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ECONOMICS OF FOOD-GRAINS

IN

KASHMIR.

BY
J. L. K. JALALI, M. A.

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PREFACE.

This attempt is the outcome of a deep desire to present the problem of food-grains in Kashmir from historico-economic stand-point. The material employed has been drawn from available authentic sources; and so far as history is concerned detailed information has been incorporated with a view to facilitate the understanding of the present in comparison with the past. It is hoped it will meet with the approval of those who may have an occasion to go through it.

Kashmir has been a land of disasters. Constant visitations of fires, floods and famines, not unoften followed by epidemics, have left a deep mark on the life of its people. In the past the Kashmiri got cheap rice to eat, and whenever calamity befell him, the *all-protecting* king relieved him of distress

at any cost. Times changed: his life received a forceful impact: he could no more think of an easy-going life. But his insular position cut him off from the rest of the moving world, and the change that should have as a result of economic upheavals outside come over him long ago, was deferred. He endeavoured to tear down the hill to find a place in the economic fore-ground; but his 'ablactation' was so slow that every blow would tell. Even as late as A. D. 1917-18, when conditions of scarcity became acute, he was terribly shaken. He had to appeal to the Government for aid. He found himself at the mercy of the notorious *galladar**, and the assistance of the Government became indispensable. This materialised into a practical institution of permanent relief, in the organization of which endless efforts of the present Maharaja were mainly responsible.

It is now for over seven years that the "State Granaries" have been in existence

*Galladar, a wholesale or retail dealer in grains, such as *Shali*, maize, barley, wheat, etc. It was this *galladar*, who used to advance money to the cultivator on the traditional system of *wad* (see footnote, p. 38), and whenever there was food-trouble was considered to be responsible for its accentuation and protraction.

rationing the city of Srinagar. But the *rasad*, or the fixed scale of monthly ration, has been found undergoing constant modifications and the prices of grains, sold privately, ever susceptible of inflation, which has not unusually been ascribed to the efforts of the *galladar* to 'corner' grains. With a view, therefore, to steer clear of the 'speculative nap-hand' of the graindealer on the one hand, and to help in 'regulating' the market by developing sources of production, on the other, suggestions have been made which, it is devoutly hoped, would prove useful in the long run, in the solution of the 'immemorial' problem of food.

April, 1928.

Three years have since passed. During this period Kashmir experienced two unprecedented floods. In 1928, the damage done was greater than in 1929. With effect from 10th Jeth 1985 a reduced ration of three instead of four *traks** of *shali* per

**Trak* is a Kashmiri measure of weight, equivalent to 6 Kashmiri *seers*, or 5 *seers* and 3 *chattaks* (British weight). 16 *traks* or 83 *seers* (British weight) equal one *kharwar*, or slightly over two maunds.

head per month was introduced, and is in force since. The "Food Control Order of 1979" was replaced by a revised Regulation.¶ In the year 1930, there was a general economic depression in India and abroad, but the situation in Kashmir was not much affected. A general fall in prices of commodities elicited no appreciable response, inasmuch as the prices of *shali*, maize, etc., sold in the markets of Kashmir showed no marked signs of abatement.

Kashmir is a problem in itself, and in view of its peculiar position it is impossible to think of it in terms of economic conditions prevailing outside. The test of world depression has made it clear beyond question. If the Granaries were to withdraw for a while, prices would not fall: on the other hand, insularity of Kashmir coupled with the

¶ "The Food Control Regulation of 1986", *vide* Appendix D. The new Regulation provides two fresh clauses regarding realisation of outstanding advances as arrears of land revenue, and commandeering of stocks. How far their application would be justified depends upon circumstances; but it is hoped that the latter measure would be resorted to only as a last alternative, and it would be the best of wisdom not to haul up the obstreperous graindealer unless his recalcitrance makes him least amenable to reason.

galladar's propensity to profiteer would bolster them up. Import would be as unthinkable as it has ever been, for the added cost of transport, loss in transit, profit, etc., would not make it economically possible to maintain prices at par. The suggestions made three years ago would, therefore, seem to hold good even now.

JAMMU,

J. JALALI.

9th March, 1931.

THE ECONOMICS OF FOOD GRAINS IN KASHMIR.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL—INTRODUCTORY.

IN THE BOSOM OF THE HIMALAYAS,

General.

at a height of 5600 feet above
the level of the sea, there lies

the Happy Valley of Kashmir, with its roses, temples and fountains “as clear as the love-lighted eyes that hang over their wave” —the country, where in the memorable words of the famous Kashmirian Historian, Pandita Kalhana, the “sun shines mildly, being the place created by Kashyapas, as if for his glory where learning, lofty houses, saffron, icy waters and grapes, things which are even rare in heaven, are common”.*

*Rajtarangini, Stein, Bk. I, Verse 42.

As we descend from the precipitous heights of the steep mountains,
 Soil.

“fan-like projections with flat arid tops run out towards the Valley”, known as *karewas*; and farther down, we come to the alluvial soil abounding with verdure, with plentiful harvests of rice, gradually sloping towards the river running through it—the sacred Vitasta, or the Jhelum as it is now generally known. This alluvial soil is of two

The new alluvial and the old alluvial.

kinds—the old alluvial which lies above the banks of the Jhelum river and extends as far as the *Karewas*; the new alluvial, which is found in the bays and deltas of the mountain rivers. The first class of soil is of less fertility, and is dependent upon rain, and when there is timely and copious rainfall, excellent dry crops are grown. The second is very fertile, and is every year enriched by the silt of the mountain streams. The *Karewas* divide themselves into two classes—one, which on their summits make so to say flat tablelands perfectly even; and the other, which slope up continuously with an increasing gradient

towards the mountains. The surface of the *Karewas* is dry, and “when there gush forth from the sides of the mountains innumerable springs and streams of water which are conducted by means of embanked earthen channels even to the top of the numerous hillocks* in the valley, thereby enabling the inhabitants to irrigate their fields of rice”,† a fertile tract in the result.

The ‘Tarikhi Rashidi’ recognised four
Divisions of soil according to the ‘Tarikhi Rashidi.’ kinds of land (i) *abi*, or cultivated by irrigation; (ii) land not needing artificial irrigation; ‡ (iii) gardens, and (iv) level ground. “On the level ground on account of excessive moisture the crops do not thrive, and for this reason the soil is not laboured, which constitutes one of its charms.”§

Mr. A. Wingate, in his Preliminary
Divisions according to Mr. Wingate. Report on Settlement Operations in Kashmir and Jammu

* Hillocks—probably refer to *Karewas* (or table-lands), “a great feature in the landscape” of Kashmir.

† Bernier’s Travels. P. 396.

‡ “The lands are artificially watered or dependent on rain for irrigation”—Ain-i-Akhbari, by Jarret, pp. 348-349.

§ Tarikhi Rashidi—(Edited by N. Elias & E. D. Ross) p. 425.

(1889 A. D.) classified land into more or less the same divisions. (a) *Abi*, or irrigated; (b) *Sambhu or Sailabi*; (c) *Nambal* or swampy; and (d) *Khushki* or dry. Under the first (*Abi*) are included.

(i) *Abi Shali* or rice lands, which grow rice year after year, and which for the most part produce no other crop;

(ii) also rice lands, but of inferior quality and requiring either an occasional fallow or sowing of some other crop to give rest to the soil;*

(iii) *Abi sagzar*, or 'maliari', lands which are put under special crops, such as vegetables, etc.

Abi (i) includes all the irrigated alluvial soil of the plain with the lower portions of the side valleys; (ii) is generally *Karewa* land, and its inferiority is frequently due to the inadequacy of the water supply; of (iii) there is a little in every village, but round the city of Srinagar, the cultivation is in abundance and important.

The second head, *Sailabi*, includes the

*This is also the case with Saffron lands (at Pampur and Letapur) in the Valley.

river bank lands, sometimes extending to a little distance from the river. These lands are flooded annually and retain sufficient moisture to grow excellent crops without manure or irrigation. They grow Shali as well as other crops, such as Makki (maize), oil-seeds, etc.

Under the third head, *Nambal*, fall all swampy lands from the richest soil to a marsh always covered with water. Its subdivisions are noticed as under:—

- (a) when such lands are naturally or artificially drained, crops other than rice grow well depending on rain and may be called *Nambal-khushki*;
- (b) when, however, water does not dry up and the soil is muddy enough retaining good moisture, rice is cultivated, and the land is called 'Nambal Shali';
- (c) lands, which are too swampy to produce anything but grass and reeds, are called *Nambal-banjar*; *sagzar* and *nambal sagzar* being the same.

Under the fourth head, *Khushki*, come all the dry lands proper which grow crops entirely dependent on rain; for example, wheat, barley, maize, etc.

Sir Walter Lawrence, author of the *Valley of Kashmir*, who was the first Settlement Commissioner of the State, has dwelt at length on the subject of land used for Shali cultivation. He writes of four kinds of soil, in which rice is generally grown throughout the seven Tehsils of the Valley, and classifies them as under:—

1. *Gurtu* soil, with its several varieties;
2. *Bahil*, (or the loamy soil);
3. *Sekil*, (or sandy soil);
4. *Dazanlad*, (or hot and burnt soil).

First, *Gurtu* soil contains a large proportion of clay. It holds water and in years of scanty rainfall is the safest land for cultivation of rice, (or shali).

*Shali means unhusked rice; or in other words, paddy. Since Shali is the common term in Kashmir it has been used in several places in this book to distinguish it from rice, wherever calculations of consumption or production have to be made; otherwise the term rice has been freely used for Shali.

But with all its advantages, it suffers from the defect of caking through heavy rainfall, with the result that it interferes with the the normal growth of Shali, and affects the outturn. The soil of the *karewas* is generally of this type.

The following varieties of *gurtu* soil are also noticeable. (i) *Surhzamin*, the dark black soil, and is the most fertile; (i) the red *gurtu* is the next best; and (iii) the yellow buff soil which is the worst of all.

Second, *Bahil*.—It is a rich loamy soil of great natural strength.
Bahil soil. There is always danger of over-manuring;* *rye* generally affects the crop of this soil.

Third, *Sekil*.—It is known as sandy soil.
Sekil soil. It is light loam with a sandy sub-soil. If there be sufficient irrigation and good rains, the outturn of rice will always be large in this sort of land.

Fourth, *Dazanlad* (or burnt). This soil is chiefly found in low-lying ground near the swamps; and
Dazanlad soil.

*See footnote p. 8.

sometimes in the higher villages also. This soil is hot and feverish, as its name implies and requires great precautions. With necessary precautions outturn is sometimes very good.

There are other minor types of soil: *tand*, land reclaimed from forests; *Minor types.* *zabalzamin*, land injured by percolation from irrigated fields; *kharzamin*, sour soil interspersed sometimes in fertile soil; *trosk* soil which will not hold irrigation water; *lemb*, land in which springs occur; *ront*, stiff, bald clay which always cakes; *shath*, stony, pebbly, sandy soil by the mountain rivers; *tats*, soil rendered warm by the presence of large stones, and liable to *rye*.*

In short as regards comparative fertility "the new alluvial soil stands first, the mountain slopes and the reclaimed land on the

* A sort of blight that affects the standing crop through cold, over-manuring or over-heating particularly during August-September, when the nights if not cool, coupled with the heat of the day affect the crop with the result that the grain (seed) does not develop and the outturn is naturally very poor, and the taste of rice itself, insipid.

edges of the swamps, rich in organic matter, second; the old alluvial soil, third; and the *karewa* soils, fourth. The heaviest rice crops are obtained on lands near the deltas of the streams which have sufficient slope to allow of rapid drainage. §

In his review on the assessments of the six tehsils, Mr. Talbot (one of the Settlement Commissioners of the State) divided the land in the Valley into following six circles:—

Assessment Circles according to Mr. Talbot.

1. *Sailaba*—The central low-lying tract adjoining the Jhelum and the Wular lake, and subject to flooding therefrom. It is generally of small extent and is less irrigated than most of the other circles.

2. *Nambal*—Adjoining the Sailaba tract and also low-lying with a considerable proportion of swampy ground which in years of heavy rainfall is liable to inundation though not as a rule from the river Jhelum. This Nambal tract where it occurs, might perhaps have been suitably included in the Sailaba Circle instead of being treated separately.

§ "The Valley of Kashmir" P. 321.

3. *Maidani*—The “ tract going from the river towards the hills ” is free from the danger of inundation to which the above two circles are subject, and from the destructive cold winds from which the high tracts suffer. The only drawback is insufficiency of irrigation here and there.

4. *Darmiana*—This may be described as rougher kind of Maidani Circle, including generally a good deal of level ground in no way differing from Maidani villages, together with much that is broken up by the Karewas and ravines or is affected to some extent by disadvantages of climate.

5. *Kandi*—Villages bordering on hills and liable in unfavourable years to extensive damage by the cold winds therefrom. Irrigation is generally ample, but the water being very chilly the rice grown is generally of inferior quality.

6. *Sarhadi*—The only tract in Handwara Tehsil ; this is the distant and very mountainous country beyond the hills which close in the Kashmir Valley in the north.

Broadly speaking, a common division is into three circles only—Sailaba, Darmiana

and Kandi ; and it is with them that we are concerned, for rice is grown in all these tracts with varying outturn. Of the three divisions, Darmiana is the best.

Connected with the above is the question of the general situation and grouping of villages which fall under two heads—those which are on the plain, and those in the hills. Of the former there are four chief groups—

Grouping of villages.
Four divisions.

- (i) those irrigated by canals, and “serab” or near the water-supply and so having plenty of water;
- (ii) “Paiaab ”—those at the tail of the channels and getting a limited supply;
- (iii) villages, chiefly “nambal ”;
- (iv) dry-soil villages, including those with very little irrigation.

Hill villages include (a) those at a very high elevation and so producing only inferior crops; (b) those irrigated by canals, and with abundance of water but sowing and harvesting liable to be retarded by great cold; and (c) those with similar advantages and

lower down, only slightly inferior in soil and climate to the plain villages.

Irrigation is an important item in the classification of soil, and where there are abundant resources of natural irrigation, and the quality of land is also good, it gives best results and the rice crop is abundant. Where artificial irrigation is to be employed, chances are not so favourable as in the former case.

The question of irrigation appears to have always been the prime concern of the Government of the time, and irrigation in one form or other has been provided. In the ninth century A. D., in the time of King Avantivarman, Suyya is said to have built stone embankments* to hold

* Says Sir Aurel Stein in his introduction on the *Rajtarangini*, page 98.—

The systematic regulation of the course of the Vitasta down to the rock-bound gorge where it leaves the valley largely reduced the extent of the water-locked tracts along the banks of the river and the damages to the crops by floods. The construction of new beds for the river at points threatened by inundation breaches was among the measures designed to effect the same object. The change thus made in the confluence of the Vitasta and its most important tributary, the Sindhu, can still be clearly traced, thanks to Kalhana's accurate topographical data. It shows alike the large scale and the systematic technical basis of Suyya's regulation. The result of the latter was a great increase of land available for cultivation, and increased protection against disastrous floods, which in Kashmir have ever been the main causes of famine.

up water; or a little earlier, during Lalitaditya's reign, we find the waters of the Vitasta distributed by a series of water wheels.

Since the Valley is mainly a land of rice for which water is necessary, and when that water is not easily available, recourse is had to either the embankments of Suyya, or the more modern canals, if possible. Besides, the natural sources of irrigation, which are rivers, kuhls, and streams fed by rain and snow and other hill torrents, the two great irrigation canals of Martand and Lal Kuhl play a most important part in the irrigation of the valley particularly the tracts in which *Shali* is grown. We shall first take a brief survey of the natural resources and then give a detailed account of these two canals.

The marginal statement will show the high percentage of irrigation on cultivation throughout the Valley. A brief reference to the

Comparative irrigation resources of the seven tehsils of the valley.

nature of irrigation in the seven Tehsils of

1. Kulgam	70.7	per cent.	the Valley, into
2. Anantnag	64.9	"	which it is divided
3. Awantipura	59.9	"	
4. S. P. S. Pura	52.7	"	for assessment pur-
5. Uttarmachipura	39.6	"	poses may make the
6. Baramula	35.6	"	
7. Shahr Khas	32.0	"	subject more clear.
Average	59.9	"	

1. Sripratapsinghpura — the natural streams and small rivers of

(i) Sukhnag (ii) Shaliganga, and (iii) Dudhganga, are the main sources of irrigation. Out of 52.7 per cent. of the irrigated land, 42.8 per cent. produces Shali, and the remaining 9.9 per cent. grows wheat, maize and other vegetables.

2. Awantipura—the condition of irrigation the same as for No. 1 *supra i. e.*, Sripratapsinghpura. Out of 59.9 per cent., 38.1 per cent. grows shali, and the rest wheat, makki, barley, sarshaf, cotton, vegetables etc.

3. Anantnag — Rivers, nallahs, and springs are largely responsible for irrigation. Moreover, the Lidder river, Martand Canal, Ded and Arwani Kuhls in the north, Aropat nallah, and Achhabal spring in the centre,

and the Branghi and Sandran, the Kokarnag and the Verinag springs in the south, play a very prominent part in the irrigation of the tract in the Tehsil.

The Ded Kuhl has great possibilities. It irrigates 885 kanals, and will irrigate about 3700 kanals provided it is well improved.

The Martand Canal, the most important source of irrigation, irrigates 5894 acres.

Out of 64·9 per cent., 52·9 per cent. produce Shali, and the rest 12 per cent., other crops and cereals.

4. Shahr Khas—Zamindari Kuhls like Shah Kuhl, and wells, *dhinglis* (in maliari lands) called dip wells. The following kuhls play no insignificant part in its irrigation:—

- (i) Harigunwan Kuhl.
- (ii) Baba Kuhl.
- (iii) Khan Ali Kuli Kuhl.
- (iv) Nagwan Kuhl.
- (v) Haran Kuhl.

Three-fifths of the cultivated land is irrigated.

5. Kulgam Tehsil—Out of 70·7 per cent., 55·7 per cent. is under Shali; the rest grows maize, wheat, etc. Main sources of irrigation are (i) the Visho with its distributaries, Kandi, Bhushe, and Kansarbuji,

(ii) the Rambiara,

(iii) the Sandran, and

(iv) the Vith-vatra;

—these are natural streams fed by snow and rain. 93 per cent. of the total irrigated area in this Tehsil is irrigated by these streams, and the remaining 7 per cent. by hill torrents.

6. Uttarmachhipura Tehsil—Besides natural resources, the Lal and Ded Kuhls are two important canals of irrigation in this Tehsil. Out of the total cultivated area 43·6 per cent. is irrigated.

7. Baramulla—Ferozpur Nallah is the chief source of irrigation in this tehsil; besides Ningal Nalah and other dip wells, there are springs on which a few estates are dependent.

“Increase in irrigated area is due more to a greater demand for shali by the growing population than to an increase in the sources

of irrigation". But the general condition of irrigation is not satisfactory still. It is believed that with the increased activities of the State Irrigation Department much improvement may be effected.

It will be of interest to know something about the two main canals constructed by the State, the one in the south and the other in the north of the Valley, which have a great bearing on the cultivation of rice.

The Martand canal takes out from the Liddar river above Ganeshpur village, in Anantnag Tehsil three miles above Aishmukam. The construction of the canal was started in the year 1901 on the alignment of an old kuhl named Shah Khul up to village Brar in mile 7 and then along a new alignment. The canal was opened for irrigation in 1902. The main line is 21 miles in length and ends opposite village Ranbirsinghpura on Kareva Martand. There are four branches of this canal.

	Length	Area commanded.	Area irrigated.
1. Main Branch	4 miles	1549 acres	842
2. Branch No. 1	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ „	1365 „	514
3. „ „	2 1 mile	360 „	310
4. „ „	3 3 miles	888 „	297

There is no water-logging in this canal. Total area irrigated by this canal as given in the report for S. 1982 is 5729.23 acres, out of which major portion is under shali cultivation.

Capital cost Rs. 4,47,259; abiana recovered Rs. 24,692 (and including mills, etc., Rs. 24,997).

The canal is opened in the middle of April and remains in flow up to the end of September.

There is sufficient water in the river that feeds it to give full supply to the canal.

Lal Kuhl—In the north, in Handwara Tehsil. It takes out from the Lal Kuhl Canal. the Pohru river at Bumhama village three miles above Drugmulla, and terminates at Boomy village in Zainapur

Ilaka. The canal has been taken out on the alignment of an old kuhl which is said to have been constructed in the reign of the Peaceful King of Kashmir, Zainulabdin (1422—1470 A. D.) This old kuhl fell into disuse, as it was ruined by the inundations in Pohru river. In the reign of His Highness Maharaja Ranbir Singh attempts were made to revive this kuhl, but it could not be brought beyond Nutnuse village. The present canal was constructed in 1902 and opened for irrigation in the same year. The length covered is 21 miles. Capital cost Rs. 1,56,332, area irrigated 4091 acres (in S. 1982), Abiana recovered including revenue from mills etc. Rs. 21,423. The canal is opened in the middle of April and runs up to the middle of September. There are no distributaries to the canal, and the area is directly watered by the main canal through outlets and zamindari kuhls.

The water in the river is sufficient to give full supply to the canal, till end of June, but in July and August it falls short

up to 5 cusecs and unless there is a rainfall the whole crop is in danger of being lost. There is no water-logging in this canal.

Along with this is a small kuhl called Dal kuhl taking out from the Lolab river three miles above the head of Lal Kuhl. It commands an area of about 400 acres. (As it affected the supply of Lal Kuhl it was closed down in the year 1916).

To crown all this, the irrigation project Zaingir Canal Project. will have justified itself, if the

Zaingir canal were soon completed. When completed it will bring the whole of the Zaingir Ilaka under irrigation. The cost of constructing it is estimated at about 13 lakhs.

The valley of Kashmir was divided into Division of the Valley into 36 Pargannahs as given by Moorcroft 36 Pargannahs, which lived up to the time of Sikhs. Moorcroft, who visited Kashmir in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, has given the names of these Pargannahs, as—

On the left bank of the Behut.

<i>Pargannah.</i>	<i>Town.</i>
1. Banahal	Shahabad
2. Deosar	Kolagam
3. Batu	Shupian
4. Suprasaman	
5. Adwaing	Mohanpur
6. Shukaruh	—
7. Mohamadabad	Mohamadabad.
8. Megam	Muran
9. Yecha	Yechagam
10. Dainsok	Wampur
11. Manchamun	Suibok
12. Birua	Wanigam
13. Baladak	Khushipura
14. Tahirabad	
15. Parispur	Gondi Khaja Kasim
16. Tilagam	Patan
17. Banijil	Uttamagam
18. Anderkoth	Sumbhelpur
19. Krohin	Wagur
20. Kamraj including Kahoi, Hamal Machipura, Durbed and Karnao.	

On the right bank.

1. Brang	Sagam
2. Kotahar	Chatar
3. Martand	

4. Dakshinpura	Kanyalwan
5. Khawarpura	
6. Islamabad	Islamabad
7. Sair-ul-Mawaza, upper	Several places
8. Wular	Tral
9. Vehu	Pampar
10. Phak	Panjgam
11. Lar	Lar
12. Atsan	Atsan
13. Sair-ul-Mawaza, lower	Safapur and others
14. Kuhama	Alusa
15. Zeinnagar	
16. Lolab	Sogam *(a)

* (a) From the earliest times the whole valley was divided for administrative purposes into small districts known as 'Parganas.' The number varied according to times. In Rajatarangini, parganas are called by the ancient designation of Visayas. The majority of parganas known till recently may be safely traced to Hindu times. Lokaprakash speaks of twenty-seven 'Visayas' (or parganas). Abul Fazal gives a systematic treatment of the Parganas of Kashmir. According to Asaf Khan the number was thirty-eight, while according to Qazi Ali, it was forty-one. During the Moghul and Pathan times the number had changed but little; and when the Sikhs came, they found the traditional number of 'thirty-six.' Although the total number remained unchanged during the Sikh times, the names of Parganas differed. Moorcroft's list differs in some places from that of Baron Charles Hugel's or that of Vigne's. During the Dogra rule frequent changes took place in the redistribution of these parganas. Sir Aurel Stein refers to the most accurate list viz. that of Major Bates'. The following list taken from Sir Stein gives forty-two (while the Gazetteer of Bates' contains forty-three.)

