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SOCIALISM
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SOCIALISM

NATIONAL or INTERNATIONAL

By
FRANZ BORKENAU

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To

MY WIFE

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PREFACE

MANY people will find this little study unduly sceptical, negative and destructive of ideals. Only towards the end there emerges, dimly enough, a positive programme. If I seem to concentrate on criticism of the prevalent type of labour internationalism, it is because I believe that our present ordeal is largely due to glib optimism about the possibilities of peace and an uncritical acceptance of ideals. It would have been easy to be more "constructive". But in my view the success of the Federal Union idea in socialist circles points to a state of mind that is still essentially utopian and unrealistic. As long as this state of mind lasts, criticism, I am inclined to think, is more important than so-called "constructive" ideas. The road to hell is paved with good intentions.

Needless to say, there is nothing particularly original in the views expressed in the following pages. All I wanted to do was to show certain well-known facts in their relation to the origin and scope of labour internationalism, and to demonstrate as forcibly as I could the need for a new realistic outlook, neither nationalist nor internationalist in the old sense, but "superimperialist" and for that very reason internationalist in a new sense.

If the objection is raised that this is not a specifically socialist policy, I agree. A political doctrine should never be made to suit one party only. The world is becoming daily more socialist, in the sense that economic and political liberalism are on the decline. But it is not a foregone conclusion that the socialist parties must profit

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from this decline. Germany shows that those who fail to take advantage of the new trends may be the victims of them. If a new world is to be built without using methods of the most cruel despotism, all main sections of the democratic nations will have to be agreed upon certain essentials. All sections will have to abandon cherished ideas and doctrines. All old problems will have to be considered again, in a new light. I have tried to contribute a little to this task of clarification.

I am much indebted to Mrs. E. J. Blair for revision of manuscript.

LONDON,

January 1942.

SOCIALISM
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I

THE PROBLEM

SOCIALISM, as a political movement, aims at transforming the existing political and social order into something different. One of its chief aims, from those early days when for the first time it became a distinctive current of ideas, has always been the abolition of national strife, the creation of a world-wide economic and social order, the establishment of political and social internationalism. Socialism as an idea was and is international.

But socialism as a political force had to start within the framework of the social and political order which it wished to change and destroy. To further its aims, it had to make use of the political institutions of our present "capitalist" society. Among these institutions, the sovereign nation-state, controlling a certain territory and all men living within it, armed against intrusion from other nation-states, held pride of place. Socialism had to work within the framework of the nation-state. In political practice, therefore, socialism, in each country, was mainly a national affair. The gulf between the necessary national starting-point of the socialist movement and its future international ideal is very considerable.

Clear-cut contrasts of the kind just mentioned are invariably no more than first approaches to complex problems. Thus it is incorrect to speak of the socialist ideal as of something inevitably international. We are living through the years of the German "national-socialist" onslaught. It would be gratuitous, at such a

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moment, to pretend that socialism must always be international in principle. There are many, to be sure, who maintain that German "national-socialism" is socialist only in name, and nationalist in reality. That may be so, though it is a more complex problem than many suspect. For it must also be remembered that Stalin started with a declaration in favour of "socialism in one country", as against Trotsky's will to world-revolution, and ever since 1924, when Stalin made this important pronouncement, "socialism in one country" has remained the guiding principle of socialist Russia. It is true that some sort of internationalism was recognized in Russia and is recognized to this day. But then emphasis has fallen more and more upon the national aspect, not only in matters of day-to-day practical politics but also in education and in the general trend of ideals.

I well remember a discussion about Marxism in which, inadvertently as it appeared, I had referred to Russia as a socialist country, drawing certain inferences from that statement. I was violently attacked by a member of one of the smaller left-wing sects of the British labour movement. He produced out of his pocket a party leaflet defining, cleanly and properly, what socialism was. It was to be a society endowed with all the best that human imagination could contrive to invent, and free from all those frailties that ordinarily go with human nature. Naturally, many of the marks of a socialist society as defined in that remarkable pamphlet were conspicuously absent in Russia. How could I dare to soil the name of socialism by associating it with a dirty piece of trickery such as Soviet Russia? One of the points under debate was the internationalism of the socialist movement, and it appeared that besides a host of other reasons, Russia could not be regarded as socialist because she was not truly internationalist as the term was understood in my

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critic's high-spirited leaflet. I was a little taken aback by so much idealism. My answer was that Russia probably did not correspond to an absolute internationalist's ideal of internationalism, yet she certainly was the nearest approach to socialism we had, and everybody must accept the inferences, for good and for evil, emerging from that indubitable fact. In my view, I said, the Russian case went far to prove, among other things, that defenders of one of the most extreme versions of socialism need not be extremists in the matter of internationalism.

The debate ended on a point of interrogation. The most obvious conclusion, to me, was that the definition of socialism must depend largely on habit and expediency. If internationalism is treated as an essential ingredient of the socialist idea, then of course no nationalist creed can ever be socialistic, however much of socialism it may contain in other respects. But it appears that to insist on rigid internationalism in a definition of socialism is to exclude many of the most important schools of socialist thought, including next to everything thought or said to-day in Russia. Such a definition then, to my mind, stultifies the whole concept of socialism. I regard it as more in accord with the real state of things to admit that within the scope of the socialist idea there are many degrees of internationalism. Some socialist schools are adherents of an absolute internationalism, asking for the destruction of all vestiges of the nation-state. Other schools are much less extreme, and to them the national aspect is often much the more important. Thus our first axiom, viz. that the socialist ideal is international, does not remain unqualified.

On the other hand, it is equally inexact to say that socialism in practice is merely national. Practical internationalism might only mean a constant awareness of the impact of other countries and other socialist and labour

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movements upon one's own country and socialist movement and vice versa ; but a more extreme version of it might imply a systematic subordination of national aims and necessities to international considerations. The second case has been rare indeed, but it has occurred—Lenin's attitude during certain critical moments of the last war is a famous instance. But if we turn to the less exigent form of practical internationalism, in which national interests are not subordinated but, as far as possible, co-ordinated with international interests, then such mild but practical internationalism is a normal feature of every modern labour movement. Trade unions have an interest in the rise of wages in foreign countries. Many other interests may cut athwart this one, and even tend towards the exact opposite, as we shall see in the course of our investigation. Yet international help is given, quite regularly, to strikers abroad. Political organizations help refugees, carry on campaigns on behalf of their friends in other countries. Last, but not least, all socialist labour parties in the world stand, more or less, and within the limits of what is compatible with basic national interests, for peace and international co-operation. They also stood, in the past, for the League of Nations. There apparently exist elements of practical internationalism within the socialist movement.

Yet few people will deny that, within the socialist movement, internationalism is mainly a matter of ideals, while nationalism prevails in practice ; a nationalism, that is to say, that connotes no jingo mentality, but a sober consciousness of the predominance of national interest over international ones. This discrepancy between the ideal and the reality was at the root of the collapse of the continental and, to a minor extent, the British and American labour movements in August, 1914. On August 7th, 1917, the German socialists, the strongest

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and most influential section of the socialist and labour international, voted for the first war credits of the German Reich, with not a single voice dissenting in public. French, Belgian and the majority of English and Russian socialists did more or less the same, and of all the socialist parties of belligerent countries only the Italians maintained a united and continuous opposition to the war. Yet all these parties, in pre-war days, had unanimously voted many a resolution condemning war and threatening revolution as an answer to war. The collapse of socialist internationalism, therefore, was a major defeat of socialism as such. Socialism as an ideal seemed incapable of existing and attracting masses, unless it was international to the highest degree. Yet socialism in practice, when for the first time confronted with a decision of far-reaching importance in matters of war and peace, unhesitatingly, as far as the majority of the socialists was concerned, chose war.

Up to August 4th, 1914, socialism, all over the modern world, had for many decades striven forward in an uninterrupted movement of ascendance. August 4th, 1914, marked an incisive turning-point. It led to various splits, culminating in the foundation of the communist international in March, 1919. Communism's claim to existence was rooted in its claim to true internationalism whereas, the communists said, the majority of the socialists had betrayed the socialist cause to nationalism. The split marked the beginning of the ebb after a high-water mark. It proved increasingly difficult for the socialist movement to attract strata not won over already. New movements arose. Nationalism made enormous strides, and finally, all over the continent of Europe, the half-hearted internationalism of the labour movement succumbed to the furious nationalism of the Nazis, the Fascists and other forces of the same sort.

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Thus internationalism, theoretical as it may often be, is apparently an essential ingredient of the socialist movement.) It is true that it is often no more than an ideal. But where the divergence of ideal and practice becomes too great, the movement tends to collapse. This does not apply to socialism only. It applies to all movements implying lofty ideals. High-flown idealism infuses strength in practical action ; but it also tends to create dangerous disappointment where the gulf between the ideal and the reality becomes too wide. This, of course, is a banal and obvious consideration.

Yet between the ideal and the real there is no absolute dividing line. No ideal can ever be conceived without elements of reality to suggest it. Even more important in practice, no far-reaching action can be taken without looking ahead beyond its immediate scope, without, that is, attributing to it ultimate aims beyond the immediate reach of practical action. Reality suggests ideals ; ideals inspire action in reality. In matters of more general significance, the one cannot exist without the other.

Their degree of interrelation varies very much from case to case. Sometimes the ideal is no more than a general formula, a sort of definition, for what is actually done. A national trade union may lay it down as one of its aims that no labour contract shall be concluded except by collective bargaining. It was a guiding line of trade-union action for many decades. But it was no more than the general principle according to which action was taken as often as occasion arose. Many unions to-day have achieved this aim, which, for them, is no longer an aim but a reality, yet for the trade-union movement as a whole it remains an aim. It is even an aim difficult of achievement, and it is to be doubted whether the time will ever come when all labour contracts will be con-

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cluded by means of collective bargaining. Yet, however broad the extension of the demand, it remains no more than a general principle guiding action in every individual case. The formula "collective, not individual labour contracts" is primarily useful in making union members conscious of the principle guiding their individual actions.

When the labour movement states that its aim is to win political power for labour, this again is an ideal, of a much higher and more far-reaching order. The term "power for labour" can be used very loosely, but it is also capable of a well-defined content, if what is meant is simply the bringing about of a stable majority government by labour. It could not be said that the everyday activity of labour directly aims at bringing this about. It is often aiming at other things, but always expects these things to help it to win power. In the case of collective bargaining the ideal is simply the general *formula* for what is constantly done. In the case of power for labour the ideal is the ultimate *aim* of many other things that are done. This ultimate aim, though not directly an everyday concern, is yet very closely connected with reality. More than once the labour movement has attempted, immediately and directly, to win power, and it expects to try again in the not distant future. The ideal is capable of practical realization.

There are very different ideals, however. The British labour movement avows the achievement of socialism as its chief aim. But it could certainly not be maintained that its day-to-day activities are parts of that struggle, either in the sense in which one case of collective bargaining is an element in a campaign for all-round collective bargaining, or in the sense in which any political campaign of labour is a stepping-stone towards the final struggle for power. Socialism, if anything, is collective

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management of industry. Most of the everyday activity both of the unions and of political labour has little to do with this aim, but is mainly concerned with the political and economic interests of labour in its present state, under "capitalism". Nor can it be maintained, after the experience of two labour governments in Britain and a great number of these governments in other countries, that an increase in the political power of the labour movement necessarily means an approach to socialism. A good case could be made out to prove that, on the whole, conservative governments have done much more than labour governments towards the collective management of economic life. Socialism is not a general formula for what labour movements actually do (like collective bargaining) nor a formula for what they actually strive to obtain (such as winning power). It is an expectation of the fundamental changes in society that ought to be brought about by labour action, if directed to that goal. It is a mixture of a prophecy and of a moral appeal. It is not necessarily a guiding principle for any practical action.

This may seem an extreme statement, and it certainly needs corroboration. But there are few who will doubt that internationalism stands even farther removed from practical action than socialism does. The relation between practice and ideal in the case of internationalism needs closer investigation. But even at the outset we must confess that there is hardly an element of the socialist creed where ideal and reality are so distant from one another. In other words, internationalism, in the labour movement, is largely an ideological affair, to use this Marxist term which has of late become so popular. It can even be maintained, that, far from epitomizing practice, it sometimes stands to practice in the relation of a direct contrast. It has this in common with many

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other moral demands, that it asks for a course of action precisely such as is never directly and instinctively adopted. It is largely an ideal not only remote from but opposed to everyday practice. Let us see why.

II

TRADE-UNION INTERNATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS

FIRST take into consideration the trade-union movement. However great the importance of political labour in these days of all-pervading politics, it is still overshadowed, in the mind of the average wage-earner, by the importance of the unions. Politics may be ultimately decisive, but the unions handle a man's working hours and bread and butter. How does the quest for bread and butter (or margarine) and for reasonable working hours, stand in relation to the international obligations of the labour movement?

National economics are not, or at any rate were not until recently, water-tight compartments. The wages of any one country influence wages in any other country, and so do all other conditions of work. The influence is both direct and indirect. Theoretically, at any rate, labour is mobile. Emigration of labour to other countries tends to create scarcity of labour, especially of skilled labour, and thus to make wages rise. Immigration of labour tends to create a labour surplus and to bring wages down—in the abstract. In practice, both these effects are subject to qualifications of a fundamental character, because immigration creates new demand, emigration takes away demand. The final effects are difficult to assess and probably not subject to any general rule. There remains, however, one special case of immigration with more distinct effects. If the immi-

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grants are prepared to accept lower wages than those previously employed, then the tendency for wages to come down will be marked. Conversely if, in a period of prosperity, the immigrants insist upon a higher level of wages, wages will tend to rise. But all this applies only to the industries directly affected. Even cheap immigrant labour, while bringing down wages in the trades it follows, inevitably creates new demand in other directions, with a certain favourable effect upon wages in these other branches of production.

The economic effects of all these combined trends are complex enough. They are made more complex by the intervention of indirect effects, generally more powerful than the direct ones. In order to be effective, the competition between labour groups with different standards of living need not take place in one country only. Labour at a low rate of wages is dangerous to well-paid labour not only when the lower paid workers are immigrants. It is just as dangerous when those labourers are set to work abroad, and give their employers an advantage in their competition with industries burdened with a higher wage rate. But this effect, obtrusive as it is, does not always work itself out to the full in practice. Many cross-currents interfere ; for instance, badly paid foreign labour sometimes creates a foreign market as important as the internal market it would create if used at home. Conversely, a higher standard of living in another country may press upon employers and make them grant higher wages, for fear of losing their workers by emigration. All these trends and counter-trends affect all strata and groups of labour, but they affect skilled workers much more strongly than the unskilled.

Economists have worked all this out in great detail and with a great deal of exactitude. Yet these details, important as they are, do not concern us here. For our

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purpose it is sufficient to realize, once and for all, that the wage-level is an international affair. From this realization the transition is easy to the conclusion: It is in the interest of labour that wages should rise and working conditions improve everywhere. The strongest labour movements, and labour in the countries with the highest standard of living, must help the more backward sections of labour to rise.

The principle has been proclaimed a thousand times. It is a favourite subject of resolutions of international congresses, where the practical and immediate is never liked and general principles are the rage. Yet in practice, the trade unions of the countries with the highest standard of living, such as the United States, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa (in certain industries), etc., have always been conspicuous for their coolness in matters of international solidarity. International solidarity is something always eagerly invoked by the weak. Hardly more than perfunctory lip-service is generally paid to it by the strong and by the well-to-do. Yet, according to the principle enunciated above, those with the highest standard of living ought to be the most severely threatened by the impact of the competition of labour ready to work at a lower rate of wages. The gulf between the abstract and the concrete, the ideal and the practical, is wide indeed.

The reason for this is obvious enough. It is not due to any particular wickedness on the part of the most prosperous groups, but is rooted in the factual state of things as contrasted with abstract conclusions drawn from assumptions in economic science. Economics start from the assumption that labour is infinitely mobile. If any worker (at any rate within the sphere of his skill) can at any time exchange any job for any other job, then the wages paid for any job influence directly the wages of any other job of the same kind. So far so good. But it

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is, of course, admitted that this is an abstract assumption to be qualified in practice. Labour is not infinitely mobile at all. Nor are the goods produced by labour infinitely mobile. Quite apart from all political considerations, the mobility of both is subjected to natural limits. Goods and men, in order to change their places, must be transported at a cost. Labour is only subject to competition by other badly-paid labour in so far as badly-paid labour is able to emigrate and goods can be transported without becoming more expensive than home products. Here already there is a considerable qualification, but we need not concern ourselves too much with it, for the natural cost of transport (as contrasted with charges introduced by legislation) is constantly decreasing. It was very expensive, a century ago, to journey to America, let alone Australia, and poor people could only do it by accepting inhuman, disgraceful and dangerous accommodation on board ship. Mortality on overseas journeys was appalling among the poor. To-day, that mortality has completely disappeared, and the cost of overseas transport under decent conditions is no longer prohibitive for skilled workers. What applies to the transport of men, applies *a fortiori* to the transport of goods. The world-wide interconnection of all branches of industry is a fact to-day, so obvious as to need little elaboration. It is only about sixty years since wheat from overseas became an important item of European food supplies. To-day Europe, in normal times, is dependent for part of its bread on Canada, the Argentine, India and Australia. The natural obstacles to the international exchange of goods and men are constantly decreasing, owing to the improvement of transport, and in this respect conditions therefore ever more closely approach the theoretical assumption of an absolute mobility of men and goods.

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Thus there has been brought about, to a large extent, one of the essential pre-conditions of all practical internationalism. Men and their work are much more closely interrelated to-day all over our planet than they were ever before. It has been rightly observed that in our present age we are witnessing a *Voelkerwanderung*, a migration such as never was seen before. Far more than one hundred million English-speaking persons are to-day living overseas, emigrants and descendants of emigrants. Thirty million Chinese have immigrated, during the last ten years, into Manchuria. Other millions have inundated Singapore, Honolulu and the Dutch East Indies. Millions of Indians have invaded Burma, Malaya, East Africa, Natal, Mauritius and other tropical and semi-tropical colonies. Out of the aborigines, the descendants of Negro slaves, and immigrants of all European and many Asiatic nations a new race is in process of formation all over Latin America. Many millions of the smaller races of the Soviet Union have been transplanted within her vast territories. All racial distinctions, all strict local separation between various linguistic, cultural and racial units are becoming more and more obsolete, and this at a very rapid pace. The time may not be very distant when the more marked distinctive features dividing mankind into racial and national groups will have been more or less obliterated, and one general human "mongrel" type will have evolved in their stead.

Yet at this point it comes to mind that these trends, strong as they are, have aroused the most passionate, most violent reaction. We are living in an era of unprecedented mass migration and interbreeding. But we are also living in an era of ruthless racial discrimination and of enforced separation of races. Chinese and Japanese, hardly ever seen outside East Asia a hundred years ago, are now trying to emigrate to every part of the globe.

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But, keeping pace with their attempts, restrictions have been adopted against yellow (and also against Indian) immigration in the United States, in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Jews are wandering over the world as never before. But also one of the most violent waves of Anti-Semitism yet experienced is sweeping over the world. Italians have attempted to settle in every country with a climate similar to their own. And hostility to everything Italian, completely unknown before, is to-day a feature of many countries. Masses from Eastern and Southern Europe have emigrated to the United States and to Canada. And both these countries have introduced stringent restrictive legislation, and France which, for special reasons, could not introduce prohibitions, introduced a stringent and obnoxious system of control, while most other European countries simply prohibited all immigration from these parts of the world. In one word, the weaker the natural barriers against international migrations grow the stronger becomes the trend to create artificial barriers in their stead.

There is no doubt whatsoever that this restrictive legislation is as much as 90 per cent. due to the influence of labour. Chinese in South Africa, Kanaks in Queensland, all non-Britishers in New Zealand were excluded owing to the influence wielded by the labour movement in those countries. The American immigration laws of 1921 and 1924, which constitute one of the major factors of the present international situation, were introduced under pressure of organized labour. Before the Great War, when labour was without any political influence in the U.S.A., there could have been no thought of such legislation. The more liberal attitude of France in matters of immigration was also directly traceable to the weakness of the French labour movement. Many of the more influential French unions were increasingly hostile

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to foreign labour. It is literally true to say that in this matter of migration of labour, which is one of the paramount problems of our times, labour is by far the most nationalist of all existing political forces.

Yet it is painfully obvious that by taking this attitude labour acts, not only against its internationalist ideals, but also against its practical interests. The barriers against the immigration of Asiatics into countries with a higher standard of living increase the economic burden of the masses in India, China and Japan. Those masses have to stay in countries where the supply of labour greatly exceeds the demand for it. There wages largely remain below the starvation level. On the basis of such starvation wages Japanese industry is able successfully to compete with European and American industries. This, in turn, threatens the economic existence of the workers employed in such industries as the spinning and weaving of cotton in Lancashire. The anti-migration policy pursued by practically all labour movements in countries with a good standard of living prevents any rise of wages in countries already at starvation-level, with disastrous results to wages and employment in the exclusionist countries themselves. Nothing is more commonplace. Nothing has been said more often. Yet never did action correspond to words. Why?

It is the very acuteness of the existing contrasts in the standard of living between one country and another which makes things so difficult. Where these contrasts are milder, the difficulties are accordingly smaller. Wages in Scandinavia, and particularly in Norway, are lower than those in the United States. Yet the difference is not acute and—more important, probably—the whole population of Norway is only about $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the population of the United States. Norwegian immigration can never become a serious problem to the American worker,

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though it is a constant drain on the Norwegian population, and therefore a constant relief for Norwegian labour. Norwegians in America willingly adopt the American standard of living, and are therefore welcome immigrants. But it is quite a different matter where, let us say, Italians are concerned. The population of Italy is one-third of the population of the United States, emigration is (or rather was, before the advent of Fascism) very strong, and the Italian, especially the Southern Italian, was content with wages which were a fraction of the wages paid to American workers. The same, incidentally, applies to the American negroes themselves, with similar consequences. The Sicilian who had emigrated to Virginia would not have known what to do with wages such as are normally paid in Pittsburgh. Now it is perfectly true that such helplessness in the use of the good things of the earth is a passing thing. The second generation would expect almost exactly the same standard of living as the old inhabitants. The standard of living of Sicilians in America is, of course, rising. But this rise is counteracted by many factors. Most important among them must be reckoned the continuance of immigration. While old immigrants gradually adapt themselves to their new surroundings, new immigrants constantly appear. Secondly, the immigrants have not cut all their ties with their homes in Europe or Asia. Instead of spending, they save up for a return home, or for families left at home. Being intent, not on good living in America, but on an improved position for themselves or their families in their home countries, they never expect to attain the American standard of living, which, at home, they could by no means maintain. Thirdly, for obvious reasons, as soon as they appear in numbers, certain jobs are available to them precisely because they do not expect the same wages as the old settlers. For all these reasons immigrant

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wages tend to remain below average local wages and, if immigration is a permanent feature of a country's economic structure, and if the immigrants are numerous, they tend to bring down wages in the industries where they work.

It appears therefore that even the direct impact of immigration upon wages and other conditions of labour is a very complex thing. It is generally admitted in economic theory that psychological, historical and political factors greatly affect wages besides the merely economic facts. Migration is one point in instance. The effect of immigration upon wages is dependent upon such factors as the margin between the wages of the immigrants at home and the wages of the country of immigration ; their adaptability to new conditions ; the permanent or transitory character of their immigration ; the degree of national cohesion they preserve in their country of immigration ; the readiness of the old settlers to treat them as equals ; the degree of their specialization and to the extent to which, in consequence, they are tied to a few jobs or can freely roam over the labour market ; and many other considerations. But of all these considerations the degree of similarity between immigrants and old settlers, both in their habits and in their standard of living, is paramount. Where the similarity is considerable, the immigrants are favourably affected and so is labour in their home country, while labour in their country of immigration is not adversely affected. Where the margin is wide, the favourable effects upon the immigrants are more strongly marked, but adverse effects upon labour in their country of immigration inevitably accompany them.

So far only the direct effects of immigration have been taken into account. In order to reach a valid result, these must be balanced against the effects of the preven-

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tion of immigration mentioned above. Very likely the pressure of labour at a lower standard of living upon labour of a higher standard, when prevented from acting directly through immigration, will act indirectly, and in a much more vicious manner, through the successful competition of goods produced in countries of a lower wage rate. It is here that the practical importance of this aspect of internationalism becomes evident. Immigration tends to produce a lower level of wages, but competition tends to produce unemployment. Economic internationalism is incompatible with a rapid rise of the standard of living. But economic nationalism tends to be incompatible with regular employment. The choice between the two would be difficult anyway, but becomes more difficult because it is not only a choice between two sets of evils. It is also a choice between different, and incalculable, quantities of both. How much unemployment is likely to be created by foreign competition? How much will wages fall if unrestricted immigration is countenanced? These are matters in which certainty is very difficult to attach. Again, even if this were not so, it would be difficult to give judgment in favour of the one policy or the other. For in addition to all the factors just mentioned, other indirect effects of immigration, already mentioned above, must be taken into consideration. Immigrants are consumers of goods, and in this capacity certainly create demand, which in turn results in the spending of more money on the wages of the workers engaged in satisfying that demand. Again, the rise of wages in countries with a low standard of living may ultimately, though not immediately, have a favourable effect on wages all over the world. It is relatively easy to point out and analyse all these trends which, jointly, affect the labour market, favourably and unfavourably. But it is absolutely impossible to assess both favourable

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and unfavourable effects in quantitative terms, quite apart from the fact that moral factors are involved, which do not allow of any quantitative assessment.

In the absence of any such assessment the attitude of labour has been determined by a set of considerations much more political than economic. It is very difficult to counter the effects of immigration, once such immigration has taken place (unless, of course, most of these effects are cancelled by a mass expulsion of the immigrants). The immigrants have entered the labour market. They are competing there on more or less equal terms with the old settlers. The effects of competition on the world market can be countered much more easily. Nothing more is needed than to add the exclusion of foreign goods to the exclusion of foreign immigrants. Immigrants, however much watched or restricted in their movements, end by finding work and becoming part of the population. Foreign goods can be excluded permanently by import regulations and by prohibitive tariffs. Thus, after having been forced by their brethren in other countries down to a low level of living, workers in backward countries are forced into unemployment as well. Such is the reality of things.

Almost grotesque consequences sometimes ensue. This may be instanced by the problem of the admission of refugees into Britain. It was a special case in so far as the admission of refugees from Nazi oppression involved the highest principles of international solidarity. What was feared, on the other hand, was not so much the impact upon wages—for these refugees had, on the whole, a high standard of living—but upon employment. As a compromise the immigration of capitalists and, to a certain degree, of scholars was encouraged. But those were only a fraction of the body of refugees now actually living in this country. The majority of them consist of children,

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old people, women without a job, and of people to be retrained and settled overseas. Thus Britain accepted the burden of maintaining several tens of thousands of unproductive people, under the condition that they should do no useful work, and in order to be on the safe side, those categories which were unable to do any such work were preferred. Very few wage-earners of any kind were admitted (except for retraining for the purpose of emigration). It can be said, without any exaggeration, that the unions (for it was they who were primarily concerned with a possible pressure upon the labour market) took the following view : We have nothing against the immigration of capitalists ; they do not concern us, or if they do, they are welcome, because they will give work to British workers. We do not object to refugees living in this country on a dole, after careful use of a means-test of a special kind. We do, however, object against too much solidarity being shown to labour ; we deprecate sweeping attempts at applying the principles of international solidarity to working-class refugees from Nazi repression ; they might take away our jobs. In the meantime, we are prepared financially to contribute, even lavishly, to the maintenance of several tens of thousands of them, always provided they do not work.—There was certainly no lack of humanitarian feelings and willingness to help the refugees on the part of the trade unions. This found expression in their admirable financial sacrifices. But humanitarian help despite contrasting interests is something entirely different from international class solidarity on the basis of supposedly identical interests.

The counterpart of this tragi-comedy was enacted, as was only natural, among the upper classes. The various organizations of professional men took a very stiff attitude against the admission of men of their kind ; but they did their best to further the importation of German and

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Austrian servants, because these were cheaper than English servants. Thus this group virtually said : We are very much against too much international solidarity being displayed towards people of our own group. We strongly urge, however, the admission of refugee labour where it can be used to advantage and safely. Every group was strongly in favour of solidarity being shown to the refugees from the opposite group.

