operations have grown more closely interrelated than the operations of air and ground troops. They are far more intimately connected than they were in the First World War. The planes spot, range, scout, and bomb enemy ships and defenses. The 1942 navy is a complex affair. The fighting fleet consists of 35,000-ton battleships, big-gunned, expensive, and heavily armored; 10,000-ton cruisers with heavy

[40] *Ibid.*, chap. 4.

[41] See Raborg, *op. cit.*; also S. L. A. Marshall, *Armies on Wheels,* New York, Morrow, 1941. See also "Pincer: Why it Worked for the Nazis but not for the Reds," *Fortune* (May, 1942), pp. 83–130; "Tank Tactics: Nine Primer Lessons," *Fortune* (February, 1942).

armor, 6,000-ton light cruisers, also armored; 1,850-ton flotilla leaders used for the discharge of torpedoes and the dropping of depth bombs, 1,650-ton destroyers used for similar purposes, submarines of various tonnages; and 20,000 ton aircraft carriers. The fleet is attended by a host of oilers, trawlers, tugs, tenders, seaplanes, harbor defense vessels, and supply vessels. New developments in destructive instruments and techniques have made the modern fleet more vulnerable than before and modern mines have increased the complexity of sea warfare.[42]

Air warfare. Airplanes are used in even more types and varieties than tanks; a few examples are light and heavy bombers, fighters, and pursuit planes. The Nazis, who started mass production of them in 1935, filled the air with their Junkers, Messerschmitts, Dorniers, and Heinkels, which had little or no difficulty with the British Gladiators and Furys. However, by the end of 1940 the Hurricanes, Spitfires, and Blenheims had appeared, after the Germans had bombed the British under a terrific barrage from August through October of 1940, and after the German planes had been the most effective single force in winning the battles of Flanders and France. Airplanes played a significant part in the enveloping and annihilating of the Allied armies.[43] Much experience in their use had been gained in Spain by Germans, Italians, and Russians, in Ethopia by the Italians, and on the Indian frontier by the British.

Airplane development is moving forward at an increasing speed. The search is for greater speed, range, fire power, defensive armor, better and more numerous landing fields, greater cruising range, larger and smaller size, greater altitude, and reduced vulnerability. New devices and instruments are constantly appearing for protection against aircraft, among them anti-aircraft cannon, searchlights, electrical predictors, radio range finders, balloon barrages, and fighter defenses. A steady de-

[42] See Brodie, *op. cit.*; also Paul Schubert, *Sea Power in Conflict,* New York, Coward, 1942; also Gilbert Cant, *The War at Sea,* New York, John Day, 1942. See also Hanson Baldwin's article "Ships and War," in the *New York Times* (April 17, 1942).

[43] See Dupuy and Eliot, *op. cit.*

velopment in specialization of both the planes and counter instruments is going on, and this Second World War is the great testing ground for these developments.

In the general field of air warfare there have been many auxiliary discoveries, such as improved refining of gasoline, improved bomb sights, and improved explosives. Bombs now are of three chief sorts: explosive, incendiary, and gas, although the last have not been used to date in the present conflict.[44]

Gar warfare. In the two first years of the Second World War, neither side had resorted to gas and chemical warfare. The chief instance of its use after the First World War was in the Italian campaign in Ethiopia. However, tremendous war power lies dormant in such lung irritants as chlorine, phosgene, chloropicrin; in such lachrymators (tear gases) as chloracetophenone, ethyl iodoacetate, bromobenzyl cyanide, and bromoacetone; in such sternutators (sneeze gases) as adamsite; and in such vesicants (blisterers) as mustard gas and lewisite. It is possible that the inability to control the gases may explain to some extent why they have not been used. In a war of movement, gases are as great a liability to one's own troops as they are to the enemy. Great care has been taken, however, to prepare against any possible attack, especially on civilian populations.

A tremendously important weapon in the Second World War is fire, and incendiary bombs have done as much damage in many instances as high explosives.

The Second World War combines all of the productive and scientific developments of our civilization for fighting purposes. No person is too obscure, no task too humble to escape notice. This situation may explain why civilian populations are being subjected to bombardment and ravages of war far more extensive than for hundreds of years, and why it seems that the very roots of our civilization are being blasted into eternity.[45]

[44] See Alexander de Seversky, *Victory through Air Power,* New York, Simon and Schuster, 1942; also H. H. Arnold and I. C. Baker, *Winged Warfare,* New York, Harper, 1941. See also "Blueprints for Destruction," *Fortune* (August, 1941), p. 42.

[45] See Donald Portway, *Military Science Today* (New York: Oxford, 1941).

Production of the Tools of War

From the beginning of the First World War it was appreciated that America was committed for all time to the method of production begun by Eli Whitney more than a century before. Industries, methods, and men had become so highly specialized that we had come to expect only special functions from each. It was clear then that long-range plans would have to be made for the future if we were to avoid most of the difficulties that we had experienced at the beginning of the First World War. If equipment is to be depended upon to last under grueling conditions for a maximum of time, the greatest care must be taken in efficient design, in selection of materials, in strength and proper fitting of parts.

Principles and practices of modern production. When modern production, which is so commonly taken for granted, is analyzed into its component parts, we find the need to produce certain equipment in large quantities. We have developed sources of raw materials required to manufacture this equipment and we have established plants for converting ore and other materials into usable metals and shaping them into usable form. Manufacturing establishments are filled with specialized tools, each capable of doing but one operation. Hence a plant that manufactures automobiles cannot be converted quickly to one making airplanes; about all that can be used is the power plant of the manufacturing organization, the buildings, the communication system, and the general service facilities. The next requirement for modern manufacturing is trained workmen for the special machine tools. The third requirement for modern production is the inspection service. This includes both gauges and trained inspectors. Specialized machines will produce with a certain degree of accuracy under the handling of trained operators. They are not perfect, however, and there is constant need for inspection. The final stage in mass production is assembly, in which special facilities commonly known as assembly lines manned by special assembly operators put together the highly

standardized parts produced on special machines by trained operators and inspected by trained inspectors.

Another feature of modern production is of great importance. It is the supplying of spare parts for the maintenance of equipment in the field. Equipment sent to the field is literally worthless unless replacement parts are also sent, with shops and trained men to maintain that equipment in hard service. So manufacturing must take account not only of the necessary parts for initial supplies of completed equipment, but also of spares for the repair and maintenance of such equipment in the field. A tank becomes useless if even a pin works loose in one of its tracks.

Maintenance of maximum usable machine-manufacturing facilities. A nation must maintain a certain group of manufacturing facilities capable of replacing obsolete equipment in the armies as rapidly as necessary and serving as the initial manufacturing facilities in any war. These we call arsenals. In the United States they are the property of the government and must be maintained by it. The equipment of our arsenals must be kept up to the standard of manufacturing establishments which can only succeed in competition with others—that is, it must be as modern and as new as possible. Trained men in adequate numbers can only be kept in such arsenals by adopting a policy of replacing obsolete army equipment as rapidly as new and better equipment becomes available.

It is necessary likewise to anticipate the need for calling in various peacetime arms manufacturing establishments, and they must accordingly be given contracts in peacetime for the manufacturing of some of the replacement equipment of the regular army and organized militia. Shell-loading plants and depots must be maintained in modern condition and in places not vulnerable in the event of any probable war. A certain number of shipyards must be maintained in the most modern condition; this can be done by a policy of replacement of warships at regular intervals when they are approaching obsolescence. The United States has had no real policy of replacement of warships at regular intervals, and as a consequence, for almost every war, it has been necessary to put on a terrifically expensive production

program that was always behind time. If administrations, regardless of party, were to replace obsolete equipment at a regular rate, so many ships of each category, the cost would not be so great, a certain number of shipyards could be maintained in modern condition, the United States Navy would always be modern, and a reasonably large number of men could be kept in highly trained condition.

Questions

1. Trace the development of the tools of warfare from ancient times to the Industrial Revolution.
2. What relationship does technology bear to warfare?
3. On which ancient state's navy were subsequent ones modeled until the advent of broadsides?
4. What was "Brown Bess," and what were her advantages?
5. How many shots were required to kill a soldier during Napoleonic times?
6. What role did Eli Whitney play in the development of warfare?
7. What did accuracy of fire mean in the War of 1812?
8. What effect did the percussion cap have on warfare?
9. Who was T. J. Rodman? What was his significance for warfare?
10. Explain the significance of steel for warfare.
11. What role did the invention of telegraph play in warfare?
12. What is meant by a magazine rifle?
13. Why was armor-piercing ammunition developed?
14. What is a breech-loading steel cannon?
15. What part does the internal-combustion engine play in warfare?
16. How far back does the idea of the machine-gun go?
17. Summarize the discoveries of the nineteenth century, which were of significance for warfare.
18. How did the Schlieffen Plan depend for success on modern inventions?
19. What role has the submarine played in the two World Wars?
20. What is the significance of motorization of military equipment?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Trace the development of siege machinery throughout the ages.
2. How did the rifle evolve?

3. What relationship exists between metallurgy and the instruments of warfare?
4. Discuss the tank in its evolution and variations.
5. Outline and survey the military uses of the airplane.
6. What are mass armies and how have they been equipped?
7. Describe and discuss weapons used in the great battles of history.
8. Discuss the role of production in modern warfare.
9. Describe arsenals, past and present.
10. Discuss the weapons and instruments of the *Blitzkrieg* in operation.

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CHAPTER 23

TOTALITARIANISM AT WAR

Organization

Totalitarian warfare is a product of twentieth-century machine civilization. More specifically it began to take form and substance during the last two years of the First World War of 1914–1918. The years following that great struggle witnessed the rise of a number of totalitarian communities: the Soviet Union (1917), Fascist Italy (1922), National Socialist Germany (1933), Franco Spain (1939), and militarist Japan (especially 1937–1938).

All the totalitarian communities exhibited certain common characteristics, though there were also some basic differences, especially in the case of the Soviet Union, which eventually took her stand against the forces of aggression. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics rested, theoretically at least, on the foundations of Marxism; Italy and Germany, originally, on fear of the proletariat. Franco Spain was a product of clerical fascism, brought to power by a victorious Nazi-Fascist invasion of Spain. A military *coup d'état* in Japan brought a military dictatorship, under the nominal authority of the emperor. All the totalitarian nations insisted on the greater importance of the group as opposed to the individual interest. In the Soviet Union it was the proletariat and peasantry together; in Germany the race; in Italy, Spain, and Japan the nation. The U.S.S.R. was organized on the constitutional basis of occupational and regional councils (soviets), but the dynamics were furnished by the Communist Party, which was headed by the Politbureau of the Central Executive Committee, led first by V. I. Lenin and later by Joseph Stalin. In Italy the state was organized on the basis of "corporativism," with Fascist principles, under a Fascist Party dominated by the Fascist Grand Council and under the leadership

of *Il Duce,* Mussolini. Under the supreme leadership of Adolf Hitler and through the organization of the National Socialist Germany Workers' Party, Germany was transformed into a totalitarian state after the seizure of power in 1933. General Franco's Spain was similarly organized around the core of the *Falange Española Tradicionalista.* All the totalitarian communities possessed one-party systems of government. Without exception, too, all the totalitarian states were inspired by official political and economic creeds and employed an official propaganda which demanded complete national unity at home. Press, theater, radio, and schools were pressed into the service of total national education. Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan had a common hatred of the proletariat. With the possible exception of the Soviet Union, the totalitarian states hated the principles of democracy, liberalism, and pacifism, and scorned the use of parliamentary methods in political life. All used the methods of the terror—the secret police (O.G.P.U., Ovra, Gestapo)—perhaps the most distinctive institutional development of totalitarianism during its twenty-odd years.

The Submergence of the Individual

With their stress on the cult of force and efficiency, and their exaltation of the uniformed mass and complete uniformity of thought and feeling, all the totalitarian states tended to produce the mass man and to suppress the individual and individual rights. In Germany, Italy, Spain, Japan, and the Soviet Union, the rights of the individual as enshrined in the bills of rights of the more democratic countries vanished before the demands of totalitarian organization. It is well to remember, however, that Italy alone had had a tradition, though it was weakly based, of genuine liberalism. In the totalitarian countries as a class, the individual, through the youth, party, and military organizations, was to fit into the military mold. An exception, theoretically, might be made as regards the Soviet Union. It is true that in the western European sense of the term, Soviet citizens enjoyed few "civic rights," largely for the reason, it would seem, that for

twenty-odd years the Soviet Union had considered itself in a state of almost constant mobilization against possible attack from the so-called capitalist world. But it is also interesting to observe the statement of fundamental rights of Soviet citizens, no doubt more honored in the breach than in the observance, in the Constitution of 1936, as a possible indication of developments along nontotalitarian lines in the future.[1] In general, Benito Mussolini stated the position of the totalitarian states when he wrote in 1923, barely six months after he had come to power: [2]

> Liberty is today no longer the chaste and austere virgin for whom generations of the first half of the last century fought and died. For the gallant, restless and bitter youth who face the dawn of a new history there are other words that exercise a far greater fascination, and these words are: order, hierarchy, discipline. . . . Fascism has already stepped over, and if it be necessary it will turn tranquilly and again step over, the more or less putrescent corpse of the Goddess of Liberty.

Total War at Home and Abroad

Basically, the Nazi-Fascist totalitarian state was conceived in a military philosophy and dedicated to the proposition that the chief end of man was to carry on war against his fellow man. This idea had taken deep root in the philosophical soil of Prussian militarism and Pan-Germanism, in the racialism of Houston Stewart Chamberlain, and in the development of nineteenth- and twentieth-century integral, or total, nationalism. From the very beginning, the National Socialist government of Germany was a war government, whose agencies were primarily designed for the carrying on of total war. Hitler himself had declared that "oppressed countries" could be "brought back into the bosom

[1] For text, see "Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens," chap. 10, articles 118–132, *Constitution (Fundamental Law) of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,* Moscow, Ogiz, State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1938, 128 pp. (For a contrasting view see Chapter 16.—*Editor.*)

[2] Cited from Mussolini's "Forza e Consenso," *Gerarchia* (March, 1923), from Carlton J. H. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1931, p. 224.

of a common Reich" only by "a mighty sword." "To forge this sword is the task of the domestic political leadership of a people; to guard the work of forging and to seek comrades in arms is the task of the foreign-policy leadership." [3] As the German concept of total war looked toward the subjection of other peoples and asserted an unfounded racial superiority as justification, so Fascist Italy and militarist Japan were similarly oriented. Fascist Italy looked toward action and conquest in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Near and Middle East, while Japan proposed to build up a Far Eastern Co-Prosperity Sphere under the might of her armed forces.

The pressure toward war was less severe in the Soviet Union. Slowly but surely, however, the country was organized for total war. For years a substantial portion of Soviet income went into military preparation, though Nazi Germany was spending twice as much for military purposes as the Soviet Union in 1939. In any case, Soviet preparation was conditioned by the fact, no doubt, that until the invasion of Finland in November, 1939, the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R., had been one of peace and of cooperation in collective security. Fundamentally Soviet armament appeared to be for defense, not aggression.[4] Germany, Italy and Japan, to the contrary, opposed the development of a sound system of collective security, constructed, from 1936 to 1940, an alliance system of an aggressive nature, and were clearly bent on conquest.

The Integration of All Aspects of State Life for Total War

Total war, it has been said, includes all fields of activity and involves all human values. It signifies, therefore, the active participation of all elements of a nation in the war effort. It involves the complete exploitation of the mental, moral, and material resources of the nation, under a totalitarian dictatorship which permits no opposition whatsoever. As Karl Schmidt,

[3] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf,* New York, Reynal, 1941, p. 891.

[4] For a less benevolent view, see Chapters 15 and 16.—*Editor.*

the Nazi ideologue, summarizes the situation: [5] "War is the essence of everything. The nature of the total war determines the nature and form of the totalitarian state." The Soviet, National Socialist, Fascist Italian, Japanese, and Spanish states have developed the basic concept of the absolute totalitarian community, "in which no activity could exist which was not integrated with the state and dominated by it." Mass propaganda, rigid party discipline, unquestioning obedience to the leader—this was the essence of totalitarianism.[6]

The Nazi concept of total organization for war really began with the plans worked out by the German general staff in 1914–1916. As evolved in the postwar years, and especially under the Nazis, totalitarian organization comprehended, literally, everything. Everything was within, nothing without, the state. Once the followers of Hitler had seized power in Germany and subjugated the German people to their rule, they began to formulate plans for the conquest of Europe. In their schemes for total warfare, military, naval, and air power; war on the economic and diplomatic front; and the "moral disintegration" of the intended victim were to play substantially equal and vitally significant parts. The Nazi propaganda machine, with its masterly "strategy of terror" against all the peoples of Europe and its assertion of German racial superiority, began its work of spiritual organization of the Germans for the conquest of Europe. All elements within the new *Führerstaat* of the Fascist community pointed to the war leadership of Europe and the world. As early as the

[5] Quoted from Hans Kohn, "The Totalitarian Philosophy of War," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, 82:1 (1940), pp. 57–72.

[6] See especially Calvin B. Hoover, *Dictatorship and Democracy*, New York, Macmillan, 1937, p. 53. Note Mussolini's statement: "The Fascist conception of the State is all-embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value. Thus understood, Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State—a synthesis and a unit inclusive of all values—interprets, develops, and potentiates the whole life of a people." (Cited in Melvin Rader, *No Compromise: The Conflict Between Two Worlds*, New York, Macmillan, 1939, p. 225.) See also Il Duce's declaration that "the foundation of Fascism is the conception of the State, its character, its duty, and its aim. Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State." (Benito Mussolini, "The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism," *International Conciliation*, 306, January, 1935, p. 13.)

year 1935 the *Deutsche Wehr* could write that "the war of the future" would be "total war not only in the employment of all forces but also in the sweeping nature of its decision." Total war meant "the complete and final disappearance of the vanquished from the stage of history." [7]

One of the fundamentals of organizing for war was the development of a war economy, the beginnings of which in Germany date from 1926, when an economic general staff under the guise of a Statistical Society was established. This involved an economic mobilization of the German resources which placed agriculture and industry completely at the disposal of the military authorities for the purpose of building up the world's most powerful war machine. Moreover, it was designed to make Germany as blockade proof as possible. While the backgrounds of military economic organization went far back, the militarization of economic life began definitely with the initiation of the so-called Four-Year Plan, announced by Hitler at the *Parteitag* on September 9, 1936.[8] The execution of the plan was placed under the direction of General Hermann Wilhelm Goering, who soon thereafter organized the Reichswerke Hermann Goering, the greatest single industrial organization for war purposes in the world. Under this military economy, capital, commerce, and industry were all placed under severe controls with fixed prices, limited profits, compulsory investment in government-controlled or important national enterprises, limitation or prohibition of "unessential" enterprises. Complete control of industry was established through the regulation of foreign exchange, raw materials, and government orders, as well as through the regulation of the capital market. The control of labor rested on the fixing of wage rates (largely at the 1932 levels), supervision of jobs, abolition of all labor unions, the establishment of the "Labor Front," and the elimination of the right to strike. The farmer was regulated through the control of the market and the fixing of farm prices, plus official determination of what he was to plant.

[7] Quoted from Otto D. Tolischus, *They Wanted War,* New York, Reynal, 1940, p. 52.

[8] Adolf Hitler, *My New Order,* New York, Reynal, 1941, pp. 394–395; see especially chap. 7.

Finally, all freedom was taken from the consumer through a complete system of rationing and "directed consumption." The financial structure of the state was subjected to similar controls through the mobilization of both the foreign and domestic credit and debit systems.[9]

German life in all its aspects was thus being organized not with a view toward the welfare of the German people, but toward total mobilization for aggressive warfare. From 1933 onward Germany underwent a process of rearmament which startled the outside world. According to Hitler himself Germany had spent 90 billion reichsmarks between 1933 and the Nazi "counter-attack" on Poland on September 1, 1939. By September 1, 1941, it was estimated that the German debt for armaments and war stood at $94 billion, while the rate of spending ran to an estimated $40 billion per year. Two-thirds of this vast expenditure, it was thought, was collected through taxation, one-third through borrowing.[10]

Whatever the cost, the Nazi government was determined to create the most formidable war machine the world had ever seen. The Nazi "Leader-state" was well conceived for war purposes, for there was to be a complete, positive unity of plan, command, and action in the military organization which rested ultimately in the hands of the Fuehrer, Hitler, who was unfettered by any organized opposition or criticism in the state. Complete mobilization of everybody and everything for the purposes of war followed as a logical and ineluctable necessity. The tradition of an expert general staff, studying and planning all phases of modern war, had existed in Prussia and Germany since the days of

[9] Tolischus, *op. cit.*, p. 143, thus characterizes the system: "It was totalitarian because it undertook to control, supervise and direct, not only politics, but also all other phases of human life—capital and labor; producer and consumer; industry; trade, commerce and the professions; agriculture, religion and education; art, literature, the radio and the press; sport, charity, every organization and association, and, to an increasing extent, even family life." (For a different treatment see Chapter 7.—*Editor.*)

[10] See especially Adolf Hitler, *My New Order, cit. supra,* pp. 679–92; S. B. Fay, "Germany's Financial Burden," *Current History,* 1:3 (November, 1941), pp. 251–254; Otto Jeidels in *New York Times,* December 3, 1941; *New York Times,* January 2, 1942. James T. Shotwell estimates the cost of the First World War to Germany at $100 billion. (These figures are debatable and the student should check them against those found in Chapters 7, 20, and 21.—*Editor.*)

Clausewitz. In our time this general staff developed a brilliant strategy and new techniques of attack and conquest. As the Nazis proceeded, they developed a fanatical *élan* in a people that had been stripped of all humanitarian or moral scruples through the Goebels propaganda machine.[11] Finally, the leaders of the National Socialist state had a penetrating sense of timing and a well-developed insight into the almost fatal paralysis of their democratic enemies. They seized and kept the initiative in all their contests, whether in their psychological offensives, on the diplomatic fronts, or (until their setbacks in the U.S.S.R.) on the far-flung battle lines.

This detailed attention has been devoted to Nazi Germany because a more complete integration of all aspects of state life for total war took place in that country. But in many respects the process really began in Soviet Russia, especially with the initiation of the First Five Year Plan in 1928. While Soviet planned economy aimed at the mechanization of agriculture, the industrialization of the U.S.S.R., and the socialization of the national economy, it is well to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was also preparing for war. A large standing army was developed through compulsory military training. By 1940 the military budget of the U.S.S.R. had reached a figure of 57,000,000,000 rubles, an increase of 38 per cent over the figure of 40,885,000,000 ($8,177,000,000) for 1939.[12]

Italy, too, as we have seen, underwent a similar development, though economically Italy was the weakest of the great powers. The duty of citizens was to "Believe, Obey, Fight." By 1937 Fascist Italy established a Supreme Autarchy Commission and adopted a planned system of economy the avowed purpose of which was to force Italian citizens to "eat, drink, dress, and think Italian." The plan was to place Italy on the basis of a permanent military economy. Fascist Italy was to attempt to

[11] Note the statement in Ladislas Farago, *German Psychological Warfare. Survey and Bibliography,* New York, Committee for National Morale, 1941, p. 24, on the educational set-up: "All media of education . . . serve the goal embodied in the slogan, 'One Reich, One People, One Fuehrer.' "

[12] The government had long since drafted people for industry, but in 1940 it began to draft from 800,000 to 1,000,000 youths annually for industry. (For the Russian part see Chapter 16.—*Editor.*)

manufacture her own war materials out of her own severely limited resources and was to become independent in nonmilitary necessities. Thanks to the Ethiopian War and the Fascist-Nazi invasion of Spain in the years 1936–1939, Fascist Italy was already introducing capital levies, control of currency and credit, and spending something more than 50 per cent of her income on the military budget.[13]

In the Far East, Japan exhibited the same tendencies, especially after the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. Later attacks against China, begun in 1937, brought the country more completely under military control, until by 1938 three major trends became evident. In the first place, all opposition to the so-called "China incident" was ruthlessly suppressed. Secondly, the military authorities, overriding the cabinet in Tokyo, took exclusive control over operations in China. Thirdly, came the development of a military economy in Japan. In 1938 a National Mobilization, after fierce opposition, was enacted into law. It provided an economic and social parallel for the military mobilization, giving the government unlimited power to draft manpower for industry and to take over all economic resources as well. Taken as a whole the act set aside virtually all constitutional checks on the government's actions. The government now had unlimited control over all aspects of social and economic activity, commerce, finance, industry, labor, and the press. No phase of life was left untouched. Old political parties went into the scrap heap and a new group, known as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, initiated Japan into the mechanism of a totalitarian military state.[14]

The Conquered Areas

Totalitarian conquest was to follow totalitarian warfare in Europe, Asia, and Africa. The conquered countries were sub-

[13] See William Ebbenstein, *Fascist Italy,* New York, American Book Co., 1939, chap. 8.

[14] See especially T. A. Bisson, "Japan's 'New Structure,'" *Foreign Policy Reports,* 17:3 (April 15, 1941), pp. 26–36; T. A. Bisson, *Shadow Over Asia,* Foreign Policy Association Headline Book, 1941; Kenneth W. Colegrove, *Militarism in Japan,* Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1936.

jected to military occupation, alien political domination, ruthless economic exploitation, and cultural debasement. In some respects Japan set the example, beginning with the conquest of Manchuria in 1931 and the establishment of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. Something of the nature of the Japanese conquest was symbolized in the taking of Nanking, China, on December 15, 1937—"the ensuing fortnight set the record for atrocity in the modern world." [15] With the Japanese invasion on China, an estimated forty million people were forced into exile as refugees. Later on, the Japanese attempted to destroy the unity of the Chinese people by establishing a puppet government in Nanking under Wang Ching-wei.[16] By the opening of 1942 Japan was conquering other lands and organizing them along similar lines.

Meanwhile, by the end of 1941 and the opening of 1942 Nazi Germany had occupied Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, a large portion of France, Belgium, Greece, Yugoslavia except the Chetnik holdings, and a part of the Soviet Union. This was an area of more than 750,000 square miles of European territory outside the U.S.S.R., with a population of more than 150,000,000. Only Switzerland, Sweden, and Portugal on the European continent were relatively outside the German orbit, while Germany's European allies were definitely under Nazi control. These included Fascist Italy, Franco Spain, feudal Hungary, Rumania, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Finland. The Soviet Union had occupied a portion of Finland, the three Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, and northern Bukovina and Bessarabia in the year 1940.

Within the Conquered Lands

Conquered and subjugated Europe occupied a somewhat special position under the Nazis. In general the pattern of con-

[15] Paul M. A. Linebarger, *The China of Chiang Kai Shek. A Political Study*, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941, p. 14. An estimated 75,000 were killed by the Japanese military.

[16] See especially S. Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1940, vol. 2, pp. 298–304.

quest pursued by the Germans has taken familiar lines. First came the army and the seizure of the economic and political machinery of the conquered land by the German high command. Then followed the Gestapo for the purpose of "pacification." A process of "Germanization" generally followed. This involved not only the occupation of the land, but the seizure of private property through "Aryanization," the taking over of all public property as a matter of right of conquest, colonization by Germans, and the de-education of the conquered peoples.

But the types of control have varied from region to region, depending on circumstances, though essentially all roads were intended to lead to Berlin. Differential treatment and indirect rule, where possible, appeared to be the principal bases on which the National Socialist domination rested. By such administrative policies, it was hoped, a united underground movement against the Nazis might be prevented. For obvious reasons the Nazis preferred to use native fascist elements as their stooges in controlling the subject population. In any case organized opposition was practically impossible because of the disarmament of the victims and the ever-present Gestapo.[17] Ultimate authority everywhere rested with the representatives of the Fuehrer.

Austria, the Sudetenland and other portions of the Czechoslovak Republic, western Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen, Malmédy, and Schleswig-Holstein were annexed outright to Germany.

Denmark remained a nominally independent country with Christian X as king, a parliament, and cabinet. The Netherlands were placed under the direct authority of Hitler's *Gauleiter,* Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who betrayed Austria in the spring of 1938, until the war should end, at which time "independence" might be restored. Following its conquest, Norway was placed

[17] For an excellent outline of the system see "Europe: How Germany Rules It," *Fortune* (December, 1941), pp. 132, 134, 136. In general, see Joseph C. Harsch, *Pattern of Conquest,* New York: Doubleday, 1941; *Germany at War: Twenty Key Questions and Answers,* New York, Foreign Policy Association, Headline Book, 1942; Douglas Miller, *You Can't Do Business With Hitler,* New York, Pocket Books, 1942, chap. 3; Josef Hanč, *Tornado Across Eastern Europe,* New York, Greystone Press, 1942, pp. 268–284.

under military ocupation, with Josef Terboven as governor-general; Major Vidkun Quisling, whose name became a synonym for traitor, became premier (1942). Belgium, with no native governmental organization under the Nazi occupation, was placed under direct military authority. France was divided into an occupied and unoccupied land, with the German military authorities and the former German ambassador, Otto Abetz, controlling the ocupied region from Paris, while the unoccupied region was subject to the authority of Marshal Pétain's fascist regime at Vichy. All the western occupied lands were drained of agricultural and industrial resources, while countries like Denmark were looted of their livestock and dairy products. The character of the Nazi occupation in France was exemplified in the execution, between September and December, 1941, of more than two hundred and fifty Frenchmen who had been held as hostages.