I.—PARGANAS OF MARAZ (MADAVARAJYA).

1. Phakh.
2. Atshan.
3. Balada.
4. Arvai.
5. Vihi.
6. Vular.
7. Dachunpor.
8. Khovurpur.
9. Matan.
10. Anyech (Anantnag).
11. Kuthar.
12. Bring.
13. Shahabad.
14. Divsar.
15. Advin.
16. Zainpor.
17. Bot.
18. Supar-samun.
19. Sukru.
20. Savur.
21. Ohrath.
22. Sair-ul-Mawazi Bala.
23. Nagam.
24. Yech.

In the time of Lawrence, the 36 Paragannahs were amalgamated and divided into three Wazarats only:—

Constitution of Wazarats and Tehsils when Lawrence came.

Wazarat Khas.

Tehsils.

1. Khas
2. Ich Nagam
3. Donsu Manchama
4. Wulur Vihu
5. Cherat

Wazarat Anantnag.

Tehsils.

1. Anantnag
2. Srirambirsinghpura

II.—PARGANAS OF KAMRAZ (KRAMRAJYA).

25. Dunts. 26. Biru. 27. Manchhom. 28. Paraspor. 29. Sair-ul-Mawazi Payin. 30. Andarkoth. 31. Bangil. 32. Patan. 33. Tilagam. 34. Khuy. 35. Kruhin. 36. Hamal. 37. Machipur. 38. Uttara. 39. Lolau. 40. Zainagir. 44. Khuyahom. 42. Lar.

In Kashmir even now-a-days when we talk of parganas we refer to thirty-six only. Moorcroft's list seems to omit Nos. 4, 16, 20, 21, 32, and 38. No. 34 (Patan) is given by Abul Fazal only. Moorcroft gives it as the town of Tilagam (No. 33). Whatever the names of these parganas may have been, to us they have descended from early Hindu times, and Stein gives us some 28 Sanskrit equivalents of these Parganas (by reference to Jonaraja, Lokaprakash, Rajtarangini etc.). So long as tradition lives the parganas will continue to be mentioned inspite of the fact that the Valley has under the new Administration been divided into Tehsils and Wazarats.

3. Deosar
4. Dachanpura
5. Shupiyon

Wazarat Sopore or Kamraj.

Tehsils.

1. Lal
2. Hamalzaingir
3. Uttarmachipura
4. Biru Magam
5. Krihun

Division as made
by Sir Lawrence.
Lawrence reducing
the Tehsils to 11
only.

Sir Walter maintained the
Wazarats (as three) but reduced
the Tehsils to eleven **only** as
under :—

I. Wazarat Khas.

1. Lal Phak
2. Srinagar
3. Sri Pratapsinghpura
4. Magam

II. Wazarat Anantnag.

1. Wantipura
2. Anantnag
3. Haripura
4. Sri Ranbirsinghpura

III. Wazarat Sopore

1. Uttarmachipura
2. Sopore
3. Patan

The present distribution; only 2 Wazarats and 7 Tehsils.

The present distribution has reduced the three Wazarats to two, and the Tehsils to 7 only.

*(a)

I. Wazarat Anantnag (or Southern Wazarat) *Tehsils.*

1. Khas
2. Anantnag
3. Avantipura
4. Kulgam

II. Wazarat Baramulla (or Northern Wazarat). *Tehsils.*

1. Baramulla
2. Sripratapsinghpura
3. Handwara

The two Wazarats are under two Wazirs, with Headquarters at Baramulla and Shahr Khas (Srinagar). It was in 1926 that the Headquarters of Anantnag Wazarat was transferred from Anantnag to Srinagar.

* (a) It is now known as Wazarat Srinagar.

The Tehsildars are under the control of Wazirs, and the Tehsils have Niabats with Naib-Tehsildars in charge thereof. They form the revenue collecting Agency of the State and in addition to revenue administrative powers they exercise judicial (criminal) powers in varying degrees, from Magistrate 3rd class to 1st class.* (a)

It is with these seven Tehsils now that we have to deal.

* (a) It is now contemplated to widen the jurisdiction of a Wazarat and form new administrative divisions and thus reduce the number of Wazarats and Tehsils throughout the State. The object is to invest the Wazir of each such reconstituted division with wider powers both Revenue and Judicial, (and to call him District Magistrate and Deputy Commissioner). He will be assisted in his task by a Revenue Assistant. The number of Niabats will also be reduced.

CHAPTER II.

LAND REVENUE SYSTEM.

THE LAND REVENUE SYSTEM OF Kashmir has a history chequered in its character. From the earliest times Kashmir was an independent country governed by its own rulers, mainly Hindus. According to ancient custom the State claimed only one-sixth of the produce of land. * This was an established practice not only in Kashmir, but throughout Hindu India. But we do not know whence the practice of recovering grains in addition to the State share sprang up. The early evidence in the Rajatranagni is found in the well known advice to his subjects by king Lalitaditya Mukhtapid (697—738 A. D.), whose reign was famed for peace and prosperity, who devoted his time and energy for

* The State share seems to have invariably been recovered in kind from ancient times. While commenting on a passage (Rajtarangini, Bk. VIII, 60—61) Sir Aurel Stein says that "the land revenue of the valley was collected in Hindu times, as it was until quite recently, for the most part in kind . . ." This was used for State Stores and the grains were sold to the city population at fixed rates.

the welfare of his people, and by making fine canals and drainage schemes reclaimed large areas of swamp, and made the land fit for cultivation of rice. "Every care should be taken that there should not be left with the villagers some more food supply than required for one year's consumption, nor more oxen than wanted for (the tillage of) their fields. Because if they should keep more wealth they would become in a single year very formidable Damaras, and strong enough to neglect the commands of the King" (Raj. Bk. III, 347—48). Although there is nothing in the passage quoted to show that it has anything to do with the question of collection, it may safely be deduced that in addition to the State share (*viz.* 1/6th of the produce) further demand was made from the villagers or the producers of food-grains in *kind*, which left them only as much as was required for personal use. When the kingdom of Kashmir passed from Hindu hands into those of Mohammedans in the 14th century, the State

System before
the Moghuls.

share of the produce is said to have oscillated; although Shah Mir who ^{During the times of Mohamedan kings.} assumed the title of Shams-uddin, "abolished the exactions of his predecessors and having repaired the ruin caused by the invasion and exactions of *Dalju*, by written orders fixed the revenue at 1/6th of the produce". With the coming of Salatin-i-Kashmir into power the condition of the country grew worse. Sikandar, the iconoclast, with his fatal fanaticism wrought a great havoc, and reduced the flourishing country to one of depression and slavery. But with the advent of Zainulabdin, some relief to the harassed people was brought; and this lover of arts and industries with his desire to promote the welfare of his subjects introduced measures that went a great way to improve their condition by making them once more stable, peaceful and prosperous. His acts of liberality, his "task of regulating the profits of middle-men", his religious toleration might have encouraged the exiled Pandits to return to their forsaken land; but with all this it became difficult to repair wholly what

was undone in a fit of religious fanaticism by rude acts of persecution and desecration.

The independence of the country was at its ebb; the people were in a ruined condition; and the Moghuls in order to somehow improve their condition are said to have reduced the demand from one-half to one-third. But as with the advance of time it became apparent that it was not possible to maintain the idle city population, with the collections (made in kind) of the State share alone, it was decreed in the footsteps of Lalitaditya, so to say, that the cultivating class should dispense with grain for three months and live on fruit, which "is so plentiful that it is rarely bought and sold", and the State share was raised to three-quarters of the produce of the land. When Akbar took Kashmir, a new era was inaugurated. Akbar visited Kashmir three times. In 1587 he brought with him his Revenue Minister, Todar Mal, who settled the revenue arrangements of the valley—the first methodical settlement of revenue in Kashmir.

Reduction of
land revenue to
one-half only
during Akbar's
time.

Says Ain-Akbari, "the system of revenue collection is by appraisement and division of crops, assessments for crops paying special rates and cash transactions not being the custom of the country... Payments in coin and kind were estimated in *Kharwars* of (*Shali*) rice. Although one-third had been for a long time past the nominal share of the State, more than two shares were actually taken, but through His Majesty's justice, it has been reduced to one-half. According to the assessment of Kazi (Ali) the revenue was fixed at 30 lakhs, 63050 kharwars, 11 traks."*

The land was in those days held as Khalisa or land of which the successors of revenue was the absolute property of the Government, or it was land "held immediately of Government and of which the State was the manager or holder". Every year allotments were made to the cultivators. Coming down to later times, the Pathans succeeded the Moghuls, and then came the

Land under the
successors
Moghuls.

Pathans
Sikhs.

* Ain-i-Akbari by Col. H. S. Jarrett p. 366.

darkest period of tyranny in the history of Kashmir. The country was once again the property of the *Zulmgār*. However, with the advent of Sikhs in 1819 A. D. the avenue changed. But the immemorial tradition that the proprietary rights of the land vested in the ruler, passed *in toto*. Some lands were given out formerly as Jagirs, or made over in grants or *inams*. But the Sikhs resumed all lands and ousted the grantees. In the words of Moorcraft "according to the prevailing notions on the subject the whole of the land in Kashmir is considered to have been, time out of mind, the property of the ruler. Of some portions of the Khalsa lands the sovereigns divested themselves by grants in Jagir for various periods, but when the country came into the hands of Sikhs, Ranjit Singh made a general resumption, and ousted the possessors of grants of land of every class thus summarily reducing thousands who had long lived in comfort to a state of absolute destitution . . . The Khalsa lands are now, as heretofore let out for cultivation. Those near the city are termed Sar-kishti, those more

remote, Pai-kishti; or head and foot, upper and lower cultivation. When the grain has been trodden out, a division takes place between the farmer and the Government; this was formerly an equal division but the Government has advanced in its demands until it has appropriated about seven-eighths of the Sar-kishti and three-fourths of the Pai-kishti. The straw falls to the share of the cultivator, but his case would be desperate if it were not practicable to bribe the overseer or the watchman to let him steal a portion of his own produce. He has a house to live in: he can keep his cattle on the mountain during summer and can support himself and family upon the wild fruits of the forest. Still the cultivators of Kashmir are in a condition of extreme wretchedness, and as if the disproportionate demand of the Government was not sufficiently oppressive, the evil is aggravated by the mode adopted of disposing of the Government share. It is sent into the market at a high price, and no individual is allowed to offer the produce of his farm at a lower rate, or sometimes to

dispose of it at all, until the public corn has been sold".—(pp. 125—26).

The Sikh government that succeeded the Mohammedans after about five centuries of varied character, might have been considered a boon as compared to the days of Sikandar, the iconoclast, or the Afghans; but the people were reduced to an abject condition, exorbitantly taxed by the Sikh government and subjected to every kind of extortion and oppression by its officers the result being the gradual depopulation of the country, and land, commanding not more than one-sixteenth of the cultivable surface, being under cultivation.

"The history of the province from this time until its grant by the English to Raja Gulab Singh differs little from that of other Sikh districts except that being far removed from Lahore, the governors were able to fleece the people with more than the usual impunity. Sometimes the oppression they exercised was so intolerable that the insurrection, the popular reply to official tyranny,

warned the Maharaja to replace an obnoxious lieutenant by one less rapacious." * (a).

Under the Sikhs the State †took half the share of the Kharif crop and in addition four *traks* per *kharwar*; and on account of the rice straw and the vegetable produce of the *sagzar* plots Rs. 1-9-0 per cent. The Patwari and Qanungo got $\frac{1}{2}$ *trak* per *kharwar* between them. Inferior village servants got something. Nazrana was levied four times a year; and "Tambol" about 2% was taken on occasions of marriage in the Ruler's family, etc. etc. The villagers had also to feed State watchers of grains called "Shakdars." ‡ For the Rabi and "Kimti" crops all classes of cultivators were taxed alike, and in addition to the half share three *traks* per *kharwar* were taken under the name of extra cesses.

* (a) Ranjit Singh (Rulers of India Series) by Sir L. Griffin.

† "In the time of Zain-ul-ab-din the annual produce of the rice crop is said to have been 77 lacs of ass-loads of which the sovereign received one-half. At present the quantity does not exceed 20 lacs. The price of rice at the period of our residence was from two rupees and a half to three rupees and a half or between four and five shillings a load".—Travels in the Himalayan Provinces etc., by Moorcroft, p. 135 Vol. II.

‡ Cf. "By levying (contributions) for the monthly pay of the Skandakas, village clerks, and the like, and by various other exactions he drove the villagers into poverty"—Raj. V. 175.

The Sikh rule came to an end with the signing of the treaty of 16th March 1846, A. D. The Dogra rule was established. In the words of A. Wingate, "Traces of disused irrigation and of former cultivation, ruins of village or, parts of villages, of bridges etc., local tradition, all point to a greater prosperity, which by the end of Sikh rule in A. D. 1846 had well nigh disappeared." Since that date some progress had been made but the system of cultivation was in no satisfactory manner improved.

The reign of Maharaja Gulab Singh does not seem to have interfered with the system in vogue. Some change during time of Maharaja Gulab Singh and his successor. The Sikh system of collection was followed, "but some slight relaxations were made in favour of land newly cultivated, for large areas were lying waste. His Highness was fond of horses and a number of grass Rakhs were reserved for cultivation." But when Maharaja Ranbir Singh succeeded to the *gaddi*, the star of hope dawned* on the over-cast horizon of misgiving and suspicion.

*See Appendix

In 1859 (S. 1916), the land—being as always the property of the State—was allotted to contractors, and the *Kardars* or State land agents to whom circles of villages were farmed out, played the role of supplying agents or collectors. In those days there was a number of Tehsils, into which the Valley was divided, and each Tehsildar had three such agents under him. The *Kardar* divided his charge into three belts. “In the lower belt he would allow nothing to be grown, but rice; in the middle belt he allowed some rice to be grown, and in the highest belt he permitted no rice.” The *Kardar*, was therefore, the absolute authority for the cultivation of the land, and as for collection, being the State Agent and responsible in every way, he cared not much, for it was at his mercy. It may have been his duty to collect the largest possible quantity of grains for the Government, but he knew how to baulk them with “*zabāni jama-oharch*,” making the State believe

Allotment of land to contractors, and the division of the Valley into Tehsils and belts.

that he was doing his best to fill her coffers as also creating a "zakhira" to depend on in times of need or dearth. When the *Kardar* allotted the land for cultivation, the State watcher, called "Shakdar", with his overseer the "Sazawol" "would sit in the village and watch the crops(a) *". When the crop was ready the Nizamat Paltan would move down to "enforce the State claim".

The State took $\frac{3}{4}$ ths of rice, maize, mil-
 lets and buck-wheat, and $\frac{9}{16}$ ths
 of oil-seeds, pulses and cotton. This system lasted till 1860 A.D. (S. 1917), when the government share was reduced to a little over one-half. But this concession in favour of the cultivators brought in its trail vices that did greater harm to not only the cultivators but the State as well, inasmuch as the State

Different Revenue realisations on different crops which lasted upto 1860 A. D.

(a)* *Shakdar* was not a recent innovation; he existed and was handed down from early times. In Sussala's time (1121-28) we find Utpala son of a certain Sthanaka, who was a watchman at the threshing floor, becoming the confidant of the king, and then being elevated as *ganjapati*. In reference to this Sir Stein has remarked: "Under the old land revenue system the produce could not be removed from the threshing floor by the villagers until the State's Share had been taken from it. As often a long time elapsed until this was done, special watchmen (known as *Sakhdars*) were employed at the *khalas* (Ks. *Khal*). Their employ extended practically over the whole year."

revenue suffered. If a village failed to pay its demand, the land was relegated to the head *amani*, i. e., the State took its share of the actual produce of a village. From S. 1926 (A. D. 1869) the practice of contracting with the *Mukadamms* or with the zamindars gradually established itself in place of the farming system. The system of farming out groups of villages continued till A. D. 1873, when the first attempt at revenue settlement in its modern sense was made, and a short term of three years was given and *rayatwari* system of settlement introduced.

First attempt
at Revenue Set-
tlement in 1873
A. D. in its mo-
dern sense.

The village contracts henceforward seemed to have been divided into *assamiwar khewats*, and either produce or cash was taken from each *assami*. This system was, however, unpalatable to the profiteering middlemen, the State agents and Officers, but circumstances beyond their control intervened to make it go on till the year 1880 A. D., though with slight modification. In 1875 A. D. the harvest being a bad one, two shares were taken by

the State leaving only one to the cultivators. In 1877 scarcity made

And the new system of revenue collection in cash and kind; which was interfered with on account of famine of 1877 A. D. its first appearance, and the new contracts broke down, so the State collected in kind only. In 1880 a new *Assamiwar khewat* was introduced and was based on the previous years, average as estimated in cash, but

New *Assamiwar khewat* in 1880. depending upon the sweet will of the authorities to collect (assessment) in kind and cash both. This is called the first cash settlement, and the present settlement is based on it. The new system of cash settlement should have been an improvement upon former *harassment*, but as it did not dispense with collection in kind, the quantity of grain to be exacted from a Tahsil or smaller unit, the village, varied in the inverse ratio of its capacity to "feed" the

Evils attaching to this system owing to arrangements not free from suspicion and contamination. official collector right up from the Patwari or the Lambardar, to the Tehsildar or the district officer. The assessing of revenue

was done in no regular manner, but was left to the Patwari and the Lambardar. Moreover, the insecurity of

service, and small pays, amplified the chances of speculation with the result that the demand made from a village was never realised in full, and arrears were so mercilessly heaped on the head of the poor cultivator that he would cut the Gordian knot of complying with the demand, which he could in no way do, by leaving the land fallow, and running away to other villages or mountain recesses. Had there been no restriction imposed on leaving the country which one could not do without a permit (*Rāhdāri* as it was generally known), numbers would have fled and never returned.

In short, any measure adopted, resulted in taxing the cultivator beyond his capacity. Since the settlement introduced by Toddar Mal the crops used to be divided into "kimiti" and ordinary. The former included Cotton, Mong, Tilgogal, Sarsun, Linseed, Saffron, etc. Under the latter fell Shali, Maize, etc. The fixation of prices by the State was gall and wormwood. A village that had to pay its revenue demand in kind, say about 10/16th, was fortunate in proportion it escaped the

payment in crops not "kimiti". For "kimiti" crops the State rate was much higher than the bazar rate, and if a lucky villager had to pay his demand in "kimiti" crops, he could purchase from the bazar and credit it to the State at State rates, and thus gain by the transaction even though he had to pay for the collecting agency; otherwise, the demand would be pressed to be paid in Shali or maize, State rates for which were far lower and the villager suffered, for it would leave him very little or even *Mujawaza*. nothing to live upon. The system of annually settling the demand in kind and in cash was known as the *Mujawaza*, and it became "a source of enormous profit to the officials, of great loss to the State, and of misery and demoralization to the people". This haphazard mode of collecting was aggravated by the system of adoption of "Izād Boli" or auctioning of villages. Auctioning was nominal. The bid would be in the name of some official or influential cityman and even then no payment would be made by the bidder, and the de-

mand would be shown as arrear in the books. Allied to this, the system of seed grain advance (meant to advance grain to the cultivator to save him from starvation which never reached him); the relegating of a village to the list of "*Sakim-ul-hal*" (unable to pay the demand—*infirm condition*) even though it had enough resources; the device of *Giriftani* to collect arrears; the detestable system of *begar* or forced labour; and the exemption from *kar-begār* of people (villagers) who were fortunate enough to be hired labourers of a Chakdar or an official, and seek protection under a "powerful name"; the unreliable system, of last, but not the least, heinous exaction of *Rasums* and other numerous taxations,—all these tended to abuse the system which was introduced with a view to improve both the cultivator (and his land) and the State revenues.

The vascillations in the system of land revenue collection have as noticed above had a very disastrous effect upon the people, the villager as well as

Effects of this system.

the townsman. The villager if he ran to the city would join the number of paupers fed at State charity to whom *shali* was supplied at rates far lower than the actual rates, nay, rates that were from the economist's point of view, not allowed to rise along with the demand. The effect was crushing—"the pseudo cash assessment was a double-edged sword invented to retard the progress of the times." But with the introduction of regular Settlement since 1887 A. D. and the fixation of cash assessment at a general rate of 30 p.c. with an emergency measure of collection in kind in times of need, has changed the whole avenue, and the abuse that attached to the system of old has gone for ever, and a day. Blessings of the regular Settlement of 1887 A.D. The people are progressing with the times. Forced labour (begar) has been practically abolished, the villager is a free-man with practically no temptations to defraud himself and the State, and with new legislations*, indebtedness has decreased, and prosperity has once again come in to stay.

1. Land Alienation Regulation Act.

2. Agriculturist Relief Regulation promulgated with effect from 15th Sawan 1983.

CHAPTER III.

PRODUCTION—*Shali*.

From time immemorial rice (*Shali*) has been the staple crop in Kashmir. Grown throughout the Valley, and the staple food of the indigenous population, it is not uncommon that references are found of rice alone, in the earlier works on Kashmir. *Rajatarangini*, *Tarikhi Rashidi*, *Ain-i-Akbari* etc. sing praises of the land that abounds in rice. But there is no record to show the produce in the past, and the only evidence on the point in the early history of Kashmir is that in the time of Zain-ul Abaddin (1422-1470 A.D.) the annual produce of the rice crop was said to be about 77 lakhs of *Kharwars* (ass-loads). The reign of this king brought peace to the country and it is not unnatural to suppose that the cultivating class must have been peaceful, contented, and large tracts of land must have been brought under cultivation, after the "destituting" effects of the iconoclasm and the

Production of
rice in early
days.

fanatic persecution of the *But-Shikan* and his successors.

In the time of Moghuls, we learn from Abul-Fazal, according to the assessment of Kazi-Ali, the revenue was In Mughal times. fixed at 30,63,050 *kharwars* and 11 *traks*, but according to that of Asaf Khan it was 30,79,433 *kharwars*. If the State share be estimated at $1/2$ of the gross produce as fixed by Akbar, the average production of Shali may be computed at 61 *kharwars*; but it may not be too much to suppose that as State share of collections in kind used to be $1/3$ rd of the produce before the Todarmalian arrangement was introduced, the gross produce must have been much more. There is no doubt that when there is peace, population increases, destitute homes are rehabilitated and deserted hearths once again send off rich clouds of voluminous smoke indicative of plenty. If the produce was 77 lakhs of *kharwars* in the time of king Zain-ul-Abidin, there should be nothing to preclude the possible in-

ference of increased production in the time of the Moghuls.

With the decline of the Moghul Empire, and the consequent passage of the government of Kashmir into the hands of marauding invaders, the Afghans, the fate of the land was worse than ever; and as the Pathan gave way before the army of the Lion of the Punjab, and one rapacious system of revenue exaction was followed by another more crushing in its effect, production naturally fell to a very low figure. The incessant changing of dynasties, all intent upon hoarding up of wealth, by means fair or foul, could leave no time to the cultivator to devote any attention to the land that made up a substantial portion of the State revenues. As seen in a former chapter, the system of collection was rotten, and the agency employed still more so, and the result was that the land fell off from its capacity to yield, and the cultivator from his to produce. Moorcroft, who visited

Decrease in produce in Afghan times.

Deterioration in Sikh times.