The refugee problem is introduced in this study, not for the sake of recriminations, but because it is the only case where the question of international migrations and the problems of international solidarity deriving from it have become practical issues in this country. To-day, English socialists will find it easier to understand the attitude of labour in the Dominions and in the United States, which always were countries of immigration. The policy pursued on this occasion may have been unsound. Experts maintain that a more broad-minded policy of admission, by widening the internal market, by introducing new crafts and raising the standard of others, and in many other ways, would ultimately have benefited the country. We believe this to be true. But it is not the merits of British refugee policy which are here under discussion. We are concerned with the problem only in so far as it provides a striking instance of the difficulties besetting international solidarity as a practical issue.

Low wages in one country, we said above, press upon higher wages in other countries. A world-wide rise in wages is therefore a primary concern of the labour movement in those countries which have achieved a relatively high standard of living. The only efficient way of achieving this is to give labour from countries with a lower standard access to countries with a higher standard. But this does not issue in a rise of wages only. It leads to a levelling of wages. Lower wages rise, higher wages fall.

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Such equalization of world wages can never be complete, but given complete liberty of migration would become a very strong trend. Such a trend would meet all the hopes of friends of international solidarity. The more equal conditions of labour become in various countries, the more similar also must the interests of the working-classes in all countries become. Unity of action would be an easy thing under such conditions. In order to bring it about, the labour movements of America, of Britain, of the Dominions and of a number of other countries (before they were under Nazi rule) had only to throw their weight into the scales in favour of complete freedom of migration ; the employers would certainly not have resisted. Only—a sacrifice must be made, a price be paid for it ; that price was a considerable reduction of the average level of wages in the countries concerned. In other words, the trade unions could practise effective international solidarity only at the price of giving up a great deal of what they had achieved in many decades of struggle. They can hardly be blamed for not doing so. Yet it must be admitted that if all this is so, then international solidarity in trade-union matters is more honoured in principle than observed in practice.

Usually, half-measures are attempted to get out of such a dilemma. The half-measure adopted in this case is financial support for labour struggles abroad. That is what trade-union solidarity mostly comes to in practice. From the days of the Chartists onwards, French and British workers gave one another occasional financial support in important strike movements. The First International, which existed during a period when no continental trade-union movement had grown beyond an embryo stage, made it its special care to support continental strikes with money mostly derived from British trade-union funds and from public collections. When,

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in the nineties of the last century, there was formed the bureau which was the nucleus of the trade-union international, it made this financial support one of its chief aims. Ever since then, unions involved in important labour struggles have received a certain amount of financial backing from unions in other countries. It is difficult to assess how much this support contributed to the course of those conflicts, but the effect should certainly not be overrated. For this help was invariably too intermittent, and generally on too small a scale to influence the decision materially.

Yet were it more regular and more lavish, it could not effect much. For the policy of financial support to trade-union struggles abroad clashes directly with the policy of excluding foreign labour and foreign goods. Prohibition of migration creates a labour surplus ; exclusion of goods narrows down markets. The result of the first is to impair the position of labour ; the result of the second to make low wages an essential condition for the survival of the industries concerned. It was quite useless to try to help unions in countries with a low level of wages, while at the same time the general policy of the unions in countries with high wages was such as to weaken labour movements already weak and threatened, and at the same time to make it imperative to maintain low wages in the countries concerned, as a primary condition of the very survival of these industries. Under such circumstances, the fruits of even the most successful struggle would have withered away in a short time.

At this point it emerges that so far we have dealt with the problem of anti-migration laws under, as it were, a wrong heading. We started from the problem of international solidarity in trade-union policy. We pointed out that it was a primary concern of unions to avoid the pressure of competition from sweated labour, and that

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the only valid means of combating it was the achievement of complete liberty of international migrations. But in the course of our discussion it has become apparent that more than an ideal of international solidarity, and more than a struggle for the rise and maintenance of wages, is involved. Our argument has led us right into the middle of those facts which make the world the hellish place it is at present. It is not primarily a matter for trade unions, nor even for socialism. We have struck upon one of the major factors of the present politico-economic world crisis.

It is not so long ago that England and Belgium, and to a minor degree France and Holland, were the only countries with a powerful modern industry. From the seventies onwards, America and Germany joined the ring, and somewhat later the British Dominions followed suit. Those are the countries which improved their general standard of living by the process of industrialization. They found it easy, because they were the first-comers. But since the beginning of the twentieth century the process of industrialization has become world-wide, and countries with a much lower initial standard of living, such as China, Russia, the Balkans, Spain, etc., took part in it. At the same time the new facilities of transport made migration a world-wide phenomenon. And these two factors together produced a general and all-round disintegration of old forms of social life. The peasants of Asia, of Eastern and Southern Europe were thrown out of their traditional ways of life, pushed into industry at a starvation level of wages, and pushed into mass unemployment. Revolutionary tensions previously quite unknown have been created all over these wide expanses. It had become impossible for the masses of these countries to continue living in the old way, however miserably. Their handicrafts were made valueless by

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the importation of industrial goods from the West, their incomes become insufficient through the introductions of oppressive taxes in money. Pressure of all sorts prevented them from continuing to live a self-sufficing moneyless agricultural life, and money could only be earned in industry. All this is true in substance of the Chinese and Japanese as of the Serb and Bulgarian, the Sicilian and Spanish masses, the South African negroes and the South American peasants. All these could now only live on wages, but industry was kept down by the narrowness of the home market and the customs barriers protecting foreign markets. Migration of men, instead of exportation of goods, became the only alternative, and, during the two decades preceding the Great War, millions and millions went overseas. But shortly after 1918 almost all the avenues of migration were closed by prohibitive legislation in the rich immigration countries. No wonder! These countries had welcomed the trickle of immigration of older and more comfortable days, which had increased their numbers and added to the variety of products and of ways of life. They were now threatened, both in their standard of living and in their ways of life, by the sudden influx of teeming millions of more or less coloured, unwashed, miserable and fanatical wretches, eager to fill half-empty spaces to the limit of their capacity, and shoving themselves into thickly populated richer countries by their readiness to accept any conditions offered to them. The face of the globe would have been changed within one or two generations, as the face of South America, the only important area not following an exclusionist policy, has been changed and is constantly changing. A hostile reaction to such a move was only natural. But it created that glut of population in Japan, China, Russia, India, Poland, Italy, Spain and other countries which is constantly threatening the peace by

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both wars and revolutions. And those who stood in the forefront of the exclusionist policy which, more than any other single fact, has contributed to the present state of things, were influential labour organizations, such as the Australian, New Zealand and South African labour parties and the American Federation of Labour. It is therefore quite beside the point to talk about the measure of international solidarity extended by strong trade unions to weaker ones and to those of countries with a lower standard of living. The only correct term to be used, and the only one providing an adequate description of the facts, is that of an international fight, not of international solidarity. Invariably, in this essential matter of migration, the industrial organizations of labour in richer countries are fighting a relentless struggle against the primary need of the teeming millions of the East, and of other countries in a situation similar to that of the East.

To avoid mistaken conclusions, however, it is important to point out that these arguments cannot be used in support of the claims of the present German, Italian and Japanese régime. The propaganda of these three régimes has made much of the exclusionist policy described above, and such propaganda has served them well, both at home and abroad. Yet a closer investigation brings to mind a number of factors which go far to prove unfounded the claims of these three aggressor powers.

Of the three, Italy, without any doubt, has the best case. The Italians are a migrating people. Millions of them, before the last war, went to North and South America and to Australia. The United States and Australia have both since introduced restrictive measures. The South American outlet, however, has not been closed by any such measures. If, keeping pace with the figures of Italian immigration to English-speaking countries, the figures of Italian immigration to South America have

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decreased to the point of insignificance, it is due to a considered policy on the part of Mussolini's government ; passports are no longer granted to the Italian lower classes, for Fascism deprecates any contact of those classes with things abroad. The Italian worker and peasant, to-day, could not go to New York, even if there were no restrictive legislation on the part of the U.S.A., and as little can he go to Buenos Aires, where there is no such legislation ; for the brake is applied in Italy herself. Mussolini has made up his mind that Italians must go to foreign countries not, as before, as honest and thrifty workers, but as bragging conquerors. But his Italians have no stomach for conquest. Thus, unable to conquer and prevented from working abroad, they starve at home. Italy will have a very strong case against the exclusionist policy of certain countries, once Mussolini has gone. She has no such case under Mussolini.

In contrast to Italy, Japan has no case at all. Over-population, certainly, is the greatest of all the many plights from which Japanese economic life suffers. But the obstacle to any cure of it must be sought in Japan herself. In Japan, only the commercial classes emigrate. The Japanese peasant, and generally also the workman, who has largely preserved a village mentality, does not want to emigrate. He clings to his country. Like the Frenchman, he does not put up with any but his own habitual climate, his own habitual food. The Japanese have been unable to send any numbers of emigrants even to Manchuria, to Formosa and to other places they wish to colonize. They, too, want to come as conquerors and not as toilers. Only, in contradistinction to Italy, the masses largely support this policy. They want Japan to become rich by foreign conquest, but they do not want to go, themselves, to foreign countries. As long as this attitude persists—and it does persist despite starvation in

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Japanese villages, and despite the rich lands available in Manchuria—the Japanese whining for living-space is a propaganda bluff.

The German problem stands in quite a different category. The habitual standard of living of German emigrants is high. German emigration, therefore, might threaten employment, but not directly the rate of wages in other countries. Accordingly, the immigration quota for Germans to the United States is ample. They have also been welcome immigrants in South America. No prohibitive barriers existed against German emigration. If this has changed, of late, it is entirely Hitler's fault. It is doubtful whether, after the experiences of many countries with Nazi settlers and immigrants, German emigration will soon be countenanced again on the lavish scale of pre-Hitler days. (The U.S.A. quota for German immigrants was never made full use of, so ample was it.) Germany, however, has a good case in another direction. Her population can only live on industrial production on a very large scale, and the capacity of her industry reaches far beyond the needs of the German home market. The German plight, between 1918 and Hitler, was rooted in the prohibitive customs barriers against German exports. The "Atlantic declaration" involves a promise of some remedy for that evil.

But all this is by the way. Let us return to the main issue. We saw how the labour movement of the richer countries, despite internationalist ideals, vigorously fought the labour movements of poorer countries on the one issue most important to them in international affairs. This fight we could explain intelligibly in terms of material interests, shaped by a tendency to act in the direction of least resistance. But what, then, about international solidarity? If material interests work so strongly against it, how then could this ideal emerge in practice at all?

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And, granted that it corresponds to a natural impulse of moral decency, how did it become so powerful a feeling, while remaining so small a force in practice? The more closely we analyse this feeling of international solidarity, the more it becomes a puzzle. But I hope that the preceding discussion has also provided elements for a solution of the riddle.

The ideal of international solidarity arose in the times of the Chartists and of the First International, in early and mid-Victorian days. At that time none of the pressing problems of our present age existed. Industrialism was limited to a few countries in Western Europe. Migration was unreservedly welcome overseas. Asia and Eastern Europe were still sleeping the slumber of a traditionalist form of life.

The dominant economic doctrine of those days was the *laissez-faire, laissez-passer* of liberalism. The days of Cobden's corn-law agitation had not yet passed when Chartism emerged. No customs, no state interference, no limits to migration of labour and capital. Those were then the slogans, not of labour, but of the capitalists, or, rather, they were formulas which had secured the assent of the whole body politic. Liberalism in its more extreme versions was very hostile to any barriers being maintained between nations; such barriers had been characteristic of the *ancien régime* which had more or less collapsed all over Europe as a result of the French revolution. Internationalism was, therefore, not so much a labour but a liberal-radical slogan. Labour only added to it the adaptation of its tenets to specific labour problems. Liberal internationalism was mainly embodied in free trade. Labour internationalism would be embodied in mutual help. Internationalism, then, is not a specifically labour and socialist point of view at all. It is something carried into the labour movement as an

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inheritance from the liberal tradition. But socialism is certainly, in many though not in all respects, the direct opposite of liberalism. The socialist movement arose as a protest against the liberal school. The relations between liberalism and socialism are certainly complex, and the word "hostility" is not an exhaustive description of them. Yet so much seems fairly clear that no element of the liberal tradition can become part of the socialist idea without undergoing profound changes. The query therefore arises : Granted that international solidarity is not part of the day-to-day struggle of the labour movement in industrial matters, would it also be incompatible with socialism itself, once socialism had passed out of the realm of dreams and entered the sphere of practical achievements ? It is a momentous problem indeed.

III

INTERNATIONALISM AND UTOPIAN SOCIALISM

AT this point of our investigation we must halt for a while and clear the road before advancing farther. At the end of the previous chapter the query was raised whether socialism and internationalism are incompatible. Before we can attempt to answer that, that other question obtrudes itself again : What is socialism ?

Our task is not, of course, to give any definition of socialism designed to draw some hard-and-fast line between what is socialism and what is not. Such hard-and-fast definitions are the pride and glory of all sectarians, because, armed with formulæ of that sort, it is easy to draw the boundary line between those who are inside and those who are outside the fold of the orthodox. But real life takes small account of political orthodoxies. In real life, there never occur pure materializations of such impressive abstractions as socialism, capitalism, feudalism. There are only societies which are predominantly feudal, capitalist, socialist. A society can be more or less socialist, as it can be more or less feudal or capitalist. Pure types are abstractions of social science, useful merely for the sake of studying a given type in isolation from all admixtures of other types of society. There existed, for instance, islands of bourgeois life in the cities of the feudal Middle Ages. There exist, at present, in Britain as in Germany, and even in France, strong remnants of the influence of the feudal aristocracy

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deriving their power and influence from institutions long gone. There exist, in present-day Russia, huge remnants, not so much of the capitalist age (through which Russia never really passed) as of the feudal age.

This idea that all social systems, in reality, shade into one another, has always been the strongest argument of that school of socialists who maintained and maintain that socialism can only be brought about gradually, over a long period. It is a view entirely in conformity with historical experience, though it must be admitted, as against all too sweeping conclusions in favour of a peaceful advent of social change, that a gradualist and evolutionist theory must also account for the undeniable fact that social transformation has sometimes been brought about, and is still frequently brought about, by revolution. Revolution is, or at any rate can be, an element in social evolution. But these abstractions have little reference to the problem of labour internationalism.

It is more relevant to the specific purpose of our present study that the gradualist view of socialism was hardly at all represented among its early votaries. It was only when socialists started to exert appreciable influence upon politics, and when elements of the socialist programme were put into effect as concessions to the growing labour movement, that gradualism won sway among socialists. Early socialists were not by any means all of them partisans of violence. Many of the Chartist leaders in England, the Proudhonists in France, and many early German socialists, thought that socialism could be brought about peacefully. Yet even they visualized its advent as a sudden and complete change from one social system to another. Revolutionaries expected the change to be violent, after the model of the great French revolution. Non-revolutionaries set their hopes upon an appeal to the insight of their contemporaries, and upon democratic

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legislation. But nearly all early socialists conceived of socialism as something to be brought about by one bold stroke. They were confirmed in this view by the very essence of the socialist idea. Socialism, if it meant anything, seemed to mean a society centrally planned for the good of all men. How could central planning be put into effect partially? Its very definition seemed to imply that it could only operate as one coherent whole, to be put into effect at one stroke, or not at all. We have learnt since that partial planning is possible and that complete planning is unachievable. Yet this realization was due to a long series of experiments, and was unaccessible to the early socialists.

Socialism, to its votaries, is, however, not primarily an affair of economics. Or rather, economics in socialism are really only regarded as means to an end. The socialist hopes that socialism will bring about a society without inequality, oppression, war and violence. He expects the advent of socialism to mark a fundamental change in human relations. He regards it as a moral and religious affair as much as an economic one. He cherishes hopes that mankind will be fundamentally changed through its introduction.

Now all these hopes are closely connected with the idea of achieving socialism at one bold stroke. In the development of the world during the last three generations, an extraordinary amount of socialism has permeated the whole of social organization. Yet this gradual advent of socialism has been mostly recognized only by anti-socialists, old liberals mourning for the rapid disappearance of free trade. Socialists have been slow to notice the change, obviously because the change in economics did not bring with it any of those fundamental changes of human character which the early socialists had expected to be associated with it. In gradual evolution, it becomes

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apparent that even drastic changes in institutions affect the basic forms of human life but little ; that inequality, oppression and war can continue through many different periods and that they can only disappear, if at all, through evolution extending over periods of tremendous length. It needs the myth of a sudden and complete social change to visualize mankind as being transformed in its essentials through the introduction of a new socio-economic régime.

Obviously internationalism, the disappearance of the oppression of one nation by another, the end of the struggle between nations, the emergence of a brotherhood of all mankind, is part, and an important part, of such visionary hopes. It would be difficult, as we shall see in a moment, to indicate any factor working directly towards such a goal in the history of the last three generations. But these hopes do not derive from an analysis of actual developments. They do derive from the idea of a sudden fundamental change in human affairs, of which the achievement of internationalism will be only one aspect. It so happens that sometimes, as in 1914 and in 1940, the demands of reality become so urgent and all-pervading as to obliterate dreams, and then the professions of faith of many decades are nullified in one moment. But there are never lacking people who call it a betrayal that reality, instead of conforming to their dreams, has broken these dreams to pieces.

But we cannot be content with such general remarks. The query is once more : Whence this ideal of internationalism ? Not only real politics, but also political hopes and dreams, must have a background in reality. If we ask this question we shall have to remember that the internationalist ideal has been carried into the present unchanged, in the main, from Chartist and Marxian times ; and that in that era it was much nearer to the

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facts, and in some respects much less utopian than it is to-day.

Internationalism aims at the abolition of the sovereignty of nation-states. It is those nation-states whose struggles, in our era, grow fiercer and fiercer, engulfing every obstruction, every personal liberty, as in a maelstrom. Now internationalism arose as an ideal when the importance of this nation-state was smaller, and apparently waning. It must never be forgotten that the Chartists, Marx and Engels, Proudhon and Bakunin, lived, or at any rate were young, in the hey-day of liberalism. It was the era when the Napoleonic wars were over and no great war was in sight. It was the era when the French, tired of being *la grande nation*, did not know what to do with their army ; when Britain, after Waterloo, was returning to a conception of politics based on sea-power alone, and completely neglecting land-power ; when Austria lived in a comfortable slumber, Prussia, after the exertions of 1813-15, returned to the old rut, while Russia remained the only military power to be taken seriously. It was the era when Cobden successfully carried through his agitation against the corn-laws and when tariffs were lowered all over Europe ; while in America the cotton-growers of the South saw to it that the U.S.A. should not become a high-tariff, highly industrialized country. It was the era when everywhere state interference in private affairs was denounced as hampering the free development of the natural forces of society, and when, accordingly, the power of the state over its subjects was everywhere declining ; or so, at any rate, it appeared. It was the era when John Stuart Mill and the Manchester school proclaimed loudly that the state had no other function but that of the policeman, the protection of life and property inside its territories. It was the era when colonial secretaries, in documents of

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state, said that the colonial era was coming to an inevitable end, and when colonies were occasionally given away as unasked-for gifts, as not worth holding. Certainly reactionary powers still existed which were bound to create trouble some time, but the principles of liberalism made headway everywhere, and there seemed to be little doubt that within one or two generations they would conquer the world. After that, peace and liberty would obtain everywhere, and the state would gradually lose its importance.

These surmises were based on the expectation, never once fulfilled in the whole course of history, that things would continue to move in the direction in which they were moving then. Yet this belief that things are going to continue to move as they are moving at the moment is the most common mistake in prognostication. But what radical-liberals of the period believed, was firmly grounded, if not in the future which they could not foresee, yet at any rate in a present which was familiar to them. In the light of these doctrines of liberalism the hopes and visions of the early socialists do not appear as extravagant at all. The surprising thing about them is rather how closely they agree with the prevailing, or at any rate with the more progressive, current thought of their day. Compared with those liberals, the early socialists even appear as sceptics. The liberals believed that by the mere continuance of tendencies already clearly discernible internationalism would come about. Socialists, by contradistinction, maintained that the continued operation of the forces of "freedom" was not sufficient, and that private property must disappear before the fond hopes of the progressives of their day could materialize. In the main, therefore, internationalism is not a specifically socialist creed at all. It is (as has been said once already, but in a narrower context) not a

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socialist but a liberal ideal, borrowed by socialists from the liberals of their age.

It is easy to understand what followed. The gradualist school of socialism, as it developed during the following three generations, closely identified the cause of socialism with the day-to-day activities of the labour movement "inside capitalism". These current activities were more and more concerned with the nation-state, because after about 1870 the nation-state became everywhere much more important, both in its relations with other nation-states and in its relations with its own subjects. Accordingly, in the mind of the gradualists, internationalism receded into the background, until it finally disintegrated when the big European nation-states went to war in 1914. The revolutionary school of socialism, however, continued to draw a strict line between the day-to-day activities of the labour movement and the future socialist revolution. Accordingly, it was easier for them to keep alive ideals such as internationalism which were increasingly opposed to the reality of social developments. It was also more urgent for them to keep alive such ideals, for their creed, in contrast to that of the gradualists, was of a messianic character, and included the hope of a fundamental change in human relations. But that difference in beliefs does not imply that the revolutionary socialists were in practice any more internationalistic than the gradualists. When, in Russia, the revolutionary idea was put into practice, it was found to have brought about one of the most nationalist régimes of our era.

What then are the new facts which are so incompatible with internationalism ?

IV

THE NATION-STATE AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION

THE reply would seem to be that it is a reality largely brought about by the labours of the socialists themselves. If there is any social force which, pre-eminently, has worked towards making the nation-state important again after its partial abeyance in the age of liberalism, that force is socialism.

But this is in anticipation. The nation-state, certainly, is not a product of the socialist and labour movement. It was in existence long before that movement. Socialism made it more important again, after a time of partial eclipse. It is not possible, within the framework of this little study, to give even the barest outline of its origins. But a few facts must be mentioned in order to put the problem of the relations between socialism and the nation-state within their true perspective.

Marxists have grown into the habit of relating the nation-state to some specific stage of social development, treating it, mostly, as a product of capitalism. It is true that that viewpoint only occurs in the very debased forms of popular Marxism now current in Russia, Britain and America. Marx, of course, said no such thing, nor does the best Marxist study on the subject, Otto Bauer's *Problem of Nationalities*, fall into that error. The fact, at any rate, is that the nation-state, in a sense, existed in the texture of European life not only before capitalism, but also before the feudal system.

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The origins of modern France, Germany and Italy are distinctly traceable to the partition treaty of Verdun, of 841, dividing the empire of Charlemagne between his grandsons. England had been constituted as a unit about a century earlier, Denmark emerged about the time of Charlemagne, whereas Sweden, Poland, Bohemia and Hungary took shape during the tenth century of our era. Portugal followed in the twelfth century, whereas the unification of Spain dates only from 1492. Austria gradually emerges during the later Middle Ages, and so do the Netherlands and Switzerland. The Balkan nations are the only ones among the modern European nations that are of quite a recent growth. The history of the nation-state in Europe therefore covers more than a millennium, and every discussion of its problems that does not take account of this fact is beside the point.

It is futile to correlate the nation-state with capitalism or any such thing, for all economic systems must be regarded as passing incidents as compared with the age of the nation-state. Yet the opposite mistake also has been largely indulged in among historians. It is not so long since it was quite customary to treat not only European history but all history in terms of nation-states, to speak, for example, of a history of the ancient Greeks, or of the ancient Arabs, as if Greeks and Arabs had been nations as the French and the English are to-day. The fact is that the nation-state as we know it is the specific political form of our Western civilization, and not of all civilizations. The Ancients did not live in nation-states but in city republics. The term "Greek" in their language had no reference, or at any rate very little, to political life, but indicated a community of descent and of ways of life similar to that represented in our Western civilization by the community of all "white men". Other civilizations lived under other forms of political

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organization. Ancient China, during a long period, was divided into a group of states of a size of the same order as that of our nation-states ; but these Chinese states differed from our nation-states in that they were not divided by differences of language, and of literary and other traditions. It would carry us too far even to try to give a survey of the possible forms of political organization of the highest types of civilization. It will be sufficient to realize that the nation-state, a political unit covering a considerable territory, and rooted in a feeling of unity among its subjects, based, normally, upon unity of language, and always upon unity of history, traditions and ways of life, is the specific form of political organization of our Western world. It is bound up with our civilization in every conceivable sense. Nation-states only occur in the Western civilization, but they are also invariably found in this civilization, which has developed practically no other form of political organization. Again, the nation-state emerges at a very early date, together with Western civilization itself. How and why it came into being is a fascinating problem. But it is a problem almost identical with the larger one—how and why Western civilization came into being. For our purposes we shall have to treat it as something older than any of the facts we are now studying, a datum or problem not to be explained in terms of any of the facts we are dealing with in this study.

The nation-state, in the more than thousand years of its history, naturally underwent great changes. No major development in Europe failed to leave its mark upon the nation-state. From the twelfth century onwards, it was organized on feudal lines. The king—nation-states were normally ruled by kings, just as Greek city-states were normally republics—appeared as the first among a hierarchy of noblemen, who ruled the country between

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them and more often than not tended to become independent. Towards the end of the Middle Ages feudalism declined, and the power of the monarch increased to the extent of becoming "absolute" in most countries towards the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century. The independence of local lords disappeared, the rule of law was established everywhere and the power of the state over its subjects considerably strengthened, while at the same time these nation-states met one another in shining armour on the battlefields of the great European wars. From the second half of the eighteenth century a change comes over the nation-state. No longer local lords, but private individuals claim their liberty from the oppression of the state. State-interference which, in countless ways, had repressed the subject during the era of paternal absolutism, is now strongly denounced, and monarchy with it. A sphere of freedom of the subject is clearly defined, the powers of the state over the individual and of the monarch over the state are limited. Great revolutions at the end of the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth century bring this change about in most countries. The age of liberalism is here.

It is of great importance, however, to realize that the age of liberalism which, in some respects, is an era of relative insignificance of the nation-state, which becomes weaker in relation to the individual, and sometimes less aggressive in relation to its neighbours, is yet, in another sense, an era of violent nationalism. The preceding era of paternal absolutist government had not succeeded in wiping out all traces of local independence remaining from the feudal age. But in France the great revolution swept away all separate rights, abolished the privileges of the local lords, the remnants of the independence of certain provinces, the custom-lines between various parts of the

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country. The same work was later done in Germany and Italy under much greater difficulties. For in those two countries the original nation-state had gradually disappeared, and a welter of independent small autocracies had emerged in its stead. Germany and Italy achieved unity again only in the second half of the nineteenth century, under the leadership of Bismarck and of Cavour respectively. Their movement of unification was accompanied and followed by other movements of the same kind. Poland, which had lost her unity and independence towards the end of the eighteenth century, strove to regain it, but only achieved that aim in 1918. Hungary strove to recover her ancient independence, gradually lost to the Hapsburg Empire after 150 years of Turkish domination. The subject races of the Hapsburg, the Russian and the Turkish Empire all strove for independence. It was a movement starting everywhere in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and coming to final fruition by the treaty of Versailles (which, despite Nazi propaganda, was a great treaty of liberation) in 1919.

All these nationalist movements were inspired by liberal ideas. In France, in particular, nationalism and liberalism developed side by side. The revolutionaries, while defending the liberties of the subject against the monarchy, defended the unity of the country against the local privileges of the *ancien régime*, and, last but not least, defended the independence of France against the conspiracy of the king with foreign monarchs. East of the Alps and of the Rhine, liberalism was everywhere directly connected with the movements for national unity and independence. In previous chapters of this study we met liberalism as a school of thought deprecating the state and therefore cosmopolitan. In that capacity liberalism contributed all the essentials of socialist internationalism. Now we must recognize liberalism as one of the most potent formative

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forces of modern nationalism, and in that capacity it has contributed a great deal to the emergence of socialist nationalism or national socialism. In the first capacity, it contributed a great deal to the socialist ideal, in the second much more to socialist practice.