While it is not easy to estimate the economic blessings of the Nazi New Order, the British government has made some interesting estimates of the annual costs of the Nazi conquests for the various subject peoples.[18] As thus calculated, Norway, for example, is paying at the rate of $274,040,000 yearly; Denmark, $104,780,000; Belgium, $302,250,000; the Netherlands, $217,620,000; and France, $3,332,281,000. The costs of occupation for western Europe alone may thus be placed at about $4,231,500,000. But if one adds the value of requisitioned goods an additional burden of possibly $403,000,000 may be included. It has been estimated, also, that the Nazis have assessed the Czechs 114 per cent of the defense budget of Czechoslovakia, and "allied" Rumania 84 per cent of the Rumanian budget. The Nazis now control the stock in something like eighteen leading non-German European banks, especially in Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, and Rumania.

The case of France is especially interesting. The Germans now

[18] Jones and Myers, *op. cit.*, vol. 3, pp. 448–449. See also Thomas Reveille, *The Spoil of Europe*, New York, Norton, 1941; Paul Einzig, *Europe in Chains*, Penquin, 1940; Josef Hanč, *op. cit.*; "Germany's Europe," *Fortune* (January, 1942).

own about 49 per cent of the stock of banks, insurance, industrial and commercial companies in France. By the armistice of June 22, 1940, France was to pay Germany the sum of 130,000,000,000 francs, or from 300,000,000 to 400,000,000 francs per day ($8,000,000 according to the preinvasion rate of exchange.—*Editor*). Since the actual "cost" of the German occupation was estimated at only 125,000,000 francs per day, the French were paying 275,000,000 francs per day toward their own economic and political subjugation. It is illuminating to compare the French payments with the standard German payment of $625,000,000 per year under the Dawes Plan or of $512,000,000 under the Young Plan. Making no allowance whatsoever for the population differential between the two countries or the disparity in industrial resources, the German charge against France is from five to seven times the *rate* of German reparations after Germany's defeat in 1918.[19]

The Nazi pattern of economic and industrial conquest within the conquered portions of the European continent has now become relatively familiar. In general, the various European currencies were pegged to the German mark, which was always given a rate of exchange high above its actual exchange value. Exchange was facilitated through a central European clearing house. The mark, naturally, was considered as a monetary keystone of the "financial consolidation of Europe." With the advent of German troops and officials in a conquered territory, a system of "pillage masquerading as purchase" was organized, whether in France or in Rumania, the Netherlands or Italy. As it has been stated: [20]

> Immediately upon occupation of a country, military commanders are assigned men who know that country through previous foreign service. These agents set to work with the mass coordination of an ant society. They direct the shipping of loot to the Reich; requisition food and materials; shut down industries or reorient production; take over enterprises. In short, the Germans have elevated looting to the status of an economic system.

[19] It is important to note that these figures make no allowance for depreciation in currency, and similar variables.—*Editor.* See Chapter 13.

[20] *Fortune* (January, 1942).

Next came the infiltration of German capital into the industries of occupied, annexed, or allied countries, which was partly organized and certainly accelerated by the great Berlin banks, thanks to the fact that they had already penetrated into the financial structure particularly of central and southeastern Europe. General Goering's Steel Works was an especial agency and beneficiary of this type of operation, designed to secure the industrial and commercial control of Europe. The manner in which the Nazis took control of Rumania's oil and steel resources is instructive on this point, though it is only typical of what was taking place in other parts of Europe.[21]

But the Nazis were also taking complete advantage of Europe's industrial capacity and the vast reserves of manpower for the purpose of strengthening their own *Wehrwirtschaft,* or war economy. By the summer of 1941, at least 2,000,000 foreign workers, aside from prisoners of war, had been brought into Germany, to keep the economy of the Reich in running order. These included at least 150,000 Czechs, more than 870,000 Poles, and in excess of 300,000 Italians. Nazi control of industry in Europe also signified the permanent disarmament of all non-German lands, if the Germans won the war. Within a few years, as Dr. Robert Ley, the Labor Front Leader, explained, the entire European continent was to be working for Germany.

While it is not possible to estimate accurately the total indirect losses which the Nazis have inflicted on the subjected nations of Europe, Thomas Reveille places the global figure, including occupation costs, requisitions, confiscations, and seizures of goods, at no less a figure than $36,000,000,000.

But whatever the costs of Nazi occupation to Europe as a whole, and however difficult the conditions of western Europe under German domination, they pale almost into insignificance in comparison with conditions in eastern and southeastern Europe under Nazi control. Czechoslovakia, for instance, was divided; in the "protectorate" called Bohemia-Moravia, Dr. Emil Hacha was president and Baron Konstantin von Neurath was protector; Slovakia was made into a puppet fascist state in

[21] Leland Stowe, *No Other Road to Freedom,* New York, Knopf, 1941, chap. 8.

March, 1939.[22] Troubles increased in the region after the outbreak of the Second World War, when hundreds of students and others were either shot or imprisoned. But on September 27, 1941, the "protectorate" was abolished, and Reinhard Heydrich, first assistant to Heinrich Himmler, chief of the Gestapo, was placed in charge of the country. Shortly thereafter the premier, Alois Eliáš, was condemned to death, the mayor of Prague was executed, and within five weeks more than three hundred victims had been shot, to be added to hundreds of others who had been murdered. Already the Nazi occupying authorities had introduced anti-Semitic measures; Czech schools, universities, and museums were closed, only to be opened later as German institutions in the attempt to Nazify the country. Eight million Czechs, formerly citizens of a free and independent country, were reduced to the position of secondary subjects within the very land which was their home.[23]

Poland was in an even worse position. The country was divided, parts of it annexed to Germany and parts to the U.S.S.R., and a Government-General, centering around Warsaw and Cracow, with an area of about 61,000 square miles, was established for the Poles. This territory, the very heart of the Polish nation, was placed under Dr. Hans Frank as governor-general, who later on announced that it was to be considered an integral part of the Greater German Reich. Never again was there to be a Polish state. By the end of 1940 some 1,500,000 Poles out of 9,500,000 had been removed from western Poland, which was annexed to Germany, to make room for about 500,000 Germans. In Warthegau province alone, during the first nine months of 1941, 7,696,520 acres out of a possible 9,633,000 acres of cultivable land were seized from the Poles. This move involved 337,-

[22] Among others, see Joan and Jonathan Griffin, *Lost Liberty: the Ordeal of the Czechs and the Future of Freedom,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1939; Robert J. Kerner, ed., *Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years of Independence,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1940.

[23] See Dr. Eduard Benes, *Nazi Barbarism in Czechoslovakia,* Chicago, Czechoslovak National Council of America, 1940; *Memorandum of the Czechoslovak National Committee Relating to the Persecution of University Education and the Suppression of Scientific Activity in Bohemia and Moravia,* Bombay-Calcutta, Czechoslovak Societies, 1940; Frank Weisl, "The Review of a Conquered Economy," *New Europe,* 2:4 (March, 1942), pp. 92–94.

192 farms, which were given to some 50,000 German families. An estimated 84,000 people were executed by the Gestapo. It had been estimated that altogether from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 Poles died from 1939 to 1942 as a result of the Nazi conquest. Thousands of Polish leaders in business and the professions were imprisoned, executed, or sent to German concentration camps. All possibility of resurrection was to be eliminated. As in Czechoslovakia, so in Poland, hundreds of thousands were transported for purposes of forced labor into Germany. As among the Czechs, so among the Poles, schools and universities were closed. The Polish state had ceased to exist, though the Government-General seemed designed to become a kind of human dumping ground for the Poles and the Jews of eastern Europe—a vast ghetto concentration camp.[24] Not since the Thirty Years' War had such conditions been known. The Germans were attempting the deliberate annihilation of a nation and were reducing the Polish people to a state of perpetual servitude. In the light of these developments it is not without interest to point to Dr. Frank's statement at the annual meeting of the Academy of German Law on November 22, 1940, in which he declared that Poland represented "the best example of the system" which would be introduced "in the countries of New Europe, controlled by Greater Germany." [25]

Yugoslavia and Greece were placed under direct military authority following the "armistice" in the spring of 1941, but peace did not come to either country. Yugoslavia was subsequently torn to pieces among the Axis powers, with portions going to Italy, Hungary, and Bulgaria, while a new kingdom of Crotia was established, with Aimone, Duke of Spoleto, as king, and Dr. Ante Pavelich, who organized the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia, as premier. A puppet government under General Nedich and German military authority was set up in tortured Belgrade. Without including Yugoslav soldiers killed in

[24] *New York Times*, February 12, 1942. (For a sharply contrasting view see Chapter 26.—*Editor.*)

[25] Republic of Poland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *German Occupation of Poland. Extract of Note Addressed to the Allied and Neutral Powers (Polish White Book)*, New York, Greystone Press, 1942, pp. 2–3.

action against the enemy, estimates indicate that more than 300,000 Yugoslavs were executed in the year after the Nazi-Fascist occupation of the country.[26]

In Greece, which the Nazis finally turned over to their Italian allies after systematically looting the country and subjecting it to a well-calculated, cold-blooded policy of starvation, it was estimated that 500,000 people were facing starvation in the winter of 1941–1942. A whole generation of Greeks was threatened literally with decimation.

The conquered portions of the Soviet Union, where German and Soviet armies were fighting the greatest land battles in modern history, were placed under the authority of Dr. Alfred Rosenberg, the outstanding Nazi Party ideologue. What was happening there, apparently, was matched only by what was taking place in subjugated Poland. The small Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—were annexed to Germany.[27]

But Soviet Russia, too, had conquered territories during the course of the war. Those portions of Finland which were taken as a result of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939–1940 became part of the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic. Eastern Poland became part of the Byelorussian S.S.R. Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, not to mention Bessarabia (Moldavia), were all organized into Soviet Republics and constituent elements within the U.S.S.R. Something of the Soviet intentions with respect to Poland, may be judged from the Soviet-Polish agreements concerning the re-establishment of an independent Poland.[28]

Examined as a whole, it was apparent that totalitarian warfare—military, economic, psychological—was followed by totalitarian conquest. Totalitarian conquest could best be seen by following the Japanese armies in the Far East and the German armies in Europe. Both states were erecting a political caste

[26] Yugoslav sources declared that on October 21, 1941, the German occupying authorities killed 4,000 Yugoslavs, including 100 schoolboys, at Kragujevac. See the *New York Times,* March 21, 1942, and *Inter-Allied Review,* 1:11 (December 15, 1941), p. 23, for statements.

[27] See Chapter 16.—*Editor.*

[28] See Vera M. Dean, "European Agreements for Post-War Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy Reports,* 18:1 (March 15, 1942), pp. 9–10. (For a sharply contrasting view of Russian policies see Chapter 16.—*Editor.*)

system, followed by a new order in economic relationships, with the old capitalistic order giving way to an autarchical system which would have looked like the medieval system were it not for modern machinery. The cultural subjugation of the conquered peoples was designed to perpetuate the new system.

Questions

1. Explain the philosophical background of the totalitarian theory of war and conquest.
2. What were the common characteristics which all the totalitarian communities exhibited? Were there any differences?
3. What was the status of the individual in the totalitarian state?
4. "From the very beginning the National Socialist Government of Germany was a war government." In what respects was this true?
5. Explain why the pressure toward war was less severe in the Soviet Union than in Germany, Italy, or Japan.
6. What is meant by total war? How does it differ from nineteenth-century warfare?
7. How do the Nazi-Fascist forces prepare for the "moral disintegration" of their intended victims?
8. What was the National Socialist Four Year Plan of 1936? How did it compare with the Soviet system of planned economy?
9. How much money did Germany spend between 1933 and 1939 in preparing for war? What were the sources of revenue?
10. Compare the status of the peoples conquered by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Point out the similarities and the differences.
11. Outline briefly the methods of control which have been employed to keep the conquered nations in subjection: political, economic, and cultural.
12. What are the methods of "scientific looting" which the Nazis have employed in conquered Europe? Compare with those of Japan in China and the Far East.
13. It has been suggested that the U.S.S.R. has been pursuing a nationalistic rather than a Communist foreign policy. Explain.
14. What is the reason for the so-called "differential" treatment of conquered peoples under Nazi Germany?
15. Estimate the costs to conquered Europe of Nazi occupation. On what bases are such estimates made?
16. Compare the German occupation charges against France with the reparations charges against Germany following the First World War.

17. Indicate the methods by which Nazi Germany is taking economic control over Europe.

18. Characterize conditions in German-occupied Poland. In Czechoslovakia.

19. What appear to be the Nazi-Fascist intentions with respect to southeastern Europe?

20. What is meant by the cultural subjugation of a people?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Discuss totalitarian war economy (German, Italian, Japanese, Soviet).

2. Describe the German (Italian, Soviet, Japanese) military machine.

3. Describe the condition of Europe under the Nazis.

4. Describe the condition of China under Japanese occupation.

5. Analyze the program of education for conquest.

6. Analyze an example of propaganda warfare, illustrating the strategy of terror.

7. Discuss the Gestapo, the German secret police (or the O.G.P.U., the Ovra, or the Japanese Thought Police).

8. Survey the role of Spain in the Second World War.

9. Describe the conditions of Fascist Italy at war.

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CHAPTER 24

DEMOCRACIES AT WAR

Background and Underlying Ideals

Nature of political and social democracies. The case of the democracies (may their tribes increase) in the present war is remarkably like Leigh Hunt's Abou Ben Adhem—they have been awakened from a deep dream of peace. In the years between World Wars, generous aspirations and exalted enthusiasm were made to serve for reasoned security as men believed that an enduring peace had been found, which would henceforth eliminate world politics.[1] They closed their eyes to the fact that although the First World War had been fought "to make the world safe for democracy," after 1919 there was a surge towards undemocratic dictatorial governments over the whole world. As has been pointed out in Chapter 13, more people were killed in the generation between 1919 and 1939 than had ever been killed in a similar period of supposed peace in the history of the world.

The question naturally arises as to how this could happen. The reply in detail is too long for this chapter, but briefly, some of the reasons lay in the background of democracy itself. Although there had been isolated instances in history where democracies of different types had been evolved—in Athens, in Rome, in the early Christian communities, and in medieval communism—it was not until the establishment of the United States as a free and independent state that democracy really entered upon its great historic role. Slowly at first, in the struggle for constitutional government in Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century, but with ever increasing momentum the idea of parliamentary, constitutional, and democratic government took hold, until just before 1914 students of government both the-

[1] See Isaiah Bowman, "Political Geography of Power," *Geographical Review*, 32:2 (April, 1942), pp. 349–352.

oretical and practical were convinced that it was only a question of time before all forms of government in the world would become democratic. This was the background of democratic idealism and psychology during the First World War.

The most serious problems of democracy came in the economic and social fields, wherein were found increasingly irritating conditions. Groups evolved whose primary purpose was the securing of power—political, economic, and social. Competition enabled the most efficient to become business enterprisers or political leaders, whose purpose then was to stifle competition. When translated into world affairs the competitive struggle developed isolationism and enhanced national individualism until it was a brake upon co-operation among states.[2] Democracy was demonstrated to be no simple clear-cut formula, but a politico-socio-economic way of life which meant one thing in one place and another thing in another place, often turning up disconcerting problems.[3]

Thus it was, after the First World War, that even though Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, the Baltic states, Germany, and Austria had adopted democratic constitutions based on the American, French, Swiss, and British models, the democratic patterns were often perverted. In the confusion, the democratic constitutions and their meanings were widely discussed, only to end in dictatorships as democracy failed to flourish on alien soil.

There was no democratic world economy.[4] The United States, devoid of a consistent foreign policy, tried to protect itself by hiding behind her tariffs, hoping to remain isolated as it had been before the advent of the airplane and the aircraft carrier. It was afraid of the League of Nations and talked of the Monroe Doctrine, the peaceful Canadian boundary, and the protection of the Panama Canal, and so refused to become a member of the

[2] See Margaret S. Gordon, *Barriers to World Trade,* New York, Macmillan, 1942, chap. 1; also Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy,* Boston, Little, 1941, part 1. (See also "Where do We Go from Here?" *Fortune* [August, 1941], pp. 94 ff.—*Editor.*)

[3] This problem is typified in "An American Proposal" contained in *The United States in a New World, Fortune* (May, 1942), pp. 20–30.

[4] See Ernest S. Griffith, *The Impasse of Democracy,* New York, Harrison Hilton, 1939, chap. 16; also Chapters 4 and 7 of this book.

greatest and most powerful democracy, the League of Nations. Great Britain played her game of balance of power and tried to revive Germany into a good customer. France relied on a ring of steel around Germany and in addition, through her alliances with Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium, tried to set up financial control of all of them through loans. These were only a few of the inconsistencies. When the League attempted to enforce democratic concepts of a world order on Japan in Manchuria and Italy in Ethiopia, is it any wonder that it failed?

But most unfortunate of all, the democracies forgot that real wealth can only be produced in the hard way, namely by labor, and they entered upon a period of speculation in the business boom of the 1920's. Writers claimed there was no limit to the coming prosperity. In their effort to win wealth the democracies bungled their own security and political interests. For example, the United States, while deploring the aggressive designs and actions of Japan, sent shiploads of scrap iron to her, thus enabling her to build her war machine. The United States received some of this scrap in return in the form of bombs and shells delivered at Pearl Harbor and other Pacific points on and after December 7, 1942.[5]

The effect of the great depression on democracy. The inflationary tendencies of the boom in the 1920's were followed by world depression with a powerful effect upon the democracies. The increasing complexity of life and the accompanying specialization led to mounting bewilderment, and the general public was bombarded with conflicting economic philosophies, while unemployment and depression led to frustration.[6]

Democracy could no longer afford to be the form of government which governed least, and democratic states began to take over functions previously limited to private agencies. The United States evolved its New Deal. France had its Popular Front. Great Britain had its Labour governments accompanied by a

[5] For this democratic problem, especially as it applied to Great Britain, see Francis Williams, *Democracy Battle,* New York, Viking, 1941.

[6] See G. D. H. Cole and Margaret Cole, *A Guide Through World Chaos,* New York, Knopf, 1933.

mass of social legislation which carried on under later governments. Sweden had its "middle way" based on a modified socialism and co-operatives.

The accompanying growth of bureaucracy led to internal inconsistencies. One government bureau nullified the work of other bureaus. There was increasing confusion and government commissions were piled on government commissions. Out-of-power parties promised that if elected they would clean out the Augean stables of bureaucracy, but upon attaining power they outdid their predecessors in creating more bureaucracy.

Democratic States at War

The defense psychology. After the First World War, democracies in particular were affected by a great increase in pacifist thought. Certain left-wing groups and many well-meaning intellectuals with more or less ingenuity pointed out the sins of the munitions makers, the profit motive in war, the horrors and degradation of legalized slaughter. Militarism was not distinguished from adequate protection and the United States allowed its armed forces to lapse into negligibility. France built the supposedly impregnable Maginot Line. Great Britain relied on its navy. The smaller democracies relied on their systems of alliances, which gave way one by one before the threat of force. Accompanying this development was the idea that all offensive war constituted aggression. Democracies would fight to protect themselves but that was all. This led to the democratic defense psychology, and people even talked about offensive and defensive arms. Such farsighted men as General William Mitchell became martyrs.[7]

The defense psychology tends to confuse means and ends. Are we strong because of our high standard of living? We have been successful in the past; we were unprepared in the past; why worry about the future? In the case of the United States,

[7] See W. F. Kernan, *Defense Will Not Win the War,* Boston, Little, 1942; also J. D. Kingsley and D. W. Petergorsky, *Strategy for Democracy,* New York, Longmans, 1942; also "The Bomber and Billy Mitchell," *Fortune* (April, 1942), pp. 186 ff.

Professor Herring points out that certainly the Spanish-American and Mexican Wars are no criterion and that the Civil War only showed our own weakness. The United States would have been more effective in the First World War if it had entered the fighting earlier. Now, in 1942, in total war the necessity for mobilizing all our social forces is upon us.[8]

In the case of the United States, defense thinking and defense psychology had embedded themselves in the national mind. Ours was a world of individual freedom, arts, sciences, and general enjoyment in which we forgot that lesson of which Nicholas Spykman has so forcibly reminded us recently, namely that war is a normal thing and that the many things which we had come to think of as a part of our heritage can only be retained by fighting.[9] Our mistaken idea of the impregnability of our geographical position was a dream of peace and security, a dream which could be sustained only by impractical idealism, reliance on legal rights alone (freedom of the seas for example), and neglect of our fighting forces.

France. This type of thinking took effect in France especially; the Maginot Line stood as a tremendous monument to it. Thinking defensively, the French and the British chose to remain behind their "impregnable" defenses rather than to attack the Germans during the winter of "phony war." This passive warfare and this defense psychology were further enhanced by the effects of the depression in France, of class arrayed against class, and of groups of the Right and Left willing to resort to violence to settle domestic issues while the enemy camped at the gates of their country. In 1939, after Germany had become united and finished her preparations for war begun in 1933, France was still suffering from the depression and social strife. To aggravate matters, French capital sought refuge in England and the United States, while the Popular Front government of Leon Blum gave

[8] See E. Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1941.

[9] See Bowman, *op. cit.,* in which he reminds us of the same forgotten lessons told us by Mahan's *The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future;* Mackinder's *Britain and the British Seas;* A. C. Coolidge's *The United States as a World Power;* and Fullerton's *Problems of Power.*

For Professor Spykman's work see *America's Strategy in World Politics,* New York, Harcourt, 1942.

France social panaceas which only left the country more disorganized than before. It seemed impossible for the French to appreciate that it might be necessary to give up some of their individual rights and achieve unity by sacrifice.

In an effort to correct some of these conditions Paul Reynaud was made finance minister and later premier.[10] Under him national output was raised to meet defense needs. The forty-hour-week law was modified and the franc stabilized. But this did not mend matters and the power to rule by decree was thereupon instituted, subject only to approval by the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. As a result priorities were given to government orders and defense industry went on to a sixty-hour week. France had always had compulsory military training but now legislation was enacted for the full mobilization of manpower and material resources. By August, 1939, the entire personnel of war factories were requisitioned and directed to remain at work.

However, the policies of labor unions and the Popular Front government had left France without an adequate trained labor reserve. Lured by higher pay, rural workers moved to the cities. In 1939 the autumn sowing of wheat was 50 per cent below normal, and French markets were flooded with livestock which no longer could be maintained on the farm. The government tried to solve this problem by importing colonial laborers. Reynaud issued the slogan of "Produce more, save more, consume less," but six months after the war began he admitted that apart from the munitions output production was still below prewar levels and that consumption had not declined. Prices rose steadily and in 1940 were 39 per cent higher than in 1939. Luxury and nonessential articles remained in the market in spite of lack of labor and lack of materials for war goods.

The government was finally forced to raise money by methods that brought on inflation. Over 20 billion francs in inflationary advances were borrowed from the Banque de France. There was a vicious spiraling of costs and prices shown in the increase of francs in circulation. From August to September, 1939, the

[10] See Frederick L. Schuman, *International Politics*, 3rd ed., New York, McGraw, 1941, pp. 599–603.

francs in circulation increased from 125 billion to 146 billion, and by April, 1940, there were 156 billion francs in circulation. In addition, the sudden mobilization of men for the army drew away a large percentage of the able-bodied industrial and agricultural workers for military service.

In 1939, France, therefore, in spite of her seeming military might, was hardly fit to carry on a war against a first-class power. She had engaged in a good deal of advance planning, but she was unable to carry it into execution. She was weakened by the depression and social strife far more than Great Britain, and although she had anticipated conflict by planning prior to 1939, she had ignored many necessary domestic interrelationships.[11]

This was the France whose Maginot Line crumpled in record time, whose military forces were taken prisoner, and whose productive powers were destroyed in a few short weeks in the summer of 1940. Chapter 15 of this book has recounted the steps in that collapse. The enemies of democracy both in France and in Germany have since joined forces to end the last vestiges of the Third Republic.

Great Britain. Britain's defense psychology, while of a different sort from that of France, was basically the same. She was content to "sleep," to follow the direction of appeasers, and to be lulled by the strategies of the disciples of Liddell Hart.[12] The fall of France and the disasters on the Continent, only wanly redeemed by the heroism at Dunkirk, led to the ousting of the Chamberlain government and the appointment of the fiery Winston Churchill,[13] who for years had been demanding that strong action be taken. Official heads fell as younger and more competent men were appointed to positions of responsibility both in military and civil branches. Parliament too had become more aware of the dangers, and on May 22, 1940, passed the New Emergency Powers bill giving the government complete power over factories. The minister of labor was given the authority to

[11] See D. H. Hopper and J. C. de Wilde, "Wartime Economy of Britain and France," *Foreign Policy Reports,* 16:9.

[12] See Chapters 13, 14, and 15.

[13] See P. Guedalla, *Mr. Churchill,* New York, Reynal, 1942.

mobilize workers, set wages and hours, and prescribe other conditions of work. It had taken England a whole year to get started for the war.[14]

As the numerous administrative deficiencies came to light, the machinery for meeting these deficiencies had to be devised. Sometimes corrections were slow in coming. Thus, while the Air Ministry and the Admiralty took care of the armed forces, the Ministry of Supply did not start to function until four months after the law providing for its establishment went into effect in 1939. Other agencies, too, were charged with the care of the armed forces, for example the Ministries of Food and of Shipping were also involved. Among all of these there was a complete lack of co-ordination. The Admiralty and the Air Ministry each retained control over contracts for the air force, and this prevented the Ministry of Supply from working out a system of joint procurement for all the armed forces.

Financial administration was similarly confused. A cabinet committee under the chairmanship of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was supposed to review and co-ordinate economic and financial policy. Lord Stamp headed the Economic Survey, which advised the committee.

Charge of priorities rested in a ministerial committee on priorities questions, which in turn appointed subcommittees to deal with labor, transportation, production capacity, and other specialties. Yet the government offices generally left the main work of development to private enterprise. They did not wish too sudden a divorce from normality. In order to correct some of these difficulties, thirteen decentralized regional boards were created to bring smaller establishments to production capacity, but as in the case of so many other agencies it took six months for these boards to function after being created by law.

The situation was no better in other matters. Bottlenecks developed. Aircraft manufacture lagged seriously, owing to skilled workers being lured to other jobs by higher pay. A continuous supply of raw materials was not insured. Although regulations governing wholesale prices were enacted in order to prevent

[14] See Winston Churchill, *Blood, Sweat, and Tears*, New York, Putnam, 1941.

rises, prices rose nevertheless because of the lack of experience and information on the part of the controllers.[15]

The problem of utilizing labor also became serious, and haphazard private attempts to secure labor inevitably caused misplacement and inefficiency. As in France, organized labor was reluctant to make sacrifices. There was an increase in unemployment from 1,232,000 in August, 1939, to 1,519,000 in January, 1940, in spite of the fact that several hundred thousand men had entered the armed forces.

From this point on, however, Great Britain began to straighten things out and cleaned up some conditions which bore similarity to those in France. In May, 1940, an Order in Council authorized the Ministry of Supply to control all manufacture of actual or potential value in turning out implements of war.

The Ministry of Labor was drawn from the ranks of labor-union officials, and they assumed responsibility for the recruitment of labor and the conditions of work. Strikes and lockouts were outlawed by decreeing compulsory arbitration for all labor disputes. Whereas the freezing of a person to a specific occupation or trade had previously been frowned on by the democracies, now the employment of miners and agricultural workers in other trades was prohibited. War industries went on a seven-day week and production of items for civilian consumption was cut.

An effort was made by the Ministry of Food to put more acreage into cultivation. Total land under cultivation had declined by over two million acres since 1914.[16]

The story of Great Britain's reorganizing for war during the last two years has been one of further and greater centralization and co-ordination. It is also a story of increasing socialization, of the destruction of many of the old and worn-out aristocratic and class privileges, and of the rise of a new nation more effective and competent to deal with the exacting demands of a total war.[17]

United States.[18] In the case of the United States the problem

[15] Schuman, *Design for Power, op. cit.*, pp. 166–186.

[16] See Popper and de Wilde, *op. cit.*

[17] See Francis Williams, *op. cit.*, particularly in the last two chapters.

[18] See *Fortune*, 24:2, dealing with "Total War for the United States."

of adjustment to war conditions has been somewhat different from the conditions which prevailed in either France or Great Britain. Many political leaders indeed preferred to carry on their quarrels rather than to reach a quick decision on vital issues, and nowhere was this more evident than in the debate over neutrality and the repeal of the provisions of the Neutrality Act. The long months of struggle with neutrality and the growing feeling that it could not escape being drawn into the conflict gave the United States a better chance to prepare than either France or Great Britain.[19] When the war did break on December 7, 1941, it found the people, government, war organizations, and industry ready for the next move.[20]

Here, as before in Great Britain, it was discovered that real leadership and centralization were necessary if democracy was to survive, and in spite of some protests and some opposition the people and the Congress united in giving to President Franklin D. Roosevelt powers to act with the promptness needed against the enemy dictators. This was done without qualms and with the firm conviction that it was "for the duration"—when the war should end a readjustment to more liberal conditions would come.

It became evident as soon as war conditions actually prevailed that drastic changes were needed in the military and naval organizations in this country. The situation was analogous to that which prevailed in Great Britain where the military and the naval authorities had originally been unable to co-operate in the carrying out of war objectives. A tragic and glaring instance of this occurred at the very outset, when Pearl Harbor was attacked; the investigating commission reported sad lack of co-operation and correlation of functions between the naval and military forces.[21]

Furthermore, the bombing of civilian communities in Europe [22] had convinced the federal government that a system of

[19] See Chapter 18.

[20] See W. D. Boutwell, *America Prepares for Tomorrow,* New York, Harper, 1941.

[21] See *America Organizes to Win the War,* New York, Harcourt, 1942.