Kashmir towards the close of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, when the country had already passed into the hands of Sikhs, estimated the produce at not more than 20 lakhs of karwars. Under the Sikhs the land deteriorated, and production was

Increased yield in Dogra times due to certain concessions and settled conditions and regular settlement.

very low; and this state of affairs continued late into the Dogra rule, when Maharaja Ranbir Singh's personal interest and granting of concessions to new settlers, and the introduction of regular settlement revived homes which had become ruined, and land long given up was cultivated, and signs of prosperity were seen "once again. The latest record that we have of the land that has come under cultivation since the settlement, is an ample proof of the growing prosperity of the peasant and his anxious desire to cultivate

Production of Kashmir as compared to other Indian Provinces.

as much and as profitably as he can. Hereinbelow is given a comparative statement of

land with its principal* crops:—

Name of Province.	Rice		Wheat		Barley		Maize	
	Percentage of area to total area.	Outturn per acre.	Percentage of area to total area.	Outturn.	Percentage.	Outturn.	Percentage.	Outturn.
Bengal	26·8	(a) 888 (b) 1029 (c) 1156 lbs.	0·5	..	..	..	..	..
Madras	14·2	1065	..	..	..	..	1·6	..
Bombay	2·4	1230	6·1	..	..	..	..	..
Sind	1·4	1341	2·1	..	0·3	..	..	..
United Provinces	8·7	900	29·6	..	60·2	..	34·1	..
Bihar and Orissa	19·4	(a) 741 (b) 987 (c) 800 lbs.	5·0	..	18·3	..	27·7	..
Punjab	1·1	777 lbs.	38·5	..	14·6	..	17·9	..
Burma	13·5	970	0·2	..	..	..	3·0	..
Central Provinces and Berar	6·5	624	13·4	..	..	..	..	..
Assam	5·8	(a) 706 (b) 896 (c) 1008 lbs.	..	..	..	..	..	..
N.W.F. Province	0·1	862	4·2	..	3·5	..	7·1	..
Ajmer-Merwara	..	..	..	..	0·9	..	1·1	..
Delhi	..	..	0·2	..	0·3	..	0·1	..
Coorg	0·1	1420 lbs.	..	..	..	..	..	..
Kashmir Valley (comprising 7 Tehsils only)	26·6	(d)* 1000 to 2200	4·3	..	1·4	..	1413	..

* Quinquennial Report on the average yield per acre of principal crops in India for the period ending 1921—22.

(a) Autumn (b) Winter (c) Spring (d) The yield in some places goes higher still. Average 1900 lbs. or 1400 lbs. rice.

The following table gives average acreage under each principal crop in all the provinces of India:—

Province	Rice	Wheat	Barley
Average acreage			
1. Bengal	20,957,000	1,27,000	96,000
2. Behar and Orissa	15,903,000	1,203,000	1,282,000
3. Madras (including Indian States).....	12,209,000	18,000	3,000
4. Burma	10,412,000	43,000	—
5. United Provinces	6,790,000	6,671,000	4,704,000
6. Assam	4,505,000	—	—
7. Central Provinces & Berar	5,106,000	3,579,000	17,000
8. Bombay	3,491,000	2,103,000	31,000
9. Sind (includ- ing Indian States)	1,154,000	594,000	25,000
10. Punjab	1,038,000	10,425,000	1,444,000
11. Mysore	743,000	4,000	2,000
12. Kashmir State	396,000	378,000	111,000

13.	Kashmir Valley	269,000	50,783	16,125
14.	Central Indian States	107,000	3,249,000	111,000
15.	Coorg	82,000		
16.	N. W. F. Province	41,000	1,023,000	304,000
17.	Rajputana States	3,000	942,000	475,000
18.	Delhi		32,000	14,000
19.	Ajmer-Merwara		17,000	53,000

The two tables read together show that certainly Bengal is the greatest 12th position of rice producing Province in the whole of India and has the greatest percentage area. In point of acreage the Kashmir State ranks 12th, and the Kashmir Valley 13th, but according to *percentage area* is second to Bengal. Although Kashmir is only *Ek-fasli* (i.e. one-cropped), still the yield per acre is very good. In certain places it is over 2500* lbs of *shali*, that is over

But second to Bengal in regard to percentage area.

*Crop experiments have yielded over 2600 lbs an acre in several places.

1600 lbs of rice (husked). Were Kashmir double-cropped like Bengal, Madras, Bihar, etc., the average yield would have 'decidedly been greater, although as it is, it is better than most of the Provinces. Punjab tops the list in wheat. The rich lands of Bengal claim 26·8 in rice, while the Punjab has 1½ times the percentage area under wheat. The United Provinces claim the first place in barley and maize, and second in wheat, just as Punjab occupies first place in wheat and second in barley. The Valley of Kashmir cannot compare with them in respect of food grains other than rice. It is, however, remarkable that out of the total area of 396,000 acres under rice, the Valley (comprising 7 Tehsils only) commands 68 p. c.; and in respect of wheat and barley, 13·4 p. c. and 14·5 p. c., respectively. It is thus evident that the main crop that abounds in the Valley is rice and it is this very staple foodstuff that we are chiefly concerned with.

Out of the seven Tehsils, Kulgam is the most plentiful in Shali (and Baramulla the

last). In all the Tehsils, *shali* covers 22·6 p. c. of the total area of these Tehsils;
 Percentage area of seven Tehsils of the Valley. maize 14·1 p. c., wheat 4·3 p. c., barley 1·4 p. c., as will be clear from the following tables:—

All the seven Tehsils	Total area in acres	Assessable Cultivated	Uncultivated
	1,183,131	716,255	443,257
Principal crops		Percentage of cultivated area	Percentage of Total area
Rice	269,457	37·6 p. c.	22·6 p. c.
Wheat	50,783	7 p. c.	4·3 p. c.
Maize	167,224	23·3 p. c.	14·1 p. c.
Barley	16,125	2·2 p. c.	1·4 p. c.

The following table gives the area of each Tehsil as also the percentage of *shali* to cultivated area.

Tehsil	Area total in acres	Area under rice	Percentage total area	Percentage cultivated area
Avantipura	190,561	40,746	21·38	38·1
Sri Pratapsinghpura	182,903	42,426	23·2	37·6
Kulgam	181,373	53,815	29·7	55·7
Baramulla	171,022	26,888	15·72	23·5
Anantnag	169,521	44,464	26·2	48·8
Handwara	149,269	40,408	27	29·9
Shahr Khas	138,482	20,710	15	34·8

Taking all these facts into consideration, **Southern Tehsils more fertile than Northern ones.** we come to the conclusion that the Tehsils to the south of the Valley are the most fertile in respect of shali, and have a greater percentage of area under rice cultivation; while the Tehsils of Handwara (46,515 acres) and Baramulla (32,918 acres) command very large tracts under maize, the next important crop of the valley, which is used not only for fodder for animals, but for human consumption as well, especially in the Illakas of Gurez, and if available, used for export to Ladakh, etc. Avantipura (12,546 acres) and Sripratapsinghpura (12,187 acres) give great out-turn for wheat. Wheat is generally used in Kashmir not as an article of food like rice or maize, but as an article of luxury, being used by bakers, confectioners, etc. Again, Handwara (5,648 acres) and Baramulla (4,548 acres) grow large quantities of barley, which is mostly used by the people coming from the adjoining hilly tracts, as also for fodder throughout.

What is the total out-turn of *shali*, which forms the staple food and crop in Kashmir? Although the average acreage sown with *shali* has risen by 42 per cent. from 1,89,000 acres (first Settlement) to 2,69,000 acres (present Settlement) roughly, the total average out-turn of the seven tehsils of the Valley amounts in an average year, according to the present settlement figures, to 29,44,000 *Kharwars*. Taking the population of the Valley as 11,90,977 or roughly, 12,00,000 souls, it works out at an average of 2·5 *Kharwars* per head per annum, *i. e.*, even

Average incidence per head per annum 2·5 *Kharwars*, which means less than 1 lb. rice per head per day.

less than four *traks* per head per month, which is the general rate of ration fixed at present.*

Besides, we find from the census report of Kashmir for 1921, the total number of immigrants reckoned at 18,295 against 12,056 emigrants which gives an increase of 9·3% in the natural population of the Valley. If since 1921 the number of immigrants may be said to have remained stationary, which in view of the fact that

*This has since been reduced to three *traks* only.

numbers of visitors come to the Valley during the season from April to October every year, is denying the fact of movement in the population, it is still a fact that if *shali* alone be taken into account, there is an insufficiency of supply even at the reduced rate of ration per head in vogue at present. It, therefore, means that besides rice, something else is used—maize,* wheat and sometimes barley, and this is necessary also in view of the consideration that exports are also made to tracts that do not produce *shali*, either at all or in appreciable quantity, *e. g.* Gurez, Muzaffarabad, Ladakh, Gilgit, etc.

We may mention in this connection, that rice is never said to have sufficed for the whole population of the Valley. In olden times, and even as

*The area under maize is 1,67,224 acres, and taking at an average of 600 seers per acre, it means that over 12 lakhs *kharwars* of maize are produced, which satisfy the demands rising on account of export, fodder, local human consumption, etc. Wheat commands an area of, say, 50,000 acres, and working at an average of 400 seers, it gives 2½ lakhs *kharwars*; and barley, which covers 16,125 acres, at an average of 300 seers, 60,000 *kharwars*. The total grains thus produced come to about 44 lakhs *kharwars*.

late as the time of the Sikhs, when nine-tenths of the produce was exacted, the rural population were denied rice, and they lived on grains other than rice, and recourse was being sometimes had to fruits, *singara*, etc. The *zamindars* were only allowed such quantities as would suffice for purposes of seed, and even if this was not considered sometimes advisable the whole produce was seized, and as stated above in Chapter II, advances of seeds were made to them. The urban population, therefore, lived in plenty, lived an easy-going life, not unoften at the bitter cost of the grower. The population which in 1891 A. D. was estimated at 8,14,241 for the Valley, increased to

Complexity of position on account of increase in population and naturally in consumption.

12 lakhs in 1921, and Srinagar which claimed 1,18,960 in 1891, swelled to 1,42,000 in 1921, and this increase is responsible for the complex problem of food that has involved the State in controlling foodstuffs, and resulted in the institution of a Stores (now Granaries) for the supply of food grains to the urban population, more particularly, the people of Srinagar.

CHAPTER IV.

PHYSICAL PHENOMENA.—Famines.

Kashmir is a land notorious for floods, fires and famines. From the time of its coming into being through the superhuman efforts of the sage Kashyapa down to the present there

Kashmir a land of famines, floods etc. is a record of vast devastations of the country by water sprites, by hailstones and storms, by 'unexpected divine wrath', that from time to time modulated the chequered existence of the land. The history of Kashmir is a history of changes not only in its administrative but physiological conditions as well, brought about as they were by constant visitations of physical disasters. Earthquakes and fires have not been uncommon and in conjunction with floods etc. have contributed to the havoc that has been caused by famines, notwithstanding the anxious efforts of the government of the time to save life at any cost.

From the records available, the earliest famine that occurred in Kashmir was in the time of Tunjina I, when the fall Famine in the time of Tunjina I. of snow in the month of *Bhadrapada* reduced the people to

sinews and bones, and they "fought for food like ghosts." Lalitaditya Mukhtapida in his anxiety to combat "habitual" scarcity caused the distribution of the waters of the *Vitasta* by constructing a series of water-wheels; Avantivarman's great Kashmiri engineer, Suyya, built stone embankments to hold up the water of the river, and the attempt resulted in successfully reducing the price of a *khari* of rice to thirty-six dinars, "which had risen to ten hundred and fifty dinars in time of famine and fallen to two hundred in times of great abundance."

During the time of Partha, in the year 917—18 A. D., the crops were
Famine of 917—
18 A. D. destroyed by floods, and although a *khari* of rice sold for a thousand dinars, it was difficult to obtain food and the land became densely covered "with bones until it was a great burial ground." In 1099 A. D., when Harsha had
1099 A. D. tormented the people, the wrath of heavens visited the land in the form of plague and flood, and all combined to devastate the country so much so that

there arose a scarcity of all wares. A *khari* of rice was bought for 500 dinars, and two *palas* of grape juice cost one dinara. A *pala* of wool was sold for six dinars; "of salt, pepper and asofoetida and other articles it was difficult even to hear the name."

In the reign of Sussala (1121-28) fire broke out which consumed all the 'food stores' and a hard and terrible famine (a)* stalked the land, and "famishing people who could scarcely walk and whose tall bodies were emaciated and darkened by the sun heat appeared like scorched posts." During Uccala's time when a similar calamity befell the land the king stopped the famine at its very rise by selling his own grain-stores at cheap rates "from tender care for the people."

Fire in Sussala's time and consequent famine.

Famine in Uccala's reign.

Famines during Mohammedan Rule in Kashmir. 1460 A. D.

times we find that famines and scarcities became more frequent. In 1460 A. D., early

* (a) When the State stores containing the produce are destroyed before the new harvest is at hand, a famine must necessarily follow for the city population. The supply of cereals from the villages by ordinary trade was practically unknown in Kashmir until recent years.

snow destroyed the *Shali* crop, and inspite of Zainulabdin's prompt measures to relieve distress no little loss of life was experienced. One *Khara* of grain which formerly sold for 300 dinars could not be had for

1500 dinaras. In 1532-33 A.D.
1533 A. D. famine was the result of an in-

vasion of Kashmir by the troops of Sultan Syed Khan, ruler of Kashgar, which greatly interfered with cultivation operations; and a *khari* of grain sold for ten thousand *nishkas*.

In 1575 A.D. early snowfall in
1575 A. D. September destroyed the crops

and the famine lasted for three years. In 1603
1603 A. D. untimely rains damaged the crops. Since the grains sent by

Akbar the Great from the Punjab did not prove sufficient, no appreciable relief was afforded with the result that the famine lasted for about two years and took away many lives. In 1646 A.D. the Kharif

1646 A.D. was damaged by excessive rains.

Shah Jehan sent large quantities of grains from Gujrat, Lahore and Multan, for distri-

bution among the famine-stricken. In 1685 and 1724 A.D., heavy rains damaged the crops. In the time of Azam Khan, when untimely rains deepened the severity of the famine, a *kharwar* of shali sold for Rs 8 and more; and the famine which had been in existence from the time of Abu Barkat Khan lingered on for two years and a half. In 1713 the immaturity of the crop caused a famine; and only after a decade or so the plunder of Bambas affected the sowings to such a degree that for about seven months there was great scarcity and a rupee fetched hardly two seers of rice. In S. 1813 (A. D. 1756) early snowfall in the month of Katak reduced the people to such a miserable condition that locusts were sold and bought like *shali* at the *ghats*. But Abdul Hassan Bande distributed the grains that were in State Stores among the people in proportion to each family's requirements. Also one lakh *kharwars* of *shali* were advanced to the zamindars as "taccavi" loan on condi-

1685 A. D.
1724 A. D.
1713 A. D.
very severe.

1756 A.D.

Abdul Hussain's
arrangements.

tion of its being recovered from them the following year. But when owing to the incapacity of the zamindars to pay, the advance remained unrecovered, they were required to pay yearly one *trak* per *kharwar* or one anna per rupee as *rasum*, till Colonel Mian Singh remitted the loan, which had now been recovered five times over, *in toto*, in the year 1834 A.D. The last great famine during the Mohammedan sovereignty was that in the 'Kahati Az'm'. time of Azim Khan, which was caused by the immaturity of the *Shali* crop due to early cold. A *kharwar* of *Shali* was sold for more than Rs. 16, and famine conditions which lasted for over five years resulted in great mortality. The famines of 1832, 1864, 1877 and 1892, complete the record of the nineteenth century, and as, excepting that of 1864, the famines of 1832 and 1877 and the scarcity of 1892 were of a destructive nature, a detailed account thereof has been considered necessary to acquaint the reader with the steps taken and the measures adopted from time to time to alleviate the pangs of distress.

The famine of 1832 is known as the “Sher Singhi” famine. In 1831, Sher Singh was the governor of Kashmir; and early snow and rain visited the country when the *kharif* crop was ripening. Maharaja Ranjit Singh had also programmed to go to Kashmir, and accordingly Jamadar Khushal Singh was deputed to make necessary arrangements for the visit, as also watch and report on the events in Kashmir. The Jamadar, in his anxiety to amass as much as was possible, not only interfered unnecessarily, but harassed the zamindars to such an extent, that famine conditions became imminent, and dearth and want stared in the face, and in their wake death stalked abroad. The ‘*zūlm*’ of the Jamadar on the one hand, and the wrath of the gods on the other, in the shape of snow, when the crop had not been cut or harvested, followed by severest cold, reduced the people to a very helpless condition. There was no hay which could be stacked, and for want of fodder cattle perished in numbers. The

Shersinghi famine 1831-32.

Due to unnecessary interference by Jamadar Khushal Singh.

severity of the winter added insult to injury, and no sowing was done in the following year. Panic-stricken as they were, thousands of Kashmiris fled to the Punjab, whence they never returned. But the Sikh Government anxious to relieve the distress, sent Colonel Mian Singh, and he imported grain and eggs from the Punjab into Kashmir, and restored in an appreciable measure the prosperity of the villagers, by giving them grain for seeds, and eggs for breeding purposes.

Deputation of
Colonel Mian
Singh.

Famine of 1877-
1879 A.D. and ar-
rangements made
during His High-
ness Maharaja
Ranbir Singh's
time.

The famine of 1877-79 A.D. was a general disaster throughout India. It did not spare Kashmir, and affected the Valley to a soul, so much so that the population, which was believed to be about 117,400 souls, was reduced to 60,000. To recount the horrors of this famine would be to disinter the painful memories of a past that is now 50 years old. But it has to be told that the famine was an inevitable calamity which involved both the Government and the people in its inextricable meshes; and had not

the generosity of His Highness the Maharaja Ranbir Singh come to the aid of the starving people, and the State spent about 40 lakhs of rupees, the fate of the people would have been deplorably worse.

The famine was due to snow and rains having commenced early towards the end of Assuj S. 1934, when the *Kharif* crop was being harvested. The grains already cut lay open in barns, and being irretrievably drenched they became withered and rotten, so much so that even grass could not be spared from the contagion with the result that many cattle were destroyed. The *Rabi* had been sold by the *zamindars* into the hands of the people of the adjoining districts of Muzaffarabad, Poonch, Kishtwar, etc., where owing to scarcity of produce a great demand prevailed. The effects of the famine could not be felt till Baisākh 1935, on account of the State Stores having a sufficient reserve for distribution among the people. With the commencement of the new year the trouble began to assume proportions. In order, therefore, to combat the situation, it was proposed to import grain from outside;

and had not circumstances beyond control interfered, the situation would have been relieved before long. The fruit crop also suffered, and tracts of vegetables were damaged by a sort of disease. The *Rabi* of 1935 could not be an assuring harvest, for sowings had been interrupted by incessant rains. The *Shali* that was available out of the *Kharif* of 1934, was so much damaged that it yielded an out-turn of 3 lbs. per *trak* as against 7 to 8 lbs. of rice.

People were frightened and numbers took to unfrequented routes, and fled to the plains. The system of *Rahdari* was dispensed with to facilitate the emigration of people who could find no means, inspite of the State arrangements, to stay on in the country. His Highness could not stop the tide: and the Government to save destruction of life on the way instituted poor houses* on the routes of Murree, Banahal and Pir Panjal. In the town of Srinagar itself 33 poor houses were open-

Deplorable condition of people--
Abolition of *Rahdari* system.

Institution of poor houses both in town and Mofussil to facilitate emigration of people to the plains.

* Via Banahal 5 poor-houses; via Pir Panjal 4; Kohala post, 3; and Akhnur 2; the total number of 14 stage poor houses relieved a total number of 2,11,276 by a total quantity of 7,301 maunds 10 seers and $\frac{1}{2}$ chattak. (Administration Report S. 1935-36 p. 42).

ed, and in the Mofussil 27, and the total number of people thus relieved was 10,74,235 at a total cost of Rs. 61,610.

The scheme of importing grains from the Punjab, for which one lakh of rupees had already been deposited in the Sialkot Treasury, resulted in a public announcement to the effect that all imports of grain were to be exempted from duty, and an importer of 20,000 rupees worth grains was to be awarded a *khillat* of Rs. 1000 (500 cash and 500 in kind) and the rates of transport were to be doubled.

But as the *Rabi* of 1935 did not seem to relieve the situation, and there was no grain now with the State that could be distributed, His Highness' Government distributed *singaras* (water-nuts) for some time. Towards the end of Assuj the grains imported from out-side were brought into Kashmir by head-loads; and although it cost the Government Rs. 15-14½ (British coin) it was sold out to the public at Rs. 10 *chilkies* or Rs. 6-4 a *kharwar*; and the rates of *makki* and *singaras* were also reduced from Re. 1-10

Arrangements for import of grains from the Punjab.

Situation in Samvat 1935.

Import price of a *kharwar* of rice about Rs. 16, sale price Rs. 6-4.

and Re. 1 to Re. 1-6 and 0-12-0 per *kharwar*. An orphanage was also created. Taxes on trades and occupations were remitted, as also the balances recoverable from the cultivators for the Samvat year 1934, etc.*

With the ripening of the *Kharif* crop fifty thousand *kharwars* were brought into the city, and this helped a great deal. It is said that at the instance of the Punjab Government, it was decided to import 2 lakhs maunds of grain—one lakh through the Punjab Government, and the remaining one lakh to be arranged for by the State Government, the charges for the former being also paid by the State. It resulted in appointing two contractors*, Messrs Thomas Russell and Ram Rattan, who were required to deliver by the 15th of June 1879, fifty thousand

Import of 2
l a k h maunds
of rice, one lakh
through contrac-
tors appointed by
Punjab Govern-
ment.

* (a) Of these remissions the one outstanding remission was that of Dagh Shawl. Total duty recoverable in S. 1919 was Rs. 12,00,000; reduction from S. 1919 to S. 1931, Rs. 3,85,000; reductions and remissions from S. 1931 to S. 1934, Rs. 3,19,000; remissions S. 1935, Rs. 4,96,000.

*These contractors were to be given no transport facilities; but it is found that at the suggestion of the Officer on Special Duty, grass was to be provided at every stage between Kohala and Kashmir. It required the State to arrange 57,750 maunds of grass which with other incidental expenses cost them about Rs. 18,500 (Chilki). This grass was not afterwards purchased by the contractors, and they were thus put to a great loss.

maunds each. These contractors were afforded necessary facilities by the State.

The State succeeded in procuring 1,31,561 maunds up to the end of Har
 One lakh through the State Agency. 1936—(S. 1935—1,05,130 maunds and S. 1936—26,431 maunds); and the Banahal route was improved to facilitate camel transport, which helped in increasing the imports into the Valley. With arrangements now made through contractors, and by the State itself, a sufficient quantity of grains was made available, and a committee of 13 members was formed to supervise distribution arrangements, etc. This Committee had 6 officials and 7 non-officials* ; its nine sittings

lasted from 12th to 28th Baisakh 1936; and according to its recommendations the city was re-enumerated, and a limited number of shops was opened, at which rice and wheat were sold, though at slightly higher rates (a), and the public could make their purchases therefrom.

* The Members of the Committee were—

1. One Officer of the British Government. 2. Officer on special duty. 3. Babu Nilamber Mukerji. 4. Syed Wazir Ali Khan, Revenue Minister. 5. Dr. Gopal Chandra. 6. Nawab Mardan Ali Khan. 7—13. Seven Non-Official Kashmiris.

(a) White Rice		4 seers per rupee.
Red Rice		5 seers per rupee.
Wheat		4 seers per rupee.

His Highness Maharaja Ranbir Singh, who was at Jammu, moved up to Kashmir to be on spot and personally direct the arrangements.

Maharaja Ranbir Singh moves up from Jammu to Srinagar.

The trouble had been aggravated by the appearance of cholera, and the city was reporting the spread of affection by the daily tolls of death. On the arrival of His Highness stock was taken of the grains in hand, and only 20

thousand *kharwars* of *Shali* were reported to be in reserve. The

Arrangements made on spot.

Rabi was expected not earlier than a month, and the *Kharif* was long way off. Orders were issued to expedite the imports from the Punjab, and to achieve this special transport facilities were guaranteed, inasmuch as an owner of camels or mules was to be compensated for any loss he

suffered on account of the death of any of his animals while transporting State grains from outside; and the State also purchased ponies, etc., from *zamindars* for the purpose.

Transport facilities by compensation to owners and State purchase of ponies, etc.

Arrangements for the protection of *Rabi* crop, for the distribution of grains, for breaking up of new lands, etc., were ordered to be made.