It is true, quite literally, that the nation-state in its modern version only emerged as a result of liberal ideas and ideals. During the liberal era, the state became less oppressive to the individual, was more strongly identified with the masses as opposed to their rulers, and for that reason was loved by subjects who formerly only feared and often hated it. No single factor has done as much to make the masses identify themselves with the state. Again, while the liberal state—after the passing away of the Napoleonic era—was not, for a long time, bent upon expansion at the cost of other nation-states, and was even sceptical about colonial aggrandisement, it was, as already mentioned, ruthless in sweeping away all local privileges and establishing the unity of the nation inside her own borders. By so doing, the liberal revolutions transformed nations from a bundle of local units and privileged persons and groups into one coherent whole, ready to act at the order of a powerful ruler or of a passionate mass movement. Moreover liberalism added new and essential impulses to the already existing loyalties bound up with the nation-state. The nations of Europe had mostly spoken one language each. But this did not apply to some of the most important powers, such as Austria, and nowhere were the linguistic and political borders identical. Liberalism introduced the concept of a nation-state as the embodiment of one linguistic unit, united in its traditions and ways of life. Before, the nation-state had been largely identified with its ruler. Under the liberal dispensation, the nation-state was identified with the nation, with the masses of its subjects. It became an inalienable right of

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the individual, identical in substance with his other liberties, to live under the nation-state to which he belonged by speech and traditions. Claims such as that, that all Germans should be citizens of one Greater Germany, were only conceivable since the idea of the nation-state had finally come to maturity in full logical coherence through the liberal credo.

The liberal era from 1815 to 1870, and even till 1914, was certainly an era of very little oppression within the nation-states, and of amazingly little aggression without. Accordingly, the leading social thinkers of the era from Adam Smith to Herbert Spencer, and their opposite numbers on the continent, deprecated the importance of the state. But it was a superficial view. For during that same era out of a welter of half-feudal domains, there emerged the nation-states of Central and Eastern Europe ; while in the West, during that era, the nation-state won greater coherence, and a deeper allegiance from its subjects, than ever before. Looking backwards, the liberal era appears as an interlude between the great wars of the eighteenth century and of the Napoleonic era on the one hand, and our present era of world wars on the other. In both cases the belligerents were the great nation-states. Only, in our own era they were more numerous (the U.S.A., Japan, Russia, China, and all the smaller countries of Central and Eastern Europe had joined their ranks) and infinitely more powerful than before. The lull of no less than a century between the two periods of international wars had created all the conditions which made the second outburst so much more violent than the first.

In stressing the pacific and individualistic aspects of contemporary development, liberal theory, and socialist thought in so far as it was influenced by the prevailing liberal doctrines of the day, had taken the surface for the core, the superficial appearance for a reflection of the

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deeper forces at work. But from about 1870 onwards, and very rapidly since the beginning of the twentieth century, even the superficially pacific and cosmopolitan aspects of the life of the nation-states were disappearing, until only the bellicose and expansionist aspects remained. It is noteworthy that this happened in spite of the fact that very few individuals profited from it, while many were desperately resisting it. But overwhelming needs were tending to bring it about.

In the preceding paragraphs we had occasion, more than once, to mention the correlation between the two main aspects of the activity of the nation-state, its relation to its own subjects, and to other nation-states. The two are closely interlocked and interdependent. The more pacific practice of the great liberal age in international relations corresponds closely to the non-interference of the liberal state in the affairs of the individual. Conversely, as liberalism declines, the increasing interference of the state in private affairs keeps pace with a more aggressive policy of all nation-states against other members of the family of nations. It is important to trace this connection in some greater detail.

It is, on the whole, in home affairs that the departure from liberal principles starts, and only at a much later stage the same process becomes marked in international affairs. The outcry against liberal principles which was the beginning of the decline of liberalism, was in fact closely connected with the rise of socialist ideas. This rise, as is well known, was originally prompted by the evil conditions which had arisen among the English poor as a result of the industrial revolution towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.

What was needed in order to counter the worst effects of the industrial revolution was certainly not a change of

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the prevailing liberal principles from top to bottom, the destruction of capitalism and the coming about of socialism. A very great deal has been achieved during the last century, without any such dramatic change, but piecemeal, through social legislation and trade-union work. But it was not in this light that the contemporaries of Ricardo and the men of the age of Chartism could see it. For liberalism, during its hey-day, was not simply a practical policy. It was an almost religious creed, a metaphysical belief in the virtues of free trade and in the sinfulness of all state intervention. Measures as simple as restrictions on the work of children and, much later, the introduction of compulsory education, were opposed on the ground that all intervention of the state in private life was evil. To this principle of absolute liberalism the promoters of protective action on behalf of the poor had to oppose another principle, in order to beat down the pseudo-religious resistance against social reform. This principle could only be state-intervention, the duty of society, through its organs, to see that the condition of the poor should not deteriorate to a dangerous degree. Thus the very extremism of victorious and exultant liberalism transformed what would otherwise have been a mild plea for social reform into a crusade for a principle radically opposed to liberalism.

Protective legislation was introduced, on paper, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and effectively when, in early Victorian days, the institution of factory inspectors was created in order to give effect to existing statutes. From that time onwards working-hours were limited, children and women were excluded from certain occupations, the truck system was abolished, elementary hygienic safeguards were introduced into the factories. It was, as Karl Marx called it in *Das Kapital*, the first victory of the political economy of the working-classes over that of the

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bourgeoisie. The very modest amount of social legislation introduced in England down to late Victorian days did not yet materially alter the liberal character of social and economic life as a whole. Marx, however, was certainly right in his view that with the introduction of the first measure limiting the free interplây of economic forces through protective legislation the principle of liberalism was defeated. Henceforward liberalism was no longer a religious creed, but a matter of expediency, hence no longer a matter of absolutes but something relative.

What Marx failed to see, however, was this, that these very same measures, while marking the first defeat of the economic (and political) principles of liberalism, also marked the first serious defeat of his own political doctrine. Marx's political views were based on a double axiom. He held that within the framework of capitalism nothing essential could be done for the well-being of the working-classes. "The worker becomes a pauper", the Communist Manifesto proclaims dogmatically, as a general economic law of capitalism ; and though later, under the impact of the accumulating results of social legislation and trade-union work, he had to modify that dictum, he never fundamentally abandoned the view that on the whole the position of the working-classes within capitalist society was bound to deteriorate, and that revolution was the inevitable outcome of this process of deterioration. Secondly, he held that, as long as the economic order was capitalist, the bourgeoisie was bound to be the ruling class politically, and that therefore the state ruled by the capitalists could only be fundamentally hostile to the proletariat. This capitalist state must not be won or permeated, which was impossible ; it must be overthrown by revolution. Every co-operation with the state was dangerous for the interests of the proletariat. This complete hostility to the state as

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it existed, squared excellently with Marx's internationalism. The workers obviously had no reason to be afraid of abolishing their worst enemies, the existing states, to the extent of merging them into one international socialist union.

Marx's view was essentially correct under liberalism. Under a régime of absolute non-interference by the state in economic matters workers were helplessly exposed to the effects of the pressure of their numbers upon the labour market (what Marx called the law of the industrial reserve army). To the working-classes the state meant the judge and the jail when their misery drove them to break the law individually, and the constabulary, the yeomanry and the troops when they tried to rise collectively against their miserable condition. Here, indeed, the state was nothing but an executive organ of the capitalist class in suppressing the revolts of the proletariat.

But the scene altered with the gradual recognition of trade-union work after the repeal of the Combination Act in 1823. Gradually it so happened that the state not only protected the employers against Luddites, but also protected the trade unions against all sorts of violence. And at the same time the state took more drastic, directly legislative action to protect labour. The parliaments which, against a considerable amount of resistance on the part of many employers, had introduced factory inspection, restrictions upon working-hours, child and female labour, Sunday labour and many other abuses—were they still no more than an executive organ of the employers against the working-classes? It was maintained by the fanatics among the socialists that these were only bribes given to the workers in order to break their revolutionary spirit. But the answer to this would seem to be that political measures are not normally taken out of sheer kindness of

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heart, and do not become less real in their effects because they have been prompted by motives of self-interest. Many motives lay behind social legislation. The fear of revolution was only one of them, and probably not the most potent. Fear of disastrous effects of the state of working-class housing and hygiene upon the health of the nation, the need to improve the conditions of certain working-class groups in order to raise the standard of their efficiency, the strong religious feeling about the sanctity of family life, all contributed to the result. One thing, however, was certain : If the miner no longer had to send his wife and daughters into the pit, if he could go to church on Sundays, if there was a school at no cost to himself available for his children, he had to thank for it that abstract being, the State. Without that being, none of these things could have happened. And however much doctrinaires might teach him to hate the Leviathan, he had to realize and did realize that his only hope rested in an extension of the state's powers and functions.

The state, however, as it started to protect the worker against his employer, was not a force contemporary in origin with the forces of modern industry. It was the age-old nation-state, that very same body which Ethelred had united, Alfred the Great had defended against the Danes, William I had conquered at Hastings in 1066 ; the state by which Magna Charta had been enacted in 1215, which had autocratically carried through the reformation, defeated the Spanish Armada, Louis XIV and, quite recently, Napoleon, under the generalship of the much-hated Duke of Wellington, that out-and-out reactionary and enemy of the working-classes. Yet had he not won at Waterloo, the miner would still have had to send his wife and daughters down the pit. No other European country had any social legislation worth speaking of before the eighteen-eighties.

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The connection between the battle of Waterloo and the early English factory acts may seem theoretical and remote. Yet the fact is that English industrial supremacy could not have been maintained had she been defeated by Napoleon ; and without that supremacy, England could never have afforded to jeopardize her competitive industrial power by social legislation ; as no continental country at that time could afford it. If this chain of cause and effect was not obvious in England throughout the nineteenth century, it was only because Wellington and Blücher had settled the French affair for good, so that, for nearly one hundred years, no threat from abroad ever impaired the industrial prosperity of England.

There were countries, however, where the relation between the power of the country and the improvement of working-class conditions was obvious to the untrained eye. The first country to follow in the wake of English social legislation was Germany. There the protective measures introduced by Bismarck from 1882 onwards were much more directly traceable to the growth of the socialist movement, and hence to the fear of revolution, than had ever been the case in England. But it is also obvious that the more than thirty member states of the old German confederation could and would never have introduced such sweeping legislation as Bismarck put into effect. The basic condition for the far-reaching system of social insurance introduced in Germany during the eighteen-eighties was the existence of a powerful and relatively rich German Reich ; no sickness insurance without Sedan—though, with equal truth, it can be said that there would not for a long time to come have been any German sickness insurance without the staggering successes of the social-democratic party at the polls. The one does not exclude the other.

Bismarck, in fact, in many respects went a great deal

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further than England had gone or was to go for some time to come. Compulsory health and accident insurance were a thing unheard-of in Gladstonian England, where these matters were regarded as preserves of the trade unions. One of the factors enabling Bismarck to allocate considerable funds for the carrying out of his social insurance legislation was the comparative weakness in Germany of liberalism and of the bourgeoisie and the strength of the state and the civil service. Yet this state was the hated reactionary militarist Prusso-German Empire of the Hohenzollern, the object of scorn and disgust of all German socialists and progressives.

The history of the United States of America throws light on another aspect of the same development. Until quite recently, and to a large measure down to the very day when F. D. Roosevelt became president, social legislation was a thing unknown in the United States, which was the last dogmatically and religiously liberal country on earth. The function discharged by social legislation in Europe could be safely entrusted in America, in the most orthodox liberal manner, to the automatic workings of the economic forces, since the United States was a country with unlimited possibilities of expansion into practically uninhabited spaces. As long as these spaces were not fully occupied, no social pressure in the inhabited regions could last for long, before producing a wave of migration to the West, thus automatically adjusting what tensions might have existed. Yet these open spaces of the West, though almost uninhabited, were coveted by more than one claimant, and therefore contested. Geographically, Mexico was nearest to the spot, and the expulsion of the Mexicans, in the events of 1845-54, was needed before the Far West could be fully exploited. More important, all the reaches west of the Mississippi were heavily contested inside the United States them-

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selves, between the slave-owning states of the South and the free-labour states of the North. The South was in absolute need of these territories, for the slave-owning cotton-planters were constantly moving west in the search for soil not yet exhausted by their wasteful slave-agriculture. Before the West became fully available for migrating free farmers and workmen from the northern states, the power of the cotton-planters of the South had first to be broken. That was done in the civil war of 1861-5.

It is doubtful whether the American working-classes can in any respect be regarded as a unity. The differences between the English-speaking workers and some at least of the Southern and Eastern European groups, the differences also between old settlers and newcomers, are very big. All general statements about the American working-classes must therefore be qualified. But it is probably safe to say that no European working-class is so instinctively patriotic and so fundamentally identified with their country and its institutions as the old settlers, especially the English-speaking and Scandinavian inhabitants of the United States ; this applies to the working-classes at least as much as to all other classes, and it was the case at a time when the U.S.A. was emphatically opposed to all protective legislation and state-interference. Yet the smooth working of liberal institutions in the U.S.A., the general prosperity and the instinctive patriotism of its citizens were all due to no less than three successful wars : First the War of Independence, then the war against Mexico, and finally the war against the South. Karl Marx, during the last of these three wars, was well aware of the situation, and the first international, under his guidance, strongly supported Lincoln and the North.

Thus the liberties and the patriotism of the American working-classes were rooted in the national power of the

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United States. If this was not very apparent during the period from 1865 to 1929 (when the outbreak of a cataclysmic economic crisis put an end to the golden days of liberalism) it was entirely due to the fact that that power was so completely unchallenged, so absolutely a matter of course. Yet the American workers were not unaware of their privileged position, as became apparent when it was threatened, not by military attack but by peaceful pressure upon their standard of living through immigration from poorer countries. Here our present argument links up with the one expounded in Chapter II. Also, when in 1929 the liberal era came to an end in the United States, the workers ranged themselves vigorously behind the banner of state-intervention and of Roosevelt's New Deal, with the result that their dependence upon the state, which had hitherto been indirect, became as direct as it is in any European country. Before the New Deal, the American worker was only dependent upon the unchallenged domination of the United States over a vast expanse of country from coast to coast. Since the New Deal, he is dependent upon the power of the administration to make its measures of social protection effective despite the sharp resistance of the employer class. And almost on the heels of the emergence of this entirely new situation there came the new and unheard-of challenge to the very independence of the United States implicit in the combined German-Japanese threat to America. To-day, all along the line, the American worker is no less dependent upon the strength of his government than any other man in any other modern industrialized country.

The working-classes could indulge in an attitude of purely negative opposition to the nation-state as long as they were miserable and of no account. But where they became prosperous, and where the state took those

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protective measures on their behalf for which they were bound to fight, they could no longer maintain an attitude of indifference and of spite. The state became very much their own affair, though this new fact might only emerge at moments of crisis.

The introduction of protective legislation in favour of the workers was not in itself sufficient to defeat the ideal of internationalism and to identify the working-classes closely with the nation-state. For this to be brought about a more forcible and also a more paradoxical development was necessary. For in the field of social protection for the workers the rôle of the nation-state was obviously an ambiguous one. It is true, as pointed out above, that every social legislation depends on the existence of a country strong enough economically to bear it, and of a government strong enough as against its subjects to carry it through. But it is also true that social legislation is hampered by the existence of boundaries between country and country. It is obvious that any and every measure in favour of the working-classes would be easier of execution if carried out over the whole globe. Bismarck, when urged, against his will, in 1890, to introduce legislation tending to prohibit Sunday work, pointed out that the young German industry could not stand the higher burden of costs involved, if it was to remain able to compete with the industry of its neighbours. It is a typical case, repeated hundreds of times. As long as standards of living differ from country to country, the countries with the higher standard of living are threatened by the competition of countries with cheaper wages. Conversely, the countries with young industries and little capital are threatened by rich countries with old industries. Every time an industry is threatened by competition it becomes difficult to impose the burden of social legislation upon it. All

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this would disappear, if only social conditions could be equalized all over the world.

Only, they cannot ; not, at any rate, without a considerable period of transition, during which the standard of living of the more wealthy countries would decline as much as that of the poorer countries would improve. We have dealt with this in a previous chapter. We must now come back to it under a more concrete aspect.

Social legislation in one country does not directly and necessarily oppose the workers of this country to those of other countries. But the benefits of social legislation are, after all, only one element of the standard of living of the working-classes, and not the basic one. Hours of work, though a chosen object of social legislation, tend to differ from one country to another, from one industry to another, even without any state interference. With increasing intensity of work, the working-day tends to decrease ; so it does as a result of any rise in the standard of living of a country, even without protective legislation. Often protective legislation, in these matters, has only enacted what the normal course of economic change, helped onwards by trade-union pressure, would have brought about anyway, at least for the better organized categories of the workers. What applies to hours, emphatically applies to wages. Legislation only recently started to interfere with wages. Long after hours of work were state-controlled, wages were left to the automatic workings of the forces of economic life. And wages, after all, are the basic fact in a worker's life.

If Marx's theory of wages, as formulated in the Communist Manifesto, were right, then wages would remain stationary or tend to sink. "The working-man becomes a pauper." He didn't, though. And in *Das Kapital* Marx had to reformulate his theory of wages, to the effect that the standard of wages was a result of a partly

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traditional and partly changing standard of living ; which amounts to saying that the change in wages is dependent upon the change in standard of living. But this is meaningless, for to a very large extent the change in wages and the change in the standard of living are one and the same thing. The theory of wages given in the Communist Manifesto is patently wrong. The theory given in *Das Kapital* is no theory at all. The theory of wages is the weakest element in the Marxian doctrine. It happens, unfortunately, to be one of its most important elements politically. For it implies that however much the wealth of a country may increase, the workers will not share at all—or, in the diluted and ill-defined version of *Das Kapital*, not substantially share in the increase. If this were so, the workers need not be much interested in the fate of the industries where they work or in the fate of their country as a whole. Marx's internationalism is closely connected with his theory of wages. But the reality of things is very different from this theory. Wages, in fact, move upwards and downwards in closest correspondence with the wealth of a country. (Be it said, for the sake of fairness, that Marx's theory of wages is not his own at all, but borrowed, with little change, from the master-economist of liberalism, D. Ricardo). Workers cannot, therefore, in practice, indulge in that purely negative internationalism which Marx preached on the basis of the Ricardian law of wages.

Let us be a little more precise. The worker cannot be disinterested, even in a purely material sense, in the fate of a nation-state giving him protection. The protection of the working-classes through social legislation is partly dependent upon the position of any given industry as against its competitors abroad. Other elements of the standard of living, and in particular the wage-rate, are directly dependent upon the international

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market, not only of labour, but of commodities. The workers are therefore not only interested in the fate of their country, but also, and even more urgently, in the fate of the industry in which they work. They have most urgent common interests with their employers, and though these interests are not normally emphasized in party propaganda, no sophistry about the "absolute antagonism between the interests of the proletariat and of the bourgeoisie" can prevent them from making themselves felt, all too strongly, in the everyday life of the working-classes. If an industry is wrecked, its hands become unemployed. If it struggles against defeat, it is forced to cut wages. Unpleasant, but elementary facts !

The links binding the working-classes to their nation-states appear strong indeed. First we had to recognize that protective legislation bound the worker to his state. Now we see that elementary economic interests bind him to his employer. But we are not yet at the end of our analysis of the situation. The situation is distinctly triangular. The workers are interested in the state, because the state is interested in the workers. The workers have common interests with the employers. But there are also points where the employer needs the state, points which leave the workers by no means unaffected.

V

LABOUR AND PROTECTIVE TARIFFS

IF business is bad owing to the occurrence of a phase of international depression, or, within one single national industry, owing to strong competition or other reasons, the employer, in the liberal system, is left to shift as best he can ; in other words to reduce the wages of his workers and introduce other measures to reduce costs and increase efficiency, and, if nothing helps, to go down. But what if protective legislation prevents him from lowering certain of his workers' standards while a strong trade union prevents him from dealing with his workers' wages as he would like to do ? Then he obviously must go down, though without such legislation and trade-union activity he might have survived. He is only right in claiming that, once the interests of his workers have been protected by legislation, with detrimental effects to his position in the world market, his own interests should be protected in a similar manner. Besides, equity is not the only point arising. Protection need not only be asked for, and, in fact, is not primarily asked for, to make up for the effects of legislation in favour of the workers. The wage-rate is only one element in a firm's budget. Cost of raw materials and machinery and the prices of the finished products are also essential items. State intervention is possible on all these points. State interference on behalf of the workers is followed by state interference on behalf of property-owners. But state interference on their behalf is hardly less important

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to the workers than to the industrialists and landowners themselves ; for, in the existing " capitalist " framework of society, the fate of the " capitalist " is, to a very large extent, also the fate of his " proletarians ".

International competition in the labour market is, as we saw, the starting-point of all restrictive legislation about migration of labour. Similarly international competition in the market of commodities was, at an earlier date, the motive force behind legislation restricting international trade. To free international trade from all fetters had been the panacea of the English liberal school, and complete free trade had become the established policy of Britain since the abolition of the corn-laws in 1846. Britain gained from it. She was by far the most highly developed industrial power. Holland, which, at an earlier age, had been Britain's master in modern industrialism, had long declined. France had specialized in certain semi-artistic and luxury goods which Britain did not export. No other country was of any account at the time free trade was good for Britain, simply because Britain was not only mistress of the waves but also mistress of the markets of the world. That enabled her to introduce social legislation earlier than any other country (and also made such legislation more urgent, owing to the importance of the working-classes in the texture of national life) without, at the same time, protecting her trade through tariffs and other measures of the same kind. But no other country found itself in the same position.

When Germany was rapidly industrialized after 1870, the problem of social legislation soon became very urgent ; but in Germany, social protection or no social protection, industrial protection against British competition was also very urgent. The two sets of measures were put into operation at one and the same time, or

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nearly so, the first protective tariff being introduced in 1879, and the first important social legislation in 1882. Both were carried through against the resistance of the liberals, by a coalition of the Prussian conservatives of the east and of the catholics of the south and the west. The German high-tariff policy rested upon the double principle of protection for agriculture and for the heavier industries. Of the two, the former very considerably raised the prices of essential food-stuffs, thus impairing real wages, while the latter assured employment to masses gravitating for the first time towards the towns (especially masses flocking from the agrarian east to the industrial area of the Ruhr) and tended to raise their wages. The socialists furiously fought the whole tariff, the more so as they were certain that it would be carried without their votes. How good it sometimes is to be a hopeless minority !

The United States had, however, anticipated Germany by more than a decade. There, the civil war had been as much a fight of the tariff-minded North against the free-trading South as a fight against slavery. No wonder, for the South had to import both food and industrial goods, and wanted freely to export their cotton, whereas the North was on its way to industrialization and the American industrialist everywhere found British industry as a competitor in the American home market. The American worker was not hostile to his democratic régime, as the German worker was to the aristocratic and military rulers of the Hohenzollern monarchy. Unhampered by any needs of political propaganda, American labour judged the tariff policy entirely on its economic merits, found it favourable to the worker's wages and chances of employment, and heartily endorsed it. Of the three great industrial powers of late Victorian times only Britain, the eldest of the three, refrained from

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introducing tariffs. America had introduced industrial tariffs, Germany industrial and agricultural ones.

This last difference is significant. It foreshadowed the biggest of all the economic problems of the continent, and one which is constantly underrated in this country in its political and economic importance : the agrarian crisis. During the seventies of the nineteenth century overseas grain, especially from the United States, and at the same time, Russian grain, became for the first time effective competitors on the European markets. The change, in Britain, finally brought down wheat-growing. The abolition of the corn-laws in 1846 had affected English agriculture but little because, owing to the rise of the population, demand for bread had grown rapidly and had over-compensated the free admission of foreign grain. But now supply overreached demand and British wheat-growing collapsed. Liberalism was still so strong, and the defeat of the landowners in their struggle against the anti-corn-law league a generation ago had been so final, that nothing was done about it and agriculture collapsed. Not so in Germany, nor in any other part of Europe except France, which neatly covered her own needs without exporting much. In Germany, the agrarian crisis which now set in, never again fully to disappear, threatened not only an economic but also a major political crisis. At the highest point of German industrialization about one-fourth of the population was still engaged in agriculture and, in the absence of colonies, and in view of the limitations of industrial expansion, had no other choice than to stay on the land or to emigrate to America. But this quarter of her population, which, of course, Germany could not let go without an impoverishment of her whole economic life, besides being numerically important, was also the firm bastion of the German social and political system. The cereal-growing

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large estates of the Prussian aristocracy of the east were hit much worse than the peasant farms of the south and west, where side by side with cereals dairy goods and poultry were produced. The agrarian crisis threatened the economic collapse of the ruling group of the Empire. Not for a moment could there be any doubt that the state would come to the rescue. Thus the measures in favour of the Prussian aristocracy were tacked on to legislation protecting big industry, and the interests of both were closely identified, to the dismay both of the liberals (mostly financiers, producers of finished goods, and professional men) and of the labour movement. Yet labour could not fully and consistently resist these measures. A collapse of agriculture would have had the most disastrous results upon the labour market, and high tariffs for industrial goods were the first condition for a full development of industry. Characteristically, only a few years after their violent agitation against the first protective tariff, some German socialists voted in favour of a government bill subventioning German shipping and thus providing jobs for otherwise unemployed German sailors.

The case of the German protective tariff is worth closer scrutiny, because it is really an extreme case. As explained above, this tariff was the strongest economic weapon of the Prussian system of government, so much hated by the worker and for such excellent reasons. Part of the tariff, in addition, was directly detrimental to the working-class interest, by raising the price of bread. Yet the German socialists could offer no more than a purely formal opposition to it, well realizing that Germany could not in full earnest stick to liberal principles. The matter came to the test as often as socialist votes were needed for carrying through some measure protecting industry ; and it appeared that the socialists could do

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little more than support the cause of their employers, just as the non-socialist American labour organizations had always done. In Britain, the bourgeoisie itself decided in favour of protection only after the Four Years' War, and even then introduced it only very gradually. Not before Ottawa were British socialists confronted with a dilemma well-known to continental socialists and American trade unionists for many decades.

It would be tedious to repeat the same story country by country. It is quite sufficient to say that there is, to-day, not a single country left which did not adopt a high-tariff policy, and even much more stringent measures for the protection of their industries against foreign competition. Russia is paramount in this direction, to-day, just as much as under her Tsars, and for the same reasons. For the more backward a country is in its industrial development the more important is a high-tariff policy for it. Those who, like England, Holland and France, stood in the forefront of the industrial advance, were necessarily interested in free trade. They wanted to buy raw materials from abroad, and to sell to non-industrial nations. Those who, like Germany and the U.S.A., came later, needed tariffs. Those who, like Russia, China and Japan, came latest, needed high tariffs even more urgently, to the degree that without such tariffs they had no chance at all to raise themselves out of the misery of countries which can no longer be self-sufficient, yet are not able to rise to the standard of modern industrialized countries. That China for a long time was prevented by the powers from raising a tariff barrier was one of the chief reasons for her plight. And even to-day it is a serious grievance on the part of India.

The problem can only be fully grasped when dealt with in a none too abstract manner. In theory (the liberal orthodox theory of economics) the most profitable

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way of conducting trade is that every producer should produce what he is able to produce at the lowest rate of costs. Tariffs raise costs, and encourage producers to indulge in lines of production which would otherwise be too costly. It would be more profitable, from the viewpoint of a maximum satisfaction of needs all over the globe, for Russia and Japan never to industrialize, but to produce wheat and rice, cotton and silk. Only the result would be that, with complete international division of labour, the Russian and Japanese peasant would have to give up his uneconomic handicrafts and buy his clothes and his tools from Europe and America. But he lives on such a combination of agriculture and crafts as is normal under primitive conditions. The peasant, reduced to agriculture alone, would be reduced to the last degree of misery. Again, while his country is drawn within the orbit of the modern world, state budgets increase and with them cash taxes. Taxes reduce the peasant to starvation. It is certainly true that he would not starve on his fields if he tilled them with modern methods of agriculture. But how could the starving Eastern peasant make the investments needed for such a transition? He might borrow capital. But he would only get it at exorbitant rates, which, far from enabling him to improve his position, would finish him off. It is, of course, an excellent maxim of orthodox economics that the economic units unfit to produce on a profitable level of efficiency should disappear. But where these units consist of a hundred million small farms the advice is hardly practicable.