[22] See "War Comes to the People," *Fortune* (August, 1941), pp. 114 ff.

civilian defense was required in addition to the regular branches of the military services. An Office of Civilian Defense was created to advise and organize the country against attack from the air. Modeled on British experience and on a voluntary basis except for certain federal and state officials, it became a new part of the services in the United States, but not until serious charges of playing politics had been directed against it.[23]

The United States also learned, as Great Britain had, that organizations were needed to provide liaison with the local areas. Therefore the Council of National Defense has a division of State and Local Co-operation. The Council of National Defense consists of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. They nominate and the President appoints certain advisory commissions. Included among the functions of these commissions are transportation, agriculture, consumer protection, price stabilization, labor, industrial production, and industrial materials. The division of State and Local Co-operation serves as a channel of communication between all the defense agencies (including the War and Navy Departments, the Council of National Defense and its Advisory Commission, the Office of Production Management, Division of Defense Housing Co-ordination, and others) and the state and local defense councils. Some confusion was experienced at the outset and a reasonable time had to elapse before action by other agencies could be called for.[24]

Since total war means the mobilization and use of all industries for war purposes, a strict watch over available resources became imperative. A priorities board was established to control the distribution of materials for manufacture. This was supplemented by concentrating production in the hands of the Office of Production Management under the direction of Donald Nelson. The enterprise of all these agencies and the freezing of the sale of certain commodities raised countless problems, heightened by the successive United States promise to supply Great

[23] See A. M. Prentiss, *Civil Air Defense*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1941.

[24] For a reliable statement of current developments see *Victory*, the weekly organ of the Office of Emergency Management.

Britain, Turkey, China, the U.S.S.R., and all countries fighting the Axis powers, in addition to carrying on her own war effort.[25]

Total war, calling for action, soon made clear to the United States (as to other democracies) that it did not have a streamlined legislative machine. Both the House and the Senate had a Naval Affairs Committee. Both had a Military Affairs Committee. Both had subcommittees of their appropriations committees dealing with naval and military concerns. Both had Foreign Affairs Committees and Judiciary Committees. The Committees on Rivers and Harbors were vitally concerned with some military and naval preparations. And, while in theory the legislature was designed to form the general policy, there was no direct liaison with the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, or the Interior, or with the President.[26]

The most serious criticism of democracies as to the war effort has been the interminable discussion that goes with the making of decisions. This was particularly true of France, but the United States also had its share. As already indicated, there have been delays, particularly where a Congress responsive to the people has debated for weeks such measures as the Lend-Lease Bill, which the President and the administrative leaders have desired. This difficulty has now been largely eliminated in the United States because sweeping powers have been handed to the President.

War has served to show the American people more clearly than ever that the increasing complexity of government has caused legislatures to become largely ratifying bodies. They do not have time to deal with many problems, and consequently delegate powers to commissions and bureaus. These agencies are tending to draft more and more legislation. In the United States the Executive branch is presenting more and more bills to the Congress in substantially finished form for its approval or

[25] See in *Fortune:* "How Many Ships How Soon?" (July, 1941); "Critical Areas in the War Effort," (August, 1941); "The General Management" (August, 1941); "The Consumer's War" (August, 1941); "The Priorities Crisis" (August, 1941); "Prelude to Total War" (July, 1941).

[26] See E. Pendleton Herring, *The Impact of War,* New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1941; also Lindsay Rogers, "The Staffing of Congress," *Political Science Quarterly* (April, 1941).

disapproval. It has been similarly noted in Great Britain that the House of Commons is becoming more and more a ratifying or debating body.[27]

Other democracies. Other warring democracies have had their own individual experiences, none of which have been exactly like any of the three named. The experiences of Holland, Belgium, Finland, Norway, Denmark, and Czechoslovakia are recounted in the chapter on the "Continent of Europe." They have succumbed to the more powerful totalitarian powers for the time being.

China, the eastern partner of the warring democracies, continues as this is written the fight begun against the Japanese in 1937. During this conflict she has found a new nationalism and has achieved a unity which nothing else has thus far given her. Her economic life is undergoing change as co-operatives are springing up everywhere. Her tremendous population is in the process of awakening, and a leadership is evolving that will be able to overcome the strength of any major power in the East when it shall have reached its zenith. The Chinese war is a tribute to the power that democratic beliefs still have when they are truly and wholeheartedly held [28] by a people, even when the government is less positively democratic.

Governments in Exile

Closely allied to the major democracies and sharing in their war against totalitarianism are the so-called governments in exile, some of them the constitutionally selected or *de jure* officials who have fled before the invader, others not government officials who as refugees have formed organizations to aid in driving out the invader and who seek the recognition of other governments. They have in general received a friendly reception and support from the democratic governments.[29]

[27] See E. P. Chase, "The War and the English Constitution," *American Political Science Review,* 36:1 (February, 1942), pp. 886–898. See especially "The Case Against the 77th Congress," *Fortune* (May, 1942), pp. 72 ff.

[28] See "Aid to China—When?", *Fortune* (September, 1941).

[29] For activities of the various governments in exile see the *Inter-Allied Review* and *New Europe.*

France. France after 1940 was a one-party state. "Labor, family, and the fatherland" replaced *"Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité."* When Marshal Pétain was made Chief of State with the capital of unoccupied France in Vichy, General Charles de Gaulle, claiming that France had prematurely capitulated, organized a Provisional French National Committee. The British government recognized de Gaulle as the leader of all Free Frenchmen who rallied to his cause. Many of the French colonies showed Free French sympathies. On September 25, 1941, a Free French Council was designated to serve under the presidency of de Gaulle as a provisional government until it could hand over its work to a constitutionally elected French government. De Gaulle, along with some of the French army and navy, made their headquarters in London. The Free French at first were unable to secure the full recognition of the United States, which maintained an ambassador in Vichy. But after the return of Laval to power the relationship between the two governments became very uncertain and in the middle of July, 1942, qualified recognition was given.[30]

Poland. When Poland was overrun, what was left of the Polish Fleet escaped and joined the British. Supported by ships given by the British, it has since distinguished itself in several naval engagements. President Moscicki escaped to Rumania, where he exercised his constitutional right to appoint a successor, Wladislaw Racziewicz, who in turn appointed a government which moved to London after the fall of France.[31]

The Netherlands. Following the invasion of the Netherlands, Queen Wilhelmina and her government fled to London. From there they carried on underground activities with the invaded territories and had direct relations with the Dutch East Indies. After the loss of the East Indies, the Dutch exile government continued to control the activities of its navy, air force, and army, collaborating with the United Nations.[32]

[30] See Schuman, *Design for Power, op. cit.*, pp. 161–163.

[31] See Szyman Wolf, "Poland's New Leaders," *Contemporary Review*, 157:890 (February, 1940), pp. 185–189.

[32] See current issues of *Netherlands News*, published by the Netherlands Information Bureau, 10 Rockefeller Plaza, New York.

Belgium. On May 27, 1940, King Leopold announced that the Belgian Army had surrendered. The Belgian Parliament had already fled to Paris, where Premier Pierlot, at a meeting attended by the presidents of both chambers, held that the king's action was illegal as there was no cabinet approval. A Belgian exile government was established in Poitiers, France, with Pierlot at the head, and received British recognition. The exile cabinet later moved to Vichy, but the headquarters of the French collaborationist government was hardly a place for it. The cabinet then moved to London, whence it established underground relations with Belgium and direct relations with the still free Belgian colonies. The conquered nation thus had a split government, with a king at home and a ministry abroad.[33]

Czechoslovakia. Although Czechoslovakia was partitioned after Munich, a provisional government for its resuscitation was formed in London, headed by the Czechoslovak National Committee. Former President Eduard Benes is head of the exile government, which the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States have recognized. Many Czechoslovaks are fighting side by side with the British. They have their own army and air-force units.[34]

Yugoslavia. When Yugoslavia was occupied by German and Italian forces in 1941, King Peter and Prime Minister Dusan Simovitch fled to England and established a refugee government. At home the Serbs, who are a fighting people, rallied under their great guerilla fighter Mikhailovitch, and supported the Allied cause by forcing the Axis to keep fighting in this area.[35]

Greece. Upon the conquest of Greece the government fled to Egypt. The cabinet later resigned and a new one was formed by Premier Tsouderos. On September 22, 1941, King George, his

[33] See *News from Belgium,* published by the Belgian Information Center, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York.

[34] See Eduard Benes, "Organization of Post War Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* 20:2 (January, 1942), pp. 226–242. For information on current Czechoslovakian affairs see *News Flashes from Czechoslovakia under Nazi Domination,* published by the Czechoslovak National Council of America, 4047 West 26 Street, Chicago.

[35] Information on Yugoslavia is difficult to secure. For background see J. S. Roucek, *Politics of the Balkans,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939; for current information see *New Europe.*

brother, and officials of the government arrived in London and established a Greek government in exile. They undertook the immediate problem of preventing widespread starvation in Greece.[36]

Norway. The invasion of Norway and the evacuation by the Allies saw King Haakon, the crown prince, the government, and all the military forces that could be cared for transported to England by means of naval vessels, privately owned boats, and airplanes. This government then proceeded to set up military training camps for Norwegians, in Canada especially. Norwegian shipping was also transferred to Great Britain for war purposes.[37] Thus one government sits in London carrying on the war, while another, more or less under Quisling, sits in Oslo under Nazi direction and rule.

The significance of the aid given the United Nations by these governments in exile may not be apparent on the surface; but a few items they are contributing follow: a Polish army of 30,000 soldiers, fighting in the U.S.S.R., Libya, and elsewhere; the Free French force in control of the major portion of the French Empire; the gold reserve of several of the countries including the Greek, French, Yugoslav, Dutch, and Norwegian, the last of which amounted to $500,000,000; the Norwegian merchant fleet; Greek, Norwegian, Yugoslav, Belgian, and Dutch troops in Britain, Canada, Africa, the Middle East, the Soviet Union, and the Far East; 200 warships; 15,000 naval officers and men; 1,600 merchant ships totaling 7,000,000 tons; and airmen in the Royal Air Force and all the flying forces of the Allies. There are some 60 ministers and 400 full-time principal members of staffs with hundreds of clerks and secretaries, working in London. Thus the eight European governments in exile and the Free French are making real contributions to the democratic war efforts.[38]

[36] Roucek, *op. cit.*, gives background information; *New Europe* contains current information.

[37] See Vera M. Dean, "European Agreements for Post War Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy Reports*, 18:1, pp. 2–12. This gives the list and description of the agreements signed by the exile governments and the United Nations.

[38] See *Bulletins from Britain*, 89 (May 13, 1942), pp. 7–10.

Joining Democratic Forces

Originally the democracies tried to keep out of war. Great Britain tried appeasement and the United States adopted neutrality legislation. In taking this stand the United States gave up the doctrine of the freedom of the seas for which she had chastised the Barbary Pirates and fought the War of 1812. Such policies later led the democracies into the position of sending too little and too late. After the invasion of Holland, Belgium, and France, the United States realized that Great Britain could not stand if it held to the cash and carry policy, as regarded war supplies. On March 11, 1941, President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act. The neutrality act was amended to allow trading with countries at war and to permit the arming of American vessels. Late in 1941, Lend-Lease appropriations were providing for shipments to Turkey, building a railroad through Iran to the Soviet Union, building docks and port facilities on the Persian Gulf for Saudi Arabia, sending airplanes and tanks into action in Libya, and building military roads and bases for troops.[39] Then came Pearl Harbor and full United States participation and leadership in the war.

Unification of command. The First World War had taught the democracies the necessity for unified command. National jealousies and politics had much to do with prolonging the war. So also, at the beginning of the Second World War, lack of united command was to be seen in the British-French and the British-Belgian relationships, and it undoubtedly contributed to the collapse in 1940.

It was clear then that for proper conduct of the war careful co-ordination between the various countries and the various branches of the service in each country was needed. Great Britain therefore began by uniting her army, navy, and air forces under one command. In the United States the president exercises supreme command, but Mr. Roosevelt did not delegate it to any military or naval leader. The British General Wavell, who had

[39] See J. F. Green, D. H. Popper, J. C. de Wilde, "U.S. Aid to Britain," *Foreign Policy Reports*, 16:20; also Norman Angell, *America's Dilemma; Alone or Allied*, New York, Harper, 1940.

been in charge of the British troops in the Far East, was appointed to take charge of the whole South Pacific area. Admiral Helfrich, a Dutch officer, was put in command of the United Nations fighting fleet for a short time during the battle of Java.[40] As United States troops grew to be the vast majority in Australia, and the southeast Pacific, it was natural and reasonable to put all United Nations forces there under a United States commander. General Douglas MacArthur, after a remarkable defense campaign in Bataan, arrived in Australia and was placed in command.

By the summer of 1942 a close relationship existed between the fighting forces of Great Britain and the United States in the British Isles, Ireland, and Iceland. The tie-up of the military program with the Lease-Lend program was shown by the visit of United States Chief of Staff Marshall and Harry Hopkins to London.

Pacific war council. While it was increasingly recognized that unity of command was imperative, there was a strong desire on the part of Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the Dutch East Indies for a share in the planning and organization of war activity of the United Nations. A Pacific War Council was accordingly established. The aforementioned countries and China are represented on the Council. This move greatly stimulated allied morale, in as much as the Anzacs felt that British losses, the distance of the London government from the scene of possible invasion, and the poor strategic position of Great Britain, made it difficult for the mother country to take the initiative.

The Pacific War Council is not a directing body. It is a consultative body. It cannot give orders to General MacArthur, who has complete command of all the branches of the service in the area. This was emphasized in the order of President Roosevelt creating the Council. The Council can work out proposals and refer them to the High Command sitting in Washington. The High Command has been referred to as the "Combined Chiefs of Staff" of the United Nations.

[40] This battle presents some interesting psychological problems. Some authorities feel that the battle was an unwise undertaking and was fought chiefly to show that the Dutch and their allies would not give up without fighting.

The Effect of War on the Individual

In all the warring democratic countries men are subject to call to military service. The continental democracies generally adopted the French system of universal military service. Great Britain has a very extensive draft system, drafting persons for the home front and applying to women as well as men.[41]

As a result of the war, campaigns of silence have been waged and talk about war industry and activities has been definitely discouraged. In both Great Britain and the United States great ingenuity has been shown in the poster war against loose talking. Men in the services are cautioned against speaking about where units have been assigned. In Great Britain the Home Secretary may detain any individual whom he believes to have acted adversely in respect to defense of the realm. The House of Commons cannot check such action; even a member of the House was so detained, the first time anything of the sort had occurred since the restoration of Charles II.

Where regulation affects freedom of speech, the criterion has followed that stated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes: that there must be a clear and present danger which the community has a right to prevent; that no one has a right to cry "Fire!" in a crowded theater.[42] Meetings of enemy sympathizers are always banned in wartime. What might be permitted in peacetime is forbidden in wartime.[43] Great Britain permitted the British Fascist Sir Oswald Moseley to talk until war was declared, but thereafter put him in detention.

Espionage acts from the First World War have been invoked and strengthened. Reasonable criticism of the manner in which the war is being carried on will probably not be infringed upon. However, advocating the overthrow of the government by force and encouraging desertion in the armed forces, or attempting to

[41] For the American aspect, see *American Selective Service*, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939.

[42] Wendell Berge, "Freedom of Speech in Time of War," *American Association of University Professors, Bulletin*, 28 (April, 1942), pp. 239–246.

[43] See Carl L. Becker, New Liberties for Old, New Haven, Yale, 1941; W. Grimes, "Law and Liberty," New York, British Library of Information, 1941).

destroy their morale are all regarded as treasonable acts.[44]

Freedom of the press is always a war problem. In the United States the newspapers with few exceptions have displayed a fine spirit of self-imposed censorship over military information that may have leaked out. The war has made censorship necessary in all of the European countries and even in neutral Sweden certain issues of her most influential papers have been banned from sale. Under Espionage Acts a paper may be banned by summary action with a hearing granted at a later date, at which time the owners may show cause why the ban should not be permanent. This was the type of action taken against *Social Justice*. The criticism has been raised that a hearing should have been granted before the ban. This amounts to contending that government action should have been taken on other grounds than on the war power.

Every country has had alien registration. Enemy aliens have been interned in detention or concentration camps in England. Fear of large-scale fifth-column activities led the United States to move persons of Japanese descent inland from the Pacific Coast to a colony in the Owens Valley where they have their own town, newspaper printed in English, and social activities. Alien property must be managed by an alien property custodian. The value of such property is enormously greater than in the First World War.

Rationing is something which all Europeans have had to undergo. Practically all necessary goods in England are subject to rationing. In the United States food rationing started in May, 1942, with sugar. Gasoline soon followed. The priorities system is really a rationing for producers. Even neutral Switzerland and Sweden have very little gasoline and have rigid rationing rules.[45]

Conclusions

This account of democracies at war may be concluded by listing their strengths and their weaknesses. First as to weaknesses.

[44] See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652; Schenck v. United States 249 U.S. 47; Gilbert v. Minnesota 254 U.S. 325.

[45] For rationing as applied to the United States see *Victory, cit. supra.*

Democracies have been extremely slow in starting and in most cases have suffered defeats before they have even begun to fight. They have spent precious times in discussion and debate, when they should have been acting. In some cases, Great Britain notoriously, men in vital positions and offices were incompetents, having attained to their positions by virtue of seniority in service, social position, political preferment, and other devious means. These men had to be replaced by competent personnel. Democratic councils have been divided, sometimes because of jealousy, sometimes because of distrust, often because of mediocrity. Perhaps no single element has counted so heavily against the democracies as the defense psychology that branded everything dynamic as aggressive and therefore something to be shunned. Democratic governments have been encumbered with many eighteenth-century vestigial institutions that had to be removed before the duties of twentieth-century civilization and especially of totalitarian war could be performed. War institutions have been adopted reluctantly, and once adopted, have been slow to get under way. Because of the freedom of discussion and debate within their jurisdiction, democracies have been peculiarly subject to propaganda, fifth columns, and nerve warfare. Finally, many of the supporters of democracies are weak allies in a world of power politics, especially most of the governments in exile.

The strengths of democracies easily surpass their weaknesses. Great Britain and the United States have a splendid morale, which defeat after defeat has not been able to shake. The conviction of final victory is the surest antidote against psychological warfare by the enemy. Though they were slow starters, the democracies have weathered the beatings of the first rounds of this war and are growing stronger in armies, navies, air forces, and production as the third year of war ends. Their vast natural resources, tremendous reserves of manpower, and productive plants, the greatest in the world, are geared to the war effort and daily are moving to the superiority which will win the war. The object lessons of France, Belgium, Holland, and the other defeated or occupied countries are fresh reminders as to the

terrible price of too-little-and-too-late, of half-heartedness, and of uncertainty and delay. The democracies are also rapidly mastering the art of nerve warfare. Winston Churchill warns the Germans that Great Britain will promptly use combat gases if Germany uses them against the Red Army. Petty jealousies are being mastered and unified commands are beginning to show productive results. Naval battles in the South Pacific indicate that United Nations fighting ability is only just being mustered. The seizure of Madagascar and the long winter offensive of the Red Army show that the democracies are rapidly changing their psychology to one willing to use dynamic initiative. And the powerful underground millions in occupied countries in Europe have made the life of the Axis precarious.

Obviously the road ahead for the democracies is hard, but it is also bright. In order to win, it has been seen, the individual must realize that he is a part of the total war effort. He is today literally his brother's keeper and must take his part in the efforts of his country. This means that many of the things he normally expected to be able to do in peacetime must now be abandoned until the war is over. Freedom of speech, of some actions under color of religion, of the press, of person, of property, and of occupation are all qualified. Government is assuming a more and more significant role in the personal lives of every individual in democratic states.

Questions

1. Explain the origin of the word democracy.
2. How have democratic ideas changed since the Industrial Revolution?
3. What is the position of the individual in a democracy?
4. Elaborate on the statement "The world was ruled by fear."
5. What were the weaknesses of French democracy?
6. What is the key weakness in defense psychology?
7. Why is Sweden remaining neutral?
8. Why is it that Germany has not attacked Switzerland?
9. Why have democratic states become bureaucratic?
10. What is the difference between democratic leadership and totalitarian leadership?

11. What does total war mean to the democracies?
12. What have democracies learned from Great Britain in regard to defense preparation?
13. To what extent should freedom of speech be curtailed in war time?
14. What differences exist between plans for rationing in Great Britain and the United States?
15. What relation does General MacArthur have with the Pacific War Council?
16. What is the High Command of the United Nations?
17. What are the relations of the United States with General de Gaulle?
18. What aid are the United Nations receiving from the exile governments?
19. What was unique about the government of Belgium after its defeat?
20. Are the United Nations justified in harboring the exile governments?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Review democratic war economy (Great Britain, United States).
2. Discuss the English Dominions and the war.
3. Discuss and report on the stimulation of morale by government.
4. Survey the democracies' aid to the underground movements in Europe.
5. What has been the cost of war to the democracies?
6. Survey the lease-lend program. Discuss the lag between appropriations and expenditures.
7. Discuss democratic political theory and the war.
8. Estimate the effectiveness of the work of the exile governments.
9. Discuss problems in unification of command.
10. Discuss Switzerland as a clearing house for information.

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CHAPTER 25

FIFTH COLUMNS, THE STRATEGY OF TREACHERY, AND TOTAL ESPIONAGE

HITLER's famed "secret weapon" has turned out to be but his willingness and ability to pursue total war. Total war is war directed against the sum total of the enemy's existence, and is moreover the mobilization of the sum total of energies and resources of the whole nation for war.[1] German military writers worked out years ago the concept of *Wehrwirtschaft,* which may be roughly translated as preparedness economy. This concept implies an orientation of the entire economic policy, or even the whole life of a nation, toward military aims both in peace and wartime, war being conceived only as an acute phase of "normal" policies, after which preparation for the next war is to follow immediately.[2] Hence, from the Nazi standpoint, war and peace are the same, each representing a phase of the national will in action. The opponents of Hitler have made a fatal error, therefore, in neglecting to unify the strategy of peace and the strategy of war, just as military strategy, in turn, is utterly useless unless it is part of the larger national policy.

In the strategic sphere of Nazism we find the Nazi concept of total warfare characterized by the generation of a remarkable dynamic energy in the Nazified nation and its leaders, by the use of propaganda, by a freedom of action engendered out of the absence of any moral inhibitions whatsoever, and by the production of strategic conceptions of grandiose kind—the ideas of geopolitics, the strategy of treachery, the fifth column, and total espionage.

Many of the German military writers have emphasized the

[1] Cf. Cyril Falls, *The Nature of Modern Warfare,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1941.

[2] Albert Lauterbach, "The Changing Nature of War," *International Conciliation,* 369 (April, 1941), pp. 214–221; "Roots and Implications of the German Idea of Military Society," *Military Affairs,* 5 (Spring, 1941), pp. 1–20.

significance of *Wofeldkampfe*, or preliminary fighting—the economic penetration and military occupation of important regions in "peacetime"; propaganda among minorities of other nations; intervention in their internal strife with a view to securing friendly political regimes there.

Probably the most effective and essential preliminary actions of this new war strategy, particularly in the first phases of Hitler's expansionism, have been the various subversive activities commonly grouped together as fifth column.

The Fifth Column

The fifth column is one of the oldest forms of tactics in military history, for it is in essence only a highly developed utilization of the old human vices of venality and treachery, combined with the equally old devices of espionage and sabotage. The Nazis, however, have given it a thorough, almost scientific organization. Basically, the fundamental rule of German strategy, whether in war, politics, mass psychology, or terrorization, has been to break the opposition into weak fragments. The Nazi technique is to divide and rule, to cut and recut until the enemy's morale, unity, leadership, strength, and plans are hopelessly broken and disorganized. In the field of psychological warfare, which the Nazis have been waging for the better part of a decade, the program in each victim nation has been to foment group and class antagonisms, aggravate differences of opinion which divide political parties and minority groups, work on the frustrated ambitions of discarded politicians, promote racial controversies, emphasize economic inequalities, stimulate petty jealousies in public life, and widen other cleavages.[3] Integrated with the foregoing, Hitler's technique has also been to keep the nations divided one from another, working on their mutual jealousies and immemorial feuds, concentrating his pressure on one country at a time, enforcing "moderate" demands which enable him, when they are granted, to make further and less moderate demands, and infiltrating one country after another "peacefully" with

[3] Ladislas Farago, ed., *German Psychological Warfare*, New York: Committee for National Morale, 1941, pp. 43–50.

"military instructors," "tourists," and so on, until the number and equipment are great enough to render further disguises needless. This is the strategy of using diplomacy as a war weapon, of economizing men and war machinery by making it a rule not to take by force what can be taken just as well by guile or by threats (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria) coupled with the ancient method of dividing and ruling the objects of the aggression. In this procedure, the actual physical seizure is the last stage of an attack which is preceded by preparatory steps of lulling the victim nation into a mistaken feeling of security through the judicious use of propaganda, weakening its morale, creating internal dissensions and lack of confidence in its leaders, and building up a myth of the invincibility of the attackers (the principle of "the wave of the future"). Everything is aimed at the disorganization of the mental state of the opponent.

This kind of warfare uses fundamental principles—employing fear, doubt, distrust, and enticement—which are as ancient and well-worn as the principles of military combat. But its immediate tactics and strategy bear as little relation to the propaganda battles of even the First World War period as the tactics and strategy of the dive-bomber-plus-armored-column combination bear to the 1916 trench-warfare-plus-foot-soldier attacks. This strategy of terror is no longer, as it was in 1914–1917, a matter of defending one's own course and trying to enlist good will or sympathy for it. It is an offensive operation, carefully correlated with diplomatic and military offenses, designed to destroy morale behind the enemy lines by whatever methods—either of terror or of seduction—may seem most appropriate. It manifests itself in the "extended strategy" that reaches out behind the enemy lines with parachute suicide squads on the one hand and a fifth column of German and native Nazis on the other.

Total Espionage

Adolf Hitler once remarked of his hopes and methods: "The greatest improbability is the most certain." The Nazis, relying

as always upon the moderate rationality of the world at large, have made a use of "improbabilities" in the art of espionage that amounts to cold genius.

While the fifth columnist performs many functions of the spy, he differs from the latter as a social and political type. The fifth columnist strives for a new era of hegemony in world politics; the spy belongs to the past era of the national sovereignty, operating in an international system wherein a balance of power existed.[4] The anti-Axis nations, in espionage and war, floundered along in traditional forms: spying to them was essential military, to be practiced by professionals.

Nazis have, however, revolutionized not warfare only but espionage also. While France's time-honored Deuxième Bureau trained its second-string Mata Haris, and Baldwin ignored as "exaggerated" (that is, Hitler's "improbable") the findings of Britain's brilliant B4, the Germans developed "the greatest espionage organization that had ever existed." [5]

The founding brains of this tremendous machine, according to Riess, were Walther Nicolai, Ludendorff, Goebbels, Himmler, and above all Rudolf Hess. It grew out of Nicolai's conversations with Ludendorff on the nature of total war, out of Goebbels' and Himmler's respect for the methods of Lenin, and out of Hess's studies under geopolitician Karl Haushofer. Haushofer assigned his star pupil the study of Japan—a study which he narrowed to "Japan and Espionage," and on which he wrote a 40,000-word thesis. In 1933–1934, Hess developed his Liaison Staff, an organization whose three basic principles, in utter departure from previous occidental practice were: "Everyone can spy. Everyone must spy. Everything can be found out." By the end of 1934 the Nazis set up the Intelligence Service of the War Ministry under Nicolai; the Organization of Germans Living Abroad (*Auslandsorganisation,* A.O.), under Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, to which we shall refer again; the Foreign Department of the Gestapo under Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich; the Foreign

[4] Hans Speier, "Treachery in War," *Social Research,* 7 (September, 1940), pp. 258–279.

[5] Kurt Riess, *Total Espionage,* New York, Putnam, 1941; also Joseph Gollomb, *Armies of Spies,* New York, Macmillan, 1939.

Political Office under Rosenberg; the Special Service of the Foreign Office under Ribbentrop and Canaris; the Foreign Department of the Propaganda Ministry under Goebbels and Hermann Esser; the Foreign Department of the Ministry of Economics and Finance under Schacht, and the Reich Colonial Office under General von Epp. All these were subordinated to the Liaison Staff, of which Hess was chairman. Its members included Goebbels, Ribbentrop, Rosenberg, Bohle, Otto Abetz, and Ley. There was also that "laboratory for the science of conquest," the Institute of Geopolitics, whose 1,000-odd researchers, states Riess, supplied it with "a series of X-ray pictures of all the countries of the world."

This machinery worked dually: above-ground and underground. While Rosenberg, as "underground foreign minister," played for internal revolution and domestic treachery, Ribbentrop and others took care of individual, strategic, persons, many of them consciously or half-consciously traitors. Ribbentrop snake-charmed the famed Cliveden set, with the help of Princess Stephanie Hohenlohe-Waldenburg-Schillingsfurst, who "modestly" admitted before a British court that it was she who made Munich possible. Canaris, who had worked with Mata Hari in Spain, founded Personnel Department B, whose special function was to "comb the world for potential Quislings." In Belgium, for instance, Rosenberg's Degrelle movement collapsed. But another espionage personnel department secured the services of Henri de Man,[6] with his influence over King Leopold. Lieutenant Dombret of the Belgian General Staff sold Germany Belgium's secret plans for defense long before the war broke out.

Joseph Goebbels' seven departments specialized in particular in counter-action, where "the separate threats of propaganda and espionage are knit together," states Riess. By 1937 it controlled some 330 German-language newspapers in the world, and its reporters were used as spies. Goebbels for his spying used motion-picture filming expeditions; entertainers, from great Wagnerian sopranos down to second-grade cabaret girls; servant

[6] Henri de Man, the well-known author of *The Psychology of Socialism*, trans., New York, Harcourt, 1928.

girls—between 1933 and 1939 some 20,000 of them went to Holland and 14,000 to England; and the famous Nazi "tourists." His agents found places in radio stations; elsewhere Germans installed and operated their transmitters.