The sale price of Shali was reduced from Rs. 3 to Rs. 2 (chilki). To afford further relief His Highness ordered cultivation of 2 lakhs *kharwars* of turnip, which was considered a wholesome food by the Kashmiris, and for this purpose seed was imported from France, India and other places; but owing to the failure of timely rains, the experiment also failed. In short the Government adopted measures which relieved the distress in main till the *Rabi* was cut and harvested, and the prospects of *Kharif* were assured. Imports through contractors which had dwindled so to say, were 'sped up,' and although much of the grains were not delivered at the destination owing to difficulties of transport, the quantities that were made available through contractors and the State Agency were distributed through official Agency. But, as this arrangement was not found to be satisfactory, it was given up and 200 sales hops were opened in the city. The cultivators, who had also suffered during the famine of two years, were granted further concessions. The *traki-rasum* * was

* The *traki-rasum* was an ancient custom, but varied according to times. Sometimes the calculations were made on the following basis. Out of 2 *kharwars* the State took one *kharwar*;

wholly remitted in regard to *Shali*; and in respect of maize, cotton, *mong*, etc., the the system of “panjtooda” was adopted, by which the *zamindar* got three-fifths and the State only two-fifths. In the end the Maharaja’s Government sustained a heavy loss in the arrangements, for it cost the State no less than Rs. 33,64,200;* and the sole object

and out of the balance of one *kharwar*, 8 *traks* were assigned for *rusum-i-traki*, *rasumi-manwanti*, *rasum-i-Qanungo* and *Patwari* and “*daman-i-gadai*”, and for *Doomb*, *Shakdar* and *Sazawal* etc. That is, the *zamindar* got only about one-fourth. Out of this 2 *traks* were taken for *Musada*, and thus only about one fifth was the net balance which the *zamindar* got. General Mian Singh fixed the *traki* at one-third i.e. out of every *kharwar* the *zamindar* was to get 5 *traks* and 2 seers; but even out of this the *zamindar* was required to meet the demand on account of *rasum-i-manwanti* of the *Qanungo*, and that of the *Patwari*. In addition “*daman-i-gadai*” and other *rasums* for *Dhoomb*, *shakdar* and *Suzuwal*, and the establishment of the *Kardar*, were demanded, which left him hardly one-fourth for his own use.

Maharaja Ranbir Singh had previous to the Samvat year 1927 remitted one *trak* out of the *traki-rasum*, and in that year granted special remissions, and reduced it to two *traks* only. But during this famine the *rasum* was wholly abolished, at least with respect to *Shali*, which was not a “*kimti*” crop. The total amount thus remitted was Rs. 2,09,000.

*The detail as given in the Appendices of the Administration Report S. 1935-36 is:—

1. Weight of grains delivered in Kashmir	1,95,714 Mds
2. Cost of grains	Rs. 17,01,368
3. Transport etc.	Rs. 12,30,038
4. Customs duty (which was remitted)	Rs. 1,06,335
5. Rewards to traders	Rs. 5,240
6. Pay to the establishment deputed for grain arrangements	Rs. 5,88,000
7. Miscellaneous expenses	Rs. 62,500
Total (spent on grain)	Rs. 36,93,481

which the Maharaja had in view was that of saving life, and that too at any cost, which he did, and for which he is still remembered as the most benevolent ruler Kashmir can well be proud of. §

Loss on account of transporting of grains.		
1. Cost of animals of transport (that died)		Rs. 96,488
2. Cost of grass	..	Rs. 28,525
3. Cost of grains lost	..	Rs. 1,51,550

Total	Rs. 2,76,563
	(Chilki)

Total cost (cost of grains and loss incurred)	Rs. 39,70,044	9	9
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Average cost of a maund of grain		20	4	0
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Rate at which grains were sold at an average, per maund		3	1	7½
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Total cost recovered by sale of grains at the given rate		6,05,849	6	6
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Net loss = Rs. 39,70,044-9½ as.

minus Rs. 6,05,849-6½ as. Rs. 33,64,195-3-3

Note—For the maintenance of orphans and poor the State spent Rs. 88,145-15-3. On relief works, a total of Rs. 1,95,487-9-6 was spent in giving wages; and if this amount be also added to the net loss suffered, the total comes to Rs. 36,46,928-12-0. In addition, exemptions and remissions, as noted in their proper places, are given as under.

	Rs.
1. Remission of <i>traki</i>	 2,09,000
2. Remission of tax on Dagh Shawl	 4,96,000
3. Remission of Taxes on trades and occupations	 77,152
4. Remission of <i>zari-Nikah</i>	 20,663

Total	 8,02,815
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§The famine of 1877-79 was a wholesale famine throughout India; and it brought into existence the first Indian Famine Commission, which was followed by several others. (The Macdonnell Famine Commission of 1901 perfected the recommendations of previous Commissions and since then, the Government of India have with them a tried scheme to handle similar contingencies).

If the relief policy of the Government of India was based on the declaration of the Secretary of State for India in 1877, (quoted below), there was no such policy for Kashmir, except that

As for the scarcity of 1893 A. D., which followed this disastrous famine only after a decade and a half, we learn that it was due to several causes, and was aggravated by natural calamities of fire and cholera. The conflagration rendered over seven thousand persons homeless, and the severity of the cholera epidemic caused a general panic, as the average toll of mortality was found to be 500 a day. The steps which were taken by the Government to tide over the difficulty are given in the official Note of the Revenue Member of Council. The causes* as

Aggravated by
calamities of fire
and cholera.

Arrangements
made, as contained
in the Note of the
then Revenue Mem-
ber.

its ruler knew only to sacrifice all to save life, even though the cost was enormous.

"The object of saving life is undoubtedly paramount to all other considerations. But it is essential that in pursuing this end your officers should sedulously guard against the danger of inducing the population to rely upon Government aid rather than upon their own industry and thrift. In the interests of the distressed population itself, as well as the tax-payers generally, you are bound to adopt precautions against indolence or imposition similar, so far as the circumstances of India will permit, to those with which in this country it has always been found necessary to protect the distribution of public relief from abuse."

The relief distributed to the distressed people in Kashmir was truly speaking abused not by the people, but the administrators of relief, viz. the official agency who peculated as much as was possible, at the cost of the sufferer.

* "The so-called distress was not due to unfavourable or bad harvest, but had been brought about by a combination of

mentioned in the footnote as also the arrangements made by the State show that there

untoward circumstances the principal of which were the following:—

“From time immemorial, the State invariably kept a reserve stock of grain for the town of Srinagar, making supplies at rates far below the market price of staples. The result was a dead loss to the State on the one hand and on the other the annihilation of free trade on mercantile principles.

Depending on the bounty of the State, the people naturally neglected to avail themselves of the blessings of self-help, and their happiness was centered in the fulness of the State godowns and the readiness with which supplies were issued from them.

The state of affairs during the incumbency of Sirdar Rup Singh, Governor of Kashmir, was extremely unsatisfactory. The books showed a nominal reserve of 6 lakhs worth of grain, though the granaries were practically empty and their emptiness no longer remained a secret.

In consequence of the ingenious frauds practised by local officials, the prevailing system of collecting the State revenue in kind was found to result in a dead loss to the State, and advantage was accordingly taken of the recent settlement to introduce a system of cash assessments—this system was not, however, extended to the whole province of Kashmir, a portion of the land revenue still continuing to be collected in kind from the unassessed Tahsil. To meet the immediate requirements of the city of Srinagar, but for some unaccountable reason and in spite of strict orders, the grain collections were so badly managed that people were actually forced to make payments in cash instead of kind, while the little that had been collected in kind was most dishonestly sold at enhanced prices which simply went to fill the pockets of the Saddar Treasurer and his Tahvildars, and curiously enough the chief revenue authority *viz.* the Governor did not take least notice of these occurrences.

The consequence was that the former Tahvil under the Governor and the latter under the State Treasurer and his son, participated largely in the speculation of State *Shali*, and the disorganisation of the recognised system of collection, and the people naturally suspected the ruinous condition of the granaries. To add to their misfortunes, the scarcity of grain was followed by the destructive fires which burnt down as many as 1500 houses in a densely populated part of the city, and with them several thousands of *kharwars* of the *shali* stored in them. To give an idea of the magnitude of the conflagration and of the havoc which followed in its train, it will be sufficient to mention that more than 7,000 persons were rendered homeless without any kind of shelter against the severity of a Kashmir winter; coupled with this the appearance of Cholera which eventually developed into

were no famine conditions, but conditions of scarcity, which the city dweller dreaded as much as the former, for fear of being victimised by the inevitable *galladar*. The general situation was so terrible that the scarcity of

a very severe epidemic, caused a mortality fearful to describe, the deaths averaging up to nearly 500 per diem.

All these circumstances combined with the heavy demands for food for the Gilgit garrison, make up the sum total of what is now known as the distress in Srinagar'', (pp. 1-2 of the Note).

(b) The arrangements that were made on the occasion before the Revenue Member was deputed, show that the requirements of the town for Samvat 1948 were estimated at 7 lakhs, in Samvat 1949, at 4 lakhs *kharwars* of *shali*, and wheat about 50,000 *kharwars*. The arrangements made were.—

"The State Council think, however, that for sometime to come it would be impossible to dispense entirely with the system of grain collections in Kashmir, but as the poor classes in Srinagar are only entitled to the concession of receiving their supply of food at low rates, it is under contemplation to issue grains to those only whose monthly income does not exceed rupees eight instead of the existing scale of rupees twenty. The change will it is hoped take effect from Kharif 1950, and will conduce to reduce considerably the demand on the State godowns. To give a resume of the arrangements made during deputation of the Revenue Member to Kashmir, it will not be out of place to mention.—

(1) That the Revenue Member was on special duty from the 23rd June to the 22nd of December 1892, during which he collected the *Mujawaza* and superintended the distribution of grain at the monthly rate of twenty-four seers per head to 1,30,000 persons.

(2) That the period of his stay in Srinagar was a most trying one in consequence of the cholera epidemic which raged with the utmost virulence throughout the country.

(3) That the collection and distribution was conducted with promptitude and unexampled regularity without resorting to the infliction of the penal provisions of the rules.

(4) That the success of the arrangements is amply evidenced by the contentment which prevailed in the country as also by the fact that the distress was averted without any expense to the State.

grain “rendered handfuls of rice even for funeral ceremonies of Moham-
 Acute situation—handfuls of rice for funerals difficult to procure. medans and Hindus difficult to procure.” The rules that were framed to regulate the supply, collection and distribution, are given in the official Note on pages I to IV and VI to X, which include duties of Tahsildars, Sergeants, Ghat Officers, etc, as also of Tehvildars and Supervisors.

Whether the trouble was that of actual
 Causes of the scarcity, or that of “distress
 Scarcity. caused by the insufficient im-
 portation of the food grain in the town of

(5) That food of the best quality was issued to the public thus avoiding the excessive use of fruit and vegetable as a preventive measure against cholera.

(6) That the Revenue Member did not leave Srinagar until he was satisfied that the godowns were full.

(7) That there was 50,000 *kharwars* in hand when he departed from Srinagar handing over charge of the arrangements to the Governor under the general supervision of the Settlement Commissioner.

(8) That the collections made during 1949 were 2,45,929 *kharwars*, of which 1,58,872 *kharwars* were distributed during that year, leaving a surplus of 87,057 *kharwars*, that 82,258 *kharwars* were collected in 1950, making a total of 1,69,315 *kharwars* in hand, of which 1,01,000 were distributed in 1950, leaving a balance in hand of 68,315 *kharwars*.

The estimated Mijawaza for 1950 is 10,000 *kharwars* of wheat and barley in rabbi and 3,00,000 *kharwars* of Shali and maize in kharif, which is in course of collection and is calculated to be sufficient for all requirements (pp. i—iii)

The havoc caused by the conflagration and cholera could not be repaired easily, and when food grains were somewhat assured there appeared to be some hope left of “rebuilding”.

Srinagar” * or due to a continuation(a) of causes, all that we may say is that it was handled in time, that the granaries were as in the past replenished to offer a consolation to the famine-stricken city dweller, and that the State was not lagging behind in offering him the necessary aid, rather in catering to his needs.

The following extract from the rules passed by the Council on 27th June 1893, will be of interest as it relates to the collections

Rules for collection of Shali and other Grains State Reserve.

* Letter No. 72 dated the 12th January 1893 from the Vice-President of Council to the Revenue member.

(a) “The chief one probably was the inefficiency or the misconduct of the late Governor of Kashmir who suddenly decreased the amount of revenue taken in kind and also failed to prevent serious embezzlement from the State granaries. Other and less direct causes were abnormally light snowfall of last winter, the disastrous fire in Srinagar and the disorganisation of the grain trade consequent on the epidemic of cholera” (p. XII—letter No. 5175 dated the 29th October 1893 from the Resident in Kashmir to the Vice President of Council).

The rules framed were considered by the Residency to meet a very exceptional emergency, and observed that “rule 17 should ensure that they are not extended beyond what is necessary”. “It is also observed with satisfaction that the new settlement is not to be interfered with and that the appointment of the 30,000 kharwars of grain to be collected as revenue from the eight unassessed Tehsils has been left to the settlement Officer. As regards the future the Government of India are of opinion that as the new settlement with its cash assessments comes gradually into operation the city population of Srinagar must learn to become independent of State helps and a proper system of grain traffic must be organized, but that for time to come it will be necessary to keep a large State reserve of grain in stock” (Ibid—P. XII)

and requirements estimated for the city people. Rule (4) runs—"In consideration of present circumstances it is necessary for the State to keep in store the following amount of grain sufficient for annual requirements of city people and the State:—

Description of requirements.	Total quantity required. Kharwars.	Shali.	Wheat	Barley	Makki
		Khrs.	Khrs.	Khrs.	Khrs.
Poor Classes of city	3,00,000	2,50,000	25,000	15,000	10,000
Jail	1,500	1,500			
State Stables etc. ...	21,000	18,000		3,000	
State expenses	13,000	6,000	3,000	4,000	
Advances for seed	10,000	5,000			5,000
Dharmarth	15,500	5,000		5,000	5,500
Total	3,61,000	2,85,500	28,000	27,000	20,500

This estimate shall be made up from the following sources:—

(a). Grain (*shali*, wheat, barley and *makki*) collected under Rules No. 1 and 2 from the assessed and non-assessed villages. They should be sold to the poor classes of the city at the prescribed State rate.

(b). Collections in kind made from big *chakdars*, such as Diwan Badri Nath; a fair portion of the produce in excess of their

“requirements should be taken under orders
 “on payment, or they be held responsible to
 “supply a Mohalla with food staples out of
 “their chak produce, taking cash price for
 “the same.

“(c). The great Jagirdars should also be
 “asked to help the State, the Rajas Ram
 “Singh and Amar Singh providing the
 “following supplies:—

“(i) Lieutenant Colonel Raja Ram
 “Singh, to supply the army from his Jagir
 “produce with a portion of their require-
 “ments on payment.

“(ii) Raja Sir Amar Singh, K. C. S. I.,
 “to help the State by supplying provisions
 “at the State rate from his Jagir produce
 “sufficient to meet the requirements of
 “Gulmarg, which are not much, being only
 “for four months as detailed below:—

“Rice.....	2,500	maunds
“Barley and makki.....	2,500	„
“Dal Mung.....	300	„
“Kashmir Basmati.....	100	„

“(5) If the State is gradually relieved
 “of the responsibility of providing supplies
 “to the inhabitants of the city, it would in

“that case too be necessary to keep for it as
 “a precautionary measure a reserve to help
 “the Military and Civil Departments in time
 “of need and to provide the people with food
 “in times of famine. The maximum quantity
 “of such reserve shall be two lakh *kharwars*
 “as detailed below and will be replaced by
 “new grains every year:—

“Shali.....	1,50,000	Kharwars
“Wheat.....	20,000	„
“Barley.....	20,000	„
“Maize or Makki.....	10,000	„ ”

It will be of further interest to note
 State consider the here that the Government be-
 galladar to be lieved the *galladar* to be res-
 responsible for the trouble by his con- ponsible for the scarcity by his
 cealing or drown- ing grains.

concealing the grains or drowning them in
 the river, etc., so much so that provision was
 made in the Rules to make the storing of
 grains beyond a certain limit, or their des-
 truction, § penal; and a rate was fixed for

§ Rule 6. The Council have been informed that the
 grain dealers of the city have purchased and stored up large
 quantities of grains this year, and do not take compassion upon
 the poor by selling them grains, this being one of the reasons
 of scarcity of food supply in the city. The Council, therefore,
 order that the traders after keeping with them grain sufficient
 for their family consumption upto 15th December 1892 should

sale of grain to the citizens, *viz.* Rs. 3-8 or Rs. 4 *chilkies* per *kharwar*, which was considered to cover the margin of profit for the *galladar*. The

And rules to thwart his machinations.

Government even apprehended the destruction of grains by these grain-dealers, perhaps thinking that the *galladar* "cliqued" against the Government to be at liberty to sell at a rate he pleased. Whether this apprehension was based on any fact, or was a mere supposition, the Government seemed to be justified in promulgating such orders as protected the citizen against the rapacity of the grain-dealer, for there was no proper grain market which could be said to exercise any appre-

sell the rest to the citizens at rate not exceeding Rs. 3-8 or 4 *chilkies* per *kharwar* of *shali*, this will leave a good margin for profit to the grain dealers and at the same time would not be too hard to the purchasers who will of course be well-to-do persons, the poor classes being supplied with *shali* by the State at the Government rate of two *chilkies* per *kharwar*.

Note.—15th December is fixed on the consideration that the new *shali* will begin to come in the city by that date.

Rule 7. Any person or grain dealer in possession of grain stores found guilty of contravening Rule 6 shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment up to six months and a fine upto Rs. 500 in addition to his forfeiting *shali* in excess of his family wants.

Rule 8. Also any person who in defiance of Rule 6 may be found guilty of destroying *shali* by drowning it in the river or of destroying it in any other way shall be sentenced to rigorous imprisonment upto one year and fine upto one thousand rupees.

cial influence over the rates. Whatever it was, the scarcity of 1892-93 was not a scarcity due to famine conditions of non-productivity, but one of "insufficient importation of the food grains in the town of Srinagar". It stands in bold contrast to the disastrous famine of 1877-79 A. D., which was one of non-availability of food due to destruction of grains by untimely snow and rain, on the one hand; and the scarcity of 1917 A. D., of which we are going to give a brief account in the following chapter, and is seen to bear some resemblance to it, on the other.

In short, the effect of famines§ seems to have been markedly apparent in the dwindling of population of the Valley. If in 1887 A.D. it was estimated at between 3 to 4 lakhs, it was surely half of what there was in 1815 A.D., that is, only 70 years before. Countries that have such a

§ A study of the history of the famines in Kashmir has made it clear that they (famines) have generally been caused by floods, excessive rains or untimely snow early in the ripening or harvesting season: to which fires, epidemics, etc. have contributed in no small degree. There have been other causes. e.g., foreign invasions, immaturity and insufficiency of crops due to cold or paucity of rains etc., which have provided much anxious food for successive administrations in the country, and it is not infrequently that State or official interference has also been responsible for grave consequences.

disastrous history of population, must have resources that should safeguard against the recurrence of such calamities as affect their inhabitants with a severity that distances return to normal conditions and gives a rude set-back to rehabilitating civilisation. Now that the population of the Valley is estimated

In this connection the following from Wingate will be of real interest:—

“Variations in the season affect the harvest, for example, Famines, etc. a wet spring would injure the young crop or insufficient snows would diminish the water-supply, but famine appears only to be caused by heavy rain and cold at the time of ripening or reaping, and fortunately this is a rare occurrence. It is, however, always important that the *shali* crop should be cut and garnered with the utmost expedition and any revenue system which tends to delay that operation must in a critical season seriously aggravate the disaster. The *rabi* crops not infrequently suffer from insufficient spring showers, but from a famine standpoint, wheat, barley and the like are of little importance and therefore in the following history of the seasons, only those calamities are noticed, which seriously affect the population:—

A.D.	Samvat	
1815	1872	Population estimated at 8,00,000.
[1824	1881]	
[1828	1885]	Severe earthquake followed by cholera.
[1831	1888]	
[to	to]	Severe famine caused by heavy rain in the autumn.
[1833	1890]	
1835	1892	Population estimated at 2,00,000.
1838	1895	Floods.
[1842	1899]	
[or	or]	Cholera.
[1843	1900]	
1857	1914	Ditto.

at 12 lakhs, that is, three times what it was only 34 years ago, it means decidedly a marvellous development, settled conditions of living, security of land, property, and person—precursors of peace and plenty.

If the past may be said to have handed down to us no defined policy to combat famines or scarcities, still the experience of long centuries is a great asset which can in no case be conveniently ignored. Whenever a calamity befell the people, the sovereign ruler, or the government of the time, adopted immediately all possible measures to afford

[1859	1916]	Scarcity owing to short water supply.
to	to	
[1860	1917]	
1856	1922	Floods.
1869	1926	Ditto.
1871	1928	Ditto.
1872	1929	Cholera.
1873	1930	Population estimated at 3,00,000.
1875	1932	Poor harvest.
[1877	1934]	Severe famine, caused by heavy rain from the end of September 1877, followed by cholera.
to	to	
[1879	1936]	
1879	1936	Good rice harvest.
1880	1937	Very good ditto.
1881	1938	Good harvest.
1882	1939	Good ditto.
1883	1940	Poor ditto, too little rain.
1884	1941	Very good harvest.
1885	1942	Poor harvest, spring rains too heavy, and sowings retarded. Severe earthquake.
1886	1943	Fairly good harvest.

relief and to relieve the distress distributed grains, which had been stored on State account, or purchased grains and distributed them *gratis** or at fixed relief rates, as the situation demanded. In the next chapter, which deals with the subject of the late scarcity, we shall see how the State resorted to all sorts of measures to relieve distress and not only

1887	1944	Good harvest
		Population estimated at 3,00,000 to 4,00,000.

"From the above it will be remarked," says Mr. Wingate, "that severe earthquake has occurred twice in the present century, and so far as I know not at all in the previous century. Severe famine has also occurred twice, caused each time by the heavy and continuous autumn rains of 1831 and 1877, and on each occasion producing a scarcity that lasted till the reaping of the second *shali* harvest after the failure".

* In S. 1960 (1903 A. D.) rains appeared in late summer, which flooded agricultural areas abounding with *shali*, *maize*, or other crops, and thus resulted in giving rise to famine conditions not only in the city of Srinagar but the suburbs to the north of the Valley to a greater extent, and to the south, slightly. The flood as far as the town of Srinagar itself is concerned, indented the embankment separating the Dal from the Sunti Kuhl and immersed several houses, *sagzari* plots, etc. This created a general panic throughout the people of the town, by rendering several homeless for a number of months and unsettled the market, which whetted the inevitable tendency to corner grains and sell them at exorbitant rates. This uneasiness made itself also visible in the people on the banks of the Wular lake or in its vicinity, on account of rise in its waters and consequent immersion of great areas of arable land. The rains not only resulted in floods, they also affected the crops, so much so that the produce fell by a large quantity and as such the trouble lasted throughout the year till the *Rabi* of 1961, complemented by the *Kharif*, came to the succour of the people by reducing prices appreciably and bringing them round to normal rates. [continued

distributed gratuitous relief to which His late Highness contributed generously, but commandeered the market, fixed maximum prices, established cooperative stores, nay, did all in the power of the Government to allay the pangs of suffering, to fortify against the future onslaughts of dire want or famine.

During this trouble the State is said to have distributed gratuitous relief to the people not only in the city of Srinagar but in the towns of Pattan, Baramulla, and the adjoining villages affected by the floods (and R. B. Pandit Radha Kishen Koul was placed on this special duty); and to have established once again *Kothas* (or granaries) wherefrom *rasad* used to be given to people at fixed rates. This state of affairs continued for a long time till the market was assured by bumper crops of succeeding years, and the prices were lowered and *shali* brought down to the rate of Rs. 2 to Rs. 2-8 a *kharwar* which sold from 6 to 8 rupees a *kharwar*. In the relief used by the State, *singharas* (water-nuts) were distributed among the people on the Wular side, and free timber was also given to villagers who had suffered and lost houses on account of flood. It cannot be said whether this treatment of issuing free timber was accorded to the townsmen also, but it is not improbable that concessions were given to State servants and others, who had suffered in one form or other.

It is thus clear that the scarcity of S. 1960 had nothing in common with the scarcity of 1892-93 A. D. or of 1917 A. D., except that in the former (S. 1960) people were rendered homeless by the floods, while in the latter (1892-93) they were shelterless because of the vast destruction caused by the conflagration; while the scarcity of 1917 finds some traces of similitude in that of 1892-93 in this that the scarcity was made calamitous by the tendency to corner food-grains, not with the successful attempt of commanding the market, but simply to sell at a future occasion at high rates, and thus profiteer at the poor consumer's cost.