The only way out of the cataclysm brought about by the irruption of modern economic forces into the primitive life of Eastern and Southern Europe, of Asia, Africa and South America is therefore industrialization. This, from the viewpoint of orthodox economics, is a bad

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thing. It is obvious that the technical efficiency of the Lancashire textile industry is superior to that of Shanghai or of Ivanovo-Vosnesensk. If these latter are able to compete it is only owing to starvation wages or tariffs or both. But those people must live, however badly. And if they do not want to live at a starvation level, they must live under protective tariffs. It is also obvious that those who would starve otherwise are not the employers but the workers. Capital, in the East, might find and does find occupation in trade, in finance, in giving loans on the land, in pawnbroking, and in financing gangsters called generals. But labour, when displaced from the land, can find occupation in industry only (unless volunteering for all sorts of warfare is regarded as an alternative). Nobody should therefore be surprised at the fierce nationalism, economic and otherwise, of Chinese, Japanese, Indian etc. labour.

A word about the more general theoretical implications of these facts is perhaps not amiss. The problem of tariffs and the attitude of labour to tariffs is similar, in many respects, to that of migrations and the attitude of labour towards migrations. Tariffs restrict trade in commodities, an anti-migration policy restricts the labour market. But as employment, wages and markets are so closely interconnected, it is really at bottom one and the same problem in different shapes. It is very likely that if migration were absolutely free, the world-average of wages would rise. But nobody except a statistician is interested in averages. Worker A in Pittsburgh feels little encouraged when he is told that in exchange for a serious threat to his own wages, the wages of worker B in Shanghai will go up. Nor will he feel much happier if he believes that within perhaps a generation wages will again rise, and this time all over the world, so that his children's children may again enjoy that standard of living which

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he had to give up for the sake of his Chinese brothers. The transition is too costly for the result to be worth while. Again, worker B in Shanghai does not feel much consoled when told that, as a result of his starvation wages and of the absence of an adequate protection of Chinese textiles, the supply of textiles on the world market is much better than if he earned more, and that ultimately, to an infinitesimal extent, he himself shares in the benefit, for his own clothes are also cheaper than they would be otherwise. His reply very naturally is that his brother in America earns twenty times, or a hundred times more than he, that he does not expect suddenly to rise to the American wage-level, but that he would be only too pleased to see the cost of living rise by a few per cent. in Shanghai if at the same time his wages were only doubled. The American worker is not prepared to be brought down to a near-Chinese level. The Chinese worker wants to escape death by starvation. Therefore the one is foremost in the battle for the exclusion of "yellow" labour from the U.S.A., and the second foremost in a Chinese revolution directed against an open-door policy for the white man in China.

These are the realities of the situation, and most of the talk about the duty of labour to be internationally-minded is based on complete disregard of these basic facts. It would be very wrong to charge either the American or the Chinese worker with narrow-minded egotism and nationalism. They are both in their own way perfectly right in what they do. For the American worker, in fighting for the maintenance of his standard of living by excluding Chinese and Southern and Eastern Europeans from his labour market, or, at any rate, restricting their impact upon it, defends the advanced positions of industrial labour. If a general levelling-down took place, the level of the relatively small well-to-do section

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of world-labour, mainly consisting of the most highly skilled workers of the most industrialized countries, would fall much more than the level of the teeming masses of the East would rise. General impoverishment of the world and the disappearance of the stimulus provided by the model of America and other countries with a high standard of living would ensue. More likely than not, industrial progress, that effort of the strongest to become still more efficient, and of the less efficient to become more efficient than they are, would stop altogether. If Western workers were impoverished, all the improvements won during the last century would go. American workers, and workers of other Western countries pursuing an exclusionist policy, may occasionally go too far in their endeavours, but basically their case is sound. Conversely, the irruption of Western methods of production into the East and the South, unless rapidly canalized and controlled through protective legislation, would lead to the physical destruction of hundreds of millions of people. Thus the Chinese and other workers in a similar position have only too much reason to fight against an open-door policy for the white man. That conflict ensues is true, and is regrettable. But there are unavoidable conflicts. It is a great mistake to imagine that, once you understand the other man's point of view, you will somehow come to an arrangement with him. More often than not the better you understand the roots of conflicts, the more surely you feel they are inevitable. Much of the facile optimism of the two decades between the last and the present war was due to the stubborn refusal of people to take any cognizance of the basic grim facts governing the situation.

It is very easy to proclaim, on paper, a number of abstract general principles which, once put into effect, would work out wonderfully. They almost invariably

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include an element of equalization between situations all too unequal at present. To make all opportunities available to everybody—what more inspiring ideal could there be? It is an ideal liberals share with socialists. It is sometimes maintained that the test of those ideals consists in their being worked out in detail. I do not agree with this view. The more you go into the details of a new order you want to introduce, the more beautiful, the more convincing does it appear. International free trade and international planning, absolute self-determination of nations and federal union to the exclusion of all sovereignties, incompatible as they are with one another, appear all the more alluring, all of them at one and the same time, if you go into the detail of all the beneficent effects they would produce once they were brought about. The real test comes when these desired states are related to the present situation, and when it is asked how the changeover could be brought about and what the cost (not, of course, mainly the cost in money) would be. It is obvious that a high price can be paid for a great good, but not a price so high that the desired good becomes unobtainable through the cost of the very process of its introduction. But this would generally be the case with the panaceas for making the world an entirely different place from what it is.

Of all existing political and economic doctrines, extreme liberalism, undoubtedly, is the most idealistic, but precisely for that reason also the most dogmatic, cruel, ruthless, and impracticable. If all restrictions on trade and migrations were abolished at a stroke, hundreds of millions of men would die from starvation at once, and the rest would be reduced to utter misery. Now it seems besides the point, from the angle of the labour movement, to deal at such length with the doctrine of liberalism, which, to-day, is really a dead lion. But our

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point is that the contrary of liberalism is economic nationalism, and that the labour movement, when abandoning the tenets of liberalism, is inevitably driven to become nationalist. This is not merely a view derived from a chain of arguments, but sums up the real history of the labour movement from 1848 to the present time.

It is also very important to note that the introduction of socialism instead of free-trade liberalism does not essentially alter the problem. The one socialist country in the world has been more nationalist, economically and otherwise, than most other countries. It has put an absolute stop to immigration, except such temporary immigration of technical experts as was indispensable owing to the low level of average skill in Russia. It has limited imports to the very minimum conceivable—and was perfectly right in doing so. Without it, the Five-Year Plans could never have been carried through, and all the wealth of Russia would to-day be Nazi plunder. The situation would not alter much if, instead of the one socialist country, we had to deal with the socialistic world with no frontiers and no nationalist feelings to divide it.

Such a socialist world-organization would be confronted with exactly the same problems as a doctrinaire liberal free-trade economy, which would also disregard frontiers and nationalist feelings. It would have to ask itself: Is the Chinese worker to be allowed into America or not? If not, then obviously world socialism would be of little immediate value to the Chinese worker. He could only get a full share of his new opportunities if allowed to work, not the inadequate machinery of a Chinese factory, but fully modern machinery. But if he were allowed to do so, Chinese labour would rush to the United States and submerge the American proletariat. It would offer to work at lower wages which, for Chinese

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workers, would still be fantastically high wages. If a socialist management insisted on paying the same wages to Chinese and American workers, existing American machinery would soon be worked to the limit by Chinese workers. It would be a matter of mere chance that some, the first-comers, would find work, whereas the majority would have to stay behind. If Chinese workers were accepted at a lower wage rate, the American standard of living would be reduced. It is true, of course, that much could be done by introducing new industries into China. But China herself would hardly be able to provide the necessary capital for doing so. She might try, at some such tremendous sacrifice as was made in the Russian Five-Year Plan. But such sacrifice would for many years tend to reduce and not to raise the Chinese standard of living, thus widening the gulf between the Chinese and American worker. If, on the other hand, China were to be industrialized by the efforts of more highly industrialized countries, this would amount to a gift to China on the part of these countries. (Or, if it were to be profitable to them, it could not be done at a much smaller rate of interest than China pays on loans to-day.) If the gift were small, it would not materially affect the Chinese situation. If it were big enough to affect that situation, it would also, but this time adversely, affect the standard of living in those countries that made the gift. For the sake of simplicity we have chosen China and the United States only. But in order to visualize the situation it must be realized that only between 200 and 300 million people belong to very rich nations, that the population of countries of medium wealth is insignificant, and that the whole of Asia, Africa, South America and a great part of Eastern and Southern Europe are extremely poor, so that any substantial gift on the part of the richer nations, if

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constituting a really effective effort to help the poorer ones, would at once substantially affect the highest standards of living in the world.

Under such circumstances it is evident that even in world socialism conflicts of interest between the various nation groups would subsist, and be serious. And while speaking of conflicts of interest we should never forget that interest is far from being the only factor affecting the conduct of nations. The national and racial antagonism between a white American and a Negro, between a Japanese and an American, but also between a Frenchman and a German, a Serb and a Croat, is something more than a matter of income. It is deeply rooted in the whole of their respective civilizations. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the amount of the economic support to be given by the stronger to the weaker would become a matter of popular passion and hence of political agitation.

It is true, of course, in a very general way, that a socialist management, controlling the whole of world production, might consciously attempt to level conditions in the various parts of the world. It could do so only very gradually, and at great cost, but it could step up the effort of equalization in such a way as to avoid the catastrophes inevitable if the pace of transformation were too rapid, and yet achieve gradual and substantial change. What must be realized, however, is that however cautiously such a policy were conducted (and more caution in this matter involves a slower pace of improvement) it would substantially favour the poorer and adversely affect the richer countries. Economically, if viewed in these more cautious terms, a policy of equalization is certainly feasible and desirable. But politics too must be considered. And the difficulty is political as much as economic.

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A policy of international equalization of chances will be feasible only under one of three assumptions. The poorer nations and races might rule the world, being by far the most numerous. They would certainly carry through a ruthless policy of equalization, but would as certainly meet the strong resistance of those who have hitherto been more favoured. There is no reason to assume that the rule of, say, the Japanese over the Western American states would be particularly lenient or, for that matter, progressive. Or else, the richer nations might willingly consent to contribute to the progress of the poorer. Within limits such a policy is practicable. But it would obviously be against human nature if the results were such as to affect severely the standard of living of the richer nations. Or, finally, a force above both richer and poorer nations might enforce equalization. The communist party in Russia, the Nazis in Germany, the Fascists in Italy, etc., provide such a force towering above all social groups. But if it is easy to conceive of such a force inside a given nation-state, it is difficult to conceive of such a force internationally. Who will be a member of this force? Will it be a force recruited from all nations, but made up of people sufficiently deracinated not to care for the immediate interests of the people speaking their own language and living near to their homes? Such would be the armed guards of an international Fascist dictatorship, a thing unfortunately not inconceivable. It is inconceivable, however, that it should be formed without reference to existing national antagonisms. It will inevitably consist mainly of nationals of certain countries, and they will be, more likely than not, countries which feel themselves slighted by the present distribution of wealth and power. In a word: the political power which is to carry out world-wide equalization of economic conditions must inevitably be

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affected in one way or another by existing inequalities, and to a certain extent defend one set of interests or another, be it the interests of the richer or of the poorer nations, or of a gang of adventurers recruited from the latter. All this is no longer a matter of conjecture. The outlines of such developments appear all too clearly in the present shape of things.

VI

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WE have had to anticipate considerably on our final conclusions in order to make these points. But it was necessary to demonstrate, as a condition of a correct understanding of the causes which have made modern labour movements increasingly nationalistic, that labour nationalism is not a vice due to "capitalist corruption" of a "labour aristocracy", but simply the result of the unequal economic development of our planet, an inequality which will not by itself disappear through the introduction even of world-socialism, and might easily become more intolerable through the introduction of some sort of world-dictatorship. Let us now return to an analysis of the economic factors which have furthered the development of nationalism.

If, next to migration, we chose tariffs as the starting-point of our disquisition, it was largely because tariffs became an important problem at an early stage of the decline of liberalism. They are also fit to provide one main item in such a disquisition because they are the nucleus and prototype of many protective measures introduced at a later stage. The aim of tariffs is to protect national industries against foreign competition. Tariffs invariably secure markets for national industries, and by so doing, they secure employment for national labour. But they do so by raising the general level of prices. For quite a long period tariffs, together with social legislation, were the main types of state intervention

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in economic life. All later developments are really, in a sense, amplifications of the principle implied in protective tariffs.

It has been said in these pages repeatedly that free trade, in practice, is a good policy only for those countries economically in advance of their neighbours. It is a policy well adapted to nations with an early industrial development, such as England, and also for nations who can afford to neglect industrial development altogether, because they enjoy overwhelming natural advantages over all possible competitors in the production of some food-stuffs or raw materials. But most countries enjoy neither of these two privileges to the necessary extent, and therefore chose to imitate England on their way to industrialization and, at the same time, to protect their young industries against the competition of older industrial countries. Thus the oldest industrial countries saw more and more markets denied to them. Besides, the happy days when free trade paid tended to come to an end even without the interference of tariff barriers. English industry had to fight a difficult struggle against German and American competition, and so had other countries. Free trade became a less alluring proposition when export industries were no longer the privilege of one or two highly industrialized countries. As a result of these developments even the staunchest supporters of free trade among the nations of the world were gradually forced into a policy of protection. The change was particularly dramatic in England, the mother of free-trade principles, when this country, after a short period of transition from the free-trade tradition to protection, adopted the Ottawa policy of imperial preference.

On the basis of protection there arose the powerful movement towards concentration and trustification of industry which has given contemporary economic life its

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peculiar shape. When, through the introduction of tariffs, conditions for the most important industries had been equalized inside certain countries, and at the same time secured against pressure from abroad, it became more profitable for the economic units to combine rather than to fight one another. This is not the place to give a detailed account of these trends, which are the subject of so many standard works. Be it enough to say that they resulted in the formation of giant combines attempting to secure for themselves both raw materials and markets ; raw materials and markets which, in a world divided by protective barriers, were no longer available as easily as in the free-trade period. Thus the world-wide expansion of modern industry led to all-round protection, and protection led to a struggle for raw materials and markets. The age of imperialism had come, and imperialism became one essential motive force (though not by any means the only one or even the most important) of the last war.

In order to understand the final and most important stage of this evolution it is necessary to remember that a policy of protective tariffs, of securing raw materials and markets, however strictly and comprehensively applied, does not interrupt international trade, though it partly alters its character. The development of modern transport has led to the emergence of trade in commodities hitherto unavailable and between countries previously almost out of reach of one another. The development of modern technique made methods of underselling hitherto unimaginable a matter of course. The development of trusts has strengthened rather than impaired these tendencies. For a trust is no longer bound always to sell at a profit. It is strong enough to take the long view, and to sell at a loss for a long time in order to conquer markets, while making up for the loss by profiting

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on the monopoly enjoyed at home. In view of all this protective tariffs have done little more than act as a palliative against the ever-increasing forces of world trade. Despite the rise of tariff barriers world trade was constantly developing down to the crisis of 1939. Only, the stronger the impact of world trade, the greater the power of the big trusts to overcome even the strongest barriers, the greater too the urge for all-round and effective protection for the industries threatened by such giant powers as modern trusts are when they are trying to force their way into some market.

To a large extent, also, the effect of protective barriers was merely to change the form of foreign penetration. Where formerly commodities were sold to a country now no longer accessible to trade in that commodity, production of the goods concerned would be organized on the spot. Instead of goods capital would be exported. This export of capital, or, in other words, the financing of industries in backward countries through the banks, and sometimes the trusts, of the richest countries, was only one aspect of the general interlocking of finance and industry which has become the most characteristic feature of modern economic life since the beginning of the twentieth century.

All these changes have been described in the works of Hobson, Hilferding, Lenin and others dealing with the period of "imperialism". If we no more than mention them here it is partly because others have said all there is to say about them, and their works are in everybody's hands. Something must be said, however, in our specific context, about those points at which the new type of intertwined trust and finance economy affected the practical and theoretical attitude of the labour movement to international problems. Reference must be made to the Marxist theory of imperialism, as evolved by

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Hilferding, Rosa Luxemburg and Radek, and copied and popularized by Lenin.

Two aspects are of paramount importance in this context. In the first place, the new era of capitalism described by those authors as "imperialism" was supposed to make capitalist prosperity advantageous to one section, but only a minority section, of labour, and hence to make this section, the "labour aristocracy", ready to identify their interests with those of their national bourgeoisie, while the majority of labour had nothing to hope and nothing to gain from any "class-collaboration". This labour aristocracy, according to Lenin (for this idea of the "labour aristocracy" is entirely his own and is the only original contribution he has made to the study of imperialism), must therefore be regarded as bribed by the bourgeoisie, by being allowed a share in the extra profits accruing from imperialist methods. In the second place it was thought that the colonial expansion of late Victorian days was closely connected with the new type of industrial and financial organization, and that these new types of economic development led inevitably to conflicts about the distribution of territory and hence to war. Conversely, once these methods of trust and financial organization had been defeated and socialism put in their stead, all reasons for war would disappear.

It is a theory which has not for a moment determined the real policy of any labour movement, including the Russian Bolsheviks, the Soviet State and the Communist International. But it is one of those theories which, owing to their simplicity, carry conviction and are apt to provide a facile formula for everything. It has exerted, therefore, very great influence upon the epigons of Marxism all over the world, but especially in Germany, France, England and America. And those admirers of a facile explanation of modern war, and incidentally of

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the split of the modern labour movement, completely failed to see that their own politics did not at all square with their theory.

Of the two sets of doctrines summarized above, the one concerning the labour aristocracy is the easier to deal with, because at bottom it leads back to the Marxian theory of wages and its implications, which we have discussed in an earlier chapter. We said that this theory, originally, consisted in the axiomatic statement that real wages could not rise, and that therefore the standard of living of the working-classes could not improve, within capitalism. This statement was later modified, in view of the undeniable improvement of labour conditions, but no new principle meeting the new facts was proclaimed. The theory of the labour aristocracy, as expounded by Lenin, takes up the thread of the Marxist theory of wages in its oldest and most antiquated form. Unless one is confined to Marxism in its earliest form, as formulated in the Communist Manifesto, there is no difficulty in explaining why wages rise together with capitalist profits. But if it is assumed as a dogmatic and unquestioned axiom, and in the teeth of all the facts, that wages cannot normally rise within capitalism, then, and only then, there arises the entirely artificial problem of why in fact they do rise, although, according to all the axioms of the narrowest kind of orthodoxy, they ought not to rise. The simple fact is that, whatever Marx, in happy days ignorant of statistics, may have thought about it, wages do rise, and rise tremendously, all through the history of capitalism, or more exactly did rise everywhere and constantly, all over the world, subject of course to cyclical variations, down to the days after the last war when structural unemployment for the first time introduced a more lasting check (though even then the upward trend was only stopped in certain European countries, and

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hardly at all outside Europe). The lowest standard of wages in a country is usually found at a time shortly after the beginning of the industrial revolution. This was the case in England when Marx and Engels studied industrial conditions in Lancashire about one hundred years ago. It is the situation, to-day, in China and other countries of the East. But as certainly as wages in England and Western Europe are no longer what they were in Chartist times, as certainly wages in Japan, China, India, etc., will not be in the future what they were yesterday—it is inappropriate to use the present tense, for these wages are rapidly rising already. The standard of technical efficiency, of capital endowment and of the markets are the governing factors and wages follow these factors with a short time-lag.

Now this simple fact is incompatible with the Marxian theory of wages, especially in its original form; the modified form given to the axiom later on, in *Das Kapital*, is no longer a theory at all. This being so, the most ordinary, general and normal trend of wages in countries with a developing industry must be explained, for the sake of the integrity of the Marxist dogma, as something extraordinary, exceptional and abnormal. Here imperialism comes in handy: The imperialist countries, i.e. the capitalists of countries with colonies and big foreign investments, are making extra profits through those foreign investments and the privileges they possess, by way of low wages and low prices, in their own colonies. With these extra profits, as a method of political corruption, not as a result of the normal working of economic laws, the bourgeoisie of the imperialist countries bribe their workers, by means of higher wages, not to follow their revolutionary destiny but to collaborate with the bourgeoisie. So far Lenin.

Now it is undeniable that the capacity of any business

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to pay wages affects the wage-rate, or that, in other words, wages are affected by the general degree of prosperity. It is also undeniable that the prosperity of industries and of countries is affected by such factors as widespread gains from financial investment, cheap prices of raw materials and sheltered colonial markets. That is the element of truth which can be found in the Leninist theory of the labour aristocracy. But the conclusions drawn by Lenin from these assumptions are very far off the mark.

First of all, it is not easy to see what is the difference between prosperity, and prosperity's influence upon wages, brought about by foreign and by home investments respectively. The difference between an investment in French iron and one in Malayan tin exists only in the imagination of Leninists. The wage-rate in the colonies may be considerably lower than in Europe, and colonial investment may therefore be more profitable than it would be otherwise, but this advantage is balanced by disadvantages: a considerably lower efficiency of technical outfit and of skill, higher transport costs, etc. Manifestly, if colonial investment were generally more profitable than home investment, industries would emigrate to colonies wholesale. They do not do so at all, because it is home industries, and not colonial industries, which, owing to the proximity of markets, and skilled labour and high-class machinery, are generally found more profitable. The Leninist agrees with the late-Victorian prospector in over-rating the possibilities of colonial exploitation. Again, where cheap raw materials for home industries are concerned, it does not appear that the possession of colonies makes much difference. The United States and Russia both find almost all essential raw materials within their own borders. Other industrial countries, such as Sweden, prosper without any colonial raw materials. More

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important even, profits from financial investment do not necessarily create new employment and hence do not necessarily lead to a rise in wages. In one word: Colonial opportunities may be good or bad opportunities. But it is impossible to conceive how they differ in principle from opportunities at home.

If this is not admitted, the results nevertheless incontestably point to the fact that the standard of living of labour in any country is not affected to any appreciable degree by the imperialist and colonial policy of the country. If Lenin had ever taken the trouble to look up the international wages statistics (which, though it must sound like blasphemy to his worshippers, he apparently never did), he would have found that American wages were rising above English wages before the last war, at a time when the U.S.A. had no colonies worth speaking of. About the only advantage which might have accrued to the average American from his colonies was and is cheaper sugar, and even that is not certain. At that time, also, the United States had no merchant marine worth mentioning, and their overseas trade was mostly carried in foreign bottoms. Finally, and this is the most important aspect of things in this context, America at that time was not a creditor but a debtor country. There were hardly any foreign American investments, but there were very big English investments in America. The best markets which might be described as semi-colonial, such as those of the Argentine and of Brazil, were also overwhelmingly under British, not under American, control. Yet the standard of living of the American worker was already in advance of any European standard. It was not due to any imperialism, but quite simply to the tremendous development of the home market.

Here the Leninist, in an attempt again to explain the normal course of things as an exception, will point to the

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specific chances of a country with unlimited space and with an enormous demand for labour. This is perfectly true. But after all the American situation, especially in the east, was no longer governed by the fact that a man could get land free of charge. He could not do so any longer. Enormous possibilities there were, indeed. But is it not an axiom of the Marx-Leninist theory that only the bourgeoisie profits from such opportunities to any appreciable extent? Yet here the workers did profit to an enormous extent.

But the simple fact is that vast possibilities of industrial expansion are not at all necessary for the achievement of enormous improvements in working-class conditions. Side by side with Britain and Holland, Sweden and Denmark could point to the standard of living of their working-classes as the highest in Europe. Yet they had no colonies, no open spaces in which to expand, no shortage of labour, and Sweden had little in the way of foreign investments to show and Denmark nothing at all.

The case of all the British Dominions is more striking. Australia and New Zealand have no colonies worth speaking of, both are debtor nations to Great Britain, have no rich new soil to settle, have no shortage of labour, yet both have a higher wage-rate than Britain.

The converse statement, that imperialist nations can be poor, is equally true. Of the big countries, before 1914, France and Russia came next to Britain in colonial power; Japan has since joined the ring. Of the smaller nations, Portugal and Belgium ranked side by side with Holland in the matter of imperialism. Now the French and the Belgians were always among the lowest of all continental wage standards. Nothing need be said of Portugal, which was unable to exploit her colonies. The Russian and later the Japanese standards were, as is known, among the lowest in the world. It is quite

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obvious that, on the one hand, wages follow the trend of industrial profits (not necessarily of financial profits) whatever the sources of such profits ; and that imperialism is quite a minor factor in determining these profits. If the English and the Dutch standards of living are high it is because they are both highly industrialized, employ much highly skilled labour, and have accumulated capital over centuries ; also because they have efficient trade unions.

But besides these facts, the whole conception of the labour aristocracy must be subjected to criticism. What is meant by saying that certain strata of labour are bribed ? I can understand how individuals are bribed. Employer X may call for agitator Y, one of his workers, and tell him : Mr. Y, here is a very soft and well-paid job for you, on condition that you shut up. But bribing groups ? Apparently not individual industrialists, but whole groups of the bourgeoisie are supposed to bribe whole groups of labour with high wages and other favourable conditions of work. Have these business men sat together and said to themselves : Economically, we need not pay these wages, for we could have cheaper labour if we wanted to, but we are going to pay high wages, in order to keep our workers content ? If such are the ways of coal-mine owners and steel and chemical magnates, then the literature depicting them as ruthless men of power seems to be far off the mark. In fact these men do not pay a penny more than they must ; meaning by " must " not a penny more than the demand for labour, enforced through well-organized unions, makes them pay. If they did so, they would not be industrial magnates, but Marxist writers on industrial affairs.

However we turn the argument, it always emerges that the working-classes do profit in general prosperity, and suffer from bad business ; not only through the ups-and-

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downs of the business cycle, but over much longer periods of industrial development. They are bound to their respective nations, not by any specific interest in imperialism, but by the general common interest of bourgeoisie and labour in prosperity. Imperialism, which has been made such a central issue by Marxists in an effort to cover up the fundamental mistakes of the Marxist theory of wages, and hence of the Marxist theory of class antagonism and of the class struggle, is quite an insignificant factor in the whole development. It happens to be precisely the one aspect of economic policy which matters least to the working-classes, for good and for evil.

We must now turn to the second chief argument of the Hobson-Hilferding-Lenin theory of imperialism, that imperialism engenders war. Here the evidence seems to be altogether obvious. Hobson launched his theory under the impression of the South African War. Had not the poor Boers manifestly been victims of the quest for gold? Undeniably. But this is not the problem. It is not denied that wars are sometimes fought, partly or wholly, for the sake of economic gain, nor is it denied that some such wars were fought in the late-Victorian era. It is also undeniable that at that time all countries that could afford it were keen to acquire colonies. But that is not the burden of the argument. The Hobson-Hilferding-Lenin school maintains that the quest for colonies and for foreign investments is specifically due to the emergence towards the end of the nineteenth century of a new form of "monopoly capitalism", in other words of trusts intertwined with big finance, as a last stage of capitalism. And this thesis can only be described as patent and manifest nonsense. As if the late-Victorian era were the high-water mark of colonial expansion! Or as if previous colonial expansion had never before been prompted by financial interests!

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Others have pointed out that the era of "imperialism" was characterized by a marked contrast between programmes and actions. It is true that not often before had there been so much talk about imperial expansion. But it is also true that other ages saw much more colonial expansion in fact. The era of "imperialism" does not mark any new departure in colonial adventure, nor even a climax therein. It is rather a period of completion. Most of the best bits are already divided up when it starts. There is a rush for the remaining bits, but not of a very serious kind. It is true that new powers enter the ring, but it is an optical illusion that the scene is fundamentally altered thereby. For while France makes a new departure in colonial expansion and Germany, Belgium, Italy and Japan appear for the first time, other powers vanish: Spain and Portugal practically disappear from the colonial field, while Holland becomes more and more unimportant. There is no more in all that than the ever-continuing process of the decline of some countries and the rise of others.

The statement that the rush was none too serious may sound extreme, but it is nevertheless true. Of all the newcomers the Germans alone created a major war. And in this war the colonial issue was manifestly a side-issue, as it is in the present war. Germany, if she had won, would of course have taken at least half of Africa. But she was not primarily concerned with Africa, nor with any other colonial possessions. Obviously the Four Years' War was not a colonial war to anything like the same extent as the wars between Holland on the one hand and Spain and Portugal on the other in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, nor to the same extent as the Seven Years' War. In Chatham's war the whole of India and North America were at stake. What modern war could have had colonial stakes like these?