In A.O., Bohle had by 1937 the services of 70,000 to 100,000 sailors on German ships and of some 3,000,000 German housemaids, grocery clerks, beauty-parlor operators, nurses, chauffeurs, opera singers, and bookkeepers living abroad. They reported to the consulates on all the aspects and details of civilian psychology, habit, and morale. Bohle had eight Territorial Bureaus; that for North America is No. 6. Until recently, the head of No. 6 had been Walter H. Schellenberg; before he left this country in a hurry in July, 1941, this worthy sat among other "patriotic" notables on the platform in Madison Square Garden, at the great Wheeler-Lindbergh rally on March 22, 1941. "He smiled benignly throughout the proceedings, and occasionally waved a small American flag," reports Riess.[7]

Hitler's Native Exponents Throughout the World

For its strategic purposes, Berlin has supported and worked through a variety of fascist and semifascist groups in other countries, usually held together by an ideology of anti-Semitism as we shall show later—although any kinds of "anti" ideology against the established order, institutions, and government have been sufficient for the offensive purposes of Hitlerism. Examples have been the National Christian Party and the All for the Fatherland combination of Rumania; the so-called Technical Union and Liotich's Fascists of Yugoslavia; the German-Bulgarian Association of Bulgaria; Anton Mussert's *National Sozialistiche Bewegung* and the National Socialist Netherlands Workers' Party of Major von Kruyt of Holland; Vidkun Quisling's Nazis in Norway; Estonia's Fathers for Freedom and the Organization of the Veterans of the International against Russia; Latvia's National Guard Leagues; Waldemaras' group in Lithuania; Spain's Falangists; Salazar's Anti-Communist

[7] Riess also sketches the intricate devices which hold South American, Mexico, and the Near East before the Nazi fluoroscope.

Committees of Portugal; and innumerable other movements throughout the world.[8]

Anti-Semitism as Hitler's International Weapon

Anti-Semitism existed long before Hitler was born. Indeed, it flourished in various forms and in many countries throughout the ages, since the time when Haman, the wicked vizier of Ahasuerus, plotted the extermination of all Jews in the lands of Persia and Media.[9] But in no country has anti-Semitism raged so long and so uninterruptedly or been bolstered up by such a mass of pseudoscientific jargon as in Germany, and in no generation and century has it ever received such an importance as an international weapon.

Originally, it was primarily religious in motive and character though often stimulated by economic jealousy; Jews could escape its barbs by assuming the cloak of Christianity. But Hitler converted anti-Semitism into a predominantly "racial" movement, although he was by no means the first to emphasize the ethnic character of the Jewish people.[10]

Hitler discovered in anti-Semitism the means of securing political power in Germany, and learned that he could utilize it for the same end in foreign countries too. To disseminate hatred of Jews throughout all countries thus became one of the cardinal tasks of the Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment, which piped its line to the German radio stations, news-transmission agencies, and steamship companies, and to a multitude of German societies and associations in foreign countries. The Anti-Jewish World League, the Aryan Christian Alliance, and the Anti-Comintern League worked in close conjunction with the *Fichte Bund* of

[8] F. E. Jones, *The Defense of Democracy,* New York, Dutton, 1938; H. C. Wolfe, *The German Octopus,* Garden City, Doubleday, 1938, give good accounts of various fascist movements abroad.

[9] Hugo Valentin, *Anti-Semitism,* New York, Viking, 1940, chap. 2, "Anti-semitism in Antiquity," pp. 20–26.

[10] He was anticipated by fifty years by a vitriolic German pamphleteer, Wilhelm Marr. Cf. Israel Cohen, "The Nazi World Conspiracy," *Contemporary Jewish Record,* 4 (December, 1941), p. 625.

Hamburg, the "World Service" (*Welts Dienst*) of Erfurt, and the "Institute for the Jewish Question" in Berlin.

The technique was to vilify Jews as the cause of all the world's local, international, and major and minor troubles, denounce them alternately or even simultaneously as bloodsucking capitalists and subversive Bolsheviks, and identify them with everything that was unpopular or obnoxious in the public life or administrative system of each country. This worked two ways; enmity and discrimination against Jews was promoted and the bases of the established government were weakened. The whole theme served as a smokescreen, behind which the Nazis were stirring up demoralization, dissatisfaction with the existing order, and dissension, which gave birth to the underground armies of Quislings and fifth columnists.

Thus in Poland the anti-Jewish policy of Germany incited the Polish Jew-baiting parties, the Endeks and the Naras, to violent disorders and dissensions when national unity was essential for the national safety. Rumania had for many decades suffered from anti-Semitism; [11] the most violent of the country's anti-Semitic parties, the Iron Guard, the terrorist organization founded by the executed Codreanu, was elected by Hitler to help to overthrow King Carol and clear the way for the Germans to come in. In Holland, Dr. van Rappard and A. A. Mussert, preached, as Jew-haters, the conversion of their country into a vassal of the Reich. In Belgium, Leon Degrelle, Rexist leader, assumed that treacherous role. Flemish leaflets from the *Fichte Bund* were distributed, and *Patrie et Travail,* a newspaper, appealed for "Today Austria, tomorrow Flanders. One people, one Reich, one Fuehrer. Heil Hitler!" In France Darquier de Pelle Poix represented the forces of Jew-baiting; in Alsace-Lorraine, the Peasants' League and the Labor Front were so serious in their agitation that the Paris government passed a law in April, 1939, against those guilty of racial defamation. In 1936 there were forty-five Nazi societies and "fulcrum

[11] Joseph S. Roucek, *The Politics of the Balkans,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939, pp. 29–48; Roucek, *Contemporary Roumania and Her Problems,* Stanford University Press, 1932, chap. 9, "The Problem of Minorities," pp. 183–216.

points." In the Near and Middle East, the German government, utilizing the difficulties between the Arabs and Jews in Palestine, helped the Arabs in their revolts. In Egypt, Jews were attacked in vicious leaflets in Arabic and German.

In South Africa, the Nazi organization was already formed in 1932 by Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, a German born in England. A pro-Nazi organization, the Gray Shirts, was founded as a subsidiary to the South African Gentile National Socialist Movement. The organization was seconded by two other organizations; the Christian Republican Movement of Dr. C. De Wet and a new Afrikander Volk Party of General Manie Maritz.

The network extended itself to all parts of North and South America. Adrien Arcand was the leader of the Canadian National Socialist Party; he renamed it the National Unity Party, and was convicted in June, 1940, for his close connections with foreign powers.

In Mexico the process started soon after Hitler's coming to power; in 1934 there was a Comite por Raza in Mexico, proclaiming, "The Jew is the leper of civilization." In Brazil, in 1934, the Green Shirts organized a Hitlerite Fascist Party. The Integralists terrorized the province of São Paulo and exploded a bomb in a Jewish school. In 1934, also, bombs were thrown into synagogues in Buenos Aires. In May, 1938, the Nazi unified their forces with the Green Shirt Integralists and tried to overthrow the Brazilian government. This forced the Brazilian authorities to expel Porto Alegre, the leader, and prohibit all political activities by foreigners. In July, 1941, it was discovered in Bolivia that the German minister, Herr Wendler, was organizing a *coup d'état*, with the help of pro-Nazi military officers; this was frustrated. In the same year, in the Argentine, a vast organization of Nazi propaganda and infiltration directed from Berlin was discovered by a committee of the Chamber of Deputies investigating prototalitarian activities.

Although we do not hear much about a Jewish problem in Great Britain, there is an intimate connection between anti-Semitism and the British Fascists (who have been interned as a menace to the country's welfare). Sir Oswald Mosley and other

Fascist spokesmen made public their sympathies with Germany. On July 16, 1939, Mosley stated that "a million Fascists" would refuse to fight "in a Jewish war." Similar sentiments were voiced by the Imperial Fascist League. William Joyce, one of the best orators of the movement, went to Germany, where he broadcasts as "Lord Haw-Haw."

Jew-baiting in the United States

In few countries has there been such an intimate bond between Jew-baiting and sedition as in the United States. It was estimated in 1939 that there were in the United States some 800 organizations that could be called prototalitarian.[12] They, as well as hundreds of anti-Semitic organizations in every country in the world, received direct or hidden support from Berlin, vast quantities of Nazi propaganda from Paul Wurm's international clearinghouse for anti-Semitism in Nuremburg. The same service was promoted by the *Fichte Bund* of Hamburg, which distributed one of Charles E. Coughlin's speeches charging that most of the leaders of the Russian revolution were Jewish.[13] The *Fichte Bund* also distributed the publications of the Canadian Union of Fascists. At a conference held by World Service, which provided bimonthly material for several hundred pro-Nazi weeklies in the United States, George Deatherage, representing the Knights of the White Camellia and the American Nationalist Confederation, was present. Deatherage was trying to co-ordinate fascist groups in the United States under the American Nationalist Confederation, of which the leading groups were the Defenders of the Faith, the Silver Shirts, the

[12] "The Attack on Democracy," *Propaganda Analysis,* 4 (January 1, 1939), pp. 1–16. Our discussion here is limited to the recent anti-semitic trends in the United States as related to fifth-column activities since 1933. For the history of the Jews in America see Harry Schneiderman, "Jewish Americans," pp. 407–425, chap. 9 in Francis J. Brown and Joseph S Roucek, *Our Racial and National Minorities,* New York, Prentice-Hall, 1937. Also, see *American Jewish Yearbook,* Philadelphia, Jewish Publications Society of America.

[13] Donald S. Strong, *Organized Anti-Semitism in America,* Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1941, is an excellent summary of the activities of such organizations between 1930 and 1940, including the German-American Bund.

German-American Bund, and Militant Christian Patriots, and the old Ku Klux Klan.

Strong points out several interesting things about these organizations.[14] The leaders of the most important groups are for the most part middle-aged or old men (Gerald Winrod was 43 in 1941, Charles E. Coughlin 50, William Dudley Pelley 56, James True 60, Colonel Hadley, 69, and Colonel Sanctuary 71). Major General Moseley, who retired from the United States Army in 1938, had and has many of the requirements of a typical anti-Semitic leader, since his supporters favor "strong arm methods" and the "Franco way." Up to 1938, the members of most anti-Semitic groups had been largely of old American stock, with the exception of the *Bund*. Before Coughlin entered it, the anti-Semitic movement was Protestant; thereafter, much anti-Semitic propaganda was aimed to impress Catholics. All regions of the United States contain anti-Semitic groups, but the greatest concentration has been on the Pacific Coast and in metropolitan New York. The three major sources of their funds are sale of literature, dues payments, and contributions. In the view of Strong, who estimates the anti-Semitic organizations in the United States at 121 in 1941, they are products of the depression, the repercussion of Hitler's rise to power, the slight growth of revolutionary sentiment, and the belief that the New Deal is "communistic." We must add that, as the history of the *Bund* and the relationship of the *Bund* to most of the native United States fascist organizations illustrates, Hitler's agencies have been a powerful instrument also in the recent rise of anti-Semitism in this country.

United States Native Fascists and the Second World War

The blasts that shook Pearl Harbor silenced most of the native fascists in this country, but not all. Coughlin's *Social Justice* offered its opinion to its followers that Japan's surprise raid represented "only a fair job in copying the 'sneak' tactics of

[14] Strong, *op. cit.* pp. 169–180.

Great Britain." [15] While we must go through with the present war, it opined, the ultimate aim is to obtain revenge on the "warmongers" who got us in. Japan, German, and Italy, as the have-not nations, were seen as forced to fight the haves (Great Britain, France, and now the United States).[16] For the United States, so the argument went on, Pearl Harbor was the start of a ten-year war in which the country found itself on the "Antichrist" side and headed for a totalitarian goal. The war was not (even after Japan's attack) properly the United States's war; the latter merely fighting the battle of its allies, a battle for the "imperial supremacy of the pound." It was engaged in saving "the imperial regime of the British Empire," but so doing "does not mean we erase the iniquities of the Peace Treaty of Versailles." Aid to the U.S.S.R. and Britain was attacked, and our defense efforts were termed generally "devious and secret schemes." As to the ultimate aim, Coughlin charged, it was the repudiation of God and the national debt, the entrance into dictatorship and Marxism. The United States had made it necessary for Germany to fight it, and the real job of its people should be to wipe out the makers of the Second World War—the "Rothschilds." Coughlin scoffs at democracy as a "co-operator in crime." How can one have confidence in Roosevelt, he asks, when Roosevelt is run by Jews?

In thousands of letters mailed on December 19, 1941, another American fascist, Francis P. Moran, director of the Christian Front, found President Roosevelt "guilty of murder." By refusing to "grant to the Orient the same right of self-determina-

[15] *Nation,* 154 (January 3, 1942), p. 4; "The Same Old Coughlin," *New Republic,* 106 (January 5, 1942), pp. 7–8.

[16] This is a survival of one of the most unfortunate theses imposed on the American public mind by such works as Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics* (New York, American Book Co., new ed., 1939), and which has been utilized so effectively by Hitler in his initial steps to obtain international conquests as a perfect rationalization on his aggressive steps. For criticism of this "have vs. have-nots" variation of the *Lebensraum* theory, see Francis J. Brown, Charles Hodges, and J. S. Roucek, *Contemporary World Politics,* 2nd ed., New York, Wiley, 1940; Norman Angell, *Peace with the Dictators?,* New York, Harper, 1938, pp. 34-35; H. A. Steiner, *Principles and Problems of International Relations,* New York, Harper, 1940, pp. 408–415; Melchior Palyi, "Economic Foundations of the German Totalitarian States," *American Journal of Sociology,* 46 (January, 1941), pp. 469–486.

tion that we ourselves have demanded in our Monroe Doctrine," the President provoked Japan into making war when it would otherwise "have had no incentive to attack us."

Nazi Trojan Horses

Reviewing the string of Hitler's successes since the break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1938 by Hitler with the help of Czechoslovakia's so-called "allies" (Great Britain and France), we may conclude that the utilization of the German minorities as spearheads of aggressive Germanism has proved one of the most powerful tactics of Nazism. Wherever there are German (and Italian) minorities, they are being used by Berlin (and Rome) to serve the imperialistic interests of Hitler (and Mussolini). Hence the countries where they are settled in large numbers became, or may become at any time, the sore spots on the world's map, not only because these particular minorities are an aggressive element disrupting the states suffering their existence, but also because they may be the victims of resentment growing against such policies.[17]

The utilization of Germans abroad by Hitler as an offensive weapon is based on his dictum propounded in *Mein Kampf:* [18]

"The German Reich as a State must embrace all Germans; its duty is not only to rally and to preserve the most valuable original racial elements, but to lead them onwards, slowly, but surely, to a position of dominance. . . . The same blood belongs to a common Reich. The German people possesses no moral right to colonial activity as long as it is not able to unite its own sons in a common State. Only when the boundaries of the Reich include even the last German . . . does there arise from the need of its people the moral right to acquire foreign soil. The plow then gives place to the sword and out of the tears of war springs daily bread for posterity."

The Nazi program calls for Germans in all countries to be organized along Nazi lines. Those reluctant to join are reminded that their relatives and friends in the "old country" can be made

[17] For their settlements over the world, see Joseph S. Roucek, "Minorities—a Basis of the Refugee Problem," *Annals,* 203 (May, 1939), p. 10.

[18] Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (1935 ed.), p. 1.

to suffer if they refuse. The German language press is brought into line through advertising subsidies, bribes, and physical intimidation.

Concurrently, open "cultural propaganda" is carried on by Hitler's puppets who pay lip service to the country to which they belong. The Nazi Party, at the same time, selects, organizes, and disciplines secret groups of Storm Troopers and Elite Guards, who create the necessary diversion, act as *agents provocateurs* and secret couriers, and start disorders when Hitler's armies are about to march. Those Germans who remain aloof are intimidated by the threats of punishment when Hitler shall march in and realize "One Race, One Reich, One Leader." German radio programs designed for listeners abroad accuse the threatened country of being honeycombed with "brutal and licentious soldiery," calling the police "sadistic torturers," the non-Germans "plundering Communists" (after the Soviet-German pact "capitalists" was substituted for "Communists"), and "warmongers." Germans are beaten, tortured, murdered, and exiled—according to the Nazi propaganda's blaring trumpets. The government of the country to be attacked is accused of "civil disorders," of having "lost all control," of being "unable to preserve the peace." The Storm Troopers and Elite Guards start national uprisings or anti-Jewish riots. If the threatened government desires to come to an agreement with its German minorities, Hitler's subordinates demand additional concessions while professing allegiance to the country they live in.[19]

Nazi Ideology and Machinery Beyond the Reich's Borders

Propaganda is not difficult in a contiguous country having a large German minority. The Nazi reliance has been put on variations of uniforms, flag waving, and appeals to the cupidity of the impecunious section of the middle classes to enrich themselves at the expense of their Jewish fellow citizens. The central theme has been provided by Hitler's official program demanding

[19] Brown, Hodges, and Roucek, *op. cit.*, pp. 509–511.

that Germans abroad must be "not apostles of humanity" but "bearers of the Nordic ideas." "Blood knows no borders" is the Nazi slogan.

Obviously the National Socialist doctrine is opposed to the sovereignty of other states over their citizens and residents who are of the German "race." Prior to the Second World War, reality forced the Berlin regime, both party and government, to separate theory from practice and make a strict distinction between German citizens living abroad and Germans of foreign citizenship. There was also a third category of "lost tribes" of Germanism, such as the Dutch, Scandinavians, and German-speaking Swiss. Germans of German citizenship living outside the Reich are called *Auslandsdeutsche* and are organized in a foreign *Gau* (province) ruled by the Foreign Organization of the Nazi Party (N.S.F.O.) and headed by Ernst Wilhelm Bohle as provincial governor. Bohle is formally related to the German government as Chief of the Foreign Organization in the Foreign Office. The Foreign Organization has thirty-two major divisions, eight regional offices, a press office, agents in more than forty-five countries, and more than six hundred Nazi groups in foreign countries.[20] The organizers are trained in a special Foreign Political Training School, founded by Alfred Rosenberg, the supervisor for the ideological indoctrination of the Nazi movement.

The Germans of foreign citizenship, on the other hand, are called *Volksdeutsche* (or "racial" Germans). The organization serving them is the *Volksbund für das Deutschtum in Ausland* (The People's League for Germanism Abroad), known as the V.D.A. Technically, the V.D.A. is a private organization financed by membership fees and tag-day collections, the token of which is the modest wall-flower, although in contrast to the N.S.F.O. its work has to be "quiet" and without loud propagandist effects because of the foreign opposition at the scene of action. Co-operating with both these organizations is the German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart, headed by Dr. Strolein, the burgomaster

[20] Cf. Otto D. Tolischus, "Hitler Enlists the Germans Everywhere," *New York Times Magazine*, November 21, 1937, pp. 1 ff.

of the town. The Institute has a library of 45,000 volumes, keeps 800 German newspapers and 400 magazines, and maintains correspondents in all parts of the world.

Every year, Germans Living Abroad, as the organization is called, used to convene in Stuttgart. At the end of October, 1937, for instance, the fifth such congress was held. The keynote was sounded by the leader, Bohle, who said: [21]

"A German always and everywhere remains a German and nothing but a German—and thereby a National Socialist." An even more aggressive tone was adopted a few months later by Dr. Frick: [22]

"We will never tolerate that racial Germans living under foreign sovereignty be persecuted merely because of their Germanism. That is not an internal affair of any state which rules over our German brothers. That is an affair which intimately affects the German mother nation. We must demand that foreign nations respect Germanism and protect it."

The "co-ordinated" Germans abroad are rewarded by the full support of the Berlin government. They are favored by the German press abroad, granted material aid and credit in business, relief in distress, free vacations, medical aid, schooling for their children within Germany, cheap vacation trips with the Strength through Joy agency, and liberty of return to the Reich.

The Bund in America

The V.D.A.'s elaborate headquarters in Berlin, headed by Dr. Hans Steinacher, an Austrian, pursued its objective vigorously not only in Central Europe, but also in the United States, where German-American speakers began to repudiate the melting-pot idea in favor of a permanent "German-Americanism." The Americka-deutscher Volksbund had its own uniformed storm troops, girls' organizations, mass meetings, and a press modeled after the Nazi press of Germany. By 1934 Nazi activities began to attract American public attention and re-

[21] *New York Times*, September 4, 1937.
[22] *New York Times*, November 28, 1937.

sulted in the creation of the Special Committee on un-American Activities.[23] The publicity attendant upon the hearings of the Committee and mounting American resentment eventually forced the Foreign Division of the German National Socialist Party to give orders, on April 1, 1936, for the dissolution of the Friends of the New Germany.[24]

But on the same day the *Amerika-Deutscher Volksbund* was formed with Fritz Kuhn as leader. Kuhn, at one time an employee of Henry Ford, stated on different occasions that he had 200,000 followers in forty-two states. But the report which the Department of Justice turned over to the Dies Committee in 1939 estimated the membership at 4,529, although an audience of 19,000 attended the Washington's Birthday meeting at New York's Madison Square Garden in February, 1939. The *Bund* proclaimed its allegiance to the American system of government, and displayed the American flag. Yet it had all the customary Nazi trimmings—uniformed military drill in the Nazi camps, and the following pledge: [25]

"I solemnly swear fidelity to my leader, Adolf Hitler. I promise Adolf Hitler and everybody designated by him known to me or to be known to me, through his credentials, or through his uniform, the respect and absolute obedience due him and give allegiance herewith to fulfill all orders without restriction, and with my entire will, because I know that my leader does not demand from me anything illegal."

English was forbidden in the camps and only the German language was used. Swastika emblems were everywhere. More than twenty schools for German children were set up and teachers imported to teach anti-Semitic principles. Seven months after Pearl Harbor the United States Government moved in on the *Bund,* which had "dissolved" upon America's entry into the war,

[23] Investigation of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, appendix, part 4, *German American Bund,* Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941, pp. 1143–1620.

[24] F. C. Hanighen, "Foreign Political Movements in the United States," *Foreign Affairs,* 16 (October, 1937), pp. 1–20, is an excellent survey.

[25] *Congressional Record,* 75th Congress, 1st session (July 26, 1937), p. 9857. *The German Reich and Americans of German Origins,* New York, Oxford University Press, 1938, is a telling account of the methods used by the Nazis.

but had gone underground in literary, singing, and sports societies. In New York, in July, 1942, twenty-nine Bundsters and associates were indicted on charges of assisting German-Americans to evade the draft.

Four short-wave radio stations sent daily programs to the United States from Germany.[26]

Minorities as a Weapon of Hitlerism

At Munich (1938) the British and French conceded in principle and practice the right of a foreign state, under threat of force, to support ethnic minorities in efforts to secede from a sovereign state. Since there is no country in the world without its minorities, Hitler's doctrine of self-determination has become an important item in the armory of his "secret" weapons for the destruction of his opponents.

Central Europe and eastern Europe, and the whole world for that matter, is freckled with minorities—and nobody has ever been able to define what makes a "minority" justified in asking for self-determination.[27] Since the very dawn of history, individuals and groups have always existed in the midst of numerically stronger and culturally different clusters. Whenever any of such different groups seek supreme power in an existing state, attempting to force the other to act in a certain way even against its own will, the quarrel may create divisions that lead to the state's extermination, especially if it is a quarrel promoted by such aggressors as Hitler, Mussolini, and the Japanese.[28] The country marked for absorption or for dismemberment sees its minorities—such as the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia and the Slovaks of Czechoslovakia—reminded that its "oppressed" minorities must be "liberated." The leaders in Berlin meanwhile stir up imaginary or real grievances and give full

[26] M. E. Tracy, "Radio and the Monroe Doctrine," *Current History,* 49 (November, 1938), pp. 28–31.

[27] Cf. Joseph S. Roucek, "The Nuisance of Minorities," in R. V. Peel and Joseph S. Roucek, *Introduction to Politics,* New York, Crowell, 1941, pp. 158–164.

[28] Cf. Joseph S. Roucek, "Sociological Aspects of the Problem of Minorities," *Social Science,* 15 (October, 1940), pp. 383–387.

support to these dissident and dissatisfied elements. Leaders of the "oppressed" minorities are induced to come to Berlin and ask for "protection" and "justice"—a trick which worked so well in the case of the Slovaks that it was used by Mussolini in Albania.

It might not be amiss to note that the United States is one of the countries most riddled with minorities [29]—minorities which, as we have shown, have in some cases served foreign masters, and might serve foreign masters simply because their land of birth is serving its conquerors. We refer here directly to such an example as the American Slovaks who were overjoyed when their country was "liberated" by Hitler from Czechoslovakia.[30]

Totalitarianism and South America in the Second World War

The totalitarian action in South America reveals two distinct periods,[31] divided by the date when the United States entered the Second World War. Before 1940, Nazism was a growing, revolutionary movement, characterized by uninterrupted propaganda attacks through newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets, radio stations, and also by attempts to bring pressure on private individuals through personal contacts. In all South American republics, carefully organized in every possible detail, there exists a secret army created by agents of the Third Reich, trained especially for the struggle in that continent, which has made use of the services of German residents and the descendants of Germans.[32] In cases where it found weak governments, or willing accomplices it acted openly. During the *de facto* government of Dr. Gabriel Terra in Uruguay, from 1933 to 1938, it went as far as to parade on the public roads in the interior of the

[29] Cf. F. J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek, *Our Racial and National Minorities*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1937.

[30] For such movements, see Joseph S. Roucek, "Foreign Politics and Our Minorities," *Phylon*, 2 (First Quarter, 1941), pp. 44–56.

[31] Anonymous Diplomat, "A Warning from South America," *Nation*, 153 (December 27, 1941), pp. 665–667.

[32] For the statistical distribution of the Germans in South America, see Joseph S. Roucek, "Minorities—A Basis of the Refugee Problem," *Annals*, 203 (May, 1939), pp. 1–17.

republic, playing its march. One of the lines is: "Free streets for the Storm Troops." This technique of provocation was particularly demonstrated in Brazil from 1935 to 1937. There the well-trained Nazi squadrons dominated the populous communities and the industrial towns of the south.[33]

Since there was not too serious opposition to their activities, the Nazis became even bolder. Armed subversive activities and sabotage on a wide scale began to be practiced. But in 1940 the Uruguayan government unearthed a plot to seize the country. Reaction from the masses of its population and pressure from the United States forced the government to take action through legislation and decrees. In July, 1940, the Havana conference, recognizing the Nazi threat to the South American continent from both within and without, passed a series of conventions which might have dealt effectively with the problem had they been conscientiously applied. Nazi activities continued. Between May and July plots were discovered in Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Colombia. Behind the boundary disputes between Peru and Ecuador were the shadows of Nazis, Italian Fascists, Falangists, and Japanese.[34]

Falangists and Axis in Latin America. Axis consulates, legations, and embassies in Latin America and the United States were more or less generally closed. This closing did not, however, affect the use of the diplomatic and consular offices of Vichy France and Franco Spain or limit the aid which may be extended to axis forces in Latin American countries by the *Falange Española.* The Falangists, unlike Germans, Italians, and Japanese, are not easily distinguishable from the citizens of the countries in which they live, and on this fact rests their ability to render useful services to their Axis friends. The Japanese, Germans, and Italians form separate and easily distinguishable groups in no matter what Latin American country they live. Their activities can, therefore, be more easily dis-

[33] For São Paulo's fight on Axis propaganda, see *New York Times,* April 12, 1942; H. F. Artucio, *The Nazi Underground in South America,* New York, Farrar, 1942, offers a mass of information on the subversive activities of the Axis south of Panama.

[34] Anonymous Diplomat, *op. cit.,* p. 666.

covered and combated. The Falangists, on the contrary, have woven themselves into the pattern of South American life to such an extent that defensive measures against them are difficult and perhaps even impossible.

The function that is reserved to the Falangists as fifth columnists seems to be that of liaison between the Axis powers and directing circles in Spanish-speaking countries. In Brazil, colonized by Portuguese, they seem not to be active. The *Falange,* therefore, has nothing to do with the most widely advertised aspects of the fifth-column peril, such as espionage, sabotage, fomenting unrest and discontent or working up popular sentiment against the United Nations, and the like, but remains discreetly behind the scènes pulling secret wires that may influence the actions of upper classes. The Falangists move in circles that are closed to most foreigners. They speak the same language as the ruling classes in Spanish America. Their chief argument is that Germany is a great European barrier against the Soviets and that if Hitler were defeated Communism would inevitably take possession of all the countries of the world. An Axis victory is represented as a thing not desirable on its own merits but as the lesser evil compared to a triumph of the Soviets. Furthermore, the strongly Catholic character of the *Falange Española* enables it to make its influence felt in at least some circles of staunch Catholics.

The strength of the *Falange* is relatively weaker in the Argentine Republic and in Uruguay than on the Pacific Coast, since the greater part of the Spanish working-class immigrants have settled there. Spanish immigrants of the working class are almost solidly republican and anti-Falangist. The greater part of those Spanish immigrants who can be described as intellectuals are also strongly anti-Franco. It is consequently among the middle and upper classes that the *Falange* finds most of its recruits.

In the Argentine, by decree on May 15, 1939, the activities of all foreign organizations were restricted, and similar measures were taken in a few other South American countries. But, apart from this, no effort has been made to curb the *Falange.* If Gen-

eral Francisco Franco, the Spanish *caudillo,* should decide to throw in his lot with Germany—or have his mind decided for him by the Axis—most of South America would without doubt undergo a severe crisis. Many governments and their peoples would find themselves torn between their sentimental attachment to their old country and their loyalty to the democracies and the United States.