CHAPTER V.

FAMINE CONDITIONS IN S. 1974 AND AFTER.

(1917-1921 A. D.)

It is now ten years since the cry for food involved the State in an experimentation to stem the tide of the prices of food grains swelling to an abnormal degree. Whether the conditions were those of famine, whether the *Kharif* crop of S. 1974 (A. D. 1917) was slightly below the normal, whether the economic after-effects of the Great War began to tell on the peaceful routine of life, a momentous situation was all of a sudden created by the grain-dealer by taking it into his head to raise the prices of the foodstuff (Shali or rice) which till then sold at about Rs. 3 a *Kharwar* (83 seers British weight). The *galladar*, who is the only middle-man between the producer, the *zamindar*, and the consumer the townsman, having sat idly but with impatient reluctance watching his grain selling at the usual rate of Rs. 3 or so even during the years of fierce struggle (1914-1917) and now affected by the rise in

General Remarks.

Sudden rise in prices in 1917 A.D. (S. 1974).

Treble and quad-ruple rates.

the imported articles of consumption, began to feel the importance of his position in the economic field; and his very first attempt was to advance the price of a *kharwār* of *shali*, he sold, to Rs. 3-8, 4, 4-8, 5, and rice from Rs. 5 to Rs. 8, 9 and 13 during the short space of a few weeks. This unexpected tendency to profiteer with a General uneasiness. vegeance, began to create a stir in the traditionally easy-living population of the city of Srinagar; and the poor, who as usual depended on the daily or the weekly purchase, were taken aback. Not only they, but the whole public was uneasy. Ever accustomed to cheap grain, at whatever cost it was supplied, this action of the *galladar* was looked upon with suspicion, and the only resource to combat the tendency of the grain-dealer appeared to lie in approaching the Government for intervention.

The winter had set in. The Government had moved down to Jammu, the winter Headquarters. The people at large were filled with dismay, especially at the idea that the Government was not at Srinagar. Pandit Narendranath Koul, Governor of Kashmir,

Action of the Gover-
nor of Kashmir
making stocks
available for sale.

took active steps to meet the situation. His attempt was to make available for sale grain at the price it was selling just before the *galladar* had begun to manipulate. This made the *galladar* recalcitrant inasmuch as he refused to sell. Stocks had, therefore, to be commandeered, and to be made available for sale. Zamindars were made to import *Shali* into the city and sell it to the people

of the town at a given State rate, a commission of 4 annas per *kharwar* being charged by the State on sales for expenses.

Commandeering of stocks and importation of *shali* by zamindars into town for sale at given State rate.

of the official agency supervising these sales. This was the first phase of the trouble. Stocks on agreement system were procured with the result that during the first five months of the trouble 1,50,000 *kharwars* were made available. But as there was no prospect of the cry being alleviated, there was no alternative but to disinter the grains, that had been cornered by the incorrigible grain-dealer. The Governor was, therefore, invested with emergency powers to search premises or places where he believed *shali* or rice to be stored. This experiment lasted for about a

month, some 20,000 *kharwars* only having been secured. This was the second phase of the trouble. As fresh stocks were not forthcoming, an improvised measure had to be adopted viz., the village *bachh*. By the middle of July some 15,000 *kharwars* had been brought in and another 15,000 was expected. This was the third phase, and came to an end with the abandonment of control.

What the State did in these trying circumstances was to sell as much *shali* as stocks permitted. Her Highness the Maharani Sahiba had made a generous donation of Rs. 50,000 in June, for the relief of the poor, to sell them grains at Rs. 2 a *kharwar*. Lists had been drawn up and some 25,000 were borne on the poor list. But the *Mohallawar* lists for the rest of the population returned excessive figures, and inspite of all strictness 1,25,000 souls had to be rationed in the town of Srinagar itself. Both officials and non-officials did not lag behind in doing their bit, but since

Acuteness of the situation — Her Highness' generous donation for relief purposes.

Drawing up of poor lists.

the situation had become acute, nothing suggested except procuring and selling of grains. In the town itself the daily sale was never less than 500 *kharwars* in addition to the 200 *kharwars* that were distributed to the poor. Another difficulty there was that the trouble in Srinagar had proved infectious. The townships of Baramulla, Anantnag, Sopore, Shopian, Pampur, etc., were affected, for there was no rice available in the market and what little there was had been cornered for feared less it

Arrangements had to be made not only for city of Srinagar but townships of Sopore, Baramulla, Anantnag, etc.

might be seized. Arrangements had, therefore, to be made for these places. Visitors joined the cry. Rice shops had to be opened to retail sale of rice on ticket system but these rice shops could hardly satisfy the demand, because the agency employed was most unreliable with the result that the strong shouldered the weak out. The rice shop in Amira Kadal sold rice at Rs. 8 a *kharwar*. The Motamid Durbar issued tickets to visitors for supply of rice from the State shops. The Military had to be rationed, the Supply and Transport Department, the travellers on the

State arrangements for visitors, etc.

Treaty High Road or the Gilgit road, the Central Asian Traders, all these looked up to the Governor of Kashmir for grain.

The beginning of 1918 had been a plunge in the deep. The Government returned to Srinagar; hope revived in the people, but notwithstanding the fact that the year had well-nigh advanced into prospective summer, no action was found possible that could satisfy both the people and the trader at the same time, and tend to resumption of business under normal conditions. The *rabi* of 1975 was fruitful inasmuch as in the absence of *Shali*, wheat was rationed out to the poor. But on the whole there was an atmosphere of unsettlement that made all uneasy, and demanded an immediate restoration. Trade had been paralysed, nay it had practically come to a dead stop, and now it was the anxious desire of the authorities to resuscitate it.

Pandit Narendranath Koul was replaced by Rai Sahib Pandit Ram Dhan as Governor of Kashmir. Can-

Replacement of the Governor, Pandit Narendranath Koul, by R.S. Pt. Ramdhan. vassing was taken up. The

Governor and the Revenue Minister (K.B. Choudhri Khushi Mohammed) to restore confidence in the *zamindars*, inspected villages, called meetings of Lambardars and other village headmen: and would explain to them that stocks would not be seized, but that in order to help the Government out of the difficulty they should respond willingly

to the demand of the Government. It was now clear that the trouble had come to stay, and could not be dismissed peremptorily. The future was as uncertain as the past had been. The Government were, therefore, driven to adopt the measure of "Mujawaza"—that infallible instrument, which has not unoften been their solace in similar times of need. Advances were to be made to the *zamindars* for *shali*. Meanwhile, His Excellency Lord Chelmsford visited Kashmir in October 1918.

A scheme for the collection and distribution of *shali*, for building up of a reserve, etc., was drawn up. Collection was entrusted to the Revenue Minister and the subordinate Revenue Agency including the

Touring in villages
by Revenue Minister & Governor.

Visit of His Excellency Lord Chelmsford in October 1918 and the introduction of a Shali Scheme.

Governor who was mainly responsible for the arrangements. Dewan Bishen Dass, the Home Minister was put in charge of distribution. An advance of 2½ lakhs of

Collection in the hands of Revenue Minister and distribution in those of the Home Minister.

rupees was placed at the disposal of the Revenue Department, which was supplemented from time to time. The "Mujawaza" scheme was enforced by the end of Katik 1975. The Kharif crop being a prospective one, the scheme would have been more fruitful, had it been promulgated a month or two earlier. But as it was, the "Mujawaza" aimed at the collection of a very large quantity of

Instruction of Mujawaza.

shali at a uniform scale of two *kharwars* per acre of *Abi* area from all the *zamindars* of the Kashmir valley. The object was to ensure a sustained supply of *shali* for the entire population of Srinagar city in the first instance, and then for other townships if necessary. The scheme took time, and meanwhile advances by private persons to *zamindars* were allowed to be made, for about 10,000 *kharwars* of *shali* which were afterwards accounted for in the "Mujawaza" *shali*.

Before the scheme was enforced, the Government of Kashmir had issued a notification declaring maximum prices of sale in the town of Srinagar and outside. It was on the 22nd of October 1918. The prices fixed were—

Declaration of
maximum prices
of shali & maize.

1. Within limits of Srinagar town

(a) Shali Rs. 3-8-0 per *kharwar*.

(b) Rice „ 6-12-0 „

2. In other parts of the Valley

(a) Shali Rs. 2-2-0 per *kharwar*.

(b) Rice „ 4-12-0 „

The notification also made it penal to remove *shali* or rice outside the seven Tehsils of the Valley, except with the special permission of the Government previously obtained. Further, no city *galladar* was allowed to sell *shali* or rice within the town of Srinagar without a license from the Governor of Kashmir. Another chapter was thus opened in the history of the food-grain trouble.

In December 1918 the staff provided by Engagement of the *Shali* Scheme was engaged. Shali establishment —Deputy Governor S. Hakim Singh. Sardar Hakim Singh was made Deputy Governor, and *Shali*

arrangements were transferred to this officer under the general control of the Revenue Department. The new office was organised, and tickets were now prepared on the basis of the *Mohalla-War* lists, and issued in time to enable the public to have

Drawing up of Mohallawar lists for distribution of *shali* in the town.

their rations for the month of Maghar 1975—the first ration being issued under the new system. A quantity of one lakh and thirty thousand *kharwars* was ordered to be brought into Srinagar within 30 days (*i. e.* by the middle of Poh 1975) or before snow-fall, to maintain regularity in distribution, it being further urged to take effective steps for collecting and storing stock till 15th April 1919. To satisfy the city purchaser that a full *kharwar* of *shali* of 83 seers (British weight) was being weighed

Issue of ration-tickets and connected arrangements.

out, a special scales was devised and introduced, but as it proved very unsatisfactory in-

asmuch as the average daily sale was not appreciable, it had to be given up in favour of the traditional system of the boatman weighing out the requisite quantity. In the earlier stages of organisation, the Home Minister to whom the task of distribution had been entrusted, was untiring in his efforts to make it successful. The teaching and inspecting staff of the State High Schools and the Mission Schools in Srinagar, helped in distribution business; the members

Assistance in distribution and transport by members of schools, etc. of the Sericulture Department helping the Police in the collection and despatch of boats; the

Revenue and Settlement Departments having all along practically devoted their whole time and energies to collection of grains, much at the sacrifice of their ordinary duties. *Shali* was now being supplied at Rs. 3-8-0 a *kharwar*, with a regularity that seemed to satisfy the frightened cry.

When the *Shali* Scheme was enforced, difficulties seemed to beset its smooth

Difficulties that beset the working of the *Shali* Scheme. execution and working. The winter season had set in; the *zamindars* had already dis-

posed of some of their stocks to the inevitable *Wad-dar* and private trade having so to say sustained a shock by the declaration of maximum prices, the situation was becoming critical both in respect of collection of grains from the *zamindars*, etc., and maintenance of a sustained supply to the townspeople, early snowfall and transport difficulties tending to aggravate it. On 16th December a meeting of Revenue officers on spot was held in regard to transport arrangements, and thus boats were commandeered to convey *shali* that had been collected, and was lying in the open at the Ghats in the Mufassil.

Another difficulty, however, arose in regard to storing of *Shali*. As it was not an easy task to transport all the *shali* collected, arrangements had to be made for warehousing it. Since there were no State godowns or Depots to stock the *shali* realised from the *zamindars*, etc., it had to be entrusted to persons (non-officials) known as *Tehvildars*, who were required to enter into an

Creation of Tehvildars for storing of grains realised from Zamindars and for distribution.

agreement to store such quantities of grain as were given to them on condition of their being delivered to the State Shali Department on demand, they (the Tehvildars) receiving in return a certain rate of commission per *kharwar*, stored and delivered. These Tehvildars were thus brought into existence not only in Srinagar, but in the towns of Baramulla, Anantnag, Sopore, Shupiyon, etc. This exigency measure of storing grains in private warehouses under the custody of private persons, the non-official agency, was necessitated by the fact that there were no State owned or State controlled granaries in sufficient number in Srinagar or outside to stock the grains for the winter or for deferred use.

Peculation by Tehvildars. But this arrangement proved defective, nay, unsatisfactory and troublesome in the end, so much so that the *Tehvildars* with whom the grains did in most cases remain beyond the stipulated period, speculated, and effected clandestine sales at inflated rates, replenishing their stock, in case of deficiency from the *kharif*

With the declaration of maximum prices and the enforcement of
 Katik 1975-- opening of rice shops. "Mujawaza" (Katik 1975), a
 sort of moribund tendency was discernible
 in the grain trade in Srinagar. When the
galladar had not come forward to resume
 trade, under license system, and had persist-
 ed in his 'recalcitration,' the Government had
 ordered the opening of 5 rice shops and the
 import of 20,000 *kharwars* of *shali* over and
 above the State Reserve. This was in
 November. Since nothing reassuring was
 visible, a meeting was held at the Residency
 on 15th January 1919, and
 among the proposals discussed,
 Meeting of 15th January 1919, and adoption to
 measures to resume private trade in shali. was the one regarding the
 adoption of measures to induce
 private trade. Accordingly under Govern-
 ment orders a Notification was issued
 announcing—

- (i) that there was to be no second
bachh that year (S. 1975),
- (ii) that restriction imposed on
galladars was withdrawn,
- (iii) that city *galladars* whose licenses
 had been confiscated for not having

resumed trade in Shali, were permitted to renew their licenses on application to the Governor of Kashmir.

This did have some effect but not of general reassurance which was still wanting. The cause was not perhaps far to seek.

Having organized a campaign to fight ^{The effect of} the demon of dearth and ^{maximum prices.} general cry against high prices, the Government seemed to have launched a tug between the economic laws on the one hand, and the anxiety to fight the situation once for all, on the other. Was the State to monopolise trade in *shali* and thus give a set-back to private trade of the profiteer or the dealer, or having settled the market and stabilised the rate to withdraw in favour of the private dealer?—was the main problem. The tough days had been tided over. Control had been taken in hand, and then given up; declarations to afford facilities to (the *galladar*) private tradesman had been made, but there was still something that required immediate attention.

While sanctioning the Shali scheme, His Highness' Government had declared in no ambiguous terms that the existing system of supplying *shali* to the town on State account, the practical effect of which had been to monopolise the whole *shali* trade, was not to continue beyond such period as was absolutely necessary to meet the existing difficult situation. The Government had not considered it advisable to undertake the heavy task of rationing the town. They never had the idea of making this scheme permanent, but it was only a tentative measure to meet a special situation created by some artificial circumstances; and the moment that situation disappeared, the State would withdraw from participation in the supply and let things take their normal course. This was certainly an honest declaration, but its execution was not as easy as it appeared to be. Faced as the Government were with the morbidity of trade and lack of confidence on the one hand, and the anxiety to restore this confidence both among the disgruntled dealers and the hungry mass that suspected every breath, on

the other, what measures were to be adopted? The grant of permission to license-holders, whose licenses had been confiscated, to renew their licenses, had shown signs of gradual return to normality but it was too slow to give any hopes of speedy resumption. How to restore confidence, when there were maximum prices, prohibition of export, etc., was the chief consideration. Schemes from

Opinion of Mr. A. M. Stow, Settlement Commissioner. Government officers were pouring in, and all were agreed on the abolition of maximum prices. Mr. (now Sir Alexander) Stow, I. C. S., O. B. E., then Settlement Commissioner of the State, was loud in his protest. He said "it must not be forgotten that the general rise in prices affects the rural population as well, especially the rise in the price of iron, imported cloth, sugar, tea and salt." He did not agree that the producer profiteered, but that it was natural in the circumstances. He resolved the action of the State into

- (a) Fixing of a maximum price for the staple food-grain; and

- (b) making of a certain amount of this staple food-grain available for sale at these rates.

As regards the first he said it was difficult to understand the end which the maximum rate was intended to serve. (i) If it was intended that trade should adapt itself to the limits fixed, it was quite obvious that that object had not been attained. The fixed rate was of no benefit to the poorer classes, and only caused the greatest inconvenience to those who wished to buy grain, even if it must be, at high rates. The retail dealers evaded a controlled price in every possible way and the task of enforcing a maximum rate among the rural population was impossible. (ii) If it was intended to break a ring of profiteers presuming such a combination to exist in a country where every man in possession of surplus grain from the highest to the lowest was a grain-dealer the object seemed to be as far from realisation as it had been when the scheme had been promulgated. (iii) As to the fixation of the rate of Rs. 3-8-0 for the town and Rs. 2-8-0 a *khorwar* for the villages, he

remarked, "But who will attempt to say what "a man with a commodity to sell, would "consider reasonable if he hoped to pay off his "debts or had a law-suit in prospect? An "answer to the question is frankly impos- "sible".

In regard to the second point, this great economist, and minute observer of rural life and conditions, remarked that the feeding of the city population from a store collected direct from the cultivator at his expense had put the clock back 30 years. He considered it to be the essential duty of the State to restore normal conditions. According to him rise in prices was permanent, brought about by world-conditions; and in the circumstances he advised the State Government that—

- (i) the fixed maximum rate be abandoned,
His recommendations.
- (ii) the policy of cash assessment and collections be adhered to,
- (iii) trade be encouraged and freed from restrictions,
- (iv) the wages of all State employees be raised to the level demanded by the increased cost of living,

- (v) charitable relief to the poor be given either gratuitously or in return for work,
- (vi) to provide money for this expenditure the land revenue of the Valley be at once raised by 4 annas in the rupee,
- (vii) every effort be made to cheapen the cost of living by provision of more transport, lower rate of food, or by State purchase of cloth (or salt if this had not already been done).

But the state of affairs continued till the

Loan of services of Mr. Townsend of the Punjab to advise the State.

services of Mr. C. R. S. Townsend, Director of Civil Supplies, Punjab, were obtained to advise as to the course of action to be followed. Having no personal knowledge of Kashmir he studied the problem at Jammu; and at the Meeting of 6th March 1919, in which he was also present, the question of a *State Reserve of Shali* was considered. For this it was natural to have a recourse to collection through State Agency, of *Mujawaza*, which was already in force

Meeting of 6th March 1919, where the question of a State reserve of one lakh Khars of Shali was considered.

for purposes of rationing the town of Srinagar. Mr. Townsend considered the declaration of a maximum price inexpedient, and said that Government could to a moderate extent *lead* private trade. As for the policy of *Mujawaza* he thought that if it were allowed to continue for any length of time, it would result in the possibility that the cultivators would put less of their land under rice, and more under maize and fruit, which were lucrative crops, and if this possibility became an actuality, the situation might on some future occasion become even worse.

Whether Mr. Townsend's apprehensions were based on economic actualities or were due to the fact of his having simply read through the several notes, he Mr. Townsend's could lay his hands on during recommendations an echo of Mr. his brief stay in Jammu, his Stow's. recommendations were merely an echo of what the Settlement Commissioner of the State had been dinning into the ears of the Government. He recommended:

1. (a) The immediate abolition of the maximum prices—nothing be-

ing allowed to postpone the abolition say after 1st Baisakh 1976 (13th April 1919) at the latest;

- (b) Any person who liked being allowed to sell rice at any rate he liked without a license;
- (c) Prohibition on export of rice from the Valley continuing for the present.

2. Announcement being made, as soon as maximum rates were abolished: (a) that there was no intention of re-introducing the "Mujawaza" which had been adopted to meet a special emergency which had now disappeared.

(b) That no further collection of revenue in kind would be made from the present rice crop.

3. That the confidence of the rice growers and dealers that there would be no interference with their business must be restored:

- (a) By making an announcement that no maximum price would be imposed on next rice crop,

(b) By declaring that the State would not take any part of the next rice crop as payment of revenue in kind unless the price exceeded a certain rate (to be fixed fairly high—considerably higher than the maximum rate then in force).

4. That it might be made known also that (a) for one month from the date of removal of the maximum price the present system of rice distribution would continue; (b) as soon as it became apparent what the uncontrolled price of rice would be, the Government would decide what policy to be adopted for future months, but that the existing system of distribution on its present scale would not be continued very long.

5. That all concessions of cheap rice to other than the poor be withdrawn, the list of the poor to include at any rate for two or three months, people on salaries less than Rs. 25, *paradanishin* widows and other respectable people, whose income was small—the course of action depending on the course the uncontrolled price of rice took,

the intervening period of bottle-feeding being made as short as possible.

6. To form a State Reserve of, say 100,000 *kharwars* of rice from the next crop, arrangements should be made by making advances, it being made quite clear that the cultivator was not to be forced to sell his rice.

Minor sugges-
tions. To help the prevention of recurrence of the existing difficulties he made the following suggestions—

- (a) That the wages of all State employees at any rate in lower grades, should be increased.
- (b) That efforts should be made to lessen the cost of living by provision of more transport (particularly mechanical), a lower rate for firewood, and by State purchase of salt.
- (c) That Government of India should be asked to provide the State with standard cloth for its people.
- (d) That the Agricultural Department should be strengthened, the

Department being asked to devote particular attention to the improvement of the rice crop to get an increased outturn per acre.

(e) That the policy of establishing Consumers' Co-operative Societies in Srinagar should be examined.

Opportunity was taken to wait now that Subsequent action taken by the State Government. sufficient *shali* for some months to come had been stocked, and it was not until the Government returned to Srinagar to study the situation on spot, that measures in the light of Townsend's opinion were taken. The *rabi* of S. 1976 was normal. To build up the Reserve of one lakh *kharwars* the proposal of obtaining by purchase in the open market, that is to say, at the cheapest rate possible, but with no attempt to fix the rate by State Agency, was apprehended to put the State to a great loss; and it was decided to form the Reserve by giving advances to the *zamindars*. To supplement stocks it was further advised to purchase 25,000 *kharwars* of wheat and barley. By the end of Sawan 1976 the

Building up of one lakh *kharwars* reserve by purchasing in open market—but afterwards advances made to *zamindars*

Government decided upon the following measures:—

(a) abandoning of control over rates;

(b) announcing of the orders that no ^{Abolition of Mu-} *“Mujawaza”* was going to be ^{*jawaza* from} taken from the coming *Kharif* ^{*kharif* of S. 1976.} crop (of 1976);

(c) Continuance of the existing system of helping the poor.

The quantity of *shali* imported into and delivered within the Municipal limits of Srinagar from 1st Bhadon 1975 to end of Sawan 1975, was 11,60,184 maunds, both through State and private agency, in addition to about 43,000 maunds of rice. Out of the quantity imported the State agency was responsible for about 60 per cent. of *shali* and 7 per cent. of rice, and the private agency for 40 per cent. of *shali* and 93 per cent. of rice.

The State had embarked on a policy of ^{Policy of gradual} gradually weaning the city ^{weaning of city} population from counting on ^{population from} State help except in times of ^{“bottle-feeding.”} real scarcity or famine; still some 30,000

persons plus State officials on low pay, Visitors' servants, State and Mission Hospitals, were fed by the State. The market rate of *shali* and rice was still high—this change in the policy of the Government also being somewhat responsible—until about Katik 1976; after which there was a fall, and prices ranged between Rs. 5-4-0 and Rs. 6 in contrast to Baisakh and Jeth, when they had risen to Rs. 9-8-0 a *kharwar*.

In these experiments, rationing not only the city of Srinagar, but stations outside, and the summer resorts like Ganderbal, Pahalgam and Gulmarg, the travellers and traders on the Treaty High Road, the P. W. D. and other staff on the J. V. Road, etc., etc., the year 1919 A. D. passed. In Poh 1976 (January 1920) *shali* was still being issued to 30,000 poor, at 4 *traks* per head, at the privileged rate of Rs 3-8-0 against the market rate of Rs 6-8-0 a *kharwar*. The prices were again on the rise; although there was a stock of 5000 *kharwars* in Srinagar, and 80,000 *kharwars* in Mufassil, daily import was not appreciable, not more than 500

Effect on prices
—rise again.

kharwars on account of the not unusual difficulties of transport, snowfall, etc. As for the Reserve for S. 1977 the Government decided to advance rupees three lakhs to the *zamindars*. Since no signs of a fall in the market rate were visible, it was decided to raise the State rate from Rs. 3-8-0 to Rs. 4 a *kharwar* with effect from 1st Baisak 1977 (13th April 1920). The market rates of both *shali* and wheat were high, the rate of *shali* varying between Rs. 6-4-0 in April and Rs. 6-12-0 in July, and that of wheat between Rs. 12 and Rs. 12-8-0, per *kharwar*. The expedient of progressively reducing the difference

between the privileged rate and the bazar rate had now again to be resorted to, and only after four months and a half the rate was decided to be raised from Rs. 4-0-0 to Rs. 4-8-0 for State *Shali*. Before effect could be given to this decision the market rate was again on the decline. The change in the rate was suspended. But again with the advent of winter and usual difficulties of transport, etc., the market rate of *shali* rose to Rs. 8 about the end of December 1920

Raising of State
rate of *shali* from
Rs. 4 to Rs. 4-8-0
a *kharwar* with
effect from
Maghar 1977.