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Besides, colonial policy as such has nothing whatsoever to do with any monopoly or finance capitalism. Colonial policy had its great exponents among Spanish kings, Dutch merchants and English aristocrats, long before there was such a thing as monopoly capitalism. It is quite simply one of the normal forms of activity of big countries. It is distinctly discernible in the policy of the Pharaohs from the earliest times, and of the great Sargon of Akkad, a Mesopotamian ruler of the 3rd millennium. It is the common denominator of Babylonian, Assyrian, Persian, Macedonian, Roman, Frank, Genoese, Venetian, and also of Chinese and a great deal of Hindoo politics throughout history. It is, naturally, coloured from age to age by the predominant outlook upon politics and economics. The degree of importance of economic aspects of colonial policy as compared with other aspects varies considerably from age to age and from country to country. But much ignorance of history is needed to maintain that the economic factor, or, more specifically, the financial factor, has been more important recently than in previous ages of colonial politics. Finance was, for example, the paramount consideration of Roman colonial politics.

Coming to our own Western world, it must be said that the era of imperialism was probably less economically minded than other generations. The quest for gold and silver had been paramount in the minds of the Spaniards and Portuguese, side by side with the desire to destroy the infidel. Commerce was uppermost in the minds of the great leaders of the Dutch colonial age. English colonial enterprise, however, was at least partly initiated through the wish of dissenters to escape religious persecution, while in India the narrowly commercial policy of the East India Company, framed after Dutch models, was overruled through the exertions of great colonial

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conquerors of the type of Clive, who cared for power and regarded money only as an unimportant accessory to it. French colonial enterprise has always been predominantly determined by the desire for power, and the same applies, as a matter of course, to German, Italian, Tsarist Russian and Japanese expansion. It is a prejudice to believe that the quest for money is the only intelligible motive of political action, a prejudice fit for stockbrokers and wholesale traders ; that this prejudice of the merchant class and its theoretical advocates should have found its way into the revolutionary doctrines of Karl Marx is one more proof of the overwhelming influence of liberalism upon early socialism, but is, at the same time, not the least of the many ironies in the history of modern political doctrine.

It is safe to say that, on the whole, Joseph Chamberlain and Cecil Rhodes, Jules Ferry and Marshal Lyautey, the Emperor William II and Admiral von Tirpitz did not regard power as a road to money, but money as a road to power. The age of imperialism has not invented colonial politics, nor brought them to a climax. It has not introduced finance into those politics. It has not for the first time brought into being a struggle for the redistribution of the world, for that struggle was already implicit in every great war of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It has not widened local wars into world wars, for the Seven Years' War of 1756-63 was a world war. If there is any distinctive feature of late-Victorian days as compared with the immediately preceding era, it is the fact that purely economic considerations now start to weigh less strongly in the balance of political affairs, and considerations of power start to weigh more strongly. The liberal age is waning, the Fascist age approaching. And as a result, ideas about colonial politics change.

The liberal age, or more precisely the era from 1820

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till 1880, had been an age of immense colonial expansion. It had brought the English conquest of the whole of India, the French conquest of North Africa, the English settlement in South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, the opening up of China and Japan, mainly through joint Anglo-French efforts, the Russian conquest of Turkestan and the Russian advance into the Far East, the French attempt to conquer Mexico, the entry of Italy into the colonial arena. Yet it was an age which, theoretically, disparaged colonial enterprise. Doctrines strongly contrasted with acts. Professors of political science and colonial secretaries indulged in considerations about the advisability of giving up colonies, while soldiers, under orders from these same colonial secretaries, and with the applause of these same professors, put down the Indian Mutiny, the Canadian rebellion, the resistance of Abd-el-Kader in Algeria, the Chinese army and many other foes. The age of imperialism, in practice, was not a new departure at all, but only continued what the previous age had begun, and brought some of it to a final conclusion. Words however had changed, and what formerly was done on no grounds of principle, or in disregard of admitted principles, as a mere matter of fact and of expediency, was now done to the accompaniment of the songs and lectures of Rudyard Kipling, of Maurice Barrès and of Heinrich von Treitschke.

Yet words did not fully agree with acts even then. The imperialists had to do homage to the prejudices of the previous age, as all innovators must in all ages. The predominant prejudice of the liberal age had been the obsession with money. Money was certainly never a small thing in human affairs, but the liberal age was outstanding in its belief that nothing else really mattered, and that no policy was warrantable unless it was shown that it was good for trade. Now the fine days of free-

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trade expansion were over anyway, and with the narrowing of markets it seemed profitable to secure both sources of raw materials and sheltered markets. The economic results achieved were, in fact, quite insignificant, and countries rose and declined, during the era between 1880 and 1930, quite irrespective of their share in colonial enterprise. Yet the argument was plausible, the urge to find a way out of pressing economic difficulties was strong, and the imperialists who, in fact, were men representing a new conception of life in which money mattered a great deal less than it had to the mid-Victorian liberals, could enlist the moneyed interests in support of their policies by representing them as profitable. Thus, whereas the liberal age had pursued a policy of colonial expansion under a theory of colonial retrenchment, the new imperialists pursued a policy of conquest of power under a theory of the state-sponsored expansion of trade. The diaries of Cecil Rhodes show this paradoxical situation in amazing clarity.

We have previously had occasion to remark to what a surprising extent Marx carried the convictions and the prejudices of the liberal age into the labour movement. It is now necessary to say that the Marxists were as ready to carry into the labour movement the convictions and the prejudices of the bourgeoisie of a later day. Because ministers of the crown, and associations of business men, said and believed that the new imperialism would be good for trade, Marxists religiously repeated what these business men said, evolving deep professorial theories about the economic needs which drove the world into imperialism; while in reality the new imperialism was the forerunner of a non-economic age, of what an able interpreter of Fascism has come to call the "end of economic man".

The whole outlook of the labour movement, all the

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world over, was grievously biased by these prejudices. Many socialists misunderstood the last war and its issues, believing they were mainly economic issues. But they also failed to see that the new economic structure which had grown up from the eighties onwards was about to confront them with problems undreamt of, which were to upset the very basis of labour politics as hitherto conceived. These problems came to the fore in the economic crisis of 1930-3.

We shall deal with labour's attitude to the last war in a later chapter. In the present context it is sufficient to say that, though the roots of the last war were not exclusively or even primarily economic, the outcome was bound to have the most tremendous economic effects upon the people involved, as must the outcome of every big war. The working-classes of the defeated countries were impoverished, as were the business classes of those countries. In that sense, labour had an immediate economic stake in the war. It must also be considered that a defeated country has no chance for some time to pursue a policy of its own, and that a defeated country had therefore little chance of pursuing a socialist policy if the policy of its conquerors was anti-socialist. But all this must be reserved for a later chapter. We are now dealing only with the direct economic problems of labour policy. And these immediate problems emerged much more urgently in the great economic crisis than they had ever done during the war.

The crisis of 1930-3 was characterized by the coincidence of two sets of disturbances which hitherto had never appeared at one and the same time : an agrarian and a financial crisis. The first of the two brought out the enormous impact of world-wide competition under modern conditions. The agricultural classes of all Europe, hundreds of millions of persons, were threatened

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with economic destruction while, at the same time, the farmers of the richest overseas countries found themselves unable to sell their produce. The financial crisis was of a more familiar type, but its effect was multiplied by the dependence of industry upon finance which had increased during many decades. Under these circumstances the financial collapse threatened to bring the whole of industry to a standstill.

As a result, all those trends of economic transformation which had been developing since the seventies of the nineteenth century and even earlier, and had gradually sapped the system of liberal capitalism, came suddenly to a head. We have described how state protection gradually assumed the rôle previously played by individual enterprise ; how one step of state interference called forth the next one ; how state interference was hailed by socialists as a defeat of liberalism ; and how, with every new step of state protection, the ties between labour and the nation-state grew stronger. We described how, in this process, the utopia of internationalism became more and more threadbare ; how, inevitably, the abstract negation of the nation-state and the belief in international revolution gave way to a policy of gradually increasing pressure by labour upon the state, thus substituting evolution for revolution. It might be appropriate to mention in this context that, together with the two pillars of a messianic conception of socialism, internationalism and revolutionism, the third, equalitarianism, also collapsed. Early socialists had believed in an order which would come about by sudden revolution, and would destroy the nation-states and all inequality between men. What labour and trade-union action had, in fact, brought about was a most unequal rise of the standard of living of various groups of labour, inside a nation-state in which labour had a stake.

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The great economic crisis clinched that development. All over the world, what remained of liberal free-trade principles was swept away. In order to meet the financial crisis, all countries had to manage their currencies. And, in order to do so, they had to regulate, more or less directly, imports and exports, prices and wages. Finance, which had been the finest flower of money-making in the old liberal sense, now became the pivot of state interference, state control, and finally state planning and state management. The planned economy socialism had always proclaimed as the system to supplant liberalism was there.

But when the aim was achieved, and a century of transformations of the liberal economic order had culminated in the way always predicted by socialists, the socialists themselves did not recognize the materialization of their own dream. For that dream, having become reality, was shorn of all the elements which had made the dream so beautiful ; such is the fate of dreams when translated into real life. It had come not by way of a revolution with iron sandals on her heels (as Freiligrath had predicted in a beautiful poem eighty years ago), but in the dreariness of financial measures to meet an unexampled epidemic of unemployment ; not to the strains of the *Internationale*, but to the sound of the Horst-Wessel song and the shoutings of coarse and brutal nationalists ; not by the efforts of labour, but, at best, as a result of the emergence of moderate democratic leaders of the Roosevelt type, and at its worst as the victory of the Nazis ; not as the advent of an era of equality, but with all the old inequalities perpetuated ; not, in one word, as a fulfilment of messianic prophecies, but as an unusually dreary and repellent, but inevitable and on the whole tolerable piece of reality. In the socialist conception of things, planned economy had been

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firmly riveted to the abolition of inequality, of oppression and of nationalism. Reality was to show that it could come while all these things subsisted and increased ; that socialism could be a thing which socialists would never be prepared to own.

The shock totally discouraged the labour movements of the world, more so than the war had done. Of all the socialist and labour parties, only those of Scandinavia and of New Zealand rose to the occasion. It is obvious at a glance that the success of these four movements, where all the others failed, was not fortuitous. They were all sober and apparently uninspired movements, in countries where every sort of dreamland was at a very strong discount. They were also countries with a strong trade-union organization. Last but not least, they were all small countries, not burdened with the major issues of international politics. Labour could only meet the new reality realistically where it had succeeded in keeping dreamland very far away from its gates. The lesson ought to be heeded.

VII

SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM BEFORE 1914

Too much space has really been devoted, in the preceding chapters, to the economic aspects of our problem. I did this partly to show as strongly as possible the contrast between verbal ideals and actual reality in these matters. But it was also done in deference to a prejudice raised by Marx to the dignity of a sociological axiom, that economics are at the root of everything. We shall now turn to a history of the national problem as it actually presented itself to the labour movements of various countries in various periods. It will then be seen that, though the economic factor undoubtedly stands for a great deal in these developments (and, invariably, stands for nationalism and against internationalism) it yet is not the main governing factor, which must rather be sought in politics proper. We have, however, gained a starting-point for the following history by pointing to the fact that internationalism is really to a large extent part of the liberal tradition and declines together with it.

The idea of the International existed long before socialism. Like so many other things in the socialist creed and in socialist practice, it derives, unsuspectedly, from what Marxists usually describe as the "bourgeois" revolution. The idea, unless I am mistaken, was originally launched by the Convention, the revolutionary parliament of France, in 1793. From 1791 onwards there was gradually taking shape a coalition of the princes of Europe against the French revolution, a coalition,

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incidentally, of which the French king was one of the most outstanding and one of the keenest members. For a certain time the politicians of the French revolution, while not at all averse to war with one or two of the great powers, had attempted by diplomatic manœuvres to avoid the formation of a general coalition against France. But, owing to causes operative both inside and outside France, the coalition against her did, in the end, come off after the execution of Louis XVI. Shortly afterwards, the moderates were overthrown in France, and the new government of the extremists, called Jacobins, under the guidance first of Danton and later of Robespierre, determined to launch a new policy in order to meet the tremendous threat. The policy was twofold : on the one hand, against the king and his partisans, the *émigrés*, who made common cause with the enemy abroad against the revolution at home, they raised the banner of *la patrie*, of the fatherland. It was really then for the first time that the nation-state, hitherto an affair of the upper classes only, and of the aristocracy in particular, was proclaimed as the most cherished good of the people. It was also then that for the first time this same nation-state was proclaimed as the highest authority on earth, in disregard of the church. The modern type of nationalism has been launched by the Jacobins. The revolutionary extremists referred to themselves as *les patriotes*, in contrast to the international aristocracy of Europe. They would not have done so, naturally, had not patriotism been somehow a potential force. But they, and only they, brought it to the surface. It is obvious enough why they did and could do so. The state of the *ancien régime* did not want the masses to take a share in politics, and did not want them therefore to have any political feelings at all. What was asked of them was obedience, not patriotism. In the French revolution the cause of revolutionary France,

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fighting tremendous wars against a world of foes, was closely identified with the liberty and with the political rights of the masses. The princes, on the other hand, were an international body. This division of forces continues to the present day. To this day, and in every crisis of her history, in 1814 and 1815 as in 1870 and 1871, partly in 1917, and finally and most disastrously in 1940, the French aristocracy and higher bourgeoisie have been traitors to their country, and the cause of the French nation, in all these crises, was closely identified with the cause of the political left and of the people.

But while, basically, the French revolution marked the emergence of a new type of revolutionary patriotism, the revolutionaries started also an internationalist campaign to help revolutionary France in her struggles. To the coalition of counter-revolutionary princes, they attempted to oppose a coalition of the revolutionary peoples. They launched appeals for revolutionary action on an international scale. The coalition of the peoples, with revolutionary France as its core, was to bring liberty, equality and also national independence and unity to all the nations. The Convention voted French citizenship to a number of outstanding democrats and revolutionaries of other countries, Thomas Paine and Fr. Schiller being among the number. Its armies, wherever victorious, carried the French revolutionary régime into other countries, abolishing feudalism and the privileges of the church, proclaiming equality, creating national republics in various territories. Thus Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Rhinelands, and parts of Italy were "liberated" during the culminating period of the revolutionary war. The response, both in occupied territories and enemy countries, was unequal. It was very strong among the Jeffersonian democrats in neutral America, very strong in Holland, where a democratic revolution had just been

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put down by the Prussians, and in Belgium, where a similar movement had been defeated by Austria, in Switzerland, where the masses writhed under the rule of a decadent aristocracy, and, most of all, in Italy, which, after centuries of tyrannical oppression by foreign rule, took breath again. The effect was more verbal than real in Poland, which was just fighting her death-struggle against partition by Russia, Prussia and Austria. It was next to nil among these three last-named powers. There was an effect in England, but here the rise of a democratic movement led to the repressive legislation of the Pitt ministry and to the final decline of Whiggism. Little effect was, at first at any rate, felt in Scandinavia, and next to none in the Iberian Peninsula.

The principles of nationalism and of revolutionary internationalism could not fail to clash, though they had both one and the same origin in the victory of the Jacobins over their moderate adversaries in Paris. (Those moderates had already played with the idea of political warfare but had miserably failed, where their extremist successors later succeeded). This clash developed on two lines. It became very marked each time some turn in the fates of the war inclined the French rulers towards a policy of retrenchment. It was an obvious argument in favour of such a policy that France could not let any chance of separate or general peace escape her merely for the sake of foreign revolutionary movements of dubious strength. French revolutionary propaganda was therefore not consistently carried through, but had its ups and downs, as the international scene shifted. But in the end it was not the policy of caution which succeeded. Though the extremists were overthrown, the revolutionary war continued and expanded, until it transformed itself into the Napoleonic wars of conquest. During these later phases, it became altogether obvious that revolutionary propa-

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ganda was largely no more than an instrument of French policy, and that the revolutionary governments formed under the ægis of victorious France were puppets with no say of their own. They were changed with every change of policy of their masters. They were made to contribute heavily and oppressively to the French effort in men and money. "Liberty" transformed itself, in the end, into subjection to some member of the Napoleonic family as a prince.

Under these circumstances the peoples of Europe were torn between opposite impulses. Everywhere French supremacy had led to the abolition of feudalism, to steps in the direction of national unification (especially important in the cases of Germany and Italy with their dozens of small, independent principalities) and, in general, to the emergence of an infinitely more modern and progressive type of rule than had obtained before. On the other hand these wars had brought in their wake arrogant French rulers, and a heavy toll in tears and sweat. Torn between these two impulses, the nations of Europe chose in different ways, and their choice at that period has left its mark on their political outlook down to the present day. Italy, Belgium, Holland and Poland in the end more or less remained within the French orbit, and so did Western Germany. Prussia, Austria, Russia and Spain turned violently against it. Democracy and liberalism became the dominating forces of the one group, reaction and nationalism those of the other.

It was reaction which, with England's help, won in the end, in 1814 and 1815, and it brought back some elements of feudalism and disruption and denationalization, to countries which had seen better days under Napoleon. The progressive elements in those countries wished to return to the Napoleonic tradition and to improve upon it. Little wonder that, in their struggles, they maintained

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the tradition of international co-operation, the more so as, in the form of the "Holy Alliance", the reactionary international of the princes had been renewed in 1816.

During the period from 1815 to 1830 co-operation between revolutionary democrats all over Europe was very close. Portuguese and Spanish revolutionaries, conspirators from various Italian and German states, Swiss and Belgian democrats kept in close contact. The centre, for all of them, was Paris, and the *Constitutionnel*, the organ of the French moderate progressives, was, to a certain extent, their common organ.

The situation was somewhat modified through the appearance on the scene of that impressive Genoese, Giuseppe Mazzini, leader of the Italian underground democratic and unitarian movement. Italy had always been in advance of other European countries in the matter of conspiracies, and was very much in advance of the rest of Europe in forming clandestine democratic groups after 1815. Mazzini did a great deal to organize and unite this underground movement, known under the name of "Young Italy". He conceived the idea of parallel organizations in other European countries, which should all of them join in a "Young Europe" movement. The plan had only incipient success and Italy remained the sole stronghold of this underground movement. But the idea, though not its practical execution, caught on in other European countries.

One reason of Mazzini's partial failure was the emergence of socialism in France and England. France, at any rate, had a strong underground movement, much stronger under Louis-Philippe than previously under the Bourbon restoration. But this movement gradually evolved towards the left. Ordinary democrats of the Mazzini type were no longer persecuted in France after 1830. But to the left of them arose more advanced move-

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ments which had to continue the underground tradition of the bourgeois democrats. These circles were under the twofold influence of the early Italian conspirators known as Carbonari and of the democratic and communistic underground tradition deriving from the conspiracy of Gracchus Babeuf in 1795. In 1823 one of the few survivors of that conspiracy, a man called Buonarotti (a French descendant of the great master of the Italian renaissance), founded a Society of the Just, which later became the Society of the Equal. It was probably the first modern underground organization with a communist programme. It was, in the first place, a French affair, but internationalist in spirit, imbued with the mentality of Robespierre and the great democrats of the French revolution. Their conception of internationalism derived directly from the revolutionary wars. They had no direct international ties, though, in the later stages, they had some contact with Chartist extremists in England. But their influence was considerable among the many German, Italian, Polish and other refugees in Paris, so that their Paris branch itself was a little international of a sort.

In 1846 Marx and Engels entered this society and convinced part of the Paris branch of their own doctrine of socialism. When the Guizot government expelled Marx to Brussels, he there established contact with German refugees and some Belgian socialists. Engels, with his English contacts, had won over, in the main, the German workers' study group in London. Brussels, Paris and London thus became pillars of the new Communist League formed by Marx and Engels in 1847. It is for this society that the Communist Manifesto was written as a programme.

It will be seen that the transition from the democratic internationalism of the Jacobins to the international democratic underground organizations of Mazzini and to

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the Communist League of Marx and Engels was gradual and not marked by any change of opinion in matters of international solidarity and co-operation. Marx's opinions in economic matters were the direct opposite of the views of the liberal Mazzini. In political matters, too, they were divided by an abyss ; Mazzini hated the idea of the class struggle. But in the specific matter of internationalism there was no division of opinion between the two. The democrats also continued to form their democratic Internationals, open or underground, for a long time after 1848. Democratic internationalism only came to an end with the establishment of German and Italian unity in the eighteen-sixties.

Again, it must be admitted that, as far as organization was concerned, both the democratic and the socialist version of internationalism existed more as an idea than as a living reality. The Mazzinian international, before 1848, was overwhelmingly Italian. The Association of the Just had been almost entirely French. And the Communist League was in fact exclusively German. Yet this defect did not deprive the internationalist movement of the first half of the nineteenth century of all significance. The significant fact was not the existence of more or less unstable international underground organizations, but the reality of the concept of an international revolution, which proved its validity in the speed with which the revolutionary fire spread from one country to all its neighbours. This became patent for the first time when, from 1820 onwards, Spain, Portugal, Piedmont, Naples and Greece were involved in revolution one after another. It emerged for the second time when, in 1830, the French July revolution almost immediately led to risings in the Papal States, in Belgium, in Poland, in several German territories and Swiss cantons, and finally in England precipitated parliamentary reform. But the strongest

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display of this democratic internationalism was beyond any doubt the revolution of 1848, which, starting in France and Sicily, spread over the whole of Germany and Italy, Austria, Hungary and Poland, and led to strong movements even in those countries which did not reach the stage of actual revolution. Of this movement, in fact, only England and Russia felt little.

Eighteen forty-eight marks the high-water mark of practical internationalism. There was no longer any dominant democratic power, as France had been in 1793, and internationalism therefore no longer went together with advocacy of foreign rule. In contrast to the last decade of the eighteenth century, in 1848, Frenchmen, Italians, Germans, Hungarians and Poles, worked together as equals. There was no international body to guide their steps ; even the Communist League had practically ceased to exist in the turmoil of the revolution. But the leaders of the democratic movements of all countries worked in constant contact and sometimes in the closest co-operation. After 1848 internationalism declined. Never again did it assume the same practical importance. There is no escaping the truth that internationalism is, essentially, a " bourgeois-democratic " affair.

Internationalism, which was gradually abandoned by the democratic liberal progressives, became a preserve of the socialist movement. Inside that movement, it was one of the many traditions carried over from the democratic movement, from which socialism had originally sprung. Thus traditions from the wars of the French revolution, and from the revolution of 1848, assumed, within the socialist movement, the dignity of things to come. The past was projected into the future. It is less uncommon a development than one might think. Ideas about the future shape of things must be drawn from past experience, as no idea can arise out of the void.

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Precisely those future things, therefore, of whose shape there is least indication in the reality of the present, are easily viewed in the light of a romanticized past, and what appears as most novel and revolutionary in such romantic glamour is, more often than not, what is most inveterate and out of date in a political system.

The Communist League and the various French secret societies all collapsed in 1850, and the following years of reaction were unfavourable for a new start in internationalism. But the early sixties brought with them a different atmosphere, and with the revival of the mass movement both democratic and socialist internationals were again in the field. The democrats, however, soon disappeared, with the final achievement of German, Italian and Hungarian independence and self-government. The field of international movements, during the late sixties, was dominated by Marx's so-called "First International", a name given to this body in retrospect.

The First International had adherents in most European countries, but its rôle was very different in those countries which already had a fully developed labour movement, and in those where such a movement was just emerging for the first time. In England, the First International found strong verbal support from many trade unions, which were quite ready to pay small fees for the sake of belonging to an international organization which sometimes did something to prevent foreign workers from coming to England as black-legs. Otherwise they brooked no interference. In France the labour movement, during the sixties, was split into two main sections, Blanquists and Proudhonists. It was the latter, adversaries of Marx in practice and in theory, who first joined up, without, however, being affected in any particular way by their new affiliation. The Blanquists, out of enmity to the Proudhonists, refused to join, though otherwise they were

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much nearer to Marx's views than Proudhon and his followers. In Germany, none of the growing working-class organizations joined, and the rôle of the international in Germany, the coming centre of the political labour movement, was therefore nil.

Its rôle was very different, however, in such countries as Belgium, Italy, Spain and, to a minor extent, Switzerland, Holland and Scandinavia. There the incipient socialist and working-class movements, not yet strong enough to form organizations entirely on their own, found life in the foundation of the international. The importance of the First International in the history of the international labour movement consists mainly in this pioneer work.

In contrast to the unorganized but very real democratic international of 1848, the socialist international of the sixties did not bring about any appreciable amount of international co-operation between the socialist and labour organizations of various countries. From the funds of the international, strike movements were occasionally subsidized. That was about its most important practical achievement in the international field, as distinct from its pioneering work in various national fields. The international documented the more important events in international politics by its manifestos, usually from the pen of Marx, of which three, dealing with the Franco-German War of 1870-1 and the subsequent Paris Commune, have won fame and were the basis for Lenin's later doctrine of social revolution and of the Soviet system. In its yearly congresses, the international was mostly occupied with pronouncements on points of socialist doctrine. It is in this field that Marx so violently clashed with the Russian Michael Bakunin, who is wrongly regarded as the father of anarchism, but certainly was one of its early and important exponents. Marx and Bakunin, very

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naturally, formed each of them his own well-organized faction inside the international. Things came to a head after the Paris Commune. The international was split between "Marxists" and Bakuninists at the congress of the Hague in 1872. The Germans, English, Dutch and Americans supported Marx, the French, Italians, Spanish and French Swiss supported Bakunin. The international was not strong enough to stand the quarrel. Only débris remained after the split. The secretariat of the international was transferred to New York, where it died a quiet death.

There is no objective reason to attribute the First International, which had ended in failure, as much importance as is sometimes done in Marxist circles. The international had a Marxist majority, and its doctrinal pronouncements generally contained a bowdlerized version of Marx's teachings. Upon this Marx laid enormous store, but he was mistaken. The international did nothing to spread Marxism. Of the majority which, at the Hague congress, had voted against Bakunin, the American vote was entirely fictitious. There hardly existed an American labour movement yet, and once one started to develop it followed entirely un-Marxist lines. The English unions were not even tinged by Marxism. Holland, for more than two decades to come, was following the anarchist, not the Marxist path. Only the German support was based on some vague reality. On the other hand, the anarchist success (for Bakunin really won at the Hague, though formally he remained in the minority) was not permanent. The anarchist movement in French Switzerland, which had been his stronghold, collapsed. Socialism in Belgium very soon, and in Italy a little later, went over to parliamentary and constitutional methods of peaceful political and industrial work diametrically opposed to Bakunin's doctrine of destructive revolution.

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France followed suit, though with many vacillations. In the end, the anarchist international was reduced to the one stronghold of Spain, extending its influence over some Spanish-speaking countries overseas. In all other countries only small sectarian groups remained. The new-won hold on the Dutch labour movement gradually vanished again from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards. Certain anarchist outbreaks in the United States were more spectacular than important. The anarchist international fought its death-struggle in 1936-7, in Spain against the representatives of the Russian Ogpu, that incarnation of the hated spirit of "autocratic Socialism".

The socialist elements, having overcome the shock of the fall of the First International, the more important shock of the economic crisis of 1873, and persecution in many countries, blossomed out into huge organized political and industrial movements in almost every European country. But this growth was entirely independent of any international ties. For nearly two decades, in fact, there were no such ties. It was only in 1889 that some of the national parties, having grown strong, felt the desire for some sort of international tie, and formed what is known as the Second International, the still existing "labour and socialist international". It was, and to this day is, in the main, an entirely formal tie which was thus created. There was no longer, even in theory, any question of a central organization with any rights over the affiliated national organizations. The international had a small bureau, first in Brussels, later in Zurich, and then again in Brussels, which helped national bodies to exchange information. Matters concerning all socialists, many of them doctrinal, were discussed at its congresses, and resolutions were passed.

Slightly more important, though treated as a Cinderella

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for quite a long time, were the efforts of that bureau for international trade-union affairs which was later to become the Amsterdam trade-union international. Here, at any rate, some work was done to prevent international black-legging, a limited but useful task.