After Pearl Harbor. The second period of Nazi activity in Latin America began with the United States entering the war in December, 1941, its Atlantic fleet increasingly active and German submarines inflicting punishment upon American ships on all the seas. Hitler's agents apparently abandoned the field of political warfare in South America, creating a false state of confidence and weakening the tense attention which had been aroused in previous years. The Storm Troops withdrew from the streets, the provocative tunes of the young Germans born in South America were no longer heard. But while the Hitler agents became silent, the fifth columns still existed within the South American governments themselves (such as General Enrico Dutra, Brazilian chief of staff, and General Goes Monteiro, both decorated by Hitler in May, 1940, for "valuable services rendered to Germany by Brazil").

The United States seemed likely to be faced at some time with the necessity for swift, effective political action in Latin America, designed to eliminate from the continent the Nazis, Falangists, Fascist Italians, and Japanese agents.

The Japanese Fifth Column

Up to the time of the treacherous attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941, American public opinion, nursed on the well-meaning but misguided theories of excessive "tolerance," "brotherhood," and "international understanding," and watered by complacency, had permitted the Japanese fifth column to do its job fiendishly well.

There were 126,947 Japanese in continental United States on April 1, 1940, of whom 47,305 were foreign-born and therefore

alien and ineligible for citizenship. Of this number, 80 per cent lived in the Pacific Coast states, and California alone had 93,717 (73.8 per cent) of the total Japanese population of the United States). Japanese residents of Los Angeles in 1940 numbered 23,321, more than in any other American city; of this number 8,726 were aliens and 14,595 were born in this country or its possessions. The city with the second largest Japanese population was Seattle, with 6,975. San Francisco was third with 5,280.

The Philippine Islands had 29,057 Japanese at the 1939 census. Of the 423,330 persons in Hawaii, 37.3 per cent were Japanese and 37,353 among these were aliens.

The military report on fifth-column activity in the Hawaiian Islands prior to the Japanese onslaught on December 7, 1941, buttressed a report made shortly after the event by Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, to the effect that such activities were second only to the fifth-column program that enabled the Germans to overpower Norway. The Washington government's sincere efforts to maintain peace with Japan induced the White House and the Departments of State and Justice to use their combined influence to ward off a public investigation that they feared would embarrass the sensitive relations between Japan and the United States before the outbreak of the war. This investigation would presumably have brought into the open the fact that the Japanese operated a well-co-ordinated system of espionage that reached not only from Southern California to Alaska but also throughout the Pacific in Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, Wake, and other islands that came later under Japanese assault.[35] Among the hundreds of small fishing boats that long have operated off Los Angeles, some were convertible into mine-laying craft and some were equipped with high-power radio sets and manned by reserve officers of the Imperial Japanese navy. Cruising ranges of military and naval aircraft were known to Japanese on the Pacific Coast. Japanese truck gardeners, producing much of the food of the Los Angeles area, con-

[35] "Plots of Japanese on Coast Revealed," *New York Times,* December 11, 1941.

centrated their farming activities in areas adjoining or close to oil-storage tank farms, airplane factories, shipyards and dry-docks, and other vital points where espionage and sabotage might be practiced upon order. Waters skirting the entire coast had been charted and soundings made at strategic points.[36]

With the outbreak of the war, the Federal Bureau of Investigation acted swiftly. Dr. Rikita Honda, head of the Los Angeles unit of the Japanese Imperial Reservists Association, killed himself while detained by federal authorities. A former Japanese army officer and graduate of Tokyo University of Medicine, he attended the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Colorado, and had been the brains of the Imperial Comradeship Society, which directed Japanese espionage on the Pacific Coast.

Educational backgrounds from the United States turned up among the Japanese participating in Japan's surprise blow at Pearl Harbor. Some of the Japanese aviators shot down were wearing the rings of Honolulu high schools and of Oregon State University.[37] Some of the Japanese agents caught during or after the raid had been trusted figures in Honolulu for twenty years or more.

A fifth column and espionage network had obviously been patiently organized over many years. Advertisements, innocent looking and accepted by newspapers in good faith, contained code messages to the fifth columnists. The espionage and sabotage network was directed by the Japanese consul-general at Honolulu and the Japanese army intelligence, with a host of spies —chiefly proprietors of small stores, restaurants, and cafes.

The Japanese consul-general in Hawaii had his own consular police, whose chief job was organization of the *ronin,* organizations of youths educated in United States schools and preserved in their devotion to the Mikado by classes in Japanese schools.

[36] The Dies Committee on Un-American Activities had fifty-two witnesses, some of them Japanese, ready for call in August, 1941. But the Department of Justice advised the Congressional Committee that the Attorney General was "unable to approve" the public hearings which had been planned.

[37] Wallace Carroll, "Japanese Spies Showed the Way for Raid on Vital Areas in Hawaii, *New York Times,* December 14, 1931,

For these the consul-general chose many of the teachers, who were probably spies too.

More highly specialized was the Japanese army intelligence service, operating through a shoal of spies disguised as petty merchants (like Major Hara of Vigan), cafe proprietors, medicine-store operators. It was financed by the Japanese Tourist Bureau. Its opposite number, the Japanese naval intelligence, had its own crews and also worked through civilian fishermen and seamen, hotel proprietors, servants in private families, and —most important of all—produce dealers who supplied fresh fruits and vegetables to the ships in Pearl Harbor and to United States Army posts.

All or most of these agents had been warned to be prepared for action on December 7. Huge swathes in the shape of arrows had been cut in the sugar-cane fields pointing toward the objectives sought by the Japanese airmen; Japanese "amateur" radio operators were caught communicating with the attacking aircraft carriers. Other Japanese were seized photographing damage to naval and military objectives. Japanese truck drivers drove from side to side of the road from Honolulu to Hickam Field to delay American pilots who were frantically trying to reach their planes.

This story would be incomplete without mentioning what the Japanese agents had been doing elsewhere. In the Canal Zone over 1,300 Japanese (together with more than 1,000 Germans and 160 Italians) were arrested; in almost every case, the F.B.I. had been watching the arrested aliens for at least a year. At the end of December, in Vigan, 200 miles north of Manila, a little Nipponese shopkeeper named Hara transformed himself when the Japanese took the city into a Japanese army major, calling himself "military governor of the province of Locos Sur." [38] In Central Luzon, United States anti-aircraft gunners found their camouflaged positions revealed to Japanese pilots by mirrors placed in treetops. The Japanese dropped propaganda leaflets while their fifth columnists on the ground (including

[38] *Time*, 39 (January 5, 1942), p. 23. See also Catherine Porter, *Crisis in the Philippines*, New York, Knopf, 1942.

members of the native Sakdalista Party) spread rumors of poisoned water supplies and many other horrors.[39]

Conclusion

Hitler won his long series of victories by dividing and conquering. But the technique and devices have become obvious. The disunited enemies of the Nazis seem, as this is written, to be developing increasing unity.

Questions

1. What is the relationship of the doctrine of "total war" to the fifth column, the strategy of treachery, and total espionage?
2. What is the fundamental rule of German strategy?
3. How does the modern spy differ from his predecessors?
4. Describe the origin and operation of the "above-ground" and underground machinery of Hess's espionage service.
5. What is the relationship of Hitler's exponents in foreign lands to Berlin?
6. Why is anti-Semitism such a powerful international weapon for Hitler?
7. Name the outstanding anti-Semitic organizations in the world and state their contacts with Hitlerism.
8. What are the outstanding characteristics of the Jew-baiting organizations in the United States?
9. What were the reactions of the United States fascists to the events at Pearl Harbor?
10. What are the Nazi techniques in "co-ordinating" Germans abroad for its purposes?
11. What are the devices used by Hitler's "Trojan horses" in order to weaken the states in which they reside?
12. Describe the organization and working of the Nazi machinery for the Germans living abroad.
13. Show the development of the *Bund* in the United States.
14. Why are the majority-minority relationships "power-relationships"?
15. What are the techniques of Hitler for the "liberation" of "oppressed minorities"?
16. What are the two periods of the totalitarian action in South America?

[39] For the Japanese fifth column in the Dutch East Indies, see "The Japanese Fifth Column in the Netherlands East Indies," in *Netherlands News*, 2:7 (January 6–February 10, 1942), pp. 318–321.

17. What are the dangers involved in the activities of the Falangistas in South America?

18. Why is the doctrine of "internationalism" and "international understanding" partly to be blamed for the tragedy at Pearl Harbor?

19. Describe the fifth-column activities of Japan in Hawaii.

20. Outline the espionage service of the Japanese government in Hawaii and the Philippine Islands.

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Compare various techniques of the "strategy of terror" as applied by Hitler in his conquests of the continent of Europe.

2. Outline the principles of the "extended strategy."

3. Investigate the backgrounds of Walther Nicolai, Ludendorff, Goebbels, Himmler, and Rudolf Hess, and relate these backgrounds to their interest in the development of the new techniques of espionage.

4. Survey the steps taken by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation against the German and Italian espionage (*a*) before the United States joined the Second World War, and (*b*) after the outbreak of hostilities.

5. Survey the exponents of Hitlerism in South America.

6. Investigate the activities of the Jew-baiting organizations in the United States since the outbreak of the Second World War.

7. Outline the techniques utilized by Hitler's "Trojan horses" in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.

8. Describe the organization and working of the German Foreign Institute in Stuttgart.

9. Survey the history of the *Bund* in the United States and the somersaults in its policies.

10. Outline the recent information made available in regard to the fifth-column activities of the Japanese in California and the Hawaiian Islands.

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CHAPTER 26

INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENTS AND SECRET ORGANIZATIONS AS INSTRUMENTS OF POWER POLITICS

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS are, strictly speaking, conducted among states in certain approved forms somewhat analogous to the sociologist's folkways and institutionalized mores. Thus states transact their business by means of diplomacy and according to the principles of the international law of peace and war. But international struggle, in spite of all the limits imposed thereon by any theory of law, any concept of human decency and civilization, is really utterly ruthless. The struggle for power is as amorally efficient as may be permitted by the needs and means of the group which has recourse to the methods involving violence. No methods are too ruthless or too cruel to employ, if, in so doing, any benefit is to be gained. This was very pointedly demonstrated by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and by the bombardment of Manila in spite of its being declared an open city by General MacArthur. If anything is characteristic of the trends in modern international politics, it is the tendency toward the utilization of all unorthodox and unapproved techniques of striving for power. The trend, in turn, is another symptom of a revolution, transforming the traditional social order on a transnational scale, against the recognition of individual rights in domestic politics and the principle of probity in international relations.[1] While formerly wars had been also ruthless and without moderation in their choice of weapons and methods of warfare, and the underground aspects of power politics also flourished, yet in intra-European relations there had been certain checks imposed on fraud, violence and terror by the cultural homogeneity of the European

[1] Hans Speier, "Treachery in War," *Social Research*, 7 (September, 1940), pp. 260–261,

upper classes, related to each other by marriage bonds, by common interests in ruling over the lower classes, or by norms of social conduct sufficiently common to all of them.[2] This applies not only to diplomats but to the class of military officers, and even during the First World War the ruling classes in western civilization restrained themselves in the conduct of war.

Today, however, militarism is not a class affair any more. It is conducted by the revolutionists seeking to tear out the very roots of what we know as western civilization, and determined to accomplish this by war as an absolute war, a concept which makes no distinction whatever —except when it needs to argue over the point for the sake of achieving the goal—between civil and foreign conflicts. These forms of conflict are dealt with in Chapter 25. In this chapter we limit ourselves to the analysis of the most important forms of struggle for power by unorthodox means: to such examples as the murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseilles in 1934 by Macedonian and Croat terrorists trained in Hungary, the underground struggle waged against Hitlerism by Czechs in Bohemia and abroad, and other movements noted thereafter. All such forms of struggle for power, of course, have roots of slow growth over decades and centuries. We shall consider, however, only their modern forms.

The Rise of the Communist International

Prior to 1914, the use of international propaganda as a regular instrument of foreign policy had been considered undignified and rather disreputable [3]—although frequently utilized. But the World War of 1914–1918 taught the belligerents the advantages of combining psychological warfare with economic and military warfare. The initiative in turning to the use of propaganda as a regular instrument of international relations was taken by the Soviet government. The Bolshevik leaders, weak

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 272.

[3] Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939*, London, Macmillan, 1940, p. 172. For the use of propaganda in the First World War see H. D. Laswell, *Propaganda Techniques in the World War*, New York, Knopf, 1927. For the use of psychological warfare by the Allies in the last war see Chapter 9 on "Psychological Warfare."

in their hold on power when they seized it in Russia, found propaganda a very useful weapon for softening their opponents the world over by attracting numerous supporters to their ideological cause—and thus also to the cause of the Soviet Union. The Communist International became a first-class international organization working by underground techniques on behalf of the Communist cause.

Behind the rise of the Communist International was the hope for a labor international, suggested in the writing of the Utopian Socialists of the early nineteenth century, and brought to the fore by Karl Marx and expressed in his rallying slogan, "Workers of the world, unite!" The First International (1864–1876), chiefly a union of French Proudhonists and British trade unionists, disintegrated through bickering over competing social philosophies and the growing animosities between French and German members after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. But it inaugurated the practice of bringing together workingmen's representatives and on several occasions promoted an exchange of practical help across the national boundaries in times of conflict between capital and labor. The Second International, a cooperative league of Socialist parties, was organized thirteen years after the dissolution of the First International (1889), and exists, at least nominally, to the present time, though often called dead and bankrupt. During the First World War (September, 1915) certain prominent figures in the Socialist International met in Switzerland and debated proposals for a civil and class war to end the World War. With the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, the entire world socialist movement eventually polarized into the supporters and opponents of the Russian experiment. In March, 1918, the Bolsheviks adopted the name of the Communist Party for the purpose of distinguishing their organization from the Socialist Parties in other countries. The Third (Communist) International was formed in March, 1919, when this Communist Party in Moscow invited 38 revolutionary class parties of all lands to organize a new International. The representatives, chiefly from eastern and central Europe, declared the Second International bankrupt.

The Somersaults in Comintern Policy

Thereafter numerous socialist radicals in many countries of Europe, Asia, and the Americas were given aid in founding Communist Parties and provided with a common platform favoring direct action for the purpose of bringing about an immediate social revolution.

The postwar history of the Third International can be divided into five periods.[4] Between 1917 and 1921, the Bolshevik leaders expected the "imperialist" war and its military diplomatic loose ends to be converted into a series of civil wars as the prelude to world revolution. They used the Comintern as an instrument for creating revolutionary movements. The Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda was set up in Moscow under three Americans (Boris Reinstein, Albert Rhys Williams, and John Reed), as a recognized organ of revolutionary diplomacy. In March, 1919, Lenin set up the Comintern. It consisted of professional revolutionists organized into national sections, controlled, in the final analysis, by the leaders of the Communist Party of Russia. Part of its program aimed at the capture of the leadership of the Socialist world.

With the collapse of foreign interventions in the Soviet Union and of its economic life likewise, Lenin launched the policy of truce with capitalism (1921–1927). The Comintern promoted the united front with the Social-Democrats. But the Canton-Moscow Entente (1924–1927) ended in the expulsion of the Bolshevik leaders and the mass execution of Chinese Communists. Following the Party's rejection in 1927 of Trotsky's thesis of "permanent revolution," its emphasis on world revolution was held in abeyance.[5] The hope for a rapid industrialization of the country produced another major shift in policy.

"Peaceful coexistence with capitalist states" (1928–1934)

[4] See Bruce C. Hopper, "Narkomindel and Comintern: Instruments of World Revolution," *Foreign Affairs,* 19:4 (July, 1941), pp. 737–750; F. Borkenau, *The Communist International,* London, Faber, 1938, p. 419.

[5] Bruce Hopper, "Potentials of Soviet Foreign Policy," in F. J. Brown, Charles Hodges, and J. S. Roucek, *Contemporary World Politics,* 2nd ed., New York, John Wiley, 1940, p. 216; cf. also Theodore Draper, "The Communist International's Road to Peace," *ibid.,* pp. 614–633.

meant the temporary renunciation of world revolution. Litvinov negotiated a series of nonagression pacts and demanded total disarmament at Geneva. The Comintern was appealing to its followers to "defend the Socialist fatherland."

The third major shift was produced by the fear of Hitler, his persecution of Communists and his proclaimed intention to get the Ukraine some day. In 1935 the Comintern's Seventh World Congress ordered its national sections everywhere to co-operate with all groups opposed to fascism and war. The resulting united front met with some political success in France and Spain. The Soviet diplomats tried to organize "collective security" against the Nazis, parallel to the anti-Fascist anti-war Comintern line, but did not succeed.

Munich (1938) changed again the international situation and a fourth major shift produced the tactics of neutrality and territorial expansion of the "Socialist fatherland" to break the encirclement (1939–1941). The Comintern supported the Stalin-Hitler agreement of 1939. In New York, the *Daily Worker* front-page editorials screamed: "Stop This Imperialist War!" [6]

But with Hitler's attack on the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941, the Comintern had to change its tune again—and is, of course, for full co-operation with all the forces opposing Hitler.

The Organization of the Comintern

The organizational set-up of the Communist Party in the United States reflects that adopted for all such organizations elsewhere. At the bottom are the units—shop units and street units—little groups of six or seven Communists who live in the same neighborhood or work in the same place.[7] They are organized into sections, headed by section committees, and the sections in turn into districts, with district committees. Then comes the Central Committee of the Communist Party, U.S.A.,

[6] Hopper, "Narkomindel and Comintern," *cit. supra.*

[7] "Communist Propaganda, U.S.A., 1939 Model," *Propaganda Analysis,* 2 (March 1, 1939), pp. 1–12, is a very good analysis of the techniques of Communist propaganda.

and finally the Communist International, the supercommittee which dictates the general policies and tactics of the Communist Parties in the various countries of the world,[8] including the United States Party, which has had as many as 75,000 dues-paying members.

Theoretically, Communist Party members are free to discuss any issue until some decision has been reached. Once the decision has been reached, discussion is over, and the decisions are binding on every dues-paying member of the party, and, as in the U.S.S.R. iron discipline is exacted from all. The Communist Parties are organized in the Third International, which arranges for periodic world congresses, and whose leading personnel is connected intimately with the ruling clique of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. Occasionally the spokesmen of the Soviet government propound the theory that they are not responsible for, or in any way connected with, the Third International. It is true that they may not be responsible for the actions of the International; but their own masters, the Politbureau, do control it. Furthermore, between congresses, the real power over the Communist parties of the world is exercised by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, which receives dictates from the Politbureau. The views of Mr. Joseph Stalin probably have a certain influence in the Politbureau and in the Executive Committee.

World communism. The uniting ideological link among the Comintern parties is the ideal of world communism to be realized by means of revolutionary action culminating in the dictatorship of the proletariat.[9] Any movement promoting these ends and helping to seize power is acceptable; hence the revolutionary process takes on different forms in different countries, sometimes favoring democracy, agrarian reform, or national independence.

[8] Earl Browder, *What Is Communism?*, New York, Vanguard, 1936. It should be noted that the Communist Party of the U.S.A., in November, 1940, amended its constitution to eliminate references to any connection with the Communist International. It also transferred ownership of the *Daily Worker* to a group of elderly ladies. General opinion was disinclined to accept the divorce from the Comintern as other than technical.

[9] But not all communist organizations of the world belong to the Third International. See W. G. Foster, "Canadian Communists: The Doukhobor Experiment," *American Journal of Sociology,* 41 (November, 1935), pp. 327–340.

In general, revolutionary work in industrially advanced countries consists of organizing revolutions. In colonial countries, in Latin America, among the Negroes, among the oriental races, and in countries with pronounced anti-Semitism or analogous animosities, the Communists are to aid every struggle directed against "oppression or racial discrimination." But the policy, tactics, and program of the parties are not consistent. They change with every shift in the political weather. While the long-term goal always remains the same (the destruction of capitalism, establishment first of the proletarian dictatorship, next of socialist public ownership with every worker being paid in proportion to what he produces, eventually of communism—the society in which the rule will be: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"), tactics depend on the international situation of the Soviet Union, the current policies of Moscow, and the domestic tensions in foreign lands—in short, on the world situation. For example, the revolutionary programs of the Comintern parties in the United Nations are distinctly latent rather than patent in 1942.

United States Communism in eclipse? That these basic aims of Communism are known to the United States government became evident in December, 1941, when the Congress passed a bill classifying the Communist Party of the United States (together with the German-American Bund) as the direct agent of a foreign government,[10] and ordering it to register all its members with the Department of Justice—although the United States and the U.S.S.R. had both agreed on their war collaboration against Hitler, the common enemy. The action was the culmination of determined efforts by the Dies Committee on un-American Activities urging the Justice Department to prosecute the Community Party for not registering under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.

The Fascist and Nazi Internationals

The activities of the Third International have been successfully imitated and improved upon by international Fascism and

[10] *New York Times,* December 20, 1941. See also the Dies reports, volume 14 (77th Congress); also appendix 5.

Nazism. Rome and Berlin have endeavored to scare western countries with unremitting agitation and the Bolshevik bogey. These have been combined with open as well as veiled support of the Nazi and Fascist organizations of their nationals abroad; of native fascist parties advocating dictatorship, dependence upon Germany, anti-Semitism and aggressive anti-Communism; and of native separatist minority movements working toward the breakup of states either by demanding self-determination or by asking for the protection of Germany or Italy. This subject is treated fully in Chapter 24.

Italian Fascism in America. Because the Italian Fascism did not have to face, until recently, the organized opposition of American Jewry, its promotion schemes received less attention in the United States than the Communist and Nazi activities in America and abroad, although they date back to 1925 when the Fascist League of America was organized under the orders of the Bureau of Fascism Abroad (*Direzione Generale degli Italiane all'Estero*) of Rome.[11] The thesis underlying its activities is Mussolini's dictum: [12] "My order is that any Italian citizen must remain an Italian citizen, no matter in what land he lives, even to the seventh generation."

Italians who took out American naturalization papers were intimidated with expulsion from the Fascist League; Italian-American businessmen were told that such expulsion must lead to grave difficulties for their relatives in Italy.

A threat of Congressional investigation forced the League's dissolution on December 22, 1929. For some obscure reasons the Dickstein Committee failed, however, to investigate the Fascists in the United States to the same extent that it paid attention to the Communists and Nazis—possibly since the Italian-Americans were better organized and more politically potent than the German-American Nazis.

There are, however, definite indications that Fascist activities did not cease. In 1934, Piero Parini, head of the Bureau of

[11] Marcus Duffield, "Mussolini's American Empire," *Harpers* (November, 1929), p. 662; F. C. Hanighen, "Foreign Political Movements in the United States," *Foreign Affairs*, 16 (October, 1937), pp. 1–20.

[12] Hanighen, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Fascism abroad, organized a pilgrimage of American children to Rome, where they were steeped in Fascism and sent back to the United States in Blackshirt uniforms to further the Fascist propaganda. Numerous *Circoli* (clubs) engaged in military drills spread Fascist propaganda. The Fascist boycott was invoked against three New York newspapers in April, 1937 by the Young Italian-American Federation of Greater New York on account of their "anti-Italianism," "anti-Americanism" and "Communism." [13] During 1934–1935, the *Nation* published a series of articles on the Fascist character of the *Casa Italiana* at Columbia University, the largest of all Italian organizations in American universities, accusing it of carrying on Fascist propaganda in America.[14]

Until the deportation of the Italian diplomatic and consular officials from the United States, these activities continued. The Italian propaganda was heard on the air waves, found in both Italian- and English-language newspapers, and was the inspiration of "cultural" societies and of "shirted" militant groups. It reached Italian-American youth by insinuating itself into public and parochial schools disguised as education.[15]

The concentration of Italian immigrants in relatively self-contained communities in or near large cities simplified the work of the Fascist propagandists. Some 2,000,000 persons who fall within Mussolini's definition of Italian live within fifty miles of New York, and were subject to propaganda pressure by Consul General Gaetano Vecchiotti. Radio propaganda masquerading as objective Italian-language news broadcasts was paid for by business firms depending largely upon an Italian-American market. Such newscasts were heard daily in Philadelphia, Boston, New Haven, Pittsburgh, and a dozen other American cities. The Anti-Fascist Italian magazine, *Il Mondo*, listed forty-six

[13] *New York World-Telegram*, April 23, 1937.

[14] On the "cultural side," the Casa Italiana Educational Bureau, under the direction of Leonard Covello, Principal of the Benjamin Franklin Junior High School of New York City, carried on and published a series of studies on the nature and range of Italian contributions to America. See L. Covello, "Italian Americans," in F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek, *Our Racial and National Minorities*, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1937, p. 384, and p. 819 for a list of these contributions.

[15] "Within the Gates," *Nation*, 151 (October 19, 1940), pp. 564–565.

Italian-American organizations in Greater New York whose direction stemmed from the Italian government. These groups were supervised by a "cultural attaché" of the Italian consulate. The graduate school of all Italian-American organizations was known as the Blackshirts, a group of 10,000 men who took this oath: "In the name of God and of Italy I swear that I will follow the orders of Il Duce and will serve with all my strength, if necessary with my blood, the cause of the Fascist Revolution."

By March, 1941, the boldness and arrogance of Italian consular representatives in building a huge network for spreading Fascist ideology in fifty-one population centers of the United States was too much for the United States Government to stomach and the steps taken led eventually to the closing of the Italian propaganda offices.[16]

The tentacles of Fascism the world over. Like the Germans, wherever the Italian emigrants have settled, they are being used by their government to serve the imperialistic interests of Mussolini.[17] During the past seventy-five years, five million Italians have emigrated to western shores. Probably a third of Argentina's population has Italian heritage. At least 35 per cent of Brazil's 48,000,000 inhabitants have some Italian blood. The name of the president of Paraguay from 1928–1931, Dr. Jose Guggiari, suggests the long-standing immigration of Italians into the very heart of the continent. Although many Italians in Latin America have remained definitely proletarian and are active in Argentine and Urugayan labor movements, Rome succeeded in converting, by propaganda and pressure, many Italian settlers to Fascism. Disobedient Italians have been ostracized socially and economically by their Fascist fellows. The further goal has been to convert the governments themselves to the Fascist creed. A Fascist agency in Lima handled all Italian propaganda for Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia and Ecuador. Other agencies, secret or otherwise, exist in Mexico, Central America, Brazil,

[16] Gaetano Salvemini, *Italian Fascist Activities in the United States,* Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1940, is a dependable survey of these activities.

[17] For their distribution throughout the world, cf. Joseph S. Roucek, "Minorities—A Basis of the Refugee Problem," *Annals,* 203 (May, 1939), p. 11.

and Argentina.[18] Various Italian-language papers are published in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru. Rome maintained a press service free of charge for Latin America. Short-wave radio broadcasts were sent out daily from Rome; two-way broadcasts were provided for and many local stations rebroadcast Italian propaganda. The Italian government built a short-wave station, among the finest in the world, in order to contact Latin America successfully. Fascist sympathizers were given free trips to Rome. Italian support of Franco and the latter's victory strengthened considerably Mussolini's influence among the reactionary ruling cliques of Latin America. In some cases Italian aid has lubricated such Fascist organizations as that of Cuba's Jew-baiter, Juan Prohias, or the Green Shirt Integralists of Brazil.

Executions with International Implications

The inability of chauvinistic nationalists to achieve their political aims within their own state compels them frequently to operate within the frontiers of other countries. In the Balkans secret revolutionary organizations have been particularly active in neighboring countries. The killing of the Archduke Ferdinand at Serajevo in 1914 was ascribed by Austria to a Serbian revolutionary society.[19] The most obvious case of political execution was the murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia at Marseilles in 1934. The Croatians [20] and Macedonian terrorists,[21] believing that they could break the Yugoslav state by removing King Alexander and thereby give "freedom" to Croatia and Macedonia, saw in the king's visit to France an opportunity to carry out their long-planned plot. The assassin, Vlada Gheorghieff,

[18] Carleton Beals, "Black Shirts in Latin America," *Current History,* 49 (1938) pp. 32–34.

[19] For the fictionalized psychological and political background of the crime see: Stephen Graham, *St. Vitus Day,* London, Benn, 1933. A more scholarly book, with an introduction by S. B. Fay, which treats history as a novel, is Bruno Brehm's *They Call It Patriotism,* Boston, Little Brown, 1932. This interesting novel is a logical consequence of an innovation fathered by Lytton Strachey and cultivated by such masters of their art as Emil Ludwig and André Maurois.

[20] Cf. J. S. Roucek, *The Politics of the Balkans,* chap. 2, "The Political Pattern," pp. 18–21.

[21] *Ibid.,* chap. 8, "Macedonians," pp. 138–151.

alias Keleman, was a Macedonian émigré on whose arm was tattooed the motto and device of a Macedonian secret society known as I.M.R.O. (the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization). Wanted by the Bulgarian police for other murders, he had been a member of Gustav Perchetz's band of Croat émigrés at Janka Puszta, a farm in southern Hungary less than four miles from the Yugoslav frontier, where he and his associates were trained by former Hungarian army officers to shoot and to throw bombs. The head of the terrorist organization was Dr. Ante Pavelitch, an exiled Croat deputy, who had been living with his lieutenant, Kvaternik, in Italy. After the murder, the non-English-speaking Councilman Ante Valenta of the so-called Supreme Council for Croatian Independence, granted an interview in Pittsburgh. Through an interpreter he said: [22]

"We sentenced Alexander to die years ago—that fiend who butchered our relatives, tortured our friends and murdered the national hero of Croatia, Stefan Raditch. All schemes for the overthrow of the Yugoslav government receive plenty of financial and moral support here. We are so happy we could sigh, when we heard that a patriot had slain the oppressor of our people."