(wheat Rs. 16 a *kharwar*, maize Rs. 9-8-0 and barley Rs. 9-8-0), and as there was no prospect of a fall in the immediate future, the rate of Rs. 4-8-0 was enforced with effect from Maghar 1977 (January 1921).

These oscillations tended to upset not only the market, but the public, and inspite of the rationing of persons on the poor list and others at about half the market rate, apprehensions of a rapid rise were discernible. As early as February 1921, the insufficiency of stock to meet even the local demand was dreaded, and it was proposed to import the grains (wheat and barley) from the plains to meet the requirements of the Srinagar public during the months of Jeth and Har 1978. Although about 70,000 *kharwars* were in hand about the close of Poh 1977, it was not possible to pull on through the remaining months. This uneasiness on account of insufficiency of stocks strengthened the *galladars*, who had sufficient experience of *profiteering* and would not easily forego the opportunity.

So we have closed a period of about 4 years, and in the following chapter we shall commence with Pandit Narendranath's regime as Revenue Minister. General Review of the situation till Pandit Narendra Nath's regime as Revenue Minister—i.e., middle of 1921 A. D.

This long period of tribulation and trepidation went through so many phases. The first was that of control and commandeering of stocks and ended with the abandonment of control in July 1918. The second began with declaration of maximum prices and enforcement of "Mujawaza" and ended with the abolition of maximum rate and conversion of "Mujawaza" into purchase of advances, say in August-September 1919. The third was the building up of the State Reserve of one lakh *kharwars* and continuance of rations at concession rates (raised from Rs. 3-8-0 to 4-8-0) to poor and low paid staff etc., and ended with the inauguration of the Stores late in 1921 A. D. We have so far as events have helped us, rambled through periods when the so called ring of the grain-dealer cornered the staple food-grain at a time when the *zamindar* had disposed of his stocks, and had practically

no surplus left to come forward to the assistance of the city men; when the intervention of the Government saved the situation, but insufficiency of stocks helped to inflate the market rate; when in spite of prospective plenty, the people looked up to State help for the grain dealer fleeced them; when notwithstanding the Government underselling the *galladar*, the market rate never showed a tendency to fall; when the attempt to gradually wean the townsman from bottle-feeding simply resulted in giving a further impetus to prices; when the economist and the layman both laid heads together but could not devise a scheme that would ease the situation, and give hopes of permanency. We have all along observed that the more the anxiety to direct private trade in *shali* into given channels, the more was the rebound of the market; the more the efforts to improve upon or effect a change to control and stabilise the market, the less the success and farther the return to normal conditions. In short, it has become abundantly clear that even if the Government could *lead* only, on every occasion

there was no breathing-time left, and every change of policy was the result of economic pressure on the one hand, and circumstances on the other; of the outcry of the city-dweller on one side, and the protest of the producer on the other; of the desire to satisfy this cry on the one part and the adjusting of conditions on the other. To "temper the economic wind to the shorn wool of the city residents" was not an economic platitude easy of attainment; it would take time to adapt things to the upheaval wrought by world conditions—but that time was hurried, and every economic anticipation only distanced the Golden Fleece.

CHAPTER VI.

SAMVAT 1978 AND AFTER.

(THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS).

We have noticed in the last chapter that the year 1921 A. D. (Samvat 1977-78) was ushered in by the Maid-in-Waiting of Unrest. It was the year of "Back to 1974." The snowfall having been deficient, the mountains wore a nude appearance, the hill torrents and streams fed by the winter reservoir of snow had practically run short, with the result that the *shali* cultivation, which depends mainly on this natural irrigation, suffered. The fore-taste of the wrath of the gods, not only whetted the profiteering propensities of the *petit* grain-dealer of Kashmir but added circumstantial gall to economic worm-wood, so much so that the price of *shali*, like wheat and barley, betrayed an unabating inflation to the utter discontent and dismay of the city population. Pandit Narendranath Koul, who since August 1918, had, so to say, retired from the

S. 1978 and
acuteness of
trouble.

scene (and was the Governor at Jammu),
 Pt. Narendra-nath again on the scene—June 1921. was appointed Revenue Member of Council and took over on the last day of Jeth 1978 (15th June 1921). With his reappearance on the field, and having now been made responsible to deal with the situation, which was threatening to become acute day by day, a hope of relief dawned upon the people. He was now all asborbed in *shali*, inviting schemes from officials and non-officials, holding discussions late into night, putting his whole energies, brains and time—under which he succumbed at last—to find a patent antidote to the recurring dread of scarcity. He was not, perhaps, favoured of the gods; during the past winter there had been no sufficient snow on the surrounding hills, now the rains held off until very late in the year. The fell demon of scarcity was ready to pounce on the frightened “Wight” of Nature. But god Indra took pity at last on the scared specks of mortality, and the rains, relieved the position to a great extent ; and though sowings were below the average, the outturn was good on the whole.

But it did not temper the market ; the price of *shali* continued to rise and outvie the past in recording a rate of Rs. 18 and sometimes Rs. 24 a *kharwar* of 83 seers, (that is, between 2 and 3 seers of rice per rupee).

Market rate of
shali Rs. 18 to
Rs. 24 a *kharwar*.

Imagine the people ever given to cheap *rice, a people, in whom the differentiation between rich and poor is purely accidental, paying a price which out-recorded not the past alone, but the markets of the Punjab and many other provinces of India. The result would have been but what was expected in the circumstances, had not the hardihood of the Kashmiri to outlive such dire calamities, as noticed in Chapter IV *supra*, come to his succour, and so to that of the General disquietude.

Government. The panic-stricken people failed to secure grains even by private bargain. The Government was uneasy again ; the soul of Narendranath knew no rest by day or night. Meeting after meeting was

**Shali* sold sometime for one rupee Kham (or 0-8-0) then for a *chilki* rupee i.e. annas ten a *kharwar*. It rose to two *chulkies* (i.e. Rs 1-4-0) and before the commencement of war, Rs. 2-8-0 was the prevailing rate. During War there was a slight rise, Rs. 3 securing a *kharwar* of 15 *traks* : when in 1917, the tendency to profiteer all of a sudden developed and the State had to undertake control of prices.

held ; officials and non-officials laid their heads together ; and it was not unoften that discussions lasted for hours together. The situation of the times will be found to have, been aptly described by a writer in a journal, and I quote an extract here—"It is no "exaggeration if I tell the learned 'Observer' "that on those days and nights, especially "on the 2nd of July 1921, when Committee "had its sittings up to late at night, many "a hungry soul rested his tottering self "against the railings of the wall, loitering "on the bridge outside the palace of the "Raja Sahib, in the earnest belief that some- "thing was being done for him."*

The *rasad* that met somewhat the re-
quirements of the poor public
was continued, with rice, wheat
or maize; but no solution was
found till the only alternative
of controlling of *shali* and maize was resorted
to, and maximum prices were laid down. In
the anxiety to grapple with the monster, that
had since 1918 developed and was strong of

The new Revenue
Member calls a
meeting of *sail-
dars, lambarbars,
citizens, landown-
ers, etc.*

*United India and Indian States, dated 8th December 1921.

limb, P. Narendranath convened a meeting of *zaildars*, *lambardars*, *chakdars*, *jagirdars* etc., on the 31st August and 1st September 1921, and conferred with them as also with

Result of deliberations—*shali* scheme on co-operative lines other non-officials as to the assistance they were prepared to

render in inaugurating a scheme of supply and collection of food-grains on Co-operative lines. These conferences evolved a scheme, main features of which were:—

1. A Co-operative Store—Srinagar Co-operative Stores, afterwards Srinagar Stores—with a non-official Directorate and Managing Committee, but under the control of the State, was created.

Institution of a Co-operative Stores under a Managing Committee and a Directorate.

- (a) A European Manager was appointed.
- (b) An establishment was engaged, for Stores and outside work.
- (c) A Directorate of 10 members was appointed; the Directors were given an honorarium of Rs. 100 a month, each; Mr. Hadow was the President of the Directorate.

(d) Tha Stores was placed under the control of the Directorate—who were empowered to make appointments (the Revenue Minister taking part in the deliberations at the start.)

(e) The Stores was financed by share* capital—each share being of the value of Rs. 10; and by the State loan up to Rs. 20 lakhs, interest whereon was payable at one per cent above the bank rate.

2. The maximum price of *shali* and maize was fixed at a rate that varied inversely with the distance of the locality from the nearest *ghat* or the city of Srinagar.

Rate of *shali*
fixed at Rs 5 and
Rs. 5-8 a *khar-*
war.

3. The rate of sale in Srinagar was

* The share-capital rose to Rs. 90,000 only. Although it has been remarked that the share-capital never amounted to more than a fraction of the State loan, it may be stated without reserve that this start of Rs. 90,000 was not in any way disappointing. Had the circumstances made it possible it was not improbable that within a few months that sum would have been doubled or trebled when it would have become sufficiently known to the consuming and purchasing public that the purchase of a share would entitle one to a concession of annas eight per *kharwar* of his consumption.

fixed at Rs. 5 § for share-holders and Rs. 5-8 for non-shareholders, that for maize Rs. 4 and Rs. 4-8 per *kharwar*, respectively.

4. Twenty-four wards for distribution of grains were created.

5. The ration system of feeding the selected poor was given up.

6. An *eight-trak* ration per head (including a child of over two years age) was declared.

7. Commission Agents were brought into existence to arrange collection, despatch and delivery of grains to the Stores. These Commission Agents were to assist the co-operative societies in this business.

8. Private import of *shali* and maize into Srinagar was prohibited.

9. Export of grain from the Valley was strictly prohibited.

(§) The rate of Rs. 5 and Rs. 5-8 was for shareholders and non-shareholders respectively. Each share was to be paid at once; people who did not purchase a share for ready money were to be granted one, when the difference of annas eight (between the rates at which it was given to a share-holder and a non-shareholder) made up the value of the share viz Rs. 10, that is to say, if a non-shareholder purchased monthly 4 *kharwars* of *shali*, and thus paid Rs. 2 more than he would otherwise have paid (by becoming a share-holder and paying at the rate of Rs. 5 a *kharwar*), he was to be allotted a share after 5 months or so, after having purchased 20 *kharwars*, and thus paying Rs. 10 by easy instalments, so to say. This was originally the intention of the late Pt. Narendranath Koul, but it is not known whether it was given effect to after his sad demise or not.

10. *Shali* Regulation and anti-Wadh legislation were promulgated; etc., etc.

The *Shali* year was now fixed to begin on the 1st Katik and end on the 30th Assuj. The calculations for acquisition of grain were made on the 8-*traki* ration basis, and taking the average population of the city at 1,50,000 souls, 9 lakhs of *kharwars* of grain (*shali* and maize) were estimated for the requirements of the city. To make up this quantity, *Mujawaza* was revived, big land-

For supply of city requirements a network of co-operative societies brought into being and commission agents appointed.

holders or *chakdars* and *jagirdars* were to deliver their surplus *shali*, and the remaining was to be secured by means of purchase effected through a net-work of co-operative societies with the assistance of certain Commission Agents working on behalf of the Stores. The supply of 8-*trak* ration more than satisfied the dismayed people. Distribution was made on ticket system, and worked well.

But in order to exercise control over the Stores an official Board of Control—
October 1921. of Control was created, and it came into operation on the 27th October

1921, with Raja (now Maharaja) Sir Hari Singh Bahadur, as President, and Pandit Narendranath Koul, Revenue Member of Council, and Mr. B. J. Glancy, whose services were borrowed from the Government of India, as Members.

As for the working of the Board the reader is referred to the official report of 1923, "Grain Control in Kashmir." But some important features seem to require notice here. The Board found that the *eight-trak* ration continued during the month of Katik (S. 1978) was not desirable because

1. It was not justified in view of the
Reduction of 8-
 trak ration to 6
 traks. then position;

2. It was ~~more~~ than the official military ration for a fighting man;

3. It was more than the actual requirements of an individual;

4. It was beyond the purchasing power of the really poor, as no part-purchase was allowed.

The *eight-trak* ration was, therefore,

reduced to *six-traks* only from 1st Maghar. Although it brought down the estimates of consumption by about 1/4th i.e., to less than 7 lakhs *kharwars*, it was a figure still far away from the possibilities of actual realisation. The Commission Agents had instead of being a helpful agency proved a hindrance and a cause of universal complaint owing to the corruption of the Staff maintained by them*.

Even though the number of village sale ^{Failure of village societies had swelled to about societies.} two thousand in number, acquisition by means of co-operative enterprise turned out to be a failure, and the only task allotted to them was that of making payments to *zamindars* for grain received or demanded. Purely voluntary transaction having made no appreciable progress, the Board of Control were faced with a threatening situation. Hopes of continuing the *six trak* ration were becoming remoter day by day. And the only alternative to ride over the difficulties was that of effecting a reduction in the *rasad* itself.

*These Agents were abolished early in 1922.

Towards the close of the year 1921, the

**Death of Pandit
Narendranath
Koul.**

Board of Control suffered a misfortune in the widely lamented death* of Pandit Narendra

Nath Koul, the originator of the scheme. His place on the Board was taken by Colonel (now Major-General) Janak Singh, Revenue Member of Council. The Non-Official President of the Directorate and the Managing Committee was replaced by an Official

**Official President
of the Stores
Managing Com-
mittee.**

President, and the first (and the last) incumbent was Rai Sahib Pandit Ram Dhan, Retired Settlement Officer of the State, who was appointed on Rs. 1,000 a month. This was early in 1922.§

The Stores could not be a wholly un-

*Pandit Narendranath Koul died on the 5th December 1921 in Srinagar. It is said that under the heavy strain of work by night and day his health deteriorated and he was forced to undergo an operation under which he succumbed. His death was widely lamented throughout, and personal observation testifies to the fact that large crowds of people, Hindu, Mohammedan and Christian, followed the funeral procession and so to say a general *hartal* was observed in the city. The people did him their last service, and do always remember him with reverence, affection and pride, more so when the pinch is sometimes felt by them.

The State also appreciated the services of this conscientious, true and loyal officer, who had the interest of the people at heart, by settling a decent pension on his survivors.

§Even when the Directorate and the Managing Committee, were abolished Rai Sahib Pandit Ram Dhan continued upto 12th March 1923.

official organization, for in the matter of collection the assistance of the Revenue Department became indispensable. The Board of Control were now disillusioned of the fact, that the maximum amount of *shali* acquisitions including the *mujawaza*, would not be much in excess of 5 lakhs of *kharwars*. This quantity of grains, even if realised in full, was not only to meet the requirements of the city, but those of the townships of Anantnag, Baramulla and Sopore, besides, demands of the State Military Department or those of Gilgit and Ladakh, where famine conditions prevailed. It was to be kept in view that the summer resorts of Gulmarg or Ganderbal, etc., were to be provided with *shali* during the Visitors season; and all these considerations combined to find out a remedy to, first, meet the local demand, if in part only, and secondly, to hold in check the market that was sure to rebound at any time the failure on the part of the Board of Control to maintain the supply was known to the lynx-eyed grain-dealer of Kashmir. In order, therefore, to spread the recoveries made, and

possible during the remaining months of the *Shali* year, a mixed ration of maize and *shali* had to be resorted to. It was first introduced in the three townships named above and then in the city of Srinagar itself. The six-*trak* ration in Srinagar, however, continued upto the end of Phagan 1978.

Reduction of six-*trak* ration to five *traks* only from first Chet 1978.

From the 1st of Chet a mixed *rasad* of five-*traks* only was distributed in

Maize and Shali in ratio of 2 and 3 *traks*.

the city as well—*shali* three-*traks*, maize two *traks*. Another device was resorted to, which

relieved the situation in an appreciable degree. Private import was allowed on surrender of ration tickets. And as there was not much consumption of maize, the stocks collected were feared to deteriorate; and in order to overcome this difficulty, the Board of Control had recourse to the expedient of

Four months supply of maize.

offering all ticket-holders a four months supply of maize during the month of Jeth S. 1979, it being announced that the purchase was optional and that no further maize was thereafter to be given out. This helped in meeting out-

side demands. The next step taken was that of decontrolling maize towards the middle of Har. By the 1st of Sawan, although *shali* recoveries continued, a further modification in the rate of ration was necessitated by the fact that estimated collections had "proved to be overdrawn".

A ration of two *traks* in place of three (of *shali*) was issued for the month of Sawan, and for Bhadon, it was further reduced to one *trak* only. But since the prospects of the new *shali* crop were very assuring the ration for the last month of the *Shali* year, viz., the month of Assuj 1979, was raised to two *traks*. This was due to the import of grain into the city in advance of the normal time.

Issue of two *traks* ration instead of three in Sawan and Bhadon and subsequent reduction to one *trak* only towards close of Shali year 1978-79.

Again raised to 2 *traks*.

But what was the condition of the market? With the promulgation of the new scheme and the introduction of the new organization, people had wholly depended on the Stores, but owing to modifications in the rate of the ration, first reducing it from 8 to 6 *traks*, and then by

Its effect—rise in prices—*shali* Rs. 11 a *kharwar*. and by bringing it down to one *trak* at a time, when ordinarily people are out of stock even in normal times and have to fall back on the grain-dealer, the market-rate of *shali* underwent fluctuations that made the situation more uneasy. While the official rate was Rs. 5-8-0 per *kharwar*, the market rate passed through all the stages upwards till it touched Rs. 11, and the tendency to soar higher was found to be unabating. Maize and private imports of *shali* coupled with the fragmentary official aid, kept the people on, anticipating to tide over the difficulties sooner or later. So it was towards the middle of September 1922 that the anxiety of the people was relieved by the bumper crop of *kharif* 1929, and the market evinced decline though not very appreciable in the beginning. For the new *shali year* beginning with the first of *Katik* 1929, the policy pursued in the past was to be modified, and fresh estimates of collection and distribution based on revised scales were to be made.

Bumper crop of *kharif* 1929 and consequent relief.

In order, therefore, to safeguard against the recurrence of avoidable inconvenience, necessary precautions were taken in the matter of distribution. To achieve this end the Srinagar city was re-enumerated* and people, who had managed to come within the "purview" of the city on former occasions, were eliminated. The distribution in Anantnag, Baramula and Sopore was stopped for good.

A monthly ration of 4 *traks* was now decided upon; private imports were allowed. The Board still required 35,000 *kharwars* a month, in addition to other miscellaneous requirements, which

*The following officers were deputed for the purpose:—

1. The late Pandit Sarwanand B. A. LL. B., (Munsiff).
2. Khawaja Noor Shah (Tahsildar).
3. Pandit Hari Kishen Shargha B. A., LL. B., (Munsiff).
4. The late Pandit Vidhlal Zutshi (Tahsildar).

These officers acted as Special Bench Officers also, and mention will be made later on about the composition of these Benches, as also the respective officers in charge thereof. The services of No. 1. the late Pandit Sarwanand were recognised by the Board of Control for the excellent work done by him, as Bench Officer and in the enumeration of the city, in the following words:—

"The name of Pandit Sarwanand is deserving of special mention: this officer served in all three Benches, and also worked most conscientiously in the enumeration of Srinagar city". This officer was put to a great strain during enumeration days; and while on the Benches he worked hard so much so that his tender health received a rude setback and he was finally carried off in June 1926 in the prime of his youth. His untimely death is most lamented.

carried the total demand to over four and a half lakhs of *kharwars*.

In the Stores organization a change was effected. The Co-operative Societies had practically failed, for it was but natural that such mushroom agencies should die of inanition. The Commission Agents had been abolished long ago, and it was now the turn of the Stores to be remodelled. Accordingly by a Resolution* of the State Council, the Managing Committee and the Directorate of the Srinagar Co-operative Stores, were

Abolition of
Managing Com-
mittee and Di-
rectorate from
1st Katik 1979. dissolved with effect from the
end of Assuj 1979, and the
Stores organization was placed
directly under the Board of Control. The
capital subscribed by private shareholders
Return of share
money to share-
holders. was ordered to be refunded to
them together with a dividend of
12½ per cent. per annum for the current *Shali*
year. The profits accruing to the Stores were
to be devoted for the furtherance of the Grain
Control Scheme, but how? That was not

*State Council Resolution No. LXVI, dated the 19th September 1922; see appendix A.

(The Resolution in question has been quoted in full to give a correct idea of the Council's decision).

defined, and was perhaps left to circumstances. The non-official element was thus eliminated, and it was now an official body recognised and patronised by the State.

In order to compensate the cultivator for the harassment he was made to undergo, during the past several years, owing to the measures adopted from time to time in the interest of the city-dweller, *Shali Benches* had been inaugurated to try and decide cases of *Wadh*, that is. cases where the transaction between the cultivator and the lender of money, particularly by advances, existed, and the former found it impossible to extricate himself from the clutches of the latter, who always paid him at far lower rates for his *kharwar* of produce.* These Benches had come into being in 1921, and were in full force still.

* The following is taken from the Sri Partapsinghpura Tehsil Assessment Report of the Samvat year 1976, by Bai Sahib Ram Dhan, pp. 45-46—

"This is the system of lending the money to the *zamindars*, generally by petty Khoja traders and Galladars, who instead of charging interest directly multiply their profits and all it *Wadh*. The usual time for such loans is Sawan and Magh and the debtor undertakes to re-pay his debt in grain in ensuing harvest at a fixed rate mutually agreed upon between the parties at the time of loan. [continued.]

The object of their institution and *anti-wadh*-legislation was to free the *zamindar* from the time-honoured custom of handing over his produce to the money-lender or *Waddar*. Three Benches had been appointed, whose term afterwards had to be extended upto end of Jeth 1980, but the 2nd and 3rd Benches having to work beyond this period, were wound up finally on 13th Har

"These fixed rates are very much cheaper than market prices. They usually vary as under:—

Name of grain.	FIXED RATES PER KHARWAR.							
	On Sawan loans.				On Magh loans.			
	Rs.	a.	p.		Rs.	a.	p.	
Shali	1	8	0	to 1 12 0	1	4	0	to 1 8 0
Maize	1	8	0		1	0	0	to 1 4 0
Wheat	3	0	0	to 4 0 0	3	0	0	
Tilgoglu	4	0	0	to 5 0 0	3	0	0	to 3 8 0

"Besides the cheaper rates at which the money-lenders buy the produce, they receive an excess quantity of grain while weighing, and other minor considerations also

When the debtor is unable, through failure of crops, etc., to deliver the promised grain in full, he is required to make up the account by calculating the price of undelivered grain according to market rate at the time, and the money thus calculated sometimes becomes more than double the amount of the original loan. The *zamindar* is again required to clear this recalculated debt in cash, by delivery of grain at future crops on low rates as mentioned above. The debt is further swelled with additional advances, subsequently made, as the cultivator generally stands in need of money at every harvest, and if this goes on for a few years the peasant is ruined. The Kashmiri proverb "*Zamindar bechwan, Wadwal padshah*," i. e. the *zamindar* becomes a pauper while the money lender gets rich, explains the idea.