Again the socialist labour movements on the continent had little opportunity to take a hand in any matter of foreign policy. These movements did, in fact, influence social legislation in their respective countries to quite a considerable extent. But in all other matters, and pre-eminently in matters of international politics, they were outsiders to the real decisions, a hopeless and negative opposition without influence and without political responsibility. In France a few socialists accepted cabinet appointments, and these incidents invariably ended in the expulsion of the members concerned from the French party. Otherwise not a single continental socialist ever became a cabinet minister before 1914. Socialist votes were never needed, on the continent, to vote any military or foreign office budget, because non-socialist majorities were always and invariably available for the purpose. Socialists, therefore, could pose as champions of anti-militarism, pacifism and hostility to all alliances, without ever being put to a test. For more than forty years continental socialism lived in an atmosphere of unreality and irresponsibility in matters of international politics.

The position of the labour movements of America, Britain and of the British Dominions was different, as the situation within the Anglo-Saxon group differed from country to country. In America, where no political labour movement worth speaking of existed, the idea of a specific attitude of the trade unions to matters of international policy never arose ; the more so as the country as a whole was only spasmodically aware of the very

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existence of international politics. In Britain, the labour party was part of the majority of the Asquith government, which introduced decisive measures of military and naval rearmament. So did, with a certain amount of reluctance, Australian and New Zealand labour groups. It is significant that those were the only labour groups which, before 1914, had an actual share in government responsibility, through direct participation in Britain and some of her Dominions, through lobbying in the United States. No wonder, therefore, that their attitude was the diametrical opposite of the attitude of continental socialists. This is the more interesting in view of the strong pacifism of many of the nonconformist elements backing these labour movements.

Among the continentals the Germans were by far the most important group, and they were most outspoken in their anti-militarism. It was only natural, for in Germany the army, besides being an instrument of war, was the ruling political power and therefore an immediate enemy of the socialists. Anti-militarist agitation was one of the most popular items of socialist work in Germany, as in practically every other continental country. The German socialists of pre-1914 days had, however, almost forgotten that in days long past, in the very childhood of their movement, their internationalism had been put to the test—and that in the queerest imaginable manner—and that their response, at that time, had not been based on the principles they now preached all over the country.

When, early in the sixties, a distinctive German labour movement, severing all ties with bourgeois democracy, appeared for the first time, it was at once confronted with the dominating problem of those days, the bringing about of German unity. Would that unity be brought about or not? If so, would it come about under Austrian or under Prussian leadership? Would it come about

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under liberal or under conservative impulses? These questions were extremely difficult to decide. A Germany under Prussian leadership would exclude Austria; it would be a smaller and for that very reason perhaps a stronger Germany. Prussia was a great deal more advanced economically than Austria. A Prussian Germany would fundamentally be more modern than an Austrian Germany. Those liberals who were strongly connected with modern banking and industry almost unanimously favoured a Prussian Germany. But Prussia was much more reactionary than Austria and under the Bismarck ministry, which had just taken over, appeared as the worst enemy of liberalism and democracy.

It is only the more remarkable, in view of this complexity of the problems involved, that the alignment of German socialists proceeded on the simplest of all principles. Socialists invariably followed the command of their princes, as good subjects should. The Prussian socialists and those of Hamburg (allied to Prussia) sided with Prussia. The socialists of the rest of Germany sided with Austria. Their division agreed up to a point with the line of division which was to align one part of Germany against the other in 1866. Immediately before 1866, Austria and Prussia had joined hands in the pursuance of a cause dear to all German hearts: the "liberation" of the provinces of Schleswig-Holstein from Danish domination. The socialists of all Germany, on that occasion, supported the war, as their governments did. In all this they proved themselves to be most strongly nationalist and so have inherited all the passion of the 1848 democrats for German greatness and unity. They appeared also as nationalists in a much narrower sense, sharing to the full the local patriotism for their specific territories which clashed in the war of 1866.

The situation was made only more tragic-comical by

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the revolutionary tirades with which this docile attitude was accompanied. Liebknecht and Bebel, in defence of their Saxon local patriotism (and Liebknecht also out of love for his Hessian home, Bebel out of love for his native Rhinelands where Prussia was so much disliked), invoked the solemn principles of 1848 revolutionary democracy in support of the Austrian cause, of the Saxon king and of the struggle against Bismarck's Prussia. In the name of these principles they co-operated with ordinary, non-socialist democrats in Southern Germany. Lassalle in the north, and his followers after his death, rejected this co-operation with bourgeois democrats, in the name of the proletarian class struggle, with the incidental result of allying themselves with Bismarck in his struggle against Austria and against democracy. At any rate, as long as the paramount problem of German unity was at stake, internationalism was sent to sleep.

The situation varied little during the third of the Bismarckian wars, the anti-French war of 1870. Resentment about 1866 was still strong in Southern Germany, and the Southern German socialists, clinging to traditions of the past, strongly and with increasing fervour rejected the war. The Lassalleans of Prussia, however, voted for the war credits, and directly supported the war until France had been crushed at Sedan and only the task of annexing Alsace-Lorraine remained. They were quite ready to go all the way towards defeating France and finally establishing German unity. Only when expansion beyond the linguistic borders of Germany was in question they became hesitant. They were German nationalists, but not, after all, extreme nationalists. The anti-Lassallean section of the movement had been more hostile to Bismarck ; but this historical reminiscence of 1866 vanished soon, as was to appear in 1914, when the

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socialist movement in all parts of Germany proved to be equally patriotic.

The Bismarckian wars afforded the only real test of the socialist attitude in case of war for quite a long time to come. They did so, not only in Germany, but also in France. The political situation in France was the almost exact contrary of the situation in Germany. In Germany socialists supported the war for national unity, though under the circumstances they also supported, by doing so, Bismarck and his men. In France, after the first defeats had brought about the fall of Napoleon III, it was on the contrary the reactionary group that wanted to end the war quickly and conspired to that purpose with Bismarck, while the democratic groups under Gambetta, and with the support of the whole of the urban masses, wanted to continue the struggle to the bitter end. The French socialists, therefore, were not hampered either by uneasiness about carrying on an aggressive war, for they were attacked, not attacking; or by the dilemma of having to choose between letting down their country or helping their political enemies at home. Struggle for democracy at home, and struggle against Prussia, worked, in their case, in the same direction, with the result that throughout the war of 1870-1 French socialists were much more wildly and unreservedly patriotic than German socialists were; thus continuing in the tradition of patriotic democracy of 1793.

The next serious tests came in Austria and in Russia. Those were the two empires containing within their borders a large number of dissident subjects, aiming at independence. Nationalities, inside these two empires, were not yet independent; they were linguistic groups aiming at independence. From the socialist point of view, these groups presented a special problem. Whereas Italian unity was achieved before the emergence of a

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socialist mass movement, and German unity during its incipient stages, the national minorities of Austria and Russia struggled towards independence while a big socialist mass movement grew up in their midst. The history of these mass movements is so very interesting because it shows to what an extent economic issues can become secondary, even within "Marxist" labour movements, when they fail to square with nationalist interests. In these struggles inside the Austro-Hungarian socialist movement not less than a dozen different nationalities were involved, differing widely between themselves in temperament, historical background and social and economic structure. Yet the result in every case was that the national got the better of the social and the economic. The Austrian socialist movement was pertinently described as an international in itself, within the bigger international of the European socialist movement. (And, in fact, what had happened in the microcosm of the Austrian welter of nationalities, was to repeat itself in the macrocosm of Europe when the socialist international was confronted with the test of 1914.) The same applies to Russia, where the minorities were confronted with a much more ugly type of oppression than in the case of Austria. Man is not the purely economic being the Marxists would like to have him. If anything emerges from this Austrian story, it is an axiom exactly contrary to the basic axiom of historical materialism. It might be concluded from these experiences that man is never primarily moved by economic considerations. That is probably an exaggeration, but nearer the truth than the axioms of historical materialism.

For the urge of the economic motive, in the Austro-Hungarian case, was entirely obvious. If ever there was a geographical zone fitted for economic unity, it was the Danubian plain with its adjacent mountain-provinces.

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The industries of Bohemia and of Vienna, the cattle-breeding of the Alps, and the wheat-growing and poultry-farming of the eastern provinces were complementary to a degree rarely found. Historical tradition had created, out of these provinces, the deeply rooted unity of the Hapsburg empire. If that empire was to be destroyed no single part of it could continue on its previous economic level. Industry was bound to suffer most severely, wages were bound to fall, and the labour movement could not hope to have as much influence in any of the successor states as it had had in the old Hapsburg monarchy. It was obvious ; but it was thrown to the winds, once modern nationalism appeared on the scene. And modern nationalism was a corollary of modern democracy. It was a product of that very awakening of the masses which had also brought into being the modern labour movement. It meant that the masses asked for their share in managing their own affairs. And they could not conceive of such participation in any form except the national one. The aristocracy which had ruled Austria for centuries had been cosmopolitan through and through. It had no language of its own, because it spoke Latin and Spanish, French and Italian, side by side with German and Hungarian, Polish and sometimes a little Czech. The bourgeoisie, which had worked its way up, was mainly German. The masses were riveted to their local dialects, their local customs, hated the neighbour with another language, and were more nationalist than any other group.

Of the various nationalities concerned, the case of the Poles was the most complex in practice, but the simplest in the matter of feelings. Poland had been divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia, so that the Poles had to conquer their liberty, not from one but from three oppressors. But the Poles were not a young nation,

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whose literary language would have to be invented, and without traditions. They looked back upon a proud past ; they were an old European race. They had been a revolutionary nation ever since 1793. The socialist movement in Poland, therefore, from the very beginning of beginnings, fell entirely under the spell of Polish nationalism, of the quest for the restoration of an independent and united Poland. This state of things was most marked in the Prussian part, in the provinces of Poznan and Upper Silesia. There, the Polish socialists became simply one element of the Polski Svaz, the Polish parliamentary party. A tragi-comical quarrel developed between them and the German socialists. The German socialist party refused to grant the Poles a kind of autonomy within their common ranks, decrying them as nationalists. The Polish socialists retorted by breaking away completely and forming a party of their own. Thus a nationalist Polish socialist party confronted, in Upper Silesia, an "internationalist" German socialist party. But the internationalism of the German socialists, in practice, amounted to exactly the same refusal of self-government for the Poles which the Prussian government practised in its own wider sphere.

In Austria, things were more complex, because in Austria the Poles were definitely not a subject race, but, within certain limits, a ruling race. As a result, Polish socialists in Austria became a very patriotic group, cherishing dreams of a united Poland under an Austrian monarch. The closest co-operation was established between Daczinski, the Austrian Polish socialist leader, and Joseph Pilsudski, the leader of the Polish socialists in Russia. For in contrast to the Austrian Poles the Poles in Russia were a subject race, and the majority of the Polish socialists accordingly worked for throwing off the Russian yoke.

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In Russian Poland a very queer division of political forces had arisen. From the seventies onwards, when the Polish aristocracy had been finally defeated and a bourgeoisie gradually arose, Poland had become the industrial centre of the Russian empire, and Polish industrialists did splendid business. Accordingly, the Polish national-democrats, the party of the bourgeoisie, became very pro-Russian, to the point of co-operating, in the Duma, with the Octobrists, the party of Russian imperialism. But the intelligentsia and the working-classes did not follow suit. On the contrary, the result of the change of front of the Polish bourgeoisie was that elements otherwise not socialist at all turned towards the labour movement as the only depository of the nationalist revolutionary tradition. The greatness of Pilsudski was mainly rooted in this, that he had managed to cement a firm alliance between the labour movement and the nationalist intelligentsia. The work of national unification and liberation, in Poland, was mainly done by socialists. Only a small group of socialists, under the leadership of Leo Jogiches, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Radek, remained outside this alliance and, in the name of the Marxist doctrine, denounced Pilsudski as a nationalist. In practice, in the all-important national question, this group followed in the wake of Dmowski and his national-democrats, co-operating with Russia, to the disgust of Lenin and most Russian socialists. But we shall deal with the Russian movement later. Here it is only important to note that Pilsudski very neatly defeated Rosa Luxemburg within the Polish labour movement, and that the Polish socialists supported national Poland through thick and thin, in the war against Soviet Russia, in the war against Germany, and in every other emergency.

The case of the Italian socialists in Austria was simpler,

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because Italian unity existed before there was such a thing as an Italian labour movement. The problem, therefore, was only to bring the small Italian-speaking parts of Austria, Trieste and South Tirol, back to the home country. In these provinces the Austrian party grouped itself round the catholic church. This was only one more reason for the anti-clerical socialists to become wildly nationalist. Benito Mussolini, one-time editor of the party paper in Trento, earned his first laurels in the socialist struggle against Austria. Giuseppe Battisti, socialist deputy, was hanged during the war for high treason committed by deserting and fighting in the Italian army. There were, to be sure, non-nationalist socialists in Trieste, and those wildly pro-Austrian. But the explanation is simple. The majority of the working-classes in Trieste were not Italian at all, but Croat and Slovene; and the socialist movements of these two nationalities being slow to develop, the Slovānic workers in the meantime stuck to the Austrian labour organizations, which they gradually left, not for the Italian but for the South Slav socialist groups.

The most interesting case is of course that of the Czechs. When, after decades of internal struggles, the Austrian socialist movement was reorganized, at the Hainfeld congress of 1887, by Victor Adler, it was conceived as one united international party which was meant to be a model for the quarrelling bourgeoisies of the various nationalities. It was thought, then, and very mistakenly, that this international unity would prove an attraction. In fact, it worked out the other way round, and the international party disintegrated under pressure of the nationalist masses. The Czechs being, next to the Germans, the most progressive and industrialized nationality, it was their attitude which decided the issue. From the Czech socialists there immediately broke away an

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influential group, calling themselves Czech national socialists, who refused to stay in the same party with German socialists. That party had much in common, in mentality and social structure, with Pilsudski's P.P.S. It had very strong trade unions, but also a very strong footing in the intelligentsia. Its pet enemies were, as in Pilsudski's case, the national-democrats, only Czech not Polish, and under the leadership of Kramarš. This party of the Czech bourgeoisie realized well enough that their economic interests were with Austria, and as Dmowski had conceived of a Russia economically led from Warsaw, so Kramarš conceived of an Austria with Prague as its main centre. But in both cases the socialist masses were much more regardless of economic interests than the bourgeoisie. Like the P.P.S. in Poland, the national-socialists in Czechoslovakia became the mainstay of the liberation movement. In the meantime, about half of the labour organizations stayed on inside the international Austrian socialist party, but not for long. Under pressure from the nationalist masses, they had to insist upon such a degree of autonomy within the Austrian movement as practically to cut all ties with headquarters at Vienna. This Victor Adler was not ready to grant, and as a result the main body of the Czech socialists split away, founding a party of their own. The departure of the Czechs was the signal for the other socialist groups to cut what slender ties they had with Vienna. Poles, Ukrainians, Italians, Slovenes, from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards, formed their own national socialist parties. The dream of an Austrian international was at an end.

Inside the Czech socialist movement, however, the struggle was not yet ended. As Rosa Luxemburg, in Poland, had led a remnant of internationalists ; as, in Trieste, the Italian and the Slavonic socialist move-

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ment had only gradually made headway against the Austrian international, so within the Czech labour movement internationalism only gradually became extinct. Nationalism became more and more aggressive, and at each important step the voice of international tradition and of economic interests was heard ever more weakly. The climax came during the war. Inside the Czech socialist party there was a sharp division of opinions. Some of the leaders, with Tusar, joined the "Maffia", Masaryk's and Beneš's anti-Austrian underground organization. Others, under Smeral, chose to remain faithful to Hapsburg. There was nothing revolutionary in their attitude. They were, on the contrary, that section of the movement which rejected all revolutions, even that of national liberation. Needless to say, all through the war the nationalists pressed back the Hapsburg faction until, at the end, Smeral was a lonely man seeking refuge in the fold of the communist international.

The German socialists in Austria remained as the only "internationalists". They rejected the clamour of the Slavonic nations for independence, and in doing so could invoke the most solemn utterances of Marx and Engels from 1848, who, during the revolution of that year, had denounced the Slavs as the reactionary nations. It was partly appropriate then, in view of the rôle of Czech and Croat soldiers in subduing revolution in Vienna and in Hungary. But even then it was short-sighted and proved that Marx himself, like all revolutionaries of 1848, was a good German patriot. But in 1914 the situation had changed. The Slavs were no longer reactionary in any sense and the internationalism of the German socialists in Austria was nothing but a veil to cover their loyalty, as members of the ruling race, to the Hapsburgs.

The tragi-comedy of this "internationalism" was reenacted, after 1918, within the new borders of the Czecho-

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slovak republic, though with inverted values. Now the Czechs were the ruling race, and the Germans were a minority with serious grievances. The Czechs enthusiastically supported their new republic, and again were seriously admonished by their German socialist opponents not to forget internationalism. But the "internationalism" of the German socialists now was only their specific way of expressing that they were ready to co-operate with the German bourgeois parties in Czechoslovakia in the struggle for the redress of national grievances. In this process the German socialists in Czechoslovakia became more and more nationalist. In the end, the masses went over to Hitler, while the leaders, feeling the rope round their neck, remained loyal to Czechoslovakia, which was now their only protection against the Nazis.

Developments among the Russian minorities were parallel, with here and there some more or less interesting local oddity. In Latvia and Esthonia, where the labour movement had always been strong owing to the importance of Riga and Tallin, nationalists and pro-Russian communists fought a long struggle, ending, in the decade before the Russian occupation, with the almost total victory of the nationalist elements. A similar process took place in Finland. In Georgia, nationalism oddly enough assumed the shape of socialism. The whole country, from 1903 onwards, went socialist; 80 per cent. of Georgia voted for the Georgian Mensheviks, who created Georgian independence and defended it against Russia.

Of the remaining European countries, Norway is the only one to deserve notice in this context. Until 1906 it was bound, much against its will, to Sweden. And so completely did the national problem overshadow all social problems, that Norwegian socialism remained entirely insignificant until the day of separation, only to grow the more suddenly and rapidly once national

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liberation had been achieved. The national motive took precedence.

Even more characteristic, and much more important for the future, is the attitude of the labour movement outside Europe. There, the labour movement is a very recent growth, dating in the main from after 1919, and influenced much more by communism than by the European type of gradualist socialism. This would seem to be a sphere in which internationalism, stimulated on virgin soil by the most revolutionary of doctrines, could display all its strength. The contrary, as everybody knows, is the case. The communists won influence in the East only by completely forsaking, on Lenin's advice, every vestige of internationalism. In Japan they failed entirely, for the Japanese are a ruling race, and Japanese labour always was violently nationalist. In China and India they won influence through a programme of revolutionary nationalism. The rôle of the Chinese communists as a vanguard in the struggle of Chinese nationalism is well known. It is all very well for communists to maintain that it is not contrary to their doctrine of internationalism to support Chinese nationalism, because it is the nationalism of an oppressed race. It makes no difference to the Chinese peasant—for in the main Chinese communism is a peasant movement—how the communists make their policy square with their doctrinal conscience. What matters for him is that they *are* nationalist, for otherwise he would not follow them. In the West the communists were defeated because they were not nationalist enough. In the East they had much more success, but only because there they were violent nationalists.

We might conclude our remarks on this topic here, but this would leave entirely out of consideration Germany and Italy after 1870, as well as France, Holland, Belgium,

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Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, etc. It is true that the question of nationalism never came to a clear issue in any of these countries before 1914. But indirectly it was there, in the internal struggles about general policy. These struggles turned upon the attitude of socialist parties towards the state. Here we come back to a subject discussed in previous chapters. We saw how the labour movement in all countries, through protective legislation of all kinds, was increasingly tied to a national point of view. This became obvious every single time any labour movement was obliged actually to take a share in decisions concerning protective legislation. But such an event was rather the exception than the rule. Nowhere, except in the English-speaking world, had the labour movement any significant share in actual legislative decisions. Being still a minority, denounced as revolutionary and dangerous, and debarred from ordinary participation in ordinary politics, the socialist movement was nearly everywhere forced into a negative, sterile and bitter opposition. It was this atmosphere that allowed doctrines to remain so important, or, more precisely, to maintain themselves unchanged, in the absence of any need to test their practical applicability. Among these doctrines, internationalism stood out as one of the most rigid, and most revolutionary. There is no difficulty in understanding this, as international affairs were the last thing that socialists could concern themselves with to any practical purpose. They could very comfortably maintain an attitude of supercilious disdain until the matter was brought home to them, with highly unexpected results, in August, 1914.

But in the meantime, despite all these obstructions, the attitude of the socialist parties towards the state and revolution changed gradually. Everywhere, side by side with a merely verbal and superficial rejection of all co-

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operation with the existing régimes, there grew up an opposite tendency, urging that it was pointless to wait for some sudden dramatic revolutionary change, that in fact socialists and trade unionists were constantly and successfully, though only through indirect means, pressing for practical reforms, and that the real grievance was that they were not admitted to the work of shaping reforms on an equal footing with other parties. This "revisionist" movement in continental socialism was violently denounced by a small group of genuine revolutionaries of the type of Rosa Luxemburg, most of them of Russian origin, but also by a host of solemn pundits of Marxism fearing an unpleasant disturbance in their comfortable existence as teachers of an empty doctrinairism. Of these, Karl Kautsky in Germany and Jules Guesde in France were the most outstanding figures. The theory of revisionism was worked out in Germany by E. Bernstein and his friends, by way of a painstaking critique of Marxism. But the whole strength of its creative impulse, impatient of artificial barriers, was voiced by Jean Jaurès, the great leader of French socialism. Under the very special conditions of the French labour movement with its ingrained hatred of the *politiciens*, Jaurès never completely won over the French socialist movement to his point of view ; a tragedy which contributed not a little to the miserable collapse of the French labour movement in 1939-40, as the prevalence of the non-revolutionary view in England contributed to the account the British labour movement gave of itself during the same period. But outside France Jaurès's influence was enormous. His point of view completely prevailed in Denmark and Sweden, in Holland and Belgium. It prevailed in Southern and Western Germany, where the German revisionists had their strongholds. It prevailed with Victor Adler and with his Czech and Polish opponents.

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It prevailed with Filippo Turati and the most important leaders of the Italian movement, though not with the party as a whole.

It failed to prevail in Switzerland, where the socialist party was an extremist minority within the working-class, though even there the organizations of French Switzerland followed his inspiration. It failed to prevail in Germany and Italy, because in these two countries—and especially in Northern Germany and in Southern Italy—socialists were persecuted and not allowed any share in the national life. It prevailed, in one word, exactly to the degree that socialists were allowed a real share in national affairs. Jaurès's basic idea was that socialists, in order to achieve their ideals, must become practically effective—a truism in the English-speaking world, but a great novelty on the continent—and must co-operate with all other progressive forces for reforms, thus making their respective countries more and more their own.

Jaurès's doctrine, however, was not one of unbridled nationalism, as was the doctrine of Mussolini, of Pilsudski, of Lassalle, and other outstanding nationalist socialists. He was well aware of the increasing tension between the European powers, and one of his chief motives in his quest for practical political influence was his eagerness to work for peace. It was not for nothing that the French war-party had him murdered on the eve of the war of 1914. The great realist even cherished naïve illusions in the matter of peace. He believed that peace could be obtained by breaking the power of the officer caste. He saw the chief danger, rightly, in the Prussian ruling caste, and he traced the apparent extremism of the German socialists to the attitude of this power which stood between German socialism and political influence. He also knew that similar dangers lurked in the French army, and he therefore became the most powerful advocate of the

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adoption of the Swiss militia system in France and Germany. No standing army, no efficient war-party—no war, was in essence his argument. It seemed a very important idea at the time, but we can see to-day that it was hopelessly utopian. No militia system, as the Russians learned during the years after their revolution, can keep armies up to a modern standard. Where there is no need for defence, there is no need for an army of any type, militia or no. But Jaurès thought there was need for defence. Identifying himself closely with France as a power, France which he wished to be victorious for the cause of socialism, he realized that this France could not be left defenceless against aggression from the other side of the Rhine. Hence his idea of a militia army. But a bad army is as bad as no army, or worse. And despite all his contentions, the generals were right in maintaining that a militia army could not be a good army. The militia idea harked back to the *levée en masse* of 1793—a tradition always cherished by French socialists but now hopelessly out of date. Again, Jaurès was certainly wrong in assuming that the root of the evil of “militarism” lay in the power of an officer caste. Like so many others he failed to realize that the masses themselves were furiously chauvinistic, in Germany as in France, among the Italians as among the Poles. It is a factor constantly and naïvely underrated in this country. What survived of Jaurès’s work, therefore, was the close identification of socialism with national politics. The pacifist turn he wanted to give to these politics did not materialize. Two days after his death, his whole party, in the French chamber, voted the war credits like one man. Had he lived, he would probably have done the same, faced with the danger to his beloved France, and would have realized that his life-work was built upon mistaken assumptions.

VIII

THE FOUR YEARS' WAR, THE COMINTERN AND SOVIET RUSSIA

SOCIALIST internationalism, which had seemed strong and full of spirit when seen in the light of the resolutions of international congresses, collapsed ~~at one stroke~~ in August, 1914. Not often has a discrepancy between doctrines and realities been so dearly paid for.

People who lived through those days of August, 1914, can only wonder about young communists contending to-day from the depths of their experience, that the economic interests of the labour aristocracy determined the attitude of the socialist and labour parties at that moment. In reality there was an outburst of nationalism among socialists of all countries, a reversal of policy inspired by the deepest political feelings of the very broadest masses. It had no counterpart in 1939 in any country, because the ideals of 1914 had been so deeply discredited in the meantime. But the story of 1914 was repeated, though in a more silent mood, in 1939.

The attitude of the masses in the main was uniform. It was the same in England and France, in Germany and Austria. Even in Russia Lenin's bolsheviks, in the beginning, stood quite alone in their struggle against the war ; all other Russian socialist groups were more or less patriotic, some of them violently so. The emotion spread to the neutrals, where socialists, hitherto professedly internationalist, also proclaimed themselves violently nationalist and voted defence credits.

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This general change in socialist attitude reflected two sets of general changes in the situation. The dominating fact was that now "the fatherland was in danger". It is one thing to talk about internationalism in quiet days. It is quite a different thing to see one's home invaded by an enemy. This simple difference has been brought home to most English pacifists in 1940. It proved that socialists, all over the world, had talked about their attitude in case of war without having an idea about what their real feelings would be, once war became a reality.

But another change was hardly less important. In the hour of danger the working-classes had become as important to their countries as their countries had become to them. Everywhere the ruling groups felt that this war could not be conducted without the active co-operation of labour ; neutral countries also realized that they could not carry out a nicely balanced policy in the midst of economic difficulties while one of the great parties, and the one with a following amongst the most dissatisfied elements, stood out and remained in the position of an irresponsible opposition. As early as August, 1914, during the German march upon Paris, one Jaurèsist (Marcel Sembat) and one Marxist (Jules Guesde) joined the French government of national defence. Very soon after the outbreak of war, Mr. Stauning, the present Danish Premier, joined a government of national unity, and Mr. Branting, leader of the Swedish socialists, became a minister of the crown at about the same time. In Belgium Mr. Vandervelde, the leader of the parliamentary socialist party, joined the Belgian government in exile at Le Havre.

In other countries the process of creating national unity was more complex. In Britain, John Burns, the only trade unionist in the cabinet, actually resigned, together with Morley and Trevelyan, and it was not until the

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seriousness of the war had been repeatedly brought home by a series of defeats that Henderson and later Clynes and others joined the second coalition government of the war as official representatives of labour. In Holland, Norway and Switzerland socialists were prevented from joining by their numerical weakness. In Italy they refused to join because the socialist party as a whole, together with other groups of the democratic left, opposed the entry of Italy into the war. In the United States there was of course no question of joining a government, as there the socialists were quite an insignificant force, but one section gave active support to the war. The very weak socialist party of Serbia supported its government. About Russia later.

The position among the central powers was different. In Austria the constitution had just been scrapped, and the despotic government of the day was too stupid to understand the necessity, not only of socialist co-operation, but of any co-operation at all. In Germany the Kaiser, in his speech from the throne on August 4th, had said : " I no longer know of any parties ; I only know Germans." The phrase had roused great enthusiasm, and the socialist parliamentary party decided with a very big majority to vote the war credits. But the imperial word had no sequel, all constitutional reforms which would have put labour on an equal footing with other sections of the population were delayed, despite very formal promises during the first months of the war, and labour, accordingly, much against the will of both leaders and masses, was driven towards an attitude of disgruntled opposition. Down to the end of September, 1918, no socialist had joined the government of the Reich, or any of the provincial governments. This narrow-minded policy was undoubtedly one major reason for the defeat of the central powers.