Terrorist assassinations between 1900 and 1939 removed fully thirty important men from activity in the political field. Without mentioning the unsuccessful attacks, we can recall the following victims of political murders: Count Stephen Tisza of Hungary, Premier Dato of Spain, Premier Granja of Portugal, Taalat Pasha of Turkey, Alexander Stambulisky of Bulgaria, Premiers Hara and Inukai of Japan, two Emirs of Afghanistan, President Narutowicz of Poland, Simon Petlura of the Ukraine, Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria, President Obregon of Mexico, President Paul Doumer of France, Sanchez Cerro of Peru, and others. The year 1934 produced a veritable carnival of political murders: Chancellor Dollfuss of Austria, Roehm and Schleicher in Germany, Ion Duca of Rumania, King Alexander of Yugoslavia, Louis Barthou, the Polish Minister of the In-

[22] *Time*, 31 (December 17, 1934), p. 26.

terior, Pieracki, and Serge Kirov, the number two man in Soviet Russia. Considering all the obscure socialists and Communists killed by the Nazis, as well as the Nazis killed by members of other parties, Germany and her occupied territory holds the record for political executions, the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich and reprisals for it alone amounting to more than a thousand deaths. This record has been compared to a somewhat lesser number of executions in Russia.

Revival of the Underground Against Oppressors

Recent news—Czech plots in the Protectorate in Bohemia-Moravia, Serbian sabotage in the dismembered Yugoslavia, Danish and Norwegian anti-Nazi activities, and new and daring "bandit" attacks in German-occupied Poland—reminds us of the perpetual existence in this decade of secret societies and movements. Characteristically enough, it is in times of social upheavals that such activities appear on the stage of history. It is true that there always have been secret societies. Powerful ones have always been intercontinental in their activities and membership; China, the Balkans, and South America have been good breeding places for them.[23] Such movements must be imbued with a dogmatic and fanatic ideology. Their vague aims often have liberty as a basis and are generated by political or religious grievances or by the desire to shake off foreign domination. Being aware of their importance as an international power element, they tend to give up their participation in the ordinary political processes and resort to violence and terrorism at home and abroad. They usually flourish in lands governed by foreigners, dictators, or social oppressors.[24] The members of such movements are very conscious of their own racial, cultural, national, or political unity, and the secret societies are often formed for the specific purpose of changing the form or personnel of government, or of disposing of an oppressor, on the assumption

[23] Richard Wilmer Rowan, *Terror in Our Time,* New York, Longmans, 1941, is an exciting survey of many such activities.

[24] Joseph S. Roucek, "The Sociology of Secret Societies in World War II," *World Affairs Interpreter,* 12 (October, 1941), pp. 289–294.

that use of "weapons of the weak" will bring about changed political conditions or national independence.

The immediate function of political conspiracy, with all its ramifications, is to achieve united and well-timed action by a group in the face of opposition and persecution from the government in power.[25] Criminals are to be found among political agitators, likewise crude rebels amid serious thinkers, religious fanatics and self-seeking adventurers, all side by side in secret movements. They usually become the agencies through which assassinations, *coups d'état,* and revolutions are materialized. Such subversive secret organizations have been innumerable in all civilizations, checking and challenging existing authorities. In recent years their existence has been increasingly as instruments of revolutionary groups, and particularly as the temporarily effective means of checking Hitler's and Mussolini's domination of Europe.[26]

The underground politics of the Balkans. The Balkans have a reputation for harboring many secret organizations. Because of the extreme number of nationalistic and cultural groups in that area, the underrepresentation or nonrecognition of these groups in the ever-changing governments, and the arbitrary methods by which the governmental systems have been imposed on the Balkan nations, the Balkan Peninsula has achieved a deserved reputation for political lawlessness. The Balkan peasant lives in a close relationship with nature. For centuries his mountains, his walled valleys and his wild and treacherous rivers have been his allies against powerful invaders. He relies on these fortifications and his own wit and strength to wear down any enemy. He is far less terrified by mechanized armies than were the French, or for that matter himself before the invasions in 1940. Whoever talks to the Bulgars or the Serbs or the Transylvanians, as they rush from their villages to join the movements against their oppressors, readily sees that for them modern war is just primitive

[25] But secret political organizations interfere in politics also for criminal aims only. In older days they existed to practice magic and witchcraft in addition.

[26] Joseph S. Roucek, "Methods of Meeting Domination: The Czechoslovaks," *American Sociological Review,* 6 (October, 1941), pp. 670–673; "Europe: How It Resists," *Fortune,* 24 (December, 1941), pp. 99 ff.

war—an affair of ambushes, guerilla bands, mountain-pass battles, physical endurance.[27] Violence and rebellion have been accepted methods in Balkan politics and are universally held in esteem. The past nationalistic revolutions have kept the prestige of the military on a very high level, and bullets have frequently played an important part in the political transformation of the region.

With the conquest of the Balkans by the Nazi and Fascist hordes, the Balkan people renewed their old techniques for real guerilla war. The Yugoslavs, in particular, have taken full advantage of it. Three weeks after the collapse of the Yugoslav army in April, 1941, small groups of *Chetniks* (Serbian for "members of the company") began sorties from the hills of central Serbia and Montenegro against German and Italian outposts, mainly for provisions. By June the German and Italian forces had to concentrate around large towns and communication centers; by midsummer some 100,000 *Chetniks* had occupied about one-third of former Yugoslavia, all of it rocky or wooded mountains. By September, 1941, the *Chetniks,* estimated at 150,000, with many Croats and Slovenes joining up, had twice reached the outskirts of Belgrade. Their leaders set up a government, recognizing King Peter II, with its seat in Montenegro, and rechristened their forces the Yugoslav National Army. The Yugoslavs, are, however, but one link in the series of movements which are shaking the conquered ground under the Nazi feet.

The Techniques of Resistance Against the Germans

Germany today is fighting a series of battles against some 200 million rebellious Europeans, resentful of the New Order; these rebels cannot win the war for the democracies but can help the Nazis to lose it. During the summer of 1941 the conquered peoples began to fight back against their tyrants with an indefinite variety of "weapons of the weak"—assassinations, dynamiting,

[27] Joseph S. Roucek, *The Politics of the Balkans, cit. supra,* chap. 2, "The Political Pattern," pp. 10–25; also Roucek, "The Impact of World War II on the Balkans," chap. 8, pp. 188–204, in Harold Zink and Taylor Cole, editors, *Government in Wartime Europe,* New York, Reynal, 1941.

arson, guerilla warfare, strikes, sabotage, passive resistance, and recalcitrance in hundreds of forms.[28] Devices range from stabbing a Nazi in the dark to breaking up a Nazi speech by constant heiling.

Thus in Poland, already largely forgotten by a world grown sick of horrors, more than 18 per cent of the population has been eliminated by the Germans [29]—and yet the Poles fight on. In Czechoslovakia the mass executions go on, but the Czechs fight back with their own methods—putting an undersized screw into a tank or a plane motor, or a match to a silo—demonstrating that "power is not strongest when it uses violence, but weakest—rape is not an evidence of irresistible power in politics or in sex." [30] In fact, the wide range of methods employed by the three small nations which have taken the lead in this desperate game of resistance falls into three general classes: (1) passive resistance; (2) sabotage of all kinds; including food hoarding, slowdown strikes, and bombing of railroads, and (3) individual assassinations and guerilla warfare. All over Europe, where modern conquerors are attempting to produce the New Order, the modern serfs employ one or all of the three methods against the design of the *Herrenvolk*. As examples may be cited the destruction of property; shooting of police and of other representatives of the authorities, notably Reinhard Heydrich; bomb-throwing; attacks on police barracks and ambushing authorities with bombs, rifles, and revolvers; murders calculated to create an international conflict embarrassing to the authorities; kidnaping, rioting; seizing of government and private property; smuggling; boycotting; strikes; and all forms of civil war. The chilly correctness of the Danes toward the Nazis is already reported to be getting on the nerves of the Nazi occupying forces. Or in the occupied Czechoslovakia one attitude of the forces of

[28] "Europe: How It Resists," *Fortune*, 24 (December, 1941), pp. 99 ff.; Joseph S. Roucek, "Non-Political Methods in Politics," *World Affairs Interpreter*, 10 (October, 1939), pp. 290–303; also Roucek, "The Sociology of Secret Societies in World War II," *loc. cit.*, 12 (October, 1941), pp. 289–294; and "The Sociology of Violence and Terror," *World Affairs Interpreter*, 13:2 (July, 1942), pp. 189–202.

[29] C. L. Sulzberger, "The Growing Union of Hate," *New York Times Magazine*, July 6, 1941.

[30] Charles E. Merriam, *Political Power*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1934, p. 190.

active and passive resistance to the Nazi domination is to "say it with flowers." Statues of John Hus, the national hero, on the morning of his anniversary in 1941, were found literally smothered in flowers as a silent protest against Nazi prohibition of the annual pilgrimage to the Hus monument. When Hitler made a speech in 1941 grossly insulting the president of the United States, barely an hour later the Woodrow Wilson monument in Prague was surrounded by a sea of primroses.

In short, the Nazis are learning that the underdog has his own "underhanded, fraudulent, and treacherous" methods which force the unwise conqueror—as Machiavelli pointed out centuries ago—"to stand knife in hand, never able to depend on his subjects because they, owing to continually fresh injuries, are not able to depend on him."

Questions

1. Why were certain limitations imposed on warfare in former times?
2. What are the origins of international propaganda as a weapon of international politics?
3. Outline the history of the three Internationals.
4. What are the five periods of the Third International?
5. Describe the organization of the Comintern.
6. What are the relationships of the Comintern to the Soviet Government?
7. What was the relationship of the American Communists to Moscow?
8. Outline the way the Italian authorities controlled their propaganda agencies in America.
9. What are the strongholds of the Italians in South America?
10. What were the international implications of the murder of King Alexander in 1934?
11. Who were the killers of King Alexander?
12. What states supported these international murderers?
13. What are the ideological justifications for the international underground movements?
14. What are the usual goals of international and underground political conspiracies?
15. Why has the Balkans had the reputation for its underground warfare?

16. What is the I.M.R.O.?
17. What are the techniques of the *Chetniks?*
18. How can the resistance against the Nazi oppressors be classified?
19. What are the methods used by the Czechs to fight the *"Herrenvolk"?*
20. Which of Machiavelli's statements could be studied profitably by the *"Herrenvolk"?*

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. Investigate the relationship of the older forms of warfare to the type currently practiced.
2. Outline the roots of international propaganda.
3. Who were the founders of the Third International, and what were their fundamental goals?
4. Relate the somersaults in the Comintern's policies since its foundation.
5. Outline the organizational setup of the American communists.
6. Investigate the attitudes of the leading American communists in terms of their social backgrounds.
7. Outline the various techniques of the Communist penetration in different countries.
8. Outline any co-operations between the Communists with the Nazis in the United States.
9. Investigate the backgrounds of various international political executions.
10. Investigate the devices and techniques developed in various subjugated countries against Nazism and Fascism.

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CHAPTER 27

PLANS FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER

ONE of the chief inadequacies of the peace settlement after the First World War was the absence of a clearly defined agreement on peace program set up in advance of the termination of the war. In subsequent years the democracies made the blunder of not preparing for defense while living in precarious peace. They can hardly afford to match the mistake by not preparing for peace while at war. The recognition of the errors in the past is largely responsible for the increasing interest in discussions of peace aims of the Second World War.[1] It is a hopeful sign that this time more realism is being put into the study of the bases of a durable peace than twenty-five years ago. The military strategists of the Axis do not hinder the Axis planners from working out, while the battle is still on, the foundations of the world in which they would like to live. The democracies are no less resourceful. They likewise began to search for a new world order the moment the war broke out. Both groups realize that to forecast the exact form of the victory or the detailed terms of future peace is impossible until the victory is actually achieved. At the same time they attach a certain strategic value to defining the peace aims in advance for purposes of strengthening the morale of their own people and weakening the morale of the enemy.

Given the nature of the present struggle, it is natural that the peace aims of the two camps are separated by an insurmountable barrier of irreconcilable principles, and interests. Probably at no time in history have enemies stood at such opposing poles. It is therefore of particular interest to note that both the Axis and the United Nations new orders draw inspiration from several identical assumptions. Both the totalitarian and the democratic

[1] See K. Forster, *The Failures of Peace,* Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1941.

planners visualize a world enduring peace, greater unity, restricted national sovereignty, more integrated world economy, and the supremacy of common interest over private gain. The Axis seeks to attain these objectives by compulsion and for the benefit of the self-appointed master races. The United Nations hope to reconstruct the community of men and nations on the basis of freedom and general advantages. It is therefore appropriate to survey briefly some of the peace plans in so far as they have already been formulated by the official governments and by several private groups.[2]

The Atlantic Charter

The joint Anglo-American declaration of August 14, 1941, was the first comprehensive statement of the peace aims of the democracies.[3] It does not offer a formula of remedies to be auto-

[2] See George B. Galloway, *Postwar Planning in the United States*, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1942; *Research and Post War Planning in the U.S.A., Survey of Agencies*, No. 1 & 11, 1942, and *Research and Post War Planning in the U.S.A., Bibliography*, No. 1 & 11, 1942, both publications by Inter-Allied Informative Center, Section on Information on Postwar Reconstructon Studies. New York City.

[3] The text of the Atlantic Charter as published in the *Department of State Bulletin*, August 16, 1941:

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

First: Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other.

Second: They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third: They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Fourth: They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment of all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth: They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security.

Sixth: After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

matically applied to create the new world in which the democratic people wish to live. As a statement of policy it lays down only broad principles pointing out the way. It postulates long-range objectives rather than concrete methods and it will have to be implemented to become a guide to practical statesmanship.

Unlike the Fourteen Points of President Woodrow Wilson, the Atlantic Charter is binding upon the two governments whose heads attested their signatures to it. The first three of the eight points indicate nonrecognition by the democratic governments of the territorial changes brought about by the Axis aggression. The two signatories "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other"; they desire "to seek no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned"; and they respect "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." The two governments also wish "to see the sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them." This does not mean that the reconstituted nations should not or could not federate by free will. Thus reinterpreted, the Wilsonian principle of the self-determination of nations has wide implications not only for Europe but also for Asia and the rest of the world, which has been affected by the oceanic dimensions of the present conflict. The subject peoples everywhere may rightly claim self-government.

Points four and five of the Charter contain promises for the establishment of equality of international trade and access to raw materials as well as the fullest collaboration for the improvement of labor standards and social security. Point six binds the

Seventh: Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

Eighth: They believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

For detailed analysis see Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "The Roosevelt-Churchill Declaration and the Forms of a Future Peace," *Social Education,* 6:2 (February, 1942).

signatories to work out a framework of effective international security. Point seven refers to the freedom of the seas. Point eight means a radical departure from the peace settlement of 1919. It provides for unilateral disarmament of those nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers. The Axis powers are to be disarmed until an enduring system of general security is established.

It is the intention of the British and American governments not to go beyond the terms of the Atlantic Charter before the termination of the war. It is also their determination not to enter into any specific obligations with regard to the territorial arrangements. Such issues as drawing of national boundaries will have to be postponed until the peace conference.

The situation in 1942 also differs from that existing during the First World War in that no secret treaties have been signed between the United Nations which might jeopardize the peace negotiations, or so it must be assumed. At the same time it would be unrealistic to assume that no preliminary and exploratory negotiations are proceeding between the governments with regard to the territorial arrangements. Special government-sponsored research bureaus have been established by several United Nations to examine the claims of the cobelligerents and those of the enemy as bases for future decisions.

On January 1, 1942 official representatives of twenty-six United Nations (United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia) signed a joint declaration in Washington pledging themselves to employ their full resources against the Axis and its adherents and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies. The Declaration was left open for signature to any other nation which was or might be rendering assistance in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism. Mexico and the Philippines have since been added to the list of the United Nations, bringing their number to twenty-eight.

In general it can be stated that every nation which has lost independence as the result of Axis aggression aims at reconstituting its freedom at the end of the war. At the same time it is realized that a mere return to the *status quo ante* is neither possible nor desirable and that certain changes inclusive of boundaries will have to be made in order to create more stable conditions. The exact nature of these changes is subject to further agreement between the parties concerned.

Peace and the Soviet Union

Premier Joseph Stalin referred to the Soviet war aims in the speech of November 6, 1941. He said that Russia's first aim was to free her own territory, and the second aim was "to free the enslaved peoples of Europe and then allow them to decide their own fate without any outside interference in their internal affairs." Earlier, on September 24, Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky informed the Inter-Allied Government Council in London that his government proclaimed its agreement with the fundamental principles of the eight-point Atlantic Declaration and added that "consistent application of these principles will secure the most energetic support on the part of the Government and peoples of the Soviet Union." [4]

The Order of the Day to the Red Army issued by Stalin on February 22, 1942, by implication referred to the territorial objectives of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.[5] "The day is not distant," said Stalin, "when the powerful blows of the Red Army will raise the siege of Leningrad, will clear the Germans from the towns and villages of White Russia and the Ukraine, Lithuania and Latvia, Estonia and Karelia, will free Soviet Crimea, and the Red banners will again victoriously fly over the whole Soviet land."

The question of frontiers was mentioned more specifically in the Polish-Soviet treaty of July 30, 1941. The treaty invalidated

[4] For Soviet documents see the *American Review on the Soviet Union,* published quarterly by the American-Russian Institute, New York.

[5] Joseph Stalin's speech to the Red Army appeared in full in the *New York Times,* February 26, 1942.

the German-Soviet agreement on territorial partition of Poland in 1939, without giving the Poles a positive guarantee of their prepartition frontiers. The Soviet official newspaper *Izvestia* commented on the 1920 frontiers as ones that should not be regarded as immutable. The British government at the same time emphasized in a note to the Polish government in London that it did not recognize any territorial changes which had taken place in Poland since August, 1939.

The Axis New Order

As the war progressed to its global dimensions, Hitler has been noticeably reticent on the details of political plans in and outside Europe. His last concrete "peace offer" was made on October 6, 1939, after the conquest of Poland and after the agreement with the Soviet Union on the partition of the conquered territory. The German chancellor stated before the Reichstag that "the creation of a Reich frontier shall be in accordance with existing historical, ethnographical, and economic conditions." There was to be "a guarantee for the security of this entire territory" and a reconstitution of a Polish state in such a way "as to prevent its becoming once again either a hotbed of anti-German activity, or a center of intrigue against Germany and Russia." [6] Nazi Germany, he declared, had ended the period of revisions of the Peace Treaties of 1919. "The whole German people no longer see cause or reason for any further revision of the Versailles Treaty, apart from the demands for adequate colonial possessions justly due to the Reich, namely, in the first instance, for a return of the German colonies." [7]

Hitler probably hoped that the western powers would become reconciled to the established situation and refrain from interfering with his conquest. However, his hopes were disappointed. The democracies did not acquiesce in the aggression and the Second World War took its course. The conquest was extended

[6] For a more impassioned view of this matter see Chapter 22.

[7] For full text, see *Documents on the Events Preceding the Outbreak of the War*, German Library of Information, New York, 1941.

to include most of Europe, and in particular all of the zone of the small states in the Baltic-Adriatic-Black Sea triangle. Poland was declared to be an integral part of the Greater Reich, to which the Ostland was added, taking in the Baltic states and a part of White Russia after the German army invaded the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941.

Although no later details were offered of the Axis official political intentions, it is possible to draw upon a wealth of material provided by the controlled press, broadcasts, and utterances of individual leaders.[8] In the political sense Hitler's New Order implies total subjection and gradual elimination of the regions which are regarded as falling within the integral Reich territory. These include, above all, the territories inhabited by the Czechs, the Poles, and the Baltic peoples; northern France; the Flemish section of Belgium; and parts of Holland and Denmark. The treatment of the population of these areas has proved the extent to which this policy is being carried out.

Around the "steel core" of the Greater Reich the rest of the European nations would be arranged in a manner to give Germany an undisputed control over all the continent. Italy, too, would eventually be under virtual Nazi domination, even though she would be permitted to exercise a limited supremacy over the adjacent Balkan peninsula as a "living space"of her own. Europe would be united willingly or by compulsion under Germany's exclusive domination. Individual peoples would be assigned such positions within the orbit of the New Order as would fit in with the Nazi political and economic strategy. In the event of Axis victory the controlled territory would extend far into the Soviet Union, Africa, and Asia. The Caucasian and Iranian oil fields and the British lifeline through the Mediterranean would be placed under German exploitation. In co-operation with Japan most of the surface of the earth would thus be reorganized and rearranged to serve the purposes of the totalitarian nations. In-

[8] For various New Orders, see Ladislas Farago, *The Axis Grand Strategy,* chap. 17; also Francis Hackett, *What Mein Kampf Means to America,* New York, Reynal, 1941; also Adolf Hitler, *My New Order* (Raoul de Roussy de Sales, ed.), New York, Reynal; also articles in *Fortune* (December, 1941, and January, 1942),

ternal order within the *Lebensraum* would be maintained by force and, where possible, in co-operation with local like-minded groups raised to positions of leadership and endowed with political and social privileges.

The experience of Nazi-dominated nations during three years of occupation may serve as an illustration of the Nazi New Order economics in practice, whether the deeds agree or disagree with the previously proclaimed intentions and even if allowance is made for the special economic needs of the military strategy.[9] There would be a high degree of centralized interference in the whole process of production and distribution to intensify the exploitation of natural resources and labor. The output of the conquered and controlled regions would be determined solely by their capacity to produce. The Reichsmark would be the sole criterion of values and exchanges would remain rigidly managed. Agricultural regions would have their manufactured goods provided by German industry to the exclusion of outside states, except where imports of lacking materials would be unavoidable. The capital requirements would also be provided by Germany. Berlin would become the financial center of the New Order empire and the intermediary with other continents. The central clearing office would balance the interstate commerce. Powerful cartels would bind the whole economy in a net of enterprises calculated to offer the master race the maximum of advantages. International cartels and bilateral bargaining methods would take care of maintaining necessary exchange between this powerful bloc and the rest of the world.

One of the frankest declarations of Germany's war aims was made, probably unintentionally, by Walther Funk, German Minister of Economics, in his speech to the meeting of the Reichsbank directors on March 17, 1942. Commenting on the fact that German war debts had reached unimaginable proportions, Funk stated as follows: "This debt will no longer be a problem after the victorious conclusion of the war. Germany will then have such quantities of cheap raw materials and cheap

[9] Paul Einzig, *Hitler's "New Order" in Europe,* London, Macmillan, 1941, p. 147.

labor at her disposal that she can simply eliminate her war debts." [10]

The New Order in Greater East Asia

Japan is a member of the Axis and by the Tripartite Pact of 1940 Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy recognized formally its hegemony in east Asia. The German conception of the *Lebensraum* has been popularized among the Japanese people through government-controlled press and propaganda. There is, indeed, much in common between Nazism and what might be called Nipponism. Yet it would be inaccurate to consider that Japanese expansion in east Asia as a mere copy of the Nazi expansion throughout Europe. Nipponism in its totalitarian aspect and exterior aggressiveness is a domestic flower rooted in native soil. Its imperialist trait can be traced back to the sixteenth century, when the conquest of Korea and China began to figure large in the program of Japan's Asiatic policy.[11] It was not until 1927, however, that Baron Tanaka allegedly proposed to the Mikado the conquest of not only China, Mongolia, and Manchuria, but also of the Dutch East Indies, Central Asia, and India. The authenticity of the Tanaka Memorial became a subject of controversy, but its objectives have become the official Japanese policy.[12]

The war aims and the peace plan of Japan were well summarized in Prince Konoye's official announcement on November 3, 1938, under the slogan "New Order in East Asia." On August 1, 1940, after the conquest of France and the Netherlands, Konoye reaffirmed this policy. The New Order was extended to

[10] For a critical bibliography of books and articles on Germany and war aims and postwar problems see *In Re Germany,* issued monthly by the American Friends of German Freedom, New York.

[11] Kenneth Colegrove, "The New Order Is East Asia," the *Far Eastern Quarterly* (November, 1941), pp. 5–24. A representative list of source material appeared in the Foreign Policy Report on "Japan as an Economic Power," April, 1942, under the title of *A Guide to Material on Japan.* See also "America and Japan," a survey of relations between the United States and Japan, with their background and implications, in *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 218:3 (May, 1941).

[12] G. Tanaka: *The Tanaka Memorial; Japan's Dream of World Conquest,* Seattle, Columbia Publishing Company, 1934.

Indo-China, Thailand, and Oceania. Foreign Minister Arita referred to it earlier the same year as the Greater East Asia Sphere of Co-Prosperity, implying the pre-eminence of Japan's economic interests in the territories already conquered and to be conquered. A plethora of private and semiofficial societies founded during the last fifty years promoted imperialism and tried to popularize it, not without success, among the Japanese masses. As the fortunes of war turned temporarily in favor of the Axis, the Asia to be controlled by Japan took in also the Malay States and Burma, and Nipponese ambitions extended to Australia and New Zealand. However, China remains the key of the program. If China is not conquered, the whole conception of the New Order in East Asia collapses.

However vague the knowledge of the imperialist plan of the Tokyo Government may appear to be, its main features are discernible from repeated official pronouncements. They include the recognition of Japan's supreme leadership throughout east Asia, integration of the territories in a closed bloc, economic self-sufficiency, exclusion of the European great powers, the United States, and the Soviet Union from the benefits of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, exploitation of natural resources in China and other countries, and the stabilization of peace in east Asia through the establishment of a *Pax Japonica* maintained by the Japanese military might. China is to be compelled to become a functioning participant in the establishment of the New Order. Provided the Chinese conform to the Nipponese leadership they may be permitted a vassal status. The alternative is outright conquest. Here the similarity to the Nazi pattern is most conspicuous.

Federal Unions and Confederations

The federal idea has become one of the major elements of most postwar planning.[13] The majority of federal concepts are being advanced by private study groups. Only the Polish-

[13] For evaluation of the federal idea and specifically of Clarence Streit's books, see P. E. Corbett, *Post-War Worlds*, New York, Farrar and Rinehart, 1942, chap. 4.

Czechoslovak Confederation and the Greek-Yugoslav Union were declared officially to be the aim of the governments in exile concerned.[14] The Polish-Czechoslovak declaration was issued on November 11, 1940, and supplemented on January 23, 1942. The two governments agreed on common policy with regard to foreign affairs, defense, economic and financial matters, social questions, transport, posts, and telegraphs. The contemplated Confederation will have a common general staff in peace and a unified command in the event of war. The members will co-ordinate foreign trade with a view to the conclusion of a customs union, and will also co-ordinate banks of issue, financial policies, and taxation; air transport, railway, road, and water communications, and the utilization of sea and inland harbors; there will be unrestricted passenger traffic and cultural interchange. Each state will have its constitution guaranteeing freedom of conscience, personal freedom, freedom of learning, freedom of the spoken and written word, freedom of organization and association, equality of all citizens before the law, free admission of all citizens to the performance of all state functions, the independence of the courts of law, and the control of government by the representative national bodies by means of free elections. The Confederation will be open to other central and eastern European small nations.

The Greek-Yugoslav agreement of January 15, 1942, does not go as far as the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement. The two states do not aspire to have a united diplomacy but will co-ordinate their foreign policy, foreign commerce, and customs duties with a view to the conclusion of a customs union. They will elaborate an economic plan and prepare a draft of an agreement instituting a Balkan monetary union. The two governments declare that the agreement is intended to present the general foundations for the organization of a Balkan union which would include other Balkan States. Both the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav agreements are subject to ratification by freely elected representative institutions after the war.

[14] Text of both agreements is printed in Vera M. Dean, "European Agreements for Post-War Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy Reports* (March 15, 1942).

Among the private federal projects the one for Pan-European union of Richard N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, dating from 1922, has received some attention among the federal planners.[15] The plan calls for the establishment of a federation of European states, including Great Britain but excluding the Soviet Union. The program includes a common policy on foreign affairs, economics, armaments, a supreme court of justice, and a European air force to suppress any revolt by individual members against the Confederation.

In 1939, Clarence K. Streit, former Geneva correspondent of the *New York Times,* published his book *Union Now.*[16] In this book the author called for a federal union of fifteen founder-democracies (United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Eire, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa), to which other nations could adhere provided they subscribed to the same democratic form of government and ways of life. Streit's Federal Union would be a permanent free federation of peoples—not a league, nor an alliance. There would be Union citizenship, a Union defense force, Union money, a Union free-trade area, and a Union postal and communications system. Since the Union would possess within its boundaries 60 to 95 per cent of every essential war material it would constitute an overwhelming economic power against potential aggression. The Union Parliament would be elected by Union citizens and would not be composed of mere delegates of national governments.

After several states passed under the Nazi domination in 1940, the original proposal was modified so as to include immedi-

[15] Count R. N. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Pan-Europe,* New York, Knopf, 1926.

[16] For fuller information on plans for federation see Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now,* New York, Harper, 1939; Streit, *Union Now with Britain,* New York, Harper, 1941; *Union Now Bulletin,* published at Union House, New York; W. Currey, *The Case for Federal Union,* London, Penquin, 1939; and *Federal Union News,* issued by Federal Union, London. See also William P. Maddox, *European Plans for World Order,* Philadelphia, *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1940. For information concerning the Commonwealth solution, see *Union Monthly Forum* of the New Commonwealth Institute of World Affairs, London.

ately at least the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Eire, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Other countries would be added after the restoration of their independence. Streit's idea caught the public fancy, especially among the English-speaking people, and permanent Union main offices were soon established in New York and London with branch offices throughout the two countries. Germany and Italy would be invited to union membership once their governments had proved their willingness and capacity to function as law-abiding members.

Considerable attention has also been paid to the idea of a North European or Scandinavian Federation.[17] According to the Swedish jurist Halvar G. F. Sundberg, the Scandinavian Federation should include Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Iceland. It would provide, as its first task, for common defense, common foreign policy, a degree of common regulation of foreign trade, adjustment of intermember commerce, the revival of the old Scandinavian monetary union, the adjustment of taxation, and freedom of residence throughout the Federation on the basis of reciprocity.