I took down statements of several of these money-lenders and the following two extracts from these statements will illustrate typical cases:—

and 2nd Sawan 1980, respectively. These

No.	Name of Money-lender.	Name of debtor.	Amount lent.	Remarks.
1.	Ismail Sofi of Whathara.	Lasi Malik of Zalwa.	100	The advance was made in Rabi 1970 on condition that it was to be repaid by 66½ Kharwars of Shali at Re. 1-8-0 per Kharwar in Kharif 1970. 20 Kharwars and 12 traks were actually delivered in Kharif 1970 and a balance of Rs. 115, calculated at Rs. 2-8-0 per Kharwar for the 46 Kharwars undelivered was carried forward in fresh account to be cleared by 77 Kharwars of Shali in Rabi 1971, at Rs. 1-8 which together with 20½ Kharwars delivered in 1970 made up a total of 97½×5, Rs. 293½ at the then market price. This gave a profit of 193½ in 18 months or a return of over 128 per cent. per annum.
2.	Ramzan, son of Ismail Dar, Gorgarhi Muhalla Srinagar.	Abdulla, son of Ahmed Mir of Bogra, Tahsil Sri-pratap Singhpora.	100	The debt was to be repaid by 100 Kharwars of Shali to be delivered at 25 Kharwars per annum in 4 successive years. 60 Kharwars were actually delivered and a decree of Rs. 60 for the remaining 40 Kharwars was obtained from the Court. The market value of the 60 Kharwars actually delivered amounted to Rs. 180 which together with the decree for Rs. 60 made up a total of Rs. 240 or profit of Rs. 140 on the original loan of Rs. 100. The interest in this instance would be 35 per cent. per annum.

Bench^{*} were continued under the new Regulation, and the object for which they were created was served so well, that although a set-back was given to the dealings that existed between the *zamindar* and the money-lender, it was temporary; and the benefits, which, perhaps, the *zamindar* did not at the time foresee because of the fear that it was a snare to decoy him into future parting with of grain on the old traditional system, became real with the passage of time. §

We have mentioned above that the work for the *Shali* year, 1979-80, was to be regulated on the lines definitely laid down, and towards this end the first act of the Board of

*One for Shahr-Khas, Baramulla and Handwara, Bench Officers, P. Sarwanand and Vidh Lal Zitshu; one for Badgam and Pulwama, Bench Officers, P. Harikishen Shargha and Kh. Salam Shah; and the third for Anantnag and Kulgam, Bench Officers, P. Satlal Raina and L. Jaswant Rai, afterwards P. Amar Nath Thusoo and Ghosain Brij Lal. Each Bench consisted of one Judicial and one Revenue Officer. Certain changes afterwards took place in their personnel from time to time. The total suits filed were 17,283; total value amounted to Rs. 16,79,328. Each bench remained open on an average for 16 months. For further particulars see the Official Report pp. 9-10.

§ If with this the problem of *Wadh* did not cease to exist, it may safely be stated that the promulgation of the Agricultural Relief Act of 1983 has gone a long way in completing what the *anti-wadh* legislation aimed at half a decade ago.

Food Control Order of 1979. Control was the amendment of the grain control order of 1978, and the promulgation of the Food Control order of 1979, (*vide* appendix B).

By this order the Board of Control was henceforth to make arrangements for purchase of *shali* through agencies employed by them according to the rates laid down therein, and distribution arrangements were to remain with the Stores under the guidance of the Board.

Prohibition of food-grains export from the Valley. The export not only of food grains, but of oil-seeds, oil, or potatoes from the territories of Jammu and Kashmir was not to be made without the special permission of the Revenue Member of Council and contravention of orders was made punishable with fine or imprisonment.

Arrangements for *Shali* year 1979-80. With these arrangements the Stores was put in order. As for the collection of grain for the *Shali* year of 1979-80, the method adopted was to be as follows:—"the *Mujawaza* system was for the present to be retained, but the *Mujawaza* was carefully worked out by the Settlement

"Department, so that all demands on land
 "where no Shali was grown were rigorously
 "excluded. The Mujawaza thus amounted
 "to about 2,88,000 *kharwars*. There was
 "an additional demand of some 33,000
 "*kharwars* from big land-holders. The
 "balance of the requirements was to be
 "obtained by means of advances, about $2\frac{1}{2}$
 "lakhs of *kharwars* were to be acquired by
 "this method, three-quarters of the price
 "being paid in advance. Cash was distri-
 "buted accordingly by the Revenue authori-
 "ties early in the summer of 1922, the
 "purchase rates being the same as those
 "adopted in the previous year. This system
 "of advances cannot be described as being
 "a purely voluntary arrangement on the
 "part of zamindars. They had seen many
 "attempts at grain control and their con-
 "fidence was not easy to inspire. They
 "were, however, in need of money, the
 "surplus quantity of grain of which they
 "were asked to dispose had been carefully
 "calculated according to their holdings and
 "was not excessive, and they had good
 "reason to suppose that if these arrange-
 "ments were not carried out, they would

“suffer as on previous occasions from a series of successive demands and be left in a constant state of uncertainty throughout the year.

“The total demand worked out at about 5,71,000 *kharwars*, but it was expected that, after taking individual remissions into account, the actual recoveries would not amount to more than 5,20,000 *kharwars* at the most.”

As for further detail in the matter of help from the Settlement Department, Lambardars and others, the official Report is explicit. We have simply to see whether the arrangements now made had any influence on the market. Certainly there was; it was that the price of *shali* was never less than Rs. 5-10-0 but even higher, going as far as Rs. 6 a *kharwar*. Even if the Stores sold 20,000 *kharwars* a month, or the facilities of import continued, or exemptions were granted, there were still forces, which had a tendency to betray the State arrangements whenever an opportunity offered.

Market rate of
Shali still higher
than State rate.

The year 1923 set in amidst "plenty".

**Shali year
S. 1980-81.**

The stocks of the past year had put the Stores in a position to reduce the demand for the coming *Shali year*, 1980-81. The prospects of good crops and good harvests had eased the situation; and the demand for the next year was worked out at 3,00,000 *kharwars* after taking remissions, etc., into account. The system of advances progressed satisfactorily, and the *zamindars* whose demands had been fixed, gladly parted with the surplus *shali* receiving rates so liberally fixed (*vide* Annexure to Food Control Order 1979).

**Advances to
zamindars on
rates fixed by
Food Control
Order of 1979.**

These advances also did relieve the position of the *zamindar*, inasmuch as he was enabled to pay his assessment with facility.

The arrangements were further facilitated by the fact that it was a good harvest again. The city people were reassured. The *rasad* system worked well and had its effect, so much so that people could freely make purchases to any extent. The present year was a great advance on the past. There were petty changes here and there,

but the scheme as it had now finally emerged gave hopes of stability; the granaries as they one after another began to rise, confirming the belief that the city-dweller's fate was really being trusted to more honourable and reliable hands and that he was no more to be consigned to the Shylockian mercy of the *galladar*.

Another good harvest and all was well. Facilities of import were often given. The old *shali* Department had finally been wound up by the end of the year, S. 1979. The transport arrangements, which had been under the control of the Governor of Kashmir, were entrusted to the Stores Department. The new "Stores Transport Officers" wielded no executive powers. This arrangement had come into effect about the September of 1923 (Resolution No. XIII, dated the 26th September 1923). The year S. 1980-81 was again one of blooming hopes. No despair, no cry, availability of *shali* satisfied the people.

The fact of the Valley being blessed with favourable harvests, the *shali* year S. 1981-82. restriction on the export of all

agricultural* produce with the exception of all *shali* and rice, from the Kashmir Province until further notice, was removed by a Resolution of the Council No. XIX dated the 15th December 1923. This was further modified by Resolution II dated the 27th February 1924.§

This tended to ease the tense situation to a great extent. Confidence was restored. The new scheme and the arrangements made thereunder were establishing their "influence" on the trepidations of the palpitating population.

The containers assured a reserve of one lakh *kharwars*, and could be replenished, every time the advance *shali* was available. The supply of *shali* through advance system and *Khush-kharid* improved; and now steps were taken to sell off the surplus. So the expedient of selling *shali* to ticket holders

Shali Year,
1982-83.

*Vide Section 5 of Grain Control Order of 1922 (Appendix C).
§"It is hereby notified that from the date of this order all restrictions on the export of *shali* or rice or other food-grains or oil-seeds or potatoes, from the territories of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur of Jammu and Kashmir will be removed. This order will remain in force up to the 1st of Baisakh 1982. Before that date a further notification will be issued intimating whether the order will be continued thereafter or will in any way be modified".

without restriction of monthly limit was resorted to. Further, State employees were allowed a year's purchase of *shali* on advance basis, recovery being effected in monthly instalments. For the year S. 1982-83, some 50 to 60 thousand maunds of rice were contracted for export,* hulling machines having been installed to convert *shali* into rice. The designation of the "Stores" was changed to "State Granaries,"

Change in the designation of the Stores.

perhaps, because the new name was intended to make it clear without doubt that it was a State-managed and State-controlled if not *wholly* State-owned department.

Abolition of the Board of Control.

With the change in the Constitution of the State Administration in October 1925 A.D., the Board of Control was abolished, and the control of the Granaries Department was vested in the Member for Kashmir Valley Food Control, Mr. Glancy. The Granaries were henceforward to be under a Minister of the State, like other State Departments.

* "Our contract with the Government of India which runs on to 31st March 1927, is for supply of maunds 56,000 rice"—Report for 1982-83.

Summer of
1926 A.D.

In the summer of 1926 A.D., there was disturbance again due to rise in prices owing to there having been a falling off in the past year's yield. *Shali* and rice sold at Rs. 6 to Rs 6-8-0 and Rs. 10 to Rs. 12-8-0, a *kharwar*, respectively. Had not the people contented themselves with the Granaries' supply of 4-*trak* ration, it was not improbable that the consumer would have paid 26 to 50 per cent more for every *kharwar* purchased from the *bazaar*. Towards the end of August (Bhadon 1983) there was however, a slight improvement, and rice sold for Rs. 9-8-0 a *kharwar*. This

Shali year S.
1983-84.
Situation in
1927 A.D.

state of affairs continued in 1927 A. D. as well. The *kharif*, of S. 1983 was below the average, the effect on prices was appreciable, intensified as it was by the fact of the Granaries having resorted to a reduced ration during the "dear" months of year. During Baisakh, Jeth and Har 1984, the Granaries managed to continue the ration at the fixed scale, but during Sawan and Bhadon and the first five days of Assuj, the Department could not but issue only three *traks* per head, it

being apprehended that it might have to be reduced still lower; but as the prospects of the *kharif* harvest and the bringing in of stocks somewhat earlier came to the succour of the Granaries, and the ration was re-issued at 4 *traks* per head from 5th Assuj, the prices fell. In Har and Sawan, the situation had become so acute that the *bazaar* rate for rice in Srinagar had reached the recorded figure of Rs. 18 per *kharwar*. The Granaries Department, however, made arrangements that went a great way in reducing the rates of sale. Subsidised and controlled rice shops, over 50 in number, were opened in the city, and the prices were brought down, first, to Rs. 16 and then to Rs. 14 a *kharwar*; and then plodding through all possible intermediary stages reached the figure of Rs. 11-8 per *kharwar* towards the end of Bhadon. With all this it was in no way assuring. The people as also the Department attributed this phenomenal rise to the "hawa-bin" *galladars* forming a ring; the former considered the action of the latter to be also responsible inasmuch as the reducing of the ration from 4 to 3 *traks*, during a period when even in normal times there

prevails dearth as a rule, had strengthened the graindealers to force up prices to the "sticking point." With the timely action of the Granaries and the restoration of the ration to the fixed scale matters improved, and although the *bazaar* rates of *shali* or rice were in no way satisfactory, confidence was restored in the people by the bringing in of fresh stocks and the re-issuing of the *rasad* at four *traks*.

During the winter of 1928 A. D., notwithstanding the intervention of the Granaries, and the *kharif* crop having been much better, the prices were high in the *bazaar*. The situation was apprehended to become grave again, but was relieved, perhaps, by the fact of imports by private persons and agencies, on permit system, having been allowed to continue upto the middle of Poh 1984 (end of 1927 A. D.). The rate of *shali* in the villages varied from Rs. 4-8 to Rs. 5 a *kharwar*, and such persons as possessed quantities of *shali* took it into their heads not to sell their stocks, anticipating *appreciation* in rates again. Although the city consumer had been afforded by the Grana-

Shali year S.
1984-85-
Winter of 1928
A. D.

ries Department the facility of converting his ticket of four *traks* into a *six-trak* permit to import privately *shali* into the city from the suburbs, still there was that vast majority—that has in any and every case to depend on the Granaries—that not being able to manage with the fixed ration had to turn for additional requirements to the market where high prices ruled. There was again a general cry during the winter, which led to formal and informal discussions between the Granaries Department and the Minister in-charge, and improvised measures were adopted to meet the situation, and it was unequivocally agreed that the *galladars' ring* was responsible for the same. Accordingly with the approval of the Government, the Granaries decided to raise embargo on the import of *shali* into the city of Srinagar, by virtue of which private *shali* could be imported into the town without the necessity of a Permit from the Granaries Department; and this arrangement was given effect to by about the beginning of April. This was a sure indication that the Granaries' supply had "given out," and

Removal of restrictions on imports into the city of Srinagar.

that this was a makeshift resorted to by the Department to continue the *rasad*, even though at a reduced rate, without being suspected of its inability to satisfy the full and fixed demand; for every additional requirement was expected to be arranged for from the market in the town or in the village. We cannot say what the result of such a step might be; but it is sure that *shali* will now be available in the *bazaar* although at a higher price, and the consumer can have recourse to it provided he cannot otherwise manage to pull on. There are about six months more of the current year, and it is time for observation how this expedient works.

Conclusion—Whether the “Granaries” are indispensable or not. Whatever the causes and whatever the remedies have been, a faithful study of the rise and fall of the market, of the dread of the grain-dealers’ ring, of the measures adopted by the Granaries from time to time, of the serious fluctuations in prices more often caused by the action of the Granaries in reducing the scale of rations and thus affording an opportunity to the *galladar* to take

undue advantage of the situation, in short of the economic struggle to stabilise the market though not with much of success, suggests the inevitable problem of hard facts, whether the Stores which has so successfully been making profits out of people's money is now an indispensable agency, or is only an institution which ekes out its existence simply because it was brought into being in time of need and emergency when it served a very useful purpose, and upset all the machinations of the graindealer to capture the market. And this we propose to answer in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION—THE FUTURE.

Having traced with the material at our disposal a brief history of the ^{Review of the} general situation. late food-trouble in Kashmir, as also the genesis of the Stores, and the function devolving on the 'Granaries' as the main economic factor in the matter of satisfying a part of the permanent demand of the rice-eating population of the city, it seems necessary, in view of the present conditions, to review the whole position, and furnish an answer to the point raised in the preceding chapter.

Since S. 1980 the *kharif* was never below the normal, excepting for the year S. 1983, when both *makki* and *shali* were below the average, the latter being "rye affected to a greater extent than usual". But inspite of the crops having been good, high prices ruled the market, and the Granaries were compelled to improvise measures from time to time to meet the situation, *vide communi-ques* of August 1st and November 17th, 1927. Whether it was due to the attempt of the *galladar* to corner *shali* and rice that high

prices prevailed, one was forced to conclude that the Granaries seemed to serve more as a military post rather than as a strong fortification to guard against the ravages of the raiders. The Granaries resorted to measures of "issuing sparingly" *through transit permits*, or called into being 'controlled and subsidized' rice shops, where an individual purchaser could get rice for two annas at a time; but it surprised one to know that despite the passage of 10 years and the existence of the Stores for the past several years, the situation of S. 1978 should be found to be imminent any moment the Granaries withdrew from maintaining the ration at the fixed scale, or the stocks of the Granaries themselves were scented to be insufficient.

It might be to the credit of the Granaries Department, that relief is afforded to a population of 140,000 souls, who want nothing but cheap rice and look upon the officer-in-charge of food for the time being—for the matter of that the *ghat-moharrir* who 'cuts the piece' of the ticket—with the reverence of an *anna-datta* (giver of food); that with a well-organised and well paid establishment,

the Department is maintaining a system of collection and distribution on a large scale, which has elicited the commendations of eht Their Excellencies the Viceroys, Lords Chelmsford, Reading and Irwin; that the savings effected by the sale of *shali* at Rs. 5 a *kharwar* are being utilised in (i) repaying the State loan contracted by the Department, (ii) building up a Granaries Reserve, (iii) financing the *zamindar* by advances to enable him to part with his grains by a system of *khush kharid*, and (iv) makings roads, constructing *ghats*, etc.; that it has evolved into a regular State Department, controlled and administered like other Departments of the State. But with all this, when one finds in the State Gazette *communiques** invariably referring to the attempts of the *galladar* "to corner *shali* stocks" he is taken aback. If the attempt of the Granaries should always be "to combat galladars' efforts to effect high prices," is it not sad to observe that every time we should have to begin from the beginning?. The occurrence of 1877-79 A. D. may be a thing of the past, but

* *Vide Appendix (Communique dated 17th November 1927).*

S. 1978 is not much too "old". Mere experiments cannot go on for ever; they must terminate one way or the other. The Granaries must either develop into a body strong of limb, full of resources, and help in the adjusting of economic laws of supply and demand, and in establishing an unaided grain market where all can sell and buy freely at reasonable price; or fall away as a useless appendage and let the consumer go to the open market to pay higher prices for a time till he is adapted to environments—the only safeguard being against general drought or famine.‡

The city consumer is at present supplied ^{The present ration.} with a ration of 4 *traks* per month by the State Granaries. Four *traks* of *shali* means 12 to 16 seers of rice. Taking the average outturn of 14 *pows* (or 7 lbs) of rice per *trak* of *shali*, it gives less than 1 lb. (.93 lb) of rice per head per day. The food of a Kashmiri is generally *batta* and vegetables, the middle class sometimes using

‡A Famine Relief Reserve Fund with a capital of Rs. 5 lakhs has been created to be raised to ten lakhs as funds become available.

meat or eggs. One *pow* (half a pound) of rice for one meal is generally insufficient for an adult male or female. It may do for a child of 8 to 10 years of age. For a labourer one *pow* of rice is not enough even though he may have his breakfast of "tea and *kulcha*" which might, if possible, be repeated in the afternoon. In other words, a ration of one pound of rice per head per day is tantamount to underfeeding. If in the past the rural inhabitant was denied the luxury of rice, and the townsman enjoyed the *batta* at the full average of 8 *traks* of *shali* per month, the producer is now as good a sharer of his own produce as the city-dweller for whom he grows rice. There were periods when the peasant lived on fruits alone. Fruits are no longer allowed to be food in that sense; they are economic commodities, and are sold and exported—for example, apples, pears, walnuts, almonds, and the like. During summer when the Srinagar-Banihal route also is open, even perishable fruits like cherries, strawberries, apricots, etc., find their way into the *bazaars* of Jammu, Sialkot and Rawalpindi. Be-

sides, the mode of living has undergone a decided change. Personal convenience is now a matter of prime concern; and as such altruism finds its votaries swelling the ranks of the renegades day by day. If, therefore, in the past the city resident consumed more than four *traks* per month, which were generally made available by the State Agency, and if now owing to the growth of population, limited possibilities of supply, and economic forces governing the life of the cultivator himself, it may not be possible that this citizen may have a *seer* of rice a day, it cannot be denied that in order to maintain health, *not the normal level of comfort*, an average ration of 3 *pows* (1½ lbs) is necessary.

According to this rate of one and a half pound of rice per capita, or six-
 Quantity of *shali* ordinarily required for the city of Srinagar *trak* ration, an enormous quantity of *shali* would be needed, the city of Srinagar alone claiming a quantity of 6¼ lakhs *kharwars*. When the annual out-turn has been calculated at 29,44,000 *kharwars* only, which in itself is much below the quantity that would ordinarily be re-

quired for the total population, it is a question whether out of this quantity the town of Srinagar can be fed with a regular and sufficient *shali* ration conveniently. As calculated, a quantity of four and a half lakhs *kharwars* at the rate of four *traks* is the minimum demand. This demand swells by 50 per cent. if calculations are made at six *traks* per head. The city requirement varies, therefore, between 4 and 7 lakhs *kharwars*; and it is a matter for consideration how this quantity may be made available.

Before 1917 A. D., the consumer made his purchase in the open market at reasonable rates, and the question of State *demand* did not arise. Conditions have since changed. The Government has been drawn into the whirl of circumstances and is faced with the inevitable problem of supply for the city consumer. It suggests that the quantity of *shali* required for the purpose might be made available either (i) by resorting to the *Mujawaza* (payment of assessment in kind) and procuring as much

How to be made available?
Whether by *Mujawaza* or unrestricted transaction?

quantity as is required, or (ii) by allowing the market to have an unrestricted transaction, the Granaries in that case withdrawing altogether.

In the former case, the difficulty arises, that such a step would interfere with the general tenour of life, and would tend to reversion to the days of yore; that it would undo what the Government has already done for the amelioration of the *ryot* by Shali Benches and Agriculturists Relief Regulation, etc.; and that it would intimidate the producer and make him deem it a denial of the elementary rights of living to be forced to sell the whole or a major portion of his produce into the hands of the State Agency, without being allowed a free hand in the bargain.

In the latter case, the market is sure to be upset, and the ordinary consumer to be inconvenienced beyond computation, for prices would rise and famine conditions would be declared and the cry would, even if only for a time, be intense; and it would again become difficult to restore the market

to the degree of stability which it enjoys at present after more than 10 years of experimentation. The grain-dealer would again be on the scene: the situation would surely become acute, for this formidable *galladar* would not allow the producer to come into direct contact with the consumer, but would control all available sources, manipulate the market, and sell at a rate which must in every case be abnormal. And when it is remembered that it is this *galladar* who secure from the dread of outside competition has always had the upper hand, whom the consumer and the Government had to fight, and still have to fight, any step that affords him the coign of vantage, would certainly be inadvisable.

It, therefore, follows that neither of the two alternatives is feasible. There should, however, be a mean course which
 What should be done ? would make the solution both easy and practicable. Past experience tells us that the State Granaries should continue the present arrangements, but try to withdraw by and by from the field,

and thus wean the city consumer from the long habit of bottle-feeding and introduce him to an open market, where he shall have to look the economic laws in the face; and that the State should come to their aid by affording possibilities of increased production and import. The total land at present under *shali* cultivation in all the seven *tehsils* is 2,69,457 acres, that is only about 37 per cent. of the total assessable cultivated area; maize, wheat and barley command a total acreage of 234,132, or an area even less than that under *shali*. The total production of all the grains, as shown in Chapter III, is estimated at 44 lakhs *kharwars*, out of which fodder for animals, outside indents, etc., are also to be met. Unless, therefore, sources of production are multiplied, the problem of food would never be satisfactorily solved.

During the reign of Zainulab-i-din the produce was estimated at 77 lakhs *kharwars*; and if an acre of land be calculated to have yielded at an average 11 *kharwars* of *shali*. 700,000 acres must have been cultivated, that is, just the total assessable cultivated area of the whole Valley at present, which

grows besides *shali*, other grains and cereals. If the produce during the time of the Moghuls be taken at 60 lakhs *kharwars*, and the out-turn per acre be reckoned at the same rate, at least $5\frac{1}{2}$ lakhs acres must have been under *shali* cultivation. The inference is that either the land, which was under *shali*, has since fallen into disuse owing to water-channels and other sources of irrigation having dwindled, or that the out-turn per acre was far greater than what it is now. We have an area of 4,43,257 acres as assessable uncultivated. And if it were made possible to cultivate a substantial portion out of it, the present difficulty would be tided over.

There are two courses open, extensive and intensive cultivation. Intensive cultivation alone in the present 'crude' conditions might prove to be an economic fallacy. Intensiveness demands improved methods of cultivation, scientific manuring, organization, State initiative, etc. This appears to be rather a remote possibility at present. The other alternative is that of extensive

cultivation. This can be done by (i) breaking up of new lands, and reclaiming uncultured wastes; and (ii) appropriation of land now used for barley, wheat, etc., for cultivation of *shali*. The second course is inconceivable, as all of these crops are economic commodities, and their cultivation is more remunerative, considering the application of time, convenience, labour, capital, etc., as compared to *shali*. Culturable wastes can only be reclaimed when necessary facilities are available. The breaking up of new cultivable lands is alone possible in the beginning, as it would cost comparatively less. If State help is forthcoming, it is not impossible that the water-power of Kashmir would convert arid wastes into arable tracts, and afford a substantial addition to the present overdrawn 'stocks.' All the seven *tehsils* of the Valley have good resources of irrigation, streams and rivers abound, and even at present more than fifty per cent. of the irrigated area produces *shali*. The two canals of Lal kuhl and Martand in the north and south of the Valley, are responsible for the irrigation of about 10,000 acres; and if the Zaingir

canal, which is estimated to irrigate no less than 15,000 acres of land, is pushed on ; and other schemes which are under the consideration of the Government, are taken up ; it is more than probable that an area of about 50,000 acres would be made available for the cultivation of *shali*. Allied to this is the question of "sirab" and "paiab" villages. Were it not for the system introduced by the Emperor Jehangir that the villages at the tail-end also get water from the channels of irrigation, there would have been constant quarrels to settle. Some of these have plenty of water, which is not ordinarily diverted to distant villages, and serves no useful purpose as it is allowed to "seek its level" unharnessed. Irrigation, the importance of which is felt day by day, and which plays a vital part in the agricultural and economic life of the villager as also the townsman, can be extended in the Valley without much ado. The difficulty may be that of money. But money can be found from the profits accruing from the Granaries, out of which a fixed proportion might be devoted for this purpose.