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Most astonishing were the developments in Russia, where the labour movement, ever since the defeat of the first Russian revolution in 1906, had been subjected to the most cruel and sanguinary persecution, without much difference being made between its various sections. Russian socialism also had a tradition of fighting against war. Other socialist parties had opposed colonial wars, such as Italy's war against Turkey about Tripolis, but the case of the Russo-Japanese war was a borderline case between a colonial war and a major war of great powers ; all sections of the Russian socialists and also the bulk of the democrats and even of the liberals, had opposed this war, hoping for a Russian defeat as the shortest way to revolution. But in 1914 it was no longer a question of Russia's Far-Eastern possessions, but of her very existence. All bourgeois parties joined in the defence of the country, and so did at least one wing of the socialists and this, very characteristically, not the right wing. The leader of the supporters of the war among the Russian socialists was G. V. Plekhanov, the founder of the party, a staunch Marxist and believer in the class struggle. There was, of course, no question of the socialists being admitted to the government, but some of them gave important support to the organization of the war industries. A fierce struggle ensued between them and the adversaries of the war, divided into three groups led by Martov, Trotsky and Lenin respectively.

Anti-war feeling among the European socialists (leaving Russia out of account) was naturally developing as the sufferings caused by the war increased. But this mere war-weariness did not amount to much unless stimulated by impulses of a more definitely political character. Of these there were two. One was the traditional pacifism and internationalism of the socialist movement. This, in England, was a by-product of

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Christian socialism, an effect of the influence of the Quaker spirit upon so many of the older socialists. Ramsay MacDonald, a moderate, if any man was, appeared as an extremist during the war owing to his entirely ethical and non-political pacifism. Others, like Snowden, were simply old liberal-radicals of the John Bright type, who refused to acknowledge that the world could actually be so bad as to allow such things as life-and-death struggles to occur. Others came from the syndicalist fold, a trade-union version of the Marxist doctrine of the class struggle, maintaining that the workers need not care for anything except their own conditions of work, and that, by doing so, they were transforming the world. It was a mixed crowd, creating a lot of trouble for the government, but achieving little for themselves. It is only fair to acknowledge that the Henderson-Clynes leadership was utterly uninspired, obediently following in the wake of the Lloyd George Government, and completely unable to conceive that labour could get all the trump-cards by putting itself at the head, instead of hanging on to the tail, of a movement for the efficient conduct of the war.

But the position of the labour movement in England had always been fundamentally different from that of the continental socialists. On the continent, there was nowhere a liberal-pacifist tradition to be taken into account, for in France as in Germany liberalism had always been war-minded. There was no religious pacifism, because no continental church worth mentioning was pacifist, and no socialists worth mentioning were Christian. Syndicalism, surprisingly, amounted to very little, and actually its revolutionary section in France collapsed owing to the war.

Pacifism on the continent was mainly moulded by the tradition of Marxist internationalism. It was swept away by the German invasion in France, Belgium and

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Serbia, and even in Italy it was badly shaken by the defeat at Caporetto. Among the German socialists in Austria (the party calling itself, in unintended irony, the "internationalist" party) and among the Hungarian socialists, it was swept away by the Russian invasion, and only gradually reasserted itself after the tremendous Russian defeats of 1915. Its stronghold, all through the war, was in Germany, Italy and Switzerland. Its men were people of the older generation, people sticking to the ideas of their youth.

But besides the traditionalism, Christian and syndicalist in Britain, Marxist on the continent, which compelled a few groups to stand out against the war, there was, as we have said, a second motive force at work, and one much more important. It was the refusal to give labour its due. Both the German and the Italian opposition to the war were fed by the feeling that in supporting the war, the workers supported their worst enemies at home. It was this feeling which gave strength to the anti-war movement in certain countries, and the absence of this feeling which deprived it of all strength in others. Strongest of all was the effect of it, naturally, in Russia.

Russia was unique among all the belligerents in that she had not gone through any bourgeois revolution. She was the only belligerent country in which the process that in France, in 1793, had made *citoyens* and patriots out of subjects, had not taken place at all. She was the only country in which the state and the monarch were still identified, and care was taken to prevent the ordinary citizen from developing any feelings about politics. She was the only country where the peasant was still in fact, though not in form, half a serf, and therefore only half a man. She was the only country where not only the working-classes, but also the bourgeoisie, were deprived of any serious participation in government. She was,

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for all these reasons, a country of unparalleled inefficiency, unparalleled corruption, unparalleled intrigue, and unparalleled disaffection. It was clear enough that such a country must have a revolution before anything stable could be achieved. This had been the common opinion of all and sundry in 1904-5. It was still the opinion of the more advanced sections of the left. The wave of patriotism, so characteristic of the Europe of these decades, had not halted before the gates of Russia. Even there, in the decade between 1904 and 1914, much had been changed, and defeatism, so general in 1904, was no longer general in 1914. But conditions had been such as to make a full deployment of the patriot movement impossible. The decisive point was that during this war fierce Russian patriots, men convinced of the unique and holy mission of holy Russia, could still be sincere defeatists, partly because it was difficult to imagine that the core of the Russian homeland could be lost through any foreign invasion, and partly because nothing could be done, unless revolution came first. The language of this group of defeatists was, in the main, Marxist, but the feelings behind it were feelings of a Russian patriotism of a very special kind. Lenin and his followers, and later Stalin and his followers, were such men ; much more patriotic than the more Westernized democratic socialists who had come under the influence of German Marxist pacifism.

But those facts, at the time, were hidden by a thick screen of revolutionary excitement. The doctrine of this group was entirely revolutionary, and nothing had happened so far either to assuage their revolutionary feelings or to put any stronger feelings into the foreground. Russian socialism had been singularly dependent upon the dogmatic formulæ of Western Marxism. And Lenin and his men were quite unaware that, in their own souls,

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a fierce Russian patriotism was lurking behind the formula of international revolutionism. They were also closely connected, though occasionally they quarrelled, with a group of international revolutionaries, mainly, of Russian and Polish origin, who had got to Germany during the two decades before the war and there represented the only small movement standing, not only for peace, but also for revolution. Luxemburg and Radek were the brains of this movement. Later on it became apparent that a very wide gap existed between these groups of homeless revolutionaries and the Russian bolsheviks, firmly rooted in their native soil. But at the time, these later conflicts were only slightly foreshadowed. Lenin still believed in international revolution, starting from Russia. The gradual transformation of international revolutionism into "socialism in one country", in Russia, and the impregnation by nationalism of the very core of Marxist doctrine, is the history of bolshevik Russia; it is also the tragedy of the Communist International. It is one of the most exciting developments to watch—how the most violently internationalist section of the socialist world movement rapidly transforms itself into the most nationalist of them all.

The struggle between the Russian bolsheviks and the left wing of the socialist movement in the West started during the war, even before Lenin had assumed power. It was fought out within that international group of anti-war socialists which was founded at the Zimmerwald conference of 1915. Within this group, to which among many others Filippo Turati, the leader of Italian socialism, Karl Kautsky the German Marxist and Merrheim the French syndicalist belonged, Lenin and his group stood quite alone. There were several characteristic points of division. All the others, with the exception of a few small groups with hardly any following, stood for peace.

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Lenin alone stood for revolution, even at the price of an indefinite prolongation of war. All the others stood for an equitable European settlement, not altogether different from Wilson's fourteen points. Lenin alone stood for active defeatism, for the victory of his country's enemies. All the others stood for winning over to their cause as many socialists as possible. Lenin alone stood for a narrow, selected revolutionary international. He saw that most of the pacifists were not revolutionaries at all, and he wanted an international, not of pacifists (he did not care a rap for shortening the sufferings of the war, deriding such feelings as petty bourgeois) but of revolutionaries ready for any sacrifice. In November, 1914, before even the Zimmerwald conference, the bolshevik paper proclaimed the death of the second international, the need for an international split. The theory to justify it was that the workers' aristocracy in the West had been bribed by their bourgeoisie into supporting the war.

Nationalism and patriotism are not things in the abstract. They are concrete ties binding an individual to his country, to the exclusion of all others. Among conservatives, nationalism is taken for granted. Among progressives it is not taken for granted but it is not generally less virulent for that reason. But in their case it usually emerges only through direct practical contact with foreign views and foreign interests. Such was the case of Lenin.

All the conflicts inside the Zimmerwald group were conflicts between the Western and the Russian concept of socialism, pacifism and the labour movement. Lenin was living in a typically and exclusively Russian atmosphere of professional underground work, among people who saw their life's goal and content in work for the revolution. This type of man he had not formed. He had found it ready, from a century's tradition of underground work.

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Nor was he the first to conceive of an organization consisting exclusively of professional revolutionaries working under the strict discipline of a supreme revolutionary committee. This, on the contrary, was the traditional type of Russian revolutionary organization. All Lenin had done was to reject the view of those Westernized Marxists who maintained that an organization of professional revolutionaries was unsuitable for socialists, because the labour movement was specifically a mass movement and not a narrow pure organization. Lenin had simply clung to the traditional national Russian concept of revolution.

The Western socialists, looking upon themselves as leaders of a labour mass movement whose aims and impulses they had to express and carry through, knew only too well that what the masses wanted was peace. Lenin knew it also, and hated it, except in so far as this feeling could be bent towards revolutionary aims. The Western socialists knew that, while the masses in the West wanted peace (if possible, and the more extreme elements at any price), nobody wanted to see his own country defeated. But defeatism was a constant tradition of the Russian revolutionary movement. The Western socialists knew only too well that the masses would never be ready to join an organization rigidly pledged to revolutionary extremism at all costs. That was precisely the traditional Russian type of revolutionary organization. A movement of the Western type had never existed in Russia. The clash between Lenin and the Kautsky people at Zimmerwald was simply a clash between the Western and the Russian tradition. But even before this clash Lenin, apparently, had learnt to hate the Western labour movement which so little complied with his revolutionary views. Whereas all the others, including even Rosa Luxemburg, were frightened by the idea of a split, he

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welcomed it, as the only means of creating an international after his principles. The Russian revolutionaries, under Lenin, made a determined attempt to conquer the Western labour movement for Russian national traditions.

It could only be done, naturally, by subjecting the Western labour movement to the control of the Russian leaders. That was what was done when, after five years of preparation, the communist international was founded in 1919, and again when it became a bigger organization in 1920. From the very beginning headquarters were set up in Moscow, under the direct control of the Soviet government and its OGPU. All important officials were invariably Russians (with the exception of one Bulgarian). Dictatorial powers were given to this Russian body. It could and did and does send emissaries, Russians in all important cases, who can and do overrule the decisions of any national party committee. The Russian executive of the International decided the conditions governing admission to the communist international. It reserves to itself the right of periodical purges. In these last-named measures lies the crux of the matter. When, after the war, in 1920, considerable sections of the German, the French and the Czechoslovak labour movement went over to the Comintern, care was taken that not a single leader able to oppose the Russians should be admitted.

Rosa Luxemburg, who had bitterly opposed this Russian rule in the incipient communist international, had been murdered by German officers before the first congress of the international met. In France, the Russians accepted the co-operation of a man such as Cachin, utterly compromised through his deals with Mussolini, and in Czechoslovakia of Smeral, compromised by his opposition to the Czech movement of liberation. Those two could no longer do any harm.

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But many men of the extreme German left, who had fought in all the revolutionary battles of 1919, were not admitted. In Italy, where in a moment of enthusiasm the whole of the socialist party had joined Moscow, a split was organized early in 1921, and the whole party, except a very small remnant, was expelled again. The same thing happened, two years later, in Norway. In 1924, Hoeglund, the only man with personal authority among the Swedish communists, was expelled, and when a new group of popular leaders had come into being, this group was expelled in turn in 1929. Moscow could not brook independent men, but only marionettes ready to turn about at any order, to curse what they had adored the day before and to adore what they had cursed. When this was said a few years ago, few people believed it because, by chance, the English communist party had made less dramatic turn-about than other communist movements. It has become common knowledge since the notorious criminal anti-war turn of the English communists in 1939.

Yet during the earlier stages, down to 1924, all these purges and reversions of policy were effected, and that quite sincerely, in the name of revolutionary principles. The bolshevik leaders, all of them shrewd politicians, were not unaware, to be sure, that they were building up a Russian despotism inside the communist international. They did it quite consciously, though they did not say so publicly. But they were sincerely convinced that this was the only safeguard against deviations from orthodox revolutionism. Russia alone had the secret of revolutionary purity. It had the task of imposing, if necessary of inflicting, it upon the rest of the world. Nationalism, however, does not become less but more penetrating by being identified with some fanatical orthodoxy.

But from 1921 onwards the situation gradually changed.

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Before that date, the cause of Russia and the cause of revolution could be sincerely identified ; after it, no longer. Lenin, before taking over, had solemnly proclaimed the right of all minorities to secede from Russia, and that right became embodied in the Soviet constitution. But while nations might secede from Russia, nobody was allowed to secede from bolshevism. In the name of the proletarian revolution the bolsheviks fought the Finnish movement for independence in 1918. In 1920, Lenin attacked Poland (which had previously attacked Russia), attempting to create a Soviet Poland. It was a move in the revolutionary war, but Poles of all sections thought, quite correctly, that it was also a continuation of the traditional Russian policy of conquest. In 1921, the Soviets conquered Georgia, against the furious resistance of the overwhelming majority of the population, and also Baku, this time with the consent of the majority of the population.

But all this assumed a different hue after 1921. The civil war came to an end, and with it the foreign wars Russia had been conducting against intervention and against her neighbours. The New Economic Policy was introduced, giving the peasant the right to sell his wheat and corn, and admitting also a partial return to capitalism in industry and commerce. Then the hope of revolution in Europe gradually vanished. It received a very bad blow when, in 1923, a big rising prepared in Germany did not come off. (The remnants of the revolutionary hopes lingered on in Russia down to the defeat of the non-revolutionary British labour movement in the general strike, in 1926, and of the revolutionary Chinese labour movement in 1927. Lenin died early in 1923. It was obvious that Russia must settle down and manage her own affairs, without outside help and without any chance of revolutionary conquests. It was then that Russian

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nationalism, hitherto living under the cloak of revolutionary internationalism, broke forth unrestrained.

The problem as to whether Russia could make a revolution within her own borders alone had occupied Russian revolutionaries before 1917. It had led to a sharp altercation between Lenin and Trotsky in 1905, during the first Russian revolution. Trotsky, at that time, had worked out his theory of the "permanent revolution", maintaining that Russia, as a backward country, could quite well overthrow Tsarism, that such a revolution could only be carried through by the proletariat (because the bourgeoisie was too weak and corrupt) but that even a victorious proletariat could not create socialism in a country so backward as Russia; the proletarian dictatorship, therefore, could only avoid collapse by bringing about a proletarian revolution in at least one of the more developed European countries. Lenin, in 1905, had opposed to this idea a concept at once more modest and more national. He had conceived the idea of a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry", a régime which would overthrow Tsarism and feudalism, but not attempt to create socialism (Trotsky had maintained that the proletariat, once in power, was bound to attempt to create socialism). Lenin's idea could be carried out in Russia alone.

In 1917, on the whole, it was Trotsky's view which prevailed. Lenin scrapped the "democratic dictatorship", and created a régime supposed to be the "dictatorship of the proletariat", and as this régime was created in the midst of an international war it was only natural that he should aim at spreading abroad what had been done in Russia. The communist international is a creation in Trotsky's spirit. Yet the hopes of an international revolution failed, and at a certain moment the bolsheviks had to ask themselves whether, despite their

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previous denials, it was not possible to maintain the dictatorship and build socialism in Russia alone. Early in 1924, Stalin, in his *Problems of Leninism*, had denied it. In the second edition, in autumn 1924, he contended it could be achieved. "Socialism in one country" became an official slogan. It implied abandonment of the close identification of the Russian and the international revolution which had prevailed in the bolshevik ranks since 1917. It led to a furious conflict with Trotsky. Trotsky, the international revolutionary, was defeated. Russian nationalism conquered.

The historical importance of theoretical formulæ ought certainly not to be overestimated. In fact, long before 1924, bolshevik Russia had developed a new type of economic nationalism. In the beginning of the revolution she was factually cut off from the rest of the world through civil war, and had to shift entirely on her own. But what had happened originally much against her will, was maintained intentionally. When, in 1920, the first timid attempts were made to form links with the outside world again, it was realized at once that such links could only be tolerated if the strictest state control was established. The mere introduction of trade barriers of the old type would not do. They could be overcome by underselling. If there was to be a central plan, foreign trade must be entirely state-managed. Russia was the first country to introduce a state monopoly of foreign trade. It was proved, by the first socialist country, in its first steps towards economic reconstruction, that socialism was the very embodiment of those nationalist trends which had gradually undermined the liberal régime of unchecked international trade all over the world. It was, however, not only a matter of planning. Planning was half abandoned from 1921 to 1929, during the years of the NEP, but at that time the foreign trade monopoly

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was even more important. Russian industry, being inferior to Western industry, could not compete with the latter. Only a strict debarring of all Western imports except those needed for industrial reconstruction could prevent the masses from buying Western goods in preference to the more expensive Russian products. If there was to be any Soviet industry, it had to be protected by a foreign trade monopoly. And it was.

What applied to imports applied to migrations. Here the political régime was involved, not only the economic order. The more the dictatorship developed, the more important did it become to prohibit the infiltration of foreign influences. Russians, except technicians on official journeys and a few students, were strictly forbidden to leave the country; an old Tsarist measure reintroduced by the bolsheviks. Foreigners were only admitted as specialists, for short periods and under very strict supervision, or as harmless tourists. In general no refugees were admitted, and those who were often fell victims to the purges.

With the abating of the revolutionary storm, symptoms of a very strong nationalism came to the fore. The whole propaganda of the communist international was changed from top to bottom. Whereas, during earlier days, it had been propaganda for international revolution, Russia was now proclaimed the "fatherland of all toilers", and the communist parties became exclusively instruments of Russian propaganda and Russian foreign politics. This was an established fact in 1929, at the beginning of the first five-year plan, which, for the last time, brought back some of the tendencies of the revolutionary period. After its completion, all remnants of internationalism disappeared. The old nationalism of pre-revolutionary times re-emerged unchanged. Russian school-children were taught about the greatness of Russia

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in the past and in the present. Russian historical traditions, among them the worship of Peter the Great, were reintroduced. The civil war was re-interpreted, as a victorious war against foreign intervention. The army was re-educated in the traditions of earlier Russian wars, and pride in the army and navy, in the usual "bourgeois" sense previously so much denounced, was systematically instilled again. The national church was given new scope. Xenophobia was fostered. Thus the idea of international socialism was buried for good.

The moderate wing of the socialist movement had abandoned internationalism in 1914. Those remnants of the internationalists who remained faithful to their creed after that date were partly swallowed up by the communist movement, and partly returned to the old, now nationalist, parties. The communists had made themselves the champions of internationalism. They ended by reproducing, within twenty years, nationalism as it had existed before their advent. It *does* seem, after all, that something was wrong with labour internationalism.

IX

LABOUR AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

WE are now coming to the most topical chapter of the history of labour internationalism, the one which developed around the League of Nations. It is not a very important chapter objectively. Labour hopes and programmes connected with the League of Nations have not influenced the course of events at all. But the hopes and illusions connected with the League have been very strong in certain sections of the Western labour movement, so that what is unimportant in European history is nevertheless very important as an element of modern labour ideology. Nor have these hopes vanished with the discomfiture of the League. They have only slightly changed in verbal expression. It is therefore to the lessons of the past that an appeal must be made, if the labour movement wants to become more realistic.

Before 1914, labour internationalism had been closely connected with a revolutionary ideology. It had mainly been an affair of the left wing of the second international. This situation continued when the communists (or, more precisely, those groups which later joined the communists) were foremost among the remnants of the internationalists during the war. Logically, when communist internationalism transformed itself into Russian nationalism, the idea of labour internationalism ought to have been dead. It would have been had we not witnessed, after the war, a curious revival of bourgeois internationalism, involving the emergence of a new internationalism among the right wing of the international labour movement.

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This new internationalist movement started with President Wilson's 14 points, thus at once showing its real origin and character. Liberalism, which was dying in Europe, was then still very much alive in America, and President Wilson was its spokesman. The reasons for this survival of American liberalism were obvious. In national affairs the United States was the only country which, down to 1931, was pledged to reject all state-intervention ; though, in fact, American economic life, since the seventies, has been sheltered by huge tariff barriers, and since 1921 by the immigration laws. *Laissez-faire*, in the U.S.A., in practice, mostly meant a reluctance to introduce social legislation, a reluctance finally broken down by F. D. Roosevelt's New Deal. But up to 1931, liberalism remained the official creed of the country, and it was much strengthened by America's situation in the world : her enormous home markets, which made all economic contacts with the outside world an affair of only secondary importance ; the fact that America, from a debtor, had become a creditor country ; last but not least, the remoteness of any conceivable danger from abroad, and the consequent abhorrence of serious modern war. America, in international affairs, lived in a mood of nonchalant cheerfulness, composed of confidence in good business, contempt of European problems and an unbroken idealism of the 1860 type. The awakening did not come until 1938.

For the United States, in contrast to the European countries involved, the war of 1917-18 was an easy venture, crowned by an easy victory. They had entered this war for many reasons, some of them practical, others highly idealistic. They were going to use their victory for giving some of their ideals to Europe. Wilson brought with him the idea of a League of Nations.

This League, a creation of the American mind, might

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have been strong if America had thrown her full weight into the task of upholding it. This would have meant that America, in the long run, would have had to make those keen efforts at rearmament which she is now gradually making for the sake of defending herself against the Nazis. But the matter did not then come up for a decision. The resistance of the Republicans made the U.S.A. refuse to join the League (and, incidentally, made her refuse to give a guarantee to France, which was much more disastrous). Not much regret has ever been felt in the U.S.A. for this refusal. It was a certain sign that liberal idealism of the mid-Victorian type was rapidly disintegrating even in America. Ten years later it had breathed its last, in the horrors of the great economic crisis.

In the meantime, the statesmen of Europe found themselves with the League on their hands and no idea what to do with it. America was out of it. Japan could not be regarded as a real member. Russia peremptorily refused to join, nor would she have been allowed to join before the advent of Hitler. Germany was not admitted at first, hesitatingly admitted later, and no regret was felt in Germany when Hitler decided to move out. The League, thus, was an Anglo-French affair, a continuation of the Entente without Russia. It so happened that, for some years at any rate, Anglo-French relations were not too good. It was difficult to see what the League could achieve under such circumstances !

Advocates of the League sometimes reply to these obvious criticisms that they only prove that the League ought to have been made more efficient. But do those critics know what it would have meant to make the League efficient ? America ought to have been brought into the League and induced to make every sacrifice to it (brought in, how ?—by persuasion ?). Russia ought to

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have been made to see that international revolution was all that Mr. MacDonald thought it was, and persuaded to abandon bolshevism and to become nice, peaceful and liberal (the Webbs said she already was). Japan, of course, had to be crushed. Germany ought to have been satisfied, and her grievances removed, so that she could become a reliable member (by giving her Austria, Czechoslovakia and half Poland?). Fascism in Italy, of course, should not have been tolerated. And finally the French should have been persuaded to give up their silly idea that they must protect themselves by rearmament against a coming German onslaught. The mere mentioning of these varied conditions ought to show that those wicked old-school diplomats and politicians who thought the League was thin air, were perfectly right, and that those nice idealistic young men and women who wanted to make the League effective did not know what they were talking about.

It is obvious that behind all the unachievable conditions for a working League one common factor is operative. Countries would not consent to give up their peculiar structure, nor their peculiar interests, unless they were forced to do so. Such structures and interests, whatever some people may think about it, sometimes clash. They even clash often, and have a disagreeable tendency to be incompatible precisely where the most vital issues are concerned. Only abolish Versailles, make America Europe-minded, crush Japan, destroy Fascism, make Russia internationalist again, and you will have a working League of Nations. Only !

It is regrettable that these problems must be discussed at all in such an abstract form. But this need derives from the very character of the ideals discussed. It is their most characteristic feature that they are conceived in complete disregard of actual conditions, actual concrete

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problems. It is perfectly true that if these concrete problems did not exist, the world would be an easier place to live in. But it is also true that reality is only concerned with these concrete problems, and everything else remains empty verbiage, to the never-ceasing surprise of all the MacDonalds of the world who will always make everything and everybody responsible for their failure, except the unrealism of their dreams.

The League was occasionally used as a machinery for certain international moves. Austrian and Hungarian finances, e.g., were restored by the League. When England and France restored the finances of the Khedive, seventy years ago, they did it without any League, to their economic and political advantage. The only difference between earlier reconstructions and those effected under the auspices of the League was that Geneva provided convenient machinery. No new thing was ever achieved through the League.

This applies particularly to the colonial mandates. The mandated territories have simply been colonies, without any qualification. They are run as colonies to-day, when the League has disappeared, and not a jot of their administration had to be changed as a result of the disappearance of the League. They had as much or as little formal and factual self-government as would have been granted them anyway, in the interests of the mother-countries, and as a result of the pressure of the colonial populations.

The League was a phantasmagoria, like so many other things in the twenties. The League policy of labour was essentially an attempt to eat the cake and have it. There had been war, and the masses did not want a second war. This was not at all a specifically socialist feeling. On the contrary, it had nothing whatsoever to do with socialism. Later events proved that peace at any

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price (called : appease Hitler) could be made a first-rate conservative slogan. But this was not quite obvious during the twenties, when the conservatives were still the traditional party of imperialism. The left made use of the general war-weariness, which was also very strong within its own ranks.

But at the same time this left had now, in England and on the continent, moved much nearer to political power than ever before. The war had broken down the barriers which had prevented socialists from taking office. Almost everywhere socialists took a constant share in government. The identification of the interests of labour and of the state had become very close. Every one of the ample social reforms achieved since the war was bound up with the strength and prosperity of the countries where they had been achieved. Wherever these countries were threatened, socialists realized only too well that they, like all other sections of the population, must come to the rescue. And the sources of international tension, political, economic and moral, were constantly growing. The League provided a convenient way out, a chance for practising, for a time, an ostrich-like policy. On the one hand the masses had to defend their countries ; this was the bitter reality. On the other hand they hated war. The League provided the means for making oneself believe that war had for ever become unnecessary.

But the time was gone when the socialists could indulge in ideals without being confronted with the task of bringing them into practice. The League mentality was essentially a remnant of the days when socialists had always been in opposition, and could dream about a future to their liking. Now socialists were Prime Ministers. And as such they were everywhere torn between the two impulses for peace and for safety ; the former consideration working in the direction of con-

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cessions towards potential enemies, the second towards measures of strict self-defence.

The delusion was much worse in Britain than in any other part of the world. Continental socialists, living under the immediate pressure of potential enemies, could not be unaware of the unrealism of all the League's doings. But the British were far away. The trust of British labour in the League was part of that determined unwillingness to take continental affairs seriously which more than anything else has helped Hitler.

In the field of great politics, the League idea transformed itself into a policy of conciliation, which would have had a great deal to commend it, had it gone together with rearmament, rearmament, and once more rearmament. It was obvious that Japan could be contained, Italy disregarded, and Germany assuaged, if Britain, France and America were ready to strike at the first sign of an aggressive intention. But costly politics are bad electoral politics. And none of the three democratic powers dreamt of pursuing a policy of "armed conciliation". They pursued a policy of reluctant conciliation and reluctant disarmament. In this policy, bourgeois and socialist parties became identified, and inevitably so. Disarmament was too popular to be discounted by anybody asking for votes, least of all a British conservative. But full disarmament was manifestly impossible. Conciliation also was very popular, but not conciliation till it hurt. As a result Germany, up to the advent of Hitler, got little, but her adversaries grew perceptibly weaker. During the hey-day of post-war pacifism, MacDonald signed the Geneva protocol, Austen Chamberlain made Locarno, and MacDonald again the economic world conference. In France, Briand, a common denominator of bourgeois and labour interests, did the whole job. In Germany,

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Stresemann, a convinced German imperialist, less extreme but no less clever than Hitler, carried through the revision of the peace treaties, with enthusiastic socialist support. This was no longer the socialism that had opposed a revolutionary ideal, however utopian, to the existing order of things. It was a socialism which cheerfully believed that the age of internationalism would be brought about by the comfortable efforts of Stresemann, Briand, Austen Chamberlain and MacDonald. Some socialists later transferred their admiration from Austen Chamberlain to his brother Neville.