Another regional union for northern Europe was proposed by Professor Kazys Pakštas, president of the Geographical Society of Lithuania, under the name of the Baltoscandian Confederation.[18] The Confederation should comprise Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, a region of nearly one million and a half square kilometers and twenty-four million inhabitants. The constitution of the Baltoscandian Confederation should be modeled on the constitutions of Switzerland, the United States, and the British Commonwealth. Each of the seven member states would safeguard its language and its culture rooted in centuries-old historical tradition. There would be, however, a Confederation Congress and Senate established along the pattern of the United States. A Baltoscandian

[17] For more on the Scandinavian Federation, see Gunnar Leistikow, "Scandinavian Collaboration," *American-Scandinavian Review* (Spring, 1942).

[18] Kazys Pakštas, *The Baltoscandian Confederation*, Chicago, Lithuanian Cultural Institute, March, 1942.

Committee, composed of delegates selected by the parliaments of the seven member states would formulate common foreign and defense policy. In some locations the countries of Baltoscandia could have common diplomatic and consular missions.[19]

In 1932 the New Commonwealth Society was founded in England to propagate the idea of an international equity tribunal and an international police force. The tribunal would settle all political disputes and facilitate peaceful change. In that way the problem of international stability and peaceful change would be solved and the states would be working interdependently to promote a progressive world order. The New Commonwealth Society takes the view that a European association of nations should precede world union. The association should have an equity tribunal to solve political issues, a judiciary to settle legal controversies, an assembly to legislate in matters of common interest, and an executive. The legislative assembly might administer certain colonies as mandates. The chief task of the executive would be to provide for the common defensive force.

Dr. Eduard Benes, the Czechoslovak president in exile, envisions a future Europe organized on the basis of a permanent equilibrium of power by means of several larger blocs of a federal or confederal character. In the west, France and Great Britain would form a bloc, possibly with some smaller nations. (It may be remembered that on the eve of the collapse of France in 1940 Prime Minister Winston Churchill offered that country a federation.) Another such bloc could be formed of the Scandinavian nations. The Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation would form the basis of a political and economic unit in the Baltic-Danubian region. The Greek-Yugoslav Union could be the starting point for a Balkan Union. Germany should be converted to a federation of autonomous states. Prussia should be divided into four smaller autonomous units in order to break up the Prussian hegemony over the rest of Germany. The Soviet Union, which already forms a federation, should be an element of all-

[19] For a survey of this phase of the subject see Milic Kybal, "Federative Movements in East-Central Europe," *World Affairs Interpreter*, 13 (April, 1942), pp. 84–87.

European balance and should co-operate in the general postwar organization and reconstruction.[20]

American-British Co-operation

The union of the two largest English-speaking peoples has been widely discussed by intellectuals and theoretical and practical planners. The war emergency has brought the governments of the United States and Great Britain into intimate contact in many activities such as the transfer of war material and food, shipping and shipbuilding, the Lend-Lease program, and common strategy. An analogous co-operation took place during the First World War, though on somewhat different lines. In 1919 the two countries returned to international competition and rivalry and the experiences gained under duress were lost when conditions became more normal.[21]

The discussions, taking place in the very course of the war, concerning postwar British-United States collaboration, are inspired by the consideration that many of the errors of the past could be eliminated in the future provided the two nations agree on a plan of postwar integration of their resources and sharing of responsibilities.[22] Secretary Knox declared on October 1, 1941, that "it is the hope of the world that sea power for the next hundred years, at least, will reside in the hands of the two great nations which now possess that power, the United States and Great Britain." From the British side similar pronouncements have been made officially and by private molders of public opinion. It must be realized, however, that the co-ordination of war efforts is to a large extent a technical problem under duress.

[20] Eduard Benes, "Organization of Post-War Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* 20:2 (January, 1942).

[21] For the text of the Anglo-United States Economic Pact of 1942, see the *Inter-Allied Review* (March 15, 1942). For the economic side of American-British co-operation see *Reconstruction,* A report by the Federation of British Industries submitted to the British Board of Trade by request, April, 1942; also press release by the National Foreign Trade Council, *New York Herald-Tribune,* July 11, 1942.

[22] See *United States—Co-operation with British Nations,* National Planning Association, Pamphlet No. 6, 1941.

Postwar collaboration in peacetime, on the other hand, is essentially a problem of policy. In order that a postwar plan for collaboration should succeed it would be necessary to remove the psychological obstacles as well as those originated in the domain of private interests. Sharing the responsibilities spread over the wide oceans and establishing a common approach to problems involving the vital interests of the non-English-speaking nations, especially the Latin American republics, are tasks that could hardly be accomplished without the re-education of the masses and without their having direct share in the conduct of such policies.

Whether the United States-British co-operation is conceived in terms of a federation or on the basis of paramount power, the program involved is certain to meet difficulties. The planners who favor the power concept have the advantage of dealing with the problem on more established grounds. Theirs would be a peace enforced by British-United States power, mainly naval, preponderant over all other world power. This thought is not balance of power, in the traditional sense of two great alliances so evenly balanced that neither of them would risk aggression, but exercise of power through the predominance of the United Nations under Anglo-United States leadership.

Although much attention has been devoted to the study of the Anglo-United States scheme no concrete plan has yet been made public officially. The present writer and others feel that a start should be made while the war is still on and the various co-ordinating offices function. Unless a practicable plan is thus conceived, the ceasing of hostilities might divert the general attention to more pressing national problems and in such a situation many of the promising wartime gains might be lost.

In this respect the understanding between Great Britain and the Soviet Union and the United States and the Soviet Union announced on June 11, 1942, represents an important step on the road toward postwar collaboration between the three most powerful nations. Within the framework of this understanding Great Britain and the Soviet Union signed a twenty-year military alliance which may create the nucleus around which European

postwar security could be rebuilt. The two countries envisage thus Europe in which they would, together with other likeminded states, preserve peace and resist aggression by common action. Basing the alliance on the Atlantic Charter, the two countries also undertook to render one another all possible economic assistance during and after the war.

The chief interest of the United States in the Anglo-Russian-American negotiations was concerned with the military problems of opening a second front in Europe and accelerating shipments and deliveries of war material to Russia. Russia's demand for a second front and increased deliveries of war material received sympathetic response from the Washington government. This fact was responsible for improving substantially the feeling of mutuality between Moscow and the United States, and should this feeling survive the war and be projected to peace time problems, it might be possible to vizualize postwar unity such as has never been obtainable between wars. It might even be possible to reduce the obstacles of collaboration arising from the difference of ideologies and concentrate on united action dictated by enlightened self-interest.

The League of Nations

Contrary to popular opinion, the League of Nations did not entirely die when the war began. It survived in spirit and to some extent in body. At its headquarters in Geneva useful research activities in humanitarian and technical fields were continued by a reduced staff of experts. The Economic, Financial and Transit Department was temporarily transferred to Princeton, New Jersey, at the invitation of Princeton University, the Rockefeller Institute, and the Institute for Advanced Study. According to A. Loveday, Director of the Department, it took as its main object to consider in advance some of the innumerable problems which will arise for settlement if the world is to have any chance of permanent peace. The preservation of the humanitarian and technical services is held desirable by most experts as a part of whatever type of international organization

the world may adopt after the war. Great Britain continued to support the League financially, and even Vichy France paid the 1941 contribution.

The League of Nations was conceived on the expectation of participation by the United States. The withdrawal of the latter from international co-operation after the First World War was one of the causes of the League's political failure. A marked reversal of American public opinion on the question of membership is therefore worthy of note. According to the Gallup Poll, in 1941 the proportion of those favoring the United States joining a future League reached 49 per cent as compared with 33 per cent in 1937. Wendell Willkie undoubtedly voiced the opinions of this increasing number of sympathizers when he stated, in August, 1941, that "out of the horror of this war will come a new order, a League of All Nations, with an international police to maintain order."

Even the most ardent supporters of the League idea do not however, envisage the revival of the League of Nations in its 1919 form.[23] They believe that it is of importance to keep up the accumulated experience of the twenty years of international co-operation, but agree that in order to perform its political functions a future League must be invested with adequate sovereignty and universality. Obligatory arbitration of international disputes, an international army (either supranational and voluntary in character or composed of national contingents subject to a united command), and inclusion of all great and small states are among the reforms recommended to make a League a working institution. The League of the future would thus develop beyond a mere association of sovereign nations to become a federation or a kind of a superstate. The planners of a universal institution of the League type agree that unless they are backed by military force and the willingness to apply it no sanctions against a lawbreaker state can have any chance of success. Such

[23] For plans concerning the reorganization of the League of Nations, see various articles in *Changing World*, issued monthly by the League of Nations Association, New York. Also see S. Engel, *League Reform*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1940; also Ross S. Hoffman, *The Great Republic*, New York, Sheed, 1942.

a plan would inevitably presuppose limitations of national sovereignty, yet without them no effective agency for enforcing peace can be evolved.

International Labor Organization

Of all the international agencies set up after the First World War, the International Labor Organization seems most likely to survive the Second World War. The principal working center of the I.L.O. is at Montreal on the campus of McGill University, but the office at Geneva also remains open. The annual conference held in New York in November, 1941, was attended by 211 accredited delegates representing 34 different nations.[24] A feature of the Conference was the interest manifested in its work on the part of the government of the United States. In eleven resolutions the Conference stressed the necessity of basing postwar reconstruction on the tripartite principle of collaboration between the national governments, workers' delegates, and representatives of employers.

The Conference claimed the right to be represented effectively at any peace or reconstruction conference at the end of the war and to be given a social mandate in the future society, amounting to a general declaration of international social policy. The mandate should cover such problems as the elimination by international action of unemployment, an international public-works policy, the organization of migration and settlement for employment under adequate guarantees, the improvement and extension of social insurance with regard to all classes of workers, a minimum living wage, greater equality of occupational opportunity, a just share of the fruits of progress for the workers, measures to promote better nutrition, to provide housing, recreation and culture.

The Conference associated itself with the Atlantic Charter and affirmed that the application of the principles of interna-

[24] *The I.L.O. and Reconstruction,* Report by the Acting Director of the International Labor Office to the Conference of the International Labor Organization, Montreal, 1941. Also, "The Conference of the International Labour Organization 1941," *International Conciliation,* 376, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

tional collaboration requires, in law and in fact, the freedom of labor organizations and participation on an equal representative basis of governments, labor, and management. The I.L.O. also favors regional co-operation within a wider world framework. This particular point found expression in the joint declaration of the government, labor, and industrial delegates of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia demanding that their peoples be included within the sphere of international exchanges of goods and services. In summary, therefore, the plan of the I.L.O. can be said to accentuate social justice as an essential factor in building up a stable international system.

Religious Statements on Postwar Reconstruction

Representatives of Protestant and Orthodox Churches interested themselves in the problem of the relation of the churches to the modern world several years before the outbreak of the war. In order to clarify the issue they met at Oxford in 1937, Madras in 1938, and Geneva in 1939. These conferences appealed to churches and individual Christians to take action to check the drift towards war and to promote the establishment of an international order based on law and ethics, that is, on a sense of obligation in the conscience of the members of the community.[25]

After the outbreak of the war, Pope Pius XII delivered a Christmas address in 1939 containing five points for a program of "a just and honorable peace." They were: the right to life and independence of all nations, large and small, strong and weak; liberation from the slavery of the race for armaments; creation or reconstitution of international institutions in the light of the experiences of the past; creation of a true equilibrium among nations on the basis of the real needs and just demands

[25] A detailed survey of the religious statements on postwar reconstruction appeared in the *Bulletin* of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, January–February, 1942, published in New York. See also *A Just and Durable Peace*, issued by the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, New York, April, 1941; also a message from the National Study Conference of the Commission held at Delaware, Ohio, in March, 1942.

of peoples and ethnic minorities; and social justice in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount.

Similar stress was laid on economic injustice, which "breeds war no less than political anarchy," in the message adopted by religious groups in the United States at a national conference held at Philadelphia in February, 1940, under the auspices of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America.

The conference of the Church of England at Malvern in January, 1941, proposed the following principles on which postwar order should be based: the restoration of man's economic activity to its proper place as the servant of his whole personal life; the expression of his status in the world as a child of God for whom Christ died; acceptance of the satisfaction of human needs as the only true end of production; and recognition of the rights of labor as equal to those of capital in the control of industry.

The general assembly of the Church of Scotland, in May, 1941, emphasized that future political training must have in view social and economic values if it is not to fail. In *America's Peace Aims,* the Catholic Association for International Peace demanded in 1941 that "powerful aggregations of capital within the nations should be denied the right of an unlimited self-regulation of international economic activities not subject to any law." The Central Conference of American Rabbis in the same year demanded "the creation of an international parliament which will adjust the differences between nations and create agencies for co-operative enterprises." It also underlined international co-operation in the field of economics.

The Federal Council of Churches of Christ, through its conference convened by the Commission to Study the Bases of a Just and Durable Peace and held at Delaware, Ohio, in March, 1942, denied that private profit should be the principal incentive relied upon to turn the wheels of industry and asserted that "willingness to strive and to produce and to render services should not be dependent either wholly upon profit motivation or wholly upon compulsion."

As a rule the plans proposed by various churches and religious movements limited themselves to the restatement of

Christian principles. They are permeated with the basic Christian thought of equality among men and nations, and they abhor wars and lay emphasis on social and economic democracy.

Commission to Study the Organization of Peace

Immediately after the outbreak of the Second World War the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace was established in New York to prepare for the work of reconstruction which will face the world upon the termination of the conflict. The Commission includes a representative number of United States scholars and experts on international relations under the chairmanship of James T. Shotwell, Director of the Division of Economics and History of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It issued its preliminary report in November, 1940, and its second report in February, 1942. Later reports will deal with blueprints for the international society to follow the war.[26] These reports will reappraise the fundamental validity of the ideal of the League of Nations, the wartime experiences of the associated governments, and the program set forth in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United Nations.

The recommendations of the Commission's report are based upon monographic studies, discussions, and criticisms, all contributed by its members. The preliminary report dealt with the general principles of international relations designed to strengthen peace as the fundamental condition of international intercourse. Peace under modern conditions could not be a static condition of life achieved by the renunciation of war, nor a mere pious desire to live at peace. According to the report "peace must be a dynamic and continuous process for the achievement of freedom, justice, progress, and security on a world-wide scale." The organization of peace must have back of it the force of a unifying ideal. The sovereignty of the nation-state is no longer adequate. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that the nation-state is the unit of world society.

[26] See *Reports of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace*, New York, 1940, 1942. Published by the Commission.

The problem for future peace lies in finding the correct balance between the autonomy of the nation-state and the authority of the family of nations. Consequently, certain attributes of sovereignty must be limited. Nations must renounce the right of each to be final judge in its own controversies; they must renounce the use of force for their own purposes; they must sacrifice the right to maintain aggressive armaments; they must accept certain human and cultural rights in their constitutions; they must recognize in international covenants that their right to regulate economic activities is not unlimited; and they must organize themselves into new worldwide and regional institutions to perform the services which can no longer be left to each state acting separately. In the opinion of the Commission, international organization must be based on the following essentials: an international court to deal with all international disputes; international legislative bodies to remedy abuses in existing law; adequate worldwide or regional police forces and economic sanctions to prevent aggression and support international covenants; international regulation of commerce, finance, health, nutrition and labor standards; and appropriate authorities to administer backward areas ceded to the world federation.

The second report of the Commission is concerned primarily with the transitional period between the termination of hostilities and the establishment of more permanent conditions.

Concluding Note

In recapitulation it should be stated that only a few peace plans could be included in the preceding paragraphs.[27] The literature on postwar world order grows rapidly, testifying to the intense public interest in the subject. The value of the various plans is unequal. Besides the plans proposed by groups there are numerous contributions by individuals. Some of these purport to be only modest contributions to the complex problem

[27] A number of private plans have been propounded such as that by Stuart Chase, *The Road We Are Traveling, 1914–1942,* New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1942.

of planning the new world order while others claim rather pretentiously the title of masterplans.[28]

A word of caution, therefore, will not be out of place. It is not so much the lack of knowledge of the principles and rules of international co-operation that hinder its process but rather the absence of favorable political conditions in which these principles could be turned to practical purposes and in which the rules of sane intercourse could operate.[29] The chief task of the United Nations—after winning the Second World War—is, therefore, —to create by concerted action such political and economic conditions at the end of the war, while not neglecting the elaboration of suitable plans and bringing them within the grasp of their peoples.[30]

QUESTIONS

1. International problems result from social, economic and political processes going on continually between nations and inside individual states. Is it realistic to assume that a world order can be planned in advance?

2. Compare the various plans referred to in the chapter with regard to their merits or demerits from the point of view of desirability and practicability.

3. Analyze the eight points of the Atlantic Charter and compare them with the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson.

4. How could the eight points be implemented in order to realize the principles contained therein?

5. Do you forsee any obstacles to future dealings between the Soviet Union and the English-speaking democracies? What are the chief ones, if any?

[28] The British Library of Information in New York compiled a list of official, semiofficial, and private statements and proposals for international and domestic reconstruction. The list marked 1.V.135 contained also reconstruction plans of political parties. In the United States, the National Social and Economic Planning Association, Washington, D.C., prepared a list of government agencies and private institutions studying the problem of postwar reconstruction.

[29] In laying the plans for a better world order in the future the superidealists are inclined to neglect the power aspect of world politics, past, present, and future. The ultrarealists on the other hand lean toward stressing the desirability of force, political and economic, as the fundamental if not exclusive basis on which world order should rest. In reality both power and morality will have to be given their due if a more durable order is to emerge from the present chaos.

[30] For an analysis of existing machinery of collaboration between the United Nations see Payson S. Wild, Jr.: Machinery of Collaboration between the United Nations, *Foreign Policy Association Report*, 18:8 (July 1, 1942).

6. Is a rapprochement between the Soviet and the democratic system possible and to what extent could the war plans contribute to bring it about?

7. Compare the war aims of Japan in the Far East with those of the Axis in Europe.

8. Describe the economic basis of the Japanese scheme of the New Order in Greater East Asia.

9. What is the principal difference between a League of Nations, a confederation, a federation, and an alliance?

10. Which aspects of national sovereignty would have to be revised in order to create a federation?

11. Which are the provisions of the League of Nations worthwhile to retain and adapt to postwar conditons?

12. What are the essential characteristics of the International Labor Organization which gave this institution its vitality and should be preserved in the future?

13. How could the United States promote international collaboration in the spirit of the existing plans, and which one would be most desirable from the point of view of its national interests?

14. Is an international police force necessary to insure universal peace?

15. How should the United States co-operate in maintaining such a force?

16. Trace the economic factors in various plans referred to in the chapter.

17. What is meant by "access to raw materials" and how should the problem of equitable distribution of raw materials among various nations be solved?

18. What is to be the place of colonies in the new world order?

19. What are the implications of the Atlantic Charter in regard to the establishment of self-government for the peoples of Asia?

20. Is it possible to have a world order without force?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Further Research

1. What are the minimum requirements for a functioning federation?

2. What are the areas of friction in the Anglo-American Co-operation?

3. Which methods of international co-operation are worth preserving in the light of the past experience?

4. To what extent do ideologies prevail over national interests or vice versa?

5. Trace the elements of wishful thinking as against realistic appreciation of international factors with regard to postwar planning.

6. How do the planners approach the problem arising from the conflict between power and international morality?

7. How much did the planners learn from the experiences of the two decades between the wars?

8. In what practical way could the churches contribute toward planning a better world order?

9. Are the people of the United States ready to assume the responsibility for building up and maintaining a better world order, acting in the capacity of leaders which was conferred upon them by the weight of recent international circumstances?

10. Is it possible to extend and to guarantee the rights and the freedoms of the individual throughout the world; and if so, by what means?

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CHAPTER 28

PEACE PLANNING

HISTORY is far from encouraging about planned peace.[1] The savage cry of "Woe to the vanquished!" has expressed the victor's will throughout the ages. Clausewitz, be it remembered and repeated, described war as the continuation of diplomacy by other means. Others described peace as the continuation of war by diplomacy. History books contain little more than records of wars and the deeds of popular heroes, while they all but ignore the works of great men of peace. Past generations feasted nostalgic eyes on the *Pax Romana,* ignoring the fact that it was but the peace of the *urbs,* not of man, also that it owed its precarious existence to the overwhelming strength of Rome. Created by brute force, that peace was also shattered by the mailed fist.

Sweeping the broad fields of history for signs of peace planning, our eyes are arrested by an unusual scene: a man of iron dictating peace to a foe subdued in a few weeks. The man was Bismarck and the foe was Austria. In 1866 the two powers signed their treaty of peace, which exacted no territories from the vanquished, and took no revenge on him. Was this one of the rare examples of planned peace? It was planned, indeed, but not for lasting peace. Its object was to make the defeated neighbor serve the victor as an ally in the coming war. The supposed peace planning was preparation for the First World War.

Years later, the 1919 peace treaty of Versailles appears to have been planned to plunge man into the Second World War. The treaty turned out to be an instrument of whipping an entire nation into a state of blind frenzy. It did not keep the enemy from sweeping across Europe a score of years later; neither did it create the conditions of a *Pax Gallica,* which appears to have been the aim of some of its signers.

Is it, then, history's lesson that peace cannot be planned? If

[1] An interesting discussion is Hans Kohn, *World Order in Historical Perspective,* Cambridge, Harvard, 1942.

that were the moral of past events, this chapter would never have been written. But man's failure to eradicate war, the cancer of the social body, should no more discourage us than his failure to find the remedy of cancer, the affliction of the physical body. The very fact that it lies in our power to exterminate ourselves with the very weapons of our own genius makes it imperative that we should learn the ways of peace planning.[2]

The preceding chapter discussed plans of a new world order. In this chapter an attempt will be made to analyze some of the underlying problems of such a new order. These problems will be discussed under the headings of distribution of raw materials (including population pressure) and the struggle for power. They correspond to man's urges to sustain himself through the acquisition of food, and to perpetuate himself through the acquisition of security.[3]

The Distribution of Raw Materials

It is a fact that wealth is unequally distributed among the nations. The soil and subsoil of some of the countries are good, while of others they are bad, or indifferent. Certain countries occupy key locations on the vital trade routes of land and sea.[4] Axis propaganda has popularized the concepts of the have and have-not nations. The former are rich in certain foodstuffs and industrial raw materials, while the latter are largely deficient in them. The United States tops the list of the have group, and is followed by the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The German Reich, Italy, and Japan were represented as the major have-not nations.

The United States is rich in some of the most vital raw materials of modern industry, such as coal and iron ore, petroleum and copper, lead and zinc, sulphur, phosphates, and mica. Before 1939 the Third German Reich, on the other hand, had adequate supplies of coal, nitrates, and potash only. Italy was even

[2] See here A. A. Berle, Jr., "And What Shall We Do Then?" *Fortune* (August, 1941), pp. 102–124.

[3] Note Henry P. Jordan, *Problems of Post-War Reconstruction*, Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1942.

[4] See Chapter 7.—*Editor.*

worse off, being self-sufficient only in mercury, sulphur, and zinc. Japan had coal, chromium, nitrates, mica, and tungsten.[5]

The United States and the Soviet Union were more than self-sufficient in essential foodstuffs. As to the have-not nations, Italy could just cover her food needs in good years, while Japan could do so more consistently, thanks not so much to any fertility of Japanese soil as to the habits and great frugality of her people. The fishing banks off the Soviet coast gave more than ample supplies of an important staple of the Japanese. The Germans could not make their own country self-sufficient in wheat, in spite of truly remarkable efforts to do so, but they produced enough rye for their domestic needs.

Before the Second World War broke out, the have-not countries launched a large-scale program to fill the gaps in their granaries and stock rooms. As already seen Italy fought what Signor Mussolini, her dictator, called "the battle of the grain." About two years after his assumption of power he set forth in an article of the newspaper *Il Messagero* that fully four million more people could find a decent living on the improved soil of Italy. He helped to improve that soil and, at the same time, to dramatize this work by having the Pontine marshes drained.

The fetish of self-sufficiency. National self-sufficiency became a major objective of both the Italian and German dictatorships. In Italy, particularly, large industries were set up and hydroelectric stations opened, in order to reduce the country's dependence upon foreign finished goods and imported fuel. An agrarian country before, Italy was striving to strike a balance between industry and agriculture. Soon she turned to the production of substitutes, with the result that, in the grumblers' words, people were compelled to wear milk (lanital) and eat wood (cellulose). This was the inevitable result of national self-sufficiency—*autarchy.*[6]

[5] For more specific treatment, see Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics,* New York, American Book Company, 1937, pp. 70–71; also Brooks Emeny, *The Strategy of Raw Materials,* New York, Macmillan, 1936.

[6] Kurt Wiedenfeld, *Die Raumbeziehungen in Wirtschaften der Welt,* Berlin, 1939.

The Germans placed autarchy on a mass-production basis, at the same time promoting its success through their pertinacity and unquestioned organizing gifts. They came close to realizing the bold plan of J. G. Fichte—the closed national economy, *der geschlossene Handelsstaat*. Thus they revolutionized the entire economy of their country.

This system of equalizing the wealth of nations through increased work and substitutes did not seem, however, to satisfy the have-not powers. They resorted to war, with the proclaimed objects of "the redistribution of the earth's resources," "a place in the sun," and "the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

The peace planner wants to know to what extent the unequal distribution of wealth among the nations affects their lives. A few illustrations can help us see the issue more clearly.

Let us compare two countries of the Old World, as unlike each other as any two countries can be. One of them occupies the largest contiguous land surface of the globe, with some of its richest soil; it has the third largest-oil producing region of the world and abundant other mineral resources, including the highly coveted manganese, platinum, and gold. This country is, of course, the Soviet Union.

The other one is one of the smallest nations of the world, and it has neither oil, nor important minerals or metals, nor access to the sea. While its contours are beautiful, its soil is poor. This country is Switzerland.

A comparison of these two countries shows beyond a doubt that the richer of the two is the one that would have to be classified as have-not in that Switzerland enjoys a much higher level of material welfare than the Soviet Union, she has no slums, knows no extremes of mass poverty.

Let us now compare a family of sharecroppers in the United States with a family of fishermen in the Norway that was free. No country has ever reached the high level of material prosperity of the United States, and few countries were poorer, on the basis of minerals and food, than Norway. The family of sharecroppers had an annual income of, say, $500 while the Norwegian family had barely one-half of that amount. Yet the Norwegians

lived far better on the smaller amount than the Americans, allowance being made for the difference in the value of money as well as cost of living.

It is clear that the have and have-not status is much more the result of the human element than of nature's caprice. Have-not Switzerland was inhabited by have people, while have Russia was inhabited by have-not people. It was simply a question of knowing how to take advantage of opportunities. What counts for more than the distribution of wealth of the nations is their domestic organization for a more efficient exploition of all they have or may gain through foreign trade.

The fallacy of this whole classification could have never been more vividly revealed than after the outbreak of the Second World War. Some of the best-informed people expected the have countries to sweep the have-nots off the globe. What did happen was the very reverse. It was the poor countries that had all that was needed for lightning victories, while the rich countries had to trust to luck to save them from disaster.

Ersatz and autarchy. The question arises as to what productive agencies should be included among the distributable wealth of the nations by the peace planner. Substitutes are rapidly replacing the natural products. The artificial rubber known as *buna* is superior in many ways to the natural rubber. Plastics are ousting the time-honored wood and metal.[7]

Germany took the lead in the *ersatz* industry long before the outbreak of the Second World War. In spite of the handicaps she had to contend with, the Reich seized the leadership in the dye and chemical industries, because of her supremacy in synthetics. Her chemical industry alone employed in 1940 no fewer than 600,000 people.[8]

Great industrial strongholds have been captured by hydrogenation, nylon, rayon and the entire vast complex of substitutes. They have already ousted the natural products in certain fields. If this trend endures—and there seems to be no reason

[7] For details, see V. E. Yarsley and E. G. Cousens, *Plastics*, London, Penguin, 1941.

[8] Oswald Dutch, *Economic Peace Aims, A Basis for Discussion*, London, Arnold, 1941, p. 210.

why it should not—we may have to revise our entire grading system of raw materials to such an extent that the substitute may take the lead.

How is the peace planner to deal with this problem? What is he to do with reference to the substitutes, if he is to apportion the raw materials of the world more equitably? Obviously, they must be assigned the weight they actually possess. Nations now considered poor could thus become extremely rich. Should Germany, for instance, be made to share her industrial secret of substitutes with the less enterprising people of other countries? Should she be compelled to transfer some of her own industry and inventive genius to other nations?

The peace planner realizes that in a world ruled by common sense it is the accessibility of raw materials that counts and not their nationality. All can buy everything when trade is untrammeled. But trade has been fettered for a long time now. It was these fetters imposed upon international commerce that led the nations into the blind alley of autarchy. Governments were afraid to be caught short of essential war materials. Fear of war will continue to make them wary.

Attempts at sanity. Peace planners have already taken a few cautious steps toward sanity in trade. Shortly after the New Deal took over the government in the United States, it inaugurated a policy designed to remove some of the trade barriers and to bring about less constricted economic relations with foreign countries. It was felt that the cause of peace would be promoted if restrictive trade policies did not drive underprivileged nations to desperation. The core of this policy was a mild reduction of tariffs within a rather narrow limit, in exchange for reciprocal trade reductions. The Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Cordell Hull, became known as an ardent advocate of these reciprocal trade agreements.