If, however, only the estimated 50,000 acres are irrigated, and *shali* is cultivated therein, the produce at the average yield of, say, 1500 lbs. per acre would amount to over 4½ lakhs *kharwars*, out of which if only two to three lakhs reached the city, a considerable portion of the demand would be satisfied. And when the reclaiming of the Wulur Lake shores provides fertile tracts of rich loamy soil, the produce would be appreciably augmented. And further, when we add to it the possibilities of the introduction of scientific manuring, cross fertilisation, and cross-breeding, as practised in Madras, and experimented in the State Model Farm at Srinagar and in several other villages, producing varieties whose out-turn is reported to be much more than what ordinary kinds of *shali* yield under the present 'traditional' conditions—the harrowing problem of food would have found a permanent solution. But so long as the schemes of fecundity do not fructify, the policy of continuing the present arrangements, with necessary modifications from time to time, should be adhered to.

The Granaries seem to have taken it upon themselves to arrange for a quantity of no less than 300,000 *kharwars* of *shali* per annum by fixed demand, and the rest by a system of *khush-kharid*. But still the arrangement does not seem to assure a sustained ration of even four *traks* for the full year. Is it due to the solicitude of the Granaries not to disturb the producer by asking him to come to their aid by parting with some more grains out of the surplus which he otherwise disposes of ? If the Granaries think that they have not made satisfactory progress with *khush-kharid** the course open would be to arrange for the fixed demand being raised so as to suffice for the part ration at least, the consumer being thus required to make good the 'balance' from the market.

The Srinagar city rationed at the present scale requires over 37,000 *kharwars* a month; and if against this demand the supply is comparatively less, the effect

*A voluntary bargain in which the seller and the buyer act with a free will as free agents. The State Granaries in addition to the fixed demand arrange their requisition by '*khush kharid*' and thus another lakh of *kharwars* or so is assured.

can well be imagined. An annual requisition of 444,000 *kharwars* is to be made by the Granaries Department at the above rate, and if the present arrangements do not ensure the supply of this quantity, it means that a revised policy should be adopted so long as the possibility of famine or scarcity conditions is not made a thing of the remote past. The present arrangements, as stated above, do not make it possible for the Granaries to maintain a uniform supply, and the only alternative they have recourse to is to reduce the rate of ration from four to three and sometimes two *traks* during the "dear" months of the year which affects very adversely the consumer, particularly the poor in whose interests the Stores Organisation was initially set up. To remedy this state of affairs it is, therefore, necessary that the Granaries should take immediate steps to fortify themselves against depletion by arranging a minimum quantity of *shali* that would sustain a uniform reasonable ration throughout the year, sufficient to maintain health, if not "the normal level of comfort."

For this purpose, it seems necessary that a survey be conducted whereby it would become possible to revise and re-estimate the possibilities of production in the Valley. The survey would be all the more desirable, because the Granaries, although in the main a *distributing* agency, collect the demand as assessed by the Revenue Department, and also by *khush-kharid* arrangement, and as such perform the functions of a *collecting* agency as well. They should, therefore, have an up-to-date knowledge of rice producing possibilities of the various tracts of the Valley; should, as long as the Department continues the present arrangement of supply, be in a position to assure the yearly demand; and should investigate the possibilities of breaking new lands with extended irrigation, to be financed by the Granaries Department, and ensure whether such schemes are practicable. And if for this purpose, as also in the interest of increased production it be necessary to adopt means and measures to re-inforce the yielding capacity of a *circle*, it would be to the advantage of both the Granaries and the Revenue Department, the

Need for a joint
survey of rice-
producing areas
of the Valley.

producer and the consumer, the villager and the cityman, the seller and the buyer, if a joint survey is made. For, in the significant and pregnant words of the Famine Commission of 1880 A. D., “It is the improvement of “the internal communications and the removal of all obstructions to the free “course of trade accompanied by extension “of irrigation in suitable localities and an “*improved agriculture*, that we must look “for obtaining security in future against “disastrous failures of food-supply”——, remarks which the Royal Commission on Agriculture has not only endorsed, but emphasized by recommending the introduction of “regulated markets.” And when every attempt of the Granaries Department is aimed at fulfilling the postulates laid down by the Commission, when rice-producing capacities are re-inforced, when prices have stabilised, when the producer and the consumer are assured plenty which would end the present struggle against high prices, and when the buyer and the seller are introduced to a ‘regulated market’ and the *galladar* is held at bay, the object of the State Granaries will have been more than achieved.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A.

Resolution No. LXVI dated the 19th September 1922, passed by the State Council.

66. In the matter of the proposed abolition of the Managing Committee and the Directorate of the Srinagar Co-operative Stores.

LXVI. Resolved—

As it has been decided that, as the Srinagar Stores are not in a position to procure grain in sufficient quantities without the direct assistance of the State, and as the capital subscribed by the public to the Stores represents only an insignificant fraction of the amount advanced by the Darbar, it is advisable in the interests of administrative efficiency—

1. That the Stores organisation should work directly under the guidance of the Board of Control appointed by the State;
and
2. That in future the Stores should be financed by State capital alone.

The Managing Committee and the Directorate of the Stores will accordingly be dissolved with effect from the end of Assuj 1979.

And all present capital subscribed to the Stores by private share-holders will be refunded by the Manager of the Stores on application together with a dividend of $12\frac{1}{2}\%$ per annum, for the current "Shali year", the dividend due in each case being calculated from the date on which the share or shares were issued upto the 31st of Assuj 1979. Share-holders, in whose names ration tickets have been issued, will also be given on application cash compensation equivalent to the difference between the price of grain purchasable at the ordinary selling rate (Rs. 5-8-0 per *kharwar*) and the price of grain purchasable at the privilege rate (Rs. 5 per *kharwar*) calculated for one calendar year at a four *trak* monthly ration per head—for example, a share-holder to whom a ration ticket for 8 persons has been issued and who is thus permitted to purchase from the Stores 2 *kharwars* per month or 24 *kharwars* per year, will be entitled to

receive on application the sum of Rs. 12 as compensation.

All applications in this behalf should be presented to the Manager of the Stores on or after the 1st of Katik 1979.

The Board of Control desire to take this opportunity of expressing their thanks to the Managing Committee of the Stores and to the Directors and share-holders for the assistance which they have rendered. The organisation which they have helped in building up, will, it is hoped, continue to discharge its functions no less successfully in future.

The profits, accruing to the Srinagar Stores, will be devoted exclusively to the furtherance of the Grain Control Scheme in such manner as the Board of Control, subject to the approval of the Darbar, may decide.

APPENDIX B.

Extract from the proceedings of a Meeting of the Jammu and Kashmir State Council held on 29th November 1922, (vide State Gazette dated the 13th August 1923).

Read—

Demi-official letter No. 3987/6, dated the 31st October 1922, from Mr. Glancy forwarding a draft of the amended Grain Control Order of 1928, which is to the following effect :—

“Whereas the Board of Control appointed by His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur, have now, with the Darbar's approval, taken action, which it is hoped, will ensure the supply of a sufficient quantity of grain at reasonable rates to meet the ordinary requirements of Srinagar city, His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur in Council is pleased to repeal the revised Kashmir Grain Regulation, 1928, and to issue the following order, which shall be known as the Grain Control Order, 1929, and shall come into operation immediately :—

1. "The Board of Control shall make arrangements for the purchase of Shali to provide for Srinagar city. The rates at which Shali shall be purchased by the Board of Control or by such agencies as they may employ for this purpose, shall be in accordance with the Annexure attached to this order. The distribution, in Srinagar, of Shali so purchased shall be effected by the Srinagar Stores which shall work directly under the guidance of the Board of Control. The profits accruing to the Srinagar Stores, after meeting the expenditure incurred by the State in connection with the acquisition of grain, shall be devoted exclusively for the furtherance of the Grain Control Scheme in safeguarding and promoting the interests of the producer and the consumer, as the Board of Control with the approval of the Darbar may direct.

2. "No agreement to repay in the form of agricultural produce any loan advanced in the Kashmir Valley otherwise than by State Agency, shall be enforceable.

3. "The Special Benches appointed by the Board of Control, shall continue in

accordance with the rules approved by His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur, to enquire into debts due to money-lenders from landholders or cultivators in the Kashmir Valley, and to determine the amount of principal and interest recoverable in each case and fix instalments accordingly.

4. "The Special Benches may, on their own motion or on the application of a party concerned, transfer any decree or orders passed or hereafter to be passed by them to the ordinary Civil Courts for execution and the Civil Courts shall then proceed with the execution thereof according to Law.

5. "No food-grains, oil-seeds, oil or potato shall be exported from the territories of the Jammu and Kashmir State without the special permission of the Revenue Member of Council. Any person who contravenes or attempts to contravene this provision, shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding one year or with fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000 or with both, and any grain found in the possession of such person shall be liable to confiscation. All such offences shall be triable summarily

by a court not lower in rank than that of a First Class Magistrate, and shall be cognizable by the Police.

6. “Any person who excites or attempts to excite dissatisfaction against the order or endeavours to defeat its objects, shall be punishable with simple imprisonment not exceeding two years or with fine not exceeding Rs. 1000 or with both. All such offences shall be triable by a court not lower in rank than that of an Additional District Magistrate.

“All previous orders and regulations passed in regard to the control of grain in Kashmir Valley are cancelled”.

IX. Resolved.—

That the draft order be approved, as recommended; the order shall be known as the “Food Control Order 1979.”

ANNEXURE TO THE FOOD CONTROL ORDER, 1979.

Locality
Abi GhatsRate of *Shali*
per *Kharwar***Anantnag Tahsil.**

Rs. a. p.

1. Khanabal ..	..	..	..	3	12	0
2. Zirapora ..	..	..	..	3	12	0
3. Sangam ..	..	..	..	3	12	6
4. Kitriteng ..	..	..	..	3	12	6
5. Pushwari ..	..	..	..	2	12	0

Awantipora Tahsil.

6. Niyayanu ..	..	..	..	3	12	0
7. Chursu ..	..	..	..	3	13	0
8. Tokan ..	..	..	..	3	13	0
9. Kakapura ..	..	..	..	3	14	0
10. Awantipura ..	..	..	..	3	13	0
11. Pampur ..	..	..	..	3	14	0
12. Patgampura ..	..	..	..	3	13	0

Kulgam Tahsil.

13. Harnag ..	..	..	..	3	12	0
14. Redwani ..	..	..	..	3	12	0
15. Arwani ..	..	..	..	3	12	0

Shahr-i-Khas Tahsil.

16. Ganderbal ..	..	..	..	3	13	0
17. Naseem Bagh ..	..	..	..	3	14	6
18. Shalamar ..	..	..	..	3	14	6
19. Safapur Sumbal ..	..	..	..	3	13	0
20. Dab Shadipura ..	..	..	..	3	14	0
21. Srinagar ..	..	..	..	3	15	6

Sri Partap Singhpura Tahsil.

22.	KarsuPadshahi Bagh ..	..	..	3 15 0
23.	Shalteng ..	..	..	3 14 6

Baramulla Tahsil.

24.	Baramulla ..	..	..	3 9 0
25.	Dilna and Sir ..	..	..	3 10 6
26.	Tarazua ..	..	..	3 10 6
27.	Palahalan ..	..	..	3 12 0
28.	Shadipura-Panzinara ..	..	..	3 14 0
29.	Sumbal ..	..	..	3 13 0

Uttarmachhipura Tahsil.

30.	Kawawari ..	..	..	3 9 6
31.	Kulangam ..	..	..	3 9 6
32.	Udhopura ..	..	..	3 9 6
33.	Sopore ..	..	..	3 10 6
34.	Doabagh ..	..	..	3 10 6
35.	Bandipura ..	..	..	3 11 6
36.	Ashtangoo ..	..	..	3 11 6

The rate in every village will decrease according to its distance from the nearest Abi Ghat at the rate of nine pies per *kharwar* per mile, (for example, if the distance of a village from the nearest Abi Ghat is four miles, the rate in that village will be 0-3-0 less than the rate at that Abi Ghat).

APPENDIX C.

Government Notification (dated 17-11-1927).

FINANCE DEPARTMENT.

Press Communique.

On the 1st August 1927 a Press Communique was issued by the Jammu and Kashmir Government, describing the salient features of the *Shali* situation of the time in Kashmir and the steps taken to meet the abnormal conditions created by that situation.

As a result of this action, normal conditions were practically restored by the end of Bhadon, so much so that the scale of 4 Trak ration which had to be reduced temporarily to 3 Traks was reintroduced with effect from the 5th Assuj.

To meet the situation created by *galladars* attempting to corner *Shali* stocks, action was taken as follows :—

- (a) Through Transit Permits were only given very sparingly and then only to meet definite and legitimate supply commitments.
- (b) *Galladars* were not allowed to import stocks into Srinagar except on terms approved by State Granaries.

- (c) For the months of Sawan and Bhadon the ration issued by State Granaries on tickets was reduced from 4 Traks per head to 3 Traks per head to conserve stocks and to prevent depletion before the new crop was available.
- (d) Controlled rice shops were opened in Srinagar, some 20 of these were subsidised by the State Granaries. An almost equal number were operated without subsidy.

The result of the action taken by the State Granaries was that the Bazar rates for rice in Srinagar, which at one time in Sawan rose to Rs. 18 per Kharwar rice, were brought down first to Rs. 16 per Kharwar, then to Rs. 14 per Kharwar, then to Rs. 12 per Kharwar and at the end of Bhadon were about Rs. 11-8-0 per Kharwar. For the major portion of Bhadon, State Granaries had rice issues at subsidised shops at Rs. 10 per Kharwar and the rates at unsubsidised but controlled shops, varied from about Rs. 10 per Kharwar to Rs. 12 per Kharwar.

At the end of Bhadon the difficulties, which first appeared in the month of Har, had been overcome, and the efforts of the *galladars* to create difficulties in the way of the Granaries and to exploit the situation were defeated.

But for the action taken, the position from the beginning of Sawan to the middle of Assuj must have gradually got worse, whereas it actually improved though gradually. The improvement in Srinagar prices resulted in a fall in prices in the Bazars of Tehsils Kulgam, Pulwama and Anantnag.

Whereas some grain-dealers have obtained excessive profits, many have actually lost over their operations and have received a severe check.

It is no exaggeration to say that but for the existence of and the action taken by the State Granaries, prices in Srinagar would have risen to the level of those obtaining in 1978 and the whole of Srinagar, as well as the Mufassil, would have been in a state of serious discontent.

The great majority of the people of Srinagar realise and appreciate what has been done for them. The crisis is now over. This year's Shali crop is a very good one. Action is being taken to combat *galladars'* efforts to create high prices in the coming year and the Granaries are confident of success.

Additional advances for *khush kharid shali* amounting to over Khs. 70,000 have already been given. Deliveries of the new crop have already begun and are proceeding smoothly and efficiently.

APPENDIX D.

*Food Control Regulation 1986 sanctioned
by His Highness the Maharaja Baha-
dur under endorsement No. 1052-C.
dated the 29th April 1929, from
the Minister-in-Waiting.*

Regulation No. 1 of 1986.

Whereas it is expedient to consoli-
Preamble.
date and amend the law relating
to Food Control in Kashmir Province, it is
hereby enacted as follows:—

Section 1.—(a) This Regulation may be
Title, extent and
commencement.
called “The Food Control Regu-
lation 1986”.

(b) It extends to the whole of the
Kashmir Province.

(c) It shall come into force on and
from the date of its third
publication in the Jammu and
Kashmir Government Gazette.

Section 2.—The Manager, State Granar-
Method of acquisi-
tion and distribu-
tion of grain.
ies, under the control of Minis-
ter-in-charge, shall continue to
make arrangements to purchase *shali* with

the object of stabilising prices in the interest of the producer and the consumer in the Kashmir Province. The rates at which *shali* shall be purchased by the Manager, State Granaries, through Government Agency or by such other agencies as may be employed by the Manager, State Granaries, for this purpose, shall be in accordance with the rates given in the Annexure to this Regulation. The distribution of *shali* so purchased shall be effected by the Manager, State Granaries, who shall work directly under the guidance of the Minister-in-charge or such other officer by whom His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur may direct the activities of the State Granaries to be controlled. The profits accruing to the State Granaries after meeting expenditure incurred in connection with its authorised operations shall be devoted exclusively to the furtherance of the Grain Control Scheme in Kashmir, with the approval of His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur.

Section 3.—No agreement to repay in the form of agricultural produce any loan advanced in the Kash-

Wad transactions not enforceable.

mir Valley otherwise than by Government Agency shall be enforceable.

Section 4.—Advances made by State Granaries on account of *shali* Advances recoverable as arrears of Land Revenue. shall be recoverable at the usual authorised rates of recovery as arrears of land revenue where failure to deliver grain necessitates such recoveries being made.

Section 5.—The Manager, State Granaries, may from time to time subject to the control of the Control of movements within the limits of Kashmir Province. Minister-in-charge, by order published in the Jammu and Kashmir Government Gazette and in such other manner, if any, as might be prescribed by the Minister-in-charge prohibit, restrict or control the import into the Municipal limits of the Srinagar city or the transport within the Province of Kashmir of *shali* or rice (including any preparation thereof) by any person or persons without the authority or permission of the said Manager.

Section 6.—No *shali*, rice or maize which shall include any preparation thereof, shall be exported from the Export of *shali*, rice or maize.

Kashmir Province except with the previous written permission of the Revenue Minister in the case of maize and of the Manager, State Granaries, in the case of *shali* or rice.

Section 7.—(1) The Governor, Kashmir
Declaration of stocks. Province or any officer authorised by him in this behalf may by notice in writing require any person to declare, within 24 hours of the service of the notice, the total stock of any *shali* or rice in his possession or held on his behalf within the Province of Kashmir and such person shall be bound to comply accordingly.

(2) A notice under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been served when it is served in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1977, for the service of summonses or when proclaimed by beat of drum or when posted in a conspicuous place in the locality or localities where the stocks are believed to be held.

(3) If any attempt is made or apprehended to remove any stock or stocks regarding which action under sub-section (1) has been authorised, the Governor, Kashmir

Province or any officer authorised by him in this behalf, may take all necessary steps to prevent such removal.

(4) If the notice issued under sub-section (1) is not complied with within the prescribed time or if there is reason to doubt the accuracy of any declaration made under this Regulation the Governor, Kashmir Province, or any officer authorised by him in this behalf may enter into and search any house, place, tent or vessel believed to contain stocks regarding which the notice was issued and served. The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1969, shall apply so far as possible to all searches and entries made under this Regulation.

Section 8.—Any person or persons other than an authorised agent of the Power to commandeer stocks of shali or rice. Manager, State Granaries, acquiring or holding *shali* or rice or any preparation thereof in excess of the quantity considered sufficient by the Governor, Kashmir Province to meet all legitimate household requirements (which shall include the requirements of guests and dependants according to the position of such person)

for a period of one year, at any time may be required by notice in writing served in the manner provided in Section 7, sub-section(2) by the Governor, Kashmir to hand over such surplus *shali* or rice or other preparation thereof to the Manager, State Granaries, or his authorised agents at the price detailed in the Annexure to this Regulation. The rate to be paid shall be the rate fixed for the place shown in the Annexure nearest to the place at which the *shali* or rice or other preparation thereof was commandeered. In the event of the person from whom *shali* or rice or other preparation thereof may be thus commandeered refusing to accept payment for the same at the rates given in the Annexure to this Regulation or refusing to give a proper receipt for the payment so made the price due shall be deposited with the Tahsildar in whose Tahsil the *shali* or rice was lying at the time it was commandeered. On receipt of such deposit the Tahsildar concerned shall issue a Notification through the Government Gazette to the effect that if the amount so deposited is not claimed within a period of six months after publi-

cation of the Notification the amount shall with the sanction of the Governor, Kashmir Province and the concurrence of the Manager, State Granaries, be credited to Government and shall not be refundable unless the claimant can show cause to the Governor Kashmir for not having claimed the amount previously.

Section 9.—Any person who makes a *Penalties.* a false declaration when called upon under Section 7 of this Regulation to declare his stocks shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or with fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000 or with both and any *shali* and rice or other preparation thereof found in the possession of such a person or held on his behalf shall be confiscated with the exception of such quantity as may be deemed by the Court to be sufficient to meet all legitimate household requirements of such person for one year.

Section 10.—Any person who disobeys any order issued under this Regulation or excites or attempts to excite dissatisfaction

against this Regulation or endeavours to defeat its object or contravenes any provision of this Regulation in any other way shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or with fine not exceeding Rs. 1,000 or with both. All offences under this Regulation shall be triable by a Court not lower in rank than that of a Magistrate of the first class, and shall be cognizable by the Police and not compoundable except with the previous written sanction of the Governor Kashmir.

Section 11.—All previous orders and Regulations passed in regard to the control of maize, *shali* and rice and preparations thereof in the Kashmir Province are hereby repealed.

ANNEXURE TO THE FOOD CONTROL REGULATION 1936.

Abi Ghats.

Locality or name of Ghat.	Rate per <i>kharwar</i> <i>shali</i> .
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Anantnag Tahsil.

	Rs.	a.	p.
Khanabal	3	12	0
Pushwari	3	12	0
Zirapara	3	12	6
Sangam	3	12	6
Kitriteng	3	12	6

Awantipura Tahsil.

Niyayana	3	12	6
Charsu	3	13	0
Tokna	3	13	0
Awantipura	3	13	0
Patgampura	3	13	0
Kakapura	3	14	0
Pampur	3	14	6

Kulgam Tahsil.

Harnag	3	12	0
Redwani	3	12	0
Arwani	3	12	6

Shahr-i-Khas Tahsil.

Ganderbal	—	3	13	0
Safapur Sumbal	—	3	13	0
Dub Shadipur	—	3	14	0
Nasimbagh	—	3	14	6
Shalamar	—	3	14	6

Sri Partapsinghpura Tahsil.

Shalteng	—	3	14	6
Karsu Padshahibagh	—	3	15	0

Baramulla Tahsil.

Baramulla	—	3	9	0
Dilna and Seer	—	3	10	6
Tarazua	—	3	10	6
Palhalan	—	3	12	0
Shadipur Panzinara	—	3	14	0
Sumbal	—	3	13	0

Uttarmachipura Tahsil.

Kawawari	—	3	9	6
Kulungam	—	3	9	6
Udhapur	—	3	9	6
Sopore	—	3	10	6
Doabgah	—	3	10	6
Bandipura	—	3	11	6
Ashtangoo	—	3	11	6

Villages

In the event of acquisition except at an Abi Ghat the rate will decrease according to the distance from the nearest Abi Ghat at the rate of nine pies per *kharwar* per mile :—

Example.—If the distance of a village from the nearest Abi Ghat is four miles the rate in such a village will be three annas less than the rate fixed for that particular Abi Ghat.

Special Provisions.

1. The rate for *shali* taken over at any Srinagar City Octroi Post shall be Rs. 4 per *kharwar*.

2. The rate for rice shall be calculated at all places on the basis that ten *traks* rice is equivalent to one *kharwar shali*. In addition four annas per *kharwar* rice shall be added as the cost of handling, etc.

Example.—(1) At Khanabal the price to be paid for ten *traks* rice will be Rs 3-12-0 or Rs. 6 per *kharwar* plus four annas for handling or a total of Rs 6-4-0 per *kharwar* rice.

(2) At any Srinagar Octroi Post the price to be paid for ten *traks* rice will be Rs. 4 or Rs. 6-6-6 per *kharwar* plus four annas per *kharwar* for handling, etc, i.e., a total price of Rs. 6-10-6 per *kharwar*.

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