The effects upon the Internationale were strange indeed. The old unity of the days before 1914 could not be restored, because there now existed communism. But even within the socialist fold there was a sharp division of opinion between those who thought that their attitude in 1914 had been right, and those who, some of them rather belatedly, thought it had not been. For three years, from 1920-3, the dissidents formed an Internationale of their own, with headquarters in Vienna, while the rump of the old Internationale was reconstituted in 1920, a body based on the assumption that all socialist parties had been right in going to war against one another, but that after peace was established things could start again as if nothing had happened. There was some difficulty in bringing Vandervelde, the Belgian leader, to consent to sit at the same table as the Germans again, but that was overcome. And in 1923 the dissidents, realizing, after the collapse of the German "independent socialist party" under the communist impact, the hopelessness of the idea of an Internationale neither communist nor nationalist, returned to the old fold. The new unity was cemented at an international congress in Hamburg in 1923.

The pre-war Internationale had been a body unable to

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make decisions, because the shape of the various national labour movements was too different to be brought under one common denominator. The new Internationale was powerless, because the members were too closely tied to their national governments. While socialists supported governments in France, and participated in governments in Britain, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Czechoslovakia, it was obvious that the socialist parties of these countries could do nothing but support a mild version of their respective countries' policies. And it is also obvious that the Internationale, far from leading the way, could do no more than register those policies upon which the various governments concerned were agreed. That went on until the terrible year 1933.

After that year there was enacted a play which nobody will ever remember without shame. Many socialist parties rushed for safety, irrespective of any international obligations, together with their respective bourgeois classes. The grossest case, in every respect, was that of Denmark, both because the policy of capitulation before the Nazis went to greater lengths in Denmark than in any other country, and because Denmark, for an uninterrupted period of more than ten years, had been under socialist leadership ; the longest term of socialist rule ever achieved in any country. Denmark's weakness is no excuse. Norway is just as weak, but infinitely more heroic.

But other cases, if less extreme, were more important, though not so simple. In most parties a sharp division developed between those who gradually subordinated their desire for peace to the need of fighting Hitler, and those who were ready to forsake anything and accept slavery rather than face war. It was the last sigh of a comfortable period, hating to give up its comforts. Peace at any price, that old Trotskyist formula which, twenty

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years ago, could still be regarded as a lever of revolution, was now nothing but a weapon of Nazi propaganda, an idea systematically instilled by Hitler's agents into all-too-willing dupes.

The Eastern European socialist movements, on the whole, behaved a great deal better than those of the West. Polish socialists, though smarting under a terroristic régime, did not for a moment, to their eternal honour, advocate capitulation to Hitler. Czech socialists, with a long past of opportunism but also of firm and consistent nationalism, supported the cause of Czech liberty. In Norway also, where labour has evolved a very peculiar tradition unlike that of any other labour movement, pacifism was tempered by a realization of the need of being on the right side, if Norway should be dragged into the war. The socialist government in Norway found itself completely unprepared to meet the Nazis on the battlefield, and paid a heavy penalty for twenty years of anti-militarist and pacifist propaganda. But at least there were no defections to Hitler, despite the most terrific pressure. The socialist movement in Holland too, which had never borne government responsibility and could easily join in the common Dutch detestation of everything German, held firm.

Sweden was a very different matter. During the Russo-Finnish war, Mr. Sandler, socialist foreign minister, was overthrown, as much by his own party as by their adversaries, because he advocated a more active attitude in favour of the democratic powers. It is only quite of late that the majority of the Swedish socialists have become sufficiently impressed with the heroism of their Norwegian neighbours to take up a slightly stiffer attitude. The main test, here, lies ahead.

France and Belgium were infinitely worse. The French party was torn, both before and after the outbreak

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of war, by a violent clash between anti-Hitlerians and pacifists, and the latter had undoubtedly the better of the fight. The French pacifist socialists were not unaware that they were sacrificing Poland and Czechoslovakia ; they were not unaware that they were sacrificing France ; they were not unaware that they were sacrificing liberty ; they were not unaware that they were sacrificing socialism. To all this they said "*n'importe*". And large masses followed them. The history of the struggles within French socialism, together with the history of the close support the French communists gave to German propaganda both before and during the war, is part of that almost unbelievable story of France rushing, with her eyes open, towards utter destruction.

The attitude of the Belgian socialists was slightly different. They went to much greater lengths in appeasing Hitler than even French pacifist socialists. But the Belgians could excuse themselves with the belief (though it was an utterly foolish belief) that they would escape disaster by a policy of strict neutrality, and they could also maintain that such a policy, if successful (which it could never be), might, in the end, benefit France and Britain. The short period of fighting did not leave room for any new attitude to be worked out, beyond appeals for the defence of the country. After the disaster, some outstanding socialists, among them the previously much-admired Henri de Man, went over to Hitler, banners flying. Others, such as Mr. Spaak, in the end stood by the cause of democracy.

In Britain, labour was divided on the same lines as the conservatives though less conspicuously so. There were, in the ranks of labour, Chamberlainites and Churchillites. Labour and conservative M.P.s together wildly cheered the news of Munich, even before knowing the result. Pacifism of the French type *was* a force in

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the British labour movement. But it was gradually overcome. And on two decisive occasions labour gave a lead, the only lead given by any labour party (except the Norwegians and the underground parties in Fascist countries) in the struggle against Hitler. The first occasion was when, on September 2nd, 1939, Mr. Greenwood rose in parliament and forced Neville Chamberlain to declare war. The second occasion was when, after the Norwegian disaster, the labour leaders rose in parliament and, together with the conservative "rebels", forced Mr. Chamberlain to go. With these two acts, after a long period of hesitation, the labour party had definitely ceased to be a party of peace and capitulation before Hitler, and had made a bold attempt to put itself at the head of the movement to destroy Fascism by force.

It is an attitude very different from that of the right wing of labour during the last war. Then labour, reluctantly and unwillingly, ranged itself with the other parties behind the coalition government. Now labour realizes that it is not less but more interested than any other group in destroying Hitler; that its policy, therefore, cannot be one of gradually ceding to the war-party, but must be one of putting itself at the head of this party. The last war dealt labour a blow from which it never recovered, despite all subsequent successes at the polls. This war, and the new attitude of British labour in it, give labour a new chance; a chance, it is true, which can only be exploited if all ballast of false ideologies from the past is cast overboard, and an entirely new departure boldly made.

In the meantime there is growing around the British labour movement a new international of a new type. It is the international of the "non-capitulators". In its ranks there are to be found the Norwegian socialists

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who all through the dreary period of 1919-39 stood apart, in signal independence and in fearless groping for new ways. There are the Czechs and the Poles, for whom struggle against Hitler was always identified with struggle against Fascism at home. There are the defeated Spanish socialists, with a tradition which there is no need to discuss, clear as it is. There are those German, Austrian and Italian underground workers who fight Hitler under circumstances of unparalleled persecution. They all look to Britain, ready to help her, and expecting her to help them. They all know that in Britain's struggle, the British labour movement has to play an essential part.

But what sort of goal, beyond the defeat of Hitler, can they have in view? This shall be the last problem to be discussed in these pages.

X

A NEW INTERNATIONALISM

THIS study will probably be accused of attacking all the ideals of labour, and advocating a policy of unreserved nationalism and militarism. To this I have only one reply : like everybody, I prefer peace to war, international planning and co-operation to isolation and national hatred. But the sociologist is not concerned with wishes. He is concerned with facts, and with trends past and present. The fact is that labour internationalism has so far proved to be one of the most futile ideologies ever cherished ; that the real trend of things has gone exactly counter to it, and that the labour movement itself, for reasons analysed in previous chapters, had over and again to bow to nationalist trends not only because it was not strong enough to counter them, but because they coincided with its own most urgent interests. If communists shout treason to this policy, let them. They never do anything else, except when it is a matter of their own endless acts of treason against all the labour movements of the world, until June 22nd, 1941.

Our analysis, in substance, has led to the conclusion that, as things stand at present, the cause of labour and the cause of nationalism are closely identified. I say "nationalism" intentionally, and not simply "nation". The cause of labour is not simply dependent upon the existence and independence of the nation ; it is also dependent upon its strength, its power, and, strangest of all, upon a great measure of national seclusion. We saw,

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in our analysis, that socialism, which during the early days had been pictured as a catastrophic change from one social system to another, had come in gradually, precisely through the gradual growth of state intervention ; and that all measures of state intervention implied the cutting of some ties with the world abroad. We also saw how the whole development of the modern state, both through the growth of state interference, and through the stronger ties developed between the state and the masses with the growth of democracy, worked towards creating a strong current of nationalist psychology which, in any and every crisis, has inevitably proved much stronger than any class feeling. We are living in a society which is becoming more socialist every day, whatever the name it gives itself ; the differences existing between the Russian, the German and the English régime are very great, great enough, in fact, to justify a life-and-death struggle between them ; yet compared with liberalism of the *laissez-faire* type they are only differences of degree. But this world, which is everywhere becoming more socialist, is also everywhere becoming more nationalist, to the point of madness. And it can be contended unhesitatingly, that it is the more nationalist, the more socialist it is. Russian and German nationalisms find only a mild replica in British and American nationalism. (Hitler, of course, is teaching the subject races a furious anti-German nationalism just now.) The combination of socialism and internationalism appears as a purely ideological error, with no roots whatsoever in reality. Socialism was always defeated in its attempts to be international. Is Hitler right, after all ?

The answer to this pressing question cannot be found in what we should like to happen. The answer must be sought in a quest of tendencies towards internationalism in real life, and an appreciation of their strength. Now,

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at the end of this short study of the problem, it is appropriate to say that there are a great many signs that the scene is about to shift, and that what obtained up to now need not be true of the future ; provided, of course, that the cause of internationalism is not wrongly identified with the type of internationalism prevalent a century ago.

Modern nationalism is rooted in three main trends. Economically, it is the result of a policy of state interference and state protection against the impact of the forces of international trade. Politically it is the result of democratization, of a closer link between the state and the masses, culminating in Fascist methods of creating political mass hysteria. This latter is the result of the disintegration of the Christian community of nations, of the return to a tribal worship of tribal gods. In all three directions nationalism, now, seems to have reached its climax.

To start with economics, we should never forget that economic nationalism is, at bottom, only a reaction against a threatening growth of international trade. World trade and the international division of labour have evolved to a point where the production of one country at a hundred points threatens the industries of other countries with extinction. All barriers to international trade are devised to stave off this danger. But these barriers do not only restrict imports. As all countries adopt a policy of protection, and an increasing number a policy of absolute exclusion of most foreign goods, exports are affected as much as imports, and international trade is in danger of being choked. To this there is a simple remedy. Countries which are strong enough to do so try to organize a territory sufficiently big to be a self-contained economic unit. Russia is so more or less. America also. Britain tried the same policy at Ottawa. Germany is trying the road of direct

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conquest. But at bottom all these are only partial solutions. For the only satisfactory economic unit is the world as a whole.

It would again be a piece of ideological jumping at conclusions to maintain that therefore the simplest way of dealing with these matters is to bring about world economic unity. We saw that such unity is a terrific danger. If it were allowed to come suddenly, whole countries would be destroyed by international competition. It can therefore only come gradually, by directing the process of mutual adaptation, by slowing it down to a degree where the pressure of populations with a low standard of living does not bring down the whole edifice of higher civilization. In other words, international migrations, and international free trade, ought to be allowed only to such a degree that the groups with a lower standard are helped to raise their standard, while the higher standards of other countries are preserved. This can only be done by international planning, and to control the dosage of international unity in economic matters is, in my opinion, the essential task of such planning. The crisis that holds our planet in its grip, and has done so really since the beginning of this century, is rooted in the contradiction between a world division of labour covering the whole planet, and the political barriers to international trade and migrations that more and more seclude each national unit within its own shell. This contradiction cannot be solved by restoring international free trade of the uncontrolled liberal type. It can only be solved by a gradual, planned abolition of trade and migration barriers, over large parts of the world. It will be, it already is, one of the results of the war to create such supernational economic units.

It has been proved by experience that planning is only possible where there is a central authority able to plan.

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This is not primarily a technical problem (any research bureau can solve the technical problems) but a problem of power. The central authority must have power to override vested interests. The ideas cherished about this central authority are sometimes vague enough, and one hears it said that such an authority should overrule all individual interests and plan in the interests of "the community". This is loose thinking. Every step of planning affects many interests, some favourably, others adversely. It is impossible to plan without affecting interests. It is also utopian to plan so that in the balance all interests would be affected favourably as much as unfavourably. It is inevitable that planning should be in somebody's favour and to somebody's detriment. The balance in favour of the one and to the detriment of the other can, however, be big or small. Big balances are the result of totalitarian, small balances of democratic planning. If despots plan, their favourites get all the good things, and their subjects all the burdens of planning. If democracies plan, planning will be the result of compromise, as it is to-day, in our war economy. But even in democratic planning, there must be an authority to enforce decisions. This authority need not be created. It is there. It is the state as it exists, with its growing civil service, and its democratic machinery of compromise.

What applies to national planning applies even more to international planning. Everybody to-day is in favour of international planning—in the abstract. No step towards it has been made in practice. In international even more than in national economics, planned decisions must be enforced. Even more than in national planning, there must be a central authority able to enforce decisions. But, in contrast to national planning, such a central authority does not yet exist, ready-made.

This is the crucial point. We shall have economic

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unity of the world exactly to the degree to which we achieve political unity. So far most people are agreed. In order to have such unity we must have a central authority able to enforce decisions ; hence sovereignty of the old type must disappear. Here also most people heartily agree, in the abstract. In practice, however, the creation of such a central authority is a problem of dimensions unsuspected by many. Our neo-liberal utopians, of the Federal Union type, therefore sit down lustily and devise forms for such a central authority, on paper. Eternal unteachables !

I contend that it is absolutely impossible to create such a central authority on the basis of the equality of all participants in international planning. Yet such equality is the central aim of all the federal union utopians, who want to give to the world a second, " more efficient " edition of the League of Nations. The reason why such a thing can never be is quite simple. It emerges from a moment's thought about the conditions of national unity. National unity is a model for international unity.

Democratic nations are run by compromise. Compromises are concluded between organizations bargaining, with, in the background, a threat that they could also fight. But " fighting " in this context is something altogether limited. Its means and methods are prescribed, and if somebody were to think of fighting with revolvers instead of fighting with the vote or strike pickets, the police and the law courts would deal with him. Suppose, however, the police and the law courts also entered the fight ? Then, obviously, there would be no more compromise, but civil war and a temporary abeyance of the state.

Now the conditions of international compromise suggested by Federal Unionists, and partisans of an interna-

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tional police force, correspond exactly to what a democratic country would be like with the police split into two parties, each of them entering the fight on its own side, with its weapons. There would be a central parliament and a central administration. This would enforce its decisions through an international police force. But this force would be recruited from nearly all or all members of the Union. If major issues were at stake (and they must be at stake all the time) the national elements of this international force would inevitably act in loyalty to their national units, not to the international federation. Imagine a majority of Indians, Chinese, Japanese and Negroes carrying a resolution very much disliked in England and America. It would be a curious sight to watch how an international police in England and America will see to the carrying out of these decisions. We are obviously in the field of utopia, pure and simple. The federal union—or whatever name the thing is given—will obviously work only when all the elements opposed to it are crushed and held down. In other words, it will work as hitherto all political rule has worked—through power. It can, and it ought to be, mild power as far as possible, and always enlightened power, yet power and a great deal of it. For power weakly used is worse than no power at all.

Economic and political unity of a wider range than is compatible with the sovereignty of dozens of nations will inevitably come about. It is bound to be a product of this war, one of its few predictable results. It is also predictable, with equal certainty, that it will not wear the shape of any Federal Union. It will be imposed, accepted willingly by some, unwillingly by others. This is a hard thing to say, but it is high time that sugar-candy politics were ostracized inside the labour movement. They have made this movement politically ineffectual

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during a period when normally all the odds ought to have been in its favour.

It is, of course, true that no domination can be maintained in the long run against the determined will of the ruled populations. Nationalism of the old type, a neo-pagan religion putting the nation-state above everything, provided such determined resolution to defend sovereignty at all costs. If this religion of nationalism is to continue in its youthful strength, then all plans of an international order must inevitably fail in the long run. The final test of internationalism therefore lies in this sphere.

Now I believe there are many symptoms pointing towards a radical change in this matter. While internationalism was the official ideology of socialism, and international co-operation the professed aim of every cabinet, nationalism of the most furious kind was rampant. To-day there is less of internationalist talk, but forces actually opposed to the religion of nationalism seem to be growing. Previously, people were much too optimistic in these matters. Now, they seem sometimes to be unduly pessimistic. It is readily assumed, for example, that Germany will make a bid for world power as often as she is given a chance. I believe, on the contrary, that, whatever happens, she will not repeat the attempt.

The symptoms of this decay of nationalism were most visible in the motherland of modern nationalism, in France. Could anybody have imagined France, only a generation ago, throwing away her arms while there was still every chance to continue the fight ; French masses absolutely impermeable to the magic of the Marseillaise ; French generals vilely cringing before Hitler's dog-whip ; French politicians using as a stunt their willingness to go to any lengths in co-operation with the hated " Boche ", hoping to win a popular success by these tactics ? No

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Frenchman this time wanted war, and many were ready for the most abject capitulation. Yet 1914 is only twenty-seven years away.

The process in England did not go so far. Yet the same process was at work in the Chamberlain policy of appeasement at any price, appeasement in complete disregard of all the interests of the masses *and* of the ruling classes. The same process was at work in that House of Commons, which, without difference of age, sex or party, wildly cheered the news of the Munich agreement before they knew even the terms. These were the things that gave Hitler courage to start the war.

Hitler's successes are basically rooted, not in his extreme nationalism, but on the contrary in his shrewd judgment of the decay of nationalism among his neighbours. He believed that nobody was any longer prepared to fight for the fatherland anywhere—and that therefore a gang of criminals could venture to annex, much rather than conquer, the whole world. He proved to be wrong, but only by a hair's-breadth. He was right in France. But it would be a great mistake to imagine that the same did not apply to Germany. There again, things hang on a hair's-breadth, and the smallest change will uncover the decay of patriotism behind the screen of blustering, bragging and propaganda. The Germans started hating the idea of the fatherland in 1918. There was a recrudescence of nationalist feeling from about 1920 onwards, but the Nazis, with their lies, their corruption, their patent contempt of all decencies, have finally killed it. There is no second point concerning Germany about which there is so much agreement as about the total indifference of present-day Germany to all news of victories. The country, which in 1914 went raving mad with every favourable bulletin of G.H.Q., now remains totally indifferent to all news of the most splendid

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successes. The German idea of the fatherland is dying amidst the Nazi campaign for a world-conquest.

The idea of the fatherland is most alive, to-day, in the countries of the East. It is a long story why. For one thing, these countries, Russia, China, Japan, partly India, and many smaller states, are simply one or two generations behind Europe, cherishing the ideals Europe cherished towards the end of the nineteenth century. Another element is provided, in some cases, by the fact of oppression. But finally things masquerading, in the East, as nationalism are sometimes something entirely different. In the West, the nation-state is invariably a parochial unit within the larger unit of Western civilization as a whole. But Russia, China, India, are not nations, linguistic and political units within a civilization. They are, each of them, entire civilizations, apt to be subdivided into national units, but furiously striving for independence from the impact of civilizations entirely different from their own.

If this is so the problem arises why, after all, Hitler failed in his shrewd and ingenious plan. The answer is, that even France, to-day, is much more willing to fight and resist than she ever was while standing upright. Norway, Holland, Belgium, and, under very different circumstances, the United States, countries whose only dream was a peaceful existence without international implications, are joining in the battle, not out of nationalism but for the simple reason that the Nazis are not merely foreign conquerors but a gang of criminals. A horde of murdering, looting, lashing, raping criminals is resisted by everybody. What has made these nations cherish their sovereignty again is the Nazi régime. They would be prepared to accept another international régime, less extreme, and more decent. The struggle becomes less and less one about national independence.

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It is not either a struggle about liberty pure and simple. It is about liberty from a gang of unspeakable criminals, steeped in every vice, and glorying in it. It is a struggle between two types of international rule. The age of nationalism is nearing its end, though it has not yet ended. It is not, therefore, the problem as to whether sovereignty will continue or not which primarily matters to-day. The harassed people of Europe will willingly give up part of it. The main question is which type of rule will follow.

Of this there are three conceptions. There is the Federal Union conception of a free federation, where nobody will rule and nobody be ruled. This is wholly utopian. There is the Nazi conception of things, that one group should rule and trample upon all the rest. This, unfortunately, is not at all utopian. But probably the Nazis have gone too far in that direction, and that will break them. There is finally the conception that one power should lead, and the others follow. This, I believe, is the only possible middle-way between utopia and horror. It is the conception for which the British labour movement, in my opinion, should stand.

It is necessary, in order to make the meaning of such a conception clear, to say something about those who should lead and those who should follow. I spoke of one power to lead. But naturally Britain alone, in the present world, could never lead alone. Not only would such an idea horrify every Englishman—most world-powers have grown into their shoes most reluctantly and unwillingly—but she would also manifestly not be strong enough for such a task. It is therefore a providential thing that there should be an English-speaking community of nations. That community in so far as Britain and her dominions overseas are concerned, has grown to full maturity between 1914 and 1933. The only matter

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remaining unsettled is the relation of this group, and of its individual members, to the United States. Now in respect of these relations tremendous changes have occurred during the last year or two. From a state of affairs in which two independent nations, not necessarily always on good terms, confronted one another across the Atlantic, there has grown a community which goes far beyond simple co-operation on the basis of an alliance. The important thing is not that America helps, and will help increasingly, with the war effort. It is such things as the Atlantic treaty of September, 1940, that are important. That treaty puts at the disposal of the U.S.A., for the sake of constructing and running air and naval bases, eight important points in British territory in the Western hemisphere. No formal agreement of the same kind has been concluded for the Pacific, but it is common knowledge that Singapore might be run any day in a similar manner. The joint Anglo-American occupation of Iceland comes under the same heading, and the number of cases of this type will doubtless multiply before the war is over. What is important, in these cases, is not the fact of military co-operation, which is a matter of course in a coalition, but the sharing of sovereignty over certain territories, in fact, though not in form. Jamaica, for example, is to-day, to all intents and purposes, part of the American naval system, but it is also an integral part of the dominions of the British crown. Such arrangements are no longer an exception to-day. The type of military co-operation between the British Empire and the United States, however much beset with difficulties, is also no longer that of a coalition between sovereign states, but that of a loose but very real union. Measures such as the sharing of sovereignty in territories strategically essential for both partners, of the sharing of military secrets and production plans, are inconceivable between

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allies conceiving of the possibility of a future clash. It is in the Anglo-Saxon tradition that political institutions should grow in fact, long before being recognized in form. Most Englishmen and Americans, to-day, would be horrified by the suggestion that their respective countries are on the way to union. Also this union has nothing in common with the paper plans for international unions so cherished by our dear utopians. It is, nevertheless, a very real fact that, in the near future, there will be no longer an English and an American policy, but an Anglo-American policy, and, let us hope, an Anglo-American polity as well. It may take a century to give full shape to it. But all progressive elements in both countries should make every effort to strengthen the tendencies in that direction, not by devising paper forms for a federal union between the two countries, but by helping a real intertwining of both by real co-operation in all world affairs. For there cannot be a new world order without somebody strong enough to enforce it. And the only alternative to the Nazis is therefore an Anglo-American joint international leadership.

An Anglo-American paramountcy cannot effectively control the whole world. It cannot control Russia, nor Japan and China. It can probably only maintain itself in India if the present system of handling Indian affairs is radically changed. Realists ought therefore to recognize that the land between the Baltic and the Pacific must be left to work out its own salvation. The task of organizing Europe, America and Africa is enormous enough. Yet I believe that this is a task imposed upon us by the state of things as they are, and hence an achievable task.

Within the sphere mentioned Anglo-American strength, once the Nazis are crushed, will be so enormous that nobody will be able successfully to resist it. It is the task of the new Union, and in particular of its American

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partner, to see to it that nobody wishes to resist it. If strength is combined with judicious respect for the peculiarities of the many races of this enormous stretch of land, the task is not too difficult. The Anglo-American union is bound to profit from the Nazi deeds, for good and for evil. It is bound to profit from the unity of the continent brought about by the Nazis. The Nazis have crushed all independence. Anglo-America will be able to restore part of it. The Nazis have brought superlative horrors. Any other régime will have an easy start. The Nazis, like Germany in general (and that is the chief objection against German paramountcy), never understood any kind of rule except the order of the parade-ground. Anglo-America has developed, as an essential element of her political tradition, a rich gamut of methods of indirect rule. It is perfectly clear that Anglo-American supremacy must assume a hundred different shapes, in different countries. It is obvious that it will have to guarantee full and unqualified independence to Scandinavians, Dutchmen, Czechs, Poles and many others, under the sole condition that these countries make their armaments and international policies fit into a system of European defence. It is equally clear that Germany, for some considerable time, will have to be subjected to some system of close control, and to perpetual disarmament. Varied forms of the Dutch, the British and the French colonial systems will have to be applied in backward areas. International economic planning, based on unity of currency and a centralized banking system, but also on measures of more direct interference, ought to be a matter of course.

I believe that no strong feelings will anywhere be arrayed against such a solution, if it is carried out with decency and respect for all those who must co-operate in it. I believe that economic and political developments

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tend towards it. I believe that the war is anyway bringing about an international order and that the only problem is whether it will be a Nazi or an Anglo-American order. I believe that for everybody, except the Nazi scum of the earth, the Anglo-American order is infinitely preferable. But I also believe that the possibility of bringing any international order about ultimately depends on somebody being strong enough to impose it. Hitler or Roosevelt ; there is no third solution.

Where does labour come in ? Objectively speaking, labour should find it easier to promote such an order than the Tories. Labour is by tradition more internationalist than conservatism, and more in favour of planning, both national and international. Labour, therefore, has a chance of putting itself at the head of a move in that direction. But it must be seen that no world reconstruction can succeed without the willing co-operation of the traditional ruling classes, that none can succeed on the basis of a programme of class struggle, and that altogether world reconstruction is too great a thing to be a party issue. The world will not be reconstructed by labour or by the Tories, by capital or by the proletariat. It will be reconstructed (unless Hitler puts his yoke upon it) by the United States and by Britain, in ever closer union.

What then about international equality ? Will Anglo-Saxons always remain a ruling race ? The answer to this is contained in a great historical parallel. The world of classical antiquity, for two centuries, was seeking a form of unity. That unity, ultimately, was imposed by Rome. The Romans were the ruling race, and all the others, allies and subjects. Yet this did not last. From the very moment the struggle had ended, the temple of Janus had been closed, and Roman supremacy had been achieved, that supremacy lost its content. It had had meaning only

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with reference to enemies able to resist it. When all resistance had ceased, it "withered away", a more appropriate instance of the withering away of political power than Lenin's dream of a withering away of the state. Two generations after Augustus little difference was left between a Roman and a provincial. Two centuries after Augustus all difference was legally abolished, long after it had become completely obsolete in fact. It is, I believe, fairly obvious that a similar course of events lies before us, always provided that Anglo-America wins the war. The fates of the world hang in the balance.

This is the only sort of internationalism of which I can conceive. It is not the liberal internationalism of 1848, not the cloud-cuckoo internationalism of Federal Union. It is a very real internationalism, though, closely encompassed within the lines of existing trends of history, wholly beneficent, and with every chance of being welcomed by all those concerned. Somebody might say it is not only imperialism, but superimperialism. Others might say that superimperialism is bound to become internationalism. It is a quarrel about words. Internationalism or superimperialism—Anglo-American unity and Anglo-American victory are the two things that matter.