The peace planner will consider reciprocal trade pacts as mere palliatives. He knows that lasting peace in the modern world is inconceivable without free trade. Should commerce be freed, however, there will be less justification for countries to go to war and to set up closed economic units because of their lack of es-

sential raw materials. Such freedom of trade in a sensible world cannot remain a unilateral policy, to be extended or withdrawn at the discretion of a sovereign country. It must be a communal obligation, which all countries must assume toward one another. Such an obligation must be made effective by the common action of all governments. But an intricate network of vested interests has first to be disentangled. A period of transition must bridge the gap between trade anarchy and trade sanity. The free flow of goods from one end of the earth to the other is a prime prerequisite of intelligent and lasting peace.[9]

The colonial problem. When the Second World War broke out, some 270,000,000 people lived in colonies, not including India, which enjoyed a special status. These colonial possessions covered an area of 14,000,000 square miles, distributed almost equally between the British (again excluding India), the French, the Dutch, and other countries.

The distribution of colonies was no more equal than the distribution of raw materials. Portugal, for instance, had a colonial empire twenty times the size of the mother country, while Germany, with a population ten times that of Portgual, had no colonies whatever. Italy had only a vast collection of sand deserts in Africa, outside of a few islands and Ethopia, the latter of which she was to lose.

The case of the colonies has often been cited in the Axis countries as the shining example of a discredited and absurd system. The dead hand of history was blamed for the perpetuation of a regime that seemed to leave changing world conditions completely out of account. The spokesmen of these countries made it abundantly clear that the unsettled state of the world was a result of the monstrous colonial tenure.

The German Nazis popularized the word *Lebensraum* to indicate the inescapable need for territorial expansion as the prerequisite of national life. Hitler himself became a late convert to the colonial idea. In the beginning he subscribed to Bismarck's

[9] League of Nations, Economic Intelligence Service, *International Trade in Certain Raw Materials and Foodstuffs by Countries of Origin and Consumption, 1938,* Geneva, 1939.

famous words: "For us Germans the colonies would be exactly like the silks and sables of the Polish noblemen, who have no shirt to wear under them."

The Axis men painted gloomy pictures of the dismal existence of countries deprived of these markets and sources of raw materials, while the fat colonial powers disported themselves with all the exhibitionist indecency of their irresponsible wealth.

Since peace planning is difficult to conceive without colonial planning, a few basic facts must be cited. First of all, we must turn our attention to the oft-repeated view that colonies are desirable for the colonial powers because they can be more easily exploited than independent territories. What is the truth behind these assertions?

Modern colonies are not the milk cows the old-type colonies were. It is no longer true that the mother country simply cuts into the juicy colonial pie, while the mouths of starved natives water. With very few exceptions, colonies have much to say in their own affairs. It is not true that heavy gold bags are constantly shipped from the colonies into the treasury of the mother country. On the contrary, if there is a budgetary surplus it remains in the colonial treasury, while the mother country is expected to meet the colonial deficit. Many colonial governments have limited powers of tariff sovereignty which protects them even against the home country.

Contrary to a widely spread belief, the colonies are not the depositaries of the greatest wealth in the world. The total colonial market is not more than 12 per cent of the total world trade, which is a small percentage.[10] Only 10 per cent of Great Britain's exports went to her colonies in 1935. Less than 1 per cent of all her external trade was transacted with her colonies when Germany had an overseas empire of her own before the First World War. Yet the great powers seek a hold on the colonies—why?

Again contrary to the popular belief, the number of colonial products that are vital for industrial civilization is rather limited. There are no more than three such raw materials that are grown

[10] Dutch, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

exclusively in regions held as colonies before the Second World War: rubber, palm oil, and copra. Three others were of colonial origin only in part: cocoa, phosphates, and tin.

Are colonies indispensable for a *Volk ohne Raum,* people without space, as the Germans describe themselves? The record shows that in all the colonies, protectorates, dependencies, and mandates of European powers there were in 1935 only about 4,500,000 whites, of whom 1,600,000 were in Africa, a continent upon which Axis eyes have long been fastened. It is also well to bear in mind that not more than 24,000 Germans were settled in the Reich's colonies before the First World War.

Do colonies pay? This was the very question Grover Clark posed in the first chapter of his book, *A Place in the Sun* (New York, Macmillan, 1936). "This book is the result of an attempt," he wrote, "to get, from actual records, an answer to the question: Do colonies pay? Most emphatically the answer is: No."

Why, then, do the powers cling to their colonies? Because the colonies, being frontier territories, yield higher rates on capital investments than the more highly developed home countries. A speculator can make money in the backward regions, but he must first have surplus capital. Such a capital is mostly invested by private persons, and the profits realized on them enter into national income as accretions of private revenue. The powers also cling to their colonies because of prestige, tradition, strategy. Besides, statesmen prefer to have their names associated with the acquisition of territories rather than with the loss of them.

Just the same, peace planners cannot ignore the colonial question. Colonies form a large part of the globe and they demand the most serious attention.

Twice, heretofore, a solution for this problem has been suggested through responsible statesmen. First, in 1890, the interested powers accepted the policy of open door in the very heart of Africa, what came to be known as "the conventional basin of the Congo." In accordance with this policy, all those powers enjoyed equal trade opportunity over this vast territory. Second, in 1937, the Advisory Committee of the British Labor

Party laid before the government in London a plan designed to solve the colonial problem without the necessity of distributing the colonies. The plan was to extend the so-called mandate system to all colonies, protectorates, and dependencies.

The mandates system was first introduced after the First World War in the former German colonies and in certain regions of the former Ottoman Empire. The control over these territories was transferred to members of the former Allies, the mandatory powers, subject to certain clearly defined restrictions. First, they were to train the mandated lands for self-government, which was eventually to be granted to them. Second, each mandatory power was to submit periodical reports about its administration in these territories to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. Third, the mandatory powers were to keep trade open to all on a footing of equality.

Thus, it would seem that if the mandatory regime is honestly administered, it can pave the way for the gradual liberation of all colonies of all nations. It can also provide a much-needed incentive to the so-called backward people, and eventually relieve the white man of the "burden" he so eagerly assumed.

Population pressure. Man, not merely land and materials, must also be the peace planner's concern. Fascist dictators have uttered bitter words about selfish rich countries trying to keep all their wealth to themselves. "Overpopulation" has become a battle cry.

When the Second World War broke out, nearly four-fifths of the world's total population lived in Europe and Asia, two-fifths of the world's area. The Eurasian continent was described by the Nazis as "the area of surplus population." In no country of Europe does the density of population fall below a hundred per square mile, and in certain regions it rises as high as seven hundred.[11] In India an average of 225 persons and in China an average of 344 persons occupy a square mile. On the other hand, only 2.2 persons live on a square mile in Australia, 3 persons in Canada, 10.9 in Argentina, 12.3 in Brazil, 16.5 in the Union of South Africa and 41.3 in the United States.

[11] Maurice P. Davie, *World Immigration*, New York, Macmillan, 1936, p. 5.

Migration largely equalized this disparity before the First World War. The population flowed from the more densely populated regions to the less highly populated ones. Some 62,000,000 persons migrated, mostly from Europe, to overseas countries in 110 years, up to 1930. The United States alone received 38,000,000 immigrants during that period; Canada received 7,000,000 and Argentina 6,000,000.

The United States received the immigrants with open arms until the First World War. Thereafter, however, a sudden change took place; a highly restrictive and selective immigration policy was introduced. The war accentuated the fear that cheap labor might flood the American market and that the "old American"—western and northern European—stock might be submerged in the influx of the eastern and southern European stock. Labor unions were particularly apprehensive about the competitive pressure of Europe's poverty-stricken millions, ready to exchange their sweat for a bowl of soup. Besides, the country discovered with a start that the old frontier was gone and that the "American way of life" was in danger. Opportunities appeared to be fewer, and open to fewer people. Isolationism became rampant in a sudden reversal of the trend which had landed the country in the belligerent camp.

Nearly all the other immigrant-receiving countries followed suit. Whereas it was possible before the First World War to cross boundaries at will, except in Russia and the Ottoman Empire, after the 1918 Armistice the freedom of movement was greatly hampered and often completely paralyzed. Passports were required to enter or traverse countries, restrictions of all kinds were imposed upon travelers not merely by countries of entry but also by countries of departure. Leaving the Soviet Union, for instance, was forbidden to all except those who traveled for the government itself. Poland, to take another example, collected large fees from its own citizens for the permission to leave the country. France, which had accepted foreign workers to help build up the devastated regions and fill the gaps of native labor, sent these very people on their sorrowful way when they were no longer needed.

Artificial pressure was applied in some countries to increase the population. Dictators issued orders for babies to be born. At the same time, they blamed the "rich countries" for the conditions resulting from overpopulation. The method in this madness was inspired by the dictators' desire to generate warlike ardor out of impossible conditions at home and, at the same time, to encourage the bearing of a brood of future warriors.

Peace-planning must get at the root of this problem of population pressure. A few illustrations may help to see it in its proper perspective.

The United States was not overpopulated in the early 1930's and yet it had more than 12,000,000 unemployed for several years. The German Reich, on the other hand, has long considered itself an overpopulated country and yet it had to introduce hundreds of thousands of foreign laborers during the same period. Nor was Germany overcrowded in 1914. While her population had increased, it was not pressing upon the means of subsistence. The number of immigrants to America decreased rather than increased.[12]

Is there not land enough in Africa and in colonial areas where the sense of national exclusiveness is less rampant than in the sovereign countries? A practical answer to this question was given in the late 1930's. Because of the persecution of the "racial Jews" in Germany, an effort was to be made by several governments to secure places of settlement for them. The extent of their help was to make a survey of the available land. The possibility of settlement in several African colonies, in North America (Alaska), South America, and Oceania was canvassed. Detailed studies were made to ascertain the availability, particularly, of Madagascar, Kenya, and Tanganyika in Africa, of the Guianas in South America, and of New Caledonia in the Pacific Ocean. The result was largely negative. It was found that the climate did not favor the settlement of whites. Finally, it was a sovereign country, the Dominican Republic, which expressed its readiness to accept a limited number of settlers.

[12] Howard Robinson and others, *Toward International Organization. A Series of Lectures at Oberlin College,* New York, Harper, 1942, p. 44.

The pressure of population is bound to increase. Even before the Second World War, the frontier had vanished over a large part of the globe. The opportunities it offered now belong to the past. Yet it would be an inexcusable error to say that the earth is overpopulated. It is not overpopulated as long as it can produce more than it consumes. And it can produce more in normal times.

The peace planner knows that the redistribution of large masses of people is primarily a political question, one that affects the sovereign rights of nations. He also knows that peace is highly precarious while citizenship is a monopoly. The sense of exclusive possession of the national territory nullifies a rational solution of this vital problem. Peace shuns the globe that cuts its surface into tightly held national units. Even more than the freedom of movement for goods, the freedom of movement for people is a prerequisite of peace.

Industry and banking. Modern peace planning must go into many details which mustered little attention in a less complicated world. No intelligent peace planner could afford to ignore the problems of industry and banking. Since, however, their detailed discussion would disrupt the narrow limits of this chapter, brief references to them will have to suffice.

Some countries are more highly industrialized than others because of the special aptitudes of their populations, their traditions, their climate, or their location. Shall one section of the world specialize in agriculture, while the other one turns its attention to industry? Industry requires greater skill, presupposes a higher level of culture, yields higher profits for capital and better wages for labor. It was on such grounds that the German Third Reich divided Europe into industrial and non-industrial sectors. The "superior" German was predestined to become the industrial man of the New Order. The so-called inferior races, on the other hand, were to be reduced to the status of collective serfdom. They were to fill the ranks of the grand army of agriculture.

This German policy was to be a complete break with the tendency toward industrialization that characterized the truce

between the two World Wars. In line with the general desire for national self-sufficiency and for increasing each country's war-potential, the belt of small states in eastern Europe began building their own industries, then placing them behind high tariff walls.

In some cases the new industries were not viable. Nevertheless, they injected a higher tone into the lives of these regions, stimulated a desire for knowledge, raised the masses' plane of living. Thus industry turned out to be a strong influence in equalizing the cultural levels of different regions, proved to be a tonic for the backward areas.

Political considerations should not sway the peace planners in delimiting the frontiers of industrial regions. The proximity of raw materials, the aptitude of labor and management, the requirements of transportation, all will be determining factors in assigning to industries certain territories.

The highly important question of capital and credit will also command the peace planners' earnest attention. In the past each country was left to its own devices in the capital market, with the unfortunate result that quite often capital stampeded in and out of markets in obedience to irrational influences, rather than to the higher interests of international economy. After the First World War, for instance, such a wave of money flooded the German Reich that a large portion of it found only "boondoggling" employment. American dollars built countless superfluous stadiums and swimming pools. On the other hand, when central Europe most needed foreign capital, it refused to be coaxed out of its hiding place. The *Kreditbank* of Vienna failed. Great Britain was shoved off the gold standard, Germany was forced to place 6,000,000 people on the unemployment roster, and Hitler reached the Wilhelmstrasse.

Planned peace must not neglect to deal with this question. Informed discussion seems to favor an international federal reserve system. It would pool a set percentage of the capital reserves of the central banks of all member states. Should a country be in trouble, the machinery of the system would be set in motion. Belgium's former Premier, Paul Van Zeeland, seems

to favor the Bank for International Settlements at Basle (set up primarily to facilitate the transfer of Germany's reparation payments under the "Young Plan"), while Professor Hans Heymann, of the New School for Social Research, has made out a good case for a Bank of Nations.

The Struggle for Power

Planning peace means signing documents. We cannot prescribe what a peace treaty should be like, but we can, perhaps, review an example of what it should not be like. So let us take a look at the Treaty of Versailles.

No more devastating criticism of that Treaty could have been written than the one by David Lloyd George, who signed it.[13] Little could be expected even of the best-contrived organization, he wrote in essence, unless the boundaries of a state were framed "in accordance with the wishes and lasting interests of the populations concerned." The French plenipotentiary, Georges Clemenceau, also endorsed this view. After having delivered themselves of these weighty words, the two statesmen proceeded to lay out frontiers that were in no wise according to the wishes and lasting interests of many of the populations concerned.

The Treaty of Versailles was a catastrophe because it sought to reconcile the incompatible components of collective security and unrestrained nationalism. It blended the creative thought of the League of Nations into an uncompromising set of punitive provisions against the supposedly vanquished powers. Hence the Treaty turned out to be little more than a new formulation of the old destructive slogan, "Woe to the vanquished!" The treaty makers assumed that the League of Nations would forever stand guard over a chastised Germany.

If the punitive idea had been consistently carried to its brutal conclusion, the Treaty might have been temporarily more successful. Brutal Prussia might have been able better to understand the brutal victors if they had put steel, instead of *papier maché*, into its provisions. As events turned out, the Treaty was repres-

[13] David Lloyd George. *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, London, Gollancz, 1938, vol. 2, p. 830. (See also Chapter 13.—*Editor.*)

sive enough to stimulate a strong reaction, and weak enough to encourage a revolt. It made it easy for Hitler to arouse public opinion in the Reich, while leaving a sting of remorse in Allied breasts to counsel patience toward the Nazi revolution.

Voices have been heard recently in the United States and Great Britain that the peace treaty ending the Second World War should be negotiated and signed only several years after hostilities cease. The hysteria of the war would thus be kept from influencing the deliberations of the peacemakers.

The puzzle of boundaries. The very name of "peace" suggests the problem of boundaries. In an era of nationalism, frontiers between states are one of the most abundant causes of war, since disputes revolving around them are of a political nature, that is, subject to the contestants' sovereign will and not to judicial decisions.

Before the Treaty of Versailles the trend in Europe had run toward the elimination of many boundary lines. When united Germany and united Italy were born, thousands of miles of frontiers were actually eliminated. But the treaty that was to end all wars added some 4,000 miles of new state boundary lines to the existing ones, and thereby it created new sources of friction.

What would be the best boundaries in the peace planner's view? Impossible ones, no doubt. The frontiers of eastern Europe, for instance, could not be improved by any amount of good will. No matter how those lines are drawn, or by whom, he is bound to commit some kind of injustice. Would there be an alternative solution? An attempt was made to provide it after the end of the war between the Greeks and Turks in 1922–1923. All responsible statesmen seemed to agree then that another war would follow shortly if the basic problem of frontiers was ignored. Under the prompting of some of the great powers, the governments of the two countries agreed on the grandiose scheme of exchanging more than 1,500,000 Greeks and Turks. They carried out this plan without delay and thereby solved the problem of huge national minorities.

Could the same plan be applied to other parts of Europe? In

the belt of regions that stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea live some 20,000,000 people who considered themselves minorities before the Second World War. How could all these millions be exchanged? Who would have the money to finance such a vast migration? Would not the remedy be worse than the disease? These questions lead us to the key problem of nationalism.

What should happen to the sovereign state? When the Second World War broke out, an accepted feature of world organization was placed under indictment: namely, the sovereign state, both in its relations to its own nationals and in its relations to other states.

Two types of state stood as polar opposites, facing each other across battle lines. Ranged on one side were Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and their satellites. In the two prototypes, the state was represented as the living will through which the individual existence of millions of people gained a more than individual status. The apex of mass will, the symbol of state strength, was the omniscient, all-powerful dictator, in his person.[14] Ranged on the other side were the United Nations, democratic in various degrees. Assessing their political philosophy broadly, it may be fairly said that they saw the state as a means and not an end, a servant in a deep sense rather than a master of its nationals. It accomplished a unity of purpose based upon willing co-operation and not upon compulsion. Its ultimate aim was to express man's individual nature better and not to nullify it, as the totalitarian state did. To the Soviet Union, in particular, the state represented the intermediary stage between the feudal system and an ideal stateless world of the future.

As the warring states were of opposite character as regards their relations to their own peoples, so likewise were they opposed as regards their relations to other states. On the one side were states determined to accept no responsibility to which other members of the family of nations might hold them; on the other,

[14] For a study of the question, see a report by a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism*, London, Oxford University Press, 1928.

states more or less willing, perhaps more and more willing, to take their places in orderly, peaceful, and responsible relation to other states as law-abiding world citizens.

A clash was inevitable between powers holding these two concepts of the state. At first, the United States itself upheld the idea of the state as a self-sufficient unit which could pursue its sovereign aims. While its government professed to abhor the totalitarian god-state, its policy contradicted this profession of faith. Isolationism was in effect merely another form of irresponsible nationalism. It was only after the attack on Pearl Harbor that the United States joined the ranks of the combatant antitotalitarian powers, and presumably abandoned the untenable policy of isolationism.

That the supreme problem of peace planning was nationalism was becoming more and more clear as the real nature of the cataclysmic struggle was revealed. *L'état assassin,* as the French called the irresponsible state, was accused of murder, indicted as the most dangerous of organized forces because of its sovereign attributes and irresponsible strength. Instead of fulfilling its mission as an instrument of man's salvation, it became a means of his destruction. Either man or the totalitarian state had to go by the board. If the totalitarian state were to win, man would be reincarnated as a member of an unthinking herd. If, on the other hand, the totalitarian idea were discarded, man would have a good chance to win.[15]

The preceding chapter has already traced the germination of this idea on the antitotalitarian front. The exile governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, in the northeast of Europe, and the exile governments of Yugoslavia and Greece, in the southeast, each renounced a large portion of the sovereign nation's perquisites. Even though it could be argued that these governments could afford to be more understanding than many others because their writ was not running in their own territories, because their actions were largely academic, the truth of the matter is that those actions did express a definite trend.

Peace cannot be planned if based upon outworn concepts of

[15] See Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Essay on Nationalism,* New York, Macmillan, 1928.

sovereignty. Its planning is feasible only on a co-operative basis. The absurdity of isolation must be recognized. Given such recognition, then peace treaties would not nullify their effectiveness by saying "nay" and "yea" in order to reconcile irreconcilable national interests. The drawing of frontiers on such a basis would not be an insoluble problem.

The sheer weight of necessity lends strength to co-operation. When faced with extinction, man may even learn to act sensibly. The new order of planned peace will avert the danger of race suicide.

The elimination of war. The catalytic agent for planned peace is now recognized as food, without which no man can do. Countries progress on their stomachs as armies march on their stomachs into battle. The need of livelihood forces the nations to plan their future. Some of the larger countries are natural units of a supernational economic system, which is the keystone of planned peace. But even a country like the United States would derive great advantage by eliminating the customs fences separating it from the rest of the world.

As to the smaller countries, they cannot live in a disjointed economic system in which all the benefits are on the side of size. It is in their midst that the new system of co-operative effort has had its first test, as mentioned in the preceding chapter. The countries of eastern Europe, particularly, cannot live unless in regional unions.[16] The Baltic region in the north and the Balkans in the south are presumably natural economic entities, which were broken into small fragments under the rule of the dominant nationalist policy. It is because of their absurd situation that some of them have become pioneers of what is expected to be a world-wide movement for economic unification.

Such a system will impose the necessity of establishing an economic parliament—global or continental—to which must be delegated the task of creating conditions of competitive equality for all its members. While it would be beyond the scope of this chapter to go into details, it may be suggested that the very first

[16] For a detailed study of the Danubian confederation, see Emil Lengyel, *The Danube,* New York, Random House, 1939.

obligation of such a parliament will be to reduce or obliterate the customs tariffs among the member states in an effort to do away with some causes of economic disequilibrium. After that, the conditions of production must be equalized by allocating quotas in accordance with the countries' productive capacities. A member failing to abide by the parliament's decision would be cast out of this cartel and thus deprived of the opportunities of privileged foreign commerce.

Co-operation or coercion? Will the new order be enforced by a League of Nations or by other means? President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated, in June, 1940: "It has been the continuous policy of this government for many years to co-operate in the world-wide technical and humanitarian activities of the League of Nations." [17]

Addressing the Congress of the United States on December 27, 1941, Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared: "If we had kept together after the last war, if we had taken common measures for our safety, this renewal of the curse need never have fallen on us."

Secretary of State Cordell Hull paid tribute to the League of Nations on February 2, 1939: "The League has been responsible for the development and mutual exchange and discussion of ideas and methods to a greater extent than any other organization in history. The United States government is keenly aware of this type of general interchange and desires to see it extended."

Paying tribute to the League for having stimulated discussion and having been useful in humanitarian activities is like saying nice things about a dead person, whose demise is definitely established. Not a word is said about the League or a similar organization in the Atlantic Charter's eight points, as promulgated by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941. The fifth article of the Charter merely voices the desire "to bring about the fullest co-operation between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all,

[17] Here see J. F. Dulles, *Peace Without Platitudes, Fortune* (January, 1942), pp. 42–89.

improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security."

The absence of authoritative utterances on this subject indicates that the reconstruction of the League or a similar organization was not contemplated by the two statesmen in the summer of 1941. Statesmen fear to attach their political fortunes to a supposedly unsuccessful plan, such as the League appears to have been. The authors of the Atlantic Charter may believe that peace will again be imposed upon the world through the operation of a new balance of power.

But in his Memorial Day Address on May 30, 1942, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles said: "Finally I believe they (who do the fighting) will demand that the United States become the nucleus of a world organization of the future to determine the final terms of a just, an honest and a durable peace to be entered into after the passing of the period of social and economic chaos . . . and after the completion of the initial and gigantic task of relief, of reconstruction and of rehabilitation which will confront the United Nations at the time of the Armistice."

Vice President Henry A. Wallace said on May 8, 1942: "Some have spoken of the 'American Century.' I say that the century on which we are entering—the century which will come of this war—can be and must be the century of the common man."

Without going into the details of peace plans, which were covered in the preceding chapter, it is reasonable to say that the actions and words of the spokesmen of the democratic front seem to indicate (at the time of writing, in the spring of 1942) that they expect the future peace to rest on power, which their anticipated victory will establish. It is safe to assume that this will really be the case. It will require a long period of transition before the seeds of destruction are removed. This time it is clear that nothing short of an effective international police can assure the successful operation of the new international society. The balance of power in the past, and the peace based upon it, were most precarious. In a world that is to be sheltered from the

horrors that attend modern wars, power must be wielded without concern for balance by a working majority of countries united in a collective enterprise. So strong must this union of nations be that attempted resistance to its will would be doomed in advance. States must renounce many of their sovereign prerogatives in such a union of countries, if it is to assure peace. Whatever form this mechanism takes, its prime task will be to deal with world affairs in a way that precludes the return of the international anarchy to which man already has been exposed too often.

A glimpse of the future. Will the conclusion of paper peace be followed by real peace, or merely by another truce? Years ago Oswald Spengler foretold the decline of the west. Some say that he may have erred through understatement. It may not be merely a decline but total collapse, involving not only the West but the entire earth. Others say that we may be on the threshold of a messianic age when man's eternal yearning for salvation may be gratified.

Of false prophets there have been many, but of real seers there have been few. Who foresaw the rise and fall of mighty empires, the coming of the era of organized insanity? Some admit their shame by reading a calendar of events into the absurd obscurities of Nostradamus. We would be bold, indeed, to cast horoscopes anew, even though fully conscious of our limitations. Yet we should not be human if we abandoned the attempt.

The earth cannot change its nature, we have recently been told.[18] We are warned that it is largely geography that prescribes the history of nations and that events are the outward manifestations of the struggle for power. We are admonished to be "realistic" in the appraisal of nature's forces. Realists appear to be those who believe in the eternal life of madness as an instrument of international policy.

At present it may not appear to be realistic to foresee the time when man learns to live in peace with his neighbors. True, there

[18] Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power,* New York, Harcourt, 1942.

are no precedents for such an era of peace. But neither are there precedents for dive bombers. On the other hand, history does teach us that while man could stop but seldom on the road leading to the abyss, he has been able to stop on its very verge. Our ancestors did learn to shed the mistaken idealism that impelled them to kill their neighbors merely because they employed a different ritual to worship the same divinity. Our forebears also learned to wipe out pestilence before it wiped them out.

We are admonished that we can expect nations to act only in the defense of their own interests. Man discovered ages ago that the only way to save his race from extinction was to band together; then the tribe was born. As tribes encroached upon one another, mutual destruction followed. The nation-state, too, was the offspring of a great necessity and for generations it served the interests of constructive realism. Today it no longer serves that purpose, as all know who read their newspapers. We are in the waiting room of a new reality.

No country has been more realistic in the pursuit of its self-interests than the United States. The map itself told us—and it could not be deceptive—that great oceans formed mighty barriers for our protection. We told ourselves that we would be fools and idealists—synonymous words?—if we concerned ourselves with events beyond those ramparts. Today we know that such a policy was not only realistic and selfish—another set of synonyms?—but also absurd. Many generations of Americans will have to pay for this new knowledge, and the price will be heavy.

We are entering a new era in which, furthermore, the strong and rich will carry a greater weight than the weak and poor. The United States is bound to be stronger and richer than the other countries and we shall have to carry a correspondingly large share of the burden. We shall not be guided by idealism or by the call of a new manifest destiny. We shall be guided merely by hard-headed realism—the instinct to survive. That instinct will tell us that co-operation is another name for human salvation.

QUESTIONS

1. Analyze three important peace treaties of the last four centuries for the objects of their signers.
2. Discuss the foundations upon which a lasting peace could rest.
3. The planning of peace must take into consideration the distribution of raw materials among the various countries. Describe the position of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Japan from that point of view, at the time of the outbreak of the Second World War.
4. How has the war affected the positions of these countries in that respect?
5. Marshal the arguments for and against national self-sufficiency in peacetime and wartime.
6. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of colonial possessions for the home country.
7. What solutions have been suggested for the colonial problem?
8. Describe the mandatory system and give your opinion of its applicability to colonies in general.
9. How did Great Britain make profits through her colonies? What profits did the Second Reich of Wilhelm II derive from its colonies?
10. Discuss the spread of industrialization in agrarian countries between the two wars. Give a detailed statement on the effect of industrialization for the cause of peace.
11. How could the Federal Reserve System of the United States be fitted into international peace planning?
12. Discuss the problem of population pressure as a danger to peace. Analyze the effect of the United States selective immigration of the postwar era upon unemployment in this and in foreign countries.
13. Give a critical analysis of the Treaty of Versailles and of the extent of its responsibility for the Second World War.
14. Discuss the constructive and destructive features of modern nationalism.
15. What was wrong with the Versailles frontiers? How should national boundary lines be drawn?
16. Discuss the Danubian problem from the point of view of federation.
17. Give several examples of the operation of balance of power, pointing out the reasons for its success or failure.
18. Discuss the strong and weak points of the League of Nations.
19. What are the prerequisites of successful co-operation among the nations?
20. What type of co-operation could assure the peace of the world?

Suggested Topics for Term Papers and Futher Research

1. What should be the human approach toward effective peace planning?
2. What are the limits of white human settlement in South America?
3. How does population pressure affect the political institutions of the nations?
4. How could the problem of "overpopulation" be solved?
5. By what means has industrialization affected the "political climate" of a selected list of countries?
6. How could the League of Nations have answered its original purpose?
7. Is federation possible and desirable in all parts of the earth?
8. What type of education could create more favorable conditions for peace planning? To what extent?
9. How would you organize an international police?
10. What are the most effective means of eliminating economic friction among the nations?

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
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MARQUESAS IS
TUAMOTU IS
SYDNEY - PANAMA 7674
MAGALLANES - PANAMA 5943
(CHILE)
CHILE
DARWIN
AUSTRALIA
SYDNEY
AUCKLAND
NEW ZEALAND
KING GEORGE SD.
4375
YOKOHAMA - SYDNEY
5636
0 500 1500 2500
MILES
0 2000 4000
KILOMETERS
NAVAL STATIONS
UNITED STATES EMPIRE
BRITISH EMPIRE
JAPANESE EMPIRE
FRENCH EMPIRE
4685 DISTANCES GIVEN IN NAUTICAL MILES